

PhD IN POLITICS
UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD

**THE PERSONAL SIDE OF POLITICS: A STUDY OF BASIC HUMAN
VALUES IN THE UK PARLIAMENT**

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ABSTRACT

This doctoral thesis examines the personalities of national politicians and is the first of its kind to apply the socio-psychological model of Basic Human Values (Schwartz, 1994) to Members of the UK Parliament. In doing so this thesis departs from the dominant traditions of Historical Institutionalism and, more recently, interpretivism in UK parliamentary studies. Interdisciplinary insights and methods from political psychology are combined to examine a number of important questions and findings relevant to wider pools of literature on anti-politics, political behaviour and representation. Specifically, I investigate 'who' enters elite politics, 'how' they behave in elected office, and 'why' public perceptions of politicians' psychological characteristics might be inaccurate. To answer these questions, I collect and analyse original survey data on the basic values, ideologies, attitudes and demographics of a sample of 106 Members of Parliament (MPs). These surveys are supported by in-depth semi-structured interviews. Firstly, these data are analysed alongside comparative data on the public from the 7th round of the European Social Survey to reveal a process of psychological self-selection to elite politics in the UK. In demonstrating that certain citizens with particular value profiles are more likely to enter elected office, these results make an original contribution to prior research into political ambition and recruitment. Secondly, I build a theoretically-driven model of parliamentary behaviour and test it empirically to show that MPs' basic values impact significantly upon legislative behaviours as diverse as voting, asking written questions, and signing Early Day Motions. Thirdly, the results of a conjoint experiment with a large sample of the British public are presented to assess the relative importance of various attitudinal and demographic variables, alongside basic values, for voters' ideal-type politicians. Compared with self-report data on UK MPs, this conjoint experiment reveals a 'perception gap' whereby citizens get MPs with the psychological characteristics they desire but do not perceive this congruence.

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Executive Summary

This doctoral thesis examines the personalities of national politicians and is the first of its kind in the UK to apply the socio-psychological model of Basic Human Values (Schwartz, 1994). This interdisciplinary study combines a range of quantitative and qualitative methods in a complementary fashion to examine the effect of basic values on elite UK politics and in doing so draws conclusions of comparative significance. Departing from the dominant traditions of historical institutionalism and more recently interpretivism, this thesis advances an original and rigorous approach to parliamentary studies. It raises a number of important questions and findings relevant to wider pools of literature on anti-politics, political behaviour and representation, whilst also going beyond previous psychological assessments of political elites done ‘at-a-distance’. The thesis is structured around three corresponding research questions:

RQ1: Who enters elite politics and how are they different to the general public?

Gathering survey data on the basic values, ideologies, attitudes and demographics of 106 Members of Parliament, supported by 17 semi-structured interviews, this thesis offers a unique analysis of parliamentarians in the UK. Academic and journalistic commentary on politicians and the political class has in recent years focused overwhelmingly on careerist attitudes, self-serving behaviour and greed. These are, ultimately, characteristics that are psychological in nature and I apply innovative methodological tools to assess not only their validity but also to link cause with effect and to discriminate between individuals at different levels of governance or with different occupational or cultural backgrounds. Data on the basic values of the British public, mined from the 7th round of the European Social Survey, are also used to identify distinct differences in basic values between those who choose a political career and those they govern. In particular, I find:

a) basic values are associated with self-selection in elite politics more so than socio-demographic factors and political opportunity structures. MPs are psychologically unique by comparison to those they govern;

b) politicians are not an homogenous group and actually differ in their basic values according to gender, age, education and partisanship. However, these differences are still smaller than those between MPs and their corresponding socioeconomic and demographic groups in the general population; and

c) congruence between the basic values of political elites and voters occurs to a much greater extent on the Right of British politics than on the Left.

RQ2: What, if any, is the impact and importance of basic values upon MPs' behaviour once they are elected to Parliament?

At the heart of imaginative and effective political science is a desire to comprehend the 'why' behind political behaviours and decision-making. Engaging critically with a rich history of political science research on political behaviours and institutions, I build an Integrated Model of Parliamentary Political Behaviour (IMPPB). The IMPPB offers an original blueprint by which political scientists may understand how cognitive processes based on basic values interact with the institutional fabric of Westminster, the effect of party political socialisation and organisation, and the mediating role of ideology. Using data collected for RQ1 and parliamentary records held by the Hansard Society, the IMPPB is tested using a series of quantitative analyses that demonstrate personality characteristics such as basic values can, in and of themselves, have a significant impact on the daily political behaviour of our elected politicians. In particular, I find:

a) MPs' basic values are significantly related to legislative activities as diverse as voting, asking written questions, joining a select committee, and signing Early Day Motions (EDMs);

b) these effects vary according to the institutional constraints exerted internally by party organisations, and externally by a range of role alters such as the media and voters; and

c) MPs' basic values exert a strong organising effect (direct and indirect) upon their attitudes towards representational focus.

RQ3: How big is the gap between voters' preferences about the personal characteristics of MPs and reality?

In spite of growing empirical weight behind the claim that public disengagement rests to a large extent on evaluations of politicians and their behaviour, politicians - as the subject of empirical research - have been largely conspicuous by their absence from the academic

debate about democratic renewal and anti-politics in the UK. Developing the insights of a burgeoning research base on the personalisation of politics, I develop and conduct a unique conjoint survey with 1637 members of the British public. This experimental survey design assesses the relative importance of various attitudinal and demographic variables, alongside basic values, for voters' ideal-type politicians. Compared with data collected on MPs for RQ1, these results are used to bridge the 'gap' and 'trap' accounts of political disengagement and offer a closer examination of the gulf between personality as perception and functioning in modern UK politics. In particular, I find:

- a) the basic values of parliamentary candidates have a greater effect on public voting habits than physical attributes such as age, gender or ethnicity and socio-economic attributes such as schooling and occupation;
- b) meaningful differences exist between the ideal candidates chosen by the British public according to voters' gender, age, social grade, partisanship, and vote choice in the 2016 referendum to leave the European Union; and
- c) there is a high degree of convergence between the basic values of elected MPs and those of the ideal candidates chosen by the British public.

The conceptual and empirical contributions of this thesis are spread across five sections and eleven chapters.¹ Chapter 1 provides a critical review of the parliamentary studies literature in the UK in order to position this thesis within the existing intellectual terrain. Chapter 1 highlights the theoretical flaws of paradigms in this body of literature, particularly the Westminster Model and historical institutionalism, which elide the daily experiences of political actors and their contribution to systemic and procedural change. It then exposes the methodological weaknesses of sociological and interpretivist approaches to the study of Parliament that have, in recent years, given attention to individual agents as a unit of analysis. Having opened a significant gap in this research base, I propose an original, interdisciplinary approach to parliamentary studies in the UK that systematically unites the intellectual and conceptual strength of psychology and political science. It is in this context that chapter 2 then reviews existing psychological studies of political elites around the world and introduces the theory of Basic Human Values (BHV). In doing so, chapter 2 provides a critical exploration of BHV as both a theory and an empirically tested set of concepts. This


¹ This thesis is purposefully ambitious in its aims and objectives. To assist the reader in navigating the scale and flow of the thesis, the outline is provided visually in the form of a flow diagram in Figure 0.1.

discussion thus clarifies the epistemological assumptions and methodological framework underpinning the specific research questions and empirical analysis presented in the rest of the thesis.

Chapter 3 focuses on the first of three research questions outlined above. It identifies significant gaps in the existing research base that pertain to psychological assumptions about the self-selection of politicians, the professionalisation of politics, the demographic homogeneity of Parliament, and the potential 'elitism' of MPs. These are issues that have for some time underpinned questions about 'who' enters national politics, 'why' they enter, and 'how' they differ in their motivations from those they represent. Chapter 4 moves to research question 2 and provides a rigorous review of extant research into the behaviour of political elites. Synthesising the conceptual wisdom and empirical findings of existing research into the UK Parliament with the theoretical foundations of psychological studies, this chapter presents an Integrated Model for Parliamentary Political Behaviour (IMPPB). The IMPPB is built through careful dissection of research on ideology, party socialisation and institutional choice. It is used in this chapter to offer specific hypotheses about the role of the individual MP - and more precisely their basic values - upon a number of over- and under-studied legislative behaviours. Focusing on broader issues of representation in the UK and beyond, chapter 5 then addresses research question 3 through critical engagement with literatures on anti-politics, trust and the personalisation of politics. In doing so it develops a compelling explanation of popular alienation from formal politics and rising cynicism in political institutions, and thus provides a conceptual base for later analysis of an original conjoint survey. Throughout chapters 3-5, theoretically informed hypotheses are developed for empirical testing.

Chapter 6 explains the methods used to operationalise the research agenda and hypotheses developed in chapters 1-5. It describes the process of data collection with UK Members of Parliament (MPs), including sampling, participant recruitment and survey design; it defends a shortened version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) used to collect data on BHV; it outlines the semi-structured interviews conducted with political elites to complement quantitative analysis; it provides a stepped explanation of the conjoint survey conducted with the public to evaluate the importance of BHV for voter perceptions of MPs; and it gives an overview of the statistical analysis of the data.

Figure 0.1 A visual flow diagram of this thesis by section, chapter and chapter foci.



The results of the thesis are then presented and analysed in four substantive chapters (7-10). Chapter 7 analyses unique data from UK MPs alongside comparative data from the European Social Survey to reveal how elected representatives differ from one another as well as their electors in terms of their trans-situational goals and motivations (i.e. BHV). Chapter 8 builds on these findings to illustrate that MPs are not only extraordinary in the trans-situational goals and motivations that they bring to the job of politics, but that this psychological disjuncture is wider still between MPs and a range of corresponding socio-demographic sub-groups in the UK population. Chapter 8 also reveals the psychological affinities of partisans on the Left and Right, and explores varying degrees of congruency between elites and voters on each side of British politics.

Applying the theoretical premise of the IMPPB, chapter 9 advances the academic understanding of both BHV – as active elements in elite politics – and of parliamentary political behaviour in the UK. It shows, in particular, that agency matters far more in UK parliamentary politics than the extant literature has assumed. Finally, chapter 10 analyses a range of extremely significant findings from a robust and original conjoint analysis of public voting habits in the UK. On one hand, the results demonstrate there is less of a disjuncture than assumed between the personalities the public *want* in national politics and the personalities they *get*. On the other hand, the data reveal schisms within the general population that translate into larger differences between MPs' basic values and the preferences of more conservative socio-demographic groups in the UK population. Chapter 11 draws the thesis to a close by reflecting on the broader implications of its central findings and the limitations of the research design. In its evaluation of the core results of this project, chapter 11 also points to future avenues of research that have been opened up in the course of this project.

“For today even semi-sovereignty seems to be slipping away...What we see emerging is a notion of democracy that is being steadily stripped of its popular component - democracy without a demos”

Peter Mair (2013)

Rethinking Parliamentary Studies

Long before the election of Donald Trump, the rise of populism across central Europe, and the UK expenses scandal in 2009, the late Anthony King (1983) wrote of the biggest divide in British politics as that between Britain's whole political class and the great majority of the British people. The ‘anti-politics’ phenomenon is now well documented in Britain: declining levels of partisanship, diminished voter turnout, poor performing governments and failures of accountability, and plummeting trust in political elites are all common research foci and even book titles.² Yet the literature seeking to explain and understand the crisis of democracy focuses almost singularly on popular notions of what politics is and how it *should* work. In doing so it fails to engage with those who actually occupy political office.

In this context the belief that the House of Commons is a ‘remote and self-important echo-chamber’ (Paxman, 2014) has not only become an accepted popular interpretation of British parliamentary politics but it has had a limiting, even detrimental effect, on the breadth of academic studies into the UK Parliament. Stoker (2011) highlights two contemporary responses to anti-politics in British academia: political engineering and democratic design. For ‘engineers’, our existing democratic institutions – political parties, electoral systems, etc. – need to be reformed so that they function more effectively. In contrast, ‘designers’ look to new ways of engaging citizens in the political process. Neither of these burgeoning streams of research in the last decade or so have given serious thought to the role of MPs as anything more than causal factors for the anti-political symptoms they try to unpick. In fact these actors are largely conspicuous by their absence. This literature is outward facing and the (relatively) small number of legislative scholars researching in the pool of parliamentary studies have

² See, for example, Stoker, 2006; Hay, 2007; Norris, 2011; Flinders, 2012; Allen and Birch, 2015; Jennings et al., 2016; Jennings et al., 2017.

failed to acknowledge their role in bringing both politicians and Parliament into this debate as relevant research foci.

The majority of contemporary studies of the UK Parliament are emic in their attention to both process and policy space. There is no doubt that this research is both rigorous and important, adding to our understanding of a range of developments such as legislative scrutiny (Russell, 2016; Kelso, 2009), free and whipped voting patterns (Cowley and Stuart, 2012), multi-level governance (Cairney, 2015; Mycock, 2016), or ministerial power and responsibility (Heffernan, 2003; Elgie, 2011). Where parliamentary studies have looked outside of Westminster, it has been to explore the functional relationships between policy-makers and experts (Dommett and Flinders, 2015; Durose, Justice and Skelcher, 2014), the executive and the judiciary (Bradley, 2008; Gee et al., 2015), or peripheral and central government (Blunkett, Flinders and Prosser, 2016; Matthews, 2017). However, the result is that this sub-discipline remains, in line with the popular narrative of politics, rather parochial and distant to the uninitiated. A sclerotic commitment to dominant traditions and methodologies has restricted the capacity for innovation in parliamentary studies, which might open the door to more creative research into 'the people' in Parliament. Indeed, to focus on the personal side of politics would not only provide a new way to conceive the relationship between Parliament and citizenry, governor and governed, but would also extend and nuance the explanatory purchase of existing research into the everyday practice of parliamentary politics mentioned above.

This chapter provides a critical review of the dominant literature in parliamentary studies to position this PhD in context. The chapter begins by reflecting on the pervasive 'British political tradition' (Gamble, 1990), the Westminster Model (WM), and the assumptions of Historical Institutionalism (HI) that has generally taken the WM as a point of scholarly reference. The procedural, descriptive and often prescriptive accounts of HI research will be compared to those new camps in parliamentary studies that afford more importance to agency. This discussion will introduce recent developments in sociological research as well as making both explicit and implicit criticisms of rational choice models, which talk of parliamentary behaviour in narrow self-interested terms. In particular this review will pick out the contributions made to parliamentary studies by interpretivism and ethnography. Parson's (2007) generalised matrix of political science will be used to highlight the substantive and methodological flaws of these overly siloed approaches to parliamentary studies, thus opening a gap in the research base which this thesis, utilising an epistemological framework of neo-

institutionalism and psychological theories of human values, hopes to occupy. This chapter will finish by explaining the benefits of reconciling politics and psychology - and particularly the Schwartz theory of Basic Human Values (BHV) - as a way to enhance our understanding of 'who' occupies elected office in the palace of Westminster and 'why' they choose to do it, 'how' they navigate their daily lived experiences as politicians, and 'why' there might be such a gap between politicians and the public.

I. Paradigms in Parliamentary Studies: The Rise and Fall of the Westminster Model and Historical Institutionalism

It would be difficult to talk of studies of the British Parliament without mentioning the Westminster Model (WM), what Andrew Gamble (1990, p.405) describes as the dominant 'organising perspective' in British political studies. Born from the traditions of Whig historiography, the WM focuses on the institutions of politics and puts emphasis on the importance of continuity in the political system, punctuated by incremental change, since the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (Gamble, 1990, p.407; see also Judge, 1993). At the heart of the WM are the principles of parliamentary sovereignty, ministerial responsibility and strong party government. These principles have become enduring realities in the literature on British politics. One may take Vernon Bogdanor's *The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century* (2003), Philip Norton's *Parliament in British Politics* (2013), or Michael Rush's *Parliament Today* (2005) as prime examples of the often descriptive, qualitative, overly technical and document-based analyses of Parliament that work within the central tenets of the WM.

Although the primacy and efficacy of the WM as an analytical framework have been questioned in recent years by those more interested in governance than government (see, for example, Bache et al., 2015; Marsh, 2012; Rhodes, 2011), there is no doubt that it remains a normative benchmark by which scholars continue to evaluate British politics. David Judge (2005, p.646) goes so far as to describe the WM as the 'constitutional morality' underpinning good government. Paul Seaward and Paul Silk (2003, p.185) argue that in spite of incremental modernisation, the organising principles of the WM are no less pertinent today, so that parliamentary sovereignty, for example, is 'as applicable a doctrine in 2000 as it was 1900'. Indeed, the WM retains currency with politicians, the media, and academics alike (Blunkett and Richards, 2011; Cairney, 2012; Lijphart, 2012).

Arend Lijphart (2012) identifies the UK, with the WM as a founding principle, as a leading alternative to consensual European governments. Yet the majoritarian democracy that

he interprets in the UK, built on a *disproportional* voting system, concentrations of power in the executive, compliant parliamentary majorities, and strong unitary government, is as much an ideal type as the WM on which it rests. Kriesi et al.'s (2006, pp. 357-358) study of policy networks in Western Europe provides empirical evidence to refute the UK's majoritarian image: 'British policy networks turned out to be quite fragmented, resembling more closely those expected for consensus than for majoritarian democracies. This would imply that future research should no longer aim at national level generalisations about power configurations and policy processes.' Yet in spite of the lack of empirical support for the WM, academics still accept the power of the majoritarian model. For example, Matthew Flinders' (2009) theory of 'bi-constitutionality' in the UK pairs devolution to consensual representative bodies with strong central government in the majoritarian image. The usefulness of the WM, both for this thesis and other alternative interpretations of British politics, is not the accuracy of its explanatory power but its reputation as an accepted reference point against which to present new models.

The primary criticism, for the purpose of this thesis, is that the WM focuses so exclusively on the macro dimensions of British politics and the top-down nature of principal-agent relations in British democracy, that it elides the individuals who actually inhabit the system and make it work on an everyday basis. There is no room for the micro, or even meso, level analysis that would enable scholars to engage with the personal side of politics. Indeed, there has been surprisingly little deviance from unfavourable categorisations of the UK Parliament as 'reactive' (Martin and Vanberg, 2011), 'peripheral or totally irrelevant' (King and Crewe, 2013, p.361), and even 'God's gift to dictatorship' (Jenkins, 2006). However, recent landmark studies by Meg Russell et al. (2016; see also Arter 2006; Matthews, 2017) have challenged David Olsen's (1994, p.84) '90 per cent rule' of legislative dominance by the executive.³ Analysing 4361 amendments to 12 government bills and conducting over 120 interviews, Russell et al. (2016) add empirical weight to previous work on 'anticipated reactions' and 'preventative influence' (Blondel, 1970) in order to show that government success in the legislative process is often over-stated, non-government failure is similarly exaggerated, and parliamentary influence before and after the formal passage of bills is often overlooked. These findings run in direct opposition to mainstream scholarship on the UK Parliament; they point to a more nuanced understanding of British government, in which

³ Russell et al. (2016) build explicitly on the normative and empirical foundations of John Griffith's (1974) *Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills*. Scrutinising government amendments, Griffiths could already conclude that the UK Parliament was 'by no means negligible' in the legislative process (ibid., p.256).

individual backbenchers and opposition party members may have a powerful effect upon the substantive direction and character of legislation. This demands greater attention and more rigorous research into the motivations of the people inside Parliament.

The criticisms levelled above are as true for the WM as the broader theoretical underpinning it has found in historical institutionalism (HI).⁴ The institutionalist label distinguishes itself from the umbrella of structural causal logic by delineating action according to man-made conventions rather than non-malleable material structures. The logic runs that certain inter-subjectively present institutions direct people to act in particular directions at later stages. This relationship connecting constraints with action is commonly formulated within temporal sequences of causality, otherwise known as path dependency: the institutional decisions taken at time *t* unintentionally direct subsequential action along certain historical paths (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006). As a foundational logic, institutionalism has diversified in many guises (sociological, rationalist, discursive...) but it is HI, with its specific blend of legitimacy and constraint, that has been most prominent in British parliamentary studies (Thelen and Longstreth, 1992; cf. Bell, 2017).

The abstract concept of institutional path dependence reduces to one contingent decision, made in an ambiguous material landscape, that engenders future sunk costs (Parsons, 2007). These sunk costs should not be considered in the economic sense of the term, whereby capital is unrecoverable, but in a political science parlance of commitments and the subsequent costs of change. Paul Pierson (1993, p.609) writes: 'Policies may encourage individuals to develop particular skills, make certain kinds of investments, purchase certain kinds of goods, or devote time and money to certain kinds of organisations. All these decisions generate sunk costs. That is to say, they create commitments'. As such, parliamentary change – as conceived in the HI tradition – is the product of 'critical junctures', which may include exogenous jolts to the political system, policy breakthroughs, or temporary institutional destabilisation and ambiguity. These 'critical junctures' allow for the incremental evolution implicit in the WM. It is useful at this point to draw on the generic matrix of political science arguments modelled by Craig Parsons (2007; Table 1.1).

⁴ Alexandra Kelso (2009, p.9) argues that historical institutionalism, with its focus on historical context, is given credence by the UK Parliament, which she sees as a historical product forged in the image of the WM.

Table 1.1 Parson's (2007) matrix of dominant logics of explanation in political science.

	GENERAL	PARTICULAR
POSITION	<i>Structural</i>	<i>Institutional</i>
INTERPRETATION	<i>Psychological</i>	<i>Ideational</i>

One half of the matrix locates logics according to the opposition of general and particular explanations: the former is deterministic or probabilistic, whilst the latter allows for contingent circumstances that cannot always be expected to turn out identically (things are explained as consequences of events that did not have to happen according to a general law). On one side of the matrix institutional and ideational (man-made) explanations, which focus on behaviours following as the result of resolved contingencies, are highly particularistic. By contrast, structural and psychological explanations flow from exogenously-derived regularities and as such their generality dismisses the counter-factuals inherent in the first two logics. The other axis in this heuristic represents a position-interpretation divide, in which the logics of structure and institution are pitted against those of ideational and psychological explanations. Whilst the former see action dictated by an obstacle course of material and man-made constraints or incentives in the social, political or environmental landscape, the latter presents action as the result of people’s interpretation of what is possible or desirable in a context of objectively ambiguous structures and institutions (Parsons, 2007).

For most HI scholars, the norms associated with the WM are preeminent over individual actors as contextual constraints on the nature and direction of parliamentary reform. As such it is possible to locate the WM, HI and associated parliamentary studies within academic approaches that take a particularistic, positional logic of explanation (see Table 1.1). Kelso (2009, p.25) makes a similar argument: ‘the structural institutional context of Parliament has a highly significant degree of influence over those actors who operate there, and [...] Parliament’s path dependency substantially constrained the range of reform options that might be realistically contemplated.’⁵ However, an alternative view of change in the HI tradition, otherwise referred to as the ‘Norton view’, has given greater agency to actors *within* the institutional path of dependence.⁶ In this view, Philip Norton (1983) presents three conditions that must be satisfied to allow for parliamentary reform. There must be

⁵ See similar arguments in Crick (1962) and Flinders (2010).

⁶ P. Norton (1983). ‘The Norton View’. In D. Judge (Ed.), *The Politics of Parliamentary Reform*. London: Heinemann. pp.54-69.

disequilibrium with the status quo; a cogent reform programme tailored to that disequilibrium; and the political will of a strong leader to see it through. However, Norton (1983, p.61) is equally adamant that the UK Parliament - as an institution whose primary function is that of representation - requires broader attitudinal change among its legislators as a pre-requisite to effective structural or procedural changes. To understand the direction of parliamentary change, then, requires an understanding of the people within it.

There are a number of important lessons to draw from the 'Norton view' about the scope of parliamentary studies in the WM/HI tradition. Firstly, it acknowledges that individual agents have an instrumental role to play within the narrative of institutional landscapes. Secondly, the role of agents is downplayed as reactionary; even in the Norton view, politicians are symptoms of critical junctures wrought by political and historical contexts but do not have causal influence over parliamentary reform (see, for example, Armitage's (2012) work on Speakership elections; or Flinders and Tonkiss' (2004) research on Parliament and Arm's Length Bodies). Thirdly, there is an implicit assumption that politicians' behaviour flows from the institutional setting and can be explained in such terms, even if the majority of research in this tradition is more interested in macro-level developments.

In terms of understanding politicians and political behaviour in and of themselves, and as a causal influence on Parliamentary change on a daily basis, HI and the WM offer little explanatory purchase and rely heavily on rationalism. Economist Douglas North (1990, p. 4; Nobel Prize for contributions to institutionalist economics) defines institutions as 'any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction', or 'regularities in repetitive interactions...customs and rules that provide a set of incentives and disincentives for individuals'. It is in linking this agreed object of study to action, in the manner implied by North's definition, that institutionalism shares its micro-foundations with the objective rationality of structural logic. Objective rationality must be assumed if institutional path dependence is to account for as much causal influence on behaviour as possible. Where regular patterns of decision-making in response to exogenously given environments are not assumed, then ideational and psychological (see Table 1.1) logics take over the primacy of causal work from institutionalism. It has been argued by some rational institutionalists that particular institutions were merely the product of rational decision making in a moment of structural ambiguity, and thereafter ongoing rational evaluation to achieve stability (see, for example, Shepsle, 1989). However, from the purest sense of this explanatory doctrine it may

be contended that such a claim undercuts the whole premise of institutionalised patterns of action, as dictated by the unforeseeable dynamics of path dependence. If institutions are only the enduring products of pre-existent self-interest, then action would seem to be the product of a looser structural logic or indeed ideational and psychological motivations.

It would appear naive to insist that simply because institutions create causal pressures and incentives, there is not a sustained element of contingency in each case that calls for the agency of actors within the institution. This may be seen as the mistake of the WM paradigm, in which scholars judge action in the UK Parliament in light of what *should* happen, according to the constitutional morality of sorts they see in the Westminster framework, and not actually what happens or how (Judge, 2004; Norton, 2013). It is this realisation, grounded in the governance literature, that has spawned new sociological approaches to Parliamentary studies – particularly interpretivist and ethnographic scholarship.

II. Sociological Studies: From Searing to Rhodes

According to David Marsh (2008, 2012), the reformulation process of Parliamentary studies away from a focus on government and towards an interest in governance is complete. The previous section has shown why this is far from the case but the new governance literature, and especially work on the differentiated polity model and multi-level governance, has gone a long way to redressing the normative assumptions of the Westminster Model (WM). In particular, the increasing complexity of the government's bureaucratic machinery and the diversification of the state apparatus to include a range of Arm's Length Bodies (ALBs) have promoted new theories of governance that directly challenge the utility of the WM.⁷

The Differentiated Polity Model (DPM) pioneered by Rod Rhodes has reconceptualised the British state, focusing on power as 'dispersed and based on exchange relationships' (Marsh, 2011, p. 33). This redefinition of British politics moves from hierarchies, as implicit in the WM, to networks of self-organising actors 'characterised by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state' (Ibid., p.34). The theory denudes central government of its supreme authority and instead presents a far messier, yet arguably realistic, picture of 'fragmentation and interdependence, and functional decentralisation' (Rhodes, 2003, p.32).⁸ The DPM and

⁷ For detailed discussions of this shift, see Goodwin and Grix (2011).

⁸ See also Christensen and Laegreid (2007).

associated governance models - such as the Asymmetric Power Model (APM) and multi-level governance literature (see, for example, Bache et al., 2015) - work within broadly similar parameters of the 'hollowing-out thesis' (see Skelcher, 2000) that were first advanced in the work on 'policy communities' by Richardson and Jordan (1979). Their seminal text, *Governing Under Pressure* (1979), downplayed the importance of the parliamentary arena long before Rhodes solidified the DPM. Exploring a series of case studies that delved behind symbolic headline politics and examined the role of the civil service and interest groups, Richardson and Jordan (1979, p.91) concluded that 'the traditional model of Cabinet and parliamentary government is a travesty of reality.'

It is neither possible nor necessary for this thesis to discuss the extant governance literature in detail, other than to highlight the premium it has placed on the role of individual actors within British politics. Arguments against the DPM have tried to downplay the 'hollowing-out' thesis as 'overblown' (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009, p.xiii) but even critics such as Holliday (2000, p.175) concede that, whilst not disabled, '[t]he core is to an extent fragmented'. This development in studies of British politics is not only important for the renewed interest it has given to agency in parliamentary studies, but for opening up the intellectual space in which new (largely sociological) theories and methodological approaches to studying political behaviour, systems and reforms have appeared. Particularly relevant is the motivational neo-institutional approach to parliamentary roles pioneered by Donald Searing; the interpretivist studies of everyday British governance instigated by Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes; and the anthropological work on symbols and norms in Parliament of Emma Crewe. In order to understand the gap amidst these agency-centred sociological approaches, each will be critically discussed with reference to, amongst others, the leading scholars named above.

(a). *Motivational Studies of Socialisation and Role Formation*

Donald Searing's (1994) *Westminster's World* stands tall amidst motivational studies of politicians' norms, values and experiences of socialisation in the UK. Searing's qualitative analysis of MPs' roles within Westminster dismisses the functionalist implications of the WM, in which the static nature of institutionalism gives limited to no agency to the individual in the role-formation process (for a discussion of structural-functionalist role theory, see Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012). Searing's motivational approach rejects many of the constraints implicit in institutional theories: individuals negotiate with role prescriptions and adapt them, rather than simply internalising and performing pre-determined obligations (see

also Giddens, 1979, p. 117). In this view parliamentary or representative roles not only exist but evolve, and not only according to new institutional frameworks or societal pressures but also in tune with the changes wrought by the players that enact them. Using transcription-based coding of 521 interviews, Searing posited eight distinct roles for MPs in Parliament. Four of these were backbench: Policy Advocates, Ministerial Aspirants, Constituency Members and Parliament Men. The remaining four were leadership roles: parliamentary Private Secretary, Whips, Junior Ministers and Ministers.

Searing's work in the motivational tradition, recognising both the power of rules and purposeful action of individuals, has been instrumental in producing a lasting seam of research broadly described as neo-institutionalist. This literature may be split two-fold. The first group of studies is the product of rational choice theory and stresses the institutional circumscription of roles via incentives for agents (Tsebelis, 2002). The second is normative and outlines the explicit behavioural prescriptions made by institutions (March and Olsen, 1989). In spite of their differences, these approaches share a common focus on the individual and their *active* interplay with institutions. The neo-institutional turn represents a vital step forward, recognising roles as institutionally specific but interpreted by individuals. Table 1.2 (below) compares the motivational approach of neo-institutionalism with two competing conceptual frameworks that exist in the study of parliamentary actors and their roles.

Searing was interested in both the rational choices, or 'career goals', and emotional incentives behind role formation. Although he states that equal attention is given to reason and feeling, he does admit '[e]motional incentives are the principal energising forces in all parliamentary roles' (Searing, 1994, p.19). It is this overwhelming concern with the emotional motivations of MPs that sets Searing's work apart from other dominant paradigms. When placing Searing within the neo-institutionalist framework, his dual narrative of role formation demands recognition of endogenous and exogenous factors in politics. Hence an MP's emotional motivations will interact with institutional constraints to produce a coherent yet personalised role in the actor's mind that is reflected in noticeable patterns of behaviour (see Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012). Whilst the theoretical framework appears admirable and worthwhile, its credibility lies in Searing's methodological approach and here there are a number of epistemological issues.

Firstly, the process of formulating a taxonomy of legislative roles is inductive and, unsurprisingly, ambiguous, subjective and strikingly creative in *Westminster's World*. Searing claims that roles are 'reconstructions...as intelligible by identifying and describing rules and

reasoned choices [in MPs' interview responses]' (Searing, 1994, p. 22). Searing accepts that to analyse the 'desires, beliefs and behaviours' of individual actors is an interpretative process, but one that he thinks runs complementary to naturalistic explanations when those characteristics are grouped and used as dependent or independent variables (Ibid., p.22). Searing overlooks the fact that any valid naturalistic explanation of roles as 'groups of characteristics' relies on the verity of the initial interpretative enterprise. Here verification is practically impossible due to the qualitative methods employed to gain and assess data. Unless Searing is willing to admit an element of Cartesian intelligibility when choosing between interpretations of 'desires, beliefs and attitudes', then we can be unsure whether the connection between certain rhetoric and roles, or even roles and their sub-types, actually exists in the minds of MPs or only as an imposed construct in the mind of the author.

Not only could Searing's discourse analysis impose roles and groupings that do not actually exist in the mind of the actor, but interviews (especially on this scale) have enormous potential to produce distortions. Indeed Searing is 'over-reliant on information supplied by actors who are likely to over-emphasise certain roles' (Garnett and Morris, 1994, p.637). The potential for bias, both by the actor and the researcher, is extensive. Searing's constructions also presuppose that politicians are actually self-conscious about their roles at all and were able to report considered, well understood answers. His roles are ultimately built on self-reported images from politicians whose discourse about their job will inevitably be constructed around institutionally prescribed norms. Thus Searing's claim to a motivational approach is weakened by the lack of consideration for truly exogenous factors, those processes and pressures in MPs' lives outside of Parliament that mould their trans-situational motivations and behaviours. In this sense, one might question whether Searing does little more than reveal those social facts (Durkheim 1982 [1895]) that exert conscious and unconscious effects on MPs within the given context of Westminster.

Table 1.2 Traditions in the analysis of parliamentary roles (Source: Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012).

Approach	Principal Focus	Preferred Methods	Research	Theoretical/Methodological criticisms	Associated Scholars
Structural-functional	Individuals act out institutionally prescribed functions (according to sets of norms) without personal preference.	Large-n structured interviews.	using structured interviews.	Two main assumptions are made. 1. That the execution of roles will be met with consistent consensus. As a variable one would expect that consensus to vary between roles. 2. Individual attitudes will be entirely determined by expectations, again a variable that will differ between roles and institutions.	Wahlke (1962), Eulau and Wahlke (1959).
Interactionist	Individuals negotiate roles within specific social settings and learn roles through interaction with associates.	Participant observation		Participants are trapped in a sociologic cage (comparable to the structural determinacy of functionalism) in which individuals are not given independent preference or motivation outside the process of interaction in which 'rules' for behaviour are constructed.	Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1984).
Motivational	Roles defined according to the dialectic between career-driven rationality, emotional incentives, and institutional constraint.	Semi-structured interviews, transcription coding.	and based	Personal or exogenous motivations are never truly understood; static categories are created out of subjective analysis of self-reported images.	Payne et al. (1984); Searing (1994).

Searing also claims that 'desires and beliefs' are interwoven with 'behaviour' (1994, p.22). Yet in explaining this connection, it becomes fuzzy as to whether Searing is trying to determine the validity of roles in his taxonomy; to analyse the MPs who populate his roles; or to assess the consequences of his roles. Each could be a valid research question in itself and in his determination to tie his perceived motivational typologies to behaviour, Searing lays himself bare to tautological criticisms. For instance, what additional knowledge is gained from comparing role constructions to MPs' opinions when those same roles were formed from an assessment of MPs' attitudes? For some critics, the 'result is page after page of very banal assessments' (Greenaway, 1995, p.313).

Searing also insists that MPs prioritise a single role focus, stressing predominance rather than homogeneity (1994, p.416). Searing's explanation is almost Darwinian: he claims that 'no one has sufficient time and energy to pursue all backbench roles at once' (1994, p.81). The implication here is that MPs recognise that in the tumultuous and demanding world of Westminster, only those who are efficient enough to specialise (and effectively at that) will succeed. Searing draws on the psychological work of James Payne who wrote: 'each politician (with a few exceptions) has only one incentive, not a mixture of incentives' (Payne et al., 1984, p.8). Thus Searing opens a door onto the world of personal, non-political and emotional motivations, but brings back rationalism to avoid explaining what these are and how or why they interact to produce purposeful behaviour in national politics.

(b). *Anthropological Insights into Parliament*

The desire to 'draw back the curtain' on Parliament and to get beyond the narrow studies of agency conducted by institutional or rational choice theorists has spawned a nascent body of anthropological perspectives on British parliamentary politics.⁹ Whilst still exceptional in the discipline, anthropological studies of Parliament - especially the substantive work of Emma Crewe - have added to that body of political science literature concerned with the actions taken by individual actors. Qualitative by nature, these studies combine interviews with both participant and non-participant observation to provide 'a rare ethnographic

⁹ Principal texts include: Crewe, E. and Müller, M. (eds.). (2006). *Rituals in Parliament*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH; Crewe E. (2014). *The House of Commons: An Anthropology of MPs at Work*. London: Bloomsbury; Crewe, E. (2006). *Lords of Parliament*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

perspective' that takes norms, ideas and beliefs as explanatory variables in a way that goes beyond rational choice assumptions of human self-interest.¹⁰

In their edited volume, *Rituals in Parliament*, Emma Crewe and Marion Müller (2006) analyse the symbols of the parliamentary world that enable its actors to make sense of their daily experiences. The chapters cover topics as diverse as parliamentary self-expression and constitutional oath-taking.¹¹ The common theme of these contributions is the general rejection of empirical, institutionalist research and the authors make this clear in the introduction: 'Parliament has been the preserve of historians and political scientists. Few have asked whether rituals affect the way Parliament operates, its reputation or its relationship with heads of state, government and the public' (Crewe and Müller, 2006, p.7). The scope of these studies is impressive and the focus on the function of rituals performed by individuals builds on a very limited body of comparative work done elsewhere, for instance that of Mark Abélès (1988) on the French Presidency in the 1980s. However, there is some ambiguity as to whether the methodological ambition is matched by theoretical clarity and delivery.

Crewe, Müller and other scholars taking similar anthropological approaches to parliamentary studies draw implicitly and explicitly on ideational logics; these can be conceived, in a political science sense, as any particularistic interpretive material that may extend to and include practices, grammars, symbols, models, norms, ideas, identities and/or beliefs (Geertz 1973; Bourdieu 1977; Sewell 1999). It is in the particularistic character of these elements that their work overlaps with institutionalism and defies their claims to 'breaking new ground'. The reliance of institutionalism upon objective rationality is a necessary symptom of the claim that intersubjectively agreed and understood organisations or rules are the arbiters of solutions to ambiguity. By contrast ideational logic often rests on a-rationality, whereby the actor's personal subjective interpretations of the problem, not the frameworks around them, illuminate a solution (Parsons, 2007). The distinction can be a fine line, since objectively rational MPs might act in accordance with particular symbols or practices in the UK Parliament because they are recognised as institutionally prerequisite for communication, not necessarily because they believe in the connotations of the symbol or practice and interpret the world through that lens. Thus institutional logic is invoked through

¹⁰ See the blurb of Crewe E. (2014). *The House of Commons: An Anthropology of MPs at Work*. London: Bloomsbury.

¹¹ Patzelt, W. (2006). Parliaments and their Symbols: Topography of a field of research. In E. Crewe and M. Müller (eds.). *Rituals in Parliament*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, p.172; Müller, M. (2006). Parliaments and their Liturgies. In E. Crewe and M. Müller (eds.). *Rituals in Parliament*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, pp.183-205.

an informal institution, not an ideational one. These theoretical arguments undermine the uniqueness of the anthropological approach as conceived thus far, but they do not diminish the intent of these studies to place agency and context in a truly symbiotic relationship.¹²

Crewe's most recent study of the House of Commons (2014), *An Anthropology of MPs at Work*, makes a concerted effort to get away from the symbolic rituals of parliamentary life to concentrate on the lived experiences of elected politicians. As Paul Evans (2015, p.590), Principal Clerk of the Table Office at the House of Commons, writes: 'Crewe gives 'a 'thick' account of the ethically-driven political life experienced through the emotions and ambiguities, the ambitions and disillusion, the joys and insults of lived experience, rather than a 'thin' account mapped on to theories of representation or accountability'. Whilst it is still questionable as to how far Crewe actually eschews more mainstream political science research that combines interviews and empirics (especially the work on socialisation by Rush and Giddings, 2011), this book tells the human narrative of most aspects of parliamentary life for an MP. The book ranges from the moment of election to friendships and rivalries, a detailed case study of law-making using section 11 of what became the Children and Families Act 2014, and the contradictions of representative governance.

What the book appears to miss is the methodological framework with which to link observation with evaluation. For example, rather stretched conceptual descriptions are used to link MPs' self-reported motivations and their behaviours. As earlier illustrated in the case of Searing's motivational approach to role formation, anthropological studies based on ideational theories (like Crewe's) open themselves to tautological criticism: people from particular backgrounds or in certain situations share similar thought processes, and that culture underpinning their shared thoughts and behaviours can be intuited from the behaviour being explained. For example, Crewe (2014, p.18) infers from her interview with Chris Bryant MP that his decision to stand for election, and his choices as an MP, are 'an act of indirect reciprocity to those who inspired his gratitude' when he received help as a child. Apart from bringing into question the author's claims to neutral political science (see the introduction to Crewe and Müller, 2006), it is clear throughout this book that the anthropological approach to parliamentary studies continues to lack a coherent model to a) understand the interplay between the competing exogenous motivations of politicians; b) explain the link between

¹² For a related critique of Emma Crewe's study of the Commons (2014), see Allen, P. (2016) *The House of Commons: An Anthropology of MPs at Work* Emma Crewe, *Parliamentary Affairs* 69(4), p.949.

personal contexts and parliamentary choices; and c) clarify the chain of agency from motivation to behaviour to parliamentary change or legislation.

(c). *Into Interpretivism*

The dominant methodologies of political science research in the twentieth century, positivism and modern-empiricism, have been challenged in the last twenty years by the rise of an alternative interpretive approach. In keeping with the epistemological foundation of the present thesis, and that of both motivational neo-institutionalism and anthropological studies, the interpretive paradigm takes individuals as its starting point and shares the contention that action can only be understood through close attention to the beliefs, ideas and desires of each actor (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006). Using an ethnographic database, interpretivism aims at that 'thick description' (Rhodes, 2011, p. xii) of political narratives which evades the so-called truths of positivist measures of external reality. According to Kerr and Kettell (2006), '[t]he most self-confident and influential attempt at a post-positivist approach to date, however, has come in the form of 'interpretivist' political science.' By virtue of its epistemological assumptions of what can be known and how it can be understood, interpretivism has further undermined the WM and HI as the normative frames of choice for scholars working on the Differentiated Polity Model (DPM) of governance or networks of exchange.

The most influential methodological inheritance of interpretivism, for this thesis, is the concept of decentred governance. This account of political behaviour moves the topos of parliamentary studies from institutional norms or structural classifications and correlations, to the meaning of individual action. The focus on bottom-up governance is defined by Bevir and Rhodes (2006, p.100) as follows:

Governance is a product of diverse practices composed of multiple individuals acting on all sorts of conflicting beliefs that they have reached against the background of several traditions and in response to varied dilemmas.

A decentred approach to governance implies that social laws and objectified institutions are insufficient mechanisms for understanding action; rather the interpretive approach prefers to focus on how individuals create meanings in political contexts and thus explain behaviour as the product of socially constructed networks.

Rod Rhodes' (2011) *Everyday Life in British Government* provides the most compelling application of interpretivism to the study of the UK Parliament to date. The book 'aims to understand the ways in which the political and administrative elites of central

government departments make sense of their worlds' (Rhodes, 2011, p.17). It is, in essence, the intellectual enterprise most akin to a counter-point for this thesis: a rival 'narrative' based on distinct methodologies and epistemological assumptions about what can be known and what should be reported. A unique ethnography of ministers and permanent secretaries across three government departments, Rhodes' study provides contrasting evidence to dominant accounts of a British constitution in decline (e.g. Bogdanor 2003, 2011; King, 2009). Moving beyond the usual research foci of Parliament as a set of rules and events, or even policies, Rhodes (2011, pp. 282-284) examines socially constructed narratives and institutional dilemmas to show that ministers and civil servants still act within the constants of a mythical Westminster Model. Applying the hallmarks of interpretivism (practices, beliefs, traditions) to participant observation and interview data, Rhodes starts from the perspective of the people doing politics to understand the daily processes occurring inside the UK Parliament and Whitehall.

However, I find fault with the interpretive approach in three key respects. Firstly, it only appreciates individuals, and their actions, as products of aggregated social or cultural norms termed 'traditions'; it thus fails to move beyond ideational facades and explain individual variation sufficiently. Secondly, the interpretive approach demonstrates an extremely limited concept of the mode and method of interpretation. Thirdly, the interpretive paradigm as championed by Bevir and Rhodes in the last decade fails to realise the explanatory potential of interpretive mechanisms. Each criticism will be briefly discussed in order to strengthen the point of departure for this thesis.

In their influential work *Interpreting British Governance* (2003), Bevir and Rhodes locate the beliefs and actions of individuals within four British political traditions: Tory, Whig, liberal and socialist. Although Rhodes (2011, p. 5) claims that traditions are 'non-deterministic' in his analysis of Parliament, the discussion does not hold up to scrutiny. The final analysis in Rhodes' (2011) study is unhitched from the decentred 'thick description' available in the data. Instead of truly individual accounts of who politicians are and how they behave in context, the reader gets a broad additive account of institutional processes already well-documented. In particular, these include managerialism (Lodge and Rogers, 2006), media contrivance and image control (Meyer, 2002; Ballard, 2006), institutional memory (Pollitt, 2007; Wilkinson, 2011), and metagovernance (Jessop, 2000, 2007). The major failing of interpretivism is, then, that it does not deliver on its promises. The result is a top-down, rather than bottom-up, analysis of the ways politicians interact with their surroundings and

responsibilities according to 'traditions'. In their desperation to eschew the path dependent arguments of institutionalism (see Bevir and Rhodes, 2006) for traditions and narratives, Bevir and Rhodes bypass the 'neo'-institutional stance that sees actors interpreting structures in a way that is affected by pre-existing *exogenous* motivators (see Hay 2007; McAnulla 2006).

Rhodes does not ultimately get at 'who' our political elites really are or why they chose a career path in Parliament. He merely observes and describes how they act within common institutional narratives. Rhodes (2011, p. 299) concludes that 'it is individuals' understandings of these roles, shaped by their personalities and experiences, which breathes life into the system, and determines the nature and quality of the collaboration between politicians and bureaucrats.' However, the conclusion and the analysis do not correspond: there is nothing more than cursory acknowledgement of MPs' inherent individual differences throughout the study and no attempt to understand how beliefs, as his point of departure in the analytical process, might fit within intellectual understandings of personality. Rhodes does not, for example, have a rigorous explanation for why one of his Ministers perceived his role to be managing the department and working in conjunction with the Permanent Secretary when the other Ministers he observed acted according to classic Westminster notions of hierarchy.

The second main objection against interpretive methodologies is the overreliance on qualitative (largely interview) data collection. In fact, the methodological outline provided in chapters 8-10 of *Interpreting British Governance* (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003) extensively privileges politicians' contemporary interpretations of their own behaviour. The argument presented here is not that actors' accounts are untrustworthy or irrelevant, but that they must also be interpreted and weighed against other evidence. Indeed to rely on interview data is to privilege an actor's *perception* of their underlying motivations when, in fact, these real motivations may be unconscious and the political terms they use may simply be rationalisations made post-hoc or social facts of political rhetoric that they understand as legitimate in the context under which they are being examined/interviewed. The extension of this critique is that interpretivism, as conceived by Bevir and Rhodes, is far too narrow and fails to expose the exogenous factors that influence the way politicians act and influence political processes.

Aside from issues of self-report, interpretivism relies on the very conscious involvement of the researcher. Rhodes (2011, p. xii) describes his analysis of ministerial life

as his 'interpretation of their interpretation of what the world looks like through their eyes'. The result is a series of interpretations that are twice or thrice removed, 'a soft science that guesses at meanings, assesses the guesses, and draws explanatory conclusions from the better guesses' (Rhodes, 2011, p. 8). Westminster is necessarily complex, episodic, contingent and ambivalent as an observational arena; as such there is certainly a need to impose some order on the analysis. Moreover, I agree with John Van Maanen (1988, p. 8) that '[t]here is no way of seeing, hearing, or representing the world of others that is absolutely, universally, valid or correct.' However, the question is whether that endeavour should take the form of abstract qualitative concepts theoretically spawned and applied according to the author's subjectivity, or whether there should be an attempt to make the analysis comparable by drawing on more appropriate empirical theories that have cross-cultural or trans-situational validity. Above all, the latter would limit the room for error and 'authorship' of the data by the researcher. In this respect I work with, rather than against, existing studies mentioned here in bringing psychological theory and measurement to the aid of interpreting the world of national representatives in the rest of this thesis.

A final related point is that of explanation and goes back once again to the central use of 'traditions' in interpretive political science. Bevir and Rhodes (2003, p. 34) argue that 'the explanatory value of traditions lies in the way in which they show how individuals inherited beliefs and practices from their communities'. The presumption that people inherit an ideational heritage is not problematic but it does not have any explanatory value for individual action without a clear mechanism of inheritance. To draw parallels between voiced beliefs and prior traditions does not suffice as explanatory analysis of anything except a constitutive link. Bevir and Rhodes also argue that traditions motivate actors to interpret dilemmas in specific ways but in turn it is also the manner in which the individual views the dilemma that determines the tradition that they follow (this critique is developed by Finlayson, 2004). It is on this premise that Bevir and Rhodes claim that they do not hypostasise tradition; if so, then it is unclear whether traditions laud power over actors or actors command power over tradition. Consequently the interpretive narrative vacillates between explanation (or claims of) and understanding, without ever clarifying its ability for either.

The three strands of sociological parliamentary scholarship reviewed here take the discipline a long way from the rigid text-based analysis of the WM and HI reviewed in section I of this chapter. Although HI has given the WM a more cogent theoretical framework with which to explain incremental change and the narrative of stability in British politics, it

remains ineffective as a legalistic model for assessing the more fluid concept of influence, the individualistic lived experiences of politicians, or the normative basis for individual behaviour. It is to these ends that alternative sociological research principles and methods have arisen. Motivational neo-institutionalism, anthropological approaches, and interpretivism all start from the premise of the individual actor, either as a way to scrutinise the micro-level of parliamentary politics or in order to extrapolate individual action to meso- and macro-level developments. However, each of these research strands is significantly hampered by its desire to develop theoretical and methodological principles from within the caucus of parliamentary political studies – typified by the use of British political traditions in interpretivism. Thus each perspective restricts itself to committing the same mistakes as extant institutional and ideational research. For these sociological approaches to fulfil their potential, they need to be operationalised with less concern for 'understanding' per se, and more focus on the ways in which specific understandings are able to motivate political agents to specific action. In the following section I demonstrate how these agent-centred philosophies can benefit from seeking interdisciplinary partnerships.

III. Political Psychology and the 'Value of Values'

The sociological studies reviewed here have given renewed attention to the people *doing* politics in Parliament, but they continue to prioritise *impersonal* determinants of political events or change. Where individual action is prioritised, it is viewed in isolation from exogenous personal characteristics and there is a presumption that actors' behaviour, even if not explained in rational choice terms, can be deduced from the normative, historical or cultural logics of their parliamentary setting (cf. Simon, 1985).¹³ By contrast to structural, institutional or sociological theories of economic or social forces, research in political psychology has focused on the unobservable psychological processes occurring in the minds of political actors. In its application of the theory of Basic Human Values (Schwartz, 1992), this thesis associates itself with a credible body of literature in which particular and well developed psychological theories are applied to the analysis of politicians and political events (Converse, 1964; Lodge and Taber, 2013; Tetlock 1985; Zaller 1992). This thesis will stand apart from the psychological political science literature on two counts. It will be the first application of the theory of Basic Human Values to national politicians in the UK (and as a feature of behavioural analysis in Parliaments anywhere), and it will be unique in gathering

¹³ It is acknowledged here that motivational neo-institutionalism has gone furthest in treating actors as independent agents, but the explanation of personal motivations is still couched in contextual terms. See Searing (1994).

quantitative survey data on MPs' values directly from the actors themselves. This section will make the case for a rethinking of parliamentary studies, opening the space for psychological political science to contribute to our understanding of British politics at the highest level. In particular I a) argue the theoretical case for crossing epistemological boundaries between psychological and institutional explanations, and b) make the case for values as the most useful psychological measure of personality for political assessment of national politicians.

(a) *A new logic of explanation: personality in parliamentary studies*

The history of psychological assessments of political elites is one of content analysis done 'at a distance', relying on archival documents such as letters, diaries, or speeches (See Winter, 2003). Noteworthy examples include studies of John F. Kennedy (Hargrove, 2008), Woodrow Wilson (George and George, 1956) and Josef Stalin (Tucker, 1973); in each case there is an attempt to fit political leaders within extant psychological typologies, the most influential of which have been the dogmatic, authoritarian and Machiavellian personality categorisations (Adorno et al., 1950; Christie and Geis, 1970; Rokeach, 1960). Although results across these studies have been largely confirmatory of one another, they cannot escape the central issue of inference. It is possible, or expected, that publically available statements will reveal more about a politician's attempts to influence others or manage their own media image than the real cognitive motivations that drive their behaviour or attitudes. Ultimately studies of this sort flit between analysis of rhetorical style (personality as perception) and personality functioning (see chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of this distinction).

The methodological heritage of this literature pertains to the need for data collection directly from political elites and the desirability of systematic consideration for contingent relationships within the political environment, as well as careful application of psychological assessments to disparate circumstances (see, for example, George, 1971) to avoid circular (and insular) reasoning. However, the aim of this literature is constant and central to the purpose of this thesis: to obviate *de novo* analyses of political actors as structural/institutional pawns by building an understanding of their personality types and thus answering important questions not only about 'who' enters politics, but also how/why they differ in their policy choices, their normative understanding of political institutions and situations, selective participation in political processes, and engagement with the public. There is a long literature to show that people do not appear randomly in political roles (see, for example, Browning and Jacobs 1964; George, 1974) and that behaviour flows from constant symbiosis between mental states and the environment (for an early example, see Lewin, 1936, pp.11-12). Yet

sound empirical studies of politicians that test these general findings are few in number, and practically non-existent in the UK. As Fred Greenstein (1992, p. 125) argues: 'If the connections between the personalities of political actors and their political behaviour are obscure, all the more reason to illuminate them.' I take up Greenstein's challenge as an important step forward for parliamentary studies of British politics.

To make the case for psychological assessments of political actors, and their behaviour in Westminster as active agents, I first return to the basic conceptual framework advanced by Lasswell and Kaplan (1950, pp.4-6): that human response (R) is a function of the respondent's environment (E) and predispositions (P). This equation evokes a simple yet neglected truism for studies of parliamentary politics: that the environment of Parliament will always be mediated by the individual agents within it who are both *proactive* and *reactive* variables. It is useful here to return to Parson's (2007) matrix (see Table 1.3, below). Given the fierce debate between Humean and Non-Humean scholars about explanation and causality, it seems appropriate that the strongest explanations for political action of any sort rest on multiple criteria; that is to say that clear explanatory claims allow for the insightful capacities of both within-case mechanisms and cross-case general patterns (Brady and Seawright, 2004). In his commentary on IR, Wight (a self-proclaimed ideational theorist) neatly captures the coexistence of supra-individual dynamics and individualism in state action:

In the final analysis, state activity is always the activity of particular individuals acting within particular social contexts. There is an ontological wall here that corporate forms do not cross (or cross only on the backs of individuals). None of this is to deny the reality of a common intention, or collective action, which individuals try to realise in their practices. Nor is this to deny the reality of social structures that enable and constrain action. Nor does...[it] entail that there can be no coordinated action that is the bearer of causal powers greater than that possessed by individuals acting individually (Wight 2004, p. 279).

This thesis presents an interdisciplinary position, albeit leaning towards the generality of psychological perspectives. I accept that the focus and even to some extent the range of MPs' behaviour will be particularistic, which should not necessarily be equated with chaotic, because of the unique institutional and normative arena of Westminster. However, using a psychological measure of values (see Chapter 2) that traverses that political arena and examines politicians for who they are as humans, and as such compares them at a base level to other humans in other particularistic arenas, allows for some generality in proposing probabilistic laws of how MPs might behave (i.e. the character of behavioural choices) in response to a range of 'particular' stimuli. Combining quantitative survey data on MPs'

values with qualitative interview data, I add theoretical and empirical weight to the E-P-R formula and build on a history of similar attempts at interactionist research (see, for example, Endler, 1981; Pervin and Lewis 1978) that is sensitive to both environmental constraints or influences and agents' capacity to be proactive (Murray, 1968).

Table 1.3 Combining logics of explanation (adapted from Parsons, 2007).

	GENERAL	PARTICULAR
POSITION	<i>Structural</i>	<i>Institutional</i>
INTERPRETATION	<i>Psychological</i>	<i>Ideational</i>

This logic (Table 1.3) is designed to work with, not against, institutionalism in proposing that actors themselves can both cause, and count as, critical junctures along a non-deterministic path of dependence. For example, new MPs - having not been present at the initial critical juncture that elicited the institution of Parliament - are by implication making an individual decision to join the parliamentary 'community', and all of the norms, rules, models associated with it. To make that decision, whether you adopt a notion of objective rationality or a socio-psychological standpoint, implies a calculation that the act of joining will serve the individual's needs, desires or hard wired traits (all of those exogenous factors that apparently weaken an institutionalist argument). A similar case could be made for MPs who actively decide to stand for re-election, although the sunk costs here may be greater. The institution provides both a formal and informal channel of constraints or incentives, but sustained exogenous factors (endogenous to the individual) will be prioritised in the decision-making process wherever the contingencies on offer allow it to be the case (*reactive* behaviour) or where an MP brings particularly strong psychological predispositions to their job (*proactive* behaviour). Given that a lot of political scenarios and responsibilities are only hazily defined by formal rules (especially the act of representation), there is immense latitude for politicians' personalities to influence their behaviours. Thus the institutional landscape is a starting point that on occasion may force action according to the unintended consequences of decisions made long before an MP entered the House, and on other occasions allows for interpretation so that action is a derivation of initial or extra-parliamentary [psychological] conditions within the unique institutional context of Westminster.

Unlike anthropological and interpretivist studies of politicians, I argue from this position that MPs may be affected by norms, symbols and practices in the House of Commons

in ways *dependent* on their psychological predispositions. Within the same group (i.e. party, select committee, cabinet) MPs may choose to engage in a particular behaviour because they hold it to be legitimate according to their personal value-informed goals and cannot comprehend an alternative (i.e. *proactive*), or because they are coerced to a greater or lesser extent by social expectations and the transaction costs associated with introducing the 'group' to a new mode of operation (i.e. *reactive* to institutionalist logic). The implication for the present research project is that personality will dictate behaviour most in those aspects of a politician's life where they operate individually and institutional norms or practices are weakest (i.e. in the constituency/on the backbench) and least in those arenas of political life where MPs are working directly within a group (i.e. following the whip/on the frontbench). This will be developed further in section 2 of this thesis.

(b) *Measuring personality?*

The use of the term 'personality' in psychological studies is extremely broad and multifaceted, going beyond the narrow psychopathological differences that have preoccupied political science studies of politicians (cf. Caprara and Silvester, 2018). This clinical conception of personality ignores social cognitive approaches that make personality, in Henry Murray's (1968) words, 'the most comprehensive term we have in psychology'. However, it is especially important that academic studies crossing these disciplinary boundaries are precise about the terms they employ in order to avoid distorting or manipulating concepts in their application to new cases, what Sartori (1970) incisively critiqued as *conceptual stretching*.

This thesis is aligned with a three-tier classification of personality. At the broad level of self-regulation, I agree with Caprara and Vecchione (2013, p.24) that personality is a 'dynamic system of psychological structures and processes that mediates the relationship between the individual and the environment and accounts for what that person is and may become'. Beneath this complex system exists synergistic relations between various subsystems - cognitive and affective - that construct and communicate an individual's personal identity (Caprara and Cervone, 2000). Thirdly, I narrow to focus on values, and specifically the theory of Basic Human Values developed by Shalom Schwartz (1992; see Chapter 2), as the core of personal identity (see also Hitlin, 2003). In adopting a social cognitive approach, I stop short of genetics and accept a dialogic understanding of the ways in which environments condition the functioning of personality as well as the ways in which the

personality of active agents influences the choice of, and change to, those environments.¹⁴ Basic Human Values are a theoretically validated and empirically testable model for cognitive representations of sought-after, trans-situational targets that act as guiding principles in people's lives (Schwartz, 1992; 1994). In selecting this theory from a critical review of integrative personality measures, I take the advice of Hall and Lindzey (1970, p.602): to choose a theory and 'wallow in it, revel in it, absorb it, learn it thoroughly....and set about the cold hard business of investigation'.


Figure 1.1 represents the different 'levels' of personality (Hall and Lindzey, 1970) that have been variously studied as indicative of the 'predispositions' inherent in the E-P-R formula of behavioural explanation. Beneath the level of 'perception', which acts as a cognitive screen of sorts for environmental stimuli (see, for example, Lau and Sears, 1986; Vertzberger, 1990), exist three broad classes of internal processes also known as functional bases of personality (Greenstein, 1992). As cognitive qualities that bear on thought and perception, Basic Human Values can be situated within the functional base of cognition and needs. As such they are more distal than opinions and beliefs as a structure for understanding the effect of personality on behaviour, but more proximal than genetic explanations that underpin new research in the field of bio-politics (see Hatemi and McDermott, 2011). A person's genetic endowment provides a range of potential values, attitudes or preferences, the actualisation of which and pathways between remain poorly understood and under-researched (Smith et al., 2011). It is for this reason that Caprara and Vecchione (2013) warn against current findings on the heritability of political attitudes and beliefs (cf. Alford et al., 2005; Hatemi et al. 2010). I heed that warning and ground this thesis in the functional base of Basic Human Values, which are both stable and inherent qualities of individuals and operationalisable to explain politicians' perceptions of, and responses to, the environment of Parliament and British politics.

Whilst I choose to investigate the basic values of UK politicians, the most accepted and researched foundation for personality studies to date is the Big Five measure of human traits.¹⁵ In political psychology, traits have been used to explain behavioural phenomena as diverse as voting choice (Caprara et al., 1999; Schoen and Schumann 2007), party affiliation (Gerber et al., 2010), ideological self-placement (Jost, 2006), candidate preferences (Barbaranelli et al., 2007), and public policy preferences (Riemann et al., 1993). However,

¹⁴ For a discussion of nature, nurture and the 'agentic person', see Funk, Sears and Brown (2013).

¹⁵ For a review of studies using the Big Five in disparate behavioural contexts, see Mondak, 2010).

Figure 1.1 - Levels of 'Psychic Functioning' or Personality. [Source: Greenstein, (1992)]



personality research in psychology continues to advance an integrative view of the individual that gives greater attention to values alongside traits as key functional bases (see Barenbaum and Winter, 2008; Cervone, 2005; McAdams and Pals, 2006). There is now significant evidence to suggest that values and traits, traditionally measured by the Big Five model (McCrae and Costa, 1997; Allik, 2005), capture distinct yet complementary data about personality (Caprara et al., 2012; Saroglou and Munoz-Garcia, 2008; Park-Leduc et al. 2015). For example, Caprara et al. (2006) found that Basic Human Values account for more variance in voting than traits, and that demographic variables such as education, location and income have no additional impact after values and traits have been included in regression analysis. Research has also shown that Basic Human Values mediate the effect of traits (Caprara et al., 2009), thus indicating the latter's causal primacy in behavioural analysis. However, as more proximal aspects of personality, values are preferable for their potential to determine political choices and behaviours that rely on conscious consideration of alternative choices that invoke motivational deliberation.

By contrast to studies of political values (Goren, 2005; Jacoby, 2006), Hitlin (2003) argues that personal values and related value commitments produce a sense of personal identity that offers a far more accurate and powerful explanatory tool for behavioural analysis in politics. Hitlin builds on the work of Gecas (2000, p.96), who describes personal identity arising when 'individuals conceive of themselves in terms of the values they hold'. In this

view, Gecas argues that our values in and of themselves are too distal for conscious understanding, but the personal identity that they inform creates a reflexive view of oneself that is directly tied to role- and group-identities as well as behaviours. This reasoning relies on the permeability of personal and social identity (Deaux, 1992; Reid and Deaux, 1996) but if values are accepted as a significant constitutive force within the self, then they also become vital for understanding both situated identities and situated behaviours.¹⁶

An empirical study of MPs' values thus conveys three key outcomes for parliamentary studies: (1) it allows researchers to interrogate MPs' judgements and perceptions of varying parliamentary (and representative) situations – such as constituency work or legislative scrutiny; (2) it can enlighten MPs' decision-making in response to situated representative activities – such as voting or debating in the chamber; (3) it can reveal more about their group identity or lack thereof – for instance at the party, House, or occupational level. Unlike the qualitative studies reviewed earlier in this chapter, this approach is nuanced in that action can be understood at both the group or institutional level, and in terms of individual agency. Not only can empirical measures of basic values identify the dynamics of counter intuitive behaviour (i.e. when MPs sacrifice their sense of self) but even if all MPs were to place particular importance on the same particular values (which might be articulated in an interview or observed in ethnographic studies), then crucial individual differences in the pattern of values that constitute their personal identity will allow for specific narratives of decision-making, perception and behaviour (see Chapter 2 for more detail).

This chapter has critically reviewed the parliamentary studies literature, albeit with broad brush strokes, to illustrate a) the theoretical flaws of the Westminster Model and Historical Institutionalism, which elide the daily experiences of political actors and their contribution to systemic and procedural change; b) the methodological limitations of sociological approaches that have started to recognise the importance of individual politicians as a unit of analysis; and c) the original contribution of an interdisciplinary approach to parliamentary studies that systematically unites the intellectual and conceptual strength of psychology (and in particular basic values as a measure of personality) and political science (in particular neo-institutional theories of parliamentary roles/socialisation). Having opened this gap, chapter 2 will now drill down into the deeper theoretical foundations of Basic Human Values, before chapters 3 to 5 outline a clear research agenda and hypotheses.

¹⁶ Hitlin (2003) demonstrates the link between Self-Transcendence values and volunteering as a situated activity and group identity.

“The value concept, more than any other, should occupy a central position . . . able to unify the apparently diverse interests of all the sciences concerned with human behaviour.”

Milton Rokeach (1973)

Basic Human Values

I aim to speak broadly to a gap in the research on democratic legitimacy and governance by exploring the fundamental motivations that inform the (self-)selection and behaviour of elected politicians. In particular, I highlight a gap in study of the UK Westminster democracy that can be filled by an interdisciplinary synthesis of psychology and political science. In the opening chapter, I outlined the salient trends in parliamentary research in the UK and rejected, in particular, Historical Institutionalism (HI) studies in which structures exist autonomously as determinants of agentic action (cf. Bell, 2017). In doing so, I advance an original study of Members of Parliament (MPs) at the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels, which goes beyond existing parliamentary studies in politics (see Chapter 1), notions of 'scripted agents' in institutional sociology (e.g. Meyer, 2008), and even behaviourist psychology research in which 'the actor's environment carries the explanatory weight [for behaviour]' (Mercer, 2005, p.82). Above all, I argue that a great deal can be gained by approaching the study of Parliament from an interdisciplinary perspective, whereby external social structures, political institutions and changes to either are only properly understood when researchers rigorously evaluate how they are interpreted and reacted to, in context, by relevant actors (see also Bell, 2012; Schmidt, 2008).

The purpose of this chapter is to unpick the theory of basic human values (BHV) and tease out its relevant application for this study of parliamentary representatives. It proceeds in five sections. The first section augments references to psychological research in politics presented at the end of chapter 1. The purpose of this section is to situate this thesis in the context of a small but highly significant body of psychological research into political elites. The second section then focuses on the theory of BHV itself and delineates not only what values are and are not, but reinforces their applicability in this thesis. Having outlined the theoretical underpinnings of BHV, section III reviews existing research on the variance in

basic values according to essential socio-demographic variables such as age, gender and education. Given arguments pertaining to political recruitment and professionalisation (addressed in Chapter 3), this section provides important insights into the stability of values as well as their foundations in childhood socialisation. More than simply understanding how MPs differ to those they govern, I seek to rigorously analyse MPs' relative heteronomy or autonomy as expressed in daily parliamentary behaviour. To set up a more detailed discussion of this in chapter 4, section IV of this chapter carefully explains the link between BHV and behaviour as informed by the latest research in this area. Finally, section V defends the primacy of BHV as compared to political values and reinforces the added value of such psychological studies for parliamentary research in the UK.

I. The Psychology of Political Elites

In chapter 1 of this thesis, an integrated model of personality was presented as the basis for understanding political action and, in particular, the situated behaviour of MPs. Although '[t]he relationship between personality and politics is one of the oldest and most frequently debated topics in political psychology' (Caprara and Silvester, 2018, p.467), there is no direct empirical evidence on the role of personality - and specifically basic values - on elite political recruitment, behaviour and representation in UK parliamentary politics. In fact, direct empirical research into UK policy makers per se is extremely rare (Kwiatkowski, 2016). As such, this thesis fills a highly significant gap in the research base. Whilst I focus on BHV as my personality measure of choice, it is also worth acknowledging important insights from additional research into the personality traits, intelligence, and self-belief of political elites. Although these were touched upon in chapter 1, this section extracts particular studies that inform the expectations of this thesis.

More than any other personality measure, traits have received the most attention in theoretical and empirical studies of political elites. Personality traits are quantifiable psychological qualities that are, generally, normally distributed in the population (Caprara and Silvester, 2018). Research into traits has tended to diverge between single trait theories - focusing on one aspect of personality and behaviour - and multi-trait theories - seeking to capture the complete personality of participants and the relative importance of a set number of traits for behaviour across contexts. One of the most common single trait theories is Machiavellianism, which is used to understand varying levels of power-seeking behaviour and manipulation in target populations. For example, Ronald Deluga (2001) asked experts to rate anonymised profiles of US presidents using the most widely approved Mach IV scale.

The results showed that the most 'charismatic' leaders also scored highest for Machiavellianism, which implies an unconventional view on morality, lower levels of empathy, and a propensity to exploit others for personal gain. Deluga concluded that higher levels of Machiavellianism directly correlated with the confidence of US presidents in advancing political goals; able to detach themselves from the effects of their decisions on the general populace, these presidents could, in effect, psychologically depoliticise their decision-making. Although Deluga's study, like most, was conducted at-a-distance, it points to a) worrying conclusions about the psychological characteristics of those in the most powerful political positions, and b) a link between personality and political behaviour.

By contrast to single trait studies, multi-trait research has been made more accessible by the widely used taxonomy of traits known as the 'Big 5' or the Five Factor Model (Wiggins, 1996). This taxonomy includes five basic traits: Extraversion (sociability, vigour, dynamism), Agreeableness (honesty, sincerity, loyalty), Neuroticism (impulsiveness, emotional stability), Conscientiousness (diligence, precision, reliability), and Openness to Experience (imagination, creativity, innovation). In recent years, a small pool of scholars have been able to obtain self-report statistics on the Big 5 from political actors. Combining data from elected members of the Italian and European Parliaments as well as regional councils (n = 230) with that of the general population in Italy (n = 3249), Caprara et al. (2006, 2010) found that politicians score significantly higher for the traits of Extraversion, Agreeableness, emotional stability and Openness to Experience. These findings run contrary to a similar study of local and state representatives in Germany (Best, 2011), where politicians did score higher than the German public for Extraversion and Openness to Experience but lower for Agreeableness and Conscientiousness.

Regardless of cultural differences that might explain these variations, there are common trends in politics globally that require politicians to wear a number of hats. Politicians must, for example, persuade and convince others in Parliament, in their party and in their electorate of their own beliefs or a set course of action; they must be proactive and acclimatise to a culture of constant competition; and they must be able to balance multiple, often diverse and sometimes contradictory, activities (see Silvester, 2012; Silvester and Dykes, 2007). Whilst the populace may, theoretically, want political agents who are high in Conscientiousness (and therefore reliably represent the interests of the principal), it may be that politicians who can 'stick the course' necessarily need to move quickly, act decisively, take initiative and prioritise responsibilities in a calculated manner. To date, there are no

comparative findings on the Big 5 of national politicians in the UK, although a small-n study of British councillors by Silvester et al. (2014) did find a positive relationship between councillors' self-rated Conscientiousness and performance ratings by colleagues. This is affirmatory of inferences made above: that external evaluations of political success may not run parallel to MPs' actual personalities.

Another wave of personality research on political elites has focused on intelligence and cognitive style rather than traits. Encompassing cognitive capacities to perform numerical, spatial or verbal tasks, organise ideas, act reflexively, or plan according to reason, intelligence has a direct theoretical bearing on how politicians might conceive their duties, conduct themselves in office, or even appear competent or not in the eyes of their electors. As such, political psychologists argue that intelligence or cognitive capacity is highly significant for political performance (Simonton, 2006). Only one study in the UK has directly evaluated this relationship. Silvester and Dykes (2007) conducted a longitudinal study of candidates in the 2005 British General Election, in which they asked candidates to complete an intelligence measure prior to party selection procedures. The study found a significant positive association between scores on the test and the candidate's vote percentage and vote swing in the election. These findings build on a more established research base that has qualitatively analysed political speeches, debates and interviews to show that political elites score higher than average for integrative complexity - the ability to think multi-dimensionally and integrate a variety of evidence in decision-making scenarios (e.g. Suedfeld, 2010; Tetlock et al., 1984). Subject to more thorough direct investigation, this research indicates that political elites sit outside the normal distribution of another personality measure; that they are more capable than most at handling complex informational environments; and that voters respond positively to this personality characteristic.

By contrast to traits and intelligence, personal values operate as a motivational feature of personality that pertain 'both [to] the nature of goals pursued by individuals and the ways in which these are pursued' (Caprara and Silvester, 2018, p.473). Personal values attest both to the impact of childhood socialisation on our basic needs - that form cognitive principles in the form of values - and at a societal level to the ways in which individuals orient themselves, behave with others, and judge events or people around them (Hitlin, 2003). Beyond this precisely psychological definition, values have been the subject of a thin seam of research on political elites in recent years. For example, in the late 90s values became a focus of academic research into public sector reform, where the rising influence of personal values was seen as a

by-product of increasing indeterminateness in complex governance systems (e.g. Peters and Wright, 1996). Torben Jorgensen (1999, p.566) identified three such 'displacements' or moving boundaries: between politics and administration; public and private sector responsibilities; national and international functions. At the intersection of these fuzzy boundaries, Jorgensen argued that a range of new situations and accountabilities were being created. None of these situations were predetermined or clarified and, thus, politics became more open to interpretation by political actors. In light of the implications for policy-making at the local, national and international levels, Jorgensen (1999, p.565) argued that political scientists needed to give greater attention to the empirical study of agents' principles (or 'values') in elite politics.

De Leon (2001) took Jorgensen's thesis further by emphasising the growing role of the 'inner check' for civil servants, politicians and administrators. This is defined as the values of each individual actor on the political stage that, hopefully, constrain his or her actions within the parameters of democratic norms and expectations. MPs, like all public servants, conduct a large proportion of their jobs away from direct supervision and thus must be trusted to act professionally in their autonomy. However, de Leon argues that as the state fragments and roles multiply, so too the discretion of administrators and politicians expands. Faced with choices where no clear answer is legally prescribed, these public servants will be guided, consciously or unconsciously, by their personal values (cf. Wall, 1991). De Leon (2001) followed up this 'problem' by studying the values of three sets of public servants in the US, including one hundred elected politicians (thirty-five senators and sixty-five representatives) from Colorado's state legislature. Combining the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS) with a measure of professional values, de Leon found striking similarities between her legislators and the other two groups (public sector managers and policy analysts). Whilst legislators ranked 'leadership' and 'compromise' one place higher than the other groups, the correlations between the three sets of average value rankings was highly significant. De Leon's conclusions echo those of Public Service Motivation (PSM) theorists such as Rainey and Steinbauer (1999, p.23) who see a 'general altruistic motivation to serve the interests of a community of people, a state, a nation or humanity' in all public sector professions.

In France, Tiberj and Kerrouche (2013) asked politicians to score their level of dis/agreement with ten policy oriented statements that carried implicit value assumptions along both cultural and economic lines. The results were then compared with data for the general public. The study found that a) politicians tend to be far more polarized in their values

than voters (Ibid., p.167), and b) voters and politicians of the same partisan affiliation largely agreed on both cultural and economic issues (Ibid., p.175). For seven out of ten of the value statements used in the test, either two principals (the electorate) and one agent (MPs) in every four actors agreed (or vice-versa). The implications for the nature of substantive representation are potentially far-reaching and point to the benefits of future work on the values of political elites. Not only can such research test assumptions of elite homogeneity but so too could it enlighten the academic understanding of democratic linkages between governor and governed in policy making.

Whilst the inferential findings in these particular studies are interesting, the research base has lacked the rigour of similar work in political psychology. In this field, the theory of basic values devised by Shalom Schwartz (1992) has greatly advanced academic research into personal values as a personality construct in and of themselves, as well as the empirical evidence surrounding the role of personal values in politics. Building on work by theorists such as Allport (1937), Kluckkohn and Strodtbeck (1961), and Rokeach (1973, 1979), Schwartz's theory proposes a near universal theory of human values that has been empirically tested in over 300 samples worldwide (Schwartz 1992; Cieciuch et al., 2013, p.1216). It is to the substance of this theory that this chapter now turns.

II. The Theory of Basic Human Values (BHV)

BHV are, according to Schwartz (1992, 1994), cognitive representations of sought-after, trans-situational targets that act as guiding principles in people's lives. By implication, basic values represent the axioms by which to understand human behaviour; they influence our judgements, our ideals and ultimately inform our daily actions (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 2006). Schwartz (1992, 2006) claims that the incremental growth of primary research into human values since the 1950s points to five key features necessary for the conceptualisation of basic values:¹⁷

- Values are beliefs inextricably linked to subjectivity or emotion;
- Values are motivational insofar as they prescribe desirable end states of attainment;
- Values are abstract and transcend specific actions or situations in a way that norms and attitudes, tied to certain actions, objects or scenarios, cannot;
- Values provide individuals with criteria by which to evaluate other people, policies and their transitory environment;

¹⁷ E.g. Allport 1937; Feather 1975; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Kluckkohn and Strodtbeck, 1961; Kohn and Schooler, 1983; Rokeach 1973.

- Values share a relationship of compatibility, unlike norms and attitudes, that allows people to place them in a hierarchical order of priority.

Using these five criteria, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) derived the first universal typology of basic values that also fulfilled three central requirements of human existence: the needs of individuals as biological organisms, the needs of coordinated social interaction, and the welfare or survival needs of communities (Schwartz 1992). Applying this theoretical framework to existing data from the Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973; see also Chapter 6 in this thesis) and various other value surveys around the world, Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) identified eight motivational types of values: prosocial, restrictive conformity, enjoyment, achievement, maturity, self-direction, security, and power. Four of these were later modified (Schwartz, 1992) to give ten value types that have remained constant in the theory since: Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity, Tradition, Benevolence, Universalism. Table 2.1 summarises the content of each of these motivational value types, their individual value markers, and their theoretical grounding. The individual value markers were selected to represent the range of values expressed by each motivational goal in multiple cultures (Schwartz, 1992, p.17) and were compiled from a detailed review of prior measures used in isolation around the world (Braithwaite and Law, 1985; Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Hofstede, 1980; Levy and Guttman, 1974; Rokeach, 1973).

Table 2.1 - An overview of the ten motivational types in the theory of Basic Human Values, including their value markers, content and related theoretical literature (Source: Schwartz 1992, pp.4-12).

Motivational Type and Value Markers	Summary of content	Theoretical Genesis
Conformity Obedient, Self-discipline, Politeness, Honouring of parents and elders	Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.	In order for social interaction to take place and groups to function successfully, individuals must inhibit socially disruptive tendencies (see Freud 1930; Kohn and Schooler 1983).
Tradition Respect, Devout,	Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or	Groups necessarily require symbols and acts that represent shared experiences and fate; these customs are indicative of the group's

Accepting of life circumstances, Humble, Moderate	religion provide.	togetherness, its unique value, and presume its future survival (see Durkheim 1912/1954; Parsons 1957).
Benevolence Helpful, Responsible, Forgiving, Honest, Loyal, Mature Love, True Friendship	Caring for the welfare of the people with whom one is in frequent personal contact.	Based on the organismic need for affiliation (see Korman 1974; Maslow 1959) and the preservation or enhancement of the in-group (see Williams 1968).
Universalism Equality, Unity with Nature, Wisdom, Social Justice, Broad-minded, Protecting the environment, A world at peace	Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature.	Derived from survival needs that occur when individuals or groups are in contact with others from outside the primary group (see Triandis, McCusker and Hui 1990).
Self-Direction Freedom, Creativity, Independent, Choosing own goals, Curious, Self-respect	Independent thought and action—choosing, creating, exploring.	Derived from the organismic need for control and mastery (see Bandura 1977; White 1959) and the needs of autonomy and independence in social interaction (see Kohn and Schooler 1983)
Stimulation An exciting life, A varied life, Daring	Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.	Stimulation values arise from the organismic need for variety as a prerequisite for optimal levels of activation (see Berlyne 1960; Houston and Mednick 1963).
Hedonism Pleasure, Enjoyment in life	Pleasure, gratification of the senses.	Sensuous gratification and the organismic need or desire for such (see Williams 1968).

<p>Achievement Ambitious, Influential, Capable, Successful, Intelligent, Self-respect</p>	<p>Personal success through demonstrating competence in accordance with social standards.</p>	<p>In order for institutional functioning to succeed and for individuals to acquire the resources necessary for survival, group members are required to perform competently (see Maslow 1959; Rokeach 1973; Scott 1965).</p>
<p>Power Social Power, Wealth, Authority, Preserving public image, Social recognition</p>	<p>Social status and prestige, control and dominance over people and resources.</p>	<p>Power is treated as a value by individuals across cultures (Lonner 1980) as a product of dominance/submission in all interpersonal relations and social institutional hierarchies (Parsons 1957; Schutz 1958).</p>
<p>Security National security, Reciprocal favours, Family security, Sense of belonging, Social order, healthy</p>	<p>Security: Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self.</p>	<p>Security values are extensively referenced in empirical research into both individualist and collectivist societies (see Kluckhohn 1951; Maslow 1959; Williams 1968).</p>

Schwartz goes further in specifying the nature of both conflict and congruence among basic values, as depicted in Figure 2.1. The essential premise is that values are always interdependent: their relationship is either more or less positive or negative depending on how closely situated they are to each other in either direction around the circle. The closer values are situated to one another within the circle, the greater the level of compatibility between their motivations and by implication it becomes more probable that they can be achieved or expressed through the same sentiments and actions. As values increase in distance around the circle, the greater the level of conflict between them and the more likely it is that the actions and attitudes used to express them will diverge.¹⁸

Each of the motivational value types is situated in a continuum around a series of orthogonals that reflect key differences among values. On one dimension the values in the top

¹⁸ See Schwartz (1992, pp.14-15) for a more detailed explanation of psychological compatibility and dissonance.

left of the continuum, which are termed 'Openness to Change', are opposed to those 'Conservation' values in the bottom right. The former stresses receptivity to change as well as independent thought, feeling and action, whereas the latter emphasises submissive self-restriction, maintaining stability and the preservation of traditional practices. The second dimension juxtaposes 'Self-Transcendence' values with 'Self-Enhancement' values. The former essentially encourages acceptance of others as equals and regard for their welfare, whilst the latter gives weight to the pursuit of personal success and dominance over others. Only Hedonism defies this categorisation, overlapping both 'Openness to Change' and 'Self-Enhancement'. The four higher order values can be used in small data sets or to pass a general comment on the value orientations of individuals or groups, without detracting from or altering the overall theory.

Fig 2.1 Diagrammatic construction of the interdependent relations between the 10 lower-order basic values and the 4 higher-order basic values [Source: Schwartz (2012, p. 9)].



All research using basic values should account for the fact that motivational differences between value types are continuous rather than discrete; values sit on a continuum and as such the theory-based partitioning of the space is arbitrary (Schwartz 1992; Schwartz et al., 2012). Values that sit near or on the boundary of partition lines embody a combination of motivational goals associated with the value types either side of that boundary. This has allowed for refinements of the theory using complex statistical testing based on multi-dimensional scaling and confirmatory factor analysis that partition the continuum into two, four, ten, and nineteen motivational value types without detracting from the original content of the theory (Schwartz et al., 2012). This goes back to a central premise, iterated in nearly all

Schwartz publications, that 'the circular arrangement of values represents a continuum of related motivations, like the circular continuum of colours, rather than a set of discrete motivations' (Davidov et al., 2008, p. 424).¹⁹ Here the theory builds on previous work (Guttman 1982) that has shown that items will evenly fill a geometrical space that is created to represent the inter-correlations among them when those items can adequately represent all factors of a content domain.

Using an early version of the Schwartz Value Survey (this and other measures will be discussed in chapter 6), Schwartz (1992) tested the theory of BHV with 40 large-N samples from twenty countries that were representative of each nation in terms of religion, age, and gender. The inter-correlation matrix of the importance ratings given to values on the survey was projected onto a two-dimensional space using the Guttman-Lingoes Small Space Analysis (SSA) (Guttman, 1982); this version of non-metric multidimensional scaling for structural analysis of similarity data (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984) represents the values as points, the distances between which reflect the empirical relations among values according to the correlations between their importance ratings. In 92.5% of samples *at least* eight motivational value types formed a distinct region in the SSA (for criteria, see Schwartz, 1992, p.22); the modal number of moves (of individual value markers) required to match the motivational structure of the theory was 0.5 and the median was only 1.5 (Schwartz, 1992, p.31). Given the expected effect of random error, Schwartz (1992, p.36) was able to suggest that his model accounted for 'near universality'. The content and structure of BHV has since been tested and reaffirmed across different socio-demographic and cultural contexts in a long list of studies worldwide (see Cieciuch et al., 2013, p.1216).

According to Sagiv and Roccas (2017), the properties of BHV provide a number of advantages for social science research compared to other personality constructs. Firstly, all values in the theory are inherently desirable and reflect important or worthy goals for people. Even Power values, which tend to receive the lowest scores in representative national samples around the world (Bardi and Schwartz, 2001), receive average ratings of c.2.3 on a scale of 0

¹⁹ Gouveia et al. (2014, p.41) challenged the Schwartz taxonomy for its multiple configurations, which they believed to demonstrate a lack of 'parsimony and theoretical focus'. This criticism failed to acknowledge the theoretical core of BHV, that (1) values sit on a motivational continuum and (2) values are situated around the circle according to the congruency of their motivational goals (Schwartz, 2014). The circular continuum is in reality nothing more than a single curved dimension in the same manner of any theoretical circle (Borg, 2013) and as such the orthogonal or partitioning of the circle should not be misconstrued as dimensions themselves. This unifying idea is extremely parsimonious and allows researchers (guided by the principle of congruency in the theory) to divide the circular continuum into the smallest or largest number of values required to explain the focus of their study.

(Not important at all) to 6 (Extremely important). Instead of understanding basic values as distinct personality features such as traits, it is their relational rather than sum importance that matters most. This provides greater explanatory purchase when examining agency in ambiguous contexts such as elite politics. Moreover, people tend to find their own values more desirable than their traits and express less of a wish to change them (Roccas et al., 2014). Their inherent desirability makes BHV uniquely powerful as a motivator of behaviour and, consequently, incredibly useful as a way for social scientists to explain situated agency.

Secondly, BHV are guiding principles that provide social justification for choices and behaviour in a way that traits, attitudes and intelligence do not (Sagiv and Roccas, 2017, p.5). Personal values are used to convey legitimacy on behaviours and can, given their trans-situational quality, be used to justify two normatively opposing choices in relation to one problem (cf. Kurz et al., 2010). In seeking to explain why politicians act in contradictory ways, how they seek to justify their decisions to electors, or even how they reconcile personal beliefs with partisan actions, BHV carry greater analytical purchase than other personality characteristics. Finally, BHV are stable over time and across situations. Whereas attitudes might only predict a specific behaviour in one context, BHV can be used to evaluate specific and general behaviours in separate contexts. For example, Benevolence values have been used to predict behaviours as diverse as lending items to neighbours (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003), contributing money in a social dilemma game (Sagiv et al., 2011), volunteering on academic projects (Grant and Mayer, 2009) and career choices (Knafo and Sagiv, 2004). As a personality characteristic, these properties make BHV particularly appropriate for a) comparing MPs with the general public; b) clarifying the extent of self-selection in political recruitment; c) minimising the effects of occupational socialisation in the analysis of MPs' behaviours; and d) operationalising personality data for behavioural analysis across varied and often ambiguous parliamentary settings.

III. Demographics and Life Circumstances

The previous section provided a detailed discussion of the theory of Basic Human Values (BHV) - their structure, content and advantages over other personality characteristics. In studying the BHV of national politicians in the UK, this thesis offers the first direct empirical analysis of personality in the operation of national politics in the UK. One of the core narratives at the heart of academic and journalistic commentary on elite politics in the UK revolves around the descriptive gulf between ordinary people and politicians in terms of occupation, education, age, and gender imbalances. In order to support the targeted research

agenda presented in chapters 3-5 of this thesis, this section will now briefly discuss the way in which salient demographic data might be expected to affect BHV in the Westminster population.


Typically basic values are adapted to an individual's life circumstances in childhood and adolescence (Schwartz, 1994, p.13). In most cases people will heighten the importance they attribute to a value that is achievable and reduce the importance attributed to one that is frequently thwarted or clearly unattainable (Bardi and Schwartz, 2001, 2003). The reverse tends to be true only for values associated with material well-being and security; when these are difficult to attain, their relative importance to an individual increases (Schwartz, 2005, p.13). The life circumstances of any person in society will be, to a greater or lesser extent, determined by their education, age, gender, and other central characteristics that direct their socialisation and learning experiences. As such these variables act as influential antecedents of differences between peoples' value hierarchies.

At the same time, it is rote in the literature on psychological assessments of political leaders (e.g. Post 2003) that actors' personalities cannot be conceived or operationalised in behavioural analysis in vacuo: the researcher must keep in mind the personal and political, social and cultural contexts in which that actor resides. Stone and Schaffner (1988) elaborate this point in their field model (Fig. 2.2, below). In order to make informed hypotheses about the BHV of national politicians, and in turn make reasoned judgements about the effect of BHV on their political behaviour, it is important to consider the contextual factors that have affected any MP's development. Value based decisions affect the life circumstances that individuals experience in their formative years, and to which they may in turn adapt their values (Schwartz 2005, p.23); it is likely therefore that the immediate social milieu (friends, colleagues, cultural environment) will share reciprocal influences with politicians' BHV. However, other factors have been shown to have direct developmental effects on BHV, including education, age and gender. These will each now be briefly discussed.

Education:

In previous studies education has related most positively to Self-Direction values and most negatively to Security, Conformity and Tradition values (Schwartz 2005, p.14). The greater an individual's degree of education, the more likely it is that they have developed the freedom from close instruction to question given truths and act on intellectual curiosity;

Figure 2.2. Stone and Schaffner (1988) Field Model



these conditions are crucial for Self-Direction values and weaken the importance of Tradition values (Kohn and Schooler 1983). Education also equips individuals with the wherewithal, on average, to secure more financially lucrative jobs, which weakens the importance of Security values.²⁰ To a lesser extent education has also been found to relate positively with Stimulation (enhancing the desire for new experiences), Hedonism (giving individuals more agency to indulge), and Achievement (encouraging individuals to work towards socially acknowledged achievements) (Schwartz, 2005).²¹

However, education shares only minimal correlations with Universalism values in samples around the world. When Universalism is broken down into its three component concepts, Schwartz (2005, p.15) found that education shared a positive and consistent correlation between countries with an individual's 'tolerance for difference', but shared correlations of zero with their 'social concern for all' and 'concern for nature'. This poses interesting questions for the nature and quality of democratic representation if this trend also bears out in an educated elite sample. The cohort of MPs studied in this thesis, elected in the 2015 General Election, share with their predecessors an extraordinarily high level of education. Of the 650 MPs elected in 2015, 33% went to fee-paying private schools (compared with just 7% of the population) and the overwhelming majority are university educated; 23% studied for their degree at Oxford or Cambridge (Hunter and Holden, 2015).

²⁰ This discussion is based on collated data from a number of studies around the world (see Schwartz 2005 for a full description of the sample populations).

²¹ Data from around the world (Schwartz, 2005) shows that the order of correlations between individual motivational value types and education conforms to the monotonic theoretical model. The Spearman rank correlation for relations of education to the integrated theory of expected priorities was .95 and .89 in two large-n collated data samples.

Age:

According to Schwartz (2005), age can affect value priorities through three specific systematic pathways: certain age cohorts will have experienced collective critical junctures such as depression or war; physical ageing is accompanied by a loss of memory and physical strength; and the activities associated with each life stage (such as raising a child) constrain or facilitate the achievement of particular values. To take the first of these, the cohort effect is nothing new. Inglehart (1997) demonstrated that age came with a greater tendency towards materialist concerns about economic and physical security as compared to the post-materialist values of self-expression more common among young people. Although individual values may rise and fall in relative importance in the face of specific circumstances, the value hierarchies formed during adolescence have proven to remain relatively stable thereafter (Schwartz, 2005, p.18). The average MP in the 2015 Parliament was 51 years old (Hunter and Holden, 2015), which means that most MPs were born during or since the Baby Boom era of economic prosperity and security (Owram 1997). In terms of political representation, it might be expected that these circumstances will have a cohort effect on MPs' BHV that produces less emphasis on Security, Tradition and Conformity than older cohorts. This will be tentatively tested with cross-sectional comparisons of younger and older MPs in this study.

Alternatively, it is accepted that energy, cognitive speed, memory and sensory reactions dull with age (Shaie and Willis 1991); in the later stages of life this leads to risk aversion and an incremental move towards increased Security and Conformity values to harness predictability and avoid incomprehensible change in a way that prioritises intrinsic rewards over extrinsic ones (Inceoglu et al, 2012; Kooij et al, 2011). This is further supported by findings from the World Values Survey (Warr, 2008). Different life stages also impose different opportunities and constraints on individuals that can affect value priorities, or at least those values in an individual's hierarchy that are most frequently activated. Early adulthood tends to encourage Achievement and Stimulation values at the expense of Conservation values as young people take up challenges to 'break into' a career or succeed in education. Conversely middle age brings with it work and family responsibilities that prohibit risk-taking and limit the possibility of change in a way that emphasises Security and Tradition values. Taken together these various analyses of the effect of age indicate the strongest positive

correlations with Security, Tradition and Conformity.²² Given that most MPs are in their middle adulthood, it might be expected that they will (all other things being equal) show stronger scores for these Conservation values. The discussion presented here covers two alternative predictions for the effect of age upon MPs' BHV that will be brought to bear on the data analysis process.

Gender:

Psychoanalytical theory has contended that women display greater communal affiliation to others than men, whereas men are more individualised, instrumental and agentic in their concerns and behaviour (Chodorow, 1990). This has been echoed in 'cultural feminism', which contrasts male autonomy to women's 'self-in-relation' (Scott 1988). Socialisation theories have also discussed the myriad ways in which communities socialise boys and girls to assume separate roles and life goals (Williams and Best, 1990). In student and teacher samples from more than 50 countries, BHV scores have confirmed these hypothesised gender associations: women tended to prioritise Benevolence and Universalism values, whilst men gave greater priority to Stimulation, Hedonism and Achievement values (Schwartz, 2005, p. 21). However, the size and direction of these correlations shows much less consistency than the effects of either age or education, implying that the associations implied by gender theory are not as strong as assumed.

Alternative interactionist theorists have proposed a fluid approach to gender studies characterised by variability (Deaux and Major 1987; Walker 1994); in this model transitory factors mean that gendered behaviour will only emerge in particular interactions that are socially understood or explained in gendered patterns. This is likely to provide the most apposite explanation of BHV variance among men and women MPs in the UK Parliament. Although the gender imbalance at Westminster has improved greatly since the Sex Discrimination (Electoral Candidates) Bill, there is still a long way to go to achieve equality of access.²³ In a stubbornly masculine environment (Childs, 2010), it is likely that women MPs will be governed by less concern for stable or harmonious social relations (i.e. values) and will be more independent and confident when it comes to violating social norms than their male counterparts. Such characteristics would seem highly apposite for the challenge of breaking into a relatively closed and male-dominated environment; one where their very

²² Findings with the SVS and PVQ from a range of countries have confirmed each of these associations. The overall Spearman rank correlations between the expected and actual correlations of age to BHV were .87 (SVS) and .90 (PVQ). See Schwartz (2005 p.19) for more detail.

²³ In 1987 women comprised just 6% of all MPs; in 2015 this rose to 29% (Smith Institute, 2015).

presence, let alone the effective execution of their jobs, entails defying social expectations and depends upon strong Self-Direction values.

IV. Operationalising Basic Human Values for Behavioural Explanation

Studying the BHV of national politicians can not only illuminate the nature of the so-called 'political class', but offer a more exacting and rigorous lens through which to analyse agency in the UK Parliament. In order to use BHV as determinants or predictors of political behaviour, the theoretical link between values and behaviour must first be established. Research in the twentieth century was mixed in its appreciation for, and understanding of, the role of values in affecting behaviour (cf. McClelland, 1985). This has been challenged by an abundant research literature in the last two decades that, using the Schwartz taxonomy of BHV, has shown when and how values constitute congruent behaviours and choices in everyday life (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Roccas and Sagiv, 2010; Sagiv et al., 2011). This section will now review the theoretical mechanisms by which BHV impact on behaviour.

The influence of BHV upon peoples' behaviour is a crucial claim for the utility of the theory. The extant literature outlines four 'linking processes' through which BHV affect behaviour:

1. *Value Activation* - values will affect behaviour when the immediate situation activates them (Verplanken and Holland, 2002); the likelihood of a value being activated in the first place depends on its accessibility, which is heightened in the case of each individual's most important values (Bardi and Schwartz, 2001). Verplanken and Holland (2002) demonstrated this when they primed participants with environmental and charitable words; those participants who had already scored highest for Universalism and Benevolence later made more environmentally friendly choices in group tasks and donated more to Amnesty International. Activation experiments like this have shown that 'activating values causes behaviour' [*sic.*] (Schwartz, 2005, p.24).

2. *Motivation* - Values prescribe motivational goals and to that extent they can induce valences on those actions that might promote the attainment of said goals (Feather, 1995). Some have taken this argument to limit the explanatory purchase of values to those behaviours that stem from conscious choice decisions in which the individual has the time to weigh up pros and cons (when basic values are most likely to be activated). This contention has an empirical basis but there is also a body of evidence to suggest that values, often as unconscious constructs (Schwartz, 1992), influence behaviour in common and spontaneous

real-life situations as well.²⁴ As central features of the self, basic values (especially high priority ones) will induce automatic affective responses to direct behaviour in all and any situations where they are apposite (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 2005).²⁵

3. *Attention, perception and interpretation* - This linking process relates to the focusing capacity of high priority values, which direct individuals to identify and address value-relevant aspects of the immediate scenario (Schwartz et al., 2000). Thus each individual will interpret a situation according to their own important values and goals, leading to a decision about the most desirable lines of action.

4. *Action planning* - The higher the level of importance given to a particular value, the more likely it is that an individual will plan to reach associated goals through value-expressive behaviour. This theory was tested by Gollwitzer (1996) across a series of experiments that demonstrated how planning activities clarify goals and focus attention on the pros of behaviours that can service high priority values.

In natural settings as well as specific occupational, cultural or social domains, there will likely be a range of factors influencing behaviour. As such value-behaviour correlations might be expected to be weak. However, a number of studies, including those already mentioned in section II, have shown strong associations between basic values and behaviours. In Israel Bardi and Schwartz (2003) generated sets of 6-10 daily behaviours for each of the motivational types in the theory of BHV (see Fig. 2.3 for examples) and compared both self- and other- reports of behaviour (frequency within a year relative to opportunities to perform each behaviour; see Buss and Craik (1983) for more information on act-frequency measures of behaviour) with data from the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS). Data was collected from three separate samples. Correlations between values and value-expressive behaviours were tested and SSA (Smallest Space Analysis) projections were used to test the structure of value-expressive behaviours according to the circular continuum of congruency inherent to BHV. All correlations between values and their expected behaviours when self-reported were statistically significant and substantial; of a possible 180 deviations from the expected motivational continuum, only 4 were observed (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003, p. 1211-1215).


²⁴ For example, basic values successfully predicted whether counselees behaved independently or dependently during a series of career counselling sessions (Sagiv and Schwartz, 2002).

²⁵ For example values have successfully predicted students' choice of university course (Feather, 1988) and voting patterns for political parties (Schwartz, 1996). Other examples from early studies are summarised by Schwartz and Bardi (2001).

Figure 2.3 Table of exemplar daily behaviours expressive of motivational value types. [Source: Bardi and Schwartz (2003)]

Values	Behavior Items
Power	Pressure others to go along with my preferences and opinions Choose friends and relationships based on how much money they have
Achievement	Study late into the night before exams even if I studied well in the semester Take on many commitments
Hedonism	Take it easy and relax Consume food or drinks even when I'm not hungry or thirsty
Stimulation	Watch thrillers Do unconventional things
Self-direction	Examine the ideas behind rules and regulations before obeying them Come up with novel set-ups for my living space
Universalism	Use environmentally friendly products Make sure everyone I know receives equal treatment
Benevolence	Agree easily to lend things to neighbors Keep promises I have made
Tradition	Observe traditional customs on holidays Show modesty with regard to my achievements and talents
Conformity	Obey my parents Avoid confrontations with people I don't like
Security	Refrain from opening my door to strangers Buy products that were made in my country

Figure 2.4 Joint smallest space analysis of values and observer rated behaviours [Source: Bardi and Schwartz (2003)]



As expected by the prototypical structure of BHV, Figure 2.4 shows that behaviours are located in close proximity to the values they are supposed to express (and adjacent compatible values) and opposite to those values with which they are supposed to conflict.²⁶ SSA analyses usually produce distinct regions for different variables or types of measurement (Borg and Shye, 1995) but here it is impossible to partition the space into distinct separate regions for behaviours and values. This suggests that the relationship between values and behaviours proved to be a stronger organising principle than either the source of measurement or the type of variable. However, Bardi and Schwartz (2003) suggest that the differential strength of correlations between behaviours and values might also reflect normative pressures identified by the person-situation controversy, whereby internal factors that normally influence behaviour are mitigated by situational pressures (Shoda 1999). People may adjust behaviours to the norms of a group or situation even when these are in conflict with their own

²⁶ The structure of value-expressive behaviours cannot be explained based on the content of the behaviours. For instance there is no obvious compatibility between 'using environmentally friendly products' (Universalism) and 'agreeing easily to lend things to neighbours' (Benevolence). Distinctions are equally difficult to make between 'conflicting' value-expressive behaviours. Compatibility and conflict between value-expressive behaviours can only be understood according to the relations between their underlying motivations (i.e. BHV) (Bardi and Schwartz 2003, p. 1214).

basic values, thus the relationship between values and behaviours may be weaker in domains with strong normative pressures. Given the strength of formal and informal institutional expectations in Westminster - and within political parties - this will be a key consideration when assessing links between MPs' BHV and their parliamentary behaviour.

In addressing this 'person-situation' controversy, as well as cultural variation in the application of BHV, Hanel et al. (2017) augment the academic understanding of how values influence behaviour via the theory of instantiation - that is, the cognitive and social links between general categories of values and specific behavioural examples or manifestations. The social implications of instantiation theory have been demonstrated in a range of studies by Lord et al. (1991, 1994). For example, consistency between basic values and a range of behaviours relating to gay men, university students, those affected by social policies, and those with mental illness, depended upon how 'typical' the target person was for the participant. These results were affected, especially in the case of mental health, by how skilled or experienced the participant was in mental ill health and those suffering from it. In terms of politics, we may say that policy-relevant judgements and behaviours may overweight typical instances of a set category (social group etc.) and ignore or underweight atypical cases. This is a case in itself for a varied and diverse Parliament not only in terms of values and attitudes, but also in terms of a range of demographic and cultural variables that might affect the types of instantiations brought to bear on value-informed discussions. At the level of daily parliamentary behaviour, whether in the constituency or Westminster, the theory of instantiation may also help to explain when MPs (especially those without prior experience of politics) might defer to the order of the Party Whip or even why MPs with similar values across the House of Commons might act differently.

Finally, this section turns to the link between BHV and prosocial behaviours. Prosocial behaviour refers to actions that benefit other people or society, especially where that action does not also advantage the agent (Twenge et al., 2007). As such, prosocial behaviours are particularly pertinent for the study of elite politics, where an actor's entire profession is dedicated to serving others locally, regionally, nationally and internationally. Daily helping behaviours have been associated positively with Self-Transcendence values and negatively to Conservation and Self-Enhancement values (Daniel et al., 2015). It makes sense that prosocial behaviours might fall along these orthogonal, suggesting an individual's concern for others or oneself might promote or inhibit helping behaviours respectively. However, Sanderson and McQuilkin (2017, p.78) urge caution that this pattern might be affected by the risk of the

requisite behaviour (in high risk scenarios, Openness to Change values might be a better predictor of prosocial behaviour), and the status of the 'asker' (in a situation of organisational, social or familial hierarchy, Conservation values might explain why individuals defer to help certain others). It is highly possible, therefore, that MPs high in Self-Enhancement values might still engage in helping behaviours if, for example, it is in response to a request from frontbench colleagues. In this instance, prosocial behaviour might be a product of obsequious deference or tactical, goal-oriented ambition for long-term promotion.

Three stand-out studies have examined the link between BHV and political activism as a prosocial behaviour aimed at societal change. Using an index of nine legal forms of political activism (including public demonstration and contacting politicians), Schwartz (2010) found strong positive associations between levels of activism and Self-Transcendence values and Openness to Change values, weak to non-existent associations with Self-Enhancement values, and negative associations with Conservation values. These results were confirmed by Vecchione et al. (2015), who examined data on BHV and modes of political activism from 28 countries across four continents. They found that people were more politically active the higher they scored for Self-Transcendence and Openness to Change values, and the lower they scored for Conservation values. Identical patterns were found by Pacheco and Owen (2015) using data from the European Social Survey. Although these studies did not use elite samples, they suggest that politics, as a prosocial behaviour, attracts people who are not only deeply motivated by concepts of equality and justice for others (Self-Transcendence values) but also take risks, think and act autonomously (Openness to Change values).

However, secondary analysis by Vecchione et al. (2015, p.19) also unearthed a positive association between Power values and *conventional* activism. In prior studies Self-Enhancement values had failed to correlate positively with political activity. Conventional activism (defined by the authors as monetary donations to parties and contacting/working for a political organisation) would, by implication, involve political parties, trade unions and other political businesses that have the capacity to produce and distribute resources (Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2003). This activity is therefore likely to be favoured by people whose value orientations favour personal prestige or control, and as such people who view conventional political organisations as a path to achieving those goals. The correlation was weak but one might expect this result to be more substantial when testing increasingly formal modes of political activism such as representative office.

V. Personal and Political Values

In analysing national politicians as proactive as well as reactive agents in UK parliamentary politics, and in bringing robust psychological theories and measures to that task, this thesis makes an original contribution to the academic study of democratic representation. The previous section made a forceful case for the causal relationship between BHV and political behaviour. However, Schwartz and other political psychologists working in this field have been accused of empirical bias in presuming direct relationships between personal values and political behaviours (Leimgruber, 2011). There is a strong argument to suggest that personal values, from a greater degree of abstraction and distance from the political world, require *political* values in order to affect behaviour (Steenbergen and Leimgruber, 2010). There is empirical research to support the link between personal and political values; for instance, authoritarianism has correlated positively with Conservation values (Davidov et al, 2008) and negatively with Openness to Change values (Rohan and Zanna, 1996). However, empirical research that integrates personal and political values into models aimed at explaining political behaviours is scarce. This section will address the issue of interaction between personal and political values, reviewing relevant empirical evidence and offering a model to understand the relation of one to the other in the explanation of political behaviour.

Studies in political science have focused overwhelmingly on political values, commonly those '*ism*' ideologies such as egalitarianism, liberalism and so on, that are perceived to underpin political evaluations and behaviours. However, these political values are highly contextual to the domain of politics and moreover contested between political contexts as well (e.g. Feldman, 2003). Schwartz et al. (2010) contend that these values are expressions, particular to politics, of underlying personal values that direct behaviour in all areas of daily life. This study adopts the theory of BHV in order to capture politically relevant and meaningful orientations across cultural and social contexts.

Two dimensional models of political orientation or ideology (e.g. liberal vs. conservative) are easily aligned with the bipolar orthogonals of BHV. For example, a standard liberalism scale, charting issues of civil liberties and individual rights, mirrors the Openness to Change/Conservation dimension of BHV. Similarly, a socioeconomic scale concerning resource distribution and state intervention, maps onto the Self-Transcendence/Self-Enhancement dimension of BHV. In making this connection, it is assumed that individuals are likely to be drawn to those political values, and in turn the parties or policies that represent

them, that promote and defend the personal values (and the associated motivational goals) that they cherish (Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Schwartz et al., 2010). A number of empirical studies now support this bi-dimensional theory of BHV and political orientation (Caprara et al., 2006, 2010; Thorisdottir et al., 2007).


Using data collected using the PVQ-21 in the European Social Survey, Piurko et al. (2011, p.554) found that basic values accounted for more variance in self-placement on a Left-Right political scale than socio-demographic variables in 10 out of 11 'liberal' western countries. However, this finding did not hold up in post-communist countries (Ibid., p.554) and the study points to the need for extreme sensitivity to context. For example, 'new politics' theory has put forward the case for ever greater individualisation in the politics of economically developed countries (Inglehart, 1997); where there is a strong service-based economy coupled with high levels of educational attainment and urbanisation, it is more likely that individual political choices will be influenced by personal preference and less by social context (Evans, 2000; Sniderman et al., 1991). It is not surprising that, at the time of Piurko et al.'s data collection in 2002, the 11 liberal countries in the sample were indexed as the wealthiest using a measure of GDP per capita, and the post-communist countries were the poorest. In the UK the individualisation of politics is well documented (Franklin et al., 1992; Inglehart, 1990) and it is expected that values will continue to supersede class and other collective interests as the critical foundation of political orientations (Caprara and Zimbardo, 2004). However, the link between personal values and political orientations at the elite level, especially as expressed through behaviours, is yet to be tested.

At the public level, Leimgruber (2011) used structural equation modelling with data from Swiss elections in 2007 to investigate the relationship between BHV and precise political values in the act of voting. He found that the direct effects of personal values on voting behaviour became insignificant when political values were introduced (2011, p. 118). In other words, the effect of personal values on behaviour was entirely mediated by political values. However, Leimgruber's (2011, p.119) study also showed substantial correlations between personal and political values, and in turn the indirect effect of personal values on behaviour remained substantial and highly significant in ten out of twelve pathways. It is entirely possible, therefore, that abstract personal beliefs require political translation in order to have specific behavioural outcomes in the domain of politics. Van Deth (1995, p.6) is clear that personal '[...] values of individuals can be transformed into political orientations which have some impact on their behavioural intentions.' Not wanting to lose sight of what politics

is and how it really works, I accept that behavioural choices must be traced back to BHV through salient political orientations that allow a voter/citizen/politician to evaluate specific political issues in line with personal needs.

There is not yet a working diagram of this causal sequence and as such, I draw upon the structuring principle of socialisation research used, specifically, in an allocative model of politics (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969). This principle (see Figure 2.5) utilises childhood psychology to posit that early political learning or basic orientations acquired during childhood structure adult beliefs and specific political attitudes (Greenstein, 1965, p.12). The aim of socialisation studies has been to identify those integumented basic goals and attitudes that are sustained into adulthood but sit separately to overt political opinions (Pye and Verba, 1965). This mirrors the Schwartz theory of BHV, which represents those underlying motivations that, whilst able to evolve, are relatively stable and change only incrementally in accordance with prior as well as new experiences.

Figure 2.5. The structuring principle applied to politics as integrated with a theory of Basic Human Values [Source: Adapted from Searing (1976)]



In prior socialisation research, the distinction has been drawn between political orientations, as central perceptions and beliefs, and political attitudes, which represent specific approaches to individual issues (Easton and Dennis, 1969). It is contended here that 'political orientations' may be more suitably defined in terms of BHV, since they symbolise inherent motivations. The allocative model of politics has used this structuring principle as an

explanation for policy outputs, tracing them back to political demands which are interpreted as expressions of mass orientations or values among the public (Easton, 1965, p.38). The diagrammatic expression (Figure 2.5) of the allocative model shows: childhood political orientations and adult experiences combine to inform an evolving set of adult political orientations (as captured by BHV), which then structure specific adult issue beliefs (cognitive rationalities in the political domain) and in turn dictate political behaviour.

Although this study accepts the work of Leimgruber (2011) and the contention that personal values require mediation through political values, there is not yet sufficient empirical evidence to suggest that this holds beyond the highly politicised act of voting. Therefore, the dotted arrow in Figure 2.5 connecting political orientations directly to political behaviour reflects the theoretical primacy given to BHV, which I propose will directly guide thought and action when salient political terms are absent or insufficient knowledge has been accrued to form relevant cognitive rationalities. Socialisation research using the allocative framework has sought to explain policy outcomes by moving backwards through this model to mass political orientations. The present study moves the other way with a focus on political elites, determining how or if their orientations (BHV) have ultimate influence upon political behaviour and policy decisions. Chapter 4 of this thesis adds nuance to this model by placing it in the specific context of Westminster politics and thus setting up bespoke hypotheses for a range of elite political behaviours in the UK.

“In our age there is no such thing as 'keeping out of politics.' All issues are political issues, and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred and schizophrenia.”

George Orwell (1946)

W

ho Rules? A Deconstruction of the Political Class (RQ1)

The dominant narrative of democratic elections, large systemic policy decisions, and the relationship between governor and governed in the UK is changing. Whether presidential or not, a popular preoccupation with political personalities, especially figureheads, has become preeminent in major parliamentary systems (e.g. Mughan, 2000; McAllister, 2007). Yet in spite of a burgeoning research pool that contributes empirical weight to the claim that public disengagement itself rests, to a large extent, on evaluations of politicians and their behaviour (Birch and Allen, 2015a; Stoker et al., 2016), politicians have remained largely conspicuous by their absence as the subject of political research on democratic renewal in general, and parliamentary studies in particular. In its interdisciplinary approach to the personal side of politics, this thesis seeks to fill that gap identified in Jack Corbett's (2014, p.508) call for future 'investigation[s] of the views and experiences of political actors about their job', and Colin Hay's (2007, p.162) argument for a greater study of the motivations behind elite political behaviour.

This chapter builds on the conceptual and theoretical groundwork presented in the opening of this thesis to advance the first inquiry of a more specific three-part research agenda.²⁷ This chapter focuses on 'who' occupies elected office in the palace of Westminster and 'why' they choose to do it. To tighten its focus and salience within these broader debates, this chapter interrogates the substantive and conceptual use of the term 'political class', which now operates as a catch-all and bluntly homogeneous metaphor, a derogative term that is employed as much to denote certain people in politics as it is to associate those actors with symptoms of social, economic, political and even moral crisis (Borchert and Zeiss, 2003;

²⁷ Chapters 3-5 build a research agenda for psychological studies of Parliament that uses MPs' basic values to a) understand who enters politics, b) explain how they behave in office, and c) address broader concerns about the nature of representative democracy.

Cotta and Best, 2007). However, Allen and Cairney (2015, p.6) argue that ‘many of the complaints put at the door of the ‘political class’ relate to Westminster politics and those with governing power or influence’. At the same time, the literature speaking to this debate talks of careerist attitudes, self-serving behaviour and greed – characteristics that are psychological in nature – without the methodological tools to link cause with effect or to discriminate between individuals at different levels of governance or with different occupational or cultural backgrounds. It is in this context that this chapter stakes the contribution of this thesis to three integrated debates: the ambition/self-selection, the professionalization, and the homogenisation of politicians. In doing so, this chapter scopes significant gaps in the extant research base and speaks to these with three theoretically informed hypotheses about ‘who’ occupies the UK Parliament.

I. ‘Only in it for themselves!’ – Towards a Model for Candidate Entry and Evaluation

To understand Parliament through its actors and to interrogate ‘who’ enters the political class, this thesis necessarily engages with derisive popular judgements about the moral fibre of our politicians - studied extensively by a post-millennial literature on anti-politics (see Chapter 5). Whilst chapter 5 will deal in detail with the role of personality politics in public disengagement from politics, this section focuses on those psychological assumptions pertaining to the career choice of aspiring MPs and subsequent evaluations of their execution of that choice. These two processes are reciprocally connected. The personal factors that lead individuals to stand in parliamentary elections (candidate activation) will likely be sustained as influential variables ‘on the job’ (candidate performance). This section tackles candidate evaluation and activation in turn, synthesising literature on political ambition to scope a significant gap in the research base on political recruitment.

As David Runciman (2008, p.196) argues, there are no easy answers to the question of what motivates parliamentary candidates to stand in the first place. The ambition that *might* come with a political class of professional politicians is not necessarily accompanied by material self-interest. Social psychologists researching workplace performance have already shown that material incentives are just one among many motivations that drive employees, and that extreme monetary reward can actually stymie enthusiasm and job satisfaction (Gregg et al., 2012). This should be set against a context of parliamentary careers that are not comparatively lucrative: MPs’ pay is only two-thirds that of an average GP or school Head Teacher, less than half that of a local authority Chief Executive and half that of elected

politicians in Australia, Italy and the US (see Hindmoor, 2017, p.11). The additional payments received by MPs with additional responsibilities (i.e. Ministerial portfolio, Select Committee Chairmanship) do not change this picture drastically (see Fisher, 2015). Indeed, the functionality of democracy relies upon capable and politically engaged citizens who are willing and able to run for office in order to present voters with a choice of policy alternatives as well as representatives. In that respect, the normative undesirability of ambition becomes more ambiguous. For the purpose of empirical investigation of politicians' performance, I draw the analytical distinction between ambition to influence policy and politics for *others*, and the ambition to dominate resources or people for *oneself*. Again this distinction points to the necessity of interdisciplinary scholarship and appropriate methodologies.²⁸

Whilst candidate evaluation is important in and of itself, the question of 'who' chooses a parliamentary political career goes back in essence to the moment at which any one candidate chooses to run. In order to understand MPs *in situ* and to truly differentiate the political class from the general public, it is necessary to conceive the factors that lead them to a job that the vast majority of the public never even contemplates. The decision to present oneself to an electorate for scrutiny demands sacrifice; the individual must be able to surrender privacy and daily routines, experience probable and repeated rejection, and invest vast amounts of time and money to enter the least trusted profession in the UK (Ipsos Mori, 2016). The question of why individuals choose a political career and what separates them from those who do not and never would, has troubled political scientists researching political ambition and recruitment for over 60 years. However, this literature is limited in its depth and breadth. There are case studies and historical accounts of politicians' journeys (e.g. Gaddie, 2004; Jenkins, 1998); there are biographies and autobiographies written by candidates and ex-MPs (e.g. Benn, 2004; Blair, 2010; Lawson, 1992); and there are academic analyses of the structural conditions that discriminate levels of ambition among strategically minded actors (e.g. Schlesinger, 1966; Stone and Maisel, 2003). These studies not only elide the personal individual differences that foster aspirations of a political career but they also tend to be retrospective and lacking empirical rigour.

As with research on political behaviour, the rational choice paradigm has become the reference point by which political scientists have studied candidate emergence and political ambition. This approach was spurned from Joseph Schlesinger's (1966) *Ambition and*

²⁸ The theory of Basic Human Values operates at a series of abstractions that allows for parsimonious as well as precise analysis of participants' values. This allows for a refined and nuanced understanding of differences in individual motivations that might not be apparent from participant observation, document analysis, or interviews.

Politics, which framed ambition as a response to political opportunity structures. Subsequent studies of the effects of term limits, legislative professionalisation, party congruence with constituents, and party recruitment criteria and procedures have dominated a largely US-centric literature on political ambition (e.g. Levine and Hyde, 1977; Maestas et al., 2006; Moncrief et al., 2001; Kazee, 1994). This research base builds from the premise that ambition itself is a fixed attribute of the individual that is expressed when individuals face favourable political opportunity structures (Prinz, 1993). This theory has burnished a model for micro-analysis of politicians' decisions *inter alia* to remain in their elected position (static ambition), to seek higher office (progressive ambition), or to step down/retire before an election (discrete ambition).²⁹ There are two remarkable limitations of this literature.

Firstly, in treating political ambition and candidate emergence as the function of structural conditions in the political landscape, rational choice studies limit themselves to highly particularistic explanations that do not account for individual, psychological factors. The rational choice paradigm put forward by Schlesinger and his disciples treats all [eligible] members of the public as equally desirous of candidacy should they be faced with the right political opportunity structure. Despite a nascent body of evidence to the contrary (Lawless and Fox, 2005, 2010), such a model does not account for the ways in which personal socialisation experiences, attitudinal dispositions or individual characteristics may discriminate between individual interest in running for office in the first place. I contend that individual differences at the personal level, specifically personality differences, ultimately presage any cognizance of political opportunity structures (Figure 3.2, below).

The second limitation of this research pool derives from its coalescence around ambition as a static psychological construct that is assessed according to exogenous institutional criteria (Maestas et al., 2006). Ambition is portioned out in lesser or greater degrees on a progressive spectrum of institutional positions of power; in this guise there is little wonder that ambition, when talking of politicians, has been conflated with self-interest (cf. Corbett, 2015). As with evaluations of office holders, empirical investigation of ambition requires a more nuanced understanding of where it comes from and what purpose it serves for each individual. By contrast to rational choice studies of political ambition, I tackle the candidate emergence process within an interdisciplinary framework. As a distal feature of the functional base of personality, basic values promote trans-situational goals and the instrumental behaviours to achieve them. As such, political opportunity structures should not

²⁹ For a full discussion, see Lawless (2012, pp.15-19).

be taken as either the generator or ends of ambition, but the means by which individuals might service a variety of ‘ambitions’. Returning to Harold Lasswell’s (1930) search for the ‘political type’, this thesis fills a significant gap in the research base by examining the role that personality may play in predisposing certain individuals to consider a career in British politics in the first place.

In her noteworthy study of the candidate emergence process, Jennifer Lawless (2012) also argues against the rational choice paradigm. Lawless (*ibid.*, p.19) traces the initial decision to run back to the concept of ‘nascent’ ambition, which she believes to be pre-requisite for Schlesinger’s expressive ambition and grounded in socio-demographics, familial and professional socialisation, and political attitudes. Analysing longitudinal data from the Citizen Political Ambition Panel Study Lawless (2012, pp.37-48) found that more than 50% of participants had considered a political candidacy.³⁰ Those that did not had not actively decided against a political career but rather it had never occurred to them. Lawless found that variables associated with the political opportunity structures in previous studies had a null effect on both the initial consideration to run for office as well as whether participants gained or lost interest over the seven-year period of the study.³¹ By contrast, Lawless found that a series of individual-level differences had a significant effect on eligible candidates. For example, men were far more likely than women to consider running for office at all; racial and ethnic minorities were actually more likely to consider themselves qualified for office than their white counterparts; individuals from a ‘political’ and supportive family home were more likely to consider candidacy; and levels of political cynicism significantly reduced the ambition to run for political office (see *ibid.*, pp.192-193, for a comprehensive summary of results).

Although far more descriptive in its methodology and analysis, these results have recently been replicated in a survey of 10,000 citizens in England, Wales and Scotland (Allen and Cutts, 2018). Unlike the US study discussed above, Allen and Cutts (2018, pp.1-2) found that just 10% of participants had considered running for political office, and just 9% would consider running in the future. The implication is, necessarily, that aspirants to political office form a significant minority within the general population and arguably a much smaller pool

³⁰ The Citizen Political Ambition Panel Study comprised a random, national sample of citizens working in law, business, education and political activism in the United States. These professions were chosen because they yield the highest proportion of political candidates in the US. See Lawless (2012), Appendix A, for a full discussion of the sampling procedure.

³¹ Almost 40% of participants lost or gained ambition between waves of the panel study. Lawless (2012, p.46) concludes that the decision to run is both dynamic and unrelated to conventional indices of the political opportunity structure.

than in the US if comparative data is accurate. Yet even among these ‘aspirants’, only 21 per cent had taken steps towards becoming an MP (Allen and Cutts, 2018, p.2). In addition to similar trends reported by Lawless (2012) on the effects of gender, ethnicity, political socialisation and political trust, Allen and Cutts (2018, pp.3-6) found:

- Participants with a university degree were twice as likely as those with just secondary level education to consider any political office, and more than three times more likely than those who did not finish secondary education;
- Political ambition increased significantly with social grade (12 per cent of individuals in grades ABC1 consider elected politics compared to just under 8 per cent of those in grades C2DE);
- Income had a significant amplifying effect on political ambition over the median national income in Britain. Those earning 50,000, 70,000, and 100,000 pounds per annum were 9, 11 and 13 per cent more likely to consider political office, respectively, than those on average wage;
- Measures of the Big 5 personality traits discriminated between those who were and were not political ambitious. Those who had considered running for political office were higher in openness to experience, extraversion and emotional stability, whilst those who had not were higher in conscientiousness and agreeableness. These results mirror similar political psychology studies of elites discussed in chapter 2 (pp.35-39).


Taken together, these studies not only testify to the hyper-selectivity of recruitment to national politics, but also suggest that supply-side variables associated with the professionalisation of politics (e.g. salaries, diverse offices and career paths) are not as important as demand-side variables (individual differences and experiences). However, Allen and Cutts (2018, p.8) dismiss their findings on personality, in particular, far too coolly: ‘whether or not the bias in favour of certain personality traits is worthy of concern is questionable. On this point, we are agnostic’. The ease with which the psychological finding is disregarded reflects an oversight about how personality may directly or indirectly mitigate other barriers/biases in the political system, influence the ambition of those in advantageous or disadvantageous socio-demographic positions to the point where political recruitment is as much about self-selection as selection, or lead the behaviour of those who do actually make it.

Outside of politics, basic values have been researched in depth as antecedents of a range of organisational workplace phenomena, including organisational culture, socialisation, employee performance, commitment and identification (for a review, see Bourne and Jenkins, 2013). The Schwartz taxonomy of Basic Human Values (BHV), in particular, not only allows researchers to understand individual behaviour per se but has applicability across time, culture and situation, and has already shown itself capable of recapturing work-value factors from

other models such as the organisational culture profile (OCP, O'Reilly et al., 1991) and the McDonald/Gandz scale (1991; see also Abbott et al., 2005; Finegan, 2000). These studies have shown that basic values can be highly predictive of career choice. For example, citizens high in Openness to Change values tend towards artistic and investigative professions (e.g. artist, musician, doctor, historian; Knafo and Sagiv, 2004), whilst those high in Conservation values favour conventional, programmatic occupations (administrative and hierarchical professions; Sagiv, 2002). Similarly, Self-Transcendence values have been strongly correlated with 'calling' professions with 'social' interest agendas, where the orientation of work is fulfilling socially valuable tasks (Arieli et al., 2016; Gandal et al., 2005). By contrast, Self-Enhancement values are positively associated with 'career' professions with 'enterprising' interest agendas, where the work involves managing subordinates towards a set of organisational or self specific targets (Gandal et al., 2005; Sagiv, 2002). Basic values have also been found to act as strong predictors of prospective performance once in role (for a full review, see Arieli and Tenne-Gazit, 2017). In terms of relating these findings to elected politics, there is a theoretical tension insofar as politics is a 'calling' profession where prosocial ethical behaviour - based on high Self-Transcendence orientations - is expected at the same time as intense conflict between tribal political parties and rigid hierarchies of power. Either way, it is possible that personality characteristics play a much more powerful role in political recruitment and, later, behaviour than Allen and Cutts (2018) acknowledge. I seek to test this claim using data collected directly from national politicians and a comprehensive model of political recruitment (Fig. 3.2).

I agree with Lawless (2012, p.189) that individuals are not, as presumed by the rational choice paradigm, equally likely to possess nascent ambition to hold political office. Whilst political opportunity structures may help political scientists to explain *successful* candidates, they cannot differentiate between individuals who do and do not *consider candidacy in the first place*. Whilst Lawless' (2012) study is important for highlighting the role of individual-level differences in producing political ambition, her model does not go far enough. She continues to work within existing conceptions of ambition as a function of unitary desire (implicitly centred on power) and she does not assess the internal attributes, personality factors and motivations that may distinguish between her participants. Therefore, I propose a model of candidate emergence that accounts for the role of personality as the ultimate antecedent in the decision to run for political office (Figure 3.2). This model works with rather than against the existing evidence base, insofar as it acknowledges that personality is necessary but not sufficient to explain who makes it to Westminster. However, in proposing

Figure 3.1. A Comprehensive Model of Candidate Emergence.³²



³² The single-direction dotted line between personality and professional skills reflects the likelihood that individuals will be attracted to jobs that increase the possibility of pursuing high priority basic values (Gollwitzer, 1996). The multi-directional line between personality and socio-demographics reflects the reciprocity between basic values and child/adolescent socialisation experiences that are likely to be shaped by variables such as gender and ethnicity (Schwartz, 1992).

a framework for interdisciplinary studies of candidate emergence and operationalising this through data on MPs' basic values, this model makes an original contribution to empirical studies of political ambition and self-selection.

H1: *Selectivity Hypothesis: Personality, or specifically basic values, act as internal factors that activate or deactivate individuals in a self-selection process for elite politics. This will result in substantive differences between the value profiles of the political class and those of the general public. In particular, the prosocial premise of politics will attract candidates who score highly for Self-Transcendence values.*

II. The Professionalisation of Politics Versus Professional Politicians

Discussions of the political class invariably extend to discussions of professional politicians (Cairney, 2014). The previous section of this chapter focused on the ambition of the political class and scoped a significant gap in the research base as well as an interdisciplinary research agenda to fill it. This section moves to focus on another recurrent, psychological criticism of politicians: careerism. The accusation proceeds that the UK Parliament and government are now occupied solely by those who have made politics a career and have no prior professional experience outside of politics (Bochert and Zeiss, 2003). The corollary of that statement is that such a development is negative for the state of politics and society more broadly. However, the rise of the career politician has proceeded reciprocally with a process of political professionalisation.

In any other occupational environment professionalisation would be viewed as a positive step but with politics and MPs 'it is much more ambiguous as it suggests a form of separation and careerism' (Wright, 2010). Verba et al. (1995) argued that experience of professional and managerial work actually developed a number of highly apposite political skills. However, in democratic politics there is a fear that with such professionalisation comes greater independence for the political class and further detachment between the interests of those that govern and those that are governed. It is this issue of elite integration that has dominated political scientists since the mid-20th century (e.g. Mills, 1956; Domhoff, 2005). It is important, however, to be clear about the empirical evidence supporting this interpretation of modern politics and the basis upon which a causal link between professionalisation and careerism is justified.

Three broad contentions in this literature need to be addressed. In the first instance there is a certain naivety to concerns about the rise of 'new' career politicians. The C19th and

early C20th were not halcyon days of amateur politicians living *for* politics, but were characterised by a Parliament filled with wealthy aristocrats who acted relatively independently of their constituents' interests (Berrington, 1985; Crewe, 1985; Norton and Wood, 1993). With neither income nor career as a primary incentive, politicians were 'self-perpetuating aristocrats and gentry [who] regard[ed] service in Parliament and government as part of their inherited duties' (Riddell, 1993, p.266). Even those MPs who now make politics their career tend to work harder than their predecessors and in a Parliament that is both more transparent and better organised to hold them and their colleagues to account (Benton and Russell, 2012; Norton, 2001).

The second dominant research narrative raises concerns about the occupational homogeneity of modern politicians (e.g. Barber, 2014). This is a subject that has interested both the press media, who tell the story of a politics bereft of 'real people' (Lamont, 2014; Kirkup, 2014), and academics who have surveyed the increasingly professionalised, paid, and often unelected roles that MPs occupy before entering office (Cowley, 2012). Paul Cairney (2007, p.6) divides these 'politics facilitating' occupations into 'brokerage' jobs such as law, which are conducive to entering politics, and 'instrumental' jobs such as being a full-time councillor, party official or parliamentary staff, which are of direct aid to election. Cairney (2007) illustrates that the post-war trend among parliamentarians has been heavily skewed in favour of instrumental backgrounds. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that MPs with instrumental occupational backgrounds are more likely to be elected at a younger age than those without, to reach higher office once elected, and to receive promotions more quickly (Allen, 2013).

If we consider that politicians are advantaged by both control over public resources and context-specific knowledge unavailable to non-elites, then the issue of occupational background becomes central in the recruitment process to parliamentary politics. Working for political parties in Parliament itself, or in a related organisation, is likely to give aspirant members of the political class unrivalled knowledge about the formal and informal processes of elected politics and thus heighten their chances of success - both of entering Parliament and rising within it. If it is presumed that aspirant MPs are choosing certain instrumental occupations specifically as a stepping stone to elected office, then there is also an element of self-selection at work. However, there is a necessary *psychological* leap from this logic to comments on the substantive personal differences between these MPs and those from non-political backgrounds. Michael Rush (2001, p.112), for instance, regards career politicians as

full-time MPs 'in both attitude and practice' but what exactly this means, both individually and in relation to the rest of the population, is rather opaque.

The third argument in the literature on careerism distinguishes between individual and institutional professionalisation. Here it is useful to think of professionalisation processes as measures of accountability and avenues of incentive. The former, such as the establishment of a behavioural code by the Committee on Standards in Public Life under the Chairmanship of Lord Nolan, have laid down strict rules regarding parliamentary conduct and transparency in the House of Commons (Oliver, 1995; Rush, 1997). The latter, such as the introduction of MPs' salaries, select committees, and devolution, have not only made politics sustainable as a career for those who may have been lured into other professions but have also proliferated the number of prized positions (even the size of the political class itself) that those with ambitions for personal influence or power may pursue. These claims are, once again, conjecture until supported with empirical evidence about the ambitions of parliamentary politicians.

Whilst the diminishing pool of occupational expertise in the UK Parliament is arguably countered by the rising use of Arm's Length Bodies, experts and the depoliticisation of policy (Durose, 2014; Flinders and Buller, 2006), there is a more sinister conclusion about professionalisation processes implicit in the literature. If it is accepted that 'reform' is characterised by intentionality (Peters et al., p.2), and that the political class does indeed share a collective consciousness (Burdeau, 1975), then the cynic may be inclined to see any or all of the reforms to make politics more 'professional' as measures of collective self-advancement enacted by politicians. Indeed, Dodds (1994) suggests that institutional reforms tend to be more successful when they translate into short- or medium-term self-interest. This argument echoes the work of Vilfredo Pareto (1935) in the early 20th century, who distinguished between two personality types in elite politics: lions and foxes. As the Machiavellian epithets imply, lions were conservative and favoured strong authoritarian regimes, whilst the latter were innovative and amassed public sentiment via persuasion. For Pareto, elites of either predisposition would necessarily seek to recruit their own 'type' and as such a closed system of political power would, sporadically, circulate between them (Femia, 2002, pp.71-74). However, prior to this thesis these causal claims linking 'professional politicians' and psychological flaws have been untested.

H2: *Political-Collar Hypothesis: The self-selection implicit in MPs who have worked in instrumental professions, entered Parliament, and pursued promotion in quick succession reflects an unusual level of desire to increase personal control over political resources. This*

will be reflected in value profiles high in Self-Enhancement values (Power and Achievement). The self-referential and self-interested aspects of careerism will be reflected in high scores for Conservation values (particularly Security).

III. 'They're all the same!' – Issues of Socio-Demographic Homogeneity

The use of the term political class has become a proxy for another long-standing malfunction of UK democracy and a common criticism of the UK Parliament - the socio-demographic similarity of our politicians and their dissimilarity to the majority of the population. In the 2015 general election, 94% of those elected were white (compared to 82% of the population), 70% were male, 90% had been to Russell Group Universities, and just 2% had worked in blue-collar manual professions (Hunter and Holden, 2015).³³ There is not necessarily such a clean causal line between the demographic (dis-)proportionality of Parliament and public disengagement with politics or even rising distrust of politicians. As Andrew Hindmoor (2017, p.7) points out, trust in politicians was actually higher in the 1950s but they were, as a group, less representative of society than they are today. However, Hindmoor (2017, p.7) admits that 'background does matter' when it comes to elections; for example, the decline in the proportion of working class Labour MPs has undercut the Party's national vote (Asthana, 2016).

Class convergence in Parliament can be understood as a product of candidate self-selection but equally as a product of the changing electoral climate and modernised party structures in the UK. The decline of near-exclusive dominance by millionaires on the Conservative benches and working class MPs in the Labour Party (Riddell 1993, pp.19/79) paralleled the decreasing stability of partisan strongholds: Webb (2000, p.79) argues that 'an electoral change since 1970 almost certainly implies a more open electoral market and increasingly complex patterns of competition'. Volatility at the polls reduced the number of safe seats and transformed the decisive hurdle for potential MPs from that of the inner party nomination to the general election. The consequences are characterised by individualised MPs and a 'cartel' thesis on the state of party democracy in Western Europe (Bochert and Zeiss, 2003; Dommett, 2016; Katz and Mair, 1995; Mudge and Chen, 2014). Coupled with the modernisation of party structures, in particular Labour's gradual detachment from the Trade Unions (see, for example, Webb, 2000), the preconditions were set for the victory of the middle classes and the emergence of a centre-ground political class (in all senses of the word).

³³ Figures for the 2015 General Election are reported here in keeping with the data collection process for this thesis, which took place in the months immediately *before* the most recent 2017 election.

Having been socialised under different societal conditions to their predecessors, MPs today are not as reliant on their parties and in turn share in the self-confidence of a political class that might, for example, be reflected in the rising frequency of vote defections (see Norton, 1999; Pattie et al., 1998). However, the empirical data to clarify consonant claims of psychological homogeneity has, until now, been lacking.

Class convergence aside, there is a rich seam of research that tackles the political class – and specifically the Westminster ‘bubble’ - as symbolic of a *descriptive* democratic deficit (Phillips, 1995; cf. Pitkin, 1967). As such, 'unrepresentative' institutions are illegitimate institutions (Childs and Cowley, 2011). Jane Mansbridge (1999), among others, argues that representatives with shared experiences of race, religion, gender, nationality, or even locality will make better MPs, and that a political class dominated by the same 'shared experiences' is not able to fulfil its democratic obligations. To support these accusations necessarily requires political science to cross disciplinary boundaries in order to study differences and similarities between legislators and citizens that are not directly observable.

Normatively, I firmly agree with proponents of the minority empowerment thesis that descriptive representation adds to the democratic legitimacy of political institutions. Whilst individual-level factors such as income, age and education affect levels of participation and political efficacy across all groups in the population, these disproportionately intersect with racial, ethnic and gender groups (Atkeson, 2003; Banducci et al., 2004; Conway, 2000; Verba et al., 1995). A raft of research on minority empowerment in the US has shown that descriptive representation can increase voter registration, turnout, political interest and efficacy, and informal participation among women, Latinos and African Americans (Barreto, 2007; Burns et al., 2001; Griffin and Keene, 2006). These results have also been replicated in a comparative context (Barnes and Burchard, 2013; Karp and Banducci, 2008; Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007). From a demand-side perspective, this evidence provides a strong bridge between theories of descriptive representation and democratic legitimacy.

The common narrative of the research cited above - of a dyadic mapping of representation between citizen and legislator - has, however, been contested by scholars interested more in the collective representation of national institutions. Atkeson and Carrillo (2007, p. 94) find that 'collective female representation influences external efficacy in a positive way', whilst Rocha et al. (2010) find similar effects on the turnout of African Americans and Latinos. Analysing data from seven US elections to the state legislature, Uhlaner and Scola (2016) show that the mobilising benefits of collective descriptive

representation also vary intersectionally. For example, their results show that collective representation increases turnout among all previously excluded groups but in particular, gender mattered more for white women and race mattered more for African American men and women (Uhlener and Scola, 2016, pp. 247-248). These studies add to our understanding of empowerment via descriptive representation in national Parliaments, insofar as the latter provide macro-level cues to minority groups who subsequently perceive intrinsic value to participation (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990).

This thesis is, however, particularly focused upon supply-side representation in the UK Parliament. Although the studies cited above justify descriptive representation in national Parliaments on the basis of participative benefits among minority groups, they do not interrogate the extent to which descriptive representatives share experiences, values or substantive interests with those represented. Such considerations are not necessarily relevant when focusing upon levels of trust, efficacy or participation among minority groups, but they do matter in the search for 'preferable descriptive representatives' (Dovi, 2002). Suzanne Dovi (2002, p.739) claims that proponents of self-representation have underestimated the vertical divisions within groups that can make physical appearance misleading as a basis for increased substantive representation of the whole group. Dovi (2002) argues for 'preferable descriptive representatives' who share the same experiences and thus the same values as the group, and in turn appreciate the diversity of opinion within it. Indeed, to strengthen the case for descriptive representation requires further research into the motivations of representatives from different demographic groups. I seek to fill this gap by studying the basic values of elite politicians in the UK alongside those of respective socio-demographic groups in the general populace.

Analysing parliamentary questions put forward in the House of Commons between 2005 and 2010, Thomas Saalfeld (2011, p. 283) found that some 71% of all questions relating to ethnic diversity and equality were put forward by 'visible minority' MPs; contrasting with their proportional presence in the House of just 30%. Saalfeld's work highlights a significant link between the descriptive nature of Parliament and the substantive representation of sectional interests. However, other scholars are less certain of such a direct relationship. In their study of descriptive representation and turnout in the US and New Zealand, Banducci et al. (2004, p.553) conclude:

Because we cannot be certain of the impact that increased minority turnout has on the policy positions of elected representatives, it is unclear whether the net effect of any differences in turnout rates inside majority-minority House districts or Maori electorates leads necessarily to changes in the substantive representation of minorities.

There is also evidence of a counter-mobilisation effect whereby dominant groups perceive increases in the representation of disadvantaged groups and turn out in greater numbers. Such effects can actually reduce the overall substantive representation of previously excluded groups (e.g. Donovan, 2010). These concerns have worrying implications for the long-term legitimacy of democratic institutions. However, I contend that a) the potentiality of democratic representation is discernible when national institutions collectively represent the people; b) political science has not given sufficient attention to the supply-side factors involved in substantive representation of sectional interests; and c) democratic legitimacy in terms of substantive policy responsiveness relies on preferable descriptive representatives with shared psychological characteristics.

H3: *Homogeneity Hypothesis: Differences in basic values between MPs will exist according to demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, age), and will be of a greater magnitude than differences between each sub-group and their counter population in the general public (reflecting the substantive differences generated by shared genetics and/or socialisation; e.g. Williams and Best, 1990). In particular, women MPs will score higher for Self-Transcendence values and Openness to Change values than either male MPs or women in the general population.*

This chapter has critiqued an array of literature on the nature of the political class, specifically politicians, in the UK and beyond. In doing so it has identified significant gaps in the existing research base that pertain to psychological assumptions about the self-selection of politicians, the professionalisation of politics, and the demographic homogeneity of parliamentarians. These are issues that have for some time underpinned questions about ‘who’ enters national politics, ‘why’ they enter, and ‘how’ they differ in their motivations from those they represent. In each case the answers are crucial precursors to developments in the study of legislatures and parliamentary political behaviour.

“As a Member of Parliament, I found a job without any job description at all, no means of knowing what I should be doing, and with no means of assessing how well I was doing it. The result is that all Members of Parliament do the job differently, having tried to work out their own job descriptions.”

Tony Wright (2010)

An Integrated Model of Parliamentary Political Behaviour (RQ2)

At the heart of imaginative and effective political science is a desire to comprehend the 'why' behind political behaviours and decision-making. This endeavour has largely focused on the voting public and their (dis)engagement with formal or informal avenues of political expression. By comparison, political science has failed in general to produce successful models of elite political behaviour, and behaviour within Parliaments in particular. For the dominant paradigms of behavioural analysis in parliamentary studies (reviewed in Chapter 1; see Table 3.1 below), there has been a preoccupation with institutions. These scholars have dismissed exogenous aspects of agency that interact with institutional constraints on choice. I argue that the latter bound, but do not eliminate, individual discretion. This is not, necessarily, a surprising trend, given that psychological studies of individuals within Parliaments require political scientists to traverse new disciplinary boundaries and deal, ultimately, with phenomena that are invisible to the naked eye of the researcher 'in the field'. This chapter seeks to challenge this gap in the research base. In doing so it develops the second of a three-part interdisciplinary agenda for psychological studies of the UK Parliament and presents a comprehensive model for understanding parliamentary political behaviour.

Where parliamentary scholars have acknowledged the importance of long-standing insights in psychology, particularly social psychology, they have been limited by poor access to elites for empirical study (e.g. Russell, 2014); they have attempted to stretch conceptual and empirical findings from studies of other elite groups, such as judges, to politicians (e.g. Gibson, 1981); they have conducted analyses at-a-distance with complex coding systems (e.g. Winter, 2004; 2005); and they have been almost exclusively concerned with explaining crisis escalation and domineering historical personas (e.g. Winter, 2011; Jost et al., 2013). In each case the everyday politician is forgotten and the fruits of cross-disciplinary fertilisation are clouded. In chapter 2, I reviewed the ability of basic values to capture causal mechanisms in

motivated behaviours, as well as the trans-situational capacity of basic values to direct everyday choices upon activation. A rigorous extant literature has reiterated the importance attached to values as central aspects of the self and as behavioural codebooks (e.g. Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Feather, 1995; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992; Verplanken and Holland, 2002). There is no reason, then, why this same logic should not help to illuminate the behavioural decisions and intentions of our political elites, especially those behaviours that are planned and temporally free from immediate constraint (Eyal et al., 2009). The rest of this chapter will proceed to build a comprehensive model of elite parliamentary behaviour that considers how cognitive processes based on basic values may interact with the institutional fabric of Westminster, the effect of party political socialisation and organisation, and the mediating role of ideology. It will conclude with hypotheses that operationalise basic values to explain four parliamentary behaviours.

I. Scoping the Limitations and Character of Institutional Choice

Political psychologists as well as political scientists have developed a complex picture of how institutions channel political behaviour, giving rise to an institutional theory of political choice (see, for example, Adams et al., 2005; Bendor et al., 2003; Sniderman and Bullock, 2004). Grounded in the work of Douglass North (1990, p.3-5), this literature takes institutions as ‘the rules of the game in society, or more formally...the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’. The central premise of this theory is that politics, or more precisely the institutions thereof, provide citizens with a selection of options; they ‘do not get their choice of choices’ (Sniderman and Levendusky, 2009, p.437). By implication this theory demands multiple explanatory mechanisms that account for both citizens’ internal preference formation and external provision of choice.³⁴ The former tends to invite heavy quantitative research, whilst the latter is largely qualitative and theory-driven. Where scholars have sought to tie these approaches, there has been an over-reliance on behavioural economics founded in rational choice (e.g. Sniderman and Levendusky, 2009; cf. Camerer, 2003). This generates a research program that prioritises the properties of the choice sets without proper consideration for the range of internal mechanisms used to discriminate between them. However, in principle a theory of institutional choice offers a blueprint by which to unite the institutionalism of parliamentary studies in the UK with appropriate

³⁴ Research on internal mechanisms may include, for example, basic values (Vecchione et al., 2015), personality traits (Caprara and Vecchione, 2012), self-esteem (Gibson, 1981), and construal-level theory (Trope, Liberman and Wakslak, 2007). Research on external mechanisms may include, for example, information environments (Kuklinski et al., 2001), framing (Druckman, 2004), and task structuring (Saris, 2004).

psychological theories, in order to better understand the situated behavioural choices of our national representatives.

For some time, scholars seeking to map political behaviours and institutional choice have been preoccupied with fitting MPs into certain parliamentary roles (see, for example, Müller and Saalfeld, 1997). Derived either deductively (Ilonszki and Edinger, 2007, Zittel, 2012) or inductively (Jenny and Müller, 2012; Navarro, 2009), these literatures are severely limited by their use and creation of static, trans-situational behavioural categories that can be applied to any single representative. However, beneath the varying approaches used to understand role formation, there is a fundamental and clearly appraisive desire to capture the way in which individual actors accommodate themselves to decision-making under institutional pressures (e.g. Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012; March and Olsen, 1989; Searing, 1994). Most importantly for this thesis, it is possible to discern a common sense of causality in this literature, whereby elite behaviour is a function of individual *role orientations* that form as the *role occupant* is subject to expectations exerted by *role alters* (e.g. party whips, colleagues, voters, journalists) who interact with them on a regular basis.

The expectations that MPs are subject to are wide-ranging and, as scholars like Rhodes (2011) and Crewe (2014) have demonstrated, largely normative. Other than the institutional code of conduct provided in Erskine May (Watson, 1995), being an MP in the UK Parliament is a job without a definitive description (Wright, 2010). Cues must be read off the culture of the workplace and responses developed with experience (Kwiatkowski, 2012). To the extent that such expectations in the House of Commons require interpretation, there is a greater premium on individual beliefs and value-driven responses. However, MPs are exposed to an extraordinarily wide selection of role alters, extending from their own colleagues (whether in the party, opposition, parliamentary staff or civil service departments) to the media and a national, even occasionally international, public audience. It is here that the formal and informal institutions of politics impinge on the individual behavioural choices of MPs. As explicated by theories of institutional choice, MPs must synthesise their own beliefs with the range of expectations they perceive from these role alters in order to reach behavioural choices within their occupational context. These decisions need be not only desirable but the role occupant must also believe them to be most appropriate. By delineating this process, it is possible to sharpen an image of the interaction between MPs' personal motivations (i.e. basic values) and the institutions that bound their professional lives.

Table 4.1. Overview of paradigms in parliamentary studies (see Chapter 1 for full review).

Approach	Principal Focus	Preferred Research Methods	Theoretical/Methodological criticisms	Associated research
Historical Institutionalism	Emphasis on the continuity of British politics within the path dependency of the Westminster Model.	Descriptive, qualitative, largely technical and document based analysis.	There is an exclusive focus on the macro-level of political structures and incremental change, as well as top-down principal-agent relations.	Gamble; Lijphart; Flinders; Bogdanor.
Interpretivism	Parliamentary studies become about decentred governance networks rather than hierarchical government.	Semi-structured interviews and participant observation.	Agency is reduced to aggregated social and cultural norms, whilst traditions are hypostasised at the expense of clear causality in behavioural explanation.	Rhodes; Bevir; Marsh.
Neo-Institutionalism	Agency defined according to the dialectic between career-driven rationality, emotional incentives, and institutional constraint.	Semi-structured interviews and transcription based coding.	Personal or exogenous motivations are never truly understood; static role categories are created out of subjective analysis of self-reported images.	Barber; Woshinsky; Searing.
Anthropology	Ethnographic perspectives on Parliament that take norms, ideas and beliefs as explanatory variables.	Interviews, participant and non-participant observation.	The methodological ambition is not matched by theoretical clarity and practical delivery. There is a blurred distinction between the ideational and institutional.	Crewe; Müller; Abélès

In his recent appraisal of the UK Parliament, Philip Norton (2017) inadvertently summarises the advancing and retreating aspects of institutional constraint on individual MPs. Inside the Commons, Norton sees ‘behavioural and institutional change on a remarkable scale’ (2017, p.192). Parliament is far stronger in its relation with the executive, wielding the capacity to scrutinise and influence government legislation through departmental select committees (Hindmoor et al., 2009); public bill committees have given MPs greater access to information previously monopolised by government (Thompson, 2016); MPs are [theoretically] secure from snap election defeat thanks to the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011; the Backbench Business Committee gives MPs the power to dictate 35 days of parliamentary business per year (for a nuanced discussion, see Norton, 2013); the party whips are increasingly unable to ‘guarantee’ votes (Cowley and Stuart, 2012, 2014); and there is more independent capacity for MPs to raise issues through ballot, on Opposition Days, or in parallel debates now held in Westminster Hall (Norton, 2013). Far from the ‘Prussian discipline’ talked of by Samuel Beer (1969, p.350), the UK Parliament is entering an era in which the independent member is given more institutional choice, faces fewer formal institutional constraints, and has more agency to ‘make a difference’ through diverse career paths (see Russell et al., 2016).

By contrast, the *informal* institutional constraints exerted by *external* role alters have intensified. Parliament has become more transparent than ever before and a greater proportion of the population can, and do, contact their MP. Indeed, the workload imposed on MPs to field the scale of public communication they receive may be one of the most restrictive aspects of their daily job (Norton, 2012; Rosenblatt, 2006). The public can watch MPs work in real time through the internet or the BBC Parliament channel, and in the process it is arguable that the expressive function of Parliament and its members has assumed heightened significance. Yet in spite of efforts to increase accountability, just 29% of respondents in the Hansard Society *Audit of Political Engagement* are satisfied with how MPs perform (2016, p.29). For Norton (2017, p.198), the (in)ability of MPs to meet expectations is affected by three external pressures: popular cynicism, a disinterested commercial media, and the immediacy of the internet. These themes have already been touched upon earlier in this chapter, and will be again in the final section, but for the purpose of the present discussion and explaining parliamentary behaviour, it points to an interesting paradox. Internal institutional reforms at Westminster have endowed MPs with a broader purview to act on individual motivation, whilst simultaneously making the House more transparent and

contributing to the proliferation of external expectations from a [relatively] new, or at least expanded, set of role alters.

It would be amiss in this discussion to ignore rational choice scholars, whose work on the political behaviour of elites proceeds from similar foundations but with an almost exclusive concern for MPs' strategic career choices (e.g. Downs, 1957; Strom, 1990, 1997). Rational choice theorists argue that such analysis is a zero-sum game, in which politicians reconcile the expectations of external role alters and internal gatekeepers in order to maximise a) their career agenda, and b) their chance of getting re-elected (see Pierson, 1994). In the fields of public policy and administration, this has spawned a literature on blame avoidance behaviour (BAB) that develops themes from rational choice work in an expanding sub-field of the discipline (e.g. Hood, 2011; Wenzelburger, 2014). Employing *agency strategies* that shift responsibility to colleagues, *presentational strategies* that distort public perceptions, and *depoliticisation strategies* that limit formal liability (Hood, 2002; 2007), this literature argues that politicians calculate every behavioural choice in order to maximise institutional advantage and minimise electoral fallout.


As with wider rational choice scholarship, work on BAB is limited for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is a tendency for strategic BAB to be written about in a distant, theoretical and often obscure manner without empirical study (Giger and Nelson, 2011; Hinterleitner, 2017, p.247). Working backwards from macro-policies and electioneering, studies deduce and intuit BAB without looking at the micro-level of daily political behaviour. Secondly, these studies echo one argument of this thesis – that politicians are most constrained by the expectations of role alters *outside* of Parliament – but they also propose an extremely restrictive conception of agency and in doing so fail to go far enough in illuminating preference formation. If the basic tenets of Strom's (1997) work hold - that politicians are ultimately motivated by loss and gain - then a far more nuanced understanding of the psychological mechanisms at work would offer more insight for behavioural analysis. Loss and gain, in themselves, map neatly onto the broad higher order values of Openness to Change and Conservation discussed in chapter 2. However, within the theory of Basic Human Values (BHV), these categories are interdependent, measurable, applicable with clear modes of activation across situations, and they operate with a more detailed second tier of motivations that helps to discriminate between individuals with similar behavioural choices. Thirdly, rational choice literature on BAB does not interrogate the variation in institutional choice across contextual daily environments, or different aspects of a politicians' daily

experience, that produce different amounts of ‘blame-generating’ pressure (Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015). In this respect it does not distinguish sufficiently between institutions as a set of formal rules such as MPs’ salaries or clerical support, and institutions as a range of less formal norms. Each is likely to elicit a different behavioural response and a different ‘strategy’. The notion of strategy is compelling in itself but the literature also fails to account for the actor-related factors (i.e. psychological factors) that might determine which actors choose which strategies and when.

In contrast to rational choice explanations of political behaviour, I draw on both psychological studies of BHV and the basic instincts of role theory and institutional choice theory. It may be theorised that the causal influence of MPs’ personality characteristics upon behaviour will be greatest when those behavioural choices are least visible to, understood by, or of interest to those ‘looking in’. Where behavioural choices are [relatively] free from institutional constraint, formal or informal, it is expected that a range of individual motivations – not simply strategic career calculations – will account for variation in behaviour. This is summarised in Figure 4.1.

This matrix is a rather crude representation of personal and institutional choice but the examples of behaviours included illustrate the premise of the debate above. There is no doubt that some MPs will have a greater propensity, based on their psychological make-up, to break this pattern, whilst some behaviours may also vacillate between different segments of the matrix. For example, parliamentary votes are recorded online, streamed on the internet and television, and often covered in the print media. Thus they are subject to high levels of external, informal institutional constraint as well as the internal formal institutions of party discipline. Yet on salient issues where MPs’ most prominent values are activated, and/or they see an alignment between their personal preferences and public appetite, then the choice may be value-led in spite of institutional constraint. The fluid nature of such scenarios is represented in the diagram by dotted arrows.

Figure 4.1. A matrix to demonstrate the interaction between agency and institutional constraint in the context of MPs' parliamentary behaviour.



II. Toeing the Party Line

In UK parliamentary politics, the party system stands tall as the arbiter of institutional choice for both popular and elite behaviour. Whilst the previous section considered behavioural responses within a broad discussion of formal and informal institutions, the influence of the party was deliberately removed as worthy of a separate discussion. Political parties exert two central pressures on elite political behaviour. The first is direct and is exerted through a range of disciplinary incentives and punishments (e.g. Kam, 2009). The second is indirect and operates through the socialisation processes of party membership and selection (e.g. Hazan, 2003). This section will briefly take the two in turn to further add to the comprehensive model of parliamentary political behaviour used in this thesis and further cultivate the gap to be filled by informed psychological research.

The extant literature on parties, mostly conducted in Europe where the party system still dominates, points to the unparalleled extent to which parties influence the legislative behaviour of their representatives. According to received wisdom, parties dictate voting patterns, intercede in the brokering of parliamentary positions and promotions, and enforce substantive policy priorities at the national level (see, for example, Hix et al. 2007). Scholars like Colin Crouch (2004) and Kate Dommett (2015) have gone so far as to talk of post-democratic political parties, in which they increasingly resemble top-down hierarchical organisations concerned solely with electoral maximisation at the expense of their participatory functions. Whilst Crouch and Dommett are concerned with parties' neglect of popular participation in agenda-setting, the same logic may be applied to internal party politics where the majority of elites will be compelled to 'toe the line'. The literature surrounding political parties and elite behaviour is at best sceptical, and more generally dismissive, of the notion that observed parliamentary behaviour is determined by individual preferences or psychological factors (e.g. Dewan and Spirling, 2011).

Dominant literatures often reduce to examinations of party organisation and discipline. Party leaders and party whips have far-reaching power to incentivise or punish legislators, whether it be exchanging the promise of promotion in return for loyalty or withholding re-selection, career advancement, or financial resources. The dominant approach, once more, is to explain party discipline from a rational choice perspective: politicians weigh the costs and benefits of party loyalty and tend to conclude in favour of the latter (Saalfeld, 1986). In his *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*, Christopher Kam (2009) develops a game theoretic model of legislator behaviour that builds on the policy-seeking, office-seeking and vote-seeking desires of MPs previously highlighted in this body of literature (e.g. Müller and Strøm, 1999). Kam's LEADS model is based on the assumption that even when individual MPs differ ideologically, their 'Loyalty [can be] elicited through Advancement, Discipline, and Socialisation' (2009, p.15). Kam argues that his model bridges the theoretical silos of preference-driven, institutional, and sociological approaches to studies of parliamentary behaviour, but in reality he makes rather blunt connections that portray MPs as largely monolithic creatures with predictable reactions to top-down pressures; he equates 'preferencenesship' between individuals with differences in Left-Right ideology on a single scale; and he ultimately dismisses the role of the individual MP insofar as party leaders have the wherewithal to offset any personal or political disagreement. Like previous scholars (e.g. King, 1981, pp.262-3), Kam jumps to an epistemological position that MPs are motivated in

essence by a desire for office, and that such motivation can be measured through proxy observations such as length of career, speed of promotion, or rate of dissent in the chamber.

In its reliance on legislators' rational self-interest, the literature on party organisations and incentive structures builds upon a rich seam of scholarship interested in the role of ambition and self-interest in politics (Black, 1972; Schlesinger, 1966). This research argues that politicians' behaviour becomes a function of calculations designed to elicit satisfaction and support from current and future constituents (both at the popular and party level) who might aid career progression (e.g. Hibbing, 1986). At the level of the European Parliament, Stephen Meserve et al. (2009, p.1016) used a crossed random-effects model to demonstrate that nationally ambitious MEPs altered their voting habits in the run-up to national elections. The effect of time horizons on legislator behaviour was taken as an indication that politicians in general, and MEPs in particular, are forward-looking; in service of their ambition, politicians will vow allegiance to the party line until such benefits are exhausted. In the context of Kam's LEADS model, such unbridled ambition would suggest that MPs' political behaviours are held hostage to gatekeepers with the power to promote (i.e. party leaders and whips). However, these arguments are limited not simply by their unitary understanding of ambition (cf. Runciman, 2008) but the blunt manner in which they treat politicians as homogeneous in their personal interests.

Scholars working on *preference-driven* models of parliamentary behaviour - Keith Krehbiel (1993, 1999) especially – have strived to show that the link between partisanship and voting is a correlative not a causative one. Krehbiel's argument (based on voting records in the US Congress) states that politicians will vote with the party that advocates a stance closest to their personal preference on any one political issue. The problem with this view is that it does not clarify *a priori* whether party representatives vote together because of shared interests and only dissent when their interests diverge, or whether they vote together in spite of disagreements. By contrast, Kam (2009, p.15) is sceptical that members' personal preferences can be sufficient to explain party (dis)unity. Yet while he eschews prior scholars who take single-model approaches to parliamentary behaviour (e.g. Franklin et al., 1986; Mughan 1990; Pattie et al., 1994), Kam's work resembles that of institutional scholars (e.g. Tsebelis, 2002; Cox and McCubbins, 2005). For Kam (2009, p.32) the double monopoly of power ceded to party leaders in Westminster parliamentary systems (Palmer, 1995) fuses professional promotion and policy influence into an indivisible goal pursued by MPs with rational self-interest, who will only dissent when they calculate the electoral benefits returned

to be greater than those of party loyalty. With grave incentives to maintain a façade of internal unity, party leaders exploit their double monopoly to quell individual dissent through a range of formal and social disciplinary pressures. In this scenario, the personal preferences of individual MPs are merely epiphenomenal to the impact of institutional constraint on their behaviour.

However, this approach has been questioned by recent work on the ‘last-term’ problem, which has shown that MPs’ behaviour in the UK does not alter significantly once they have taken the decision to retire at or before the next election. Analysing MPs’ attendance at votes, incidents of rebellion, and the signing of Early Day Motions (EDMs) for the 2005-2010 and 2010-2015 UK Parliaments, Willumsen and Goetz (2017) found that retiring MPs alter the number of votes they attend but do not change their substantive voting behaviour or the rate at which they sign EDMs. If rational choice scholarship on party discipline and elite behaviour is to be believed, then one would expect MPs’ behavioural patterns to change significantly. Free from the desire to appease party gatekeepers in order to acquire promotion, to seek re-election through cultivation of a personal vote, and no longer fearful of career retribution for defying the party, retiring MPs do not need to be constrained by strategic rational action. The fact that their behaviour appears stable is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, it suggests that the extant research may have exaggerated the effects of a sanctions model, in which daily legislative behaviour is motivated by the threat from either of an MPs’ principals: the party or their constituency. Secondly, it implies that MPs are not necessarily self-interested but behave according to a conception of what it means to be a ‘good representative’ (Willumsen and Goetz, 2017, p.275). Both of these conclusions support work previously done on the nature of individual legislators (e.g. Crisp et al., 2014) and the type of empirical investigation of individual differences and behaviour presented in this thesis.

The second dominant approach to studies of party cohesion and elite behaviour are sociological in substance and method. Parties are, in essence, coordination devices that provide a common platform for broad coalitions of interest. However, insofar as these coalitions agree on their disagreement with other parties, there is at heart an overarching incentive to avoid dissensus. In relation to political elites, Sniderman and Levendusky (2009) use party cohesion to illustrate the paradoxical simplicity of those with supposedly complex political cognition. Ozbudun (1970, p. 305) famously spoke of parliamentary party cohesion in sociological terms as ‘the extent to which, in a given situation, group members can be

observed to work together for the group's goal in one and the same way'. Such a definition presumes a high level of policy agreement between party politicians, although this has not been supported by empirical research (Kam, 2009). Some scholars have sought explanations for cohesive behaviour in politicians' prior political socialisation, or the deep-seated loyalty and demographic similarities between MPs from the same party (i.e. Hazan, 2003). Still others have taken long historical perspectives to examine party behaviour before the introduction of official whipping in 1832 and still find evidence of cohesion (Cox, 1987). This literature would suggest that something more than a party's organisation and discipline wields an influence over its representatives. To understand this requires a long-term view of developments in the study of political parties.

In contrast to traditional Marxian conceptions of political parties - in which representatives were tied in their articulation and pursuit of hegemonic class struggles (Anderson, 1976; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) - Weberian scholarship in the twentieth century advanced a symbiotic process whereby parties merged with the bureaucratic machinery of the state (Weber, 1914 [1978], p.294). In securing candidatures and internal appointments, politicians within parties are, according to Weber, evaluated on partisan criteria and thus work under intense loyalty to embed their party in the state (1919 [1958], pp.87-95). Valdimer Orlando Key (1942 [1958], pp.181-182) developed this thinking to an extent with his distinction between the 'party-in-the-electorate,' 'party activists,' a 'party-in-the legislature,' and a 'party-in-the government'. For behavioural analysis, I take Key's categories as fluid rather than static. Legislative scholars working within the confines of role theory would seek clear dividing lines between these labels and the people who carried them, or otherwise seek to understand the progression of individuals from one to the other. By contrast, I presume that individual MPs may move back and forth between these categories, or even hold two or more simultaneously. A Minister serving with a government portfolio is at one moment bound by collective responsibility to agree with her party colleagues and 'follow suit', and the next moment finds herself door-knocking with her local party colleagues. There is a presumption that the sociological dimension of operating as a party representative differs across these arenas, and in doing so exerts a variable degree of influence on MPs' behaviour. This opens a significant gap in the research base. Political scientists have yet to conceive of, or employ the interdisciplinary tools to analyse, the micro-level behaviour of politicians as the product not simply of party political demands but of a nexus between those pressures, individual differences and psychological needs, and the formal/informal institutional context of their daily lives.

Meg Russell's (2014) research is a rare example of parliamentary studies adopting a psychological approach to understand cohesive partisan behaviour. Drawing on social identity theory, Russell found evidence among members of the UK House of Lords that psychological or sociological motivations for party cohesion were far more important than instrumental rationality. Whilst only 4 percent of those members surveyed were concerned about the punishments associated with dissent, a significant majority were worried that such actions would damage the prospects of their party (Russell, 2014, pp.716-719). Such findings are consistent with social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) that posit both informational reasons (e.g. Festinger, 1954) and normative reasons (e.g. Hornsey et al., 2003) for why group membership influences our sense of self and behaviour. Russell's study is a lone but useful stepping stone with a number of limitations. For example, Russell's research is limited to meso-level analysis of group behaviours in which psychological needs for social cohesion are triggered. It cannot, therefore, move beyond a focus on voting behaviour without losing its explanatory power.

Whilst symbolic, votes are just one aspect of daily parliamentary behaviour. To understand micro-level trends and decision-making, or even to explain why MPs may buck cohesive voting patterns as construed by social identity theory, there is a need to return to micro-level analysis. In its use of basic values, I utilise a psychological construct that is capable of explaining a range of individual-level behaviours across different situations, as well as expanding our understanding of the way in which group-level cohesion and dissent manifests itself. However, what Russell's (2014) study does show is that a) more research on the nature of legislators is needed to supplement, if not counter, the predominance of a sanctions model of party political behaviour, and b) important work on the sociological character of political parties, discredited in the last decades of the 20th century for lacking scientific purchase, can be supported by the rigour of social psychology.

At the same time, political parties will recruit those candidates who they believe to be most suitable for securing election (Daniel, 2015; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Holland, 1987). This raises interesting questions for this thesis regarding the personality differences between MPs from separate parties and the ways in which political recruitment may actually impact on parliamentary behaviour. Candidate selection procedures are largely non-standardised; they are, according to Moshe Czudnowski (1975, p.55), the process through which 'individuals or groups of individuals are inducted into active political roles.' Ultimately MPs elected to Westminster and socialised within that world will both determine the future image and

direction of the party, and be the successful product of its prior selection process (see also Hazan and Rahat, 2010). For Norris and Lovenduski (1995; see also Lovenduski, 2016, p. 514), supply and demand factors operate reciprocally in the selection process, with both selectors and aspirants affecting outcomes that are then structured within a range of formal and informal institutions.

The impact on representative behaviour is potentially two-fold. On one hand, centrally controlled nomination procedures can heighten the power of party discipline to suppress individually motivated behaviour that threatens party cohesion. On the other hand, the democratisation of candidate nominations (currently visible in the UK Labour Party; Chakelian, 2016) can produce lower levels of discipline in Parliament, since successful candidates do not feel beholden to any single organ of the party machine (e.g. Barnea and Rahat, 2007; Katz and Mair, 1995). In this context, Lovenduski (2016, p.522) is quick to admit that not enough has been done to expand our insight into the effect of individual demand-side factors, ‘especially...ambition and motivation’. In operationalising data on elected MPs’ basic values, I aim to fill this gap in the research base. This will not only allow for differentiation of the psychological motivations that distinguish politicians at each juncture of the ‘recruitment ladder’; it will also permit analysis of when and how institutional and individual level variables are superordinate or subordinate to one another in directing political behaviour.

III. Incorporation of Ideology

Chapter 2 (pp.50-58) of this thesis presented a strong theoretical defence for the primacy of basic values in the organisation of political thought and behaviour. In doing so, an allocative model of politics and a structuring principle of socialisation were used to illustrate that basic values, either directly or through interaction with a series of formal and informal institutions, determine political ideologies and in turn behaviours. The purpose of the present chapter has been to build a more comprehensive understanding of those formal and informal institutions that MPs must navigate in their daily jobs. This section will briefly return to incorporate the role of ideology, as informed by basic values, within a comprehensive model of elite political behaviour at Westminster.

Political values and ideologies have been applied in numerous political contexts to explain behavioural phenomena at the elite and popular level, including policy choices, voting patterns and party cohesion (see, for example, Conover and Feldman, 1981; Pollock et al.,

1993; Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009;). This work is largely interdisciplinary and emerges from schools of political psychology in the US. Whilst ideology has been operationalised as an independent variable in political studies of behaviour, there has been only sparse engagement with theories and methods for understanding where ideological structures come from. This is a particularly important question for studies of elite behaviour, given that the extant research base confirms that measures of ideology (as a split social and economic construct – see Feldman and Johnston, 2013) increasingly covary as a function of political sophistication (e.g. Jost et al., 2009) and tap both the consistencies and biases in elite policy opinions (Converse, 1964, 2000; Lodge and Taber, 2013). In order to explain when and why ideology directs particular behaviours and decisions, it is necessary to understand where it comes from and what purpose it serves at the micro-level.

Political scientists have answered this question by explaining ideology as a product of top-down, discursive interaction with more politically sophisticated others or political structures (e.g. Layman and Carsey, 2002; Sniderman and Bullock, 2004). Ideology is, in political science, a sociological and institutional outcome. By contrast, political psychologists focus on the bottom-up psychological formation of ideological preferences, in which ideologies are not received in environmental packaging but adopted according to individual epistemic needs and motivations (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2008). In terms of the personality factors that represent those needs and motivations, political psychology has demonstrated that basic values are stronger predictors of overt political preferences and ideologies among elites than personality traits (e.g. Caprara et al., 2010). More proximal than traits, basic values are activated more readily in conscious decision-making processes. This is especially true of political behaviours such as voting that require the individual to choose between value-laden alternatives (e.g. Caprara et al., 2006). As a multi-layered and nuanced theory of human motivation, basic values also allow for a particularistic explanation of behavioural choices at the micro-level that is not possible with a simple Left-Right continuum.


However, a study of elite political behaviour – especially in a highly politicised environment such as Westminster – would be incomplete without a measure of ideology. As discussed in chapter 2, individuals require overarching, collective and organisational principles through which to structure generalisable preferences into politically salient opinions and behaviours. Schwartz, Caprara and Vecchione (2010) showed that political values, organised under a broad Left-Right spectrum, predicted up to 54 percent of variance in

citizens' voting habits; these political values mediated the effect of basic values, which accounted for their cognitive organisation in each participant. As trans-situational functional goals, basic values discriminate between ideologies and prioritise those that promote them in specific contexts. Given that this link has been found to be strongest among politically sophisticated participants (Caprara et al., 2010), it is expected that basic values will, indirectly via ideology, predict behavioural choices made by MPs on a daily basis. Ideology must thus be accounted for as a facilitator of value-led behaviour alongside the institutional constraints already considered in this chapter.

Having accepted that basic values operate through political values/ideology, but that neither of the latter is sufficient for explaining and understanding parliamentary behaviour at the micro-level, I offer a more comprehensive theoretical model (Figure 4.3). This model incorporates ideology on the basis that basic values will be operationalised consciously through political ideologies in explicit political environments (i.e. Parliament). This allows the model to differentiate with greater precision between the direct and indirect significance of basic values for a range of selective and non-selective behaviours. However, it is unlikely that the institutional choices for action presented to elites in Parliaments will always allow such neat delineations of personal and non-personal behaviour. Thus MPs might opt, in the majority of cases, for that choice which is simply most compatible with their personal values; this is most likely to be the ideologically charged option favoured by their party. Psychological research also shows that individuals are more likely to engage in ideologically dissonant behaviour in scenarios of low perceived choice (Kastenmüller et al., 2010; Nam et al., 2013). Where perceived institutional choice is low in Westminster (e.g. when voting under the party whip), then individual differences may be masked by collective compliance in counter-attitudinal behaviour. In these instances, behaviour is best explained by institutional constraint. In contrast, where perceived institutional choice is high (e.g. on the backbench and in the constituency), then individual differences are likely to be more significant as causal factors for MPs' behaviour.

This process is illustrated in Figure 4.3, which attempts to combine the hypothetical causal factors for political behaviour explored within this chapter. The model presents a four-panel filter that shows how parliamentary political behaviour may be grounded in the psychological micro-level of basic values, whilst remaining flexible to account for a range of institutional constraints. The size of the arrows in the second half of the diagram indicates the theoretical causal primacy given to basic values - mediated by ideology - and/or institutional

Figure 4.2 An integrated model of parliamentary political behaviour (IMPPB).



factors (e.g. the party) in behaviours with high and low perceived choice respectively. As contended in chapter 2, it is expected that the effect of BHV on behaviour will only bypass the second panel (ideology) when the MP is faced with a scenario that is highly moralised and/or crosses ideological boundaries (i.e. a free vote).

IV. Hypotheses for Parliamentary Behaviour

So far this chapter has attempted to build a robust model for understanding MPs' parliamentary political behaviour. It has synthesised a range of research from political science, sociology and psychology in order to precisely theorise the way in which politicians at Westminster navigate their daily lived experiences. This section concludes the chapter with four specific hypotheses that anticipate the effect of basic values upon parliamentary behaviours with differing levels of institutional constraint. In building this model and testing it empirically, this thesis fills an original and highly significant gap in parliamentary studies.

1. Voting

As many of the studies already cited in this chapter indicate, voting in the House of Commons is characterised by high levels of intra-party unity. Peter Richards (1970, p. 179) wrote of this: 'the average division list from the House of Commons is not an exciting or revealing document. It will faithfully reflect the size of a government's majority'. Even in the case of free or 'conscience' votes, when members are not obliged to follow party lines, there is evidence that party affiliation remains the largest predictor of vote choice (Cowley & Stuart, 2010). Philip Cowley (1998, p. 188) concluded that free votes 'are more likely to cut down party lines than across them . . . it is rare to find one vote where both of the major parties are significantly split'. This has been corroborated by a number of additional studies (see, for example, Plumb, 2015). However, rebellion by backbench MPs has become more frequent in recent decades: the difficulties that faced John Major over European integration, Tony Blair over the invasion of Iraq and the introduction of tuition fees, and James Callaghan over devolution to Wales and Scotland, are but a few examples that have intrigued scholars researching the UK Parliament (e.g. Cowley, 2002, 2005; Norton, 1980).

The mistake of scholars seeking to explain hiccups in the dominance of party unity has been to take 'the party' as both the explanation and the cause. Political scientists have drawn neat dividing lines between policy issues and parties on the Left or Right.³⁵ Such analysis

³⁵ For example, Alison Plumb (2013) suggests that the UK Labour Party and the Australian Labor Party split over votes on abortion and embryo research because of their Roman Catholic heritage.

does not get beyond the meso-level of party political history and organisation, and fails to interrogate differences in interest and motivation at the intra-party level that may explain party (dis)unity. This literature may demonstrate that political parties act cohesively and divide in ways that are consistent, but it does not explain ‘why’ these patterns exist. Scholars attempting to explain rebellions in more depth have pointed to ideological heterogeneity, the level of personalisation in the political system, the style of party selection, and gender as potential avenues for further research (see Benedetto and Hix, 2007). These explanations rely on system-level and at-a-distance studies of vote records. By contrast I utilise psychological data on basic values, gathered from the political actors under scrutiny, to discriminate between individual vote choices.

In order to apply the Integrated Model of Parliamentary Political Behaviour (IMPPB) to vote choice, it is necessary to consider the level of institutional constraint exerted on the act of voting, the party political significance of the issue being voted on, and the nature of the issue itself. For example, a highly politicised vote on boundary reform, in which the stakes are high for parties and the whip is strictly enforced, produces an extreme low-choice scenario in which the anticipated effect of individual basic values will be small. In a free vote on a moral issue such as gay marriage, where party pressure is only informal and institutional choice is relatively high (in a liberal western democracy), then the anticipated effect of basic values will be larger. Where an MP chooses to rebel, the IMPPB would predict that the vote topic has activated their strongest basic values, which in turn are either directly threatened by the party whip – in this instance the MP is unable to justify their actions and rebels in order to avoid cognitive dissonance – or they are supported by common feeling among role alters outside of Parliament (i.e. constituents) who augment the institutional choice available to the MP and make rebellion defensible.

H4: *As the moral dimension of the vote increases and the level of institutional constraint decreases, the greater the variance in individual vote patterns explained by BHV.*

2. Written Parliamentary Questions

Parliamentary questions are a common legislative tool used in the UK House of Commons; in the last two decades, a typical session has involved more than 40,000 questions from MPs (United Kingdom House of Commons 1998-2010). Written questions have become a topic of increasing academic scrutiny for their heuristic potential as a unit of analysis for legislative studies (Martin, 2011). In a parliamentary system where party organisation and

reputation tends to dominate legislative business and elections, political scientists have struggled to identify objective incentives for MPs to exert additional effort on constituency service (e.g. Leonard, 1992; Margetts, 2011; Norris, 1997). Written parliamentary questions have proven one such puzzle. Typical explanations in both the UK and comparative systems split neatly between largely qualitative studies of MPs' preferences and constituency service (e.g. Saalfeld, 2011), and quantitative studies of legislators' rational vote-seeking behaviour (e.g. Rasch, 2009; Soroka et al., 2009).

The first of these two approaches has used the relative autonomy of parliamentary questions to map legislators' substantive interests. This literature has found that MPs often focus their questions on one key issue in any parliamentary session (Judge, 1974), and that the nature of the questions often depends upon either the MP's demographic characteristics or those of their constituency. For example, there is evidence that women MPs ask more questions related to women's interests than male MPs (Bird, 2005), and that black or minority ethnic (BME) MPs or those representing constituencies with higher percentages of BME residents, ask more questions related to immigration and diversity (Saalfeld, 2011). This research base indicates a profound link, previously theorised by Donald Searing (1994), between MPs' legislative behaviour and their personalities or goals. Existing scholarship is yet to utilise the correct psychological tools to discriminate between these substantive arguments or to confirm their validity. For example, it is unknown whether MPs ask questions in order to explicitly pursue personal motivations linked to policy preferences, to pursue constituency interests because they are motivated to help those around them, or in order to appear successful according to standards of legislative productivity.

The second dominant approach to studying parliamentary questions, grounded heavily in rational choice theory, builds on the last of these three suggestions. As formal and publically recorded legislative acts that are not limited in number or tightly regulated by party officials, and which can force government responses that may receive media attention (Franklin and Norton, 1993), written parliamentary questions may be used by legislators to build a personal vote. This electoral link has been demonstrated by Michael Kellermann (2016, p.91), who found that MPs in marginal constituencies asked 15% more questions on average than those in safe seats. This would suggest that written questions are used as a response to electoral vulnerability. However, Kellermann could find no commensurate rise in the number of constituency-related questions among 'unsafe' MPs. This contradicts classical models of the rational actor, which would suggest that the strategic incentives born out of

electoral vulnerability would push MPs to adopt a constituency orientation in order to secure re-election (Strøm, 1997). Comparative evidence is equally mixed (e.g. Blidook and Kerby, 2011).

For the purpose of this thesis, these studies show that informal institutional constraints are more important than formal processes or party pressure when explaining MPs' use of written questions. There is clear evidence of a constituency link that requires more precise investigation. However, there remains no evidence to suggest that parliamentary questions produce direct electoral returns and only an average of 7 percent of questions actually refer to constituencies, constituents and communities in constituencies (Kellermann, 2016, p.95). This would suggest that parliamentary questions are also likely to offer MPs high perceived choice to pursue personal motivations.

H5: *MPs' basic values will predict a moderate amount of variance in the number of written parliamentary questions asked. This is specifically anticipated for MPs high in Security values (who are more likely to plough effort into constituency-oriented behaviours to combat electoral marginality); MPs high in Achievement values (who may use ex ante questions to signal party loyalty and ambitions for higher office); and MPs high in Benevolence values (who may use questions out of a genuine desire to be a good constituency representative).*

3. Early Day Motions (EDMs)

In studies of parliamentary behaviour, EDMs offer another indicator by which scholars may assess members' preferences. Like written questions, EDMs offer backbench MPs an outlet to cultivate a personal image by sponsoring non-binding internal motions that could hypothetically – though rarely – be debated in the chamber at an unspecified date in the future (House of Commons Information Office, 2010). EDMs can be used to offer support or criticism for government legislation; they can raise local issues that concern individual MPs; or they can be used as an additional arena for party political point scoring. To the extent that EDMs are of little parliamentary significance and are not tightly regulated by party whips, the costs of sponsoring them are small by comparison to other parliamentary behaviours. Although these contextual factors make EDMs a source of expressive legislative behaviour, research has tended to explain them as signalling tools used by rational self-interested actors who seek to send internal messages to party leaders (Berrington, 1973) or external messages to voters (Kellermann, 2013).

In a similar study to his work on parliamentary questions, Michael Kellermann (2013) found a strong relationship between electoral marginality and the number of EDMs introduced by MPs. Kellermann argues that this reflects a causal relationship in which peripheral legislative behaviours (i.e. EDMs) become a function of electoral pressures as MPs seek to improve their chances of re-election at the margin (cf. Carey and Shugart, 1995; Gaines, 1998). However, Kellermann (2013, p. 274) also found significant party differences in the introduction of EDMs. These differences were broadly reflective of Left-Right divides; for example, Conservative MPs were much less likely to introduce at least one EDM than Labour MPs, and also likely to introduce fewer when they did. This is an important finding that Kellermann largely dismisses, even though it holds across multiple Parliaments and therefore cannot be confounded simply by the added restraint of being ‘the party in government’. Whilst these differences could reflect styles of party organisation and selection, they may also reflect the types of MPs who occupy parties on the Left and Right. More so than written questions, which can force a government response, EDMs have trivial policy implications and are largely invisible to the general public. In line with the IMPPB, EDMs offer MPs high perceived choice with only minimal formal and informal institutional constraint. Therefore EDMs may be used to pursue, or at least indicate, personal preferences and value-led policy goals.

H6: *Basic values will predict a large amount of variance in the number of EDMs signed; the relationship between basic values and EDM sponsorship will reflect substantive differences in the values of MPs in centre-Left and centre-Right parties.*

4. Select Committee Membership

Select Committees (SCs) have been a feature of the parliamentary landscape since 1979; after the Wright reforms in 2010 they have become a high profile adjunct to the House of Commons chamber where MPs can scrutinise the business of government and influence policy directions. Described as ‘the most significant change to the way that the House operates in 30 years’ (Hagelund and Goddard, 2015), SCs are an ‘empowered system’ (Marsh, 2016, p.96) that receives increasingly frequent media coverage (Kubala, 2011). Existing scholarship on SCs has sought to explain their power, autonomy and policy influence as well as the efficacy of the Wright Reforms (e.g. Bates et al., 2017; Fisher, 2015; Kelso, 2009). Benton and Russell’s (2013) study of the impact of SCs found that they exerted considerable influence, both measureable and non-measurable, upon government activity. For example, their carefully coded quantitative analysis of SC recommendations from 1997-2010

found that departmental SCs were successful in securing more than 200 substantive changes to government policy every year (Benton and Russell, 2013, p. 781).

The purpose of the present thesis is not to augment this already established body of research on the efficacy of SC output and outcomes, but rather to add nuance to it by looking backwards at the types of people attracted to SCs who influence those outcomes. In the study mentioned above, Benton and Russell (2013, pp.782-783) argue that the success of SCs depends upon a combination of committee-, inquiry-, and recommendation-level factors. At the committee-level, Benton and Russell (*ibid.*, p.782) refer to ‘the committee’s style and reputation, the nature and culture of the department that it shadows, the personality and effectiveness of its chair, and the drafting style of its clerk’. The personal side of SCs is also been discussed by Marc Geddes (forthcoming, 2019) in his interpretivist approach to role typologies among SC chairs. Additional research has focused on the career paths of individual SC members; as of 2016 11 of the 47 SC chairs elected post-2010 were previously, or went on to, [shadow] cabinet positions (Democratic Audit, 2016). This would suggest that the increasing efficacy of SCs, as well as the emergence of the ‘celebrity’ chair (see Fisher, 2015), has transformed the career paths open to backbench MPs and especially those with aspirations to frontbench office. Equally intriguing, SC chairs vote against their party majority significantly more frequently than their backbench colleagues (Democratic Audit, 2016).³⁶ This maverick tendency among SC chairs is suggestive of either the confidence endowed upon these individuals by internal parliamentary elections, or substantive personality differences in the types of MPs pursuing these positions. This nascent feature of scholarship in parliamentary studies has neither been developed systematically nor supported by rigorous research methods. There is an over-reliance on interview data gathered from SC members as well as textual analysis of committee reports, both of which reflect the opinions of those with most reason to exaggerate the efficacy of SCs. The resultant research base is, therefore, largely impressionistic and vulnerable to bias.³⁷

In light of the above discussion, the decision to stand for SC membership or chairmanship represents a potentially expressive behavioural decision that may reveal individual differences between backbench MPs. In utilising the IMPPB to understand this, there are a number of competing explanations. Whilst it is evident that SCs have become increasingly autonomous of both party and government control – this would indicate high

³⁶ In the 2015-2017 Parliament, Select Committee chairs had a mean rebellion rate of 1.3% compared to a mean of 0.65% for other backbenchers.

³⁷ For an extended discussion of the limitations of this research base, refer to: Bates et al., 2017; O’Brien, 2012.

perceived choice for MPs considering a move onto the SC ‘circuit’ – this has brought with it an increased public profile and reputational risks. Therefore, institutional constraint may be low in terms of internal and formal parliamentary and party structures, but the expectations of external role alters are growing. This may, in itself, limit the pool of potential applicants; MPs with a high priority for security may be much less likely than other MPs to put themselves forward. SC membership also requires a level of cross-party collaboration and consensus rarely found in the UK Parliament. The ability to conceive of oneself working with rather than against political opponents may also filter potential applicants. Nevertheless, SCs allow MPs relatively high levels of institutional choice.

H7: *Basic values will successfully discriminate between MPs’ decisions to run for SC membership and the relationship will be stronger among MPs who have been SC chairs. In particular, it is expected that MPs on SCs will score more highly for Achievement values (attracted to SCs by the promise of career progression and visibility) and Self-Direction values (MPs who struggle to conform to the party whip and see SC membership as a way of acting upon individual preferences).*

This chapter provides a thorough and rigorous review of extant research into the behaviour of parliamentary political elites. Synthesising the conceptual wisdom and empirical findings of existing parliamentary research with the theoretical foundations of psychological studies, this chapter presents an integrated model for parliamentary political behaviour (IMPPB). The IMPPB offers an original blueprint by which I suggest an interactive relationship between cognitive processes based on basic values, the institutional fabric of Westminster, the effects of party political socialisation and organisation, and the mediating role of ideology. The precise yet flexible nature of the IMPPB allows me to frame four hypotheses for original empirical testing.

“In free governments the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors and sovereigns. For the former therefore to return among the latter was not to degrade but to promote them. And it would be imposing an unreasonable burden on them...not [to] allow them to become again one of the Masters.”

Benjamin Franklin (1787)

P

ersonality and Anti-Politics: Re-Examining Representation (RQ3)

In 1965 David Easton (p. 212) argued that the history of regimes is a long lesson in the downfall of political systems in which those with authority did not have the support or confidence of the governed. So far I have argued for an interdisciplinary approach to parliamentary studies that can augment the academic understanding, at the micro-level, of who is motivated to enter elite politics and, at the meso-level, of how these individual-level personality characteristics interact with institutional factors to shape legislators' behaviour. This chapter adds to that research agenda by extrapolating to macro-level issues of representation and anti-politics. The central argument of this chapter reduces to the existence of an unhealthy premium on the individual in contemporary democratic politics, both in terms of the ways representatives understand and execute their professional function and how/why voters become disillusioned regardless of their political choices.

In contrast to a post-millennial literature on political malaise that is concerned, above all, with institutional processes and failures of political administration (Allen, 2006; Hay, 2007; Norris, 2011; Flinders, 2012), I trace an insidious preoccupation with political personalities and a growing perception gap that underpins citizens' withdrawal from formal political participation. Classical and contemporary scholarship alike has made the case, whether implicitly or explicitly, that political scientists cannot talk of a crisis in democracy without talking about the people who work in and for it. This chapter clarifies that argument and in doing so it completes an interdisciplinary research agenda founded on the empirical study of Members of Parliament (MPs), their Basic Human Values (BHV), and public perceptions thereof.

The chapter proceeds in three interrelated sections. Part I offers an extended review of prominent debates in the literature on democratic theory, identifying flaws inherent in the process of blending the institutions of representation and democracy that have set up a crisis built around the *people doing politics*. Part II builds on this discussion by outlining 'gap' and 'trap' accounts of anti-politics as agency-oriented phenomena that necessarily emanate from the arguments of part I. Part III then focuses specifically on the personalisation of politics in the media and the ways in which anti-political sentiments revolving around politicians' psychological flaws have been exacerbated. Through critical exploration of these issues, I isolate three key hypotheses about the role of personality in democratic representation that will be tested empirically in later chapters of this thesis.

I. The Human Process of Representative Democracy

According to Nadia Urbinati (2011, p. 24), 'representation is the locus of the dynamics that keep modern democracy in motion and the political process that activates the communication between state institutions and society.' This definition is useful insofar as it succinctly captures the procedural aspect of democratic representation, but it conveniently elides the human relationships within and between institutions. Implicit in this definition is, on the one hand, the notion of one person (i.e. a citizen) authorising another (i.e. a representative) to act on their behalf. This is a crucial condition for understanding representation as a facilitative institution for democracy, for the people's sovereignty, and it demands proper respect and attention (Habermas, 1996, pp.462 - 515). On the other hand, this definition conveys the sense of unitary will that is conceived in the act of representation; this is a unitary will that does not necessarily pre-exist but is formed in the representative and as such demands an enormous amount of individual-to-individual trust (i.e. Kant, 1991). Moreover, representation necessarily transfers power from the principal to the agent and disassociates democratic liberty from the direct authorisation of will. In doing so it places a performative emphasis on the role of the representative to a) discern and secure the 'common good', or b) to enter into an enduring process of contestation on behalf of certain factional interests.

A relatively recent constructivist turn in this debate goes further in suggesting that democratic representatives are not simply responsive to the will of the people but make present those people they represent through a series of 'representative claims' (e.g. Saward,

2006, 2010).³⁸ The implication of this constructivist approach is to grant the act of representation a creative force as constitutive of popular power, thus divorcing it from a system of elections (see, for example, Näsström, 2015). Whilst this understanding of representation may give rise to a broader palette of public opinions and marginal interests, it also assumes that representative claims will, necessarily, be democratic. As Hannah Pitkin (2004, p. 339) argues, any schema that decouples representation from the legitimacy granted by elections risks a system in which representatives 'act not as agents of the people but simply instead of them'. For those scholars concerned by the degenerative slide to 'mainstream populism' in western democracies (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Mény and Surel, 2002) and the dog-whistle politics of those making representative claims that undermine democratic values, I argue that there is an academic imperative to understand the motivations and machinations of those who formally represent and thus make representative claims in that capacity.

This discussion has so far outlined two key repercussions of linking the concepts of representation and democracy: the first is the overwhelming responsibility placed upon the individuals elected to office and the second concerns the negative potential of a system in which popular power is ceded to those same individuals. This emphasis on the people *doing* politics is reinforced by the institutions of representative democracy, primarily its system of elections. Though supportive of the institution of representation, democratic formalists, particularly Hans Kelsen (1999), believe that the political binding of elections is not enough to ensure that representatives both reflect the will of the people and are 'responsible' to their electors. Whilst political binding introduces a host of ethical norms surrounding the prudence of the representative, Kelsen argues that this moral duty requires an imperative mandate secured by law. For Kelsen (1999, p.292) '[l]egal independence of the elected from the electors is incompatible with legal representation'. The UK does not provide its representatives with an imperative mandate, although the Recall of MPs Act 2015 (effective as of March 2016) has introduced rules by which an MP can lose their seat in Parliament subject to a successful petition, signed by at least 10% of constituents (The Electoral Commission, 2016). In reality the Recall of MPs Act 2015 is a limited re-balancing of democratic power towards the principal within the institution of representation. Petitions can only be triggered by the Speaker of the House on the occasion that an MP should receive a

³⁸ For a comprehensive overview of wider scholarship in this tradition, see Lisa Disch, 'Toward a Mobilisation Conception of Democratic Representation,' *American Political Science Review* Vol. 105 (2011): pp. 100-114.

custodial sentence, falsify allowances under the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, or find themselves barred from the House of Commons for more than 14 calendar days per year. Parliamentary elections remain the institutional site of popular will, vested in representatives who, in the absence of an imperative mandate, must ultimately be judged on the merits of their values, opinions and ideological discourse - what Kelsen refers to as 'political fictions' (Kelsen, 1992). The emphasis of the debate thus switches from the institutional mechanisms by which democracy is enacted to the *psychological characteristics* of the people who are deemed eligible to act in one's best interests.

It is in this theoretical as well as practical context that elections arguably engender two of the key indicators of anti-politics explored later in this chapter: popular disengagement and the personalisation of politics. Firstly, insofar as elections give the people post factum control over their government, they make popular participation and democracy an accessory to the actions of representatives in the interim. Secondly, the electoral process creates democratic inequalities, since only those who are elected have both deliberative and decision-making powers. Combined these processes create a politics of personality, both in terms of how people characterise their democratic choices and in terms of how they evaluate the performance of democratic governments. For similar reasons, Sofia Näsström (2015, p.4) argues that elections, as an arena for perverted ideological competition about what is right for "we, the people", have become 'a democratic straightjacket'. If elections induce a regular competition about 'who' is fit to instantiate popular power, then the health of democracy simultaneously rests on the personal qualities of those representatives who assume that power: representation becomes less a process of authorisation by voters so much as a constant judgement about the rectitude of laws and lawmakers. Where representatives are found wanting in their democratic capacity, the sovereign people can either disengage with politics, thus threatening the very system of government, or harness negative power to censure representatives via extra-parliamentary institutions.³⁹

In terms of holding individual members to account, Parliaments around the world have responded to public approbation with a raft of reforms to both their accountability and scrutiny measures, as well as public engagement and education mechanisms (see, for example, Beetham, 2011). However, there is already a nascent body of research that

³⁹ For a discussion of the latter, see Pierre Rosanvallon (2006) on 'counter-democracy' or John Keane (2011) on 'monitory democracy'.

demonstrates a disjuncture between citizens and elites when it comes to agreeing upon acceptable behaviour by elected representatives (Jackson and Smith, 1996; McAllister, 2000; Atkinson and Bjerling, 2005). Therefore, parliamentary reforms that focus on the legality of representative behaviour, such as those introduced by the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) in the UK following the expenses scandal of 2009, fail to appreciate that the public understanding of ethics in 'normal politics' goes beyond corruption or bribery. In a three-wave quantitative study of British citizens in 2009-2010, Nicholas Allen and Sarah Birch (2015b, pp. 62-88) found a significant mismatch between the narrow conception of ethics expounded by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, and a public understanding of ethical behaviour that prioritised ideological and discursive integrity. Given that Parliaments are often associated with unpopular or sullied aspects of politics (Beetham, 2011), it may be expected that the emphasis on the personal probity of representatives - cultivated by the concept of representation and the institution of elections - extends to meso-level evaluations of Parliament.

As a functional arena for representation - insofar as it provides the site of representative deliberation and the enactment of legislation - Parliament also produces laws that affect all citizens, not just the electors of any one representative. As Carré de Malberg (1922) argued in the early 20th century, this process of representation via Parliament necessarily alters the act of authorisation between elector and elected in a democracy. In a will-based theory of representation, elected politicians must then be conscious of both the will of the people in general, whom their laws will affect, and their direct electoral relationship with a constituency (for a full discussion, see Urbinati, 2006). Coupled with a free rather than imperative mandate, representatives must traverse the complex nexus of being both politically bound by ideological similarity to their electors and yet legally independent of them in order to retain the political legitimacy necessary to make laws for all (Thompson, 1987). In the Burkean sense, democratic representatives cannot then share a dyadic delegate relationship with their constituents. Yet so long as they are permanently in political relation to that constituency, neither can they be entirely like Burke's trustee.

In its haste to categorise the focus and style of democratic representation, political science has not given enough thought to this mandate-independence controversy (Pitkin, 1967). Instead a long line of quantitative and qualitative research has attempted to discern the antecedent conditions for, and broader systemic effects of, representatives who act as either

trustees, delegates, partisans, or politicians (Eulau and Wahlke, 1959; Katz, 1997; Mendez-Lago and Martinez, 2002; Müller and Saalfeld, 1997). To the extent that the very nature of representation in Western liberal democracies eschews these 'pure forms', as delineated above, this literature brings a rigid model with weak explanatory power to the task of understanding how and why politicians take roles seriatim in the fluctuating context of democratic politics. This is reflected in a disappointing lineage of studies that find inconsistent results in politicians' self-reported representative focus, or alternatively counter-intuitive links between those answers and politicians' political behaviours (Andeweg, 2012; Gauja, 2012; Gross, 1978; Sorauf, 1963). Using the conceptual base of the IMPPB, developed in chapter 4, I believe that the enduring ambiguities outlined above may be clarified according to personal preference and motivated decision-making.

H8: *Basic values will successfully discriminate between MPs' ranked preferences for representative focus. In particular, there will be a close correlation between Self-Transcendence values and delegate preferences, Openness to Change values and trustee preferences, and Conservation values and partisan preferences.*

This section has engaged with a rich umbrella of literature on democratic theory in general, and the nature of representation in a democracy in particular. In doing so it advances a series of interrelated claims. Firstly, the system of representation produces a continual contestation about who "we, the people" are and what is (il)legitimate in a modern democracy that, as a theoretical system, has no locus of power. Secondly, this contestation is given embodiment in the institutions of elections and Parliaments that not only divorce democratic norms from practice but also place an enormous emphasis on the personal qualities and motivations of those making representative claims. Thirdly, it is by recourse to studying the psychological qualities of politicians and the personalisation of politics that political science may better understand both how representatives decide upon their democratic focus and how or why citizens choose to disengage from, distrust or disparage politics. In focusing upon the issue of anti-politics in the following section, this chapter proceeds with an underpinning acknowledgement for vertical lines of causation from representative democracy as a system down to its institutions and ultimately the actors who make manifest the potentiality (positive or negative) of that system.

II. The Gap, the Trap, and the Prominence of Personality

If the previous section highlighted the normative systemic catalysts for an anti-political culture built upon personality politics, then the purpose of the following section is to illustrate the manifestation of this argument through existing scholarship on anti-politics in the UK and beyond. This body of work distils neatly into two dominant explanations (Corbett, 2015). The first is a ‘gap’ account of political malaise and the demonisation of politicians based on a divergence of citizen expectations and politicians’ performance. The second is a ‘trap’ account, in which politicians are caught between contradictory demands inherent in democratic publics and representative politics. More than fifty years since the publication of Bernard Crick’s (1962) famous defence of politics, these accounts map the change as well as the constants in public understandings of politics and politicians. However, even that literature trying to pick up where Crick left off (e.g. Corbett, 2014; Flinders, 2012; Medvic, 2013; Riddell, 2011) fails to move beyond disciplinary boundaries to incorporate the lived experiences and personal motivations of those politicians they seek to defend. Instead there is a tendency towards theoretical debates in the academy that only stress the normative plurality of the discipline’s understanding of why politicians are necessary.⁴⁰ This section draws upon the empirical and normative work of this literature to outline the potential contribution of a counter-narrative built upon careful attention to the personal side of politics.

The imperative of this research is, to an extent, two-fold. On the one the hand I have already outlined a range of threats to representative democracy that demand original research, but on the other hand I seek to answer that promise of political science to cultivate the public understanding of politics through engaged and relevant scholarship. By contrast the dominant narrative has been one of rational choice approaches and indulgent apocalyptic strap lines, so that ‘political scientists have contributed significantly to the demonisation of politics. [T]hey trained us, in effect, to be cynical. And in that respect at least, we have been excellent students’ (Hay, 2009, p.587). This is an argument echoed elsewhere and reduces to a realisation that the discipline may have failed its responsibility as a knowledge-filter and a knowledge-broker, not simply a knowledge-creator, when it comes to tempering an overly critical civic body (Flinders, 2013). Adding faux credence to a political witch hunt, the literature talks of ‘inevitable cases of political misconduct’ (Allen and Birch, 2015) and

⁴⁰ For a systematic review of the rationales, roles and normative ideals assigned to politicians in this field, see Corbett, 2014, p. 499.

convinces its readership that 'one might be forgiven for thinking that the ABCs of British politics are arrests, bribery and cheating' (Bowler and Karp, 2004). Such slippage in the discourse of this literature extends to the conceptual starting point of political analysis. One may go back as far as the 70s - before public indices for falling trust in politicians were the subject of such stark concern - and take Arnold Heidenheimer's (1970) model of 'white', 'grey', and 'black' corruption as an example of political analysis that extends only in the direction of elite *sinning* without consideration for those *doing good* in public life. These examples are typical of a political science academy that has been complacent and complicit in the moral degradation of politics and political office, inadvertently fuelling the anti-politics it now seeks to explain.

To take the first of the dominant approaches mentioned above - the 'gap' account - is to distinguish between two further schools of thought. On the one hand a demand-side explanation, energetically pursued by Matthew Flinders (2012; see also Hatier, 2012), works backwards from public disengagement to a certain moral panic about the quality of our representatives. In this view, public apathy is underwritten by a lack of political education and thus an inflated impression of what is deliverable in democratic politics. On the other hand a supply-side explanation (see, in particular, Hay, 2007; Hay and Stoker, 2009; Stoker, 2006) blames professional politicians and neo-liberal reform agendas for their complacency in fuelling anti-political sentiment. The latter explanation sits nicely with those who welcome the threat of anti-politics as a chance to rejuvenate democracy through new forms of popular deliberation and participation (e.g. Dryzek, 2000; Evans et al., 2013). Whilst these explanations might contend with one another, there are distinct similarities. Firstly, both accounts come back to the people *doing* politics; one to defend politicians from the expectation of being super-human and the other to criticise them for a range of human vices.

The evidence here is compelling whichever way it is interpreted. In their application of Kahneman's (2011) philosophy of fast and slow thinking, Stoker et al. (2016) confirmed received wisdom that the public's intuitive thinking about politicians is highly negative, cynical and characterised by a vernacular of disillusionment. Focus group participants provided 209 word associations for politicians, of which only 7 were positive. However, in every case the 'slow thinking phase' saw such trenchant negativity give way to a more considered critique and a reflective form of reasoning that was 'far more generous to the spirit of what politics might be trying to achieve' (Stoker et al. 2016, p.14).

Similarly, Allen and Birch (2015a, p.402) found a significant negative relationship between respondent's confidence in politicians' personality traits, such as honesty, and process dissatisfaction in politics. As confidence in politicians' personal qualities increased, so too the gap between respondent's ideal process beliefs and their perceptions of the status quo decreased. As a causal relationship, it would appear sensible to believe that citizens who trust their politicians to be honest and interested in popular opinion, will be more satisfied with the operation of democratic politics. Allen and Birch (2015a, p.406) also found a significant positive relationship between perceptions of politicians and the likelihood of respondents endorsing the view that voting is a duty. Studies of this kind clearly indicate an appetite for politics but a profound disagreement with the conduct of representative democracy that rests, to a large extent, on the personal qualities of representatives. From a demand-side perspective, the reliance of the public on subjective process-space intuitions about politicians might confirm a deficit of informed popular engagement and evaluation. By contrast, the same evidence might be interpreted from a supply-side perspective as proof that the 'wrong' people are governing the country in the 'wrong' interests. The point to make here is that either interpretation involves a significant preoccupation with the personal side of elite politics but neither acknowledges this explicitly nor utilises the correct methods to investigate the topic further.

It is striking that such critiques of politicians and their motives, let alone their involvement in major policy decisions, is at direct odds with the beliefs and experiences of politicians as presented in a relatively small pool of political studies research (e.g. Reeher, 2006; Tiernan and Weller, 2010) and in academic texts or biographies by former politicians (e.g. Ignatieff, 2013; Volgy, 2001). This is a practical defense of politicians that has been specifically advanced in recent years by Jack Corbett (2015). According to Corbett (2015, pp.473-480), the disjuncture between evidence from politicians and public evaluations thereof points to four central defences that can be made. Firstly, the number of inter-confirmatory qualitative studies of politicians' ideological beliefs (e.g. Tiernan and Weller, 2010; Weller and Gratten, 1981), as well as various typologies of politicians (e.g. Searing, 1994; Navarro, 2009), suggests a level of heterogeneity that does not feature in the literature on political 'careerism' and professionalisation. Secondly, self-report and interview data on politicians from numerous democratic systems conveys a common commitment to serve others and achieve goals directed at a 'better' future (e.g. Reeher, 2006). Thirdly, accounts of political life are replete with references to extreme time commitments, consistent conflicts, poor health,

and tense family relations (e.g. Volgy, 2001; Ignatieff, 2013). This is a sentiment echoed succinctly by Rhodes' (2011, p.161) study of British government: 'The key task of the departmental court is to cope.' The final argument in Corbett's (2015) defense mirrors what John Keane (2009, p.51) calls 'the ubiquity of perplexity' in his *Life and Death of Democracy*. While the public criticises politicians for procrastination and grandstanding, politicians themselves describe political life as beset by endless contingencies (e.g. Evans et al., 2013; Naim, 2013). Clearly focused on politicians' integrity as well as their individual actions, these claims reflect an unspoken narrative dominated by the personal side of politics.

Although the literature cited above is largely based on subjective, secondary analysis, these arguments are compelling for the way in which they distil 'gap' accounts of anti-politics to common causes. In delineating the disconnect between emic and etic perceptions of politics, these claims also neatly bridge the conceptual divide between 'gap' and 'trap' views of anti-politics. For example, the obvious conclusion of Corbett's (2015, p.473) defense of politicians is that 'real *people* are neither saints nor sinners...the demonisation of politicians partly reflects our own discomfort with their function in a democratic system and our unwillingness to undertake the job ourselves.' Corbett touches on the essence of the 'trap': that politicians have always been plagued by their need to 'wear masks' (Runciman, 2008) and compromise on their own goals and those of others (Crick, 1962). Whilst the 'gap' view helps us to understand much of what has changed in democratic politics, from the role of the media to the rise of neo-liberal reform agendas, the 'trap' account clarifies a number of constants.

To meet the contradictory demands of their publics, and to take leadership positions in a system supposedly committed to popular sovereignty, 'trap' accounts of anti-politics argue that politicians must be both leaders and followers, principled and pragmatic, ordinary and exceptional (Medvic 2013). For example, principle and pragmatism do not necessarily contradict one another, but in the realm of democratic party politics one will commonly negate the other. Acting on deeply held principles is noble and sustaining those values in politics is even more admirable, but when politicians remain dogmatic in their adherence to a set of principles they are decried as harbingers of stalemate and political stagnation. Should politicians divert from principle too easily to reach a compromise, they are cast as unreliable and opportunistic. As Kane and Patapan (2012, p.44) argue: '[the electors] want somebody who will do their bidding, listen to them, and not break promises, yet they will hold in contempt the leader who merely follows the polls, has no 'vision', and refuses to make tough,

unpopular decisions.' Thus the trap is laid. Far from being overtly political, each of these paradoxes reflects a popular preoccupation with process space - propounded by systems of representative democracy, as argued in section 1 - and thus a focus on the personal qualities of those people doing politics.

The 'trap' account also reflects, to some extent, disaggregated popular conceptions of what 'good' representation actually means (Carman, 2006). Therefore, it is necessary to ask, in turn, how this situation affects popular conceptions of 'what MPs are for?' and how they react 'in office'. In their review of MPs' casework activity, Norton and Wood (1993) claim that constituents in the UK increasingly view their local representative as a lightning rod for achieving personal 'policy' goals. This is an argument mirrored in recent scholarship that finds a preference among UK voters for strong-willed MPs who, independent of the party line, prioritise the constituency over national policy work (Campbell and Lovenduski, 2015; Vivyan and Wagner, 2015). This is particularly interesting in light of previous evidence from the UK indicating that citizens with the strongest preferences for a constituency representative are significantly more likely to believe that MPs are out of touch (Carmen, 2006). In studies of the US and the UK, Christopher Carmen (2003, 2006) has also found political efficacy, education, race and gender to be significant predictors of representational preferences.⁴¹ It is evident, then, that the public have varied normative ideas about representation and that these ideas have an impact on their evaluations of politics and politicians. However, these studies are severely limited in two respects. Firstly, they do not link representational preferences with popular evaluations of/votes for prospective candidates. Secondly, they draw inadequate causal links between representational preferences and a popular narrative about politicians characterised by psychological accusations (e.g. Stoker et al., 2016). To fill this lacuna in the representation literature, I seek to assess the extent to which popular evaluations of politicians' *qua people* dominate over political considerations.

H9: *Prospective MPs' personalities, as measured by basic values, will be more important to voters than other personal qualities such as age, gender, or faith, or a candidate's commitment to a specific representational style.*

⁴¹ Similar results have been found in Spain, including a significant difference by region of residence (see Mendez-Lago and Martinez, 2002).

From Hannah Arendt's (1958) description of politics as the constitution of personhood via the public realm to Max Weber's (1978, p.225) classic belief in politics as a vocation that demands the 'slow boring of hard boards', there has been a narrative of human endeavour at the heart of some of the greatest political thinking in the last century. However, this focus on the human condition - both in Parliament and outside of it - has not translated into effective empirical research on democratic participation and disengagement in the 21st century. This chapter now turns to a prominent feature of post-1945 political science research that epitomises the importance (and rise) of the 'personal' for the anti-political - the personalisation of politics.

III. The Personalisation of Politics

As both cause and symptom of anti-politics, I argue that fluctuations of public interest, trust and participation in formal politics are tightly connected to another phenomenon of post-1945 political communication: the personalisation of politics. Drawing on a range of contemporary and recent research in this area, I argue in this section that the personalisation of politics encompasses changes to the way in which power is held and deployed, a veer towards public understandings of politics based upon the personal qualities of representatives, and a self-perpetuating politicisation of the private and the personal (see, in particular Langer, 2007; Poguntke and Webb, 2005). As such I treat the personalisation of politics as more than just the increasing importance of mainstream political leaders. The arrival of personalisation mechanisms in democratic politics is not particularly sudden; insofar as democratic political leadership is especially paradoxical in its demands, the roles and actions of leaders have always been of heightened significance (Kavanagh, 1990; Kane and Patapan, 2012). However, modern types and styles of media have altered the public consumption of politics in an overtly agency-centred and personal direction (Langer, 2007; Hayes, 2009; Garzia, 2011; Teles, 2015). As the vehicle for trust judgements in politics, this section presents the phenomenon of personalisation as the embodiment of those systemic misgivings of representative democracy identified in section I.

As a process, the personalisation of politics has proceeded in tandem with a range of concomitant symptoms of anti-politics: the rise of individualistic democratic societies and post-modern values; the growth of identity politics and the decline of aggregative ideologies; the implosion of party memberships and popular allegiances; the increasing complexity of

modern governance systems; and the dawn of mass media (Mughan, 2000; Poguntke and Webb, 2005; McAllister, 2007; Hayes, 2009). The last of these is of special significance but there remains a lack of joined-up thinking in the extant research and a number of unanswered questions. Media scholars and political scientists alike have demonstrated a growing media focus on process space as opposed to policy issues (Deacon et al., 2001; Heffernan, 2006; Wring and Ward, 2010), a trend that has been particularly apparent during election campaigns when 'leaders are increasingly the personification of their parties' (Heffernan, 2006, p.583; Stevens and Karp, 2012). These research findings chime with a literature on anti-politics that has shown both the importance of process space for popular evaluations of politics, and its significance for democratic disengagement (Allen and Birch, 2015; Stoker et al., 2016; Stoker and Hay, 2017). However, these two bodies of literature have not been bridged either theoretically or empirically. I argue that the two are inextricably linked: in democratic systems driven by personality politics, it is highly likely that citizens make political judgements (about institutions as well as actors) based on everyday inferences about the qualities of those they observe/read about.

There is a largely US-centric literature on personality politics that has already confirmed the centrality of character evaluations in American elections, based overwhelmingly on judgements of competence and integrity (Goren, 2002, 2007). Related work in Britain is generally qualitative and limited in both size and scale. It has also been dominated by high-profile publications and commentaries that have tended to downplay the effect of media discourse on public considerations of politics and voters' decisions (e.g. Deacon et al., 2001; Kavanagh and Butler, 2005). These studies largely overlook personality or tend to conflate it with other personal characteristics; they are overwhelmingly observational; and they employ weak experimental designs in instances of empirical analysis (see Hayes, 2009, p. 232-233). However, the role of media effects in general, and personality/process space in particular, on both elections and political disengagement, cannot be ignored given changes to the amount of mediated political consumption as well as the style of that consumption.⁴²

⁴² According to the Electoral Commission in 2005 (p.31), 89% of the British population use the television as their primary source of political information during a campaign, and 54% also use newspapers. This thesis argues, therefore, that is necessary to ask what is being consumed and how it affects popular engagement with politics in the UK.

In her historical exploration of the personalisation of politics in the print media, Ana Langer (2007) coded 2008 articles from six 'ordinary' weeks in three years for each British Prime Minister between 1945 and 1999. Langer found that there has been a significant increase in the number of stories about Prime Ministers, with particularly substantial increases in non-political entertainment or human-interest stories (ibid., p.375). The proportion of words given over to prime-ministerial references per article has also increased (ibid., p.377). In addition to increased visibility in the press, Langer found a distinct change in what journalists counted as 'good leadership' in their coverage of John Major and Tony Blair. Beyond traditional references to communication, strength, or their political stratagem, Langer (Ibid., p.3180-381) found a new focus on the personal characteristics of both Prime Ministers that was not present in coverage of their predecessors, as well as an increase in the number of illustrations of good/bad leadership qualities through the leaders' personal lives. The number of these references, such as appearance, lifestyle, childhood and religion, has also increased exponentially since Thatcher (Ibid., p.383).

There is no reason to assume that the personalisation of politics in the print media has not continued in the last twenty years. Langer's findings point to a distinct personalisation of the political and a worrying politicisation of the personal in media coverage of politics. However, I argue that the significance of personalisation is not its existence per se but its impact on the public understanding of politics and their engagement with it. A character-based model of political journalism not only creates false intimacy between voter and candidate (Hayes, 2009), but it means that policy issues that are already misunderstood or poorly understood by the public are made even more peripheral to political debate. Indeed the weight of personal characteristics in political coverage arguably heightens the salience of interpersonal trust in the representative chain of delegation, making politicians more dependent on public approbation qua humans and more vulnerable to a form of public accountability based on personal (in)consistency.⁴³ To explore this further, it is necessary to

⁴³ Mayer et al. (1995, p.712) define trust as 'the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor'. Such psychological definitions of trust as an *interpersonal* construct map neatly to trust relationships implicit in a representative chain of delegation. At the ballot box most voters are faced with a choice between candidates they know extremely little about and must therefore commit an act of faith about where to delegate their sovereign liberty as a political citizen. It is likely, therefore, that voters may well prioritise non-political indicators of psychological qualities such as Benevolence when deciding whether or not to invest in a trust relationship with an individual MP or party leader, especially in an age of party congruence around the centre ground and sporadic media coverage of political scandals (Hindmoor, 2017). This thesis therefore seeks to assess the importance of personality (particularly shared values) as the basis upon which citizens might discriminate between candidates in an election (the vote itself representing a proxy expression of interpersonal trust).

examine not only which personal characteristics matters most to the public (cf. Allen and Birch, 2015a, 2015b) but how these characteristics affect political choices.

According to Rahat and Shaefer (2007, p. 65) the personalisation of politics reflects ‘a process in which the political weight of the individual actor in the political process increases over time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e. political parties) declines’. If this process is evident in the print media, as discussed above, then the television media’s ubiquitous focus on individual politicians has also perpetuated a mode of public appraisal based upon everyday cognitive judgements of representatives as *people* (McAllister, 1996; Karvonen, 2010). In restructuring social space, television can reposition the public’s view of politicians away from their role as actors in political institutions and towards their role as people to be trusted. As early as the 1980s, Joshua Meyrowitz (1985, p. 271) talked of the *lowering effect* of television on politicians, wherein ‘the camera minimizes the distance between audience and performer...[and] lowers politicians to the level of their audience’. Rahn et al. (1990) argue that this *lowering effect* facilitates public evaluations of politicians as ‘common’ people based on inferential strategies constantly employed in our everyday lives. This conclusion goes back to the basilar assumptions of the previous section: absent from the hidden wiring of political institutions and decision-making, the public pass political judgements (either of individual representatives or the institutions of representative democracy) that are founded upon the personal characteristics they perceive in their representatives.

The average public understanding of elite politics is, as already stated, minimal; it is compounded by the cognitive difficulty of not only securing relevant information but matching it correctly to personal preferences. This has been the premise, for example, of a burgeoning research pool on the benefits of Voter Advice Applications (VAAs; Fossen and Anderson, 2014; see also Garzia et al., 2014 for a recent overview of these studies). However, these studies make the same mistake as other supply-side solutions to the ‘knowledge gap’ by failing to account for the importance of personality in vote choice, let alone in public evaluations of politics more broadly. The visual consumption of politics and politicians through a personalised television narrative arguably gives citizens an attractive cognitive shortcut tailored to the essential point that ‘[w]e want to trust competent leaders, but we also

want to like them personally' (Caprara and Zimbardo, 2004, p.590). From this perspective, personalisation is a product as much of supply-side changes to political communication as demand from any democratic public in a representative system. The media has, essentially, responded to '[a]verage news consumers [who] prefer to read about other people, not about abstract groups or remote bureaucracies and government agencies' (Davis, 1990, p.169).

These arguments should not be taken as evidence that political parties no longer matter to the public but rather these institutions have themselves undergone deep changes that are both cause and consequence of the personalisation of politics (see Garzia, 2011; McAllister, 2007). Utility-maximising parties, moving from class-mass to 'catch-all' profiles in an age of ideological dealignment (Mair et al., 2004), have focused more on presenting telegenic leaders than ideologically-driven policy rhetoric (Farrell and Webb, 2000; Mughan, 2000). This has become particularly apparent as a campaign tactic, although arguably this has resulted in greater political power for individual politicians and a diminished role for parties themselves. Twenty years ago, scholars were already claiming that 'election outcomes are now, more than at any time in the past, determined by voters' assessments of party leaders' (Hayes and McAllister, 1997, p.3).

Comparative electoral research, especially studies influenced by the Michigan model, have contested the growing primacy of personality over party (King, 2002; Holmberg and Oscarsson, 2011). According to the Michigan model, the personality of leaders cannot influence voting calculus more than partisan attachments, which are deep affective orientations based on early socialisation and thus temporally antecedent in models of vote choice. The exogeneity of partisanship as a causal factor in this equation has, however, been challenged by recent theoretical and empirical work (Holmberg, 2007). For example, studies of valence politics have found voters to be Bayesian updaters whose partisan attachments are more flexible than believed. Using data from the British Election Study as well as experimental designs, Clarke et al. (2004) showed that the governing capacity of the party is increasingly dependent on the short-term influence of the leader and their image. Using instrumental variable analysis to decouple partisanship and leader effects on vote choice, Diego Garzia (2012, p.181) also found that leader effects dominated over parties in all three of his sample nations (Britain, Germany and Italy). This nascent research base indicates a shifting tide in the received wisdom of electoral studies that suggests the personality of

individual politicians may have a greater effect on political choice than party identification.⁴⁴

The challenge for this literature is to incorporate these conclusions into a broader set of political choices, i.e. not simply to explain vote choice but also levels of popular participation.

At an individual level, politicians themselves are arguably tied to a circular process in which the increasing prevalence and impact of 'life-style' politics becomes a strategic behavioural pre-requisite - however inconclusive the evidence may be at this stage - in the presentation of their public personae. The politicisation of the private is hard to escape:

[E]ven if some leaders were to remain unenthusiastic, they would find it ever harder to decline to reveal aspects of their personal lives as this is likely to be perceived as an indication of aloofness, weakness, or, even worse, concealment. (Langer, 2007, p. 386)

In many ways, it is possible to contend that the personalisation phenomenon has changed the nature of political leadership, insofar as contemporary politicians build authority 'not by being beyond the people...[but] by being of and like them' (Renshon, 1995, p.201). During times of systemic crisis when politics more broadly is deeply distrusted, new faces are even more likely to be judged by their symbolic proximity to the masses and their perceived similarity to each individual voter (Pitkin, 1967; Barisione, 2009). Political parties and politicians alike are, however, aware of the power of political advertisement on modern voter perceptions, and thus package candidate images to match potential constituencies (Campus, 2010). It is here that the distinction must be made between what the public are exposed to, that is personality as perception, and those cognitive or motivational processes that guide politicians' actual behaviour, that is personality as functioning. In this narrative, MPs themselves are obliged to focus on the public perception of their personalities, fuelling a self-fulfilling prophecy in which they honestly believe they must deceive in order to be trusted. However, this area of research has been sorely neglected in political science (cf. Caprara et al., 2012).

To make this connection, I draw on perceptual-balance theory (Nimmo and Savage, 1976). Unlike cognitive realism, in which objects are perceived exactly as they are (e.g. Gibson, 1966), or cognitive constructivism, in which understanding comes entirely from inference (e.g. Neisser, 1967), perceptual-balance theory strikes a middle ground in which voters' perceptions of politicians are the product of both their subjective knowledge and the

⁴⁴ This is illustrated in Figure 5.2, where partisanship is shown to be subsidiary to leader effects.

images projected by candidates (Cwalina et al., 2008). According to Kenneth Hacker (2004), the construction of politicians' images is thus voter-driven rather than candidate-driven but this appears to over-simplify the underlying narrative. Whilst it is certainly the voters' final judgement on politicians that counts, it is not so easy to disregard the projected images associated with the personalisation process more broadly. Political campaigns may well read public mood swings and attempt to construct affable images suitable for particular audiences in particular moments, but as long as voters are exposed simply to constructed personae, they can never truly judge the personality of those 'functioning' in politics on a daily basis. Therefore, public demand for personality politics is matched by a distorted supply that ultimately sets up public disappointment at the first sign of disingenuity to that constructed image.


The validity of these theoretical concerns and hypothetical commentaries relies on the validity of connections between identifiable personal characteristics and political choices. Given the ubiquity of the personalisation phenomenon in everyday political communication and the evidence surveyed in this chapter, it is extremely likely that citizens project from personal assessments of candidates to what kind of representative they might become or what kind of political system they symbolise. Yet whilst the literature on personalisation has explicitly acknowledged the importance of politicians' personalities for vote choice, 'the role and relevance of specific traits have not received sufficient attention' (Laustsen and Bor, 2017). The extant research in this area agrees that the 'common traits used to characterise politicians tend to fall into a limited number of categories: competence ('intelligent', 'hard-working'), leadership ('inspiring', '[not] weak'), integrity ('honest', 'moral'), and empathy ('compassionate', 'cares about people')' (McGraw, 2011, p.190; see also Hayes, 2005; Laustsen, 2016 for similar descriptions). The majority of these studies collapse the first two factors and the latter two into a binary opposition of competence versus warmth (Ohr and Oscarsson, 2013; McAllister, 2016).⁴⁵ Both of these dimensions are well established in social psychology as central aspects of social perception and the unconscious categorisation of others (Fiske et al., 2007; Osterhof and Todorov, 2008, Bor, 2017). The political science literature on candidate evaluation has tended to play down the effects of warmth and focus on the apparent primacy of competence as a voting heuristic (e.g. McGraw, 2011; McAllister,

⁴⁵ Warmth is generally associated with morality, friendliness, trustworthiness, helpfulness and sincerity; competence is associated with knowledge, intelligence, confidence, skill and efficiency (Laustsen and Bor, 2017, p. 4). The descriptions of these two factors maps to similar implicit motivations in the two orthogonal of Basic Human Values (Self-Transcendence Vs. Self-Enhancement, Openness to Change Vs. Conservation).

2016). These studies assume that voters care most about candidate competences in order to secure their preferred policy outcomes.

These findings, largely based on old data and small-n experimental designs with students, stand in stark contrast with a social psychology literature that consistently finds warmth to outperform competence in everyday social perceptions (e.g. Wojciszke, 2005; Goodwin et al., 2014). Normatively there is an evolutionary argument that suggests 'another person's intent for good or ill is more important to survival than whether the other person can act on those intentions' (Fiske et al., p. 77). Contra to the majority of political science scholarship in this area, Laustsen and Bor (2017) find that warmth is a more significant predictor of candidate preferences in both a longitudinal analysis of American National Election Studies (ANES 1984-2008) and an experimental text-based study of 824 voting adults in the UK. In their research, warmth outperformed competence across different methodological designs and cultural contexts, and the results held even after the authors controlled for party and the interaction effect between candidate party and participant partisanship. Laustsen and Bor (2017) provide preliminary evidence to support the arguments put forward in this chapter so far: that a personalised consumption of contemporary politics fuels everyday cognitive assessments of representatives that may inform levels of interpersonal trust and thus political choices (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Candidate choice and political participation in an age of personalisation (adapted from Garzia, 2011)



More work is needed to hone the reliability of these results through careful experimental designs, in order to test the causal influence of candidate personality on voter

choices alongside other personal characteristics (including demographics and professional/educational background). The extant research has also failed to move beyond studies of vote choice to assess the effect of personalisation on anti-politics and political disengagement. Bringing together data on the BHV of national-level politicians with experimental data from the public, I hope to fill this gap. It is anticipated that basic values associated with warmth (in particular Self-Transcendence) will be most important to candidate selections made under experimental conditions, which – when compared to data on basic values collected from MPs – will reveal a perception gap based on personalised assessments of sitting representatives and ideal types in the public. I argue that such a perception gap fuels public cynicism about politics in general and politicians in particular, and in turn contributes to the narrative of disengagement outlined in research into anti-politics.

H10: *There is a distinct perception gap between the person that citizens ideally want to represent them, who they think represents them, and who actually represents them.*

This chapter has attempted to trace a narrative that explains the contemporary crisis of western liberal democracies, in terms of both popular alienation from formal politics and rising cynicism, as grounded in the fundamental misgivings of representative democracy as both theory and practice. It has been argued that representation, as both necessary yet antithetical to the realisation of democracy in complex modern societies, creates an overwhelming preoccupation with the personal side of politics. In relinquishing their democratic sovereignty, people want the *right* representatives. Engaging with the post-millennial literature on anti-politics, the chapter shows how such under-researched arguments might underpin contemporary accounts of popular disengagement. The final section drills down into research on the personalisation of politics, identifying a number of worrying symptoms that are at once the realisation of theoretical concerns about representative democracy discussed in section I and the lightning rods for practical explanations of anti-politics in section II. Focusing on the macro-level phenomenon of anti-politics, this chapter completes a rigorous three-part research agenda for psychological parliamentary studies and in particular, the study of elected representatives.

“[Y]our story is no longer written by you – other people are writing about it and telling you who you are in a way that I’ve never found before.”

Kemi Badenoch MP (2017)

M

ethods

I have committed considerable space in this thesis to the normative contemplation of the role played by the personalities of politicians in contemporary British politics. In doing so, I have proposed a rigorous three-part research agenda that advances an interdisciplinary study capable of augmenting the conceptual and empirical purview of a relatively small, largely qualitative parliamentary studies literature in the UK. Chapter 1 outlined the limitations of this research pool and the gap to be filled by a psychological study of our political elites. Chapter 2 introduced the theory of Basic Human Values (BHV) and placed this research project within the context of previous political psychology assessments of elites. The last three chapters have, in turn, dealt with the heavy lifting needed to demonstrate the significance and necessity of three interrelated research questions:

RQ1: Who enters elite politics and how are they different to the general public?

RQ2: What, if any, is the impact and importance of personality on MPs’ behaviour once they are elected to Parliament?

RQ3: How big is the gap between voters’ preferences about the personal characteristics of MPs and reality?

In addressing each of these research questions in depth, I have not only engaged with a broad and dense array of literature, but I have also offered a series of hypotheses (Table 6.1) that speak directly to gaps in the existing scholarship.

This chapter will describe the methods employed to operationalise these hypotheses in five sections. Part I will explain the process of data collection with UK Members of Parliament (MPs), including sampling, participant recruitment and survey design. Part II will focus on the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) that was used to collect data on BHV; this

discussion will defend the selection of both a rating mechanism and a truncated measure (the *Twenty Item Values Inventory*, TwIVI). Part III outlines the semi-structured interviews used in this study as a complement to the quantitative data collected on politicians' BHV. Part IV provides a stepped description of the data analysis, in particular the statistical tests used to assess the impact of MPs' BHV on a range of parliamentary behaviours. Finally, part V completes the research design by explaining a conjoint experiment that was conducted with the public to evaluate the importance of BHV for voter perceptions of MPs.

Table 6.1 Hypotheses organised by research question.

Research Question (RQ):	Hypothesis:
RQ1	<p>H1: <i>Personality, or specifically basic values, act as internal factors that activate or deactivate individuals in a self-selection process for elite politics. In particular, the prosocial premise of politics will attract candidates who score highly for Self-Transcendence values.</i></p> <p>H2: <i>The self-selection implicit in MPs who have worked in instrumental professions, entered Parliament, and pursued promotion in quick succession reflects an unusual level of desire to increase personal control over political resources. This will be reflected in value profiles high in Self-Enhancement values (Power and Achievement). The self-referential and self-interested aspects of careerism will be reflected in high scores for Conservation values (particularly Security).</i></p> <p>H3: <i>Differences in basic values between MPs will exist according to demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, age), and will be of a greater magnitude than differences between each sub-group and their counter population in the general public. In particular, women MPs will score higher for Self-Transcendence values and Openness to Change values than either male MPs or women in the general population.</i></p>
RQ2	<p>H4: <i>As the moral dimension of a parliamentary vote increases and the level of institutional constraint decreases, the greater the variance in MPs' vote patterns explained by BHV.</i></p> <p>H5: <i>MPs' basic values will predict a moderate amount of variance in the number of written parliamentary questions asked. This is specifically anticipated for MPs high in security values (who are more likely to plough effort into constituency-oriented behaviours to combat electoral marginality); MPs high in Achievement values (who may use ex ante questions to signal party loyalty and ambitions for higher office); and MPs high in Benevolence values (who may use questions out of a genuine desire to be a good constituency representative).</i></p> <p>H6: <i>Basic values will predict a large amount of variance in the number of EDMs signed; the relationship between basic values and EDM sponsorship will reflect substantive differences in the values of MPs in centre-left and centre-right parties.</i></p> <p>H7: <i>Basic values will successfully discriminate between MPs' decisions to run for select</i></p>

	<p><i>committee (SC) membership. It is expected that MPs on SCs will score more highly for Achievement values (attracted to SCs by the promise of career progression and visibility) and Self-Direction values (MPs who struggle to conform to the party whip and see SC membership as a way of acting upon individual preferences).</i></p> <p>H8: <i>Basic values will successfully discriminate between MPs' ranked preferences for representative focus. In particular, there will be a close correlation between Self-Transcendence values and delegate preferences, Openness to Change values and trustee preferences, and Conservation values and partisan preferences.</i></p>
RQ3	<p>H9: <i>Prospective MPs' personalities, as measured by basic values, will be more important to voters than other personal qualities such as age, gender, or faith, or a candidate's commitment to a specific representational style.</i></p> <p>H10: <i>There is a distinct perception gap between the 'person' that citizens ideally want to represent them, who they think represents them, and who actually represents them.</i></p>

I. Data Collection

The literature on British MPs, both academic and (auto-)biographical, provides a rich minefield of insights into the world of Westminster and national representation (Radice et al., 1990; Searing, 1994; Rush, 2001; Cowley, 2002; Childs, 2004; Rush and Giddings, 2011). However, empirical studies are few and far between, and largely qualitative and subjective (see Rosenblatt, 2006). Existing research on MPs in the UK has not, in particular, gone as far as breaching highly sensitive topics such as personality, which, necessarily, invoke ethical dilemmas regarding participant recruitment and highly politicised fears of confidentiality. Research in the UK is not unique in this respect. The psychological assessment of political elites world-wide, especially in terms of personality theory and research, is heavily grounded in case studies done at-a-distance using psycholinguistics, content analysis, observation and remote interviews (for a review, see Post, 2003; Barenbaum and Winter, 2008). Good research practice requires ethical recruitment of participants that includes informed consent (Kelley et al., 2003; Vellinga et al., 2011). In that context, even medical studies of psychological phenomena in the general public - relying on 'opt-in' survey participation - suffer from notoriously low response rates of 20-40% (for a review, see Nelson et al., 2002; Hunt et al., 2013).

The challenges outlined above are exacerbated in populations of political elites where a) no code of best practice exists that combines both maximal response rates and ethical recruitment, and b) the response rates for political research have already dwindled significantly. In 1972 and 1973, Searing (1994) interviewed 521 MPs (83% of the House of

Commons) and achieved a 79% response rate to his follow-up questionnaire. In their study of the 1992-1997 and 1997-2001 Parliaments, Rush and Giddings (2011) secured response rates of 61% and 52%. In 2010/11, the Hansard Society could only secure a response rate of 25% in their study of new MPs (n = 57/232) who entered the House of Commons after the 2010 General Election (Fox and Korris, 2012). This is in spite of the fact that the Hansard Society operates with a respected reputation in Parliament, the support of political parties, and uses a well-resourced research team in terms of finance, access and time. For their study of MPs conducted in 2012, Campbell and Lovenduski (2015) employed the paid services of a corporate research consultancy firm, ComRes, to recruit 156 parliamentarians (24% of sitting MPs). Not only are such methods expensive but Campbell and Lovenduski were unable to recruit frontbench politicians, thus introducing significant response bias and limiting the statistical power of their results. They admit that without similar approaches, '[i]t is highly unlikely that such a high response rate is now achievable' (Campbell and Lovenduski, 2015, p.695).

A studious review of the empirical literature on British MPs and a number of informal discussions with authors cited above raised two central issues for this thesis: the recruitment of participants from a highly inaccessible population in general, and the collection of extremely sensitive data on their personal values, ideologies and representative styles in particular. To address these difficulties, the findings presented on MPs' BHV in this thesis are based on a three-phase tailored design study (Dillman et al., 2014) that ran from 1st November 2016 to 1st June 2017. This involved a customised survey procedure, in which mixed modes of data collection were utilised in a scientific manner to reduce the four sources of error (coverage, sampling, non-response, and measurement).

Of particular concern for this research design was non-response error; regardless of response rate – which is often overestimated as an indicator of nonresponse bias – it was important that the final dataset did not over- or underestimate the prevalence of certain basic values in the MP population. All 650 sitting MPs were thus approached sequentially via post, email and phone, as well as through advocates recruited in the participation process.⁴⁶ In doing so, the data collection design focused on building a positive social exchange relationship with the target population, using strategic methods that are founded on theories of

⁴⁶ Email communications contained a secure personalised link to the survey, which was hosted via the online survey platform Qualtrics.

cognitive dissonance, reasoned action, leverage, and cost-benefit analysis (Friedman, 1953; Stafford, 2008).


Following the principles developed by Blau (1964) and Homans (1961), a number of steps were taken, firstly, to increase the *benefits* of participation. For example, each round of communication clearly stated the public benefits of the research project as well as the potential benefits accrued to future MPs in terms of reforms to working practices and public reputation (Appendix A). All written communications, electronic and mail, utilised visual sponsorship from the University of Sheffield and the Sir Bernard Crick Centre - thus conveying legitimacy on the study - and high profile advocates were recruited in advance to give their approval to the project. The survey itself was designed so that the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ; see Part II) came before more mundane questions, and the response style for each block of questions was varied in order to maintain interest in completing the survey. Follow-up communications via email and phone also shared the ongoing response rate, thus conveying the participation of other in-group members and cultivating trust as well as an element of competition in the non-response population (Cialdini, 1984). Communications were also personalised (using mail merge for headed letters/emails and hand-written compliment slips in postal communication) in order to engender a trust relationship between respondent and researcher.

Likewise, steps were taken to reduce the *costs* of participation. Practically, there was no monetary cost to MPs taking part in the survey. Both rounds of mail communication were accompanied by pre-paid return envelopes and the sequential mixed-mode communication strategy allowed for varying preferences among the target population. Given that the decision to respond to a self-administered survey usually occurs within one to two days of receiving the communication (Dillman et al., 2014, p.25), the effort invested in multi-mode contact was vital to both a) keep the survey visible in the target population for as long as possible, and b) ensure ultimate convenience for respondents.⁴⁷ The benefits of this can be seen in Figure 6.1. Mail and electronic surveys were designed with professionalism in mind, and participants were guided through each section with simple instructions. Multiple contact details were included in each survey communication, thus increasing the perceived authenticity of the request. A number of participants did utilise these contact details to verify the legitimacy of

⁴⁷ In hindsight, phone calls to MPs Parliamentary offices were particularly unhelpful. MPs were rarely available and their administrative support staff frequently apologised on their behalf before a conversation could begin. Phone calls were thus dropped from the second wave of communication.

the project before participating. As per prior research collecting sensitive data (i.e. Singer et al., 1995), strong confidentiality assurances were made in each communication (Appendix A).

Figure 6.1 Cumulative response rate (actual Figures) by tailored design communication.



This tailored design was followed up with a single wave of targeted email correspondence to former MPs recommended by those who had already participated. These former MPs were targeted specifically to augment the number of respondents with frontbench experience. The data collected produced a broadly representative sample of 106 MPs (85 sitting, 21 former) by gender, party, age, status and length of service (see Table 6.2, below). A comparative data set for the BHV of the general public in Great Britain ($n = 2264$) was extracted from the 7th round of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2014).⁴⁸ Given the limitations of a) conducting sensitive research with political elites, and b) conducting that research within the confines of a lone doctoral research post, this response rate is highly encouraging. Above all, it suggests that the received wisdom of tailored design experiments, coupled with the resource allocation of a large scale, multi-researcher project, may facilitate valid future survey work with political elites in the UK.

The survey itself was designed in two main sections with a total of 30 questions.⁴⁹ The first section included the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) used to measure participants' BHV. This constitutes 20 self- to other comparisons using a six-point Likert scale (see Part II). The second section of the survey asked MPs to provide basic demographic information, including their previous occupation before elected politics. These data serve to allow intra-

⁴⁸ This data was extracted and downloaded from: [http:// www.europeansocialsurvey.org/download.html?file=ES S7e02_1&y=2014](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/download.html?file=ES S7e02_1&y=2014).

⁴⁹ An example of the mail survey can be found in Appendix A.

sample and external comparative analysis of the variation in BHV according to age, gender, education and occupational experience. MPs were also asked to report the length of their parliamentary service in order to facilitate comparisons between newly elected and experienced politicians. Although BHV are typically stable across time (Schwartz, 2006) and life transitions (Bardi et al., 2014), it is possible that such an extreme vocation - including high-level decision making that invokes value trade-offs on a daily basis - may stimulate value change that is revealed through cohort effects. Section two also asked MPs to report any additional responsibilities or offices that they may hold within the House of Commons, thus allowing for intra-sample comparison of front- and backbench politicians.

MPs' ideology was also measured in section 2 of the survey using two 11-point Left-Right scales, reflecting the heterogeneity of economic and social ideology (Feldman and Johnston, 2013). This decision builds on empirical research that shows self-placement along a single dimension of ideology is insufficient given the multidimensionality of ideological preferences across policy domains (Duckitt, 2001; Layman and Carsey, 2002; Treier and Hillygus, 2009), the variety of symbolic connotations attached to ideology (Ellis and Stimson, 2012), and the distinct meanings attached to a liberal-conservative continuum by participants within and between research populations (Zumbrunnen and Gangl, 2008). In order to sharpen the analysis of the relative importance of BHV and ideology when explaining MPs' behaviour across both policy areas and parliamentary life, economic and social ideology were thus measured on two separate scales.

Following the questionnaire design of similar studies (Katz, 1997; Müller and Saalfeld 1997; Judge, 1999; Mendez-Lago and Martinez, 2002), section two of the survey was also used to ascertain participants' attitudes to representation. Each MP was asked to rank three representative priorities (Nation, Party, Constituency) on a three-point scale from 'Most' to 'Least' important (Appendix A). This question invoked the classical Burkean conception of political representation as developed by Eulau and Wahlke, which is central to the normative discussions of chapter 5 in this thesis. The use of a ranking mechanism forced MPs to interrogate their own hierarchy of commitments and revealed decisions of relative importance that were not only easy to interpret and operationalise for statistical analysis, but also circumvented issues of non-commitment in prior research (Andeweg, 2012). Finally, MPs were presented with the option to conduct a follow-up interview (see Part III). All surveys

were accompanied by a participant information sheet (Appendix B) and interviewees later signed an additional consent form (Appendix C).⁵⁰

Table 6.2 Descriptive data comparing a sample of 106 UK MPs with the composition of the House of Commons (April 2017), and a sample of the general population gathered by the 7th round of the European Social Survey (Figures rounded to the nearest whole number).

Variable	MP Sample (n = 106)	House of Commons (n = 650)	ESS Sample (n = 2264)
Gender:			
Male:	67%	70%	45%
Female:	33%	30%	55%
Age: (mean)	55 yrs	50 yrs	52 yrs
Length of Service: (mean)	9.6 yrs	8.7 yrs	N/A
Party:*			
Labour:	47%	35.2% (40%)	33%
Conservative:	31%	51% (49%)	35%
Liberal Democrat:	5%	1% (2%)	15%
SNP:	9%	8.3% (5%)	3%
Other:	8%	4.3%	14%
Additional Frontbench Responsibilities	At time of sampling: 19% Over career: 63%	42%**	N/A

* ESS scores relate to votes cast in the 2010 general election. Bracketed Figures for the House of Commons indicate seat shares after the June 2017 election.

**Based on the four most represented parties in Westminster at the time of sampling.

II. Capturing Basic Human Values using the Portrait Values Questionnaire

This thesis advances the body of knowledge on psychological assessments of political elites by capturing data directly from national representatives. The previous section gave a

⁵⁰ These steps were taken in accordance with ethics approval granted by the Department of Politics at the University of Sheffield (Appendix D).

detailed review of the way in which participants were recruited and the data that was collected in that process. This section will now turn to the format and properties of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) that was used to gather data on MPs' Basic Human Values (BHV). This section defends this measure insofar as it not only describes the content of the questionnaire but outlines its development, its validity, and its superiority over alternative measures of personal values. The section finishes by describing the shortened version of the PVQ used in this study.

a) Development of the measure:

Until the late 1990s all studies of BHV used the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) to measure basic values. The SVS presented participants with 56 or 57 single-value items (namely those value markers that underlie the motivational value types in the theory - see chapter 2), each of which was accompanied by a short explanatory phrase. Respondents rated the importance of each value item as a 'guiding principle in my life' using a numerical 9-point scale. Although the SVS had gathered substantial support for the content and circular relationship of the ten BHV in over 200 samples across more than 60 countries (Fontaine and Schwartz, 1996), it was excessively lengthy and did not work effectively in five percent of samples (taken mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, the East-Indian subcontinent and rural communities). Schwartz et al. (2001) subsequently devised the PVQ, which emphasises context-free thinking and contains short verbal portraits of 40 individuals, gender-matched with the respondent (Schwartz, 2005). Each portrait implicitly expresses the importance of a specific value according to the goals, desires and standards it describes. These portraits are configured as two statements, one expressing the importance of a value and the other the desirable goal of that motivational type. The PVQ was created in three steps:

1. Portraits were built from the conceptual definitions of the values as identified in the theory. For example, one marker of Achievement values led to, "It's very important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does."
2. Value items from the SVS were paraphrased to emphasise the motivational goal in context. For example, the Universalism value "protecting the environment" became "He strongly believes that people should care for nature."
3. Abstract terms or phrases from the SVS were made more concrete. For example, the Conformity value "politeness" became "It is important to him to be polite to other people all the time."

(Source: Schwartz et al. 2001, p.524)

For each portrait, participants respond to the question “How much like you is this person?” using a six-point Likert scale that ranges from 'very much like me' to 'not like me at all' (Appendix A). The PVQ contains between two and four portraits for each of the motivationally distinct values, depending on their conceptual breadth. Participants' personal values are then inferred from their self-reported similarity to those portraits described, each of which has been designed a priori as an indicator of a specific value.⁵¹ Each value is presented across multiple portraits and a score for the importance of each value is calculated from the average rating the respondent gives to these portraits. By focusing on the goals and wishes that are most important to each persona in the portraits, the PVQ can measure a respondent's values without explicitly stating values as the subject of scrutiny or the specific value being measured in each portrait. The comparison of other to self also focuses attention on the specific characteristics of the other, thus avoiding some of the pitfalls of similarity judgements in self to other surveys (Holyoak and Gordon, 1983).

The PVQ has been used in studies around the world and is now the survey of choice for measuring BHV. Academic studies have examined both the ability of the survey to capture the theory of BHV and the psychometric properties of the survey itself (see Schwartz and Cieciuch, 2016). There has been some criticism of the discriminant validity of the PVQ (Davidov et al., 2008) but Knoppen and Saris (2009) trace this back to the strategy used to select items, which attempts to cover the conceptual breadth of each value at the cost of homogeneity between items measuring the same value.⁵² This problem derives from Schwartz's (1992, 2005) commitment to operationalise BHV within a circular continuum, which necessarily produces fuzzy boundaries between values and multicollinearity between those items measuring adjacent values. To increase the number of items on a measure, as well as the number of values being measured (i.e. PVQ-RR), is to refine the conceptual definition of each value and thus reduce the chance of cross-loading among items. However, the problems raised above are also common to numerous psychometric surveys that aim to capture different aspects of personality (e.g. Marsh et al., 2010); by contrast the internal

⁵¹ Each portrait comprises an 'importance' statement and a 'feeling' statement. There has been some scepticism based on cognitive response theory that a respondent's answer will be weighted towards one of these statements rather than both (Neuman, 2000, p. 508, Krosnick and Presser, 2010, p. 264) but in a two-nation pilot Schwartz used Multi-Trait Multi-Method (MTMM) analysis to conclude that 'combining the two into one item neither increased nor harmed reliability and validity' (Schwartz, 2003, p. 305; Schwartz, 2007). Similar studies have since concurred that if a study is 'interested in the goodness-of-fit to Schwartz's two-dimensional structure then it doesn't matter whether the combined or split version is used' (de Wet, Bacher and Wetzelhütter, 2016, p.1583).

⁵² Saris, Knoppen and Schwartz (2013) use Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to demonstrate that the PVQ can actually discriminate between fifteen and nineteen values that are narrower than the original ten motivational types. This has led to a new 57 item PVQ-RR, which yields greater discriminant validity of the measurement items.

validity of the original ten-factor PVQ-40 has been corroborated across a wide range of large-n samples using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA; Schwartz et al., 2001; Vecchione, Casconi and Barbaranelli, 2009) and remains current among new studies of BHV.

b) From Theory to Measurement - Schwartz versus Rokeach:

I selected the PVQ from amidst a number of alternative measures for personal values, in particular the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS, 1973). The PVQ justifies its selection for this thesis on the back of a number of methodological advantages over other dominant value questionnaires. In sum the PVQ is the most apposite measurement for the core theoretical principles of BHV: that personal values are a) abstract motivational goals, b) vary in importance within an interdependent structure, and c) sit in relation to one another on the basis of inherent conflicts and compatibilities (Kluckhohn, 1951; Schwartz, 1992). Given that the psychometric properties of survey tools hold both methodological and theoretical implications (Roccas et al., 2017), this section will briefly outline the strength of the PVQ in comparison to alternative instruments.

The first issue to be considered is the methodological impact of value definitions. Rokeach (1973, p.5) posited that values are ‘enduring beliefs that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state of existence’. On this basis values guide actions but they are distinguishable, according to Rokeach, as either terminal or instrumental. The former represent desirable end-states of existence, whilst the latter are selective modes of behaviour. By contrast Schwartz (1992) defined values as trans-situational goals or guiding principles that are differentiated by their specific motivational content. The methodological impact of these definitions centers on the cognitive accessibility of values, presupposed by Rokeach but not Schwartz. This raises the opposition of a “paradigm of articulated values” versus a “paradigm of basic values” (Fischhoff, 1991). The first paradigm presumes that individuals know their values and can accurately articulate them to researchers through self-report mechanisms. The second paradigm accepts that individuals do not have clear and conscious values that cover all areas of life and thus lack useful answers to such questions. In parliamentary studies we might expect MPs to believe that they fit into the articulated values paradigm, but their specific answers in this case are more likely to derive from an inferential process or indeed from the desirability of being self-aware and 'meeting expectations'.

On the back of these paradigms, Mumford et al (2002) define two forms of measurement, direct and indirect, that capture the distinction between articulated and basic values. Relying on the fact that people have consciously articulated values, direct measurement techniques ask participants to rate or rank *explicit* value statements (e.g. the RVS or SVS). Conversely, indirect measurement infers values on the basis of preferences expressed by respondents to statements or questions that *implicitly* test for specific values (e.g. the PVQ). Direct measurement tools such as the RVS, for example, are also highly ipsative. They depend on the assumption that all participants will be able to place more or less importance on the value labels provided. The results therefore present a hierarchical picture in which values are not measured in and of themselves but in complete dependency on one another. By contrast an indirect measure in the form of a rating technique, such as the PVQ, allows respondents to attribute significance to values independently of one another - using a Likert Scale in the case of the PVQ. Whilst any additions or changes to a ranking questionnaire would alter the importance of all other items, a rating system like the PVQ allows these changes to be made whilst retaining the individual scores given to each value. Crucially, the flexibility of rating mechanisms circumvents the fixed distribution of ranking measures, which necessarily assume gaps of equal importance between all values for all participants (Roccas et al., 2017, p.21).

Table 6.3 A snapshot comparison of the study of values by Rokeach and Schwartz.

	Value Definitions	Measurement	Outcome/Critique
Rokeach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Self-conscious and articulated. - Split into instrumental and terminal categories. 	Direct: ranking or rating system (Rokeach Value Survey)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Highly ipsative choices and artificial hierarchies. - Assumes conscious understanding and evaluation of personal values. - No contingency for the subjective population of value lists by researchers.
Schwartz	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trans-situational guiding principles distinguished by their motivational content. - Difficult for people to access or clarify. 	Indirect: inferences made from participant responses (PVQ)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Values assessed independently of one another, allowing for alterations and additions without loss of reliability. - The motivational continuum caters for inter-subjectivity.

Whilst this section has chosen to compare the suitability and reliability of the PVQ to the RVS, attitudinal studies (e.g. Maio and Olson, 2000) have also taken a functional approach to studying values. These studies offer a competing conception of basic values that rejects the dichotomisation of Schwartz's motivational continuum. Gouveia et al. (2014, p.42) describe eighteen functional value items that are arranged in a three-by-two matrix of three guiding actions (personal, central, social) and two expressed needs (survival or thriving). Gouveia's (2003) Basic Values Survey (BVS) is similar methodologically to the SVS and RVS in that it asks participants to rate eighteen value markers on a seven-point importance scale. However, the BVS has only been tested in a limited number of samples and thus far the alpha coefficients, as well as the inter-item correlations, perform poorly in comparison to the PVQ (see Gouveia et al. 2014). This might reflect the conceptual breadth and thus confusion of the BVS items (Schwartz, 2014, p.248). The BVS also has an average completion time of fifteen minutes, compared to four minutes for the PVQ-21 (used in the European Social Survey) and about ten minutes for the latest fifty-seven portrait PVQ-RR (Schwartz 2014, p. 248).

In sum there are clear theoretical and methodological advantages to using the PVQ:

1. Portraits of action place values in context and avoid the inevitable abstraction and variation of individual interpretations of linguistic labels (Gibbins and Walker, 1994);
2. Each value is measured using multiple items and therefore provides a stronger case for assessing participants' value characteristics (Braithwaite and Scott, 1991);
3. By using a multiple rather than single item measure, it is possible to carry out quantitative estimates of the reliability of results;
4. The PVQ taps personal values through self-to-other comparison, without the assumption that people can a) attribute clear hierarchies to abstract values, or b) cognitively recognise those values on a daily basis (Maio and Olson, 1998);
5. There are many existing datasets that have used the PVQ to research the basic values of diverse sample populations, including the British public.

c) Using a shortened PVQ:

Long surveys and questionnaires, especially in personality studies, tend to outperform the psychometric properties of shorter instruments (Leong et al., 2016). However, social science research is carried out in a pressurised 'live' environment in which the luxuries of time and funding often share an inverse relationship with the scope of the research being conducted. Thus, there is frequent occasion for brief and ultra-brief instruments (Robins et al.,

2002). This chapter has already noted the difficulties associated with extracting data from UK MPs and the dwindling body of empirical research that these difficulties have engendered. The need to present a 'quick win' with immediate satisfaction and limited repetition was an iterated message from parliamentarians engaged in the scoping stage of this project. Whilst the mainstream measures of BHV (SVS, PVQ-40, PVQ-RR) are all shown to be valid and reliable, they are lengthy and take upwards of 10 minutes to complete. It was therefore necessary to employ a shorter version of the PVQ - the TwIVI - that would 'eliminate item redundancy and therefore reduce the fatigue, frustration, and boredom associated with answering highly similar questions repeatedly' (Robins et al., 2001, p.152; also see Saucier, 1994).

In general, shorter scales have weaker internal consistency and test-retest reliability, but they can still capture meaningful results (Ziegler et al., 2014). A number of studies into questionnaire design have also indicated that the associated costs are smaller than often believed (Burisch, 1984, 1997). In the case of large-scale surveys, experience-sampling studies, pilot studies and longitudinal studies, where participants are unlikely to complete lengthy multi-item questionnaires or results are needed quickly, brief and ultra-brief measures have proven extremely effective (Robins et al., 2001). Previous studies of personality traits and BHV (e.g. Leimgruber, 2011) have taken a selection of items from original instruments in order to produce shorter measures. However, the decision to shorten instruments in this manner, excluding certain items but retaining others, often reduces the predictive and construct validity of the data (see Boyle et al., 2015; Roccas et al., 2017). This is particularly true of BHV, which are conceptually broad constructs.⁵³

To record the most robust dataset possible, I employed a twenty-item PVQ (henceforth TwIVI; see Appendix A) that is capable of fully recapturing the psychometric properties of the longer PVQ-IV (Sandy et al., 2017).⁵⁴ Schwartz and colleagues (Sandy et al., 2017) drew upon items from the PVQ-40 to develop the TwIVI, applying the same methods that had been employed to create the PVQ-40 and using equivalent samples (Sandy et al.,

⁵³ For example, an index of Self-Direction values that only includes those items designed to measure autonomy of *thought* would neglect the autonomy of *action* also implicit in this value. In the context of researching politicians and political behaviours such as decision-making, this would significantly bias or limit the analysis.

⁵⁴ A brief twenty-one item version of the PVQ was used in the European Social Survey (PVQ-21; Schwartz, 2003) but this measure is limited for a number of reasons. Firstly, it includes modified items from the original theory that make comparisons to PVQ-40 datasets difficult; it was developed without demographic data on the item-derivation sample; the scale was not tested against external variables; and convergent validity scores were not recorded. These four key steps are crucial in the creation of a viable shortened measure (Gosling et al. 2003). However, the PVQ-21 does provide a rich source of data on the BHV of general population samples and therefore continues to inform large-scale comparative research (see, for example, Piurko et al., 2011).

2017). The TwIVI has been tested using a derivation sample of 38,049 individuals (63% female; aged 18-94, mean = 26.42, SD = 10.01) and an evaluation sample of 29,143 individuals (62% female; aged 18-92, mean = 27.45, SD = 9.52) (Ibid.).⁵⁵ Cronbach alpha reliabilities for the TwIVI ranged from .33 for Security to .91 for Benevolence across the two samples (mean .71) as compared to reliabilities for the PVQ-40 (using the same samples) of .51 for Tradition to .88 for Self-Direction (mean .76). It is not surprising that the internal reliabilities of the PVQ-IV, with *more* than two items tapping each value, were higher than the shorter scale. However, it is recognised that Cronbach's alpha can underestimate the reliability of brief measures - which aim to capture a construct with as few items as possible - given that alpha is a function of average correlations among items on a scale.

In Sandy et al. (2017) vector correlations revealed that the TwIVI captured patterns of correlation with eleven external variables that were extremely similar to the full PVQ-40 (mean of .93 in the selection sample and .97 in the validation sample). Sandy et al. (2017) drew upon the extensive literature on BHV to hypothesise the directionality of relationships between each value and external variables including religiosity (Saroglou, 2004), socio-demographic variables (Schwartz and Rubel, 2005) and political conservatism (Purko et al., 2011). Results obtained using the PVQ-40 were able to match 82% of the ninety predictions in both direction and significance, compared to an 85% match for the TwIVI (Sandy et al., 2017). When the ranking of the mean scores for the TwIVI were compared to those of the full scale, only four out of fifty possible deviations occurred (Ibid.). Although there are some apparent, not necessarily genuine, limitations to the internal consistency of the TwIVI, it has successfully demonstrated that it is capable of recapturing the full PVQ-40 in terms of reliability, external correlates and convergent validity.

III. Interviews

a) Mixed Methods Research

Mixed methods research has become increasingly accepted in social science over the last two decades, reflecting a diverse and innovative combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in a way that transcends the rigidity of epistemological traditions (see Ragin, 2008). Crude definitions of quantitative and qualitative methods have led to enduring oppositions of nomothetic and idiographic research, causal and interpretive, explanatory and

⁵⁵ Participants were approached using the MyType software on Facebook. Their nationalities were: United States (72%), Singapore (8%), Canada (3%), Australia (3%), and Great Britain (3%). 12% of participants lived in other countries and 11% did not report a location.

descriptive (Bernard, 2002; Duncan, 2008). In many cases these epistemological or ontological arguments, albeit important considerations, preclude the benefits of mixed methods research in which multiple platforms for data collection and analysis actually provide useful confirmatory or complementary capacity. Therefore, I employed semi-structured interviews with MPs to drill down into the quantitative analysis of their BHV, and thus add a layer of thick description to the study of personality in UK parliamentary politics. This section briefly defends this methodological decision before outlining the design and conduct of these interviews.

Critics of mixed methods studies continue to claim that combinations of quantitative and qualitative methods are impossible without inherent contradictions based on the nature of truth (Guba and Lincoln, 2005). By contrast, I align this thesis firmly with a pragmatist critique of foundationalism. Pragmatism provides a theoretical skeleton on which this study and many mixed methods designs favour discovery over narrow justifications or definitions of 'truth' (Maxcy, 2003). Pragmatism encourages researchers to open their eyes to the points of compatibility between methods in order to prioritise the most practically useful research design that will enable the most detailed exploration of social science problems in the 'real world' (Feilzer, 2010, p.8). Thus the combination of data collection by survey and interviews in this study rejects the one-to-one connection of methods and paradigms (i.e. constructivism or interpretivism with qualitative) and speaks to the premises of both methodological eclecticism and paradigm pluralism (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2012).

Importantly, I use interviews in a complementary rather than confirmatory fashion. There is a dubious heritage of mixed methods studies that have sought to verify findings using data derived from different sources (Pager and Quillian, 2005; Miller and Gatta, 2006). Again, by contrast, I find profit in the capacity of different types of data to measure the same phenomenon in a way that compensates for the limitations of others. As such this thesis joins a long list of studies that have used participant observation, interviews or other qualitative methods as an additional tool through which to explain, interpret or add nuance to the results of large-n surveys (e.g. Obstfeld, 2005; Small, 2009).

Given that the data produced by the PVQ and interviews are inherently different, this study shies away from claims to verification. By virtue of being completely different in form, it is possible that the two types of data might unintentionally measure entirely separate phenomena. For example, the results might show that MPs' behaviour, and the theoretical values implicit in those actions, are accurately reflected in one or both of the PVQ and

interviews. This will not necessarily mean that the statements in the interview 'confirm' the data from the PVQ but rather reveal the relationship between two phenomena: how the MPs' consciously perceive their behaviour as politicians and how they unconsciously report their character as humans. Therefore, interviews are used to enlighten and enrich the explanatory power of the PVQ, but they are not used to 'verify' the quantitative data.

b) Interview Procedure

In line with the principles of nested analysis in the social sciences (Liebermann, 2005), I sought to follow-up statistical analysis of MPs' BHV with in-depth analysis of selected cases. However, given the difficulty of obtaining elite interviews (Richards, 1996), I ultimately relied on a self-selecting sample of the survey participants. At each stage of the tailored design method (Part I, above), participants were given the option to volunteer for a follow-up interview. In total, 24 MPs (23% of the sample) agreed to be interviewed; in line with the contingent nature of elite interviews (Huggins, 2014), a further seven of these MPs either cancelled their interview at the last minute or failed to respond to further email correspondence in order to arrange the interview in the first place. This left 17 participants (11 sitting MPs and 6 former MPs now sitting in the House of Lords) who were willing to conduct in-depth interviews. As a self-selecting sample, there is an overrepresentation of older, Labour MPs. However, the sample is diverse in terms of gender, tenure in elected office, and experience of different occupational responsibilities (Table 6.4).

As per existing scholarship on elite politics and interview methodologies, I used semi-structured interviews (Robson, 2002; Köker, 2014). This interview design carries a number of advantages in that it a) allowed the interviews to relate directly to the research questions guiding the project and the results of the survey analysis; b) provided a structure in which a large amount of relevant information could be obtained within a time-pressured interview environment; and c) gave the interviewer flexibility to change the order of questions and offer bespoke follow-up questions. Given the personalised nature of each interview and the type of data already collected, interviews were conducted with a passive professionalism. Following the advice of Ruth Blakeley (2012), the utmost care was given to maintaining positive or neutral facial expressions and body language, hiding frustration and/or disapproval, and remaining wary of the fine line between pushing an interviewee further and besmirching their opinion. In this manner trust was built with the interviewee, who could answer honestly without fear of personal or professional judgement.

Table 6.4 Profile of Interviewees.

	Gender	Age	Party	Tenure (Years)	Prior Career in Politics	Frontbench (at any point in career)	Select Committee Membership (at any point in career)
1	MALE	60-69	LAB	18	YES	YES	YES
2	FEMALE	60-69	OTHER	12	NO	NO	NO
3	MALE	60-69	LAB	1	YES	NO	NO
4	MALE	60-69	OTHER	15	NO	YES	YES
5	FEMALE	50-59	LAB	13	YES	YES	YES
6	MALE	60-69	LAB	19	YES	YES	YES
7	FEMALE	30-39	SNP	1	YES	NO	YES
8	FEMALE	40-49	LAB	5	YES	NO	YES
9	MALE	60-69	CON	3	NO	NO	NO
10	MALE	70-79	LIB	16	NO	NO	YES
11	MALE	70-79	DEM LIB DEM	20	YES	YES	YES
12	MALE	70-79	LAB	11	YES	NO	YES
13	MALE	50-59	DEM LIB DEM	17	YES	NO	YES
14	FEMALE	60-69	LAB	12	NO	YES	NO
15	MALE	70-79	LAB	18	YES	YES	YES
16	MALE	60-69	LAB	8	YES	YES	NO
17	MALE	40-49	CON	11	NO	NO	YES

NOTE: In order to maintain the anonymity of participants, the age of respondents has been grouped. Party labels are only provided for respondents in the top four most populated political parties in the UK Parliament.

Questions were grouped around three themes that directly related to the research questions of this project (Table 6.5). The first set of questions on personalisation within Parliament sought specifically to test the boundary between MPs' conscious and unconscious perceptions of their own values and the personal motivations they and their colleagues bring to the job. The second block of questions focused primarily on identifying behavioural constraints and enablers in Parliament in order to a) understand how consciously MPs act upon or suppress personal motivations in their job, and b) add nuance to the causal mechanisms (or lack thereof) revealed between MPs' BHV and a range of parliamentary behaviours in the quantitative analysis. The final set of questions tested participants' awareness of how much they believe they are understood by the electorate and how much importance they attribute to this (mis-)understanding. In each case, questions were personalised according to prior responses in the survey phase of data collection and additional research carried out about the background of the participant prior to the interview.

Table 6.5 Semi-structured interview plan.

Block 1: Personalisation (RQ1)	Block 2: Political Behaviour (RQ2)	Block 3: Anti-Politics (RQ3)
If you were to describe yourself in 3 words, what would they be and how have those characteristics helped you in politics?	To what extent do you feel that you act according to your own motivations as an elected politician on a daily basis?	Do you think that the public perception of politicians is accurate? Why/Why not?
There is a dominant media narrative that paints politicians as greedy and self-interested. What do you think of those accusations?	How do you find the Palace of Westminster as a working environment?	Has public/media approbation of politicians had any impact on you personally?
In your professional experience, is there a certain type of person who enters elite politics? And do you think there are any personal similarities between those who rise to the frontbench?	Are there any aspects of your role as an elected representative that you feel you <i>can/cannot</i> be yourself?	Are you satisfied with your performance as an MP? Why/Why not?
Do you agree or disagree with the majority of your colleagues' opinions?	What do you perceive to be your priority as an elected representative?	If we stopped one of your constituents on the street, how do you think they might describe you in three words?
	How do your prior beliefs about elite politics compare to your experience of elected office?	Is it important, in your opinion, that the public <i>like</i> MPs?
	Have you achieved what you set out to achieve as an elected politician? Why/ Why not?	What is the biggest reason, in your opinion, for popular disengagement from politics?

Interviews lasted an average of 30 minutes; the longest went on for over an hour and the shortest finished after 17 minutes. Given the different occupational demands on each participant, there was significant variation in how much time each MP was willing or able to give to the interview. All of the interviews were conducted in person at the Palace of Westminster, although individual participants expressed different preferences about where in the Palace they would like to meet. Whilst some were happy to conduct the interview publically in the atrium of Portcullis House, others insisted on meeting in their private office.

Three MPs would only be interviewed at more discrete locations in a parliamentary outbuilding, Millbank House, away from the eyes and ears of their colleagues. From an anecdotal perspective, these requests reflected not only the highly sensitive nature of the discussions but also the varying experiences and personal characteristics of those being interviewed. At the start of each interview, the purpose and nature of the research project was described again for complete transparency. Interviewees were provided with a repeat copy of the participant information sheet and signed a consent form. Every interview was recorded, transcribed and later coded thematically.

IV. Outline of Data Analysis

So far this chapter has explained how data was collected from MPs using surveys and semi-structured interviews. This section will briefly outline the analysis conducted on this data, the process and results of which are explored in depth in subsequent chapters of this thesis.

a) Correcting for socially desirable responding

Each value in the BHV theory receives its score from the mean of the raw ratings given to the items on the PVQ measuring it. However, it is advisable or rather necessary at this point to correct for individual differences in the use of the response scale before carrying out analyses (Schwartz et al., 1997). In spite of the comparison of self-to-other, the PVQ remains a self-report questionnaire and is thus vulnerable to socially desirable responses (Paulhus, 1991). For two reasons this may be amplified in the current study: firstly, MPs are by definition dependent on public support and thus rely on a positive public image. Secondly, the subject of values itself may encourage socially desirable responding, since values are loaded as preferences that ‘people consider to be justifiable by certain moral, aesthetic or logical bases that are mutually ‘desirable’ (Kluckhohn, 1951).

Socially desirable responding comes in multiple forms but personality researchers are particularly concerned with impression management (Paulhus, 1991). Impression management involves the purposeful depiction of oneself as socially conventional in a precise manner aimed at eliciting positive social responses (Paulhus, 1986, 1991). However, large-N studies in Israel and Finland (Schwartz et al., 1997) have shown that BHV surveys remain relatively robust in the face of socially desirable responding. Using the Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability index (Crowne and Marlow, 1960), Schwartz found only weak associations between BHV data and *stylistic* impression management (whereby all values are

rated slightly higher on the belief that all values must be socially desirable). A similarly small variance in the results (3-7%) was explained by *substantive* social desirability bias, whereby the scores given to values associated with, for example, Conformity or conversely Stimulation and Self-direction were exaggerated by participants to appear socially cohesive or independent (Schwartz et al., 1997). Even relatively small degrees of bias such as these can lead to systematic underestimates of negative correlations and overestimates of positive correlations in later statistical analysis.

The effect of substantive and stylistic impression management can be countered by partialling out the data of the PVQ, using the mean of responses to all items as a covariate. All individuals will use the scale differently and this partialling also focuses the data on the relative importance of values for each individual, which is the most useful result for comparative comments. Therefore 'centred means' for each value are produced by subtracting MRAT (total Mean RATing) from the mean scores of the raw data for each value. Partial correlation also suits the theoretical assumption that values operate interdependently as part of a circular system. Values affect emotion and behaviour through a constant balance of those that are most poignant in any given decision or situation; thus to focus on individual raw scores for single values would be to ignore the basic premise that values work in patterns of constant (in-)compatibility with each other (Schwartz, 2006). The scale correction method used for the PVQ thus converts raw data into scores that represent the *relative* importance of each value for the individual. By centring values within cases rather than standardising, according to the standard deviation across all items, the results of the PVQ retain the meaningful variance between individual's value ratings; even when individuals assign the same mean importance to all values, they may well discriminate more or less sharply among them.

b) Statistical testing

Prior to carrying out statistical tests on the survey data collected from UK MPs, a series of robustness tests were conducted to check that the data adequately fit the theory of, and previous research on, BHV. In the present sample, Cronbach alpha reliability coefficients for the four higher order values were .718 for Conservation, .666 for Self-Transcendence, .824 for Openness to Change, and .870 for Self-Enhancement (alphas for the ten individual values ranged from .443 for Security to .880 for Achievement with seven values scoring

greater than .6).⁵⁶ Factor analysis (Principal Components) revealed a four factor model (eigenvalues > 1.00, cumulative variance = 58.5%) that captured all items on the measure within the expected pattern of the theory (Table 6.6). Cross loading of items, in this instance Security and Conformity, is expected given that basic values share interdependent relations within a quasi-circumplex space (Vecchione et al. 2015). However, for the purposes of comparative validity, these results demonstrate that the theory of BHV works with a new target population – national politicians in the UK.

In order to advance an answer to research question 1 (*Who enters elite politics and how are they different to the general public?*), a series of parametric tests were conducted. Pearson's correlations were carried out to explore the relationships between the PVQ centred means for each of the ten lower-order basic values and a series of additional variables (Table 6.7). Tests of difference (independent t-tests and one way ANOVAs) were then conducted to compare the PVQ centred means for each of the ten lower-order basic values between MPs by demographic and occupational variables such as gender, age, political party, prior occupation and political status (frontbench versus backbench). Where significant differences were identified, post-hoc Tukey tests were conducted to explore these further. Having identified value differences within the parliamentary sample, MPs were then compared to the British public (n = 2264) using a sample that had completed the PVQ-21 in the 7th round of the European Social Survey (ESS; see Table 6.2, above).

Although the PVQ-21 and the TwIVI vary in their item descriptors, both measures are derived from the same theoretical framework and share extremely similar properties (Sandy et al., 2017). A series of factorial ANCOVA (analysis of covariance) models were used to assess the differences in BHV between and within each sample (MPs vs. public) according to age, gender and partisanship.⁵⁷ These ANCOVA models also revealed the interaction effects of each combination of independent variables (e.g. MP/Public and Centre-Left/Centre-Right) on BHV scores. In order to maximise the statistical power of the models and counter the disparity in sample sizes, these analyses were conducted using the four higher-order basic values (Conservation, Self-Enhancement, Self-Transcendence, and Openness-to-Change),

⁵⁶ High internal reliabilities are not expected for two reasons. Firstly, each value index only uses two items; secondly, each value has multiple component meanings that are being measured. However, these alpha scores relate favourably to prior studies using the TwIVI (Sandy et al., 2017), the PVQ-21 (Purko et al., 2011), and the PVQ-40 (Schwartz et al., 2001).

⁵⁷ Partisanship for the public sample was measured using their self-reported vote choice in the 2010 UK General Election.

Table 6.6 Varimax Rotated Component Matrix - Four Factor Model.

Summary of Portrait Item	Value	Component			
		1 (Openness to Change)	2 (Self-Enhancement)	3 (Conservation)	4 (Self-Transcendence)
Likes risks and adventures	Stimulation	.826			
Important to be curious	Self-Direction	.734			
Important to enjoy life	Hedonism	.706			
Important to try new things	Stimulation	.689			
Important to have fun	Hedonism	.677			
Important to be original	Self-Direction	.578			
Important to be successful	Achievement		.785		
Important to be in charge	Power		.767		
Important to get ahead	Achievement		.709		
Important to be the leader	Power		.667		
Important to be organised	Security		.564		
Important to be traditional	Tradition			.817	
Important to show respect	Conformity			.762	
Important to follow religion	Tradition			.712	
Important to have stability	Security			.627	
Important to behave properly	Conformity				.531
Important to care for others	Benevolence				.795
Important to support others	Benevolence				.738
Important to promote peace	Universalism				.681
Important to have equal opportunities	Universalism				.539

thus maximising the number of items/responses per index. Significant differences were followed up with independent samples t-tests. A full discussion of these analyses can be found in chapters 7 and 8.

Research question 2 (*What, if any, is the impact and importance of personality on MPs' behaviour once they are elected to Parliament?*) was addressed using the specific hypotheses built in chapter 4 and the theoretical model of the IMPPB (chapter 4, p.90), which specifies the causal primacy of personality (specifically basic values) in explaining MPs' behaviour within contingent contexts of varying institutional constraint. In the first instance, logistic regression models were built to test the effect of BHV upon three high profile votes: the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (*free vote*), the vote on military action in Syria 2013 (*whip enforced for one major party*), and the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017 (*whip enforced for both major parties*).⁵⁸ These voting records were chosen a) for their high profile nature and the contrast in party lines/discipline, and b) to maximise the number of MPs in this sample who could be included in the analysis. Additional logistic and poisson regression models were run to test the effect of MP's BHV upon their membership of a select committee⁵⁹ and the number of written questions submitted/Early Day Motions (EDMs) signed by MPs (over one parliamentary calendar year, 2015-2016).⁶⁰ A full discussion of these analyses can be found in chapter 9.

To determine the effect of BHV upon MPs' self-reported focus as a representative (i.e. nation, party or constituency), structural equation models (SEM) were built. Following preliminary analyses in SPSS 22, AMOS 24 was used to create SEMs with a weighted least squares estimator; probit regressions were used to estimate categorical dependent variables and linear regressions were used to estimate continuous dependent variables in the model. Following the advice of Rex B. Kline (2015), this analysis was conducted in two steps. Firstly, a measurement model was built and tested using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA); secondly, a series of alternative SEMs with differing pathways were constructed (these are discussed in detail in Chapter 9). In doing so, I sought to demonstrate the supremacy of one theoretical

⁵⁸ These divisions were recovered online from The Public Whip (<http://www.publicwhip.org.uk>), a non-governmental, non-for-profit repository of Parliamentary debate transcripts and voting records taken from Hansard.

⁵⁹ Records of select committee memberships (as well as written questions and early day motions for the Parliamentary year 2015-2016) were retrieved online from TheyWorkForYou (<https://www.theyworkforyou.com/>), a repository of open data taken from the UK Parliament.

⁶⁰ Poisson regression is commonly used when the dependent variables are count variables observed over the same length of time for all units in the analysis.

Table 6.7 Overview of statistical analysis.

Focus:	Variables:	Tests:
RQ1: Who enters elite politics? (<i>Variation of Basic Human Values among MPs and the public</i>)	- Length of service - Age - Gender - Party - Political Status - Prior Occupation - Education	- Pearson's correlations - Logistic Regression - Independent t-tests - One-way ANOVA - ANCOVA - Post-hoc Tukey tests
RQ2: Parliamentary behaviour (<i>Variation between MPs</i>)	<i>Independent Variables:</i> - Basic Human Values (BHV) <i>Dependent Variables:</i> - Voting records - No. of written questions (2015 - 2016) - No. of Early Day Motions signed (2015-2016) - Select Committee membership	- Independent t-tests - Logistic regression - Poisson regression (count model)
RQ3: Representative focus (variation in MPs' priorities)	<i>Independent Variables:</i> - Basic Human Values (BHV) <i>Dependent Variables:</i> - Self-reported priority (Nation, Party, Constituency)	- Structural Equation Modelling (SEM)

model - based on the IMPPB - over others by comparing the strength of direct and indirect causal pathways running between BHV and this abstract behavioural decision.⁶¹

In line with the pragmatist critique of foundationalism advanced in Part III, this thesis is problem-driven rather than method-driven. The theory of BHV and the mixture of quantitative survey techniques with semi-structured interviews were all selected for their suitability to the problems raised in the project's research questions. However, I also accept that data cannot speak for itself. The post-positivist philosophy underpinning this thesis is concerned with prediction and explanation but clearly acknowledges that social scientific inquiry is ultimately hermeneutic. As Veronique Mottier (2005, p.3) argues, '[i]nterpretation and explanation, objectivity and subjectivity, cannot be clearly separated'. In analysing both

⁶¹ Follow up studies may wish to collect related data to test the reliability of these self-reported priorities (i.e. does an MP with a 'constituency focus' actually spend more time in their constituency?).

the quantitative and qualitative data collected for this thesis in tandem, and attempting to construct an explanation for the ways in which MPs make sense of their daily lives as elected representatives, I engage reflexively throughout the analysis process.

V. Conjoint Analysis

In the final sequence of this thesis design, a conjoint experiment was used to test the hypotheses (H9-10) proffered in support of research question 3 (*How big is the gap between voters' preferences about the personal characteristics of MPs and reality?*). As outlined at length in chapter 5, it is possible to trace a contemporary crisis of popular disengagement from, and distrust of, politics back to the agency-centred focus of democratic representation. I use an experimental survey technique known as a conjoint experiment to assess *who*, and with what type of personal profile, the British public would ideally vote for in a General Election. Coupled with data on the BHV of MPs, these results are used to test the existence of a perception gap based on personalised assessments of sitting representatives and ideal types in the public.

A conjoint experiment is a multivariate choice-based survey technique that originated in marketing research. Typically, consumers are faced with an array of products that have a broad range of characteristics and must choose which of these they prefer. A conjoint experiment works on the premise of utility, which refers to each individual's unique subjective preference formation (Hair et al., 2008). Consumers can evaluate the objects offered as a whole, thus reducing the cognitive fatigue demanded of the participant. Conjoint experiments have been common in marketing research for over 40 years and their versatility has attracted the attention of scholars in other fields as diverse as transport management and financial services, oncology and taxation (Beusterien et al., 2014; Hundsdorfer et al., 2013). In politics, conjoint experiments have been rare and sporadic (cf. Vivyan and Wagner, 2015).

The conjoint experiment used in this study presented members of the public with hypothetical profiles of MPs who varied in the following attributes: gender, age, ethnicity and disability; religion; family status; personality; education; prior occupation; accent (as a proxy for region); and political priority.⁶² These variables were chosen in order to a) reflect a variety of personal characteristics that are focused upon by empirical research into descriptive representation; b) create an experimental scenario in which candidates appeared credible; and c) force a highly personalised decision without the distortion of partisanship. The variable




⁶² Gender, age, ethnicity and disability were represented in normed profile images obtained from the CIE Biometrics PUT Face database.

'personality' was presented using a series of 10 statements taken directly from the PVQ (TwIVI) used to collect data on BHV from MPs. The variable 'political priority' constituted three statements related to party, constituency and national policy objectives. This variable was included to provide a direct comparison with prior survey work on public preferences for MPs (Campbell and Lovenduski, 2015; Vivyan and Wagner, 2015). Figure 6.2 shows a screenshot of one random survey iteration.

Given that the number of potential combinations in a conjoint experiment grows exponentially with each additional attribute and level (i.e. how many random options are used to populate, for example, the attribute 'Religion'), a fractional factorial design was used so that the participants were only ever presented with a selection of levels for each attribute at once. The number of attributes in the design was limited to eight, including the image, in keeping with received wisdom on the limits of this experimental design and its cognitive accessibility (Bradlow, 2005). The compensatory model underpinning conjoint surveys posits that participants evaluate an object in comparison to another object by combining the positive or negative value they assign to each of its different attributes. Where participants are presented with too many choices at once, they engage simplified criteria of selection (Hauser, 2014), whilst a large choice set also reduces the amount of data available for each attribute and therefore limits the accuracy and weight of statistical estimates (DeShazo and Fermo, 2002; Huertas-Garcia et al., 2016). To maximise the statistical power, efficiency and cognitive accessibility of this conjoint analysis, a sample of 1637 UK adults were asked to choose between three randomly populated profiles of MPs with eight attributes each and to complete this process five times. Participants responded to the question: *Which of the following candidates would you elect to represent you as a Member of Parliament?* Apart from the image of each candidate, the order of attributes changed randomly between participants to control for order effects in the survey design.

In total, a representative sample of 1637 UK adults participated in the conjoint analysis. The participants were recruited by the polling agency, YouGov, and surveys were completed on the 23rd and 24th October 2017. Demographically, the sample is broadly representative of the UK population. The median age is 48 years old (range of 19 - 117) and participants resided in 11 different regions of the UK. No single region accounted for more than 13% (London) of the sample. Although the number of participants who voted in the 2017 General Election was slightly higher than the national average (80% compared to 69%), it included a good mix of supporters from different political parties: 34% Conservative, 33%

Figure 6.2. A screenshot from the conjoint survey.

	Individual A	Individual B	Individual C
			
Accent	Liverpudlian accent	Welsh accent	Scottish accent
Family	Married with Children	Married	Married
Occupation	Stock broker	Builder	Builder
Personal statement	I am curious and think that it is important to try to understand all sorts of things. I think up new creative ideas and like to do things in my own original way.	It is important to me that things around me are organized. I am concerned that the social order is protected and the government as well as society is stable.	I always show respect to older people and think that it is important to be obedient, to behave properly and to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
Education	Attended a State Grammar School	Attended a State Comprehensive School	Attended a Religious School
Religion	Buddhist	Atheist	Atheist
Political Priority	Wherever possible I will prioritise the wants and needs of my constituents.	Wherever possible I will prioritise the common good of the nation.	Wherever possible I will stay loyal to my party and its manifesto.

Labour, 6% Liberal Democrat, 1% UKIP, 1% Green and 4% Other. Approximately equal numbers of men and women completed the survey (51% of the sample is female) and participants are evenly spread across social grades: 28% categories AB, 29% category C1, 21% category C2, and 22% categories DE.⁶³ In the context of the highly contested Brexit vote in 2016, this sample was split between those who voted remain (38%), leave (41%), and those who claimed they did not vote or could not remember voting (21%). In sum, the survey data reflected a representative mix of the UK population.

The conjoint experiment confers a number of advantages over more traditional ranking and rating survey techniques used to assess voters' perceptions of politics. Given that the choice-based model creates a total utility value for each profile (or bundle of attributes), it is also possible to isolate the part-worth utility of individual attributes and their levels. This allows the researcher to capture not only the specific effect of certain attributes but also their effect when interacting with other combinations of attributes. For example, it might be that voters in highly professional occupations or social grades AB prefer MPs with a similar

⁶³ According to the National Readership Survey of the UK population in 2016, 27% of citizens fell into categories AB, 28% category C1, 20% category C2, and 25% categories DE. Social grades are calculated using interviews that ask about the occupation of the chief income earner in the household, qualifications and the number of dependents cared for by the participant. Data available here [online]: <http://www.nrs.co.uk/nrs-print/lifestyle-and-classification-data/social-grade/>

occupational background, but only when that MP is also committed to their party manifesto. In particular, the conjoint analysis enables me to draw conclusions about the relative weight, if any, that citizens place on different BHV when asked to simultaneously judge other personal attributes such as gender, age, and education. Faced with complex hypothetical profiles, participants are also presented with realistic choices that makes the findings more transferable to 'live' environments beyond the survey. Indeed, the profiles were purposefully designed to include the same types of personal information that appear on candidate flyers and websites.

"There are 650 people in Parliament and so with any group of 650, there is good and bad. There are people in Parliament I wouldn't trust as far as I could throw them and there are people in Parliament I would trust with my life."

Conservative MP (Interviewee 17)

The Basic Human Values of UK Members of Parliament

Members of Parliament (MPs) are unique among elite groups for their capacity to 'affect political outcomes regularly and substantially' (Higley and Burton, 2006, p.7). Even backbench MPs, who are traditionally seen as party political lobby fodder, play an important role in moulding crucial and far-reaching policy decisions, in assuming the most influential roles in the state (either as a pool of potential recruits for the executive or by granting and withdrawing support for the government of the day), and in helping to design and reform the institutional nature of the state (Best and Vogel, 2018). However, the existing parliamentary studies literature has only given limited attention to the individual, psychological characteristics of those actors who hold elected office and exercise these powers. As such, this thesis advances a highly original interdisciplinary study of MPs' personalities (specifically their Basic Human Values (BHV)) that offers significant insights into the ways that politicians operate, horizontally at the institutional level of the UK Parliament, and vertically as democratic agents of the electorate.

The first half of this thesis engaged in depth with a range of literature to expose gaps in the study of structure and agency in elite politics, the nature of principal-agent relations in democratic representation, and elite political behaviour. Fresh conceptual thinking has been matched by a careful research design and extensive quantitative and qualitative data collection with 106 MPs and survey data from the British public (Chapter 6). This chapter now turns to the empirical results of these efforts. In particular, this chapter focuses on research question 1, which pertains specifically to the basic values of MPs and their differences from and similarities to the wider British public. Section I reports descriptive results about the entire sample of MPs and compares their values to comparative data extracted from the 7th round of

the European Social Survey (ESS, 2014).⁶⁴ Section II focuses on MPs' Power values, comparing their motivational drive for prestige and authority with that of the public. This section also uses MPs' BHV to differentiate between the goals and ambitions of representatives at different levels of the parliamentary hierarchy. Section III uses both data sets to model elite political recruitment, examining the effect of basic values upon political ambition alongside commonly studied variables such as profession, education and gender. The final section of this chapter builds upon the results of section III to interrogate the personality differences of career politicians and those without prior employment in politics. In each section, highly significant quantitative results are accompanied by qualitative findings from 17 in-depth interviews with a diverse sample of MPs.

I. Psychological Scrutiny: Who are our Representatives?

The observable nature of democratic politics makes possible a host of hypothetical contestations about the personal characteristics *required, expected or assumed* of political elites. I test these claims with a unique study of MPs' basic values. This section reports value hierarchies for MPs and the public, compares centred mean scores for basic values across these two groups, and closely examines the nature of political ambition by differentiating between front and backbench participants in the elite sample. The findings suggest that all MPs are psychologically different from those they represent in terms of their basic values and that these differences are exaggerated among MPs who advance to the highest levels of political office.

A comparison of basic value scores in the elite sample and the ESS general population sample provides strong support for the suggestion that personality influences selectivity in parliamentary recruitment (Hypothesis 1). The average value hierarchies for MPs and the British public only overlap in three of ten positions (Table 7.1, below).⁶⁵ For both samples, Self-Transcendence values are the most important motivational goals. In each case, Benevolence values - which relate to the preservation and support of those known personally - are scored as more important than Universalism values - which represent an understanding of and protection for the welfare of all people. However, across the remainder of the value

⁶⁴ Cumulative British sample (N = 2154). This data was extracted and downloaded from: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/download.html?file=ES_S7e02_1&y=2014.

⁶⁵ These hierarchies are based on the average mean scores given to each basic value, calculated from responses to the Portrait Values Questionnaire (see chapter 6 for more detail). The hierarchies run from most positive to least positive.

hierarchies, there are a number of distinct differences. The elite sample of MPs reveals greater priority for Openness to Change values, whilst the public sample gives more importance to Conservation values. This would suggest that MPs are motivated more by the need for independent thought and action, and autonomy in exciting, novel or challenging circumstances (Self-Direction and Stimulation values), whereas the public are more likely to respect and commit to traditional customs or ideas and in turn restrain their action so as to maintain social expectations or norms (Security, Tradition and Conformity values).

Table 7.1 Value hierarchies compared for UK Members of Parliament (n = 106) and the general population (N = 2154).

Members of Parliament	General Population
BENEVOLENCE	BENEVOLENCE
UNIVERSALISM	UNIVERSALISM
SELF-DIRECTION	SECURITY
CONFORMITY	SELF-DIRECTION
STIMULATION	TRADITION
SECURITY	CONFORMITY
POWER	HEDONISM
ACHIEVEMENT	ACHIEVEMENT
HEDONISM	STIMULATION
TRADITION	POWER

A correlation matrix (Appendix F) containing centred mean scores for each of the ten lower order BHV and each participant's status (MP or public) reinforces a number of the inferences that can be made from these value hierarchies. After combining these data sets, eight BHV (not including Achievement and Hedonism) share statistically significant relationships with whether a participant was an MP or a member of the public. Benevolence, Universalism, Self-Direction, Stimulation, Conformity and Power values all shared positive relationships with being an MP, whilst Tradition and Security values shared a negative relationship. These results reflect the findings of previous studies that have demonstrated strong positive associations between levels of political activism in mass samples and Self-Transcendence values as well as Openness to Change values, and negative associations with Conservation values (Pacheco and Owen, 2015; Schwartz, 2010; Vecchione et al., 2015). Whilst wary of generalising these findings across cultures, it might be inferred that in order to be motivated strongly enough to work doggedly in a political party, to secure a candidacy, and to operate in an elected capacity, one must not only care about improving the lot of those they work for (i.e. Self-Transcendence values), but also be particularly motivated to defy

expectations, confront the status quo and take personal risks in that process (i.e. Openness to Change values).

These results are revealed in greater detail by a direct comparison of group means. The centred mean scores for the basic values of the elite and public samples differ significantly across eight out of ten lower order values (Table 7.2). The results of a series of independent samples T-tests suggest, for example, that MPs are significantly more driven by motivations to care for those around them and support those they know personally (higher scores for Benevolence: $t(2257) = 4.26, p < 0.001$); they are significantly more driven by originality and a desire for new experiences (higher scores for Openness to Change values: $t(2257) = 3.49, p < 0.001$); and they are significantly less motivated to preserve tradition (Tradition values: $t(2257) = -10.56, p < 0.001$) or to secure stability in their own lives or society (Security values: $t(2257) = -8.71, p < 0.001$). The size of these differences and the test statistics, as well levels of significance, point to specific personality factors in the selection and self-selection of UK MPs. In particular, higher scores for Benevolence, Universalism and Self-Direction indicate a greater commitment among MPs [than the public] to those political values of individual freedom, social welfare and equality among citizens (cf. Caprara et al., 2006).

One noticeable anomaly to these trends is the positive association between Conformity values and elected office (Appendix F), and the higher average ratings given to Conformity values by the elite sample. This result is antithetical to the assumptions of the Schwartz taxonomy and its sinusoidal structure. Indicative of obedience, self-discipline and social inhibitions, Conformity values are expected to operate in opposition to Openness to Change values such as Self-Direction and Stimulation (Schwartz, 1992). However, in the elite sample Conformity values are rated as almost equally important. This result may reflect a measurement issue. Conceptually, Conformity values are conceived in the Schwartz taxonomy as comprising two related subtypes: the first is interpersonal (maintain harmonious social relations) and the second is compliance (conforming to expectations). In the traditional Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ), each of these subtypes is measured with two items and the mean score of all four provides an individual rating for Conformity values in sum. In the shorter twenty item PVQ used for this research project (Appendix A), one item expressed compliance (behave properly/avoid doing anything people say is wrong) and another expressed interpersonal Conformity (respect parents/obey). Although principal components analysis (Chapter 6, p.140) shows that both items load onto a single latent Conservation

Table 7.2 Mean differences between the Basic Human Values of UK MPs (n = 106) and a representative sample of the British population (N = 2154).

Basic Human Values (Lower Order)	Centred Mean Scores (MRAT) MP/Public †	MRAT Difference
Benevolence	1.13 (.07)/0.85 (.01)	0.28 **
Universalism	0.88 (.09)/0.64 (.01)	0.23 **
Self-Direction	0.63 (.08)/0.47 (.02)	0.17 *
Stimulation	- 0.14 (.08)/- 0.64 (.02)	0.50 **
Hedonism	- 0.49 (.08)/- 0.41 (.02)	- 0.08
Achievement	- 0.48 (.09)/- 0.56 (.02)	0.08
Power	- 0.47 (.08)/- 1.08 (.02)	0.61 **
Security	- 0.15 (.09)/0.55 (.02)	- 0.70 **
Conformity	0.02 (.09)/- 0.19 (.02)	0.22 *
Tradition	- 0.93 (.13)/0.05 (.02)	- 0.98 **

Two-tailed significance: ** p < 0.001, * p < 0.05

† Standard error of means in parentheses.

factor, empirical evidence from other studies suggests that these two subtypes are more readily distinguishable.

In multidimensional scaling analyses of PVQ data (Schwartz et al., 2012), the compliance items have emerged closer to Security values and the interpersonal items have been closer to Self-Transcendence values. Similar results have been achieved with confirmatory factor analysis (Beierlein et al., 2012). Schwartz et al. (2012) have used these results to partition a more refined 19-factor taxonomy of values in which Conformity-Interpersonal values are recognised and measured as a distinct factor compatible with Universalism values. It is anticipated that the ratings given to Conformity values by this elite sample - who also score much higher than the public for both Self-Transcendence values - are inflated by participants' heightened sensitivity to its interpersonal elements. Individuals high in Conformity-Interpersonal values are motivated to 'avoid negative social reactions [and] to

consider the desires of others' (Schwartz et al., 2012, p. 670). Both of these motivations seem highly apposite for MPs, who must win the hearts and minds of voters to sustain their time in elected office and who, according to the Self-Transcendence scores above, are particularly concerned to help, rather than upset or harm, those around them. This result demands future research of elite samples using the PVQ-57, which measures the 19-factor BHV taxonomy.

These quantitative results are supported by interview data. Although MPs might have a vested interest in self-reporting an inflated image of their own altruism, nearly every interviewee recognised that politicians of *all* partisan affiliations are driven, first and foremost, by a desire to help others and enact change. As one very experienced Conservative MP commented:

I mean I've met literally thousands of politicians from all over the world in the course of my years. They all believe that they're trying to do good and many of them are doing good and they're not in your party either, which is quite annoying. The idea of the self-seeking politician, it might have been true in Tammany Hall and in some of the murkier bits of the Italian political system, but overall people seek elected office to change things, particularly in the western democracies (Interviewee 9)⁶⁶

This observation was as common among interviewees with relatively little experience of elected office. One newly elected member of Scottish National Party (SNP), who had been in office for less than 18 months at the time of interviewing, said:

I think probably some politicians are here to further their own personal life to get more money, to be more powerful, but a huge number of people from across the House, not just SNP members, Labour, Lib Dem, Tory members are actually here to try to make a positive difference to their communities. I could disagree with them on how to make that positive difference but that's actually their intention when they come here (Interviewee 7)

These comments are particularly interesting for two reasons. Firstly, they indicate that Self-Transcendence values are as clearly observable to those who have been socialised into elite politics for many years as for those who are new to Parliament and its milieu of elected representatives. Secondly, these comments (especially that of interviewee 7) are indicative of the ways in which all participants articulated the principles of value instantiation - i.e. the cognitive and social links between general categories of values and specific behavioural manifestations (Hanel et al., 2017). As such, interviewees were adamant that the majority of their colleagues came to Parliament with well-meaning intentions to change the lives of others for the better, but at the same time they often voiced disagreement with the policy or behavioural instantiations of those intentions. It is important to acknowledge, therefore, that

⁶⁶ Profiles for each interviewee can be found in chapter 6, p.135

the overall motivational goals of Self-Transcendence values may take a variety of behavioural forms in elite politics, dependent upon other variables (e.g. age, gender, education) that may affect an individual's perception of the 'common good'. These differences will be explored later in this chapter and the next.

II. Dark Intentions? A Focus on Power Values

The previous section presented descriptive results for MPs' BHV that show a significant difference between the personalities of the governors and the governed. In particular, these results indicate that elected representatives are far more motivated by equality, social justice and caring for others (Self-Transcendence values) than the public. This section now focuses in more detail on another interesting discrepancy between the BHV of MPs and their electors: Power values.

Although the results discussed thus far have demonstrated a normatively positive image of MPs, who - contrary to media speculation - are more motivated by the welfare of others than themselves, the data collected here also suggest that they are more motivated than the public to control resources and be in charge of others (Power values: $t(2257) = 7.12, p < 0.001$; Table 7.2). In representative national samples around the world, Power values have consistently received the lowest average ratings (c.2.3) on the PVQ's Likert scale of 0 (Not like me at all) to 6 (Very much like me) (e.g. Bardi and Schwartz, 2001). This is likewise the case for the ESS sample used in this thesis (Table 7.1), in which Power values are rated as least important among all basic values for the British public. However, in the elite sample of MPs, Power values are rated as more important than Achievement, Hedonism and Tradition values, and receive an average rating among participants of 3.6.

A correlation analysis of Power values and 'being an MP' reveals a positive relationship ($r(2258) = 0.15, p < 0.001$) that, taken together with the results above, adds weight to a previously anomalous association found in a large-N study of Power values and conventional political activism across four continents (Vecchione et al., 2015). Given the unparalleled access to personal and political resources and knowledge provided by elected office, these results support claims that politics necessarily attracts individuals who are more motivated by authority, social recognition and, importantly, control than those who elect them. It is crucial to interpret this result holistically, given that basic values must be understood relationally rather than in isolation (Schwartz, 2014). In the elite sample, Power values remain subordinate to Self-Transcendence and Openness to Change values. Whilst

they may be more likely to influence MPs' decisions or behaviour than those of the public, they remain *less* likely to be activated in decision-making scenarios, to guide perceptions and interpretations, or influence action planning than, in particular, MPs' Benevolence and Universalism values.

Interview data provide two key complementary insights to this finding. Although interviewees talked of colleagues' motivations in terms readily relatable to Self-Transcendence values, they were quick, for example, to argue that elite politics required personality characteristics typical of Self-Enhancement values (Power and Achievement). One former Liberal Democrat frontbench MP even claimed '[t]here are quite a number – a disproportionate number – of aggressive people in politics, but I think politics is dominated by people who are, I would say, at least assertive' (Interviewee 13). Given that democratic politics in the UK is characterised by partisan competition and constant debate and deliberation between elected representatives, one could argue that MPs must necessarily come to the job with the confidence to put themselves forward and push their cause. As one Labour MP characterised it, '[y]ou have to have a personality that can project because people, and it sounds dreadful, but people need you to perform a bit. It's no good creeping into a room as a wallflower' (Interviewee 14). Whilst the majority of interviewees cast such characteristics as either necessary and/or desirable in elite politics, others were more candid about the prevalence of Self-Enhancement values among MPs and the accompanying self-interest:

If you look at the people who succeeded in the Labour Party to get to the top, they were people who put ambition above anything and everything else – above family, above other social activities. They all, with the notable exceptions of Robin Cook and John Smith, I think, they all came down and lived in London. You had to be in the centre of things. You had to have ambition. You had to, to some extent, push people aside, even though they were your friends, and trample on them (Interviewee 12)

Secondly, for a number of interviewees, Self-Enhancement values were activated when they joined the House of Commons or at some point during their career there. This is unusual given that extant research in political psychology - and psychological studies more broadly - testifies to the stability of people's basic values across time and situation, as well as people's conscious desire *not* to change their values in adulthood (Roccas et al., 2014). Nevertheless, a number of interviewees talked about an increase in their ambition and self-belief as an MP. As one Liberal Democrat put it:

I would say – and I think this is probably an important bit of your note on me – that I used to be actually very shy, and not terribly assertive, and didn't speak very much at

meetings, but you gain confidence sometimes by engaging and sometimes being forced into the limelight (Interviewee 13)

There are two possible explanations for this result. Either the immense stresses, challenges and unparalleled experiences of elected office are capable of generating value changes, or the parliamentary environment is more immediately geared towards activating Self-Enhancement values in the first place. Correlations between MPs' Self-Enhancement values and tenure (length of service) are virtually non-existent and non-significant in the elite sample. Therefore, the second explanation seems more plausible. Given that MPs attribute more importance to Power values than the general public in the samples used here, then the principles of value activation suggest that those motivations will be more accessible to MPs when placed in an immediate situation that activates them (e.g. Verplanken and Holland, 2002; Schwartz, 2005).

If this theoretical explanation is correct, then it is anticipated that the activation of Power values will be strongest among frontbench MPs. Being in a position of authority or responsibility in Parliament, especially a post in the executive, confers upon MPs incomparable influence over policy decisions. With this come innumerable more scenarios or opportunities (media interviews, public speaking requests, civil service portfolios, extended administrative support, access to classified information) that may activate Power values and associated motivations towards social status and prestige, control and dominance over people and resources. One interviewee, a former Secretary of State, articulated this when she recalled her time in office:

A certain amount of arrogance and self-belief, I suppose, that you have to have as a politician. In fact, if anything, I grew those. I grew the idea that I was quite good at it (Interviewee 5)

Likewise, it may be that the individuals who come to Parliament with higher Power values in the first place are also those who are attracted to the upper echelons of the democratic hierarchy. As one former Labour frontbench politician sagely reflected: '[s]elf-belief, I think, is quite an important thing. If you want to advance in politics, you can't really afford to be self-deprecating, unless it's no more than an artifice' (Interviewee 16). In order to explore the potential self-selection among those who do and do not pursue top parliamentary and governmental positions, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with post-hoc Tukey tests (Figure 7.1).


The analysis split the parliamentary sample into those MPs who reported frontbench experience at the time of investigation or previously ($n = 63$) and those who did not ($n = 40$). Frontbench experiences ranged from Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Minister, Secretary of State, and Prime Minister. Parliamentary Private Secretaries were also included in this group; although not technically a frontbench role, the position offers additional responsibility and proximity to decision makers, and often acts as a career stepping stone to higher office (Searing, 1994). The one-way ANOVA showed that any variations between conditions were unlikely to have arisen by sampling error. Although harmonic means were used to counter the contrast in sample sizes, the results here (especially between each elite sub-sample and the public) are treated as indicative and preliminary to more extensive future research. To maximise the reliability of the data, only higher order values are used to compare MP sub-samples and the public.

The results show that MPs with frontbench experience differ significantly from the public on all four higher order values ($p < 0.001$), whilst backbench MPs only differ significantly from the public on two higher order values (Self-Transcendence and Conservation, $p < 0.05$). An additional independent samples T-Test showed that the differences between frontbench and backbench MPs were highly significant for one higher order value (Conservation) and three lower order values (Conformity, Tradition, Achievement).⁶⁷ MPs with frontbench experience also scored higher for Power values, although this result was not significant. These results show that a) the differences in personality between MPs and the public are not uniform and are, in fact, greatest at the highest levels of parliamentary responsibility; and b) basic values act as internal criterion for self-selection within Parliament (Hypothesis 2; Figure 7.2, below).

In particular, these tests show that frontbench MPs are far less motivated than either their backbench colleagues or the public to abide by or protect rules and traditions, or to maintain harmonious relationships (lower scores for Conservation values: $F(2, 2245) = 34.884$, $p < 0.001$). This result falls in line with previous research by Schwartz (2010) that showed a strong negative correlation between levels of political activism and Conservation values. Schwartz (2010) also reported strong negative correlations between Conservation values and a range of other 'political' measures, including tolerance of immigrants and support for organisations that promote or protect animal rights, peace, and the environment. Two


⁶⁷ Mean difference in Conservation values of 0.435 ($t(101) = 2.87$, $p < 0.01$). Mean differences in Conformity values of 0.645 ($t(101) = 3.63$, $p < 0.001$); in Tradition values of 0.558 ($t(101) = 2.14$, $p < 0.05$); and in Achievement values of -0.416 ($t(101) = -2.07$, $p < 0.05$).

Figure 7.1 Comparison of higher order values (centred mean scores) across frontbench MPs, backbench MPs, and the British public.



conclusions may be drawn here. Firstly, these results suggest that MPs who rise to the top of the 'greasy pole' are those least committed to cultural or religious norms (Tradition values), least restrained in their actions, impulses or inclinations (Conformity values), and least concerned about the stability of their own relationships or society (Security values). These findings would seem appropriate, given the sacrifices required in order to build a successful political career in Parliament (Childs, 2016). However, they also raise some worrying questions about the circumspection of those MPs who hold the most power over far-reaching policy decisions and who make those decisions under the time pressure of fixed term Parliaments in the UK. Secondly, this result would suggest that frontbench MPs of all partisan affiliations are far more liberal in their psychological outlook than the public they represent. This finding will be discussed in more detail in chapter 11.

Figure 7.2 Comparison of lower order basic values for frontbench MPs (n = 63) and backbench MPs (n = 40).



Within the context of the earlier debate in this section about parliamentary self-selection and power, it is especially interesting to note the difference in Self-Enhancement values between frontbench and backbench MPs (Figure 7.2). Although the difference here is amplified by Achievement rather than Power values, the result is still highly significant. The data would suggest that those who rise to the top are far more ambitious, self-respectful, and desirous of influence than those who remain on the backbench. Asked if they could describe those MPs who succeeded in gaining additional responsibilities, interviewee 6 responded: 'People with ability. People with ambition. People who are connected.' As powerful motivators of goal-oriented behaviour, it seems that Achievement values are as evident to MPs in the actions of their more 'successful' colleagues as Self-Transcendence values appear to be as motivators across the House. Answering the same question as above, another interviewee commented:

[A]mbition is a wonderful thing. They're all driven by extreme ambition; even in the Lords. And people, of course, who acquire ambition by the time they get to 50 or 60 can't give it up. How do you give up being what you are? It's habit (Interviewee 2)

A number of conclusions can be drawn from these results. In the first instance, these data show that MPs are not psychologically homogeneous. In particular, ambition - in the sense of pursuing personal gain or success as implied by Achievement values - is not evenly spread across the so-called political class. The skew in these results neatly captures significant differentials within the elected parliamentary community that run along hierarchical occupational dividing lines. This should not, however, be taken as evidence with which to

indict a self-interested *elite within an elite*. As argued in chapter 3, the extraordinary ambition of those who seek and secure elected office, and in turn climb to positions of influence, may not necessarily be negative if, in turn, that ambition works with and services more important motivational goals aimed at improving the lives of others (i.e. Benevolence and Universalism values). This line of inquiry demands further research.

III. The Role of Basic Values in Parliamentary Recruitment

So far this chapter has compared the basic values of UK MPs and the British public, revealing a number of highly significant differences. MPs are, by comparison to their electors, 'extraordinary' in their motivation to secure justice, equality and help others (Self-Transcendence values). However, they are also relatively more motivated by personal success and the desire for social influence (Self-Enhancement values). This extreme ambition not only differentiates MPs from those they represent but similarly distinguishes between those who occupy frontbench offices and those who do not. This section now turns to examine the role of that ambition in parliamentary recruitment. In doing so, the relative contribution of basic values to the exercise of political ambition (and successful candidacy) is examined alongside socio-demographic variables.

The results presented in the previous sections demonstrate that basic values can capture meaningful distinctions between the governors and governed. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that those same distinctions - and the substantial variations in personal motivations that they represent - might also help to explain why certain individuals are attracted to politics and run for office (i.e. candidate activation). Contra to rational choice studies of political ambition (Schlesinger, 1966; Stone and Maisel, 2003), chapter 3 of this thesis argued that explanations of candidate emergence that depend entirely on the structural conditions of political and social systems are insufficient. Instead, it is argued that members of the public are *not* equally desirous of political office. Differences in personality are anticipated to characterise what Jennifer Lawless (2012, p.19) calls 'nascent ambition' and ultimately forecast its expression through elite political participation. The comprehensive model of candidate emergence presented in chapter 3 (Figure 3.1, p.66) therefore predicts that basic values will exert a significant effect on political ambition in tandem with previously researched socio-demographic variables such as profession, education and gender (cf. Allen and Cutts, 2018; Lawless, 2012).

In order to test these predictions, comparative data were again combined from the elite sample of MPs collected for this project and the ESS sample of the British public. Together, these data sets provide information on participants' basic values, age, gender, education, occupations and experience of politics. Prior involvement with politics - in the formal sense of working with, being an active member of, or volunteering for political parties and trade unions - is used here as a proxy for the political opportunity structures faced by participants. Although prior experience may interact with other socio-demographic variables, it is assumed that a) participants will be more likely to have accrued these experiences where opportunities to do so were transparent, and b) that formal political participation will provide the contacts and knowledge necessary to secure a successful candidacy. As anticipated, preliminary analysis revealed a significant correlation between being an MP and having prior experience of politics ($r(2369) = 0.129, p < 0.001$). In line with prior research on the political ambition of the British public (Allen and Cutts, 2018), being an MP also correlated positively with levels of education ($r(2369) = 0.239, p < 0.001$) and whether participants worked in high-earning private sector professions ($r(2369) = 0.403, p < 0.001$), but correlated negatively with being a woman ($r(2369) = -0.088, p < 0.001$). Correlations between being an MP and each of the higher order basic values were also statistically significant. These correlations were positive for Openness to Change, Self-Transcendence and Self-Enhancement values, but negative for Conservation values. These trends might be anticipated, given the differences reported in section I between the basic values of MPs and the public.

To investigate the predictive power of these variables, a logit regression model was calculated using the statistical software SPSS (Table 7.3).⁶⁸ Based on the theoretical assumptions of the model presented in chapter 3 (Figure 3.1, p.66), variables were included sequentially to test the cumulative effect of personality (basic values), demographics (age and gender), socialisation and professional skills (education and profession), and political opportunity structures (experience of politics). Eight of the ten lower order basic values were

⁶⁸ **Dependent variable MP(Dummy):** 1 = Elected MP; 0 = Member of the public.

Independent variables: Basic Human Values (*Conformity, Tradition, Security, Benevolence, Universalism, Self-Direction, Stimulation, Power*) = centred mean scores (MRAT); **Age** = continuous data; **Gender** (Dummy) = 1 - Female, 0 - Male; **Education** (rescaled 0-1) = 1 - No qualifications, 2 - Apprenticeship, 3 - A-Levels/Vocational Diploma, 4 - Bachelor's Degree, 5 - Postgraduate Degree; **Occupation 1** (Dummy) = 1 - Brokerage professions (*e.g. law, finance, consultancy, public relations*), 0 - Other occupation; **Occupation 2** (Dummy) = 1 - Manual or administrative professions (*e.g. construction, public amenities, personal assistant, secretary*), 0 - Other occupation; **Occupation 3** (Dummy) = 1 - Public sector professionals (*e.g. teacher, doctor, lecturer, civil servant*), 0 - Other occupation; **Occupation 4** (Dummy) = 1 - 'Helping' professions (*e.g. third sector charity or NGO, emergency services*), 0 - Other occupation; **Political Experience** (Dummy) = 1 - Prior experience (*e.g. trade union member, political researcher, involvement with a political party*), 0 - No experience.

included in these models. Due to the multicollinearity of factors that sit in a sinusoidal space, regression coefficients can be inaccurate and misleading if all ten values are included in regression equations (see Appendix E). To limit the number of variables, Achievement values and Hedonism values are excluded here a priori on the basis that they do not reveal any significant differences between MPs and the British public (see section I, above).

The regression coefficients for all variables are presented in Table 7.3; the odds ratios for each variable have also been included for ease of interpretation. The results show that basic values are strong predictors of whether someone becomes an MP, even after controlling for age, gender, education, occupation and prior experience in politics. Taken together Benevolence values and Conformity values (again presuming inflated scores according to interpersonal elements) are particularly important. These results suggest that individuals who score highest for these values - and are by implication most motivated by caring for and supporting the welfare of others - are much more likely to become an MP than individuals who score lowest for these values. The same is true of Stimulation values, indicating that those most motivated by excitement, novelty and challenge are more likely to enter elected office.

Tradition and Security values, by contrast, are negative predictors in these models. Therefore, those individuals scoring highest for values of respect, stability, and commitment to accepted norms and customs were less as likely to be MPs. Of all the basic values included in these models, Power values are the strongest predictors of being an MP. Each unit change in the average scale response to items tapping Power values in the PVQ is associated here with a five-fold increase in the odds of the participant being an MP. Hence, those individuals most motivated by social influence, authority and public recognition were many times more likely to be an MP than individuals least motivated by Power values.⁶⁹ These results should be interpreted in relative terms. Although, for example, Power values are the strongest predictor of whether someone is an MP, this does not show that Power values are most

⁶⁹ Robustness checks were conducted to rule out the effects of multicollinearity in the regression model. Firstly, the inter-item correlations between each basic value in the model were inspected. Only one correlation exceeded .5 (Power and Universalism, $r = .54$) but this was not strong enough to cause concern. Secondly, a series of linear regression models were conducted that replaced status (MP or Not) as the dependent variable with each of the basic values in turn. All other variables were retained in these models. These regression equations allowed for more precise collinearity diagnostics, in particular the Tolerance statistics and Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of each value item. For each value item, the tolerance levels of the other value items were well above the recommended levels of .10 (e.g., Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001), .20 (Menard, 1995), and even .25 (e.g., Huber and Stephens, 1993). Similarly, the VIF statistics for each value item - as a predictor of another value item - were below 2, and thus well beneath the maximum VIF scores of 5 (e.g., Rogerson, 2001) and even 4 (e.g., Pan & Jackson, 2008) recommended in the literature.

Table 7.3 Logistic regression models to test the effect of basic values on candidate emergence in the UK.

Variable/Model	Personality		(+ Demographics		(+ Professional skills/resources		(+ Political Opportunity	
	B(S.E.)	Exp(B)	B(S.E.)	Exp(B)	B(S.E.)	Exp(B)	B(S.E.)	Exp(B)
<i>1. Basic Values:</i>								
Conformity	1.05 (.14) ***	2.846	1.00 (.15) ***	2.728	1.39 (.22) ***	4.053	1.39 (.22) ***	4.012
Tradition	-.47 (.13) ***	.624	-.54 (0.14) ***	.585	-.48 (.18) *	.619	-.46 (.18) *	.629
Benevolence	1.16 (.21) ***	3.198	1.31 (.21) ***	3.719	1.47 (.28) ***	4.337	1.41 (.29) ***	4.092
Universalism	.88 (.19) ***	2.431	.86 (.20) ***	2.352	.75 (.26) ***	2.113	.67 (.26) *	1.944
Self-Direction	.28 (.16)	1.321	.19 (.16)	1.216	.11 (.21)	1.112	.11 (.21)	1.119
Stimulation	.87 (.17) ***	2.396	.82 (.17) ***	2.276	1.03 (.24) ***	2.802	1.01 (.24) ***	2.732
Power	1.51 (.19) ***	4.543	1.52 (.19) ***	4.556	1.68 (.27) ***	5.383	1.65 (.27) ***	5.210
Security	-.36 (0.15) *	.696	-.38 (.16) *	.684	-.25 (.22) *	.783	-.34 (.22) *	.713
<i>2. Demographics:</i>								
Age	-		.02 (.01) **	1.020	.05 (0.01) ***	1.051	.05 (0.01) ***	1.052
Gender	-		-0.957 (0.26) ***	0.384	-.92 (0.34) **	.397	-.94 (0.34) **	.390
<i>3. Professional:</i>								
Education	-		-		4.09 (0.64) ***	60.090	4.18 (0.66) ***	65.460
Occupation 1	-		-		3.55 (0.46) ***	34.740	3.46 (0.46) ***	31.954
Occupation 2	-		-		-1.56 (0.73) *	.210	-1.67 (0.75) *	.188
Occupation 3	-		-		-.74 (0.64)	.477	-.69 (0.65)	.504
Occupation 4	-		-		2.23 (0.66) ***	9.251	2.22 (0.67) ***	9.245
<i>4. Political Opportunity:</i>								
Prior Experience	-		-		-		1.06 (0.35) **	2.889
<i>Model Statistics:</i>								
Chi Square	261.59 ***		277.09 ***		513.72 ***		524.83 ***	
Cox & Snell R Squared	0.112		0.122		0.217		0.221	

Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

important to those same individuals by comparison to other basic values. This is evident from the results presented in sections I and II.

The results show that demographic variables are also, as expected, powerful predictors of being an MP. Each additional year of age in the sample population is associated here, for example, with a 5% increase in the likelihood of the participant being an MP. Gender also exerts a statistically significant effect: the odds ratios indicate that women are 2.5 times less likely than men to become an MP. Second to basic values, socialisation variables (education and occupation) are the strongest predictors of being an MP. In the first instance, the highly educated (those with postgraduate qualifications) are 65 times more likely to be an MP than those without any qualifications. Occupational experiences are also powerful predictors. Individuals working in Brokerage professions (now or previously) are, in particular, 32 times more likely than those in other professions to become an MP. Though weaker, a similar positive association can be seen between elected politics and 'helping professions' such as charity work and the emergency services. By contrast, individuals in manual or administrative professions are 4.5 times less likely as those in other professions to become an MP. Being in a public sector professional occupation such as teaching or medicine exerts a negative, yet not significant, effect on the outcome variable.

As rational choice theorists would anticipate, the results also show that individuals with prior experience of formal politics are almost 3 times more likely to be an MP than those without. However, by comparison with the effects other variables in this model, political opportunity structures appear to be helpful, yet insufficient, when it comes to explaining successful candidate emergence. The pseudo r-squared scores reported in Table 7.3 show that the amount of variance in the outcome variable explained by the predictors increases in each model cumulatively. That said, basic values jointly account for 11.2% of variance in the outcome variable, more than any other set of variables tested here. This supports the theoretical assumptions proposed in chapter 3: that a) personality characteristics act as a highly effective self-selective mechanism in political recruitment, and b) personality characteristics contribute as much or more weight to explanations of who enters elite politics as other individual differences or structural conditions.

The results presented in these regression models are testament to the hyper-selectivity of elite politics in the UK. Above all, these data show that basic values are - as in other occupational domains - highly predictive of career choice (Bourne and Jenkins, 2013; Knafo and Sagiv, 2004; Sagiv, 2002). On one hand, the strong associations found here between

Openness to Change values and political office are indicative of the creative, problem-solving nature of the job, as opposed to more programmatic and risk averse professions that tend to attract individuals high in Conservation values (Arieli and Tenne-Gazit, 2017). The predictive power of Stimulation values, in particular, suggests that this link is more affect-oriented than cognitive (associated with the explorative and investigative motivations of Self-Direction values); it is the desire for excitement, impulsiveness and diversity that attracts people to elite politics. On the other hand, these results also complement previous research demonstrating the link between Self-Transcendence values and 'calling' professions (Gandal et al., 2005). It would appear that citizens attracted to political office have an intense calling orientation and see elected politics as a vehicle through which to fulfil socially valuable work and obtain some level of self-actualisation.

A 'calling' orientation was also a common theme in the interview data. As interviewee 7 commented, '[w]hen I left school, I had this plan that I wanted to help people and that was kind of my aim in life.' For most interviewees, their decision to enter politics had been a value-laden one. There was, across nearly all interviewees, a sense of injustice or inequality that they perceived in the world around them and sought to correct through the political arena. One Labour MP expressed this sentiment in forceful terms:

I don't remember ever deciding to [enter politics], it was more that it felt very natural to do it... I think the world seemed an unfair place. I felt incredibly... Nothing else interested me, really. I felt that that was so urgent. That it was what one should devote one's life to doing. That was kind of in my late teens. I just, I don't know, I suppose I was just awakened. I had no idea why anyone would do anything else (Interviewee 8)

However, the prosocial side of politics as a vocation is juxtaposed against politics as a tribal, competitive, and (inside Parliament) hierarchical occupation. It is possibly not surprising, therefore, that the results presented in Table 7.3 show that individuals who attribute more importance to Power values are more likely to enter elite politics. This was captured neatly in the comments of one former Secretary of State:

I am ambitious and, luckily, not too worried about showing it, which is always helpful, I think. [...] I'm strongly of the view that politics is a collective process. However, being an MP is one of the more individualistic things that I've ever done in my life. You need to have quite a strong sense of self-belief and ambition in order to survive and be successful (Interviewee 5)

If politics per se attracts people with a calling orientation, then parliamentary politics in the UK also attracts individuals with an above-average level of enterprising interest (see also Holland, 1997). Given that basic values have been found to predict employee performance as

well as career choice, it may be that individuals scoring highest in Self-Enhancement values are necessarily those most adapted to survive and succeed once they enter Parliament.

Asked why they entered politics, interviewees also placed a great deal of emphasis on their education. In line with the results presented in Table 7.3, interviewees were particularly insistent that university life had presented them with a gateway for politics. As a former frontbench MP reflected:

I think I really started to get interested at university. I didn't get really involved in student politics but I know while I was at university, I remember, was the first time I actually went canvassing for the Labour Party in a general election (Interviewee 15)

Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative data presented here point to the powerful socialising effect of higher education on *future* politicians. This effect would seem to be as much about initiating individuals into political debate and thought as providing them with new opportunity structures to engage with formal institutions. The following interviewees typify this distinction:

[M]y political education really started at university. I went to university at a time of ferment, when people said you don't come to university to get a degree and a good job, you come to university to change the world (Interviewee 1)

I was at XXXX University and involved with student politics. I was President of the XXXX, the Student Representative Council, which is the Scottish equivalent, I suppose, of the Students' Union, and then became President of the XXXX. So, I was active in student politics, but I joined the Labour Party at the same time (Interviewee 12)

In addition, the interviews revealed limitations with the statistical analysis. They highlighted variables that were neither measured nor considered in the survey data. In particular, interviewees talked about the importance of familial connections with politics and, above all, about luck. In the first instance, it was apparent to a number of interviewees that their political ambitions, or at least their readiness for political participation as an adult, had been burnished by familial networks.

My idea of fun when I was a child was when election day came round, and I got to cycle backwards and forwards to the polling station and pick up the numbers, because my mum and dad were both actively involved as local councillors. So, I had a strong sense, from quite an early age, of debate and political process, and also, I suppose, was motivated by the idea that I could play a role in changing the way that things worked (Interviewee 5)

This would add weight to prior research indicating the link between individuals interested in running for political office and individuals whose parents had been politically active (Allen

and Cutts, 2018). Given that basic values are at their most flexible in childhood, it is possible that this level of early socialisation into politics shares a powerful interaction effect with them when it comes to predicting an individual's future political involvement. What survey data and statistical analysis cannot account for, however, is the role played by luck. On top of the self-selection for elite politics demonstrated in this thesis, there is also a long list of potentially uncontrollable variables - for example, the inclinations and preferences of party selectorates and the wider electorate, or the performance of party leaders - that may help a candidate to reach office. Interviewee 6 reflects upon one such series of events:

I looked at London, I was chair of the London Labour party then, and I looked at the map of London, saw boundary changes: two old seats had been put together near where I lived, where I had some contacts. I put my hat in the ring with 60 other people and managed to use the lesson that I'd learnt from Margaret Hodge and beat the other 59 people and got selected as a candidate and ended up here.

For others, their introduction to formal politics was far more coincidental and unplanned. Recalling a chance encounter with the Young Liberals in the basement bar of a hotel, one interviewee described the happenstance occasion that sparked their political career:

One of the young persons walked towards me and he said, "Excuse me, we are the Young Liberals." No idea what the Young Liberals was, I said, "What's your problem?" He said, "We can't get on with our meeting because we haven't got a quorum." I said, "What's a quorum?" He said, "We need four or five people to make a quorum." I said, "What do I have to do?" He said, "You pay half a crown," that was two shilling six pence, "and you're a member." I said, "Great," paying two shilling six pence, something to chat about and that was my introduction to the Liberal Democrats (Interviewee 11)

The data presented in this section are rich in both the breadth and depth of the insights they provide about elite political recruitment. The quantitative data indicate that personality - here measured using the Schwartz taxonomy of BHV - can significantly discriminate between 'who' enters Parliament and the motivations that they bring to the job (Hypothesis 1). Contra to previous studies (Allen and Cutts, 2018; Lawless, 2012; Schlesinger, 1966), it is argued that structural and socialisation variables, as well as political opportunity structures, do not inculcate political ambition but rather facilitate the expression of particular psychological motivations through the realm of politics. As such, future studies should study political ambition and political recruitment within a far more holistic approach, one that recognises the powerful explanatory purchase of personality characteristics.

IV. Professional Politicians and Claims of Careerism


The logistic regression models reported in section III indicated a strong association between brokerage professions (law, management consultancy, public relations, journalism and finance) and becoming an MP. This finding is broadly in line with prior research by Paul Cairney (2007, p.6), who argues that these professions provide the skills, resources and proximity to elite politics that are conducive to seeking election. Of the elite sample surveyed in this research project, 60% had previously worked in these professions (Table 7.4). Given that these occupations are generally used as proxy indicators of social grades A and B (NRS, 2016), these results would also seem to confirm comparative research on a) the amplifying effect of wealth upon political ambition (Allen and Cutts, 2018, p. 3) and b) the increasing exclusion of the working classes from elite politics (Evans and Tilley, 2015, 2017). However, there is a leap of abstract reasoning required to presume that these 'career' oriented professions, and the conveyor belt between their offices and Westminster, necessarily produce MPs of questionable moral fibre (Allen and Cairney, 2015). This final section of chapter 7 focuses on the effect of wealth and prior political employment to test derogative claims about 'career politicians' as a new breed of MP.

Table 7.4 Breakdown of Members of Parliament (n = 106) by previous occupation.

Occupational Group	Frequency (4 missing)	Percentage of Sample
1. Brokerage (e.g. law, finance, consultancy, public relations, journalism)	64	60
2. Public sector professionals (e.g. secondary or higher education teaching, medicine, public infrastructure design and management)	11	10
3. Manual (e.g. construction, engineering, amenities)	2	2
4. Administrative (e.g. secretary, personal assistant)	3	3
5. 'Helping' Professions (e.g. emergency services, charity sector, the Church)	17	16
6. Other	5	5

If MPs from brokerage backgrounds are, in fact, more self-interested and career oriented than their colleagues from 'real jobs' (cf. Lamont, 2014), then these differences should emerge in their BHV. However, an independent samples T-Test indicates no such trend (Figure 7.3). MPs from brokerage and non-brokerage professions share very similar value profiles. Although MPs who have worked in brokerage occupations score slightly higher for Self-Enhancement values, none of the differences seen between the higher order values of these groups are statistically significant. If MPs are not matching up to public expectations for ethical integrity (cf. Birch and Allen, 2015), this data would suggest that it is not because of their occupational homogeneity. Moreover, the relative proportion of MPs in this sample from 'helping' professions - and the predictive strength of this occupational category upon becoming an MP (see section III, Table 7.3) - runs counter-intuitive to the claim that elite politics is restricted to those with wealth or those *only* interested in the pursuit of wealth.

Figure 7.3 A comparison of MPs from brokerage (n = 64) and non-brokerage (n = 41) professions. Scores show centred mean ratings (rescaled 0-1) for MPs' higher order basic values.



Of equal if not greater concern for those studying and commenting on the professionalisation of politics has been the rise of the career politician (Allen, 2013; Cowley, 2012). Indeed, Cairney (2007) argues that the post-war period has seen a proliferation in the number of 'instrumental' jobs (from local councillor to party official, parliamentary staff to special advisor) that are of direct aid to election and, increasingly, occupy the majority of MPs' pre-parliamentary careers. In the present study, 76% of MPs surveyed (n = 80) had

worked in politics at some point before entering Parliament. The current sample ranged in their prior experience of politics from ‘none at all’ to elected office in local or devolved governments, working as a party researcher, Trade Union official, special adviser and party campaign manager. However, tests of difference revealed no statistically significant differences in BHV between those with and without pre-parliamentary political careers. The data also revealed no significant correlations between MPs' previous political experience and their basic values.

Adapting Cairney's (2007, p.6) categorisation of politics-facilitating professions, participants from ‘instrumental’ careers were split further between ‘elected’ and ‘non-elected’ subtypes. It was anticipated that those who had pursued elected office elsewhere might share substantive psychological motivations (i.e. to serve others through meaningful policy or, alternatively, to dominate policy resources) that are not necessarily served in other ‘political’ careers. The differences in BHV between these subgroups, though still not statistically significant, show interesting variation between those with non-elected political experience and the rest (Table 7.5). For example, the data indicate that non-elected instrumentals are actually more likely to seek risks, challenges and to innovate (Openness to Change values), and to be less concerned with conforming to traditional ways of thinking or acting (Conservation values). This suggests that ‘new’ pre-political careers inside the Westminster bubble - those that are *of politics* but do not carry elected responsibility - are potentially producing a different kind of MP. These trends warrant further research with a larger sample.

Table 7.5 Comparison of MPs’ basic values according to prior political experience.

Higher Order Values	Centred Mean Scores (S.E)		
	No Prior Political Occupation (n = 26)	Elected Instrumental Occupation (n = 44)	Non-Elected Instrumental Occupation (n = 36)
Openness to Change	- 0.071(0.11)	- 0.054 (0.09)	0.115 (0.09)
Self-Transcendence	0.896 (0.15)	1.017 (0.10)	1.067 (0.10)
Self-Enhancement	- 0.440 (0.14)	- 0.547 (0.13)	- 0.413 (0.13)
Conservation	- 0.232 (0.13)	- 0.260 (0.13)	- 0.551 (0.13)

The data presented here contradict assumptions made in the political class narrative about the careerism of MPs who have only ever worked in politics (Hypothesis 2). If they are desirous of personal gain, policy control, or wealth, this is not borne out in their basic values. If anything, they are just as committed to helping others and seeking equality for all groups (Self-Transcendence values) as their colleagues from 'normal' professions. Only two of the MPs interviewed disagreed with the principle of professionalisation and the idea, in particular, that MPs might only ever work in politics prior to election. However, these MPs were adamant that non-political careers provided more balanced representatives who were in tune with the zeitgeist of their electors.

I sound like a fuddy-duddy now but I think it's good to have done something else. To have what Dennis Healey used to call a "hinterland" [...] I was a mental health social worker for six years sectioning people in my twenties, which is something else, I can tell you. Then I was on the staff in XXXX of teaching various bits of social work and social policy, and law and stuff. It didn't actually change my political stance right left, as it were, but it gave me a huge insight into [...] what my constituents are struggling with. So, when I got here I think I was fully fledged (Interviewee 4)

The idea of building a community connection was a common theme among interviewees when discussing this topic. For the majority, political jobs provided aspiring MPs with far greater exposure to people's needs and indeed, the salient social, economic and political feelings of a time, than 'ordinary' occupations.

I'm not sure, actually, because you've had a life in politics, meeting ordinary people through campaigning, fighting elections, working with experts in lots of different fields, makes you any less qualified to stand up in Parliament and speak up on causes than if supposedly you've done something like, say, run one business for 20 years and then after 20 years of running a single business become an MP. It means as an MP you know an awful lot about that one business you've run, but not necessarily much else (Interviewee 13)

Contrary to accusations that career politicians might be out of touch, interviewees argued the exact opposite. For most, politics necessarily involved listening to people and getting to know their problems and their beliefs. Starting early was, therefore, not simply an advantage in terms of forging links with all types of people but it also produced more competent representatives when those individuals finally stood for office. Interviewee 8 - who had been both a councillor and a political researcher prior to entering Parliament - talked passionately about the effective foundations provided by her previous employment:

It all felt very familiar. Especially as well as being a researcher, being a councillor. It really helped, understanding how Whitehall worked, because you could make them work for you when you were trying to get stuff done as a constituency MP. You knew

who to speak to, you knew how the processes worked. I think it saved me a lot of time as junior minister having been a special adviser, because I knew how to operate within that system [...] I think that was unbelievably helpful, just made me more effective.

Taken together, the anecdotal evidence provided by interviewees and the quantitative data collected from all survey participants, suggests that career politicians are *not* substantively different in terms of their basic values than MPs without prior political employment. Alongside the results presented throughout this chapter, these findings have far-reaching implications for academic studies of elite politics and, in turn, the causes of psychologically-based anti-political rhetoric in the media and the public domain.

"[W]e're so keen to find fault – not just with our politicians but with our political system – that we very frequently forget, as citizens, that democracy is what we collectively make it. Casting stones at politicians, and diminishing the importance of the democracy in which we live, ultimately damages us all."

Labour MP (Interviewee 16)

P

psychological scrutiny of UK Representatives in an Age of Anti-Politics

The personalities of politicians are playing an ever more prominent role in political leadership around the world (Caprara and Silvester, 2018). This was particularly stark in both the US presidential election of 2016 and the UK General Election of 2017. In the latter, for example, voters compared the candidates as much on psychological characteristics as physical ones; the 'robotic' yet 'decisive' Theresa May was contrasted with the 'principled' yet 'weak' Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn (YouGov, 2017). A burgeoning literature has testified to the frequency with which voters are now using personality as a *human* yardstick for making judgements about political candidates (Bittner, 2014; Garzia, 2011; Stulp et al., 2013). However, most studies focus only on the voting public or are, where they introduce elite analysis, severely limited by at-a-distance methodologies and, in political science in particular, a reluctance to cross disciplinary boundaries (cf. Wyatt and Silvester, 2018). This thesis joins a select body of research that has managed to extract self-report data from politicians themselves, and is the only research project to obtain data on the Basic Human Values (BHV) of national politicians anywhere outside of Italy (Caprara et al., 2003).

This chapter builds on the results presented in chapter 7 to add more depth and nuance to the understanding of research question 1: how different are MPs, psychologically, to those they represent. The chapter is organised into two substantive sections, each of which has three sub-components. Section I interrogates the model of candidate emergence (Chapter 7, section III) in more detail, focusing in particular on the effects of age, gender and education upon the BHV of both MPs and the public. Section II then focuses on the interaction between partisanship and basic values in British politics. This section analyses data on basic values to a) understand psychological differences between MPs from different political parties, b)

delineate psychological representative links between MPs and their party's voters, and c) assess the psychological characteristics of those who disengage from formal politics. Where possible, qualitative evidence from 17 in-depth interviews with UK MPs is used to support quantitative analysis.

I. At the Intersections: Descriptive Representation of Multiple Publics

I have argued in this thesis that the legitimacy of Parliament, as a democratic institution, depends upon substantive policy responsiveness to the interests of all socio-demographic groups in the polity. However, existing research into democratic deficits has largely focused, instead, on the participative benefits generated among under-represented groups by the individual or collective presence of *descriptive* representatives (Childs and Cowley, 2011; Rocha et al., 2010; Uhlener and Scola, 2016). In order to add to the minority empowerment thesis and build a case for 'preferable descriptive representatives' (Dovi, 2002), this PhD analyses self-report data on the BHV of 106 MPs in the UK. This section divides this sample by age, gender and education in order to compare their psychological characteristics to corresponding groups in the general population (European Social Survey, 2014; N = 2154). A series of factorial ANOVA models is used to assess the extent to which MPs are more or less similar to one another in their basic values than the 'descriptive' sub-populations to which, either by nature or nurture, they are drawn from. In each model the participants' higher order values were analysed using two between-participant factors of status (MP vs. Public) and either gender (male vs. female), age (Under 50 vs. Over 50), or education (University Graduate vs. Pre-University Qualification).⁷⁰

a) Age

The first factorial ANOVA showed that the main effects of both status (Openness to Change, $F(1, 2254) = 11.22, p < 0.001$; Self-Transcendence, $F(1, 2254) = 16.94, p < 0.001$; Self-Enhancement, $F(1, 2254) = 24.6, p < 0.001$; Conservation, $F(1, 2254) = 60.92, p < 0.001$) and age (Openness to Change, $F(1, 2254) = 4.27, p < 0.05$; Self-Transcendence, $F(1, 2254) = 5.55, p < 0.05$; Self-Enhancement, $F(1, 2254) = 11.25, p < 0.001$; Conservation, $F(1, 2254) = 9.65, p < 0.01$) were unlikely to have arisen from sampling error. The F statistics are significant for both predictor variables, indicating that each has an effect upon an individual's basic values regardless of the other. Put another way, being an MP significantly predicts an individual's BHV (as per Chapter 7) and being over or under 50 years old also influences an

⁷⁰ Age categories were decided using the average age of participants in each of the samples as a cut-off point.

individual's BHV. However, the interactions between status and age were not significant, indicating that those over and under the age of 50 displayed similar variance in basic values within each status group.⁷¹ Together, these variables accounted for 18.7% (adjusted partial $\eta^2 = 0.187$) of the variance in participants' four higher order values.

Independent t-tests were conducted to explore these intra-group differences further (Table 8.1). The results show that amongst both MPs and the public, the over-50s are more motivated by justice, equality and caring for others (Self-Transcendence values). By comparison the under-50s are more open to risk and challenge (Openness to Change values), and also more motivated by success and power (Self-Enhancement values). At a between-groups level, the over-50s in the elite and public samples are significantly different on all four value factors, whereas the under-50s are only significantly different from one another for Self-Enhancement and Conservation values. This implies that MPs under the age of 50 in Parliament are more representative, psychologically, of their corresponding cohorts in the public than those over the age of 50. In particular, MPs over the age of 50 are far less motivated by traditions and maintaining social or religious order (Conservation values) than comparable age groups in the British public.

Table 8.1 Comparison of centred mean scores for MPs and the public by age (under-50 vs. over 50).

Mean Differences				
Basic Values	Public <i>Under-50 vs. Over-50</i>	MPs <i>Under-50 vs. Over-50</i>	Public <i>Under-50</i> vs. MPs <i>Under-50</i>	Public <i>Over-50</i> vs. MPs <i>Over-50</i>
Openness to Change	0.18 ***	0.07	- 0.14	- 0.26 ***
Self-Transcendence	- 0.07 *	- 0.21	- 0.17	- 0.32 ***
Self-Enhancement	0.3 ***	0.23	- 0.35 *	- 0.42 ***
Conservation	- 0.32 ***	- 0.08	0.38 ***	0.63 ***
N	2154	106	1057	1201

Two-tailed significance: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

⁷¹ The interaction for Conservation values approached significance: $F(1, 2254) = 3.75$, $p < 0.06$.


Physical changes that accompany the aging process have been shown to affect people's tolerance for risk and their capacity to comprehend and cope with large-scale change (e.g. Inceoglu et al., 2012). It is not surprising, therefore, that older participants in this study score higher for Conservation values in both the elite and public samples. However, this age differential is more muted (and not statistically significant) among MPs. Although the age categories used here are necessarily blunt to maximise the statistical power of the data, this result may also suggest that MPs are less susceptible to cohort effects (cf. Inglehart, 1997). If collective critical junctures can have an impact on the basic values of certain age cohorts (Schwartz, 2005) then such effects are not as easily discernible in elected politicians, whose personalities appear to be less different from one another than those of corresponding citizens at a similar age.



b) Gender

The second factorial model shows the main effects of status (Openness to Change, $F(1, 2254) = 12.27, p < 0.001$; Self-Transcendence, $F(1, 2254) = 31.06, p < 0.001$; Self-Enhancement, $F(1, 2254) = 26.87, p < 0.001$; Conservation, $F(1, 2254) = 76.01, p < 0.001$) and gender (Self-Transcendence, $F(1, 2254) = 8.91, p < 0.01$; Conservation, $F(1, 2254) = 7.72, p < 0.01$), as well as the interactions between them (Self-Enhancement, $F(1, 2254) = 15.12, p < 0.001$; Conservation, $F(1, 2254) = 14.67, p < 0.001$).⁷² This model accounted for 13.2% (adjusted partial $\eta^2 = 0.132$) of the overall variance in the four higher order values. The main effects are broken down further and illustrated in Figure 8.1. These results show that when one ignores the presence of gender, MPs and the public significantly differ across all higher order values (as per Chapter 7); when one ignores whether a participant is an MP, gender has a significant effect on two of the higher order values; and, finally, the interaction statistics show that the effect of gender on basic values is different among MPs and the general public.

⁷² The main effects of gender on Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement values were not significant; the interactions between status and gender for Openness to Change and Self-Transcendence values were not significant.

Figure 8.1 Two-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA): plots to show the effects of status (MP vs. Public) and gender (male vs. female) on four higher order basic values.





A series of additional independent samples t-tests adds nuance to these results (Table 8.2). The data presented above and below show that - apart from Self-Transcendence values - men and women MPs show inverted differences in basic values by comparison with men and women in the general population. Women MPs are, for example, more self-motivated and curious to try new things (Openness to Change values) and more ambitious to succeed and gain recognition (Self-Enhancement values), than male MPs. However, these differences were not statistically significant in the present sample. By contrast, men and women in the general population differed across all four value factors to a high degree of statistical significance (Table 8.2). Unlike their parliamentary counterparts, women in the general population sample were less motivated than men by the need for creativity, autonomy, excitement and pleasure (Openness to Change values) and by the need for prestige, social status and demonstrating their competence (Self-Enhancement values). Yet as with women MPs, women in the general population sample *were* more motivated than men by understanding, appreciating, and protecting others (Self-Transcendence values). The last of these findings complements prior research on the heightened psychological need for communal affiliation among women (Chodorow, 1990) and the impact of socialisation variables in childhood upon women's BHV (Schwartz, 2005).

These findings are also extremely informative at a between groups level: supplementary t-tests show that women MPs differ significantly in their basic values to women in the public on all four value factors, whereas male MPs only do so for two. This would suggest that male MPs are psychologically more representative - in terms of BHV - of men in the general public than women MPs are of women. As with age, these data show that the differences in basic values (by gender) are greater between MPs and their corresponding cohorts in the public than within either group (Hypothesis 3). This finding is significant given that the political class narrative often collapses to complaints about failures of descriptive representation (in that politicians do not look like the people they represent) and failures of substantive representation (in that politicians are out of touch with popular interests) (Allen and Cairney, 2015).

Table 8.2 Comparison of centred mean scores for MPs and the public by gender (male vs. female).

Mean Differences				
Basic Values	Public <i>Men vs. Women</i>	MPs <i>Men vs. Women</i>	Public <i>Men vs.</i> MPs <i>Men</i>	Public <i>Women</i> <i>vs. MPs Women</i>
Openness to Change	0.09 ***	- 0.11	- 0.10	- 0.31 ***
Self- Transcendence	- 0.22 ***	- 0.12	- 0.37 ***	- 0.26 **
Self- Enhancement	0.24 ***	- 0.35	- 0.10	- 0.69 ***
Conservation	- 0.07 **	0.43	0.31 ***	0.81 ***
N	2154	106	1043	1215

Two-tailed significance: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Within the parliamentary sample, it seems appropriate that these findings be placed, for example, within the context of Westminster's enduring gender imbalance. Although all-women shortlists and parliamentary reforms to working hours and childcare have greatly improved gender parity in Parliament, the institutional fabric of formal and informal parliamentary politics remains overwhelmingly masculine (Campbell et al., 2010). Not enough has been done to challenge an historical culture of male dominance and corresponding exploitation of women MPs (Meakin, 2017). In a report on the representativeness of the House of Commons, the All Party Parliamentary Group on Women in Parliament (2014, p.26) noted: 'You see pictures of men on the walls; you see statues of men lining the corridors; you see men everywhere'.

In this context, the findings presented here indicate the strength, or at least style, of character needed by female candidates. The results indicate that women MPs are governed by less concern for stable or harmonious social relations than their male colleagues; they are more confident when it comes to violating social expectations and norms; and they are more independent than male MPs. These characteristics are arguably appropriate for anyone entering politics but especially so for women, who require extraordinary resilience and ambition to overcome the effects of generalised political socialisation patterns and to succeed in a highly gendered working environment.

Whilst it is clear that women MPs differ from their male colleagues and bring different values to their job, it is not clear that these values align with women in the general population. In fact, on all higher order value factors, women MPs in this sample were significantly different from women in the public. This would suggest that, from a psychological perspective, women are not descriptively represented in Parliament and – given that basic values inform particular behaviours (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003) and political attitudes (Leimgruber, 2011) – the increasing number of women MPs in the UK Parliament may not be impacting as much as assumed on women’s substantive representation. Such a claim would require more extensive research of individual patterns of behaviour, especially since it runs contrary to prior research showing distinct policy preferences among women legislators for issues concerning women, health, education, family care and equality (Childs and Krook, 2008; Dodson, 2006). However, these gender differences in policy preferences may be skewed due to the unequal success of parties on the Left in recruiting women candidates (Best and Vogel, 2018, p.351). Of the 36 women MPs recruited in this study, 22 were, for example, members of the Labour Party. The unequal ratios of men:women within parliamentary parties may, given the differences in basic values presented above, inhibit the advances made in descriptive representation when it comes to the substantive representation of *all* women in Parliament.


As Anne Phillips (1995, p.157) rightly argues, ‘the presumption that all women or all black people share the same preferences and goals, [...] is clearly - and dangerously – erroneous.’ Indeed, I am conscious that the research here is not used to argue for undesirable constraints on the behaviour or beliefs of members of any historically under-represented group. Rather this discussion builds on the work of Suzanne Dovi (2002, p.738), who has argued for preferable descriptive representatives who share mutual relationships and aims with dispossessed subgroups in the population. If women politicians are more significantly outside the normal distribution for women in the population (psychologically) than their colleagues in historically dominant groups (i.e. white men), then Dovi’s criteria for group representation raise important questions about the inequalities of political recruitment to Parliament. I do not seek to undermine the advances made in gender equality in elite politics, but rather to highlight how much more needs to be done in this area of policy and scholarship. As discussed elsewhere (see, for example, Lovenduski, 2015), the blame here must lie with both Parliament and political parties (as the organisations responsible for candidate selection and outreach) for not committing to supply-side reforms that improve institutional access and



incentives for equal political participation by 'ordinary' members of all under-represented groups.


c) Education

The comprehensive model of candidate emergence tested in chapter 7 (section III) revealed a positive relationship between educational attainment - specifically university education - and becoming an MP. However, those results did not explain whether or not education per se had an effect on participants' BHV and whether or not these effects were consistent across MPs and the public. A two-way ANOVA indicates that the main effects of status were, as expected, highly significant (Self-Transcendence, $F(1, 2254) = 12.59$, $p < 0.001$; Self-Enhancement, $F(1, 2254) = 5.93$, $p < 0.001$; Conservation, $F(1, 2254) = 12.19$, $p < 0.001$). Similarly, education (whether or not someone acquired a university qualification) influenced both Openness to Change values ($F(1, 2254) = 5.15$, $p < 0.05$) and Conservation values ($F(1, 2254) = 11.26$, $p < 0.001$). However, the interactions between status and education were not statistically significant, indicating that educational attainment had a similar effect on basic values among both the elite and public sample. In total, this model accounted for 10% (adjusted partial $\eta^2 = 0.099$) of the overall variance in the four higher order values. The main effects are broken down and illustrated in Figure 8.2.

Figure 8.2 Two-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA): plots to show the effects of status (MP vs. Public) and education (university graduate vs. pre-university qualifications) on four higher order basic values.







These results are directly comparable to prior research by Schwartz (2005, p.14) that highlights positive associations between Self-Direction values and education, and negative associations between the latter and Security, Conformity and Tradition values. Although basic values have proven to be remarkably stable after adolescence in large-N samples around the world (Schwartz, 1992, 2005), these results would suggest an important socialising effect in young adulthood for university students. Given that a disproportionate number of MPs attended independent secondary schools (34% of the current sample) and went on to gain graduate or post-graduate qualifications (89% of the current sample), it is expected that these effects might be amplified in Parliament.

Table 8.3 Comparison of centred mean scores for MPs and the public by education (university graduate vs. pre-university qualifications).

Mean Differences				
Basic Values	Public <i>Uni vs. Pre-Uni</i>	MPs <i>Uni vs. Pre-Uni</i>	Public <i>Pre-Uni</i> vs. MPs <i>Pre-Uni</i>	Public <i>Uni</i> vs. MPs <i>Uni</i>
Openness to Change	- 0.09 **	- 0.28	0.03	- 0.17 **
Self-Transcendence	- 0.08 **	0.07	- 0.36 *	- 0.21 ***
Self-Enhancement	- 0.15 ***	- 0.14	- 0.26	- 0.25 **
Conservation	0.26 ***	0.33	0.27	0.34 ***
	2154	106	1617	642

Two-tailed significance: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

The main effects illustrated in Figure 8.2 are supported by the results of a series of independent samples T-tests (Table 8.3).⁷³ Focusing solely on those participants who went to university, the differences presented in Table 8.3 show that the basic values of MPs and the public remain significantly different. MPs who went to university score much higher for Openness to Change values, Self-Transcendence values, and Self-Enhancement values than graduates in the general population, and much lower for Conservation values. If educational attainment may help to explain who enters politics (via the opportunity structures provided at university), these results imply that future parliamentary candidates still remain outside the personality norms of their peers. Given the links between basic values and political attitudes/behaviours (Leimgruber, 2011; Vecchione et al., 2015), these data suggest that shared social backgrounds (i.e. university education) will not necessarily produce shared common interests and not, thus, decrease the likelihood of agency loss (cf. Pitkin, 1967). Congruence between the educational experiences of principals and agents may, given the findings presented here, make it easier to communicate and/or justify political decisions (Gay, 2002), but it is not possible to assume fixed vertical links between the preferences of university graduates and the majority of MPs. Similarly, the accusation that MPs are affiliated

⁷³ Given that only 14 of the MPs in the present sample did not go to university, it is difficult to draw robust conclusions about their basic values by comparison to other sub-groups in this analysis.

to elite social groups (i.e. the university educated and the wealthy) and, by virtue of these backgrounds, share values, cognitions or dispositions that make them 'out of touch' with the majority, is weaker when these results are considered (cf. Bovens and Wille, 2017).

II. Basic Values and Partisanship

Research into principal-agent relations has long contested whether the principals' interests and preferences are cause or consequence of the political process (Best and Vogel, 2018). In the former interpretation, principals select agents who appear most able and trustworthy to convert their fixed and exogenous interests into policy (Stimson et al., 1995) and in the latter interpretation, elites enjoy wide autonomy from their principals and influence popular thought by offering competing political preferences (Körösényi, 2018). The results presented in the previous chapter and section I of this chapter have shown that a) principals are driven by a different hierarchy of psychological motivations than their agents, and b) that they are more similar to one another in these motivations than their corresponding socio-demographic groups in the general population. Whether researchers assume a populist model, in which democratic legitimacy is secured by agent responsiveness, or a trustee model in which it is exclusively assured by elite accountability, these findings have far reaching significance. In the populist model, these data imply that elites are forced to curtail their own psychological drives in order to tailor policies that fit, *ex ante*, a popular electoral mandate; in the trustee model, they suggest that MPs might be more inclined to anticipate citizens preferences and, *ex post*, mould and manipulate them to suit their own value valences when it comes to policy-making. This section now turns to examine whether these results are sustained when elites are broken down by partisan affiliation. Findings are examined horizontally between MPs of different parties and vertically to reveal the extent to which party leaders and followers converge in their BHV.

a) Elite Comparisons

A series of correlations was run to test the relationship between, in particular, the four most represented parties in the current elite sample (106 UK MPs) and the ten lower order basic values (Table 8.4, below). The results reveal opposing trends between parties on the Left and the Right. In particular, Labour Party membership correlated significantly and positively with Universalism values, Self-Direction values, and Power values, and correlated negatively with Conservation values. By contrast, Conservative Party membership correlated positively and significantly with Conservation values, and negatively with Self-Transcendence values. These results are reinforced by the correlations between MPs' social

and economic ideology (as measured on two Left-Right scales of 0-10) and each value factor. Again, those scoring to the Right and Left on both measures are differentiated, in particular, by inverse relationships with Conservation and Self-Transcendence values.⁷⁴

A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that these correlations translate into stark differences between the basic values of MPs according to left- and right-wing party affiliations, replicating the congruency principle developed in previous research with politicians in Italy (Caprara et al, 2012). Although the numbers of MPs sampled from smaller parties makes statistical comparison difficult, the trends in the data reveal, for example, that Labour, SNP and - to a lesser extent - Liberal Democrat MPs scored significantly higher for Self-Transcendence values than their Conservative colleagues. These results reflect the ideological foundations of the UK's centre-left parties, in particular their strong advocacy of social welfare and the ideal of 'a fair, free and open society, in which we seek to balance the fundamental values of liberty, equality and community' (Liberal Democrat Constitution, 2013). By contrast, Conservative MPs scored higher for Conservation values, again in line with the Party's historic ideological roots in social and economic hierarchy (Dorey, 2011). The data reinforce conclusions drawn in chapter 7 that personality acts as both an internal selection criterion for candidates who are drawn to parties with a shared set of values, and as an external criterion by which party-specific selection mechanisms favour or disfavour candidates in the recruitment process (Hypothesis 1).

⁷⁴ Labour MPs scored an average of 3.3 for economic ideology and 2.4 for social ideology. Conservative MPs scored an average of 7.3 for economic ideology and 5.7 for social ideology.


Table 8.4 Partial correlation matrix of Basic Human Values and Members of Parliament (n = 106) from different UK political parties.

	Conformity	Tradition	Benevolence	Universalism	Self-Direction	Stimulation	Hedonism	Achievement	Power	Security
Labour (n - 49)	-.267 ***	-.446 ***	.152	.293 **	.258 **	.102	.160	.024	.225 *	-.166
Conservative (n - 33)	.314 ***	.452 ***	-.242 *	-.410 ***	-.257 **	-.060	-.174	-.024	-.111	.164
Liberal Democrat (n - 5)	-.124	-.127	-.101	.058	.022	-.155	-.027	.264 **	.099	.082
Scottish National Party (n - 10)	-.098	-.054	.074	.206 *	.005	-.005	.095	-.024	-.052	-.085
Other (n - 8)	.159	.210 *	.138	-.108	-.057	.043	-.079	-.190	-.250 **	.054
Social Ideology (Left - 0 Right - 10)	.356 ***	.568 ***	-.273 ***	-.634 ***	-.410 ***	-.091	-.164	.067	-.052	.201 *
Economic Ideology (Left - 0 Right - 10)	.243 *	.403 ***	-.194 *	-.512 ***	-.266 **	.033	-.075	.057	-.093	.105

Two-tailed significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

In prior research on the value convergence of party members, Caprara et al. (2006, p.2) argue that personal values ‘are the crucial grounding of ideology’ (see also Leimgruber, 2011). Prior research on the links between basic values, ideology and partisanship (Davidov et al., 2008; Steenbergen and Leimgruber, 2010) are complemented in the data presented below (Figure 8.3). Labour Party MPs attribute greater importance to a broad world view based on equal access to social welfare and justice (Universalism values), whilst also being more motivated by independent thought and action (Self-Direction values). Conversely Conservative MPs are more authoritarian, placing more importance on discipline, customs and traditions, personal and national security (Conservation values).

Figure 8.3 Comparison of lower order basic values for Labour MPs (n = 49) and Conservative MPs (n = 33). Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences in this sample.



These differences were also borne out by in-depth interviews with elite participants. In particular, it was clear for a number of MPs that their respective affiliations to political parties had been motivated by personal value judgements. One former Labour frontbench MP recalled:

I got to know a South African student [at University] quite well. He was a black South African student who had come on a sort of scholarship. Just talking to him about the realities of apartheid really opened my eyes to some of what was going on in the world. I suppose I felt back then there were things that needed to change. Which party most fitted? It was Labour (Interviewee 15)

For these MPs, there was a tendency to talk of personal priorities, interests and motivations in party terms, and vice versa. Older interviewees, in particular, and those in the Labour party

especially, reflected very clearly on the values of their colleagues and the political manifestos that were produced from value calculations:

Wealth is power. We see now what I was saying to you earlier, where the real power lies in the establishment, where the mega-corporations, the newspaper barons, the hedge fund managers, that's where all the power is. I think it's only radical parties, like the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party, the German Social Democratic Party that ultimately can do something about it (Interviewee 12)

Other MPs were more pragmatic, acknowledging a diversity of opinion within each political party. However, even these interviewees were adamant about the ideological differences between the two main parties and the need to join one side of a dividing line:

I think politics is about coalitions. In that each political party is a coalition and we live in a two-party country, pretty much, so you need to accept that and you know, work out which side you're on. And that there are good reasons for wanting your side to win (Interviewee 8)

Subject to further investigation and analysis, these results contradict much of the work done in recent decades on mass, catch-all (e.g. Kirchheimer, 1966) and cartel (Katz and Mair, 2009) theses of party competition. The arguments routinely stated - that ideological conflicts between parties have become little more than amorphous differences in Left-Right orientations – are not reflected in the basic values of MPs within UK parties. Richard Katz and Peter Mair's (2009, p.758) claim that 'party psychological identification' has declined does not hold at the elite level. In light of the findings in this article, future research might address these contradictions by focusing on a) the dissonance between the beliefs of individual MPs and party manifestos; b) the value trade-offs caused by professionalization processes (e.g. salaries), which encourage MPs and parties to shy away from ideologically driven campaigns and focus on the 'reasonably anticipated minimum pay-off' (Katz and Mair, 2009, p.758); and c) the centralisation of party organisations that distances the leadership from those below and thus transforms party representation from an ideological loyalty to one of employment.

b) Leaders and Followers


A two-way ANOVA (status and partisanship) was conducted to investigate the congruence between MPs on the Left and Right and their corresponding partisans in the general population. To maximise the statistical power of the data - and based on the similarities identified in Table 8.4 - parties on the left of centre (Labour, SNP, Liberal Democrat) and on the right of centre (Conservatives, Democratic Unionist Party, Ulster



Unionist Party) were grouped together. The elite sample as well as the ESS sample of the general population, as used in chapter 7 and section I, were grouped in the same way. The partisanship of the public sample was based on participants' last recorded vote, which in this case was the UK's 2010 General Election. After excluding all participants who did not vote in the election, 1342 participants remained. These voters were reasonably well split between those on the Left (738) and the Right (604).

The analysis showed that the main effect of being an MP was, as per discussions in chapter 7, highly significant for all higher order values (Openness to Change, $F(1, 1445) = 11.55$, $p < 0.001$; Self-Transcendence, $F(1, 1445) = 7.38$, $p < 0.01$; Self-Enhancement, $F(1, 1445) = 26.81$, $p < 0.001$; Conservation, $F(1, 1445) = 47.21$, $p < 0.001$). Regardless of whether someone was an MP, partisanship also exerted a significant influence on three of the four higher order values (Openness to Change, $F(1, 1445) = 10.32$, $p < 0.001$; Self-Transcendence, $F(1, 1445) = 51.00$, $p < 0.001$; Conservation, $F(1, 1445) = 78.48$, $p < 0.001$). The interactions between the two variables were also significant, indicating differences in the effect of partisanship upon basic values in each status group (Openness to Change, $F(1, 1445) = 4.04$, $p < 0.05$; Self-Transcendence, $F(1, 1445) = 13.59$, $p < 0.001$; Conservation, $F(1, 1445) = 27.57$, $p < 0.001$). This model accounted for 21% (adjusted partial $\eta^2 = 0.209$) of the overall variance in participants' higher order basic values. There are a number of relevant inferences to be made from this data.

Of particular note, the main effect of partisanship (unlike gender or age) was equally strong or in excess of status for three of the four higher order values, indicative of the antecedent relationship between basic values, ideology and party allegiance (Leimgruber, 2011). At first glance, these results also reinforce the findings presented in chapter 7: that Self-Enhancement values are particularly different among MPs than the general population. Self-Enhancement values were the only higher order value factor affected substantially more by status than partisanship in this model. This would suggest that, regardless of ideology or party preferences, people who become MPs are more ambitious and desirous of control. On the other hand, partisanship had a particularly strong effect on participants' Self-Transcendence and Conservation values, indicative of the differences already reported above between elites on the Left and Right. These findings are illustrated in a series of plots (Figure 8.4).

Figure 8.4 Two-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA): plots to show the effects of status (MP vs. Public) and partisanship (Centre Left vs. Centre Right) on four higher order basic values.





The interactions between these variables show that there are not only substantive differences in basic values between MPs and the public, and between those on the Left and Right, but that those on the Left and Right also display significant psychological differences within each status group. Independent samples t-tests were conducted to investigate these differences further and to rule out sampling error (Table 8.5, below). The results confirm significant differences across three out of four higher order values within each status group, and these differences run in the same direction. For example, the Left are more receptive to change (Openness to Change values), more committed to equality, care and support for others (Self-Transcendence values), and less motivated by preserving rules, traditions and stability (Conservation values). Whilst wary of the difference in sample sizes, the data show that these differences are more exaggerated in the MP sample than the public, supporting prior research that has shown greater polarisation among elites than publics around the Western world (e.g. Sood and Iyengar, 2014). The interactions of the variables also suggest that it makes a distinct psychological difference to both be on the Left and to be an MP. Whilst MPs on the Right only differ significantly from their supporters on one higher order value factor, MPs on the Left differ significantly from their supporters on all four factors.

Table 8.5 Comparison of centred mean scores for MPs and the public by partisanship (Centre-Left (CL) vs. Centre-Right (CR)).

Mean Differences				
Basic Values	Public <i>CL vs. CR</i>	MPs <i>CL vs. CR</i>	Public <i>CL</i> vs. MPs <i>CL</i>	Public <i>CR</i> vs. MPs <i>CR</i>
Openness to Change	0.07 *	0.31 ***	- 0.32 ***	- 0.08
Self- Transcendence	0.20 ***	0.61 ***	- 0.36 ***	- 0.06
Self- Enhancement	- 0.01	0.27	- 0.54 ***	- 0.26 *
Conservation	- 0.23 ***	- 0.90 ***	0.77 ***	0.10

Two-tailed significance: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Of the sub-group variables tested, partisanship is the only one that revealed greater mean differences in basic values within the political class than between the political class and

the public (Hypothesis 3). Close inspection of value differences at a between-groups level shows that the congruency principle (Caprara and Zimbardo, 2004) appears to hold on the Right but not the Left in the samples used in this study. Whilst politicians and voters on the Right were congruent and statistically similar in their value orientations, politicians and voters on the Left were statistically different. This provides a nuanced picture of the leader-follower match previously researched by scholars like David Winter (1987). On the ideological Right, it would seem that basic values, as part of a reflexive and purposive system of personality, help people to make political choices consistent with the basic principles that guide their lives. Thus there is psychological congruence between leaders and followers. On the ideological Left, the leader-follower match fails in this study. This may reflect the broader ideological space on the Left and the challenge facing centre-Left parties, particularly Labour, who must bridge support from small-c conservatives, cosmopolitan liberals, and democratic socialists in the public. The incongruence between politicians and voters on the Left also suggests a greater need for self-presentation strategies in order to secure core votes. Thus MPs on the Left have a greater incentive, in an age of telegenic personality politics, to convey an altered impression of their personal motives that conforms either to those attributes perceived to be most important to the electorate, or to party policy. This need for cognitive dissonance in the presentation of personality may explain both the successes and failures of the Left in the last 100 years; the attitudes of Corbyn and Blair make an interesting comparison in this respect. These results will be discussed in more depth in chapter 11.


c) Non-Voters

The results presented so far in this section have illustrated distinct differences between the basic values of those on the Left and the Right of politics, differences that are sustained to a greater extent among political elites. However, I am also interested in understanding the role of personality, and specifically basic values, in contemporary political disengagement. Chapter 5 of this thesis argued that the personalised nature of modern political consumption underpins *everyday* assessments of politicians that heighten or lower valences on the act of voting. If non-voters *do* disengage for reasons grounded in their own basic values and their value judgements about politicians, then it might be expected that a) non-voters exhibit differences in BHV to other voters, and that b) non-voters are more different to MPs in terms of their BHV than voters.

To test the first of these assumptions, an ANOVA between voters and non-voters in the general public was conducted using the ESS 2014 general population sample for Britain.

The voting population remained split between those on the Left and Right, in order to identify the ideological affinities of those who disengage (Figure 8.6). The results show that non-voters attribute less importance to Conservation values than voters on the Right and less importance to Self-Transcendence values than voters on the Left. In terms of the main psychological divisions illustrated between the Left and Right (see above), these results would suggest that non-voters are no more or less similar to either ideological bloc of the voting public. However, the data *do* show that non-voters differ from both voting groups in terms of their Self-Enhancement values. More so than either voters on the Left or Right, non-voters attribute relatively more importance to social power, authority and self-respect.

Figure 8.6 Comparison of lower order basic values for voters on the Left (n = 738), voters on the Right (n = 604) and non-voters (n = 812) in the UK 2010 General Election.



Note: * - Non-voters significantly different to both voting groups ($p < 0.05$); † - Non-voters significantly different to voters on the Left ($p < 0.05$); x - Non-voters significantly different to voters on the Right ($p < 0.05$).

Having ascertained that non-voters differ from the voting public in terms of the relative importance they attribute to a variety of personal goals and motivations, a logistic regression was conducted to assess the impact of these differences upon turnout.⁷⁵ In order to

⁷⁵ **Dependent variable Turnout:** 1 = Did not vote; 0 = Voted.
Independent variables: Basic Human Values (Conformity, Tradition, Security, Benevolence, Universalism, Self-Direction, Stimulation, Power) = centred means scores rescaled 0-1; **Age** = continuous data rescaled 0-1; **Gender** (Dummy) = 1 - Female, 0 - Male; **Education** = 1 - No qualifications, 2 - Apprenticeship, 3 - A-Levels/Vocational Diploma, 4 - Bachelor's Degree, 5 - Postgraduate Degree; **Occupation 1** (Dummy) = 1 -

avoid multi-collinearity between the lower order basic values, Self-Direction and Hedonism values were dropped as predictor variables in the model.⁷⁶ Control variables were included for socio-demographic factors such as age, gender, education and occupation as well as ideology. The results are presented in Table 8.6.⁷⁷ The data show that of all the variables included in the model, only Power values and Stimulation values were statistically significant predictors of *not* voting. For the purpose of the present investigation, these data suggest that personality plays an important role in discriminating between those who engage with formal politics and those who do not.

The results also show a highly significant relationship between age and voting, testifying to a large literature on youth turnout (e.g. Sloam, 2014). In this sample, the oldest participants were 25 times more likely to vote than the youngest ($\exp(b) = .04$). Other significant predictors included occupation: individuals in manual and administrative jobs or public sector professional vocations were roughly a third more likely to vote than those in other occupations. Educational attainment had a large impact on turnout; the odds ratio indicates that those with postgraduate qualifications were almost twice as likely to vote than those with no qualifications at all. With basic values included in the model, the effects of ideology were weak and non-significant.

These results may have far-reaching significance for the study of anti-politics in the UK. They suggest that those who are most motivated by excitement, novelty and variation (Stimulation values) and ascribe most importance to social recognition, wealth and authority (Power values) are more than 3 times more likely *not* to vote than citizens who are least motivated by these values. In the first instance, it is possible that citizens high in Stimulation values are not energised by contemporary politics. For people whose typical behaviours might, necessarily, involve more unconventional activities than the average citizen (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003), politics may seem anything but unconventional. This judgement may apply as much to the people *doing* politics as its conduct. A parliamentary population of

Brokerage professions (e.g. law, finance, consultancy, public relations), 0 - Other occupation; **Occupation 2** (Dummy) = 1 - Manual or administrative professions (e.g. construction, public amenities, personal assistant, secretary), 0 - Other occupation; **Occupation 3** (Dummy) = 1 - Public sector professionals (e.g. teacher, doctor, lecturer, civil servant), 0 - Other occupation; **Occupation 4** (Dummy) = 1 - 'Helping' professions (e.g. third sector charity or NGO, emergency services), 0 - Other occupation; **Ideology** = Continuous scale from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right)

⁷⁶ This decision was made on the basis that Self-Direction values were not significantly different between voters and non-voters, and Hedonism values only differed slightly. More than 8 values in any one regression model risks skewing the results and producing inaccurate findings.

⁷⁷ Variables have been rescaled from 0-1 and odds ratios are reported for ease of interpretation.

Table 8.6 Logistic regression model to test the effect of basic values on political disengagement in the UK.

Variable	Turnout (not voting in 2010 General Election)	
	B(S.E.)	Exp(B)
<i>1. Basic Values:</i>		
Conformity	.146 (.43)	1.157
Tradition	-.005 (.49)	.995
Benevolence	-.326 (.51)	.722
Universalism	-.495 (.66)	.610
Stimulation	.929 (.49) *	2.531
Achievement	.375 (.48)	1.455
Power	1.322 (.48) **	3.752
Security	.565 (.43)	1.759
<i>2. Demographics:</i>		
Age	-3.159 (.28) ***	.042
Gender	.168 (.12)	1.183
<i>3. Socialisation:</i>		
Education	-.556 (.17)***	.573
Occupation 1	-.267 (.24)	.768
Occupation 2	-.428 (.15) **	.652
Occupation 3	-.344 (.17) *	.709
Occupation 4	.055 (.29)	1.057
<i>4. Ideology:</i>		
Left-Right (0-10)	-.011 (.03)	.990
<i>Model Statistics:</i>		
Chi Square		256.008 ***
Cox & Snell R Squared		0.132


Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

disproportionately white, older, male figures in business attire is unlikely to inspire someone who is easily turned off by the mundane or stereotypical.

In the second instance, those citizens high in Power values may be the most likely to disengage when they cannot perceive their own influence in politics. For these citizens, there needs to be a tangible benefit to their daily behaviours (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003). Thus the inability to engage with politics at a local or national level and the staid nature of political processes, let alone the sclerotic pace of political change, may antagonise a psychological need for control and influence that is higher than in the average citizen. Citizens high in Power values may, therefore, be far less likely to engage in the act of voting if they perceive that act as one in which they a) give up control to others to make change on their behalf, or b) confer a mandate on politicians who fail to deliver.

The corollary of both of these interpretations involves personal judgements about politicians who fail to meet the same psychological standards - or trans-situational goals - by which certain citizens govern their own daily lives. These claims are hypothetical (see Chapter 5) but may be supported by comparing non-voters to MPs. An independent samples t-test shows that non-voters differ significantly from MPs on eight lower order value factors (all except Achievement and Hedonism), whereas voters only differ from MPs significantly across six (except Self-Direction, Conformity, Achievement and Hedonism). These differences are illustrated in more nuance in Figure 8.7, which compares non-voters to MPs on the Left and Right for all four higher order value factors. An ANOVA comparing these three sub-groups confirms the trends revealed in Figure 8.7: non-voters are significantly different from MPs on the Left in terms of their Openness to Change values ($F(2, 916) = 6.273, p < 0.01$), Self-Transcendence values ($F(2, 916) = 38.811, p < 0.001$), Self-Enhancement values ($F(2, 916) = 5.239, p < 0.01$) and Conservation values ($F(2, 916) = 50.807, p < 0.001$). By contrast, the differences between non-voters and MPs on the Right were much smaller and none reached statistical significance. If voters seek congruent personalities in elite politics and vote accordingly (see Caprara et al., 2003), these findings suggest that non-voters are more likely to be re-engaged by politicians on the Right than the Left. The implications of these results will be discussed in detail in chapter 11.

Figure 8.7 Comparison of higher order values (centred mean scores) across MPs on the Left, MPs on the Right, and non-voters in the British public.



The results presented in this chapter contribute to the existing understanding of representative parliamentary politics in the UK at a number of levels. Firstly, these findings illustrate that the political class are not only extraordinary in the trans-situational goals and motivations that they bring to the job of politics, but that this psychological disjuncture is wider still between MPs and a range of socio-demographic sub-groups in the population than it is between MPs of differing backgrounds and socialisation experiences. Thus these data provide a new lens through which to study democratic deficits in UK politics and demand further research. Moreover, this chapter has operationalised a unique data set to a) complement prior research around the world on the psychological differences between those on the Left and Right of politics, b) expose a significant contrast in the psychological affinities of elites and voters on the Left and Right, and c) identify a number of psychological characteristics underpinning formal disengagement from politics. Given that issues of partisan dealignment and political participation are current in the study and practice of politics, these findings will likely be of interest to scholars and practitioners around the UK and beyond.

"I have no idea and I quite often wonder this, how people that are kind of 40 years my senior manage to do this because I regularly miss meals, I don't get nearly enough sleep, I do an incredible amount of travelling on aeroplanes, which are not the healthiest kind of way to travel. I don't understand how people who are much older than me can manage to put themselves through this, just even physically, if nothing else."

Scottish National Party MP (Interviewee 7)

Personal Choices, Political Behaviours

Members of Parliament (MPs) operate with unparalleled pressure from role alters inside and outside of Westminster, as well as formal constraints in the parliamentary process. Together, these expectations and the 'rules of the game' provide an institutional map that MPs must navigate in order to fulfil their representative function (Kwiatkowski, 2012; Wright, 2010). Yet studies of elite political behaviour in the UK Parliament and abroad are severely limited by their substantive preoccupation with crisis management and, in particular, their inability to extract data from political elites (e.g. Winter, 2011; Jost et al., 2013). So far I have operationalised a unique data set on 106 UK MPs to demonstrate that they are, by comparison to their electors, psychologically unique in terms of their Basic Human Values (BHV). However, public dissatisfaction with British politics often reduces to internalised preconceptions about the immorality or corruption of MPs' political *behaviour* in Parliament (Bowler and Karp, 2004; Birch and Allen, 2015). In order to understand a) how MPs interpret and respond to the formal and informal institutions of elite politics, and b) the extent to which their behaviour is self-led, chapter 4 (p.90) of this thesis proposed an Integrated Model of Parliamentary Political Behaviour (IMPPB). Founded upon the trans-situational capacity of basic values to direct everyday choices upon activation (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 1992; Verplanken and Holland, 2002), this model prioritises MPs' internal, psychological interpretations of their political environment. In doing so, it argues that MPs must synthesise their own beliefs with the range of expectations and constraints they perceive in order to reach behavioural choices within their occupational context.

In order to test this model, this chapter presents highly original analysis of MPs' parliamentary behaviour. Data on MPs' basic values are used to assess to extent of political

agency in a range of contexts of varying institutional constraint. The chapter proceeds in three extended sections. The first section examines MPs' voting behaviour in the House of Commons chamber, taking both a free or 'conscience' vote and a whipped vote as its substantive focus. Data on basic values are used to explain how and why MPs may vote with or against their party on any particular cause. Section II takes the same psychological lens and applies it to the study of Early Day Motions (EDMs), parliamentary (written) questions, and select committee membership. These analyses examine the relative importance of MPs' personal motivations in [objectively] more autonomous conditions than legislative voting. The third section uses self-report data on participants' political priorities to analyse the factors that influence MPs' abstract decisions about who or what they represent. This section also uses structural equation modelling to test the indirect effects of BHV posited in the IMPPB. In each section, quantitative findings are complemented by qualitative data from 17 in-depth interviews with elite participants.

I. 'Ayes to the Right': Basic Values and Voting Behaviour in the House of Commons.

Popular access to 24-hour commercial media and the immediacy of the internet have, in recent years, greatly increased the transparency of Parliament (Norton, 2017). However, these technological advances have, at the same time, increased the external pressure on MPs to 'behave'. Nowhere is this pressure more acute than in the voting chamber, where every decision an MP makes upon legislation is available, either recorded or streamed live on the internet and television, or covered in the print media. Voting in the House of Commons is also characterised by party political blocs (Cowley and Stuart, 2010). Indeed, voting records have been the subject of a rich literature on the hierarchical nature, agenda-setting function, and disciplinary powers of party organisations (Saalfeld, 1998; Hix et al., 2007; Kam, 2009; cf. Krehbiel, 1999). Subject both to intense external informal pressures and internal party constraints, MPs vote on legislation in a 'low perceived choice scenario' (see Chapter 4). The IMPPB would predict, therefore, that party affiliation might explain more variance in vote patterns than other variables (i.e. BHV), thus masking counter-attitudinal behaviour at the micro-level of each politician that, occasionally, produces rebellions on particularly contentious topics.

To test this theory, this section analyses the voting records of 106 MPs in three different contexts: a free or 'conscience' vote for both of the largest political parties, a Bill on which only one of the largest parties gave its members a free vote, and a vote in which both of

the largest parties enforced a three-line Whip. It is anticipated that basic values will explain more variance in MPs' voting patterns in a free vote scenario than a whipped one (hypothesis 4). In order to amplify the rigour of the analysis, votes were selected that maximised the number of participants who a) could be used in each analysis, and b) voted in each of the scenarios selected.⁷⁸ At the same time, votes were selected that received attention in the media, thus accounting for maximum exposure to public scrutiny and the degree of agency exercised by each MP under the watch of external role alters (i.e. their electors). I therefore examine the 2013 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill - third reading; the 2017 European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill - third reading; and the 2015 vote to sanction 'UK Air Strikes Against Islamic State in Syria'. Full party summaries of the three votes are presented in Table 9.1.

Table 9.1 Party summary for three legislative votes in the UK House of Commons.⁷⁹

Party	EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill - Third Reading 8 Feb 2017		Marriage Same Sex Couples Bill - Third Reading 21 May 2013		UK Air Strikes Against ISIL in Syria 2 Dec 2015	
	Majority (Aye)	Minority (No)	Majority (Aye)	Minority (No)	Majority (Aye)	Minority (No)
Conservative	320 (+2 tell)	1	117 (+1 tell)	127 (+2 tell)	313 (+2 tell)	7
Democratic Unionist Party	8	0	0	8	8	0
Green	0	1	1	0	0	1
Independent	0	3	0	1	1	2
Labour	163	52	194	14	66	153
Liberal Democrat	0	7	43 (+1 tell)	4	6	2
Plaid Cymru	0	3	2	0	0	2 (+1 tell)
SDLP ⁸⁰	0	3	2	0	0	5
Scottish National Party	0	52 (+2 tell)	-	-	0	53 (+1 tell)
UK Independence Party	1	0	-	-	1	0
Ulster Unionist Party	2	0	-	-	2	0
Total:	494	122	359	154	397	223
Turnout:	96.4%		82.4%		96.9%	

⁷⁸ Not all participants were present in the House of Commons at the same time and many did not vote at the same time on specific legislation when they were.

⁷⁹ As explained in chapter 6, all data was retrieved from Hansard records via <http://www.publicwhip.org.uk>

⁸⁰ SDLP - Social Democratic and Labour Party

The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill of 2013 extended the Civil Partnership Act 2004 to allow same sex couples to get married lawfully in England and Wales. The Bill provided that such marriages would be treated equally to those between man and woman; that same sex marriages be permitted religious rites in the process; that, at the same time, religious organisations or individual ministers of religion would not be obligated to conduct a same sex marriage ceremony. Following the lead of a handful of other nations, this highly progressive Bill split MPs in both of the major political parties. Both Labour leader Ed Miliband and Conservative leader David Cameron granted their MPs a free vote.

The decision by UK MPs to support military action in Syria followed a United Nations Security Council Resolution (No. 2249) in November 2015.⁸¹ The motion acknowledged requests from France, the United States and regional allies for UK military assistance and recommended all necessary measures short of ground combat - specifically air strikes - to, in the words of the United Nations, 'eradicate the safe haven [ISIL] have established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria.'⁸² Although the motion was carried, it deeply divided the Labour Party. Then newly elected leader, Jeremy Corbyn, unambiguously opposed military intervention, whilst a number of his shadow cabinet and backbenchers vehemently supported it. The Labour leader consequently granted his MPs a free vote on the motion.

Following a politically charged referendum - in which UK citizens voted by a small majority to leave the European Union (EU) - and a protracted legal battle to allow Parliament a vote on the outcome, the EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill empowered the Prime Minister to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. This Bill was highly significant, not least because of the intra-party divides caused by the referendum campaign and the overwhelming majority of MPs who had supported Remain.⁸³ Both of the major parties enforced three-line Whips to enact the referendum result.

These votes each attracted significant media attention that placed MPs, and the decisions they made, under public scrutiny. At the same time, each vote was emotionally and politically charged, not only tapping a range of competing personal preferences but also divides within and between political parties. Correlations between MPs' BHV and their votes on each of these motions are reported in Table 9.2. Clear and statistically significant

⁸¹ The UN Resolution can be downloaded here: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2249%282015%29

⁸² For full quotation, see UN Resolution 2249.

⁸³ MPs' declared stances were reported by the BBC the night before the referendum (22nd June, 2016): <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35616946>

relationships are evident in each case. Not surprisingly, Conformity and Tradition values are negatively associated with voting for same sex marriage, whilst Universalism values are positively associated. Given that Conformity and Tradition values commonly express commitment to orthodox religiosity and social conventions, it is understandable that MPs scoring higher for these values would be less likely to endorse a major social and religious change such as same sex marriage.

Strong negative correlations are also reported between MPs' Universalism values and voting for military action in Syria. This would suggest that MPs particularly motivated by peace, tolerance, and the welfare of all peoples were, understandably, less likely to endorse war. In the case of the EU Withdrawal Bill, Self-Transcendence and Conservation coefficients were again statistically significant. The positive relationship between Conformity and Tradition values and voting for Brexit indicates that MPs who are more attached to known cultures and customs were also more likely to vote to enact the referendum result. To analyse the causal effect of MPs' basic values upon their vote choices, a series of sequential logistic regression models were conducted. With a reduced number of participants in each model, only five lower order basic values were entered as predictors. These were selected *a priori* for theoretical reasons and based upon correlations reported in Table 9.2. Controls were included sequentially for party membership, length of service in Parliament, and the size of an MPs' majority in their last election. The latter two of these variables are used to assess potentially strategic decisions taken by MPs' to appease either of their main principals: voters and party leaders (cf. Willumsen and Goetz, 2017).

Table 9.2 Partial correlation matrix of MPs' basic values and their votes on three pieces of legislation in the UK House of Commons.

	Conformity	Tradition	Benevolence	Universalism	Self-Direction	Stimulation	Hedonism	Achievement	Power	Security
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill - Third Reading	-.295 *	-.653 ***	.102	.415 ***	.220	-.126	.464	.322*	.411 **	-.376
UK Air Strikes Against ISIL in Syria	.287 *	.371 **	-.214 *	-.467 ***	-.185 **	-.104	-.063	-.046	-.149	.152
European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill - Third Reading	.312 **	.242 *	-.251 *	-.385 ***	-.085	.053	-.150	-.013	-.037	.130

Two-tailed significance: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

a) Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill 2013:

The results of the first analysis are reported in Table 9.3. Tradition and Universalism values are significant predictors of whether an MP voted for same sex marriage; these values remain statistically significant, along with Achievement values, when controls are added for partisanship, tenure and electoral margin. In the values-only model, BHV account for a substantial 49% of the variance in participants' voting behaviour. A further 14% of the variance is explained when the control variables are added. The reduction in the number of available observations means that the standard error scores of the variables, especially party dummy variables, are large. Statistically this means that the results may not reflect meaningful variation in the general population. However, the size and direction of the coefficients do compare meaningfully to the party voting summaries presented in Table 9.1. The Chi-Square test statistic is also relatively small and highly significant, indicating that the model adequately measures relationships in the data.

These results suggest that MPs' basic values have a substantial effect upon their legislative voting record when the whip is withdrawn (as predicted in hypothesis 4). These data run contrary to prior research, which argues that party affiliation remains the largest predictor of vote choice in free vote scenarios (Cowley and Stuart, 2010). Even after controlling for partisanship, MPs scoring highly for Universalism and Achievement values were still significantly more likely to vote for same sex marriage. The opposite was true for Tradition values. Whichever party they were in, MPs' who attributed most importance to equality and tolerance were more likely to support same sex marriage. The relationship between Achievement values and voting for same sex marriage is intuitively more problematic. It is possible that this result is linked to public attitudes and, in turn, instrumental vote-seeking behaviour. Data from the British Social Attitudes survey shows that more than 70% of the public supported same sex marriage by the 2010 Parliament, as opposed to less than 50% in the 1980s.⁸⁴ MPs high in Achievement values may, therefore, have seen this vote as a strategic way to get in line with public opinion and service future ambitions.

⁸⁴ This data is published online by NatCen and available publicly at: <http://www.natcen.ac.uk/blog/charting-changing-attitudes-%E2%80%93-same-sex-relationships>

Table 9.3 Hierarchical logistic regression model to show the effect of MPs' basic values upon their decision to vote *for* the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (n = 49).⁸⁵

	Model 1	Model 2
Independent Variables	B (S.E.)	B (S.E.)
<i>Basic Values:</i>		
Conformity	.44 (.6)	2.71 (1.69)
Tradition	-.89 (.46) *	-2.20 (1.16) *
Universalism	2.16 (1.00) *	4.09 (2.48) †
Achievement	.80 (.68)	3.39 (1.92) †
Power	1.02 (.87)	1.37 (1.66)
<i>Party:</i>		
Labour	-	-1.83 (26481.48)
Conservative	-	-6.00 (26481.48)
SNP	-	-
DUP/UUP	-	-22.82 (32090.20)
<i>Additional Controls:</i>		
Tenure	-	12.56 (5.92) *
Margin	-	-7.11 (4.79)
<i>Model Statistics:</i>		
Chi Square	32.276 ***	47.607 ***
Cox & Snell R Squared	.490	.629

Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10

The value trade-offs reported here may also help to explain the split in the Conservative Party on this vote. As shown in chapter 8 (pp.189-194), Conservative MPs score much higher than their Labour peers for Conservation values but still, relatively, attribute great importance to Self-Transcendence values as well. Basic values tend to directly guide behaviour when they are a) activated by the immediate scenario (Verplanken and Holland, 2002), and b) accessible based on the importance attributed to them by the individual (Bardi, 2000). The same sex marriage bill evidently activated both Conservation values and Self-Transcendence values in MPs; the split in the Conservative vote may, therefore, reveal a divide between MPs in that Party who assign more importance to Universalism and those who are more motivated by Tradition values respectively. In contrast to the assumptions of the 'congruency principle' (Caprara et al., 2012), whereby political allegiance and values share a

⁸⁵ All predictor variables in these models are re-scaled from 0-1 in order to ease interpretation.

reciprocal relationship, these data suggest that free votes can reveal stark psychological differences within groups of partisan elites.

These findings are complemented by interview data from 17 participants. It was evident from each of the in-depth interviews that participants were aware of the trade-off between values and party loyalty that they engaged in on a daily basis. Some participants had made a conscious decision to ignore the whip upon their election but recognised, in turn, that they limited their career prospects in doing so:

In answer to your question “Have I been able to be myself?”, then yes, I made a special effort that I would always stick up for what I believed in. That’s why I said in my maiden speech in Parliament that I would never accept a promotion. I would always stay on the backbenches so that I could actually always stand up and say what I thought rather than say what might help get me promoted (Interviewee 17).

Similar sentiments were echoed by other MPs in both of the major parties. There was, however, more of an attempt among Labour MPs to reconcile cognitive dissonance as a foregone aspect of representing citizens who had, ultimately, voted for a party. As one former frontbench MP (Interviewee 12) reflected: ‘what was best for my constituency was usually what the party wanted anyway. It made it easier.’ This justification was developed by a number of interviewees, who described party loyalty as a fundamental function of democratic politics:

I think politics is about coalitions. In that each political party is a coalition and we live in a two-party country, pretty much, so you need to accept that and you know, work out which side you’re on. And that there are good reasons for wanting your side to win, and then you need to be loyal (Interviewee 8)

In contrast, the majority of interviewees were quick to eschew the issue. Instead they spoke of personal and party values as one, and where possible reasserted this connection. Interviewee 15, for example, reflected on joining the Labour Party ‘[s]imply because that was the party that fitted most neatly or nearly to [their] views. Nothing more or less than that.’

b) UK Air Strikes Against Islamic State in Syria:

The vote to sanction military action against Islamic State in Syria is equally revealing as a test of the IMPPB. Crucially the logit shows that BHV again significantly predict voting behaviour after controls have been added to account for internal party constraints and external public scrutiny (Table 9.4, below). However, the additional variance in the results explained

by the variables in the model increases by a larger margin (from 30% to 64%) than it did for the Same Sex Marriage Bill (from 49% to 63%). Although the regression coefficient is not statistically significant with such a small sample size, being a Conservative MP does correlate strongly and significantly with voting 'yes' for the motion ($r(66) = .690, p < 0.001$). Given that Conservative MPs voted under the influence of the Whip, this testifies to the power of disciplinary sanctions/incentives to override psychological differences within the Conservative Party and unite them in the division lobbies. This may be compared to the free vote on same sex marriage, where these intra-party differences meaningfully split Conservative MPs.

Table 9.4 Hierarchical logistic regression model to show the effect of MPs' basic values upon their decision to vote for UK Air Strikes Against ISIL in Syria 2015 (n = 66).

	Model 1	Model 2
Independent Variables	B (S.E.)	B (S.E.)
<i>Basic Values:</i>		
Tradition	.28 (.28)	-1.04 (.74)
Benevolence	-.42 (.48)	-.59 (.73)
Universalism	-1.28 (.43) **	-2.44 (1.17) *
Self-Direction	.05 (.42)	-.61 (.81)
Power	-.71 (.41) †	-2.77 (1.31) *
<i>Party:</i>		
Labour	-	-22.32 (40192.98)
Conservative	-	2.35 (40690.25)
SNP	-	-44.23 (41353.97)
DUP/UUP	-	-21.69 (40192.98)
<i>Additional Controls:</i>		
Tenure	-	3.29 (3.07)
Margin	-	-2.12 (3.81)
<i>Model Statistics:</i>		
Chi Square	23.972 ***	67.368 ***
Cox & Snell R Squared	.305	.640

Significance: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.10$

Over and above the effects of party membership, tenure and electoral margin, Universalism and Power values were statistically significant predictors of whether MPs voted for military action in Syria. Both values were negative predictors, indicating that those most

motivated by Universalism and Power values were more likely to vote *against* air strikes than those less motivated by these values. This is a theoretically ambiguous result, given that Universalism and Power values sit opposite one another in the sinusoidal continuum of BHV and denote incongruent motivational goals (see Chapter 2, p.43). On the one hand, MPs highly motivated by Universalism values may have opposed military action to protect the welfare of Syrian civilians and to protest against British military involvement in *any* violent conflict. It is also possible that Universalism values interact with Labour Party membership here, given that the majority of Labour MPs score higher than Conservative MPs for these values (Chapter 8, pp.189-200) and also voted against air strikes in greater numbers.⁸⁶ By comparison, it is harder to explain the effect of Power values in this instance, given that the motivational goals of this factor - such as authority, control and dominance - usually predict competitive and subordinating behaviour (Gandal et al., 2005) that one would associate with military conflict.

There are three possible explanations that demand further consideration. Firstly, there may be confounding variables that are not included in this model. With more participants, a more complicated model could unearth these effects. Secondly, the ambiguity of this result may reflect differences proposed by the theory of instantiation (Chapter 2, pp.50-55; Hanel et al., 2017). It could be that military action does not, understandably, count as a ‘typical’ instantiation of Power values in terms of central tendency, ideals or familiarity for citizens who have grown up in the UK.⁸⁷ Thirdly, this could be an instrumental decision. A decade previous, MPs voted to engage in military action in Iraq and faced a steady backlash of public disapproval.⁸⁸ Only two years previous in August 2013 MPs had overturned a Government proposal to intervene in Syria, which made David Cameron the first prime minister since Lord North in 1782 to lose a parliamentary vote on military action. For MPs who are highly motivated by Power values, and thus attribute great importance to the authority, recognition and influence accumulated via their parliamentary office, then support for another potentially failed military campaign without clear public support would be a highly risky decision (see also Strong, 2015). It is neither possible nor necessary to explore these explanations in further depth here, but each warrants future investigation.

⁸⁶ A larger sample size is required to test this interaction effect. In the present sample, 19 Labour MPs voted against air strikes and 7 voted in favour.

⁸⁷ Refer to chapter 2 (pp.50-54) for more information on the theory of value instantiation.

⁸⁸ A YouGov poll in June 2015 showed that only 37% of the public ever believed that military action against Saddam Hussein was the correct decision (<https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/06/03/remembering-iraq/>).

The power of party incentives and sanctions to override personal motivations in the Commons' chamber was also starkly revealed in the interview data. Interviewee 1 – a Labour MP who had previously held ministerial office – not only recalled voting against their own beliefs for the Party but having done so to start a war, specifically the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Describing the period before the vote, this participant experienced sustained pressure from the highest offices:

Yes I did, and particularly if I can be specific, over Iraq and the invasion of Iraq... I was in interview after interview. I had a discussion with the Foreign Secretary, Prime Minister, three or four times, all about this issue and gradually they wore me down, in the sense of I had to balance my own individual point of view with what would be the impact on the Government and the future of the Labour party in government, should anything negative happen...Blair said he would have resigned, in fact he claimed he was going to. He said to me several times in private meetings that if he didn't get a majority of Labour members, he would resign...I eventually, reluctantly, came down on the side of trying to maintain the Government.⁸⁹

Whilst this data is compelling as evidence of the extent to which MPs are manipulated to uphold the party directive in the Commons' chamber, the interview was even more telling for the way in which the participant went on to justify their actions. Rather than placing blame on the Party leadership, the interviewee started to evoke value judgements in order to make sense of the invasion. Talking in terms indicative of Universalism values, the interviewee explained how they had attempted to soothe their own conscience:

Iraq had gone through hell long before the invasion. They were subject to an embargo that embargoed critical medicines. Thousands upon thousands of children were dying. Others were dying as well. There was a no-fly zone, there was anarchy in the country. And I convinced myself while the invasion might be bad, it would bring some stability to the country. We'd get rid of a dictator...[I] tried to justify it on the basis of the balance of probabilities. The people of Iraq would be in better shape with the invasion than without it. I have to say, looking back on that now, that was totally naïve. The people of Iraq have suffered tremendously since the invasion... Through heart-searching I still think I bear a responsibility for that (Interviewee 1)

This qualitative data adds nuance to the statistics presented in Table 9.4. It both adds colour to narratives of party 'loyalty' and exposes the degree to which party organisations can mask their internal differences to secure legislative victories. Taken together, the data presented here testifies to the mitigating effect of party structures upon MPs' psychological agency as elected representatives in the UK Parliament.

⁸⁹ Interviewer: *A number of other participants have talked about the kind of inner turmoil they felt when they had to vote with the party whip or act in a certain way against their conscience. I wondered whether you'd experienced that, and how you dealt with it?*

c) European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017:

The EU Withdrawal Bill is the only one of the three votes analysed in this thesis where both major political parties enforced a three-line Whip. It is revealing, therefore, that this is the only one of the three votes where the statistically significant effect of MPs' BHV, in particular Universalism values, is eradicated after control variables for party affiliation are introduced (Table 9.5). By themselves, basic values account for just 17.5% of MPs' voting behaviour on this Bill, less than either of the other two votes studied above. The jump in variance explained by the model after controlling for each MP's party, tenure and electoral majority is also considerable (a rise of 32%). In the values-only model, Universalism values are highly significant predictors of *not* voting to trigger Article 50. Given that Universalism values denote an understanding and appreciation of all peoples, as well as a greater inclination towards social contact with out-group members, it makes sense that MPs particularly motivated by these values would not endorse risking the diverse social, cultural and even economic opportunities afforded by EU membership. According to this model, MPs were 3 times ($\text{Exp}(B) = 0.331$) more likely to reject the referendum result with each average unit change in their response to items measuring Universalism values on the PVQ.

A larger sample size is needed to test the robustness of this result. However, the data indicate that MPs accept cognitive dissonance in low perceived choice scenarios. Put another way, MPs are willing to vote against their personal preferences and goals when external constraints impinge on their freedom of choice (cf. Nam et al., 2013). In this instance, MPs were cajoled by both party Whips – and the prospect of disciplinary repercussions if they rebelled – and a fragile external environment in which the ‘majority’ of UK citizens (i.e. their electors) had already chosen to leave the EU. In terms of Kam's (2009) LEADS model, there was no possible benefit for MPs to accrue from not following a public/party directive. As anticipated by the IMPPB, MPs' values become epiphenomenal to behavioural outcomes in the context of such extreme formal and informal constraints. However, it is also possible that MPs' personality characteristics continue to influence these behaviours indirectly. The clear differences in the BHV of Labour and Conservative MPs reported in chapter 8 indicate a powerful self-selection process in party recruitment to elite politics. It is possible, therefore, that MPs' values are merely mediated by party structures in low choice scenarios. This contention requires a larger sample size for verification.

Table 9.5 Hierarchical logistic regression model to show the effect of MPs' basic values upon their decision to vote *for* UK the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017 (n = 69).

	Model 1	Model 2
Independent Variables	B (S.E.)	B (S.E.)
<i>Basic Values:</i>		
Tradition	.19 (.29)	-.44 (.47)
Universalism	-1.11 (.42) **	-.79 (.58)
Power	-.24 (.38)	-.92 (.92)
Security	-.09 (.32)	.10 (.44)
Self-Direction	.23 (.41)	-.05 (.57)
<i>Party:</i>		
Labour	-	21.81 (40193.14)
Conservative	-	42.37 (40951.88)
SNP	-	-.58 (41948.91)
DUP/UUP	-	21.64 (40193.14)
<i>Additional Controls:</i>		
Tenure	-	-1.09 (2.01)
Majority	-	-.97 (2.67)
<i>Model Statistics:</i>		
Chi Square	13.264 *	47.245 ***
Cox & Snell R Squared	.175	.496

Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10

Whilst institutional constraints appear to mask the majority of individual differences between MPs in the context of the EU withdrawal Bill, there were still some MPs on both sides of the House who defied the Whip. These MPs did not respond to the surveys issued by this study in sufficient numbers to pass quantitative judgements, but interview data revealed a number of key insights about the act of rebellion in general. A handful of participants admitted to being serial rebels. Some had rebelled against their party out of frustration and a sense of principle. As interviewee 9 put it, ‘I was bored with them, I was fed up with them, I didn’t like Blair, I thought the Labour Party stood for nothing.’ Others were compelled to rebel because of the strength of their local support base; interviewee 15, for example, ‘never really got any sort of aggravation from the local party because of the times when [they] voted against [the Whip]. Local Party were very supportive.’ Yet for others still, the prospect of

rebelling had become more attractive as they approached the end of their careers. Reflecting specifically on the EU withdrawal Bill, interviewee 3 said:

I've seen Labour leaders make mistakes and I'm old enough, I'm not worried enough and not on the career path enough to really give it more of a cursory thought. I absolutely feel I was in the right position on [welfare in 2015] and I feel I'm absolutely in the right position on Brexit. I wasn't cavalier about it. I knew that I might be sacked. I didn't want to be but I love whichever role I've got, but had I been sacked, I would have said, "Well, that is fair dues since that is what normally happens."

Whilst these participants were able to reconcile the act of rebellion, others could not. For many interviewees, the prospect of rebelling in the Commons' chamber was tantamount to treachery. These participants were quick to recognise that their colleagues may have genuine grievances with party policies but they advocated compromise and consensus behind closed doors.

[M]y starting point is the importance of party loyalty – not just to the party to which you owe your seat, but also to the electorate that voted for that ticket. I do respect the fact that some of the times people either absent themselves or will vote against their party, but I think you've got to do a lot of soul-searching before you commit to that. There were quite a few of my colleagues who saw it as a badge of honour to vote against their party, and I rather despised that (Interviewee 16)

I don't even like the use of the word 'rebel'. I prefer the use of the word 'traitor'. (Laughs) I never was attracted to the idea that there was something virtuous about rebelling against your party. I feel slightly different about it now, but actually, on the whole, the people I really respected were the ones who did support the party when they had difficulties with it, not the ones who bailed out at the first whiff of gun smoke (Interviewee 5)

The results reported in this section are compelling for a number of reasons. Firstly, the quantitative data presented show that MPs' personality characteristics *do* matter for voting behaviour in the House of Commons. As anticipated by the IMPPB, it is also possible to discriminate between free and conscience votes. As a proxy for MPs' agency in the division lobbies, basic values explain a substantial amount of variance in MPs' voting behaviour when the whip is withdrawn. This result holds even after controlling for party affiliation, length of service and the size of an MP's majority. Contra to rational choice depictions of MPs as strategic and predictable party animals (Hazan, 2003; Kam, 2009), as well as rival studies that give pre-eminence to sociological unity within political parties (Daniel, 2015; Russell, 2014), I find that political elites will diverge on legislation according to deep-seated personality characteristics. MPs in general, and the main political parties in particular, are not monolithic

psychological groups. Internal party constraints (i.e. the Whip) and external public expectations can, it seems, force a false image of unity that disguises more nuanced psychological cleavages at the intra-party level. These results will be discussed in more detail in chapter 11.

II. Moderate Constraint: Explaining Early Day Motions (EDMs), Written Questions and Select Committee Membership.

The previous section analysed three separate votes in the House of Commons to determine the causal influence of MPs' personality characteristics upon legislation in the UK. The results showed that even in the legislative chamber, where internal and external constraints upon politicians are greatest, MPs' basic values have an important impact on their political choices. This section now analyses three different parliamentary behaviours that are, by comparison to voting in the Commons' chamber, more distant from institutional constraints (formal or informal). In line with the propositions of the IMPPB put forward in chapter 4, it is anticipated that basic values will have a significant effect on these behaviours, which are less visible to or understood by public role alters and, in turn, less important to party officials. The section proceeds in three short parts. The first analyses the number of Early Day Motions (EDMs) signed by participants in the parliamentary year 2015-2016.⁹⁰ The second examines the number of written questions asked by participants in that same year. The final, third section assesses the impact of participants' basic values upon their historic record of working on a select committee.

a) Early Day Motions (EDMs)

Prior research on EDMs has examined these expressive acts as indicators of ideological blocs in political parties (Franklin and Tappin, 1977), proxies of elite opinions on specific legislative issues (Childs and Withey, 2004), measures of party cohesion (Bailey and Nason, 2008), and as signalling tools used by MPs in a competitive electoral climate (Kellermann, 2013). Within this small and under-developed literature on peripheral legislative behaviour, there has not been any attempt to understand EDMs as a function of personal preferences or psychological differences within the legislative body. However, EDMs are often loosely regulated by party officials and unknown to electors. As per the IMPPB, it is anticipated, therefore, that EDMs might reveal meaningful expressions of MPs' basic values in their representative role.

⁹⁰ This Parliamentary year was chosen to maximise the number of participants that could be used in the analysis. Given that contextual factors are likely to impact on MPs' propensity to sign EDMs or ask written questions (in response to the political context), a single Parliamentary year was selected.

To account for the dispersion of scores and the skewed distribution caused by participants who signed no EDMs in 2015/16, the effect of BHV upon MPs' sponsorship of EDMs was tested using a poisson loglinear count model.⁹¹ To maximise the statistical power of the data with a limited pool of participants, only those basic values with statistically significant or particularly large correlations with the dependent variable were included in the regression model. Two demographic control variables (age and gender) were included along with three variables to measure additional constraints. Firstly, controls for the party affiliation of the participant accounted for whether or not the MP was a member of the ruling party. The number of years served by each MP (tenure) was included to assess whether or not a two-tailed causal relationship might exist between signing EDMs and electoral longevity. Finally, each participant's 2015 election margin was included to account for the added pressure of cultivating constituency support. The results are presented in Table 9.6.

As predicted by the IMPPB, BHV were highly significant predictors of how many EDMs each participant signed in 2015/16 (Hypothesis 6). The relative public anonymity of EDMs, as well as their political triviality in terms of party dynamics, produces a 'high choice perceived scenario' in which MPs' personal preferences seem to have a substantial impact. The incident rate ratios indicate that Universalism and Power values are particularly relevant. Those MPs in the sample scoring highest for Universalism values signed over 24 times more EDMs in one parliamentary year than those scoring lowest for that value factor. Similarly, those participants with the highest scores for Power values signed just 17% as many EDMs as those MPs who attributed least importance to that value factor. This result not only conforms to the sinusoidal model of incongruence expected of Universalism and Power values (Schwartz, 1992) but offers a stark insight into the types of legislators most likely to use EDMs.

In contrast to prior work that suggests peripheral parliamentary behaviours such as EDMs are, above all, expressive signals for party leaders or MPs' electors, and thus used strategically as a function of electoral pressure (cf. Kellermann, 2013), this result suggests that MPs might use EDMs to service personal motivations. The relationship between Universalism values and EDMs indicates that MPs with particularly strong commitments to furthering the interests and welfare of all electors equally, may express that motivation through sponsorship of as many EDMs as possible. It is, however, impossible to know

⁹¹ 20% of participants signed 0 EDMs in the Parliamentary year 2015-16. The maximum number of EDMs signed by a participant was 918.

whether the increased frequency with which these MPs sign EDMs is matched by their commensurate substantive focus. By contrast, the relationship revealed between Power values and EDMs indicates that those MPs most concerned with their own authority and recognition do not perceive EDMs as a way to further those goals. This is understandable, given that EDMs very rarely influence parliamentary debate or manifest in legislation. To the extent that they might accrue benefit to the signatory, EDMs are little more than a signal of support to party gatekeepers.

Reproducing trends from Kellermann's (2013) longitudinal study of EDM sponsorship, MPs in right-wing parties signed fewer EDMs than participants in left-wing parties. However, this effect is marginal and may simply reflect the differences in BHV between the two main parties (see chapter 8) - in particular the higher scores for Universalism values among Labour MPs. Contra to Kellermann (2013), the data here reveal a positive association between an MP's electoral margin and signing EDMs. Whereas Kellermann's study found that MPs with the smallest margins signed more EDMs, participants with the largest margins in this study signed 27% more EDMs than those in the most competitive seats. However, this data relates to the first year after the 2015 General Election. It may be that those MPs in the most marginal seats were expending energy to consolidate their victory in more visible ways (i.e. in the constituency) at this point in the parliamentary cycle or, alternatively, were not yet turning to EDMs as a defence against electoral vulnerability.

Participants who had served in Parliament the longest also signed 92% more EDMs in 2015/16 than those MPs who had just been elected. On one hand, this may simply reflect differential experience and knowledge of parliamentary procedure. Newly elected MPs may be less likely to sign EDMs by virtue of not fully understanding what they represent, due to myriad other new and demanding commitments, or from a desire to throw themselves into the fray of more symbolic parliamentary action. Given prior evidence of a positive relationship between signing EDMs and electoral returns at the ballot box (Kellermann, 2013, p.269), this finding might also reflect the strategic behaviour of MPs who have successfully utilised peripheral parliamentary behaviours to appeal to constituents. Without longitudinal data and physical randomisation, it is, however, impossible to test this causal claim.

Table 9.6 Regression analysis of the effect of MPs' basic values upon the number of early day motions they signed in the parliamentary year 2015-16, the number of written questions they asked, and whether or not they have ever joined a select committee in the UK Parliament.⁹²

Variable	Select Committee Membership (n = 91)		No. of Early Day Motions Signed (n = 83)		No. of Written Questions Submitted (n = 75)	
	B(S.E.)	Exp(B)	B(S.E.)	Exp(B)	B(S.E.)	Exp(B)
<i>1. Basic Values:</i>						
Conformity	1.39 (.49) **	3.996	.278 (.08) ***	1.321	-	-
Tradition	-	-	.225 (.09) **	1.253	-	-
Benevolence	-.04 (.49)	.964	-1.07 (.08) ***	.344	-	-
Universalism	.53 (.45)	1.692	3.18 (.09) ***	24.145	.74 (.08) ***	2.103
Self-Direction	.17 (.56)	1.188	-.18 (.08) *	.834	-1.22 (.08) ***	.296
Stimulation	.28 (.51)	1.318	-	-	.26 (.08) ***	1.30
Achievement	1.19 (.49) *	3.271	.30 (.10) **	1.345	-.21 (.08) **	.810
Hedonism	-	-	-	-	-	-
Power	.19 (.48)	1.210	-1.75 (.08) ***	.173	-	-
Security	-	-	-	-	1.85 (.08) ***	6.358
<i>2. Demographics:</i>						
Age	-2.85 (2.33)	.058	-.96 (.07) ***	.382	.02 (.10)	1.022
Gender	.405 (.76)	1.499	-.49 (.03) ***	.611	-	-
<i>3. Career Considerations:</i>						
Partisanship	.546 (.88)	1.726	-.09 (.03) **	.912	-.399 (.03) ***	.671
Tenure	3.96 (2.09) *	52.458	.65 (.06) ***	1.923	.2 (0.08) *	1.215
Majority	-1.11 (1.75)	.328	.24 (.06) ***	1.268	-.81 (0.07) ***	.443
<i>Model Statistics:</i>						
Chi Square	24.73 **		5650.47 ***		1365.94 ***	
Cox & Snell R Squared	0.238		-		-	

Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10

⁹² **Independent variables: Basic Human Values** = centred mean scores (rescaled 0-1 for Poisson models); **Age** = continuous data rescaled 0-1; **Gender** (Dummy) = 1 - Female, 0 - Male; **Partisanship** (Dummy) = 1 - Centre Right Party, 0 - Centre Left Party; **Tenure** = continuous data rescaled 0-1; **Election Majority** = continuous data rescaled 0-1.

b) Written Questions

In spite of a compelling body of evidence that points to the marginal, near non-existent electoral impact of individual legislative behaviour in the UK's tight party system (Margetts, 2011), parliamentary questions are asked on a daily basis by MPs of all partisan affiliations and occupational grades (except members of the Executive). The extant research base analyses written questions, in particular, as either an expression of substantive representational interests (Bird, 2005; Saalfeld, 2011) or a rational electoral stratagem (Kellermann, 2016; Soroka et al., 2009). As with EDMs, however, political scientists in the UK are yet to study this relatively autonomous representative behaviour as a function of MPs' personality characteristics. Following the theoretical logic of the IMPPB, it is expected that MPs' basic values will have a substantial impact on the number of written questions they ask in any one parliamentary year.

The distribution of the number of questions asked by participants in the current sample is skewed considerably. Participants asked an average of 86.6 written questions in 2015/16, with individual results ranging from 0 to 858. However, only 5% of the observations exceeded 300 questions, highlighting the effect of individual participant variation. To account for this skew in the data, a poisson loglinear regression analysis was conducted to examine the impact of MPs' basic values on the number of written questions they asked in the parliamentary year 2015-2016. Once again, a limited number of BHV were selected a priori based upon correlation analyses and the same political control variables were included as with the analysis of EDMs.

The results (Table 9.6) confirm trends in prior research (Kellermann, 2016; Rasch, 2009) that find a link between electoral vulnerability and the number of questions asked by an MP. Participants in the present sample who won with the largest margins in the 2015 General Election asked just 44% as many written questions in the following parliamentary year as those participants who had won with the smallest margins. Given the immediacy of the election result in 2015/16, MPs in marginal seats may have felt an additional impetus to plough their efforts into communicating an active and committed profile to their electors. This effect may reflect the pressures exerted by 24-hour news media, in which the public can easily access proxy metrics for legislator's productivity. The House of Commons, for example, now publishes lists of the questions asked by each MP (Young et al., 2003) and the media have even used written questions as the basis for league Tables that rank MPs on their (pro-)activity (Leapman, 2005). Whilst composing and submitting written questions to the

government takes time, it is therefore understandable that MPs in marginal seats might try to ask as many questions as possible in order to signal their commitment to external role alters.

Even after controlling for important contextual factors such as electoral margin and partisanship, MPs' BHV still had a statistically significant impact on the number of written questions they asked in 2015/16.⁹³ Above all, Security values had a strong positive effect (Hypothesis 5). Participants scoring highest for these values asked over six times more questions in one parliamentary year than those MPs who attributed least importance to Security values. This result may signal strategic behaviour by those MPs who are most motivated by stability in their own lives and thus ask more parliamentary questions in order to attract positive support from their electors. Unlike prior research into the substantive base of written questions, the data imply that questions are used as much to look busy as they are to confer importance on any representational issue. As such, this gives credence to theories of rational vote-seeking behaviour (i.e. Kam, 2009) but adds nuance to that conclusion insofar as it reveals an underpinning psychological motivation.

To assess the relationship between BHV and electoral strategy in the context of asking parliamentary questions, the count model was re-run to incorporate an interaction term between Security values and electoral margin. A significant regression equation was found ($F(1, 10) = 7.49(.39)$, $p < 0.001$) that suggests a mutually reciprocal relationship between these variables. Given that both variables were rescaled 0-1 for ease of interpretation, the interaction term indicates that MPs who attribute most importance to Security values asked 7 more questions in 2015/16 when they were, simultaneously, in a position of electoral vulnerability. This result complements prior research on BHV, which suggests that the immediate context of action can activate relevant values and thus *cause* behaviour (Schwartz, 2005; Verplanken and Holland, 2002). Where MPs had been elected to a marginal seat and faced uncertainty in terms of their personal and professional lives, Security values were likely to be activated and to promote behaviours (i.e. asking written questions) that might mitigate risk. This connection is also appropriately enhanced in MPs who already attribute more importance to Security values and thus access those values more readily in *any* context.

In contrast to Security values, Achievement and Self-Direction values displayed highly significant negative effects upon the number of written questions asked by participants.

⁹³ Participants in right-wing parties (majority Conservative MPs) asked just 67% as many questions as participants in left-wing parties (majority Labour MPs). This arguably reflects the dynamic of two-party politics in the UK, whereby the opposition must hold the Government to account and be sure that it is seen doing so.

In the first instance, MPs scoring highest for Achievement values asked only 81% as many questions as those who attributed least importance to this value factor. This suggests that the most ambitious MPs who are motivated to demonstrate success, do not - to a moderate extent - perceive written questions as a beneficial expenditure of time and energy. In the second instance, MPs scoring highest for Self-Direction values asked just 30% as many written questions as those participants who attributed least importance to that value factor. For MPs motivated by creativity and independent thought and action, it is possible that the perfunctory, often ex ante nature of parliamentary questions deters them. Whilst both of these results require more detailed longitudinal analysis with a larger number of observations, the data do highlight the individuality of UK MPs in Parliament. In particular, this section shows that written questions are used in varying measures by different MPs to service a range of psychological goals and motivations, even after controlling for party affiliation and electoral competition.

c) Select Committees

A growing literature on the role and influence of Select Committees (SCs) in recent years has cast a spotlight on their increasing impact upon parliamentary procedure and legislation (Benton and Russell, 2013; Kelso, 2009; Marsh, 2016). With this augmented presence in Westminster has come greater media attention outside of Parliament as well as a diversification of attractive career paths for backbenchers (Fisher, 2015). However, the existing research base has not yet supplemented its qualitative conclusions that a) the personality and efficacy of an SC's membership influences its success, b) the work demanded of SC members is unique in Parliament and antithetical to the ethos of British politics, and c) SCs now entice ambitious MPs away from mainstream career paths (see Benton and Russell, 2013; Geddes, 2016). Using rigorous interdisciplinary analysis of MPs' basic values in the context of the UK Parliament, I offer preliminary clarification of these statements.

A binary logistic regression was conducted that modelled the effect of basic values upon an MP's historic record of select committee membership. Records of membership details are now freely available for the public to access online via the website [TheyWorkForYou](https://www.theyworkforyou.com). In total, records were available for 91 participants in the current sample. As with written questions and EDMs, correlation analyses were conducted first to determine which BHV to drop from the regression model. Additional control variables were included to account for demographic and contextual factors such as party affiliation, tenure in Parliament, and electoral majority. The purpose of the analysis was not to differentiate within or between SCs

per se, but rather to provide a preliminary perspective on 'who' puts themselves forward to these committees in the first place. In line with the IMPPB, it is expected that MPs' basic values will successfully discriminate between those who do and do not join SCs (Hypothesis 7).

The results of the regression model (Table 9.6) reveal three statistically significant predictors: Conformity values, Achievement values and tenure. The first of these results suggests that MPs who are most restrained in their actions and impulses, and prefer to avoid conflict with others, are also more likely to join SCs. In fact, the odds ratio indicates that participants were 4 times more likely to have served on an SC with each average unit change in their Likert scale response to Conformity items on the PVQ. Individuals who are motivated by Conformity values tend to inhibit disruptive tendencies in order to facilitate successful social interaction (Schwartz, 1992). It is possible, therefore, that these MPs - who do not enjoy or do not want to engage in the competitive party political sparring of the Commons' chamber - may see SCs as an alternative, collaborative forum in which to advance policy specific goals. This finding supports previous observations that 'politicians who are less party-political tend to be selected, affording the committees greater independence from divisive, partisan politics' (Fisher, 2015, p.421). This is highly significant, since it suggests that SCs' reputation for avoiding the adversarialism of the Commons' chamber is a product not only of their remit but also, crucially, of the personalities that comprise them. To move as one with a shared purpose, SC members must be able to reach a consensus on, for example, the wording of a report. This requires diplomatic compromise with colleagues from all political parties. The success of SCs in achieving consensus, and thus presenting robust and unified scrutiny of the Executive, appears to be a function of the MPs who join them.

The importance of Achievement values in predicting SC membership also supports prior research on the career paths of MPs (Democratic Audit, 2016). The data indicate that the most ambitious MPs, desirous of success and influence, are much more likely to join a SC. The odds ratio indicates that participants were more than 3 times more likely to have served on a SC with each average unit change in their Likert scale response to Achievement items on the PVQ. As a member of a SC, an MP has the potential not only to achieve measurable impact upon government policy (cf. Benton and Russell, 2013) but also avoids the protocols that bind ministers, for example, from commenting on issues beyond their portfolio. Ambitious MPs can thus use SCs to speak openly on contentious or sensitive topics and, for those MPs highly motivated by Achievement values, have the opportunity to demonstrate

their competence to party gatekeepers. In turn, SCs command an increasingly high profile media presence that gives MPs a platform to engage with, and impress, external role alters. Inquiries into, for example, phone hacking at News International, security at the 2012 London Olympics, or female genital mutilation have, in recent years, given MPs such as Tom Watson, Keith Vaz, Margaret Hodge and Sir Alan Beith a media presence akin to that of junior or even senior ministers in the government. The data suggest that these changes have also affected the type of politicians seeking to join SCs.

The logit also revealed a positive significant relationship between how long an MP had served in Parliament and whether or not they had served on a SC. This might suggest that SCs are not so much stepping stones to higher office but equally end goals for long-serving MPs. As Keith Vaz MP, former chair of the Home Affairs SC, told a Hansard Audit: 'I think being chair of a committee is probably one of the last jobs you do in Parliament, and rightly so' (reported in Fisher, 2015, p. 422). It is possible that ambitious MPs who have failed to take up ministerial roles across their careers seek consolidation in SCs as an alternative end-of-career role. To substantiate this claim, the logit was re-run to test for an interaction effect between Achievement values and tenure but the coefficient was negative and non-significant. Far from being the domain of ambitious yet bitter MPs nearing the end of their career, this might indicate simply that longstanding MPs garner more support from their colleagues and enter SCs in higher numbers - especially post-2010 and the Wright reforms. This inference requires future research into the personality characteristics of SC members.

III. Representing 'What' or 'Whom'? Basic Values and MPs' Representative Priorities.

So far this chapter has analysed a series of parliamentary behaviours as diverse as MPs' legislative voting and the submission of written questions to the government. In each case, it has shown that MPs' personality characteristics, specifically their basic values, have a meaningful impact on the way they behave in Parliament. This effect holds across scenarios where it is expected that MPs are exposed to high and/or moderate levels of institutional constraint from their political parties and external role alters (i.e their electors). These findings are not only highly original but significant as a step forward in the academic understanding of representative agency in the UK Parliament. This section advances this analysis further by interrogating the motivational reasons that inform 'who' or 'what' an MP perceives as their representative priority in elected office (Hypothesis 8).

The outcome in this case is defined as a three category variable. MPs were asked to rank three representative foci in order of importance: their political party and its manifesto, the common good of the nation, and the wishes and welfare of their constituency. Chapter 5 of this thesis has already critiqued a long literature on democratic focus and style (Andeweg, 2012; Eulau and Wahlke, 1959; Gauja, 2012; Judge, 1999); I argued, in particular, that both the theoretical implications of the mandate-independence controversy and the natural flux of democratic politics in the West undermine studies that seek to draw neat causal links from political behaviours to politicians' representative foci/style or vice versa. Whilst I maintain that MPs *must* take political roles seriatim, their abstract priorities are nevertheless important as an indication of how they perceive their democratic duty - whether or not this is translated directly into tangible political behaviour is of secondary consideration for this study. More so than the other behaviours already explored in this chapter, the institutional constraints upon participants' responses were entirely informal. The decision about *how* or *who* to represent (or at least how or who an MP would *like* to represent) is an abstract choice conceived within a political, ideological context, but one that reflects significant personal motivations. In line with the IMPPB, it is anticipated, therefore, that MPs' BHV will have a powerful indirect effect upon participant responses.


To model causal pathways between variables and to understand complex direct and indirect relationships between variables - as represented in the IMPPB - I use Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). In this section, SEM is carried out using the statistical package AMOS 24 to model the pathways by which basic values might affect MPs' representative foci using the full sample of data (n = 106). The four higher order basic values (Conservation, Self-Transcendence, Self-Enhancement, and Openness to Change) are included at one end of the model as measured by all 20 items on the TwIVI portrait values questionnaire. The measurement model (Figure 9.1) shows that these items measure the latent constructs accurately. Nearly all factor loadings between the questionnaire items and the latent values are above .5 and every factor loading is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$ or $p < 0.001$.

Two additional independent variables were included. Firstly, MPs' economic and social ideology was measured using two independent scales of 0-10 (Left-Right).⁹⁴ Secondly, MPs' party affiliation was included. To reduce the number of parameters in the equation and thus maximise the power of the data, party affiliation was coded as a binary variable that designated MPs as members of centre-Left or centre-Right parties. Due to the limited number

⁹⁴ See Appendix A for a sample copy of the questionnaire sent to all MPs.

of observations available, it was not possible to include socio-economic correlates of either basic values or ideology (cf. Feldman, 2003, p.488). However, the ANOVA models reported in chapters 7 and 8 show that the effects of age, gender and education upon BHV are all relatively homogeneous within this elite sample. In their responses to the survey, only 7% of MPs (n = 8) reported their political party as their top priority in elected office. Therefore, to limit the number of parameters in the model, these results were re-coded as two dummy variables for those MPs who prioritised the nation (i.e. Trustees) and the constituency (i.e. Delegates).

Figure 9.1 The measurement model of basic values (UK Members of Parliament, n = 106).



Note: Maximum likelihood estimation was used to calculate the measurement model. All factor loadings are standardised regression coefficients and measurement errors indicate the percentage of variance (squared multiple correlations) of each questionnaire item explained by the model. All factor loadings are significant at $p < 0.05$. $N = 106$, $AIC = 450.633$, $RMSEA = .09$. Refer to Table 6.6 (p.140) for unabbreviated item descriptors.

Following the advice of prior methodological research on Structural Equation Modelling (MacCallum and Austin, 2000, Homer and Kahle, 1988), three alternative models are tested here to assess the supremacy of the IMPPB (Figure 9.2, below). The first model, the *direct* model, replicates prior research in which BHV directly influence political outcomes without mediation (e.g. Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Devos et al., 2002, Caprara et al., 2006). In the second (*complicated*) model, economic and social ideology and party affiliation are introduced. This generates additional paths of causation, so that the outcome variables


(trustee/delegate) are explained both directly and indirectly by basic values (cf. Leimgruber, 2011). In the final (*theorised*) model, all of the assumptions of the IMPPB are reproduced. In this model, the direct effects of BHV upon the outcome variable are set to 0. The model dictates that BHV are wholly mediated by ideology, and in turn indirectly impact on party affiliation and representative focus. As per the IMPPB, this model assumes that BHV are mobilised in political contexts by corresponding political values or ideologies and that, secondly, their indirect effect upon abstract, unconstrained behaviours (i.e. representative focus) will be greater than that of institutional factors such as party affiliation. The accuracy of these theoretical propositions is demonstrated if (a) basic values have a significant direct effect on representative focus in the *direct* model but (b) lose significance in the *complicated* model when indirect effects are included, and if (c) the *theorised* model fits the data as well as or better than the *complicated* model.

Figure 9.2 Three theoretical models of MPs' representative focus.


(a) The *direct* model



(b) The *complicated* model



(c) The *theorised* model



The results of all three models are reported in Table 9.7. The *direct* model shows that BHV have a highly significant impact upon the outcome variables. The only pathway where this is not the case is between Self-Transcendence values and being a trustee. In chapter 5 of this thesis, I tentatively hypothesised relationships between Self-Transcendence values and constituency service (delegate model), and between Openness to Change values and a national ‘trustee’ mindset (Hypothesis 8). These claims are borne out by the data, which reveal stronger effects between Openness to Change values and whether an MP self-reported as a trustee than as a delegate. Similarly, Self-Transcendence values have a highly significant effect upon MPs' self-reports as a delegate but share no significant relationship with being a trustee. However, the strongest effect revealed in the *direct* model is between Conservation values and being a trustee. This suggests that MPs who are most motivated by traditions, security and social cohesion are also more likely to prioritise national politics.

In the *complicated* model, the pathways between basic values and ideology/party affiliation and from both of the latter to the outcome variables are freed. As anticipated, all of the direct effects of basic values upon representative focus become insignificant. Put another way, the effects of BHV upon MPs' self-reported priorities are now fully mediated by ideology and party affiliation. In this model, the data indicate that MPs' choices are now fully explained by the direct paths from economic ideology to representative focus. MPs scoring higher for economic ideology (i.e. more right-wing) were more likely to self-identify as a trustee and less likely to self-identify as a delegate than MPs with left-wing ideologies. These same trends (for all variables) hold in the *theorised* model where economic ideology is, again,

the only variables to exert a statistically significant effect on the outcome variables. The *complicated* and *theorised* models also both perform better than the *direct* model, as indicated by their similar fit statistics (loglikelihood and AIC scores).

Table 9.7 Structural equation modelling of the *direct*, *complicated* and *theorised* models of MPs' representative focus.⁹⁵

	Direct Model			Complicated Model			Theorised Model		
	Est.	Sig.	SE	Est.	Sig.	SE	Est.	Sig.	SE
Direct Effects									
<i>Trustee ON</i>									
OC	.862	***	.239	-.169		.234		Fixed to 0	
ST	-.001	-	.213	-.316		.252		Fixed to 0	
SE	.588	**	.216	-.145		.227		Fixed to 0	
CON	1.347	***	.217	-.080		.244		Fixed to 0	
Econ.		Fixed to 0		.082	**	.027	.081	***	.025
Social		Fixed to 0		-.006		.030	.011		.026
Party		Fixed to 0		.039		.156	.053		.146
<i>Delegate ON</i>									
OC	.747	**	.237	.348		.236		Fixed to 0	
ST	.741	***	.211	.148		.254		Fixed to 0	
SE	.479	*	.214	.037		.228		Fixed to 0	
CON	.509	*	.215	.128		.246		Fixed to 0	
Econ.		Fixed to 0		-.071	**	.028	-.068	**	.025
Social		Fixed to 0		.012		.030	-.002		.026
Party		Fixed to 0		-.062		.157	-.062		.147
<i>Economic Ideology ON</i>									
OC		Fixed to 0		1.187		.994	1.187		.994
ST		Fixed to 0		-3.952	***	.882	-3.952	***	.882
SE		Fixed to 0		-.280		.896	-.280		.896
CON		Fixed to 0		3.149	***	.902	3.149	***	.902
<i>Social Ideology ON</i>									
OC		Fixed to 0		.135		.790	.135		.790
ST		Fixed to 0		-4.277	***	.701	-4.277	***	.701
SE		Fixed to 0		-.049		.712	-.049		.712
CON		Fixed to 0		3.976	***	.716	3.976	***	.716
<i>Party ON</i>									
OC		Fixed to 0		-.366	**	.143		Fixed to 0	
ST		Fixed to 0		-.255		.156		Fixed to 0	
SE		Fixed to 0		-.639	***	.128		Fixed to 0	
CON		Fixed to 0		-.145		.153		Fixed to 0	
Econ.		Fixed to 0		.103	***	.014	.102	***	.014
Social		Fixed to 0		.066	***	.018	.084	***	.015
	Est.	Sig.	SE	Est.	Sig.	SE	Est.	Sig.	SE
Indirect Effects									
<i>Trustee ON</i>									
OC via Econ.	-		-	1.111		.087	1.12		.086

⁹⁵ OC - Openness to Change; ST - Self-Transcendence; SE - Self-Enhancement; CON - Conservation; Econ. - economic ideology; Social - social ideology.

ST <i>via</i> Econ.	-	-	-2.514	*	.129	-2.626	***	.122
SE <i>via</i> Econ.	-	-	-.311		.073	-.311		.073
CON <i>via</i> Econ.	-	-	2.291	*	.113	2.375	*	.107
OC <i>via</i> Social	-	-	-.13		.006	.158		.009
ST <i>via</i> Social	-	-	.198		.128	-.422		.111
SE <i>via</i> Social	-	-	.065		.005	-.068		.008
CON <i>via</i> Social	-	-	.199		.119	.422		.104
Econ. <i>via</i> Party	-	-	0.25		.016	-.421		.015
Social <i>via</i> Party	-	-	0.249		.01	-.421		.012
<i>Delegate ON</i>								
OC <i>via</i> Econ.	-	-	-1.08		.078	-1.093		.074
ST <i>via</i> Econ.	-	-	2.207	*	.127	2.325	*	.116
SE <i>via</i> Econ.	-	-	.306		.064	.310		.061
CON <i>via</i> Econ.	-	-	-2.052	*	.109	-2.146	*	.099
OC <i>via</i> Social	-	-	.157		.01	-.067		.004
ST <i>via</i> Social	-	-	-.399		.129	.077		.111
SE <i>via</i> Social	-	-	-.068		.009	.051		.002
CON <i>via</i> Social	-	-	.399		.119	-.077		.103
Econ. <i>via</i> Party	-	-	-.394		.016	-.421		.015
Social <i>via</i> Party	-	-	-.393		.01	-.421		.012
<i>Party ON</i>								
OC <i>via</i> Econ.	-	-	1.179		.104	1.178		.013
ST <i>via</i> Econ.	-	-	-3.821	***	.106	-3.817	***	.106
SE <i>via</i> Econ.	-	-	-.312		.092	-.312		.019
CON <i>via</i> Econ.	-	-	3.154	***	.103	3.148	***	.102
OC <i>via</i> Social	-	-	.171		.052	.171		.066
ST <i>via</i> Social	-	-	-3.14	***	.089	-4.126	***	.087
SE <i>via</i> Social	-	-	-.06		.047	-.069		.059
CON <i>via</i> Social	-	-	3.059	**	.086	3.943	***	.085
<hr/>								
N	106		106		106			
Loglikelihood	- 885.817		- 629.348		- 612.154			
AIC	- 845.817		- 537.348		- 544.154			

Note: Estimator is Maximum Likelihood. Directs effects on representative priority (Trustee, Delegate) and Party affiliation (1 = Centre-Right) are unstandardised probit regression coefficients. Other path estimates are unstandardized linear regression coefficients. The statistical significance of the indirect effects is calculated using Sobel's (1982) test of mediation based on the standard errors of the unstandardized coefficients for direct pathways. Due to the combination of continuous and nominal data in the model, the indirect effects are not directly interpretable and are therefore italicised in the Table. Statistically significant results are highlighted as follows: * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$; *** = $p < .001$.

In both the *complicated* and *theorised* models, Self-Transcendence values and Conservation values exert a substantial effect upon economic and social ideology. The direct pathways between these variables show that MPs attributing importance to Self-Transcendence values were more likely to report left-wing ideologies on both the economic and social scales. The data suggest that MPs with the highest scores for these values in the sample population reported economic and social ideology scores of roughly 4 scale points lower than those participants with the lowest scores for Self-Transcendence. The reverse was true for MPs scoring highest for Conservation values, who reported comparatively right-wing ideologies on both scales. These results corroborate prior research in which Self-

Transcendence and Conservation values have successfully discriminated between citizens' Left-Right self-placements and political attitudes around the world (Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; Davidov et al., 2008; Caprara et al., 2006; Steenbergen and Leimgruber, 2010).

To replicate the IMPPB, the direct pathways between basic values and the outcome variables are fixed to 0 in the *theorised* model. Crucially for this thesis, the data show that Self-Transcendence and Conservation values successfully discriminate between trustees and delegates *indirectly* through economic ideology. Whilst MPs' Self-Transcendence values had a significant positive effect on self-reporting as a delegate and negative effect on self-reporting as a trustee, the reverse was true for Conservation values. This result partially confirms hypothesis 8 put forward in chapter 5. The data suggest, firstly, that those MPs most motivated by equality, justice and responsibility to others, are also more likely to perceive their democratic duty in terms of the welfare of their constituents. By contrast, those MPs most motivated by traditions and customs are, as also revealed in the *direct* model, more likely to approach politics as a patron of common interests at the national level. More research is required to discern whether these pathways from personality to representative focus also inform related behaviours in office.

These differences are, to some extent, replicated in the interview data. Participants who reported as delegates were more likely to talk of their representative duties in terms of both advocating causes and helping constituents. As interviewee 8 reflected:

I was very, very clear that I wanted to be a good constituency MP and that that was sufficient. Both because it's very important, and I really liked the idea of representing somewhere that kind of needed advocates. I don't see how you could represent a sort of very affluent area, that's not the point of it really.

In this vein, delegates described their purpose in office as bound to the welfare of their constituents and issues of (in)equality. In doing so, they spoke in value-laden terms indicative of the link between constituency representation and Self-Transcendence values revealed in the quantitative data. It was in following through on these commitments that delegates also seemed to be most satisfied with their performance in Parliament:

Just a few weeks back I was in my local pub and somebody came in, saw me and came over and wanted to talk...Years and years back I was sorting out quite serious immigration problems for him and he was saying, "You changed my life." It's great, when somebody comes along and says that to you (Interviewee 15)

In contrast, interviewees who self-reported as trustees did not speak in terms reflective of Conservation values. They continued to advocate for public interest as grounded in principles

of equality and justice, but expressed these commitments through a vernacular of national politics. As interviewee 1 put it, Parliament is ‘there as the national forum, the national debating chamber, the national voice and [MPs’] primary responsibility is national-based. Towards what’s good for the nation.’ By comparison to delegates, trustees saw their elected remit as one defined by shaping national discourse, not following it. Interviewee 11 was particularly adamant:

Even in this country, if you take it forward tomorrow, I bet you, like Brexit, people will say, bring back hanging...It’s not [MPs’] job to simply follow public opinion, but [their] job is also to lead public opinions.

The quantitative results reported in Table 9.7 also add nuance to the partisan comparisons presented in chapter 8. In the *complicated* model, where direct pathways between basic values and party affiliation are freed, both Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement values exert a significant effect. MPs scoring higher for either of these value factors were also more likely to be members of political parties on the Left (represented in this sample by a majority of Labour MPs). In the *theorised* model these pathways are fixed to 0, but Self-Transcendence and Conservation values continue to exert an indirect effect upon party affiliation via both social and economic ideology. MPs scoring higher for Conservation values were more likely to be found in parties on the Right, and vice versa for those scoring higher on Self-Transcendence.

The fact that Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement values impact directly on other variables (i.e Party), whilst Self-Transcendence and Conservation values do so indirectly via ideology, suggests a differentiated relationship between MPs' basic values and their political behaviours. In chapter 4 of this thesis I argued that BHV, as broad principles that humans use to make decisions and evaluate behavioural options in *many* situations (Feldman, 2003), require translation in politics in order to guide *context specific* choices. The results presented above indicate that this may only be true for Self-Transcendence and Conservation values when it comes to politics. By virtue of not directly relating to common political orientations (i.e. Left and Right), it is possible that Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement values impact directly on the political behaviour of MPs from all party affiliations. Further research is needed to interrogate this finding properly.

Building on the conceptual and empirical work of previous research, the results presented in this chapter advance the academic understanding of both BHV – as active elements in elite politics – and of parliamentary political behaviour in the UK. Grounded in

the theoretical premise of the IMPPB, this chapter makes a highly original, interdisciplinary, contribution to the study of elite agency in the UK Parliament. It shows, in particular, that a) elected representatives make important decisions based upon their own personality characteristics; that b) this effect operates in flux with informal pressures exerted by external role alters and internal party structures; and c) these effects operate via both direct and indirect pathways.

"[W]e have a role beyond making the machine here work better for everybody and that is, without being too grand about it, we have a national purpose being here. It is to make ourselves redundant."

UK Member of Parliament, 2017 (Interviewee 4)

In Search of the 'Perfect' Politician

So far in this thesis I have discussed a range of original findings that have important consequences for the conduct and study of representative parliamentary democracy in the UK. Data on Members of Parliament (MPs) have been compared with the British public to show that personality matters in differentiating the political class from the rest of society. Political elites in the UK differ from their electors in terms of the goals and motivations that drive their daily behaviour, even when compared to corresponding socio-demographic sub-groups in the general population. The data also reveal distinct divisions between those on the Left and Right of politics that are exacerbated among elites. However, these findings suggest, in turn, that the gap between governors and governed is particularly acute - in psychological terms - on the Left of British politics. The final related, substantive results of this study are presented in this chapter, which analyses data from a conjoint experiment conducted with a representative sample of 1637 British citizens in October 2017 (see Chapter 6, pp.143-146). The data are operationalised to reveal the relative importance of personality characteristics - specifically Basic Human Values (BHV) - to public voting habits and, at a further level, the types of people most desired in national politics. In line with hypotheses built in chapter 5, these results are used to assess the existence of a mediated perception gap between citizens' ideal-type MP and the politicians they elect.

I. Basic Values and Political Preferences

The extant research base on the role of personality in politics has gathered pace in recent years (Caprara and Silvester, 2018; Dietrich et al., 2012). Studies have examined the links between personality and political ideology (e.g. Fatke, 2016; Lewis and Bates, 2011), political attitudes (e.g. Jonason, 2014), political participation (Vecchione and Caprara, 2009)

and voting behaviours (e.g. Bakker et al., 2016). However, studies of personality in leadership (cf. Zaccaro, 2007) and, moreover, studies that examine Basic Human Values (BHV) in politics are more scant (cf. Vecchione et al., 2015). Within this smaller literature, studies that gather representative self-report data on elites' personalities are particularly unique (cf. Wyatt and Silvester, 2018). Not only is this thesis highly original for analysing data on MPs' basic values and comparing it to the voting public - the first study of its kind in the UK - but this has been followed by a robust experimental survey in which public preferences vis-a-vis the values of elected representatives can also be compared to reality. The data presented and the methodology used to gather it are unique in existing political science and political psychology research.

Existing studies - including the results presented in this thesis so far - suggest that political elites and voters of similar partisan blocs share congruent personality characteristics (Caprara et al., 2003; Caprara and Zimbardo, 2004). However, less is known about the importance of this congruency effect for voting habits and the extent to which voters seek to elect politicians with similar personalities to themselves. Given the increasingly personalised nature of contemporary democratic politics (Barbaranelli et al., 2007) and the near ubiquitous use of social media technologies by political parties, it is entirely possible that the salience of personality as a voting heuristic has increased as voters have more opportunities to see, hear and scrutinise candidates. In the United States, for example, Ryne Sherman (2018) has used large-N online data from the *Trump Similarity Values Test* to show that people with similar value profiles to that of Trump were more likely to support him regardless of party affiliations or political ideology.⁹⁶

The results of the conjoint experiment augment this literature in a number of directions. The average marginal component effects (reported graphically for the full sample in Figure 10.1) show, firstly, that voters have very distinct preferences when it comes to selecting their elected representatives. In comparative studies of the public-opinion/public-policy nexus, the 'Ostrogorski Paradox' (Rae and Daudt, 1976) stipulates that the collective outcomes of elections, by virtue of representing the aggregated interests of individual decisions borne from individual causes, cannot convey coherent policy mandates. Yet in this case, even when the sample is combined and 'individual' characteristics are elided, there remain clear and statistically significant trends in the data. This would suggest that regardless

⁹⁶ Donald Trump's personal value profile was created by researchers, who took the similarity test in the guise of Trump prior to its public release.


of sub-group variety, it is possible to identify common preferences among the public about 'who' they want to represent them - even if the same cannot be said of the policies these sub-groups want those MPs to enact.

The z scores reported in Table 10.1 and the change in predicted probabilities illustrated in Figure 10.1 show, for example, that the sample slightly prefer female and older candidates to male or young candidates. The first of these results presents somewhat of a paradox, given that the majority of MPs are male. It may be assumed, therefore, that public preferences in terms of gender are not translated into electoral choices due to a lack of women candidates (see also Fox and Lawless, 2010; Holman and Schneider, 2017). By contrast, it seems that public preferences for older politicians are successfully reproduced in a Parliament comprising MPs with an average age over 50.

The data also suggest that the British public moderately prefer candidates who went through state education as opposed to private schooling, reflecting the majority experience for members of the public (93% attend state schools) and, in turn, the disparity between public preferences and the composition of Parliament (33% attended independent schools). The public show moderate preferences for MPs who have worked in teaching or the charity sector over those who have already held elected office locally. This result echoes sentiments found in the political class literature, which highlights public dissatisfaction with the professionalisation of career politics. In addition, participants moderately preferred candidates who were married with children, indicating greater trust in politicians from nuclear families.

Whilst the preferences reported above were all relatively marginal, participants were more concerned about the religion, political priorities, and personalities of candidates. Although the ethnicity of a candidate had no significant effect on vote choice, participants expressed strong preferences for Christian candidates over, in particular, Muslim ones. Muslim candidates were, in fact, more than 10 percentage points less likely to be selected than Christians. This result may reflect conflicted public fears about radicalisation, extremism and terrorism that have, in recent years, manifested in anti-Muslim, anti-immigration attitudes (Fisher et al., 2015). If these findings generalise to wider voting patterns, it suggests that Muslim candidates face a much more difficult task getting elected to Parliament than their Christian peers. Considering that religious minorities are already under-represented in British politics, this is a worrying finding.

Figure 10.1 Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample of 1637 British adults (change in predicted probability of candidate selection by attribute).



Similarly strong preferences were expressed for participants whose political message prioritised the good of the nation or their constituents over party interests. This extends a dense literature on attitudes to representative roles and confirms research indicating public preferences for constituency MPs (Childs and Cowley, 2011; Campbell and Cowley, 2014). However, these data also support previous empirical studies that find surprisingly small differences between these 'local' inclinations and public support for other representative tasks (Campbell and Lovenduski, 2015). The Hansard's audit of political engagement in 2010, conducted at the height of the parliamentary expenses scandal, found that there was little difference between the number of citizens who preferred MPs to focus on local issues in the constituency (46%) and those who preferred MPs to focus on national interests (40%). Yet as with that study, the results presented in this conjoint analysis show that the public prefer politicians to prioritise either of those interests over those of their political party. This finding reinforces existing literature on public antipathy for partisan politicking (Jennings et al., 2016).

Asked to rank their Party, the nation, and their constituency in order of importance, MPs in the elite sample analysed for this thesis overwhelmingly reflected similar preferences to public participants in the conjoint experiment. Only 7% of MPs ($n = 8$) reported the party as their top priority as an elected representative. The other 93% ($n = 98$) reported the constituency or the nation as their most pressing priority in politics, and some 52% placed party interests at the bottom of their list. The comparisons drawn here imply that MPs and the public are broadly in line with one another when it comes to defining the purpose of national political office.

Finally, the conjoint analysis reveals specific personality preferences among the British public when it comes to choosing elected officials for Parliament. In particular, citizens want MPs who are high in Self-Transcendence values. Candidates whose personal statement reflected Universalism or Benevolence values were approximately 30 percentage points more likely to be chosen than candidates who expressed Power values.⁹⁷ This would suggest that, above all, citizens are looking for MPs who are tolerant, broad-minded, honest and loyal. Self-Direction, Security and Conformity values also had a strong positive effect on vote choice. This implies that after Self-Transcendence values, citizens are most concerned about selecting representatives who are creative and independent but who, simultaneously,

⁹⁷ Power values were selected as a baseline because they are routinely rated as least important in representative samples around the world (Bardi and Schwartz, 2001).

will apply themselves to protect the safety, stability and dominant character of society. For participants in this conjoint survey, these personality characteristics had a greater impact on vote choice than any other physical or social variable (Hypothesis 9).

Table 10.1 Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCE) for a conjoint analysis of public voting preferences (N = 1637).

Attribute of Candidate	Level	Estimate	Standard Error	z value
Gender (Baseline = <i>Male</i>)	Female	0.028	0.007	3.860 ***
Age (Baseline = <i>Young</i>)	Old	0.018	0.008	2.155 *
Ethnicity (Baseline = <i>White</i>)	Black, African and Ethnic Minority (BAME)	0.003	0.008	0.415
Disability (Baseline = <i>Not Disabled</i>)	Disabled	0.003	0.01	0.343
Education (Baseline = <i>Private School</i>)	State Comprehensive School	0.051	0.009	5.973 ***
	State Grammar School	0.043	0.008	5.110 ***
	Religious School	-0.010	0.009	-0.919
Occupation (Baseline = <i>Local Councillor</i>)	Armed Forces	0.016	0.013	1.199
	Stock Broker	-0.024	0.013	-1.898
	Lawyer	0.008	0.013	0.638
	Charitable	0.025	0.013	1.978 *
	Worker			
	Teacher	0.029	0.013	2.316 *
	Consultant	0.001	0.013	0.113
	Party Official	-0.011	0.013	-0.839
	Builder	-0.006	0.013	0.482
	Trade Union Representative	-0.012	0.013	-0.901
Family (Baseline = <i>Single</i>)	Married	0.010	0.008	1.254
	Married with Children	0.030	0.008	3.603 ***
	Single Parent	0.023	0.008	2.529 *

Religion (Baseline = <i>Christian</i>)	Muslim	-0.107	0.009	-10.871 ***
	Buddhist	-0.042	0.009	-4.328 ***
	Jewish	-0.044	0.009	-4.642 ***
	Atheist	-0.005	0.009	-0.471
Accent/*Regional Identity* (Baseline = <i>Queen's English</i>)	Welsh	0.011	0.012	0.884
	Scottish	0.007	0.012	0.566
	Irish	-0.012	0.012	-0.978
	Mancunian	0.016	0.012	1.331
	Liverpudlian	-0.001	0.012	-0.103
	West Country	0.017	0.012	1.351
	Yorkshire North-East	0.020 0.005	0.012 0.012	1.613 0.418
Political Priority (Baseline = <i>My Party and its Manifesto</i>)	<i>Common Good of the Nation</i>	0.097	0.008	12.362 ***
	<i>My Constituents</i>	0.089	0.008	11.257 ***
Basic Human Values (Baseline = <i>Power</i>)	Conformity	0.124	0.0130	9.547 ***
	Tradition	0.038	0.0130	2.985 **
	Benevolence	0.291	0.014	20.705 ***
	Universalism	0.305	0.014	21.445 ***
	Self-Direction	0.162	0.013	12.209 ***
	Stimulation	0.047	0.013	3.752 ***
	Hedonism	0.038	0.013	3.018 **
	Achievement Security	0.012 0.171	0.013 0.013	0.996 13.175 ***

Significance: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

A comparison of MPs' average BHV hierarchy with public preferences expressed in the conjoint survey (Table 10.2, below) shows distinct similarities at the top end. The fact that MPs attribute most importance to Self-Transcendence values and these are, at the same time, most important for citizens' candidate selections, implies that voters get MPs with the 'right' personalities. If a hypothetical line of causation is drawn between public preferences and candidate success, then this result would suggest that either a) voters correctly perceive congruent personality characteristics in potential candidates and fill Parliament with MPs high in Self-Transcendence values, or b) mediated party political campaigns adeptly manipulate candidate images to meet the public's psychological preferences. Either way this is a highly significant finding, given a large extant research base now pointing to the importance of leader evaluations for vote choice (Garzia, 2012; Lausten and Bor, 2017).

Table 10.2 Value hierarchies compared for UK Members of Parliament (n = 106) and public ideal-types (N = 1637).

Members of Parliament	General Population (Ideal-Type)
BENEVOLENCE	UNIVERSALISM
UNIVERSALISM	BENEVOLENCE
SELF-DIRECTION	SECURITY
CONFORMITY	SELF-DIRECTION
STIMULATION	CONFORMITY
SECURITY	STIMULATION
POWER	HEDONISM
ACHIEVEMENT	TRADITION
HEDONISM	ACHIEVEMENT
TRADITION	POWER (BASELINE)

At the same time, it is clear that MPs attribute more relative importance to Self-Enhancement values and less relative importance to Conservation values than the public would like. Whilst these values are relatively less important to MPs and voters than Self-Transcendence values, these differences would seem to be crucial for understanding contemporary disaffection with political elites. It is on these characteristics that anti-political media arguably concentrates, focusing public attention on the incongruence between public preferences and the personalities of their politicians. These results do, to an extent, confirm the model theorised in chapter 5. A preoccupation with finding fault in parliamentary representatives, as well as a string of unfortunate moral scandals, arguably distorts the public perception or projection of MPs' most important motivations. The public thus consume a skewed and often homogenised set of political personas in the press that emphasise MPs' Self-Enhancement values and, consequently, undermine the interpersonal trust judgements necessary to sustain political participation (see Chapter 5, Hypothesis 10).

These conclusions require further research but they are also supported here by interview data with elite participants. Not only do the comments reported in chapter 7 testify to MPs' overwhelmingly positive appraisals of one another - regardless of partisanship - but nearly all participants also spoke of the damage done by a voyeuristic media and, in particular, the parliamentary expenses scandal of 2010. Interviewee 5 was adamantly

dismissive of the media but also blamed their biased coverage of MPs' moral fibre for diminishing the transparency between politicians and the public:

I think it's bollocks. The hardest-working, most virtuous [...] people that I've ever met have been fellow politicians. There's a certain hypocrisy amongst journalists in particular who claim to be disappointed about the fact that MPs aren't more open and free-thinking about what they say, when actually the thing that most shocked me about becoming Home Secretary was the way in which every single thing that I said was pored over, and dissected, and kept on record [...] To protect yourself, rightly or wrongly, you tend to be very careful about what you say.

Other MPs were quick to point out the irony of a media profession that seeks to expose the worst traits in politicians without acknowledging the 'small number of press barons who are mostly tax exiles and are just, in some cases, vile, and run campaigns against individuals that are disgraceful' (Interviewee 12). One senior Labour MP reflected that the media purposefully homogenised its coverage of MPs in order to ingratiate itself to the public:

So, it's nonsense to say we're all any one thing, but it makes the media more powerful if we're useless because then they are absolutely, amazingly clever and you can trust them to tell you what to think rather than trusting the politicians. That's really what they're after (Interviewee 14)

For more experienced MPs, it was the expenses scandal of 2010 that sparked an intensification of the personalised pillorying of MPs. Interviewees expressed a sense of injustice that for the sake of a few 'who quite deliberately worked the system' (Interviewee 16), they could no longer instil trust in their electors:

The expenses did us a terrible amount of damage. There's always been this view that, "Oh, politicians are just in it for themselves. They don't represent us. They just think whatever they can achieve for themselves." That's always been there but I think the expenses stuff made that far, far worse. It didn't matter whether you were one of the people who were having fingers pointed at them in the press or not (Interviewee 15)

Taken together, these findings represent a significant step forward in the academic understanding of the role of elite personalities in anti-politics and voting behaviour. Ultimately, citizens appear to place great importance on the personality characteristics of those whom they elect to represent them. Based on congruence between their priorities in this respect and the importance attributed to those same basic values by MPs, it is possible to argue that citizens get the representatives they desire. It is, however, the points of dissonance between these ideal-types and the personalities of elected MPs - and not their congruence - that occupies the public perception of national politicians.

II. Leadership Emergence

So far this chapter has presented original survey data to illustrate that the British public have distinct preferences about the personalities of their representatives. Compared with self-report data from a representative sample of UK MPs, the most important of these preferences appear to be reproduced in the strongest basic values of those occupying Parliament. However, to test this democratic link between principal and agent requires some understanding of the extent to which it is based on causal mechanisms. For example, in a pure experimental scenario such as the conjoint analysis reported in this thesis, those candidates who match the public's BHV ideal-type are more likely to get elected than those who do not. Yet the world of democratic elections is far more messy and layered. Firstly, the clean theoretical statement above does not account for the fact that most voters will ascribe personality characteristics to candidates based on secondary sources (Bhattacharya et al., 2016). Secondly, in line with ascription-actuality theories of leadership (cf. Judge et al., 2002), there is no guarantee that those candidates who match public preferences in terms of their personality characteristics will also succeed once they are in the role.

In a recent study of 138 local politicians in the UK, Wyatt and Silvester (2018) found evidence for the ascription-actuality theory in British politics. Gathering self-report data on the Big 5 personality traits from local councillors, ascribed traits from 526 members of the public based on candidate image only, and at least two peer appraisals of political effectiveness for each councillor, Wyatt and Silvester found that Agreeableness was the most important predictor of candidate success in an election but a negative predictor of efficacy in-role. To check whether or not these results replicate at the national level, an elite sample of 106 MPs is used here to test the effect of BHV upon leadership emergence (the majority achieved by each MP in their last General Election) and leadership effectiveness (whether or not an MP has occupied a frontbench role). The results of a poisson loglinear regression model between basic values and each MPs' vote majority are reported in Table 10.3 (below). Controls are included for age and gender as well as party performance in the relevant election for each participant, thus accounting for the strength of partisanship as a predictor of vote choice in the UK system (Holtz-Bacha et al., 2014). The model also controlled for the number of years each participant had held office, thus accounting for advantages accrued to an incumbent candidate.

The results show that all of the variables included in the model had a significant effect on participants' election majorities. However, there are clear differences in the direction and

magnitude of these effects. Not surprisingly, a participant's tenure in office was the single biggest predictor of the size of their majority. MPs with the longest record of service in this sample gained majorities in their last election win that were almost 60% larger than the least experienced candidates. Incumbent politicians necessarily have opportunities to cultivate relationships with their voters, accrue context-specific knowledge about an area, and develop necessary skills for campaigning that a new candidate does not. By contrast, participants' margins only increased by 5% between those elections in which an MP's party had performed worst and best in terms of its overall vote share. The results also indicate that women candidates achieved larger margins in their last election than men, which contradicts prior research showing voter preferences for male candidates but runs in line with the findings of the conjoint analysis presented in section I (above). It is possible that this finding is confounded by the over-representation of Labour women MPs in the sample.

When it comes to personality characteristics - measured here using MPs' basic values - it appears that MPs who are motivated by Conservation values were most successful in achieving large majorities. Those participants who scored highest for Conformity, Tradition and Security values won majorities that were 46%, 34%, and 43% greater respectively than those MPs who scored lowest for these value factors. However, the voter preferences revealed in the conjoint analysis (section I) suggest that Self-Transcendence values should impact on an MP's election success more than any other. There are two possible reasons for this result. Firstly, the model of candidate emergence tested in chapter 7 showed that individuals who are attracted to politics attribute extraordinary importance to Benevolence and Universalism values. It is possible, therefore, that the uniform presence of these values in campaign rhetoric decreases their salience as a measure by which voters can actually discriminate between candidates. Secondly, it is possible that voters - conditioned by an anti-political media filter - either do not acknowledge candidates' behavioural and rhetorical expressions of Self-Transcendence values or, alternatively, do not believe them.

Table 10.3 Poisson loglinear regression model to test the effect of basic values on leadership emergence (candidate majorities by vote count) in the UK.

Variable	B (S.E)	Wald Chi Square	Exp(B)
<i>1. Basic Values (rescaled 0-1):</i>			
Conformity	.381 (.0098)	1506.911 ***	1.464
Tradition	.291 (.0099)	865.095 ***	1.338
Benevolence	.053 (.0086)	37.519 ***	1.054
Universalism	-.063 (.0093)	45.407 ***	.939
Self-Direction	-.475 (.0081)	3449.935 ***	.622
Stimulation	.460 (.0087)	2791.960 ***	1.584
Achievement	.091 (.0105)	75.403 ***	1.095
Power	-.363 (.0092)	1547.243 ***	.695
Security	.361 (.0084)	1847.996 ***	1.434
<i>2. Demographics:</i>			
Age (continuous data rescaled 0-1)	-.070 (.0082)	73.885 ***	.932
Gender (dummy = 1 - Female, 0 - Male)	.211 (.0023)	8067.886 ***	1.235
<i>3. Contextual:</i>			
Party Success (% vote share in relevant General Election)	.050 (.0039)	169.323 ***	1.052
Candidate tenure (no. of years as an elected MP)	.469 (.0062)	5801.727 ***	1.599

Significance: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

Whereas abstract political psychology research with voters has shown that warmth is the most significant predictor of candidate preference (Goodwin et al., 2014; Lausten and Bor, 2017), the results presented above suggest that UK MPs do not actually maximise their vote tallies by stressing their integrity, honesty, or commitment to social equalities. Instead, those candidates who were able to articulate a sense of belonging, self-discipline, family and social security, and social order won their elections by bigger margins regardless of how long they had been in office previously or how well their party did in the election. This *does* support the results of the conjoint analysis, in which hypothetical candidates with personal statements defined by Conformity and Security values were 12% and 17% more likely to be selected than those who defined themselves by Power values (Table 10.1, above). It also complements the research conducted with local politicians by Wyatt and Silvester (2018, p.7), who discovered negative associations between voter ascriptions of warmth and candidate's leadership emergence.

Wyatt and Silvester (2018) also found positive relationships between councillors' self-rated personality trait Agreeableness and election success. In previous research (Park-Leduc et al., 2015, p.13), the personality trait Agreeableness has correlated with Benevolence ($\rho = .61$), Power ($\rho = -.42$), Universalism ($\rho = .39$), Conformity ($\rho = .26$), and Tradition values ($\rho = .22$). At a local level, it is possible that the trans-situational goals associated with Benevolence values translate into poignant, vote-winning issues that are important to local residents. However, at the national level, results presented here would suggest that it is the more conservative aspects of Agreeableness (i.e. shared characteristics with Conservation values) that predict candidate success. This is understandable in the context of post-millennial Britain and rising concerns about national/social stability and a fractured social fabric (Runciman, 2018).

To an equal extent, the model tested here shows that those MPs who scored highest for Stimulation values in this sample also won their last election by the largest vote margins. Stimulation values motivate people to seek challenges and take chances, and moreover to enjoy novel or uncertain situations (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 1992). Given the unique pressures of running a political campaign as well as the stakes of losing, it is understandable that those candidates most suited, psychologically, to that environment will also be most confident and successful when canvassing voters, generating public support and keeping up with the pace of the campaign. These results support prior research demonstrating a link between the personality trait Extroversion and candidate success (Roets and Van Hiel,

2009; Simonton, 1988).⁹⁸ It also augments a literature on apposite political skills in parliamentary politics, which has tended to focus on competences such as communication, persuasion and intelligence rather than more affective motivations (Silvester et al., 2014; Silvester and Dykes, 2007).

Although the results presented here suggest a strong positive association between Conservation values and leadership emergence, as measured by a candidate's election majority, these same values were negative predictors of whether MPs in the sample held/had held frontbench offices. Frontbench MPs in the sample scored considerably lower for Conservation values than backbench MPs; by contrast MPs in frontbench roles scored higher for Self-Enhancement values (Chapter 7, p.157). This finding echoes the 'trait paradox', which has shown personality traits to be productive in some scenarios but disadvantageous in others (Judge et al., 2009). Here it would seem that the same principle applies to basic values in British politics: the goals, motivations and behaviours associated with Conservation values help MPs to get elected but inhibit their advancement once they are *in-role*. Holding frontbench political office demands a certain set of skills and characteristics that are associated with confronting others, arguing for and defending beliefs, leading others and, at the same time, manipulating or persuading them to behave for you in certain ways (Deluga, 2001). MPs who score above average for Conservation values and thus attribute importance to stability, respect and moderation may naturally find it harder to succeed at these tasks than those with above average scores for Self-Enhancement values. As gatekeepers to these roles, senior party officials and other MPs will also have different standards and expectations by which to select suitable candidates than the wider public ascribe in a general election scenario.

III. Conjoint Analysis of Candidate Preferences by Sub-Groups

In previous chapters of this thesis, I have used data on MPs' BHV to show that members of the political class are distinct from one another, from the British public in general, and from corresponding socio-demographic sub-groups (Chapter 8). The data also revealed that those sub-groups are, themselves, characterised by meaningful variations in their basic values. It is plausible, therefore, that those variations are translated into differing candidate preferences when it comes to democratic elections. The final section of this chapter therefore divides the conjoint analysis discussed in section I above and presents results on the

⁹⁸ In a meta-analysis of personality studies, Park-Leduc et al. (2015, p.19, 22) found moderate-strong associations between the trait Extraversion and the basic value Stimulation.

political ideal-types of the British public by gender, age, social grade, partisanship, and vote choice in the 2016 referendum to leave the European Union. It is neither necessary nor possible to discuss all of these results in the depth they deserve within this thesis, but supporting graphs can be found in appendices G to K.

i. Gender (Appendix G) - A longstanding literature on gender differences indicates that men and women approach politics in separate ways (see Elder and Green, 2003), emphasise different political topics (Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Schlozman et al., 1995), consume political information differently (Elder and Green, 2003), and express different preferences for modes of political activism (e.g. Rosenthal, 1998). In this thesis, I have also shown that men and women are distinct in their basic values among the general British population and political elites. It is expected, therefore, that together these differences will inform a range of separate preferences when it comes to choosing an elected representative.

Dividing the conjoint analysis by gender supports these predictions. In terms of candidates' socio-demographic characteristics, men and women differed in their preferences for education, occupation and family status. For example, women preferred candidates who attended a religious school instead of a private school but men did not. Trends in the data showed that women had much stronger preferences for candidates from charitable or teaching professions, whereas men displayed a stronger sense of anti-careerism in their dislike of all 'political' backgrounds. Women also revealed a slight preference for single parent candidates, whilst men clearly valued nuclear families where the candidate was married with children. Surprisingly, there was not a significant difference in men and women's preferences for candidates according to their gender - in both cases, women candidates had a slight advantage.

Finally, the conjoint analysis shows that men and women *do* have different psychological preferences when it comes to democratic elections. In particular, Self-Transcendence values had a greater impact on women's vote choice than men's. Candidates with a personal message linked to Benevolence values, for example, were almost 35 percentage points more likely to be chosen than those with Power values by women. The same Figure was only just above 20 percentage points for male participants. Male participants also demonstrated larger preferences for Conservation values than women. Given that the analysis of European Social Survey (ESS) data (Chapter 8) showed that men in Britain score significantly higher for Conservation values than women - whilst women score significantly

higher for Self-Transcendence values - the results of the conjoint would suggest that men and women project their own value priorities into candidate preferences at political elections.

ii. Age (Appendix H) - The data presented in chapter 8 showed that there are clear cleavages in the basic values of the young and old. The young are more motivated by Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement values, whereas older citizens attribute more importance to Conservation values. It is possible that these differences are the cause of either lifecycle or cohort effects, or both (Schwartz, 2005). However, these findings link to a wider long-standing literature on the liberal political attitudes of young voters and the more conservative inclinations of older voters (Russell et al., 1992). In the last UK General Election, age became a deciding factor in the resurgence of the Labour Party under socialist leader Jeremy Corbyn. Young voters were attracted to a Labour manifesto that pledged progressive policies on university tuition fees, investment in social housing, re-nationalisation of the rail network, and rent controls for the private sector (Sloam and Ehsan, 2017). It is expected, therefore, that age will have a significant effect on voters' ideal-types when it comes to selecting a national representative.

As anticipated, the candidate selections of young participants (18-29 years old) were more objectively liberal than either the 30-49 or 50+ age cohorts. They were, for example, more likely to select women candidates and did not show the same religious biases as older participants. The over-50s were more anti-political in their selections than the other age groups: they preferred candidates from all occupations (except finance) more than those from 'political' jobs, which were represented in the conjoint by the categories of party official, trade union representative and councillor. The over-50s were also the only age cohort to express preferences for candidates from manual professions over those with political experience.

In terms of BHV, Self-Transcendence values were almost equally important to all age groups. However, Self-Direction values were, in particular, more important to the youngest participants and those in the middle-aged bracket than the over-50s. Hypothetical candidates with a personal message characterised by Self-Direction values were, on average, 20 percentage points more likely to be chosen by the two younger cohorts than those candidates who prioritised Power values. By contrast, the over-50s only expressed a 12-14 percentage point preference for those same candidates, less than the swing in this age bracket for candidates who prioritised Conformity or Security values. In light of the analysis presented in chapter 8, these results suggest that age has a significant effect on the personal and psychological characteristics that citizens seek in candidates for Parliament.

iii. Partisanship (Appendix I) - The strong connections between partisanship and basic values discussed in this thesis (chapter 8, pp.185-200) and elsewhere (Bakker et al., 2016; Fatke, 2016; Lewis and Bates, 2011) provide compelling evidence that suggest stark psychological divisions between those on the Left and Right of politics, and potentially those who do not vote at all. In a parallel small-n, standard survey of voters in Belgium, Roets and Van Hiel (2009) found that these partisan differences re-emerged in the personality traits desired in politicians by voters on the Left and Right. Both ideological blocs wanted their parliamentarians to be high in Conscientiousness but voters on the Left also demonstrated a preference for Agreeableness and Openness, whereas voters on the Right wanted their politicians to be higher in Extraversion (Roets and Van Hiel, 2009, p. 62).

These findings reproduce in the current conjoint analysis. Self-Transcendence values - which tend to correlate with the personality traits Agreeableness and Openness (Parks-Leduc et al., 2015) - were more important for Labour voters (and to a lesser extent non-voters) than Conservative Party supporters.⁹⁹ For example, Labour voters were almost 40 percentage points more likely to choose candidates who prioritised Benevolence values than those with a statement reflecting Power values. Among Conservative voters, this swing was only just over 20 percentage points. Accounting for the error terms in these results, Security and Conformity values were almost as important as Self-Transcendence values for Conservative voters. These results again indicate that citizens project from their own values (see Chapter 8) to ideal-types when it comes to abstract choices about the characteristics of elected representatives.

Non-voters were also included here as a comparative group. By contrast to both Labour and Conservative supporters, non-voters showed more distrust of hypothetical candidates who were characterised by Power values. Assuming that voters are discouraged from formal politics by specific evaluations of incumbent politicians (Bowler and Karp, 2004; Easton, 1965), then it makes sense that these citizens will also be most sensitive to those basic values that imply Machiavellianism. In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, non-voters were more conservative in their selections. Though not statistically significant, non-voters showed preferences for non-disabled and white candidates that were not present in the results for the other two voting groups. However, Conservative voters were the most pro-

⁹⁹ Participants were asked to self-report their voting record from the 2015 and 2017 General Elections. Given that the General Election of 2017 stood in stark contrast to elections over the last two decades - in terms of both turnout and vote shares - the data from 2015 was used to partition the participants.

Christian and anti-Muslim, and also preferred candidates who spoke with Queen's English to all other accents.¹⁰⁰ The opposite was true for Labour supporters.

iv. Social grade (Appendix J) - Political scientists writing in the second half of the 20th century documented a decline in class voting. On one hand, it was argued that social and cultural issues - independent of class - overtook economic concerns as people's material standard of living improved (Inglehart, 1990). On the other hand, class was assumed to lose its importance as a political umbrella as divisions and diversity within classes became more prominent and created new shared interest groups in society (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985; Lash and Urry, 1987). This research has been accompanied by a vast literature on party politics, in which class cleavages are no longer indicative of either partisan affiliation or party political stratagem. Taken together, the research on class dealignment in the twentieth century argues that the differences in voting behaviour between classes have greatly diminished (see Crewe, 1986; Heath and McDonald, 1987). However, more recent research has also shown that political attitudes as well as political ambition remain clearly distinguishable between citizens in the lowest and highest social grade groups (e.g. Allen and Cutts, 2018). Given that social grade also tends to intersect with educational attainment, wealth and socialisation experiences, the gap between the socioeconomic profile of citizens and the political class is greatest for those in the lowest social grades.

The results of the conjoint experiment confirm both similarities and differences in voting preferences across social grades in the UK. When selecting ideal candidates for their political representation, those participants in social grades AB attributed much more importance to Self-Transcendence values and Self-Direction values than those participants in social grades DE. By contrast, participants in social grades DE assigned more relative importance to Security values. Theorists have long argued that class voting patterns will intensify and decrease according to short term changes in material well-being (Converse, 1958; Inglehart, 1990). In the UK, austerity policies since 2010 have drastically affected the living standards of those on low incomes in socially precarious situations (Belfield et al., 2014; Pemberton et al., 2016). It is possible, therefore, that these experiences are reflected in the values that citizens desire in their policy-makers. Affluent citizens in social grades AB can afford to think in more abstract terms about the welfare of *others* (Self-Transcendence values) and are happy to delegate this at a political level to independent and creative politicians (Self-

¹⁰⁰ Accent was used here as a proxy for the candidate's regional identity on the basis that voters have been proven to infer candidates' characteristics from biological and verbal cues (see Antonakis and Eubanks, 2017).

Direction values). On the other hand, citizens in social grades DE who are struggling to provide material safety and stability for themselves and their families, want MPs who will not only promote their welfare (Self-Transcendence values) but at the same time prioritise social and national security (Security values).

In the present sample, the Labour and Conservative Party vote in 2015 was almost equally reliant on citizens from social grades AB (31% and 32% respectively). However, participants in social grades DE made up significantly more of the Labour vote in this sample (25%) than the Conservative vote (16%). Taken together, these statistics would appear to testify to an enduring class affiliation among working class Labour voters as well as New Labour's success in attracting votes from the wealthier, cosmopolitan elite (cf. Cruddas, 2006). However, the ideal value profiles of an MP for those in social grades DE are, by comparison to the elite of sample of MPs gathered for this thesis, much more similar to Conservative MPs than Labour ones. This finding reinforces the results presented in chapter 8 and adds nuance to the subsequent inference: that the psychological gap between the political class and the rest of the population is largest on the Left of politics and, in turn, between *working class* voters on the Left and their Labour representatives.

v. Brexit (Appendix K) - On the 23rd June 2016, the UK voted to leave the European Union in a historic referendum. Political journalists and researchers alike have spent much of their time since then trying to unpick who voted for Brexit and whether the decision was instrumental or affective. Both avenues of investigation point to a highly divided nation. In their multivariate analysis of vote and turnout share in 380 local authorities, Becker, Fetzner and Novy (2017) show that the key correlates for 'Vote Leave' were low educational attainment, a disproportionate reliance on manufacturing work, low income, and high unemployment. These were much stronger predictors of Vote Leave than participants' exposure to substantive political debate in the run up to the referendum (Ibid., pp. 644-646). However, research on public attitudes to the European Union suggests that voters take influential cues from the images and rhetoric of prominent politicians (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). In a large-N panel study of the Brexit vote, Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley (2017, p. 455) found that high likeability scores for Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson (the *de facto* leaders of the Leave campaign) significantly increased a) the probability of voting Leave and b) the chance of perceiving fewer costs than benefits in making that decision.

Taken together, these studies suggest that voters in the European Union referendum brought very different trans-situational goals (i.e. BHV) to their evaluation of the vote and, in

turn, sought congruence between their values and those of leading figures in the campaign. The conjoint analysis presented in this thesis is the first study to test this hypothesis. The results indicate a number of relevant insights. Firstly, Self-Transcendence values were far more important to the candidate selections of Remain voters than Leave voters. For example, 'Remainers' were almost 40 percentage points more likely to choose a candidate with Universalism values over one with Power values; the same statistic for Leave voters was a swing of just 20 percentage points. Whilst Remainers also prioritised Universalism values over Benevolence values, the opposite was true for Leave voters. It is possible that the local dimension attached to Benevolence values - the motivation to care for the welfare of those one knows *personally* and to be loyal to those around you - was much more important to Leave voters, whose concerns were dominated by their own well-being and that of other working class British citizens (see Becker et al., 2017). By contrast, Remain voters appear to be more broad-minded and attribute more importance to the need for, and potential benefits of, collaboration with other social and cultural groups (Universalism values). These are motivational goals that are, necessarily, supported by integration with other European states.

Two other differences appeared between these groups. Leave voters attributed more importance to Conformity values, whilst Remain voters showed larger preferences for Self-Direction values. This would imply that Leave voters are more likely to prioritise discipline, honouring past generations, and social cohesion. These values support extant research on the socially conservative nature of Leave voters and, in particular, their negative perceptions of immigration.¹⁰¹ Although Leave voters in the conjoint survey did not express significant preferences for white candidates, they did show a much stronger dislike of Muslim candidates than Remain voters. This suggests that religion rather than race is a more important factor in political decisions for Leave voters. Remainers, on the other hand, are more motivated by freedom of choice and curiosity when it comes to social interactions and new experiences (Self-Direction values). These are psychological needs that are arguably met by European Union membership and the opportunities inherent in the principle of free movement of goods and people.

Not only do these results reveal significant differences in the personality characteristics valued by Leave and Remain voters in politics, they also support the model of

¹⁰¹ Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley (2017, p. 457) show that negative attitudes towards immigration were not only associated with voting Leave but also predicted positive benefit-cost evaluations of that decision as well as the belief that immigration catalysed domestic terrorism. The latter attitude, in particular, contradicts the motivational goals of Conformity values.

personalised candidate choice/political participation developed in this thesis (Chapter 5). Put another way, the value preferences expressed by Leave and Remain voters map neatly to the rhetoric of respective campaign leaders. Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson pedalled a pseudo-nationalistic message to British citizens that centred on 'taking back control', British sovereignty, securing borders, and saving money for the NHS. By contrast, David Cameron and (to a lesser extent) Jeremy Corbyn led a Remain campaign with the slogan 'Britain stronger in Europe', warning citizens that exiting the European Union would have catastrophic *global* as well as domestic effects on the economy. Ultimately the Remain camp's 'Project Fear' did not appeal as effectively as the Leave campaign to a largely conservative British public and, in particular, the values of future Leave voters.

If the model presented in chapter 5 is accepted (Figure 5.1, p.116), then it is anticipated that the perception and projection of MPs' personalities underpins voters' political participation. Where there is perceived congruence between the values of citizens and politicians, interpersonal trust between the former and latter is increased and voters relinquish their democratic liberty accordingly. In the case of the European Union referendum, the conjoint survey analysed here suggests that Leave voters trusted political leaders (ie. Farage and Johnson) who managed to project congruent basic values and speak to the public's deep-seated psychological needs. Whether that congruence was true or not, these results testify to the power of personality as an elite cue for public political decision making (cf. Gigerenzer et al., 2011). However, that same public have made a monumental political decision that will now be carried out by frontbench politicians who are, by and large, very different in their personality characteristics (see Chapter 7, section II).

This chapter has analysed a range of extremely significant findings from a robust and original conjoint analysis of public voting habits in the UK. These data show that in experimental scenarios where voters do not know the partisanship of a candidate, personality outweighs other political and socio-economic variables as a voting heuristic. Compared with elite data from 106 MPs, these results also indicate that at the aggregate level there is less of a disjuncture than assumed between the personalities the public *want* in national politics and the personalities they *get*. MPs' basic values reflect, for example, a public desire for politicians who prioritise Self-Transcendence values. This reinforces theoretical propositions made earlier in this thesis: an anti-political media is exacerbating a 'perception gap' that undermines interpersonal trust between governors and governed. However, the conjoint survey also reveals significant schisms within the general population that translate into larger differences

between MPs' basic values and the preferences of more conservative socio-demographic groups. These highly original findings greatly extend the academic understanding of electoral politics in the UK and the role of personality in candidate success.

“Then [Aneurin Bevan] realised he wasn’t really very powerful as a backbench member of Parliament, so he eventually got into the Cabinet. Then he got into the Cabinet, and he wondered where on earth the power really lay and came to the conclusion, as I have done, that most of the power lies with the establishment. Parliament is just there to try and moderate the excesses of some parts of the establishment.”

Labour MP (Interviewee 12)

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he Personal Side of Politics: Implications, Limitations and Next Steps

In writing this thesis, I set out to augment the conceptual and empirical purview of parliamentary studies in the UK. In doing so, I have executed a study that is purposefully ambitious in its scope, theory, and methodologies. Gathering unique quantitative and qualitative data on the Basic Human Values (BHV) of 106 national politicians, I departed from the rigid dominant traditions of historical institutionalism and opened a black box on the personal side of representative democracy in the UK. Through rigorous analysis of this data, as well as the results of a complementary conjoint analysis of public voting habits, I have made a number of highly significant and original contributions to both the parliamentary studies literature in the UK and additional subfields such as anti-politics, political behaviour, leadership and representation. Drawing on the interdisciplinary wisdom of political psychology in general, and the study of basic values in particular, I have attempted to traverse complementary areas of the academe to reveal new insights about the people who enter elite politics, the motivations they bring to the democratic arena, the ways in which they navigate institutional environments, and the divergence between popular rhetoric about politicians and reality.

The previous four chapters not only presented the results of this project but evaluated these findings in relation to both the extant literature and a series of theoretically informed hypotheses. The purpose of this final chapter is thus threefold: to tease out the broader implications of some of the central findings in this project and to suggest future avenues of research that have become apparent in the course of this study. For clarity and consistency, these objectives are met concurrently in five short substantive sections. The first three sections reflect on the core results presented in chapters 7 and 8 about 'who' enters elected

office and what these findings suggest about self-selection to elite politics, partisanship and descriptive representation in the UK. The fourth section builds on the data discussed in chapter 9 about the behaviour of politicians in Westminster and the implications of these results for debates about structure and agency in British politics. The fifth section adds to the findings of chapter 10 and drills down into issues of media bias, political choice and the quality of democracy. A final, sixth, section then reflects on specific limitations to the research design and the generalisability of the results.

I. Self-Selection and Democratic Elitism?

Through this thesis I committed to challenge the restrictive paradigms in studies of the UK Parliament that have, in line with an archaic notion of the Westminster Model, privileged the institutions inherent in the 'British Political Tradition' (Gamble, 1990). To achieve this objective, an innovative research design has been advanced that focuses, primarily, on the people 'doing' politics. Building on a nascent base of agency-centred research into the UK Parliament (Bell, 2018; Crewe, 2014; Rhodes, 2011; Searing, 1994), I executed a novel psychological study of UK Members of Parliament (MPs) as a way to cast new insights about representative agency inside Westminster, as well as the link between public disengagement from politics and a popular focus on political personalities. Combining new survey data on MPs' BHV with existing comparative data for the British public taken from the European Social Survey (ESS), I find:

- a) MPs are psychologically unique in terms of their basic values and that the differences between MPs and their electors are greatest at the highest levels of political office (RQ1; H1);
- b) political ambition is grounded in certain psychological motivations that contribute to elite self-selection as much or more so than socio-demographic factors and political opportunity structures (RQ1; H1);
- c) career politicians are no different in terms of their goals and motivations than other MPs from 'traditional' backgrounds, and appear equally committed to concepts such as equality, justice and welfare (RQ1; H2);
- d) politicians - as a significant proxy of the political class - are not an homogenous group. In fact, they differ in their everyday goals and motivations according to gender, age, education and partisanship (RQ1; H3); but

e) the psychological differences between MPs are still smaller than those between MPs and their corresponding socioeconomic and demographic groups in the general population. The only exception found in this study relates to the effects of partisanship, where a significant divergence in popular and elite basic values occurs on the Left but not the Right (RQ1; H3).

Through this thesis I have demonstrated a distinct self-selection to elite UK politics. Going beyond previous work on the demographic and socioeconomic predictors of political ambition (Allen and Cutts, 2018; Lawless, 2012), the data presented in this thesis suggest that aspirations towards elected office - and indeed the success of fulfilling those aspirations - relates strongly to certain psychological backstops (cf. Lasswell, 1930). As discussed in chapter 7, these results tap two features of democratic politics - competition and social change - that map onto two [normally] separate dimensions of psychologically 'sorting' into 'calling' and 'career' professions (Bourne and Jenkins, 2013; Knafo and Sagiv, 2004). The intense combination of prosocial public service and conflictual, hierarchical, even resource-driven party politics appears to attract people with an unusually high commitment to Self-Transcendence values and a *relatively* strong orientation towards Power values.

From a normative and empirical standpoint, these results should be interpreted carefully and, in the first instance, holistically. When MPs' basic values are assessed as a whole, then the results presented in this thesis are indicative of the democratic elitism previously found in the US (e.g. McClosky, 1964; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2013) - a highly liberal political elite (strongly motivated by Self-Transcendence and Openness to Change values) representing a comparatively authoritarian public (more motivated by Conservation values). Charges related to the flawed characters and self-serving nature of the political class (Osborne, 2007) do not withstand empirical scrutiny. Although the data indicate that MPs score significantly higher than the public for Power values, implying a greater desire to seek and control resources, the 'motivational differences between [basic] values can be seen as continuous rather than discrete' (Schwartz, 2014, p.247). Therefore, MPs' scores for Power values must be understood against their conflict with the opposing values of Universalism, Benevolence and Self-Direction (on which MPs score more positively overall). People who give high priority to Self-Transcendence and Openness to Change values tend to prefer and promote policies that they believe will extend and defend individual freedoms (Purkayastha et al., 2011). If one assumes a normative position that a) democracy is preferable to other political systems and that b) it is best protected by those who are motivationally aligned

to its core principles, then the psychological (self-)selection of MPs discovered in this study is a positive outcome.

These findings are highly significant for the original insights they provide about political recruitment in the UK and, in turn, anti-political sentiments about the 'quality' of its political class. Recent survey research by Will Jennings et al. (2016) showed that political discontent with contemporary politics in the UK revolves around presumptions about the necessary characteristics of politicians. In line with the perennial debates first raised by David Easton (1965), specific appraisals of moral malaise in elite politics have gravely impacted on diffuse public support for politics per se (cf. Jennings et al., 2017). In this context, the relevance of the data collected and analysed for this thesis centres on the extent to which politicians act upon the incongruent motivations expressed by Self-Transcendence and Power values. On one hand, if MPs primarily act upon Self-Transcendence values in their representative roles - or have the freedom to do so - then public fears about self-serving elites are unfounded, or at least exaggerated. If in fact MPs act more often than not on Power values, then scholars might conclude that public apathy and discontent is grounded in impressively perceptive psychological judgements that go beyond media negativity bias.

To the extent that chapter 9 did show that MPs' BHV impact on their daily parliamentary behaviours, it also showed that certain values became prescient depending on the context of the behaviour. These findings conform to previous research on the link between BHV and human behaviour, which suggest that values are often activated by the immediate situation (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003; Verplanken and Holland, 2002). In order to answer the dilemma raised above, future studies might conduct a more detailed analysis of the Westminster environment and the nature of those dominant stimuli under which MPs must act. These studies might, then, ascertain whether MPs' general commitment to the motivational goals of Self-Transcendence values are, or are not, activated by comparison to Power values. Experimental surveys and ethnographic research might also assess the extent to which MPs are able to withstand institutional cues and, instead, reconceptualise the political environment proactively in line with their most important values. Such inquiry is beyond the scope of this PhD.

This study has also shown that the 'personality gap' in the UK is greatest between the public and *frontbench* MPs, indicating that basic values also act as an internal criterion for self-selection within the political class. Those MPs who make it to the top are significantly more motivated to seek out new experiences, to be driven by original thought and action, and

to desire success that is recognised by others. This reinforces prior scholarship on the 'ambition factor' of political 'high flyers' (Hibbing, 1986; Macdonald, 1987; Searing, 1994). Whilst it may sound self-evident that the executive of any Parliament are different from their backbench colleagues, this finding has interesting repercussions for the functioning of a representative democracy. It implies that those actually making policy and running the country are the least like those they are representing. These differences are particularly interesting in the context of Brexit: a relatively conservative public has voted to revert to a past political situation, which will be carried out by politicians who are significantly less concerned about maintaining harmonious relations, stability or conforming to rules than either their constituents or their backbenchers. The repercussions of this can already be seen in the volatile handling of UK-EU negotiations since the Brexit referendum, both in the legislative debacle that led up to triggering Article 50 and afterwards (May, 2017).

As Allen and Cairney (2015, p.6) argue, 'many of the complaints put at the door of the 'political class' relate to Westminster politics and those with governing power or influence'. Highlighting this distinction is important because it indicates that popular perceptions of politicians reflect a degree of unconscious sensitivity to the psychological differences among MPs that are presented in this thesis. Psychologically speaking, it is in talking of high-level policy (decision-)makers that the gap between 'them and us' is greatest. However, these results are not necessarily negative, depending on the subjective understanding of democratic leadership brought to bear upon them. A rich literature on the 'mandate-independence' controversy (Pitkin, 1967) and more recently a 'trap' account (Medvic, 2013) of politics makes it clear that 'electors want their leaders to be just like them but also much better than them' (Kane and Patapan, 2012, p.44). Indeed, the well-established 'stealth' view of democracy indicates that citizens are more interested in the general character of those entrusted to rule than actually participating in politics themselves or even holding politicians to account over the details of their decisions (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). I have demonstrated in this thesis that, psychologically, political leaders in the UK are not like the vast majority of the British public and that these differences are largely supportive of a Westminster system that depends upon representatives with an acute sense of democratic duty. Frontbench MPs score, for example, higher than their backbench colleagues and the public for Openness to Change and Self-Transcendence values, which have been shown to underpin liberal democratic attitudes (e.g. Caprara et al., 2006; Leimgruber, 2011).

Again, however, there is an aspect of the results of this study that demands future research. The frontbench MPs in the current sample also score higher than their backbench colleagues for Self-Enhancement values, indicating a heightened desire for success and control that may be theoretically linked to accusations of self-interest. In a qualitative and largely theoretical discussion, David Owen (2012) reflects on the intoxication of power and its effects upon the character of political leaders in his book *The Hubris Syndrome*. As more central to the self-identity than episodic experiences or actions (e.g. political office), people's Basic Human Values are typically stable across time (Schwartz, 2006) and resistant to change across a range of life transitions (Bardi et al., 2014). This premise has, in fact, underpinned many of the inferences made in this thesis about the effect of basic values upon political ambition. However, it is possible that experiences of extreme political responsibility, especially during critical junctures in public life that trigger difficult value trade-offs (such as the Brexit vote), could reveal evidence of the types of troubling reverse causation that Owen alludes to in his book.

Assuming that MPs come to parliamentary politics with the values discovered in this thesis, and that those values *do* remain stable, then future studies might also examine the job satisfaction of our political elites. To the extent that this thesis uncovers a relationship between basic values and self-selection to elite politics, then the actual nature of political office - grounded in compromise and negotiation - may thwart those very same intentions that attract people to it in the first place (particularly Self-Direction and Power values). In itself this may seem a slightly innocuous research agenda. However, a large number of the interviewees in this study talked about the psychological toil of the job and the mental ill-health that they had suffered as a result. Prospective and serving MPs find themselves in or entering a job that requires constant impression management, both at the internal level within political parties and at the external level with the voting public. This environment may exacerbate the tendency towards surface acting prevalent in other public sector service industries (e.g. Hochschild, 1983; Pugh et al., 2011) and, in turn, place our governors at a heightened risk of poor mental health and wellbeing. Future research should address this concern.

II. Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Gender

Taking basic values as a specific focus, I have shown that MPs in the UK differ from their electors in relevant demographic subgroups by greater margins than they differ from one another. These findings have significant implications for broader literatures and debates about

agency loss (e.g. Best and Vogel, 2018), the public-opinion/public-policy nexus (e.g. Shapiro, 2011) and the substantive representation of sectional interests (e.g. Barnes and Burchard, 2013; Childs and Krook, 2008; Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007). Of these findings, arguably the most interesting relate to gender and, in particular, the 'personality gap' between women MPs and women in the population. Not only do women MPs appear to invert the gender differences in basic values seen between men and women in the general population, but they also differ significantly from women in the public on all four higher order values whereas male MPs only do so for two.

In its contribution to the existing knowledge base, this thesis joins a number of studies that have recently called for a move away from numeric measurements of group representation (for a review, see Celis and Mügge, 2018). This claim is not intended to question the valuable and evident benefits to political participation that arise from an increase in descriptive representation (e.g. Atkeson, 2003; Banducci et al., 2004; Saalfeld, 2011; Uhlener and Scola, 2016). Rather, I argue that academia also has a responsibility to move beyond a crude litmus test for political equality, whereby democracy 'works' when certain thresholds or critical masses are met (e.g. Studlar and McAllister, 2002). Indeed, a nascent body of scholars has claimed that the simplicity of the 'politics of presence' thesis (cf. Philips, 1995) elides far more complex yet pertinent debates about women's influence in leadership positions (Dahlerup, 2006), the actual implementation of laws relating to women's interests (Mazur and Pollock, 2009), and the contested content of women's issues (Celis et al., 2014). Yet this research remains relatively staid in its conceptualisation of how, and to what extent, debates in the UK Parliament (or any other) about equal pay, reproduction, or maternity leave are representative of *all* women. Utilising unique data on the basic values of national politicians, I offer a new avenue of investigation for this research arena and demonstrate, specifically, that the motivational goals and interests of British women do *not* align with those of their descriptive representatives in Parliament.

Building on discussions in chapter 5, I explore these arguments in line with scholarship in the constructivist paradigm. From this perspective, research on representation should not start with the citizen but with those who are actually in the political arena *doing* the act of representation. MPs constantly make representative claims about specific groups of citizens (see Saward, 2010) in which they not only identify or constitute the group's problems but also the political solutions that are needed. There is clearly not a linear conveyor belt between citizens and representatives in this scenario, and the extent to which representative

claims are accurate will depend upon a) an MP's perception of citizens' views and life experiences, and b) the pre-existing interests or opinions that the MP brings to their decision-making and political attitudes (see also Arnold and Franklin, 2012). In the first study of elite and mass basic values in the UK, I have revealed a distinct mismatch between the psychological backstops that women MPs bring to the act of representative claim-making and those of the women they claim to represent. Put another way, British women do not appear to get the 'preferable descriptive representatives' (Dovi, 2002) called for in chapter 3. There are obvious limitations with the sample sizes used in this study and therefore the generalisability of the results. If future studies can gain access to a larger sample of UK elites, then there is significant work to be done to establish a) how far basic values (or other personality characteristics) inform elite and public attitudes to specific sectional group interests or issues, b) whether these results reveal similar patterns or not, and crucially c) the degree of congruence between elite attitudes and those of citizens in corresponding groups (i.e. women).

The results presented in this thesis are equally significant for what they say about the political (under-)recruitment of women in the UK. Traditionally this scholarship splits between supply-side explanations focusing on the lifestyles and attitudes of women that inhibit their participation, and demand-side explanations focusing on features of political systems or institutions that limit their opportunities (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2013; Holman and Schneider, 2017). In the first of these traditions, a growing research base shows that women express less political ambition than men, are more deprecating of their own suitability for office, and are less likely to consider politics as a vocation in the first place (Fox and Lawless, 2011; Holman and Schneider, 2017; Lawless and Fox, 2010). This thesis makes a significant contribution to this literature. In particular, the results show that women attribute less importance to Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement values, both of which appear to predict candidate emergence and political activism (chapter 7, p.162; see also Pacheco and Owen, 2015; Vecchione et al., 2015).

In line with demand-side theories, the results of this thesis also indicate that the women who do successfully enter politics are more likely to share similar motivational goals with men than their fellow women in the general population. Recent research in the US by Kathleen Dolan and Michael Hansen (2018, pp.5-7) has shown that women are more likely than men to perceive systemic barriers and discrimination in public life when it comes to explaining their under-representation in political office. This research is desperately needed in the UK but assuming similar results, I expect that such findings reflect a gendered

institutional design. As well as instigating political and social debates about women's under-representation (descriptive and substantive), the findings of this thesis may be developed by future research programmes to influence parliamentary design processes as well as to lobby political parties and campaign professionals. The latter have a moral responsibility to alter the tone and nature of political environments in order to encourage participation by all women.

III. Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Partisanship

Whilst the previous section was concerned with opening up the results of this study in terms of the descriptive and substantive representation of demographic group interests, this section focuses on findings related to basic values and partisanship. In essence, I have shown in this thesis that clear personality differences exist between partisans on the Left and Right in the UK; that these differences are exaggerated among political elites; and that congruency between elites and voters occurs to a much greater extent on the Right than the Left. In the presentation, analysis and evaluation of these results, I add to a well-developed but diffuse literature on the relationship between personality, ideology, political orientation and behaviour (e.g. Carney et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2008). As the first comparison of elite and public basic values in the UK and one of only a handful of such studies worldwide, this thesis provides original insights with broader comparative relevance.

Of these findings, the most compelling relate to the 'personality gap' found between voters and political elites on the Left of British politics (mostly comprising Labour participants; see Chapter 8, pp.189-194). This is particularly compelling in the context of previous research on the congruence between personality factors and political ideology, choice and partisanship (Caprara et al., 2006; De Neve, 2015). Indeed, a recent large-N study of political orientation in the UK found that personality traits contribute double the variance in political orientation explained by demographic factors such as gender, age, religion, and social class (Furnham and Fenton-O'Creevy, 2018). However, the results of this thesis question the validity, or at least parsimony, of these results in general and the congruency principle in particular.

Whilst voters on the Left did score higher for Openness to Change and Self-Transcendence values, and those on the Right higher for Conservation values, these differences were relatively muted compared to differences in the elite sample. On one hand, these findings corroborate previous measures of cognitive style, which affirm a more stable and tenacious link with political ideology among elites than in mass samples (e.g. Caprara et

al, 2012). Put another way, the data presented in this thesis indicate that values direct politicians towards certain career choices that encourage them to endorse particular ideologies and political programmes (via parties), which in turn reinforce their personal preferences. On the other hand, the data suggest that the basic values of voters on the Left (and non-voters) are, if anything, more congruent with MPs on the Right than their own representatives (Chapter 8, pp.189-200). If voters do judge political candidates according to personality characteristics and vote for those they deem as similar to themselves (i.e. Bittner, 2014; Caprara and Zimbardo, 2004; Caprara et al., 2012), then I only find indicative evidence in this thesis of such a link between voters and representatives on the Right of British politics.

Assuming that these differences hold in larger samples of UK political elites, then the results of this thesis suggest that voters on the Left do not identify with corresponding political parties because of perceived similarity to MPs on the Left. To make sense of this finding, I turn to dual motivations theory (Groenendyk, 2018). This theory identifies two pathways to partisan affiliation. On one hand, partisanship comes from instrumental evaluations of the political environment, in which citizens are attracted to parties (and their policies as well as politicians) that best suit their personal and political preferences (e.g. Brader and Tucker, 2012; Dalton and Weldon, 2007). On the other hand, partisanship is an expressive choice grounded in social identity and therefore resistant to changes in party personnel or policy platforms (e.g. Huddy and Bankert, 2017; Mason, 2015). In a recent study of political systems in Europe, including the UK, Huddy et al. (2018) find strong evidence of the latter among partisans who, for example, engage more in motivated reasoning, display more animosity to out-groups, and exhibit defensive or positive emotions respectively when their party is threatened or reassured. This thesis makes a highly significant addition to this research. The differences between voters and elites reported in chapter 8 show that partisanship may be more of an expressive identity on the Left and an instrumental choice on the Right (grounded in value congruence).

These findings need to be replicated in larger, longitudinal samples that can a) account for interaction effects within the data, and b) assess the stability of these results across multiple UK elections. However, if the results hold in those analyses, they pose a number of unanswered questions worthy of future research. For example, to what extent do basic values inform policy attitudes at the mass and elite level, and how far do these attitudes overlap between elites and voters on the Left and Right? What opportunities are there for voters to learn about party issues and ideological positions? And do these opportunities, as well as the

attention paid to them, differ in the extent to which they predict vote choice on the Left and Right? In particular, these findings might inform future studies of party election campaigns and even electoral success.

If Labour Party MPs represent a comparatively conservative partisan bloc in the general public, whose support is a consequence of expressive social identity, then this has clear implications for how the Party may win or lose votes in general elections. For example, a rich literature on expressive partisanship (largely in the US) has demonstrated that social identification with a political party can be reinforced through ‘negative partisanship’ or negative campaigning (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016). In this scenario, animosity towards the out-group (i.e. opposition party) becomes a more powerful driver of voting behaviour than positive affects about the in-group (i.e. host party) (e.g. Iyengar and Westwood, 2014). Based on the findings of this thesis, future research might look, therefore, for associations between negative campaigning by the Labour Party and its electoral success.

Whilst negative campaigning might reinforce the partisan sentiments of long-term supporters on the Left, the results presented in this thesis also suggest that the Left (particularly the Labour Party) will have more difficulty in attracting new or floating voters than the Right. In line with notions of instrumental partisanship, the data analysed in chapter 8 indicate that the average British citizen will be more likely to vote for parties on the Right. It is on this side of politics that the personalities of potential representatives (as well as policy platforms) appear to have greater resonance with citizens' own personal goals and motivations (i.e. basic values). The Labour Party has only held a majority in the UK Parliament for 28 years during the last century and to some extent, it is possible that this statistic reflects the political difficulties posed by a ‘personality gap’ between elites on the Left and the general British population.

In this context, the results of this thesis can also add retrospective nuance to scholarship on the successes of New Labour under Tony Blair, which were elsewhere attributed in large part to the Party’s move towards the ideological centre-ground (Hay and Farrell, 2014; Hindmoor, 2017; Turner, 2013). In 1997 Labour offered a modest yet unashamedly neoliberal policy agenda that included, for example, fast-track punishment for young offenders, no further rises in income tax, and dropped the Party’s commitment to national ownership of public services. These are policies that drastically reduced the rile scores between Labour and Conservative campaign manifestos, and arguably made the former far more attractive to ‘instrumental partisans’ motivated by Conservation values. However,

the New Labour movement simultaneously violated many of the norms associated with expressive social identification among its traditional support base. As the perceived differences between the two main parties increased, it is possible that the cohesion of this support base dwindled (cf. Cruddas, 2006). The inferences made in this section are broad and have far-reaching consequences for our understanding of British politics. Whilst there are distinct limitations to the size and power of the data in this thesis, these preliminary findings and the questions raised by them are deserving of future research.

IV. Agency Matters

In an attempt to reinvigorate a rather limited parliamentary studies literature in the UK, I have added theoretically and empirically to the academic understanding of agency in representative politics. Building upon psychological and institutional theories of logic (see Parsons, 2007), I offer an Integrated Model of Parliamentary Political Behaviour (IMPPB) that eschews qualitative, structure-dominated and normatively charged generalisations about the 'organising perspective' of the Westminster Model in British political studies (cf. Bogdanor, 2003; Norton, 2013; Rush, 2005). Employing unique quantitative data on MPs' basic values alongside qualitative accounts from the actors themselves, I find:

- f) MPs' BHV have a substantial effect upon legislative activities as diverse as voting, asking written questions, joining a select committee, and signing Early Day Motions (EDMs) (RQ2; H4-7);
- g) these effects vary according to the institutional constraints exerted internally by party organisations, and externally by a range of role alters such as the media and voters (RQ2; H4);
- h) MPs' BHV exert a strong organising effect on their attitudes towards representational foci (RQ2; H8); and
- i) the effects of BHV upon MPs' political behaviour are both direct and indirect.

Whilst a voluminous comparative literature has explored the effects of institutional factors such as electoral systems and party structures upon legislative behaviour (André and Depauw, 2013; Shugart et al., 2005; Sieberer, 2006), it has also tended to elide individual differences by treating legislators as monolithic groups of rational actors with parallel behavioural incentives (cf. Fernandes et al., 2018). As Audrey André et al. (2015: 468) argue, 'studies that focus on electoral institutions have largely ignored within-system differences in favour of differences across systems – as if legislators operating under the same set of rules

all behave in a similar manner.' I present preliminary evidence in this thesis to suggest that, in the UK at least, representatives are neither psychologically homogeneous at the inter- or intra-party level and that these differences have a real impact on their behaviour in elected office. Whilst these findings have been discussed in detail in chapter 9, there are five broader comments to make.

Firstly, I have shown that a range of internal motivations affect elite political behaviour across a variety of different parliamentary contexts in which they are activated. For the purpose of enriching future research, this finding offers a sharp rebuke to a long list of scholars who have prioritised behavioural economics and rational choice explanations of political agency (e.g. Downs, 1957; Strom, 1990). That BHV were able to predict significant representative activities such as legislative voting and MPs' use of parliamentary written questions, suggests that research into parliamentary political behaviour (and public policy) should - as anticipated in chapter 4 - start from an institutional theory of political choice (e.g. Sniderman and Levendusky, 2009). Rather than assuming strategic and unitary desire on the part of *all* political elites, and applying this same logic sequentially to behavioural scenarios, I find evidence that MPs constantly synthesise their own trans-situational goals and motivations with an extended climate of expectations from both internal and external role alters. Thus to provide a satisfactory account of elite behaviour, future studies must consider a) the extent to which any behavioural choice is transparent to/of importance for a cynical media/electorate, b) the extent to which the choice is affected by internal scrutiny and accountability procedures or party interests, and c) the specific personality characteristics that inform each agent's interpretation of the choice itself as well as the constraints outlined in a) and b). Taken together and measured using appropriate variables, this triangulated approach to studies of elite political behaviour may provide a much more accurate understanding of structure and agency in the UK Parliament and other representative chambers around the world.

Secondly, I offer complementary evidence for the psychological basis of what Fenno (1977) describes as the 'perception' of the principal-agent relationship. Put another way, MPs understand the mechanical rules of the game and the strategic choices that may or may not attract electoral benefits, but these 'facts' operate alongside or subordinate to a range of psychological beliefs or attitudes about the act of representation. Chapter 9 (pp.223-231) of this thesis showed, for example, that BHV not only inform MPs' economic and social ideologies, as well as their partisan affiliations, but also indirectly structure their orientation towards national or constituency level representation. These results require further

investigation with a larger sample of elites, so as to account for a wider range of confounding factors. However, they remain highly significant as an indication of the direction in which scholarship on legislative role formation must move. Studies that seek to group elites in representative categories (e.g. Jenny and Müller, 2012; Müller and Saalfeld, 1997) or use these categories to explain elite behaviour (e.g. Andeweg and Thomassen, 2005, Gauja, 2008) must account for the psychological backstops that underpin these categories and the variable ways in which actors might apply them under a range of institutional constraints.

Thirdly, the results of this thesis call into question many of the paradigms in parliamentary studies of party politics and elite behaviour. To the extent that political parties still dominate the character and electoral outcomes of representative politics in the UK, I find competing psychological motivations among the MPs of different parties and those within them. If frameworks of accountability and delegation rely upon a consensus of support among political elites, I suggest that such antagonistic cooperation (see Best, 2010) relies on broad coalitions of personality characteristics. The fact that Labour MPs share heightened psychological commitments to Self-Transcendence values, whereas Conservative MPs do so for Conservation values, binds individuals who are otherwise competing contenders for vote, office, and policy success. Beyond these broad coalitions of primary motivation, the data indicate that significant variability exists within parties according to secondary motivations and even their instantiation in MPs' political actions.

These findings have significant repercussions for dominant rational choice studies of party politics. Kam's (2009) paradigmatic LEADs model, for example, no longer seems sufficient as an explanation of elite behaviour. When party representatives act as one, this solidarity has as much basis in common personality characteristics as it does in their membership of a political movement. In fact, the analysis in this thesis suggests that the former facilitates the latter. Similarly, when MPs act against the grain of their party directive, it appears to be as much or more so about a divergence of their personal beliefs as any strategic decision related to electoral outcomes. However, the analysis of voting records in chapter 9 (pp.201-214) does show that Kam (2009) and other scholars in this field (e.g. Hix et al. 2007; Meserve et al., 2009) correctly predict the power of party organisations to enforce or encourage representative decisions that run contrary to MPs' personal motivations. This suggests that future studies should draw on the insights of psychological and preference-driven models of party politics (e.g. Krehbiel, 1999) in order to understand when and why

political elites within and between parties compete or cooperate with one another, and in turn the impact this has upon representative outcomes.

Fourthly, the results of this thesis make a direct contribution to the academic understanding of psychological processes in political decision-making. A rich literature shows that voters and citizens commonly employ psychological heuristics to make decisions in political situations (Redlawsk, 2004; Bang Petersen, 2015), but comparative empirical studies of political elites are extremely rare (exceptions include Kropp, 2010; Weyland, 2014). These studies focus on cognitive shortcuts such as availability and representativeness biases (see Vis, 2018) but their use of the term 'heuristic' is vague and often relates to any psychological tactic employed by participants in the absence of adequate information (for a full discussion, see Druckman et al., 2009). Whereas citizens may often use heuristics to overcome political ignorance, this small literature shows that political elites may use them to overcome an abundance of [often contradictory] information (see Kropp, 2010). Focusing on a distinct personality characteristic rather than heuristics and biases, this thesis is the first study in the author's knowledge that demonstrates a causal link between national MPs' basic values and a range of parliamentary behaviours in the UK (and possibly any developed western democracy). Adding to the literature above, these findings suggest that UK MPs employ their personal goals and motivations to make sense of decisions in complex political environments. Future research should now attempt to clarify the extent to which these causal mechanisms are consistent, conscious and function at the highest levels (i.e. foreign policy decisions or crisis management by political leaders).

Finally, the link between MPs' basic values and parliamentary behaviour demonstrated in this thesis provides an empirical standard by which to measure their integrity in democratic politics. In political theory, integrity is overwhelmingly understood as a property of character exhibited 'in a person's resistance to sacrificing or compromising [their] convictions' (Scherkoske, 2013, p.29; see also Williams, 1981). From an external, anti-politics perspective, it is this understanding of *integrity as propriety* that also underpins popular evaluations of political conduct (Hall, 2018; Jennings et al., 2016) and stands at odds with institutional, even elite conceptions of the term (Allen and Birch, 2015). In this respect, official documents like the *Principles of Public Life* produced by the Committee on Standards in Public Life - designed to circumscribe official misconduct or malfeasance - do not satisfy unanswered questions about the integrity of our elected representatives. I suggest two preliminary observations. Firstly, MPs' personal convictions (measured as basic values) appear to exert a

sustained impact on their elected behaviour in spite of a complex political system characterised by compromise (i.e. evidence of integrity as propriety). Secondly, those convictions are also generally positive and reflect personal commitments to other- rather than self-enrichment. I did not set out upon this doctoral study to build a sympathetic counter-narrative about the political class, or specifically politicians, but rather to test unfounded psychological claims that underpin popular disillusionment with democratic politics and to clarify the contested and amorphous nature of related academic debates. In doing so, I have tried to recall many of the themes advanced in Bernard Crick's (1962) *In Defence of Politics* and have shown that public understandings of political conduct are often distorted and simplified versions of a complex truth.

V. Personality and Democracy

So far this chapter has reflected upon a range of significant findings from this thesis, such as who enters elite politics in the UK, how their basic values compare to those they represent, and the extent to which these personality characteristics influence agency in the UK Parliament. However, I also operationalise these data alongside a conjoint analysis of public voting preferences to augment the academic literature on personalisation and democracy (e.g. Rahat and Sheafer, 2007; McAllister, 2007; Karvonen, 2010). In doing so, I find that:

j) followed by their religion and political agenda, the personality characteristics of parliamentary candidates have a greater effect on public voting habits than physical attributes such as age, gender or ethnicity and socio-economic attributes such as schooling and occupation (RQ3; H9);

k) meaningful differences exist between the ideal candidates chosen by the British public according to voters' gender, age, social grade, partisanship, and their vote choice in the 2016 referendum to leave the European Union (RQ3);

l) on average elite participants attribute most importance to Self-Transcendence values and these are, on average, the most desirable and influential feature of a citizen's ideal candidate (RQ3; H10); but

m) MPs still attribute more relative importance to Self-Enhancement values and less relative importance to Conservation values than the public would like to see in their ideal representative (RQ3; H10); and therefore

n) MPs who are more motivated by Conservation values than their colleagues are also more successful in achieving large majorities at general elections (RQ3; H9).

Whilst most parliamentary scholars in the UK seek objective measures of democracy based upon institutional indicators, I argue that political scientists must also study citizens' subjective evaluations of democracy in order to understand when, why and how it succeeds or fails (see also Fuchs and Roller, 2018; Mayne and Geissel, 2016; Pickel et al., 2016). In chapter 5 I synthesised the insights of a varied yet relevant intellectual terrain in order to develop a model that might explain the role of personality, and specifically a personalised feedback loop between citizens and elites, upon democratic engagement. In its analysis of a highly original conjoint survey, chapter 10 found evidence that this model might capture significant causal mechanisms underpinning vote choice and democratic apathy in the UK. On one hand, the results of the conjoint survey add to an extremely small and limited literature on the role of specific characteristics in personalised voting behaviour (cf. Lausten and Bor, 2017). On the other hand, the conjoint survey also reveals a striking overlap between the personality characteristics of political elites and the ideal-types of the British public. This finding suggests that public discontent, founded upon cynical judgements about self-serving elites (Jennings et al., 2016; Jennings et al., 2017), may be grounded in a perception gap that says more about the consumption of politics in the UK than the 'quality' of its elected representatives.

This implies that future research must do more to account for the influence of an anti-political media. In a comparable recent study of voting habits in Tanzania, Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig (2018) discovered that media coverage of elite tax evasion had a negative effect on participants' intention to vote. Moreover, this effect was accentuated among participants who received the information in a *morally* charged format. Whilst this research needs to be reproduced in advanced democracies, I argue that charged media treatment of elite (mis-)behaviour not only undermines trust in politicians but also citizens' confidence in the existing social contract and broader political institutions and processes. Kolstad and Wiig's (2018) research, taken together with the results of the conjoint survey in this thesis, provides compelling evidence in support of the model developed in chapter 5. Put another way, psychologically charged media coverage of individual, isolated or small-n cases of elite malfeasance a) heightens the salience of personality characteristics as a voting heuristic, b) distorts accurate evaluations of politicians, c) compounds low trust/high distrust interpersonal judgements about political elites, and thus d) leads citizens to disengage from formal politics

altogether or vote for populist leaders who identify as anti-establishment. There is a large comparative literature on the accountability function of a free press (e.g. Besley and Prat, 2006; Reinikka and Svensson, 2011) but I argue, in line with the inferences above, that more research is needed to assess the unintended consequences of personalised coverage of elite capture.

The conjoint survey conducted for this thesis also makes an original methodological contribution to the study of personalisation in politics generally, and during election campaigns in particular (see also Adam and Maier, 2010; Boumans et al., 2013). The majority of research into candidate preferences relies on observational data from election studies but conclusions drawn about the effect of any one variable (i.e. class, race, gender) may be correlated with a series of other (often unobserved) factors that influence the election outcome. By contrast, conjoint survey experiments - in which participants select from hypothetical candidates with randomised attributes - allow researchers to identify the causal impact of specific variables on candidate evaluations. Consistent with prior studies that stress the role of candidate personality in elections, I applied a conjoint design to demonstrate that candidates with specific personality characteristics (high in Self-Transcendence values in particular) perform better in an abstract election scenario.

There are necessarily a number of limitations to the conjoint design in this thesis. Firstly, the conjoint survey purposefully did not include the party affiliation of each candidate. This decision was made in order to isolate the personality characteristics preferred by voters on the Left and Right without the confounding influence of candidate partisanship (and by implication, the connotations these labels carry for partisans and non-partisans alike). Future studies should re-run this conjoint design to determine whether the effects of basic values upon candidate choice are sustained once participants know a candidate's party affiliation. Secondly, more research is needed to ensure that the patterns discovered in this thesis are replicable beyond the UK. Given that conjoint surveys are hypothetical simulated choices, future designs with a greater number of participants might also account for a broader array of paralinguistic messages and signals that voters receive during election campaigns.

VI. Limitations

Whilst this chapter has reflected on the broader implications of this thesis and the future research it might inspire, as well as reflecting on what might be achieved through further data collection, there are necessarily a number of standalone limitations that should be

clarified. In particular, I must be candid about a) the robustness of my critique of Historical Institutionalism (HI) as a paradigm in parliamentary studies, b) the extent to which my claims about representation hinge on normative assumptions about the desirability of Basic Human Values (BHV), and c) the caution that must be heeded in generalising the findings of this thesis, based on a relatively small-n sample of MPs, to conclusions about political elites more broadly. Each of these will be briefly taken in turn.

In chapter 1 of this thesis, I argued that HI research was severely limited by its top-down focus upon the rules and constraints of Parliament as an institution, rather than as a body of (semi-)autonomous actors. I maintain that the path dependence so central to HI scholarship does not need to be deterministic and, by contrast, agents in Parliament negotiate between the formal and informal constraints they face and their own psychological predispositions to navigate the 'job of politics'. The predictive capacity of BHV to explain a range of parliamentary behaviours, demonstrated in chapter 9, is testament to this argument. However, the underlying assumption here dictates that MPs bring a peculiar set of values to Parliament and that these remain stable during their time in Parliament. This assumption can only be verified by a longitudinal study of MPs' BHV.

Although cross-sectional analysis in this thesis did not reveal a time-cohort effect on MPs' basic values [based upon tenure in office], it may be possible that prolonged exposure to Parliament and 'the political' influences subtle changes in the values of politicians. In their conceptual model of value change, Bardi and Goodwin (2011) elaborate on the likelihood framework of persuasion (cf. Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) to argue that values may evolve by effortful cognitive or peripheral affective processes. Drawing on this model, Arieli et al. (2014) have also shown that short lab-based interventions can affect temporary value change. This research has direct applicability in politics, where the struggle between structure and agency is not only constant and acute, but also central to the operation of democracy. If our political institutions - or indeed the very nature of UK politics - are capable of transforming or at least altering personality characteristics that are otherwise incredibly stable (e.g. Milfont et al., 2016; Vecchione et al., 2016), then the claims made by this thesis about HI scholarship would need to be reviewed. In that scenario - and given the links found in this thesis between BHV and behaviour - the institutions of politics and in this case the UK Parliament would remain the arbiters of political agency and, by implication, political outcomes.

Secondly, I have made a number of big claims in this thesis about the nature and quality of political representation in the UK. In this chapter and others, I have argued that the

data presented in this thesis exposes a psychological gap between certain demographic and partisan groups in the general population and their representatives in Parliament. This 'gap' has been used to outline a democratic deficit in the UK whereby citizens (especially in under-represented groups) do not get preferable descriptive representatives (Dovi, 2002). However, this argument necessarily assumes that MPs with the same value orientations as corresponding groups would make *better* representatives and that, in turn, citizens in these groups would actually want their representatives to share the same values. By contrast, political scientists concerned with the state of representation have argued that voters want to hold politicians to higher standards across a range of psychological characteristics related, above all, to integrity (Allen and Birch, 2015b; Kane and Patapan, 2012). Data collected in Italy would, however, appear to suggest that there is a high degree of congruency between voters' BHV and those of the representatives they support (Caprara et al., 2006, 2010), but I cannot provide similar comparative evidence in this thesis. I did not, for example, have the financial resource to collect additional data on participants' own basic values in the conjoint experiment. In order to fully understand the extent to which voters project their own personality characteristics onto those of their ideal parliamentary representative, this data is needed.

This thesis is also hampered by the size of the elite sample. Whilst the data collected is unique and the sample size compares favourably to other survey studies of national politicians, the participants only account for 16% of the target population. The danger with such a sample is that I have only measured one specific 'type' of politician, and in particular those who are already motivated by certain basic values to, for example, give time and energy to academic research. In this sense, there is a risk of collecting data from a skewed sample of particularly prosocial politicians. At the same time, MPs are especially skilled at impression management and it is possible that they are able to affect levels of social desirability bias not found in mass samples (cf. Schwartz et al., 1997). On one hand, the defence to both of these accusations lies in the spread of the data. If MPs in this sample were overwhelmingly prosocial and/or engaged in heightened impression management, then I would not expect the results to reveal a) distinct differences in the value priorities of MPs within the sample, or b) unusually high scores for Self-Enhancement values by comparison to existing research with mass population samples. On the other hand, there is no substitute for large-N data in empirical research with psychometric measures. Therefore, the inferences and conclusions drawn from this thesis should be read carefully until additional studies of this kind are conducted.

Finally, this thesis revealed some interesting and possibly worrying trends in the structure of MPs' BHV. The anomalous inter-item discrepancy for Conformity values was addressed in chapter 7, but the confirmatory factor analysis reported in Figure 9.1 (p.238) also shows weak-moderate positive correlations between Self-Enhancement and Self-Transcendence values. This should not be the case if the generalisable structure of BHV along orthogonals holds - as tested in mass population samples around the world (see Chapter 2; Schwartz, 1992, 1994). This suggests that either there is a confounding variable in the data; the new shortened Twenty Item Values Inventory (TwIVI) used to collect data in this thesis is not adequately measuring the theory of BHV; or that the structure of BHV is actually different among political elites in the UK (and potentially beyond). The derivation and evaluation samples used by Sandy et al. (2017) to create the TwIVI would suggest that - among mass samples at least - it *does* measure the same value constructs with the *same* interdependent relations as any other version of the PVQ. It is possible, therefore, that this is not a measurement problem but a theoretical one. I tentatively suggest that some of the inherent motivations implied by Self-Enhancement values and Self-Transcendence values are not directly incompatible for those people who go into politics. This claim goes back to the contentions I made in chapter 3: that a more nuanced approach to the study of political ambition requires researchers to consider ambition 'for what' and 'for whom', rather than assuming ambition to be a unitary concept revolving around self-interest. It may be that those people attracted to politics are desirous of success and influence (i.e. Self-Enhancement values), but only in order to service 'helping' behaviours implicit in Self-Transcendence values. This demands future research with comparative samples of elites, both across nations and within the UK at regional and local level.

I set out on this study to make an original contribution to the academic understanding of the personal side of UK politics. On one hand, I conclude that politics is a profession few 'ordinary' people care to enter. On account of the preliminary findings in this study, it would appear that the majority of MPs are individuals with an 'extraordinary' dedication to the welfare of others and an unusually high propensity for independent and creative thought and action. At the same time, they exhibit much higher levels of personal ambition than those they govern. On the other hand, I have also demonstrated that MPs' personalities matter for studies of public policy and representation. MPs' basic values not only influence their own perceptions of what an elected politician on the national stage *should* do, but also have a substantial impact on a range of *actual* legislative behaviours. In sum I have attempted to

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Chapter 11 - The Personal Side of Politics: Implications, Limitations and Next Steps

provide 'theoretically driven empirical research' (Ostrom, 2000, p.42) that goes a long way to clarify the psychological nature and membership of the UK Parliament.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A (page 326)	Exemplar survey correspondence. Postal wave 2.
Appendix B (page 329)	Participant Information Sheet.
Appendix C (page 331)	Participant Consent Form.
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Appendix E (page 333)	Scoring Key for PVQ TwIV Value Scale.
Appendix F (page 336)	Correlation matrix of centred means for Basic Human Values and 'Status' (Member of Parliament [n = 106] Vs. General Population [n = 2154]).
Appendix G (page 337)	Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample of British men (n = 746) and women (n = 841). Graph shows the change in predicted probability of candidate selection by attribute.
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Appendix I (page 342)	Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample of Labour Party voters (n = 350), Conservative Party voters (n = 470), and non-voters (n = 432) in the 2015 UK General Election. Graphs show the change in predicted probability of candidate selection by attribute.
Appendix J (page 345)	Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample of British adults in social grades AB (n = 458), C1 (n = 475), C2 (n = 344) and DE (n = 360). Graphs show the change in predicted probability of candidate selection by attribute.
Appendix K (page 349)	Conjoint analysis of candidate preferences among a representative sample of Leave voters (n = 673) and Remain voters (n = 620) from the 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union. Graphs show the change in predicted probability of candidate selection by attribute.

Appendix A – Exemplar Survey Correspondence. Postal Wave 2 (page 1).



Dear Ms. MP,

We hope this letter finds you well. You may have read about our research in a recent feature of *The House* magazine (*'All Things to All People': We Need to Understand the Personal Side of Politics*). Following that article we would like to invite you to participate by taking **no more than 5 minutes** to complete the survey (overleaf) and return it in the **pre-paid envelope provided**.

More than 50 of your colleagues have already completed and returned this survey in the autumn, and with additional responses during this session we hope to have an equal representation of data by party, gender and experience of elected office. This study is the first in the UK to examine the value orientations of British MPs and the agency of parliamentarians using a unique combination of political science and psychology. This study is funded by the ESRC and the Crick Centre at the University of Sheffield. The project has already received much positive attention from politicians and academics alike, and has been endorsed by Lords Peter Hennessy and David Blunkett.

We can assure you that all responses are strictly confidential; you will not be able to be identified in any reports, publications or conference presentations that arise from this research. We would be most grateful if you could now complete the survey overleaf and return it in the pre-paid envelope provided.

If you would like feedback or a summary of the overall findings when the results are fully processed, please email James Weinberg at jweinberg1@sheffield.ac.uk or telephone on 0114 222 1681. If you would prefer an online copy of the survey to complete on your desktop or mobile phone, please request one via email and it will be sent immediately.

We are very grateful for your cooperation in this unique study.

Yours sincerely,

Prof Matthew Flinders
*Founding Director,
The Sir Bernard Crick
Understanding of Politics*

*Professorial Fellow,
House of Commons*

*Chair, Political Studies
Association*

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Appendix A – Exemplar Survey Correspondence. Postal Wave 2 (page 2-3).

Section 1: Portrait Values Questionnaire

Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much each person is or is not like you. Using a 6-point scale from “not like me at all” to “very much like me,” choose how similar the person is to you.

6	5	4	3	2	1
very much	like me	somewhat	a little	not like	not like
like me		like me	like me	me	me at all

HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON?

_____ 1. She believes she should always show respect to her parents and to older people. It is important to her to be obedient

_____ 2. Religious belief is important to her. She tries hard to do what her religion requires.

_____ 3. It's very important to him/her to help the people around her. She wants to care for their well-being.

_____ 4. She thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. She believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.

_____ 5. She thinks it's important to be interested in things. She likes to be curious and to try to understand all sorts of things.

_____ 6. She likes to take risks. She is always looking for adventures.

_____ 7. She seeks every chance she can to have fun. It is important to her to do things that give her pleasure.

_____ 8. Getting ahead in life is important to her. She strives to do better than others.

_____ 9. She always wants to be the one who makes the decisions. She likes to be the leader.

_____ 10. It is important to her that things be organized and clean. She really does not like things to be a mess.

_____ 11. It is important to her to always behave properly. She wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.

_____ 12. She thinks it is best to do things in traditional ways. It is important to her to keep up the customs she has learned.

_____ 13. It is important to her to respond to the needs of others. She tries to support those she knows.

_____ 14. She believes all the worlds' people should live in harmony. Promoting peace among all groups in the world is important to her.

_____ 15. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to her. She likes to do things in her own original way.

_____ 16. She thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life. She always looks for new things to try.

_____ 17. She really wants to enjoy life. Having a good time is very important to her.

_____ 18. Being very successful is important to her. She likes to impress other people.

_____ 19. It is important to her to be in charge and tell others what to do. She wants people to do what she says.

_____ 20. Having stability is important to her. She is concerned that the social order be protected.

PTO.

Appendix A – Exemplar Survey Correspondence. Postal Wave 2 (page 4).

Section 2: About You

The following questions are designed to supplement the results of the PVQ on the previous page. Please circle the appropriate answer or provide a written response where required.

Gender: Male Female

Birth year :

Current party:

In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale for *economic* issues? (Please circle one number)

0-LEFT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10-RIGHT

And where would you place yourself for *social* issues?

0-LEFT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10-RIGHT

How long have you been serving as an MP? years months

Please rank these representative priorities (1– most important to you, 3 - least important to you): Nation..... Party..... Constituency.....

Do you hold any ministerial or cabinet responsibilities? Yes No

Prior Occupation:

To what extent are you satisfied with your performance as an MP?

Not at all Somewhat satisfied Mostly satisfied Completely

Would you be willing to conduct a short 15 minute interview about this research?



Appendix B – Participant Information Sheet.

Participant Information Sheet

1. Research Project Title: Understanding the Personal Side of Politics: A Study of Basic Human Values in the UK Parliament

2. Invitation: You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

3. What is the project's purpose?

Following on from a successful pilot study with 48 MPs in 2013, this research project aims to explore a relatively under-examined area in political science: the value orientations of British politicians and the convictions behind modern representation in Westminster. A similar study was recently conducted by Caprara et al. in Italy, where correlations were drawn between voters' values and those of the politicians they supported. This particular project will take that a step further, reversing the focus to evaluate the impact of politicians' values on Parliamentary behaviour. Applying the Schwartz theory of Basic Human Values, this study will provide an insightful and much needed modern addition to the seminal work of Donald Searing in the 1970s, and in turn will add to that body of literature that seeks to reappraise the state of democracy in the UK through a careful examination (and defence) of both politics and politicians.

4. Why have I been chosen?

If you are receiving this invitation to participate, then you are currently serving as a Member of Parliament in the House of Commons or as a Peer in the House of Lords.

5. Do I have to take part?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will need to complete and return the attached survey. By completing and returning the survey, you give consent for your data (anonymised) to be used in this study. If you are later called upon with an interview request to discuss your results, you may decline; if you accept to conduct an interview you will be provided with a written consent form. You are entitled to withdraw at any time without it affecting any benefits that you are entitled to in any way and all of your data will be destroyed. You do not have to give a reason.

6. What will happen to me if I take part?

As a participant in this study you are asked to complete the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ), and a few choice questions regarding your political priorities/basic details. The PVQ is designed to measure those desirable, transitional goals that serve as guiding principles in people's lives (Schwartz, 1994). The tool provides scores for ten basic values, each of which

entail further derivational values. These values have been validated and corroborated in over 220 samples worldwide and cited over 3000 times by scholars in the social sciences. Each question provides a portrait of an anonymous individual; you are required to compare yourself to the portrait by choosing from a Likert scale of 1-6, ranging from 'Very much like me' to 'Not like me at all'. The survey contains only 20 portraits and takes *no more than 6-8 minutes* to complete. If you contacted at a later date about completing an interview, this will be used to clarify issues surrounding personal values and how these inform your representative function within the constraints of institutional politics.

7. What are the possible benefits of taking part?

Ever since Bernard Crick wrote his 'Defense of Politics', and more recently scholars like Medvic sought to tackle prejudices against politicians (2013), there has been a recognition of the need to rebalance academic and popular evaluations of democratic representation and representatives. By participating in this study you will be providing invaluable data for that cause, allowing scholars to understand the human side of national representatives and the institutional constraints on their ambitions and ideals. In turn this may help to bridge the gap that has arguably emerged not just between politicians and the public but also between academia and society more broadly. In light of the looming restoration and renewal of the House, a study into the personal side of politics may also highlight institutional changes that are needed to allow politicians the room they require to fulfil their representative functions properly.

8. Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?

All the information that we collect about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. Your raw data will only be handled by the primary researcher named at the end of this sheet. You will not be able to be identified in any reports, publications or conference presentations.

9. Who has ethically reviewed the project?

This project has been ethically approved via the University of Sheffield's Politics department's ethics review procedure.

10. Is there any cost involved?

There is no cost to the participant in this study. The enclosed envelope allows for pre-paid postage when you return the survey and in the event of a follow-up interview, the primary researcher will travel to your most convenient work location.

11. Contact for further information:

James Weinberg (The Crick Centre; Department of Politics; University of Sheffield; S10 2TU). Tel: 0114 222 1681 Email: jweinberg1@sheffield.ac.uk

Appendix C – Participant Consent Form.

Participant Consent Form

Title of Research Project: Understanding the Personal Side of Politics: A Study of Basic Human Values in the UK Parliament

Name of Researcher: James Weinberg

Participant Identification Number for this project:

Please initial box

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet/letter (delete as applicable) dated *[insert date]* explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline. You may contact James Weinberg about any concerns on 0114 222 1681
3. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research.
4. I agree for the data collected from me to be used in future research
5. I agree to take part in the above research project.

Name of Participant
(or legal representative)

Date

Signature

Name of person taking consent
(if different from lead researcher)

Date

Signature

To be signed and dated in presence of the participant

Lead Researcher

Date

Signature

To be signed and dated in presence of the participant

Copies:

Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form, the information sheet and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and dated consent form will be placed in the project's main record, which will be kept in a secure location.

Appendix D – Ethics Approval Letter



Downloaded: 12/05/2016
Approved: 12/05/2016

James Weinberg
Registration number: 150123037
Politics
Programme: PhD in Politics

Dear James

PROJECT TITLE: The Personal Side of Politics: Value-driven behaviour in the British Parliament
APPLICATION: Reference Number 008585

On behalf of the University ethics reviewers who reviewed your project, I am pleased to inform you that on 12/05/2016 the above-named project was **approved** on ethics grounds, on the basis that you will adhere to the following documentation that you submitted for ethics review:

- University research ethics application form 008585 (dated 26/04/2016).
- Participant information sheet 1017580 version 1 (26/04/2016).
- Participant consent form 1017581 version 1 (26/04/2016).

The following optional amendments were suggested:

Hopefully the comments contain some useful advice but overall this can be approved.

If during the course of the project you need to [deviate significantly from the above-approved documentation](#) please inform me since written approval will be required.

Yours sincerely

Edward Hall
Ethics Administrator
Politics

Appendix E - Scoring Key for PVQ TwIV Value Scale.

	PVQ #
<u>Individual Level</u>	
Conformity	1,11
Tradition	2,12
Benevolence	3,13
Universalism	4,14
Self-Direction	5,15
Stimulation	6,16
Hedonism	7,17
Achievement	8,18
Power	9,19
Security	10,20

The score for each value is the mean of the raw ratings given to the items listed above for that value. For most purposes, it is necessary to make a correction for individual differences in use of the response scale before performing analyses. Below are instructions for making the correction that is appropriate to various types of analyses. **Failure to make the necessary scale use correction typically leads to mistaken conclusions!**

Individuals and cultural groups differ in their use of the response scale.¹ Scale use differences often distort findings and lead to incorrect conclusions.² To correct for scale use:

(A) Compute scores for the 10 values by taking the means of the items that index it (above). If you wish to check internal reliabilities, do so for these value scores.

(B) Compute each individual's mean score across all 20 value items. Call this MRAT.³

(C) Center scores of each of the 10 values for an individual (computed in A) around that individual's MRAT (i.e., subtract MRAT from each of the 10 value scores)

1. For correlation analyses: Use the centered value scores (C).

2. For group mean comparisons, analysis of variance or of covariance (t- tests, ANOVA, MANOVA, ANCOVA, MANCOVA): Use the centered value scores as the dependent variables.

3. For regression:

a. If the value is your dependent variable, use the centered value score. If all 10 values are included, the regression coefficients for the values may be inaccurate and uninterpretable due to multicollinearity.

b. If the values are predictor variables:

Enter **up to 8** centered values as predictors in the regression.

Choose the values to exclude as predictors *a priori* on theoretical grounds because they are irrelevant to the topic.

If you are interested **only** in the total variance accounted for by values and not in the regression coefficients, you may include all 10 values as predictors. The R^2 is meaningful but, because the 10 values are exactly linearly dependent, the coefficients for each value are not precisely interpretable.

c. In publications, it is advisable to provide a table with the correlations between the centered values and the dependent variables in addition to any regression. These correlations will aid in understanding results and reduce confusion due either to multicollinearity or to intercorrelations among the values.

4. For multidimensional scaling, canonical, discriminant, or confirmatory factor analyses:

Use raw value scores for the items or 10 value means.⁴

Footnotes

1. For a discussion of the general issue, see Saris (1988). Schwartz, et al. (1997) examine meanings of such scale use as an individual difference variable. Smith (2004) discusses correlates of scale use differences at the level of cultures.

2. Two critical assumptions underlie these corrections.

(1) The set of ten individual level values is reasonably comprehensive of the major motivationally distinct values recognized across individuals and cultural groups. Empirical evidence supports this assumption.

(2) Studies of value priorities are concerned with the importance of particular values as part of the value system of a person or group. This is because the way values affect cognition, emotion, and behavior is through a trade-off or balancing among multiple values that are simultaneously relevant to action. The relevant values often have opposing implications for the action. The absolute importance of a single value across individuals or across groups ignores the fact that values function as a system. The scale use correction converts absolute value scores into scores that indicate the relative importance of each value in the value system, i.e., the individual's value priorities.⁵


3. When centering, do not divide by individuals' standard deviation across the 20 items. This is because individual differences in variances of value ratings are usually meaningful. Even if, on average, individuals attribute the same mean importance to the set of values, some individuals discriminate more sharply among their values and others discriminate less sharply. Standardizing that makes everyone's variance the same (i.e., 1) would eliminate these real differences in the extent to which individuals discriminate among their values.


Appendix F - Correlation matrix of centred means for Basic Human Values and 'Status' (Member of Parliament [n = 106] Vs. General Population [n = 2154])

	MP or Public	Conformity	Tradition	Benevolence	Universalism	Self-Direction	Stimulation	Hedonism	Achievement	Power	Security
MP or Public	1	.047*	-.217**	.089**	.071**	.043*	.105**	-.019	.016	.148**	-.180**
Conformity	.047*	1	.219**	-.076**	-.147**	-.295**	-.395**	-.301**	-.201**	-.004	.160**
Tradition	-.217**	.219**	1	.050*	-.003	-.197**	-.376**	-.239**	-.372**	-.262**	.152**
Benevolence	.089**	-.076**	.050*	1	.285**	.064**	-.182**	-.220**	-.311**	-.306**	-.010
Universalism	.071**	-.147**	-.003	.285**	1	.115**	-.113**	-.273**	-.347**	-.387**	-.113**
Self-Direction	.043*	-.295**	-.197**	.064**	.115**	1	.070**	-.126**	-.151**	-.171**	-.191**
Stimulation	.105**	-.395**	-.376**	-.182**	-.113**	.070**	1	.199**	.107**	-.020	-.411**
Hedonism	-.019	-.301**	-.239**	-.220**	-.273**	-.126**	.199**	1	.066**	.026	-.197**
Achievement	.016	-.201**	-.372**	-.311**	-.347**	-.151**	.107**	.066**	1	.245**	-.153**
Power	.148**	-.004	-.262**	-.306**	-.387**	-.171**	-.020	.026	.245**	1	-.136**
Security	-.180**	.160**	.152**	-.010	-.113**	-.191**	-.411**	-.197**	-.153**	-.136**	1


Two-tailed significance: ** p < 0.001, * p < 0.05


Appendix G - Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample of British men (n = 746) and women (n = 841). Graph shows the change in predicted probability of candidate selection by attribute.







Appendix H - Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample of British 18-29 year olds (n = 311), 30-49 year olds (n = 563), and 50+ year olds (n = 763). Graphs show the change in predicted probability of candidate selection by attribute.










Appendix I - Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample of Labour Party voters (n = 350), Conservative Party voters (n = 470), and non-voters (n = 432) in the 2015 UK General Election. Graphs show the change in predicted probability of candidate selection by attribute.










Appendix J - Conjoint analysis of voting preferences among a representative sample of British adults in social grades AB (n = 458), C1 (n = 475), C2 (n = 344) and DE (n = 360). Graphs show the change in predicted probability of candidate selection by attribute.









Appendix K - Conjoint analysis of candidate preferences among a representative sample of Leave voters (n = 673) and Remain voters (n = 620) from the 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union. Graphs show the change in predicted probability of candidate selection by attribute.

