

Zainichi Beyond the Third Way:
Towards a Transnational Identity

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

Since the end of the Pacific War, the existence of the Korean minority in Japan (*Zainichi* Koreans) has been trapped in a monolithic dichotomy of Koreanness and Japaneseness. In this situation, *Zainichi* Koreans faced the dilemma of whether to become full citizens of Japanese society through naturalisation and abandon their Korean ethnicity or to maintain either of their Korean legal affiliations (colonial Korean registration, *Chōsen* register, or South Korean citizenship) and their status of foreign resident as a means of claiming their Koreanness. In the late 1970s, Kim Tong-Myung proposed an alternative to the monolithic dichotomy in his articulation of the ‘Third Way’, which aimed at transcending nationalist discourses by advocating a new subjectivity for the younger generations as simply *Zainichi*. This study questions the Third Way discourse by criticising its failure to address the actual diversity within the *Zainichi* community. Furthermore, through the examination of a new set of empirical data collected from qualitative research methods involving participant observation as well as semi-structured and in-depth interviews, this work presents new insights into the question of the *Zainichi* identity. Focusing on the impact of ethnic education in the formation of an ethnic identity in third and fourth generation *Zainichi* individuals, this study analyses the similarities and divergences in the identity formation process of twelve *Zainichi* participants from four different educational backgrounds: *Chōsen* schools, South Korea-oriented *Kenkoku* school, extracurricular *Minzoku Gakkyū* courses, and Japanese public schools. In addition, the analysis of participants’ interpretations and conceptualisations of their own existence with respect to Japan and the Korean Peninsula permits the elaboration of a new theory that highlights the dynamism and the fluidity of *Zainichi* identities, which overcome traditional, nationalist discourses and seek new ways of transnational belonging.

Table of contents

Acknowledgements	i
Abstract	ii
Table of contents	iii
List of tables and figures	x
Glossary of terms and acronyms	xi
Chapter 1. Introduction	1
1. The Zainichi Korean Minority in Japan	1
2. Problem Statement and Research Purpose	2
3. Research Design	4
4. Chapter Outline	6
Chapter 2. The Paradox of Transnationalism	9
1. Introduction	9
2. What is Transnational?	9
3. Diaspora Politics	11
3.1. Spaces of Belonging	13
4. Transnational Networks and Globalisation	14
4.1. Globalisation	14
4.2. Cosmopolitanism and the Re-territorialisation of Identities	16
5. Transnationalism in Practice	17
5.1. Being Transnational	17
5.1.1. Transnational Social Networks.....	17
5.1.2. Transnational Consciousness.....	18
5.1.3. Cultural Reproduction.....	20
5.2. Doing Transnational.....	21
5.2.1. Transnational Economy	21
5.2.2. Transnational Politics.....	22
5.2.3. Transnational Labour	24
5.2.4. Social Remittances	25
6. Conclusion	27
Chapter 3. Identity and Society: The Paradox of Social Interaction	32

1. What is Identity?	32
1.1. The Self and the True Identity.....	33
1.2. The Paramount Role of Difference	34
1.3. Modernity and Identity: How the World is Set Up	35
1.4. Spaces of Interaction	37
2. Stages of Social Interaction.....	38
2.1. Interactive Groups	39
2.2. Reference Groups	41
3. Self-Representation.....	43
3.1. Stigma	44
4. Identity in Collectivity	47
4.1. Traditional Discourses.....	47
4.2. Identity Acquisition or Formation?	50
4.2.1. Primordialism.....	50
4.2.2. Instrumentalism.....	51
4.2.3. Escaping Categorisation: A Cognitive Perspective on Ethnicity	51
4.3. New Perspectives: Disembedding Identities.....	52
4.3.1. Absolutist Collective Identity Model.....	52
4.3.2. Relativist Collective Identity Model	53
4.4. Examining Collective Identities	54
5. Culture Assimilation or Assimilating Culture?	55
5.1. Culture Learning: Acculturation or Enculturation?	59
5.2. Ethnic-personal Identity Conflict	62
6. Conclusion.....	64
<u>Chapter 4. Zainichi Inception: A Historical Approach to The Zainichi Question.....</u>	<u>68</u>
1. Introduction	68
2. Colonial Rule and The Deprivation of Self-Determination in Korea	69
2.1. Japanese Colonialism in Perspective	69
2.1.1. The Hermit Kingdom and the pre-modern East Asian scenario.....	69
2.1.2. Japan’s Seizure of Control over Korea	71
2.1.3. Japanese Modernisation in Korea and the Inflow of Population.....	72
2.2. Korean Migration to the Metropole	73
2.2.1. First Migrations and the Emergence of Students’ Nationalism 1910 – 1918.....	74
2.2.2. Voluntary Migrations 1919 – 1938	77
2.2.3. Involuntary Migrations 1938 – 1945.....	80

2.3.	Cultural Nationalism: Assimilation and Segregation.....	81
2.3.1.	Education and Indoctrination	81
2.3.2.	Names, Surnames and Clan Names	83
3.	The Liberation of Korea and The Problematisation of the Korean Presence in Japan.....	85
3.1.	Liberated Koreans in Japan	85
3.1.1.	Return to the Homeland	85
3.1.2.	Socio-Economic Situation	86
3.1.3.	Community Association and Fracture.....	88
3.2.	From Liberation to Exclusion	89
3.2.1.	Condemnation of Ethnic Education	90
3.2.2.	Legal Status and Geopolitics	92
3.2.2.1.	1945 – 1952	94
3.2.2.2.	1952 – 1965	94
3.2.2.3.	1965 – 1991	96
3.2.2.4.	1991 Question Resolved	98
3.2.2.5.	Naturalisation as an Escape	99
3.2.3.	Repatriation Campaign	99
4.	Conclusion.....	102
<u>Chapter 5. Rooting Japanese Identity in the Nationalist Discourse.....</u>		<u>105</u>
1.	Introduction	105
2.	Adapting the Nationalist Discourse.....	106
2.1.	Mixed-blood Nationalism in Pre-war Imperial Japan.....	106
2.2.	Total Defeat and Post-war Auto-Orientalism	108
2.3.	Post-war and the Redefinition of the Nationalist Discourse.....	109
3.	Regulating Membership in the Nation	112
3.1.	<i>Uchi</i> and <i>Soto</i> : Organising the World.....	112
3.2.	Legitimate members in the <i>National Uchi</i>	113
3.3.	Multi-ethnicity and the Construction of <i>Soto</i> within <i>Uchi</i>	116
4.	Actualising the Nationalist Discourse.....	118
4.1.	Minzoku Discrimination from Above: the Racialisation of Institutional Membership...	119
4.1.1.	Subjects, Citizens, and Semi-citizen	120
4.2.	<i>Minzoku Discrimination</i> from Below: Hate Speech online and offline	123
4.2.1.	Zaitokukai: ‘Active Conservatives’	124
4.3.	Nationalism, Cultural Hegemony and Education	127
5.	Conclusion.....	129

Chapter 6. Identity Politics and Nationalism in the Zainichi Community	136
1. Introduction	136
2. Zainichi Identity in the Nationalist Paradigm	136
2.1. The Ideology of Return: Long-Distance Nationalism and the Differentialist Trend	137
2.1.1. Instrumentalist Approach in <i>Sôren</i> Ethnic Education	139
2.2. The Ideology of ‘Permanence’: Realisation and the Assimilationist Trend.....	140
2.2.1. ‘Passing’ as Default Condition for Younger Generations	141
2.3. The Zainichi Dilemma: Caged in the Identitarian Dichotomy	143
3. Post-diasporic Experience and the Empowerment of Younger Generations	144
3.1. The ‘Third Way’ and the Emergence of Alternative Discourses.....	145
4. Taking Over the Differentialist and the Assimilationist Trends.....	148
4.1. Negotiating Ethnicity: from Involuntary ‘Passing’ to Voluntary Visibility	148
4.1.1. Visibility from Above: Citizenship as an Ethnicity Container	149
4.1.2. Visibility from Below: Aliases and Ethnic names.....	149
4.2. Civic activism: Grassroots’ Demand for Civil Rights.....	151
4.2.1. The Anti-Fingerprinting Movement	152
4.2.2. Public Service Employment.....	153
4.2.3. Enfranchisement.....	154
5. Conclusion.....	155
Chapter 7. Methodology: Qualitative Research	157
1. Introduction	157
2. Philosophical Approach	157
3. Study Design	158
3.1. Research Questions	159
3.2. Qualitative Methods: Participant Observation and Interviews	159
3.2.1. Participant Observation	159
3.2.2. Interviews	160
3.3. Research Location and Context	161
3.4. Sampling Strategy	162
4. Data Collection	164
4.1. Participants’ Recruitment	164
4.2. Participant Observation	165
4.3. Conduction of Interviews.....	166
4.3.1. Interview Context and Language	166
4.3.2. Interviewing Process.....	167

4.3.3. Rapport Building and Impact on Participants	169
5. Ethical Implications	170
5.1. Informed Consent	170
5.2. Confidentiality and Anonymity	170
5.3. Sensitivity of the Topic.....	171
6. Approaches to Data Analysis	172
7. Reflections on the Research Process: Outsider Within or Outsider Without.....	174
8. Conclusions	175
<u>Chapter 8. Results: Unravelling Zainichi Identities</u>	<u>177</u>
1. Introduction	177
2. Becoming Different: Consciousness, Realisation and Conflict.....	179
2.1. Zainichi Consciousness.....	180
2.2. Realisation and Sense of Difference	181
2.2.1. Cultural Dissonance	182
2.2.2. Contextual Position.....	183
2.2.3. Social Prejudice	183
2.2.4. Racialised Membership.....	184
2.3. Self-denial and Conflict	185
3. Ethnic Education in the Zainichi Community	187
3.1. <i>Chôsen</i> Schools	187
3.1.1. Relational Effect.....	187
3.1.2. Cognitive Effect.....	188
3.1.3. Purposive Effect	189
3.2. <i>Kenkoku</i> School	191
3.2.1. Multifaceted Curriculum.....	191
3.2.2. Plural Atmosphere	192
3.2.3. Functional Aspect	192
3.3. Extracurricular Ethnic Education at Japanese Schools.....	193
3.3.1. Ethnic Instruction as a Tool.....	193
3.3.2. Destigmatisation Effect.....	194
4. Zainichi Roots, Zainichi Routes and What Else?.....	195
4.1. Roots and Routes	195
4.2. Social Sensitivity.....	197
4.3. Cultural Oxymoron.....	198
4.3.1. Neither 100% Japanese.....	199

4.3.2. Nor 100% Korean	200
5. Negotiating Ethnicity: Markers of Difference and Mechanisms of Representation	201
5.1. Markers of Difference	202
5.1.1. The Korean Language.....	202
5.1.1.1. Language Use: Performative or Instrumental?	203
5.1.1.2. Feelings: A Primordial Connection?	204
5.1.2. <i>Chesa</i>	209
5.1.3. Korean Cuisine: the Role of <i>Kimchi</i> and <i>Horumon</i>	212
5.2. Mechanisms of Self-representation.....	213
5.2.1. Names	213
5.2.1.1. Natural Incorporation of Korean Names in Ethnic Education Environments.....	214
5.2.1.2. Instrumental Incorporation for Visibility Purposes.....	215
5.2.1.3. Contesting Conceptualisations of the Value of Names.....	215
5.2.2. Nationality	216
5.2.2.1. <i>Chōsen</i> Register.....	217
5.2.2.2. ROK Citizenship	219
5.2.2.3. Japanese Nationality	220
5.2.3. Terminology and Self-representation: Conceptualising Identity	221
5.2.3.1. Sticking to Traditional Concepts	221
5.2.3.2. Transcending Traditional Concepts	224
6. Placing Identities	226
6.1. National Perspective: the Korean Peninsula.....	226
6.1.1. DPRK	227
6.1.2. ROK	229
6.2. Regional Perspective: Jechu and Kansai	232
6.2.1. Jechu Island.....	233
6.2.2. Kansai.....	234
6.3. International Perspective.....	236
6.3.1. Overseas: Beyond the Borders of the Nation	237
6.3.2. Okinawa: on the Margins of the Nation.....	238
<u>Chapter 9. Conclusion.....</u>	<u>240</u>
1. Introduction	240
2. Key Findings	241
2.1. The Role of Ethnic Education	241
2.2. Towards a Transnational Identity	242

3. Other Findings	243
3.1. Zainichi Identity Formation.....	243
3.2. Interpretations of Zainichiness	244
3.3. Reproduction and Representation of Culture.....	245
4. Theoretical Innovation	246
5. Research Limitations and Recommendations	249
5.1. Limitations in Research Aims	250
5.2. Limitations in Sampling.....	251
5.3. Avenues for Future Research.....	252
<u>List of References</u>	<u>254</u>
<u>APPENDIX A. Information Sheet (English version)</u>	<u>273</u>
<u>APPENDIX B. Information Sheet (Japanese version)</u>	<u>275</u>
<u>APPENDIX C. Consent Form (English version)</u>	<u>277</u>
<u>APPENDIX D. Consent form (Japanese version)</u>	<u>278</u>

List of tables and figures

TABLE 1. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF KOREAN AND JAPANESE POPULATION IN JAPAN.	73
TABLE 2. KOREAN MIGRATION FROM 1917 TO 1927.....	78
TABLE 3. ANNUAL CONSCRIPTION OF KOREAN WORKERS FROM 1939 TO 1945.	80
TABLE 4. KOREAN POPULATION IN JAPAN FROM 1939 TO 1945.	81
TABLE 5. GESIS - INTERNATIONAL SURVEY PROGRAMME: NATIONAL IDENTITY I (1995), II (2003) AND III (2013).....	115
TABLE 6. GESIS - INTERNATIONAL SURVEY PROGRAMME: NATIONAL IDENTITY I (1995), II (2003) AND III (2013).....	115
TABLE 7. GESIS - INTERNATIONAL SURVEY PROGRAMME: NATIONAL IDENTITY I (1995) AND II (2003).....	115
TABLE 8. ETHNIC MINORITIES DEFICIENT MEMBERSHIP.	117
TABLE 9. NUMBER OF MARRIAGES OF ZAINICHI KOREANS.....	140
TABLE 10. NATURALISATIONS OF KOREANS IN JAPAN.	142
TABLE 11. RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS	163
TABLE 12. PARTICIPANTS IDENTIFICATION ACRONYMS.....	171
TABLE 13. NUMBER OF <i>CHŌSEN</i> REGISTERS FROM 2012 TO 2016.	217
FIGURE 1. CULTURAL ACCOMMODATION MODEL.	60
FIGURE 2. IMPERIAL SUBJECTS' REGISTRATION LEVELS.....	93
FIGURE 3. CHOSENESE LEGAL POSITION IN EAST ASIA 1945 – 1965.	96
FIGURE 4. CHOSENESE LEGAL POSITION 1965 TO PRESENT.	97

Glossary of terms and acronyms

Japanese terminology

Bogo	Mother tongue
Bokoku	Motherland
Chesa	Confucian ritual of ancestors worship of Korean origin
Chôsen Hantô	Korean peninsula
Chôsen Gakkô	Korean schools managed by <i>Sôren</i>
Chôsenseki	<i>Chôsen</i> register
Daikan Teikoku	Great Korean Empire (1897-1910)
Daisan no Michi	‘Third Way’
Dôhō	Compatriot
Dōka	Assimilation
Dōka seikaku	Assimilation policies
Futei seijin	Unsettled or malcontent Koreans
Gaichi	Interior territories, colonies
Hōji	Buddhist memorial service for ancestors
Honmyō	Real name
Honmyō Sengen	Real name declaration
Ichijōkō	Mainstream schools
Jinshu	Race
Kankoku	Republic of Korea
Kankokuseki	ROK citizenship
Kenkanryū	Anti-Korean Wave
Kenkoku Gakkō	Korean school managed by <i>Mindan</i>
KEY	Organisation of United Korean Youth in Japan
Kikenkan	Sense of danger
Kimchi	Korean dish of spicy pickled cabbage
Kimigayo	National anthem of Japan
Kokyō	Hometown, native village
Kokumin	A national
Kokusaika	Internationalisation
Kokuseki	Nationality, citizenship
Kokutai	National policy
Koseki	Family register
Kyōsei Renkō	Forced migration

Mindan	Union of Korean Residents in Japan
Minseki	Sub-nationality
Minzoku	Ethnicity, people, nation.
Minzoku Gakkyû	Ethnic classes at Japanese public schools
Minzoku ishiki	Ethnic consciousness
Minzokumei	Ethnic name
Naichi	Internal territories, metropole
Naisen ittai	‘Japan and Korea as one body’
Netto-uyo	Internet right-wingers
Nikkeijin	Japanese descendants
Obon	Buddhist festival for honoring the spirits of ancestors, which are supposed to be visiting with the living on 15 August
Okonomiyaki	Savoury pancake representative of the Kansai gastronomy
Osechi	Special dishes for the New Year's Day
Pachinko	Japanese upright pinball game
Panchoppari	‘Half Japanese’ (pejorative term)
Senpai	One’s senior
Shimon ônatsu	Fingerprinting
Shinmin	Citizen
Shôshi Kaimei	Imperial ordinance for the Japonisation of Korean names in the Korean Peninsula (1939)
Sokoku	Homeland
Sôren	General Association of Korean Residents in Japan
Tabunka Kyôsei	Multicultural co-existence
Tan'itsu Minzoku	Homogeneous people
Tan'itsu Minzoku Kokka	Homogeneous nation-state
Tokubetsu eijyû	Special Permanent Residence
Tokurei eijyû	Exceptional Permanent Residence
Tsûmei	Alias
Yakiniku	Japanese-style barbeque
Zaitokukai	Association of Citizens Who do not Tolerate Special Privileges of the Zainichi

Korean terminology

Hanchung	Alliance of Zainichi Korean Youth
Onma	Mom, mother
Oppa	Dad, father
Urihakkyo	‘Our School’, Korean (<i>Chôsen</i>) schools system
Urimal	‘Our language’, the Korean language
Urinara	‘Our country’, Korea
Saram	Person, people

Acronyms

DPRK	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Korea
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisations
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
JRC	Japanese Red Cross
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
ROK	Republic of Korea, South Korea
SCAP	Supreme Command for the Allied Powers

Chapter 1. Introduction

1. The Zainichi Korean Minority in Japan

Setting its origin in the Japanese colonial period in the Korean Peninsula (1910-1945), the Korean minority has been present in the Japanese archipelago for more than a century. At present this minority is mainly constituted by second, third and fourth generations of ethnic-Koreans born in the archipelago, who have naturally incorporated most of the cultural aspects of Japanese society. Official statistics from the Ministry of Justice (2016a) speak of a total population of 485,557 ethnic-Koreans with either South Korean citizenship or *Chôsen* register. Nonetheless, alternative sources including naturalised ethnic-Koreans estimate that the Korean minority in Japan comprises more than 800,000 people, constituting the largest ethnic minority group in the country.

Since their settlement in the Japanese archipelago, Zainichi Koreans – literally meaning ‘Korean residents in Japan’ and implying the condition of temporary sojourners – have seen their presence in Japan as embedded in a double dichotomy conditioning their existence as individuals. In the first place, the question of ‘how to be Korean’ was initially linked to the two ideologies emerging in the Korean Peninsula after the Pacific War. Thus, the largest portion of the Zainichi community tended to ascribe with the northern regime, leaving a marginal sector of the minority ideologically affiliated with the new state in the south.

This division was materialised with the establishment of two ethnic-Korean organisations in Japan: the pro-North *Sôren*, or General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, and the pro-South *Mindan*, or Union of Korean Residents in Japan. Nonetheless, the major identitarian dichotomy that Zainichi Koreans had to face set out the question of either ‘being Korean’ or ‘being Japanese.’ Everyday discrimination against ethnic-Koreans in Japan as well as the gradual assimilation of Japanese culture and the loss of references of Korean culture motivated the decision of many Zainichi Koreans to live their lives as Japanese hiding their Korean ethnic origin. Consequently, several strategies were taken by Zainichi Koreans to manifest their positioning in the dichotomy. The nationality soon became an issue after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the southern Republic of Korea in 1965, as affiliation with the southern regime could be materialised through the acquisition of the ROK citizenship, while ascription with the North was manifested by the conservation of the pre-war *Chôsen* register. Likewise, the option of naturalisation offered by the Japanese state was also chosen by many ethnic-Koreans as a way to obtain civil rights in their country of residence and, in many

cases, of birth. Furthermore, ethnic-names were in numerous cases hidden under Japanese aliases as a means to conceal Koreans' ethnic origin and avoid discrimination.

However, not all ethnic-Koreans decided to succumb to discrimination and forget about their ethnicity. Instead, a large portion of the community looked to maintain their cultural and ethnic ties with the peninsula through the establishment of systems of ethnic education in Japan. On the one hand, organised by *Sôren*, pro-North Zainichi Koreans committed to the formation of a network of ethnic schools which currently includes more than 70 schools across Japan from nurseries to high schools, being the sole institutions providing Korean-oriented education fully in Korean. On the other hand, *Mindan* affiliates founded their own schools, forming a much-reduced network of pro-South ethnic schools, whose curriculum is largely adapted to the guidelines stipulated by the Japanese Ministry of Education.

2. Problem Statement and Research Purpose

More than 60 years have passed since the end of the Pacific War and the emergence and settlement of the Korean minority in Japan. However, the double existential dichotomy still determines numerous aspects of Zainichi Koreans' lives in Japan. The 'Third Way' discourse articulated by Kim Tong-Myung in the late 1970s proposed an alternative identitarian perspective which envisaged a form of belonging in Japan while maintaining the Korean ethnicity. Kim's alternative discourse paved the way for an identitarian revolution within the community which led up to the empowerment of Zainichi younger generations who were in the position to decide how to live their condition of Zainichi in Japan, abandoning the idea of return and hence taking a post-diasporic position. However, the Third Way was still encapsulated in monolithic conceptions about ethnicity which were strongly tied to nationalist interpretations of identity categories. Consequently, alternative forms of Zainichi experience, such as those of naturalised individuals, children of bi-ethnic couples or Zainichi Koreans with no access to ethnic education, were ignored and denied membership within the Zainichi community.

At the same time, the obstinate determination of the Japanese government to deny the actual multi-ethnic essence of the country's population motivates the stigmatisation of the ethnic-Korean minority within the society. This, in conjunction with the perpetuation of patent forms of institutional racism in the state, hinders any attempt of the Zainichi younger generations to develop a solid sense of belonging towards their country of birth. In addition, the lack of experience in the Korean Peninsula as well as the unavoidable loss of Korean cultural literacy or the lack of recognisable traces of 'Koreanness' equally impedes the total identitarian ascription with the Korean population in either DPRK or ROK. In these circumstances, the Zainichi

younger generations are still likely to encounter identity issues, mainly motivated by the impossibility to totally fit in any of the identitarian categories derived from nationalist interpretations of belonging.

Considering this context, it is the purpose of this research to examine the ways whereby Zainichi younger generations (mainly third and fourth generations) construe and interpret their identities with respect to Korean and Japanese national categories and evaluate possible alternative forms of transnational identification, which challenge frequent assumptions about belonging. With this analysis, this thesis highlights the salient diversity existing in the Zainichi community and contribute to the study of Zainichi identit(ies) by taking a transnational perspective. Additionally, this thesis aims to explore the role of ethnic education programs on the formation of an ethnic identity within the Korean minority in Japan by examining their effects on the development of particular interpretations and conceptions of the Zainichi community and the Korean Peninsula as its homeland. This study is framed by the following research questions:

1. How do Zainichi Koreans develop a Zainichi identity (consciousness) and what are the consequences?
2. What is the impact of ethnic education on Zainichi Koreans' identity formation and diversification?
3. How do Zainichi Koreans construe and interpret their Zainichiness?
4. How do Zainichi Koreans reproduce and represent their Koreanness?
5. How is belonging construed and interpreted by Zainichi Koreans in relation to national and transnational spaces?

Being one of the most significant contributions of the research, this thesis provides evidence about the positive impact that the existing ethnic education systems have on the process of identity formation of Zainichi Korean individuals. Thus, thanks to the examination of three different ethnic education environments, it was possible, not only to observe the particularities existing in each educational institution, but, most importantly, to demonstrate the determinant role played by ethnic education institutions as a whole in the process of overcoming episodes of self-stigmatisation derived from the hardship to find recognition in the post-colonial scenario of Japan and Korea. Likewise, the presented evidence also demonstrates that, owing to the certain amount of Korean cultural literacy obtained through the different ethnic education curricula, ethnic-Korean students are able to develop a consciousness as Zainichi which, being separated from the concept of Japanese, is likely to become the foundation of their ethnic identities as Koreans in Japan.

Furthermore, this study makes another salient contribution to the study of Zainichi identities by presenting evidence of transnational forms of identification within the community. These alternative forms of identification, it was demonstrated, allow for the development of a sense of belonging that is not dependant on hegemonic categories defined by nation-states. Additionally, through the analysis of the diverse accounts collected from Zainichi informants regarding their experiences in Japan, the Korean Peninsula and other countries, it was possible to elaborate the main theory of the research which questions the hegemonic position of national categories in defining possible forms of identification and claims the validity of intranational and extranational areas, in the form of micro-regional and macro-regional spaces, as providers of solid grounds for the development of transnational identities within the Zainichi community.

3. Research Design

This thesis presents a new set of empirical data generated through the conduction of ten months of fieldwork between October 2015 and August 2016 in the Kansai Region, particularly in the city of Osaka. Thanks to the application of qualitative multi-methods, including semi-structured and in-depth interviews as well as participant observation, this study is based on the accounts of twelve informants with four different educational backgrounds and the direct experience gained through the participation in numerous public and private events organised by diverse individuals and organisations within the community. In addition, this work also provides a thorough literature review on studies regarding identity politics and transnationalism as well as a compilation of previously published materials of great relevance for the study of the Zainichi community, which include academic works, biographies, newspaper articles and official governmental reports.

The data generated during the conduction of interviews to informants permitted the elaboration of an exhaustive thematic framework which eventually was utilised to structure the results chapter presented in this thesis. Firstly, reflections and narrations concerning early stages of childhood served for the analysis of the process of development of a Zainichi consciousness and its subsequent consequences. Secondly, accounts regarding experiences at ethnic education schools and courses permitted the identification of a series of particular parameters common to each educational institution which are considered to play a role in the formation of Zainichi identities. Thirdly, personal reflections and explanations with regards to individual experiences as Zainichi Koreans in Japan allowed for the conceptualisation of the Zainichi experience, attending to particular aspects commonly shared by Zainichi individuals. Fourthly, the interrogation about specific elements relevant to the maintenance and manifestation of the

Korean ethnicity and culture permitted the identification of a number of strategies taken nowadays by Zainichi Koreans in order to be recognised as Koreans. Lastly, reflections about informants' sense of belonging derived from accounts regarding experiences in Japan and abroad helped to establish a theory on alternative forms of belonging in transnational spaces.

The ideas and arguments presented in this work participate in the academic debate about the possible forms of identification developed by Zainichi Koreans in the present post-colonial scenario of East Asia. Likewise, the theories elaborated in this text make a contribution to the theoretical literature on ethnicity, race and nationalism, as the three concepts have been thoroughly analysed not only attending to their theoretical implications but also to the practical consequences they have in present Japanese society. Therefore, through the theoretical approach taken in relation to transnational identities, this study challenges the omnipresent tendency to bind together the concepts of ethnicity and nation which envisages both ideas as conditional on each other and restricts the scope for independent forms of identification. Also, the concept of racism has been rigorously scrutinised in the particular context of Japanese society, where the phenomenon of racialisation is not necessarily founded on physical features but on cultural and blood-linked differences. Consequently, this work intends to delegitimise the hegemonic position of the nation-state as a source of identification and to emphasise the post-colonial individual's legitimacy to defy nationalist discourses and seek for new forms of identification bond to transnational spaces.

Furthermore, through the examination of the impact of ethnic education on Zainichi individuals, this project provides evidence of the positive role played by ethnic education programs in the process of identity formation and in overcoming episodes of self-stigmatisation. In addition, it also highlights the relevant exercise of contestation carried out by these institutions, and the community in general, against the Japanese nationalist discourse that neglects Zainichi Koreans' right to belong by restricting their membership in the nation and consequently hindering their complete integration in the society by means of racialisation and stigmatisation of the community.

Ultimately, this study provides a new perspective on the Zainichi minority as a community emancipated from the monolithic national categories of Japan and Korea, which discredits nationalist discourses still existent in both the Japanese archipelago and the Korean peninsula and seeks for alternative forms of identification that are not necessarily dependant on national categories and find their foundation in transnational spaces inside and outside the nation-state.

4. Chapter Outline

The first two chapters presented in the literature review, Chapter 2, *The Paradox of Transnationalism*, and Chapter 3, *Identity and Society: The Paradox of Social Interaction*, establish a solid theoretical framework regarding the concepts of transnationalism and identity.

Chapter 2 examines the theory of transnationalism analysing its impact on modern societies. In so doing, this chapter explores various relevant concepts of great importance in the fields of sociology and anthropology. The concept of diaspora is thoroughly analysed and presented as key for the understanding of the concept of belonging and the emergence of transnationalism. Additionally, the phenomenon of Globalisation is also explored, paying particular attention to its major impact in diminishing the hegemony of the nation-state.

Chapter 3 explores the issue of identity by discussing its fundamental conceptualisation and examining its formation and development. In this analysis, the major role of difference is highlighted as the most essential element in the identity formation process. Subsequently, different typologies of identity are explored and traditional explanatory theories about ethnicity and identity are critically analysed. In addition, the concept of stigma is thoroughly examined as one of the most relevant elements affecting the normal formation of identities in minority groups.

Following the establishment of a theoretical framework, the literature review focuses on the research of the case study presenting three chapters which explore the historical background, the Japanese nationalist discourse and the issue of identity in the Zainichi community.

Chapter 4, *Zainichi Inception: A Historical Approach to the Zainichi Question*, presents a thorough analysis of the economic, social and institutional circumstances that preceded the emergence of the Korean minority in Japan during the imperial period and their permanent settlement thereafter as well as a critical examination of the factors that motivated the subsequent problematisation of the Korean presence in the archipelago.

Chapter 5, *Rooting Japanese Identity in the Nationalist Discourse*, examines the reformulation of the Japanese national discourse during the post-war period, exploring the effects of the conceptualisation of the idea of the Japanese nation through discourses of power elaborated by particular elites. Particularly, by examining its origins and antecedents as well as its visible consequences in Japanese society nowadays, this chapter analyses the impact of ethnocentric nationalism on the regulation of belonging and membership of social and ethnic minorities.

Chapter 6, *Identity Politics and Nationalism in the Zainichi Community*, evaluates chronologically the changes in the identitarian discourse within the Zainichi community. In the first place, the emergence of two principal ideologies, the ideology of return and the ideology of permanence, in the minority are critically analysed, attending to their failure to provide an efficient identitarian discourse for Zainichi younger generations. Subsequently, the alternative discourse proposed by Kim <g in the late 1970s is also examined, by observing its social consequences and limitations in representing the real diversity existing in the community.

The literature review of this thesis is followed by Chapter 7, *Methodology: Qualitative Research*, which discusses the multi-methods used for the empirical research of this project. In the first place, an introduction to the general philosophical approach taken during the conduction of the whole research is presented. Subsequently, the study design is explained in detail, paying special attention to the qualitative methods selected for the empirical research as well as the contextual circumstances surrounding the fieldwork investigation. Additionally, a section of this chapter is also dedicated to the analysis of the ethnic implications of the research as well as to the strategies taken to overcome subsequent limitations encountered during the research. Lastly, the chapter concludes with an evaluation of the role of the researcher as an ‘outsider without’ and the eventual positive outcomes derived from the cultural and social distance existing between the author and the participants of the present study.

Following the presentation of the methodology, Chapter 8, *Results: Unravelling Zainichi Identities*, presents the results obtained from the analysis of the data generated during fieldwork. Being the most expanded and relevant chapter of this thesis, the results chapter presents an exhaustive analysis of the Zainichi younger generations’ identitarian experience through five mains sections organised thematically. The first section examines the process of identity formation providing empirical evidence and attending to the factors implied in the development of a Zainichi consciousness. The second section looks at the role and implications of different ethnic education institutions in the formation and moulding of ethnic identities of Zainichi Korean students. The third section presents a thorough analysis of the most relevant elements in the conceptualisation and interpretation of the Zainichi condition according to Zainichi individuals from younger generations. The fourth section observes the impact of the Korean ethnicity on Zainichi Koreans nowadays. This section examines certain Korean cultural marks, such as the language, the cuisine and the Confucian worship ritual of *Chesa*, which are still maintained and transmitted within the Zainichi community. Furthermore, predominant mechanisms of representation of Koreanness, such as ethnic names, Korean nationalities and the everyday terminology referring to Zainichi Koreans, are thoroughly analysed. Lastly, the fifth

section looks at the impact of transnationalism in the conceptualisation and experience of belonging within the community. Also, this section looks at the failure of the nation-state to provide a solid sense of belonging and presents new forms of transnational identification in intranational and extranational contexts.

Ultimately, the thesis concludes with Chapter 9, which draws together the findings of all the chapters for a discussion about the identitarian diversity existing in the Zainichi Korean community nowadays. It condenses the empirical findings with the theoretical conclusions from the study to provide a set of theoretical innovations useful for the future research of the Korean minority in Japan and for the study of ethnic identities of members of ethnic minority groups around the globe.

Chapter 2. The Paradox of Transnationalism

1. Introduction

This chapter explores the transnationalism theory and its impact on society. An initial examination of the concept paves the way for the analysis of its origin through other remarkable concepts, which have traditionally been of major salience both in sociology and anthropology. In the first place, great importance is given to the concept of diaspora, which turns out to be indispensable in comprehending the emergence of transnationalism inasmuch as a numerous transnational networks find their origin in it. Additionally, an analysis of the notion of belonging, as essential for understanding the ideas of community and attachment, is included in the second section. The third section is entirely dedicated to globalisation. Through an examination of its emergence, evolution and recent impact, this section aims to break down the so exploited concept of globalisation and drift away from common generalisations that introduce the phenomenon as something exclusive to (post-)modernity. These first sections provide the necessary background on *when* transnationalism takes place and *who* enables and enacts it, and pave the way for the examination of its application – *how* it is put in practice. Thus, the fourth section of the chapter explores the most recognisable manifestations of transnationalism focusing on two main aspects: the impact of transnationalism within migrant groups – being transnational – and the impact of these migrants' communities within and across societies – doing transnational. Lastly, a final section provides a reflexive conclusion about the potential impacts of transnationalism, at both micro and macro levels, over the traditional conception of the nation-state.

2. What is Transnational?

The concept of transnationalism has been used in the social sciences for the last two decades. Despite its original, and practically exclusive, application in anthropology, the concept has been adopted by a wide array of scientific disciplines (Vertovec, 2009). It is precisely the interdisciplinary aspect of transnationalism what renders its very conceptualisation and definition an arduous task due to the apparent infinity of applications that the term has come to have nowadays.

Even in a purely academic environment, it might seem confusing to make an accurate distinction between the existing terminologies, when observing the surprising quantity of nomenclatures that contain the 'nation' as its core meaning. 'International', 'plurinational', 'multinational' are some of the terms that criss-cross with the notion of 'transnationalism'.

From an exclusively morphological point of view, the affix ‘trans’, meaning ‘beyond’, suggests that the term ‘trans-national’ comprises what is situated ‘beyond’ the ‘nation’. This puts the concept in contrast with the idea of in-betweenness that the affix ‘inter’ expresses in ‘international’ or the idea of multiplicity or plurality of the ‘multinational’ and the ‘plurinational’.

This pseudo-etymologic clarification, far from resulting in a conclusive definition of the concept, throws us in the not less challenging conceptual quandary of the formulation of a consistent definition of the slippery idea of ‘nation’. Out of academia, the concept of nation is commonly referred to as a community that shares a conglomerate of cultural features and is located in a particular place. However simple or vague this conceptualisation might seem, it is not in great contrast with the general conception held by the scholarship. Benedict Anderson (2006: 6) defines the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” Albeit open to interpretation, Anderson’s definition proves to be functional for the understanding of the idea of the transnational. Transnational practices, therefore, can be envisaged as processes that take place across the sovereignty boundaries of national communities. This reconceptualisation, notwithstanding, raises one more question: *what exactly traces such boundaries?*

Throughout human history, national communities were scattered over territories, which were administered by governing institutional entities, namely, states. Nation and state belonged to different strata, as they were not necessarily linked to or conditioned by each other. This disassociation between the nation and the state can be observed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire which, encompassing more than a dozen different nationalities within its territory, was characterised by the plurinational aspect of its subjects. Nonetheless, this apparent plurinational aspect of states would come to an end as a result of the First World War.

Transnational practices, therefore, entail processes that take place through networks that connect agents located in different nation-states whose activities penetrate national borders, positioning themselves on a level beyond the territorial sphere of dominance and sovereignty of the state. That is to say, the *status quo* becomes wobbly as traditional nation-states are defied “from above” by transnational economic, political and social activities and “from below” by local transnational activism and ethnic nationalism (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998).

In order to thoroughly understand the process whereby these networks have been emerging across human history, it is fundamental to tackle the phenomenon of diaspora, which entails the

dispersal of human groups over different territories and on which migration studies has been focusing most of its interest.

3. Diaspora Politics

Traditionally, diaspora studies were tempted to conceive the diasporic experience only with regards to its dispersal condition and found most of its theories on a never-ending attachment to the lost homeland, which is inherited through generations (Clifford, 1994; Cohen, 2006). This conception of the diasporic experience as conditional on this attachment, which in the case of the younger generations is nothing but an imagined conception, appears to be a condemnation that renders the diasporic experience irremediably traumatic. This essentialist conceptualisation of the diaspora fails in providing a thorough description of the relationship that diasporic communities have with their hostlands and pays no attention to alternative forms of belonging, which are in continuous mutation within these communities.

There has been a tendency in the diaspora discourse to conceive the role of victims of the diasporic groups as central. Cohen (2006) points out that the victim tradition characteristic of the Jewish history, which is directly related to its infelicitous origin, has been considered the essential feature of several ethnic communities displaced throughout history. The mass slave trade across the Atlantic that blemished the African historiography, the massacres of the late nineteenth century and the subsequent deportations suffered by the Armenian people, the migration of the Irish resulting from the famine during the mid-nineteenth century and the dislocation of the Palestinian people as a consequence of the formation of the State of Israel are other cases that Cohen takes as examples of this victim tradition that has represented traditional discourses.

In an attempt to formulate a defining model, Sefran (in Clifford, 1994: 304) posits that diasporas share the following features:

1. **Dispersal** from an original “centre” to not less than two “peripheral” places;
2. **Preservation** of a “memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland;”
3. Collective belief in a – certain or not – **impossibility to gain full acceptance** in the host country;
4. Expectation of an **eventual return** to the original homeland;
5. Commitment to **perpetuation and restoration** of this homeland;
6. Group consciousness and solidarity based on the maintenance of **a relationship with the common homeland.**

As Clifford points out (1994: 305), Sefran's definition constitutes a model of diaspora appropriate only to the Jews' case, leaving other diasporic communities in a conceptual limbo. The author himself defines the Jewish diaspora as the "ideal type," since it is the only diasporic community that fits in his model. This being said, *can this model be considered a description of the diaspora experience pertinent to the generality of diasporas? or should it be exclusively referred to the Jewish experience?* The fact that the six defining characteristics of the model suggested are not completely transferable to other communities implies that not all the diasporic groups share the essential qualities of the "ideal type" and, consequently, these cannot be contemplated as diasporas but as "quasi-diasporas" (Clifford, 1994: 306).

The Korean diaspora, in terms of definition of their experience, apparently fits with some of the points proposed in Sefran's model. The condition of dispersal towards peripheral spaces is undeniable since, as a consequence of the occupation of the Korean Peninsula by the Japanese Empire and the posterior outbreak of the Korea War, thousands of Koreans emigrated to other bordering countries besides Japan, such as Russia and China as well as other overseas destinations such as the United States (Yoon, 2012). Regarding the level of acceptance in each destination, all experiences were not exactly the same as in the beginning the Chinese policies and even the Russian government prior to the rise of Stalinism seemed to be rather welcoming. However, each of the three experiences concluded with unfortunate endings marked by massive deportation and strong assimilationist policies. Similarly, the idea of return appears to have been considerably present in the Korean diasporas, which justifies their strong affiliation to both of the political formations resulted from the fragmentation of the Korean Peninsula and the desire for an eventual unification of the motherland. Nevertheless, any attempt to categorise the diaspora would ignore the individual experience's singularities and, hence, succumb to generalisation.

Nonetheless, the assumption that the diaspora experience is, by definition, based on the distance, spatial and temporal, of the community from the ancestral homeland and its controversial position within the hostland, reduces the whole experience to its traumatic inception and limits enormously the possibilities to truly comprehend the diaspora experience. The Jewish history, as well as that of the Armenians, Greeks, Africans, etc., should be taken into much consideration as they are the starting point of the diaspora discourse (Clifford, 1994). However, these cannot be regarded as normative, since the context wherein they originated is inapposite with respect to the present global context. Therefore, two main elements that have marked the discourse can be identified: the traumatic aspect of the inception of diaspora and the yearning desire for return to the homeland. Both elements circumscribe the diasporic experience

to an everlasting state of stagnation that blocks the way to a plausible development of a positive experience within the hostland.

From a generational perspective, the distressing aspect of first generations' migration and relocation in the new society is undeniable, as is the attachment of the whole displaced community towards their homeland. However, the question to be raised is *what is the diasporic experience like for subsequent generations?*

3.1. Spaces of Belonging

Diasporas are theoretically located in the middle of the dichotomy between the ideas of homeland and hostland. Incapable of completely occupying either only one or both spaces, diaspora communities live in “a new cultural terrain located between localism and transnationalism: a diasporic third space” conformed irremediably by “entangled tensions that weave together new webs of belonging that trouble spatial fields of ‘nation’, ‘home’, ‘territory’ and ‘community’” (Fortier, 2000: 157). These tensions originate from the clash in dualities in which the defining elements are commonly conceived as rigid and immutable.

Members of diasporas face the challenge of self-definition. Being born in a certain place, growing up within a certain community, speaking a certain language or having a certain look might not appear relevant aspects, but they sketch the singularity of the “diasporic journey” (Brah, 1996: 180). Diasporians look to belong in the collective ‘us’. That is because the context wherein the individual experience takes place – that is, society – constructs the ‘us’ as well as sets the boundaries of ‘the other.’ In his *Politics*, Aristotle (328 B.C.) stated that:

Man is by nature a social animal; an individual who is unsocial naturally and not accidentally is either beneath our notice or more than human. Society is something that precedes the individual. Anyone who either cannot lead the common life or is so self-sufficient as not to need to, and therefore does not partake of society, is either a beast or a god.

Aronson, 1995: xvix. Italics added.

The individual and the social are, thus, displayed as relational and inseparable, and any attempt to experience life outside society, or at least not conditioned by it, relegates human existence to the quality of beast or god. At this point, the question to formulate is *what role should diasporic members take on within society, beast or god?* The approach to this question takes us to the analysis of the context wherein diasporas have had to muddle through across modern history.

As a result of the Treaty of Westphalia, which bestowed territorial sovereignty upon the states with no possibility for external agents to participate in their domestic affairs, the world was configured in accordance to the presumed nationality of each territory. In a nutshell, the state and the nation were hybridised to give birth to the concept of the nation-state. This new notion of territorial sovereignty, classified and fenced cultures and peoples by assuming that the inhabitants of each particular place (had to) share an array of fixed and immutable characteristics that rendered them ‘equals’ to their co-nationals *within* and ‘unequal’ to the others *without*. This new arrangement of people of the state as nationals, that is, scions of the mother nation, shut the door on cultural diversity in favour of purity, which conferred the right to belong in the nation to its pure inhabitants and neglected any type of singularity. In this scenario, diasporic groups, as holders of extraterritorial features, cannot seem to stand a chance to belong *within*.

The *status quo* that the conception of the nation-state has laid all across the globe allows us to understand the complexity of the diaspora experience and its situation of in-betweenness (Frotier, 2000: 160) in the midst of the essentialist dualities of here–there, within–without, indigenous–alien, majority–minority and, more crudely, *us–them*.

In most cases scholarship has focused on the relationship diasporas have with their homelands from their hostland, sustaining an argument that pivots between the traumatic aspect of the departure and the longing for return, which neglects any possible sense of belonging or attachment towards the hostland. The following sections tackle the reconceptualisation of the ideas of homeland and home, and the forms of belonging that migrants and their offspring develop in host societies.

4. Transnational Networks and Globalisation

Transnationalism is closely related to the phenomenon of globalisation, which does not imply that either of them is dependent on the other. Both concepts have been *en vogue* during the last few decades and have repeatedly been considered exclusively as contemporary phenomena. This assumption, however, overlooks the long history of cultural exchanges that trespassed the boundaries of human collectivities and interconnected communities across the globe creating what is commonly denominated “transnational networks” (Faist, 2010; Vertovec, 1999, 2001).

4.1. Globalisation

In the same way that the concept of transnationalism has been intensively discussed and analysed by scholars in the last decades, the globalisation phenomenon has been even more *en vogue*, not only in academia, but also in almost every aspect of everyday life. The concept has been so overly used, especially in recent years, that the majority of the public has been led to believe that it is a recent phenomenon that could not, in any possible way, be conceived to exist in the past. Pieterse (2012) argues that the periodisation of globalisation is strictly dependant on the academic approach used. Whereas a historical and archaeological approach would situate globalisation's origin further back in time focusing on the growth of connectivity and social cooperation derived from the commercial movements along the Jade Road from Central Asia to China that dates back to 3000 B.C., political economy views globalisation as equal to modern capitalism, dating its beginning to the late fifteenth century with the first western exploration in the Americas. Attending to the importance of connectivity in the definition of globalisation, the discovery and posterior colonisation of the Americas is a revealing example as it paved the way for the development of a new form of global commerce and exchange of ideas between the Old and the New Worlds, that is, it gave space to the connectivity of two vast territories presumably oblivious of the existence of each other.

However, what appears to be the most commonly accepted defining aspect of globalisation, especially with respect to migration and transnational studies, is the rapid development of the denominated 'communication technologies' in the last couple of decades, which triggered off the remarkable growth of those global connections responsible for the multiplication and modernisation of transnational networks. The significant advances in telecommunication infrastructures and transportation methods have facilitated an increase in the numbers of global exchanges, which include the mobility of people.

This new scenario turns out to be a challenge for the classic national view on migration. The essential idea of homogeneity of the nation-state cannot admit the permanence of an external agent – the other – into its territory. Therefore, states have come to cope with migration in accordance to the premise that migrants are fated to either return to their origin or become an indistinguishable part of the receiving community. As Castles (2002: 1143) explains, two models of migration have dominated the policy approaches from the late twentieth century: the "settler model" and the "temporary migration model." The former assumes that immigrants staying in the host society irremediably surrender to the host culture and reject that of their original group, whereas the latter presumes that immigrants in most of the cases are temporary sojourners who will eventually leave.

Globalisation defies these preconceptions about migration as it blends out national borders and is capable of penetrating through the political boundaries policed by states (Ley, 2009; Castles, 2002), due not least to the potential that it turns out to be for migrants to benefit from a more-free-than-ever freedom of movement and, consequently, establish affiliations with several spaces at once. This quality of globalisation provides new room for manoeuvre for ethnic minorities to escape mono-ethnic discourses in both their host and home countries, as the ease to communicate and travel make them mobile agents between different spaces, capable of determining the forms and scale of attachment.

4.2. Cosmopolitanism and the Re-territorialisation of Identities

The emergence of transnational spaces where there are intensive exchanges of cultural aspects, as is the case of global cities, has paved the way for a much more generalised form of cosmopolitanism. However, this concentration of cultures provokes the fragmentation and multiplication of identities (Cohen, 2006) that often leads to identitarian hybridisations. Individuals start to identify themselves with the local space wherein they belong, bringing about the *de-territorialisation* of identity from the homeland, which characterises long-distance nationalism of old diasporas, and resulting in its *re-territorialisation* at a local level (Cohen, 1996, 2006; Castles, 2002). In this globalised context, diasporas are in a very advantageous position, not simply because the re-territorialisation of identity provides them with new identitarian opportunities, but because their long history of dispersal and their relative uprooting facilitate their mobility, allowing them to play the role of conducting axes for a salient number of globalising activities.

Ingyu Oh's (2012) remarkable study on the evolution of identities among Korean-Japanese provides substantial cases in which Zainichi individuals decide to overcome their diasporic experience and embark in a quest for new forms of identity. Oh raises the concept of "evolutionary diaspora" as key to understand the process whereby diasporas evolve from the classic diaspora stage to a post-diaspora one characterised by the postcolonial experience highly dependent on and conditioned by an imagined construction of the motherland. Lastly, Oh states that Zainichi Koreans are reaching a third level defined by the surmounting of the imaginary homeland and the "transnationalisation" of their experience, and subsequently of their identity. They look at other countries for new opportunities taking advantage of their multilingual and multicultural skills.

5. Transnationalism in Practice

In the same way that the very definition of transnationalism appears to be problematic, its manifestations and effects are rather hard to determine and particularly to categorise, due to the fact that most of the possible transnational processes are interconnected and inseparable. Notwithstanding, in an attempt to analyse the fields wherein transnationalism can be identified, in the following pages some specific actions and manifestations of transnationalism that take place through social networks are examined.

5.1. Being Transnational

Being transnational implies the subsequent impact of transnationalism on social relations and culture, to wit, the manifestation of transnationalism.

5.1.1. Transnational Social Networks

Based on the idea that ethnic diasporas, viewed as social groups spanning the limits of nation-states, develop a series of transnational networks, Vertovec (2009: 5) states that “diasporas of old have become today’s ‘transnational communities’ sustained by a range of modes of social organization, mobility and communication.” This new perspective towards diasporic communities replaces and reconceptualises the role of diasporas, which mutates from a quasi-marginal position of ‘astray roamers’ to a much more promising position of *ethnic entrepreneurs* (Cohen, 1996).

The impact of globalisation in the development of these transnational networks has been fundamental, since the means whereby the interconnectivity between the nodes and the hubs of the networks becomes significantly reinforced by the development of the communication technologies, which characterises the phenomenon. These interconnections, however, must not be observed simply as ‘bilocal’, namely as merely linking two spaces. The initially devastating feature of dispersal that defined the origin of diasporas has gradually undergone a transformation into an exceptional asset because of their current transnational role. Predominantly, these communities were scattered through a number of different locations conforming the nodes of a transnational network that may, or may not, share the common hub that would be the homeland. This scenario assumes that ethnic groups disseminated over several places not only sustain a linkage with their respective homeland, which is the departing point of

their migratory experience, but also develop and maintain relations with other co-ethnic communities, fomenting a ‘trans-cultural’ exchange.

As a consequence of this long-distance, multi-spatial set of connections, the traditional conception of community understood as strictly bounded to a single space is put in question. The emergence of links of solidarity and mutual cooperation sprung among the different nodes of global diasporas (Cohen, 1996) enables the creation of powerful transnational social networks that precede the geographical borders of nation-states and defies directly state’s sovereignty and influence over their peoples.

However, neither can this solidarity be taken for granted nor can it be considered unconditional. Portes (1999) considers three determinant factors for the emergence of transnational solidarity. Firstly, the motivations leading migrants to leave their countries play a key role in the maintenance of ties with their community in the homeland. The case of Salvadorian refugees in the United States proves that the volume of migrants as well as the political motivations of migration movements kindles the desire of the dispersed groups to remain tied to their community of origin and get involved in transnational activities. Notwithstanding, if the decision to emigrate is motivated by personal and familial reasons, the level of commitment to the community is not necessarily significant, as seems to be the case of Colombian and Mexican emigrants from urban areas. Secondly, Portes points at the level of hostility towards an immigrant group in the host society as another factor. When a particular immigrant community is unwelcomed due to its cultural or ‘racial’ characteristics, it is likely that within that community links with the homeland are maintained and the defining cultural aspects are strongly reproduced. This situation might lead to a social and economic isolation of the group that intentionally remains separated from host society. Finally, the political response of sending countries to emigration can stimulate the preservation of transnational bonds. Governments look at the presence of co-ethnic communities abroad as assets to the economic development of their countries and, in many cases, as the tool to initiate political revolutions.

5.1.2. Transnational Consciousness

In diaspora studies, the ideas of attachment and consciousness have been of central importance. The situation of being physically *here* but mentally and culturally *there* makes the diasporic experience of belonging extraordinarily complex. The awareness of their multilocality is translated into a double consciousness and a multiple sense of attachment, towards the land from where they came, their homeland, and the space wherein they live, the hostland. It is precisely the sentiment of neither being any longer in *there*, nor being completely from *here*,

what develops a ‘diaspora consciousness’ in dispersed communities based on the shared experience of “being home away from home” (Vertovec, 2009: 6).

This double consciousness, the multiplicity of cultural features, which the diaspora members embody, and especially the plausibility of development of certain forms of attachment towards the hostland, represent a challenge for the traditional discourse of power that presupposes that in human groups there exist solely two possible forms of belonging, namely, that of the *native* and that of the *stranger*. For, unlike temporary sojourners, the members of diasporic communities do pertain in a “diaspora space” located in-between, which “decentres the subject position of the ‘native’, ‘immigrant’, ‘migrant’, in/outsider, in such a way that the diasporian is as much the native” (Brah, 1996: 242).

The challenge of assuming the complexity of belonging in the diaspora space, if observed from a macro perspective, represents exactly the same challenge that the concept of transnationalism constitutes with regards to the overcoming of the nation-state’s hegemony. The quality of beyond-ness of transnationalism can be equated to what could be viewed as the trans-nativism of diaspora politics. Individuals belonging in diasporic communities, and especially those existing in the hostland and for whom the conception of the homeland is merely imagined, generally hold a conscious awareness of the intersectionality in their lives. The offspring of Mexican immigrants in the United States, for instance, occasionally consider themselves not only as Americans but also as Mexicans or Latinos. This broadens significantly their possibilities of attachment that indeed precede the duality of belonging solely to the homeland and to the hostland, expanding the range of reach of the diaspora space. Clifford (1994: 322) defines such phenomenon as the “empowering paradox of diaspora” according to which “dwelling *here* assumes a solidarity and connection *there*,” this not meaning that *there* is represented by a “single place or an exclusivist nation.” This clashes with the traditional diasporic discourse mainly focused on the “ideology of return” (Brah, 2005) in a way that diasporians not only identify with their “roots”, but also with their “routes,” that is, with their array of common experiences (Gilroy, 1993). The amalgamation of different cultural features and diasporic experiences, therefore, enables the formation of a transnational consciousness under the premise that ‘we are from *there* but walked *this path* to now exist in *here*’.

The development of a transnational consciousness is salient for the study of the Zainichi community. Regardless of the place of origin, the level of assimilation or even the ideological views, Zainichi individuals share a series of traumatic experiences – the conditions of their settlements, the loss of their original homeland or the absence of recognition – which reinforce the formation of such type of consciousness as a form belonging in a minority ethnic

collectivity. In this sense, a hypothesis worth considering is the plausibility of an expansion of that transnational consciousness from its most apparent bilocal form, namely, that constituted by the classic homeland–hostland relationship. Such expansion would entail an increase of the referential reach that would include other co-ethnic diasporas. In the case of the Zainichi community, it would contemplate the establishment of social networks with other Korean diasporas. The Koryo-saram individuals in post-soviet states and the Korean-Chinese community in Chinese Yambian’s prefecture, for instance, share a great deal with the Zainichi community in terms of inception and adaptation to the hostland (Yoon, 2012).

5.1.3. Cultural Reproduction

In a single day in most of the cities of Europe, we are likely to encounter hundreds of cultural manifestations. Having an Ecuadorian coffee with a French croissant in an Italian cafeteria, while reading a Spanish newspaper and overhearing British-Pakistani children wearing traditional clothes and playing in English under the supervision of their parents, who are having an impassioned discussion in Urdu, might seem a romantic scene from a traveller’s diary. However, it is merely an example of the quotidian experience of most Londoners.

The emergence of transcultural spaces has enabled cultures to be no longer attached to a singular place. These days the contact with and the experience of *the other* are not necessarily exclusive of anthropologists conducting fieldwork. Be it through the consumption of products typical of other latitudes, the access to pieces of literature created and conceived in very remote contexts or simply the ease of encountering peoples from other cultures in one’s own location, the contact with other cultures has become part of our everyday lives. Nonetheless, what should be considered is how all these cultures are reproduced and, above all, how individuals interpret and embody them.

The aforementioned development of communication technologies that features globalisation has changed drastically the experience of culture. The impact on everyday life of new technologies has facilitated the maintenance of traditions and customs, particularly in the case of migrants. The experience of *home* being away from home is now almost indistinguishable from the experience of *home* being home. Transnationalism has not only gathered several cultures and ethnicities together, but it has also created the perfect scenario for localisms away from localities. The easy access to international media, via Internet or satellite television, as well as the availability of nearly any international products, make it possible to reproduce *home* at our home away. This translocation of cultural features is without a doubt a blessing for migrants who can easily continue to feed from their cultures and in a certain way overcome their situation

of displacement. Equally important is the substantial reduction in the cost of international telephone calls, which has made it possible for transnational communities to maintain day-to-day relationships with their homelands (Vertovec, 2009: 54).

Another noteworthy impact that transnationalism has in multicultural societies is the amalgamation of cultures. Descendants of immigrants are prone to face several identity crises along their lives due to the situation of in-betweenness in which they grow up and live in society. The difficulty in dealing with two cultural spaces when simultaneously belonging to both has a great deal to do with Brah's theory regarding the "diaspora space" as it perfectly explains the complexity of being constantly *in* and *out*. These transnational individuals have at their disposal differing cultural aspects from which to choose, rendering culture reproduction a personal and selective matter. Therefore, the culture re-production is questioned, leading to individual forms of culture re-reproduction that can bring about the [re]production of new forms of culture (Vertovec, 2009; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998).

5.2. Doing Transnational

Doing transnational involves a series of conscious actions that transnational agents carry out, rendering transnationalism rather a tangible phenomenon that can be gauged.

5.2.1. Transnational Economy

If globalisation is characterised for a reason in particular, it would probably be the flow of capital that the present global market generates. Due to the supra-national nature of their activities and the detachment from their nations of origin, transnational corporations (TNCs) have become one of the clearest institutional representations of transnationalism. From industrial production and supply networks to investment and marketing strategies, TNCs' practices enable and facilitate a great deal of the world's present transnational activities (Vertovec, 1999, 2009). TNCs play a key role in the transnational game as "Big Players" by carrying out their business activities across globe-spanning networks, which at the same time come to be the paths through which "Little Players" (Vertovec, 1999: 452) activities take place. TNCs determine "from above" the patterns for economic activities that transnational agents (executives, work migrants, etc.) execute "from below" (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998). However, it is erroneous to consider that all the transnational macro-economic activity is in hands of TNCs. Much of the capital circulation around the world that takes place through economic transnational networks is devised and orchestrated by transnational organised crime

organisations. The Italian mafia, for instance, has proved to be one of the most prosperous and globally expanded organisations that circulates hundreds of millions of dollars every year, by conducting its illegal business activities throughout Europe, the United States and South America (Allum, 2014). International crime organisations, in this sense, could be placed at the same level as TNCs or rather they should be considered as such because of the transnational essence of their corporation activities. Furthermore, it must be noted that international crime usually relies on the transnational networks buttressed by their diasporas, as is the case of *Cosa Nostra* whose criminal business tradition was exported to New York by immigrants, constituting what Dickie (2013) denominates the “mafia diaspora.”

Despite the fact that seemingly most of the global flow of capital is caused by the business practices of these world-spanning organisations, the impact of little players’ economic activity is of no less salience. Guarnizo explains that remittances are the manifestation of “long-distance social bonds of solidarity, reciprocity and commitment, which link migrants with their relatives and friends through national borders policed by states,” but also emphasises that, although the scope of action might appear rather limited, it actually is likely to “become a macroeconomic factor which unleashes vast effects in the countries of origin and beyond” (Guarnizo, 2011: 18. My translation). The continuous increase in the amount of money that immigrants send to their countries and localities has led many countries with strong migrant traditions to depend on their expatriated co-ethnics’ remittances (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). Observing the remittance impact on countries with large numbers of displaced population, India and China crown the statistics with \$69,970 and \$59,491 million respectively. Other countries such as Mexico, with approximately \$24 billion, and Nigeria, with more that \$21 billion, are also examples of this increasing tendency. Nonetheless, to truly understand the impact of remittances on migrant-sending countries, it is necessary to pay special attention to the actual effect that these capital inflows have in the local economies. Striking cases of such crucial influence include the Philippines, which in 2014 had an inflow of more than \$26 billion that translated into the 9.8 per cent of the country’s GDP, Bangladesh, with remittances of \$13,857 million being the 10.7 per cent of its GDP, and certain Latin American countries with an important number of emigrated population such as Honduras and El Salvador, whose total amount of remittances added up to \$3,971 and \$3,136 million, that is, more than the 16 per cent of their GDP in 2013 (The World Bank, 2015).

5.2.2. Transnational Politics

Governments around the world are becoming aware of the importance of maintaining ties with their expatriate citizens; the potential benefits that countries can procure from the transnational

networks created by their diasporas are now more considered than ever. The increasing volume of remittances from emigrated populations flowing constantly into their homelands discussed above has encouraged governments to revise and adjust their migration policies so as to stimulate the entrance of foreign capital. Citizenship as a form of political membership in a nation-state is directly related to the discourse of sovereignty within a particular territory, since it is meant to be valid only within a limited territory. However, when individuals ascribed to a particular nation-state cross its borders, they encounter a lack of political recognition, that is, membership in the new territory. In most of the western democracies, the mechanism of international relations established a series of commitments that guarantee a certain level of rights for the non-nationals in foreign territories. Notwithstanding, when citizens penetrate their nation-state borders with the intention of staying, the international system of civil rights and duties appears to fail. Citizenship, hence, works only on the presumption of a permanent compromise of the citizen to belong in their national territory. In this context, the permanent presence of non-nationals within a territory seems problematic. The response from several countries, especially from migrant-sending nations eager to maintain ties with their expatriate nationals, generally involves the acceptance and promotion of double citizenship. This causes the pluralisation of citizenship statuses, which is commonly referred to by scholars as “transnational citizenship” (Bauböck, 2010).

Nevertheless, the interest of states in the maintenance and promotion of bonds with their diasporas does not always have an economic motive. Certain political and ideological powers see in their co-ethnics overseas a source of support of utmost importance. An example of this governmental interest was observed in the 9N self-determination referendum that the Catalan regional government held on November 2014. The Catalan government looked at their expatriated citizens to widen the participatory range, by opening up external electoral colleges in 19 foreign countries that allowed 13,435 Catalans to participate in the consultation (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014). Another remarkable example can be seen in the Italian Parliament, which in 2001 went one step further and passed a law whereby Italian expats can elect twelve deputies and six senators through the Constituency Overseas [Circoscrizione Estero] located in four electoral departments.

Putting aside the active or passive interest that states might have in their emigrated population, it is important to observe how emigrants engage with their homelands’ politics. According to the traditional discourse on diaspora, immigrants’ destiny is advocated to be the return to the homeland after meeting their expectations or to the eventual complete assimilation in the host society after a definitive settlement (Castles, 2002). As discussed above, this all-or-nothing situation has been broken down as the existence of transnational social networks enable the

maintenance of ties with the homeland, regardless the scale of assimilation, and certain governmental political means motivate the active participation in homeland politics. Guarnizo, Portes and Haller (2003) point out that migrant political engagement takes place through electoral and non-electoral methods. Transnational electoral politics include the active affiliation in political parties in the country of origin, the involvement in political campaigns or the economic contributions to political institutions. Non-electoral politics, however, comprises of membership in civic associations, monetary contributions to hometown civic improvement projects and the active participation in campaigns in favour of the development of the homeland. This binary of possible political engagement fits perfectly with the theories regarding forms of transnationalism ‘from above’ and ‘from below.’ The membership and support of officially established associations at a national level, as political parties are, can be analysed as a form of participation in politics ‘above’, whereas the association with hometown organisations and the involvement in civic project at a local level, which are supposed to be purely individual, are clear manifestations of transnationalism ‘from below.’

Another form of political engagement is observed by Vertovec (1999, 2009) who assesses that International Non-Governmental Organisations [INGOs], such as the International Red Cross and several United Nations agencies, are examples of transnational political activities, due to the border-crossing nature of their actions. Nonetheless, citing Kriesberg, Versovec (1999: 454) explains that certain INGOs simply “represent the status quo of hierarchy and power,” and points at Transnational Social Movement Organisations as key forms of transnational political activism whose actions truly cut through national borders.

5.2.3. Transnational Labour

The visible manifestation of transnationalism can be observed in campaigns by certain governments of developed countries which appeal to their co-ethnic diasporas widespread around the world in hope of satisfying local issues. Various modern states now look at their expatriates, and particularly at their offspring, as a safe way of quenching their urgent need for workers without putting their ethnic homogeneity in danger. This is mainly motivated by the shortage of force labour derived from the continuous decline in birth rates.

This tendency has been patent especially in several Asian countries that have elaborated foreign policies specifically in order to lure member of their diasporas to return to their homeland with the promise of good working conditions and opportunities. An apparent example of these welcome back policies took place in the Japanese archipelago. Japan has been known as a country traditionally reluctant to immigration in favour of the maintenance of a fictional racial

homogeneity. Due to the shortage in the labour force that threatened Japanese industrial economy during the 1980s, the government launched campaigns to encourage Brazilian descendants of Japanese emigrants to return to their parents' homeland (Tsuda, 2009). A new immigration law passed in 1990 allowed second and third generation *Nikkeijin* (Japanese descendants) to reside and work in Japan (King and Christou, 2001).

In this sense, this governmental effort to attract second and subsequent generation co-ethnics is not the only reason that encourages people to leave their homes for their parents' homelands. Transnational movements of Latin Americans of European descent who in hope for improvements in their lives decide to migrate to the old continent is another illustrative example. The migratory waves of southern Italians to Argentina after the Unification of Italy in the nineteenth century, as well as the exile of many Spanish republicans to Mexico during the Francoism, brought about the emergence of new diasporas which, in many cases, opted to retain their nationalities and pass them on through generations.

5.2.4. Social Remittances

Levitt highlights the important effect of the transmission of ideas between transnational social networks, regardless of the positive or negative impact they may have. She explains that migrants do not simply send money to their homeland, but also “social remittances,” that is, “a local-level, migration-driven form of cultural diffusion” (Levitt, 1998: 926). The exposure to completely different cultural, social and economic settings in the hostland translates into the development of awareness of the deficits in the homeland. Settlement in a developed country generally provides migrants with better opportunities for security and health. In this sense, migrants in host societies are likely to acquire new health habits that they will transmit to their relatives back home. New standards of salubrity are transferred through transnational networks creating a social consciousness in the homeland with regards to healthy practices. For instance, Lindstrom and Muñoz-Franco's study about the diffusion of contraceptive knowledge through social networks (2005) highlights the potential of rural Guatemalan migrants in the United States who, owing to their experience with fertility control, often become promoters of necessary contraceptive knowledge which potentially has a significant impact on fertility levels and trends in rural Guatemala.

Attitudes towards education can also change. Migration to more developed countries generally offers opportunities for access to higher education and to a wider range of fields of study. This access to higher education for co-ethnics overseas in many cases involves future educational opportunities for those in the homeland. Migrants who develop professional careers overseas

are likely to become assets for the education of the homeland's future generations, paving the way to what Meyer, Charum and their colleagues (1997) denominate "brain gain," in opposition to the loss of intellectual force, 'brain drain'. Nonetheless, Levitt and Lambda-Nieves (2011) highlight a reduction in the interest for education of children in out-migrant environments that in some cases prioritise emigration to education. Therefore, as Levitt and Lambda-Nieves put it, "while, in the long run, migration generates more income for education, in the short term it reduces resources" (Ibid: 5).

As a matter of fact, the entrance of new ideas can unleash the necessary forces to provoke a political change. Expats in countries where democracy is well developed have access to a series of political views that are yet to be embraced in their countries of origin. When the movement across national borders is motivated by political reasons, migrants are likely to become external agents of ideological resistance. Portes (1999) assesses that transnationalism can have moralising and democratising effects on the homeland as a consequence of three factors that define the migrant context. Firstly, he highlights the modest origin of the majority of migrants that renders them reluctant to sympathise with local elites in their places of origin. Secondly, the fact that they are located abroad and hence outside of the sphere of influence of these elites makes them free from their repressive and alienating instruments. Finally, migrant entrepreneurial success and organisational freedom can be much more influentially effective than other sectors in the home country. For instance, of salient importance are the influence of the diffusion of ideas from the Indian diaspora, which has proved to be key in the reformation of India's economic policies, or the neoliberal movement led by the 'Chicago boys' in Chile (Levitt and Lambda-Nieves, 2011).

It is needless to say that, as in most aspects of transnationalism, the outcomes of the flow of social, economic and cultural ideas depend directly on the context, not only of the nation-states but also of the localities and the agents themselves. In fact, one of the biggest concerns for migrant and non-migrant communities is the flow of criminal knowledge. The return home is optimistically regarded as a moment of positive reunion, but should deportations be considered returns, this perspective is likely to change. Transnational crime operates throughout the world availing itself of transnational criminal networks to enlarge the reach of its activities. In many cases, countries' legislation agrees on deportation as a solution – obviously for the host country, which simply disposes of the problem.

However, social remittances do not always have a beneficial effect in the communities. New ideas and views brought by migrated relatives can cause confrontations of all sorts. The importation of progressive ways of thought can provoke social exclusion or even put in risk the

stability of the family. Strictly isolated countries where dictatorial regimes operate, such as DPRK, trust in their people's ignorance and powerlessness to maintain their power and focus a great deal of their efforts on strengthening the impermeability of their borders. The continuous smuggling of South Korean audio-visual materials into DPRK by escapees and Chinese-Koreans from the northern border has been augmenting criticism among North Koreans. The access to such materials may open their eyes to the possibility for a more prosperous life, however, also encourages many to flee from the Jucheist state putting themselves in danger.

6. Conclusion

This chapter addressed the concept of transnationalism through the analysis of its potential impact on the diaspora experience of migrant communities in the present era of globalisation. In the first place, an introduction is provided to the terminology as well as to other key concepts, which are fundamental to fully comprehend the emergence of transnationalism. A brief but consistent presentation of the notion of 'nation-state' and its implications in the matter provided the necessary context to understand the spaces wherein the processes that represent transnationalism take place. Likewise, in order to provide a historical introduction to the issue, the phenomenon of diaspora covered an important part of the chapter. Through this analysis, it was proved that diasporas do not necessarily share a common pattern and are in constant transformation. Traditional essentialist discourses about a presumed state of temporal and spatial stagnation of diasporas does not appear applicable any longer, since the new conditions imposed by globalisation have facilitated the development of new forms of belonging, which translate into the discontinuation of the conception of the diaspora experience as isolated and uprooted.

At present, diasporas embrace new forms of attachment characterised by links of solidarity and the sense of belonging to more than one space. This process is brilliantly described and conceptualised by Brah (1996) and Fortier (2000) in their theories about the existence of a *diasporic third space*, which defies the classic bipolar conception of belonging that does not contemplate any form of belonging beyond that of the native and that of the stranger. However, the overstatement of such theories is likely to incur in an essentialist form of anti-essentialism. The transformations in the playground where diasporas are to play are patent, yet they should not be considered incontestable. Globalisation has proved its role as facilitator for a redefinition of the place that diasporic groups might occupy in the present era. However, it cannot be taken for granted that all diasporians are keen to embrace transnationalism and abandon their endeavour to belong and fit in the receiving society, that is, to *go native*.

Following the analysis of the globalisation phenomena, an examination of transnational practices was presented in two main sections: *Becoming transnational* and *Doing transnational*. In the former section three main effects of transnationalism were addressed. Firstly, an ineluctable manifestation is the pivotal role of complex social networks, which has emerged over the last decades, buttressed by traditional diasporas and expanded by globalisation. This modern channel for co-ethnic interrelation and solidarity has proved to be crucial for the reconceptualisation of the role of diasporas, which in the present scenario have the possibility to work as transnational linking nodes of the network. Secondly, transnationalism has brought about new forms of self-consciousness that imply multiple attachments. Due to the emergence of transnational networks, diasporians are now offered the opportunity to develop several senses of belonging focused on different spaces and experiences. Finally, the third manifestation of the transnational experience is the reproduction of cultures. Being a process more natural of second and subsequent generations, cultural reproduction entails a challenge for transnational individuals. The defining aspects of the original cultures generally turn out to be imagined for later generations, as they normally do not stand a chance to experience the culture in the homeland but to live in a cultural space different to that of their parents. Thus, the exposure to the original culture is limited to the co-ethnic community in the hostland, which not only *reproduces* the original culture, but also *produces* it anew.

The latter section, *Doing transnational*, identified four main forms of transnational practice. Firstly, the significant impact of remittances in host countries is highlighted. The increasing flow of capital from receiving countries to sending countries has proved to be of salient importance for the improvement and maintenance of certain economies. Secondly, potential impact on politics by migrant collective activism is also worth attention. Thirdly, the labour migration has also been characteristic of transnationalism. Finally, social remittances were presented as significant forms of knowledge exportation for the development of migrant-sending societies.

As a result of the examination of some of the most apparent transnational processes, it is possible to assert that transnationalism can be construed as the series of exchanges and interactions between co-ethnic groups, located in and out of their homelands, that benefit from the social networks built by diasporians along history and are reinforced by globalisation's development of communication technologies. They cross the national borders giving place to new forms of solidarity that neither depend completely on nor are necessarily conditioned by states.

Guarnizo raises the concept of *transnational living* that refers to a “wide array of social, cultural, political, and economic cross-border relations that emerge, deliberately and unintentionally, from migrants’ drive to maintain and reproduce their socio-cultural environments of origin from afar” (2004: 15. My translation). The pages above recount the evolution of that *transnational living* from its origin in the diaspora discourse to the most significant manifestations in relation to the globalisation phenomenon. Transnationalism, therefore, represents social-cultural and political-economic activities that take place through the borders of sovereignty of the nation-state; this does not imply the involvement of the nation-state in the process. Diasporas appear to have defeated the supremacy of the nation-state, making the most out of their situation of displacement and becoming individual figures of global influence that surmount national borders policed by states. Nonetheless, certain scepticism has been emerging among some scholars (Calhoun, 2004) who are not in total sympathy with theories that vaticinate the beginning of a post-nationalist era resulting from the transnationalism’s overcoming of nationalisms. We should remain reluctant to claim that transnationalism has completely disarmed nationalism. Optimism might lead us to think that the presumed unboundedness of the present world scenario brought about by globalisation has rendered nation-states incapable of exerting their sovereignty within their territories as borders have become porous and subjects have the tools to dodge any institutional action. Nevertheless, it is fundamental to bear in mind that nationalism is also a form of reaction that is likely to manifest in an infinite number of ways. Long-distance nationalism, diasporic nationalism and reactive nationalism are forms of nationalism derived from migration which prove the liquidity and malleability of nationalism itself.

It is also indispensable to highlight the significance of the context of every transnational process. An important part of the scholarship has been tempted to situate transnationalism in an imaginary third space due to the fact that the processes are supposed to take place outside of two different nation-states. In this respect, it is important to emphasise the undeniable significance of every migrant context in the process, as Guarnizo and Smith (1999: 11) posit: “transnational practices cannot be construed as if they were free from the constraints and opportunities that contextuality imposes.” That is because of the immeasurable variety of “imagined communities” (Anderson, 2006) that social networks can generate in relation to the scale of aggregation (local or national) or the political, ideological or social implications of each community (Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004). Furthermore, contextualities are also formed by states and politics inside national borders, conditioning the options for migrant actions and restricting their room for manoeuvre.

Thus, in the first place, it is necessary to include in the transnational equation the variable of state's institutional and political control. Host country's fears for their ethnic homogeneity and ideological integrity can lead states to implement policies, not only with the purpose of controlling or even stopping the influx of migrants, but also regulating membership and guaranteeing an eventual assimilation of immigrants into their societies. Assimilation in host societies does not necessarily entail a complete loss of aspects of the original culture and the total refusal to preserve a relationship with the homeland, but it might have significant effects in the maintenance of social networks. In this respect, Castles (2002) states that a discriminative environment can bring about forms of "reactive ethnicity" characterised by co-ethnic solidarity, which leads to socio-cultural isolation compensated with transnational linkages. Migrant communities in a host society where multiculturalism is promoted are likely to develop cosmopolitan identities that for second and subsequent generations can translate into a refusal to continue to feed transnational networks with their parents' homelands. On the other hand, another factor to take into account is the migrant's social circumstances prior to their departure and the political environment in their homelands. Political turmoil can compel people to abandon their homes in search for ideological freedom. This can motivate involvement from overseas in homeland politics, as is the example of Salvadorian refugees in the United States. However, in cases where migrational movement is motivated exclusively by individual reasons, such desire to produce an impact on the home society may not be a priority, as in the aforementioned case of Colombians and Mexicans from urban areas. In this manner, the study of social networks should perhaps take a closer look and leave the overgeneralisation of 'transnationalism', concentrating upon the possibilities of 'translocalism'. As Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) assert, migrant affiliations and organisations are often based on their hometowns resulting in a migrant bilocalism, which comprises natives and strangers and not necessarily nationals and foreigners, as in domestic migration. This apparent dependence of transnationalism on contextualities clashes with the theories assessing that the new transnational order opens up a space for post-nationalism, as the hegemony of the nation-state is now put in question. The undeniable conditionality to which transnational processes are susceptible, however, raises doubts about the discontinuation of nation-state's *status quo*, as its indirect impact, as the institutional force that indirectly or directly sets the scenario wherein transnational practices take place, is indisputable. Social, political and cultural contextualities are conditioned by the sovereign power of the state as it still fabricates and regulates societies' politics. Therefore, despite the indisputable beneficial impact of transnationalism in increasing migrants' capacity of shaping and controlling their experience in host societies, we should be reluctant to affirm that it diminishes the nation-state hegemony. The new scenario established by globalisation, where national borders seem to blend out, represents a major challenge for states' territorial domination. Nonetheless, it does not mean that states will remain impassive

and not attempt to adapt to the new circumstances. Furthermore, we should not forget that many of the transnational activities are nation-centred. Political involvement in homeland politics might seemingly be out of reach for the nation-states' tentacles as they take place away from the homeland. Nevertheless, the operating of such political actions needs to be channelled through the apparatus of the state.

This chapter introduced the issue of transnationalism focusing on three main aspects: its origin, manifestations and potentialities. Notwithstanding, it leaves a number of questions unanswered: *are migrants' descendants around the world concerned or even aware of the existence of transnational networks? Can it be presumed that transnational living is a plausible option for all migrants? Or, more importantly, should it be assumed that transnationalism has an impact on migrants' self-conception and identity?* The answers to these questions are likely to be as many as the number of displaced communities and many more, if considering the fragmentations within each of these communities. The examination of transnationalism's emergence as well as its present and future impact, however, enables the subsequent analysis of the context wherein the Zainichi community has evolved in the last few decades. As a major concern for the present study, an exploration of the Zainichi issue through the prism of transnationalism will likely provide evidence regarding the existence of a change of course in the present generations' experience of their identity. To do this, it will be fundamental to observe whether or not there exists a sense of or an aspiration for *transnational living* within the Zainichi community and investigate how it is manifested and practised. In order to analyse thoroughly and correctly the identitarian experience of the community, it is essential to explore the existing theories on identity, paying particular attention to the processes of formation and interpretation. For this reason, the following chapter provides the necessary theoretical framework for the study of identity, focusing particularly on its formation, development and interpretation in the context of migration.

Chapter 3. Identity and Society: The Paradox of Social Interaction

1. What is Identity?

Observing history, human beings appear to be eager to explore, discover and find answers for the enigmas and questions about all what surrounds them. Religion and science have attempted to provide answers and satisfy much of men's curiosity by means of faith and scientific evidence respectively. Nonetheless, it is inevitable to think that people have mainly focused on the search for explanations for the mysteries that surround them, forgetting about the enormous enigma that being a person poses.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the French post-impressionist painter, Paul Gauguin, captured in one of his most impressive pictures, due to the dramatic circumstances surrounding it, the three most intriguing questions that can be raised by the human mind: "*D'où venons nous? Que sommes nous? Où allons nous?*," that is, where do we come from?, what are we?, where are we going? Not intending to cover the magnitude of the triad that these three incommensurable questions form and attending strictly to its identitarian reading, this chapter aims to present what the question of identity entails, particularly concerning its formation, development and dimensions, attending especially to the role that groups play in individuals' personal identification.

Paying attention to the etymological origin of the term, identity sees its origin in the Late Latin word *identitas*, which means *sameness* or *oneness* and finds its root in the word *idem*, 'the same.' From this it can be deduced that the idea of similarity and equality plays a key role in the process of understanding what *identity* is about. Returning to the triad of questions, the question "what are we?" or rather "who are we?" might, apparently, easily be answered by giving a name, a nationality or even a professional title. However, if we are willing to do an exercise of introspection, the answer to that question may not seem quite easy to find. Assuming that possessing an identity implies a degree of *sameness* with respect to others makes it patent that identity is the result of interaction between different agents. Identity is conceived as a social or even human quality that everyone should have or, at least, should look for in order to gain a position in a certain collectivity. Communities evaluate the right of membership on the basic assumption that every member presents themselves as *someone*, that is, as a subject with an identity, which is defined by themselves and their interest to belong in a group. Identity, therefore, appears to be a mandatory element of human inner and outer life, which, at the same time, defines and is defined by its membership in a social group (Malešević, 2002). Nevertheless, we must remain cautious when dealing with the concept of *identity*, as the term,

Brubaker and Cooper posit, “tends to mean too much, too little or nothing at all” (2000: 1). Following their thesis, throughout this chapter, the use of the term *identity* is advocated in a descriptive manner rather than with a normative approach, avoiding any absolutist categorisation of the processes and mechanisms related to identity whatsoever.

1.1. The Self and the True Identity

The traditional presumption that every individual possesses a particular *self*, that needs to be discovered, assumes that identity is an element of human nature indisputable, fixed and to be found. Goldstein and Rayner (1994) highlight the essentialist perspective of identity studies in early modern society. The mystic perspective that envisages identity as a result of realisation reminds of the Buddhist pursuit of Nirvana, Shintoism’s supreme quest for *Satori* (existential understanding), or even the Christian search for salvation. This essentialist view involves a continuous process of introspection, which presumably leads to a final level of realisation wherein the true identity of the individual is found. This view on identity as something essential, pre-established and, hence, incontrovertible might be deemed out-of-date. However, if pluralised and observed from the standpoint of the nation-state, this interpretation does not appear so unfamiliar. Nationalist perceptions of national identities entail the search for and perpetuation of a true national character. Authenticity plays a key role in this process, as nationalism looks to ‘dig out’ the true essence of the nation, as the nation, and therefore the national identity, is specific, unique and exceptional – and any attempt to reshape or even reinterpret it is out of consideration. This interpretation of identity as something predefined and concealed that needs to be sought leads to thinking that the answer to the question *Que sommes nous?* does exist, is already sculpted in stone and we can only hope to find it – not to answer it ourselves.

Sociologists’ congenital fear for surrendering to essentialist generalisations and, what are even more terrifying, vacuous categorisations suggest that the applicability of this pre-modern perspective onto whatever historical or social context is utterly questionable. However, were we to be willing to give generalisation a certain level of trust, this approach to identity as an innate quality of individuals or collectivities, especially in the case of the nation, could be even contemplated in particular time-space contexts. The idea that every social agent cannot be or become anything other than what they truly are, due to their position in the respective social context wherein they happened to be born, could be contemplated in a social-historical context where diversity does not exist. Yet could we certainly speak of any time-space setting where diversity is absolutely or, at least, partially absent?

1.2. The Paramount Role of Difference

Current discourses around globalisation (further discussed in Chapter 2) tend to imbue the term with an uncomfortable degree of assumed novelty, whereas the freshness of the phenomenon is highly arguable – and so is the idea that diversity is something new. According to Jenkins’s (2008a) thesis regarding the significance of difference, the process of identification is based on differentiation and in this process diversity plays a paramount role. Attending to its etymological origin, *identity* is the result of a process whereby subjects determine what they are by recognising ‘sameness-fellows,’ that is, others with whom they share specific characteristics – “similarity” (Jenkins, 2008a: 16). In the 1955 BBC documentary *Around the World*, Orson Wells introduced the Basque people saying:

The people who live here [the Basque Country] are neither French nor Spanish, they’re Basques. [...] And the Basques are what the Basques are, but what is a Basque? All we know for sure is *what a Basque is not*.

BBC, 1955.

Thus, it appears logical to deduce that *to know who I am* demands *to know what I am not* – in Hall’s words:

Above all, and directly contrary to the form in which they are constantly invoked, **identities are constructed through**, not outside, **difference**. This entails the radically disturbing recognition that **it is only through the relation to the Other**, the relation to what it is not, **to precisely what it lacks**, to what has been called its *constitutive outside* that the positive meaning of any term – and thus its identity – can be constructed.

Hall, S. 1996: 4-5. Original italics, bolds added.

Hall refers to the concept *constitutive outside* coined by Derrida (1991), which entails an interesting deconstructivist interpretation of identity formation. Mouffe emphasises that the *constitutive outside* cannot be conceived as sheer “dialectical negation” since “the outside has to be incommensurable with the inside and at the same time, the condition of emergence of the latter” (2000: 12). Thus, the antagonism between *me/us* and *them* does not merely represent a confrontation between two different, yet equally concrete contents, but between the concreteness-seeking subject and an unfathomable whole which relativises concreteness as such. Albeit devoted to the analysis of political identities and forms of democracy, Mouffe makes an interesting reflection in regard to pluralism – as valorisation of every difference. She assesses that *being* cannot be considered a mere act of objective presence “because every object has inscribed in its very being something other than itself.” Therefore, “everything is

constructed as *difference*” (Mouffe, 2000: 21. Original italics) and hence needs to be construed as such. Following this logic, identity can clearly be envisaged as the result of a conflict – presumably between the self and the constitutive outside.

Not leaving Mouffe’s thesis aside, it is interesting to pay attention to her theory about the “ant agonistic pluralism” with which she proposes two possible ways to negotiate difference. She claims that the negotiation of difference may take place in antagonistic or agonistic terms. The former implies a hostile relationship between both elements, as enemies, which would not share a “common symbolic space.” On the other hand, agonism would involve a more hopeful vision over the process of negotiation, as the conflict would not take place between enemies but adversaries who, sharing a common symbolic space, would clash when trying to organise such space. This clash would hence bring about a form of competition, not necessarily hostility.

1.3. Modernity and Identity: How the World is Set Up

Modernity has been a recursive term in sociology during the last century. However, the concept itself appears to be rather volatile, as, due to the wildering range of influence it has on social sciences, it is loaded with a great deal of relativism that renders it remarkably difficult to fathom. Modernity refers to the social order that emerged in Europe after the Middle Ages. It involved the end of the previous traditional order, which was based on a social system of face-to-face relations. These relations were homogeneous and took place on a small scale, being closely regulated by direct contact among individuals whose social ascription was unquestioned. This change in the social order is interpreted by Tönnies (2002) as the change in human association from small communities, where individuals interacted directly and shared a common will, to societies where interactions are based on self-interests and rationality. It is impossible to precisely determine when modernity overtook human history. However, it is accepted that it was the combination of three main developments that brought about the rise of modernity. The expansion of scientific knowledge, the emergence of capitalism and the establishment of centralised nation-states and bureaucracy were the necessary ferment for the emergence of modernity (Lineman, 2009). Berman (1983) dissects modernity’s beginning and evolution into three particular phases. The first one extends from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth. In this period, Berman identifies the beginning of a modern form of social life, which was not entirely noticed but rather intuited by the peoples of that time. The second phase goes from the start of the great revolutionary wave of the late eighteenth century to the twentieth. The French Revolution and its subsequent effects in Europe signified the emergence of a new social order that would influence every aspect of social and political life. Ultimately, the twentieth century introduced the last phase of modernity, which spanned globally and was

manifested in numerous revolutions in arts, politics and social life in general. Mass migrations from the countryside to cities, the growth in production and expansion of monetary economy along with the development of a specialised division of labour altered the traditional forms of social relationships, which mutated from being interpersonal and emotional to be purely mechanical and rational. This motivated that individualism prevailed over collectivism in society.

Quoting Giddens, “[t]he modes of life brought into being by modernity have swept us away from *all* traditional types of social order, in quite unprecedented fashion.” That enacted a series of transformations that extensionally “have served to establish forms of social interconnection which span the globe,” and intentionally have “altered some of the most intimate and personal features of our day-to-day existence” (2008: 4. Original italics). Furthermore, Giddens highlights three principal discontinuations representing the major separation between traditional and modern social order. In the first place, the “pace of change” has enormously varied and is now characterised by its unparalleled rapidity. Secondly, the “scope of change” has been equally altered and now expands globally, which implies the appearance of the transnational networks discussed in the previous chapter. Lastly, Giddens speaks of the discontinuation of the traditional “nature of modern institutions.” The rise of the nation-state, along with the bureaucratic system promoted by it, are examples of a new modern institutions that completely altered the individual experience of social life. All these changes brought about what Giddens denominates the “disembedding” of social systems – “the ‘lifting out’ of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their structuring across indefinite spans of time-space” (Giddens, 2008: 21). This disembedding from pre-modern traditions, wherein the role of the individual in his society was relatively fixed, takes him through a process of continuous self-interrogation, derived from the absence of referential guidance. This process is denominates “flexibility” (Giddens, 2001; 2008) and involves the constant examination and reformulation of social practices motivated by the acquisition of new information about those practices that modify them at the same time.

In this context, conceptions about identity change significantly, transforming the process of understanding and conception of the *self* from being static, fixed and immutable to becoming relativized, questioned and constantly re-elaborated in a never-ending “*reflexive project*” (Giddens, 2001: 32). Many defining aspects of the late modernity have facilitated the interconnectivity beyond time-space boundaries bringing about the disembedding of identities from their localities. Individuals still live their lives in a local context, as the constraints of the body impose, but the formation of their cognitive framework is no longer exclusively linked to their situational context; now it is enriched with multiple ideas, values and experiences which

do not necessarily pertain to either their temporal or spatial context. However, far from easing human interaction, that is, identity formation, the modern social order leaves the individual in an orphan situation, due to which the protective framework of traditional communities fades away and whereby the individual finds himself alone in the world, without the psychological support and sense of security provided by traditional orders. This modern scenario that individuals are to face is related to Bauman's (2000: 117) idea concerning the "unholy trinity" of uncertainty, insecurity and unsafety – in the modern world nothing is to be taken for granted any longer. The individual is now placed in a much more impersonal environment wherein universalisms overthrow particularisms and neutrality prevails over affectivity. Modernity placed the social world in motion and thereby social determination was replaced by self-determination. The individual now needs to *become* what he is; identity is no longer predestined and considered a given, but as a task, a project that individuals have to undertake (Bauman, 2001). "Each person," Giddens explains, "has a unique character and special potentialities that may or may not be fulfilled" (2001: 74). From an identitarian standpoint, these potentialities translate into a bewildering array of possible *selves* – identities understood as social ascriptions – that individuals may consciously or unconsciously develop, which at the same time lead to anxiety. Bauman (2000, 2001) speaks of the constant *re-embedding* that follows Giddens' *disembedding*. Individuals need to choose, prove and reshape their ascriptions in a process of continuous redefinition that is not meant to come to an end. With modernity – and especially with late modernity – the number of identitarian possibilities have increased remarkably, breaking through the boundaries of time and space. However, this does not mean that the choice is easy to make. In order to come to personal and social fulfilment, individuals are now required to play a zero-sum game of trust and risk. (Post-)modernity opens up a space of identitarian choice, although not without individuals having to take the toll of anxiety. In other words, modernity offers individuals a great deal of new opportunities, to both succeed and fail. This situation, however, does not mean that individuals are bound to either success or failure, but that they are irremediably and permanently in a state of redefinition – there is no final re-embedding. The modern individual is no longer a pilgrim in quest of a final destination where his anxiety shall cease. Now he takes on the role of a vagrant cast adrift, who cannot but wonder where he should go and who is fated to set off on a never-ending journey through trial and error.

1.4. Spaces of Interaction

At this point, it appears evident that identities are the result of interaction between an internal reality – the *self* – and an external one – the *other*. Nevertheless, it is fundamental to understand what the space where this interaction takes place is like. Thus, in order to elaborate a concise understanding of such processes of interaction and how it is dealt with, it is interesting to start

off by examining Jenkins's understanding of the human world as a series of orders or realities. Jenkins (2008), building on Goffman and Godden's theories, states that the human world consists of three main interrelated orders, which simultaneously occupy the same time and space: the *individual* order, the *interaction* order and the *institutional* order.

The first and most intimate order, the *individual*, refers to the reality within every embodied individual, '*what-goes-on-in-their-heads*'. Individuals are assumed to be distinctive, unique and independent, but their selves cannot be conceived as independent, viz., in isolation. Self-hood can only be understood as relational and contextual, as it is socially constructed, defined and redefined through difference. Thus, the individual reality – the *self-hood* – must be envisaged as an “ongoing [...] synthesis of (internal) self-definition and the (external) definitions of oneself offered by the others” (Jenkins, 2008: 40).

The second order, based on *social* interaction represents the relational aspect of human life in society, '*what-goes-on-between-people*'. This level of reality is intrinsically related to the notion of identity as result of a reciprocal process of influence. This order, therefore, is fundamental to understand the essential and defining interactional aspect of identity, as it represents the point of encounter between the *self* and the *other*. However, interaction should be understood as a bilateral and repetitive process. Individuals self-identity is dependent inasmuch as it is recognised by others, but at the same time individual's presentation of the self defines others' in the same manner that it is endlessly defined and redefined by others. Thus, it must be assumed that the interaction order is dauntingly present, and never stops being significant for identity formation.

Lastly, the *institutional* order takes the identity analysis to a collective level. Until now, the interaction between the *self* and the *other* as two independent realities was discussed. However, it is of great importance to determine the space where both elements encounter each other. With institutional order, Jenkins refers to the idea of *group* to which both the self and the other are ascribed. Both are aware of the interaction process, that is, both play a conscious role in the two first orders. Yet, the institutional order can be conceived only in perspective (from outside the group). This idea is in line with Derrida's “constitutive outside,” due precisely to its incommensurable aspect.

2. Stages of Social Interaction

Personal relationships with Zainichi individuals has taught me that, like with any ethnic minority or majority, contextuality and thus the subsequent set of social interactions that it

allows for, has a remarkable impact on individuals' development and self-understanding of their own identity. In particular, the revelation of a sense of unworthiness and embarrassment towards her ethnicity by a Zainichi friend made me aware of the degree of complexity that Zainichi community members' experience may imply. Not having received the same ethnic education as her sister, my friend confessed a certain level of dissatisfaction with her condition, derived from the absence of skills in her presumed ethnic language. Whereas her sister had had multiple opportunities not only to learn the language but also to interact with Zainichi individuals with a high level of ethnic consciousness, my friend held a sentiment of fakery and incompleteness concerning the ethnic dimension of her identity. This personal account turns out to be very significant as it exemplifies the salience of interaction in the development of identity.

For this reason, the following section is intended to outline the different stages and dimensions of social interaction by resorting to Cooley's and Tönnies's theories about social organisation, based on inherited groups, and attending to Hyman's and Shibutani's views on reference groups, as important sources of identification.

2.1. Interactive Groups

This first category of groups encompasses every *other* with whom the individual is expected to have some kind of interaction, direct or indirect. This interaction brings about two main types of relationships: organic and mechanic. Depending on the type of resulting relationship, two subgroups can be identified: primary and secondary. This was observed in the early years of the twentieth century by the American sociologist Charles H. Cooley who drew attention to the fact that social interaction takes place within two principal groups whose form of interaction, direct or indirect, with individuals produces different impacts on them. "Primary groups," Cooley explains, are "characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation" and hence "are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideas of the individual." This affirmation supports the idea of ethnicity as a quality given by the group as a result of a social nepotism, i.e., "the result of intimate association" which involves "a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole [the community], so that one's very self ... is the common life and purpose of the group." Thus, through interaction with this primary group, individuals naturally incorporate group's content as their own, bringing about "the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which 'we' is the natural expression" (Cooley, 1910: 23). Cooley explicitly identifies three "spheres of intimate association and cooperation": family, playground of children and neighbourhood or community group of the elder. Although these three groups shape the primary group of association, it is important to bear in mind that neither are they meant to be on the

same degree of influence nor are they supposed to unconditionally share the same characteristics.

According to Tönnies's theory (2002) about community and association, human relations are relations of will, insofar as they are based on mutual [inter-]actions ideated to diminish or support others' will. These interactions bring about different types of associations – social interactions –, which, in accordance with their nature, are deemed either organic or mechanical. Likewise, the spaces wherein social interactions take place are also dependant on the type of relationships. Therefore, the social space wherein organic interactions, that is, private and intimate relationships, take place is denominated *Gemeinschaft* (community) and the one where relations are purely mechanical and even imaginary is described as *Gesellschaft* (association or society). Tönnies's notion of community as *Gemeinschaft* has a great deal of resemblance to Cooley's primary groups, as they are mainly based on face-to-face interactions. In the view of Tönnies, there are three possible forms of *Gemeinschaft*: kinship, neighbourhood and friendship. In the first place, kinship *Gemeinschaft* comprises a form of association based on blood-ties and the constitution of a common "realm" (Tönnies, 2002: 42), the household or the familiar ties, made up of "common fear and common honor" that "ensure peaceful living and co-operation with greater certainty." Secondly, neighbourhood entails a form of association based on locality. The physical fact of proximity, Tönnies argues, causes the necessity for "co-operation in labor, order and management" and, more mystically speaking, "common supplication for grace and mercy to the gods and spirits" (Tönnies, 2002: 43). This is to be interpreted as the sharing of interests and purposes *with the community inasmuch as they also share a cultural identity*. Lastly, friendship constitutes what Tönnies denominates *Gemeinschaft* of mind, the result of work relations and intellectual attitudes.

Regarding *Gesellschaft*, Tönnies explains that it is a form of association purely artificial and imaginary. Being an emerging phenomenon at the time it was formulated, *Gesellschaft* was a reflection of urban life styles derived from industrialisation and the subsequent patterns of behaviour that rendered social relationships more superficial and impersonal – consequences of modernity. Tönnies also speaks of human *Gesellschaft*, describing it "as mere coexistence of people independent of each other" (Tönnies, 2002: 34). In line with this argument, another term is of major salience to understand this phenomenon. The concept of secondary groups, albeit not formulated by Cooley himself, complements and completes the idea of *Gesellschaft*. As Rajendra assesses, secondary groups are mainly defined by their opposition to the primary groups insofar that "physical closeness, intimacy and individuality are not desired in them" as they are constituted exclusively "for some purposes and aims" (2007: 130), and therefore are not meant to last any longer than it takes for purposes to be achieved. Despite the apparently

obvious deliberate and purposive character of the relations that take place in this group, it is important to emphasise the situation of self-dependence of members. Relations and interaction between members of a society may be motivated by individual interests, but at the same time they guarantee the stability of the collectivity as in the end all members, consciously or subconsciously, look to achieve a common goal – the prevalence of the group.

Therefore, in summary, within the interactive groups category two main subgroups can be identified. On the one hand, primary groups encompass organic relations among individuals based on three main forms of dependence. Firstly, the most premature and emotional association is derived from the ideas of a shared household and upbringing, which in most cases are determined by birth. Secondly, common intellectual attitudes bring relations of friendship. Thirdly, sharing interests and purposes creates relations of comradeship and common understanding. On the other hand, secondary groups include mechanic relations of dependence derived exclusively by the need for cooperation to achieve particular goals.

2.2. Reference Groups

Reference groups is a concept mostly used in contemporary sociology and social psychology which proves useful to comprehend the importance of contextualities and individual aspirations. Herbert Hyman, who studied the influence exerted by particular groups in individual self-appraisal through a process of comparison, originally elaborated the concept in 1942. He observed that “[i]ndividuals are complicated and varied and creative in the ways they orient themselves to others, in the groups they select as frames of comparison for self-appraisal” (1960: 386). With this statement, Hyman assesses that individuals create frames of reference, out of a selective process, in order to establish their own array of opinions and attitudes. It is important to emphasise the selective character of the whole process, which distinguishes it from the models proposed by Tönnies and Cooley. The construction of a reference frame must be envisaged as essentially empirical as it is strongly dependent on individual experience, thereby likely to be taken into more consideration than interactive groups. Reference groups theory’s main purpose, Hyman explains, is to determine the decisive factors and consequences of the process of self-appraisal whereby individuals take standards from other individuals and groups as their own.

Shibutani (1955) re-elaborated the concept and identified three different usages. Firstly, following Hyman’s argumentation, he recognises its comparative aspect in evaluating individual’s own status in society. In this regard, Shibutani also underlines the salience of Stouffer’s concept of “relative deprivation” (in Shibutani, 1955: 562), which refers to the

deprivation experienced by individuals when they compare themselves to others. Individuals who lack something compare themselves with others who have it, the latter being the reference group for the former. Secondly, Shibutani points at the conceptualisation of the reference group as the collectivity from which the individual desires to gain acceptance and membership, as a way to enhance his status in society. Lastly, distancing from its presumed selective aspects, a third usage of the concept understands the reference group as the standpoint from which the individual perceives the world. This understanding, Shibutani asserts, does not involve individual's voluntary ascription to group perceptual field, but views it as a by-product of individual's position in society. With regards to minorities, he explains that, despite the degree of disapproval and contempt towards the collectivity represented by the whole of the majority, they are likely to endorse their viewpoint at large.

Continuing with the elaboration of this last interpretation of reference groups, Shibutani includes the notion of culture that he defines as a perspective shared by a particular group, that consists of particular attributions and conceptions about the group and the world that thread a matrix through which environments are perceived. He also explains that cultural pluralism has brought about the simultaneous internalisation of different perspectives, which may even contradict each other. In view of this complexity to determine cultural perceptions, it is of salient importance to examine which groups individuals may choose as their principal reference groups. There is no doubt that a study must, in order to determine such a thing, dig deep down into individuals' personal experiences, because "the choice of reference groups is a function of one's interpersonal relations" (Shibutani, 1955: 565). However, it is not only the individual choice that is important, but also the variety of references to choose from – or the different associations (*gesellschafts*) to take as reference. Shibutani speaks of "social worlds" (1955: 565) as the series of different perspectives that shape modern mass societies, whose scale of consideration from the individual's side is mainly dependent on their personal experience. The major complication, therefore, for the study of ascription to the social world, that is, the endorsement of certain reference groups, is the utterly contextual and relational nature of the process.

Building on Shibutani's interpretation of reference groups, it is possible to conceptualise the existence of two forms of reference groups. An aspirational type of reference group comprises Hyman's perspective inasmuch that certain groups of references are selectively chosen in basis of individual aspirations (longing for belonging). On the other hand, a more critique approach is embodied by the notion of contextual reference groups, which are represented as the different social worlds wherein the individual is involved – the different constitutive outsides. This source of reference is not the result of a selective process, as it is imposed by the context in

which the individual exist. Therefore, it is possible to affirm that the constitutive outside is shaped by the different contextual reference groups, which are acknowledged by the individual. However, given that this acknowledgement is purely referential, the individual's conception and viewpoint concerning them are not expected to be homogeneous. Also, building on Mouffa's theory on pluralism, it is possible to asses that the perception of those different references can be positive and enriching (agonist) or negative and intimidating (antagonistic).

3. Self-Representation

Identity escapes individual's control and is deeply dependent of social interaction. Therefore, building on Jenkins' orders theory, self-identity (the individual order) is the result of a process of negotiation whereby the individual selectively exposes and shows off their self in order to gain a particular form of recognition. There are infinite modes of self-representation that range from specific forms of social behaviour and moral attitudes to dress codes and speech style. A descriptive example of one of these modes of self-representation can be found among university students all around the world. A well-extended practice among students is wearing clothes with inscriptions of the institutions where they are enrolled. Such practice, commonly deemed simply fashion, involves a process of representation of the self as belonging in a particular institution, and, in certain cases, in a particular social class. Traditionally, university students have been associated with intellectual prestige and social success and this practice can be interpreted as a search for positive social recognition. In the same manner, the self-ascription to and self-representation with particular educational institutions that are nationally or even internationally celebrated can be viewed as a practice of power whereby individuals look to be socially situated at a higher level of recognition.

The concept of self-representation was theorised by Goffman in his book *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life* (1990). The American sociologist conceived identity as a social performance. Being in the presence of others, he explains, entails others' interest in obtaining information from the individual in order to contextualise the encounter. On the other hand, the individual seeks to transmit a particular impression, positive or negative, in order to achieve their interests. Goffman emphasises the importance of belief in this dramatic performance:

When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered before them. They are asked to believe that the character they see actually possesses the attributes he appears to possess, that the task he performs will have the consequences that are implicitly claimed for it, and that, in general, matters are what they appear to be.

Goffman, 1990: 10

This theatrical representation of the *self*, Simon Clarke (2008) points out, can be taken in by the individual, to the point of sincerely believing his own performance, or be essentially instrumental as a means for obtaining particular goals.

This distinction between the *represented self* and the *true self* leads the assumption that there exist several strata in the self which are hidden or disclosed depending on contextual situations – who the *other* is – and the individual’s intentions. In this respect, Goffman (1963) proposes three different levels of identity: firstly, “social identity,” which is fundamentally based on assumptions made when encountering other for the first time. Secondly, “personal identity” refers to the presentation of the *self* that the individual makes in front of others in order to modulate the impression they get of him. Lastly, “ego identity” belongs exclusively to the individual’s psyche and involves the internal management of others’ impression about him. This threefold identity division can be contrasted with Jenkins’s (2008) division of the world in three main orders. Thus, the *ego identity* would be formed within the *individual order*, while the *personal identity* would be developed in the *interaction order* and the *social identity* in the *institutional order*. This stratification of identity, nonetheless, is related to Goffman’s theory about stigma, which involves the reception of the self-representation by others.

3.1. Stigma

The Canadian-born American sociologist defines stigma as “an attribute that is deeply discrediting” reduces its possessor from being considered ‘normal’ to “a tainted, discounted one” (1963: 12). Nevertheless, Goffman emphasises the relational essence of stigma that cannot be merely reduced to the *stigmatising* attribute, as it turns out to be operational when opposed to another attribute or set of attributes that are considered ‘the norm’ – “[stigma] is neither creditable nor discreditable as a thing in itself” (1963: 13). Therefore, it is paramount to assume that stigma is socially constructed and that, in many cases, its discrediting value is exclusively, temporally and spatially contextualised, as certain attributes labelled as stigmatising in particular societies do not necessarily awake the same negative perceptions in other circumstances. “Society,” Goffman posits, “establishes the means of categorizing persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories” (1963: 11). This categorisation, which involves the stigmatisation of certain attributes, must be observed as a social process whereby deviances are defined in opposition to the norm, which hence is also socially constructed. Building on several studies, Yang et al. (2006) concludes that stigma is a devaluating mark, which is often an objective feature that conveys a devaluated *social identity* in a particular context, which is socially constructed. This interpretation, thus, implies a dichotomy between a “virtual social identity” – the assumptions

that others make about the individual – and an “actual social identity” – the real attributes that the individual possesses (Goffman, 1963: 12).

The second level of identity, *personal identity*, involves the control of identity information. This strategy takes place during interpersonal relationships with others and aims to hide stigmatising symbols and emphasise prestige symbols. It is indispensable to highlight that the management of the stigma does not always entail a willingness to make the stigmatising attribute or mark disappear, but what is at stake is the moral integrity of the stigma possessor. By controlling identity information, the individual seeks to avoid the consequences of stigmatisation, that is, the loss of status, mistreatment, discrimination and so forth (Yang et al., 2006: 1525).

At this point, it is fundamental to emphasise the importance of stigma disclosure and concealment. Goffman identifies three different types of stigma:

Three grossly different types of stigma may be mentioned. First there are abominations of the body – the various *physical deformities*. Next there are blemishes of *individual character* perceived as weak will, domineering or unnatural passions, treacherous and rigid beliefs, and dishonesty, these being inferred from a known record of, for example, mental disorder, imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, homosexuality, unemployment, suicidal attempts, and radical political behaviour. Finally, there are the tribal stigma of *race, nation, and religion*, these being stigma that can be transmitted through lineages and equally contaminate all members of a family.

Goffman, 1963: 13. Italics added.

Due to the nature of the present study, special attention must be given to the third type of stigma. This type of stigmatisation based on attributes characteristic of ethnicity cannot always be easily identified. Ethnic minorities’ defining features cannot always be singled out, as they do not necessarily have to visibly differ from those of the ethnic majority. Notwithstanding, the apparent safety that this concealment is likely to provide should be questioned. Link and Phenal (in Yang, 2006) point out the role of power structures, which enforce policies or practices that facilitate the disclosure of stigmatising marks. The apparatus of the state, for instance, imposes registration and identification procedures on the population in order to, in many cases, guarantee the perpetuation of the ruling majority or at least to ensure the easy identification of ‘strange agents’ in society. Absence of institutional recognition towards certain social groups or intentional differentiation of those causes the disclosure of particular non-visible identity information. Names, for example, are commonly conveyers of ethnic lineages. For this reason, members of discriminated ethnic minorities might opt to conceal their ethnic origin under aliases. However, this stigma management strategy is demolished at the moment of institutional registration, since legally the use of aliases might not be accepted. This institutional requisite

ensures the stigmatisation of the minority member in whatsoever procedure that requires identification.

The last level of identity proposed by Goffman, *ego identity*, is directly related to the psychological consequences of stigmatisation in individuals. Whereas the first two types of identity are socially constructed, this third type belongs exclusively to individual's internal life – the *individual order*. The self-dimension of stigma is salient for the study of identity in concealable minorities. As aforementioned, the concealment of the stigmatising attributes generally does not turn out to be reassuring. The presumable protection from social disapproval that it is supposed to provide does not guarantee identity security. The concealability of the stigma places individuals in a constant state of alert, as the disclosure of their stigmatising marks is internally negotiated and turns into a psychological burden. To this pressure to hide their true self, it should be added the difficulty to create bonds of co-ethnic solidarity. The invisibility of particular ethnic attributes renders the recognition of other member of their minority complex and problematic. This averts the development of a feeling of belonging in the minority, bringing about a total sense of uprooted-ness both from that majority, which is likely to find out the stigma and exclude the individual, and from the individual's 'stigma-fellows', which cannot be easily identified. In relation to the negative aspect of concealment in minority groups, Mak and Cheung (2010) claims that such situation causes minority members to develop a sense of awareness about the social prejudice and disapproval that their stigma potentially provokes. This may bring about the internalisation of such negative feelings. Self-stigma weakens individuals' self-esteem in a psychological process, which Mak and Cheung expound in three well-differentiated stages. In the first place, the "self-stigmatising cognitions" refer to the internalisation of negative beliefs and stereotypes that diminish individual's self-appreciation and generate a sense of unworthiness. Secondly, "self-stigmatising affects" take place in form of self-defeating feelings – shame, anger and embarrassment. Lastly, the individual ends up taking on "self-stigmatising behaviours" leading him to self-denigration and isolation from society (Mak and Cheung, 2010: 268).

Possible solutions to face stigmatisation involve assimilation and subsequent concealing of stigmatised attributes or the emphasis of those attributes as a way to gain self-esteem. A more positive standpoint in this regard is taken by Matysiak (2014), who claims that the key process is destigmatisation. This reverse process implies the reinterpretation of stigmatised attributes as simply different and not necessarily negative. This process can be triggered by stigmatised groups but can only be effective if assumed collectively. The result of this collective destigmatisation paves the way for positive reception of singularities both at collective and individual levels.

This analysis of social stigmatisation of minority groups, regardless of their visibility, raises the question of cultural assimilation. In the next section, the concepts of assimilation and acculturation are explored, attending particularly to younger generations of immigrants. In addition, a more optimistic perspective with regards to ethnic attributes is provided by tackling the concept of enculturation and destigmatisation as processes characteristic of transnationalism.

4. Identity in Collectivity

Due to the undeniable importance of interaction in the formation of identity, it is logical to presume that collectivities, as spaces of interaction, play a key role in the process. However, given that collectivities are not something tangible and easily identifiable, it is essential to bear in mind that the idea of collectivity is consciously or unconsciously constructed, out of a presumable shared sense of belonging, and therefore imagined. For this reason, it is no surprise that collectivities are likely to emerge at an infinite number of levels, and function in all of them as the constitutive outside for individuals belonging or wishing to belong in them. In this section diverse levels of collectivity are discussed, concentrating particularly on ethnic groups as fundamental conveyers of ethnicity and culture. In addition, an approach related to the idea of collective identities provides evidence of the importance of collectivities as identitarian references for individuals.

4.1. Traditional Discourses

When observed from a collective level, the notion of identity appears to take on a particular aspect, not exclusively related to the ideas of identification and categorisation but it adopts a form more concerned with the conception of belonging – and the wish to partake in a specific human group. The emergence of such a sense of belonging and, hence, of a certain collective idea is strongly based on two fundamental categories: time and space. Traditionally, collectivities and collectivism were envisaged as temporally and spatially contained and, thus, clearly identifiable and classifiable. Pries (2012) outlines three forms of collective identity that have traditionally had a significant impact on sociology.

Firstly, the concept of ethnic identity or ethnicity has occupied a place of honour especially in anthropology, being directly associated with the cultural characteristics that define human groups – which explains why the concept is often exchanged with cultural identity. Despite the absence of authoritative definitions of the concept, Li and Skop (2009) assess that, although ancestry has been one of the most common identifiers of ethnicity, there are “many other

cultural features have been used to differentiate ethnic groups, including a shared homeland, language, or dialect; religious faith or faiths, traditions, values and symbols, literature, folklore and music, food preferences, social and political ties that transcend kinship, neighborhood, and community boundaries, and/or migratory status” (Ibid.: 615). The discourse around ethnicity, however, seems to have given importance, rather than to the cultural content, to the maintenance, transmission and function of culture in the dialogue among the different ethnic groups. In his book *Ethnic groups and boundaries*, Barth emphasises about the importance of focusing on “the boundary that defines the group” rather than “on the cultural stuff that it encloses” (1998: 6). Therefore, ethnicity cannot be exclusively envisaged as a whole of cultural features that a certain ethnic group possesses and represents but special attention should be given to its function in the drawing of the boundaries that separate each culturally differentiated group. Building on Barth’s theory, Jenkins (2008b) highlights four main functional aspects of ethnicity. Firstly, Jenkins points out the cultural differentiating function of ethnicity. Secondly, he considers ethnicity linked to the common understanding of culture but rather in regard to the processes of culture production and reproduction resulting from social interaction. Thirdly, Jenkins emphasises the situationalist perspective that highlights the mutability and adaptation of ethnicity in relation to the context or contexts wherein individuals interact. Lastly, ethnicity is viewed as a process of identification inasmuch as it is externalised in categorisation of others and internalised in personal self-identification.

The second form of collective identity is the national identity. This has been undeniably present in nationalistic discourses, which have seen in the nation-state an element sufficiently consistent and indisputable as to render it the identitarian basis for a presumable sense of belonging for national collectivities. However, the pillars that sustained the conception of the nation-state as a homogeneous and fixed reality were debilitated by the emergence of transnationalism and cannot underpin such foundations anymore. Malešević (2011) accuses directly the concept and the assumption of the existence of national identities of being purely chimeric. The concept, he argues, is residual and its present utilisation in whatever discourse is essentially instrumental. The politico-rhetorical conception of national identities as undeniable, established and almost inherent of populations gives space only to reluctance. When attending to ethnic minorities’ role in the nation and national identity discourses, one cannot ignore the apparent selective aspect of national inclusion. Paying attention to nationalistic discourses, if national identities are unquestionable and foundational elements of a nation’s people, how could the rise of national identities within nations that clash with and defy already established national identities be explained? Distancing from examples of secessionism in Europe, as that of the Catalans and the Basques in Spain, the Scottish in the UK or even the Flemish in Belgium, it is worth looking at the Italian case. Highlighting the controversial aspect of Italian national identity in the southern

regions of the country, the Neapolitan songwriter Federico Salvatore (2013) wrote: “What is the meaning of the Italian flag? If we sing in jest *Brothers of Italy* (Italian national anthem). We are brothers only at the Italy vs. Brazil football match”¹. In these strophes, Salvatore points out the occasional and opportunist manifestation of Italian national identity, as a result of the controversial unification of Italy in 1871 (Aprile, 2010). Cases like that of Italy are repeated across nations where the attempts to claim, or rather create, “monolithic national identities” (Malešević, 2011: 280) have proved to be sheer manifestations of nationalism.

Lastly, the traditional discourse was a source for the emergence of collective identities in social (socio-economic) classes. Following Marxist theories on this matter, collectivities based on the social position of determined groups were viewed as likely to develop a sense of belonging to a particular socio-economic class. That is due precisely to the traditional fixed stratification of society into multiple social ranks based on the means of production and the outlooks members hold in relation to the rest of the social classes. This vision over society as stratified in diverse classes was fundamental for the emergence and study of socio-political movements, which are still present nowadays. However, albeit still paramount for the understanding of societies, the impact of socio-economic classes in the formation of collective identities was decentralised by individualism. Giddens (2001) explains that modern differentiation of the division of labour brought about a centralisation of the attention on the individual. Modernity raised the idea that “each person has a unique character and special potentialities that may or may not be fulfilled” (Giddens, 2001: 74). Therefore, individuals look for a personal fulfilment rather than one to be achieved by social or communal means. Nonetheless, according to Savage’s views on working-class identities (Savage, 2005; Savage et al., 2010), the emergence of individualism, as a quasi-doctrine which calls upon the natural sovereignty of the individual over their own life, can be construed as nothing but a reaffirmation of a social class identity founded on a process of dis-identification.

Furthermore, four distinctive features, Pries argues, characterise these traditional categories of collective identity. Firstly, the temporal premise that identities are inherited along generations involves the assumption that collectivities remain immutable, that is, they are subject to a presumed continuity. Secondly, homogeneity has traditionally been taken for granted as a coherent result of a hypothetical spatial stability, which guarantees the maintenance of the generational continuity. Thirdly, the existence of a “fixed mechanism of integrations” (Pries, 2012: 24–25). This refers to cultural features such as names, languages, cuisines, etc., which are

¹ The original text was written in Neapolitan and is part of the lyrics of the song *L'inno 'e Papele* (*The Paper Anthem*): “*Ché vò significà 'sta bandiera Italiana? Si cantamm' pe' celia Fratelli d'Italia. Simm' frat' sultant' a finale 'e Italia – Brasile.*”

generally associated to particular groups and, therefore, are taken as undisputable defining aspects. Lastly, the common acceptance of a universal rationale that separates human groups in a precise way creating well-formed spaces of culture and identity which neither cross-pressure nor cross-breed with each other.

4.2. Identity Acquisition or Formation?

Social interaction appears to be the Rosetta Stone for understanding identity formation. Therefore, it is mandatory to observe how interaction takes places in society from early stages of growth and through adult life. In order to tackle the task, the first thing to do is to examine if human beings possess any type of predefined identitarian feature whatsoever – to wit, whether or not persons are born with inherent identity aspects. With regards to cultural identities, early discourses were mainly divided in two perspectives: *Primordialism* and *Instrumentalism*.

4.2.1. Primordialism

The primordialist perspective follows the line drawn by evolutionism and considers ethnicity as something inherited. Cultural identities, therefore, are based on primordial ties that individuals maintain with their group (Malguesini and Giménez, 2000) and “provides structure, continuity, and meaning for the members” (Li and Skop, 2009: 616). According to this view, groups’ cultural identity is a product purely biologic and historic, as it is transmitted by members of the same group. In this respect, Van Den Berghe (1981) speaks of the “ethnic nepotism,” which assumes an ethnocentric prevalence of cultural characteristics in the group as a result of individual preference for their own group. Primordialist interpretations of ethnicity and culture as something fixed and static laid the foundation for nationalist discourses, which avow that there exists a national or racial – i.e., ethnic – purity that was bestowed upon peoples. Illustrative examples of this construal can be traced back in German Nazism’s annexation of Austria and Poland, both justified by presumably shared German ethnicity, or *Nihonjinron*’s interpretation of Japaneseness as an ethnic essence that encompasses nationality, race and ethnicity as equals (Dikötter, 1997) (See Chapter 5). However, a new approach to ethnicity from a primordialist perspective has been present in the recent years. Bayar (2009) posits that Primordialism was condemned due not least to the fact that it was construed exclusively in relation to its value to justify nationalism and racism, leaving aside its explanatory potential. Nonetheless, Bayar argues that the fixed ethnicity assumption is patent in the historical persistence of ethnic identities and proposes that such assumption facilitates the task of analysing and contrasting ethnicities.

4.2.2. Instrumentalism

Instrumentalism focuses on the sociological value of ethnicity and rejects its inherent nature. Thus, it is not considered something pre-established or fixed, but as a variable concept, which can only be observed, and therefore defined, when placed in opposition to others. For Barth (1998), the study of boundaries in ethnic groups is paramount for the understanding of the foundational aspect of social interactions in ethnicity politics. It is precisely the contraposition between ethnic groups, in terms of membership and exclusion, what raises the question of the ethnic identity. For this reason, instrumentalism considers that “calls upon ethnicity are a product of political myths, which are created and manipulated by political elites in search for benefits and power” (Malguesini and Giménez, 2000: 162. My translation). The instrumentalist vision on ethnicity, in sum, defends the instrumental use of ethnicity as a form of social organisation based on the definition and maintenance of culture-containing ethnic boundaries (Barth, 1998). This particular viewpoint is frequently defined as social constructionism, due to its interpretation of ethnicity, not as something merely given, but as something constructed by social groups within certain socio-historical contexts in order to accomplish particular collective interests (Llobera, 2009). This perspective interprets ethnic groups’ solidarity as based on the rational calculation of interests and not on the cultural proximity and affinity (Li and Skop, 2009: 616).

4.2.3. Escaping Categorisation: A Cognitive Perspective on Ethnicity

Observing these two lines of argument and placing them in perspective, it seems logical to think that, albeit presented as opposite, both discourses discredit each other solely in regard to the emergence and acquisition of identitarian or cultural content. In an attempt to drift away from the tendency towards categorisation and classification, which leads to the construction of stereotypes, Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov (2004) propose the study of ethnicity not merely as a social category but as a domain of study in itself. Treating ethnicity as a cognitive process, that is, not simply as a static category, but rather as the “way of understanding, interpreting and framing experience” (Brubaker et al. 2004: 53) whereby the individual interacts with cultural groups, would allow for the overcoming of the traditional approaches, while benefitting from both. This perspective would turn over the primordialist view, which considered ethnicity as a natural and immutable given, by imbuing it with rather a more explanatory value that would find in Primordialism the answer to why ethnicity seems to be present in all human groups and be conveyed across generations. On the other hand, Instrumentalism’s claim about the instrumentalisation of ethnicity for the achievement of particular goals would also be

questioned, as a cognitive perspective does not accept the idea of a conscious change in ethnicity – cognition is not changed, it *evolves*.

4.3. New Perspectives: Disembedding Identities

The present post-modern scenario characterised by the emergence of transnationalism as a result of globalisation has involved the turndown of many of the traditionally presumed ideas concerning identity. The aforementioned disembedding of the identity has brought about an abstract set of identitarian references that are constantly mutating (Goldestein and Rayner, 1994; Giddens, 2001; Bauman, 2000). The prerequisite for ascription to a particular ethnic, national or social group, cannot be dealt with in absolute terms any longer, as they are not compatible with the modern shape of societies nowadays. Essentialism appears to have lost most of its followers and believers, but does that mean that relativism can be unconditionally embraced? Probably not.

Far from accepting any type of essentialism but as a result of his thorough study about geographical and societal spaces, Pries (2012) develops a noteworthy double multi-level model of collective identities applicable to the present world scenario. On the one hand, he reifies an “absolutist” model based on the substantial concept of space, wherein both the geographical space (delimited physical terrain) and the societal space (container of social interaction) are bound together and considered equals. On the other hand, Pries proposes a “relativist” model derived from a relational conception of space, according to which societal and geographical spaces neither define nor condition one another (Pries, 2005).

4.3.1. Absolutist Collective Identity Model

Firstly, on top of every possible form of collectiveness, Pries argues for a *global level* of identity based on the concept of humanism. This level would thus be underpinned by a series of universal beliefs and agreements, which organise life in modern societies, such as the respect for human life, dignity and integrity or the compliance with rational thought over religion. A *macro-regional framework* occupies a second level of collective identity. This level is based on Huntington’s notion of civilisation and refers to “socio-historical macro regions of the world” (Pries, 2012: 28). The consideration of this level, Pries argues, is paramount for the understanding of forms of mutual belonging, which already characterises certain social groups. By way of illustration, the case of Latinos in the United States represents an apparent manifestation of the significance of this level of collective identity as a shared consciousness of

their common Latino heritage, which causes a form of solidarity (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller, 2003; Guarnizo, 2011) and a form of pan-ethnic consciousness (Rumbaut, 1994, Okamoto and Mora, 2014). At the third level of collective identification, Pries proposes the *national identity* or, to avoid possible misconceptions, “re-nationalised” (2005: 176) identities. The term re-nationalisation refers to “a certain kind of counter-tendency to the ... supra-nationalization and ... globalization processes” (Pries, 2005: 177). Diverse forms of reactive nationalism represent this phenomenon. The strengthening of existing national identities as a result of international and supranational hostilities or the emergence of regionalisms demanding self-determination or political recognition in territories with a remarkable national consciousness are patent manifestation of re-nationalisation. Lastly, the fourth level takes places at a *micro-regional* or *ethnic level*. Conformed by rather cultural elements like language, traditions, faith or social relations. Pries proposes this last level under the idea that the total quantity of different ethnic groups are considerably more numerous than the number of nation-states in the world at present.

This first absolutist model suspiciously resembles the traditional conception of the nation-state. The assumption that social interactions between human groups, understood as an array of particular cultural practices, are strictly configured and defined by neatly delimited territorial spaces works perfectly in conjunction with the ideas that cultural homogeneity exists and is apparently packed in demarcated spaces of state sovereignty. The second model, however, feeds from Pries’s relativist conception of space (2005) and paves the way for multidimensional categorisations of collective identities. Separated in three different levels, this model assumes that collective identities are “‘located’, spatially distributed and spanning across different contiguous and coherent geographical territories” (Pries, 2012: 30).

4.3.2. Relativist Collective Identity Model

In the first place, *glocal identities* are a conglomeration of global symbols, claims and norms and local identities, bringing about an adaptation of particular cultural elements to different locales. This process can take place either by the reinforcement of local identities and cultural practices through their re-foundation in global imaginaries or principles, or the vindication of them by their justification in global conventions (Pries 2012: 29-30). Secondly, *diaspora identity* is derived from the awareness of belonging to a group – an *us* – disseminated across different geographical spaces and sharing a strong attachment to the motherland. This level of identity is strongly rooted in the notion of space as a substantial, tangible element, due to the paramount role played by the idea of motherland, which is viewed as the principal spatial reference for the emergence and maintenance of diasporic identity and solidarity. Lastly, the

most relativist level of collective identity is strongly based on the ideas about transnationalism discussed in the first chapter. *Transnational identities*, albeit similar to diaspora identity insofar as diffusion and circulation across locales are involved, represents the ultimate level of detachment from concrete spaces. Unlike diaspora experiences, transnationalism implies a space-referential pluralism wherein the multiplicity of attachments disregards the centralisation of identity solely in one space.

Despite the absolute impossibility to fit every single identitarian collective experience into each of the levels proposed by these two models, it turns out to be of utmost importance to have at disposition models sufficiently structured and organised in well-defined categories in order to conduct empirical analysis of particular cases. Nevertheless, it is equally important to guarantee the recognition of particularities, which cannot entirely be contemplated in this type of models of unquestionable essentialist nature.

4.4. Examining Collective Identities

The mere attempt to define collective identities seems to fall irremediably into generalisation. If any pretension for conceptualising identity appears to be vacuous, imprecise and vein, the very assumption that identities at a collective level can be categorised, classified or labelled turns out to be inoperable. Assuming such premises, what resources could be relied upon to sketch a model of collective identity that defines the identitarian traces a certain social group has in common without succumbing to essentialisms?

In their revolutionary article *Identity as a Variable* (2006), Abdelai, Herrera, Johnson and McDermott propose to operationalise the notion of identity as a variable. They establish an analytical model, which allows scholars to measure and compare collective identities without necessarily incurring too deeply in essentialisms. According to this study, collective identity is subjected to two different forces: content (Barth, 1998) and contestation. **Content** refers to “the *meaning* of a collective identity” and **contestation** denotes “the degree of *agreement* within a group over the content of the shared category” (Abdelai et al. 2006: 696. Original italics). Therefore, the membership in an identitarian shared space can be construed as a dialogue between two elements. On the one hand, groups commonly share, a presumably well-defined, set of views, which computes the scale of inclusion in the group, and, on the other hand, personal identification with such set of views are likely to be *contested* by views or convictions based on individual experiences or even by the membership in other groups. Thus, according to the methodology proposed, the analysis of collective identities would involve the analysis of the content, as an impelling force towards the group, and the examination of the potential

contestations, as aspects questioning membership and as an expelling force detaching the individual from the group. This type of analysis would, hence, result in a thorough description of the defining particularities of a collective identity at a macro level, which, despite its undeniable essentialist nature, would be cross-questioned and refined by the contrastive examination of the degree of individual deviation at a micro level.

5. Culture Assimilation or Assimilating Culture?

In order to get a clear-cut idea of the way the concept of assimilation has been understood and utilised across the last century, it is worth having a look at the definition included in the Oxford dictionary of Sociology:

A term synonymous with acculturation, used to describe the process by which an outsider, immigrant, or *subordinate group becomes indistinguishably integrated* into the dominant host society. ... Assimilation implied that the subordinate group *actually came to accept and internalise the values and culture of the dominant group*.

Oxford dictionary of Sociology, 2009. Italics added.

If read out of context, one could think of it as a hard-scientific definition of a complex molecular process whereby certain cells integrate into an organism by becoming indistinguishable – utterly identical. However, an outrageously revealing shock is involved when finding out that such definition refers to the integration of people – social agents and human beings – in a particular society. This dictionary entry, albeit unintentionally, uncloaks the instrumentalisation of the concept since its coinage. Paying attention to the etymology of the term, it is observed that the Latin past participle ‘*assimulatum*’ translates into English as ‘feigned, pretended, and fictitious’. Assimilation, hence, could be interpreted as the result of a strategy of emulation of certain cultural aspects devised with the sole goal of becoming integrated, but entailing the risk of exclusion in the case of an eventual discovery of the actual origin.

Classical assimilation models were conceived from a standpoint that assumed the homogeneity of nations. Studies of assimilation emerged in the United States due to its migrant tradition and evolved in accordance with the on-going challenges that the different migratory waves posed. The first entries of foreign populations in the country encompassed foreigners from Europe whose assimilation into the American mainstream was expected as a natural process. As Park’s view on the issue accredits, “[w]hen migration leads to conquest, either economic or political, assimilation is inevitable” (1928: 891). This affirmation assumes that assimilation is a natural

and irreversible process, whereby immigrants abandon their original culture and acquire a new one as a means for a successful integration. Despite the degree of logic such statement might contain, it is paramount to criticise it for two principal reasons. Firstly, Park assumed homogeneity as the natural outcome of human congregation, disregarding all the particular singularities that are likely to be in whatsoever collectivity, let alone the nation. Secondly, in tackling assimilation as a straightforward process, Park completely ignores the potential difficulties that immigrants are prone to encounter in host societies, which might hinder it. It is obvious that the context of migration nearly a century ago was significantly different to the one now. Phenotypical similarities between the American population and that of the migrants – mainly Italian, Greek and Eastern European – leads to think that Park's assumptions were based on the ease of the new immigrants to become visibly indistinguishable. However, the question of visibility does not always hold advantages. In addition, Park posited that, regardless of the level of similarity, intercultural marriages guaranteed a full level of assimilation of migrants in a process he denominated amalgamation.

Later studies questioned assimilation as an inevitable process and highlighted the importance of institutional factors in the acceptance of migrants as a key element for assimilation. Warner and Srole (1945) carried out a more empirical research that shed new light on the study of migrants' integration in host societies and defined two main conditioning factors, internal and external. The former referred to the migrant's predisposition to assimilate that challenged Park's theory of straight-line assimilation. Of more significance, however, were the external factors by which Warner and Srole defined the institutional ethnic and racial boundaries in American society. Although the economic and social differences are bound to disappear over time and especially with the emergence of new generations, they pointed out that social mobility in ethnic minorities would be restricted by ethnic boundaries. Nearly two decades later, Gordon (1964) took a step further in the study of assimilation and developed a theoretical model that comprised seven types of assimilation. Each assimilation variable was based on different subprocesses or conditions that ranged from the acquisition of new cultural patterns (cultural or behavioural assimilation), the development of a sense of community based on the host society (identificational assimilation) or in the scale of intermarriage (marital assimilation) to the absence of prejudice (attitude receptional assimilation), discrimination (behaviour receptional assimilation) or value-power conflicts (civic assimilation). Gordon's theory, however, is mainly based on a seventh type of assimilation that is determinant for the inclusion of the migrants in host societies: structural assimilation. This level of assimilation is reached when migrants engage in primary group relationships with members of the receiving society, that is, when a "large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs, and institutions of host society, on primary group level" (Gordon, 1964: 71) takes place. The salience of this last type of assimilation is based on

its determinant role over the rest of the assimilation variables. As Gordon points out, structural assimilation “is to be seen as the keystone of the arch of assimilation,” due not least to the fact that “[o]nce structural assimilation has occurred, either simultaneously with or subsequent to acculturation all of the other types assimilation will naturally follow,” which inevitably leads to “the disappearance of the ethnic group as a separate entity and the evaporation of its distinctive values” (Gordon, 1964: 81). Notwithstanding the scarcity of empirical evidence in Gordon’s work, the complexity of his multidimensional model should be remarked as it involves a significant step forward from Park’s simplistic model. It is in this last quote, however, that Gordon’s view fails in describing the actual scenario of ethnic pluralism.

With regards to migrants’ presence in the United States, the 1960s brought about a series of “anomalies” (Zhou, 1997: 978). Along with the increase in the dimension and number of migratory movements and, the entrance of non-European migrants, with more noticeable ethnic characteristics, paved the way for a permanence of such cultural elements across time and space, discrediting the previous assumptions about assimilation as a time-honoured final stage of integration. Immigrants tended to stick together and congregate in particular areas, which facilitated a natural maintenance of ethnic aspects within their communities. Likewise, it could be observed that these ethnic and cultural factors were transmitted over time across generations, not only because of exogenous factors but also for endogenous ones (Zhou, 1997). With the emergence of this new scenario, three main lines of argumentation turned up. Firstly, assimilationist views still remained in studies such as that of Alba and Nee (1997) who assess that, despite new forms of migration, assimilation continues to take place. Nuancing the general definition of assimilation as the complete loss of original cultural aspects, Alba and Nee claims that assimilation, despite its presumable inevitable nature, is not a process exclusive of minorities as subjugated to the dominant majority. It is, instead, a process that, at a collective level, may take place between different ethnic groups, including the majority. At an individual level, they point out, it appears inevitable that the process occurs in a one-sided manner, that is, the ethnically singular individual goes through a definitive process of cultural assimilation of the ethnic aspects of the mainstream. Other perspectives advocated ideas of ethnic redefinition and multiculturalism. Instrumental perspectives like that of Cozen (et al., 1992) challenged the concept of ethnicity. With his conceptualisation of ethnicity as an invention, he argues that ethnicity is “a process of construction or invention which incorporates, adapts and amplifies pre-existing communal solidarities, cultural attributes and historical memories” (Cozen, 1992: 5). This statement, therefore, not only emphasises the instrumental character of ethnicity as an invention, but it also highlights the malleability of the concept. Building on this notion of ethnicity, multiculturalism asserts the permanence of diverse cultures in a singular space as well as the processes of intercultural exchange and ethnicity redefinition likely to take place. Lastly,

structuralism, Zhou (1997) points out, focuses on the system structures, based on ethnic boundaries, which impede migrant population to reach a complete level of equality in societies. This view does not preoccupy about cultural assimilation or interethnic assimilation, but is rather concerned with the impossibility to gain a structural assimilation.

Notwithstanding these three currents of thought, of salience is the “segmented assimilation” model by which Portes and Zhou (1993) explain the multidimensional forms of adaptation of second-generation migrants. Founded on empirical data, this model present three main lines of adaptation in host societies, determinant for subsequent social mobility:

One of them replicates the time-honoured portrayal of growing *acculturation and parallel integration into the white-middle class*; a second leads straight into the opposite direction to *permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass*; still a third associates *rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community’s values and tight solidarity*.

Portes and Zhou, 1993: 82. Italics added.

The first and presumably most appealing form of adaptation goes in line with Gordon’s idea of structural assimilation as key for successful integration but at the price of original ethnicity disappearance. It is apparent, however, that such option is not equally at disposal for all ethnic groups. Second-generation migrants are exposed to different pressures, both from the mainstream and their community. The aforementioned stigmatisation processes have a great deal to do with this, since stigmatising attributes, created by host society, such as skin colour, language proficiency, social class and so forth, turn out to be an enormous obstacle for upward social mobility; condition of social inequity commonly called *glass ceiling*. In addition, pressure might also come from the in-group community, as Portes and Sesenbrenner conceptualised it, “levelling pressures” that “keep members of downtrodden groups in the same situation as their peers.” This mechanism of constraint is founded on “the fear that a solidarity born out of common adversity would be undermined by departure of the more successful members” (Portes and Sesenbrenner, 1993: 1342). It is, therefore, the morale of the group what is at stake, because it is essentially based on the restricted possibilities for upward social mobility. Examples of this double-sided stigmatisation can be observed in American society in the case of Chicanos and Cholos.

The second adaptation strategy is directly related to the downtrodden strata of society. When assimilation is not orientated to the receiving country’s middle class, the possibility of ending up assimilating into the most disadvantaged groups is considerably higher. The lack of opportunities to assimilate into the most privileged groups of the host society, be it either for in-

group or out-group constraints, brings about the ghettoisation of migrant groups that hence tend to congregate in inner-city underclass enclaves.

Lastly, the third form of adaptation implies benefitting from ethnic singularities. The reproduction of original ethnic aspects in the host society might bring economic success and prosperity to the ethnic community. However, the level of success derives from the degree of admission and acceptance received from the host society. In order to gain such positive recognition, ethnic groups need to take on strategies and actions of culture reproduction and restriction in a process of self-presentation on a collective level that adjusts to the host-society's perception and value scale. Returning to Cozen's idea of ethnicity as unstatic and malleable, Min Zhou (1997) claims that the original culture can be adapted to the new society in a form of re-presentation of the original culture; this can take place with most of the cultural aspects, but the most patent instance can be probably found in cuisine – Chinese, Mexican or even Italian culinary traditions have been tremendously reconstructed in the United States and other countries bringing about the emergence of totally new cuisines. However, it cannot be assumed that any culture may be positively received and integrated in the host society. The scale of acceptance of foreign cultural aspects directly depends on a negotiation process that takes place within the ethnic community. Therefore, the likelihood of cultural acceptance is determined by the selective and adaptive capacity of the group to choose potentially suitable cultural elements.

5.1. Culture Learning: Acculturation or Enculturation?

The term *acculturation* has been traditionally presented as a synonymous of cultural assimilation (Park, 1928; Gordon, 1964; Berry, 1997). The Oxford Dictionary entry on the word acculturation reads:

Adoption of or adaptation to a different culture, esp. that of a colonising, conquering, or majority group.


Oxford dictionary of Sociology, 2009.

This definition equals acculturation with the adaptation of a cultural group to another in the context of colonisation or migration. Attending to the etymology of the word '*ac(ad)-*' + '*-cultur-*' + '*-ation*', the Latin prefix '*ad-*', meaning 'toward', suggests the movement toward culture, which could be interpreted as *a movement from one culture to another*. Nonetheless, it reveals nothing regarding the original culture, which leaves a great deal of construal space. If a quick look at the traditional conception of assimilation and acculturation were taken (Park 1928;

Gordon 1964), it appears that the interpretation of term *acculturation* favours a Greek reading, dismissing the actual Latin origin of the word. Not willing to start out with a complex sociolinguistic argumentation, the intent is to point out that the traditional conception of acculturation as ‘*a movement toward a culture*’ entailed the eventual loss of the original one, which leads to believe that the Latin prefix ‘ad-’ was instrumentally substituted by the Greek prefix of negation ‘α-’, reinterpreting the term as ‘*refusal of culture.*’

A noteworthy study on culture accommodation was conducted at the end of the twentieth century by Berry (1997), who proposed a model of cultural accommodation. According to his work, in the context of migration culturally distinct groups are to establish particular strategies based on two major issues: *cultural maintenance* and *contact and participation*. The response to these two major issues, he claims, might be positive or negative, which outlines a four-outcome model (Figure 1):

Figure 1. Cultural accommodation model.



Source: Berry, J. W. (1997) Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation.

Berry's model was criticised by Weinreich (2009) due its overly optimistic perspective towards two main arguments. Firstly, Berry presupposes that both host and foreign cultures are benign in essence and therefore that the acceptance of each side's norms can be assumed – taking on an unfounded agonistic view on cultural pluralism. Secondly, Weinreich highlights that the model presumes that cultural adaptation is to a large extent based on individual and collective

conscious capacity and willingness to choose among the diverse patterns of culture maintenance and interrelation. Lastly, Berry's thesis also assumes that adaptation undoubtedly equals minority culture's welfare. These main critical points raised by Weinreich are based on rather realistic views that neither ignore xenophobic tendencies towards immigrants in certain societies as well as ethnic constraints, shaped in norms, that obstructs members' capacity of choice, and nor assume a presumable conscious awareness about cultural assimilation in minority groups.

Continuing with Weinreich's perspective, the emeritus professor of the University of Ulster highlights the importance of reconceptualising culture assimilation from a more positive and enriching viewpoint. Rather than through acculturation, the psychological process of culture acquisition and incorporation should be envisaged as "enculturation" (Weinreich, 1997, 2009). First of all, there are two unquestionable realities to take account of: childhood enculturation and alien-like perception (Weinreich, 2009). During the early stages of growth, people are exposed to cultural aspects particular to the location they live in. These cultural aspects are internalised, taken in as their own self, in a natural passive process of enculturation, that is, the pick-up of cultural elements from the environment. In the case of migrants old enough to know of their original country, or "real migrants" (Weinreich, 1997: 155), the new context, and hence the new culture, are appreciated as different from their origin – their *sense of normalcy*, the base of their self. For them, therefore, the process of enculturation is rather active and conscious; thereby the level of success in adaptation may vary considerably. In a nutshell, in the process of enculturation, the context is perceived in quite different ways: as a sort of '*abnormalcy*' in the case of the real migrants or newcomers, and as '*normalcy*' in the case of migrants' offspring. On the other hand, the perception of the émigré as a stranger, a foreign agent – an outsider –, is another undeniable reality pointed out by Weinreich. In this matter, being a real migrant or the offspring of one also varies the impact both for the individual and the indigenous group. In the case of migrants, their atypicality is presumed as they are well aware of the differences and can, hence, make a clear-cut distinction between their origin and past and their present *alienness*. The case of migrant descendants, however, is rather disparate, as their sources of identification belong in the mainstream host-society as well as in their foreign parental environment. This state of in-betweenness is defined by Weinreich as "semi-alien" (1997: 157).

On the basis of these two realities, the migrants' identity formation process in relationship with the surrounding cultures can be presumably complex, especially in the case of non-real migrants. Weinreich's theory about this process, highly influenced by Erikson, stands between primordialism and situationalism. During the early stages of the upbringing, the young child identifies, to a limited extent, with their parents, in a process of apprehension. In this premature process of personal identification, the infant learns of their progenitors or caretakers' ethnicity

and internalises certain elements of it conforming a “primordialist sentiment” (Weinreich, 2009: 129). This leads to the conclusion that, at least initially, identity is shaped in premature stages of individual’s growth in reference to their primary groups, particularly, the one compounded by their kinship. Likewise, this conceptualisation about ethnicity underpins the primordialist view about the transmission of ethnic identities by and through generations as well as explains the permanence and persistence of them across history (Bayar, 2009). A more constructive and situational line is elaborated in Weinreich’s discourse when referring to identification in adolescence and adulthood. During these stages, he assesses, the individual continues to identify with his primary group at the same time that he part-identifies with remarkable elements of his community as a result of comprehension of those aspects. By the end of this formative process, the individual has equally internalised both cultural elements of the primary group and those of the secondary group, whose likelihood to be mutually incompatible is considerably high – as Weinreich himself explains, “‘heritage culture’ as a consistent unproblematic incorporation of it into the person’s identity heritage, is untenable” (Weinreich, 2009: 127).

5.2. Ethnic-personal Identity Conflict

The incompatibility between cultural elements acquired by the individual can be seen as a conflict – *a crisis within the self*. The tragic sense of the term *crisis* was diminished in Erikson’s *Identity: Youth and Crisis*, where identity crises were no longer interpreted as a catastrophe but a “necessary turning point, a crucial moment, when development must move one way or another, marshalling resources of growth, recovery, and further identification” (Erikson, 1968: 16). Although not exclusive of adolescence, this process appears to be rather patent in that period when the individual is no longer a child but is yet to become adult. In this period, Erikson explains, the individual seems to be more concerned with others’ interpretation of his self than about his own self-experience. Identity crisis, however, is not exclusive of migrant’s offspring and can be identified in whatever contextuality as it is to happen to every individual, to a major or minor extent. In the case of émigrés, nevertheless, the identity conflict is extrapolated to the whole spectrum of cultural identifiers – ethnic markers – (language, religion, cuisine, dress, etc.) that shape a significant piece of the individual’s identity.

At this point, it is interesting to observe the existing relation between personal identity and ethnic identity. Returning to Weinreich, he formulates two remarkable definitions, which rely on the temporal aspect of identity:

Personal identity: the totality of one’s self-construal, in which how one construes oneself in the present expresses the **continuity** between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one construes oneself as one aspires to be in the future.

Ethnic Identity: that part of the totality of one's self-construal made up of those dimensions that express the continuity between one's construal of past ancestry and one's future aspirations in relation to ethnicity.

Weinreich, 2009: 127-128. Bolds in the original.

What turns out a novelty in Weinreich's definition of identity, both in its personal and ethnic dimension, is the perspective of time and continuity. At a personal level, individuals' *personal self* is constructed and construed in relation to their own, accurate or biased, construal of their past self and the desired image of the future self they wish to construct – *Me is what I think that Me was and what I wish Me to be*. With respect to ethnic identity, the importance of temporal continuity is equally salient, as it surpasses the individual's own existence. An individual's *ethnic self* is shaped by his interpretation of his ethnic group's past, in which he has not been involved, and his future social strategy in relation to that group – *Me with respect to Us is what I reckon that Us was and what I wish Me to be in relation to Us*.

These processes, however, are not as voluntary and controlled as they might seem. Coming out of a process of self-construal, the ideas that the individual holds with regards to himself and to his group are not always correct. As part of his Identity Structure Analysis model, Weinreich (2003) breaks down the process whereby individuals prefer to identify with one of their cultural reference groups. The identification process can be viewed as aspirational or empathic. An aspirational approach understands identification as the voluntary decision to either associate (ideal-identification) or disassociate (contra-identification) oneself with values, objectives or ideas of certain groups. An empathic approach, instead, refers to the involuntary identification with a group motivated by the recognition of similarity between one's values, objectives or ideas and those of a group. In the case of migrants' offspring, it can be presumed that empathic identification is likely to lead to confusion as, in their case, similarities can be found both in their ancestral ethnic group and their present ethnic environment. Should the aspirational mode of identification be included, however, the equation would become much more complex. Individual's dissociative identitarian aspirations can be found within his group, where they also experience empathic identification. An individual from a particular ethnic minority is likely to develop an aversion towards certain cultural markers of that minority but at the same time identify with them. This identitarian conflict can be envisaged as identity crisis, but, due to the almost unlimited extent to which the term can be used, in an attempt to highlight the double dimension, personal and ethnic, of such identitarian conflict, in this work it is referred to as *ethnic-personal identity conflict*.

6. Conclusion

This chapter tackled the issue of identity from its more fundamental conceptualisation to its formation and development. The first section presents a critical introduction to the question of identity exploring four main points. Firstly, the traditional discourse about identity that claimed the existence of a true self and assumed the existence of identitarian authenticity is questioned. Nevertheless, despite the discredit given to this essentialist perspective, it is still possible to find manifestations of such lines of thought in ideas about original nations and national identities derived from the still appreciable hegemony of the nation-state. This leads to the proposition that the emergence of transnational drives, which challenge that hegemony, might also bring about a progressive disembedding of identities from nation-states, allowing for multiple forms of identification within and without the nation. Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapter 1, the discontinuation of the nation-state at all levels cannot be assumed, as it has proved its malleability and capacity to adapt. Only empirical studies will determine whether such assumptions are correct.

Following this critique, special attention was given to the role of difference in the theorisation of identity. Hall's (1996) and Jenkins' (2008b) arguments have proved useful in the conception of identity as the result of a process of differentiation and negation between the individual and the group of others as an abstract whole superior to every individual, in what Mouffe (2000) conceptualised as *constitutive outside*. Difference, therefore, appears to be the spark that initiates the identity engine.

After this initial approach to the concept of identity formation from the perspective of difference, a contextualisation was provided through the examination of the major changes in the orientation of the identity formation process resulted from modernity. With the beginning of late modernity, individual identities have been disembedded from localities and their referential space spans through time and space, increasing infinitely the number of possible identifications. This causes individuals to be compelled to go through a permanent identity debriefing and self-interrogation process – Giddens' *reflexive project* (2001). In this scenario differences are found everywhere and individuals need to find the solution to their own identity equation through a never-ending process of re-embedding. This new scenario encloses multiple identitarian possibilities that are likely to give a solution to still unresolved questions. However, finding such solutions requires the overcoming of two major obstacles: the constraints imposed by nation-states, which still try to fence identities within their own principles, and the incommensurability of the constitutive outside that has become transnational.

Subsequently, the significance of interaction as the point whereby sameness and difference appear and where identity is defined, was highlighted through Jenkins' model of social interaction that sketches a map of social interaction. According to this model, three interaction orders can be identified: the individual, the social and the institutional. This three-fold model leads to assume the existence of three levels of personal identity that depend on the subject of interaction: oneself, other one or the constitutive outside.

The second section was devoted to the examination of the stages of social interaction, that is to the groups with which every individual is expected to establish direct or indirect relations. Two main groups are identified according to the scale of choice: interactive or inherited groups and reference groups. The former refers to those relationships that do not result from a fully conscious process of analysis and choice. They are divided in two main subgroups: primary and secondary. The former encompasses relations of closeness determined by birth, friendship or common understanding. The secondary groups, however, do not necessarily entail closeness and are to be conceived as relations based on mutual dependence and cooperation in order to achieve particular goals. On the other hand, reference groups refer to those people, communities or "social worlds" (Shibutani, 1955), which do not necessarily pertain to individuals' same time and space, but with which they identify or wish to identify.

The third section tackled identification as a process of self-representation. Building on Goffman's theories, this section explores the performance of the self by individuals as the means to provoke certain impressions. The self is not exposed entirely as it is, but it is represented out of a process of selective disclosure so as to obtain a particular form of recognition (acceptance) and to avoid misrecognition or disrecognition (refusal). This process, nonetheless, is subject to a series of norms whose non-compliance brings stigmatisation. In his essay *Pacifism and the War*, Orwell (1970: 147) wrote "he that is not with me is against me." This statement appears suspiciously applicable to the identity recognition discourse, particularly in the still present nation-state context. Stigma is the price to pay for those who are not capable of fitting in – *or skilled enough to pretend to fit in*.

This understanding of identification as a process of identity negotiation highlights the fact that identity is not simply an individual matter, but that it necessitates social confirmation. The human need for belonging leads individuals to wish to identify with collectivities as integrant parts of them. For this, they make of collectivities defining features (norms, purposes, views, etc.) their own identitarian foundation. As most of what has to do with identity, this process is not necessarily conscious, but this perspective turns out practical to comprehend the existence of collective identities, which in the present work are envisaged as the collective ascription of a

series of attributes that are defined by a particular group of people that are equally defined by those attributes at the same time.

The question of collective identities was explored in the fourth section. An introduction to the concept opens the section by examining the three key levels of collective identity: ethnic identity, national identity and social identity. This initial presentation intends to make the reader aware of the existence of several levels of identitarian ascription, which depends on the nature of the factors that individuals take on as reference. The present work, however, focuses on the analysis of ethnic identities, or ethnicities, considering that that is the most relevant aspect for the study of the identitarian particularities of the Zainichi community. Despite the fact that one of the main objectives of this study is questioning the existence of a fully independent ethnicity within the Zainichi collectivity, it is also fundamental to examine the particularities of the identitarian experience within the community from an ethnic point of view.

Thus, the section continues with a critique of the two major approaches taken in ethnicity studies: primordialism and instrumentalism. Both discourses are juxtaposed with each other to come to an alternative viewpoint, whereby a conjunction of both perspectives functions to explicate ethnicity's permanence through generations (primordialism) and its transformations and reinterpretations through time and space (instrumentalism).

In line with that idea of the transformation and reinterpretation of ethnicity, the analysis of Pries' (2005) absolutist and relativist models of collective identities provides a thorough and practical explanation of how late-modernity permits, or provokes, the disembedding of identities from individuals' localities. Identitarian references are no longer fenced by time and space borders and now individuals can incorporate elements belonging in different places. Thus, it is possible to witness the emergence of new forms of identity that relativise previous assumptions. Of these potential alternatives, transnational identity is the one that this study considers to deserve special attention. It is the most significant response and solution to the diasporic experience of ethnic minorities and involves the ultimate detachment from spaces – from the ideas of home and host lands in diaspora politics. For this reason, the achievement of a transnational level of identity is considered one of the major hypothesis of the present study.

All identitarian experiences are subjected to contextualities. Regardless of the transnational aspirations of the individual, early stages of their growth are contextualised in a particular locality that inevitably has somewhat of an impact on it. In order to understand the level and the type of such impact, the fifth section tackled the issue of assimilation. Thus, it explored the literature about migrants' assimilation, highlighting the change of course in the academic

perspective during the twentieth century. Initially, assimilation was envisaged as the inevitable condition and consequence of integration, regardless of the degree of dissimilarities with the local population. In the 1960s, however, the increase in the number of migrants arriving and settling down in the United States questioned the assimilationists' presumption. Low levels of cultural assimilation were accompanied by limited social integration and the lack of chances for upward social mobility within the host society.

With regards to migrants' identity, a critique of the concept of acculturation was elaborated around its generally exclusivist character and the concept of enculturation was emphasised as key to the adoption of an inclusivist perspective on migrant identity politics. Weinreich's (1997) thesis on enculturation as culture acquisition without cultural elimination defies the traditional acculturalist assumption that more than one culture cannot cohabit within a single individual.

The theoretical framework elaborated in this chapter provides a series of tools that are useful for the examination of the Zainichi identity experience with regards to their identity formation and their possible forms of perception and contestation of national identities that are likely to lead to transnational forms of identification. In order to fulfil this objective, the following chapters explore the Zainichi experience through an exhaustive literature review with regards to various historical, socio-anthropological and political aspects related to the topic.

Chapter 4. Zainichi Inception: A Historical Approach to The Zainichi Question

1. Introduction

The term ‘inception’ is used in the title of this chapter because it is conceived as a presentation of a series of social, economic and institutional circumstances that paved the way for the emergence of a Korean minority in Japan during the imperial period and the subsequent crystallisation of certain problematic factors that brought about the problematisation of the Zainichi question. Through the analysis of the most relevant historical events, this chapter highlights the correlation existing between events occurring before and after the Pacific War. A continuity expanding through pre-war and post-war periods can be observed in the application of racist policies devised to maintain a power structure wherein ethnic-Koreans were to occupy a second-class position in the Japanese state. The migration movements of the Korean population from the peninsula to the Japanese archipelago during the colonial period as well as from Japan to DPRK since the 1950s are both the result of campaigns devised and promoted by the Japanese state. Furthermore, the subjugation of Korean culture can be observed in colonial ordinances prioritising the study of the Japanese culture and language in Korea and in post-war legislation limiting the establishment of Korean education institutions in Japan. Also, patent similarities in the elaboration of policies restricting the access of ethnic-Koreans to civil rights can be observed in the various amendments made in the Japanese Nationality Law across the twentieth century.

This chapter is presented in two sections: *Colonial Rule and the Deprivation of Self-Determination in Korea* and *The Liberation of Korea and the Problematisation of the Korean Presence in Japan*. The first section presents the impact of Japanese colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula and, most importantly, over ethnic-Koreans during the first half of the twentieth century, through three main sections. First of all, a historical introduction is provided, presenting the international conditions that paved the way for the ultimate annexation of Korea to the Japanese Empire in 1910. Secondly, an analysis of the migratory movements between the Korean Peninsula and Japan is provided, paying special attention to both the economic factors that motivated those movements and the subsequent socio-economic conditions wherein Korean migrants lived in Japan. Lastly, a brief introduction to the measures of japanisation imposed by Japan on the Korean populations is provided in order to underline the double function of assimilation policies as a form of acculturation and segregation.

The second section focuses on the consequences of the liberation of Korea and the surrender of Japan over the Korean population in the Japanese archipelago. On the one hand, the process of repatriation, which took place shortly after the Japanese surrender, as well as the associative movements emerging during the occupation and its ideological and political impact on Japan and within the community are presented. On the other hand, institutional and social exclusion of the Korean community is also tackled by examining three principle points: firstly, the process of illegalisation of Korean ethnic education by both the Japanese authorities and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces (SCAP) is presented as an attempt to hinder the maintenance of Korean ethnic consciousness in Japan. Secondly, a thorough analysis of the evolution of the legal status of Koreans in Japan from the colonial period to the present day is provided along with an overview of the changes that have occurred to the geopolitical map of East Asia. This permits an understanding of how Zainichi Koreans interpret their reality in relation to the three states confronting them – the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. Finally, the controversial issue of the mass repatriation program in the late 1950s is briefly presented so as to highlight the grade of manipulation by institutions, which solely conceived the Korean community in Japan as an obstacle for their nationalist purposes.

2. Colonial Rule and The Deprivation of Self-Determination in Korea

Since the sixteenth century, Korea had undertaken a policy of seclusion from most of the nations, in an attempt to safeguard its sovereignty. Despite foreign interference during the nineteenth century, Korean achieved to uphold its isolation. However, this isolationism was condemned to fail as Meiji Japan decided to start their colonial enterprise and expand towards the Korean Peninsula.

2.1. Japanese Colonialism in Perspective

The fast modernisation during the Meiji period (1868-1912) permitted Japan to become a colonialist empire. In order to attain a dominant position in East Asia, which would keep western powers away, by the beginning of the twentieth century, Japan started a campaign to increase its influence over the Korean Peninsula.

2.1.1. The Hermit Kingdom and the pre-modern East Asian scenario

The nineteenth century in Asia was characterised by the threat of Western Imperialism towards East Asia. The European Nations and the United States had succeeded in establishing modern

industrial societies in their territories and intended to expand towards the Far East. China's defeat in the Opium War (1839-1842) entailed the cession of Hong Kong to Britain and the opening of several ports in 1842. By the same token, Japan, despite its policies of seclusion, was forcibly opened to trade with the West by Commodore Perry in the Convention of Kanagawa in 1854.

Since the Japanese invasion of the 1590s, Korea, ruled by the Joseon Dynasty since the fourteenth century, undertook a strict policy of isolation towards Japan and the rest of the nations, except Qing China, with which maintained tributary relations. French and American attempts, in 1866 and 1871, to break into Korea were successfully stifled and led the Korean government to uphold its policy of exclusion. This obstinacy to remain isolated and the determination to maintain its autonomy made Korea merit the title given by the Western nations of the "Hermit Kingdom" (Cummings, 1997: 87).

This successful isolation, however, was damned to fail. In 1868, the Meiji restoration put an end to the Tokugawa Shogunate and established an imperial regime in Japan, which promulgated a series of reforms that led to a fast modernisation of the country. Meiji Japan was not willing to succumb to Western Imperialism and was determined to obtain a position of dominance in East Asia. The constant refusal of the Joseon Dynasty to establish relations with Japan served as a pretext for the application of the same 'gunboat diplomacy' that the Americans had used to open Japan, this time over Korea. In 1875, when the Japanese warship *Un'yo* reached Ganghwa Island without Korean permission, Koreans responded as they had done against the French and the Americans. However, due to the Japanese military superiority, the Joseon Dynasty was compelled to sign the Treaty of Ganghwa in 1876, which, despite recognising Korea's independence as a sovereign state, abolished the tributary relationship with China and demanded the opening of several ports – the isolation of the Hermit Kingdom had come to an end (Hatada, 1969: 92). This new scenario complicated the relations between Japan and China, who was determined to maintain its influence over the neighbouring peninsula.

The new reforms introduced by the Japanese and supported by the Joseon throne led to general discontent among the Korean military and several sectors of the society, bringing about instability in the country. As a consequence of the military revolt of 1882, known as the "Émeute of 1882" (Ibid.: 94), the Japanese had to take a step back in their attempt to modernise and control the Korean army, which significantly reduced their influence and permitted Qing China to reassert its authority. Nevertheless, the incessant spread of anti-foreign intervention promoted by the so-called Donghak Movement brought about the peasant rebellion of 1894. The rapid advance of the rebels throughout the peninsula seriously threatened the stability of the

Korean government, which sought for help in China. Thus, the dispatch of Chinese troops in the peninsula provoked the immediate action of the Japanese government, which also sent armed forces to Korea. The Donghak Rebellion was put down shortly after the foreign intervention. However, despite the Korean government's request for the withdrawal of both armies, the Japanese, upset for the unilateral decision of the Chinese government to intervene in Korea, decided to stay in the peninsula, which was the spark for the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in the same year. The military modernisation since the Meiji Restoration gave Japan the victory over the old Qing China, which lost definitively its influence over Korea and South Manchuria after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 (Ibid.: 104).

The advantageous position of Japan with regards to Korea and Manchuria led to diplomatic tensions with Russia, which saw how its opportunities to take a dominant position in the region were compromised. As a result of the Triple Intervention, in which Russia, France and Germany protested against the favourable conditions obtained by Japan from the Treaty of Shimonoseki, a series of tortuous negotiations took place between Japan and Russia, not reaching a satisfactory conclusion. In February 1904, the Japanese Imperial Navy carried out a surprise attack on Russian installations at Port Arthur, starting the Russo-Japanese War (Lee, 1984: 307). Generally considered the first defeat of a western power by an Asian nation, the Russo-Japanese War concluded with the signing of the peace Treaty of Portsmouth in September 1905, whereby Russia recognised Japan's rights in the Korean Peninsula (Cummings, 1997: 141).

2.1.2. Japan's Seizure of Control over Korea

In the beginning of the twentieth century, Japan's military superiority was demonstrated in the armed conflicts against Qing China and Russia, which led to the indisputable recognition of its dominant position in the region. Furthermore, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, signed in 1902 and extended in 1905, and the secret diplomatic talks (the Taft-Katsura Agreement) between Japan and the United States, translated into the international recognition of Japan's right to intervene in Korea (Ibid.; Lee, 1984). In November of the same year, the Japanese statesman Itô Hirobumi travelled to Seoul to force Gojong, Emperor of Korea, to sign the Japan-Korea Treaty, according to which Korea was to become a protectorate of Japan. Since that moment, all diplomatic matters, police forces, the telegraph system and so forth were brought within the competence of Japan.

In 1907, on the occasion of the celebration of the Second Hague Peace Convention, the Korean emperor secretly dispatched three envoys to attend the convention and solicit international support against the Japanese aggression. None of the present nations, however, recognised

Gojong's sovereignty over Korea's foreign affairs and the request to participate was denied. As a result of this vain attempt to gain international support, Gojong was dethroned and pro-Japan Yi Wan-Yong was inaugurated as prime minister. After the assassination of Itô by the hands of the Korean nationalist An Jung-Geung, the general Terauchi Masatake became the new Governor-General. From that moment, Yi and Terauchi would cooperate on the elaboration of the Treaty of Annexation, which became effective on 22 August 1910 (Cummings, 1997: 145).

The annexation of Korea put an end to the Jaeson Dynasty and to nearly a millennium of unity and sovereignty in the Korean Peninsula. Since that date, Korea as a single independent nation ceased to exist, due to four decades of colonial rule by the Japanese Empire and the subsequent division of the peninsula, which, even nowadays, cannot seem to be resolved.

2.1.3. Japanese Modernisation in Korea and the Inflow of Population

Immediately after the annexation was effective, the Japanese Governor-General established military rule [*budan seiji*] in the new-born colony in order to prevent potential resistance among the Korean population, who in the previous years had firmly expressed their reluctance to be subjected to Japanese rule. Through a combination of military action and administrative control, the Japanese were committed to the development of both Korea's administration and economy whatever the cost. However, the ideas of modernisation were not conceived to benefit Koreans, but to ensure their subjugation.

The new Japanese rule, as Lee and De Vos (1981a: 32) point out, sought to develop an "economic symbiosis" that favoured the flow of Japanese populace into the peninsula who, as might be expected, were to occupy the highest positions in Korea's administration, education and industry. The Japanese presence was dominant in the mining and fishing industries, increasing notably the productivity, in the financial sector, establishing a solid banking network to promote the Japanese to assist the development of the economy, and the sector of public services, controlling communications and transportation (Lee, 1984: 317). However, the sector that experienced a significant development was agriculture. Between 1910 and 1918, a cadastral survey was undertaken by the Oriental Development Company, which had been established during the protectorate period to manage the colonial policy, causing the prominent flow of Japanese bureaucrats and surveyors into the peninsula. Moreover, the new system of land registration provided the Governor-General with the ownership of a whole lot of cultivable lands, since all lands that were not properly registered were confiscated and the lands previously assigned to estate instrumentalities became property of the Governor-General. The final objective of promoting a majority of Japanese landlords was accomplished, as by 1930 the

Governor-General came to own 40 per cent of the land (Ibid.: 318), which he redistributed among Japanese entrepreneurs, peasants and companies. Reforms in the agricultural system had a devastating impact on the Korean peasantry as a vast number of countrymen lost property over the lands they cultivated – 80 per cent of Koreans were considered tenants by 1930s (Weiner, 1994: 44).

The colonial government had succeeded in establishing a “racial role model” (Ibid.: 41) that ensured the institutional and economic control of the Japanese over the Koreans, who, instead of benefitting from the modernisation of their country, were condemned to become a “caste” (Lee and De Vos, 1981a: 33). According to Grajdanzev (1944: 76), the Japanese population in Korea increased from 171,500 in 1910 to 650,100 in 1939, amounting to 2.9 per cent of the total population. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that Japanese and Koreans formed antagonistic social groups, occupying well-differentiated sectors in society (Table 1).

Table 1. Occupational Distribution of Korean and Japanese population in Japan.

	Korean population			Japanese Population		
	1920	1929	1938	1920	1929	1938
Agriculture	87.1	81.8	75.7	11.5	8.3	5.3
Fishing	1.1	1.5	1.5	3.2	2.5	1.5
Mining	1.9	2.2	1.2	17.8	14.5	2.3
Industry			2.6			16.6
Commerce	5.6	6.3	6.5	33.7	30.2	23.4
Communications			0.9			5.9
Public and professional services	1.7	2.5	2.9	29.3	34.2	38.1
Other occupations	1.7	4.3	7	3.7	6.9	2.9
No occupations	0.9	1.4	1.7	1.4	3.4	4
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Grajdanzev, A. (1944) *Modern Korea: Her Economic and Social Development under the Japanese*. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations.

2.2. Korean Migration to the Metropole

The number of Koreans in the Japanese archipelago who saw their homeland become a colony of Japan in 1910 was only 790 (Morita, 1996). The small Korean community was composed majorly by Korean students who were eager to discover the Japanese secret that had led the country to a fast and remarkable modernisation. The advent of the new colonial rule in the Korean Peninsula had put the peasantry in a tremendously unfavourable condition, as the cadastral survey executed by the Governor-General had deprived numerous farmers of their lands and had subjugated them to work under a regime of tenancy. For this reason, it seems obvious that a huge sector of the population contemplated the possibility of emigrating to the metropole.

In accordance with the annexation terms, Korea had become an extension of the Japanese Empire and the Koreans had converted into subjects of the emperor – Koreans had become sons of the emperor [tenno no sekishi] just like the Japanese were. Nevertheless, the colonial system had devised a complex system of subject classification, registration and control. It would be too innocent to think that in this new territorial configuration the coloniser and the colonised would be considered equals and, therefore, be granted the same rights – the Japanese emperor had ‘love’ for all his children [sekishi], yet a different kind of ‘love’.

The Japanese Empire was configured as a multinational sovereign state and consisted of an interior territory [naichi] (Japan) and three exterior territories [gaichi] (Taiwan, Karafuto and Korea) (Wetherall, 2006: 18). Despite the fact that all subjects in these territories were granted with Japanese nationality and that the Japanese held sovereignty over every area, each territory had their own administrative jurisdiction. Therefore, inhabitants of each territory were subject to a particular legislation. Also, in the same manner that territories were classified, Japanese nationals were categorised according to their domicile – Korea had its own register where all Koreans appeared as inhabitants of the exterior territory. This classification allowed for a clear division and separation of imperial subjects and subsequent restrictions in rights, giving a clear advantage to the ethnic-Japanese both in the interior and the exterior territories.

2.2.1. First Migrations and the Emergence of Students’ Nationalism 1910 – 1918

This new status permitted Koreans to travel to the metropole, just like the Japanese were allowed to move to the new colony. Notwithstanding the relative freedom of movement, the number of Korean migrants remained solely a few thousand during the initial five years, from 790 in 1909 to 3,917 in 1915. However, the significant expansion of the Japanese industries during the First World War (1914-1918) motivated by the growth in exports (Inkster, 2001: 97)

had a notable impact on the labour market with an increase in the workforce demand. Thus, many entrepreneurs found in Korea a handy source of labour and devoted much of their efforts to the temporary recruitment of Koreans in order to cover the domestic labour shortage (Weiner, 1994: 91). As a result, the Korean population in Japan increased exponentially to 26,605 in 1919.

Koreans in Japan were relegated to the lowest strata of Japanese society. The lack of experience and practice along with the prejudice of the Japanese majority restricted Koreans to deplorable working and living conditions. The lack of commitment of Koreans, who easily changed jobs for better wages and security as well as the impossibility of many to speak Japanese, excluded them from permanent positions (Lee and De Vos, 1981a: 38). Consequently, Koreans usually worked as operatives in small industrial complexes with the poorest conditions. Also, they had to resign themselves to living in doss-houses or camps [hamba] in the industrial areas (Weiner, 1994: 49-50) or buildings owned by other Koreans, since Japanese landlords usually refused to rent to Koreans, since they were regarded as noisy, careless with the property and late in their payments. The rumours about unfavourable conditions in the metropole would not dissuade Koreans to continue migrating, as salaries in Japan, despite being remarkably inferior to those of the Japanese, were considerably higher than those of the peninsula. (Ibid.: 61).

Another important group of migrants was composed of students who, due to the lack of opportunity for higher education in Korea, hoped to get imbued with the ideas of modernity that led Japan to economic and industrial success. As a matter of fact, the Japanese government was in need of an intellectual contingent to occupy certain administrative positions in the colony, which explains its willingness to give Koreans access to higher education. Notwithstanding, the Japanese were rather selective to ensure that only students from loyal-to-the-regime families entered the country. The number of students grew during all the colonial period from the 790 who resided in 1910 to more than a thousand in 1922, a figure that would increase up to about 8,000 by 1937 (Lee and De Vos, 1981a: 42).

The outburst of the Bolsheviks Revolution in 1917 that would cause the collapse of the Tsarist regime in Russia and 'Fourteen Points' Declaration made by the U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson, in 1918 imbued Korean students with ideas about self-determination. The end of the Great War brought about the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the subsequent independence of several nations such as Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia among others. These events had an important impact on the Korean student community in Kanda (Tokyo), which started a Korean nationalist intellectual movement. Members of the Korean YMCA and the *Gakuyūkai*, the main organisations of Korean students in Japan, formed the Youth

Association for the Independence of Korea [Chôsen Dokuritsu Seinendan] and elaborated a declaration of independence in which they claimed that “[t]he Annexation of Korea to Japan, not being a product of the will of our people, is a menace for the survival and the development of our nation and compromises peace in the East” and warned that, in the event of failure to comply with the demands, “our people will wage an eternal war of blood against the Japanese”² (Yang and Yamada, 2014: 93). The declaration was mailed to the Japanese government and foreign diplomatic missions and, on 8 February 1919, it was read aloud during a meeting at the YMCA student union in front of more than two hundred students. Excitement among Korean students and tensions with the police led to the cancellation of the meeting and the arrest of twenty-seven students, of which nine were sentenced to prison (Mitchell, 1967: 20).

The Korean students’ independence movement was heavily suppressed by the Japanese Police. However, there is no doubt that this uprising was the germ for the March First Uprising, or *Samil Undong*, wherein Koreans in the peninsula declared unilaterally their independence from Japan in 1919 – being this a clear example of transnational solidarity (Portes, 1999). During the two months of protests in the peninsula, which followed the students’ declaration, the response of the Japanese Governor-General was ruthless: 46,948 arrests, 7,509 killed, and 15,961 injured (Kang, 2001: 17). As a result of the protests, which extended over a year, new administrative reforms were announced in the Imperial Rescript of 19 August; the hitherto so-called ‘Military Rule’ [budan seiji] was to be substituted by what was denominated ‘Cultural Rule’ [bunka seiji]. Through this new colonial policy, which was allegedly adopted as a voluntary gesture of benevolence and not as a concession to the uprising, Koreans were promised that they would benefit from a certain liberalisation and a more equalitarian treatment from the Japanese. The military government was abolished, Koreans gained access to administrative positions, including the new civilian police force that replaced the military police, freedom of press was incorporated at a certain level and an educational reform was enacted (Weiner, 1994: 94). These reforms, however, in many cases did not have a real application and were instrumentalised.

It is paramount to emphasise that the educational reform, in particular, introduced with the Educational Ordinance of 1922, paved the way for assimilation policies which would be reinforced during the following decade. Another measure taken by Japan was the promulgation in April 1919, of an official decree that restricted the travel of Koreans to the metropole – a special permit was now required to enter Japan. In addition, due to the radicalism showed during the independent movement, Japanese police would place Koreans in Japan, now

² Articles 1 and 4 of the Declaration of Independence.

nicknamed as *futei seijin* (unsettled or malcontent Koreans) (Ibid.: 1994: 71), under surveillance (Lee and De Vos, 1981a: 40-41).

2.2.2. Voluntary Migrations 1919 – 1938

The conclusion of the Great War and the subsequent end of the economic boom led Japan to an economic recession that extended over the 1920s. Consequently, the unemployment rates increased exponentially up to 3,000,000 people in 1931 provoking a general worsening in labour conditions. Notwithstanding, Koreans continued to migrate to Japan doubling its population in only two years and amounting to almost 300,000 people in 1930. Despite the travel restrictions imposed after the March First Uprising, the rapid increase of the population in the peninsula (30 per cent from 1915 to 1930) brought about a continuous flow of Korean population between the colony and the metropole, reaching an average of almost 200,000 Korean people moving from and to the colony between 1924 and 1928 (Table 2). The economic recession also had an important impact on the migrant population with more than a 15 per cent unemployment rate in 1925 (Mitchell, 1967: 31). Nonetheless, Japanese employers continued to hire Koreans as manual labour with wages far lower than those of their Japanese counterparts. As Weiner points out, the continuous increase in the employment of Korean migrants at low wages during the recession period could have contributed to the aggravation of the precarious situation of many Japanese workers unable to compete with the migrant labour (1994: 116). There is no doubt that this discontent among the indigenous population was a factor in the spread of a general prejudice towards Koreans in Japanese society.

The general conception about the racial superiority of the Japanese over the Koreans led to the belief that Koreans were inferior people [rettô minzoku] with a minimal cultural development and no expectation for self-improvement, whose possibilities of subsistence were limited to the execution of manual, unskilled jobs (Mitchell, 1967: 31-32). In the same fashion, Koreans were associated with any criminal activity (Lee and De Vos, 1981a: 40) or act of brutality, presumably, due to their primitive nature. This contempt became apparent on July 1922, when a number of bodies of Korean workers were sighted floating in the Shinano River. Subsequent investigations confirmed that up to 100 Korean workers had perished due to poor living conditions and a shootout occurred during an escape attempt from the electric construction site where they worked (Weiner, 1989: 104-105). However, it was during the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1 September 1923 that Koreans suffered probably the worst tragedy of their history in Japan. During the martial law following the earthquake, rumours that accused Koreans of poisoning the water supply, rapes and rebellious riots, rapidly spread around the Kanto area, causing great confusion among the population. Under the pretext of defence against

the *futei seijin*, these rumours were the spark that initiated a wave of hate crimes, resulting in more than 6,000 Koreans murdered by Japanese soldiers, police and civilian vigilantes [*jikeijin*] (Lee, 2013: 144).

Table 2. Korean migration from 1917 to 1927.

Year	Migration to Japan	Returnees to Korea	Residents in Japan	Annual increase
1917	14,012	3,927	10,085	10,085
1918	17,910	9,305	18,690	8,605
1919	20,968	12,739	26,919	8,229
1920	27,497	20,947	33,469	6,550
1921	38,118	25,536	46,051	12,582
1922	70,462	46,326	70,187	24,136
1923	97,395	89,745	77,837	7,650
1924	122,215	75,430	124,622	46,785
1925	131,273	112,471	143,424	18,802
1926	91,092	83,709	150,807	7,383
1927	138,016	93,991	194,832	44,025

Source: Weiner, M. (1994) *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan*. London: Routledge.

In view of the precarious situation of the Korean population in Japan, during the 1920s a number of associations were formed by students and workers in order to collectively fight for an improvement in their social and labour situation. After the failure of the independence movement in 1919, radical left ideologies attracted the attention of numerous Korean students, who in 1922 established extremist groups such as the communist North Star Society [*Hokuseikai*] and the anarchist Black Wave Society [*Kokutôkai*] led by Park Yeol (Chung and Tipton, 1997: 174). As a product of the protests that followed the Shinano River incident and the Korean Massacre after the Great Kanto Earthquake, the Federation of Labour of the Koreans [*Zainihon Chôsen Rôdô Sôdômei*] in Japan was established in 1925 with the objective of creating class consciousness and promoting the ethnic unity of the community. The federation played a prominent role in the labour and ethnic movements of the 1920s, leading the fight for rights for the Koreans in Japan and against the promulgation of assimilationist policies. In 1929, however, as a result of the resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Profintern in Moscow, the federation was dissolved as an independent organisation and absorbed by the National Council of Japanese Trade Unions [*Nippon Rôdô Kumiai Zenkoku Kyôgikai*] (Weiner, 1989: 1719). Most of the remaining associations were suppressed by the Japanese authorities during the 1930s.

Another contingent of Korean population started to promote harmony and collaboration with the Japanese and oppose the Marxist-oriented revolutionaries. This group formed what Kim Tu-Yong (in Lee and De Vos, 1981a: 48) named “anti-nationalists.” The most representative group in this line was the Mutual Love Society [*Sôaikai*] founded in Osaka in 1923. Initially committed to the support of the Korean community during the recession, *Sôaikai* progressively collaborated with the Japanese authorities, earning themselves recognition and financial support. Soon after that, the number of affiliates rose up to nearly 100,000. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that membership in the group signified having representation and gaining a wider access to the labour market (Ibid.). Since the promulgation of the Peace Prevention Law in 1925, which criminalised the association against the National Polity [*Kokutai*], *Sôaikai* carried out a valuable task in partnership with the Japanese political police [*Tokkô*] by providing information regarding insurgent actions by Koreans. Also, their actions were fundamental in the suppression of labour demonstrations, as is the case of the Kishiwada protests of 1929, where *Sôaikai* strikebreakers opposed the Korean and Japanese workers on strike (Weiner, 1994: 172).

The increase in the inflow of Korean population to the Japanese archipelago during the 1920s became even more accelerated during the 1930s. This migration, however, would change course fatally by the end of the decade with the gradual introduction of coercive migration policies that functioned as a pretext to the forcible transportation of thousands of Koreans. Until those measures were imposed, the Korean population largely doubled amounting to more than 500,000 in 1935 and almost 800,000 by 1938. With the gradual recovering from the economic recession, more Koreans decided to try their luck in Japan. Also, the Japanese government started to support the migration of couples in order to stimulate the formation of a more stable migrant community (Mitchel, 1967: 76). Industrial cities such as Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto, Yokohama and Nagoya received the major part of migrants. The case of Osaka is very significant as it became the city with the highest Korean population of the country in the 1930s, amounting to more than 241,619 Koreans in 1938 and 395,380 in 1943, adding up to 10 per cent of the total population (Lee and De Vos, 1981a: 45).

This exponential increase in the migrant population, along with the precarious living conditions, accentuated the social segregation with the formation of ghettos in areas adjacent to industrial estates. These areas developed an enclave economy through the establishment of small businesses by Koreans and for Koreans – restaurants, markets as well as shaman doctors and clothing shops (Lie, 2008: 8). It cannot be assumed that the emergence of these outlying slums motivated the ethnic isolation of the community. As is common in numerous social contexts,

isolation hindered the contact with the Japanese, which impeded cultural assimilation, fuelled Japanese prejudice and stimulated ethnic segregation.

2.2.3. Involuntary Migrations 1938 – 1945

As a result of the unstoppable expansion of the military campaign in China, the Japanese government implemented the National Mobilisation Law [Kokka Sôdôinhô] in 1938. This law gave the government total control over the national economy. The labour mobilisation towards strategic industrial sectors motivated by this new legislation caused an immediate shortage of labour in Japanese industries. Consequently, the supplemental National Service Draft Ordinance [Kokumin Chôyôrei] was passed in 1939 with the objective of mobilising labour from Korea. The shortage of workers in Japanese industries was to be satisfied with Korean workers from the peninsula. During the period 1939-1941, the recruitment in the peninsula was carried out under industry application and assisted by the General-Government of the colony, mainly in southern provinces. The recruitment was 'voluntary' and Koreans were employed under two-year contracts to work at munition plants, construction sites and especially coal mines (Lee and De Vos, 1981a: 52). In order to satisfy the labour shortage, the Welfare Ministry projected the mobilisation of about 85,000 Koreans in 1939 and 97,000 in 1940. However, only 62 per cent of the quota was reached (Table 3). In view of the failure in covering the quotas, by the end of the two-year period the Welfare Ministry, in collaboration with *Sôaikai*, now under control of the Japanese authorities and renamed *Kyôwakai*, proceeded to the extension of contracts (Weiner, 1994: 194).

Table 3. Annual conscription of Korean workers from 1939 to 1945.

Year	Scheduled quota for labour mobilisation	Number of workers transported to Japan	Quota coverage (per cent)
1939	85,500	53,120	62.1
1940	97,300	59,398	61
1941	100,000	67,098	67.1
1942	130,000	119,851	92.1
1943	125,000	128,354	102.7
1944	290,000	286,000	98.6
1945	50,000	10,622	21.2

Source: Weiner, M. (1994) *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan*. London: Routledge.

In 1942, with the imminent outbreak of World War II, the colonial government took over the recruitment task by establishing local recruiting stations throughout Korea. Each local station had its own quota and the recruitment was carried out by Korean officials who, in many cases, turned coercion into voluntariness by groundless promises about prosperity in the metropole. Consequently, due to the government-oriented recruiting system, more than the 90 per cent of the quota was satisfied in 1942 and it was even exceeded the following year. Finally, in 1944 the Korean Labour Conscription Law was promulgated, giving way to the period of forced migration [kyôsei renkô] wherein approximately 300,000 Koreans were mobilised in an ultimate attempt of the Japanese Empire to avoid total defeat in the Pacific War (Ibid.: 195). As a consequence of the migrant movements from the Korean Peninsula into Japan, the total population of Koreans in the archipelago was approximately 2 million (Table 4).

Table 4. Korean population in Japan from 1939 to 1945.

Year	Recruitment/ conscription totals	Resident population	Annual increase
1939	53,120	1,030,394	unknown
1940	59,398	1,241,315	210,925
1941	67,098	1,469,230	227,915
1942	119,851	1,625,054	155,824
1943	128,354	1,768,180	193,126
1944	286,000	1,911,307	143,127
1945	10,622	2,100,000	188,693

Source: Weiner, M. (1994) *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan*. London: Routledge.

2.3. Cultural Nationalism: Assimilation and Segregation

The Japanese rule was characterised by the implementation of policies in its colonies conceived to facilitate the cultural assimilation of the colonial population into the Japanese Empire. However, the Japanese authorities also sought to maintain a strict regime of separation between ethnic-Japanese and other ethnic groups in the empire. In so doing, the Japanese ensure their position of superiority over the colonised groups.

2.3.1. Education and Indoctrination

The sense of superiority that fed the Japanese self-conception served as a pretext to not only take control over Korea, but also apply a series of policies, in a sort of paternalistic form of

colonisation, devised to usher Koreans through a process of modernisation *à la Japanese*. The common belief that Koreans could never reach modernisation by themselves justified the gradual process of Japonisation instigated throughout the colonial period. All trace of Koreanness – *backwardness* – was to be amended with Japaneseness – *progress*. Representative of this amendment is the prohibition of the nomenclature Great Korean Empire [Daikan Teikoku], and its substitution by the term *Chôsen*. Unlike the imperial denotation of the former name, the latter emphasised the sense of subjugation and peripheral subordination of the new colony, which was to be considered a province within the Japanese Empire. Names of cities, streets, squares and everything that commemorated the recently extinguished greatness and sovereignty of the Korean people was obscured under Japanese nomenclatures.

In like manner, the Japanese authorities had the intention of ultimately imbuing Koreans with the necessary cultural elements so that they could contribute to the imperial apparatus. In order to accomplish this objective, in August of 1911 the educational ordinance for Korea was promulgated with the ultimate purpose of “educating good and loyal subjects” [chûryônarû kokumin wo ikusei suru]³ (Jo, 2016: 157). Japanese citizens, too, had been imbued with nationalistic principles of loyalty to the state and the head of it, the emperor, through the Meiji education system, whose final goal was the creation of a mass of Japanese “subjects of an absolute monarch [...] willing to sacrifice [themselves] for the nation-state”⁴ (Tipton, 2002: 60-61). Therefore, the making of imperial subjects [kôminka] should not be taken as a measure that exclusively affected Koreans.

The educational ordinance established a dual educational system, whereby Korean schooling period was notably shorter, with elementary schools [futsû gakkô] offering four years of schooling and secondary schools [kôtô futsû gakkô] offering four years for boys and three years for girls, in opposition to the six-year elementary schooling and five-year secondary schooling offered in Japanese schools (Lee, 2012: 151). Furthermore, the Japanese language was actively promoted in detriment of Korean, which played a secondary role in education. The final purpose of colonial education, Pak and Hwang states, was “the inculcation of duty” in elementary schools and the “creation of semi-skilled employees” in secondary schools (Pak and Hwang,

³ Although the most accurate translation of the term ‘*kokumin*’ is national subjects, the word ‘national’ was intentionally omitted in order to avoid any possible association with ‘nation’ or ‘nationality’.

⁴ “Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters: as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; *should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth*” (Italics added). Extract from the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1880 (Tipton, 2002: 60).

2011: 382). In the same line, Ichiba (2005: 168) points out that short schooling periods, as well as the educational content in Korean schools, suggest that the final goal of colonial policies was not the *japonisation* of the Korean populace but its *stupidification* [guminka].

The so-called Cultural Rule, which followed the first decade of heavy military repression, brought about the second educational ordinance of 1922. This new educational decree entailed a partial reform of the education system that, allegedly, promoted equality between Koreans and Japanese [Isshi Dôjin] by placing both educational systems at the same level in elementary and secondary schools and giving Koreans access to university education. Although the alleged equality was in fact obscured by persisting differences, Koreans grew eager to improve their situation through education, which was reflected in a significant increase in enrolment of students. The Japanese authorities, nonetheless, took advantage of this extension of their influence outreach to implement a curriculum “meant to have the effect of blurring the recognition of ethnic differences between the colonisers and the colonised,” achieving that students accepted “the status quo as a matter of course” (Pak and Hwang, 2011: 387-388).

The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 justified another modification on the colonial rule by strengthening the assimilation policies under the slogan *Naisen Ittai* (Japan and Korea as one body). Thus, a series of new rules such as the mandatory recitation of the *Pledge of Imperial Subjects* [Tennô Shinmin no Seishi] (1937), the obligatory use of Japanese at schools, as a result of the 1938 educational ordinance, or the compulsory worship at Shinto shrines (1939) were implemented (ibid., 391).

2.3.2. Names, Surnames and Clan Names

Nonetheless, the most controverted measure taken by the Japanese colonial authorities was the one concerning Korean names. Under the *Sôshi Kaimei* order, Koreans were compelled to *create a surname* [shôshi] and invited to *change their given names* [kaimei] in order to adapt to the Japanese family registration system [koseki]. The traditional Korean naming system was based on the transmission of the father-side surname [sei] through generations without losing it as a result of marriage. This system permitted the preservation of surnames, or rather ‘clan names’, in a sort of clan mentality that connected familial groups along history and prevented matrimony between members of the same clan (Ijichi, 1994: 15). The Japanese system, however, having acquired a Western-style naming system, prioritised the familial unity over the ancestral lineage. Korean women, therefore, regardless of their marital status, conserved their ‘clan names’. This clan-oriented custom opposed the Japanese conception of the supreme imperial lineage that justified Japanese nationalism (Naoki, 2008: 51). The controversy around

this issue is based on two important facts: the alleged non-compulsoriness of the measure and the Japanese reluctance towards an eventual administrative integration of Koreans.

On the one hand, the obligation to create a surname [shi] did not necessarily entail, in the case of husbands, the loss of the clan name [sei], as after a period of six months, this was automatically taken as *shi* (wives had to adopt their husband's new *shi* as their own), unless individuals decided to change it. The change of given names was entirely voluntary. Thus, it is clear that, in accordance with the law, there was no obligation to modify Korean names. However, it is indispensable to take into account the social circumstances wherein Koreans lived by the end of the 1930s. After more than 20 years of colonial rule, due to the colonial identity installed in the Korean society, which defined the colonised as inferior with respect to the coloniser, certain Koreans were eager to adopt Japanese-style names in hope for social mobility. Notwithstanding, unofficial pressure from the Japanese side actually played a significant role in the decision of the Koreans who decided to voluntarily abide by the order – those who did not comply were considered suspicious by the police forces, placed under surveillance and deprived of certain rights (Miyata, Kin and Yan, 1992: 113). On the other hand, the suggestion for Koreans to adopt Japanese-style names was perceived negatively by some Japanese circles, especially the police, who feared that Koreans and Japanese became indistinguishable. Owing to these oppositions, the adoption of Korean-style names was officially advised⁵ (Naoki, 2004: 1). In conclusion, Koreans were constrained to modify their clan-oriented naming custom and adapt it to the Japanese naming system – *assimilation* –, but at the same time they were compelled to do it maintaining identifiable marks – *segregation* –; or as professor Ijichi puts it: “It was as if they put a seal on Koreans saying ‘Korea is a colony of Japan’” (Ijichi, 1994: 18. My translation.).

It is paramount to understand that the final goal of the assimilation policies, or rather acculturating measures, was in no case the *japonisation* of the Korean populace – intended as the making of Japanese full-right citizens – but the construction of a new group of imperial subjects [kôkoku shinminka]. Koreans' absorption of Japanese cultural patterns theoretically would facilitate their subjugation and the discontinuation of national independence aspirations. In addition, Koreans were expected to develop a strong sense of loyalty towards the emperor, for whom they would be willing to give their lives, in the event of war, in an ultimate gesture of patriotism.

⁵ Korean and Japanese names were registered in Chinese characters. Thus, when we refer to Korean or Japanese style names, it is not related to phonetic aspects of the name, but purely to visually recognisable traces in characters.

3. The Liberation of Korea and The Problematisation of the Korean Presence in Japan

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the 6th and 9th August 1945 is remembered as one of the most horrifying events in human history. The number victims of this devastating attack is roughly estimated at 140,000 and 70,000 deaths, respectively. At the moment that the bombs were dropped, the Korean population in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was 180,000 people. 80,000 of these were directly exposed to the atomic bombing, resulting in an estimated total of 40,000-60,000 deaths and thousands injured. The bombing forced Japan into unconditional surrender on 15 August with the Potsdam Declaration announced by emperor Hirohito. In the Article 8 of the declaration the territorial limits within which Japan could exercise its sovereignty were redefined:

The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.⁶

Since that day, every 15 August, Koreans celebrate their National Independence day. This is a day of jubilation as it commemorates the liberation of Korea after 40 years of Japanese rule. Nonetheless, we must remain critical with regards to that date, as the jubilation that the liberation brought about did not last long for many Koreans, especially those who remained in Japan.

3.1. Liberated Koreans in Japan

The liberation of Korea had been long-awaited. The end of Japanese colonialism was expected to bring freedom and independence to the Korean people. However, the Koreans who decided to, or had to, stay in the Japanese archipelago soon realised that their liberation would not exactly mean what they had been hoping for.

3.1.1. Return to the Homeland

The approximate two million Koreans who were in Japan at the end of the war received the news about the liberation of their homeland with great joy and enthusiasm. Thousands of them were looking forward to their return and a mass exodus to the peninsula began almost immediately after Japan's surrender resulting in a disproportionate accumulation of people in

⁶ Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration (National Diet Library, 1966).

ports and embarkation areas. However, the post-war conditions in Japan were not favourable, as the return of Japanese soldiers and expatriates to the archipelago and the lack of sailing boats caused a shortage of vessels, impeding the repatriation of a great number of Koreans. Nonetheless, during the first three months after the end of the war, approximately 800,000 Koreans returned (Mitchel, 1967: 102), thanks to the mobilisation of Japanese naval and merchant vessels. The repatriation, nonetheless, was far from being complete and, in view of the demands of the Korean population and the chaos generated in the first months, SCAP urged the Japanese Ministry of Welfare to coordinate the entire repatriation operation in November 1945. Notwithstanding the increase in means for the repatriation, many Koreans had a second thought about their return due to two main factors. Firstly, the restriction imposed by SCAP in fixing a baggage limit of 250 pounds and the prohibition to carry more than 1,000 yen (approximately two-month cost of living of a five-member family) discouraged many Koreans reluctant to leave their properties and savings behind. Secondly, rumours about famine, poverty, floods and epidemic diseases in the peninsula, not only demoralised Koreans in Japan, but also motivated the comeback to Japan of many returnees. With the regularisation of the repatriation operation, moreover, Koreans were not authorised to return to Japan, which caused a flow of illegal immigrants of more than 13,000 Koreans by August 1946 (Lee, 1981a: 60).

Due to the decrease in the number of returns, the Japanese government, under SCAP instructions, launched a registration program of Korean population in order to ascertain the number of Koreans determined to return. Of the 646,932 Koreans who registered by March 1946, 514,035 expressed their desired to be repatriated. Consequently, the repatriation program was extended until December 1946, and an extra 575,000 Koreans returned. Although until August 1947 approximately another 15,000 Koreans were allowed to return, the rest of the population who decided to remain forfeited their right of repatriation (Mitchel, 1967: 103).

3.1.2. Socio-Economic Situation

Two years after the surrender, the total population of Koreans in Japan had shrunk down to approximately 600,000 individuals. Korea was no longer a colony of Japan and, hence, Koreans had been liberated. That liberation, however, would lose most of its meaning as soon as Koreans in Japan realised their situation was to stay unresolved. Since the beginning of Japan's occupation, SCAP had presumed that the problem of the Korean population in Japan would resolve on its own, as all the migrant population would naturally return to their homeland. Despite the fact that Koreans were now liberated nationals and the Japanese were considered the defeated enemy, Koreans were not to receive whatever preferential treatment from the occupation forces. The fact that for four decades Koreans had been subjects of the Japanese

Empire raised suspicions over the Korean population, who consequently should be considered liberated nationals but treated as “enemy subjects” if need be, bringing about protests from Korean organisations, which demanded preferential treatment as other United Nations nationals (Lee, 1981b: 76-78). Ironically, all Koreans who remained in Japan retained their Japanese nationality and hence fell under the jurisdiction of Japanese law. Nevertheless, after the amendment of the Election Law in 1945 and the enactment of the Alien Registration Law of 1947, Koreans forfeited suffrage and became to be considered aliens. In other words, Koreans in Japan were considered the same as Japanese nationals inasmuch as they retained Japanese nationality, but were treated as aliens with regards to certain social rights (Ibid.: 138).

The Japanese economic situation had deteriorated during the war. Most of the factories and industrial sites in major cities had been destroyed during air raids or had ceased their activities and unemployment rates increased exponentially in conjunction with the return of thousands of Japanese from overseas. Discrimination and hostility towards Koreans in Japanese post-war society placed the community in a difficult situation, sometimes even worse than during the colonial period. Koreans were compelled to subsist on precarious labour in small industries or working as scrap merchants or swineherds. Ethnic discrimination along with the lack of experience took Koreans to earning wages 41 per cent lower than those of their Japanese counterparts (Park, 1957: 75-76). “Locked out of their workplaces after the war,” Park states, “Koreans were in a situation in which they had to make a job for themselves. It stands to reason that those people, who had no capital and no experience, had no choice but to earn a living in the dark” which, in many occasions, signified involvement in “crimes related to poverty” (Ibid.: 124). Thus, numerous Koreans resorted to black market activities and illegal production of liquor.

Moreover, hostility between Japanese and Koreans did not disappear with the colonial rule. During the first period of the American occupation, some sectors of the Korean population unleashed their repressed anger against the Japanese, perpetrating numerous violent episodes. This violence and Koreans involvement in illicit activities, summed to the prejudice that already existed in Japanese society, resulted in a smear campaign against Koreans. Japanese press overtly accused the Korean community, under the sobriquet ‘third party people’ [daisan kokujin], of smuggling people, being involved in black market activities and spreading diseases. A representative example of this anti-Korean campaign is a poster that was distributed by the police during a crime prevention campaign around Ueno, Tokyo. The poster showed a woman being threatened by a robber with a knife over a background that intentionally resembled the Korean emblem. This defaming campaign, Mitchel points out, had to be authorised by SCAP censors, who did little to prevent anti-Korean sentiments (Mitchel, 1967: 111).

3.1.3. Community Association and Fracture

In view of the precarious situation after the surrender, Koreans started forming organisations in order to collectively coordinate ethnic activities and political struggle for rights. After the suppression of Korean associations in the 1930s, Koreans had no official platform for political activism, except for the Japanese-controlled *Kyôaikai*. On 15 October 1945, a conglomerate of Korean activists from different political backgrounds congregated in Hibiya Public Hall (Tokyo) to organise the *Zainihon Chôsenjin Renmei* (League of Koreans in Japan) or *Chôren*. The Korean communist Kim Chon-Hae, who had recently been released from prison, was invited to participate in the assembly. After his seventeen-year imprisonment, Kim was considered a national leader and soon became the head of the organisation. *Chôren* collaborated with the Japanese government and the SCAP in the coordination of repatriations, the mediation of ethnic conflicts and the support of the Korean community, and became the main organisation representing Koreans in Japan.

Kim's sympathies to the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) were evident from the beginning and *Chôren* gradually oriented politically towards the left. This generated discontent in some members of the organisation and led to the expulsion or resignation of an important number of members. *Chôren* leaders considered that, due to the difficult conditions in the homeland, Koreans had to remain and cooperate with the Japanese workers to overthrow the imperial system. Pamphlets at the time read:

The enemy is the Emperor system, and both the Korean people and the Japanese people are victims in common. The Japanese want to understand and support the struggles of the Korean people.

Moore, 1983: 35

On 16 November 1945, certain dissidents from *Chôren* and other anti-communist groups created the *Chôsen Kenkoku Sokushin Seinen Dômei* (Youth League to promote the foundation of Korea) or *Kensei*, a right-winged organisation, with the main purpose of destroying *Chôren*. On 2 January 1946, other dissidents formed the *Shin Chôsen Kenkoku Dômei* (League for the Foundation of a New Korea) or *Kendô*, under the leadership of Park Yeol, a Korean anarchist, founder of the Black Wave Society, who had been imprisoned for twenty-three years for plotting the assassination of Crown Prince Hirohito in 1920s. Common animosity against *Chôren* and their intention to also engage in social activism for the Korean community led *Kensei* and *Kendô* to create the *Zainihon Chôsen Kyoryû Mindan* (Union of Korean Residents in Japan) or *Mindan* in October 1946 (Mitchel, 1967: 106-107).

At an international level, the post-war situation in the Korean Peninsula became another point of friction between Korean organisations in Japan. As a result of the Moscow Conference in December 1945, the United States, which occupied the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, and the Soviet Union, controlling the north, came to an agreement whereby a four-power trusteeship would be established in Korea for up to five years in an attempt to facilitate a government in Korea. Unlike *Chôren*, who endorsed the agreement, expecting soviet influence over Korea, the Korean right-wing in Japan declared their opposition. Furthermore, the inauguration of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in August of 1948 and the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in September of the same year signified the definite ideological and political alignment of Korean organisations. *Mindan*, rebaptised as *Zainihon Daikan Minkoku Kyoryû Mindan* (Union of Republic of Korea Residents in Japan), and *Chôren* declared their support to ROK and DPRK, respectively. From that moment, the line of action of both organisations took diametrically opposed standpoints in most matters.

Chôren's successive political action in form of demonstrations and mass meetings in conjunction with the JCP as well as the continuous display of the DPRK flag, which had been prohibited, and violent disputes derived from the disagreement over Korean education brought about a climate of hostility. Consequently, the Japanese government, in accord with SCAP, passed the Organisation Control Law in April 1949 and ordered the dissolution of *Chôren* in September accusing them of being an "undemocratic and terrorist organisation" (Lee, 1981b: 84). Subsequently, during the dramatic scenario of the Korean War, ex-members of *Chôren* established the *Zainichi Chôsen Tôitsu Minshu Sensen* (United Democratic Front in Japan for the Unification of Korea) or *Minsen* in January 1951. Until the sign of the armistice in Korea, *Minsen* cooperated actively with the JCP, which had been illegalised, in various violent actions. However, in view of the new Korean scenario, *Minsen* members decided to cease their collaboration with the JCP in order to pursue the reunification and defence of their fatherland in alliance with DPRK. As a result, *Minsen* was dissolved and the National Meeting founded the *Zainihon Chôsenjin Sôren Gôkai* (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) or *Sôren*.

3.2. From Liberation to Exclusion

Their condition of liberated nationals would not bring Koreans equality in Japan. Both the Japanese authorities and SCAP began to conceive the permanence and establishment of a Korean community as an obstacle to the construction of a new Japanese nation-state. This would translate into institutional pressure to exclude Koreans from Japanese society and even to get rid of them.

3.2.1. Condemnation of Ethnic Education

The ‘Liberation of Korea’ in 1945 had a very precise significance for the Korean people: from that day, they could live truly as Koreans. The situation of many Koreans in Japan, however, raised doubts about what living truly as a Korean was. Many migrants, especially those born and raised in Japan, had become “quasi-Japanese” (Lee, 1981d: 162). Soon after the war, a series of Korean language classrooms [kokugo kôshûjo] were set up in private houses, and a massive ethnic education movement was promoted by *Chôren*. Under the slogan “Those who have money, give your money! Those who have abilities, give your abilities! Those who have knowledge, give your knowledge!” (Yi, 1956: 66-67. My translation.), a campaign for the establishment of an independent Korean educational system in Japan was launched and by October 1946, 525 elementary schools, four middle schools and 12 youth academies had been established throughout Japan (Lee, 1981d: 164). Korean schools intended to recover the Korean cultural heritage lost during the colonial period, focusing on the teaching of the Korean language as a fundamental pillar of Korean ethnic education. Korean ethnic education was designed as an instrument to raise Korean national consciousness among the new generations of Koreans in Japan (Inokuchi, 2000: 148).

During the first years, Korean schools were relatively free from governmental pressures and followed their own curriculum. However, with the enactment of the Fundamental Law of Education in March 1947, Korean education became a form of resistance. The new law established a series of curriculum standards and compulsory education for all Japanese nationals. Koreans in Japan, as Japanese nationals (they still retained Japanese nationality), were constrained to follow the new legal standards, which deprived them of the possibility of education in Korean.

In January 1948, the Japanese central government, urged by SCAP, ordered local governments to carry out a register of Korean schools that complied with the new legal framework. *Chôren* protested against the order and, in February, claimed that, being ethnic-Korean, Korean education was fundamental for their future return to Korea. *Chôren*’s petitions were unheard and in April the closure of unaccredited Korean schools was ordered. This ordinance brought about a movement of protest within the Korean community, who saw how the story they lived years back was repeating. Kobe and Osaka, where the volume of Korean populace was notably high, were the scenario of violent incidents. On 23 April, the Japanese police and governmental authorities arrived at three Korean schools in Kobe with an order of eviction. Only two of the schools were closed on that day, as the perseverance of the outrageous protestors avoided the eviction. The following morning, a group of protestors had a mass demonstration in front of

Kobe City Hall that ended up with the irruption of some protestors into the building, forcing a meeting with the governor of *Hyôgo* prefecture and the mayor of Kobe. As a result, the authorities agreed to withdraw the closing order. However, during the evening of the same day, the U.S. military commander in Kobe proclaimed a state of emergency in the city and ordered the governor to nullify the agreement. Also, the U.S. military police, along with the Japanese police, carried out raids in the main Korean ghettos of the city, arresting 1,600 people, many of whom were *Chôren* members (Lee, 1981b: 82).

In Osaka, some 30,000 protestors gathered together in front the Osaka City Hall on 25 April to demand the revocation of eviction orders. Not only their petitions were rejected, but also the Osaka military police interrupted negotiations with the government representatives and ordered the mass of protestors to break up within five minutes. As some of the demonstrators ignored the order and started throwing stones, the police, commanded by the U.S. military police, began to discharge water and opened fire on the mass of demonstrators, resulting in the death of Kim Tae-II, a sixteen-year-old boy (Kim, 2008: 341).

In early May, negotiations between *Chôren* and the education minister, Morito Tatsuo, culminated in a memorandum whereby Korean schools were to be registered as private schools with a certain grade of autonomy but following the Japanese legal framework. However, after the dissolution of *Chôren* in September 1949, the government ordered the closure of their schools and urged those few Korean schools that did not belong to *Chôren* to reapply for the private school status. This resulted in the closure of more than 300 ethnic schools and the relocation of many Korean students into Japanese public schools (Inokuchi, 2000: 154). Eventually, when Koreans in Japan lost their Japanese nationality and became *de facto* ‘aliens’, they also lost their right for public education. Nonetheless, the Japanese government allowed enrolled Korean students to carry on with their education at public schools and admitted new students on the condition that the parents complied not to demand ethnic education (Lee, 1981d: 167).

In summary, SCAP’s ‘red scare’, which led to the persecution of *Chôren* and the Korean community in general, and the desire of an important sector of Japanese authorities to get rid of the remaining Korean population, which was conceived as an obstacle for Japan’s renewal on the basis of homogeneity, condemned Korean education to exile from legality and recognition. Although a small number of schools achieved accreditation and in some cases ethnic education managed to enter Japanese public schools (Inokuchi, 2000: 154), educational programs had to be modified, leaving ethnic education in an extracurricular place. Of more than 500 schools that were operative in October 1947, less than 200 remained open after Japan regained its

independence in 1952 (Ibid.: 164). Since then, the issue of Korean ethnic education in Japan has been very controversial and considered counterproductive for Japan's interests by certain sectors of Japanese society.


3.2.2. Legal Status and Geopolitics

Japan's surrender and the subsequent liberation of the Korean Peninsula brought about a total change in the East Asian geopolitical scenario. In order to understand the legal implications of this new scenario upon the ethnic-Korean community residing in Japan from the end of the Pacific War to the present day, it is necessary to have a solid idea on the new geopolitical scenario derived from two principle events: the collapse and disintegration of the Japanese Empire (1945) and the Korean War (1950-53).

As a characteristic shared by most imperial states that emerged during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Japanese empire was a multinational system, where various nations were under the sovereignty of a supreme state. This does not mean that all the nations were to be considered equal within the imperial state. Japan established a complex legal status system, whereby its position of dominance was not compromised. Membership within the Japanese Empire can be dissected into three main levels. Firstly, membership in the imperial state, in the form of subjecthood to the imperial sovereign, the emperor. Secondly, membership in each of the non-sovereign national territories (colonies) that formed the imperial state. Finally, local membership in each province or prefecture in which each national territory was administratively divided.

Legal registration for each of these membership categories conferred legal status to imperial subjects. Thus, membership to the imperial state attributed *nationality* [kokuseki], inasmuch as all subjects of the Japanese Empire were considered Japanese nationals. Membership in nations governed by the imperial state attributed *sub-nationality*⁷ [minseki], a registration category implemented in *Chōsen* during the protectorate period. This registration category, however, was absorbed after Korea's Family Register Ordinance in 1920 (Umeyama, 2010: 99) by the family register [koseki] that attributed local membership legal status in relation to the membership in a corporate family (Wetherall, 2006: 28) (Figure 2).

⁷ The term 'Sub-nationality' was borrowed from Wetherall, 2006.

Figure 2. Imperial subjects' registration levels

By 1945, the Japanese Empire was conformed by the metropole, Japan, and two main colonies *Chosen*⁸, the Korean Peninsula, and Taiwan. Chosenese (Koreans), thus, held Japanese nationality, as members of the Japanese Empire. It is important to understand the real implication of the attribution of Japanese nationality, as there might be a tendency to interpret it as positive. The attribution of Japanese nationality to Chosenese signified the total administrative destruction of membership in the Korean Peninsula as a sovereign territory. In addition, the legal discrimination between territories and the consequent negation of rights imposed through the family register ratified the Japanese determination to treat their colonies as inferiors. Borrowing from Umeyama's words, the act of attributing Japanese nationality to Koreans was "for the Japanese, a proof of their [successful] aggression, for the Koreans, a proof of oppression" (Umeyama, 2010: 99).

⁸ The use of the terms *Chosen*, to indicate the Korean Peninsula, and *Chosenese*, to indicate ethnic-Koreans, is intentional, so as to facilitate reader's understanding of the geopolitical changes in East Asia and the social implications in the Korean community in Japan during the post-war years.

3.2.2.1. 1945 – 1952

With the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July 1945, the Japanese Emperor, Hirohito, announced the surrender of Japan and the relinquishment of its sovereignty over the colonial territories. Consequently, the imperial system became a mono-national state. This new scenario brought about the dilemma of how to reconfigure legal status in both Japan and former colonies. Japanese nationality was no longer applicable over the former colonial territories as they had regained their sovereignty and their inhabitants were no longer considered Japanese nationals. In the case of non-Japanese residing in the colonies, the logical assumption that the automatic discontinuation of Japanese nationality could function in the new sovereign territories. However, in the case of Chosenese who migrated to Japan during the previous 35 years and decided to remain in Japanese territory or could not return, such assumption does not seem valid.

During the occupation period, SCAP recognised Chosenese as “liberated peoples,” but, due precisely to the high level of assimilation in many cases, those liberated subject were also perceived as potential enemies:

You will treat Formosan-Chinese and Koreans [Chosenese] as liberated peoples in so far as military security permits. They are not included in the term "Japanese" as used in this directive but they have been Japanese subjects and may be treated by you, in case of necessity, as enemy nationals.⁹

In addition, in view of the complexity of the legal status of Chosenese residents in Japan, it was agreed by SCAP and the Japanese authorities that former colonial individuals would retain Japanese nationality and would be treated as Japanese nationals during the occupation period (Lee, 1981c: 138). Notwithstanding this provisional measure, Chosenese in Japan became formally aliens under the Alien Registration Law in 1947. This created a confusing situation whereby Chosenese held Japanese nationality but were administratively considered aliens.

3.2.2.2. 1952 – 1965

On 8 September 1951, with the signing of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, it was agreed that Japan would recover full sovereignty over its territory. By the time the Allied Powers left Japan, however, no agreement regarding the legal status of the Chosenese remaining in Japan was signed. The Korean Peninsula had been divided at the 38th parallel and two antagonistic

⁹ *Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan (JCS1380/15)*. In: Caprio, 2007: 183.


governments proclaimed sovereignty over the whole Korean territory, which translated in a bloody military conflict, which prolonged until the armistice of July 1953. Japan and ROK, urged by SCAP, had failed in coming to an agreement during negotiations between 1951 and 1953 (Mitchel, 1967: 134-136). Consequently, when the peace treaty came into effect on 28 April 1952, all Chosenese lost their Japanese nationality, which was presumably to be reverted to *Chôsen* nationality. As, not recognising either of the two governments established in the Korean Peninsula, Japan officially recognised the sovereignty of the Korean state previous to the annexation in 1910, Chosenese were registered as *Chôsen* nationals. However, there was no *de facto* *Chôsen* state and neither ROK nor DPRK would recognise it. In relation to the right of residence of former colonial individuals, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had determined to promulgate a special law (126, art. 2., para. 6), whereby former colonial subjects who had lost Japanese nationality were allowed to stay in Japan, which did not mean they were granted permanent residence status. Chosenese who had resided permanently, and continuously, in Japan since 2 September 1945, were eligible for the '126-2-6 alien status'. The children and grandchildren of '126-2-6 aliens' were, instead, granted '4-1-16-2 alien status' and '4-1-16-3 alien status', respectively. These treaty-based statuses allowed right of residence for three years, which could be extended under application to the Ministry of Justice (Kim, 2006: 58).

In the case of former colonial individuals who lost their Japanese nationality, the acquisition of this particular alien status translated into subjugation to the Japanese authorities under immigration control measures and the loss of social rights and work opportunities. According to the Alien Registration Law, all foreign residents registered as aliens, including Chosenese, were subject to the following provisions: 1. Requirement to report any changes in registration detail (Art. 8 and 9); 2. Requirement to carry the registration certificate (alien registration card) at all times and to present it to any competent authority when so required (Art. 13); 3. Requirement to have their fingerprints taken at the moment of registration or renewal (Art. 14) (Ministry of Justice, 2016b). On the other hand, those entitled with the 126-2-6 status and their descendants were, as a result of the loss of Japanese nationality, excluded from welfare programs such as National Health Insurance, National Pension and Welfare Allowance and from relief programs for veterans of war (many Chosenese served in the Japanese army during World War II). Also, public servants were dismissed or had to naturalise as Japanese nationality in order to participate in the exercise of public authority (Kim, 2006: 59). In addition, the lack of a nationality meant the lack of a passport and hence the impossibility to travel.

At this point, it is necessary to consider the controversial legal and geopolitical scenario brought about by the events aforementioned and the armistice that froze the Korean conflict in 1953. The Japanese multi-national imperial state had collapsed leading to the relinquishment of

sovereignty over the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the new Japanese state had seen its sovereignty restricted to the archipelago. The Korean Peninsula, however, had been divided into two independent states: ROK and DPRK. As for the legal status of Chosenese in Japan, they all were registered as *Chôsen* nationals. Thus, for Japanese administrations they had a *de jure* *Chôsen* nationality (they were registered as *Chôsen* nationals), which in fact was recognised neither by ROK nor DPRK. On the other hand, if any Chosenese decided to acquire ROK or DPRK nationalities, this translated into *de facto* having a nationality that was not recognised by Japan, as it had no diplomatic relations with either of the two states established in Korea (Figure 3). This confusing state of affairs prolonged in time until mid-1960s, leaving the Korean community in Japan in a tremendously difficult situation derived from the lack of rights.

Figure 3. Chosenese legal position in East Asia 1945 – 1965.




3.2.2.3. 1965 – 1991

On 22 June 1965, the signing of the ROK-Japan Normalisation Treaty signified the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states and the recognition of the ROK government by Japan as the only legitimate government in the Korean Peninsula. The new treaty included a bilateral agreement on the legal status and treatment of ROK nationals. According to this agreement, Chosenese were eligible for an ‘Agreement-based permanent residence status’ [kyôtei eijyû] on the condition that they registered as ROK nationals (Figure 4). Agreement provisions only included ROK nationals in the following three categories: 1. Those who had resided continuously in Japan since 15 August 1945; 2. Children born to parents

in category 1 between 16 August 1945 and 17 January 1971; 3. Children born after 17 January 1971, to parents in categories 1 or 2 (Lee, 1981c: 146; Kim, 2006: 60). The status of children of parents in category 3 remained uncertain, as no more provisions were to be taken until 1991.

Figure 4. Chosenese legal position 1965 to present.



Of the approximately 600,000 Chosenese in Japan, 340,000 decided to register as ROK nationals in order to gain ‘permanent residence status’ by 1974. However, this does not necessarily mean that they felt political or ideological sympathy for the new government. The majority of the Korean people in Japan had roots in the southern provinces of the peninsula, from where they or their parents and grandparents had migrated into the Japanese archipelago. The strong attachment many Chosenese felt towards the South, where they still had relatives or where their ancestors were buried, motivated many Koreans in Japan to apply for ROK nationality as a means to be able to visit their regions of origin, regardless of their political ideas. Bumsoo Kim points out that the 250,000 Chosenese who did not opt for permanent residency “strongly identified themselves with North Korea [sic]” (2006: 61), presumably suggesting political affiliation or ideological sympathy towards DPRK. Nevertheless, it is paramount to clarify that, despite the fact that *Sôren* affiliates outnumbered *Mindan* members, political ascription with DPRK was not the sole reason why many decided to remain stateless. Many Chosenese could not recognise their motherland in a divided Korea and, therefore, decided to not align themselves with either of the two states.

Until the following decade, the status of those who had remained stateless and those who became ROK nationals differed slightly. Although the agreement included provisions regarding

possible welfare benefits, the reality is that these provisions basically amounted to a series of ‘humanitarian’ benefits that, in essence, stateless aliens in Japan already had. Changsoo Lee affirms that “[t]he only real difference was that it was more difficult to deport permanent resident aliens than those who were not so classified” (1981c: 150-151).

With Japanese government’s endorsement of the International Convention on Human Rights in 1981, Japan reformed its social security system giving aliens access to most welfare benefits, including National Pension, Welfare Pension, National Health Insurance, Child Allowance and Public Housing. Furthermore, in order to abide by the United Nations Refugee Convention, the 1952 Immigration Control Act was revised into the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, which allowed Chosenese still holding 126-2-6 status, 4-1-16-2 status and 4-1-16-3 status to obtain the ‘Exceptional Permanent Residence status’ [tokurei eijyû] (Kim, 2006: 61). This new status permitted Koreans to reside permanently in Japan and apply for re-entry permits for overseas travel.

3.2.2.4. 1991 Question Resolved

The 1965 Normalisation Treaty provisions, whereby ROK nationals were eligible to obtain ‘Agreement-based permanent residency status’ [kyôtei eijyû], left many third and fourth generation Koreans in a legal limbo for 25 years. The ‘1991 Question,’ however, had to wait until the enactment of the ‘the Special Law on the Immigration Control of Those Who Have Lost Japanese Nationality and Others on the Basis of the Treaty of Peace with Japan’ as a result of the Japan-ROK Foreign Exchange Memorandum of 1991. The aim of promulgation of this law was to “stabilize the legal status of the people and their descendants who have continued to reside in Japan since before the end of World War II and lost their Japanese nationality with the enforcement of the Peace Treaty with Japan” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999). Following the enactment of this law, the Japanese government granted the ‘Special Permanent Residence’ [tokubetsu eijyû] to all Koreans who lost their Japanese nationality in 1952, including both Chosenese holding ‘Exceptional Permanence Residence Status’ and ROK nationals with ‘Agreement-based Permanence Residence Status’ (Ibid.: 66)

The creation of this new status meant the stabilisation and homogenisation of Zainichi Koreans’ legal position with regards to their residence. However, this status is still far from being equal to the concept of citizenship, inasmuch as it maintains the thick line dividing rights to the Korean community. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the actions carried out by the Zainichi community across the last six decades have translated into the conquest of numerous civil rights.

3.2.2.5. Naturalisation as an Escape

Since they lost their Japanese nationality, Chosenese, as well as Taiwanese, were given the chance to naturalise Japanese and thus regain their lost nationality. Albeit the improvements in terms of social rights, the various legal statuses aforementioned maintained the clear line dividing ethnic Japanese and ethnic Koreans. The Japanese Constitution of 1947 in its article 14 reads:

All of the people (of the country) [kokumin] are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.¹⁰

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, 1946.

In this article, the term '*kokumin*', people of the country or nationals, turns out to be rather confusing, as it raises the question: *who are supposed to be all of the people?*

As aforementioned, Chosenese were deprived of most of their rights after losing their Japanese nationality. This led to the belief that Chosenese, and any individual without Japanese nationality or stateless, therefore, did not belong in the '*kokumin* group'. The only escape from that lack of rights seemed to be, and on a smaller scale still today seems to be, naturalisation as Japanese. Naturalisation guarantees the entitlement of the same rights and privileges that an ethnic Japanese born in Japan as a Japanese national has. Naturalisation, however, does not assure social acceptance and recognition in that '*kokumin* group.'

Since 1952, Koreans in Japan have been under the pressure of an ultimatum, according to which they have to choose either to retain official recognition of their belonging to their homeland and renounce citizen rights, or to give up on that official recognition of their ethnicity and naturalise as Japanese in order to obtain civil rights. The choice for a nationality – an institutional form of belonging – as conditional for social integration, legal equality and ethnic recognition was and continues to be one of the fundamental bases to the irresolute aspect of Zainichi identity.

3.2.3. Repatriation Campaign

During the 1950s, the Japanese government considered the presence of thousands of Chosenese as a threat for its national and international political goals. For this reason, during the following

¹⁰ All translations from Japanese sources are mine.

two decades, the Japanese government enacted a mass repatriation program to DPRK. This political measure, which was surrounded by a mist of doubtful legality from the beginning, was supported by international institutions, in a shameful example of political manipulation.

By mid-1950s, in view of the absolute lack of interest from the ROK government to accept the repatriation of Chosenese, certain politicians and bureaucrats started to consider the possibility of devising strategies oriented to the repatriation of thousands of Chosenese to North Korea. The foreign affairs director at the Japanese Red Cross (JRC), proposed a repatriation program in conjunction with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Thus, with the support of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Ministry of Justice, the JRC formally requested the ICRC to supervise a mass repatriation program of Koreans to DPRK for 'humanitarian purposes'. The request of international support was simply a strategy from the Japanese authorities and the JRC to cover up the actual purpose (Morris-Suzuki, 2009: 47).

During April–May 1956, the ICRC sent as special mission with two envoys, William Michael and Eugene de Weck, to Japan, ROK and DPRK. The purpose of this mission was verifying the viability of the program espoused by Japan, whereby an estimate of 60,000 Koreans should be repatriated within the year (Morris-Suzuki, 2005: 365). It can be presumed that a certain number of Zainichi Koreans were eager to move to North Korea, namely, those with origins in the northern part of the peninsula, some students wishing for higher education and DPRK affiliated detainees at the Ômura Detention Centre, who were pending for deportation to ROK, where they were likely to receive a worse treatment due to their political orientation. However, the total number of Koreans eager to be repatriated was nowhere near the 60,000 estimated by the Japanese authorities, as *Sôren* itself confirmed with its estimation of only 1,424 persons. On the other hand, the information gathered during the visits to South and North Korea contrasted with the Japanese proposal. ROK, albeit its refusal to accept Zainichi Koreans, strongly opposed repatriation to North Korea, fearing a potential strengthening of DPRK army and improvements in the Japanese-DPRK relations. The North Korean government did not show interest in possible repatriations. The lack of consensus led to the stagnation of negotiations.

On 19 October 1957, the JRC, urged by the Japanese prime minister, Kishi Nobusuke, presented the Resolution 20 at the 19th International Conference of the Red Cross in New Delhi to the ICRC. The resolution encouraged Red Cross societies and governments to assist "the reunion of displaced persons, both adults and children, with their families in accordance with the desires expressed by these people" (Morris-Suzuki, 2006: 331). Meanwhile, the DPRK government changed course in his policy towards Koreans in Japan. With the purpose of promoting its own image and gaining allegiance among Zainichi Koreans, DPRK sent 121 million yen in April

1957, and another 100 million in October to *Sôren* on behalf of the Korean Education Assistance Fund. More importantly, at the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the foundation of DPRK in July 1958, Kim Il-Sung offered Koreans in Japan the opportunity to start a new life in North Korea and promised jobs, accommodation, transport and assistance to all those who wished to be repatriated. This change of course was mainly motivated by the lack of skilled labour after the withdrawal of Chinese workers and volunteers who remained in Japan after the Korean War. In addition, with repatriations, Kim Il-Sung looked to give an improved image of DPRK to the world and hinder the reestablishment of relations between ROK and Japan. Also, in the same year, a massive campaign promoting repatriations was launched by *Sôren*, who insisted upon the promising circumstances for those willing to return to the fatherland.

In February 1959, the Japanese Prime Minister Office presented the ‘annex’ on mass repatriations, which was introduced as the humanitarian response to the demands of the Korean community in Japan. In line with these events, from April to June both the JRC and the North Korean Red Cross started a series of secret negotiations that resulted in a compromise agreement that included a supervising role for the ICRC. After much deliberations and disagreement between members of the international committee, the ICRC accepted to support and supervise the program on the condition that repatriations were strictly voluntary and the result of individual choice, that the ICRC could verify the procedures and intervene at any time, and that Zainichi Koreans were properly informed about the legal status of those who decided to remain. Finally, with the sign of the Calcutta Agreement on 13 August 1959, the ICRC confirmed their support in the mass repatriation program, despite the strong opposition shown by the ROK government.

From the sign of the Calcutta Agreement in 1959 to 1984, 93,340 Zainichi Koreans were repatriated to DPRK with the expectation to find a better life in a land, which was called ‘homeland’ by many but was unknown for most of them (Morris-Suzuki, 2007: 1). The voluntary character that allegedly was a condition for the execution of the program was compromised in many ways from the start. ICRC’s lack of resources in Japan along with *Sôren*’s constant intervention in the process obscured the presumable voluntary nature of the repatriations. Despite the fact that from the beginning they worked as political instrument for the involved parts, the repatriations were conducted in a very disorganised way, not always respecting the real will of the returnees.

Morris-Suzuki (2009) claims that this was provoked by three forces. Firstly, the lack of legal rights derived not only from the loss of Japanese nationality, but also from the scrutiny of welfare payments, which targeted Korean communities in 1956, left the Korean community in a tremendously precarious situation. Secondly, manipulation in both the information provided by

the Japanese authorities and the JRC to the ICRC and the propaganda singing the praises of DPRK was determinant in the whole process. Thanks to the letters sent by returnees to their families in Japan from 1960 onwards, it is known that they hardly found anything of what they were promised about in the homeland. The third force proposed by Morris-Suzuki, the role of patriarchy in Korean families, is equally significant. The deplorable management of the register of returnees by the ICRC led to the ultimate decision falling exclusively on the head of the family, resulting in many women repatriated against their will.

4. Conclusion

As a conclusion to the chapter, a number of reflections concerning the lack of recognition of the Korean minority in Japan and the apparent manipulation and abuse that they have been subject to throughout their history in Japan are presented.

In the first place, it is important to note that the movement and displacement of the Korean population both as colonised people in the peninsula and as a migrant population in the archipelago was the result of an institutional exercise of manipulation and, in many cases, coercion. This was evident in two key events: the induced and forced migratory movements into Japan after the promulgation of the National Mobilisation Law in 1938 and the repatriation campaign initiated in the late 1950s, which led to the displacement of thousands of Koreans to DPRK. Albeit noticeable differences in the number of people displaced, the means whereby both migratory movements were instigated turn out to be rather similar. The migration of Koreans into the Japanese archipelago from 1938 to the end of the war was carried out, if not by means of coercion, through promises of a better life in Japan. In the case of repatriation campaigns, the situation was, in essence, the same. Koreans in Japan were lured into repatriation with promises of prosperity in DPRK. These two events provide us with an insight into how the Korean population living in Japanese territory, either in colonial Korea or post-war Japan, was manipulated and abused with impunity.

Secondly, it is possible to make a correlation between the educational ordinances passed in Korea, which prioritised the study of the Japanese language over the Korean language, and the discreditation of Korean ethnic schools during the post-war period. Japanese education in Korea intended to subjugate Koreans and establish a clear separation between superior colonisers and inferior colonised through a curriculum that emphasised the importance of Japanese culture and displaced Korean culture and language to a second-class position. Additionally, the enactment of the Fundamental Law of Education of 1947 and the subsequent provisions promulgated by the Japanese government during the occupation and thereafter were

a clear attempt to similarly displace Korean education. By imposing the endorsement of the Japanese curriculum in Korean schools, the Japanese authorities sought to recreate that colonial hierarchy, differentiating and prioritising the study of Japanese culture and use of the Japanese language.

Thirdly, looking at the promulgation of the Alien Registration Law of 1947, whereby Koreans were registered as aliens, and the signing of the Peace Treaty of San Francisco in 1952, which translated into the loss of Japanese nationality, a certain parallelism with the legal situation of Koreans during the colonial period can be observed. Koreans were entitled with Japanese nationality after the Annexation Treaty of 1910. However, a complex system of family registration [koseki] guaranteed the categorisation of Japanese nationals as inhabitants of the metropole or interior territory [naichi] or colonial individuals from the colonies or exterior territories [gaichi]. This distinction based on the ethnic origin was recreated in 1952 by legal means when Koreans became stateless and were registered as foreigners. Therefore, it can be assessed that the alien–national distinction in Japan is in the case of Koreans, a post-colonial reproduction of the segregation policies used during the colonial period to guarantee the legitimisation of Japanese cultural superiority within Japan’s sovereign territories.

Lastly, it is particularly indispensable to clarify two aspects relevant for the study of the Zainichi community in Japan: the genesis of the Zainichi question and the victimisation of the Zainichi experience. The usage of the term ‘*Zainichi*’ was intentionally avoided in most parts of this chapter in order not to involuntarily induce the reader to think there exists a clear conceptual line categorising Zainichi Koreans and non-Zainichi Koreans. Concentrating exclusively on the semantics of the term, ‘*Zainichi*’ designates the condition of residing [zai] in Japan [nichi]. Therefore, leaning strictly on semantics, the 790 Koreans residing in Japan at the moment of the annexation should be considered Zainichi Koreans. Nonetheless, building on Ryang’s perspective of the collective experience of the Korean minority in Japan as a diaspora, the present work considers the end of the Pacific War and the consequent liberation of Korea as the start of the Zainichi experience (Ryang, 2009: 6–7).

Abuse and coercion are two elements inseparable from the Korean experience of Japanese colonialism. Likewise, the post-colonial experience of Koreans in Japan after the war until the present day has also been characterised by disrecognition and exclusion from Japanese institutions. A brief comment surrounding the question of *kyōsei renkō* turns out to be noteworthy, because even today it is an ineludible part of the historical memory of the Zainichi community. The actual period where forced migration is situated historically is encapsulated in the last two years of the colonial regime. Notwithstanding, this issue continues to be

controversial, since authors cannot seem to come to an agreement on the veracity of the accounts. Mitchell asserts that “[i]t is a mistake, however, to apply the terms ‘slave labor’ or ‘forced labor battalions’ to Korean workers [as t]hey were not mistreated, and in some cases were treated better than their Japanese fellow workers” (Mitchel, 1967: 84-85). For this reason, it is convenient to, not forgetting the actual gravity and cruelty of the fact, maintain a conscious objectivity so as to not succumb into a biased victimisation of the whole community. The Zainichi community should not be incarcerated in a cage of condescension, ignoring its actual cultural, ethnic and historical richness – because the Zainichi are not what they made of them, but *what they made of themselves*.

These factors have limited the study and the very conception of the Zainichi minority to their condition of *victims*. The violence surrounding its emergence, their condition of *deprived* in post-war Japan and the lack of recognition have created a tendency to victimise the whole community and hence ignore the real significance of their existence in Japan. The following chapter presents the Zainichi experience from the point of view of resistance against Japanese nationalism in an attempt to highlight the achievements of the Zainichi community in the last decades and their perseverance to maintain certain standpoints in some case.

Chapter 5. Rooting Japanese Identity in the Nationalist Discourse

1. Introduction

The idea of Nationalism is easily understood as a derivative of a radical and instrumentalised conception of the idea of Nation. Nonetheless, the great difficulty to define and conceptualise the idea of Nation due to the apparent volatility of its essence, which is commonly subject to very differentiated conceptions, leads to the shift of the concepts of Nationalism and Nation as cause and effect respectively. In this line, Gellner explains: "[I]t is *nationalism which engenders nations*, and not the other way round. Admittedly, nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them radically" (2006: 54). By taking this deconstructive perspective, the present chapter explores the effects of the conceptualisation of the idea of the Japanese Nation through discourses of power elaborated by certain elites.

This chapter is divided in three main sections which facilitate a correct understanding of how nationalist discourses in Japanese society have an undeniable impact on the way belonging and membership in the nation are constructed, construed and recognised.

The first section, *Adapting the Nationalist Discourse*, provides a chronologic examination of the evolution of the nationalist rhetoric in Japan from the imperial period to the present. This examination provides the necessary insight to comprehend the how and the why of the apparent permanence of ethnocentric interpretations of the nation in the Japanese national discourse. The second section, *Regulating Membership in the Nation*, is conceived as an approach to the social and national interpretations of belonging in the Japanese nation through two particularly significant cultural concepts – *Uchi* and *Soto*. The analysis of these two concepts, which entail a conceptualisation of the individual and the collective experience in absolute terms of inclusion and exclusion, enables a further examination of membership in Japan in relation to the national discourse. The third section, being the longest one, aims to provide evidence on the impact that the ethnocentrism inherent to the national discourse has on various aspects of the social and institutional experience of Zainichi Koreans in Japan. The process of racialisation of institutional recognition of ‘nationals’ and ‘non-nationals’ in Japan is thoroughly explored from the perspective of the concept of Citizenship, as fundamental for the understanding of Zainichi Koreans’ position in Japan as subjects of a particular form of discrimination from below. Additionally, an introduction to the emergence and evolution of diverse forms of ‘Hate Speech’, as a form of discrimination from below is provided in the analysis of the neo-nationalist civil

association *Zaitokukai*. Lastly, the section concludes with an approach to the Gramscian concept of ‘cultural hegemony’, which is considered fundamental for the understanding of the role that compulsory education in Japan plays in the attempt by the hand of the state to influx a concrete and well-defined form of interpretation of reality which permits the eventual legitimisation of particular national(ist) discourses in the form of an unconsciously acquired and assimilated common sense.

2. Adapting the Nationalist Discourse

Nationalist discourses have the capacity to convert particular interpretations of the social reality in a sort of collective common-sense or absolute knowledge which, assimilated by society, legitimises those particular interpretations of reality and transforms them into the morphology of that reality itself. In Foucault’s words:

[T]he problem does not consist in drawing the line between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity or truth, and that which comes under some other category, but in seeing historically *how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false.*

Foucault, 1980: 118. Italics added.

Ethnocentrism has been at the centre of the Japanese national discourse since the imperial period to the present. Its discursive representation of truth and reality, however, has evolved and adapted to the challenges posed by the unfolding of new political periods.

2.1. Mixed-blood Nationalism in Pre-war Imperial Japan

In the late 1930s, Japan had ventured into a military offensive through China. The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) was envisaged as a fight against Communism in East Asia. Nonetheless, the Japanese Empire was primarily intended to expand its domain over East and South Asia. On 3 November 1938, Prince Konoye announced a new foreign policy known as ‘New Order in East Asia’. This policy, revised in 1940 under the name ‘New Order in Greater East Asia’, included intervention not only in the exterior territories of the empire (Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria), but also over Thailand and the European territories in Indo-China and the South Seas (Colegrove, 1941).

These policies which aimed at the territorial expansion of the empire were embellished by propaganda, promoting the prominent role of Japan in leading Asia against European

colonialism under the slogan of ‘Greater East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity’ [Dai Tōa Kyōei Ken]. Pan-Asianist intellectuals played a significant role in the development of ideas of co-prosperity in Asia and opposition to Western hegemony. The New Asian Order envisioned the expulsion of the Western powers from Asia and the development of regional trade, which would allow the establishment of a new world order based on regional economic blocs in cooperation with Europe (Aydin, 2007: 186).

It is important, however, to analyse how Japan envisaged its position in relation to the rest of the nations forming the colonial empire and in the accomplishment of the regionalist task. Pan-Asianists, such as Ōkawa Shūmei, who founded the ultranationalist association *Yūsonsha*, claimed that “the descendants of the indigenous people, as well as the descendants of the nationalised migrants, were all assimilated without exception by the Yamato nation” (Oguma, 2002: 286). In line with Ōkawa, Takata Yasuma stated that the Japanese people were the result of hybridity between most of the East Asian peoples and that the imperial venture in Asia was, in fact, *a return to its ancient roots* (Takata Yasuma in *ibid.*: 286-287). The Japanese Empire was envisaged by these intellectuals as the reflection of Japanese people’s multi-national essence and, therefore, Japan’s colonialist enterprise was not conceived as based on nationalism, but as an attempt to reunite the peoples of Asia.

This interpretation of the Japanese Empire as non-nationalistic was, however, obscured by ethnocentric policies. In the development of the New Asian Order and the establishment of Greater East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, Japan reserved for itself the central role:

Under the leadership of the Yamato people morality shall be the foundation, and we will try to mutually develop the peoples of Greater East Asia. [...] We will raise the Imperial Way. [...] As the pivot of the Greater East Asia Peoples’ Cooperative Body Japan will have the central role in military, political, economic and cultural spheres. To other people Japan has the duty of leadership.¹¹

The Japanese assumed and affirmed diversity in their territory and hybridity in their own blood. However, they also claimed their pivotal position in the pan-Asian project, because of their alleged superiority in comparison with Europeans and Americans.

Since the 1930s, Japanese intellectuals had devoted their efforts to the creation of a series of theories which contributed to Japanese self-praise and justified that presumed superiority. Literary works such as *Climate and Culture* (1935) by Watsuji Tetsuro or *The Structure of ‘Iki’*

¹¹ General Staff Headquarters, 14th Section, *Plan for Leadership of Nationalities in Greater East Asia*, 6 August 1942. In Lebra, 1975, pp. 118-121

(1930) by Shūzō Kuki among others promoted the uniqueness of certain Japanese cultural and geographical characteristics, which justified the superiority of the Yamato people and the imperial system. However, it is of major importance how this ethnocentric ideology was institutionalised through the promulgation of the *Cardinal Principles of the National Body* (Hall, 1974) by the Japanese Ministry of Education in 1937. This document elaborated on the idea of Japaneseness, emphasising the superiority of Japan over its Asian allies and its Western enemies. Likewise, the figure of the Emperor was divinised and the imperial institution was envisaged as central to the fulfilment of the New Asian Order.

In summary, the theories regarding pan-Asianism and mutual prosperity in Asia concealed the actual ultranationalist rhetoric that was brewing in the pre-war period. The Japanese were taught that the Japanese nation was a quasi-divine entity and that the Yamato people were predestined to lead the enterprise of reclaiming the splendour of the whole Asian continent against Western colonialism under the name of the supreme emperor.

2.2. Total Defeat and Post-war Auto-Orientalism

Defeat at war brings about economic, social and political turmoil. However, in the case of Japan, the defeat in the Pacific War also signified the delegitimisation of all the ideas and values related to the imperial system, the Japanese nation and the Yamato people. The Japanese people had been convinced that they belonged to a superior nation and that a defeat by the West was implausible. The Japanese Empire, however, had not only been defeated but Japan was occupied by the West. In addition, on his declaration of 1 January 1946, the Emperor Hirohito asserted:

The ties between Us and Our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine, and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world.¹²

The emperor himself, the central figure of the whole myth around Japanese superiority, stepped down from the skies to declare his real human nature. As Befu explains, during the years following the defeat, Japan entered a period of “soul-searching” in which “traditional Japanese values and institutions, which were mobilised for fighting the war, were now objects of criticism” (2001: 135). This self-stigmatisation derived in the emergence of new national

¹² Excerpt of the *Imperial Rescript on the Constitution of a New Japan*, commonly known as the ‘Humanity Declaration’ [Ningen Sengen]. In: Brownlee, 1999, pp. 213.

thought characterised by the vilification and undermining of Japanese cultural traditions and its comparison with the Western values, in an exercise of self-condemnation during the late 1940s and 1950s. The West and particularly the United States were now the ideal model to follow and also a source of lucidity to comprehend the errors committed by the Japanese people. Proof of this was the editorial success of Ruth Benedict's anthropological study *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946) in its Japanese translation. Benedict's depiction of the Japanese culture and people turned out to be a revelatory exercise for the Japanese about how wrong they had been.

Befu refers to this new form of national thought and conceptualisation of Japaneseness as a period of "auto-Orientalism" (Ibid.), due mainly to the fact that the Japanese, having abandoned all motivations that led them to self-praise and the exacerbation of nationalism, sought to fit in the new historical period not by means of victimisation, but by an exercise of self-condemnation and self-criticism which depicted the Japanese as inferiors to the Western civilisation.

2.3. Post-war and the Redefinition of the Nationalist Discourse

As Gellner claims, "[i]n a world divided into particular communities, national identity tends to be associated and confounded with a *community's sense of uniqueness and the qualities contributing to it*. These qualities (social, political, cultural in a narrow sense, or ethnic) *therefore acquire a great significance in the formation of every specific nationalism*." (2006: 8. Italics added). With the post-war turmoil overcome, Japan became a perfect example of Gellner's asseveration as the economic success achieved by the country from the 1960s through to the 1980s, in what was called 'the Japanese economic miracle', provided the spark for a change in the way the Japanese looked at themselves. If the Japanese defeat was a reason for Japan to be ashamed, the economic miracle was something to be proud of. Japanese intellectuals began to regain their lost national self-esteem and look at the Japanese as a unique group of people with a series of cultural characteristics that permitted success. Japaneseness became synonymous with successfulness and, at the same time, it was envisaged as a conditioning factor for successful development.

This new cultural nationalism became a major subject of discussion among intellectuals, who contributed to the question of Japaneseness with several works in what is known as the *Nihonjinron* – theory about the Japanese or a discussion on Japanese national identity (Dale, 1986: 119). Through the hyperbolisation of allegedly exclusive-to-the-Japanese characteristics, *Nihonjinron* literature sought to install a primordialist sense of belonging within Japanese society. In so doing, *Nihonjinron* theorists such as Doi Takeo (*The Anatomy of Dependence*, 1981), Chie Nakane (*Human Relationships in a Vertical Society*, 1989) or Eshun Hamaguchi

(*Rediscovering 'Japaneseness', 1982*) explicated the nature of the Japanese by the codification of certain elements of Japanese culture and society into emic concepts such as '*Amae*', '*Tate*' and '*Kanjin*', which due to their alleged intractability, served to prove the presumed uniqueness of the Japanese (Kuwayama, 2009) only by means of comparisons with 'The West' (Befu, 2001: 64) and ignoring 'The East' completely – *who could think that Japanese and Koreans could possibly share anything?* As Burgess points out, the emergence of the Nihonjinron discussion “reflected not only the need to recover a sense of identity and pride amongst the Japanese after the loss of the empire and the experience of occupation but also the increased visibility of the ‘Other,’ particularly resident Koreans” (2010: 2).

Regardless of the level of agreement among writers, Nihonjinron productions contributed to the creation of a discourse – “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about a particular kind of knowledge about a topic” (Hall, 1992: 291) – regarding the Japanese national identity based on the assumption that the Japanese people formed a homogeneous group with unique characteristics it engendered a vision of the Japanese people as a monolithic homogeneous group where an “equivalence of land, race, language and culture” existed (Befu, 2001: 68). Regardless of the questionable veracity of this argument, it is necessary to focus on, in Foucault’s words, “how effects of truth are [historically] produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false” (1980: 118). Besides, Nihonjinron ideologists succumbed to the temptation of boastfully congratulating themselves for Japan’s post-war remarkable recovery, instead of critically elaborating solid theoretical frameworks about Japanese culture, and contributed to its ahistorical and essentialist mystification (Goodman, 2005; Befu, 2001; Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986). Argumentations and ideas that Nihonjinron authors poured into the literature obeyed allegedly declarative intentions as they were meant to describe the Japanese – *what the Japanese are like*. However, these declarative intentions eventually were transformed into a “hegemonic ideology” and utilised by “the corporate establishment” luring people to, consciously or unconsciously¹³, believe in such ideas (Befu, 2001: 81). Thus, declarative intentions took the shape of ‘prescriptions’ and were interpreted as a normative model of behaviour – defining *what the Japanese should be like*; if the Japanese nation is

¹³ As regards the conscious or unconscious nature of the general public’s assimilation of nationalistic ideas promoted by the Nihonjinron literature and the resulting ‘cultural model’, it is worthwhile paying attention to Levi-Strauss’s insight into the role of consciousness in social models: "A structural model may be conscious or unconscious without this difference affecting its nature. It can only be said that when the structure of a certain type of phenomena does not lie at a great depth, it is more likely that some kind of model, standing as a screen to hide it, will exist in the collective consciousness. For conscious models, which are usually known as “norms,” are by definition very poor ones, since they are not intended to explain the phenomena but to perpetuate them" (1963: 281-282).

homogeneous and unique, the Japanese, thus, ought to be homogeneously unique. This national discourse leaned on historical presumptions that considered the imperial lineage as the Rosetta Stone of Japanese homogeneity: just like during the colonial period the emperor functioned as the paternal figure who ruled over his subjects, the figure of the emperor was proclaimed the living proof of Japanese homogeneity, that is, Japanese purity of blood inasmuch as all Japanese were descendants of the imperial lineage. These presumptions confer the nationalist discourse about Japanese homogeneity a “mythistorical” (McNeill, 1986; Gluck, 1990) foundation, revealing the prominent role that subjectivity plays in tailoring national discourses and the “invention of traditions” (Hobsbawm, 1983: 14).

Despite scarce plausibility in the arguments buttressing the new national discourse, what is most significant is the general belief in those argumentations among the population. Nihonjinron productions were not exclusive to scholarly, but they reached all strata of Japanese society through the mass publication of non-academic books and articles, in an undeniable example of how “print capitalism” enables “growing numbers of people to think about themselves and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways” and its prominent role in the creation of “imagined communities” (Anderson, 2006: 36). This wide proliferation of Nihonjinron productions and readers’ assimilation of those made-prescriptive ideas about homogeneity and Japaneseness brought about a commonly shared cultural model or, borrowing from Kearney, a particularistic “world view” – “a culturally organized macro-thought: those dynamically *inter-related basic assumptions of a people* that determine much of their behaviour and decision making” (1984: 1. Italics added).

Notwithstanding ideology makers’ adaptability to each epochal context, it is wondrous how the national discourse in modern Japan took diametrically opposed stands in order to nourish ethnocentric argumentations. As aforementioned, during the colonial period Japanese discourses promoted diversity not only within the empire borders but also hybridity in Japanese blood. However, with the end of the war, national discourses pointed at homogeneity as a via for safeguarding and guaranteeing racial and cultural supremacy of ‘the Japanese’ within the new Japanese nation-state. This ideological change of course was sharply articulated by the political theorist Kamishima Jirô in 1982:

In pre-war Japan, everyone said that the Yamato nation was a mongrel [zasshu] nation, a mixed nation. People argued in this way even while they were advocating Japanism. However, after the war, something very strange happened. People, including progressive intelligentsia, began to insist that the Japanese are a homogeneous nation. There is absolutely no foundation for the claim, but this baseless theory is rampant.

in Oguma, 2002: 320

3. Regulating Membership in the Nation

The idea of belonging in a particular group is subject to a relational process of identification and recognition wherein those who are defined as members recognise or deny membership to individuals who may or not identify with those members and hence seek to benefit from their recognition. In this section, the exercise of recognition, definition and determination of membership is analysed in the present Japanese social context via the application two emic concepts, *uchi* and *soto*, which turn out to be the linguistic representation of absolute forms of inclusion and exclusion pertaining to the Japanese cultural model.

3.1. *Uchi and Soto: Organising the World*

In order to fathom the way whereby Japanese construct and construe their reality, it is of great importance to tackle two concepts intrinsic to the Japanese thought: *uchi* and *soto*. These two terms constitute a conceptual framework around which social life is organised and interpreted. As Bachnik puts it, "[t]he lexical evidence indicates that *uchi/soto* orientations constitute a *lifeway*, a socially learned way of construing, approaching, and moving through one's world, in domains of experience as different as perception and interpersonal relations" (1994: 39. Original italics). '*Uchi*' literally means 'inside' and is constituted by everything pertaining to the "individual person," that is the self, "a family, a group of playmates, a school, a company, or a nation" (Lebra, 1976: 112). '*Soto*', instead, refers to everything that is 'outside,' everything lacking membership into the categories constituted by *uchi*. Although categories of membership and belonging can be found in every language and social group, in the Japanese case *uchi* and *Soto* categories constitute a deeply structured organisational system for the individual life, the social life and the Japanese language.

As explained in Chapter 3, belonging and membership are situational and relational concepts. By the same token, *uchi* and *soto* categories are dependant on one another and both exist inasmuch as one defines the other (Bachnik, 1992). That relational essence implies that *uchi* categories be determined in opposition to *soto*. Thus, membership in a group (*uchi*) entails non-membership in another (*soto*) and vice versa. Therefore, the existence of one category is conditioned to the existence of the other as one cannot be if not in opposition to the other.

It is prominent to consider the extrapolation of *uchi* to the national level. Envisaged as a hypothetically fixed category of belonging, the Japanese nation would constitute a 'national *uchi*' within which membership is bestowed upon Japanese nationals (national *uchi* members). Likewise, the existence of a 'national *uchi*' – Japan as a national entity – wherein 'national *uchi*

members' exist necessitates a '*national soto*' determined by the lack of belonging within the 'national *uchi*'. Put in a more practical way, the idea of 'the Japanese,' as members of the Japanese nation, is determined by and conditional to the existence of 'non-Japanese,' non-members of the Japanese nation.

Having briefly examined the mechanism whereby the Japanese thought is organised in relation to *uchi* and *soto*, what at this point requires further examination is the factors regulating membership in the Japanese 'national *uchi*' category – to wit: *what makes a Japanese?*

3.2. Legitimate members in the *National Uchi*

The homogeneous conception of the Japanese nation constructed through Nihonjinron narratives since the 1960s gave birth to a very restricted category of *Japanese*. As aforementioned, the post-war nationalist discourse envisaged the Japanese nation as a monolithic collectivity characterised by a state of homogeneity wherein land, race, culture and language were equalised (Befu, 2001) and stuffed into the notion of *Japaneseness*, of which the same elements are conditional. The premise sustained by the Nihonjinron discourse that the Japanese comprise a homogeneous people [tan'itsu minzoku] and that Japan is a racially and culturally homogeneous nation-state [tan'itsu minzoku kokka] have been internalised by the Japanese people as part of their common sense and their self-conception as a national entity, a national body (Ibid.; Burgess, 2010). However, when referring to the term '*tan'itsu minzoku*', semantics appear to yield to pragmatics. Whereas *tan'itsu* indicates singularity, homogeneity and unicity, the concept of *minzoku* cannot seem to simply comprise one category. Although it is frequently translated as 'ethnicity', the modern concept of *minzoku* was generated in opposition to the Western concept of 'race' [jinshu] in an attempt to escape the idea of racism. Nevertheless, *minzoku* was utilised for referring to other Asian peoples as different from the Japanese (Morris-Suzuki, 1998; Kawai, 2015) – not only culturally, but also biologically – since the Japanese nationalist discourse implied the continuation of an intact imperial lineage. In so doing, the notion of 'race' as a marker of purity, lineage and pedigree is obscured by the concept of *minzoku* and "can become a source of positive identification of 'Japanese blood', which is used for the positive identification of 'us' Japanese" (Yoshino, 1997: 201) and its association with cultural particularities exclusive to the Japanese and only comprehended by them.

Fukuoka (1993) breaks down the concept of *Japaneseness* commonly shared by most of the Japanese as constituent members of Japanese society. He contemplates that two main factors are involved in the concept: *kokuseki* (nationality/citizenship) and *minzoku*. As Fukuoka also

claims, for the reasons exposed above, the latter requires further dissection into another two factors: culture [bunka] and blood purity or lineage [junketsu]. Therefore, Japaneseness can be deconstructed into three main categories: *lineage*, *culture* and *nationality*. Mouer and Sugimoto, in their critique to Nihonjinron assumptions about homogeneity in Japan (Mouer and Sugimoto, 1995; Sugimoto, 2003), elaborate on Fukuoka's argumentation and determine particular aspects of Japaneseness. They agree with Fukuoka with regards to categories of *nationality* (citizenship) and *lineage* (blood purity) and also specify two fundamental aspects in *culture*, namely, *language competence* and *cultural literacy*. Thus, it can be argued that Japaneseness needs to be recognised in relation to *institutional membership* (citizenship), *racial membership* (lineage) and *cultural membership* (cultural literacy and language competence).

In line with this categorisation of Japaneseness-defining aspects, it is important to clarify that membership within the Japanese national entity – the national *uchi* – is subject to the recognition of all three categories of membership simultaneously. In other words, membership in the national *uchi* is contingent to having Japanese ancestry (racial membership), possessing Japanese citizenship (institutional membership) and having competence in the Japanese language and cultural literacy (cultural membership). The absence of all or some of these factors, hence, compromises membership in the *national uchi* and justify non-membership, that is, belonging in *soto*. The hegemonic belief that Japan is a homogeneous country, which assumes that all Japanese are essentially equal, i.e. institutionally, racially (biologically) and culturally identical, brings about the assumption that “[o]ne looks Japanese because one is ethnically Japanese because one possesses Japanese citizenship” (Arudou, 2015: 20). This syllogistic reasoning only works in opposition to the notion of ‘*gaijin*’ (foreigners – literally, ‘outside people’), as they do not comply with the conditional aspects conferring membership and, therefore, lack Japaneseness. Put in a more simplistic way, one can be either completely Japanese [nihonjin] or not Japanese at all [hi-nihonjin].

Even today this conception of Japaneseness as a monolithic form of existence that restricts membership exclusively to ‘pure Japanese’ seems to remain well internalised in the Japanese majority's public opinion. In a study on national identity conducted by GESIS (1995, 2003 and 2013), it was proved that a major portion of the Japanese population is still highly influenced by conceptions defined by the traditional nationalist discourse regarding membership in the nation. In the following tables (5, 6 and 7) it can be appreciated the importance given to several factors defining Japaneseness can be appreciated:

Table 5. GESIS - International Survey Programme: National Identity I (1995), II (2003) and III (2013)

Year	Being born in Japan			Proficiency in Japanese		
	1995	2003	2013	1995	2003	2013
Very important	37.10%	44.80%	39.50%	39.40%	45.80%	39.40%
Fairly important	31.40%	31.70%	29.90%	31%	32.60%	36.60%
Not very important	24.10%	19.80%	25.10%	21.90%	16.10%	18.40%

Table 6. GESIS - International Survey Programme: National Identity I (1995), II (2003) and III (2013)

Year	Possession of Japanese nationality			Having Japanese ancestry	
	1995	2003	2013	2003	2013
Very important	49.30%	52.70%	52.20%	42.10%	32.50%
Fairly important	33.60%	34%	34.60%	30%	30.20%
Not very important	12.90%	10.70%	11%	19.80%	27.50%

Finally, it is noteworthy to observe the level of closeness expressed by Japanese respondents in the 1995 and 2003 surveys (no question directly related to *minzoku* was included in the 2013 survey).

Table 7. GESIS - International Survey Programme: National Identity I (1995) and II (2003)

Year	How close do you feel to your [minzoku] ethnic group?	
	1995	2003
Very close	67.70%	52%
Close	29.10%	42.20%
Not very close	3%	5.20%

3.3. Multi-ethnicity and the Construction of *Soto* within *Uchi*

Notwithstanding presumptions about a cultural and racial isomorphism in Japan, the reality is that, as in all countries and societies, the Japanese archipelago is home to several ethnic groups. In addition to the ethnic Japanese majority that seems to obscure the existence of minorities, five principle ethnic groups can also be found in contemporary Japan: Ainu, Ryukyuan, Burakumin, Zainichi Koreans and Taiwanese (Lie, 2001). Culturally and linguistically differentiated from the Japanese, the Ainu and Ryukyuan constitute ethnic minorities indigenous from territories upon which the Japanese state gained sovereignty in the nineteenth century, that is, Hokkaido and Okinawa respectively. Since their colonisation in 1968, Ainu have held Japanese nationality but have also been regarded as racially different from the Japanese majority (Siddle, 1996). Ryukyuan cultural and linguistic particularities, instead, have been broadly disregarded and considered simply a regional variety within the Japanese majority. Koreans and Taiwanese minorities are constituted mainly by the descendants of Chosenese (colonised Koreans) and Taiwanese immigrants who moved to Japan before the Japanese surrender after the war when the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan were colonial territories of the empire. Lastly, Burakumin people comprise the largest minority group in Japan, which, despite sharing ancestry and culture with the so-called Japanese majority, is racially excluded due to the condition of pariahs attributed to their ancestors during the Tokugawa period (1603-1868).

Due to the fact that most of the members of the five minorities have grown up in Japan, Ainu, Ryukyuan, Koreans and Taiwanese are linguistically and culturally assimilated into Japanese society. Therefore, it can be assumed that they hold *cultural membership* into the national *uchi*. Nonetheless, due to their non-Japanese ancestry, according to the nationalist interpretation of belonging in the nation, they are deprived of membership into the racial category. As for the institutional form of membership, Ainu and Ryukyuan, institutionally registered as Japanese nationals, seem to fit into the category. Koreans' and Taiwanese's *institutional membership*, instead, varies from case to case. Burakumin, however, seem to fit in the whole three categories of membership. Nonetheless, due to the fact that they used to be considered racially inferior to the mainstream Japanese and that still nowadays are subject to different forms of ethnic discrimination, it can be affirmed that their total membership within the national *uchi* is compromised by means of ethno-racial exclusion (Table 8).

Table 8. Ethnic minorities deficient membership.

	Institutional	Cultural	Racial
Korean & Taiwanese residents	×/✓ ¹⁴	✓	×
Ainu & Ryukyans	✓	✓	×
Burakumin	✓	✓	(×) ¹⁵

Despite lacking *institutional* and *racial membership*, ethnic minority groups altogether share the same cultural and linguistic aspects with the Japanese majority. Coexistence in Japan with mainstream Japanese, the sharing of cultural characteristics and the impossibility of visibly distinguishing them place ethnic minorities in a position of in-betweenness. They inhabit within the national *uchi*, which compromises the whole structure of the constructed national self and delegitimises preconceptions about Japanese uniqueness. This situation brings about what Dale denominates “cultural exorcism,” a social phenomenon whereby “internal tensions are projected onto an external and inauthentic Other” (1986: 40). Thus, ethnic minorities are *otherised*, rendered *inside others* or, as Creighton (1997) puts it, made “*uchi* others.”

This complex scenario can be simplified through a pertinent metaphor. The term *uchi* is commonly used for referring to one’s own house. Observing the structure of houses in Japan, the inside and the outside are separated by the *genkan*, which is a space, generally pretty small, between the house gate and the house door – a sort of entrance hall. This space divides two timely and spatial experiential states, the one of *being away from home* and the one of *being at home*, yet not incorporating either of them. Thus, the *genkan* is an atemporal and aspatial location where everybody entering the house carries out the same ritual of taking off their shoes. Pragmatically speaking, mainstream Japanese consider Japan their house and see the rest of the peoples of the world as inhabitants of the outside – people who, regardless of where they exist, do not belong in the house. However, what seems to be far from a common acceptance is that

¹⁴ Korean residents’ *institutional membership* is dependent on either the determination of maintaining a Korea-oriented nationality, *Chōsen* register [chōsenseki] or ROK citizenship, or the decision of naturalising and acquiring the Japanese citizenship.

¹⁵ Despite the fact that Burakumin share common ancestry with mainstream Japanese, their lack of racial membership is solely founded on prejudice for unfounded, racist reasons.

that house is not solely inhabited by Japanese, as at the moment of its construction several groups were already on the plot where the house was built. Ethnic minorities also belong in that house, however, they seem to be restrained from entering the house and, consequently, are restricted to existing at the *genkan* where belonging is not defined in terms of being in or out but in terms of not being at all.

4. Actualising the Nationalist Discourse

In the common language the concept of ‘race’ tends to be used for referring to biological and genotypic characteristics differentiating human groups. Those so-called ‘racial characteristics’ are, however, exclusively related to phenotypics rather than genetics. “Race,” as Banton points out, “is a second-order abstraction” independent from phenotypics and genetics (2015: 149). Although racial theories based on biological differences between human groups have been heavily criticised, the concept of race continues to live as a socially constructed form of “imagined community having a common and unified sense of comradeship” (Yoshino, 1997: 200) among its members, who consciously or unconsciously, determine allegiances based upon bonds uniting members in the present and in the past. Therefore, rather than trying to find a proper definition of *what ‘race’ is*, it is crucial to pay attention to the impact of that concept on social life, that is, to *what ‘race’ does*.

Article 14 of the Constitution of Japan reads:

All of the people [kokumin] are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination [sabetsu] in political, economic or social relations because of race [jinshu], creed, sex, social status or family origin.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, 1946.

This article refers directly to ‘race’ and discrimination claiming that in Japan racial discrimination is condemned by the Constitution. However, it must be noted that the word used for ‘race’ is *jinshu*. As aforementioned, the term *jinshu* refers to the idea of ‘race’ inasmuch as it emphasises visible differences between human groups – the classic categorisation of humans by their skin colour into blacks, yellows, whites and reds – and makes of racism and racial discrimination an overseas issue. However, the term *minzoku*, which comprises particularities in culture and lineage, is not included in the article, which brings up the question *is discrimination on the basis of minzoku constitutionally allowed?*

The racialisation of institutional exercise, that is, the consideration of race as a fundamental factor motivating and conditioning the elaboration of laws, policies and establishing a social order is conceptualised by Arudou as “embedded racism.” Building on Goldberg and Essed, Arudou defines *embedded racism* as:

The overt, covert, subtle, or implicit expression of a normalized, hegemonic racialized discourse that is hidden and anchored in daily interpersonal interactions, laws and law enforcement, media, and other public dialogue. It has the effect of differentiating, ‘othering’, and subordinating people into a predetermined group or social status within a social order.

Arudou, 2015: 10

In the present section the continuous presence of embedded racism in Japan since the imperial period and its significant impact on Japanese institutions and societies is examined. Focusing on the experience of Zainichi Koreans, two significant forms of *minzoku discrimination* from above and from below are analysed. On the one hand, institutional discrimination is analysed as an example of racialisation of institutional membership through the concept of citizenship. On the other hand, recent manifestations of racism are presented as consequence of the racialisation of the concept of the Japanese nation. In addition to this, special attention is paid to the role of compulsory education as a process to maintain nationalist discourses.

4.1. Minzoku Discrimination from Above: the Racialisation of Institutional Membership

As aforementioned, full membership in the national *uchi* constituting the Japanese nation is contingent to three categories of membership (racial, cultural and institutional). Institutional membership is dependent on the institutional recognition by means of possessing Japanese citizenship. Citizenship in Japan is automatically equalised to the possession of Japanese nationality, resulting in the categorisation of population in Japan as nationals and non-nationals. Likewise, the possession of Japanese nationality is incompatible with the possession of any other nationality. This can be interpreted as an institutional attempt to prevent overseas interference in the configuration of the Japanese national *uchi*.

In order to fully understand the institutional position of Zainichi Korean, it is pertinent to explore the concept of citizenship in Japan and the process whereby institutional membership was legally racialised. The British Sociologist T. H. Marshall described citizenship as “the basic human equality associated with... full membership of a community” (Marshall, 1950: 8). Being a concept born from the French revolution and thus intertwined with the creation of the modern

state (Brubaker, 1989), a citizenship-related form of membership necessarily points at the nation-state as its core. Membership in the nation-state (institutional membership), however, does not quite seem to be properly defined in the case of migrants, sojourners and refugees, as their institutional membership is not always equal to *de facto* citizens. Albeit it can be examined from multiple scientific perspectives, citizenship can be mainly described in terms of agency and subjecthood. Simply put, citizenship can be defined as the bestowal of a series of rights and obligations from above – the state – to below – citizens – (passive citizenship), or as the achievement of rights as a result of social struggle (active citizenship) (Bendix, 1964).

Morris-Suzuki (2015) resorts to the concept of “semi-citizenship” in order to defy the usual consideration around the idea of citizenship as a zero-sum game, where institutional membership is limited in absolute terms to the possession of a citizenship or a nationality. The terms *semi-citizenship* and *semi-citizen* are the conceptualisation of a partial membership in the nation-state opposed to the common conception of *full citizenship* as the only valid forms of institutional membership. This conceptualisation of partial institutional membership in the nation-state is similar to Hammar’s (1990) concept of “denizen” as a long-term resident who, in consequence of their permanent residency status, is granted certain rights of citizenship. This perspective is crucial to comprehend the actual civil, social and political dimension of the Korean ethnic minority in Japan since the colonial period until the present day.

4.1.1. Subjects, Citizens, and Semi-citizen

During the colonial period, membership in the imperial state was institutionally recognised by Japanese nationality which was conferred to both inhabitants of the colonies [*gaichi*] and inhabitants of the metropole [*naichi*]. In terms of citizenship, however, there existed a clear division between *gaichi* and *naichi* inhabitants that guaranteed differences in rights and obligations between colonisers and the colonised. The Family Register System [*koseki*] permitted the categorisation of imperial subjects in accordance with their national origin and subsequently allowed an unequal distribution of rights regardless of the place of residence. Thus, Japanese who moved to the colonies maintained their rights as ‘*naichi* citizens’ and Koreans in Japan, who were not allowed to modify their *koseki*, had always the same status of ‘*gaichi* citizens’. As discussed in the previous chapter, policies affecting only *naichi* citizens were promulgated along the colonial period. For example, education in the colonies was accordingly stratified through several educational ordinances that promoted a dual schooling system. Franchise was notably restricted and eventually deprived from *gaichi* citizens. Also, ordinances such as the *Sōshi Kaimei* were exclusive to *gaichi* status people.

Due to the patriarchal nature of *koseki*, the only citizens of the empire who continuously held agency (active citizenship) were Japanese men with *naichi* status, who could actively participate in the nation-state by having voting power. Colonial individuals, as well as Japanese women, had their citizenship – their institutional membership – limited to the status of subjecthood (passive citizenship), that is, they could not politically participate in the state-making process¹⁶.

During the occupation period, the enactment of reforms in the Electoral Law in December 1945 signified enfranchisement of Japanese women in Japan. The same law, however, disenfranchised all individuals registered in *gaichi* territories. In the same year, the Japanese government, with the necessary support of SCAP, passed the Alien Registration Law, whereby all individuals in Japan whose *koseki* was in the former colonial territories had to be registered as aliens. Furthermore, in 1950, the Japanese Nationality Law was promulgated, determining that Japanese nationality could be inherited only by children born to male Japanese nationals (*jus sanguinis*), which means that Japanese nationality could exclusively be inherited by children whose fathers were registered in the Japanese *koseki*¹⁷. As a result of these meticulously devised legislations – which certainly could be considered a process of decitizenisation –, former colonial Japanese nationals – Chosenese and Taiwanese – lost their Japanese nationality after the San Francisco Peace Treaty was effected in 1952. During the occupation SCAP authorities had no real interest in modifying the Family Register System, which condemned all Koreans who remained in Japan to lose most of their civil and social rights. Therefore, their status of semi-citizen was denied and no form of citizenship, passive or active, was assigned to them. Although they were registered as ‘aliens’, that does not mean they were foreigners with membership in another state. They just became stateless – individuals with no institutional membership in any state. In Agamben terms, with the deprivation of citizenship Zainichi Koreans were reduced to *bare life* [*nuda vita*] – biological life without political rights – becoming *homo sacer*, a form of existence outside society or rather a form of life in a continuous state of exception, wherein the life of individuals is made worthless – they lose their own sovereignty as citizens (Agamben, 1996; 2005). In the Roman Empire the *homo sacer* could be killed without committing a crime. In the modern nation-state, instead, the decitizenisation of citizens allows for the criminalisation of politics inasmuch as the modern

¹⁶ It is necessary to clarify that, with the promulgation of the General Election Law of 1925, all men over 25 living in the metropole were enfranchised, regardless of whether they were registered as *naichi* or *gaichi* citizens. Residents in the colonies, however, lacked suffrage during all the colonial period.

¹⁷ Matrilineal descent was not recognised until 1985 when the necessary amendment was introduced in the Nationality Law (Chapman, 2011).

homo sacer – stateless people, illegal immigrants, refugees, etc. – does not pertain to the world of legality and can be treated anyhow without committing a crime.

The situation of statelessness was resolved for a large portion of the Korean community in the 1960s, as a result of the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and ROK. However, no form of institutional membership in Japan was contemplated for Koreans until 1980s, when the Japanese government endorsed the International Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Refugee Convention. This translated into two fundamental changes: Firstly, the 1952 Immigration Control Act was revised into the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, giving permanent residence to all Zainichi Koreans regardless of their nationality and re-entry permits for overseas travels. Secondly, reforms in the Japanese Social Security System gave all aliens a large array of welfare benefits such as National Pension, Welfare Pension, National Health Insurance, child allowance and public housing. The acquisition of these rights and the definite regularisation of their residence status in Japan signified the re-acquisition of semi-citizen status (denizenship) by former colonial subjects. However, it is noteworthy that semi-citizenship for foreign residents does not solely translate into the receipt of certain rights (passive citizenship), but also the imposition of obligations particular to ‘aliens’, such as the mandatory carrying of alien registration cards, periodic status renovation and notification of any change of address among others.

Recent reforms in the immigration control system in 2012 abolished the Alien Registration System which was replaced by the Residency Management System. This is meant to be an improvement in the situation of foreign residents in Japan. The Alien Registration Card was substituted by a Residence Card (foreigners are no longer ‘aliens’ but ‘residents’), the re-entry permit application process was simplified and rendered almost automatic (although the Japanese government can still revoke re-entry permits) and also the residency period for permanent residents was extended from three to five years. Albeit clearly beneficial in some bureaucratic aspects, these reforms did not do away with the controversial ordinance obligating all foreign residents to carry their new residence card at all times and show it upon request of the police (Japanese nationals are not subject to any similar order).

Moreover, the Family Register System, as Chapman (2012) points out, continues to have a cardinal impact in determining full citizenship rights. Despite significant reforms in the Resident Registry [jūminhyō] that no longer divides Japanese and foreign residents according to their nationality, the *koseki* system still marginalises foreigners inasmuch as it prioritises nationals over foreigners. Foreigners married to Japanese nationals are registered in the *koseki* in rather a secondary place – as additional information. In addition, the *jus sanguinis* principle

continues to be determinant in the assignation of Japanese nationality (full citizenship). In other words, as *koseki* only recognises Japanese nationals as principal members of a family, the inheritance of full citizenship by new-borns takes place only when one or both of the parents hold Japanese nationality. Children born to Zainichi Korean parents, however, are not eligible to receive full citizenship¹⁸. Instead, they inherit the Special Residence Status from their parents, that is, they also stay within the realm of semi-citizenship or denizenship, lacking active citizenship, that is, agency in the process of shaping nation-state policies.

4.2. *Minzoku Discrimination from Below: Hate Speech online and offline*

The twenty-first century has been witness of the emergence of diverse forms of xenophobic and discriminatory manifestations from the grassroots in Japan. The term ‘Hate Speech’ has gradually entered the common vocabulary and nowadays there exist important campaigns to raise public awareness about this issue throughout the country. This increase in the number of xenophobic manifestations, however, has particularly new characteristics as it is not simply a sign of continuity of the post-war nationalist discourse. This relatively new phenomenon is originated as a riposte to the threat posed by globalisation to traditional discourses about homogeneity and uniqueness.

Although these manifestations have become patent since the twenty-first century, it is necessary to look back at the 1990s to comprehend what motivated the emergence of neo-nationalism/racism in contemporary Japan. Economic stagnation in the Japanese economy during the 1990s provoked a tenacious worsening in the living standards of many Japanese families. The generalised idea of Japan as an egalitarian society where everybody pertained to the middle-class was challenged by the appearance of a significant sector of Japanese society negatively affected (Rebick, 2004). This brought about a lower-class consciousness in Japanese society, which began to take social welfare as a serious matter. At a larger scale, slow economic growth in Japan since the 1990s and the recent economic success of its neighbouring countries, China and ROK, have questioned previous discourses regarding Japanese uniqueness as paramount to economic success.

As a consequence of globalisation and the Japanese need of labour, the notable increase in the number of foreign residents in the country since the 1990s (from 1 million in 1990 to almost 1.7

¹⁸ The assignation of full citizenship would take place if the Nationality Law in Japan had been established in accordance to the *jus solis* principle, which prioritises the place of birth over parental institutional membership.

million in 2000 [Ministry of Justice, n.d.]) contributed to rendering diversity visible. Furthermore, also in consequence of the migrant inflow, a new discourse about multiculturalism has emerged in the Japanese mass media and amongst intellectuals in Japan. The impossibility of ignoring heterogeneity has resulted in the displacement of the traditional discourse about Japanese homogeneity (Yamamoto, 2012).

Consequently, the apparent failure of traditional national(ist) discourses and the subsequent absence of new discourses to uphold previous nationalistic self-images cause the emergence of ancillary discourses nourished with sheer xenophobia in an attempt to discredit ‘the others’ in favour of those constituting the ‘national self’ who demand a presumably legitimate right to be taken care of by the nation-state (Wimmer, 1997). Thus, disadvantaged sectors of society are prone to resort to or succumb to racist and xenophobic discourses, which, as Wimmer points out, should be seen as an appeal “to the pact of solidarity into which the ethnicized bureaucracy and a national community have entered and which at times of intensified social conflict seem fragile, especially from the viewpoint of those threatened by loss of their social standing” (Ibid.: 32).

4.2.1. Zaitokukai: ‘Active Conservatives’

Of the several organisations endorsing xenophobic discourses in Japan, the most representative is the Association of Citizens Who do not Tolerate Special Privileges of the Zainichi [Zainichi Tokken wo Yurusanai Shimin no Kai], commonly known as Zaitokukai. Founded at the end of 2006 and lead by the ultranationalist Sakurai Makoto, Zaitokutai is the materialisation of an “anti-Korean sentiment” (Ito, 2014), which appeared first as an online racist wave promoted by the so-called *netto-uyo*, internet right-wingers, in the early 2000s through online discussion platforms such as 2-channeru (McLelland, 2008), and materialised in the popular *Kenkanryū* publications since 2005.

Even though Zaitokukai does not focus its activities exclusively against Zainichi Koreans, the very foundation of the association is based on arguments directly related to the Korean minority. The association disseminates the idea that the rights of Japanese nationals are violated because Zainichi Koreans enjoy special privileges.

Zaitokukai propaganda refers to these alleged privileges as follows:

- Unlike other foreigners in Japan, Zainichi Koreans enjoy the status of *Special Permanent Resident*, which permits them to lead a life almost equal to that of the Japanese;
- *Korean Schools* received public subsidies, even though they do not qualify for it and they provide anti-Japanese education;
- Foreign residents *benefit from public welfare assistance*, even though only Japanese national are supposed to receive assistance. In addition, Zainichi Koreans constitute the 70 per cent of foreigners benefitting from it;
- Zainichi Koreans are allowed to use *aliases* (Japanese names). This permits them to remain anonymous when committing a crime as only their Korean name is not reported.

Zaitokukai, 2017. Italics added.

Despite the slanderous character of these argumentations, Zaitokukai has managed to become widely known in Japan, gaining the support certain radical sectors of the society. A fundamental aspect characterising the xenophobic rhetoric of *Zaitokukai* is the victimisation of the Japanese people (Itagaki, 2015). During the post-war period Korea-phobia was present in Japanese society as a result of discrediting campaigns that saw the Korean minority as the core of criminal activities in the country. Derogatory terms such as *futei seijin* (malcontent Koreans) or *Sangokujin* (third party people) were commonly used to refer to the allegedly criminal nature of the Korean community, which made the Japanese victims of their felonious activities. In addition, the confirmation of abductions of Japanese citizens carried out in the 1970s and 1980s by DPRK, as well as the missile launch perpetrated in late 1990s by the North Korean regime, helped to augment the Japanese feeling of being victims. As another characteristic of the *Zaitokukai* rhetoric, the tendency to “conceptually equate the ‘individual’ and the ‘state’” (Ito, 2014: 440) legitimises xenophobic and discriminatory attitudes against Zainichi Koreans, seen as representative of the North Korean state, by the *Zaitokukai*, whose members consider themselves the chosen ones who can give voice to the Japanese state.

With roughly 16,400 members in early 2017 (Zaitokukai, 2017), Zaitokukai members, who refer to themselves as ‘activist conservatives’ [kôdô suru hoshu], focus on what could be defined as xenophobic activism by organising periodic demonstrations and rallies in public spaces. Two of these demonstrations, where the Korean community was targeted, particularly shocked public opinion. On 4 December 2009, a group of Zaitokukai members, along with some members of ‘The Association for the Restoration of National Sovereignty’ [Shuken Kaifuku wo Mezasu Kai], started a protest in front of a Korean elementary school in Kyoto. The school had been using a public park nearby as its school ground for about 50 years, but the

group of right-wingers demanded that the school cease in using the public space and immediately remove the school equipment, alleging that the use of that park was a violation of Japanese sovereignty. The protest soon heated up and the protestors announced a series of declarations through loudspeakers:

“During the war, when there weren’t many men, you raped and massacred our women and robbed this land.”

“This is an institution for the training of (North Korean) spies!”

“These are the descendants of smugglers... Spy kids! Kids educated by criminals!”

Youtube, 2009.

Another scandalous demonstration took place in the popular Korean Town of *Tsuruhashi* (Osaka), the largest ethnic Korean community in Japan, on 24 February 2013. A group of *Zaitokukai* demonstrators rallied around the area until they arrived at the main avenue where they began giving public hate speech. Among the several participants, the speech given by a Japanese middle-school girl stands out due to its cruelty with statements such as:

“I detest you Koreans so much that I want to kill you all!”

“If you keep on being so arrogant, it won’t be the Nanking Massacre but the Tsuruhashi massacre what we will start!”

“This is Japan, not the Korean Peninsula! Go back to your country before we start the massacre!”

Youtube, 2013.

From these statements, three significant characteristics can be identified. Firstly, *Zaitokukai*’s xenophobic activism fits in what Balibar denominates “racism without races,” that is, “a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences” (Balibar, 1991: 21). Secondly, *Zaitokukai*’s and other extreme right groups’ actions are essentially performative and radical in their language, like online racist manifestations by the so-called *netto-uyo*. It appears that xenophobic demonstrators simply seek to draw attention expecting to receive views on their internet broadcasts (Ito, 2014). Lastly, victimhood is perhaps the most significant element in *Zaitokukai*’s discourse. The Japanese are continuously portrayed as victims of what particularly this association denominates ‘reverse discrimination’. By an insistent denial of historical facts such as the existence of Comfort Women and the forced migration campaign perpetrated by the Japanese during the war, *Zaitokukai* members present

themselves as victims of a Korean and Chinese campaign to discredit the Japanese people in order to alter diplomatic relations.

4.3. Nationalism, Cultural Hegemony and Education

As aforementioned, post-war nationalist thought that envisaged Japan as a uniquely homogeneous country and that saw in that unique homogeneity the key for its success soon became part of Japan's cultural model. In this last section, the Japanese nationalistic and ethnocentric cultural model is examined through the Gramscian concept of 'hegemony', paying particular attention to the role of Japanese compulsory education in the process of establishment and maintenance of such cultural hegemony.

The concept of *hegemony* [Egemonia] was first presented by the Italian marxist, Antonio Gramsci. In his celebrated *Prison Notebooks* [Quaderni del Carcere], Gramsci (1975) emphasises the importance of the concept of "cultural hegemony" as a form of domination whereby the culture of the ruling class is unconsciously acquired by the ruled classes in the form of beliefs, values, expectations and so forth, creating a cultural norm, perceived as natural, which perpetuates a particular *status quo* in a society. Unlike other coercive forms of domination, the concept of *hegemony* contemplates the natural acquisition of a particular cultural model through institutional agencies such as education, religion or the mass media – structures of legitimisation. Alike other ideological state apparatuses, the educational system, Althusser states, "teaches 'know-how', but in forms which ensure *subjugation to the ruling ideology*" (2001: 133. Original italics). Education, being a political act, serves as a linkage between knowledge and power as it presents knowledge in a specific manner as to guarantee a particular perception and interpretation of reality. As Apple posits, "[t]here also seems to be symbolic property – cultural capital – which schools preserve and distribute ... create and recreate forms of consciousness that enable social control to be maintained without the necessity of dominant groups having to resort to overt mechanisms of domination" (2004: 2). The success of hegemony is in its capacity to pertain to the unconsciously assumed world view of the individual who generally conceives that particular interpretation of reality as constructed by themselves – the product of their own logical thought. That is because:

[H]egemony supposes the existence of something which is truly total, which is not merely secondary or superstructural, like the weak sense of ideology, but which is lived at such a depth, which *saturates* the society to such an extent, and which, as Gramsci put it, even constitutes the limit of common sense for most people under its sway, that it

corresponds to the reality of social experience very much more clearly than any notions derived from the formula of base and superstructure.

Williams, 2005: 37. Italics added.

It is precisely this *saturation* of individual's consciousness which converts assumptions and interpretations about reality, pertaining to the common sense, into the morphology of reality itself.

In his thorough analysis of the Japanese educational system, McVeigh speaks of “educational nationalism” rather than nationalist education. He explains that the Japanese educational system, rather than being utilised as a means for the dissemination of the nationalist ideology, is integrated as part of that ideology: “[educational nationalism] means the forging of a powerful ideo-institutional linkage between schooling and national sentiments, so that very little of what is learned is not configured by nationalism” (2002: 47). This provokes the perception of education as part of the scheme of what ‘being Japanese’ is supposed to mean – a good Japanese is an educated Japanese. Thus, education becomes the “national religion” (Ibid.) through which the Japanese incorporate the ‘national dogma’ of inclusion and belonging according to principles of institutional, racial and cultural membership. As the educational project itself, its priorities and objectives are moulded in harmony and conformity with the nationalist ideology which determines the notions of ‘Japaneseness’ and ‘nationhood’. Aoki claims that the Japanese educational system creates the notion of collective membership through the treatment of the Japanese language as ‘our language’ and the study of Japanese history as ‘our history’, consequently giving “a primordial guise to the Japanese national identity” (2000: 164), which is presumed to be absorbed by all the students in the classroom who, at the same time, are supposed to be Japanese. As a result, the formation of such sense of collective belonging into the national *uchi* obviates the existence of non-Japanese children in the classroom and of non-Japanese members belonging in Japan.

It seems clear that the Japanese cultural model is an undeniable example of cultural hegemony. Nonetheless, what is still striking is the fact that that form of hegemony has remained apparently untouched since the post-war period. Paying attention to the educational reform enacted during Japan's occupation, coordinated by SCAP, this reform envisioned the democratisation of education, eliminating the nationalist precepts of the Meiji Imperial Rescript on education, which aimed at the cultivation of a mentality of subjugation to the Emperor. The new educational system was meant to contribute to the formation of a citizenry in Japan. However, the cynical character of the voluntary reforms taken by the Japanese government proves that, although ultranationalism was dismissed after the traumatic defeat, the “deeply-

rooted ideologies of economic nation-statism and Japaneseness,” albeit presented “in a more ‘internationalistic’ light, were left intact” (McVeigh, 2000: 80).

After the occupation period, Japan’s *Jimintô* or Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the conservative political party that has ruled Japan almost continuously since 1955, usually showed discontent towards symbols of foreign imposition, which became targets of its policies – being perhaps the most controversial the overtly expressed intention of the current Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, to revise the war-renouncing Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution (The Japan Times, 2016). Another significant controversy had to do with the 1989 reform of education guidelines [*gakushû shidô yôryô*] enacted by the LDP government. After this reform, the use of the *Hinomaru* (Japanese flag) and *Kimigayo* (the Japanese anthem) was made mandatory at public schools. This measure was largely criticised by the Japanese Teachers Union and some left parties, due to the lack of legislation justifying the use of *Hinomaru* and *Kimigayo* as the national flag and the national anthem. However, the legal question was resolved a decade later when the Act on National Flag and Anthem was passed in 1999, officialising the use of such symbols (Itoh, 2001).

Another significant controversy was related to the content of textbooks. Although after the surrender the production of textbooks was liberalised and commercial publishers began producing materials, the distribution of every textbook remained dependant on the authority of the Ministry of Education. Therefore, all the content of newly produced textbooks was subject to the power of censorship of the Ministry, which held the authority to modify the form and content. Since the beginning of the post-war democratic period, marked by the nearly constant LDP’s ruling position, Japanese textbooks suffered several alterations centred on the question about which perspective should be used when tackling topics such as Japan’s colonisation of Korea and the Pacific War. Neo-nationalists’ reluctance to recognise the aggressive character of Japanese militarism and colonialism and take an apologetic attitude in Japanese diplomatic relations was reflected in a large number of modifications on textbooks’ content (Nozaki and Selden, 2009). Despite the efforts made by certain sectors of Japanese academia, as that of the Japanese historian Saburô Ienaga in order to include more accurate historical description of factual events occurred in the twentieth century, Japanese textbooks have been largely criticised due to the Ministry of Education’s indulgence towards neo-nationalist ideas.

5. Conclusion

In the first section, the development of nationalist discourses in Japan was addressed focusing on variations in form and reminiscences in essence. In the description of pre-war and wartime

Japanese nationalist discourse, the importance of ethnocentric representations of the Asian region as antagonistic to the West were explored. Pre-war and wartime Japanese national discourse was presented in conjunction with a sort of fraternity among the different peoples of Asia. Ideas and political projects regarding the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere presented Japanese colonialism in Asia as a legitimate exercise of mutual defence against Western colonialism. Interventionism in Asia was presented as a return to the ancient roots as many pan-Asianist intellectuals of that period claimed that the Japanese people were the result of hybridity between different peoples of Asia. These theories were instrumentalised with the sole objective of distancing from Nazi nationalism and its racial fundamentation. However, the presumed exercise of fraternal solidarity and mutual protection was influenced by and executed in accordance with ethnocentric interpretations that justified the superiority of the Yamato people over the rest of the peoples of Asia. In short, the theories regarding pan-Asianism and mutual prosperity in Asia concealed the actual ultranationalism behind the whole expansionist imperial venture in Asia. The Japanese were taught that the Japanese nation was a quasi-divine entity and that the Yamato people were predestined to lead the enterprise of reclaiming the splendour of the whole Asian continent against Western colonialism under the name of the supreme emperor.

With the start of the occupation of Japan by the Allied Forces after the traumatic defeat in the Pacific War, all the traditional values and institutions upon which the Japanese Imperial venture had been based were delegitimised. All the references that sustained the former national discourse were discredited and Japan immersed itself in what Befu (2001) defines as a period of soul-searching. Thus, the pre-war and wartime national discourse, which emphasised the virtues of the Japanese nation, the imperial household and interventionism in Asia, was abandoned and substituted by an opposed discourse based on self-criticism and condemnation of nationalism. The early post-war period, therefore, was marked by an auto-Orientalism that praised all the good in Western civilisation and disapproved of all Japanese traditional values.

Nonetheless, the economic success achieved from the 1960s through the 1970s and 1980s motivated the development of a new national discourse based on the acclamation of the cultural singularities of the Japanese people that were considered the principal motive for the rapid recovery and the outstanding economic development of the nation. This new discourse paved the way for a cultural nationalism in Japan that leaned on the literary works of numerous intellectuals and theorist, in what was known as *Nihonjinron*, instead of critically elaborating solid theoretical frameworks about the Japanese culture, *Nihonjinron* ideologists ended up succumbing to a narcissist exercise of self-congratulation that derived in an ahistorical and essentialist mystification of the Japanese culture. The new nationalist discourse installed in

Japanese society a primordialist sense of belonging based on the hegemonic ideology that justified Japanese success upon the assumption that Japan was a homogeneous nation. Thus, the idea of homogeneity in Japan created an equivalence of land, race, culture and language which gradually penetrated into public opinion and became part of the Japanese cultural model, assimilated as a sort of universal and undeniably obvious truth.

In the second section, the effects of this cultural model in Japanese interpretation of belonging were examined. Through the analysis of two cultural concepts, *uchi* and *soto*, it was observed that belonging and membership are interpreted in absolute terms of inclusion and exclusion in Japanese society. In addition, an analysis of the present common interpretation of Japaneseness as a conditioning factor for the recognition of membership in the Japanese nation – *national uchi* – was presented.

Despite the more-than-fifty-year period separating the emergence of the cultural-nationalist discourse and the present, the interpretation of belonging in primordialist terms in accordance with the ideology of homogeneity appears to be still functional. The conception of Japan as a homogeneous country presumes the sole existence of Japanese people in Japan, bringing about the assumption that the Japanese people constitute a racially and culturally monolithic whole. Likewise, institutional recognition is presented as exclusive to the Japanese as the only members of the allegedly homogeneous nation. In other words, Japaneseness is envisaged as determined by belonging in the Japanese nation and, at the same time, as a determining factor for membership in the Japanese nation. Thus, based upon the interpretation of the Japanese nation in terms of culture, lineage and institutional recognition, a model of belonging in the nation was presented highlighting three sub-categories of membership in the nation: *institutional membership* (possession of Japanese nationality), *racial membership* (lineal descendancy from the Imperial blood-lineage) and *cultural membership* (proficiency in Japanese and cultural literacy).

This interpretation of national belonging in absolute terms of inclusion and exclusion, however, becomes clearly problematic when examining the presence of minorities in Japanese society. None of the ethno-cultural minorities (Burakumin, Ryukyuan, Ainu and Taiwanese and Korean residents) fits completely in the model of national belonging presented, as in all the cases at least one of the subcategories is not met. In the case of Zainichi Koreans, although cultural membership does not seem to be compromised due to cultural assimilation, racial membership is denied, and institutional membership is impaired unless the individual has naturalised Japanese. Despite the inadequacy of the model and hence of the whole ideology of homogeneity in explaining the presence of minorities in Japan, the model seems to be perpetuated in time.

This consequently causing a “cultural exorcism” (Dale, 1986), that is, the otherisation of members actually belonging the national *uchi* by internal exclusion, creating a ‘outsiders inside’ – a *soto* within the national *uchi*.

In the last section, manifestations of that ‘cultural exorcism’ are presented under the concept of ‘embedded racism’ which implies the “expression of a normalised, hegemonic racialised discourse that is hidden and anchored in daily interpersonal interactions, laws and law enforcement, media, and other public dialogue” as a means of otherisation and subordination of certain groups of people discursively differentiated into a predetermined social stratum (Arudou, 2015: 10). This process of racial discrimination, however, is not constructed under traditional notions of ‘race’, as a purely physical characteristic. Instead, it is constructed under the racialised concept of *minzoku*, which does not merely refer to cultural characteristics represented by the idea of ethnicity but also includes the notion of lineage as determinant to the definition of a particular group. Therefore, in this section the process of racial otherisation and subjugation was conceptualised as *minzoku* discrimination, which, unlike racial discrimination, is not clearly condemned by the Japanese constitution.

Two forms of *minzoku* discrimination were analysed in the section as the most pertinently related to the present study. On the one hand, the racialisation of institutional membership in the nation-state was presented as a form of *minzoku* discrimination *from above*. This is done through the examination of the concept of citizenship, which is envisaged as a recognised and exercised form of full membership in the nation-state, channelled in the form of subjecthood and agency. Whereas the former confers protection to the citizen, by the bestowal of rights and duties from above – the state – to below – citizens –, the latter guarantees their participation in the process of construction and refinement of the nation-state through enfranchisement. Paying attention to the case of Zainichi Koreans, however, it was observed that full membership in the Japanese nation-state is only enjoyed by those in possession of Japanese nationality. As a result of an orchestrated process of decitizenisation through the promulgation of several laws during the Japanese occupation, Zainichi Koreans and Taiwanese were deprived of their Japanese nationality and, consequently, of any form of membership in the Japanese nation. Since then and thanks to the endorsement by the Japanese government of various international agreements concerning the protection of human rights and the elimination of discrimination, Zainichi Koreans went through a process of denizenisation, whereby a series of rights (permanent residency, welfare assistance, etc.) were guaranteed, this resulting in the recognition of Zainichi Koreans solely as semi-citizens, as they still lack permission to participate in the construction of the nation-state through suffrage. This form of incomplete membership is maintained by the reliance of Japanese authorities in the Family Register System [*koseki*], which, recognising only

Japanese nationality possessors, preserves *minzoku* discrimination as a form of embedded racism by a sort of legitimisation of institutional membership founded exclusively on conceptions of blood purity and lineage. Therefore, it is sensible to consider that non-naturalised Zainichi Koreans, either possessing ROK citizenship or staying solely registered as ‘Chosenese’ are still trapped in a *state of emergency* (Agamben, 2005) inasmuch as they have no form of political life in the Japanese nation-state. Also, it is noteworthy to emphasise the exceptionality of the state wherein Zainichi Koreans registered as ‘Chosenese’, that is, possessing no recognised nationality, exists even nowadays. This exceptionality or rather vulnerability is particularly noticed when they leave Japan as re-entrance permission is conditional to the compilation and submission of a ‘written oath’ whereby they formally state no intention to travel to DPRK and acknowledge the revocation of their re-entrance permit in the event of failure to comply with that ‘oath’ (Choson Sinbo, 2016).

On the other hand, another form of *minzoku* discrimination was identified particularly in the recent emergence of the nationalist group of xenophobic rhetoric, *Zaitokukai*. As a manifestation of the online-born anti-Korean sentiment that emerged in the early 2000s, *Zaitokukai*’s appearance is analysed as a consequence of two significant economic and social phenomena that took place in Japan in the later decades of the twentieth century. Firstly, economic stagnation in the 1990s questioned the hitherto so-valued ‘Japanese uniqueness’ as a key element for economic success. As a consequence, Japanese competitiveness was compromised by the economic success of its neighbouring countries and unprivileged sectors of Japanese society began to develop a lower-class consciousness. Secondly, the significant inflow of migrants from South America and South East Asia discredited the commonly shared conception of Japanese society as homogeneous, since the ever-extant heterogeneity became evident and undeniable.

These two phenomena brought into disrepute the national discourse prevailing in Japan since the 1960s, whereby Japanese uniqueness and homogeneity of the nation were envisaged as pillars of Japanese national identity. The loss of foundation rendered the discourse malfunctional and the absence of a new national discourse, as Wimmer (1997) points out, paved the way for the emergence of xenophobic nationalist discourses which cannot be understood as anything other than an attempt to legitimise membership in the nation through the otherisation and discrimination of those considered different.

Notwithstanding their reprehensible actions in public, it is prominent to note that *Zaitokukai*’s ‘activism’ is arranged from an extremely nationalist perspective, not simply because of their xenophobic rhetoric but particularly due to their essentialist tendency to disregard the line

dividing the individual and the state. Judging from their rhetoric, it can be affirmed that the so-called 'conservative activists' envisage the Japanese political and social scenarios from a state-based collectivist perspective whereby the Japanese state and the Korean states shape monolithic structures which constantly clash with each other. This involves the victimisation of the Japanese who are presumably endangered by the North Korean menace represented within Japan by the Korean minority.

Closing the chapter, an introduction to the concept of cultural hegemony was included as it is considered crucial to comprehend the role of education in the formation and maintenance of nationalist discourses. Referring to the prominent role of education in the maintenance of nationalism, Gellner posits "[a]t the base of the modern social order stands not the executioner but the professor.... The monopoly of education is now more important, more central than is the monopoly of legitimate violence" (2006: 33). As Gellner points out, national education systems function as a means for the influx of a specific cultural capital which, despite providing individuals with the necessary knowledge, simultaneously guarantees their subjugation by the creation and recreation of particular forms of consciousness. As an ideological apparatus, education, therefore, serves rightly to the purpose of the state to generate commonly shared assumptions of a total truth, unquestioned and unquestionable, which penetrates individuals' subconsciousness and constitutes the limits of common sense, consequently transforming a particular interpretation of reality into the morphology of reality itself.

The presence of a cultural hegemony and the role of education in the process of creation and incorporation of specific patterns of interpretation of reality are clearly applied to the Japanese case. In Japan the role of compulsory education is prominent for the acquisition of a particular conception about the Japanese nation and Japaneseness. As McVeigh claims, the influence of the nationalist discourse on the education system is so significant that, rather than the idea of 'nationalist education', "educational nationalism" should be considered, entailing "the forging of a powerful ideo-institutional linkage between schooling and national sentiments, so that very little of what is learned is not configured by nationalism" (2002: 47). Thus, it can be affirmed that Japanese education is still fundamental for the rooting of a primordialist sense of belonging in the nation based on the three categories of memberships explored in this chapter.

The maintenance of a national discourse in Japan, whereby the recognition of belonging and membership in the Japanese nation is contingent on the traditional exclusive way of construing Japaneseness, appears to be a priority in the political agenda of the Japanese state. New discourses have been promoted in the recent decades in an attempt to create an image of Japan as a globalising country where concepts such as internationalisation [kokusaika], multicultural

coexistence [tabunka kyôsei] are overtly and overly utilised. These new discourses, however, have been criticised by scholars (Ivy, 1995; Morris-Suzuki, 2002; Burgess, 2004) as a form of domestication of 'the foreign' in Japan, whereby Japanese and foreigners are presented as equals but the usage of a multicultural rhetoric is exclusive to the Japanese majority. New discourses are but a reformulation of the traditional national discourse that moves from a rigid presentation of Japanese national identity towards, as Morris-Suzuki puts it, a "cosmetic multiculturalism" where "diversity is celebrated 'on condition that it remains essentially a form of exterior decoration that does not demand major structural changes'" (2002: 171). In this discursive scenario, it appears unlikely that reductionism and essentialism will easily succumb to the 'push and pull' between nationalism and globalisation (Burgess, 2004), where changes in the social order bring about new forms of belonging that national(ist) discourses constructed by the nation-state simply neglect or reinterpret in its own interest.

Chapter 6. Identity Politics and Nationalism in the Zainichi Community

1. Introduction

This chapter is presented in three main sections. The first section, under the title *Zainichi Identity in the Nationalist Paradigm*, explores the most influential discourses emerged in the Zainichi community from the 1950s to the 1970s. In this analysis, the inefficiency of the discourses to represent Japan-born Zainichi Koreans is highlighted and regarded as the motivator for the emergence of subsequent alternative discourses.

The second section, *Post-diasporic Experience and the Empowerment of Younger Generations*, presents Kim Tong-Myung's thesis about a 'Third Way' of existence as Zainichi in Japan, which represented Japan-born Zainichis' demands and views in opposition to the first-generation's discourse.

Lastly, in the third section, *Taking over the Differentialist and the Assimilationist Trends*, second and third generations' views on ethnicity and belonging are explored through an analysis of several civil movements arising from the 1970s, which manifested a majoritarian acceptance of the 'Third Way' of existence conceptualised by Kim.

2. Zainichi Identity in the Nationalist Paradigm

After their denaturalisation in 1952, Zainichi Koreans were forced to find alternative forms of identification, belonging and self-representation within the nationalist discursive panorama of post-war East Asia, where none of the three states that were born out of the collapse of the Japanese Empire was willing to undertake the task of providing the state-orphan ethnic-Korean minority with a legal and institutional buttress. As discussed in Chapter 5, the post-war nationalist discourse did not contemplate the inclusion of the Korean minority in the construction of the Japanese nation-state, since it was cynically represented as an utterly homogeneous entity where only 'the pure Japanese' had the right to be recognised as members of the Japanese nation (Yoshino, 1997). Therefore, the ethnic-Korean minority was repudiated and restricted from belonging in the new national project, due to their impossibility to comply with three fundamental forms of membership constructed and imposed by the new national(ist) discourse: institutional, cultural and racial. Institutionally alienated as a result of a gradual process of denizenisation and denaturalisation (Lie, 2008: 36-37), culturally distinguished for

their ethnic origin and racially otherised due to their presumed impure lineage, first-generation Zainichi Koreans had to look towards their homeland for a sense of belonging.

2.1. The Ideology of Return: Long-Distance Nationalism and the Differentialist Trend

The Korean War resulted in the political and ideological division of the Korean Peninsula. Also, the same geopolitical fracture was incarnated by the ethnic Korean community in Japan who took sides either with the communist regime led by Kim Il-Sung in the North or the pro-U.S. dictatorial regime led by Syngman Rhee in the South. Ideological positioning brought about the emergence of two main Zainichi organisations in Japan: *Mindan* and *Chôren*. Let alone ideological orientations, both organisations also differed in their views towards Japan. *Mindan*, overtly ROK-oriented and hence pro-U.S. and pro-Japan, avoided intervention in Japanese politics arguing that Zainichi Koreans were foreign residents in Japan. *Chôren*, instead, looked at political intervention in conjunction with the JCP as a means for the betterment of the Zainichi Korean community in Japan (Lee, 1981b: 83-84).

However, in 1954, the DPRK Foreign Minister Nam Il publicly referred to Zainichi Koreans in Japan and declared that they were North Korean citizens [kômin] (Lie, 2008: 37). This declaration legitimised DPRK's intention to recognise the Zainichi population as 'overseas nationals', which, at least partly, signified the psychological liberation of Zainichi Koreans from the burden of colonial subjecthood to become DPRK citizens (Ryang, 1997). Thus, the northern regime was regarded as the embodiment of national independence (Ryang, 2000: 34). On 25 February 1955, Nam Il announced DPRK's official intentions to initiate discussions with Japan on the normalisation of diplomatic relations (Morris-Suzuki, 2011). Aware of the potential damage their intervention in the Japanese political scenario could cause to DPRK's attempt to establish relations with Japan, *Chôren* leaders decided to dissolve the organisation and established *Sôren* in 1955 with a new agenda exclusively oriented towards DPRK – Zainichis' new homeland. During the 1950s, *Sôren*, with 90 per cent of the Zainichi population affiliated (Lie, 2008: 42), became the main ethnic-Korean organisation in Japan. The new organisation elaborated a discourse around the idea of return to the homeland and, since 1957, engaged in the effort to educate Zainichi Koreans as DPRK nationals through an ethnic education system that expanded all across the Japanese archipelago.

Two particular manifestations of the ideology of return promoted by *Sôren* turn out to be enlightening in understanding the identitarian outcome during the 1950s and 1960s. In the first place, *Sôren*'s focalisation on homeland's politics and its determination to contribute to the

reunification of the Korean Peninsula can be described as a form of “long-distance nationalism”¹⁹ (Anderson, 1994; Shipper, 2008). DPRK had not only recognised Zainichi Koreans as its own nationals but also counted on its displaced ethnic comrades to participate in the new national project, which intended to unify the Korean Peninsula under the Marxist-Leninist *Juche* ideology. Thus, although the vast majority of Koreans in Japan were originally from the southern part of the peninsula, most of them decided to affiliate with North-aligned *Sôren* and participate in DPRK’s national project by sustaining the ideology of return – a return that became a sort of mystical goal for the community, who had finally found a beam of hope coming from a homeland that, for many of them, was only part of an imagery (Lie, 2008: 119), which had solely been constructed out of narrative accounts and symbolic representations, and now seemed to have been legitimised by the new Korean national discourse that had emerged in the North.

This form of long-distance nationalism and the ideology of return created a fundamental necessity to recover the Korean ethnicity. After several decades of displacement, Zainichi Koreans’ ethno-cultural linkage with their homeland was eroded as a result of a process of acculturation, indubitably favoured by the policies of assimilation/Japanisation applied by the Japanese government. As an attempt to revert the effects of Japanese assimilationist policies, *Sôren* created an ethnic schools network whose principal objective was providing ethnic education to ethnic-Koreans and raising Korean national consciousness (Inokuchi, 2000: 148).

This determination and urgency to recover a presumably lost ethnicity can be easily related to the structuralist perspective on culture. Such perspective assumes the existence of an association between territories and peoples with cultures, on whose coalition civilisation depends (Levi-Strauss, 1952). Therefore, the assumption about the existence of an undeniable cultural essence in Koreans, that is, the existence of a ‘Koreanness’ shared by all Koreans, not only identifying membership in the Korean ethnic group but also determining and restricting belonging in the ethnic group, brought about the necessity for exercising that ‘Koreanness’, prioritising it over any sign of ‘Japaneseness’ assimilated during the imperial period. This anti-assimilationist stance can be described as a ‘differentialist trend’ urging the rapprochement towards Koreans’ ‘natural’ ethnicity and the distancing from the ‘unnaturally’ imposed ‘Japaneseness.’

¹⁹ Anderson defines long-distance nationalism as: “a nationalism that no longer depends as it once did on territorial location in a home country. ... The internet, electronic banking and cheap international travel are allowing such people to have a powerful influence on the politics of their country of origin, even if they have no intention any longer of living there. This is one of the main ironic consequences of the processes popularly called globalization” (Anderson, 2001).

Despite its early foundation in 1948, *Mindan* was a minor organisation during the 1950s and 1960s whose impact was incomparable to *Sôren*'s. This was motivated by the lack of reciprocity among the ethnic organisation and the ROK government, which, due possibly to its strong anti-Japanese sentiment, neglected the existence of a Korean minority in Japan (Lie, 2008: 39-40). Also, in the archipelago, *Mindan* was not considered representative of the Korean community as a whole but solely of a middle-class group somehow associated with South Korea (Mitchel, 1967: 125-126).

2.1.1. Instrumentalist Approach in *Sôren* Ethnic Education

The Korean school system had as its main purpose to ensure the readiness of Korean children born in Japan to return to their homeland. Also, as declared overtly by *Sôren*, ethnic education was to be carried out in accordance with DPRK's guidelines and communist educational system so that Korean students in Japan could actively participate in the construction of their democratic fatherland. Thus, by the early 1970s, 180 schools of different levels had been established receiving approximately 35,000 students (Lee, 1981d: 168-9).

Regarding *Sôren*-managed Korean schools' legal status, they were officially classified as 'miscellaneous schools' [*Kakushu Gakkô*] (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, 2006), which essentially means that the schools were not accredited by the central government as *ichijôkô*, that is, as compliant with Article 1 of the 1947 School Education Law (Fukuoka, 2004: 223; Ryang, 1997: 24-25). Pertaining to this category entails a series of disadvantages related to lack of state subsidy from the central government and difficulties in access to Japanese public higher education. However, 'miscellaneous schools' are not directly dependant on the Ministry of Education, which translates into the ability to design one's own curriculum and the lack of censorship on their textbooks.

Notwithstanding the salient role of Korean Schools in Japan since the 1950s, it is important to emphasise the instrumentalist approach carried out by *Sôren*. The salient role played in the Korean community by the organisation upon the ideology of return and the ultimate ethnic goal represented in their discursive orientation towards reunification also provided the organisation with the sufficient power to install a discourse regarding ethnicity [*minzoku*] onto a large portion of the minority. This instrumentalisation of the *minzoku* concept, furthermore, was undeniably based on a nationalist discourse, not too distant ideologically from the post-war Japanese *Nihonjinron*. In other words, it could be affirmed that membership in the Korean national group was also defined according to ethnocentric forms of membership. Although institutional membership did not seem to be key in the discourse, the absence of official

membership, that is, the lack of nationality as *Chōsen*-registered stateless, seems to have been broadly embraced until the early 1970s (Lie, 2008: 31). As for the racialised form of membership, statistics on the number of co-ethnic marriages turn out to be rather revelatory. Marriages between ethnic-Koreans outnumbered the total of Japanese-Korean unions until the early 1970s (Table 9), which can be interpreted as a form of ethno-biological nepotism (Van Den Berghe, 1981) motivated by bonds of ethnic solidarity which guarantees the ethnocentric prevalence of cultural characteristics in the group.

Table 9. Number of marriages of Zainichi Koreans.

Years	Korean+Korean	Korean+Japanese	Korean+Other	Total Marriages
1955 to 1959	1,650 (71.2%)	629.2 (27.1%)	38.4 (1.6%)	2,318 (100%)
1960 to 1964	2,905 (67.8%)	1,347 (31.4%)	33 (0.7%)	4,285 (100%)
1965 to 1969	3,578 (61.5%)	2,202.6 (37.9%)	39 (0.7%)	5,819 (100%)
1970 to 1974	3,879 (52.9%)	3,401.8 (46.4%)	56.8 (0.8%)	7,337 (100%)
1975 to 1979	3,246.6 (47.2%)	3,594.4 (52.2%)	41.2 (0.6%)	6,882 (100%)

Source: Yang, T. and Yamada, T. (2014) *Shin Zainichi Kankoku-Chōsenjin Dokuhon: Rirakkusu shita Kankei wo motomete* [New Reader About Zainichi Koreans: in search of a relaxed relationship]. Tokyo: Ryokufū Publications.

Likewise, Korean schools' freedom to design their own curriculum assured students' acquisition of a particular form of knowledge which provides the necessary proficiency in the Korean language and cultural literacy. In short, Korean schools' curriculum assured the attainment of the ethno-cultural knowledge required for the obtainment of cultural membership in the Korean national entity conceived by DPRK's national project and supported by *Sōren*.

2.2. The Ideology of 'Permanence': Realisation and the Assimilationist Trend

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the governments of Japan and South Korea, as a result of the ROK-Japan Normalisation Treaty (1965), made it possible for Zainichi Koreans to acquire the ROK nationality (citizenship). Regardless of the political and ideological implications, becoming a South Korean citizen translated into a considerable betterment of living conditions. ROK citizenship provided permanent residence in Japan, access to welfare

and medical benefits and the right to travel abroad (and return to Japan) and hence visit South Korea – Zainichi could now visit their relatives and their ancestors' tombs.

However, the signing of the treaty did not only involve the possibility to attain a series of civil rights, but it also translated into the corroboration for the Zainichi community that the unification of the peninsula would not take place in the near future (Lie, 2008: 68). There is no doubt that the official recognition of the new geopolitical scenario in Asia signified for Zainichi Koreans the realisation that their future was tied to Japan as the ideology of return no longer seemed to pursue a plausible goal. Furthermore, the decade of the 1970s would witness how *Sôren*, the principle sponsor of the ideology of return, lost their hegemonic position within the Zainichi community. The sentiment of delusion derived from the arrival of letters from returnees to DPRK, which discredited *Sôren*'s propaganda describing North Korea as a "Paradise on Earth" (Ryang, 1997: 115), along with the autocratic turn of the North Korean regime and subsequent mimicry of *Sôren*, motivated the "decoupling" of Zainichi and the DPRK-oriented organisation (Lie, 2008: 68). Being Zainichi Korean no longer involved affiliation with *Sôren* and, by the same token, the ideology of return gave way to the ideology of 'permanence' – Zainichi Koreans had nowhere to return and focused on their stay in Japan.

This turning point for the Zainichi population and the lack of organisational representation within the most disenchanted sectors of the community, however, were not exploited by *Mindan*, which, despite the rapprochement of traditionally opposed sectors of the community, was not able to provide an alternative discourse. Also, the militaristic character of Park's dictatorship in the South, which was made patent after the kidnap of Kim Dae-Jung in Tokyo by ROK's secret service, dissuaded Zainichi Koreans from any ideological ascription to *Mindan*, which came to be considered nothing but a "glorified passport agency" (ibid.) due to its role of 'passport dispenser certified by the ROK government'.

2.2.1. 'Passing' as Default Condition for Younger Generations

1970s ideological turmoil was the context wherein many second-generation Zainichi Koreans grew up. Having spent all their lives in Japan, ethnic-Korean youngsters were culturally undistinguishable from the Japanese. This, along with the fact that no major phenotypical differences exist between Koreans and Japanese, made the identification of ethnic-Koreans within Japanese society rather a hard, if not impossible, task. For this reasons, as part of their daily lives, passing as Japanese became a way of life for Zainichi Koreans. Prejudice and discrimination were present in Japanese society and the possibility to pretend being Japanese, or simply not emphasising any possible ethnic differences, made it possible for Zainichi Koreans

to integrate socially in Japan without suffering from discrimination. ‘Passing’, therefore, was second-generation Zainichi Koreans’ default option; a condition that socially placed them in a comfortable neutral position – hardly enjoyed by their parents in the past – that, at the same time, was out of choice for them (Lie, 2008: 20). The automatism of the ‘passing’ condition motivated a major number of Zainichi Koreans to live their lives as Japanese by hiding any recognisable aspect of their cultural heritage, which could give them away and reveal their ethnic origin, making them subject to discrimination. Therefore, unlike the differentialist trend, which urged the learning, maintenance and manifestation of Korean ethnicity, the sense of safety and security derived from the natural assimilation of Japanese culture involved an ‘assimilationist trend’, which motivated a large portion of the Zainichi population to live as Japanese, making their Korean ethnic origin a secret.

The most evident manifestation of this assimilationist drive can be found in the gradual increase in the number of Zainichi Koreans deciding to naturalise as Japanese and resigning their ROK citizenship or their *Chôsen* register (Table 10). The clear increase in the average number from the 1960s to the 1970s (by almost 40 per cent) turns out to be significantly representative of the gradual impact of the assimilationist trend within the Zainichi community.

Table 10. Naturalisations of Koreans in Japan.

Years	Number of Koreans	Number of naturalisations
1952	535,065	232
1955	577,682	2,434
1960	581,257	3,763
1965	583,537	3,438
1970	614,202	4,646
1975	647,156	6,323
1980	664,536	5,987
1985	683,313	5,040
1990	687,940	5,216

Source: Tai, E. (2004) ‘Korean Japanese’. *Critical Asian Studies*. 36(3), pp. 955-982.

Nonetheless, it is prominent to consider two important factors involved in the process of naturalisation. On the one hand, the ethnocentric nature of the process itself, which equalises

naturalisation and assimilation, assumes that the applicants are willing to assimilate and leave behind any trace of Korean ethnicity (Kashiwazaki, 2000). Particularly representative of this assimilation requirement is the administrative expectation that the applicant shall naturalise with a Japanese-style name²⁰. This measure was considered a second *Sôshi Kaimei* (see Chapter 4) and was one of the reasons why many Zainichi Koreans rejected the naturalisation option. On the other hand, naturalisation does not necessarily signify a definite escape from discrimination. Furthermore, in many cases, naturalising Japanese involved rejection from the Zainichi community. Naturalised Zainichi Koreans used to be called ‘*panchoppiari*’ (half-Japanese) becoming Japanese on paper was considered an act of treason towards the ethnic-Korean collective as it was commonly assumed that as a Japanese citizen the maintenance of an ethnic-Korean, or Zainichi, identity was impossible (Lie, 2008: 10; Harajiri, 1998).

2.3. The Zainichi Dilemma: Caged in the Identitarian Dichotomy

Japan-born Zainichi Koreans, who by the mid-1970s constituted approximately 75 per cent of the community with some 480,000 individuals (Chapman, 2008: 38), experienced their existence in Japan in a manner totally different to that of their parents. As Kang Jae-Eun pointed out in 1976, “whereas the generation of those who were born in Korea [Chôsen] was a generation united by a ‘nostalgic sentiment’ [kyôshû] towards the homeland, the generation born in Japan has, in many cases, been a generation that lived their condition of ‘Zainichi’ as a given premise” (Kang, 1976: 36).

In this context, younger Zainichi Koreans had to face the identitarian dilemma of being either Korean or Japanese. In other words, they could either allow themselves to be carried away by the differentialist trend in favour of their ethnic pride and the maintenance of an ethnic consciousness, or they could succumb to the assimilationist trend and simply live their lives taking advantage of their default condition of ‘passing’ and conceal any trace of ‘Koreanness’. None of the options, however, seemed to completely satisfy the identitarian necessities of the Japan-born generations. On the one hand, the differentialist trend, despite presumably providing an ethnocultural ground for their identities, was based on the knowledge of a homeland that, with the emergence of new generations, had turned into an imagined concept. The assimilationist trend, on the other hand, required the detachment from and concealment of their ethnic-Korean background in pro of a not always guaranteed integration in Japanese society. This provoked a sense of “disrecognition” (Lie, 2008: 79-84), that is, the sense of living a lie

²⁰ Although the ‘unofficial’ requirement to adopt Japanese-style names when naturalising was allegedly eliminated in the 1990s, Lawyers Association of Zainichi Koreans denounced the continuation of such practice in 2014 (LAZAK, 2014).

wherein one's true self is not fully revealed and hence lacks recognition from the others. The default condition of passing, despite providing a certain sense of security and integration, also hinders aspirational identification with the ethnic-Korean group due to the consciously experienced absence of ethnic markers by the culturally assimilated individual, who is more likely to identify with the ethnic-Japanese collective. Therefore, culturally assimilated Zainichi Koreans were prone to experience an ethnic-personal identity conflict (see Chapter 3), owing to the lack of correspondence between their elements defining the ethnic-Japanese majority, which they identify with (empathic identification), and the ethnic markers defining the ethnic-Korean minority, which they aspire to identify with (aspirational identification). Robert E. Park's 'marginal man' theory turns out to be relevant in understanding younger Zainichi generations' identity conflict. Park assesses that the marginal man is "a cultural hybrid, a man living and sharing intimately in the cultural life and traditions of two distinct peoples; never quite willing to break, even if he were permitted to do so, with his past and his traditions, and not quite accepted, because of racial prejudice, in the new society in which he now sought to find a place. He was a man on the margin of two cultures and two societies, which never completely interpenetrated and fused" (Park, 1928: 892). Therefore, Zainichi Koreans, as the marginal man, live in a permanent state of in-betweenness whereby neither of the hegemonic discourses (Japanese nationalism and first-generation Zainichi long-distance nationalism) is functional to the process of identity formation. The incongruence of both discourses with regards to the actual experience of Japan-born Zainichi Koreans limits their possibility to develop a solid and thorough sense of identity, and renders them likely to internalise negative ideas about their ethnic community, being this a form of self-stigmatisation. Therefore, the lack of an alternative discourse condemned young Zainichi Koreans to base their whole identity upon an absolutist conception of belonging defined by nationalist discourses according to which whatever form of hybridity was not to be contemplated.

3. Post-diasporic Experience and the Empowerment of Younger Generations

The generational change in the Zainichi community has been interpreted as the transcendence of Zainichi diasporic experience (Ryang, 1997; Oh, 2012). Looking at Safran's model of diaspora (see Chapter 2), two of the points presented seem problematic when applied to Japan-born Zainichi Koreans' case. According to Safran, diasporic individuals "believe that they are not – and perhaps cannot be – fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it" and they "regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return" (Safran, 1991: 83-84). Younger Zainichi Korean generations, unlike the first-generation, did not contemplate

return as a solution to their situation in Japan and, instead, were eager to gain acceptance and integrate into Japanese society. Not ignoring Chapman's (2008: 41-42) perspective on Zainichi diasporic experience as mutable and variable and not simply encapsulated in absolute categories of diasporic or post-diasporic, findings from the present study demonstrate that the experience of Japan-born Zainichi Koreans is broadly distant from first-generation's ideology of return and characterised by a hope to find their own place in Japanese society without obligatorily succumbing to naturalisation and disrecognition.

The hegemonic position of nationalist discourses inside and outside the Zainichi community, however, hindered the definition of the Zainichi experience outside the essentialist conception of belonging and identity in absolute terms that solely gave way to two possible identitarian positions which mutually excluded one another. As discussed in Chapter 3, difference plays a paramount role in the process of identity formation (Hall, 1996). However, understanding younger Zainichis' experience requires finding the source of difference, not only in the 'constitutive outside' (Derrida, 1991) represented by Japanese society but also within the Zainichi community itself. Thus, the generational change can be envisaged as the overcoming of the first-generation's discourse based on a form of long-distance nationalism, which, for Japan-born Zainichi, is likely to constitute a 'constitutive outside' inside the community wherein they believe they belong. In this context, the experience of younger generations, as 'marginal men' between two cultural spaces – or rather discursive spaces –, can be believed to intensify the impact of a presumable sense of being of oxymoronic nature. Thus, Zainichi Korean younger generations suffered from a "double consciousness" (Du Bois, 1989; Gilroy, 1993), a dual identity based upon their experience in both the Japanese cultural space and the Zainichi Korean ethnic space; two irreconcilable spaces opposed to each other, where belonging was interpreted in the absolute terms of nationalism and where whatever aspiration for an in-between existence was condemned.

3.1. The 'Third Way' and the Emergence of Alternative Discourses

In 1970 the second-generation Zainichi Park Chong-Seok passed the employment examination to occupy a position in the Hitachi Corporation. As was common among Zainichi Koreans, Park had completed his job application using his Japanese-style alias. The joy derived from his successful result in the examination process, however, turned into despair when Park was informed by Hitachi that his application had been withdrawn because he could not produce a copy of his family register [koseki] as he was not naturalised Japanese. Park decided to sue Hitachi, accusing the company of racial discrimination in the employment process, in what was

the first case wherein a Zainichi Korean took a Japanese corporation to court (Lee and De Vos, 1981b: 277-278; Paku, 1999: 39-40). Four years later, the court decided in favour of Park.

This case highlighted the difficult situation wherein Japan-born Zainichi Koreans had to live due to their status of foreigners, despite their incontestable level of assimilation. The Hitachi case paved the way for the emergence of numerous debates around the necessity to find an alternative form of existence in Japanese society. In 1977, Sakanaka Hidenori, the director of the Immigration and Naturalisation Bureau, pointed at naturalisation as the most viable and reasonable alternative for the Zainichi who lived as foreigners, despite being indistinguishable from the Japanese. Sakanaka emphasised the urgency to create the necessary conditions in order to facilitate the naturalisation of Korean residents in Japan (Paku, 1999: 77). Despite the novelty of Sakanaka's argument, which made a clear-cut distinction between the concepts of citizenship and ethnicity (Sakanaka, 1999: 44), the path of naturalisation was still a source of stigmatisation within the Zainichi community.

In contrast with Sakanaka, in 1979, Kim Tong-Myung, a second-generation Zainichi, articulated an alternative identitarian perspective, committed to providing a way-out to the Japan-born Zainichis' identitarian dilemma. In his interview [taidan] with Iimura Jiroo, a professor of the University of Tokyo, Kim spoke about a change of cycle within the Zainichi community marked by the generational change [sedai kôtai]. Kim insisted on the error of considering the presence, and hence the existence, of Zainichi Koreans in Japan as temporary. He also accused the two ethnic organisations, *Sôren* and *Mindan*, of incapacity to provide practical solutions for younger generations' dilemma (Kim, 1988: 23). Kim considered the tendency to stay permanently in Japan not a consequence of the impossibility of an immediate return but as a well-founded desire of the new generations:

It is not about considering a hypothetical return if the peninsula was reunited or if South Korea was democratised, the fact is that we do live in Japan and we do want to live here. This is a right we have and so it should be expressed as such.

Kim, 1988: 70

In order to make this common desire viable, Kim Ton-Myung proposed a 'Third Way' [daisan no michi] that would allow for a Zainichi existence as an ethnic group with civil rights in Japan. Likewise, he made it clear that the transmission of certain knowledge and cultural aspects was fundamental for the maintenance of an ethnic consciousness. However, this transmission was no easy task for the second and subsequent generations. As Kim put it:

Even though they themselves do not have clear ethnic characteristics, the second and third generations must provide the subsequent generations with an ethnic consciousness [minzoku ishiki]. They must transmit their children a love for a homeland [sokoku] they don't even know. They have to make them learn a language they don't even speak. Even if we had the sympathy of the first-generation, it seems to me that they cannot really understand the difficulty in transmitting something we don't even know. Personally, the more I think about it the more I realise that this is a lonely and sad task. [...] Something that the Zainichi can't help asking themselves is 'how can I have my children acquire a knowledge I don't have?', 'How can I raise my children with an ethnic consciousness shaped through the fight against discrimination?'. Therefore, the question of education is parallel to the Zainichi existence. This is where the third form of Zainichi exists, this is the Third Way.

Kim, 1988: 69-70

Considering education, and in particular ethnic education, an integral element of the existence as Zainichi, during the interview, Kim remarked the need to elaborate a proper curriculum in ethnic schools. Ethnic education was fundamental but not any kind of ethnic education. Kim criticised the educational systems of the hegemonic ethnic organisations, particularly that of *Sôren*, due to their lack of practicality derived from its ideological orientation. *Sôren*'s ethnic education would be focused on the transmission of a sort of devotion for Kim Il-Sung and the advocacy of Socialism, rather than providing the necessary instruments to develop a prosperous life in Japanese society that is clearly capitalist (Kim, 1988: 63).

Another salient element in Kim's proposal is "the overcoming of history" (Kim, 1988: 30-36). By these words, Kim means the overcoming of the conception of Zainichi Koreans as victims. After more than three decades living in Japan, it was common, especially for the younger generations, to have Japanese friends and even feel an attachment [aichaku] towards Japan. This reality should, hence, lead to both a new interpretation of the Zainichi existence away from the idea of victims and the disassociation of Japanese from the idea of aggression. This way, Zainichi Koreans, according to Kim, could live in Japan as ethnic-Korean citizens and collaborate in Japanese society as its active members.

The Third Way articulated by Kim Tong-Myung signified the occupation of a third space separated from the ethnocentric conceptions of nationhood, where the totalities of Japaneseness and Koreanness were displaced by the conception of 'Zainichi' as central (Chapman, 2008: 44). It assumed a form of existence in Japan as a home without losing an ethnic consciousness and reconfigured traditional discourses about belonging, delegitimising homeland's hegemonic place for Zainichi Koreans' sense of belonging and recognising Japan as a legit place to belong. Having transcended the ideology of return, second and third generations did not have to succumb to the dichotomy represented by the differentialist and the assimilationist trends. They were ready to take over both trends and negotiate both their ethnicity and their membership in

Japanese society. The ‘Third Way’ conceived an existence in-between, maintaining an ethnic pride and consciousness, while being culturally assimilated, as well as envisaging an active membership in Japan as citizens [shinmin] without resorting to naturalisation.

4. Taking Over the Differentialist and the Assimilationist Trends

The Third Way not only presented an alternative discourse but also became empirically representative of certain sectors of the Zainichi community already involved in civic activism. Both the differentialist and the assimilationist trends obviously had a significant impact on Zainichi Koreans’ everyday life. However, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a progressive takeover of both trends by younger generations, which eventually would translate into a certain level of authority over their own representation in Japan and an important demand for civil rights.

4.1. Negotiating Ethnicity: from Involuntary ‘Passing’ to Voluntary Visibility

As aforementioned, passing was for younger generations a default condition. Due to the level of assimilation, going unnoticed and ‘looking Japanese’ to Japanese eyes was out of choice for younger Zainichi Koreans since the 1970s. As Lie assesses, "*not* passing for Zainichi requires a decision to be out of the ethnic closet" (Lie, 2008: 20). However, despite the seeming benefits of not being perceived as different, accepting that default condition as the core of one’s social integration was likely to take a high psychological toll. ‘Coming out’ of the ethnic closet required an intentionality, a voluntary effort to render the invisible visible and the unheard heard; in short, a will to carry out an active exercise of ethnic self-representation. The famed ethnic-Korean singer Akiko Wada once affirmed: “I had no intention to hide my Korean ethnic origin. If asked, I answered. But nobody asked.” (Paku, 2005: 24-25). Therefore, how can Zainichi Koreans render their ethnic origin visible?

Van Den Berghe states that “in situations where some short-distance migration and intermarriage take place... most ethnic groups *look* so much like their neighbours that they *must* rely on cultural markers of distinction” (Van Den Berghe, 1995: 361. Original italics). However, due precisely to the high level of cultural assimilation, ‘relying on cultural markers’ was not entirely possible for many Zainichi. Nonetheless, two elements were considered to be representative of the Korean ethnicity: citizenship and names.

4.1.1. Visibility from Above: Citizenship as an Ethnicity Container

Although the possession of a particular citizenship is not necessarily a synonym of belonging to a particular ethnic group, for Zainichi Koreans the maintenance of a form of legal and institutional bond with either of the Koreas became a way of preserving their Korean ethnicity. For younger generations, political and ideological affiliation was not as important as it had been for their parents. However, the maintenance of the ROK citizenship or even the *Chōsen* register was not only considered a form of ethnicity conservation but also a way of resistance against Japanese assimilationist policies. Thus, it can be affirmed that it was not simply the official recognition of a form of institutional membership in the Korean Peninsula that counted, but it was precisely the reluctance to naturalise Japanese what was prominent for the maintenance of their ethnic identity (Wagatsuma, 1981: 312-13).

Not possessing Japanese citizenship left ethnic-Koreans in a paradoxical position as foreigners in the country where they had always lived. Nonetheless, it also translated into a refusal to accept and comply with the dominant social and administrative norms that required an absolute level of cultural assimilation (Motani, 2002: 228-229). Being a ROK citizen or stateless were seen as synonyms of not being Japanese and hence of being Zainichi Korean. Despite the gradual increase in the number of naturalisations since the 1970s, the number of naturalised Zainichi Koreans remained rather low during the following decades. The maintenance of Korea-oriented forms of administrative registration, furthermore, not only provides Zainichi Koreans with some sort of cultural marker but at the same time it prevents the disappearance of Korean ethnicity ‘from above’. Zainichi Koreans with ROK citizenship as well as those still registered as Chosenese do exist in statistics. Even today the Japanese Statistics Bureau does not consider ethnicity as a variable and, therefore, population census statistics reflect information based only on nationality (citizenship). Consequently, the presence of ethnic groups in Japan can only be represented by foreign citizens as naturalisation automatically includes every possessor of Japanese citizenship into the category of Japanese, obviating whatever ethnic heritage (Ministry of Justice, 2016a). By the same token, after the creation of the Special Permanent Resident Status in 1991, Zainichi Koreans who refuse to naturalise appear in the census statistics as special permanent residents, which gives them visibility ‘above’ (Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan, 2016).

4.1.2. Visibility from Below: Aliases and Ethnic names

There is no doubt that names play a prominent role in individuals’ lives. Hertzler asserts that “an individual has no definition, no validity for himself, without a name. His name is his badge

of individuality, the means whereby he identifies himself and enters upon a truly subjective existence” (1965: 271). Koreans in Japan, due to a colonial legacy marked by policies of cultural assimilation, adopted the custom of negotiating the disclosure of their ‘true subjective existence’ by the usage of aliases. Just like Jews in Germany between 1812 and 1933, Koreans in Japan suffered from a “stigma of names” (Bering, 1992) and looked for shelter in Japanese-style names as a means for escaping discrimination and prejudice.

Even today the usage of Japanese-style aliases [tsûmei] remains a common practice among Zainichi Koreans. Regardless of each individuals’ ethnic consciousness or ethnic pride, the usage of Japanese names can be understood as a strategic performance whereby one can go unnoticed. As Fukuoka points out, “until the late 1970s it was virtually impossible for ethnic Koreans to get employment in Japanese companies” (Fukuoka, 2000: 29). Park Chong-Seok himself consciously used his Japanese alias when applying for a position in Hitachi as a strategy not to be automatically excluded due to his ethnic origin. It is also important to note that such practice is accepted from the legal point of view, as in the case of those Zainichi individuals’ with aliases that are registered, which means that they officially possess two names. The official registration of aliases not only proves the internalisation of their use but also, and most importantly, it demonstrates the recognition and even cooperation of the Japanese state in maintaining prejudice and discrimination.

Since the period of colonial rule and the implementation of assimilation policies, the usage of aliases became a common practice ensuring total invisibility of Zainichi individuals within Japanese society (Ijichi, 1994). However, this tendency changed as a consequence of the Hitachi trial, when the issue of ethnic discrimination was publicly recognised and a tendency to wonder what Japanese society was like emerged among the Japanese (Tanaka, 1995: 134).

Consequently, throughout the 1970s, various initiatives appeared proclaiming the Zainichi’s right to use their ‘real names’ [honmyô]. Considering the social pressure to use aliases in order to gain certain benefits as a form of discrimination, activists sought to promote ethnic pride and condemn discriminatory practices deeply entrenched in Japanese society (Lie, 2008: 110). As a result, many ethnic Koreans decided to ‘come out’ of the ethnic closet and reveal their ethnic names, in many occasions by performing a public ‘real name declaration’ [honmyô sengen] usually in high school or university. The real name declaration movement was also supported by naturalised Zainichi Koreans. In 1985, the Association for the Restoration of Ethnic Names [Minzokumei wo torimodosu kai] was established in Osaka in support for Park Sil and Chong Yang-Jie, both naturalised Japanese, and Yun Choja, who grew up with her Japanese mother’s

name. After years of fighting in court, the three of them won the right to change their names and use their ethnic names (Ijichi, 1994: 97-98).

4.2. Civic activism: Grassroots' Demand for Civil Rights

From 1960s through the 1970s and 1980s, Zainichi Koreans went through a gradual process of denizenisation. However, the result of such process was nowhere close to the status of 'full citizen' and left non-naturalised ethnic-Koreans in a legal limbo as semi-citizens, possessing a certain degree of passive civic rights but lacking any form of active citizenship. The change in the subject position of Zainichi individuals as permanent members of Japanese society, which took place during the 1970s as a consequence of the generational change in the community, motivated a series of movements for the attainment of a wider range of civic rights. Young Zainichi Koreans did not consider themselves outsiders but insiders, and thus sought for a recognition of that position in the legal and social scenarios.

Examples of the struggle for the recognition of Zainichis' position in Japan as insiders can be found in the aforementioned Park Chong-Seok's trial against the Hitachi Corporation and in the legal battle initiated by Kim Kyeong-deuk, who in 1977 appealed to the Supreme Court after becoming a lawyer and passing the national bar examination due to the eventual refusal of his application for an internship position because it was a Japanese-only position (Lee, 2016: 49; Lee and De Vos, 1981b: 278-279). Chapman refers to these years as a "period of self-making," wherein Zainichi Koreans defied the "subjectification of the Japanese state and the hegemony of Zainichi political organizations" (2008: 65), seeking for an emancipation from the traditional discourses.

Thus, the emergence of numerous civic groups [shimin no guruupu] at regional and local levels highlighted the popular demand from Zainichi Koreans and other foreign residents for a legal recognition of their belonging in Japan as permanent 'citizens' [shimin] against the hegemonic notion of 'nationals' [kokumin], from which they were excluded. These civic movements, unlike those that had occurred in the past, originated from below, in the grassroots of society and were not orchestrated by the hegemonic ethnic organisations (Paku, 1999: 69). Not less important is to notice that these grassroots movements in many occasions counted with the support of Japanese citizens, as is the case of the numerous civic associations that emerged in

Kansai since 1947 and fought for the acquisition of social and civil rights for non-naturalised Zainichi Koreans²¹.

4.2.1. The Anti-Fingerprinting Movement

In September 1980, the first-generation Zainichi Korean, Han Chong-Seok, refused to be fingerprinted [shimon ônatsu] at the Shinjuku Ward Office during the process of renewal of his alien registration card. He claimed that fingerprinting constituted a form of ethnic discrimination and a violation of human rights. This “one-man rebellion” (Lie, 2008: 108) highlighted the discriminatory aspect of Japanese Alien Registration Law which, since its passage, required all foreign residents to be fingerprinted upon renewal of their registration every three years. Han’s stand against the discriminatory procedure became an example for many who during the 1980s refused to be fingerprinted. During the early 1980s, the number of Zainichi Koreans refusing increased notably from a couple of isolated cases in 1982 to a total of around 100 refusals in 1985 (Paku, 1999: 54). The protest spread all across Japan with refusals from Koreans and other foreign residents in Japan, reaching a figure of over 10,000 (out of a total of some 360,000 renewals) when the movement reached its peak (Ônuma, 1992: 523). Significant figures from the ethnic-Korean community, such as Kim Suok-Puom and Kang Sang-Jung, also joined the anti-fingerprinting movement (Kang, 2008: 160-170).

This movement signalled the start of a new era of control within the Zainichi community. Observing the figures, of the 107 Zainichi individuals who refused to be fingerprinted, more than half were second or third generation, which turns out to be representative of the generational change and the empowerment of younger generations (Jung Yeong-Hae in Chapman, 2008: 74). In 1985, when the movement was already firmly established and the number of refusals skyrocketed, the Japanese state began to replace black ink with invisible ink and moved from rotating fingerprints to flat fingerprints. As a consequence of Prime Minister Nakasone’s promise announced during the Asian Olympics in Seoul, a new policy whereby the fingerprinting of foreign residents would be done only once in a lifetime was enacted in 1987. This measure led to a weakening of the anti-fingerprinting movement, although not solving the problem entirely (Strausz, 2006: 654). Finally, in 1992 the fingerprinting requirement was revised for special permanent residents and eventually abolished in 1993.

²¹ As Paku Iru explains, the associative effort carried out by Zainichi Koreans and Japanese was crucial for the elimination of the nationality requirement that impeded the acquisition of numerous social rights such as the right for public housing, children endowment or the free access to public transport for the elderly (Paku, 1999: 43-45).

4.2.2. Public Service Employment

Since 1953, the Japanese government restricted access to public service positions exclusively to Japanese nationals [kokumin], based on the Nationality Clause [kokuseki jôkô] set by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, which read: “Japanese nationality is required for civil servants who participate in the exercise of public authority or the formation of public will” (Kim, 2006: 59). However, as Paku points out, according to national and local legislations regarding civil servants, there were no specifications concerning nationality (1999: 45). Despite the absence of formal legal restrictions, local and national governments predominantly applied the 1953 guideline, impeding a large number of Zainichi Koreans from the access to public employment and translating into employment discrimination and the creation of class divisions (Chapman, 2008: 80), as well as the proliferation of an ethnic economy based on self-employment (e.g. *yakiniku* restaurants, *pachinko* slots, etc.) (Lie, 2008: 74).

The public education sector was the scenario for one of the most significant civil fights for the rights of non-naturalised Zainichi Koreans. In 1984, the Zainichi Yang Hong-Ja, after passing the Japanese Teaching Staff Examination [Kyôin Saiyô Shiken] in the Nagano prefecture, was offered a provisional position as a teacher [kyôyu]. However, given the pressure from the Ministry of Education [Monbushô], the offer was retracted. As a consequence of Yang’s incident [Yan-san no jiken], several civil groups engaged in a movement for the cessation of the application of the Nationality Clause in public schools and protested against Nagano prefecture’s committee of education (Paku, 1999: 49). As a result of the civil pressure, in 1985 the committee offered a position as full-time instructor [jôkin kôshi], instead of teacher [kyôyu]²². Despite the apparent restrictive characteristics associated with the category of ‘instructor’ (impossibility to undertake positions such as principal and other positions of responsibility, limited to possessors of Japanese nationality), it can be affirmed that Yang’s incident facilitated the inclusion, albeit partial, of Zainichi Koreans in the educational sector.

Yang’s case, however, was not isolated. Numerous civil movements paved the way for the gradual inclusion of non-naturalised Zainichi Koreans in the public sector. Grassroots associations such as *Yao Tokkabi Kodomo*, *Buraku Kaihō Dōmei* or *Kakomu Kai* actively participated in the fight for the elimination of the Nationality Clause and the inclusion of

²² Yang’s incident set a precedent and nowadays, according to the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology [Monbukagakushô], as a result of the official announcement “on the employment of persons without Japanese nationality, such as Zainichi Koreans, as teaching staff for public education,” non-nationals are permitted to take the Teaching Exam and those who successfully pass the screening process can be employed as full-time instructors (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2009).

Zainichi Koreans in the public sector. Subsequently, public companies such as the Osaka Post Office or Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation eliminated the restrictive clause and gave access to Zainichi Koreans (Paku, 1999: 51-53).

4.2.3. Enfranchisement

Zainichi forfeited suffrage upon amendment of the Election Law in 1945 and the enactment of the Alien Registration Law of 1947. After the dissolution of *Chôren*, the issue was not given enough attention due to the diasporic course taken by the main ethnic organisations, which focused almost exclusively on homeland politics. The enfranchisement issue, however, regained its importance in the late 1980s with the emergence of a modern movement demanding the right to political representation. During its National Congress in 1987, the National Council for Combating Ethnic Discrimination [Mintôren] underlined the necessity for enfranchisement of the foreign permanent resident population in Japan (Paku, 1999: 63). Also in 1987, *Mindan* highlighted the contradiction in the situation of foreign residents, who complied with their duty to pay taxes but were not given voting rights (Paku, 1999: 63). In other words, Zainichi Koreans in the 1980s made the same call for ‘no taxation without representation’ that American colonists did in the eighteenth century. This reappearance of the enfranchisement issue emphasised the notion of permanency and local-level belonging of the Korean community and the restrictive aspect of Japanese legislation (in Weiner and Chapman, 2008: 179).

Subsequent cases appeared in the Japanese Supreme Court wherein Zainichi and other foreign residents highlighted incongruences in the Japanese Constitution. According to the terminology included in the Constitution, it appears that the document refers exclusively to the Japanese nationals [kokumin]. Foreign permanent residents’ fight for political representation paved the way for a wider debate on the definition of ‘citizen’ [shinmin] against ‘national’ [kokumin]. In 1990, a group of nine Zainichi Koreans filed a lawsuit against the Osaka Election Committee for not including them in the voting register (The Japan Times, 2014). Although their attempt to get entitled to vote in local elections failed, in 1995 the Supreme Court in an obiter dictum stated that granting local suffrage to non-Japanese national was not unconstitutional (Neary, 2003: 274).

According to surveys conducted in 1983 and 1995, more than 79 per cent of Zainichi Koreans, regardless of their political affiliation, were in favour of gaining voting rights (Chapman, 2008: 77). An important portion of Japanese public opinion in the 1990s also seemed to support the enfranchisement of Zainichi Koreans, as according to a survey published in 1994 by the Asahi Shinbun, 47 per cent of the Japanese approved Zainichis’ enfranchisement against a 41 per cent

who did not (Paku, 1999: 58). This positive attitude towards the acquisition of civil rights by the foreign resident community has become more apparent in recent years. Another survey also conducted by the Asahi Shinbun in 2010 indicated that around 60 per cent of Japanese are in favour of foreigners' enfranchisement against a 29 per cent who remain reluctant (Asahi Shinbun, 2010).

As a result of the Supreme Court's declaration and general public opinion's approval, certain local governments gradually adapted their policies providing some form of political representation to foreign residents. Maihara in Shiga prefecture became the first city to give suffrage to foreigners after a local ordinance law to enfranchise some 30 permanent residents was passed in 2001 (Day, 2009). Following this pioneering case, other municipalities opted to enfranchise their foreign population (e.g. Takaishi, Tsu or Kawasaki) (Chapman, 2004: 30). As of 2005, a total of approximately 200 municipalities had authorised foreign residents to vote (Green, 2013).

5. Conclusion

In the first section, the two main ideologies that emerged in the Zainichi community from the 1950s were presented. On the one hand, the ideology of return marked first-generation's discourse, which maintained the desire for an eventual return as its main purpose. This brought about the emergence of a long-distance nationalism whereby a large majority of the Zainichi community, mainly represented by *Sôren*, looked at North Korea as the only possible source of a sense of belonging after DPRK officially recognised Zainichi Koreans as its own nationals in the 1950s. Likewise, an urgency to maintain a Korean consciousness appeared in the community, giving way to the establishment of a network of ethnic schools run by *Sôren*. On the other hand, the corroboration of the impossibility for an imminent unification of the Korean Peninsula after the normalisation of relations between Japan and ROK motivated the abandonment of the ideology of return by many Zainichi Koreans who, realising that their future would be tied to the Japanese archipelago, embraced the ideology of 'permanence'. Also in this section, the identitarian dilemma faced by younger generations was addressed. The influence of two trends derived from the two main ideologies marked the existence of Japan-born Zainichi. On the one hand, generated from the ideology of return, 'the differentialist trend' demanded the prioritisation of Korean ethnicity over Japanese ethnicity, that is, the self-differentiation from the concept of Japaneseness. On the other hand, an 'assimilationist trend' motivated the concealment of whatever trace of Korean ethnicity in favour of social inclusion.

In the second section, the inefficiency of both ideologies in providing an identitarian discourse for Japan-born generations was discussed. The exclusivist aspect of both ideologies, which refused any form of existence in-between, brought about an identitarian dichotomy whereby *Zainichi* individuals could be either Korean (differentialist trend) or Japanese (assimilationist trend). The lack of alternative discourses confined Japan-born *Zainichi* to suffer from an ethnic-personal identity conflict due to the impossibility to resolve the identitarian dilemma imposed by the first-generation.

Also in this section, the emergence of an alternative discourse was addressed, playing special attention to the 'Third Way' presented by Kim Tong-Myung in the late 1970s. Younger generations had begun to demand a position in Japanese society as full-right citizens. This demand was interpreted by Kim Tong-Myung in what was denominated a 'Third Way' of existence as *Zainichi* in Japanese society. This new discourse legitimised the empowerment of younger generations and conceived a form of existence where an ethnic consciousness was maintained and a sense of belonging in Japan was represented by the wish for civil rights.

In the third section, significant social movements led mainly by *Zainichi* Koreans were presented as evidence of the application of ideas included in the 'Third Way'. On the one hand, exercises of self-visibility through nationality and names were presented and considered representative of a form of opposition to the assimilationist drive. Various civil movements led by *Zainichi* Koreans were explored and presented as key to understanding the desire of second and third generations to gain full citizenship in Japanese society.

Although the discourse presented in the 'Third Way' can be, at least partially, obsolete, it is still representative of the generational emancipation and empowerment that led to the existence of ethnic-Koreans in Japan as simply *Zainichi* and not necessarily ascribing with either of the nationalist discourses represented by the Japanese government and the *Zainichi* first-generation. This new identitarian perspective paved the way for the subsequent diversification and heterogenisation of identities in the contemporary *Zainichi* community, which are explored in Chapter 8.

Chapter 7. Methodology: Qualitative Research

1. Introduction

For the collection of empirical data, several methods of qualitative research were selected during this study. The generation of original data derived from the application of a multi-methodological research strategy, mainly based on participant observation, semi-structured interviews and in-depth interviews. This chapter is presented as an introduction to the methodology that guided the whole research project since its initial conception, through its experimental application and empirical analysis on the field, to the final stage of interpretation and theorisation. It consists of six main sections: firstly, a philosophical approach is presented with the purpose of making the reader aware of the researcher's standpoint with respect to the labour of research. Secondly, Section 3 provides a thorough explanation regarding the research design selected for the execution of the study, looking at the research questions initially proposed, the methods utilised, the contextual setting for the application of those methods and the sampling strategies carried out for the recruitment of participants. Section 4 presents an account of the empirical application of qualitative methods during the fieldwork, examining the recruitment process, the conduction of observation and interviews, and including a significant reflection on the impact of the research on both participants and the researcher. Section 5 explores the ethical implications of the study, exposing the measures taken for the preservation of the ethical integrity throughout the research. Section 6 presents an approach to the process of data analysis, explaining in detail how the data generated during fieldwork was subsequently handled and prepared for its theoretical examination. Lastly, Section 7 includes a reflection on the position of the researcher in the researched field, highlighting the possible advantages and limitations derived from his condition of 'outsider without'.

2. Philosophical Approach

The overall philosophical approach of this project is mainly based on the paradigm of Critical Theory (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Ontologically speaking, this paradigm assumes that realities, both natural and social, are socially constructed. Therefore, every theorisation of reality and endeavour to define reality is based on assumptions, which are "embedded in theoretical constructs and common-sense thinking" (Blaikie, 1993: 97). This conception of reality as constructed, which has much in common with interpretivism (*ibid.*), rejects objective observation as it considers it impossible – there is no objective reality to observe. More specifically, this research takes Historical Realism as its fundamental ontological base. Albeit apparently contradictory with the Critical Theory paradigm, Historical Realism assumes that

reality, as an objective fact, does not exist but is constructed over time “by a congeries of social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender factors, and then crystallised (reified) into a series of structures that are now (inappropriately) taken as ‘real’, that is, natural and immutable” (Guba and Lincoln, 1994: 110). Hence, it can be asserted that social realities, conceived as objective facts, are nothing but historical realities, which have been socially shaped over time in particular contextualities.

Nevertheless, this project does not simply assume such historical realities as disputable. A postmodernist outlook is also taken as a means to criticise historical assumptions about human sense of belonging (Fortier, 2000; Brah, 1996). Thus, the resort to theories regarding the fluidity of modern society (Bauman, 2000) and the disembedding of social systems (Giddens, 2008) allows for the elaboration of a postmodernist critique of many of those taken-for-granted assumptions about the configuration of social worlds (Shibutani, 1955). Likewise, in an attempt to explain the social facts, this study distances itself from possible reductionist approaches, which prioritise the study of the factors provoking those facts, and focuses on the whole social phenomena (Silverman, 1985). Thus, this project engages in the study of society and social life under the premise that these are “constituted through the practices identified and given meaning by the language used to describe, invoke and carry them out” (Hughes and Sharrock, 1990: 125).

The relativist ontological standpoint proposed above suggests a subjective and transactional epistemology. Due to its relativist dimension, this study presupposes an inevitable influence of the researcher onto the research. As Guba and Lincoln point out, the Critical Theory paradigm assumes that “what can be known is inextricably intertwined with the interaction between a *particular* investigator and a *particular* object or group” (1994: 110. Original italics). This subject-object interaction, however, should not be envisaged as a source of bias, since it is precisely in that interaction where knowledge is created. As Guba and Lincoln put it, “the investigator and the object of investigation are assumed to be interactively linked so that the ‘findings’ are *literally created* as the investigation proceeds” (1994: 111. Original italics).

3. Study Design

This section presents the research plan and study design elaborated for the realisation of the present project, looks at the initial research questions proposed, the qualitative methods selected and applied during fieldwork, and also describes the location and context selected for the conduction of the research as well as the sampling strategy designated.

3.1. Research Questions

This research contributes to several fields in sociology, cultural anthropology and Asian studies. These include areas related to identity studies, transnationalism and Japanology. Also, it participates in the theoretical debate on the impact of transnationalism on the formation of cultural identities within ethnic minority communities with a relativist approach that questions and defies traditional assumptions about both Japanese national identity and Korean ethnic identity.

This project tackles the Zainichi issue from two main scientific perspectives that, in conjunction, provide responses to the research questions set out below. On the one hand, the examination of the topic from an identitarian standpoint permits the theorisation of the Zainichi experience with regard to the self-consciousness of their members. On the other hand, a transnational approach is taken in the study of the Zainichi minority as a social-ethnic collectivity, whose sense of belonging and identity is not necessarily defined in national terms.

Specific research questions to be addressed include:

1. How do Zainichi Koreans develop a Zainichi identity (consciousness) and what are the consequences?
2. What is the impact of ethnic education on Zainichi Koreans' identity formation and diversification?
3. How do Zainichi Koreans construe and interpret their Zainichiness?
4. How do Zainichi Koreans reproduce and represent their Koreanness?
5. How is belonging construed and interpreted by Zainichi Koreans in relation to national and transnational spaces?

3.2. Qualitative Methods: Participant Observation and Interviews

During the conduction of fieldwork, the methodological strategy followed included the following two qualitative methods:

3.2.1. Participant Observation

Being a fundamental method of ethnographical research, participant observation was selected as a method for researching Zainichi culture from within and thus obtaining an objective understanding of community members' behaviour. Additionally, during the present research,

participant observation was conceived not simply as a way of witnessing how the phenomenon of social interaction between community members and other subjects unfolds, but also as a means to develop relationships with key members of the community and gain access to potential informants.

The selection of the participant observation method was motivated by a series of remarkable advantages expressed in the literature (Spradley, 1980; Jorgensen, 1989; Bogdewic, 1992). Due to the long periods of time required, the researcher's presence is likely to become accepted by the community members and hence the observer is "accommodated rather than reacted to" (Bogdewic, 1992: 49). Consequently, study subjects' behaviour and interactions are likely to unfold normally. Thus, the researcher is able to observe real behaviour, unlike, for instance, in interviews where it might be altered during the verbalisation process. Equally important is the fact that, as a "participant observer," the researcher spends time in the study context, witnessing how social interaction takes place, that is, observing "the activities, people and physical aspects of the situation," and "engaging in activities appropriate to [sic] that particular situation" along with community members (Spradley, 1980: 53-54). In consequence, the researcher is expected to attain a deeper level of understanding on how study subjects conceptualise and express important elements within their social world, which turns out to be helpful in the process of designing additional research strategies and methods as well as in refining the researcher's language in accordance to the codes utilised by community members to express their feelings and ideas.

Owing to both the ethical implications of the study and the actual phenotypical characteristics of the author, participant observation was opted to be carried out in an overt manner ("overt participation") as opposed to "covert participation" (Schutt, 2006: 295-298). Therefore, the researcher identified himself as such and stated the purpose of his study on every occasion. With regards to the record keeping techniques employed during participant observation, field notes were taken assiduously and meticulously scrutinised afterwards. This analytical process facilitated the task of establishing a solid set of topics to be raised during interviews as well as permitting the author to identify and become familiar with specific terminology, formal and informal, used by community members, which gradually enabled him to engage in smooth and deep conversations with informants.

3.2.2. Interviews

Interviews are commonly considered the research method par excellence in social sciences (Mason, 2002; Plummer, 2001; Silverman, 1985). However, the act of interviewing is not

simple and should not be taken as defined in absolute terms. The epistemological perspective assumed in this project requires an approach to qualitative interviewing that takes into account the interactive dimension between the researcher and the researched as fundamental in the creation of knowledge. As a researcher, the author of this study believes that his own conscious and unconscious interests and expectations are, to some extent, likely to have a positive impact on the project. For this reason, it was considered that the interview act should not be viewed as a mere Q&A exercise between an active part, the interviewer – the subject –, and a passive part, the interviewee – the object. It is paramount, therefore, to not focus on the results expected (and more suitable for pre-established conceptions) but on the process of interaction itself.

This initial perception motivated the choice for loosely structured interview methods that were expected to give a certain degree of authority and control to the interviewees (Mason, 2002) and permit them to decide what it is really important in the study of their own social and personal experiences. This, however, does not entail a role-swap that leaves the researcher in a merely passive position. The researcher is responsible for the act of interviewing inasmuch as he looks for it to happen, thematically organises it and, especially, maintains the curiosity that makes him truly listen (Terkel in Plummer, 2001: 140).

Nonetheless, emphasising and facilitating an act of interaction during the ‘generation of data’ (Mason, 2002) can lead to bias in the results (Plummer, 2001), regardless however much the researcher tries to keep distance. Likewise, it should be expected that the cultural and social position of the researcher conditions interviewees’ self-representation (Goffman, 1990) and hinders the process of information disclosure (Gray, 2003). Notwithstanding, this should not necessarily be viewed as overly problematic for the research in general but as an inextricable condition for understanding human life experiences – as Plummer puts it, “[t]o purge research of all these ‘sources of bias’ is to purge research of human life” (2001: 156). Furthermore, in the particular case of this project, author’s position as a complete outsider – from the Japanese social, political and ethnical contexts – is expected to be beneficial and facilitate the disclosure of personal information. For the reasons espoused above, semi-structured and in-depth interviews are viewed as the most adequate qualitative method for the purpose of this research.

3.3. Research Location and Context

The fieldwork for the present study was conducted in the Kansai Region (southern-central part of Japan), mainly in the city of Osaka, for a period of ten months (September 2015 – August 2016). The selection of Osaka and the Kansai Region as the main research locations was motivated by two principle reason: on the one hand, Osaka is known for having the largest

population of Zainichi Koreans and for having been, since their settlement in Japan, the core of much of the community's history and activist struggle. On the other hand, Kansai in general, and Osaka in particular, are the source of a strong sentiment of regional identity in Japan, which turns out to be of great significance for the study of transnational and multidimensional identities among Zainichi Koreans.

Although most of the fieldwork took place in the locations specified above, the researcher also travelled to other locations such as Tokyo, Kyoto, Kobe, etc. with the purpose of visiting archives and museums (e.g. The History Museum of J-Koreans in Tokyo), attending specialised seminars (e.g. Doshisha University's Japan-Korea historical relations seminars in Kyoto) and participating in events organised by different Zainichi Korean associations.

Furthermore, during the second half of the fieldwork period (March 2016 – August 2016) the author decided to change the location of his accommodation and stay in the Ikuno ward (Osaka), which is the area of Japan with the largest presence of Zainichi Koreans and the epicentre of Zainichi-related activities. This decision was made out of the determination to be in daily contact with the community and facilitate the conduction of qualitative research. This decision turned out to be notably advantageous to the study due to its positive impact on the development of relationships with a wide range of Zainichi Koreans.

3.4. Sampling Strategy

The sampling strategy for this project was based on mixed methods. Particularly, stratified sampling and purposeful sampling (Patton, 2015) methods were combined in order to cover four specified segments of the population as well as to select information-rich cases from each segment.

In the first place, based on participant observation and the literature, the study population was stratified according to their educational background and experience in ethnic education environments. Therefore, four main groups were identified:

1. Individuals with experience at any Korean (*Chōsen*) ethnic school.
2. Individuals with experience at the Korean (*Kenkoku*) ethnic school.
3. Individuals with experience at Japanese public schools who had not attended extracurricular ethnic classes.
4. Individuals with experience at Japanese public schools who had attended extracurricular ethnic classes.

Following this, purposeful sampling methods, particularly snowball sampling, were utilised to gain access to potential informants whose personal experiences as Zainichi Koreans could turn out to be of particular significance. Thus, community members encountered during participant observation were questioned on possible information-rich cases. Subsequently, three informants per each of the four segment groups aforementioned were selected to undertake interviews, always considering the relevance or particularities of their personal cases (Table 11).

Furthermore, additional requirements were also considered in the sampling process. Firstly, participants had to be of adult age (20-year-old in Japan) at the moment of the interview. Secondly, participants had to be Zainichi Korean of third or fourth generation²³. Lastly, participants had to be born and raised in the Kansai Region. No gender or maximum age restrictions were included.

Table 11. Research Participants

No.	Initials	Schooling	Age	Sex	Generation
4	X.X.	Chôsen School 01	33	Male	3rd
5	K.S.	Chôsen School 02	41	Male	3rd
10	X.X.	Chôsen School 03	25	Female	3rd
1	H.C.	Japanese School 01	39	Male	3rd
2	T.I.	Japanese School 02	49	Male	3rd
3	I.K.	Japanese School 03	45	Male	3rd
7	X.X.	Kenkoku School 01	26	Male	3rd
9	X.X.	Kenkoku School 02	38	Female	3.5*
11	K.S.	Kenkoku School 03	20	Male	4th
6	H.S.	Extracurricular Ethnic Edu. 01	44	Male	2.5
8	W.O.	Extracurricular Ethnic Edu. 02	33	Female	3rd
12	X.X.	Extracurricular Ethnic Edu. 03	36	Male	3rd

(*): Decimal numbers indicate individuals born to parents from different generations (e.g. 3.5 generation refers to a participant born to second-generation and third-generation parents.).

²³ An exception to this requirement can be found in the case of participant MG-1 who was of 2.5 generation (first generation father and second generation mother). However, due to the relevance of his account and the apparent absence of particular bias in his narration, this case was not discarded.

4. Data Collection

In this section, the process of data collection for the study during the fieldwork is examined. Firstly, a description of the process of participant recruitment is presented. Secondly, a detailed explanation regarding the application of the methods selected (participant observation and interviews) is presented, paying special attention to the stages that marked the conduction of interviews. Finally, a reflection concerning the relationship between the researcher and the research participant as well as the subsequent impact of the research on the participant is also presented.

4.1. Participants' Recruitment

Due to the nature of the study and the limited number of possible informants known previously to the conduction of participant observation, all informants for this study were recruited either during author's attendance and participation in events or as a result of introductions or recommendations from other community members. Although some of the participants were contacted and recruited in person at the various events attended, most of the informants were recruited through snowball sampling (Rubin and Babbie, 2010: 148-149). This method was fundamental, not only in gaining access to eventual informants, but also in identifying particular social networks among Zainichi Koreans. Also, this turned out to be of great help for the researcher in locating networking patterns and grasping a deeper understanding of general segments of population existing in the community, which eventually configured the four target groups aforementioned.

Once potential informants were contacted, either in person or via email/social networks, they received an information sheet (print or electronic copy) which included a brief explanation of the research project and its ultimate purpose, researcher's profile and academic background, information regarding privacy and confidentiality (in comprehensible language to guarantee their entire understanding), and a formal invitation to participate²⁴. Receivers of this information sheet were asked to confirm their participation afterwards (via email, social networks or text message) and invited to ask whatever questions they had or specify whatever topics they preferred to omit during interview.

²⁴ A copy of the original Information Sheet used during the recruitment process can be found in Appendixes A and B.

It is fair to remark that kind recommendations and introductions from other fellow researchers (Myeonhee Kim and Minsu Kim) and university professors (Prof. Noriko Ijichi and Prof. Paku Iru from Osaka City University and Prof. Kichan Song from Ritsumeikan University), staff from Zainichi-related associations (*Hanchung* and KEY) and NGOs (Korea NGO), as well as teachers, students and volunteers from Korean ethnic schools and Japanese public schools were essential for access to participants and their eventual recruitment.

4.2. Participant Observation

Initially, observation was carried out as an exercise of exploration of the setting to be researched. With the purpose of mapping the territory of study, the researcher attended a number of Zainichi-related events, which allowed him to get in contact with primary informants. These initial contacts turned into a chance to engage in casual conversations regarding the social and cultural situation of Zainichi Koreans, as well as to grasp an actual understanding of how the community has diversified over the years.

Subsequently, with the increase in the number of informants and acquaintances within the community, the author could get involved and participate in a larger number of events. These events can be classified into two main groups: public and private. On the one hand, public events comprised of, for example, visiting Korean school open days or particular festivals, attending meetings and lectures organised by Zainichi associations and volunteering in the preparation of certain events. The involvement in such events was crucial for networking with community members and learning about the diverse networks existing in it. On the other hand, private events principally consisted of invitations to join casual gatherings (lunches, dinners, meetings, etc.) where individuals, Japanese, Zainichi and members of other ethnic minorities, who in numerous occasions held a position of relevance in the community, came together. Additionally, the author was also often invited for dinner and tea by participants along with their families and friends.

Furthermore, during his participation in events, the author engaged in an exercise of “descriptive observation” by “approaching the activity in process without any particular orientation in mind, but only the general question, ‘What is going on here?’” (Spradley, 1980: 73). The recording of relevant information from the field was generally carried out through the collection of field notes and, in some particular cases, through audio recordings, which were carefully analysed afterwards. During casual gatherings, however, notes and audio recordings were solely collected under the authorisation of the people involved, since personal matters were brought up with frequency.

Overall, a great part of the data collected from participant observation was fundamental to the successive elaboration and design of question plans and thematic charts orientated to the conduction of posterior interview sessions.

4.3. Conduction of Interviews

In the following paragraphs, the process of interviewing, of major importance for the study, is exhaustively examined, paying particular attention to the contextual setting and the structure followed.

4.3.1. Interview Context and Language

In every case, after informants' participation in the study was confirmed, they were invited to choose a place of their convenience for the interview in order to respect their privacy and preferences. All the 24 interview sessions took place in public spaces such as restaurants, cafes, parks, etc., where privacy and safety could be guaranteed for both the interviewee and the researcher. There was only one exception to this, in the case of MG-3, whose sessions were conducted at the offices of the KEY organisation. As a gesture of appreciation and gratitude for their cooperation, incentives were given to participants in form of souvenirs, gifts, food, etc. In addition, the researcher intended to take care for the bill for participants' consumptions during the interviews. However, this token of gratitude was not always accepted, especially by older participants who, following Korean traditional norms of Confucianism, insisted on paying the bill.

With regards to the language use, the author adapted his language, both in terms of codes and expressions, in order to show comprehension and respect towards participants' culture as well as willingness to adjust to the cultural situation. In particular, researcher's previous knowledge of the Korean language facilitated the task of articulating questions using specific Zainichi-Korean terminology. For instance, oft-used Korean words for 'homeland', 'Korean Peninsula', 'father', 'mother', 'school', etc. were constantly used during interviews. On the other hand, other specific terminology in Japanese referring to particular feelings or ideas was gradually adopted and intentionally used by the author in an attempt to ease the process of communication and provide conversations with a natural tone. As a result, interviews were conducted in a notably fluid manner that allowed interviewees and the researcher to engage in deep levels of introspection and mutual understanding.

4.3.2. Interviewing Process

Interviews with each participant were divided in two different sessions with an average lapse of two weeks in between. Each interview session was conducted in Japanese and audio-recorded. Sessions took place during the day in public spaces agreed with each participant in order to avoid any potential risk. During the first interview session, semi-structured interviews, which were highly orientated in the manner of life-story interviews as proposed by Atkinson (1998), were conducted with the objective of giving the interviewees, as “*homo narrans*” (Plummer, 2001: 263), the chance to organise their own account and identify, by themselves, the topics that turned out to be most crucial in their identity development. During second sessions, in-depth interviews were conducted in order to get more detailed accounts regarding specific topics raised during first sessions. The main goal of second sessions, whose structure was intentionally flexible, was enabling a contrastive analysis of each experience with respect to particular historical, political and social issues discussed in the literature review, and thus obtaining specific information concerning particular issues identified during first interview sessions with each informant. This permitted a contrastive thematic analysis of each Zainichi perspective in accordance with their background.

i. Session 1: Semi-structure Interviews

The main goal in session 1 was obtaining a detailed account from each participant with regard to their lives as members of the community. Instead of structuring the interview with specific and closed questions, a set of topics elaborated from the literature and related to a number of general issues was established as a thematic guide to “ensure that the relevant contexts are brought to into focus so that situated knowledge can be produced” (Mason, 2002: 62). Consequently, this loose structure provided interviewees with the sufficient narrative freedom to relate their own biographical stories.

General topics were tackled with open-ended descriptive, structural and contrastive questions. These types of questions were meant to take the interview to a feeling level (Atkinson, 1998: 5), granting the researcher access to the particularities of each participant’s life experience (Arksey and Knight, 1999: 82). Mason defines interviews as “conversations with a purpose” (2002: 67) and it is clear that such definition refers, in general, to the generation of data meaningful for the research. However, the act of interview as interaction is also likely to result in parallel achievements that seeing one’s own life in perspective may bring about (Artkinson, 1998: 25-26). In the particular case of this project, interviews in session 1 contributed to the building of rapport between the interviewees and the interviewer based on trust and mutual understanding

(Arksey and Knight, 1999: 101) that allowed for a more specific, sensitive and personal approach during second sessions.

The set of questions used in this session was classified in several topics relevant to transnationalism and identity studies. Participants were asked about general aspects of their families and backgrounds and also were invited to reflect about issues related to their life, self-consciousness and identity.

ii. Intra-session analysis

Due to its wide range of functions, thematic analysis was used to examine the data generated during session one. This analytical method permits an interpretative and constructive approach to be taken in the process of working with qualitative data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The intra-session analysis process consisted of three stages: familiarisation, indexation and thematisation.

Familiarisation with the data was a fundamental step in the analysis of qualitative data. This process took place both during the interaction with interviewees and, especially, during the transcription of audio-recorded interviews. In order to avoid possible interpretation problems in the process of translation, interviews were analysed directly in the original language and certain extracts were occasionally translated during memo taking. Likewise, in order to capture the meaning from the discourse, a semiotic approach was taken during the transcription process reflecting non-verbal communication into in-text notes.

The second stage of intra-session analysis was indexation. This process of classification of main notions allowed for the examination of “the underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualizations – and ideologies – that are theorised as shaping or informing the semantic content of the data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 84). This initial indexation was based on two main patterns: relevance to research questions and repetition at three levels (individual, background-group and general).

Lastly, thematisation permitted the conceptualisation of the information indexed through diverse general themes, which were eventually used as the theoretical guide for the elaboration of session 2 question plans.

iii. Session 2: In-depth interviews

Session 2 consisted of in-depth interviews. It is important, however, to point out that, although specific, semi-closed questions structured the interview during this session, it was the author’s

intention to maintain a qualitative perspective and avoid any structural rigidity. Additionally, the reviewing of themes and answers from first sessions was occasionally performed, with the purpose of clarifying particular points or ideas and tackling issues in greater depth. This reflective factor, consequently, was beneficial in stimulating the production of more complex and profound responses. Also, session 2 was meant to provide interviewees with the possibility to interpret and put into perspective their life experiences in relation to their position in the Zainichi community and Japanese society in general.

4.3.3. Rapport Building and Impact on Participants

During the whole process of recruitment and interviewing, it was considered fundamental to provide participants with the sufficient space and time to gradually open up and prepare to narrate their vital experiences – venturing into sensitive territory. In so doing, the researcher was not only flexible in establishing appointments adequate to participants' daily schedules and routines, but also it was considered essential to create an amicable and relaxed atmosphere appropriate for the natural unfolding of each conversation. Also, stiff formalities were intentionally abandoned during the whole interviewing process, and interviews progressively became casual conversations wherein relevant and not-so-relevant matters were discussed. This does not mean that the informal atmosphere created eventually corrupted the study by inverting or breaking down the interviewer-interviewee relationship, as the author was constantly aware and ensured that interviews did not lose their significance as “conversations with a purpose” (Mason, 2002: 67). However, given that “interviewing is always interactional and constructive” (Holstein and Gubrium 2004: 143), it turned out that interspersions between related and unrelated subjects, as well as the mutual sharing of experiences between the interviewer and the interviewees, helped build a rapport and, in some cases, friendships.

The disclosure of the personal reasons behind the author's interest in the Zainichi issue and the sharing of personal experiences as well as his willingness to respond to participants' questions and reveal his personal view on issues related to Japanese society were deemed important in the creation of a common ground between both parts. Most informants were notably collaborative, enthusiastic and responsive during interview sessions. Likewise, the author received great support from most participants in the form of verbal encouragement and, most significantly, in the form of personal invitations to private gatherings and public events as well as by offering relevant materials, such as magazines, books, DVDs, etc.

Finally, some of the participants showed appreciation and expressed gratefulness at the end of interview sessions. This sentiment of gratitude was manifested in general and particular terms.

Participants with notable awareness about their position in Japanese society thanked the author for providing a new look into the Zainichi issue and contributing to the international visibilisation of the matter. Personal manifestations of gratitude were expressed by a number of participants, who stated that, through their participation in the study and their consequent engagement in an exercise of introspection, they managed to develop a higher level of comprehension on their Zainichi condition and a sentiment of release.

5. Ethical Implications

The present research project raised a limited number of ethical issues, which are identified in this section in accordance to the University of Leeds standards and discussed below. The ethical issues addressed are related to the qualitative aspect of the research, which involved the conduction of interviews and participant observation as the most appropriate methods for the purpose of this project.

5.1. Informed Consent

All interviewees received a formal invitation containing all the information regarding the nature and objectives of the project and concerning the relevance of their participation for the research. In addition, thorough information on the methods for handling their personal data was included (in comprehensible language to guarantee their entire understanding) as well as a summary of the researcher's academic background and current position.

A short information sheet was prepared detailing the issues above and provided to all participants in advance of the interview via email or in person. A printed copy of the information sheet was also handed to and read through with all participants at the moment of the interview. Furthermore, a consent form reflecting information with regards to the assurance of confidentiality and anonymity as well as data retention and protection was also given to each participant before the beginning of the first interview session²⁵. Those deciding to participate in the interviews were required to sign the informed consent form as well as express their conformity verbally at the beginning of each interview session.

5.2. Confidentiality and Anonymity

²⁵ A copy of the original Consent Form used during the recruitment process can be found in appendixes C and D.

The identity of the participants was protected throughout the research process, guaranteeing total confidentiality. Also, the audio recordings collected during the interviews were stored securely in external password-protected devices and transcribed afterwards within the next two weeks. Once transcribed, recordings were destroyed and only transcriptions were preserved. Anonymity in the transcriptions was also assured by storing identification data and transcriptions in separate password-protected files.

None of the participants who participated in the project held any official position in any institution that could lead to their eventual identification. However, informants are solely identified in the study either in general terms referring to their age, sex, background and occupation or by indicating their educational background through acronyms (Table 12), so that the non-identification from third parties is guaranteed.

Table 12. Participants Identification Acronyms.

Acronym	Correspondence	Educational background
CG (-1, -2, -3)	Chôsen Gakkô	Korean (<i>Chôsen</i>) School
JS (-1, -2, -3)	Japanese School	No ethnic education
KG (-1, -2, -3)	Kenkoku School	Korean (<i>Kenkoku</i>) School
MG (-1, -2, -3)	Minzoku Gakkô	Extracurricular ethnic Education

These procedures ensured compliance with the current EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, the UK Data Protection Act 1998 and the Act of Protection of Personal information (Law No. 57 of 2003) of the Japanese legislation.

5.3. Sensitivity of the Topic

Due to its nature, this research entailed a consideration of issues that could have had an impact on the feelings, ideas and values of the participants involved. Considering that participants might have found certain topics or questions distressing and upsetting, they were given the opportunity to refuse discussing certain issues (no participant refused to tackle any particular topic). Also, as indicated on the informed consent sheet, participants were given the chance to pause or suspend interview sessions at any time. However, no intention was held from the researcher's side to interrupt interview sessions as a result of participant's emotional reactions

(unless these were clearly detrimental to the participant or the researcher). It was considered that catharsis could have a positive impact (self-validation, sense of empowerment, reassurance, etc.) in participants and that, hence, emotional reactions should not be deemed as negative responses.

It is noteworthy to mention that, although neither the nature of the research nor the researcher himself held any intention of making interview sessions function as a therapy, psychological and emotional benefits for participants were held in high consideration. For this reason, it was considered of great importance to develop a rapport based of reciprocity with each participant from recruitment through not only respect for participants' experiences and readiness, but also by means of self-disclosure from the researcher's side. Eventually, such rappers guaranteed rather a natural development of interview sessions and were fundamental to overcome potential distressing or upsetting situations.

6. Approaches to Data Analysis

The analysis of data in the present study was carried out by taking the Glaser and Strauss's (1967) Grounded Theory Approach. The choice of this approach was motivated by its "[relevance] for qualitative research as a whole" (Flick, 2009: 428), being a "method [that] offers the tools for conducting successful research" (Charmaz, 2014: 5). The analysis of final data collected from interview sessions (two manuscripts per participant) was carried out in two main phases: transcription and coding.

Transcriptions were made by using Express Scribe Transcription Software (NCH Software). The resulting files were subsequently converted into Microsoft Word files for revision and formatting purposes. The process of transcribing audio recordings was carried out as accurately and precisely as possible, including every single word said by interviewees and without omitting anything in order that transcriptions contained all the data generated. Additionally, non-verbal communication, such as voice tone, sighs, laughter, length of pauses, etc., was also reflected in the transcriptions by in-text notes.

Subsequently, transcriptions were read and reread on numerous occasions so as to obtain a thorough idea about each participant's account. Also, an initial phase of thematisation was carried out by creating a single profile report for each participant, which contained basic information regarding age, education, naming, nationality, etc. This turned out to be of great help at the moment of contrasting different accounts and identifying common points among participants' stories.

Once the author acquired a clear understanding of each account and profile reports were complete, the coding phase of the analysis was initiated. According to Charmaz, “[c]oding is the pivotal link between collecting data and developing an emergent theory to explain these data” (Charmaz, 2014: 46). For this reason, much effort was devoted to this phase, which was performed following a Grounded Theory-oriented coding strategy. It entailed the creation of initial categories and identification of significant concepts in the text for a posterior elaboration of axial categories and core categories, which later became the sections configuring the results chapter of this work. In order to ease the coding phase and render the transcription text more manageable, Microsoft Word documents were converted into Microsoft Excel files, wherein codes and text excerpts were organised in cells.

During the coding phase of the analysis, it was considered prominent for the final quality of the study to not condition or bias resulting codes with preconceived ideas, as it is expected that “[c]odes ‘emerge’ from data and [sic] be not imposed *a priori* upon it” (Flick, 2009: 428). Therefore, to ensure the natural ‘emergence’ of codes and concepts from the data, the coding phase was performed through three main steps: open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Corbin and Strauss, 1990).

Firstly, an initial phase of open coding was carried out in order to break down the data analytically by categorising and conceptualising it. As a result, transcriptions were divided, paragraph-by-paragraph and line-by-line, into a large number of open categories. Secondly, a subsequent phase of axial coding was performed, which implied the formation of conceptual and categorical groups according to the open codes previously generated. In other words, more general categories were created as a result of the analysis of the correlation existing among initial categories and concepts. Thus, open codes were condensed and grouped into much more manageable categories of axial codes. Lastly, selective coding was carried out by examining open and axial codes in a reflective manner and subsequently unifying them around core categories. This last step was useful to identify inconsistent or content-lacking categories, which eventually needed to be refined and redefined, as well as to establish a solid structure for the results chapter, wherein each core category eventually became a section.

In regards to the language used during the data analysis, Japanese continued to be used as the primary language in order to respect the metalinguistic integrity of the conversations maintained with informants. Considering the task of translation not simply as a process of search for linguistic equivalences but as a substantially more complex process of metalinguistic interpretation and transplantation of culture-tied forms of understanding of particular realities,

the translation of certain extracts of text was, therefore, done only when strictly necessary for their inclusion in final drafts of the study.

7. Reflections on the Research Process: Outsider Within or Outsider Without

The epistemological positioning of this project assumes that the research itself relies on interaction as the fundamental factor in the creation of knowledge. However, it is also essential to pay attention to the position that each of the agents of the research assumes. Commonly, the position of the researcher with respect to the participant is analysed in terms of belonging and understanding. Hence, the position of the researcher is viewed in rather absolute terms of insider or outsider with reference to the social world of the participant (Bridges, 2001). Nevertheless, this perspective should be relativised, as it does not explain entirely the complexity of qualitative research in social sciences.

In the process of interaction with members of particular communities, particularly those represented by disempowered groups, the researcher's attempt to explore the social world of the participant is likely to be seen as a form of intrusion. That is because, as Bridges points out, the "researcher will always be something of an outsider in his or her own community by virtue of becoming a researcher, especially in any community which is itself culturally remote from the world of academe" (2001: 2). Furthermore, as argued by Spivak (1989), cultural differences between the researcher and the researched and particularly the hegemonic position held by the former – the academic – with respect to the latter – the *subaltern* – are expected to hinder the transference of knowledge and disrupt the message of the researched, due to researcher's incapability to comprehend and, therefore, represent the complexity of the social world of the researched. Despite their unquestionable validity, these argumentations partly fall into the realm of reductionism as they assume a solipsistic perspective on knowledge that, in itself, neglects the notion of knowledge as understandable and conceptualisable from outside the individual dimension.

Distancing from such perspective and attending to the particular case of this project, the researcher's position as outsider needs to be relativised and reconceptualised because *what is exactly that place the researcher is outside of?* In the case study of this research, the categorisation of the Zainichi community as a disempowered minority strictly pertains to the sociological dimension of Japan as a specific society. Hence, it can be asserted that the disempowering force comes exclusively from that dimension. Therefore, the inside-outside interaction is restricted, in terms of power, to Japanese society. This assumption helps to outline

differences between two separate dimensions of outside-ness: power and space. Thus, power-outsideness represents agents within the mainstream Japanese social context and without the Zainichi social world, whereas space-outsideness includes all agents not pertaining either to the mainstream Japanese social context or to the Zainichi social world.

This being clear, it was considered throughout the conduction of this research that researcher's position as a space-outsider is likely to bring about particular advantages. Not being a member of either Japanese society or the Zainichi community led to assumptions about a presumed incapacity not only to understand the actual complexity of the issues to research but also to communicate appropriately with participants. It is believed, however, that the author's voluntary self-representation as a researcher with the necessary linguistic, cultural, cognitive and sensitive competencies (Bestor, Steinhoff and Bestor, 2003) pulls down many of those assumptions. In addition, despite his belonging to a different cultural context, the exhibition of interest to contribute to the international recognition of the issue and his intension to participate in the creation of knowledge, which could potentially have a positive impact on the community, could possibly translate into the attainment of access to the community. Likewise, the apparent (and certain) lack of prejudice from the researcher's side could also motivate participants to allow him to reach deeper and more intimate levels of their self-consciousness.

8. Conclusions

In this chapter, the key points around the conduction of the research project were thoroughly explicated. This chapter examined the process of elaboration of a consistent research plan with a well-founded philosophical approach, where a multi-methodological strategy was selected in order to, firstly, gain access to the sources of information and, eventually, to generate original data relevant for the elaboration of a solid theory. Subsequently, this chapter also looked at the process of application of qualitative methods during the fieldwork. Participant observation exercises guaranteed the access to the field of study as well as to multiple sources of information. Subsequently, with a total of 24 sessions, semi-structured and in-depth interviews allowed the researcher to grasp a thorough understanding of the Zainichi experience at present, as well as to comprehend the process of identity formation in Zainichi individuals and their apprehension and interpretation of concepts such nation, ethnicity and belonging.

The second half of this chapter included an examination of the data analysis procedures applied in this study. The transcription phase was described in detail, ensuring a correct capture and transplantation of all the information disclosed during interviews, both verbal and non-verbal. Likewise, the subsequent coding process was also examined in detail, describing the principle

stages followed and their relevance for the final work. In the end, the chapter concluded with a post-fieldwork reflection on the position of the researcher with respect to research context and the subjects of study, highlighting the, initially unapparent, significance of the author's position as a 'researcher without' in this particular project.

In conclusion, it can be, therefore, affirmed that all the phases, of which the present research project consisted, were in every case crucial for the successful execution of the study.

Chapter 8. Results: Unravelling Zainichi Identities

1. Introduction

This is a significant chapter because it presents the results obtained from the application of qualitative research methods throughout the ten-month period devoted to the exploration, study and examination of the case study proposed in this project. Since its primary stages, it was the purpose of this study to analyse the identitarian dimensions of Zainichi Korean younger generations nowadays. As its main hypothesis, this project raised the question of the impact of transnationalism on the development of multi-dimensional identities within the Zainichi younger population, where the hegemonic position of the nation as a source of identity and sense of belonging becomes discontinued.

As a result of conducting multi-methodological research in the field, the present project provides new data and sheds new light on the multidisciplinary scientific study of the formation of new identities outside the nation-state paradigm in the current globalising world. In so doing, this research presents a new set of empirical data, generated and collected from the realisation of fieldwork through conducting multiple exercises of participatory observation in various settings as well as qualitative semi-structured and in-depth interviews with 12 informants from differentiated educational backgrounds. Furthermore, the perspective of analysis proposed, which observes the community through the scope of ethnic education's influence on individuals, entails an original form of conceptualisation of the Zainichi identitarian reality, not simply with respect to the Japanese majority, but also in relation to the community members themselves.

The unusual length and structure of this chapter is motivated by the author's intention to provide and maintain a congruent line of argumentation where ideas and theories flow and converge coherently. Nonetheless, the chapter is carefully divided in four main sections, which present and tackle prudently differentiated topics, following an intuitive structure and facilitating the connection of ideas. The chapter structure is presented as follows:

The first section, *Becoming Different: Consciousness, Realisation and Conflict*, presents an analysis of the early stages of identity formation in Zainichi individuals during their childhood and adolescence. In an attempt to describe the process of development of a 'sense of difference', this analysis is presented through three main points. Firstly, the idea of possession of a *Zainichi consciousness* is critically examined, presenting evidence about the frequent existence and

natural development of a primary ‘sense of normalcy’ in early stages of growth. Secondly, four causes behind the subsequent development of a ‘sense of difference’ are analysed, paying attention to their impact on the neutralisation of the ‘sense of normalcy’ as a consequence of a process of realisation of difference, resulting from social interaction with the Japanese majority. Lastly, the negative effects of such a realisation process are presented in the form of a self-denial, derived from the impossibility to reconcile identitarian aspirations towards the Japanese majority and empathic identification with the Zainichi community.

In the second section, *Ethnic Education in the Zainichi Community*, the impact of ethnic education on the identity formation process is examined, attending to the different options for ethnic education available for Zainichi individuals in Osaka. Firstly, *Chôsen* (Korean) schools’ influence on Zainichi students is presented through the conceptualisation of three particular effects: a *relational effect*, which entails the provision of a space for sharing distinctiveness in favour of the facilitation of a sense of sameness, a *cognitive effect*, which is represented by the transmission of a concrete ethno-cultural knowledge stimulating the development of a sense of Koreanness, and a *purposive effect*, which involves the reinforcement and preservation of a sense of comradeship that contributes to a sense of collectiveness. Additionally, the second section exposes three particular features of *Kenkoku* (Korean) School’s educational setting, which were highlighted by former students during interviews. Firstly, its *multifaceted curriculum* is promoted as the perfect balance between the provision of the educational content required by the Japanese Ministry of Education and the transmission of the ethno-cultural knowledge necessary for the development of students’ awareness about their ethnic heritage. Secondly, *Kenkoku*’s determination to create a *plural atmosphere* in the school with Zainichi, Korean and Japanese schools is also tackled. Thirdly, *Kenkoku*’s ultimate goal is presented as a functional aspect of its education, which seeks to assist students in adjusting to Japanese society and living as Zainichi. The third point of the section observes the functional effects of extracurricular ethnic education imparted at Japanese schools through the comparative analysis of accounts from informants who attended these classes and others who did not.

The third section, *Zainichi Roots, Zainichi Routes and What Else?*, examines various ways wherein younger Zainichi generations conceptualise and interpret their own Zainichiness. Particularly, this section gives voice to Zainichi participants of the study in their attempt to verbalise ideas, impressions and feelings that, despite their complexity and apparent ineffability, turn out to be of great importance in the effort of comprehending the Zainichi existence. In the first point of this section, primordial and situational interpretations of Zainichi identity and experience are analysed from the perspective of two prominent concepts in the study of ethnic groups: *roots* and *routes* (Gilroy, 1993). Subsequently, another point is devoted to a brief

analysis of a particular sentiment, which appears to emanate from the development of a consciousness regarding a primordial sentiment (roots) and a historical memory (routes). Lastly, the section is closed with an analysis of the quasi-nihilist interpretation that Zainichi Koreans are prone to advocate with regards to their ethnic identity in relation to the socially constructed notions of Japaneseness and Koreanness. In this analysis, the concept of ‘cultural oxymoron’ is presented in relation to the processes of assimilation and enculturation.

The fourth section of this chapter, *Negotiating Ethnicity: Markers of Difference and Mechanisms of Representation*, presents a thorough analysis of the cultural, social, institutional and conceptual elements that Zainichi Koreans are likely to utilise in order to negotiate their ethnicity. On the one hand, the point *Markers of Differences* examines three significant Korean cultural elements that can still be found in the Zainichi community: the Korean language, the Confucian ritual *Chesa* and the Korean cuisine. This analysis provides an important perspective, not only on the actual maintenance and promotion of such cultural elements, but, more significantly, it examines the diverse interpretations that can be found in the Zainichi community concerning the role played by those elements nowadays. On the other hand, the last section, *Mechanisms of Self-Representation*, presents an account of the main strategies used by Zainichi individuals in representing their ethnicity with respect to the Japanese majority. Firstly, the different ways wherein Zainichi Koreans negotiate their visibility by using Korean names or Japanese aliases is presented. Secondly, apprehensions towards Korea-related nationalities is also examined. Finally, the last point looks at the ways wherein Zainichi Koreans conceptualise their identities and represent themselves through the use of different terminology.

Finally, the fifth section, *Placing Identities*, provides a thorough examination of different interpretations of belonging and attachment made by participants with respect to national and transnational spaces. On the one hand, reflections regarding national spaces in the Korean Peninsula are presented as evidence of Zainichi younger generations’ impossibility to fully identify with nation-states. On the other hand, forms of transnational identification linked to intranational and extranational spaces are also presented, highlighting the transnational dimension of Zainichi identities.

2. Becoming Different: Consciousness, Realisation and Conflict

It is necessary to make a clear distinction between the consciousness, or rather acknowledgement, of a sense of belonging to a particular ethnic group – in this case, the consciousness of being Zainichi – and the psychological recognition of one’s own distinctiveness, that is, the development of a *sense of difference*. The acknowledgement of

certain singularities that characterises one's own particular ethnic group must not be deemed equivalent to the development of a sense of difference. The realisation of the different social position of an ethnic group by individuals belonging to that group is the result of a process of social interaction with various groups, which allows individuals to comprehend the particular social position where their own group is situated with respect to the majority as a result of an othering process whereby differences, actual or constructed, are remarked and maintained.

2.1. Zainichi Consciousness

As young adults, all the informants who decided to participate in this study had a strong consciousness of belonging to the Korean-ethnic minority group, which is, for most of them, clearly differentiated from the mainstream Japanese majority group. During the various encounters and interviews with informants, this apparently natural consciousness was interrogated in order to fathom whether this acknowledgement was the result of a natural process or, instead, it was somehow inculcated. In most cases, Zainichi consciousness seems to be developed in early stages of childhood. Informants pointed at the environment wherein they grew up as the fundamental factor motivating that consciousness. Some cultural markers, such as language, cuisine or names, also seem to play a paramount role in the acknowledgement of individuals' Zainichi Korean identity. As CG-3 points out, the usage of certain Korean terms contributed to the development of her Zainichi consciousness:

"Even before going to the *Chōsen* school, I would call my mother '*onma*' and my father '*oppa*'..."

In other cases, cultural elements or particular celebrations are presented by informants as key for the formation of a Zainichi consciousness. JS-2 explains that the constant presence of Korean food in the house was an important factor for his consciousness:

"Since I was a child, every time I opened the fridge, I found kimchi in it... The (Korean) food culture was always present at home."

KG-2, instead, highlighted the fact that she always had and used a Korean name as the main reason why, since she was "old enough to understand things", she was aware of her ethnicity.

However, we must be critical when interpreting these statements as the conviction regarding their ethnic difference, which most of the informants showed, cannot be assumed in the context of their childhood. When speaking about the familial environment wherein they grew up, JS-3 and MG-2 explain:

"My daily life was probably exactly the same as that of any Japanese child. Nonetheless, at home things like *Chesa*, the ritual to honour ancestors that Koreans carry out, were present. However, I never thought we did that sort of things because we weren't Japanese. I assumed doing that *was just normal*." (JS-3)

"My parents couldn't speak Korean. But there were certain ethnic elements at home; for example, we used to have Korean food and celebrate *Chesa*. However, I didn't know that was something 'Korean' *I just didn't realise*." (MG-2)

This telling statements highlight the significance of *a sense of normalcy* as opposed to the *sense of difference*. Especially in social environments, such as that of Ikuno ward, where multiculturalism has traditionally been patent, the absence of apparent relations of antagonism between the different groups allows for the unconscious awareness of belonging in a particular cultural environment without necessarily assuming the 'abnormality' of it with respect to majority's cultural space. Supporting this idea, KG-1 pointed at the singularity of Ikuno and stated: "ever since I was born, I was in the community, everybody around me was Zainichi." KG-1's statement emphasises that perception of 'being Zainichi' as part of that environment's normalcy.

Nevertheless, this case should not be considered universal. Other informants explained how their childhood was marked by a consciousness of belonging to the majority. KG-3 explained how, as a child, he was certain about being Japanese:

"When I was a child, I used to play with other children in my neighbourhood and, actually, at the time I never thought 'I am Korean', never had that consciousness. Rather, somewhere in my mind, I had the *consciousness of being Japanese*."

In the case of JS-1, he points at the lack of motivation from his family to create a sense of 'Koreanness' in him:

"My parents never thought of having me learn, for instance, Korean dance or the Korean language and, since there weren't this kind of motivations (in my childhood), I wasn't quite aware (of being Zainichi)."

In both cases, due possibly to the lack of stimuli and as a result of a natural relation to the Japanese environment, the informants not only did not develop a significant consciousness of being Zainichi, but they naturally thought to be part of the Japanese majority group.

2.2. Realisation and Sense of Difference

Regardless of their degree of consciousness during their childhood, all informants affirmed that certain episodes in their lives had a revelatory effect upon their consciousness and brought about a sense of difference as members of the Zainichi minority group. Elaborating on the accounts collected during the qualitative research, four main causes can be identified behind the development of a sense of difference: cultural dissonance, contextual position, social prejudice and racialised membership.

2.2.1. Cultural Dissonance

The aforementioned *sense of normalcy*, whereby particular cultural elements are considered standard, ordinary and mainstream, is likely to be neutralised as a consequence of experiences within Japanese cultural environments. JS-1 explains that, during his visit to a Japanese classmate's house on the occasion of a birthday party, there were noticeable differences in the environment of the house that would trigger that sense of difference:

"It's curious, when I went to my friend's house for his birthday party, I noticed some sort of difference in the atmosphere of that house. That, somehow, made me *feel I wasn't Japanese*."

JS-1 referred to a sensation, a feeling that he could not quite express with words. MG-1, instead, was more illustrative and explained about a feeling of "being ensnared in a cultural frame." He elaborated on this idea by explaining that, in certain conversations with Japanese people, he becomes aware of his limited Japanese cultural literacy:

"For instance, during New Year's Day, the Japanese have *Osechi*. However, I don't eat that. Even though I've seen it on TV and more or less know what it is, I don't have that custom. It is at moments like that that *I realise I'm not Japanese*."

Furthermore, MG-1 also explains how certain festivities particular to the Japanese culture strengthen that sense of difference:

"When I was a child, I used to see how, during the *Obon* holiday, my Japanese friends left the city and returned to their hometowns in the countryside. However, I had no place to return. Instead, not being able to go to Korea, I stayed in Osaka."

Albeit apparently insignificant, these episodes allegedly have an important impact on the emergence of a sense of difference in the Zainichi individuals, as a consequence of the realisation that their cultural environment, be it at home or in particular neighbourhoods, is somewhat in dissonance with majority's cultural space.

2.2.2. Contextual Position

Changing the context of social interaction also appears to have an impact on the perception of the Zainichis' position in Japanese society. After finishing middle school at Ikuno's public school, JS-3's parents decided to send him to a Japanese public high school in a different ward. As JS-3 himself relates, going from Ikuno's school, where approximately a half of the students were Zainichi, to a new educational environment where the huge majority was Japanese conditioned the way whereby he disclosed himself:

"From that moment, I started using my Japanese alias. It wasn't that my parents told me to do so, but, for some reason, possibly to avoid discrimination, I just decided to use my Japanese name. I believe that had an important impact on the way I felt as a Zainichi."

It can be affirmed, hence, that the change of environment from one with an agonistic relation to the constitutive other to another where that relation is defined in antagonistic terms has clear effects on the way the individual behaves and interacts with that new environment. In a reverse case, there also seems to be a significant impact on the way individuals construe their own identity in relation to others. This is the case of MG-2, who moved from Jôtô ward, a chiefly Japanese area, to Ikuno ward at the age of ten. Due to this change of environment, she could normalise and positivise her experience as a Zainichi, possibly developing a late sense of normalcy. She explains that process of normalisation as follows:

"I went to a school with ethnic courses where about half of the class was Zainichi. Also, it was common to hear Korean names such as Kim or Lee. In addition, besides all the Korean shops, I felt, possibly for the first time, I could speak about my condition of foreigner (not Japanese)."

In both cases, the change in contextual environment has clear impacts on the way individuals construe their existence and behave with respect to their sense of difference. In JS-3's case, his transition to a less diverse environment, where the majoritarian presence of the Japanese was patent, provoked in him a natural reaction of precaution and concealment of his *difference*. On the other hand, MG-2's case demonstrates how relocation into an environment where difference is not necessarily condemned, but taken as normal, has a positive, empowering effect in the way the individual interprets, negotiates and discloses their distinctiveness.

2.2.3. Social Prejudice

Another important factor in the process of development of a sense of difference is the experience, direct or indirect, of social prejudice and discrimination. As explained in previous

chapters, the concealment of noticeable elements prone to disclose individual's own distinctiveness does not guarantee protection from the effects of prejudice and discrimination. Rather, it could bring about a particular awareness of vulnerability. JS-1, who lived most of his childhood with a Japanese name, explains that witnessing prejudiced actions against other Zainichi Koreans provoked a sense of danger [kikenkan] in him. Realising that one of his classmates, who had a Korean name, was the target of bullying made him aware of the risk of suffering discrimination in the event of disclosure of his ethnic heritage. As JS-1 clearly explains:

"At that time, I used my Japanese name. This boy, instead, had a Korean name. It was then that I realised that I was protected by a wall that portrayed me as a Japanese, that it was for this reason that I wasn't bullied. It was as if that boy and I lived in different worlds (despite both being Zainichi)."

This sense of danger would provoke him distress and a profound wish to become Japanese, that is, to leave behind that sense of difference and the subsequent sense of danger.

In other cases, the encounter with social prejudice appears to provoke a certain sense of discontent and confusion. JS-2 and KG-3 recounted similar experiences where the disclosure of their condition of Zainichi brought about disappointing results. JS-2 explains that, he developed a close friendship with his *sempai*, who then, however, decided to ignore him after finding out JS-2's Korean heritage. Similarly, KG-3 states that, after being interrogated about the singularity of his non-Japanese-sounding name and explaining the Korean origin of it, his classmate decided to stop talking to him. Although these two episodes do not involve any direct harassment, they highlight the undeniable impact of prejudice in the process of development of a sense of difference in Zainichi individuals.

2.2.4. Racialised Membership

Lastly and directly related to the concept of the racialisation of institutional membership discussed in Chapter 5, it is interesting to look at the impact of institutional restrictions on the strengthening of Zainichi's sense of difference. Albeit already abolished, the fingerprinting procedure must be deemed a turning point in Zainichi consciousness. Required to be fingerprinted after turning 16 years old, JS-1 explains how the whole procedure not only made him feel different in terms of belonging but also in terms of legality:

"They took my fingerprints. Then, they gave me my residence card, which had my fingerprint on it. I was supposed to carry it at all times and show it to any policeman if asked to. That was the kind of treatment received by criminals."

In addition, JS-1 narrates an episode when he felt profoundly otherised. Upon request of a scholarship, he successfully passed the initial stages of the application process. However, when it came to complete the procedure in person, his application was rejected due to his ROK citizenship.

"When I queried the man, he told me: 'well, obviously, this is a Japanese scholarship. So, there's no point in giving it to a Korean, right?'"

Lastly, MG-1 and MG-3 point at the lack of enfranchisement of a large portion of the Zainichi community as an institutional factor bringing about a sense of difference. The ROK citizenship holder, MG-3, explains that, on the occasion of general elections in Japan, he realises the institutional difference between Japanese and Zainichi Koreans:

"When there are elections, you unconsciously think of going to vote. However, you end up realising you can't vote in this country."

On the other hand, MG-1, who is naturalised Japanese, points out that in his case the sense of difference is towards other Zainichi friends who cannot vote as if there was a line dividing those who can and those who cannot vote. Similarly, JS-2 exploits that sense of co-ethnic difference by consciously taking his individual enfranchisement to a collective level and, as he states, "voting for the whole community."

2.3. Self-denial and Conflict

The realisation of the ethnic and social differences between the Zainichi minority and the Japanese majority and the subsequent racialisation of their presence in Japan, which, in many cases, leads to unequal treatments and prejudice, often result in emotional instability and distress. Despite the fact that most of the participants in this study claimed not to have gone through an identity crisis, they all declared to be aware of the assiduousness and regularity of this issue in the Zainichi community. In particular, three informants confessed to having suffered from an identity crisis at some point in their lives as a consequence of the realisation of their ethnic distinctiveness.

JS-1 speaks of a persistent sentiment of 'obsequiousness' [hikutsu] since his realisation of the detriments that his ethnic distinctiveness was prone to bring about. He states that growing up in the 1980s, when ethnic prejudice and discrimination were widely spread in Japanese society, provoked in him a sentiment of self-denial:

"It was a sentiment of denying myself, feeling that it would've been better not to be born and that I just had no right to living in Japan."

On the other hand, KG-3 points at the responsibilities derived from the fact of being Zainichi and receiving ethnic education as well as his primordial conviction that he was a regular Japanese child, as the triggers which sparked off his rejection towards his condition of Zainichi:

"At elementary school, I hated the idea of learning Korean. 'If I speak Japanese all the time, why do I have to learn Korean?!', 'If only I was Japanese!', I used to say."

Furthermore, KG-3 explains that also the bureaucratic measures he is subject to as a ROK citizen used to make him regard his Zainichi condition with dislike:

"Having a South Korean passport involves having to fill out forms that a Japanese don't need to fill out. Just like when Zainichi Koreans were fingerprinted... You live in Japan all your life but still procedures are totally different... That kind of things made me wonder 'why is it that I have to be Zainichi Korean?!'"

In the case of JS-3, his adolescence was marked by a clear refusal of whatever elements in his life that represented or had relation to the Korean culture, that is, a sentiment of rejection of aspects strengthening his sense of difference.

"When I really became aware that I was a Zainichi as a teenager, I would despise every Korean thing around me. I would hate this town (Ikuno), the language my grandmother spoke sometimes, the Korean garments... As a susceptible adolescent, I was ashamed of all those things."

The cases of JS-1, KG-3 and JS-3 are enlightening examples of what was previously defined in this study as *ethnic-personal identity conflict*. The rejection towards ethnic elements as well as the emotional instability and discontent derived from the sense of difference in Zainichi youths can be considered the consequence of a sentiment of frustration due to the impossibility to conciliate their identitarian aspirations towards the Japanese majority and his empathic identification with his ethnic group. More simply put, due to the revelatory effect of the sense of difference, which evidences inequality and detriment with respect to the majority group, the Zainichi individual is prone to want to identify with that majority group. However, the inevitable empathic identification with their own ethnic group hinders individual's attempt to fully identify with the norm represented by the majority. As a consequence of this presumed implausibility for reconciliation of both aspirational and empathic identification, episodes of identity crisis and subsequent sentiments of self-denial (self-stigma) and emotional instability are likely to emerge and have a negative impact on the formation of individuals' identity.

3. Ethnic Education in the Zainichi Community

In this section, the impact of education on Zainichi individuals' formation of their identity is examined by paying attention to biographical testimonies collected during in-depth interviews with participants who had experience in four different educational environments: *Chôsen* schools, Osaka's *Kenkoku* school, extracurricular ethnic education courses and public Japanese schools.

3.1. *Chôsen* Schools

Experiences at *Chôsen* schools or, as they are commonly known, *Urihakkyo* (Korean for 'our school') seem to have specific effects on pupils' consciousness as Zainichi. In this section, three main effects are examined: relational effect, cognitive effect and purposive effect.

3.1.1. Relational Effect

As explained above, the development of a sense of difference, whereby the Zainichi becomes aware of their social and cultural distinctiveness, may be the cause for ethnic-personal identity conflicts. This is due to individuals' incapacity to concretise their position with respect to the notions of *difference* and *sameness*. In other words, actual identitarian positions and aspirational forms of identification might not coincide as individuals might not achieve to grasp what really puts them in a specific position differentiated from the other.

Urihakkyo's education and, more accurately, its educational environment appears to play an effective role in the prevention and overcoming of such conflict and in concretising notions of *difference* and *sameness*, or rather inclusion and exclusion. According to CG-1, attending to a *Chôsen* school in Kyoto provided a sense of relief as in-school relations take place exclusively with other Zainichi students:

"My friends at school, almost all of them, if not all of them, *shared with me a history*. Like mine, their grandfathers came to Japan... it was like there was no need to explain things, it felt so easy."

CG-2, on the other hand, highlights the fact of needing to commute a long distance as a fundamental step to get a clear understanding of his particular ethnic position. By the same token, that very fact can be interpreted also as an influential factor in his perception of difference, as his was rather a particular case in his neighbourhood:

"Since, unlike other children who went to the local school, I had to go to a far-off school... I soon realised that our school was somewhat different from the others."

Equally important is *Urihakkyo* children's realisation of the undoubtedly different treatment received. The three informants who attended *Chôsen* schools stated that direct or indirect episodes of discrimination targeting their schools had distressing effects on them. CG-3 explains how the politisation of *Chôsen* education becomes apparent when diplomatic incidents between Japan and DPRK arise. As a consequence of the apparent antagonisation of relations between Japanese and Zainichi sectors, *Chôsen* schools, the *Urihakkyo* community and, irremediably, students are prone to become targets of discriminatory actions. These actions, informants explain, bring about a sense of insecurity in the schoolchildren, who are prone to develop a sentiment of rejection and even hostility towards the Japanese majority. This, therefore, can be also envisaged as a factor motivating a conscious distancing from Japanese society and an unconscious self-segregation.

Therefore, the relational effect of *Chôsen* education can be understood as its ability to construct a space for sharing distinctiveness and create a *sense of sameness*. In this context, Zainichi students seem to avoid or overcome possible identitarian conflicts as their identity is clearly defined and delimited around specific notions of sameness and difference.

3.1.2. Cognitive Effect

Chôsen schools' freedom of manoeuvre to unilaterally shape their curricula allows for the conception and exercise of education from a very concrete ethnic perspective. Thanks to this freedom, *Urihakkyo*'s curricula are drafted, both in shape and content, according to a particular conception of ethnicity [minzoku]. On *Sôren* official website (2016), it is stated that "the purpose of twenty-first century's *Chôsen* schools is the instilment into young compatriots [dôhō] born and raised in Japan of an independent ethnic sense of being Korean [Chôsenjin], ethnic knowledge, a correct understanding of history and present-day scientific knowledge." Paying attention to this statement, it clearly appears to be that *Urihakkyo*'s main purpose is providing students with a concrete ethno-cultural knowledge that permits them to have, not only the necessary level of cultural literacy as Koreans, but also the necessary intellectual stimulus to develop a consistent sense of being Korean – that is, a solid ethnic identity.

CG-1 and CG-2 point at the transmission of Korean ethnicity [minzokusei] as one of the fundamental roles of *Chôsen* schools. When asked about the necessity to maintain *Urihakkyo*'s educational system in present-day Japan, both informants highlighted *Chôsen* schools'

paramount role in the preservation and transmission of a particular sense of belonging and ethnic identity. Also, both emphasised the fact that Japan has done little in order to guarantee the continuation of Zainichi's consciousness as a minority group. Instead, CG-2 points out, the Japanese government has been committed to imposing assimilation and hindering Zainichi community's efforts to keep constituting a differentiated ethnic group in Japanese society.

In addition, the renovated approach to the 'restoration' of ethnicity within the *Urihakkyo* institution is a signal of distance from the original purpose of return to the homeland. Nonetheless, the notion of homeland and the attachment to that concept appears to continue to be central. Turning back to the concept of cultural hegemony (Gramsci, 1975), *Sōren's Chōsen* School system seemingly envisages and apply ethnic education as a means to discredit Japanese cultural hegemony by the (re-)creation of a supposedly Korea-oriented ethno-cultural hegemony within their facilities.

3.1.3. Purposive Effect

Lastly, the most remarkable aspect of *Urihakkyo's* system is its capacity to reinforce and preserve a sense of comradeship in the community which seems to have prevailed since the post-war era. The main pillar of such comradeship can be found in the purposive aspect of *Chōsen* schools' discourse that shapes students' conception of themselves as a whole.

In their attempt to preserve their Koreanness, in relation to a particular notion of ethnicity, the *Urihakkyo* institution and its members find in a strong *sense of collectiveness* the key to resist to assimilationist forces, either 'natural', as a consequence of generational gaps, or 'constructed', as a result of Japanese nationalism's political efforts to promote ethnic homogeneity and discredit 'undesired' diversity. In this context, apparent antagonistic relations and social and political hostility pave the way for a strong sentiment of comradeship amongst members based on solidarity, pride and ethnic responsibility. CG-1 highlights the important role of *Urihakkyo* beyond the simple transmission of knowledge:

"It isn't just about learning about our country, our people [minzoku] and becoming aware of who we are. Another principle we learn at school is the purpose of doing the best for our compatriots."

CG-1 later on elaborated on this idea by evoking *The Three Musketeers'* motto "all for one, and one for all" but specifying that in the case of *Chōsen* schools "*one for all* would go first."

Observing these three aspects of *Urihakkyo's* educational system, it can be affirmed that by creating clear-cut cultural spaces wherein children can develop a solid sense of belonging to a sharply defined ethnic category, *Urihakkyo's* environment helps to avoid severe internal identity conflicts and facilitate the formation of a stable identity based on inclusion in the minority group. Notwithstanding the positive collective effects of this system on the community's unity and integrity, it is necessary to look at other possible effects at an individual level. CG-3's experience at Ikuno's *Chôsen* school turns out to be significant to comprehend other effects. Although during interviews she praised numerous aspects of *Urihakkyo's* educational system, CG-3 could not avoid transmitting a rather critical overall perception of the institution. She highlighted the high degree of psychological pressure derived from the seemingly imperious necessity to fit in and prioritise the group. Referring to *Chôsen* schools, she stated:

"It's hard to get away from the idea of group. The way I see it, when people get together in a group, as they are not the same, if the group is defined in rigid terms, there will always be someone who falls behind – some exception. That doesn't mean that exceptions were not permitted, it's just that they were not considered. That's something I couldn't stand."

According to CG-3's words, the prioritisation of a sense of collectiveness over individuality, that is, the promotion of a particular form of belonging in the collective may hinder the development of a stable sense of individuality. This argument is reinforced by another experience narrated by CG-3 with regards to the use of language in the school. As Ryang (1997: 31-32) explains, in-school policies related to language use, such as "100% Our Language Movement," promote the usage of the Korean language not only in class but also during break times inside the school. CG-3 points at these measures (in her particular case the "daily review" [kyô no sôkatsu] whereby students are debriefed concerning how much use they made of Korean and Japanese) as another distressing factor, due to the high level of responsibility required²⁶.

Finally, CG-3 recalls her transfer to a Japanese public school as a moment of relief – "I am glad I didn't stay at the *Chôsen* school." In particular, she emphasised the fact that, unlike in her *Chôsen* school, at her Japanese school she realised that individual opinions are accepted and considered. CG-3's testimony holds an obvious critical character. Nonetheless, individual apprehensions let alone, her experience helps contrast the apparent unanimity in opinions from *Urihakkyo's* community regarding their school system.

²⁶ It must be remarked that Zainichi Korean children's native language is in all cases the Japanese language and that, regardless of the level of proficiency in Korean, that must be considered a second language.

3.2. *Kenkoku* School

Participants from *Kenkoku* school [Kenkoku Gakkô] shared rather a uniform opinion about the main characteristics of the school, with regards to both its environment and its education system, and highlighted some of its particular features that contributed to the formation of their identities as Zainichi Koreans.

3.2.1. Multifaceted Curriculum

In the first place, the *Kenkoku* School, unlike *Urihakkyo* schools, is recognised by the Japanese Ministry of Education as a 'mainstream school' [ichijôkô]. This accreditation was attained in 1951 and requires compliance with National Education Ministry's guidelines and offering of the national curriculum established by the government, which mandatorily must be imparted in Japanese. Additionally, the *Kenkoku* school offers a supplementary curriculum focused on Korean culture, history and language, thus establishing a parallel ethnic education programme. Furthermore, a number of cultural 'Club Activities' [kurabu katsudô], including traditional Korean dance and music, are available for the students.

In relation to this parallel ethnic education system, KG-3 emphasises the importance of having a chance to *touch* and experience Korean culture in developing a solid sense of being Korean:

"Had I gone to a Japanese school, I don't think I'd have had many chances to 'touch' the (Korean) culture. So, for that reason, I don't think I would now be able to say 'I am Korean'."

As one of the teachers at the school explained during participant observation, ethnic education at *Kenkoku* school looks to create a conscious awareness in Zainichi children's minds who get to comprehend the factors behind their presence in Japan, while they learn about their culture. It turned out to be particularly illustrative to attend one of the most significant modules of the ethnic education curriculum, 'Zainichi history' [Zainichishi]. During the lesson, students were taught about various historical episodes where ethnic-Koreans were involved, such as the aftermath of the 1923 Kanto earthquake. Although the lecture was conducted in Japanese, students were encouraged to remember Korean terms referring to specific historical events.

3.2.2. Plural Atmosphere

The aspect about *Kenkoku* school that was most often remarked by interviewees was related to the educational environment. Unlike *Chôsen* schools, where having a 'Zainichi lineage' appears to be a determining factor, the *Kenkoku* school is portrayed as an international school. This is not simply because the teaching of Japanese, Korean and English are highly promoted, but it is also associated with the profile of enrolled students. Although Zainichi children seem to be the general norm in the classrooms, South Korean and Japanese students have also been numerous in the recent years. This singularity of *Kenkoku* signifies an heterogeneisation of the educational environment where the roles of majority and minority appear to be neutralised, giving space for a balanced cultural plurality. Due to this plurality, KG-2 explains, discrimination has no place in the school:

"In the *Kenkoku* school... discrimination towards Zainichi doesn't exist at all, there is no negative notion about it."

Therefore, the *Kenkoku* school can be envisaged as a space of normalisation of the Zainichi condition, wherein notions of sameness or difference in terms of ethnic solidarity and racialisation lose their contextual significance. KG-2 also points at this space of normalisation as a fundamental factor during her growth. When asked whether growing up in that educational environment had contributed to avoiding a hypothetical identity crisis, she argued that rather than to its avoidance, it contributed to its overcoming:

"During my adolescence years, when I wondered about things like 'what kind of person am I?'. The fact of being in an environment where Zainichi was the norm [majorithii] did not allow me to skip those doubts, but it allowed me to simply question what person I was, instead of being tormented by the idea of not simply being Japanese."

KG-3, too, points at plurality amongst students as an advantageous factor in comparison with other educational settings. For the 20-year-old boy, *Kenkoku's* atmosphere is genuine and permits the students to actively come in contact with diversity. Particularly, it is in that access to experience diversity where KG-3 places the main difference between *Chôsen* schools and the *Kenkoku* school.

3.2.3. Functional Aspect

When asked about the ultimate goal of *Kenkoku's* education, the three interviewees pointed at inclusion in Japanese society. Underlying the two factors explained above, it can be affirmed that *Kenkoku* education also provides the cognitive and relational factors seen in *Chôsen*

schools. However, these two are conceived and introduced in a somewhat different manner. The cognitive content provided at the school does not constitute the core of the educational curriculum, as is the case of *Urihakkyo*, but it is included as complementary. Additionally, the relational factor is not devised in terms of sameness, promoting and preserving ethnic homogeneity, but is built upon the notion of cultural pluralism.

In a nutshell, the *Kenkoku* school promotes an idea of multiculturalism based on the notion of enculturation of Korean culture, which allows for the development of a consciousness as Zainichi, and the notion of cultural pluralism, which envisages the Zainichi experience as a differentiated element of the Japanese multicultural social scenario. As KG-1 accurately expresses, *Kenkoku's* main objective is to "help students adjust to Japanese society and be able to live as Zainichi."

3.3. Extracurricular Ethnic Education at Japanese Schools

Since 1945, an increasing number of Japanese public schools in Osaka and other cities in the Kansai region offer their students supplementary courses commonly known as *Minzoku Gakkyû* [ethnic classes] focused on the introduction of characteristic cultural elements representative of Korea and the teaching of Korean history, traditions and language. These classes, due to the fact that they are significantly limited in time and resources in comparison with ethnic schools' curricula, are prone to be considered a merely anecdotic introduction to Korean culture. However, *Minzoku Gakkyû* and other extracurricular ethnic education settings are alleged to have relevant effects on Zainichi children, as participants in this study affirm. In this section, some of these effects are analysed and contrasted with the experience of Zainichi individuals who did not receive any ethnic education.

3.3.1. Ethnic Instruction as a Tool

Paying attention to the testimony of MG-1, a 2.5 generation Zainichi who attended *Minzoku Gakkyû* at elementary school, it can be claimed that, unlike the cases of *Urihakkyo* or *Kenkoku* school, extracurricular ethnic education is not expected to have a notable cognitive effect on students. As MG-1 states, due precisely to limitations in time, he just holds anecdotic memories from its experience at his ethnic class:

"I wasn't so passionate about it at the time, but I guess it was good for me. I still remember some Korean words and can read the Korean alphabet."

According to MG-1, it is the experiential dimension of ethnic education, that is, the personal contact with elements of the Korean culture, what plays a paramount role in children's identity. As a consequence of Japanese assimilationist policies that promote a monoethnic vision of Japanese society, Zainichi Koreans, MG-1 explains, lack the necessary elements to express their difference. For this reason, the direct experience of that difference through the introduction to various cultural elements and traditions creates a reference point for Zainichi children from which, MG-1 states, one can "tell their identity [aidenthithii wo kataru]."

Furthermore, MG-1 highlights the importance of acquiring a "historical consciousness [rekishi ishiki]" in the process of understanding one's own position with respect to their ancestral relation to the Korean Peninsula. Due to their generational distance with the historical events that motivated the displacement of thousands of Koreans to Japan, Zainichi younger generations are likely to read those events with a certain fictional perspective, that is, to disconnect those events from their own reality. Therefore, MG-1 emphasises the necessity of receiving certain historical instruction from a Korean perspective, so as to comprehend the reasons and consequences of events such as the Japanese colonisation of the Korean Peninsula, the subsequent Korean War or the Jechu uprising, whilst personally recognising their own historic connection with those events. In addition, MG-1 refers to the significance of perceiving an alternative reading of history and making contact with Korean culture. He states that, instead of subtracting, those knowledge and experience provide an extra point of view to students, which broadens children's horizons. Directly related to this idea, JS-2, who never received any ethnic education whatsoever, states that Japanese education systems only contemplates the promotion of a Japanese identity. Consequently, Zainichi children, as was the case of JS-2, might find it hard to define their own ethnic particularity due to the lack of cultural references and historical knowledge. As a result of this difficulty, Zainichi individuals with few ethnic references, such as JS-1, JS-2 and JS-3, develop their own strategies to define and portray their difference (see Section 5).

3.3.2. Destigmatisation Effect

Another significant effect highlighted during interviews was the destigmatisation and positivisation of both the Korean culture and the condition of Zainichi. In the first place, *Minzoku Gakkyū* provides a space for visibility. As MG-2 explains:

"Due to the fact that there are ethnic classes [minzoku gakkyū] and that all the kids there share the same roots, you could easily know who was Zainichi at school."

This creates a space of acceptance of difference wherein this is promoted and encouraged by, for instance, the usage of Korean names. The existence of such space within the Japanese school provides Zainichi children with the ground to not conceal their difference. This contrasts with the aforementioned case of JS-1 who during all his school years lived concealed behind a Japanese alias, whilst being aware of the risk of being identified as Zainichi. There is no doubt that the existence of an inclusive space turns out to be of much help for the acceptance of difference by the individual and their environment.

MG-2, who received ethnic education at elementary and middle school, and currently works as a teacher for various *Minzoku Gakkyū* courses in Osaka, explains that, due to the lack of ethnic and cultural stimulus in their everyday live, fourth and fifth generation Zainichi children tend to identify themselves simply as Japanese, ignoring their ethnic ancestry. Likewise, she highlights a tendency amongst some Zainichi individuals to solve their own identity crisis by stigmatising the condition of Zainichi as well as the Korean culture as a whole. For this reason, as a teacher, she is committed to providing Zainichi children with the opportunity to discover the Korean culture so as to facilitate a positive consciousness of the Zainichi condition and avoiding the development of a self-stigma.

4. Zainichi Roots, Zainichi Routes and What Else?

The mere attempt to describe one's own identity or the essential elements forming or sustaining one's own perception of oneself is no easy task and is likely to lead the individual to a complex process of introspection. As a researcher who turns out to be but a stranger in his field of research, the author had an unusual chance to become a witness to that exercise of introspection and listen to deep narrations concerning perceptions, feelings and emotions that, in many cases, were rather ineffable to the subject. It is the purpose of this section to describe the Zainichi experience with regards to individuals' identity. In so doing, some of the most significant ideas expressed by participants when asked to define and describe their own Zainichiness are conceptualised and presented three main sections: *Roots and Routes*, *Social Sensitivity* and *Cultural Oxymoron*.

4.1. Roots and Routes

When speaking about the idea of being Zainichi or possessing what could be defined as 'Zainichiness', two elements are constantly referred to by most of the participants: an ancestral connection and a situational position.

On the one hand, the simplest definition of Zainichiness [zainichisei] seems to unconditionally contain the term *roots*:

"Your own *roots*, a connection with the ancestors." (JS-2)

"The people who have *roots* in the Korean Peninsula and live in Japan, even though they aren't completely aware, they are Zainichi." (KG-1)

This idea of *roots* is directly related to an ancestral connection with those who are deemed the original inhabitants of the Korean Peninsula. It represents a general notion of a Korean bloodline tying the genealogically legitimate members of the Korean ethnic group. This understanding can be interpreted as a form of *primordialist sentiment* (Weinreich, 2009: 129. See Chapter 3). However, the emergence of this primordialist sentiment, in the case of third and younger generation Zainichi, cannot be considered a result of a complete and direct experience of a thoroughly defined ethnic environment, as in the case of migrants' first generation descendants, whom Weinreich defines as "semi-aliens" (1997: 157). Instead, it should be considered the consequence of the generational inheritance of a perception of belonging to the Korean ethnic group as an imagined community. JS-2 describes that ancestral connection as a form of nostalgia [natsukashisa] towards the lives of his ancestors from the peninsula. This sentiment of nostalgia, however, does not come from experience, as JS-2 never met his ancestors, but from a collective imaginary, which Zainichi individuals can be expected to feel curiosity about. A curiosity motivated from the idea that the Zainichi collectivity represents a sort of alteration of the natural genealogic course of the Korean ethnic group. The idea of *roots*, therefore, represent a primordial conception of belonging that is likely to be contested by experience.

Albeit not expressed as such, the notion of *routes*, on the other hand, seems to have a significant impact on the consciousness as Zainichi. Participants commonly referred to the historical dimension of the existence of the Zainichi community in Japan. CG-1 explains that Zainichi is a form of "experience born from colonialism and war." This appreciation of Zainichi existences denotes a significant degree of historical memory in the community. Although references to history were merely occasional during conversations with participants, numerous reflections towards a vivid awareness of the historical circumstances that paved the way for the presence of a Korean minority in Japan highlight the importance of the idea of *routes*, as the transitional experience of the collective from the past to the present, in the Zainichi collective consciousness.

Furthermore, it can be affirmed that this collective historical memory or historical consciousness plays a prominent role in the social and moral positioning of, at least, a significant part of the Zainichi community. As CG-2 explains:

"If you don't know anything about history, you're likely to not live your life consequently. Knowing your past is knowing yourself... In order to comprehend why you're here now, you need to know what happened in the past. Otherwise, you can't come to any conclusions. To clearly know the reason why we were born here, you must look back, or else you might end up forgetting and thinking that no one ever came."

This awareness of the necessity of preserving and transmitting this collective historical memory, however, does not exclusively respond to an existential need to have answers about one's own presence in society, in what could be seen as an *inward effect* towards the community, but it also seems to be somewhat impregnated of an *outward effect* that represents a form of testimony, or rather contesting statement, against Japanese nationalist discourses about the past and the present. Concerning the past, it is evident that Zainichi presence in Japanese society is an undeniable proof of Japanese colonialist campaign during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nonetheless, it also turns out to be of great significance how Zainichi existence in Japan play an irrefutable role in questioning present nationalistic conceptions regarding the Japanese nation. JS-3's interpretation of Zainichi's historical background and the present importance of it is illustrative of this idea:

"Well, as a result of history, this existence came about. Also, I was born in my family just by chance. It's simply the result of a concatenation of coincidences – nothing more than just a phenomenon. In the world, there are many cases like that, people born in one place who live in another. Personally, I don't think there's anything especial about that (Zainichi) existence, nothing at all. It just that sometimes in Japanese society certain bad individuals claim that Japan is a monoethnic country [tan'itsu minzoku kokka]. At times, when someone with that stupid way of thinking appears, I wonder 'have they, by any chance, forgotten about our existence?'"

Taking a rather post-modern stand, JS-3, conscious of the historical factors behind his own presence in Japan, plays down the importance of those factors and, involuntarily, highlights the actual implications of the Zainichi community's presence in the Japanese social landscape. As he states, rather that the Zainichi existence itself, it is the current Japanese mono-ethnicist discourse what can be deemed lacking in congruence. Thereby, the presence of a Korean-ethnic minority, as a group with a historical memory that generationally preserves a collective consciousness, plays a prominent role in discrediting Japanese nationalist discourses.

4.2. Social Sensitivity

As a result of this consciousness derived from a primordial sentiment (roots) and a historical memory (routes), Zainichi individuals are expected to develop a particular *social sensitivity*. During fieldwork, in some instances, informants described their Zainichi experiences as bond to a singular form of conscious awareness, that is, a natural disconformity towards certain social conventions. As JS-2 states:

"Due precisely to the fact that I'm Zainichi, there are particular things that I'm more sensitive [binkan] to, that I notice; things like hate speech or discrimination. In my case, as I always went to Japanese schools and grew up in the Japanese culture, if I were unconscious that I'm Zainichi, perhaps I'd unconsciously, unmindfully, discriminate against whoever who's not Japanese. So, that idea of being able to notice certain things, to be sensitive to them, that is key (in my consciousness as a Zainichi)."

Probably, this *social sensitivity* is easy to be interpreted from a victimising perspective, since it can be considered a simple sense of vulnerability – as CG-1 affirms, that sensitivity can bring suffering when coincidentally encountering, or simply overhearing, majority's xenophobic assumptions. Notwithstanding, more significant does it turn to be the positivisation of that social sensitivity by some participants.

"As Zainichi individuals, we notice particular things... Being sort of in the middle, not completely fitting in society, we become sensitive about many things, because we're conscious (of our Zainichi condition). In that sense, that destiny, the fact that we were born as Zainichi.... makes our life richer. ... Had I been born simply as a normal Japanese, I'd be just one among hundreds, I'd lead rather an ordinary life, and probably I'd never think of the contradictions of society." (CG-2)

CG-2's statement exemplifies the positivisation of Zainichi thought regarding their position in society. *Social sensitivity*, therefore, should not be exclusively interpreted as a trigger for discontentment, but it should be considered, at least in some cases, a possible key to both the positivisation and the enrichment of Zainichi identity. JS-3 accurately describes this:

"Just because I was born Zainichi, I had more chances to think about things like my own identity, my nationality, etc. That's it! If I wanted to be negative about it, I'd focus on discrimination issues and stuff, but actually, I'm more positive and can say that I'm happy I was born in this situation."

4.3. Cultural Oxymoron

A common factor found in the majority of accounts collected in the present study is the seeming ubiquity of negation as a cardinal element in the depiction of Zainichi identity. In line with Kazuki Kaneshiro's novel *GO*, where Zainichi's younger generations' identity is formulated in

the phrase: "I'm not Korean, nor am I Japanese. I am uprooted"²⁷. Participants in this study gave emphasis to the notion of negation as a way-out from the identitarian dichotomy imposing a choice between being either Japanese or Korean. Thus, aware of their impossibility to fully ascribe to either of the monolithic categories, Zainichi Koreans take distance from both categories. However, this negation seems to take them to define their identity in terms of lack and incompleteness. In an attempt to narrate the feeling of being Zainichi, CG-1 accurately illustrated this idea:

"hmm... Sometimes, it feels like being incomplete [chûtohanpa]... Like you don't perfectly fit (in either of the categories), as you're neither Japanese nor Korean."

Through this idea of *being incomplete*, CG-1 highlights a presumed incapacity to meet a series of cultural requirements necessary for a rightful inclusion into one of the two categories. Notwithstanding the level of ethnic education received, the conviction of being Zainichi is apparently marked by the conviction of not perfectly being either Korean or Japanese.

4.3.1. Neither 100% Japanese

Considering that they were born to parents raised in Japan and being raised within Japanese society, it can be easily assumed that third and fourth generation Zainichi Koreans are more Japanese than Korean. Actually, by listening to the first person accounts, one can realise that such simplistic thinking may also be assumed within the Zainichi community. Despite the constant denial to identify themselves as Japanese, many cases proved an unquestionable cultural closeness. After being asked whether she was Japanese, KG-2 broke a long pause by stating:

"I don't think I am Japanese. However, even though I'm not Japanese, if someone told me that I am completely different (from a Japanese), I'd be like 'that's not the case!'."

Despite the fact that she attended school at *Kenkoku* and has a strong Zainichi consciousness, KG-2 also shows a significant awareness of her cultural proximity to the Japanese majority.

Similarly, KG-3 and JS-3 recognised that, due to their upbringing in a Japanese environment, an important part of their selves is to be considered Japanese. In particular, they both point to their way of thinking [shikô] and values [kachikan] as genuinely Japanese.

²⁷ In the original, this sentence is included in its Spanish translation "no soy coreano, ni soy japonés, yo soy desarraigado" (Kaneshiro, 2000).

Nonetheless, the distance from the notion of Japanese seems to be more weighted. Considering the unquestionable impact of Japanese culture on the upbringing and subsequent lives of Zainichi Koreans in Japanese society, the notion of cultural assimilation could be taken for granted. However, this notion continues to be denied, due partly to extracultural connotations related to the concept itself. As discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of assimilation is often associated with the elimination of a culture in favour of another. This negative interpretation of the concept is still in force within the Zainichi community, since, despite the apparent level of natural enculturation of Japanese culture, some individuals constantly discredit the actual effects of assimilation. That is because assimilation [dôka] is directly related, not solely to the natural process of acquisition of particular elements supposedly constituting a culture, but to the intentional application of assimilation policies [dôka seisaku] in order to impose majority's culture over minorities, in an attempt to culturally homogenise Japanese society.

CG-1 states that assimilation is more related to the feelings and to the conviction that individuals have concerning their identity:

"The way I see it, the word 'assimilation' has more to do with the mind, the feelings... Rather than to the idea of dumping one culture, that term is related to the idea of choosing one culture (over another)."

CG-1's statement provides the very notion of culture with a volitional nature. According to his argument, being culturally one thing or the other is the result of a personal choice, not simply to the natural acquisition of a particular culture. As CG-3 also explains, "the fact that we are born in Japan doesn't make us Japanese." To be more precise and complete CG-3's argument, it can be affirmed that the enculturation of particular elements, such as language, cuisine or even a set of values, is not sufficient to assert that an individual is culturally assimilated. Therefore, the conception of *Zainichiness* seems to not be simply related to the possession of a particular cultural background, but to the psychological *will* to not identify with the Japanese majority, despite the unquestionable enculturation of Japanese cultural elements.

4.3.2. Nor 100% Korean

On the other hand, despite the easiness with which Zainichi individuals seem to affirm their Koreanness, notions of incompleteness and imperfections have an even more noticeable impact on the case of Korean culture. The lack of firm notions of Korean culture, particularly in the case of individuals with a modest level of ethnic education, can provoke a certain cultural impostor syndrome in the Zainichi individuals. MG-1 explains:

"In my case, well... I don't eat much kimchi... I don't eat spicy food, I don't speak Korean...I didn't attend any ethnic school... and my nationality is Japanese. For all of these reasons, even within the Zainichi community, when I call myself 'Zainichi' I have this weird feeling..."

With this affirmation, MG-1 highlights, not only what could be described as an absence of consciousness as a Zainichi, but, more importantly, a tangible lack of cultural elements deemed necessary to prove his Koreanness.

In the case of individuals who received full-time ethnic education, the notion of cultural incompleteness is interpreted from a different perspective. Although both *Chōsen* schools and *Kenkoku* school students receive a remarkable level of ethnic education, this cannot quite seem to fully satisfy the cultural requirements to rightfully fit in the category of 'Korean'. KG-3 and CG-1 explain that Zainichi Koreans, regardless of their ethnic instruction or experience, are always in need to *pursue* [oikakeru] the Korean culture.

"If we consider Koreans in the peninsula, it's obvious that they naturally acquire the culture. In here, instead, we have to pursue it. We cannot get it all." (KG-3)

"The people over there (in the Korean Peninsula), as it is said in Japanese, 'get it just like the air', the language, the food, etc. ... We, instead, need to go after it, we need to find it! That's the difference, I think." (CG-3)

The idea of *pursuing* culture, therefore, leads to the conception of the enculturation as a voluntary process, opposed to the allegedly involuntary nature of the assimilation process. Simply put, Zainichi Koreans' cultural situation is the result of the natural absorption (assimilation) of elements of the Japanese culture and the absence of Korean cultural elements or, in some cases, the voluntary acquisition (enculturation) of Korean cultural elements.

5. Negotiating Ethnicity: Markers of Difference and Mechanisms of Representation

In their attempt to regain ethno-cultural elements, which, in some cases, appear to be still today considered primordial and necessary for the preservation and manifestation of Koreanness, Zainichi individuals seem to develop diverse strategies. Eagerness to (re-)acquire certain cultural elements and to maintain particular customs are still present in the community as most of the testimonies collected demonstrate. Besides that, particular elements, not strictly culture-related, are utilised to represent and manifest the Korean ethnicity, in what could be defined as mechanisms of representation of ethnicity and ethnic affiliation.

5.1. Markers of Difference

It is not the purpose of this study to identify the specific number of possible cultural elements differentiating Zainichi social and personal life from the average cultural experience of the Japanese, as this is likely to vary immensely depending on several biographical and social factors. However, by paying attention to three particular cultural elements, it is intended to present significant views concerning the recovery and maintenance of Korean cultural elements as a means to examine the impact of such cultural elements on the formation of Zainichi identities. In particular, due to the frequent reference made to them by participants, three main elements are examined: the Korean language, the memorial ceremony *Chesa* and the Korean cuisine.

5.1.1. The Korean Language

The Korean language, spoken by the first generation at their arrival in Japan during the first half of the twentieth century, has nowadays lost its communicative role in Zainichi Koreans' daily lives. Since the second generation, it was naturally substituted by Japanese as the main form of communication. When one visits some of the most representative areas where Korean population used to settle down, such as Utoro in Kyoto and especially Ikuno in Osaka, the presence of the Korean alphabet²⁸ is still noticeable. Nonetheless, Japanese chatters seem to have completely taken over their streets, shops and markets, rendering the hostland's language the common lingua franca within the Zainichi community.

The Korean language, however, seems to still have a very significant impact on the lives of younger generations, who charge it with a quasi-mystic energy and consider it a fundamental key to define and refine their ethnic identity. From the data collected in this study, interviews confirm that high levels of proficiency in the Korean language cannot generally be found in the community, with the exception of *Chôsen* school graduates who are often notably fluent. Nonetheless, regardless of the level of proficiency, it can be affirmed that the Korean language still plays a remarkable, symbolic role in such a manner that present-day Zainichi Koreans are, in important numbers, inclined to study it. All participants in this study stated to have studied it at different levels, achieving in some cases to acquire high levels of proficiency. Notwithstanding, it is not the intention of this research to provide a Korean proficiency map

²⁸ The Korean alphabet is commonly known as *Hangul* in South Korean and *Chosôn (Chôsen) muntcha* in North Korea.

amongst Zainichi Koreans, since it would require exhaustive quantitative data. Instead, in this section, some important aspects of the symbolic role played by the language are tackled.

5.1.1.1. Language Use: Performative or Instrumental?

One of the most striking elements about the use of Korean within the Zainichi community nowadays is its apparent performative aspect. Informants with a high level of proficiency confirmed that their use of the language was mainly reserved to formal ceremonies or culture-oriented activities.

In the case of *Chôsen* graduates and individuals involved with *Urihakkyo* and *Sôren*, as CG-1 and CG-2, the Korean language acquired a solely performative role. Therefore, it is regarded as being a formal element during official ceremonies, rather than an actual instrument of communication. As CG-1 and CG-2 explained, the Korean language "doesn't come out naturally." For this reason, it is used exclusively at particular official events and formal occasions, particularly those organised by *Sôren* officials.

Cases such as those of CG-3 and KG-3, who are involved in cultural activities including Korean traditional dance and music performance, also demonstrate that the use of Korean within the community is mainly performative. CG-3 explains that her chances to speak Korean are limited to occasions when she participates in particular gatherings to practice playing traditional instruments and *Nongak* dance.

In other cases, the language used is not even related to the performance of particular traditions or to the maintenance of a formalised, symbolic form of communication. At present, JS-3 and MG-3, who for diverse reasons decided to learn Korean, state that the use that they give to the language is merely work-oriented. After opening up his own guest house at the centre of Ikuno's Korea Town, JS-3 explains that for him Korean has no other use than occasionally communicating with some of his guests:

"Well, for us, third-generation Zainichi, there's no place to use Korean while we live in Japan. However, my case is somewhat different from other Zainichi. As I have this business in the middle of Korea Town, at times I happen to talk in Korean with newcomers and travellers from South Korea."

Similarly, MG-3, who works at a Japanese trade company with a long history of commercial exchanges with South Korea, explained that the reason why he makes use of the language is nearly exclusive to the fact that he needs to speak to Korean customers regularly.

It can be affirmed therefore, that in terms of usage, the Korean language does not play a *de facto* communicative role in the community, except for conducting particular official ceremonies and the performance of cultural activities. In other words, the usage of language in the community is almost exclusively restricted to the *re-production* of ethno-cultural spaces in an attempt to preserve a clear differentiation between what is Japanese and what is Korean.

5.1.1.2. Feelings: A Primordial Connection?

Regardless of the practical customs related to the language, it is undeniable that there also exists a sentimental dimension directly related to the Korean language. Paying attention to the accounts, a clear differentiation in terms of emotional interpretation and attachment to the language can be made. On the one hand, experiential accounts from some informants suggest the existence of a clearly primordial perspective towards the Korean language within some sectors of the community. On the other hand, such perspective is critically contested against by some informants who question the alleged significance of the Korean language in the present.

Accounts collected mainly from Zainichi individuals who attended ethnic schools prove that the acquisition of the Korean language is, in certain cases, interpreted as a fundamental step for succeeding in the formation of a solid identity as a Korean individual. Suggesting an indubitable primordial connection through the language with the Korean collectiveness supposedly constituting and embodying a defined Korean ethnic group, this perspective seems to derive, principally, of three factors directly related to the language: the creation of an ethnic bond, the accomplishment of an ethnic duty and the legitimisation of ethnic belonging.

Firstly, the acquisition of the Korean language paves the way for a first-person experience of the Korean ethnicity. In other words, knowing the language allows the individual to not simply observe their presumably original culture but to gain access to it and even take part in it. As CG-2, who considers the language a fundamental element of ethnicity, passionately explained:

"It's not just about being capable of speaking, but it's something emotional. Going to South Korea and being able to communicate directly with the people without any interpreting is something really extraordinary."

CG-2's statement highlights the emotional impact of being able to communicate with co-ethnic individuals. He does not refer to the possible conversations that he can have with Koreans in the peninsula, but to the fact that that communication can take place in first person.

Secondly, CG-2 suggests that learning the Korean language also obeys to a certain sense of responsibility. Zainichi Koreans, as Koreans themselves, are hence expected to preserve their primordial connection by the active preservation of linguistic ties with their ethnicity. Quoting his own words:

"Well, in reality, it's sort of our original language. It's hard to explain, but there's no doubt that South Koreans and North Koreans wish to speak *our language* [urimal], right? In the same way, as that language is originally our language, we shouldn't forget it."

This affirmation accentuates the primordial perspective already shown in the previous statement, not simply attending to a practical necessity to gain access to the original culture, but emphasising what could be defined as a collective ethnic duty to preserve a pure ethnic essence in the collectivity. However, that is not the only remarkable element in this statement. Aside from its significant content, a particular expression used in the original statement also deserves special attention.

The term '*urimal*' (Korean for "our language") is commonly used in the Korean Peninsula to refer to the Korean language. Apart from the transnational interpretation that can be given to this term, its use also denotes an interpretation of the Korean language as Koreans' native language, their *mother tongue*. Not coincidentally, when asked about his personal interpretation of the language with regards to his individual case, CG-2 was determined to claim that his sole mother tongue [bogo] was Korean, in contrast with Japanese, which he considers a simple instrument for the normal conduction of his daily life [seikatsu no kotoba]. This proves that the sentimental attachment to the language derived from the conscious conception of a presumably primordial connection with their ethnicity brings about a necessity to emphasise the importance of that ethnic bond and the subsequent disregard towards other facts, as the actual level of proficiency. Although CG-2's case seems to be, in this regard, somewhat exceptional, other accounts also suggest an impact of this sentimental attachment towards the language. For instance, CG-1 and JS-1, who, despite recognising that the only language they could objectively refer to as their mother tongue is Japanese, also insisted in their desire to refer to the Korean language as such.

Finally, the knowledge of the Korean language, regardless of the level, seems also to be considered by some Zainichi Koreans as an important pillar sustaining their Korean identity, which, furthermore, seems to be more associated with the idea of being a Korean rather than a Zainichi.

"Well, I think there is a relation to the fact that I am a Zainichi Korean rather than with being Zainichi. I think it's better for a Zainichi Korean to learn (Korean) in order to

have an identity as a Korean. Even if I didn't speak Korean, I could acknowledge that I am Korean. However, in order to know the culture better, I think it's better to know it." (CG-1)

This statement could easily be linked to the idea of the language as a way to gain direct access to the Korean culture. Nonetheless, as he later explained, it is not a simple exercise of studying the culture but a way to comprehend one's own existence; something rather related to, as he claimed, the "mind" and the "spirit." As an example, CG-1 stated that as a result of reaching a high level of Korean proficiency, his own character changed and, literally, "kimchi started tasting better." This affirmation, due to its subjectivity, cannot be interpreted scientifically. Notwithstanding, it can be said that, owing to CG-1's emotional emphasis in his account, such subjective experiences are the result of a certain sense of ethnic accomplishment. In other words, following the arguments exposed above, the attainment of a certain level of proficiency in the language can be envisaged as the accomplishment of the ethnic duty for the maintenance of a primordial connection and a privileged access to the Korean culture. In line with this interpretation, this could, therefore, facilitate a sense of confidence concerning the legitimacy to belong in the ethnic category of *Korean*, thus prioritising the primordial connection with ethnicity over the actual fact of being part of Japan as *Zainichi*. KG-2 made a similar point by stating:

"In my case, unlike others who are certain about their Koreanness..., I was uncertain whether I was Japanese or Korean. It was through the mastering of the Korean language that I became confident enough to claim I am Korean."

CG-1 and KG-2 point at the language as a prominent element for the legitimisation of their Koreanness. That is, the Korean language is deemed a legitimiser of their own conception as Koreans. At this point, it is necessary to consider how this function of *legitimiser* bestowed upon the Korean language is supposed to work. As aforementioned, the real use of Korean within the community seems to be restricted merely to a performative level. Therefore, the question to raise is *what is it that needs to be legitimised?* Apparently, the legitimising function seems to work in relation to two monolithic conceptions regarding ethnicity – Koreanness and Japaneseness. The relation to those two constructed ethnic conceptions, however, is not defined in the same terms. On the one hand, there is a tendency to justify and define – that is, *legitimise* – Koreanness in terms of sameness with respect to the Korean ethnic group represented by Koreans in the Korean Peninsula. CG-1, one of the participants with a higher level of proficiency, explained that mastering the language was a fundamental factor for the recognition of his Koreanness by Koreans in the peninsula.

"Before my Korean was good, every time I came across Koreans both from the North and the South, I was seen as a *Zainichi*. However, when my Korean improved and I spoke to them, I felt like I became a *true Korean fellow*, I wasn't just a guest."

Nevertheless, the legitimising function of the language does not simply work in terms of sameness, as, on the other hand, it also seems to play a significant role in legitimising difference. Another informant with a remarkable level of fluency in Korean, KG-1, explains that the study of Korean is likely to alleviate the tensions of living as a *Zainichi* in Japan. As he explained:

"Obviously, even when a *Zainichi* doesn't speak any Korean, they can claim they're *Zainichi*. However, living in Japanese society... hmm... If as a *Zainichi* you don't know any Korean at all, I guess life in Japan is tougher. There are many people who start learning Korean for that reason."

Instead of referring to the possible benefits of learning a language in order to communicate in that language, KG-1 highlights the fact of knowing it as fundamental. As he elaborated later, regardless of the level of proficiency and fluency, knowing Korean functions as a legitimiser of difference with respect to the Japanese ethnic space. Due to the lack of cultural literacy, the study of the Korean language provides the sufficient ground to justify and thus legitimise difference, in an exercise of contestation towards cultural assimilation.

During one of the interviews, KG-1 set an, albeit simplistic, illustrative example:

"If someone claims to be *Zainichi*, they're likely to be asked: 'So, you speak Korean?'"

It is precisely this correlation between a monolithic conception of Koreanness and a notion of *Zainichiness* as subordinate to it that motivates the need to re-acquire cultural elements in order to legitimise a *Zainichi* identity. Therefore, *Zainichi* individuals are likely to look to re-acquire a set of cultural elements presumably 'lost' generations back. Nonetheless, this effort is not solely motivated by an eagerness to regain and legitimise their Koreanness as Koreans, but, most importantly, to legitimise their ethnic difference as an ethnic minority with respect to the Japanese majority.

In contrast with the notion of *Zainichi* as subordinate to the conception of Koreanness, other informants proved a contestation against such a monolithic conception and a significant identitarian disassociation between Koreanness and *Zainichiness*. JS-3's and MG-2's accounts clearly represent this identitarian disassociation. JS-3 explained that after suffering from an identitarian conflict, he looked at Korea in search for answers. His attempts to gain knowledge about Korea and the *Zainichi* history through numerous readings culminated in his decision to

spend one and a half years studying Korean in Busan (ROK). Similarly, MG-2's account narrates how she decided to go to South Korea to learn the Korean language and the Korean culture as a result of insistent advices by her elder Zainichi fellows who repeatedly encouraged her to learn Korean and use her Korean name. In both cases, the experience in Korea and, above all, the learning of the Korean language are envisaged as a decisive manner to resolve uncertainties regarding their Koreanness. At the initial stages, it can be affirmed that the perception of the acquisition of the language as legitimiser is undeniably present, either by external influence or internal uncertainty. This perception, however, gets discarded as a result of personal experience of that language acquisition process and experience of the language. JS-3, who showed a notable universalist perspective on identity during interview sessions, explained:

"Hmm... well, after reflecting a lot about my identity, I went to study in South Korea and learnt the language. However, the language, eventually, is nothing but a tool, I believe. For this, what really matters isn't what you use to say something, but the person you are. I don't have that idea that Korean, and languages in general, are particularly important. For me, they're not at all. I also studied English, but with regards to languages, what I think is really important is to become truly competent in your own mother tongue."

In the above statement, JS-3 is clearly discrediting whatever primordial connection attributed to the language, by pointing at the merely instrumentalist value of languages in general. Also, by focusing on the actual experience of his life, which takes place in Japanese, and advocating the cultivation of his mother tongue, the Japanese language, he is prioritising the content – the real experience, “the person you are” – over the form – the constructed interpretations given to the language as a legitimiser.

In a similar fashion, MG-2 explains how the acquisition of Korean as a second language brought about practical advantages related to the capacity to interact with Korean people directly. However, in her account, she also discredited whatever primordial connection legitimised by the learning of Korean.

"I was intrigued by their insistence: 'use your Korean name', 'learn the language'. So, I started to use my Korean name and studied Korean with the doubt in my mind: 'will something in me change?' After that, I became fluent and able to directly understand the emotions of Koreans in the peninsula... However, how can I say...? Just for the fact that you become fluent, it doesn't mean that you become Korean [kankokujin ni naru wake de ha nai shi]."

In her statement, even though she praises the actual advantages derived from the acquisition of a language, MG-2 is invalidating whatever legitimising function attributed to the Korean

language. In line with JS-3, she states that in her particular case the language does not have any particular impact on her identity as a Zainichi.

5.1.2. *Chesa*

Another important marker of cultural difference between Zainichi individuals and the Japanese mainstream is the Confucian ritual of ancestors worship known as *Chesa* (or *Jesa*). *Chesa* is a ceremony traditionally practiced in the Korean Peninsula which functions as a memorial for ancestors. Although there exists a similar practice in Japanese culture, the traditional Buddhist memorial service commonly known as *Hôji*, both rituals are clearly distinguished in practice.

The impact of the Korean ancestors rite is undeniable as it is still present in the lives of a large portion of the Zainichi community. As Visočnik points out, "the most distinct element is the Confucian memorial ceremony *Chesa*, ancestor worship, when the family gathers to perform a ritual" (Visočnik, 2016: 241). As proof of this, of the 12 informants who participated in this study, ten still practice the ritual on a regular basis. However, what turns out to be of great importance is the different ways in which *Chesa* is interpreted and considered in the community. It could be argued that perspectives towards the practice of *Chesa* in the Zainichi community can be understood through two main tendencies: conservative and progressive.

On the one hand, the conservative tendency is represented by individuals who identify the maintenance of the traditional ritual as a crucial element of their ethnicity and hence are determined to preserve and strictly follow its most traditional rules. This determination comes from a conscious desire to maintain ethnicity markers as intact as possible in order to also maintain their own ethnicity. CG-1, who is very much aware of his conservative tendency, explains:

"I believe that following Confucianism, therefore, is one part of our ethnicity. Just like the Korean language or the Korean cuisine, Confucianism is also part of it."

According to CG-2's statement, the practice of *Chesa* as a Confucian ritual is envisaged as a requirement to accomplish in order to legitimately belong in the category of ethnic-Korean. Yet, at this point, it cannot be assumed that the practice of *Chesa* remained intact in the Korean Peninsula since the colonial period when it was imported to Japan along with the first waves of Korean migration from the peninsula. Several informants pointed out that the ritual guidelines followed in the peninsula were gradually modified and evolved with the times. CG-1 also highlighted this disparity in the guidelines as he noted that during a *Chesa* ritual with his

relatives in DPRK, his cousin started laughing at him as he found out how his Zainichi cousin ran *Chesa* in a much stricter manner. This disparity appears to be so significant that academics such as Harajiri (1989) considered the Zainichi version of *Chesa* constitutive of an independent ethnic culture.

However, how could such an aware determination to comply with traditional norms be explained even when knowing that such norms seem to have lost validity in contemporary Korea? For CG-2, there is a seemingly obvious response:

CG-2: "That is because we think we need to protect it, to stick to those norms. If it changed, it'd be wrong..."

Researcher: "Does that mean that in the case that it changed, your sense of ethnicity [minzokusei] would be prone to disappear?"

CG-2: "I believe it would fade away."

This determination to maintain the ritual in strict terms, in view of an eventual risk of losing their sense of ethnicity, is the main characteristic defining the conservative tendency towards *Chesa*.

On the other hand, there seems to be a considerably more relaxed interpretation of *Chesa* and its role in the community. Far from considering its preservation as vital for the maintenance of an alleged sense of ethnicity in the community, alternative opinions challenge the conservative tendency and seem to propose progressive views on the ritual. This progressive tendency represents an updated perspective on the Zainichi situation which seeks to adjust the reality of the community to the present times wherein they happen to live as a collective. This, however, does not mean that elements such as *Chesa* are to be disregarded or even refused in favour of a cultural Japanisation. Instead, it does highlight the need of a cultural adaptation. The participant with the most remarked relativist and universalistic perspective on the community, JS-3, represented this alternative approach to the ritual:

"Since recently, even Koreans in Korea do not seem to run *Chesa*. Nevertheless, Zainichi Koreans still stick to it in a very strict way. Personally, I wouldn't really mind if it disappeared. It's ok if it didn't disappear completely, but at least it should be practised in an easier way, it should be simplified. Why I say this? That's because it doesn't match with the present times anymore, it also takes so much money and time..."

Traditional *Chesa* rites are carried out several times annually in the community. Also, the celebration of the ancestral ceremonies involves an important cost for each family in expenditure and preparation. Paying attention to JS-3's testimony, some Zainichi individuals

seem to regard the ritual practice as tedious and costly which contrasts with the current frenetic pace of daily life in Japan. This is possibly one of the reasons behind the total abandonment of the practice by Zainichi individuals such as JS-1 and JS-2.

JS-3's perspective towards *Chesa* clashes with CG-1's conservative views. However, it proposes rather a more viable strategy to maintain the practice as an integral element of the Zainichi culture, instead of pursuing the impregnable maintenance of a temporally-displaced version of the ritual. In more general terms, unlike the conservative tendency, the progressive perspective advocates the emancipation of the Zainichi cultural reality from the rigid norms deeply rooted in the past whose legitimacy is buttressed by interpretations of ethnicity as a fixed, immutable and absolute quality.

Furthermore, what turns out to be surprising is the fact that, despite Zainichis' acquisition of most of Japanese cultural elements in their daily lives, the *Chesa* ceremony is still very much present in the Zainichi community nowadays. The reasons behind the still present validity of *Chesa* can be found in the very essence of Confucianism, which promotes respect for elders, reverence for ancestors and, most importantly, consciousness of mutual duties and obligations to relatives (Clark, 2000: 30). Despite his apparent progressist mentality, JS-3 highlighted the importance of *Chesa* as motivator for the maintenance and strengthening of familial ties. However, MG-1's testimony revealed the intrinsic influence of Confucianism's advocacy of mutual familial duties. On the one hand, MG-1, who explicitly confessed his desire to desist from running *Chesa* ceremonies, stated that a sort of sense of responsibility towards his ancestors compels him to carry on with the ritual every year. On the other hand, that sense of responsibility seems to also be consciously projected towards the future. When speaking of *Chesa*, MG-1 highlighted his responsibility towards his brother's children:

"My nephew and niece, whose mother is Japanese, are being raised as Japanese. They know about their father's Korean ancestry, but obviously they assume they themselves are Japanese. However, I'm certain that, as they grow up, one day they will realise that one part of them belongs to a minority and that might cause them certain insecurity and distress in the future... I'm the only one who can explain certain things to them."

In conclusion, the still present impact of Confucianism and particularly of the *Chesa* ceremony on the community does not simply function as proof of the reproduction of Korean culture but, most significantly, the production of an independent form of culture. Regardless of the tendency taken, either conservative or progressive, the practice of *Chesa* within the Zainichi culture breaks through the boundaries of Korean ethnicity as encompassed inside the national borders of the Korean Peninsula.

5.1.3. Korean Cuisine: the Role of *Kimchi* and *Horumon*

The third marker of difference whose presence is undeniable in the Zainichi community is the Korean cuisine. Although in the last number of years the Korean gastronomy has become a trend in Japan and the world, for Zainichi Koreans Korean food is nothing new. A short walk around areas of Osaka or Tokyo where Zainichi Koreans have resided for generations is enough to comprehend how Korean gastronomy is not a recently imported element but an autochthonous part of the Zainichi culture.

All participants in this study confirmed that the Korean cuisine was constant in their lives. However, their testimonies also proved that Korean food was displaced by Japanese gastronomy as the main cuisine in their homes. In most cases, informants assessed that Japanese cuisine was the base of their daily meals during their childhood and at present, and that the preparation of Korean dishes took a secondary place on the table. Nonetheless, this does not mean that Korean cuisine is disregarded or reserved exclusively for special occasions.

In general, it appears that the presence of Korean cuisine in Zainichi households takes place in two different modalities. On the one hand, Korean dishes continue to be prepared and served along with Japanese plates. As KG-2 explains, both cuisines are combined at meals but not mixed. That means that Japanese main dishes are likely to be accompanied by Korean side dishes and vice versa. On the other hand, there is likely to be a mixture of both cuisines. CG-1 explains how at his home there is a prevalence of Japanese cuisine. However, dishes are often seasoned with Korean spices and garlic in order to obtain a spicy taste.

Furthermore, the performative character given to Korean cuisine in the Zainichi community is also noticeable. Previously in this chapter, it was argued that the usage of the language has taken a mere performative position in most cases. This also seems to be the case of Korean gastronomy. Directly related to the celebration of the *Chesa* memorials, informants highlighted that the running of those memorials at home entailed the preparation of particular Korean dishes, which would not be present in daily-life culinary customs.

One particular gastronomical element appears to still have a significant impact on Zainichi lives. That is the traditional side dish made from salted and fermented vegetables, commonly known as *kimchi*. Most of the participants assured that the presence of kimchi at their dining tables has been constant since their childhood. Most striking does it turn out to be how kimchi is deemed a must-have by some Zainichi individuals, such as CG-2 who stated:

"Kimchi is almost mandatory, there must be kimchi at all times. There's no way I can bear it more than three days without kimchi!"

Ultimately, it is of great importance to also pay attention to the regional dimension that Korean food finds in the Zainichi community. As a consequence of the high rates of unemployment and poverty in the community in the post-war era, the consumption of cheap ingredients and products became customary. Particularly, the acquisition of discarded animal parts from local butcheries at low prices permitted many Zainichi families to have their meals regularly. The tradition of offal-cooking was already part of the Korean gastronomy of the time. However, Zainichi Koreans made their own version commonly known as *Horumon*²⁹. This culinary tradition has evolved until today, giving way to what for many is already a Zainichi cuisine wholly emancipated from the Korean cuisine.

5.2. Mechanisms of Self-representation

During encounters and conversations with participants, certain mechanisms of representation of Koreanness, devised and interpreted as forms of volitional manifestation of belonging to the Zainichi Korean collective were identified. Particularly, three mechanisms of self-representation appear to be still in use within the community: names, nationality and the particular terminology used to conceptualise different Zainichi experiences.

5.2.1. Names

Due to its fundamental role in social interaction, the most representative mechanism of self-representation is the name. In the previous chapter it was argued that, since the 1970s, as part of the empowering processes by Zainichi younger generations, numerous campaigns for the recovery of Korean names were launched throughout the country. With this collective effort, the Zainichi community appeared to overcome its self-stigma of names and demand a positive recognition of its ethnic roots.

In the attempt to decipher the current impact of name choice and usage on the community, participants, upon interrogation about their name usage, offered significant reflections towards their names. Generally speaking, in the case of Zainichi interviewees, the usage of Korean names is regarded as highly significant for the development of an ethnic consciousness and, particularly, for the satisfactory self-representation of individuals' ethnic singularity. However,

²⁹ The term *horumon* literally means discarded (horu) goods (mon).

taking into account the educational background of participants, there seems to be a correlation between education and usage. This correlation, nonetheless, is not merely related to the use of Korean names, but rather it appears to have an effect on the process of incorporation of Korean names.

The qualitative data collected during fieldwork suggest that three tendencies can be found in relation to the incorporation and conceptualisation of Korean names within the community: natural incorporation, instrumental incorporation and contestation.

5.2.1.1. Natural Incorporation of Korean Names in Ethnic Education Environments

As argued in previous sections, the functional purpose of full-time ethnic education is promoting the incorporation of diverse ethnic elements by *Zainichi* students so that those elements become an intrinsic part of their self-consciousness and identity as ethnic-Koreans. In like manner, as students appear to learn or, especially in the case of *Chôsen* schools' students, acquire the Korean language, they also seem to naturally normalised the use of their Korean names.

During previous decades and even nowadays, a stigma towards Korean names is still noticeable in certain areas of Japanese society. A sense of danger or vulnerability, therefore, can be said to still condition the name choice, as names are one of the most perceptible markers of distinction. Notwithstanding, *Chôsen* schools' *relational effect* and *Kenkoku* school's *plural atmosphere* function as neutralisers of such sense of danger, allowing for the natural use and incorporation of Korean names by *Zainichi* students.

Some participants with ethnic education experience asserted that the use of their Korean names was not the result of a choice but the natural consequence of not having an alias (CG-1, CG-3 and KG-2). On the other hand, KG-3, who used a Japanese alias in the past, stated that he only made use of it occasionally before entering *Kenkoku*. Also, KG-1 explained that the only time he used his now discarded alias was as a result of his boss's insistence for him to cover up his ethnic heritage. Significantly, KG-1 stated that using his Japanese alias was "close to using a mask, an act of fakery." KG-1's testimony is useful to explain how the natural incorporation of Korean names is possibly motivated by the normalisation of their use within ethnic schools. In contrast, none of the six informants who did not receive full-time ethnic education affirmed they had used their Korean names since their childhood.

5.2.1.2. Instrumental Incorporation for Visibility Purposes

Participants' testimonies also demonstrate that the disposal of aliases in favour of an incorporation of Korean names is still today a common practice derived from personal experiences. This transition is commonly characterised by a voluntary exercise of public manifestation, or as it is commonly known as 'real name declaration' [*honmyô sengen*], whereby individuals publicly announce their decision of recovering their Korean names. The most representative example of this can be found in JS-1's testimony. JS-1, who lived his childhood and adolescence with a Japanese name, decided to change his name during his second year at university. As he explained, his decision was motivated by one particular event. On occasion of the 50th anniversary of Japan's defeat in the Second World War in 1995, JS-1 had the opportunity to listen to the testimony of a Korean woman who, during the Pacific War, was forced into prostitution as a comfort woman. This testimony, JS-1 states, had a major impact on him:

"In that year, many ladies came out, after 50 years of silence. They made public their experiences, there were already pretty old, but in their youth they were sent away with the military and made into sex slaves. At that time, one of them said: 'I can't die this way. I just can't die without telling a thing'. Those words had a great impact inside me. Recalling it, I think that it was at that moment that I gained the certainty that we (Zainichi Koreans) also need to take some similar action."

Consequently, the following year, during one of his classes at university, he stood in front of his classmates and delivered his 'real name declaration'.

When asked about the purpose of such declaration and the decision to recover his Korean name, JS-1, as well as MG-2, assured that by using their ethnic names they provide visibility, not solely to their own lives as Zainichi, but also to the whole community. MG-2 described how at the moment of introducing herself to new people she can clearly notice the faces of surprise of Japanese people. Those times, MG-2 explains, provide her with the opportunity to speak of her ethnic background and history, thus neutralising the concealing effect of aliases that compels Zainichi Koreans into involuntary passing.

5.2.1.3. Contesting Conceptualisations of the Value of Names

Lastly, special attention must be given to the testimonies of MG-1 and JS-3, which function as an apparent contestation to traditional conceptualisations and interpretations of names within the Zainichi community. In the first place, it is necessary to provide a brief explanation of the concept '*honmyô*' that is still commonly used. This term is translated as 'real name' and is

broadly used for referring to 'Korean names' as opposed to Japanese aliases. Therefore, a correlation is commonly made between the idea of 'real names' and Korean names, bestowing a sense of legitimacy upon the Korean ethnic names. The term *honmyō* was used during interviews by most of participants, going, consciously or unconsciously, in line with that semantic correlation. However, the testimony of MG-1 collided head-on with that correlation. Having lived all his life with a Japanese name and having used his Korean name merely in an anecdotic way, MG-1, when interrogated about his *honmyō*, stated:

"Well, it's not like that. How can I say? I have lived all my life as H.S. (*Japanese name*), whereas I used to be called by my Korean name only during my ethnic classes at elementary school or when I went to Korea... In short, that is simply my *ethnic name*."

In his statement, MG-1 suggests that the usual assumption that Korean names are to be deemed *authentic*, that is, legitimate names, is not always truthful to real experience. For MG-1, his Japanese name is his name as much as his ethnic name is. In other words, the almost automatic legitimacy given to the notion of Korean names, which is nothing but a primordial interpretation of names as ethnic markers, is not universally functional since, as in the case of MG-1, individual experience seems to have a more significant impact.

Similarly, JS-3 proved to also have a particular view on names. In his case, personal experience in Korea and years of reflections about his identity led him to take the decision of recovering his Korean name. Thus, nowadays most of his registrations are made with his Korean name. Nonetheless, he affirmed that at present the question of his name has no impact whatsoever on his life. As a matter of fact, he affirmed that the most useful way to get his attention, the word that most efficiently represents him, is using his nickname. Despite the fact this nickname is just an abbreviation of his Japanese name, JS-1's perspective is representative of a contesting tendency that arguably questions the validity of primordial interpretations of ethnic names' value and advocates instrumental functionality exclusively based on individual experiences.

5.2.2. Nationality

According to official statistics, as of the end of 2016 the total number of Korean residents in Japan was 485,557, of which 453,096 were registered as ROK citizens (*Kankokuseki*) and 32,461 are registered as Chosenese (*Chōsenseki*) (Ministry of Justice, 2016c). These numbers, however, look exclusively at registrations based on citizenship (or the lack of it) and, therefore, do not differentiate between new-comers and old-comers. Observing the number of special permanent residents provides a more accurate perception of the actual number of Zainichi Koreans. Of the total number of 338,950 special permanent residents in Japan, governmental

statistics indicate a majority of Zainichi Koreans with 335,163 members, of which 303,337 possess a ROK passport and 31,826 are registered as Chosenese (Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan, 2016).

Even though this data provides a useful referential scheme regarding the administrative position of Zainichi Koreans in Japan, it remains far from providing an objective reference concerning the real number of Zainichi Koreans. Due to governmental methods of population registration, naturalised Zainichi Koreans are missing in all statistics as they are registered simply as Japanese, thus obviating their ethnic heritage. Official statistics on naturalisation applications indicate that since 1952 a total of 365,530 Koreans naturalised Japanese, with a yearly average of about 6,000 naturalisations during the last decade (Ministry of Justice, 2016d).

Notwithstanding the difficulty to provide an accurate analysis on the Zainichi Korean population in Japan, fluctuations in numbers do indicate presumable variations in the perception of nationality amongst the Zainichi community. In order to comprehend the present-day perception of Zainichi Koreans regarding their nationality (citizenship), participants were questioned about their interpretations of their nationalities and their motivations to maintain or change them.

5.2.2.1. *Chôsen* Register

Only two of the participants have been or are still registered as Chosenese. This is not surprising as statistics from the last five years³⁰ indicate a notable decrease in the number of *Chôsen* registers (Table 13). This decrease in the last few years can be interpreted as the result of a more practical perspective towards nationality.

Table 13. Number of *Chôsen* registers from 2012 to 2016.

Year	Registers
2012	40,617
2013	38,491
2014	35,753
2015	33,939
2016	31,826

Sources: 1. *Foreign resident population by nationality/region* (Ministry of Justice, 2016e). 2. *Foreign Resident Population Statistics* (Ministry of Justice, 2016c).

³⁰ Until 2011 official registers classified both ROK citizens and Chosenese under the same category of '*Kankoku-Chôsen*.' Separate registrations started to be taken in 2012.

The only informant registered as Chosenese, CG-1, justified his determination to maintain his registration on three principle reasons: unjustified hostility, anti-division ideology and historical significance.

Firstly, CG-1 points at Japanese society's hostility toward Zainichi Koreans, and particularly towards those like him and his family registered as Chosenese, as one of the main reasons for the decrease of *Chôsen* registers. Also, he explains that succumbing to social pressure and changing his register would imply a certain level of guilt regarding a social and geopolitical situation for which he holds no accountability. Put in his own words:

"Of course, my grandparents... even my brother, are keeping their *Chôsen* register [Chôsenseki]. How can I explain this? The point is, we haven't done anything wrong. It's this society that must change."

Secondly, CG-1 explains that *Chôsenseki*, not being a nationality, remains a symbol of the existence of stateless people in Japan, as a consequence of the division of the Korean Peninsula and the lack of relation between Japan and DPRK. This symbolic interpretation, it can be affirmed, seeks to highlight Japanese responsibility for not providing a consensual solution to the indefinite permanence of Korean population in Japan after the war.

Finally, the ROK-citizenship alternative is refused by CG-1 as it is interpreted as the legitimisation of the fracture of the Korean Peninsula. By the same token, under the hypothetical scenario that relations between Japan and DPRK were established, CG-1 pointed out that he would have no intention to acquire the DPRK citizenship for the same reason.

On the other hand, CG-2's case is also noteworthy as he decided to abandon his *Chôsen* register in favour of the ROK citizenship. After the death of his father in the summer of 1999, CG-2 decided to become a ROK citizen as a means to visit the Jechu Island and satisfy a sense of responsibility [sekininkan] to return to the land from where his grandparents emigrated. Two significant conclusions can be drawn from CG-2's account. On one side, the fact that he did not make his decision until his father passed away indicates a familial imposition, possibly unconscious, to maintain the *Chôsen* register. On the other side, his intention to visit the homeland of his ancestors, which motivated his final decision, highlights a purely practical interpretation of nationality which, as he stated, "has nothing to do with identity, (ideological) orientation or thought."

5.2.2.2. ROK Citizenship

Interviews with informants who since their birth have had ROK citizenship highlight the existence of two major perspectives towards their nationality: passive and active. The former is represented by individuals who do not manifest an attitude of protection and utilisation of their nationalities as mechanisms of representation. The latter, however, implies a conscious and purposive determination to maintain and protect their nationality.

Passive attitudes were manifested mainly by CG-3 and KG-2 and to a lower extent by JS-3. On the one hand, when speaking about their reasons not to naturalise Japanese, both CG-3 and KG-2 pointed at the present-day absence of impediments and disadvantages in their daily lives as one of the reasons for their reluctance to become Japanese citizens. Both participants acknowledge their impossibility to vote in Japanese national elections in Japan but also explained that that was not a weighty enough reason to naturalise. On the other hand, JS-3, who also highlighted the current lack of barriers in his daily life, emphasised his disdain towards the notion of nationality. As he pointed out:

"I don't think nationalities are important. Things like borderlines between countries or nationalities are things that could just disappear. But, well, they exist as instruments of control for the governments. I just wonder if it'd not be more natural to simply think of humanity on earth as just one; especially, in the present global society."

Although CG-3 and KG-2's opinion and JS-3 insightful interpretation of nationality can be considered as passive perspectives, the origin of such passivity comes from well-differentiated reasonings: on the one hand, a lack of consideration towards the notion of nationality and a negative consideration towards it, on the other.

The active perspective is represented by JS-1 and KG-3 who consciously give a prominent significance to their ROK citizenship. On the one hand, JS-1 manifests a determination to maintain his nationality as a means to protect Zainichis' singularity within Japanese society. He explains that the maintenance of non-Japanese nationalities, as well as foreign names, is key for the visibilisation of minorities and the betterment of their situation in Japan. Also, considering his own personal experience as a Zainichi Korean working as a public servant a reference for future generation, JS-1 accentuates the importance of protecting such mechanisms of representation, deeming them prominent for the triggering of a sense of difference in future generations. On the other hand, KG-3, who studies to become a teacher, explains that, despite the obvious advantages of having Japanese nationality when applying for jobs in the public sector, his decision to keep his ROK citizenship is based both on his identitarian experience as a Zainichi and on his determination to live as such, regardless of the hindrances it may cause.

JS-1's and KG-3's accounts prove their interpretation of nationality as a mechanism of representation of their heterogenetic aspect within the portrayed-as-homogeneous Japanese society. However, what turns out to be significant is the perception of disadvantages derived from difference as a prominent element in Zainichi experience and the formation of an identity as Zainichi. In JS-1's words:

"For me, the impediments derived from my nationality are one aspect of my identity. It's that inconvenience that forges one part of my (Zainichi) identity everyday."

5.2.2.3. Japanese Nationality

Although, in the case of the two participants who possess a Japanese passport, nationality does not work as a mechanism of representation of their Korean ethnicity, some of their reflections turn out to be significant.

Naturalised Japanese at a young age, JS-2 highlights the work-related and administrative benefits that his nationality provides. However, he also emphasises the fact that his condition of Japanese citizen with full citizen rights translates into a somewhat level of empowerment for the community. As he explained, he conceives his vote at general elections as the vote of the Zainichi minority. That is because JS-2 developed a Zainichi consciousness through his own personal experience that was disassociated from his citizenship. In other words, JS-2's individual interpretation of his ethnicity as Zainichi Korean does not come into conflict with his nationality as both concepts are deemed irrelevant to one another. Nonetheless, JS-2 confessed to regret the fact that his naturalisation process was not carried out using his Korean name, rendering his ethnic heritage visible and not leaving it concealed under his Japanese name.

Similarly, MG-1, who was born to naturalised parents, manifested perceptions towards nationality and ethnicity that did not collide with each other. However, he pointed out the fact that, although both concepts, nationality and ethnicity, are coupled in Japanese society, the naturalisation does not guarantee protection from discrimination. MG-1 accentuated the continuous sense of vulnerability narrating his brother experience:

"When my younger brother (who also naturalised) was about to get married to his Japanese wife, her parents made a rather discriminatory comment about us: 'we consent to this marriage because of your Japanese nationality. But if you were a South Korean citizen, we would not.'"

MG-1's point, reinforced by his brother's experience, proves the fact that naturalisation and the possession of Japanese citizenship does not ensure the total acceptance within Japanese society in the cases where ethnicity is not concealed.

5.2.3. Terminology and Self-representation: Conceptualising Identity

Countries, nations and states seem to have lost the capacity to define individual ethnic identities. Consequently, toponyms appear to have lost their capacity to entirely define individuals' identitarian experience related to the place where experiences take place. The assumption that, for instance, someone born in Britain is to be automatically and solely considered British has been largely contested. The word British, therefore, does not quite describe the experience of those born to Jamaican, South Asian or Chinese immigrants in Great Britain. A quick look at the 'ethnicity section' of whatever official form reveals the reality that the geographical and institutional essence of the term 'Britain' cannot seem to entirely define individuals' identities, as mentions to their skin colour or ethnic origin are necessary to describe Britons' identitarian experiences.

In the case of Japan, interpretations are rather different. The assumption that the term *Japanese* incarnates all possible dimensions of identity and belonging is still in place. While it is common for U.S.-born ethnic-Japanese to be represented (and self-represented) as Japanese Americans, Japan-born children born to non-Japanese nationals are rarely referred to as *whatever-Japanese*.

Possibly, *Zainichi* individuals are the most apparent example of this phenomenon. *Zainichi* Koreans are not likely to be considered *Japanese*, regardless of the number of generations away they are from the Korean Peninsula and the fact that they might be naturalised. This impossibility to be regarded as co-nationals is motivated by the commonly accepted interpretation of Japaneseness as essentially blood-tied. This fact is no news for the *Zainichi* community who frequently accept it and even adhere to it.

5.2.3.1. Sticking to Traditional Concepts

Throughout this work, the terms *Zainichi* and *Zainichi Korean* are used interchangeably for clarity purposes. However, in order to thoroughly comprehend how *Zainichi* individuals construe their identitarian experiences in Japan, it is pertinent to look at how they conceptualise and articulate their own realities.

Sticking to its semantic value, the term *Zainichi* is a rather simple term: '*staying in Japan*'. Nevertheless, historical and social experiences nourished the term with very specific connotations of temporality and disapproval. It is of major importance, however, to bear in mind that the term has become a social construct, tantamount to racialised colour categories. '*Zainichi*' points at the physical presence in Japan but, unlike affixes such as American or British which are supposed to indicate inclusion into the citizenry, it possesses a clear restrictive essence, highlighting an alleged dysfunctionality in their presence in Japan. In other words, the term *Zainichi*, albeit broadly accepted, needs to be considered an othering concept that represents Korean minority's in terms of disapproval, disrecognition and exclusion.

On the other hand, the term *Zainichi* is commonly accompanied by diverse elements such as *Chôsenjin* (Chosenese) or *Kankokujin* (South Korean), which refine the conceptualisation by providing particular interpretation of their ethnicity and experience.

i. Zainichi Chôsenjin

The concept *Chôsenjin* derives from the name given to the Korean Peninsula, *Chôsen* (Joseon in Korean). Due to its historical significance and, most importantly, owing to its geographical value, this concept is still today regarded as unificatory as opposed to the term *Kankoku* that refers exclusively to the southern part of the peninsula.

All three participants from *Chôsen* schools defined themselves as *Zainichi Chôsenjin* accentuating the non-divisory essence of the concept.

"Originally, it was *Chôsen*. *Kankoku* refers exclusively to the southern half... The *Chôsen* I say refers to the idea of a unified Korea(n peninsula)."

Likewise, as CG-1 points out, the concept *Chôsen* is presented as free from political connotations, thus being detached from nation-state categories:

"I am *Zainichi Chôsenjin*... [But] I'm neither Japanese nor a citizen of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or the Republic of Korea."

Therefore, CG-1, CG-2 and CG-3's interpretation of the concept emphasises its ethnic value, as representing the Korean ethnicity or the Korean ethnic group, rather than symbolising a particular political ascription or referring to a specific nation-state. Furthermore, based on conversations with the three participants, it can be affirmed that, in their self-representation as

Zainichi Chôsenjin, the *Zainichi* part appears to function as an element merely descriptive of their residential situation, leaving the largest charge of significance to the *Chôsenjin* part.

Notwithstanding its matter-of-factly descriptive value, this articulation and description of *Zainichi* existence as *Zainichi Chôsenjin* should not be deemed dissociative of nation-state categories. Albeit its functionality in interpreting *Chôsen* as a historically – and geographically – irrefutable concept, it provides a definition of the *Zainichi* experience as still diasporic and linked to a national category, refusing to transcend national boundaries restricting identity. Furthermore, it is no surprise that such articulation is supported by participants with experience at *Chôsen* schools. Despite its seemingly political dissociation with DPRK, *Chôsen* schools seem to still promote an interpretation of Korea's national history and ethnicity that goes in line with DPRK's national discourse. *Chôsen* schools' *purposive effect* assures the development of a strong collective consciousness as members of the *Chôsen* category, which not solely refers to the micro category of *Zainichi Chôsenjin* but to the macro category of *Chôsenjin*. This notion of collectiveness motivates the accentuation of *Chôsenjin* as a primordial ethnic connection to that macro category, over *Zainichi*, as a merely contextual element in their existence.

ii. **Zainichi Kankokujin**

In the case of *Kenkoku* students, they described themselves as *Zainichi Kankokujin*. This form of self-representation, however, does not respond to political affiliations or orientations. Three main factors seem to condition their choice: (a lack of) apprehension of DPRK, prejudiced interpretations and personal experience.

Firstly, social connotations attributed through history to the term *Chôsen* seem to be a major reason behind *Kenkoku* students' reluctance to ascribe with that concept. Although all participants acknowledge the geographical and historical significance of the term, the three informants appear to have incorporated the prejudiced connotations socially given to the term. KG-1's comment is illustrative of this:

"Personally, I unconsciously refrain from using that word; as if I unconsciously hate it."

Secondly, informants stated to base their choosing of *Zainichi Kankokujin* over *Zainichi Chôsenjin* due to the common association of the latter with the North Korean regime. This does not necessarily entail a critical view over DPRK, but a reluctance to identify with a term that links to a country that they do not know much about. When interrogated about her tendency to refer exclusively to Koreans and herself as *Kankokujin*, KG-2 explained:

"Perhaps, I only refer to the South. It's not that I want to make a clear distinction, but I haven't actually been there (North Korea) and there's much more that I don't know than I do really know about that country."

The last factor goes in line with this argument as it points at the actual experience as the primary motivation to opt for a particular concept. In this sense, first-hand experiences in the South as well as personal bonds of friendship (KG-1) and kinship (KG-2) with South Koreans also seem to have a significant impact on their election.

Besides these three factors, it is important to consider the fact that these three participants were students at the *Kenkoku* school, an educational institution linked to *Mindan*. Therefore, beyond salient experiential motives, it can be assumed that ROK-oriented ethnic education also plays a role in individuals' self-representation – be it due to provision of resources for a first-hand experience, or be it for the teaching of a particular interpretation of Korean history.

5.2.3.2. Transcending Traditional Concepts

To a large extent, the traditional terminology representing the Zainichi experience appears to be anchored in conceptualisations based on pre- and post-division interpretations of Korea as a nation. At the same time, such interpretations seem to also coincide with diverse forms of political and ideological ascriptions to particular forms of thought seemingly encapsulated in the old dichotomy of aligning with either the North or the South. However, it can be affirmed that the interpretation of alignment, which had a prominent impact during several decades after the war, has been almost completely discontinued in terms of individual experience. Nevertheless, the still prominent role played by the two major ethnic-Korean associations, *Mindan* and *Sôren*, seems to subtly define the collective identities in terms of, if not alignment, orientation (not necessarily political, yet based on historical interpretations). For this reason, it is no surprise that the six participants with full-time ethnic educational backgrounds represented themselves in accordance with one of the two ethnic associations.

As for the rest of the participants, the terminology used to describe their identitarian experiences as Zainichi Koreans, in some cases, differs greatly from the traditional conceptualisation, providing significant re-interpretations of their experiences.

i. **Zainichi Korian, Zainichijin and Zainichi Saram**

Through the adaptation of the English word 'Korean' [Korian], MG-3 intends to override traditional concepts and dissociate from the notion of the nation-state.

"When you say *Chôsen*, it refers to the current North Korea, and when you say *Kankoku*, it indicates ROK. Both terms project that image – that recognition. However, the Zainichi experience is not like that, because it's separated from the concept of country (nation-state)... So, without depending on the category of country and emancipating from it, the Zainichi experience involves a way of life not encapsulated in that notion. That is, I believe, the feeling behind the use of the word *Korian* nowadays."

This conceptualisation highlights a liberation of the Zainichi experience from the chains of nation-state ascription, hence placing the ethno-cultural dimension of Zainichiness at the core of the identitarian experience.

Along the same line, the terms used by JS-2 and MG-2, '*Zainichijin*' and '*Zainichi saram*'³¹, respectively, also recognise the agency of Zainichiness over the structural role played by traditional concepts. JS-2 explained that "not being either Japanese or Korean, 'Zainichi' is to be deemed a third category" – a third space –, where Zainichi takes on the chief role, construing their identity based on experience rather than primordial connection with Korea as a homeland that they no longer acknowledge as theirs.

ii. **Zainichi Chikyûjin, Zainichi Jechujin and Zainichi Ajiajin**

In contrast to MG-3, JS-2 and MG-2 who articulate their identities based exclusively on personal experience and dissociated from a particular location, JS-3 and CG-3 described their identities in terms of location, yet not alluding to nations or countries. On the one hand, JS-3 described his experience from an emphatic individualist perspective. He outlined his human nature and defined himself as a '*Zainichi Chikyûjin*', that is, as a Zainichi earthling. Unquestionably, this categorisation responds to a purpose to not associate with any particular category and advocating a global level of identity based on humanism and individual experience.

CG-3, who reconceptualised her identity in various occasions during her interviews, also detached from categories of Korea or Japan and described her experience as rooted in various

³¹ The term *saram* [person] is used in the Korean language as an affix to form demonyms. For instance, *Ilbon* (Japan) + *saram* = Japanese person.

dimensions transcending the boundaries, set by nation-state categories, from above and below. On the one side, based on her familial experience, she defined herself as ‘*Zainichi Jechujin*’ (Zainichi from Jechu Island) alluding to the concrete region of origin of her ancestors. On the other side, based on her personal experience, she also stated to feel ‘*Zainichi Ajiajin*’ (Zainichi Asian) as a result of interaction with other Asian individuals that leads to the realisation of the existence of diverse cultural and experiential similarities. In short, CG-3’s conceptualisation of her identity can be interpreted as derived from a sense of belonging towards multiple dimensions of collectiveness, which are detached from the concept of nation.

6. Placing Identities

In this section, the notions of belonging, recognition and self-identification in relation to national and non-national spaces are examined through the analysis of narrations regarding experiences in the Korean Peninsula, the Kansai Region, the Jechu Island and Okinawa. This analysis permits an evaluation of the nation-state’s failure to provide a solid identitarian reference and allows for the conceptualisation of transnational forms of belonging.

6.1. National Perspective: the Korean Peninsula

It is apparent that, when weaving a discourse about their identity both in individual and collective terms, Zainichi Koreans refer to the Korean Peninsula [Chôsen Hantô] as a fundamental source, not only of the very origin of the community, but also of their own ethnic identity nowadays. As discussed previously, certain cultural elements such as the Korean cuisine, the Korean language as well as ancestral rituals and even concepts still play a significant role in Zainichis' lives. Nonetheless, that role appears to be played from a spatial and temporal distance. Despite the fact that those elements are integral to what can be defined as a Zainichi culture, individuals appear to tend to still locate themselves in the peninsula, which is considered a primordial container of a Korean essence – Koreanness – which Zainichi Koreans observe, interpret and construe from a distance.

It is prominent, notwithstanding, to consider the possible effects of breaking that distance and experiencing in first person the territorial space conceived as the vessel of Koreanness. With the advancements brought about by globalisation, international travelling was largely normalised and nowadays it is relatively easy to move from one country to another. The access to South Korea from Japan was even more simplified in recent years with the emergence of low-cost airlines, and weekend trips are an affordable option for almost anyone on the archipelago.

Likewise, albeit at a much lower scale, North Korea has in the recent years opened to the tourist industry, enabling more people to visit the country.

The following lines present diverse accounts of Zainichi experiences in both DPRK and ROK.

6.1.1. DPRK

Since the 1980s, the *Urihakkyo* institution has been organising the *Sokoku Hômon* [fatherland visit] school trip for high school students in their third year. With the purpose of offering students a chance to experience their homeland, *Sokoku Hômon* takes students to different places in North Korea, where they can interact with other students and participate in a variety of activities. As was splendidly captured in documentaries such as Kim Myung-Joon's *Urihakkyo* (2008) or the recent *Sorairo no Symphony* [The Blue-sky Symphony] (2015), the trip usually turns out to be a revelatory experience for students, who come into contact with a land that, due to its mystification in the *Chôsen* schools' rhetoric, has constantly played a prominent role in their collective imaginary.

The number of participants with direct experience in DPRK Korea was only two, CG-1 and CG-2. Both participants visited the country during their high school years as part of their studies at *Chôsen* schools. CG-1 and CG-2 narrate experiences which include some major similar factors.

In the first place, both participants speak of a *sense of sameness*. CG-2 accentuates how he had the "odd sensation" of suddenly being part of a majority:

"I felt joy. In here (Japan), we have the consciousness of being foreign residents [gaikokujin zainichi]. However, when I went there (DPRK), the experience was different. It was the first time I was in a country with only Koreans [Chôsenjin]. How can I say..., I was part of a majority... It was amazing, an odd sensation."

That "odd emotion" that CG-2 verbalises entails a complete identitarian breakdown whereby former foundations of his identity cease to function as such. The *sense of difference*, which since early stages of his childhood was the basis of his identitarian position, appears to be neutralised by a *sense of sameness*, that is, by the conscious conviction of being, as a Chosenese, the same as the rest of the Chosenese constituting the majority.

Secondly, two parallel factors explain the emergence of that *sense of sameness*. On the one hand, both CG-1 and CG-2 comment on the fact that North Koreans actively acknowledged the existence of a Korean minority in Japan. As CG-1 points out, DPRK schools' curricula include

references to the emergence of the Zainichi community in Japan and its struggles to maintain their ethnic consciousness. In consequence, North Koreans not only acknowledge, but also celebrate Zainichis' determination to maintain their bonds with Korea. On the other hand, CG-2 speaks of a certain contraposition between the fact of encountering the homeland and the conviction that he would not stay there.

"That homeland is *Urinara*³² (our country) for us, we are people of that fatherland. However, I was conscious that I'd never live there, that I'd be there just for the trip period... [However] I had the feeling that I was in my country, in my homeland."

Although the purpose of the *Sokoku Hōmon* trip can easily be interpreted as attempt to charge the imaginary conception of the motherland with a load of experiential realism, it is not incorrect to say that such experience ultimately functions to nourish the same imaginary conception, in a form of metaphysical realism.

Therefore, the *sense of sameness* cannot be entirely envisaged as a new foundation for their identity. In the case of the *sense of difference*, it is the lack of recognition by the Japanese mainstream and the self-representation as different what provides the ground for a Zainichi identity. In the case of the *sense of sameness*, the process appears to be, if not completely, partially unilaterally motivated. When interrogated about their encounters with North Koreans, both participants explained that they were not completely recognised as equals [dōhō]. Seemingly, CG-1 and CG-2 construe their recognition in terms of ethnic sameness and experiential differences. Sticking to the primordialist interpretation that considers ethnicity as something immutable and static, both participants affirm to feel recognised as Koreans. Nonetheless, they also explain that, due to the evident differences in the environments where they grew up and live, there are significant factors that distance them from North Koreans. This argument clearly alludes to the impact that contextualities have on individuals' perception of their social world and their position in it, which is nothing but a situationalist interpretation of their ethnic identity.

In a nutshell, even though there are multiple factors that might initially contribute to the development of a certain *sense of sameness*, if not belonging, with respect to North Koreans, actual experiences with natives from the land that participants perceived as their homeland seem to discredit some of their former assumptions. Thus, it can be affirmed that recognition in primordialist terms appears to take place as they are seen as *Chōsenjin*. Nonetheless, their

³² In the Korean language, the term *Urinara* is commonly used to refer to the fatherland.

Zainichi condition, which is but the result of experience in their native Japanese contextuality, frustrates their desire for complete recognition by North Korean individuals.

6.1.2. ROK

Despite the recent DPRK's efforts to promote international tourism, it is not surprising that the number of visitors to ROK Korea from Japan is much higher. By the same token, it is evident that *Zainichi* Koreans, too, look at South Korea as the most obvious way to visit the peninsula. This reality is well represented by participants in this study, as everyone of them had visited the southern half of the Korean Peninsula at some point in their lives. Motivations as well as the assiduity in those visits, nonetheless, also vary significantly. For instance, in the case of *Kenkoku* students, their first chance to visit ROK is commonly provided by the school, which organises *Bokoku Hômon* (Motherland visit) school trips in a similar fashion as *Urihakkyo's Sokoku Hômon* trips. In other cases, it is familial connections or simply the desire to see first-hand the land from where the majority of Koreans emigrated to Japan. However, it is evident that in most cases visiting the peninsula entails an expectation to acquire a deeper level of comprehension and understanding – a sort of ethnic enlightenment – regarding their own existence as *Zainichi* Koreans. JS-3, who as a university student decided to spend some time in South Korea explained this idea as follows:

"It was during my time at university, by chance I came across these books (about Korea and Japan) that created a spark of interest inside me about both countries' relations and my identity as well. That is what motivated my decision (to move to South Korea)."

Expectations about the encounter with the peninsula, notwithstanding, do not always seem to be fulfilled. That was the case of MG-2 who, as a result of emotional accounts from some of her family members, expected to be significantly affected by her arrival to the peninsula:

"Knowing that, on his first arrival to South Korea, my father burst into tears as the aeroplane landed, I wondered 'will I feel the same way?' However, it wasn't like that at all."

On the other hand, other accounts narrate a rather different experience. CG-2's account turns out to be particularly salient due to the real impact of the actual experience on his previous assumptions. Having received full ethnic education at a *Chôsen* school, CG-2 had a considerably negative impression about ROK, which he considered a U.S. puppet state with no real sovereignty that had not given any support to *Chôsen* schools in Japan. However, after being invited to join the East Asian Workshop in 2000 and meeting South Korean youngsters for the first time, his prejudices started to dissipate. This encounter paved the way for CG-2's

decision to go on a trip to ROK along with some other workshop members in the same year. Unlike MG-2's case, for CG-2 his first visit to South Korea entailed a significant emotional impact:

"It was obviously pretty different from when I went to the North. ROK is a capitalist country and things like cities' layout, the streets, the amount of trains and cars circulating were exactly like in Japan. But all signs were on *Hangul* (Korean alphabet), that was fascinating. Everything was written in Korean and I could read it. Also, I could listen to the radio and watch TV... The food was the same I've always had since I was born. The peninsula had been divided and I had seen both sides, but I had this feeling that the Korea in the south was truly my country."

The emotional impact of CG-2's case is of great significance as it demonstrated that first-hand experiences are likely to break down particular preconceptions. Nevertheless, it is his last statement, "it was truly my country," what certainly stands out in his narration – for what does *my country* mean?

At this point, it is useful to look at other participants' account. In numerous interview encounters, informants coincided in their perception of ROK, or rather the whole peninsula, as a familiar, not-unknown place. Participants such as JS-1 and MG-1 speak of a sense of closeness or familiarity [shinkinkan]. This is explained by the higher or lower degree of exposure to Korean cultural elements that Zainichi Koreans are likely to have throughout their lives. It is evident, too, that the level of cultural literacy resulting from such exposure is variable depending on, amongst other factors, the type of ethnic education received. Notwithstanding, it is significant that JS-1 and MG-1 are the ones pointing out that sense of closeness, as they confessed to having a very low level of cultural literacy. Still, they pointed at elements such as the Korean language, the Korean cuisine and also the phenotypics of Koreans as triggering factors. However, it is obvious to assume that higher levels of cultural literacy can bring about a stronger emotional impact. As aforementioned, the agency provided by proficiency of the language gives access to an interactive dimension of the experience – CG-2 is not simply aware that everything is written in Korean, he also can read it.

Furthermore, all participants affirmed that the emotions and feelings brought about by their stay in ROK are not the same as when visiting other countries. It is undeniable that the sense of closeness and the familiarity towards multiple cultural elements is responsible for the particularity of Zainichis' experience of Korea. However, of not less importance is the predisposition to feel that way. In addition, the South Korean experience appears to enact an exercise of introspection. That is the case of CG-1, who, as a result of the achievement of his original purpose of knowing the land of his grandfather, reflected on his own existence.

"Well, I always thought that it's a good thing to be born Zainichi and develop this particular sensibility [kankaku], but at the same time that causes a lot of distress in terms of my ethnicity. It's not something that I consider much but, in a sense, had I been born in South Korea, I wouldn't have had to worry about discrimination or the dilemma about 'what am I? Korean or Japanese?' That's all a waste of distress [muda na nayami]."

Therefore, the experiential hardship to define Japan as a place to belong and the imaginary construction of the homeland, as the place of legitimate belonging for Zainichi Koreans, originate individuals' predisposition to have an experience of Korea separated from the notion of foreignness. However, even if the notion of foreignness were discarded, this is obviously the result of an individual process that takes place unilaterally. That is to say, a Zainichi individual is likely to perceive the Korean contextuality as a place of *sameness* – in absence of *foreignness*. However, identity, as well as the sense of belonging that constitutes its integral basis, cannot be construed solely in a unilateral manner. It is prominent, then, to examine how the Korean contextuality – its agents – perceive Zainichi Koreans.

In the first place, one of the most remarkable comments made by participants when questioned about their encounters with South Koreans was the lack of acknowledgement. For instance, JS-3 speaks of the attestation that the knowledge on the Zainichi community is dismayingly low as a shocking realisation. This lack of knowledge, consequently, hinders whatever attempt to gain ethnic recognition from the locals. JS-3 explains:

"The vast majority of Koreans in South Korea ignore the existence of Zainichi Koreans who, despite being Koreans, don't speak Korean. For this, almost nobody saw me as a Korean. That was something that struck me, but I guess it's just natural."

The most common outcome from this realisation in the case of most participants is a sense of frustration, which MG-2 expressed as:

"I made friends with some South Koreans and I told them: 'we have the same roots'. Nonetheless, I was shocked when they said to me 'but you're basically the same thing as a Japanese, aren't you?' In spite of my sense of closeness towards them and my conviction about my ethnicity, they made me realise it wasn't like that."

Similarly, MG-1 highlights the difficulty to have his identitarian position understood by Koreans. Unable to speak Korean and not liking spicy food, MG-1 explains how he is commonly taken as Japanese regardless of his attempts to inform about his ethnic origin.

Also in the case of fluent speakers of the language whose cultural literacy is notably high the sense of frustration derived from the impossibility of being recognised arises. KG-3 speaks of a

patent tone of condescension in South Koreans' words when answering to his questions in Korean, resulting from interlocutors' noticing of singularities in his accent. KG-3 himself explains that South Koreans might acknowledge the ancestral connection they share with him. However, he also points out that what defines him among Koreans in the peninsula is his Zainichiness, that is, his identitarian experience in Japan, and not his Koreanness, since any attempt to introduce himself as a Korean [kankokujin] has disrecognition as a result.

Therefore, it can be affirmed that, although Zainichi Koreans are likely to perceive the Korean Peninsula as a non-foreign contextuality, due to their cultural literacy, they are seemingly prone to be perceived as foreigners. Thus, CG-2's statement of 'truly my country' should be interpreted not as a place for *de facto* belonging but as a place where, despite the lack of recognition, self-identification with particular cultural factors can effectively take place.

The Zainichi experience, therefore, should be understood in terms of *homelessness*. Zainichi Koreans are trapped in a conceptual gap dug between the notions of homeland and hostland. These two concepts, which have traditionally played a most fundamental role in the rhetoric of diaspora, lose their significance and fail in the attempt to describe the contemporary situation of the Zainichi community. Albeit the concept of homeland seems to still occupy a prominent position in Zainichi imaginary, with younger generations, it has lost its cardinal quality of place of return. By the same token, Japan as a hostland does no longer represent the place where Zainichi Koreans play the role of guests, but it has, since long ago, become a place of stay and not a place of departure. Nevertheless, the still dominant position occupied by the nation-state as supreme categoriser of peoples leaves those who cannot entirely identify with a single national category in a state of *homelessness*. That is for the modern status of stateless – which Zainichi Koreans still embody – represents nothing but the impossibility to have a home. Thus, Zainichi Koreans are limited to formulate their identity in terms of disrecognition and disbelonging, because the monolithic conception of the nation, as the ultimate conferral of recognition, condemn them to be disrecognised in the hostland for their alleged Koreanness, and disrecognised in Korea due to their Zainichiness.

6.2. Regional Perspective: Jechu and Kansai

In the previous section, an approach to the experience of Zainichi Koreans in the Korean Peninsula was provided. This approach, however, focused on the experience of Korea from a national perspective, as the questions raised during the interview sessions were formulated in terms of nation-state. Although the data collected has proved to be notably useful to comprehend Zainichis' experience in Korean contextualities, the same accounts from the

participants demanded an alternative approach. Some of the informants made a clear distinction between their experiences in either of the Koreas, as nation-states, and their experience at a regional level, particularly in the Jechu Island. In other words, participants represented their experience in DRPK or ROK as separated from their experiences in the Jechu Island. Likewise, the impact of experiences in Jechu appears to be more crucial in the process of fathoming one's own self in relation to Korea.

6.2.1. Jechu Island

The salience of the experience seems to be preconceived before it even takes places. Unlike the predisposition to positively embrace the experience of Korea as a national entity, the first contact with Jechu Island is envisaged as an experience of tremendous importance for the individual self. CG-2 explained that making the determination to visit Jechu was not a simple process.

"I'd already been to ROK about ten times, but I kept on avoiding to go to Jechu. That is something that even today I can't quite understand. I'd done everything to change my nationality and be able to go to the place where my roots are [kokyô] but, for some reason, I just couldn't go there (Jechu)."

CG-2 highlights that, in appearance, that contradiction could be deemed groundless but, at the same time, he also implied a significant distinction in his recognition, in this case, of South Korea and his place of origin [kokyô].

"Actually, I had a lot of friends around me (in ROK) and I would visit them in Seoul. Nonetheless, at that point, inside me I still couldn't see South Korea as my place [kokyô]."

Also CG-3 was emphatic about the fact that South ROK was not quite a relevant place for her:

"I don't consider South Korea as my place [kokyô] and hardly see South Koreans as my compatriots [dôhô]."

The Jechu Island, instead, should be envisaged as a particular contextuality, separated from the peninsula, where the processes of identification and recognition take place in a difference manner. Unlike other areas of the peninsula where Zainichi Koreans tend to be seen as Japanese, CG-3 explains that in Jechu she achieves recognition:

"Probably Jechu is a somewhat particular place. When I tell people there that my grandfather and grandmother are from Jechu, people receive me very warmly... Rather

than simply a co-ethnic [minzoku dôhō], they see me as someone from the same hometown [dôkyô]."

Although lack of recognition appeared to be the last obstacle to overcome during informants' experiences of Korea, the fact that that recognition is likely to be achieved in the island is the most relevant outcome from the experience of Jechu. As a matter of fact, it seems to be the likelihood of the regional space to trigger a process of identification, more significant than the one taking place in the peninsula, which has a major impact on informants' experience. In her narration of her experience accompanying her grandmother to Jechu, MG-2 accentuated this fact as follows:

"When my grandma still lived in Jechu, she attended a Japanese school and therefore she can read and speak Japanese without an accent. Actually, her Japanese is so delicate that I'd never really considered she came from Korea [Chôsen]. However, as we arrived at Jechu and my grandma met her cousin, despite the bad state of her legs, she suddenly started running and chattering in Jechu dialect. At that moment, I was so surprised... and felt it all in my body, she had come from Korea to Osaka and then she had my father who later had me... That was the first time I really felt it in my body."

That instant when CG-2 'felt it all in her body' can be interpreted as the identification of the bond linking her own existence in Japan and the past of her family. That is, that encounter signified the realisation of her own familial connection with Korea. This form of identification, however, implies a radical difference in significance with respect to the form of identification described above as a sense of sameness.

The experience of a Korean contextuality is likely to bring about a sense of sameness, as is the case of CG-2 who initially described South Korea as "truly his country," but this perception should be deemed nothing but the corroboration of certain ethno-cultural elements acquired during school years or at home. This corroboration takes place in collective terms, that is, assuming a collectivising perspective that envisages Koreanness as a whole. MG-2's experience of realisation, instead, has an impact on the core of her individuality, as she is not tracing back the journey of the Chosenese as a whole, who moved to Japan in the last century, but she is realising about her family's journey from Jechu to Osaka, linking the oral history of her family with her actual experience, finally fathoming the origin of her own individual existence.

6.2.2. Kansai

One of the initial purposes for the present study was determining whether or not Zainichi Koreans could be expected to develop a sense of belonging towards their hostland if such belonging were not encapsulated in the traditional category of the nation. In order to do so,

participants were questioned around their impressions and feelings towards the region where they have mostly lived all their lives – Kansai in this particular case. The region of Kansai, one of the most industrially developed regions of Japan, is referred to as a container of some of the most ancestral traditions of the Japanese culture. At the same time, this region is commonly known in Japan for having rather an idiosyncratic conception of its own singularity, which is embodied by its inhabitants, who are likely to develop an almost patriotic sense of belonging towards the region as separated from the rest of the archipelago. As a result, there is a number of regional markers such as the Kansai cuisine or the Kansai dialect which are protected and actively promoted by the *Kansaijin* [people from the Kansai region] within the country.

Participants' accounts regarding their relationship with the region paved the way for the theorisation of a certain form of belonging at a regional level which clashes with the sense of disbelonging that Zainichi Koreans usually have towards Japan. Ten of the participants in this study affirmed having a particular form of attachment towards the Kansai region and, most importantly, stated that that attachment had a considerably important impact on their identity. CG-1, for instance, explained that the region played a prominent role in one part of his identity.

"As a Zainichi, it (Kansai) is important. As a Korean, not really."

This way CG-1 is representing his identity as fragmented. On the one hand, he refers to his Zainichiness as his "Japanese part" – his situational experience –, on which the fact of having grown up in Kansai has an impact. On the other hand, his "Korean part," based on his primordial conception of the fatherland, is not affected by his contextual experience, as it is principally built out of an imaginary.

On the other side, JS-2 affirmed that the fact of being a *Kansaijin* had a more significant impact on his identity than the fact of being Zainichi.

"Perhaps, being a Kansaijin has a somewhat stronger impact on my identity. Although it's just a little bit more, somewhere around the 55 per cent."

It is evident that an attempt to measure identities would be utterly nonsensical. However, JS-2's statements suggest that the dimension of his identity related to his attachment to the Kansai region plays a role as prominent as his self-conception of Zainichi. Therefore, it can be affirmed that both aspects of his identity overlap when he tries to define which dimension, his Zainichiness or his Kansaijin-ness, is more determinant to the core of his existence. JS-2 himself, later in the interview, conceptualised this overlapping by conceptualising his identitarian experience as "*Zainichi Kansaijin*."

The term *Zainichi Kansaijin* was popularised by the Zainichi songwriter and activist Cho Bak in his book *Boku wa Zainichi Kansaijin* [I am a Zainichi Kansaijin] (2003). With his declaration, Cho Bak highlighted the impossibility to consider himself – and consequently Zainichi Koreans – either Japanese or Korean. This impossibility to consciously fit into either of the categories, which are social constructs based on forms of national attachment/belonging sketched principally in primordialist terms, compels Zainichi individuals to seek alternative forms of attachment and belonging founded on situational experiences. Therefore, by defining himself *Zainichi Kansaijin*, JS-2 is describing his impossibility to belong to the national category of Japan as a Zainichi and also his actual belonging to Kansai – his attachment towards the region.

This regional attachment is evidenced particularly when participants narrated their experiences away from the region or Japan. On the one hand, CG-3 comments on the realisation about her regional attachment as she narrated her experience studying in Okinawa:

"During the period that I was in Okinawa, I realised about the fact that I am a Kansaijin from my continuous appetite for *okonomiyaki*³³. Also, regarding the language, when I heard the Kansai dialect after a long time, I felt at ease."

As in the case of Korean cultural markers, it can be, therefore, affirmed that cultural markers from a particular region do also have a significant impact on the formation of identities.

Additionally, MG-2 made another meaningful comment regarding her regional attachment. After reflecting about the importance of Kansai for her identity, she claimed that the most apparent effect of this takes place after spending some time away.

"I possibly belong in here (Kansai). When I came back to Osaka (after a year in Korea), I felt really reassured."

The meaning of the place of belonging can be simplified as the space of return. When referring to their experiences in the Korean Peninsula, participants explained that visiting Korea did not involve any sense of returning home [satogaeri]. In the case of MG-2's statement, however, it is evident that the region, and particularly Osaka in her case, does represent a place of return and hence a source for a certain sense of belonging.

6.3. International Perspective

³³ *Okonomiyaki* is a savory pancake representative of the Kansai gastronomy.

Finally, an analysis of participants' experiences overseas, in foreign contextualities and in Okinawa, as a space of ethnocultural difference, turns out to be useful to understand whether or not their ethnic singularities are recognised by ethnically unrelated contexts and to examine the potential impact that interaction with other ethnic groups might have on Zainichi Koreans' identity.

6.3.1. Overseas: Beyond the Borders of the Nation

In order to know how Zainichi Koreans interpret their Zainichi condition and their relation to both Japan and Korea, participants were questioned about their experiences abroad. The results obtained prove that observing their own existence in relation to their ethnicity in a foreign context and utilising the aforementioned mechanisms of self-representation within an international environment brings about a significant process of self-realisation regarding their ethnic identities. This process of self-realisation can be observed paying attention to the processes of identification and recognition.

On the one hand, participants were interrogated about the things that they missed the most while they were abroad. One of the most repeated comments amongst the informants was the fact that they missed Japanese food. Likewise, when they were asked about their encounters with other Japanese or Korean individuals abroad, all of the participants affirmed that they were more inclined to interact with Japanese people than Koreans. These two instances can be easily deemed unexceptional. However, what turns out to be remarkable is the impact of these apparently ordinary episodes on participants' minds. During interviews, some participants alluded with deception to the fact that those episodes highlighted the fact that, despite their attempts to consciously distance themselves from the Japanese category, their thoughts and emotions are considerably enclosed in such category.

On the other hand, the achievement of the recognition of their ethnic singularity was presented as a challenge. CG-1 and MG-1 speaks of the frustration they feel when trying to make themselves understood during their first encounters with people from other countries.

"Regardless of where I am, be it Japan or in a foreign country, I always have to explain what I am. Firstly, when I'm asked 'where are you from?' I respond 'I'm from Japan, but I'm Korean'. People's reaction, however, is usually: 'what? You are Korean or Japanese?'" (CG-1)

"When I was in the United States, I first tried to explain what it means to be Zainichi. However, it gradually gets more and more frustrating, so I end up going as Japanese... It's so hard to make people understand the implications of being Zainichi." (MG-1)

With their accounts, CG-1 and MG-1 are highlighting the frustration of fighting the national categories not only within the Japanese and Korean contexts, but also globally. The hegemony of the nation-state form of categorisation of peoples, therefore, excludes individuals from recognition as soon as they do not perfectly match one category. At the same time, it seems to force those same individuals into fitting in national categories by means of social pressure. MG-2's account turns out to be illustrative to explain this:

"When I was a high school student, I spent a month in Canada. At that time, when people asked me where I was from, I always responded 'Korean' [Kankokujin]. However, people usually said to me: 'but you're not a real Korean, right?', to which I'd reply: 'why not?'. Their answer then was: 'you were born in Japan; the way you dress, the language you speak, it's all Japanese'."

MG-2's statement about her identity as a Korean, based on an imaginary about the idea of the homeland motivated principally by the lack of recognition received by Japanese society, gets challenged by others in an international context. External individuals, it can be affirmed, constitute a different constitutive other, that neither being part of Japanese society nor conceiving belonging necessarily in primordialist terms, construes the inclusion in national categories with reference to cultural markers defining those categories. As a consequence, MG-2 realised about the necessity to acquire Korean cultural markers in order to support, or rather legitimise, her identity as a Korean.

6.3.2. Okinawa: on the Margins of the Nation

Despite the fact that the Okinawan archipelago is part of the sovereign territory of Japan, Okinawa can be seen, due to its singular historical and cultural background, as a space of ethno-cultural difference with respect to the ethno-nationalist rhetoric of the Japanese government. CG-3 spent four years studying at the University of Okinawa in what she defines as four years of "study abroad." The conception of Okinawa as an overseas territory highlights a series of disparities with respect to the main Japanese archipelago. The exposure to such particular ethno-cultural space, CG-3 states, had a series of effects on her self-perception as a Zainichi Korean.

On the one hand, CG-3 points at the ethnic singularity of the Okinawan people as a catalyst for her recognition of her own ethnic singularity and the subsequent positivisation of her self-conception.

"Okinawa was something particular, as it's different from Japan. Being the land of the *Ryukyu* dynasty, it feels like a different country with a genuine culture. Actually, Okinawans call themselves '*Uchinanchu*', as opposed to the Japanese which are called '*Yamatonchu*'. Learning about this was like learning about myself. Okinawans were like a mirror where I could see myself."

CG-3's statement can be interpreted as the discovery of a common sense of difference shared with Okinawans as another ethnic minority. This, by the same token, can be envisaged as the emergence of a sense of sameness towards Okinawans and, also, an admiration towards their eagerness to remain ethnically differentiated. As a result, CG-3 explains that this realisation motivated a positivisation of her self-conception as a Zainichi Korean and a desire for learning more about Zainichi singularities.

On the other hand, CG-3 accentuates the salience of Okinawa as a multicultural place. During her interviews, she narrated her intercultural experiences with South Asian students, mainly from Indonesia. In this exchanges, she learnt about some significant cultural similarities in common with other Asians, particularly in traditional dance and music. According to CG-3's words, this also worked as catalyst of a sense of belonging into a wider category of people including East Asia.

"At the museum, there was a space called 'Women across Asian borders' in which I participated some times. There, I could meet and talk to different people from various Asian countries. Thanks to those encounters, I realised that there was something in common between myself and those people, that's when I began to think of myself as an Asian."

In conclusion, it can be affirmed that CG-3's experience in Okinawa resulted in her self-realisation and the development of new forms of belonging derived from the emergence of a sense of sameness towards both Okinawans and other Asian people. This realisation, it is noteworthy to highlight, entails the reconceptualisation of her own identity as a Zainichi from an interpretation of belonging in terms of exclusion to inclusion, not simply in terms of ethnicity, but in terms of sameness with respect to various experiential aspects such as the social position in Japan as a minority as well as in East Asia as a member of a macro-regional cultural category.

Chapter 9. Conclusion

1. Introduction

This thesis has explored the current diversity of younger generations of Zainichi Koreans from an identitarian perspective, examining the processes and dynamics of identity formation, and analysing the ways wherein Zainichi Koreans construe and interpret the concepts of ethnicity and belonging. In order to explore the issues of Zainichi identity, this thesis began by asking the following five questions:

1. How do Zainichi Koreans develop a Zainichi identity (consciousness) and what are the consequences?
2. What is the impact of ethnic education on Zainichi Koreans' identity formation and diversification?
3. How do Zainichi Koreans construe and interpret their Zainichiness?
4. How do Zainichi Koreans reproduce and represent their Koreanness?
5. How is belonging construed and interpreted by Zainichi Koreans in relation to national and transnational spaces?

By giving a response to these five questions, this study has provided an analysis of the Zainichi identity examining: 1. The process of identity formation, 2. The role of ethnic education in the process, 3. Possible interpretations of the Zainichi identity, 4. The reproduction and representation of culture, and 5. Transnational forms of belonging within the Zainichi community.

The theoretical model presented in this thesis is based on a rich new set of empirical data obtained from fieldwork in Japan. During the ten months of study in the field, a multi-methodological research design, including qualitative interview sessions and participant observation, was adopted. Likewise, semi-structured and in-depth interviews were conducted with 12 informants from diverse educational backgrounds, which permitted the exploration of various forms of conceptualisation and interpretation of the Zainichi experiences. Likewise, numerous exercises of participant observation were also conducted in different educational and social settings, which made it possible to gain access to informants as well as to observe the phenomenon of social interaction between Zainichi Koreans in different contexts. Consequently, a significant number of relevant findings were collected, permitting the elaboration of pertinent theories which give response to the research questions.

2. Key Findings

As a result of the analysis of the empirical data, two main conclusions can be raised in relation to the impact of ethnic education on the process of identity formation of Zainichi individuals and on overcoming episodes of self-stigmatisation as well as with regard to the existence of various forms of transnational identification in the community. These key findings not only entail a new set of evidence contributing to the study of the Zainichi issue, but they also present an alternative perspective with which to view the Zainichi Korean community at present.

2.1. The Role of Ethnic Education

The methodological strategy taken in the present study allowed for an examination of the impact of ethnic education in terms of particular features of each educational institution as well as in terms of general effects of ethnic education on Zainichi individuals. Thus, the analysis of accounts from individuals with experiences in four different educational environments provided the research with a unique set of data which permitted the theorisation about particular and general effects of ethnic education on Zainichi Koreans.

Being one of the most significant findings of the present research, the evidence gathered through this analysis permitted to prove that ethnic education programs have significant impacts on both the development of identities as Zainichi Koreans and the overcoming of episodes of identity crisis and self-stigmatisation. Thus, it was demonstrated that, regardless of the particular limitations and restrictions of each educational program, ethnic education provides a series of elements that facilitate and motivate the process of formation of Zainichi identities as separated from the monolithic conceptions of Koreanness and Japaneseness. Furthermore, by providing students with the opportunity to ‘access’ Korean culture through the presentation of particular cultural elements, such as Korean traditional music, folklore or cuisine, or lessons regarding the Korean language, history and even geography, ethnic education institutions ensure the acquisition of a certain level of cultural literacy by Zainichi Korean students. This, it was observed, translates into beneficial effects in the development of an identity as Zainichi in positive terms of cultural definition as ethnic-Koreans, instead of cultural indefiniteness as neither Japanese nor Korean.

Additionally, evidence also showed how the environment provided by ethnic educational institutions plays a significant role in the process of overcoming the social stigma existing in post-colonial Japanese society against ethnic-Koreans. Being one of the principal commitments of ethnic education programs, the promotion of difference in positive terms was proved to bring

benefits to Zainichi individuals inasmuch as it allows for the visibilisation of the community as an integral part of a Japanese multicultural and multi-ethnic society. Thus, Zainichi students are able to develop a positive attitude towards their ethnic difference, which leads them to manifest such difference through the use of names or a particular self-defining terminology, and hence become visible to the Japanese society in general and to other members of their community in particular.

Furthermore, the examination of diverse ethnic education institutions also permitted the identification of specific characteristics particular to each educational setting, which are considered fundamental to understand the present diversity existing within the Zainichi Korean community. In the case of *Chōsen* schools, their freedom of manoeuvre to establish their own curriculum, which strongly concentrates on the acquisition of Korea-oriented cultural content, permits the development of a strong sense of belonging both in the Zainichi community in particular and the Korean ethnic group in general as well as a strong sense of solidarity, paving the way for community cohesion. Experiences at the *Kenkoku* school represent a post-diasporic step in the conception of Koreanness, focusing on the existence as Zainichi in a multicultural Japanese society. *Kenkoku*'s determination to accept students from multiple ethnic backgrounds proves its ultimate goal of promoting integration without complete assimilation or Japanisation. In a similar fashion, it was demonstrated that, despite their limitations in time and space to transmit solid cultural content, extracurricular ethnic classes at Japanese schools contribute to the overcoming, if not prevention, of identity crises based on self-denial, destigmatising the Zainichi condition through the visibilisation and the promotion of difference.

2.2. Towards a Transnational Identity

Being the major purpose of the research, this study has intended to identify potential forms of identification within the Zainichi Korean community, which do not depend on national categories defined by nationalist discourses and whose main foundation lies on particular senses of belonging towards transnational spaces. Considering 'transnational spaces' as sources of attachment transcending the geographical and discursive boundaries of the nation-state, two particular forms of transnational identification were found. On the one hand, the evidence showed that transnational forms of identification based on a sense of belonging towards micro-regional spaces are actually present in the community. Particularly, the Jechu Island in South Korea and the region of Kansai in Japan were proved to function as fundamental sources of a sense belonging and foundation for participants' identities. On the other hand, macro-regional and supranational spaces were also proved to function as sources of identification for Zainichi individuals participating in this study. Specifically, non-national macro-regional spaces such as

East Asia were pointed at by informants as containers of a series of historical elements and cultural characteristics which, being to some extent shared by all East Asians, function as a source of identification and belonging towards the whole collectivity of the East Asian people. Equally interesting turned out to be the accounts of some participants who placed the universal condition of ‘humans’ and ‘citizens of the earth’ at the core of their identities involving a cosmopolitan perspective on the ideas of belonging and membership.

Moreover, such forms of transnational identification were also found in the terminology used by Zainichi individuals in defining their own existence. On the one hand, terms such as *Zainichi Kansaijin* or *Zainichi Jechujin* highlight the transnational dimension of Zainichi experiences, which precisely find in their experience in the micro-regional spaces of Kansai and Jechu the basis for their identities. On the other hand, other terminology such as *Zainichi Chikyûjin* and *Zainichi Ajiajin* underline the transnational essence of their identity as individuals in Japan (Zainichi) who see their existence as connected to the collectivity of Asia (Ajiajin) and to the collective category of inhabitant of the Earth (chikyûjin).

Consequently, given that national categories in the present East Asian post-colonial scenario fail to satisfy Zainichi Koreans’ necessity of developing a solid sense of belonging, this study has purposed an alternative perspective for the study of Zainichi identities through the reconceptualisation of transnational identities. Therefore, considering the multiplicity of possible forms of transnational identification, belonging and attachment towards intranational and extranational spaces, which transcend the boundaries of the nation-state inwards and outwards, this alternative perspective widens the scope of analysis of Zainichi identities, leaving behind the hegemonic position of the categories of Japanese and Korean and permitting the recognition of numerous new forms of identification.

3. Other Findings

The present study has also presented a number of findings relevant to the process of identity formation in Zainichi individuals, the different forms of interpretation of the idea of ‘Zainichiness’ and the various forms of reproduction and representation of ‘Koreanness’ that can be found within the community.

3.1. Zainichi Identity Formation

The question of Zainichi identity was tackled by examining the elements enabling the development of a Zainichi consciousness and analysing potential consequences of this process. The formation of a Zainichi identity, that is, the consciousness of belonging to the Zainichi Korean community as different from the Japanese majority in terms of ethnicity and culture, takes place as a result of social interaction with primary and secondary groups. On the one hand, interaction with primary groups, especially with family members, is likely to facilitate the acquisition of particular cultural markers, such as cuisine, customs (e.g. *Chesa*) and, at a minor scale, language. However, accounts collected in this study demonstrated that the acquisition of these particular markers does not necessarily translate into the development of a *sense of difference*. Instead, it was proved that a *sense of normalcy*, that is, the perception of ‘being Zainichi’ as a quality not different to ‘being Japanese’, prevails in early stages of growth. On the other hand, social interaction with secondary groups, mainly constituted by Japanese individuals, appears to disrupt a sense of normalcy and catalyse a sense of difference. The development of this sense of difference is, therefore, the result of a process of realisation derived from the encounter and identification of four principal elements in Japanese society: the cultural dissonance between the Japanese majority and the Zainichi minority, the contextual position of the minority with respect to the majority, the social prejudice existing towards the Korean community and the institutional racism embedded in Japanese society. This takes place in a process of othering that, in the case of Japanese society, appears to occur in antagonistic terms. That is because ethnic pluralism in Japanese society is not conceived as an advantage but as a flaw and, hence, difference is interpreted through antagonism bringing about potential relations of hostility with the *ethnic others within*. A plausible consequence of the revelatory effect that motivates the development of a sense of difference, as a result of the realisation of cultural, social and institutional differences, is the emergence of an identity crisis – an ethnic-personal identity conflict – at some point in Zainichi individuals’ lives. This crisis is driven by the impossibility of reconciliation between the two forms of identification: aspirational identification and empathic identification. Consequently, sentiments of self-denial and emotional instability were observed and seen to negatively affect individuals’ identity formation due in great measure to the aforementioned antagonistic interpretation of ethnic pluralism in Japanese society.

3.2. Interpretations of Zainichiness

Conversations with Zainichi informants confirmed that a cognitive perspective on ethnicity, in which both primordial and situational perspectives are combined, is useful in understanding and explaining the ways whereby Zainichi Koreans interpret and construe their Zainichiness at present. During interviews, it was observed that a primordial sentiment, frequently

conceptualised under the term ‘roots’ [rûtsu], continues to be shared by Zainichi Koreans who commonly allude to an ancestral connection with their past as one primary element of their identity as Zainichi Koreans. This interpretation of Zainichiness directly linked to an origin strictly encapsulated within the geographical borders of the Korean Peninsula and bonded to a homogeneous conception of ethnicity embodied by the Korean people [Chôsenjin/Kankokujin] proves the salience of primordialist views still existent within younger generations. Furthermore, a *situational perspective* was also observed in Zainichi younger generations in the form of a historical awareness about the community’s past. Particularly, it is the social and institutional effort carried out by the community from the 1970s, which paved the way for Kim Tong-Myung’s ‘Third Way’, that plays the most significant role in Zainichi Koreans’ interpretation of their own history in the Japanese archipelago. Therefore, it can be affirmed that, unlike in the case of older generations, younger generations’s interpretation of their condition of Zainichi is at present equally linked to the community’s *routes* as it is to its *roots*. This entails that for younger generations the quest for an answer to the question ‘where do we come from?’ has been exceeded by the quandary ‘why are we here?’ which they seek to resolve by learning about the experiences of their community that constitute their Zainichiness, rather than by just attempting to access their primordial sources and regain a presumably lost Koreanness.

3.3. Reproduction and Representation of Culture

Findings from this research proved that, despite being evident in some cases, a tendency to emphasise distinctiveness with respect to the Japanese majority cannot be considered universal in the Zainichi community. However, it was demonstrated that Koreanness is maintained and reproduced in numerous cases. On the one hand, particular Korean ethnic markers were identified within the community. Specifically, the Korean language, the Korean cuisine and the *Chesa* ritual appear to still have a significant impact on Zainichi Koreans’ lives as ethnicity containers, whose maintenance at present is the result of either a natural transmission through generations, as is the case of the *Chesa*, or voluntary determination to recover a presumably lost primordial connection, as is the case of the Korean language. Additionally, through the analysis of cultural practices of the community, it was observed that, despite the attempt to preserve and maintain cultural aspects in their original form, certain practices have gradually evolved into cultural by-products that, emerge as integral elements of an independent Zainichi culture. On the other hand, certain *mechanisms of representation* of Koreanness were identified in interpretations of the value of Korea-related nationalities, the use given to Korean names and the conceptualisation of Zainichi experiences through particular terminologies. Firstly, the dichotomy between the usage of ethnic-Korean names and Japanese aliases was thoroughly

analysed, revealing two particular tendencies. On the one side, an inclination to recover the usage of Korean names was proved as a sign of ethnic pride and a form of ethnic self-representation and visibilisation. On the other side, a significant alternative to the traditional usage of Japanese aliases as a means of passing and escaping discrimination was found in cases where Japanese names are not interpreted as aliases and the level of ethnic consciousness is not conditional upon the use of Korean names. Secondly, similar views were found in participants' considerations towards nationality. Although in most of the cases presented the maintenance of Korean nationality, in the form of either *Chôsen* register or ROK citizenship, is envisaged as a mechanism for the representation of Zainichi individuals' Koreanness, alternative views were also found. On the one hand, the clear decrease in the number of *Chôsen* registers proves that the colonial register is no longer perceived as the sole legitimiser of an original attachment to the whole Korean Peninsula as a homeland since even *Sôren* members and supporters are likely to opt for the ROK citizenship as a means of attaining particular rights and benefits (particularly the possibility to travel abroad). On the other hand, although the naturalisation option is clearly refused by certain sectors of the community, due to ideology, ethnic loyalty or simply to an apparent absence of well-founded motivations, particular cases relative to naturalised Zainichi Koreans proved that an alternative perspective on nationality as disassociated from ethnicity does exist in the community, as naturalised individuals demonstrated high levels of ethnic consciousness and a strong sense of belonging in the Zainichi community. Finally, with regards to everyday terminology, it was observed that traditional concepts, such as *Zainichi Kankokujin* and *Zainichi Chôsenjin*, which highlight the ideological ascription to national spaces, are still in use within the community. Nevertheless, it turns out to be of great salience that other concepts, such as *Zainichi Korean*, *Zainichijin*, *Zainichi chikyûjin* or *Zainichi Kansaijin*, have progressively emerged in an attempt to verbalise alternative forms of interpretation, construal and conceptualisation of the Zainichi experience.

4. Theoretical Innovation

The study presented in this thesis permitted the establishment a solid theory about Zainichi identit(ies) which provides a resourceful and original perspective for the study of the identity of members of the Korean minority in Japan, and could potentially prove its validity for the study of other ethnic minorities existing in different societies.

This research contributes to the study of the Zainichi community through the proposal of a new perspective of analysis of ethnic-Korean identity from the perspective of transnationalism. In addition, through the reconceptualisation of the concept of 'transnational spaces', this study presents a different approach to the study of belonging which goes beyond traditional

conceptions of nation and ethnicity. On the one hand, by conceiving the notion of ethnicity as a cognitive aspect of existence which is likely to evolve and is by no means fixed in temporal and spacial conceptions of belonging, this research proposes the study of Zainichi ethnic identities through both the examination of the impact of traditional conceptions of ancestry and the motherland, and the analysis of individual experiences of Zainichi individuals in various national and international contexts. On the other hand, this study has intended to delegitimise the absolutist position traditionally conferred to the nation-state, and particularly to the national categories constructed and devised by nationalist discourses, by showing the incapacity of those discursive categories to provide solid grounds for the development of a sense of belonging for Zainichi individuals. Furthermore, with its new perspective on traditional spaces, this study contributes to the theoretical conceptualisation of Zainichi identities in present Japanese society by considering macro-regional and micro-regional spaces, located inside and outside the boundaries of the nation-state, to be fundamental references for Zainichi Koreans to develop a solid sense of belonging. Therefore, through the application of this alternative perspective, this study has demonstrated that transnationalism entails the identitarian emancipation of the Zainichi community from Japanese and Korean nationalisms in an exercise of defiance by the post-colonial individuals against traditional categories of nation that represent and recognise their presence in the nation-state only in terms of exclusion. Thus, Zainichi individuals become able to construe their identities in terms of recognition of their membership in transnational categories. This new conceptualisation of transnational identities, nonetheless, is not restricted to the case of ethnic-Koreans in Japan but it can also be extrapolated to the study of other minority groups whose 'fitting' into the nation-state is constantly put in question by nationalist discourses.

In terms of its methodology, this research project presents an alternative approach to the study of ethnic education as a whole. Taking distance from other studies focusing on particular ethnic educational institutions, the present research has looked at the role of ethnic education from a collective perspective, examining the common aspects existing in the different educational institutions studied. Not ignoring the particularities of each institution, this research has demonstrated that the participation in ethnic education programs have positive impacts on Zainichi Koreans. This global approach has, therefore, permitted to observe that ethnic education in general terms entails an exercise of contestation towards racism in Japanese society.

On the one hand, it has been proved that experiences within ethnic education institution facilitate the overcoming of episodes of self-stigmatisation. Through the experience of difference in positive terms within these institutions, Zainichi individuals become capable of

positivising the conception of their Zainichness and the interpretation of their position in Japanese society, in an exercise of discreditation of racialised conceptions about ethnic minorities that neglect their membership in the society. On the other hand, the acquisition of a certain level of Korean cultural literacy through the attendance to ethnic classes was proved to have a positive impact in the development of an ethnic identity in terms of cultural definition rather than indefiniteness or negation, since it provides the means for confronting and resolving the identitarian dichotomy of being Japanese or Korean. Furthermore, with this examination of the role of ethnic education in the process of identity formation, this research contributes to the study of identities within ethnic minorities and especially to the analysis of the exercise of contestation carried out by institutions of ethnic education, which challenge the cultural and institutional hegemony of nation-states. Therefore, the analysis of the impact that ethnic education programs have on minorities in developing and maintaining not only cultural and ethnic differences but, most importantly, alternative forms of identification which do not necessarily comply with the requirements for national recognition and social inclusion established by nationalist discourses, opens up a significant line of research for the future.

Additionally, in this study it was also demonstrated that social interaction is a key element, not only in the formation of an identity based on a particular ethnic consciousness, but also in the process of realisation of individuals' social and institutional position with respect to the ethnic majority. This process of realisation, however, is dependent on social interaction with the individual's ethnic other, which enables the development of a *sense of difference* derived precisely from the encounter and experience of difference. Being a fundamental step, this *sense of difference*, as opposed to a *sense of normalcy*, is to be envisaged as a milestone in the formation of ethnic identities and the development of an ethno-social awareness, which occur as a consequence of an unconscious incorporation of the number of social constructs forming the constitutive outside.

Furthermore, the cognitive perspective taken in this research to examine Zainichi Koreans' interpretations about their ethnicity permits the identification of a number of defining aspects, which, not simply construed in primordial or instrumental terms, establish a more flexible model of analysis of ethnic identities. Combining primordialist and situationalist approaches, this perspective allows to identify the continuation of a primordial sentiment motivated by a conscious psychological connection with ancestors in the Korean Peninsula (*roots*) as well as the existence of a historical awareness concerning the social and ethnic struggle carried out by the Zainichi community since its inception in Japan (*route*). This interpretation of the Zainichi identity elaborated from the empirical data collected, in conjunction with other defining aspects found, such as a *social sensitivity* and the *condition of incompleteness*, prove the evolutionary

quality of identity. Post-modern times of identitarian indefiniteness and uncertainty have motivated the disembedding of identities from previous forms of solid identification, such as monolithic interpretations about the Korean or the Japanese identities, and forced Zainichi Koreans into the reflexive project of their identities. This entails a constant re-embedding of identity that leaves Zainichi individuals, no longer able to find solid references, in a position of identitarian vagrants, constantly reinterpreting and reconceptualising their identities. Therefore, with this study, the condition of fluidity, adaptability and evolvability of identity, characteristic of post-modernity, were clearly proved through the analysis of the Zainichi identity, thus contributing to the wider field of identity studies.

Another contribution of this study is its analysis of how ethnicity is negotiated within the Zainichi community. With the exploration of diverse markers of difference and mechanisms of self-representation, the performative aspect of ethnicity was examined proving that, despite the prevalence of specific Korean cultural markers, the maintenance, manifestation and portrayal of ethnicity depends in great measure on the adoption of voluntary mechanisms of representation. In addition, it was also observed that, despite the conscious attempt to maintain the Korean ethnicity in the community by the transmission and inculcation of particular cultural markers, the impact of the experience of Japanese cultural environment led to the adaptation and modification of many of those Korean cultural markers. Consequently, this gradual adaptation of Korean cultural aspects resulted in the production of Zainichi cultural markers which, despite originating from both Japanese and Korean cultures, are to be considered as constituents of an independent culture. Therefore, this emergence of particular Zainichi cultural aspects defies monolithic interpretations of Japaneseness and Koreanness as essential and invariable elements constituting Japanese and Korean ethnicities, in an exercise of contestation that, not only discredits nation-state-tied construals of ethnic identities, but also highlights the fluidity and independence of the concept of ethnicity from the concept of nation.

5. Research Limitations and Recommendations

There exist a number of limiting parameters to this study which need to be considered. These limitations have to do with different aspects of the research, mainly related to its conceptual framework and the methods applied. As is common in social sciences, the conceptualisation of certain phenomena is likely to restrict the analysis of potential broad effects of such phenomena. When investigating identity, the very attempt to condense in solely one term the multitude of conscious and unconscious strategies of representation in play, which in many cases are exclusive to each individual, and the abundance of elements which are key in the game of identification and recognition appears to be nothing but a futile exercise. In its attempt to

analyse the identity of Zainichi Korean younger generations, this study saw as one of its fundamental aims to highlight the potential infinitude of identitarian possibilities existing in the community by theorising on diverse forms of interpreting and conceptualising the Zainichi experience from individual perspectives. Nonetheless and despite the determination to avoid the production of a discourse merely based on generalisations, it is important to admit that this study contains a number of statements which, not being necessarily incorrect or imprecise, might unintentionally participate in the exercise of essentialism. The evaluation of this fact, and the relevance it might have in the study of the Zainichi question, is assigned to the reader, who in this section is kindly invited to critically examine this work taking into account the number of limitations encountered.

5.1. Limitations in Research Aims

This work presented a number of aims which in some cases proved to be excessively broad or synthetic. Much attention was given to the process of identity formation, particularly focusing on the development of a Zainichi consciousness at a young age. The empirical data collected permitted the identification of certain parameters which turn out to be helpful in explicating some of the fundamental elements presumably responsible for the development of a Zainichi consciousness. However, a major limitation was found in the analysis of these parameters as conclusion were drawn only by theorising about informants' memories of their childhood. Notwithstanding the veracity of the collected accounts, it is necessary to acknowledge the potential bias existing in narrations of events which took place in early stages of growth, as narratives about personal histories are likely to change over time. Future researches focusing on Zainichi Korean children might contribute to more accurate identification of elements and aspects relevant in the development of a Zainichi consciousness and the formation of an identity as Zainichi.

Another potential bias of this investigation can be found in the research location. The selection of Osaka and specifically the Ikuno ward as location for the conduction of fieldwork was motivated by the outstanding presence of Zainichi Koreans and the prevalence of Zainichi practices. Nevertheless, two principal limitations in the extrapolation of findings collected from data generated in the area need to be highlighted. The aforementioned significant presence of the minority in the area, which was maintained across the decades, is likely to be the cause for the emergence of singularities pertaining exclusively to this area and unable to be assumed as general to the Zainichi Korean community as a whole. In the same line, the original precedence of a large portion of the Ikuno community, which is located in the Jechu Island (South Korea), might translate into the existence of regional characteristics, not found in other sectors of

Zainichi population. This potential bias could be confirmed by the conduction of future research projects of contrastive nature. Furthermore, if confirmed, this bias could eventually contribute to the theory presented in this study, precisely highlighting intranational forms of transnational identities.

Additionally, albeit mentioned in various parts of the study, the phenomenon of production of an independent Zainichi culture was not sufficiently explored in this research project. Not having been part of the initial set of hypotheses, this phenomenon deserves a dedicated study which explores the conditions surrounding the evolution of the (re)production of new cultures by ethnic minorities and the impact of these cultures on contexts similar to their culture of origin.

5.2. Limitations in Sampling

This study focused on the analysis of identity in the Zainichi community by paying attention to four sections of the Zainichi population classified in accordance with the type and level of ethnic education received. Previous studies focused on the role played by *Chôsen* schools within certain portions of the community (Ryang, 1997) and the impact of ethnic education programs in Japanese schools (Hester, 2000). However, during the elaboration of this study, no academic work focusing on the impact of ethnic education as a whole, that is, considering multiple educational options, was found. For this reason, the present study intends to contribute to the study of ethnic education systems by providing a contrastive analysis of various existing settings.

During the course of this research project, the sampling strategy used was exclusively focused on non-probability sampling methods. The selection of this type of sampling was primarily motivated by the nature of the study as it was considered that an analysis of the identity phenomenon should be conducted through the application of qualitative methods and no intention to elaborate statistical data on probability was held. Nevertheless, the lack of probability sampling methods in the study impedes the generation of numerical data which could enable the framing of particular patterns within the community. The inclusion of quantitative methods, in future projects, might provide more tangible information regarding the degree of presence and manifestation of some of the phenomena presented in this study. Nonetheless, due to the relativist approach taken in this research, the analysis and explication of how the identity phenomenon unfolded among young Zainichi Koreans was prioritised over the elaboration of a model focused on how much or how often particular practices are manifested in the community.

Furthermore, attending to the number of informants participating in the study, the mere attempt to elaborate an essentialist discourse about the Korean minority in Japan as a whole would have failed since the beginning. The number of participants is another factor to be considered a limiting factor. Although the recruitment of a total of 12 informants was deemed a success considering the temporal and spatial restrictions affecting the research, it must be taken into account that the number might be seen as insufficient to build a solid theory about the whole community. The potential negative impact of this fact on the research, however, was minimised during the recruitment process by scrutinising and selecting informants whose accounts turned out to be relevant and significant for the study and provided testimonies about the disparities existent in the community. Consequently, it can be affirmed that the accounts collected during fieldwork are largely representative of diverse forms of identitarian experience within the community.

5.3. Avenues for Future Research

The present project principally focused on the study of the ethnic identity of Zainichi Korean younger generations. Although it attempted to cover the potential multiplicity of cases existing in the community through the examinations of particular cases according to the level of ethnic education received, it is indubitable that many other important factors could not be considered. In the following lines, alternative factors to be considered are highlighted by way of recommendation for future research projects.

Firstly, owing to the limitations specified above, the variable of gender was not considered in this study. An analysis of the implications of gender in the community as a factor motivating the development of particular forms of identification and recognition could turn out to be very useful for the study of Zainichi identities.

Secondly, in a similar fashion, the factor of class should be another variable to be considered. A good number of academic works have focused on the economic success of certain sectors of the Zainichi community. Nonetheless, a new line of research could be founded on the examination of the economic factors restricting the access of Zainichi Korean children to ethnic schools and the consequent cultural and economic gaps that might separate different sections of the community.

Thirdly, another important factor worthwhile researching is the impact of race and ethnicity in the recognition of biracial and biethnic children in the community. During the conduction of

fieldwork, the author had the chance to learn of a number of cases of biracial children born to a Zainichi Korean parent whose integration, not only in Japanese society but also in the Zainichi community, was often compromised due to the impossibility of being fully recognised by either group. The study of this phenomenon could signify the relativisation of the traditional position occupied by the Zainichi community with respect to Japanese society and the highlighting of the new identitarian challenges to be faced by Japanese and Zainichi societies as a result of the advancement of globalisation.

Finally, two more factors related to ethnic education should also be contemplated as subjects of future studies. On the one hand, the Korea International School (KIS), inaugurated in Ibaraki (Osaka) in 2008, tried to provide alternative educational options to ethnic Koreans in Japan by disassociating from nationalist discourses found in other institutions of ethnic education. Although less than a decade has passed since its establishment, future research on the influence of KIS's international curriculum on Zainichi children could contribute to the study of ethnic education and its relation to the formation of ethnic identities. On the other hand, the impact of the recent resolution taken by the Osaka District Court condemning Japanese government's decision to deny high school tuition subsidies to *Chôsen* schools (The Japan Times, 2017) should also be considered by future research projects. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the anti-hegemonic position occupied by *Chôsen* schools is likely to be reinforced after this legal victory against the Japanese state. Although any assumptions at this point would be merely speculation, possible investigations on the effects of this delayed victory for the most discriminated against section of the Zainichi community could surely contribute to the study of the diversity existing within the Korean minority in Japan.

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APPENDIX A. Information Sheet (English version)

Ethics Committee Approval No.:



Information Sheet

Zainichi Beyond the Third Way: Towards a Transnational Identity

You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. And of course, do not hesitate to ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

First of all... let me introduce myself.

My name is Alejandro G. Lario. I am a PhD student from Spain who studies at the University of Leeds (UK). During all my life I have had a close relationship with both Korea and Japan, and I have tried to understand their cultures and societies. I have had the chance to interact with many people from different background, and now I am interested in the lives of Zainichi youngest generations, and especially in the way they think about themselves and their community.

In order to fully understand what it is like to be a Zainichi youngster nowadays, I need your help. I am hoping to involve 24 Zainichi people in a research project, and to interview them about their experiences in very relaxed environment. I would like to talk to you, and especially listen to what you would like to tell me about what and who is important to you, what it is like to grow up and live in Japan as a Zainichi and what it means to be Zainichi.

With your help I hope to learn a lot about your community and transmit your thoughts to other people in the shape of a PhD thesis. In this way my project will help other people in the world get a better understanding of the Zainichi community and the lives of their youngest members.

Ethics Committee Approval No.:



Why have I been chosen?

You are a Zainichi youngster and your opinions and thoughts are important to this project.

What do I have to do?

You just need to have a chat over a cup of coffee with me a couple of times. The technical name is “interview sessions” but I want you to think of them as relaxed conversations. This is not a questionnaire or an opinion poll. I would like to discuss some topics with you, but what I want the most is listen to what you want to tell me about your life as a Zainichi.

What will I have to talk about?

I would like to talk to you about what is important to you – your family, your friends, your work, etc. I want to know what you think and feel about being Zainichi and about other Zainichi people.

Will you tell anybody what I say?

Everything that you say will be kept confidential. Your information is of great importance to my research and myself, but so is your anonymity. In my project you will have a pseudonym, so that nobody can recognize you. However, if you specifically would like your real name to be reflected in the project, you can ask me (You will need to indicate it in the consent form).

Do I have to take part?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you can still withdraw at any time [up until June 2017 when the project will be officially presented]. You do not have to give a reason.

How can I get in touch?

You can ring or text me: tel. 00-0000-0000 or email me: ssagl@Leeds.ac.uk

Thank you very much for your consideration!

APPENDIX B. Information Sheet (Japanese version)

研究倫理委員会承認後番号: AREA 14-177



2016年1月1日

研究説明書

第3の道を超える在日朝鮮人・韓国人

－トラスナショナル・アイデンティティに向かって－

これは研究調査への参加協力のお願いです。参加するかどうかを決めていただく前に、どうしてこの研究が行われているのか、そしてどんな研究なのかを理解していただくことが重要です。ですので、次の情報を注意して読んでいただき、何か質問があればお聞きください。そして、もし分かりにくいこと、あるいはもっと深く説明してほしいことがあれば、ご遠慮なくお聞きください。

まず、自己紹介

私はアレハンドロ・ゴンサレス・ラリオと申します。スペイン出身で現在は、イギリスのリーズ大学の社会学部で大学院生です。私は人生の中で韓国と日本と親密な関係があり、これらの国々の文化や社会を理解しようと決心しました。さらに、様々なバックグラウンドの人達と触れ合う機会もありました。現在は在日の若者世代に関心を持っていて、特に在日の人たちが自分たちや在日のコミュニティについてどう思っているのかを研究したいと思っておます。

今の時代に在日の若者であるということは、どういうことなのかを深く理解するために、あなたの協力が必要です。約24人の在日朝鮮人・韓国人を対象に、在日としての経験をめぐるインタビュー調査をしたいと思えます。あなたとお話ししたいのですが、特に重要なことは、聞かせていただくことです。あなたにとって、大切なものは何か、日本で在日として育ったり住んだりするのがどういうことなのか、そして、在日であるということがどういうことなのかを聞かせていただきたいです。

あなたの率直な話によって、在日の若者世代について色々と理解できれば博士論文の形で在日の人たちの意見と考えを世界の様々な人に伝えることができると思えます。

なぜあなたを？

あなたは在日朝鮮人・韓国人でああなたの考えや意見が大変大事なのです。

何をすればいい？

私とコーヒーなど飲みながら気軽におしゃべりしたりして下さればけっこうです。専門用語で言うと「インタビュー・セッション」になりますが、ゆるいお喋りだとお考えください。アンケートや世論調査ではありません。様々な話題について話し合うことにより、あなたの在日としての人生について、いろいろと教えていただきたいと思えます。

どんなテーマについて？

あなたにとって大事なことについてお喋りさせてください。つまり、家族や友人や仕事などです。自分自身が在日であること、そして他の在日の人たちに対してどう思っているのか、どう感じているのかを聞かせていただきたいです。

あなたから聞いた話は・・・

あなたが話してくださった情報の秘密。私にとってインタビューの情報が大切であるのと同じように、あなたの匿名性も大変大切なものです。私の研究データの中では、あなたが特定されないように、あなたの名前を使わずにあなたのデータには仮名が付けられます。しかし、研究で自分の本当の名前を出して欲しければ、お知らせください（その場合は、同意書で教えてください）。

参加したくなければ？

研究への参加協力はあなた次第です。協力していただける方は、この研究説明書を読んだ上、同意書にサインしてください。もちろん研究途中、あるいは研究後に同意を撤回することができます（協力中止期限2017年6月・研究論文提出期時まで）。

連絡先

ご質問やもっと詳細に知りたいことがあれば、または参加していただける場合は、次のメールアドレスにメールをお送りください。

ssagl@Leeds.ac.uk

ご考慮、どうもありがとうございます。

APPENDIX C. Consent Form (English version)

School of Sociology and Social Policy



UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

Consent to take part in

Zainichi Beyond the Third Way: Towards a Transnational Identity

Add your initials
next to the
statement if you
agree

I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 01/04/2016 explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.	
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline. In the event of withdrawal all the data related to the participant will be deleted. Contact number: 00-0000-0000. Email: ssagl@Leeds.ac.uk.	
I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. (If you specifically prefer not to be anonymised and want your real name to be reflected in the project, please indicate it in the next section).	
I want my real name to be reflected in the final project. (if not, keep it blank)	
I agree for the data collected from me to be stored and used in relevant future research.	
I understand that other genuine researchers may use my words in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs, only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in this form.	
I understand that relevant sections of the data collected during the study, may be looked at by individuals from the University of Leeds or from regulatory authorities where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission for these individuals to have access to my records.	
I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform the lead researcher should my contact details change.	

Name of participant	
Participant's signature	
Date	
Name of researcher	Alejandro G. Lario
Researcher's signature	
Date*	

*To be signed and dated in the presence of the participant.

Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form, the letter/ pre-written script/ information sheet and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and dated consent form should be kept with the project's main documents which must be kept in a secure location.

Project title	Document type	Version #	Date
Zainichi Beyond the Third Way: Towards a Transnational Identity	Consent form for interview sessions.		

APPENDIX D. Consent form (Japanese version)

研究倫理委員会承認後番号: AREA 14-177



研究への参加同意書

第3の道を超える在日朝鮮人・韓国人

—トランスナショナル・アイデンティティに向かって—

同意の場合は名前のイニシャルをお書きください。

2016年01月01日の日付のある研究説明を読んで理解したこと、そして研究について質問する機会をもらったことを確認します。	
研究への参加は自発的だということも、私の研究への参加は不利益なしに、いつでも理由を伝える必要なく、中止させて頂けることも理解できました。さらに、答えられたくない質問の場合は、断ることができます。参加打ち切りの際には、私に関係している全てのデータが削除されます。	
研究チームのメンバーが匿名にされた私の情報を利用するのに同意します。私の名前は研究資料にも研究から出た論文にも使用されないことを理解します。私の情報が機密になることを理解します。(本当の名前を明らかに表現したいという方は、次の欄に)	
<u>研究資料に私の名前を明らかに明示してほしい。</u>	
将来の研究のためにインタビューから収集されたデータの保存・利用に同意します。	
秘密保持が守られた状況では、他の研究者が私の情報をウェブ・サイトや刊行物などで公表されてもけっこうです。	
インタビュー調査中に収集されたデータがリーズ大学のメンバー、あるいは規制当局に点検されることに同意します。	
上記の研究プロジェクトに対象者として参加します。そして、私の連絡先変更の際に、可及的すみやかに研究代表に知らせることに同意します。	

参加協力者の名前	
参加協力者のサイン	
日付	
研究代表者	
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