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**POLITICAL BRAND MANAGEMENT:  
FORMS AND STRATEGIES IN MODERN PARTY POLITICS.**

A Thesis in partial fulfilment for the Degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this Thesis to my brother, Daniel Osei Mensah, and the entire DANMENS family in Sekondi-Takoradi (Twincity), Ghana. For your sponsorship and guidance, I say THANK YOU!

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## **ABSTRACT**

The concept of branding is known within the commercial world as the marketing tool that enables customers to make product and service choices using functional and emotional attributes which they find satisfactory. These functional and emotional attributes are what is conceptualized by producers as brands. Hence, the traditional notion of the brand as an identifier and differentiator is passed on to the political market, according to the literature on political branding. However, many years into the inquest of political branding as an essential part of our electoral processes, agreement on political brand development is still proving elusive. In the literature, there are different views on how the political brand is developed. Some argue for political brand identity management based on policy attributes, whereas others regard candidate attributes as the essential source. This research argues for the amalgamation of all the three political elements: the party, the policy, and the candidate as a comprehensive source of building a political brand that is responsive to prevailing political market conditions. Using a case study of a political party in Ghana, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the research aims to demonstrate how party values are considered to be an integral part to policy and candidate attributes in building a comprehensive political brand identity. Here, the study does not imply that the NPP deliberately used branding as a set of principles in managing its campaign. However, it proposes that the strategies and the tactics with which the party executed its electioneering campaign parallels the brand architecture concept in marketing, given the way it identified roles for the three political elements (the party, the candidate, and the policy) and occasionally rearranged them to reflect the broader party goals. The research therefore borrows from brand management literature ‘the brand architecture’ concept to guide its analysis and the eventual development of a parallel model, ‘the political brand architecture (PBA)’ approach for political brand management.

## ABBREVIATIONS

AD	:	<i>Advertisement</i>
ADV	:	<i>Advertorial</i>
BA	:	<i>Brand Architecture</i>
BH	:	<i>Branded House</i>
CPP	:	<i>Convention People's Party</i>
EC	:	<i>Electoral Commission</i>
FGD	:	<i>Focus Group Discussions</i>
GJA	:	<i>Ghana Journalist Association</i>
HB	:	<i>House of Brands</i>
KNUST	:	<i>Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology</i>
MOP	:	<i>Market Oriented Party</i>
NDC	:	<i>National Democratic Congress</i>
NPP	:	<i>New Patriotic Party</i>
NR	:	<i>News report</i>
PB	:	<i>Political Branding</i>
PBA	:	<i>Political Brand Architecture</i>
PM	:	<i>Political Marketing</i>
POLY	:	<i>Polytechnic</i>
POP	:	<i>Product Oriented Party</i>
PP	:	<i>Progress Party</i>
PRAAD	:	<i>Public Records and Archival Administration</i>
SOP	:	<i>Sales Oriented Party</i>
STP	:	<i>Segmentation, Targeting and Positioning</i>
UDS	:	<i>University of Development Studies</i>
UG	:	<i>University of Ghana</i>
UGCC	:	<i>United Gold Coast Convention</i>
UP	:	<i>United Party</i>
URP	:	<i>Unique Recall Proposition</i>
USP	:	<i>Unique Selling Proposition</i>

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **Introduction**

#### **1.1 Introduction**

This thesis is located in political branding, and is prompted by a simmering tension in the political brand literature. The thesis will also look at some of the prevailing issues in the parent literature of political marketing. The dual review is relevant because branding is inextricably linked to the marketing principle and concepts. Political practices that bordered on branding had been treated generally as political marketing, which had become the ‘umbrella’ literature at the beginning of research into this domain. However, political branding has now gained the recognition it deserves as a sub-discipline of political marketing, with its own dedicated literature.

The political brand literature is replete with strategies for political parties to maintain difference from competitors and also to stand identified to voters. In practice, studies (Worcester and Baines, 2006; Needham, 2006; Reeves et al., 2006; Norris, 2001) suggest an increasing use of the brand concept by political parties to differentiate and identify themselves just as commercial firms do. However, there seems to emerge a situation of convergence in political identities. Political convergence occurs when parties are perceived to be the same in the eyes of the electorate. This is opposite to the political brand theory’s objectives, which are to create difference and identity (Reeves et al., 2006; Hay, 1999). The issue has become a problem for political parties and their agents, just as it is for voters. An example is David Cameron’s uncomfortable ‘Heir to Blair’ title. Describing himself in private as the ‘Heir to Blair’ (Guardian.co.uk, May 2007), David Cameron, the leader of the British Conservative party prescribes to his party that the policy position of the New Labour

government was the way forward. This strategy was meant to differentiate the Conservatives from what they thought would be Gordon Brown's policy direction.

In two separate instances, at an event organized by the right wing think tank 'Policy Exchange' and in a speech at London, the shadow Chancellor of the Conservative party, George Osborne, said that Mr Brown, as New Labour's successor to Tony Blair, was rather 'lurching to the left' of his own party's initiatives introduced by Mr Blair while the Conservatives stay more in tune with those plans to give greater freedom to public service bosses and more choice to users of public services. He claimed that the Tory party (as the Conservatives are known in the UK) agrees with Mr Blair on the 'essentials of the way forward', aiming to reform public services, whereas Mr Brown was a 'roadblock to reform'. Hence the Conservative's bid to push forward Labour's policies, such as the public-private partnership in funding public services, Labour's flagship city academy programme, and extending the choice agenda by giving parents more scope to decide on which school their children attend.

Although the Conservatives' objective for adopting the Blair policies was to widen the party's appeal base, analysts believe that the opposite was rather the case, as core Conservative supporters denounced the strategy. Offering such a 'policy-look-alike', according to political pundits (Daily Mail, December, 2006; BBC, May, 2007; Guardian.co.uk, May, 2007), is rather damaging to the party. This is because many Tory supporters believe that the Labour party's public service reforms do not offer enough independence (Guardian.co.uk, May, 2007). This has therefore provoked and alienated many Tory traditionalists, pundits say, resulting in public divisions and squabbles. Cameron's Blair-look-alike policy pronouncement further created chaotic exchanges among

party leadership, activists, and the membership in the media with the eventual plummeting of the leader's public perception as one with the ability to unite the party.

But the above scenario is not new. Research in British politics of the past (Reeves et al., 2006; Needham, 2006; Hay, 1999; Norris, 1997) shows that there has been a convergence in the identities of the Conservatives and Labour as a result of the emergence of New Labour in 1993, leading to the situation of a 'blurred effect' (Gringwold, quoted in Waters and Harry, 1981). This is when voters - floating voters especially - find it difficult to differentiate and choose among parties and what they stand for. This thesis recognises that this is a problem for politicians, just as it is for voters. Politicians spend a lot of time demonstrating to voters how different they are to competitors and why they should be the preferred choice.

Despite the desire to create a difference, it is possible to argue that politicians are also somewhat sceptical of any notion of branding or marketing, given the consequences. For example, in their quest to maintain a difference from the Conservative party, the Labour party had an entirely leftist agenda in the 1983 elections. The eventual consequence was an outright rejection of the party at the polls. The party's electoral manifesto was then described by Gerald Kaufman as 'the longest suicide note in history'. In this case, the problem was not the attempt to be different but how it was actioned, as the Labour party at the time did not make any conscious decision to apply the marketing concept. As noted by media and political pundits, the Labour party and its leader, Michael Foot, sought only the support of the people of the left. Foot's leadership had lurched the party too far to the left of the issues about which people cared, and had hoped that when well argued, people would come to accept it like a product-oriented party does (Less-Marshment, 2001). According to

Malcolm Boughen (Channel 4 News, dated 3 March 2010) the causes to which Foot was committed were usually on the losing side at the time (accessed on 11 May 2010). He was anti- common market when the country voted to join the EEC, anti-nuclear when Britain was updating its independent deterrent, and a staunch republican in a country that still supported its monarchy.

The Guardian newspaper editorial, also published on Thursday 4 March 2010 immediately after the death of the former Labour leader, described the Labour party's campaign in 1983 as one 'resembling a sailing ship competing against an ironclad, a cavalry charge against cannon, and romance against reality.' According to the Guardian newspaper, 'Mr Foot spent most of the campaign in Labour areas, speaking in the language of the labour movement to Labour voters, while the more attuned and better focused Margaret Thatcher led the march through the marginals and the middle ground to a landslide victory. It was a near-death political experience for Labour!' The paper continued that the overwhelming lesson for Labour was to move into the modern world and become something radically different from the party of Mr Foot, if it was to survive and eventually to prosper again. This lesson informed and ushered in the modernization process, taking Labour into the middle ground (Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003, p. 1). The remaking of Labour after the 1983 defeat provided fundamental reordering of the party's doctrine and ethos, and these changes saw the narrowing of ideological and policy stances between Labour and the Conservatives in British politics (Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003, p. 1). So, how do political parties stay identified without looking alike, and how do they maintain their differences without alienating the electorate they need to attract? This question is what the research sought to explore.

Based on the above discussion of the Labour and Conservative parties' reorientation struggles, the thesis argues that the problem of political convergence is likely to continue into the future, or so it seems, unless the current approach of how political parties brand themselves is modified. As it stands now, keeping a political brand difference has become a transient activity if not impossible. This is due to developments such as the increasing transfer of marketing knowledge and expertise across parties, and the desire by major political parties to pursue the centre ground of the political spectrum. A party can only create a successful difference today for it to be copied tomorrow. This means that the trend of parties looking alike is likely to increase as differentiation becomes unsustainable and, at worse, elusive. Political parties cannot also choose to remain the same, as they once were, only to appeal to their core base as in the case of Michael Foot's Labour. Hence, the alternative argument of this thesis is for parties to seek clarity of political identity on three fronts: on issues, and where they stand on message; how where they stand is communicated to the people; and on leadership, how and when to lead both from candidate and party perspectives. This approach will ensure a difference between competing parties and provide diverse reasons for the majority of the electorate to support the party.

Having identified the research problem, referring briefly to the narratives of the Labour party's and Conservatives' rebranding efforts in British politics, which will be looked at extensively in the review of the literature, I shall move to introduce the research area, which is the forms and strategies in political branding. Here, I shall also show where the current research fits within the political branding subdomain. The thesis conceptualizes political brand forms as party, candidate, and policy brands, and applies this framework in the review of the literature and the analysis of the findings. Analyzing political branding in this way

enhances our understanding of the diversity in political branding, and ensures clarity in developing further arguments about forms of political branding.

Branding in marketing is in many forms, including corporate, umbrella, and individual brands. These brand forms shall be discussed later in Chapter 2. Regardless of its forms, the brand enables customers to make product and service choices through the use of both tangible and intangible attributes (de Chernatony and McDonald, 1998, p. 28). From the supply side, the brand enables organizations to stay different from competitors. According to the political brand literature, the brand's notion of creating *difference* and *identity* is well transposed into politics (Needham, 2006; Hughes, 2001; White and de Chernatony, 2001). In the literature, political parties differentiate themselves well from each other by using functional and emotional attributes that are associated with the party, the candidate, and the policy (Needham, 2006; Hughes, 2001; White and de Chernatony, 2001). This understanding is the basis on which the literature will be reviewed in Chapter 2, with the aim of identifying the existing approaches to political brand management. Before then, a general introduction to the political branding process is offered in order to set the scene concerning what political branding is and its usefulness to the political process.

Political branding generally is the way parties identify and differentiate themselves to voters and the political market in general, including the media, civil societies, prospective financiers and even the competing parties. Literally speaking, political branding could be seen from the way parties conventionally identify themselves with their colours, emblems, tradition and the ideology that positions them along the left/right continuum. Van Dijk (2006, p. 116) defines ideology, and is used in this context in the thesis as a belief system within which groups of people form opinions about, and understand, socio-political issues.

Ideology thus understandably defines a party's position on issues and its possible policy initiatives. It shapes the characteristics and leadership style of the party and the leading candidate when in government and even identifies who the likely supporters are. Therefore the combination of the tangible features of the party in the form of colours and emblems, and intangible features like ideology and tradition, is what this thesis refers to as 'party brand'.

This conventional approach to political branding, when ideology plays a key role in the creation of difference and identity, has been described as obsolete and ineffective in the political marketing and branding literature (Lees-Marshment, 2001; Needham, 2006; Reeves et al., 2006; Worcester and Baines, 2006; Scammell, 1999). The approach is likened to the product-orientation era in commercial marketing in which companies internally decide what value would potentially satisfy the customer, and then manufacture and position the product according to this value, with the view that when well promoted customers will buy it (Lees-Marshment, 2001). This attitude to political branding has generated significant critique in both political marketing and branding literature, noting that it is unsustainable and susceptible to failure, since it misses out voter input which is fundamental in creating difference and identity (Needham, 2006; Reeves et al., 2006).

Based on the knowledge of the limitations of party branding, theories and research in political branding began to propose the idea of policy and candidate attributes as the basis for developing and managing the political brand. The central focus of these new strands of literature is that there was the need to build a market-oriented party brand in which the voters' needs are central. This 'voter need', for example economic, health, security, and aspirations, could be achieved by having policy development and party candidates' selection

tailored to the views of the voter, according to the literature. This view leads Needham (2006) and Reeves et al. (2006) to recommend the creation of a party brand based on attributes associated with candidates and policies.

Although appropriate and useful, these political brand theories lead to increasing reliance on voter databases by major political parties to inform policy and candidate selection just to offer what voters need (Norris, 1997; Hay, 1999; Reeves et al., 2006; Needham, 2006). By recognizing only voter attributes, these approaches also misconstrue the concept of market-orientation when consideration is equally given to other internal and external organizational attributes of value, not only customer needs, in brand-building. They in effect confine political brand-creation to voter desire without recognition of internal organizational strengths. And by doing so, they increase the instances of political convergence where parties appear to be the same to voters, making their choice difficult (Hay, 1999) and unnecessary.

The approach also harbours the tendency to limit electoral opportunities by alienating some segments of voters who may, for example, be connected to the party as a result of its ideology or history. And no matter how small the number of this alienated segment may be, their electoral resentment and protest voting may eventually have far reaching consequences. Therefore, this thesis is of the view that there are situations when party values become the crucial dividing line, based on which competing parties define themselves and offer choice. There are instances when party attributes, including ideology, become the 'political equity' (value or devalue) based on which to offer (or not to offer) trust, confidence, and credence to the political product. As a result, the decision to build a political brand should take into account the prevailing environment in order to consider or

not consider internal party values. The brand-building decision should recognize electoral situations, including voter and competitor environments, party position within the political market, and internal party issues.

Departing from existing literature, this thesis argues that the political branding process should be conceptualized in the context of a 'brand architecture management' exercise that seeks to assess and organize multiple brand portfolios for different sets of voter segments. In this case, a political brand framework that considers multivariate attributes to political brand management is proposed. This means that political parties need to consider and identify any political elements within and without the party system that have positive equity—market value—and are of electoral relevance to the party in achieving its goals. The strengths and roles of these elements have to be identified, organized, and managed within a brand system that aims to develop a cohesive political brand identity capable of relating to the majority of the electorate. This approach is informed by the commercial brand notion in which a brand is most valuable when seen as a point of connection to sell products to customers, aid communication, and to guide multiple stakeholder impressions and actions towards the corporation's goal.

According to the literature on corporate branding (Dacin and Brown, 2006; Brown, Dacin, Pratt and Whetten, 2006; Handelman, 2006), a commercial brand, its function and management, is understood in the context of its entire set of stakeholders and their importance in building brands. In the event that only one of the many stakeholder groups is identified, there is the tendency for the organization to inadvertently cut off others in its brand-building strategy. On the other hand, problems could equally occur when all

stakeholders are considered without due recognition of their level of relevance to the organization's brand strategy. It is necessary, therefore, that the right balance is ensured.

Akin to commerce, party political elements in the form of the party, the candidate, and the policy are the connecting points that link various stakeholder groups to a party's electoral agenda. These political elements become the defining points through which the electorate makes voting decisions, politicians make participating decisions, and sponsors make funding decisions. This means that a political party stands to gain if it is able to identify and manage as many political elements as possible which could potentially serve as connecting points between the party and its stakeholders. By so doing, a party is likely to gain a maximum level of access to potential stakeholders as a number of political elements of electoral relevance are given a fair chance and a proportional level of resources to contribute to the party's electoral goals.

To advance its proposition, the thesis will analyze how the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in Ghana managed the electioneering campaign of 2000. This will be supported with global case studies in the literature to arrive at the conclusions. The thesis does not claim that the NPP deliberately used branding as a set of principles in managing its electoral campaign in Ghana, but proposes that the party's approach parallels the brand architecture concept in commercial marketing. In this regard, the thesis borrows knowledge from commercial marketing literature to describe how a political party organizes its political brands and their relationships (Aaker, 2002). The brand architecture concept, which is elaborated in Chapter 2, will demonstrate how the management of political brands and their relationships could offer *clarity* to the electoral campaign, *synergy* in maximizing electoral fortunes, and *leverage* in targeting key segments.

## **1.2 Research Questions (RQ)**

The following are the research questions through which the thesis attempts to accomplish its aims:

### **1.2.1 RQ 1. What Political elements did the New Patriotic Party (NPP) consider most relevant to win the year 2000 elections?**

Inherent in this question is the hypothesis that political parties organize their campaigns around three political elements, i.e. the party, the candidate, and the policy, in a way similar to how commercial organizations manage multiple brand portfolios. In this direction, an attempt is made to illustrate how the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in Ghana organized its electioneering activities around this framework.

The framework is based on findings in the literature that people join or vote for a party as a result of a number of factors including the party's history, social relationships with its leaders and followers, and its ideological positions on the issues of concern. These are some of the factors around which parties aggregate votes. However, electoral studies are increasingly showing a dwindling influence of party-related factors on voter decision-making in favour of others such as candidate electability, charisma, and pragmatic policy positions. Candidate personalities, for example, are increasingly referred to by voters as a factor influencing their electoral choice (Lees-Marshment, 2001; Needham, 2006; Reeves et al., 2006; Worcester and Baines, 2006; Scammell, 1999) as the willingness and the ability to deliver what is promised increasingly becomes a concern to voters of how such promises would be delivered.

Based on this knowledge, there is the need to consider other elements within the party political system that could offer added incentives to persuade the electorate that the party will deliver when voted into power. Although this position is common in the political marketing and branding literature there is nevertheless a dividing line on which the political element is (or is likely) to offer the needed incentive. Some suggest the policy, others vouch for the candidate. However, it should be made clear, as Worcester and Baines (2006) have shown, that voters still believe that the party as an ideological institution is the shelter of hope when there is a significant amount of mistrust in the political market. And so it is worth noting that in today's ever-changing world, with many political players around, one is unable to predict what would be the ideal element to win the support of the increasingly volatile and sceptical electorate—hence the need for an ongoing critical study to understand what voters look out for, year after year.

### **1.2.2 RQ 2. How are these political elements managed?**

It is noted in the political brand literature that the party, the candidate, and the policy are managed as brands in an attempt to build and sustain voter interest during elections. This can be done through the use of attributes that are either internal or external to these elements, as explained in Chapter 2. For example, John Kennedy's image-management during the 1960 elections against Nixon, as illustrated by Scammell (1999), shows candidate personality as a source of voter persuasion. Other contemporary examples (Muller and Plasser, 1992; Hughes, 2001; Reeves et al., 2005; Needham, 2006; Worcester and Baines, 2006) include Tony Blair and the New Labour party in Britain, Bill Clinton and the Democrats in the US, Chancellor Vranitzky and the SPO party in Austria, and the Green party in Australia. In this question, an attempt is made to understand what attributes informed the management of the three political elements in the NPP campaign.

### **1.2.3 RQ 3. What are the roles of these political elements?**

In section 1.3, it is stated that despite the relative importance of the three party political elements to the electorate (see Worcester and Baines, 2006), there is still ‘a wide blue sea’ between these elements on the one hand, and on the other hand between them and the voters they represent (Norris, 1997, 2001). The gap even becomes wider in the case of the latter. Based on this view, the research sought to find out how the relationships between the political elements were managed to avoid an overlap or collision of purpose that could potentially affect voters’ perception of the party’s brand identity.

### **1.2.4 RQ 4. How did NPP manage the relationships between the political elements and voters?**

In the political branding literature, Needham (2006) suggests that in managing relationships between the candidate and target voters, parties identify and orient their appeals around attributes that voters perceive as desirable of their chosen candidate. In this direction, parties attempt to select candidates whose characteristics fall within voters’ perceptions and expectations. The party brand is then nurtured through the candidate’s management style, his or her engagement style at discussions and debates, and interactions with voters all under the spotlight of the media. The party, through this process, according to Needham, begins to remould itself in the minds of voters. This research attempts to find out if such a process occurred in the case of the NPP.

## **1.3 The justification for the study**

The research attempts to deal with the problem of perceived political convergence (Norris, 1997; Hay, 1999; Needham, 2006; Reeves et al., 2006) as explained in section 1.1 above. In

some of the literature (Hay, 1999; Norris, 2001; Reeves et al., 2006; Needham, 2006), it is noted that although political parties seek to differentiate themselves from their competitors, the opposite is unfolding in practice. Voters are increasingly finding it difficult to identify the difference among parties in making political choice, claiming that parties look alike. The issue of political convergence, the study assumes, is as a result of the growing reliance on market research, e.g. consumer databases and polling, by the major parties in developing political brands without consideration to other party attributes which are of equal importance. This means that the trend of parties looking alike is likely to rise and creating any difference would become difficult to sustain. The situation undermines the foremost objective of branding, which is to create the difference in an attempt to stimulate demand. In this thesis, the argument is advanced that the inclusion of party attributes such as ideology, history, and organizational competence as inputs to political branding would provide parties with the opportunity not only to create the difference but to ensure clarity, synergy, and leverage.

The other justification is in regard to the gap in the voter—party relationship. As noted earlier, conventional knowledge in politics suggests that the party is an aggregate of its belief (ideology) and organizational systems from which certain functions are expected. Therefore, the party is the totality of separate units, based on which voters make their electoral decisions. However, recent studies have suggested that the three main political elements, i.e. the party, the candidate, and the policy, influence voting decisions separately and at varying degrees (Worcester and Baines, 2006; BBC online survey, 2004; Henneberg, 2003). Research findings by Worcester and Baines (2006, p. 10) and the BBC ([www.news.bbc.co.uk](http://www.news.bbc.co.uk), 2004) on factors that influence voting decisions, concluded that all three factors are considered as important by voters.

However, policy was considered the most influential factor, followed by the candidate and the party, in that order. This pattern of influence partly explains why the political marketing literature concludes that the party is losing its grip on voting decisions. The literature on political branding follows similar argument and focuses on political branding based on policy and candidate attributes (Hughes, 2001; Worcester and Baines, 2006; Reeves et al., 2006; Needham, 2006). Despite the recognition of their importance to the electoral process, a comprehensive study on the party, the candidate, and the policy as brands, and how they connect with stakeholders has not been explored in the literature. This is the gap the thesis seeks to fill in addition to others identified below.

#### **1.4 Research Objectives**

The research has two main objectives. The first is to explore the evidence of political branding in Ghanaian politics, which until this research has not been done. In this regard, the study will examine the approaches that brought the NPP into power and demonstrate how those approaches parallel political branding theories in the literature. In this examination, the study will demonstrate how the NPP organized and managed its political elements in order to create difference, clarity, synergy, and leverage against competing parties in its bid to influence voter decision. Based on its findings, the study aims to fulfil its second objective, which is to propose a ‘political brand architecture (PBA)’ theory as a framework for political brand management. The PBA theory aims to offer guidance on how political parties and politicians may organize and manage political brands and their relationships with their target voters.

To accomplish the above tasks, global case studies in extant literature on political branding shall be reviewed to understand its current forms and strategies in theory and practice. The

literature review will also aim at identifying similarities and differences in political practices in Ghana in comparison with the global case studies. Based on the findings, data collection will be conducted by analyzing media items, interviewing party officials, media practitioners and academics and conducting focused group discussions to examine voter perspectives.


### **1.5 Organization of the Thesis**

This thesis is organized into 9 chapters. Figure 1.1 below offers a graphical representation on how the chapters are linked together. The introduction (Chapter 1) is setting the scene by explaining what the brand concept is and how it is currently applied in the political sphere. It also presents how the current study fits into existing literature. It goes on to introduce the research problem to be addressed, supported by the rationale; why the study, and its importance in contributing to knowledge.

Chapter 2 is the literature review in which the study takes a multidisciplinary approach in reviewing extant literature in political marketing and political branding in support of its argument. The review will focus on political brand's development from the operational to the strategic stage. It is also to identify the gaps in literature and to explain how the findings of this research will contribute towards filling those gaps. The conceptual models for this research are also presented in this chapter, exploring the brand architecture theory of managing brands and their relationship with the market. The chapter demonstrates how political brand roles are determined, either to drive the purchasing decision or to augment the position of the parent brand, which is the political party in the case of political marketing.

Chapter 3 will explore the background of political marketing in Ghana and the party under study, the NPP. This will be discussed within the global context of political marketing to identify the factors that have contributed to political marketing's development in Ghana. Chapter 4 discusses the methodology of the research, which is qualitatively oriented. It looks at the processes involved in gathering and analyzing the data. The results are presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The final two chapters, 8 and 9, explore the study's proposed theory for political brand management, its contributions, limitations, and implications for future studies.

**Figure.1.1 A Diagrammatic Framework of the Thesis**



## **CHAPTER 2**

### **The Literature Review**

#### **Understanding Political Marketing and Branding**

##### **2.1 Introduction**

In Chapter 1, it was argued that parties are facing challenges in branding themselves. They either fail to connect with the electorate they aim to attract or end up looking alike, as observed in the Labour and the Conservative narrative in that chapter. These problems could, arguably, be avoided by conceptualizing political brand management as a brand architecture exercise in which multiple brands are managed to reflect individual values and target markets. In this chapter, the various approaches in political branding shall be reviewed, noting their conceptual and empirical limitations that impact on the existing forms and strategies in branding the political product.

By extension, the chapter also reviews political marketing literature in an attempt to address some of the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical issues facing the parent discipline. This is necessary because one cannot talk about branding without referring to marketing since the brand concept is guided by the fundamental principles of marketing. Another reason for this approach is that the political marketing literature began with generic views of marketing's application in politics, until recently when there began to emerge specific and refined concepts with dedicated subliterature, such as political branding. This means that brand-related theories and research found their way into the parent literature of political marketing. Based on this understanding, the chapter will begin by reviewing political marketing literature and then will move to its specific area of political branding later in the review. The chapter will begin with the following question:

*Do political parties behave as commercial companies do in modern politics? And how do we conceptualize their behaviour?*

In an opening statement of a book ‘understanding marketing, expert solutions to everyday challenges’ published by the Harvard Business School Press (2010), a rhetorical question was posed: ‘What is the first thing you think of when you hear the word ‘marketing?’’ The answer to this question was that perhaps one would imagine a salesperson ‘pitching’ their company’s products to its potential customers. It could also be that one would think of flashy advertising billboards lining a highway, or would imagine finance managers calculating (forecasting) the possible profit that a new product may bring in (2010, p. 4). The writer goes on to say that should one envision any or all of the above concepts at the mention of the word ‘marketing,’ they are on the right track as ‘selling, advertising, and profitability’ are all important parts of marketing. Based on this understanding of what marketing entails, its definition was offered as ‘the process of planning and executing the conception, pricing, promotion, and distribution of ideas, goods, and services to create exchanges that satisfy individuals’ and companies’ goals. The chapter goes on to note one of marketing’s most popular statements made by the famous Jack Welch of General Electric (GE):

‘Marketing is not somebody’s responsibility—it is everyone’s responsibility.’

The above quote affirms Peter Drucker’s views (1973) that marketing is so basic that it cannot be considered a separate function to manufacturing or personnel. Both Welch’s and Drucker’s views imply that marketing does not end with identifying customer needs; neither do they suggest that adhering to one of the many activities involved is more marketing than

the other. However, the key text is to understand the needs of the customer, and that includes *the need for information that the customer can access and comprehend*. This is why Drucker asserts, from a philosophical perspective, that marketing is an attitude collectively developed by the entire organization and is essentially the *centre* of the entire business, seen from the point of view of the consumer. This marketing principle of a customer focus and an organization-wide responsibility towards achieving satisfaction for a profit is the same for managing brands. Brands reflect the values of the customers they target and are supported by activities that resonate with their values.

It is observed that the definition of what marketing is has evolved over time, although current versions of marketing's definition still maintain the key text—customer focus—and still maintain that marketing activities be carried out effectively, efficiently, and continuously, in order that the satisfaction of customer needs also result in profit. However, the addition is the recognition that the increasing competition in the market place means that monitoring the customer alone is insufficient to yield sustainable success. The customer-orientation is thus criticized for its assumption that market exchanges happen between only two players, the customer and the company, although there are other exchanges such as competitor-monitoring. The customer-orientation does not also take into account other players such as suppliers, substitute products, new entrants, and the regulatory system.

Based on the above limitations, an improved definition of marketing (Doyle, 1987; Wilson and Fook, 1990), with what Gilligan and Wilson (2003, p. 5) call 'a strategic content', was sought and led to a change in conceptual emphasis. The improved definition of marketing proposed that the identification and satisfaction of the needs and wants of the customer should be measured in respect to offerings of the competition, if the organization is to

sustain its success. Subsequently, the much broader 'market-driven orientation' that includes players other than the consumer was proposed. In this instance, the firm is to equally monitor in addition to the customer, the activities of suppliers, direct rivals, substitute products, and new entrants in the market. Marketing was thus defined as 'a managerial orientation which recognizes that the eventual success of an organization is primarily dependent on the identification and satisfaction of changing customer needs and developing products and services that match these needs better than those of the competition' (Doyle, 1987; Wilson and Fook, 1990).

For the difference between the current definition and the earlier version, Gilligan and Wilson (2003, p. 5) illustrate that the latter concept of the customer-orientation, which is at the heart of marketing, is an introspective concept that only examines performance and improvements in key operating ratios, like sales volumes, without a direct comparison with competitors. Gilligan and Wilson (2003) assert that understanding marketing in this direction lacks strategic insights of what the competition is offering. In contrast, a market-driven organization measures consumer satisfaction in comparison with competitors' offerings as well as potential offers from new entrants and substitute products through a constant monitoring process.

The implication of this change in emphasis from the customer to the market-orientation in terms of branding was the recognition to manage the brand as a strategic entity with dedicated resources to track customer needs, competing offerings, and market changes. Hence, individual brand manager positions were created by most corporations. In these definitions and explanations are a number of activities and behaviours characteristic of commercial organizations and of brands for that matter. They are interactive in character;

have organized internal structures and processes geared towards customer satisfaction and competitor monitoring; activities and responsibilities are predetermined and ongoing; and are profit-oriented. These are explored in the following sections.

## **2.2 The character and behaviour of the Commercial firm.**

According to Hutt and Speh (1998), a 'market-driven organization stays close to the customer and well ahead of competition' (Hutt and Speh, 1998, pp. 226-7). This means that the organization structures its internal systems with the aim of impacting on its external environment. This makes the management of both environments interactive, each impacting on the other. The absence of this interactivity will thus result in a dysfunctional market organizational system and will lead to a failure. George Day (1994, 1998, 1999) illustrates this interactivity in a market-driven organization as a commitment to a set of processes, beliefs, and values that permeate all aspects and activities that are guided by a deep and shared understanding of consumers' needs and behaviour, and competitors' capabilities and intentions, for the purpose of achieving superior performance by satisfying customers better than the competitors (Day, 1994, p. 37).

Such internal processes, beliefs, and values as noted by Day, are predetermined internal arrangements that guide the firm's relationships with the external environment. These arrangements are found in organizations' mission and vision statements, corporate marketing plans, and other departmental plans. In conglomerate organizations where brands are seen as strategic business units (SBUs), these arrangements are enshrined in the brand's mission and vision statement, marketing, and operational plans. Although such processes and beliefs are predetermined, the interactivity notion suggests that they are guided by the understanding of the needs and wants of the customer as well as the competition.

According to Hutt and Speh (1998) for this to happen, the organization should possess two distinctive capabilities: *market-sensing capabilities* and *customer-linking capabilities*. The former capability suggests effective, efficient, and continuous analysis of opportunities and threats, as well as spotting prevalent market trends in order to respond to them well ahead of competitors and to the benefit of the customer. The latter capability suggests a strategy of engaging the customer in a long-term, close-up relationship. In the application of marketing techniques and tools, the first capability involves the use of market research and intelligence-gathering, such as advertising tracking, competitor intelligence, surveys, and focus group research. The second capability involves activities such as segmentation, targeting, and the manipulation of the marketing mix instruments in positioning the offering for the customer. Having observed the behaviour, the character and the activities of the commercial firm, the question is:

### **2.3 Do Parties behave as firms do? Political Marketing Development.**

Apparently they do, according to the political marketing literature. In the literature, it is observed that political actors use marketing strategies and instruments, such as market research, advertising, segmentation, and branding in managing political campaigns (Kelley, 1956; Newman, 1994; Kavanagh, 1995; Scammell, 1995; Wring, 1999; Kotler, 1999; Scammell, 1999; Lees-Marshment, 2001; Wring, 2002b). In the US and UK, marketing strategies and instruments, market research and advertising especially, have been increasingly applied to the management of the party image, the candidate image, and the development of policies (Kotler, 1972; Kavanagh, 1995; Kotler and Kotler, 1999; Smith, 2001; Lloyd, 2003; Sniderman et al., 1991; Popkin, 1994; Butler and Collins, 1999; Reid, 1988; Wring, 2002a). Branding, which is the focus of this thesis, is also lately gaining prominence in the political marketing discourse (Henneberg, 2003; Hughes, 2001; White

and de Chernatony, 2001; Needham, 2006; Reeves et al., 2006; Worcester and Baines, 2006).

However, not only is the brand character of the political product the talking point in literature but the entire behavioural forms of political parties have been conceptualized in marketing terms, albeit with some difficulties. A number of political marketing theories have tried to conceptualize party organization in the same manner that we understand the commercial firm as explained above. In the political marketing literature, Maarek (1995) and Wring (1996) have looked at the political marketing phenomenon from the evolutionary perspective with emphasis on developments across the Atlantic. Lees-Marshment (2001) has also analyzed the phenomenon using the evolutionary theory, but from a behavioural perspective, and so did Reeves et al. (2006). Others, such as Scammell (1999), Lock and Harris (1996), Lilleker (2005) and Needham (2006) are also referred to in the review. They all have a common goal: to understand whether parties behave, or could behave, in the same way in their dealings with the voter as firms do with the consumer. The review will start with the evolutionary development of political marketing across the Atlantic, focusing on Scammell's work, and the latter stages of the Maarek and Wring models. It will then analyze that of Lees-Marshment and Reeves et al. in the second part of the political marketing concept, the behavioural perspective.

In the late 1950s, Stanley Kelley (1956), the man credited with the term 'political marketing' observed that the 'work of the public relations man' (Kelley, 1956, p. 53) in politics was to 'organise and build favourable public attitudes towards the political actor'. The ultimate goal was to help design a political message that resonates with voters. But this view was to change over time and develop into a much more comprehensive study of

political organization that involves ‘pre-, during, and post’ electoral management activities from a marketing perspective. Since Kelley’s mention of political marketing (ibid.) research in the area has grown, its application has become widespread, and its practice has become permanent.

In a review of political marketing development, Scammell (1999) notes that early works analyzed the phenomenon from a media—campaign point of view (Harrop and Miller, 1987; Smith and Saunders, 1990; Kavanagh, 1995; Maarek, 1995), taking clues from what emerged in the US as ‘image politics’ and later became the standard-bearer of the Americanization thesis in campaigning. According to Scammell, the Kennedy/Nixon context was key to this period when Kennedy, with the active support of public relations specialists, is believed to have won a debate against Nixon. This understanding led most of the early research to focus on image management as the discipline progressed.

In the early 1980s, research on political marketing shifted its focus to one that analyzed political behaviour from a marketing concept perspective (Scammell, 1999; Lees-Marshment, 2001; Henneberg, 2001; Kotler, 1999; Maarek, 1995). The new era, driven by scholars from mainstream marketing such as Philip Kotler, argued that politics has a marketing character (Kotler, 1999). Research from this era advanced that the marketing concept of customer-orientation and its notion of exchange was also applicable to non-commercial activities and entities such as politics. Therefore, politics was now seen as an unquestionable domain adaptable to the marketing concept. Following this claim, a widespread practice and research in the area ensued across the world, generating quality academic seminars each year under the political marketing banner (Scammell, 1999; Henneberg, 2001; Maarek, 1995; Newman, 1994; Scammell, 1999; Lees-Marshment, 2001).

In 1995, Philip Maarek's influential book on American political marketing observed that the use of modern marketing was evident in the United States Republican Party's campaign in the 1950s. Describing them as the infancy, adolescent, and adulthood stages, Maarek charted an evolutionary path of political marketing development in the US (see Maarek, 1995, for details).

At the adulthood stage, experts on US elections proclaimed the application of strategic marketing where political marketing is considered to be a long-term process, even in governance (Newman, 1994; Nimmo, 1999; Coxall, Robins and Leach, 2003; Lees-Marshment, 2001; Smith and Hirst, 2001). Phillip Kotler (1999) citing a research conducted by the Pew Centre, notes that politicians and political consultants in the US see the needs and wants of the electorate as paramount in framing campaign messages. Hence, the increasing demands to adapt a more 'voter-oriented' approach. In this era, the work of the political marketing strategist goes beyond simply to sell the political product developed by the political actor, or to investigate voters' opinions in an effort to align political message accordingly (Wring, 1996, p. 9; 1999). The strategist work involves a deeper investigation into the needs and wants of voters so that they could be factored into policy development and implementation to offer real satisfaction.

In Britain, Wring (1996) also uses the evolutionary theory to chart the developments of political marketing. According to Wring, the third phase of political marketing emerged in Britain with Margaret Thatcher's leadership of the Conservative party in 1975. The 'New Labour project' that succeeded it in 1997 is also cited as a test case of how political parties have come to adopt political marketing as an organizing philosophy (Scammell, 1997; 1996; 1995; Wring, 1996; Gould, 1998, Lees-Marshment, 2001). This stage of political marketing

evolution is where the dichotomized character of the marketing concept is adopted by political parties. And in this direction, political marketing could be viewed as ‘first, a philosophy, an attitude and a perspective of managing the business of political organisation, and second, as a set of instruments and activities used to implement that philosophy’ (Crompton and Lamb 1986, in Wring, 1996, p. 1).

Margaret Thatcher’s leadership, according to Wring (1996), had proved to be a watershed in the development of political marketing in Britain (ibid. p. 9). Elected as a Conservative leader in 1975, Thatcher is said to have rejuvenated a party demoralized by defeat in the general elections of 1974. Under Thatcher’s watch, the revitalized Conservative party established a close working relationship with the advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi, and ‘at the heart of this arrangement laid a partnership between party communications director Gordon Reece, Saatchi executive Tim Bell and the leader, Margaret Thatcher, herself’ (Wring, 1996, p. 10). According to Wring, this arrangement is the inspiration behind the implementation of a series of campaign initiatives, most famously the ‘Labour Isn’t Working’ poster, which aimed at further undermining public confidence in a Labour administration already besieged by problems.

The ability of the Thatcher leadership to transform the Conservative party is partly explained by the agile nature of the party’s internal structures, Wring observes. This is because the leadership had the mandate to appoint the Party Chairman. The leadership also exercised the right to draw up a party manifesto. The agility of the Conservative organization enabled the party leader to manage the affairs of the party according to the leader’s direction with little or no resistance—hence Thatcher’s ability to fundamentally restructure the Conservative Central Office, formulate policies, and draw up the party

manifesto using the marketing concept as a keen polling analyst herself, Wring observes. Scammell (1996) supports Wring's observation of Thatcher by saying that contrary to the public opinion of a deep-rooted ideologue of a strong, resolute, and a conviction politician, marketing actually offered Thatcher the strategies to mastermind the three successive election victories for the Tories this century (Scammell, 1996, p. 114-115). As evidence, Scammell points to the Conservatives exploitation of public concern over crime and immigration in addition to the more orthodox policy appeals, such as the commitment to allow council house tenants the opportunity to buy their homes (Scammell, 1995, in Wring, 1996).

In the case of the New Labour project, analyzing the latter stages of political marketing development, Gould (1998, p. 4), a member of the architects of the New Labour, observed that there was an admission within the party that British voters 'have outgrown the crude collectivism (that characterise traditional society within which early politics thrived) and left it behind in the supermarket car park. Now they aspire, consume and choose what is best for them and their families.' In other words, politicians are no longer able to win over today's British society with the 'one-size-fits' all approach that characterized early political organization. Parties could only appeal to people—and people are only attracted to parties—when their needs and wants are considered. And in Gould's view, only a thorough understanding of their socio-economic behaviour could make this happen. As a result, a number of marketing-oriented techniques such as market research, segmentation, targeting, and positioning (Lees-Marshment, 2001; Lilleker, 2005; Worcester and Baines, 2005) were applied in restructuring the Labour party. In the party's 1994 conference, the New Labour brand was considered by the top officials of the party. They realized the need to rebrand after three consecutive electoral defeats. The new brand needed to reflect the current make-

up of Britain's society of newly found affluent consumers. The new brand also needed to show that the party had ended the dominance of the trade union, which was seen as 'hijacking' the party for its interest. The name 'Labour' needed to be modified to reflect the party's new direction; to offer a synergetic view of its identity. Hence, the choice of the descriptor prefix 'New' to the already existing name, Labour, to signal the party's new look.

In implementing this change, three distinct but supportive areas were ensured by the party, according to literature (Lees-Marshment, 2001; White and de Chernatony, 2001; Taylor, 1997; Shaw, 1999): a coherent internal organizational structure; a coordinated market approach and an integrated communication effort. The party is known to have used both formal and informal market research to gather intelligence both within and outside the party (Lees-Marshment, 2001; White and de Chernatony, 2001). Public meetings were held to find out opinions on a range of issues of major concerns to people, the party's strengths and weaknesses etc. Others such as the analysis of post-electoral results, focus group discussions, and opinion polls were conducted to identify the motives of electors, including traditional Labour supporters who vote for opposition parties (Lees-Marshment, 2001). Based on these findings, the party was restructured from three fronts: the internal voting pattern, policy direction, and leadership style. The introduction of the one member one vote (OMOV) policy for internal party elections, for example, was to allow ordinary party members other than unions to influence party decision-making and to make them feel they had a stake in the party.

In segmentation and targeting, the Labour party from its traditions represented the working class of industrialized Britain (Shaw, 1999; Taylor, 1997; White and de Chernatony, 2001). It served as the only definitive mouthpiece that represented their interest (Shaw 1999), thus

its commitment to this group, as observed in what is known as Clause IV of the party's 1918 constitution. Clause IV essentially referred to securing for the working class the fruits of their labour and the provision and distribution of national wealth through the state system, ensuring the best of administration, and control of the means of production. This proposition was to dictate the policy direction of the Labour party mainly towards socialism, entrenching the powers of the state through its policies, and to identify its target segment of the political marketplace, the working class. Before the 1997 elections, it was observed that Labour's proposition was no longer relevant to modern Britain. The society had changed from mass industrialization to a property-owning one, partly as a result of Thatcher's owner-occupier policies on housing, in which people could buy the council houses they lived in. People no longer demanded job security—they had good jobs, owned houses, and wanted to do better.

In a sense, a clear problem was realized through research that the party had lost touch with its segment. The industrialized working class Briton it once represented had metamorphosed into a different kind of commercialized middle-income-earner, so there was the need to set out a number of initiatives in order for the party to modernize in line with the aspirations of its support base and those it aims to target. The party needed an identity that was well defined and offered a core proposition that could differentiate it from its past, and also to offer a future direction in its relationship (Aaker, 1996). This resulted in the party's change of policy as described in the new Clause IV: 'to work for a dynamic economy with a thriving private sector and high quality public services' (Shaw, 1996, p. 199). This new declaration effectively moved the party to the centre of British politics and offered the party a new direction to govern (Taylor, 1997; Shaw, 1996; Brivati and Heffernan, 2000).

In operational terms, a strategy to keep good relations with the press was ensured. Posters, broadcast advertisement, and all communication tools were used to reinforce party pledges and to repeat the message that the Labour party had changed, under new leadership with new vision and most importantly, ready to govern New Britain towards a new future of hope and economic prosperity. The New Labour brand, at this point, had totally parted company with its past and was ready for a new beginning. The New Labour party that was eventually created and presented at the general elections became clearer, connective, and meaningful to the electorate. New Labour was now seen as a modernized electoral machine that defined and characterized the political landscape of the New Britain (Heath and Jowell, 1994). Its electoral gains at the end of the 1997 general elections demonstrated a synergetic effect of the three elements of the party system.

From the above accounts of the developments of political marketing in the US and the UK, one could clearly determine some characteristics of the political party that are comparable to the commercial firm, as observed in the beginning of this chapter. First is the use of skilled professionals with the intent to ‘talk up’ or promote the selling points of both entities in order to persuade the customer (the voter). The second character is that they both have organized structures geared towards the target customer (or voter) and the competitor. This means that as political marketing matured across the Atlantic, political institutions became sophisticated in their approach and began to possess market-sensing (intelligence) capabilities, just as the commercial firm observed above. In this direction, Wring and Scammell refer to Thatcher’s use of polling data to track voter interests and issue positions in designing policy. The Labour Party’s use of market research and segmentation using public data, analyzing post-electoral results, and organizing focus group discussions are cited at this stage. However, there are obviously bound to be differences in the way parties

and firms behaved. These differences become clearer when analyzing political marketing from the behavioural perspective. The following section will look at this view.

#### **2.4 Do Parties behave as firms do? Political Marketing Behaviour**

The Comprehensive Political Marketing model (CPM) by Lees-Marshment (2001a) argues that political parties have moved from the politics of conviction to one influenced by voter needs. It categorizes party behaviour into three: a product-oriented party (POP), a sales-oriented party (SOP), and a market-oriented party (MOP).

The CPM model argues that a POP focuses on what the party thinks is good for the people and develops policies alongside this belief with the hope that when presented before the electorate, they will rally behind it and eventually vote for it. Just like the product-orientation theory in marketing, the POP concept concludes that the eventual outcome of policy formulation and development reflects on ideological positions of the party. For example, a party that perceives state control of the forces of production as the best means to manage the economy becomes a POP if the people believe in the free market concept of economic management. This makes the party's ideas deflective of the people, as observed in the introduction chapter about Michael Foot's leadership of the Labour Party in the 1980s. In a POP, communication activities and messages are designed to advance party ideological positions with the view that voters will be convinced to shift their positions to the party's and eventually vote for it.

The SOP is similar to the POP in policy development. However, the SOP, unlike the POP, uses marketing techniques such as opinion survey to determine voters' position on the issues, in order to design party communications. In this direction, campaign messages and

themes are carefully developed along polling findings. The SOP uses communication mechanisms to direct political debate in an attempt to influence voter opinion. It employs modern 'persuasive selling techniques' (Smith and Hirst, 2001) like sound bites, advertising, direct mail, and telemarketing alongside traditional communications channels to convince voters.

The MOP, which is the third and final stage of the CPM model, designs its behaviour to provide voter satisfaction. It uses market intelligence to identify voter demands, and designs its product (policy) to suit them (Lees-Marshment, 2001a). It proclaims the long-term application of the marketing concepts in party management; in government or in opposition (Newman, 1994; Coxall, Robins and Leach, 2003; Lees-Marshment, 2001; Smith and Hirst, 2001, Nimmo, 1999). The MOP makes a comprehensive, integrated, and continuous use of market research, segmentation, branding, integrated communication, the marketing mix instruments amongst others in party management and organization (Newman and Sheth, 1985; Smith and Hirst, 2001; Lees-Marshment, 2001; Scammell, 1999; Lilleker, 2005). In *structure*, the MOP is characterized by the establishment of a permanent department staffed with marketing and communication professionals with a mandate to coordinate day-to-day political management activities, using marketing concepts and instruments mentioned above. In character, the CPM model argues that the MOP is *interactive*. Policy development involves a continuous marketing research and intelligence gathering, analyzing speculative feedbacks in the media and from voters, and inculcating these findings into policy development and implementation (Sparrow and Turner, 2001). A number of case studies (Wring, 1996; Smith and Hirst, 2001; Lilleker, 2005; Lees-Marshment, 2001) in political marketing literature have demonstrated this behaviour of the MOP.

In conclusion, the CPM advances that the two earlier models, the POP and the SOP, try to persuade voters with an already packaged 'political product' and programmes that the party believes voters will eventually buy into, when aware of its benefits to them. With the MOP, political product development is interactive, largely influenced by voter needs. It applies marketing research to identify voters' needs to be infused into policy formulation and implementation. It applies marketing intelligence to gather information on competing parties. Although the MOP clearly marks a matured use of marketing concepts in politics, its conceptual understanding of the market-orientation in party politics raises questions, which are discussed later in this chapter.

On their part, Reeves et al. (2006) argue that a market-driven party, with New Labour in Britain as an example, is one that uses consumer-based data (2006, p. 422), focus groups, and other market research tools to design party policies. But Reeves et al. observed that in the long-term political parties may 'also need to be market-drivers in predicting and taking action on longer-term programmes which are not immediately important, but will have longer-term consequences' (2006, p. 425). In this 'market-driving' proposition, Reeves et al. argued that a party has the responsibility to demonstrate that it is best placed to develop ideologically driven policies that will bring gains to the people, given their experience and knowledge. They caution that the ideologically driven approach could have the immediate political ramifications of making a party or a government unpopular, but may have positive consequences in the long term (2006, p. 425).

From the two political marketing behavioural models explained, it is recognizable that there arise conceptual tensions when compared with the behaviour of the commercial firm above. First, it is suggested that the political party with a market-orientation, like the commercial

firm, is characteristically interactive, has organized internal structures, and processes geared towards offering satisfying voter needs, and has ongoing predetermined and assigned responsibilities. These characteristics present the party with market-sensing capabilities (Hutt and Speh, 1998 as explained above) to track socio-economic trends and offer policies that it thinks could be in the best interest of the voter in the longer-term. In the political marketing behavioural models explained above, this behaviour characterizes a POP and conceptually collides with the explanation in commercial marketing.

In the market-orientation, product design does not necessarily rely on customer input through market research all the time. There are future needs, which potentially could be oblivious to the customer, that a product could fulfil (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990; Lafferty and Hult, 2001; Narver and Slater, 1990). For example, the Sony ‘walkman’ was not a result of market research, but a response to market trends that the customer had no knowledge about. When it was developed it became a market success by instantly satisfying consumers’ need (Hornby, 2006). The product design itself was not focused on the customer it ended satisfying. However, the pricing, promotion, and distribution of the product were. The product was promoted and distributed through channels accessible to the customer and at a price affordable to the customer. In this case, the question could be asked: ‘If other marketing activities are performed far superior to the competition and the product’s function delights and satisfies a need that the customer originally did not envisage, is such a product and process less market-oriented?’

The next conceptual issue is the level of authority possessed by the ‘marketing department’ of a political party—and the scale of its mandate—to make marketing decisions and to implement them independent of any external influences outside its corridors, if really such

structures and processes exists in political parties. Certainly, a supposed 'political marketing department' is far more constrained in its mandate and authority than its counterpart in commerce. Although such a department may have defined responsibilities, as the CPM model suggests, these responsibilities are largely influenced by various interests that exist within the political party, as noted by Blondel (1974), as well as outside of it.

Blondel observes that political parties are coalitions with diffuse power bases to a much greater extent than are commercial organizations (cited in Lock and Harris, 1996, p. 17). This atmosphere within the party political structure may limit even the influence of the party leader in determining the party's position on certain key issues, such as subregional integration. Adding to that, Lock and Harris (1996) observe that 'even in office, the complexities of modern government leaves the Prime Minister with limited influence over individual ministries' (1996, p. 17). Hence, although a party leader may be at the core of the party image, his or her ability to influence policy direction is constrained by the need to construct a series of informal coalitions. If such is the level of influence wielded by other party organs upon even the party leader, one could only imagine the extent of influence these coalitions, including the leader, would have on mere functionaries such as a 'political marketing department and its staff', if such a structure exists in a party.

The existence of coalitions and diverse interests within the party makes it difficult to assume that voter interests are dominant in political parties, just as customers' interests are dominant in the pursuit of profitability, in the case of the commercial firm. In the commercial firm, it was observed that the pursuit of profitability is consequential to the pursuit of the satisfaction of the customer, and so the attitudes and behaviours of the commercial staff are geared towards these inseparable goals. From Blondel's description of the internal power

struggles that are manifested in the party, one could argue that there may not be a collective attitude after all that is geared towards the interests of the voter in the party, as it is for the consumer in the firm.

Another area that raises tension in the political party, with comparison to the commercial firm, is the idea of pitching ('talking up') the organization and its offering. As observed in the behaviour of the corporate firm, pitching the firm is a responsibility of all the personnel in a market-oriented organization. This is not always the case in politics. Although politicians and their operatives are generally supposed to 'talk up' their parties, Blondel's observation of coalition interests assumes the possibility of public clashes amongst these coalitions, concerning their differences (Lock and Harris, 1996). The situation may contribute to 'talking down' the party image. This behaviour departs sharply from that of the commercial firm. However, it is an essential part of the democratic principles that differences in opinions and beliefs within a party could be expressed in public (Lock and Harris, 1996, p. 17). No matter how inconvenient and negative such differences may be to the party image, they are essential and normal for democratic politics, and any attempt by the party leadership to suppress it is considered undemocratic.

Other questions may also arise. For example: what kind of marketing decisions are the marketing professionals in political parties allowed to take and implement? Are these decisions contingent on the approval of the party chairman, the presidential or premier candidate, or any other authority within the party structure? Is the marketing budget predicated on findings from the market, or is it internally driven based on available funds? Should market research findings suggest unrealistic voter needs, considering the number of factors that could impact on a country's socio-economic structures, such as a country's

developmental budget, global economic downturn, and other exogenous political and economic forces, would the party go ahead to formulate policies around these unrealistic voter needs? And if it does not, but rather suggests alternative policies that are achievable and realistic in the face of these forces, and uses marketing techniques and tools that could aid their understanding of the situation, does that make the party or the process less market-oriented? In these scenarios, the models of both Lees-Marshment and Reeves et al. suggest so. However, the revised version of the CPM model and the model of Reeves et al. recognize the hybridity of the product and market-orientations in certain situations. The latter, for example, suggests that at a point such a shift is necessary because parties have the capacity to determine future needs that voters may not see. But both theories also seem to neglect the inherent internal and external constraints that could impact on a marketing department of a political party. These and other tensions that arise in political marketing when marketing theories are directly applied to party behaviour pre-empt questions such as: when is a party more or less market-oriented?

The inconsistencies such as the above raise questions about the appropriateness of the marketing theory to analyze party behaviour and make its application in practice problematic, but they do not entirely negate marketing's applicability in politics. Rather, they suggest the need to adapt and develop frameworks capable of responding to these tensions, as proposed by Lock and Harris (1996). As Arndt (1983) observed, the evolution of the marketing-orientation itself is as a result of reciprocal influences between marketing and other disciplines, and that includes the ongoing harmonization with politics (Lees-Marshment, 2001b) despite the criticisms. It is fair to say that the optimism amongst academics of the political marketing subdomain has not blinded the recognition of the discipline's limitations. Within it there is a growing recognition of fundamental flaws in

theory, research, and in practice (Henneberg, 2004; O'Shaughnessy, 1996; Lilleker, 2004; Lilleker and Negrine, 2003).

In theory, Henneberg (2004), for example, observes that our increasing quest to demonstrate that marketing works in politics has resulted in the increasing use of the managerial and operational concepts of marketing to explain the political marketing subdomain (Lees-Marshment, 2001a and 2001b; 2002; Kotler and Kotler, 1999; O'Cass, 1996; O'Shaughnessy, 1996, 1990; Newman, 1994; Sabato, 1981). In this direction, the seeming dominance of the marketing mix, political campaign explananda in literature, has particularly been flagged. Lock and Harris (1996 p. 23) on their part, bemoan the failure of political marketing to develop its own theory and the attempt to wean itself from the mainstream marketing. O'Shaughnessy (2001, p 1057) agrees with Lock and Harris that political marketing needs to develop its own theory framework. O'Shaughnessy argues that political marketing and commercial marketing are separate entities, which makes our continuous comparison of these two inaccurate: 'Marketing is a business discipline whose relevance lies primarily in business: we should not assume that political contexts are invariably analogous to business to the extent that methods can be imported and used with equal effect.' (O'Shaughnessy, 2001, p. 1047).

In practice, Lilleker (2005) questions whether political marketing could not be held responsible for the emerging democratic deficit in Britain. Lilleker observes that the market-oriented behaviour of the New Labour party in Britain was at first hailed as reconnecting with public opinion as members of the public were brought in to advise the party (Bowler and Farrell, 1992; Lees-Marshment, 2001). However, having examined New Labour's electoral approaches and the empirical data from the 2001 electoral turnout, Lilleker notes

that there were significant flaws in the party's application of political marketing (Lilleker, 2005, p. 5). This observation leads Lilleker to argue that because marketing usually focuses on the strategic section of the population through targeting, it seems antithetical to politics (Lilleker, 2005, p. 3):

If political parties talk to certain groups, other sectors of the electorate may feel disenfranchised, and indeed evidence from recent elections does not substantiate the position that politics and the people have become more connected. If anything the UK General Election of 2001 indicates that the reverse has taken place. This article discusses the role of political marketing as the cause of an emerging democratic deficit in UK politics (Lilleker, 2005, p. 3).

In research, political marketing has not escaped criticisms either. Concerns are raised about the discipline's increasing application of the positivism theory. There is also another strand of critics who only see the promotional arm of marketing in politics (Franklin, 1998, 2004; Philo, 1993). Though they tend to be generally dismissive of the 'consumer centredness' thesis of the political marketing literature, they do recognize that political parties have improved on their communications efficiently and effectively over the years, aiming the right communication tools and techniques at the right voters at the right time. This development, they observe, is aided by the recruitment of professionals in public relations, media, and marketing into the party offices. Here, they talk of '*packaging politics*' with the preferred conceptual reference point of analyses being '*selling*', as opposed to the much broader '*political marketing*' theory. They argue that 'political marketing has transformed politics into being obsessed with spin and packaging', not substance (Henneberg, 2004, p. 227).

These criticisms need addressing. Whereas some are inherent to the theory, given the way political marketing emerged (Scammell, 1999) others could be attributed to the appropriation—or misappropriation—of the marketing concepts in theory and practice. For example, if we accept that all that there is in politics from the marketing perspective is promotion, does that make the process less market-oriented, knowing that access to the right information could also be a need to fulfil? Should we also agree with the argument that marketing is antithetical to politics, and is responsible for the decline in political participation in Britain, knowing that the failure of a concept as a result of its misapplication is not the same as the failure of the concept itself?

In the case of Labour's application of targeting techniques resulting in the decline of the voter turnout in the British elections of 2001, the situation could chiefly be attributed to the misapplication of the technique, a point Lilleker failed to observe when the claim was made that political marketing could perhaps be the cause of the emerging democratic deficit in UK politics (Lilleker, 2005, p. 3). Targeting in marketing does not mean 'talking to a section of the population whilst you leave others', as Lilleker observes was the Labour party's approach in the 2001 British general election. Targeting as a marketing activity is part of the wider STP process—segmentation, targeting and positioning. This means that an organization identifies different categories of the market and decides to do many things with them, including approaching each of these segments with different brands.

The marketing tactic of targeting, as Lilleker refers to, is in two folds: concentration and multi-segments targeting (see Smith and Hirst, 2001, for details). Concentration on targeting deals with focusing resources on a particular segment in a bid to increase profitability. That means targeting a segment that can afford premium pricing and lead to higher profit. But

multi-segment targeting is to increase the market share in a bid to increase profitability. That means focusing on more customers, but not necessarily higher prices. The decision to choose between these two approaches rests on a number of considerations, including the type of product, industry, and the competition that the organization operates in, the resource capabilities of the company in question and its entire corporate and marketing strategy: to differentiate, to be a cost leader or a niche, as observed by Michael Porter (1985, p. 11-15; see also Dibb et al., 2001). Obviously, a political party operating in a first-past-the-post electoral market, where 'one person one vote' applies, the decision to choose concentration targeting, whether explicitly or implicit by its actions or inactions, could only be considered as 'irrational', considering the fact that such a market depends on the highest number of votes to win elections.

In addition to cases of the political marketing theory's misapplication and conceptual tensions which need addressing are other arguments located in subdomains like political branding. For example, according to Lock and Harris (1996, p. 14-15), the political product is so complex that voters are unable to unbundle the whole, and as a result make judgment based on party attributes. Although this is noted in the political marketing literature, its implications are directly located in political branding. From the demand perspective, the assumption in this claim is that voters are faced with limited means, based on which they make political choice. It also presupposes that political parties have little room to differentiate and to brand, from the supply perspectives. However, there are case studies in literature that contrast this view and are explored in this chapter. This assumption and the case studies that aid its analysis are chosen because they relate to the core idea of the thesis, political branding.

## **2.5 Political Brand Behaviour**

Lock and Harris (1996), like many others in the literature reviewed earlier in this chapter, also caution the direct transfer of the marketing principle and associated theories into politics (Shama, 1975). As a result, they identify seven key differences that make the application of political marketing in politics difficult (Lock and Harris 1996, p. 14-15). Although the seven observable differences (OD hereafter) based on which they make their proposition are located within political marketing, two have implications for political branding and will be discussed in this section. According to them, differences such as those that they identify expose the weakness of core marketing concepts as the basis for political marketing's development. They strengthen the case that political marketing has a responsibility to develop its own frameworks and models if it is to inform and influence political action. However, it is also the case that these differences, especially the two to be analyzed, have empirical limitations when applied to analyzing political marketing in emerging democracies. The following is a list of the seven ODs out of which OD-1 and OD-5 shall be addressed extensively in this chapter.

### **Number    Observable difference (OD)**

- (1)            For any one election, all voters make their choices on the same day (with trivial exceptions such as postal and proxy votes). There are almost no purchasing decisions with this characteristic and certainly none which affect as large a number of people. Thus while there are similarities between opinion polls and tracking measures of brand shares, the latter are aggregations of real purchasing decisions, as opposed to the essentially hypothetical questions of the former.

(2) While some might argue that there are long-term individual costs or regret (in the economist's sense) in electoral choices, the fact that there is no price directly or indirectly attached to voting or the choice of party sharply differentiates it from a purchase. Despite being normally constrained to making only one valid choice, the conventional utility-maximizing framework subject to budget constraints fits electoral choice poorly and the link to personal outcomes subsequently is at best tenuous.

(3) Although the actual act of voting may not have a price attached to it, apart from emigrating, a voter has to live with the collective choice, even though it might not have been his or her own preference. This shows the sharp distinction between public choice issues and consumer markets.

(4) The winner takes all in the UK's first-past-the-post election, whether in an individual constituency or across a general election. The nearest business equivalent would be bidding to run the National Lottery and the monopoly it grants.

(5) The political party or candidate is a complex intangible product which the voter cannot unbundle. As a consequence, most voters have to judge on the overall packaged concept or message. Apart from general economic self-interest, it appears that single-issue voting has in the past had a minor effect on the overall outcome of British elections. We argue that while there are other complex products or services which consumers are unable to unbundle, the range of concepts and issues in the political bundle distinguish it from such situations. Furthermore, in the case of complex product or service choice, consumers are usually able to change their minds, albeit at a cost, if they believe that they have

made a mistake. Voters have to wait until the next election.

- (6) While there may be means of influencing the direction of a local or national party (with clear parallels with conventional product modifications or brand extensions), the possibility of introducing a new brand in the form of a new party is relatively remote—witness the short but eventful life of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). A recent European example is the Forza Italia Movement of Silvio Berlusconi, although the recent denouement may discourage other media moguls from attempting to emulate it. Apart from communism in the past, international brands do not really exist and there seems little immediate prospect of cross-border parties even in the EU, although we recognize that parties have been able to form transnational groupings in the European Parliament since its formation.
- (7) In most marketing situations, brand leaders tend to stay in front. In the UK, while governments may win successive elections, there seems to be an increasing trend for them to fall behind in opinion polls between elections. This is of course connected with the fact that governments have to make difficult and sometimes unpopular decisions, particularly when choosing between controlling expenditure and raising taxes. This cycle may well become more accentuated as it appears that governments' borrowing capabilities are becoming increasingly constrained by financial markets.

**Source: Lock and Harris, 1996, pp. 14-16**

It is clear that a straight transfer of marketing theory into politics would not work all the time, as observed in the earlier analysis of the market-oriented party models in relation to the behaviour of the commercial firm. This is as a result of the nature of politics and the conditions that pertain in different political markets. Even in countries that share the so-

called democratic values, structural differences such as the voting systems, political funding, electoral calendars, and governing templates—parliamentary or presidential—make difficult the direct comparison of political strategies across different political markets. Based on this premise, it could be argued that Lock and Harris' OD-1 and OD-5 are too simplistic. Of the former, the claim is made that:

For any one election, all voters make their electoral choices on the same day (with trivial exceptions such as postal and proxy votes). There are almost no purchasing decisions with this characteristic and certainly none which affect as large a number of people. (Lock and Harris, 1996, p. 14-15).

To support this view, they refer to the outcome of the Irish referendum on divorce, about which a court ruling concluded that the government-sponsored advertising campaign did not impact on the 'Yes vote'. Based on this knowledge, they claim that 'there is very little evidence on the impact and evaluation of political advertising on voting intention and the propensity to turn out and vote in a particular way' (p. 16). In many instances, the first part of the quote is generally true of elections. The second half is problematic because it ignores, for example, the concepts of political sophistication (Luskin, 1990; Converse, 1964; Campbell et al., 1960). It ignores the existence of different voting behaviour and studies which show that internal and external stimuli impact on this behaviour. Luskin defines political sophistication as 'the extent to which a person's political cognitions are numerous, cut across a wide substantive swath, and are highly organized or 'constrained' (Luskin, 1990, p. 332). Luskin asks a fundamental question relating to why people become politically sophisticated or unsophisticated as they do, and provides three explanatory bases: the political information to which people are exposed, their ability to assimilate and organize such information, and their motivation to do so.

According to Luskin, findings to the study of political sophistication suggest that interest and intelligence, representing motivation and ability, have major effects, but that education and media exposure, the big informational variables, do not necessarily provide the impetus for sophistication (1990, p. 331). This means that voters, just like consumers, are not equal in their understanding of—and interest in—the political product and how it impacts on their motivation to vote or to abstain from voting, and even to decide which way and means to vote if they decide to do so. Thus, voters could not be treated in the same box as Lock and Harris do in OD-1.

Voters could be categorized according to their levels of sophistication (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960), which includes ideological and non-ideological belief systems (Luskin, 1990; Converse, 1964), and depending on these levels, voting behaviours and patterns could be determined. In their study of measuring political sophistication, Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) said that they were interested in the presence or absence of certain abstractions that have to do with ideology. They were also interested in the degree to which an individual's political world is differentiated; roughly, numerous and wide-ranging (Luskin, 1990 p. 332), some of which they might have intentionally discriminated against in their study. Most importantly, they were also interested in the nature of the degree of 'connectedness' between these elements, noting that 'in short, we are interested in the structure of thought that the individual applies to politics' (Campbell et al., 1960, pp. 221–22).

The findings of these thought structures—ideologically based or none of it—were the basis of their 'levels of conceptualization' theory, as illustrated in Table 2.1 below. Although 50 years have passed since its publication, *The American Voter* is still relevant today in voter

research. It is claimed to be one of the influential studies on voting behaviour (Pomper, 1978; Bartels, 2008). Pomper and Bartels, for example, have argued that studies on voter behaviour have evolved based on the original work of *The American Voter* (Bartels, 2008). In 1978, Gerald Pomper observed that ‘this book provided us with our basic socialization into the study of voting behaviour and it is difficult to change one’s early beliefs’ (1978, p. 624). Larry Bartels also noted in 2008 that the publication of *The American Voter* was the most important landmark in the whole canon of electoral research (Bartels, 2008, p. 7). Both Pomper (1978) and Bartels (2008) claim that such is the influence of *The American Voter* that most leading researchers in this area have visited Ann Arbor, Michigan, which is where the authors of *The American Voter* were based, to learn from them.

**Table: 2.1 *The American Voter*: Levels of conceptualization**

Level	Description	Approximate percentage of the 1956 electorate
A	Ideologues and near-ideologues	11.5
B	Group benefits (‘ideology by proxy’)	42.0
C	The ‘Goodness’ and the ‘Badness’ of conditions of the Times	24.0
D	No issue content	22.5

**Source: Campbell et al. (1960)**

In their explanation of the above table, Campbell et al. (1960, pp. 221-244) observe that the respondents who fell within Category (A) are those whose understanding and evaluations of the political actor have abstract connections that one would associate with ideology. For example, what is a good or a bad principle? In this case, one does not necessarily use the

correct intellectual term, but needs to display a form of opinion about specific issues that could relate to a broader, more abstract notion such as ideology. The respondents in Category (B) are those likely to use ‘identity cues’ and frames in their evaluation and understanding of political actors, such as: ‘This candidate or that party is friendly or hostile to people like us (our group). We worry little about “long-range plans for social betterment”’ (p. 234). This group thinks about whether a party/candidate is ‘for’ its group: farmers, the working class, the poor, etc. For those in Category (C), the prevailing conditions are the most important stimuli to their voting behaviour and pattern. This category largely makes references to public policy issues, though implicitly most of the time (p. 240) by forming opinions based on whether times are good or bad. For example, if conditions are ‘good’ and ‘my family is doing well’ then the incumbent is doing well. Respondents in Category (D) are those who fail to comment on anything related to policy differences and debate between the parties, but rather worry about the candidates’ personal characteristics such as ‘their popularity, sincerity, religious practices, or home life’ (1960, p. 244).

These categorizations of political sophistication, identified by Campbell et al. (1960), influence voter behaviour and impacts on the voter’s decision-making process of a kind parallel to that of purchasing the decision-making process in commercial marketing. In commerce, categorization of the consumer is located in the STP (segmentation, targeting and positioning) model where consumers are grouped and targeted with product offerings (brands) and are believed to make product choices on a number of factors, including economic and geographic. Shama (1975) observes that likewise the consumer, the voter as an individual, relies on similar bases in order to reach a particular predisposition towards the political product in question. Shama observes that well-known models and frameworks of

consumer behaviours can be effectively applied to voter behaviours and vice versa. In this direction, a reference is made to Howard and Sheth (1969), a five-stage decision-making process model (Shama, 1975, p. 110).

Given the explanations on political sophistication above, it is clear that there are certain prevailing conditions that would suggest whether a person goes through a purchasing decision or not, in making a voting choice. However, these prevailing conditions may vary from country to country and at different times even within the same polity. In the same manner, the number of people that fall within the category of those that are likely to go through some purchasing decision (the rational voter approach), as opposed to those who do not, does vary just as the degree to which these conditions would motivate and impact this process of decision-making. From the model of Campbell et al. (1960) and their explanations offered, one could infer that respondents in categories A and B are highly likely not to go through any kind of purchasing decision, as observed by Lock and Harris, but those in D and C are likely to. On this basis, one could say that perhaps Lock and Harris are right to suggest that even if voters do go through such a decision-making process, it is certainly not one that affects a large number of people, given that the sum total of categories A and B in the example given by Campbell et al. above outweighs that of C and D; 53.5 per cent and 46.5 per cent respectively.

As noted earlier, the conditions described above are highly dependent on political environments. For example, in comparison it is fair to say that the majority of the British public almost certainly know what the Conservatives or Labour would offer than most Ghanaians know about what the NPP or NDC are offering when voted into government. One basic reason behind this view is the longevity differences between the democratic

journeys of these two countries. Therefore, it could be argued that a good number of British voters may belong to categories A or B of the model by Campbell et al. above and may not necessarily go through purchasing decision-making of a sort, having participated in democratic governments for years with these two main parties taking turns to govern. It could also be argued that the majority of the British public could belong to these two categories of voter sophistication, because the only dividing lines that separate them—and would motivate and impact on their voting pattern—are the ideological constructs such as conservatism, liberalism, and socialism, or by socio-economic paradigms such as middle or low income backgrounds. And because these constructs are well established overtime, one does not necessarily have to ponder over which party or candidate to vote for. But this view on voting based on party loyalties in established democracies, like the UK and the US, has been altered somewhat some 50 years ago, when *The American Voter* explained above was published. The publication recognized the effect that other factors such as candidate personality, citing Eisenhower's popularity for example, could have on the campaign and which could prompt some level of decision-making, although party loyalties might widely be considered as the 'basic division of electoral strength within which the competition of particular campaigns takes place' (Campbell et al., 1960, p. 121, in Bartels, 2008, p. 8).

In a developing nation like Ghana there are other subdivisions such as ethnicity, religion, and other subtle constructs (Anebo, 1997; Ayee, 1997, 2000; Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Nugent, 2001; Youde, 2005; Ninsin, 2006) that underlie the more generic political divide as we know them in Western democracies. The decision to vote in a particular direction becomes even more crucial when the individual electorate is faced with a candidate who is from his or her ethnic group but knows that the economic conditions nationally are not of the best and are affecting his or her livelihood. This 'individual/community' dichotomy of interests

that prevails upon the voter when making district, parliamentary, or presidential electoral choice (Anebo, 1997; Ayee, 1997, 2000; Gyimah-Boadi, 2001) for example, becomes a measure of intense purchasing decision-making activity, either to go for a local political actor who the voter knows well and can trust, or to go for one with potentially promising agenda for the wider economy but does not know well and as a result does not trust as much.

This is one of the several purchasing decision points that face the Ghanaian electorate due to the nature of the political environment after years of non-delivery and mismanagement since independence. Politicians are notoriously known for their non-delivery, much as they are known for discrimination in development projects, usually focusing attention on their local regions. In short, equitable development agenda gives way to tribal allegiance in development. Voters in Ghana thus need to negotiate with themselves internally, between these interests and reality, before deciding which way to cast the vote. This purchasing (or voting) decision-making process could take place either at the polling day or before. In this instance, even the model by Campbell et al. may not be sufficient, because although voters in especially Category B, for example, may be more in terms of numbers, the mix of ethnicity and poverty amongst this group will play a crucial role in determining how they vote, if it is found that the leader of the party is of the same tribe but he/she is poor at the same time and conditions are not favourable. This is where the purchasing decision-making comes to play and may differ from the British or the American voter.

Even in Britain, the assumption that most voters predetermine their vote far in advance of elections (Worcester and Baines, 2004, p. 8) raises questions. According to Needham, in politics, just like the marketplace, voters must negotiate the conflicts between loyalty to

trusted brands and the novelty of the new, while making sense of complex and conflicting product information (Needham 2006, p. 179). Research has shown that the majority of the less sophisticated political voters still cannot make their minds up even at the polling day. Most of them are believed to have changed their minds at the point of marking the ballot paper, including younger voters who tend to break away from parties of their ancestors; those that their parents and grandparents support(ed).

As a result of this recognition of different categories of electors with different levels of political sophistication, political parties and their operatives increasingly find ways of continuous persuasion that would influence voter decision-making, especially amongst those that fall within Categories C and D and even amongst A and B, when parties try to align themselves closely to issues that they traditionally may not have done. This has been manifested in a number of ways, including having a presentable and inspirational leader—the cases of Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Nick Clegg are recent examples; Tony Blair and the revision of Clause IV, recognizing the market as a force for good; Clinton’s third-way agenda that promised lean government; the introduction of celebrities at party conferences, on campaign platforms, in political broadcasts and advertisements; and having a catchy, inspirational ‘one-liner’ campaign slogan such as Obama’s ‘Yes We Can’.

The above situation is the reason behind the thesis’ proposition of a multivariate political brand system capable of connecting different categories of electors. As noted in the section, voters belong to different levels of political sophistication that impact significantly on the processes through which they make electoral choice. In OD-5, Lock and Harris note that:

The political party or candidate is a complex intangible product which the voter cannot unbundle. As a consequence most voters have to judge on the overall packaged concept or message (Lock and Harris, 1996, pp. 14-15).

The above quote draws the chapter to the heart of this thesis, political branding architecture. It becomes the platform on which the thesis' conceptual framework, brand architecture (BA), will be introduced and explored. In the above quote, Lock and Harris argue that because voters are unable to unbundle the electoral product offering, the majority choose on the basis of the overall political package, concept, or image. In this regard, Lock and Harris suggest that the party assumes prominence amongst the various knowledge structures, such as the candidate and specific policies, based on which voters make electoral decisions. This means voters are most likely to base their electoral decisions on the party image as against candidate image or policy issues. They argue that, 'beyond very broad generalization, voters' perceptions of party characteristics can be blurred and their knowledge of specific policies is low.' They support this argument by contrasting voter perception and low knowledge of policies in politics with consumer knowledge in commerce, where 'consumers have remarkably homogeneous perceptions of product characteristics' (Lock and Harris, 1996, p. 14-15).

However, the apparent gap between voter and consumer perceptions of products in their respective markets, and the notion that customers have more of a grasp of product knowledge in commerce than their political counterparts, electorates, could be analyzed and explained on two fronts. The first is based on the behaviour of people as regards choice-making in general, and the second is based on how corporations seek to brand themselves in order to shape consumers' perceptions about individual product brands and their relations to the parent company, which is analyzed within the brand architecture concept.

The commercial marketing literature (De Chernatony and McDonald, 2000; Duckworth, 1991; McDonald et al., 2001; Ind, 1991) shows that consumers, just like voters, rely on cognitive shortcuts in making the purchasing decision, as they have less time to ponder over detailed product information in order to make product choice. Studies suggest that customers rely on a number of sources, including previous information gained through product use, friends' and relations' and experts' opinions. As a result, effective brands present 'a few high quality pieces of information' in order to avoid 'bombarding consumers with complex and large quantities of information' that could confuse them and could make them consider the competitor product (de Chernatony and McDonald, 2000, p. 67). Brands, they say, act as simplifiers, reducing consumer dependence on detailed product information in the facilitation of the choice process. This means that the consumer's remarkable awareness of the brand, as Lock and Harris observe, is a result of a company deliberately choosing to promote 'few high quality pieces of information' about a brand to the consumer. A similar situation is found in politics. According to Needham (2005), studies suggest that voters rely on cognitive shortcuts as a substitute for detailed information (Lazarsfeld et al., 1968; Neuman et al., 1992, p. 15; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998, p. 5).

In this regard, the thesis argues that if one aspect of the political elements—the party, candidate or policy—is heavily promoted and gains visibility unequal to the rest, and is used as a representation of the rest in the party political structure, it is most likely that voters will have a 'remarkable' knowledge of that element which is mostly promoted. Based on this knowledge, it goes without saying that traditionally the political party has been the element mostly promoted with ideology as its core value, on which the candidate and the policy are anchored. As a result of this arrangement, the political party has always been the most visible amongst these three political elements, and as such the possibility that voters would

know much more about the party than the candidate or the policy. This arrangement in which the party is dominant still persists in modern party politics.

However, there is the emergence of another arrangement whereby values other than the party's are the bases upon which the political brand is managed. Needham (2005) observes that aside of ideology voters have impressionistic perceptions about candidates in electoral choice-making. These are personality factors such as simplicity, uniqueness, aspiration, credibility etc. Voters have also used similar shortcuts to evaluate policies as a basis for electoral choice. In this regard, Lees-Marshment makes reference to the New Labour pledge cards in the 1997 British general elections. This means there are varied means available to voters beside party image, in making the electoral choice. Based on this understanding, if we agree with the proposition that voters are unable to unbundle the different components of the political brand then we are agreeing with two basic assumptions, which case studies in the UK, the US, and Austria have already contrasted.

The first assumption is that from the supply perspective, political parties have no option to brand themselves other than by basing such branding activities on the party since voters could identify with the party or the ideology it embodies. And the second assumption is that from the demand side, voters have no other 'cues' other than the party and its ideological component to evaluate political brand options because of their limitation in understanding the political product. It has been identified that these assumptions are empirically based and are dependent on the political situation.

Conceptually it is possible that political elements other than the party could also be the basis for political choice, should the party as an organization deliberately decide to spend more

resources to promote, for example, the candidate more than the party during elections. Therefore, the thesis suggests that political strategists should find new ways of developing the political brand by using the candidate, the policy, or the combination of the three—party, candidate, and the policy (Smith and French, 2009; Needham, 2006; Reeves et al., 2006; Worcester and Baines, 2004; O’Shaughnessy, 2003). Based on this background, the thesis conceptualizes political brand forms as the party, the candidate, and the policy brands (Lilleker and Negrine, 2005; Reeves et al., 2006; Worcester and Baines, 2006). It holds the view that analyzing political branding in this way enhances our understanding of the diversity in political branding and ensures clarity in developing further arguments on forms of political branding. These political brand forms are analyzed individually below.

## **2.6 Forms and Strategies of the Political Brand**

### **2.6.1 The Party brand form and strategy**

It has been noted in the chapter that an implicit consensus exists in the literature that policy and candidate elements of the party political system are the bases upon which successful political brands are developed in modern political dispensations. It is also noted in the literature that inherent values of the party, such as ideology and history, are least considered as a political brand source. This view contradicts the commercial branding literature where corporate values (production history, for example) inform the management of both corporate and individual product brands. In Richard Branson’s Virgin group, the corporate brand values of ‘service quality, innovation, adventure and fun’ are the bases on which individual product brands like Virgin Atlantic Airlines, Virgin Records, and Virgin Cross Country Trains are maintained (Aaker and Joachimsthaler, 2000). These values are traced from the early beginnings of the Virgin brand.

Having said that, the seemingly inseparable character of the party, the candidate, and policy elements also raises questions on how the party could be left out in the process of managing political brands. In politics, one could argue that the value of the party brand to voters could only be as good as its candidate and policy representations. This makes it seem unlikely that the name of Tony Blair, for example, is mentioned in a party political broadcast without any reference, either visual or vocal or both, to the New Labour party at the time of his premiership in Britain and as such one is unable to discuss the party brand without mentioning the candidate or policy.

However, this view has been disproved by the experience of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPO—Social Democratic Party) in Austria. According to Müller and Plasser (1992), the SPO party was involved in political scandals and resulted in the resignation of most of its top officials (Meth-Cohn and Muller, 1991, p. 185; Müller and Plasser, 1992). Poll results forecasted 3–5 per cent loss of vote for the party in the 1990 parliamentary elections. However, in the midst of a battered party and leadership image was Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, one of the party's top political figures considered as a positive exception, and almost 60 per cent of voters had indicated their interest in voting for him if the chancellorship position was to be elected directly. Based on this knowledge, it was said of the SPO party:

Focused almost exclusively on its candidate Vranitzky. He was the only one who appeared in party advertisements and SPO posters showed only him, even without the name of the party...the aim was to profit from Vranitzky's popularity (Meth-Cohn and Müller 1991, p. 185).

On the other hand, the decline of the ideological leanings has led to the gradual dissipation of the party brand's influence. Notwithstanding this view, there are equally certain distinctive features inherent in the party as an organization based on which a party brand could be developed. For example, policies and candidates may need changing, but not the party in most cases. In most democratic countries the party is the first point of call in political participation for most people, and the party has always remained the custodian of historic political events of a country.

To explain the above points, the literature suggests that a political brand is built through functional and emotive attributes (White and de Chernatony, 2002). Parties, like many other institutions, focus resources on names, images, ideas, and even taglines as essential means of building and maintaining brand identities. The objective is to offer graphical summation of what the party represents and also to create a desired image in voters' minds. Functionally, political parties mostly attempt to demonstrate how they can perform when in government by making references to party unity, according to Needham (2006). Through statement of core values, political parties attempt to represent the aspirations of the people. They evoke, and seem to hold, the vision of the good life that citizens aspire. These are mostly captured in radio, television, and newspaper discourses which normally feature party spokesmen and women. Through these means, parties strengthen their position, rally support, and garner further support.

The party brand as a concept of images, custodian of history, and embodiment of certain ideals and belief systems also becomes important in times of perceived 'dissonance' in the political system (White and de Chernatony, 2002; Needham, 2006). Voters may remain 'captive loyals' to their original parties of accommodation in fear of voting for the

unknown, although they may be dissatisfied with their original parties. They may thus find comfort in ‘the devil you know...’ adage (Ayee, 2000; Anebo, 1997), a fundamental character of party politics. Despite its pervasive and time-tested use, the current approach to party-branding is criticized as limited (Needham, 2006; Scammell, 1999; Lees-Marshment, 2001). Critics observe that although party images may be useful to inform, differentiate, and identify party positions, they do little to reposition voters’ already held views (Worcester and Baines, 2006).

### **2.6.2 The Candidate brand form and strategy**

The concept of candidate branding, amongst party and policy branding, and its impact on a party’s electoral fortune, is one of the topical issues in political brand literature (Needham, 2006; White and De Chernatony, 2001; Worcester and Baines, 2006). Although policy positions and party ideals continue to play significant roles in electioneering, the process of image-building of political candidates and the public perceptions of attributes considered desirable of a candidate are regarded as some of the factors that impact on election outcomes in most Western democracies, especially in countries of presidential governments like the US (Sniderman et al., 1991; Popkin, 1994; Kavanagh, 1995; Scammell, 1999; Kotler and Kotler, 1999; Smith, 2001; Norris, 2001; Lloyd, 2003; Newton and Van Deth, 2005; Needham, 2006; Worcester and Baines, 2006).

Needham (2006), for example, argues that due to the decline in institutional attachments by consumers, with its reflections in politics, parties are no longer able to persuade voters with their inherent values. Instead, political parties need to identify and orient their appeals around values that voters perceive as desirable to vote for. In this direction, parties aim to choose candidates around these values. The chosen candidate then nurtures and enhances

the party's image through his or her leadership and management style that is manifested during discussions and debates, interaction with voters, the media and other stakeholders all under the spotlight of the interactive media, well-connected with voters. Through this process, the party begins to remould itself in the minds of the electorate. The approach, according to Needham (2006), possesses the potency to create memorable, emotional, and functional pictures in the minds of the electorate.

Examples of parties that have remoulded themselves based on candidates' characteristics, according to Needham, are Blair and the New Labour party in Britain, and Clinton and the Democrats in the US (Needham, 2006). These leaders chiefly dictated a new way of party organization for their respective parties and saw their parties renewed much along the values of the leaders themselves (Needham, 2006). Following this analysis, it could be argued that the Conservative party's current image through the leadership of David Cameron could be classified as a recent example in British politics. Other literature on candidate-branding also observes that voters use candidate attributes as 'cues' in making electoral decision (Sniderman et al., 1991; Popkin, 1994; Kavanagh, 1995; Kotler and Kotler, 1999; Smith, 2001; Lloyd, 2003).

Despite the recognition of political candidates as brands, the basis on which to develop it is still a matter of intense debate, which is linked to the wider conceptual issues in political marketing, already discussed in this chapter. Reeves et al. (2006), for example, question whether the political brand should be market-driven or market-driving. And in the case of candidate-branding, the question is whether it should be based on the attributes voters say they find desirable or based on what the party considers appropriate.

### **2.6.3 The Policy brand form and strategy**

Policy branding involves investigating the needs and wants of the public in order to develop voter-oriented policies. It involves the application of market research, segmentation-targeting and positioning and the building of relationship with voters (Scammell, 1999; Henneberg, 2001; Wring, 1999; Lilleker, 2003; Lees-Marshment, 2001; Worcester and Baines, 2006; Lilleker and Negrine, 2003). According to Worcester and Baines (2006), to build a policy brand is to create a single political theme strongly tied in underlying issues that sum up the entirety of the party's policy positions. This approach is akin to what Baer (1995) refers to as 'broadcast and narrowcast messages'.

The broadcast message concept suggests that a political campaign strategy should begin with identifying an overall theme, the core stance of the party, from which other subthemes could be derived, which is the narrowcast. The narrowcast message, on the other hand, is the subthemes derived from the broadcast message and used to identify and target specialized electoral groups that matter to the campaign. In its development, Worcester and Baines argue that for the policy brand to qualify as such, the process should include two strands of activities. The first activity should involve political marketing and political market research and the second, opposition research.

The first process involves identifying, anticipating, and satisfying voter needs. And this could be achieved by segmenting the political market where voters are essentially identified on geographic, demographic, behavioural, and psychographic bases (Smith and Saunders, 1990) and their needs determined and assessed through political market research mechanisms (Lees-Marshment, 2001). The second activity, opposition research, involves benchmarking against competitors' policy positions and the use of political information

systems (Lees-Marshment, 2001) such as the British Electoral Survey (BES), for example. As noted earlier, Reeves et al. (2006) argue that political parties such as the New Labour party in Britain used a market-oriented policy development approach due to the increasing pressure to meet the needs and wants of the electorate (p. 422).

Such an approach, they say, is essentially market-driven since they are designed to ‘tailor-make’ public services to suit relevant consumer groups. The ‘New Labour, New Britain’ ‘broadcast message’ (Baer, 1995)—a theme used to identify generally the party’s core electoral stance—broadly expressed the party’s recognition of choice in public services and most especially, the role of the market forces alongside the State as partners in nation building (Shaw, 2000). This was further cascaded into subpolicy initiatives in many sectors under the Public/Private Partnership (PPP) policy programmes. However, market-driven policy brand proposition is not without problems. For example, the tendency of policy look-alike has already been identified earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 1, and has led Reeves et al. to recommend that in the long term, a party is best placed to develop a market-driving policy brand, given that parties are experienced to identify future voter needs (2006, p. 425).

Although Reeves et al. (2006) recommend a market-driving approach in the long term, their failure to acknowledge a blend of both market-driven and marketing-driving approaches simultaneously limits their proposition. This thesis argues that a policy brand that considers a ‘fusion’ of both ideologically and market-oriented design would be appropriate. The idea of inculcating party values, in terms of experience and knowledge, in political branding could facilitate the building of voter trust in the political brand. The approach has the tendency to create brand difference and sustenance for the long term.

In designing policy brand based on the ‘fusion or the multivariate approach’, a party should consider the generics of voters’ needs; for example, free education, free health care etc. and then identify the delivery and implementation of these needs within the context of party knowledge and experience on the economy. A workable and deliverable proposition of benefits to both the majority of the people and the State is then put forward with substantive and cogent explanation possible. The explanation should convincingly identify the strengths of the economy and how it can support alternative propositions as demanded by the voters.

As a result of the limitations of the existing political brand-building approaches, identified earlier in the thesis and in this chapter, an alternative view with the right balance is proposed herein. Through a brand architecture strategy, parties will be able to harness internal party values such as knowledge and experience and the creation of networks in an attempt to develop a political brand of interests to all stakeholder groups. This is achieved through the identification and management of factors of electoral relevance, such as the party, the candidate, and the policy elements and the relationship between them and their target markets using the brand architecture (BA) theory explained below.

## **2.7 The Brand Architecture (BA) theory**

This research dwells on the concept of brand architecture (BA) and how it could apply to managing political brands. BA is commonly explained (Aaker and Joachimsthaler, 2002; Mottram, 1998; Gilmore, 1997; Nilson, 1998; Kapferer, 2004; Riezebos, 2003) as the organizing structure of a company’s brand portfolio for specifying roles and relationships among brands and their markets in order to establish clarity in customers’ minds and to ensure a combined effect of performance as a result. Explained differently, it is a periodic assessment and rearrangement of an organization’s portfolio of multiple brands or product

groups to reflect their roles within it and to create a structure for marketing success. The need for organizations to follow brand architecture programmes becomes paramount when there exist more than one brand to manage.

According to Kapferer (2004), as soon as an organization ceases to create one product there should be a thought, first and foremost, of how the system of assigning names and symbols to these products could be organized. This is because internal issues of managing multiple products could be very complicated. Aaker (2002) points to the external complexities in addition to Kapferer's. To Aaker, factors like serving multiple segments in the market and dealing with 'savvy' consumers all contribute to a complex brand-management situation. Thus there is the need for a brand-management system that could enhance corporate performance.

Kapferer (2004) also describes brand architecture as a system whereby the overall brand and products relationships are clarified and structured in a manner that can be understood by buyers. Mottram (1998) considers brand architecture as the approach to structure brands in a portfolio with the aim of persuading customers to transfer the goodwill that they have for one product or services to another product or services of the company without blurring the product's or corporate brand's strength in the process. The resulting effect is the achievement of consistency and clarity in the organization's offerings, as well as a synergetic effect in output. Three brand architecture types are identified in the BA theory (Laforet and Saunders, 1994): corporate-dominant, product-dominant, and mixed structure architecture systems (Uggla, 2005, p. 787).

The first, corporate-dominant brand architecture, is the process of managing products based on a common corporate identity or value. This means the visibility and recognition of the corporate brand identity as the main influence on consumer choice-making (Uggla, 2005). The second, product-dominant brand architecture, is the identification and development of individual identity and value for each product. The third, a mixed breed, is the development of products with some degree of association to the corporation, yet allowing them to exercise their own inherent values. These three architecture patterns are classified further into two main approaches, as the Branded house (BH), which includes the first pattern, and the House of brands (HB), involving the second and third patterns.

In managing either the BH or the HB, three main requirements should be followed. First, the establishment of portfolio roles—driver, endorser, or descriptor roles (Aaker and Joachimsthaler, 2000a)—is necessary to understand the relationship between different brands within the portfolio. Secondly, the identification of the brands' relationship to target markets, and the brand/market relationship, needs to be ascertained (Kapferer, 2004). Thirdly, it is also important to establish what Uggla refers to as the 'brand association base' (Uggla, 2005). A brand association base is a semiotic reference point or imagery used to crystallize the brand's identity or personality in the minds of target customers. Uggla thus defines brand association base as 'the link a brand establishes with its stakeholders through, for example, people, places, institutions that add to (or subtract from) customers knowledge of the brand' (2005, p. 789-790).

This thesis argues that analogous to the commercial environment is the situation found in politics. Political parties have to manage political elements such as the party, the candidate, and the policy so as to ensure the achievement of a common goal. Parties are no longer

dealing with ‘captive voters’ who share allegiance just because their ancestors did. Neither are they dealing with a set of voters homogenous in need. As observed by Blondel (1974), parties are largely influenced by various interests that exist both within and outside it; coalitions with diffuse power bases to a much greater extent than in commercial organizations (cited in Lock and Harris, 1996, p. 17).

The implication of such a political market to political parties is the management of different political products capable of satisfying the interests of different ‘political stakeholders’ in the market. This means that the ‘one political product satisfies all’ approach could not manage the situation, rather a multi-product to meet the multiple segments of the political market where each segment has wide-ranging aspirations and interests to satisfy. If such is the situation, then Aaker, Mottram, and Kapferer’s recommendation about managing the multi-product, complex market in commerce also holds true in politics. There should be a thought of a strategy capable to produce, distribute, and manage the political product as Kapferer recommends. This means the party, the candidate, and the policy are equally relevant to the campaign, and must be managed in a way that could target their respective audience. Policy, for example, could be managed by embedding into the policy brand narrowcast themes (Baer, 1995) that reflect the interests of different voter groups—hence the brand architecture concept, its forms and strategies as a brand management tool that has proved successful to major commercial institutions. In the next sections, various forms and strategies of brand architecture will be explored in detail as they are used in commercial markets followed by its applicability to the political domain.

## 2.8 Forms and Strategies of Brand Architecture Management

Although the brand architecture theory is absent in the political brand literature, a number of political practices fall within its domain. Political endorsements in electioneering campaign seasons, for example, is a practice prevalent in Western democracies like the US and the UK. Politicians and political institutions try to establish the brand association base (Uggla, 2005) by seeking the endorsements of known people of good standing in society and institutions. These endorsers declare their support in public to the courses of the political parties as the parties attempt to reinforce their positions on the issues. In reverse, they also try to distance themselves from associations that are potentially damaging. This approach in voter persuasion is part of the two main theories of *House of Brands* (HB) and *Branded House* (BH) in the brand architecture concept.

Over the years, the political branding literature has failed to explore brand architecture as a concept of managing political brands, despite the increasing growth of the political brand theory in general, and the increasing evidence of its practice in countries such as Britain, United States, and Austria (Worcester and Baines, 2006; Morris, 1997; Müller and Plasser, 1992). Although there exists literature on these case studies, their conceptual foundations have been located within the concept of brand-positioning, explaining the relationship between the political elements and the target voters (Worcester and Baines, 2006; Morris, 1997; Müller and Plasser, 1992). In commerce, the brand architecture concept is usually regrouped into two main approaches as BH and HB (Aaker and Joachimsthaler, 2000; Kapferer, 2004). This thesis thus focuses on these two approaches to ensure simplicity and clarity.

### **2.8.1 The Branded House (BH) approach**

This strategy, also known as monolithic or corporate branding, is whereby a corporate brand's *values* and *identity* are aligned with products and services offered by the company (Gilmore, 1997; Mottram, 1998; Nilson, 1998; Aaker, 2002). In this case, the corporate name, character, visual styles, and colours are used across different product groups and their markets (Riezebos, 2003; Aaker, 2002). In commerce, the 'Philips' name of the Philips Electronics Company across all of its products, and the Virgin Group's brand concept of *confidence*, *adventure* and *fun* leveraged across its range of products and services, from airline to music stores, are examples. The Branded House approach suggests that the corporate brand, with its values and character, takes the centre stage in marketing the brands in a corporation's portfolio (Mottram, 1998). This means that the corporate identity becomes the single source from which its product and services draw their values and are marketed.

The approach is relatively easy for a company that deals in one product market rather than a multi-market one, according to Kapferer. The challenge for such a multi-market company, like Richard Branson's 'Virgin', is that the brand's personality has to be flexible enough to cover the various product and service markets in which it operates. Also, when the brand is contaminated it affects the rest of its range. Its advantage, amongst others, is the relatively low cost of maintaining brands in the organization's portfolio (Mottram, 1998). The BH approach is thus recommended when the corporate brand's associations with the products and services will enhance the value propositions, credibility, and visibility of the individual brands.

### **2.8.2 The House of Brands (HB) approach**

The House of Brands approach, as defined by Aaker and Joachimsthaler (2002), is the strategy whereby individual brands are created and nurtured with limited connection to each other or to the corporate brand. It involves assigning different values to individual brands to satisfy particular needs (Kapferer, 1997, p. 189). Individual brands are left to maximize their own impacts on the markets through their own values, with no or less contact to the corporate brand. In this case, individual brands are also allocated their own marketing budgets. This makes the HB strategy a relatively expensive exercise to the BH. As a result, the HB strategy is only recommended when there is a compelling need for a separation or adaptation of brands.

Aaker observes that the cost of creating a separate or adapted brand is enormous, in that there should be substantial and compelling reasons to warrant that decision. In politics, for example, the cost of adapting policy issues in line with opposing ideals, as was the case in Clinton's 1996 electoral strategy, means possible alienation of party activists. To succeed, the distinction between the new and the old brands should be enough to bridge the perceived value gap.

On the other hand, there are times when old brands should strategically be kept on board, though separate from the new, simply to maintain the traditional bond between customers and the organization. However, the decision to keep or do away with a brand (in the event of a new one) rests on the strength of the bond between the customers and the old brand. It is therefore ideal to keep an old brand if the brand's visibility, associations, and customer loyalty are strong amongst its target market. The above advantages, according to Aaker, explain why organizations embark on the HB architecture strategy in managing their brand

portfolio. The HB strategy includes the endorsed and product brand architecture forms (Kapferer, 2004).

## **2.9 Understanding the relationships between brands**

A brand's role and its relationship to the brand architecture system could simply be referred to as its responsibility for the achievement of the overall goal of the brand system. Aaker and Joachimsthaler identify several brand roles (2000, p. 106). However, these brand roles could be grouped under three main headings as *driver*, *endorser*, and *descriptor* roles for the purposes of this study. According to Aaker and Joachimsthaler, each brand should have a purpose which it represents in the brand system, and understanding these purposes and relationships within the brand portfolio is key to understanding how the system is structured and how it can be managed effectively. It ensures that communication programmes and other resources directed at individual brands and the brand system achieve optimum benefits and are not done in isolation.

There is also the need to understand the measure of resources appropriate to nurturing a brand to achieve its objectives. This is only possible when the understanding of what role a brand plays within the system as well as its relationship towards the target market is determined. In determining these roles, the attention of the brand manager is drawn to some important decisions and actions. First is to take an inventory of the brand system so as to explore the brand identity and value propositions of each brand. Second is to determine which role(s)—driver, endorser, or descriptor—a brand can play to support achieving the system's goals. The various roles are explained below.

### **2.9.1 The driver role**

A driver role reflects the degree at which a brand drives the purchase decision and use experience. Therefore a driver brand is considered as the brand that drives the purchasing decision. The identity of the driver brand and its value proposition is central to the expectations of the customer. As a result, the name, the symbol, and all the characteristics of the driver brand need to be given a priority, prominence, and clear visibility above that of the others in the organization's communicational mix.

Product packages and promotional materials should magnify the driver brand's identity in order to attract the full attention of the customer. Possible programmes and activities geared at generating Unique Recall Proposition (URP) and establishing the driver brand in customers' minds should be aimed at. As an example, Aaker illustrates that if a person were to buy an IBM ThinkPad and was to be asked 'What brand of laptop did you buy?' then 'ThinkPad' would be the answer. This is because 'ThinkPad' assumes the primary driver role in the communication strategy of the IBM laptop.

### **2.9.2 The endorser role**

In endorsement, the attempt is made to use the reputation of another product or a person, the endorser, to affirm that a brand, the endorsed, will deliver its promise. With this strategy, the endorser and the endorsed brands possess different levels of value propositions. The endorser usually possesses market assets in the form of credibility, trust, and security (Aaker, 2002; Mottram, 1998) to guarantee the endorsed brand's certainty to deliver what is promised.

The host brand, one that is being endorsed, on the other hand offers choice (Kapferer, 2004, p. 307) to the customer through its originality distinct from other offers. It therefore drives the purchasing decision, whereas the endorser serves as a guarantor. In this form of branding, the endorser and the endorsed are linked, though weakly, through *verbal* and *nonverbal* communication activities in ‘anointing’ the endorsed brand. As an example, Kapferer observes that Johnson’s range of products such as Pledge, Wizard Air Freshener, and Toilet Duck are all endorsed by the corporate brand name, ‘Johnson’. This means that the ‘Johnson’ corporate brand guarantees the high quality and security of its individual product brands. However, the product brands are allowed the freedom to express their inherent individual values in the market through performance and communications.

### **2.9.3 The descriptor role**

According to Aaker (1999, p. 88), descriptor brands play an informant role by making the customer aware of slight variations made to an already known offering. Descriptor brands do not have driver roles and do not transfer goodwill to the host brand. They subtly influence purchasing decisions by adding extra information, such as the word ‘new’ to an existing version, so as to stimulate interest. A descriptor role is used to replace the creation of multiple stand-alone brands that require money, time, and personnel to support. A product descriptor can help to extend brands into new markets while also highlighting new features, product improvements etc.

### **2.10 Developing Brand Associations**

According to Schneider (2004), good brands are those that have established knowledge structures of what they stand for in the minds of consumers over time. *Volvo* is for *safety*,

*Mercedes-Benz* is for *prestige*, as examples in commerce. In British politics, one is most likely to attribute *fiscal discipline* to the Conservative Party and *social justice* to the Labour Party in a broader sense. The process through which a political brand is able to project a certain reference point in the minds of the voter is known as ‘brand association’. Based on this understanding, a political brand association process involves personalizing the political brand by giving it functional and emotional attributes that could reinforce the brand’s strength in the eyes of the consumer (Kapferer, 1997, p. 109).

For example, a consistent on-time delivery of consignments by a postal company (a functional attribute) will naturally enhance the impression held about the company as a *dependable partner* (emotional attribute) if the statement ‘a dependable partner’ happens to be the postal company’s slogan. In reverse, the emotive *personal* attribute of the company as *a dependable partner*, is most likely to weigh on the consumer’s choice when faced with a similar purchase decision in future.

In developing brand association to manage brand/market relationships, a two-dimensional framework of *brand-to-associate* and *associate-to-brand* could be used (Farquhar and Herr, 1993, p. 265). Within the wider debate on how the political brand is managed, brand-to-associate is market-driven whereas associate-to-brand is market-driving (Reeves et al., 2006). The benefit in operationalizing the two, according to Kapferer, is the opportunity not only to build a brand but also to stretch the brand—*leveraging*—to other terrains not original to it. In implementing brand-to-associate strategy, an organization examines internally held values of the brand, its identity for example, to understand the brand’s basic uniqueness and who it targets (Kapferer, 1995, pp. 30-31). This first step helps gain insights in product

performance features that are suitable for the target market. It also assists in developing the brand's marketing activities, such as communications to support the brand.

In the automobile industry, for example, the brand name Volvo is synonymous or associated with the word *safety* because the company inculcates the idea of safety, not only in their communication but also in product design. According to the managing director and the technical manager, Assar Gabrielsson and Gustav Larson (1927), at the time of the auto-maker's establishment, the fundamental identity of Volvo is derived from the fact that cars are driven by people, and so the guiding principle behind Volvo cars is and must remain 'safety'.

On the other hand, operationalizing an associate-to-brand orientation means identifying market expectations (consumer values) and associating the brand's values to match those expectations. It involves re-examination of the brand's identity and keeping track of the brand's image and reputation—opinions about the brand held by consumers. The process of associate-to-brand is crucial to renewing the brand's relevance to the market, as it is in stretching the brand to other markets not original to the brand. The process involves asking two main questions, according to Kapferer (1997, pp. 169-172). The first is: *how do we adapt to the changing conditions whilst keeping the brand's identity?* The next is: *what should we adapt and what do we leave untouched?* This exercise is thus important as the brand's clientele and market expectations change overtime.

Associate-to-brand strategy is especially crucial for brand extension, when a decision is taken to advance a product into other markets. In Volvo's case for example, when the association 'safety' is mentioned, it should evoke the brand of Volvo. With people

becoming 'time poor', i.e. with more to do within a short time, the brand needs to find out other values that are of concern to consumers aside to 'safety'. This may yield results such as less time spent in commuting, not necessarily safety, for automobile buyers, especially the younger generation. This requires Volvo to remain relevant, expand its market, and share the brand needs to adapt the association 'faster', whilst keeping its original identity of 'safety', hence becoming the 'safest fast' car in an attempt to tap into the 'yuppie' (young urban professional) market of today.

### **2.11 Do Voters understand the complications of the Political Brand?**

The brand has been defined as the combination of both tangible and intangible features of a product that aid identification, evaluation, and choice-making. In this regard, the brand is the combination of a product's 'name, term, sign, symbol, texture, design and its functional aspects' (AMA, 1960). Based on this definition, political marketing literature suggests that political parties clearly satisfy this definition and therefore qualify to be brands (Smith and French, 2009, p. 211; Needham, 2006; Reeves et al., 2006; Worcester and Baines, 2004; O'Shaughnessy, 2003). Although it could be argued that voters in general find the political product a complex consumable, Smith and French (2009, p. 211) note that the electorate have a high level of recall of the names of political parties such as New Labour, Conservative, Republican, Democrat, and their symbols. They continued to observe that voters attach meaning to these party names and symbols over time and this allows them to differentiate and vote for one party over another during elections. This analysis of the political brand based on consumer recall has also been advanced to political candidates and policies elsewhere in political marketing literature (Needham, 2006; Reeves et al., 2006; Worcester and Baines, 2004; O'Shaughnessy, 2003) as they also satisfy the conditions that make a product a brand.

## **2.12 Conclusion**

This chapter introduced the conceptual models of this research. It began by examining the marketing, customer, and market-orientations as it pertains in commercial marketing using the characteristics of the commercial firm. It then moved to analyze the behavioural patterns of the political party within these same orientations as advanced by the political marketing literature. The conclusion was that although there are similarities in the way the commercial firm behaves when compared with the way the party behaves, there are some inherent differences that make uncomfortable such comparisons sometimes.

Despite this tension, the chapter shows the applicability of the marketing theory in political behaviour analysis by using empirical studies in Britain, the US, and Austria (O'Shaughnessy, 2003; Worcester and Baines, 2004; Müller and Plasser, 1992; Meth-Cohn and Müller, 1991) to advance its position on how political branding, for example, is managed both from the supply and demand perspectives. It argues that the party, the candidate, and the policy are brands, since they possess both functional and emotional cues that make it possible for voters to identify and evaluate them amongst competing offerings. On the supply side, the chapter argues that depending on how the party chooses to frame its political brand image, given the prevailing political situation, each of these elements could serve as an 'association base' on which a comprehensive political brand image is formed using the brand architecture (BA) concept.

It was also discussed in the chapter that the notion of BA to the management of political branding suggests the management of both internal and external environments of the party, which could be achieved in two forms: branded house (BH) or house of brands (HB). The internal environment, among others, is the challenge of marketing more than one brand, a

parent and sub-brand. In the case of party politics, the parent brand is the party with its ideological position and history, as well as party logos and colours that serve as the party's principal identity. The sub-brands, on the other hand, are the candidate, the policies, and the various local and national functionaries such as parliamentary representatives through which the party interacts with its public.

It was observed earlier on in the chapter that although the party (as parent brand) and its sub-brands are expected to be of a unified kind, democratic principles in party politics are likely to encourage disunity at times as free speech, for example, is encouraged. This is one of the cases that make it uncomfortable when the attempt is made to understand political behaviour with the marketing concept. However, it was noted that internal challenges such as this are the very reasons why a brand architecture strategy is important. It was also noted that external challenges of serving multiple voter markets, with different levels of political 'savviness' are some of the reasons why BA is necessary. Political institutions have to deal with constituents different from the like-minded ones they were used to decades ago who, through families, religious, and ethnic ties, pledged allegiance to the party. Today, the political market is made up of coalitions of interests with wide-ranging aspirations and needs to satisfy.

The limitations of the study's proposition and of the political marketing theory generally, were noted in the chapter as well. It was observed that although the study proposes the management of party political elements in the fashion of the brand architecture concept as commercial entities do, the limitation is that a party stands to be labelled as undemocratic when the attempt is made to predetermine the way party functionaries behave. Democratic principles preserve free will, free speech, and not predetermination of behaviour. More

generally, the chapter noted that the market-orientation concept, for example, raises concern when directly applied to the analysis of party behaviour, as certain behavioural types considered market-oriented in commerce become product-oriented in political marketing. This situation affects clarity on the market-oriented party theory. The inconsistency is as a result of the inherent differences that exist between the political and commercial environments. For example, it was noted that given the definition of how democracy is supposed to function, 'a marketing department' in a political party is likely to be constrained in many ways when compared with its commercial counterpart, should such a department exist. This is part of the tensions that surround the application of the marketing theory to understand political behaviour.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **Country Context:**

#### **Ghana and the Emergence of Political Marketing in Politics**

##### **3.1 Introduction**

It is suggested that political marketing is today a global phenomenon (Schafferer, 2006; Lilleker and Lees-Marshment, 2005; Scammell, 1999; O’Cass, 1996) where parties from all corners of the world manage their campaigns and other strategic political activities, such as manifestos and fund-raising, based on results of intelligence gathered through market research (Lilleker and Lees-Marshment, 2005, p. 1). Although literature proclaims political marketing’s global reach, the adaptation of the phenomenon in practice has not been a smooth one in most countries. Research in the United Kingdom and Australia, for example, (O’Cass, 1996; Scammell, 1999; Lilleker and Lees-Marshment, 2005) highlights the concerns of political practitioners on the use and effect of marketing-orientation on political leadership, principles, and practice. Such concerns question the holistic fit of the marketing theory to the political world.

Nevertheless, research also suggests that political marketing has become a necessary activity engaged by politicians as a result of certain national, transnational, and global influences affecting political communities worldwide, with the mention of democracy as the chief factor. The democratic process assumes that individual citizens have the capacity to hold elected officials as accountable (Curran et al., 2009). And in practice such accountability, according to Curran et al. (ibid.) requires a variety of institutional arrangements including free and frequent elections, presence of strong political parties, and of importance to

political marketing, a media system that makes available the political product to the exchange partner, who is the voter.

It is thus necessary, as pointed out by Henneberg (2004, p. 16), for political marketing research to include the three main systems of multi-party democracy: the political system, the party system, and the media system, as units of analysis that support the two main variables of the marketing concept, which are competition and exchange. In this chapter, therefore, the research introduces these systems in Ghanaian politics and explains their consequences for party organization and management and how they are shaping the emergence of political marketing in Ghana. It compares that with global trends in political marketing as reported in the literature.

### **3.2 The Political system in Ghana**

Ghana has experienced a number of political transitions; from slavery to colonial rule, to multi-party democracy after independence, to military dictatorship, and lastly, a shift back to multi-party democracy in 1992 (Austin, 1961; Monfils, 1977; Anebo, 1997; Handly and Mills, 2001). Earlier constitutions of 1958, 1969, and 1979 were overthrown in military coups in 1966, 1972 and 1981 respectively. The military interventions reflected and weighed heavily on party configurations, the media system as well as other democratic institutions such as the Electoral Commission. Those interventions resulted in the fragility and neglect of political institutions, placing them in a kind of limbo where they remained until the unprecedented election of 2000.

In April 1992, the socio-political landscape of Ghana began to change when the people overwhelmingly voted for a constitutional mandate in a referendum. The constitution that

emerged then required the organization of presidential and parliamentary elections by a permanent independent Electoral Commission (EC) on the 7th day of December every four years and according to a first-past-the-post system. Voting takes place at local polling stations within 230 constituencies distributed proportionally across the 10 regions in the country (EC, as at 25 August 2011, <http://www.ec.gov.gh/node/8>) by secret ballot under universal adult suffrage. In December 1992, the first elections under the fourth republic was organized followed by the 1996 elections. By the 2000 elections, well over 90 per cent of eligible voters were registered to vote (Ayee, 1997; Larvie and Badu, 1996) and six political parties had been on the presidential and parliamentary ballots (African Elections Database, 2006).

### **3.2.1 The Party system**

Since independence, political parties have become relevant to Ghana's democratic process and continue to do so as the main platform for political participation, especially for elected office. The evidence for this is in the number of candidates elected as President and Members of Parliament (MP) on party tickets, as against those elected as independent candidates. Whereas both offices, presidential and parliamentary, have seen a number of attempts by independent candidates to defeat party candidates, it is the latter that has been successful, with just four and one independent candidates elected at the 2000 and 2004 elections respectively.

The country's constitution combines both the American presidential system of government and some elements of the British Westminster parliamentary system. This makes it possible for the President, selected through party primaries if running on a party ticket, to be elected directly by popular vote in the same way as a Member of Parliament. Notwithstanding the

power of the party, a number of events including military interventions have made Ghanaian political parties appear as though they are agents of the few instead of the masses as intended (Ninsin, 2006).

In their establishment, the early traditions of political parties in the 1950s aligned with the left/right ideological continuum as socialist and capitalist. They were also inadvertently aligned along the characterization of their forbearers, Nkrumah and Danquah, the pacesetters in party politics in Ghana. Thus Nkrumah and his 'radical' Convention Peoples Party (CPP), the first to govern independent Ghana, is of the left whilst Danquah and the UGCC party, the first active political party to be set up, which later metamorphosed into PP, UP, and now NPP, is of the right in ideological terms (Anebo, 1997).

In 1992, when the nation was returned to constitutional rule once again, a third party of significance emerged, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The NDC to a large extent took over the CPP's position as a social democratic party and became the new reference point for radical politics (Carbone, 2003, p. 10). Having won two consecutive elections, in 1992 and 1996, the NDC became the main opposition party pushing the CPP to a distant third. Unfortunately for Ghana, these ideological leanings gradually translated into other subliminal identifications such as tribes, religion, and other sectional divisions as the nation departed further from the early years of independence. Although political parties and their interests are proscribed by the constitution to be formed along these lines, they have, as analyzed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, significantly reduced the potency of the ideological cleavages to mobilize voters (Nugent, 2001; Ninsin, 2006).

Ideological debate on policy issues during campaigning is somewhat non-existent. This could be attributed to a number of reasons, including the long absence of political participation as a result of years of military rule. Other factors that stifle ideological debate are poverty and illiteracy. The illiteracy rate in Ghana is estimated to be about 40 per cent of the electorate (Ninsin, 2006), with most trapped in poverty. This group can make little sense out of abstract left/right, socialist/capitalist ideological debates and are of little practical relevance for their daily lives. These ideological debates had only prevailed within the elite communities such as civil society gatherings.

Hence, the subordination of ideology in Ghanaian politics is both party- and voter-driven. As political parties play ethnic and religious sentiments implicitly, few voters would also identify with ideology. A significant number would vote according to family attachment to political interests and the majority will go with the ‘electoral hype’—parties that appear to be the most appealing during electioneering campaigns. In fact, this characterization of voter identification also explains the structure in party membership, funding issues, candidate selections, and many other party-related issues. In party membership for example, Ninsin (2006) identifies two forms in Ghana: formal and informal (p. 12). The former is a committed card-bearer of a party who contributes to the party’s activities in the form of dues, attending party meetings and political rallies. The formal member is most likely to canvass for votes for the party either at the local or national level, as well as delivering his or her own guaranteed vote during elections.

In contrast, the more numerous informal member or supporter does none of the above apart from voting for the party at general elections (and even then, only occasionally may vote *skirt and blouse*, i.e. vote for the party in the presidential election and the opposition in

parliamentary elections, or vice versa). The supporter is thus loosely convinced to vote in a certain direction, as against the formal member who has ideological, family, and economic convictions to bind his or her vote to a particular party. The majority of supporters could therefore be categorized as ‘floating’ or ‘independent’ voters, as their allegiance is volatile. They are likely to be swayed in one way or the other based on a number of reasons, including ethnic identification of the party leader or key issues specific to the election, as was the case in 2000.

The state of membership also translates into funding issues. Party-funding in Ghana is seen as significantly inadequate, as it is mostly solicited through membership dues, handouts from party leaders and sympathizers (CDD-Ghana, 2005). In a country where the average worker earns less than a dollar a day and formal party membership is the reserve of the few, political parties are financially incapacitated and are operated by ‘political entrepreneurs’ (Ninsin, 2006, p. 15). Parties are mostly in the hands of people who are economically self-sufficient and who use their wealth to assume leadership positions in the party.

Although these political entrepreneurs can claim democratic legitimacy for their positions as they are selected or elected according to transparent party rules, they use their positions to further their own and their supporters’ interests. They use material inducements to buy votes and to influence decision-making in their favour. The situation of under-funding has also advanced the grip of the two party systems since independence (Handly and Mills, 2001; Nugent, 2001, p. 4). Smaller parties find it hard to compete with the membership dues, the logistics, training, and tax exemptions given to them by donor agencies, the Electoral Commission, and the government. Hence, the political landscape today continues to be dominated by yet another two parties: the NPP on the right, and on the left, the ‘new kid on

the bloc' since 1992, the NDC. So, although the political system in Ghana has experienced some remarkable degree of democratic advancement and modernization (Ninsin, 2006; Smith, 2002; Nugent, 2001), challenges still remain and a lot needs to be done to combat the influence of ethnicity, religion, and money.

### **3.2.2 Electoral volatility**

Research suggests a substantial partisan identification in Ghana with about 66 per cent of respondents interviewed by the Centre of Democratic Governance (CDD) in 1999, claiming to identify with a party strongly. It is arguably risky to take for granted such findings as accurate characterization of the Ghanaian electoral market. In the CDD's 1999 'Afrobarometer', 38 per cent of respondents interviewed identified with the NDC, a mirror image of what the party claims is the size of its membership relative to the total electorate (Ninsin, 2006, p. 18). On the other hand, 25 per cent identified with the NPP. However, this significant lead of about 10 per cent for the NDC did not save the party in the ensuing elections of 2000 when it lost to the NPP. What could then account for that polling gap? For the NPP to survive the first ballot meant the party must have gained ground on either the NDC or other parties or both, making it possible for a second round run-off between the two parties. How this happened is probably due to the 'newness' of the NPP's campaign and the fragility of the electorate's allegiance with all parties (see Table 3.1 below).

In aggregate terms, the two parties have enjoyed some level of stable dominance since 1992. The duo has dominated the electoral market for four consecutive terms, alternating government office between themselves. They have gained almost 91 per cent of the total votes and have influenced the socio-political discourse in many ways (Morrison, 2004, p. 429). However, individual party dominance is fragile and is vulnerable to competition. The

two parties may generously raise their core membership and support stakes (Ninsin, 2006, p. 18) to look ‘electorally’ good well before the election campaigns. Table 3.1 compares the electoral performance of the parties and shows their electoral net gains and losses in the presidential elections of 1996, 2000, and 2004.

The presidential and parliamentary elections of 1992 were not included, due to allegations by the opposition that the elections were ‘stolen’ by the incumbents. The parliamentary elections in 2004 were also excluded due to the controversial increase in the number of seats from 200 in the 2000 elections to 230 for the 2004 elections, which raised concerns among opposition parties, as the ruling government virtually won all the new seats. And that means only the 1996 parliamentary election stands as uncontested, and that alone is not enough for a comparative analysis.

**Table 3.1 Electoral volatility in Ghana based on valid vote casts in Presidential Elections 1996–2004**

<b>Presidential Elections</b>			
<i>Party</i>	<b>NDC</b>	<b>NPP</b>	<b>Other Parties</b>
<i>Led by:</i>	Rawlings/Mills	Kufuor	Other Candidates
<b>1996</b>	*57.4%	*39.6%	3%
<b>2000</b>	(43.1%)	(56.9%)	( * )
	44.5%	48.2%	7.3%
<b>2004</b>	44.64%	52.45%	2.92%
<b>Net + / -</b>	<b>-12.76%</b>	<b>12.9%</b>	<b>- 0.08%</b>

\* Note: Analysis based on parties own electoral strength when not in any alliance of some sort. The two main parties, the NDC and NPP in 1996, formed electoral alliances with other smaller ones under the Progressive Alliance (led by Rawlings) and the Great Alliance (led by Kufuor) respectively. But the PNC led by Edward Mahama went alone and got 3%. Figures in brackets ( ) represent the second round of results in the 2000 elections since none of the candidates secured 50+ % votes in the first ballot. Data source: Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana.

Table 3.1 shows NDC winning the 1996 election. However, NPP's net gain of almost 13 per cent since the 1996 elections is significant. Although Rawlings and his newly formed NDC party had won the elections of 1992 (not in table) and 1996 based on his unprecedented popularity among rural voters and the urban poor (Anebo, 1997), the party's dominance was being chipped away gradually, leading to its major losses at the 2000 elections. By 2004, the party since 1996 had accumulated a net loss of about the same size as the net gain of the NPP in the presidential elections, suggesting that the NPP gains were the NDC's losses.

The above argument is possible since the other opposition parties have not shown any significant strength since 1996, with their highest percentage vote of 7.3% and a net loss of (-0.08) by the 2004 elections. Although the figures may not show a significant margin of change between the two parties, this does demonstrate how the electoral market swings in Ghana as both parties have gone ahead to win two terms. The analysis also makes the case about the use of marketing by the NPP, gaining strength from one election to the other, although the NDC may show some degree of consistency with its electoral base. Having raised that assumption, it is right to note its limitations. Lack of enough electoral evidence makes the assumption weak in the sense that Ghana is only in its 4th electoral cycle, at the time this research began, since the constitution of 1992.

### **3.2.3 The Media system**

Perhaps one area that significantly evidences the transformation of 'all communication between social actors and political matters, interpersonally or mediated' in Ghana (Negrine and Stanyer, 2007, p. 1), and one that underpins the country's comparison in political campaigning and political marketing, for that matter, with the world. The Ghanaian media system has undoubtedly seen a transformation since its liberalization almost some fifteen

years ago and has reciprocally impacted on the engagement of the political institutions and the citizen publics in a way exemplified in most liberalized democracies (ibid.). Hence, *The Statesman* newspaper's assertion that 'If a vibrant private press is the hallmark of a healthy democracy then Ghana has it in abundance' (Morgan, 2006; thestatesmanonline.com, accessed 02/04/10). This quote follows the newspaper's observation of the increasing competition in the print industry.

However, the image of growth as observed by *The Statesman* does not take account of the growth of the entire media industry in Ghana. The Ghanaian media industry of television, radio, print, and telecommunication, including fixed and mobile telephony and the internet, is thriving in its establishment and patronage. However, those that have made tremendous impact on the political system since 2000 are radio, television, and print, with mobile phones and internet gradually assuming significance.

Fifteen years ago, Ghana could only boast of one broadcasting house, the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC), and two nationally regulated newspapers, *The Daily Graphic* and *The Ghanaian Times*. The GBC solely operated radio and television programmes throughout the country, whilst *The Daily Graphic* and *The Ghanaian Times* supplied print nationally. Since the liberalization of the Ghanaian market and the deregulation of the communication industry in 1996 (Gadzekpo, 2005; Intermedia, 2005), the Ghanaian broadcasting industry has now over 96 FM stations, about 40 newspapers, and six television broadcasting houses, and cable networks such as CNN and the BBC. The media industry has become very competitive since 1996, especially with television and radio. Operators are increasingly trying to win the major share of the market through prime-time programmes like 'the morning shows' that normally host panels of experts from varied

areas, including politics to discuss pertinent socio-economic issues; ‘drive jams’ in the afternoon that mix music with ‘listener-generated’ social discussions; and ‘evening talk shows’ with a moderator and panel of activists on gender, environment, poverty, and many other issues.

The distinctive change from a predominantly state-owned media to a thriving liberalized one is a departure from a politicized media that served the interests of incumbents. An independent media system has ensured some degree of freedom and diversity of discussions, making way for citizens in varied capacities to contribute, get informed, and make decisions through the media. Patrons of radio and television programmes are offered the opportunity to contribute to discussions through ‘phone-in’, ‘text-in’, ‘mail-in’ and many other forms of getting involved. Another change worth noting is the collaborative way through which these discussions are carried out in the media. Radio and television discussions mostly use news articles and stories that appear on the front pages of the print media, hence their appeal as people get the opportunity to know what is making the headlines, even when they are not able to buy the daily newspaper. Although there is a growing trend in all the three sectors—print, radio, and television—radio seems to be the most popular.

In 2005, Gadzekpo observed that about 90 per cent of the Ghanaian population had listened to the radio in the past seven days, whilst 69 per cent listened to it at least once a day (Gadzekpo, 2005). The mixed use of English and the local language is one of the factors making radio the most popular. It is also the cheapest means by which to get informed as radio sets are shared in open spaces: at home, at work, and at commercial places like commuter terminals. Although newspapers are also shared in Ghana, they are predominantly

found in regional and district capitals more than the rural areas where the illiteracy rate is high.

As for television, a lack of transmission facilities in most of the nation's rural areas and the cost of ownership are major factors in its subordination to radio. The most popular television stations in Ghana are the national broadcaster, Ghana television (GTV), for its Saturday evening 'Talking Point' programme aired in English, and the Sunday evening 'Akan Drama' aired in Twi, one of the local languages. Metro TV's socio-political discussion programme, 'Good morning Ghana' in English is popular amongst the literates while TV Africa's local news bulletin and TV3's 'evening talk shows' aired in different languages appeal to a number of audiences. On radio, Joy FM, Radio Gold, and Peace FM are the most popular ones with the latter being well known for its local language broadcasting. Although all are based in Accra, the capital of Ghana, they transmit to other regional, district, and rural areas through affiliate radio stations.

In print, the literature estimates about 40 newspaper groups published in Ghana, amongst which two are State-funded, *The Daily Graphic* and *The Ghanaian Times*, and understandably provide national coverage. Only 16 privately owned newspapers are thought to provide national political coverage, with the most influential amongst them being the *Ghanaian Chronicle*, *The Independent*, *The Crusading Guide*, *The Statesman*, *The Free Press*, *The Ghana Palaver* and *The Public Agenda*. Although the consensus is that the news media industry has experienced a marked boom since the late 1980s till today, data on circulation and other indicators hardly exist. According to the 'Press, Power & Politics' report, neither the Post Office whose mandate it is to register all the papers nor the National Media Commission (NMC), which has the responsibility of oversight for media

independence, has up-to-date data. Moreover, publishers are not obliged to declare circulation figures and are not even interested to do so, for fear that revealing circulation figures could undermine sales and income (Press Power and Politics Report 2000, p. 13).

However, the report cites Harruna Attah of *The Statesman* for saying that almost no privately owned newspaper circulates above 10,000 copies (Press Power and Politics Report 2000, p. 13). The State-owned *Daily Graphic* newspaper, on the other hand, boasts a circulation of 200,000. The paper operates offices in all 10 regional capitals and is distributed throughout the 10 regions via train, bus, and courier. *The Daily Graphic* is the most common newspaper to find outside Accra. It is by far the most prosperous news organization in Ghana followed by *The Ghanaian Times*. This success is attributable to a number of things, including the government supplies of substantial advertising revenue beyond official state subventions. Moreover, in an uncertain political environment, many local businesses are still somewhat wary of public association with the opposition. This makes them avoid the private press and cautiously place their advertisements in the state press.

Foreign businesses patronize the state press almost exclusively. Advertising in the state press is not merely political but pragmatic, as the state papers are daily, have advanced equipment, and offer professional appearance. With a roomful of computers, several company vans, access to world news services, more sophisticated colour printing, available newsprint, and a large well-paid staff, the Graphic Corporation is able to produce a newspaper that resembles the Western prototype. Not able to wean itself from the state, *The Daily Graphic* consistently supports the agenda of the state, serving the ideological purposes of the political party in power. The major private papers represent distinct ideological

perspectives and social groups but all face similar conditions, including high printing costs, lack of equipment, occasional exclusions from state functions, hostile or fearful sources, and difficult access to timely world news. In the early 1990s economic conditions were so harsh that private newspapers could only afford to publish weekly, though many now appear biweekly and others are published three or four times a week, according to the Press Power and Politics report (2000).

In political campaigning terms, the growing relationship between the media and the public presents a window of opportunity for political actors to re-engage electors in a much more diverse and sustained means. The Ghanaian constitution does not limit the purchase of political advertising spots on any media, neither does it inhibit the setting up of new media channels. Therefore, the party leadership of the NPP saw the growing media as an opportunity to run a cost-effective campaign to counter what they saw as the grass-roots mobilisation power of their main challenger, the NDC, as well as the growing demographic change of the Ghanaian society.

In an interview for this research in March 2008, one of the NPP party executives, **PR-1** (see Appendix 1, Table A1.2, for detailed profile), noted that the party recognized the changes that had taken place in the Ghanaian society, and saw the need to adapt. **PR-1** observed that political campaigning in Ghana now has modernized along the style and methods used in the leading democracies like the US and the UK, part of which could be attributed also to the advancement and availability of technology. The party official recalled that in the past, political campaign rallies were central and thought to be effective in engaging voters. He acknowledged that in hindsight political rallies do not add to the support base of the party, in his opinion, because they only turn out the ‘faithfuls’—hence the need to use commercial

advertisements on television, radio, and in newspapers in order to reach those who do not attend these rallies in their offices and homes (PR-1 Interview, March 2008. See Chapter 5). With this in mind, the NPP party spent close to \$2 million on its media campaign alone, a phenomenal amount unprecedented in Ghanaian political history, according to Ofori-Atta (2008). This undoubtedly shows that the media played a significant role in the NPP's rise to government, and the following section will demonstrate this relationship.

### **3.3 The Media-Politics relationship in Ghana prior to elections 2000**

The Ghanaian political literature is replete with accounts on the chequered media-politics relationships of historic and contemporary Ghana. For example, after the 2000 elections, a comprehensive report of this relationship was sponsored and published by the Freedom Forum, an American media foundation, under the theme 'Press, Power and Politics'. As part of its mandate, the Freedom Forum examines political coverage across the world and in 2000, the foundation organized global media forums on 'Press, Power and Politics' in a number of countries including Ghana (Karikari, 2000, p. V). The report was written by one of Ghana's foremost journalists and scholars in media studies, Kwame Karikari, a professor at the Department of Communication Studies at the University of Ghana. He also doubles as the Executive Director of the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), a Ghana-based non-profit organization that supports media freedom across Africa. Kwame Karikari is a former director of the state-owned Ghana Broadcasting Corporation.

The 'Press, Power and Politics' report (2000) holds a general view that Ghana has a free and fair media environment in the current dispensation although the independent press often takes a partisan, anti-government stance. The state-owned media also reports thoroughly the ruling government's activities, but in a more muted voice than it used to be. Karikari

observed that in the run-up to Ghana's 2000 election, the international community's attention was focused on Ghana, its elections, and its media. The concern was whether the media would help cement democratic trends in Ghana by providing fair and accurate political coverage, or the incumbent will try to circumvent legitimacy? The general consensus, he noted, was that Ghana survived the test demonstrating democratic values in times of political turmoil for much of the continent. The election in the end was widely hailed as a triumph for democracy as was for Ghana's news media, which covered the campaign intensely.

But this victory has its chequered past. There had been widespread irregularities with repressive laws that prohibited the private press, such as the criminal libel and sedition law that sought to insulate the government from the political heat generated by the private press (Karikari 2000; Tamin and Smith, 2002). The 'Press, Power and Politics' report (2000, p. 3) observed that whilst the 1992 Constitution requires 'fair coverage' of and 'equal access' to all political parties, opposition parties accused the state-owned press of being biased to the advantage of the sitting government. They complained that the government circumvented the state press through a number of actions, including 'punitive transfers' of editors who try to resist its agenda. The private press, which was vigorous and served as the safety net for the opposition parties was also frequently a victim of government crack-downs and libel suits. As at 1999, more than 120 libel cases against the private press were pending, including the Ghanaian Chronicle's landmark fine of nearly \$20,000 in a libel case against a minister of roads and transport (ibid. p. 4).

In June 1999, private newspaper editors Harruna Attah of *The Statesman* and Kweku Baako of *The Guide* were found guilty of contempt of court. Each were fined the equivalent of

US\$5,000 dollars and thrown into prison for 30 days for continuing to publish details on a story involving First Lady Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings after she had launched a libel case against the papers. Earlier in January 2000, the editor of *The Independent* newspaper was also arrested and held overnight by security forces for reporting against military officials. These law suits and the imprisonments of the journalists climaxed the soured relationship between the private press and the NDC party, leading to the 2000 elections. The situation resulted in nationwide protests and the formation of 'The Friends of Free Expression', which was made up of members of the Ghana Journalists Association (GJA). They marched to the Supreme Court in protest during every trial that involved their members under the libel laws.

As a result of this frosty relationship between the private press and the NDC party, the private press in general, excluding those who are overly sympathetic with the NDC party, sought accommodation in the NPP as the party promised to repeal the criminal libel and sedition laws and promote a diverse and fully independent media environment. However, beyond the occasional frosty media environment, the socio-political systems in Ghana as explained in the previous sections suggest a political campaigning environment comparable to contemporary global trends that are to be analyzed in the sections below.

### **3.4 The evolution of Political campaigning in Ghana**

Has political campaigning changed in Ghana? If so, where lies in literature the Ghanaian experience of change in the campaign evolution theory? Has the change occurred consequential to the introduction of democracy and media liberalization as a result of increased awareness and adaptation of practices and technologies from advanced

democracies? Or as a result of challenges offered by the advancement of the Ghanaian society itself?

In the preface to his book, *Election Campaigning in East and Southeast Asia: Globalization of Political Marketing*, Christian Schafferer (2006) noted that Huntington's captivating study on the new wave of democratization that first affected Portugal in 1974 and later swept through most part of the global world caught the attention of many scholars. Schafferer observes that for the most part the democratization process achieved three things: it created several vital processes, such as the conduct of periodic multiparty elections; expanded existing structures to aid the democratization process; and most importantly, changed the relationship between political actors and the people in these countries.

According to Schafferer, the so-called Americanization of electoral campaigning, which implies extensive American influences in campaign practices in the new-wave democracies, is one such change that is mostly referred to by scholars in the new democratization discourse. However, other scholars in political campaigning chart differing perspectives of influence (Blumler et al., 1996; Mancini and Swanson, 1996; Negrine and Papathanassopolous, 1996; Negrine, 1996; Scammell, 1997; Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Some refer to globalization in which diverse experiences from different countries are said to be the contributing factors to local campaign knowledge (Negrine, 1996; Scammell, 1997, p. 3). Others argue for modernization or professionalization of political campaigning to define the trend (Scammell, 1999). The differing descriptions of what is becoming a common set of campaign practices in democracies worldwide demonstrate the divergent opinions to its component parts. This chapter will explore the varied theoretical underpinnings facilitating the emergence of the 'new politics' (Scammell, 1997) in Ghana.

### **3.4.1 The Americanization perspective?**

At a glance, one may argue that Ghana's experience in contemporary campaigning is no doubt influenced by practices from the US as most countries, especially the developing ones, tend to look up to America as the source of 'any good thing one desires on earth'. Scammell defines the Americanization perspective of political campaigning as the US leading trends in modern democratic campaigning worldwide through direct export of American style campaigning; the employment of American consultants abroad; by education through participation, observation and literature of political campaigning; and by the acceptance of the US as a role model of how to run a campaign and how to manipulate media and technology to persuade voters (Scammell, 1997, p. 3).

Scholars of the Americanization perspective of political campaigning argue that the diffusion of expert and expertise from the United States into political campaigning abroad is consequential to the emergence of this new trend globally. It is believed that over the last thirty years, a political campaign consultancy industry, worth over one billion US dollars a year and employing over 7,000 people, has emerged in the United States. This industry, Americanization theorists argue, is forced out of the US due to competition to seek businesses elsewhere; thus their presence in Latin America, Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East (Plasser and Plasser, 2003, pp. 45–46).

In Ghana, and by the 2000 elections, though political actors may not have the financial muscle to hire campaign experts from the US, the country may fall within the latter characterization of the Americanization theory as politicians are likely to refer to the US as a role model. Aided by media channels such as the CNN and Voice of America (VOA), American political campaigning has been accessible to the Ghanaian society in recent times

since the liberalization of the Ghanaian economy in 1992. A party official of the NPP interviewed in March 2008 observed that campaigning in Ghana is now ‘full of drama’ (see Chapter 5 for details), which is almost close to Gitlin’s ‘concocted pageantry for the *hoi polloi*’ characterization of US politics (1991, in Scammell, 1997, p. 1).

Although the Americanization term frequents academic discourse on new trends in campaigning some Americans, for example Lance Bennet and Todd Gitlin, are dismissive of it, according to Scammell (1997). Bennet considers it as an ‘empty ritual’ undeserving to be emulated (Lance Bennett, 1992, p. 144, in Scammell 1997, p. 1). Negrine (1996) also questions the appropriateness of the Americanization thesis as the source of the ‘new politics’ on the basis that America itself sometimes source campaign assistance from Britain, for example. Negrine argues that some countries look up to Britain, and sometimes Europe in general, for modern campaign knowledge instead of America (see the globalization section below). Negrine’s observation is also true in Ghana’s case. In their observation of how the NPP managed its Election 2000 campaign, two of the party officials interviewed (see Chapter 5) cited Britain and Germany alongside the US, as sources for what works in political campaigning. Such references fall within the globalization thesis.

### **3.4.2 The Globalization perspective?**

Could the globalization thesis hold true for Ghana? Borderless news channels such as the BBC, the CNN, and the German national news channel ‘Deutsche Welle’ (DW) continue to beam foreign content, including political campaigning, into the country. In the globalization thesis, scholars (Negrine, 1996; Scammell, 1997, p. 3) believe that sources of knowledge to contemporary democratic campaigning are varied and far more diverse, that even the US may sometimes import expertise from Britain, which examples abound. The British

advertising agency, Saatchi and Saatchi, which consults for the British Conservative Party, independent of the party, is one that is believed to have lent assistance to George Bush's 1992 electoral campaign in the US. The service of Saatchi and Saatchi was also engaged in Russia, Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands (Webb, 1992).

Political parties in Ghana may learn from Britain, the US and other countries through a different kind of arrangement. For example, the democratic process in Ghana is aided by local and international institutions supported by the UK, the US, Germany, and even Japan. These institutions, such as the Frederick Egbert Foundation (FEF), the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) provide training and other assistance to political parties in Ghana. This means transferring knowledge from these countries of association is possible. In a relatively direct way, the two dominant parties in Ghana—the NPP and the NDC—have maintained relationships with their ideological partners in the UK by regularly sending high-level party delegates to attend party political conferences. The parties see these trips as opportunities to learn new things in political organization, fund-raising and voter mobilization, according to the high-ranking party officials of the NPP who attended the British Conservative party conference in Blackpool in October 2007 ([www.myjoyonline.com](http://www.myjoyonline.com), 28 September 2007; accessed on 12 June 2010).

Based on this background, it could be argued that Britain, more than America, influences campaign practices in Ghana. However, given that Ghana's candidate-centred campaigning, which is somewhat like that of the US, differs from the British party-centred system, Ghanaian political parties are most likely to behave as parties do in the US. In this case, Britain and the US may influence and serve as role models to Ghanaian politicians. But this influence is likely to be hampered by indigenous factors such as the electoral system, party

system, media system, and the patterns of partisan identification. In this case, Scammell's observation on modernization, where campaigning techniques are under the influence of indigenous and national events, could hold true for Ghana (1997, p. 3).

### **3.4.3 The Modernization perspective?**

Could Ghana's experience of the 'new politics' be as a matter of modernization driven by the overhaul of its socio-political structures internally? This is the position of the modernization thesis, arguing that indigenous factors are the forces behind the worldwide conduct of contemporary campaigning (Bowler and Farrell, 1992; Butler and Ranney, 1992; Farrell, 1996). Amongst them, the proliferation of mass communication, the collapse of ideological cleavages, a weakening voter-party identification, mass-mediated campaigns and the growth of 'image' politics aimed at voters perceived as more or less consumers. These factors, the modernization thesis argues, have come to characterize most liberal democracies around the globe and are gradually eclipsing traditional forms of voter mobilization, such as political rallies and town hall gathering (Scammell, 1997). In the modernization theory (Mancini and Swanson, 1996; Negrine and Papathanassopolous, 1996; Negrine, 1996; Plasser and Plasser, 2002) the evolution of campaigning is attributable to macro-level structural changes causing gradual modifications to traditional behaviour, styles, and strategies of political actors and their relationship with the media and the electorate.

It is certainly the case that the current mode of political campaigning in Ghana, the relationship between the political parties, the media, and the electorate has been influenced greatly by the liberalization of the Ghanaian economy and the return to democratic rule since 1992, as observed above. The development that ensued, with respect to campaign knowledge, personnel, and technology available for campaigning, have come from mixed

sources. Parties have relied on the expertise of internal party members and have studied indirectly from advanced democracies. However, parties have also reacted to internal changes such as the shrinking of voter support and the deregulation of the media industry to inform political strategies and tactics, according to party officials interviewed.

#### **3.4.4 The Professionalization perspective?**

Professionalization means improved standards of campaigning in modern democracy, especially where individuals with certain skills, techniques, and technology needed in campaigning are hired by the political parties. Of all the theories used to explain the contemporary campaign phenomenon, Scammell (1997, p. 4) observes that ‘professionalization’ (Farrell, 1996; Blumler et al., 1996) is perhaps the umbrella theory under which all research in the area assembles. According to Scammell, theories on contemporary campaigning, as explained above, all allude to personalization and technological sophistry that characterize contemporary democratic campaigning. The theories acknowledge the infusion of strategists and agencies with specialist skills that either replace or complement existing party men at campaign headquarters, especially in areas such as polling, issue development, internet and television presentation, as well as advertising development among others.

In the case of the NPP in Ghana, the various elements of the professionalization theory, such as the infusion of a strategist with specialist skills and the application of marketing techniques in the campaign, were evident. In the first instance, the campaign manager for the NPPs 2000 elections, Jake Obetsebi-Lampsey, is a marketing and advertising specialist who, until his appointment, was the General Manager of an advertising firm in Ghana, A-P Lintas. Through his direction, the party made use of advertising and adopted a number of

campaign approaches parallel to marketing techniques (Interviews PR-1, PR-2, and PR-3; March, 2008). Where the NPPs approach may differ from the general frame of the professionalization thesis is that Jake and many other campaign officials of the NPP were not external experts hired for the purpose of the campaign, but were card-bearing members who functioned as NPP party leaders as well. This position of interest might influence their views in managing the campaign, as against a professional from the outside who might have managed the campaign from an entirely professional perspective. Nevertheless, the expertise that Jake and his team brought to bear may not be different from that of an external individual employed by the party.

Despite the various schools of thought in the study of contemporary campaigning, of which political marketing is part, evidence in Ghana suggests a mixture of all the above. It is noted that as a result of the socio-political changes since 1992, political parties and their operatives have adopted what is perceived as good political campaign practices from Western democracies through a number of means, directly and indirectly—for example, observing political campaigns from Britain and the US through the media, participating in electioneering campaign conferences, and receiving training and logistical support from local and international development agencies and their associates working in the country. Based on this background, are political parties in Ghana following the global trend of political marketing? According to the thesis, they are. The thesis explains this position with the NPP's campaign approaches in the 2000 elections, a brief of which is provided in the following section.

### **3.5 The emergence of Political Marketing in Ghana**

Ghana's election in the year 2000 was considered 'a remarkable transition' by Handly and Mills (2001, p. 5). This was because it gave hope for the establishment of continuous democratic processes in the country, especially being the first time the nation witnessed a transfer of power from one democratic government to another through the ballot box. The new political era brought about by the 2000 elections generated series of discussions amongst the academic, journalists, and other groups in order to understand the underpinning structures that ensured its uniqueness and the quality of organization and participation (Youde, 2005; Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Ayee, 2000). Part of these underpinnings was the 'innovation' of political campaigning offered to Ghanaians by the major political parties, especially the New Patriotic Party (NPP), to effectively engage voters and to out-shine competitors using marketing instruments and techniques, as I have also argued elsewhere (Mensah, 2006). The approach was ingenious in the Ghanaian context and truly reflected global trends and, according to electoral observers (Handly and Mills, 2001; Nugent, 2001; Smith, 2002; Ninsin, 2006), these trends seemed positive overall, although they posed some challenges. Before examining NPP's approach to the Election 2000, a brief introduction into the party's background prior to the elections is necessary.

In the years since its establishment, the NPP tradition has evolved from the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) to the United Party (UP), the Progress Party (PP) and now the New Patriotic Party (NPP) (Anebo, 1997; Carbone, 2003). In ideological positions, the NPP tradition is often aligned to the centre-right of its opponents (Nugent, 2001; Carbone, 2003, p. 9). They pride themselves with 'political moderacy', espousing multiparty democracy, individual rights and liberties, and the rule of law (Anebo, 1997). They encourage a property-owning society where the individual is at the centre of both the creation and

distribution of wealth. Its traditional electoral constituency is largely the business and the social elite, mostly found in the urban centres of the country. It is also largely supported by what could be referred to as the ‘rural upper class’ made up of chiefs, elders, and opinion-leaders of such communities, and most importantly, the rural rich who own large tracts of cocoa farms, according to the NPP official interviewed in March, 2008 (see Chapter 5).

However, in general, it is common knowledge in Ghana that the NPP tradition is firmly rooted in the middle belt of the country geographically, especially in the Eastern, Brong Ahafo and the Ashanti regions; areas that readily come to mind when one refers to the party’s support base and unfortunately, one that comes to haunt the party as ‘tribal’ in its looks. Critics say the party’s leadership and followership profile looks more ‘Akanistic’, as the majority of its leaders and supporters are from the Akan tribe in Ghana. Also, as a consequence of its demographic cohorts in leadership and followership, the party has further earned the unpleasant label of being ‘elitist’, as it tends to be led, supported, and sympathized by the elite in Ghana since its formation in 1947. Although leaders of the party had previously played down views and the effect of perceived sectarianism, voters’ perception of the NPP as ‘tribal’ and ‘elitist’ have dogged the party since independence and have become the bane of the party’s perennial electoral misfortunes until the 2000 elections. But in the 2000 elections a different breed of leadership attitude led to a different kind of strategy to address the perennial issue.

As part of the overarching objective to gain the majority votes to win the elections, the party set itself a critical task of ridding itself of the perceived sectarian image of being tribal, elitist, anti-migrant and Christian-dominated. To achieve that, areas seen as endemic and prone to such perception had to be targeted—hence the party’s focus on the Volta region,

the three Northern territories: Upper West, Upper East and Northern regions, and the Greater Accra region. Muslims, rural, and suburban dwellers such as the Zongos were also part of the battlegrounds (see Chapters 5 and 6).

To understand what underpinned the changes to the party's organizing behaviour since the 2000 elections, a pilot of this research was first conducted in 2004 using in-depth interviews with electoral observers of the Ghanaian elections. This was followed by another round of face-to-face interviews in 2007 with the head of the NPP's 2000 campaign team and an NDC campaign official. And in March 2008, eight officials from the NPP's leadership were also interviewed for the purposes of this thesis. In all these interviews, it was noted that changes first began with the NPP when in opposition at the 2000 elections, followed by the NDC in 2004, and other parties later followed suit. The significant development noted was the use of advertising techniques in the form of paid commercial billboards, slogans, and jingles on television and radio and other approaches parallel to marketing techniques and strategies such as marketing intelligence, segmentation, targeting, and branding.

In an interview with an elections observer from the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) in 2004, the official noted the use of commercial billboards as marketing companies do, as part of the changing behaviour of parties, saying:

Political parties have become a little bit more 'savvier' than before, employing huge monstrous commercial electronic billboards at major intersections as compared to those small sign boards at street sides and corners in the olden days. The developments of video clips, jingles and slogans were heavily utilized. Most of the TV commercials were shown with massive supporters at political rallies; videos of underdeveloped areas of the nation were shown by the opposition parties. What was again notable was the

development of single message: the Positive Change camp and the Continuity camp.

(Interview, Agyeman-Duah, 2004).

The above techniques were part of the NPP's grand design of being visible and competitive. According to a party official, the billboards and TV commercials were crucial in winning the 2000 elections, as they offered the party the lead in projecting itself, making them visible across the country from the major road networks to the smallest village (see Chapter 5). This was in addition to 'free media' as a result of the emergence of FM radio stations that needed content and were competing to get significant personalities to appear on their programmes.

Not only did the party leadership employ marketing techniques in communications, but also in organization and management of political activities, especially in framing policies and campaign messages. According to top-ranking party officials interviewed (PR-1 and PR-2), who were also senior members of the NPP 2000 campaign team, intelligence-gathering was seen as important to understand what electors' views were on a range of issues, including the performance of the incumbent administration, what Ghanaians wanted, as well as how people perceived the NPP. In his response to the questions on what were the changes to the party's organizing behaviour, this is what he had to say:

If you don't get down to the grassroot, your perception may be flawed, so you listen to the people when they talk. I have been a grassroot politician from day one, so I will go to the women at Makola (one of the biggest indigenous Ghanaian market), the taxi ranks. They will talk to you and you get the sense that look there is something happening. (PR-1 and PR-2 Interview, March 2008. See Chapter 5 for details).

The views above are a sample of an elaborate data set to be analyzed more fully in Chapters 5 and 6 that identify the political campaign techniques employed by the NPP in managing the 2000 elections. The approach in 2000, according to the NPP leadership, was a change from the past when the party relied extensively on campaign rallies as the main staple in campaigning—a practice that was ineffective and unfocused, in hindsight, according to the party leadership interviewed, but was seen otherwise then.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

In this chapter, it is noted that the employment of marketing professionals, market research, segmentation, targeting, branding, advertising, and other marketing techniques has come to characterize modern political campaigning globally. The use of these techniques and expertise for party organization and management has become widespread in the US and UK, and in the case of Ghana the practice has just begun. The case study of Ghana suggests that a number of these techniques, to be explored further in later chapters, have occurred in the organization of the NPP's campaign in the 2000 elections.

From the understanding that modern practices of campaigning emanates from the US, or as a result of global forces or internal changes, the chapter attempts to understand under which of these sources of influence could Ghana's experience be aligned. Again, the chapter attempts to demonstrate whether really what we have in Ghana could be understood as political marketing, as reviewed in Chapter 2. In this direction, references were made to historic and contemporary case studies from the US and UK in an attempt to identify the tools and techniques that were used in the campaigns and are considered within the domain of political marketing. These are then compared to those used in contemporary Ghanaian political campaigning to understand the parallels and the differences. In the end, it was

noted that political marketing had indeed emerged in Ghana, comparing the campaign of the NPP and that of the global case studies. However, detailed analysis of the NPP's approach to the 2000 elections is needed to understand which tools and techniques were at play and paralleled commercial marketing practice. This is addressed in the remaining chapters of this thesis after the method chapter below.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **Methodology**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

The research is a study of the electioneering campaign approaches of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in the 2000 general elections in Ghana. The period under study was the entire electoral year from January to December 2000. This is because the NPP started the campaign season early in that electoral cycle as they selected their presidential candidate two years in advance. The 2000 Ghanaian general election was chosen due to its perceived competitiveness since constitutional rule was restored in 1992. This is when, for the first time in the nation's history, political power changed hands through the ballot box. It is also perceived as when political campaigning became sophisticated, making significant use of marketing concepts and techniques such as commercialized television and radio advertisements, billboards, and other approaches new to the Ghanaian political environment, especially by the two main parties, the NPP and NDC (Ayee, 2002, p. 162; Gyimah-Boadi, 2001).

The main field work, which was conducted in March and April 2008, was preceded by a preliminary study in 2007 with the objective of shaping the research questions, developing contacts, and building rapport with target respondents, especially those of the party under study, the New Patriotic Party (NPP). In the preliminary study, two politicians from the two main parties in Ghana, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the NPP were interviewed, each lasting for an hour long. The first interview was with a Member of Parliament (MP) of the NDC and the second was with a Minister in the NPP administration at the time. The interviews were followed by a workshop at the British Council in Ghana, organized with the support of the Chartered Institute of Marketing (CIM), Ghana Chapter.

Attended by fifty participants who were marketing, and media practitioners and students, the hour-long workshop titled ‘Understanding the use of marketing in the Ghanaian politics’ contributed in shaping the research questions for the main study, and offered diverse and insightful perspectives on how marketing has been used in Ghanaian politics. For example, participants observed that political marketing in Ghana could only be compared to ‘transactional’ as opposed to ‘relational’ marketing, since political parties only ‘recruit’ for votes during election times. This insight, for example, was helpful as it offered the awareness to probe further claims by interviewees that the NPP had a network of institutions that they met regularly in consultation for policy developments, way before the elections.

#### **4.2 The field work**

The research used a number of different approaches to data collection in order to bring together material that would help answer the main questions that underpin this work. Three main sources of information were used for this research: a selection of media items, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions. This approach provides the opportunity to combine the strengths of each method, cross-reference data, and to seek clarifications on emergent themes that arise in each of the data sources. The identification and selection of the study’s sources of data was based on the researcher’s local knowledge of Ghanaian politics, being a Ghanaian himself and having been in Ghana before and after the 2000 elections. Therefore, the study’s sample was purposefully selected, restricting data sources to those that could offer the needed insights to the research questions (Patton, 1990; Neuman, 2000). Each of these sources of information is described more fully below. The study thus selected 20 respondents for the in-depth interviews and a total of 100 respondents for the focus group discussions (FGDs).

It is important to mention that data for this research was collected almost eight years after the elections in 2000. As a result, there were challenges in the collection of data such as limited access to archival materials for the media analysis. Media institutions and major research institutions in Ghana, such as the Public Records and Archives Administration (PRAAD), carry little of such data due to cost implications.

Also, it was expected that there would be issues of interviewees' and focus group participants' recollections of events leading to the election that could impact on their accounts of these events. However, due to the unprecedented nature of that election, as already mentioned in Chapter 3, such issues did not emerge. This is because the respondents of the interviews, for example, were mainly academics and media practitioners who were active observers of the 2000 elections and have been teaching and commenting on it at various platforms. The remaining were party executives who played key roles in the NPP campaign. Members of the focus groups also had good memory of the events leading to the elections and had prompted each other, in addition to the researcher's interventions, for recollection when necessary.

#### **4.2.1 The review of the Media Items**

Seven news media titles were chosen for the media analysis, as listed in the table below. The selection of the seven media titles for the review was based on my local knowledge of the Ghanaian society, knowing that these titles represent some of the leading outlets with wider coverage of the Ghanaian society in terms of geographical reach and in content. With the exception of *The Daily Graphic* newspaper, which is state-owned and claims to follow a policy of 'political neutrality', the remaining are some of the most influential privately owned newspapers in Ghana. In ideological terms, *Crusading Guide* is aligned to the left of

the political spectrum but was (and still is) sympathetic to the centre-right NPP party, and *The Ghana Palaver* is sympathetic to the NPP's main competitor, the centre-left NDC. *The Statesman* is a self-acclaimed centre-right newspaper alongside *The Independent* and *The Ghanaian Chronicle* newspapers. However, the latter tends to have a 'maverick', independent-minded posture with the habitual freewill of criticizing and praising whichever ideological tradition it chooses. Joy FM online, the only radio station listed, is one of the most listened-to private radio broadcasts in the country, and its online platform is equally popular amongst Ghanaians. It is believed to be the first commercial radio station to be established when the deregulation of the industry took place. A detailed profile of the media titles is located in Appendix 1, Table A1.4.

The majority of the media items were sourced from PRAAD in Ghana in March and April 2008 during the field trip in that country and the remaining were retrieved online as PRAAD did not have all the materials on the shelf. The following is a list of the media titles selected, and the number of items sampled for each of the genres: news reports (NRs), advertising (ADs) and advertorials (ADVs).

**Table 4.1 A list of media titles and items selected.**

News Media Title	News Report (NR)	Advertisement (AD)	Advertorials (ADV)	Total Items
Daily Graphic	11	8	9	28
The Independent	3	4	0	7
Joy FM online	6	0	0	4
The Statesman	10	6	0	16
The Chronicle	1	1	0	2
Crusading Guide	6	0	0	6
Ghana Palaver	15	5	0	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>85</b>

In this research, media analysis of the NPP campaign refers to a review of news stories, advertisements and advertorials. The objectives of the review of the media items were to understand how:

- news stories mirrored, constructed, and projected the perceived image of the New Patriotic Party and its candidate to the people of Ghana
- the NPP party sought to construct and project itself to the people of Ghana using the media within the period under review.

The research suggests that as part of the NPP's objectives to influence the voting decisions of the electorate, and to change perceptions of its image, the party and its agents employed certain persuasive themes, as brands do (Potter and Wetherell 1987; Daymon and Holloway, 2002), in their media interaction with voters. In this direction, two different approaches are identified: an indirect approach through candidate and party functionaries' speeches carried by news media reports and a direct approach through paid advertising and advertorials.

According to Daymon and Holloway (2002, p. 140), analyzing the media is useful to understand the political as well as the socio-cultural contexts in which both natural and contrived forms of talk and text occur. It also can reveal the intent of the text producer as social text actively constructs objects, events, and categories pre-existing on the social world and do things with social and political implications (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p. 6; Daymon and Holloway, 2002, p. 141). Thus, the research seeks to understand what it is that news stories, advertisements, and advertorials on the NPP aimed to achieve; how they intended to achieve those aims and the underlying nuances and implications. In this

direction, themes and rhetorical devices used in the texts are identified and their socio-political implications are explored.

For the sample size of the analysis of the media titles, the study initially selected 133 media items from the seven selected titles based on the mention of Election 2000 and related words in the headlines. They were further reduced to 85 items, and at this stage only items with NPP in the headline were selected for analysis. Where a story headline mentions Election 2000 but its lead is found to focus on a party other than the NPP, that story is rejected. Similarly, a story is rejected if its dateline is found to be outside the period under review, which is January to December 2000. In short, the 5Ws and an H framework of news analysis was applied in the sample process (Bell 2001, p. 66). This framework answers the questions: What was the story? Who was involved? When did it take place? Where did it take place? Why did it happen? How did it happen? These questions were directed at the headlines, the lead paragraphs, the main paragraphs, and the supporting quotes in the stories (Bell, 2001, p. 68).

In the selection of the advertisements and advertorials, because they generally had the party name NPP, the name of the candidate Kufuor, or the policy (the 'positive change agenda') boldly printed at the top of the main text, all the ads and advertorials that featured in the initial 133 newspaper items got selected. They were few, needless to say, and repetitive due to the cost involved in their production. They only appeared in the latter stages of the campaign period because Ghanaian parties generally operate on a low budget. They do not have resources to support a paid media campaign for the long haul. All repetitive ads and advertorials were counted as one. For the distribution of items across media and types, see Table 4.1 above.

In the analysis, Bell's framework (see Appendix 2, Figure A2.1) was also deemed a suitable guide for analyzing both the news stories and ads and advertorial texts in addition to Van Dijk's cognitive analytical framework (see the section on analytical framework below). Although texts of advertising and the advertorial may not include all the elements such as the journalist byline that a news story may carry, advertising and advertorial texts carry the attribution and abstract, and sometimes a full story, which are also part of news story analysis. According to Bell, there is a link between the stories that people tell and their social identity, and so is the construction of life story part of our self-identity (2001, p. 64). This includes news stories, and the media as a social institution, with politicians and journalists as stakeholders. The media and the news stories they produce increasingly shape and reflect the cultural, political, and social life of stakeholders. This is reflected in stories journalists write: in structure, order, opinions, and values (Bell, 2001, p. 64).

Thus, Bell identifies the branches of a story that need to be analyzed as: attribution, abstract, and the story itself. Attribution indicates the source of the story, the place and the time. This is usually illustrated in the journalist byline and the dateline. In this research, attribution also refers to sources such as the political candidate, the party, party functionaries etc. to whom quotations and phrases in the analyzed texts are attributed. As observed by Bell (2001, p. 67), the main story may have explicit attribution to an information source. The abstract consists of the headline and the lead sentence, or the 'intro' of the news story and the lead covers the central event of the story and possibly one or more secondary events. This also includes information on the actors and the setting involved in the event. The abstract is then extended in the main story, indicating the events involved, and describes actors and actions. The main story also indicates the time and place of the events (Bell, 2001, p. 67).

Through the above guidelines the 85 sampled media items were subjected to an in-depth interrogation, looking for themes in the following: Who was being addressed by the party? What persuasive mechanisms were being employed? Who was representing the party? At which location was the discourse taking place? What was the party trying to achieve? How was the audience being addressed— collectively or individually? And how was the party being portrayed in the discourse? Again, these questions are directed at the headlines, the abstracts, and the main stories as illustrated in Bell’s framework above. After this stage, analytical themes are formed and are used to identify further data in the next stage of the analysis process, which is under the analytical framework section, further on in this chapter.

#### **4.2.2 The In-depth Interviews**

This section of the data collection was aimed at:

- generating specific inner experiences, opinions, attitudes, and feelings on the approaches the NPP party employed in the 2000 elections, from individuals that were part of the campaign decision-making and operations.
- finding out from political observers their assessments, drawing from previous electoral examples within and outside Ghana, on how the NPP’s approach compares in order to identify parallels, distinctive features, and to determine future trends.

Based on the above objectives, the research selected as interviewees eight party officials, three of whom were part of the party leadership involved in the campaign and other strategic party decisions, one former MP and five lower-ranked party officials involved in day-to-day operational activities such as organizing constituency meetings, door-to-door campaigning

at local constituency levels etc. All these officials have worked in various capacities with the party since 1992, when multiparty democracy was returned to Ghana, and have been members of the party even before then. In the main text of the thesis, responses of the party interviewees are identified with the code **PR**, meaning ‘party respondents’ as a means to comply with the promise of anonymity offered to respondents prior to the data-gathering exercise. This is also within the University of Sheffield’s research ethics guidelines. Therefore, **PR-1**, for example, indicates a party respondent number 1, in that order. However, a detailed profile of the party respondents is located in Appendix 1, Table A1.2.

Seven academic respondents were selected from the department of political science, the School of Communications and from the Sociology departments, all of the University of Ghana in Accra for the second strand of interviews. The academics were chosen based on the researcher’s knowledge of them in the literature on Ghanaian politics and campaigning. These academics have published extensively on Ghanaian politics, including the 2000 general elections. In addition, a final set of five media practitioners and analysts were selected. These media practitioners and analysts are well known in Ghana, and their opinions are widely sought on public debate on politics, policy and governance. Again, academic and media respondents in the main text are identified as **AR** and **MR** respectively, with detailed profile of these respondents located in Appendix 1, Tables A1.1 and A1.3.

In all these interviews, a semi-structured method with four open-ended questions was used (see Chapter 1, section 1.2). A semi-structured interview permits flexibility, the use of probes and invitations (May 1997, p. 109). It allows the changing and ordering of questions, modifying existing ones, and addressing new questions that were beforehand not part of the research questions. The approach also permits interviewees to expand on issues they raise in

their own terms rather than would be the case of using a structured interview technique. In this research, although specified questions and themes were used in all the interviews, questioning respondents according to this list varied depending on their responses, as additional questions outside the list were sometimes necessary to clarify some points raised by the interviewee. All interviews in this study were conducted on a one-to-one basis and in a face-to-face situation between the months of March and April, 2008. Each interview lasted for an hour in the interviewees' offices.

#### **4.2.3 The Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)**

The focus group discussion (FGD) was to assess whether the NPP's campaign approaches influenced and impacted on voters' decision-making, as the research suggests. On the heels of the in-depth interviews, two focus group discussions were held in each of the five regions visited between the months of March and April, 2008. Each FGD had 10 participants, making a total of 100 respondents. The sampled regions were Greater Accra, Northern, Upper West, Volta, and the Ashanti regions. The Ashanti and Volta regions are known for their allegiance to the NPP and the NDC respectively. The remaining three regions, Greater Accra, the Northern and Upper West, are neither stable nor swing towards both parties although the NDC had been dominant over the NPP in the last two previous elections, 1992 and 1996. It must be noted that the electoral profile of the regions are not reflective of the focus groups themselves, or as the basis upon which participants were chosen.

For sampling, a chain or snowballing approach was used (Goodman, 1961). Members of the FGD were chosen with the help of the Student Representative Council (SRC) on the various campuses. Individuals who were initially contacted were asked to recommend someone who is within the age bracket and would be willing to partake in the process. These contacts took

place on the same day that the discussions were held, and members were contacted at their locations about two hours prior to the discussion time. For the FGDs held at the light industrial area, market centres, and transport terminals, the same process used in the first round of FGDs on University and Polytechnic campuses was used. Authorities of these places were contacted for their assistance in getting members to participate and to provide suitable locations within their vicinities for the discussions. This approach ensured a 100 per cent turnout as replacements were sought for those who made known their unavailability. Again, the high participating turnout was as a result of the area of discussion, as the 2000 general election is perceived by many as one of the historic events in Ghana that people would always like to share opinions on. Finally, and most insignificantly, interests were also boosted by the provision of accessories marked with the University of Sheffield emblem as gifts; mugs, pens, key holders etc.

Regarding the profile of the FGD participants, the first group was made of mature students selected from the University of Ghana (UG, Legon) in the Greater Accra region, the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST, Kumasi) in the Ashanti region, the University of Development Studies (UDS, WA and Nyankpala campuses) in Upper West and Northern regions, and Ho Polytechnic in the Volta region. The reason for this group was the possibility that they would understand the concept, the marketing in politics at least, and be able to express their observation based on this understanding. It was also to enable diversity and discussion on ethnicity and religion, the two most dominant themes in Ghanaian politics, and their effect on voting decisions other than marketing. The only qualifying criteria were that respondents must have been 18 years old or more during the 2000 elections and must have observed the process directly in Ghana. The second group was made up of ordinary electorate chosen from market places, lorry stations, and industrial

areas of the regions visited. The qualifying criteria for such a member were the same as for the first group. However, the difference between this group and the first is the language used for discussions. Whereas English was used for discussions in the student groups, one of the major Ghanaian languages, Twi, was used in the second group. Although all the regions in Ghana have their own indigenous languages, most people could understand and express themselves in basic Twi.

Proponents of FGDs observe that the process is appropriate, amongst others, when there is the need to explore nuances of opinions on an issue and to understand factors that influence opinions or behaviour and differences in perspectives as people identify and clarify their accounts in ways that could be less accessible in a one-to-one interview (Merton et al, 1956; Morgan, 1988). In terms of questioning, a list of open-ended questions, formulated in themes, was used. However, questions were adapted as and when necessary. For example, in the two regions located in the north of the country, the effect of religion on voting decisions was one of the key questions. Participants were asked whether they considered voting for the party that had a Muslim as a leader or in the leadership. This is because of the perceived role that religion and ethnicity play in Ghanaian political campaigns. Hence specific questions were asked to probe this particular issue. All focus group discussions lasted for an hour and were held at the working locations of the participants, the first group being on the University campuses and the second at markets, lorry stations, and a light industrial area called 'Magazine' (Adeya, 2006, p. 2) in Kumasi, the Ashanti region.

In each of the discussions, the researcher was the moderator, leading the discussions, keeping the conversation flowing and taking some notes to remember comments that needed clarification later on as the discussion progressed. However, the researcher was aided by an

assistant moderator whose task was to take comprehensive notes, operate the tape recorder, and hand it over to respondents as they took turns to speak. The assistant moderator was also in charge of logistics, such as refreshments and handing out gifts, and keeping track of time.

### **4.3 The Analytical Framework**

In the analysis, the study employed thematic and textual analysis frameworks. In this direction, not only does the research focus on identifying what themes the party used in framing its campaign, as noted in Table 4.2 below, but also attention was paid to the kind of rhetorical devices employed in introducing these themes in news stories, advertisements, and advertorials in a way that could lend explanation to the kind of expected impact on the audience. Hence, varied frameworks were applied, including Van Dijk's cognitive analytical framework (1995), Aristotle's rhetorical analysis (Ryan, 1992) for news and advertising and advertorial analysis, Bell's framework (2001) for newspaper analysis, and Wetherell and Potter's interpretative repertoires (1988) for interview and focus group analysis.

In news analysis, Van Dijk's cognitive analytical framework argues that manipulation of power is always evident in the production and retrieval of text, such as the news stories in the press (1995, 1988, 1984) in which the producer attempts to impose a certain line of ideas on the receiver through persuasion of some kind. And in this direction, it is necessary to analyze the contexts within which discourse occurs, looking out for its historical, political, or social background as well as its main participating parties. For example, the analysis should attempt to understand the power relations involved by identifying the social function of a political candidate's speech, such as how ideological rhetoric is shaped to co-opt readers to take sides, and in this case noting positive and negative opinions in 'us versus

them' dimensions, as well as making explicit the presupposed and the implied. The analysis also examined the lexical choice and syntactic structure, in order to understand how opinions are encoded and the possibility of its acceptance and comprehension by the target recipients. These have been identified as key phrases in Chapter 6, Table 6.1.

From the perspectives of advertisement and advertorial analysis, persuasion frameworks in NPP ads and advertorials are observed where contexts and text structures are taken note of. Ad and advertorial texts aim to impose the producer or the owners' views on the receiver or the consumer using certain persuasion devices. Writing on the analysis of advertisement, McQuarrie and Mick (1996, p. 424) state that the central concern of advertising has always been the method and the manner in which to discover the most effective way to express thought in a given situation. They observe that advertisement has many functions, part of which is to sustain attention and encourage a recall of the advertisement using persuasion devices. However, the central concern of this research goes beyond the attention-seeking and sustaining functions of ads. The research focuses on exploring the 'affective' or 'transformational' function with which ads aim to alter potential audiences' beliefs to the benefit of the advertised brand. This function of an ad could be achieved in three different instances:

The first instance, 'vicarious classical conditioning' (Bandura and Rosenthal, 1966; Puto and Wells, 1983) is when the portrayal of a social model's response to a brand in an ad is expected to induce the same response in the observer or the consumer of that ad. This is because the source character in the ad, which is the social model, is seen as 'credible' or 'ethical' and as a result, the audience of the ad becomes convinced by this character. This mode of persuasion is referred to as the *ethos*-self (credible or ethical, for example) that is

projected (Wallace-Lewis, 2005). Eugene Ryan, drawing from Aristotle, observes that *ethos* ‘might be translated roughly as “character” or “moral character”’ (Ryan, 1992, p. 294). Hence, persuasion on the basis of *ethos* is effected through speech when one possesses three things, namely: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill ... which inspire confidence in the orator’s own character ... and that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it. Anyone who is thought to have all three of these good qualities will inspire trust in his audience (Ross, 2010, p. 60).

In the second instance, Clyne’s model of generalized emotions (1980) suggests that the evocation of an emotional state attributable to the advertised brand could affect potential consumers’ psychological state when they go ahead to consume or experience the brand after being exposed to the ad. This second mode of persuasion in the ad is referred to as *pathos*. Again, *pathos* equates ‘passion’ or ‘emotion’ and could be defined as persuading by appealing to the reader’s emotions, according to Ryan (1992, p. 294). In reference to Braet, Ryan notes that in situations where there is not enough ground for a rational argument to win over one’s listeners, one must make an appeal to *ethos* and *pathos*, i.e. aligning one’s perspective on values with those of the listeners, and using words that will carry with them an appeal to the feelings of the listeners (Ryan, 1992, p. 294).

The third and final instance is the use of logical reasoning where an ad uses data-supported evidence to make its claims. This final stage is called *logos*. Aristotle defines *logos* as the process of effecting persuasion through logic (Ross, 2010). According to Deighton (1985), advertisement is designed within this framework in the sense that it intends to influence an audience with a set of assertions (Deighton, 1985, p. 433). This means that for an ad to influence, it must be able to support its claim with evidence in the form of either an


experience recalled from memory by the person exposed to the ad or by a source the person considers as credible and verifiable (1985, p. 433). Based on these persuasion devices, the research investigates the basis of which NPP advertisements and advertorials were designed, either based on moral, emotive, or logical reasoning.

For the analysis of the interviews and focus group discussions, Wetherell and Potter's (1988) interpretative repertoires framework was used. According to them, the individual's accounts of the same phenomenon are likely to contain 'relatively internally consistent, bounded language units' which they use to construct versions of the phenomenon (Wetherell and Potter, 1988, p. 171). In this case, what is of interest for analysis is 'the regularity that exists in the elements used by different speakers to describe the same person, event, or a thing' (McKenzie 2005, p. 2). Based on this understanding of media items, interview and focus group transcripts were read on several occasions, identifying portions of texts that are relatively consistent and are of meaning to the topic under study.

In other words, I look out for a term or phrase that reflects a form of opinion about specific issues that could relate to broader notions such as *party behaviour*, *policy benefits* or the *candidate personality*. These portions of texts, labelled as *attributes*, were classified into two levels: first-level attributes and second-level attributes. This is a grounded and systematic process in which the labels for the codes are taken directly from the text (Holstein and Gubrium, 2003). After this process, all *level two attributes* were allocated to their corresponding level one attributes and all *level one attributes* were categorized under the five broader *themes* illustrated in Table 4.2 below. Quotations illustrating these attributes and themes are identified and used as bases for building the discussions of the findings.

Based on the above explanation, the entire process of data collection and analyses could be described as a three-stage process by which: (a) sampled data text was generated based on the research questions, forming the main themes; (b) segments of texts related to these themes, known as attributes, are identified and categorized in two levels: first level attributes and second level attributes; (c) contextual explanations are offered using quotations derived from the media texts and transcripts of both interviews and FGD discussions. This three-stage process is illustrated in Figure 4.1 below.

**Figure 4.1 Analytical framework: A three-stage model of analysis**



Legends: *A1 = First level Attributes; A2 = Second level Attributes*

Sources: Adapted from Ingeborg Astrid Kleppe and Lena Larsson Mossberg (2002), 'Company versus Country Branding: Same, Same but Different.' SNF-Report No. 45/02

**Table 4.2 Themes and attributes for analysis**

<b>Themes</b>	<b>Attributes</b>
<b>Party image</b>	<i>ideology, tradition, history, track record, tribe, religion, class, behaviour, organizational structure and capacity to function</i>
<b>Candidate image</b>	<i>personality, competence, ideology, track record, tribe, religion, class, behaviour,</i>
<b>Policy</b>	<i>issue position, social benefits, Internally driven (party-oriented), externally driven (voter-oriented),</i>
<b>Message formulation</b>	<i>ethos-oriented content, pathos-oriented content, logos-oriented content,</i>
<b>Audience</b>	<i>demography: men, women, young adult, geographic, Individual, Identifiable groups: party groups, tribal groups, professional groups</i>

Note: the themes and attributes in this table were generated from the analysis of the 85 sampled news report (nr), advertisement (ad) and advertorial (adv) items, and transcripts of interviews and FGD discussions based on the analytical framework in Figure 4.1 above.

#### **4.4 Instruments used in data collection**

Instrumentation in this research refers to gadgets and materials that facilitated the data collection process from respondents' recruitment to data-capturing and analysis (Rudestam and Newton, 2001, p. 95). They include interviewer introductory letter, interview guide, tape recorder, pens and note pads, external hard drives, flash pen drives, University paraphernalia as gifts for respondents, and data transcription software and a computer (laptop during field work and a PC during transcription). Patton (1990, p. 347) observes that notwithstanding the style or research tool appropriated in a research, data capture is very important. The aim is to carefully and fairly record interviewees' words in the same way they were authored in order to interpret, analyze, and make sense of at a later date. Data capture or recording can take many forms ... video and audio tape recordings, note-taking etc.

The interviewer's introductory letter was prepared by the researcher's supervisor, introducing the researcher and the research to prospective respondents. The letter also assured respondents of the researcher's good conduct and the protection of their identity and responses within the confines of the University's research ethics code of practice. The interview guide, which was developed by the researcher in consultation with the supervisor, highlighted the reasons behind each research question (see Chapter 1). To motivate respondents and to show appreciation, accessories such as key holders, badges, and pens bearing the University's emblem were offered as gifts to all participants. In the case of the FGDs, respondents were further refreshed with soft drinks.

In this research, audio taping was used in order to allow the researcher to pay attention to the interviewees' responses. Short notes were taken on 'prompts' that needed expansion and

clarification. The limitations to the data capture instruments used are that whereas the tape recorder can break down, the excessive use of note-taking could disrupt attention. However, none of these limitations occurred during the field work in this research. The researcher ensured that the tape recorder had a reachable battery capable of supplying a sustained and reliable power to operate the device. Note-taking was also kept at a minimum throughout the process. Regarding data storage, flash pen drives and external hard drives were used in addition to the storage of the computer, to ensure maximum protection against data loss. They were also 'password secured' in order to avoid unauthorized access or possible data theft.

Another part of instrumentation is the data transcription process. Data transcription is the translation of the voice data captured on a recorder into a text format so as to enable references, analysis, and replication. It could be an expensive exercise. The Minnesota centre for social research gives an estimated ratio of 4:1 as the data-transcribing time to tape time. In other words, e.g. it takes someone an estimated time of four hours to transcribe some hour-long tape-recorded data (Patton, 1990, p. 349). Patton observes two methods of data-transcription, which are full or partial transcription. The latter is when resources are limited, insufficient, and cannot support the former. In this case, interview notes are compared with sections of the recorded data to sieve out quotations and observations that are particularly important for data analysis and interpretation (ibid. p. 350).

Full transcription, on the other hand, is the opposite of the partial. Full copy of the recorded data, not merely particular quotations and observations, are transferred into text for thorough analysis and interpretation. Using speech-to-text data transcription software, this research appropriated full transcription in order to ensure a thorough analysis of interviewees' views

and opinions to be able to match them against the themes and concepts used in the research. In transcribing the recorded in-depth interviews and the focus group discussions, a software called 'Transcriber 1.5.1 for Windows' was used.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

In conclusion, this chapter outlined the processes through which data was gathered and analysed. It defined the research as a qualitative case study situated within the realist view of the social world (Hitchcock and Hughes, 1995; Cavaye, 1996; May, 1997). It demonstrated in detail how a three-tier data analysis framework incorporating both deductive and inductive means of investigation (Rothchild, 2006, p. 5) was used to reduce inherent biases.

As data sources, the research employed a triangulation of media items, interviews, and focus group discussions. The media items involved news stories, advertisement, and advertorials. The interviewees were politicians, academic and media practitioners, and the members of the focus groups' discussions were adults who took part in the 2000 elections. The processes through which the data sources were selected are also detailed in this chapter.

In analyzing the data, thematic and discourse analysis frameworks were used, drawing on the models of van Dijk, Bell, Aristotle, and Wetherell and Potter. All these models allowed text coding and categorization of the codes into broader themes according to the research area, questions, and the objectives (Holstein and Gubrium, 2003; Morgan, 1997). The first set of frameworks were van Dijk's (1995, 1988, 1984) cognitive analytical framework and Bell's (2001) model discourse structure for news texts. These looked at the NPP's attempts in shaping its identity in media discourse. The second were frameworks on analyzing

advertising discourse that draws on Aristotle's persuasion theory (Deighton, 1985; McQuarrie and Mick, 1996; Puto and Wells, 1984; Bandura and Rosenthal, 1966; Clynes, 1980) located in consumer research. These frameworks are located in persuasion theory and were applied to investigate the persuasive mechanisms used by the NPP campaign to 'affect', 'alter', or 'reinforce' the belief systems of potential readers. The final framework, interpretative repertoires by Wetherell and Potter, was concerned with identifying and categorizing into broader themes common units of 'language' reflective of the research subject used by the respondents in the interviews and focus group discussions to describe their versions of the NPP's campaign in the 2000 elections.

## CHAPTER 5

### Analysis of the In-depth Interviews

#### 5.1 Introduction

The in-depth interview section of the research was conducted to provide context to the findings of the media analysis in Chapter 6. It aims to offer a detailed insight into the approaches and the reasons behind the NPP campaign, allowing respondents to highlight the facts, opinions, and experiences (May, 1997, p. 109) in relation to strategies and techniques employed in the campaign leading to the 2000 Ghanaian elections. The first round of interviews was carried out with party officials of the NPP, the second with media practitioners, and the third and final round with academics from the University of Ghana.

The study applied purposeful sampling, when respondents were chosen as a result of their relevance to the research topic (Neuman, 2000). This meant that an interviewee was a chosen individual who was either part of the campaign decision-making of the NPP party in the 2000 elections or actively participated operationally, had researched and published on Ghanaian politics and elections, or was a known commentator of Ghanaian politics. On these bases were the selection of eight party officials, seven academics, and five media practitioners. These individuals have in-depth knowledge and opinions on the 2000 elections and on the Ghanaian politics generally. As observed in Chapter 4, in order to maintain the anonymity of respondents their profiles have been replaced by codes, with detailed description located in Appendix 1.

In order to offer contextual background to the media analysis Chapter 6, this chapter was to find out how and why, from the interviewees' differing perspectives, the NPP managed its

image issues the way they did along with the wider political goal of attaining power. This chapter therefore addresses the research questions as follows:

## **5.2 RQ 1. Which of the political element was the most important to winning the 2000 elections?**

The damage to the image of the NPP party as ‘elitist’ and ‘tribal’, and the need to amend it before going into Elections 2000 preoccupied the leadership and their approach to the campaign. This is partly because the leadership was under no illusion that the party’s image was important to its electoral fortunes. And resolving these issues needed a strategic way of mobilizing and implementing political resources, including the use of attributes related to the party as an institution, the personality attributes of both the candidate and the vice-candidates, along with other personalities in the party hierarchy, as well as policy attributes.

In this chapter, when respondents were asked about their opinions of which of the three elements—the party, the candidate, and the policy—they think was the most important to the party winning the elections, both party officials and academics were almost split between the party image and the candidate. For those in the media, the emphasis was on the policy. However, beyond the categorization of the importance of the political elements were varied reasons explored in the sections following.

### **5.2.1 The Party**

The common line of argument amongst interviewed party officials who are of the view that the party is the most important was that independent candidates do not win presidential elections in Ghana. The same line of argument is found in the literature on Ghanaian politics

about the importance of political parties in Ghana (CDD, 1999; Ninsin, 2006, p. 18). Those who hold this view, including NPP party officials interviewed, say that since independence political parties have been the major actors in the nation's political body providing the main platform for political participation, especially for elected offices. As evidence, they point to the number of candidates elected as president and members of parliament (MPs) on party tickets as against those elected as independent candidates (see Chapter 3). Based on this understanding, the NPP leadership interviewed argued that the party image was the most important to the campaign going into Elections 2000. The following were some of the responses:

*I think it is predominantly the party. In Ghana here very few independent candidates win elections. I am sure the statistics will back me up. A lot of the time if you want to win elections, you must be a member of a political party first. I am told that there are some seats where it doesn't matter who is presented as the candidate, they will vote for that person. (AR-5: Interview, March 2008).*

Another respondent acknowledged that:

*In this part of the globe, like any other, there are many factors that are supposed to inform the political decisions of the electorate and one of them is the candidature of the individual contesting the elections; the other is the manifesto of the political party, the alternative development programmes that the candidate profess to be able to implement; and then we also look at the image of the political party itself. Unfortunately for us, majority of our people vote for political parties, second layer vote for the individual and an insignificant minority looks at the message or the manifesto ... that is a little unfortunate but you can't rule that out, it happens everywhere only that ours is a bit*

*over the top. We have two big parties here, the NDC and NPP and I can tell you that these two parties command not less than 92 to 95 per cent of the national votes. Each of these parties, without campaigning can command about 41 per cent of the national votes. That makes our system a little off-sided. It doesn't give the picture on competence and message. Whereas in the US candidates talk about issues, ours here is a little different. (PR-7: Interview, March 2008).*

The quotation attributed to PR-7 contains a certain degree of frustration from a respondent who desires a political culture that gives preference to policy evaluation and competence as the basis for voter decision-making. The respondent argued that although the reliance on the party as basis for voter decision may be a character of party politics globally, that of Ghana is 'a little bit over the top'. And the reason, he argued, is voter-driven, which is explained later on in this section. This view was seconded by PR-3. When asked about his opinion on the same question, he answered:

*The most important is always the party just because Kufuor as an independent candidate would not have shown. So number 1 is the party, number 2 is the candidate and the number 3 is the policies ... I mean you cannot reach out without the party leading you on. Your basic image will give you perhaps 1 per cent or 2 per cent. (PR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

For the reasons behind his evaluation PR-3 is of the opinion that should the entire voter population of Ghana be divided into three, almost about 30 per cent of the electorate are totally committed or opposed to the NPP tradition. The remaining 40 per cent, he argued, may not be committed either way, but just want to see something better in their lives. And though this latter group, he opined, are usually considered as floating voters, they could not

be categorized as such because the majority are ‘ethnically bound and are likely to move in one way or the other depending on how you reach them’ (ibid.). From this background, PR-3 is of the view that the NPP party enjoys, on the average, about 35 per cent of the total electoral supports in the country as a result of its tradition.

The same party tradition was alluded to by PR-2 who said the electorate have always been divided into CPP and the UP tradition until the emergence of the 1979 revolution by Jerry Rawlings, as explained in Chapter 3. The respondent observed that because people fought and lost their lives during this period, they traditionally belong to these parties and nothing much had been done to change them (PR-2: Interview, March 2008). This understanding amongst the party hierarchy perhaps explains the rationale behind the number of campaign advertisements and advertorials that focused on the party’s history, as shown in the media analysis, Chapter 6.

However important the party may seem to the NPP officials as a mobilizing force for votes, their reliance on it as a campaign tactic could have been counterproductive for reasons they recounted themselves during the interviews. For example, PR-2 in his interview observed that there is a decline of voter/political alignment based on party traditions. However, this decline, according to PR-2, has more to do with the ideological left, not the right where his party locates. In his view the socialist ideology began to lose its relevance since the collapse of the Berlin wall, arguing that:

*Because of the collapse of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war, they, the socialists, don’t have much to hold on to because the inspiration they were getting from Cuba, Russia etc. are no longer there and so there isn’t much attraction again. In the*

*Universities in our time in the 70s and the 80s, for example, it was fashionable to say that I am a Socialist. You have to grow beard, wear a smock and wear 'afro' (bushy hair) to show that 'Yes, I belong to this group'. Now, I don't think in the Universities people talk about socialism. It's anti-establishment or establishment now. And so we believe that we have won the ideological battle of the century; you can put it that way. Therefore we are proud inheritance of an ideology which has proved to be the one that the whole world had come to accept. (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

PR-2's position, as described in the above quotation is inconsistent with his earlier assertion that party tradition rallies support. As the latter part of the quotation reads: 'University students now identify themselves as establishment or anti-establishment.' Should we equate 'establishment' to mean 'capitalism', then 'anti-establishment' could also mean 'socialism'. Therefore, one could argue that University students today, to use PR-2's example, may or may not identify themselves as socialist and capitalist anymore, and if they do identify themselves politically then they do so in a different form to reflect the contemporary world.

PR-2's views also contrast that of his party colleague, PR-1, who like PR-2, also argued that the party is the most important. However, PR-1 believes very few differences exist between the parties in Ghana today, making it difficult to rely on party attributes as the base differentiator. In PR-1's assessment, identifiable attributes or characteristics associated with the political parties are more or less blurred. According to him, one can use ideological tags such as capitalist, socialist etc., but they are now meaningless:

*Now in Ghana, the distinctions between the parties are all blurred. There are rich people in all the parties and there are poor people in all of them. There is no concentration of one particular social class in one party more than the others, which*

*means these well-grounded characteristics are no longer there. (PR-1: Interview, March, 2008).*

PR-1 rhetorically questioned, ‘How many traditionalists are there to claim that they will never vote any party?’ They are not many, he answered. PR-1 explained that because these traditions date back some 50 years ago, they do not seem relevant to the modern electorate, using his own household as an example:

*I don't know how many of my nephews and nieces belong to the tradition (the NPP). My own daughters were in Legon, the University of Ghana (UG). I will tell them about Busia and others and they don't know them. I have a boy who is a typical Rawlings fan. They don't know Busia and Nkrumah etc., they know only Rawlings. But what is happening is that those who because of education are able to compare political choices may have sympathy for a political party, but that sympathy is fragile. (PR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

Based on the above accounts, two conclusions could be drawn: first, though party tradition may be important and necessary during campaigning, its use to target votes could mainly be effective amongst older voters who could relate to them. And on this point, the NPP's choice of advertising in *The Daily Graphic* with its readership majority being the older generation of Ghanaians seems consistent.

Secondly, it is risky to take for granted findings that support a strong partisan identification amongst Ghanaians today on the bases of party ideology and tradition. This is because political attachment in Ghana, as observed by PR-3 and PR-1, is fluid and difficult to determine and could change, depending on how political parties reach the electorate. Even

in the CDD 'Afrobarometer', which suggests strong partisan identification amongst the electorate, about 50 per cent of those surveyed said the candidate's abilities were the most important, not ideology, when asked 'What do you consider in voting for a presidential candidate?' (Ninsin, 2006, p. 18). So the voter is clearly shifting, and in each passing year, the size of the party's core voters and supporters diminishes, according to MR-2 (Interview, March, 2008).

Notwithstanding the gradual dissipation of the party ideology as the overarching element in aggregating support, especially amongst the new generation of electors, it is also understood that the prevailing socio-political landscape during a particular campaign period may determine the importance, or otherwise, of the role of the party (PR-2: Interview, March 2008). For example, the difficulties that confronted the NPP in the 2000 elections; a negative party image that stemmed from the 1970s meant that the party's history and traditions had become crucial in shaping perceptions. It was thus important to draw on the party's history even if it had the capacity only to mobilize a handful of votes, but could change perceptions.

The alternative view noted on the use of the party, especially to target modern generation of electors, is that it should be contrasted with the opposition party behaviour in a dichotomous framework of 'us versus them'. For example, indicating a party's long history of good governance and democratic principles in contrast with the opposing parties' undemocratic behaviour may help change electoral decisions of floating and independent voters. In this direction, reference is made to AR-2's argument that young people who may know nothing about Ghana's political history make political choices based on issues they witness in recent

years (AR-2: Interview, March 2008). Therefore, some are likely to be anti-NDC and choose to support NPP based on the latter's democratic credentials.

But this view, according to AR-7, makes Ghanaian politics unchallenging. Responding to the same question, which of the political element the NPP used most in their campaign, he said:

*I think they have always been stressing good governance and democracy, but for Ghanaian politics it's not challenging. We are doing the same thing that the donors are telling us to do. You see, this is the problem. We want to liberalize the economy, have democracy but then something is giving way, which is the national question: are we (Ghanaians) really going to be in control as we strive for this status? That issue is not being mentioned and I think in a way, the politicians, the intellectuals, civil society and the media have let the country down. (AR-7: Interview, March 2008).*

AR-7's apparent frustration of the campaigning situation in Ghana stems from the view that the process of attaining a liberalized and democratic country is invariably seeping away power from the nation into the hands of those who finance it: the IMF, the World Bank, and other donor agencies such as those who support political parties. The respondents, AR-6 and AR-1 who share this view, argued that the lack of funds and the resulting influence of the donor agencies make the parties' agenda look the same as donor agencies, behind the scenes, dictating what will and will not be funded.

### 5.2.2 The Candidate

Other respondents, AR-3, AR-1, AR-6, MR-2 and a local NPP party staff also argued that from their perspectives, the candidate was central to the NPP's campaign and the reason behind this view was also varied. An example is the statement below:

*It appears to be quite obvious that the party have projected more on the personality of the Presidential candidate. The next on importance to the parties will be the Party image. Policy issues, I will rank them last. (AR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

In the interview with the above respondent, who is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of political science at the University of Ghana, political parties since 1992 have failed to show any significant difference between them, especially in the area of policy. As a result, they are unable to tout competitively what divides them from the candidates' personalities. AR-3 argued that in the 1992 and 1996 elections, human rights, for example, was one of the dividing lines between the two main parties, the NPP and the incumbent NDC. However, the former failed to make this issue central to its campaign. For the reason, he said:

*I don't think that so far even the parties themselves have considered policy the most attractive component. Of course, the candidate personality and the image of the party also are not outside of the framework of policy and so on, but in terms of pronouncement of specific policy issues, I think that is not the most important element they project. Yeah, so that's what I will say, the personality first the image of the party and then lastly the policy. (AR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

AR-3's observation that political parties not finding it attractive to differentiate themselves either on party or policy positions could be as a result of many things, some of which had

been identified in this chapter or earlier in the thesis. It could also be as a result of the lack of relevance of the party image, for example, to the electorate. And regarding the policy, it could be interpreted as due to the lack of interest in policy discourse within the wider society as a result of the prolonged military intervention, as discussed in Chapter 3.

On his part, AR-6 observed that political campaigning in Ghana had been candidate centred:

*Political parties rely on the candidate more than the policy precisely because they are not solvent. Parties, as I have researched, are of the opinion that because most of the candidates they choose are usually time-tested and are already well-known individuals in society, they do not need much time and money marketing them. The parties tend to believe that a candidate with some inherent qualities can help the party market itself. So you can see that the personality is what is driving the campaign. (AR-6: Interview, March 2008).*

The respondent continued to argue that the lack of funds to project alternative views through policy positions, for example, is giving way to campaigning and voter decision based on ethnic associations and personality-tagging where leaders try to use their ethnic origin and their association or dissociation to certain segments of the society to attract votes.

AR-6's view is shared by AR-1 (AR-1: Interview, March 2008), who also said the political parties rather project personalities in Ghana based on ethnicity. He claimed that in Ghana's presidential elections, it is not the party per se that the campaign projects, or the voters choose, but the candidate as an individual. To him, parties explicitly and/or implicitly appeal to ethnic, religious, and tribal loyalties, knowing that candidates' ethnic background cannot

be underestimated, especially in the rural areas. Parties switch to promoting party manifesto, what the party stands for and will do when it captures power only in the urban areas:

*When it comes to let say rural or local area in our politics then you realise that a number of factors are in play. Voters will be looking not only for the individual personality but also an element of ethnicity. Even at the national level or the presidential level, the person's ethnic background can't be underestimated.*

*Another issue that they project better is what I will call 'group identity'. In most of the areas that we have researched, you realize that there is a kind of ethnic balancing act depending on the composition of the constituency. (AR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

In addition to the above opinions on ethnicity and lack of funds as reasons behind candidate-centred political campaigning and voter decision is apathy. According to MR-2, public apathy for the two parties means that the candidate had become the main source for the electorate's decision to vote.

*The parties can organize rallies and see large crowd attending, but there is nothing to be happy about, people only vote because of the candidate. (MR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

And for this reason, the candidate's own personality attributes become crucial. Although unable to tell whether the party campaigned mostly based on the candidate's personality, PR-6 thought the candidate was central to the party's success in the 2000 elections.

*To me, our candidate Kufuor behaved well. He didn't follow all those faults of the previous candidates. I think he is a fair-minded man who was seen as someone who will treat every Ghanaian equally. So in this light, I think the candidate was first. I also think the message of positive change was appealing to many people and then the party. (PR-6: Interview, March 2008).*

Another party official held a similar view:

*I think the man in person was a factor to the campaign. I have known Kufuor since my professional career as a journalist (now retired). During the 2000 elections campaigns, he came here. All those politicians came here but whenever you met this man he was different. If you meet the man, he was such a gentle man and the man looks like a giant. He is as tall and huge with some fearful eyes [draws laughter]. So the gentle giant, the description we used in the campaign for him, was appropriate. It drew a lot of response for the NPP campaign. (PR-8: Interview, March 2008).*

### **5.2.3 The Policy**

Those who thought it was rather the policy positions that were central to the NPP campaign argued that the proliferation of the radio stations by the 2000 elections instigated huge public discourse on the issues that mattered most to people. According to one of the local party officials:

*Elections 2000 was about policy issues. People now attend to issues rather than the size of your nose or your head. Now it's issue centred; media pluralism, tolerance of opinions and democracy. We are now 'growing'; people are now much aware these*

*days and were phoning into radio programmes on the issues and we also were organizing press conferences etc. (PR-5: Interview, March 2008).*

This view is shared by AR-4, a media analyst and a PhD student at the University of Ghana Political Communication Department. In his view, he would rather put policy first. This is because, according to him, he listened to phone-in programmes on radio, and without any fear of contradiction can argue that the campaign boiled down to the economy. He agreed that parties and voters talked about other things, but policies were central, saying:

*I once went to the rural areas to research about what they think are their considerations when it comes to voting, and policy was one key issue that dominated all our discussions. Gradually people want to throw away the ethnicity because of the gradual understanding of policy. People understand now that you don't need someone of a particular ethnic background to come and implement a certain kind of policy but you need a human mind that can come to some understanding, take decisions and implement them. (AR-4: Interview, March 2008).*

Having observed that the party was central to the campaign does not de-emphasize the importance of policy discourse during the campaign trail, nor suggest that the candidate's personality wasn't important to the campaign. As I identified above, the three elements, including the personality of the vice-candidate and that of other party leaders played crucial role in influencing voter decisions. As in every campaign, it is inconceivable that political parties will go to the electorate during an electioneering campaign only to talk about what they stand for—as Danquah—Busia, for example, and not what they will do when voted into power. However, creating the difference along policy lines was rather more difficult than using the candidate or the party.

According to AR-2, because the majority of our people live in the rural areas, it is not difficult to know what the majority of Ghanaians need. As a developing country, problems facing communities are the same. For example, health, education, shelter, and accessible roads are all the same from community to community and are captured in the Ghana Living Standard Survey (the GLSS) and the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) compiled every 3 to 4 years. For this reason, AR-2 does not see the reason behind politicians reinventing the wheel to identify what the people want on the campaign trail. Perhaps this view could explain the reasons why political parties in Ghana are unable to differentiate alongside policy positions because the issues facing the people are the same.

Of course, the philosophical view of solving these issues could offer the underlying difference. However, we have also observed in this chapter that it is in itself the main challenge. Policy debate within the confines of ideology is left only for a few politically 'savvy elite' in society, usually found in urban areas for a number of reasons, including illiteracy and the long absence of political participation because of military rule (AR-6, AR-1, and AR-2: Interview, March 2008). The illiteracy rate in Ghana is estimated to be about 40 per cent of the electorate (Ninsin, 2006), with most trapped in poverty. This group can make little sense out of the abstract left/right, socialist/capitalist ideological debates that seem to have little practical relevance for their own daily lives.

### **5.3 RQ 2. How are the Political elements managed?**

In the media review, which is located in Chapter 6, it is noted that the NPP campaign had managed the party, the candidate and the policy within the same themes that have recurred throughout the analysis of Research Question One: tradition, democratic values and personality attributes interwoven with ethnic and religious undertones. Campaign

advertorials featuring the party as an organization had always referred people to the history of the party and its links with certain ethnic groups, such as those in the North and the Volta regions. These advertorials also mentioned the party's commitment to the democratic principles dating back to the early years of Ghana's multiparty democracy. However, what was also revealed in this research was the use of certain personalities within the party structure in addition to the candidate and the vice-candidate, such as the wife of the presidential candidate and others like Major Quarshigah, Odoi-Sykes and Obetsebi-Lampitey, who are notable party officials from the regions where the NPP is weak.

The candidate, as revealed in the media analysis, has been managed as someone with good 'leadership personality', not 'leadership competence' as critics argue. Media articles on the candidate (see Chapter 6) always referred to the candidate as a moderate, a unifier, a team player amongst other personality qualifiers. His posture was thus demonstrated as someone who exhumes 'Fatherliness' and 'Statesmanship', as opposed to someone who is 'Robust' and 'Aggressive', for example.

The policy had also been managed within the same line of framework as the two political elements above. Policy statements were 'personalized', as in the *ethos*-oriented message explained in Chapter 4. For example: 'Leave a life of debt, despair, and deprivation behind. Positive change will enable you and your family to lead meaningful lives...' (see Chapter 6). In Research Question 2, respondents were asked about their opinions on how, from their perspectives, these elements were managed in order to achieve the objectives of the party. The following sections deal with their responses to this question. First to be analyzed is the party, followed by the candidate and then the policy.

### 5.3.1 Managing the Party

In Question 2, when respondents were asked about their opinions on how the party's image was managed, non-party officials were of the view that the party was managed within the personality framework with complex interplay of ethnicity, religion, and other sectional nuances, as observed in previous paragraphs. They argued that the party desperately tried to appeal to different social groups through individuals who are themselves identified leaders of certain ethnic and religious groups. According to AR-1, the NPP used what he calls 'local elite', observing that:

*Since 1992 we have noted that the Islamic religion and the northern factor have been decisive in the elections, not only for the Northern votes but for the Zongo communities in southern Ghana. And so once you get a central figure that is viewed as the 'home boy' around the centre of power, he is able to pull the votes. That is the perception.* (AR-1 Interview, March 2008).

*They normally find a prominent person from that particular voting bloc who will present a very good face of the party among the population. So for example, Kufuor appointed one of his key advisors from the Volta region. Also from the Greater Accra, he appointed a Ga woman as his Chief Advisor. In this way, the party invariably conveys the message to the people that 'look at our top advisors, they are Ga's, Ewes etc.* (AR-2: Interview, March 2008).

The above views were consistent with the party's approach. Responding to the same question, PR-3 argued that the majority of the people in Ghana are Akans and the majority of the Akans are Twi-speaking Akans, so if you are going to have a party to reflect the national look, then it is going to be predominantly Akans. And by the same measure, it is

going to be the majority of Twi-speaking Akans. Secondly, people who go into politics, he said, are actually very aggressive. They are ambitious and they want to move forward. This ambition makes them want to be seen, especially in their communities because:

*If you are a leader you must be seen and so people fast themselves forward. People believe you have more power if they see that you are always in the proximity of power than if you are some way back. And so those who want to be seen as near power always fast themselves forward to walk beside the leader. In this sense, if you have a large chunk of people from group A competing with small groups of people from group B, C, D... in pushing themselves forward, you are definitely going to have a preponderance of group A people forward just by nature of things. This is what was happening to us.*

(PR-3: Interview, March 2008).

As a result of the above, according to PR-3, the party structure was perceived as Ashanti-dominated, although the same could be said about the rest of the parties in Ghana. However, the reason why it was a problem for the NPP is precisely because of the same issue as highlighted above; that their leadership had been predominantly Akans—hence, the deliberate strategy to change the image of the party.

*In fact, for the 2000 elections, [we] took a deliberate step to say that we will reduce the mostly Akan face and push forward other ethnic, religious, and gender faces, so if you go back to most of our press conferences that we held, you will find people like honourable `X` [mentioning some female, GA, EWE (other tribes) and Muslim members of the party] at the front row. And whenever the Akan members are pushing forward, [we] say to them please hold back, hold back let us show that we have other people inside this team! And that was deliberate ... yeah, it was deliberate! (PR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

In another development PR-3 observed that the party needed to put structures in place that could reinforce their strategy of de-emphasizing the Akan dominance and to shape the perceived inclusiveness of others. In this direction, the party initiated a grass-roots approach to target non-Akan communities, settler communities, and created what is known as the Nassara clubs as an active wing of the party to propagate the party's message and to represent it in the Zongos.

*Because of the aliens' compliance law in the past, we were very weak in the Zongos and we could not continue to be weak. So we formed an outfit that later became the Nasara club, which was tasked to take the NPP message into the Zongos that we were not in the business of repeating the aliens compliance order. I also projected myself to show the sympathy that I have for the Muslim faith and for [the people who live in the Zongos] and in many ways they found comfort that somebody close to the leadership of the party was obviously pro-Muslim. (PR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

The issue of the party's image as sectarian was widely acknowledged within the party itself, especially amongst the non-Akans. According to PR-1, who is a Ga, the indigenous tribe of the people of Accra, the majority of Ga's, for example, believe that his party is an Ashanti party and this notion dates back to the early years of Ghana's political history.

*They say, 'Oh, it's the Ashantis'... that is, something that bothered us and informed our decision all the time. How do you address it? (PR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

According to PR-1 and PR-3, there was the urgent need to demonstrate a balanced representation using local elite as the mouthpieces of the party in these areas.

*We went on the ground to where we came from, Ningo Pampram, Pong Kantamanso (all indigenous local areas in greater Accra, the capital city of Ghana) etc. and sat at the beach with the people to ask them how they can say that this is an Akan party when you have a Ga man as the head. But they didn't know and we said, 'Yes, Nii Odoi, he is the head of the whole party. That's why Greater Accra, we did so well.' They listened and voted for us' (PR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

These strategies, according to the party leadership, were replicated nationally. However, whereas they were successful in some areas, others were unsuccessful.

*We are still very poor in reaching some of these migrant communities but at least we are aware of our weakness and can still do something about targeting interventions. For instance, in the Akyim area, we deliberately picked a Krobo as our candidate in the Fanti Akwaa constituency to send a message that we were not anti-migrants but they didn't vote for him. However, at least he was able to do something for them when he became the District Chief Executive when we assumed office. (PR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

From the above, a number of impressions are created. First, that the party is centrally controlled. Secondly, the statements revealed the intentions behind the advertorials and advertisements in the press that consistently referred readers to the party's history and traditions. It does emphasize the point that those were deliberate attempts to shape opinions on the party's image, which had been seen as crucial to the campaign, as observed in Chapter 6 and the early part of this chapter in Question 1. Thirdly, that the candidate for the Fanti Akwaa seat, for example, had been deliberately chosen and imposed upon the electorate. In situations like this, electors, and especially party activists, are understandably

likely to reject an imposed candidate. This view tends to emphasize the point that when political campaigns are centrally controlled from the head office, as it does in many case studies on political marketing, as opposed to a decentralized approach, there is a clash of interests. This situation tends to defeat the very idea and purpose of the political marketing concept, which tends to seek the involvement of all voters, including those identified in pages 255 and 304.

However, according to party officials the perceived tension between the party interests, presumably from the position of what voters want and that of the activist as in the case of the Fanti Akwaa constituency, only occurred at the level of candidate selection. PR-2 in one of the questions on the issues of conflict of interests, observed that:

*It has been more with the selection of candidate where we may say that, 'Well, this person used to be our opposite number but had just come to join us and due to his stature in the constituency, we want him to represent us so we can win that seat,' then activists will resist and say 'You are not rewarding loyalty.' That is where we normally have the problem. (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

It is identified in the above scenarios that the party's tradition and its organization had become central to the campaign process. This is also evident in the media review, located in Chapter 6. The attempt was made to institutionalize the approach nationally as the party sought to shape its image across the country. In addition to the above is the party's democratic value, again derived from its traditions, according to PR-2.

*We maintained the fact that what our forbearers fought for was freedom in basic human rights, fundamental human rights, free media, freedom of associations, and that had*

*been going, and is something that the NDC is struggling to claim a part of. So the connection and the attraction had been that.* (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).

PR-2 continued to suggest that discourse on NPP's principles and beliefs was located within the confines of their main opposition party's behaviour, then and now, as observed by AR-2 somewhere in this chapter, in order to demonstrate the difference between the two parties.

PR-2 said:

*And of course reminding the people of what happened in the past when during the revolutionary days people who have struggled and earned their properties were forcefully taken away from them. Those were the things, trying to consciously link PNDC to NDC that they are one and the same. These messages were adhered to and they voted for us.* (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).

Whether PR-2's observation on the wider political discourse was effective or not, couched in the frame of 'the NPP is democratic' and 'the NDC is undemocratic' as a means to justify why people were to choose the NPP but not their opposing party, the NDC, given the fact that they had an image problem of their own, the thesis is unable to determine. However, it is noted earlier in the research that as a result of contemporary events, with the beginning of the 1992 constitution, the Ghanaian people have come to accept democracy and its principles as the benchmark for good governance and party behaviour. Therefore, political parties are likely to be judged as 'good' or 'bad' to belong to, based on their democratic behaviour, or none of it, as against their ethnic or religious nuances.

From the ideological perspectives, PR-2 denied a view that had previously been expressed by his party colleague, PR-3, that the party has been managed as a centrist to accommodate

others who may have liked to join it, but for ideological differences. When questioned that ‘some experts believe the NPP is now more of a centrist instead of the right of the centre’, the following was his response:

*For me, it had never changed. When we even say we are capitalist, or rightist, I can tell you if you are talking of a welfare approach consistent of our traditional values, we don't say that we are rightist in the sense as people try to categorize us. So if you even say that we now have moved to the centre as if we have now come down on that ideology, I don't believe that in all practices is the case, no! (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

PR-2 maintained his views that if there have been any changes to ideological identification in Ghana, whether from party perspectives or from the voters, then it is those to the NPP's left who have changed. He argued that in the African context, the understanding of the centre-right ideology is in reference to, more or less, the right to freedom and the understanding of the basic tenets of democracy, not in economic terms. And in this case, the NPP had always been on that side, upholding the freedom of the individual to free speech and ownership of property.

*We have always talked about empowering the individual. When Ghana was the leading producer of cocoa, it didn't have cocoa plantations. It did not, yet we were the leading producer of cocoa. Individuals wielded that property, and they owned it themselves and they had their money. So we have not changed; it is not as if we were extreme right and now we are centrist, no we are not, and I will say that if anybody has moved, then it's the socialist who have moved. Those who talked about state farms are no longer talking*

*about state farms now. So they have shifted. We never talked about state farms so we haven't shifted in terms of economy* (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).

### **5.3.2 Managing the Candidate**

In the literature review Chapter 2, it is observed that candidate personality attributes such as charisma, competence, and other public profiles are crucial to political campaigns and voter decision-making. Parties strive to ensure that these attributes are promoted. Findings in the media review suggest that the situation is no different in Ghana. Hence, the need to understand how these attributes about the candidate were managed to ensure their relevance to the campaign and its objectives. Below are some of the responses and their analysis when in the interviews respondents were asked 'How was the presidential candidate managed?'

*I think the candidate was managed within his own core values. That the candidate was committed to the democratic dispensation, and I think that has been proven ... the second one was competence, to show that we had the competence.* (PR-3: Interview, March 2008).

Understanding the view of PR-3 from the above statement and within the wider context of the NPPs campaigning approach, especially from the findings in Chapter 6, one gets the sense of the campaign's attempt to craft good leadership around the candidate's personality traits. Increasingly, in campaign advertisements and advertorials, the candidate's personality attributes such as his calm demeanour had been interpreted and defined within the confines of democratic values; tolerance for dissenting views and as a team-player.

According to the NPP leadership (Interview, PR-3; PR-2; PR-1, March 2008), managing the candidate in this way was effective because the incumbent government provided the enabling environment. They argued that the aggressive and robust posture of President Rawlings of the NDC party that was in government was perceived as undemocratic in many ways, with a number of incidents offering credence to this view, including the detention of journalists under the Criminal Libel Law. As a result, despite the fact that Rawlings' tenure as president was over, the NPP was of the view that their strategy was to be effective only when Kufuor was pitched against Rawlings and the NDC party, as opposed to pitching against NDC's candidate for the 2000 elections, Atta Mills.

*If we were matching Kufuor with Atta Mills, we wouldn't have said he was a Gentle Giant because no matter how biased you were, you wouldn't say Mills is violent. So for that moment, we picked Kufuor and contrasted him with Rawlings and the party and we succeeded. (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

*And unfortunately for them, Rawlings was still domineering and for many people, you see that if we talk about Kufuor, we are able to let the people think of Rawlings. More so when fortunately Atta Mills said that he will consult Rawlings 24/7, and so we also had the opportunity to 'hammer' him. We had cartoons of him bowing to Rawlings, and therefore when we were contrasting we always used Kufuor as and when we picked and chose where the strategy will be effective. (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

*In hindsight, when you look at some of the campaign messages, most of them were more or less attacking personalities like that of Rawlings. It was, more or less, a Rawlings campaign issue and because he had presided over the country for about 20 years, they zeroed in on his personality and his family, and of course, the people in his government. (Interview, MR-1, March 2008).*

However, it must also be noted that the approach on the other hand offered the avenue for Kufuor's competence to be questioned. Critics maintain that the campaign was silent on the candidate's achievement and questioned his ability to lead the nation when he could not prevent his own company going bankrupt (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Ayee, 2000). Critics claim that the candidate lacked the eloquence in articulating his own vision in comparison with other candidates, especially that of the NDC (Advertisement in *Ghana Palaver*, 30 August 2000. See Appendix 2.2, Text AD1).

According to AR-3, the personality-centred campaign run by the NPP party, although helping the candidate to appeal to the native senses of the people, limited the candidate's opportunity to demonstrate his abilities to debate the issues, noting that:

*'It's all well and good to just go round, like Kufuor did, to campaign from funeral to funeral. You see, funerals are not places for debate, so you go from funeral to funeral, you appeal to the very native senses of the people. 'Oh, he came! Oboo Nsawa one million' [translates in English as 'he donated one million to the bereaved family'], everybody claps and then he goes. Fine, there is a room for that kind of whistle-stop campaigning in all political campaigns, but when that becomes the primary practice then there is something wrong. (AR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

AR-3 continued that:

*We expected the elections to be based on debating the issues and people weighing the options, making informed choices and thinking, 'Should I vote for this or that people?' But you didn't hear much, precisely because you don't get this focused kind of campaigning where candidates meet people in assembly halls, give lectures and they get*

*feedbacks and debate the issues. The big rally mood was enough for them; nobody asks a question at a rally, nobody opposes anybody at a rally. It's still a top-down, one way communications. (AR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

Whereas it is fair to say that the NPP candidate, Kufuor, participated in the national presidential debate that was organized for all contesting parties in the 2000 elections (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Ayee, 2000), the respondent was referring to individual party organizations, including the NPP campaign, that did not allow candidates to interact with voters in town halls and at gatherings conducive for participatory discourse. This made the 2000 elections disappointing, in that regard, despite the high expectations.

The above view on the lack of substantive debate in Ghanaian political campaigning is supported by AR-2, a research fellow at the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), the agency that organizes presidential debates in Ghana during elections. AR-2 is of the opinion that a lack of candidate preparation and grooming during the campaign period on the issues that concern people, has contributed to the absence of policy debates. On the same question regarding how the candidate was managed, the following was his response:

*No, no! I say no because it's interesting. First of all, when they constitute a campaign team, they don't look for specializations. Somebody who will groom you to be able to answer questions on foreign policy, economic policies etc., no they don't do that. When they constitute the campaign team, their idea of a campaign team is people who will be able to go and tell people to vote for them. They don't constitute teams that are of all kinds of competencies to help the campaign. (AR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

AR-2 observed that in the United States and elsewhere, candidates are prepared on issues by experts in those fields, citing an example that if Hilary Clinton, during the US 2008 Presidential Elections campaign, was going to speak on foreign policy, she has access to foreign policy experts who coach her on exactly what the problems are within Africa, Northern America, Asia etc. This does not happen in Ghanaian political campaigning, according to AR-2.

*In 2000, I went on leave from this University to work for the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) for the conduct of the 2000 presidential debate. Well, I expected as a political scientist that since we said we are going to do a presidential candidates debate, those candidates were going to get a team of people to groom them on, for instance: 'If they ask you a question on women say this; on foreign policy say that; on energy say that.' None of them had this preparation. Everybody just walked up and down, just like that. (AR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

Consequently, one is able to argue that the NPP campaign made a conscious effort to portray the candidate in a certain light, as a capable character and someone committed to due process, and according to how they thought could be effective through the portrayal of his leadership personality instead of leadership competence; a view articulated by AR-6 in his response to Research Question 1 above.

### **5.3.3 Managing the Policy**

In policy development and dissemination, PR-2 claims that the NPP had a policy committee that had branches across the country. The committee had zoned all the constituencies

according to their peculiar needs and identified issues and solutions with the people of these zoned areas.

*Dealing with the issues that we felt were of concern to Ghanaians, we identified them from place to place in each constituency we analyzed. What are the issues? What are our strengths etc? So we go to an area and we zone them in say four to five zones, knowing that the needs of Zone 1 within the same constituency will differ from other zones. And so we took time to let these zones come out with issues that concerns them.*  
(PR-2: Interview, March 2008).

The above view was also expressed by a party colleague, PR-1, who acknowledged that their opinions regarding the reality on the ground could have been flawed without going down to the electorate.

*If you don't get down to the grass root your perception may be flawed, so you listen to the people when they talk. I have been a grass-root politician from day one, so I will go to the market, the taxi ranks, go to the women at Makola [one of the biggest markets in Ghana], they will talk and you get the sense of what is happening.* (PR-1: Interview, March 2008).

Despite the party leadership's claim from the above that voters were consulted to get a sense of what they needed, whether the gathered data actually influenced policy formulation is another issue that the research was not able to verify, but may be half true. The reason behind this doubt stems from two fronts. First, in an interview with PR-3, the point was made that the agreement on policy that NPP reached with smaller parties in exchange of their support had not been followed through. According to PR-3, the NPP favoured a

‘wealth creation’ policy in line with their philosophical position, whereas the smaller parties solicited their support going into the second-round ballot favouring ‘poverty reduction’ economic policy. The NPP, in accordance with its ‘accommodation of a centrist position’, finally decided to agree to the smaller parties’ position on ‘poverty reduction’ economic policy (Interview, PR-3, March 2008). This agreement was abandoned when the party assumed power.

*In fact the all-inclusive government was a thank you gesture to the smaller parties for their support in the second round, and also more to that was a statement to show how we wanted to bind the country together. By bringing in CPP, PNC we were sending out the statement to say that Ghana for Ghanaians in moving forward, which was very much part of comments that we have made either openly or in a way that people could understand. (PR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

*I mean we had our manifesto and the CPP raised some concerns with the manifesto. We agreed that we will take onboard some of the concerns as we went forward in implementing the manifesto because it was far too late to try and change the manifesto. In reality, when we came to power, Nduom, who was working on the economic policy and on the Ghana poverty reduction strategy, which we had internal debates, wanted it to be poverty reduction and most of us said no it has to be wealth creation. That, even though we are not in the position to start creating wealth, we should still set ourselves a target for creating wealth as we tackle the endemic poverty. (PR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

Aside the above, PR-2 had also in his interview played down any suggestion that the NPP adapted its philosophical stance, although he does not deny entirely a party behaviour that resembled both ends of the ideological debates. To PR-2, the NPP has always had a welfare-

based economic policies despite its capitalist categorization. He argued that the NPP's identification as a centre-right party is more of its liberal democratic principles, such as the right to freedom of expression, not economic policies (Interview, PR-2, March 2008). Notwithstanding PR-2's views it is fair to say that his interpretation of the NPP's ideological positions on the issues is not reflective of what is known about the NPP in Ghanaian politics, both now and in the past (see Chapter 3).

Having said that, the point could be made that as a result of the inconsistencies in the party leadership views on their ideological position before, during, and after the campaign, the party may not have changed its stance regarding what it thought should be done—ideology-oriented actions—as opposed to what the people said the party needed to do—voter-oriented actions—during the consultation process to formulate policy, if really there was such a process.

However, there was mixed acknowledgment from respondents who are non-party officials. Some had expressed doubts regarding the notion that there ever was a direct contact with the grass roots by the party with the view of gathering data to inform policy. When asked whether they ever observed or heard a process that involved the party consulting voters for their input in policy developments, none of them acknowledged the said process as described by the party leadership. However, they acknowledged that as a result of the influx of radio phone—in programmes during the elections—gathering data through a third-party means by the political parties is possible. And in this direction, they are unlikely to be privy to such process, just as any other person outside the political parties. They also acknowledged that the political parties, including the NPP, visited organized institutions.

*Well, the political landscape has changed a lot in Ghana and especially with the proliferation of radio stations where people can pick up a phone and call to make their views heard; I think voters' views are listened to. (MR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

*Because of the radio stations, the phone-ins and the general atmosphere in which people expressed their view points, I think the parties may probably have taken a lot from the grass roots without consciously organizing it. They may not have developed a very conscious plan of consulting the grass roots the way you are putting it. (AR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

In fact, the above respondent continues to say that what makes him sceptical that the parties really listen to the grass roots are certain developments within the parties leading to the 2000 elections and beyond, which suggest that the top-down approach to policy formulation has not changed. According to him, there were many protests at the grass roots, at the constituency levels in all the political parties against parliamentary candidates chosen by the party headquarters, but almost invariably, AR-3 observes, the grass roots did not win in most cases. And to the respondent, such a situation is an indication, therefore, that the top-down kind of approach to policy development and party management in general might still be prevalent.

Other respondents acknowledged that presidential candidates visited the business community, musicians, and journalists, as groups leading to the elections to find out what their needs were.

*Some of the presidential candidates have been touring, visiting the business community such as the AGI, MUSIGA, GJA and quite a few groups to find out what they want (AR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

However, the respondent is of the opinion that researching the voter needs to formulate policies through such process could be ‘reinventing the wheel’ as there are established avenues through which one could understand what is needed to be done, for example, through the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS). Despite the sketchy acknowledgement of how the NPP developed its policy amongst respondents, the party’s dissemination of policy was recognized as effective. According to MR-1:

*Campaigning for the NPP in opposition was more or less direct to the people. It was more of people contacts, raising issues that will raise emotions in people. For example the catch phrase for the NPP when in opposition was: ‘Assess your life to cast a good vote,’ playing the economic and social card, whether you can pay school fees, medical bills etc. (MR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

It is noted that the NPP managed to use pictures from the Universities and teaching hospitals in advertisements, showing how overcrowded and deplorable the country’s hospitals and students’ accommodations were to make their case on the state of the nation under the ‘agenda for positive change’ campaign. This the party managed to achieve through the use of the private press, the majority of whom were sympathetic to the party, and later through state-owned media networks such as Ghana Television and *Daily Graphic* newspapers after it secured a court order to have its programmes aired on state radio and TV stations in line with the constitutional requirements (MR-1; PR-2, March 2008).

### **5.4 RQ 3. What are the roles of the Political elements and who are the targets?**

This research question is designed to understand the relationship that exists within the political elements and their relationship with target constituents. From discussions in this chapter, and Chapter 6, the point is made that parties use certain personalities to shape perceptions on the party's image, in order to gain entry into certain localities. It is also acknowledged by the NPP leadership that in 2000 the candidate's personality was used to reach constituencies they weakly represented (Interview PR-2, March 2008) much as they used other personalities, such as the vice-candidate, in the party hierarchy.

According to PR-2, although the campaign focused more on the party, there were areas where people just did not like the party, and so they had to rely on the attraction of the candidate to make gains. In other areas, they combined both the party and the candidate to maximize their chances (Interview: PR-2, March 2008). AR-2, in his view, thinks the NPP's selection of its campaign manager for both the 2000 and 2004 elections was because he is a Ga, as the tribe tends to vote NDC (Interview: AR-2 , March 2008). When respondents were asked, 'What do you think were the roles of the political elements?' the following were the responses headed by the party, the candidate, and the policy.

#### **5.4.1 The role of the Party**

The role of the party, its image and structure, to the rest of the political elements in the campaign, according to the views of the NPP leaders interviewed, was to show their capacity to govern by demonstrating credible democratic credentials, internal wealth of knowledge and expertise needed to govern, and the ability to mobilize resources in pursuit for power. In other words, it is possible to argue that in summation, the party image was to

answer the competence question (Ayee, 2000; Gyimah-Boadi, 2001) raised against the party's presidential candidate by critics, as noted by PR-1:

*We used the good performance of our members in parliament and how experienced we are, with some of us having served in parliament [for that long] ... and that gave the perception to the country that oh, this people are better. And when we were in opposition in 2000, we encouraged people like Kwamena Bartels, Addo Kufuor and all those to come out because we had to make noise to project the image of the party, and people came to feel that yes, these people they have the men, they can do the job and we had scholars too. We have economists; I mean we had the Pianims, the Jones Offori-Attahs etc. and when they spoke and you went back to your books and checked, you realize that what they are saying is actually worth listening to. When it comes to law, then I don't think the opposition will come close ... So that was a very big favour and that gives the party a certain image. (PR-1: Interview March 2008).*

In his account of the party's role in the elections, PR-2 also observed that the perception about the party's competence was down to three main attributes, which are the party's tradition, its behaviour in the lead to the elections, and its organization. About party behaviour, PR-2 observes a party that was prepared to win the elections. It was optimistic, ambitious, unbureaucratic, open, and fully aware of its environment, saying;

*We monitored the media. By the close of day whatever happened in any media station throughout the country we were aware of it, and by the following morning we had prepared responses for all of them and so we didn't give any space. We had a lot of volunteers as we were able to inspire and equip people, believing that we could win, like a crusade and that was important because we could not pay for their services. (PR-2: Interview: March 2008).*

On party behaviour, in addition to the above, PR-2 noted that it was crucial that the party secured a committed media relationship and also the safety of the ballot. He observed that although the national media had constitutional obligations to the political parties, this obligation does not come into play until four or six months into the election, hence the need for the party to devise its own media plan. However, what was equally crucial was to understand which of the media was friendly and which was not. This led to the categorization of the media along those lines. Having done that, they were able to identify insiders in all these media outlets who could work for the party.

*We had the communication part of the campaign using adverts, using other things, but then we had special people who were linking all the other parts of the media. Of course, we categorized them friendly and unfriendly; we had those also who were in charge of the electronic and the print. (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

Despite the organization capacity of the party towards the campaign, PR-2 continued to acknowledge the difficulties with the party's image as tribal and elitist. He observed that because of the perceived Akan image, the party had not been winning in certain areas like the 'Zongo' communities and the evidence, he points out, is in the electoral statistics. Based on this reality, the party had to embark on a number of organizational restructuring to counter the negative perception, which is explained under Research Question 4, section 5.5.

On party tradition and ideology, PR-2 maintains that the party's long-standing democratic credentials were also key to shaping its image. He noted that throughout the campaign they made the electorate aware that when they are voted into power, people can enjoy their freedom, which is consistent with the pride of the Ghanaian. Also the NPP is a national home for all people who love freedom, are hard-working, and respect the end of their

labour, and these messages were adhered to, according to him. ‘So we were able to sell that for people to come to our side’ (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).

Whereas securing the support of the people was important, PR-2 is of the view that in Ghana, as in most developing democracies, it was also necessary that the party devised mechanisms to secure the votes as well. Therefore, the role of the party was also to design the means of protecting the ballot, and in this direction PR-2 noted: ‘Then of course at the end of the day, it was a question of getting the ballot paper secured. Even the votes that people will cast for you must be secured. So there was a special programme for ballot security, because at the end of the day people would vote for you and yet the ballot could be stolen.’

On the part of PR-1, the party’s traditional role of aggregating support was adapted to include a mass party approach. As observed earlier in Chapter 3, historically the NPP described as a centre-right party is not known to have grass-roots mobilization mechanisms as others such as the CPP and the NDC youth wing, women’s wing, and student groups alongside its constituency branches. The NPP, on the other hand, had only the constituency branches, and according to PR-1:

*For the first time in the year 2000, we formed the women, the students, and the youth wing of the NPP. When I was in Legon [the University of Ghana], the party hadn’t thought about any youth association but Kwame Nkrumah [CPP] who had foresight, had NASU – National Association of Socialist Union, the GAPSIN, the LAMIN etc. (PR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

PR-1 is of the view that having such an organizing structure made the NPP more representative and enhanced the party's image as a listening one, making sure that their perceptions on what concerned these groups of people were not flawed. It could therefore be argued that the internal coherence of the party, its behavioural and organizational competence, may have compensated for candidate Kufuor's alleged incompetence (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Ayee, 2000) levelled against him by critics.

#### **5.4.2 The role of the Candidate**

Although the opinions of the NPP leadership, as observed in quotations attributed to them in Research Question 1, suggest that the party image played the central role in the campaign, they also recognized the importance of the candidate. From their responses to this question, the party leadership alluded to the fact that the party gained enormously from the candidate's attributes, and so were the views of other respondents in the in-depth interview.

When asked about the candidate's role in the campaign, respondents noted that the candidate helped change perceptions on the party's negative image and reinforced other positively held views about the party, such as its democratic credentials. This means that in as much as party officials would have liked the party's inherent values to be the core reason for electoral choice, it was insufficient to win them the elections given the party's negative image, as it were, at the beginning of the campaign. And that brings into focus the discussion in RQ 1: Which of the political elements is more important going into elections? It is therefore prudent to suggest that one could only be assertive on the party's values, for example, as the overarching reason for voter choice when it is found to be in the good books of the majority of voters. When this is not the case, then the consideration of other elements,

such as the candidate or other personalities in the party leadership and the policy, could be made central in planning the campaign.

In the NPP's case, it was obvious that a lot of attention and resources were focused on the candidate to serve as a vehicle to correct the 'wrongs' of the party, so to speak, and to lead the party into the constituencies where it was weak, evidence of which is found in the media review (See Chapter 6). The candidate's own attributes such as his calm demeanour were promoted immensely as someone who cares and understands people and as a team player, less of a dominant individual. This was to contrast their main opposing party's image, characterized by the NPP party as 'totalitarian' along the perceptions people had about its leading figure, Jerry Rawlings (Ayee, 2000). For example, the party general secretary observes that:

*We also had to focus on the candidate. So we dwell more on the party and then when you get to an area where you have to maximize, then we use the candidate also. You see, there are areas that people just don't like the party so you can use the attraction of the candidate to see whether you can get something from there. So we combined both, where it is effective to talk about the candidate, then we do that. (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

The above quotation explicitly or otherwise shows a subordination role of the candidate to the party, based on the leadership's conviction that the party is always the major force to the campaign. However, his other comment below portrays a different picture; one that reveals how the campaign relied on the candidate, necessitating the attention and resources focused on him.

*We chose our presidential candidate in 1998, two years before the elections. So he had time to move around. Almost every funeral, he attended; almost every church service, he attended. All over the country he tried to attend. (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

From the socio-cultural perspective, as far as the NPP campaign is concerned, having the candidate attend funerals and church services was perhaps the most innovative part of the NPP campaign, given their negative image as being elitist. It was innovative, not because it was the first time a politician went to a church or a funeral, but to recognize these visits officially as part of a campaign tactic. Having access to places that will enable the candidate to interact with the masses was crucial to the party in their attempt to change and form perceptions. Of course attending church services is not by invitation, neither are funeral grounds in Ghanaian societies. Therefore, to have access to the people is to attend these ‘by partisan’ functions where one could win the hearts and minds of people not through debates but through a show of sympathy and ‘fellow felling’, to use Kufuor’s own words. According to AR-3, one of the academic respondents, these events are effective for parties to gain more votes and to transcend their natural constituencies, saying:

*I think, yes they do because, you see once you start doing that, you get closer to smaller groups of people (family and community units) and you also make appeals directly to the leadership of these groups ... you appeal to the very native senses of the people. (AR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

Aside from targeting to change and enhance voters’ perception about the party’s image with the candidate’s values, it is also observed that the candidate personality was used as a differential attribute in promoting the difference between the two parties, as observed in the above pages. In this direction, PR-2 asserts:

*Oh yes! We have been able to push the NDC as a violent party, and a section of the people were afraid of a possible electoral chaos, so that's why we talked about the 'gentle giant'. I suppose if the NDC hadn't that background, the question of contrasting it with someone as the gentle giant wouldn't have come up. But once we emphasized and link them, we were able to succeed in saying that 'Look, it's the same PNDC, just the 'P' had gone off ... therefore you need somebody who can achieve development in freedom and we have the gentle giant who would not abuse and trample upon your rights and that's what Ghana needs, a peaceful atmosphere. (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

The same view was echoed by PR-3:

*I mean, it was important he was seen as non-threatening, because nobody wanted to see the country go into civil war. (PR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

To the academic respondents (AR-1, AR-6, AR-3, AR-2), the role of the candidate in the campaign was to bridge the sectional divide, especially ethnicity and class, but also to bridge the gap between parties in respect to resources. An example is AR-1's observation that:

*If you read the history and development of politics in this country, it is well documented that the NPP used to be an urban-based, educated middle class intelligentsia. Now if you look at 2000 you realize that Kufuor started from the grass root, trying to make sure that he is in touch with the common people at the grass-root level. (AR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

On the part of bridging the resource gap, AR-1 is of the view that having contested an election and lost, Kufuor would have been dropped in the next elections by the party if it were a Western democracy. However, the case is different in Ghana. According to AR-1, party officials are of the view that maintaining a candidate who had previously contested and lost an election may possess the exposure and popularity needed to bridge the resource gap, a view held by other respondents in this chapter.

*I talk to the two dominant parties and they say 'Look, we don't have the resources to market a candidate so it's good to maintain one over time. If we canvass this person persistently for two or three times, the people eventually get to know him better than any new person.' So, what that tells me is that it is not his capacity or ability per se that they are interested in but his popularity, looking at how he will be able to create visibility for the party. (AR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

Notwithstanding the role played by the candidate, first to shape perceptions about the party's image, secondly to differentiate the NPP from the NDC, and thirdly to bridge both the sectional and resource gaps and to popularize the party, respondents also observed that other personalities, the vice-presidential candidate for example, played similar roles within certain targeted electorate.

#### **5.4.3 The role of the Policy**

Just like the impact of the party and the candidate elements on the NPP's campaign, policy attributes also played a role in enhancing and transforming perceptions on the party and candidate's image. Although the least talked about by respondents, as they were of the view

that parties and voters in Ghana hardly engaged in policy discussions, references to how the policy attributes impacted on the party's image were made.

As already discussed in this thesis, the majority of Ghanaians over the years have associated NPP with elitism, accusing it as the mouthpiece of the business community as its leadership and membership is dominated by private business men and women, lawyers and medical doctors. Market men and women, factory workers, commercial drivers, the teaching community, civil service, social workers, and members of what is considered as key workers are hardly associated with the party, as observed in AR-1's submission. Against this background, the perception that the party only propagates antisocial policies was ripe in most voters' minds. Thus, the development of social programmes such as mass transportation, the school feeding programme, the national health insurance scheme, and many other social programmes were key to the transformation of the party's image as socially responsive to the majority of Ghanaians. As one of the respondents observed:

*The historical tradition of the NPP is the Westminster capitalist approach ... but the reality of it is that the NPP party talked about a metro mass transport system, capitation grants, national health insurance scheme, low cost housing etc. I mean these are socialist policies and ideas. (MR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

The party's policy positions in other areas also enhanced its traditionally held view as the most democratic and a pursuer of good governance. With this view, historical Ghanaian politics suggest that the NPP is able to claim that space as the adherent of democratic principles and values. Thus, the development of many programmes geared towards ensuring press freedom and entrenchment of free speech was enormously welcomed, especially within the media fraternity, the civil society, and the international community. Typically,

one would expect the atmosphere of free speech to be part of a democratic state like that of Ghana.

However, the story was different prior to the 2000 elections. The ability to speak freely was not for the faint hearted. Not even the hard core defenders of the fourth estate, the media, could withstand the wrath of the Criminal Libel Law that was in place at the time (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Ayee, 2000). Therefore the NPP announcement of its repeal demonstrated the party's commitment to democratic principles that they have always guaranteed the people. The eventual effect was that members of the media became an 'apparent part' of the opposition machinery. Some of them allegedly campaigned openly on behalf of the NPP, as observed by some respondents in the focus group discussion in Chapter 7. And in the in-depth interview, MR-1 observed:

*Of course it's the NPP that abolished the Criminal Libel Law, it's them that promised the international press house to the media, and to the credit of the NPP I don't know any journalist who has been jailed since the party came to power. So to that extent there is a consistent strategy not to do anything to disturb its relationship with the media.*

(MR-1: Interview, March 2008).

So having identified all these roles played by the three political elements—the party, the candidate and the policy—towards shaping the identity of the NPP in 2000, it is thus difficult to measure the importance of one political element against the other. However, findings in this chapter suggest that Ghanaian politicians and political observers—journalists and the academic in this research—are of the view that the party, other than the candidate, still wields the utmost power in aggregating voter support, a view that is contrary to literature (Reeves et al., 2006; Needham, 2006) where party image is subordinated to

candidate and policy attributes. Nevertheless, the effect of the candidate and the policy attributes on the NPP party's image in the tripartite relationship could not be discounted. It is observed that these elements were crucial to the party's ability to change perceptions on its image as elitist and tribal and to entrench its traditionally held views as the most democratic.

From the above, and considering the limitations of the research methods used in this thesis, one could not determine that one political element is more important than the other although they may possess varied abilities to reinforce or change perceptions regarding the political brand's identity. On the issue of whether the party, the candidate, or the policy is the most relevant in this role-playing relationship, the NPP leadership recognized the role mutuality of these elements, observing that the party is replaced by the candidate, for example, in areas where the party is not liked (Interview: PR-2, March 2008).

#### **5.5 RQ 4. How did NPP manage the relationships between the political elements and the voters?**

The traditional relationship between political parties and voters in Ghana, aside from ideological identification and party membership, much of which has been explained in this thesis (see Chapter 3), has often been explained within the context of *Clientelism* (Kermath, 2005). However, some observers (MR-2, MR-1) of Ghanaian politics and politicians believe political relationships between voters and their representations have moved beyond these two paradigms. 'Clientelism', as Brian Kermath (2005) explains, refers to a form of social organization common in many developing regions including Ghana, characterized by 'patron-client' relationships. In this instance, powerful and rich 'patrons' promise to provide

the powerless and poor ‘clients’ in society with jobs, protection, infrastructure, and other benefits in exchange for votes and other forms of loyalty, including labour.

Whilst the above definition suggests a kind of ‘socio-economic mutualism’, the relationships involved in Clientelism are far from mutual; they are typically exploitative, often resulting in the perpetual indebtedness of the clients (Kermath, 2005). In some instances, patrons employ coercion, intimidation, sabotage, and even violence to maintain control and some fail to deliver on their promises. Moreover, patrons are frequently unaccountable for their actions. Therefore, clientelistic relationships are often corrupt and unfair, and as a result obstruct the process of implementing true and sustainable political relationships, Kermath observes.

Certainly in today’s Ghana, the description of political relationship between voters and politicians as clientelist is unfit, although complicated with its own peculiarity, referring to the influence of ethnicity and religion in particular. However, there is also a general consensus in Ghana about the influence of money- and material-related relationships but not to a degree of obscenity at which voters are held indebted to the politician. Those who are of the opinion that political relationship has moved on also argue that where such relationship exists, it tends to be on individual cases rather than nationally orchestrated incidents, because politicians have realised how difficult it is to sustain such relationships. According to MR-1, a media analyst, some kind of clientelistic relationship may still remain to some degree on the individual level. Nationally, though, he continues, ‘politicians and voters have come to realize the impossibility of sustaining such relationships’ (Interview: MR-1, March 2008). He observed:

*I think on individual basis, relationships with sector ministers, relationship with MPs for example, people will be getting what they want but nationally, it is difficult to achieve that. How much can you reach out to your voter constituency if the whole nation is not developed? You can pick a few to get them recruited in the army or get some jobs for some few people but you cannot do that for all, and so I think that when you listened to some of the strong and passionate adherence of the political parties, they complain that oh, the party has come to power and is not taking care of its foot soldiers. But I can also appreciate the difficulties of government. It will find it difficult to separate its foot soldiers from the entirety of people who needs jobs. I mean, it's not realistic. (MR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

In MR-2's opinion, the average Ghanaian voter has a fair idea of their voting rights, saying:

*I strongly disagree with those who think that, and I don't know about other African countries; the average Ghanaian voter doesn't know what he is doing. Whenever we conduct opinion polls to find out voter attitudes, what we realize is that we have moved on from the era where the politician will give the average man money, help feed him, all as a campaign ploy. Activists and supporters, for example, will collect money from you because they know that once you are elected, you will put 'beware of dogs' sign on your gates. So yes, politicians will try to give those inducements; they will collect them but will not vote for them. It has happened also at the various congresses of the political parties to elect their presidential candidates. (MR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

So what is left to politicians in forming that needed relationship with voters at the time that we recognize also the decline of voter identification and membership to parties based on ideological inclinations? There is no doubt of the need for politicians to consider other ways of fostering relationships with voters in modern party politics in Ghana, in the wake of

trends such as those described above. In this regard, the NPP party leaders interviewed are of the opinion that they responded to these challenges. When asked about how the party managed the relationships with voters, all the party leaders interviewed made mention of the creation of the Nassara Club, Tescon, and a women's wing, in their attempt to foster relationships given their historic background as explained in Chapter 3 and most parts of the thesis.

*Our party is perceived to be Akan-based, so we have not been winning in [certain areas such as the Northern regions and in the South, the Zongo communities for example]. So you see, the statistics in 1996 show: Upper West—0, Upper East—0, and Volta Region about only three seats and Northern Region. That were the things staring us in the face; we had 61 seats and the NDC had 153, more than twice of ours. So we took the map and zero-in on that. For example, we formed the Nassara Club. Nassara, I'm told, is a Hausa word for 'victory', which was purely to address the concerns of the people of Northern extractions because of our history on the aliens' compliance order. (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

PR-2 continues:

*... and so we improved on our scoring in those areas. We took the issues ... and addressed them. [For example, the Nassara club], because now when you talk about Zongo you don't mean people who are aliens but it ties in, unfortunately, with religion, as if Muslims and Northerners are the same and therefore are against the party. So when you are addressing a message to them, you have to have that at the back of your mind, though it is uncomfortable saying it. But yet it's a thing that you can't also run away from. So we dealt with that, then we dealt with the purely ethnic one. You can have a region where you get zero and get less than 10 per cent, the Volta region. It is about*

*the 3rd or 4th highest registered number of electorate, so you have to have a strategy for that. (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

From the observation above comes in the 'Tescon' also, which is the youth and student wing of the party, according to PR-2. He observed that the creation of Tescon was to allow them not only to keep their presence on the campuses, but also to use those students who are from areas like the Volta region as connecting points to propagate the party's message to their relatives and friends. The Tescon, he said, also played a crucial role in serving as polling agents to protect the ballot:

*In our analysis, as I have said earlier, we know that there were certain segments of the country where, purely based on ethnicity, we were losing votes so we had to address that. We had students who hail from those areas who started working to let the people know that our government will be friendly to them. Then of course at the end of the day, it was a question of getting the ballot paper secured. So there was a special programme for ballot security, training especially the Tescon, because they were students and were more up to the challenge to the NDC's cadres. These students were full of energy, very daring and were not afraid. So we took them to become polling agents of the party. (PR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

PR-2's views were shared by the other party officials, observing that it was absolutely necessary for the party to assure the people of the Zongos, especially, that 'we were not in the business of repeating the aliens compliance order, hence the setting up of the Nassara Club (Interview: PR-3, March, 2008).

Aside from the politicians' views on how they fostered relationship with voters, the non-politician respondents observed a different kind of engagement. According to MR-1, campaigning for the NPP in opposition was more or less direct to the people. There was more of people contacts, raising issues that will create emotions in people by playing to voters' economic and social needs: whether you can pay school fees, medical bills etc. Although on this basis, MR-1 noted, things could be emotional, it is not necessarily a committed one, saying:

*I think that connection of voters to parties is more of emotional connection other than committed connection. What I mean by this is that I wonder how many voters are registered party members with cards and pay dues unless someone had in mind becoming a party official. (MR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

This party/voter relationship, according to him, is still based on party ideology with certain undertones such as fear.

*The undertones of this could be ethnicity, could be the class placement of an individual in the society. The middle and the 'uppish class', most of them have the tendency of going with NPP because they see it as more modern liberal Democratic Party that can tolerate some liberal tendencies. The lower class will mostly tilt towards the NDC because of its revolutionary history that spoke their language etc. The middle and uppish class also fear that the NDC still harbours certain revolutionary tendencies that when in power they will repeat some of the revolutionary regime's policies, such as seizure of properties, arrest of people, a general level of insecurity for that class of people. And then also a sense of fear with those in the downtrodden class who believe that these people of the top [the middle and upper class] only think about themselves, but*

*not about them. So I also see fear as a factor of attaching people to the political parties.*

(MR-1: Interview, March 2008).

This fear factor resulted in the NPP's strong relationship with the media when in opposition, because most people in the media have had issues with the NDC government; sedition arrests, jail and court appearances etc.

*So naturally, they all formed an opposition with the NPP. The private media, by and large, touted the message of the NPP when they were in opposition. I think the NPP in reality, is still flying on the wings of its cordial relationship with the media. Of course it's the NPP that abolished the Criminal Libel Law; it's them that donated the international press house to the media, and to the credit of the NPP I don't know any journalist who has been jailed since the party came to power. Today, the media, especially the private media, finds it difficult to separate itself from the NPP government because there is this continuous relationship from the opposition days that most of them have found difficult shedding off, and some of us think that they serve as vigorous spokespersons for the party than even the party people themselves' (MR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

In another instance, AR-1 is of the opinion that politicians have come to realize the dichotomy between how to appeal to urban voters and those in the rural communities, and that should be made clear. He claims that now we can broadly divide the Ghanaian electorate into urban and rural, noting that:

*Politicians have come to realize this dichotomy between urban voters and rural voters, so when they are talking to the urban electorates, they want to speak their language ... you realize that smart politicians try to talk about policy issues and their programmes;*

*what they will do when they gain power. Now, when it comes to let say rural or local area then you realize that a number of factors are in play; they are looking not only for the individual personality, but then there is an element of ethnicity, even at the national level or the presidential level. The person's ethnic background can't be underestimated. Another issue that they project better is what I will call 'group identity'. In most of the areas that we have interviewed, you realize that there is a kind of ethnic balancing act depending on the composition of the constituency, for example, you have 3/4 dominant ethnic groups, then there is a kind of local politics going on. And then there is more of a 'demand and supply' in their language. They look at what the people need and then they use that as a way of getting their votes. For instance, sometimes depending on the locality, 'If you vote for me I will do this road for you.' They also look for what I call 'local elites' and 'champion' those local elites to work for the party. (AR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

This dichotomy is also observed by others, such as AR-7. He noted that most of the electorate, especially those of rural Ghana are ignorant about the basic responsibilities of the government to provide schools, roads etc.

*They tend to think that if they get it from that party then no other party can do it for them. Of course in the advance country they all know that's not even the government's money. We tie government performance, or we see our welfare or our ability to secure these things, to the individual. So you hear that the North is pro-NDC. They will say, 'Okay, it was only NDC time that we had electricity and our roads were expanded.' Politicians know all these things so they use them to exploit the populace to their advantage. (AR-7: Interview, March 2008).*

## **5.6 Framing the message**

In the media review of Chapter 6, it was revealed that the first two of Aristotle's three persuasive instruments—ethos, pathos and logos—were predominantly applied in the formulation and dissemination of campaign messages. This chapter examines, similarly, the use of these persuasive instruments in managing the image of the party, the candidate, and the presentation of policy. In Research Question 2, participants were asked about their opinions on how the party, the candidate, and the policy elements were managed. In their answer to this question, a number of responses pointed to the same predominant use of ethos- and pathos-oriented framing.

On the party, for example, the most recurring themes of framing were local, ethnic, and religious group identification, and the least mentioned theme of framing was ideological group identification. These are the themes around which the NPP party image was formulated and was sought to project to voters. This is not to say that the party was identified with one ethnic or religious group against the other. However, it was observed that the NPP party claimed to 'see itself in all the ethnic and religious groups' in Ghana. In other words, the party claimed to be part of each and every ethnic and religious group in the country, contrary to the opposition's charge of the NPP being sectarian. This 'unified self' is what the NPP's campaign sought to formulate and to project, using a number of instruments such as the formation of the Nassara club and the deliberate selection of party officials for press conferences and as speakers at campaign events. Typical examples could be found in quotations in pages 148-149.

On the ideological identification theme, although party officials interviewed acknowledged the NPP's right-of-centre identity, such recognition was apparently toned down in the

campaign in favour of a broader ideological orientation, in order that it might ‘sync’ with the party’s ‘all inclusive government’ proposition. In this direction, a party official observed that:

*The NPP, which is a broad-based ideological party, includes people who are very far to the left and those very far to the right. Somehow we managed some sort of coexistence within a centrist platform. So those who came over being left of centre found actually that they could stay in. I mean, there is still a debate ... at one stage one of our leaders led an NPP delegation to an international Liberal’s forum; at the same time another leader was taking us to the right wing Conservative association. (PR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

On the candidate and the policy, a similar orientation of persuasive framing—ethos and pathos—had been used. Regarding the candidate image, the use of self-projection (ethos) and emotions (pathos), as against logical reasoning (logos), could perhaps be understood from the view that the candidate was accused of lacking performance in track record, but possessed other personality traits—good temperament, good-looking, statesmanship, good leadership skills, thoughtfulness etc.—in abundance, upon which the NPP campaign wanted to focus. To one of the party officials interviewed, the candidate ‘was managed within his own core values. That he was committed to the democratic dispensation.’ (PR-3: Interview, March 2008).

On communicating the policy, the party sought to draw on emotions and personalization to make the comprehension of policy proposition and their benefits easier for the majority of voters to relate to. It has already been noted in the thesis that due to a large section of the population being illiterate, rational policy debate in ideological terms and in terms of

quantification, makes no sense to the majority of the electorate. One of the respondents expressed this as follows:

*Campaigning for the NPP in opposition was more or less direct to the people ... raising issues that will raise emotions in people ... the catchphrase for the NPP when in opposition was: 'Assess your life to cast a good vote', playing the economic and social card, whether you can pay school fees, medical bills etc. (MR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

## **5.7 The Audience**

Likewise the findings in Chapter 6 concerning how the party used its campaign messages in the media to target specific groups of voters, similar observation was made in the interviews in this chapter. According to respondents, the NPP campaign messages were framed according to, and communicated to, certain target groups such as voters in the 'Zongos', Volta region, Greater Accra region, and the three Northern regions. In addition, certain demographic groups such as Muslims, the media, and the Armed forces were also targeted. Some respondents (AR-1 and AR-6: Interview, March 2008) noted that the NPP, like other parties, switched between promoting either the party manifesto or ethnicity when in either urban or rural areas campaigning, knowing that voters in these two settings look for different indicators when making voting decisions. Amongst others, AR-1 and AR-2 observed further that:

*Since 1992 we have noted that the Islamic religion and the northern factor have been decisive in the elections, not only for the Northern votes but for the Zongo communities in southern Ghana. (AR-1: Interview, March 2008).*

*They normally find a prominent person from that particular voting bloc who will present a very good face of the party among the population. (AR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

## **5.8 Conclusion**

This chapter has offered a detailed understanding of why and how the NPP campaign made use of targeting and other techniques parallel to brand personality and endorsement strategies, as explained in Chapter 2. The predominant view amongst the interviewees in this chapter—and indeed amongst academics in Ghana (CDD, 1999; Ninsin, 2006, p. 18)—is that the party still wields an enormous following. Amongst the reasons given for the party's strength in aggregating support were included both past and contemporary Ghanaian political events, and prominent personalities who played leading roles in these events. The consensus amongst the interviewees, and in the literature, is that ideology as a reason for political following is very much relegated to the background in Ghanaian politics today, which is consigned to only the elite few and, perhaps, to the students of higher academic institutions.

Therefore, inasmuch as politicians would like to define themselves by their ideological positions through policy, such definitions make no meaning to the voter majority. Therefore, parties have to rely on other factors such as party behaviour; how democratic a party is in comparison with other parties, which is measured in good governance, intra-party policies, relationship with the media, and other leadership attributes. As a result, respondents are of the opinion that the party image and the personality of the leading candidate became central to the NPP campaign. But these differential bases are not distinctive enough to show the differences between the NPP and the NDC, not to talk about the rest of the parties, given that all parties are subject to certain basic democratic practices as mandated by the country's

constitution. Nevertheless, it was noted that the NPP seems to be much more transparent and far-reaching democratically in its policies and practices, especially in comparison with the NDC. But the two parties command a combined strength of almost 95 per cent of the national vote. This strength of support commanded by these two parties offered a good reason for most of the academics and the politicians interviewed to think that the party's image was the most important to the NPP campaign.

However, there is a counter-opinion that it is risky to take for granted findings that support strong partisan identification amongst Ghanaians today on the basis of party image. In all the general elections held so far, the two most dominant parties have been led by personalities already known in the Ghanaian society, with attributes considered by the electorate to be desirable and worth voting for. Even the bases for party political attachment in Ghana today, as observed by some of the respondents, make it difficult for a party to claim a dominance that is based on its image. PR-3, for example, recognized that political allegiance amongst the electorate is difficult to determine. It is fluid and could change, depending on how political parties reached the electorate. He attributes this fluidity to the element of ethnicity which is interwoven with party tradition and leadership personality constructs. This view emphasizes the importance of electoral strategies in such an unpredictable political market. MR-2, (Interview: MR-2, March: 2008) also observed this difficulty, saying that the voter is clearly shifting in view, and in each passing year the size of the party's core voters and supporters diminishes.

Those who argued that the candidate was at the centre of the party's campaign were of the view that since the commencement of democratic politics in 1992, parties have failed to show any significant difference between each other in the area of policy. AR-3, for example,

is of the view that parties do not see it attractive to discuss policy on the campaign trail and as a result are unable to tout competitively for what divides them, apart from personalities. Other respondents suggest that parties rely on candidate personalities precisely because of the lack of funds. According to AR-6 (Interview: 2008), research suggests that parties choose as candidates time-tested and already popularized individuals in society that they do not need much time and money to market. These parties, he noted, believe that a candidate with some inherent qualities can help the party market itself, and so the candidate becomes the driving force behind the campaign.

Those who thought policy was central to the NPP campaign argued that the proliferation of the radio stations by the 2000 elections, which instigated huge public discourse on the issues that mattered to people, meant that parties generally had no option but to tell the people how they could make their lives better.

In addition to knowing which of the political elements was central to the NPP campaign was the need to know how these elements were managed to shape the party image and to influence voter decision. With this objective, respondents reaffirmed the interrelationship between the political elements, which is noted in the analysis of media items in Chapter 6. Interviewees acknowledged that the NPP campaign sought to influence voter decisions based on ethnic associations and personality-tagging. This is where leaders try to use their ethnic origin and their association to certain segments of the society in order to attract votes, knowing the existence and effect of ‘group identity’ nuances in the country’s body politics (Interview: AR-1, March 2008). AR-1, for example, argued that in Ghana’s presidential elections it is not the party, per se, that the campaign projects, or that the voters choose; rather it is the candidate as an individual. To him, parties explicitly and/or implicitly appeal

to ethnic, religious, and tribal loyalties knowing that a candidate's ethnic background cannot be underestimated. This view was acknowledged by most of the respondents, who thought that the party's image was managed within the personality framework. They argued that the party desperately appealed to different social groups through individuals using the 'local elite', and what is known as the 'home boy' phenomenon.

This assertion was confirmed by the party strategist who acknowledged that due to the party's peculiar image issue as 'Akanistic', the NPP campaign had no option but to have a deliberate policy to de-emphasize the mostly Akan face and push forward other ethnic, religious, and gender faces in order to demonstrate that the party had a national identity (Interview: PR-3, March 2008). Other approaches alongside the leadership structure in the party identity creation were the formation of the Nassara club in the Zongo communities, the widening of the ideological space through policies, and collaborating with left-leaning political parties, notably the CPP.

This chapter therefore concludes that the complexities of the Ghanaian political market and the NPP's ability to understand which political elements to combine and to elevate in targeting different voter blocs parallels the brand architecture (BA) concept used in commercial marketing, as explained in Chapter 2.

## CHAPTER 6

### Analysis of the Media Items

#### 6.1 Introduction

According to the 'Press, power, and politics' report (2000), the media played a crucial role in the elections that brought the NPP to power. The report states that:

*The media provided full coverage of party congresses, selection of parliamentary candidates and wrangles over presidential running mates in the 2000 elections. The independent media generally viewed the Rawlings' government and the NDC critically ... the state-owned media worked hard to minimize their usual bias for the incumbent government and its candidates ... there was a high public demand for professional and fair media coverage of the elections ... but most importantly, there was more pressure on the state media to provide fair coverage to and equal access for the political parties and their candidates to reach the electorates.* (Press, power and politics report, 2000, p. 35).

The purpose of this chapter is to review media items to enable the assessment of the party's approach in attempting to change perceptions of its image and to amass the needed support leading to the Ghanaian elections of the year 2000. The research questions were geared towards finding out how the party managed its campaign in the 2000 elections and were aimed at understanding the *objectives* of the campaign, the *strategy* employed, and the day-to-day operational *techniques* it executed to achieve its goal of attaining power. In this direction, seven news media outlets of the Ghanaian press were chosen for analysis, as observed earlier in the method chapter (Chapter 4). Apart from *The Daily Graphic*, which is state-owned press, the remaining six are privately owned; namely *The Ghanaian Chronicle*,

*The Ghana Palaver*, *The Independent*, *The Statesman*, *Crusading Guide*, and 'Myjoyonline.com', the online version of the radio station, 'Joy FM'. A detailed profile of the news media selected for the analysis, including a table of the media items, can be located in Appendix 1, Table A1.4.

Speaking to party officials included in the interviews conducted for the thesis, the understanding gained is that apart from the overarching goal of the party to win the elections, specific objectives were deemed necessary (Interview: PR-1; PR-2; PR-3, March, 2008). For example, the party needed to improve on its *image* as well as its *vote gains* in areas known to be the strongholds of the opposition. In these areas, the age-old perception amongst electors is that the NPP is a party that is tribal, elitist, anti-migrants, and Christian-dominated. Thus, geographically five out of the ten regions in Ghana, i.e. the Volta region, the three Northern territories (Upper West, Upper East and Northern regions) and the Greater Accra region, were drawn as the battlegrounds by the NPP campaign. The objective in focusing on these regions was for the party to rid itself off the perceived sectarian image, in addition to gaining votes. Aside from the geographical spread, the party also had to deal with the Zongo settler communities amongst whom purely socio-political issues some thirty years before have degenerated into a religious matter, as explained in the country Chapter 3 and throughout the thesis.

Therefore, although the review period in this thesis is from January to December 2000, stories that preceded this period were deemed helpful in summing up how the party was going to engage the 2000 elections. These stories are also important to understand the events leading to the main campaign period and to understand why certain campaign techniques and decisions were made. For example, in 1999 there was intense debate and rumours about

the selection of the vice-presidential candidates, particularly from the camp of the NPP due to its historic past as identified above. Since then, the selection of vice-candidates has become one of the pillars of electioneering strategy in Ghana, and one that has gained electoral traction in the news. In one of such stories on 6 September 1999, an article headlined ‘Kufuor Selects Running Mate,’ the state-owned *Daily Graphic* newspaper reported a rousing welcome for the NPP presidential candidate at Wa, the capital city of the Upper West region, and a stronghold of its main opposition party, the NDC. According to the paper, in his speech Mr Kufuor allayed rumours that an NPP Government would expel aliens, stressing that this was a ploy being used by opponents of the party to scare people living in the ‘Zongos’ so that they would not vote for the NPP. Hence his choice of a running mate from the north:

*The selection of Alhaji Mahama Aliu as his running mate is aimed at building bridges between Christians and Muslims and people living in savannah lands of northern Ghana and those in the south. (News Report, The Daily Graphic, 6 September 1999).*

For his part, the vice-presidential candidate, Alhaji Aliu Mahama, observed that:

*There is the need for the people in the Upper West Region to vote massively for the NPP for a positive change since the party originated from the region under the name ‘Northern People’s Party (NPP)’. (News Report, The Daily Graphic, 6 September 1999).*

Earlier in the same year, April 1999, a newspaper article, headlined: ‘Make Party More Appealing to the Electorate, Kufuor Urges Supporters’, reports that:

*The NPP's presidential candidate has called on branches of the party to evolve appropriate campaign strategies that would make the party more appealing to their electorate. He reminded them that the party's tradition evolved from the rural areas and greater effort must therefore be made to win the rural dwellers to accept the liberal democratic principles of the party. (Article, The Daily Graphic, 28 April 1999).*

In Ghanaian political history, literature suggests that the NPP largely draws its support from the urban and suburban communities (see Chapter 3; Anebo, 1997). However, in rural Ghana, the support base is drawn from those considered as the 'rural upper class', which involves farmers with large tracts of farms (Interview, PR-3, March 2008), and since the majority of people resident in rural communities are what is considered as 'peasant farmers', there was the need for the party to go beyond its traditional rural upper class support base.

In Greater Accra, an 11-member delegation of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) toured the 'Ga Mashie' area to wish the people well in their preparation towards the celebration of their annual indigenous festival. The NPP Presidential candidate, Mr John A. Kufuor, who led the delegation, said the tour formed part of the party's commitment and respect for traditional rulers considering the major role they play in ensuring *unity* in the society. According to the paper, the presidential candidate further seized the opportunity to urge the chiefs to:

*Discard the wrong notion that the NPP is only an Ashanti party, adding that the NPP is a true national party and therefore you should not allow small-minded people to deceive you. (News Report, The Daily Graphic, 11 August 1999).*

In May 2000 the NPP campaign manager launched what the party called ‘Operation reach the communities in their Hamlets’, a campaign programme aimed at settler communities in Accra to:

*Enable the party to interact with, educate, and sensitize six Ewe and Dangme communities in the area on the political and economic situation prevailing in the country. Obetsebi-Lamptey, NPP National Campaign Manager, called on the team to debunk the anti-alien and anti-Ewe smear campaign by opponents against the NPP. He told the team to try hard to build the party’s confidence in the people and let them know that the NPP does not hate any tribe or ethnic group but accepts all people who share in its aims and principles. (News Report, The Daily Graphic, 1 May 2000).*

And by December 2000, the NPP’s presidential candidate had instructed its stalwarts to:

*Intensify the campaign in the Volta Region, the ‘Zongo’, and the rural communities to enable it gather the necessary votes to win the 2000 elections. (News Report, The Daily Graphic, 28 December 2000).*

In all the above quotations, specific references were made to certain locations, groups, tribes, and religious groups in Ghana that were targeted by the NPP party. Specifically, references were made to Muslims, the Northern and Upper West regions, Greater Accra region, rural dwellers, traditional rulers, settler communities such as the Ewe and Dangme communities in Accra, and the ‘Zongos’. This is not to suggest that the other regions and groups were considered to be ‘safe havens’, such as Ashanti, Western, Central, Eastern, and the Brong Ahafo were not given the needed attention—far from that. For these areas, known

as the Akan bloc, the battle was more to increase the party's performance in electoral share than image improvement.

Again, from the interview analysis (see texts NR2, NR3, NR17, and AD2), it was observed that the party's strategic option to attain its identified objectives was to run, in marketing terms, a differentiation-focused campaign (Dibb, Simkin, Pride and Ferrell, 2001 p. 700) in which the special needs of elector segments were to be identified and satisfied. For example, although issues such as unemployment and healthcare were of national concern, others such as national reconciliation, criminal libel, and sedition laws—as well as dual citizenship laws—concerned certain groups of people. These groups—journalists, the Ghanaian diaspora, the civic society, and many other special-interest groups like the non-governmental agencies—wielded a major influence amongst the electorate and their satisfaction could go a long way to impact positively on the NPP party image; hence the effort to court their attention. One example is an advertisement targeting the security forces that appeared in *The Statesman* newspaper, which arguably was the first of its kind in the history of the nation's politics. The ad piece reads:

*The officers and the men of the Ghanaian Armed forces and the police have to be given incentives to enable them to protect our lives and property. (Advertisement in The Statesman, 4 November 2000).*

The advertisement, headed 'Kufuor: For the Army and Police', claimed that despite the security forces' efforts to keep Ghana safe, and performing services elsewhere through the United Nations Peace Programmes, the security forces have been treated unfairly by the incumbent administration. Thus the NPP was committed to ensuring the well-being of the security forces, if it was given the mandate to govern.

As a strategy, the NPP campaign also had to decide ‘who to compete with and with what capabilities’. A deliberate narrowing of the battleground where the actors consistently appeared to be only the NPP and the NDC was orchestrated by the NPP campaign. The aim of this strategy was to push the smaller parties out of the contention in order to swing their supporters onto the side of the NPP and also to gain the support of others who might want to vote for a viable party capable of winning the elections. In an ad carried by *The Independent*, headed ‘JAK (John Agyekum Kufuor) to the Nation’s rescue’, the NPP campaign sought to execute this by cautioning voters:

*Don’t waste your vote. There is only one opponent, the most popular opposition presidential candidate, John Kufuor. (Advertisement, The Independent, 21 November 2000).*

Having reduced the frontline, adversaries made the strategic approach clearer for the NPP, especially in framing the campaign message. In this direction, it was possible for the party to focus on the main opponent, the NDC, by designing ‘two-way’ campaign messages: e.g. ‘NPP is Good, NDC is Bad’; ‘Change vs. Continuity’; ‘Reward vs. Cost’; ‘Democrats vs. Autocrats’ dichotomies. This was to help the party achieve simplicity in its campaign message and to be effective in getting the message across to the electors. Messages were carved in tones such as:

*Victory in December is only the first in a number of battles to save Ghana from the grip of the anti-democrats. (News Report, The Statesman, 24 September 2000).*

And:

*A political party or leadership that thrives on keeping our nation divided does not deserve your vote. I will therefore work with the leaders of the other parties in bringing about the positive change Ghanaians are crying for. (NPP adverts in The Daily Graphic, 4 December 2000).*

What was also evident was the fact that the differentiated campaign strategy of the NPP against the NDC was aided, to a large extent, by the personality values of the NPP's presidential candidate, John Kufuor. Kufuor's leadership personality became the tool with which the NPP used to differentiate itself from the NDC in ads and advertorials. For example, words and phrases such as 'intelligent', 'honest', 'listens to advice', and 'resolute but calm' were mostly used. The NPP contrasted Kufuor's personality attributes against the perceived characteristics of the NDC party and its outgoing leader Jerry Rawlings instead of its presidential candidate, Atta Mills. This strategy was deliberate, according to party officials during the in-depth interviews. The understanding amongst the NPP party officials was that much as the NDC party and a stock of its leadership, including Jerry Rawlings, were considered corrupt, arrogant, and undemocratic by their behaviour at the time, the same could not be said about the NDC's presidential candidate, Atta Mills. Thus, matching Kufuor and Atta Mills would not yield the kind of difference the party wanted to create in matching Kufuor with Rawlings and the NDC party. That was considered effective and was demonstrated in a number of party ads and advertorials.

Also in tactical terms, the golden rule in advertisement—'*Keep it simple*' (KISS)—was adhered to. Statements illustrating the benefits of voting for Kufuor and buying into the positive change agenda were kept short, crisp, and simple, spelt out in about three- to four-line points, well spaced out like a product or service advertisement. The political

advertisement illustrated below was outlined as a commercial product or service advertisement would be:

*It's time to join the wind of change ... the wind of positive change and hope blowing across Ghana. Leave a life of debt, despair and deprivation behind. Positive change will enable you and your family to lead meaningful lives. (Advertisement in The Daily Graphic, 23 December 2008).*

Also of notice and importance was the vice-presidential candidate's attributes, especially his origin and religious background as a Muslim, the party's tradition, and historic values, but less so of its ideology and policy. In most cases, discourse on the vice-presidential candidate goes along with the mention of keywords such as the 'North', 'Muslims', and 'Zongo' communities. In one of such instances, the presidential candidate said:

*The party stand to reap from the vice-candidate background as a Muslim from the north and with strong ties to the 'Zongo' communities in the country. (News Report, The Statesman, 17 September 2000).*

And finally, in its structure the NPP campaign could be described as strategically centralized but operationally decentralized. This is because campaign decisions were taken from its central head office in Accra but implemented using local constituency officers and foot soldiers. The head office maintained a very small number of staff who were themselves part of the party's top hierarchy, including the presidential candidate, the campaign manager, the general secretary of the party, and the party chairman. The campaign manager, a marketing and advertising expert, controlled the running of the campaign with the presidential candidate given the preserve of the final verdict on decisions related to the campaign.

Having summarized the events leading to the 2000 electioneering campaign, the next sections of the chapter will analyze in detail the approaches adopted by the NPP according to the research questions of the thesis.

In all, four research questions (RQs) were developed to aid the data collection. These were as follows: What political elements did NPP consider most relevant to win the election? What are the roles of these political elements? How are these political elements managed? How did the NPP manage the relationships between the political elements and target voters? This chapter addresses each research question in turn, analyzing ‘text’ and ‘context’ of press articles as defined in the methodology chapter of the thesis.

## **6.2 RQ 1. What Political element(s) did NPP consider most important?**

The research brings into focus some findings on political branding that are currently absent in the literature. However, the method applied to the analysis does not permit generalization on which of the political elements were used most. It will not go further than the observation that attributes of all the three political elements—the party, the candidate and the policy—featured in NPP’s campaign news reports, advertisements, and advertorials.

In the NPP campaign, other political personalities other than the presidential candidate were made visible. This situation departs from practices in political branding or political marketing literature, when in most cases only the premier or the presidential candidate is referred to. For example, in political marketing and branding literature on Britain and the US, only the candidates, e.g. Nixon, Kennedy, Thatcher, Blair, and Clinton, are usually cited with no mention of their vice-candidates (Needham, 2006; Reeves et al., 2006; Worcester and Baines, 2005; Lees-Marshment, 2001; White and de Chernatony, 2001; Scammell,

1999; Gould, 1998; Wring, 1996; Maarek, 1995). In the NPP's case, the origin and the social background of the vice-presidential candidate was considered imperative in shaping opinions on the party's perceived 'Akanistic' image in the same way as the presidential candidate's own social identity was instrumental in entrenching views of the party's democratic credentials. Other personalities, such as the wife of the candidate, the campaign manager, and the party chairman, as well as other prominent party officials of repute in their local areas, were 'managed' as 'symbols' of the all-inclusive image that the party sought to project to electors (Interview: PR-3, March 2008).

For example, a news item in *The Daily Graphic* on 8 November, 2000, headed 'Kufuor speaks on Aliens Compliance Order', the paper reports that Kufuor, in addressing people of settler communities in an area called Kasoa, said that:

*The NPP sees all 'Zongo' residents as playing a very important part in shaping the nation's economy and therefore assured them that an NPP government will co-operate with them. It is to emphasise on this point that the party selected a running mate who hails from the North who happens to be a 'Zongo' boy. How can a 'Zongo' boy be a party to a decision to deport other 'Zongo' boys? (News Report, The Daily Graphic, 8 November 2000).*

As indicated by Schöpflin in the interdependency theory of identity construction for individuals and groups (see Chapter 4), the presidential candidate in the above statement, consciously tied the party's image to that of the vice-presidential candidate's social background as someone from the 'Zongo', and in the process attempted to 'construct' an identity of 'tolerance' and 'inclusiveness' for the NPP. He encouraged the people of the minority 'Zongo' communities to accept the vice-candidate's presence in the party as a

substantial guarantee that was enough to allay their fears, which was brought about by the rumours that when voted into power, the NPP would deport them.

Such a stance was replicated in other communities where the NPP's negative image perception was strongly held, such as the Volta region, Greater Accra, and the three regions located north of Ghana—the Upper West, East, and the Northern regions. In the Volta region, for example, the wife of the candidate who had spent most of her early years in the region and spoke the indigenous language fluently was in most occasions used to engage the people. Here, van Dijk's concept of determining an 'in-group' through a certain shared language in identity construction, as explained in Chapter 4, is invoked. In a news report by *The Ghanaian Chronicle* on the NPP's manifesto launch in Ho, the capital city of the Volta region, dated 11 September 2000, the reporters claimed that the NPP's packaging and performance at Ho banished perceptions of the party as Akanistic, saying:

*An emotional address for support in Ewe [the local language] from Mrs. Theresa Aba Kufuor, the candidate's wife, raised the atmosphere to a crescendo and banished perceptions of the party as Akanistic. (News Report by Coomson and Ogbamey, The Ghanaian Chronicle, 12 September 2000).*

The paper further reported that:

*The running mate, Alhaji Aliu Mahama gave an extended Arabic prayer chanting 'Allahu Akbar,' 'Allahu Akbar,' stressing the Greatness of God and afterwards said 'even I, a Zongo boy, I am standing here today as your next Vice President, Insha Allah, who can say this party has no national outlook. Today we put to rest once and for all, the vile propaganda that NPP is an Akan party. (ibid).*

According to the news report, such was the conviction of the people of Volta's reception of the party that the Chief of the Volta regional capital, Ho, had reportedly insisted on hosting the Kufuors overnight. The newspaper reported that the reception from the powerful local Chiefs and 'commoners' encouraged optimism and signalled that the impregnable fortress recognised as the NDC's 'World Bank' might spring some electoral surprises.

From socio-political perspectives, it is fair to say that *The Ghanaian Chronicle's* reportage contained some amount of exaggeration on two fronts. First, the suggestion that the presence of the local chiefs meant that the NPP party had been overly welcomed and was in the position of winning handsomely the entire region was false. In Ghana, chiefs are considered as local rulers of the community and thus the presence of chiefs at political gathering is not unusual, although by the Ghanaian Constitution they are barred from party politics. Therefore, such attendance is merely ceremonial and is accorded to all parties during the electioneering year. In the same manner, politicians are customarily expected to visit the chief's palace once they are in the communities as a sign of respect.

Secondly, it is not in any way conceivable to imply that as a result of a function in Ho the entire region was within the grasp of the NPP, as the majority of the people of the Volta region reside in the rural villages and might not have even be aware of what had happened in Ho. Nevertheless, to the NPP, it was significant that the candidate through his wife was seen as someone with social ties to the Volta region, given the party's frosty relationship with the region. And like the relationship between the vice-candidate and the people of Northern Ghana and the 'Zongos', it was important that the social backgrounds of other personalities in the party structure were well known, so as to shape the electorate's opinions of the party's image.

Another dimension of why the newspaper took that stance, as it did, in portraying that somehow the party was extremely successful in the Volta region, is important. This brings into focus van Dijk's observation (see Chapter 4) that access to discursive fields means power and could provide a 'persuasive' platform for collectivists to influence the minds of others. Although *The Chronicle* newspaper is widely seen as independent, political observers and critics of the NPP alleged during the 2000 elections that the Ghanaian press, excluding the state-owned *Daily Graphic* and the anti-NPP press, was 'in bed' with the NPP (Interview: MR-1, March 2008). This view had been repeated during the focus group discussions and the interviews in which participants were of the view that the party had undue access to the private press. However, respondents attribute the 'flirting' of the private press with the NPP party to the criminal libel and sedition laws that were in place at the time, which the NPP promised to abolish when voted into power. This, amongst others, account for the cordial relationship and the sometimes 'sympathetic' reporting for the NPP.

From the review of the media items in Research Question One, it could be argued that certain marketing techniques such as brand personality and endorsement (see Chapter 2) are evident in the NPPs campaign. The party, for example, targeted the 'Zongos', Muslims, rural Ghana, and the Ewes. This is evident in the number of times that these areas were referred to in the quotations identified above. The attempt to 'personalize' the party around the characteristics of these identified groups was by deliberately 'creating a perceptual notion of congruence' between the party and the identified groups. An example is the question by the NPP's vice-presidential candidate asking 'How can a 'Zongo' boy be a party to a decision to deport other 'Zongo' boys?' As regards endorsement, the following statement also by the vice-presidential candidate is an example: 'Even I, a 'Zongo' boy, I am standing here today as your next Vice-President—Insha Allah—who can say this party

has no national outlook.’ This is the case of an endorser, the vice-presidential candidate in this instance, who possesses certain market assets in the form of credibility, trust, and security, guaranteeing that a host brand, in this case the NPP party, will deliver what it promises. This approach shows a party committed to leveraging its strength, in the form of the vice-candidate’s personality, to reach electoral markets that the party is traditionally weak in.

The above emphasis on the use of other personalities in the NPP campaign other than the presidential candidate, the party, and the policy, does not in any way suggest that those political elements were ignored. They were used concurrently. However, the observation of the use of other political personalities other than the candidate, for example, is to address the gap in the literature, which treats the electoral candidate’s attributes as the main focus in the ‘personalization’ of campaigning. The party, candidates, and policy attributes were also used in the NPP campaign, as will be explained in the next question, on how the political elements were managed. In terms of the policy, the campaign’s central theme, ‘the agenda for positive change,’ for example, had been employed effectively. It had been used within the context of the ‘opportunity cost’ theory, where the party insinuated that voters choose the agenda for positive change or they risk regretting.

### **6.3 RQ 2. How are these Political elements managed?**

The management of the political elements is divided into three areas: the management of the party, the candidate, and the policies. To address this question, the party leadership attitude to correcting the perceived image issues and how the candidate’s personality and policy positions influenced the campaign agenda are analyzed.

### 6.3.1 Managing the Party

Prior to elections of 2000, the NPP's centre-right ideological position along with its structures had been associated with elitism since the early 1950s. Left-leaning critics have always maintained that the party is of, and for, the economically advantaged in society. They claimed that the NPP is the mouthpiece of the business community, as its leadership and membership is dominated by private business men and women, lawyers, and medical doctors. Therefore, the perception that the party's policy positions were going to be pro-business and anti-poor was dominant in most voters' minds. This led to the adaptation of the party's ideological positions on major policies such as transportation, health, and education, leading to a gradual shift towards the centre, and a change in vocabulary during party engagement with the public. This was noted by PR-3 in an interview (see Chapter 5, page 185).

Nonetheless, there was still the feeling that the party should dwell less on the ideological debate and 'focus on the things that bring us together', as PR-3 observed (*ibid.*) in that interview, noting that:

*The focus was on reconciliation and the commitment to democracy and the rule of law.*

*That one it embraces everyone; you don't have to be of the left or right so long as you follow that the best form of government is democracy. (PR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

Based on this thinking on the part of the party's hierarchy, the party's campaign message in the media, which is yet to be analyzed below, focused on two areas. First, it was to shape the party's image around its traditional democratic credentials, and in a way use the perceived elitist view to its advantage. Thus, issues of good governance, the rule of law, leadership

and corruption, were to take a centre stage. Secondly, it was to rely on its historic past and current personalities to promote reconciliation and a unity government. A sample of the party's approaches to communicating its positions in the media is identified in Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 below.

**Table 6.1 A selection of News Reports (NR) on NPP campaign in the 2000 elections**

<b>Text No.</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Media Channel</b>	<b>Headlines</b>	<b>Key Phrases</b>
NR 2	28/12/1999	Daily Graphic	NPP kicks off 2000 campaign.	Presidential candidate directed its campaign teams to intensify the campaign in the Volta Region, the 'Zongo' and the rural communities.
NR 3	01/05/2000	Joy FM	NPP launches 'operation reach the communities'.	To enable the party interact with, educate and sensitise six Ewe and Dangme communities in the area.
NR 6	02/06/2000	Joy FM	Kufuor in Upper West soliciting votes.	We have the people who are capable of redeeming this nation from the present mess.
NR 16	17/09/2000	The Statesman	NDC's 'World bank' is under threat	It is shameful and disgraceful that after 20 years of solid support for the NDC, the Volta region has nothing to show for it.
NR 17	17/09/2000	The Statesman	Kufuor's unbeatable ticket.	Kufuor said he was influenced by Aliu's religious and ethnic background as a Muslim who hails from the north and with strong ties with the Zongo communities in the country.
NR 21	3/10/2000	Ghana Palaver	Vengeance, Kufuor's Creed	He said they have problem with Kufuor's public speech and that he sounds too immature on the subject of reconciliation.
NR 25	08 /11/2000	The Independent	Kufuor Speaks On Aliens Compliance Order.	How can a Zongo boy be a party to a decision to deport other Zongo boys?
NR 26	20/11/2000	Joy FM	Opposition leader on reconciliation for Ghana.	Alhaji Mahama Aliu as running mate is a manifestation of NPP's commitment to reconciliation.
NR 30	18/12/2000	Joy FM	NPP will form broad-based govt. – Kufuor	The party will form a broad-based government if it wins power.
NR 31	21/08/2000	Ghana Palaver	Kufuor's December 8 Superstition and Reality.	When you sit in Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi to pontificate on human rights and the rule of law whilst the rural dwellers suffer from guinea worm, his vote will automatically go for those who show concern.

**Table 6.2 A selection of Advertisements (AD) on NPP campaign in the 2000 elections**

<b>Text No.</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Media Channel</b>	<b>Headlines</b>	<b>Key Phrases</b>
Text AD2	4/11/2000	The Statesman	J. A. Kufuor: for the army and police for national peace and security.	It is preposterous for officers and men to go on peacekeeping mission, risking their lives and the future of their families and return by HIS GRACE only to have their meagre savings 'shared' by them and government.  My government shall ensure within reason that our officers and men and the police shall be respected, cared for, so that they can play their rightful role in our society.
Text AD3	11/11/2000	The Statesman	J. A. Kufuor: your president for year 2000.	I respectfully ask all suffering Ghanaians in the urban centres to come together and send emissaries to their hometowns and villages to...
Text AD5	21/11/2000	The Statesman	JAK to the Nation's rescue.	Don't waste your vote. There is only one opponent, the most popular opposition presidential candidate. Ghana cries for a new father of the nation.
Txt AD6	23/11/2000	Daily Graphic	A New Ghana.	A new kind of leadership, an all-inclusive government.
Text AD7	26/11/2000	The Statesman	JAK For President In 2000	Mature, experienced, intelligent, honest, hardworking, tested and loved, resolute but calm, listens to advice, a man of integrity, presidential personality...
Text AD8	27/11/2000	Daily Graphic	J.A. Kufuor	I strongly believe that God (Allah) will use me to deliver his people on December 7.
Text AD9	4/12/2000	The Daily Graphic	Kufuor's message to Ghana's hardworking people.'	A political party or leadership that thrives on keeping our nation divided does not deserve your vote. I will therefore work with the leaders of the other parties...
Text AD10	23/12/2000	Daily Graphic	A Message of Hope. Reject the mediocre leadership the NDC is offering.	Be part of the new dawn of hope. It's time to join the wind of change...the wind of positive change and hope blowing across Ghana.  Positive change will enable you and your family to lead meaningful lives. You must be able to feed, clothe, house and educate yourself and your family and live in dignity in a truly free and just society.

**Table 6.3 A selection of Advertorials (ADV) on NPP campaign in the 2000 elections**

<b>Text No.</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Media Channel</b>	<b>Headlines</b>	<b>Key Phrases</b>
ADV 1	24/11/2000	Daily Graphic	Your Country Needs You.	NPP would like to thank the many thousands of you who have and continue to support the party in many ways. Ghanaians are poor because of the poor leadership. We want democracy to work and give hope to young people.
ADV 2	23/12/2000	Daily Graphic	The roots of the NPP are deep in the North. NDC falsifies history to deceive the North.	Over the years, the NDC propagandist has blazingly falsified the political history of Ghana by painting the parties in the lineage of opposition to CPP as Akan party.  The Volta, North, and the two upper regions have a chance to reject the false propaganda of the NDC and join the national mood of change.  All the time the UP remained an organizational troika with three main wings being the NPP in the North, Togo congress in the Volta, and NLM in Ashanti. By what stretch of imagination can anyone identify a party with such as history as an Akan party?
ADV 3	23/12/2000	Daily Graphic	Kufuor has a better chance of uniting Ghana.	Kufuor has the moral authority to begin the process of healing old wounds, building new bridges, repairing old damaged structures, exorcising the old evil spirit, and expelling the poisoning from our system.  JAK is not one of the radicals from whom one could have been afraid of vengeful leadership.  Gentle and Mild-mannered, his natural disposition is that of a consummate conciliator. If there is any leader in Ghana politics today who has the potential to lead the way towards the politics of new millennium, that man is JAK.
ADV 4	23/12/2000	Daily Graphic	Have you ever thought why the NDC calls the Volta region its 'World bank'?	No matter how they destroy your education and deprive you of your health care, they feel you must vote for them. Because they think they have ensnared you with the illusion that you have no other choice.
ADV 6	27/12/2000	Daily Graphic	Can you imagine the level the NDC will go to deceive the people?	The first NPP in Ghana was the Northern People's Party (of the Northern Regions) led by Tolon Na.  It was the principal partner of the Togoland Congress and the Anlo Youth of the Volta Region and the NLM of Ashanti Region who together form the United Party—Same as texts 2, 4 and 7 above in its attempt to address party image.

### **6.3.1a The use of party tradition and democratic credentials**

It is observed by the interviewees in Chapter 5 that one of the areas within which the party was to shape its image was the use of its traditionally perceived democratic credentials. To achieve this, the aim was to move the party to the centre, according to PR-3 (Interview, March 2008; see Chapter 5, page 185), so to demonstrate its tolerance with other political views. As a result, the party proposed an all-inclusive administration with ministers from all the political parties in opposition to the incumbent NDC, and a broader policy agenda in line with both sides of the political divide as illustrated in text NR30 below.

Text NR30:           *'NPP will form a broad-based government.'*  
(Joy FM, 18 December 2000)

In the news report of the above text the NPP candidate J. A. Kufuor reiterated at a rally organized in Accra that the party will form a broad-based government if it wins power in the December elections. The rally, organized to thank the people of Accra for their support in the first round of the elections which gave the NPP victory but was short of the required 50+1, was also to give the platform for the rest of the opposition parties to openly endorse the NPP flagbearer, Mr Kufuor, for the second round. The Joy FM news item above reported that present at the rally were the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), the United Ghana Movement (UGM), the People's National Convention (PNC), and the National Reform Party (NRP). Of the four parties present, three i.e. CPP, PNC and NRP, are to the left of the NPP, ideologically. Only the UGM ideologically aligns to the NPP, having come out of the latter as a breakaway party. Amongst these parties of significance was the CPP, the foremost of the left-wing parties. The CPP, since independence in 1956, has been the main opposition party to the NPP tradition as explained in Chapter 3.

According to the report, the flag-bearer of the left-wing CPP, Prof. George Hagan, pledged the CPP's co-operation with the NPP to dislodge the PNDC/NDC rule, with the explanation that the CPP after all originated from the UGCC, which is the same stock of political tradition from which the right-wing NPP descended.

This show of force, involving the leaders of these two traditionally opposed parties since the nation was founded, was followed by certain policy pronouncements and seen as the NPP party's preparedness to adapt its 'traditional policy position of a 'Westminster' capitalist party where they believe that individuals other than government manage the economy and all that government does is to ensure the enabling atmosphere' (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; interview: MR-1, March 2008). So in terms of the issues, the party managed to focus a lot of media attention on specific programmes such as mass transportation, national health insurance, low cost housing, and the school feeding programme. These are perceived as socialist policies but became the party's flagship policies and occupied the centre stage of its media interactions. These policies, according to those interviewed, were key to transforming the party's image as socially responsive to the majority of Ghanaians.

Having said that, from the political history standpoint the NPP's attempt to adapt its ideological position on the issues that concerned the majority of Ghanaians in order to reflect their wishes was not new in Ghana. In the early 1990s, the People's National Defence Council (PNDC), a military regime that governed as a centre-left administration which later became the National Democratic Party (NDC) when constitutional rule was installed in 1992, had begun a liberalization programme that was aimed at expanding the economic base of the country (Carbone, 2003). In the PNDC's liberalization programme, a

majority of state-owned institutions and industries, including the media which was pivotal to its survival, were privatized.

The liberalization and deregulation programme by a PNDC administration far to the left of the NPP, according to Carbone (2003, p. 10), was strategic to convincing the growing middle class usually attached to the NPP, of its preparedness to modernize the economy of Ghana. To Carbone, Rawlings, and the decision of PNDC (and later NDC) to locate themselves between the egalitarian and social justice ideals and the neo-liberal economic philosophy was strategic for capturing a cross-section of the Danquah-Busia Network—the NPP’s support base is usually referred to as such; see Chapter 3—that proclaims economic privatization. This approach, according to Carbon, was central to Rawlings and the NDC’s two successive electoral gains in 1992 and 1996.

However, what was different from the NPP’s approach to that of the NDC’s 1992 approach is that the NPP’s concept of ‘a broad-based government’ was an in-depth one, in the sense that not only did they talk about adapting the party’s traditional neo-liberal policy standpoint, but also included politicians from across the divide. The ‘all-inclusive government’ concept (see text AD6 below) was perceived not only for economic reasons but also as a means to unite the country. The ‘all-inclusive government’ concept was also perceived as a strategy to convince the electorate that the NPP party was prepared to work with even its opponents as the party sought to calm tensions in the country, leading to the elections. It was, in other words, ‘a physical evidence’ to the party’s newly found identity of being ‘tolerant’ and ‘inclusive’, aimed at setting apart the current party from its perceived divisive past.

Although it might appear to be a political strategy for the NPP to locate itself in the centre of the ideological spectrum (Interview: PR-3, March, 2008; Gyimah-Boadi, 2001, p. 114), it was nevertheless suggested that such practice was only reflecting the reality on the ground. According to some of the respondents interviewed (Interview: AR-7, MR-1, and PR-2, March 2008) no political party is able to win power in Ghana and Africa in general, without being a bit of both left and right, ideologically. This is because whereas the international agencies and partners such as the IMF and the World Bank, who usually fund the majority of African countries' economic budgets, would prefer full cost-recovery for social services that a government provides for its people, for example, such policies in practice are not workable in most cases for the people who vote.

Therefore, proposing policies supported by the political financiers is highly unpopular amongst the very people who vote, and usually lead to a party's defeat at the polls. The situation presents a real dilemma for the majority of African political parties either in government or eyeing for power. So from an ideological standpoint, 'it's neither left nor right,' to put it simply, for political parties in Ghana as observed by two interviewees (see Chapter 5). Despite this background, political parties are still able to perceive, present themselves, and persuade others within the ideological framework as left-, right-, or centre-leaning.

Though it was noted that the NPP managed to focus media attention on its adaptation of leftist policies such as the mass transportation programme (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001, p. 114), it is also important to note that there were other major policies that remained right-leaning. For example, according to a party official, the NPP leadership had insisted that any long-term economic programme should be 'wealth-creation-based' as against the 'poverty

alleviation' that was favoured by some key leadership figures and the smaller parties that were seeking their support (Interview: PR-3, March 2008). This disagreement indicates an unsettled environment in the party's attempt to adopt a 'multilayered' view of itself; something that contrasts commercial branding when compared with the political brand theory. These disagreements that occur when parties attempt to brand themselves also entrench the view that political marketing strategies are for electioneering purposes only, to be abandoned once in government—a criticism levelled against Blair's New Labour project in the UK.

In Chapter 4 (see also van Dijk, 1995; 1988; 1984; Schöpflin, 2001), it was argued that the ordering of words in discourse serves a crucial function to the collectivists in the conveyance of ideas. Its social function is to co-opt support, maintain dominance, and to enlarge membership as the collectivists succeed in persuading other groups with this text structure. The same could be said of the NPP in managing the party's image. The NPP managed to keep in its political vocabulary, and in the media spotlight, certain phrases to demonstrate its image as a true national party, concerned about the interest of the nation as observed in texts AD6 and ADV1 below:

Text AD 6:            *A new Ghana, a new kind of leadership, an all-inclusive government (Daily Graphic, 23 November 2000).*

Text ADV 1:        *Your country needs you ... come together if we want our democracy to work and give hope to young people (Daily Graphic, 24 November 2000).*

Texts AD6 and ADV1 are paid advertisement and advertorial placed in the *Daily Graphic*, a state-owned national newspaper. In text AD6, the advertisement uses a rhetorical device called *amplification* to emphasize the newness of the NPP party's agenda for Ghana. According to Harris (2010, p. 3) in the *Handbook of Rhetorical Devices*, amplification involves repeating a word or expression while adding more detail to it in order to emphasize what might otherwise be passed over. In other words, amplification allows you to 'call attention to emphasis' and expand a word or idea to make sure the reader realizes its importance or centrality in the discussion. In the case of text AD6, the NPP campaign tries to draw the readers' attention to the significance of the word 'new', implying that Ghana is set to become a new place with the kind of 'new' leadership the party proposes to offer, which is embedded in their concept of government: 'an all-inclusive government'.

Text ADV1 uses an advertising technique called *Appeal to Loyalty*. This technique suggests that humans, as social beings, possess strong emotive attachment to groups. Advertisers seek many ways to appeal to this kind of emotion. One of such ways is *the general appeal to loyalty*, which operates on the notion that one should act in concord with what is claimed to be the group's best interests, regardless of the merits of the particular case being argued. The other is the *bandwagon effect*, which creates the impression that everybody is doing it, and so should you. In the former, the appeal to loyalty, text ADV1 is an example in which the party takes a nationalist stand, projecting itself as what could be described as a 'concerned citizen', interested in the well-being of the nation instead of its own, and encourages the all citizenry to follow suit. The party, in this case, hides its own interests and brings into prominence instead the interest of the nation in the phrase: '*If you want our democracy to work ...*'

Having demonstrated the commitment to the democratic principles through its political activities, as discussed in Chapter 3, the party is able to entrench its perceived ‘identity’ as the most democratic through this kind of advertising discourse. Since the 1991 referendum that ushered in the constitutional rule for the fourth republic, any party that seems to exhibit good democratic credentials is perceived as the ‘best’ party to belong to. And with this understanding, the NPP had always laid a claim to such a position by virtue of its historic tradition as well as its contemporary organizational behaviour.

On another front, a segment of the electoral audience is *targeted* with the party’s democratic credentials through the phrase ‘... *and give hope to young people*’, in anticipation of their likely breakaway from their older folk and from the status quo. From the perspectives of political history, the younger Ghanaian generation (especially those between 18 and 30 years) by the 2000 elections had only lived and experienced one type of government, which was the Rawlings’ administration from the PNDC regime to the NDC. Altogether, the two regimes had ruled Ghana for about 20 years by the 2000 elections. Therefore, the NPP party’s view about this group of electors was that ‘they were a group “tired” of being under “one party” rule since their adult life.’ Therefore, the probability that the majority of this group would vote for the NPP was high. This was the view of one of the academic respondents, AR-2, on the issue of how voters come to get connected to a political party (see Chapter 5). He outlined three main ways through which young people could make a party choice: family tradition, which is usually between Nkrumah and Danquah/Busia, a break from this tradition, and a choice oblivious of this tradition (see Chapter 3).

Although the party’s continued engagement with discourses concerning commitment to democracy, human rights, free speech, and the many other liberal democratic credentials,

was advancing in the right direction to enhance opinions on its democratic ‘identity’, there were times when such discourses seemed out of touch with reality. For example, in an address (see page 194), the presidential candidate urged his campaign team to spread the party’s principles of free speech to the people of rural Ghana, and with this message he was convinced that they would support the NPP. Such an argument, to say the least, sounds out of touch with reality. It is no secret that the rural communities and much of the country’s immediate concern was the basic infrastructure to enhance their living conditions, not freedom of speech. This view of the presidential candidate also challenges the party’s claim that they consulted voters on the ground in making policies, as discussed in Chapter 5. The presidential candidate’s call for free speech for rural Ghana offered the opposing party (the NDC) and its associates enough ammunition to criticize the party for being out of touch (*Ghana Palaver*, 21 August 2000), as evident in text NR 31 below:

Text NR 31:            *Kufuor’s December 8 Superstition and Reality: When you sit in Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi to pontificate on human rights and the rule of law whilst the rural dwellers suffer from guinea worm, his vote will automatically go for those who show concern. (Ghana Palaver, 21 August 2000).*

On the other hand, the party’s policy positions and behaviour in other areas, such as the media, also enhanced its traditionally held view as being the most democratic and a pursuer of good governance. The NPP’s proposed policies, such as the abolition of the criminal libel and sedition laws (*The Independent*, 2 November 2000) geared towards ensuring press freedom and entrenchment of free speech, was enormously welcomed, especially within the media fraternity, the civil society, and the international community.

Typically, one would expect the atmosphere of free speech to be part of a democratic state of Ghana. However, the story was different prior to the 2000 elections. The ability to speak freely was not for the faint-hearted. Not even the ‘hard core’ defenders of the fourth estate, the media, could withstand the wrath of the Criminal Libel Law in place at the time. Hence, NPP’s announcement of the repeal of this law that stifled press freedom and curtailed many other freedoms, even within the academic, went a long way to demonstrate their commitment to democracy, to which they have always laid claim. The eventual effect was that members of the media became an ‘apparent part’ of the opposition machinery. Some of them allegedly campaigned openly on behalf of the NPP, as observed by some respondents in the focus group discussion in Chapter 7 of this thesis.

### **6.3.1b. The use of personalities and historic ties**

As explained in Question 1 above in this chapter, the social background of certain personalities of the party hierarchy, including the candidate, the wife of the candidate, and the vice-presidential candidate, became crucial to the campaign. Also observed was the evocation of the party’s historic past in campaign discourse in an attempt to show how certain blocs of voters might share something in common with the party. In this direction, texts NR26 and NR16 are examples:

Text NR26:            *Opposition leader on reconciliation for Ghana* (Joy FM, 20 November 2000).

Text NR16:            *NDC’s world bank is under threat ... the NPP’s links with the region dates back to the Second Republic, when the Progress Party, under the leadership of Dr K. A. Busia laid most of the infrastructure that the region has today.* (*The Statesman*, 17 September 2000).

In Text NR26 above, the presidential candidate is reported to have said that the government of NPP, if voted into power, would seek as priority a reconciled nation devoid of any type of discrimination. The presidential candidate supported this position by saying that:

*His choice of Alhaji Mahama Aliu as running mate is a manifestation of NPP's commitment to reconciliation, which is necessary for socio-economic and political development. (News Report, Joy FM, 20 November 2000).*

He continued to say that:

*He is a Christian and comes from the forest zone while Alhaji Aliu is a Muslim from the savannah zone. Thus the two have come together in harmony as leaders of the opposition party to promote reconciliation which the country needs to heal the wounds within the rank and file of the populace. (ibid.).*

From socio-political perspectives the words of the candidate as quoted above give an impression of a divided country based on religion and tribe, with the phrase: '*the two have come together in harmony as leaders of the opposition party to promote reconciliation which the country needs to heal the wounds.*' Hence their candidacy, as a Christian from the south and a Muslim vice-candidate from the north, was symbolic in bridging that divide. In fact, the allusion, as the quotation above seeks to paint, has never been the case in the country, Ghana. In contrast, the Ghanaian community as compared to others within the West African sub-region is considered the most progressive in both political and social stability terms. Leading to the 2000 elections the country, since 1992 when the current constitution began, has conducted two successive elections that have been declared as free, without any political upheavals (see Chapter 3). And even well after the country's independence in 1957,

varied religious, tribal, and other social divides have cohabited well until the ‘Aliens Compliance Order (ACO)’, a policy passed in the 1970s which demanded migrants to leave the country (PR-2 and PR-3: Interviews, March 2008).

The passage of the ACO by the NPP’s predecessor party, the Progress Party (PP), forced migrants, mainly Nigerians, out of Ghana. The policy had become a symbol of intolerance on the part of the party, especially to settler communities in Ghana, usually referred to as the ‘Zongos’, which is widespread in southern Ghana. Although the ACO policy was not of the NPP of today and never will be, as the party maintains, the two are always linked by the party’s critics, and also by political commentators of Ghanaian politics. Thus the need for the NPP’s leadership to address the matter before it caused them another electoral victory. In the same instance, critics of the party in the past and leading to the 2000 elections, had always labelled the party tribal as a result of certain historic utterances by its leadership which, to many, divided the country. For example, a *Daily Graphic* report of 17 May 2000 quoted a leading politician from the Democratic People’s Party (DPP), as saying:

*Ghanaians have not forgotten about Mr Victor Owusu’s remarks that the people of Volta region are ‘inward looking’. This remark inflicted deep cuts on the mental faculties and created festered sores in the minds of the people of the Volta Region which have not healed up till now. (News Report, The Daily Graphic, 17 May 2000).*

The supposed remark by Victor Owusu, a prominent figure of the NPP tradition, is regarded in Ghanaian politics as one of the most damaging to the already sour relations between the NPP and the Ewe tribe, which is in the Volta region. This background, amongst others, partly explains the challenges the NPP faced going into Elections 2000 and their campaign strategies thereon.

In a news report featured in the right-wing *Statesman* newspaper, Text NR16 above, the NPP party sought to remind people that it was actually under the government of its predecessor party in the Second Republic, the Progress Party (PP), when most of the infrastructure the Volta region has today were developed. The story goes on to suggest that the dominance of the NDC in the Volta region was under threat, given the resurgence of the NPP nationwide—hence the NDC and their allies’ desperate attempts to smear the party. These kinds of attack on the NPP’s image also led to the ‘Community Outreach Programmes’ reported in text NR3 below:

Text NR3:            *NPP launches Operation Reach the Communities in their Hamlets* (Joy FM, 1 May 2000).

In the text above, a ‘community outreach programme’ is reported to have been initiated by the NPP to target people in communities where the party’s negative image is perceived. In the report, Mr Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey, the NPP National Campaign Manager, called on the people of such communities to debunk the anti-alien and anti-Ewe smear campaign by opponents against the NPP. He told the campaign team to try hard to build the party’s confidence in the people and let them know that the NPP does not hate any tribe or ethnic group but accepts all people who share its aims and principles. He further stated that the programme:

*... is to enable the party to interact with, educate, and sensitise six Ewe and Dangme communities in the Greater Accra constituency area on the political and economic situation prevailing in the country.* (Joy FM, 1 May 2000).

The attempt to counter the attack on the party's image was replicated in the media, using advertisements and advertorials. The advertorials, usually a quarter, half, and sometimes a full page long, presented a detailed background of the NPP party's historic links with such communities that they are accused of being against. These advertorials were usually placed in the state-owned and nationally circulated *Daily Graphic* Newspaper with a declaration that it was being paid for by a group known as 'the Citizens Committee for Democratic Change' (CDDC). As is always the case, general elections in Ghana always attract *para-political* groups who speak in favour of their parties of support.

In this direction, where the message is placed in the *Daily Graphic* and not in the right-wing newspaper, *The Statesman*, which is a known NPP sympathizer and is paid for by a group known as 'the Citizens Committee for Democratic Change', the attempt is made to remove the partisan source from the message. As observed by Deighton, in Chapter 4, a claim must possess grounds that are not in dispute, and part of achieving this includes having a source that could be considered credible and verifiable (Deighton, 1985, p. 433). On the other hand, placing such advertorials in the nationally circulated *Daily Graphic* is an attempt to reach the majority of the people, as ethnic groups in Ghana are not necessarily geographically bound. Due to economic necessities, different ethnic groups are found in settler communities all over the country. Examples of the advertorials sponsored by the CDDC are texts ADV2 and ADV5 below:

Text ADV 2:        *Roots of the NPP are deep in the north. NDC falsifies history to deceive the north. (Daily Graphic, 23 December 2000)*

Text ADV 5: *Can you imagine the level the NDC will go to deceive the people? (Daily Graphic, 23 December 2000)*

In the texts above, the NPP and its operatives sought to highlight the party's historic ties with the targeted communities where it had image issues, through the use of advertorials. For example, the CDDC of the NPP camp sponsored a number of such advertorials 'intended to educate and encourage Ghanaians to vote for change', the group claims (the CDDC in the *Daily Graphic*, 23 December 2000). One of such advertorials targeting those communities read:

*The propagandist of the NDC will tell you the NPP has historically been an Akan party. The first NPP in Ghana was the Northern People's Party (NPP) led by Tolon Na. It was the principal partner of the Togoland Congress and the Anlo youth of the Volta region and the NLM of Ashanti, who together formed the United Party. The second person to lead the UP after K. A. Busia had gone into exile was Chief S. D. Dombo, who was the leader of opposition until Ghana became one party state. Victor Owusu, Joe Appiah, R. R. Amponsah, all served under the leadership of Chief Dombo. The UP was thus the first national party to be led by a 'Northerner'.*

*Indeed the NPP today is a historical tribute to the tremendous contribution made by the Northern People's Party to the evolution of democracy in Ghana through the illustrious leaders like Tolon Na, Jatoe Kaleo, Chief Kaboe, and Chief J. A. Brimah (these chiefs of significant influence during Ghana's independent struggle who hail from the North of the country). Put an end to the NDC falsehood. The rest of the country has seen through their deceit and the mood for change is now irresistible. The northern and upper regions should be a central part of the process of change. If you miss the message of change on December 7, you can make amends on December 28. Be true to the heritage of Chief*

*Dombo; join the national mood for change*' (a CDDC advertorial, *Daily Graphic*, 23 December 2000; see texts ADV2, ADV5, and ADV6).

In concluding how the party image was managed, it was observed that the NPP campaign operationalized marketing techniques such as *brand personality* and *endorsement* approaches in crafting an identity as 'democratic' and 'national in character', 'congruent' to the ideal audiences they sought to persuade. The party had done so through the communication of its tradition and ties to the communities it targeted, the personalities within its rank and file, and the perceived democratic credentials it beholds. Although these techniques offered the party the opportunity to create a multilayered image consistent with, and appealing to, individual groups of people, it targeted as commercial brands do. However, there was a side effect as tensions arose during discussions on the party's economic policies as observed above. This limitation, for example, brings into focus the discourse about the total 'fit' of commercial marketing techniques and strategies in politics raised in political marketing literature.

### **6.3.2 Managing the Candidate**

In Chapter 2, it was discussed that as a consequence of the increasing voter disassociation from political institutions, parties consider building brand identities around attributes of their electoral candidates instead (Needham, 2006). In this instance, Needham recommends that developing the party brand around a popular leader's attributes is commendable (2006). To this, Needham asserts that parties select as candidates popular leaders with attributes which voters identify as desirable, and in the course of managing the party under the spotlight of the intrusive media the party begins to remould itself in the minds of the electorate. The approach, according to Needham (2006), possesses the potency to create a

memorable, emotional, as well as functional picture in the minds of the electorate. This idea and process of building political identity on the candidate's characteristics is supported by other research (Sniderman et al., 1991; Popkin, 1994; Kavanagh, 1995; Kotler and Kotler, 1999; Smith, 2001; Lloyd, 2003) as it is widely recognized that most voters, to a large extent, use candidate attributes as 'cues' in making electoral decisions.

In managing the candidate, part of the NPP's approaches parallel what is in the literature. The party's presidential candidate, John Kufuor, was the most popular amongst the candidates that contested the 2000 elections, only second to the incumbent Jerry Rawlings, who at the time had come to the end of his constitutional term in office. His party's candidate, Atta – Mills, the vice-president at the time, had only been poached into politics and therefore was less popular despite his tenure as Vice-President. In contrast, candidate Kufuor, apart from being the NPP's presidential candidate in the 1996 elections, which he lost to Jerry Rawlings, had been in politics for close to 30 years by the 2000 elections and had served in various administrations, including that of Rawlings' PNDC government.

Kufuor was also described as moderate in comparison to other leaders in the centre-right party who contested the party's primaries with him in 1998. He was considered calm, reasonable, and a consensus-builder. He was described as a 'fatherly figure', and presumably a good leader (see Chapter 7) of a party that had been consigned to opposition for almost the greater part of his political career. These qualities readily fit into Needham's criteria of a candidate brand.

However, selecting Kufuor as a leading candidate for the NPP in Elections 2000 was not by consensus, despite these qualities. The party emerged from the primaries almost as a divided

house and needed an intensive healing process in order to present a unified front. There were calls on members by very significant party leaders to forget about their grievances in order to rally around the party's cause (Adu Boahen, in *The Statesman*, 24 September 2000). This means the democratic process that grants people, including internal party members, the right to choose whoever they liked as a candidate, largely calling into question Needham's and others' theory of branding a political party based on candidate attributes.

A person may possess certain likeable attributes, usually personality attributes admired by the majority of the electorate, but these attributes to party functionaries may not be competitive enough when compared for competence, for example. These functionaries who select party leaders, in some democracies like Ghana, become the 'gatekeepers' that a candidate chosen by voters must pass before having the chance to brand the party in line with his or her attributes. Should the party functionaries fail to select a candidate according to what the opinion polls say is the voters' choice, then what happens to the branding strategy?

Despite the above being one of the limitations of the candidate brand approach, it was an integral part to the NPP party's electioneering strategy once Kufuor was selected as the party's leading candidate. In an interview, a party official observed that although critics and opposing parties had questioned their candidate's competence after the NPP's primaries, the campaign did not hold back in managing the expectations of the electorate, using the candidate's true values embedded in his personality—who Kufuor really was, saying:

*I think the candidate was managed within his own core values. That the candidate was committed to the democratic dispensation ... it was important he was seen as non-*

*threatening because nobody wanted to see the country go into civil war, and the whole business of the NDC previously had been, 'If you vote against us there will be bloodshed.'* And so we were able to bring that fear down. So the candidate was helpful in that. (PR-3: Interview, March 2008).

And with this understanding, certain mundane attributes of the candidate such as his build, height, and calm demeanour were summed up into a composite political asset in the well-popularized slogan, 'The Gentle Giant' (Interview: PR-3, March 2008). The Gentle Giant was to be 'dramatized' for the 'sensational' broadcast media, with the hope that when exposed to the entire drama that comes with it, people would come to own the campaign and spread the word (*ibid.*)—hence the skillfully developed 'J. A. Kufuor Jingle' which pummelled the Ghanaian airwaves as an advertisement, leading to the 2000 elections.

In the press, a similar approach was adopted using Kufuor's personality attributes as a key construct within which the agenda for positive change was framed. Again, this could be found in Table 6.3 above. The sample of advertisements on Kufuor shows how social personality played a role in building his *identity*. In the analyzed advertisement and advertorial items, only two failed to mention the name Kufuor, or feature his photograph, alongside the party name, the NPP. The remaining items had the photograph of candidate Kufuor along with active phrases describing him. The photographs used in advertisements and advertorials seemed controlled and deliberate, very different from those used in news reports, which were not under the control of the party. In the former, Kufuor was either in a suit, wrapped in Kente cloth, the traditional wear from Ghana's south, or the smock from the north, sitting down with either his legs or arms crossed, or both, with certain keywords describing him in the text as follows:

Text AD7: *'JAK For President In 2000.'* Mature, experienced, intelligent, honest, hardworking, tested and loved, resolute but calm, listens to advice, a man of integrity, presidential personality. (*The Statesman*, 26 November 2000)

Text AD5: *'JAK to the Nation's rescue.'* Don't waste your vote. There is only one opponent, the most popular opposition presidential candidate. Ghana cries for a new father of the nation. (*The Statesman*, 21 November 2000)

In Text AD7, the depiction of candidate Kufuor suggested a controlled attempt to look *presidential, statesmanlike, elderly*, and as a *fatherly figure*, in line with Scammell's description of image-management (see Chapter 2). It is also in line with a rhetorical strategy employed in advertising discourse known as *source credibility*. This is where a person in an ad displays characteristics befitting of a trusted and authoritative source. In this direction, the NPP campaign bestowed on the candidate words they presumed would fit the character traits in line with voter expectations. As explained by the party officials in the interviews, the approach was deliberate. The aim was for the candidate to exude confidence, and at the same time remain calm so as to contrast the incumbent Rawlings' robust and aggressive posture.

It is necessary to acknowledge that the use of words and phrases to demonstrate personality attributes such as *'mature'*, *'experienced'*, *'listens to advice'* etc. as they appeared in the NPPs campaign ads was not peculiar to the party. However, what seems different in the NPP's case in 2000 was how these themes were used to target certain segments of voters, and also to differentiate Kufuor's type of leadership from the status quo. Significant amongst them is that of Texts AD2 and AD8 below, where a conscious effort was made to address voters on a targeted basis.

In Text AD5 above, a rhetorical technique in advertising theory called *false dilemma* is employed. Here, the choice possibilities were deliberately limited by the NPP campaign for the purpose of avoiding voters considering other opposition candidates. In this instance, the NPP campaign presented Kufuor as the *only* competing candidate against the incumbent, and implied that a choice was to be made from the two. In assessing the effectiveness of this rhetorical technique in text AD5, transformational or affective ‘ad’ conditions could be used, as explained earlier in this section and in the methods chapter (Chapter 4). The claim that there was ‘*only one opponent*’ to the incumbent in the elections was obviously false. However, the grounds based on which this claim was made, that candidate Kufuor was the ‘*the most popular opposition presidential candidate*’, was true. This meant that although the argument was flawed, when considered within the frame of Aristotle’s logic (logos), it was emotionally credible and potent enough (ethos/pathos) to appeal to those who wanted the incumbent to be removed at all cost and were ready to vote for the one with the ability to achieve this.

In texts AD3 and AD9 below, a common rhetorical technique in advertisement, *fallacy*, runs through them as emotive terms were used to attach value or moral goodness to their propositions without necessarily being true. A fallacy is a pathos-oriented rhetoric engineered to exploit emotional triggers in the listener or the interlocutor, for example: *appeal to emotions*. It is also used to take advantage of social relationships between people. A fallacy attempts to elicit an emotional response that will serve as the basis of any decision to be made, as opposed to logos-oriented argument that relies on logic.

Text AD3:            *J. A. Kufuor: Your President for year 2000. I respectfully ask all suffering Ghanaians in the urban centres to come together and send emissaries to their*

*hometowns and villages to interact with their people and educate them against rigging and electoral malpractices' (The Statesman, 11 November 2000).*

Text AD9: *Kufuor's message to Ghana's hardworking people. A political party or leadership that thrives on keeping our nation divided does not deserve your vote. I will therefore work with the leaders of the other parties in bringing about the positive change Ghanaians are crying for. (Daily Graphic, 4 December, 2000).*

Again, in Text AD3, another rhetorical technique, *appeal to pity and fear*, were evoked through three assumptions. In the first assumption, the ad pre-empts the possibility of rigging and electoral malpractices. The second assumption is that the rigging will come from the villages. The third assumption is that the suffering Ghanaians in the city centres would know better and understand that it is in their interest to ensure that the election is not rigged. Going back to the theories of transformational advertisement described earlier, it was noted that in appealing to the people's fear the advert carries what is known as 'a general emotional state,' which is *suffering*, that a potential audience will not desire to be in. Of course, all suffering people may dream of a day when their situations will change for the better. This dream is capitalized on by the NPP's candidate suggesting that by ensuring a fair election, the suffering Ghanaians in urban centres will be a step closer to changing their situation. The candidate also seemed to create an in-group, 'all suffering Ghanaians', with which he identified himself. Again, choosing the word 'emissaries' as opposed to 'representatives' when analyzed in the context of the figurative device, *metonymy*, perhaps strengthens the seriousness of the course for which the 'suffering Ghanaians' are being called.

Also in text AD9 above, an *appeal to prejudice* using solidarity-engineered technique to evoke pride in a prospective audience and to encourage positive emotions was used. Prejudice is defined as a predisposition to judge someone or a group of people, or a thing, either positively or negatively, even after the facts indicate otherwise. Another rhetorical technique employed in this ad is *glittering generalities*. These are important-sounding ‘glad words’ that have different positive meanings for individual subjects. When they are used, they demand approval from the recipient of the message with no logical thinking, simply because they are linked to what the recipient of the message values as important concept. The phrase ‘Ghana’s hardworking people’ is in this class of rhetorical technique.

In Text AD8 below, the candidate consciously addressed the two dominant faith groups, Christians and Muslims, in their own languages using the word ‘Allah’ along with the word ‘God’. It must be acknowledged that in Ghana, people of the Christian faith use the title of God even when addressing Muslim or multi-faith audiences. In the same way, it is also the case that the people of the Muslim faith use Allah when addressing the Christian audience. This practice is acceptable and well understood in public discourse. So for the NPP to make a conscious use of the title ‘Allah’ alongside ‘God’ shows a certain level of ‘*deliberateness*’ of the part of the party to communicate with *identifiable groups* in their own language and to demonstrate its ‘membership’ of the Muslim community, for example.

In the case of text AD2 below, hardly have the Ghana Armed Forces and the Police featured in electoral discourse targeted with campaign messages. This does not mean that until 2000 the votes of the Armed Forces had never been courted. During general elections in Ghana members of the Armed Forces are made to vote separately, a week ahead of the election day, so that they can be dispatched to maintain law and order at polling stations for security

reasons. Politicians therefore court their votes generally as they go about their usual campaign trails, but not in the way that the NPP did, an example of which is demonstrated in the text below.

Text AD2: *The officers and men of the Ghana Armed Forces and the Police have to be given incentives to enable them to effectively protect our lives and properties. It is preposterous for officers and men to go on peacekeeping mission, risking their lives and the future of their families and return by HIS GRACE only to have their meagre savings 'shared' [between] them and government. My government shall ensure within reason that our officers and men and the police [are] respected [and] cared for so that they can play their rightful role in our society. (The Statesman, 4 November 2000).*

Text AD8: *I strongly believe that God (Allah) will use me to deliver his people on December 7. (Daily Graphic, 27 November 2000)*

Text AD2 could be analyzed on two fronts. First is the ad's target audience and second is how the ad is planned to influence the targets. In analyzing the target audience, the ad could be said to have two targets, primary and secondary, looking at its design. The first and primary target is uniformed men and women and their families. A secondary target could be understood to be ordinary citizens who are not related to the uniformed men and women but have interest in their welfare, due to the role they play in protecting lives and properties.

The attention of these two groups are attracted and sustained in two ways. The first is the sense of 'novelty' associated with a political ad targeting uniformed men and women for the first time in the nation's political history. The second is the attempt to relate the interest of

the primarily targeted audience, the uniformed men and women, to that of the secondarily targeted audience, the ordinary citizen, in the phrase ‘*to effectively protect our lives and property*’.

On another front, the ad seeks to affect the potential reader’s state of being, using a rhetorical component, *dysphemism*, to effect emotions. Dysphemism, which is the opposite of the glittering generalities discussed earlier, literally means ‘sounding bad’. It is defined as a word or expression that produces a negative effect on the attitude of the audience towards someone or something or to eradicate any positive predispositions an audience may have for someone. Again in Text AD2 above, a number of phrases were designed in such a manner that the reader might find the situation of the men and women in uniform ‘*pitiful*’. For example, the use of the phrase: ‘... only to have their meagre savings shared’ evokes a state of unfairness with the present arrangement between the government and the people of the armed forces.

In fact, public discussions on the deductions from uniformed men and women’s allowances have been ongoing since 1991. It is the belief amongst certain media and political circles that the policy of deductions from peacekeeping allowances were orchestrated by the authorities in charge of the military, as opposed to a government-sanctioned arrangement (*Ghanaian Chronicle*, 25 April 2005, accessed from ghanaweb.com, 5 June 2010). The story has been running occasionally, especially whenever officers were back from UN missions. According to a report by the *Ghanaian Chronicle*, at the time when the NPP party itself was in government, the members of the Armed forces complained of compulsory deductions from their salaries, including allowances for serving in the UN Peacekeeping Operations. These deductions had been ongoing since 1991, with the most recent ones

introduced in 2003 and 2005 when the NPP administration was in power. So whereas the pettiness of the situation, as portrayed in the NPP's ad, was enough to exploit the emotions of prospective audiences exposed to it, part of the situation was far from the truth in reality.

From the above, one could be certain that the belief of the primary audience, men and women in uniform, and possibly their immediate relations who are directly affected by the allowance deductions, was likely to be influenced. This is because 'at the heart of persuasion is the ability to adapt a message to the feelings, needs, and values of the audience,' according to O'Hair et al. (1995, p. 585). Advertisers therefore endeavour to create a 'general emotional state' (Clyne, 1980) with their message, which the audience would or would not most certainly desire to be in. On the other hand, it is difficult to determine whether the ad will affect the secondary target audience. This is because although the claim of unfair deductions may not be supported by the citizens, which is the secondary target audience, the ad fails to support this claim with any evidence that is independently verifiable. And being a political advert coming from a political party, the secondary target audience is likely to be aware of the ad's partisan inclination. This caveat is likely to influence the expected impact, especially amongst politically 'savvy' voters.

To further understand the NPP's approaches of managing the candidate using discursive texts such as party advertisements and advertorials, is to look at how voters thought these words and phrases were reflective on the candidate Kufuor's personality in reality. In this direction, opinions from the in-depth interviews and the focus group discussions are worth referring to (see Chapters 5 and 7). It was understood that these words were not abstractive, but a representation of what the candidate stood for. Both in-depth interviewees, including non-party ones and focus group participants, said the candidate was someone of fatherly

traits. His calm demeanour, it was observed, differentiated him from the incumbent President Rawlings, making him the likeable candidate in comparison. This view confirmed party officials' position that the candidate's 'own core values' were central to managing his image.

In analysis of media items, according to van Dijk (see Chapter 4), contextual and structural frames with which texts are produced also reveal embedded meanings. In this direction, understanding the factors in the Ghanaian society that formed the basis of the news, advertisement and advertorial texts related to the NPP campaign, and how these factors affected interpretation of the campaign were necessary to the analysis. Therefore, it is possible to argue, given the understanding of the socio-political realities in Ghana, that the NPP campaign sought to build and transmit 'a responsible leader' image about its candidate, Kufuor, so as to allay voters' fears of possible electoral violence, which the opposition NDC party was associated with, at least according to the NPP officials' beliefs.

According to PR-3, the party leadership was of the view that 'it was important the candidate was seen as non-threatening' since the whole business of the NDC previously had been: 'If you vote against us there will be bloodshed' (Interview, March 2008). Such an identity, according to the NPP campaign, had the capacity to calm down tensions and fears within the Ghanaian society in general and, most importantly to the campaign, to contrast the two parties given 'the incumbent Rawlings' robust and aggressive posture' (Interview: PR-2, March 2008). The party campaign hoped to achieve the above through the choice of words and phrases (text structure) used to describe Kufuor, and also through quotations in his speech when he addressed his audience.

With phrases such as ‘*the father of the nation*’, ‘*resolute but calm*’, ‘*JAK, he cares*’, ‘*JAK to the nations rescue*’, and ‘*the people’s choice*’ the tone of the NPP candidate’s campaign appeared less adversarial and reconciliatory, resonating with how voters perceived candidate Kufuor’s true personality. This means the NPP campaign succeeded in building a candidate brand in Kufuor as a leader through associations as discussed earlier in Chapter 2. On the other hand, if candidate Kufuor’s personality, as known by the public (see Chapters 5 and 7), had been inconsistent with the associations depicted in the campaign texts, the brand identity would have failed.

Regarding its electoral appeal, it is possible to also argue that the identity the campaign sought to create was aimed at the centre, especially amongst those who have less or no ideological inclination. This observation could be determined from two fronts. First is the text structure, as texts in advertisement, advertorials, and quotations attributed to the candidate in news reports strike a reconciliatory tone with no ideological intonations. For example:

*There is only one opponent, the most popular opposition presidential candidate.*

*JAK to the nation’s rescue.*

*I will therefore work with the leaders of the other parties.*

Secondly, the reconciliatory tone of campaign advertisements appearing in newspapers such as *The Daily Graphic* and *The Independent*, which do not appeal to a particular segment of the ideological divide, makes it possible to suggest that non-aligned or ideologically volatile voters are the targets of the candidate’s campaign. On the other hand, the use of *Crusading Guide*, which is a ‘not-so-extreme’ leftist paper suggests an appeal to such an audience who might have been dissatisfied with the status quo. The use of *The Statesman*, a right wing

newspaper, for NPP's advertisement and advertorial campaigns may well have been to reassure and maintain the party's core support base.

### **6.3.3 Managing the Policy**

In Chapter 2, a policy brand is described as a process of developing policies responsive to the issues that voters care about, and communicating them through channels accessible to them. In this case, marketing tools such as market research, segmentation, and targeting are central to building a policy brand as with any other type of political branding (Scammell, 1999; Henneberg, 2001; Wring and Lilleker, 2003; Lees-Marshment, 2001; Worcester and Baines, 2006; Lilleker and Negrine, 2005). Worcester and Baines (2006), in describing the process, suggest two areas: policy development and policy dissemination. Whereas the former takes care of identifying the policy needs and incorporating them into policy formulation, the latter considers a voter-oriented communication process. This could be achieved by developing a single all-encompassing theme to depict the entire policy agenda with the aim of keeping the campaign message simple and memorable for the voter. Baer (1995) also postulates a similar theory in disseminating messages in what is termed the 'broadcast and narrowcast message' development process.

In determining whether the NPP's approaches in managing the policy parallel the policy brand development theory, findings on the NPP's policies in the media could only partly show its use. This is because there was very limited information in print on policy discourse, as opposed to discourse on the candidate and the party. Also, as observed by Lilleker and Negrine (2004), the 'messiness' of developing policy, by nature, will always remain a back-door process with the methods not published for public consumption, especially in the African context, where activities of this nature are usually considered 'the secret of our

trade', to use the exact words of PR-3 (Interview, March 2008). Party officials interviewed claimed that policies were formulated based on research findings gathered from intense consultation with the people, as part of their new-found strategy. This claim received mixed responses when put to non-party interviewees and members of the focus group discussions. Some agreed with the party officials' claim, others rejected it, but only to a certain degree. Those who partly agreed noted that radio programmes in particular may have contributed to the NPP's process in registering people's views and incorporating that into policy development. In news reports, certain activities initiated by the party suggest a gathering of voter views in policy-making. An example is Text NR3 below.

Text NR3:        *'NPP launches Operation Reach the Communities in their Hamlets.'*  
*Discussion on outreach programme targeting settler communities.* (Joy  
FM, 1 May 2000).

Programmes like the one in the above text, and others such as 'Operation 2000 Grass-root Elephant Walk,'; 'Operation 2000 for 2000' (*The Independent*, 1 March 1999; Joy FM, 1 May 2000; 9 October 2000), were organized to intensify the party's campaign in targeted areas such as the Volta region, the 'Zongos' and the rural communities. These 'outreach programmes', according to the party campaign manager, Obetsebi-Lampsey (2000), as quoted in the newspaper, were geared towards support mobilization, fund-raising and as a means to 'interact with, educate, and sensitise these communities on the political and economic situation prevailing in the country'.

Findings also suggest that the NPP, through its engagement with certain interest groups such as the Ghana Journalist Association (GJA), had offered to respond to certain policy demands that the incumbent administration failed to enact. An example is the NPP's proposed repeal

of the Criminal Libel Law (CLL), a law passed by the incumbent administration to ensure that public officers were not irresponsibly ‘smeared’ by journalists. However, to the members of the GJA, the CLL is antithetical to freedom and democracy of the press. To them, it was a ploy only to protect the leaders of the administration and make them ‘untouchable’. In *The Independent*’s edition dated 2 November 2000, the presidential candidate of the NPP is reported to have said that:

*Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the constitution of the fourth republic. The NPP government will uphold this freedom. Indeed the NPP government will ensure free and diverse private ownership for the print and electronic media. (The Independent, 2 November 2000).*

From the Ghanaian socio-political perspectives, the statement above by the NPP’s presidential candidate could be judged as partly true. On the one hand, it is inconsistent to suggest that it would require an NPP government to ensure media pluralism given the fact that the entire economy, including the media industry (see Chapter 3) was liberalized under the NDC administration and was witnessing the influx of private ownership. On the other hand, although such private ownership existed alongside the state-owned media, the entire media industry malfunctioned and faced limitations in the discharge of its civic role as a result of the existence of the CLL, hence the NPP’s claim. The NPP argued that it was the vanguard of free speech and the incumbent was not. This approach to identity construction is consistent with the ‘us versus them’ theory observed by van Dijk (see Chapter 4).

The contextual and structural analysis of text also comes to play in understanding how the NPP exploited the CLL argument as part of a strategy to entrench its democratic identity and to differentiate itself from the incumbent. For example, in the discourse structure

relating to the discussion of the CLL, the party outlined ‘... who from the general public could be part of the NPP’s defined self,’ which was ‘the vanguard of free speech’. In other words: ‘Join us if you believe in a free and diverse media.’ However, the same text has limitations, as it sought to draw ideological lines with the explicit use of the words ‘diverse private ownership’. This makes the discourse adversarial and ideological, and has the potential to alienate left-wing voters who do not believe in total privatization of the media space.

However, given the characteristics of those whom this advertisement was targeting, (the civic society and those who believe in free speech, such as academics) it was unlikely that they would not be predisposed to the advert. It is also possible to suggest that such discourses would appeal to people of investment interests. Hence it could be argued that the NPP’s presidential candidate used this statement in an attempt to reach a wider audience, not just the journalists and those who work in the media industry affected by the CLL.

Although the repeal of the CLL and other policies by the NPP may have been responsive to the very needs of the Ghanaian people, it could not be verified beyond the opinions of those interviewed that they were formulated as a result of market research findings. According to AR-2 (Interview, March 2008) the majority of the issues that were of concern to most Ghanaians were not privy to only one party. He observed that a number of researches commissioned by international agencies, such as the World Bank working in Ghana, had available data on the needs of the people of Ghana:

*If political parties read the many reports, such as the Ghana poverty reduction strategy [GPRS], like I have done, it is easy for politicians to know what our people want. (AR-2: Interview, March 2008).*

And in the case of the CLL, the debate had been in the public domain since its introduction. Hence the electoral appeal for repealing such a law was without question, especially to those who worked in the media. And this was a fact known by all the political parties, including even the incumbent administration. In fact, in the same election year one of the smaller parties, the United Ghana Movement (UGM) said that it aimed to repeal it six months into administration, if it won power (Wereko-Brobby, in *The Independent*, 2 November 2000).

It was also noted that media proliferation, especially the growth of FM and TV stations broadening access to socio-political discourse (Gadzekpo, 2005; Intermedia, 2005; see Chapter 3), made it possible for political parties to take note of voters' views through TV and radio 'phone-in', 'text-in' and 'write-in' programmes. However, whether such data was actually used in policy-making is difficult to conclude without only making assumptions, and this is as a result of the method limitations of the thesis.

On policy dissemination, the review of the media items revealed the framing of an all-encompassing theme, 'agenda for positive change', as the broadcast theme that encapsulated the entire electoral programme of the NPP. This was tied in with specific policy themes such as the proposed repeal of the CLL, which targeted those people concerned about free speech; a dual citizenship bill aimed at the Ghanaian diaspora; an all-inclusive government; a national reconciliation initiative and a zero tolerance for corruption initiatives, all of which targeted smaller parties and other interest groups. These policy statements targeted the interests of the influential segments of the Ghanaian society.

From the interviews and the focus group discussions, it was generally agreed that the NPP's broadcast theme, 'Agenda for Positive Change', was a reflection on the national mood at the time. The narrowcast themes, which captured individual policy statements, were to offer assurance. For example, from an economic and 'good governance' perspective, the national youth employment programme and the zero tolerance for corruption, for example, were to assure those who expressed active discontent. As for those who entertained fears of electoral chaos, they were to be reassured of the party's commitment to the relative peace and stability that the nation enjoyed, with the proposition of the all-inclusive government and the national reconciliation initiatives. In rhetorical technique terms, this approach falls within what is known as 'epideictic' (Rapp, 2002). This is the attempt to praise or blame somebody by describing their deeds as honourable or shameful. By proposing a national reconciliation initiative, the NPP was suggesting that the incumbent administration was governing a divided nation, which when in power it would try to heal.

Campaign advertisements and advertorials on the policy agenda were also designed, using rhetorical devices to attract and retain readers' attention and to affect their beliefs. An example is text AD10 below:

Text AD10            *A Message of hope. Reject the mediocre leadership the NDC is offering. Be part of the new dawn of hope. It's time to join the wind of change ... the wind of positive change and hope blowing across Ghana. (Daily Graphic, 23 December 2000).*

*Positive change will enable you and your family to lead meaningful lives. You must be able to feed, clothe, house and educate yourself and your family and live in dignity in a truly free and just society. (ibid.).*

In Text AD10, a number of advertising techniques were employed, using figurative language to affect readers' emotions. First, the advertisement used metaphorical phrases such as 'wind of change' and 'new dawn of hope' as a means to set voters' expectations on what the party was promising, and encourage voters to be part of it. Metaphorical statements make implied comparisons between two unlike things, whereby the unfamiliar is expressed using the familiar (see Richard Nordquist, about.com. accessed on 7 June 2010). In this case, the 'wind', of which every reader is familiar, was to signify the change that was blowing across the country at the time. Knowing the speed of the wind, this statement was to indicate to readers that the political situation in the country, in terms of power, was changing hands very swiftly indeed. The same could be said of the 'new dawn', which was associated with expectations.

In persuasion theory, advertisements also try to create a 'state of emotions' in which a person who is consuming the adverts would or would not like to be, as explained in Chapter 4 on Clyne's model (1980) of generalized emotions. This was evident in the NPP's advert on the 'positive change agenda', which reads: *'Positive change will enable you and your family to lead meaningful lives.'* From the generalized 'state of emotions' theory, this advertisement was attempting to affect the reader to be positively disposed to the party's agenda. Secondly, the advertisement was also using the bandwagon effect: *'You and your family'; 'Positive change and hope blowing across Ghana'*, to demonstrate that the reader was not the only one who was being affected.

#### **6.4 RQ 3. What are the roles of the political elements and who are the target?**

Are political elements assigned roles in the campaign, and what are they? In literature, Needham (2006) argues that a party's image is likely to remould itself under its leader and

around the leader's character traits. Scammell narrates how Kennedy's image may have influenced listeners' judgment that he was the best candidate during the 1960 US presidential debate against Richard Nixon. This observation is widely supported in political marketing literature (Sniderman et al., 1991; Popkin, 1994; Kavanagh, 1995; Kotler and Kotler, 1999; Smith, 2001; Lloyd, 2003) in which it is claimed that most electors, to a large extent, use candidates' image as 'cues' in making electoral decisions. In the same way, the party and its ideological position embody people's beliefs and aspirations. The kind of philosophy a party pursues, which is manifested in its policy positions on the issues, represents the beliefs of its supporters (Interview: AR-2, March 2008). Therefore a political party is a rallying point of association for its followers. This means that whereas the candidate image targets voters who are not so concerned about ideology, the party image targets ideologically inclined voters.

Based on the above, the thesis argues that although political parties may not consciously assign roles to the political elements in electioneering campaigns, they have implicit roles nevertheless. AR-2 (Interview, March 2008) for example, observed that since 1989 when the Berlin wall collapsed, ideology and philosophy disappeared completely from African politics as the means for political identification. People no longer identify political parties by the kind of philosophies they pursued, making way for the politics of ethnicity and personality to prevail.

The NPP party may not have made a conscious effort to assign roles to the party, the candidate, and the policy; but these political elements had certain objectives to fulfil. For example, the vice-presidential candidate had been chosen for the sole aim of changing the perception of the party's image and also to fulfil a demand from a cross-section of the

Ghanaian electorate. On 11 November 2000, *The Daily Graphic* reported that there were calls by some prominent opinion leaders and pressure groups in the country, urging political parties to select as their running mates people from the three Northern regions, which are located in the Ghana's Savannah zone. Prominent among these groups making that call, the newspaper reported, was the Savannah Caucus made up of eminent scholars and personalities like Dr Ben Abdullah, a former Secretary of State under the PNDC administration. The report stated that the group had a press conference in Accra to demand emphatically that the electorate would only vote for the party that would choose its running mate from the north. They further explained that their demand was on the premise that such a move could be a way of solving the political equation of bridging the North and South. They also claimed that the North had been excluded from national politics for quite a long time and now was the time for the North to assert its position—hence their demand for an influential leader who would protect their interests and ensure the initiation of projects in the three northern regions.

The eventual selection of the vice-presidential candidate by the NPP party, according to Coomson and Ogbamey (2000), connected with the cries and desires of the North because, as they put it, 'In him the powerful "Zongo" and "Savannah" clubs have what they really wanted, a "Northerner" and a Muslim.' The knowledge that the northern sector of the country would not declare their support to any party other than the NDC unless they had some concrete reasons to do so was well known in the country. They, like many other deprived areas of the country, had experienced development only at the time of Nkrumah and Rawlings. With the exception of these two administrations, the area had witnessed very little development in both colonial and independent Ghana, and with a party popularly perceived as Ashanti, the people of the North had very little to hope for. Therefore, the

NPP's decision to go for someone from the North symbolized its preparedness to answer the Northerners' developmental needs—so it seemed.

From electoral perspectives, the credentials of the vice-presidential nominee, according to a *Daily Graphic* report dated 8 September 2000, were something good for the NPP to go by. He was known to be an active member of a powerful youth group in the area, the 'Dagbon Youth Association'. He was also the Chairman of the City of Tamale's twinning programme with Louisville in the US, called the Tamale–Louisville Friendship, a programme which seeks to promote fraternal relations between the two sister cities of Ghana and the United States respectively. It was thus clear that the vice-presidential candidate and other party personalities such as Major General Quarshigah and Odoi-Sykes were part of the means for the party to make gains in areas in which it was weak. And these decisions were deliberate, according to a party official interviewed:

*In 2000 we took a deliberate step to say that we will reduce the mostly Akan face and push forward other ethnic, religious, and gender faces. (PR-3: Interview, March 2008).*

So what was the role of the candidate? From the analysis it could be argued that the candidate's popularity, for example, became essential in narrowing the political battlefield by suggesting that there were only two contenders when in fact, eight political parties contested that election. The candidate personality was also used to target particular audience types such as supporters of smaller parties and independent voters, as discussed earlier in this chapter. For example, in an advertisement featured in *The Independent* headed 'JAK to the Nation's rescue', Kufuor is described as the only opposition presidential candidate capable of wrestling power from the incumbent (see Table 5 above). The advert further

insinuated that Ghana was ready for a new leader and that whosoever shared in this belief but did not support ‘the most popular leader’ with the real chance of making this happen ought to have a rethink.

The candidate was also used to symbolize what the NPP stood for, a democratic party that represented unity, free speech, good governance, zero tolerance of corruption, and above all, peace. To the NPP campaign, there was a tremendous amount of fear in the country (Interview: Party officials, March 2008). People feared that change in government could derail the peace the nation enjoyed. Therefore, it was important that Kufuor was seen as non-threatening, as he advanced the party’s campaign message. In doing so, the difference between the NPP and the NDC would be obvious, the party officials believed (PR-2, see Chapter 5).

Regarding the role of the policy and the party image, it was observed that the two were fused together with ideology, party history, and traditions as the melting points. To succeed in appealing to a broader ideological audience other than its traditional neo-liberal constituency, the party had to demonstrate that it was prepared to adapt its philosophical views on policy issues that mattered most to the people. It was also to show tolerance and appreciate dissenting opinions in line with its liberal democratic identity. And that is where the party’s traditions and historic perspectives came in (see section 6.3.1a). The same approach was used to address negative perceptions about the party being elitist and tribal.

## **6.5 Framing the message**

A key part of political campaigning is how the political message is framed in order to gain acceptance and to possibly influence voters’ electoral decisions. In this direction, persuasion

theory and rhetoric analyses are deemed essential components of understanding political campaign strategy. Analysis of how the NPP party communicated with the voters revealed a predominant use of democratic credentials, historic and contemporary personality ties, and historic achievements as connective elements. It was also revealed that political messages were framed in a way that could elicit emotions, trust, and reason from the targeted audience to the benefit of the party. In this direction, Aristotle's persuasive strategies of ethos, pathos, and logos were employed to understand the framing of the NPP's message on the party and the effect it expected of such framing.

### **6.5.1 Rhetorical strategies applied: appeal to ethos, pathos, and logos**

From the analysis it was noted that messages on the party had a mixed use of ethos, pathos, and logos as persuasive tools. How each of these was used, as identified in the analysis before here, will be summarized in this section. As Aristotle observed, the rhetorical strategy of ethos is a projection of the communicator's credibility or character with the aim of eliciting from the audience a desired response, such as trust. It is argued, therefore, that through ethos the NPP political messages were aimed at injecting confidence and trust that the party was not sectarian—tribal and elitist—and to demonstrate that the party was tolerant and all-inclusive, contrary to perceptions held by a section of the populace. These positions were demonstrated through the use of the party's long-standing democratic values and its historical and contemporary leadership of individuals who happened to be people of all creed in the Ghanaian society.

For example in Text NR30 and Text AD6, the NPP's claim of forming a broad-based and all-inclusive government was used as the party's 'affirmation' of being a tolerant and democratic party, observed in Text NR26. In the review, it was observed that other political

parties traditionally opposed to the NPP, such as the CPP, PNC, and the NRP, all left-wing parties opposed to the NPP's capitalist orientation, were invited to a rally organized by the NPP. In this regard, the NPP's declaration of being a tolerating and democratic party was given credence by its actions of inviting opposing parties to rallies for the second ballot and to its policy-development committees.

In another development, the party also used its selection of the vice-presidential candidate to give credence to its claim of being tolerant of all tribes and religions when interacting with voters. In Text NR26, a report by Joy FM on 20 November 2000 observed the presidential candidate to have said that he, John Kuffuor, a Christian from the south, having chosen Alhaji Mahama Aliu, a Muslim from the savannah zone, as running mate was a manifestation of the NPP's commitment to reconciliation. The presidential candidate claimed that the two had come together in harmony as leaders of the opposition party to promote the reconciliation which the country needed to heal the wounds within the rank and file of the Ghanaian populace. Similar 'affirmation' of tolerance was claimed, in Texts NR16, ADV2, and ADV5, with references to the party's historic ties with prominent people, groups, and activities of certain areas in the country. In Text NR16, the party claimed responsibility for the infrastructural development in the Volta region, saying:

*The NPP's links with the region dates back to the Second Republic, when the Progress Party, under the leadership of Dr K. A. Busia, laid most of the infrastructure that the region has today. ( The Statesman, 17/09/2000).*

To the Northern regions, an advertorial by a parallel group of the NPP, the CDDC, claimed that:

*The first party by the name NPP was led by Tolon Na and was the principal partner of the Togoland Congress and the Anlo youth of the Volta region and the NLM of Ashanti, who together formed the United Party. The second person to lead the UP after K. A. Busia had gone into exile was Chief S. D. Dombo who was the leader of opposition until Ghana became one party state ... Indeed the NPP today is a historical tribute to the tremendous contribution made by the Northern People's Party [NPP] to the evolution of democracy in Ghana through the illustrious leaders like Tolon Na, Jatoe Kaleo, Chief Kaboe and Chief J. A. Brimah [all chiefs of significant influence during Ghana's independent struggle who hail from the Northern hemisphere of Ghana].*

As discussed in the method chapter (Chapter 4), the persuasive strategy of pathos equates 'passion' or 'emotion' and could be defined as persuading by appealing to the reader's emotions, according to Ryan (1992, p. 294). This is when the orator aims to elicit an emotive response from the audience towards the causes the orator promotes. In the case of the NPP campaign, it was identified that statements that were ethos-oriented had elements of pathos involved, as the party sought to project trust and confidence through the elicitation of emotions at the same time, from the prospective voters. For example, in Text AD6 the NPP party attempted to build expectations of some kind, such as hope and better conditions, when it declared 'a new Ghana, a new kind of leadership' under its 'all-inclusive' government agenda if voted into power. This declaration, it could be argued, puts prospective voters into a state of 'anxiety' making them anxious about the NPP's kind of a country, better than what they find themselves in now.

In the same Text ADV1, appeal to pathos and ethos were mixed in what seemed to be a patriotic declaration, meant to depict the NPP's characterization as a truly democratic party concerned that democracy should work in Ghana, and was throwing the challenge to

‘others’ to do the same. In the first part of the statement in Text ADV1, ‘Your country needs you,’ an appeal to loyalty and responsibility to the country was made in which the party seemed to be demanding people’s attention to a national course, as opposed to a course for the party itself. When analyzed, one could argue that the intent of this appeal was actually to promote the NPP’s credibility and character as a responsible democratic organization which was always seeking good democratic values for the country. Upon this background, the party challenged ‘others’, including voters and other political parties (perhaps the smaller ones) to do the same by calling upon them to ‘come together if we want our democracy to work and give hope to the young people.’ This call is ethos-oriented, because the first part of the call by the NPP, ‘come together ...’, emphasized the party’s pledge of forming an all-inclusive government, whereas the second part, ‘... if we want our democracy to work and give hope to young people’ was suggestive of a willingness to make ‘democracy’ and ‘expectation of a good life’ happen to the country and the young people.

In text NR16, the party’s statement began with pathos-oriented rhetoric, with the headline: ‘The NDC’s ‘World Bank’ (Volta Region) is Under Threat.’ This statement was possibly an attempt to convince prospective voters that the opposing party’s stronghold was diminishing in strength, with the intent to emotionally unsettle the opposing camp’s support base whilst, at the same time, emboldening the support base of the NPP in and outside of this region. A similar approach is found in Text ADV2. In this text, the claim that the ‘... roots of the NPP are deep in the North’ sought to establish relations and association with the people of the North, and of northern extraction, by ‘exciting’ them with the fact that one of the country’s main parties had its roots in their place of origin.

The last and final rhetorical strategy, the use of logos, is when a set of evidence is aimed at securing reason from the audience. This evidence or assertion should be verifiable (Deighton, 1985, p. 433) from experience, for example. Again, in text ADV2 the NPP party proved its claim that its roots were in the North, with the mention of personalities such as Tolon Na, Jatoe Kaleo, Chief Kaboe, and Chief J. A. Brimah, all chiefs of significant influence who hailed from the north and led the party during the struggle for independence and after independence.

Regarding the candidate, the campaign messages were predominately ethos- and pathos-oriented. The party sought to project who the candidate was and what the candidate would do when voted into power. This line of framing was mixed with patriotic and aspirational allusions that would not only project the candidate's image—who he was—but also elicit emotional response from the receiver so as to make the image a memorable one. For example, in text AD3, Kufuor was characterized—and projected (ethos)—as someone who cares much about the principle of fair elections, and challenged others to do the same as opposed to directly calling on them to go and campaign for his benefit.

Obviously being an opposition candidate, Kufuor stands to gain should the election be held in a free and fair atmosphere. However, this eventual gain was hidden in his call as a means to, perhaps, appeal to a broader political base. A similar approach was used in Text AD9 where the candidate was projected as someone in the business of uniting the country by aiming to work with leaders of other parties. He again challenged the voters not to give their mandate to those who he claimed 'thrives on keeping our nation divided'.

Text AD2 combined ethos and pathos in the sense that the NPP candidate pitched himself as a leader concerned about the situation in which ‘even the meagre savings of the Armed forces after their peacekeeping missions abroad are being shared by the incumbent administration’, and in this observation phrases such as ‘risking their lives’, ‘the future of their families’ were used.

In policy, the same approach of combining ethos and pathos was applied. Policy messages were framed and projected in a way that symbolized the NPP’s characterization as being the upholder of good governance. In ads and advertorials, the party promised to uphold the freedom of expression that is enshrined in the constitution and even offered to entrench that freedom by ensuring private ownership of printed and broadcast media, which at the time was immensely restricted. Pathos-oriented rhetoric was used in framing the benefits of the party’s positive change manifesto by projecting the aspirations and expectation of ‘good times ahead’ in the minds of the voter, thereby making the voter anxious about such a possibility in their lives, if the NPP party was given the mandate in the statement ‘Positive change will enable you and your family to lead meaningful lives. You must be able to feed, clothe, house and educate yourself and your family and live in dignity in a truly free and just society.’ (The Daily Graphic, 23/12/2000).

## **6.6 The Audience**

According to Bitzer (1968), rhetoric always requires an audience as change is sought to be produced by influencing the decisions and actions of persons who function as mediators of change (1968, p. 8). This section deals with how the NPP targeted its audience through the formulation and dissemination of political messages. It is observed that as part of the

overarching objective to win elections, ideally a political party should attempt to appeal to a broad section of the electorate in order to win the majority of votes. Whereas this is true, especially in the first-past-the post systems, the task of doing so seemed daunting for a political party like the NPP, given the issues they faced going into the elections. Hence, the need for a strategic way forward.

It was observed in the media analysis that certain groups in society were predominantly targeted by the NPP as a result of the party's inherent image issues and the strategy to benefit from the incumbent party's negative relationship with the media and other sections of society. These targeted communities were the three Northern regions and the Zongos (mostly Muslim communities), the Volta region (the Ewes), the greater Accra region (the Ga's). Amongst them, these targeted areas accounted for a significant 42 per cent of the national total of registered voters; i.e. 4, 544, 546 and 10, 698, 652 registered voters respectively (Ghana EC, 2008). Other targeted groups included the media and the Armed Forces; their relevance to the campaign has been explained earlier in this chapter. Each political campaign activity and message was embedded in an identified voting target.

For example in Text NR17, the vice-presidential candidate's religious and ethnic background as a Muslim, who hails from the north and with strong ties to the Zongo communities, was used to target voters of the Muslim community, the Zongos and the three northern regions. In text NR25, candidate Kufuor is reported to have said that the Aliens Compliance Order of the 1970s was a thing of the past and under no circumstance would a government of the NPP re-introduce it. The NPP, he said, saw all Zongo residents as playing a very important part in shaping the nation's economy and so an NPP government would co-operate with them. Mr Kufuor said that he was to emphasize on this point that the party

selected a running mate who hails from the North, and happened to be a Zongo boy. He thus questioned how someone from the Zongo would be party to a decision to deport other Zongo people? The same approach was used to target voters from the Volta region, in text AD5, claiming that the party's tradition is linked to the Togoland Congress and the Anlo youth.

## **6.7 Conclusion**

It has been discussed in this chapter that the NPP party employed marketing strategies and tactics in its campaign. Strategically, the NPP identified and targeted the Ewes, Ga-Adangme, Northerners, Muslims, the Army and the Zongo communities, in reaching out with their offering. This had been carried out using advertisements and advertorials in addition to campaign messages at rallies. The party had also adapted its ideological positions, deliberately deemphasized ideological debates, and narrowed the field of competition, restricting it only to itself and the NDC. These approaches aided and simplified their strategy of differentiation, only between two parties as opposed to a multitude of parties, and ensured effective targeted campaign messages. These campaign messages focused on the 'benefit' of voting the NPP and were presented in the 'keep it simple' (KISS) advertising format. The approaches also aided the accommodation of policies that were previously outside the boundaries of a free-enterprise party, but were essential to broadening the NPP's appeal—one that could persuade a large swathe of voters to join what was perceived as the 'electorally viable' party with the greatest chance of winning power through the ballot box from the incumbent in almost 20 years.

In the NPP's differentiation strategy, the party laid claim to democratic principles, and painted the NDC as autocratic. This was demonstrated with the use of candidate Kufuor's

calm, consensus-seeking personality against President Rawlings' robust and perceived authoritarian character. Apart from the candidate, the chapter also demonstrated that every political element of value to the NPP campaign had been used to influence perceptions on the party's image and to influence voter decision-making. In this direction, the social background of the vice-candidate and the wife of the presidential candidate had been invoked in the party's media campaign. The party's organization capacity, attitude, and behaviour as well as its democratic credentials and traditions had also been used as means to influence voting decisions. These multivariate attributes were paraded to the people as enough 'physical evidence' to show that the NPP offered a credible governing alternative to the NDC.

It was also discussed in the chapter that strategies and techniques akin to brand endorsement and brand personality concepts were used by the NPP. In the case of brand endorsement, the vice-candidate had said, 'Even I, a Zongo boy, I am standing here today as your next Vice-President—Insha Allah—who can say this party has no national outlook.' In brand personality creation, NPP advertorials had noted, 'roots of the NPP are deep in the North', and had gone on to mention some prominent chiefs from the northern regions in Ghana who had led the NPP party in the past. These are examples of how the NPP attempted to create 'congruence' between the party brand and the people it targeted, and were aimed at satisfying one goal: to create an identity of a party that is inclusive and tolerant of the people of the Zongos and the three regions of relations, Northern Region, Upper East and Upper West Regions. This strategy was replicated in connecting with other ethnic groupings that the party was accused of under-representing in their organizational structure. This is how the party campaign discourse was framed.

## CHAPTER 7

### Analysis of the Focus Group Discussions (FGD)

#### 7.1 Introduction

In the two previous analyses, Chapters 5 and 6, the NPP party image issues and the strategies employed in shaping it were considered. With advertisement, advertorials, and news reports as data sources, Chapter 6 sought to understand how the NPP party conducted its campaign to address perceptions on the party's image. Chapter 5 focused on understanding the same objective from the viewpoint of party officials, media practitioners, and academics in in-depth interviews. The resulting findings in both chapters suggested that the use of party, policy, and candidate attributes, as well as other notable personalities in the party hierarchy, played crucial roles in the overall strategy for going into Election 2000.

In this chapter, the use of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) is employed to assess voters' views on whether the findings in Chapters 5 and 6 had influence on the way voters perceived the NPP party and their consequent voting intentions. The reason for choosing FGD as the method in assessing voters' views on the NPP's approach to the campaign in this chapter is because of its ability to gather substantial data within a short period of stay in the field, as research budget would permit. It is also the best means to validate group members' assertions, as discussions allow back-and-forth comments on issues raised by members in the group (Patton, 1990, p. 335). It helps identify issues not captured in preceding data collection events and allows cross-validation of practitioner and observer opinions on voter behaviour. For further details on the sample size and profile, see the method chapter (Chapter 4).

## **7.2 RQ 1. What influenced your political choice in the 2000 elections?**

This research, located within political marketing theory, assumes that political parties take political management decisions, including campaign decisions, within the context of voter behaviour akin to customer behaviour. The customer-orientation concept in marketing suggests that an organization's marketing planning activity is ultimately driven by the knowledge, through research, of how and why customers behave as they do, and how they are likely to respond to the various elements of the marketing mix (Gilligan and Wilson, 2003, p. 221).

This chapter on voter decision-making is based on the assumption that the process of making a political choice is layered, i.e. based on a phased approach as it pertains in customer decision-making in marketing. In marketing, buyer decision-making models suggest that customers go through different stages of exposure before settling on what to buy. The makeup of the stages and the duration within which these processes take place depends on a number of factors, including the type of purchase, whether routine, occasional, or a one-off purchase. And so it is possible that one may not go through the same process all the time if the purchase is a familiar one, in the case of a routine purchase. The occasional purchase process may be a little longer than that of the routine one, due to situational changes on the part of the buyer or the market environment; a new entrant or changes to the same product that the customer used to buy, for example. Whatever the type of purchase, marketers suggest that the buyers' decision-making process is layered. Hence, the buyer decision-making models such as the one described by Gilligan and Wilson (2003, p. 238) are: *Total set*, *Awareness set*, *Consideration set*, and *Choice set*.

In brief, Gilligan and Wilson posit that a consumer gathers information from various sources, including from family and friends, expert opinion, mass media, and the larger society. This first stage of data gathering forms the 'total set'. And in so doing, the person develops the knowledge and understanding of the various products or brand options in the market, forming the 'awareness set'. The 'consideration set' is when the evaluation task begins, comparing the options available in order to settle on one. In this case, information gathered on the options available interacts with the person's internal and external stimuli to arrive at the ultimate 'choice set' stage. Although similarities abound (Wilson, 2007; Oscarsson, 2009), there is no doubt of some inherent differences in how the decision-making model works in commerce and in politics. And the reason could be as simple as the sheer number of supply players involved in both markets. There could be countless numbers of firms producing similar products and services in the commercial markets, whereas the political market usually can accommodate just a handful, in comparison.

In commerce, the consumer is constantly inundated with supposed new offerings of value in the market, and thus is always prompted to update his or her memory to accommodate these options. The implication is that a consumer's decision-making process, from the total set and awareness stages through to consideration and the final choice stages, could be altered by a promotional activity; for example, as late as the time of making the purchase. Based on this knowledge, brand managers employ cognitive dissonance techniques (de Chernatony and McDonald, 2000) to encourage or dissuade consumers to maintain or change their choice decisions at each stage of the buying process. An example of a dissonance technique could be the use of expert opinion in an advertisement for a highly involved purchase, such as buying a car for the first time. It could also be the use of just a statement from the

advertiser, indicating the opportunity cost of forgoing the advertiser's product for a competitor's, or a combination of both.

In politics, on the other hand, it could be argued that for most voters the two initial stages, the total and awareness sets, may occur at the early stages in life, as it could take a very long time before another player emerges. At least, by the time one reaches the voting age it is assumed that one is aware of the various parties available. In the consideration set stage, it is true that most voters may also have made up their minds about their choice of party as a result of their ideological leanings way before the campaigning and the voting day. However, this may differ, based on a voter's level of participation in politics, it could be argued. Whether a voter is highly, lowly or somewhat involved in politics could determine how early or late they arrive at their consideration and final choice stages.

For those lowly involved in politics, their consideration stage could be arrived at during the time of campaigning; comparing parties and candidates' issue positions and other factors, such as personalities etc., to make the ultimate choice at the polls. For the most highly involved, the consideration stage may have long been arrived at since the day of their first ballot. Nevertheless, certain intervening factors, such as current living conditions and performance of their own party of choice, amongst other factors, could alter this group's decision-making process.

The focus group discussions opened with the question of what participants think were the main influences on their voting decisions. In this question, all the factors observed in the in-depth interview sessions in Chapter 5 were identified by the focus groups' discussants: personalities, individual needs, ideology, policy positions, the need for change, party

behaviour, family traditions, and the desire to break away from these traditions were identified as some of the foremost influences on voting decisions. However, probing questions were used to elicit further responses and to encourage the debate amongst discussants.

For example, for those who identified ‘the need for change’ as the reason behind their electoral choice, the probing question ‘What got you convinced that the change you sought will materialize beyond a mere administrative change?’ was asked. For those who said the candidate, the party or the policy was their source of influence, the probing question was, ‘What about the candidate, the policy or the party that impacted on your choice?’ From these probing questions emerged themes such as opinion leader influence, candidate personality as honest individual and party behaviour factors. These themes altered further the reasons behind voter choice as the discussion went on.

As almost all participants observed that they needed change, the overarching theme: ‘Change with what (?) as influence’ is used to outline participants’ responses in this chapter, followed by the subcategories: ‘living conditions’; ‘incumbent length of stay in government’; ‘party attributes’; ‘candidate attributes’; ‘policy attributes’, and ‘others’.

### **7.2.1 Change with ‘living conditions’ as influence**

In the discussion of the first question, ‘What influenced your political choice in the 2000 elections?’ respondents identified many factors as mentioned above, including adverse living conditions at the time. And even in this category there were subcategories as participants referred to economic hardships on personal and national levels. In the case of the former, respondents who thought their personal living conditions had worsened, a

circumstantial self-need assessment was the main driver of their voting decision, generally with the view that having the administration changed could spin off change in their personal lives. These views could be found in the illustrative quotations provided below. At Ho Polytechnic FGD 1 for example, a participant observed that neither he nor his family had made any meaningful life under the incumbent administration, hence the decision to change the incumbent.

*To me personally, I was looking at what improvement I have gained in my life under the incumbent regime; not only me but my brothers and sisters as well. And also when you talk to people, especially someone who is independent, they tell you, 'Things used to be good sometime back but are very bad now.' The independent voters are very honest, so I was asking them how do they see the system now and was making my analysis on that.* (Participant in Ho Polytechnic FGD, Volta Region, March 2008).

Another participant was of the view that:

*Sometimes we also look at the leaders, the opinion leaders. What they cry for is what sometimes we also look for. I can say in 2000 most of the leaders were in for the opposition party, the NPP. So you see them crying for that, why not us?* (Participant in Ho Polytechnic FGD, Volta Region, March 2008).

At KNUST FGD 1, a participant acknowledged:

*I am a teacher by profession, so I needed to try someone else to see how the economy and my situation as a teacher will change. I have tasted a bottle of water, how do I know there*

*is another that is better than the one I have tasted? The sweetness of the pudding is in the eating.* (Participant in KNUST FGD 1, Ashanti Region, March 2008).

At UG FGD 1:

*I want to see a change. Although I can see they are constructing roads etc. but then what you use your money for is also important. Prices of fuel always go up. So I am not going to vote based on infrastructure but we need to feel it in our pocket.* (Participant in UG FGD 1, Greater Accra Region, March 2008).

And at UDS FGD 2, another participant observed:

*I, before 2000, wasn't in favour of the opposition but as at 2000, I saw that the hardship was just double so I thought I should change the government and see what will happen.* (Participant in UDS FGD 2, Northern Region, March 2008).

As said earlier, notable in the above quotations are views that the change of government could possibly spin off a change in personal situations economically. However, in the first to the fourth quotations, there seemed to be some level of hesitation and scepticism in the way participants viewed the situation generally. In the first and second quotations, for example, participants ensured to affirm their judgment that changing the administration was the right thing to do by seeking other independent opinions alongside personal and the family experiences. In the third quotation, the participant was of the opinion that although he recognized some level of infrastructure development in the country, economic hardships as a result of the lack of personal disposable income and fuel prices meant that he changed the government. A similar view is expressed in the fourth quotation, a participant who initially

was on the side of the incumbent but later switched allegiance as a result of economic hardships.

From the views above, two lessons could be drawn. First, there is an understanding that although voters may have a need to satisfy, for example, to change their life situations, such a need could be latent. Further still, voters could equally be hesitant in fulfilling such a need by taking certain kinds of decisions, such as to vote for a party they have never experienced before, as they may be unsure whether they are making the right decisions. In this case, it would take a relevant plan of action and a relative level of assurances by the political party to allay the fears of these voters and to activate their willingness to fulfil the latent or hesitant needs.

Secondly, although voters may know what they need, they may still want to seek out further information, as observed in the first and second quotations above, from trusted sources such as family members, or sources of certain expertise like the media. This means, ‘talking policy’, and the issues alone were not enough to convince voters that the NPP was the right choice. How such policies and issues were disseminated, and which were equally crucial to reduce the fears and concerns of the voters as identified in the quotations above are factors that the NPP campaign was noted to have addressed better than its competitors, using approaches akin to brand association and dissociation techniques, as observed earlier in the previous chapters.

As part of the ‘how’ to disseminate the issues, the NPP party created advertisements concerning the economic hardships that people all over the country were going through. The ‘positive change agenda’ advertisement featured the presidential candidate, J. A. Kufuor,

with Ghanaians from across the country under one Ghana flag. In the advert, the people from almost all professions and across the country were walking towards the candidate and singing the song: 'J. A. Kufuor, the nice gentleman with the mission and the vision to save our motherland.' The J. A. Kufuor, positive change agenda advert was aired on television, radio, and featured in the press. With the question whether the advertisement influenced people's perceptions and decisions, participants at the UDS Nyankpala Campus FGD in Tamale, for example, said the following:

*I believe that it really helped him a lot. Because as at the time almost everywhere in the country people were fed up, and upon seeing that on television or other channels, they did believe that people are actually suffering and it is actually happening elsewhere in the country. (Participant in UDS Nyankpala Campus FGD, Northern Region, March 2008).*

*I want to say that seeing people from every angle coming made me think that, hey, people even from the North are joining this people; from the East etc. are joining so let us also join. So it was a good tactic they used and I think it did help. (Participant in UDS Nyankpala Campus FGD, Northern Region, March 2008).*

*I also think that there are some people who normally don't know where to go, so upon seeing that one, it then energized them to make a move and that influenced their decision. It also shows that the people are going to win, so why not join the winning team? (Participant in UDS Nyankpala Campus FGD, Northern Region, March 2008).*

*I think that advert was very good. It was very emotional. Initially people thought that it was doctors alone who were being addressed by NPP, but looking at people from the farm, fishermen etc. they then saw that the party when in power will address all those*

*sectors, but not only one. (Participant in UDS Nyankpala Campus FGD, Northern Region, March 2008).*

On the same discussion, others also thought that another way of addressing the issues other than the commercials were useful.

*I think the local radio stations were heavily used. They used local languages and the way they discussed the issues, sometimes they can convince you. (Participant in UDS Nyankpala Campus FGD, Northern Region, March 2008).*

*Looking at television it will give you much information, with the pictures and the detail. But the other question is, was it nationwide with TV? That is where it falls short. So we give credits to the radio stations where they made use of resource people to debate issues and policies and that guided the electorate to make voting decisions. (Participant in UDS Nyankpala Campus FGD, Northern Region, March 2008).*

*I will also say that the local (traditional) way, using posters, also helped a lot because when you go to a community and there are a lot of posters, it is perceived that almost all the community people support that particular party. So the floating voters in that community will be contemplating that ... why don't I also join them? (Participant in UDS Nyankpala Campus FGD, Northern Region, March 2008).*

But the use of advertisements in the media does not guarantee acceptance of the message, especially in the North of the country. For example, at the UDS Nyankpala Campus FGD in Tamale, participants observed that although people may be concerned with the issues and what goes on in their economic circumstances, society still has a fixation on, and are

influenced by, 'who is who' in politics and that still goes a long way influencing voter decisions. The following are some of the observations:

*Our society is such that they continue to judge the past so the individuals in the party also count. Most people in my community claim that they suffered before Rawlings came to their salvation. So wherever his party goes, they follow. So it is necessary that those who lead political parties have a legacy. (Participant in UDS Nyankpala Campus FGD, Northern Region, March 2008).*

*People look at what type of people you have in your campaign. They look at the number of intellectuals in a political party. I will also say that, for example, if a party is able to deliver for the populace, they are likely to vote them again because they hope that those policies will help them. Talking about advertisement in radio etc. helps, but as an individual I think it all boils down to proper policy implementation for those adverts to work. (Participant in UDS Nyankpala Campus FGD, Northern Region, March 2008).*

*I also think that in our nation as it stands now, despite everything people are for NDC and NPP but the floating voters look at how far you have worked. What evidence do you have? (Participant in UDS Nyankpala Campus FGD, Northern Region, March 2008).*

It is possible to argue that any other party in Ghana, including the NPP, was aware of the above. However the means to deal with it may differ. In the NPP's case, the party had used campaign techniques akin to brand association and brand personality in advancing the

party's policy and issue dissemination. PR-1 had already observed in section 5.4.1 that the campaign made use of the parliamentary performance of its Members of Parliament as well as the experience and credibility of its known experts in the areas of economy, finance, law etc. as evidence, as commercial brands do in brand association, to send the message and convince the nation that they were a competent bunch ready to form a capable government. This association base, it seems, had played out well in the campaign, as a participant (see also the second quotation above) observed:

*Looking at Nana Akufu Addo, Jake Obetsebi Lamptey, Da Rocha, Addo Kufuor, Dr Amoako Tufour, Kwame Pianim etc. and their qualifications, experience, and the intelligent pool they presented were a convincing bunch to say that the people were ready to lead and to deliver. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

### **7.2.2 Change with 'incumbent length of stay in government' as influence**

Part of the reasons why the NPP won the elections is the general consensus that the length of incumbency contributed to the NDC's loss of power. This assertion was consistent with the views of the FGD participants. Participants were of the view that having one party rule the country for so long was, perhaps, a contributory factor to the slow progress of the nation and their personal lives, hence their quest for change. The following are some of the illustrative quotations:

*I did vote in 2000 but I was given birth in 1979 and since that time, it's either been PNDC/NDC so I felt that I needed a change. As human beings we sometimes need change to make things right, so for some of us we wanted a change, not necessarily NPP. (Participant in Ho Polytechnic FGD, Volta Region, March 2008).*

*In 2000, I voted because I wanted a change. We have been with a party for so long a time and there certain policies that were not beneficial to us. (Participant in KNUST FGD 1, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

*What I will also say is that in 2000 all my parents were in NDC, so I thought that why should one political party be in power for so long and so there should be a change. That's why I voted for other political party. (Participant in UDS FGD 2, Northern Region, March 2008).*

*I also want to say that we grew up to see only one party, the NDC, and much had been said about them. So for us, the students, we just wanted a change. (Participant in UDS FGD 2, Northern Region, March 2008).*

Significant in the above quotations were three issues. The first was the feeling that the NDC, as a consequence of their length of stay in government, had run out of ideas, which led to their implementation of certain unbeneficial policies. Secondly, there was the feeling that there needed to be a break from tradition and the status quo, not for any economic reason but the feeling of saturation, the fatigue of knowing and being under the rule of only one party, coupled with the anxiety of knowing something else, not necessarily the NPP. The third was the expectation that a change might mean a change in conditions of life. Based on these quotations, one could argue that the strategies and tactics employed by the NPP party were not solely responsible for the people's voting decision, in line with the argument advanced by some participants at the KNUST FGD 2. In that session, a participant was of the opinion that despite the seemingly good preparation and management of the NPP campaign, '... it was actually a good wind that caught the party and strengthened their sail,' to use the participant's own words. The participant noted that:

*For me I will not give the NPP thumbs up so much for the regime change, because the whole society was actually geared for change. The only thing I can credit them is just that they were the formidable party amongst the lot. So it was actually a good wind that caught them and strengthened their sail. It was actually a wind of democratic change facilitated by media proliferation; the growth of civil society etc. where people could talk freely. So they took advantage of that wind and being a formidable party, they won. And even that the electoral fight had to be sent to a run-off when the incumbent had around 42 per cent, which wasn't a bad thing for a battered party. So that is my view. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

Others with similar views pointed out:

*When you look at 2000, things changed dramatically because of the cry for regime change which was all over the place and people began to consider issues of development, and the NPP was the party that was highly placed to offer these issues to the people and that is why they won. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

*I also share with the view that in 2000 it was a massive quest for political change due to the fact that many believed the incumbent party hadn't done enough after being in power for so long. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

*I think all the factors play into one, which is the quest for a change. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

It is important to understand the above quotations from the socio-political perspectives. Prior to and during the 2000 elections, there was a feeling that although the nation had earlier conducted two elections in 1992 and 1996, the 2000 election was the first genuine

democratic process since the nation was returned to constitutional rule (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Handly and Mills, 2001; Aryee, 2000). Therefore, the 2000 election was seen as a democratic novelty in which people were keenly motivated, either by self-recognition of needing change or by external forces, to exercise their franchise to remove the incumbent administration from power. Either way, the incumbent and its followers were of the view that the unprecedented anxiety for change that persisted then was being orchestrated by the media and the civil society ganging up in opposition with the NPP to remove the old government from power.

Although the above view was partly supported by other respondents, as in the quotation below, some participants acknowledged also that the very submission that NPP was the most formidable party in the 2000 election was exactly what influenced others to support it. A participant thus noted that the NPP's ability to take the opportunity by using the people's mood of discontent against the incumbent and to market itself through its campaign slogans especially contributed to the perception that the party was the only one that could win. The participant noted:

*Firstly, I side with my colleague's opinion that it was the times; I think we wanted to try something new. But at the same time, even when an opportunity presents itself, success will come based in how you harness the opportunity. It was no doubt that NPP made good use of it and marketed itself well. When you look at the slogans such as 'asee ho' (the bottom, depicting the party's position on the ballot), 'gentle giant' and 'hwe wase tinamu na to aba pa' [which translates in English as 'assess your living conditions and vote wisely'] and even the gospel songs such as 'awurade kassa' [which translates in english as 'Speak, God'] and all that they used in Radio and TV political commercials, they all attest to the fact that they used the opportunity to capture the aspirations of the*

*people. They intensely used the media to do the job very well, given the fact that most of the media were in opposition with them. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

### **7.2.3 Change with 'party attributes' as influence**

The party attributes were recognized by FGD participants as some of the factors that influenced their decisions to vote, and they included party organization, communication, and attitude. Participants observed that it was important the NPP party was seen as having the capacity to win power as they sought for a change.

*But again, I didn't want to vote for a party that will lose at the end of the day, which will mean me losing. So that's why I voted NPP because if you look at PNC etc., there was no way they could win, voting for them. (Participant in Ho Polytechnic FGD, Volta Region, March 2008).*

In all the FGDs, participants observed that the NPP looked the most formidable party organization-wise, as highlighted in some of the above quotations. The NPP was also perceived as the most competitive and much more in a position to wrestle power from the incumbent, given their organizational and communication superiority over the other parties, including even the incumbent party. These capabilities, participants observed, were evident through the party's knowledge and articulation of the issues that concerned people and through their quest to reach even the remotest areas in the country with the message. In Ghana, some of these remote places are known as 'the overseas' as it is difficult getting access to them. Some of these villages are usually accessible only by air or through a boat, as they are islands, which makes it expensive to get to these areas. A quotation from one of

the FGD participants at the KNUST FGD 1 sums up how the organizational strength of the party was thought to have influenced people's voting decision.

*I too needed a change very badly and what made me go for the NPP's change was how they were able to bring out their message of change and it was in line with the change I expected. They were able to come out with some realistic facts, so I was convinced that when I bring those people to power my problems were going to be solved. I think the way they were able to bring out their manifesto and policies in reaching out to the people played a major role. They did very well in communicating to the people the state of the economy and how they can salvage it. They had absolute grip on the issues and people were convinced that they could do the job. They really campaigned, even well into some remote and deprived areas, and managed to convince them of the problems facing the nation and how they could solve them. (Participant in KNUST FGD 1, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

Others expressed the following views:

At KNUST FGD 1:

*Their contributions in the parliament house were helpful. When the NDC were coming out with certain policies that were inimical to the state, they tried to avoid them and were coming out with alternatives which were seen as laudable. (Participant in KNUST FGD 1, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

At KNUST FGD 2:

*NPP as party's image was by far ahead given the numerous slogans such as the 'osono', 'eshie' etc., it was mainly the party and the personalities in the party. I remember we were in the senior secondary school and we were just thrilled and happy with the composition of their leadership: lawyers, doctors etc., showing that they were ready to lead. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

*I could see that there was not any other party that was up to the challenge and that is another factor. The popularity of the party also attracts more votes. So when you see that the party that you support is not that popular, you have no other option than to join the popular party so that the actual change you want would be affected. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

At UDS Nyankpala, Tamale Campus FGD:

*I can say in 2000 most of the leaders were in for the then opposition party, the NPP. So you see them crying for that, why not us? (Participant in UDS Nyankpala, Tamale Campus FGD, March 2008).*

*I think in 2000 we had a lot of people from the North here whose presence in the NPP influenced people's voting decisions and I believe that it is necessary. (Participant in UDS Nyankpala, Tamale Campus FGD, March 2008).*

*If you look at the NPP in the North here, a lot of us joined it because of the fact that Aliu Mahama was part of the leadership. (Participant in UDS Nyankpala, Tamale Campus FGD, March 2008).*

At UG, Legon FGD:

*'What informed my decision was my ability to determine who might win the coming elections. I am for the winning party and that is how I voted. It is quite wise to be with the winning team if you are a student and comparing the NPP and the NDC, we can easily say that the NPP are quite better than the NDC, even in achievement'* (A Participant, UG Legon FGD, Accra March, 2008).

*Personally, I also voted for change but most importantly to stick to my capitalist ideology. The capitalist, which is the NPP, always wants individual development, property-owning democracy making sure that the individual is well educated from the outset and that is why I voted for the party.* (Participant in UG Legon FGD, Greater Accra Region, March 2008).

In addition to NPP's organizational and communicational strength, a participant recounts the party's attitude going into the elections, saying:

*If you seem to be an underdog to your opposing party, then it will be difficult to win the elections. The NPP seemed much more in control of the problems at stake than the NDC who were in power. So that got Ghanaians convinced that they could do the job.* (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).

The view that the NPP was in the lead when it comes to the issues that concerned the people in the elections was common amongst participants of the FGDs, and it emphasizes the party's competence in marketing, organization and communication alluded to by the party officials and others that were interviewed. The perceived display of issue competence on the

part of the NPP in the eyes of the voters inadvertently symbolized the NDC's lack of control on governance, and contributed to their rejection by the voters.

#### **7.2.4 Change with 'candidate attributes' as influence**

In this category, participants observed a number of candidate attributes, such as the candidate's popularity, physical appearance, temperament, credibility, and attitude as factors that influenced voting decisions. Just like the attributes of the party as the most organized and prepared, the perception that the candidate was honest and could be trusted with the leadership of the nation was central to participants' conviction to vote NPP.

*I think all of them counted because the candidate himself was an honest person.*

*He was like a father to most of us so we took him to his words.* (Participant in Ho Polytechnic FGD, Volta Region, March 2008).

Another participant observed similar attributes, saying:

*Another thing that convinced me to vote for that change is also because of the personality of the candidate. I saw him to be a very calm person, trustworthy, and someone who wouldn't like to lie to us but to tell us the truth. For me personally, I believe in people who would like to tell the truth than given me riches. So I saw him to be a figure that could control the country, because of his nature, being a humble man etc., so I think it was the personality of the candidate to a large extent and also those he surrounded himself with, who were largely intellectuals.* (Participant in KNUST FGD 1, Ashanti Region, March 2008).

At the University of Ghana Legon FGD a participant observed that most of the electorate, especially the less politically savvy, based their vote on personality and physical appearance. He observed that people had voted Rawlings in the past as a result of his charisma, so now was the turn of the ‘Gentle Giant’, in reference to the NPP candidate, Kufuor. This participant used his auntie as an example, saying:

*I will say others have also followed candidate’s personality, how charismatic they are. Some may say he is handsome, refer to his build in terms of height, his intelligence and then they vote for them. I remember one of the leaders was seen by my auntie on TV and she exclaimed, hey, this guy is so ugly! So you actually need a guy who is nice, with some appealing features etc. (Participant in UG FGD, Greater Accra Region, March 2008).*

Others observed the following:

*I guess when we were young we always see someone who is tall as a leader, so in a way those less literate are influenced by such view in society. (Participant in UG FGD, Greater Accra Region, March 2008).*

*People only voted for Rawlings because he was kind of unique in a Ghanaian way—charismatic personality. I think that the person that NPP brought and they marketed matched that standard. The only thing that was different was the colour. So the personality did count. (Participant in UG FGD, Greater Accra Region, March 2008).*

On temperament, participants observed that the electoral atmosphere at that time was charged that people were afraid of electoral tensions, thus Kufuor’s blend of temperament was good to dissuade people’s fears.

*You know the days were just that people were afraid that if the election doesn't go the way people are thinking and Kufuor loses because he was a gentleman; he wasn't going to engage in any scuffle. That is why candidate Kufuor was seen as a better person. (A Participant, UG FGD, Greater Accra Region, March 2008).*

*In 1992 people saw Adu Boahen [the previous NPP candidate at the time] as more radical and then in 1996, when Kufuor came he was seen as a bit dull. So in 2000 he blended a bit of radicalism and moderation. (Participant in UG FGD, Greater Accra Region, March 2008).*

On popularity, one participant said:

*In politics, what counts most is popularity. What made Kufuor's name was that it wasn't the first time he was contesting for the presidency and that distinguished him from Atta Mills, and that was very clear. Kufuor went and he lost in 1996, so even those in the Volta region could remember him although they were not going to vote for him. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

For another participant, Kufuor had a certain kind of appeal that had to do with his attitude towards the voter.

*I think Kufuor himself understood the people at that time and knew how he could fit his words very well. I have observed him so much; I think he had a way of appealing to the people although he wasn't seen as charismatic. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

Participants also acknowledged the contributions of policy to the success of the party. Not only was NPP seen as well organized and its candidate trustworthy, the party also was seen as committed to the issues people cared about and had proposed laudable policies to deal with them, according to participants of the FGDs.

### **7.2.5 Change with 'policy attributes' as influence**

Notable amongst the submissions on policy and issue attributes as reasons for voter decisions were as follows:

*I think the NPP was also serious with issues because what they were presenting at that time were the real issues that Ghanaians concerned about and that was the deciding factor.* (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008)

*I think the policies that they put in place were also laudable.* (Participant in Ho Polytechnic FGD, Volta Region, March 2008).

*Well, their policies and promises they gave convinced me that given the mandate they could deliver.* (Participant in Ho FGD 1, Volta Region, March 2008)

*What I looked at was the promises. When they said they will create jobs etc. when they are voted into power.* (Participant in Kumasi Small Business FGD, Ashanti Region, March 2008).

As observed in the above quotations and earlier discussions, participants were of the opinion that the NPP party was well organized and articulate on the real issues that concerned the people. It was noted that the party kept track of daily economic issues and presented things

in a way that could connect with their campaign theme, the agenda for positive change. As a follow-up to the above quotation, another participant observed that:

*On the transport industry, Kufuor used the high fuel prices to court their support. On TV Kufuor was seen with a gallon of fuel and lifting it up to a crowd of people to say, 'How much is this selling?' and that time increase in fuel prices were literally every day and NPP didn't take chances on that. Whenever this happened they kept record of it and blew it to get to every corner of the country. (Participant in Kumasi Small Business FGD, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

In health, the following was observed:

*I think the issue of national health insurance was spot on. When you look at the adverts for example, it's so emotional, very touchy: 'Someone goes to the hospital and the doctors are not able to save his live because of the cash and carry policy by the Rawlings administration.' So around those times even if you were an NDC supporter and sees adverts like that I don't know how you will feel. (Participant in Kumasi Small Business FGD, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

Not only were the NPP's policies responsive to the general public but also to various interest groups, such as the media:

*The NDC at the time had fallen out of favour with the media, the private media I mean, and this was mainly because of the Criminal Libel Law. Most of the journalists, at least those considered as the top journalists, have all tasted at least a week in jail for publishing libellous contents. Most of them have either been prosecuted, beaten, or abused in all forms. So the NPP promised that when they come into power, they will*

*abolish the Criminal Libel Law. It was a clear platform for them to use the local and private media, who are very vocal and have people who listen to them ... and also if I may add, some local journalist who reported for the international broadcasters like BBC and CNN, for example Kweku Sekyi-Addo, come out clearly to say that he supported the NPP. All these contributed the NPP's position. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

*'I also think that my colleague hit the nail rightly on its head when he talked about the Criminal Libel Law which was one of the NPP's flagship policies and one of the most difficult issues. When the NPP promised to abolish that law, the media was happy at that. There were so many issues the media was trumpeting to make the NDC unpopular that people couldn't establish that NPP gurus were behind those radio stations that trumpeted those stories. There is even a story that a presenter in one radio station forgot about himself when the results confirmed that NPP had won, to say, 'Oh, I understand we have won, so let's move on' to the surprise of many listeners. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

#### **7.2.6 Change with 'others' as influence**

A good political strategy is one that is able to capture and convert the feelings and the expectations of voters into a relevant and compelling electoral case. In the case of the NPP, the party seemed to have done so using all the three political elements—the party, the candidate and the policy—in a brand architecture fashion where the strengths of these three elements reinforced each other.

For example, in the above FGD discussions on Question 1, two brand architecture concepts discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis are invoked, brand personality and brand endorsement.

In brand personality, respondents seem to have transferred their perception of credibility and other attributes they behold on candidate Kufuor unto the NPP party. Therefore, just as they saw candidate Kufuor as trustworthy with ‘fatherly’ impressions, they expected an NPP government, if voted into power, to demonstrate such characteristics. Hence their conviction that this was the right choice of a party out of the many. In brand endorsement, the party’s ability to deliver is supposedly guaranteed by the support of opinion leaders who were perceived as knowledgeable and credible personalities in society. Hence their support for the NPP was able to influence the participants and many other voters’ perceptions about the NPP.

In the brand endorsement and personality concepts discussed in Chapter 2, it was observed that when an organization, a product, or a person is associated with a brand, such an entity automatically guarantees the brand’s performance. Thus, Kufuor’s leadership of the party and the opinion leaders supporting it, as in the case of the above quotations, meant they were guaranteeing that the party would deliver what it promised, knowingly or otherwise.

In the third quotation under the party attributes above, another strand of the brand personality concept was invoked. The quotation suggested that a congruity between the need of the respondent (the voter) and the party’s offering occurred, resulting in the likeability of the party’s position by this respondent.

### **7.3 RQ 2. Which of the three elements did you notice the most during the campaign?**

Visibility is one of the main building blocks in brand architecture management. It identifies the leading brand of an organization’s portfolio and determines whether a branded house or

house of brands model is being pursued by an organization. As mentioned in the IBM ThinkPad example in Chapter 2 of this thesis, a customer refers to ThinkPad as the brand of laptop bought because in IBM's communication strategy, ThinkPad assumes the primary driver (selling) role. Hence, the ThinkPad product brand enjoys the highest visibility above the corporate brand, IBM.

Similarly, the thesis assumes that the political element thought of as the main influencer of voting decision by the campaign planners assumes the primary driver role in the NPP party's communication strategy for going into Election 2000. This would be the party, in this case, taking for granted the intentions and assessments of the NPP party officials interviewed in Chapter 5. They argued that the party was the key element amongst the three—the party, the policy and the candidate. If this was the case, then one would think that the party would have assumed a greater role in the NPP's campaign communications strategy, as in the IBM's Thinkpad example. Therefore, participants were asked to assess which of the three elements—the party, candidate, and the policy—were visible to them during the campaign in the question: 'Which of the three political elements did you notice the most during the 2000 elections?'

In this question, participants were again divided along the three elements. Some participants were of the view that given Kufuor's weaknesses such as the failure of his own company (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Aryee, 2000) that the NDC and other critics consistently pointed out during the campaign, the NPP party couldn't afford to make him the centre stage of their communication strategy. This group of participants argued that Kufuor's taking of a leading role in the party's communication would have opened up the NPP campaign to an unprecedented attack, as he was competing with a far more qualified candidate in

comparison, the NDC's Atta Mills, who was an accomplished professor in addition to other credentials. As a result, they think NPP rather made the issues the centre stage of their campaign.

*With the three, you may be tempted to believe that the NPP won the elections on issues. In my opinion, I don't think the party projected so much of the candidate because his track record wasn't of a match to that of the NDC candidate. But they projected more of the policies (issues), the party and then the personality. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

*I observed on TV, adverts with University students discussing how they can't get any job after school other than teaching; saying, how can all of us go into teaching? And I think this was a response to a comment by the incumbent administration then that graduates cannot say there are no jobs because they can go and teach. The NPP took advantage of this and packaged it into advertisement to depict graduates' discontent on the government's position. (Participant in KNUST FGD 1, March 2008).*

*I will rank policy above the other two because the NPP came out with their policies and then comparing that with the NDC that the NDC hasn't done anything and when we come we will do this and that. So the people then said, 'So why don't we vote for them because if they have these ideas for us then it means that we will be comfortable with them?' So I think the NPP articulated their policies very well and then the personality too helped them. So, I will give the policy 4, the personality 2, and the party image ranked last. (Participant in UG FGD, Greater Accra Region, March 2008).*

*For me what I can remember was education [policy] and to me personally, it is really helping us as the kids are feeding free. (Participant in Kumasi Small Business FGD, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

*Ok! One, they talked a lot about petrol ... and they said so many things for people to be convinced and vote for them. (Participant in Kumasi Small Business FGD, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

On the other hand, those who were of the opinion that the candidate was the centre stage of the party's communication argued that throughout the media and on the street one could only see the candidate.

*All there was, everywhere you went, on radio, TV, in print advertisements and other party paraphernalia such as T-shirts, in my opinion I think, was J. A. Kufuor. (Participant in UDS FGD, Wa. Upper West Region, March 2008).*

*The first was about the personality, that is what I saw because everywhere you went it was Kufuor. The second was the party and the third was the policy. (Participant in Ho Polytechnic FGD 1, Volta Region, March 2008).*

*In my opinion I think the gentleman himself was one, because there were songs on J. A. Kufuor that were very loud. Then two, to me personally, was the policies because they projected their policies in such a way that it was as if they were coming to create heaven on earth. Then the third was the party itself. (Participant in Ho Polytechnic FGD 1, Volta Region, March 2008).*

*I think it was the personality. You know in NDC for example, I believe if Rawlings were to contest again he would have won due to his personality and Kufuor was having that urge over Atta Mills then. So the NPP focused on Kufuor. (Participant in Ho Polytechnic FGD 1, Volta Region, March 2008).*

*I think it was basically the personality, although Kufuor wasn't as charismatic as Rawlings but Atta Mills, who was succeeding Rawlings, was also dull. Listening to the jingles and the songs etc., they were basically Kufuor's name that were mentioned, not the party, with his 'elephant stature'. That is what I think was going on. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

*In my view, I think it was the candidate and on a scale of one to five, I will give it around Four. The candidate helped as well as the policies. Because they were preaching creating a thousand jobs in a hundred days, making sure that people will go to hospital free and to offer free education etc. so the policies also helped them and then the party's image is the last. (Participant in UG FGD 1, Greater Accra Region, March 2008).*

*I think I will give personality Four. You see the NPP at the time were competing with Rawlings' NDC, tagged solely with Rawlings. People only voted for Rawlings because he was kind of unique—a charismatic personality. I think that the person that NPP brought and marketed matched that standard. So the personality did very well. So on a scale, I will rank the personality Four and the policies may be Three and then the party. (Participant in UG FGD 1, Greater Accra Region, March 2008)*

Other participants were of the view that although the candidate played a crucial role as voters perceived him to be credible, the party was rather more visible than the candidate, as

he surrounded himself with the people in the party perceived to be well qualified to govern, which was immensely crucial as they convinced voters that they had the team.

*Personally I don't want to say that it was the personality per se, but I think Kufuor himself understood the people at that time and knew how he could fit his words very well. I have observed him so much. But I think the party too, NPP itself, looking at Nana Akufu Addo, Jake Obetsebi Lamptey, Da Rocha, Addo Kufuor, Dr Amoako Tufour, Kwame Pianim etc. and their qualifications, experience and the intelligent pool they presented were a convincing bunch to say that the people were ready to lead and to deliver. So I will go for the party, the personality and the policy. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008)*

*It was basically the elephant they were promoting. It was the NPP and the message that we needed change and I think when we changed it was good. Now in Ghana everyone feels free without any fears. So it is good. (Participant in Kumasi Small Business FGD, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

Another was of the view that where the candidate was used in the advertisement and other communication materials, although it was less so in his opinion, it was rather his personality and those surrounding him as against the candidate's own competence, saying:

*You see, the previous speaker mentioned the personality surrounding Kufuor, not Kufuor himself, and even he himself once said, 'We have the people to do the work.' And in the adverts, they were trumpeting the 'gentle giant' not Kufuor, the party was trumpeting 'Asee ho' rather than J .A. Kufuor, they didn't have much to say on Kufuor because his weakness were massively exploited by the NDC, going into his records in the 1980s when he was the local government minister in PNDC and didn't perform. So*

*that was a weak proposition. So they had to rely on issues of democracy, free speech, the slogans etc. to gain grounds.* (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).

#### **7.4 RQ 3. Did you observe the NPP attempting to manage relationships with voters?**

It is noted that party/voter relationship had moved on beyond ideological leanings into the terrain of candidate attributes and policy benefits (Needham 2006; Rees et al., 2006). On party/voter relationship based on candidate attributes, Needham suggested that parties select as candidates people whose characteristics fall within voters' perceptions and expectations. This relationship is managed over time and through party management style, such as debates on the issues and continuous interaction with the general public, the party's image beginning to reshape itself in line with the leader's image in the minds of voters.

Other perspectives are shared by Baines et al. (2002) and Reeves et al. (2006) who propose that political parties, such as the New Labour party in Britain, foster relationships with voters based on the benefits of market-oriented policies (see Chapter 2). According to a research by Baines et al. (2002), political parties in Britain were becoming consumer-driven. The research, which included a series of interviews with MPs and strategists for the three main political parties—Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat—was to develop a political marketing planning framework to describe how political parties campaigned locally.

The findings of the Baines et al. (2002) research reveal the use of market research data aimed at building a profile of the relevant consumer base that could be used to segment,

target, and position the political brand's offering to the relevant consumer groups. The sources of these data include socio-economic census statistics, current and past constituency research, which may include measures of the current level of support for a party, the likelihood of party switching behaviour, and the views of the electorate regarding key issues and policies. In this process, voters' needs and interests are considered into policy documents; their means of engagement is identified and is communicated with in this means. The objective of the two approaches—candidate- and policy-centred voter relationship processes, according to literature (Needham, 2006; Reeves et al, 2006)—is to foster lasting relationships between the party and voters as voters become aware that their views are being recognized and actioned upon.

In this thesis, evidence from the two earlier chapters, 5 and 6, also suggest a coalescing of both internal and external structures that were used by the NPP party in Ghana as a means to foster relationships with identified voting blocs and to understand the issues that concerned them. In Chapter 6, the party campaign manager is said to have launched 'operation reach the communities in their hamlets' in their bid to interact with various communities on the prevailing political and economic situations in the country.

In Chapter 5, in-depth interview respondents also recognized that the party had visited institutions such as the GJA, MUSIGA, and other organizations with the aim of understanding the issues that concerned their industries. Respondents in the in-depth interviews also acknowledged candidate Kufuor's attending of social functions, such as churches and funerals, in an attempt to foster relationship with voters as a means to shape perceptions of the party image. In this chapter, participants in the FGDs also made the same observations as the findings in the previous two chapters, with the question: 'Did you

observe the NPP party attempting to foster relationships with voters leading to elections 2000?’

In this question, participants acknowledged that the NPP party used organizations, both internal and external to the party, as ‘interacting structures’ to investigate and understand the issues facing the people. Some participants claimed that Tescon and the Nassara club, for example, were used to network voters and to propagate the party’s electoral promises. Other participants also observed that institutional bodies such as the Ghana National Associations of Teachers (GNAT), the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) and the Ghana Journalist Association (GJA) were met regularly, leading to the elections to discuss their concerns. However, it must be noted that whereas the use of Tescon and the Nassara club to network voters was observed as continuous, that of the professional associations, such as GNAT, for example, which are external to the party is believed to have been a temporary practice; only occurring in times of elections.

The Nassara Club and the Tescon are nationally recognized as part of the party’s organizing structures. The Nassara Club is a specially created organ in response to the NPP’s long-standing image problems associated with the ACO policy of the Progress Party in the early 1970s, as explained in Chapters 3 and 6. The Tescon, on the other hand, was mandated to keep the party’s presence in higher educational institutions. Prior to the 2000 general elections, the NPP had lost the two previously held elections (1992 and 1996) to Rawlings and his NDC. According to the NPP, the issue of rigging on the part of the ruling party was the reason behind their loss, due to the party’s inability to mobilize a substantive number of foot soldiers to serve as party agents at the various polling stations to monitor the voting process. As a result, the idea of TESCON was mooted and adopted at a meeting of NPP

students' activist group at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST).

According to the first president of Tescon, Francis Asenso-Boakye, in the article 'TESCON is 7-years Old: What is There to Celebrate?' (ghanaweb.com, 2007):

*For those of us who were NPP activist at the tertiary education institutions at the time, that was the greatest inspiration for us to come together and reorganize the then latent NPP branches in the tertiary education institutions into a formidable branch of the party that was capable of mobilizing its members to serve as polling agents across the country, and also propagating the party's manifesto and campaign message. (Francis Asenso-Boakye, ghanaweb.com, 2007).*

Tescon is thus a breeding ground for the NPP party leadership, as most of Tescon leaders have risen to become party functionaries after graduating from the Universities, the Polytechnics, and other higher educational institutions. According to participants at the University of Ghana (UG) FGD 1:

*The NPP worked through teachers, nurses and market women who have direct access to the masses, especially in the villages. They regularly meet these groups and discuss economic issues, living and working conditions. I was at school in Kyemu, a village in the Brong Ahafo region, and observed first hand that teachers at the Senior Secondary School were moving from class to class to convince students at the voting age to vote NPP... so they used teachers, nurses and market women, preaching policies and ideas because by then inflation was high and everyday you go to the market, prices change. So the society itself was ready for a change and the NPP capitalized on it and modernized its*

*technique of operations and used everyone available to make gains. (Participant in UG FGD 1, Greater Accra Region, March 2008).*

*Yes, they did. On all the campuses, the NPP had Tescon—the student wing that convinces people to vote for NPP, and they have other groups that go to the villages to convince them to vote NPP. So the NPP came out with means to get to the grass roots. (Participant in UG FGD 1, Greater Accra Region, March 2008).*

*I also think they did because as my brother explained earlier on, the party structure is kind of departmentalized where you have chairmen in the remotest part of the country. So I think basically that kind of idea was to allow them to get to the grassroots. (Participant in UG FGD 1, Greater Accra Region, March 2008).*

*I think it's [the party] basically decentralized in a form of a network, by which information is disseminated. Tescon, for example, is still running, which is the central body of all the student networks in the country. (Participant in UG FGD 1, Greater Accra Region, March 2008).*

At KNUST FGD 2, discussion in Kumasi on the same topic:

*The campaign team had someone in charge of manifesto and I can assure you that they go round. The way they conduct scientific campaigning is one thing I have observed. They have a way of collating such information to fit into their campaign and that made Kufuor understand very well the psyche of the people in the 2000 elections. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

According to another:

*No! Not specific. But you realize that what actually goes down in the society is what the politicians use in formulating policies but you do not see the results as reflecting the original inputs. So, maybe there is a problem of linkage between policy formulation and implementation, therefore people become disappointed in the process at the end of the day. (Participant in KNUST FGD 1, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

*I can say that the party's means of knowing the issues wasn't scientific, like my brother just said, but then there was the wind of change everywhere as people were opting for change. They realized that the NDC wasn't the best and the NPP knew what people were complaining about. For example, one journalist, Kweku Barko's office, was vandalized more than once and many of those media men had been 'tortured' by the NDC administration, so most of the people especially in the media were fed up. These were some of the things that NPP used against the NDC at the time. So it was not necessarily a scientific data gathering, but I believe that they had their own intelligence agency that may have been supplying them with some information. (Participant in KNUST FGD 2, Ashanti Region, March 2008).*

Others from Ho FGD 1:

*'Where I come from, I will say no; nothing of that sort' (A Participant, Ho FGD 1, Volta Region March 2008).*

*'Where I stay is closer to the campus and I didn't see anything of that sort' (A Participant, Ho FGD 1, Volta Region March 2008).*

*'These needs are only considered when there is external pressure through strike actions but not a formal and deliberate process'* (A Participant, Ho FGD 1, Volta Region March 2008).

*Where I am coming from, there is nothing at all! We only see these things during party politics time, but after that nothing follows.* (Participant in Ho FGD 1, Volta Region, March 2008).

Although participants were divided on whether the party directly consulted people in developing policies, they however agree just like the academia and the media practitioners that the proliferation of local FM stations and the regular Phone-in programmes means the NPP could gather voter inputs without necessarily visiting communities directly. Hence, it is most likely that politicians could be relying on other secondary sources available to them, including regular reports from party constituency wards etc. Participants were of the view that policy formulation has always reflected issues of concern to the society. However, its implementation has always failed, making less meaningful what and how issues of concern get to the politicians.

Another perspective on how the NPP managed its relationship with voters was through the use of personalities. In Chapters 5 and 6, it was noted that the candidate's core personality values played a central role in the party's attempt to forge a relationship with certain key voter blocs. In Chapter 6, press adverts analyzed contained words like 'mature, tested and loved, experienced, resolute but calm, listens to advice, respectful, honest'—a man of integrity, presidential personality, and a fatherly character. In Chapter 5, interviewees acknowledged similar value constructs attributable to the candidate. And in this chapter, these same values attributable to the candidate, according to participants in the FGDs, are

some of the reasons behind their belief in the NPP's 'agenda for positive change', hence their support of the party. These findings suggest a parallel between the Ghanaian experience and that of the global context.

However, in the case of the NPP, it was understood from the previous chapters that the party's perceived image meant that the candidate's personality alone was not enough to connect and sustain a relationship with some key voter blocs necessary for the party to win the elections. Hence, it was necessary to connect other voter blocs with personalities, such as those of the vice-presidential candidate and other party officials. For example, participants of the focus group discussions conducted in northern Ghana observed that they were influenced to vote NPP as a result of the presence of certain key people in the party, such as the vice-presidential candidate. In this direction, the following quotations are revealing when the question, 'Is it necessary for parties to bring forward leaders of certain attributes with the aim of influencing voter decision-making?' was asked.

*I think in 2000 we had a lot of people from the North here whose presence in the NPP influenced people's voting decision. And I believe that it is necessary. (Participant in UDS Nyankpala Campus FGD, Northern Region, March 2008).*

*If you look at the NPP in the North here, a lot of us joined it, based on the fact that Aliu Mahama [the vice presidential candidate of the NPP in 2000 elections] was part of the leadership. Previously that wasn't the case. We hardly will think about the NPP but now we do. (Participant in Wa FGD UDS Campus, Upper West Region March, 2008).*

*In Ghana people are of the view that if they have a local person at the national level then they are more likely to have their share in the nation's development agenda than when*

*they have no one in the leadership.* (Participant in Wa FGD UDS Campus, Upper West Region, March 2008).

The understanding of the above quotations could be argued to have so much to do with ‘sectional identity’ as in where the person comes from, his religion etc., as an integral part of personality than attributes such as his build and calm demeanour, which defines the attributes of the presidential candidate. This means, like brand endorsement, the vice-presidential candidate, Major General Quarshigah, a prominent ex-army general from the Volta region and the wife of candidate Kufuor, who schooled and worked in the Volta Region earlier in her life and speaks fluently the local dialect of the Volta people, became ‘endorsers’ of the NPP party in areas such as the Volta Region and the Northern Regions, the strongholds of the opposing party, the NDC.

## **7.5 Conclusion**

Findings in the previous two chapters suggest that although the three main political elements—the party, the candidate and the policy—were used in the campaign, the composition of the Ghanaian political market generally, and voter attitude to party political allegiance specifically, meant that policy became subordinated to the party image and personality. It was also observed that the key to the NPP campaign success was not the importance of the political elements, per se, but rather how these elements were interwoven with each other to offer the voter a coherent and comprehensive choice. This chapter therefore sought to confirm these findings from the perspectives of the very people the campaign was meant for, the voters, in focus group discussions.

To understand the factors that influenced participants' voting decision in the elections, the question '*What influenced your political choice in the 2000 elections?*' was asked. Varied reasons were given, including the adverse economic conditions; the length of stay of the incumbent administration then, having been in power for almost 20 years; party image as the most organized and democratic; the party's candidate attributes as the most trusted and well respected; and the party's policy as the most responsive to the issues on the ground. But amongst these reasons, the main factor of influence amongst participants was the economic situation. And even in this category there were subcategories, as participants referred to economic hardships on personal and national levels.

In the case of those who thought their personal living conditions had worsened, a circumstantial self-need assessment was the main driver of their voting decision, generally with the view that having the administration changed could spin off change in their personal lives. This makes it obvious for one to assume that policy issues could have been the fundamental influence on voter decision in the 2000 elections, but that was not the case, according to participants. Participants noted that politicians' failure to deliver on policy promises means that policy talk on the campaign trail means nothing to voters, especially in the case of those likely to vote in blocs along the lines of ethnicity and religion. Instead, they look at 'who is who' within the parties that might represent their interests and is likely to deliver on it. As a result, policy becomes subordinated to personality in voter decision-making.

Findings from the focus groups' discussions also confirm a held view that ideology is almost inexistent in the Ghanaian body politics. Few respondents made mention of ideology as their reasons for voting NPP. The majority referred to the party's organizational

capabilities, democratic credentials as reasons for their support, observing that it was the most formidable to depose the incumbent at the time and the most perceivably capable to govern, given the expertise and qualifications of its leadership. This brings into focus the usefulness and the rationale behind the party's use of all the political elements in influencing voter decision.

Discussing which of the three political elements participants thought was visible in the campaign, they seem to have been split in between the party and the candidate. This split was based on the candidate's perceived weakness and the party's image issues. For those who thought the candidate was the most visible, arguing that due to the party's image as Akanistic, the candidate, given his mild manner and other likeability attributes such as his build, resulting in the ubiquitous 'gentle giant' appellation, was effectively elevated above the party image to influence those who had held the view that the party was elitist and tribal. However, those who thought the party was the most visible argue that as a result of the candidate's perceived and alleged weakness as underachiever, the party image, which includes a dozen scholars and experts in various fields, was elevated to offset this weakness.

## CHAPTER 8

### **A Proposed Model in Political Brand Management: The Political Brand Architecture (PBA) Theory**

#### **8.1 Introduction**

In Chapter 1, it was stated that one of the two key goals of the study was to propose a strategic reference framework to inform political brand management. This framework is informed by the researched case of the NPP and the review of the literature, which was carried out to identify differing views on extant forms and strategies in political brand management. The key finding in that review was the emphasis on political branding, based on candidate and policy attributes, but less on party attributes, especially in the US and Britain where the practice of political marketing has grown. However, these approaches are contentious and with limitations that have already been discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, one of which is the view that there are times when the party image, for example, is stronger than the candidate's and should be the focal point in the campaign.

For example, in the 1992 British elections, according to Andrew Brown (1992, p. 551), although the Labour party had succeeded in winning over voters in terms of policy, their leader Neil Kinnock's personality and style remained an electoral deficit. Brown noted that voter surveys leading to the elections had the Labour party leading the Conservatives on key areas of policy, and yet almost 25 per cent indicated that they did not think Mr Kinnock would make a good Prime Minister, hence their reason for not wanting to vote Labour (Brown, 1992, p. 551, citing Gallup surveys). This example could also demonstrate the seamless integration of the three core political elements—the party, the candidate and the policy—and precisely argue the case that when one of these elements is faulted by the

voters, there is a greater chance that the whole bunch would be rejected, and so it does not matter which amongst them is emphasized in the electioneering campaign. Although such an argument could be advanced, Brown noted that the Conservatives' low approval rating below Labour in terms of policy was not an obstacle in voting the Conservative candidate John Major in the 1992 elections. It should also be recognized that despite Kinnock's disapproval amongst the 25 per cent of voters in the Gallup survey, who may probably belong to the 'floaters' (Harris, cited in Brown, 1992, p. 551), Kinnock had a significant approval within his own party, which was evident in the 'Sheffield "mega-rally" that saw over 10,000 party faithful turn up' (Brown 1992, p. 553).

The knowledge that different political elements appeal to different voter segments has led to voter segmentation assuming strategic significance in campaign management. Political parties commit a significant amount of resources into identifying, categorizing, and managing portfolios of voter segments. The Labour party's voter segmentation database resource known as "Mosaic" is a typical example (news.bbc.co.uk, 2 January 2005; accessed on 22/11/2011). Voter segments labels such as: *Mondeo Man*, *Middle England*, *Heartlands*, *Working class*, *Worcester Woman*, *Pebbledash People*, *Bacardi Breezer generation*, *Ben and Chloe*, *Lee and Noreen* etc., which are some of the examples one could find in the Labour and Conservative parties' voter vault, according to BBC's Political Reporter, Ollie Stone-Lee (news.bbc.co.uk, 2 January 2005; accessed on 22/11/2011). In the 1997 elections, for example, the *Mondeo Man*, *Middle England*, and *Worcester Woman* voter segments, who are mainly middle income, homeowners from provincial cities, were seen as crucial swing voters whom Labour needed to win over from the Tories. These target segments seemed to have been convinced by Tony Blair's leadership and voted for Labour.

However, some argue (Osborne, 2006; Lilleker, 2005) that the party's focus on these newly identified swing voters left the heartlands, that were disenchanted core Labour party voters.

The above observation backs the view that side-stepping a political element, for example, the party in political branding could lead to alienating a cross-section of the voters such as those who vote based on party loyalties, hence the argument in this thesis that a party stands to gain by considering all the political elements of electoral relevance in political brand management. However, such a process should be led by the element with the most electoral equity, and within a framework where the weaknesses of the others are managed. These are the assumptions behind the multivariate political branding proposition in this thesis.

The multivariate approach suggests that in addition to the candidate and the policy brands, the party brand is equally important to the campaign because there are times when other personalities and institutions in the party structure are crucial and beneficial to the campaign. This was evident in the case of the NPP where, in addition to the candidate and the vice-presidential candidate, other party personalities and institutions such as the Nassara Club and the Tescon became useful in targeting certain key voter blocs. It was further revealed that certain institutions outside the party structure, for example, members of the media and civil society groups, became useful to the campaign also. These personalities and institutions were therefore used, directly and indirectly, in ways that were complementary to each other in targeting votes for the NPP party. This approach by the NPP, according to the thesis, parallels the brand architecture concept in the corporate world. The findings led to the proposition of the PBA concept in managing political brands. The PBA is elaborated in this chapter with the research findings located in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

In the PBA management, as noted in the review of the brand architecture concept in Chapter 2, three key steps are necessary. First, there is the need to identify which political element plays the driver, endorser, and descriptor brand roles. Secondly, parties should be able to identify association bases on which to manage the political brands. And thirdly, there is the need to identify, understand, and manage the relationships between the political elements and their target audiences. The following sections describe in detail, with findings in the analyses chapters, the three activities involved in using the PBA concept in managing political brands.

## **8.2 Political Brand Roles: Identifying the driver, endorser, and descriptor roles**

Knowing the brand roles of the political elements in the NPP party structure is derived from Research Question 1. The question was geared towards understanding how the roles of the political elements were determined. In the review of the literature, it was noted that corporate firms such as IBM determine brand roles based on the market value (or devalue) of their brands. The same applies to the political market, according to the thesis. The political brand of the most market value plays the driver brand role with which to coordinate the remaining brands.

In the review of the literature, it was noted that Needham's political branding concept (2006), for example, conceptualizes the candidate as the driver brand with which a party's image is likely to remould itself. Scammell had also noted earlier how John Kennedy's image may have influenced voters' judgment in the contest between him and Richard Nixon for the 1960 US Presidential Election campaign. In these examples, the assumption is that the personality of the candidate becomes the leading element, and plays the driver brand role in the brand architecture framework, amongst the three in influencing voter decisions.

The same could be said of the re-election of the SPO party and the effect of its Chancellor, Vranitzky, in Austria's 1990 elections, as noted in the literature review.

On the other hand, there are times when a political element augments other political elements in order to strengthen the latter's position. In this case, the former only plays the role of 'a guarantor' (endorser) that the latter, which is the driver brand, will fulfil what it promises. Similarly, findings in this research suggest that all the three political elements were used in various ways by the NPP party. It was observed that the candidate and the vice presidential candidate were key to the campaign in creating a party image of tolerance and inclusiveness, but they differed in the approach of fulfilling this objective.

In the case of the NPP, just as in Needham and Scammell's observations, the personality of the presidential candidate in the elections played the driver brand role. The presidential candidate's personality was used to create and articulate the difference in party temperament, behaviour, and leadership attitude between the NPP and its main opposition party, the NDC. In the media review, for example, Kufuor's personality was conceptualized to denote a character committed to the democratic principles. This character was used to demonstrate how different the NPP's administration would be to that of the incumbent, when in power. The findings also revealed that the candidate's popularity was used to define and narrow the political battlefield by suggesting that there were only two contenders in the race when in fact eight political parties were contesting that election. In an advertisement featured in *The Independent* newspaper, headed 'JAK to the Nation's Rescue', Kufuor was described as the only opposition presidential candidate capable of wresting power from the incumbent. The advertisement thus admonished voters not to waste their mandate by casting their votes to other opposition parties that were not in contention to win (see section 6.4).

The findings in the thesis depart from extant literature on political branding in many respects, one of which is the consideration of the vice-presidential candidate in the process. The findings suggest that the vice-presidential candidate, in the case of the NPP, had been chosen for the sole aim of guaranteeing to voters, especially those from areas that the NPP is accused of discriminating against, that the party was not sectarian. This role was acknowledged by the presidential candidate in Chapter 6, and is conceptualized in the thesis as an endorser role (see Chapter 2). This is because the vice-presidential candidate possessed certain valued qualities, enough to assure those identified groups that the presidential candidate and the party would fulfil their promises when voted into power. For example, in the media campaign analysis the presidential candidate, through a number of statements, is noted to have consciously tied the vice-presidential candidate's social background to the party, noting that 'the party stands to reap from the vice-candidate's background as a Muslim from the North and with strong ties to the Zongo communities in the South' (see section 6.3.1b).

Also, in the NPP's approach the party's image in the campaign could be conceptualized as an endorser brand, given that its organizational competence, human resources, and the depth in the knowledge of governance were articulated as the reasons behind Kufuor's capacity to govern. According to a party official interviewed, the party structure and behaviour that was presented to the Ghanaian public then was one that demonstrated optimism and ambition. This character, in his opinion, inspired most people to join (section 5.4.1). The use of the party's historic ties with the regions again, through certain individuals and groups, also contributed in shaping opinions. In advertisements and advertorials, references were made to the party's historic institutional ties with some of the regions in the country. The NPP campaign claimed that the current NPP was the descendant of a historic relationship in the

1950s between the Northern People's Party (NPP) of the three Northern regions and the Anlo Youth of the Volta region. Other notable non-Akan personalities in the party leadership were also used to demonstrate how nationally representative the party was in the attempt to debunk the perception that the party was sectarian. These approaches were used to guarantee the people that the party harboured no sectarian intentions and therefore could be trusted.

The role of the policy in the NPP's campaign could be conceptualized as a descriptor, given that the policy is acknowledged in both the interview and the focus group discussions as the least emphasized element, despite its informant role. In Chapter 2, it was discussed that a descriptor brand plays an informant role by making the customer aware of certain variations made to an already known offering (Aaker 1999, p. 88). In this direction, the NPP used policy statements such as 'all-inclusive government' to show the broadening of the party's ideological base. The NPP officials interviewed indicated that through policy statements, a deliberate attempt was made by the party to expand its ideological platform to accommodate people of all persuasions. This was achieved by avoiding ideology-based policy debates and allowed the party to accept and propose alternative economic policy views, such as the mass transportation and national health insurance schemes that became key to the party's campaign. It also allowed them space to focus on issues such as democracy, rule of law, and reconciliation which cut across all persuasions, the officials noted.

Based on the relevance of these political elements and their roles, it is obvious that all the political elements were important to the campaign. What was uncertain was the determination of which amongst the party and the candidate was the driver brand; the most influential and visible in the campaign around which the rest of the brands were

coordinated. In Chapter 7, views amongst in-depth interviewees were almost divided on whether the party or the candidate was the driver brand. Party officials, especially those directly involved with the campaign decision-making, thought the party was the leading political element in the campaign. However, participants of the FGDs in Chapter 7 favoured the candidate. The focus group participants said the candidate was the most visible during the campaign and the most influential on their voting decisions (section 7.2d). Participants consistently referred to the personality of the candidate as the source of influence on their voting decisions, hence being central to and the most visible of the party's campaign. As a result of these differences, it is possible to argue that whereas the party leadership intended the party image to be the driver brand in the elections, their actions played out differently to the participants of the focus group discussions and possibly to voters. It could also be argued that both the party and the candidate played driving roles to different voter categories. Notwithstanding the differences in views, what was clear was the acknowledgement that the three elements were used in their respective roles to either change or reinforce voters' perceptions of the party's image.

### **8.3 Managing Political Brand Associations**

This activity is derived from Research Question 2, which sought to understand how individual political elements were managed by the NPP campaign. From the findings this was achieved from two dimensions: the first was by framing the argument around each of the political elements using certain persuasion devices. The second was by organizing practical activities with or around each of the individual political elements. The following sections describe these two dimensions in detail. However, before then, referring to Chapter 2 is necessary as a reminder to reinforce the understanding of how brand associations are managed in a brand architecture setting. In Chapter 2, it was noted that a brand's association

to certain values and attributes either in the form of personalities or abstracts facilitates the projection of the brand into the minds of the consumer through performance and communication. In this regard, a reference was made to Kapferer, who noted that these values and attributes could be functional and/or emotional, and could exist internally or externally to the brand so long as it corresponded with the image to project.

In the case of the NPP, findings revealed that the campaign identified three forms of brand association bases for the party brand. These were tradition, democratic principles, and party structure. In Chapter 6 it was observed that the party was managed through tales of its traditional (emotional) and democratic (functional) credentials. Advertising and advertorials in the press carried stories about people and institutions of significance that were involved in the formation and leadership of the NPP tradition who happened to hail from the regions, and belong to the religious group that the party is accused of being ‘anti’ to.

Party officials interviewed acknowledged also the deliberate attempt to de-emphasize ideology and promote instead democracy and reconciliation in the campaign discourse. A party interviewee, PR-3, who was a top-ranking campaign official in the 2000 election, for example, said the reason behind this deliberate decision was because they realized that ‘for democracy, it embraces everyone; you don’t have to be of the left or the right of the ideological cleavage to acknowledge that the best form of government is democracy’ (see section 5.3). Based on this understanding amongst the leadership of the party, certain word choices such as ‘good governance, the rule of law, leadership, corruption and all-inclusive governance’ were consistently used in the party’s advertisements, advertorials, and published speeches in news reports (see Table 6.1, section 6.3–6.3a). This approach, according to the party official interviewed, was aimed at presenting a centrist platform to

accommodate everyone, including people who are very far to the left and those far to the right (see Chapter 5).

In terms of structure, PR-3 observed that although it was necessary that the party maintained its perceived image as the most democratic, it was also important to restructure its organizational hierarchy to appear nationally representative. As a result, the party deliberately made visible certain groups of people such as Muslims, Ga's and Ewes in the party hierarchy, especially during the party's interactions with the media (see section 5.3.1). Others were the creation of the Nassara Club within the Zongo communities, the selection of a Muslim vice-candidate in the view that doing so, the party stood to gain from the areas in which they had been rejected in two consecutive elections. This process of deliberately linking the party brand to the perceived characteristics of the target customer (or the voter, in this case) is conceptualized as 'brand association'.

In the case of the candidate, again democratic values with which the personality of the candidate was claimed to be consistent, according to party officials interviewed, became the association base for his image management. In Chapter 5, a party official observed that the candidate was 'managed within his own core values'. That he identified as the candidate's commitment to the democratic principles which, according to him, include tolerance for differing views, respect for human rights, and free speech. Based on this knowledge, word choices such as 'calm', 'listens to advice', and 'team player' were used to describe who candidate Kufuor was in campaign advertisements. These values were also used to define the party in order to demonstrate and articulate the common values between the candidate and the party. According to both party and non-party respondents interviewed, the candidate brand image was also associated with the 'commoner' through a number of public

engagements, including church and funeral visits by the candidate to symbolize his accessibility and commitment to the ordinary folk.

The policy brand was associated with pro-poor, pro-social issues, as opposed to pro-middle class, and pro-business. This view was enhanced by the inclusion into the NPP leadership of the CPP, a party left to the NPP, presidential candidate to be in charge of policy. But this relationship later became controversial when the NPP party was in power (see section 5.3.3). The ‘agenda for positive change’ policy brand, which had within it the introduction of mass transportation system, National Health Insurance System, all-inclusive government, national reconciliation initiatives, amongst others, was symbolic of the NPP’s newly adapted image.

The benefit of political brand association is that it influences the decisions of the people within the identified groups of association. Examples are comments made by participants of the FGDs, saying: ‘Sometimes we also look at the leaders, the opinion leaders; what they cry for is what sometimes we also look for.’ (see section 7.2a). Another observed: ‘If you look at the NPP in the North here, a lot of us joined it based on the fact that Aliu Mahama, the vice-presidential candidate of the NPP in 2000 elections, was part of the leadership’ (see section 7.4).

#### **8.4 Managing relationships between the Political Brands and target voters.**

The literature observes that the party/voter relationship has moved on beyond ideological leanings (Baines et al., 2002; Needham, 2005; Reeves et al., 2006). The continuous decline of ideological identification amongst voters means that political parties should now look for different ways of forging relationships with voters. In Chapter 2, it was noted that the

Labour party used consumer research tools, such as focus groups, in policy-making. The obligation to forge relationships with voters has become necessary to political parties so as to understand well the voters' needs. In commerce, corporate brands deem relationships with customers as essential to market success. In reference to Farquhar and Herr's *brand-to-associate* and *associate-to-brand* approaches (1993, p. 265) in Chapter 2, it was noted that corporate decisions on which values of the brand would appeal to the customer and through which means to communicate those values require understanding the customer's needs, which in turn demand the forging of relationships.

Coming back to the case of the NPP, participants in both the interview and focus group discussions in Chapters 5 and 7 identified certain internal and external structures through which NPP forged relationships with its target voters other than through ideological leanings. Internally, respondents identified Tescon, the Nassara Club, women's wing and Keep Fit clubs as some of the structures through which the party sought connection with electors.

The Tescon (Tertiary Education Students Confederation of the NPP), for example, is a student organization mandated to keep the NPP's presence on the campuses of higher educational institutions. The Nassara Club was created to deal with the party's perceived sectarian image issues within the communities of Northern and Muslim extraction, including the Zongos in Ghana (see sections 5.4.1; 5.5). The two institutions, according to the findings, are 'interacting structures' through which the NPP promotes its policies, and understands the issues of concern, amongst these key communities (see section 5.4). For the institutions external to the party, it is observed that professional associations such as the Ghana National Associations of Teachers (GNAT), the National Union of Ghana Students

(NUGS) and the Ghana Journalist Association (GJA) were met regularly by the party leadership, leading to the elections to discuss their concerns and how they could be resolved if the party gained power (see sections 5.3.3; 7.4).

It is also noted that what could be described as an indirect (remote) relationship was forged with voters through the behaviour and actions of the candidate (see sections 5.2d; 5.4). This relationship is considered indirect because it is as a consequence of the candidate's perceived attribute as 'trustworthy', not as a result of any formal action initiated by the party. According to participants of the FGDs, the candidate was perceived as an honest person; a fatherly figure who could be trusted with their mandate (see section 5.2d).

Others also noted that the vice-presidential candidate and other personalities in the party were used to foster relationships, particularly in three of the five regions where the party trailed its main opposition. In the focus group discussions in the North, participants were of the view that the inclusion of a Northerner who was also a Muslim in the top hierarchy of the party leadership encouraged many to join the NPP. In the words of a participant, 'If you look at the NPP in the North here, a lot of us joined it based on the fact that Aliu Mahama, the vice-presidential candidate of the NPP in 2000 elections, was part of the leadership' (see section 5.4).

In respect to how policy was used to create relationships, party officials interviewed observed that market research was used in collecting data for policy-making, just like the case of the Labour Party in Chapter 2. They noted the use of party constituency offices across the country in collating voter views in developing the party's policy and manifesto. According to one party official, local constituencies were zoned for discussions on what


each and every zoned area needed the most, as the party recognized that even within the same constituencies, there could be different needs that the party had to understand (see section 5.3.3). According to another, it was important the party got to the grass roots to listen to the people in order to avoid their perception being flawed (see section 5.3.3).

On the other hand, non-party officials interviewed failed to share the party officials' views of researching voter opinions at constituency levels. This group of academics and media practitioners declined ever observing or even hearing that the party conducted such a process in developing party programmes by visiting the voters directly. However, they acknowledged the possibility of voter input through a secondary source such as radio Phone-in programmes and national development reports sanctioned by local and international non-governmental organizations, for example (see section 5.3.3). They also acknowledge that the NPP party visited organized institutions and interest groups regularly in the lead up to and during the campaign period. This, according to them, makes it possible for the party to collate opinions and consider them in policy-making in the interests of these organized institutions.

In Chapter 6, evidence of voters' views in policy developments could only be gathered from news reports that the party was organizing outreach programmes called 'Operation 2000 Grass Root Elephant Walk' and 'Operation Reach the Communities in their Hamlets', 'interact with, educate and sensitize communities on the prevailing political and economic situations' (see section 6.3.3, and Table 6.3 text 8). In Chapter 7, there were mixed responses from participants of the FGDs on voter opinions in policy development, when participants were asked whether they thought the party considered voters' views. On the other hand, findings in all the three chapters suggested the application of targeting, as a

marketing instrument, in policy-dissemination by the NPP taking into consideration the profiles of target audience. Based on these findings, NPP’s relationship with voters in the 2000 elections could be conceptualized in the form of Figure 8.1 below.

**Figure 8.1 Party/Voter relationship model of the NPP based on data collected in March, 2008.**



*The figure above is a frame of how the NPP created and managed its relationships with identified groups and a cross-section of Ghanaian voters in the 2000 general elections.*

### **8.5 Deciding on a PBA strategy to adopt: BA or HB**

Crucial to the political brand management decision in the PBA theory is to understand which of the two main strategies to adopt; branded house (BH) or house of brands (HB). The former is an integration strategy and the latter a separation strategy, as observed in Chapter 2. In each case, individual brand roles and relationships to the electoral goals are identified. These brand roles and relationships are considered as transitive instead of fixed, noting that they could change in relation to changes in the political climate. As a result, a periodic review of the roles and relationships amongst the political brands themselves (within the political brand portfolio of the party) and between the political brands and the target voters is recommended.

So, given the explanation of the brand architecture theory in Chapter 2 and the detailed analysis of the NPP's 2000 electoral approaches in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, which of the two organizing concepts in political brand architecture could the NPP approach be aligned to? To understand this is to understand within which brand architecture management environment, integrated or separated, did the political elements perform their roles. If the political elements performed their roles within the NPP's core identity, then it was a branded house (BH) approach and within an integrated environment. It becomes a house of brands (HB), and thus a separated environment if there was adaptation, or variation, to this core party identity. In the previous chapters it was discussed that all the political elements were assigned roles, and the roles were fulfilled through values individually attributable to them. Nevertheless, they also shared value commonality, which is the commitment to the democratic principles. Therefore, the NPP's approach could be categorized as HB or BH, depending on which of the two sides weighs heavily.

As described earlier on in the thesis, the HB approach is the development of individual brands with their own values, and detached from the corporate values. That said, in brand architecture terms the NPP party could be argued to have managed its internal political elements based on the HB concept. On the other hand, if the NPP party had maintained and defended its ideological platform and formulated its economic policies based on its traditional ideological position of free enterprise, for example, then one could argue that it organized its three party political elements based on the BH architecture theory. But having formulated and implemented policies based on some degree of adaption to the party's free enterprise ideals, it could be argued that the party's approach was HB. This conclusion is elaborated further below.

As observed in Chapter 4, prior to Elections 2000 the party usually differentiated itself from the competition, and to voters, from two perspectives: first, based on its traditional ideals of free enterprise, which the party refers to as 'property-owning democracy'; secondly, the party differentiated itself based on its perceived behavioural values as the true beholder of the rule of law, free speech, and fundamental human rights. However, leading to the 2000 elections, the NPP's central ideal of free enterprise, or property-owning democracy, was under attack and was labelled as the mouthpiece of the privileged in society. As a result, the party adapted this ideal, which was evident in the kinds of policies that it formulated. To clarify this view, a reference to Peter Drucker's analysis of the free enterprise ideals (2004) is appropriate. Drucker asserts that what characterizes capitalism is 'the belief in free enterprise economic system' (2004, p. 1). Drucker posits that although the idea of free enterprise does not welcome government's limitation on business, it does not exclude its regulation either. Essentially, the responsibility of a government, according to the free

enterprise ideal, is to provide the enabling framework within which business is conducted, but not to run business enterprises itself (Drucker, 2004, p. 3).

However, the free enterprise ideal, as explained by Drucker, also suggests that although business should be in private hands, government ownership of certain public utilities such as rail transport, does not violate the basic tenet of free enterprise, should their management be in the hands of men who are neither appointed by, nor responsible to, any political agency other than the court of law (Drucker, 2004, p. 3). This latter part of Drucker's explanation may differ from country to country, it could be argued, based on the level of institutional dependence on, or independence from, the state; which in turn, is associated with the level of development, type of political system, and the level of democratic practices. Therefore, a pure free enterprise ideal is one that could be described as Americanized; situated within the laws and regulations of the United States where the fundamental principle of free enterprise, within the definition of Drucker, is widely applied.

In the 2000 elections, the NPP's policies differed from the core belief of the free enterprise ideal that Drucker demonstrates above. To understand the NPP's policy positions in the 2000 elections within the theory of the free enterprise, as Drucker examined in his explanation of capitalism, one would expect that an NPP administration would only provide the enabling environment for the private sector to offer solutions to the issues that faced Ghanaians in areas such as health care, jobs, housing, education, transportation, and others. Instead, the party formulated programmes such as the National Youth Employment Scheme, the National Health Insurance Scheme, the School Feeding Programme, the Metro Mass Transportation, and Affordable Housing, to mention but few, when in government. These policies are based on centre-left as opposed to centre-right ideals.

With this understanding, it is possible to argue that the NPP party adapted its beliefs on the free enterprise ideal, which is core to its identity, towards the centre-left. But this argument is not conclusive unless details on how the party implemented and ran such policy programmes are given, which is the second part of Drucker's analysis. For example, did the NPP government set up the programmes with private involvement? Where was capital sourced and who constituted the daily running of the programmes, the private or public sector? Essentially, who are the main players to the factors of production—land, labour, and capital? In the case of the NPP in 2000, the government was the main player.

## **8.6 Conclusion**

In this chapter, the use of the PBA theory for political brand management was discussed. The PBA theory argues that the characteristics that qualify the party element as a brand, such as name recognition, distinctive values, and other inherent tangible and intangible features, could also be found in the candidate and the policy elements, making them qualify as brands too. Therefore, unlike the existing literature, the PBA theory argues that a political party could have a portfolio of three brands to manage—the party brand, the candidate brand, and the policy brand. The PBA theory further argues that amongst the three-set brand portfolio is the parent brand which is the party, and the two sub-brands being the candidate and the policy brands.

The PBA theory also maintains, as discussed in the chapter, that each of these brands has a role, driver, endorser, and descriptor role, which must be identified based on their strengths and weaknesses in relation to their relationship with the target voters and the goals of the party. These roles are not permanent. They are reviewed occasionally depending on the

prevailing political environment. For example, being the parent brand does not mean that the party brand plays the driver role. Depending on the prevailing political climate, the candidate brand may be suitable to play the driving role, as was the case in Chancellor Vranitzky and the SPO party in Austria's 1990 parliamentary elections. It was also discussed, as the NPP example indicated, that political brands' roles could change from constituency to constituency, depending on their relationship with the target voters. The flexible and fluid character of the political brand, according to the PBA theory, is necessary and must be appreciated in political brand management, given the nature and the character of the political market.

Based on this knowledge, it was discussed in the chapter that in managing political brands using the PBA theory, three key steps must be followed. First is the need to identify which political element plays the driver, endorser, and descriptor roles. Second is to identify association bases on which to manage and project into the minds of the target voters the political brand images. The third is to identify, understand, and manage the relationships between the political elements and their target audiences. Based on these processes, a party stands to create clarity in its brand management and to leverage its brand strength into key voter segments.

## **CHAPTER 9**

### **Conclusion:**

#### **9.1 Introduction**

The research draws on the case of the NPP's Election 2000 campaign, when the party was faced with two main issues going into the elections. The first was a perception problem about the party's image as elitist and tribal, especially amongst five of the ten regions in Ghana: Volta, Northern, Upper West, Upper East, and the Greater Accra regions. Secondly, for a party that has been in opposition for over thirty years since it last won elections (as Progress Party in the 1970s) competing against an incumbent which has been in government for almost twenty years running, the NPP faced enormous resource deficit comparatively. Therefore, there was the need for a strategic approach if the NPP campaign could face up to these challenges and achieve its aims of shaping the party's image to influence perceptions and to win the majority votes to gain power. To understand how the party managed these challenges, the study reviewed media articles, organized focused group discussions (FGDs) with members of the voting public, interviewed party officials, and academics and media practitioners.

The findings of the research were analyzed within the framework of the brand architecture theory. The theory essentially was applied to understand, from branding perspectives, how the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in Ghana managed its image issue and sought voter support through the use of advertisements and other approaches parallel to marketing techniques such as segmentation, targeting, market intelligence, and market research. The findings led to a set of conclusions and implications for political branding research and practice generally. However, the thesis is specifically aimed at offering guidance to political parties in emerging democracies on how to build, manage, and maintain political brands and their

relationships with target voters made up of coalitions of ethnic, religious, and economic interests.

## **9.2 Contribution to knowledge**

For its contribution to the field, the research expands further the discourse on political branding in two ways. First, it explores a political market that previously was nonexistent in the literature. Prior to this study, the political branding literature has been American or European focused, and so is the literature in the parent discipline of political marketing. The closest one could find on the use of modern campaigning techniques in Ghana, and in Africa generally, is the use of advertisement in political campaigning; big billboards, radio, and TV commercials (Gyimah-Boaidi, 2001; Ayee, 2000; Agyemang-Duah: Interview, 2004). Such findings could only be located in the political science literature, under election studies, and are usually allocated not more than half a page of a narrative. However, this study has revealed that not only do political parties in Africa use marketing instruments, they also apply strategies that parallel marketing thinking, such as branding, in party political management. Secondly, at the conceptual level, the study's proposed 'Political Brand Architecture' (PBA) concept of analyzing and building political brands introduces the idea of interactivity of the political elements in two main forms of brand management; branded house (BH) and house of brands (HB). This has been explained extensively in the previous chapter.

Another part of the study's contribution to knowledge is its clarification on why political parties should brand, not only to market. For some time now marketers have argued and proven that the brand is one of the company's most valuable assets. Brands such as 'Coca Cola', 'Persil', 'Ariel', 'Pepsodent', 'Ben and Jerry', 'McDonalds', 'Danone', 'Mercedes

Benz', 'Virgin', 'Guinness', to mention but few, are living testimonies of this position, and their longevity and ability to renew themselves in times of market challenges lend credence to the claim. This recognition of the brand's value has led to its quantification and representation on the balance sheets of most corporations.

It is discussed in this thesis that a similar situation pertains in politics, despite the differences. In politics, the longevity of the party brand—its name, emblem, core belief, tradition and followers, amongst others, make it one of the most valuable assets to the political process. It is almost unreasonable that a political party, such as the British Conservatives, may decide to ditch its name for an entirely different one. However, the last time an attempt was made it was just an addition to the long-held name 'Labour', to 'New Labour'. So what is different to what parties are already doing, and what has changed? In other words, 'Why should parties stick to branding, or rebranding, not only marketing?'

The 'why' could be attributed to the adage that 'familiarity breeds contempt' and in today's consumer society, contempt breeds faster. After being in existence for so long, as party brands such as Labour and Conservative have been, brands have become so common that we fail to recognize their 'brandness': that they have distinctive features which except them from the competition, and aid us to identify and differentiate them. We get used to their attitudes, textures, symbolisms, and their performances with time. They cease to excite us at this point. In short, they lose their relevance in one way or the other. For these reasons, commercial brands from time to time reorganize themselves with the aim of being relevant again so as to maintain their commitments with existing customers, attract new ones, renew with the dissatisfied, and to regain lost ones. What this means to political marketing practice is that being a market-oriented party (MOP) (Lees-Marshment, 2001a; 2001b) alone is not

enough to offer the sense of relevance needed to reconnect the voter over a long period of time.

The relationship between branding and marketing is such that the former is the ‘strategic content’ that the latter seeks to create and outdoor. In a human metaphor sense, it could be conceptualized as a ‘baby-parent’ relationship. So when all the market research is done, the voter segments and targets identified, the competitors and the position in the market known, it is now time to consistently respond to the requirements identified in those marketing processes. This consistent response is offering a core product (diary milk, say) with its own personality: name, texture, colour, attitude, symbolism and performance that are distinctive and have the agility to renew overtime. That is when a product becomes a brand, with the ability to be relevant all the time.

### **9.3 Limitations of the research**

Notwithstanding its claims, the study also acknowledges its limitations; one conceptual, the other methodological. At the conceptual level, it is expected that the challenges of democratic principles in party politics could endanger any strategic decision to implement either a BH or HB architecture. For example, in an attempt to predetermine the way party functionaries behave, the party risks a dissenting environment within its rank and file due to the principles of free will and free speech associated with democracy, including internal party democracy. The party may stand accused of being concerned only about winning, not about ensuring internal party democracy. However, dissenting views in party politics is part of the general party political management, not a challenge only expected of a party aiming to implement a political brand architecture strategy. As a result of this limitation, continuous and consistent two-way communication within the party structure on the branding strategy

and its benefits to the party is recommended. Such a consultation process could help reduce the level of dissenting views amongst party members as they are made to feel part of the process.

At the methodological level, the lack of internal party records to support the assertions of the party officials makes the study limited. Internal party records would lend extra evidence with which the views and opinions of party officials could be verified. However, the study could not obtain such data because party officials regarded them as ‘secrets of their trade’ and would not release them despite the assurances of data protection. Several attempts by the researcher to retrieve some of these internal records on the campaign proved futile. At a point, the researcher was told that these records could not be located at the party offices as they are in the care of individual party members who could not be traced. Future research should take account of such instances and find a means to address them.

Next on method limitation were the focus groups discussions used to understand voter opinions. With a total of 100 respondents in this study, out of over nine million registered voters (Anebo, 2001, p. 69) across Ghana for the 2000 elections, the sample clearly prohibits the generalization of the findings on voter opinions. This means, the views of the focus group discussants could not be entirely taken as a representation of the voter population. Although this limitation was anticipated prior to the study, resource constraints could not allow any adjustment. Nevertheless, this limitation was compensated for by the inclusion of the academics and media analysts who had observed voter behaviour in their various capacities as researchers and so were in the position to offer some insights.

Based on the above limitations, three key recommendations are suggested for future studies. First, attention should be paid to ways through which internal party records, for example, could be obtained, given the lack of data and information transparency amongst political institutions in Ghana, and Africa in general. Secondly, future research on political brand architecture should consider methods that could allow quantification of results, using survey for example. Such methods, in addition to internal party records on the advertising budget could allow the quantification of ‘which amongst the political elements plays the driver role at elections’, for example. It will also aid the evaluation of the variance between political parties’ intent on affecting voter behaviour and the results in reality.

#### **9.4 Trends after the 2000 General Elections**

Since the 2000 elections, all the major political parties have come to embrace the idea of political marketing. This view was highlighted in a pilot study for this research by a highly ranked member of the NDC government, then a Member of Parliament (MP) in 2007 when the NDC was in opposition. In an interview about the changes in political organization and campaigning in Ghana, the NDC politician was of the opinion that changes began with the NPP in 2000, and since then all the major parties have followed suit (see Chapter 3, section 3.5). This opinion is also highlighted in the literature on Ghanaian politics (Jockers et al., 2009; Gyimah-Boadi, 2009; Kelly, 2005), which suggests that successive elections in Ghana have followed similar patterns in political organization and campaigning.

For example, in the 2004 elections Kelly (2005, p. 3) observed that as a result of the perceived group identity politics, voter-targeting was key to the NPP campaign, with the Vice-President as the connecting point for the NPP in the North; touring and holding rallies in the three Northern regions just as he did in 2000. In the 2008 elections, Gyimah-Boadi

(2009) observed that the NPP campaign extensively used TV, Radio, and Newspaper commercials to advance their campaign messages. They also made use of broadcast and narrowcast themes to drive the campaign. For example, just like the positive change agenda in the 2000 elections, the NPP, which was in government by the 2008 elections, used ‘*yeeko-yenim*’, which translates in English as ‘We are moving forward’ as its broadcast message to symbolize a sparkling future for Ghana as a modern industrialized and technologically advanced middle-income country (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009, p. 142). In an attempt to reinforce the campaign message, and to make it resonate well with ordinary Ghanaians, the party also adopted the ‘Hopping Kangaroo Dance’ of the national football team, The Black Stars, and a popular song, ‘Go high’.

The opposition parties followed suit. The two main opposition parties in the 2008 elections, the NDC and the CPP, also adopted the signs that football coaches and fans do at football games when they want a player to be changed: ‘finger-wriggling’ of both hands lifted upwards to indicate a desire to change a player. This was to symbolize and reinforce the two parties’ message of ‘*yeere-sesam*’, which translates in English as ‘We seek change.’ These approaches of ensuring that voters understand clearly what a party wants to communicate, and to identify with that message without alienation, using marketing techniques are credited to the Kufuor-led NPP in 2000, as admitted by the NDC official.

In preparation towards the 2012 elections, the leadership of the NPP continue to better their voter-orientation approach. First, the NPP National Delegates’ Conference approved in August 2011 a constitutional amendment to expand the party’s Electoral College from 2,340 to 115,000 for the selection of presidential and parliamentary candidates, and party officers (*The Statesman*, 23 August 2009; accessed on 02/06/11). According to the right-wing

*Statesman* newspaper, the view amongst the party leadership on the expansion was that ‘greater sampling of a presidential candidate’s popularity is better than a smaller sampling of that popularity’, hence the need to extend the franchise ‘to all the 105, 170 NPP polling station officers across the country’.

The party has also enhanced its grass-roots listening strategy by electing its presidential candidate two years ahead of the 2012 elections, as they did in 2000, with the ambition that the presidential candidate could have enough time to tour almost every corner of the country, meeting ordinary Ghanaians from house to house, listening and talking to them directly and personally (Myjoyonline, 14 July 2011; accessed on 14/07/11). In addition, the party leadership has created a dedicated committee in their campaign team which they call ‘the committee for identifiable groups’, in line with the 2000 approach and mandated to deal with identifiable voting blocs. They have also reformed their centralized campaign structure to what they call a ‘constituency-based campaign structure’ where a 20-man campaign team would be formed in each of the polling stations across the country, with over 400,000 volunteers to be recruited nationwide (*The Statesman*, 09 May 2011; 11 May 2011; accessed on 01/07/11).

These developments are not happening in the NPP alone. It is observed that all the major political parties are also making changes to reflect the new thinking in party and campaign management. For example, the NDC 2008 ‘Better Ghana Agenda’, which also saw a shift in power from the NPP to the NDC after the former’s eight years in government, was largely a ‘house-to-house’ canvassing tactic in which the NDC candidate, Professor John Evans Atta Mills, launched his ‘I Care for You’ campaign; toured and met ordinary Ghanaians directly and personally. This initiative gained a lot of media traction, and the ‘cash-strapped’ NDC

campaign was given a momentous boost, despite the NPP camp's persistent critique as unsustainable (*The Statesman*, 29 May 2007; accessed on 01/07/11).

In the Convention People's Party (CPP), political marketing is being considered for party organization and management towards the 2012 elections. In a news article by the *Ghana News Agency* (GNA) on 8 February 2011, it was reported that the leadership of the CPP had made an explicit call to party members to 'turn to marketing' for the party to win power. According to the report, the CPP head of communications, William Dowokpor, had 'charged [party] members to adopt marketing-oriented approach to organise the party at all levels'. William Dowokpor is reported to have said this at an orientation seminar on the theme: 'Building a Strong CPP Brand Towards Election 2012' organized for newly recruited members of the party's communications team (Accessed on 18/02/11). Although this call by the CPP leadership was significant, it was not the first time the party had considered marketing as a strategy in connecting with voters (Austin, 1961, p. 296; Monfils, 1977, p. 314; Vieta, 1999; Mensah, 2007). Based on these trends, it could be argued that political marketing has come to stay in Ghana, and is set to evolve even deeper, adding to the global phenomenon of managing the business of politics from the marketing perspective.

## **9.5 Conclusion**

This research was aimed at filling the gaps in the existing literature in political marketing and branding, using the NPP's 2000 election campaigns in Ghana. It first established the emergence of political marketing in Ghana, highlighting the various developments that could have influenced the experience of the phenomenon. The thesis discussed that Ghana's experience of the 'new politics' as Scammell calls it, could be seen within the four theories:

Americanization, Globalization, Modernization, and Professionalization that the literature has noted as the possible influences on the spread of political marketing across the globe. To arrive at this conclusion, the chapter analyzed the development of the Ghanaian political system and its related micro-systems such as the media.

As its core research problem, it was noted that there is a convergence in party identity and behaviour amongst the major political parties, especially in Western democracies. This problem of political convergence is as a result of major parties' attempts to occupy the centre ground of the ideological continuum in order to appeal to a broad section of voters. And according to the political marketing literature, market research is at the heart of this market-orientation strategy. This view is discussed extensively in the thesis, drawing comparisons between the party and the commercial firm to demonstrate the differences, similarities, and the lessons that could be drawn to advance the political marketing discourse.

The thesis continued to review the literature on how political parties seek to create difference and identity using political branding concepts. In this regard, concepts such as party-branding, candidate-branding and policy-branding were analyzed. In that review, it was noted that prominence has been given to the last two, candidate and policy brands, on the assumption that increasing the anti-establishment sentiment across modern societies has made people resent loyalty to institutions, such as the party. And that makes the party, as a brand, less influential on voter decisions and increasingly less relevant in competitive political strategies.

This thesis disagrees on this position and attempts to chart a differing view on political brand management where the party brand is key, amongst others. It argues that the party brand, with its inherent attributes, could not be under-estimated. It further argues that it is necessary that parties build and maintain at least three political brands in their portfolio; the party, candidate, and policy brands with which to target different segments of the voter market. In this view is the assumption that each of these political elements, the party, the candidate, and the policy, appeals to different categories of the voter population, hence abandoning one could result in the alienation of a cross-section of its followers. Therefore, a party stands to connect with multiple voter targets with its portfolio of three political brands. Based on this understanding, the thesis introduces the concept of political brand architecture (PBA), which is borrowed from the commercial brand literature. It was discussed in the thesis that in PBA the role of the three brands, as driver, endorser, or descriptor brands, must be determined based on their strengths and weaknesses in relation to their market value.

Another feature of the PBA is the management of these political brands within either the branded house (BA) or house of brands (HB) architecture frameworks. This feature of the PBA theory suggests that it is possible to project into the minds of voters ‘integrated’ or ‘separated’ images of the political brands in a party’s portfolio, given the prevailing political environment. The assumption in this view, as discussed earlier, is that the traditional composition of the party, the candidate, and the policy as three unified entities bonded by a common belief system is not always the case in modern party politics. Hence, there should be another way of organizing these three political elements when the political environment is far from the ideal.

It is also recognized that it is highly unlikely, in most cases, for one to think of a political party without any recognition of its candidate, for example. This seemingly ‘inseparable’ and synergetic character of the political elements should be appreciated for a political brand strategy to have its intended impact. That means presenting to voters a comprehensive political brand that involves the party, the candidate, and the policy in a way that they reinforce one another; compensating for each other’s weaknesses with each other’s strengths, but noting also the relevance of each element to different target groups, and prioritizing them in communication with these groups. This also means committing to them the resources that could facilitate their competitiveness.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1: Profiles of data sources

**Table A1.1 Profile of the in-depth interviewees- Academic Respondents (AR)**

Interviewee code	Profile
<b>AR-1</b>	Is a Senior lecturer at University of Ghana. Has a number of publications on Voter Choice and Electoral Decisions, Ethnicity and Voter Choice, and Electoral Volatility.
<b>AR-2</b>	Is a Senior lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana. He is also a Senior Researcher at one of Ghana's leading think-tanks. His opinion is widely sought on public debate on politics, policy and governance and is widely published in these areas.
<b>AR-3</b>	Is a Professor at the Department of Communication Studies at the University of Ghana. Has a number of publications in media studies and politics.
<b>AR-4</b>	Is a Lecturer and a PhD research student at the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana. Was once an editor reporter for one of the leading private newspapers and has authored a number of publications in media and politics.
<b>AR-5</b>	Is a Senior lecturer at the School of Communication Studies, University of Ghana. Publications include Private Broadcasting in Ghana, Journalism and Ethics, Electoral Coverage in Ghana and Media – Politics relationships.
<b>AR-6</b>	Is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana. A public commentator on issues of governance, party politics and policy and has a number of publications in these areas, including the district assemblies, local governance and local elections, and grassroots participation in general elections.
<b>AR-7</b>	Is a Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Ghana. Has researched and published on social and economic Issues in development, political development, governance and democratization, the social, economic and behavioural dimension of health, and the patterns and impact of scientific communication in Ghana and Africa.

**Table A1.2 Profile of the in-depth interviewees- Political Respondents (PR)**

Interviewee code	Profile
<b>PR-1</b>	Is a lawyer by profession and has been one of the leading figures of the NPP tradition since the 1970s. Has also been a Member of Parliament and a High Commissioner at separate instances.
<b>PR-2</b>	Has held a number of top ranking positions in the NPP party and when the party came to power. Held a ministerial position in the Kufuor government. He is currently a Member of Parliament (MP).
<b>PR-3</b>	Has been one of the leading members of the NPP party, held several party positions as well as ministerial positions when the party was in government.
<b>PR-7</b>	Was previously a Member of Parliament. He has since been a Banker and an Executive Director of one of the public institutions.
<b>PR-4, 5, 6, 8</b>	Local party officials at HO, Takoradi and Kumasi party offices

**Table A1.3 Profile of the in-depth interviewees- Media Respondents (MR)**

Interviewee code	Profile
<b>MR-1</b>	Is a media commentator on politics and policy issues. Is the regional president and national vice president of an interest group of one of the public services. Has engaged in a number of public debates on Ghanaian political and policy issues and is widely sought on a number of published studies, recent of which is on the ongoing constitutional review.
<b>MR-2</b>	Is the managing editor of one of the leading private newspapers and is a member of a leftwing party. He is also one of the many journalists that were arrested and imprisoned by the Rawlings PNDC regime.
<b>MR-3</b>	Is a media commentator and programmes manager of a radio station. Research and Interest includes policy research on human rights, good governance, security and peace building. Has participated in a number of electoral colleges for a number of African countries.
<b>MR-4</b>	Is a news editor at a radio station in the western region of Ghana. Has formerly worked in the offices of the opposition party, NDC
<b>MR-5</b>	Is a news editor at a radio station in the western region of Ghana, and

	teaches at a journalism college.
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**Table A1.4 Profile of selected the Media Titles**


Media Title	Profile
The Daily Graphic newspaper	The Daily Graphic is a state-owned national newspaper. It boasts a circulation of 200,000. The paper operates offices in all the 10 regional capitals and is distributed throughout the country, even in the remote areas as part of its responsibility as a national newspaper. It is by far the most prosperous news organization in Ghana with substantial advertising revenue along with official state subsidies. It claims to follow 'political neutrality' policy but it is perennially accused of bias reporting in favour of incumbent administrations.
The Independent	The Independent's circulation is estimated at 35,000 though the paper may report higher numbers in recent times. According to the freedom forum's report, the Independent was the first of the new private press to come out during the publishing boom in 1987. However, it immediately had political brushes with the Rawlings' military regime and was stopped after three issues. The paper reappeared later in the 1990s when democratic governance was restored. The paper was once again in trouble even in the new dispensation and the Editor, Kabral Blay-Amihere, was arrested and detained overnight by security forces prior to the 2000 elections.
The Statesman	The Statesman is a self confessed follower of the New Patriotic Party. On its official website, the Statesman claims circulation figures of 100,000 copies and proclaims to '...share the liberal philosophies of the Danquah-Busia tradition, where the right of every individual to freedom of expression, conscience, association and economic advancement, irrespective of class, creed, colour, race, religion or ethnicity are encouraged. It shares the concept of property-owning democracy and is committed to the extensive and indiscriminate realisation of that goal...' ( <a href="http://www.thestatesmanonline.com">www.thestatesmanonline.com</a> , accessed on 05/06/2010).
The Chronicle	The Ghanaian Chronicle newspaper is known to have an independent-minded posture with a habitual free will to criticise or praise whichever ideological tradition it chooses. It is perhaps the most widely read private newspaper according to the press, politics and power report. On its website, the paper claims to have played a significant role to the development of democracy in Ghana, especially during the transition from dictatorship to democracy. It claims to be a leader in the crusade for peace and reconciliation among Ghanaians and against corruption, poverty and human abuses. With its status as the most widely read privately owned newspaper, the Chronicle's circulation may surpass the 100, 000 estimates.

**Continuation of Table A1.4 Profile of selected the Media Titles**

Media Title	Profile
Crusading Guide	Published by one of Ghana's ace journalists, Kweku Baako, the Crusading Guide is a leftwing newspaper. The Editor Kweku Baako is a self acclaimed and known supporter of Rawlings first coup. The pair however fell out and Baako became a persistent critic of Rawlings and his NDC party. Furthermore, with the leftwing CPP no longer a political force, and having fell out with the NDCs Rawlings, Baako is known to have developed close ties with the rightwing NPP party.
Ghana Palaver	The Ghanaian Palaver is a staunch defender of the Rawlings' regime and could be seen as the political opposite number of the Statesman. Although there is no information on the 'about us' page of the paper's official website, a glance through its editorials reveals a clear line of anti-NPP rhetoric and ardent defence of the NDC agenda.
Joy FM Online	Myjoyonline.com is the online version of the reputable media organisation operating a number of radio stations in Ghana. The press, politics and power report observes that the independent radio sector is dominated by the Multimedia Company, owners of JOY FM. It owns love FM in Kumasi, Adom FM in Tema (all cities in Ghana) and has a number of associate radio stations across the country for contents. It is perhaps the most well-known private radio station, the report observes, and does better than its competitors in the amount of news its own staff produces. On its official website, the station sees itself as Ghana's leader in news and information delivery, observing that it offers its reading audience with a comprehensive online source for up-to-the-minute news about politics, business, entertainment and other issues.

## Appendix 2: Media Items

Figure A2.1 News text selection diagramme



*Source: Allen Bell (2001, p 68). Model discourse structure for news texts*

## 2.1 Extracts from selected News Report (NR) items

### **Text NR 1: Daily Graphic 11 /08/ 1999.**

#### ***Headline: Kufuor Tours Ga-Mashie***

An eleven-member delegation of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) has toured the Ga Mashie area in Accra, to wish the people well in their preparation towards the celebration of their annual Homowo festival. He urged the chiefs to discard the wrong notion that the NPP is only an Ashanti party adding that "the NPP is a true national party and therefore you should not allow small minded people to deceive you"; party's commitment and respect for traditional rulers

### **Text NR 2: Daily Graphic 28/12/ 1999.**

#### ***Headline: NPP kicks off 2000 campaign***

The New Patriotic Party (NPP) on Monday kicked off its campaign for next year's elections with a call on its stalwarts to intensify the campaign in the Volta Region, the 'Zongo' and the rural communities.

### **Text NR 3 Joy Fm 01/05/2000.**

#### ***Headline: NPP launches 'operation reach the communities.'***

The programme, code-named "Operation Reach the Communities in their Hamlets," is also to enable the party to interact with, educate and sensitise six Ewe and Dangme communities in the area to the political and economic situation prevailing in the country. Mr. Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey, NPP National Campaign Manager, called on the team to debunk the anti-alien and anti-Ewe smear campaign by opponents against the NPP.

### **Text NR 4 Daily Graphic 26 / 05 / 2000**

#### ***Headline: Kufuor did not insult Fantis, NPP***

The Central and Brong Ahafo regional branches of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) have denied that the flagbearer of the party, Mr. J.A. Kufuor, described the Vice-President and flagbearer of the NDC, Professor John Atta Mills, as "a Fanti concert man who does not deserve to go to the castle."

### **Text NR 5 Joy Fm 31/ 05 / 2000**

#### ***Headline: NPP women's chapter challenges First Lady***

The Eastern Regional Women's Chapter of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) has challenged the First Lady, Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings, to make available copies of letters purported to have been written by the NPP calling on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to refuse the request of Ghana government for loans

**Text NR 6 Joy Fm 02 / 06 / 2000**

***Headline: Kufuor in Upper West soliciting votes***

Mr. Kufuor attributed the current economic crises facing the country to lack of foresight on the part of the ruling party in managing the country's resources. He, therefore, urged the electorate to vote for the NPP because it has the right human resources to make the economy buoyant.

**Text NR 7 Daily Graphic 10/ 07 / 2000**

***Headline: NPP to unveil manifesto in August, Kufuor***

The New Patriotic Party (NPP) will unveil its 2000 manifesto in Accra next month, Mr John Agyekum Kufuor, Presidential candidate of the party told a rally in London on Sunday.

**Text NR 8 Ghana Palaver 16/08/2000**

***Headline: Kufuor's Volta Tour Flops... As He turns to the churches for divine miracle***

The much trumpeted Volta Region tour of J.A Kufuor to shore up his dwindling electoral chances has ended in a disaster as he was shunned by the people of the region. So poor was the attendance that Kufuor told his associates to forget about the region and concentrate on other regions. Having been taught a bitter political lesson, Kufuor and his men went to see the Chiefs who as usual reminded him of their neutrality. They however cautioned him to desist from the use of abusive language on the people of the region for the simple reason that they do not give their votes to the NPP

**Text NR 9 Ghana Palaver 18/08/2000**

***Headline: Kufuor for Volta Region***

The flagbearer of the NPP, J.A Kufuor is expected to visit the Volta region tomorrow August 19 and 20 in an attempt to resolve intractable disputes within the regional party which is threatening its virtual collapse in the region. According to our scouts the visit is also to enable him study the grounds as to whether it will be an appropriate place for the party's congress scheduled for September 2, 2000.

**Text NR 10 Daily Graphic 21/ 08 / 2000**

***Headline: Kufuor promises Voltarians fair share of national cake***

Mr John Agyekum Kufuor, flagbearer of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) said on Sunday that his government would give the people of the Volta Region a fair share of the national cake to improve upon their living standards. "Even though the NDC calls the region its 'World Bank' it has insulted their intelligence by neglecting them all this while", he noted. "Volta region has worst roads, poorest educational infrastructure and high unemployment rate, he added. He said his party has men of proven ability to turn the fortunes of the country around for better living standard for the people

**Text NR 11 Daily Graphic 21/ 08 / 2000**

***Headline: Ashantis and Ewes have fraternal ties-Asantehene***

The Asantehene, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, has stated that Ashantis and Ewes are allies whose fraternal ties can be traced to history and has remained so ever since. He therefore asked Ewes to ignore speculations in certain sections of the society that Ashantis have hatred and disaffection for Ewes since such negative impressions would undermine the brotherly links between them. He said the creation of Anloga community in Kumasi is a practical demonstration of the genuine co-operation that the Ashantis have with Ewes and stressed the need for its consolidation for the benefit of future generations.

**Text NR 12 Ghana Palaver 28/08/2000**

***Headline: \$180, 000 Vehicle for Kufuor (Kufuor's campaign vehicle)***

Some individuals suspected to be in league with the US mafia have ordered a special campaign vehicle for the use of Mr. J.A Kufuor the NPP presidential candidate for the December elections. The bullet proof vehicle expected to arrive in Tema is equipped with sophisticated gadgets and is said to provide comfort of the highest order. The specially equipped vehicle is estimated to cost about \$180, 0000, about 1.2 billion cedis. According to suppliers, Kufuor has ordered five more of such vehicles to be brought in January 2001 for his personal use and that of a few close cronies when he assured the suppliers that he would have been in office by then as President of Ghana.

**Text NR 13 Chronicle 11/09/2000**

***Headline: NPP launches manifesto in Ho with roaring prayers***

THE NPP last Saturday rocked Ho with powerful message of hope at the Party's Special Delegates Conference, combining it with a dramatic launching of the party's manifesto with roaring Muslim and Christian prayers and invocation of God's blessings...

**Text NR 14 Ghana Palaver 15/09/2000**

***Headline: NPP Running Mate, A Liability***

Intellectuals in the NPP are fuming with anger over the selection of Alhaji Mahama Aliu as the running mate, describing him as a liability. According to the sources, Aliu stunned the egocentric party men when he struggled to put his sentences together. They lament bitterly about Aliu's weak oral presentations and expressed fears that instead of complimenting the presidential ticket, he has come to make it worse

**Text NR15 The Statesman 17 / 09/ 2000**

***Headline: NDCs 'world bank' is under threat***

The NPPs links with the region dates back to the second republic when the progress part under the leadership of Dr. KA Busia laid most of the infrastructure that the region has today. It is shameful and disgraceful that after 20 years of solid support for the NDC, the Volta region has nothing to show for it. Odoi-Sykes assures the nation that NPP would work for peace, unity and national reconciliation. NPP would not pursue agenda of vengeance, vindictiveness or victimisation

**Text NR17 The Statesman 17/09/2000**

***Headline: Kufuor's unbeatable ticket***

The NPP flagbearer, JAK has described the partnership with his running mate Aliu for December elections as a formidable and unbeatable ticket. Kufuor said he was influenced by Aliu's religious and ethnic background as a Muslim who hails from the north and with strong ties with the Zongo communities in the country. The NPP flagbearer said that the party stands the chance of reaping from Mahama's selection.

**Text NR 18 The Statesman 23/09/2000**

***Headline: Target first round victory***

The main objective of the NPP in the 2000 election campaign is to ensure a first round victory for JAK, says Jake. December 7th is a date of destiny when the people of Ghana will have the chance to heave a sigh of relief from the authoritarian grip of NDC government

**Text NR 19 The Statesman 24/09/2000**

***Headline: Let's back Kufuor***

Victory in December is only the first in a number of battles to save Ghana from the grip of anti-democrats

**Text NR 20 Daily Graphic 28/ 09 / 2000**

***Headline: Ghana's candidates take part in historic debate***

The first-ever forum for Ghanaian presidential candidates attracted a raucous, overflow crowd of 1,400 — and six of the seven candidates — to the Accra International Conference Center auditorium yesterday. Kufuor said in response to a question that the libel law is "a relic of (British) colonialism." calling the free flow of information "critical," he said it is "too much to allow the government to use the criminal libel (law) to gag the press." At the same time, Kufuor said it was imperative that the news media be "responsible."

**Text NR 21 Ghana Palaver 03/10/2000**

***Headline: Vengeance, Kufuor's Creed***

Seeking political vengeance remains J.A Kufuor's creed as espoused when he answered questions at the presidential debate last Wednesday. The presidential candidate sought to create the impression that should his party win power, they will eke old wounds and cause the trial of those perceived to be guilty. A source at the NPP headquarters told our scouts that their flagbearer did not sound conciliatory. He said they have problem with Kufuor's public speech and that he sounds too immature on the subject of reconciliation. By doing so, our candidate has scared away many voters who would have voted for us

**Text NR 22 The Statesman 04 / 10 / 2000**

***Headline: Kufuor shakes the north***

NPP flagbearer JAK has called for the 2 decade try and error policies to come to an end. NPP has the best manifesto and competent management team to restructure the economy, adding ‘Ghanaians will be the best judges of the work the NPP government would do, as compared to the 20 year record of the (P) NDC.’ Kufuor says after two decade of uninterrupted rule of Jerry Rawlings, the (p) NDC have run out of ideas.

**Text NR 23 The Crusading Guide 15/10/ 2000**

***Headline: Busy Sunday for NPP***

In its determination to win election 2000 the New Patriotic Party (NPP) is leaving no stone unturned in its preparation towards the crucial election. Subsequently, the party has embarked upon a series of campaigns and fund raising activities today, being a very busy one for the party. At Dome in the Ga North constituency. Speakers at that rally include Hon. I.C. Quaye, Deputy Minority Chief Whip, Mohammed Quaye, Greater Accra Regional Organizer, Yakubu Al-Hassan Hon Malik, MP for Yendi, Hon. Francis Kwame Nyarko, MP for Kade and Hon. Dante-Afriyie, MP for Atwima Mpoma.

**Text NR 24 Ghana Palaver 20/10/2000**

***Headline: NPP to Lose Yendi Seat...Aliu Mahama's choice unpopular***

The political temperature in Yendi is reported to be so high that if care is not taken there is likely to be breach of the peace there. The township is now divided into two main groups – the NDC and NPP. A perceived stronghold of the NPP, the balance of power is said to be shifting following the nomination of Aliu Mahama as Kufuor's running mate as a result of Mahama's backing of one of the two chieftaincy factions, The Abdulai Gate

**Text NR 25 The Independent 08/11/ 2000**

***Headline: Kufuor Speaks On Aliens Compliance Order***

Addressing the chief and his elders, Mr. Kufuor said that the Aliens Compliance Order of the 1970s is a thing of the past and under no circumstance will a government of the NPP re-introduce it. The NPP, he said, sees all Zongo residents as playing a very important part in shaping the nation's economy and therefore assured them that an NPP government will cooperate with them. Mr. Kufuor said that it is to emphasise on this point that the party selected a running mate who hails from the North who happens to be a Zongo boy

**Text NR 26 Joy Fm 20/11/2000**

***Headline: Opposition leader on reconciliation for Ghana***

Mr John Agyekum Kufuor, flagbearer of the NPP, said on Saturday that a government of the party would promote reconciliation. He said his choice of Alhaji Mahama Aliu, as running mate is a manifestation of NPP's commitment to reconciliation, which is necessary for socio-economic and political development.

**Text NR 27 Joy Fm 20/11/2000.**

***Headline: Opposition leader on reconciliation for Ghana***

Mr John Agyekum Kufuor, flagbearer of the NPP, said on Saturday that a government of the party would promote reconciliation. He said his choice of Alhaji Mahama Aliu, as running mate is a manifestation of NPP's commitment to reconciliation, which is necessary for socio-economic and political development

**Text NR 28 Crusading Guide 26/11/2000**

***Headline: NPP has the Team, new ideas – Kufuor***

NPP has the team and new ideas, programmes to solve the economic problems, says Kufuor. People of this country should aim to make all politicians accountable and neglect all corrupt politicians in the polls. There should be a very big push to free the whole socio-economic system out of the grip of the forces of stagnation

**Text NR 29 Daily Graphic 04/12/2000**

***Headline: Vote NDC out – Kufuor***

"I see the people's power before me. Power that is flowing around the globe, in which people are demanding accountability and change through voting"...Alhaji Mahama Aliu, the running mate, blamed the NDC for the Northern Conflict and said "the government has set tribe against tribe in the country". He said the NPP has new vision for Ghana, which is unity and development.

**Text NR 30 Joy Fm 18/12/2000**

***Headline: NPP will form broad-based govt' -Kufuor***

THE Flagbearer of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), Mr J. A. Kufuor, has reiterated that the party will form a broad-based government if it wins power in the December 28 run-off. It was also to give the platform for the rest of the opposition parties to openly endorse their support for the NPP Flagbearer, Mr Kufuor.

**Text NR 31 Ghana Palaver 21/08/2000**

***Headline: Kufuor's December 8 Superstition and Reality***

In 1996 the political opposition spearheaded by the NPP and their allies in the media made so much noise about the election date. This year, the NPP has already started predicting victory at the polls. Kufuor's confidence is buoyed by the fact that this year's election will be held on his birthday, December 8. Kufuor and his fellow aristocrats....

It also reveals the deep seated disrespect and scorn they have for Muslims. They are only accommodating them for the mere sake of clinching political power. When you sit in Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi to pontificate on human rights and the rule of law whilst the rural dwellers suffer from guinea worm, his vote will automatically go for those who show concern

## 2.2 Extracts from selected Advertisement (AD)

### **Text AD1 Ghana Palaver 30/08/2000**

#### ***Headline: For your judgment. Culled From the NPPs strategy document***

J. A. Kufuor, NPP. Weak in oral presentation in comparison to other likely presidential candidates. He is not well armed with political, social and economic ramifications. Strong points: He is well known countrywide; he has a good physical appearance; he is a fatherly figure and very approachable (this same ads was run several times through the campaign)

### **Text AD2 The Statesman 4/11/2000**

#### ***Headline: J. A Kufuor: for the army and police for national peace and security***

It is preposterous for officers and men to go on peacekeeping mission, risking their lives and the future of their families and return by HIS GRACE only to have their meager savings 'shared' by them and government. My government shall ensure within reason that our officers and men and the police shall be respected, cared for, so that they can play their rightful role in our society

### **Text AD3 The Statesman 11/11/2000**

#### ***Headline: J. A Kufuor: your president for year 2000.***

I respectfully ask all suffering Ghanaians in the urban centres to come together and send emissaries to their hometowns and villages to...

### **Text AD4 The Independent 16/11/2000**

#### ***Headline: JAK for the president in 2000***

Hardworking, a man of integrity, a presidential personality, father of the nation, resolute but calm. JAK, 'the people's choice

### **Text AD5 The Statesman 21/11/2000**

#### ***Headline: JAK to the Nation's rescue.***

Don't waste your vote. There is only one opponent, the most popular opposition presidential candidate. Ghana cries for a new father of the nation.

### **Text AD6 Daily Graphic 23/11/2000**

#### ***Headline: A New Ghana***

A new kind of leadership, An All inclusive government.

### **Text AD7 The Statesman 26/11/2000**

#### ***Headline: JAK For President In 2000***

Mature, experienced, intelligent, honest, hardworking, tested and loved, resolute but calm, listens to advice, a man of integrity, presidential personality...

**Text AD8 Daily Graphic 27/11/2000**

***Headline: J.A Kufuor***

I strongly believe that God (Allah) will use me to deliver his people on December 7

**Text AD9 The Daily Graphic 04/12/2000**

***Headline: Kufuor's message to Ghana's hardworking people***

A political party or leadership that thrives on keeping our nation divided does not deserve your vote. I will therefore work with the leaders of the other parties...

**Text AD10 Daily Graphic 23/12/2000**

***Headline: A Message of Hope***

Reject the mediocre leadership the NDC is offering. Be part of the new dawn of hope. It's time to join the wind of change ...the wind of positive change and hope blowing across Ghana. Positive change will enable you and your family to lead meaningful lives. You must be able to feed, clothe, house and educate yourself and your family and live in dignity in a truly free and just society.

## 2.3 Extracts from selected Advertorials (ADV)

### **Text ADV 1 Daily Graphic 24/11/2000**

#### ***Headline: Your Country needs you.***

NPP would like to thank the many thousands of you who have and continue to support the party in many ways. Ghanaians are poor because of the poor leadership. We want democracy to work and give hope to young people

### **Text ADV 2 Daily Graphic 23/12/2000**

#### ***Headline: The roots of the NPP are deep in the North. NDC falsifies history to deceive the North***

Over the years, the NDC propagandist has blazingly falsified the political history of Ghana by painting the parties in the lineage of opposition to CPP as Akan party. The Volta, North and the two upper regions have a chance to reject the false propaganda of the NDC and join the national mood of change. All the time the UP remained an organisational troika with three main wings being the NPP in the North, Togo congress in the Volta and NLM in Ashanti. By what stretch of imagination can anyone identify a party with such a history as an Akan party.

### **Text ADV 3 Daily Graphic 23/12/2000**

#### ***Headline: Kufuor has a better chance of uniting Ghana***

Kufuor has the moral authority to begin the process of healing old wounds, building new bridges, repairing old damaged structures, exorcising the old evil spirit and expelling the poisoning from our system.

JAK is not one of the radicals from whom one could have been afraid of vengeful leadership.

Gentle and Mild-mannered, his natural disposition is that of a consummate conciliator if there is any leader in Ghana politics today who has the potential to lead the way towards the politics of new millennium, that man is JAK.

### **Text ADV 4 Daily Graphic 23/12/2000**

#### ***Headline: Have you ever thought why the NDC call the Volta region its 'World bank'?***

No matter how they destroy your education and deprive you of your health care, they feel you must vote for them. Because they think they have ensnared you with the illusion that you have no other choice

### **Text ADV 5 Daily Graphic 23/12/2000**

#### ***Headline: Can you imagine the level the NDC will go to deceive the people?***

Can you imagine the level the NDC will go to deceive the people? The propagandist of the NDC will tell you the NPP has historically been an Akan party. The first NPP in Ghana was the Northern People's Party (NPP) led by Tolon Na. It was the principal partner of the

Togoland Congress and the Anlo Youth of the Volta region and the NLM of Ashanti who together formed the United Party

Indeed the NPP today is a historical tribute to the tremendous contribution made by the Northern People's Party to the evolution of democracy in Ghana through the illustrious leaders like Tolon Na, Jatoe Kaleo, Chief Kaboe, Chief J. A. Brimah (Kabachewura). Put an end to the NDC falsehood. The rest of the country has seen through their deceit and the mood for change is now irresistible. The Northern and Upper Regions should be a central part of the process of change. If you miss the message of change on December 7, you can make amends on December 28. Be true to the heritage of Chief Dombo.

Join the national mood for change.

**Text ADV 6 Daily Graphic 27/12/2000**

***Headline: Can you imagine the level the NDC will go to deceive the people?***

The first NPP in Ghana was the Northern People's Party (of the Northern Regions) led by Tolon Na. It was the principal partner of the Togoland Congress and the Anlo Youth of the Volta Region and the NLM of Ashanti Region who together form the United Party' Same as text 2, 4 and 7 above in its attempt to address party image

### **Appendix 3: Examples of Media Items**

Sampled media items presented in this section (page 381 – 390) are littered with ink markings as part of the analysis process; identifying and categorizing texts for analysis. Efforts to replace them proved futile, hence the decision to maintain the marked samples in the thesis.



Is that a problem you have, or an inconvenience

Vol. 10 No. 6 Week ending September 17, 2000

ISSN:0855-1227

Price: ₵1000

# NDC's WORLD BANK UNDER THREAT



Obetsibi Lamptey

## Target: First Round Victory

The main objective of the NPP 2000 election campaign is to ensure a first round victory for J. A. Kufuor, the party flagbearer, says National Campaign Manager, Jake Obetsibi-Lamptey.

Addressing last weekend's emergency delegates' congress of the party at Ho, Obetsibi Lamptey said the NPP also aims to win at least 120 out of the 200 parliamentary seats and where it loses, to minimise the margin of defeat.

Obetsibi-Lamptey said these campaign objectives are not impossible to achieve if adequate protection is provided for the votes. The party, he said, will, therefore, take precautionary measures to check any electoral irregularities at the polls.

He asked the constituencies and polling station executives to continue to be on their guard, in order to expose the NDC's electoral machinations in the run up of the election. He assured the other opposition parties of the NPP's cooperation to put a stop to the rot in the electoral system.

Obetsibi-Lamptey said December 7 is a date of destiny, when the people of Ghana will have the chance to have a sigh of relief from the authoritarian grip of the NDC government.

The people, he said, are fuming and determined to change the destiny of this nation with their electoral power and warned the NDC not to be a stumbling block in their path.

He warned party supporters not to make the mistake of rejoicing over anticipated victory, thereby exposing their flanks and allowing the NDC to steal the votes.

The National Organiser of the Party, Major (ret) Courage

Contd. on back page



Ammu Busia and Naa Morkor Busia conferring at the Congress

By Fortune G. Alimi

The NDC's Volta Region "World Bank" is running out of cash, says James Dogbe, the NPP's Volta Regional Chairman.

Referring to the rousing welcome accorded the NPP at Ho, Dogbe said that the people of the Volta Region are determined to change the political destiny of the region, because they have been deceived by the NDC government for far too long.

Dogbe, who was welcoming delegates to the Party's emergency congress held at the Mawuko Girls Secondary School, described the NPP's triumphant entry into the region as historic. He said it was not only the first time that the Volta Region

hosting was an NPP national delegates' congress, but it would also be the last congress of the NPP in opposition.

He said the NPP's links with the region date back to the Second Republic, when the Progress Party, under the leadership of Dr. K. A. Busia, laid most of the infrastructure that the region has today.

Dogbe said it is shameful and disgraceful that, after 20 years of solid support to the NDC, the Volta Region has nothing to show for it. The roads, he said, are better described as death traps, while schools are near collapse and school children carry their mothers' stools and their fathers' dining tables to write on at school.

Dogbe condemned the breakdown of morality in the country and said this is a dangerous legacy the NDC is bequeathing to the nation. An NPP government, he said, will save Ghana from total moral disaster.

The Volta Regional Chairman estimated that, with the support the party is receiving, the NPP is sure of winning nine parliamentary seats out of the 19 in the region.

Dogbe said that the Volta Region NPP is determined to dismantle the NDC dominance in the region and reduce its "World Bank" status to a branch of a rural bank. He appealed to the party leadership to support the regional branch with enough logistics to make the task easier.

The National Chairman of the Party, Samuel Odoi Sykes, assured the nation that the NPP would work for peace, unity and national reconciliation. When voted into power, he said, the NPP would not pursue an agenda of vengeance, vindictiveness or victimisation. "We shall promote

Contd. on back page



Kufuor and Odoi Sykes raise the hand of Aliu Mahama to introduce him to the crowd at Ho

## Kufuor's unbeatable ticket

The NPP flagbearer, J. A. Kufuor, has described the partnership into his running mate, Alhaji Aliu Mahama, for the December 7 election as a formidable and unbeatable ticket.

Introducing his running mate to the party's Emergency National Delegates Congress at Ho last Saturday, Kufuor

said Alhaji Aliu Mahama has everything it takes to win power.

The NPP, he said, is loaded with competent people who can successfully partner him to win the December elections, but he could select only one of them. His selection of Alhaji Aliu Mahama, he said, was influenced by his

religious and ethnic background, being a Muslim who hails from the North, and with strong ties with the Zongo communities in the country.

The NPP flagbearer said that, the party stands the chance of reaping from Alhaji Mahama's selection and urged the rank and file to

Contd. on back page

### 3.1 News report in the Statesman Newspaper

# The STATESMAN



A heart full of love has no room for envy

Vol. 10 No. 11 Week ending October 22, 2000

ISSN:0855-1227

Price: ₵1000

# KUFUOR SHAKES THE NORTH

## IN THIS ISSUE

Hawa Yakubu makes special appeal - P5

Philippa on the resurrection - P8

PRINPAG and Jerry Rawlings - P12

By Our Roaming Correspondent

**N**PP flagbearer J.A. Kufuor, has called for an end to the two decades of trial and error policies of the NDC government that has brought untold hardships to the people. "The NDC government has hit the dead end of the road. They have nothing more to offer the nation and the only remedy to save Ghana from economic disaster is to vote for the NPP in the December election," he told thousands of cheering supporters at Salaga in the Northern Region at the weekend.

He said the NPP has the best manifesto and competent management team to restructure the economy adding, "Ghanaians will be the best judges of the work the NPP government would do, as compared with the 20-year record of the (P)NDC."

Kufuor said after two decades of uninterrupted rule Jerry Rawlings, and the (P)NDC have run out of ideas and the people now have the best opportunity to reject his government through the ballot box in December.


Alhaji Musa Bamba, MP for Wenchi East, told the cheering crowd that the NPP is praying for a peaceful election but "we will not allow the NDC to intimidate us." He called on supporters of the party to be vigilant at the polling stations, because that is where "elections can be won or lost."

Kufuor, had earlier paid a courtesy call on the Kpembe Wura Kabasili I, Paramount Chief of Kpembe, who prayed for God's



Odoi Sykes

SSNIT Cont'd. on back page



Kufuor exchanging greetings with the Wulensi Naa, Alhaji Salifu Wumbei when he paid a courtesy call at his palace

## Cape Coast CPP office vandalised

The Convention Peoples Party has condemned acts of thuggery and vandalism by a gang of NDC members who stormed the CPP office at Amanful, Cape Coast last Sunday posing as CPP supporters.

A statement from the CPP head office in Accra says the bandits seized CPP banners, flags and other materials that had been prepared for a health promotion procession in Cape Coast. They heckled the CPP organiser at the office and destroyed election materials. They then stormed out of the office onto the Savoy Road and unfurled an NDC flag, amidst jubilation and singing.

The CPP says the acts of vandalism clearly indicate the extent to which the NDC would go in their desperation to hang on to power, after 20 years of mismanagement of national affairs. It warned all those who intend to disrupt their campaign that the party would use every lawful means at their disposal, including force in self-defence, to stop these acts of vandalism and mayhem.

It appealed to the National Electoral Commission and the law enforcement agencies to take swift action to forestall political disorder and restore normalcy in the campaigns.

## SSNIT needs public inquiry — NPP

**By Fortune G. Alimi**  
The NPP has called for a commission of enquiry into the allegations of reckless dissipation of the funds of the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT).

Addressing a press conference in Accra yesterday, NPP National Chairman, Samuel Odoi-Sykes,

said a public commission of enquiry, as against an investigation by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), would set the records straight and restore the confidence of contributors in the pension scheme.

The NPP, he said agrees with the Trust that the affairs and the investments of SSNIT should be

approached in an impartial, holistic and non-politicised manner. He believes that a commission of enquiry appointed under the terms of Article 280 of the Constitution would satisfy the concerns of an anxious public and protect SSNIT from "trial by the media," he said.

The allegations of financial

recklessness against SSNIT were first published by The Statesman of Friday, January 21, and have been followed up by other media.


Flanked by Anna Busia, First Vice-Chairperson, Nana Akufo-Addo, MP for Abuakwa, Dr Koti Kouadu Apraku, MP for Offinso North, Kwamena

Bartels, MP for Ablekuma North, Gladys Asmah, MP for Takoradi, Jake Obetsebi-Lamprey, National Campaign Manager and Obaa Yaa Afrifa, Leader of the Women's Wing, Odoi-Sykes said a commission of enquiry would be preferable because its proceedings would be in public and

SSNIT Cont'd. on back page

3.2 News report in the Statesman Newspaper

NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY




N.P.P. DEVELOPMENT IN FREEDOM

# J.A. KUFUOR

## for PRESIDENT year 2001

- ▷ HARDWORKING
- ▷ MATURE
- ▷ EXPERIENCED
- ▷ TESTED AND LOVED
- ▷ INTELLIGENT
- ▷ RESOLUTE BUT CALM
- ▷ LISTENS TO ADVICE
- ▷ RESPECTFUL
- ▷ HONEST - A MAN OF INTEGRITY
- ▷ PRESIDENTIAL PERSONALITY
- ▷ THE FATHER OF THE NATION



*Per family*

### Vote massively for

## J.A. KUFUOR as PRESIDENT

**J.A. KUFUOR - THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE**

3.3 Advertisement in the Statesman Newspaper



• Mrs Justice Bamford Addo — Presided

• Philip Apaloo — Plaintiff

# Court clears the air THUMBPRINT, PHOTO ID'S ELIGIBLE

## For December 7 General elections

**Mensah**  
Court, in a unanimous decision, yesterday ruled that thumbprint (photo and thumbprint-IDs) must be accepted for the conduct of the presidential and parlia-

mentally scrutinise the identity of holders of thumbprint cards before they vote as enshrined in section 19 of the Constitutional Instrument (CI 15).

The five-member panel, comprising Mrs Justice Joyce Bamford-Addo (presiding), Mr Justice A. K. B. Ampiah, Mr Justice F. Y. Kpegah, Mr Justice W. A. Atugubah and Mr Justice George Lamptey, indicated that it will give its reasons on January 17, 2001.

A resident of Accra, Mr Philip Kwaku Apaloo, filed a writ at the court to seek relief as to whether or not a photo ID card should

Electoral Commission officials of the polling stations had been instructed to accept photo ID cards and crit-

### Officials recall Akweyey

... wrongdoing.  
... of the directive to the Health Minister was made available to the *Graphic*, also indicating other recommendations of the SFO and whether they have been endorsed by government and whether they should, therefore, see to their prompt implementation and a feedback given to the Office of the President at every stage of the implementa-

*Graphic* last year published an investigation by this writer on supply malpractices and unethical trade practices at the KBTH in Accra. The chemist, a main supplier to the hospital, was being at the centre of the scandal. The chemist was subsequently blacklisted and stopped doing business with the hospital. The purchasing committee of the hospital...

Continued on P. 3

be the only acceptable procedure for voting in the December 7 elections.

In his submissions, Mr Norbert Kudjawu, leading counsel for Mr Apaloo said his client alleged that the act of the EC in abrogating the thumbprint ID cards was contrary to the provisions of the 1992 Constitution.

He said the procedure of the conduct of any election in the country is enshrined in the Constitutional Instrument (CI 15), adding that any other regulations that sought to give directives to the conduct of the elections should fall under the CI.

Mr Kudjawu sub-  
Continued on P. 3

**NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY**  
  
 MOTTO: DEVELOPMENT IN FREEDOM  
**J.A. KUFUOR**  
 "I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT GOD (ALLAH) WILL USE ME TO DELIVER HIS PEOPLE ON DECEMBER 7, 2000"  
**VOTE NPP**  
**VOTE FOR POSITIVE CHANGE**

*Kufuor's mission is seen as the work of God!*

*Kufuor is portrayed as a savior.*

3.4 Advertisement in the Daily Graphic Newspaper (bottom right)

# A MESSAGE OF HOPE

Dear Fellow Ghanaian,

*the people as NDC*

*plays down on the advantage of NDC in security issues*

The peaceful conduct of the first round of voting amidst prayers by peaceful law abiding Ghanaians shows that the "Peace and stability" Ghana is enjoying has been brought about only by God's will and the determination of ordinary Ghanaians to ensure that peace thrives.

Congratulations and God's blessing to all Ghanaians.



Indeed peace will continue to reign in Ghana after the (P)NDC leaves office. Almighty God will ensure that our Ghana remains peaceful.

*invitation*

It is time to join the wind of change..... the wind of positive change and hope blowing across Ghana.

Leave a life of debt, despair and deprivation behind.

Positive change will enable you and your family to lead meaningful lives. You must be able to feed, clothe, house and educate yourself and your family and live in dignity in a truly free and just society.

Are you happy with life? Think carefully about your future.

Pray over this.

Reject the mediocre leadership the NDC is offering.

Be part of the New Dawn of Hope!!! Reject a life of poverty.

Vote J.A. Kufour as President for a meaningful change to your life.

*the outside tend to play down on what is perceived to be the strength of NDC - National Security and invites people to join NDC using the perceived benefits.*

Vote N.P.P. on 28th December 2000

Vote J. A. Kufour for positive change

Sponsored by a group of

**CONCERNED GHANAIS**

*it exploits people sensitive - fear, aspirations and offer rewards using religion etc.*

### 3.5 Advertisement in the Daily Graphic Newspaper

*Done*

# J. A. KUFUOR TO THE NATION'S RESCUE



**V  
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Y**

*Portrayed to smaller party vote*

**DON'T WASTE YOUR VOTE**

**THERE IS ONLY ONE OPPONENT**

**DON'T ALLOW THE OPPONENT TO PENETRATE  
VOTE FOR THE MOST POPULAR OPPOSITION  
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE**

**VOTE FOR J. A. KUFUOR**


**{ GHANA CRIES FOR A NEW  
FATHER OF THE NATION }**

*Portrayed NPP as the most popular party with the use of words such as 'Don't waste your vote!', 'Vote for the most popular opposition Presidential Candidate'.*

3.6 Advertisement in the Independent Newspaper

# J.A. KUFUOR

**FOR THE ARMY & POLICE  
FOR NATIONAL PEACE & SECURITY**



*Targeting Armed forces & Police. n.p.p. favors Govt for Armed forces*

The officers and men of the Ghana Armed Forces and the Police have to be given incentives to enable them to effectively protect our lives and property.

It is preposterous for officers and men to go on peacekeeping missions, risking their lives and the future of their families, and return by HIS GRACE only to have their meagre savings "shared" by them and government. My government shall ensure within reason that our officers and men and the police shall be respected, cared for, so that they can play their rightful role in our society.

**J.A. KUFUOR - HE CARES!  
J.A. KUFUOR - PRESIDENT 2001**

**Kukrudu - Still Eeshi!!!**

3.7 Advertisement in the Daily Graphic Newspaper

## arers, running mates

the country are to appear on November 15, to see justice and tranquillity in the December 7 elections. The office of the Okyere is unprecedented in the country that peace and order during and after the election of the chiefs who will participate in the National House of Chiefs. Imoru, Nandom, Na;

Nana Kwadwo Nyarko III, Pranghene; Nana Atta Amanafu Poku, Bremen Essiamhene; and Oseadeeyo Addo Dankwa, Okuapchene.

Others are Nene Klagbodjor Animle, Osudoku Mantse; Naaba J. S. Nabila; Wulugu Naba; Pe Charles Awampaga; Paga-Na Bariamini Sandu, Kule-Na; and Nana Aburam Akpundji, Buemhene. The rest are Odencho Gyapong Ababio and the Okyerehene Osagyefuo Amoatia Ofori Panin.

The release also said the presidential candidates of all the registered political parties in the country, together with their running mates, and members of the diplomatic corps are expected to participate.

now he proposed by supporters of all political parties.

It said the directives reminded the IGP of his statutory responsibility to maintain law and order as well as ensure the individual security of all law abiding citizens.

"As Inspector-General of Police, you will take personal responsibility for any inaction on the part of the police and in consequence, you may be called upon to relinquish the position" the directive stated.

According to the statement, the President, however, expressed the expectation that the IGP will live up to the challenge.

# DC, NPP LASH AT LAJO

## ht sustain injuries

people sustained various injuries when supporters of the Democratic Congress Party (DC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) clashed in the suburb of Accra, last Sunday.

Those who were said to be receiving medical attention at the time the *Graphic* visited were NDC supporters. At the Constituency office of the DC, no one was available for comment.

At the NPP office, no comment has been made, but armed men were seen patrolling the area. On the issue, both sides refused to give details of the clash with the explanation that they would organise press conferences later in the day to brief the public.

A member of the NDC, however, hinted that a political argument between supporters of the two parties in a house just behind that of Sheikh I. C. Quaye, the NPP MP for the Ayawaso Central Constituency, degenerated into a free-for-all fight.

He claimed the NPP members had the upper hand and chased the NDC supporters to their constituency office where they beat up the people there and destroyed valuable office equipment.

An NPP official, on the other hand, refuted that allegation and alleged that it was rather the NDC

• Continued on P. 3

## at scoreboards in regional capitals

He said EC regional offices are linked to the 'Operation Room' at the Headquarters in Accra, by telephone, radio and fax machines to facilitate the transmission of results as soon as they are received from the constituencies.

As usual, political party officials will be allowed in the operation room to observe the transmission from the regions," he said.

All district capitals without communication links have also been provided with facilities for transmission to the regional capitals for onward transmission to Accra.

Mr Arhin said as soon as the District Electoral Officer

• Continued on P. 3

NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY  
 MOTTO: DEVELOPMENT IN FREEDOM  
 J.A. KUFUOR  
 A NEW GHANA  
 A NEW KIND OF LEADERSHIP  
 AN ALL INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT  
 VOTE NPP  
 VOTE FOR POSITIVE CHANGE

*Handwritten notes:*  
 Kufuor  
 with a  
 white  
 shirt  
 and  
 tie

3.8 Advertisement in the Daily Graphic Newspaper (bottom right)

Advertiser's Announcement  
**Asee**  
**Ho**  
**Nkomode**

ADVERTORIAL

This is a special page intended to educate and encourage Ghanaians to vote for **CHANGE** on December 28. It is prepared and sponsored by the Citizens Committee for Democratic Change.

NDC falsifies history to deceive North

# ROOTS OF NPP ARE DEEPLY IN NORTH

To Region North / v.m.

Over the past years, NDC propagandists have brazenly falsified the political history of Ghana by painting the parties in the lineage of the opposition to the CPP as Akan parties. By this ploy, as they have succeeded in hoodwinking some otherwise well-meaning citizens in some regions to place themselves at odds with the nation mood for change.

This has been a major factor in helping the NDC regime sustain the Volta Region as its electoral World Bank and it has also taken its toll on the three Northern and Upper regions in the December 7 presidential and

parliamentary elections. The undertones of ethnicity if obviously tragic but what is surprising is that it has been sustained in spite of the fact that the fundamental premise on which it is based is completely false.

In a recent article in the Daily Graphic an obvious NDC propagandist listed the leaders of the parties from which the NPP draws its lineage as Dr J. B. Dinguah, Dr K.A. Busiah, Victor Owusu, Adu Boahen and J.A. Kufuor, all Akan, and he drew from this the conclusion that the NPP was an Akan party from whose leadership others were excluded.

A more blatant distortion of the history of the so-called "opposition parties" cannot be imagined and the tragedy is that the NDC's own Vice Chairman and propaganda guru Prof. Kofi Awoonor is the author of a book on the political history of Ghana, entitled *GHANA: A Political History* which shows clear that far from being an Akan party, the opposition had always been a coalition of powerful regionally-based parties.

Indeed, such is their need to falsify history that they have completely written out of Ghana's political history, that distinguished chief from the North, Chief S.D. Dombó, who took over as leader of the United Party and Leader of the Opposition after Dr Busia went into exile.

Chief Dombó led the opposition until Ghana became a one-party state. He is thus the first Northerner to lead a national party and the United Party, from which the NPP derives its lineage, is therefore the first national party to be led by a Northerner. It should be noted that men like Joe Appiah, Victor Owusu, all served happily and faithfully under Chief Dombó.

The extent of the falsification is better understood by briefly examining the facts relating to the formation of the so-called opposition political parties.

In contrast to the CPP which began as a national political party from birth, the opposition parties were alliances or coalitions of regionally-based "parties" and at all times, the three regions where the opposition parties were strongest were the North (which at the time included the two Upper Regions of today), Volta and Ashanti.

In fact, the NPP of today may well have been intended by its founders as a route to the first political party to bear the NPP name, the Northern Peoples Party which was by far the strongest group within the opposition in the North.

The NPP was led by Tolon Na and brought into national politics such eminent persons as Chief Dombó, Chief J.A. Birmah (Kabachewura), Jatoe Kalao, Chief Bayifa Karboe, and included Mr. J. H. Alhassani and Mr. Munnah Bawumia, the present chairman of the Council of State who were later to cross over to the CPP.

Aside from the North, the strongest opposition group was in the Volta Region where S.G. Anlo, Koko Ayako, Siodosto Apoko, were the dominant forces within the Togoland and Anlo Youth Congresses.

And the formation of the National or New Movement in Ashanti, they were joined by the NPP and the Togo Congress and Anlo Youth to form the United Party with Dr Busia as leader and Chief Dombó as deputy. Appropriately, Chief Dombó took over as leader when Dr Busia went into exile.

At all times, the UP remained an organisational trike with the three main wings being the NPP in the North, Togo Congress in the Volta and the NLM in Ashanti.

By what stretch of imagination can anyone identify a party with such history as an Akan party? And yet this is the negative propaganda that has been waged against the NPP because it traces its political lineage to the United Party.

It is to be hoped that the truth will now prevail and the young patriots of the Volta, Northern and Upper Regions who have fallen for the obvious propaganda will reappraise their views.

What is more important, however, is the fact that all the parties opposed to the NDC have come together to save the country from the mismanagement of the NDC and give Ghana a new leadership.

The CPP, the PNC, the Reform Party, the GCPP and the UGM have all committed themselves to support the PNP's J.A. Kufuor in the run off against the NDC's Vice President Atta Mills.

The Volta, North and the two Upper Regions have a chance to reject the false propaganda of the NDC and join the National Mood for Change.



Mr J. A. Kufuor



HAVE YOU EVER THOUGHT WHY THE NDC CALL THE VOLTA REGION WORLD BANK?

Because they take the Region for granted. Just as they take Ghana's Rural Communities for granted. No matter how they neglect you. No matter how impoverished they make you. No matter how they destroy your education and deprive you of health-care. They feel you must VOTE for them. Because they think they have ensnared you with the illusion that you have no other choice.

### NOW YOU KNOW THE REALITY

The majority of the people of Ghana have broken free. They have shown that there is a choice — a rational, Positive Choice. And they have voted for Change. The NPP is now the majority party in the next parliament. And the rest of our political parties are committed to support J A KUFUOR to bring an end to the discredited regime of NDC.

If you missed the message on December 7, you can make amends on December 28.

The Volta Region has been taken for granted too long. Its time to say thus far and no further. Remember it took Hon Kwamena Bartels, NPP MP to expose the Scandal of the Keta Sea Defence wall before they rushed to find a face-saving new contract. We are still waiting to find out what happened to the money blown in the original contract.

DO NOT ISOLATE YOURSELF FROM THE NATIONAL MOOD FOR CHANGE.

Vote J A KUFUOR on December 28.

Aseε  
Hɔ  
kɔmodε

This is a special page intended to educate and encourage Ghanaians to vote for CHANGE on December 28. It is prepared and sponsored by the Citizens Committee for Democratic Change.



# KUFUOR HAS BETTER CHANCE OF UNITING GHANA

Although the December 7 elections did not provide the clear-cut answers which political pundits would have expected, it did give a sufficiently clear picture of the national mood such as would offer guidance to those who may still be undecided about the Presidential run-off on December 28.

The unadulterated picture which emerged is that of a National yearning for a change of government, specifically for the rejection of the ruling NDC. It showed that the people do not accept a back-pass from President Rawlings to vice-president Atta Mills as adequate and seek instead, that power be passed on to a completely new administration.

The NDC, which had enjoyed a near two-thirds majority in the 200-member parliament, lost as many as 45 seats to end up as the minority party in the next legislature. The NPP did not lose a single seat but gained 42 new seats, finishing as the majority party with 99 of the 199 contested seats. (There is still one seat up for election next month which could give the NPP one extra seat to give them exactly half of the seats in the house.)

Crucially, this gives Ghana a hung parliament, which is not the ideal situation for any government in any circumstance. It has set off a host of spurious arguments, and the NDC propagandists have been quick to plead for a deal by which the people will allow them to retain the executive having rejected them in the legislature. 'You have given Parliament to the NPP. Now give us the Presidency' is the new plea of the NDC.

This is no more than an attempt to con the people. There is nothing but mayhem in a conscious division between the executive and legislative authorities. When a people say they want change, what they mean in reality is a change of the executive and it is spurious to ask them to be content with a change of the majority party in the legislature.

Vice President Atta Mills is already out there assuring the nation that he will have no difficulty working with the legislature even though his party is the minority party. He has the examples of the United States, France where there have been many instances of presidents working with legislatures controlled by opposing parties.

This is where Ghanaians have to be careful not to be misled.

Ours is a young democracy. It is now taking roots and needs to be tended carefully. To subject it, at this stage, to the ultimate strains and stresses which a country like the United States can withstand is to be guilty of dangerous complacency. The important question voters

have to ask themselves is given the make-up of the legislature, which of the two leaders has the better chance of mobilising legislative support for his programmes. This is an important question because although the president will have to encourage a large measure of bi-partisanship, democratic reality requires him to be able to muster some working majority when the chips are down.

Mr Kufuor already has 99 seats and may well extend this to 100. He now has the support of both the PNC with three seats, and the CPP with one. Assuming he is able to sustain the spirit of co-operation with the two parties, he must have a far better prospect of mustering a majority, albeit a slim.

No such prospect exists for Atta Mills.

Which takes us to the concerns expressed by many people for the cultivation of a spirit of bi-partisanship in our politics. Important and necessary as this may be, it will be hardly meaningful if it becomes just a legislative numbers game.

The new spirit we need should evolve and permeate through all levels of Ghanaian politics. It should take us away from the viciousness, injustice, and arbitrariness that have marred political relationships lately.

It is our considered view that this is one of the most fertile reasons why Ghana's President cannot be the NDC. The NDC's predecessor, PNDC, was responsible for the injection of the poison that has afflicted Ghanaian politics over the past

two decades. The arbitrariness and sheer vindictiveness, the persecution of political rivals and dissenting journalists, the politicisation of wealth creation, the unashamed manipulation of the judiciary—these are the legacies of the regime that have completely undermined public confidence in the political system. With this background, no one from the NDC is going to have the credibility to inspire a new spirit of bi-partisanship in politics. Indeed, the fact that their present leader spurned all advice to begin a process of genuine reconciliation in his last year in office underscores the point that the NDC cannot lead the way towards the new spirit of bi-partisan politics.

That task requires a new man from a new party. It is only a new President from a new party who will be invested with the moral authority to begin the process healing old wounds, building new bridges, repairing old damaged structures, exorcising the old evil spirits and expelling the poison from our system.

It is Ghana's good fortune that the NPP leader who is today's front runner for the Presidency is John Agyekum.

JA is not one of the radicals from whom one would have been afraid of vengeful leadership. Gentle and mild-mannered, his natural disposition is that of the consummate conciliator. If there is any leader in Ghanaian politics today who has the potential to lead the way towards the politics of the new millennium, that man is J A Kufuor.

audience:  
Togehij Undecideds.  
Phrase like:  
healy old wounds,  
Buildij new bridges,  
Kufuor  
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Mr J. A. Kufuor

THOUGHT WHY  
VOLTA REGION  
ANY?

Make the Region for granted. Just as the Rural Communities for granted. They neglect you. No matter how they make you. No matter how they educate and deprive you of health. You must VOTE for them. Because they have ensnared you with the illusion of another choice.

### YOU KNOW THE REALITY

The people of Ghana have broken the illusion that there is a choice — a free choice. And they have voted for the NPP as now the majority party in the Parliament. And the rest of our political parties support J A KUFUOR to bring an unadulterated regime of NDC.

In a message on December 7, you can see the reality.

There has been taken for granted too long this far and no further. Remember the Gambia, NPP MP to expose the Keta Sea Defence wall before the incoming new contract. We are looking at what happened to the original contract.

PROTECT YOURSELF FROM THE NATIONAL MOOD FOR CHANGE.

Support KUFUOR on December 28.



3.10 Advertorial in the Daily Graphic Newspaper