STATE FAILURE AND HYBRID SECURITY GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF JAMAICA

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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with examining the intersection between the failed state and security governance literatures, through the case study of Jamaica.

This thesis is primarily concerned with examining the under-researched link between concerns raised in failed state and security governance literatures. The thesis proposes that the presence of state failure and success in the same setting is a direct result of the execution of a problematic security governance framework that impedes the nation's ability to establish a stable state infrastructure that is capable of fulfilling the welfare needs of the entire citizenry. By utilising Jamaica as a case study, and more specifically the Tivoli Gardens Incursion as a sub case study, the main contributions to research that this thesis makes is that state failure can co-exist alongside spaces of state success. State failure, as exemplified in Jamaica, can exist on a continuum and manifests itself geographically and within certain sectors of the state system, such as security.

The thesis employs qualitative methodology using data gathered from 22 semi-structure interviews from public and private actors in the security sector, residents from two inner-city communities. The thesis engages in a historical analysis of Jamaica's state development by examining how factors such as its post-colonial identity, urban segregation, stark social inequalities, and the dysfunctional relationship between state and non-state actors that was established in post-independence Jamaica have laid the foundations for a state indicating signs of failure. It further explores the dichotomy between the public and the private sectors in Jamaica, specifically as it relates to security provision, in an effort to assess how this dichotomy has fostered structures of social inequalities that further entrench features of failed statehood and problematic security governance prominent in the urban space. Specific focus will also be placed on examining how the structures of failed state and security governance that permeated the country precipitated the 24 May 2010 incursion into Tivoli Gardens, and its ramifications on the state's ability to reassert its centralised power.

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References.

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1 Introduction

Jamaica may be described as a state that exhibits multiple contradictions that have aided in framing an interesting and somewhat oppositional social and political environment. The country's socio-political landscape highlights a tapestry of multilevel forms of power, governance, access and control that are separated geographically by the borders of communities – ultimately creating a somewhat unbalanced social system. On one end of the spectrum, communities exist in which access to privatised social welfare goods and services, such as healthcare, education and security is considered the norm. Crime and violence are relatively low in these urban spaces and the various actors at play tend to belong to the political, social and economic elite. These privatised spaces are occupied by the middle to upper classes that have created gated communities of wealth. Whilst urban spaces, characterised by features of intense conflict, high crime rates, poverty, poor housing infrastructure, and in which residents are forced to rely on poor social welfare with limited access to healthcare and education opportunities, exist on the other end of the spectrum. In these spaces/communities employment rates are low and non-state actors assume positions of authority and control due to the noticeable absence of the state. These spaces are populated by communities of the marginalised poor.

The provision of security across these differing urban spaces has become one of the key indicators of a somewhat problematic and oppositional state infrastructure. The security environment is littered with a multitude of actors assuming varying forms of legitimacy and which are empowered by different frameworks of authority and control. Both spaces benefit from dual types of privatised security. In gated communities, the private security sector, which is regulated by the state, maintains a strong presence alongside the state's police force. Security in these spaces is thus

commoditised and privatised. Conversely, security provision in inner-city communities is controlled by non-state security actors, such as dons and community gangs. A subversion of power occurs in these spaces that places these non-state actors at the centre of power and authority rather than the state. One of the more interesting aspects of the security environment in the poorer communities, and more specifically the actors that provide it, is the underlying influence that politics and illegal trade have played in its development and current construction which ultimately places it outside the formal structures of state security. Within the security sphere, the social inequalities of the state come to the fore alongside the problematic nature of governance.

Taken together, the Jamaican society epitomises several forms of inequalities in its socio-economic environment and governance structures that have fostered a state setting that assumes a dual identity – that of failure and success. This thesis thus contends that though Jamaica cannot be considered a failed state it exhibits incremental instances of failure in certain urban spaces throughout the country. The security environment comes to the fore as one of the main spheres in which failure is exemplified, and as a result, highlights certain issues that have impacted significantly on the construction of the Jamaican state. The state is thus defined by a continuum of functionality that indicates why state failure or success is more pronounced in some areas of the society than others.

In light of this, the aim of this thesis is to provide an account for the existence of both state failure and success within the same setting. In order to accomplish this, the thesis will explore the link between the concerns raised in failed state and security governance literatures in order to examine how they may yield a comprehensive appreciation of the nuanced development of Jamaica's state system; and how it has

impacted on the construction of the state and the roles played by both state and non-state actors throughout the urban space. This thesis is therefore concerned with exploring 1) the nature of statehood, 2) the manner in which governance is executed, and 3) the dichotomy between the public and the private in order to gain a better appreciation for the issues affecting the Caribbean island. The thesis proposes that the failure and success of the state in different spaces is a direct result of the execution of a problematic security governance framework that impedes the nation's ability to establish a stable state infrastructure that is capable of fulfilling the welfare needs of the entire citizenry. In examining Jamaica through the lens of the state failure and security governance literatures this thesis intends to provide a critique and highlight the under-researched link between the concerns raised in both literatures as it applies to the Jamaican context.

1.1   Framing the Research

1.1.1   Context and Rationale

Concerns such as continuous warfare, internal ethnic conflict, non-existent state welfare institutions, and a lack of a stable government are all identified as factors contributing or representative of state failure (Rotberg, 2004; 2003). These states lack the ability to control their territories, are unable to maintain a monopoly on the use of violence, and they also lack the capacity and capabilities to provide for the welfare needs of their populations (see Chapters 2 and 4). Based on this description, it cannot be argued that Jamaica is representative of a failed state.

However, in examining the dynamics of relationships within the state, the identities and role played by multiple state and non-state actors, the causes and implications of conflict within the country and the collective impact on the welfare of

the population, it can be surmised that in some instances and spaces Jamaica does suffer from state failure. The main outlier of failure in the country rests in the nature of its security governance framework and the manner in which it functions in the state system. The problems engendered in the type of security governance at play have aided in undermining the state system and facilitated a more targeted form of state failure which only exists in inner-city communities controlled by gangs and dons which ultimately has greater implications on the overall welfare of the entire population as well as the functionality and stability of the state.

The thesis thus attempts to undertake a two-tiered approach to examining the links between the issues raised in state failure and security governance literatures through a Jamaican case study. The first concern that will be examined in this thesis is understanding the manner in which state failure manifests itself geographically. As noted above, the urban landscape is littered with dual forms of communities – i.e., those that exist in wealth, and in which the privatisation of welfare goods is an intrinsic feature; against those that are defined by problems such as constant violence, poverty, inadequate housing and the lack of state intervention. Regarding the latter space, state failure is demarcated by the garrison community lines that divide politically adversarial communities from each other and from the rest of the state. Identifying state failure in these spaces, as opposed to the relatively success of other urban communities, becomes particularly more evident when the features of state failure illustrated in the literature is applied to these settings (see Chapters 2 and 4). State failure and success thus become spatially indicative zones across Jamaica's urban landscape.

The secondary approach that this thesis will assume is by exploring how the systems of state failure that are established within the security environment aid in

replicating and reproducing social inequalities, whilst considering what the long-term impact this may have on state development and functionality. In spaces of wealth in particular, the privatisation and commoditisation of security (and other welfare goods) have aided in creating pockets of stability and success across the state.[1] These communities are able to function because of the financial investment of its residents, thus making a public good a private commodity (see Chapter 6). Thus, the privatisation of these communities aids in producing a functioning state. Conversely, for residents in inner-city and garrisons communities the option to access privatised social goods is non-existent, thus forcing them to seek security from informal non-state actors such as dons and criminal gangs (see Chapter 6). Due to the absence of the state in these communities, coupled with the residents' reliance on criminal actors, the state is unable to regulate the security environment in these spaces which ultimately creates a lack of transparency in the management and control of security provision in these urban spaces.[2] The nature, provision and governance of security in these marginalised communities of the poor thus became compromised. The issue that this dualistic treatment of security privatisation in both spaces creates (i.e., transforming a public good into a private good) is the *reinforcement* and *reproduction* of inequalities across the social landscape. As such, this thesis will approach this aspect of the link between the failed state and security governance literatures by addressing the implications that

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[1] Other public welfare goods such as education, healthcare, housing and access to affordable housing do not play a significant role in this thesis as the dynamics of their provision and management falls outside the general scope of this study. Although these public goods and services are mentioned intermittently throughout the thesis, the primary focus is exploring how the state, alongside non-state actors (specifically gangs and dons), are able to provide for the security of the citizenry.

[2] It should be noted that the state's regulation of privatised security is much more pronounced in the wealthy urban spaces. There is also a greater degree of transparency with private security companies being held accountable for their actions and the manner in which they operate. The regulation of the industry was formalised by the establishment of the Private Security Regulation Authority Act, 1992.

the reinforcement and reproduction of inequalities may have on the long-term development prospects of the state and its ability to maintain a stable and functioning social environment.

Taken together, this thesis is concerned with understanding how features of state failure, manifested in security provision, may yield a greater appreciation of post-colonial states like Jamaica that have not been previously linked to this typology of statehood. It will seek to examine how failed state and security governance literatures have facilitated a nuanced state system with success and failure occurring at the same time in different spaces within the nation; and the overall implications that the varied provision of security may have on the future development and sustainability of the state. Therefore, this research seeks to a) explore the under-researched aspects of these literatures in an attempt to shine a light on how they interrelate; and b) emphasise the need to conduct further research on these issues to advance the research literature on state failure, security governance and post-colonial states.

1.1.2   Key Terms

This section will provide an overview of the key terms used in this thesis. It will also highlight some the key aspects of the failed state and security governance literatures that will be referenced throughout the thesis.

1.1.2.1   The State

The conceptualisation of the state used throughout this thesis incorporates both the traditional and modernist definition that focuses on the centralisation of power/authority and service provision as core features of a state. According to the traditionalist approach, statehood is associated with the power of the leading authority

to: a) maintain its monopoly on the use of force (thus asserting primary control over state security forces); b) exercise exclusive autonomy from the influence of internal and external non-state actors; and c) coordinate the activities of agents responsible for delivering social welfare goods to the populace (Rotberg, 2002; Gros, 1996; Migdal, 1988). Maintaining a centralised authority and protecting the balance of power within the territory act as the defining and distinguishing features of a state (Demetriou, 2003).

As the theory of statehood developed, there was a slight paradigm shift which highlighted the evolution from the traditional Weberian construction of the state as being the primary territorial authority that maintains a monopoly on the use of violence, to an entity which is also responsible for providing for the social welfare needs of its citizenry (as asserted by Migdal, 1988) whilst also being the "guardian" of the country's natural resources (Gros, 1996). The modern state is also charged with delivering public goods such as security and stable national commerce and communication institutions designed to serve the needs of its citizenry (Rotberg, 2002). As such, the modern state can thus be recognised as an entity that maintains the central authority over a territory in which it is able to exercise its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence whilst also being primarily responsible for the delivery of social welfare goods that meet the diverse socio-economic needs of a population.

Engendered in state literature is the idea of citizenship and accountability which will act as underlying issues of concern throughout the thesis. The initial conceptualisation of citizenship, asserted by T.H. Marshall, posited that people should be treated as equal members of a common community/society by affording them three main rights: "civil, political, and social" (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994, p. 354). The establishment of all three citizenship rights, especially civil and political rights,

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enabled the expansion of the "class of citizen"; in that, people who previously belonged to marginalised communities such as women, slaves, blacks, people who did not own property, etc., were afforded the same rights as others (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994, p. 354). Under the welfare state, these rights would ensure that there was not an unequal dispersal of social benefits (Phillips, 2012, p. 487). Citizenship is also recognised in legal terms as a contract between the state and the people (Irving, 2007). According to modern conceptualisation of the term greater focus is placed on the responsibilities and the reciprocity of relations amongst citizens and between the people and the state (Phillips, 2007).

As will be discussed in the forthcoming chapters the reciprocity of relations and the problematic nature of this in marginalised communities of the poor brings to the fore important concerns related to citizens' social contract with the state and non-state actors (Zartman, 1995); in that, in communities in which the rights of the people (particularly their social and political rights) have somewhat removed their ability to enter into a contract with the state for the equal delivery of welfare goods is suspended. In place of this, a new type of social contract is established with non-state actors such as gangs and dons that undermine the central authority of the state, but which also fills the welfare gap created by the absence of the state. Therefore, citizenship in these spaces of marginalised poor is executed through a relationship between the residents and non-state actors that have become de-facto service providers and the central authority of the community (see Chapters 4 and 6).

In a democratic setting the state is created by the citizenry and stays in place by maintaining its accountability and responsibility to the people (Ifidon, 1996). Eriksen and Sending (2013) explain that accountability means "those who rule and act on behalf of others must be accountable towards those on whose behalf they (claim

to) act" (p. 219). The idea of accountability thus asserts that states and their agents, such as the police, army officers, elected officials etc., must be accountable to their citizens, in so doing states are able to reinforce their legitimacy and authority at the national level (Eriksen and Sending, 2013). The mechanisms of accountability put in place are aimed at guaranteeing a certain level of public protection by ensuring that the needs of the people are fulfilled and in return the state retains its authority in the society.

With the introduction of non-state actors as new forms of service providers within the state the idea of accountability becomes a bit more ambiguous and difficult to assign. Given the privatised nature of these non-state actors the accountability and responsibility they maintain is primarily to the paying members of the public (i.e., their customers) (Eriksen and Sending, 2013). The state, as an agent of control and authority, is removed or displaced from being the provider of these services to becoming the regulator. This type of privatised accountability thus makes it far more difficult for the state to establish a centralised framework for governance in spaces occupied by non-state private actors, which ultimately makes it more difficult to regulate their activities and practices. This is particularly a more pressing concern for the privatisation of security by gang members because, unlike private security companies (PSCs), the state is unable to regulate the practices of the gangs. Therefore, the idea of the state maintaining central authority is thus problematised and further reinforces certain levels of inequalities throughout the state in terms of the power structures, and the responsiveness of the state.

1.1.2.2 Levels of Statehood

The literature delineates a multilevel categorization of states that is directly based on their capability of meeting the demands of the citizenry. According to Migdal (1988), the "capabilities of states include the capacities to *penetrate* society, *regulate* social relationships, *extract* resources, and *appropriate* or use resources in determined ways" (p. 4, original emphasis). A continuum of strength is thus proposed that includes: a) strong/successful states which possess the capabilities to meet the aforementioned tasks and provide the populace with the requisite political goods; and b) weak/quasi states that are incapable of meeting the same level of capability as strong states (Hill, 2005; Migdal, 1988). Weak states are so defined due to the presence of intercommunal tensions, corruption, high crime rates, and low GDP (Rotberg, 2004). Weak states lack the ability to provide sufficient political goods; and the public institutions such as hospitals, police stations and schools in rural areas are severely neglected (Rotberg, 2004). Countries such as Cambodia under the rule of Pol Pot, North Korea, and Libya are often characterised as weak states (Rotberg, 2004; see Chapter 2).

At the further end of this spectrum is the fragile or failed state which is a category that has been variously defined throughout the literature. According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the term "fragile states" includes the spectrum of failing, failed or recovering states, and often these states are defined based on their vulnerability or whether they have entered into crisis (USAID, 2005; Hameiri, 2007). It further recognises that these states are underscored by instability due to "ineffective or illegitimate governance" (USAID, 2005, p. 3). The failure of the state is also connected to the unwillingness or inability of a government to deliver basic social welfare goods to the citizenry, especially the poor (Hameiri,

2007; DFID, 2005). The presence of conflict, fragile institutions and weak governance further add another dimension to categorising nations within the failed state literatures (Hameiri, 2007).

The literature further cautions, however, that there is an integral distinction that must be acknowledged between fragile and failed states. The notion of state fragility suggests that though complete failure is possible, the state's deterioration can be arrested with the appropriate external intervention and through the implementation of effective policies (Hameiri, 2007; Rotberg, 2004). State fragility is thus identified by "low *capacity*" and the "lack of political *will*" (Hameiri, 2007, p. 127). State failure, on the other hand, indicates the incapability for the central authority to function and meet its obligations to its citizenry – the state has essentially ceased to operate (Hameiri, 2007). Rotberg (2002) asserts that failed states are marred by extreme conflict, and the intensification of criminal violence being carried out by illegitimate actors such as gangs. These states exhibit an inability to exercise control over their borders and internal spaces. Moreover, they are unable to provide the requisite security to citizens and are undermined by weak state institutions that limit their abilities to support their people. (See Chapter 4 for further discussion on failed states).

The literature on state failure therefore suggests that this is a condition that encompasses the entire landscape of the state, and once fully achieved, it becomes the fixed identity of the state. This thesis, however, posits the opposite view. Based on an exploration of statehood in Jamaica and the roles played by both state and non-state actors (see Chapters 4, 6 and 7) this thesis asserts that state failure is incremental and exists in urban pockets across the social landscape. As a result, it is a condition of statehood that is able to exist alongside successful urban spaces. Additionally, this failure (particularly the extreme forms of state failure, i.e., the emergence of civil

conflict) can be incremental and only becomes evident in significant periods of state crisis (see Chapter 7). In instances in which state failure is evident the overall functionality of the state is not compromised to a degree that will affect its entire populace, but rather only members inhabiting the marginalised communities in which the failure of the state exists.

1.1.2.3   Appreciating Security Governance

The second area of this research delves into the role played by both state and non-state actors in maintaining the basic functions and general management of the state. It highlights the interconnected relationships between both groups of actors and the implications that this relationship may have on the way in which states are categorised, and their capabilities in meeting the needs of the populace. Security governance literature is used throughout the thesis to examine this network of actors.

1.1.2.4   Government versus Governance

In exploring the concept of security governance, the thesis first highlights the differences between the terms 'government' and 'governance' (see Chapter 2). The literature on 'government' contends that the term refers to the regulation of state policies and procedures by a central authority (Webber et al., 2004; Krahmann, 2003a, 2003b; Rosenau, 1992;). The term specifically highlights the coercive means as well as the vertical and hierarchical structure in which state control is enacted (Webber et al., 2004). The term 'governance' is defined throughout the literature as a network of actors and institutions that are involved in the decision-making processes of a state. Governance is illustrative of power sharing between the state and public institutions,

transnational organisations and corporations (Webber et al., 2004; Commission on Global Governance, 1995). In so doing, the literature recognises governance as a shift or relaxing of the central authority held by the state in which the management of the society becomes an act assumed by a network of players. From a global perspective, this shift from government to governance is even more critical as governance provides the global community with a platform to appropriately address emerging challenges in trans-organizational networks and transatlantic security (Liao, 2012).

The end of the Cold War, coupled with globalisation, established a new world dynamic in which states began to focus on new security threats that endangered the safety and welfare of populations worldwide. The external threat posed by transnational crime syndicates and terrorist organisations on international borders, alongside the internal threats of civil war, ethnic conflict, weakening economies, and population displacement were deemed as new threats facing the international community (Krahman, 2005a). As a result of the emergence of these new threats, states were forced to consider alternative ways of protecting their populations, and therefore began to integrate non-state actors into the state security infrastructure. In so doing, the power and control that the state previously maintained became decentralised and dispersed amongst a multiplicity of state and non-state actors, a process which came to be defined as security governance.

1.1.2.5   Security Governance

The literature argues that the concept of security governance refers primarily to the pluricentric coordination of both state and non-state actors that carry out the critical function and activities generally reserved for the state (Ehrhart et al., 2014). It recognises the integration and coordination of the informal and formal processes of

both interdependent and autonomous actors within the state infrastructure (Ehrhart et al., 2014). The connection between public and the private actors therefore becomes an integral network within this state system. What the literature further reveals is that central to the idea of security governance is the replacement of the hierarchical approach to governance in favour of a more horizontal system – thus dispersing the use and control of power evenly across this network of actors (Ehrhart et al, 2014). The state, as a result, loses its monopoly on control as the option to share its duties with non-state actors becomes a more feasible and necessary response to its incapacity and incapability in meeting the security needs of the citizenry (Ehrhart et al., 2014).

With the establishment of the security governance framework, however, the literature recognises that security provision should not remain the central responsibility of the state but rather a public good that can be provided by a wider category of actors. Security governance thus exemplifies the management and coordination of this network of providers and the role played by the state in maintaining and managing these relationships. The central control of the state is present but its role changes as it moves from being provider to regulator and coordinator. In some cases, the state is undermined or superseded by the assumed power of non-state actors that are able to assert greater authority in the provision of a particular social good (Ehrhart et al., 2014; Krahmann, 2005).

Furthermore, intrinsic to security governance literature is the pluralisation and privatisation of the delivery of social welfare goods and services. The literature notes that the consequential privatisation of security, as a result of the integration of multiple non-state actors into the state's network of providers, diminishes the cohesion of the state and creates structures of inequalities that can further aid in undermining the stability of the state. The privatisation of security prevents the equitable and legitimate

distribution of welfare goods (Caparini, 2006); in that, it essentially commoditises a public welfare good, thus basing citizen's access to a particular quality of security on their financial means and social class. In so doing, a dichotomy of social inequality plays out throughout the literature by highlighting the idea that middle to upper classes are able to afford the services of private security firms, whilst members of the poorer classes are regulated to accessing more community based informal security actors such as gangs. Social inequalities are therefore replicated and reproduced, which highlights one of the more problematic aspects of this literature that will be addressed in this thesis.

1.1.3   Limitations of the Key Concepts

Though this thesis generally agrees with the modern definition of statehood, there is a notable concern that emerges that to some extent undermines the literature. As noted by Hill (2005) most of the research exploring the idea of weak, failing, fragile and collapsed states bases its findings against the standard of the successful state and its ability to exercise positive sovereignty (Hill, 2005) (see Chapter 2). As Weber's definition of a successful state was based on the European standard of statehood, the literature exhibits an entrenched bias against other states that are unable to meet the criteria created by their "successful" European counterparts, thus relegating them to the categories of "weak" and "failing". Success, according to the literature, is focused on the ability to obtain and disperse goods and control power – actions that have ultimately become the norm based on the influential power of Western states (Hill, 2005). Western/European states are therefore considered the benchmark of success which ultimately negates the cultural, social, political and economic factors that influence statehood for nations across the global community. This thesis asserts that

this comparative approach does not facilitate a balanced and effective comprehension of states that exhibit any deviance from the norm. It rigidly aligns states to categories that do not necessarily provide an accurate depiction of their development and the factors that are inhibiting, or enhancing, their development and stability.

It is this grey area around what constitutes successful or failed statehood that this thesis seeks to contribute to the literature. Although the literature provides an overview of the features that facilitate state failure – which predominantly focuses on the lack in state capacity and capabilities – it is primarily gauging this analysis on a model of success based on and created by Western States. This literature thus becomes analytically unhelpful in some post-colonial states as it presumes that for these states to be destined to succeed they must have mimicked the state system and procedures of their colonial rulers, i.e., Western States. Nations that were unable to adopt European/Western state identities and systems of governance were ultimately cast into the framework of a failed or collapsed state, thus exemplified by the multitude of African states assigned to these categories (Hill, 2005). Similarly, it does not adequately explain why failure also occurs in some post-colonial states that did adopt the infrastructure (for e.g., the political system) of their colonial rulers. Jamaica acts as the prime example of this as a majority of the state architecture (i.e., the Westminster style of government, policing and security infrastructure) were modelled on the British example, yet the country, particularly in the areas of security, the economy and politics, is still displaying incremental signs of failure decades after obtaining its independence.[3]

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[3] The application of Western standards of statehood does not render the use of state failure literature in the Jamaican context wrong or inappropriate. The thesis is also not disagreeing with the basic established features of failed statehood that are outlined throughout the literature. What this thesis is suggesting is that creating a barometer for failure or success based on the infrastructure of European/Western is unnecessary. Rather, emphasis should be placed on how states are able to govern, meet the needs of their citizenry, establish and

The thesis further contends that the guidelines for success or failure are in fact too rigid and do not account for the impact that social factors may have on the stability of a state and the welfare of a society. Conflict, extreme poverty, population displacement, instances of war, etc., that are usually defined as characteristics of failed states cannot be applied to all states, like Jamaica, that exhibit some form of vulnerability and incapacity. This thesis contends that state failure, as highlighted in the Jamaican context, exhibits a more fluid set of characteristics that can be evaluated based on the unique internal features of the individual state. For example, Jamaica has been classified as a developing state with a relatively strong middle and upper class which has helped to maintain its classification as an upper middle-income country (World Bank, 2016). Though the country is faced with large amounts of international debt and exhibits limited growth (World Bank, 2016.) it is still able to maintain a fairly good physical communications and travel infrastructure and benefits significantly from the profits made from a stable tourism industry. Additionally, members of the middle to upper classes have access to commoditised welfare services such as private healthcare, private security, private housing enclaves, and private education – thus supporting the growth of a multi-layered private sector to meet their everyday needs.

However, for many people living in marginalised poor communities their standard of living is inadequate. In many instances this segment of the population is unable to afford proper housing, education, and healthcare and often endure various forms of criminality and violence on a daily basis. This entire segment of the population has been disenfranchised from the society as they lack the means and

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maintain its sovereignty on an individual basis. Additionally, as will be highlighted in this thesis, state failure can occur alongside successful spaces within a country. Therefore, to label an entire country successful, and use it to determine levels of statehood in others, is problematic as these 'successful' Western/European states may also exhibit aspects of failure that do not meet the criteria outlined in the literature.

ability to purchase the necessary social welfare goods and services; and the state lacks either the capacity or willingness to fill their needs gap. The commoditisation of social welfare goods not only places the poorer segment of the society at a disadvantage but removes the state as the central authority within the system by prioritising the position of private welfare providers. See Chapter 6 for further discussion on how welfare needs are addressed across the urban landscape, specifically in the marginalised communities of West Kingston.

Failed state literature prioritises the presence of conflict, warfare, violence and state incapacities as key indicators of failed statehood (Rotberg, 2004). However, it is the position of this thesis that factors relating to the social, economic, political and cultural stability of the state should be given greater precedence in this framework. Social inequalities that exist in different mediums and to varying extent throughout the state should be recognised as a concerning feature of failed statehood. As such, in cases like Jamaica where the traditional understanding of conflict is not an ongoing threat, but in which the aforementioned social conditions are present alongside the disenfranchisement of a segment of the population, the category of failed statehood should be applied. Therefore, state failure, particularly in modern middle-income state, cannot only be categorised based on the presence of conflict and state incapacity; but should also recognise a plethora of social inadequacies and problems that possess the potential to undermine and destabilise the state.[4]

The focus on geographical and social inequalities as indicators of state failure also removes the North/Developed versus the South/Underdeveloped states divide that

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[4] Following on from this, throughout the thesis concerns such as the inability of the state to provide for the welfare needs of the citizenry, poor housing, education and high unemployment rates, the inability of the state to provide security and protection to its citizens, poor infrastructural development, etc., can all be recognised as failures of the state. These are classed as failures as the state has not met its contractual obligations to its citizens, thus enabling non-state actors to fill theses welfare gaps.

underscore state literature. By bringing these features of state failure to the fore the lines become blurred as to which states can comfortably fit into each category; in that, it does not uses the identifier of being a North/Developed state, for example, to dictate whether state failure is possible as it suggests that even these states (despite the traditional view of them being developed) can exhibit signs of failure. In so doing, the thesis priorities gaining a more in-depth and holistic appreciation of the factors affecting statehood and evaluate them accordingly.

Furthermore, the literature does not adequately address states in which their post-colonial identity, coupled with the establishment of an adversarial political system, may in fact contribute to its failure.[5] As noted in the case of Jamaica, the adversarial nature of politics and its impact on systems of governance have contributed to the emergence of various features attributed to weak and failing states. From political corruption and patronage to the presence of wide scale social inequality, poverty, criminal violence and significant periods of conflict, the Jamaican adversarial political environment has become the critical link that has undermined the potential of the state to strengthen its infrastructure and capabilities.

This thesis suggests that the political and social environment that emerged out of the post-colonial Jamaican state lacked the framework for success due to the establishment of an adversarial political system that encouraged intercommunal violence, tense social relations, and a system of political patronage that favoured one segment of society, whilst disenfranchising others. The system that emerged as a result also handed the reins of power and authority into the hands of illegitimate non-state

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[5] Harriott has carried out extensive research on politics, crime and gangs in Jamaica. His research also references the post-colonial legacy on the security and political infrastructure of the state (see Harriott, 2008). However, his research, though recognising the problematic nature of the state, does not frame these issues as being indicators of state failure.

actors. As a result, since gaining independence in 1962 urban spaces throughout the country have drifted in and out of failure which ultimately reached crisis point with the state's incursion on Tivoli Gardens in May 2010 (see Chapters 4 and 7).

The security governance literature places considerable emphasis on the pluralisation and privatisation of welfare goods and services provision within the state (Caparini, 2006). The key focus of the literature is its recognition that in order for a state to maintain its stability services and goods, such as security, must be contracted out to non-state actors. In so doing, the state maintains central control by regulating the activities and practices of non-state actors. The traditional hierarchical structures of governance are replaced with a horizontal approach that evenly distributes power and authority throughout the wide array of actors assuming positions within the network (Ehrhart et al, 2014; Liao, 2012; Daase and Friesendorf, 2010; Krahmann, 2005b)

One of the key limitations of the security governance literature is an approach to security provision and the management of actors in the state system that is unable to mitigate the negative repercussions that are bound to occur with the pluralisation and privatisation of social welfare goods. The integration of non-state actors into a state system concerned with the delivery of public goods immediately challenges the central authority held by the state and undermines the cohesion of the network. Based on this premise, there is an aspect of the security governance that tacitly fosters a network of ungoverned state and non-state actors that operate differentially across the urban landscape due to the socio-economic features of varying communities. With the state unable to exert a top-down approach to security provision it is ultimately unable to assure the even distribution of these goods by the actors.

The literature therefore does not recognise the implications that the privatisation of security can have on the state system. The cascading repercussions that result from the privatisation and pluralisation of security first shift this public good into the private domain, thus commoditising it, and in turn fosters its differential distribution and access by the citizenry. The inequalities that emerge in accessing this now privatised public service replicates the socio-economic inequalities present across the social landscape, further entrenching social divisions within the state (Goldsmith, 2010).

Additionally, the pluralisation of security that is intrinsic to the framework removes the authority from the state (in spaces where security governance appears problematic) and in so doing prevents it from effectively and efficiently 'policing' the practices, activities and policies of non-state security providers. This particularly pertains to actors that do not fall within the formalised structures of the state system, such as gangs and dons. In so doing, this places the state and its citizenry in a position of vulnerability against potential abuses that may be carried out by non-state actors. The thesis argues that without the effective central management of a pluralised security sector by the state the ability for both state and non-state actors to provide effective security and protection to all segments of the society is thus compromised.

In focusing this criticism of security governance paradigm within the Jamaican context another limitation presents itself when examining the influence that the country's political environment has on the network of relations within the state. The paradigm treats the state as an independent authority that is not governed by the political ideologies of the government in power and the problematic relationships they maintain with both state and non-state actors. In so doing, it ignores the unique social, economic and political culture of the state in favour of a more generalised observation

of how states 'should' act. This thesis challenges this view and asserts that the state's ability to execute a positive and successful security governance framework is dependent on the ruling government's interrelationships with these actors and the varying segments of society that it governs. This thesis thus places into focus the political environment of the state as an integral aspect in understanding how security governance is executed and in determining its success within the state (see Chapter 6).

1.2 Contributions

The main contribution this thesis makes is to the development of the failed state literature and the manner in which it examines states that exhibit non-traditional signs of failure. As noted previously, the current construction of failed state literature aligns states that suffer from prolonged internal conflict (i.e., warfare), extensive poverty, limited or non-existent state institutions and the inability to maintain its monopoly on violence within this category of states. It further notes that failure is highly dependent on the capacity and capability of the state to provide for the social welfare needs of its citizenry. In so doing, the main analysis of failure is the state rather than issues that define the state that include its historical and social identity, foreign and local relationships with state and non-state actors and a wide array of social, political and economic concerns. As such, in offering its critique of failed state literature, this thesis notes that there is in fact a more subtle form of state failure evident in some post-colonial states. The thesis argues that various features relating to the social, economic, and political factors that have cumulatively aided in destabilising the state should be brought to the fore. It emphasises the idea that failure is in fact a gradual process that is dependent on the identities assumed, and the varying roles

played by a diverse group of state and non-state actors throughout the state system. It further adds that the political environment of a state, and the manner in which both state and non-state actors integrate, creates the foundations for state failure that are evident in most post-colonial and other states. More critically, it suggests that the process of failure begins at the stage of state formation rather than during its development. The consequential failure of the state is therefore due to the inability of the state to rectify its problems as it continues to evolve in the state system. It therefore provides a critique of the traditional framework for evaluating failure in post-colonial states, and beyond, that to-date have been unrecognised and miscast in the process of state development.

1.2.1   Why Jamaica?

Jamaica was chosen as the primary case study for this thesis for two key reasons. These include the familiarity with the case study and a recognition that literature regarding the nature of the Jamaican state does not adequately explain its construction and the complex social, political and economic dynamics at play that have affected its development and stability since the country gained independence.

Firstly, as a Jamaican national, the researcher is familiar with the complex nature of the state system and the actors that populate it. Moreover, concerns such as poverty, adversarial politics and social inequalities have been noted by the researcher as prevailing issues that have impacted significantly on the stability and functionality of the state. As an individual who belongs to the middle-income class, with access to privatised social welfare goods and services, the researcher was intent on understanding how and why the noticeable socio-economic disparity across the social landscape was able to emerge and the repercussions that it has had on the formulation

of the Jamaican state. Similarly, the research was motivated by the researcher's interest in understanding the background and implications that the Tivoli Gardens Incursion of May 2010 has had on the state's security environment and its political and societal infrastructure.

The interest that the researcher assumed in establishing a more comprehensive understanding of the Jamaican state brought to the fore certain questions about how Jamaica is characterised and the extent of the power and authority of non-state actors, particularly dons, had on state development – thus contributing to the second reason Jamaica was chosen as a case study for this thesis. Firstly, Jamaica displays a rather interesting configuration in its urban space; in that, garrisons and inner-city communities are able to co-exist alongside gated middle to upper income communities and commercial zones. The disparity in the socio-economic landscape of the country is blatant, yet the state seems to straddle both literatures on state failure and success. Though the literature has suggested that Jamaica may be recognised as a hybrid state (Jaffe, 2013), it primarily focusses on how criminal dons and the state are able to establish a working relationship that transfers the responsibilities of the state in garrisons to non-state actors, i.e., dons. The literature thus prioritises governance structures and the political environment without expanding on how these features aid in replicating and reproducing social inequalities across the landscape, and whether similar problematic networks of state and non-state actors can be identified in middle to upper-class communities. More concern is placed on understanding the nature of organised crime and criminal gangs (Harriott, 2015; Harriott, 1996) rather than the state system that they are allowed to operate in, and the repercussions it may have on the overall nature of governance, citizenship and accountability across the state (in both wealthy and poor communities). It ignores the impact that establishing such a

network may have on the future development and stability of the state if these networks of relations and the instability inherent in these spaces are allowed to move into other spaces of the society.

Furthermore, the literature, though recognising the emergence of garrison communities and their link to politics, crime and violence in Jamaica (Figueroa and Sives, 2010; Stone, 1980), does not seek to efficiently identify the dynamics within these communities as being indicative of failure, but rather places them within the blanket category of being a contra-state (Kerr, 1997). This thesis thus seeks to identify and understand the gap between recognising these communities as simply contra-states and seeing how their construction can influence the stability of the wider society. The researcher wanted to find ways to account for the dual presentation of failing (poor and marginalised) communities against that of successful (wealthy and elite) communities in the society – essentially examining why pockets of failure exists and persist in Jamaica's urban spaces.

It further chose Jamaica as an exemplar for exploring the post-colonial state through a different lens. With areas of failure existing alongside spaces of state success the research attempts to bring to the fore that post-colonial states that exhibit similar features ought to be re-evaluated within the failed state framework. In so doing, a greater appreciation of its internal dynamics and the issues preventing its sustained development may be brought to light and addressed appropriately by the state.

1.3   Conducting the Research

1.3.1   Methodology

This thesis employs a qualitative methodological approach to its research design (see Chapter 3). The research employed a case study approach in which

Jamaica was treated as the main case study; and the 24 May 2010 Tivoli Gardens Incursion becoming a sub-case study. Over a period of 6 month a series of semi-structured interviews with 22 participants from various sectors of the society were conducted in Jamaica. The participant cohort includes:

1. 1 gang and crime researcher who establish several peace building initiatives in garrison and inner-city communities

2. 4 retired members of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) that represent the public security sphere

3. 5 active members of the private security sectors (3 of which are retired members of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF)

4. 12 inner-city community residents (5 from August Town, and 7 from Trench Town)

Due to the relatively small participant pool documents were employed as supplemental data. A combination of historical documents, autobiographies, government reports, newspaper articles, NGO and INGO reports were incorporated into the research in order to supplement the knowledge gap encountered by not being able to gain access to certain potential groups of participants.[6]

To analyse the data collected in the interviews and documents the research applied a grounded theory approach. A grounded theory approach allowed for a more theory building form of analysis (Charmaz, 2008). After uploading transcripts of the interviews and documents into the NVIVO qualitative data management programme codes were derived from a combination of inductive and deductive method of data analysis which was concerned with bringing to the fore the core issues raised by

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[6] Chapter 3 provides further details about the types of documents used and the difficulties in accessing certain participant groups during the fieldwork phase of the project.

participants (Hennink et al., 2011), which were subsequently applied to the analysis of the documents. Through various cycles of coding and analysis themes related to corruption, social inequalities, crime, Jamaica's two-party political system emerged that aided in forming the core framework of this thesis in relation to how state failure is not only illustrated through security but is also geographically evident and an incremental state phenomenon.

The methodological challenges of conducting fieldwork in Jamaica are further explored in this thesis (see Chapter 3). The challenges that emerged formed yet another key aspect of the dynamic type of statehood existing in Jamaica; in that, on the one hand the difficulties in accessing state agents for interviews and in gaining ethical approval to conduct research with certain groups in the country may represent a weakness in the institutional capacity of the state, particularly in its ministries. On the other hand, it may also represent a strong state that is able to control the narrative being created regarding its functionality and stability by being selective of the type of research being conducted within its borders.

1.3.2 Omission of the Jamaica Defence Force

In examining the interconnected concerns raised in both security governance and failed state literatures this thesis specifically focusses on the nature of security provision from a policing perspective. The decision to focus primarily on examining the nature, practices and policies of the main policing body, the JCF, rather than include the JDF (the military), in greater detail was based on several key factors.

Firstly, it provided a critical foundation for tracing the historical, political and social evolution of Jamaican society and the influence that the colonial government had on shaping the practices and policies of the country's security sector. Unlike the

JDF, which was formally constituted in 1962, the JCF (in its various historical iterations) has had a far-reaching impact on the manner in which the colonial and post-colonial Jamaican society was supported and protected by the state. See Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion on the establishment and evolution of the JCF.

Secondly, the JCF's practices and positionality within the state infrastructure could be considered as being more intermingled with the political, social as well as to some degree the economic infrastructure of the state. As will be highlighted further in this thesis the JCF not only acted as a security agent of the state, but also supported political parties and various non-state actors throughout the historical development of the country. The close relationship that members of the JCF have established with political parties throughout its historical development is not mimicked in the JDF, which has been able to maintain a relatively neutral stance in its operations with the state and the people. In so doing, members of the JCF problematized governance and security provision in Jamaica, repercussions of which are highlighted more poignantly in the May 2010 Incursion in Tivoli Gardens. Connected to this issue is the stark difference in the response that the citizenry, especially in inner-city communities, has towards the police force as opposed to that of the JDF. The JCF, unlike the JDF, has been accused of significant human rights abuses against citizens of the state, so much so, that there has been a call for reform within the police force by several national and international NGOs.[7] The nature of abuses, including police brutality, extrajudicial killings, etc., allegedly perpetrated by the JCF, requires investigation in light of the

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[7] See the following reports highlighting the problematic concern of police brutality in Jamaica: Amnesty International "Jamaica: Killings and violence by police: How many more victims? (April 2001: AMR 38/007/2001); "Amnesty International Report 2016/2017: The state of the world's human rights"; Amnesty International "Waiting in vain: Jamaica: Unlawful police killings and relative's long struggle for justice" (AMR 38/5092/2016); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights "Report on the situation of human rights in Jamaica (2012); Jamaicans for Justice "Killing impunity: Fatal police shootings and extrajudicial executions in Jamaica: 2005-2007".

failed state literature. As a result, the JCF assumes greater precedence than the JDF in this examination.

Thirdly, as the police force is often recognised as the key security actor, even in a more plural understanding of security governance, it is appropriate to focus the discussion presented in the thesis primarily on policing practices, rather than that of the military. Additionally, by primarily focusing on policing, the thesis is attempting to examine the interconnectivity between security governance and state failure within a more defined and specific context, that is, the various forms of 'policing' that are assumed by multiple actors within the society. As such, the idea of policing is evaluated from the perspective of the state protecting and providing security to the populace, as well as from the perspective of non-state actors who provide an informal type of policing in specific urban communities. To incorporate a military component into this discussion would in fact broaden the specific scope of this research and prevent for a more targeted analysis of the connection between the concerns raised in both security governance and failed state literatures. The discussion relating to security governance throughout this thesis thus primarily focusses on the state and non-state policing aspect of this body of literature and places the role of the military on the periphery of the discussion.

The practices of the JDF is only addressed in this thesis when implicated in a key incident of policing, as exemplified in the May 2010 Tivoli Incursion (see Chapter 7). The JDF is discussed primarily in an effort to acknowledge the nature and breadth of the security operation in Tivoli Gardens, and the means used by the government to reclaim its authority within this urban space. The inclusion of the JDF in this chapter is also used to gauge the use of force not only used by the state against its citizens, but

also the type of weaponry used by non-state actors against the state's security personnel.

Overall, the thesis omits any in depth discussion relating to the JDF for three key reasons. These are: 1) prioritising the role of the JCF acts as an historical anchor for an in-depth examination of the establishment and growth of Jamaica's complex security environment, and the impact that its colonial and post-colonial foundations have had on the present construction of security; 2) unlike the JDF, the practices and policies of the JCF, since its establishment, have been intermingled with the socio-economic and political environment of the state which have contributed to the highly problematised security environment; and 3) in a pluralised security environment the police force is often seen as the key security actor, and therefore takes precedence over the military.

1.3.3   Research Questions

The main research questions examined by this thesis are:

1. What are the connections between security governance and state failure?

2. How does a nation's colonial history and post-colonial identity affect state failure and security governance?

3. What are the implications of the shift from security government to security governance on the understanding of state failure in Jamaica?

Each question will be addressed in various chapters throughout the thesis (see below) and directly answered in Chapter 8, the concluding chapter.

1.3.4 Overview of Chapters

The thesis is comprised of 8 chapters. This section provides a brief synopsis of the key issues explored in each chapter. A fundamental feature of the chapter development of this thesis that should be noted is that in addition to examining literatures on failed states and security governance, this thesis uses key events in Jamaica's history to also explore statehood, the complex relationship between state and non-state actors and the influence they have on the state system. By applying a historical perspective – highlighting key events in the nation's history – the thesis aims to critique the limitations and strengths of the literatures being explored.

Chapter 2, *State Failure and Hybrid Security Governance in Theoretical Perspective,* provides a literature review of the key debates surrounding the two literatures framing this thesis, failed state and security governance. It will examine the definitional issues regarding the state, security and the differences between government and governance. One of the core concerns of this chapter is to outline how the ideas of failed state and security governance are conceived within this thesis and the varied undertones that affect their application to the Jamaican context. As such, it will explore the issues surrounding key aspects of the literatures such as the connection between privatisation and pluralisation of the state and the impact it may have on the functionality of the state. This chapter addresses the first research question: *What are the connections between security governance and state failure?*

As noted above, Chapter 3, *Methodology,* explores the investigative tools employed to collect and analyse data used throughout the thesis. The chapter reveals that the thesis assumes a case study approach in which Jamaica is employed as the main research area. As a case study, Jamaica is used to examine the more general application of the literatures to explore how each characteristic directly impacts on the

nature of the state and the population. From a historical perspective, the country as a case study is used to chart the development and treatment of certain indicators of failed state and security governance paradigm to determine how they evolved and framed the current construction of the state. The Tivoli Gardens Incursion of 24 May 2010 is further employed as a sub-case study to situate the various characteristics of these literatures, as applied in the Jamaican context, within a specific temporal and physical space in order to provide a more specialised examination of the key issues. A reflection on the investigative process in Jamaica acts as concluding section for the chapter. This section explores the challenges in conducting research in Jamaica, especially within marginalised communities, and the extent to which it may impact on further research of a similar nature being carried out in the country.

Chapter 4, *Understanding the Nature of the Jamaican State,* examines the limitations and strengths of the failed state theory within the Jamaican context. The chapter addresses the following research question: *How does a nation's colonial history and post-colonial identity affect state failure and security governance?* This chapter delves into the problematic impact of Jamaica's adversarial two-party political system by highlighting the issues it has created within the state infrastructure. The aim of the chapter is to highlight the main areas in which the country maps on to, develops or contests the criteria of failed statehood and the implications that this may have on the state.

Chapter 5, *The Historical and Political Background of Public Security in Jamaica*, provides a historical account of the development of public security, government and politics in Jamaica. It was considered important to include a chapter specifically detailing the development of Jamaica's policing infrastructure and its link to politics and gangs in order to provide a brief context as to the main factors that have

influenced its current construction and its interaction with the populace. The chapter explores the colonial origins of policing in Jamaica and brings to the fore problematic themes such as the militarisation of the force which will play a key role in forthcoming chapters. It will also discuss the force's incorporation of a civilian based approach to policing under colonial leadership and the implications this had on the society. A discussion on how the Westminster system of government that was adopted in Jamaica influenced the creation of Jamaica's (adversarial) two-party political system and consequently impacted on security provision and social tensions is also undertaken.

Chapter 6, *Complex Networks of Governance*: The research question examined in this chapter is: *What are the implications of the shift from security government to security governance on the understanding of state failure in Jamaica?* This chapter specifically examines Jamaica through the lens of security governance literature and seeks to establish how state failure in Jamaica is manifested in its security sector. The implications of establishing a privatised and pluralised security environment creates a state environment in which social inequalities are replicated and reproduced across the state system. This chapter therefore explores the consequences this may have on the future development of the nation and the ability of the state to control and curtail the instability and failure in certain urban spaces from flowing over into more stabilised areas of the state.

Chapter 7, *The Tivoli Gardens Incursion*, is the main empirical chapter which focuses on the Tivoli Incursion of 24 May 2010. The objective of this chapter is to engage in an in-depth analysis of the Tivoli Gardens Incursion within the failed state and security governance framework. It asserts that the Incursion represents a crisis point for the state as it shows the actual ramifications of the state being unable to control its internal borders. In this chapter, the inability of the state to govern

effectively, regulate the actions of non-state actors, the notion of privatised forms of security usurping the power and authority of the state due to lack of accountability and the problematic nature of citizenry and accountability in marginalised communities come to the fore as determining features of the state moving into a significant phase of (temporary) failure in one of its urban spaces, which ultimately affected the entire territory.

The concluding Chapter 8 outlines the key findings of the research by addressing the research questions. It discusses the key contributions to knowledge being made by the thesis regarding the linkage and development of both failed state and security governance literatures. It also makes suggestions, from a methodological perspective, on how to conduct research in challenging countries.

2 State Failure and Hybrid Security Governance in Theoretical Perspective

2.1 Introduction

The focus of this research is to explore the conceptualisation of the state through combining the failed state and security governance literatures. The research seeks to offer a critique of the nature and functionality of the state based on key features present in both literatures. It will explore whether it is feasible to evaluate the failed state literature through the tenets presented in security governance; and whether there is a level of interconnection that allows for a more complex understanding of states.

To evaluate these issues this chapter is divided into two main sections that seek to first understand the construction of the state; and second, the notion of security and the various features that underscore the concept. The first section on the state will explore the definition and construction of the state, the various typologies of statehood, their characteristics and functions, and the key themes that permeate the literature on statehood. The section will then explore the manner in which government and governance are defined and differentiated; and the way in which they map onto our general understanding of the state. The second section of this chapter will explore the multidimensional conceptualisation of security. It will seek to bring to the fore issues related to the various actors that play significant roles in security provision, and the impact that the capacity of the state has on its ability to provide security. It will also examine the extent to which security is treated as a commodity and the way in which this characterisation has affected its treatment as a social welfare good within the state.

This concern is explored in specific discussions related to the privatisation of security as well as the pluralistic nature of security providers.

Central to both discussions is the nature and capacity of the state and the roles played by the various actors within the state. Themes such as economic inequality, conflict, urban segregation, patronage and corruption are highlighted in the chapter and will be used to examine whether there is a feasible opportunity to critique how these themes are raised in the literatures related to the failed state and security governance. It hopes to accomplish this by stating the interconnected themes that have been somewhat neglected in state, security and governance scholarship.

2.2 Understanding the State

2.2.1 What is a State?

This thesis is specifically framed within scholarship related to the state; that is, its structure, responsibilities to the citizens and its capability in maintaining the social, political and economic integrity of the nation. The state acts as the foundation in understanding the behaviours of its legitimised actors, as well as that of non-state actors, and their response to its shortcomings or strengths. It is therefore integral to formulate a clear depiction of the nature/construction of the state in order to understand the current socio-political and economic environment in which state and non-state actors operate.

Gros (1996) explains that the state can be conceptualised as the "territorial entity ruled by an authority that has a monopoly over the legitimate means of violence and that is recognised (or at the very least tolerated) by members of the polity and the larger international community" (p. 456). In most modern states, coercive agencies such as the police force, which provides internal security, and the army, which

provides external security, are established and controlled under one central umbrella of authority that eliminates any potential rivalry between the two agencies (Wendt, 1999). In addition to maintaining its monopoly on violence, the modern state is also responsible for the provision and regulation of several services; protecting the country's environment and natural resources; and regulating the redistribution of wealth in the territory as part of its role as welfare provider (Gros, 1996, p. 456). One such aspect of welfare is the provision of security (both internal and external), which is deemed one of the primary responsibilities of the state to its citizens (Schneckener, 2006; Wendt, 1999).

This definition captures the essence of Weber's often used conceptualisation of the state which places significant emphasis on the possession of territory and the use of force to facilitate its activities and complement its identity. Weber asserts that "a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate state use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 2009, p. 78, original emphasis). Weber further contends that the right to use force by individuals and institutions can only be granted by the state as it is "the sole source of the 'right' to use violence" (Weber, 2009, p. 78).

Migdal (2001) suggests that Weber's definition assumes that society, which is defined by a multiplicity of views, practices and interactions, is controlled primarily by the state through violent practices. In so doing, this conception of the state underestimates the interaction between varied state and non-state actors and their impact on the everyday functions of the state (Migdal, 2001). Additionally, Migdal (2001) argues that Weber's definition of the state presents a problematic view that does not recognise states that fall below the idealised version that is presented. He notes that emphasis placed on terms such as "monopoly" and "legitimate" does not

accurately define states where there are instances in which "authority is fragmented and contentious" (Migdal, 2001, 14). Migdal contends that the "real-life" state deviates from Weber's characterisation and is at times a corrupted version of Weber's ideal state. He further notes that in order to properly identify states that do not fall within Weber's idealised paradigm terms such as "corruption" and "weakness" are employed to characterise their deviation from the normative understanding of states (Migdal, 2001, p. 15). These states are thus cast into the mould of being weak, failing, and potentially non-states (Migdal, 2001).

In response to Weber's definition, Migdal posits that a "state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organisation in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts" (Migdal, 2001, p. 15-16, original emphasis). In so doing, Migdal combines the importance of territory, central authority and the threat of violence that are identified in Weber's definition with the supplementary role played by societal actors that facilitate the functioning of the state. This definition recognises that rules and regulations created by the state's central authority (i.e., policy makers) are revised by societal actors and "street-level bureaucrats" who respond to the needs of the public (White, 2013, p. 5). Migdal's definition places significant onus on recognising the interconnected relationship between the state authority and various societal actors in ensuring the effective operation of the state – therefore, highlighting the multiplicity of actors that engage in the development and functioning of the state. Migdal (2001, p. 20) explains:

> These alliances, coalitions, or networks have neutralized the sharp territorial and social boundary that the first portrayal of the state has acted to establish, as well as the sharp demarcation between the state as preeminent rule maker and society as the recipient of those rules.

The blurring of these boundaries essentially questions the public/private dichotomy that now characterises the functioning of states. Critically, it also highlights the important role played by multiple actors within the societal system whilst the state maintains an authoritarian and rule making image in society.

With the emergence of the public/private dichotomy, the power and authority of the state faces the risk of being undermined by the assumed power of non-state actors. In response to this threat to the state Weber's conception of the state exhibiting a hierarchical and bureaucratic structure that uses force, combined with Migdal's conception of it as the primary regulator of laws which imposes a defined and acceptable set of practices in a territory, enables states to maintain and exercise their authority and control despite the presence of other challenging actors (White, 2013). The image of the state as the primary and necessary source of authority therefore becomes a naturalised conception; in that, the state is considered to be as "natural as the landscape around them; they cannot imagine their lives without it"; this idea thus "provides a powerful antidote to disintegrative forces, even in the face of continued weakness in delivery goods, effecting policy, and gaining efficiency" (Migdal, 2001, p. 137). White (2013) explains that although the state appears to be losing its centralising power it still maintains a significant cohesive image that is consistently recognised by societal actors, thus re-emphasising the core role that the state continues to maintain.

2.2.2   Levels of Statehood

In examining 'statehood' focus is placed on the aspects of functionality that define the state. It is primarily concerned with the political decision-making apparatus of the country – specifically the manner in which decisions are executed (Schneckener,

2006). Integral to the conceptualisation of statehood is the inclusive nature of the framework. Its analytical framework is not restricted to the functionality and operations of government, but rather encapsulates a wide range of actors that include "political parties and public institutions" (Schneckener, 2006, p. 31).

Engendered in the debate on states is the idea of positive sovereignty. Fully functioning successful states display "positive sovereignty" in which they are capable of meeting the needs of their populace without the intervention of external actors from the global community (Hill, 2007; Jackson, 1990). The terminology, 'positive sovereignty' suggests that states that possess this particular characteristic of success manage their own affairs, independent of their colonial forefathers – thus becoming their own masters (Jackson, 1990). There is a distinct separation of control and ideological influence taking place within these states which is replaced by the creation of new principles of government that successfully recognise the diverse needs of the entire society. A state capable of asserting positive sovereignty possesses the capability of delivering political goods. These political goods "inform the local political culture, and together give content to the social contract between ruler and the ruled" (Rotberg, 2004, p. 3). Inherent in this criterion is the state's ability to provide security as an essential good in order to prevent crime, corruption and other external and domestic threats to its sovereignty whilst ensuring the protection of the people (Rotberg, 2004, p. 3). The state is charged with the responsibility of providing its citizens with a sense of security and resolve social conflict between the government and the people without having to resort to armed or intimidating measures (Rotberg, 2004). Failure to provide these critical goods places into question the stability and success of the state.

In light of this assessment, researchers have identified various levels of statehood (strong, stable, weak, fragile, failed, collapsed, etc.) existing in the international community. These typologies of statehood have aided in explaining global relations, the role of local and international institutions and the development of the social welfare systems of the Global North and South. Determining state strength is dependent on several factors which include the state's ability to "maintain social control, ensure societal compliance with official laws, act decisively, make effective policies, preserve stability and cohesion, encourage societal participation in state institutions, provide basic services, manage and control the national economy, and retain legitimacy" (Dauvergne, 1998, p. 2). Issues such as the regional location of the state, the state's ability to control various social entities and its historical foundations act together in defining, and ultimately determining, the strength, or weakness, of the state (Dauvergne, 1998).

The literature on the varying levels of statehood centralise their critique on state capacity. The literature also explores statehood within a post-colonial critique which measures growth and the ability of the state and its institutions to adequately meet the welfare and security needs of its citizenry – placing the conceptualisation of the state in a socio-historical context. These concerns will play an integral role throughout this thesis, specifically as the discussion focuses on the nature, functions, capacity and capabilities of states in the Global South.

The first conceit relating to state capacity is defined as the "degree of control state agents exercise over persons, activities, and resources within their government's territorial jurisdiction" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001, p. 78). The capability of the state to gain compliance from individuals (coerce) within the territory is also a critical facet of state capacity (Ottervik, 2013). Sikkink further posits that the term

focusses on the effectiveness of the state to implement its goals; whilst avoiding the normative perceived constraints of what the state is expected to achieve (as cited in Hanson and Sigman, 2013). Hanson and Sigman assert that "capable states may regulate economic and social life in different ways, and may achieve these goals through varying relationships with social groups" (2013, p. 2). States are therefore essentially defined based on their coercive, extractive, control and legitimation functions (Ottervik, 2013). Ottervik (2013, p. 10) explains that for states to maintain an:

> effective monopoly of violence (coercive function) the military and police need to have resources extracted from society (extractive function), be supported by effective bureaucracies that coordinate with other elements of the state that also constrain them (control function), and operate in a society with some level of consent (legitimation function).

States are thus depicted based on their capacity to achieve these goals, with high capacity states being able to provide public welfare goods whilst maintaining a state infrastructure that fosters development; and low capacity states being defined by their inability to meet the same level of capacity which ultimately contributes to limited development prospects and even state failure (Ottervik, 2013). Hill (2007) explains that the categorising of states is dependent on their level of capabilities in providing social goods to the populace. As such:

> successful states provide their citizens with a wide range of political goods including the most valuable of welfare, law and order and security. Below these are quasi and weak states, which cannot provide the same array of political goods or political goods of the same value as successful states. At the bottom are collapsed and failed states, which are unable to deliver any political goods of value to their unfortunate citizens (Hill, 2007, p. 145)

Hill, therefore, places significant emphasis on state capacity and its ability to deliver and meet the welfare and political needs of the populace as benchmarks for success and failure.

Secondly, in addition to exploring states based on their capacity to meet the needs of the populace, there is a notable binary depiction of statehood that appears to disqualify the legitimacy/success of states based on their post-colonial identity. This binary proposes that Western states be cast into the mould of successful whilst their counterparts (often associated with the Global South) are unable to achieve a similar level of success as they lack the infrastructural capacity that facilitates development. Ultimately, the literature suggests that the post-colonial identity of a state contributes to its eventual failure or collapse. The comparison created between Western and post-colonial states is somewhat unbalanced and is based on the "deceptions of sovereignty" as it is comparing transplanted infrastructural capabilities developed in post-colonial states to that of Western states that have had a much longer period to develop and enhance similar processes (Bilgin and Morton, 2002, p. 63). Similarly, by focusing on a neo-Weberian conceptualisation of the state, which exhibits pluralistic behaviours in decision and policy-making activities, an oversimplification of the processes of the state occurs which neglects to root the foundation of the post-colonial state in its appropriate socio-historical context (Bilgin and Morton, 2002). In so doing, it becomes difficult to account for entrenched historical and political ideologies that have shaped state-formation, power and social order in post-colonial states, which therefore contribute to the inability to effectively chart the establishment and growth of the post-colonial state and the complex relations between the state and civil society (Bilgin and Morton, 2002).

Thirdly, adding to the narrative on failed states, Rotberg (2004) emphasises that there is the issue of conflict that is intrinsic to this level of statehood. Failed states are therefore defined as:

> tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. Occasionally, the official authorities in a failed state face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state (Rotberg, 2004, p. 5).

This definition brings to the fore the antagonistic role that criminal gangs, militias and other negative authority groups (i.e., Rotberg's 'warring factions') play in influencing the integrity of the state. Rotberg (2004) further posits that failed states are characterised by intercommunity conflict. Poor and repressive governance also contributes to the development of failed states as it facilitates the conflict within the state (Kraxberger, 2007).

Boege et al. (2009) argue that in response to the impact of globalisation various institutions and non-state actors like warlords, gang leaders, transnational networks, organised crime groups, "new forms of tribalism", etc., have complicated the intricate nature of governance in certain states (p. 16). These types of forces have facilitated a further weakening of the state infrastructure as the people, recognising that the state and its agencies are incapable of producing basic public goods like security, resort to seeking assistance from these societal entities (Boege et al., 2009).This in turn creates an opportunity for these forces to assume power in certain spaces within the country – ultimately seizing control from the state and exerting control in the form of violence over their assumed territories. This ultimately creates competition for the state in its control of power and usurps the state's monopoly over its legitimate use of violence (Boege et al., 2009). This situation, as will be explored further in this thesis, is

particularly linked to urban spaces that exhibit a higher rate of conflict, poverty, social economic disparities and a wider variety of non-state actors attempting to assume control over certain spaces.

In highlighting the characteristics of the various types of states it must be noted that there are many countries within the international arena that are placed within a specific mould of statehood (i.e., weak, strong, failed, fragile, etc.) that appear to function despite their categorization; in that, states characterised as weak or failing still exhibit some form of functionality and cohesion – making them resilient; whilst their stronger counterparts are impacted by aspects of weakness. For strong states that exhibit an innate form of weakness, critics have suggested that this source of frailty is created due to their overreliance on a system of patronage as well as the manner in which the state leaders have structured and controlled the state apparatus – thus introducing corruption that undermines the political system of the state (Dauvergne, 1998). Some strong states are also viewed as maintaining strong coercive powers and organisational control capacities, but display poor organisational capacities in other infrastructural areas, which undermines their strength to a degree.

Conversely, there are weak states that exhibit strong capabilities in certain areas. Migdal (1998) suggests that the source of the strength in weak states is the relationship and bargains made between clients and patrons which allows for the exchange of critical goods. Migdal (1998) argues that weak states lack the ability to provide sufficient goods such as security to their populations; however, the state creates an effective patron-client framework that fosters the necessary bargaining structure that is specifically designed to provide these goods. In so doing, the state, being supported by non-state powerful organisations, is able to provide goods and services related to security, environmental protection and development, etc., to its

population (Migdal, 1998). A mutually beneficial tri-party relationship between the patron (non-state actors), the population, and the state thus develops.[8] The patrons support the state because they are able to gain significant financial, political and social advantages from that relationship, as well as some legitimacy from international players; the population becomes highly dependent on the patrons for basic welfare goods; and the state's capabilities and infrastructure remain intact. It has further been posited that the stability of these weak states is also based on the coercive capabilities of the state as they possess "well developed and effective coercive arms, using violence to lower the risk of opposition to them" (Migdal, 1998, p. 22). It has been noted that collusion and coercion are not the primary factors that maintain state stability, but they do present an additional explanation for why most states that are viewed as weak or failing still maintain some resemblance to stability and are able to continue functioning within the international community.

This dual categorisation of some states as being failed but exhibiting strong characteristics and vice versa highlights the inherent flaws of the failed state literature. These flaws bring into question the validity of the scholarship on state failure to accurately categorise states, which ultimately prevents an in-depth understanding of the internal dynamics that contribute to the construction of the state and which also affect the functionality and operations of the state.

2.2.3 Limitations of the Failed State Literature

As highlighted above the level of statehood assigned to a country is determined by the presence of specific conditions within the states. The capacity of state

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[8] It is important to note that states are also recognised as patrons. However, in the context of this thesis, the term 'patron' will refer specifically to non-state actors such as dons. This will be explored in further detail in Chapters 4 and 6.

institutions to provide for its citizenry, the post-colonial identity of a state, the presence of inter-community conflict and the capacity of the state to exert its control and monopoly on violence are recognised as the key determinants for failure and success. States that are able to provide for their society whilst avoiding conflict, and which do not have to contend with a post-colonial legacy (such as Western or European states) are generally recognised as successful within state literature; whereas the opposite is true for many states categorised as failed. However, this thesis posits that, in considering the specific context of the Jamaican state, this depiction of statehood is inherently flawed as it fails to recognise how social constructs may undermine the functionality and stability of states.

Failed state literature notes that for a state to fail it must exhibit signs of anarchy (Rotberg, 2004). Rotberg's (2004; 2003) template for failure asserts that for a state to be recognised as failed it must exhibit all, if not most, of the indicators listed in Table 2.1 that define its institutional and social environment. However, this thesis posits that within the Jamaican context specifically other factors should be considered as indicators of state failure (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1. Failed State Criteria

Rotberg's Criteria of Failed States	Criteria for Evaluating State Failure in Jamaica
1. Civil wars[9]	1. Post-colonial history
2. Intercommunity violence	2. Stark social inequalities
3. Inability to control its internal and external borders	3. Segregation of the urban space
4. Increase in criminal violence	4. Structural and systemic conflict in the state environment
5. Flawed and deteriorating institutions and infrastructure	
6. Corruption	
7. Economic inequalities	
8. Declining GDP	
9. Privatisation of welfare goods, for e.g. health and education	
10. Loss of legitimacy	

Source: Rotberg (2004, 5-10; 2003, p. 4-9)

By accepting Rotberg's depiction of a failed state the literature assumes that all states that fail have most if not all of these conditions in common. Call (2008) suggests that to claim that states such as Colombia, Iraq and North Korea are failed because they exhibit similar conditions of failure, but represent a wide range of capabilities, is misleading and such a characterisation does not provide for a more tailored solution to address these problematic conditions being experienced by each state, particularly in post-colonial states like Jamaica. As such, another layer of

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[9] It should be noted that this thesis does not posit the view that the events of May 2010 in Tivoli Gardens was a civil war (see Chapter 7). It maintains that the community did fall into a form of civil unrest with intense and violenct conflict between state and non-state actors. However, if the incursion persisted and moved into other communities across the Jamaican landscape and resulted in the deaths of more people it could then be considered a civil war. The term "civil war" is used here in order to maintain Rotberg's initial depiction of state failure and to highlight the intense and violent social conditions that could facilitate state failure.

analysis should be applied for identifying failed states which takes into consideration the inherent diversity of states as well as the nature of the actors that operate within them.

2.2.4 Government and Governance

Another aspect of state literature that needs further exploration is the idea of government versus governance. In order to further understand the nature of states it is important to glean an appreciation of the processes and procedures that manage the authority and power within states. For this to take place scholars turn towards the concepts of government and governance in order to understand the inner mechanisms of the state. Rosenau (1992) conceptualised the term 'government' as the "activities that are backed by formal authority, by police powers to insure the implementation of duly constituted policies" (p. 4). It is generally identified in terms of having a regulated structure of operations in which authority is mainly centralised and there is an official body that maintains the exclusive ability to implement policy changes through coercion if necessary (Webber et al., 2004). In a more concise description, Krahmann (2003a) states that government "refers to the political control of a centralised state" (p. 11).

Governance, on the other hand, diversifies control within the state by legitimising the power and authority of non-state actors. Governance essentially denotes a network of relationships (including state and non-state actors) that are charged with the function of maintaining the integrity of the state. Governance is defined as the:

> …structures and processes which enable a set of public and private actors
>
> to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making

and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central

political authority (Krahmann, 2003a, p. 11).

This definition removes the government as the primary authority in state management, thus pluralising power enabling multiple players to become active participants in the decision-making processes of the country. Governance essentially facilitates the decentralisation of the traditional hierarchical structure of the government – providing a more horizontal approach to maintaining the system (Liao, 2012; Daase and Friesendorf, 2010; Krahmann, 2005b). It must be noted that the functionality of governance is only possible if a majority or all the key stakeholders accept the system of rules being promoted (Rosenau, 1992, p. 4). In noting this, governance has further been described as the:

…sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken (Commission on Global Governance, 1995).

Taken together, both definitions of governance highlight the importance of the complex interconnected state-civil dynamic, especially when applying the idea of governance at the national level (Weiss, 2000). The public arena is managed and "maintained by political actors from both the state and society" which ultimately enables both state and specifically non-state actors to assume legitimate roles in the managing of the public space (Weiss, 2000, p. 800).

The emphasis placed on governance heralded a significant reconfiguration in the state's control of certain aspects of society; in that, the hierarchical approach taken in the creation of public policy and the delivery of public goods was no longer being applied by the state (Bevir and Hall, 2014). Rather, increased focus began to be placed on networking, outsourcing and establishing integral public/private partnerships with

non-state stakeholders who share similar interests as well as the capabilities and expertise to create and implement policies and regulate systems (Bevir and Hall, 2014, p. 24). Government institutions also play an integral role in the success of governance as they promote compliance that is in the best interest of the majority stakeholders, which include individuals and established institutions (Commission on Global Governance, 1995).

2.2.4.1 Factors That Contribute To State Failure

In evaluating the literature on state failure two key concepts - bad governance and state dysfunction - come to the fore as issues that may contribute or lead to failure within the state. In order to unpack how these may contribute to state failure a brief look at the differences between good and bad governance must first be undertaken.

Entrenched within the governance literature are the dual concepts of 'good' versus 'bad' governance. The idea of 'good' governance is recognised as the ability of states, alongside their civil partners, to guarantee the protection of "human rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in public administration" (UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, cited in Weiss, 2000, p. 797). The characteristics of 'effective' or 'good' governance thus includes "rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equality, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, strategic vision and participation" (Al-Qudsy and Rahman, 2011; UNDP, 1997). Effective governance ensures that there are institutions in place that are capable of delivering important public welfare goods and services whilst also giving citizens the authority to make public and political officials accountable (UNDP, 2014). Good governance further "promotes freedom from violence, fear and crime, and peaceful and secure societies" that are stable and conducive to opportunities for

development (UNDP, 2014, p. 2). Hence, effective governance is therefore considered the basis for sustainable development (UNDP, 2014). These features of good governance map onto the idea of strong states as they indicate a functional state environment that is capable of meeting the needs and recognising the rights of its citizenry.

On the other hand, 'bad' governance is the direct opposite.[10] It illustrates a deficiency in human rights and accountability of state public and political officials and is associated with bad and corrupt government (Weiss, 2000; Bøås, 1998; World Bank, 1989). In these circumstances, governments are usually unelected and political actors often prioritise their own personal interests over that of the populace. These behaviours are further enabled by a community of civil actors who either refuse or neglect to hold officials accountable for their actions (World Bank, 1989). The World Bank (1989) associates bad governance with states that employ systems of political patronage as a measure to secure power, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of the leadership (government). These states are thus considered "coercive and arbitrary" because they lack the ability and capabilities to foster an efficient economy (World Bank, 1989, p. 61). Moore (2001) suggests that bad governance is grounded in the distinct relations between nations of the global North and South; and more so the impact that the economic and political policies and practices of the North have on fostering an environment of bad or weak governance in the South.

Therefore, intrinsic to the conceptualisation of governance is the notion that it requires multiple public and private actors, interacting both formally and informally, to guide and manage the development of the state, whilst maintaining the social welfare of the citizenry. In so doing, governance has created a state system in which

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[10] The World Bank (1989) also refers to bad governance as "crisis of governance".

certain responsibilities carried out by formal state agents are being delegated to multiple private non-state actors, thereby diffusing authority and enabling the privatisation of the responsibilities of the state. The issue that emerges as a result of governance is whether the support that is provided by both state and non-state actors to the population would be equal across urban landscapes and what implications might arise out of the differential treatment of the population due to multiple actors assuming authoritarian roles.

The second concept that may also point to state failure is based on the dysfunctionality that may occur within a state. In bringing together the literatures on statehood and governance an interesting dynamic emerges which questions whether there is an "ideal" state. Based on Weber's conceptualisation, noted above, the state represents the central legitimate authority within a nation that maintains a monopoly on the use of violence. However, in acknowledging this as the norm - the 'ideal' - an analysis of a majority of the states in the global system will reveal areas that are ungoverned and in which state institutions are unable to implement policies or exercise their authority (Börzel and Risse, 2016; 2010). These states, which include "Washington D.C, Berlin, Rio de Janeiro and Nairobi", are recognised as exhibiting "limited statehood" as they lack the ability to assert legitimate rule within certain spaces across the national landscape (Börzel and Risse, 2016, p. 149). Within these spaces of limited statehood the central authority has "limited capacities to enforce and implement decisions, at least in some policy areas or with regard to large parts of the population" (Börzel and Risse, 2010, p. 119). As a result, external non-state actors become the suppliers of public welfare goods and services that were previously provided by the state (Krasner and Risse, 2014). The dysfunctionality of the central authority and its institutions to govern becomes evident in these spaces of limited

statehood and is described as lacking "the capacity to set and enforce collectively binding rules and to provide common goods" (Börzel and Risse, 2016, p. 150).

However, it is important to note that limited statehood does not primarily afflict failing or failed states but, is a recognised condition of developing or transitioning nations as they lack the capabilities to efficiently enforce policies due to the weakness or absence of critical state institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2010). According to Börzel and Risse (2016), the absence or dysfunctionality of state institutions in areas of limited statehood does not immediately signal that these areas cannot be governed. Rather, this situation facilitates the emergence of a "shadow of hierarchy", which includes external non-state actors such as NGOs, international organisations etc., that can provide public goods and services and effectively replace the state as legitimate figures of authority; thus allowing good or effective governance to take place in these spaces (Börzel and Risse, 2016). There is a limit, however, to the nature of services that non-state actors are willing to provide in cases of limited statehood as they tend to avoid engaging in "complex governance functions" (Börzel and Risse, 2016, p. 151).

The presence of dysfunctionality in state institutions is integral to the development of this thesis as it brings to the fore the implications that low capacity may have on the manner in which the state functions and the roles assumed by non-state actors. Dysfunctionality with regards to the state, as recognised by Börzel and Risse (2016; 2010), highlights a deficiency of the state to assert its control and legitimacy as well as managing the provision of goods. Dysfunctionality can thus be recognised as the undermining of the core and identifying functions and characteristics of the state.

Although the literature situates dysfunctionality within the sphere of the state and its capacities there is a key argument to be made that it may also foster a varying level of dysfunctionality within the network of non-state actors that are forced to assume the responsibilities of the state in areas of limited statehood. This in turn will contribute to the weakening or undermining of governance within these spaces that may increase a state's susceptibility to failure. As such, the next section of this chapter will explore the way in which the state seeks to address the problem of limited statehood by relying on a complex network of state and non-state actors to provide welfare goods and services to the populace and the implications this may have on the state. This network of non-state actors, and the manner in which it interacts with and is managed by the state, is known as security governance.

2.3   Understanding Security: From State Provision to Security Governance

In order to appreciate the influence that security governance has on the construction of a failed state it is first important to establish an understanding of the basic concepts engendered in security governance literature. This section will thus examine the definition of security, how the idea of security governance emerged, and how the privatisation and commoditisation of security by non-state actors have influenced the dynamics of a state's security environment.

Webber et al. (2004) note that security (including the monitoring and implementation of security policies) has become one of the main functions of the state that has been outsourced to non-state actors as a result of a global move towards governance. In light of this, the scope of the security environment has increased to include actors from "charities, environmental organisations, human rights watchdogs, medical organisations and think-tanks" (Webber et al., 2004, p. 6). Additionally, this

process of outsourcing has led to the increasing privatisation of certain elements of the security environment. The national autonomy in security shifted into a more public-private relationship which developed as a result of governments preferring to resort to the use of private firms to fulfil their security needs, as evidenced by the privatisation of the Western European armaments industries in the 1990s (Webber et al., 2004). This evolution into privatised security will be explored in greater detail below.

2.3.1   What is Security?

The concept of security has evolved from "the theory and practice of state sovereignty and inter-state relations in Western Europe and North America" (Luckham, 2009, p.1). Luckham (2009; 2007) asserts that creating a universal conception of the term 'security' is somewhat problematic given that its definition would vary based on the experiences and needs of various peoples throughout the international arena. Security is described as an integral appendage of the modern state which was expected to provide "peace and security" in exchange for it receiving "sovereign authority" from the citizenry (Luckham, 2007, p. 683). This type of relationship essentially establishes a "social contract" between the state and its citizenry in which the state is obligated to provide the necessity of security to its people (Luckham, 2009, p.1).[11] Sovereign power and authority thus become integral to the state and the protection of the people in order to prevent the threat of war. As Hobbes notes in his description of the state, "during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man" (Hobbes, 2014, p.97). The state therefore,

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[11] The social contract that is established connects to Irving's representation of citizenship (2007) and Eriksen and Sending's position on accountability (2013) as integral aspects of a state regarding its obligations and the nature of its responsibilities to its citizenry.

traditionally, maintains a 'monopoly on force' which protects the citizenry from internal and external threats (Wulf, 2011).

Security consequently becomes the regulator of disorder within the society and the primary function of the state (Agamben, 2001). Luckham (2007) further argues that security is viewed as a 'public good' which is characterised based on the dichotomy that exists "between public and private, the state and market" which are features of "modern, especially capitalist, states" (p. 684). However, the issue of security remains one of the defining features that determines the functionality and construction of the modern state (Luckham, 2007).

The culmination of the Cold War and the introduction of globalisation into world politics created an international system that challenged the right of the state to maintain its monopoly on force. New security threats such as terrorism; the internal threat of ethnic conflict and civil war; transnational crime; as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were elevated to primary importance within the state system. These new security threats were considered more of a problematic challenge than the past threat of nuclear war as the probability of states engaging in nuclear aggression was ranked low due to its potential devastating impact on the survival and welfare of society (Krahmann, 2005a). Population displacements, weakened economies, as well as limited or decreased foreign investment, described as indirect and long-term effects, have been viewed as some of the most damaging effects arising from the new security threat environment created in the aftermath of the Cold War (Krahmann, 2005a).

Additionally, the Cold War fostered the dismantling of the bipolar system. In so doing, states could no longer rely on superpowers to protect the citizenry from external and internal security threats such as transnational crime, civil war, etc.

(Mandel, 2001). Many governments also lacked the critical funds and manpower that would create a significant source of long term security for their people (Mandel, 2001). Mandel (2001) argues that due to the decline in external threats many governments reduced their defence spending and the size of their military and police forces. Furthermore, given the new types of security threats, particularly transnational threats, governments have had to employ different strategies to protect their borders and the integrity of their internal security (Krahmann, 2005a). In so doing, the emergence of non-state actors assuming security powers that were previously monopolised by the state has created a new security and political environment in which power and control is no longer centralised within the state, but rather supported by multiple non-state players, thus fostering the emergence of security governance within the transcending state system.

2.3.2   Security Governance

In exploring the definitional complexities of the term 'security governance' Ehrhart et al. (2014) posits that at the foundation of the term is the assumption that there is a:

> pluricentric coordination in which national governments are one central, but not necessarily the only actor; a combination of formal and informal structures among interdependent but autonomous actors operating beyond formal hierarchies; and a tendency toward cooperative bottom-up implementation rather than top-down command and control (Ehrhart et al., 2014, pp. 120)

Further definitions of the term focus on the coordination and relationship between public and private actors, without the influence of central political authority (Krahmann, cited in Ehrhart, et al., 2014). It has been noted one of the primary concerns facilitating the development of security governance within a country focuses

on the state's willingness, in addition to its ability, to provide security to the citizenry (Bryden, 2006). Armed non-state actors (ANSAs) in this environment are considered to occupy a dual role as they possess the capability to either challenge or support the state's ability to provide security (Bryden, 2006). Krahmann (2005c) explains that the loss of control over its security policy has enabled the transition from government to governance within states. This loss of control is as a result of the increasing

> privatization and internationalization of the security industry and the consequent fragmentation of security policy making in terms of geography, function and distribution of resources contributes to the reduction of immediate governmental control over national and international security (Krahmann, 2005c, p. 258).

The government's loss of control, as Krahmann argues, challenges the normative understanding of the state in European and North American countries as having a monopoly on violence and being the autonomous provider of security (Krahmann 2005c).

The international security governance model is further underscored by the combination of democratic controls by the state in its use of violence; and transparency and accountability of institutions utilising force in their provision of security to the state (Schroeder et al, 2014). Sperling (2010, p. 9) explains further:

> Security governance performs two functions – institution-building and conflict resolution – and employs two sets of instruments – the persuasive (economic, political and diplomatic) and the coercive (medium to high-intensity military interventions and internal policing.

This research is particularly invested in understanding the manner in which ANSAs challenge the normative understanding of security governance in relation to the nature of failed states.

2.3.3 Privatisation of Security

Connected to security governance framework is the issue of security privatisation which juxtaposes the security goods and services provided by the state against that which are maintained and controlled by non-state actors. This highlights a shift from security being a public good to becoming a private one. This transition from the public to the private sphere further brings to the fore the significant implications on the nature of security that can be afforded by different socio-economic segments of the society; in that, wealthy segments of the society are more inclined and able to afford the services of private security firms; whilst poorer communities must resort to using actors like gangs and dons for their security needs. As a result, the socio-economic disparities of a state can be connected to the nature and prevalence of varying types of non-state actors providing privatised security in varying spaces across the urban landscape.

The international private security market represents a dichotomy of actors whose actions and motives are created as a result of the differential socio-political environment they occupy. The nature and extent of security privatisation in countries in both the global North and South highlights the dependency and the interlinked connection that private security actors play in the provision of security. But more importantly, the critical role they play in the security governance of both the North and South (strong and weak states) shows that their development in the state system has become somewhat essential to the functioning and security of the state; thus filling a gap left vacant by the government. In so doing, a core function/service of the state is privatised and becomes a commodity that is delivered by multiple non-state actors.

Mandel (2001) contends that the core problem with security governance is its bottom-up approach to security provision in which these services are provided by

gangs or private militias, rather than with the top-down approach in which the government sub-contracts security to established security companies. Additionally, by providing private security forces unrestricted powers it becomes difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate behaviours; this further fosters a contentious relationship between the private security actors and state actors, such as the police and military (Mandel, 2001). The gap between those able to afford security (the haves) and those who are unable to do so (the have nots) would deepen, resulting in the further fracturing of societal relations (Mandel, 2001). This further divides the urban space in particular based on economic inequalities; and impacts on their ability to attain requisite level of security to protect their welfare needs.

Security privatisation has become a global industry which earns billions of dollars annually. The estimated global private security market was worth US$230 billion in 2015 (Securitas, 2007, p. 13). In 2015 the private security market was estimated to be worth US$19 billion in North America, US$15 billion in Latin America, US$29 billion in Europe, US$15 billion in Africa/Middle East and US$20 billion in Asia (excluding Japan) (Securitas, 2015, p. 7). Abrahamsen and Williams (2008) note that the fastest growing markets are in developing countries; with Africa being recognised as the most ideal place to further develop the industry. Private security officers in the United States and the United Kingdom outnumber the police force three to one and two to one, respectively; and in developing countries it has a higher ratio of ten to one (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007, p. 131). The size of the international private security industry, coupled with their comparable, and in some cases superior, expertise in relation to state security providers illustrates a global evolution in security management and provision (Dupont et al., 2003; Singer, 2001). The direction in which assistance is provided through the use of PSCs is also an issue

of note that highlights the somewhat dependent relations between the North and the South, whilst also reinforcing global power structures. Mandel (2001) explains that countries like the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Israel are the primary providers of private security services, which include private military support to nations in the South such as Sierra Leone, Colombia, and countries in South America.

The spread of the private security industry in the North and South has a somewhat opposing genesis. Whereas in the North private security firms are considered a necessity to fill a security gap caused by the understaffing of the public police force; in the South, due to widespread corruption within the police force, and the government's resulting inability to provide security for the citizenry, these firms have become a critical form of protection (Mandel, 2001). What is notable about the way privatised security is used in the North is that it is being recognised as a liberal shift in the power dynamics of the state in which the government's use of private actors enables it to assume a less central position in ruling (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007). In so doing, the state is "crucially involved in security governance, but its task may be one of "'steering' rather than 'rowing'" (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007, p. 136). The dynamics of the relationship between the state and the private in the United Kingdom is somewhat complex but highlights the authority that the state retains over policing despite the presence of private security actors. White (2010) argues that the British police force has been able maintain a "symbolic power" as the society views them as the primary authority in fighting crime. Much of this response is due to supportive and "positive cultural feelings and attitudes" the society holds towards the police (White, 2010, p. 29). Loader (1997) explains that the symbolic power that the police possess is one of "legitimate pronouncement" whereby they have the "power to diagnose, classify, authorize and represent both individuals and the world… The

police's entitlement and capacity to speak about the world is seldom challenged." (p. 3). This conception of the police force casts the idea of a private security into a negative light as it opposes the notion of state centred security provision (White, 2010).

Conversely, in Africa the emergence of PSCs was facilitated by the end of apartheid which forced former members of the military and the police into the private security sector (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011 and 2008). Notably, in Africa's conflict areas these ex-military and ex-combatants became mercenaries that engaged in the "prosecution of factional wars, debt collection, settling of scores, forced protection and other criminal activities" (Musah, 2002, p. 914). Additionally, years of structural adjustment programmes and economic austerity in Africa have reduced the capacity of the state; and facilitated a considerable reduction in police resources and the earnings of the police and military personnel (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007). This reduction in resources ultimately contributed to wide scale corruption and bribery within the force along with collusion between the police and criminals, thus contributing the public distrust of the force (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007). For example, in Kenya, citizens were compelled to bribe members of the police force they encounter at "roadblocks and at roadside vending pitches... 4.5 times a month, paying them US$16 per month" (Baker and Scheye, 2007, p. 515). In order to fill the gap made by an unreliable police force, security privatisation in Africa includes a wide range of non-state "security actors such as private guarding companies, risk consultants, neighbourhood watches, and so-called vigilante groups" (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007, p. 131).

Musah (2002) explains that the construction of private security in Africa is based on the transition of "traditional mercenary activities" into new practices, with

the primary players in this field being private military companies (PMCs), also referred to as private mercenary companies (p. 913). These PMCs are corporate entities which provide a plethora of security related services which include creating temporary armies comprising of mercenaries to carry out combat activities in foreign countries; the procurement of war materials; the collection of intelligence; and the provision of VIP escort and guard services (Musah, 2002).

In light of the diversification of the security environment the state's monopoly on security is reduced and refocused with greater emphasis being placed on establishing private/public partnerships that will facilitate the successful delivery of social welfare and other public goods. As a measure to decrease its role in maintaining the security of its citizenry, power is transferred, enabling the citizens to become 'responsibilized' for their individual, community and corporate security (Goldstein, 2010). The provision of security and other social welfare goods ultimately become privatised by the state. Though the state still maintains a legitimate control over aspects of security relating to policing, justice and the punishment of criminal offenders, personal protection has essentially become commoditised.

The increasing global reliance on private security has contributed to the development of a "global market for force" which formally recognises the fluid transference of powers exercised by the state and various non-state actors (Avant, 2005, p. 121). In addition to the varied services provided by PMCs and PSCs, privatised security offers a more tailored response to the evolving security needs of the people whereby the firms provide internal security services that include home, industrial and commercial burglar and surveillance systems, security guards and the investigation of fraud – services that are not traditionally associated with the state police (Shearing and Stenning, 1983). They are also known to offer external security

services focused on the protection of the state's territorial borders, which allows them to provide military advice and tactical training to the state (Avant, 2005).

It has been noted that the emergence of multiple state and non-state actors in the security environment has raised concerns with the manner in which security is provided and procured and its impact on the cohesiveness of the society. Caparini (2006) notes that in applying democratic principles to security governance these multiple state and non-state actors should be able to provide security that is "equitable, legitimate, effective, accountable and responsive" to the needs of the diverse array of consumers present in the society – regardless of their financial or social status (p. 270). The criticism that is levied against security governance, however, questions the ability of these actors to comply with the tenets of democratic security governance in an environment in which security is privatised. Privatised security creates a tension in society in which only the consumers who are able to afford security enjoy the benefits of protection – thus resulting in the disenfranchisement of a segment of society who are unable to meet the financial demands of this elite service. The privatisation of security in this sense results in the commoditisation and monopolisation of a public good by the elite and powerful rich; thus, forcing the poor and less powerful into receiving an unequal share of security (Caparini, 2006). This in turn forces the development of dualistic security dynamic in the state in which the elite rich enjoys the provision of security from formal state and non-state actors; while the poor accept security from informal non-state security factions. The tension created is physically represented in the differential urban spaces inhabited by both groups. That is, non-state security factions, like organised gangs, usually service poorer communities, while private security firms and the police operate successfully in gated communities and other areas inhabited by the middle to upper classes.

What develops as a result of the privatisation of security in the urban space is the further entrenchment of social inequalities which is physically defined through the examination of the differential nature of security provision in poor inner-city communities as opposed to that of rich gated communities. As the societal needs of both types of communities are different, the nature of crime and violence, and the type of security employed to address these problems (whether that be public or private) would also be significantly different. This issue is further compounded by capacity of the state to effectively address these problems for the population.

Scholars have noted additionally that there is a significant connection between the stability of states and the emergence of security governance. It has been posited that transnationalisation and globalisation has caused the state to lose its monopoly on force – a situation that is highlighted in weak, failing, and post conflict states (Wulf, 2011). Power in "low capacity states" is essentially usurped by "forms of privatized violence – from warlords, militias, and rebels to private military and security companies" (Wulf, 2011, p.137). These ANSAs not only undermine the state's monopoly on force, but in certain instances, they assume state-like power and authority at the sub-national level, thus creating a problem for the development of security governance (Schneckener, 2006). Essentially, the privatised component within security governance framework displaces the state in countries where its infrastructure is weakened or failing due to national and global constraints. In so doing, the state becomes more susceptible to failure or even collapse as there is no legitimate or central authority controlling the actions of all the key players in the security network.

2.4   Pluralisation of Security

As noted above, one of the primary characteristics of governance is the ability of multiple public and private actors to engage in the provision and management of social services that are traditionally assumed by the state. One such function which has transformed as a result of a greater emphasis being placed on governance is the provision of security. In this case, security is no longer viewed as the primary or exclusive function of the state; but rather a function that various types of non-state actors provide and procure for the populace (Caparini, 2006). This in turn results in the effective pluralisation of security at both the national and transnational levels – a process that is evident in all types of states ranging from developed to failing nations (Caparini, 2006). The pluralisation of security involves "multiple types of authorisers and providers of security that include state (public) authorities and institutions, non-state (private) actors and hybrid or mixed forms" (Caparini, 2006, p. 264). This ultimately fosters the development of security governance as a method in which the provision and procurement of security is managed and controlled to accommodate multiple players.

The security governance framework presents an opportunity for the development of a more comprehensive understanding of the implications and benefits of the pluralisation of security. A further depiction of the pluralistic nature of the concept explains that it is indicative of "changing security relations at different levels (international, national, subnational), between different actors (state and non-state actors), and with regard to the management of various threats (e.g. civil war, trans-border refugee flows)" (Branović and Chojnacki, 2011, p. 555). Additionally, security governance is concerned with the manner in which multiple actors construct security policy and the outcome of this process (Sperling and Webber, 2014). This in turn

creates "'multi-actor and multi-level forms of coordination'" in security (Schroeder 2011, quoted in Sperling and Webber, 2014, p. 128). The security environment which develops based on this framework is one which finds state actors, such as the military and the police, providing security in conjunction with a wide range of non-state security actors, such as commercial or corporate firms, community groups, militias and local and international organisations, etc. (Caparini, 2006). The collective response of non-state groups in the provision of security aids in complementing the state's ability to provide security to the citizenry – thus making the state one of many security providers (Caparini, 2006).

The pluralisation of security and its implications for the state's capacity to meet the security needs of the entire cross section of its populace is a theme that will be explored throughout this project. The concept of security pluralisation suggests that a wide range of actors, ranging from state to non-state security providers, will have differential capabilities and authority across the urban space. Similarly, the clients they support will also inhabit differential spheres ranging from the state institutions, the rich living in the gated enclaves, as well as the poor living in inner-city communities. Given the inequalities that exist across the urban space it is important to understand how the pluralisation of security affects or is impacted by the nature of the state; the way in which it directly impacts on the poor; and the manner in which it is replicated and reproduced across the diverse urban space.

In order to fully highlight the differential provision of security that takes place throughout the urban space, and the variety of actors that assume security identities in particularly weak states, it is important to evaluate the roles played by various non-state security agents. Non-state actors such as gangs, warlords, dons, mercenaries, and international criminal organisations versus PMCs and PSCs appear to occupy

opposing ends of the security spectrum, yet the nature of the services they provide align evenly with each other. Whereas PMCs and PSCs assume a more business orientated characteristic to its identity, in which security is directly linked to financial profits; non-state actors such as gangs, dons etc., employ the idea of security provision as an added feature of their overall service delivery functions to communities of the urban poor. Similarly, PMCs and PSCs have also engaged in somewhat problematic practices in their security activities that tend to have criminal undertones. Gangs and dons also exhibit criminal and problematic behaviours but their form of security provision is also recognised as filling a security void created by the state's unwillingness to support the needs of these marginalised spaces. The activities and practices of these various non-state actors, specifically gangs, dons, warlords etc., are integral to this research as they exemplify the extent to which privatised non-state security contributes to the destabilisation/weakening of a state infrastructure, as well as undermining the authority and central control held by the state. The pluralisation of security in this instance thus plays a dual role; in that, to some extent it has supported the basic functioning of the state, but also acts as the critical destabilising force that enabled the failure of the Jamaican state. This dual role of non-state private security actors will be explored in more detail in the following chapters.

2.5   Conclusion

The above discussion carried to the fore several concerns related to failed state and security governance that are relevant in understanding the nature of the state and whether it is feasible to reconceptualise some states using the frameworks outlined in these literatures. The first concern relates to the social and economic inequalities that develop as a result of employing the security governance framework in the state. By

employing this framework states are illustrating that they lack, to a degree, the capacity and the functional abilities to provide the necessary goods and social welfare needs to the entire cross section of their population. In order to address this problem, the literature suggests that the responsibility of providing goods and services, particularly security, is no longer controlled by the state but rather delegated to multiple non-state societal actors that then act as proxy service providers on behalf of the state. In so doing, goods and services traditionally attributed to the state become privatised and controlled by actors with varying economic, social and political motivations. The inequalities that develop are based on the quality of goods provided, and the extent to which segments of the population in varying urban spaces are able to afford these privatised goods. An underlying problem that comes to the fore in this inequality equation is the development of urban segregation which finds wealthier segments of the society being able to afford PSCs or PMCs, while their poorer counterparts are forced to utilise the services of non-state service providers like gangs.

The question that arises is whether or not the employment of multiple security providers, coupled with the privatisation of these goods, will further entrench and replicate these economic inequalities throughout states that employ this approach. The research will further question whether employing this literature in states across the international arena will yield similar outcomes in their conceptualisation.

Connected to the issue of employing multiple service providers is whether the pluralisation of state capacity has facilitated some level of dysfunction in service delivery throughout the state. With authority and control being given a bottom-up approach resulting in non-state societal actors assuming more power and control over the state in the provision of goods, the potential arises for there to be some level of dysfunction which removes the state completely from the position of authority in

certain urban spaces. This in turn contributes to the development of a state within a state where non-state actors assume the state's identity and responsibility as service providers in problematic urban spaces. Thus, members of the community become completely dependent on the support and the services provided by non-state actors. This research seeks to explore whether this dysfunction is more entrenched in poorer communities in Jamaica in which non-state actors like gangs assume a more authoritarian role, or whether this is a cross-sectional societal issue.

The discussion relating to the failed state follows on from the issues raised in relation to security governance. Therefore, the question arises as to whether or not the failed nature of the state can be explored through themes such as, economic inequality which is integral to security governance. There is a noted gap in the literature that does not connect the existence of the failed state to the social and economic inequalities produced as a result of security governance. Additionally, the post-colonial history of states (noted in failed state literature) also forms the basis for evaluating their capacity to deliver goods and services to their populations, but is an overlooked aspect of the security governance theory which also considers the capacity of the state as a feature that encourages the emergence of multiple actors. The existing literature does not highlight a connection between the dysfunctional pluralism as a feature in security governance to that of the failed state - even though it contributes to similar concerns of low capacity, corruption and patronage that underscore the failed state theoretical framework.

The next chapter will discuss the methodological practices employed in this thesis to examine the aforementioned issues regarding state failure and security governance. It will further note how the challenges encountered in the fieldwork aspect

of this project can be integrated into how failure is exemplified within the institutional

framework of a state.

3 Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the main research strategies employed to investigate the interconnected issues engendered in failed state and security governance literatures. It will attempt to justify why the project's approach to data collection and analysis were employed in constructing a sound analytical discussion throughout this thesis.

The first section of this chapter will therefore explain the research strategy of using Jamaica, and subsequently the 2010 Tivoli Gardens Incursion, as case studies to examine the theoretical underpinnings of this project. It will justify the usefulness of this approach in identifying the rich real world information that will aid in testing the features of the paradigms, and in determining whether or not they can be justifiably applied to Jamaica's context. The section also outlines the use of interviews and documents as data collection tools, and the challenges faced as a result of employing these devices throughout the investigative aspect of this research. The section then discusses the benefits of applying a grounded theory approach to the project's data analysis.

The second section of this chapter is a reflective discussion regarding the primary challenge faced during the fieldwork. Gaining access to relevant communities in an effort to diversify the real world information gleaned throughout the fieldwork was restricted by the complex nature of the state's policies and practices about conducting scholarly research in Jamaica. By limiting access to these groups of actors, which included marginalised groups of gang members, this chapter proposes that the state is in effect attempting to assert its coercive control over the flow of information

and the manner in which it is depicted in research. This issue also further extends the discussion on the capacity of the state's institutions to provide for the varying needs of its citizenry. As such, it will attempt to illustrate how the problematic research environment created by the state can be recognised as another feature of its failed statehood in certain spheres.

3.2   Research Strategy

3.2.1   Case Study Approach

The thesis employs a case study research strategy to examine the two main bodies of literature being investigated, failed state and security governance. A case study approach is deemed particularly useful for investigating "a contemporary phenomenon within its real life-context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 1994, p. 13). It is concerned with understanding how and why events occur and therefore prioritises a specific "issue, feature or unit of analysis" to investigate (Noor, 2008, p. 1602). A well conducted case study validates the analysis of the specific subject or issue being examined (Lukka and Kasanen, 1995).

One of the notable criticisms of applying a case study strategy in qualitative research is the limited contributions it makes to developing theory or practice as the findings from these studies prevent generalisations (Harland, 2014; Lukka and Kasanen, 1995). However, the case study approach does offer an empirical frame for the nuanced development of failed state theory, as explored specifically through the case of Jamaica. Case studies provide the necessary tools that enable the inductive development of the theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). They highlight the importance of context in the examination of a theory by placing significant weight on

the way in which social phenomena occur within a specific setting (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). In so doing, the characteristics of the theory is evaluated against a real world context. By employing this strategy the theory is able to develop based on "recognizing patterns of relationships among constructs within and across cases and their underlying logical arguments" (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, p. 25). Case studies also employ deductive strategies which allow the data generated from the case study to test the theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).

The purpose of applying a case study approach in this research is therefore to critique the theoretical framework and scholarship of the failed state which is used in a generalised manner to categorise states that do not meet internationally acceptable benchmarks of success. As it is applied to the Jamaican context, a case study approach will allow for the identification of 'enclaves of state failure' that are present in otherwise functioning state conditions. The challenge emerges by questioning the appropriateness of some of the basic characteristics of the theory by suggesting that not all states that have been traditionally assigned to this category display these features. Based on the real world context that the theory is being evaluated in, new features emerge that not only challenge how failure is determined but which may also facilitate new dimensions of failure that can be applied to a select grouping of states. Ultimately, the aim of applying a case study approach in this thesis is to provide a different insight as to how this state failure can be applied to the Jamaican context.

3.2.1.1 *Using Jamaica and the Tivoli Gardens Incursion as Case Studies*

This thesis employs Jamaica as the primary case study for examining the interconnection between the failed state and security governance literatures. The most critical contribution that this approach provides to investigating the interconnection

between failed state and security governance is that it provides a practical and social context for exploring how each theory can be identified, their impact on the state, and the practical real world concerns that may actually challenge the normative understanding of the identifying tenets put forward in the literatures. Using Jamaica as a case study provides this research with the real world information that will help in validating the core arguments being made by this thesis and providing an appreciation of how these theories actually operate and are constructed in societies like Jamaica that exhibit a complex state environment. Avenues for dissecting the strength and weaknesses of the theories are revealed though this case study.

Jamaica has been characterised as an upper middle income state that is supported by a strong middle to upper class, but which also exemplifies a crippling economy that is plagued by enormous international debt (World Bank, 2016.). This characterisation by the World Bank brings to the fore the concerning features that have made the conceptualisation of Jamaica as a stable state problematic as it suggests that though it may have a strong middle and upper class (which acts as a façade of success), the functionality and stability of the state is threatened by a struggling economy and the many underlying political, social and cultural factors that have facilitated the poor management of the state. Despite this, the country is not considered a classic characterisation of a failed state. One of the most resounding features of state failure, according to the literature, is the presence of conflict and violence occurring across the urban landscape, and which affect multiple socio-economic communities.[12] What this thesis suggests is that other factors should be incorporated into the characterisation of state failure within the Jamaican context. These include its post-colonial history, stark social inequalities, the segregation of the urban space, as well as structural and

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[12] See Rotberg's (2004; 2003) criteria of state failure outlined in Chapter 2

systemic problems in the state environment. The thesis suggest that the convergence of these factors make Jamaica a good case study for state failure as they add a different dimension to how Jamaica, and states similar to it, are perceived and constructed. The thesis posits further that in combining the suggested criteria of failed statehood noted above with the somewhat dysfunctional nature of Jamaica's security governance the state thus becomes illustrative of why many post-colonial or capitalist states could be considered as failed or failing.

What will be highlighted throughout this thesis are circumstances in which the theory fails to account for various social phenomena as exemplified in the Jamaican case, and the implications that this may have in developing and reconceptualising the failed state theory. Taken together, by choosing Jamaica as the primary case study a multifaceted investigation into state failure and security governance is carried out systematically to: a) determine the core features of state failure; b) determine whether or not, and to what degree, it is feasible to apply these features to Jamaica; c) explain how the social, historical, economic and political circumstances of the country altered the general perceptions of how, why and when state failure is initiated; and d) understand the ways in which the interaction between state and non-state actors impact on the stability of the state's infrastructure.

Security provision in Jamaica becomes the central focus for this investigation as it is the primary welfare tool in Jamaica that is provided and controlled by a variety of actors – which proves useful in highlighting the vast inequalities present within the state. Security provision is treated as a conduit for further exploration of the political, social, economic and historical conditions that have enabled the emergence of a challenging state and which underscores the problematic relationships between the state and non-state security providers such as gangs, dons, and private security firms.

Based on this relationship, an interesting dynamic emerges that interconnects political tensions, a diverse array of social identities, and historical structures of power and authority that ultimately create a significant and otherwise under-researched social context. This social context thus provides for an exploration into how a failure occurs, and the implications this may have on other states with these pre-existing features.

The 24 May 2010 Tivoli Gardens Incursion provides a more precise spatial and temporal context for the further examination of the strength and weaknesses of the failed state theory, specifically in investigating the nature of security and the way in which this is affected by both state and non-state actors.[13] This incident represents a crisis point for the country and provides a significant platform for examining the key features of failed statehood and dysfunctional security governance combined. Various concerns converge within this particular episode, including: the problematic security environment; state incapacity; the inability of the state to assert its monopoly over violence; the state authority being challenged by non-state security providers; the dysfunctional interplay between state and non-state power and authority structures; as well as the heightened presence of conflict and violence. The political underpinnings of the incursion and the complicated relationship that existed between the state and the don of the community (Christopher 'Dudus' Coke) expand on the idea that Jamaica does not fit into the classic understanding of failed state. Additionally, the manner in which the political and territorial sovereignty of the nation is characterised and challenged within this episode also contests how these issues have been approached in the literature, thus allowing for a nuanced critique of the literature. In so doing, a space for analysing the implications of dysfunctional security networks on the nature of statehood is presented. The findings provided from examining this situation can be

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[13] Chapter 7 provides a more detailed discussion of the Tivoli Gardens Incursion.

applied to further understanding states like Jamaica and providing an alternative appreciation of the failed state theory.

Utilising the case study approach thus provides an empirical platform for examining the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of the two literatures being examined by this thesis. The rich real world information and context that case studies are able to provide are crucial as it removes the boundaries between the actual phenomenon and the theory that defines it. Using Jamaica and the Tivoli Gardens Incursion as case study and sub-case study, respectively, facilitates an analytical examination of the failed state and security governance theories that places their characterisation into context with a real world exemplar.

3.2.2 Research Tools

This section outlines the two main investigative tools used to conduct research for this thesis. As a qualitative research study, interviews and supplementary documents became the main research methods employed. The main reason for using both is to provide a diverse, as well as holistic perspective surrounding the research problem (Hennink et al., 2011). It will discuss the main reasons for choosing these research methods, the approach to employing these methods, and the challenges they presented. The fieldwork component of the project, in which all the interviews were conducted, took place over a six months period (November 2015 to May 2016) in Kingston, Jamaica.

3.2.2.1 Interviews

As noted above, one of the tools used to collect data for this project was qualitative interviews. These interviews were conducted with a wide range of actors

from both the public and private sectors as well as members of the community. This section will detail the interview process employed in the research. It will discuss the choice of interview style, the reason for choosing participants and how the data collected aided in generating specific thematic concerns that resonate throughout the project.

Within the qualitative research field, interviews are considered one of the most commonly used tools of data collecting (Braun and Clarke, 2013). Utilising Braun and Clarke's (2013) definition of interviewing, the process is primarily concerned with gleaning an in-depth and detailed appreciation of a participant's response to a specific experience on a topic raised in the conversation by the interviewer. [14] Their perspective on a particular experience as well as the language they use and the manner in which they describe their response to the issues raised by the interviewer (Braun and Clarke, 2013) are key to the interviewing process in qualitative research and will further underscore the analysis to take place. Interviews provide an opportunity to fully explore the way in which participants "view" and comprehend their world and life experiences (Braun and Clarke, 2013; Kvale, 2007).

Qualitative interviewing is particularly useful in "describing social and political processes" and their impact on the everyday lives of the research participants and the wider community in which they live (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p. 4). It allows the interviewer to fill knowledge gaps created by formal records of historical and social events or processes that often ignore the voices of marginalised communities such as women, children, the poor, etc. (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p.4). By targeting specific communities, the interviewer is hopefully able to glean an alternative response

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[14] Braun and Clarke incorporate Kvale's (2007) description of interviews as a "professional interaction" that is focussed on gaining in-depth knowledge on a specific issue through "careful questioning and listening" (Kvale, 2007, p. 8).

to events than what is being depicted in formal records. Interviews provides the researcher with an opportunity to explore the specific political, and socio-economic context that participants live in, which will ultimately affect the nature of their responses to the questions put forward in the conversation (Hennink et al., 2011). This method of data collection also allows the researcher to highlight new areas of concern regarding long-standing issues that still play an important role in the everyday lives of their participants. As a result, integral to the interview process is listening on the part of the researcher and being willing to recognise the importance of the issues being discussed by the interviewee (Longhurst, 2016). As this thesis provides an exploration of how various political and social events helped to shape the nature of the Jamaican state, employing qualitative interviewing provides a useful tool for understanding how key events, such as the Tivoli Gardens Incursion aided in affecting the lives of the interviewees and influenced their perspectives on how the country operates.

In exploring the society's response to the Tivoli Gardens Incursion interviews were considered the best option to gather data that was not already vetted by either state actors, journalists or other researchers exploring the event. Face to face interviews helped to provide the critical context that guided the participants' response whilst also giving them an opportunity to speak freely about their perceptions of the event. Utilising other research tools such as questionnaires, which require a 'yes' or 'no' or graded response, would have restricted the response and engagement of the participant and potentially prevented the researcher from gaining an in-depth appreciation of how the Incursion impacted on their lives.

There are three main types of interviews that can be undertaken in qualitative research: structured, semi-structured and unstructured (Longhust, 2016; Braun and Clarke, 2013). In structured interviews, the most common form of interviews, the

researcher probes the participant using a standard and pre-determined list of questions. Unstructured interviews are "participant-led" with the interviewer providing themes and topics to be discussed (Braun and Clarke, 2013). Semi-structured interviews, though managed by a list of pre-determined questions, provides for a more fluid and unstructured discussion that is largely determined by the participant (Dunne, 2005 as cited in Longhurst, 2016; Braun and Clarke, 2013). Semi-structured interviews employ a localist approach which integrates social context into the interview process (Qu and Dumay, 2011). With this approach, data that is collected from the interviews cannot be analysed in isolation but must be considered against the social context they occur (Alvesson, 2003; Qu and Dumay, 2011).

Given the nature of this project semi-structured interviews were utilised for two core reasons: 1) to glean a more diverse insight into the specific social, economic and political concerns that determined the participants' responses; and 2) to provide the participant with the ability to freely express their views on issues that may seem contentious, for example politics or crime. To facilitate the interview process the researcher incorporated Hannabuss' interviewing techniques whilst preparing for and during the interview sessions. These techniques include "establishing rapport; keeping the discussion going; asking questions which avoid closed yes/no answers; avoiding jargon and abstractions; ... knowing when not to interrupt ...; being non-judgemental; and knowing how to focus and pace the interview" (Hannabuss, 1996, p. 26). As the Tivoli Gardens Incursion was a highly politicised event, which still resonates in the society 7 years later, it was important to conduct the interview in a sensitive and measured manner which allowed the participants to somewhat shape the direction of the questioning and the overall tone of the conversation. Though the pre-determined questions were used, the general flow of the interview was guided by the individual

response of the participants. Given that the project was primarily concerned with gleaning the societal response to the Tivoli Gardens Incursion, and the highly political underpinnings of the event, it was necessary to employ semi-structured interviewing to give the participants the opportunity to speak freely about their response to the events and the role played by state, the police force and the community members during the incursion. Topics related to security, politics, the presence of gangs, dons, crime, violence as well as the social and economic landscape of Jamaica were discussed throughout the interviews. By employing a semi-structured interview process the researcher was able to cover a diverse array of themes that underscore this project.

The interviews were conducted using open-ended questioning which allowed the participants to share their perspectives on the various topics raised. Terms such as "what were your thoughts on..." or "how would you describe..." were included in most of the questions posed to each participant group. Emphasis, by the constant use of the word 'you', was placed on the interviewees' ideas and thoughts on a specific subject matter that was intended to illicit their personal views and perceptions rather than what they perceived to be the socially accepted response. This would prove valuable in the analysis phase of this research. It must be noted that in addition to open-ended questions participants from the private security sector (see below for further details) were also asked more standardised questions at the beginning of the interview regarding the basic operational features of their companies, such as "How many guards does your company employ?" or "What type of services do you offer?". This was done in an effort to gain a more detailed picture of the operational aspect of the private security industry in Jamaica.

3.2.2.2   Participants

As noted above, the research participants for this project were mainly taken from three different societal groups. These include 1) public security officers, 2) private security actors and 3) community residents. A researcher who has conducted extensive research in garrison and inner-city communities on gangs and various peace initiatives was also included in the participant pool (see Table 3.1 for detailed list of participants). The aim of designing this type of participant pool was to create a balanced approach to researching some of the core themes highlighted in this thesis. As a result, the researcher was able to examine responses from retired state security actors, active players in the private security industry and members of the society who were directly affected by the actions of the state during the Tivoli Gardens Incursion, as well as those who live within the same communities that were in the past heavily controlled by gangs. Additionally, given the socio-economic divide that is inherently represented in this participant pool a discussion on the socio-economic, and to some extent, political landscape of Jamaica emerged as core themes throughout the interviews. In so doing, a diverse perspective on Jamaica's security infrastructure, as well as the socio-economic concerns that plagued the urban landscape were raised and explored within this setting.

There was a total of 22 participants interviewed for this project. Throughout the thesis in-text citations of interviews conducted by the researcher are identified using a coded system with 'I' being the prefix, which is then followed by a two letter descriptor of the participant group the citation is taken from. This is further followed by a number which identifies a specific interviewee and the year the interview was conducted. For example, the in-text citation for a quote from interviewee number five from the Trench Town community will be identified as 'I.TT5, 2016'. This system

was employed as a measure to fully anonymise the identities of all research participants for the project.

3.2.2.3   Targeting Participants

Participants for this project were targeted using a combined approach of purposive and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling was primarily employed when targeting interviews from private security companies. Purposive sampling allows the researcher to select participants that could provide a substantial wealth of information about a specific subject, these participants are considered "information rich" (Patton, 1990, as cited in Polkinghorne, 2005, p.140). By employing purposive sampling, also known as judgement sampling, the main concern is not the size of the sample but rather the value and the meaning participants are able to contribute to understanding the social phenomena being examined in the research (Lynch, 2013; Polkinghorne, 2005). In light of this, prior to beginning the field work aspect of the project it was determined that conducting interviews with a wide range of security actors would be ideal in order to gain in-depth knowledge of the security environment in Jamaica.

A sample of small to large private security companies to approach was compiled from the Private Security Regulation Authority's (PSRA) website.[15] Company websites, where available, were also consulted in order to gather a better picture of the background expertise and the positions currently held by the participants in the industry. This proved useful as the researcher was also able to identify individuals who were also former members of the JDF.

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[15] The PSRA is a branch of the Ministry of National Security which holds the responsibility of monitoring and regulating various aspects of the private security sector. "Contract security organisations, proprietary security organisations, private security guards, private investigators and   security   trainers"   fall   within   the   purview   of   the   PSRA (http://www.psra.gov.jm/aboutus.html)

This background in public security was particularly useful as participants were able to provide further knowledge on the dynamics between private and public security based on their past and current experiences in the security sector. These companies were either contacted via email or by phone in order to arrange meetings with either the CEO or executive managers of these companies. It was decided to approach higher level executives as they would have a more holistic understanding of the nature of the private security industry, as well as the business and human resource aspect of the operations and would be able to better address questions regarding the challenges they face within the sector. Though it would have been beneficial to speak with armed guards from the companies, as they would have been able to share their direct experiences with providing security in various communities, it would have been difficult to negotiate access to them with the companies.

Table 3.1 Research Participants

Participant Group	Background Descriptors	Date of Interview	Project I.D.
Public Security Actors	Retired JCF Officer	17 February 2016	I.RO1, 2016
	Retired JCF Officer	20 April 2016	I.RO2, 2016
	Retired JCF Officer	7 April 2016	I.RO3, 2016
	Retired JCF Officer	1 May 2016	I.RO4, 2016
Private Security Actors	Former JDF member	26 January 2016	I.PS1, 2016
	Former JDF member	4 February 2016	I.PS2, 2016
	Company CEO	1 March 2016	I.PS3, 2016
	Company CEO	4 March 2016	I.PS4, 2016
	Former JDF member	6 May 2016	I.PS5, 2016
Community Residents	August Town Resident	21 March 2016	I.AT1, 2016
	August Town Resident	21 March 2016	I.AT2, 2016
	August Town Resident	21 March 2016	I.AT3, 2016
	August Town Resident	21 March 2016	I.AT4, 2016
	August Town Resident	22 March 2016	I.AT5, 2016
	Trench Town Resident	26 March 2016	I.TT1, 2016
	Trench Town Resident	26 March 2016	I.TT2, 2016
	Trench Town Resident	26 March 2016	I.TT3, 2016
	Trench Town Resident	26 March 2016	I.TT4, 2016
	Trench Town Resident	26 March 2016	I.TT5, 2016
	Trench Town Resident	26 March 2016	I.TT6, 2016
	Trench Town Resident	26 March 2016	I.TT7, 2016
Researcher/NGO	Gang and crime researcher	17 March 2016	I.NGO1, 2016

In reflecting on the interactions with this group of participants the researcher noted an interesting dynamic that reinforced the differences between the private and public security sectors; in that, the private security actors were more willing to engage in an investigative research process that sought to explore the dynamics of their industry and the influence they have in the construction and provision of security in Jamaica. They therefore illustrated more transparency in discussing how the industry has affected the country and illustrated openness to contributing to research regarding

security and the construction of the state. Though there were a limited number of interviews conducted within this group (only 5 interviews), each respondent was willing to delve into the challenges and the varying dynamics of private security and share their views regarding the nature of the state and the extent to which security has supported or challenged state development throughout the country's history. The more transparent approach to research exemplified in this group of participants, juxtaposed against a more restrictive dynamic identified within the state's approach to research (discussed in 3.3) further reinforces the oppositional dynamics between public and private security in Jamaica that have had a significant impact on the manner in which the sector is constructed, as well as the consequential influence this may have on the social dynamics of the country.

Other participants in the research were contacted through snowball sampling. The snowballing strategy involves the generation of a participant pool through the researcher's network as well as the network of the participants (Braun and Clarke, 2013; Lynch, 2013; Polkinghorne, 2005). For example, after interviewing a retired JCF officer who was introduced through a mutual relation, the officer provided the researcher with the contact details of another high ranking retired member of the JCF. This strategy proved highly effective in generating the participant pool for the retired JCF members as it allowed the researcher to gain access to former members of the JCF who held top leadership positions within the force. In so doing, a varied appreciation of the security environment from the perspective of the state was gained. It also provided the researcher with useful data on the perceptions the state had of non-state actors who were engaged in some form of security provision within certain urban spaces.

Gatekeepers were used to gain access to residents living in Trench Town and August Town. These two areas of study were chosen primarily due to the access provided by gatekeepers. Gatekeepers usually assume prominent roles in communities; are typically mindful of the complex dynamics of the community; and are aware of the useful characteristics of community members that may prove beneficial to the research (Hennink et al., 2011). The gatekeeper's role in becoming the local advocate for the research and providing information about the community that would aid the researcher in better understanding the dynamics of the community proved highly beneficial as the fieldwork progressed (Hennink et al., 2011; Devers and Frankel, 2000).

Two gatekeepers, one from each community, were initially introduced to the researcher through contacts in her own professional and personal network. One gatekeeper, in particular, is considered a community leader who helped to negotiate peace with a neighbouring community. He maintains a strong presence in the community and was able to introduce the researcher to other community residents who were active in the peace initiative and other community development programmes. From a safety perspective for the researcher, it was also crucial to gain the assistance of a gatekeeper to enter these communities as the researcher would be considered a stranger and her motivations for conducting research would be questioned by the community members if she was not supported by a well-known and trusted community member. After initially meeting with the gatekeepers to discuss the project and the type of participant pool the researcher wanted to develop arrangements were made to meet with the gatekeepers on specific days to conduct the field interviews within the communities.

The interviews in the communities took place over a combined total of 3 days, with one day being allocated to the Trench Town residents. All interviewees were provided with an information sheet which explained the purpose of the research, who the researcher was, and how the data will be secured and managed. They were also informed that all interviews would be anonymised. A consent form was then provided for the interviewees to sign to confirm that they agreed to be recorded by the researcher, and that they were happy to take part in the interview. In some cases, due to the literacy level of the participants, the information sheet was read out loud by the researcher and the participants were then asked if they understood the information provided and whether they would like to continue with the interview. In two cases, the participants indicated that they did not want to continue with the interviews as they expressed concerns with the subject areas being discussed. In other instances, after the information sheet was read to the participant and they expressed their willingness to continue the consent form was then read to them and their responses were audio recorded to have verbal confirmation that they agreed to take part in the research. Throughout all the interviews the researcher did not refer to the participants by name. Three participants within the retired state security officer category noted their names during the recorded interviews. However, the researcher has chosen to anonymise their identity, in line with the other participants, in order to maintain the objectivity of the data.

After completing the initial set of interviews, further efforts were made to arrange meetings with additional participants. However, this proved unsuccessful due to the unavailability of one gatekeeper, and the inability of the other to identify other interested participants. In the case of the latter gatekeeper, the participant pool that he provided access to was a network of his friends, family and neighbours – thus the

researcher recognised that this may have limited the participants that he was able to provide access to.

3.2.2.4 Difficulties in Gaining Access to Participants

It must be noted that access to other potential participant groups was essentially denied due to safety concerns and ethical approval; or difficult to gain based on the unwillingness of the participants in responding to requests made by the researcher. Initially, this thesis attempted to pursue interviews from active members of the JCF and executives within the Ministry of National Security. In order to do so the researcher had to seek ethical approval from the Ministry of National Security. After completing and submitting the required ethics application, the researcher was never provided with the Ministry's decision on the application, despite following up with them on several occasions. As a result, this potential participant pool had to be excluded from the project. To counter this void in the data, retired members of the JCF were approached and interviewed. Other attempts to arrange interviews with members of the private security sector (specifically from small firms), former members of government, INDECOM, NGOs, and researchers, were unsuccessful as they were either declined or no response was received.

A further challenge to the gaining access to potential participants in both the local communities and public institutions was the announcement that the country's next general election was to be held on 25 February 2016.[16] This announcement was made by the then Prime Minister, Portia Simpson Miller, at a Peoples National Party (PNP) political rally on 30 January 2016. The announcement of the general elections

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[16] This problem did not apply in gaining access to the other participants in the study, and as such interviews began with these participants in early February 2016. The main challenge that prevented earlier meetings with them was due to their personal and business schedules.

created new concerns for the interviewer which were primarily related to access and safety. In terms of access to participants, though the researcher contacted the community gatekeepers prior to the announcement, both gatekeepers suggested that it would be a difficult period to enter the local communities, which were highly politicised, as many residents would be campaigning on behalf of their political parties. The gatekeeper of the August Town community also suggested given the surname of the researcher, many potential participants in his community would incorrectly assume that I was related to a member of the opposition political party, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), and as a result would not be willing to agree to discuss issues related to politics or the work of the government. The many attempts to contact state agencies to secure an interview yielded similar responses as the researcher was often advised to "wait after the elections".

It is recognised that given the uncertainty that the elections would bring regarding the employment and positions held by the state agents it would have been somewhat difficult to insist on an interview as they would have been preoccupied with other affairs, such as ensuring that the nation's election machinery was in place. Though the position taken by these state actors and the hesitation of the community residents to take part in the interviews was understandable, this situation delayed the interview process for several months. Due to the uncertainty of the date of the general election the interviewer decided to delay the interviews until a confirmed election date was announced in order to avoid campaigning activities in communities. As such, the interviews were subsequently conducted in March 2016.[17]

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[17] Many news outlets between the period of November 2015 and February 2016 noted that the ruling party, the PNP, was due to call the elections at some point early 2016. See *The Gleaner*, 23 November 2015, "No 2015 Poll - Portia Opts Not To Call Election This Year" and *The Gleaner*, 28 January 2016, "Portia Promises Happy Easter ... - PM Expected To Announce Election Date At Half-Way Tree Meeting Sunday". This speculation was supported when Dr. Peter Phillips, the former government's finance minister and the PNP's campaign director,

Given Jamaica's past record for tense and violent elections it was also considered in the best interest of the interviewer to delay entering local communities to interview participants until after the election period. It would have been at that point that a clearer understanding of any potential volatility in these communities would be gleaned. In the aftermath of the elections, whilst undertaking the interviews in both August Town and Trench Town, the interviewer ensured that the gatekeepers accompanied her and were in close proximity. The interviewer also employed a buddy system before entering the communities to ensure that someone was aware of the time and location of the interviews in case the researcher did not check in at the agreed time (Braun and Clarke, 2013).

Due to the safety concerns for the researcher and ethical concerns for the safety of potential interviewees, expressed by the Economics, Law, Management, Politics and Sociology Ethics (ELMPS) Committee of the University of York, final approval was not given to interview members of community gangs.[18] The ELMPS Committee stated that rather than having these interviews take place in a community setting it would be best to approach gang members who were incarcerated, thus minimising the security risk to the researcher and the interviewees. Groups like prisoners are considered especially vulnerable as they would be placed at risk if the content of what they revealed during the research process became public (Lynch, 2013). The ELMPS Committee also further required that ethical approval to interview this group of participants be gained from the proper Jamaican authorities first, before it made any

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signalled in late 2015 that a general election would be called in 2016. However, due to ambiguous statements made by the Prime Minister there was no formal confirmation of this until February 2016 (See Virtue, 2015).

[18] This participant group represented the community based private security sector that is illustrative of another typology of security provided in Jamaica. It would have been also beneficial to interview these active members of gangs to gain their direct insight into the impact of the Tivoli Incursion and the nature of garrison politics in Jamaica.

final decisions on whether to approve the researcher's application. The request to interview incarcerated gang members was also made in the ethics application submitted to the Ministry of National Security, which as noted above was not returned. As a result, this group of potential participants were also excluded from the research.

3.2.2.5   Geographical and Gender Limitations to Participant Group

In reviewing the composition of the research participants two main concerns come to the fore that may act as both beneficial and limiting factors in analysing the overall robustness of the data collected. The first concern is highlighted in the geographical homogeneity of the participants (Robinson, 2014). As noted previously, each participant of this study resides in Kingston and St. Andrew. Taken from communities ranging from high to low income residential spaces, and in which there is a significant disparity in crime and violence, the research participants represent a relatively wide cross-section of Jamaica's urban society. In this regard, the intentional homogeneity of the participants (Robinson 2014), based on geographical characteristics, allowed for a more focused discussion of the direct impact that the 2010 Tivoli Gardens Incursion had on the livelihoods of residents of these communities, and their relationships with both state and non-state security actors. It also provided real-life information on how various urban communities interpreted the political and economic fallout of the Incursion and the extent to which the political fabric and gang culture of the urban area were affected.

However, by limiting the geographical scope of the participants to only Kingston and St. Andrew there is a valid criticism that the study primarily values the concerns of residents of urban areas. Furthermore, it may be posited that Kingston and St. Andrew are used as an unsubstantiated barometer in examining the nature of

Jamaica's security environment, without providing a comprehensive assessment of the manner in which it is presented in rural communities, and whether the same level of dysfunction, present in the urban areas, can be identified in these communities. This study does recognise the concerns raised in recruiting its participants from within a very defined geographical space, but does assert that given the dynamics between state and non-state actors operating in urban communities, coupled with the socio-economic and political characteristics of these communities, the nexus between state failure and security governance is best exemplified in urban communities. As a result, they act as the best research areas to examine the issues discussed in this thesis. Additionally, from a logistics point of view, given the limited time frame to carry out the field work for this study it would have been difficult to travel to establish relationships with potential gatekeepers in rural communities across the island in order to gain a more geographically diverse participant group. The limiting nature of the geographical scope of the study however provides a basis for further research into how the key themes examined by this study are illustrated in Jamaica's rural communities.

The lack of female research participants also presents an important challenge in providing a balanced discussion on Jamaica's security environment and failed statehood. As noted previously, the privileging of the male perspective throughout this study does present some degree of bias, particularly in relation to the themes of crime, violence, power and authority within the Jamaican context. A majority of the male participants used in this study occupy positions of power and authority in both the public and private spheres of society. From former Commissioners of Police to current chief operating officers of private security firms, the male voice used throughout this study is one of privilege and power. Chevannes (2002) explains that though women outnumber men in educational and religious institutions in Jamaica

they are underrepresented in many leadership positions – a pattern which is replicated amongst participants in this study. Men and young males assume more visible positions of power in the community and become leaders in youth clubs and criminal gangs and are often elected "to the seat of student power" in educational institutions (p. 56). A singular male view of how crime, gang violence, political tribalism etc., is therefore presented in this study which does not allow for a more nuanced perspective on how these issues affect the entire cross section of the Jamaican society.

Most notably, a majority of the literature on crime and violence tends to ignore the female voice. When women are studied, criminology literature privileges the perspective of white British and North American women, thus ignoring the effect that issues like violence and crime may have on black Caribbean female communities (Jones, 2003). This in turn aids to further reinforce the invisibility of black Caribbean women in research. This marginalisation of black Caribbean women is further extended to the underground economy where women are often regulated to "high-risk/low-reward" positions in the transnational drug trade, often becoming couriers for illegal narcotics (Harriott, 2008, p. 19).

However, there is also a counter argument to the systematic marginalisation of women in Jamaica, especially in the gang culture where they inhabit positions that are often on par with male gang members. According to Gayle (2017), over 25 percent of women in violent communities become key players in the violence and tend to assume roles in gangs such as "strategists, sleepers, or partners of combatants. Sleepers are those women who lure opponents to their death" (See also Clarke, 2018). Within this context the women become equal players in the perpetuation of crime and violence in marginalised inner-city communities, thus subverting the traditional narrative on their invisibility as key players in the society.

The need to provide an appreciation of the multifaceted role played by women in Jamaica and the counter culture of gang violence in inner-city communities is thus another aspect that would add a critical layer of analysis to the central issues being examined in this thesis. However, the inability to access this community created a research gap for this analysis which ultimately relies on the male perspective to gain insight into societal issues. The resulting implication of this is that whereas this research is able to explore the insight provided from both state and non-state players in leadership positions this perspective is skewed to privilege the male voice, ultimately ignoring the views of their female counterparts. The only real life information gathered from the female perspective is through testimony provided in the Report of the Commission of Enquiry on the Tivoli Gardens Incursion (2016), which is used as one of the primary documents examined in this thesis, and newspaper articles. With this is mind however, the researcher contends that an opportunity is thus provided for expanding upon this thesis to explore the female perspective, specifically regarding their societal positionality and identity in Jamaica's security environment.

3.2.2.6   Documents

Although 22 participants were interviewed for this project the researcher believed that there was a need to supplement the data with additional information. The inability to gain access to active members of the state security sector, gang members and high ranking government officials created a knowledge gap in the information gathered. The experiences reflected in this study based on the participant pool was in fact a mixture of non-state actors and residents in so doing the perspective of retired JCF officers and of a particular group of private security players (the gangs) was absent. Additionally, given the difficulty in accessing Tivoli Gardens' residents the

researcher was also unable to gain any significant knowledge on their experiences surrounding the Incursion and the impact that it has had on their lives and the stability of the community. This lack in information also limited the researcher's ability to explore the roles played by dons in communities that were actively being managed by them.

To supplement this gap in knowledge a wide variety of documents were included as research materials for this project (Bowen, 2009). The documents that were collated for analysis came from a diverse range of literatures which allowed the researcher to expand on the knowledge gained through the interview phase of the fieldwork, and discover new perspectives on social phenomena that are particularly integral to this project (Bowen, 2009). Specifically, further information regarding the events surrounding the Tivoli Gardens Incursion and its aftermath was primarily obtained through the supplementary documents.[19] The supplementary data was also used to gather a more detailed understanding of historical events that helped to shape the nature of the country's political environment. It was also used to garner data on the country's economy and factors that influenced societal development across the decades prior to and after gaining independence in 1962. As such, documents that examined historical events filled a knowledge gap that could not have been filled by primarily relying on interviews. Various types of reports were also consulted to gather a wide array of data related to crime statistics, the practices of the state security forces,

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[19] It is important to note that the Tivoli Gardens Incursion was discussed with the interviewees from the researcher, residents, and private security participant groups, with some speaking at great length about how it has impacted on their lives as well as the manner in which it has affected their relations with the state and its security forces. The researcher did have access to high ranking officers who were still employed by the JCF during the Incursion. However, given the establishment of the Commission of Enquiry which was ongoing at the time of the interview phase of the project this topic was not broached as it was highly likely to stoke tension between the researcher and the participants. The researcher also recognised that these participants would not have been able to openly discuss the event with a student researcher given the highly problematic outcome of the Incursion.

and socio-economic issues such as the rate of unemployment, poverty and the quality of education and healthcare provided to the citizens (see Table 3.2 for a list of documents that were analysed for this thesis). Collectively, the types of documents used as supplementary data included newspaper articles, NGO and INGO reports, government reports, and biographies and autobiographies of former political leaders.

It must be noted that with documents such as autobiographies, speeches and governmental reports there is a risk of bias from the authors of these documents. Though they provide key historical insight into the societal climate regarding political and socio-economic issues in Jamaica, particularly in the years prior to and proceeding independence, given that they were written from subjective perspectives the information provided in these documents may be highly biased. For example, former prime minister Edward Seaga's account of the establishment of Tivoli Gardens may differ significantly from that of his political opponents or the residents who lived in these communities during this period. It may be argued that these documents shed a positive light on the actions carried out by political leaders and governments in order to reinforce a specific agenda and appease their supporting base, and as a result cannot be regarded as objective pieces of documentation of historical events and national policies. Nevertheless, they still provide significant background into the actions of these players during specific periods and help in filling information gaps in scholarly research.

Chapter 7 provides a more detailed discussion regarding one of the primary documents used throughout the study, the *Report on the Commission of Enquiry appointed to enquire into events which occurred in Western Kingston and related areas in May 2010*. The Report highlights the composition of the Commission; why the Commission was established, and its intended outcomes.

Table 3.2. Types of Supplementary Documents

Type of document	Source	Rationale
Autobiographies, Biographies,	• Edward Seaga (2009), *My Life and Leadership* Patrick E. Bryan (2009), *Edward Seaga and the Challenges of Modern Jamaica*	To gain a first-hand account from the key players who helped to shape Jamaica's political landscape.
Speeches	• Michael Manley: *Rex Nettleford (Ed) (1971), Manley and the new Jamaica: Selected speeches and writings 1938-1968* • Owen Ellington (2012), *Protecting Human Rights, Human Dignity A JCF Priority* • Patrick Atkinson (2014), *Statement to Parliament on the Tivoli Commission of Enquiry*	Speeches from various state players act as useful historical documents that provide insight into the rationale for changes in policy and practice; whilst also providing the direct first-hand perspective of institutional leaders in the political and security arenas.
NGO Reports	• INDECOM: The INDECOM Quarterly Reports: *April-June 2016; January - March 2017; and April-June 2017.* • Jamaicans for Justice: (2010), *Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee 100th UNHCR Session*; and (2008), *Killing with Impunity: Fatal police shootings and extrajudicial executions in Jamaica: 2005-2007.* • Private Security Regulatory Authority Annual Report (2016)	These reports were employed to gain an objective and local perspective regarding the nature of crime, violence, state policing, as well as the political social and economic issues affecting the nation. By consulting numerous NGO reports it was hoped that a balanced representation of Jamaica for the purposes of analysis would be created. These reports also helped to fill the significant knowledge gap for this thesis regarding the Tivoli Gardens Incursion.
INGO	• Amnesty International (2001; 2011; 2016a; 2016b; 2017) • Carter Centre (1998), *Observing the 1997 Jamaica elections: A report of the Council of the Freely Elected Head of Government* • UNDP (1997) *Governance for Sustainable Human Development: A UNDP Policy Document*	Similar to the NGO reports, INGO reports were included to provide data regarding the nature of crime and the political environment of the country. They also provided in-depth reporting on the Tivoli Gardens Incursion and the policing environment of the country.

Type of document	Source	Rationale
Government Reports and Policy Documents	• *Jamaica Constabulary Force Human Rights and Police Use of Force and Firearms Policy (2007)* • Kerr Report (1997) *Report of the National Committee on political tribalism* • Ministry of National Security (2010), *National crime prevention and community safety strategy (NCPCSS)* • *Report of the Commission of Enquiry appointed to enquire into events which occurred in Western Kingston and related areas in May 2010* (2016)	In the absence of having the state represented in interviews, government reports were used as a formal substitute in order to get some insight into the state's response regarding crime, policing, Jamaica's gangs, etc. The Commission of Enquiry 2016 Report on the Tivoli Gardens Incursion provided a detailed review of the events that took place, how the state security forces reacted and the way in which their policies and practices either helped to stem or escalate the violence. This report provided the researcher with access to sensitive details about the Incursion that helped to understand the impact of the Incursion on statehood and security in Jamaica.
Newspaper and website articles	• *The Gleaner* (2018; 2017; 2016; 2015; 2012, 2010) • *The Jamaica Observer* (2017; 2016; 2015; 2012) • *The New Yorker* (2012; 2011) • *RJR News* (2016)	Most of these articles refer to interviews conducted with either state agents or members of the public. One particular article which was of significant importance for this research was by *The New Yorker (2012b)* and featured an interview with former prime minister Bruce Golding which focussed on the role he played during the Incursion and the state's response to the escalating situation with the don. These articles were employed to gather an overview of the societal responses and help to develop the social context regarding factors associated with the Incursion, economic and political issues plaguing the society, and also the nature of security.

3.2.3   Data Analysis

The researcher employed a grounded theory approach in the data analysis phase of the research. A grounded theory approach was taken as it provided a process of analysis that was committed to examining and critiquing the theory rather than prioritising the results of the investigation (Charmaz, 2008). Based on the grounded theory approach the development of theory is facilitated by recognising the "interplay between existing theory and the inductively derived empirical theory to develop new explanations or transform and refine pre-existing theory" (Hennink et al., 2011, p. 210). This thesis is concerned with using grounded theory approach to "refine" the application of failed state theory, specifically within the Jamaican context, by critiquing the ways in which the concerns raised in both failed state and security governance literatures interconnect.

All interviews were transcribed verbatim and then double checked for accuracy. Prior to the analysis phase the transcripts were proofread in order to develop a general understanding of the "essential features" in order to "move forward analytically" (Sandelowski, 1995, p. 373). The transcripts, along with the supplementary documents, were then uploaded into the NVIVO qualitative data management software for management, coding and analysis. Codes were developed using a combination of an inductive and deductive methods in qualitative data analysis. In so doing, some of the initial codes identified were based on the theoretical framework of the study and integrated into the interview questions (a deductive strategy); whilst other codes emerged directly from the data (inductive strategy) and exemplified the core concerns highlighted by the participants during the interviews (Hennink et al., 2011). These codes were then applied to the supplementary documents

and analysed in relation to new themes that also emerged in the documentary dataset (Bowen, 2009).

The data was placed through several rigorous cycles of coding in order to cultivate and recognise specific thematic patterns that related to the overall theoretical concerns of the study. The themes were also analysed by taking into consideration the way in which the participants related various issues throughout the conversation (Lynch, 2013). For example, in discussing the idea of corruption within the society, whether that may be at the state level or in private institutions, many participants related it to economic and social issues such as low wages, poor education, the lack of proper institutional checks and balances, and the personal power and authority gained by carrying out corrupt practices. The participants also linked the idea of corruption to various social identities such as police officers and members of the political elite. The data was therefore analysed with the intention of gleaning an appreciation of societal response to Jamaica's security environment. Additionally, codes and subsequent themes, were based on the perception held by members of the society regarding the state's ability to provide for their welfare needs and address the critical issues impeding state growth, such as wide scale corruption, unemployment, poverty, etc. The analysis of the data also brought to the fore the varied responses to the Tivoli Gardens Incursion and the tense socio-political dynamics that permeate the state infrastructure which has led many of the participants to assert that it has contributed to the undermining and weakening of the state. Analysis of the data revealed several noteworthy results that would have a significant impact on the manner in which both state and non-state actors have contributed to Jamaica's failure.

3.3 A Reflection of the Investigative Process And Accessing The State

This section highlights the link between the restrictive practices of the state with regard to research, and the concept of failed statehood as exemplified in the Jamaican context. The crux of this discussion lies in the notion that in an effort to maintain an environment of control, whilst asserting its authority over the citizenry, the Jamaican state has established a research environment that is restrictive. This section will therefore explore the idea of restrictive state access, how this translates onto the societal context and the consequences this may have on expanding or challenging the traditional conceptualisation of failed statehood.

Throughout this thesis, particular emphasis is placed on the various challenges and restrictions endured by marginalised communities throughout Jamaica's historical and political development. From the black ex-slave community being prevented by the colonial state from assuming an active role in the democratic processes of the state (Edie, 1989) (see Chapter 4), to poverty stricken garrisons being regulated to the outskirts of the country's welfare system, the state has a long and problematic history of not recognising marginalised identities. In the context of this research, the continued marginalisation of certain communities by the state extends to its restrictive access to groups of both state and non-state actors that are in varying degrees controlled and connected to the state apparatus.

As noted previously, the researcher was not able to gain approval from the state to interview members of the JCF, the executive branch of state ministries as well as incarcerated gang members for this project. By exercising a difficult ethical approval process the state established a restrictive research environment that facilitated a

"closed off" relationship between the state and external research actors.[20] The difficult bureaucratic process of gaining access to these communities ultimately made it very difficult to glean a full appreciation and explore the dynamic social environment that these communities exist in, thus eliminating their voice in the research (Koch, 2013; Turner, 2013). In so doing, the opinions of marginalised groups (particularly in reference to this study) such as incarcerated gang members, regarding crime, the status of gangs in the country and the consequences of the Tivoli Gardens Incursion etc., were practically excluded from this thesis. Given the significant role they play in crime, community development, and the security and protection of most communities, the absence of their "voice" in this project aids in undermining the valid role they play in constructing and defining the state.

What is highly significant about the state's response to the research process associated with this project is that by restricting access to its agents and to marginalised groups of gang members the state is inadvertently asserting its control and authority. It has essentially created a niche environment, academic research, in which it can assert a different type of state control over the flow of information and the construction of various social identities within the state. By controlling access to these gang members, the state has affirmed its control on how varying discourses on the Jamaican state are constructed and investigated. The ability to challenge the identity and powers of the state through research and the depiction of non-state actors is thus managed, and in some cases prevented by the state. An unequal structure of

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[20] It should be noted that there has been significant research conducted by the state and various subsidiary agencies, some of which is cited in this thesis, which explores the varying social, economic and political concerns plaguing the country. A plethora of this research explores new avenues for identifying and ameliorating national problems. Therefore, this thesis is not assuming that the state does not encourage research, but rather may create a complex investigative environment for independent research. Additionally, the reflection offered in this section relates to the problems experienced in conducting this specific study and may not reflect the challenges experienced by other researchers in Jamaica.

relationships emerge which the state, through its restrictive and controlling policies and practices, is able to assert its authority and maintain an aspect of control over a certain community. The state therefore establishes a social and political environment that is defined by the "complex micro-politics of unequal relations between central state actors and marginalised groups" (Koch, 2013, p. 393).

Amnesty International (2016) reports similar difficulties in gaining access to state officials and members of the JCF for its report investigating the spate of unlawful killings in the country.[21] Although the organisation was eventually granted interviews with several government officials including the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP), the Commissioner of Police and the Public Defender, it was still not granted access to junior officers in the JCF (Amnesty International, 2016). Despite repeated requests made to the Commissioner of Police's office to interview the officers no response was given. A similar request for information was submitted to the DPP and the Ministries of Justice and National Security under the Jamaica´s Access to Information Act (Amnesty International, 2016, p. 8). The requested material was received from the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of National Security provided some of the information more than 60 days after the request; and the organisation did not receive any information from the DPP (Amnesty International, 2016, p. 8). The response to an INGO in this manner highlights the difficult research environment created by the state, and the fact that it is willing to 'close off' and/or restrict the sharing of select information to some of the most prominent organisations present in the international system.

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[21] Blake (2013) also reports noted similar difficulties in gaining access to government officials whilst conducting research in Jamaica.

The question thus arises as to how this unequal and restrictive relationship perpetuated by the state, and observed by this project, maps onto state failure? In examining the issue of state capacity as a fundamental feature of determining the strength and weakness of a state, the ability of the government to control its own agents, as well as assert its coercive control over other actors throughout the state system, aids in delineating capable/strong states from incapable/weak or failed states (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001; Ottervik, 2013). Strong states are determined based on how well they can successfully execute their coercive, extractive, control and legitimation duties (see Chapter 2) in order to ensure that the needs of their citizenry are met.

It may be argued that by creating such a restrictive environment for research that is designed to examine the nature of the state the government is in effect protecting itself against potential criticism from both national and international actors. In so doing, the state is utilising its coercive function in a problematic manner that undermines its integrity. On another hand, it may be argued that the lack of response to these types of research requests further highlights an institutional incapacity to adequately establish a robust state system that encourages a diverse investigative research environment.

It must be noted that the restrictive approach to research in the state can be viewed from two different perspectives. Firstly, it does suggest that by restricting access to certain groups the state is fostering an intellectually stunted research environment whilst quieting the voice of marginalised communities. The coercive tactics employed here may be viewed as a feature of state failure as the state is not operating in the best interest of the public. Conversely, it may also highlight an element of strength in the research sphere; in that, it exemplifies the ability of the state

to control the portrayal of its institutional capacities and capabilities. The authority of the state in the research sphere is thus brought to the fore and becomes a central factor in how and if research is allowed.

This thesis contends that the promotion of a restrictive research environment by the state is indicative of an under-researched aspect of failed state literature which suggests that a failing or failed state fosters an intellectually closed and censored research environment. This research posits the view that by restricting certain types of investigative research the state is: a) succeeding at frustrating the independent research process for external academic investigators; b) marginalising the voices of certain communities (for example, incarcerated individuals and state agents); and c) controlling the creation and dissemination of information that in its view may potentially threaten or undermine the state and its identity in research communities. Communication and academic exploration taking place within the state system are thus governed, monitored and controlled by the state, thus eliminating a platform for independent research to take place within the country.

The idea of state failure thus assumes a new characteristic when examining the coercive control of the state and its capacity in establishing a fair and objective independent research community in Jamaica. Closed and restrictive states limit the dissemination of information and prevent investigative research that is geared at expanding knowledge and understanding regarding the various issues and actors that challenge the stability of the state. As such, a different avenue for examining the concept of failed statehood comes to the fore within the Jamaican context.

3.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter attempted to outline the investigative processes guiding this thesis and the challenges in conducting qualitative research in Jamaica's complex social and political environment. It further outlined and justified the research methodology employed in choosing Jamaica as the case study and the challenges encountered in employing certain research tools to investigate the thematic framework of the project.

The primary intent of this chapter was to illustrate how issues related to the country's political environment, the state's restrictive access to marginalised communities, and the transparency of the private security sector converge to establish a unique social context that brings into question the stability of the state and the factors that have limited further exploration into its institutions. It identified the extent to which the voices of specific identities across the urban landscape have been further marginalised through a restrictive state research framework, thus signalling an attempt on the part of the state to exercise its coercive control on the nature and dissemination of information regarding the security, political and socio-economic apparatus of the state. What emerged through this process was the reinforcement of the way in which failed state and security governance literatures characterise social identities and the power structures within states; in that, whereas the state and its institutions utilise various tools to assert its central authority (in the case of Jamaica it is through controlling access to certain communities and identities such as gangs) there is also a recognition that the privatised segment of security provision in the country not only operates as an independent body, but is also more transparent and willing to question the construction of the state.

In Chapters 4, 6 and 7 the themes and societal concerns that came to light during the fieldwork will be discussed in relation to how they map on to the theoretical framework of this thesis. Issues related to crime, violence, corruption, the state's responses to socio-economic issues, the influence that gangs have on the society, and the nature of the political fabric of the country, etc., will all feature in the upcoming examination of Jamaica in light of the failed state and security governance.

4   Understanding the Nature of the Jamaican State

4.1   Introduction

This chapter is concerned with exploring the concerns highlighted in failed state literature, through the lens of the Jamaican context. It will focus on the extent to which the country maps onto and/or subverts the traditional construction of failed statehood. Particular focus will be placed on how features of state failure such as stark social inequalities; the segregation of the urban space, and structural and systemic conflict in the state system contribute to framing Jamaica within this body of literature. It will also focus on the role played by non-state actors in governance. This chapter posits that these characteristics of failed statehood are interlinked and mainly connected through the establishment of an adversarial political culture in the country which has had far reaching implications on social relations; the problematic treatment of the urban poor; and the emergence of multiple non-state actors who have assumed positions of power and authority in the state. Issues such as the two-party political system, political clientelism, and the social and economic disparities that exist throughout the state will have a resonating presence throughout this research.

These features of failed statehood in Jamaica are explored in this chapter through a historical analysis of key events, actors and policies that have shaped state development prior to Jamaica gaining independence in 1962, and in the decades after. The chapter assumes this historical approach in its discussion as it aids in identifying critical stages of state development in Jamaica and the factors that both positively and negatively affected the country's political, social and economic evolution.

In order to examine these issues in detail the chapter will contain two main sections that will cover the historical period between 1938 and the 1980s. The first

section (see Section 4.2) will examine the adversarial political system that was established in the state prior to and after independence. It will highlight the concern that Jamaica's inability to stabilise its statehood and assert itself as a strong and capable state between the 1930s and 1960s was severely hampered by the conflict riddled adversarial two-party system that developed in this era. It will show that this system, which established the problematic political clientelist practices in the state, helped to undermine the functionality of the state, and also created a social and political culture that pitted one socio-economic class of citizens against another. It will further illustrate that out of this problematic political culture emerged a segregated urban landscape that created distinctive dualities in Jamaica that are still present, and which have helped to define power relations in the country, and ultimately the capacity of the state.

The second section (see Section 4.3) will focus on the change in the society's response to adversarial politics, as well as the shift of power and authority from the political elite and wealthy to non-state actors and the urban poor in specific areas of the state. This shift heralded a new era in Jamaican politics, but it also helped to transform the socio-economic landscape of the country and introduced new power players (gangs, dons, etc.) into positions related to governance and control. Patron-client relationships and the economy will be discussed as characteristics of Jamaica's failed statehood. Focus will also be placed on how conflict is manifested within the borders of the state. Conflict will be discussed in terms of its traditional conception within the literature which focuses on violent clashes between opposing groups. However, it will also bring to the fore the structural and systemic forms of conflict, particularly related to politics that have weakened the state system over the decades. Conflict in this context has multiple layers as it is first treated in relation to security

and protections (i.e., instances of aggressive encounters between members of the society, which are primarily politically motivated). Secondly, the idea of conflict is applied in relation to the social and economic concerns such as the social tensions and antagonism created by the opposing political parties as well as the entrenched socio-economic disparities that are displayed between communities of differing economic backgrounds and the conflicting ways in which politics, social welfare and security are managed within these communities. The chapter will then conclude with exploring how all of these issues map onto Jamaica's current socio-economic landscape and their collective influence on determining Jamaica's statehood.

4.2   The Establishment of a Politically Divided Jamaica

4.2.1   1938: The Foundations of Jamaica's Political And Social Tensions

In order to glean an understanding of Jamaica's current political and social environment it is first important to outline the various events and social policies that have contributed to the emergence of a politically and socially divided society. In Jamaica's case it is important to address these issues from the point of its first attempt at establishing and exercising a democratic society, whilst examining the various events that contributed to social conflict and which pitted members of the society against that of the political elite. This period helped to construct an interesting social dynamic in Jamaica that was defined by political conflict, socio-economic inequalities and the emergence of various actors assuming positions of power and authority that have become entrenched in the nation's political and social environment. It is in the context of these events that this thesis asserts that Jamaica began to experience the initial signs of a problematic state infrastructure across the urban landscape.

The events of the 1938 labour rebellion in Jamaica signalled the beginning of decades of social and political change in the country. Often described as a "watershed" moment and the dawn of "political modernity", the labour rebellion, which interestingly occurred exactly 100 years after emancipation, facilitated the establishment of Jamaica's political institutions, and defined the identities of the key players who still assume positions of authority in the state (Scott, 2003, p. 7). Though this project will focus more on the development of politics and social life between the 1960s to present day, it is important to note that the revolt of 1938 acts as a precursor to the political and socio-economic problems that eventually evolved within the Jamaican society, and which this project will explore. These include class struggles, adversarial politics, socio-economic difficulties and problematic encounters between the citizenry and the police.

Before further discussing the impact that the events of 1938 had on the development of the Jamaican state it is important to briefly take note of one of the most prominent debates surrounding the period, that is whether it should be referred to as the labour 'unrest', 'rebellion', 'riot' or 'revolution'. In establishing his argument for defining the events of 1938 as a labour rebellion, rather than a revolution, Post (1969) asserts that the motivation for rebels is to bring about reasonable structural change that could feasible be provided by the state infrastructure. Revolutionaries, on the other hand, seek to fulfil their demands through the destruction and the subsequent rebuilding of the structures of the state (Post, 1969). For the rebels taking part in strike actions across Jamaica in 1938 their main demands were for "higher wages, more work, and more land" – requests that the state had the structural capacity of meeting (Post, 1969, p. 388). Although each individual incident can be referred to as strike actions that, in some instances, became violent (and evolved into riots such as the one

in Frome, Westmoreland), the collective labour movement in Jamaica during this period can be defined as a rebellion. In a similar vein, scholars such as Stephens and Stephens (1986) and Holt (1992) have also referred to the 1938 events as a labour rebellion. As such, this thesis will adopt this characterisation of the events by referring to it as a labour rebellion in which workers demonstrated, and at varying intervals rioted, to improve their working conditions.

From the perspective of Jamaica's political infrastructure, the rebellion helped to establish "mass-based political parties and a competitive electoral system; trade unions and an active labour movement; adult suffrage and constitutional decolonization" and signalled the beginning of representative democracy in Jamaica (Scott, 2003, p.7) (see Table 4.1). The 1938 rebellion underscored a growing need within the Jamaican community for greater political independence, racial justice and economic reform (Bryan, 2009). This ultimately led to the establishment of an alliance between the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) and the newly founded PNP, and represented a "union between the nationalist movement of the coloured middle class and the movement of workers for betterment of their socio-economic position in Jamaican society" (Bryan, 2009, p. 38). The rebellion essentially highlighted the concerns of two major groups in Jamaica, that is, the black and brown middle class which was trying to establish a politically independent and autonomous socialist Jamaican state, and Alexander Bustamante's group which advocated on behalf of the working class for more unionised representation and better working conditions (Bryan, 2009).

From a social perspective, the rebellion also helped to define a legacy of social identities that still resonate in present day Jamaica; in that, the leadership elite of the brown and black middle class were juxtaposed against that of the black and poor

working class which was embroiled in significant turmoil against the police during the rebellion. Hostilities between the police working under the directives of the state, and black labourers during this period came to a significant boiling point which resulted in wide scale violence and several deaths. (Box 4.1 explains how rioting began in Frome, Westmoreland and highlights the tensions and nature of violence that erupted as a result of the labour rebellion). These hostilities became the precursor to the present nature of violence in the society which is often underscored by issues relating to socio-economic inequality and tensions between the police and the poorer citizenry (discussed in more detail later in this chapter).

From a conceptual basis the tensions that existed between the middle class (comprised of the brown political elite) and the working class (comprised of poor black labourers) fostered the conception of Jamaica as a racially and economically segregated society. State functionality in these circumstances was not only undermined by the social tensions this type of segregation created, but also fostered a more traditional form of internal conflict that is represented in state failure literature. These tensions encouraged violent protests between these groups whilst also stoking racially motivated conflict which has subsequently evolved into a more politically driven antagonism between today's political parties. The labour rebellion thus acts as one of the initial foundations of state failure that manifested itself in the state's socio-economic and political spheres. The tacit segregation of the state emerges as a result of these tensions.

Box 4.1. The 1938 Labour Riots in Frome, Westmoreland

"At Serge Island, workers made a claim on 5 January for more pay. Bustamante arrived on the scene ... He urged the workers to accept the 1 ½ pence per day offered by the management. This was a mediating role he played on appropriate occasions. The workers refused and fighting broke out with the police: 33 protestors were hurt; 60 were held by the police. After a time, the workers took the wage offer and went back to work. At Frome, the following week, as news of the events of Serge Island spread, workers attacked the pay office, demanding cessation of deductions of arbitrary amounts from their pay. Hostilities again broke out, as was becoming the pattern. This time the outbreak drew blood as workers and police clashed. The police opened fire: six workers were killed, 50 wounded and 89 charged with rioting. The protest action abated after this tragic event.

Frome was again the site of the next big confrontation. Workers on 20 April attacked the Tate and Lyle West Indies Sugar Company pay office. The next day they demanded increased pay 'to a dollar a day' (4 shillings in local currency) or they would not return to work. The management refused. On 3 May the workers took a more definitive stand, telling management, 'four shillings or else'. The police intervened and, once again, there was bloodshed: four more people were killed, nine were seriously injured and 89 held."

Source: Seaga (2009, p. 38).

In his address to launch the PNP on 18 September 1938 at the Ward Theatre, Norman Washington Manley noted the difficult economic environment the country was enduring. Regarding the 1938 rebellion, Manley provided an insight into the economic state of the country, alluding to the fact that this was indeed a period of economic difficulty for Jamaica. Coupled with dealing with the impact of the Great Depression of 1930, mass unemployment, and low wages the country was facing mounting social resentment from the working class. Manley stated:

> I am very far from saying that in these times there are not many problems
> that are perplexing the minds of Jamaicans. I am very conscious of the fact
> that we have serious economic difficulties to face and in my own small

way I have devoted all the time and all the teaching and all the energy I am capable of in thinking about them, and in assisting in organising with that end in view. I have myself assisted in drawing up, for long hours, an enormous memorandum, about the economic conditions in Jamaica (Nettleford, 1971, p. 11).

Post (1978) explains that in 1937 "eleven per cent of 'essential wage earners' ... were continuously unemployed and 'at least 50% of the remainder 'only intermittently in work" (p. 134). These accounts of Jamaica's economy during this period depict a state unable to effectively address the growing discontent and alleviate the economic desperation of the masses demanding better wages and employment.

In reviewing both Seaga and Manley's comments on the rebellion a significant picture of the nature of the state emerges which further situates Jamaica, during this period, within failed state literature. Highlighting Hill's (2007) view of failed states as being unable to deliver political goods to its citizens alongside Rotberg's (2004) assertion that these states tend to exemplify tense conflict between warring factions, an image of a Jamaican state unable to provide stable employment opportunities, whilst illustrating its inability to control the nature of violence within its territory emerges. The stark economic difficulties experienced by the labourer class exemplifies a state system that is unable to meet the basic income needs of its populace and in turn was unable to adhere to its responsibilities as a governing body to provide for its people. As one of the core indicators of failure the inability of the state to meet the income demands of a wide cross section of its society points to more structural issues, such as poor management of state finances or a lack of adequate financial resources, that are indicative of state failure.

After Bustamante founded the JLP in 1943 his focus on improving the economy and eliminating the stark social inequalities became the primary objective of the JLP. In the JLP's manifesto launch in the run up to the 1944 elections, the

democratic socialist undertones of the PNP were critiqued while outlining its broader objective of promoting social equality – thus bridging the gap between the rich and the poor. The manifesto stated:

> The aims and objectives of the Jamaica Labour Party are to work for the improvement of the social, economic, educational and political improvement and development of the condition of the small taxpayers, the workers, and the masses on the whole. ... to advocate for the introduction of such measures and Laws that will shorten the terrible wide economic and social gulf that exists today, that almost inhuman disparity between the haves and the have-nots – the rich and the poor, and which indeed is a reflection on the sense of honour, justice and democracy of a civilised country (Bryan, 2009, p. 43).

What this manifesto pledge confirms is that the chasms between the rich and the poor, which manifested in the 1938 revolt, were still evident by the time Jamaica held its first election in 1944 (see Table 4.1). Yet more interestingly, it was used as a tool to distinguish the party and build support for its election machinery. The PNP, on the other hand, promoted a more democratic socialist ideology (Bryan, 2009; Stone, 1983). The PNP's socialist ideology supported greater state ownership "cooperative worker-peasant ownership in agriculture, and the development of enlarged worker-peasant influence in the polity through the creation of more democratic organisational forms and mass political education" (Stone, 1983, p. 51). The differences in ideologies between the PNP and JLP established the antagonisms in the political culture of the state that would eventually lead to the emergence of adversarial politics which underscored the state infrastructure (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Phases in Jamaica's Political History

Political Phase	Period	Description
Crown Colony Government	1865-1958	Following the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865 Jamaica was placed under direct British rule. Crown Colony government became the prevailing system of government in Jamaica and underwent several modifications throughout Jamaica's political history until the state established its independence constitution in 1962. The Crown Colony system was deemed to be overall autocratic in which the Crown held the power to overrule any form of resistance exhibited in the legislature (Lewis, 2004). The Governor, by way of the Executive, maintained primary control and authority in this type of government and acted as the primary representative for the British Crown.
Trade Union Movement	1938	The Labour Rebellion of 1938 laid the initial foundation for the establishment of the trade unionism in Jamaica and launched the political careers of Bustamante and Manley. The PNP (which was a political party that eventually established its own trade union) was officially formed in 1938 with Norman Manley, who pushed for self-government in Jamaica; whilst the BITU was formed by Bustamante in 1938. The Moyne Commission, which was appointed by the Colonial Office to investigate the impact that the labour rebellion had on the colonies, recommended that a new form of government was necessary in order to stem any further unrest. One of the key recommendations of the Moyne Commission was the establishment of adult suffrage (Sires, 1955).
Semi-Representative Government	1944-1958	On 20 November 1944 Jamaica adopted a new constitution which made provisions for the establishment of universal adult suffrage. With the new constitution voting in Jamaica was no longer restricted based on class or race. With the establishment of universal adult suffrage Jamaica became the first British colony with a majority black community to gain the right to elect representatives in the lower house of the legislature (Zeidenfelt, 1952). This period further identifies as a significant political phase in Jamaica as it marked the establishment of political parties that were subsequently able to run campaigns in the first ever elections held in the country under universal adult suffrage. The idea of 'party politics' first came into play in Jamaica's political system during this period (Zeidenfelt, 1952). The 1944 constitution provided for the establishment of 4 core branches of government: 1) the Privy Council; 2) the Executive Council; 3) the Legislative Council; and 4) the House of Representatives (Zeindenfelt, 1952).

Political Phase	Period	Description
		After 1953, further political reform led to the development of a ministerial system presided by a chief minister. The first chief minister was Bustamante (1953-1955), who was then followed by Manley (1955-1959). The governor maintained his powers to veto legislation, thus not fully allowing the country to assume responsible government.
West Indian Federation (Internal Self-Government)	1958-1962	The 1947 Montego Bay Conference, "Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies" launched the official movement towards federation in the English-speaking Caribbean (Johnson, 1999). The movement towards the establishment of the West Indian Federation was based on the growing public and political consensus for self-government (Ayearst, 1957). The Colonial Office encouraged federation throughout the British Caribbean to create a "cheaper and more efficient administration" (Bryan, 2009, p.74). From an economic perspective, the federation was encouraged as a means of promoting economic independence and self-sufficiency which would have ultimately enabled the country to decrease its dependency on the Colonial Office's Treasury, thereby allowing for the nations in the Federation to achieve "Dominion Status" (Ayearst, 1957, p. 248; see also Johnson, 1999).
		In a further push towards greater self-government, the House of Representatives in 1956 created a bipartisan select committee to review the constitution. The committee's final report in 1958 recommended that the House of Representatives membership be increased to 45; the legislative council would increase to 21 members; the governor would lose his reserve powers; and that chief minister would be given more responsibilities and be referred to as the "premier" (Bryan, 2009, p. 53). There was much opposition to the idea of federation, however, as it was considered a means of losing Jamaica's autonomous standing within the group of 10 nations. Bryan (2009) argues that given the autonomy of Jamaica's house of assembly, any engagement in federation would constitute a reversion to Crown Colony government. The JLP expressed its opposition to federation, and in response, Manley held a referendum in September 1961 which asked the Jamaican citizenry whether the country should remain in the federation. The people voted against federation and the country withdrew in September 1961.

Political Phase	Period	Description
Parliamentary democracy system under a constitutional monarchy	1962 - Present	After gaining independence in 1962 Jamaica became a parliamentary democracy (Westminster Model of government). This form of government is a constitutional monarchy whereby the Queen remains the Head of State and is represented by a Governor-General who is recommended by the Prime Minister. The Governor-General appoints 21 Senators (8 are recommended by the opposition party, and 13 are recommended by the Prime Minister). The House of Representatives is comprised of 63 elected members chosen by the people. Under this system Jamaica has 3 branches of government: the executive, legislature and judiciary.

4.2.1.1 The Pre-independence Tensions and the Rise of Political Patronage and Violence

The urbanisation of Kingston in the 1930s due its growing population and its transformation into the commercial and cultural hub of the island contributed to the city becoming the site of Jamaica's main political rivalry. By the 1940s the urban landscape of Kingston was marked by stark divisions between the middle and upper classes which established its enclaves in the north and east of the city; and the poorer communities, which were located in the west of the city (Post, 1978; Gray, 2000). The initial indicators of a segregated urban space, coupled with evidence of stark social inequalities begin to become more prominent features of the state during this period. It is within this environment that "enclaves of the poor" and "gated communities of wealth" aid to geographically exemplify the disparities that existed across the urban landscape. These spaces can be identified as the precursors to "pockets of failure and success" that eventually evolve and define the current construction of the Jamaican state.

Although the poorer communities of Western Kingston were considered dilapidated, and characterised as 'squalor', they became the base for Bustamante's bid for political office in 1944 (Gray, 2000) (see Table 4.1). As the trade union leader and Mayor of the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation, coupled with the JLP controlling the local government, Bustamante was able to allocate work to residents who supported his party, thus establishing a system of political patronage in the communities of Kingston (Munroe and Blake, 2017; Gray, 2000). The allocation of these resources to party supporters was carried out in an attempt to secure election votes, and represents the earliest use of material clientelism in Jamaica's political machinery (Edmonds, 2016; Sives, 2002).

The culture that evolved from the introduction of clientelism in Jamaican politics at this point in its history contained features of conflict, violence and the disenfranchisement of various communities based on their political affiliations, further entrenching adversarial politics in Jamaica (see Table 4.1). The system of patronage promoted by Bustamante and his party, the JLP, disenfranchised supporters of the PNP who demonstrated their discontent through a series of strikes and protests which often ended in violence. One such incident which had significant impact on the political environment of this period was the February 1948 strike by workers in a mental hospital. In response to an incident on 15 February1948 in which Bustamante was assaulted by one of the inmates of the hospital during the strike, he returned the following day with his supporters to address the strikers. A riot then ensued which led to the deaths of 3 people and many more being injured (Gray, 2000). Not only did this incident, and other similar events, highlight the extreme conflict between the members of the JLP and the PNP, it also acted as catalyst for the emergence of politically affiliated gangs in Jamaica. I.NGO1, 2016 explains that, "essentially the violence began right after the first election in 1944 when Bustamante's unionised workers tried to intimidate and prevent Peoples' Party people from having their street meeting, and they retaliated by forming the Fighting 69, which was in Matthew's Lane" (see also Levy, 2009; Clarke, 2006). Bustamante, at this point, certainly associated himself with the use of force and violence to address his political adversaries (Boyne, 2010; Gray 2000). This was one of the first instances in which partisan politics contributed to violence, and highlights the major role that patronage and clientelism have played in developing conflict within the state.

The development of adversarial politics, underscored by violence and patronage in the 1940s and 1950s are still viewed to have a resonating influence on

the nature of violence in modern day Jamaica and is considered a critical focal point of politics in the country. The head of a community development NGO interviewed for this project notes that "the violence for most of those years in the 40s and 50s was concentrated among the trade unions. It wasn't until the late 50s and then of course into the 60s, then it really moved into the communities, and it moved into the communities because the political parties offered sport gear and other things to use and drew them into the political process. So that's how it started" (I.NGO1, 2016) (see Table 4.1 for explanation of the transition from semi-representative government to internal self-government during this period in Jamaica).

This period is therefore important to consider in examining the nature of the Jamaican state and the issue of governance as it gives important insight into the political foundations of the state. The state and its independent identity emerged out of an economic environment that featured economic inequalities, and in which people of the marginalised communities felt they had no other option but to rebel in order to have their concerns recognised by the state. The economy at this time, particularly as the world recovered from the Great Depression and World War II, struggled to support communities of the marginalised working class that were in need – a concern that still prevails in modern day Jamaica. This period highlights the state's inability and/or unwillingness to adhere to its responsibility in meeting the basic rights of its citizens, specifically members of its labour class which lived in marginalised communities. As a result, the idea of the state maintaining some form of accountability to this group of citizens was non-existent and further aided in the emergence of non-state actors that helped to evolve the nature of the state system.

Similarly, the concept of adversarial politics began to take shape during this period with the launch of the PNP and the JLP. Though they both advocated for social

and economic equality, the socialist background adopted by the PNP, juxtaposed against the JLP becoming the party of the working/labourer class and poor peasants, framed them as ideological opponents that will continue to manifest itself in more concerning ways as they build their political identities throughout the years. The period of the 1960s onwards illustrate how adversarial politics fuelled a problematic economy, pervasive social inequalities, and urban segregation in the country, which evolved into greater concerns that have affected Jamaica's governance structure and state capacity.

4.2.2 Building Political Enclaves: The Incorporation of Clientelist Politics into the Urban Social Fabric

The difficult state of the Jamaican economy from the 1960s to the 1980s fostered the growth of a political clientelism in Jamaica as it created a socio-political environment in which citizens relied heavily on the political elite to provide them with basic welfare goods and services in return for their political support and votes during elections periods. The struggling economy and the willingness of the political parties to use this to their benefit to essentially 'buy' votes helped to lay the foundations for a politically divided urban landscape which still resonates in today's political culture and social life.

The most visible signs of this political divide manifested itself in the establishment of political garrisons in the Western Kingston area between the 1960s and the 1970s. In a report commissioned by then prime minister of Jamaica, P.J. Patterson, in 1997 to examine political tribalism in Jamaica the garrison phenomenon was essentially described as a system of "scarce benefit distribution" (Kerr, 1997, p.11). With unemployment increasing due to a slumping economy that was unable to

meet the needs of a growing population (Thomas, 2009) the garrison provided an opportunity for political parties to meet the economic and social welfare needs of their voters within a specific jurisdiction, while maintaining their political power. The nature of poverty in garrison communities was multidimensional in that it was characterised in relation to access to sanitation, housing and public utilities which is referred to as public poverty; as well as the ability of citizens in these communities to enjoy a specific standard of living, known as private poverty (Blake, 2013). Justice Kerr's report (1997) confirms that wide scale poverty and unemployment were the primary contributing factors that led to the development of political tribalism and garrison communities in Jamaica. The growth of the garrison phenomenon in this period points to a wider security governance problem in which the state lacked the capacity to comprehensively meet the needs of its entire citizenry. In so doing, political groups like the PNP and the JLP, assumed the de facto role of social welfare provider which ultimately allowed them to set up their own politically homogenous spaces throughout Jamaica's urban metropolitan region. However, the distribution of these "scarce benefits", using the resources of the state, was not deemed a form of corruption by the political leaders, but rather as a way of 'rewarding' party loyalists (Sives, 2002). This in turn highlights the issue of entrenched forms of corruption in the state that initially materialised through the securing of political support by providing material benefits.

The garrison phenomenon was also problematic, as noted in Kerr's report; in that, though it provided critical social and economic support for impoverished communities it also opened channels for "political and economic victimization should their party not form the government, an immediate risk of losing projects in progress when their party loses and, not least, the general deterioration of market values in real

property within these areas" (Kerr, 1997, p. 16). This in turn helped to establish an environment of social and economic instability for citizens living within these communities as the permanency of their social benefits could not be guaranteed by the state. The social contract between the state and the citizens in these spaces was therefore in flux and dependent on whether or not a political party affiliated with specific garrisons was elected to the government.

One of the key "scarce benefits" that attracted the support of the voter was housing. The provision of housing was used by the political parties as the primary gateway into creating these enclaves for their supporters. In explaining the way in which housing was used as a tool by the parties to create their own zone of supporters a retired member of the JCF notes:

> So basically, the garrison phenomenon is that once you've had the power normally coming out of the Ministry of Housing you would look at a particular area within your constituency, which is normally run down and looks a bit of a shanty town, but then you'd find that most of the people living within the shacks and so on are not your supporters you would then level it, drive them out, force them out under the pretext that you are improving the housing stock; but once new housing is put in you would then pack it up with your own supporters and then you created the loyalty and so on (I.RO1, 2016).

In exploring these comments it becomes clear that sectors of government were embroiled in this system of garrison creation during this period, with the Ministry of Housing being used as an extension of the ruling party's power and control over the citizenry. The success of these developments was further rooted in the fact that the political leaders were targeting impoverished communities whose political support would be acquiescent to any party capable of securing them permanent housing and other social welfare goods (Munroe and Blake, 2017). This statement also illustrates

the violence carried out against opposing party supporters in creating these politically loyal communities.

The state in this instance used its power and authority in illegitimate ways to gain the support of the citizens. The responsibility it held in meeting the welfare needs of all its citizens was thus undermined as it assumed a systematic programme of valuing the citizenship rights of its supporters, i.e., social, civil and political (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994), over that of other members of the society. In creating an unbalanced and biased welfare system the state aided in entrenching urban segregation along political lines – another indicator of the incremental form of state failure occurring in Jamaica.

During the 1960s the area of Western Kingston which housed some of Jamaica's most notorious garrisons was the site of extensive poverty and was often volatile due to violent clashes between the political parties. It essentially became an unstable political zone punctuated by violence and elements of criminality. By winning the constituency seat of West Kingston in 1962, Edward Seaga used his power within the government to permanently establish the JLP's political enclave of Tivoli Gardens through the development of a housing scheme (Sives, 2012; Thomas, 2009; Sives 2002). This area was "built in the most deprived area of Kingston, Back O'Wall, where cardboard and zinc dwellings covered the land and people eked out a living mainly in the informal economy. ... In building Tivoli Gardens the JLP had created a base support in West Kingston, establishing a group of hard-core supporters who were ready to fight to defend their political enclave and ensure, through the use of collective clientelism, that West Kingston would remain a safe seat for the JLP" (Sives, 2002, p. 74-75; see also Edmonds, 2016). However, Back O' Wall was also home to PNP supporters and the destruction of it by the JLP could be interpreted as direct aggression

against its political opponents and a sure way of galvanizing its own political support in the area (Edmonds, 2016).

In a contrasting depiction to the establishment of Tivoli Gardens as a garrison, Seaga legitimised and framed its formation as an "urban community development" project aimed at providing access to social welfare for residents, whilst reducing poverty in the area. Seaga (2009) explained that Western Kingston had the largest slums and squatter settlements on the island with over 1,500 residents living in Back O' Wall, which was renamed Tivoli Gardens (Edmonds, 2016; Clarke and Howard, 2006; Thame, 2011). Seaga contended that this area was considered a "notorious criminal den" for Jamaica (2009, p. 153). However, he asserted that this was a characterisation that would prove unacceptable and thus needed changing as it was believed that it discouraged the police from working in the area. Seaga (2009, p. 153-154) explained that:

> In order to both create proper housing and disperse the criminal elements, Back O'Wall had to be demolished. In its place I planned a 40 acres community for 4,000 residents living in variety of structures: some high-rise condominiums, other townhouse type complexes and some bungalows. There were seven parks and one large playing field for football. ... On a nearby separate lot there was a 12-bed maternity centre for expectant mothers from a wide region, including areas surrounding the community. ... There were comprehensive programmes of sports, culture and education for adults and youths, using the large community centre as a base. ... Instructors for the programme were provided by government, and the housing units would, as was usual, be constructed by government

for rent and sale but, unusually, private funding was sought for the construction of the community centre and the Mother and Child Complex. Seaga's description of the transformation of Back O' Wall's slum into the community of Tivoli Gardens can be interpreted on one hand as a major push by the state to improve the social welfare needs of a specific community within the metropolitan area, whilst removing the criminal element that prevented further development. His depiction suggests that this development was a direct attempt by the state to address the poverty concerns of a community through the systematic implementation of a community development programme. However, in considering the terminology used to describe Back O' Wall, a known PNP stronghold at the time, as being overrun by criminal elements, it highlights an attempt by Seaga to negatively stigmatise his political opponents and their supporters as criminals. The systematic removal of oppositional party supporters from specific swathes of lands in West Kingston during this period was underscored by the notion of state complicity in corruption and violence which were tools used to protect interests of the governing political party. Additionally, the case of Back O' Wall's transformation into Tivoli Gardens exemplifies another instance in Jamaican politics and state development that contributed to the further segregation of the society based on political affiliation (see Box 4.2 for further details of how urban segregation materialised through the garrison development).

In response to the creation of Tivoli Gardens, the PNP established its own political stronghold, Arnett Gardens, also known as 'Concrete Jungle', in 1972 after it regained political control (Thomas, 2009; Sives, 2002). The construction of Concrete Jungle in West Kingston created a physical representation of the adversarial nature of Jamaican politics during this period as it positioned communities of rival political

parties against each other, thus politicising and segregating the urban space (Sives, 2002). It also provided an actual physical representation of the duelling clientelist culture that supported marginalised and impoverished communities, and which aided in galvanising party loyalties and support in a period of significant economic instability.

Box 4.2. Impact of Garrison Boundaries on further Political and Social Segregation of the Urban Space

> "The border wars between garrison communities of different persuasions result in:
>
> (i)   the increased difficulty in maintaining law and order;
>
> (ii)   an inability to maintain social infrastructure (roads, water, sewage, garbage disposal, electricity, shops, supermarkets, markets), which border or pass through disparate communities;
>
> (iii) a restriction of movement through these areas which affects human rights, transportation, and job attendance and opportunities;
>
> (iv)   a restriction of business opportunities to the localised areas as customers from other communities are denied access by blocked roads and real or perceived threats of violence."

Source: Kerr (1997, p. 12)

4.2.3   The Role of Violence as a Tool in State and Party Building

The issue of violence plays a key role in the examination of Jamaica's stability and the capacity of the government to protect the citizenry of the state. Rotberg (2004) posits that intercommunity violence and the increase in criminal violence are two of the core concerns highlighted in failed state literature and are deemed characteristics of state failure. In connecting this idea to the typology of statehood exemplified by Jamaica one may argue that these basic indicators of failure are present within the state. However, the thesis suggests that the political nature of the violence carried out

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in the country between the 1960s and the 1980s offers a more nuanced perspective in the way the idea of violence should be treated in failed state literature; in that, aside from the commonly referred to forms of violence that are underscored by criminal intentions, ethnic tensions etc., the nature of violence exhibited in Jamaica was not only state condoned but perpetrated by citizens and non-state actors in an attempt at asserting either the power of the ruling party or that of the opposition. Violence in this instance was thus utilised as an extension of the political apparatus of the state, and a necessary tool used by the political elite (via their surrogates) to protect their interests and power. This in turn highlights an additional way in which state failure as conceptualised in Jamaica differs from the classic approach.

Violence was promoted directly and indirectly by the political elite and was directly linked to the adversarial nature of Jamaica's two-party political system and the growing prominence of political clientelism. It should be reiterated that violence was first introduced into the country's political system during the tense relations between the BITU and the PNP's Group 69 in the 1940s and predates the post-independence surge in violence associated with garrison communities (Dawson, 2016).[22] However, the nature of the use of violence in politics significantly changed during the creation and subsequent development of the garrison phenomenon between the 1960s and 1970s when the political patron-client relationship was introduced into the political culture of the state. I.RO1, 2016 suggests that a combination of partisan politics and the establishment of garrison communities helped to promote the violent nature of the country's political culture. The interviewee asserts that: "the background of the nature of our politics where our over... enthusiasm for politics often translates into violent acts in support of one party or another. And I do believe that that has been

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[22] Group 69 is also referred to as the Fighting 69.

played upon by successive politicians as well, and the creation of the whole garrison phenomenon was an outcome" (I.RO1, 2016).

During the establishment of garrisons during the 1960s and 1970s the political parties indoctrinated youth gangs into the political culture in order to act as "partisan enforcers" on their behalf (Dawson, 2016, p.187). These enforcers (who were armed by the political parties) were expected to provide protection, secure votes, and threaten political opponents during election periods. I.RO1, 2016 confirms the power held by the "enforcers" during election periods by noting that they were the "militant arm of your political machinery where you would use intimidation and violence to influence the outcome of elections at the local level. So what you get with a change of government is the other party that come into power would repeat the very same activity in different constituencies so you would develop these war zones, garrisons." In so doing, the political elite essentially incorporated these groups, and their enforcers, into a political patronage system in which they delivered essential goods to these communities on their behalf in exchange for political support (Dawson, 2016). This patron-client relationship between the political parties and the communities fostered the establishment of a political environment in West Kingston in which rival political gangs would use any means necessary to intimidate voters and secure votes in election periods under the guise of political loyalty (Thomas, 2009). Kerr's report reinforces this concern by explaining that "political tribalism, the use of violence in political activities, the creation of political garrisons were not a natural outgrowth of a political process, but rather they were nurtured and nourished as strategic initiatives to secure or retain political power" (Kerr, 1997 p. 11). The relationship between the political parties and the communities/garrisons was maintained through the leaders of the groups (Blake, 2013; Thomas, 2009). It was at this point that Jamaica began to

establish the first iteration of gang leaders/dons whose identities, authority and roles with the community continued to develop over the subsequent decades.

Incidents of violence taking place in the run up and during election campaigns have riddled the Jamaican political environment for many decades, with some of the most serious incidents occurring between the 1960s and 1980s. For example, Bryan (2009) suggests that in 1966, a year before the hotly contested 1967 election, the violence that permeated the streets of Western Kingston was primarily linked to the government's plan to develop Tivoli Gardens into housing and industrial estates, effectively removing the squatter community. Months of riots thus ensued in which the use of guns, Molotov cocktails and dynamite were employed – increasing the intensity of the violence (Sives, 2002; Bryan, 2009; Clarke, 2006). The violent riots of 1966 eventually led to the government imposing a state of emergency in West Kingston (Bryan, 2009; Sives, 2002). In his autobiography, Seaga acknowledged that the violence in 1966 was linked to the planned clearance of the squatter community in Tivoli Gardens (Seaga, 2009). However, he also noted the extreme levels of violence and weaponry used as well as the state's attempt at quelling the actions of the gang members that were terrorising the community by involving the police (see Box 4.3). The evolution in the weaponry used, juxtaposed against the heightened political rivalry between the PNP and the JLP, significantly transformed the nature of violence being carried out:

> what really escalated the whole issue was the escalation of the weaponry used by the gangs moving from stones, sticks, bottles to hand guns up to, and including, high powered weapons, assault weapons. But then they created - there become a mix, a volatile mix in all of that because Cold War politics played out between the parties in the 70s and 80s and that created a massive arming of both gangs that both major political parties controlled (I.RO1, 2016).

Violence was thus recognised as a recurrent theme in partisan politics in Jamaica and became an integral layer in the culture of politics in the country. A member of the private security sector asserts that the violent elections of the 1970s and 1980s, and their lasting impact on the political culture of the country, were due to partisan politics (I.PS5, 2016). He notes that, "[t]he political rivalries have got more intense and I saw it first hand in '76 elections the '80 election and then in '83 that wasn't too bad. But those were turning points and the society has become extremely polarised ... extremely polarised" (I.PS5, 2016).

In its 1998 report on the general elections carried out in 1997 the Carter Centre (1998) noted that historically there was institutionalised violence in the electoral process which was enabled by the growth of garrisons. The Carter Centre report states (1998, p. 15-16):

> Both the PNP and the JLP developed garrisons, where party supporters sometimes used violence to prohibit rival party activities. Electoral returns overwhelmingly favoured the dominant party, sometimes due to fraud and intimidation. Over time, garrisons spread, numbering over a dozen in the corporate area by 1997. In some areas, they grew large enough to provide a 'safe seat' in Parliament for the party controlling them.
>
> Although violence never reached the same level as in 1980, intimidation and violence marred subsequent elections. ... at least 121 incidents occurred that aimed to affect the election, from murder to intimidation to ballot-box theft. The JLP charged that some security-force members had been complicit in fraudulent acts by direct action or neglect.

Figure 4.1 provides a representation of the location of some of the spaces in the Kingston and St. Andrew area that experienced significant levels of violence during

the 1970s. The main cluster of high violence areas is located on the boundaries of Tivoli Gardens, Denham Town, Rema, Jungle and Trench Town, which have been identified as known political garrisons during the 1970s.

Box 4.3. Edward Seaga's Account of the Riots in 1966

"On 13 July 1966, prior to the planned clearance of the area, the police received reports that residents of that community and the adjoining Industrial Terrace were robbing and terrorizing commuters. This resulted in a police presence to deal with the situation. But the police got much more than they bargained for. The Daily Herald 18 June 1966, reported that some 150 gang members challenged the police, who had to reinforce the strength of their team to 100. ... A Molotov cocktail was thrown ... Guns were brought into play. The battle lasted six days because the police could not risk penetrating the impenetrable squatter community and had to play a reactive role. Tear gas was used and, in the end, the gangs were dispersed.

After the clearance, there were sporadic acts of violence from June to September, which though confined to smaller areas, indicated that a planned campaign of terror was being launched to discourage settlement. ... By the beginning of October, the situation was getting out of hand. Prime Minister Sir Alexander Bustamante advised the Governor-General to issue a proclamation for a state of emergency for the month of October. The area included West Kingston and part of the adjoining constituency. All public meetings and marches were banned; barbed wire was strung at point of entrance to the area to prevent the movement of vehicles. Searches were conducted, house to house, looking for bombs, dynamite, guns and ammunition."

Source: Seaga (2009, p. 157-158)

Figure 4.1. Kingston, Zones of Violence

Source: Clarke (2006, p. 425)

Table 4.2. Reported Incidents of Political/Election Violence

Year	Election	Incident	Source
1947	Parochial election in Western Kingston	Hugh Lawson Shearer (JLP) beaten by opposition party and life was threatened	*The Gleaner*, 20 September 2012
1976	Jamaica Election campaign	Mike Henry (JLP) and Tidley Watson (JLP Youth Leader) shot	*The Jamaica Observer*, 22 April 2012
February-October 1980	Jamaica Election campaign	844 killed (35% killed in Western Central St Andrew)	*The Jamaica Observer*, 30 October 2012
1980	Jamaica election campaign	Michael Manley (PNP) motorcade fired on	*The Gleaner*, 29 August 2006
1980	Jamaica election campaign	Rory McGann (PNP) and bodyguard, Acting Corporal Errol White, killed by policemen in Gordon Town Square	*The Jamaica Observer*, 30 October 2012

Source: Higgins (2015)

The use of violence as a political tool during this period of transition and development in Jamaica aided in undermining the social and political culture of the state and the manner in which it exercised its security governance. See Table 4.2 for a breakdown of reported cases of violence during election campaigns between the 1940s and 1980s. Though the country could be characterised as having a democratic political system during the 1960s to the 1970s, the use of violence as a tool in politics essentially mimicked more authoritarian rule on the part of the political elite. Violence, coupled with the creation of politically homogenous zones that engaged in a wide-scale political patronage system, helped in elevating and securing the power and authority of the political elite (Thame, 2011). In some areas of the country, specifically the garrisons of West Kingston, electoral votes were achieved through bribery in the

form of clientelism and intimidation; and solidified through the claiming of specific territories as strongholds for each political party. The use of violence in this period and the dependency of the political parties on their "enforcers" to secure the vote also helped to introduce a new form of political/non-state actor into the Jamaica's security governance infrastructure; in that, these enforcers essentially became the de facto leaders of these marginalised areas who were entrusted with managing the communities on behalf of the political elites that were dependent on their votes. The power they held through the use of violence helped to solidify their authority within the garrisons, as well as their respective political parties (Gray, 2003) These leaders/enforcers controlled the vote through fear and intimidation, but they also became synonymous within these communities as the provider and controller of social welfare goods and services that were given by the political elite.

The socio-economic inequalities that pervaded the 1930s to the 1980s, coupled with the adversarial nature of politics, the political division of communities, high levels of poverty and political conflict, the politicising of the urban landscape, as well as the introduction of violence as a tool to gain power and authority are characteristics of a period of unstable governance which aided in setting the tone for Jamaica's political and social landscape from the 1980s onwards. High levels of unemployment and vast communities being defined as impoverished and conflict riddled highlight a state unable to fully adjust to its independence in order to govern effectively. Yet more importantly, the identities and complex relationships that emerged within a conflicted political environment created a state system that was highly susceptible to failure. The conflicted political relations between the core state actors in the country affected the social landscape so much so that social phenomena such as political tribalism, clientelism, patronage and the rise of the garrison communities created a social and

political environment in Jamaica that was highly problematic, and which pitted the elite rich against the marginalised poor. These conditions, that were first identified before Jamaica gained its independence, created an environment of dysfunction as it prevented the nation from exhibiting and attaining a cohesive and stable political and social identity that would facilitate positive development and a strong institutional framework. The weakness of the state's institutional framework as a result of the dysfunction that appears in its social and political environment is explored in further detail in Section 4.3.

4.3 Changing Power Dynamics in the Jamaican Society – 1980s Onwards

This section is concerned with outlining the extent to which the socio-economic conditions of the country aided in undermining its potential for growth and its ability to establish a stable state infrastructure. The primary focus of this section is to explore the state of the economy from 1980s onwards, and the way in which the management of state finances, the increase in levels of poverty, high unemployment rates, and the deepening of stark economic inequalities facilitated the weakening of the state. It will further highlight how these factors contributed to a shift in the power dynamics in the country once a new type of economy emerged in Jamaica in the form of the arms and drugs trade. The intention of this section is to highlight how the destabilisation and usurpation of the political power and central authority held by the state was carried out by the "new players" in the state's security governance structure, the non-state actors.

4.3.1   The Economy

The 1980 election was considered Jamaica's most violent which spiralled out of the control of the political elite (Sives 2012; 2002; Harriott, 1996). What compounded this issue was the stark economic conditions of the country which severely impacted on the state's ability to govern and secure the welfare of the entire populace. This situation further deepened the difficult economic conditions faced by the poorer communities of West and East Kingston that had grown increasingly dependent on the handouts of their political patrons.

The Manley government's structural reform programme, under the banner of democratic socialism, laid the groundwork for years of economic successes and difficulties for the nation (Henry and Miller, 2008; Meditz and Hanratty, 1987). Under the Manley government's democratic socialist ideology "the state would control the 'commanding heights' of the economy in order to direct and ensure development, but the private sector would play a central role. ... Moreover, the assertion of national self-determination would lead to a reduction of dependency on external forces and markets" (Skidmore and Smith quoted in Bryan, 2009, p. 168).   Under democratic socialism the PNP's economic mandate prioritised the economic sovereignty of the state's business interests and ensured that any form of foreign investment not only protected national interest but was "consistent with national purposes" (Kaufman, 1985, p. 79). In line with this approach the government sought to foster a form of economic sovereignty over "natural resources... banking and financial institutions... [and] foreign trade relations" (Kaufman 1985, p. 79). The PNP further aimed to encourage the "development of productive forces", that is, the public and private sectors, by creating a more self-reliant industry, more efficient forms of land

acquisition and utilisation, and improving the capacity of the citizens in order to reduce unemployment (Kaufman, 1985, p. 79).

However, the Manley government's ability to create a stable economy during this period was hampered by several domestic and global forces. Of particular note was the decline in investment in the tourism and bauxite industries, which began in the 1960s under the JLP led government. Stephens and Stephens (1986) contend that the declining investment in both these industries, coupled with a tumultuous international monetary system, resulted in the PNP government having a "balance-of-payment crisis" once it assumed government in 1972 (p. 84). Between 1973 and 1980 there was negative growth and the country reported an average fiscal deficit of 15.5 percent of the GDP, which eventually contributed to the departure of the skilled labour force (Henry and Miller, 2008; Meditz and Hanratty, 1987). Bourne (1980, p. 3-5) further explains:

> The overall balance of payments, measured by changes in official reserves, moved from a surplus of J$36 million in 1971 to a deficit of J$44 million 1972. Deficits persisted thereafter, reaching the alarming level of J$238 million in 1976. The current account deficit widened from J$145 million in 1970 to J$275 million in 1976. Private net capital inflows, which historically performed an equilibrating role, became increasingly inadequate after 1970, and practically ceased in 1976.

In the same period public expenditure increased to 419 percent, whilst revenue rose by 274 percent with net foreign reserves decreasing by US$582 million (Alleyne, 2000, p. 8). These economic problems further compounded the prevalence of unemployment in the urban areas. Due to the failing agricultural sector many young unemployed workers migrated to the urban areas seeking jobs. This internal migration consequently contributed to an increase in inner-city populations, as well as increased inequality and unemployment, and was often viewed as one of the main causes of an

increase in crime and violence (Stephens and Stephens, 1986). Notably, Manley confirmed the migration of the classes, due to the unstable economic environment, was the root to Jamaica's economic and social problems. Manley asserted that the problems experienced by the country resulted in "wealthier classes seeking only to maximise profits as quickly as possible but syphoning this off to build nest eggs abroad" (Manley, 1972 as quoted in Stephens and Stephens (1986, p. 85). In assuming the commanding heights of the economy the government took over control of several major industries (see Table 4.3) which helped the Manley government project an image of strength (Bissessar, 2014). It is important to note however, that the nationalisation of industry began in the 1960s and continued into the 1980s under the 'Internal Design Plan' which was created to help the government manage its economy as a newly independent state (Bissessar, 2014). The Manley government also implemented free education in 1972 which was welcomed by the opposition, JLP. However, the free education programme increased the government's budget from J\$47,750,000 to J\$209 million within the space of a year (Bryan, 2009).

These economic problems were further compounded by the decision to enter into, what would prove to be a very rigid, loan agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1978 (Sives, 2002; Bissessar, 2014). Under the IMF's three year Extended Fund Facility Jamaica received US\$240 million (Bissessar, 2014, p. 194). The loan agreement required that the Jamaican "government reunified and devalued its currency, agreed to place the currency on a crawling-peg system of regular devaluations during the next year, imposed new taxes on consumer goods, reduced government expenditures, increased charges for government services, lifted price controls, guaranteed profits for private firms, set a ceiling on wage increases, and limited the activities of several state-owned corporations" (Bissessar, 2014, 194).

This agreement, as noted above, led to increased economic hardship for the country, especially the poor, and the deterioration in national living standards. Manley eventually decided to end Jamaica's relationship with the IMF in 1980. This decision unfortunately "led to further hardships, including a struggle to pay public servants; 11,000 of whom ... would have to be chopped from the State payroll in order to shore up the $50-million budget for fiscal year 1980-81. This led to a strike by over 300 workers of the Government-run Jamaica Public Service Company, that virtually plunged 70 per cent of Jamaica into darkness" (Helps, 2012). Seaga further noted that the agreement failed "because our basic problems are not economic but political", alluding to the problematic economic, social and political environment created by Jamaica's adversarial political system (Crittenden, 1979).

Table 4.3. State Agencies Nationalised and Established by Government between 1970-1980

Utility		Agriculture, Tourism and Development		Finance
Established	Nationalised	Established	Nationalised	Established
National Water Agency	Electricity Company (JPS)	Urban Development Corporation	Sugar Industry Authority (owned 8/12 sugar factories)	Barclays Bank (renamed National Commercial Bank)
	Domestic Telephone Company (JTC)	Prices Commission	Jamaica Omnibus Company	
		Port Authority Hotel Corporation of Jamaica Ltd.		

Source: Adapted from Bisserssar (2014)

The struggling economic environment and the decline in living standards for Jamaicans plunged the country into a state of uncertainty and it became increasingly apparent to the populace that the government lacked the ability and capacity at this point to fulfil the diverse welfare needs of the country. The country was in fact struggling and dependent on the economic support of external agents (i.e. the IMF), whilst losing the ability to maintain its own infrastructure. The state at this point indicated yet another feature of state failure as it suffered from declining GDP and economic instability that further entrenched the economic inequalities in the urban space. The ability of the state to once again ensure that the population was receiving its basic welfare needs was compromised by a weakened state infrastructure – thus threatening their inherent rights as citizens of the state.

It is at this juncture in Jamaica's political, social and economic history that we recognise the emergence of a new non-state actor, the drug don, assuming the position of authority in an effort to stem the harmful impact of poor leadership, as well as economic and social welfare decisions implemented by the state.

4.3.2   The Changing Role of the Don

As noted above, during the creation of the garrison community in the 1960s into the 1970s, partisan enforcers were used by the JLP and the PNP to protect their interests in politicised urban spaces. The key role of the enforcer was to execute the directives of the political leaders aligned with their community. They were considered the de facto intimidation arm of the political parties within these impoverished communities. They often used violence to intimidate and threaten members of opposing communities, particularly during election periods. The dons were also viewed as welfare providers for their communities as they often distributed goods and

services, on behalf of the political elite. They were the functioning arm of the extensive patron-client relationship that existed in this period between the political parties and members of the impoverished garrison communities. The community members thus associated these enforcers with the provision of goods, but also with the idea of fear, intimidation and violence. Despite their origins as a political tool in the ongoing adversarial nature of Jamaica's two-party political system, political dons evolved into drug dons (Sives, 2012). This evolution in their status can be connected to changes taking place within the economic, social, and political infrastructure of the state – changes that have in turn mapped onto the power dynamics of the garrison communities and the wider Jamaican society.

The failing economy of the 1970s had a significant impact on the nature of the state and its ability to assert its authority in certain urban spaces. Politicians no longer wielded the same power to distribute state resources due to the economic restrictions of the decade (Edmonds, 2016). By the 1980s the unstable culture of politics that developed in the country – where the state lacked the capacity to govern and provide for the citizenry – was underscored by the increasingly violent nature of gangs and dons assuming control of garrisons (Munroe and Blake, 2017; Sives, 2002). The elevation of the don to a position of leadership in the garrison was facilitated by the growing drug trade which not only increased their wealth but also heighted their power and the violent nature of their practices (Munroe and Blake, 2017). As the formal economy failed and the state introduced restrictive economic policies there was a significant increase in the exportation of cannabis (Harriott, 1996). The drug trade became a lucrative business which was operated out of Jamaica's garrison communities. The gangs in these communities not only produced cannabis but they also distributed other drugs such as cocaine to markets in North America and Europe,

thus becoming key players in the international drug market (Edmonds, 2016; Harriott, 1996). It is important to note that these gangs were initially involved in the trade of cannabis from the 1960s, but their engagement in this trade intensified and became international after 1980 with the introduction of the more lucrative drug, cocaine (Sives, 2012). The transnational development of the drug trade created a new dynamic between the politicians and the dons in that it helped the don to establish more lucrative and alternative sources of income which was also more regular (Sives, 2002). Thus, the dons no longer had to rely on the politicians for support or "scarce benefits" – ultimately making them more independent. They were essentially able to delve into a new form of income generation that was not as deeply entrenched in politics.

One of the significant aspects of the establishment of the drug trade in Jamaica is that it represented yet another sphere in which the state, specifically in certain communities, exhibited signs of failure. Failure to control its external and internal borders with the introduction of the illegal trading of drugs and guns highlights another level of state incapacity (Rotberg, 2004). The power to control the goods coming in and out of the state shifted from the state and into the hands of gangs and dons. In so doing, a reversal of the power structure of the state occurred within this sphere that further entrenched the weakening of its power and authority in garrisons.[23]

Several participants in this study recognised the importance of this shift in relations between the politicians and the dons as the period in which dons officially established themselves as leaders of garrison communities. It is at this juncture that the ties between politics and community begin to strain and the dons begin to emerge

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[23] It is important to note that although the state and the political elite, in some instances, supported the drug trade as it benefitted them financially, the thesis suggests that this contradicted the core responsibility of the state which was to ensure that the laws of the state were protected and followed. By engaging and/or supporting criminality the state effectively devalues its authority – thus supporting its continued weakening.

as autonomous actors that are capable of providing for their communities. They note that the independence that the drug don was able to establish after 1980 still resonates today and is a critical element to understanding the development of crime in the country and the new relationship between garrisons and the political elite. A member of the private security sector explains that dons and their gangs were initially connected to partisan politics "but they realised that you can operate without political oversight, they no longer have to rely on the party for handouts or that sort of thing; they can generate their own income which makes it even worse. ... so they were borne out of a political requirement and then having no longer need for that requirement now that the garrisons have been established they have been turned loose, or they have turned themselves loose" (I.PS5, 2016). This reinforces the idea that this break in relations with the political elite was orchestrated by the gangs and dons who recognised that they now wielded a significant amount of power of their own. I.PS5, 2016 further notes that the political elite also officially recognised the authority and control that the dons and gangs held in the garrisons by explaining that:

> It's only at times when you have problems within the particular constituency or community where the politician may come in and speak with the gang leaders and say "Look, you need to bring things under wraps, you need to cool down a little. Stop the foolishness". So, it's a matter of now when who needs who when, rather than a perpetual requirement. I was going to say it usually flares up itself during the elections but mark you this last election there wasn't as much, there wasn't as much violence as we have seen in the past times. So it means that the gangs are probably not at the complete bidding of their political masters. They realise that you know they have other things to focus and worry about than getting elected because it doesn't really matter who is elected, as long as they can operate it doesn't really matter who is in power and that is probably where the danger lies (I.PS5, 2016).

I.PS5, 2016 confirms the diminishing role that politics play in the garrisons which was probably a consequence of the 1970s economic crisis when these communities realised that partisan politics was no longer a lucrative endeavour for them. Returning to the theme of dons as the enforcer, I.PS2, 2016 states, "I believe it's now bigger than politics I think the politician would like to think they have control I don't think they have control I think the gangs have control. The gangs do what they want to do in their communities. Who needs who? The politician needs the gang, or the gang need the politician? The gang is the enforcer of the politician, he's the persuader, that's how the gang exist, persuades that community one way or the other". In this statement there is an acknowledgement that post-independence power relations between gangs and the political elite have been reversed and the dependency the gangs used to have on politicians no longer exist. Although the statement suggests that gangs still operate in some capacity for the politicians it also suggests that in some capacity the politicians are in fact dependent on gangs to protect their own interests.

4.4 Discussion

Bringing together the various thematic threads that connect the development of statehood in Jamaica an interesting tapestry of issues emerge that support the idea that Jamaica does exhibit incremental signs of state failure.

The above sections bring to the fore the idea of state failure being an incremental process that exists in different spheres of the state infrastructure at varying times of its development. Although this thesis posits that state failure in Jamaica is primarily manifested through its security environment, it may be argued that between the 1930s and the 1980s (the formative years of development) state failure was evident in the political and socio-economic spheres of the state – which ultimately contributed

to the more concrete manifestation of it in the security sector. The key to understanding the nature of state failure during this period is the fact that it remained contained geographically in the garrisons, and socially within the black labourer classes; whilst state success and stability was more indicative within the classes controlled by the political elites that governed the country. This further supports the idea that Jamaica does experience elements of state failure and success at the same time.

In examining how the idea of stark social inequalities may contribute to state failure it is important to consider two key periods in Jamaica's historical development, the labour rebellion of the 1930s and the emergence of garrison culture in West Kingston in the 1960s. The labour rebellion as well as the growth of the garrison communities primarily affected marginalised communities of the black labourer class. The essence of the disturbances boiled down to a conflict between the two social classes in Jamaica – the poor black labourers who demanded better wages and the rich brown political elites who controlled the industry and defined policies relating to income and welfare. The social inequalities of the state that came to the fore as a result highlighted a state battling to come to terms with the idea that it was evolving into a socially and economically divided state that was defined by two types of societies: a rich middle to upper class and a poor lower class. Although the state was able to function, as there are no indicators that the country devolved into island wide poverty with severely broken infrastructure, the social inequalities that permeated the state system undermined its ability to assert its control and authority over its entire citizenry.

The impact of the adversarial nature of politics in the country was further manifested in the manner in which social welfare goods were distributed in the society. In many instances the ruling party would ensure that politically affiliated communities would receive various social welfare goods and services from the state, whilst

communities associated with their political opponents were disenfranchised from the state's welfare system, thus fostering further conflict. Institutions that provided social welfare goods and services thus became politicised and aided in further entrenching social and economic inequalities throughout the urban landscape. Similarly, the culture of political clientelism that materialized as a result of this political environment introduced corruption and bribery into the state system. It aided in establishing a problematic governing framework that connects corruption, and the attainment of political power and control to social welfare provision, particularly in the poverty stricken communities of West Kingston.

The garrison phenomenon evolved the problems created by social inequality into a physical construct, formalising the physical segregation between the wealthy and the poor. This brings to the fore one of the other underlying indicators of state failure in Jamaica posited by this thesis – the segregation of the urban space. In creating the political enclaves of West Kingston, members of the political elite essentially created enclaves of failure in which housing was scarce, but a valued welfare good, and poverty was extensive. These spaces ultimately fell under the leadership of community dons who were able to gradually assume the power held by the politically elite. In these spaces the social contract between the citizenry and the state was replaced by one which existed primarily between the dons (non-state actors) and the people – undermining the central authority of the state.

Additionally, from a social and political perspective both phases in Jamaica's history represented periods in which the state was unable or unwilling to provide for political goods for a specific segment of society, the poor black labourer class. In so doing, it undermined its responsibility as a modern state which was to ensure that it was able to deliver public goods whilst maintaining a stable economy to meet the

needs of its entire citizenry (Rotberg, 2002). Whether it may be ensuring that these citizens had received fair wages or had access to affordable housing the social contract between the state and the people was nevertheless broken. The idea of citizenship in relation to the reciprocity of relation between the citizens and the state (Phillips, 2007) was weakened during these phases and carried to the fore the idea of the Jamaican state falling into some degree of failure. The responsibilities held by the state, particularly in light of the development of the garrisons in West Kingston, shifts into the sphere of the non-state actor like the dons, and the political elites who engage in informal relationships with other non-state actors to ensure that they are able to meet the welfare needs of their political supporters. The state thus becomes the secondary actor in this network of power relations.

In addressing whether there is a link between the establishment and evolution of a problematic and divisive political environment to the progressive fracturing of the Jamaican state it is important to consider Rotberg's definition of the failed state. As discussed in Chapter 2, Rotberg (2004) asserts that failed states are characterised by the entrenched conflict and violence that contribute to the dissent of the populace against the state and various other social groups. In the context of Jamaica, the "warring factions" characterised by Rotberg (2004) emerged out of the adversarial nature of politics. The nature of conflict depicted in Jamaica is highly diverse and includes the duelling nature of political ideologies that paved the way for divisive politics; the oppositional treatment of the black labourer class versus the white and brown rich upper class; and the tension that continues to evolve in the society as a result of the extreme social and economic disparities. As such, conflict in Jamaica is not only manifested physically but is exemplified in the political ideology and socio-

economic differences of the society that are intertwined and ultimately contribute to the fracturing of the state infrastructure.

Events such as the labour rebellion, the economic crisis of the 1970s and various instances of election unrest which collectively facilitated the temporary destabilisation of the country reinforce the notion that failure is an incremental process for Jamaica. All of these periods ended in the somewhat normalisation of state in which it was able to regain some degree of functionality and stability. The main areas in which these events had the most destabilising impact occurred primarily in spaces inhabited by the marginalised poor. For example, during the economic crisis of the 1970s, whereas the members of the middle to upper classes were able to escape the debilitating impact of unemployment, low income, a failing economy and national industries and the lack of access to basic welfare goods by migrating to other countries, the members of marginalised poor who lacked the finances to 'escape' faced the full brunt of the economic downturn. In the spaces that they lived poverty became a debilitating reality and access to welfare goods became even more restrained, forcing them to rely on the informal authority of non-state actors. Although the state was able to recover from the economic crisis, poverty and poor social conditions still persisted in these spaces, thus creating pockets of failure that are still evident in today's garrison communities.

What these instances further confirm is that a breakdown in the state infrastructure which may originally be contained within poorer communities has the potential to occur on a wider scale across the island. For example, though the various incidents of the election unrest between the 1940s and the 1980 primarily involved groups of rival political parties their overall destabilising impact affected the entire nation. Although the state once again became functional after each episode the

political tensions and divisiveness it created not only forced the state into establishing politically segregated communities, but encouraged the emergence of politically affiliated criminal gangs that facilitated much of the violence and criminality of the state. This points to one of the underlying assertions of this thesis which is the idea that though state failure in Jamaica may be a contained phenomenon which exists primarily in specific communities it does hold the potential of flowing over into the other urban spaces, ultimately threatening the stability and functionality of the entire state.

4.5   Conclusion

This chapter focussed on the historical concerns that have influenced the development of Jamaica's economic, social and political infrastructure. It highlighted how various forms of entrenched conflict (characterised through partisan politics and the violent creation of garrisons), the poor management of the economy, the establishment of a clientelistic political environment, and the presence of multiple actors assuming power and control in various periods of Jamaica's post-independence environment all laid the foundations for identifying the country as exhibiting signs of state failure. These issues collectively created a state that was not able to effectively provide for the needs of its entire populace during crucial periods of its development. Although the country implemented a two-party democratic system of governance and inherited a somewhat stable economy the conflict created by the political leadership, its marginalisation of certain communities, and its use of violence to assert its power and control undermined the country's ability to develop as a successful state.

It is the position of this paper that the politically segregated social environment that developed during this period which was underscored by high rates of violence, a

struggling economy, high rates of unemployment and the differing political ideologies of the JLP and PNP laid the grounds of instability and state incapacity for the country. Authority and control was not maintained by the state but farmed out to political enforcers who in turn were able to usurp this authority and establish their own enclaves of power in garrison communities.

What makes state failure in Jamaica important is that it was established not as a result of poor economic or social policy initiatives, but rather due to the problematic political framework created by adversarial politics in the country. This concern then ultimately contributed to the dysfunctional nature of security governance that is present in the society as well high rates of conflict, violence, corruption, and social inequality political patronage that are recognised as the key markers of failed statehood.

The next chapter will begin to frame the security environment as one of the key manifestations of state failure in Jamaica. The chapter will therefore chart the development of the public security infrastructure of the state and the roles played by both state and non-state actors involved in its evolution from a colonial policing tool to its current, somewhat problematic, construction.

5 The Historical and Political Background of Public Security in Jamaica

5.1 Introduction

Jamaica's security environment acts as an integral focal point for the development of this thesis. The multiplicity of actors involved in the security sector, the complex relationship between the key security actors that has evolved over the decades, and the political influences on the construction of security within the state collectively aid in understanding the somewhat problematic nature of security provision in Jamaica. In order to comprehensively examine how the two literatures intersect in the Jamaican context it is critical to explore the evolution of public security sector in the country. As a result, this chapter is primarily descriptive as it outlines the development of security in Jamaica.

The chapter highlights two concerns: 1) the impact of colonial security policies and ideology on the formation of the police force; and 2) how this structure was incorporated by national representatives once the country attained full independence. One essential theme that will come to the fore in this chapter is the fragmentation of the state as a result of the intricate and divisive political and social relationships that emerged due to the escalation of tensions between the governing elite and poorer classes before and after the country gained independence from British colonial rule.

Additionally, focus will be placed on the external (i.e., the Colonial Government) and the internal (i.e., local politicians and gang leaders) political influences on the JCF. As the primary agents of control during the colonial and post-colonial periods it is critical to examine the impact of these factors on the JCF with the view that their ideologies have helped to shape the role, identity, and status of the

force. It will further show that since its establishment, the practices and policies of the JCF have been significantly influenced by the political and social interests of the governing elite, whether they may be state or non-state actors. This ultimately created a security environment in Jamaica that is complex, problematic and which has been diversified to appeal to the varying identities and actors demanding bespoke security provision.

It must be noted that the development of policing outlined is primarily centred on the post-emancipation era in which the colonial government maintained significant political and social control over the island. It was during this period that the first features of a policing authority were established which laid the foundations for the current construction of modern day JCF. As a British colony, significant dynamics developed between the state and the citizenry which have affected the manner in which security is practised and maintained within the country. It is this dynamic that this research will examine as the primary cause of a chasm between state and non-state actors, as well as the private versus the public domain, thus creating a problematic security environment in Jamaica.

5.2   Colonial Security: Policing Framework

The establishment of early forms of a national security infrastructure in Jamaica can be traced back to the nineteenth century during the colonial period. In his analysis of colonial policing Jefferies (1952) noted that the development of the police force can be broken down into three critical phases, elements of which still resonate in policing pratices in today's society. These phases will be discussed below.

5.2.1 Phase I: Establishing the Police

Policing in post-emancipation Jamaica was defined by the use of coercion and intimidation tactics to assert the dominance and control of the colonial government, and members of the social elite. The establishment of the Abolition of Slavery Act in 1833 created a social atmosphere throughout the country that was defined by fear and tension between the governing British class and the slave population. In order to maintain a secure level of control, law and authority over the "unstable, excitable, ignorant and discontented" slave population (Jeffries, 1952, p. 60) the British governing class established the nation's first official organised police force (Sigler and King, 1992; Jeffries, 1952). Colonial policing was inherently designed to address issues such as crime, class control, anti-government sentiment and anti-social behaviour which threatened the legitimacy and central rule of Westminster. Policing in this form acted as a state sanctioned tool that aided in "legitimising [the] external governance" of the British Empire (Brogden, 1987, p. 9).

In the years leading up to and immediately after emancipation the colonial government in Jamaica engaged in a systematic structuring of the police force. In 1834 the Chief Magistrates for all the parishes in Jamaica were authorised to recruit men they believed would be suitable petty officers. In 1835, in order to combat the underwhelming impact of the initial recruitment process, an Act was passed that formalised the establishment of an official police force which bore similar characteristics to the traditional English policing model. One of the most notable adaptations of this model was the appointment of an Inspector-General to command the force. The Inspector-General was in turn assisted by a contingent of County Inspectors, sub-inspectors, sergeants and privates (Jeffries, 1952, p. 27). Following several tense and violent incidents between the police and the majority ex-slave

population (for example, the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865) the force was reorganised in 1866 (Jeffries, 1952, p. 28). The newly reorganised force consisted of 5,000 regular and auxiliary members. However, it was subsequently reduced in 1880 to 1,760 which included a contingent of 1,000 'rural police' (working on a part time basis) (Sinclair, 2006, p. 86). Policing at this point in colonial history highlighted a compromise for the British government as it created a state security body which ruled through force and was comprised of members of the 'indigenous' communities, but which was not governed by them.

Colonial policing was also used as a measure to protect colonial financial interests (Cole, 1999). During this period policing was envisaged as a tool that could be used to safeguard and maintain the elitist class structure. In Jamaica, the governing authority's attempt to reinforce their dominance in the society came with the enactment of several Acts designed to curtail the financial growth of the apprentice community. For example, in 1835 the colonial government ratified the Police Bill which was essentially designed to prevent apprentices from transporting agricultural goods without the written consent of the landowners of the farm the produce was grown on. Failure to present this documentation would result in their immediate arrest (Johnson, 1991). The inherent bias of this Bill against the apprentice community effectively prevented them from cultivating and marketing their own produce and discouraged them from engaging in any other form of cultivation outside the sugar estates. Thus, securing the continued access of cheap labour for the landowning class, and subjugating the role of the apprentice as a dependent and powerless segment of the society (Johnson, 1991). The colonies were viewed as a direct market for the European Empires, and as such, governments sought to protect their economic

interests through the establishment of a force that assumed the de facto role as their agent of security (Cole, 1999).

From a policy perspective, the enactment of the Police Bill created a divisive security infrastructure that was designed to alienate and restrict the daily lives of the apprentices. The development of the Jamaican society at this point was therefore based on an unfair security system intended to benefit the needs of the economic and social elite while regulating the majority black poor population to positions of relatively little power. In so doing, it reinforced the powers of the colonial government over the territory.

The provision of security and the nature of policing were therefore influenced by the power dynamics and the manner in which various identities/classes (i.e. black slave/apprentice/exslave and the planter class) interacted during the colonial period. There was a clear distinction between the police, i.e., the rich governing class that was largely made up of the planter community; and the policed, which included the black exslave and apprentice underprivileged community that was unrepresented in the government. The force utilised its power and the threat of incarceration or punishment to solidify its position of intimidation in the community. Its main focus at this point was to protect the interests of the elite, the colonial government, and in doing so the police force became a strong and intimidating feature of the colonial society.

5.2.2 Phase II: The Militarisation of the Police

The second phase Jefferies discusses focuses on the militarisation of the colonial police force. As mentioned above, the British Empire was heavily dependent on specific colonies for trade and economic growth. Often referred to as 'pacified' colonies (Cole, 1999), they were subject to a different style of policing in which the

police force was considered both defender and law enforcer that protected the economic and social interests of the colonial government (Sinclair and Williams, 2007). As a result, in order to fully assume the role of "defenders" of the state the police force incorporated paramilitary undertones into its basic practices. This form of policing was modelled on the RIC after the 1860s and it was created with the intended purpose of mitigating and/or eradicating crime and instances of community violence and rioting throughout the colonised state (Jefferies, 1952, p. 32). The forces operated with dual capacity, in that, they were provided with the necessary training to carry out simple everyday policing duties, while also possessing the military skills and might to protect the security and economic interests of the colonial government during time of war or unrest (Jefferies, 1952, p. 32). Modelling the RIC became a significant feature of colonial policing and is often referenced as the primary foundation of its subsequent militarised development. In addition to being armed with batons and trained in military techniques of riot and violence control, the RIC was also known for its selective recruitment strategy in which sub-inspectors and high-ranking officers were appointed from an "elitist cadetship system" from the gentry (Sigler and King, 1992, p. 15). This form of elitist recruitment resulted in the formation of a force in which the minority (i.e., the gentry) had direct control and dominated the majority (Sigler and King, 1992), a problem that persisted in the colonies.

The militarised nature of the force at this point in its development was first evidenced in the official military titles assumed by officers, for example corporal and major (Sinclair, 2006; Jefferies, 1952). Officers and other members of the force were housed in barracks and trained according to military methods which often included the use of drills and weapons originally associated with military use (Sinclair, 2006; Brogden, 1987). They were similarly recruited according to strict military rules.

Herbert. T. Thomas, an Inspector who joined the JCF in 1876, noted that the police depot in Spanish Town resembled an army barracks. Thomas (1927) further commented that the police force:

> constituted as an armed force, on the general lines of the Royal Irish Constabulary; the officers being called Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors, while in the other ranks the purely military designations of corporal, sergeant, and sergeant-major were adopted. The Inspector General, Major J. H. Prenderville, was an ex-officer of the then recently disbanded 3rd West India Regiment; and there was among the other officers a sprinkling of men from the same corps. We were armed with muzzle-loading rifles of the Snider pattern... (Thomas, 1927, p. 35).

A similar sentiment was expressed by Superintendent William Calver who was sent by the Metropolitan Police in 1945 to review and reform the police forces in the Caribbean colonies. Calver noted that the functions, structures and basic daily activities and training of the Jamaican police force was centred on military ideals. He explained that the force was, "partly a Military organisation and liable to be called out for Military service vide part II of Jamaica Constabulary Law. Much of the training, therefore, is upon Military lines such as drills, marchings, musketry etc." (Sinclair, 2006, p. 86).

In the colonial territories paramilitary police forces were initially intended to play a supportive role for the British imperial army, however, they formally replaced the army in later years as it became increasingly difficulty to recruit soldiers from Britain to work in the colonies (Cole, 1999). Additionally, militarising the security forces at this point was considered a critical solution for the protection of the colonial community as the British government began a systematic withdrawal of the imperial troops across the Caribbean (Johnson, 1991). The removed troops were subsequently sent to Jamaica and St. Lucia, colonies that were economically important to the British

Empire (Johnson, 1991). This reshuffling ultimately led to a greater concentration of military influences in the security infrastructure of these nations. During the 1930s Jamaica, like most of the Caribbean, experienced a significant period of unrest due to the demands of the majority black population for fairer wages and improved labour conditions from the colonial government (see Table 4.1).

Mobs of dissatisfied workers and unemployed individuals took to the streets, estates and rural communities with cutlasses and sticks. In response, the colonial government commissioned the swearing in of thousands of police special constables to assist in quelling the violent demonstrations across the island. The paramilitary undertones of the police force were utilised in full force as police, special constables and British troops were dispersed with full military artillery to control the violence and quash the unrest. For example, in an attempt to prevent the impeding strike in Frome, Westmoreland, in April 1938 a police inspector ordered the deployment of "one hundred heavily armed policemen" (Holt, 1992, p. 385). In fear of the strikers that were advancing towards the WISCO's offices, a manager fired a shot into the air in order to attract the attention of the police. The police moved in with "fixed bayonets" (viewed as a controversial use of force) and ultimately fired upon the crowd, killing four people and wounding thirteen others (Holt, 1992, p. 385). A few weeks later, at another strike in Islington, St. Mary, the police also fired their weapons into a crowd of protestors (Holt, 1992). Eight people were killed in this incident and another 32 were shot and wounded (Holt, 1992).

Policing at this point was defined in response to public disturbances, which highlighted the military undertones in the force's practices. Notably, it appeared that the use of firearms by the police during the unrest was due to a sense of panic as they were unable to cope with the volume and the violent nature of the protests (Thomas,

2008). However, the police were held accountable for their actions to a degree; and in instances in which they were deemed to have acted outside the remit of their duties the government apologised and acknowledged their wrong doing.

5.2.3 Phase III: Civilian Based Approach

Set with the purpose of re-structuring the police force, Calver first targeted the inherent militarisation of the force and called for the formation of a civilian policing body. As outlined by Jefferies (1952), this signalled the third phase of development of the police force which included a more civilian based approach to security. As part of his reform efforts Calver recommended that the 'new' Jamaican police be assisted by British officers on loan in order to include more British methods of policing into the Jamaican constabulary. However, despite Calver's initial recommendation that the police force should begin to rely heavily on the officers from the home police a large volume of applicants came from other colonial police branches. Inspector generals and colonels from as far afield as Palestine, Hong Kong and Ceylon submitted their interests to join the Jamaican force along with other high-ranking members of the home police (Sinclair, 2006). Major R.L. Hill, who served with the colonial police in Gambia, and attached to Scotland Yard, was ultimately offered the position of Assistant Executive Officer in Jamaica (Sinclair, 2006). In 1948 Calver became Commissioner of the Jamaican police, a position he held until 1953 (Sinclair, 2006).

Calver's tenure in the force and his varied and numerous reorganisation efforts were noted as contributing to the development of a force that was efficient and modernised. The new 'Civil Police Force' provided the critical foundations for the current construction of the police. Calver was able to launch a force that was more focused on establishing improved relationships with the general public, which

subsequently facilitated the creation of two special units, the 'Flying Saucers' and 'The Twenty-Two Squad', to patrol the streets of Kingston (Sinclair, 2006). Soon thereafter, the Island Special Constabulary Force was established in 1950 (Sinclair, 2006). The force also began to invest heavily in scientific advancement at this point which included utilising new scientific methods in the investigation of crime (Jefferies, 1952). The force thus began its journey towards modernisation – services were tailored for the public needs in solving crime efficiently and expeditiously, there was greater interaction between the force and the community, and special squads were developed to target specific forms of criminality.

What is of particular interest in the manner in which policing developed at this point is the importation of external actors to manage the development of a security infrastructure in the colonised communities. With the recruitment of external colonial officers and members of the British police the Jamaican model of policing began to illustrate signs of disconnect between the force and the community – socially, culturally, and also racially. The interests of these two parties were significantly different; in that, the force still maintained a strong allegiance to supporting and protecting the welfare of the British government – disregarding the needs of the majority Jamaican community. The political power of the colonial government was reinforced by these recruitment measures so much so that it spiralled into the problematic issue of "strangers policing strangers" (Sigler and King, 1992). The retention of military practices and behaviours created a force that essentially reinforced the interest of the Crown Colony government through coercion, force and intimidation. This is a theme that provides a critical undertone to this thesis; in that, though the modern-day Jamaican police force is charged with ensuring the security of the public, its history of problematic practices as a public security actor have created

a chasm between it and the general public. Though it is charged with the responsibility to protect the community's interest, the use of force, while maintaining the integrity and self-interest of the state, reinforces its problematic identity.

One of the core aspects in the establishment of the Jamaican police force was the absolute reliance it had on the Crown Colony in governing the development of its basic features and practices. The force's architects (Crown Colony citizens themselves) created a security infrastructure that was a derivative of colonial initiatives and ideology. Relatively little consideration was placed in transplanting these ideologies and practices in a manner that would suit the unique and diverse needs of a newly independent state with a complex societal framework. Essentially, state autonomy and independence, particularly as it related to security, was not fully achieved despite the apparent move for greater disengagement between Britain and Jamaica.

5.3 The Impact of Jamaica's Two-Party Political System on the Development of Culture of Policing Crime in Jamaica

The political climate that developed in post-independence Jamaica had an immense impact on the nature of security and crime control in the country, particularly in present-day inner-city communities. Crime and the ability to effectively police it are concerns that have been directly and indirectly connected to the political structure of the society (Harriott, 2008). Therefore, in order to gain an appreciation of the development of crime in Jamaica this research must pay due consideration to the development of the two-party political system, and examine its influence on the culture of policing crime in Jamaica. The two-party political system facilitated the creation of

politicised communities in which illegitimate forms of policing are more accepted than the state official security infrastructure.

5.3.1 The Westminster System and the Creation of Jamaican Politics

As one of the effects of decolonisation the nation inherited a social system that was subjugated based on race, class and existing relationships with the Crown Colony.[24] In the upper echelons of this system were the educated middle class colonial expatriates (supported by the British government) that maintained strong control over the nation's economy and industries. The white dominant class was replaced by an empowered light skinned middle class (Mars, 1995), which signalled an attempt by the colonial government to redefine the power structure in the colonies. This reassertion, and to an extent, the re-imagination of colonial authority was facilitated by the adoption of the Westminster system after the country gained independence in 1962. It must be noted that the relative successful implementation of the Westminster model after independence can be viewed as a direct result of the many constitutional changes and demands for democracy and decolonisation that took place in the country from 1944 to independence in 1962 (see Table 4.1 Phases in Jamaica's Political History).

The Westminster system was intended to indoctrinate the colonies into a political structure that was defined by "the convention of constitutionalism; the doctrine of civilian supremacy, the presumption of bureaucratic and police neutrality; the habit of competitive elections; and the practice of pluralist representation" (Sutton, 1999, p. 68-69). The transplantation of the Westminster model into the Caribbean allowed the elites to enjoy a familiar political system which enabled them to reaffirm their social and political authority within the colonies. As Sutton argues, the

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[24] See Chapter 4

Westminster model was essentially viewed as an "autochthonous" system of political rule that was privileged above all other political systems (quoted in Sutton 1999, p. 69). Yet, one of its most defining legacies is the establishment of a two-party political system in the Commonwealth Caribbean.

The two-party political system not only created an independent Jamaica that was seemingly more democratic, but also one which was underscored by political tribalism and clientelism. These two features of the political system in Jamaica fostered a socio-political environment that was unstable. Within the midst of the developing rivalries between the government and the opposing party, a problematic situation developed in which state and non-state actors were engaged to further reinforce and protect the authority of the ruling party and their opponents. Populist politics therefore subverted the democratic ideology entrenched in the Westminster system, thus creating a political environment that led to the development of a deep rooted clientelist political network in which votes for individual parties were made in exchange for financial and social benefits (Sutton, 1999). What emerged as a result in Jamaica was a political system that possessed the potential of destabilising the social infrastructure of the nation.

5.3.2   The Establishment of the Politics/Security Nexus in Jamaica

The 1930s labour rebellion in Jamaica (discussed in Chapter 4) introduced a new dynamic in politics and social relations between the upper, middle and lower classes, which significantly altered the way the state interacted with the people. The nature of crime during this period, particularly in inner-city communities, and the subsequent policing was highly affected by the political atmosphere of the state. As such, a problematic policing environment emerged in which the security forces were

used by the sitting government, in later years, to influence election results and intimidate opposing communities. Crime in this instance was therefore persistently perpetrated by the security forces with political undertones. But more significantly, the practice of policing was adopted and redefined in specific communities that had strong affiliations with the two political parties. It is therefore important to examine the development of localised politics and the manner in which it has merged into the realms of security and crime.

The emergence of the JLP (the political arm of the BITU) and the PNP was a direct social response to the colonial government's continued control of Jamaican politics and social welfare systems. These parties were created to provide a more realistic representation of the society, and as such appealed to the brown and black farming and working class communities (Clarke, 2006). The colonial government created a political system in which it controlled key political decisions and engagement was only authorised for the elite plantation owner community – thus marginalising the black community from the democratic processes of the state (Edie, 1989). However, for the first time in Jamaica's history the voices of the majority labour class were finally recognised by the government. Jamaica was attempting to gain the ability to construct and define its own ministerial, legal and socio-economic systems that better reflected its own needs – rather than the needs of the British Empire. These two parties signalled a significant change in political discourse making it more localised.

Problematic politics in Jamaica began to take centre stage after 1943 as a result of the rivalries between the political parties. The PNP having restructured its identity as a working class party, began an active campaign to infiltrate and gain the support of the JLP members. The PNP, disregarding its socialist framework, now envisaged

the working class as a critical target constituency, and as a result, established the National Workers Union in 1952 to present a more palatable political front for their labour and wage related concerns (Figuero and Sives, 2002). Interestingly, the JLP featured a diverse mix of the low and middle classes, despite the middle-class background of its leader. The two parties became involved in an intense competition for votes from the white, brown and black communities (Clarke, 2006). Politics in Jamaica began to take on tribal qualities as the society became segmented based on political allegiances to both parties (McDougall, 2003).

The initial tensions and instances of violence between these sparring parties first materialised in fights in communities in Kingston in which sticks and stones were used as common weapons (Figuero and Sives, 2002). During the 1940s violence and organised criminality became key features in politics – to the extent in which violence became a political tool (Sives 2003, p. 59). In recognising that instances of violence between party supporters were escalating, Manley and Bustamante, once in a public show of solidarity, held hands at a political gathering, with Bustamante stating to his crowd of supporters, "Don't touch my cousin" (Moser and Holland, 1997, p. 13).

Sives (2003) argues that the partisan violence that developed during the 1940s may not have been as extreme as the type of political violence showcased in 1960s (post-independence) Jamaica but it ignited a legacy of interparty warfare, specifically within the inner-city communities of West Kingston. For example, during the 1940s the PNP was supported by an armed gang called "Group 69" – a somewhat militia group that was characterised as the defence force that prevented attacks from groups supporting the JLP (Sives, 2003). Security, specifically party protection, thus was transferred into the hands of the general public who assumed identities of control and power within an unstable political environment. The establishment and promotion of

these armed gangs as a legitimate element of the political system further aided in undermining the power of the police force. However, they were deemed necessary during the 1940s as the police force was considered somewhat inadequate in preventing inter-party conflict.

Members of the JCF have also been known to support garrison politics in their positions as official state security actors. As a significant portion of the force is comprised of individuals who were born and raised in garrison communities they tend to display/support their political affiliations through illegal means. From facilitating vote rigging during the election process to engaging in criminal activity to protect and secure the power of their political party, corrupt members of the force have created a security situation in Jamaica in which crime is condoned and perpetuated by the forces charged with its prevention. For example, during the 1993 elections, the leader of the JLP, Edward Seaga, was accused of vote rigging by supporters of the PNP. Upon hearing that he was barricaded in a polling station in Marverley, St. Andrew, by PNP supporters, police officers associated with both political groups gathered and a confrontation took place, which was subsequently quashed by military intervention (Harriott, 2000). In further evidence of political corruption being entrenched in police duties Harriott (2000, p. 53-54) noted that in 1991:

> 36 percent of the JCF officer corps reported that the political directorate had intervened to restrain police operations and protect party strongholds, and only 28 percent denied this was a reality… Some 20 percent reported having experienced interventions by politicians to have charges against suspects dropped, and another 40 percent refused to confirm or deny this.

Based on these numbers, it appears that corrupt political intervention in the practices of the state security force was in fact a pervasive issue. Yet, this was a practice that appeared to be common knowledge and was not curtailed by the force which illustrates a high level of complicity within the governing structure of the organisation.

The perception of policing crime in Jamaica, and in the inner-city communities in particular, therefore represents an interesting reversal of roles between the public and private actors. Despite the many attempts throughout its history to create a well-balanced and lawful police force that was focused on serving the community, external actors have been able to manipulate the powers of the force to serve their self-interests. From the colonial government establishing the force to protect its financial prospects and maintain its power and authority over the ex-slave population, to political leaders using the JCF to reinforce its political dominance in inner-city communities and across the island, the police force has never been able to operate without some form of prejudice whilst carrying out its duties. State policing of crime is therefore perpetually biased against a segment of the society that has been disenfranchised throughout the decades based on their race, social standing or political affiliation. In addition to this, in order to carry out their duties, the police have often employed military tactics against the very civilian population it is expected to protect. Conversely, some of the more genuine forms of state protection and the prevention of crime have been successfully achieved by the leaders of politicised communities. Their interests have remained singular and resolute, and since the establishment of these communities dons have managed to create a social welfare and criminal prosecution system that is efficient, and which meets the needs of their communities. Law and order is managed with a strong fist, but it appears to be one which has maintained the survival of these communities for several decades.

5.4   Conclusion

As this chapter has highlighted, the destabilisation of the state has been caused by a colonial system that was divisive, and which did not provide for the successful

assertion of a new Jamaican socio-political identity once independence was granted. From the establishment of a police force based on policing practices of the Colonial Government to the use of the Westminster system as a format for a newly independent Jamaican government the society was forced to assert a new identity based on practices and policies that encouraged division and highlighted inequalities between the poor and wealthy. The poor were marginalised with the ruling apparatus being placed in the hands of the wealthy elite that were guided based on their allegiances to the Crown Colony. Subsequently, this division in society became further reinforced by the emergence of the Westminster system that fostered a political system based on tribalism and clientelism. The prominence and impact of these issues on the societal structures of the Jamaican society were more acute in inner-city communities, especially garrisons.

In terms of the nature of security in Jamaica the legacy of the Crown Colony policies and the emergence of party politics created a security environment that was unequal and problematic. A dichotomy in the power structure of the society developed that had a prevailing influence on the manner in which the citizens and the state interacted. The legacy of the colonial period created a security environment that was firstly, unequal and rife with distrust as positions of power were held by the brown and white middle to upper classes, whilst the poor black classes were marginalised and often had few rights; and secondly, did not highlight the dynamic security needs of a society in political transition. Political tribalism and clientelism became staples of the society which in turn allowed for the emergence of organised criminal groups that aided political parties in garnering and sustaining electoral votes. Security thus became corrupted in inner-city communities as the state infrastructure relied on these enterprising criminal gangs to maintain law and order in exchange for political votes

and financial benefits (see Chapter 6). As the state was unable to provide the necessary social and political goods to sustain the Jamaican society it had to rely on the economic, political and security support of criminal gangs – thus giving up all forms of legitimate control within these communities. The state system did not allow for these criminal entities to be questioned by official structures and actors of state, and as a result, security within the urban space of downtown Kingston became corrupted.

With the increasing prominence of dons in garrison communities and the continued inability of the state to provide for the welfare, particularly the security needs, of specific segments of the society an interesting dynamic in the relationship between the state and non-state emerges-; in that, a significant collusion develops, underpinned by the notion of state failure, in which the state becomes dependent on illegitimate forms of governance to effectively meet the needs of a subsection of a community. An environment in which the private, epitomised by the roles of dons and organised crime groups in garrison communities, becomes unavoidably intermingled with the public (i.e., the state governance infrastructure), begins to emerge that illuminates the security and governance concerns that threaten the stability of the state. As noted by Harriott (2008), with the increasing prominence of non-state actors assuming responsibilities of the state (with the state deliberately colluding with these actors in some instances to transfer power) there is clear evidence of the growing "incapacity" that has enabled the "co-rulership of the state" (p. 9). By subcontracting certain responsibilities such as security, welfare provision and policing to the dons and organised crime groups in the urban poor areas the state is essentially engaging in a "nontransparent and unstable process of quasi privatization" (Jaffe, 2013, p. 737). The power thus assumed by the dons in these spaces epitomises the inherent failure of the state, particularly because the power wielded by the dons is underscored by violence

(Jaffe, 2013). The outsourcing of power and responsibility by the state to non-state actors highlights its essential retrenchment from the structures of governance and the growing privatisation of the public space. Thus, illuminating further the complex dynamics between state and non-state actors, particularly regarding the manner in which security is provided and managed.

The primary focus of Chapter 6 is to explore how both state and non-state actors have impacted on the evolution of the state. The complex nature of Jamaica's security governance environment will be brought to the fore in order to examine how it can be linked to state failure existing throughout the urban landscape. More specifically, it will examine the implications of security becoming a private good on state functionality and the welfare of the citizenry.

6 Complex Networks of Governance

6.1 Introduction

In exploring the nature of the state infrastructure and the manner in which state and non-state actors interact within the security environment it may be argued that Jamaica exhibits some of the core features of security governance. Firstly, there is a multiplicity of both state and non-state actors at play that have enabled the state to maintain its functionality. Secondly, non-state actors are often considered necessary service providers that ensure that a wide cross section of the society receive welfare goods otherwise unattainable from the state. Thirdly, the construction of security governance in Jamaica also suggests that it adheres to a state system that has moved from government to governance – adopting a horizontal approach in which the government no longer occupies central role as the main figure of authority within the state. In Jamaica power, responsibility and authority are thus diffused amongst state and non-state actors, and the nature and degree of social welfare goods they provide differ based on the location and needs of the people they service.

However, this project posits the view that this assessment of the security governance is limited and ineffective in the Jamaican context as it does not adequately depict the true complexity of relations at play in the country, the impact on the state's relationship with non-state actors, and the ongoing repercussions on the stability of the state. The chapter is therefore concerned with answering the following research question: *What are the implications of the shift from security government to security governance on the understanding of state failure in Jamaica?*

The focus of the chapter will be to explore the dysfunctional characterisation of security governance in the Jamaican context by looking at the development and

nature of the country's political culture, the ability of the state to provide basic goods and services (specifically security) to the populace, and the role that non-state actors play in supplementing the needs of the people, particularly across the diverse urban landscape. It will also examine the direct and indirect relationship established between state and non-state actors and the impact that this relationship has had on the stability and capacity of the state. It will assert that the dysfunction of governance is primarily manifested in various areas (such as, security and welfare provision, education, employment, housing, etc.) that are connected to the state's capacity and stability which will have long-term implications on the sustainability of the state and the role played by various actors. More importantly, it will highlight how this dysfunction has directly eroded the security infrastructure of the state by introducing a multitude of state and non-state security actors that are motivated by different factors, and who are struggling to assume positions of authority throughout the diverse urban landscapes of the state. As the focus of the project is to also examine Jamaica in light of the failed state literature concerns related to corruption, social inequalities, violence, problematic patron-client relationships and clientelism will add another dimension to conceptualising Jamaica's state infrastructure within dysfunctional security governance.

6.2   The Role of State Actors in Security Governance

6.2.1   Post-Colonialism and its Impact on Governance

The post-colonial discourse on state development and its link to state failure is particularly integral when evaluating the nature of the modern Jamaican state, its governance structure, and the role played by various actors. It may be argued that many of the architects and proponents of decolonisation expected that out of this wave

of discontent against colonialism would emerge newly legitimate states that were able to provide sufficient security options, and ensure equal wealth distribution for its citizenry within a number of years after gaining independence. This ideal of the new modern and decolonised state however was not rooted in reality as the states that emerged out of decolonisation failed in their attempt to qualify for statehood. Statehood was achieved by nations fighting for their independence, but was also seemingly forced upon decolonised countries that were not able to establish an "effective government, with centralized administrative and legislative organs" (Brownlie, 1979, as cited in Milliken and Krause, 2003, p. 11). Although these states were provided with a constitution by their former colonisers (as in Jamaica's case), with some states ultimately assuming either authoritarian or dictatorial governments, their governments were recognised by the international community as legitimate (Milliken and Krause, 2003).

However, what is central to the depiction of these states is the differing ways they were able to manipulate their post-colonial statehood; in that, a few post-colonial Asian states, for example, assumed a 'pseudo-statehood' which was ultimately transformed into 'real' statehood due to the systems of governance that were established; whilst some African countries remained in a situation of quasi-statehood after decolonisation (Milliken and Krause, 2003). This difference in the achievement in statehood is due to the highly differential treatment of both Asian and African states by international governments. For the case of the Asian states, though the nature of their statehood after decolonisation did not exhibit structures of a centralised government and legislative arms, as required by international law in the 1930s, governments recognised them as "*bona fide* representatives of national communities" which eventually became recognised as "real statehood" (Milliken and Krause, 2003,

p. 11, original emphasis). According to Jackson (1987) the inability of African post-colonial states to assume full legitimacy or 'real' statehood is due the very composition of its government and the motivations of various actors that assume positions of power and authority in the country. Jackson (1987) explains that for the post-colonial African state:

> Corruption and incompetence infiltrate virtually every agency of government, not merely hampering but in most cases undermining state autonomy and capacity. Corruption is integral rather than incidental to African politics. Self-enrichment and personal or factional aggrandizement constitute politics. Many "public" organizations are thoroughly "privatized" in the unusual sense that they are riddled with nepotism, patronage, bribery, extortion, and other personal or black market relationships. ... Government is less an agency to provide political goods such as law, order, security, justice, or welfare and more a fountain of privilege, wealth, and power for a small elite who control it (Jackson, 1987, p. 527).

Jackson's assessment of the post-colonial African state and its failure to assume 'real' statehood fixates on the central themes of failed statehood such as corruption, patronage and the inability of the government to provide social welfare goods such as security and justice. However, more critically, Jackson also connects these issues to the interplay between the public and the private and the impact that this has had on the post-colonial state's ability to evolve into 'real' or successful statehood. Within Jackson's depiction of the post-colonial African state we find the evolving interaction between state and non-state actors becoming the critical tool that facilitates state instability and dysfunctionality.

The dynamic between the public and the private, as well as state and non-state actors, in conjunction with the aforementioned problematic themes of corruption, patronage, etc., are concerns that are featured extensively in security governance

literature and provide a critical foundation for evaluating the nature of the failed state. Although the state remains the central actor, the relationship between both state and non-state actors acts as the critical foundation for governance (Jakobi, 2016). The underlying connective characteristics for most of these states are their post-colonial history as well as the inability of the state system to meet the demands of the populace for varying reasons. As such, the government is compelled to resort to the support of non-state private actors to satisfy the needs of the citizenry and fill the welfare gap created by its incapacity. For example, in an effort to manage the failed or weak nature of their state system, and to cope with the negative repercussions of conflict, many African states, like Somalia, established informal relationships between the government and non-state actors (i.e., clan elders and transnational businessmen) which have included the creation of informal police forces and tax systems that regulated the economy (Raeymaekers et al., 2008). For example, the government of Somalia, which has been characterised as a failed state, has had difficulty in asserting its authority in certain spaces of the territory as it lacks the capabilities and capacity to implement and enforce certain rules in these spaces that confirm its legitimacy – an issue recognised as 'limited statehood' (Börzel and Risse, 2010). To replace the deficiencies of the government in these areas non-state actors, such as private security forces and businessmen, have assumed positions of authority and control.

In other cases where there were protracted periods of conflict, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, non-state actors assumed integral positions of authority in managing access to resources, local security and public goods and services (Raeymaekers et al., 2008). The roles assumed by the non-state actors were legitimised through arrangements made with the state. Meagher (2012) notes that the violence engendered in these conflict regions, particularly in the post-colonial state,

can be treated as a transformative tool which allowed "local actors to counter state neglect by seizing a measure of regulatory authority" (Meagher, 2012, p. 1076). Conflict and violence ultimately aided the establishment of new spaces of authority and legitimacy within the state as ANSAs attempted to legitimise their power and authority in order to remain relevant – thus becoming agents of "innovation and reordering" for a variety of actors in the state system (Duffield, 2001, p.6; see also Bagayoko et al, 2016). The ANSAs thus transformed their initial predatory and violent activities in certain areas "into more durable and legitimate forms of local-level governance, constructed around alliances with local business and public sector elites" (Bagayoko et al., 2016, p. 6).

For most African states authority is thus pluralised rather than centralised, with countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad, etc., falling under the control of various ANSAs assuming positions of power and authority (Meagher, 2012; Jackson, 1987). What is significant about this development of their legitimacy through conflict and violence is that ANSAs are able to establish an alternative to traditional, and also failing, state institutions and their security infrastructure (Bagayoko et al., 2016). It is from this perspective that this project seeks to evaluate the roles played by non-state actors and the impact that their authority and legitimacy have had on the nature of the Jamaican state.

6.2.2   The Relationship Matrix between State and Non-state Security Providers

In evaluating Jamaica against systems of governance in post-colonial failing or failed state (as outlined above) a similar matrix of relationships is established that connects state and non-state actors. A governance infrastructure emerges that indicates that in spaces where the government lacks central authority non-state actors such as

gang leaders, businessmen etc., assume positions of power and control in order to legitimise and maintain their own form of authority in the state. In the case of Jamaica (specifically in garrison communities in West Kingston and St. Andrew) this matrix of relationships and the pluralised power being assumed by non-state actors play a critical role in directly addressing state incapacity. In some instances, non-state actors, such as gang leaders, have been able to create their own enclaves of power that directly contradicts the state's central authority.

One of the first concerns in exploring the relationship between state and non-state actors against the concerns raised in failed state literature is the pluralised nature of security provision. The provision of security in Jamaica highlights the vastly differential ways in which a public welfare good is operationalised throughout the urban space. The security environment is defined by an acute power struggle between both state and non-state actors, and is often underscored by issues related to Jamaica's two-party political system, state condoned corruption and patronage, as well as violence and conflict. Security thus falls within the spheres of the public and private and brings to the fore the social inequalities that exist across the urban landscape. What is even more significant about the provision of security in Jamaica is that in some instances the activities carried out by non-state actors in security either undermine the power and central authority of the state or seeks to fill a gap in which the state lacks the capacity or ability to meet the needs of its citizenry in specific urban spaces.

Taken together the issues raised in the provision and pluralisation of security in Jamaica exemplifies several characteristics of state failure. In this regard, security provision and pluralisation in Jamaica is to some degree influenced by the post-colonial history of the state and the systems of governance established between state and non-state actors; the nature of security and the various actors participating across

the urban landscape; is closely linked to the stark social inequalities that exists and the segregation of the urban landscape; and to a degree responds to systemic and structural conflict plaguing the state environment.

6.2.2.1   Security Provision from the State

State policing has always occupied a problematic space in Jamaica's security infrastructure. As noted in Chapter 5, , the establishment of Jamaica's first police force was born out of a need to create a security agency that was designed to protect the assets of the Crown Colony alongside providing security for members of the planter class, often disregarding the security needs of the poor black labourer classes. Harriott (2000) argues that in establishing the police force the British government had the ability to model the force on one of three types of policing methods that existed during the colonial period. The first model, which was the "British home model" emphasised creating a localised police force that did not operate under centralised authority; whilst the second model was "the French dual system of centralized and highly militarized gendarmerie responsible for public order and local general police" (Harriott, 2000, p. xxx). The third option, which the British ultimately implemented in Jamaica, was the Irish model which was primarily concerned with maintaining public order (rather than crime control), whilst protecting the security needs of the state (Harriott, 2000; Harriott, 1997). It is at this point that we find the initial problematic concerns arising in the country's security infrastructure as the state sought to create a policing body that was concerned with protecting the welfare of the state, as well as the state's political and social elite, rather than its citizenry. The police force thus exhibits no real accountability to the people for any failings in its institutional framework, but rather to the state – creating a problematic relationship between the people and the state.

The lack of impartiality exhibited by the state through the actions of the force and its distribution of power across the elite classes ultimately questions the legitimacy of the state and its security actors (Harriott, 2000). This lack of impartiality exhibited in the policing model that Jamaica ultimately adopted highlights the foundations for problematic policing that will emerge and become one of the main indicators of failed statehood in Jamaica. As the policing infrastructure in Jamaica developed throughout the decades issues such as corruption, police brutality and varying forms of abuse (features of failed statehood) further aided in questioning the legitimacy and authority of the force as a state agent. This has ultimately fostered the emergence of other non-state actors assuming positions of authority in the country's security infrastructure.

The consequent evolution of the force mimicked the paramilitary practices of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and featured a coercive and militaristic element which was often used against members of marginalised communities. As noted by I.RO1, 2016, a former high ranking officer in the JCF, "what happened is that Britain in all of her colonies basically set up this paramilitary force designed for one thing: to put down insurrection, protection of the governors ... and they were never there to be a part of [the society] ...When you look at the training police are receiving we have not moved from that construct". The establishment of a policing force that is inherently biased against a certain segment of the society ultimately lead to systemic problems within the force that have contributed to its problematic relationship with citizens living in impoverished communities. As highlighted by a former member of the JCF, "There is a bad legacy problem because I think that we still are plagued by the notion that the police force as it was then established to control black people who are behaving disorderly and watch men by day, and by night to protect the bourgeoisie from the peasants ... Some of that hereditary challenge still exists" (I.RO2, 2016). In

examining both quotes the implication that arises is that from an institutional perspective, public/state security was inherently designed to not only divide the society but also marginalise the lower classes. Security thus became a tool of the state for control in poor communities, whilst also being used as a tool of protection by the elite classes and the state itself. State policing therefore became a tool of social segregation where members of the poor and rich segments of the society were treated decidedly different by the state – an underlying feature of state failure. It is against this background of the JCF being a biased and militaristic force designed to protect the elites that this project posits the view that public policing in Jamaica is rife with challenges that have laid the foundation for the establishment of private forms of security designed to protect a wider cross section of communities across Jamaica's urban landscape, specifically the marginalised communities of the urban poor.

In exploring the nature of state policing in Jamaica a problematic tapestry of concerns come to the fore that often focuses on abuses conducted by JCF officers against members of the public. These instances of excessive use of force and abuse of their state condoned power and authority have undermined the legitimacy of the force, especially within garrison and poverty stricken communities in which abusive forms of policing appears more prevalent. It also brings to the fore the idea of bad governance manifesting in the state. The inability of the state's policing agents to recognise the human rights of the citizenry during its operations and its lack of accountability to the populace (to be discussed in more detail below) points to a state exhibiting the core signs of bad governance which ultimately threatens its legitimacy (Weiss, 2000; Bøås, 1998; World Bank, 1989). As state security agents, in some circumstances, are not held accountable for their actions the security framework of the state becomes

problematized and illustrates features of weakness that may further undermine the power and authority it holds.

In an Amnesty International report (2016) the extent of negative policing being conducted by the JCF was examined based on reports of extrajudicial killings carried out by the force. The report provides significant details on the repercussions to public safety and security caused by the force's disregard for the Use of Force Policy (2007), as well as the human rights implications of these practices.[25] Between 1981 and 2000 there were an estimated 140 civilian deaths per year at the hands of the police (Amnesty International, 2001, p. 8). The report notes:

> Since 2000, law enforcement officials in Jamaica have allegedly killed over 3,000 people. Killings by police – many of which may amount to extrajudicial executions – represent a high percentage of overall killings in Jamaica ... Between 2005 and 2013, more than 200 people were killed by police each year... only 2 police officers have been convicted of murder since 2000. Between 1999 and 2008, only one police officer was convicted of murder (Amnesty International, 2016, p. 11).

What this report highlights is not only the high rates of deaths/extrajudicial killings linked to the police but the inability of the state infrastructure to curtail and punish the actions of the problematic members of its policing force. So much so that between 2011 and 2013 there was a steady increase in police related killings that resulted in a total of 687 people being killed by a member of the JCF over a three year period (see Table 6.1). What makes the figures reported by the Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) more troubling is that during a 30 month period (2013-2015) 340 people were killed in operations carried out by the JCF, with 124 of deaths or injury to civilians taking place during planned operations (INDECOM, 2016, p. 5).

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[25] See section 6.2.3 for further discussion on this policy and its application during the 2010 Tivoli Incursion.

These figures suggest that there is an entrenched system of violence against the citizenry, and potential abuse of power being perpetrated by a force that rarely holds its members accountable for their actions. The state in this instance has exhibited an inherent inability to effectively manage the negative and problematic practices of its agents – thus creating a security environment that uses extreme force against the public.

Table 6.1. JCF Related Killings between 2011-2015

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Reported Murders	1133	1099	1201	1005	1207
Killing by Law Enforcement	210	219	258	115	101
% By Law Enforcement	19%	20%	21%	11%	8%

Source: Amnesty International (2016, p. 11)

Table 6.2. Breakdown of Fatalities Involving the JCF: July 2013 and December 2015

Category	2013 (01/07-31/12)	2014	2015	Total
All Fatalities	124	115	101	340
Planned Operations where death and injury resulted	51	36	37	124
Number of fatalities occurring in planned operations	49	38	38	125 (36% of all fatalities)

Source: INDECOM Report (2016, p. 5)

In its 2017 report covering the period of January to March 2017, INDECOM noted that there were 73 complaints of assault and 34 reported fatal shootings being committed by JCF members (INDECOM, 2017a, p. 9). INDECOM further noted that reported incidents of fatal shootings resulted in 42 deaths (2017a, p.9). From April to June of 2017 these numbers remained relatively the same, with 75 reported assaults and 33 incidents of fatal shootings of which there were 39 reported deaths at the hands of the JCF (INDECOM, 2017b, p. 10). These figures highlight the JCF's use of extraordinary force in a relatively short time period. These incidents of police shooting are particularly high in the country's capital and metropolitan areas which is incidentally the urban space that contains most of Jamaica's garrisons and poverty stricken communities (see Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2). When compared to figures over a three year period (see Table 6.2) it becomes clear that rather than deescalating, instances of fatal police shootings are increasing. INDECOM notes that in 2014 there were a total of 115 fatalities (INDECOM, 2016, p. 5). Comparing these figures to the January – June 2017 reported fatalities, noted above, a concern emerges that the JCF is on track to potentially surpass its total 2014 fatality rate only 6 months into 2017.

Figure 6.1. Fatal Shootings by the Police by Parish Between Januray and March 2017

Source: INDECOM (2017a, p. 11)

Figure 6.2. Fatal Shootings by the Police by Parish Between April and June 2017

Source: INDECOM (2017b, p. 12)

6.2.2.2 The JCF's Human Rights and Police Use of Force and Firearms Policy

The INDECOM report highlights the fact that although these operations carried out by the JCF were planned they often disregarded internal policies and procedures, particularly as it related to its Use of Force Policy (INDECOM, 2016; Henry, 2016). The Force Orders is officially referred to as the *Jamaica Constabulary Force Human Rights and Police Use of Force and Firearms Policy* (serial no. 3147) and was put in place on 27 September 2007. According to the policy, during planned operations "the principle of upholding the 'right to life' should be central to all armed operations, hence proper planning is essential" (JCF, 2007, p. 17). The policy continues by stating "[f]irearms operations must be planned and controlled so as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, the need to resort to potentially lethal force (i.e. it must be strictly necessary)" (JCF, 2007, p. 18). One of the main concerns raised by INDECOM in the JCF's handling of these planned operations is that they were conducted under the oral directives of the commanders, with no recorded plan of action in all but one case (INDECOM, 2016, p. 6; RJR News, 2016). This places the actions of the force in a contradictory position to the procedures of modern day forces, which consequently fosters public distrust in the force (RJR News, 2016). The INDECOM report further focuses on the problematic practices of the Mobile Reserve, a specialised police unit that plays a key role in planned operations. The report states that:

> With its additional training and specialism, a greater awareness of tactics, planning and operational procedures, one would expect to observe less fatal encounters than other policing units and better adherence to operational policies. This does not appear to be the case. During the examined period, no

recorded plans were presented by the Mobile Reserve (INDECOM, 2016, p. 6-7).

The actions of the force, specifically the Mobile Reserve Unit, in planned operations highlight the willingness of the state's security agent to carry out practices that directly contravene the policies and procedures of the state. The state's inability to manage the actions of its security agents thus aids in illustrating the notion that the Jamaican state lacks the central authority and power to exert effective control over its own agents.

In response to the increase in police related killings in 2012, and the JCF's excessive use of force, then Commissioner of Police, Owen Ellington, in an address to members of the JCF, acknowledged the problematic security infrastructure of the state, and the public's growing discontent with the JCF's practices. Ellington highlighted two main concerns that have defined negative policing in Jamaica, i.e., the force's disregard for its duty of care to the public, and the excessive use of militaristic weaponry used by frontline officers in confrontations with the public, and in planned operations. Both issues can be linked to the high rate of public fatalities involving the JCF, which Ellington recognises is indeed problematic for a modern day force. More significantly, these issues point to the breaking of the social contract between the state and the citizenry where state agents no longer operate with some form of accountability or regard for the rights and welfare of the citizenry.

Ellington further highlighted a problematic aspect of the JCF's employment of Use of Force Policy and training by stating that one of the practices that needed to be re-evaluated by the JCF is the importance its members place on "officer safety" as opposed to "bystander safety" (Ellington, 2012). Ellington explains that, "[t]he current view is that police officers' first reaction when faced with danger is "officer safety". We are seriously considering a policy position which demands that police officers exercise equal concern for "bystander safety", extended to the attacker as they do for

their own safety. That is to say our officers must take reasonable and safe steps to protect the lives of attackers and "possible bystanders" as they do to protect their own lives" (Ellington, 2012). This statement illustrates that from the perspective of the police, there is an ambiguity in their intended purpose as there appears to be no recognised commitment to protect and secure the safety of the public, particularly bystanders caught in armed conflict.

Another issue of concern highlighted in Ellington's speech is the militaristic weaponry used by the JCF. Ellington notes that frontline officers previously employed the use of M16 assault rifles and carbines, which were eventually replaced with "lighter and less lethal MP5 submachine guns and Glock pistols" (Ellington, 2012). The heavy artillery that was previously used on frontline duty acts as a tool of intimidation against criminal elements, and the public, which does not comply with normative forms of modern policing. The paramilitary undertones of the force's practices (a derivative of the force's colonial policing foundations) have fostered a negative perception of the JCF as being unnecessarily heavy handed in its operations. What makes Ellington's statements even more problematic is that prior to this address members of the JCF were known to use their weapons indiscriminately in incidents involving the public, directly disregarding international policing standards on the use of force (see Box 6.1).

The "paramilitary watchman" identity assumed by the police ultimately redefines the public not as citizens of the state but rather "subjects" of the state (Harriott and Jones, 2016, p. 45). By using this method of paramilitary style policing and reducing the people to "subjects", nullifying their identities as citizens, the force has in fact created a security environment in which the public, especially from lower class communities, not only fear but are unable to trust the actions of the JCF –

essentially eroding the relationship between the police (the state) and the citizenry (Harriott and Jones, 2016; Harriott, 2000). These actions reduce the positive social relationship between the state and the people. By investing in heavy military grade weaponry for frontline duty the question arises as to whether or not the force can be appropriately defined as a public policing agent, or simply as a state sanctioned armed force. It is this ambiguity in its perceived purpose and the negative way in which it engages with the public, coupled with its militarised practices and procedures, that this project posits that the JCF has indeed lost its legitimacy and authority as a public security agent, and instead occupies the identity of a paramilitary policing state force.

Box 6.1. Excessive Use of Force by the JCF

> "At least six out of 17 passengers were seriously injured when police officers fired indiscriminately at a bus on 30 June 2000, in clear violation of both international standards and JCF policy... According to passenger accounts, after one passenger was shot in the foot, another started waving his white shirt outside a window, shouting, 'don't shoot'. Two police officers in a car beside the bus shot directly at him, injuring him and others... injured passengers stated that they were denied medical attention until all the bus passengers had been searched. Police subsequently alleged that they had information that the bus was carrying gunmen, but no guns were found."

Source: Amnesty International (2001, p. 13)

6.2.3   Corrupt Relationships and Security Governance

Corruption within the state's security infrastructure is often considered one of the markers of weak states as they lack mechanisms of accountability usually associated with strong states (Dupont et al., 2003). Members of public security forces in weak states often employ corrupt and coercive means in an effort to supplement the

low income they earn as state employees. As a result, "the coercive technologies bestowed on police officers by the state are used as private revenue raising tools, contributing to the insecurity of those who experience the full impact these public providers' illegitimate and illegal authority" (Dupont et al., 2003, p. 338). In the case of the JCF, the persistent reports of entrenched corruption permeating all levels of the force's hierarchy further aids in confirming not only the problematic nature of policing in Jamaica, but also the nature of the country as a failing state (Macini, 2006). It is important to note that the nature of corruption in the force is two-fold; in that, it is first used as a tool to supplement welfare/financial needs, and second, to gain and reassert an individual's power and authority within the community which may also benefit the needs of other illegitimate non-state actors, for e.g. gangs or corrupt businessmen.

Firstly, poor wages have been cited as a primary reason for entrenched corruption in the force. Many officers resort to engaging in illegitimate means of earning another form of income to support either themselves and/or their families. From applying for security guard roles in private security companies to engaging in illegal criminal activities, such as the sale of drugs and accepting bribes from members of the public, one of the main manifestations of corruption within the force is concerned with making financial gains through both legitimate and illegitimate means. An owner of a private security firm acknowledges that he often finds instances in which active members of the force assume positions within these firms - which complicate the nature of the relationship between the public and private forms of security. I.PS5, 2016, a private security actor, explains that the police "don't help matters ... because they have their own culture. A lot of them moonlight on the side...with the private security industry... So that there is this sort of long-term incestuous relationship going on and it doesn't auger well for the country ... and for

the industry". A resident from August Town added that if presented with a large financial offering to kill someone a policeman is unlikely to reject that offer due, in part, to their financial constraints - explaining, "I think the police get corrupt because di ting weh name money when a man look pon a police and say mi a give you a million dollar to get rid a this man, him get rid a you" (I.AT3, 2016).

The incapacity of the state in this regard fosters an environment in which its agents are unable to demonstrate total loyalty and dedication to the state and its commitment to fulfilling the entire security needs of its citizenry. By defecting to the private security industry, as well as assuming more illegal forms of income generation, these officers are tacitly undermining the legitimacy of the state and contradicting the state's identity as the primary provider of security and welfare.

The other construction of corruption present in the force can be applied to actors in all levels of state agencies that use it to gain power and authority for illegitimate personal gains, whilst also enabling the illegal gains of non-state actors. With this form of corruption non-state actors are introduced into a complex relationship with state actors, and the public, in order to produce a system in which each actor is able to make gains based on the actions of the other. In so doing, an intricate matrix of relationships develops which may include state actors such as politicians, the police, customs and immigrations officials, etc., and non-state actors such as business owners, lawyers, accountants, organised criminal groups, bankers etc. These relationships emerge against a background of sophisticated criminality that builds the nexus between criminal enterprises and the political processes and practices of the state. I.RO3, 2016 explains the complexity of this relationship by asserting that these actors:

> don't necessarily want you to be operatives in crime but they want you to facilitate it by ... the issuing of licence, permits, certificates, the corrupt

awarding of contracts, sponsoring the campaign of a candidate so that he gets into government and gets a very important ministry and ... diverts contracts and money from the state into criminal organisations through ... the ranking contract system which is where government contracts are issued on a basis which does not meet the high standards of probity, and they are issued to connected individuals... So there is that income stream from the state through "legitimate organisations" then into the gang and some of it back into the political party... a lot of that money is channelled through the political criminal organisations back into the gangs and we get little in terms of value for it (I.RO3, 2016).

The state, through its agents, thus becomes intertwined into a dependent relationship based on criminal motivations with other actors. The power traditionally associated with the state thus becomes diluted as each actor, at a particular stage in the relationship, assumes a position of power and authority that allows the needs of all involved to be successfully fulfilled.

Within this discussion on corruption an equally important one on the importance of networks in the security governance emerges. The network of relationships described above essentially highlights the problematic nature of security governance in Jamaica as it is not only indicative of illegitimate forms of relationships between state and non-state actors, but also exemplifies the normative networks that exist between both the private and public. Governance literature dictates that such a complex network of actors ultimately determines the nature of public policy, with private actors having a significant controlling role in the making of public policy (Meagher, 2012; Peters and Pierre, 1998). In the case of Jamaica with private sector monies being funnelled into the purses of political parties the loss of central control of the state to these non-state actors becomes even more pronounced. Additionally, the pervasiveness of these alliances between the public and private creates an environment in which state institutions and functions are co-opted by private actors because they

tend to possess the means and capabilities to be able to carry out these functions more efficiently (Meagher, 2012). The state thus becomes marginalised by non-state private actors, which ultimately contributes to the "hollowing out of the state" and its consequent failure (Meagher, 2012).

In the case of Jamaica, security governance becomes dysfunctional and problematic as the state is unable to assert its central control and power over non-state actors in its network, and is ultimately dependent on these actors in order to maintain the appearance of stability. The type of corruption noted above essentially is indicative of the wider dysfunctional network of relationships between state and non-state actors that is designed to not only support the state, with the intentions of preventing its complete failure, but also to address the needs of citizenry. Security provision in Jamaica acts as an ideal platform for illustrating this dysfunction as it highlights not only the necessity of having this type of network but also the problematic impact of the government losing total control of a function traditionally associated with the state.

In this network of non-state actors such as gangs, organised criminal groups, and private security firms the state's role is marginalised and "hollowed out", especially in specific urban spaces in which the state's authority has been usurped by non-state actors like gang leaders and heads of organised criminal groups. This issue is further reinforced by the fact that the citizenry, particularly those in impoverished urban spaces, distrusts and fears the state security agents (i.e., the JCF) due to their recorded questionable actions against the citizenry, as noted above. As a result, a void emerges which non-state/private actors are allowed to fill by providing security and other welfare goods that the state is unable to provide. By assuming a position of control in the provision of security many non-state actors are consequently categorised in positions of authority and leadership in these urban spaces – undermining the central

power and leadership role held by the state. However, because many of these non-state actors tend to operate outside the formal and legal structures of the state a complicated and problematic relationship emerges that problematizes security governance in Jamaica, but which also has repercussions on categorising the nature of the Jamaican state.

6.3   Non-state Actors' Role in Filling the Security Void in Jamaica

In communities of Kingston metropolitan area and St. Andrew, a significant dynamic is at play in which non-state actors such as gangs, organised criminal groups, and private security companies play a critical role in the maintenance and security of the state. In some instances these groups have been able to carve out enclaves in which they assume leadership positions that allow them to mete out justice and enforce a rule of law that contravenes the authority of the state. In many instances the state has essentially lost control and power over these spaces to non-state actors and is often inclined to seek the assistance/permission of these actors if they need to enter the areas to carry out various state functions. What is important to note about this complex relationship is that the roles being carried out by non-state actors is in fact recognised by the state. The problem that emerges in this network of relationships is based on the state's inability to effectively control the actions of these groups, and its inability to reassert its central authority due to its incapacity to meet the welfare demands of the citizenry. This section will therefore focus on the problematic relationship that exists between state and non-state actors, and will explore how non-state actors, particularly those in garrison communities, have subverted the power and authority of the state and the implications this has had on the stability and strength of the state's infrastructure.

6.3.1 Privatisation of Security as a Feature of a Failing State

The privatisation of certain aspects of the state infrastructure (for e.g., security) has been recognised as a symptom of weak/failing states. It highlights the inability of the state to establish public security institutions that are capable of meeting the diverse security needs of its entire populace, and as a result, private actors are engaged to fill this void in security provision (Holmqvist, 2005; Lunde et al., 2003). The privatisation of state functions is pronounced in industrial and developing regions that are resource rich but in which the state refuses to or cannot abide by its obligations to support the security needs of specific industries and the population (Lunde et al., 2003). As such non-state actors are hired to fulfil the duties and obligations of the state. Security governance in these environments is indicative of state functionality as there are rules and regulations implemented by the state that aid in governing and managing the practices and activities of these private non-state actors in order to ensure that there is transparency and some accountability in place that will protect the rights and welfare of the people/customers utilising the services.

However, in weak and failing states the introduction of PSCs and other non-state providers into the state's security framework not only represents the state's incapacity or inability to provide security, but also highlights the "establishment of parallel or 'shadow' structures of power and authority" (Holmqvist, 2005, p. 12). These "shadow structures of power and authority" emerge as a result of poor regulation, ultimately facilitating the emergence of a comparable non-state privatised infrastructure to assume the functions of the state (Lunde et al., 2003). In creating this parallel infrastructure of power and authority, PSCs and other non-state security providers aid in replicating and reproducing social inequalities and divisions in weak states, such as in many countries in Africa and in Colombia, where the distribution of

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stable and effective security is underscored by police corruption, political patronage, economic exploitation and the dominance of the elite which have facilitated an economic and social environment in which goods and services are distributed unequally (Holmqvist, 2005).

Jamaica's booming illegal drugs industry of the 1980s and after helped to establish a governance system, specifically in garrison communities, that illustrate the above features. Organised criminal groups, due to their newly acquired wealth, were able to exert significant authority and control in garrison communities – effectively creating a contra state that highlighted the inherent weaknesses of the Jamaican government in being able to provide for the welfare of citizens living in these communities. The newly acquired wealth that these criminal groups received facilitated the loosening of power and authority that political groups, such as the JLP and the PNP, previously had over these communities (Jaffe, 2012; Sives, 2010). The boom in drug sales placed financial power in the hands of the dons. The resulting impact was the establishment of a new partnership in which the political parties channelled state funds into the coffers of organised criminal groups to support garrisons and maintain the allegiances of the dons and gangs, and in return these groups made campaign contributions to their chosen parties (Harriott, 2008; 2003). In so doing, criminal groups assumed a new identity as partners of the state which allowed them to establish a contra government in garrison communities – ultimately altering the power relations between the state and non-state criminal groups (Harriott, 2008). This new type of relationship between the political elite and criminal groups not only aided in legitimising the power of criminal groups in the political infrastructure of the state, but also aided in the normalization of crime by the political

elites benefitting from financial donations of the organised criminal groups (Harriott, 2003).

From a governance perspective, the power and authority assumed by non-state actors essentially facilitated the delegitimising of the state. Peters and Pierre (1998) argue that in traditional networks the state acts as the primary negotiator, maintaining a sense of control over the network. The delegitimising of the power and authority of the state, however, creates a bargaining environment in which the state is forced to negotiate with non-state actors as an equal player in the network (Peters and Pierre, 1998). This in turn creates a relationship in which the state is highly dependent on non-state actors – essentially forfeiting its identity as the central authority within the network.

In the case of Jamaica, the inability of the state to assert its authority over the network (and the consequent delegitimising of its central control), coupled with the problematic growth of shadow structures of power, facilitated the establishment of a problematic security governance infrastructure in the state that has had far reaching implications for the provision of security in the country. Furthermore, the social inequality that is indicative of this problematic network of relationships (illustrated primarily in the types of non-state actors providing security in specific urban spaces) further aids in underscoring the idea that failure in Jamaica's state infrastructure is exemplified by the complex and multifaceted security governance structures at play in the country.

6.3.2   Gangs Filling the Security Gap for the Urban Poor

In Jamaica, as noted above, the characterisation of private security differs significantly across the urban landscape and primarily highlights the entrenched social

inequalities at play in the Jamaican society. The privatisation and pluralisation of security (and the typology of non-state actors at play in various spaces) is further linked to the idea of state failure being identified through the segregated urban space and caused by social inequalities present in the society. For impoverished and politicised garrison communities in West Kingston, gangs and organised criminal groups assume dual identities (that is as security provider and criminal element) which enables them to exert total control over the community. As noted previously, the booming drugs industry gave the dons in inner city and garrison communities a new position of power and they became critical intermediaries between the state and the citizenry in these urban spaces. Due to their newly acquired financial and political power residents of these impoverished communities began to recognise them as the primary providers of social welfare goods. The dons were the source of employment, financial support, and they also provided access to education and healthcare – services that were traditionally associated with the state (DCAF Horizon, 2015; Rapley, 2006). By providing these services the more successful dons were either able to connect residents to the requisite state actors or they replaced the state entirely by assuming the role of social welfare provider (Jaffe, 2012). This established a new social contract between dons and the people which undermines the contract which was once held between the state and the people. A new state thus emerges which places the state on the periphery of systems of control and authority within the garrison.

The social welfare provider role assumed by the dons has been recognised across Jamaica's urban landscape as a significant feature of the garrison community. In recounting the impact and characterisation of one of Jamaica's most notorious dons, Christopher 'Dudus' Coke, leader of the infamous drug gang, the Shower Posse, a former senior member of the JCF stated that many of the residents living in his

community, Tivoli Gardens, would often claim "Dudus gave me lunch money and he provided books and school treats" (I.RO2, 2016). I.RO2, 2016 further argued that: "the cartels in Colombia, in Mexico, they build housing schemes and hospitals. Our guys would provide books and school things and money for them ... So they in their own way had their benefits to be gained. And the political parties couldn't provide certain resources; they were providing it from ill-gotten gains." These actors transformed poverty stricken urban spaces into the base for their activities, and created an environment in which they were able to provide critical services to the residents that was not accessible through the state (DCAF Horizon, 2015). A senior manager of a PSC highlights further that "they govern by fear in one sense and then they also govern by the fact that they are the ones providing these benefits instead of the government. So in that context they become the godfather of the community more than the political representative or the mayor or whoever it may be in the area" (I.PS4, 2016). Both statements indicate the critical "godfather" role assumed by the dons, whilst also recognising the absence and lack of capability by the state to support the people in these communities. The identity of the state as provider and protector is thus ultimately usurped by the don and his/her gang. Within these communities the state's capacity to provide for the residents is essentially non-existent.

The absence of the don, as seen with the removal of Christopher Coke and Donald 'Zekes' Phipps, the don of Matthews Lane, highlighted the incapacity of the state as it struggled to replace the don as the primary welfare provider and exert its formal control and authority in these communities.[26] After the imprisonment of

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[26] In 2010 Christopher 'Dudus' Coke was extradited to the U.S to face criminal drug charges brought by the United States government. His extradition and the circumstances surrounding it will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7. Donald 'Zekes' Phipps was arrested and charged in 2005 for double murder. He was subsequently found guilty "and sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 30 years" to be served (Hibbert, 2012).

Phipps, the government promised to implement social welfare programmes that would fill the void left by the don, i.e., providing work, security, better roads, etc. A resident of Matthews Lane noted that in the years following the incarceration of Phipps the only initiative the government has been able to complete was asphalting a stretch of road, "That's the only thing they do... They just pass through" (Fahim, 2010). Mark Shields, a former deputy commissioner of police further noted that in removing powerful dons from impoverished communities like Tivoli Gardens and Matthews Lane a welfare provision void is ultimately created. However, the severity of the situation is further entrenched as the interest initially expressed by the state towards these communities after the removal of the dons eventually diminishes (Fahim, 2010). Shields asserts, "To sustain filling the gap is costly, and my concern is Jamaica does not have the resources to sustain it" (Fahim, 2010).

These sentiments were also expressed by a retired member of the JCF interviewed for this project (see Box 6.2) but with the emphasis on the idea that within these specific urban spaces the infrastructure of the state essentially failed. This statement illustrates that the state's incapacity to meet the welfare needs of its citizenry became increasingly pronounced with the arrests of Phipps and Coke. It also acknowledges the counter state that these gang leaders were able to create for impoverished communities which provided citizens with basic welfare goods and services traditionally associated with the state. The environment they created – one which made the citizenry highly dependent on and loyal to gang leaders – highlights the crux of the dysfunctional nature of relations and power sharing between the state and non-state actors like the dons; in that, the state's identity as the central power in the country was ultimately usurped by the dons – which has made it relatively difficult for the state to reassert its control in these communities, years after the removal of

their leaders. The state's infrastructure, power and authority in these communities thus became delegitimised, whilst the power and authority of the don is formalised by the community residents.

Box 6.2. Research Participant's View on Social Conditions after the Arrest of Christopher Coke

> "...the social infrastructure, the development that should have gone in to replace the gangs and what they were doing for the community never went. The social conditions never changed. When Dudus could have provided them with hundreds of books and school things ... that was not replaced by the state. So the people were left to go … and others were left to try to replace themselves with Dudus - to find ways of making themselves another leader because the state failed, the state failed to replace the social conditions, the social benefits that the dons were giving; and failed to provide for the people what it is that would make their lives different. So some of them would tell you that things have gotten worse because the state have failed to provide the resources to fix the light, to fix the road, to fix the housing conditions, ... to provide ... job opportunities, and to provide employment skill training... And policing it alone with law enforcement officers is not, cannot, be the solution ...What was missing and what void was taken out ...was the social benefit that was required to make a difference in the lives of people." (I.RO2, 2016)

One of the more interesting aspects of the power sharing role between the gangs and the politicians is the fact that dons are recognised by the state as the de-facto providers of order and justice in garrison communities. In becoming "partners of the state" the don's role as security and justice provider was sanctioned by the state – giving them the authority to essentially become the de-facto policing agents of these communities (Rapley, 2006). The state's delegation of policing powers to the dons was "operationalized in the jungle courts. The local jurisdiction of the don is exercised 'in conjunction' with the state and police" (Harriott, 2008, p. 53). For residents in these

communities the dons were recognised as their only protectors from the violence and crime that the dons themselves created (Jaffe, 2012).

Resorting to the dons for protection also emerges out of the residents' perception of the police as corrupt, unreliable and unable to provide them with justice for crimes committed against them (Harriott, 2000). Jaffe (2012) asserts that for many residents of inner-city communities in "providing physical security and protection, and an alternative form of dispensing justice" the dons became a critical asset to the community (p. 189). A gang researcher interviewed for this project further supports this idea of gangs as protector and security provider by explaining that in providing protection from petty robbery "a resident can inform Dudus and you get it back in short order and there will be severe punishment after that kind of thing ... this is why people in Tivoli still moan over his departure and wish he was still here ... because they enjoyed the benefits that he provided, significant benefits, and so you can't blame them too much for that" (I.NGO1, 2016). In many instances the dons worked alongside or with the approval of the police to carry out justice in these communities (Sives, 2012; Duncan-Waite and Woolcock, 2008). Security and protection, coupled with social welfare provision, become their primary role – which for many residents supersedes their criminal activities. However, more importantly, justice in these communities was swift and successful and accomplished without the restrictions imposed by a public policing and judicial system that many found biased and corrupt.

Residents were compelled to disregard the formal state security and justice infrastructure in favour of the justice provided by the dons as a result of the perceived alienation they felt from the state security infrastructure. This alienation stems from the established conflict between the state security forces and the poorer social classes that originated during the force's establishment in the colonial period. Harriott (2000)

explains, "[t]he colonial definition of the police function led to the construction of structures and practices that have since framed police-citizen relations. This highly centralized configuration of power affords little protection from abuses of power by the state" (p. 104). This statement suggests that the problematic relationship between the state police force and the citizens is not only due to the dons' willingness and capability to meet the security needs of the poorer segment of the Jamaican society, but also as a result of the entrenched social distrust in the state and its security infrastructure and the conflict that arises for a police force that was created as an agent of a colonial state to protect its assets and interests against that of a revolting slave community. This is not to say that the past pro-colonial sentiment of the JCF still exists. Rather, that the manner in which it was trained to deal with the security needs of the marginalised poor, providing them with a sense of comfort and security that is commensurate with what was provided to the political elite, has not evolved and still acts as a position of conflict between the state and the people.

6.3.3   Private Security and the Elite Society in Jamaica

The identity of non-state security actors in Jamaica also transcends that of the informal characteristics of gangs and criminal organisations. One of the most critical aspects about security in Jamaica is that there is a dichotomy of actors that provide protection and security services to a wide range of communities across the island. As noted above, gangs and organised criminal groups are considered primary security providers in garrisons and the poverty stricken communities of West Kingston and sections of St. Andrew. Conversely, private security firms, often with the full support of the police force, are the more prominent security providers in the gated communities of upper St. Andrew in which residents belong to the middle to upper echelons of the

society. This dichotomy in security provision highlights the socio-economic disparity that exists in the society, but also points to a further dissolution of state powers and authority to yet another non-state security provider; thus, revealing another aspect of failure in the state's ability to meet the social welfare and security needs of the people.

The emergence of the private security sector in Jamaica has been linked to two possible causes: 1) the boom in private security options being provided to protect the interests and assets of large multinational corporations during the 1960s; and 2) as a result of the growing insecurity in the country between the 1970s and 1980s due to the increase in the levels of crime and violence (Epps, 2013). Both circumstances resulted in the police being unable to protect public assets and meet the growing demands for residential and corporate protection. Additionally, the increase in criminality and violence, alongside a growing distrust in the JCF due to entrenched corruption in the force, required many with the financial means to employ the use of PSCs (Epps, 2013).

The incapacity of the state to meet the security demands of a growing nation is further supported by the difficulty in recruiting and retaining officers for the JCF. According to National Security Minister, Robert Montague, the JCF is currently experiencing a relatively high attrition rate of 500 officers per year which has resulted in the force needing at least 3,000 new officers to increase its capacity to 14,000 employed officers (Mathison, 2017). Contrasting this figure against the 22,093 armed and unarmed guards employed in over 319 private security firms across the island (PSRA, 2016) it is evident that the private security sector is increasingly becoming the more dominant form of security in the country (see Figure 6.3 and Table 6.3). These figures, however, highlight the more pressing concern of a deficit in the state's security infrastructure which can be possibly linked to the low wages associated with public policing roles, as discussed above.

Figure 6.3. Annual Private Security Companies Registration

Source: Private Security Regulation Authority (2015, p.15)

Table 6.3 Number of Private Security Companies and their staff

Reporting Year	No. of Companies	No. of Guards
2015/2016	319	22,093
2014/2015	328	21,722
2013/2014	332	21,497
2012/2013	305	19,122
2011/2012	279	17,762
2010/2011	245	16,461
2009/2010	227	14,974
2008/2009	212	13,941
2007/2008	212	12,853
2006/2007	222	12,605

Source: Private Security Regulation Authority (2015)

The relative rise in security companies being established in Jamaica may be indicative of two main factors, 1) the rise in rates of criminality and violence (and the exportation of these issues from inner-city communities into other spaces of the

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society); and 2) the diversification of the type of clients demanding private security services – i.e., more clients are requesting security for their commercial activities as well as for personal protection. This point is supported by I.PS1, 2016, as he states that the rise in security firms is related to:

> High levels of crime in certain areas ... I mean crime itself is broad but ...say for most of the clients that we do as I said we do commercial and industrial clients ... I would more akin Jamaica's particular problem with other third world countries who suffer from the issues of high unemployment, low wages, unequal opportunity etc., that be the prevailing issues that causes our own sector to be buoyant ... In fact in the last ten years the sector itself has grown by 55%... When it's more what you call systematic and robust as in organised crime syndicate which existed in communities like Tivoli Gardens and so on you find that they export violence and export criminality more than internalise it.

The exportation of criminality and violence from the inner cities and garrisons to other areas of the state further underscores one of the main concerns with the idea of confined state failure in Jamaica; in that, though these communities experience varying degrees of state failure, especially in regard to the high rates of criminality and violence, that are confined to the borders of the communities there are instances in which this failure spills into the surrounding urban space. I.PS1, 2016 further explains:

> We are not deployed in the inner-city area, we are not… we may be protecting the assets of companies that may be deployed in these areas or be in the industrial areas, industrial belt, that will become targets from time to time. Spanish Town road for instance, you know, the trucks that pass through certain areas are going to be subject or targets for criminals, and we've seen that. So that in itself is where our role falls. So it's not that we are deployed there [inner-cities] but certainly for companies that might be in those areas, yes but primarily when you look at how our inner cities are dispersed they are dispersed around residential areas of influence and

industrial areas of influence anyway. So irrespective of you not being in those areas you are protecting the companies and their assets from the persons who come from those areas.

The question thus comes to the fore as to how to effectively curtail the spillage and manage the problems within the communities associated with state failure so that it does not have long-term effects on the stability of the entire state. Therefore, although this thesis posits the idea that in Jamaica state failure is contained within urban spaces it also acknowledges that being able to stop and or/curtail this failure becomes a more pressing issue for the state to resolve.

From providing armed guard protection for banks, various manufacturing industries, and the major ports on the island to providing more specialised personal and electronic security and employee background checks for varying types of businesses, the private security sector fills a security gap that has been created by a notable lack in state resources that have affected its policing and security infrastructure. Much like its connection with the gangs and dons of the inner-city, the state has also formalised an interdependent working relationship with these firms. The practices and procedures of the sector are regulated by the state (unlike that of the gangs), and over the decades, has become an important feature of state's security infrastructure (see Box 6.3 I.PS2, 2016). One of the more significant contributions that PSCs have made to the national security infrastructure is the training and support they provide to the JCF. From aiding in investigations to training members of the JCF in new surveillance technology these firms, due to their vast amount of resources, have been able to assist the JCF in the more critical aspects of their everyday duties and in addressing criminality in the country. I.PS4, 2016, a private security actor, supports this by explaining that "we assist the police with certain operations, we assist them with equipment when they need covert recording, software system, with kidnap

equipment, again we assist them a lot we work very closely with them". In recognising an opportunity to expand the breadth of the PSC impact on the security infrastructure of the country I.RO3, 2016 (a retired member of the JCF) argues that this sector opens opportunities for pluralised policing in the country – merging the public with the private to provide a better and more efficient security environment for the populace (see Box 6.3)

The prevalence of the private security sector and the supportive role it plays in the security infrastructure of the state brings to the fore a different dialogue in the state/non-state security dynamics; in that, although, like the gangs and organised criminal groups, PSCs provide bespoke security and protection to a particular class of society in specific urban spaces, the sector is able to enjoy a more formalised and recognised status within the security framework of the country. The state does concede much of its security functions to these firms but is still able to retain its identity as the central power and authority within this network as it possesses the ability to regulate and approve the practices and policies governing this sector. The responsibility of security provision is dispersed, but within this particular network the relationship remains functional rather than dysfunctional and problematic.

Box 6.3. PSCs role in Jamaica's National Security Infrastructure

> "If you look at the number of private security officers that are deployed at our major ports of entry – airport, seaports – we far outweigh the public presence in those arenas ... You look at the access control and the whole security and safety elements within our tourism sector there's private security industry in there. If you look at major industries, be it the breweries, be it the distilleries, be it the petroleum plants, whatever it is, there's a major role being played by private security industry in there. So there's a clear indication that there is an important function being

executed by the industry that's working in conjunction with and coordinated with the public security services" (I.PS2, 2016).[27]

"I see opportunities for partnership between private security and public security in the form of what they call plural policing which could begin at the level of sharing of information or intelligence, assisting in training – the police may have certain techniques that they would train the private security people in and the private security industry may have developed certain techniques that they could train operating policemen in... I also see where private security guards could take over some of the security activities that the police have to perform at critical infrastructure like your airports, seaports, government offices, building etc. which then releases more police persons for street duties because policing is a public function" (I.RO3, 2016).

6.4   Conclusion

The above discussion sought to bring to the fore some of the key features of security governance that have contributed to Jamaica's failed statehood. Entrenched state issues such as corruption in all levels of government and within the social fabric of the society, extensive levels of conflict and violence that is woven into the political, social and economic tapestry of urban spaces, as well as wide spread social inequalities have aided in designating pockets of failure in Jamaica. Underscoring these issues is the problematic historical development of the country in which its ex-colonial identity has had far reaching negative implications on the manner in which the state governs the society, and its limitations in providing for the social welfare needs of the citizenry. In Jamaica's case, its failed statehood is predicated on the fact that the state and its agents either lack the capacity or the willingness to provide basic social welfare goods and services – a problem that is particularly distinct in the urban spaces of West

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[27] This interviewee is a member of the private security sector.

Kingston in which poverty and a lack of government involvement are problematic. Propelling the failed nature of the state further is the problematic nature of politics that exists, and which affects all levels of government institutions across the island – essentially creating a debilitating and poorly functioning state infrastructure that is incapable of meeting the demands of its diverse and multifaceted society.

It may be argued that the introduction of a security governance has been the key to somewhat stabilising the state. By introducing both formal and informal non-state actors, with differing motivations and intent, into the state infrastructure the pluralisation of governance has become dysfunctional and problematized. At the heart of this dysfunction is the somewhat incestuous relationship between politics, criminality, leaders of criminal groups and the state. The country's identity as an ex-colony and its transformation into a self-governing state that still retains features of its colonial past (for e.g., maintaining its colonial policing model), has prevented Jamaica from establishing full positive sovereignty as old structures of social inequality and state abuses are still allowed to permeate the institutional framework of the country.

Although the state recognises the need to engage non-state actors to provide goods and services to its citizenry as an equal partner, it is unable to maintain its central power and authority, and thus loses its strength in managing this diverse network of state and non-state actors. The power of the state is even more lacking in its management of its own agents – as depicted in its inability to effectively eradicate and prevent the corrupt and criminal behaviours of its agents in the JCF. Similarly, as seen in its relations with gang leaders providing security in poverty stricken and garrison communities, the state has become embroiled into a complex network of corruption and bribery which makes it dependent on non-state actors for political and economic support. It is this problematic relationship between the state and these particular non-

state actors that raises the concern that security governance in Jamaica is highly dysfunctional.

Security governance in Jamaica thus contradicts its traditional conceptualisation throughout the literature; in that, although there are multiple players assuming positions of power within this multifaceted network the state is unable to assert its central authority and identity amongst the more powerful non-state agents. Conflict and violence become the tools that are used against the state by non-state actors as a means of achieving positions of power, especially in the inner-city communities of West Kingston. It is within these communities that the struggle between state and non-state actors for power, against a backdrop of violence, conflict, poverty and political, social and economic corruption, is the most pronounced in Jamaica. These communities represent a microcosm of issues that support the notion that Jamaica's security governance is problematic and is a feature of infrastructural decline that has been precipitated by the failure of the Jamaican state.

Chapter 7 is a case study of the Tivoli Gardens Incursion. The chapter will primarily be concerned with how various features of state failure and security governance interconnected and facilitated the spate of violence that gripped Jamaica for several days in May 2010. In so doing, particular focus will be placed on the issues that triggered the violence, the way in which both public and private forms of security operationalised during the Incursion and aided in destabilisation of Tivoli Gardens which laid the path for the unrest that threatened the entire Jamaican society.

7 The Tivoli Gardens Incursion

7.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the intersection between failed state and security governance through the case study of the Tivoli Gardens Incursion of May 2010. As posited previously, the idea of state failure in Jamaica can be viewed as an incremental process that is primarily contained within urban garrison communities. In addition to classic indicators of state failure, such as intercommunity violence, the loss of the state's legitimacy and the inability of the state to control its internal and external borders (see Rotberg 2004), the events of 24 May 2010 illuminated other features of failed statehood that have been otherwise under-represented in state literature. Concerns related to the social, political and economic instability of the state, as well as the dysfunctional relationships between state and non-state actors, played a key role in the destabilisation of Tivoli Gardens. Similarly, the implications of the establishment of a pluralised and privatised security environment in the urban space further escalated the tensions between the state and Tivoli Gardens, which eventually contributed to the community teetering towards collapse, and threatening the stability of the entire state.

The Tivoli Gardens Incursion therefore represents one of the more critical periods of state failure identified in Jamaica and has helped to bring to the fore certain concerns regarding the stability, capacity, capability and governance of the state infrastructure that should be addressed if the state intends to avoid another episode of state failure occurring in the future. Primary focus is therefore placed on the construction of Tivoli Gardens as a contra state, i.e., an urban space in which the state no longer maintains central authority and control, and which is governed through the

de facto leadership of non-state actors like criminal dons. It intends to frame Tivoli Gardens in two lights: 1) as a problematic urban space defined by high rates of criminality, supported by an illicit economy (the drug trade) with residents contending with poor welfare infrastructure and in which the state is virtually absent; and 2) as a contra state in which the illegitimate provision of social welfare goods and services, specifically security, is provided and maintained by non-state actors. The main factor that has facilitated its stability, especially in peaceful periods, is due to the social contract established between the residents and the dons that have become the leaders of the space. As such, the examination of Tivoli Gardens in this chapter is through the lens of it becoming an urban space in which the idea of state accountability and responsibility is assumed by non-state actors, and it will explore the implications this may have on how the state responds to the community and vice versa.

This chapter will therefore approach the exploration of the Incursion in a three-step process. It will first outline the background of the Incursion, highlighting the social, economic and political concerns that facilitated the conflict. Primary focus is placed on understanding the nature of the Shower Posse and its leadership and the complex relationship it established with the political elite of the nation and residents of the community. Secondly, it will discuss the impact that the conflict had on the idea of statehood in Jamaica paying particular attention to how the state responded in its attempt to reassert its authority in the community. Finally, it will explore how the pluralisation of the security environment during the Incursion facilitated the entrenchment of failure in the society during this period, whilst also diversifying the typology of non-state security actors assuming prominent positions in the state.[28]

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[28] During the Incursion there were two main factions (similar to Rotberg's warring factions) that engaged and escalated the hostilities. These are: 1) The state's (public) security forces, i.e., the JCF and the JDF, which were employed to reassert the state's authority in Tivoli

Though the Incursion is one of several incidents in Jamaica's history in which conflict facilitated the destabilisation of the state and resulted in its temporary failure, it is noticeably the only time in which mercenaries have been employed – a new non-state actor which may signal other concerns relating to the potential for more extensive/permanent periods of failure in Jamaica's future.

7.2   Background to the Incursion

7.2.1   'Presidential Click'/'Shower Posse': Understanding the Identity of Tivoli Garden's most Notorious Gang

As noted previously, literature on state failure fails to recognise more subtle indicators of state failure that have significant implications on the capacity and functionality of states (see Chapter 2). One of the key limitations of the literature is its underplaying of the social, economic and political factors that may contribute to state failure. As one of the core players in the Incursion, the Tivoli Gardens gang, the Shower Posse, and its leadership, may be viewed as one of the underlying factors that facilitated the upheaval in the community in May 2010. As such, it is important to understand the dynamics of the gang and its leadership and the manner in which its relationship with the political apparatus of the country and the residents helped to form the foundations for its subsequent failure.

After Jamaica gained independence in 1962 the country veered deeply into the terrain of adversarial politics (see Chapter 4). Urban spaces throughout the country were physically divided into two oppositional factions that supported either the JLP

Gardens; and 2) the private security forces belonging to Christopher Coke, i.e., gang members, mercenaries, and members of the public, which were employed to protect Coke and the integrity of the contra-state he created, and also used as tool to "push back" against the authority and advances of the state.

or the PNP. In their on-going fight for control the political parties would employ the support of local area community leaders/dons/strongmen to protect their interests in communities that supported their respective parties. The relationship that was initially established between the state/political elite and these non-state actors was one of political patronage, which would eventually become the precursor to failure exemplified across Jamaica's social, economic and political environment.

A booming national and international drug and firearms trade in the 1980s encouraged the shift in loyalties between the community leaders and the political elites (Edmonds, 2016; Harriott, 1996). Dons were now able to make significant financial profit without the support of politicians, which eventually lead to new dynamics between them (Sives, 2002). It is at this juncture that Tivoli Gardens' Shower Posse, also known as the Presidential Click, became one of the most infamous politically affiliated drug and criminal gangs in Jamaica. A distinction needs to be established, however, between the Shower Posse and the Presidential Click, as even though they represent the same criminal organisation the extent of the criminality and influence exhibited by both factions are different. Both segments of the gang were led by two different leaders – with the United States based Shower Posse being headed by Vivian Blake, and the Jamaican based Presidential Click being managed by Lester Lloyd 'Jim Brown' Coke when it was first established in the 1980s (Grillo, 2014). The characterisation of each group is distinct and defined by the cohesive and structured organisation of the Presidential Click, and the Shower Posse's "trans-border multi-nodal" organisation (Harriott, 2015, p. 235).[29]

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[29] It is important to note that the operation in Jamaica was commonly referred to as the Shower Posse. Harriott (2015) asserts that that the entire enterprise (including its local and international branches) was referred to as Shower.

The origins of its name, the Shower Posse have been debated since its establishment in the 1980s. Some argue that it derives from a speech given by former head of the JLP, Edward Seaga, during a campaign event in the 1980s as he promised his supporters, and Jamaica, economic "showers of blessings" (Robbins, 2010). Others claim that it refers to the volume of bullets the gang would shoot at its victims (Robbins, 2010). These suggestions point to the highly brutal nature of the gang and the political affiliation and support it enjoyed from the JLP.

The Shower Posse was renowned for the significant hold it had on the illicit drugs and arms industry. Retired Senior Superintendent of Police, Delroy Hewitt, described the gang as "supreme" and further noted that "Under 'Jim Brown', the role of the gang was political, defending the status quo of the political party (i.e. the JLP). Under "Dudus", it changed to a criminal enterprise, with a heavy concentration on amassing weapons" (Commission of Enquiry, 2016, p.17). Hewitt's depiction of the gang is integral to this study as it not only recognises the changing identity of the gang in terms of its stated goals and motivations (transforming from a political to a criminal gang), but it also highlights its diminishing reliance on the political power of the elites, and the rise in its "supreme" dominance in local and international criminality.

As a criminal enterprise, the Shower Posse has been characterised more as "a Fortune 500 Company than a street gang" (Leuprecht et al., 2016, p. 376). In the early stages of its development into a transnational criminal enterprise the Shower Posse benefitted significantly from the changing nature of the drug market in Jamaica and the rest of the Caribbean. Though the nation was renowned for its marijuana trade, the Shower Posse began to expand its enterprise to include the more lucrative trafficking of cocaine with the support of Colombian drug empire (Edmonds, 2016). The Colombian drug gangs used Jamaica's garrison communities as critical "trans-

shipment points to North America and Europe" (Edmonds, 2016, p. 64). Edmonds (2016) argues that the expansion of the Shower Posse's enterprise from marijuana to cocaine trade was also supported by the political elite and facilitated by the Drug and Enforcement Agency's efforts to eliminate the marijuana trade in Jamaica. It is this support and influence of the political establishment that helped to elevate the Shower Posse's status to the primary position of power and authority in Tivoli Gardens. As a transnational network of wealth operating within the garrison it was able to parlay it power into becoming the primary provider of social welfare goods in the community. Security, housing, employment opportunities, access to education and healthcare were all provided by the leadership of the Shower Posse which not only helped to confirm the residents' allegiances to the gang but also circumvented the social contract the residents had with the state (Leuprecht et al., 2016). The incapacity of the state in this instance comes to the fore and further reinforces the idea of failure within the community gradually evolving as the state loses its central authority to the Shower Posse.

With the support of gang members that migrated to other countries, Lester Coke and Vivian Blake (former leaders of the gang) were able to establish branches of the Shower Posse in the United States (U.S) and Canada (Leuprecht et al., 2016). Blake established the U.S. operations of the Shower Posse in New York City and helped it to evolve into a complex transnational drug enterprise (Leuprecht et al., 2016). Its operations included having drug smugglers take cocaine from "Panama and the Dominican Republic to North America, where they were distributed to street gangs in New York and Toronto" (Leuprecht et al., 2016, p. 380; see also Robbins, 2010). The "franchises" it established in New York and Canada "helped to reduce the degree centrality of the Jamaican Shower Posse, thereby reducing the gang's vulnerability to

law enforcement" (Leuprecht et al., 2016, p. 383). Any residual income from its business went into financially supporting the JLP, which would in turn allow the Shower Posse to operate freely within the state (Leuprecht et al., 2016).

According to Harriott (2015) the Presidential Click can be characterised as a cohesive and highly structured community-based group which is primarily comprised of current and former residents of Tivoli Gardens. The group also consists of residents from neighbouring communities who form "satellite units" and are often regarded as subordinates within the gang (Harriott, 2015, p. 235). The internal dynamics of the Presidential Click reveals a multi-layered group with a distinct hierarchy which carries out various functions at each level. Members belonging to the lower level, the base of the group, are street criminals who are residents of the community. These members commit basic level street crimes and are controlled by the leader of the Presidential Click (Harriott, 2015). These street criminals are treated like employees of the group, in that, the leader takes their stolen goods and pays them a percentage of their worth in return (Harriott, 2015). Their main purpose is to enable the gang to maintain its criminal and territorial monopoly over the area (Harriott, 2015). The second tier that Harriott identifies centres on the gang's criminal enterprise at both the local and transnational levels. The production of illegal goods and corruption are entrenched tools for the gang at this level which enables it to commoditise "its reputation for violence via extortion and protection rackets, and exploits drug markets at home and abroad" (Harriott, 2015, p. 237). As the Click benefits from impunity for these crimes due to its political affiliations it is able to assert its significant power and authority at the national level (Harriott, 2015; 2008).

The third tier of the Presidential Click is recognised as the legitimising arm of the group. Its practices focus on exploiting the corrupt components within the state

through its political relationships to carry out legal activities, mainly related to the construction industry (Harriott, 2015). As Harriott explains the Presidential Click uses "its reputation for violence, it fixes the prices of construction materials from its suppliers and in various ways imports criminal methods into the world of normal business" (2015, p. 237). The construction industry in Jamaica is considered one of the main tools used by political elites to legitimise the activities of criminal organisations for their own gains during periods of election (Harriott, 2008). By awarding government contracts to gangs/business enterprises like the Presidential Click, politicians are able to funnel funds to their campaigning delegates, who ultimately give these funds to voters in the form of welfare benefits or cash, in exchange for their support (Harriott, 2008; see also Collier, 2000). Harriott (2015) argues that these activities aid in legitimising the image of the Presidential Click; thus further blurring the lines between its legitimate and illicit activities.

7.2.2 Events Precipitating the Incursion into Tivoli Gardens

The sequence of events that triggered the incursion on Tivoli Gardens on 24 May 2010 were actually set in motion a year earlier on 24 August 2009 when the government of the United States initiated the extradition process against Christopher Coke related to his transnational crime network. In the nine months leading up to the Incursion the extradition request was challenged by then Prime Minister Bruce Golding based on the grounds that it violated the right to privacy of communication as set out in the Jamaican constitution. Golding explained that in the interest of public safety, however, this right could be "abridged" under the authority of a Supreme Court judge (Golding quoted in Schwartz, 2012b). Golding further explained that:

We said to the United States, "These are violations that have taken place. We cannot abide these violations. We will hold the extradition request, we are not going to refuse [it]. ... We simply ask you to send a new request that is in conformity with our laws and our constitution." For a year, we kept putting that to the U.S. authorities, and the U.S. was stone deaf. They were not prepared to countenance any suggestion that the process was wrong; they were not prepared to countenance anything other than, "Let us have Coke." That was their position. Now, I thought it was wrong. I thought it was bullying of a country. And I was in a difficult position, because Coke was connected with my constituency and my party (Golding quoted in Schwartz, 2012b).

At the core of this disagreement with the U.S. was the notion that the constitutional integrity, and ultimately the sovereignty of the state, was being threatened/bullied by a more powerful nation. As noted previously, the positive sovereignty enjoyed by states focussed on their ability to provide for and protect the welfare and security needs of the citizenry without the involvement of external actors (Jackson, 1990) (see Chapters 1 and 2). The state thus assumes the responsibility of preventing external corrupting or criminal forces that threaten its integrity and the safety of the citizenry (Rotberg, 2004). With the U.S. demanding the extradition of Coke the sovereign power of the Jamaican state was thus undermined.

The nature of the relationship that Golding, and the JLP, had with Coke and the Shower Posse further complicated the state's official response to the U.S. extradition request. As highlighted in one of the findings by the Commission of Enquiry (2016): "Mr. Golding clearly was in a position of conflict. He was Prime Minister and Minister responsible for Defence. He was also Coke's M.P. and leader of the political party to which Coke was wedded" (p. 40). With the pressure from the U.S., coupled with his party's relationship with Coke, the independent power of the state became compromised. Even more significant is the underlying question as to

whether Golding's challenge to the extradition was an attempt to protect the welfare of an individual drug don over the general needs of the Jamaican public. This highlights not only the significant power held by Coke but the influence that this power had on essentially weakening the authority and sovereignty of the Jamaican government.

The state's continued compliance with supporting the illicit actions of criminal elements was also brought to the fore in the months preceding the Incursion. The Commission of Enquiry reported that on 25 August 2009 the security forces intended to detain Coke at his residence in Belvedere, St. Andrew. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Major General Stewart Saunders, stated that the intention of engaging in "a soft detention" would allow the forces to take "Mr. Coke at his home in Belvedere, St. Andrew and avoid him fleeing to Tivoli Gardens and fortifying his position there" (Commission of Enquiry, 2016, p. 36). Whilst informing the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Security at Vale Royal, intelligence confirmed that Coke, who was under surveillance, was still at his Belvedere residence. However, as reported by CDS Saunders, "I left Vale Royal and, within 5 minutes, I received information that Coke had fled from his home in Belvedere and headed to Tivoli Gardens" (Commission of Enquiry, 2016, p. 37). The leaking of this information provided Coke with the opportunity and advantage to "fortify" himself within the walls of Tivoli Gardens, giving his 'soldiers' an opportunity to amass a considerable number of weapons that ultimately escalated the level of force used by the security forces during the Incursion.

The leak highlights a specific deficiency within the infrastructure of the state and its inability to distance itself from the influences of criminal non-state actors like Coke. The implication that the Commission's report made was that someone with

knowledge of the internal discussions and decisions made at the highest level of the security forces and involving the Prime Minister maintained an open line of communication with a known criminal actor whose position as a gang leader threatened public safety and the integrity of the state. This leak speaks to the extent of Coke's influence and ability to infiltrate the upper hierarchy of the state. It also brings into focus the dysfunctional power relations between the state and non-state criminal actors; in that, although matters related to the intention to detain Coke was discussed amongst the heads of the security forces and the Prime Minister, Coke's authority as a leader of an important garrison community, and his power as a don, also took precedence in that meeting. It also further supports the notion that corrupt criminal elements have been able to infiltrate various levels of the state system, giving dons like Coke an advantage over the state.

Golding's decision to publicly confirm that the state intended to sign an Authority to Proceed and an arrest warrant for Coke during a radio broadcast on 17 May 2010 carried to the fore the issue of the long-held alliance between Coke (a don) and the political elite. By notifying the public of its intentions Golding effectively alerted Coke to the fact that the state finally agreed to United States' extradition request. According to the Commission's report, the heads of security were not aware of Golding's decision to make the announcement, as evidenced by Ellington's comment that "I was advised like the rest of Jamaica" (Commission of Enquiry, 2016, p. 44). CDS Saunders further noted the implications that Golding's announcement had on the force's plans to effectively execute the warrant by stating that "I learnt that the ATP was to be signed through the media in a broadcast. It took me by surprise ... It denied the operation the element of surprise." (Commission of Enquiry, 2016, p. 44). As a consequence, Golding's announcement had significant repercussions in Tivoli

Gardens as Coke's supporters began to arm and barricade the community against the state forces – thus further heightening an already tense situation.

Golding's decision to announce the signing of the ATP initiated the militaristic mobilisation of the gangs in Tivoli Gardens in defence of Coke. Assistant Commission of Police, Leon Rose, explained that there was "a tremendous mobilisation of criminal elements into Tivoli Gardens ... A number of blockades sprung up at all entrances to Tivoli Gardens, on Marcus Garvey Drive, Industrial Terrace and others" (Commission of Enquiry, 2016, p. 46). It is at this point the injection of violence, resistance and the use of heavy weaponry began to reshape the nature of relations between the state and the residents of Tivoli Gardens and precipitated the intense violent nature of the Incursion.

The amassing of weapons by gang members in Tivoli Gardens certainly aided in precipitating tensions between the state, its security forces, and the residents and gang members of Tivoli Gardens. Golding explained that on 23 May 2010 he was informed by the head of the security forces that:

> there was a significant and massive buildup of armory [sic] and armed men in the area—not only in Tivoli but the adjoining area—and that they were muscling up to prevent any attempt by the security forces to enter the area. [The security forces] recommended to me that to ensure that they can effectively restore law and order, a state of emergency was required (Golding quoted in Schwartz, 2012b).

This growth in armed resistance illustrates a community on the brink of armed civil unrest against the state – one of the primary and more troubling signs of failure occurring within the state (see Chapters 1 and 2). The legitimacy of the state, which it tried to reassert by implementing a state of emergency, was undermined due to the authority and power held by Coke and his gang members. It is at this point in which a

true challenge to the state, by non-state actors, was fully confirmed, and the resulting incursion is representative of the apex of this challenge.

This thesis refers to the Incursion as a form of 'civil unrest' as it manifested itself as a form of formal protest by the civilians against the state. According to Ramakrishnan, et al. (2014), civil unrest "capture[s] the myriad ways in which people express their protest against things that affect their lives and for which they assume that the government (local, regional or national) has a responsibility" (p. 3). In many instances of civil unrest, demonstration and strike action has the potential of becoming violent and tends to result in injury or the loss of life. In the case of Tivoli Gardens, this thesis suggests that the main concern of the protestors was the perceived unfair treatment of their community leader (Coke) by the state, and the need to push back against the unwanted infiltration of the state into their community. As a community in which welfare goods were scarce and security and protection were provided by one key non-state actor the possibility of having this removed by the government posed an imminent threat to the welfare needs of the community. As such, the unrest that ensued acted as a form of civilian protest, though violent, against the practices of the government to protect the best interests of the community. Though a wide range of heavy artillery was used by both state and non-state actors, the conflict that took place do not meet the most basic criteria of a civil war. Civil war is defined as "as an internal conflict with at least 1,000 combat related deaths per year … both government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least 5% of these casualties" (Collier and Hoeffler, as cited in Baev, 2007, p. 248). Although there was a significant loss of civilian life during the Incursion it does not meet the recognised number of deaths to warrant the depiction of this event as a civil war.

In light of the above, publications examining the nature of the Incursion, i.e., causes, the events that occurred, the actions of state and non-state security actors, as well as the impact that it had on the community, have mostly referred to it as a "civil unrest" (see Beckford, 2012; Galvin, 2012; Hamilton, 2012; Schwartz, 2011). In keeping with this, the thesis will ascribe similar terminology in discussing the Incursion. It does note, however, that if the conflict persisted, expanded into more communities and intensified it is possible that the state could have plunged into civil war with factions of Coke's gang fighting against the state security forces. In light of this, the Incursion does exemplify, to a degree, the concerns highlighted in the scholarship on state failure as it relates to the emergence of civil unrest and civil war.

7.2.3   The Show of Force in Tivoli Gardens

After declaring a month-long state of emergency on 23 May 2010 the state faced violent opposition from residents of West Kingston. Two police stations were attacked and burned down by gunmen, two officers were killed in Mountain View and road blocks were erected and protected by heavily armed men in Tivoli Gardens (Amnesty International, 2011). This illustrates how the Incursion essentially spilled into other communities across Kingston and St. Andrew. On 24 May 2010 the JCF and the JDF commenced a joint operation in Tivoli Gardens to execute the arrest warrant for Coke and, according to a spokesman for the JCF, "establish law and order in a place where there was none" (Schwartz, 2011). This operation resulted in the deaths of "74 people, including a member of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF), were killed and at least 54 people, including 28 members of the security forces, were injured" (Amnesty International, 2011, p. 6). An estimated 4,000 young men were found to be unlawfully detained by the security forces (Amnesty International, 2016b;

Jamaicans for Justice, 2010). These men ultimately had their fingerprints and pictures taken and were then released without charge by the police (Jamaicans for Justice, 2010). Coke was eventually found outside the community and arrested on 22 June 2010.

According to reports 800 soldiers and 370 police officers were engaged in the onslaught and faced off against what has been described as "hundreds of gunmen, recruited to defend Coke" who were stationed on rooftops across the community (Amnesty International, 2016b, p. 1). These people were gang members from across Jamaica that Coke had enlisted to help defend Tivoli Gardens (Commission of Enquiry, 2016). Heavy artillery such as mortars was employed by the armed forces throughout the operation. An estimated 37 rounds of mortars were used by the JDF in what has been described as "irresponsible and reckless" use of force by the state, especially within a densely populated urban community (Amnesty International, 2016b, p. 3; Schwartz, 2012a). What transpired in Tivoli Gardens during the Incursion was essentially a zone of conflict that highlighted the internal destabilisation of the state.

7.2.4   The Commission of Enquiry 2016 Report on the Tivoli Gardens Incursion

One of the primary source documents used to examine the concerns raised in security governance and failed state literature within the Jamaican context is the Report of the Commission Enquiry on the 2010 Tivoli Incursion. It provides crucial data regarding the manner in which the government and its security agents responded to the events taking place as well as the nature of the roles played by gang members, community residents and dons throughout the unrest. It was further used to examine

the implications that this operation had on the security environment as well as on the relationship between the state and the citizenry.

The Tivoli Gardens Incursion in May 2010 acted as a crucial watershed moment for Jamaica in which long standing tensions between gangs, political supporters and the security forces seemingly came to a head in one of the most violent incidents in recent history. Socio-political issues such as gang warfare, the consequences of prolonged inner-city poverty, human rights abuses by state actors, poor policing standards and the debilitating nature of crime and violence in certain urban spaces intertwined to produce a period of social discord and unmitigated violence across the country's capital. During the Incursion, according to official statistics, "the violence which took place resulted in the deaths of 73 civilians and 4 members of the security forces and injury to scores of other citizens and members of the forces" (Atkinson, 2014, p. 1). In the aftermath of the Incursion there were calls for an explanation concerning the actions of state agents during this period and for insights into how this situation could have been avoided and the steps required to prevent a recurrence. More importantly, there was a demand from the public for an explanation for the significant loss of life and for accountability to be affixed to the appropriate party.

In recognising this need for clarity, the Public Defender, Earl Witter, after providing his initial findings from his investigation into the Incursion recommended that a Commission of Enquiry be conducted under the Commissions of Enquiry Act (Atkinson, 2013).[30] The Public Defender's report was delivered to PNP led

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[30] The Public Defender submitted a report of his findings on 29 April 2013 to the Jamaican government. The Commissions of Enquiry Act was initially established in 1873 and amended in 2013. The 2013 section 7A amendment mandated that "before making an adverse finding against a person identifiable in a report, a Commission must give the person a written notice containing a copy of the proposed adverse comment and seek the person's written response

government at the time. As a result of Witter's recommendations, the then Governor General, the Most Excellent Sir Patrick Linton Allen, formally elected the Commission of Enquiry. The Commissioners selected to lead the enquiry were: Sir David Anthony Cathcart Simmons, K.A., B.C.H., Q.C., who was the Chairman of the Commission; Mrs. Justice Hazel Harris J.A. (Ret) C.D.; and Professor Anthony Harriott PhD (Report of the Commission of Enquiry, 2016). These commissioners were possibly selected based on their judicial expertise and extensive knowledge of criminology, Jamaica's security environment and gang culture. They were also selected as they were viewed as independent actors who would be able to provide an unbiased assessment of the Incursion. The Commission also received bi-partisan support with the JLP's Bruce Golding, who was Prime Minister during the Incursion, providing witness evidence (Commission of Enquiry Report, 2016). The Commission was initially instructed to conclude the Enquiry within three months, however, based on the magnitude of the investigation took much longer than initially anticipated. The final report was submitted on 10 June 2016, almost two years later (Sangster, 2017). The Commission conducted 9 public hearings between 1 December 2014 and 19 February 2016; and also took witness evidence in private. In total the Commission received evidence from 94 people that included residents, the former Prime Minister, Bruce Golding, members of the JCF and JDF, the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners of Police, the Political Ombudsman, Bishop Herro Blair, etc. (Report on the Commission of Enquiry, 2016).

The Terms of Reference of the Commission were very specific and focused on investigating: the reasons for the declaration of a state of Emergency whilst

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within 14 days after the notice is received" (Report of the Commission of Enquiry, 2016, p. 8).

apprehending Christopher 'Dudus' Coke; the circumstances that contributed to state security officers coming under gunfire; the circumstances that lead to the damage of police stations and property; the plans made to ensure the protection of Tivoli Gardens citizens; etc (Commission of Enquiry Report, 2016). In total, the Commission was charged with investigating 17 core issues but was also primarily committed to investigating the socio-political and economic conditions that facilitated the Incursion. In a basic summary of its duties and intent, the Commission asserted that the:

> Commission served to facilitate the voices of those who suffered and felt aggrieved. They were able to recount and even re-enact their experiences – with the nation as an audience. Secondly, the Enquiry served to highlight certain constraints on power in Jamaica's democracy. Symbols of accountability were seen through the testimony of the former Prime Minister and former Ministers. The Enquiry also provided a platform for demonstrating the accountability of the security forces. A third outcome of the Enquiry is surely that it was a mechanism for trying to resolve grievances against the State and contributing to the delivery of justice in Jamaica (Commission of Enquiry Report, 2016, p. 34).

The Commission thus acted as a formal documentation of the violence and atrocities that took place in Tivoli Gardens and surrounding communities in May 2010. It brought into light, and officially recognised the difficult socio-economic circumstances faced by communities in Jamaica and also highlighted the devastating impact that poverty, combined with a repressive gang culture has had on inner-city communities. The recommendations provided by the Commission also brought to the fore the need for relevant and significant policy and practice change in the public security sector.

7.3 The impact of Tivoli Gardens' Incursion on the Idea of Statehood in Jamaica

In considering the historical, political and social factors that underscored the events of May 2010 a nuanced configuration of state failure indicators emerges. These include 1) the loss of the state's central authority in Tivoli Gardens; 2) the subsequent assertion of de facto leadership by non-state criminal actors in the community; 3) the privatisation of public welfare goods and the establishment of privatised forms of public institutions by the leadership of the Shower Posse; 4) the undermining of the internal sovereignty of the state by the activities carried out by international drug trade and the U.S. demands for the extradition of a Jamaican citizen; and 5) the militarisation of the urban space by both state and non-state security actors which heighted the nature of the conflict and violence that ensued during the Incursion. The problematic political environment, the complex relationship between the residents, the gang and the state, and the economic poverty of the state that facilitated the rise of the Shower Posse all contributed to Tivoli Gardens falling into state failure. This section is therefore concerned with exploring the Tivoli Gardens Incursion through the lens of state failure literature to determine to what extent Jamaica meets the criteria set out in the literature.

7.3.1 A State in "Crisis"

Rotberg's (2004; 2003) criteria for state failure (see Chapter 2) posits that intercommunity violence, the inability of a state to control its internal and external borders and an increase in criminal violence are integral to failure. The nature of the state environment during the Incursion is indeed indicative of this. The threat of Coke's extradition essentially signalled the destabilisation of the state. In explaining his decision to implement a state of emergency and authorise the security forces to

enter Tivoli Gardens, Golding asserted that at that point "the country was in a crisis, the government was in a crisis, and I had to make a decision" (Schwartz, 2012b). What is significant about this statement is the acknowledgement, by the head of the state, that the country was unstable and that he was no longer able to maintain control. The state's crisis at this critical point is linked to the severe and crippling form of violence that gripped the city for several days. The nature of violence and conflict centred within the West Kingston urban space evolved from one that not only threatened the welfare of the citizens within that community, but which also threatened the state's identity as a figure of authority. This violence was engaged as a tool by a private non-state actor, Coke, to protect his economic and personal interests, and as a device for resisting the authority of the state.

In the final stages of state failure outlined by Rotberg (2002) citizens assume a position of formal protest against the state to highlight their grievances with a state infrastructure that is incapable of meeting their needs. Rotberg (2002) explains that the availability of weapons, the continued preoccupation with longstanding disputes between the state and the citizenry, and the desire to achieve some form of independence from the state ultimately provided the foundations for a violent conflict to evolve between the discontented populace and the state – thus contributing to its consequential failure. The convergence of these issues is mimicked in the events that occurred in Tivoli Gardens as this violent conflict came to fruition as a result of the historically contentious political and social relationship between the Jamaican state, Coke, and Tivoli Gardens residents who were often regulated to the periphery of the state system as a garrison community (see Chapter 4). In this situation the state attempted to reclaim its territory and authority from the gangs, whilst the residents of the community, and the gang leader, attempted to establish their own form of

autonomy and power against the state. The accessibility of a large cache of military grade weaponry (as evidenced by the mortars used by the state) further supports the idea that Jamaica was moving towards violent civil unrest, which is the final benchmark, according to Rotberg, of state failure (see Chapter 2).

The activities of the state security forces during the Incursion add further credence to the idea that the state was approaching a crisis point. As noted previously, one of the primary concerns about state policing in weak or failing states is the tendency of state security actors to engage in heavy handed use of force against the citizens (see Chapter 6). The JCF in particular has been charged with allegations of committing extra-judicial killings and not being able to temper its use of force by employing practices that abide by international human rights and policing guidelines when carrying out planned operations in communities. The Mobile Reserve Unit has been specifically targeted as one of the more problematic units within the JCF due to the relatively high amount of extra-judicial killings that it has been involved (see Chapter 6).

The actions of the JCF during the Incursion, and the resulting allegations of multiple extra-judicial killings and unlawful detentions of residents, contradicts its formal role as a public security force vested with the responsibility to protect the welfare of citizens of the state. As noted in witness testimony provided to the Commission of Enquiry, and its subsequent findings (see Box 7.1), the state lacked the critical ability to manage the action of its agents, and thus forfeited its social contract with the people by ignoring their inherent rights as citizens of the state (see Chapter 1). Hence, the state's legitimacy as a figure of authority is diminished.

Box 7.1. The Killing of Dwayne Edwards and Andre Smith

Circumstances surrounding the deaths Dwayne Edwards and Andre Smith

"Mr. Edwards observed police officers taking Dwayne and Andre upstairs Building #22. He "heard a barrage of shots coming from the second and third floors" of the building and saw the police officers come back downstairs. He said in evidence that when the officers came back downstairs, they said words to the effect: "You think we are fools. You think you can hide gunmen?" He saw police officers carry two bodies wrapped in sheets and the foot of a person was protruding from beneath the sheets." (p. 224)

Findings of the Commission

"We find that the evidence of Mr. Hemmings, Mr. Paulton Edwards and Ms. McCarthy was truthful. Dwayne Edwards and Andre Smith were taken away from the company of their family by police officers to an apartment upstairs in Building #22. All the evidence adduced strongly suggests that Dwayne and Andre were unlawfully killed by unidentified police officers. There is no evidence that the officers may have been acting in self-defence or under provocation. Such issues could hardly arise since the killings occurred after soldiers had cleared the building, according to the evidence... The evidence suggests, at a high level of probability, that a criminal offence may have been committed and we recommend that there be further investigation into the deaths of Dwayne Edwards and Andre Smith." (p. 225)

Source: Report on the Commission of Enquiry (2010, pp. 224-225)

Rotberg's assessment of failed states further emphasises the integral role in which conflict and the threat of intense violence plays in characterising states within this body of literature (Rotberg, 2004; 2002). In these instances, the state is forced to engage in armed conflict with non-state armed actors in an effort to stave off varying forms of rebellion which is often rooted in some form hostility between the state and non-state actors. Rotberg asserts that, "[f]ailure for a nation-state looms when violence cascades into all-out internal war", thus creating an internal zone of conflict in the state (Rotberg, 2002, p. 86). Evaluating Jamaica in this light provides the premise for

recognising when and how statehood can fall under threat if the potential for violent civil unrest is not appropriately addressed and prevented by the state. As Rotberg (2002) notes without properly employing the tools to arrest this process of the state falling into crisis its failure will be assured and result in complete collapse, as seen in the case of Somalia.

7.3.2 Coke's Challenge of the Authority of the State

As noted previously, the internal dynamics of a state, its ability to assert its control over the citizenry and maintain its monopoly on the use of violence are some of the main features of stable and strong statehood. These features are indicators that the state is recognised as the formal authority, and that the country exhibits a vertical power structure that allows the government to assume the top leadership position. However, the Tivoli Gardens Incursion highlighted the presence of an oppositional power structure that ultimately undermined the power and authority of the state. With the support of the Presidential Click/Shower Posse, as well as decades of support from the political elite, Coke was able to establish a new power structure that essentially undermined the state in marginalised garrison communities. As a non-state actor, the counterforce that Coke represented highlights the implications of having a pluralised governance structure that is not adequately controlled by the state (see Chapters 2 and 6).

The primary source of Coke's power, particularly as it related to Tivoli Gardens, was based on his ability to provide the necessary social welfare goods to the residents which helped to fill the welfare gap created by the absence of the state. Particularly as it related to security provision and the control of violence in the community prior to May 2010, the state was visibly absent and would often delegate the enforcement of laws to Coke and his gang. I.NGO1, 2016 confirmed that:

> the state basically failed to exercise its role in keeping the violence down. When there be shooting in a community the police often enough, prior to the incursion in Tivoli, the police would say let them kill them one another off. They'd come in to collect the dead bodies afterwards. They were not going to expose themselves to the shooting or anything of the sort... in general the state stayed out of Tivoli.

Security governance in this urban community was indeed dysfunctional; in that, rather than managing centralised authority in this space, the state relinquished its power to the gang and neglected it obligations to the residents of the community. Employment opportunities, financial support, education, health care and an effective judicial system was established in the community due to the profits made from the illegal activities of Coke's Presidential Click/Shower Posse. Social welfare provision was thus privatised by Coke and his criminal organisation.

The privatisation of public goods in this manner (see Chapter 6), coupled with the general disengagement of the state, facilitated the emergence of a contra state in Tivoli Gardens which the government was unable to penetrate due to its inability to sufficiently establish comprehensive social welfare programmes and adequate security for the residents of the community. The Incursion, however, highlighted the significant impact that decades of this form of privatised social welfare provision has had on the state's relationship with its citizenry, and its ability to effectively function within these urban spaces. As explained in a concept note prepared by the Ministry of National Security regarding the state's response to the May 2010 conflict:

> The May events hardened effects of an unbalanced engagement of residents of the area by the State, civil society and the private sector over a sustained period in all spheres of development. These communities manifest the symptoms associated with high levels of dysfunction and brokenness: degraded physical infrastructure including poor housing stock; poverty and generational unemployment; social exclusion and

geographic discrimination; the presence of criminal facilitators such as guns and drugs; and, dysfunctional social relations and conflict. As a consequence, crime, violence, anti-social and anti-State behaviour have been normalized in these areas and have influenced the consolidation of a culture and institutions that are oppositional towards the State. (Concept note, as quoted in the Ministry of National Security Crime Prevention and Community Safety Unit, 2010, p. 4)

The entrenched oppositional response to the state created by the presence of Coke highlights the problematic consequences of dysfunctional security governance at play in these marginalised communities. Rather than creating a space for the privatised provision of welfare goods to fill welfare support gaps left by the state, the relationship that Coke established within the community encouraged a culture of opposition that displaced the state as the primary authority. Once the state threatened to uproot Coke's culture of governance, the residents responded with equal force which aided in further entrenching the political and social divide between the community and the state. It should be noted that garrisons also fostered a space in which concerns related to social inequality (i.e., lack of social welfare, poor housing, and marginalisation of the poor) are replicated and reproduced. As the residents were highly dependent on the financial and social welfare support of the don and his gangs they were unlikely to be able to ascend the social ladder. The nature of the garrison was to not just to support but to also create an unbalanced relationship between them and the leadership that will keep the residents financially dependent. In so doing, these urban spaces became enclaves of failure within the state.

Gros (1996) argues that in some failed states the façade of centralised authority held by the leaders of the country is undermined by their inability to govern and exercise their power over certain territories within the state. Gros contends that the state's inability to assert central rule in these spaces is due to the presence of a

"counter-insurgency group (or groups)" that have assumed control over specific areas in the country which ultimately become off limits to the state (1996, p. 458). By exerting their power within these groups effectively created their own policing force, constitutions and economies to manage these spaces outside the formal infrastructure of the state (Gros, 1996). In his testimony to the Commission of Enquiry, Ellington, explained that the state was unable to conduct "regular policing in Tivoli Gardens" in the 30 years prior to 2010, in part due to the danger it posed for JCF officers going into the community (Commission of Enquiry, 2016, p. 21). This illustrates the extent to which the central authority and power of the state and its agents was severely hindered and undermined by the structures of power created by the gang in Tivoli Gardens. Centralised authority is also threatened in states like Haiti that have endured a long history of poor administrative and institutional infrastructure as well as lagging political system (Gros, 1996).

In the aftermath of the Incursion the state's visible inability in asserting its authority and presence in Tivoli Gardens is even more distinct. Participants for this project have noted that the state is still unable to improve the social living conditions for the residents in the absence of Coke. Coke's extradition has created a significant void in leadership, security and welfare provision for the community that the state appears to be unwilling to or incapable of filling (see Box 7.2). The state's inability to meet the social welfare needs of its citizens in the absence of non-state welfare providers is one of the more problematic features of a failing state. What this incident confirms is that in attempting to regain control of Tivoli Gardens the state created a post-conflict space that remains void of social development initiatives. It exhibits a failing state infrastructure that is still incapable of mitigating the impact of the residents losing their primary welfare provider (thus further entrenching the failure of

the community). Coke's removal highlights how effective his leadership of the community was and the extent to which the state, and the residents, depended on him for controlling the level of violence and maintaining structures of welfare provision.

Box 7.2. Views on the Impact of losing Coke's Support of Tivoli Gardens

> "When Dudus could have provided them with hundreds of books and school things and whatever else he provided that was not replaced by the state. So the people were left to go … and others were left to try to replace themselves with Dudus. To find ways of making themselves another leader because the state failed, the state failed to replace the social conditions, the social benefits that the dons were giving; and failed to provide for the people what it is that would make their lives different. So some of them would tell you that things have gotten worse because the state have failed to provide the resources to fix the light, to fix the road, to fix the housing conditions. ... To provide jobs, and job opportunities, and to provide employment skill training. So the void, the void was never filled. And policing it alone with law enforcement officers is not, cannot, be the solution because that's not what was missing. What was missing and what void was taken out, significant void, was the social benefit that was required to make a difference in the lives of people." (I.RO2,2016)
>
> "It change a lot and it make more violence going on becoz roun' dere mash up now. As I say frenz an' frenz warring now, yuh can talk of round dere about that dung in Denham Town an' Tivoli, because di one man weh did a run di place him gawn so every man have dem own don now. So some a dem a tek revenge becoz we have a man weh normally beat some man so some man when dem see dem man deh now yuh know dem attack dem becoz chru di place nah inna no orda yuh know? Nuh under no govancy so it lead back to fren a shoot fren now, fren a kill fren, fren a style fren." (I.TT3, 2016).

The Tivoli Gardens situation thus presents a strong representation of the manner in which the employment of dysfunctional security governance practices can aid in further entrenching social, economic and political divide within a society. Moreover, it highlights the implications that this framework can have on the integrity and stability of a state if it is facing an oppositional force that is far more capable of meeting the social welfare needs of a community. It supports the notion that within specific urban spaces in the Jamaican society non-state actors play an integral role in social welfare provision. Once this key non-state player is removed from the community a better picture of failing state institutions and welfare system is brought to the fore that further supports the idea that the infrastructure of the country is failing to meet the needs of its most marginalised communities.

7.4 Non-state Actors and the Pluralisation of Security – Facilitators of State Failure

This section highlights the critical role played by non-state actors during the Incursion and the impact they had in amplifying tensions between the state and the residents of Tivoli Gardens. It will focus on the threat created by both internal and external non-state actors and security providers during the Incursion and the extent to which the power they asserted aided in undermining the authority of the state. Of critical focus is the manner in which the introduction of mercenaries into the conflict forces a re-evaluation of the way in which they are portrayed within the security infrastructure of a Caribbean developing state, and the implications of this new type of security actor has on the functionality and stability of the state – particularly from a security perspective. As such, it calls into question how the establishment of a dysfunctional security governance environment by the state facilitated the emergence

of a counterinsurgency group acting under the authority of a powerful non-state actor which ultimately was able to threaten and destabilise the authority and power of the state during the Incursion. It further argues that with the ambiguous nature of security and welfare provision, and the assumption of authoritarian powers by non-state actors in inner-city and garrison communities like Tivoli Gardens, the presence and identity of the state is undermined and becomes non-existent in these spaces.

7.4.1   The Involvement of Mercenaries as an Oppositional Form of Non-state Security Provider

It is important to juxtapose the actions of the state security forces against the gang members and community residents who "defended" Tivoli Gardens during the Incursion in this discussion. The Commission of Enquiry described these individuals as an "army of gunmen" and "mercenaries" who patrolled Tivoli Gardens and were heavily armed with .50 rifles and AK 47s during the incursion (Commission of Enquiry, 2016, 59-60). According to Deputy Commissioner of Police Glenmore Hinds:

> Intelligence was that men from several areas of Jamaica were recruited into Tivoli Gardens, where they joined forces with men from Tivoli Gardens and were patrolling the community with high-powered weapons...Thirty men from one community – Rose Town – went in armed with rifles and gunmen were being paid $30 000 per person. ... Other men came from Waterford, Mountain View Avenue, May Pen and Clarendon and they were armed (Commission of Enquiry, 2016, p. 59)

Captain Anderson from the JDF suggested that these mercenaries were paid between "$75000 to $100000 to come to Tivoli" (Commission of Enquiry, 2016, p. 59). The presence of mercenaries during the Incursion is integral to the understanding how this

group of private security actors have enhanced hostilities between the state and the community of Tivoli Gardens.

Mercenary forces are traditionally characterised in relation to countries such as Sierra Leone, New Guinea and Angola that have experienced periods of internal violent disputes (Aning, 2001; Mandel, 2001). They are depicted as "soldiers who are hired by a foreign government or rebel movement to contribute to the prosecution of armed conflict" (Nathan, 1997). The introduction of mercenaries into this conflict between the state and Coke however reinforces a problematic theme that defines failing statehood which focuses on the extreme power held by non-state actors and their ability to assume armed control over a territory and assert an illegitimate monopoly on the use of violence and force in the state system. The purpose of introducing these private security actors into the events of May 2010 was to escalate the violent conflict with the state and to forcibly challenge the operations of the public security forces. The situation that evolved during the Incursion was tantamount to two warring factions (i.e., the state security forces and Coke's mercenaries) engaging in armed conflict for (a) the territory of Tivoli Gardens and (b) the ability to assert its authority over residents of the community. The challenge the state thus endured from the mercenaries was intended to destabilise its functionality by attacking its security infrastructure. The fact that these mercenaries were also equipped with high powered military weaponry similar to that of the JCF and JDF further reinforces the idea that Coke was not only the leader of a drug gang but was able to command a fully functioning army for the purposes of protecting the integrity of his enclave/contra state.

The introduction of mercenaries as an oppositional security force during the incursion provides a new outlook on the manner in which private security is

conceptualised in Jamaica and its influence on statehood. Based on interviews conducted for this thesis, PSCs are considered a critical appendage to state security as they act in a supportive role to the JCF by filling security and policing gaps in areas the police are unable to respond to due to a lack in resources and capabilities. These companies have often been viewed as a helpful resource for the state and as a result have been positively incorporated into the state's security architecture.

As illegitimate private security actors operating in marginalised communities, mercenaries on the other hand, provide a contradictory response to the idea of a positive private security sector; and they highlight the negative implications that this landscape of varying actors has on the stability and integrity of the state. This conceptualisation of these actors proves that, though they may be used to provide security in marginalised communities, they can also become a destabilising force that is capable of enhancing the nature of conflict and violence experienced within the state. The presence of mercenaries in Jamaica also adds another facet to the typology of non-state actors that pose a challenge to the authority and power of the state, as their presence and the power they yield in situations similar to the Incursion are not generally recognised as a critical concern to the state. It is integral to highlight that by introducing mercenaries into a conflict that had political, economic and social unrest undertones, Coke laid the foundations for the possibility of initiating an internal civil unrest (that had the potential of evolving into a civil war) between the state and the armed mercenaries he employed to defend Tivoli Gardens. As this group of ANSAs were essentially paid for their services to Coke the concern is raised as to whether or not Jamaica is susceptible to the same factors that have facilitated civil conflict in some African countries (Musah and Fayemi, 2000) that display similar features of failed statehood.

7.4.2   The U.S. as an Intervening Destabilising Force

Failed state literature recognises the importance of a state's ability to maintain its positive sovereignty as a signal of its success (Hill, 2005; Jackson, 1990). At the core of the idea of positive sovereignty is the idea that the state maintains its autonomy from the influence of external actors. Hill notes that "a successful state not only has international legal or *de jure* recognition of its statehood, but the government and organs of that state also possess the capabilities to project and protect their authority throughout the entirety of their sovereign territory and enter into collaborative arrangements with other governments" (Hill, 2005, p. 146). One of the most significant aspects of the Incursion that underlines the notion that Jamaica's positive sovereignty was being challenged was the integral role played by the United States. By initiating the extradition request for Coke the United States asserted its authority into the national politics of the country. Moreover, even after expressed disagreements with the government with the manner in which evidence was collected against Coke that facilitated the extradition request, the United States still insisted that the state extradite a Jamaican national to face charges.

It is clear from the comments made by Golding that the government was under significant amount of pressure by the United States to handover Coke (see Box 7.3). This interplay between the U.S. and Jamaica is integral to describing the country as a failed state as it confirms that to a significant degree the state is still unable to assert its autonomy against more powerful countries. There is still an element of intervention and political colonialization existing in Jamaica's state system which prevents it from appropriately resisting the demands of international actors like the United States. An example of this is the threat of "decertification" by the U.S. if Jamaica engaged in any

programmes that went against the illegal drug policies of the United States. Golding stated that the state did in fact consider the legalisation of marijuana,

> But we couldn't get very far. And we couldn't get very far because the United States made it very clear to us that any move we make in that direction would almost certainly lead to decertification. And that decertification carries horrendous consequences.... Each year, the President of the United States issues a list of countries that are decertified, which means that these countries are not doing enough in the fight against drugs, and therefore, you encounter problems in terms of technical programs, aid programs, even raising funds commercially. You don't want to be on that decertified list (Schwartz, 2012).

This dependent relationship that Jamaica still maintains with the U.S. undermines its autonomy as a state and fosters an unbalanced relationship between the two countries. This relationship mimics that of its colonial past with Britain in which Britain maintained a form of power and control that enabled it to freely dictate how the internal operations of the state should be managed.

Box 7.3. Bruce Golding's Opposition to U.S. Extradition Request

> "That would be wrong. The U.S. made it very clear from the beginning of this Coke issue that the extradition of Coke to the United States was an issue of fundamental importance — not at the time when the operation in Tivoli took place, they made that clear from the very beginning, that they attached great importance to Coke's extradition.
>
> And as you probably know, we said to them, 'The process you have used is wrong.' There is a provision in our constitution that guarantees the right to privacy of communication, such as telephone calls. Parliament passed a law that allows that right to be abridged, provided certain things are satisfied. There must be reasonable suspicion that it is necessary in the interest of public safety, the pursuit of criminals, and so on. But parliament was so cautious in allowing that right to be abridged that

parliament said, 'Before you can do that you must go to a judge of the Supreme Court, present your case, and get the judge to authorize it.'"

Source: Golding as quoted in Schwartz (2012b)

Golding's comments also place into focus and confirm the problem of state incapacity that is commonly experienced by failed states. Positively sovereign states are recognised as being capable of providing for the general social welfare needs of their citizenry, without having to seek assistance from both national and external non-state actors. As highlighted by Jackson (1990), "A positively sovereign government is one which not only enjoys rights of non-intervention and other international immunities but also possesses the wherewithal to provide political goods for its citizens" (Jackson, 1990, p. 29; see also Hill; 2005). By depending on the assistance of a foreign government like the U.S. for critical aid and the establishment of technical programmes designed to support the state's infrastructure the Jamaican state is confirming that it lacks the institutional capacity and capability to provide for its people. The intervention of the U.S. from an aid perspective, coupled with the apparent incursion into the political and economic substructure of Jamaica confirms the weakened institutional capacity of the government and its inability to prevent the unwanted intrusion of external actors in the internal operations of the state.

Recognising Jamaica's sovereignty in this light complements the literature related to the consequences of historical and modern forms of colonialism on statehood. It frames Jamaica within a network of states that is incapable of functioning without the direct support of external international partners – thus putting them at a disadvantage in the global state system. It also suggests that though Jamaica identifies as an independent state, the structures of statehood that were left after gaining full independence are still not developed adequately enough to support the welfare needs

of the entire Jamaican populace. The legacy of poor institution building in a post-colonial society is still present in the Jamaican state and still highlighted in its inability to assert its autonomy in the shadows of U.S. authority.

There is however an integral caveat to the idea that in order to be considered successful all states must exhibit full positive sovereignty. Although the idea of being able to provide for its citizenry without the external intervention of a foreign state is indeed ideal, and a much sought after aspiration for many post-colonial developing states, the reality is that positive sovereignty is not possible for most states. For many post-colonial states the practice of accepting international aid from countries in the Global North has become integral for maintaining their functionality and developing the country's infrastructure. In light of this, the question that does come to the fore is whether or not the JLP led government did in fact have a choice in rejecting the U.S extradition request for Coke.

Although the government had a right to dismiss any formal request from a foreign government for the surrender of one of its citizens, the repercussions of this action would present significant implications for the citizens. Between 2007 and 2010 Jamaica received on average US$12.7 million annually from the U.S in aid (Sullivan, 2010). This aid was provided for the "Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Funds (ESF) for USAID to implement a variety of development projects" in Jamaica (Sullivan, 2010, p. 7). As a result, the notion of maintaining its positive sovereignty becomes tenuous for Jamaica as it has to decide whether to either risk the loss of critical developmental support in an attempt to prevent foreign intervention or choose to harbour a known drug don. However, the reality of the situation that Jamaica was placed in was that the notion of full positive sovereignty, though ideal, is not

entirely possible for post-colonial states that lack the infrastructure that would allow them to function independently of external developmental support.

7.5   Conclusion

The Tivoli Gardens Incursion highlights some of the concerns features in state failure literature; in that, it depicted a state experiencing conflict (almost verging on civil war), intercommunity violence, and an increase in criminal violence. It also highlighted a state in which the political fabric, i.e., the governing class was unable to or unwilling to exercise the authority of the state within the community of Tivoli Gardens. The sovereignty of the state was not only challenged externally by the U.S. but also by the internal forces of the gangs that prevented the state from defending its internal borders. The power of the state at this point was destabilised by the power held by non-state actors.

However, the Incursion also exemplified the interconnection of the concerns raised in both state failure and security governance literatures within the Jamaican context. These include the dysfunctional relationship between state and non-state actors and the destabilising impact of the privatisation and pluralisation of security. Within this intersection also exists the more nuanced indicators of social, political and economic factors that further facilitated the breakdown of the state system in May 2010. The relationship between the political elite and the gangs was underscored by systemic and historical political patronage and corruption which not only undermined the power of the state in Tivoli Gardens but prevented it from objectively addressing its role and responsibilities to its citizens as a governing body in responding to Coke's extradition request. The loyalties of the state became blurred in this instance which ultimately contributed to its weakened position as an authority figure once the

Incursion was initiated. By illustrating diminished capacity in Tivoli Gardens for decades, the state forfeited its authority within the urban space to the dons and gangs that managed it. The absence of the state created an enclave of failure which aided in replicating and reproducing forms of social inequalities that occurred as a result of lack of state intervention and investment in community. It thus created a welfare gap that was filled by non-state actors that eventually established systems that privatised public welfare goods and services.

The Incursion further highlighted the troubling degree in which state failure in Jamaica can be manifested in the security environment. The Incursion emphasised the problematic nature of public security, highlighted in the heavy-handed and violent approach it assumed in quelling the violence and asserting state control in the community, (see Chapters 5 and 6). It also illustrated the destabilising impact of privatised security on the state. The introduction of mercenary forces as a more militarised form of private security in Jamaica illustrated a level of oppositional security force that was never represented in Jamaica before. In combining its strength with that of gang members and the residents that fought in the Incursion against the state civil unrest was displayed that pitted the state against non-state criminal actors. The security environment in this instance became the space of conflict, but also an illustration of the power struggle and pursuit of central authority engaged by the state and its non-state counterparts.

The Incursion also highlighted yet another important feature of state failure in Jamaica that has not been fully appreciated in the literature which is its temporal and spatial aspect. Though Tivoli Gardens has been characterised as an enclave of failure the operationalisation of this type of failure primarily occurred in May 2010, before which it was contained within the confines of the community. Once Coke was

extradited to the U.S. the community, and indeed the rest of Jamaica returned to some degree of normality and stability. In so doing, another increment of the state indicating signs of failure came to an end. Much like the Labour Rebellion of 1938, and many instances of election violence in the nation's history that showcased some elements of failure (see Chapter 4), the state once again fell into a temporary period of instability that was re-set once tensions dissipated. Thus highlighting the idea that failure, in states that exhibit the similar features to Jamaica, can be considered a temporal concept.

Additionally, state failure based on the Tivoli Gardens example is manifested geographically. The main conflict and violence that occurred was situated within the community, areas inhabited by middle to upper class residents was largely unaffected. However, with incidents of violence escaping into communities like Mountain View, the important concern of it affecting the stability of the entire state became a key concern. As such, although Jamaica has exhibited a long history of 'enclaves of failure' existing in its marginalised inner-city communities, the potential of this failure expanding to other areas of the state becomes a real threat.

The concluding chapter of this thesis will therefore examine the key findings of this examination of state failure and security governance in Jamaica. Based on these findings it will put forward several contributions that the thesis makes to the literatures and in understanding the nature of Jamaica and other states that exhibit similar features of statehood.

8 Conclusion and Epilogue

This thesis sought to examine the link between the concerns raised in failed state and security governance literatures in the context of Jamaica. By using Jamaica as a primary case study several key findings and contributions were uncovered that are geared at enhancing the manner in which these two bodies of literatures are treated in relation to each other; and which also sheds new light on the way in which some post-colonial states are identified and treated in the international state system. This chapter therefore seeks to first respond to the research questions; secondly, it will provide a brief reflection of security and socio-political issues in the aftermath of the 2010 Tivoli Gardens Incursion; and finally, outline the core contributions that this thesis seeks to offer to scholarship on state failure and security governance.

8.1 Key Findings

The primary basis for initiating a study on the nature of the Jamaican state was to examine the core features that have affected its development prospects; its status within the international system, and the desire to delve further into the complex and highly dynamic relations between various actors at play in the country. This section will therefore respond to the research questions in order to highlight the key findings of the thesis.

In responding to the first research question, (*What are the connections between security governance and state failure?*) it is important to identify the features that both literatures have in common. The thesis asserts that factors such as social inequalities, the impact of urban segregation, violence, conflict systems of patronage and corruption as well as the complex relationships between state and non-state actors are

in fact illustrated to varying degrees in both literatures. For example, the concern of stark social inequalities as a key feature of failed statehood is connected to the manner in which security privatisation and pluralisation is treated in the security governance literature; in that, the ability of some segments of the society to access private forms of security is directly related to the level of wealth they exhibit. Private security for the rich upper classes is more accessible than for poverty stricken lower classes. This inequality in accessing privatised goods is consequently translated onto the physical space which is segregated based on the income inequality demonstrated in the society. The two literatures, as presented in this thesis, should not therefore be explored independently of each other but should be assessed interdependent in the Jamaican context.

The concerns that connect both literatures ultimately converge and are manifested in the Tivoli Gardens Incursion of May 2010. The thesis notes that issues that are connected to social inequalities in a state such as poverty and urban segregation (features of state failure) became more problematic once tensions reached their apex between state and non-state actors in the months prior to the Incursion. The pluralisation and privatisation of the security environment (features of security governance) which introduced mercenaries as a new security actor created a situation in which conflict and violence were used as tools by the state and non-state actors to reassert their authority within the community. In so doing, what features during this episode is a convergence of problematic societal issues that ultimately facilitated the failure of the state. The critical connection that all these issues illustrate is the fact that they feature heavily within failed state and security governance literatures; but also, that to an extent, they co-exist in a framework that is necessary in order for them to be functional in their respective literatures. As such, it is important to recognise this link

in order to provide a more in-depth appreciation of the issues emerging out of states that may threaten or support their stability.

The thesis has further noted that a more nuanced conception of statehood in Jamaica is achieved by examining Jamaica (and other similar states) against the failed state framework – ultimately facilitating a different perspective on how to approach the country's future development goals. One of the emergent issues that played a role in the development of this thesis is that there has not been, to date, a comprehensive analysis of Jamaica in light of failed state literature. Though researchers such as Harriott and Jaffe have suggested that a convergence of its political divisiveness and gang culture have created a problematic hybrid state, the incapacities and the reduced central authority of the state in certain spaces have not been recognised to be indicative of some degree of failure. By assigning Jamaica to this typology of states this thesis sheds new light on the lack of accountability for states and other power-holders and the need to establish a revised social contract; the high presence of conflict and violence in certain spaces and social inequalities. However, the implications on the development goals of the nation and the need to establish a revised social contract between the citizens and the state, though critical, go beyond the full scope of this thesis. As such, the intention of this thesis is to put forward these concerns as issues to be developed upon and explored in greater detail in future research on state failure, and more specifically on Jamaica.

More critically, with the impact of the events of 24 May 2010 in Tivoli Gardens (see Chapter 7) still resonating throughout the society, categorising Jamaica in failed state literature facilitates a more comprehensive appreciation of the background concerns that facilitated the initial tensions; the reasons behind the intense escalation of violence between the state, the residents and the gang; and an understanding of the

behaviours and presence of non-state actors that had not been previously acknowledged as critical players in the state environment, i.e. the mercenaries (see Chapter 6). The introduction of mercenaries into the state system highlights an elevated status of failure within the state and to some degree places it on par with other confirmed failed states that are contending with the impact of having mercenaries as private security actors (Musah et al., 2000; Reno, 1997). Additionally, the thesis also establishes the need to explore the extended implications of state failure in Jamaica beyond the manner in which it manifested in Tivoli Gardens – and as such, will ultimately facilitate new analytical input about Jamaica and a better understanding of failed states.

The core finding revealed by Chapter 1 is that the concept of statehood, and the manner in which it manifests across the state system, is not fixed and is changeable based on the capacity and capability of the state. As highlighted in the chapter, many states, particularly post-colonial states, are often recognised as weak or failing because they exhibit prevailing issues such as intercommunity violence, ongoing conflict, poor welfare infrastructures and a government that is unable and/or unwilling to provide political goods to its people (Rotberg, 2004; 2003). Successful states, on the other hand, represent the opposite of this and are capable of meeting the long-term needs of their populace. However, one of the core findings of this thesis is that there are states like Jamaica that exists on a continuum and which exhibits signs of both success and failure within the state system (see Chapters 1 and 3). More specifically, the thesis finds that Jamaica exhibits "pockets of failure" throughout its urban landscape. Therefore, the idea of permanency of statehood in a specific territory should be reconsidered as a fluid and incremental process and which is also spatial.

Similarly, in examining security governance literature it reveals that state failure or success can in fact be predicated on the way the security governance framework of a state is managed. For states like Jamaica (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6) failure is manifested in the security environment. With the multiplicity of state and non-state actors vying for authority and facilitating structures of socio-economic inequalities due to the privatisation of security, a social environment comes to the fore that is unequal and heavily divided based on socio-economic standing. As a result, social inequalities are therefore reproduced and replicated within this system and acts as another indicator of state failure. Hence, the idea of security governance becomes a heavily laden term that is surrounding by issues related to the stark social inequalities that exist, accountability, regulation, the rights of citizens to demand and receive certain political goods from the state, and the implications that emerge when the state is supported and/or undermined by non-state actors.

In trying to answer *how does a nation's colonial history and post-colonial identity affect state failure and security governance?,* Chapter 4 notes that the adversarial nature of the political environment in Jamaica fostered a society that was divided based on race, class and political affiliation. The emergence of the garrison communities in which both the PNP and JLP were able to secure enclaves of political support also fostered the growth of states within the state whereby non-state actors such as gangs and criminal dons became the primary benefactor and leaders of the communities. By affiliating with a political party and dealing with poor welfare infrastructures and limited access to state services, the garrison exemplified the geographical separation between members of rival political parties and highlighted the absence of state infrastructures from these communities. By tacitly handing over the governing of these spaces to non-state actors like criminal dons, the state voided its

responsibilities to its citizens – forcing them to seek political goods and services outside the formal state environment.

Additionally, adversarial politics supported structures of patronage, clientelism and political corruption that aided in undermining the authority of the state and the control it had in some urban spaces. In Jamaica's case, with the emergence of garrisons and the dons there was a noticeable shift from state provision to a system of patronage to a 'warlord' form of privatization of public goods. Eventually, dons no longer relied on political parties for support and were able to establish their own source of income, through illegal trade, which would to some extent trickle down to the residents of their communities (Munroe and Blake, 2017; Sives, 2002). Due to the absence of the state and limited access to political goods and services garrison communities became synonymous with poverty, criminality, violence and the de-facto leadership of the don. Conversely, communities that were not politically affiliated and comprised of middle to upper classes were able to gain easier access to various social goods and services. The state's presence was also far more prominent and functional in these spaces. The Jamaican urban landscape was therefore divided based on social, political and economic lines; in that, the two main political parties created distinct political garrisons in which residents represented the lower socio-economic strata of the society. On the other end of the spectrum was another type of society that was not affiliated with adversarial politics but was able to establish strong communities of wealth with the support of the state. In so doing, the on-going impact was the further entrenchment of social inequalities throughout the state and instability in specific areas. The two-party political system is therefore found to have been one of the initial factors that supported the emergence of a socially divided state, but which also

encouraged and reinforced features of state failure that are primarily evident in garrison and inner-city communities.

This research question is further addressed in Chapter 5 where focus was placed on the impact that a colonial and post-colonial identity may have on the security governance infrastructure of a state. The findings suggest that with specific regard to the nation's political identity and security infrastructure, because Jamaica's state system was modelled on the policies and practices of its former colonial leaders, the opportunity to create its own individual political identity and security environment was never granted. By inheriting the Westminster style of government, and the RIC policing methods, structures of social inequalities that existed in the colonial period persisted (Sutton, 1999). This essentially created a state system that marginalised the poor and protected the political elite – which still resonate in today's society.

The heavy handed and militaristic policing practices of the RIC were adopted into Jamaica's policing tactics and have become a significant and highly problematic feature of modern day public policing, especially in marginalised communities (Sinclair, 2006; Brogden, 1987; Jefferies, 1952) (see Chapters 5 and 6). In an effort to combat the problematic nature of state policing, many members of marginalised and impoverished communities have relied on the support of dons and criminal gangs who offered their own form of community policing and justice system (Harriott, 2015; 2008). In many cases due to a lack in confidence in the JCF, or because of its lack of resources, members of these communities preferred to take their grievances to the community dons – in most cases grievances were addressed and resolved with expediency. Though this type of private policing directly contradicted state policing, it was efficient and accessible for inner city residents. As a result, one of the key findings of this thesis is that traditional structures of policing and security provision

inherited from Jamaica's post-colonial leaders reinforced structures of social inequalities and implanted problematic policing practices that continued to affect the disenfranchised. In response to this, marginalised communities created their own structures of security and protection in order to safeguard themselves against abuses of the state whilst ensuring their security needs were addressed.

The final research question asks: *What are the implications of the shift from security government to security governance on the understanding of state failure in Jamaica?* Though varying forms of policing and security provision emerged in response to either the lack of state capacity, the unwillingness to trust public security due to its acknowledged abuses, or the ability of some residents being able to afford commoditised forms of private security, a crisis has developed due to the plethora of actors present that has essentially destabilised the state as the central authority. With a multiplicity of actors assuming control and providing security in several urban spaces across the island the centralised control of the state essentially diminishes, especially in garrison communities. Although formal structures of justice and security are still in place, within marginalised communities lead by criminal dons a different infrastructure comes to the fore that undercuts the authority of the state.

Similarly, the idea of accountability becomes problematic with the involvement of private non-state actors in the security sector. Though the state may be able to more effectively regulate PSCs in wealthier urban spaces, these firms are still held accountable by their clients – thus side-lining the state's authority in this network (Eriksen and Sending, 2013; Ifidon, 1996) (see Chapter 1). Similarly, as the state is unable to regulate and demand transparency in how dons and criminal and community gangs provide security in inner-city communities the idea of accountability becomes impossible to achieve as there are no checks and balances put in place to control the

practices of these actors. As such, whereas the pluralisation of the security environment by both state and non-state actors have provided much needed access to security and protection for both the marginalised poor and wealthy communities of Jamaica, it has also created a network of tension between the state and the private actors vying for some form of power and authority in each space (see Chapter 6). The delivery of security as a good and service is thus unequal and regulated to varying degrees with more wealthier communities being able to afford more accountable and stable PSCs, whilst residents living in inner-city and garrison communities having to seek security with less checks and balances from dons and gangs.

8.2   Key Contributions

The thesis seeks to make several contributions regarding the Jamaican state and the way in which failed state and security governance literatures are applied to states across the globe. More specifically, it offers insights into the way in which some post-colonial states are treated and categorised in the state system. These contributions therefore include 1) understanding Jamaica within the failed state literature; 2) acknowledging the interconnection between the concerns highlighted in failed state and security governance literatures; 3) applying the idea of state failure to post-colonial states as well as to others that are traditionally viewed as successful/strong to add a nuanced understanding of statehood in the international system; and 4) bringing methodically new insights into the capacity of the state.

Firstly, one of the main contributions this thesis offers conceptually is the idea that state failure and state success are not primarily phenomena that affect an entire nation, but can also be identified at the community level and exist alongside spaces of success in the same state. As in the case of Jamaica, pockets of state failure emerge

across the urban landscape and are often evident beside urban spaces that exhibit more stable features of state functionality (see Chapter 4 and 6). The state therefore illustrates its functionality and stability on a continuum, in which some urban spaces demonstrate the traditional features of failure, whilst others can be identified as strong/successful spaces. In so doing, a new outlook on how failure is presented in states emerges.

Similarly, based on the Jamaican example, state failure is not a permanent and ongoing condition, but rather emerges at varying points in a nation's historical development. The Tivoli Gardens Incursion represents one such incident in which ultimate failure (verging on collapse) is evident as a result of the state reaching a point of crisis in its relationship with non-state actors in a marginalised community. The concern that this incident of state failure brings to the fore is how will the state be able to mitigate against it spreading to other parts of the nation? What will become of the state if another internal conflict like the Incursion occurs, but on a larger scale? The contributions that this thesis therefore puts forward is that though failure in states like Jamaica may seem incremental and geographically contained, without establishing a cohesive plan to address the underlying flaws in the state infrastructure that facilitated the emergence of this problematic space, the state does risk falling into full and complete failure in the future. By addressing socio-economic inequality, structures of governance, the roles and positions of authority held by non-state actors of all kinds as well as creating a more stable and functional welfare system in marginalised communities that is void of the influence of partisan politics, state failure can be mitigated.

Secondly, the thesis posits that social inequalities are replicated and reproduced in states where state failure exists in tandem with a problematic security

governance framework. Security governance fosters a state environment that is dependent on multiple non-state actors, working alongside state actors, to fulfil the basic welfare needs of the citizenry (Ehrhart et al., 2014; Sperling, 2010; Bryden, 2006). In so doing, non-state actors essentially facilitate the privatisation and commoditisation of public goods and services, like security. The resulting implication is that wealthy individuals are able to access private security from a multiplicity of PSCs (that operate with the formal authority of the state); whilst their poorer neighbours are forced to rely on the inadequate security of the state, or on that which is provided by non-state players like community dons (see Chapters 4 and 6). This creates a system of accountability and legitimacy that is differential, and which further marginalises poorer communities to the outskirts of the state institutional environment. The state's ability and willingness to regulate these different forms of private security is also differential and tends to leave more marginalised communities at risk of abuse by non-state security actors like criminal gangs and dons as their practices are not mandated or regulated by the state. The nature and quality of security an individual and/or community is able access is therefore dependent on its socio-economic standing, further entrenching the socio-economic inequalities of the state. This finding suggests that linking state failure and security governance can collectively contribute to the entrenchment of social inequalities across an urban landscape, thus adding a defining feature to the joint study of both literatures.

When considering the impact of the security governance framework within spaces demonstrating failed statehood, it can be viewed as a facilitating mechanism of social conflict between the state and the populace. Though the literature suggests that security governance should be considered a neutral aspect of statehood this thesis is suggesting that it is an active feature that is able to facilitate and entrench problematic

features of state failure. For example, the Tivoli Gardens Incursion was not merely indicative of the state losing its authority and power in a specific urban space, but the consequence of multiple non-state actors assuming central authority within an urban space over several decades and becoming the de-facto leaders and security providers of that space (Harriott, 2015; 2008). As the state relaxed its control, allowing dons to assume a bigger position of authority in the community, security provision, along with other welfare services, became privatised and managed by the dons. These dons in turn were able to establish their own contra state that essentially marginalised Tivoli Gardens from the rest of the state system (Blake, 2013; Kerr, 1997). Once the state attempted to reclaim its control and authority of the community the pluralised nature of Tivoli Gardens' security environment contested the power of the state.

What ultimately developed was security governance becoming a tool of internal social conflict; in that, state actors such as the JCF and the JDF (which provides and controls public security) are engaging in violent confrontation with non-state actors like criminal gangs and mercenaries, with residents becoming co-opted fighters for the dons (see Chapters 6 and 7). But for the fact that a security governance environment was operationalised in Tivoli Gardens the state would not have witnessed such intense conflict and ultimately descend into contained failure.

A third contribution made by this thesis is that given the nature of failed statehood present in Jamaica, there is reason to evaluate some post-colonial states against this literature. Though conducting one case study into failed statehood cannot be applied on a general basis to represent phenomena in a wide variety of states it lays the foundations for developing research that is geared at evaluating statehood in post-colonial states from a different perspective, one which suggests that state failure is incremental and capable of existing in marginalised spaces within a state alongside

more successful examples of statehood. The literature tends to argue that given their fractured governance, intense and ongoing conflict and debilitating forms of poverty there is a certain grouping of post-colonial states that exemplify the issues in failed state literature. In fact, in most literature that discusses the conceptualisation of failure in these terms the post-colonial state is often used as the exemplar for failure (Bilgin and Morton, 2010; Brooks, 2005; Rotberg, 2003; Gros, 1996).

The challenging nature of the Jamaica's state system is not a newly developed phenomenon but caused by a state infrastructure that is based heavily on a problematic colonial environment. As a post-colonial state, Jamaica inherited a social system that was divisive, and which marginalised sectors of the populace based on their race and socio-economic status (see Chapters 4 and 5). It further established a political culture that highlighted similar racial and socio-economic divisions, as well as one which was adversarial in nature and enabled varying modes of violence and conflict to become entrenched in its fabric. The security infrastructure that was similarly inherited from colonial rule further aided in reinforcing and entrenching these inequalities and the marginalisation of poor segments of the society from the rich and political elite (see Chapters 4 and 5). In so doing, areas of poverty versus that of extreme wealth emerged across the urban landscape; and access to welfare goods and social opportunities were disparate and determined based on an individual's wealth and position in the nation's class structure - hence, replicating social, political and economic class structures evident during the colonial period.

This project suggests, however, that there is a category of post-colonial states that should be evaluated against this typology of states. Like Jamaica, these other states may indicate incremental failure, social inequality and structural and systemic forms of violence and conflict that gradually impact on the state infrastructure and which

threatens the overall stability of the state once the failure is no longer confined to the urban spaces it is evident in. The thesis posits that in evaluating post-colonial states against this framework these states should be considered on an individual basis placing more emphasis on the nuances of the state infrastructure, rather than treated with a broad stroke.

An argument for evaluating post-colonial states based on the Jamaican framework can therefore be made. Unlike some post-colonial African countries, failure in states like Jamaica is incremental and geographically situated, thus highlighting the difference between how state failure is manifested in various post-colonial states. For state failure to be identified the project suggests that it does not need to be established on a large nationwide scale, but evident within certain communities across the urban space. Post-colonial states exhibiting similar features of state breakdown and incapacity, high levels of violence, conflicting structures of power and authority, and the inability of the state to deliver political goods to populations in concentrated areas of its urban space (Rotberg, 2003; Gros, 1996) should therefore be evaluated based on the state failure framework illustrated by Jamaica, as it provides for a more nuanced examination of their state environment, and a more tailored approach to addressing these issues.

Additionally, the thesis suggests that there needs to be a more nuanced critique in examining states in light of failed state literature which would change how states in both the Global North and the Global South are evaluated. For example, on the surface, cities like Los Angeles and Washington D.C. do not display the classic signs of failure illustrated in state literature. They both are situated within the United States, a nation of the Global North, which is considered the benchmark of development and state success. However, a closer examination of the nature of these cities highlights the fact

that they exhibit signs of state failure; in that, both cities are indicative of severe social inequalities, and are affected by the destabilising role of gang violence and conflict (especially in Los Angeles). The social inequalities present in Los Angeles are extensive and there is distinct urban segregation between rich and poor communities (Tobar, 2015; Gottlieb et al., 2005). The communities of the ultra-rich are situated under a mile away from poverty stricken communities – highlighting the stark socio-economic disparities existing within the confines of the city (Tobar, 2015; Gottlieb et al., 2005). The civil disturbances of April 1992, based on the racial tensions of the period (Gottlieb et al., 2005; Pastor, 1995), also act as a significant indicator (as in the case of Jamaica) of the city showcasing an incremental form of failure. Much like the Tivoli Gardens Incursion and many periods of election violence, the Los Angeles riots were temporary, and once quelled, the city returned to a normal level of stability. However, there still remains an undercurrent of social, political, racial and economic concerns that threaten to destabilise the city once again. Washington D.C. displays a similar construction by exhibiting high levels of income inequality (Holmes and Berube, 2016). Washington D.C. is recognised as one of the wealthiest U.S. cities, but based on the national average, it is also home to the largest amount of poor people in the United States (Tuths, 2016; Simpson, 2014). The city had the "third-widest gap between wealthy and poor among the 50 biggest U.S" (Simpson, 2014). Along with other factors, both cities are indicative of both failure and success existing at the same time and in the same space, like Jamaica.

Based on these features it may be argued that both cities can be viewed as exhibiting some degree of incremental failure. This depiction of these cities ultimately has wider implications for state failure literature as it shows blurring of traditional divisions between the Global North/developed and the Global South/underdeveloped

nations. It brings forward the idea that state failure cannot be predicated on traditionally held categorisation of states but is a fluid concept that is dependent on the changing internal nature, capacity, capability of a state and its diverse urban landscape.

The fourth contribution to knowledge made by this thesis is the methodological approach to conducting research in challenging state environments. Chapter 3 highlights the difficulties encountered by the researcher attempting to conduct field research in Jamaica. The challenges encountered helped to shine a light on state failure as it impacts on a research setting. Access became one of the more challenging aspects of conducting research (Amnesty International, 2016; Blake, 2013). This thesis suggests that research access in Jamaica is used as a tool of the state to assert another form of control and authority. Given the dual nature of Jamaica's state system, where functionality and failure exist within the same space, maintaining a strict and somewhat repressive role on research in the country may be considered a way for the state to exert and manifest its power in a different sphere, research. By controlling and restricting access to marginalised communities of gang members and inner-city residents the state is essentially controlling the research narrative being created for it. As a result, the further marginalisation of certain actors and communities is continued and supported by the state. Conversely, the limiting access for researchers in this setting is used as a tool by the state to reduce any exploration into its failure. In so doing, research is used as a knowledge management strategy by the state.

The inaccessibility created by the state can therefore be treated as a methodological and practical feature of the country's complicated statehood. Hence, the contributions made from a methodological perspective is that in states where failure exists the limitations to research created by the state can also be recognised as an indicator of its incapacity and capabilities in some spaces and functionality in

others, and a further exemplar of how and why the state belongs in the category of partially failed statehood. Therefore, rather than researchers viewing it as a hindrance to the research process these limitations should be used as a tool to expand the analysis of the subject matter being examined.

In closing, this thesis sought to establish a link between the failed state and security governance literatures. By utilising Jamaica as a case study, and more specifically the Tivoli Gardens Incursion as a sub case study, the main contributions to research that this thesis makes is that state failure can co-exist alongside spaces of state success. State failure, as exemplified in Jamaica exists on a continuum and manifests itself geographically and within certain sectors of the state system such as security. The pluralisation and privatisation of security in this setting aid in creating a problematic state system that reproduces and replicates social inequalities and in which the idea of accountability is in flux. As Jamaica represents a typical post-colonial state the presence of this dynamic type of statehood supports the idea that the characterisation of other post-colonial states should be reviewed to see whether or not they meet the same characteristics of state failure.

8.3 Epilogue: Aftermath of the Tivoli Gardens Incursion

In the aftermath of the Tivoli Gardens Incursion there have been several changes to the country's security environment and the manner in which the government addresses crime and gang violence in certain communities. One of the most notable changes has been the implementation of a new security strategy aimed at addressing crime, and to some degree, its impact on the socio-economic conditions in rural and urban communities. The government's *Five-Pillar Strategy for Crime Prevention and Citizen Security*, announced in April 2017, was designed to directly address the

concerns of citizen safety and security across the island. One of the most significant contributions of the Strategy is that it has facilitated the reassertion of the power and authority of the police, and by extension the state, across the island and has laid the foundations for a more proactive state supported response to improving socio-economic conditions in inner-city communities. The Strategy seems to acknowledge the link between high levels of crime and violence and poor socio-economic conditions and attempts to address these issues through the implementations of a more comprehensive security strategy. According to the Ministry of National Security (2017, p. 3-4), the Five Pillars, as outlined by the strategy, include:

1. Effective Policing − the effective policing pillar focuses on strengthening the rule of law and enhancing police legitimacy with the general public.

2. Swift and Sure Justice – involves close collaboration with the judicial system to ensure swift, sure and fair justice for all.

3. Social Development − addresses many of the contributing risk factors to crime and violence deriving from these inequalities, through multidisciplinary partnerships.

4. Situational Crime Prevention − undertakes measures to reduce opportunities for particular crime and violence problems through spatial interventions, such as crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) methodology and urban renewal.

5. Reduced Re-offending − aims at improving community reintegration for offenders and facilitating greater awareness and access to support services for assimilation of the deported population.

The Strategy provides a comprehensive approach to tackling crime and violence; in that, it is approached from the perspective of improving the policies and practices of security agents; it prioritises community and social development as a means of crime prevention; and it also recognises the need to have a targeted spatial approach to crime and violence, that is, directly focussing security prevention efforts in at risk communities that have a propensity towards specific type of criminality such as gang violence. From the perspective of this thesis, the *Five-Pillar Strategy* does provide a critical foundation for managing the effects of state failure and normalises the nature of security governance in the country by reasserting the authority and power of the police and the state.

Probably one of the most evident outcomes of the *Five-Pillar Strategy* has been the changes in the nature of policing through the establishment of state of public emergency (SoPE) in several communities across the island. On 18 January 2018 the government issued a SoPE for the parish of St. James which was intended to initially last for a period of 14 days. In February 2018 the House of Representatives voted to extend the SoPE until 2 May 2018 (an additional 3 months) to continue efforts to address criminality in the parish. In addressing the extension of the SoPE, Prime Minister Andrew Holness (leader of the JLP) explained the government and the security forces were "targeting both the street-level criminal and the facilitators. While we acknowledge that there will be some disruption and fallout, we must take back control of our country and we must dismantle the network of organised crime" (Calder, 2018). In a similar vein, another SoPE was also declared for the parish of St. Catherine North Police Division on 18 March 2018, and subsequently extended until 2 August 2018. According to Holness, issuing a SoPE for St. Catherine was a targeted attempt by the state to tackle criminality and gang violence in one of Jamaica's most

problematic communities. The SoPE has thus far yielded significant results with a 26 per cent decrease in murder and shooting being reported in the North Police Division (Office of the Prime Minister, 2018). Holness, in explaining the need to extend the SoPE noted, "The next phase of our operations is not so much to go and detain the corner men; the next phase of the operation is to use the space created, the networks that we have uprooted to get to the mastermind and kingpins" (Office of the Prime Minister, 2018, p. 30).

The implementation of the SoPE in these spaces and the mandate under which they are created appears to primarily be concerned with addressing the problem of organised crime in communities that resemble the socio-economic and criminality markers of Tivoli Gardens prior to the 2010 Incursion. In line with the underlying concern of this thesis, one may argue that with the implementation of the SoPEs in both St. James and St. Catherine, the state, embolden by the unrest caused by the 2010 Incursion, is in effect attempting to reassert its authority and power in urban spaces controlled by non-state criminal actors. The idea of state failure extending into other communities across the island is thus given credence in this context. However, what is significant about the state implementing SoPEs is that it appears to be disregarding the traditional relationship held between criminal elements and political actors in Jamaica. The hard-line approach to ending gang criminality and violence in these communities by the Holness administration may offer a new mode of operation for the state that has made it easier for it to directly counter the power held by gangs and dons in inner-city communities. However, the overall effectiveness of this strategy can only be assessed in the years to come when the full impact of this strategy against crime and gang violence can be adequately measured.

Since the 2010 Incursion the state has engaged in several community development initiatives, primarily aimed at improving the relationship between the state's security forces, particularly the JCF, and citizens of inner-city communities. This is carried out in an effort to reignite the trust between the state and its citizenry whilst also used as a means of ensuring the reassertion of the state security actors as the primary providers of security for all communities.

9 List of Abbreviations

Abbreviations	Term
ATP	Authority to Proceed
ANSA	Armed Non-State Actor
BITU	Bustamante Industrial Trade Union
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
DPP	Director of Public Prosecution
ELMPS Committee	Economic, Law, Management, Politics and Sociology Ethics Committee
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDECOM	Independent Commission of Investigations
JCF	Jamaica Constabulary Force
JDF	Jamaica Defence Force
JLP	Jamaica Labour Party
PMC	Private Military Company
PNP	Peoples National Party
PSCs	Private Security Companies
PSRA	Private Security Regulation Authority
RIC	Royal Irish Constabulary
SoPE	State of Public Emergency
SSP	Senior Superintendent of Police
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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