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Territoriality, Resistance and Indigenous  
Development in Protected Areas: A Political Ecology  
Analysis of Truku People in Eastern Taiwan

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
January 2018



## ABSTRACT

Indigenous areas in Taiwan were a 'special administrative region' during the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945). The Japanese police controlled the primary aspects of everyday life of indigenous people. Some policies concerning indigenous people have been continued in the post-colonial regimes of Han Chinese until now. Protected areas (PAs) have been established since the 1980s by central government when Taiwan was still under the martial law. National parks are typical protected area with rigorous conservation restrictions. Some protected areas actually overlapped with the traditional domains of indigenous people. Community conservation is a participatory protected area and has emerged around the 1990s. It is seen as a reform of fortress protected areas such as parks because it integrates both objectives of conservation and development. The rolling back of the state and empowerment of the local community are assumed to be the features of such a reformed policy. Community conservation has become popular among indigenous communities of Taiwan since 2000.

This study aims to look at the interactions between state authorities and local indigenous people in PAs. Two Truku villages in east Taiwan were selected as case studies, as one is in Taroko National Park while the other conducted a community conservation project in the 2000s. Qualitative methods were employed for data collection. Drawing from the theory of political ecology, a framework is constructed drawing together human territoriality, resistance, and social impacts. This analysis framework was employed to examine the acts of state agencies and local Truku people, and social repercussions in the Truku examples in the context of PAs. Research results showed that the establishment of PAs and conservation policy implementations in PAs by state agencies were acts of internal territorialisation. Such a spatial classification restricted the locals' exploitation of natural resources according to the imposed regulations. Through the control enforcement by state agencies and judicial authorities, conflicts between the local indigenous people and state agencies have happened. Even the co-management arrangement of the Park and the planning of scenic areas for local development revealed the domination of power by the government. These restrictions resulted in unpleasant social impacts such as difficulties of cultural practices and livelihood selections as well as the undermining social capital in the local indigenous communities. Accordingly, the local Truku people mobilised resistance to the conservation interventions via individual everyday practices and collective protests. Their resistance aimed to express their sustenance demands and ethnic claims. Differences between covert and overt resistance depended on the degree of empowerment. Through the process of empowerment, local protesters gained more information and political dynamics for their collective action, open resistance.

I primarily contend that the establishment of PAs and conservation policy implementations by governmental agencies, whether through parks or community conservation, are acts of internal territoriality. Territorialisation of the state tends to result in resistance by the local indigenous residents due to the negative social impacts as a result of conservation interventions. This argument also interprets the unexpected consequence, resistance of the local indigenous people, of PA policies in Taiwan. To avoid the undesired outcome of policy implementation and social cost, it is necessary to build trust between them. A participatory project which confers genuine power and accords with local norms may be feasible. Decentralised power could be the first step of a breakthrough.

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# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, thank God for giving me the opportunity to complete my PhD studies in Sheffield, for the experiences I've had, and for His guidance during my studies.

I would like to extend thanks to many Truku people and officials who saw me as a friend and family in my fieldwork. This thesis could not be completed without their contributions. I am also grateful to the support of the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange (DF012-U-12).

My sincere gratitude goes to my supervisors, Dr Glyn Williams and Professor Heather Campbell, who guided me with their academic experience and expertise. Similar gratitude also goes to Dr Janice Barry serving as my second supervisor in my second year, and Dr Chasca Twyman serving as the first supervisor in my first year.

I would like to express profound thanks to the examiners of this thesis, Professor Katie Willis and Dr Andy Inch, who checked my work a few times. Their useful comments have improved this thesis a lot.

Special gratitude goes to many enthusiastic sisters and brothers in the Lord, in particular those in St Marks Broomhill, Christ Church Central Sheffield and Love Fellowship. Their warmth and encouragement make me see Sheffield as my special home in the UK. A special mention goes to my friend Joshua Birch, a native of Sheffield. He did his best to encourage me writing my thesis, though he's disabled. I'll always be thankful.

Last but not the least, I want to thank my family for their patience. They were conscious not to distract me from my studies with external concerns, so that I can pay attention to my studies. I am also grateful to FT for his company at my writing-up stage.

# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Research background

### 1.1.1 Interactions between two primary actors in protected areas (PAs)

The establishment of protected areas is seen as the main strategy of biodiversity conservation (Norgrove and Hulme, 2006; Borrini-Feyerabend, Kothari and Oviedo, 2004; Adams, 2004). Stemming from the western tradition, protected area establishment aims to protect biodiversity and prevent 'The Tragedy of the Commons' (Hardin, 1968) from overuse of natural resources with population growth. According to this popularly cited work, he suggests nationalisation of the common property as an approach to avoid such a disaster for common good. State authorities have been a primary actor in protected area establishment, in particular in the developing world, because they possess the powers over administration, law-making and jurisdiction. In protected areas, it is common to restrict resource access by conservation laws and behaviour control through law enforcement. However, these restrictions potentially affect the life of local people, especially those indigenous populations depending on local resources. Locals' livelihoods such as land use for agriculture and cultural practices such as hunting and gathering are limited because of conservation implementation. Nature conservation for the public interest actually relies on the costs of local people through resource restriction and others. Local people as the other vital actors within protected area management are comparably disadvantaged for they are expected to passively accept conservation policy implementation. These powerless actors actually can react to policy implementation and the more powerful actors by individual and collective actions. David Easton's political system (1957), for example, notes that the feedback of decisions or policies made by a political system shapes people's demands and the support for a political system. Applying this idea to the conservation case, the feedback refers to the acts of affected people towards conservation policies made by state authorities. The feedback of protected area policy implementation by the locals will shape new demands of and support for conservation policy-makers. James Scott's 'weapons of the weak' (1985) shows the everyday resisting actions of tenant farmers toward landlords and wealthy farmers in the green revolution in Malaysia. These 'criminal behaviours' such as theft and slander by the powerless farmers were understood as hidden resistance against social change --- intervention of capitalism in the form of agricultural revolution. In this regard, the locals as the disadvantaged actors regarding protected area

management possibly use their weapons to fight for their rights. The interactions between the state authorities and local people are significant for conservation policy because the locals can resist policy implementations of protected areas and cause unexpected consequences of conservation policy. It is only possible to interpret local peoples' resistance to conservation policy by understanding their views and the socioeconomic context of the local community.

### **1.1.2 Social dimension of nature conservation**

Mascia et al (2003) have noted that social science studies play a vital role in nature conservation. Furthermore, conservation decisions are greatly influenced by social and political process (Wilshusen et al, 2003; Ban et al, 2013). In this regard, the interactions between the state authorities and local indigenous people are useful for debates of nature conservation. Given the existence of injustices of conservation, international law and organisations such as the International Unit for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) have recognised the rights of indigenous communities in protected areas (Colchester, 2004). Taking the World Parks Congress in 2003 as an example, the consensus document of the Congress declared a new paradigm that protected areas should include the interests of the affected people in protected areas. The Accord of the Congress also honoured the nature conservation efforts made by indigenous peoples (ibid). The General Assembly of the United Nations announced the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 and through this aimed to ensure the interests of indigenous peoples in the world. Taiwan is a non-member of the UN due to certain specific political factors in 1970s<sup>1</sup>, but important questions remain as to whether the Government of Taiwan guarantees the rights of indigenous people in protected areas in accordance with these international norms. I intend to historically trace the relationship between the state and indigenous communities via policies of indigenous peoples in different political regimes of Taiwan. The historical examination helps to explain some similarities and differences of the interactions, which is a necessary starting point for understanding the state as well as the local indigenous people.

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<sup>1</sup>The Republic of China (ROC) was established in the Mainland China in 1912 and has moved to Taiwan area since December 1949 when the ruling party (Kuomintang) eventually lost to the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War. Mainland China area has been governed by the People's Republic of China of Chinese Communist Party since then. The ROC Government claimed that Taiwan area under the rule of ROC Government is a free area of China. The United Nations Assembly Resolution 2758 in October 1971 recognised the People's Republic of China as the only legal representative of China to the United Nations to replace the place of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Knowing the proposal and the possible outcome of recognition, the ROC Government announced its withdrawal from the United Nations before the vote of the Resolution. Therefore, ROC Taiwan has not been in the UN since October 1971.

Different political regimes have applied various policies to indigenous residents of Taiwan. In this study I want to reveal the development of the relationship between indigenous people and the state at different stages about one hundred years ago when indigenous peoples of Taiwan completely surrendered to the Japanese colonial authorities. This starting point is important because it reflects the moment that indigenous populations in Taiwan contacted the modern state for the first time. Before the Japanese colonial regime, indigenous groups in Taiwan, in particular those in the mountains, were not really under the rule of any mainstream regime. They then were greatly influenced by the state policies of different political regimes and the mainstream society.

### **1.1.3 The important debates concerning this study**

This thesis situates itself within the field of political ecology. A further discussion of the field is provided in chapter two, and it is important to state at the outset that there are a number of differing approaches to political ecology research. The approach taken in this thesis, informed by the works of Peluso and Vandergeest (2001) and Holmes (2014), is to search for understanding of ecological conflicts in PAs by considering the political history of protected area establishment by state authorities and the locals' resisting responses. This study emphasises control and conservation of the approach to environmental politics in the field of political ecology. This approach has been taken because state authorities are usually powerful enough to show their hegemony concerning carrying out nature conservation projects. However, the locals' natural resource management to some degree has proved more efficient than external interventions (Gibson, Williams, and Ostrom, 2005; Hayes, 2006). Conservation interventions such as PAs by state authorities restrict the locals' resource use and are a means of control. These conflict with locals' sustenance, and cultural practices and potentially elicit unintended consequences which possibly result in the failure of conservation efforts. The lens of political ecology examines not only the domination of the state authorities, but the environmental justice of conservation. Locals take actions in response to the changes from conservation in order to politically present and secure themselves. Thus a political ecology approach appropriately interprets the political communications between state authorities and the local indigenes. This study is of value to the theory of political ecology by looking at the social and political processes of nature conservation in a conventional strict park and in a participatory community conservation project. Two types of PAs represent the paradigm shift of conservation policy within decades. Comparison of two examples highlights the similarity of environmental politics in the social and political process.

Debates about the balance between conservation and development have been an important element within political ecology. Core questions for political ecology approaches to conservation and development debates have included uneven power relationships and social costs between stakeholders. The political interactions between the acts of state authorities and local indigenous people affect nature conservation as well as local communities. The state represents the public to safeguard biodiversity conservation while the locals secure their rights over development. The political processes between the two parties shape conservation policy, local economic development, and social change. This thesis aims to contribute to these broader debates by political process between primary stakeholders.

This critical engagement with conservation and development debates through a political ecology perspective has important implications for environmental policy, both within Taiwan and more widely. The key policy questions raised by the thesis are how conservation policies were implemented by state agencies, and what the conservation policy effects were on the local indigenous communities. These questions attempt to explore conservation policy implementations within PAs in indigenous regions in Taiwan since national parks were established three decades ago. The exploration is vital within Taiwan because no park has been established in indigenous regions since the creation of Shei-Pa Park in 1992. At least three park plans have been rejected by the local indigenous people and other indigenous organisations. Nature conservation policy for the common good has been unexpectedly denied by disadvantaged groups. The political results of rejection seemed to show that the establishment of PAs is not their option. The failure of conservation policy like this is worthy of study. Moreover, with the paradigm shift of international conservation to embrace local people and people-centred conservation (Brown, 2003), the central government has legislated the co-management rules in the park system in 2009. Did the new participatory institutions improve the state-society relationship regarding park management? This study also attempts to examine the co-management policy implementations in indigenous regions. For the broader world, the environmental conflicts with respect to PA management are evident, in particular those locals relying on resources for livelihood. In the political system model of Easton (1957), policy is the output of a political system influenced by people's support and demand. People's perception and action to policy are the feedback of policy which shapes people's support and demands. In this way, the conflicts from PA administrations can be seen as the feedback of nature conservation policy. These conflicts possibly modify new policy-

making in a political system. Yet if the unexpected policy conflicts can be avoided, political costs can also be reduced. Understanding environmental conflicts is the prerequisite of avoiding the unexpected result of struggle. Thus, the locals' views are of value to the understanding of conflicts. The social and political interactions between two primary actors in PAs in this study contribute to the debate of conservation and development and public policy by the lens of political ecology.

## **1.2 Research aim and questions**

### **1.2.1 Research aim**

Based on the changes of international conservation and the political environment of Taiwan, this thesis aims to look at the interactions between the government authorities and local indigenous dwellers in PAs. This social dimension of conservation reveals not just the governance of indigenous communities and natural resources by the state, but also the social justice and indigenous development of the local people. Moreover, this study also contributes to environmental policy through the empirical case study of indigenous groups in two types of PAs.

### **1.2.2 Research questions**

The further objective focuses on the acts of two primary actors---the state agencies and the local Truku people in Taroko National Park and a community conservation project respectively. These include how the Park and the community conservation project were created, how conservation policies are implemented in the Park, how conservation effort was made in a community, what the locals' perceptions of conservation are, what were the social effects on the locals, and what the responses of the local indigenous residents to these protected areas. These social interplays in PAs construct the hegemony of the state and the resistance of indigenous people through the lens of political ecology.

This thesis is designed to investigate three paramount questions in two Truku villages that are located in two differing types of protected areas (Taroko National Park and a community conservation initiative).

**Q1. What were the policies and policy implementations of governmental agencies in Taroko National Park and a community conservation initiative?**

**Q2. What were the local Trukus' responses/actions to these conservation policies and policy implementations in PAs?**

**Q3. What social impacts from conservation occurred in the two Truku villages?**

These questions follow a simple linear logic that how 'a political system' (Easton, 1957) operates for decision making and then how the decision or policy is implemented in the local environment. These appear to be 'top-down' processes dominated by the governmental authorities or the elite. Later I explore the effects of the decision in the local villages of indigenous people. The local indigenous dwellers' consciousness of conservation decisions, as well as their responses to the decision, acts and the dominant class are equally important 'bottom-up' aspects of these processes. The feedback created by local people's actions shapes the political system for a new decision. My discussion of interplays between the primary actors in a conservation context interprets the policy implementations and the reply of local indigenous people.

The first question is concerned with the acts of exercising power and decision making, in particular the role of governmental agencies. It looks at the performance of the state in order to detect the unjust domination on conservation by the powerful state authorities. Accordingly, the scheme of local participation is a significant indicator in this question. In the two protected areas, a park and a community conservation project, I address a few sub-questions to comprehend the acts of state authorities:

Q1.1 How were protected areas created? Was there any local participation when PAs were established? How was conservation policy implemented in the local community?

Q1.2 What are the processes of decision-making in protected areas? Who are the decision-makers? What was the foundation of decision or policy in protected areas?

Q1.3 Were there any mechanisms for people's participation in these decisions? To what degree and by which means do local people participate in the management of PAs?

The second question studies the perception and the response of the local indigenous residents to nature conservation. This inquiry focuses on the local indigenous



dwellers. It is of importance as it relates to the autonomy of the local indigenous residents and their local development. Their responses potentially alter the decision or policy of conservation. Some questions are addressed to grasp the attitudes of local people in protected areas:

Q2.1 How do local people think about conservation institutions and conservation implementations in PAs? What do they think about the local development of PAs?

Q2.2 To what extent are traditional practices still performed within the villages? Why do they continue to perform these under the pressure of conservation?

Q2.3 What did the locals do in response to the conservation mechanism in PAs? Why did they take these actions?

The third question scrutinises the influence and social impact resulting from the exercise of power. This question aims to witness the effects of conservation in the local indigenous community, especially on the use of natural resources. The issues of effects on livelihoods and traditional practices are examined closely through the follow questions:

Q3.1 What was the social change or social influence from conservation institutions or conservation implementations in the local community? To what extent do the local indigenous people depend on the use of natural resources for livelihoods? How are traditional practices affected by conservation in PAs?

Q3.2 Is there any compensation from the authorities of protected areas? Is there any feedback scheme?


Q3.3 In addition to the restraint of access to natural resources, is there any impact caused by the PAs' conservation institutions on the village? How were these impacts perceived by local people?

These inquiries are put into practice in the field work in two indigenous villages and in the multiple governmental agencies in order to reach the research aim and objectives.

### 1.3 State authorities and indigenous peoples in Taiwan

#### 1.3.1 Current governmental organisations in the Republic of China (in Taiwan)

The Constitution of ROC is the foundation of the establishment of administrative government of ROC because ROC is a nation based on the rule of law. The principle of 'rule of law' affects the ROC government's administration as well as every resident in Taiwan area. The state organisation of the ROC in Taiwan is broadly constituted of central government and local government (see Chart 1.1 and 1.2). The Amendment of ROC Constitution regulates that the president with vice president is directly elected by the populace of the ROC in the free area (Taiwan area). The five bodies of the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan and the Presidential Office constitute the central government of ROC. The local government is established by provincial and municipal governments with their elected councils.



*Chart 1.1 The organisations of central government in ROC Taiwan*

The president with vice-president serves a term of four years. The president is the head of the State, supreme commander of military forces and represents ROC in foreign relations. He/she has the power of declaring regulations and martial law with approval of the Legislative Yuan, appointing officials, and issuing emergency decrees by the resolution of the Executive Yuan Council.

The Executive Yuan is the highest administrative organ of the state. The president of the Executive Yuan is nominated and appointed by the president of the ROC, with the


consent of the Legislative Yuan. There are different departments administrating diverse affairs of every aspect of life such as education, natural resources, and indigenous development. The Executive Yuan is the highest decision-maker of important policies and establishes the principles of policy implementation. These policies and practical principles play an important role in policy implementation at the local level. The Executive Yuan is responsible to the Legislative Yuan for presenting statements of administrative policies with reports on administration.

The Legislative Yuan is the highest legislative organ of the state, and its members are elected by the people. These legislators exercise the legislative power such as passing regulations to reserve natural resources and to protect the interests of indigenous peoples on behalf of people. There are 113 members serving terms of four years in the Legislative Yuan since 2008 owing to a reform. They also have the power to decide by resolution upon vital bills proposed by the Executive Yuan, and other important affairs of the state.

The Judicial Yuan is the highest judicial organ of the state, and in charge of civil, criminal and administrative cases. There are 15 Grand Justices (two as the president and the vice-president of the Judicial Yuan) responsible for the interpretation of the Constitution, laws and orders of ROC. The law courts of multiple grades are established under the Judicial Yuan, the judges in courts hold the office for life, above partisanship, and hold trials independently in accordance of the laws, free from any interference.

The Examination Yuan is the highest examination organ of the state, and has charge of the matters of public servants such as employment and retirement.

The Control Yuan is the highest control organ of the state, and exercise the powers of impeachment, censure and auditing.



*Chart 1.2 The organisations of local government in ROC Taiwan*

The local administrative organs are under the Executive Yuan, so the local government always implements the policies made by the central government. Local government contains provinces and municipalities according to the Local Government Act. A province is constituted of counties and cities, while a municipality is subdivided into districts. A county or city is subdivided into towns/county cities. These governmental agencies are all self-governing bodies except provincial government because it has been a branch of the Executive Yuan in accordance with the Amendment of Constitution of ROC since 1998. The provincial government has been a detached agency of the Executive Yuan since then. In the free area of ROC, there are currently six municipalities, Taipei, New Taipei, Taoyuan, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung, and two provinces, Taiwan and Fujian. Local governmental agencies have their corresponding councils possessing the legislative power. The heads of these governmental agencies, and the members of councils on multiple levels are directly elected by the citizens.

This study focuses on the interactions between the state agencies and the local indigenous people by examining two Truku examples associated with Taroko National Park and community conservation supported by the local county government. Therefore, the state agencies related with this study contain nature protection agencies (conservation system in the Council of Agriculture at the central level, and park system in the Construction and Planning Agency, Ministry of Interior at the central level) which make

conservation policies, justice agencies (the National Police Agency, Ministry of Interior at the central level) which implement policies in practice, and indigenous agencies (the Council of Indigenous Peoples at the central level) in the Executive Yuan. Moreover, the executor system in the Ministry of Justice (at the central level), Executive Yuan, responsible for investigation, and the law court system in the Judicial Yuan making judicial judgement are closely associated with the law enforcement. These agencies on the central level to represent the state and the public interest. At the local level, conservation agency and agency of indigenous affairs in Hualien county government, and Siou-Lin Township Office are closely relevant to this study.

The following sections review the modern political regimes governing Taiwan at different phases and their policies regarding indigenous groups to explore the interactions between the state and indigenous people in Taiwan.

### **1.3.2 Colonial period of Japanese regime (1895-1945)**

The colonial Japanese government employed the police to govern indigenous people in almost all primary aspects of the daily life of indigenous groups after the conquering battles in the indigenous regions. For example, the policemen set rules for transactions<sup>2</sup> between the Han Chinese and the mountainous indigenous people. The Japanese policemen were seen as teachers in the primary school in the tribes. The dictatorship by the police forced indigenous residents to be obedient people and this enabled the more efficient exploitation of natural resources in indigenous regions by the Japanese colonial regime. The policy of relocation implemented by the police after the 1920s (It was more active after the 'Wushe Rebellion' in 1930) separated indigenous families and compelled indigenous residents in the mountains to move to the hill areas closer to the plains where Han Chinese lived. The authorities attempted to change indigenous lifestyles based on hunting and swidden agriculture to the sedentary production of paddy rice. Authorities of the Taiwan state in the colonial period used violence to conquer indigenous people in the highlands and controlled them in everyday life. The policy of resettlement attempted to monitor them and to alter their traditional practices through livelihood shifts.

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<sup>2</sup> *Indigenous groups were minority groups and Han Chinese were the majority people in Taiwan. They were located in different areas and sometimes made deals with each other before the Japanese colonial era. During the colonial period, The Japanese police regulated the transactions in order to manipulate the economy of indigenous groups.*

### **1.3.3 Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, KMT) regime (1945-2014)**

After World War Two, Taiwan returned to the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, KMT) regime of Han Chinese in 1945. Later in 1949, this regime established the central government in Taiwan because they were defeated in the civil war in Mainland China. The KMT policies regarding indigenous people largely continued the Japanese colonial regime's. The policy of the reserved land for indigenous people, for example, was the Japanese planning for indigenous lifestyle in forestry areas<sup>3</sup>. It greatly limited the living space of indigenous groups owing to the natural resource exploitation by the colonial regime. Ignoring the unjust planning for indigenous populations, the KMT government adopted it as the land policy of indigenous groups in Taiwan (Yen and Chen, 2012). Moreover, after governing Taiwan for a long time, the KMT regime developed conservation regulations such as the National Park Law and the Wildlife Conservation Act that restricted local people's access to natural resources because resource restriction is the commonly used strategy for conservation authorities. Yet the Council of Indigenous Peoples at central government was established to fight for rights of indigenous groups in 1996. The Additional Articles of the Constitution formulated in 1994 have expressed the ethnic pluralism in Taiwan and the idea of respecting indigenous groups.

### **1.3.4 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) regime (2000-2008)**

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the election to rule Taiwan for its first time in 2000. Some progress in policy regarding indigenous peoples was made. President Chen announced that the state of Taiwan should establish a 'New Partnership' with indigenous communities. The 'Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples' was passed in 2005 to safeguard the rights of indigenous peoples, and ensure that other legislations that conflict with the new Basic Law should be amended (Unfortunately, many conflicting regulations were still in negotiations or not revised).

These political regimes governing Taiwan are seen as external regimes for indigenous groups. The subjectivity of indigenous communities seems to be lost when looking at the governance and policies regarding indigenous peoples in different

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<sup>3</sup> *The Japanese colonial regime in Taiwan nationalised the forestry land of Taiwan. Later the regime zoned some nationalised forestry land only for indigenous groups. It was the prototype of reserved land for indigenous peoples. The zoning in the colonial era actually restricted the living area of indigenous groups (Yen and Chen, 2012).*

governments despite the improvements in their condition. These were confirmed by reviewing the social movement of indigenous people of Taiwan since the 1980s.

#### **1.3.5 Indigenous populations of Taiwan and the Truku group**

There are currently over half million indigenous people of sixteen groups in Taiwan, constituting of 2.36% of the whole population in Taiwan according to the latest statistics of Department of Household Registration in June, 2017. Approximately 58% of indigenous people older than fifteen years old lived in the indigenous regions in 2014. It indicates that nearly 60% of indigenous populations live in the rural areas and mountain areas as the satellite map of Taiwan (Figure 1.1) and the distribution map of Taiwanese indigenous peoples (Figure 1.2) show. The settlements of the recognised 16 indigenous groups (see Figure 1.2) are located in mountain areas (the dark green part of Figure 1.1).



*Figure 1.1 A satellite map of Taiwan*

Source: Google map (access:20171210)






Figure 1.2 Distribution of indigenous groups in Taiwan

Source: Indigenous Ministry Committee

(<http://aboriginal.pct.org.tw/distributed.htm> access:20160510)

Among these older than 15 years old, 23.73% of them have a college degree (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 2017). In the same year, the percentage of people with higher education and older than fifteen years old in Taiwan is 43.6. The education level among indigenous groups is generally much lower than it is in the Han Chinese community. It is greatly associated with employment. The employment rate among the indigenous populations with college or higher education is the highest in the light of the same report

of CIP (ibid.). Over one-third of indigenous people depend on the construction industry (16.15%) and manufacturing (14.76%). Only 10.77% of them work in the primary sector of economic activities. Those relying on agriculture and fishery have seasonal free time and they usually search for temporary labouring jobs during the period. A new trend is that 10.80% of surveyed indigenous populations work in catering with accommodation industry. This is probably because of tourism development in indigenous regions. In this report, most young people work in the catering and accommodation industries, majority middle-aged populations work in the fields of construction and manufacturing. Senior people usually rely on farming and fishing related jobs in the countryside. The unemployment rate of indigenous people in March 2017 was 4.06%, which was a little higher than the rate (3.78%) of the whole nation (ibid.).

To sum up, there are 16 recognised indigenous groups in Taiwan. These indigenous residents make up 2.36% of the population of Taiwan. Approximately 60% of them live in rural areas. Their education level is lower than the average, which affects the employment. Over 30% of indigenous people depend on construction and manufacturing industries while about just one-tenth of them live by agriculture and fisheries. The new emerging tourism development in the indigenous regions also offers 10.80% people's livelihood. Different age groups depend on different industries. Younger generations depend on tourism-related jobs, while middle-aged people mostly work in the secondary sector of economic activities, and the senior workers rely on the primary sector. The unemployment among indigenous community is a little higher than the average rate in Taiwan, which indicates the employment problem is improving (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 2017).

The Truku group is one of 16 officially recognised indigenous groups in Taiwan. There are currently 30,963 Truku people according to the survey in April, 2017 (Council of Indigenous Peoples, 2017). The majority of them live in the three towns (Siou-Lin, Wan-Rung, and Zhuo-Xi) of Hualien County. This group became a recognised independent group in 2004. They traditionally lived by agriculture in the highlands and hunting practices, believed in ancestry spirits, and established a customary system based on the faith in ancestry spirit, Gaya, as social norms. The adult Truku had to tattoo their faces, which depended on how many human heads the male hunted, and how beautiful the female weaved. Their ancestors could recognise these tattoo-faced people when they passed away. They developed their hunting rules which was connected to the Gaya norms. This patrilineal society moved from central highland to east area of Taiwan about three or

four centuries ago due to hunting demands and expanding populations (Liao, 1984). Their single family based communities in the eastern highlands were small and dispersed.

In 1914, the Japanese colonial regime in Taiwan attacked the Truku and conquered them. They have been dominated by modern states since then. The Japanese strategically plundered their traditional living lands and forestry resources by relocation policy and forestry policy. Then the Han Chinese regimes created the reserved lands for indigenous people which were based on the foundation of the forestry policy of the Japanese. During the Japanese colonial period, many Truku people converted to Christianity because of the effort of a Truku female missionary and her colleagues. Christian churches have become a new Truku identity since the Japanese period. The Presbyterian Church established the Truku presbytery in 1960, which was the first one among all indigenous groups of Taiwan. This Christian denomination later eagerly promoted the Truku as an independent group. However, different Christian denominations frequently elicited the ideological conflicts among the Truku (Chiu, 2004). In 1986, Taroko National Park was built by the Han Chinese K.M.T. government for nature conservation and recreation in the traditional domain of the Truku people. Their resource access in the Park has been restricted since the establishment of the Park. Later in the rule of Han Chinese D.P.P. government, the Truku was recognised as an independent group. Being a proactive indigenous tribe in politics, the next step for the Truku is to practise autonomy.

Integrating the 2017 report and my fieldwork experience, most Truku people living in the villages are seniors, and students. These senior Truku depend on agriculture and temporary labouring jobs. Young and mid-aged adults usually work as labours in construction and manufacturing industries in urban areas and visit their family irregularly. Tourism has become a new income source for a few Truku residents. Nowadays, very few Truku rely on hunting or other traditional craft-makings for livelihood. Yet some young people follow experienced hunters to learn how to hunt wildlife as cultural practices. Because of the employment of foreign labourers in the 1990s, some Truku people have returned home. A few of these unemployed engage in hunting for income. Truku people are financially and educationally disadvantaged in Taiwan. More and more Truku villages and residents are involving in tourism-related businesses.

The two Truku villages in this project, F village and T village are typical indigenous villages in terms of livelihood and population structure. High unemployment is prevalent in both cases. In addition to low education (Lin and Chang, 2011), Tai (2007) points out

that the restriction of PAs also contributes to high unemployment in Truku villages. Because there are vast forest fields in the Truku villages (e.g. F village area is 685km<sup>2</sup> and T village area is 288km<sup>2</sup>. The residential areas are concentrated in the foothills in both villages.) and the Truku traditionally rely on natural resources in the forests, some contemporary Truku residents are supposed to work in the forest (e.g. herb collectors, mushroom growers, farmers, hunters, and loggers). However, the establishment of PAs in the two case villages limits the livelihood selections on natural resources in the forests. The majority of adults in both villages are actually on temporary contracts working as labourers in the cities or nearby villages. Just a few people rely on public employment, agriculture, and small businesses. Moreover, my fieldwork experience showed that there were more seniors and school children than young and mid-aged adults living in the villages. There are approximately 2200 residents in F village and 1500 residents in T village respectively, but the real voters were lower than registered voters according to the elections of village heads in 2010 and 2014. In addition, an observation in the fieldwork was that church goers were seniors, and school children. More ladies than men lived in the two villages to work as housewives for care. Many male adults were responsible for the primary family income working outside the villages. The current population structure was greatly connected to livelihood selection in the Truku villages. The condition revealed some serious problems in everyday life of the Truku communities, which is seen as the influence of long-term interactions between the state and the Truku people in this study.

#### **1.4 Structure of the thesis**

There are seven chapters in this thesis. Chapter one has provided a brief background to the core themes of this study. The research aim is based on these debates to look at the political interactions between state authorities and local indigenous communities in protected areas. In order to realise this aim, three questions about the acts of state agencies, those of local indigenous people, and the social consequences for the local Truku communities are studied. Chapter two begins with the theoretical lens of political ecology which embraces the issues between the natural environment and human society. The discussion justifies why the adoption of political ecology is appropriate for this study examining the social and political process between state agencies and local indigenes regarding protected area management. This topic pays attention to the political dimension of political ecology by exploring how political processes influence nature

conservation policies. Then, I employ three main conceptions: territoriality, social impact and resistance, attempting to construct a theoretical framework to examine two indigenous cases in Taiwan. Moreover, two types of protected areas, fortress parks and participatory community conservation initiatives, are introduced to understand the paradigm shift of international conservation and to grasp the practical problems that have occurred in protected areas. Finally, the role indigenous populations play in nature conservation is presented to show that global indigenous populations possess potential contributions to conservation.

Chapter three outlines how this research was conducted. The employment of a qualitative approach with multiple methods is justified. I pay more attention to interviews for they offered the majority of the data collected. The positionality in my fieldwork is presented to show how I got access to my informants and the reliability of the data. In addition, the characteristics of two Truku cases helps to explain why I selected them as case studies. In the last section, I delineate some practical experiences with indigenous groups in the field work, especially the ethical issues which are significant for indigenous studies.

Chapter four, context of nature conservation and indigenous development in Taiwan, is designed to offer a more detailed background of the interactions between modern states and indigenous populations within about a hundred years. Different political regimes adopted different policies to deal with the affairs of indigenous peoples. First, attention is drawn to the Japanese colonial power and its violent ways of administering indigenous people in order to take advantage of resources in indigenous regions. The successive Chinese regimes considered indigenous groups as ‘undeveloped’ communities and gave help to improve their life. Second, attention is paid to the contemporary conservation system. The nature conservation system was originally devised under the authoritative regime. The contemporary national park system was initially established in the 1980s when Taiwan was under martial law. Rigorous protection within park boundaries is a vital feature of these national parks. On the contrary, the participatory community conservation idea was seen as an alternative to these barricaded parks. Decentralised power and local participation constitute these micro-conservation initiatives. In Taiwan, this idea emerged in the early 1990s and has become popular in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Community conservation integrating biodiversity conservation and economic development has been very welcome among indigenous groups. These background details

build up the potential legacies of contemporary interactive communications between the government agencies and local indigenous people.

Following the background, chapter five looks at the case of Truku village 'F'<sup>4</sup>in Taroko National Park. First, the establishment of this park with its park plan, which was then subsequently reviewed three times, confirms the long-term neglect of the local Truku group by park authorities, although the rights of local Truku were gradually recognised in the second and third park plan reviews. The early reactions of Truku residents to this early neglect, and the strict restrictions of park authorities and park police, included resentment and overt protests organised by local politicians. With the development of new regulations about indigenous rights such as the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples, new participatory park schemes have been built. I therefore, second, scrutinised these comparably new schemes of local participation. I identify the evident domination of the park authorities in the most important joint scheme. In addition, the role of the legal system in conservation is investigated through the judgments associated with wildlife conservation of the district court (a total of 146 verdicts were examined). The attitude of the judicial system indicates the final judgement of conservation violation by indigenous people. The analysis of practical conservation measures in the park stresses that conservation, rather than local development of indigenous peoples, is seen as the first priority in the park. In response to the tolerant attitude of state authorities regarding park management and conservation law enforcement, the local Truku people used some tactics to continue their everyday practices of exploiting resources and simultaneously to avoid confrontation and conflict in the park, which can be regarded as hidden resistance to conservation. Truku covert resistance showed they were unsatisfied with park domination and restrictions on resource access. Local participation schemes were tokenism for the Truku due to the low degree of participation in practice. In this case, the control of multiple state authorities in the park elicited the resistance of local indigenous people.

Community conservation is usually regarded as an alternative to the 'fortress conservation' model expressed within parks (Wilshusen et al, 2003). Chapter six outlines a case of community conservation in Truku village 'T' to probe how conservation policies of local government were being implemented in the local community. The local governmental agencies and the local elite cooperatively guided the conservation with

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<sup>4</sup> Village names have been removed to protect the anonymity of villagers and individual respondents who might otherwise be identifiable.

development project at the beginning because the agencies and locals focused on local demands of development. Local leaders convinced residents and carried out the community conservation project for two years. However, some controversies resulting from the conservation initiatives were brewing among the local populace. Tourism development in the village followed from the end of a conservation ban. With the development of the local tourism industry, more complaints about pollution and the distribution of benefits from development were spreading in the case village. The industry was dominated by external travel agencies, because local Truku were poor and there was a lack of specific regulations regarding visitor and tour guide management. Thus the local government decided to promote a 'Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area' and passed new rules about the scenic area. These acts of local state agencies were questioned by many Truku residents. They took a series of collective actions to protest the establishment and promotion of the scenic area. Open resistance had been going on for a few years since 2010. The Truku protesters organised themselves to point out the controversies relating to conservation implementation and development planning within the community conservation project. They also appealed to the county head and an indigenous legislator for help and petitioned for the cancellation of the scenic area plan. Finally, the overt resistance suspended the policy planning of local state agencies because there was no consensus among community residents in a negotiation conference held by a legislator. In this case village, Truku people explicitly resisted community conservation with tourism development supported by the local government. The evolution of the community conservation initiative revealed the heterogeneity of a local indigenous community. When local government ignored the complex of power relationships at the community level and strongly guided a policy without full local participation, the local residents' feedback to the policy should reshape their support and demands as Easton's political system model suggests.

The final conclusion in chapter seven discusses the primary argument of the thesis based on the theoretical framework in chapter two and embodied in the two indigenous cases. That is, in the context of protected areas, the territorial acts of the state agencies possibly cause the resistance of indigenous people primarily because of social impacts from conservation on local communities. From stronghold national parks to decentralised community conservation initiatives, conservation policies were opposed by the local indigenous people. Comparative analysis has found that these local communities suffered from conservation implementations such as restrictions to resource access which affected

their cultural practices and livelihoods. In addition, social cohesion was undermined because conservation interventions caused problems such as elite capture and power struggles. As for the locals' response to conservation, this thesis found the difference between covert and overt resistance was the degree of empowerment. The empowerment process was evident within examples of open resistance. Two types of resistance seemed to be adopted alternatively by the locals. This study finally addresses suggestions in terms of conservation policy according to two indigenous examples.



# CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

## 2.1 Introduction

This study explores the broad social dimension of conservation illustrated by West, Igoe and Brockington (2006). Paying attention to the social/ political interactions between the state agencies and the local indigenous people, I use two village examples of Truku people in two types of PA to examine their political processes containing the acts of state agencies and local indigenes, and the social effects from conservation policies on the local Truku communities. These interactions embody the conservation policy-makings and the consequence of implementation of conservation policies in indigenous regions.

The literature of political ecology embraces the issues between environment and human society, in particular how human actions affect the natural environment. Environmental degradation and resource access or control potentially result from those complicated human decisions. The establishment of PAs for resource protection is evidently a restriction on resource access and an influence on human behaviours. I am concerned with the political processes among primary actors to deal with a dilemma of conservation and development in PAs from the perspective of political ecology. I argue that those social elements such as the administrative acts of state authorities and collective actions of the local residents may interplay to contribute to decision making about conservation policies which affect the environment. In this study I focus on the political part in political ecology to indicate that these social and political factors are important for nature conservation. Moreover, the social/ political interactions can be improved by human actions. This chapter aims firstly to establish a theoretical framework by connecting notions in the literature of political ecology in order to examine two empirical cases of Truku people in two PAs in eastern Taiwan. Secondly, I introduce the paradigm shift of PA management to show the trend of international conservation. Thirdly, the role indigenous populations play in nature conservation is also explored to understand their potential contribution to environmental conservation.

This chapter begins with the theory of political ecology because it deals with the social and political processes of environmental issues. Interactions between the natural environment and human society are interpreted by the combined term 'political ecology'. This discipline emphasises human impacts on ecological systems. Bryant and Bailey (1997)

examine the actions of key actors to understand environmental change in some developing countries. I adopt this view to analyse interactions among main actors in protected area management. Social practices and political actions possibly affect the environment by establishing institutions. The politics of political ecology becomes the primary argument in the literature of political ecology so that Vayda and Walters (1999) comment that authors of political ecology have placed too much importance on political actions. However, they recognise political factors are often causes of environmental change. Political elements such as power relations among various actors on conservation interventions indeed influence decision making of environmental policies and local development. Four traditional themes of political ecology literature are presented to link to the topic I explore. Political ecology offers critical insights into the political processes and social impacts when studies pay attention to the interactions between main actors in PAs. In addition, Wilshusen (2003) focuses on power as a significant social component to regulate political acts, and how it is constructed in conservation practices. Therefore, I conclude here that power relationships in political processes should be seen as influential factors when protected area management is considered.

Under the umbrella of political ecology and discussion of power, in the second section of this chapter I adopt some concepts about manifestation of PA policies and responses of the locals living in or adjacent to PAs in order to examine some key ideas in political ecology. The first idea is human territoriality defined by Sack (1986). He argues that human territoriality can be regarded as a spatial strategy of manipulating people and resources. This view not merely helps to understand that territoriality is socially constructed (Sack, 1986), but also indicates why acts of territoriality easily arouse opposition. His territoriality is the basis of power which plays a significant factor in the restraint of locals' access to resources for the reason of nature conservation. Ribot and Peluso's broad definition of access (2003) is employed to highlight the territorialisation acts of governmental agencies. They extend access from 'the right to benefit from things' to 'the ability to benefit from things' so that power relationships could be considered in debate (*ibid.*). Theory of access forms the second idea. These two ideas applying to conservation implementations shape social impacts on the locals. Combining the control feature of territorialisation and political power relations of access, we can imagine that once such actions of territoriality are imposed on the local community, potential resistances will be exercised as responses to a coercive policy of territoriality. Resistance is the third concept I employ to look at the response of locals to conservation in PAs.

Practices of covert resistance in everyday life (Scott, 1985) and overt protests show as Scott argues the 'weapons of the weak' when there are limited options for the local residents of PAs. I intend to scrutinise these resistances as responses by the locals, especially in the context of conservation policy or PAs. Various resistances such as collective political protests and hidden sabotage practices in everyday life show the locals' values. I argue that the establishment of PAs by governmental agencies is an act of territoriality. Such a territorialisation of the state results in resistances of indigenous locals who are the neighbours of PAs. I also see these resistances as a failure of policy implementation. Scott (1998) notes certain necessary elements resulting in failures of social engineering in last century. These components are in relation to attitude of bureaucracy when dealing with social policies. His views are employed to review the performances of governmental agencies in this study and to understand the unanticipated consequences (resistances) of policies of PAs.

In the third section I examine the paradigm shift of PA management. That is, the mainstream PA from fortress national parks to the initiatives of community-based conservation. Parks are the typical type of regulated PAs meanwhile community-based conservation initiatives are local participatory PAs. Located at two opposing extremes of the spectrum of PAs, the latter is usually seen as a policy change to the ineffectiveness of the former. This paradigm shift has happened during previous decades (Colchester, 2004). I am concerned with why the shift occurred and the practices of community conservation projects.

The fourth section looks at the role indigenous community plays in nature conservation. With the change of conservation paradigm from exclusionary to inclusive, indigenous people are in general recognised as important actors in conservation. Their local knowledge is regarded as a contribution to conservation.

Lastly I conclude that a framework based on political ecology literature appropriately connects to my research. Such a perspective suitably interprets interactions between the local indigenous residents and the governmental agencies in the context of PAs of Taiwan. I contest that territorialisation of the government by means of establishing PAs potentially causes resistances of the local indigenous people.

## 2.2 Political ecology as a lens to examine political processes

Political ecology is a significant area of thinking about environment and development in social science (Peet and Watts, 1996). This term can be traced to the 1970s to be used to combine practical land ownership and political economy factors in social theory (Wolf, 1972) as well as to be a reply to what were then new findings on how the physical environment was affected by politics (Cockburn and Ridgeway, 1979 cited from Peet and Watts, 1996). With subsequent additions from historical, anthropological and geographical scholars, political ecology pays attention to the links between political economy and ecology (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). Work in this field emphasises that one has to take contexts of history, politics and economy into consideration when studying land use. Historical tracking not merely interprets events in the past but offers a point of reference to comprehend present conditions (Blaikie, 1995 cited from Wilshusen, 2003; Bryant, 1992). A search for the context in which environmental change (or conflict) emerges through attention to historical background, political processes and socioeconomic circumstances is seen as a highlight of political ecology research.

From a broad view to examine the operation of the general political system by Easton (1967), to some degree such a contextual tracking on a specific topic can be seen as the inputs of a dynamic political system. That is, these historical factors and the socioeconomic environment facilitate the formation of specific demands and then influence the political system. Decisions or policies are the outputs engendered by a political system which affect people in the environment. Responses of those affected toward these authoritative decisions can be converted to feedbacks to constitute inputs. Here I adopt Easton's primitive pattern to firstly look at these interactions between various actors to frame production of decision making of policies of PAs. Secondly, what impacts may be imposed on specific people and finally, how the reactions of influenced people to policies mould demands of inputs.

It is necessary to briefly introduce this frequently cited model. The model (see Figure 2.1) is a dynamic circle constructed by inputs, a political system, outputs and feedbacks in environment. Inputs consisting of demands and supports are provided to make the circle operate persistently. The political system accounts for transforming inputs into outputs which are authoritative decisions such as policies. Some actors within a political system may respond to these decisions, which form feedback to generate new demands of inputs. This loop model implies that people's response to policies does shape

a dynamic political system. Easton notes that if a political system does not adapt to these demands of inputs, the dynamic circle stops and it possibly collapses (Easton, 1957). For instance, if decisions from the political system do not induce support of members or do not reflect demands, people's collective resistance as feedbacks should renew demands to mould new decisions. The political system needs to accumulate support in order to sustain its long term existence. A successful strategy should be a negotiation of adopting new demands to renew decisions. Moreover, the conversion of demands to decisions occurs in the process of a political system which may not be transparent. Interactions between interest groups, the government and others produce binding decisions affecting people. When the decisions are concerned with conservation in PAs, the processes represent the political part of political ecology. Such decisions cause impacts on people and the environment. Theories of political ecology offer ways to explore not just the political processes and interactions in the system, but also the processes and outputs leading to feedback and feedback forming new demands.




Figure 2.1 The political system

Source: Easter (1957)

As I position this thesis to explore the relationship between the state and local indigenous people in the context of PAs, interactions in the political processes among players epitomise their relationship. Environmental policies are authoritative decisions enacted through the operation of a political system. Drawing on Easton's model of a general political system, I emphasise the latter sphere that outputs of policies affect people, and these people's responses to decisions as feedback generate new demands shaping policies. In addition, there are also debates about how the previous environmental

policies were generated and why the replies of people to environmental decisions were so called 'unexpected consequences' of policies. After grasping this broad view of a political system by Easton, I return to discuss more notions of political ecology in order to probe details of policies of PAs and the local people.

### **2.2.1 Politics of political ecology literature**

This section emphasises the political area of political ecology literature, in particular how social elements affecting the environment are explored in political ecology studies. For instance, national conservation policy may aim to save endangered species by the establishment of PAs. It is a policy intervention in the environment by the state. I could examine some social dimensions of this environmental topic in order to find out the social influence on the physical environment. Does the policy really protect the species from extinction? How is the protected species exploited by people? How is the policy implemented in the protected area? These questions explore human acts on the environment and the interactions between society and environment. The social dimension should not be ignored when studying environmental issues.

Political ecology accounts usually contain three premises according to Bryant and Bailey (1997). The first is that various actors bear uneven gains and expenses through environmental change; the second is that existing social and economic injustice is increased or weakened with the inequality associated with environmental change; and third is that dynamic power relations among actors shape these political outcomes. These assumptions reveal that not just interactions among diverse actors matter but inequality and power relationships would be the main themes of political ecology studies. Wilshusen (2003) notes that studying power is key to learning about resource governance and access. Yet it requires a clear combination of notions to examine its operation. He therefore explores three viewpoints of power in the political ecology literature and constructs a framework of power. Marxian political economy firstly pays attention to social structure such as market forces and the state which result in environmental degradation. This view provides a materialist insight of the political economic environment. The second track of power analysis focuses on actors and their actions (e.g. Bryant and Bailey, 1997). This type of analysis is action-oriented. Thirdly, a post-structuralism perspective shows that nature is socially constructed and understood by analysing practices and discourses of biodiversity conservation (Escobar, 1996). This dimension of political ecology stresses that how people comprehend a conception affects power relationships. Power is constructed

by all actors and their understandings. These three aspects of power study in political ecological treatises function as a political environment, political acts and emblematic meanings. (Wilshusen, 2003).

The former two views are relevant to material aspects of power while the latter reflects the symbolic perspective of power. Both these perspectives frame analysis of power dynamics of political ecology (Wilshusen, 2003). For instance, a materialist may observe a specific incident where the park police captured an indigenous hunter with an 'endangered species' - a dead deer, when patrolling in the park at night. The symbolic views further interpret that power dynamics of this event come from regulations of conservation, traditional norms of indigenous groups, local knowledge and other forces. The symbolic realm of these institutions legitimates the actions of the police as well as the huntsman. I intend to pay attention to power in the interactive actions between the locals and the state. Moreover, the power relations within the local examples will also be examined.

#### **2.2.2 Four traditional themes of political ecology**

Robbins (2004) notes four themes in political ecology which represent four concerns of society-environment interactions. The first thesis of degradation and marginalisation aims to explain why and how the environment changes; the second focus on environmental conflicts intends to explain who can get access to environmental resources and the reasons for this; the third thesis of conservation and control explains why conservation fails and how political/economic exclusion occurs, and the fourth thesis of environmental identity and social movements explores where social upheaval around environmental concerns emerges, who joins the movement and how it takes place. My study is situated in the context of PAs in indigenous regions. Specifically, conservation policies were implemented and the local Truku groups were excluded from decision making, resource access and sustenance. Since the coercive power of the state implemented conservation, the local indigenous people who passively received policies took collective and individual actions of explicit and implicit resistance in order to express their indignation and claims. In summary, my subject is undoubtedly close to the core concerns of political ecology. In addition to the theme of conservation and control, the threads of social movement and environmental conflicts connect to complex cases of my research. These three themes of political ecology are briefly introduced in the following paragraphs.

### ***Theme of conservation and control***

In the application of the thesis of conservation and control, Robbins describes a general argument of this category:

*“...control of resources and landscapes has been wrested from local producers or producer groups through the implementation of efforts to preserve “sustainability,” “community,” or “nature.” In the process, officials and global interests seeking to preserve the “environment” have disabled local systems of livelihood, production, and socio-political organisation. Related work in this area has further demonstrated that where local production practices have historically been productive and relatively benign, they have been characterised as unsustainable by state authorities or other players in the struggle to control resources.”* (Robbins, 2004, pp. 149-150)

He finds four theoretical foundations underpinning such an argument (ibid.). First is an outlook that sees conservation as a form of hegemony that manipulates the governed via social technologies and institutions; second is the preference of the local people to manage resources through their own traditions rather than through the intervention of the state; third is that the conservation imagination is based on a non-existing ideal that wilderness is there without human disturbance; fourth, that conservation implemented within specific geographic territories is necessarily inconsistent with ecological and social realities. The four philosophical basics are offered to interpret writings of conservation and control theme in political ecology. These views indicate the negligence of policies of environmental conservation, the bias of the state or conservation organisations as well as the unexpected outcomes of policies. The local people are usually considered as sustainable users of natural resources by the authors of this strand of political ecology. Antagonistic interactions and political processes between the state authorities or conservation organisations and the local residents are emphasised for analysis in that these offer evidence to point out problems of policy implementation.

### ***Theme of environmental conflict***

Theses of environmental conflict accentuate political conflicts of environmental problems among various actors due to increasing scarcity of resources. Interventions of conservation and development policy concurrently ‘ecologise’ those long lasting and current struggles between communities according to a general argument of environmental conflicts (Robbins, 2004). Political ecologists pay attention to the institutional configuration of environmental resources and explore which groups benefit while which



groups lose. Such distributions usually activate conflicts among different groups. If interventions of environmental conservation influence institutional configurations, the conflicts stemming from resource distribution are seen as hidden costs of conservation. In addition, postcolonial views contest that development planning and environmental management tend to be in line with some groups' fictitious expectation, especially that developmental projects always echo the imagination and views of planners. For instance, the local users such as an indigenous community are regarded as a group with a shared homogeneous interest by planners. In fact, different interest groups in one community do exist. The ignorance of such a fact may result in more frictions between groups when development plans are conducted (ibid.). Interactions among diverse actors here reveal a form of negotiations. Institutional arrangements according to negotiations suggest the power relations among these actors. Power struggles in different issues may strengthen due to environmental interventions of state agents. Moreover, domination of the state and of mainstream groups within society on developmental projects tends to affect the subjectivity of the local people. This theme helps uncover the unequal relationship in terms of resource access when state agencies intervene in the local communities through conservation policy. Moreover, existing conflicts within the local communities could be more serious by ecological intervention of conservation. New conflicts may happen when the local resources are managed by external groups such as governmental agencies and private firms. I will pay attention to those unpleasant impacts resulting from conservation policy in the local community and explore the response of the local indigenous residents to these social impacts and to policy interventions.

#### ***Theme of environmental identity and social movement***

In the category of environmental identity and social movement, a common argument stresses that local groups take political actions due to changes of environmental management institutions and environmental quality (Robbins, 2004). Degradation and marginalisation are key to this theme. Environmental degradation jeopardises the livelihood of some people and they thus take collective actions based on an identity constructed around their livelihood. Modern development methods and practices could also affect some people carrying out traditional practices. Social actions can be mobilised in order to protect their livelihood operation. Contemporary peasant studies show that when ways of livelihoods are violated or challenged through the introduction of new technology and new institutions, divided groups may cooperate to take collective actions of resistance (e.g. Vandergeest, 2003). In addition, postcolonial perspectives see livelihood

movements as an attempt to address assertions of marginal communities (e.g. Rangan, 2000). Political ecology studies of environmental movements promote local interests and question dominant views of environmental change. This theme in political ecology stresses that social movements of marginal communities are closely related to livelihoods. The introduction of new technology, institutions or development practices possibly results in local upheaval and complaint. Local protesters' claim is based on their values which are different from the views and acts of mainstream actors in terms of environmental change. The theme of political ecology work is reflected in this study when I ask questions about the social impact of conservation interventions and the response of the locals to conservation interventions. Social actions may be the step the locals take when their livelihood is threatened or other negative impacts happen due to conservation interference.

These three political ecology treatises reveal that conservation and development interventions by the state are regarded as hegemonic acts. In contrast to this, the value of local claims and traditional ways of resource exploitation are highlighted. PAs creations separate their geographic space and social connections. Conflicts over environmental issues between actors could stem from original power struggles within a region. Power relationships between various actors predict institutional configurations of resource management. Marginalisation and livelihood challenges lead to collective resistance by local people. In addition, postcolonial views critically remind us that planners' imaginations of developmental subjects and their demands tend to be distorted through a mainstream bias. Such a tendency potentially causes environmental conflicts through misconceptions. All these philosophic basics underpin perspectives of political ecology to examine topics of conservation and development. These themes of political ecology are offered to raise the research questions of this study. The role and acts of the state agencies are considered when a conservation decision is made because it is probably a hegemonic act which is based on unequal resource distribution and damage bearing. I therefore explore the decision making of PAs in order to understand the nature of conservation interventions conducted by the state agencies. Environmental conflicts imply controversies on natural resource access among actors. Original conflicts between the locals may accelerate and be ecologised due to external conservation interventions. In this regard, to analyse social impacts from environmental policy implementation in the local communities it is necessary. These impacts, in particular the negative impacts, potentially deteriorate the quality of everyday life in the local indigenous community and elicit locals'

complaints. The negative perceptions more or less facilitate the mobilisation of social actions of resistance to environmental policy. Protesting movements are seen as the response to conservation policy, which are mobilised by the locals. The governmental authorities and the local protesters both have to pay for such an unexpected outcome of policy---protesting collective action. The reason why resistances happen may derive from the different opinions about local development between the locals and the policy makers. In this study, I ask questions about what resisting actions the local indigenous people take and why they take such an action with high cost.

The theory of political ecology suggests that political processes affect nature environment and environmental change (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Exploring the political processes, actors involved and social influence of environmental policies is necessary for good governance. Moreover, political ecology *'attempts to do two things at once: critically explaining what is wrong with dominant accounts of environmental change, while at the same time exploring alternatives, adaptations, and creative human action in the face of mismanagement and exploitation'* (Robbins, 2004, p.12). The dominant approaches to the environment such as PA establishment and regulatory arrangements are usually favoured by state authorities. Yet the local residents or marginal populations such as indigenous groups may unfairly bear social costs when the approaches are implemented. They thus take a different view of these powerful methods. The views of the locals not only show their values and identity which motivate their collective actions, but offer some alternatives or amendments to dominant approaches. This study concerns the relationship and interactions between the state agencies and the local indigenous people within PAs. The lens of political ecology offers insightful ideas such as the dominant role of the state, social impacts of conflict, and protesting actions of the locals. These ideas construct an essential interactional foundation between the local indigenous people and the state authorities. This study employs political ecology as the analysis tool to examine the controlling policies of PAs supported by the state agencies, and to understand local indigenous people's sentiments of actions. Following the principle of political ecology, the conceptions in next sections are used to interpret the acts of the state agencies and local indigenous people.

## 2.3 Territoriality and resistance

In this section, I intend to introduce three linked ideas that contribute to the explanatory framework of this thesis. This framework helps structure research questions and interpret the interactions between the state agencies and the local indigenous people in PAs. The first concept is territoriality which is according to Sack socially constructed and seen as a spatial strategy to manipulate people and resources. Its tendencies are applied to probe acts of the state. These characteristics see political strategies as a means of control. The second conception is access which is explained as ‘the ability to derive benefits from things’ (Ribot and Peluso, 2003, p.153). This idea makes clear the conflicts between governmental authorities and the local people in PAs. The local residents in a protected area are usually the financially and ethnically disadvantaged groups such as peasants and indigenous communities. Conserving natural resources in the areas by the governmental agencies alters their local exploitation for sustenance and cultural practices. Such a tension may lead to resistance of the local groups due to social impacts from the establishment of PAs. The third concept, resistance, is generally categorised into two types - overt resistance and covert resistance. Covert resistance is considered as everyday resistances in Scott’s works (1985, 1990) that is widespread in the life of the subordinated community via various ways. I pay attention to its political implications which should not be neglected. The other kind of explicit resistance is embodied by several specific actions such as political protests and petitions. I would argue that the governmental acts of territorialisation restrain access to resources, which is regarded as a social impact by the locals. Therefore, resistances are the responses to the acts by the local residents because of the social impacts. In the following sections, I offer these three concepts and their relevant arguments.

### 2.3.1 Spatial interpretation of social power

Many discussions of territoriality come from studies of animal behaviours by biologists. They may see territoriality of human society as a kind of animal instinct. Nevertheless, Sack (1986) does not consider human territoriality as aggressive nor a natural instinct, but as the foundation of power. He suggests territorialisation in human society should be seen as ‘a spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area’ (ibid: p.1) because once a place is territorialised, it indicates a management authority of this area. He defines human territoriality as *‘the attempt by an*

*individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area'* (ibid: p.19). According to his interpretation, political purposes such as governing residents and resources in such a territory are evident, and acts of territorialisation are motivated by political ambitions.

Sack further clarifies some vital principles of human territoriality. I select part of these features relevant to the establishment of PAs. First, a territory needs effort to be built and sustained, for its goal is to manipulate people's behaviours within the boundaries by means of controlling access (ibid: p.19). Without manipulation in an area, a territory does not exist. This clarification implies that a territory is not only a specific zone distinguished from other areas, but also that territoriality is socially constructed rather than occurring naturally. This clarification indicates that maintaining a territory implies costs to keep control, and so establishing institutions may be necessary. In this thesis, PAs such as parks need administrative authorities, patrolling groups and the police to implement resource conservation policies which restrict people's access to natural resources and prevent poaching within PAs. Anyone violating the rules of parks should be sent to the justice system. The judges in the court decide cases according to legislation. These state agencies represent public power to conduct control in the protected territory. What these agencies do to maintain the territory and how the local users of natural resources respond to the restrictions and institutions is of interest. Second, in a territorialised area, practices of moulding people's behaviours and relationships aim to exercise control which can contain or exclude depending upon the manipulator. The person or group controlling a territory does not necessarily stay in this geographical zone since a wall or a boundary marker functions for this. This means that a controller may be far from his territory. For instance, decision makers influencing PAs such as scholars and officials do not usually live in the PAs. Third, control is a primary rationale within a territory, which marks different extents of access to people, resources and relationships in specific area compared to other areas (ibid: p.20). It is possible for a territory to return to a non-territorial area. Sack notes that if the restraints of a territory are always broken, it is possible to cancel the geographical restraint. This explanation offers a significant implication that a territorial intervention could be withdrawn if the controlled people successfully resist restrictions placed upon them. The control of access to things or resources in a bounded place may be changed because of other considerations. For instance, hunting is allowed in a wildlife reserve. Fourth, the boundaries of a territory are changeable according to negotiations or other schemes. It tells us that it is possible for some forces to affect the decision of a territory

manipulator on boundary issues. Different territories may be territorial on various levels. This may rely upon different contexts and controllers. This interpretation reflects various degrees of strictness of a territory. There are diverse types of PAs stipulating various degrees of access to resources. Many methods are used to announce territoriality. For example, a certificate confirms land right by legal authorities while traditional norms note taboos in a remote zone of a lake. However, Sack thinks that if the announcement is not clear or recognisable, it is not clear whether an act of territorialisation is being exerted or not. He also admits that in practice a definite explanation may have blurred borders (ibid). This indicates the practical implementation of territoriality may meet difficulties despite its definition being unambiguous.

Three significant features of human territoriality stemming from its definition are stressed by Sack (ibid) in order to reveal the philosophy and vital consequences of territoriality. First, he points out that territoriality should contain a geographic classification. Second, different forms of communication such as boundary signs of a territory are easy for people to understand. The last is manipulation of access to things or specific zones in a territory, which affects the behaviours of people in an area. Take PAs as an example; to establish a park requires the geographic scope to be shown by a map in the park plan. This park is distinguished from other areas around it. A park's boundaries can be a way of communication. That is, to tell people that some things are different within this area. Implementing conservation regulations by the park police such as restraint of access to natural resources in a park is always based on park legislation, with control being central to the nature of a park. PAs such as parks are therefore typical territories, and their construction by the state is an act of internal territoriality.

All these interpretations reconfirm that human territoriality is a socially constructed action for it is a strategy in human society. It affects people controlling the geographic areas and those who are manipulated. Their interactions are an important perspective to examine power relationships in a territory. Being a strategy of the state to control and influence people, such an examination in a territory offers not just implementation of territoriality, but also reveals whether this strategy is sustainable or not. In addition to the above three bases of territoriality, Sack develops another seven associated potentialities of territoriality for use in practice (ibid).

### 2.3.2 Tendencies of territoriality

Three tendencies of territoriality from Sack's definition shown in the previous section. Sack uses one term to summarise each tendency. The first three are *classification* (of geographic areas), (easy to) *communicate* and *enforce* (manipulation). The fourth one is that territoriality is viewed as a way to *reify* power. Intangible power relationships are embodied through the act of territoriality. Fifth, the relationship between the controller and the controlled is *displaced* by territoriality. It means that one may mistakenly take for granted that territory is the agent exercising the control. The sixth one interrelates to the fifth and first one that classification in terms of area causes relationships to become *impersonal*. People's linking to others changes due to place. Seventh, explanation of acts of territoriality may be complex so that it is difficult to expose all controlling activities. People could see these as a view that 'things need space to exist' (ibid p33). Eighth, a territory becomes a spatial *container* for events occurring within it, such that these activities share the same spatial features of a specific territory. Ninth, the human act of territorialisation has created 'the idea of a socially *emptiable place*' (ibid p33). For instance, national parks created in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in USA were regarded as the wilderness without human disturbance, despite the fact that American Indians had lived in these spaces for a long time. Finally, territoriality *engenders more territoriality* and shapes more relationships. This inclination refers to the observation that social events and geographical territory can expand each other and accordingly more controlled territories are produced.

These features are interrelated and may interplay with each other to form various combinations. The primary message summarised from these inclinations of human territoriality is that the exercise of human power in spatial areas potentially leads to the weakness of personal relationships, displacing this through the emphasis on space. Manipulation exertion in an area is easily taken for granted. Its risky implication with respect to politics is that human territoriality may rationalise domination of the authority in control of the territory. Here in light of Sack's definition of human territoriality, it is viewed as a means of social manipulation in an area. It possibly duplicates inequality or enhances oppression in a society.

### 2.3.3 Theory of access, stressing power relations

The most evident restraint made by human territoriality is access to resources in a territory. To understand meanings of access helps to explore the impacts caused by human territoriality. Ribot and Peluso (2003, p. 153) explain access as 'the ability to benefit from

things—including material objects, persons, institutions, and symbols.’ Their definition extends the original meaning of access to be ‘the right to benefit from things’ in property literature in order to include debates on more social relationships than property alone. These social relationships can facilitate or restrain people in meeting their interests from resources through mechanisms and processes. Behind these relationships are interplays of power relations. People’s ability to gain benefits from resources depends on these powers existing in the social and political-economic contexts. As they note, analysis of access provides an understanding why some people can gain prioritised advantages from resources, as well as to examine whether they possess rights to do so.

Their analysis of access (2003) tends to see ‘ability’ as ‘power’ in two levels. Power firstly refers to the ability to influence others’ thoughts and behaviours as in Lukes’ (2004) first dimension of power. Secondly, power is based on the social relationship of people. The concept of access accordingly implies all the ways through which people can gain interest from resources. Property generally accepts certain socially recognised rights and claims, which may be supported by legislation or traditional customs. Rights are contained by the ability because they are only part of all means to benefit from things.

Ribot and Peluso (2003) develop a theoretical framework of access which can be used to scrutinise specific conflicts of resource access. The main structure of the framework consists of various degrees of access to technology, capital, markets, labour, knowledge, authority, identity, and social relations which actors possess. They argue that access analysis supplies the combination of various ways, relationships and courses which allow different players to get benefits from resources. Their argument inspires the exploration of diverse power relationships behind resource exploitation. Coincidentally, Peluso and Lund (2011) agree that conflicts over land actually should be conflicts over ‘power and property right’ (Thompson, 1975 cited from Peluso and Lund, 2011).

#### **2.3.4 Resistance of the weak groups**

This section attempts to explore the protests of subordinate communities, in particular the resistance to conservation in order to grasp the political implications of resistance and the potential influence on conservation policy.

This study pays attention to examine responses of the local indigenous people to policies of PAs. Resistance as a response to policies indicates that local communities are unsatisfied with these outcomes of the political system or the implementation of policies. These resisting people are affected by these political results, nevertheless, they are never



policy makers. They are in a subordinate class, expressing their complaints and resentments to the superordinate class. Scott (1985) broadly defines resistance of the subordinate class as:

*'...any act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims (for example, rent, taxes, prestige), made on that class by superordinate classes (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-à-vis those superordinate classes' (Scott, 1985, p.290).*

The definition extensively contains different types of opposition between the dominant group and the subordinate group including individual behaviour and collective action, material type and symbolic form, unsuccessful and successful actions (Holmes, 2007). Applying this explanation to the context of conservation, the subordinate community is the locals who experience the oppression of conservation in PAs. The dominant group whom the local people resist is the state or conservation organisations who regulate and implement the conservation. According to the definition, the local residents attempt to alleviate or refuse the restraints of conservation legislation and implementation by the state in PAs. The locals may propel their assertions of rights against the state agencies. Scott (1985) has argued that oppression and resistance are in constant flux by paying attention to the small-scale but predominant everyday resistances in a Malaysian village. Scott was curious as to why the peasants did not revolt when the green revolution was introduced in rural Malaysia. The introduction of new agricultural technology led to high unemployment in the agricultural regions. He found that the everyday forms of resistance rather than open rebellion were exerted in the agricultural regions.

A few elements analysed in Scott's case village are seen as restraints of explicit resistance (Scott, 1985) and the protests of the subordinate group become a covert pattern which was embodied in daily life. These factors were taken into consideration and everyday techniques were favoured by the affected farmers over explicit insurgency (Holmes, 2007). The first is the angst of oppression (actual, remembered or anticipated). The worry of the protesting people allowed them to adopt covert moves such as small-scale theft. The second factor is the non-uniformity of the peasantry group, which undermines their collective action of resistance. Some farmers were the relatives of the elite and the voices and interest of the subordinate class were various. Moreover, the

individual demands of surviving on daily level also repress the possibility of open insurrection. The opportunity cost of explicit revolution was too high to be taken for these peasants in rural Malaysia. Similar components may oppress the locals and prompt them to use implicit ways to resist to conservation.

Holmes (2007) reviews resistance to conservation in various cases, mostly in the context of PAs, in order to help conservation practitioners to comprehend diverse forms of resistance and the political implications rather than misinterpret resistance and take inappropriate measures. This 'disobedient knowledge' (Igoe, Sullivan, & Brockington, 2010) of resistance to 'top-down' conservation by the locals just express the voice of the locals (Holmes, 2014).

## **2.4 Paradigm Shift of International Conservation**

The aim of this section is to explore the changing paradigm of international conservation and why the shift occurred by reviewing the history of international nature conservation. Further, I probe into the features and practical difficulties of the new paradigm. The intention is to analyse these attempts not just to understand the trend of international conservation and the implications of the paradigm shift, but also to recognise the practical barriers of conservation projects. Making conservation efforts to maintain biodiversity can be seen as a process of responding to the resource demands of people in order to avoid 'the tragedy of the commons' proposed by Hardin (1957). The following paragraphs first outline the conventional paradigm of nature conservation. Second, the paradigm shifts and the reasons for change are described, and third the connotations of the new paradigm are explored. Finally, the realistic difficulties of the new popular model of conservation are introduced.

### **2.4.1 Early exclusionary approach of conservation**

The history of nature conservation in the West shows that conservation implementation is deeply political. This is especially so in the establishment of protected areas because of practical political considerations behind nature conservation policies (Adams and Hutton, 2007). Early conservation practices exclude local people from protected areas. Adams and Hutton (2007) argue that the development of scientific knowledge (Scott, 1998), and processes of rationalisation (Murphy, 1994) underpinned the control of nature by state bureaucracies. Their review of conservation finds that through

these practices nature was seen as a set of differently categorised and calculated resources. The idea of the separation between nature and human society was manifested by the division of wild land and cultivated/ inhabited land (Adams and Hutton, 2007). People were not part of nature so protected areas for nature conservation should avoid the involvement of humans. Yellowstone, the first national park in the world, was created in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to preserve a version of ‘pristine nature’ without human disturbance. To do so, it was thought that people living within the park boundaries should be resettled. This park model greatly guided the conservation practices in the 20<sup>th</sup> century (ibid). Due to the rigid restriction of access to natural resource in protected areas such as parks established in the colonial period or authoritarian rule, local people tended to associate parks with autocratic political power (Wilshusen et al, 2003).

The establishment of protected areas grew swiftly after World War Two (Adams and Hutton, 2009), in particular in African countries (Neumann, 2002). International organisations such as the IUCN and the United Nations advocated conservation actions in the 1950s and 60s. The IUCN categorised different types of protected areas and has refined the classification frequently (Ravenel and Redford, 2005). The first two categories of protected areas containing parks are eminently exclusive. Many Latin American regions and other developing countries employed the park model and global protected areas doubled in the 1970s. The growing protected areas doubled again between the fourth (1993) and fifth (2004) World Parks Congress. The park model was the mainstream of conservation practices in the 20<sup>th</sup> century until the 1970s.

Social impacts of protected areas creation were widely identified in the 1970s. Adams and Hutton (2007) note that certain economic activities were allowed in the buffer zone of UNESCO’s ‘biosphere reserve’. The relocation of people in protected areas was recognised as a potential problem in the 1970s. Colchester (2004) remarks that the IUCN General Assembly passed the Kinshasa Resolution in 1975 to protect the traditional lifestyle of indigenous people and call for the ban of resettlement of people in protected areas.

A few authors point out that the paradigm shift of conservation from an exclusionary to an inclusionary model occurred by the 1980s (e.g. Hulme and Murphree, 1999; Wilshusen et al, 2003). The community-based projects with a people-oriented approach have prevailed within disputes over international conservation since the 1980s. McNeely (1984) indicate the Third World Parks Congress in 1982 paid much attention to

the issue of local people in context of protected areas. For example, McNeely (1984) uses the term 'new reality' to describe the socio-economic needs of human society and believes that protected areas were adapting to these new realities. The Fourth and Fifth Congress continued to debate the issue of local people. A few indigenous people participated in the Fifth Congress declared the 'Durban Accord' to show a new conservation approach to PA, which equitably combines conservation goals and the interests of affected people.

#### **2.4.2 The rise of community-based natural resource management and practice**

Parks were an exclusive strategy to strictly implement conservation. The conflicts may occur as outlined in the previous section, and local people were almost inevitably the losers. Some commentators may support these measures to save the degraded environmental resources, but in this study, the powerful acts of parks are seen to imply injustice. An alternative inclusive strategy has been accepted as the mainstream approach through a series of international conferences on the environment (Colchester, 2004). Here I focus on the participatory strategy, community conservation, to examine its principles and problems.

Since the 1980s, a range of new conservation approaches and practices have been promoted around the world, including integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), community based conservation (CBC), community based natural resource management (CBNRM), and wildlife utilization (Brown, 2003). The emergence of these initiatives revealed three tendencies in thinking and practice of conservation arena according to Hulme and Murphree (1999). These comprise the conservation activities shifting from a state-centric to a local society level; the conceptualization of conservation moving away from preservation to sustainable development, with a combination of conservation and development goals; and natural resource management informed by neoliberal economic thinking (Hulme & Murphree, 1999). The trends implied a changing managerial paradigm of PAs which takes local residents' needs into consideration when pursuing biodiversity conservation, and which needs to place part of the responsibility for conservation at community level.

Adams and Hulme (2001) use 'community conservation (CC)' to name such a kind of 'conservation narrative'. They note that the notion means conservation practice cannot and should not be pursued against the interests and wishes of local people and these relatively new initiatives have become dominant in global conservation policy, especially in the developing areas (Adams & Hulme, 2001). It is difficult to accurately define

'community conservation'/ 'community based conservation' because of the broad meanings of community and conservation. The term comprises diverse conservation activities implemented at local levels around the globe. However, the core concept of CBC lies in the coexistence of people and nature (Western & Wright, 1994), and natural resource management by, for and with local communities (Murphree, 1994). In the community conservation narrative, people living adjacent PAs are regarded as 'partners' who participate in conservation and share the economic benefits that are yielded by species, and ensure that PAs to contribute local sustainable livelihoods (Adams & Hulme, 2001). It seems that community conservation strategy is seen as an alluring panacea to solve the long term conflicts between PAs and local communities. Nevertheless, what are the challenges in theoretical principle and while carrying out such integrated strategy at community levels? Is it an effective means to combine both objectives of biological conservation and economic development of local communities?

Challenges in the principle of community based conservation are addressed firstly in the following paragraphs. It is also necessary to distinguish such projects from other similar initiatives in order to understand the nature of community conservation.

#### ***Challenges of community conservation***

Community based conservation is used as an important symbol to represent the paradigm shift to people-centred conservation. Brown (2003) suggests three essential changes in such people-centred conservation approaches in order to achieve the dual goals of conservation and development. The first challenge concerns the need for more plural interpretations as well as understandings of knowledge and values toward conservation. For example, traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) expresses ways of knowing based on local daily practice of natural resource use by indigenous people (Berkes, et al., 2000). Their perspectives and knowledge of conservation have usually been embedded in their cultural customs and can become viable parts of management strategies. According to Berkes et al (2000), these traditional systems also possess certain similarities of adaptive management that can adapt to the changes of uncertainty and unpredictability (Berkes, et al., 2000).

The second challenge is to adopt appropriate inclusionary processes to recognize such plural knowledge, value and interests of various stakeholders. This challenge needs to take action to associate conservation and development. Brown (2003) stresses deliberative ways to respect diverse actors in different positions and use particular

techniques to make better decisions in practice such as working with small groups of people or accommodating the broadest extent of possible interests.

The third challenge lies in establishing adaptable, integrated and dynamic institutions to deal with complicated natural environment and human development. Institutions are regarded as rules that regulate people's behaviours. 'Institutional fit' here describes '*conservation institutions trying to improve the integration of human needs with biodiversity*' (Brown, 2003, p. 90). Such creative institutions need to match up organizations and space across scales and have to link local needs with international interests rather than merely limiting people's behaviours. Being adjustable helps such new institutions to meet both needs for biodiversity conservation and economic development. The three challenges and proposed solutions from Brown not only provide specific directions of successful and meaningful people-centred conservation, but also point out the plural and hybrid nature of community conservation. These challenges are useful to evaluate practical participatory community and co-management arrangements with local communities.

#### ***Issues of empirical field studies***

The empirical results of implementing community based conservation projects reflect multitudinous lessons that people can learn from case studies in various regions in the world, particularly in developing countries. Here, I list much greater concerns based on social science arguments rather than ecological views due to the stress of CBC relevant literature and my orientation of research. The analyses of such pragmatic programs lie in institutions and political power, participation, attitude of local residents, and the distribution of benefits. Moreover, external changing environments play a vital role in affecting the communities where community conservation projects are running.

#### ***Institutions and power relationships***

The first key issue that I would like pose according to empirical studies on community conservation is the establishment of institutions and their associated power relations. After their examination of the concept of 'community' in community conservation literature, Agrawal and Gibson (1999) suggest that research analysis of community conservation should focus on multiple stakeholders with their various interests and relevant institutions rather than the communities in order to get more meaningful information. They argue that the adoption of such a political approach is because the assumption of community in resource management is that it exhibits

*'homogeneous social structure, shared norms and small unit in space'* (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999, p. 630) which do not coincide with the actual situations of empirical settings (Gibson & Koontz, 1998), while the political description can portray the real communities (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). Similarly, the importance of institutional arrangements is also stressed by Gibson and Koontz (1998) after analysing two communities with many similar physical features in India to govern their forest resources. In spite of these conditions, the two communities developed different institutions to support their values and this in turn resulted in different outcomes. Institutions are not only the reflection of given values, but also transform values and shape the preference of a community. Therefore, paying more attention to institutions linking with values of local residents helps to understand the processes and effects of resource management at community level (Gibson & Koontz, 1998).

Institutions play a primary role in my analysis of research about contemporary indigenous hunting of Truku people. The focus is put on institutional interplays between wildlife conservation policy, indigenous development policy, and hunting norms of Truku people that shape current hunting practices. Institutions also attract much attention within community conservation studies in order to understand the sustainable development of common pool property such as wildlife, fishery and forestry. No matter what kind of institutions, the processes of building institutions are associated with power relations and politics.

#### ***True participation of the locals?***

Local participation is regarded as a significant means for protected area management to minimize the conflicts among diverse stakeholders of common pool resource appreciation and to promote the sustainable development of resource utilization such as wildlife use (Mbaiwa, 2005). The establishment of cooperation and partnership between the PAs' administration and their local communities is useful to facilitate the adaptation of traditional values to a modern environment and schemes of resource management. Such an idea of partnership, namely local participation, benefits both local and wildlife management authorities in livelihoods improvement and biodiversity conservation (ibid.)

In practice, Platteau (2004) discusses the seriousness of elite capture at a local level, especially within the popular model of community based development projects. One small group of an association in West Africa handled and controlled the external funding

and led to a highly unfair profit distribution. The primary leader also tampered with the accounting documents and took much more individual benefits for granted. The livelihoods of the poor did not improve (Platteau, 2004). The elite capture problem confines the participation of community conservation projects to specific groups of villagers, hence reinforcing conflicts among community leaders and undermining social capital. The necessary collective action in the local conservation initiatives cannot be reached, let alone the success of dual objectives of community conservation (Tai, 2007).

Research shows that one of the dissatisfactions with community conservation comes from the insufficient opportunities for local communities to participate in the process of decision making. Community conservation project systems in Zambia contained many issues local inhabitants were concerned with to enhance local participation such as the loan to run small enterprises and increased access to education. But women received very few opportunities to be involved in development initiatives in community conservation in Zambia (Wainwright & Wehrmeyer, 1998).

From a macro view, wildlife conservation policy in Taiwan is made by a few experts including scholars and officials in the office. Accordingly, opinions of many other stakeholders are excluded and this results in complaints as well as conflicts in practice, especially around cultural practices carried out within indigenous areas. Participatory approaches have become popular in conservation since the 1980s, replacing the previous separate strategy from the locals. Thus, measures towards participation should be taken by conservation authorities to improve the relationship between the state and indigenous people. Accordingly, in this thesis, I will explore indigenous peoples' cooperative experiences with public sectors, particularly the authorities of PAs. However, some empirical evidence shows that specific groups such as the poor and women at a local level are often neglected by community conservation programs. The problem of elite capture within communities exacerbates the exclusionary status quo. These divergent variables that affect the empirical participation at community level become what I examined in my field work sites.

#### ***Attitudes of the locals toward conservation and interest distribution***

There is no doubt that the local communities are the key component of community conservation projects, and that the attitudes of the communities may play a vital role of the success of community conservation (Masozera, Alavalapati, Jacobson, & Shrestha, 2006; Moswete, Thapa, & Child, 2011). According to Holmes (2003), community attitudes



towards conservation reviewed within numerous studies in general indicate that positive attitudes comes from the benefits or services provided by the authorities of PAs, while negative attitudes form because the inaccessibility of resources such as wildlife and land, and the conflicts with wildlife and the staff of PAs respectively (Holmes, 2003). The attitude investigation conducted by Musumali, Larsen and Kaltenborn (2007) demonstrates that the residents living adjacent to national parks in Zambia and Botswana respectively hold negative views towards relevant institutions and wildlife authorities after two decades of implementation of CBNRM programs. They therefore declare the impasse of such community conservation initiatives in these two countries since CBNRM fails to fulfil its intention to empower the local communities (Musumali, Larsen, & Kaltenborn, 2007). The main reasons lie in the incongruence between what the communities perceive and expect about the function and aim of natural resource institutions and those of conservation authorities. Their empirical findings reveal that the communities are passive within such wildlife management schemes and their roles seem merely functional with limited opportunities to make decisions. Natural resource management and all activities are principally controlled or policed by the wildlife authorities in the two countries and thus easily lead to recurrent tensions (Musumali, et al., 2007). On the contrary, one SWOT analysis of three key stakeholders including the state agency, local communities and an environmental organization on community conservation management in a Rwandan forest reserve shows that the positive attitude of the representatives of local inhabitants outweighs the negative one (Masozera, et al., 2006). The leading factor is the additional increase of income from community conservation and the simultaneous decrease of poverty in the communities. That is, local people perceive that community forestry conservation indeed results in the improvement of livelihoods.

In addition to economic benefits derived from community conservation, Mbaiwa and Stronza (2011) connect positive local attitudes with conservation objective as well. They depict the changing attitudes of local residents towards community conservation projects--- CBNRM in the Okavango Delta, Botswana (Mbaiwa & Stronza, 2011). The CBNRM projects aim to improve both conservation and tourism development and result in transferring effect to the positive attitudes towards community conservation. The results from qualitative and quantitative analysis reveal that attitude changes were shaped not only by direct economic benefits but also from cooperation between the government and local communities in natural resource management and collective action within communities in CBNRM development initiatives. Co-management mechanisms and

collective action can strengthen social capital in the communities and simultaneously create a sense of ownership over natural resources. Accordingly, the positive attitudes towards conservation and tourism are enhanced (ibid.).

Since tourism is often seen as a tool to help local development in community conservation projects, the distribution of benefits and relevant challenges brought by tourism should not be neglected. Ecotourism in rural areas can indeed provide employment opportunities and additional revenue that facilitate local improvement of livelihoods. However, unequal distribution of the benefits from the tourism industry could result in marginalization of community. In Namibia, community conservation intends to alleviate poverty and promote wildlife conservation and thus attracts international donor funding. Community ecotourism enterprise plays the most important role in development objectives. After examining two cases managed under community conservation approaches, Hoole (2009) finds that ecotourism systems in participatory communities are always controlled by external private enterprise partners and government. The local elites within communities also capture the majority of benefits (Hoole, 2009). Such imbalance at local levels may silence the voice of the community and make the community lose its position within management institutions (Blaikie, 2006; Hoole, 2009). Furthermore, a Nepalese case on community conservation indicates that women and the poor did not share the benefits derived from ecotourism development, and their less supportive attitudes to the project indicated their excluded position (Mehta & Kellert, 1998). Some undesirable changes to lifestyle and cultural tradition of local communities could also be brought by tourism (Mehta & Kellert, 1998). Complaints about limited employment opportunities, opaque processes of decision-making, and hiring of family members and residents from other communities were found in South Africa (King, 2007). Various interest groups within the communities responded to such conservation initiatives in different ways, and King (2007) notes that this differentiation was driven by factors including variation in material access to natural resource and recreation opportunities. Songorwa's study in African reveals that the traditional hunters expressed their opposition to conservation programs because of limited direct benefits meanwhile the farmers' camp opposes it due to insufficient compensation (Songorwa, 1999).

Attitudes of local communities generally depend upon the benefits they receive and the relationship between the steward authorities of PAs and the local inhabitants. The positive attitude can facilitate the success of community conservation or PAs directly. Applying this perspective to my research program, I intend to investigate the attitude of

indigenous residents who live adjacent to Truku National Park in order to understand the interaction and relationship between the administration and the locals. This may indicate the probability of future cooperation or conflict. Further, the factors that affect their attitude could be explored and discussed to help better management the National Park. Similarly, the attitude of the other villagers who possess national forest within the village can reflect their relationship with the Forestry Bureau. The locals' attitude toward state agencies is an indicator to evaluate the interactions between them.

## **2.5 Indigenous Populations in Nature Conservation**

Indigenous people play an important role in nature conservation because they may retain traditional knowledge or local knowledge connecting to their environment. Mistry's definition of indigenous knowledge points out that it is context-specific, transferred orally or by demonstration, adjusted to the surroundings, built in communal norms, and is naturally implanted in people's lives (Mistry, 2009). Furthermore, recent studies show that indigenous land use practices contribute to the control of deforestation and carbon dioxide emission (Mistry and Berardi, 2016). Ford et al (2015) indicates that indigenous knowledge increases adaptive capacity when facing climate change in Arctic areas. Conservationists and state authorities had for a long time neglected the contribution of indigenous knowledge in respect of nature conservation. Local indigenous people living in or near protected areas were seen as destroyers of natural environment because they relied on local resources. The mainstream idea of separation of nature and people resulted in the resettlement within early fortress protected areas. With the understanding of social impacts in the local communities close to protected areas, and the function of locals in ecological system, local indigenous people and their environmental knowledge were gradually recognised. The role of indigenous people in conservation is closely associated with the evolution of protected areas of international conservation. The mainstreamed idea of indigenous populations in conservation has changed from destroyers to guardians of nature as the paradigm of protected areas changes. Before exploring indigenous groups in different types of protected areas, it is necessary to understand the idea of conservation in indigenous cultures.

For indigenous populations, there may not a conception of 'conservation' in their values. According to his experience, Alcorn (1993, p. 435) notes that this word can be interpreted as '*respecting Nature*,' '*taking care of things*,' or '*doing things right*.' It is seen

as 'part of making a living' by indigenous community (ibid, p. 435). In indigenous people's cultural practices, for example, there may be taboo systems such as forbidden species and holy zone embedded in hunting activities, which reduces the frequency and range of a hunting trip. The shared value and practices in indigenous culture is the empirical manifestation of nature conservation (e.g. Tai et al, 2011).

### **2.5.1 Indigenous people from early fortress parks to community conservation**

When people-free protected areas such as parks are employed by conservation authorities, indigenous/ forest/ local people are usually excluded from accessing resources within protected areas. Furthermore, some locals are forcefully displaced due to the thinking of the separation between people and nature. There have been works documenting the conflicts between PAs and indigenous/local people around the world (e.g. Neuman's work in Africa (1998); Poirier and Ostergren's work in Australia, Russia and US (2002); Smarden and Faust's work in Mexico (2006); Nicholas' work in Malaysia (2005)). These clashes with PA management seem to show that indigenous people are the destroyers of natural environment. However, the debates of environmental injustice and other political-economic forces behind these clarify the roots of environmental degradation. Indigenous people are a vital part of ecological system. Local interests and sustainable use are adopted to form participatory conservation or co-management arrangements in the fortress PAs.

Conflicts and local costs have ensured the failure of exclusionary PAs. Coordination with local indigenous people is a new approach to conservation. Local/traditional knowledge of indigenous populations is recognised as treasure to nature conservation and global environmental change. Indigenous participation in community conservation and other types of protected areas potentially reach both objectives of conservation and local development.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

This chapter employs the lens of political ecology to examine the interaction between state agencies and local people in PAs. By employing notions of human territoriality, access, social impact and resistance, a critical view is established to indicate that the state's territorial acts through the establishment of PAs and conservation policy implementation usually restricts the locals' access to natural resources. Such a restraint

affects the locals' livelihood selections, traditional practices and causes other social impacts on the local communities. The local residents may take implicit and explicit resistance as responses to the state's acts of territoriality. Adopting the perspective of political ecology in this thesis implies that I stress to deliberately examine the nature of conservation policy and the influence of policy implementation on the local community regarding environmental topics. Literature review of political ecology also offers the insight that historical tracking of political process and socioeconomic context are critical to current environmental conflicts. Moreover, the review of the paradigm shifts of international conservation implies that social impacts from conservation on locals were commonly recognised. These recognised impacts contributed to the new paradigm, community-based conservation. Simultaneously, the local indigenous populations were gradually seen as important actors in nature conservation. However, is the idea of participatory community conservation a win-win strategy which avoids the hegemony problems in the fortress parks and integrates both objectives of conservation and development? The existing studies indicate that the success of community conservation is affected by various variables. This study takes two indigenous examples in a park and a community conservation initiative respectively to examine this framework of political ecology in practice. Before testing the framework, the next chapter outlines of how I carried out this PhD project in field work and how I analysed the empirical data.



## **CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY**

### **3.1 Introduction**

Chapter two analysed the critical views of political ecology in order to construct the theoretical framework for this research, combining theories of human territoriality, resistance and social impacts regarding PAs. I argue that the territorial acts of the state that create PAs and implement conservation policies could have a social impact, which stimulates the resistance of the locals. This contention is explored through the analysis of two Truku examples in eastern Taiwan. Three research questions concerning the acts of state agencies and the local Truku, and social effects on the local Truku communities are investigated in Hualien of East Taiwan.

In this chapter there are three sections outlining the methodology of this project. I firstly set out the two main approaches to data collection and why I employed them to conduct this study (sections 3.2 and 3.3). Two Truku villages are briefly introduced here to strengthen the approach choice. Secondly, I introduce the adopted methods and how I applied these to this study, focusing on the interview sampling and my positionality in the field work (sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6). Finally, I am concerned with ethical issues and how I analysed the data (sections 3.7 and 3.8).

### **3.2 Qualitative approach rather than quantitative approach**

I employed a qualitative approach because of the nature of this research, which is to understand the relationship and interactions between state agencies and the local indigenous groups in PAs. The relationship and interactions are closely associated with traditional practices of natural resource management of neighbouring indigenous people in PAs. Their practices in PAs are seen as illegal acts in light of the modern conservation regulations of the Han Chinese government. The justification of a qualitative approach relies on the search of the contexts of PA creation, policy implementations and local people's perceptions of conservation policy implementations in PAs. Therefore, descriptive data is more appropriate for the analysis of the social relationships in which this research is interested. Below I present three detailed considerations about the reasons behind employing a qualitative research approach and methods.

The first consideration is the controversial nature of the issues related to this study. The core of this controversy should be clarified through interpretive-descriptive research. The aim of this study on specific relationship and interactions between the two primary actors in PAs are connected to some controversial issues such as contemporary indigenous hunting practices in the national park, power relations between the two sides, and social impacts resulting from the policy of PAs. These issues are of importance since they greatly shape these interactions in PAs. However, exploring these issues required sufficient data to find the core of the controversial issues. Further, the interactions between the two actors need to be interpreted carefully/ in detail. Qualitative methods are appropriate tools for the collection of rich descriptive data, especially when the core of controversies are unclear. Accordingly, I had to collect abundant descriptive data to understand the core of relevant disputes connecting to this topic. Qualitative methods were appropriate for this study.

The second reason for employing qualitative approach in this research, is that this topic needs the participation of key persons rather than random respondents. As Flick (2008) notes, qualitative research emphasises the understanding of processes of social phenomena. In this research aiming to look at specific interactions, so the staff dealing with matters about the local indigenous residents in PA authorities are supposed to offer much more information than an engineering technician. An example of the latter would be the ability of an old permanent indigenous resident who could tell more stories than a young person with higher education working in another city. Key persons' data is more important than others' ideas for this research, since they are aware of what constitutes the real interactions between two parts analysed in this thesis. Through interviewing key persons, in addition to participant observation, the picture of the specific relationship in the context of PAs was captured. The employment of these qualitative methods for data collection helped to reveal rich meanings and unheard voices. The topic of this research is relevant to the everyday life of local people in/neighbouring PAs, however, only a few key persons are familiar with the specific inter-communications between the governmental authorities and the locals. The dialogues with these key persons enhance the knowledge of the social dimension of conservation via the use of qualitative methods. Therefore, this study requires the detailed representations of key persons rather than the summarised characterisation of all people in PAs.

Thirdly, some representative events and institutions are of value for this research topic, such as the significant experiences and governmental schemes that potentially affect



the relationship between the two sides. The data collection of these events and institutions is explorative, which requires qualitative methods rather than a quantitative survey. The participation schemes for the local population in parks was investigated using methods such as document analysis and interviews. These interactions between the state agencies and the local indigenous residents revealed their awareness and attitude; the implications of these incidents and institutions can be developed and enhanced from the deeply descriptive materials of qualitative methods. Moreover, the perception of indigenous residents about policies of PAs is more appropriately interpreted via interactive experiences rather than the pre-set categories used frequently in quantitative questionnaires. For instance, telling personal experiences about protesting in PAs by the local inhabitants reveals stronger negative perceptions and is more meaningful than ticking the selection box of 'very bad' within a questionnaire. It is here that qualitative methods are appropriate for researchers when exploring a new topic or there is very limited information about a topic. Qualitative methods are useful collecting materials regarding specific events and institutions for further interpretations (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008).

Fourth, qualitative researchers prefer to study inquiries in the natural settings rather than through artificial experiment (Hammersley 1992, Silverman 2011), especially what and how the natural occurrences impact a phenomenon. My research explores the actual interactions between the state and the local indigenous people in two types of PAs. Furthermore, I analyse the effect of these interactions and the implications. These happen in a natural setting rather than an experiment where the experimenter can control certain elements.

Conducting field study in natural settings for naturally-occurring data confirmed the preference of qualitative approach since it did not indicate that the data is 'out there' objectively because the topic aimed to examine the interactive experiences perceived and interpreted by people. Moreover, it neither connotes that events in the field site can be observed or collected objectively by qualitative researchers because researchers' involvement of studying and interpreting is subjective itself (Stake, 1995). As a researcher, I should reflect my position when explaining and interpreting data so that a reader may understand the degree to which I influence the data and contexts. Here I stress the natural occurrences gathered by a qualitative researcher are totally different from the responses in an experiment that tries to keep several variables under control.

Finally, doing research in the field sites indicates that the researcher is approaching those social actors along with their points of view in the social world by adopting in-depth methods such as interviews and observations. The 'insider' position which qualitative investigators take is appropriate to examine directly specific issues in a particular case in a dynamic world (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). In this research, I not only observe events happening in the two indigenous villages in order to catch their value in everyday life but also interview locals to explore their views. The face-to-face data collection in this study means that adopting a qualitative approach is appropriate.

### **3.3 Applying case study**

Stake (1995) categorises qualitative case study research into three types: intrinsic, instrumental and collective. I use case studies in order to understand social relationships and phenomena, namely, the relationship between the state authorities and the local indigenous people in PAs, as well as the social impact of PA policy on the local communities. Case studies are employed to get insights into the research objectives as an instrumental consideration. The reasons behind the selection of the Truku group as a case study and two villages as field sites, are based on their uniqueness and on three concerns which are outlined in the following sections.

#### **3.3.1 Why select the Truku group as my case?**

I argue that the selection of the Truku group as case study is appropriate for this research based on three foundations. These include that firstly the Truku people are a proactive group regarding politics (Tsai and Simon, 2011); secondly that the Truku community has had a rich experience in contact with dominant political regimes for over one hundred years; and thirdly, the traditional territory of Truku people is mostly included in the boundary of PAs. These unique features make the relationship between the local Truku people and state agencies in PAs particularly suitable for investigation.

In relation to Truku's proactive role in politics, they have actively engaged in the Name Rectification Campaign and the autonomy movement of indigenous people in Taiwan since 1996 (Wang, 2008). The Campaign aimed to claim that they were an independent tribe rather than a sub-tribe of the Atayal tribe. Wang (2008) notes that at the beginning of the campaign there were a series of conferences held by several local organisations and the Presbyterian Church arguing that it was necessary for the Truku

community to have a new name different from the Atayal group. In order for the construction of their cultural connotation and a new group name, these elite activists in the organisations justified their nature as a different community. In addition to differences of some objective conditions such as language and custom, Truku leaders claimed that subjective elements of their identity, such as the dignity to be a group was also significant. Activists of this Campaign took advantage of the political opportunity in the election of the Hualien County Head in 2003. They successfully gained the support of these candidates of county head. These candidates recognised the Truku as a new group. One of the Truku activists thought that this Campaign actively connected to politics and make use of politics (ibid). In 2004, the central government ratified that the Truku were an independent tribe among the indigenous peoples of Taiwan. The success of the Campaign was associated with the political stance of the government in power that Taiwan is a nation-state of ethnic diversity (Simon, 2007, Wang, 2008). The process of the Campaign indicates that the Truku community proactively promoted their ethnic identity among residents in order to claim they were an independent tribe. These activists also took advantage of political opportunities to highlight their claims. Through the efforts of collective action by the local Presbyterian churches, three Township Offices and a few local aboriginal organisations, Truku people were approved as a separate ethnic group and increased their political resource.

After the success of the Name Rectification Campaign to become an independent tribe recognised by the state, these leading activists started to draft a Truku autonomy statute and other actions for the establishment of an autonomous region. The similar pattern to the Campaign was used to promote Truku self-governing. In the village meetings, the activist team explained the financial matters of the Truku autonomous region. The promotion team intended to create the Region in 2006. Simon (2007) notes that the planning of an autonomous region actually attempted to establish a political nationality (Simon, 2007). The Conference of Truku Autonomy was held in 2005. The Truku autonomy draft was sent to the Legislature at a central level in 2010. The autonomy preparatory offices were created in two Truku Township Offices in 2011. Although an autonomous region has not yet been established, these actions have justified Truku people's willingness and determination to seek their autonomy, which is a project of national identity. Their proactive role in politics is appropriate for the debate of relationship between them and the Taiwanese state.

The second concern is that Truku people have experience in interactions with external political regimes since the colonial Japanese government included their region into their governance by violence. Truku people used to live on the highlands relying on swidden agriculture and hunting. They established their separate kingdom through many single-family based communities. Before Japanese rule, the Truku region was out of the reach of the governance of the Chinese Qing Empire. The Chinese regime saw Truku people as barbarians due to their unusual practice of head-hunting. In principle, the Chinese government restrained Han Chinese people's contact with indigenous people. The sporadic trades between Chinese and Truku people primarily depended on interpreters. Some fortifications such as the 'Barrier Defence Lines' in the hills were created in order to reduce the disturbance of indigenous people and protect Chinese residents. The Qing government did not extend its governance to the Truku region. The Japanese colonial government gained Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese War. Indigenous regions were regarded as a 'special administration region'. The Japanese Authorities conquered Truku people by violence in 1914 and governed them via the police system. The police managed everyday life of Truku community such as education and industry transactions in order to control these 'savages'. Relocation policy was used in the Truku region for the convenience of police governance. At the latter Japanese period, the assimilation policy was implemented in the indigenous regions. During the colonial period of 50 years, the Japanese government adopted violence to govern the Truku people. Truku community experienced the comprehensive domination of the external regime.

Taiwan was returned to the Chinese KMT government after World War Two. The KMT government later established the central government in Taiwan when the regime lost the civil war. Because of the application of martial law in Taiwan after 1949, the KMT government ruled Taiwan in a dictatorial way. In general, the KMT regime continued the policy legacy about indigenous people during the Japanese colonial period such as reserved land for indigenous people and ethnic categories. The central government created Taroko National Park on the traditional domain of Truku people in 1986 and the National Park Law was implemented on the Truku region. The martial law of Taiwan was lifted in 1987. The Additional Articles of Constitution in 1992 reveal the principle of cultural pluralism in Taiwan and establish the status of indigenous people as well as their political participation. The Council of Indigenous Peoples was established in the central government to make policy of indigenous peoples, to safeguard the interest of indigenous people, and to deal with the affairs of indigenous people. The Truku tribe was recognised

by the central government in 2004 when the DPP government was in power. The Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples was passed in 2005 in order to ensure the sustenance and development of indigenous peoples. The environment of political participation had improved when Truku people sought their self-governance by political actions as mentioned earlier. The Truku group has had rich experience of contact with these external regimes for over one hundred years ago so were an appropriate case for the exploration of interactions with the state agencies.

The third consideration of seeing the Truku tribe as a case study is because part of their traditional domain had been demarcated in the Taroko National Park and national forest where conservation legislation is implemented. The KMT authoritarian regime continued the Japanese policy of nationalisation of forests while the reserved lands for indigenous people were reduced. National Park Law was developed in the 1970s and the central government has established parks since the 1980s. Taroko National Park Authorities bought some lands of Truku people and it was built on the nationalised forest area. The Park was actually still utilised by the local Truku residents. The local Truku inhabitants never took part in the decision-making process of the establishment of the Park and the conservation regulations. However, these local people have their access to forest lands restrained by the Park Headquarters, the Law and the Park Police, which is unjust. The nationalisation of forests during the colonial period aimed to ease the exploitation of natural resources, which ignored the lifestyle of indigenous people. Following the policy legacy indicates that the unfairness continues. In the Truku region, the spacious traditional domains are nationalised and their traditional practices such as hunting are suppressed by the conservation legislation and state agencies. Therefore, the Truku case is appropriately employed to probe the interactions between the locals and the governmental agencies.

### **3.3.2 Why the two Truku villages as field sites**

Siou-lin Township is where most Truku people live in modern administrative regions. I have selected two Truku villages: F Village and T Village in this township, Hualien County as my field sites<sup>5</sup> to explore the relationship with interactions between Truku people and the state agencies in PAs because of the following two reasons.

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<sup>5</sup> Two villages were anonymised. The information of two field sites shown here was only limited so people should not recognise them. Figure 3.1 just indicates the location of east Taiwan.

First, the majority of areas of the two villages are within the territory of PAs. The majority areas of F village are in the boundary of the Park (see the location of the Park in Figure 3.1). There are great amounts of distribution of forests in the two villages. The forestry area in T village is national forest which is managed by the Forestry Bureau. In F village, the Park Authorities, Park Police and conservation regulations affect the everyday life of local Truku residents. Meanwhile, the Forestry Agencies, the Conservation Police and conservation regulations shape the Truku life in T village. This village was an officially recognised case of community conservation in Hualien County. The national parks are regarded as the typical PAs with ‘fortress’ restraints while community conservation is seen as an alternative approach to replace the conventional PAs. In this regard, the two villages respectively represent two types of PAs. Natural resource management, for example, may be differently interpreted by local indigenous residents and state authorities of PAs. The two villages are appropriate as case studies because they are located in two kinds of PAs. Interactions between the local Truku and two state authorities may vary.

The second consideration to justify the appropriateness of the two Truku villages as case studies is that some traditional practices such as hunting and trapping exist in the two villages. On the one hand, these ‘illegal’ behaviours of hunting in PAs are seen as a touchstone to explore how conservation regulations have been implemented in PAs. It is associated with policy implementation by state agencies. On the other hand, hunting practices are a vital custom for the Truku. Hunting represents the bravery of Truku men. Hunting game plays an important role in the Truku social life. Tai et al (2011) note that the contemporary Truku people are still active in hunting. Truku huntsmen usually take advantage of existing roads to access mountains for hunting. In the two field sites, there are not only extensive forest areas but the current roads along with streams uphill to high mountainous areas, which are convenient for hunting activities. Hunting practices by the local Truku huntsmen are based on culture, sustenance and livelihood (Tai, Jhuang and Lin, 2011), which explains the attitude of the Truku towards conservation implementations in PAs as well as providing clues as to social costs due to conservation implementations in PAs. In this regard, hunting is related with the everyday life and values of the Truku. Therefore, hunting practices in the two villages are closely connected to this study exploring the interactions and relationship between the state and the local Truku people in PAs.

I argue that selecting the two Truku sites are appropriate because of their geographical positions in PAs and the frequent traditional practices there. These

potentially offer the information of conservation policy implementation by state agencies as well as of local people's attitudes towards conservation and the Truku values.



Figure 3.1 The map of east Taiwan

### 3.4 Document collection

The purpose of gathering documents in this research is to comprehend contemporary indigenous hunting practices, and the relationship between indigenous people and the government. According to Hodder (2003), records are official whilst documents are more personal and less formal, thus, documents need to be interpreted contextually. Records usually refer to official power and access may be hampered by regulations because of confidentiality and anonymity. However, thanks to 'The Freedom of Government Information Law' in Taiwan, I could collect certain records relevant to the topic via online database of website of public sectors.

First, I assembled regulations are associated with indigenous hunting because it relates to wildlife conservation in PAs, livelihood selections of indigenous development, and cultural practices of indigenous people. This controversial issue in PAs potentially shows the practical interactions between state agencies and local indigenous residents. These regulations to some degree reveal the acts of conservation policy implementation. The Ministry of Justice provides a law and regulation database for the public to search and study. I searched 16 regulations related to this topic (see Table 3.1). Besides primary laws, I also collected sub-laws often regarded as enforcement rules for law-executors such as the police. Histories of these regulations and their processes of amendment allowed me to grasp the attitudes of the government and the mainstream society. The information was downloaded from the legal system of legislature.



Category	Primary Regulation	Sub-laws
Wildlife Conservation	The Wildlife Conservation Act	Enforcement Rules of the Wildlife Conservation Act
		The Incentive Rules of Banning or Exposing Violation Cases of Wildlife Conservation Act
		The Wildlife Management Rules of Indigenous People for Traditional Culture and Ritual Needs
	The Forestry Act	The Enforcement Rules for the Forestry Act
		Forestry Protection Rules
		Regulations Governing Management, Operation And Coordination of Forests Located within National Parks Or Designated Scenic Areas
	The National Park Law	The Enforcement Rules for National Park Law
	The Working Rules of Taroko National Park Administration	
	Organisational Rules of National Park Police, National Police Agency, Ministry of the Interior	
Indigenous Development	The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law	
		Regulations on Development and Management of the Lands Reserved for Indigenous People
		Regulations on Development and Management of the Lands Reserved for Indigenous People
Indigenous Culture	Protection Act for the traditional intellectual creations of indigenous peoples	

Table 3.1 The regulations relating to indigenous hunting in Taiwan

The second section of document collection relied on documents gathered in the two field sites. These contained a development project plan in T Village. In the park case, I collected the Taroko National Plan with its reviews, some projects supported by the park, and meeting records on participation schemes of the Taroko National Park Administration. The development project of the scenic area in village T was supported by the county government but rejected by many villagers. Reviewing the project and comparing with interviews can help understanding of the locals' collective action of resistance. I also collected the documents of their demands and news related to their protests. The information allowed me to analyse the political interactions between the local government and the Truku residents in T village. In addition, the park plan and its three reviews offered the official views of the local Truku community at different times. The meeting records of the Taroko National Park provided this study with the opportunity to look at the views of strict protected area administration on co-management of natural resources. The evolution of different participation schemes established by various directors revealed interactions between the national protected area and local indigenous residents. All the documents with their meanings facilitated the analytical development of this study.

Third, in order to understand the legal processing of infringing regulations relating to wildlife conservation, I gathered the verdicts of violations of Wildlife Conservation Act and National Park Law in Hualien District Court. I took advantage of the Law and Regulations Retrieving System belonging to The Judicial Yuan. The verdicts of district courts collected in the system start from 2000 and are updated daily. I downloaded 155 adjudications relating to Wildlife Conservation Act and National Park Law in Hualien District Court during the period of 13 years (January 2000 to March 2013). Analysis of this section was triangulated with the perceptions of the state towards violators of conservation regulations, especially those indigenous violators. Also the judgment is the final and most important stage of enforcing the regulations because the majority of these indigenous violators do not appeal the decision.

Document collection was significant because I did not attend certain acts of the state and events in the field sites. Through analysing the written and video documents I found out the political processes and views of actors. The analysis of documents helps produce a more holistic perspective.

### 3.5 Participant observation

Observing as part of fieldwork implies that the researcher becomes a tool to receive various messages via all senses (Neuman 2006). This is the foundational constitution of my field research; besides observing the everyday life in the two indigenous villages in order to catch the indigenous views, I attended several specific events (see Table 3.2) to understand their modern cultural phenomena and attitude of collective actions. This method was often carried out together with informal short conversations to comprehend the views of indigenous people. After observations, I took field notes and recorded reflections that were used during the analysis.

I had the opportunity to conduct participant observation during the fieldwork period, primarily due to invitations from indigenous informants. Before the observations, I established relationships with those informants attending events that allowed me to be familiar with the contemporary indigenous society within the Truku community. I played a dual role, from being a complete participant to a total observer (Gold, 1958). At times, I approached the former whilst sometimes was close to the latter depending upon different occasions. That is, my role on undertaking observations was like the participant-as-observer and observer-as-participant (Gold, 1958). I attended the majority of these events just like other attendees, thus my attendance as a researcher should not have altered the behaviour of other attendees and their activities.

<b>Episode observed</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Access source</b>	<b>Entry objective</b>
Sunday services and Christmas celebrations	Presbyterian churches in F Village	Visit the pastors voluntarily	1.to explore the influence of Christianity on Truku community 2.to establish trust relationship with indigenous Christian hunters
Ritual performance of witch doctor	A workshop in F Village	Invitation of one informant	To observe the modern practice of traditional faith
Wedding banquet (open-bar type)	Activity centre in F Village	Invitation of one informant	To observe modern wedding in indigenous village
Meeting for removal of chairman of tribal meeting	Activity centre in T Village	Inform of one informant	1. to observe the degree of collective action of villagers 2. to observe how conflicts to be solved
Coordination meeting of one development planning	Activity centre in T Village	Inform of some informants	1. to observe the degree of collective action of villagers 2. to observe how conflicts to be solved
Informal lunch discussion of indigenous officials working in CIP	A tea shop near CIP in Taipei	Invitation of one official in CIP	To explore the views of urban indigenous officials on indigenous issues

*Table 3.2 The specific incidents the author observed on fieldwork*

### **3.6 Conduct of In-depth interviews**

An interview is the interaction between interviewer and informant(s) by dialogue and the interactive process yields significance of knowledge (Mishler 1986, Neuman 2006).

#### **3.6.1 The joint process of qualitative interview**

In this study, it became evident that interviews were the processes of interviewer and respondent jointly constructing meanings on specific issues (Mishler 1986). There were two layers to establish this idea in this study.

First, I used semi-structured interviews so I could cover my concerns while simultaneously covering interviewees' own interests. The primary reason why I adopted

this method is that I wanted to capture not only my respondents' views in relation to my topic at various levels, but also the complexity behind their interactions and considerations behind their actions in order to establish the meanings of protected area policy implementation in indigenous regions of Taiwan. Therefore, I prepared open-ended questions that covered the acts of governmental authorities and local indigenous people and social impacts on local communities in advance. I also expected that my informants might talk about other issues while I conducted interviews. These might show their concerns in their everyday life or others.

Different inquiries from various informants were addressed. For example, when interviewing officials who undertook wildlife conservation policies in local governmental agencies, I asked questions about the implementation of conservation affairs that may pose stress on indigenous hunters and the conflicts between conservation regulations and the hunting culture of indigenous people. Their responses sometimes stretched into reserved land policy of indigenous people and forestry management in addition to enforcing wildlife conservation regulations. Based on their responses, I then intervened with new follow-up questions searching for deeper meanings and influences of other policies. The dialogue process was always interactive allowing both sides to propose their interests. This is the first layer of my argument that interviews are jointly constructed by interviewer and respondents.

The second layer lies in what Mishler (1986) emphasized as the interactive understanding of questions and responses during interview process. Through continuous conversation of explaining questions and answers, the interviewer and the informant may achieve their agreement forming the meanings of the interview. In my case, while interviewing Truku people about their informal norm system, *Gaya*, in modern society, I discovered that this term indicates different meanings for different Truku interviewees. Some Truku people, for example, expressed the *Gaya* as prohibitions, and told me what people cannot do. For others, the *Gaya* referred to the teachings of ancestors, so modern people can see it as traditional legacies. These suggest that when using this Truku term (*Gaya*) in interviews, I had to make sure how they interpreted it and proposed several follow-up inquiries to understand their responses. Therefore, the meanings of our dialogue were created via repeated questions and explanations in a joint manner.

Qualitative interviews played an important role in my research since I explored the interactions between two main actors and the social impacts on the local communities via

this method. This topic stressed the political process of interactions between two primary stakeholders and the effects of the process. Different informants in governmental agencies and Truku villagers were interviewed to gain a picture of interactions between the state agencies and local Truku people in Taroko Park and the community conservation example.

During my fieldwork period, interviews were conducted in three stages. First, I visited officials and implementers of wildlife conservation and indigenous land policy within the local government - Hualien County Government - in order to comprehend the outline of implementation of conservation and development policies at county level. Later, I focused on the two Truku villages to interview Truku leaders, some hunters and residents to capture the relationship and conflicts between local Truku inhabitants and diverse governments in a broad sense. Their personal experience of hunting practices, the values of the Truku community, perceptions of diverse conservation institutions, and actions taken were what I explored at this stage. Finally, after collecting many views from local indigenous people, I brought these ideas to interview officials in central and local government in order to look for practical solutions.

Each interview experience was unique, due to different interviewees participating, issues discussed, place, and time. I usually conducted interviews after meeting several times or after several communications in advance to build rapport and trust, which are factors that increase validity to qualitative research (Arksey and Knight 1999). Introducing myself as a research student in the United Kingdom was the first step while visiting interviewees, and then I informed them of the purpose of my research project including basic information such as topic, aim, objectives, and advantages with disadvantages to invite their participation. I also stressed my ethical approach to using their names, which will be confidential to others and anonymous while writing. Gaining consent for joining this study and audiotaping were necessary before interviews. I obtained a total of 34 consent forms of three broad categories: public sector, indigenous elite, and indigenous hunter. Interviews were always undertaken in the participants' offices and houses for convenience and security, and so they could feel easy and express their thoughts freely (Arksey and Knight 1999). As for those policemen who were afraid that their views might be described as official opinion, I tried to have conversations in their office to explore their attitude toward indigenous hunting and personal experience of enforcing conservation regulations without recording the conversations. After these conversations, I reflected and took notes for analysis. I did not record informal interviews, conversations, and telephone

conversation because of inconvenience, but I usually adopted field notes to fill in the missing details.

### **3.6.2 Key Informant Interview**

I have listed my interviewees in a table as Appendix 1, which categorizes interviewees into three types, including people in the governmental agencies on multiple levels, indigenous elites at local level and indigenous hunters in both villages, who were key informants of this study. Since I wanted to explore the territoriality of the state, resistance of Truku residents and indigenous development in park and community conservation contexts, it was evident that firstly wildlife conservation policies and indigenous development policies in the two examples needed to be examined. A good method for achieving the latter was to talk to policy-makers and implementers who may offer considerations taken into account by them and some difficulties while implementing these policies. Therefore, I interviewed officials in the government at multiple levels and police officers in different stations. Secondly, indigenous leaders and elders in the local villages may provide their views of these policies and interactions between the public sector and locals and their values. Besides, indigenous hunters and residents can share their experience, perceptions of conservation institutions and the actions they took to respond to these conservation implementations.

Here I attempt to justify the interview classifications in detail, for interviews greatly contributed to this study regarding methodology and research findings. The first group was those public servants working in governmental agencies. They were responsible for the affairs associated with nature conservation and indigenous people in public sector. Their statements to some degree should express the position of the government, and the attitude toward their tasks. Therefore, I considered their narratives as the basis of acts of governmental agencies. Interviewees of this sort were usually Han Chinese officials except a few in the Council of Indigenous Peoples of the Executive Yuan, county government, and the indigenous township office. I explored the decision making of policies, policy implementations, communicating schemes with local people, and attitudes toward cultural practices of indigenous groups in protected areas in light of the research questions. These officials were the persons in charge of conservation matters, indigenous matters in the central and local governmental agencies.

In the field work, I interviewed officials in the Council of Indigenous Peoples of the Executive Yuan, Taroko National Park Headquarters of the Interior Ministry, Agricultural

Department and Indigenous Peoples Department of Hualien Government, and Agricultural Tourism Section and Indigenous Administration Section of Siou-Lin Township Office. An official of the Forestry Bureau changed his mind when I arrived at his office, so we just had short conversation. After the talk, he concluded that I did not really understand indigenous people because his impression of indigenous groups was different from what he was hearing from me<sup>6</sup>. I also rang another official in the branch of the Forestry Bureau, she just expressed her respect for the traditional practices such as hunting activities of indigenous community. For those in the Council of Indigenous Peoples, the questions focused on the policy decision-making process, and the negotiations with other departments in terms of policies about indigenous peoples. The interview questions for those in the county government were the practical challenges on their tasks such as hunting applications and the autonomy of indigenous peoples. As for those working in the township office, the interviews paid attention to the actual projects in the two field sites and the difficulties they faced in their jobs.

The second group of interviewees contained a clerk of the higher court and the police who were responsible for law enforcement and other conservation services. There were at least three different parts of the police system associated with this study: national park police, forestry conservation police and local administrative police. They were wary of conducting 'formal interviews' but wanted to take advantage of 'informal conversations' to explain their views of law enforcement. Basically, these informants performed their tasks according to the legislation. I interviewed and discussed with them more informally in order to investigate their attitudes to indigenous people's using of natural resources in protected areas and to the implementation of conservation policy, and their viewpoints of nature conservation legislation as well as indigenous rights. The policemen's views were important for indigenous practices of natural resource management in protected areas because they might contact indigenous 'poachers' face-to-face. A clerk's views to some degree indicated the position of judicial staff in the court system.

In practice, the district court responded to me on the phone that I had to offer an official document for interview, so that the staff could accept or reject the interview. I did

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*<sup>6</sup>His past work experience at the county level and his colleagues in indigenous regions showed that indigenous people have been included in the market focusing on economic interest only rather than keeping traditional conservation values in cultural practices as I told him. In his opinion, contemporary indigenous hunting, for example, had been a selection for making a living. Indigenous hunters didn't obey traditional rules nor share the game with family members. Yet what I experienced in some indigenous villages was different from his views.*



not belong to any official agency, so I could not issue an official document. It seemed to be difficult for me to interview the staff of the court system. Yet in the second field work period in 2014, I happened to contact a friend working as a clerk in the higher court and he promised to be interviewed in his apartment. The interview centred on the new 'courts for indigenous people' and the legislation regarding indigenous groups, in particular those associated with natural resource management by indigenous community. Concerning the conversations with the police, the questions focused on their law enforcement and their attitude toward indigenous practices. These policemen included the park police, conservation police and administrative police in the two Truku villages. Half of these policemen were indigenous, and their attitude toward practices of Truku residents was more tolerant despite their own observations that indigenous policemen tended to arrest indigenous hunters. Han Chinese policemen preferred to express their respect towards indigenous ways of resource governance on misdemeanours such as picking fuel woods, but regarded hunting activities as a serious crime. Conservation police told me that they could change the shifts if they were going to work in their hometown. The administrative policemen usually ignored the 'illegal hunting' of Truku hunters because they frequently contacted the locals and cooperated with local vigilantes. However, if they got a report of poaching, they had to take actions. In principle, reverence was used in the police system and the conservation law enforcement was tolerant nowadays.

The third group of interviewees was the local Truku people living in or neighbouring protected areas. They were main actors in this study. Their opinions of conservation policies and conservation implementations showed part of the social and political interactions in protected areas. These interactions examined whether biodiversity conservation and social justice could be combined. I interviewed three groups of Truku people including Christian leaders and elders, local leaders, and residents and hunters. Christian leaders and elders were selected because some were greatly involved in the Truku language dictionary and the interpretations of Truku traditions in many rituals. Those local leaders I interviewed were opinion leaders in the local communities and they did participate in local affairs. The local residents might offer different views of local affairs from the leaders on the same thing. Their opinions might convey the voice of some residents. Truku hunters to some degree were the practitioners of Truku customs, and their practices were controversial in terms of nature conservation.

In the field work, I interviewed Truku pastors and elders on questions of Truku ways of resource governance, differences between Truku practices and conservation of

protected areas, and attitudes toward conservation institutions such as parks and the police system. I also asked them about socioeconomic changes in the communities coming from conservation interventions. The interview questions for the local leaders focused on the actual interactions with governmental agencies such as conservation policy implementations and the protesting response of local people, especially the authorities of protected areas. These leaders revealed their perceptions of different conservation institutions and the social effects of conservation policy. The Truku hunters and residents were interviewed about their hunting knowledge and its customary values, and their perceptions of conservation institutions and conservation implementation.

This study aims to critically examine the interactions between governmental authorities and the local indigenous people in protected areas. By interviews or dialogues with governmental officials, police officers, a clerk in the higher court, indigenous leaders, hunters and residents as the primary part of data collection, the acts of governmental agencies, responses of indigenous people, and social effects in the local communities were explored. I selected these informants because they were the nature and indigenous case officers in the public sector, law enforcement officers, indigenous opinion leaders, indigenous resource users, and local people affected by conservation implementations. They represented important parts of the political system as described in section 2.2 (drawing on Easton,1957). Together the three groups allowed me to understand elements of decision-making, but particularly decision implementation and its effects in terms of feedback from indigenous groups that were important in reshaping the political system.

### **3.7 Ethical issues in fieldwork**

Moral dilemmas were often confronted whilst doing this study not only because of the controversial nature of indigenous hunting issues in Taiwan, but also because of the cross-cultural nature of this research project. Ethical decisions within this study were particularly important, which led me to prepare in advance information sheets about this research and consent forms, which aimed to provide sufficient information to my potential informants and gain their consent to join this research. During the fieldwork period, I provided consent forms and information sheets to my respondents in different situations hoping that it would minimize negative impact. The following paragraphs are what I took into consideration about ethical issues of this project.

### 3.7.1 Concerns while conducting cross-cultural study

Researchers are often faced with both power and control issues when carrying out cross-cultural projects, especially among those who are minority or marginalised groups (Marshall and Batten 2004). These people have been regarded as lacking power in mainstream society. In this study, I collected data among one of fourteen officially recognised indigenous groups in Taiwan as a doctoral student, which seemed to indicate I have power over these indigenous people. However, the imbalanced relationship in power may improve if the researcher adopts a way to join the community instead of interloping within the group as a professional (Crigger et al. 2001; Marshall and Batten 2004). During fieldwork, I sometimes joined the local church to attend services like local residents and told the congregation that I was a graduate student. The relationship with Truku villagers in church services helped me to get closer to potential informants and obtain their trust.

Control problems involve the dominance of researcher and the cross-cultural study can empower the researched community by valuing different social systems (Hudson et al. 2001; Marshall and Batten 2004). These relate to research design of this indigenous study. I used a qualitative approach to conduct the study, which meant that I chose to interact more deeply with participants to undertake the field study rather than the superficial relationship between questioner and respondent on questionnaire survey. I established trust relationships first by visits and explaining my study concerns and ethical issues. Then I explored the views of the indigenous community on hunting issues and the relationship with the Park authorities or the government. Qualitative approaches offer opportunities for cooperative and participatory so participants can play an important role in the construction of the research project. The positive relationship with interviewees during the interview process allowed us to complete our dialogue together. In addition, this project is also concerned with the development of Truku people, so I should pay attention to their cultural practices, values and informal norms, *Gaya*, to reduce the control while doing field study. In practice, I visited Truku pastors in local villages to listen to their views of national policies and interpretations of contemporary Truku society with informal institutions. Certain wildlife governance practices of the indigenous community may be refined to benefit conservation policy. My role as a research student was an efficient tool for collecting sufficient data for further meaningful analysis rather than manipulating the study during fieldwork period.

The problems resulting from power and control issues highlight the significance of informed consent (Hammersley and Traianou 2012; Wiles et al. 2012). Providing sufficient and clear information could improve unpleasant experiences during field study. Therefore, I gained the approval of the committee of research ethics of the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at the University of Sheffield before commencing fieldwork. They suggested some considerations to improve the information sheet and ethics form of this project such as confidentiality of back up data and confidentiality of information sheet when conducting research in field sites. It was necessary to translate the documents into a Chinese version that my participants could read during the study. For indigenous interviewees, I added oral explanation of this project and then invited them to participate. Key themes I noted in the information sheets comprised:

1. The research aim, objectives that revealed my concerns.
2. The involvement of participants on interviews primarily.
3. The advantages and disadvantages of participating on this project.
4. That I ensured that anonymity of interviewees and confidentiality of data (includes backup data).
5. That participants could withdraw from the research without any reason at any stage.
6. My contact information during field study period and after.

All the information aimed to protect the respondents to minimise negative impacts or harm (Hammersley and Traianou 2012). It was easier for me to gain consent of potential informants through the communicative way of information sheet of research because the contents and my identity were clear. My informants did not play a passive role on the field study because they could get a primary picture of this project and possessed rights to join my study and withdraw at any stage. Due to the legal controversy of hunting activity, I had to keep my data confidential and I chose not to join any hunting trip during fieldwork period to avoid the risk of being captured by the police. Similar considerations were taken while interviewing the police system, including the local police, National Park Police and Forestry Conservation Police; I had to take notes rather than record the dialogue. Moreover, some of these policemen emphasised this was informal conversation in order

not to be identified in future litigations. I had to respect their concerns and carried on this project.

### **3.7.2 Reflection on my positionality in the fieldwork**

In qualitative research, the researcher is a measuring tool. S/he has to, for example, select interviewees, conduct interviews, and observe events in field sites for data collection. Thus, the researcher's positionality and reflections are significant for the establishment of research reliability and validity, to get genuine and analysable information about a topic. Moreover, a researcher's reflections of position may reveal the limitation of the research. Minimising the bias of limitation is necessary for a responsible study. In this regard, I need to clarify my positionality when I did field work in order to show how I attempted to improve the reliability and validity of this study. The role I played in the field work was associated with my personal religion, working experience, and being a Han Chinese.

I am a Christian and Christianity is a popular faith in the indigenous regions of Taiwan. Christianity in the Truku group can be traced to the Japanese period when a Truku woman converted to Christianity. She was seen as the first indigenous Christian in mountain areas of Taiwan, and she was trained to be a preacher to spread the Christian gospel among Truku villages. Within a few years, the majority of Truku people converted to Christianity. Chiu (2004) argues the Truku believed they were abandoned by the ancestry spirit because they were conquered by the Japanese and later under the Japanese rule. Unfortunately, they could not repair the relationship with the spirit by the ritual of 'head-hunting' due to the ban of the Japanese police. Christian God preached by the lady in the meantime seemed to be the hope for the Truku to resist the Japanese domination. Chiu notes that Christianity in the Truku communities actually mixes biblical views and the traditional faith of the Truku. Christian pastors, for example, have replaced traditional psychics to conduct necromancy after the conversion. In this way, Christian pastors have become the interpreters of traditional faith and contemporary Christianity. Wang (2008) and Chiu (2004) both consider the only officially recognised ceremony of the Truku, thanksgiving ceremony (Mgay Bari in Truku language), as the reinvention of some pastors because they interpreted this forgotten term, Mgay Bari, as 'God who weaves the universe' in order to take the place of ancestry spirit. Chiu (2004) believes the combination of traditional idea and Christianity by Christian pastors is normal because many Truku people are Christians. There is usually more than one church in a Truku village nowadays.

In T village, for example, there are three denominations of Christianity, and the villagers belong to these three groups in terms of religion faith. Very few Truku individuals believe in other faiths. These religion groups in T village usually become the basis for collective actions. Being a Christian allowed me to use similar faith values and terms to dialogue with indigenous believers in the field sites. Trust and good relationships were built due to these interactions in the Truku churches. Attending Sunday service is an optimal opportunity to enter their life. Pastors and elders in the churches are usually local leaders whom I could interview and consult. My religion facilitated me to get access to Truku people and their life. Trust relationships was built easier through these interactions in the local churches. However, my study was associated with the issue of traditional practices such as 'poaching' in the park or national forest. Sensitivity around discussing these issues still existed, in particular to a Han Chinese outsider like myself.

In the field work practice, although it was easy to access to pastors and other church members, I still had to build a trust relationship with them, especially when I discussed some sensitive issues such as poaching in PAs. I remember that when I interviewed a senior hunter in F village about his hunting practices with his son, his son suddenly appeared and refuted his practices. The senior told me his son had been arrested by the police the previous year. In T village, a relative of one Truku informant asked me why I focused on Truku 'poaching' when I interviewed a semi-professional hunter. Some church members in two cases once invited me to attend community events. Through these, I added more opportunities to observe and participate in tribal life, and contacted more villagers. Being a Christian, it was easier for me to get access to church members and experience tribal life through their eyes (participatory observation). A trusting relationship was then easier to build through introduction and further interactions. Therefore, they were willing to offer their genuine perceptions, reliable information and local knowledge. Yet talking about some controversial issues still require sufficient trust.

I worked as an employee in an agency of Hualien County Government for a few months in 2005. During this short period, I got to know a few staff of the Agriculture Department in charge of nature conservation there. It was convenient for me because the community conservation in the T village was under the local government (township office and county government). According to the Wildlife Conservation Acts, the county government is the responsible governmental authority at the county level. My earlier personal network in the Agriculture Department of county government was therefore useful. Working in the agency increased the opportunity of keeping into touch with some

residents in T village. The reputation of the governmental agency was good among Truku residents in T village, thus there should be no negative effect on how the Truku residents saw me when I did the fieldwork for this PhD study. My work later as a research assistant to conduct projects about indigenous people before studying within a PhD programme in the UK allowed me to get access to more Truku residents in Hualien. The research network established from this work experience in several Truku communities allowed greater possibilities of finding the key persons in the two local communities.

When I conducted this PhD study for data collection in the Hualien County Government, a woman staff of Agriculture Department still recognised me, and introduced me to an official accounting for nature conservation cases at the county level. She told the official that I was an ex-colleague and it was ok to tell me everything. Her words were important because she saw me as the insider who could be given information of 'business secrets' in administration. Her words reminded the nature conservation official that he could tell me the truth (reliable information). I used the official's statements of interviews to examine the conservation policy implementations in T village. I also compared the ideas between him and local Truku residents in terms of nature conservation. In the example of T village, I had known a few informants when I carried out research projects of indigenous studies. Some informants mentioned that a young man (young leader L) assisted organising tribal meetings in the community and could express fluent Chinese. They helped me contact the young man and he became the most important interviewees in the T village. This young leader was a church deacon. He lived in T village and once worked as a tour guide in the township office and a substitute teacher in a primary school. He was one of very few young people who still lived in the hometown. He was always the spokesman in many protesting actions not only because he spoke fluent Truku language and Chinese, but also because he understood the difficulties of village life and his honest personality. He once challenged the head of township office in a public meeting by asking questions about the administrative acts in the village by the township office. His frankness impressed many residents and some seniors invited him to help organise protesting actions and meetings. The interviews with him offered many important sections of community conservation case in this study. Working experiences allowed me to build the networks in the local government as well as in some Truku villages. These networks to some degree reduced the entry barrier in my fieldwork.

Being a Han Chinese studying an indigenous topic was sometimes a barrier in the field work because I look different from the majority of my indigenous interviewees. For

indigenous people in Taiwan, Han Chinese are the mainstream and powerful group. Historical experience confirms that Chinese and Japanese deceived indigenous groups in order to gain land ownership. Chinese and Japanese regimes had always dealt with indigenous peoples by adopting the assimilation policy. Some indigenous people thus take a defensive attitude to avoid not being manipulating or used by the mainstream Chinese, which is more evident among those officials working in the government. I had to take time to explain my studentship and research concerns when doing field work. I also showed my Christian faith to connect to those Truku residents. In the field work, an indigenous official in the county government mistrusted me in the first place because I was a Chinese. After a few times of sharing ideas about indigenous people with him, he changed his mind and invited me to his house to chat. I admitted that it did take time for me to get the trust of indigenous people, yet time improved it. Frequent contacts and sincerity were good strategies for those doing indigenous studies.

Overall, my personal networks based on religious faith and working experiences worked on the field studies. The networks primarily ensured that snowballing methods of gaining access to respondents worked, and removed the entry barrier of getting access to the key persons. Christianity further strengthened the trust relationship building before the interviews. Moreover, my Han Chinese identity indeed took me longer to get the trust of indigenous informants, especially those in the higher position. Frequent contacts and sincerity helped. These made sure I collected reliable data, and established the reliability and validity of this study.

### **3.7.3 Contribution of master study to this PhD study**

I did my master programme from 2002 to 2005. My master dissertation (Jhuang, 2005) explores the early evolution of an indigenous community conservation initiative between 1997 and 2005, containing the preparatory stage before conservation action (1997-2003), the conservation stage of carrying out the conservation project (2003-2005), and the trial operation stage of tourism industry (2005.01-2005.03). This example was the same case of T village in this study. The evolution contributes to this study by the acts of local government and local Truku residents, and social struggles in the village during the period (see section 6.2 and 6.3). I adopted qualitative and quantitative methods for data collection in 2004 and 2005. The questionnaire examined the residents' environmental awareness and attitudes toward community conservation project. Interviews and participant observation were employed to understand the integrated conservation with development



project in this indigenous village. The primary findings were that firstly, some social conflicts within the local village affected the collective conservation effort and undermined social capital; secondly, owning sufficient capital influenced the local participation in tourism operation; thirdly, the external private travel agencies and visitors dominated the tourism in trial operation. These findings also contribute to this study.

The first finding reminds me of the influence of political/social interactions, and the roots of these social clashes among groups in the village. It stresses the importance of social and political processes in the local community, which facilitated the composition of this research aim to critically examine the political interactions between the local people and state agencies. Moreover, these clashes within the local community were accelerated by the conservation interventions supported by the local government. An interviewee of my master dissertation viewed community conservation as a key to Pandora's Box. Many unpleasant disputes and competitions disturbed the calm lake-like lifestyle in the village. In this study, these growing conflicts possibly are seen as the negative social effects stemming from the conservation idea when I investigated the political process between state agencies and local people. Based on the data of master study, the conservation idea was inspired by the local governmental agency. In this regard, it is an external idea which was hard to fit into village life, and caused unfavourable effects. The second and third findings offered this study the basis of local participation issues in T village. Among the conflict problems in the village, the lack of local participation in conservation and development affairs was a common complaint. Some informants in my master's research were discontented with their marginalisation within community conservation matters because the government just contacted a few specific groups and leaders. For them, no participation in conservation matters indicated that tourism development in the coming future was irrelevant to them. Actually in a tourism trial operation in 2005, the local industry association could not take part in the operation due to financial problem. I also observed some conflicts between visitors and local businesses in 2005. I thus predicted in the dissertation that the tourism development might not contribute to local people as much as locals expected because of the capital intensity of the tourism industry and the market of Han Chinese. When I collected data for PhD study, this prediction was manifested in resistance against further planning of the scenic area (described further in Chapter 6). The tourism development was actually controlled by external travel agencies. Local participation in conservation and development was limited to very few leaders and residents. The incomplete participation in conservation resulted in more doubts and

misunderstandings between state agencies and local people and among groups of T village. The lack of participation in tourism development caused the unfair distribution of interest (e.g. income and feedback fund) and environmental costs (e.g. pollution and inconvenience). These practical problems gradually shaped the motive of resisting actions. I consider the lack of local participation as the state's territorial acts and the subsequent problems as negative social impacts on the local community in this study.

Overall, my master data in T village set up the foundation for PhD study to look at the complex social and political processes in terms of conservation enforcement. The empirical example was further developed, updated through further data collection, and expanded through the comparison with the other park-based conservation to make a more thoroughly evidenced argument. The Masters study therefore provided some prior knowledge of T village, and a set of lines of inquiry that were important in supporting both the fieldwork and the analysis within this PhD. The data discussed in the rest of the PhD are, except where indicated otherwise, drawn from the two periods of PhD fieldwork described here. Where interview material or documentary sources was collected through the Masters work, this has been indicated in the text by adding '[Masters Study]' to the referencing of the source. Similarly, where interpretation or findings are directly drawn from the Masters dissertation, this has been indicated by referencing the MA thesis as per other sources, '(Jhuang, 2005)'.

### **3.8 Data analysis**

Data analysis and data collection in fact were conducted simultaneously in this study as Merriam (2009) notes. I was not sure who might be interviewed, and which questions would be asked when doing the fieldwork. While an interview was done, I took notes to analyse the meanings of the interview in order to check the aim of this study and then looked for the next interviewee and thought about interview questions. These repetitive processes continued until the initial analysis was done. As I interviewed a Truku hunter in F village, for example, for his hunting practices and his attitude toward the Park, he told a story about his father's last words about the wish of maintaining the family hunting domain. I took note that this hunter still kept on his hunting practices in the Park. He justified his hunting practices by his father's last wish. The last words of a father were

seen as the Gaya norms in the Truku culture although the wish was a violation of modern conservation legislation. Thus he might think that he had the hunting right on his traditional domain despite the external institution. I highlighted 'hunting on traditional domain of the Park' and 'Truku Gaya' in one section of this interview. This was the first step of data analysis.

I then transcribed the interviews and compared these stressed terms and sentences of my notes. I did detailed coding on these transcriptions to understand the implications of each interview. From these codes and initial field notes, I built some categories. For instance, I found there were frequent hunting activities in the Park but the hunting scope was shrinking and the hunting pattern was changing according the interview codes and my notes of Truku hunters and residents in the F village. Moreover, these activities were based on the hunters' reserved lands and their traditional domains. Some hunters obtained the help of indigenous policemen when they conducted their hunting practices. The hunters avoided the confrontation with the police due to the help. I constructed some categories such as 'hunting practices in the Park', 'Truku values', 'deliberate avoidance' on these codes and notes. The repetitive analysis of building categories according to interview codes and notes was the second step of data analysis.

Some collected documents such as regulations and verdicts were regarded as transcriptions. Conservation regulations and verdicts regarding those against conservation laws were sorted as parts of state agencies acts. I initially coded the verdicts by the judgment and which articles of regulation were employed. The judgment included the category of the ethnic group of criminals, the penalty, and the reasons of decision-making. These categories constituted the trends of court judgement regarding the violation of nature conservation legislation, especially indigenous criminals. These were later used to compare with interview data for the further debate of the interactions between state agencies and local indigenous people in PAs.

When constructing numerous categories, I sorting these categories by the three research questions in this study and by linking to the theory of political ecology. The above hunting practices in the Park, for example, were the local Truku's responses to the Park authorities and nature conservation institutions. They maintained the usage of natural resources in a protected park in order to keep their cultural values and livelihood. They claimed that the hunting right was their cultural foundation and sustenance, therefore it was permissible to exploit these natural resources on their domain within the Park. They

knew the restrictions on resource access in the Park, yet they still used resources but avoided the conflicts with the police. Moreover, their contemporary hunting activities were usually individual acts rather than collective actions. Thus the Truku's deliberate hunting practices in the Park could be seen as the implicit resistance to the conservation system. The motives of resistance included cultural impact and livelihood impact. These analyses had been closely associated with the theoretical framework of political ecology.

The data analysis aimed to obtain research findings and connect to the theoretical framework of this study. I started the data analysis by taking notes when interviewing different informants. The transcriptions codes and interview notes then were shaped as the foundational categories. Categories were sorted by primary research questions and political ecology theory. These sorted analyses were the findings of this study connecting to the theoretical framework and research aim.

### **3.9 Summary**

This study adopted a qualitative and case study design. Two Truku villages were selected because one was in Taroko National Park while the other one was conducting a community conservation project. Qualitative methods were used for data collection. Informants included the officials in the Park, central and local government, policemen, a clerk of court system, Truku pastors, elders and hunters. My positionality helped me gain access to the informants. My master dissertation contributed to the analysis of the early revolution of the community conservation example. Doing cross-cultural study, I paid attention to ethical issues in order to get reliable data through methods. Finally, I explain the way I analysed the data from transcription to themes and categories closer to the theoretical framework of this study. Before empirical chapters exploring a park and a community conservation project, we should understand PAs and Truku people in Taiwan as a background/context in Chapter Four.

# CHAPTER FOUR: PROTECTED AREAS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN TAIWAN

## 4.1 Introduction

This context chapter aims to offer the background to the establishment of PAs in Taiwan in order to point out the forms of dominance expressed by the state in terms of conservation. Nationalisation of common property is seen as a way to avoid ‘the tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). Moreover, this chapter also aims to depict the traditional lifestyle of the Truku group and their encounter with the Japanese colonial regime around a hundred years ago. The historical background indicates not just the forms of territoriality enacted by a modern state, but also the superior attitude of a state when dealing with indigenous affairs. The governance of indigenous people since the colonial period by the Japanese regime shows that for the indigenous community, external regimes tend to command indigenous people and resources in the indigenous areas in a coercive way. Neglecting the demands of indigenous people, the regime’s actions usually lead to resistance by indigenous people.

Exploring the factors influencing the establishment of PAs may assist our understanding of the dominance of PAs’ authorities in Taiwan. When international conservation affected the state authorities of Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s, the establishment of PAs with conservation legislation was the response to such an environmental trend. The political and social milieu also shaped the process of policy making. In practice, these PAs were located in, or close to, where indigenous groups resided. These minority groups had depended on natural resources for livelihoods and cultural practices for a long time. As PAs were established by the government in the name of conservation, the local indigenous people lost their rights to exploit natural resources and the right to undertake their cultural practices. State control caused complaints from local indigenous people, and such controversy at the local level increased the costs of conservation policy implementation.

In this chapter, I firstly introduce the current status of PAs in Taiwan to stress the growing significance of PAs in conservation administration. Secondly, the national park system is seen as an example not just to explore the supremacy of the state but also to analyse some factors fostering the regulation and establishment of parks. In the third section, community-based conservation as an alternative protected area system

recognised by the state is presented. I consider whether this co-management scheme could be a solution to conflict between the state and the local indigenous people in terms of conservation. Fourthly, Japanese governance of indigenous groups is offered to show the manipulation of colonial rule. The Truku people are taken as a case in that colonial context to highlight the controversies between the state and the indigenous people. The question for the later empirical work (Chapters 5 and 6) will be to ascertain whether post-colonial political regimes have dealt with the policies of indigenous people better than the Japanese colonial administration. Finally, the conclusion attempts to reveal the similar nature of control in the contemporary state administration in Taiwan according to the analysis of important indigenous policies.

#### **4.2 The current status of protected areas in Taiwan**

There are currently six kinds of official PAs in Taiwan including 22 Natural Reserves<sup>7</sup>, 20 Wildlife Refuges<sup>8</sup>, 37 Major Wildlife Habitats, 9 National Parks, 1 National Nature Park and 6 Forestry Reserves (Nature Conservation website of Forestry Bureau, 2017) (see Table 4.1). In total, these PAs represent 19 percent of the land territory of Taiwan. PAs were initially established in the 1980s as reactions to emerging environmental movements and political reforms (Ho, 2010). The Forestry Act (1932), the National Park Law (1972) and the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act (1982) are the primary legal resources of these PAs established in the 1980s. A feature is that early PAs were stricter than those established later because of amended regulations. The establishment of PAs accelerated in the 1990s due to the Wildlife Conservation Act passed in 1989. Not only the central government but also local governments announced the creation of PAs. Local governments announced the majority of Wildlife Refuges and a few natural reserves. The growing numbers of PAs show that the establishment of PAs plays a vital role in nature conservation. These areas are given special significance via conservation regulations. Human actions within these areas are restricted due to these valuable protected resources.

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<sup>7</sup>Nature Reserve refer to the "areas which are representative of various types of ecological systems, which have unique topographic or geologic features, or which are deemed valuable for long-term observation, education and research regarding genetic preservation, and which are designated as such in accordance with the Act" according to the Enforcement Rules of Cultural Heritage Preservation Act.

<sup>8</sup>According to the Wildlife Conservation Acts, Wildlife Refuges refer to major wildlife habitats with special conservation needs and are established by local government. Local authorities may announce restrictive measures regarding hunting wildlife, collection of plants, destruction of environment in these wildlife refuges.

Establishing PAs is considered as an act of internal territoriality of Taiwan by the state agencies.

Protected area type	Quantity	Legislation source	Time	Authorities	IUCN Category <sup>9</sup>
Natural Reserves	22	Cultural Heritage Preservation Act	1980s-2010s	Central-Council of Agriculture Local-County Government	I, III,V
Wildlife Refuges	20	Wildlife Conservation Act	1990s-2010s	Central-Council of Agriculture Local-County Government	IV,VI
Major Wildlife Habitats	37	Wildlife Conservation Act	1990s-2010s	Central-Council of Agriculture Local-County Government	IV
National Park	9	National Park Law	1980s-2010s	Construction and Planning Agency of Minister of Interior	II
National Nature Park	1	National Park Law	2011	Construction and Planning Agency of Minister of Interior	II
Forest Reserves	6	Forestry Act	1980s-1992	Forestry Bureau of Council of Agriculture	I
Totally	95 PAs totally occupy 1,133,488ha, about 19% of land area of Taiwan				

Table 4.1 Protected areas of Taiwan (Source: Conservation Website of the Forestry Bureau, 2017. Access: 22.02.2017)

### 4.3 National park establishment

#### 4.3.1 The legal source of the parks

The national park system was the most explicit conservation institution among governmental agencies in central government before the 1980s (Lu, 2006). As Taiwanese policies are based on the rule of law, there must be a legal foundation to the establishment of national parks. Huang (1999) explores the legislative processes of the National Park Law and finds that domestic demands and the pressure of international conservation in the

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<sup>9</sup>International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) category indicates the creation of protected areas in Taiwan was affected by international conservation. There are six categories of recognised protected areas in the IUCN; Category I is Strict Nature Reserve or Wilderness Area; II refers to National Park. III is Natural Monument or Feature; IV is Habitat/Species Management Area; V refers to Protected Landscape/ Seascape, and VI is Protected area with sustainable use of natural resources. The first two categories are seen as strict protected areas. Others encompass proper resource use or participatory governance of the locals.

1950s and the 1960s led to the formulation of the National Park Law in 1972. These two forces affected the establishment of the early system of nature conservation in Taiwan.

On the one hand, domestic needs came from the lobbying of specific civil organisations to advocate tourism in 1950s on the basis of the planning of national parks in the 1930s when Japan colonised Taiwan (Huang, 1999). These civil organisations and tourism associations were led by a senior legislator without a popular mandate for he was designated to be a legislator rather than through election. The tourism associations urged the authority in control of national parks, the Ministry of the Interior, to build national parks for tourism development to enhance the foreign currency reserves of the ROC. The Taiwanese Government aimed to facilitate economic development in the 1950s and accepted US aid from 1950 to 1965. The tourism departments in multiple governmental agencies and tourism associations played important roles in promoting the establishment of parks although they were not park authorities. The civil tourism association even drafted the National Park Law as a reference for park authorities. Yet the central government took a passive attitude toward the domestic demands in the 1950s (Huang, 1999).

On the other hand, in the 1960s Taiwan experienced more international pressure for conservation from the United Nations, IUCN (the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources) and from the US, which vitally influenced legislation of the National Park Law (*ibid*). In 1960 the UN urged member countries to send park regulations and a list of parks to collect park data from around the world. Some staff were sent to Taiwan to discuss the establishment of national parks in 1968. IUCN asked Taiwan to offer information on PAs and legislations on plant protection in 1968 and 1970 respectively. Some American conservation professionals were invited to Taiwan to plan national parks and PAs. These international organisations and influential persons caused the pressure to start the policy of nature conservation.

Before the legislation of National Park Law, the two major forces of economic development and environmental conservation were intertwined to facilitate park establishment. Domestic demands aimed for economic growth while the foreign pressure paid more attention to nature conservation. Huang (1999) notes that the former force was constant but loose while the latter was intermittent but powerful. The National Park Law was passed within this context. The draft law was transplanted from US regulations with high standards of nature conservation, although many legislators focussed on economic



development via the tertiary industry- tourism. Enforcing the National Park Law in practice tended to pay more attention to nature protection due to the US conservation model.

#### **4.3.2 The National Park Law and its implementation in the 1980s**

Four National Parks were established in the 1980s according to the National Park Law before the lifting of martial law in 1987. It reveals that the state was dominant when these parks were created under the authoritarian control. The decision-making of parks was based on the state agencies and experts rather than democratic local participation or co-management arrangements. Moreover, articles one and six of the National Park Law point out that three objectives of national parks are conservation, recreation and research. Therefore, nature conservation was more important than the locals' development when these parks were created. The park police were established after the creation of parks. The park police were responsible for the legal enforcement of nature conservation. Local needs on development, in particular those who depended on local natural resources were exclusionary in light of conservation priority. Parks' exclusion of locals was common in Taiwan under the autocratic political surroundings in the 1980s.

#### **4.4 The Rise of community-based conservation in Taiwan**

A few communities made independent, high-profile conservation efforts in Taiwan in the 1990s. Community conservation was supported by policy encouragement of the state such as the 'community establishment policy' of the Council of Culture in 1994 and the community movement of civil society (Lu, 2004). These conservation cases became famous due to the 'bottom-up' power in natural resource management. These small-scale community conservation cases mostly undertook stream conservation in remote indigenous areas. These indigenous communities did these as their traditional lifestyle had strong links to the stream resources. The starting point of the conservation idea was always that these locals were inspired by the government and aimed to attract visitors by creating new sightseeing sites of natural beauty. The interactions between the two primary stakeholders of such community conservation, the governmental agencies and the local communities, were key to the evolution of these community conservation initiatives because their interplay affected project sustainability. Moreover, as the result of collective conservation action, the majority of these early cases were included in the official protected area - 'wildlife refuge' in accordance with the Wildlife Conservation Act. In the

following sections, the roles that the government and the local community play are introduced. The concluding section stresses that similar social impacts took place in community conservation projects as in the parks.

#### **4.4.1 Empowerment and financial support of the government**

The Wildlife Conservation Act offered the legal source for the local county government to announce PAs. Conservation affairs were authorised by the central government. An indigenous community conservation case, Nan, in southern Taiwan in early 1990s started the conservation effort when a local leader was elected as the supervisor of the township office. He mobilised the residents of some local villages to patrol their different stream reaches to protect their traditional practices of fishing through the sponsorship of the township office. His promotion of conservation was closely related to local development (Lu, 2001). In Lu's study (2001), the township office cooperated with the police to enforce conservation according to the Fishery Act despite a few local people's complaints about restraints of resource use. The two-year effort restored a good river habitat for fish and such a conservation result attracted anglers. It was hard to control anglers from accessing the river, so the county government and township office adopted the Fishery Act to establish closed fishing areas. Later the government used the Wildlife Conservation Act to continue the conservation effort and created sustainable use areas for anglers to fish. The township office was authorised to manage the community conservation affairs by the county government. The office charged anglers for fish licences from June and November every year. The township office paid for patrols of the river, while the county government entrusted an academic group for fish investigation. The continuous conservation acts of the local government gained the appreciation of the central government and scholars. Many local people also coordinated with the conservation policy of the local government. The dominance of local government in guiding a conservation path to the establishment tourism seemed to be accepted by the central government and the local people. The wildlife refuge of river fish with the sustainable use zone within it was therefore established in 1993 in accordance with the Wildlife Conservation Act.

Another Han Chinese case, Wu, involving a waterfowl conservation effort in north-eastern Taiwan also showed the dominance of the county government in establishing wildlife refuges. In the political and economic context in the early 1990s, the US was Taiwan's largest trading exporter. However, Taiwan was a popular market for wildlife

transactions, so the US government decided to impose economic sanctions. This site of wildlife refuge had been dedicated as a site for a power plant, but was transferred to establish a protected area in order to show that the Taiwanese government was serious about conservation. Lu (2001) notes that central government was the decision-maker in light of the legal foundation. The interactions between the local people/communities and local government directed the establishment of this wildlife refuge rather than the voices of the locals. After the announcement of a protected area, the county government led matters of construction and investigation with the financial sponsorship of the central government. Some inappropriate decisions such as the exclusion of a few private plots from the refuge were made by the county government because of the limited understanding of the local environment. The transfer of management to the local organisation was key for the interactions between the locals and the government. The act of decentralisation improved the relationship between two main players of community conservation (ibid).

The other indigenous case, Tou, in south-western Taiwan was famous for the autonomy granted to traditional institutions of the local indigenous community (Lu, 2004). The supportive intervention of the government took place at the stage when this community operated this conservation and development programme well in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This case was awarded the great honour of the president and conservation prize. This community conservation project was not employed as an official wildlife refuge, but was created as an ecological park by villagers themselves.

These early community conservation cases revealed that the local governmental agencies exerted acts of territoriality (see the discussion in section 2.3) through the establishment of PAs. They also played the predominant role in the management of the refuges when they were politically empowered and financially supported by the central government. The Wildlife Conservation Act was adopted to territorialise the PAs. The design of a sustainable use zone was employed as a form of economic development such as the fishing zone in the first indigenous case.

#### **4.4.2 Support of the local community**

The dominance of the local government was evident when these early wildlife refuges of community conservation were established. Yet the establishment was still impossible without the help of local groups.

In the first indigenous case (Lu, 2001), Nan, when the elected supervisor of the township office proposed the idea of fish conservation, some seniors disagreed with it because they believed fish were part of nature, which should not be restrained by human regulations. Some others thought the conservation concept belonged to the Han Chinese rather than indigenous people. The supervisor turned to the local leaders and the local police to develop a consensus. The collective action of community conservation was mobilised through the executive order of the township office and the implementation of the local police and the local patrol teams. The early outcome of the conservation effort for a few months was to enhance the confidence and interest of the locals.

The second Chinese case, Wu, changed because a local group participated in the conservation effort due to the environmental degradation of the refuge habitat. The group built the waterfowl habitat on private plots according to their local experience, which was different from the idea of the government. The group was later authorised by the government to manage the refuge. In this community conservation case, the disagreement between the officials with scholars and the local community was that the government insisted on the wildness of the wetland habitat for waterfowl, while the locals believed dredging was necessary for the human affected environment in light of their experience (Lu, 2001). The collective action of dredging on private plots opened the opportunity of communication between two sides because doing this did create a good habitat for waterfowl. In addition to the habitat creation by dredging, this local group also acted as the bridge between the government and the local land owners. Environmental education activity, conservation patrolling, resource monitoring and engaging in the planning of protected areas were all the conservation efforts of this local organisation.

Another indigenous case, Tou, displayed the power of local autonomy via the traditional family system of fishing resource distribution (Lu, 2004). The core leaders persuaded villagers in an open village meeting to take advantage of their traditional family governance of river fish to make conservation effort. The local community association conducted such a conservation project to attract tourism. Paying attention to conservation for a few years, the community built a riverine ecological park. It became a popular tourist attraction through media promotion, and the local indigenous people made considerable profits. They also established a social welfare scheme to distribute these profits. The decision of stream conservation and tourism development were approved by villagers via open meetings. Every household was engaged with the community association and the distribution of benefits was comparably even. The choice to allocate tourism income into

forms of social welfare such as old age allowances and scholarships for students was popular in the village. The support of the local villagers contributed to the project's success. This case combined the traditional norms and the modern conservation idea to find a way of local development and autonomy (Tang and Tang, 2001; Lu, 2004). Such integration gained the recognition of the local residents. Moreover, local participation and the distribution of social welfare strengthened the support of the locals.

#### **4.4.3 Social impacts in community conservation**

In the first community conservation case of indigenous people, Nan, the social impacts from river conservation intervention was the cultural conflict which happened when the conservation idea was introduced to the local communities. This clash of different values was evident among senior residents, thus they disagreed with the conservation intervention. They thought the conservation idea stemmed from the Han Chinese rather than from their own indigenous tradition. Indigenous beliefs were that people gained a fish harvest as long as they made effort. Restricted access to fish due to a conservation intervention was a concern to many locals (Lu, 2001). The second impact was the livelihood problem. Lu's study notes that poaching and corruption existed in the local communities, which indicated some residents still depended on fish as a source of livelihood. The conservation action directly affected their life. As this case was included in the official wildlife refuge, fishing without permission would be more serious in terms of punishment. The third influence brought from community conservation was that the dominance of the township office undermined the trust relationship between the office and the locals. For example, the opaque information about the distribution of fishing income caused local people to doubt the office administration (ibid). Yet the office did not respond to questioning. The dominance of the office also ignored the controversy of this conservation idea in the local communities as the local leader agreed with it while the general residents disagreed with it (ibid). Power sharing did not exist on a local level. These undesired difficulties took place due to the community conservation intervention.

The social impacts in the second Chinese case, Wu, came from the dominance of the county government. The government insisted that its conservation knowledge rather than the locals' suggestion should guide management, and this led to environmental degradation in the protected area. When the government authorised the local group to manage the wildlife refuge, there was poor communication between the government, the experts and the local group. After 2000, more governmental sponsorships flowed to the

local communities. These resources resulted in internal conflicts in the group and in the local communities (Lu, 2004). This support from governmental agencies aimed to encourage and empower the locals. However, these economic incentives could potentially undermine the harmony of the local communities and organisations due to interest competition (Jhuang and Tai, 2009).

The third indigenous case, Tou, was not included in the official protected area system later, so the community kept their own self-governance. The community conservation implementation was approved by the village meeting and the distribution of tourism development stressed social welfare. These participation schemes seemed to minimise the unpleasant social impacts of external conservation interventions.

These early cases of community conservation in Taiwan indicated that the conservation interventions dominated by local government probably resulted in negative social impacts such as livelihood problems and controversies about distribution. These difficulties undermined the social capital of the locals, which directly hampered the collective action of local residents. These social problems took place in the parks which were comparably strict in terms of conservation level. In this regard, community conservation as a co-management scheme did not always put the principle of power sharing into practice.

These representative cases of community conservation showed some negative social impacts such as cultural conflict in the local communities when the external idea was introduced to the locals. These impacts undermined social capital and potentially damaged their collective action to achieve conservation efforts. Moreover, the Tou case demonstrated indigenous conservation with development and developed an example for other groups to study. Their performance in conservation and development impressed the mainstream society and was awarded with many honours. I think that indigenous people conducting conservation projects should develop their way rather than be guided by the government authorities or other experts because they are the users of local resources. Their local knowledge and traditional practices may offer some potential ways of conservation and development. Behind the practices are their norms and capacity building which underpins the structure of society. When a local community has a consensus based on locals' rules and knowledge in terms of conservation and development, residents' collective action tends to succeed more easily. Otherwise, external interventions

potentially cause or accelerate locals' struggles which undermine social networks and cooperative actions.

## **4.5 The governance of indigenous people in Taiwan**

This section introduces the governance of indigenous peoples of Taiwan by different political regimes. The Japanese colonial power is firstly presented in order to reveal how separate governance of indigenous groups and the Han Chinese residents was established. This isolated form of governance implies that the indigenous peoples were seen as unknown and brutal groups by the Japanese regime. I regard the Truku people as an example to explore how indigenous people were impacted by policy implementations of Japanese rule. The traditional lifestyle of Truku people in mountain areas will be discussed. Their lifestyle and living environment have been greatly changed by the Japanese reign. In the subsequent governments, policies of indigenous peoples in these Han Chinese regimes are examined to consider the influences over indigenous communities of Taiwan. These policies reflected the attitude of the government toward indigenous groups.

### **4.5.1 Traditional lifestyle of Truku people**

Before the campaign of rectifying the name of Truku, Truku people in eastern Taiwan had been seen as part of the Atayal group according to the indigenous category of Japanese anthropologists since the Japanese period. Truku people had executed slash-and-burn agriculture in highlands in eastern Taiwan since they gradually moved from ancestral locations in central Taiwan three hundred years ago. The motives to migrate to new places included the need for more agricultural lands and game harvest, transaction of goods, and enemy intrusion (Liao, 1984). Basic sustenance was the most important reason urging them to migrate east. With an increasing population, Truku people needed to search for new places to establish new small-scale settlements based on close family relatives owing to the narrow river terraces they inhabited. Agriculture and hunting were the primary economic activities of Truku people until a hundred years ago. Head-hunting was their impressive character. Contact with outside world was rare in this group (Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs, 1911). Wang and Tien (2009) remark on the spatial arrangement of upland indigenous groups. The core area is the residential zone which is surrounded by the agricultural zone. The outermost zone is for the use of hunting (Figure 4.1) Men in the same community conducted collective hunting and organised fighting groups to protect

their property such as their hunting territory and agricultural lands (ibid). The hunting territory system, including the boundaries and the norms, were developed by Truku ancestors of different families via negotiations. The Truku people also developed a complex system of social norms called 'Gaya' which regulated each aspect of everyday life. Gaya refers to the teachings of ancestors in light of literal interpretation (Wang, 2003, 2008). It is associated with the ancestral faith and social practices such as hunting activities and agricultural pattern of Truku people. I can still see the influence of these traditional customs in contemporary Truku communities in my field work. For example, a short prayer before drinking was affected by traditional faith in ancestor spirit. A hunter's dream was related to his hunting harvest according to the Gaya. Truku people believed that these customs were their culture and self-identity. Chiu (2004) indicates that contemporary Truku faith in Christianity is mixed with traditional faith in ancestor spirit. Truku values and customs affect Truku residents' perception of conservation policy implementations and their responses to conservation policy implementations in this study.




Figure 4.1 The traditional space arrangement of upland indigenous people

Source: Wang and Tien (2009) p. 12

#### 4.5.2 Colonial Japanese reign

Taiwan was ceded to Japan according to the Treaty of Shimonoseki when the Chinese Qing government lost the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Japan colonised Taiwan until the end of World War Two in 1945. During the 50-year colonised period of Taiwan, the highest power, namely, the Taiwan Governor-General's Office, governed people in



Taiwan differently according to their ethnicity to avoid either conflict or cooperation between Han Chinese and indigenous people. Han Chinese people and 'civilised aborigines' such as the Amis people living in the flatlands were classified together in the general administrative district. Those indigenous people living in the remote mountains were called 'uncivilised aborigines' and were managed by certain special units such as the police department (Teng, 1988). From the perspective of geography, indigenous people in Taiwan were broadly divided into 'northern aborigines' and 'southern aborigines'. Northern aborigines were described as 'brutal' while southern aborigines were 'tame'(Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs, 1911; Ishimaru, 2008). Accordingly, different governance tactics were applied to different people. The 'brutal' northern aborigines were conquered by Japanese forces. The police were responsible for the everyday affairs of indigenous peoples in highland areas. These highland indigenous peoples were encouraged to resettle to the foothills or the flatlands for the convenience of their management by the state. The Japanese promoted the sedentary agriculture of paddy rice in order to change the livelihood of hunting indigenous peoples. The land policy in the forestry zone of Taiwan promoted by the Japanese regime restrained the living space of indigenous peoples. The Japanese policy was handed over to the Chinese KMT government and affected the policy of reserved lands for indigenous peoples in subsequent periods.

#### ***Special administration in highland***

The administrative system in Taiwan during the Japanese period was separated into two categories, which were the general administration of Han Chinese with plains indigenous people and the special administration of indigenous people. The difference between the two groups depended on their perceived degree of obedience and evolution (Huang, 2012). In the general administration, administrative power was held by the Governor-General Office of Taiwan which was supervised by the Japanese Cabinet. The legislative power was shared by the Japanese Parliament, Japanese Cabinet and the Governor-General Office of Taiwan. However, in the special administration, the police were the only power responsible for the affairs of education, industry, medicine, transaction and construction (Ishimaru, 2008; Lin, 2011).

The colonial regime established the Department of Pacification and Cultivation in 1896. The subject of pacifying was the upland indigenous peoples, while cultivation aimed at developing natural resources in the mountainous areas. The mountain areas of Taiwan

were demarcated as a 'special administrative zone' where special governance was carried out (Li, 2011). The majority of these highland areas were occupied by indigenous people. This department accordingly opened the governance of highland indigenous peoples by the Japanese regime of Taiwan. Since the exploitation of natural resources such as camphor in mountainous areas was the first priority of the early policies of indigenous affairs (Teng, 1988), it was important for this department to pacify indigenous people in the highlands in order to avoid the disturbance from indigenous communities.

The Japanese regime adopted the 'Guard Line System' of the Chinese Qing government, to protect resource exploitation and simultaneously saw the system as the boundaries of upland administration. The system was used in the mountains in the early era of the Japanese colonial period. Within the guard lines was the general administrative zone where the Japanese officials managed, while outside the lines were the special administrative zone where the 'disobedient' indigenous people lived. The system was materially constructed by stations, lines and defensive facilities. There were soldiers guarding these routes to avoid the violation of indigenous people (Lin and Wang, 2007). The systems were primarily military facilities to prevent the attacks by indigenous groups, in particular the 'brutal' northern aborigines. The Truku group was seen as the 'most powerful savages among the Atayal' (Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs, 1911) in the east uplands of Taiwan. Although pacification was employed to govern indigenous people by Japanese rule in early times, the Japanese Governor-General Office decided to use violence to conquer the mountain areas with the completion of the subjugation of rebellions of Han Chinese people. Therefore, 'advancing the guard line' to violate the areas beyond the lines was a deliberate practice of indigenous management. The system was totally replaced by the police substations in mountains in 1920s and the mountain administration entered another era.

### ***Police governance and expeditionary force***

The police system was in general responsible for the social order of colonised Taiwan. Indigenous affairs were transferred to the police, indicating that Japan changed the strategy of governing indigenous people from the approach of pacification. Armed suppression was the aggressive way to dominate indigenous people and natural resources. Ishimaru (2008) notes that there had been several reforms of the police system since 1901. The 'Department of Police' under the 'Minister of Civil Affairs' at the central level was established in 1901, and the reform of the local administrative system enhanced the power

of the police and local governments who were mostly under the control of the police system. An indigenous revolt took place due to the camphor and land policies of the Japanese colonial regime in 1902, which resulted in the establishment of a dedicated agency of indigenous affairs at the central level in 1903, which was under the control of the police system (Lin, 2003; Ishimaru, 2008). The Department of Police was abolished and indigenous affairs was expanded to become the 'Department of Indigenous Affairs' in 1909. The Department of Indigenous Affairs dealt with affairs of indigenous people, and banned illegal camphor manufacture. In practice, this department enforced a 'Five-year Plan of Aborigine Control (1910-1914)', a military action plan, and managed forestry areas in Taiwan. In 1911, the Department of Police was re-established for the actions of 'Aborigine Control' by forces. After the Japanese Central Office conquered the 'brutal' northern indigenous people by force (in which the Truku group was the primary target), the Department of Indigenous Affairs was abolished and indigenous affairs returned to a section in the Department of Police in 1915. Indigenous affairs were still under the power of the police although the Department was downsized to the 'Bureau of Police Affairs' in 1920. This section lasted till the end of Japanese rule of Taiwan in 1945. The police had manipulated the affairs of indigenous people of Taiwan for over forty years. The adoption of the police revealed that the force was used in indigenous affairs in order to control upland indigenous people. Chen (1998) notes the police had monopolised the transaction of mountainous produce since 1910. This was the most evident benefit that the police obtained when they dealt with the affairs of indigenous people.

The Taiwan Office employed active control of indigenous people in the term of the fifth Governor-General (1906-1915) because the resistances of Han Chinese had been appeased. The strategy of pacification transformed to suppression. This Governor-General's plan of controlling indigenous people was carried out by the forces of military strength and the police. Lin (2011) notes that the Japanese documents showed that ten thousand troops forced the surrender of the northern indigenous people, especially the Truku group in the Five-Year Plan. Moreover, twenty thousand shotguns were captured. Li interprets that the number of confiscated shotguns revealed the worry of the Japanese regime because indigenous people with shotguns caused uncertainty in mountain areas for Japanese Authorities. This military action in the Truku area in 1914 brought the Truku areas under Japanese administration (ibid). The police in the highlands represented the footprint of the Japanese Governor-General. The policy of pacification returned after the Truku people were conquered.

### ***Relocation***

After the Truku areas were demarcated in the administration, the Department of Indigenous Affairs was abolished and the governance of indigenous people was transferred to the Department of the Police. The policy of relocation was implemented by the police in the mountain regions. Relocation here referred to the collective moving of upland indigenous people to the foothills or places close to the plains. The Japanese regime claimed that this policy helped the evolution of indigenous people because the new settlements were close to the culture of Han Chinese (Chen, 1998). The relocation policy was implemented more actively by the police after the indigenous revolt known as the 'Wushe Incident' in central Taiwan in 1930. The 'Principle of Aboriginal Control' was announced in 1931 to suggest the collective relocation of indigenous people was necessary for the improvement of their economic condition and independence of indigenous people (Ishimaru, 2008). Chen (1998) mentions that the Japanese police claimed the relocation of indigenous groups was due to disease infection and the willingness of upland indigenous residents. However, the relocation policy should be seen as a means of manipulation because the resettlement actions were actually controlled by the police in terms of places and new combination of different families.

The relocation of Truku people started after the Truku people surrendered to Japan in 1914. This policy was entirely guided by the convenience of management for the Japanese Authorities. Truku people scattered in the mountains were forcefully moved to new places according to Japanese orders. There were two basic strategies used by the Japanese for the resettlement of the Truku people (Liao, 1984). The first strategy was moving people from the mountains to the plains. The Japanese regime commanded the Truku people to establish new settlements on the river terraces or in the foothills closer to the plains. The majority of the Truku people living in the highlands in present-day Shaw-Lin Township were resettled to the river terraces and foothills in Shaw-Lin Township and two other townships in the south. The most extreme case was that three new Truku communities were settled in the territory of a different indigenous group. In addition, original family communities were usually split up among different new communities. The new communities therefore consisted of several families, which was in contrast to the Truku tradition. The other strategy used was moving to new places adjacent to the police substations which were responsible for indigenous affairs. The Japanese Authorities commanded several Truku communities in the same mountainous region to relocate to a new place near a police substation. The total number of Truku communities

decreased because of the relocation policy. Most Truku communities were resettled to foothills close to the plain which is now called the East Rift Valley.

I attempt to show the great change from the relocation policy implementations during Japanese period by the examples of my field sites. According to Liao (1984), F village contains five communities, four of which were established during the Japanese period because of the relocation policy. Residents of each community consisted of various families. Taking one community of F village as an example, there were at least 13 families living in this community. Most of these families immigrated in 1927 following the guidance of the Japanese police. Besides, T village was made up of three communities. One of the three communities had mixed 14 families from different traditional communities, but only one big family dominated the community population. This family was forced to move to this location, a river terrace, from the highlands, by the Japanese police in 1928.

The Japanese relocation policy changed the social construction of Truku society, namely, the single family centred community. Firstly, geographical relocation compelled Truku people to leave their original scattered settlements in the highlands which were made of houses, fields and hunting territory from the centre to periphery (Wang and Tien, 2009). They had to adapt to the new environment closer to the plains. The interaction between Truku people and other groups inevitably increased in the new communities, which indicated the possibility of cultural infiltration. New sources of livelihood also needed to be developed to meet the basic needs of people. Secondly, the new concentrated communities made up of several traditional families resulted in some impacts within the communities. The original community was dispersed to various new places by the Japanese police in order to decrease family cohesion which may have led to the collective revolt. Physical distance and reduced enforcement of family rituals further weakened the family ties. Diverse families in a new community were prone to friction, especially between families with a history of hostility in the original uplands. Frequent interactions with different families and other groups became normal in the new Truku communities.

#### ***Promotion of sedentary agriculture***

According to Chen (1998), in the early era of the Japanese period when the pacification policy was used to deal with indigenous affairs, the proposal of turning upland indigenous people into farmers was addressed. The authorities thought that it was not worthwhile to use force to treat indigenous groups. To annihilate all indigenous people would stimulate joint resistance, which was harmful to the Japanese reign. In the economy,

the sedentary agriculture would replace the hunting practices and help remove groups' violent spirit. These highland indigenous people would become obedient residents without any shotguns or armed force. This idea was re-proposed after the battles in 1910s. Agricultural promotion in the mountains was seen as a determined objective of indigenous policy. In this principle, the authorities depressed the price of hunting-based produce such as antler and skins in order to suppress hunting as a practice. More budget provision of pacification was used in the mountains when the police gained the reconciliation of more tribes.

The police were the only official power in the indigenous regions. Their responsibility included the promotion of industry. Mountain paddy cultivation was uneconomical because of environmental factors such as water provision and sloping terrain, let alone the problem of cultural conflict. Why did the colonial government advocate paddy cultivation in the mountains? Chen (1998) considers the demand of rice in Japan as the background. Paddy cultivation became popular after the implementation of the relocation policy. Moreover, the colonial regime nationalised the forestry lands to rationalise the exploitation of natural resources. The reserved lands used by the upland indigenous people were therefore reduced. The land policy directly caused the resettlement and indirectly resulted in the popular paddy agriculture in the mountains. Owing to several environmental and cultural reasons, the policy was a failure. When the Japanese government reviewed the policies of indigenous people after the large revolt of indigenous people in 1930s, some reforms in the mountains were proposed. However, the battle between China and Japan broke out and reflections on understanding the locals was thus interrupted. The control of indigenous residents in the mountains continued with the existing patterns without any reformed acts.

Li (2011) argues that the promotion of paddy agriculture in indigenous regions of eastern Taiwan influenced the lifestyle of indigenous residents. Millet was displaced by paddy rice, indicating that traditional lifestyle practices such as shifting cultivation and mobile migration had been changed because the paddy fields required sedentary agriculture. The value of land ownership was accordingly stressed through the process of resettlement. In addition, millet was associated with many traditional rituals and customs of indigenous groups, so rice's displacement of millet necessarily undermined the importance of traditional practices and norms. Moreover, the social status of traditional hunters was weakened because there were fewer hunting practices during paddy

cultivation. To own paddy fields also referred to good production and wealth. The replacement did undermine the values and lifestyle of indigenous groups.

### ***Land policy of indigenous people***

The traditional domains of indigenous people were reduced when the Japanese regime nationalised the forestry lands. The policy of reserved lands for indigenous people was regarded as a violation of the territory of indigenous people (Chen, 1998). At the beginning, the zoning of forestry lands was in favour of the Japanese enterprises exploiting natural resources. A forestry plan for the whole of Taiwan was implemented in 1925. After the land investigation, the living area of indigenous groups were from 1.6 million hectares to 0.20 million hectares (Lin, 2001). The reduction limited the living space for indigenous groups in mountainous areas. The reserved land for indigenous peoples regulated that the maximum forestry land each indigenous resident could hold was three hectares. Indigenous people could cultivate, graze and take firewood on their lands. In practice, many controversies happened such as demarcating cliffs as part of the reserved land, or not zoning the reserved lands after forestry investigations. The Japanese authorities ignored the traditional practices of indigenous people when implementing the policy of forestry lands, which caused indigenous people to be arrested when carrying out traditional hunting and farming. The land policy directed at indigenous people aimed to promote resource exploitation for Japan, which sacrificed the land rights of indigenous users and simultaneously undermined their culture due to the restriction of forestry land use. Chen and Yen (2011) argue that the nationalisation of communal lands of indigenous people and the privatisation of land use are the root of later conflicts over land use and the undermining of social cohesion in the indigenous communities.

The colonial regime of Japan used different policies to take advantage of the natural resources in indigenous regions of Taiwan. They delimited indigenous regions as a special zone where the police governed the life of indigenous people. Policy implementations such as relocation and the establishment of reserved lands destroyed indigenous people's traditional practices and customs. They lived in the plains and depended on paddy agriculture rather than hunting with swidden agriculture in mountains. The territoriality by the Japanese regime was evident through special geographical boundaries, specific rules in the area, and the police enforced control.

#### 4.5.3 Under the rule of Han Chinese KMT

The KMT regime has ruled Taiwan over 60 years (1945-2000, 2008-2016) and over half of the period Taiwan was under the martial law (1949-1987, 38 years). This government's overall policy about indigenous people can be summarised as 'assimilation' (Huang, 2010). Indigenous people had been called 'mountain compatriots' for a long time under the governance of this regime. It attempted to 'flatten the mountain areas' in practice, namely, an assimilation strategy to domesticate indigenous people to be as 'civilised' as the 'Han Chinese' and to boost the mountain economy to be similar to the prosperity on the plain areas. Economic development in Taiwan was emphasised by this party, so development issues in the indigenous regions had been the focus for a long time. In the 1990s, some breakthroughs about indigenous policy were made under this regime, such that the term 'mountain compatriots' was replaced by 'indigenous people' and the 'Council of Indigenous People' was established in the central government. I attempt to briefly introduce the policies of indigenous people and their evolution under the rule of the KMT party in Taiwan in the following paragraphs.

The KMT government initially continued many Japanese policies regarding indigenous groups such as the policy of reserved land for indigenous people, because this regime did not develop an overall policy about indigenous people (Hsieh, 2012). The government spread the official language 'Mandarin' in indigenous areas when it moved to Taiwan, which could be seen as the very beginning of assimilation policy in relation to indigenous people. Under the authoritarian rule and martial law, the Han Chinese KMT regime aimed to assimilate indigenous groups with respect to economic development. Thus in the 1950s and 1960s, the KMT authorities promulgated a series of administrative rules and policies to improve the livelihoods of indigenous communities. For example, Taiwan Province Government announced the principles of mountain administration and mountain construction plans. Thus taking advantage of the forestry resources such as timber and mines was necessary. A series of development plans in the mountains allowed more Han Chinese to work or travel in what were the traditional areas of indigenous people. Excessive resource exploitation in the indigenous regions resulted in resource depletion (Shih, 2013). Economic objectives were prioritised after the KMT government retreated to Taiwan because Taiwan was the base from which they intended to retake Mainland China. The initial policies about indigenous groups of Taiwan were temporarily expedient because the objective was to transform indigenes into Chinese in terms of economic life and values, without recognising the differences of indigenous peoples. This



prioritisation of economic development resulted in environmental degradation in the mountains, and indigenous people were also influenced by the values of Han Chinese society.

Land policy of indigenous people is a manifestation that indigenous communities were unjustly treated by the KMT government. The policy of reserved land for indigenous people is vital for indigenous groups because indigenous people have traditionally relied on lands for livelihood and established the strong relationship with the land (e.g. shifting agriculture and hunting practices on communal lands belonging to different families or whole community). The KMT government followed the restrictive land policy of the Japanese rule and announced that reserved lands were national lands while indigenous people had right of use (Lin, 2001). The rules of reserved land management in 1960 regulated that the Han Chinese could not use the reserved lands unless they had rented the land before June 1958 and the Chinese with households in the mountains were allowed to rent reserved lands. Moreover, legal Chinese individual or company running business on the reserved lands could apply for their rent if they do not hinder the land use of indigenous people. Later in 1966, the amendment of the rules allowed more Chinese businesses to rent or use the reserved lands and continued the Chinese rent if their rent was before a specific time. This amendment also allowed individual indigenous people to get land ownership, which opened up individual privatisation of the reserved land. Although the rules of reserved land were amended again in 1990 to prioritise the development projects of indigenous people, it was also legal for Han Chinese to rent the reserved land. Some land use problems have emerged in practice (Yen and Cheng, 2012). Because the reserved land can only be transacted between indigenous people, and indigenous people are usually financially disadvantaged, banks usually refuse to grant them a loan. The shortage of agricultural fund has caused a practical problem that some indigenous land owners transfer their reserved lands to Han Chinese in private in order to access funds. The Chinese investments in the development projects on the reserved land resulted in the introduction of capitalist production which was environmentally unfriendly. Some clashes happened between Chinese and indigenous residents. In addition to these problems, Lin (2001) points out that some PAs have been created in rural areas and overlap with reserved land. Taking Taroko National Park as an example, 11.7% of the park land is the reserved land for indigenous people. Nature conservation virtually restricts the space for indigenous people (Lin, 2001). The evolution of reserved land policy from the Japanese colonial period to the Han KMT government reveals the modern states

unjustly treat indigenous groups. The land issue thus became the theme of indigenous movements in the 1980s and 1990s. The KMT government later responded to the petition movements through the policy of adding more reserved lands to indigenous people (Shih, 2013; Yen and Cheng, 2012; Lin, 2001). Although the land movement of indigenous groups did not successfully claim the lands, it did reveal the ethnic conflicts on the land issues (Wang, 2003).

Although the KMT regime ignored the indigene's participation and rights when policies regarding indigenous people were made, some breakthroughs were made. After some civil groups' libel petition to change the discriminatory 'mountain people' for ten years, this stigmatised term was altered to 'indigenous people' in the National Assembly in 1994 and the new term was put in the Third Amendment of the ROC Constitution. 'Indigenous people' were transformed into 'indigenous peoples' in the Fourth Amendment of the ROC Constitution in 1997 to show the diversity of indigenous groups in Taiwan. These were the outcomes of social movement of indigenous people in Taiwan (Wang, 2003). The movement also urged the birth of the Council of Indigenous Peoples in the central government. This council was established in December 1996 to deal with the affairs of indigenous groups. Diverse issues of indigenous people were discussed in the central government. The council was supposed to represent indigenous communities to fight for the rights of indigenous peoples and negotiate with other departments.

#### **4.5.4 Under the rule of Han Chinese DPP**

The DPP reigned between 2000 and 2008 during its first term in office. The history and rise of this party was the process of democratisation of Taiwan. It has become one of the primary parties in Taiwan. Its experience of social movements in the 1970s and 1980s made it spawn a more sympathetic policy towards indigenous peoples. For example, the DPP promoted the autonomous law of indigenous peoples with higher levels of self-governance. According to Shih's study (2013), the DPP tended to plot the major policy principles of indigenous peoples in advance and implemented policy in an orderly way. This was relatively progressive compared to the acts of the KMT. The DPP's reign confronted a difficulty that the KMT controlled the majority of members of the Legislature. It hindered the promotion of policy making by the DPP government in the administration.

When the DPP ruled, the principle of ethnic policy was multiculturalism which was revealed in its party platform, in particular the acts of safeguarding minority rights

(Shih, 2013). The concrete acts of policy about the indigenous peoples during the DPP tenure contained the 'new partnership' confirmation between the indigenous peoples and the Taiwan state; the institutionalisation of the legal system of indigenous peoples; the tribal name rectification of five new groups; the establishment of a College of Indigenous Studies, Indigenous TV, International Austronesian Conference, and authentication mechanism of indigenous language; the promotion of co-management schemes; and the planning of traditional domain, autonomy and land policy.

The legal system of indigenous peoples passed some significant legislation such as the 'Indigenous Peoples' Employment Rights Protection Act' (2001), the 'Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples' (2005), the 'Status Act for Indigenous Peoples' (2001), the 'Protection Act for the intellectual creations of indigenous peoples' (2007). The Status Act defines who indigenous people are in different conditions, while the Employment Protection Act promotes employment of indigenous people in public agencies and schools. The Basic Law regulates some basic rights such as autonomy and natural resource use in the indigenous areas, while the Protection Act ensures the authentication of intellectual creations such as rituals and folk arts. The passing of the Basic Law was vital because the regulations were seen as the legal source of indigenous rights. One official informant even regarded the regulations as the 'constitution of indigenous peoples'. However, it was a pity that many other regulations related to the Basic Law were not corrected by other departments in central government after the legislation. Article 44 of the Fishery Act, for example, allows state authorities to pass rules to restrict or prohibit aquatic organisms because of adjusted resource management. This conflicts with Article 19 of the Basic Law, which regulates the permission to indigenous hunting wildlife for non-profit purpose in the indigenous regions. The legislation of indigenous rights indicated that the DPP regime recognised the disadvantaged position of indigenous peoples in Taiwan and ensured their interests on multiple levels. Yet because the Legislature was dominated by the KMT, the vital Autonomous Law by the DPP Administration had been amended and returned by the Legislature. The KMT suggested indigenous autonomy in education rather than the autonomy with land ownership and financial power because land rights and financial issues are controversial.

Shih (2013) notes that the indigenous policy of the DPP government generally coincided with three dimensions with which the indigenous movement was concerned: the rectification of the name of indigenous groups, autonomy and the return of lands. These topics are controversial in Taiwanese society because they are associated with lands

and political interests such as the budget allocation to each group. The DPP government did make progress on these topics despite the dominance of the KMT in the Legislature. In rectifying group names, five new groups were approved including the Truku people I study. In relation to autonomy, at least two versions of the autonomous draft had been elaborated and proposed, yet the interest groups had no consensus and the plans for greater autonomy failed. In land issues, the highly controversial nature of this topic resulted in a failure to establish agreed traditional domains of indigenous peoples. Other dimensions such as education and culture had made more evident progress (ibid). The cultural communication by the creation of Indigenous TV and the establishment of the College of Indigenous Studies in Hualien were significant achievements of the Council of Indigenous Peoples during the tenure of the DPP Administration.

Over their eight years in power, the DPP regime showed their sympathy towards indigenous communities by advocating some important policies of indigenous peoples such as the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples. However, the land rights of indigenous peoples and the land associated controversies were the target of diverse interest groups and governmental agencies. The withdrawal of the Autonomous Law and the regulations related to traditional domains for indigenous peoples was the outcome of such a policy debate. Many governmental agencies responsible for regulations associated with indigenous rights did not respond to the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples by addressing corrected versions. For example, national parks in the indigenous areas should establish a co-management mechanism. Yet such rules of a co-management mechanism were created via an executive order by the Minister of the Interior in 2009. The trend summarised by these administrative acts indicated that the state could not insist on the just principle to deal with the policies of indigenous peoples nor follow the legal base due to certain controversies during the DPP reign period. Minority rights were subsumed under the dominance of the state through the bureaucracy.

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

This chapter has reviewed the establishment of PAs and policies of indigenous peoples under colonial and post-colonial regimes in Taiwan. Truku people, as an example, have experienced oppression in these contexts of national policies. The Japanese colonial government adopted 'advanced' approaches such as the modern army to attack Truku residents and advocated paddy agriculture in the mountains to deal with the control of

indigenous peoples. The police were the only official representatives of the Japanese colonial government. Many policies implemented in the indigenous areas restrained the rights of indigenous communities of Taiwan. The control of indigenous groups aimed to exploit natural resources in their regions. The next political regime, the KMT government of Han Chinese, accepted many handovers of Japan in terms of policy of indigenous peoples. Taking advantage of resources in the mountains caused environmental degradation. The appeal of conservation was addressed in the 1970s. The National Park Law following the US model was passed in 1972. Early strict PAs were created in the 1980s. The Wildlife Conservation Act was legislated in the 1989. The government at central and local levels jointly demarcated PAs. Newer types of protected area such as community conservation were recognised by the government. Empowerment and bottom-up conservation became popular in 2000s. The DPP government used the partner relationship to describe the state and the indigenous community. The passing of the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples secured the basic rights of indigenous community.



# CHAPTER FIVE: CONSERVATION FIRST? PARK AUTHORITY DOMINATION AND THE RESISTANCE OF THE TRUKU PEOPLE

## 5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the interactions between Taroko Park Authorities with other governmental administrations and the Truku residents living within and adjacent to Taroko National Park as a means to understand the relationship between the state and indigenous people in PAs of Taiwan. It is of importance because the relationship is associated with the wellbeing of minority groups as well as environmental conservation in PAs. A good relationship is defined here as a situation where content indigenous residents live in a healthy environment, and also in which the locals support the conservation implementation of governmental agencies in PAs.

In this chapter, the creation of Taroko National Park is firstly examined to reveal the fact that the local Truku inhabitants were not consulted during the planning and setting up of the Park. This was investigated by interpreting the literature and documents including the history of the national park system of Taiwan, the Taroko National Park Plan and the regular Retrospective Reviews of the Taroko National Park Plan. After reviewing the official documents, it is necessary to understand Truku communities' perception of the Park and their responses to conservation institutions. The second part, reviews the Truku people's response to the strict regulations and vigorous enforcement of conservation policies by political actions in the first decade of the Park. After failing to change national parks policy, Truku residents retreated to conduct passive resistance. They continued their everyday practices making use of natural resources in the highlands within the Park in spite of the conservation regulations. The chapter will argue that their practices avoided a head-on collision with national conservation legislation with the help of some indigenous policemen who not only provided information about the Park Police and Park Authorities but implemented conservation laws in a flexible way. Truku residents took advantage of covert tactics to express their resistance to retain their cultural identity in modern society.

In fact, according to my field work, the attitude of the legal sector and the enforcement of these conservation regulations in the Park have changed to become more

favourable to indigenous people. Therefore, the relationship between the state and the local Truku villagers has improved a little. The judicial system makes the final decision on poaching crimes by indigenous groups. Interpretations of judges about conservation regulations not only put legislation into practice but reveal the state's attitude toward indigenous poachers. In the third section, the change in thinking of the judicial system about aboriginal crime is studied via the analysis of the verdicts by Hualien District Court and some interviews. The informal conversations with Park policemen and local policemen also indicated the elastic enforcement of conservation legislation. In addition, the judgements showed not only a more liberal trend, but revealed some critical problems in National Park Law. These coincided with the interviews with certain officials in the Park authorities. However, the tolerance of the legal system may reflect the nature/malady of legislation of Taiwan.

The fourth section investigates the opportunities for local Truku people to participate in Park management. Taroko National Park Authorities started the participation mechanism at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The participation of the local Truku people in the park system seemed to show that indigenous culture and inhabitants were respected by the governmental agencies. In general, there are four types of participation in Taroko National Park headquarters. Different groups of Truku people took part in the management of Taroko National Park through the official meetings of co-management mechanism, festival events, projects and employment opportunities. However, the participation schemes revealed the controlling nature of the Park Authorities. The Park was seen as a special geographical area with a few special regulations of conservation implemented within it.

Finally, this chapter draws conclusions about territoriality of the government, the resistance of indigenous people and social impacts. It argues that local indigenous people searched for their own practical development based on their cultural identity under the strong conservation institutions of PAs.



## 5.2 The history of the establishment of Taroko National Park

### 5.2.1 Before the establishment of the Park

The establishment of Taroko National Park can be tracked back to the 1930s during the Japanese colonial period when the Council of National Parks investigated, planned and announced three national parks in Taiwan. Before the official council, there was a local civil organization promoting the attraction of the Truku area which suggested establishing a national park there. The decision making was in the hands of a committee which included the Governor-General of Taiwan and other professional staff. The territory of Taroko National Park today was part of “Tsugitaka-Taroko National Park<sup>10</sup>” established in 1937. However, the outbreak of World War Two in Asia suspended the planning and policy implementation of national parks because the Japanese government focused on the war. At this stage, the contributions made were the protocols of national parks containing the regulations of national parks, the management architecture as well as the determination of geographical scopes of national parks (Construction and Planning Agency, 2000).

The KMT government from China came to political power in 1945 and paid more attention to economic development than nature conservation (as discussed in Section 4.3). Therefore, the conservation regulations were not proposed by the governmental agencies. There were several forces advocating the establishment of national parks. One was the tourism association of Taiwan. Another was some officials of the National Parks of the United States. The other force was some academics who were concerned with conservation values. Advocacies for national parks of Taiwan came from the fields of economics, diplomacy, and academia. The National Park Law was legislated and published in 1972. The Truku area was the first priority selection for a national park site in this phase (ibid.). Yet the Premier at that time suggested the Kenting area in southern Taiwan could also be a national park according to National Park Law to preserve the natural landscape. Kenting then became the priority for national park selection. The Agency of Construction and Planning under the Ministry of Interior was established in 1981 to take on the practical affairs of the national park system. The Enforcement Rules of National Park Law were formulated in 1982. The ‘Organizational Act of National Park Administration’ and the ‘Organizational Regulations of National Park Police’ were enacted respectively in 1983 and 1984. Kenting National Park Administration was established in 1984 as the first national

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<sup>10</sup> The park contained the territories of Shei-Pa National Park and Taroko National Park today.

park in Taiwan. Taroko National Park Headquarters were created in 1986 as the fourth park in Taiwan.

There were some topics to be discussed when the Truku area was planned to be a park that reveal the conflict between conservation and development. The Truku area was to be designed as a national park because of its tourism interest, rather than the value of conservation according to the rationale of national park system in Taiwan (ibid.). That is, the purpose of this national park was to develop the tourism industry for economic demands. Moreover, two departments of central government held different views on the power plant and industrial area in the planned territory of Taroko National Park. The website of National Parks of Taiwan Digital Archive describes the evolution of Taroko National Park (Construction and Planning Agency, Ministry of Interior). The Economy Minister saw the national park along with conservation as a priority, meanwhile the Secretary of the Interior stressed the importance of resource development. Advocating the value of conservation, the Economics Department therefore paused the project for the development of the cement industry in the industrial area. The Director of Planning Agency in the Interior Ministry also regarded ecological protection as a priority in the national park. However, The Bureau of Mines of Taiwan suggested mining should be excluded from the national park to safeguard people's interests. Some legislators hoped to re-scope the territory of Taroko National Park in order to protect business interests. Several days after the discussion, the territory of Taroko National Park was approved by the central government. Some mines within the park were exploited without restraint, which destroyed some of the landscape of the park. Some academics proposed pausing the industrial and energy development projects in the predetermined territory of Taroko Park until the completion of an environmental impact assessment. The central government indeed stopped the plant project to reserve the natural beauty of the Truku area. These controversial events highlighted the dilemma between resource use and conservation within central government itself.

These events before the creation of Taroko Park indicate that the value of conservation was not taken seriously among the policy makers in the Central State in Taiwan. What they were concerned with was the development of a non-consumptive tourism industry. The conflict between resource use and conservation was great in that different departments held different views toward the positioning of Taroko National Park. Before Taroko National Park was officially established, the issues of the local

indigenous people did not emerge as an obstacle or a serious problem due to the authoritarian attitude of the State.

### **5.2.2 The interactions between the Park and locals in official documents**

#### ***Taroko National Park Plan in 1986***

The headquarters of Taroko National Park were established in 1986 after the park plan was approved by central government. The first director was a botanist, which may indicate he would pay more attention to natural resources rather than people when dealing with the affairs of the Park. According to Tan's (2000) analysis of the Taroko National Park Plan, the local Truku people were ignored by the planning authority. He notes that there was no statement in relation to the interactions and relationship between the local Truku residents and the Park headquarters although one of the objectives of the Park was that the historical sites and culture of local Truku people would be reserved. The Park authorities seemed to follow the isolation characteristic of the US national park system to separate humans from the natural environment. The local development of Truku culture and livelihood was excluded while Taroko National Park was established.

Major issues raised to be solved in the plan were irrelevant to local Truku culture (ibid). The only issue relating to Truku residents was that their historical heritage within the park should be preserved. The concrete measures in the Plan were: to set up a committee to deal with the affairs of the heritage of Truku people; to organise a team for the investigation of Truku culture and heritage; to add some facilities to protect the heritage; to build an exhibition room of local indigenous culture. The main issues the Park focused on were about the natural environment, infrastructure and park management rather than the local inhabitants. Again, the Park was considered primarily as wilderness without people within it.

It was obvious now that the planning authority and Taroko National Park headquarters paid much more attention to the natural environment, recreation and conservation issues rather than local indigenous culture and their development. This was confirmed through analysis of the Taroko National Park Plan which devoted large portions to the issues of natural ecology. The social impacts on local residents resulting from the establishment of Taroko Park were not examined in the Park's early stages. Before its establishment, Truku people living in the two communities in the highlands had been moved to the flat land due to the lack of primary education. However, some authors (e.g. Simon, 2011; Lin, 2010) see this as a strategy to isolate people from the natural environment

of scheduled national parks. This may also be the reason why the Plan did not consider interactions between the Park authority and local Truku inhabitants in the Park. The Park was created during the era of martial law: people did not have freedom of speech and policy makers were the government and the experts during that period. The authoritarian style of national park management could partly result from the bureaucracy of the period of martial law.

### ***The First Retrospective Review of the Taroko National Park Plan in 1995***

The First Retrospective Review of the Taroko National Park Plan was announced in 1995 to reflect on Park management. The central government suggested that Taroko National Park headquarters should pay attention to the problems of natural environment, recreational matters, and should support private enterprises investing in the Park's public facilities (Taroko National Park, 1995). Tan (2000) analyses the issues raised by the Review and finds that it was similar to the original Plan because the local Truku residents were excluded. There was no interaction between the Park and the Truku villagers mentioned in the Review. He again confirms that the Review regarded the Park as an unpopulated region (Tan, 2000). However, a protest against the Park happened in 1994 when Truku people expressed their dissatisfaction with conservation of Taroko Park including the restrictive use of natural resources, land issues within the Park, and few conservation regulations were enforced by the park police. Many specific questions raised by the Truku protesters could only be solved by the amendment of regulations (ibid).

This First Review of the Park Plan in 1995 after the large political protest in 1994 revealed the Park authorities did not realise the value of local culture and claims of Truku residents in the Park. The Truku community and their development were excluded once again despite their mobilisation around some political actions. This document showed the dominant hegemony to control natural resources and local people's access to natural resources in the Park in accordance with the conservation laws. The amendment of conservation legislations relied on proposals of the central government and legislators.

### ***The Second Retrospective Review of Taroko National Park Plan in 2003***

The Second Review in 2003 re-iterated the objectives of the Taroko National Park, and restated the significance of conservation of nature and heritage, recreation and scientific research (Taroko National Park, 2003). The preservation of local Truku culture was mentioned but the focus was placed on the historical sites in the Park. The evaluation of zoning of the Park accepted the reality that some private reserved lands of the

indigenous people could be developed appropriately for agricultural use and housing. This implied that Taroko National Park headquarters agreed with appropriate development as long as it met the principle of conservation.

Some issues about the local Truku were raised in the Second Review. The first issue for Taroko National Park authorities was to establish good relations with local Truku villagers, to preserve Truku culture and to promote local development (Taroko National Park, 2003). The Park headquarters thought the Truku culture had gradually weakened so that they were responsible for the support of local culture. Second, the Park recognised the conservation concept in Truku tradition, such as the prohibition of hunting practices when wildlife was breeding. Third, the Park introduced local Truku culture to travellers and facilitated local economic development through the promotion of eco-tourism in the Truku region. Fourth, Truku people were encouraged to participate in the affairs of Park management to improve the relationship between the Park and Truku community.

Concrete measures taken by the Park to solve the issues of indigenous people included the amendment of Article 13 of the National Park Law for the maintenance of Truku tradition; to start training courses on traditional Truku artistry for the maintenance of Truku culture; to provide information about online training courses and to increase the communication channels between the Park and local indigenous residents (*ibid.*). Among these measures, revising Article 13 of the National Park Law seemed to address the difficulty of indigenous people in terms of natural resource management as the Article listed the Park prohibitions containing fire use and hunting activities. However, there were no further specific steps to be taken for the amendment after this Review.

The Second Review displayed the concerns of the Park authorities such as ‘the Committee of Cultural Consultation’ for local Truku leaders to advise Park management and a conference of indigenous culture. The Truku representatives of the Committee could take part in some official meetings and expressed their views. The Park also promised to allow an eco-tourism industry to improve the livelihoods of local indigenous people. It seemed to be a milestone of national park management in Taiwan because it was the first participation mechanism for locals to take part in national park management. These friendly schemes in Taroko National Park were initiated by the fourth director but some of them stopped working when he left the Park in 2002. The Park headquarters opened a new page of national park management to allow local indigenous people to participate in Park affairs.

Taroko National Park authorities in the Second Review recognised the importance of the relationship and interactions with local residents. Simultaneously, the nature of conservation/protection was also emphasised by the Park. Therefore, appropriate development could be permitted as long as the development met the principle of conservation. This was why eco-tourism was seen as a development approach for Truku people by the Park for it accorded with the principle of ecological conservation<sup>11</sup>. However, was eco-tourism the most appropriate way of development for Truku villagers? It seemed necessary to understand the perception of local Truku community about the development issues.

### ***The Third Retrospective Review of Taroko National Park Plan in 2015***

The Third Review was displayed publicly in 2013 and was approved in 2015. At the beginning of the Third Review, the Taroko Park headquarters stressed that it reflected the problems of the lands within the Park belonging to various governmental agencies and some private owners. It also discussed the development of the livelihoods of the local Truku community (Taroko National Park, 2015). These opening statements reveal that the Park authorities seemed to recognise the significance of the local Truku inhabitants and their livelihoods. The contents of this Review are different from the previous reviews in that firstly, it referred to several international conferences on environmental governance to emphasise that the Park was linked to certain international movements on issues of conservation and development; secondly, it reviewed some development projects in relation to the local indigenous community in order to confirm the endeavours of the Park headquarters to improve the mutual relationship; thirdly, it analysed the current planning projects supported by multiple levels of the Government. These inclusions indicated that the Taroko National Park authorities had become more aware of the local indigenous people and intended to handle the difficult land problems within the park territory.

Further, the Park viewed the local Truku residents as partners in terms of management and sought consensus of governance between the local inhabitants and the governmental agencies on multiple levels. The Park headquarters took advantage of the franchise rights to cultivate some local people through environmental education and eco-tourism. A project about organic agriculture has been supported by the Park for a few

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<sup>11</sup> According to the definition of eco-tourism in the book published by the central government (2005), it is a type of travelling in the natural environment and stresses the conception of ecological conservation; sustainable development is its ultimate goal.

years, which I consider as a participation scheme for the locals (see section 5.7.2). The Park authorities hoped these locals would educate the local communities. According to this report, the ideal processes of cooperation may start with administrative coordination and then establish the platform of partnership in order to promote environmental education and eco-tourism. Therefore, cooperation will help promote the economic conditions of local indigenous residents (Taroko National Park, 2015).

In order to increase participation and partnership, the Park made short, medium and long term plans. In the short term, the Park authorities hope to strengthen 'the council of co-management consultation' for the elite and communication schemes for the public. In the medium term, the Park encourages local Truku residents to participate in conservation affairs and increase job opportunities for them. In the long run, the authorities intend to establish participatory institutions for enterprise, allowing local villagers and environmental non-governmental organisations to participate in the Park management. The Park may empower the local organisations and residents with franchise rights to develop the eco-tourism industry to enable people to experience the natural environment in Taroko National Park. The plan will help create more job vacancies for the locals (ibid. Chapter 6).

In this Review, the Park authorities seem to have ensured partnership with the local Truku residents and value local economic development. They have taken some measures to confirm the good relationship and have made plans to sustain benign interactions with the local people. I believe the good intentions of the Park headquarters would be recognised by the local inhabitants if the locals were aware of these intentions and experienced supportive acts of the Park. Thus further interactions could also facilitate meaningful reforms such as co-management arrangement schemes in Park management. Therefore, the awareness of the partnership with the Park by the local Truku people is vital for furthering reciprocity between them. Accordingly, the next section investigates the reactions of the local Truku residents to the conservation institutions of Taroko National Park in order to understand the interactions on the ground.

Examining these official documents of Park Plan and Reviews of Plan helps to grasp the attitude of the Taroko Park authorities toward the local Truku people. From the exclusion of locals to partnership with locals, the Park Headquarters seemed to have changed their approach towards the local Truku people and granted more sympathy to local development. It is necessary to explore the local Truku's perception of the Park with

conservation institutions to see if a reciprocal relationship is developing. If the perceptions of Truku residents were consistent with the views of the Park, we should fully understand the relationship between the Park and the local Truku people as the official documents noted. Yet if the perceptions of the Truku were different from the views of the park, we should explore further.

### **5.3 The responses of local Truku residents to Taroko National Park**

This section is primarily made up of interviews and observations of field work in exploring the Truku community's perceptions of Taroko National Park, particularly the conservation institutions. Firstly, it presents the responses to the conservation regulations and the enforcement agency, the National Park Police. These external regulations and agencies forced Truku residents to stop their livelihood practices such as hunting and agriculture in the highlands of the Park. Accordingly, the Truku residents firstly expressed their complaints and dissatisfaction through the local representatives. They also protested against some policy implementation of Taroko Park by demonstrations and movements in the 1990s. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the fourth director of the Park opened a new page of co-management with the local Truku community through a 'Committee of Cultural Consultation'. The judgements made by the Hualien District Court also showed more tolerance for indigenous people when indigenous hunters violated conservation regulations. The policemen in the Park expressed a more flexible attitude in the enforcement of conservation regulations when I did the field study. These changes of the public sector indeed improved the interactions between the local Truku community and Taroko National Park authorities a little. Yet the Truku still perceived the restrictions in everyday life. Conservation regulations and conservation implementations elicited complaints. The following sections reveal the views of the local Truku. Their opinions and perceptions indicate they would take actions to respond to the conservation interventions.

#### **5.3.1 Truku's perception of conservation legislations**

National parks are comparably stricter PAs in Taiwan in accordance with the National Park Law. The strictness of the National Park Law expressly prohibits activities such as hunting, fishing and breaking off the branches of trees. In addition, the implementation of the provisions is the mission of the National Park Police, park staff and some volunteers from national park headquarters. In Taroko Park, such a prohibition has impacts on the lifestyle of the local Truku people, who traditionally make use of natural



resources in the mountainous areas. The majority of Truku residents who engage in the primary sector of the economy in this region have been affected greatly due to these conservation regulations. The livelihood of these people has been threatened directly just because their homelands are classified as a national park, which is viewed as an external institution for the locals. That these restrictions were imposed on them without any communication in advance is the first injustice I want to point out. The second one is that the content of these conservation regulations are inimical to the lifestyle of the local Truku people. The values of the indigenous community, which are different from those of the mainstream, should be addressed here to understand their reactions to these external institutions. Moreover, there are some problems which result not merely from the implementation of National Park Law itself, but from general ignorance of the human environment of PAs.

### **5.3.2 Conservation regulations vs. Truku Land Practices**

The National Park Law and the Wildlife Conservation Acts are the foundation of conservation enforcement in Taroko National Park. The restrictive use of natural resources in the Park is expressly provided for. However, the local inhabitants did not know the regulations until they were warned by the staff of Park authorities or caught by the Park Police. They were unaware of these regulations in detail. In addition, they were unsatisfied with the way the police implemented the laws. All these eventually led to the resentment of the local Truku people. They resisted the Park with conservation institutions via various practices. They mobilised collective actions to protest against the Park. Their everyday lifestyle of exploiting natural resources in the highland of the Park can be seen as implicit resistance. In contemporary practice, the National Park Law has been in operation for over 30 years and some articles are out of date. Therefore, some of the penal provisions of the Wildlife Conservation Act have replaced the penalties of the National Park Law.

### **5.3.3 Dominant conservation legislations and ignorant Truku residents**

Truku people did not know that the establishment of national park would change their lifestyle. One amateur hunter, T, also an elder in a local church, noted local residents' ignorance of the complex conservation institutions. He also expressed his discontent about the domination of Taroko Park authorities.

*'We were ignorant of the provisions when Taroko National Park was established...It seemed they [the Park authorities] came to our land whenever they*

*want...What they did seemed to be ok, which is totally different from our situation...'*  
(Hunter T, 13.01.2013)

It is obvious that local Truku people were not consulted when the national park was planned and established. They were not aware of the many restraints being imposed on them with the establishment of Taroko National Park. The Park headquarters apparently played the role of an authoritarian, who could not be challenged. The hunter T therefore used irony to stress the strong power of the Park authorities against the powerlessness of local Truku community.

According to a Pastor H in F village, his awareness of 'endangered species' and some conservation regulations was based on third hand information and also from the news of indigenous poaching. He also complained about the lack of a forum which would help the local indigenous Truku community recognise the conservation regulations.

*'I know about the endangered species by word of mouth, or from news reports about poaching. The news noted the regulations in relation to poaching...There are no conservation regulations on the bulletin board. There is no forum for us to know these things.'* (Pastor H, 21.11.2012)

Truku hunters in F village do not know about the basic concept of conservation legislation, let alone the details of these articles. Hunter C, who is an active huntsman in the Park, expressed his doubt and confusion about conservation.

*'Honestly I don't know about these regulations...we cannot hunt so many species because of conservation...I heard of the endangered species from others' talking. There are many endangered species such as birds and mammals...actually I don't know which bird we cannot hunt...I know wild boars are not the endangered species. But the boar will be confiscated if we catch it. This is very contradictory because it is not the endangered species... they always mention conservation but they never clearly explain what conservation is...anyway, we cannot hunt anything.'*  
(Hunter C, 20.01.2013)

One pastor, S, whose hometown is F village, was captured by the Taroko National Park Police while hunting within the Park. He rebuked the irresponsible public servants of the local government who should be accountable for promoting the government's new policy about indigenous rights.

*'I was caught by the police...in the process I found out that there are new rules for indigenous people to go hunting for the ritual demands. But my compatriots do not know this. The local representatives and the supervisor of the Township Office did not promote the policy which is close to our life...they never teach people nor take care of people.'* (Pastor S, 27.02.2013)

However, one Truku hunter who is now the traditional leader of one community in F village said he knew about the applications for indigenous hunting in a meeting he attended and an official document from the local government. Because of the complicated process of applying, he thought such a way of applying for hunting is unfeasible.

*'It is very troublesome to apply for legal hunting. You have to point out where you intend to go hunting when applying. You cannot go to the forestry areas, only within the territory of reserved lands of indigenous people. But there are merely few wild animals in reserved lands...you also need to register the number of animals you want to hunt. What if the number you hunt does not match the number you register? There are other limits about the hunting time and the specific species...so we don't apply for the legal hunting.'* (Hunter G, 05.01.2013)

The interview citations above have at least two important implications. The first one is that the majority of Truku people are unaware of the conservation legislation which is associated with their traditional practices. They usually obtain the conservation information from everyday chatting and meeting with others in their communities. On my field trip, all the Truku huntsmen did not know that one species of flying squirrels had been removed from the list of endangered species since 2009. The other implication is that the mixture of two sets of conservation regulation also makes them feel confused.<sup>12</sup> As a result, the Park authorities should pay more attention to promoting the conservation policies and strengthening communications with the locals. Also, the meanings and value of conservation could be explained and interpreted more in the PAs to assuage the doubts among the local Truku communities. The communication forum with the local inhabitants may be a good start. The Park authorities justify conservation in the Park through legislation, and through this manipulate local Truku people's practices in the

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<sup>12</sup> The Wildlife Conservation Act defines what the endangered species are, while the National Park Law doesn't allow any natural resources to be taken away. Non-endangered species can be hunted when necessary but it is prohibited in the national park.

Park. Yet they did not consult the locals when Park was created, neither did they publicise the conservation legislations well. The local Truku lifestyle was impacted by conservation.

#### 5.3.4 The external conservation institutions

Further, the responses of local Truku residents toward the conservation regulations and Taroko National Park can be attributed to seeing them as external institutions. The views of Truku inhabitants showed not merely the hostile relations with the Park but the subjectivity of the Truku community. One interviewee, L, who ministers a large Presbyterian church in this region, thought that Truku people do not possess the conception of 'nation' beyond the identity of family and Truku community. These external institutions are different from the traditional norms of Truku community. The norms represent the identity of Truku group in spite of the rapid change in contemporary Truku communities.

*'We have the concept of hunting territory traditionally rather than a nation... This is our hunting territory which is the inheritance from our ancestors. It is given by our ancestors instead of the state. The government is exotic. We have lived in this region before the establishment of Taroko National Park and the state in Taiwan. Before the national park, our ancestors had frequented this region. The conservation regulations are formulated by the Han Chinese instead of us...If we need any natural resource, we use it rather than waste it because we believe there is spirit on everything and we respect every natural resource.'* (Pastor L, 22.12.2012)

The pastor hunter S told a story about a Truku huntsman, who depended on hunting as livelihood, who was caught by the state, in order to reveal the difficulty Truku people face:

*'The state sets many barriers to stop people going hunting, which is simply to kill us Truku. There is a true story about a Truku huntsman who has a six children family in this region. He is not educated so he can only go hunting to make a living. His wife felt difficult and left him. When he was arrested by the police due to poaching and sent to the court, he brought his six kids and talked to the judge that there is no problem for him to be sent to the jail and stop hunting. For he then asked the judge to help raise the children for him. This may be a special case. However, we are helpless. If we want to have the mountain food for protein nowadays, we have to go hunting surreptitiously with the sacrifice, fine and prison things in our mind. Do you know how heavy our hearts are? It is very stressful.'* (Pastor S, 27.02.2013)

For some Truku people, hunting practices are the traditional way of living. The conservation regulations oppress their livelihood. Lower educational qualifications and less social integration in mainstream society of Taiwan mean the Truku have fewer employment opportunities. When I worked as a research assistant before my PhD study, A Truku hunter in T village expressed his voice on a hunting trip while we were going back home. He thought it was difficult for him to adapt to the life in the city. He enjoyed the life in the countryside of his ancestral land. Hunting for him is a way of making a living. What he needs is subsistence hunting only. In this way, this minority group should also have the freedom to live and pursue their way of life. Truku lifestyle was different from the mainstream Chinese society. These conservation regulations were passed by the Chinese legislators rather than indigenous people. Nevertheless, lifestyle and practices of Truku residents needed to be changed by these external laws. Their livelihood was affected by these interventions of Park creation and conservation implementations.

One female elder, Y, in a Presbyterian church of F village, remembered the days before the establishment of Taroko National Park. She and her husband relied on natural resources as their livelihoods. They searched for wild orchids and some herbs in mountainous areas and sometimes went hunting for their family's food. After the Taroko National Park was established, their lifestyle became illegal. Her spouse also died in an accident in the 1980s when she was in her 30s and thus she raised her five children (two are disabled) through agriculture in the highlands in the Park.

One ranger, D, who works in the park, explained why the local Truku inhabitants dislike the Park authorities. He thought that there were many limitations within the Park, which contradict the ideas of Truku people. It is unfair for those Truku residents depending on natural resources in the Park territory.

*'Some people rely on hunting to improve their life a little...The park restricts the land development within the park territory. No plant or animal life in the park can be taken away. If one needs to do something on his land in the park, he has to apply for the permission of the park headquarters. You need their permission to do everything in the park...Instead, our concept is that we can do what we want on our own lands. Why can't we develop our lands? So many limitations are put on our lands in the highlands in the park.'* (Ranger D, 19.02.2013)

Truku lifestyle was composed of the continuous interactions with the natural environment. Truku people were characterised by taking advantage of natural resources

sustainably. Their strong dependence on natural resources was destroyed by the external conservation institutions. Some Truku residents' livelihood was greatly influenced, which was an unpleasant social impact in Truku society. The restraints of access to natural resources within the Park imposed on the local Truku by conservation institutions revealed the asymmetrical power relations between the locals and the Park authorities as well as behaviour control in the Park.

### 5.3.5 The implementation of conservation legislation in the Park

The National Park Police is the system enforcing the conservation regulations in the Park. According to the official website of National Police Agency, Taroko National Park Police was established in May 1988. After several administrative reforms, there are currently 31 policemen in four teams in Taroko National Park Police. The primary mission of the Taroko National Park Police can be categorised into: 1. Security of visitors, especially during some special festivals and events; 2. Security of land and forests in the Park; 3. Service for residents in the Park (Source: <http://www.7spc.gov.tw>). The second one is the mission of conservation in the Park. For Truku residents, the image of the Park Police is formed by their practices of dealing with indigenous offenders.

An old hunter, L, an elder in a local church, talked about the way the police implemented the ban during the initial years of the National Park.

*'In the past, once the police paid attention to one person who was the suspect of violating regulations, they would ambush him in turn the whole night. They might also ambush in roadside at night. So the police arrested many people at that time.'*  
(Hunter L, 06.01.2013)

A retired pastor stated his impression of the implementation of the conservation regulations by the police. This reflects the operation of the police system as well as the helplessness of the indigenous people.

*'The police don't know indigenous culture at all... They push indigenous policemen to arrest indigenous people... those indigenous policemen want to keep their job and win the praise of higher police officers...but recently I know these policemen aren't rewarded...anyway, we don't make friends with the police. They always do harm to others. Those who are caught are very poor, serious. It is said that the fine of the poaching hunters is ten times the price of selling the game. These*

*huntsmen have no good end. The police deliberately make things difficult for those poor locals.’ (Pastor D, 11.01.2013)*

The rigid implementation of the conservation regulations by the police resulted in resentment among the local Truku community. Some of my interviewees expressed their wrath when mentioning the police in the park.

*‘The most excellent hunters in this community are almost marked by the police. It is like me, we are the people with criminal record. They may monitor my mobile phone communication whenever they want...it is true. I am not afraid of being arrested again. If they are brave, just follow me to the hill. I will...’ (Pastor S, 20130227)*

*‘Some compatriots feel disgusted with the police. They want to use shotgun to shoot them. If we are pushed to the extreme, we may go to excess, be forced to commit crime.’ (Hunter T, 13.01.2013)*

The police in the past used controversial methods such as ambushes to carry out their legal mandate for their personal interest, which developed the hostile relationship with the locals. Truku residents had to use natural resources carefully in their everyday life. The tension had an uneasy social impact among Truku villagers. The retired pastor noted that those who bully the poor would come to a sticky end according to Truku tradition. The unpleasant tension forced Truku to indignantly take extreme measures such as force for solution. Truku people took advantage in what they were expert in to retaliate against the police. The pastor S mentioned revenge acts in the mountain while the hunter T talked about shotgun shooting. They intended to take advantage of their good shooting skills and the knowledge in the mountain to retaliate against the police who always arrested Truku huntsmen. Simultaneously, the difficulties Truku people face are the inhumanity of the system including the legislation and its implementation. It seems that Truku people have to accept the institutions passively and then be persecuted by the institutions to commit more crimes.

## 5.4 Overt resistance of the local Truku people

The previous section indicated that Truku residents experienced oppression from the Park authorities and conservation implementation. The responses of the local Truku residents to Taroko National Park can be divided into two kinds, namely, everyday resistance, and political demonstrations to express their claims. These implicit and explicit resistances to Taroko National Park Authorities by the local Truku revealed not just the tension between the local indigenous people and the state, but also the unexpected outcomes of conservation policy, as evidenced by Truku people's collective actions against the Park Authorities via political channels and demonstrations. This open protest showed their dissent against conservation interventions.

Truku residents in the Shio-Lin Township mobilised several political protests against the Taroko National Park Authorities due to restraints by the Park. According to the 'Historical, Linguistic and Cultural Dictionary of Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan', the Movement of Return Our Land by the Truku tribe constituted of four outcries. The first was that the Township Representative Council proposed a condemnation in 1988. These representatives blamed the Park Headquarters for the neglect of the due right of local Truku people. The second protest action in 1990 was a countersignature by the residents of three neighbouring villages. These Truku neighbours censured the arrogant attitude of the Park Authorities who never respected the local indigenous people. The third demonstration happened in 1993. Over 50 Truku residents countersigned a petition about the amendment of the National Park Law. A hearing was consequently held to demand the modification of the Park Law and the allowance of hunting practices in the Park by the local Truku. In 1994, a large scale demonstration was mobilised by Truku people to encircle the Park Headquarters building. A non-indigenous politician and many local leaders organised the protest and over 2,000 Truku residents participated in the demonstration. The primary slogan, 'Anti-oppression, Strive for Survival and Return My Land', expressed their claim. The trigger of this protest was that a resident found his land had been expropriated by the Park through the Township Office without his permission. More local people also found their lands were in a similar situation. In addition to the controversial issues of land, the rigid implementation of conservation legislation had elicited the rage of local Truku people. The director of the Park Headquarters replied to the protesting Truku people by attempting to demonstrate his sincerity through promising more communication. One informant, Pastor N, noted his experiences of participating in the political protests when he studied in a seminary in east Taiwan.



*'...my classmates and I encircled the Park Headquarters located in that previous place...the director ordered the secretary to see us...But the secretary had nothing to say to us. The director finally furiously said to us that if this happened before, we would probably be executed by shooting. I also replied to him that if this happened before, I do not know where your head is. You invaded us first...The Park Authorities forced the land expropriation of the current headquarters building. One unit of land (0.96992 ha) is only worth 5,000 NTD...Truku people were poor and did not know the value. The price later increased to 50,000 NTD, which was about one tenth of that unit. But the locals thought the land was worthless and sold it to the Park. We eagerly fight for the justice yet our compatriots sold the land for money. We lost and we quarrelled due to this... We aimed to let people select freely rather than the means of inducement and menace used by the Park...'* (Pastor N, 11.03.2013)

His views paid attention to the injustice behind the establishment of Taroko Park. He considered that the Park authorities took advantage of power relations and the financial disadvantage of the local Truku to gain land. In the process of land expropriation, the local Truku people could not but accept what the decision of the authority due to unequal power relations. Moreover, the financially disadvantaged Truku residents gave up land due to the higher purchase price after a protest. This pastor thought that the local indigenous residents actually had no other options such as renting lands or cooperative development which were beneficial for them for a longer time, because the Park authorities were the only decision-maker. Without any consultation in advance, the creation of Taroko Park actually affected the land use and natural resource exploitation of the locals.

These concrete political actions revealed the conflictual relationship between the Park and the local indigenous people, in particular on the issue of natural resource management. Using political powers via politicians and legal channels, Truku people explicitly showed their resistance to conservation regulations and land use restrictions within the Park. Their dissent stemmed from these social impacts, especially the restraint on livelihoods they relied on. Protest actions such as countersignatures and petitions were adopted as the response to such a restrictive policy of conservation. However, the political protests did not shake the foundation of conservation policy in the Park. The local Truku still perceived the inconvenience resulting from the Park. Challenging the Park collectively was costly and like banging your head against a brick wall. Paying attention to sustenance,

Truku individuals changed their strategy against the Park with conservation institutions in their everyday life.

## **5.5 Everyday practice as resistance**

Besides the explicit protesting conflicts via collective actions, the local Truku individuals used several tactics to continue their lifestyle based on their singular idea, which can be regarded as implicit resistance against the external institutions, especially against the conservation schemes. These tactics were carried out in a hidden way. In general, the local Truku residents prefer roundabout methods to avoid confrontation. The tactics may look weak, however, their continuity in everyday life is powerful and long-lasting. As Scott (1985) notes resistance through everyday practices by the disadvantaged class is a more possible way to show dissent than open protests although these practices are hidden. The political implications of this hidden resistance should not be neglected (Holmes, 2007).

### **5.5.1 Getting National Park Police into trouble**

The National Park Police is the main tool used to implement the conservation policies in national parks in Taiwan. In Taroko Park, the attitude of early enforcement of the policies by the police was arrogant and tough. Thus, they are disliked by the local Truku people, especially the huntsmen who were always seen as criminals by the Park Police. If lawbreakers are arrested by Park Police in the Park, the Park Police have to transfer them to the state police as the Park Police do not have the power of investigation. Certain Truku hunters 'framed' the Park Police to show their dissatisfaction. An old hunter told a rough story about this.

*'The Park Police caught the poachers and then transferred them to the local police station. There were two versions of the evidence in the Park and in the police station respectively. Both statements were sent to the district court. The judge asked which one was correct and the hunters answered that the record of local police station was correct. They also said that the Park Police did not ask anything but they made up the evidence. The indigenous people framed the Park Police this way. The court blamed the Park Police for not inquiring in detail but making up the evidence. The Police replied to the court that the poachers did say what was in their statements. However, the indigenous hunters did not recognise it but said the Park Police made*

*up fake records themselves. Therefore, the judge blamed the Park Police.’ (Hunter L, 06.01.2013)*

Truku hunters put the blame on the Park Police in the process of investigation due to the hostile relationship. Hunter L said this was a true story which happened in a neighbouring Truku community. This device demonstrated not only the anger of Truku hunters against the conservation oppression but their action against the conservation regulations. This kind of protest against the Park Police reflects that Truku people do not oppose the current institutions directly but take advantage of the legal system to show resistance to the dominant conservation narrative.

#### **5.5.2 Asking for the help of indigenous Truku representatives**

Truku people took advantage of democratic representative politics to protect their own interests. In F village, a majority of interviewees told me that they would seek help from indigenous representatives at multiple levels if their family broke the conservation laws. The intervention of elected indigenous representatives usually pushed the governmental agency and judicial police to deal with the criminal case leniently because of the supervisory powers of Legislature.

*‘A Truku resident living in the next village was caught by the Park Police because of illegal poaching in the Park. He was fined over 300,000 NTD [about 6,000GBP]. He hunted several protected species including goat, deer and flying squirrel. Then he negotiated with the court and finally he was fined over 200,000 NTD. Then he complained to an indigenous legislator that he depended on hunting as a livelihood but was arrested by the Park Police. He asked the legislator to help him. When the legislator came to the Park, he was angry with the Park authorities. He blamed the Park headquarters and the Police. He said that he believed the staff had nothing to do but make problems for the local Truku... He said that he could cut the budget of the Park... Later, the budget of the Park seemed to be deleted about 15 million NTD. The Park headquarters may be afraid of this a little.’ (Hunter L, 06.01.2013)*

*‘An Atayal pastor came to Hualien for hunting in the Park but was arrested by the local policemen. The news was published in the paper. But he asked for the help of an indigenous legislator and nothing more happened... I am not embarrassed because the natural resources are ours. From then on I know that indigenous culture is valued. In the past, he would have been sent to jail without any recourse to appeal.*

*It is stressful to be in the hands of the Police...This happened last year. I thought he must be fined much but several legislators helped him later. The governmental agencies are still afraid of this.'* (Pastor H, 21.11.2012)

*'I prefer the help of indigenous legislators who I know. Other ways are not so effective...One legislator can help this...He can help intercede if that is the felony...He is A Seediq in Nantou. I often heard that he helps Truku hunters...The news spreads among the indigenous communities...The poachers have to go to the court...But the outcomes are very different with the help of that legislator...We are not wealthy and go hunting because we want to eat...doing this is only for life...we don't want to hunt much and go back when we carry enough on back.'* (Pastor T, 11.01.2013)

Truku people refrain from head-on collisions with powerful institutions, instead, they make use of the elected representatives on multiple levels to revenge the conservation institutions.

### **5.5.3 Truku hunters exploiting windows of opportunity to harvest natural resources without detection**

National Parks are carefully PAs in Taiwan and satellite monitoring of forest lands is common used in the park. It is inconvenient for Truku people owning reserved lands in the Taroko Park. Truku residents exploit natural resources naturally in the highlands. However, to use natural resources without the permission of Park authorities is illegal. Truku people therefore avoid the monitoring time to make use of natural resources to continue their everyday practices in the highlands.

*'We still live in the highland and we need wood in everyday life. We have the ownership of reserved land; it should be alright to use the trees on our lands. The park authorities know that we use the wood in the mountainous areas instead of selling them on the flat...We should be very careful to use fire in the highland...The Park headquarters use a satellite to monitor hillsides at the time between 10 am to 11 am and they prohibit hillside reclamation. This was according to the staff of the park headquarters when we chatted ... We don't use fire at that time. Our way is to use fire in the afternoon. Since we have done it, they have nothing to do about it... Anyway, it is all right if they do not see us doing that...'* (Hunter L, 06.01.2013)

Truku people expressed their resistance by insisting on their original way of living of using natural resources in the highlands within the Park. They could exercise the practices because they knew about the time of satellite monitoring by the park. They also possessed the desire to exploit natural resources on their own land. Before getting the information about monitoring, they had known the prohibitions of Taroko Park and felt annoyed as they had no solutions. Finding out when monitoring occurred from certain staff of the Park, Truku residents farming in the Park found their own way to avoid confrontation. The tactic of avoiding the Park monitoring time for resource use thus was applied here. Such a daily practice of Truku inhabitants may indicate the strong voice of the powerless indigenous people in the strict PAs. Subsistence demand of using natural resources by Truku residents was necessary in the highlands of the Park because there was no infrastructure such as power and water supply there. Besides agriculture on their reserved land, few Truku people who lived there went hunting by trapping and shooting.

#### **5.5.4 To continue hunting practices**

Keeping on hunting practices within the Park is an obvious protest against the unfair conservation legislation for Truku people. In F village, such traditional practice continues within Taroko National Park in spite of the conservation ban and socioeconomic change. These huntsmen know that it is illegal to go hunting in the Park, so they find some ways to avoid the investigation of the Park Police and the staff of the Park authorities. Some Truku hunters insisted on their hunting practices as part of their cultural identity and inheritance. Others were motivated by livelihood demand. Some others went hunting for leisure only. Pastor H stressed that a Truku tribe is naturally a hunting group.

*'We have the tradition of being fond of hunting, and people like to eat wildlife animals since they were young. We have the traditional dialect sentence to describe that I want to eat game. This is a very positive expression.'* (Pastor H, 14.11.2012)

When I asked about the linkages between Truku masculinity and hunting, Pastor S told me that hunting is the natural existence for Truku hunters.

*'Hunting is the root of Truku people... this is the root of Truku culture, the ineradicable thing. It is very natural and original in Truku tradition. It is like that grass is grass, tree is tree, and soil is soil. It is foundational.'* (Pastor S, 27.02.2013)

Hunting as the essential element of Truku culture is also recognised by the governmental agency of Council of Indigenous Peoples on the central level. The official

website states that the Truku culture is characterised by 'hunting for men while weaving for women'. The cultural identity of Truku community is embodied in long lasting hunting practices. In contemporary Truku society, the traditional motivations of hunting practices such as ritual needs and livelihood demands have partly been transformed into a leisure or sporting activity. In general, the population engaging in hunting activities declines because of employment options and conservation institutions. The new generations do not live in the appropriate environment for them to perform traditional hunting practices like the older generations. However, the comparably newer motive of leisure is an important element of identity in modern Truku culture. This modern demand of leisure may sustain the practices of hunting, especially among the new generations.

*'I don't think hunting practices become less, instead, there are more and more people going hunting. They just go hunting surreptitiously. Some Han Chinese also feel curious about hunting and go to the highland with indigenous people. They always use shotguns to shoot the game directly.'* (Hunter G, 09.03.2013)

*'I seldom went hunting before. I had no chance to go to the mountainous area because no one could lead me to do so as well as hunting was physical-demanding...I have gone hunting when I ministered the church here. Hunting has become my hobby...Some people in the church encouraged their children to study rather than go hunting. I think we should go hunting for our children because the modern internet and computer games are more toxic. These activities cause physical deterioration and vision loss of new generations. They are addicted to the computer.'* (Pastor H, 14.11.2012)

There remain few Truku people carrying out their hunting practices and the trend of hunting as a leisure activity gradually increases according to the curious visitors of Han Chinese and leisure needs. Hunting practices exist in Taroko National Park and were run by Truku residents in spite of the pressure of conservation institutions. In addition to cultural identity, other motives for Truku huntsmen to carry out hunting practices can be explored.

Hunter C in F village still went hunting in his traditional hunting territory to execute his father's last wish. Fathers' words were traditionally regarded as the norms for daily life, which formed the norm system of Truku society, Gaya. Hunter C justified his hunting practices in the Park by citing his father's wish before death. Such an expression also indicated that Truku identity was much more important than the Park bans. For him,

hunting was a way of living when he returned home from urban life in his forties. He depended on hunting to raise children in 1990s. He now also works as a driver but he remains to hunt. He noted he used to go to the mountain for hunting.

*'This is the tradition from our fathers as well as a habit. If Truku people did not go hunting in the past, we cannot know how to hunt the game. We cannot like hunting...my motive of hunting is due to livelihood. Some of us aboriginals depend on hunting because we do not have a stable job. If I have a stable work in modern society, it is impossible for me to do this. I have no other ways of living. I just go hunting for livelihood. Some people prefer to eat the game, which means there is such a market'* (Hunter C, 20.01.2013)

*'There have been much fewer hunters hunting by trapping within this decade...most people use shotgun to hunt the game because the gun is convenient and easy...some huntsmen go hunting on the main roads while some others are on the trails in the park. These trails were developed and used for walking and hunting by our fathers. The park authorities widened them for visitors...Others open their own trails due to the fear of the police...'* (Hunter T, 13.01.2013)

*'The policeman I know in the Park Police came to tell me not to tell others you are going hunting and it is better to go by yourself. You had better not come down before mid-night. You can come back between 2am and 4am because the Park policemen always take rest at this time.* (Hunter L, 06.01.2013)

*'I start off in the early morning and patrol my traps along the way. I then sleep there and continue the patrol next day. Finally, I come back home on the flat. It is difficult to come home at night. But it is easy to be caught by the police in the day time. Why am I not be caught after hunting for decades? It is because I am cautious, that is, I make use of night and small hours when the police are still sleeping. I do not sleep. I do not have other way.'* (Hunter C, 20.01.2013)

*'We do not have other way here and as long as the Park Police wait for the hunter at the entrance of the Park, where do hunters go? So when the hunters need to come back, they usually place the game in the vegetable blankets and the game is covered by vegetables. How do the police recognise? ...In fact, they should know the tactic. They just do not open the blanket. They are not silly...When I hunted in the*

*Park, I always placed the game in the big toolbox in my car. Then I put some tools inside the box...I always did so at that time.'* (Hunter G, 09.03.2013)

Truku residents continued their traditional practices of hunting due to cultural habit, livelihood, and leisure sport in the Park despite hunting activities being illegal in terms of conservation. From the perspective of culture, hunting practices had changed with time in terms of motivation and ways of hunting. We could interpret these changes as cultural adaptations. However, the fact was that Truku individuals kept on hunting practices in PAs because of livelihood and cultural reasons, which should be seen as resistance to conservation in the Park. The political implication of hunting practices as implicit resistance to Park restrictions is that Truku people are more concerned with their lifestyle than the external conservation interventions. Indigenous identity of Truku culture with custom was more powerful in their mind. The cultural nutrients were embedded in Truku lifestyle, especially in hunting practices and wedding rituals. Moreover, Truku hunters got reminders from certain indigenous policemen to avoid confrontation with the Park Police, which revealed the support of indigenous policemen. There will be discussed further in 5.6.1. about the law enforcement by the police. The support enhanced Truku's covert protests via hunting practices in the Park.

## **5.6 The changing thinking in the legal system**

The legal system in Taiwan contains two main sections, namely, the prosecutor system of the Justice Minister in central government (Executive Yuan) and the court system in the Judicial Yuan. Prosecutors investigate legal cases and decide whether to file the lawsuit or not. They may also suspend some prosecutions due to insufficient evidence or in the case of minor offences so that there will no longer be a further stage involving court judgements. Judges in the court make verdicts according to the legislation and the investigation by prosecutors. The police system belonging to the Interior Minister of central government aims for law enforcement. In this section, I pay attention to the law enforcement of conservation in the Park by the police and the subsequent verdicts made by the district court, particularly on those indigenous 'lawbreakers'. Such an examination helps understand the disadvantaged position of indigenous people and the dominant state in terms of the legal system despite the importance of some sympathetic measures.



### 5.6.1 The elastic enforcement of conservation legislations by the police

I had informal conversations with some Park policemen and administrative policemen in F village in order to explore their views of indigenous hunting. Two police units execute their missions in F village. Taroko National Park Police is directly under the National Park Police of the National Police Agency at central level, while the administrative police belong to the local police station under Hualien County Police at a local level. The local police substation is responsible for accidents and general policing, meanwhile the Park Police are accountable for the specific missions such as conservation duty and public security in the Park. Both of them can arrest conservation violators such as poachers. Their attitude is significant for they are part of the conservation institutions to implement the conservation regulations.

Implementing conservation legislation by the Park Police in the Park at earlier stages has been discussed in the sections above. Here I pay attention to the regulation enforcements by the police in F village to understand the current interactions between this conservation institution and local Truku residents.

A hunter remembered his experiences of the Park Police. Nowadays some Park policemen may come to give information about the Park Police. He unfolded the appropriate time of returning from hunting on the mountain. This example compared the difference between the contemporary Park Police and the Park Police before. He thought the current Park Police was changing their arrogant attitude in this regard:

*'Sometimes certain policemen come to my place to tell me that if I intend to go hunting, do not tell others. It is better to go alone. 'If you want to go hunting this evening, you start off around 6 or 7 p.m. when it is dark. You cannot see anything at that moment. You can park your motorbike in the foothills and go to the mountains. Never come down before mid-night and it is ok to come back between 2a.m. and 4a.m. because we are sleeping at that time. There is no one to examine people on the roads.' he said. It was very rigorous before. They never came to me to inform this. Now it is better.'* (Hunter L, 06.01.2013)

One ex-staff member of Taroko National Park shared his observations on Park Police to show the pressure from the peers in the indigenous community and the cultural conflict for those police members who were also indigenous people:

*'Many members of National Park Police are indigenous people because the parks are usually located in remote rural areas or mountainous regions and those who may be transferred back to the parks are always local indigenous residents. They have the pressure from their peers. If they destroy the locals' hunting traps, they may be cursed by the hunters after work back to the village. The extreme case is that they can be attacked when they drink in the village. They have this kind of pressure and people also say they can be warned or provoked. Therefore, they do not like to execute this type of duty. They also have the cultural conflict. The hero in the indigenous community becomes the criminal when the indigenous policemen are at work. For these indigenous policemen, they have confusion of values. So this section is not what the Park headquarters implement or handle seriously.'* (Official G, 03.03.2013)

*'Some policemen are nice and most of them are indigenous people. They are more tolerant to hunters. They understand hunting and seldom arrest the local indigenous residents for poaching. They may sense the pressure. If they treat the indigenous residents badly, they have the pressure. The bad policeman can feel the stress and the hatred of the villagers.'* (Pastor H, 21.11.2012)

A short conversation with a park policeman happened when I interviewed an indigenous elder in F village. He came for a chat with this interviewee. He advised the local hunters to be more cautious when they return from the mountainous regions. Simultaneously, he expressed his awkward position of being an indigenous park policeman. Besides, his interpretation of a good policeman nowadays is to implement the legislation flexibly and to impress people with a benign attitude and service.

*'I sometimes tell them that they shall be smarter. We indigenous people are very simple. When bringing back the game from the mountain, the hunters should hide the game at a safe place and then come to see whether there is any strange person or not on the road and wait for a while...the poaching pastor might think there was no policeman on the road and boldly carried the game to the road...I just want to remind them to be smarter when they go hunting...I am embarrassed to be the bad person to arrest the hunter. Maybe I am pushed to ambush someday...Sometimes I feel awkward for we are friends. I don't hope that people ignore me when I retire from the police...yesterday my team leader said that some indigenous people asked him why the Park Police hamper the traditional customs. He is in a pickle. He must arrest the poacher because of the Wildlife Conservation Act...But I think that while the*

*regulations are ossified, people can implement them flexibly. The attitude on duty is important. If the violator commits a minor crime, we can caution him/her verbally because the higher officers taught us this way. They stress nowadays the police should serve people. It is service-oriented rather than authoritarian governance. During the Japanese Era, people were extremely deferential to the police. But now it is different, the police should give people a good impression, to serve the people... We cannot be so rigid to dealing with everything according to the law. It is good to replace the penalty by persuading. Sometimes...when I was at the police school, the officers there also suggested us to treat people well, not to regard the public as criminals... We should impress people with our good behaviours. The attitude when enforcing the duty shall be good. We cannot search people's items, and the correct steps are to check by sight firstly. Then if there is bloodstain on the item, we may check further...'*  
(Police Officer C, 12.01.2013)

These interviews reflect the modern picture of implementation of conservation regulations by the Park Police in the Park. The Park Police are changing the attitude on duty, especially among those indigenous policemen. The awkward role of an indigenous law-enforcer makes them want to give the local indigenous residents certain information or some ways to avoid being arrested by the Park Police. These indigenous policemen can make friends with the local Truku inhabitants easily because of their aboriginal status. Behind the status is their cultural identity. That is, they still agree with the lifestyle of indigenous people such as indigenous hunting practices. At least, indigenous hunting is not the major violation in their mind. This coincided with the case Hunter C mentioned. When meeting the indigenous park policemen he knew in the mountains, he understood what the policemen asked was a kind of caution for him. Hunter T talked about his experience of meeting Park policemen with his brother-in-law. It also revealed that the policemen knew their hunting purpose but did not purposely make difficulties for them.

By contrast, a Han Chinese park policeman interpreted the flexible law enforcement differently. He agreed that a policeman should enforce the laws flexibly to respect the local culture. For him, a minor crime such as picking up tree branches can be dealt with verbally. Nevertheless, the hunting practices are not misdemeanours.

The local administrative policemen whom I talked to in the Park agreed that the police should respect indigenous culture. One indigenous policeman recalled the teaching of a higher officer of a local police station in a training conference a few years ago. The

officer taught the police attendees to respect local indigenous customs when they were on duty. Moreover, the team leader of the local substation also told me that they do not take the initiative to seize the local indigenous people. He thought it was more important to get along with them harmoniously. They used their judicial discretion while implementing the regulations. However, they took one indigenous policeman they knew as an example to present differences in regulation implementation. That policeman had arrested several local indigenous residents in the Park, which made other policemen concerned. Other policemen guessed he just wanted to be promoted for his good performance. In general, the majority of local policemen who are also indigenous people respect the indigenous culture including hunting practices when they work as law enforcers.

The arrested Pastor S has three younger brothers who are policemen. They always encourage him not to go hunting again. This is because of their brotherly relationship. Yet Pastor S complained that many policemen still go hunting and eat game in spite of the ban on hunting. He explained the curse that those policemen bullying hunters do not have a peaceful end according to traditional norms.

*'These conservation regulations prohibit hunting. My three younger brothers are policemen and they don't want me to go hunting...which policeman does not go hunting? Which one does not eat game? The policeman who arrested me can hunt and the other policeman who found other game was Truku. Son of bitch. Forget it. I don't blame them. They want to be the flunky of the government. Up to them. There is no good end for those who bully hunters according to the words of our ancestors...'*  
(Pastor S, 27.02.2013)

This pastor meanwhile revealed the problem in the indigenous community resulted from the enforcement of the conservation regulations.

*'There is a Truku policeman working in the public sector in this village. He came to arrest a villager with his colleagues because of a shotgun. It is ridiculous. You know that we indigenous people have a shotgun for hunting only. Because of this, many people stared at the person with the shotgun. Now many villagers do not talk to one another. The hunters do not talk to others easily. They also warn their family not to talk to others nor call others because the news of hunting spreads quickly. The hunters use argot to refer to hunting things. We have to do many things surreptitiously...the atmosphere of some Truku villages is very terrible...you had better deal with the game in the mountains and return home to cook it immediately.'*

*Never let the neighbours know this, otherwise you will be unlucky. The neighbours may come to check your fridge, which causes you to be arrested. A Truku man wanted to eat game and bought one barking deer. When he signed it, his neighbours reported him to the police to take him and he was arrested. There are more and more bad happenings in the Truku villages, even our own compatriots bully our own people.'*  
(Pastor S, 27.02.2013)

It is clear that the conservation legislation in the indigenous villages was sometimes seen as a tool of revenge or power struggle, which undermined the social capital of the indigenous community as pastor S pointed out. Therefore, collective action by the Truku people may be more and more difficult with the repetition of this vicious circle. The undermining of community harmony can be seen as a social impact of conservation intervention. Because of the illegal nature of hunting practices in light of conservation in the Park, Truku residents could report a hunter with opposing views. Hunting practices became hidden in order not to let others have information about hunters. The decline of Truku community cohesion was the social impact attributed to conservation intervention such as the Park creation.

To sum up, the implementation of conservation legislation in F village is changing to be friendlier toward indigenous residents with regard to hunting. This tendency may stem from the atmosphere of respecting of indigenous culture in Taiwan. In addition, the majority of indigenous policemen do not regard indigenous hunting as a crime. They may agree with such a traditional practice. However, indigenous hunting practices in the Park are still a crime according to conservation regulations. The dilemma of the indigenous policemen pushed them to search for new options. In the case of last resort, the indigenous policemen gave their indigenous friends some information about the police in order to help them reduce the risk of being arrested. They did not deliberately make difficulties for indigenous hunters when they were aware of hunting activities. The other notable effect is that this conservation legislation can undermine the social capital of an indigenous community. This hinders the possibility of collective action persisting in the indigenous villages. Yet social impacts like this resulted from conservation intervention possibly elicited the dissent of the local people. Individual resisting actions such as hunting practices and other means of using natural resources against dominant conservation might be taken by the affected local Truku.

### **5.6.2 The trend of adjudications of conservation cases in Hualien District Court**

The adjudications of Hualien District Court about conservation cases are important because these verdicts show the ultimate outcome of violating the conservation legislation. The judicial court system of Taiwan is the institution making judgments according to the various laws. Before going to the judge, the prosecutors of the administrative system always review suspects to decide whether to bring a lawsuit or not.

I have examined 146 verdicts in relation to the Wildlife Conservation Act, which were issued by Hualien District Court between January 2000 and March 2013 via the online Law and Regulations Retrieving System. The jurisdiction of this court contains the whole of Hualien County, which is the largest in terms of territory in Taiwan's district court system. The judges of this court would hear the criminal cases such as conservation violations in the two Truku villages in my study. Among the collected verdicts, a few are about petition of forfeit and revocation of probation, and most others can be categorised in general litigation and summary judgment. The majority of litigants of these cases were indigenous people of different minority groups in Hualien. They usually violated the Wildlife Conservation Act by hunting rare wildlife, mammals and fish or endangered species. Some verdicts discussed the controversial problem of indigenous people possessing a shotgun with cartridges. The motives, attitude and education of litigants were taken into consideration on verdicts made by judges. Almost half the litigations were summary judgments, which indicate that these cases were not complicated. These indigenous criminals usually admitted their crimes. There were judgments about service labour, legal education and conservation education as additional conditions. The special court for indigenous people only started in 2013 and I collected one verdict from the special court in Hualien.

Before entering the court system, the prosecutor has the power to make important decisions about criminal cases. There are three choices; to prosecute, not to prosecute or to defer prosecution, which can be made by the prosecutor as a result of his/her investigation. Some conservation cases I examined just confiscated the wildlife and deferred prosecution. The reasons for deferred prosecution include the maintenance of public interest, the motivation, purpose, attitude, education, disposition, living condition of the offender, and the means used of the offence, in accordance with the Criminal Code and its enforcement law. These cases should not only affect the misdemeanour. The punishment of deferred prosecution on conservation cases is the power of the executive

institution---the prosecutor's office of Ministry of Justice. This is a system in the Executive Yuan, so prosecutors' decision may be influenced by other officials or legislators. This is why my indigenous informants usually mentioned the involvement of the legislators at central level or representatives at local level if their relatives or friends disobeyed the conservation regulations. One interviewee G who once worked in Taroko National Park discussed his observations about conservation offences by indigenous people.

*'When I worked in the Park headquarters several years ago, I reviewed the cases by gathering the indictments of not to prosecute cases. Maybe indigenous people develop their tactics to deal with these legal situations. The prosecutors probably think the regulations about nature conservation and indigenous culture are changing. Also these cases of violating conservation legislation are minor offense for prosecutors. If the suspects are indigenous people, the outcome of violation is very different from the Han Chinese criminals'. My conclusions show that suspects were not prosecuted as long as they were aboriginal, and they refused to admit their guilty no matter how exaggerated the excuses were...'* (Official G, 03.03.2013)

His conclusion to some degree is right when I examined the verdicts of conservation cases. Quite a few indigenous lawbreakers, nature conservation law in particular, were not prosecuted or got deferred prosecution because of poor living condition, low education, weak legal conception, and customary motives for hunting. These requirements for non-prosecution and deferred prosecution in the Criminal Code have been mentioned above. Some indigenous people did meet these conditions, thus they got light sentences. The official noted that the legal system saw indigenous people as different groups when investigating and making judgment. This may have facilitated the birth of 'Indigenous Court and Investigation' in 2013. An official N working in the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office, briefly talked about the start of establishing a new special court for indigenous peoples. It is due to their distinct value. Yet it is difficult for the state to legislate new regulations for indigenous groups.

*'This is the primary goal of creating the specific court for indigenous peoples...their history and values are different from the mainstream legal system. But it is impossible to pass a new law only for them. It is too hard. For example, land registration and sale are common in Taiwan. The principle of land pre-emption as the traditional value of indigenous groups is not recognised...the legal system cannot amend the land system because of the value of indigenous peoples in theory no matter*

*if the system is right or not. In this authoritarian society, groups with power and force can manipulate these...the state does not allow exception...Taiwan just started the change...'* (Official N, 30.09.2014)

Among the verdicts I reviewed, half of the conservation litigations were summary judgments, which indicated these cases were comparably simpler than other criminal cases. The defendants' confession and sufficient existing evidence made the oral arguments of general litigation unnecessary. The other precondition of summary judgment was that the case was a misdemeanour and it could merely be declared probation, imprisonment of six months or commutation to a fine by the judge finally. This did save the public sector legal resources as well as the litigant's financial expenses. The violators of conservation cases are always indigenous people, and the summary judgments revealed that many indigenous suspects confessed their violation of conservation legislations. These conservation violations were not treated as felonies. Therefore, the judgements were simple to describe the punishment and then the facts and reasons were listed including the regulations.

In general, the punishment in conservation cases was usually slight according to these verdicts. For example, the indigenous litigants who were arrested due to poaching were usually sentenced to the minimum term of imprisonment which was six months according to Article 42 of the Wildlife Conservation Act. However, they were in the end sentenced to probation. The judge usually considered they were indigenous people, which meant they usually had different living styles from mainstream society in Taiwan. Many verdicts used the following descriptions. 'The litigant had poor awareness of the laws and did not know it was wrong to violate the regulations in this case. But his attitude was good after being committed, which revealed he was remorseful. After the lessons of this sentence, he should exercise greater vigilance. There should be no danger of recidivism. The court therefore thinks it is appropriate not to perform the punishment temporarily and declares probation for several years to encourage his rehabilitation.'

This typical judgment adopted the mainstream idea of legislation to see indigenous people as having a weak understanding of regulations. The sincere attitude of indigenous criminals showed their repentance. The shock education of prosecution must teach them a lesson to avoid recidivism. Since they did not commit the crime on purpose and it is impossible for them to repeat the offence, the judge decided to suspend punishment. The outcome for indigenous 'offenders' may be good, but such statements did not really



respect differences in society of Taiwan. The powerful mainstream values still look down on the minority groups in terms of their institutions. The dominant Han Chinese society defines what crime is and establishes institutions to implement the legal system. The 'criminal behaviours' of indigenous people here such as hunting and collecting natural resources were reasonable under their traditional customs and contexts. The rights of indigenous people in the justice system are still neglected despite the lenient sentence according to these adjudications in relation to the Wildlife Conservation Act.

The other controversial issue among the adjudications was the shotgun "problem". It is illegal to make and possess a gun in the light of the Regulations of Guns, Ammunition and Weaponry Control. However, several amendments of such regulations to deal with the particularity of lifestyle of indigenous people have decriminalised this act. That is, if the gun is a living tool for indigenous people, it is legal to make and possess a gun. The prosecutor or judge thus sought for evidence whether the shotgun was used only as a tool in their life. The decriminalisation of manufacturing/owning a shotgun for indigenous people was based on the spirit of Article Ten of the Additional Articles of the Constitution to recognise cultural pluralism and promote the development of indigenous cultures. Further, some judges interpreted above legislations to suggest that owning a shotgun is not the prerequisite only of those indigenous people who rely on sustenance hunting. Indigenous people who use a shotgun as a tool in their life can also own it legally. The judges cited the processes of amending the law and affirmed the constitutional amendment in order to confirm the innocence of indigenous litigants regarding shotguns. In fact, the majority of indigenous people possessing shotguns use them for hunting practices or ritual needs, not for harming others. The opinions of these judges on the shotgun topic supported the speciality of traditional culture and ensured that some indigenous residents still go hunting when they are free. Since the shotgun was seen as a life tool, the decriminalisation of manufacturing/ possessing a shotgun should apply to the whole indigenous group. Such opinions are similar to those of one aboriginal legal professor:

*'National Police Agency established a rule to examine whether the shotgun is traditional or not...what is the purpose of the rule? What does it limit? People have to stress they are indigenous people first. Then their possession of a shotgun seems to return to the situation one hundred years ago such as they made a shotgun according to traditional ways, and it is reasonable and legal to own it. However, many indigenous people are arrested, prosecuted and sentenced. The police still arrest*

*indigenous people owning shotguns in these years but some prosecutors dislike this because the regulation has changed. Some prosecutors still prosecute these offenders. A few judges have declared they will acquit<sup>13</sup> but they are few only... there has been a new verdict which claimed the aboriginal litigant having two shotguns was not guilty. A judge adopted two covenants (ICCPR, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and ICESCR, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) to explain his opinions. The primary spirit is 'cultural development'. The judge thought the right for indigenous people to possess the shotgun should also coincide with the concepts of cultural development and cultural creativity. Indigenous people cannot sustain the original situation of long ago with the development of science and technology. A shotgun is also developed. There are new technologies being put into traditional knowledge system. But a shotgun is still a shotgun. The concept of a shotgun is the same (for hunting only). The judge established his opinions on this.'*  
(Professor A, 08.03.2013)

The next discussion was whether the litigant was aboriginal or not. Indigenous communities were usually convicted leniently on shotgun topic in accordance with a series of amendments of the Regulations of Guns, Ammunition and Weaponry Control. It is easy to know one's status of indigenous people by checking the identity card. Among these verdicts, there was an identity controversy and the judges referenced the Status Act for Indigenous Peoples, the official documents of Council of Indigenous Peoples and the explanation letter of household registration unit to confirm his status. In this case the defendant showed his great grandfather's census data from the Japanese Era to insist on his aboriginal status but this was rejected because on the documents above there was no note about his being an aborigine on his identity card. He was therefore sentenced to imprisonment over one year due to possessing a shotgun. The other special defendant was a non-aboriginal but had lived in indigenous community for a long time. He learnt the skills of making shotguns and did manufacture one for hunting wildlife. The judges considered his situation and the punishment of his crime of manufacturing of firearms was mitigated.

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<sup>13</sup> Such a judgement came from a verdict of Taitung District Court in 2012. An indigenous man possessed a shotgun made by modern ways in his hut. He was arrested by the police according to the Controlling Guns, Ammunition, and Knives Act. A judge acquitted this indigenous man finally because he thought that indigenous people have their own culture (hunting) according to the Additional Articles of the Constitution of ROC, and indigenous people should benefit from scientific progress (making shotguns in accordance with modern ways) in line with two covenants.

I found some new precedents were established when reading these judgments. For example, labour service was usually an additional condition for one year after issuing the verdict during the probation period. A charitable donation could be the basis of mitigation of punishment. Legal education and conservation learning both seemed to become the means to reduce the violation of conservation regulations. In addition, I collected a conservation adjudication in 2013 and its reference number indicated that it concerned an aboriginal person. It was judged by the new aboriginal court which deals only with aboriginal cases based on Article 30 of the Basic Law for Indigenous Peoples. By examining this case, the old indigenous hunter was sentenced to imprisonment for six months but probation for two years. The game, shotgun, and ammunition were confiscated. The additional condition was legal education for twenty hours. It seemed there was no difference from the previous verdicts about conservation violation because the current conservation legislation is the foundation of this adjudication. Indigenous people and their customs unfortunately still lose their importance in the special court.

In summary, indigenous hunting practices were in conflict with conservation legislation in Taiwan, in particular in PAs. All cases in national parks (there are two parks in the jurisdiction of Hualien District Court) were penalised according to the Wildlife Conservation Act rather than the National Park Law because the loss of few animals did not significantly damage the parks. Indigenous huntsmen were usually sentenced to probation for several years as most of them were arrested for hunting for the first time. The lenient sentence for indigenous defendants was one climate among the justice system. But such a 'grace' exposed the institutional conflicts between different groups. The dominant community controls the justice system and imposes its institutions on other groups. Article Ten of the Additional Articles of the Constitution stresses the cultural pluralism of Taiwan and indigenous culture should be promoted sustainably. The emphasis of fundamental law still cannot strengthen the position of indigenous people within the justice system. Indigenous people of Taiwan still need the amnesty of all dominant institutions if they offend these institutions.

### **5.6.3 Some essential problems of National Park Law**

There have been some problems when the Park Police carry out their conservation mission in the park. These problems stem from the nature of National Park Law. Firstly, the law has been formulated for over 40 years without any essential correction. It implies that the problem of outdated provisions may not coincide with contemporary conditions.

The second problem is raised when people interpret some relevant articles of National Park Law.

Most of the forests in Taroko National Park belong to forest compartments of the Forestry Bureau, so the Wildlife Conservation Acts formulated in 1989 can be applied to the territory of Park. In the interview with a female elder Y, a park policeman came to chat with her. I took the opportunity to ask him about the implementation of the conservation regulations in the Park. He talked about poaching and said that hunting the general wildlife such as wild boar in the Park will be penalised in accordance with National Park Law. As for hunting protected endangered species, the Wildlife Conservation Act becomes the legal source of the penalty rather than National Park Law. This coincides with the interview with an official of Taroko National Park headquarters. This is the second controversy that two streams of conservation legislation are used in national parks. This problem simultaneously highlights the domination of conservation in the Park. The Park authorities use both regulations to control resources and people within the Park.

*'It is different in and out the park. Outside of the national park, the Wildlife Conservation Act is used and legal hunting can be applied according to the regulations. Meanwhile, it is forbidden to hunt wildlife because the 13rd Article of National Park Law...The Park Police apply Wildlife Conservation Act to poaching matters in the Park now. The poaching cases are usually divided into protected endangered species and general wildlife in terms of the wild animals a hunter hunts. The Park Police then transfer the hunter to the local police station. He will be punished according to Wildlife Conservation Act.'* (Official C, 07.11.2012)

Its application of Wildlife Conservation Act reflects the problem of National Park Law formulated over 40 years ago. The penal section of the law seems to be out of date when the newer act is used. The two reasons may explain why the Act is applied when the Park Police conduct their conservation mission. The problems which emerge are the correction of the law and the integration of conservation regulations and governmental agencies in the park.

One of the management partitions of a national park is existing use area in accordance with the Article 12 of the Law. The eighth Article defines the general controlled area, namely, the existing use area, and notes the residents can sustain the original land use in the park. Therefore, Truku people should claim that their hunting territory, a type of land use, can be sustained within the general controlled area in the park. They can

continue their hunting practices in the park. However, Article 13 of the Law expressly prohibits hunting practices in the park. The different clauses related to original land use can be interpreted differently by various stakeholders. This fuzzy space of interpretation is a problem itself, but can be adopted as the negotiation between the local indigenous people and the Park authorities. The Taroko Park official, C, pointed out the vague interpretation.

*'Existing buildings can be sustained in the general controlled area. The Law recognises the original land use. There was no clear definition and explanation of the original land use when the law was formulated in 1972. Whether afforestation or hunting can be continued or not? Article 13 notes the hunting prohibition... there is no integration among several articles of the law... in fact, it gives room which the local indigenous people can use. When the wildlife from the protected area destroys the farm, why can I hunt the animals? It is legal in accordance with Wildlife Conservation Act...why do the authorities designate the traditional hunting territory as the ecological protected area rather than the general controlled area? ...maybe it is sufficient to designate one-tenth of Taroko National Park as the hunting territory of the local Truku people.'* (Official C, 07.11.2012)

Overall, there are three points here in the interview. First, some articles of the National Park Law were out of date. Second, the Wildlife Conservation Acts were employed by the Park to supplement the slight penalty of the National Park Law in order to strengthen the power of nature conservation. Third, the zoning of the Park could be used by the locals because of loose restriction. These problems reveal the domination of the Park for they strengthen the power of manipulation within the Park boundary by the Park authorities. Access to natural resources by the local Truku residents is concurrently restrictive. The law is the main legal source of the park. It is a tool for the Park authorities to justify their conservation intervention and communications with the locals. Yet there are critical defects in the law. The Park authorities and the state did not propose a revised version in order to adapt to the current environment and society. Accordingly, the Park authorities with Park Police could keep on implementing such a strict regulation in the Park. The Park remained a territory where special law was enforced to control local people's behaviours.

## **5.7 Participation schemes of Taroko National Park**

The local participation schemes in the Park suppose that participation must improve the relationship between the Park headquarters and the locals. Thus local participation is the foundation for further co-management arrangements in the Park. Yet can such a positive supposition be applied to the Taroko Park? The tangible scheme for the local indigenous people to participate in Park affairs is the beginning of the inspection of local participation. The participation schemes of Taroko National Park Headquarters can be traced back to the start of this new century. The director at that time held a series of events to demonstrate a friendly attitude towards the local Truku residents. A new cultural participatory committee was established for Truku people to join in the management of the park but only on a consultation level. This innovation in the National Park system was later discontinued because there was no legal basis for the committee.

There were at least four types of scheme of Taroko National Park for Truku people to join in the management of Park according to my fieldwork. These channels of participation contained the official committees, commissioned projects of the Park headquarters, festival events, and employment opportunities of the park. The participation levels of these types vary, and primarily depend on the designation of the schemes by the administration. The Park authorities play the dominant role in these participation schemes. For example, the Park headquarters designed the cultural committee and selected its members. Without these specific conduits, the local residents cannot express their views about the Park and the Park authorities easily. That is because these mechanisms are the only form of interaction between the Park authorities and the local Truku people.

### **5.7.1 Participation in official committees**

The start of local participation of Park management was a series of cultural events such as lectures about indigenous culture in 2000. In 2001, the 'Indigenous Cultural Consultation Committee' was formed by the Park authorities. Before forming this official committee, the Park authorities once claimed they had a communication platform in the form of a committee to deal with the matters of the local indigenous people after the protest in 1994. However, Sung and Yeh (2010) found that such a committee for aboriginal affairs did not exist. The fourth director of Taroko National Park Headquarters commenced consultation with the local elders and held a series of events such as for the rectification of the local names, and a conference about indigenous culture in 2000. The

establishment of the 'Indigenous Cultural Consultation Committee' was the final outcome after these welcome events in relation to Truku culture. The proposals and discussions of the three meetings of the committee in 2002 were seen as official proposals for various sections of the Park to deal with. An official L explained why the Park headquarters used 'culture' as a participatory aspect,

*'That was a breakthrough at that time. The reason why the director selected the aspect of 'cultural consultation' was because the perspective coincided with what the management unit could expand. Culture was one way for the administrative system at that time to break the budget restrictions. Culture was a possible link...this should be the limit of the management authority. Without the legal rules there was no power to sustain the affairs of co-management...there must be a legal basis for the administration to establish every unit in it. People in the administration including the leader cannot violate the legal norms.'* (Official L, 05.03.2013)

This committee was composed of the local leaders, staff of the Park authorities, and some scholars from the universities. The aboriginal representatives accounted for half of the committee (11/22). The proposals of the meetings were handled by different sections of the Park headquarters and the planning section was responsible for the administrative affairs of this committee. The Agency of Planning, which was above the national park system, issued an official document to command national parks to establish committees similar to Taroko National Park later in 2002 (Sung and Yeh, 2010). The new committee for communication with the local people seemed to be approved by the central government. However, due to the lack of legal force, the fifth director intended to cancel the fourth meeting in December 2002. Many representatives expressed their ideas for convening the assembly and pushed the Park headquarters hold the meeting. The Park did not deny the committee that meeting but there was no meeting of the committee called in the following years. In 2006, the Park authorities discussed with several local churches to establish a committee to deal with local matters but such planning was stillborn because the director was transferred to another national park (Sung and Yeh, 2010). The official website of Taroko National Park Headquarters reveals that different sections of the Park accounted for different communities in the Park territory as the partnership network during 2003-2006. The staff entered the communities to understand the problems and views of the local indigenous people and provided help. In 2007, the section of planning of the Park also established a 'petition window' for local people to express their opinions (interviews with official L, 2013). The informant thought the Park

headquarters interacted with the local people all the time, but there might be no the official channel or formal name for the cultural committee. There were four joint conferences being called in 2007 and January 2008 for the leaders of governmental agencies, local churches, communities and Truku elites to attend. Some specific themes such as eco-tourism development and cultural events were discussed in the conferences. The third conference noticed the new draft of rules of co-management in the indigenous regions and recommended 11 representatives to prepare for the co-management committee. The fourth meeting in January 2008 declared the co-management committee would replace the conference. Two preparatory meetings of the co-management committee were convened in 2008 and then were paused for a while because of the change of director (Sung and Yeh, 2010). The Ministry of Interior issued the ‘Standards for Establishing Co-Management Committee in Indigenous Regions’ in October 2009. The Park thus held the first meeting of co-management committee in 2010 and second one in 2011.

<b>Time</b>	<b>Official communication scheme</b>	<b>Remark</b>
<b>2002</b>	The committee of indigenous cultural consultation (non-official committee)	Four meetings
<b>2003-2006</b>	Partnership network	Irregular visit
<b>2007-</b>	The petition window	For nearby communities
<b>2007-2008</b>	The conference of indigenous affairs	Four meetings
<b>2009</b>	The standards of establishing the co-management committee in indigenous regions (official administrative rule)	Agency of Planning, the Ministry of Interior
<b>2010-2011</b>	The committee of co-management	Two meetings

*Table 5.1 The official participation schemes of Taroko Park*

Source: Information drawn from interviews with L, and Sung and Yeh (2010)



The development process for official participation schemes of the Park indicates that first, the legal basis of every scheme is significant because this is in relation to the budget and implementation. The legal basis ensures not only budgeting of such a scheme but the legality of implementing such a scheme. Two factors affect the implementation of such a scheme. First, the legal basis of a scheme supports the finance and implementation of such a scheme, which allow the scheme to run smoothly and sustainably, irrespective of any change to the Park directorship. Thus, the scheme may become a formal institution of the Park headquarters. Second, these schemes vary according to the change of directors of the park. This means the schemes run only for a short time. It is not easy for the schemes to transfer to be long-term institutions.

Since the legal basis of the co-management committee has now been established, I will examine the legal resource and the implementation of the new participation rules. The standards are formulated in the 'Rules of Co-Management of Resources in Indigenous Regions' of 2007. The rules can be traced back to the 'Basic Laws of Indigenous Peoples' of 2005. This implies that the standards were passively enacted in accordance with other regulations rather than due to consultation with the indigenous people.

*'These are the standards, because there was an article in the 'Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples' about establishing the co-management committee to protect the rights and resources of indigenous people. A parent law extends to many agencies to formulate their administrative rules. These rules are based on the parent law.'*  
(Official L, 05.03.2013)

The standards note that the main mission of the committee is to deal with affairs in relation to indigenous people including the plans of the Park and the proposals of the indigenous community. In other words, the committee is a task-oriented group. The members of the committee are the representatives of the local indigenous people, experts or scholars, and the representatives of governmental agencies which are relevant to indigenous affairs. Half of the members of the co-management committee must be indigenous people who are recommended by the indigenous communities. If there is no tribal meeting organisation, the township office can recommend members. The director of the Park is the convener of the meeting. The meetings are convened every half a year in principle.

*'The standards are also task-oriented. Unless the Legislation Yuan at a central level amends the law, the committee may become permanent or the necessary section. It is possible to change on that high level. (Official L, 05.03.2013)*

The records of the two meetings of the co-management committee reveal that those representatives of indigenous people were the leaders of Truku social organisations, the head of F village and the head of the township office. These Truku leaders represented the local indigenous communities to express their opinions. Official L explained the members of the co-management committee and the problems happening at the meetings:

*'The members of the committee contained the Park authorities, local governmental agencies---county government, county parliament, township office, and township representatives, and those representatives recommended by the tribal meeting groups. However, there was no tribal meeting group in this township. Therefore, the township office offered the list of members of indigenous people. The people the office recommended of course belonged to the same faction. So you can imagine what happened at the meeting. That is, what the head of the office said on the meeting was supported by the other seven members. No objection among those aboriginal members. This was the problem which happened in practice...In principle, no matter on the legal and practical levels, we hoped to invite members who were real representatives in the indigenous groups. But we saw the practical difficulty that the standards stipulated the tribal meeting groups recommend members but the group in the village was not running or immature. Thus, the implementation changed to the governmental agency like the situation. I think if the regulations are incomplete, people may interpret by themselves. If the legislations are complete, it may be not flexible to implement the legislations. It is difficult in practice. It is not easy to consider both sides, it is kind of dilemma.'* (Official L, 05.03.2013)

The benign conception of the standards can lead to a power struggle in practice when the tribal meeting groups at the local level do not operate well. This was not what the policy makers expected at the beginning. It indicates that the policy or regulations at the central level may not be implemented successfully locally because not every factor of the policy is complete. Even if the elements are complete, the local environment could affect the policy implementation. It indicates that the policy should take the environment of implementation into consideration when policy making, or policy ideals may be

distorted. In this way, the head of the township office can dominate the indigenous community of the committee, even the meeting, to carry on a personal agenda.

Further, it is important to examine the proposals and discussions at the meetings in order to understand the practical operation of this co-management committee. The motions of the first meeting primarily concerned the development issues of the local Truku people. Some members suggested increasing employment opportunities for the local indigenous residents. The training programmes such as a tour guide course were needed for the local people to develop eco-tourism in the Park. Some local leaders asked for more participation of Park festivals and for a budget increase for cultural events. The head of the Township Office hoped that the land problems in the Park could be solved, especially the reserved lands for indigenous people. It is worth mentioning that a retired Truku principal noticed this committee was a task-oriented one and suggested a change to a permanent committee. In addition, a scholar who worked in this Park before, suggested adding the representatives of the local inhabitants (Taroko National Park, 2011).

The second meeting was held three months after the current director's inauguration. The meeting started with the responses to the motions at the first meeting. I found the Park usually replied to the proposals with projects. For example, a new festival event 'Happy Taroko 2011' was used to promote Truku culture and local tourism industry. The Park also financially sponsored the training programme with the Township Office. The Park headquarters thought they had hired many indigenous people in accordance with the regulations to respond to the issue of local employment. As for the land issue, the Park authorities would report to the higher agency. These replies seemed to ignore some fundamental difficulties of Truku people such as employment and tourism industry. Most job vacancies for the local people were labour service with low income. The employer was the outsourcing company instead of the Park. This meant poor protection and harsh working conditions. The eco-tourism industry benefited merely a few residents who were wealthy enough to run such a business. The empowerment of training courses to cultivate the aboriginal tour guides did not ensure that these trainees would have jobs in the future. In fact, the travel agency usually hired their own tour guides rather than the local people. I do not think that eco-tourism is what the local indigenous people embrace. Eco-tourism could be the wishful thinking of the Park headquarters after considering the dilemma of conservation and development.

The majority of motions at the second conference focused on development as well, particularly the suggestions of construction projects and environmental improvement. These motions were proposed by the head of township office and the chairman of township representatives. These motions looked like the motions at the meeting of township representatives. This led to a negative complaint of the Park headquarters. So some Park staff did not expect a proactive meeting of the co-management committee.

*'We have established the committee of co-management. But everyone thinks it is a disaster. It is not a disaster for an individual. If it is not necessary to establish the committee, we don't do it. If it is not necessary to call the meeting, we don't do it. If it is not necessary to discuss motions, we don't do it. Can you understand? That is a very heavy burden...because what the committee can offer are 'resources'. However, we cannot afford the resources... it was like the interaction between the township office and the township representative, that kind of level...' (Official C and L, 05.03.2013)*

Another problem came from the nature of the standards which were designed by the administration. The standards place limitations on the committee. For instance, the Park authorities have the power to pick half of the members. The task-oriented nature also implies that the committee is needed when necessary.

*'The committee is still the design of the administration. There are many things under it secretly. These secret things are meant to help the person in charge (the power) to eliminate interference. It looked fair to distribute the members to every community...but when some experts/scholars join in the committee, the local leaders join, and the director of the Park also selects some non-indigenous people to join in the members...now the co-management is running the 'consultation' only...this is relevant to what we talked 'suffrage', the rights to participate in public affairs...' (Official C, 05.03.2013)*

Informant C stressed the motivation for designing such standards to avoid the interference of the local indigenous people since the convener (the director of the Park) possesses the power of selecting the members from other governmental agencies and academia. These half members of the co-management committee may form a force to counter the interests of indigenous people. The standards makers who represent the mainstream Han Chinese society, did not allow the aboriginal members to participate in these public affairs of the Park. The participation level is merely 'consultation' in practice.

The irregular meetings cannot effectively take care of the needs of the local indigenous people. This is not only because the nature of them is task-oriented, but also for the operations of meetings.

*'I think the committee should operate regularly and continuously. But it is not the fact. As I know, the reasons why the committee cannot operate like that is because many members admitted that they came for the resources. When the Park authorities can't afford the resources, we really cannot do it. So we called two conferences in 2010 and 2011 respectively. The members of the first session expired the term at the end of last year. If we convene a meeting this year, we need to select members. (Official L, 05.03.2013)*

These official meetings and co-management committees participated in by the leaders of Truku people unfolded that the Park authorities were the dominant agency to manipulate the schemes. The directors of the Park usually guided these schemes such as the selection of committee members and the frequency of meetings. The Park headquarters grasp the utmost power to control the committee. Their control might stem from the design of legal foundation. The rules allow the Park to own the greatest discretion. The level of local participation by the local leaders was comparably low. Moreover, in such schemes, did the local representatives really express the voice of Truku residents? They appeared to merely represent their interests according to the analysis of meeting records. In general, the participatory schemes failed to improve the relationship. The Park authorities led the formal meetings. The co-management arrangements did not achieve the goal of co-management with the local Truku people.

### **5.7.2 Participation in commissioned projects**

The commissioned projects were the projects financially supported by Taroko National Park headquarters. Some of these projects were in relation to the local Truku people, particularly the industry planning for the local residents in the Park. These plans were usually allocated to professional organisations such as NGOs. Here the participation of the local people in the projects denotes that the local people had the opportunity to join the process of conducting the projects. Perhaps they could express their views of the commissioned projects despite the projects being sponsored by the Park. I selected five projects as examples to explore the participation of Truku people in the park management. These plans involving the local people were studied after 2000, which indicated that the participation issue was to be valued in the new century. These projects included 'a public

forum for developing community-based ecotourism action plan' in 2004, 'An overall planning of ecotourism in Taroko National Park' in 2005, 'An ecotourism programme with the local hunters in one highland area in the Park' in 2007, 'Expanding partnership with the local people on conservation action in the Park' in 2009, and the series of 'Agriculture transformation to organic agriculture in a highland area in the Park' from 2010-2013. Furthermore, a conservation project sponsored by the conservation section of the Park in 2005 is also worth mentioning for some Truku residents participated in conservation action to protect the river in their traditional territory. The following paragraph outlines the projects in order.

In the Project forum discussion, the different views and concerns between one local group and the Park headquarters became clear. The Park regarded natural conservation as the priority while the Truku community stressed their livelihood development. The research suggested that mutual communication and making use of the current regulations for both sides' interests were necessary. The Park authorities should empower the people and the amendment of inappropriate regulations was also needed (Lee and Wang, 2004). Findings of the holistic planning of ecotourism of the Park in 2005 indicated the Park authorities should take hierarchy principle of ecotourism and cooperate with the local Truku inhabitants for management of ecotourism trips. Accordingly, the planning suggested establishing a co-management mechanism for the local aboriginal community to take part in Park management (Lin, 2005). The trial ecotourism programme with the local huntsmen playing the role of tour guides developed the connection between wildlife conservation and local economic development. The idea was to offer interests to Truku hunters that they may recognise the un-consumptive value of wildlife so that the conception of wildlife conservation could be established in their mind. The participating visitors could experience the lifestyle of indigenous people and see this as a special ecotourism trip. The practical project ran five trips during June and November in 2007 and found some elements that could impede the promotion of such an ecotourism tour by questionnaire survey (Wu, 2007). The project concerning partnership with local residents noted the general controlled area could hold a chance for the local people to enhance the partnership with the park authorities as people were allowed to develop certain economic activity in the area according to the National Park Law. The Project therefore suggested that the Park authorities establish a long-term mechanism to connect to the local people in order to facilitate the partnership (Lu, 2009). The agricultural reform projects have been sponsored by the Park headquarters for at least four years, which indicated the park

authorities were serious about this topic in the Park. Among these project documents from 2010 to 2013, several stages of agricultural reform occurred in one highland area of the Park including the initial promotion of organic agriculture and communication, there was further cooperation by signing contracts for producing organic vegetables, to gain verification of organic food, and the marketing of organic fruits and vegetables. More farmers joined the organic group in the highland area according to the data of the projects (Su, 2013).

The participation of the local Truku residents highlighted the differences in thinking and concern from the Park authorities when the projects were carried out because these projects primarily dealt with the economic development of the local people. In the forum project in 2004, by holding the joint conference among the stakeholders, the local people and the Park headquarters dialogued on certain issues on economic, socio-cultural and environmental domains for the better management of that highland area. For example, the local Truku residents owning reserved lands in one highland area of the Park stressed their livelihood needs such as the transportation of agricultural products and employment. Issues of everyday life such as electricity also indicated the practical concern of the local people. The representative of the Park headquarters listened and responded with the expectation of collective consensus of the residents at the meetings. This project organised the forum platform for the local Truku residents to attend to express their thoughts, which could be seen as the initial step of communication between the Park authorities and the Truku civilians. The local Truku people in that area also self-organised a new association as a response after these communication conferences held by the programme moderator. However, the project aborted and lasted only for one year. The suggestion of collaborate planning might be shelved after the project.

In 2005, the overall eco-tourism planning found six challenges of developing eco-tourism in the Park. One of those was that the economic development of the local inhabitants was difficult in the Park because of the conservation restrictions. The eco-tourism industry might be the reconciliation of conservation and development in the Taroko National Park. The local people could be trained as eco-tourism professionals to improve their livelihood. The suggestion was also consistent with one principle of ecotourism--- the participation of the local inhabitants. Furthermore, the culture of Truku people played a significant role in the human resource of the Park. The culture enriched the ecotourism development in the Park. The project recommended that cooperative management of ecotourism was necessary. The communication platform of the Park for

the local people to participate could be established. The participation of the local residents in this planning project was a suggestion for the future development of eco-tourism. Local residents' concerns were addressed as one of the concrete recommendations. This was at best an indication of the policy of the Park rather than a feasible substantive policy. The next year of this project paid attention to the participation of social enterprises. This might imply that the Park authorities did not anticipate any further step in the co-management with the local people.

The initiators of the project in 2007 arranging an actual hunting trip with the Truku hunters thought that it was a chance for Han Chinese visitors to experience the life of Truku people in the highland. The questionnaire survey of the visitors attending the trip replied that the hunter guides of Truku people were not as expert at interpretation as they anticipated. An official L of the Park headquarters mentioned that one of the plights of this project was the capacity of interpretation of the Truku hunters.

*'The first problem of the project was the resource of the visitors. The bad weather impeded the trip. The other one was the hunters were not good at guiding tours and interpreting, so they had to depend upon some outsiders.... but my personal opinion was that it took time to empower and coach these local residents.'* (Official L, 05.03.2013)

This subjective opinion of visitors and the official reflected the views of mainstream Chinese society about what an excellent tour guide was. These Han Chinese tourists were not aware that Truku huntsmen were always quiet because the informal norms of Truku tradition---Gaya standardised the hunters and made hunters behave. They had been disciplined by these teachings of traditional norms since they were young. Being a hunter one should behave quietly and cannot freely speak. Therefore, Truku hunters are unlikely to be eloquent tour guides. There is also the typical response that the customer-oriented conception of the mainstream Chinese society imposed on the minority indigenous community, which was unfair. One essential principle of authentic ecotourism is the participation of the local people. This idea can be applied to these trial trips of the project that the tours shall be led by the local Truku residents to reflect the Truku characteristics. The local residents can involve the visitors in their life-style more deeply. They should take the initiative to organise such travel in their territory. Moreover, the non-consumptive use of wildlife of this project did not coincide with the traditions of the Truku people. According to my interview with one Truku park ranger the real hunting trip



occurred after the tourism trips. This revealed the local Truku people's identity, which was greater than the modern interest in the ecotourism programme.

The partnership project in 2009 pointed out certain weaknesses of one local Truku community when exploring the partnership between the local people and the Park authorities. The Truku inhabitants seemed to lack traditional knowledge in everyday life and some people simply pandered to the visitors. They doubted the governmental agencies and the institutions. When ecotourism was concerned, the response of the majority of residents was passive including the weakening of traditional knowledge in modern society, the mistrust of governmental agencies, and the passive responses of residents. It can be concluded that indigenous people are more greatly affected by modern institutions rather than their traditional culture. Their identity in modern times is also highly dynamic. In addition, according to the project findings, I can detect that the local Truku people may not so passionate about the ecotourism being strongly promoted by the Park authorities, due to the poor interaction between these two primary stakeholder bodies. In this project, the participation of the local Truku residents was mainly in the public participatory geographic information system for land use analysis and Truku residents' responses to the Park headquarters in the interviews and focus group. The data from the residents showed their understanding and interpretation such as the traditional place names and land use in the traditional territory by the geographic technology. The information and the suggestion of co-management on industry topics had been raised several times by these projects. Nevertheless, the Park authorities seemed to see these as the suggestions rather than a feasible policy. Otherwise the co-management mechanism in the Park should have been established earlier than the official rules of co-management that were decreed in 2009.

The series of agricultural reform projects aimed not merely to transform agriculture but to create a new ecotourism industry in one highland community in the Park. In the participation the local inhabitants including the farmers joined the organic group to gain training courses, to attend conferences, and to grow vegetables and fruits. This was a process of communication and negotiation for the Park to deal with the agriculture issues in the Park. First, conservation was the priority of this protected area, so the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides degraded the environment, which was a problem. Second, the eco-friendly way for the environment was organic agriculture and such a transformation was beneficial for the local people and the Park. Finally, the transformation of agriculture was regarded as the base of ecotourism industry. The process

showed the new industry---ecotourism was not introduced directly to the local residents. Rather, the Park authorities commissioned a professional NGO to communicate with the local farmers and talked about the eco-tourism. The Park headquarters concerned themselves with local economic development and persuaded the people gradually to transform their agriculture for a better future. The Park financially sponsored this project for several years in order to improve the environment and to repair relationships with the local people. The efforts of the commissioned foundation and Park authorities for several years seemed to get initial success as more and more farmers agreed to the transformation and joined the organic group.

*'People in that highland area make living on agriculture and it is ok for them because they provide vegetables when there is lack of vegetable in plains in summer. The problems they face are the typhoon disaster which may cause cut-off of roads and destruction of agricultural products. The transportation problems and destruction resulting from the disaster are the difficulties in agriculture. For us Park authorities, we hope to develop ecotourism in that area. But the obstacle to this is the general farming way of adopting pesticide. We believe that the transformation of agriculture from the general way to organic way is beneficial for the ecotourism industry in the future. This is the general direction.'* (Official L, 30.09.2014)

*'In 2010, we coached a community for agricultural reformation in the highland in the Park. We wanted to help them reform their agriculture from general way to organic way. If the project lasts for one year merely, it is hard for the community to change because all people must resist against change. How to make them agree to change, to change step by step, you can see that we spent half a year to persuade them to try the new way. Then we spent one more year making them try to grow organic vegetables. This is the third year, we hope all the farmers agree to grow organically and all agricultural products reform to be organic. Doing these demands to link all details. For example, the marketing of the organic products is also needed. The farmers have to ensure all these steps from production to sales, otherwise no one wants to change the way they use to be.'* (Official L, 05.03.2013)

In the interviews of staff of the Park headquarters, my informants in different sections expressed their disparate views of the effect of the series of agricultural transformation projects.

*'There are two areas where larger-scale agriculture exists in the Park, and these two areas are the source of some problems in the Park... there are two ideas among the farmers there. One is that they are familiar with the whole procedures of the general agricultural way including the farming and the market. The Park authorities commission a foundation to implement a series of project there to promote organic agriculture. The foundation also grasps the distribution channel of organic vegetables which is the other idea. The organisation understands both production and marketing, which is good...If the typhoon ruins the vegetable zone in the flats of west Taiwan, the farmers in the highland in the Park make much money...Farmers there adopt the general way to grow vegetables near the primary school while organic agriculture is used close to their houses. They make much there but lose here by the organic way. The challenges are that organic agriculture cannot earn much money nor solve their original problem of transportation. Also people in the other agricultural area do not envy the organic production, which indicates it is not good enough. They may think everything of organic farming is just so. My personal opinion is the series of agriculture projects are not successful. The Park headquarters support the projects with several hundred thousand NT dollars to commission the foundation every year. Otherwise the foundation cannot help the agriculture there. People there still keep both ways of agriculture...there are thirty households in that area but merely seven households actually living there nowadays. Totally ten households including neighbourhood area join the organic agriculture group in these years...It is difficult to conclude that the series of project are successful or failure for we are carrying out the project at the moment...'* (Official C, 29.09.2014)

The different views of the project can be analysed from the perspective of the different roles they play in the project. L is the official in charge of the project and she has participated in most processes of the project for five years. She accordingly comprehends the difficulties of conducting the projects within the five years such as mutual communications and the problem of plant pests for the participating farmers. Instead, the chief, official C, is the examiner of the projects and he understands these through monthly briefs. He used a higher level to compare two agricultural areas in the park. He therefore thought since the organic project did not attract the other farmers of the other area, it seemed the project was not successful.

A public TV programme depicted organic agriculture in this area of the Park in 2012. The participating farmers expressed their ideas of the organic experiment in the

mountain. One farmer mentioned the organic idea was a win-win approach because it was friendly to the environment, farmers and consumers. Another farmer said he tried the organic way in a small part of his field at the beginning and then most of the field was applied this soft farming despite the problems of pests and wildlife. Confronting these difficulties, he optimistically thought he may make less but sustainable profit. The other participant said she wanted to leave the benign land to the next generation. The positive feedback from the project participants justified the project and did change their minds. As for the farmer who did not join the organic team he was concerned about the lower yield and less income.

Examining these projects one could conclude that the national park authorities emphasized natural conservation rather than economic development of the local residents because these industry development projects were based on the prioritisation of conservation. The compromise way between conservation and development was the eco-tourism industry which less negatively impacted the environment. It seemed to be the bottom line of the Park authorities in terms of development issue. These projects had proposed some suggestions and solutions to the problems of the local people, but they were at best regarded as suggestions for the direction of policy making of the Park authorities. These showed the hegemony of the Park authorities that they had the established stereotype which could not be challenged. The commissioned projects were entirely perfunctory. Furthermore, these trial researches confirmed the difference in thinking of the local people from the Park authorities. The norms for participation of the local people in these programmes implied that they could merely express their opinions on the execution of the projects. There were some opportunities for mutual dialogue between the Park authorities and the local people, yet there was no tangible progress made for improvement of mutual trust.

The organic agriculture project showed a different scenario from other projects. Not only was there a longer implementation time than others, but there was a priority of implementation. The mutual communications and training courses affected their environmental awareness. Their livelihood was prioritised while the ultimate goal—eco-tourism was the secondary at the initial period. The project concerned both farming production as well as sales, which also reinforced participants' dependence upon the eco-friendly way of agriculture. The processes allowed the local farmers to agree with the idea of the Park and were willing to change to organic cultivation. However, the organic experiment was merely based on the agricultural areas of Han Chinese. The Truku farmers

did not propose the demand of agricultural transformation to the Park headquarters, which indicated indigenous residents might prefer other ways of development in their areas. If it was true, the Park authorities could not advance the relationship with Truku residents because the Park blindly pursued eco-tourism and organic agriculture rather than the demands of Truku people. If the Park knew the needs of Truku people but just promoted these environment-friendly projects, it was evident that the Park was dominant within the Park territory.

### **5.7.3 Participation in festival events**

The participation of local people in the festival events held by the Park is the residents' involvement in the events primarily comprising stalls and ethnic performances. Those who took part in the events were the local groups such as community associations and craft workshops. Since 2004, there have been tribal concerts and a cultural market held once every month (the second Saturday afternoon) at the visitor centre by the Park headquarters. These events allow those local aboriginal workshops and associations to increase income meanwhile the cultural events enhance the diversity of the national Park.

*'The frequent events have been held since 2004. At the beginning, the participating craft shops thought the income was limited after the whole-day selling. But later the local craftsmen might tell you that some visitors saw their works at the stall and then order their craft by other means when they needed. So the effect is not just the income on that day but the later sales. The stalls on the day led to the subsequent marketing. Therefore, I think the events can continue to operate because the events work.'* (Official L, 30.09.2014)

Taroko National Park headquarters have cooperated with the local township office to hold the events during the summer since 2011. The Park is responsible for the performance and booths from Monday to Thursday while the township office is in charge from Friday to Sunday. The events become routine activities of the Park and the township office during the summer.

The 'Gorge Marathon' and 'Gorge Music Festival' are two other large-scale festival events of the Park. However, the participation of the local indigenous community is rare and Truku culture seldom plays a main role in the events. Official C frankly questioned that the Park authorities had ever put the local indigenous people the first priority in the important events:

*'The Marathon should be a good chance to promote the ideas of the Park. The organisers can lead visitors and competitors to some attractions and trails to listen to the interpretation. It is good to experience nature but this lacks the human dimension. The local indigenous culture can be this medium. Furthermore, the terminal point of the contest is always the buildings of Park headquarters. Why not bring people to the local indigenous community? ...In fact, if the Park takes people to the indigenous community, there are more chances for interactions between visitors and indigenous people. As for the food at the competition, it is always the food of convenience store. If the food changes to the ethnic food, it will give significant economic benefits for the local indigenous people. The family of the competitors also need feeding and the benefit may be over million NT dollars. The organisers must take food security into consideration. Honestly this is what the state can help with. The local government can help improve the hygiene standards and it should be alright. A lot of foods of indigenous people are distinctive but are not shown at the event. To sum up, the local people are not the first priority of the Park authorities unfortunately. This is the same for the music festival. The locations of concert are not in the places of the local people. The music is always western and Chinese melodies rather than the music of Truku people. Only one time, about six or seven years ago, that the music of the indigenous people was emphasised. In the first half was the performance of aboriginal children and the music was arranged from melodies of indigenous people. Indigenous people were put at the front place at that time. If the Park really values the local indigenous culture, their music can be the opening and closing songs sung by the local chorus...'* (Official C, 29.09.2014)

The above interview by official C revealed that the Park authorities did not sincerely take the local indigenous people into consideration when they hold festival events in the park. Indigenous people were not given priority to help them benefit materially from the events. Even if the local indigenous people are involved in the festivals, their participation here is just for payment only. Their vital rights to the natural resources and lands are still in the shadow of conservation power. As for the leisurely singing and dancing performance and cultural market, the type of participation can be seen as the opportunity for the indigenous groups to increase income and promote ethnic tourism. For the Park headquarters, the events would enhance cultural aspects of the park and attract more visitors. The events should also create an impression of a good relationship between the Park and the local indigenous community. These seem reciprocal at first

glance as the local groups gained benefits from the events held by the Park meanwhile the Park won the reputation as a good neighbour. Nevertheless, the benefit flowed to a few residents and such a way of performance may become the stereotype of ethnic tourism in Taiwan, which is, the lost subjectivity of indigenous people. Visitors may believe that the local indigenous people are excellent at recreational performances, which reinforces the impression that indigenous people indulge in pleasure but neglect work. These ethnic performances of the Truku people makes the performers the objects who are watched by Han Chinese audience. Their culture being judged by the surface impressions such as their dresses, speaking accent and singing rather than the deeper implications of solemn ceremony and norms. Again, their natural sovereignty and rights cannot be recovered by the participation in these events. The participation of indigenous people in these cultural events or festivals can be regarded as therapy to compensate for their sacrifices or the sugar-coated poison that manipulates them to forget their rights. This type of local participation should be seen as non-participation.

#### **5.7.4 Employment and the feedback funding of the staff shop**

The employment in the Park is viewed as a broadly defined participation of management. Levels of participation depend on vacancies. The local indigenous residents were usually hired as employees, park rangers, shop staff and cleaners. The employees could be involved in administration of the Park but their temporary employment and low position reduce their participation. Park rangers assisted conservation of the Park. Their practical tour for conservation in the wilderness forced them to destroy the traps set by local indigenous hunters. Accordingly, their reputation in the community might be bad in terms of culture. Moreover, their low rank limited their participation in Park management. Some local people complained to me that the Park headquarters seldom hired rangers, which broke the promise before the creation of the Park. There were only two local Truku full-time rangers in the park. The shop staff were hired by the union of the Park. They were not the regular employees of the Park. Yet the income of the shop was partly distributed to the local associations of Truku people. Two associations got the feedback fund of the shop in 2011. Vacancies for cleaners were many but low pay and highly physical demanding reduced employment inspiration. Cleaning jobs had been outsourced, which meant no pension guarantees. The director of the Park showed slides to me that the Park Headquarters were concerned with the employment demands of the local Truku people yet rejected my question about concrete measures taken due to his busy schedule.

We can observe that the local employment offered by the Park authorities contained low ranking vacancies and non-employees of the Park Headquarters. These confirmed that employment was an outreach and reward rather than a participation route for the locals.

## **5.8 Conclusion**

This chapter aimed to explore the interactions between the state and the local Truku residents living in and close to Taroko National Park. I have analysed the acts of governmental agencies, legal system and conservation regulations in Taroko National Park. Moreover, the responses of the local Truku people are also presented. I finally conclude that the establishment of Taroko National Park can be considered as an act of internal territoriality by the state (Holmes, 2014). The responses of Truku residents to conservation in the Park are seen as individual and collective resistances due to negative social impacts in their daily life. I attempt to draw on the theoretical framework to analyse the interactions over 27 years.

First are the territoriality acts of the state in various agencies. The Park authorities and their acts should be the most important part for analysis because the Park headquarters were created for policy implementation in this protected area. The history of Taroko National Park and the Park plan indicated that there were clear boundaries of this park after the negotiations between departments in the central government. This is the first of Sack's (1986) characteristics of human territoriality. Moreover, the Park was established according to national legislation. The Park Law regulated some prohibitions in the Park, which was regarded as the easy way of communication. This is the second characteristic. The third characteristic is associated with behaviour control enforcement in the Park. This one can be expanded to other manipulations in the Park, especially the manipulation in different schemes of the park. The Park plan and history of this Park seemed to stress nature conservation and recreational function yet excluded the participation of local Truku people because they were seldom mentioned in these documents. It revealed the attitude of the government to see a Park as a wilderness without human disturbance, which is similar to the US park model. The indifferent attitude possibly enforced control without sympathy. However, the second and third



reviews of the Park plan showed the Park authorities gradually confirmed the value of local Truku, in particular the local knowledge of conservation (see the reviews of the Park plan in section 5.2.2). The changed stand of the Park toward the local Truku should be confirmed by specific actions and could gain friendly responses of Truku residents, otherwise the official documents were self-deception. I accordingly examined the participatory schemes of the park and the perceptions of the local Truku residents.

The Park established some new schemes for the local Truku people to join the Park management around 2000 and included Truku culture in Park zoning, which were regarded as a breakthrough in the park system of Taiwan (see section 5.7.1). A non-official committee of cultural consultation was later changed to an official co-management committee in light of an administrative rule. I further examined the meeting records of the co-management committee. The interviews and the text analysis reveal that the Park director controlled the committee (also see the discussion in section 5.7.1), which implied the supremacy of the Park authorities within the park. Other potential ways of local participation of project participation (see section 5.7.2), event participation (see section 5.7.3) and employment (see section 5.7.4) in the Park all uncovered the fact of tokenism and no participation of the Park. I supposed the improved attitude of the Park authorities could be put into practice by means of these participation schemes. However, the hegemony of the Park authorities enforced control in the territory of this park.

Another legal system (a representative of the state) in the Park including the Park Police and the district court is responsible for the law enforcement of conservation. Interviews, conversations with some policemen and a court clerk and the analysis of verdicts of Hualien District Court concluded that these law-enforcers had practised tolerance when they implemented conservation regulations (see the analysis of sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2). However, indigenous residents are still constrained by the external institutions. They accordingly lost autonomy and subjectivity when they are under pressure of these series of external institutions, in particular the conservation institutions. This does not meet the pluralism principle of the R.O.C. Constitution. Moreover, the National Park Law without amendment over 40 years has been partly replaced by the Wildlife Conservation Act in practice when poachers are arrested, particularly the penalty section, which should not occur in the society of rule of law in Taiwan (the discussion in section 5.6.3). The contradiction between the conservation legislation and law enforcement indicated indigenous people in the Park (their traditional domain) lost their

autonomy and opportunity for self-development. Their behaviours were manipulated by the institutions of the state.

To summarise the acts of the government via different institutions imply that the state territorialised this Park as a protected area and enforced its control in the territory. The participatory schemes could be seen as a tokenism and the tolerant law enforcement could not change the nature of hegemony in terms of legislation. In this Truku example, the creation of this Park can be understood as a practice of internal territoriality of the state.

When we turn attention to the local Truku people, their responses to these policy implementations of conservation and institutions should demonstrate their perceptions. The findings through literature and broad interviews revealed that Truku people in general resisted these conservation institutions (see the overt resistance in section 5.4 and covert resistance in everyday practices in section 5.5). They stated their traditional values and practices (in section 5.3.2) were very different from these external institutions such as conservation legislations and the Park (see section 5.3.4), yet they had to follow the dominant institutions because the Park authorities and other conservation institutions had power in the Park (see the interviews in sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.5). Truku residents' disadvantaged position in the Park was evident in their perceptions of the Park and other conservation institutions despite the fact that the Park should be their traditional domain.

When the park was established, Truku residents were not aware of conservation regulations and conservation implementation, so some Truku hunters were arrested by the Park Police because of poaching in the Park. The law enforcement of conservation was serious (the description in section 5.3.5) and some local Truku politicians and residents protested against these conservation restrictions a few times (see the open resistances in section 5.4). The most impressive protest in 1994 mobilised over a thousand Truku residents to encircle the Park centre and to raise their claims about natural resource management. Nevertheless, these were worthless because the National Park Law and many restrictions were the same after open resistances. In addition, many Truku residents could not afford the high cost of overt resistance. The majority of individual residents therefore continued their everyday practices of farming and hunting in the park as implicit resistance (see section 5.5). Some tactics were employed to avoid the confrontation of the Police and park rangers (see 5.5.3). If the locals got the chance, they got the Park Police into trouble (section 5.5.1) and sought for the help of indigenous legislators with greater

power (section 5.5.2). The help of a few indigenous policemen was key for them to resist implicitly in everyday practices was. The policemen disclosed information to the locals, so that the locals could exercise the practice of natural resource management and averted arrest by the Park Police. This might indicate these indigenous policemen to some degree had the identity of being indigene. Such an identity was sometimes more important than their work. Moreover, the identity made the policemen see the local Truku as friends rather than potential criminals.

The interactions between the government and the local Truku people could be interpreted as that the territoriality of the state resulted in the resistance of indigenous people. It was vital to further explore the reason why the indigenous people took actions of resistance. As the debates in section 5.3 demonstrated, Truku people were still familiar with their foundational values such as Gaya and local knowledge. Conservation institutions of the Park and legal system were regarded as external restrictions. These limits hindered their traditional practices of hunting and livelihood selections of natural resource use. The special administration of the national park also made some document applications more complex. A pastor also complained that the social order in the Truku community became mistrusting because conservation regulations could be treated as a tool to threaten others. The custom of sharing game with joy had been changed. Hunting activities were individual and furtive rather than important rituals for a whole family. I argue that these undesired social impacts in everyday life of Truku society turned to motivate the explicit and implicit actions of resistance.

Overall, conservation control was much more significant than development of the local Truku communities in the Taroko National Park territory. As a result, development of the local Truku people was constrained by the conservation institutions. Some seemingly sympathetic measures were taken in the handling of the affairs of indigenous people by the public sector such as the legal system and national park authorities. These institutions were actually dominated by the state. The uniqueness with autonomy of indigenous people was not recognised by these institutions. In the special geographical area, Taroko National Park, the Truku residents needed to be manipulated by the state according to conservation legislation in terms of natural resource management. The internal territoriality of the state was manifested in the establishment of the Park. Being aware of negative social impacts in life, the local Truku continued their everyday practices exploiting natural resources in the Park as covert resistance against the external conservation regulations. Their resistance features sustenance agriculture, hunting

practices, informal norms of Gaya, and autonomy. This type of development was based on their cultural identity in contemporary society.

# CHAPTER SIX: AUTONOMOUS DEVELOPMENT? TRUKU PEOPLE SEARCH FOR THEIR SOVEREIGNTY

## 6.1 Introduction

In the last chapter, I examined the oppression imposed on Truku people in F village primarily by the strictly protected Taroko National Park at central level. In this chapter Truku people in T village encountered A series of policy allocations made by the local governmental authorities. This main policy design was community-based conservation, which is a co-management arrangement of protected area. It is usually considered as an amendment to the fences-and-fines parks. If community conservation is seen as a decision made through a political system in terms of Easton's political system (1957), people in the environment should respond to this decision when it is implemented. People's responses develop, and become feedback that affects the demands and support of people as the 'input' to enter a political system. A new circle of the political system therefore continues. Since this study pays attention to the interactions between the government and local Truku residents, what is of interest in this chapter is the responses of Truku dwellers towards the implementation of a series of projects supported by the local government in their village. Analysing the interactions chronologically for almost two decades, this chapter divides the period into three stages: the early interaction (1997-2001), community conservation intervention (2002-2005), and development planning for tourism (2006-). Moreover, social impacts within the surveyed village are also examined to grasp the factors affecting responsive actions of Truku people.

This chapter begins with the intervention of the local governmental authorities via a nature conservation idea in the late 1990s. The local government here refers to the Hualien County government and the Siou-Lin Township Office. The local response showed Truku autonomy. Then the idea was transformed into a community conservation project which mixed with development objective. The idea was accepted by the locals. This community-based conservation initiative indicated the reform of the conservation policy regime in order to empower the local community. Tourism development based on conservation achievements was seen as a means of livelihood for the local people. In addition, such a conservation intervention guided the Truku village to open a new page of economic development.

Tourism development following conservation actions, played a main role in this village in terms of economics after 2005. Hualien County authorities thus transferred developmental affairs of this village to the Tourism Department and the Department of Indigenous Affairs at the end of the conservation project in 2005. The village also created a new 'industry association' aiming to deal with tourism-related matters. Simultaneously, external travel agencies offering tour packages and transportation companies providing tour mini-buses also joined the tourism development of this village to promote this indigenous village as a new tourist attraction. The interactions between the public sector, private companies, and the local people complicated the issues of tourism development. This section highlights the empirical difficulties from the popular development of the tourism industry in this village.

In order to deal with the emerging difficulties, the local government promoted the planning of 'Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area' (NCESA). The new idea of the 'Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area' was a term with its definition in the 'Act for the Development of Tourism', but it lacked the sub-laws to support its practical enforcements. In 2003, the central government announced the 'Regulations Governing Professional Guides at Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Areas' and in 2007 the 'Directions Establishing Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area'. There had been no such scenic area in Taiwan prior to my field-work in 2012. In Hualien, the local governmental authorities worked on a special project of conservation with development in order to plan T village as the first NCESA, and enacted regulations at the local level to put the planning into practice. Truku villagers' responses to the new policy implementation constitute the main part of this section to highlight their perceptions about local government's neglect. This ignorance justified the collective actions of the Truku.

The final section looks at various social impacts on this village since the community conservation intervention, in particular the negative effects which stimulated the collective actions against the policy implementation of local government. To conclude this chapter, I interpret the acts of the local governmental agencies, social impacts, and the responses of the Truku protesting residents, to explain such an unexpected feedback to the policy of community conservation.

## **6.2 Early local governmental acts and Truku response**

### **6.2.1 The cautious Truku and the conservation intervention of local government**

The story started when the Department of Agriculture of Hualien County Government intended to conduct a river resource survey and historical trail exploration in T village in 1997. Some officials contacted a few local leaders. The relatively isolated village welcomed the curiosity of the outside world but rejected the further survey because some opinion leaders and the village head insisted on protecting their land rights and natural sovereignty over the village (Jhuang and Tai, 2009). It seemed that the leaders were worried about the excessive intervention of the public sector. The most obvious intervention of governmental agency in the Truku community was the case of Taroko National Park in F village described in Chapter 5. The conflicts between the local Truku residents and the Park authorities were serious enough that the majority of Truku people were aware of the displeasure. In addition, some residents relying on natural resources might be banned if the county survey was conducted. It was also the legacy of Taroko Park. The Truku of T village were cautious about every government intervention due to the case of F village. They used their decision-making to refuse what they did not want. To some degree they had their autonomy in everyday life at this point.

When T village residents noticed the environmental degradation problem of over-fishing or illegal fishing, they accepted the county government which carried out a conservation project in 1998. The county government simultaneously also proposed establishing a management committee to deal with river conservation and potential tourism development, but this was rejected again by the village leaders because some residents' livelihoods depended on fishing (Jhuang, 2005). Again, it is evident that the village doubted the development project addressed by the local government, not only because of some villagers' livelihoods, but because the trust between both sides was not easily established after a brief contact.

At this stage, the Truku residents and leaders were very cautious about every intervention from the government, especially those projects which were associated with their livelihood selections. Their rejection was effective in preventing the government's conservation and development suggestions. The local government also respected the locals' decision. The experience reminded the officials to consider local needs and different ways of communication with local indigenous people.

## **6.3 Local government's introduction of community conservation and local Truku acceptance**

### **6.3.1 New strategy for policy introduction**

In 1999, some village leaders were invited by the county government to join a trip to view river development projects in other indigenous communities. They were surprised by the profits brought by a river conservation project in an indigenous Tsou group. The leaders spread the idea of river protection mixed with economic development by interpersonal communication in the village. They began to increase fundraising for two community associations, and hoped that they could develop the industry to eradicate poverty in the village. The county authorities strengthened conservation education, organisational training, and organised further trips to existing river conservation projects in order to gain the support of the villagers. The Aquaculture Breeding Institute of Hualien (ABIH) started to undertake river conservation following the organisational reform of county government in 2000.

The supervisor of the governmental agency eagerly promoted the conservation industry to the village head of T village and other leaders. After the 2001 election at the local level, the new village head actively promoted conservation and development in the village. They decided to follow the profitable model of the Tsou community, carrying out a river conservation project for future tourism development. They believed the landscape of the village was more attractive than the Tsou community, and thus that they would make more profit. A retired military officer and his younger brother working in the township office helped with the paperwork in the name of one existing community association. The village, led by the head, cooperated with the local governmental agency to propose the conservation initiative for the tourism development.

At this stage, the local government used 'pragmatic' strategies such as visits to other indigenous communities gaining community conservation profits, and environmental education to communicate with the locals. These personal experiences of opinion leaders of other indigenous communities running tourism businesses influenced other residents. The transfer of river protection affairs to a specific agency outside the local government building made the relationship between the local government and local indigenous groups a little closed because the locals could contact the government more easily. The supervisor of the ABIH frequently went to the T village after work for the communications with local leaders also increased the Truku people's trust. The township



office always coordinated with the agency attempting to run a new ecological economy by river protection with tourism development. The local government recognised indigenous people's need for economic development and provided them with a conservation option to reduce poverty.

The locals' response to the acts of local government was changing because the opinion leaders experienced the potential profits of tourism development. The new elected village head actively cooperated with the agency desiring economic development in this village. The coordination between local state agencies and the Truku as a result of the changing strategy and benign intention of the local government pushed the community conservation initiative.

### **6.3.2 The start of the community conservation initiative**

The decision to conduct a conservation project for further tourism development had been made by T village's head, after promotion in public and in private. The retired military officer and his brother were responsible for the administrative affairs of applying for a financial subsidy. A conference held in December 2002 depicted the future picture of the village, which contained two river conservation areas, a travel package, and one deserted military base would be reused within the village. The agency of ABIH helped to prepare the necessary documents for the official announcement on the county level. A community association applied for employment grants from the central government to hire temporary workers for conservation implementation. A conservation patrol team of ten residents was therefore established in December 2002. The village also provided the supporting records of public hearing conferences in the village and the river survey to the county government through the township office, favouring the official announcement of river conservation. The elected village head with his team organised these and increased personal contacts with the supervisor of the governmental agency.

The local governmental agencies and local Truku people helped each other to apply for the community conservation initiative. The central government offered funding for temporary employment. The state and the locals optimistically expected the new approach to nature conservation and local development.

### 6.3.3 The practices of community conservation initiative

The information in this section is based on my master dissertation (Jhuang, 2005) which focuses on the early evolution (1997-2005) of community conservation initiative of T village. In March 2003, the county announced that people could not fish in two river reaches of T village for two years under the Fisheries Act. The patrol team was financially supported by the Council of Labour Affairs to implement the conservation actions. The project was conducted in the name of a community association of T village. The conservation initiative attracted the attention of some governmental agencies. In May 2003, some officials of the county government and township office, along with the aboriginal representatives of township and county attended an inaugural event declaring that T village was the first conservation initiative of Hualien County, to show the determination of implementing conservation at a county level. The designated agency of county government also released native fish in the conservation reaches in the village. In June that year, the headquarters of the East Rift Valley National Scenic Area (ERVNSA)<sup>14</sup> held a conference to discuss whether they might financially sponsor the village for tourism development or not. The head of the village, some members of the patrol team, and the retired military officer also attended the conference. When the supervisor of the headquarters mentioned that T village could be included in the management of the scenic area, the head and some patrol members expressed their worries and discontent and then left the conference furiously. What the villagers were worried about was similar restrictions to those in the Taroko National Park, however, the supervisor of the National Scenic Area explained the difference according to different regulations. The head and the patrol members seemed to doubt that and then left on bad terms. Meanwhile in the same conference, the retired officer accounting for the documents and paperwork, thought T village could take advantage of the financial support from the National Scenic Area headquarters to develop the infrastructure and tourism industry, rather than refuse the opportunity.

In November, the Chinese Taipei Alpine Association along with some societies held their annual celebration in the village. They held this annual activity there because they were aware that the village stressed natural conservation associated with their values. The association intended to cooperate with the village to take conservation actions such

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<sup>14</sup>*This governmental agency aims to deal with tourism-related matters in East Rift Valley of Eastern Taiwan. It is a subsidiary organ of the Tourism Bureau in the central government.*

as releasing fish fry. They gained the permission of the village head, and entered the restricted reaches early in the morning for upstream trekking. The head was extremely angry when he heard the news from the patrol team that many visitors had destroyed the stream by trekking. When staff of the ABIH with fish arrived, there had been violent disputes between the locals and the participants of the external societies, so some societies left early. The local police attended to maintain order amongst the groups and locals. The head of the patrol team quarrelled with members of the Alpine Association. The head expressed that they could prevent the others from accessing the conservation reaches by blocking the roads.

The patrol team visited the conservation reaches in turns. The members checked the conservation reaches, persuaded people not to play in the water or fish, and occasionally fed the fish bread. All of them listened to the head of the village to conduct the project. During their salaried nine months in 2003, the village head and the patrol team focused on development matters. For instance, they planted cherry trees along both river sides in order to create attractions in the future. They paved trails providing access to the stream by using natural materials to attract tourists. In addition, they searched for some spots for the future visitors to explore. The laborious jobs occupied the majority of their working time in addition to the conservation task.

During the period of implementing the conservation project in 2003, the retired officer who had been helping the project by writing and applying for funding left the association. His resignation was not just because his idea of development was different from the head of village, but also because some villagers rumoured he did not deal with money clearly. He disliked this misunderstanding in this hometown village so much that he chose to leave. Some Truku people interviewees mentioned that traditional Truku society was based on the faith in ancestor spirit and the Gaya norms. These norms were passed on by word of mouth. Many norms were associated with curse, fear and taboo. People's curse was traditionally seen as a powerful tool. Contemporary Truku communities are still affected by the Gaya and other ideas of fear. Rumour and reputation are still important disciplinary processes in Truku society. This clerical staff member left his position partly because he hoped to stop misinterpretation and justify his innocence in his hometown community.

The retired officer's departure resulted in the interruption of financial funding to hire temporary workers in 2004 because the continuous proposal was cut by central

government. The supervisor of ABIH later organised a meeting and invited the village head; a retired teacher, the leaving officer, both chairmen of two community associations, and the Truku representatives from both county and township levels to discuss a solution. The county representative encouraged the village to pay attention to the future profits rather than the hard conservation actions. Furthermore, they decided to establish a new industry association in addition to two community associations aiming for ecotourism management in the coming future. The subsequent processes of establishing this new industry association stimulated new power struggles in the village. Firstly, the name of the association referred to one family in the village, which caused dissatisfaction among different power factions. Secondly, the list of association initiators led to complaints because some of the initiators were too old to be the core management team in the future. The village head therefore held a meeting to explain his will of supporting the public interest. Finally, the majority of elected core directors and supervisors were familiar with the head of village or in the same family as the head, so other groups within the village expressed their displeasure. Three-quarters of the important posts of the industry association were from the same community as the head. Villagers of the other community also complained about this unfairness. The processes and the election result enhanced the competition for power among factions in the village, because many villagers thought the core managerial positions of this association would be connected to future profits from tourism.

In February and March 2004, the magistrate visited the village twice because of this bottom-up conservation initiative. He promised to sponsor the building of the visitor centre which was a disused barracks. Cooperating with the township office, the designated governmental agency of county government helped the property transfer and the building of the centre. In October, the village took part in a competition of ecotourism sites held by The Council of Indigenous Peoples. The supervisor of the ABIH gave the brief presentation while a retired local teacher worked as the tour guide. The village won recognition as an excellent ecotourism place through this contest. This denoted that the village had gained approval among indigenous areas by the state, and the highest governmental agency of indigenous people would help promotion of this Truku ecotourism site. It also implied that it was very possible for the village to gain financial support of the council, when the village addressed the project proposal.

In July 2004, the visitor centre was completed. The county government and local villagers celebrated the new era of tourism. However, the local attendees almost all came

from the same community as the head and the management team of the industry association. Some villagers of the management team intended to run a coffee shop there, and learnt the skill of making coffee and dessert. Then, the property rights of the centre were transferred to the township office, and the office declared that the management rules were being developed. As for the operation, the office would entrust a civil association according to the rules. The new association were worried that the management rights of centre might encompass other groups, and expressed their concerns to the Township Office. The management team submitted an operation project to the Office to defend their rights in accordance with the normal procedure. The Office supervisor later stated he was inclined to let the next supervisor make the decision about the franchise of this visitor centre in 2005.

The industry association sent three young members to participate in the intense three-month course training of environmental education, which was financially supported by the central government. This was undoubtedly the preparation for the tourism operation. This was the primary way for the governmental agency not only to teach indigenous people modern life skills, but also to change their minds about development. Before the intensive training, the designated agency held several conservation and development courses in the classroom, but the effect was limited because the villagers preferred to do practical jobs outside rather than listen to indoor teachings. The invitation of a lecturer of local history course illustrated the power struggles within the village. An official of the designated agency pointed out that the serious power competition resulted in the temporary replacement of the lecturer before the course began. The original lecturer thought that since the other retired teacher had been designated as the leader of tour guides, that he should be the teacher of the course, otherwise the different interpretations of history might confuse learners. Furthermore, the professional investigation organisations carrying out biological projects supported by the county government should gain the permission of the village head to enter the village; otherwise the investigation could not be conducted.

In September, a marketing company under contract from the county government, had intended to interview the village head, and to make a promotional video of T village. Yet the head refused the invitation until the supervisor of ABIH intervened to explain that the video could be used by the village in the future, when the village head agreed to the interview. The other travel agency was introduced by the supervisor to test the possibility

of upstream tourism, but the head worried that employment opportunities for the locals in the agency might not be guaranteed.

In November 2004, a training course sponsored by the county agency was held in the village. A member of the core management team of the new association was rejected by the village head because he intended to use a public space as the classroom for training. He felt disappointed, and used a private house as the classroom. The patrol team did not attend the training course because they listened to the head only.

At this stage, a new association above two community associations emerged to lead the future tourism matters. This new organisation would concentrate on tourism development which was close to the potential profits. Therefore, the processes of establishing it resulted in power struggles which undermined the social capital of the village. On the one hand, the village head was the most powerful person at that time, so the majority of the core management team were his 'troops'. He embraced the conservation suggestion of county government, and the financial support of centre government for human resources. However, he rejected the intervention of a national scenic area because of the unpleasant restrictions imposed on Truku residents of F village in Taroko National Park. It implied that the local people had the ability to refuse the entry of most governmental agencies. This coincided with the study teams needing to gain permission of the village head through the county agency before conducting projects. On the other hand, different interest groups in the village also coveted the potential tourism profits; otherwise competition over establishing the association and the membership of the core management team of the new association would not have been so intense. Rumours about the process were so negative that the village head had to explain and apologise to all members. This meant that the power of restriction among social groups in Truku community still worked. The rumour and complaint were still powerful, which could stem from the traditional Truku society with informal norms---Gaya. The practices of the norms were partly based on the power of words among a family community so that members of a community could not violate the traditional teachings when placed under public pressure. However, making rumours could be a tactic to deal with people in other groups because rumours could be either factual rumours or tactical false rumours. The blackmails of warning or accusing spread between hostile camps, and were even sent to the administer outside the village

The conservation initiative attracted the attention of some governmental agencies because of its 'bottom-up' nature. The governmental agencies usually used financial support as a way to interact with the village. The specific sponsorship contained hiring temporary workers such as the patrol team, training courses of environmental education and ecotourism, and the building of the visitor centre. The county agency introduced other professional groups to give training courses and to carry out biological surveys for the future ecotourism, and played the role of mediator. The central government Council of Indigenous Peoples also approved the initiative and recognised this new ecotourism attraction. The local township office mediated between the village and other governmental agencies. The interactions between T village and the township office depended on the supervisor of the office. At this stage, the supervisor came from the north of this township while T village was located in the south, and was not seen as an insider of T village. Some villagers complained about the unfair distribution of construction plans in the official meeting. Few villagers with good relationships with the officials in the local government might work in the office as a temp or employee.

The development issue was still the focus of this village by examining the implementation of the conservation project. Development acts were given much more attention than conservation patrol actions. There were rumours about the poaching in the conservation reaches but no further action was taken. For Truku villagers, conservation was just a concept or slogan; development was seen as the real essence because they recurrently stressed their development. Because the conservation for public interest was regarded as the insignificant surface of the development plan, various camps aimed for the tourism benefits rather than conservation efforts. Neglecting the importance of collective actions, the village lost the opportunity to negotiate between different interest groups. The effect of elite capture was more powerful than the collective conservation effort.

<b>Time</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Significance</b>
March 2003	River conservation was approved by county government.	The county government announced the official conservation reaches for two years.
April 2003	Patrol team started visit in turn.	The conservation initiative was financially sponsored by central government.
May 2003	Public event to announce the conservation initiative	Many local politicians jointly declared the river conservation initiative to show their support.
June 2003	A conference of East Valley National Scenic Area	The village head and patrol team refused the intervention of national scenic area because of worry of limits in national park.
November 2003	An event of external societies leasing fish fry	The village head rebuked those destroying stream bed and drove out some external societies.
January 2004	A meeting, gathering leaders of T village and Truku representatives	The decision of the meeting contained to establish new industry association for tourism management and to continue patrol visit without pay.
February and March 2004	The Magistrate visited the village twice and promised to support the establishment of visitor centre.	The village was again financially sponsored by the public sector for the establishment of visitor centre.
July 2004	The new industry association was established to function tourism development.	The establishment of new industry association enhanced power struggles because majority core management team of this organisation were in the same faction of the village head. Different groups competed their



		interests more eagerly since the tourism profits could be a lot.
July 2004	The visitor centre completed.	This implied that T village entered the new age of tourism as a development way.
September 2004	Some external companies were rejected by the village head.	The village head was powerful to reject outside interest groups. The supervisor of county agency helped the negotiation.
October 2004	T village awarded the excellent ecotourism site.	The Council of Indigenous Peoples holding the contest might promote this village and offer financial support when the organization addressed the development project.

*Table 6.1 The important events during the practices of river conservation project*

source: Information drawn from Jhuang (2005)

## **6.4 Difficulties from tourism development**

### **6.4.1 Tourism development in T village since 2005**

In January 2005, the county held a marketing event to promote the activities of the county government. T village was seen as a new ecotourism attraction to enjoy natural beauty and ethnic culture. The supervisor of ABIH made use of this event to connect the village and some local travel agencies. The village was also reported by the media as a new indigenous tourism attraction in Hualien. The new Industry Association made the decision to entrust a local shop owned by a representative on the township level, as the agent to deal with tourism affairs on a five months' trial period before the end of the official river conservation. On behalf of the association or the village, a diner owner interacted with a travel agency which was introduced by the supervisor of the designated ABIH. The travel agency was responsible for attracting tourists and taking them to the centre. The visitor centre was regarded as a platform for visitors and the tour agency to get information about the village. There were six stalls selling local agricultural products and ethnic food, most of them were run by villagers of the same community, which elicited discontent among the villagers of the other community. The travel agency cooperated with the diner to operate package tours. There had been a maximum tourist amount of 600 people every

day according to their planning. The township office also held an annual celebration in this visitor centre.

The association chose to entrust the rights of operation to the political leader of the shop and the external travel agency primarily because of the lack of funds. The association could simultaneously observe the tourism operation and learn through experience. Many villagers were not sure whether there was tourism interest. When taking a closer look at the management team of this new association, the problem of power struggles entangled some leaders so that a few members intended to leave the team. In addition, the coming local election of village head stirred power relations in T village. The dictatorial style of the head seemed to provoke grievances in the village, despite his promotion of the conservation projects.

The development of the tourism industry initially was not going smoothly in this village, in particular the issues of capital and internal conflict. The local government served as an intermediary and helped introduce travel agencies and hold tourism festivals. The locals paid more attention to getting resources for development. Both primary actors focused on the tourism development.

#### **6.4.2 The side effects of tourism development from conservation**

The local Truku were busy searching for funds and other resources. Simultaneously, the emerging problem of power struggles within T village became more serious. This social problem accelerated because of the resource arrangements and interest conflicts via the community conservation intervention of local government. The existing conflicts were 'ecologised' (Robbins, 2004) when the conservation idea was introduced. Tourism development later was controlled by the external travel agencies due to the lack of capital and no consensus among locals. After some power competitions within the new industry association, the leading team of this organisation held a meeting with travel agencies to discuss the issue of tourism benefit arrangement. However, travel agencies were aware of the clashes within the village and as there were no rules restricting tourism business in this area, they ignored the locals' voice of interest allocation.

I would like to point out some problems since the idea of community conservation emerged in this village. The analysis is related to the interactions between local government and the local Truku, and the implementation of community conservation. The lessons here can be analysed at three levels. First is an exploration of the power relations of the initial processes of tourism development through conservation initiative

in the village. Second is reflection on governmental agencies and the short-comings of top-down governance of indigenous communities. Finally, I discuss how the imagination of development among residents of T village caused unexpected results.

In the first place, I would like to argue that the power relations of the village affected the initiative, and resulted in the undermining of social capital. Tourism development was dominated by a few elites and external travel agencies. That a community is never homogeneous group is evident from the initial process, confirming Agrawal and Gibson's (1999) critique of assumptions of homogeneity within community conservation. They emphasise paying attention to the decision-making influenced by different interest groups, and internal and external institutions. T village's political leaders dominated the scheme's evolution by promoting the idea of tourism development wrapped with conservation actions. At the beginning about 1997, conventional leaders such as the elders and village head excluded the interference of local government for the consideration of livelihoods of some residents. The local development of T village mainly depended on agriculture and using natural resources such as hunting and collecting herbs. As the head and leaders were replaced by a new generation of leaders of middle-aged elites, their conception of development became different from their elders. The inspiration of the county government via trips to other prosperous indigenous areas stimulated their imagination; these successful cases usually relied on popular ecotourism. The leaders of T village comprised of chairmen of two community associations, the village head, local representatives on township level and other elites, who agreed with the attractive suggestion of the county government to start the conservation initiative. Their motives may contain political ambition, economic profits and sense of place; however, competition among them undermined the consensus and weak collective action in the past. The dominant village head fought for his group's benefits and excluded other interest groups' participation, which offended other elites and their groups; for instance, the head led the election of the core management team of the new industry association to make sure his supporters jointly formed the team so that he could dominate tourism development. His peremptoriness offended many elites and villagers because it undermined any collective ownership of tourism development. The head's exclusionary tactic to refuse an external NGO a public space for training and to reject a local leader's participation aroused complaints from villagers and dissatisfaction of opponents. Many villagers perceived that only a few leaders were decision makers of public affairs of the village at this stage, even in the industry association, and a transparent discussion forum was lacking. The elite

capture which happened in the village undermined mutual trust not just among different interest groups, but between leaders and villagers. The majority of villagers seemed to think the leaders considered their private profits only rather than the public interest.

Second, the local governments, particularly the county agency—ABIH, attempted to guide the development of T village to reduce poverty. The approach the authority selected was popular conservation mixed with development projects to reach this goal. The supervisor believed that only strong intervention by public sector experts could improve the condition (Jhuang, 2005). Perceiving the development demand of the village leaders, he used the strong elected head of the village to promote such a conservation idea. The specific method was to invite the elites to attend the trips to several indigenous communities where the conservation programmes were successfully conducted. The huge economic incentive of tourist-led development attracted the attention of leaders of T village. These attendees believed the scenery of T village was much more beautiful than these cases. They therefore agreed with the idea of a conservation programme and expected the tourism dream. However, the local elites and the public sector ignored the fragile characteristics of T village, where collective action was problematic. Villagers' participation in public affairs was low because of various family factions and political groups, resulting from the effects of Japanese resettlement policy. The conflicts in everyday life increased since then because of frequent contact. The spread of Christianity to the village integrated parts of the village. There were three primary Christian denominations in the village, the three groups seldom co-sponsored events or celebrations, and their followers established their own churches in their neighbourhoods respectively. The large-scale religion cooperation in this village was rare. The public sector neglected the historical context of the village and introduced the joint conservation plan; the initial outcome showed that there was serious competition over employment, political leadership and development profits. One middle-aged member who once joined the management team of the industry association expressed his regret by saying that the external institution intervened in the affairs of the village without taking the social capital of the village into consideration. The conservation project became a competition of power due to the under the table profits.

Finally, the common dream of T village at the initial evolution of the conservation initiative was development through tourism. The basic demand of development was necessary, nevertheless, the requirement of a successful community-based conservation project was the negotiations during the period of conservation actions according to the

proposition of Tai (2007). He suggested that a development-through-conservation approach may be an appropriate tactic when carrying out community-based conservation initiative in indigenous areas, because the conservation actions facilitate collective action and institutional building. In practice, the actions for public goods without evident economic interests foster the consensus before the distribution of benefit. In T village, the goal of development greatly surpassed conservation, which could be seen via the work of the patrol team, was not conducive to the negotiation between interest groups and to the building of appropriate management institutions. The fatal injury, was that the development demand and economic interests possibly crowded out other benign motivations such as sense of place and environmentalism (Jhuang and Tai, 2009). Examining the initial stage of conservation initiative, the potential failure could be anticipated (Jhuang, 2005).

## **6.5 Local government's introduction of scenic area and local Truku resistance**

Community conservation initiative in this Truku village has been conducted over ten years. Through the practices of river protection actions and tourism development, this study examines the acts of local government and the indigenous Truku residents, and social impacts on the Truku community. First, I analyse the introduction of the NCEA to the T village by local government, and how governmental authorities ignored the needs and voices of the local Truku by series of administrative acts. Second, I interpret the responses of the Truku to the acts of local government as open resistance. The locals' views showed why they took the protesting actions against the policy of local government. Their opinions contain current social impacts since the community conservation idea was introduced to the village. Some existing conflicts were also exacerbated since the community conservation intervention by local government. In this regard, it is vital to employ the locals' views, in particular the voice of the protesters. I thus depend on the interviews of a young informant L in this village. I have introduced him on section 3.7.2 that he was fluent in Chinese and Truku, and his experience of participating in public affairs in the village was rich. In the process of open resistance, he helped organise the agendas of meetings, represented the tribal meeting group to express protesters' voice, and organise young generation to join protesting actions. Other senior leaders in the tribal meeting group recommended him and introduced him to me. They told me that L could interpret the opinions of the tribal meeting group very well. Their ideas regarding the NCEA and the community development were the same to

his because they had discussed these issues. We had interviews and informal conversations in his workshop room for a few times in my field work. I gradually grasped the context of resisting actions, and perceived the Truku protesters' concerns via these interviews and conversations. Therefore, I frequently used his interview quotations in this section to clarify the protesters' views. Throughout my fieldwork, I was able to cross-check his account through informal discussion with other inhabitants of the village and my own observations: these helped to triangulate the information gained from L, and confirm that he was able to represent the views of many within the village. Protesters had accumulated over two hundred countersignatures against the NCESA and The petition action in the county hall had gathered over one hundred villagers. These showed that the protesters were not the minority group in the village.

#### **6.5.1 Introduction of the 'Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area (NCESA)' to T village**

This section continues the process of conservation mixed with development project implemented in the previous section, and starts the new page of tourism development in this village. The pilot sightseeing from January to May 2005 was entrusted to a local political leader who was a representative at the township level, and an operator of an aboriginal restaurant. He cooperated with a travel agency introduced by the supervisor of ABIH to run the package tour containing a trip and meal. The chairman of the industry association paid attention to the coming election of village head (end of November 2005) and other matters of association. The supervisor of ABIH suggested that T village could be planned as a 'Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area, NCESA' according to the 'Act for the Development of Tourism'. However, the central government refused the application because there was not such a scenic area before. The county government was also advised by central government to take advantage of other regulations rather than the NCESA without complete enforcement rules. The supervisor of ABIH discussed this with other departments in the county government and township office, the conclusion was that the scenic area had flexible planning compared to other reserve areas:

*'I remembered that the supervisor of ABIH told us clearly that the 'Cultural Heritage Preservation Act' would strictly protect an area and restrict people from entering the area. These regulations are rigid and inappropriate for the village to develop in the future. What we could do, is to introduce the public to know the area with beautiful landscape. We should preserve the area from destruction rather than restrict the area as the historical heritage from the entrance of people. Thus, we*

*insisted the direction of 'Natural Human Ecology Scenic Area' after discussion. (Official Y, 06.03.2013)*

Suffering from defeat in the village head election, the chairman (village head) of the industry association resigned. Some other members of the core management team gradually left the board with him in 2006. Other factions took the opportunity to enter the management team of the association. A woman representative at the township level was elected as the association leader later. Tourism development of the Truku village was transferred to the Department of Indigenous Peoples and Tourism at the county level. The county head decided to establish a 'Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area' and in 2006, the 'Rules and Operation Directions of Review Committee for the Establishment of Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area in Hualien County' were announced. Hualien County Government appointed board members to consider several designated natural cultural ecology scenic areas according to this autonomy statute. The Shou-Lin Township Office entrusted the academic unit to study the planning of a scenic area in T village in 2007.

*'It was a project implemented from October 2007 to 19<sup>th</sup> August 2008, which was under one year... the planning was from scratch, there is no planner in the township office nor staff studying law. We don't know how to plan the scenic area according to the current regulations to comply with the requirements of establishing a scenic area. The requirements also contained the communications between different governmental agencies...we need a planning report for us to talk to county government. The planning should conform to the requirements of establishing such a scenic area on county level.'* (Official Y, 06.03.2013)

The planning of a scenic area was financially supported by the township office. The office entrusted this plan to a professor and it was later sent to the county government. Both local governmental agencies supported the plan associating with tourism development. On the one hand, the outcome of promoting a 'Natural Cultural Ecology Scenic Area' among governmental agencies on multiple levels during the period between 2006 and 2010, was that Hualien County agreed with the establishment of this kind of scenic area in T village as the first one in Taiwan. On the other hand, the practical tourism development in the village was dominated by outside travel agencies. It was not only because there was no legislation in relation to charging fees for indigenous attractions, but there was no single group or association representing the majority of villagers either. A few villagers with lands close to the tourist attractions and those with sufficient funds

started operating booths and package tours. Tourism development did not actually benefit the majority of Truku villagers since they never engaged in any work relevant to the tourism industry. There seemed to be no feedback scheme or benefit distribution through social welfare in the village. Instead, Truku villagers engaging in agriculture suffered from traffic congestion on the way to their farmlands. Most villagers' summer production was affected due to too many visitors and pollution. A few tourists destroyed the crops in the farmland adjacent to tourism attractions, although tour guides embellished stories of environmental damage by tourists. Occasionally, visitors belittled local indigenous villagers as they travelled in the village. All of these indicated that the development of tourism in the village negatively affected the life of local people without much benefit while the local governments insisted on the promotion of the Natural Human Ecology Scenic Area.

The county government started to formulate the management regulations of NCESA by entrusting the same planner in a national university in Hualien. This planning project contained the management rules for NCESA in T village as a practical case study. In June 2011, the township office advised 'stream closing' one stream where the primary tourism attraction was and to hold a public conference, but the proposal was refused by many villagers because the closure would affect their lifestyle. In July, the local governments held a public hearing: the planners producing management rules for NCESA were invited to explain these and the planning of this new scenic area. Dozens of villagers protested by disrupting the meeting, stressing that there was insufficient communication about NCESA's role. The second public hearing was also interrupted due to the fierce protest of villagers, and a self-help group was organised by these demonstrators to seek for their tribal sovereignty and to protest against the NCESA in T village. The dissatisfaction urged the township office to make the village head explain to the local people: the head convened the heads of neighbourhood to organise an investigation committee of 50 members to conduct an opinion poll about the scenic area.

According to a TV programme, News Magazine of Indigenous Peoples, which recorded part of the investigation committee's conference in August 2011, the meeting intended to examine the draft ecological convention. It also pointed out two problems of the meeting; one was that the chairman did not check the attendance, the other was he did not confirm how the members were generated. Both these were contrary to formal conference procedures. In the meeting, the controversy of the name of the new scenic area was addressed by the chairman of a community association. One villager expressed that



the township office intended to dismantle all illegal buildings including huts and block houses adjacent to the attraction, this action would threaten his livelihood, and he therefore would like to commit suicide by self-immolation in front of the township office. The supervisor of the office explained that office authorities would dismantle illegal houses on the state-owned lands only, instead of those on private lands. The chairman emphasised that the convention draft aimed to manage visitors rather than local people. Finally, he said completed conference records would be sent to every family to seek villagers' advice. During the conference, the dissenting villagers submitted a written protest against the establishment of the scenic area to the supervisor of township office. They expressed their objection at the end of the conference; one protestor noted that the majority of attendees were 'their own people', but the land owners in the attraction were not invited to attend the conference, so humans were not respected in the new scenic area, let alone nature. The chairman was interviewed by a journalist after the conference; he pointed out that ninety percent of villagers refused the NCEA because they regarded this as the prelude to the establishment of a national park. The township office supervisor in the interview thought the villagers had rights to express their opposition: however, she stressed that the statements of these protesters 'that the staff and supervisor of township office collaborated with travel agencies' were incorrect and hurtful.

In the conference recorded by the TV programme, opponents of the scenic area seemed louder than those who supporting it, because the supporters were silent. Without the disagreement, the planning of NCEA supported by the local governments would be implemented soon. The protesters raised questions about the planning; first, who was making decisions about the future of their homes. Being the land owners of the primary attraction, they were unsatisfied that they had no rights to participate in the conference. Second, the process of planning was not transparent. The majority of villagers had no understanding of the NCEA which might be relevant to their rights and future, this led to the fierce protest by some villagers. Third was the development of tourism in the village. Some villagers suffered from the congestion, pollution and disrespect resulting from tourism development. However, most benefits flowed to outside travel agencies, an injustice that aroused resistance against the scenic area.

NCEA regulations insist that the surrounding natural beauty of this scenic area should be strictly protected. The aboriginal reserved lands can also be zoned into the NCEA scope. As long as one area is planned as the NCEA, the lands there should be transferred into another category. Private-owned reserved land becomes nationally

owned, which shows that the local indigenous people lose the connection to the land they depend on. The extended problem is the restriction of their livelihoods. Overall, indigenous people in the scenic area cannot take advantage of natural resources such as hunting practices nor can they own private reserved lands.

These Truku residents fear that if the state extends its powerful administration into the indigenous community, their lifestyle will be compromised because of the example of their compatriots in F village in Taroko National Park. Although aiming to develop tourism, this scenic area is a kind of 'protected area' for Truku people because the natural environment is also rigorously preserved. They imagined that similar conditions would occur at the NCESA in the future and that their livelihoods would be highly restricted. They were especially concerned about the institution of successive management agencies every four years because the regulations behind these governmental agencies would confine what they do for livelihoods.

#### **6.5.2 What is NCESA in Hualien and its problems?**

In this section, I introduce the development of the NCESA in Hualien. The attention is drawn to the establishment of series of regulations concerning the NCESA. The active acts of promoting the NCESA may reveal that tourism is concerned by the local government. The development of the NCESA in Hualien is greatly connected to the case of T village because the plan of the NCESA sponsored by the local government adopted this example to create management rules and promoted the case as the first NCESA in Hualien. The NCESA itself was a new idea in Taiwan because there has been no such an area so far. This term originates from the Act for Development of Tourism, and refers to a natural area where the scenery is impossible to recreate by humans, and the environment of fauna, flora and prehistoric relics should be strictly protected. The county government created a committee in 2005 to examine the establishment of the NCESA at the county, rather than national, level. The management rules of the NCESA were formulated in 2012, and here I indicate several problems based on this Truku case.

County-level legislation established the NCESA committee and operation directions of the NCESA in Hualien. The regulations were announced in 2006 and amended in 2007 in accordance with the operation directions of the designation of the NCESA announced by the Bureau of Tourism in central government. Amendments increased the public hearing conference in order to include the views of the local people,

and required the listing of current conditions and facilities of tourism development in the explanatory memorandum of the NCESA. Comments of different governmental agencies including the local township office and other agencies in that territory also needed to be provided, along with the offer of several specific plans for the future tourism industry. It is obvious that the establishment of the NCESA is for the development of the tourism industry. The competent authority for related matters which offers the explanatory memorandum is usually a governmental agency, because it should be easier for an agency to interact with other governmental agencies and then gain comments from them. Interactions and negotiation among different governmental agencies should be easier than those between NGOs and the public sector. For residents of T village, the definition of the NCESA has excluded the traditional hunting practices of the Truku community for the natural ecology system, in that the ambit of the scenic area should be strictly protected.

The establishment of the NCESA in one area depends on the decision of this committee organised by the county authorities. The committee is made up primarily of specialists and officials at multiple levels. Three of the 15-members committee are local representatives, or individuals of NGOs engaging in community-building work. These local people are not the decision-makers of the establishment of the NCESA, they can join in the meeting to express their views in the public hearing, but the committee makes the final decision. This again affirms the expert or official oriented feature of regional planning, with public participation playing a tokenistic role within the NCESA legislation. It is very possible for the local residents to be marginalised in the process of planning the NCESA, as in the case of T Village.

According to the Regulations Governing Professional Guides at Natural and Cultural Ecology Scenic Areas promulgated in 2003, people travelling in the scenic area should be accompanied by a professional guide. These guides are qualified due to certificates of completion of training programmes as well as of service, the basic requirements comprise being a local citizen over 20 years old, educated to at least secondary level. However, the authority can adjust these requirements to the specific social environment and tourism market. Requirements around NCESA's professional guides protect the priority of employment of local people. In practice, the protesting villagers were concerned they would not be guaranteed employment in the scenic area according to their observation of current tourism development in the village. A protesting leader K did not trust these necessary training subjects, but further hoped the local tour guides would be equipped with traditional/local knowledge through the teachings of older

generations. He also stressed Truku culture was undermined by the mainstream culture and institution.

*'The tour guides may not be the local villagers. Now the tour guides are those who do not understand the local history, and they speak carelessly. I don't know whether they have the license or not. Some locally-taught people guide for making profit. I don't agree with this, I think the tour guide should be taught by the elderly who understand the local areas, not according to the regulations of the governments. The local people who are familiar with the local areas are ok. The external tour guides don't know these local things. The governments marginalise our culture and customs, but apply the Chinese values to us. The public sector destroys this place in order to make profits. I can't help it.'* (Hunter K, 29.01.2013)

The regulations relating to NCESA guides are based on modern knowledge and the value of mainstream society, rather than the traditional knowledge and ideas of indigenous communities. In addition, the current development of tourism in the village reminded the local people that they may be marginalised by the industry due to different values of making profits. The guides and visitors just consumed the natural beauty and culture of the local indigenous community and left inconvenience and pollution, therefore many local residents enthusiastically protested against the NCESA and sought their own way of development.

NCESA Management Rules in Hualien, state that the county government is the competent authority, and can entrust NCESA matters to the township office or other registered NGOs. The opposing villagers thought these management agencies must be various governmental agencies whose scope of jurisdiction overlaps with the territory of the NCESA. Accordingly, there will be more and more legislation restraining their lifestyle:

*'They restricted us via the legislations...it is very possible that every four years different governmental agencies managed us via different regulations because we are under different authorities...these are the problems in the future NCESA...these were proposed by villagers in the tribal meeting....'* (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)

The competent authority intended to establish the scenic area to manage visitors and to create a charging system for the local people. The county government created a fee-charging standard. Eighty-five per cent of the fee goes to the allowance of the professional guides while fifteen per cent goes to other matters including administrative jobs,

conservation, community-building matters, and training programmes. NCESA had a specific account of the NCESA, its fee being included in the annual budget of the county government. This resource allocation was however severely misunderstood by local people:

*'Eighty-five per cent of every fare of the visitor will go the national treasury of county the government while fifteen percent as the fee for tour guide...these visitors do so many things here on our land but the county government wants so much.'* (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)

*'Fifteen per cent of the income is attributed to the tour guide with license while eighty-five per cent belongs to national treasury of the county government. What can the local residents do? The township authorities do not make sense on this. The local indigenous people don't have any working opportunity. The public sector wants to take advantage of the resources in indigenous areas for making money. The local indigenous people cannot gain any profit.'* (Hunter K, 29.01.2013)

These local people worried that fee distribution would not be possible because the fee is part of the financial budget of the county authorities. If there are remaining funds, they will be incorporated into the budget of the next year. Moreover, the county authorities seem to dominate the matters of the NCESA. The local residents and organisations are unable to use the fee freely, as it remains within the financial budget of county authorities. The feedback scheme isn't clear in the management rules. This could result in complaints about the current tourism development in the village that local people suffer from inconvenience and pollution but do not profit. It is obvious that the feedback scheme of the NCESA plays an important role but it is neglected by the county authorities.

### **6.5.3 Local government's dereliction concerning the NCESA planning in locals' view**

This section collected what the local government did to arouse complaints from Truku villagers in the process of promoting the NCESA. The implementation of policy undermined trust between the local Truku villagers and the local governments, which resulted in fierce and persistent resistance against the establishment of the NCESA in this village. These actions by the local governments included opaque processes of communication and decision-making, the negligence of administrative jobs, the problems of legislating for the NCESA, proposed restrictions on the livelihoods of Truku villagers, the issuance of land ownership certificates, and their attempts to mine in the village.

### *Opaque communications and decision making*

The planning of NCESA was closely related to all villagers' interests because almost the whole village was in the territory of the scenic area; however, the local governmental agencies, and the township office in particular, usually communicated with a few leaders and specific groups rather than undertaking public participation. Decision-making was thus dominated by an elite few, which aroused complaints and protests among villagers, who questioned both their representativeness and their decisions. When one community invited the local governmental authorities to attend a tribal meeting to discuss the NCESA, these public servants never attended. Accordingly, the protesting villagers believed that the local government never understood their voice.

A protesting hunter stated his observations that the local governmental agencies and an elite few led the private meeting of the project of the NCESA. The conclusion of such meetings was not approved by the majority of villagers. The secret operation of public affairs resulted in distrust between the local people and local governments.

*'There were merely few villagers such as directors and supervisors of the industry association took part in the meeting in private. They were playing...They expressed their views but claimed it was the idea of the whole village without gaining approval. Most villagers didn't know this project of NCESA. Their secret meeting didn't allow villagers to attend. It must be the government or few leaders to dominate the meeting. Only few people spoke in the meeting. This happens in many villages. Such caused the local residents to mistrust the governmental authorities. It was hard to believe them.'* (Hunter D, 09.03.2013)

A young leader in the village helped the protests against the scenic area. He perceived that the county authorities discriminatively responded to different interest groups on the same issue. This indicated that the county government favoured those whose position was consistent with the county authorities'. The unjust response incited further protest.

*'Their response document has been delivered while we still wait for our reply though we petitioned earlier than their action...they are chairmen of associations, representative on township level...they are powerful people...and they have received the reply. We went to the county hall earlier but there has been no response.... The county head supports tourism development. He must agree with those who favour the scenic area. We oppose the scenic area. It is very possible that the county*

*government neglects our petition...It is obvious that county authorities deal with things effectively when these things are beneficial for them. It is no problem not to receive our opinion, however, they should respond in accordance with the official programme...it seems as long as we do not agree with them, they can backlog documents...' (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)*

In addition, he thought that the under-the-table negotiation between the township office authorities and the specific local associations must divide the protestors. The contact of specific interest groups by the local governments exacerbated the mistrustful relationship between the governmental agencies, and the Truku villagers which simultaneously undermined social capital in the village.

*'We guess the local associations contact the township office. They communicate with each other in private. What we worry about is that the more frequently they contact, the more tired we are (because of new tactics). We have to gingerly handle these things.'* (Young Leader L, 08.03.2013)

An amateur hunter who leads the protesting group thought diversity of views was normal in a village. Nevertheless, few leaders should be blamed because they expressed their own ideas on behalf of the whole community. This misled the public sector to regard the ideas as the whole community's. When the public sector agreed with the ideas, some villagers were afraid of the negative impact the ideas may result in and queried where the ideas came from, raising wider questions about the representation of indigenous communities in contemporary society. Who and what represent the community? Through whom, and how are representatives deputised to represent the community? To which degree do they represent the community?

*'My wife, my son and I in one family may argue the simple meal, let alone a village. So, there was no objection to approve, the establishment of the NCESA was impossible. Such a statement was according to the township authorities and the chairman of the other tribal meeting. The project was approved by the committee at county level but now the argument that whether the whole community agree with the idea or not just started. People of that community told us that they had the meeting to vote for the chairman only, the meeting was irrelevant to the NCESA, and they thought the agreement of the idea came from the chairman and the township office only. The residents of that community doubted the idea and were aware of the seriousness of that matter.'* (Hunter K, 29.01.2013)

The local governmental agencies' decision to communicate with specific interest groups in the village, affected broader trust between the public sector and Truku villagers of T village. The neglected villagers more eagerly expressed their voice via demonstrations. Moreover, this undermined social capital in the village because it seemed that specific groups represented the community only. Other groups' protesting actions and complaints to fight for its representativeness usually irritated the conflicts between camps with different interests. Possibility of cooperation or negotiation may accordingly reduce due to fierce opposition. The vicious circle certainly weakened the implementation of policy at the local village.

### ***The new planning of stream closure for nature conservation in 2011***

River conservation was seen as the first step to develop the tourism industry in the village. Suffering from the inconvenience of tourism development, some villagers refused the conservation decision made by the township authorities and the industry association. The tourism development benefited a few people only rather than all villagers. Furthermore, the conservation action indicated that the local people cannot access to the stream where they used to play in summer. The restriction on the lifestyle of the local residents was not welcome. Based on these considerations, the majority of the villagers categorically rejected the plan in a conference. The planning of river conservation in 2011 stemmed from the township office and the industry association in order to prepare for the NCEA could not be implemented due to the resistance of most villagers.

*'They (the local governmental agencies and the industry association) have planned the scenic area for a while...from the river conservation to the establishment of the industry association...many villagers do not agree with what they have done during the period of nine years. They never paid attention to the conservation things, instead, tourism development was their focus. The tourism development results in trash pollution and a lot of conflicts among villagers. We cannot reach the consensus and suffer from the troubles from the outsiders. They cannot solve these problems...They never create a good atmosphere in the village...they did intend to protect the stream again about one and half years ago. Many villagers were angry with this. After the stream blocking conservation was the public hearing conference. Now we can understand that all these were a series of procedures...they hoped us to have no time to respond to these. We fortunately stopped their action when they wanted to protect the stream...'* (Young leader L, 28.01.2013)



The rejection of the idea of stream closing in a public conference indicated that many villagers were tired of tourism development in the village. First, they were aware that the nature of conservation action from the township authorities and the local industry association was tourism development rather than pure rehabilitation of nature. Second, the development experience in the past years had not benefited the local economy. Instead, the local residents suffered the inconvenience resulting from tourism. Industry interests were mostly dominated by the external travel agencies. Third, conservation might restrict their rights to access the stream. The local people finally refuted this proposal. The public response to the conservation idea also revealed that the development imagination of a specific few individuals and township authorities may not be approved by the local people. The young leader highlighted that the conservation idea was in fact the preparatory step for the creation of the NCESA which aroused protests in the village. The purposeful planning of a NCESA affirmed the opaque communications between villagers and local government.

#### ***The draft ecological convention in August 2011***

The formulation of this draft convention followed the same type of private discussion between the township authorities and the local industry association. The purpose of this convention was to manage the tourists visiting this village. This could be a new start for the village to deal with travelling issues, if it gained approval by the majority of villagers through an investigation committee. However, it was seen as a supporting measure of the NCESA policy. Due to the mistrust, the protesting villagers expressed their voice outside the conference venue. Some land owners in the attraction complained that they were not invited to attend the conference. The conference failed to be convened for lack of a quorum. The village head noted that the office authorities temporarily asked him to convene the conference, but many members of the committee could not attend the conference when he notified them. The chairman of the committee decided to send the record along with the convention draft to these committee members, in order to entrust them to investigate the villagers' opinion on the convention and the NCESA. With the development of the protesting wave, this supporting measure became useless because it would not be approved by most villagers. Again, the opaque communication undermined the trust between Truku people of T village and local governments.

*'The township office convened a conference of draft of ecological convention. This was about the future of our village. The convention aimed to manage the visitors*

*in the village rather than the local villagers. There were fifty representatives of various groups such as Catholic Church and Presbyterian Church discussing the draft. But finally the conference failed to convene because the draft was from the township authorities rather from villagers. They formulated that and waited for the decision of the village. It seemed to be all right. However, this was made by the office authorities and industry association. They usually didn't recognise the convention when the leader changed. It is in vain. We didn't believe them. We opposed the draft of convention...'* (Young leader L, 28.01.2013)

### ***The absence of from tribal meetings***

The tribal meeting aimed to seek the most consensus on diverse issues in one indigenous community. In this community of T village, the issues of the NCESA were proposed for discussion for several times in the tribal meetings. The meeting group also invited the local governments to attend the forum in order to let them understand the voice of the local community as well as to explain the planning of the scenic area. Unfortunately, the public sector at the local level never participated in their meeting. Instead, the local authorities held the recall election of the chairman of this tribal meeting group, which was proposed by the community association. The selective attendance seemed to express their position on the issues of NCESA, which disappointed those villagers opposing the establishment of scenic area and showed their resent.

*'We have held several tribal meetings. The guiding agencies are county government and township office. We invited staff of these governmental agencies to attend the meetings, but they never attended. One day, the chairman of the community association sent an official document to the local governments in order to advise to recall the chairman of the tribal meeting group, these governmental agencies did come here for the recall election. You can understand what the problem is.'* (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)

*'I don't really know what these officials do for the local villagers. What their concern is, is the money. They never attend our tribal meetings...In other indigenous groups the conclusions of the tribal meetings were implemented by the public sector. I think our township office is too bad.'* (Hunter K, 29.01.2013)

The absence of the local authorities to attend a tribal meeting of this 'trouble making' community revealed that they were unwilling to confront those protesting villagers. The development of such an infrequent communication seemed to strengthen

their antagonistic relationship. Contacting specific leaders and groups when promoting the NCESA of the village, the local government aroused more and more complaints of many villagers. They worried about their interest damage so they were ready for their insisting demonstration.

### ***The negligence of administrative jobs***

During the period of promoting the policy of the NCESA, the local governments were negligent in their administration. These specific actions led to misunderstanding between the protesters and the local public sector. The disadvantaged protesting villagers believed that the power authorities did this on purpose in order to implement the policy of the NCESA despite the demonstration in the village. The negligence contained the short notice of the public hearing, the tokenism of public hearing, postponing of the negotiation, cognitive difference on the news release of local governments, the new director's unawareness of the NCESA issues, and the collision of different legislations on the NCESA issues. The ignorance could serve as a tactic for the policy Implementation of the NCESA.

### ***Short notice of the public hearing conference***

The official public hearing was held to understand opinions of the villagers, but the local people received the public hearing on the day of meeting. There must be something wrong with the short notice. The administrative error might have been a tactical ploy, to avoid the attendance of the protesters who opposed the NCESA.

*'They should notify us one week ago, but in fact they notified us on the day of the public hearing, which was inappropriate. That was a week day, and there were few people in the village in the day time. The notice was announced in the morning while the meeting was in the afternoon. Most villagers were working. People knew the news by word of mouth. This should be done at least one week before the meeting. This was the first public hearing. The director of the Tourism Department, supervisor of township office and representative attended the public hearing. The short notice was unusual. People knew this on that day. The village head said he didn't know the reason why it was a short notice. He stressed he was neutral. I think he was not responsible.'*  
(Young leader L, 28.01.2013)

As the young leader mentioned, it was unusual to convene a public hearing with very short notice. The possible explanation was that it was a tactic to notify the older generation at home only because they seldom addressed questions in the conference,

which might show the locals agreed with the policy. The village head should be the conductor at the local level. For the public sector, using the tactic might be a way of successfully implementing the policy to avoid the confrontation. However, it was a public hearing aiming to listen to voices of the local people to facilitate the policy implementation. Such a tactic was totally inconsistent with the purpose. Actually, word of mouth mobilised the opposing villagers to express their voice. This administrative negligence or tactic not merely irritated these protesting people but enthused their rebellion.

### ***Tokenism of the public hearing conference***

Following the short notice, the conference was held in a public space next to the village office in the afternoon.

*'The preparatory jobs were not good, but the public hearing was convened on that day. The public hearing said that there was a consensus and that they just listened to some opinions. Many stakeholders of the NCESA were in the conference, so it was noisy. The public hearing was paused then. The planning team (a professor and his assistant) were explaining the advantages of the NCESA and the potential benefits toward the local community. Some villagers made uproar when the planner just started several slides. The villagers questioned why the establishment had not been discussed with, and approved by villagers. Why did they not respect the local residents while the establishment was closely relevant to the whole village? Can we participate in the meeting to express our views in the future? It seems that the public sector can conduct what is approved by local governments themselves even if it were controversial in the local community or excludes the local people...'* (Young leader L, 28.01.2013)

*'We want to manage ourselves; but the governmental authorities said we don't communicate with them, the thing is that the development project should gain approval of the local people and then start the establishment of the scenic area. They were different from this; they planned the NCESA and approved it by themselves, then they convened the conference of public hearing as a formalism. The planning had been ensured before the conference, they just told villagers about that planning.'* (Hunter D, 09.03.2013)

An amateur hunter who was a retired contractor in the other community, blamed the local government for the ill-defined explanation of the NCESA in the public hearing.

He also pointed out what the demonstrators were worried about and the poor interactions between the local villagers and the local governments.

*'The county authorities didn't explain the NCESA well in the public hearing, it was more unclear when some villagers made an uproar. In my observations people in our community don't actively attend the meeting because they're self-centred as well as busy at work. Many people attended the meetings because of some villagers' encouragement, and they also considered their rights might be violated. Rome wasn't built in a day. They distrust the government due to many reasons.'* (Hunter U, 08.03.2013)

The public hearing seemed to serve as a specimen for the policy makers. However, there were at least two points showing the tokenism of the public hearing. First, the project had been planned for several years but lacked public participation. The majority of villagers were not aware of the NCESA, not to mention the content. Before the public hearing, the planning project had been approved by the committee at the county level. Second, the presentation of the management of the NCESA used the official Mandarin language, which many villagers could not use well. Some ideas might not be interpreted well in Chinese in the conference. It suggested that the understanding of the NCESA by the local people was not the highest priority.

#### ***Procrastination and cancelation of negotiation meeting***

After the protest against the NCESA happened in the public hearing in July 2011, the county authorities promised the opposing villagers that they would convene a coordination meeting. Simultaneously, the authorities appointed the planners of the NCESA to understand the opposing views. The township authorities were also involved; attempting to change the complaint of the establishment of the NCESA in the village. Accordingly, the negotiation meeting was never going to be held after the public hearing.

*'They (the local governments) told us that they would come to negotiate with us, they changed the time three times, but ultimately they never came. So we decided to petition in the county hall... Originally, the county authorities would come to us, but the supervisor of the township office said it was unnecessary and she would come to talk to us. When we knew this, we believed she was lying...'* (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)

*'We protested because these things were not good for indigenous people and they (the governmental agencies) didn't communicate with us. The county authorities promised to communicate with every household but they didn't keep this promise once in the whole year. They might only talk to the people in their own camp such as the village head and the chairmen of the local associations. It was impossible for them to communicate with those protestors because it was unnecessary. How do I believe these local authorities?'* (Hunter D, 09.03.2013)

*'When we started the protest, they (the local governments) should pause the project of NCESA, but they didn't. They continued to make progress of the project. They used a method of calling on the opponent villagers one by one in private rather than in a public hearing conference. This was the tactic of crushing one by one...we doubted that whether they may negotiate under the table...that was why some people opposed the project but then they supported it. Later, they returned to the protesting groups due to disinterest...their trick was exposed.'* (Young leader L, 28.01.2013)

Even when the protesting villagers petitioned in the county hall, the county government used the delaying tactic to change the time of meeting the county head in order to talk to the director of Tourism Department first. Later, these Truku villagers failed to meet the county head due to the altered schedule of county head. The deputy county head met the protesting villagers but the villagers were disappointed because he was not the decision-maker.

*'It was supposed that we met the county head at nine o'clock, but they told us the time changed to ten o'clock. We needed to talk to the director of the Tourism Department. It was they who always changed the time. This was not good because they changed the original meeting time...It was problematic...the sub-prefect was sitting there... did not respond to our voice...'* (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)

The local governments delayed the coordination meeting and hoped to solve the problem by contacting the leaders of various views in private. Nevertheless, these actions irritated the protesting groups and forced them to search for other ways to express their opinions. The county authorities used the same tactic of delay to face the protesting Truku people's petition. The county head avoided the protesting masses and left, and the sub-prefect who was not the decision-maker talked to the demonstrators. What is of interest here is that the local governments attempted to seek negotiation in private, but failed due to the insistence of these Truku protesters. The local governments lacked capacity of crisis

management, being as they opted for a tactical avoidance strategy. The unresolved problem was still there and the relationship between them were undermined due to these administrative actions. Protesters were aware that the county authorities deliberately ignored the locals' voice and insisted the plan of the NCESA. The authorities used some more other means such as media to promote their decision.

### ***Cognitive difference on the news release of local government***

The news release of the county government depicted that the idea of the NCESA had gained the support of the majority of villagers of T village, particularly the total agreement of one community. The opposing villagers were surprised at this when they read one local daily newspaper. They saw this as a way to manipulate public opinion by media. Such a statement was not based on a public poll, but views of a few leaders. As the protesting groups stated their questions of the NCESA, more and more villagers joined the camp. They were afraid that their rights might be negotiated if the NCESA was established in the village. The cognitive difference originated from the fact that the local governments contacted some specific leaders and groups of the village and regarded their views as the majority villagers'. The views became the forged mainstream opinion of the village via the press release. The county authorities should be blamed for the media manipulation and the negligence of a villagers' opinion investigation. The young leader stressed their protests coincided with the views of most villagers. Simultaneously, many negative impacts had been resulting from the tactics of the local governments.

*'The county authorities stated that eighty percent of villagers supported the establishment of scenic area and only a few people opposed. How could they say so? If there were few residents in the conference, it coincided with what they said, but there were over two hundred villagers there in the video. These people were not few in the village. The county government emphasised this but the township office didn't endorse this. The website of the county government describes that eighty-five percent villagers agree with this idea and the other community totally agrees with the establishment. However, over twenty residents of that community came to our last tribal meeting last year and told us they didn't know about the NCESA. Some of them were emotional...they doubted the number...they knew they'd elected a chairman of tribal meeting...does the views of that chairman represent the whole community? ...these people came to attend our meeting and refuted the number of county authorities...What is the administrative data based on? It seemed to be falsification*

*of documents. If such a statement aimed to be beneficial for the village, there should be complete measures and procedures rather than doing things under the table. They made a mess and declared this is the consensus of the village. These things have caused a lot of unpleasant conflict, controversy, and confusion in the village.’ (Young leader L, 28.01.2013)*

Moreover, he compared the people joining in the petitions of two camps and justified the protest. The ridiculousness of the press release was also highlighted.

*‘The local governments mentioned that the two communities have different views on the NCESA and they wanted to promote this when reaching consensus. We have stressed that we don’t need this but it seems that they want to continue to promote this...last December the advocators went to the south to meet the county head. The news reported their petition. There were only 35 people there while there were over one hundred villagers when we petitioned in the county hall. They claimed we were the minority but the majority of the local residents agreed with this idea. It was possible for them to say so because they were village head, representative, tour guides...etc. So far, we insist to say no to the NCESA but it seems they still want to promote it. (Young leader L, 08.03.2013)*

The local state agencies claimed they stood with the figure that eighty percent villagers supported the NCESA, while the demonstrators justified their protest via the countersigned documents of over two hundred villagers who opposed the establishment of the NCESA. Some villagers of the ‘supporting’ community also questioned what the source of the news release statement was. The cognitive difference between the county authorities and protesting villagers resulted from poor communication and views of villagers were always dominated by few leaders. In this way, complete participation should be emphasised in the process of communication meetings before policy implementations on controversial topics. Through local participation, the unexpected consequence of policy such as the resistant actions against the NCESA policy implementation could be reduced.

### ***New director’s ignorance***

The new director of Department of Tourism and Public Affairs was appointed in July 2012. She dealt with this difficult case but the complexity made her become the target of protesting Truku villagers. She was blamed by the Truku protesters for her poor preparation and lack of power.



*'The newly appointed director did not do the lessons because she didn't know these things. She took the post in July last year... when they transferred duties, they didn't talk about these...'* (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)

Before the petition in the county hall, the director phoned leaders of the protesting villagers in order to negotiate with them directly. She hoped that there wasn't going to be a clash in the County Hall between the Truku leaders and the county officials. The villagers were prepared with supporting documents, and people ready to back their petition. They refused her suggestion and didn't answer her phone call later. It was possible that the head avoided the petition because of the breakdown of negotiation.

*'We made the appointment with the county government before and we agreed with the schedule arranged by the officials. The evening before the day of petition, the director of Tourism Department called us to ensure that we would meet the county head or not. She said that it was unnecessary to talk to the head, and it was more appropriate to meet her. But what we want to see was the county head rather than her. We did not think that she could make decision for our community.'* (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)

For the Truku protesters, the new director was not familiar with the issues of the NCESA, and she was not the decision-maker in terms of the NCESA. The Truku knew that the county head was famous for his dominance on governance, so her strategy of interim negotiation meeting with her was ineffective. The strategy of negotiation might attempt to shake the determination of the Truku. She didn't have enough authority to deal with the issues which affected their communities under the governance of the county head. The Truku protesters therefore petitioned the head as they planned in order to withdraw the approval of the NCESA in T village. Nevertheless, the objection of negotiating with the director might start up the crisis management of county authorities. The head's avoidance could reveal the position of the county government and rejection of the protest. The county government did not listen to the petition in relation to local development and sustenance. Instead, the government insisted the decision of the NCESA and tourism development in T village.

### ***Conflicts between different regulations***

Here the conflict occurred between different legislations at various levels grasped by different stakeholders on the NCESA issues. The protestors insisted on the protection of the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples, while the supporters accused the opposing

villagers of illegal block houses. Simultaneously, the local governments promoted the NCESA the county level according to local autonomy and the Act for the Development of Tourism. Accordingly, the conflicts lay in the interactions among supporting villagers, opposing villagers, and local governments via different regulations.

The protesting Truku complained that some local residents and political leaders allied to report the illegal hut of some protestors which had existed for a long time. They stressed the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples protects not only the traditional lifestyle of indigenous people, but respects the willingness of local people on development construction in modern society.

*'They used the external regulations (Building Act) to oppress the Basic law of Indigenous Peoples. The Basic Law regulates the rights of building a block house. The old people do the farming and build the house...the law also mentions the developers should get the consent of the local people when they intend to start a major development...this is the foundational protection.'* (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)

*'If there is an important development project in the community, the tribal meeting should be convened to get the consent of the majority of residents...in the meeting we hoped that our community was not restricted by these new things...we are the masters, we should own the advantage...they should respect the local people...the Constitution stresses that everyone is equal...I think people should respect the local people and their lifestyle in a specific area...'* (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)

These clashes on legislations happened within the village, and highlighted the discord in T village. The conflicts were the expansion of the controversy of the NCESA and power struggles between groups within the Truku communities. Social capital was undermined with the development of some firm actions of both sides. Therefore, the difficulty of cooperation among villagers increased. More importantly, was the fact that the local governments could not help solve the regulation issues. They dealt with the huts whenever receiving reports. This hut issue in T village stemmed from power struggles between different camps with opposing views on the creation of NCESA.

#### **6.5.4 Rising of resistance forces---from self-help group to tribal meeting group**

The previous section explored the acts of local government regarding the promotion of the NCESA from the views of local Truku residents in T village. These shaped the locals' discontent. The discontent linked to an organisation and became collective actions of resistance against the policy of the NCESA. This section studies where the resisting group originate and how collective protesting actions were organised. These analyses are based on my interview data and document data.

A new self-help group for tribal sovereignty led the protest against the scenic area. The group originated from a mining activity in a mountainous area close to a concentration area of this village. Some villagers gathered to protest for villagers' safety in future excavation, as a severe landslide over 20 years ago had concerned many villagers. This new self-help group investigated the mining proposals and reported to the county government with an indigenous member of the legislative body at the county level. The instigator was the township office itself: it was fined by county government according to the regulations of soil and water conservation, and villagers' trust in the office was further reduced.


The self-help group transformed into a 'tribal meeting' in March 2012. Tribal meetings seek consensus around the specific issues affecting the community. For this community, the chairman of the tribal meeting group was finally elected after twice cancelled meetings. The chairman was a member of the self-help group and he adopted issues of scenic area for discussion in the tribal meeting. The second meeting refused the convention proposed by the township office authorities because the office never discussed its content with villagers. This group invited the office and county government to attend the third meeting but they did not. The meeting made a stand against the establishment of the NCESA in their traditional domain. On the same day, the chairman received an anonymous letter in which he was accused of spreading rumours and attempting to cause intra-tribal disharmony.

In August 2012, the county government approved the rules for NCESA's management, the authentication of its tour guides, and for its use of funding at a county level. The county government continued to promote the scenic area in spite of opposition within the village, the statement of the county government was that the other group totally agreed with the establishment while there were only a few villagers who objected to the scenic area. In September, the government authorities formally announced the

management rules of NCESA in Hualien County, but the protesting villagers were only aware of these when they read a local daily newspaper.

In October, the office authorities received the community association's request to recall the chairman of the tribal meeting and held a meeting in the village. Due to low attendance, the chairman of tribal meeting could not be recalled by a quorate vote. In the same month, a member of the county legislative body introduced the self-help group to the director of Tourism Department of Hualien in the county government. The director hoped that NCESA could be a win-win situation. If some villagers still disagreed with the establishment, it was possible to cancel the planning in the village.

A few protesters received blackmails from different law firms in 2012 (Figure 6.1). The mails accused that the receivers and other protesters illegally spread lies and used violence for collective demonstration, and the acts caused the whole village uneasy. The district court had dealt with the litigation accused by other leaders of the village regarding the slander, intimidation and violence. The blackmails evidently stemmed from the clashes between groups with different voices within the village. The statements in the mails only expressed one voice of the NCESA controversy. Moreover, the law firms didn't exist. Blackmails were seen as a means attempting to menace protesters.



(source: the author, 2018)

Some staffs in the local government and the chairman of community association had measured the block houses close to the attraction and declared their intention to demolish these illegal buildings. The office authorities did not inform the house owners

before measuring these buildings, an action that aroused more displeasure among the protestors. At the end of November, the self-help group decided to use a 'Meet the County Head' event to petition the head and hold a press conference. The protestors' leaders received a phone call from the director of Tourism Department requesting negotiation before the petition. The leaders still insisted on their action the next day, the day of petition, and the county government announced that the county head had a previous engagement and that the vice-head would talk to the villagers instead. These petitioners were enraged by this and protested in the county hall. When the director of Tourism Department talked to them, the representative of villagers stressed that the local governments planning the scenic area lacked transparency. In addition, the inconveniences resulted from tourism development aroused complaints of villagers. They expressed their desire to govern themselves on their lands, and refused the establishment of NCESA in their home village.

A few weeks later, the village head, several chairmen of local associations, and some villagers went to another 'Meet the County Head' in southern Hualien to express their enthusiasm for NCESA. One informant told me he knew this because an old villager joining the action complained this petition in a tribal meeting of December 2012. These senior attendants were originally invited to join the free spa tourism in southern Hualien, but finally they 'by the way' met the county head to petition for the establishment of NCESA. They were used by some political leaders who organised the trip. He felt cheated in the petition action with these leaders. The response of the county government toward the petition in the south came via a formal document delivered the village soon after while there was no reply to the earlier petition/ protest in the county hall.

Both groups of self-help for tribal sovereignty and tribal meeting were aware that the local governments kept on promoting the NCESA. They therefore sought the help of an indigenous legislator on the centre level. One legislator came to visit the village and promised to hold a negotiation conference. In February 2013, the legislator invited several representatives of different governmental agencies to attend the conference. In the meeting, various interest groups stated their views on the topic. Most governmental agencies did not insist on the establishment of NCESA in this village. Villagers in different camps addressed their views as the legislator chaired, but from my observations, the opposing people seemed to have more time to depict their complaints. Finally, the legislator concluded that since the NCESA was controversial in this village, it was appropriate to suspend the issue until a consensus was reached. Later in February, the

county government documented to notify that the establishment of NCESA in the village was suspended because no consensus on the topic had yet emerged.

## **6.6 Social impacts from community conservation on Truku community**

The community conservation project with development planning caused some serious negative effects on T village. I highlight three points including livelihood selection, land ownership and power struggle which are closely associated with the everyday life of Truku residents.

### **6.6.1 Restriction on livelihood selections**

As mentioned in section 6.5.1, the NCESA regulations protect the natural environment within and contiguous scenic areas. It caused some questions and complaints among villagers when the plan was completed. They didn't trust the plan supported by the local government because many residents were not aware of the plan. Land users in and next to the expected tourist attraction of the NCESA could not attend the meeting in the process of planning. These land users and some other residents worried about the potential negative influence once the scenic area is established, in particular the restriction on their livelihood. They guessed that the surrounding natural beauty of this scenic area should be strictly protected similar to the national park. The aboriginal reserved lands can also be zoned into the NCESA scope. As long as one area is planned as the NCESA, the lands there should be transferred into another category. Private-owned reserved land probably becomes nationally owned, which shows that the local indigenous people lose the connection to the land they depend on. The extended problem is the restriction of their livelihoods. Overall, indigenous people in the scenic area cannot take advantage of natural resources such as hunting practices nor can they own private reserved lands.

*'The scenic area will limit the use of our reserved lands such as water resource, crop, plantation and wildlife. The restrictions affect the development and livelihoods of indigenous people. What can we do without land? We grow vegetables for family use and a little for sale. The farmers must be affected negatively as the first victim. The lands cannot be developed, what can our children do? Working in the scenic area usually requires license while the local people lack such an opportunity of making a living unless they have the special relationship with the officials at higher level. We*

*indigenous people cannot survive due to the restrictions. We cannot do farming and go hunting freely. The scenic area is like the national park. Many Han Chinese make money in the indigenous tourism attractions. Few indigenous people can make profits as well because they retire from the public sector. The general indigenous people have no chance to make a living in the scenic area. They keep saying the employment of indigenous people but there is no chance in the national park now. In the past, there were job vacancies such as once ranger and cleaners for the local indigenous people. This is the fraudulent scheme of the governments. There is sweetness at the beginning but no pension ultimately. (Hunter K, 29.01.2013)*

*'It is better to let nature take its course that the government gives up the establishment of the NCESA. At least the lands can still be utilised by new generations of indigenous people. If the scenic area was established, the lands must be restricted due to ecological conservation...Our culture dies or becomes extinct because we cannot practise it. Our fathers were famous for hunting practices, they made use of the mountains. Now we want to follow them but are limited by the conservation regulations. If we continue to protest against the NCESA, it is possible that indigenous hunting will exist in the future.'* (Hunter D, 09.03.2013)

These Truku people fear that if the state intervenes their community, and their lifestyle will be changed because of the example of their compatriots in F village in Taroko National Park. Although aiming to develop tourism, this scenic area is a kind of 'protected area' for Truku people because the natural environment is also rigorously preserved. They imagined that similar conditions would occur at the NCESA in the future and that their livelihoods would be highly restricted. They were especially concerned about the institution of successive management agencies every four years because the regulations behind these governmental agencies would confine what they do for livelihoods.

*'If the scenic area is developed, it is very possible to be like the Taroko National Park, that there are hotels and B&B's. Then there will be more development. It is also like the previous situation where the Amis community anticipated the wonderful future with tourism development after the building of a large hotel. Later the local Amis people complained that there were no job vacancies at all. The local people were driven away without paying them. We learnt the lesson from the case... The scenic area will destroy our lifestyle and customs. The local government promoted tourism development but there were no follow-up measures. The first*

*priority is to make more money, but where are the rights and interests of indigenous people?’ (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)*

*‘Our Truku hunters are almost arrested in the Taroko National Park. They cannot apply for hunting there. If this village becomes the NCESA, we cannot apply for hunting, either. What we can do is stay at home rather than go out because of the policing of the NCESA. We cannot do the farming unless we gain approval of many governmental agencies including the township office, county government, police station, Tourism Bureau, and Forestry Bureau. If one of these authorities refuses it, we cannot cultivate in the area. These multiple regulations suffocate us. We’re used to the traditional way, but the public sector doesn’t accept it.’ (Hunter K, 29.01.2013)*

*‘It is possible that people cannot grow vegetables in the scenic area. We may be restricted like the people in the Taroko National Park...now I don’t really trust what the government says...’ (Hunter G, 29.01.2013)*

The livelihood was the priority for the locals. They depended on agriculture on their land for sustenance. The intervention of the NCESA was seen as the same thing like the Park intervention due to the mistrust between the locals and state agencies in PAs. Moreover, the management system in the NCESA was not clear. Protesting residents worried that different state agencies could adopt diverse regulations for the management. Their life could be affected due to different managers.

*‘They have planned the large territory in the village as the scenic area. Then it is a problem as we do farming, weeding and hunting...the draft of management rules mentions several groups such as the Forestry Bureau, River Management Office, Township Office, Police Substation, Indigenous groups of vigilante...etc. These agencies will affect our everyday life in the future. (Young leader L, 28.01.2013)*

A few residents were concerned with their Truku customs. The natural resource management of the Truku such as hunting practices may be banned in the NCESA intervention. The changing regulations regarding hunting activities probably change again once the scenic area is created in their village.

*‘The local people cannot touch the vegetation under the power of the regulations, not mention to the wildlife. Our traditional domain is now nationally owned and we can go hunting in celebration. But we can’t do this in the future if the*



*scenic area is built. Hunting practices are our traditional culture. For instance, I have to visit the girl my son loves with the present of wildlife. The custom still continues in modern time. We can exploit the resource of wildlife according to the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples. The new rules permit us to go hunting but we can't do this once the NCESA is established.'* (Hunter K, 29.01.2013)

A young hunter observed the difference between Han Chinese and indigenous people around employment, stressing the recent disadvantaged status of indigenous people in Taiwan. Importing foreign labourers prevented indigenous Taiwanese labourers from gaining employment in urban areas. Indigenous people returned to their hometown in the countryside and depended on farming as well as exploitation of natural resources. Although establishing the NCESA in indigenous areas increased employment for the local residents, their original work such as agriculture could be restricted, particularly certain traditional practices. Without sufficient economic capital, it is very possible that they will merely be employed by wealthy Han Chinese at the NCESA. Such a development way seems to lose the cultural autonomy and livelihood selection of indigenous people. Taking these into consideration, the protesting villagers continued to claim their rights for a sustainable livelihood.

*'They told us the advantages only but neglected some restrictions on purpose. For example, they mentioned that young people and offspring must have jobs in the village and they don't need to work outside the hometown after the establishment of the scenic area, but they didn't tell us the limits. This meant that we have to give up the current jobs in order to allow the tourism development. I think we cannot learn the skill. Such scenic areas cannot help the development of Taiwan. It will be really terrible if most reserved lands in Taiwan become the NCESA. In fact, the governments cannot guarantee to offer jobs in the village because it is usually the Han Chinese people which undertake the jobs rather than indigenous people. They are capable of doing these jobs. They don't hire the indigenous employees due to the impression of drunken people and lazy personality. No one guarantees to offer the job vacancies for the local people. The scenic area is not beneficial for the local residents.'* (Hunter D, 09.03.2013)

The restrictions related to the NCESA were never put into practice in this village. The locals' worries came from the negative example of F village in the Park. Residents there were restricted by state agencies and the Truku lifestyle was greatly influenced by

conservation regulations. Truku people in T village cherished their hunting tradition and land use, so they resisted the plan of the NCESA.

### 6.6.2 Controversy over land ownership

Truku villagers opposing the NCESA questioned the issuance of ownership certificates of reserved lands in the tourist attraction. These land users claimed their ancestors utilised these plots for a while, so that they applied for private owned reserved lands for indigenous people. They had applied for the ownership certificate and the field measurement of land had been completed much earlier, however their certificates still had not been issued. Once the NCESA is established, they worried that they would not gain their certificates after land alternation. This was unfair because the lands were inherited from their fathers, and were still in use. Therefore, their protests can be seen as safeguarding their land rights.

*‘The officials in the governmental agencies didn’t communicate with us, but the planner visited me, I protested because of the land problem. We cannot gain the certificates after the measurement. We want to express our opinion if the NCESA is permitted, we can never get the ownership. The land ownership certificates are our premise to talk about the establishment of the NCESA. (Hunter K, 29.01.2013)*

I had an informal conversation with an NCESA planner when doing field work, who noted that the land problem was one primary issue for those protesting. She thought the lands were close to the stream, which indicated the public sector would not be able to issue the ownership certificates of the lands for private use there. The local land users had followed legal procedures but finally they couldn’t gain the ownership, and therefore doubted the Township Office authorities, which mediated the matters of reserved lands. They believed the promotions of the tourism development and the NCESA affected the issuance of ownership certificates in the tourist attraction.

*‘There are sixty plots without issuing land ownership certificates in the two sections (close to the primary attraction of the scenic area). People said the measurement of lands should not charge at that time, but they were charged 3,000 NTD by the township office and land office. No one explained where the money went...some villagers talked about this problem of the charge in the tribal meeting...many details emerged...some were legal but became illegal later because of individual interest...they said so in the meeting...we illustrated some regulations such as the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples...the case of losing lands...it is possible that*

*the lands are developed and then the lands are transferred to the state because of land alternation... each land in the two sections was charged 3,000 NTD in the past ten years, but these villagers have not gotten the ownership certificates...there are sixty lands...these are on the hands of the township office supervisor...some counsellors discuss whether the office supervisor's jurisdiction is appropriate or not...they believe that the authorities should issue the certificate as long as the land is reserved for indigenous people. ' (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)*

Rights of reserved lands for indigenous people are close to private property. The delay or rejection of issuance of ownership certificates by the public sector meant the violation of individual property. Collective action was therefore formed due to the same loss of land ownership.

The other land issue took place when the NCESA was uproarious in this village. That was when the land agency re-measured land boundaries using satellite imagery. It did so because land information based on manual measurement was out-of-date according to an informant in the other community. Yet the young leader L of M community considered this re-measurement as a way of occupation by the state. His perception was built on experiences of some Truku compatriots in a neighbouring village.

*'The Land Office is measuring our lands in three communities containing house lands and mountain lands...in the past, it took four thousand NTD while one certificate charged hundreds NTD. However, it will be free for measurement this time. The staff said it is because that the lands here have not been measured over fifty years. In fact, it is wrong; the lands here were measured in the 1980s and 1990s from time to time. They mentioned the information is old. But older people here think it is impossible to be free. You cannot make bricks without straw. The village head also endorsed this. It is said that if your land is measured, they cannot measure as the same size as original measurement. Part of the land will be taken away. Otherwise, you must quarrel with others due to land conflict. This causes opposition. Neighbours possibly fight for lands...these measurement staff are endorsed by the County Government. For us, this moment is unusual because there are NCESA, and the planning of cable cars according to the new legislations for development of Hualien and Taitung. The scheduled areas are here within the areas for re-measurement. What we're concerned about is as the neighbouring village head mentioned, is that we have the rights not to join the re-measurement. Yet if the staff*

*inform you twice, they can measure your land without permission. When they post the certificate to you, you cannot have objections...the staff said this village is now an obstructing community because we don't want the re-measurement. We protest against the NCESA and this field measurement is closely associated with our land right. These things are going-on simultaneously, which makes us feel doubtful...we don't need them but they continue to do these...the government should give us the buffer time after we absorbed many different ideas (the NCESA and different laws) ... Nowadays there is always protest when policy implementation is concerned by the state... (Young leader L, 08.03.2013)*

This young Truku leader revealed some implications about resistance by these protesting Truku people. First, Truku residents didn't trust governmental agencies due to past unpleasant experiences and unreasonable excuses. Contradicting and dominant acts of government underpinned their mistrust. The overlaps between controversial policies made the protesting people doubt the ulterior motive of governmental agencies. Second, policy interventions relating to land rights potentially lead to controversy due to personal interests. Every land owner tended to defend his/her private property. Some Truku villagers worried about property loss after measurement, so they rejected re-measurement, expecting that controversial cases always result in land loss rather than gain. Yet coercive act of measurement by the government incited their resentment. At the same time, an informant in a different interest group in this village thought the re-measurement was proper policy implementation, commenting that the opposing villagers were poorly educated. Finally, empowerment is a vital variable during the protesting period. Protesting Truku residents knew these regulations which were related to their life although these were made by Han Chinese mainstream society. They were inspired to use the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples to fight for their rights. Some groups such as the Truku Presbytery of Presbyterian Church of Taiwan provided information about land rights of indigenous peoples, so that these local people were connected to other indigenous groups with experience of oppression and to a few Han Chinese lawyers favourable to indigenous rights. This empowerment enhanced persistent resistance by Truku villagers against unfair treatments.

### **6.6.3 Tangled power relationships within the village**

Power relations in the village affect villagers' collective actions because they are usually mobilised and organised by various interest groups. The groups included

traditional families and relatives; religious groups of Christianity, political groups, the local community organisations, industry associations among others. Interactions among these groups form a primary part of village life. For example, the chairman of a community association accompanied one legislator candidate to visit some local family leaders of the village. These interest groups in various domains may compete for resources or cooperate for the same interest. Competition and unfairness among these groups could usually cause the undermining of social capital of the village. This thesis argues that these power struggles are reinforced by interventions of the state agencies. These negative social impacts include not merely livelihoods and traditional practices affected by access to natural resources, but also the weakening of social capital through power conflicts. Conflicts over interests stemmed from external interventions containing community conservation projects, event sponsorships and tourism development directly or indirectly supported by governmental agencies. These struggles were acknowledged by many residents and they noted that this disadvantage was serious in this village. The following are details of power struggles on various issues, which revealed complex scenarios in T village.

#### ***Controversy over the name of the NCESA***

The association for tourism promotion's name<sup>15</sup> refers to the name of one traditional family. This family submitted to the Japanese and moved to the flat lands earlier than others during Japanese colonial period. The family advised other families to surrender, and the patriarch of the family was appointed as the chieftain of this area. The current patriarch of this family is now the leader of traditional matters in one community, and attends the meeting of indigenous traditional affairs in Hualien county government. Adoption of the name of this family as for the tourism association originated from the proposal of an attendee of one closed meeting before the tourism development started. It implied that only a few people attended the meeting while most villagers were neglected. The outcome of the meeting was that the name of the association almost replaced the name of this village through the development of its booming tourism industry. The singular family name representing the whole village made of many families led to complaints among villagers because the adoption of the name lacked agreement. Such a complaint extended to the establishment of the NCESA as the name which should be continued to be used. In the meeting of the investigation committee in August 2011, the

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<sup>15</sup> *The name of this association is not shown here to protect anonymity.*

chairman of B community association proposed this. The petition of protesting villagers also concerned the name issue. Their argument about the name stated that neglecting justification of the name highlighted the disrespect of culture in the NCESA.

*'Many people think this village is famous for the natural beauty, which is good for tourism development: they may also believe that this is a harmonious village. Honestly it is wrong, we have disagreed with the name of this tourism attraction. There are many families in this village and everyone can share the common resource rather than one family monopolising resources and making decision. What can other families do? These families own lands in the attraction. They cultivate there. We should respect them and reach the consensus. It is not right that only one family is the decision maker.'* (Young leader L, 28.01.2013)

*'We intended to correct the name of the attraction via media... these names of sites in the attraction are only for business use only. These sites have their own names and meanings which were legacies of older generations, but we know that the local governments have promoted tourism here for a while. It is not easy to change the name suddenly. But I have to stress that the pre-process of tourism development is incomplete.'* (Young leader L, 28.01.2013)

Responding to the urgency of tourism development, sites in the main attraction area were renamed in Chinese, which lost the connotations of the local Truku legacy. The implication of such a complaint is that the cultural identity behind current economic development may be lost.

The controversy of the name revealed that the local people sought fairness on village matters, in response to a few people making decisions for the whole village. Different interest groups accordingly obtained a topic to criticise their autocratic style. This controversy was addressed in many public meetings and private gossip. People in different interest groups expressed the unfair mechanism of past decision-making. It is reasonable to let more groups obtain the opportunity to attend meetings as well as decision-making.

### ***Power struggles among local interest groups***

Power struggles in the village can be examined through the interactions between the groups over the operation of funding, the emergence of a new organisation, threats in the village, and the attitude of some leaders. These everyday interactions in the village

revealed that first, many villagers sought fairness<sup>16</sup> so that they might easily complain about funding operation of an organisation if they felt it was unfair. Second, each interest group had its strong self-identity so that creating a new group was easier than coordination between existing organisations. Separation appeared to be normal in the village. Finally, negative communications through menace, threatened some people's livelihood, arousing more resentment and undermining social relationships. I argue that these conflicts sapped trust between villagers: without basic common faith, collective actions of villagers would be hard to be mobilised and the actions would collapse easily. The communications within the village affected the interactions between villagers and the local governmental agencies and vice versa. The implementation of policies would be hampered due to the vicious circle of poor communications and mistrust: these conflicts reinforced problems with the interventions of community conservation and other sponsorships from governmental agencies on multiple levels.

*'The tribal meeting group of that community exaggerated their mistakes to the maximum. They thought the planning of the NCESA from the county government was not approved by the local people. Last time, they wanted to come to this community to hold a meeting. We have our own chairman of tribal meeting. They didn't respect us; otherwise our chairman should be invited to attend the meeting. Why did they go over the line of community? The group despatched an official document that they intend to hold a meeting last week. I think the conference is for the public but why did they not invite the public sector such as the township authorities and village head? Why did they go across the boundary? I accordingly suggested shutting the door so that they could not use the space. They should respect us.'* (Hunter U, 08.03.2013)

One tribal meeting group was the leading organisation of mobilising collective protests to the NCESA. This group became notorious for its fight against the local government and other opposing groups whose position was close to the government. Thus the violent reputation aroused some residents' and groups' dissent. Other groups used various means to undermine the mobilisation of the leading group. Similarly, when a group attempted to organise collective action to protest against acts of the government,

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<sup>16</sup>Truku group is an acephalous society without permanent power mechanism. In general, every man is equal in political power (Simon, 2013).

other groups might decide to 'let it alone' in order to avoid confrontation and hindered the mobilisation. These non-cooperative actions appeared to deepen mutual antagonism.

*'When we dealt with the event of excavation in the hillside, the chairman of the community association helped take photos and data collection. We hoped that the association could dispatch the document to the local government, but I don't know why he did lose the data and why the computer was out of order. Later he admitted that he didn't want to send the report because he was afraid that doing so might cause unnecessary conflict. I have not joined the association since then because of these. The group is empty and the meeting there was a kind of formalism. There were no concrete actions after meeting. It is meaningless to stay there.'* (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)

Diverse camps with different points of view sometimes induced them to avoid the important part, but to dwell on the trivial. Some protesters were the land owners in the planned tourist attraction. The camp supporting the NCESA attempted to persuade the county head by pointing out that some protesters were outsiders living in another village.

*'What I mention here, are according to the statements of petition in the south, those supporting people said some protesting people come from the other village. In fact, they are also the local residents of this village. They were forced to move due to the serious landslide. They owned lands in this village. Some people's households are still in this village. So people should respect them and their rights.'* (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)

Different camps took advantage of political power to menace other camps. Land owners in the planned tourist attraction used to build huts for storage or raising chickens. When the owners joined the protesting group, their lifestyle was disturbed by the threat of the demolition of huts which was based on the legislation. This threat affected the livelihood of some protesting residents and undermined mutual trust in the village.

*'To rebuild the house let alone the henhouse is not allowed in the tourist attraction. If the village becomes the NCESA, this is the first one in Taiwan. Now this area is not a scenic area but the block house should be demolished. The representative said that some people petitioned, but I believe the petition was a lie. She (the representative) wished that this village becomes the NCESA because she has no land inside the attraction. The collusion between the government and businessmen works*



*when the scenic are established. She took advantage of many means to influence villagers so that there will be no protest against the NCESA...'* (Young Leader Y, 02.01.2013)

Moreover, a few hunters were threatened that their illegal acts would be reported due to their opposing views on the NCESA. One leader of the protesting tribal group explained that he and his brother were warned by menace because they used to go hunting and mobilised demonstrations in the village. Menaces were the embodiment of power struggles in this village, and were a means to stop other rival individuals continuing their action. Several types of menace had been recorded during my fieldwork, which contained warning by blackmail, verbal warning, and report to some authorities concerned. These threats were significant in the village for they caused psychological pressure on those people threatened, and reports to officials made some villagers worry about their personal property and livelihood. Such menaces undermined social relationships in the village, and reduced the possibility of negotiation or coordination between interest groups. These menaces, as parts of power struggles, are seen as the negative social impacts from governmental interventions; because interventions reinforced these power struggles in the Truku village.

Blackmail was a type of menace (see section 6.5.4) which exposed the position and motive of the sender. It showed the complexity of power relations among different groups in the village. When the trick was exposed, that was, the receivers knew that the blackmail was a warning from other groups with opposing views, they felt more resentment at the supporting group and were determined to hold a demonstration. As a result, the blackmail warning did not work to stop receivers' action.

The second threat was a verbal warning. This warning was usually in relation to the livelihood of the threatened villager. The example was illustrated that two brothers in the village were famous hunters, and had greatly depended on hunting in the 1980s. More recently one was an amateur, while hunting accounted for half of the other's income, and both fought against the establishment of the NCESA. One led the protesting locals, while the other directly protested against the supporting camp in Truku in a public meeting. During this period, they were warned that they should be cautious if they continued to go hunting because it was very possible that the police were waiting for them. The reason why hunting practices could be regarded as a menace was because the game in the area was usually an 'endangered species'. It was not easy to get approval to hunt endangered

species when applying for legal hunting, despite the rules that allowed indigenous hunting for endangered wildlife for non-profit purpose. For the brothers, the hunting practices were traditional culture as well as a way of livelihood. When they got the warning, the one depending more on hunting chose to be a wage labourer in the suburb of another city. This was his first time working outside the village for a comparably long term (over one year) since he married over 25 years ago. However, he frequently came back for protest actions and exercised hunting practices as he stayed home.

*'Few supporters of NCESA paid attention to my brother and me. They said that we mobilise the protesters. These supporters warned us when chatting in the village. They knew that we used to go hunting for livelihood and would report to the police about our poaching. They believed that it will be calming in the village if we are arrested. Few villagers went hunting this winter only because supporters of the NCESA monitored us. They go to the police substation frequently, which is very troublesome. I still go hunting but go surreptitiously.'* (Hunter K, 29.01.2013)

The supporting camp also warned some poor old people that their subsidy for low-income household could be cancelled if they attended the tribal meeting. These illiterate locals worried about the sustenance subsidy and listened to the rumour. One informant heard of this from an old man in his community. The case was also seen as a threat to a sustenance livelihood.

*'When we convened tribal meeting, a specific powerful person in the village treated some villagers so that they couldn't participate in the meeting. There are a few low-income families here in this village. He also menaced some poor villagers that they cannot gain social benefits if they attend the meeting. He did say that to some old people. These old villagers were afraid of attending the meeting when he told them about the loss of social subsidy. It was related to their livelihoods. It was too risky for them...when we met last August, he organised a trip of dining out. The other trip was also organised as we held the third tribal meeting to avoid their participation of tribal matters.'* (Young leader L, 28.01.2013)

It appeared that the menace of an oral warning on livelihood worked to some degree for it forced a Truku hunter to work outside the village and stopped an old person attending a tribal meeting supporting the opposition. Nevertheless, the hunter still joined the protest actions and kept on his traditional practices of hunting.

The third type of menace was the report to the authorities of certain illegal activities of the rival group. The instance in the village was the block houses in the attraction. These buildings belonged to those villagers opposing the NCESA. After public conflicts between the two sides, the supporting group reported the illegal houses to the township office on the lands where the local users did not gain the ownership certificates. The houses were important personal properties for the owners, so one expressed his thought of committing suicide in a public conference. Some users worried about the demolition by the local government, and the protesting group searched for the help of a lawyer. In the public conference, the tribal meeting group stressed that the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples safeguarded the rights of building block houses for farming and hunting:

*'We disagreed with the establishment of the NCESA last year and the representative advised to demolish the block houses of those protestors. These houses are regarded as the lifeblood of indigenous people. The local newspaper reported that she proposed to do so in the township representative council. What she meant was this area. Those who supported the NCESA petitioned the county head also mentioned the illegal block houses should be destroyed.'* (Young Leader L, 28.01.2013)

The existence of menace in the village demonstrated that the public negotiation seemed to be impossible between the two sides. These different threats did not really affect the stance of the majority of protestors, but they did result in trouble in the village in addition to psychological pressure as the discontent between the two camps increased, particularly the threatened opposing camp. These conflicts in the village were reinforced because of intervention from the government. We could see the weak social capital in the village was undermined due to the planning of NCESA supported by the local county government. This planning stemmed from the development dimension of the community conservation project. Different interest groups in the village held different views of the planning. The land owners in the tourist attraction tended to oppose the scenic area while many leaders supported the local government's plans. Many villagers were neutral to see the planning. The protestors were organised by the tribal meeting group and self-help group. The supporters depended on the industry associations and community associations. After a few demonstrations and mobilisations, the protesters evoked a sense of crisis in many villagers. They perceived that their livelihood, land rights and Truku lifestyle would be invaded when the planning of NCESA was put into practice. Moreover,

the unpleasant social impacts such as menace and inconvenience from tourism development had affected their life. More residents joined in the opposing camp.

***Local leaders' flag-flopping attitude towards the issue of the NCESA***

Some leaders and retired teachers of the village changed their position over the NCESA. This appeared to be normal since they understood the issues more deeply with the development of communications between villagers and the local government. But the opposing residents thought that there could be a benefit exchange under the table. In addition, the village head always insisted on his neutrality, which irritated the protesting villagers because he in reality helped the local governmental agencies. A retired teacher opposed the scenic area but changed his mind later to support the plan. These leaders' changing views impressed the protesters. The protesting residents guessed that the leaders might have been bribed.

*'When the planners talked to some leaders of villagers in private, there may be illegal transactions under the table. We are sure this problem exists...that is why some people opposed the NCESA but then they agreed with this idea, later they found there was no interest and returned to protesting camp. Such a trick exposed...'* (Young leader L, 28.01.2013)

*'When the planners came to us, the retired supervisor of the primary school opposed the establishment of the NCESA. However, he supports the scenic area now and is in the same camp of the supervisor of township office.'* (Hunter K, 29.01.2013)

The point of view of the village head was vital for he represented the village to a certain degree. When more villagers joined in the protesting camp, the head still insisted on his own neutrality, yet his actions exposed his support of the plans. Many opposing residents expressed their complaint that the head was not in favour with the opinion of the majority of villagers.

*'We invited the village head to come to our tribal meeting but he didn't. He came when the recall election of chairman of tribal meeting was held. He may think that the tribal matters affect his duty of village head. He may not know how to respond to these matters. However, when we asked him, he was utterly ignorant and replied that he was neutral. I think he was elected by villagers (two communities) and he should help a little. He can at least come to listen to our opinions and help express*

*our views. No, he never helps. How can we express our opinion?’ (Young leader L, 28.01.2013)*

*‘The village head stressed he was neutral when the weak villagers had difficulty. It is unbelievable that the elected village head emphasised his neutrality. What should we say about this? The NCESA is in relation to the local governmental agencies, politicians and the consortium, which is hard to deal with.’ (Hunter D, 09.03.2013)*

An opposing leader blamed these Truku leaders including the village head, the representative and supervisor of the township office because they always cooperated with the businessmen for their interest rather than the will of many villagers. He therefore suggested that the local residents could run their micro-businesses in their village rather than let the public sector entrust external companies.

*‘Why do we protest against the planning so hard? The village head, representative and the township supervisor don’t support us. They support the consortium in order for their benefits only rather than popular will. If the village head helps us, the public sector cannot do the planning. The project of the NCESA must have been vanished long time ago. I think it is appropriate to run the business ourselves.’ (Hunter K, 29.01.2013)*

The evolution of community conservation project revealed that local community suffered from the power struggles among groups, local leaders could not help seek the consensus of controversies of the NCESA, the problem of land ownership and land use was getting serious, the custom practices might not be exercised in the NCESA, and the distribution of tourism resource was uneven. I considered these as the social impacts on the Truku village from the intervention of community conservation. These negative impacts aroused these local Truku’s collective actions of open resistance.

## **6.7 Conclusion**

This chapter explored the evolution of a community conservation example over 17 years in order to examine the interactions between the government and local Truku villagers. I have reviewed the early interactions between local government and the Truku village via conservation issues in section 6.2. In the section 6.3, I looked at the new communication strategy of the local government with the local Truku. This strategy

successfully persuaded the locals because of the common goal of tourism development. Hualien County Government was famous for its tourism industry and the Truku needed economic development to improve their life. However, Truku practice of community conservation paid much more attention to development expectations rather than the conservation effort. This practice model unfortunately resulted in a serious problem of elite capture and power struggle (Jhuang and Tai, 2009). I noted the external conservation idea showed this participatory conservation was actually manipulated by the local government. Moreover, the internal hegemony of a few leaders contradicted full local participation. This community conservation greatly depending on the market demonstrated that financially disadvantaged Truku people were easily marginalised due to lack of capital. Tourism development was therefore dominated by external travel agencies. The local government again intervened the village in order to deal with the difficulty. A solution to the difficulty was to create a new scenic area and new rules. The planning of the NCESA by the local government was not spread among the whole village. Quite a few residents protested against this plan. They complained to the local government as section 6.5.3 pointed out. They considered the NCESA as an intervention attempting to control their life and natural resources. I regarded Truku residents' political actions as the legacy of strict conservation implementation in the Taroko Park. Many social impacts from the policy interventions are described in the remaining sections in section 6.6. Focusing on the acts of the local government, responses of the locals to those governmental acts and social impacts resulted from the policy on the study village, I conclude that community conservation containing conservation and development strategies can be understood as an act of internal territoriality by the powerful government. The territorialisation of the government resulted in some negative social impacts on the local community, which threatened their livelihood, land property and social cohesion. Accordingly, most of the local Truku residents exercised overt resistance to the policy intervention of the NCESA. These three conceptions have constituted the main argument of this study, the territorialisation of the state caused the resistance of local indigenous people due to negative social impacts, which is seen as an interpretation of policy implementation in the indigenous regions.

# CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

## 7.1 Introduction

This study set out to explore the interactions between state agencies and local indigenous people in PAs in order to review nature conservation policy implementations in the indigenous regions of Taiwan. Three broad research questions about the state acts, locals' acts and social influences on local community were raised to reach the research aim. Specifically, I have examined conservation policy implementations and institutions of the central and local governmental agencies in Taroko National Park and a community conservation case. Moreover, the perceptions and responses of the local Truku residents to policy implementations and institutions in these PAs were also investigated. This study is important for PA management because state agencies and the locals are primary actors. Their interactive processes shape nature conservation policies and reflect policy implementations. Their interplay also informs debates about biodiversity conservation and social justice.

In this concluding chapter, I firstly present empirical findings to reply to these questions. The data analysis was based on two different types of PAs in two Truku villages, and placed within the theoretical framework to verify the primary argument. In this framework examination, I also attempt to compare the similarities and differences between these two Truku examples. This is followed by the theoretical contribution and policy implications of this study. Finally, I make policy recommendations for the future and a conclusion.

## 7.2 Research questions and findings of this study

There were three research questions in this study to understand the interactions between state agencies and local Truku people in Taroko National Park and a community conservation initiative:

Q1. What were the policies and policy implementations of governmental agencies in Taroko National Park and a community conservation initiative?

Q2. What were the local Trukus' responses/actions to these conservation policies and policy implementations in PAs?

Q3. What social impacts from conservation occurred in the two Truku villages?

These questions are concerned with what the acts of state agencies and the local Truku, and social impacts occurred in the two Truku villages. This study adopts the definition of human territoriality of Sack (1986), social impacts from conservation, and Scott's everyday resistance (1985) to structure the framework design in chapter two in order to examine two Truku cases. As section 2.2.2 points out, political ecology studies have identified that the powerful actor's hegemony is embedded in conservation interventions through the manifestation of specific institutions and technologies. Therefore, Sack's human territoriality containing the feature of behaviour control is employed in the framework. The institutions and specific technologies such as the co-management arrangements in the Park and the NCESA planning were scrutinised in this study to understand whether the acts of the state authorities met Sack's definition of territorialisation. Scott's implicit resistance was adopted because many hidden ways of resistance might be ignored. Yet these everyday acts contain important political implications (Holmes, 2007). When analysing the local Truku's actions to conservation, I not only looked at evident actions but these covert responses and checked the political implications.

Research question one was concerned with the acts of state agencies including the conservation policy-making, diverse conservation institutions in the PAs, and conservation regulation enforcement. Question two explored the responses of local Truku people containing Truku values of natural resource management, local attitudes toward PA authorities and the police, Truku hunting practices, collective actions related to PA authorities and the police. Question three investigated the influences resulting from conservation or PA establishment on the local Truku communities, especially the negative effects. I used these questions to interview officials in charge of nature conservation and indigenous development affairs in state agencies on multiple levels, Truku leaders on politics and Christianity in two village examples, and Truku hunters who frequently exercised hunting practices. Moreover, I attended celebrations, meetings, and church services in two villages for participant observation. Documents such as court judgements, and official documents were collected through governmental website and interviewees. Some video clips about some events were collected via interviewees and YouTube. Data collection was conducted between October 2012 and March 2013, and September 2014. The data were analysed by the framework of political ecology to examine whether the acts of state agencies were the operation of territorialisation according to Sack's definition (1986),



whether the performances of local Truku people were practising covert and over resistances against conservation authorities as Scott (1985) and other authors (e.g. Norgrove and Hulme, 2006; Holmes, 2014) note, and finally whether negative social impacts occurred in Truku communities and the effects were strong enough to drive the resistance of the Truku. In the following sections, I answer these questions in order by exploring the acts of government agencies, responses of the local Truku, and the extensive social influences.

### **7.2.1 Internal territoriality of state agencies in two protected areas**

I used the three principles of Sack's definition of human territoriality as the indicators to examine the government authorities' acts in two PAs. These principles were spatial classification, ease of communication, and behaviour control. I applied these to two PAs of this study and explored decision-making, local participation institutions, conservation legislation, and conservation implementations.

Reviewing the history of national parks in Taiwan in sections 4.3 and 5.2 provided a broad picture of the specific socio-economic background and political atmosphere in the 1970s and 1980s. Taiwan was at that time under the rule of martial law, so the state ruled the whole country in a dictatorial way. The foreign force of the US and domestic economic demand for recreation affected the establishment of parks. The decision-making of park creation was a 'top-down' process based on experts' scientific knowledge and excluded the locals. The Taroko National Park Plan clearly declared the scope of the park by professional maps with park zoning. The Park Plan and the First Review of the Park Plan both confirmed the fact that the local Truku were overlooked. In the Second and Third Reviews, the local Truku were mentioned by their traditional knowledge contributing to conservation and some specific institutions such as the Cultural Advisory Committee and Co-Management Council were elaborated to accommodate local participation. However, when examining these participation schemes, I found the level of participation for the Truku was surprisingly low. The majority of participants could not be involved in the Park management. In the Co-Management Council considering Park management, local participation was restricted to a few leaders who were invited to be the Council members. The analysis of meeting records and my interview data showed that the Park authorities retained the power to select indigenous members and to decide when to hold meetings, which implied that the local participation was controlled by state conservation authorities.

In addition, the Council meeting had been suspended since August 2011. Some officials also thought that those Truku members were concerned with their own interest only.

In the other example of community conservation, the river conservation area was publicly announced by the Hualien Government, and set up a sign on the main road close to the river. The development project of the NCESA was planned by a professor and his assistant. In the NCESA plan, the professional planner delineated the boards of the scenic area after a few negotiations with the Forestry Bureau in order to avoid other existing PAs. Both conservation and development projects were spatial designations. However, the decision-making of both conservation and development programmes was grasped by the local government and few local leaders as shown in sections 6.2. and 6.3. The lack of full local participation and the opaque political process caused complaints among Truku residents. The name of this tourism attraction and the Industry Association, for example, has long been complained about by some local leaders in public meetings. The complaining leaders pointed out that they could not participate in the meetings and the decision about the name was made by some specific leaders only. Moreover, the plan of NCESA also eliminated the participation of the land users of the main attraction in the scheduled NCESA. The expected participatory community conservation in fact was dominated by the local government agencies and experts rather than full participation of local stakeholders. In this regard, two examples demonstrated that the Park and community conservation project were both spatial classifications, and that the decision-making of the boundaries was expert-oriented and exclusionary. Local participation in the co-management arrangement of the Park and community conservation projects was solely opened to a few leaders, yet even they could not affect the decision-making.

The legal source of PAs embodied the restrictions in the territory of a protected area, which was seen as an easy way of communication of human territoriality (Sack, 1986). The legal foundation of the Park example was the National Park Law and its sub-laws. Besides, the Park authorities and Park Police also adopted the Wildlife Conservation Act to strengthen the implementation of conservation (the penalty section) as section 5.6.3 showed because the Law has not been amended over 40 years. These conservation regulations have listed some forbidden activities such as using fire and hunting in the parks. In the practices of communication with the locals, many Truku informants in the Park case expressed their lack of awareness of the detailed rules such as endangered species and other restrictions on natural resources until some locals were arrested due to poaching (section 5.3.1). The example of community conservation employed more legal

sources when making conservation efforts and dealing with development issues. When the conservation project was conducted, the local government proclaimed the conservation announcement in light of the Fisheries Act because the conservation effort aimed to protect fish and river resources. The development planning after the end of conservation implementation was a new scenic area of NCESA (see the development of the NCESA in section 6.2.3 and the problems of the NCESA in section 6.4). The local government developed specific regulations (the rules of NCESA establishment and the Regulations of Governing Guides in NCESA) for the NCESA. Similarly, the majority of residents in T village did not understand the creation of a new scenic area nor the rules associated with the NCESA. In this regard of territoriality, the restrictions of resources in PAs were clearly justified with respect to specific legislation, yet lacked effective communication with the local indigenous residents.

The differences between the local practices and the conservation policy implementation in PAs highlight the control enforcement of territoriality by the state and the Truku identity. The Park headquarters, Park Police and local police were responsible for controlling poaching within the Park according to these conservation regulations. The traditional practices of Truku residents about natural resource management were prohibited. Quite a few interviewees mentioned they knew the conservation restriction when they or their neighbours were arrested by the police. When I examined the Second and Third Reviews of the Park Plan, the Park authorities expressed their inclusion of Truku culture and practices. Some measures of participatory or co-management arrangement were taken by the Park since 2000. Yet when further analysing these participation schemes, I found these schemes were tokenistic because the Park authorities manipulated these to make sure they still maintained the power within the Park as section 5.7 revealed. The Park elaborately interwove power control in these participatory schemes. Moreover, the police and district court also changed their law enforcement to be favourable for indigenous people. The legal system usually used probation to pardon 'indigenous poachers' rather than legislating new regulations for indigenous people. Nevertheless, their grace of law enforcement highlighted that the nature of conservation law lacks the idea of pluralism although the Constitution has declared this as a guiding principle. The local Truku lost their autonomy and rights over decision-making. In the other example, the locals conducted a community conservation project but the fact that only a few leaders hold power caused a backlash from other interest groups in the village. The opaque process of planning and negotiation between government officials and a few leaders produced

mistrust between the locals and the local government. When the meetings were behind closed doors and public hearing became the endorsement for the planning of local government, more and more residents raised their doubts about the NCESA planning. Protesters in T village complained that they were potentially restricted and manipulated by the new rules of NCESA when they got the planning project and studied the rules of the NCESA (as with the problems they pointed to in section 6.4). The development of tourism which was included in the idea of community conservation indicated that local tourism resources were controlled by the external travel agencies. The development idea originally came from the local government (see section 6.2.1).

This section ensured that PA establishment and conservation policy implementations in PAs in the two Truku villages by the state agencies were the acts of territorialisation, which echoes the argument of Vandergeest and Peluso that modern states tend to internally territorialise their ruling scopes for their interest. The government used scientific knowledge, experts, and legislative power to zone territory for nature conservation. Within the PAs, resource and behaviour control was common even though some participatory schemes were adopted. These measures caused inconvenience to the local Truku. Their responses to these territorial acts were various forms of resistance.

#### **7.2.2 Resistance as responses of Truku residents to conservation interventions**

My second question is the responsive acts of Truku people to state acts in two PAs. There are sub-questions including Truku residents' perceptions of PA authorities, conservation regulations and conservation implementations. Moreover, what were the local Trukus' specific actions to these PAs, conservation regulations and conservation implementations? Almost all Truku informants in the Park case expressed their antagonism between them and the Park with Park Police because of the restriction on resource exploitation in the Park as sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 outlined. Some interviewees recalled that some policemen used controversial tactics to trap Truku residents (the depiction in section 5.3.5). The conservation implementation in the late 1980s and early 1990s directly caused the overt protests of the locals combined with local politicians as described in section 5.4. Therefore, a Truku pastor regarded these conservation institutions as external rules and the state as an external political regime in section 5.3.4. These more or less reflected the inner voice in many Truku residents' mind for the subject of this accusation was Truku/indigenous community. A church elder thought that the political actions and claims were costly but did not gain tangible feedback. Truku

individuals retreated and continued their everyday practices for basic sustenance. The practices contained their traditional customs and activities such as hunting, farming and social norms in the highland within the Park. I see these practices as implicit resistances because Truku individual residents deliberately practised these. They avoided the confrontation with the police and the satellite monitoring of the Park authorities, got the Park Police into trouble, went on hunting practices, and asked for the help of indigenous politicians. I have outlined these tactics in section 5.5. They kept on with the everyday practices not only for their sustenance, but for cultural identity that these practices were part of the roots of Truku community. Truku residents could do these primarily due to the help of some indigenous policemen. These policemen provided useful information for the Truku to evade those conservation implementations. The policemen might have a stronger sense of Truku identity and saw the locals as friends. In section 5.6.2, some informants did mention that indigenous policemen helped them on their hunting trips. Truku people in the Park individually took actions of covert resistance against conservation institutions. These actions in everyday life looked similar to the peasants in Scott's *Weapons of the Weak* (1985). Holmes (2007) also notes that to continue livelihood practices is a frequently used strategy of hidden resistance against conservation.

In the other Truku village, residents articulated the mutual distrust between the local government and them because of many unpleasant experiences in the past. When the local government introduced the idea of community conservation, many leaders and residents questioned the public sector and the suggestion. After communications and educational trips for a while, the locals roughly accepted the conservation intervention because of the idea of tourism development. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 described the evolution of the project. The development vision of tourism then frustrated the locals because it needed a great amount of capital. There were actually only a few residents joining the industry and most of them ran small businesses because their fallow fields were close to the attraction. The external travel agencies introduced by the local government monopolised the tourism resource in this village yet they did not build the mechanism of feedback with any local NGO as Chapter 6.2.3 revealed. The local government considered the NCESA as an attempt to solve the tourism difficulty in T village. However, the series of opaque acts in the process of planning the NCESA taken by the local government with very few leaders were considered as dereliction by the many residents (see the points in section 6.5.3). The planning of the NCESA was the straw that broke the camel's back. The action of overt resistance was mobilised by the tribal meeting group. Some young people

also participated in the protests. The protesting Truku took advantage of the media to express unfairness, challenged the officials in open conferences, and asked for the help of powerful politicians. Finally, the opposing residents successfully caused NCESA's planning to be suspended in a negotiation conference held by an indigenous legislator. The local government returned the planning because there was no consensus of the creation of NCESA in the village. Four months later, some residents mobilised a protest against current tourism development in order to claim that tourism activities should obey the Mountain Control Rules. That was, visitors could only walk in the mountain area of T village.

Both examples coincidentally revealed that the responses of the locals to the conservation interventions were resistances implicitly and explicitly. Their perceptions of the conservation institutions and the government were negative and based on mistrust. In this study, both kinds of resistance interacted with each other. Individual covert resistance was the foundation for collective action of overt resistance. Overt resistance could return to hidden resistance by individuals when open actions did not work or were difficult to mobilise. These two patterns of resistance could be alternatively used by the local Truku. Their resisting responses to conservation implementation in the PAs by the Truku showed that there might be something wrong with conservation policy implementations. Otherwise it was costly for the local Truku to resist state policies in explicit and implicit ways. Some informants commented that they could not find steady jobs while the political actions were on going. Covert resistant acts of exploiting natural resources in the Park also took the risk of being arrested. The calculated risks of organising resistance aimed not only to point out the unfairness imposed on them, but also to continue to use resources. Local Truku resistance was the unexpected result of policy because such resistant actions reduced the effectiveness of conservation policies.

The difference between the two examples concerning resistance was evident in my fieldwork. The Truku in F village tended to resist individually while collective political actions were used in T village. Actually the Truku used these two patterns of resistance alternatively. F villagers mobilised open protests and T villagers implicitly used natural resources. Yet it was true that natural resources were more seriously protected in the Park. The police system (local police and the Park Police) and the patrol system of the Park authorities made frequent conservation efforts. The National Park Law banned every resource use within the Park. In the T village, however, the law system was more flexible because the Wildlife Conservation Act and the Forestry Act allowed resource use in some

specific contexts. Some amendments concerning local use and resource use in the national forests had been passed according to the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law, except within the strict park system.

Furthermore, empowerment plays a key role in explicit resistance as Poteete and Ribot (2011) note. In the community conservation example, the tribal meeting group was inspired by church organisations and some professionals in a conference about the land conflicts between indigenous groups and the state. Also, through the discussions and communications in each tribal meeting between attendees, the leaders of the tribal meeting group realised that they could justify their resistance because the Basic Law of Indigenous Peoples conferred Truku protesters the rights to self-determination in the indigenous areas. External groups should get the consent of local indigenous people when engaging in development activity or conservation in indigenous regions (Article 21-23). In this regard, these protesters were also empowered by decentralised legislation. Early open actions were also exercised in the Park example because of the support of local politicians and churches. Political support could be seen as political empowerment. The leaders and residents complained about the restrictions of the Park. In alliance with a social movement of indigenous groups regarding land issues, the Truku leaders positioned their collective actions as resistance against resource restriction and land intervention. It did not mean that there was no political support after the early collective actions. Yet the political support after the actions was indirect and not so powerful to mobilise an open action. These indicate that if the imposition of conservation continues and the Truku are empowered by these factors, Truku collective resistance to conservation may happen.

The resistance as a response to conservation was the unexpected consequence of conservation policy for resistance acts undermine conservation efficiency. It was also costly for the state to deal with the resistance. For the locals, collective actions of open resistance took their time and money. Since the main stakeholders both see the resistance to conservation as a high cost, it is vital to understand the reasons that facilitate resistance and to prevent it from policy implementations. I attempt to summarise these factors in next section.

### **7.2.3 Social impacts from conservation intrusions in the Truku villages**

I consider the social impacts from conservation interventions, no matter whether they were in strict or more participatory protected areas, as the main factor contributing to the resistance of indigenous people because these caused direct influences on the life

of Truku residents. I categorise these impacts as three types. The first one is the effect on livelihood. The second type is the cultural impact. The final one is the influence on social capital. I attempt to justify this argument by my empirical data.

The natural resource use ban in protected areas influenced the livelihoods of a few financially disadvantaged residents. They were hunters, stone and herb collectors, and mushroom growers who heavily relied on natural resources as their livelihood. Truku hunters played a vital role in traditional Truku society although there are fewer and fewer hunters in modern society. Few of these modern huntsmen made a living on hunting only. According to the discussions in my fieldwork, they sold game to other indigenous villagers and their relatives, and a little to Han Chinese friends and game shops. They did this cautiously due to conservation regulations. When their hunting job was threatened by the other camp in terms of political position as section 6.8.2 noted, the huntsman was forced to leave home for other jobs. The majority of hunters used shotguns rather than traps, as making setting and checking traps in mountain areas took more time. Spending more time in hunting domains meant there was more opportunity to be arrested by the police, especially in the Park. Although the police were becoming more permissive towards indigenous habits, as discussed in section 5.6.1, the hunting activity in the park was still called poaching. Conservation institutions prevented the desire of Truku people to hunt, as the ranger of the park mentioned in section 5.3.4, and more hunters said the practices would be exercised continuously in section 5.5.4 because it was a cultural habit. In the community conservation village, the opposing protesters worried that hunting activities would be banned when the NCEA was established because hunting and sight-seeing were different (see their worries in section 6.5). In general, hunting practices still existed despite the pressure of conservation. The senior generation took hunting practices more seriously and emphasized traditional norms. Instead, younger people regarded hunting as a recreational activity or cultural habit, and hunting was not a livelihood priority. Yet for the disadvantaged hunters in the two examples, their livelihood selection was restricted.

The livelihood impact resulting from community conservation was the tourism development in T village. It was a vision among the Truku residents when the locals made conservation efforts. Yet the practices of tourism showed that majority of the locals could not afford to run a costly business of tourism like the Han Chinese businessmen. It was a market-based strategy which was unlikely to be favourable for the disadvantaged indigenous groups. The tourism resource was controlled by external private agencies rather than the locals. There was no sound system of distribution of tourism interest. The



tourism industry exploited the resource of T village and caused inconveniences such as traffic jams and mess in the attraction. Cultural misunderstandings also occurred when the external tour guides introduced the local landscape. These negative experiences had been noted in section 6.6. Low employment and poverty were not improved, but more environmental problems emerged. These impacts allowed the Truku to rethink their development approach.

The second social impact which pushed the resistance should be the cultural implications of conservation measures. I have recurrently mentioned that the hunting practices were associated with Truku culture and Gaya norms. The prohibition of hunting wildlife and using trees clashed with the values of natural resource management held by local Truku people. A general impression that indigenous people are cruel to hunt wildlife was created by the mainstream media and conservation discourses. Several Truku informants stressed their value was to use natural resources sustainably for they had depended on these resources for livelihoods in the past (see section 5.3.1). Their traditional norms didn't allow them to waste any wilderness resources, and their resource use was full of reverence for nature. Some contemporary significant celebrations of Truku communities such as weddings and funerals require game for sharing among relatives (see the statement of a Truku hunter in section 6.6.1 that he must go hunting before his son's wedding celebration as a traditional ritual). The implications of using natural resources contained not merely physical demands but social and spiritual meanings, although hunting was declining with the socioeconomic change in Truku community. The mainstream discourse of conservation sees indigenous hunting as poaching. Hunting as a cultural symbol in Truku society was still important (Simon, 2013). Traditional heroes raising the whole family by hunting game were regarded as criminals in terms of conservation regulations, in particular in the protected areas. Cultural clashes were undermining the Truku identity. Such a social impact spread with formal education and mainstream Han Chinese media. Truku huntsmen arrested by the police were labelled as criminals and they usually experienced lengthy legal trials. Conservation interventions, regulations and other institutions affected the material and spiritual connections to natural resources in Truku culture, which possibly impacted the ideology of the Truku. Oppressing cultural practices of Truku people in the Park forced them to take individual action of hidden resistance. They kept on hunting practices by justifying that it was father's will of sustaining traditional domain (see hunter C in section 5.5.4) or it was an admirable practice and they saw it as the foundation of Truku culture (see the hunters' statement in

section 5.5.4). Similarly, protesting residents also worried that the hunting practices could not be exercised when the NCESA was created so they resisted the establishment of the scenic area.

The third negative impact in the local Truku communities is the undermining of social capital. As we can see in the two Truku examples, social conflicts were reinforced through the external conservation interventions. Garcia's study in Kenya shows that some existing inner clashes are the crux of surface environmental conflicts. These existing conflicts are ecologised due to conservation projects (Garcia, 2017). Pretty (2003) has demonstrated that high social capital groups are related with positive economic and ecological outcomes. Social capital matters not only for the local community, but for the collective action of nature conservation. Here I analyse the possible origin of the existing conflicts, and how these were ecologised by conservation policy implementations in the Truku communities. As we can see the colonial policy of relocation in Truku group in section 4.5.2, the new community was constituted of different families. The social capital was weak and collective action was rare in the relocated Truku communities. When conservation policy entered the Truku regions, social impacts from conservation interventions were embodied in the everyday life of Truku villages. Some informant pastors, leaders and hunters noted that their Truku community was changing. Due to the restriction of conservation legislations, hunting practices were stigmatized and were seen as a means to menace others as pastor S complained in section 5.6.1. In my fieldwork, many Truku residents thought that hunters being arrested was mostly because of them being reported to the police. These reporters were supposedly always some jealous Truku villagers or the Truku residents of different political camps. Accordingly, hunting activities became a secret action exercised in a stealthy way. Arrested Truku hunters usually avoided mentioning anything about hunting after the arrest. Mutual trust was undermined in the village. A professional huntsman in T village left his village for livelihood reasons as his hostile camp threatened to report his hunting practices (see the case in section 6.6.3). Pastor S also blamed the external conservation regulations which confused the order and trust of Truku community in section 5.3.4.

Conservation interventions with sponsorship led to serious competition among various camps in the Truku villages. They competed over limited employment opportunities, business interests and political power. The outcome of these power struggles was opposition and division. For example, at the conservation stage of community conservation in T village, problems of elite-capture and rent-seeking took

place and caused a crowding-out effect (see sections 6.2. and 6.3 and the comment in section 6.4.2). Those community members whose social and normative motives were deterred, undermined the will of collective action of conservation effort (Jhuang and Tai, 2009). Conservation intervention in T village caused more conflicts, reflecting Robbins (2004) observation that conservation can ‘ecologise’ many pre-existing tensions within a locality. This disharmony further undermined social capital amongst the locals. Another example was that the tribal meeting group organising protests against the NCESA in T village created a new association not just for leaders of other associations which were in favour of the establishment of the NCESA, but the group hoped to control the new organisation even though they complained about too many associations in the village (see the complaint in section 6.6.3).

Conservation interventions resulted in many negative social impacts on livelihood, culture and everyday life within the two Truku villages. These undesirable experiences directly threatened their foundational demands. Truku residents therefore expressed their voices by individual and collective actions of resistance.

From a macro historical lens, we can see that the Truku region was demarcated as a ‘special administrative region’ when the Truku capitulated to the Japanese colonial regime in 1914. They were governed by the Japanese police in almost every aspect of life. They were discriminated against through their official categorisation as a brutal group and the police forced them to discard some practices such as head-hunting. Other policies such as relocation and nationalizing forests were also imposed on them. The evident territoriality during the Japanese period aimed to make use of natural resources in the indigenous regions of Taiwan. Many policies regarding indigenous people continued when the Han Chinese regime ruled Taiwan. The Taroko Park was created in 1986 and implemented the National Park Law which was passed in 1972 when martial law was still implemented in Taiwan. The Park with conservation regulations restricted access to resources in the Park. The Park Police also assisted the conservation legislations in the Park. These institutions and restrictions reminded the local Truku of their colonial situation (Simon, 2013) because of the similar acts of territoriality. Some political actions were mobilized but these did not work effectively. The locals individually resisted conservation interventions by taking various tactics to maintain everyday practices. Community conservation, regarded as an alternative to strictly controlled parks, was a participatory approach aiming to reach the goals of conservation and development. The local Truku carried out the conservation project as part of a vision of community

development, yet the tourism development was manipulated by a few external travel agencies. The local government advocated local development through the attempt of creating the NCESA. A few rules associated with the NCESA had been passed at the local level in order to manage local tour guides and visitors. However, the local Truku perceived the spirit of a park would be manifested by the NCESA and resisted the establishment of the NCESA. Likewise, the local government attempted to territorialise the indigenous region by the means of community conservation with development. The Truku exercised collective action of resistance as a response to the conservation intervention. The livelihood restrictions, cultural clash, and the undermining of social capital were the catalyst to speed up the action of resistance.

#### **7.2.4 Territorialisation of state authorities causes resistance of local indigenes due to social repercussions**

According to the analysis of collected data, this study concludes that the territorial acts of the state agencies in PAs result in the resistance of local indigenous neighbours primarily because of the negative social influences from conservation. The concluding argument based on fieldwork answers research questions by demonstrating that the acts of the state agencies in PAs were dominant and based on low levels of local participation, even within participatory projects and co-management institutions; that local indigenous responses to conservation were resistance in various patterns; that the negative social effects on the locals were serious and aroused the local indigenous movement.

### **7.3 Theoretical contribution**

This thesis adds to the debate in political ecology by using conceptions of territoriality, social impacts and resistance to examine PA management in Taiwan. It pays attention to the social process of conservation by looking in detail at the interactions between the state agencies and the local indigenous people. This political ecology framework emphasizes that the hegemony of the state possibly results in some inconveniences in affected peoples' lives via imposed conservation measures, in particular those effects associated with locals' livelihoods. These negative influences stimulated local indigenous opposition. The local indigenous people in this study considered the resisting actions as customary practices or legal self-defenses. The locals in fact deliberately opposed nature conservation policies in the PAs. The interactive process between the two vital actors in the two indigenous examples interprets why these conservation

interventions elicited resistance. From the exclusionary strategy to co-management arrangements, for instance, the Park authorities and other state agencies imposed different conservation values on the locals and caused negative social impacts. In the community conservation case, participatory planning also excluded many affected villagers. The negative impacts from tourism development of community conservation and the power struggles from conservation interventions in the local community were so serious that many local residents organised political protest actions. Local resistance against conservation occurred in both cases because of social impacts, behaviour manipulation and the low level of local participation. Focusing on the social dimension of conservation, the debate about communication process between actors and social effects on the locals in this study adds to the literature of political ecology. According to the analytical categories of political ecology literature described by Robbins (2004), this study connects to three themes for it deals with conservation issue and explains why PA establishment and conservation policy implementations arouse opposition and conflicts.

This study also adds to debates around conservation and development by analysing the complex institutional arrangements of balancing two objectives. According to the empirical examples, the participatory institutions of the new co-management arrangement of the Park and the community conservation in T village revealed autocratic and undemocratic processes. In the Park case, nature conservation was the priority, so the local Truku's economic demands and ethnic development were sacrificed. Conservation agencies even manipulated the co-management regime. The local participation in the Park was tokenism. The local Truku people thus did not support the conservation priority. Individuals adopted hidden resistance against conservation institutions. It was never a balanced institutional allocation in this Park. Although the ecological recovery was efficient, the repair of the conflicting relationship was costly for the Park authorities because of the nature and conservation priority. More outreach and friendly communications would be hard to improve the mistrust. In the community conservation case, the local government holds the power of communications with specific local leaders and legislations, so the policy implementations of community conservation and development projects lacked the participation of more locals. The participatory initiative became tokenism in practice because many residents chose to protest against the development planning. When further thinking about the dilemma of conservation and development, local well-being and development were constantly emphasised but other important social impacts from conservation intervention were ignored. For instance, local

Truku overlooked the opportunity of internal negotiations when making conservation efforts at the early stage of community conservation because conservation was given less emphasis. Internal consensus was hard to be reached in the competition of development interests. Putting too much emphasis on development seemed to result in the problem of a crowding-out effect as Jhuang and Tai (2009) point out. In this regard, a 'development through conservation' model tends to be more appropriate (Tai, 2008). The dilemma of conservation and development makes the optimal arrangement difficult in practice. Brown's (2003) suggestions of inclusionary knowledge and decision-makings, plus with pluralist and adaptive approaches to reconcile both objectives may be useful to deal with the plight of conservation and development regarding natural resource management. In the Park case, the Park authorities should support the project combining conservation and development organised and conducted by the local Truku groups in order to fulfil their needs. The community conservation example indicated that local participation should be put into practice and the process of participation should be transparent, so that local residents could express their voice. A consensus on various topics might be reached through such a process. Collective actions based on consensus should enable the project goals to be met more easily.

#### **7.4 Policy contribution**

This thesis makes a contribution to the policies of PAs of Taiwan by analysing the interactions between state agencies and the Truku people in the contexts of Taroko National Park and a community conservation initiative. The policy of the national park system has been implemented in Taiwan for over 30 years. Since three mountain national parks were established in the 1980s and 1991, no park has been created in the indigenous areas because of the constant controversies between the state and the local indigenous people within these three parks. An alternative form of conservation is community conservation which integrates conservation and development goals. In the community conservation project, the locals make the conservation effort, linking this to development planning. In the indigenous areas of Taiwan, tourism development is getting popular with the spread of the idea of community conservation. Tourism is regarded as the panacea of indigenous areas for poverty eradication in these developing areas. The thesis is based on the review of these conservation policies in Taiwan to reflect the policy implementation in indigenous villages.

The analysis of policy implementation of parks and community conservation confirms that the rigid conservation intervention such as a park establishment did affect livelihood and cultural values of the local indigenous community. The dominance of conservation implementation in the Park excluded local people despite participation schemes. Moreover, tourism development possibly excluded the poor locals due to its capital-intensive nature. These conservation interferences also elicited some severe social impacts such as power clashes and value chaos in the local villages. These difficulties initiated the resistance of the local indigenous community even though the intentions of development planning were for the indigenous locals. In the community conservation case, I interpret that the overt resistance of the Truku protesters stemmed from the social impacts resulting from acts of territorialisation by the local government. The primary argument of this study explains why the locals opposed development planning. The Truku's ongoing protests surprised the policy makers in the local government. My argument interprets the unexpected consequence of policy, which contributes to the policy of community conservation of Taiwan. Reviewing conservation policies from strictly protected parks to co-management arrangements of community conservation, this study has identified the controlling nature of state authorities which runs counter to democracy. The argument based on both examples also reveal why it has been hard for the state authorities to create new parks in indigenous regions. The problem resulted from the state not conferring power to the locals in terms of natural resource management. Hayes's work (2006) indicates that legal parks may not be the most efficient way for local conservation. Rather, local users could establish rules for effective resource governance. A true participatory approach based on local demand, empowered by the state, could be the first step for the local indigenous residents to participate in local governance in terms of conservation. Last but not least, from Easton's political system, the resistance of the local indigenous populations can be seen as the feedback to the output of conservation policy. Such resisting responses can influence the people's demand and support which then go through the operation of a political system to yield a new decision/policy. The locals' resistance actually affects the policy-making. The community conservation case demonstrated this because the protesters constant political actions altered the implementation of the NCEA planning.

## 7.5 Suggestions for Further Research

I have two suggestions in this thesis. The first one is for the government. As I note above, a participatory project with empowerment may be a first step for mutual trust. This study found the past and current interactions between state authorities of PA management and the local Truku people were often unpleasant. The Truku perceived the oppression imposed on them via the policy interventions such as relocation and conservation policy implementations. Mistrust has existed in the political process for a long time. It is vital to establish mutual trust through an empowered programme. Moreover, it had better be based on indigenous tradition and current legislation, which indicates that the locals and the government may be interested in it. This suggestion of mixed knowledge is similar to the advice of Brown (2003) to deal with the challenge of expert-driven policies in community conservation initiatives. I suggest creating a community-based wildlife zone for sustainable use in T village. Truku people still keep their hunting practices based on customary Gaya, and the Wildlife Conservation Act allows indigenous populations to apply for non-profitable hunting. Demarcating the zone is definitely an act of human territoriality, a geographical area where some specific rules are enforced to control resources and people's behaviours. Yet the rules should be made by the locals. On one hand, this planning would be a recovery of the traditional hunting territory of the Truku people. The local Truku people could plan, conduct and review the territory for wildlife use (which can also be consumptive and non-consumptive use). The Truku participants have to build their own rules about hunting types, hunting routes, quantitative restrictions, self-monitoring and review to ensure that they are abiding by them in order for sustainable utility. On the other hand, the planning would be a compliance with current regulations. The Wildlife Conservation Act has been revised to allow indigenous hunting for ritual or non-commercial use. However, the application of hunting requires many documents that are hard for indigenous people to complete. The period allowed is too short, which is different from the indigenous tradition. The bureaucrats in this programme need to negotiate the restriction of wildlife use and provide necessary financial sponsorship. I suggest the hunting period sustains for one season in the light of the Truku tradition. The participants have to protect the given forest around their individual hunting territory when they inspect their traps and do their shooting. The forest protection can be conducted for a whole year although the hunting period is only three months. The forest protection is not just beneficial for conservation but for wildlife use. The local indigenous hunters are motivated to protect the mountain as their way of



natural resource management, which promotes the public interest. I think the planning of wildlife use meets the needs of the Truku as well as the interest of the public and the state. The government has to empower the local Truku by decentralised policy and trust them with their rules in this programme. If the plan works well, I think the mutual trust can be established a little.

The other suggestion is for the research in the future. I found that indigenous tourism is popular in indigenous regions of Taiwan. Yet some emerging social problems associated with tourism should be given more attention because these problems may damage the sustainable development of tourism. Tourism is at the interface between the environment and human society, which indicates the forces of the environment and human society potentially affect tourism development. In this study, I did not explore the practical operation of tourism in the Park and the other community conservation example due to the time limitations. There are plentiful studies on the tourism development in indigenous community in Africa and America (e.g. Butler and Hinch, 2007). The Asia-Pacific experiences should also be shared to contribute to knowledge. I suggest indigenous tourism is an interesting topic for further exploration.

## **7.6 Conclusion**

The interactions between the indigenous locals and the governmental authorities in protected areas affect the establishment of protected areas and well-being of indigenous residents in Taiwan. This exploration of the political processes of conservation contributes to the debate between social science and science. I adopt the theory of political ecology to examine this topic by the conceptions of human territoriality, social impact and resistance. The empirical data show that the acts of territorialisation of the state agencies resulted in the resistance of indigenous people due to negative social impacts. The establishment of protected areas such as national parks and scenic areas of community conservation is understood as the operation of internal territoriality by the state as Holmes (2014) notes because the state made use of every mechanism to control resource and people within the protected territories. The conservation interventions by the state authorities caused social impacts such as livelihood restrictions, value confusion and the damage of social capital in the local indigenous villages. The elicited chaos in the village, which directly led to the resistance of the locals. The implicit resistance was based on everyday practices because surviving should be the first priority. The indigenous policemen assisted the covert

indigenous protesters to avoid being arrested. The open indigenous protesters used means of political demonstrations, petitions and public relations to express their claims. Because their claims were based on the legal foundation, their overt resistance caught attention and reshaped the development policy. Empowerment was the key between two types of resistance. Empowered by the government, civil organizations and regulations inspired the local indigenous residents to resist the conservation policy explicitly. More empowerment tends to induce overt resistance (Poteete and Ribot, 2011). The interpretation of the unexpected consequence of conservation policy contributes to policy makers by reminding them of social impacts of conservation amongst the locals. The primary message of this study is that the internal territoriality of modern states (Vandergest and Peluso, 1995) by the means of conservation potentially results in the resistance of the local indigenous people due to the undesirable social impacts resulting from conservation interventions.

APPENDIX 1. The interview list in the fieldwork

Category	Interviewee (Anonymity)	Interview Objectives	Main Questions
Public sector	Vice Director in the Department of Economic and Public Construction, Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Yuan (M)	The processes and opinions of the new hunting regulations for indigenous people	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What are the position and advantages of CIP while negotiating with the Forestry Bureau on the new hunting rule?</li> <li>2. What are your views of contemporary indigenous hunting?</li> </ol>
	Executive Officer in the Department of Planning, Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Yuan (A)	Questions about 'tribal meeting'	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What is the objective of 'tribal meeting'?</li> <li>2. Is there any scheme helping to solve conflicts stemming from 'tribal meeting' at local level?</li> </ol>
	Officer in the Department of Planning, Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Yuan (G)	Information about nine new courts for indigenous people in district courts	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How does CIP communicate with other Judicial Departments (in Executive Yuan and Judicial Yuan) on issues of the new</li> </ol>

			indigenous courts? 2. What is the process of the establishment of new indigenous courts?
	Two Legal Staff in the Legal Affairs Office, Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Yuan (C, D)	The processes of the making new hunting regulations for indigenous people	What is the process of formulating new hunting rules for indigenous people?
(informal conversation)	Technical specialist, Forestry Bureau (W)	The processes of the new hunting regulations for indigenous people	What is the process of negotiating process of formulating new hunting rules for indigenous people?
(Telephone short conversation)	Officer in Hualien Forest District Office, Forestry Bureau	The opinion of the new hunting rules	What is the division of responsibility on the new hunting rules?
	Chief in the Section of Conservation, Taroko National Park Administration	1.Rights of indigenous people 2.Views of indigenous hunting 3.Duties of conservation section and national park	1. What is the relationship between indigenous people and national parks in Taiwan? 2. How do you see contemporary indigenous hunting?

<p>Officer in the Section of Conservation, Taroko National Park Administration (C)</p>	<p>1. Indigenous culture 2. Ecological management within national park</p>	<p>1. What are your views of indigenous hunting by local Truku in the park? 2. What are the differences between ecological view and national park management on issues of natural resource?</p>
<p>Chief in the Section of Planning, Taroko National Park Administration (N)</p>	<p>1. The relationship with local communities 2. The future planning of an indigenous area in national park</p>	<p>What is the relationship between the administration and local residents?</p>
<p>Employee in the Section of Planning, Taroko National Park Administration (L)</p>	<p>1. The scheme for local residents to participate in national park management 2. Experience of dealing with indigenous matters</p>	<p>1. What are the participation schemes in Taroko National Park and the operation of co-management committee? 2. What are critical problems when handling affairs of indigenous people in the park?</p>

	Policemen in Hualien Detachment, Forestry and Conservation Police (E, F)	Attitudes toward indigenous hunting and enforcing the conservation regulations	1. What are your opinions of indigenous hunting? 2. What is your attitude toward indigenous hunting while enforcing conservation policies?
(informal conversations and only two interviews with C)	Policemen in Taroko National Park Police (L, M, N, C)	Attitudes toward indigenous hunting and law enforcement in the park	1. What are your opinions of indigenous hunting in the park? 2. What is your attitude of indigenous hunting while enforcing conservation policies?
	Policemen in the local police station (F village) (G, Q)	Attitudes toward local indigenous hunting and enforcing conservation act	1. What are your opinions of local practices of using natural resources? 2. What is your attitude toward indigenous hunting while enforcing conservation policies?
	Policeman in the local police station (T village) (O)	Attitudes toward local indigenous hunting and enforcing conservation act	1. What are your opinions of local protesters?

			2. What is your attitude toward the traditional practices of local Truku?
Vice Director, Hualien Indigenous People Department (W)	1.Opinions on indigenous development 2.Duties of Indigenous Department in Hualien		1. What is your view of indigenous development, autonomy in particular? 2. What are the duties of indigenous department at county level?
Senior Officer, Hualien Indigenous People Department (P)	1.Views of indigenous practices on natural resource management 2.Indigenous land policy		1. What are your opinions of indigenous movement? 2. What are indigenous land policies in Taiwan?
Associate technical specialist, Hualien Indigenous People Department (B)	1.Forestry matters on indigenous reserved lands 2. Opinions of contemporary indigenous hunting		1. What are your views of natural resource management of indigenous people? 2. What are your views about indigenous hunting on reserved lands?
Associate technical specialist, Hualien	1.Wildlife conservation matters in Hualien County		1. What are the implementation of wildlife

	Agriculture Department (G)	2.Views of indigenous hunting and conservation policies	conservation policies at county level? 2. What are your views about indigenous hunting?
(Informal conversation)	Supervisor, Siou- Lin Township Office (S)	1.Truku modern society and culture 2.Planning of new scenic (NCESA) area in T village	1. What are characteristics of modern Truku society? 2. What are conflicts on the planning of new scenic area in T village?
	Chief of Section of Culture, Siou-Lin Township Office (M)	Views of conflicts in T village	What conflicts happen in T village?
	Officer of Section of Culture, Siou Lin Township Office (J)	Views of conflicts in T Village	What conflicts happen in T village?
	Veterinarian of Section of Agricultural Tourism, Siou Lin Township Office (Y)	1.Conflicts between indigenous T villagers and township office 2.Views of the planning of new scenic area in T village (NCESA) 3.Implementation of the tourism events in F village	1.What conflicts happen in T village? 2. What is the stance of township office on the planning of scenic area in T village (NCESA)? 3. What were the implementation of tourism planning in F village?



Veterinarian Section of Agriculture, Shou-Feng Township Office (G)	of of Shou- Township	1.Views of indigenous hunting 2.Experiences of conservation implementation	1. What are your views about indigenous hunting? 2. What are your experiences of implementing wildlife conservation in Taroko Park and other mountain areas?
Clerk of Taiwan High Court , Hualien Branch Court (N)	of	1. Views of 'the court for indigenous people' 2. Views of traditional practices of indigenous people	1. Why did the legal system create the court for indigenous people? 2. What is your attitude of indigenous practices?
Indigenous elite	Truku pastors in F Village (6 people) (S, H, T, N, L, J)	1.Informal norms of Truku people 2.Contemporary hunting practices 3.Christianity and Truku culture	1. What are informal norms of Truku community? 2. What are your views about indigenous hunting? 3. What are similarities and differences between Christianity and Truku traditional culture?

	Local leaders in F Village (3 people) (F, K, G)	1.Conflicts between Truku and the park authorities 2.Contemporary hunting practices	1. What are conflicts between national park and Truku people? 2. What are your views of indigenous hunting practices?
	Youth leader in T Village (L)	1.Views of establishment of NCESA 2.Conflicts between villagers and the local government	1. What are your views of the new scenic area in T village? 2. What are conflicts between villagers and local government?
Indigenous hunters	Truku hunters in F Village (8 people) (L, C,T,G, Y, D, S, E)	1.Informal norms of Truku people 2.Contemporary hunting practices 3.Attitudes toward public sectors and wildlife conservation policies	1. What are traditional norms of the Truku community? 2. What are your hunting practices? 3. What are your views of wildlife conservation policies with relevant institutions?
	Truku hunters in T Village (5 people) (D, K, G, U, L)	1.Informal norms of Truku people 2.Contemporary hunting practice	1. What are traditional norms of Truku community?

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3. Attitudes toward public sectors and wildlife conservation policies

2. What are your hunting practices?

3. What are your views of wildlife conservation policies with relevant institutions?

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Totally 52 persons

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## **Information Sheet**

### **Research Project Title:**

Territoriality, Resistance, and Indigenous Development in Protected Areas: A Political Ecology Analysis of Truku People in Eastern Taiwan

### **Invitation paragraph**

You are being invited to participate in a research project. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

### **What is the project's purpose?**

There are more and more protected areas being established by state agencies and non-governmental agencies for nature conservation in the world. These conservation acts are supposed for the common good. However, the local people living near or within the protected areas and their rights such as livelihoods, cultural practices and land ownership are possibly influenced by the conservation acts, in particular those indigenous communities who rely on the local resources. Thus local responses to protected areas are important for protected area management. To some degree these responses may vary depending on the attitudes of protected area authorities toward local communities and authorities' specific schemes for the locals. A trend of international conservation is that conservation authorities pay more attention to local economic development and compensations by co-management schemes or other community-based projects. In Taiwan, state agencies (central and local government) are the primary authorities establishing protected areas for resource protection. The primary stakeholders of protected areas are the powerful state agencies and the powerless local people. The interactions between the state authorities and the local people potentially affect policy implementations of protected areas. This study aims to explore the

interactions between the state authorities of protected areas and the local indigenous people. The objectives are: 1. To examine the policy implementations of protected areas authorities and other state agencies (in the Taroko National Park and a community conservation project). 2. To explore local Truku people's responses to protected areas authorities, other state authorities, and conservation policies. 3. To study the social effects resulting from protected areas management and conservation policy implementations. The project starts from July 2012 and conducts fieldwork for data collection from September 2012 until March 2013.

### **Why have I been chosen?**

Since the main issues of this research are associated with protected area management and local indigenous people, the research project focuses on interviewing key stakeholders including officials in protected areas authorities and other governmental agencies, local Truku leaders, and Truku hunters with residents in order to access various views of them.

### **Do I have to take part?**

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you can still withdraw at any time without it affecting any benefits that you are entitled to in any way. You do not have to give a reason.

### **What will happen to me if I take part?**

This project conducts fieldwork from October 2012 to March 2013 for data collection via in-depth interviews, participant observation, and documents collection. Your involvement will be primarily with the in-depth interviews.

The interviewees are intended to cover two groups. The first is relevant officials in public sectors in order to comprehend the conservation policies and indigenous development policies and policy implementations. The second is Truku leaders, hunters and residents in Truku villages aiming to understand firstly the social effects from protected areas, and conservation policies with policy implementations. Secondly the views and responses of Truku people toward protected areas and conservation implementations.

Interviews will be arranged at a time suitable to you and the frequency of interviews depends on different participants. The officials in different governmental agencies will participate about twice during the period. The interviewing venues will be often in the office buildings. As for indigenous Truku people, the participation will be more frequently to approximately twice of short discussions in every month during the fieldwork period in their homes or other places of their choice to discuss relevant themes. Each interview or discussion will finish within around one hour. The participants can offer their understanding of each theme in the interviews. This project will last until 2014 when the research thesis finishes.

### **What do I have to do?**

Your participating does not involve any changes to your lifestyle – just for you to discuss your own experiences and opinions of the research topic.

### **What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?**

There are no anticipated risks to taking part in the study. Individual responses will be confidentially recorded, and we hope that this will allow all participants to speak freely about this research topic. Once you find the interview topics distressing, you can be able to opt out at any stage, or not participate in some aspects of the research.

### **What are the possible benefits of taking part?**

Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the project, it is hoped that this work will help diverse views of protected area management to be taken into consideration when making regional plans by the government, especially the establishment of protected areas.

### **Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?**

All the information that this project collects about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. The researcher will keep the collected data secure in the locked data file of the laptop and email back up duplications of the data to the university server. The real names of participants will not be able to be identified in any reports or publications except obtaining permission from them.

### **What will happen to the results of the research project?**

The data collected through research methods from participants will be the base of PhD thesis and other relevant journal articles.

### **Who is organising and funding the research?**

This research is a self-funding project organised by the primary researcher (PhD student).

### **Who has ethically reviewed the project?**

This project has been ethically approved via Town and Regional Planning Department's ethics review procedure. The University's Research Ethics Committee monitors the application and delivery of the University's Ethics Review Procedure across the University.

### **Contact for further information**

Please contact the researcher for further information.

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Dr. Janice Barry: 0114 222 6943 [j.barry@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:j.barry@sheffield.ac.uk)

Signature of Researcher:

Signature of Participant:

Date:

(This information sheet to be kept by research participant)

Record of informed consent - *Territoriality, Resistance, and Indigenous Development in Protected Areas* interviewee

Research participant's name:

Signature of Participant:

Signature of Researcher:

Date:



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