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Disaggregating authoritarianism:

The effects of territorial dispute involvement on regime survival and democratisation in four types of autocracies

By:

Barbara Helena Buraczynska

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Department of Politics

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Abstract

In recent years, a new approach to studying the relationship between democracy and peace has emerged within the field of International Relations. The Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT) argues that the arrow of causality in democratic peace research should run from conflict behaviour to regime type. More specifically, Gibler (2010) argues that participation in territorial disputes makes all regimes less likely to become democratic because salient threats to their survival reduce the bargaining power of the opposition within the country. Nevertheless, the theory is too general and it does not engage with related fields of research.

By reviewing the most recent developments from the field of Comparative Politics, the thesis argues that ReSIT is compatible with the literature on elite-ruler dynamic in autocratic regimes. By narrowing the scope of the theory to autocracies, the thesis argues that territorial dispute involvement has a positive impact on autocratic regime survival and negative impact on the likelihood of democratisation. Furthermore, the thesis argues that the relationship between territorial dispute and regime survival and democratisation is likely to be affected by the structural features of the autocracy. The propositions are tested on a disaggregated sample of 314 autocracies between 1951 and 2008 using survival analysis. The analysis suggests that while territorial disputes have a significant positive impact on the survival of military and single party regimes, they have little or no effect on multiparty and monarchic regimes. Furthermore, a history of territorial dispute involvement decreases the likelihood of democratisation in all types of autocracies, and the effects are moderated by the structural features of the regime. The thesis has important implication on policy making, suggesting that democratic regime change in conflict-ridden regions is unlikely to reduce the likelihood of war. Efforts to stabilise conflict-prone areas should be re-focused on peaceful resolution of territorial conflict.

Chapter 1: Introduction

On September 22nd 1980, Iraq launched a military attack on Iran in an act of aggression that instigated one of the longest and bloodiest wars of the 20th century (Willett, 2004: 4). Lasting almost eight years, the conflict destroyed much of the Iraqi infrastructure, and resulted in devastating casualties on both sides (Ibid.). However, in addition to crippling the Iraqi state, the war also had a profound impact on its domestic politics, and constituted a significant turning point for the Ba'ath regime which assumed power in 1968 (ICG, 2002: 6, Gibler and Miller, 2014: 635). Over the course of the war, the party leadership used the conflict with Iran as an opportunity to strengthen their position within the state. Namely, all major political opposition to the Ba'ath Party was neutralised through systematic purges, a nationalist ideology replaced the Pan-Arabic rhetoric of earlier years, and the public was successfully mobilised in a concerted war effort that established a cult of personality within the regime (Tripp, 1989: 62; ICG, 2002: 6). By appealing to patriotism, Saddam Hussain, the then leader of the Ba'ath regime, managed to secure the support of the population even within the oppressed Shiite majority, despite the fact that the war resulted in the forced displacement of almost a quarter of a million Shiites of Iranian origin (ICG, 2002: 7). Many scholars believe that the Iraqi-Iranian war of 1980-1988 made a significant contribution to the survival of the Iraqi regime, until it was forcefully toppled by the US invasion in 2003 (Gibler and Miller, 2014).

The link between power centralisation and military conflict, like the one described above, has been a constant feature of the discourse on the relationship between the war-making and state-making within the social sciences (Gourevitch, 1979; Tilly, 1985; Migdal, 2001). For example, much of the most influential sociological research on the formation of states in medieval Europe suggests that wars strengthen the capacity of states because external conflict justifies oppressive structures (Tilly, 1985). As seen in the example of the Iraqi regime above, leaders who defend their citizens from international threats can often be seen as more

legitimate by both regime elites and the population. The state of emergency caused by the possibility of defeat in war gives leaders scope to extend their power beyond what is typically accepted in times of peace. It is often argued that when faced by the prospect of foreign invasion, few will question the means by which the survival of the state is to be achieved (Machiavelli, 2003 [1532]). As a result, the authorities may find it easier to demand that individuals sacrifice their freedoms or provide access to crucial resources in the name of preserving the integrity of the country (Thompson, 1996). Granted with more domestic power as a result of war-making, state leaders proceed to strengthen their newly found powers. This 'state-making through war-making' does not only consolidate power (Tilly, 1985), but also makes its de-centralisation more difficult, potentially hindering the process of democratisation within affected states (Gourevitch, 1978). In recent years, this discussion has evolved into a brand new sub-field of International Relations theory, what has come to be known as the *Reversed Second Image Theory* (ReSIT),¹ which questions the prevailing debate on the relationship between regime type and international conflict. Before explaining how ReSIT fits into the broader IR literature on the subject, it is important to explain the context in which it gained its prominence.

The traditional perspective on the relationship between interstate conflict and regime type has traditionally been confined to research on the causes of war within the IR second image tradition, as explained in more detail in Chapter 2. The dominant view, what is known as *Democratic Peace Theory* (DPT), argues that democracies rarely go to war with one another. Many researchers consider this proposition to be 'the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations' (Levy, 1988: 88, see also Lee Ray, 1988; Russett, 1993; Owen, 1994). The 'perpetual peace' between democracies is usually seen as a result of public aversion to wars, which are both costly and destructive (Doyle, 1983a). Alternatively, peace can also be a result of the special relationship between democratic regimes, whose leaders treat each other with a great deal of respect

¹ Thank you to Garrett W. Brown for coming up with this abbreviation.

and mutual accommodation. While this dominant view has been challenged by a number of rival theories in the past, these critiques, as will be argued in Chapter 2, are unconvincing and fraught with theoretical and methodological shortcomings. In contrast to these critiques, ReSIT presents a unique and original alternative to DPT.

Based on historical insight from a number of qualitative studies (Thompson, 1996; Rasler and Thompson, 2004), ReSIT challenges DPT by suggesting that the causal arrow between democracy and peace should be reversed. Instead of viewing peace as a result of a special relationship between democracies, ReSIT suggests that democratic systems develop because of stable security relations between neighbouring groups of states, regardless of their regime type. If conflicted regions tend to result in more centralised and authoritarian state structures, then peaceful regions should have the opposite effect. In the absence of interstate disputes in the region, oppressive power structures might be harder to legitimize, and states are liable to become more open and liberal over time as a result of internal demands for democratisation. Hence, some regions develop into so-called 'zones' or 'niches' of peace (Thompson, 1996). This proposition has important and far reaching consequences for liberal theories of International Relations, because it explains why democracies tend not to engage in war with one another. As observed in much of the quantitative conflict studies literature, international disputes tend to occur between neighbouring states. If democracies tend to be a result, rather than the cause of peace, then it is not surprising that democracies do not fight one another. After all, the sole reason they are democratic in the first place is the fact that they are peace with their immediate neighbours. This alternative theory of the democracy-peace nexus has on many occasions been praised for its intuitive theoretical foundations (Gates *et al.*, 1996; Rosato, 2003). That said, until recently, despite growing interest in the theory, there was still relatively little quantitative evidence that would support its claims (Midlarsky, 1995; James *et al.*, 1999; Mousseau and Shi, 1999).

However, in the last decade, a major contribution to the theory by Gibler and colleagues (Gibler, 2007, 2010, 2012; Gibler and Tir, 2007, 2014) suggested that the

lack of conclusive quantitative findings can be attributed to the overly general conception of external threats adopted by previous ReSIT studies; Gibler (2007) claimed that not all international conflicts are equally likely to elicit strong centralising effects. Grounding his research in the study of interstate rivalries, his theory proposes that territorial conflicts between neighbouring countries are much more likely to be perceived as threatening than conflicts over other, non-territorial issues.² Most importantly, territorial disputes do not have to result in a military confrontation between states for the centralising effect to occur: the mere threat of foreign occupation or loss of vital territory is likely to enable leaders to rally support from the general population and regime elites (Gibler, 2010). In autocratic regimes, the presence of a territorial dispute with a neighbouring country means that leaders will acquire a much better bargaining position vis-à-vis the regime elites and their opposition. This means that they can reorganize the regime in a way that strengthens their position permanently, and centralise power in the hands of a much smaller group of individuals – a process explained in more detail in Chapter 3.

Despite the fact that this branch of the theory has generated strong empirical support, this thesis argues that Gibler's (2007, 2010) proposition suffers from a number of significant underdevelopments. In order for these results to be valid and reliable, they need to rest on more solid theoretical and methodological foundations. Up until now, most of the research within the ReSIT tradition focuses explicitly on explaining why some states are likely to be more democratic, while others more autocratic. This is a direct result of the theory's continuous engagement with the democratic peace research project in an attempt to explain the curious phenomenon of democratic peace. The polemic relationship between ReSIT and DPT has meant that the theory rarely engaged with other democratisation research in associated fields of study. For example, many of the methodological and theoretical aspects proposed by ReSIT operate within the framework of International Relations, yet fail to account for methodological and

² Non-territorial causes of disputes and military conflicts might include policy or regime disputes (Vasquez and Henehan, 2016).

theoretical developments in the field of Comparative Politics. This is problematic for ReSIT in a number of ways, as explained below.

Unlike much of the current Comparative Politics literature, ReSIT focuses on domestic structures within *states* rather than *regimes*. This means that the only distinction between different units of analysis is between democratic and autocratic forms of governance. However, this simple distinction means that different forms of authoritarianism are expected to react to external threats in exactly the same ways, despite the striking differences between them (Geddes, 2003). This also means that a period of authoritarianism – a *spell* of authoritarianism - is typically treated as a single regime, even if major power shifts and transitions occur within that state. Due to the explicit focus on states, autocratic instability is often incorrectly equated with democratisation, despite considerable Comparative Politics research suggesting otherwise (see for example Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a; Geddes *et al.*, 2014; Wright *et al.*, 2014). Finally, the lack of engagement with the Comparative Politics literature means that key predictors of regime change are often not accounted for, despite their importance in explaining both regime stability and democratisation.

Furthermore, in order to demonstrate that external threats hinder democratisation, traditional ReSIT studies often use continuous measures of democracy as their dependent variable. As will be explained in Chapter 4, while these measures can often be useful as independent variables in IR research, they are not appropriate as dependent variables in regime change studies. The main problem with the use of continuous measures of democratisation as dependent variables is the fact that it makes the exact moment of democratisation difficult to establish. This is because continuous measures of democratisation conceptualise democracy as a scale, rather than a dichotomy. This means that a regime can be democratic to a certain degree, without having to meet essential criteria for undergoing a full transition. As a result, authoritarian regimes which include some liberal features such as multiparty elections or freedom of speech might be confused for democracies, even if they do not satisfy essential criteria contained in well-established definitions of

'democracy'.³ Such omissions significantly decrease the validity and reliability of quantitative studies of democratisation.

In response, this thesis aims to address the shortcomings outlined above by developing a theoretically and methodologically reformulated ReSIT framework. In doing so, it argues that in order for ReSIT to become a serious explanatory framework of regime stability and democratisation, it must present solid theoretical reasoning that applies beyond the discipline of IR. For this reason, rather than merely attempting to discredit the propositions and conclusions of DPT, this thesis will instead focus on extending the theoretical and empirical scope of current ReSIT studies. It will not argue that ReSIT should become a substitution for the DPT, but rather that it can exist as an independent field of research, providing that it continues to further engage with the field of Comparative Politics so as to sharpen its analytical and heuristic properties.

Original contribution of the thesis

This thesis offers a number of original theoretical and methodological contributions to the fields of IR and Comparative Politics that improve on the shortcomings outlined above. The most important contribution is the emphasis on the distinction between regime change and democratisation. In doing so, this thesis demonstrates that the factors that decrease autocratic stability do not necessarily lead to democratisation – a distinction not currently made in the ReSIT literature. In fact, many autocratic regimes transition to a different form of autocracy upon regime change. This has serious implications for ReSIT, which tends to assume that if peaceful state relations destabilise autocratic regimes, they must necessarily lead to democratisation. This confusion stems from the state-centric approach of much of the IR literature, which rarely makes a distinction between autocratic *spells* and autocratic *regimes*. A *spell* of autocracy is the period of non-democratic rule within

³ These criteria might include level political playing field, or *ex ante* uncertainty over the outcome of the elections (see for example Przeworski *et al.*, 2000).

a given country. This logic dictates that when a spell of autocracy ends, the state will naturally become democratic.⁴ Hence, the processes of democratisation and regime change have become synonymous in the IR literature. This state-centric approach conceals the fact that most autocratic spells contain within them a number of authoritarian *regimes*. In this way, it is often ignored or forgotten that states go through a series of violent and disruptive structural changes before they become democratic. These power shifts from one type of autocracy to another are often accompanied by a series of drastic economic, social, political, and cultural transformations. Given that these changes often have a very profound negative impact on the citizenry, they are an important phenomenon to study and understand, in which this thesis takes into account.

Furthermore, if the assumptions of ReSIT are correct, and territorial disputes result in power centralisation within autocracies, autocratic regimes should not only be less likely to democratise, but also to transition to any other form of regime. This thesis tests the proposition that territorial disputes strengthen autocratic regimes by applying it to the wider Comparative Politics research on the stability of authoritarian regime types (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a; Boix and Svobik, 2012; Wright and Bak, 2016). Hence, the first research question of the thesis asks: how do territorial disputes affect the stability of autocratic regimes? This question will be answered in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

The second major contribution concerns the original proposition of ReSIT, which claims that participation in territorial disputes makes democratisation more difficult. By making a distinction between regime change and democratisation, this thesis is able to investigate two arguments. The first argument is that territorial disputes might increase autocratic stability, and therefore decrease the chances of regime change of any kind. The second argument is that territorial disputes additionally lower the likelihood of democratic transitions more specifically, and that the mechanism involved in the dispute-regime change nexus is different for

⁴ Sometimes, the autocracy might end without democratisation occurring, but this is usually only the case in the instance of state failure or foreign occupation, and the state structures cease to exist altogether.

regime change, and different for democratic transitions. These arguments have never been previously investigated by the ReSIT literature, and offer significant theoretical contribution to the current literature on the subject.

The second original contribution of this thesis is the adoption of dichotomous measures of democratisation in Chapter 7. As mentioned earlier, previous studies investigating the connection between international threats and domestic regime change used continuous measures of democratisation. As a result, the analysis focused on the impact of conflict on small changes on the democracy-autocracy scale, rather than the impact of conflicts on complete regime transitions (see for example James *et al.*, 1999; Mousseau and Shi, 1999; Rasler and Thompson, 2005). The focus on small institutional changes within autocratic regimes rather than instances of complete democratisation weakens the theoretical argument of ReSIT and prevents the study of democratisation that is methodologically compatible with well-established Comparative Politics research. In other words, traditional ReSIT frameworks that use continuous measures of democratisation limit the theory's ability to gain interdisciplinary insights. Therefore, this thesis will make a methodological contribution to ReSIT and use a dichotomous measure of democracy to investigate whether territorial threats hinder the process of democratisation. This contribution achieves two things. First, it improves the construct validity of the dependent variable in this thesis. By adopting a set of essential criteria of democratisation (discussed in detail in Chapter 4), the thesis will limit the likelihood of type II error, where non-democratic regimes are classified as democratic ones. This is especially important, given that many autocratic regimes adopt liberal features such as genuinely competitive elections, and can be easily mistaken for democracies. Second, the use of continuous measures of democratisation improves the theoretical strength of ReSIT. If territorial disputes hinder the process of democratisation, this is much better illustrated by using a strict definition of democracy, rather than by measuring small, institutional changes within regimes that may not indicate genuine structural changes. By adopting these strict criteria for measuring the impact of territorial disputes on democratisation,

the study will aim to provide evidence that is more robust and convincing. Finally, the use of dichotomous measures of democratisation makes the study of ReSIT more compatible with well-established and methodologically superior research on regime change, increasing its interdisciplinarity. Hence, the second research question of the thesis asks: How do territorial disputes affect the process of democratisation in autocratic regimes? This question will be answered in Chapter 7.

The third significant contribution of this thesis is its vast incorporation of Comparative Politics research on autocratic regimes into the field of IR. Apart from few notable exceptions (Chiozza and Goemans, 2004; Weeks, 2012), IR research tends to approach all autocratic regimes as structurally and operationally similar, purely by virtue of being non-democratic. This is a major theoretical oversight, especially when investigating regime stability and democratisation. Accounting for structural features of autocracies is important because much of the current research suggests that they have a significant impact on autocratic stability as well as the likelihood of leaving power via negotiated settlement that results in a democratic transition. The nature of the interaction between leaders and their elites is not universal across autocratic regimes, but is instead context specific - a fact overlooked by Gibler (2010) and other theorists.⁵ For example, while splits between elites are particularly threatening to military regimes, they rarely pose a threat, and can even be advantageous, to single-party autocracies (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). Accounting for structural features of autocracy should become a standard feature not just of Comparative Politics, but all theories interested in the study of domestic structures of states. Hence, two additional research questions are posed in this thesis: How do structural features affect the relationship between territorial disputes and regime stability in autocracies?, and; how do structural features affect the relationship between territorial disputes and democratisation in autocratic regimes?

The fourth and final contribution is the application and test of ReSIT that is limited to autocratic regimes. Although it is possible that all regimes centralise as a result of

⁵ See Chapter 2 for this discussion.

territorial threats, the current theoretical underdevelopments within ReSIT warrant a more focused approach. Previous ReSIT work assumed that the impact of international conflict on power centralisation is the same for democracies *and* autocracies. For example, researchers assumed that territorial conflict can make both democracies and autocracies less democratic. This was facilitated by the use of continuous measures of democracy, which allowed researchers to study small institutional changes in domestic structures of regimes in democracies and autocracies alike. As a result, the causal link between territorial disputes and democratic transitions was difficult to establish. Moreover, this approach completely ignored the possibility that autocratic regimes might transition from one form of autocracy to another form of autocracy, and that the severity of these changes might not be reflected on continuous measures of democracy. Hence, in order to improve the study of ReSIT and demonstrate a causal link between territorial disputes and genuine regime change (rather than simply small structural changes in the regime), this thesis will focus solely on autocratic regimes. This is important, because autocracies are structurally different from democracies. Current ReSIT research attempts to explain too much variation with the use of one theory. As a result, ReSIT must diversify in order to better explain specific regime changes in autocracies, and specific changes in democracies. This thesis will aim to explain regime transitions in autocratic regimes only, recognising that the complexity of autocratic rule requires a separate set of explanations. Moreover, it is possible that the overly general approach of previous attempts to test ReSIT might be one of the reasons for its inconclusive and contradictory empirical results.

All of the propositions of this thesis are tested using a quantitative, large-N analysis of regime duration data for 314 autocratic regimes between 1951 and 2008. The sample consists of all available independent autocratic regimes with a population of 500,000 citizens or more. The main data sources include Magaloni *et al.* (2013) regime change and regime duration dataset, Gibler and Miller (2014) dataset on territorial dispute involvement, and Maddison data on economic performance (Bolt

and van Zanden, 2014).⁶ The thesis employs two types of regression analysis to test whether territorial disputes have an effect of regime duration and time-to-democratisation in the sample: the non-parametric Cox Proportional Hazards survival analysis and the semi-parametric Royston-Parmar regression analysis. Both of these regression techniques provide considerable advantages over the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression commonly used in political science. First, unlike OLS regression, survival analysis does not require residuals to be normally distributed. Given that the risk of regime failure is unlikely to be evenly distributed throughout the existence of a regime, violations of this assumption in duration data are very frequent. Moreover, while logistic regression can only provide information on odds of an event taking place, survival analysis can provide an additional insight into the length of time it takes for regimes to transition. Given that (eventually) most regimes come to an end, survival analysis can provide a wealth of information which is unavailable using the standard logistic regression techniques. For example, it allows the researcher to compare of the length of time it takes for a transition to occur in autocratic regimes under different external conditions. Further discussion on the advantages and limitations of survival analysis can be found in Chapter 4. The effects of territorial dispute involvement will be tested on two dependent variables: time to regime change (Chapters 5 and 6) and time to democratisation (Chapter 7). A fuller explanation of the methodology will be presented in Chapter 4.

Summary of findings

The findings of the thesis are encouraging, and partially support the main assumptions of the thesis. The overall aim of this work is to demonstrate that the impact of territorial disputes on autocratic regimes goes beyond that presented by past research on this subject. Territorial disputes not only reduce the chances of

⁶ A very limited number of regimes were excluded from the analysis due to issues of missing data. These cases are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

democratisation, but also reduce the likelihood of transitions from one type of autocracy to another. By narrowing the scope of the theory to autocracies, the thesis argues that territorial dispute involvement has a positive impact on autocratic regime survival and negative impact on the likelihood of democratisation. Furthermore, by engaging in interdisciplinary research, the thesis argues that the relationship between territorial dispute and regime survival and democratisation is likely to be affected by the structural features of the autocracy.

Overall, territorial dispute involvement had a significant effect on the durability of certain autocratic regimes, and a significant effect on the chances of democratisation. More specifically, Chapter 5 demonstrates that when no consideration is given to autocratic regime structures, all autocracies are significantly less likely to transition into either autocracy *or* democracy if they depend on petroleum production as a considerable part of their GDP. However, once the structural characteristics of regimes are taken into account in Chapter 6, military regimes were significantly less likely to transition regardless of their dependency on natural resources. Chapter 6 further demonstrates that when a country is not dependent on oil, single-party regimes were also more durable as a result of territorial dispute involvement. Furthermore, different types of autocracies are affected by wealth, oil dependency, and a host of other important variables in strikingly different ways, emphasizing the need to, where possible, disaggregate the analysis of regime stability.

In addition, Chapter 7 provides evidence in support of traditional arguments presented by ReSIT – that territorial dispute involvement has a negative impact on democratisation. In summary, Chapter 7 demonstrates that time-to-democratisation is significantly extended for regimes that took part in territorial dispute involvement. Nevertheless, the results are not robust, and depend on the type of regression model used. That said, the findings are clear, robust and statistically significant when an alternative measure of dispute involvement is included, especially in the form of prior territorial dispute involvement in the regime's history. There is strong statistical evidence that regimes which were

involved in territorial disputes at some point during their rule take significantly longer to democratise than regimes that were never involved in territorial disputes. Finally, Chapter 7 provides strong empirical support that economic development makes democratisation more likely, despite the finding in Chapter 6 that economic development reduces the chances of all types of regime change in some types of autocracy. The results of this thesis thus warrant further investigation into the relationship between wealth, regime survival and democratisation, which ideally should be conducted separately for each of the autocratic types. In this way, this thesis is original in setting out foundations for a future research agenda, which can more appropriately capture the relationship between economic development, regime stability, and democratisation.

Implications of the thesis: academic contribution

The findings of this thesis have serious implications for the IR and Comparative Politics literature. They emphasize the need to take ReSIT propositions seriously, and conduct further studies that could cross-validate the results using alternative data, measures and methodologies. The most important finding of the thesis is that territorial dispute involvement reduces the likelihood of regime change in some types of autocracy, and reduces the likelihood of democratisation in all types of autocracy. Moreover, as the theory outlined in Chapter 3 assumed, the factors that affect regime change in autocratic regimes more generally do not necessarily impact their chances of democratisation. While territorial disputes significantly reduce both the likelihood of regime change and democratisation, the causal mechanism for each is different. While territorial disputes affect both regime durability and time to democratisation, the effects are not the same, and depend on a wide range of other predictors of regime survival and democratisation.

These results provide initial confirmation that when testing ReSIT, the effects of territorial disputes on regime stability and democratisation are not synonymous, and should be studied separately. This is the first ReSIT study to demonstrate that

territorial disputes hinder democratisation without relying on the assumption that regime instability and democratisation are causally related. This means that a more comprehensive theoretical inquiry into the relationship between external threats and democratisation must be explored by future researchers. It is also worth noting that the statistically significant link between democratisation and territorial disputes has been present despite the fact that criteria for democratic transitions used in this thesis are much stricter than those usually employed by IR scholars testing ReSIT, and even when structural differences between autocracies have been taken into account (see for example: James et al., 1999; Rasler and Thompson, 2005; Giber, 2010). This indicates that the relationship between external threats and regime stability and democratisation is strong and robust. It further indicates that ReSIT has serious potential to become a major explanatory theory which could aid future researchers in explaining autocratic regime stability and democratisation.

In addition to the above, a number of other important findings can be reported. One of the primary findings of Chapter 6 demonstrated that involvement in territorial disputes has a significant impact on the stability of military autocracies. Military regimes often adopt the rhetoric of 'guardianship' in order to prolong their rule. In other words, elites in military regimes often claim that the regime is justified, because it provides order in times of domestic or international instability. The finding that territorial dispute involvement increases stability of military regimes is important, because it suggests that external threats to territorial integrity of the state increases the credibility of military rhetoric. It is therefore crucial to conduct further qualitative research into whether territorial disputes are used as part of the justification for military rule, and under which conditions this rhetoric tends to be more successful. As a result, the thesis provides an important contribution to the literature on the survival of military regimes.

Moreover, the thesis provides an important contribution to the study of the relationship between oil rents and regime survival. The thesis demonstrates that single party with no access to petroleum rents are also much less likely to transition as a result of territorial dispute involvement. This finding has far reaching

implications for the literature linking petroleum rents to regime survival. In the existent literature, it is often assumed that petroleum rents decrease the likelihood of regime change, because they allow the regime to fund its operations and buy-off the oppositions without the need to tax their citizens. Nevertheless, this thesis demonstrates that single party regimes are only affected by territorial disputes when they are not reliant on petroleum revenues. This suggests that oil rents can serve as a stabilising force against external threats, most likely through their ability to instantly increase military spending and provide a sense of security within the country despite existing external threats. Further research should focus on establishing why the relationship between petroleum, territorial disputes, and regime change is particularly prominent in single party regimes.

Finally, the findings in Chapter 7 demonstrate that territorial dispute involvement, as well as a history of dispute involvement has a significant effect on all types of autocratic regimes. While this finding is somewhat limited by a small sample of democratic transitions in single party and monarchic regimes, it provides strong support for the claims that even when a strict, dichotomous measure of democratisation is used, territorial disputes still reduce the chances of democratisation in autocratic regimes. This is an important implication to both IR and Comparative Politics literature, which so far has not seriously considered the possibility that external threats to the regime might be causally related to institutional changes at the domestic level. Having summarised the main findings of this work, the section below will now outline the main implications of this thesis.

Implication of the thesis: policy-making

If the findings of this thesis are confirmed by further replication studies, it will have a major impact on the policy-making arena. So far, the discussions about how best support transitioning states in their efforts to democratise has been focused on foreign aid and market liberalisation in line with the assumption that economic wealth is the main factor which can help incentivise these changes. The finding of

this thesis - that unstable security environments may have been overlooked as a cause of autocratic stability and unsuccessful transitions - is important because it suggests that major efforts should be placed on stabilising border relations between the regime in question and its neighbours. However, this approach, as shown in Chapters 5 and 6, is a double-edged sword. While increasing the territorial security of autocratic regimes might lead them to eventually democratise, it might also result in autocratic breakdown that is followed by the introduction of yet another autocratic regime. As will be discussed in the initial sections of Chapter 5, such changes can be very disruptive to the social and economic fabric of the society. For example, when the Sandinista movement overthrew the Somoza military dictatorship in Nicaragua in 1979, the country underwent a series of drastic economic, social, political, and cultural transformations; while structural changes within autocratic regimes have major impact on the social and economic fabric of the country, they are often overlooked by Comparative Politics and IR scholars (Wright *et al.*, 2015). A more detailed study of the effect of territorial disputes on such changes can bring social scientists one step closer to determining what causes them.

Moreover, although the thesis does not explicitly aim to disprove the assumptions of the DPT, it is undeniable that the results of this thesis have called the policy prescriptions of DPT enthusiasts into question. The main assumptions of DPT state that democracies tend to be less prone to engage in international conflict. As a result, a number of policies have focused on interfering with autocratic regimes in an effort to encourage democratisation in conflicted regions such as the Middle East and Africa. This is often done by providing financial aid and support to civil society organisations, encouraging more liberal market policies, and even forceful regime change. It is possible that instead of focusing on changing regime structures within non-democratic states by force or other means - as done in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan – policymakers could aim to design policies that help stabilise border relations in conflict-ridden regions. This thesis suggests that in some types of autocratic regimes, territorial dispute involvement hinders the likelihood of such

transitions. Hence, attempts to bring democracy to areas which do not have the security conditions necessary for such changes may not only be futile, but may also further destabilise an already fragile relationship between neighbours. This is because, as previous research suggests, transitioning and unconsolidated regimes tend to be more conflict prone than older regimes (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). As a result, this work has serious implications for policymakers working in the area of conflict resolution and democracy promotion.

The structure of the thesis

The thesis is composed of seven extensive chapters. Chapter 2 will review International Relations literature on the relationship between regime type and conflict behaviour and explain the theoretical and empirical context in which the modern version of ReSIT emerged. By demonstrating inherent problems in second image approaches to the study of the democracy-peace nexus, Chapter 2 will contextualise the need for alternative perspectives within International Relations. By examining the tradition of regime studies within IR, it will demonstrate the need for the discipline to incorporate progress from other fields of research such as Comparative Politics, and become more interdisciplinary in its enquiry into the democracy-peace nexus. The review will demonstrate that ReSIT offers new insights into the dynamic between regime type and international conflict, and provides a genuine alternative to the liberal and realist IR traditions. The chapter will also outline the main assumptions of ReSIT, and the contribution made by Gibler (2010), who proposed that territorial disputes have a much more centralising effect on regimes than other types on conflict because they affect the bargaining dynamic between the regime leader and regime elites.

Chapter 3 will make a detailed examination of Gibler's (2010) theory of the changes to elite-leader interaction within autocratic states as a result of territorial threats. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will focus on how territorial disputes affect autocratic stability, and propose some new theoretical

directions for the theory. The section will present Giber's (2010) argument that territorial disputes diminish the bargaining position of regime elites and regime opposition in autocratic regimes, increasing the power of the regime leadership. This is because the threat to territorial integrity of the state is likely to be perceived as extremely threatening, and all efforts to topple the current regime are likely to be suspended. Moreover, any anti-regime activities in times of highly threatening conflict are likely to be perceived as treason. The weakening of the bargaining power of opposition groups reduces the likelihood of leadership turnover, and makes a transition to any other type of regime (autocratic *and* democratic) less likely. The original contribution of that section will be to demonstrate that Giber's (2010) argument applies to autocratic regime survival, rather than democratisation, and framing it in the context of more recent research on autocratic regime survival. This new framework is important, because, as mentioned previously, when autocratic regimes end, they do not always end in democratic transitions. Hence, Giber's (2010) argument only applies to the study of regime stability, but not necessarily to the study of democratisation. Finally, one of the most important contributions of this section will be the application of Giber's (2010) framework to the specific context of each autocratic regime type investigate in this thesis. The distinction between military, monarchic, single-party and multiparty regimes will be made, and different theoretical expectations for each regime category will be made. The section will explain why Giber's (2010) framework is likely to apply to multiparty and military regimes, but not to monarchic and single party regimes. The proposition put forward in the first section of Chapter 3 will be tested in empirical Chapters 5 and 6.

The second section of Chapter 3 will review the theoretical propositions of ReSIT in relation to democratisation and place it in the context of wider democratisation studies within the Comparative Politics literature. The section will demonstrate why territorial disputes, apart from stabilising autocracies, additionally reduce the likelihood of democratisation. It is theorised that involvement in territorial disputes divides civil society opposition groups which are pushing for regime liberalisation.

This is because threats to territorial integrity of a country are likely to be perceived as a security emergency. Because democratic systems can often be perceived as slow and inefficient when it comes to dealing with external threats, any efforts to liberalise the regime might be suspended. The section will further demonstrate importance of accounting for autocratic regime type when discussing democratisation, as well as other influential factors such as economic development and petroleum dependency. The theoretical assumptions of the second section will be tested in the empirical Chapter 7.

Having explained the main theoretical contributions in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 will outline the methodology and methods used to answer the research questions of this thesis. The chapter will justify the use of large-N, quantitative comparative approach, along with the choice of the unit of analysis and independent and dependent variables. Chapter 4 will further discuss the sources, reliability, and limitations of data used throughout the thesis. Finally, the appropriateness of survival analysis regression technique will be addressed, along with the main assumptions of the regression, its limitations, as well as steps taken to ensure that all assumptions of the models are met in analytical chapters 5, 6 and 7.

In line with this methodology, Chapter 5, 6 and 7 will address the research questions of this thesis. Chapter 5 will test the assumption that autocratic regimes are more stable as a result of territorial dispute involvement, while controlling for the effects of wealth, oil dependency, political instability, as well as ethnic and religious fractionalisation. Chapter 6 will test the same assumption, but will split the sample into separate smaller sub-samples, which are based on the structural characteristics of the autocracies. In summary, Chapter 6 will investigate whether the findings of Chapter 5 are still applicable when autocratic regimes are disaggregated and re-categorised based on their power structures. Finally, Chapter 7 will test the proposition that autocratic regimes are less likely to democratise as a result of territorial dispute involvement as well as prior history of dispute involvement. Chapter 7 will also account for the moderating effects of structural

characteristics of autocratic regimes, wealth, oil dependency, the effects of Cold War, and the history of prior regime changes.

Finally, the conclusion of the thesis will present the findings and restate the importance of the research conducted in this thesis, emphasizing the original contribution of the findings, and propose new directions for further inquiry. However, one of the most important aspects of the chapter will be the discussion of the main theoretical and methodological limitations of this work. Bearing in mind potential biases and shortcomings, the chapter will also discuss the wider implication of this thesis to the international policy making, especially in relation to transitioning regimes and peace building efforts in heavily conflicted areas.

To begin, the next chapter will contextualise the importance of ReSIT to current literature on the democracy-peace nexus, and explain the importance of reversing the causal arrow between regime type and conflict involvement.

Chapter 2: Previous research

Introduction

The following chapter will review the literature on the association between international conflict and regime type in the field of International Relations (IR) in order to contextualise the emergence of Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT). As briefly discussed in Chapter 1, the IR literature on the regime type – conflict nexus has been largely dominated by research projects relating to the empirical observation that unlike authoritarian regimes, democracies never engage in war with one another: a phenomenon known as the *dyadic peace*. The following chapter will review the dominant approaches within the IR literature in order to demonstrate that the empirical debate on the existence of democratic peace has been largely limited to the liberal and realist explanations. The chapter will first review the second image propositions of the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) and Selectorate theories. It will then outline the third image neo-realist critique of the second image arguments. The chapter will demonstrate that neither the second nor third image approach to the democracy – peace relationship is very convincing, explaining the emergence of the Reversed Second Image Theory of power centralisation as a better way of capturing the effects of external threats to the state's integrity.

While many other attempts to explain the dyadic peace exist, among them Marxist, constructivist, and postmodernist approaches, to name but a few, this review will concentrate on appraising the positivist paradigms within the IR discipline.⁷ The review of the debate on how best to explain the dyadic peace phenomenon is important, because it contextualises the framework in which ReSIT originated. This is especially important when reviewing the theoretical claims of the DPT, because,

⁷ This is done not because other approaches are seen as less valuable, but rather due to the explicit empirical focus of this thesis. Hence, only approaches concerned with the scientific study of the regime-conflict relationship are discussed.

as mentioned in Chapter 1, many of the problems this thesis aims to address are a direct result of the polemic nature of ReSIT, which emerged because it largely saw itself as having to give a direct response to the DPT.

In addition, the analysis of the literature outlined in this chapter will demonstrate that ReSIT presents a convincing and theoretically original approach to explaining the association between peace and democracy. Namely, as a theoretical framework, it shows much scope for further scientific and theoretical developments on the relationship between external threats and domestic power centralisation. Unlike other theories on conflict studies, ReSIT literature offers a clean break from theoretical mono-directionality of the 'images of war' approach to conflict studies still dominant within the field of IR (Waltz, 1959). As this chapter will argue below, this mono-directionality, so prevalent in the current literature on the subject, is one of the main reasons that, with the exception of ReSIT, no convincing theoretical arguments have been made that could explain the empirical association between conflict and regime structure. As will be shown below, neither the liberal DPT, nor realist theories have successfully theorised the association between regime type and conflict engagement. Finally, it will also be argued that both DPT and realist theories have been too preoccupied with normative arguments about whether democracies are, or are not more peaceful than autocracies, which greatly limits the scope of their analysis.

In response, the final section of this chapter will further argue that there is much more to the democracy-peace nexus than exploring the question of democratic pacifism. Because it is less normative than other IR theories, ReSIT offers further scope for future studies and thus shows promise as an alternative to liberalism and realism. Nevertheless, while the ReSIT literature is one of the most original contributions to the field of IR in the past two decades, it is still largely underdeveloped, and suffers from theoretical and methodological limitations that can only be addressed by engaging with other fields of political science. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, the IR explanations of the democratic peace from the second, third, and reversed-second image perspectives rarely draw on literature

and insights from Comparative Politics, making the interdisciplinary contribution of this thesis heuristically salient. While these shortcomings in the IR literature will be contextualised and outlined in this chapter, their detailed assessment in relation to ReSIT will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. What is important here is to emphasize why ReSIT is a valuable and original approach to the study of the democracy-peace nexus.

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, it will give a very brief introduction to the three images of war developed by Kenneth Waltz. By doing this, it will contextualise the debate on conflict and regime type that has dominated the empirical study of international relations over the past 50 years. Second, it will present and scrutinise the main arguments of the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) and Selectorate Theory, along with a detailed review of the empirical findings of wider DPT research. With the help of related IR critiques of the DPT, the chapter will identify inconsistencies and theoretical weaknesses within the liberal paradigm, and argue that the explanation of the dyadic peace is not fully convincing, despite the strong empirical finding of no wars between democracies. Third, the chapter will scrutinise the realist critique of the DPT and argue that to date, the realist literature has not come up with a convincing explanation for the puzzles in which democratic peace claims to answer. Once the dominant approaches to the democracy-peace nexus are outlined, the final section of this chapter will demonstrate that ReSIT presents a genuine and convincing alternative to current debates. However, it will also be argued that ReSIT suffers from similar limitations to the standard second image liberal approach, which will be improved upon by this thesis in Chapter 3. The chapter concludes by outlining the implications of this review, and set the discussion for Chapter 3, which will outline the original theoretical contributions of this thesis: namely, the thesis proposes that territorial dispute involvement reduces the likelihood of any type of transition, democratic *and* autocratic. Furthermore, the thesis puts forward an original theoretical argument which demonstrates that the impact of territorial disputes on regime stability and democratisation is likely to vary depending on the type of autocracy under investigation.

Waltz's 'three images' framework for studying the causes of international conflict

Within International Relations literature, the study of war and international conflict has been traditionally confined to three levels of analysis as conceptualised by Kenneth Waltz (1959). The first image, realism, typically views human nature as the primary cause of interstate disputes, and came to prominence shortly after the outbreak of the First World War (Carr, 1939; Morgenthau, 1948; Jervis, 1976). Unlike the first image, the second image distanced itself from individual-level explanations of international conflict, which were seen as tautological, and instead considered the domestic organisation of states as the primary source of international conflict (Waltz, 1959). Finally, the third image, formulated and adopted by Waltz himself, sees conflict as a result of interstate competition in conditions of international anarchy. In the absence of explicit central authority at the international level, states fight for resources and position in order to secure their survival (Waltz, 1959; Mearsheimer, 1983). Over time, the importance of the first image decreased, and it now mainly serves as a compliment to the dominant second and third image approaches (Goldgeier and Tetlock, 2008).⁸ The following literature review will use these dominant image narratives as a framework for reviewing the literature on the dyadic peace. More specifically, the chapter will outline the position each approach takes to the study of the conflict-regime nexus, and explain why these dominant approaches are limited in their understanding of this relationship. Finally, it is proposed at the end of the review that through breaking with the three images approach, ReSIT offers key theoretical and scientific developments to the study of both international conflict and domestic organisation of states.

The section below will review the two parts of the democratic peace literature – the *audience costs* literature, which claims that democracies are more likely to be peaceful in relation to all states within the international system (monadic peace), and the *normative constraints* argument, which claims that democracies tend to be

⁸ For examples, see Christensen and Sneider (1990) and Taliaferro (2004).

at peace with other democracies (dyadic peace). Additionally, an alternative version of the audience costs argument, the *Selectorate Theory*, will be reviewed and appraised. It will be argued that the propositions put forward by DPT and associated theories do not provide convincing theoretical argument for why democracies do not go to war with each other, instead positing that a new, more interdisciplinary approach is needed in order to fully understand the association.

The audience costs literature

The proposition that representative governments are less violent stems from an argument proposed by Immanuel Kant in his essay on *Perpetual Peace* (Kant, 1903 [1795]). Although, like Hobbes, Kant saw the natural condition of the international system as a state of war, he believed that a republican organization of states would provide a long-lasting solution to the problem of international violence (Kant, 1903 [1795]: 117-128). He claimed that the general population is naturally war averse because it is the public, and not the leaders, who bear the financial and physical costs of war (Kant, 1903 [1795]: 122-23). On the other hand, as the first image of conflict studies would suggest, the state leaders tend to be naturally more violent for personal or financial gain (Kant, 1903 [1795]; Paine, 1945 [1776]; de Tocqueville, 1988 [1835]) Therefore, it follows that representative republics, whose definition is congenial with the modern notion of democracy, are inherently peaceful because the ruling elites rely on their citizens support for re-election (Rousseau *et al.*, 1996: 513). Democracies will be less likely to engage in wars because their leaders are afraid that unpopular foreign policy decisions might cost them their seat. Additionally, the pacifying effect of public opinion on foreign policy behaviour is further enhanced in democracies by their respect for rights and freedoms of their citizens. The respect for freedom of speech, opinion or assembly, 'protect[s] citizens from persecution for their opinions', and decreases the costs of monitoring and rating the performance of their leaders (Lake, 1992; Faeron, 1994: 577). Aware of the war-averse nature of their voters, democratic leaders tend to avoid

international conflict that could escalate to war and adopt strategies that are based on diplomacy and peaceful conflict resolution (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993; Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* 1999, 2003). This notion of democratic accountability as the core of modern democratic peace research is widely known as the *audience costs* literature (Fearon, 1994).

In contrast, it is argued that authoritarian regimes lack all of the above features, making them more likely to engage in predatory behaviour that ultimately leads to war. It is typically assumed that removing autocratic leaders from office comes at a great cost, and therefore guarantees immunity to those in power. The lack of public accountability means that all actions are in reference to the benefit of elites, and not to please the war-averse public. The inherently aggressive nature of the executive guarantees a continuous involvement in international disputes. Since the leaders do not bear the physical costs of war, they are more willing to engage in them for personal gain.

The audience costs argument has become particularly popular in the aftermath of the Second World War and the portrayal of the conflict as a battle between the democratic West and the aggressive fascist Axis. These studies resulted in the conviction that democracies are inherently more peaceful than autocracies and that Western nations could serve as a model for the world (Babst, 1972; Rummel, 1983; Waltz, 1991). The theory was further reinforced and consolidated by the discovery of the puzzling phenomenon of enduring peace between democracies, which will be discussed later in this chapter (Babst, 1964, 1972; Doyle, 1983a; 1983b, 1986; Rummel, 1983). In a nut shell, this argument suggests that the public is opposed to their government getting involved in interstate conflict because wars tend to cost money and lives. Since elected officials rely on public approval in order to get re-elected, they will avoid getting involved in international conflict. Despite the popularity of these claim in the current literature, DPT has attracted a great deal of criticism over the past two decades, with many scholars claiming that the theoretical arguments to not live up to critical scrutiny.

A critique of the audience costs literature

Although holding a great deal of appeal as an intuitive claim, the *audience costs* argument outlined above is problematic. The main problem with the dominant approach to the conflict-regime nexus comes from the fact that the theory did not revise its assumptions in line with theoretical progress from other fields of political science. For example, the bulk of the claims made by the audience costs literature rest on the assumption that only democratic leaders can be held to account for their policy choices. Nevertheless, the findings within the field of Comparative Politics demonstrate that this is not the case (Svolik, 2009; Weeks, 2012; Croco and Weeks, 2016). In response, the section below will demonstrate that while autocratic rulers might not always be liable to the general public, they often respond to regime elites on whose support they rely to stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, 2003).

First, the proposition that heads of autocratic states are not culpable for unfavourable policy choices stems from a faulty assumption that all autocracies operate in a similar manner purely by virtue of being non-democratic. Drawing on the history of violence by Adolf Hitler, Idi Amin or Kim Jong-Il, most researchers make a faulty inference that all autocratic rulers have a blank cheque to initiate foreign and domestic violence and face no consequences for their actions (Weeks, 2012: 326). However, with the exclusion of rulers in highly centralised, personalist regimes, and some non-dynastic monarchies, a great number of autocratic leaders depend for their survival in office on the regime elites, making them extremely cautious in foreign policy dealings (Geddes, 2003: 50; Weeks, 2008: 45; Croco and Weeks, 2016). This is demonstrated by the fact that a vast majority of autocratic rulers are overthrown in *coup d'états* staged by their immediate support group, rather than civil uprisings or revolutions (Svolik, 2009: 478). The relative strength of the elites comes from their control over certain features of state apparatus or bureaucracy. For example, in some regimes, elites assume control over various security organs, making it exceedingly difficult for the leaders to punish them for

dissent, and providing them with means of staging a potential coup (Weeks, 2008: 41; Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). Additionally, many of the Middle Eastern dynastic elites like in Bahrain, Kuwait or Qatar distribute key family members among a range of crucial economic and military posts, making them extremely resilient to any internal power shifts, including the change of the monarch (Herb, 1999: 8-10). Finally, in some regimes, elites have relative autonomy from the leaders. As a result of these various designs, many elite groups in autocratic regimes are strong and largely independent from the leader (Herb, 1999; Weeks, 2008, 2012; Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). This means that they often have the power and the political will to remove unfavourable candidates from office or to question foreign policy decisions that threaten their interests.

Second, the assertion that the public is naturally war-averse finds little support outside of the DPT literature. Although it is assumed that democratic voters are naturally more peaceful, it has often been shown that foreign conflict significantly raises the chance of widespread nationalism, leading to the so-called 'rally around the flag' phenomenon (Mueller, 1973; Levy, 1988; Morgan and Cambell, 1991). This has been shown both in the case of historical disputes (Levy, 1988: 664), as well as more recent conflicts (Schubert *et al.*, 2002). According to Diversionary War Theory, the surge in nationalism in response to foreign conflict results in widespread support for the leaders in power, contradicting the assumption that democratic politicians are likely to face disapproval when opting for war involvement (Mueller, 1973). The sense of common interest and the shared commitment to the states' well-being are some of the factors thought to be responsible for the phenomenon (Levy, 1988: 665). It is often speculated that the lower the poll ratings and the closer the date of the presidential re-election, the more likely U.S. presidents are to become involved in a foreign military conflict to boost performance ratings (Stoll, 1984; Ostrom and Job, 1986; Mintz and Geva, 1993: 487-488). In fact, it became anecdotal that in the United States to suggest that the only way to secure a re-election at home is to start a war abroad. These

observations hardly correspond to the proposition of a peaceful public offered by the democratic peace research.

In summary, the section above demonstrated that the two main assumptions of the audience costs literature – the uniqueness of democratic accountability and the public aversion to war - do not find consistent support in reality and thus cannot be assumed as given. The first assumption is unconvincing because most dictators are responsible to regime elites who have the means to oust them from power. Since getting involved in war might be costly for authoritarians, they should avoid international conflict in the same way democratic leaders do. The second assumption of the audience costs literature also lacks merit because the public can, and often does, support international conflict. Furthermore, the above analysis of the existing literature on autocratic and democratic accountability demonstrates that DPT should become more interdisciplinary, and accommodate more research from other fields of political science. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, ReSIT literature has inherited some of these flaws due to its direct engagement with DPT.

A new version of the audience costs argument: the Selectorate Theory

As a result of shortcomings of the audience costs research, Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues (1999, 2003) developed a new theory whose aim was to capture the complexities of autocratic governance. It was built on the empirical finding that democracies tend to only get involved in wars if they have a chance to succeed and, as a result, usually win them (see for example Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bennett and Stam, 1998; Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001). It addresses the criticism levelled against the audience costs argument that authoritarian leaders are to some extent accountable for their actions. According to the theory, autocratic leaders are accountable to a small portion of the population who put them in power – the autocratic elite, or ‘selectorate’. However, unlike the electorate in democratic regimes, which is large, the autocratic ‘selectorate’ is relatively narrow. The primary

idea behind the theory is that all leaders need resources to stay in power. They use these resources to 'buy' support from their winning coalition in instances when the public (in democracies) or the elites (in autocracies) are dissatisfied with their policies. Therefore, to win support, democratic leaders must implement successful and popular public policies that redistribute the nation's wealth to the general population. The support of the selectorate, on the other hand, can be bought by a small network of private goods provisions, such as one-off payments and private rents.

When democracies and autocracies engage in war and are defeated, democratic leaders are more likely to lose office than autocratic leaders, because as a result of a loss, they will have much fewer resources available to redistribute in the form of public goods to their wide base of supporters. On the other hand, autocrats are less affected by war losses, because very few resources are needed to buy-off the 'military cronies' (de Mesquita *et al.*, 1999; 2003; de Mesquita and Smith, 2012). As a result, when getting involved in a war, one is likely to lose more in democracies than in autocracies, thus making war a more costly risk for democratic leaders (Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, 2003).

Although the theory provides a more theoretically sound account of the reason why some democracies might not be willing to get involved in potentially risky international conflict, while at the same time avoiding normative theoretical claims, it has faced both theoretical and empirical criticism. In terms of empirical challenges, much of the recent quantitative literature demonstrates that losing or winning a war explains the length of tenure for autocratic leaders, but not democratic leaders (Chiozza and Goemans, 2004). Furthermore, some more recent empirical studies have suggested that regime type has very little explanatory power when it comes to the outcome of international conflict, calling into question the suggestion that democracies are more likely to win wars (Desch, 2008).

From a theoretical point of view, although Selectorate Theory should be credited with the effort to engage with Comparative Politics literature on authoritarian

regimes, its assumptions are often simplistic and unsupported by empirical evidence. For example, the proposition that autocratic leaders are safe from being overthrown because they can simply 'buy-off' their supporters with private goods can be easily brought into question. First, although Selectorate Theory claims that elites can be easily swayed by private goods, as discussed above, the control of the state apparatus by the elites can often put a check on the despot's private expenditures, thus making it difficult to 'buy off' the establishment (Weeks, 2008: 41, Croco and Weeks, 2016). Second, autocratic rulers are far more likely than democratic leaders to be severely punished as a result of unfavourable policy outcomes (Goemans, 2000; Rosato, 2003; Escribá-Folch, 2013; Frantz *et al.*, 2014). According to Escribá-Folch (2013: 160), almost half of all dictators between 1946 and 2004 have faced death, imprisonment or exile as a direct result of being removed from office. Since losing war is an extremely unpopular policy outcome, it is worth considering the diverging effects of failing in conflict across various regimes. Given that the severity of punishment is much higher in authoritarian regimes, their leaders have far more incentives than their democratic counterparts to avoid potential conflict (Rosato, 2003; Escribá-Folch, 2013). Furthermore, if buying off regime elites with private goods were an easy fix for unpopular foreign policies, dictators would rarely be removed from power, and certainly would not face death as a result of it. Hence, the Selectorate Theory, although offering a valuable contribution to the field, fails to sufficiently account for the way autocracies operate at the domestic level, demonstrating the need to further interdisciplinary research between the fields of IR and Comparative Politics. This critique of Selectorate Theory is also important because it plays a considerable role in Gibler's (2010) ReSIT explanation of the democracy-peace nexus discussed in Chapter 3. Having appraised the audience costs and Selectorate theory, the section below will critically review the normative constraints arguments of the DPT.

The normative constraints literature

In order to strengthen the structural constraints logic that underpins DPT, or perhaps to rescue it from the overwhelming empirical evidence against it, a second form of argument was developed by researchers within the last two decades. The normative constraints argument claims that the interaction between democracies is governed by values of mutual respect and accommodation, resulting in peace that exists between democracies, but which does not necessarily extend to autocracies (this is sometimes referred to as 'the separate peace theory'). At its core, the normative constraints argument claims there exists a set of socially acceptable rules on what is and what is not acceptable within democracies. These rules stem from the liberal respect for individual rights and freedoms, and as a result, create an overt condemnation of the use of force. For political leaders, this means that physical violence or oppression of opposition is never acceptable as means of furthering one's agenda (Dixon, 1994: 16). Since democratic leaders rule by consent of the people, it is seen as unjust and illegitimate to abuse their position by resorting to violence to solve domestic problems (Russett, 1993). The rules governing the interaction between conflicting groups on a domestic level are then externalized to the international domain (Doyle, 1986; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993; Dixon, 1994). When two democracies clash over a potentially dangerous issue, the expectation that the other state will also externalize their peaceful means of conflict resolution leads to a greater degree of respect and accommodation. Furthermore, since elected governments are seen as 'just', they are perceived as having a right to remain free from any form of intervention into their domestic affairs (Doyle, 1983a: 230). For this reason, any coercive action against a democratic rival would be seen by the country's elites as illegitimate and unacceptable. Since these perceptions are mutual, democracies are more willing to assume that their democratic opponent is willing to cooperate and solve the conflict without resorting to violence.

On the other hand, it is argued that authoritarian regimes do not operate using the same set of rules. In fact, political elites in authoritarian regimes are free to liquidate or imprison their political opposition, or even turn against their own citizens (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 625; Oneal and Russett, 2015). The lack of respect for human dignity and freedom makes them appear unjust and unworthy of accommodation in the eyes of democratic leaders (Doyle, 1983b). Furthermore, aware that the rival might take advantage of its 'naïve' and 'dovish' democratic values, democracies are likely to become suspicious and therefore more hostile when confronted with authoritarian states, resulting in more, rather than less, conflict (Doyle, 1983a, 1983b, 1986, Clifton Morgan, 1993: 198; Owen, 1994; Rosato, 2003: 586). Hence, while the normative constraints argument assumes peace between pairs of democratic states (dyadic peace), it does not assume that democracies are more peaceful towards *all* types of regimes, including autocracies (monadic peace).

A critical appraisal of the normative constraints literature

Although democracies are expected to externalize and then expand their norms of peaceful conflict resolution from the domestic to international level, they rarely live up to this standard of conduct. Historical analyses demonstrated that when confronted over highly salient issues, democracies tend to resort to measures that are consistent with a realist, rather than liberal, state behaviour. In his analysis of four major near-misses of war between democracies, Layne (1994) demonstrated that strategic interests and realpolitik considerations were more important than upholding democratic values. In all four cases, at least one democracy was ready to go to war on the contested issue (Layne, 1994: 38). A peaceful resolution was achieved not through mutual accommodation or through pacific negotiations, but because one of the sides decided to back down from the dispute. One of the most contested of these clashes was the Franco-German Ruhr crisis of 1923. The military intervention of liberal France into an equally democratic Germany has clearly

shown that grievances over the Versailles treaty and overdue war reparations were more important than mutual accommodation and the spirit of 'live and let live' (Layne, 1994: 33-38). According to this research, the only reason for the peaceful resistance to war on the side of Germany was France's relative power, since Germany was a recently defeated state struggling with the economic costs of war reparations. The remaining three examples by Layne provide equally compelling cases against the 'norms and values' argument of the democratic peace, which in turn undermines the theoretical presuppositions of DTP.⁹

Moreover, democracies have a long history of applying double standards in the way in which they conduct their foreign affairs. The widespread use of covert and overt interventions in legitimate democracies (Forsythe, 1992; Lilley and Downes, 2010) is highly inconsistent with the mutual 'trust and respect' expectation forwarded by DPT scholars (Doyle, 1986; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993; Dixon, 1994; Owen, 1994). For example, the United States government has a longstanding history of forcibly intervening in other state's affairs, many of them highly functioning republics (Forsythe, 1992; Kinsella, 2005). The U.S. has forcibly removed elected officials from Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1950s) Chile (1973) and Nicaragua (1980s) in an effort to gain substantial strategic and economic interests (Forsythe, 1992: 385; Rosato, 2003: 590; Lilley and Downes, 2010: 267). Given that all the above states were a form of representative government (yet to varying degree), it is clear that *realpolitik* and anti-communist sentiments play an important role and that these concerns can tamper other commitments such as freedom or democracy (Forsythe, 1992).

Thus, these interventions pose a major threat to the consistency of the 'norms and values' argument, which asserts that democracies, as legitimate regimes, ought to be free from foreign intrusion and war (Doyle, 1986: 230). Reiter and Stam (2002: 160) assert that in order for the normative theory of liberal peace to hold true,

⁹ Apart from the Franco-German Ruhr crisis of 1923, Layne (1994) reviews the events following the outbreak of the 1st Anglo-American crisis (1861), the 2nd Anglo-American crisis (1895-96) and the Fashoda crisis between France and England (1898).

democracies should never use *any* form of coercion, overt or covert, in order to replace a democratically elected government. Given that liberal states *have* used covert action against legally elected leaders, the peace between democracies can no longer be attributed merely to respect for legitimate domestic structures. Although liberal peace proponents have argued that most of these states were not ideal type liberal democracies at the time of intervention (Doyle, 1986: 335; Forsythe, 1992: 393; Russett, 1993: 121), it is important to note that the international community and the U.S. government still recognised them as fully functioning representative governments at the time (Lilley and Downes, 2010). Furthermore, the fact that U.S. actions have intentionally hindered the development of liberal institutions abroad hardly supports the notion that democracies will always value liberal norms of behaviour.

In most cases, the structures installed forcefully by the U.S. have resulted in far more oppressive regimes (Forsythe, 1992: 387; Rosato, 2003: 591). In fact, in the case of Indonesia in 1957, 'at least some of the concern by the U.S. stemmed from Sukarno's implementation of proportional democracy, which would grant the communist parties a representative share in the decision-making process (Forsythe, 1992: 388). Here, it is clear that democratic values were seen as secondary to the strategic interests dictated by the Cold War reality. It is more likely that the privilege of non-intervention and peaceful co-existence is granted to political allies rather than democracies more generally.

It is clear from the analysis above that the normative constraints argument is equally unconvincing as the structural proposition of the democratic peace thesis. The 'trust and respect' argument, resting on the right of non-intervention into free and democratic states, is not fully supported by empirical evidence. A range of covert actions performed by the paragon of liberal democracy, the United States, against other representative states clearly demonstrates that respect is in many cases granted according to geopolitical considerations rather than purely on the mutual recognition of just regimes.

Therefore, a review of audience costs, Selectorate Theory, and the norms and values literature has demonstrated that the main theoretical arguments in favour of the democracy – peace nexus are unconvincing and largely uncorroborated by empirical evidence when compared to other fields of study. While the Selectorate Theory successfully engages with the Comparative Politics literature to address the theoretical limitations of the audience costs literature, the scope of engagement remains very limited. Yet, despite these shortcomings, DPT has remained one of the most influential empirical theories of IR to date. As will be shown below, this is due to the strong empirical finding that despite the theoretical flaws of DPT, democracies do tend to avoid being involved in war and militarised disputes with one another.

Having reviewed the main theoretical assumptions of the second image theories within the field of IR, the chapter now turns to critically evaluating the empirical evidence for the theory, and the appraisal of this quantitative evidence by the third image literature.

The review of the quantitative evidence

Democratic Peace Theory is one of the most frequently tested propositions within the field of IR. It has been investigated on several levels of analysis (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997), and the results are exceptionally robust despite the remaining theoretical and empirical challenges put forward by rival theories. While some limited number of studies found support for the monadic peace proposition, the general consensus within the literature is that democracies are significantly less likely to engage in militarised interstate disputes on a dyadic level. The summary of evidence gathered in support of the theory is given below.

The dyadic peace proposition

The peacefulness of democracies has been accepted as axiomatic long before sophisticated statistical measures were available to test the theoretical assumptions of the DPT (Small and Singer, 1976: 50). The quantitative study exploring the war-proneness of democratic states conducted by Babst (1964: 55; 1972), utilizing Wright's (1965) data on conflicts, was the first one to confirm that 'no wars have been fought between independent nations with elective governments between 1789 and 1941.' His work has sparked a range of research testing both monadic and dyadic versions of the Kantian argument. Most have found that democracies are neither more, nor less, war-prone than other regimes (Wright, 1965; Russett and Monsen, 1975; Small and Singer 1976; Chan 1984; Weede 1984; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Clifton Morgan 1991; Russett, 1993; Dixon, 1994; Chan, 1997; Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, 1999, 2003). Although Rummel (1983) found statistically significant evidence that monadic peace indeed exists and democracies were less likely to engage in war than other regimes, it was heavily criticised at the time for excessively narrow temporal domain (1976-1980), as well as idiosyncratic definitions and operationalization of key variables with the inclusion of libertarianism as a key feature of democratic systems (Chan, 1984; Weede, 1984; Benoit, 1996). Further studies by Weede (1984) and Chan (1984) have disproved his claims and discouraged further studies from pursuing evidence for the monadic peace proposition (Benoit, 1996). Since then far more attention was given to uncovering the nature of the dyadic, rather than monadic peace.

Some studies found that 'pairs of democracies are much less likely than other pairs of states to fight or to threaten each other in militarized disputes less violent than war' (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Weede, 1994; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Russett and Oneal, 2001: 46), while others asserted that disputes between democracies run a lower risk of escalating into violent conflicts (Bennet and Stam, 2004). Therefore, a consensus on the dyadic nature of the democratic peace has emerged: democracies virtually never fight one another (Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Clifton

Morgan and Campbell 1991; Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993; Clifton Morgan and Schwebach 1992; Weede 1992; Dixon, 1994).

Given the inconsistencies within the audience costs literature, it is perhaps unsurprising that the monadic peace proposition has found weak empirical support. Although accountability to a peaceful electorate as well as the will to stay in office should reduce the military ambitions of political leaders, quantitative IR literature largely rejects the propositions of monadic peace: while democracies are highly unlikely to fight one another, they are just as likely to engage in war with authoritarian regimes as authoritarian regimes are to engage in war with each other. Since the main purpose of a theory is to explain occurrences in the real world, the lack of such occurrences renders the theory unconvincing (Minzberg, 1979; Shah and Corley, 2006). Thus, all of the features outlined in the previous sections imply that democracies should be less aggressive than autocracies in their relations with other regimes, suggesting the existence of monadic, rather than dyadic peace.

Reactions to the lack of support for monadic peace theory

To counter the empirical claims of these and similar studies, some theorists have suggested that democracies might be more likely to fall victim to predatory attacks by authoritarian regimes. According to Weede (1984: 652-53), democracies, by favouring policies of appeasement, might project an image of weakness and indecision, inviting potential exploitation and attacks. The diffused executive power and the need to convince the public that war is necessary make democracies slower in their response to an attack. It follows that representative regimes, despite being generally pacifistic, are more likely to fall victims to offensive attacks from non-democratic regimes, a process which explains their more frequent involvement in international conflict, while preserving the possibility of monadic peace. Although the claim that authoritarian regimes are more likely than democracies to initiate Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) finds some empirical support (Reiter and

Stam, 2003), it has also been shown that democracies are more likely to initiate disputes against autocracies than autocracies are to initiate disputes among each other (Quackenbush and Rudy, 2009). These results suggest that states are more likely to begin conflict with a nation they have less in common with, rather than authoritarian regimes behaving in a predatory manner. This finding is further supported by the dictatorial peace literature, which suggests that personalist dictatorships are less likely than other forms of autocracy to go to war with one another (Peceny *et al.*, 2002). Alternative studies have even suggested that a monadic version of authoritarian peace might hold some research potential, but was quickly discredited (Ishiyama *et al.*, 2008). Furthermore, Small and Singer (1976: 66) have found that out of 19 wars between 1815 and 1965, 53% of them were initiated by democracies. Similarly, Gleditsch and Hegre (1997), examining the 1816-1994 period, show that democracies start 73% of all wars they take part in. It is therefore highly unlikely that democracies fall 'victims' to predatory behaviour of authoritarian rulers.

The current state of the literature in support of DPT is in agreement that while democracies are much less likely to get involved in militarised disputes or wars with one another, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that they are more peaceful in general. To a large extent, the empirical finding that democracies tend not to fight one another is the main reason why the DPT literature has remained the dominant explanation of the dyadic peace despite the fact that its theoretical arguments are so unconvincing. Due to this discrepancy between theoretical inconsistencies and strong empirical findings, third image theories called the above findings into question, generating a separate body of quantitative and empirical research devoted specifically to discrediting DPT findings. However, as will be demonstrated in the section below, the realist statistical critiques of DPT are equally unconvincing. Hence, as will be explained later in the chapter, ReSIT fills an important gap in the IR literature. This is because it provides a theoretically plausible explanation of the dyadic peace. ReSIT not only accepts the empirical findings of DPT, but it also accepts the role of regime type as an explanatory factor.

The realist critique of quantitative evidence in favour of the DPT research project

Given that the third image approach does not distinguish between states based on their domestic organisation but views them purely in terms of their strategic position, it is perhaps unsurprising that the main form of engagement of neorealist theory with the democracy-peace nexus literature is the attempt to discredit it on statistical grounds. Nevertheless, despite minimal theoretical contributions to the understanding of how regime type might impact international behaviour, it is important to understand the arguments put forward by its proponents. The fact that neither of the dominant theories could provide a strong explanation for the dyadic peace creates a theoretical void in the literature, which ReSIT has successfully filled, and which this thesis refines further. Yet, in order to demonstrate that the realist approach to the existence of the dyadic peace is equally problematic as the liberal approach, its main assumptions must be critically analysed. In order to demonstrate the problems inherent in the realist critique of DPT, the section below will outline its main propositions. Namely, it will address the argument that absence of wars between democracies is nothing more than a combination of the Cold War and statistical artefacts (Mearshimer, 1990; Spiro, 1994; Faber and Gowa, 1997; Gartzke, 1998; Gowa, 1999, 2011). However, this critique cannot explain why, despite the fall of the Soviet Union, the dyadic peace persisted in the age of unipolarity (Park, 2013).

The statistical artefact argument

The realist critics of the separate peace thesis claim that the lack of violent conflict between democracies should not be interpreted as significant, because the distance between the very few existing democracies prior to 1945 meant that states had no plausible physical threats / reasons / means to engage in war with one another. Although this critique has raised some serious concerns about the significance of results of many major quantitative studies dealing with the pre-1945

temporal domains, it does not account for the continuous lack of conflict between democracies in the age when more and more free nations share their borders, which under realist logic would provide new rationales for a potential dispute.

The first objection to the theory forwarded by sceptics is an argument that the lack of conflict between democracies is not surprising given that war is a relatively rare occurrence (Mearshimer, 1991; Spiro, 1994). As explained by Weede (1992: 377), the chances of war between two randomly chosen nations within a ten-year period are close to zero. As a result, it is hard to conceive that particular feature, like regime type, could reduce that likelihood even further. The reason for such a low probability of conflict between two randomly selected nations is the fact that very few of them have common borders. Given that having a shared neighbourhood accounts for at least two thirds of all interstate disputes between 1816 and 1976 (Grochman, 1990: 8), it is not surprising that democracies, rarely in close proximity before 1945, do not fight one another. According to critics, the liberal peace should not be treated as statistically significant for the above reasons, despite the evidence (Mearshimer, 1990: 50-51; Spiro, 1994; Walt, 1999).

Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, contiguity as a control variable in model testing the DPT has been accounted for by many quantitative studies of the field, which had nevertheless yielded negative relationship between democracy and war involvement on a dyadic-level (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Bremer, 1992; Weede, 1994; Maoz and Russett, 1993). Furthermore, although the chances of two democratic states at war are low to begin with, it is the *cumulative* probability that really matters. In other words, although a low chance of conflict in a given year is not surprising, the zero observation is highly significant if it occurs every year over extended periods of time (Russett, 1995: 171; Chan, 1997: 72). Finally, the criticism does not apply to the post-Cold War period. The fall of the Berlin Wall caused a sudden spike of democratization across the world, resulting in a growing number of representative regimes sharing borders (Marshall and Cole, 2011: 12). If the small, politically irrelevant sample critique were correct, the increasing incidence of

democratisation should have discredited, not strengthened, the democratic peace proposition.

The Cold War artefact argument

Although many separate peace scholars agree that the small number of democracies prior to the Second World War might have provided questionable support for the dyadic peace (Small and Singer, 1976; Chan, 1997), it is undeniable that that the 'zero wars' proposition became more compelling with the rise of incidence and proximity of liberal democracies in Europe and the world after 1945. New data available to scholars have revealed that democracies, despite their growing number and increasing contiguity, are yet to engage in war with one another.

Notwithstanding, the realists criticise the theory for its failure to account for the effects of bipolarity on state behaviour (Farber and Gowa, 1995, 1997). According to sceptics, the lack of war between democracies in the First World can be easily accounted for by the perceived common threat of communism from the East (Waltz, 1991; Gartzke, 1998; Gowa, 1999, 2011; Schwartz and Skinner, 2002). In face of danger, the ideologically similar free nations entered alliances against what was the foreign and unknown threat of communism. While a number of democratic peace advocates have included alliance as a confounding variable in their analysis, still reporting significant effects of regime type on *dyadic peace* (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001; Ray, 2003; Oneal and Russett, 2005), their efforts have been heavily criticised by realist scholars. According to Schwartz and Skinner (2002: 166), most truces are no more than 'pieces of paper containing joint declarations of nonenmity', and should not be viewed as genuine alliances. Polish non-aggression pacts with both Nazi Germany *and* Soviet Russia prior to the Second World War are a case in point, demonstrating the meaninglessness of most international non-aggression treaties. According to realists, there should be a clear

distinction between controlling for non-enmity alliances and controlling for NATO membership, for the latter was 'an armed, integrated, semi-mobilized organization under U.S. political leadership and military command' (Schwartz and Skinner, 2002). Thus, according to realists, most studies on the democratic peace fail to include NATO membership as a potential explanatory variable and are therefore unable to recognize that it is common interests and goals, not regime type, that account for the separate peace phenomenon (Waltz, 1991; Faber and Gowa, 1995, 1997; Gartzke, 1998; Schwartz and Skinner, 2002).

Despite the above claims, the 'common interests' argument forwarded by realist scholars fails to account for a number of puzzles. First, the communist states have faced a threat of similar magnitude from the Free World, yet there were many instances of armed conflicts between them (Ray, 2001). If strategic interests and ideological similarities account for a lack of conflict, then communist nations should have been equally peaceful towards each other. However, both Hungary and Czechoslovakia were invaded by the USSR during the Cold War, which demonstrates that a shared ideology is not a guarantee of peace. Furthermore, had the realist claims been correct, the democratic peace should have ceased to continue past the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Although Gowa (2011: 169) argues that the 'dispute and war rates by dyad type converge after the collapse of the bipolar system', her research was criticised for numerous omissions. For example, she did not include a direct measure of common interests between dyads, and did not distinguish between established and young democracies; this is important, given that the latter tend to be more conflict-prone (Park, 2013: 180). A recent study including the above measures and controlling for the lagged effect of democracy on conflict has shown that separate peace persists despite the collapse of the Soviet Union (Park, 2013). With more recent data available for the post-Cold War period, it is yet to be established whether democratic dyads continue to be significant predictors of conflict proneness, although most robust studies of the phenomenon post-1989 to date suggest that they do (Dafoe, Oneal and Russett, 2013; Park, 2013). Furthermore, even if the effects of alliance will in fact explain the

scarcity of conflict between democracies in the unipolar system, it is yet to be explained why republics are more likely to ally together, and why those alliances tend to last longer (Siverson and Emmons, 1991; Gaubatz, 1996; Simon and Gartzke, 1996; Bennett, 1997).

As demonstrated above, the realist critique of the DPT findings remains underwhelming and unconvincing. Yet, despite the large body of quantitative work indicating a link between democracy and peace, both realist and liberal approaches do not offer a convincing account for this empirical anomaly. The structural constraints argument makes hasty and incorrect assumptions about the differences in the level of accountability in democratic and autocratic states. Equally, the normative constraints argument is regularly contradicted by empirical evidence, and cannot explain the many instances of both overt and covert actions between democracies, which counters the assumption of mutual trust and respect. Moreover, the realist explanations of the statistical anomaly of the democratic peace, as demonstrated above, have proven to be equally unconvincing. This is largely because the peace between democratic states has persisted despite the growing number and proximity between democratic states following the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the two most influential perspectives on the origins of conflict incapable to fully account for the dyadic peace, the field on International Relations is in need of an alternative account. The final section of this literature review will demonstrate that Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT), which reverses the causal arrow between conflict and regime type, offers a genuine alternative to the DPT project, which can overcome many of the theoretical hurdles faced by liberalism and realism - the two most dominant empirical IR theories.

Reversed Second Image Theory

As a result of failures of the two dominant approaches to the study of IR, the Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT) has in recent years gained a substantial

following, drawing increased attention from realist and liberal scholars (Ungerer, 2013; Hegre, 2014). As mentioned in Chapter 1, ReSIT challenges the assumption that the causal arrow should go from democracy to peace, and suggests instead that it is equally likely that peace provides conditions for democratic regimes to develop. In other words, it is conflict behaviour that explains regime type, rather than the other way around (Hintze, 1994; Gourevitch, 1978; Thompson, 1996; Gibler, 2010). The originality of the theory lies not only in reversing the direction of causality, but also in moving beyond the traditional, and unavoidably mono-directional levels of analysis, provided by Waltz's approach to conflict studies (Waltz, 1959).

As mentioned above, the notion that the causal arrow between peace and democracy should be reversed is not new. Over the past two decades, a number of scholars have suggested that external factors might have a substantial impact on the degree of power centralisation within certain types of states. Some of the earliest and most influential attempts have focused on the causes of authoritarianism. In his seminal work on hydraulic civilizations, Karl Wittfogel (1957) proposed that severe resource scarcity might have contributed to the development of some of the first autocratic states. The need to manage irrigation waters in areas characterised by extreme aridity has resulted in highly centralized forms of resource redistribution, ultimately leading to the responsibility for such redistribution being concentrated in the hands of the most powerful elites. Subsequently, the inability of the population to influence resource distribution networks allowed the ruling classes to impose oppressive governing structures and exclude their citizens from the decision-making process.

Building on Wittfogel's (1957) work, Midlarsky (1995) has drawn attention to a number of additional environmental factors which might aid power centralisation by investigating the link between the number of sea borders and the likelihood of democratic development in Sumer, Mesoamerica, Crete and China. The most crucial part of the study was the finding that a high proportion of sea borders minimises the threat of war from rival settlements. In earlier analyses, some

peninsular and island states such as Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Greece, Ireland or Malaysia had exhibited levels of democracy too large to be predicted by domestic variables, such as economic development, trade, land scarcity levels or lack of domestic violence. Coincidentally, the high proportion of sea borders was also correlated with low international conflict participation and a relatively low size of the army (Midlarsky, 1995: 237). The conclusion offered stated that that low levels of military threat in states insulated by large bodies of water somehow contribute to their democratic development. This point is supported by Thompson (1996), who later suggested that zones of peace, likely to be enforced by extensive sea borders, often preceded democratic progress in early European states. This research suggests that these cooperative niches were insulated from aggressive regional geopolitics and therefore were less likely to be threatened by war (Thompson, 1996: 142). An example of this dynamic is offered by Gourevitch (1978), who juxtaposed two contrasting geopolitical environments faced by England and the historical state of Prussia:

‘As the English Channel sharply lessened the chances of invasion, England was spared the necessity of constituting a standing army and mobilizing national resources to sustain it. [...] England's international security environment thus facilitated the development of a liberal, constitutional political order (Gourevitch, 1978: 896).’

Conversely, Prussia, effectively a garrison state, was shaped by an entirely different security environment:

‘It was surrounded by a flat plain, here and there carved by easily fordable rivers. There was nothing natural about its borders, indeed nothing natural about the very existence of the country. It emerged in response to war, which also shaped its internal organization. [...] The continual importance of military concerns gave the army and the Crown far greater influence than would have been the case had security-power issues mattered less (Gourevitch, 1978: 896).’

In the wake of criticism directed at the democratic peace theory in the 1990s, some scholars have attempted to test ReSIT premises empirically. In their extensive study of democracy, democratisation and war, Crescenzi and Enterline (1999) have found that while all these processes are to some extent endogenous, the relationship is not as strong as expected, and highly dependent of the spatial and temporal domains in which they are analysed. Furthermore, an empirical study by Mousseau and Shi (1999) has found that states are just as likely to become autocratic as they are to become democratic in the period leading up to interstate war, suggesting that the reverse causality studies should be abandoned in favour of the DPT.

Due to the mixed findings of quantitative research projects keen to support the reversed causality hypothesis, the theory had not gained much traction within the field of IR, that is until the theoretical developments offered by Gibler and colleagues (Gibler, 2007, 2010; Gibler and Tir, 2010, 2013). While the original proposition of ReSIT states that international conflict, especially war, causes states to become more centralised and autocratic, Gibler (2010) proposed that certain types of conflict are more likely to result in cartelisation than others. More specifically, he claimed that territorial disputes are more likely to lead to power centralisation than disputes over trade, diplomatic, or any other type of issue (Gibler, 2010)

According to Gibler (2007) territorial conflict results in extreme security emergencies that reduce the level of political polarization on both the public and government levels. On the public level, the 'rally around the flag' effect heightens the feelings of nationalism, leading to a spike in support for the ruling party or elite. On the government level, the presence of a salient threat provides strong incentives to back the incumbent leader, since surviving the emergency is temporarily more desirable than solving domestic rivalries (Gibler, 2010: 520-524). Given that the debilitated bargaining position of the opponents results in weaker checks on the executive power, opportunistic political leaders are likely to take advantage of their newly acquired autonomy and increase their influence (Gibler, 2010: 526; Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, 2003). While most of the above changes are

ordinarily reversed once the conflict is over (Trumbore and Boyer, 2000), continuous war-making might lead to consolidation of authoritarian models of governance (Gibler, 2010; Thompson, 1996; Gourevitch, 1978). Correspondingly, the resolution of disputes and a stable security environment means that a unified national and political front are no longer needed. In the long-term, in the face of absence of salient threats, the opposition might proceed to question the *raison d'être* of centralized political power and attempt to increase their bargaining position. If the opposition is successful, and given that other necessary conditions are satisfied, these changes might lead to a process of democratization. Although the absence of exogenous threat cannot be seen as a guarantee of democratic transitions, it might be a prerequisite for its occurrence (Thompson, 1996: 144).

Despite its increasing popularity within the IR community, the ReSIT framework outlined above is subject to the charge of endogeneity. For example, territorial conflicts and non-democratic regime occurrence could be correlated only because democracies are more likely to settle territorial disputes with their neighbours in the first place. Nevertheless, some of the most recent empirical ReSIT research has tested the proposition, finding little evidence for such claims. For example, Gibler and Owsiak (forthcoming) examine all contiguous dyad-years between 1919 and 2001, and find no empirical evidence suggesting that democratic regimes are more likely than other types of regimes to settle their borders. Democratic regimes are also *no more* likely than any other type of regime to keep their borders settled, or be 'more peaceful during settled-border years' (Gibler and Owsiak, forthcoming: 1). In addition, throughout the 1919 to 2001 period, democratisation of both countries in a dyad very rarely preceded the first border settlement or peaceful border transfer between them (ibid.). Other studies examining the endogeneity of the reversed second image proposition have found similarly little evidence that democracies are more likely to settle their borders peacefully (see for example Owsiak *et al.*, 2017; Owsiak and Vasquez, forthcoming). As a result, the correlation between territorial disputes and domestic power centralisation is unlikely to be

caused by the fact that some types of regimes are more skilled at managing and preventing territorial conflicts with their neighbours than other regimes.

Gibler's new theoretical framework for the relationship between democracy and peace has found empirical support in large-N quantitative studies (Gibler, 2007, 2010; Gibler and Braithwaite, 2012; Gibler and Tir, 2013). This recent reformulation of ReSIT has also gained some significant traction in the most recent appraisal of the democratic peace research project (see for example Ungerer, 2012, Hegre, 2014, and Park and Colaresi, 2014). This is not surprising, given the important theoretical contributions of this proposition.

Apart from breaking with the mono-directional nature of most IR approaches, the theory offers a more eclectic approach to the study of the regime-conflict nexus. For the first time within the DPT debate, a theory escapes the paradigm wars, which are dogmatically persistent within the field of IR (Levy, 1998: 145). Much of the current debate on the causes of democratic peace tries to fit either within the liberal or the realist framework, and explanations that do not fit their theoretical core are often discounted or ignored by the research community. Moreover, ReSIT escapes the charge of Eurocentrism that is inherent in many traditional approaches to the study of IR. Liberalism, the dominant explanation of the absence of conflict between democracies, is explicitly Western-centric (Hobson, 2012). It attributes normative qualities to democracies by assuming that all autocratic regimes are unable to solve international disputes peacefully. In other words, they are yet able to develop necessary norms and values inherent in Western democracies (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993; Dixon, 1994).

Furthermore, liberal approaches to International Relations assume state perfectibility and see democratic transition as a linear learning process. This belief is equally Eurocentric as it portrays Western liberal democracies as more advanced and developed than other regimes. ReSIT, on the other hand, seeks to explain democratic transitions as a side effect of states' peaceful relations with their immediate environment. Issues such as territorial conflict arise not because states

are naturally violent due to their regime type, but because the border between them might be relatively new, and likely to significantly raise interstate tensions (Gibler, 2007). Finally, Reversed Second Image theory perceives the development of democratic values and its institutional processes as a side effect of the absence of external pressures. All states are equally likely to develop into democracies given sufficient external conditions and a stable geopolitical environment. More importantly, countering the linear vision of progress within the field of IR, it is implicit within ReSIT that democracies are by no means immune from the centralising effects of territorial disputes. For the above reasons, as well as its ability to address existing shortcomings in liberal and realist models, this thesis will adopt ReSIT as its main theoretical framework.

Nevertheless, while ReSIT provides a compelling explanation of the dyadic peace that breaks with established theories, it originated within the field of IR, and as such reproduces many of the IR literature's shortcomings. These issues are particularly pertinent to ReSIT, because by reversing the causal arrow between democracy and peace, it directly engages in the study of regime change and democratisation. Hence, it is crucial that ReSIT draws on advances in the field of Comparative Politics, which has generated a wealth of methodological and theoretical material on the study of regime centralisation and democratic transitions. These current shortcomings of ReSIT, as outlined in the Introduction and that will be addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, include equating regime change with democratisation, focusing on autocratic spells rather than autocratic regimes, and the use of continuous measures of democratisation. In response, the main aim of this thesis is to present a more interdisciplinary theory of ReSIT that draws heavily on some of the most recent developments in the field of comparative authoritarianism, and to test its assumptions using robust mechanisms found in Comparative Politics, rather than using existing IR methodologies alone. This augmentation is important, particularly if ReSIT is to become a stand-alone explanation of regime stability and democratisation, rather than simply yet another usual response to the theoretical failings of the DPT.

Conclusion

The review above has demonstrated how the Reversed Second Image theory, used as a primary theoretical framework for this thesis, situates itself within the wider research on the relationship between regime type and conflict. The theoretical appeal of ReSIT emerges as a response to the continuing relevance of the empirical association between democracy and peace, despite many attempts by realist scholars to discredit these findings. Despite many empirical challenges, the observation that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other than other types of regimes remains one of the most important empirical findings in the IR discipline. Nevertheless, while the realist critique of the findings does not hold up to scrutiny, neither do the explanations put forward by Democratic Peace researchers. The audience costs literature suffers from serious theoretical underdevelopments and lacks interdisciplinary focus, while the normative constraints literature rests on overly normative assumptions about the nature of democracies, which do not find confirmation in the way they tend to behave in the international arena. Finally, even more interdisciplinary approaches, such as the Selectorate Theory, suffer from major theoretical weaknesses through a lack of interdisciplinary engagement with the Comparative Politics literature.

In the context of these above issues within the field of IR, ReSIT offers a genuinely new approach to studying the relationship between peace and democracy. By reversing the causal arrow between regime type and conflict engagement, the ReSIT literature offers a convincing explanation for why democracies tend to be less involved in violent conflict with one another. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that ReSIT approaches to the regime-conflict nexus are still relatively underdeveloped. Similarly, not unlike the liberal approaches, they are also lacking an interdisciplinary focus. This is a charge that is especially pertinent to ReSIT because its main theoretical assumptions encroach upon the field of regime change studies in Comparative Politics.

Given the wealth of literature currently available in Comparative Politics on theoretical and methodological approaches to democratisation and authoritarian stability, it is surprising that to date the study of ReSIT has failed to take into account a more dynamic approach to regime change study. The following thesis will aim to fill this gap in the literature by developing a more interdisciplinary approach to the Reversed Second Image Theory. More specifically, the thesis will draw upon the most recent literature on democratisation and autocratic stability to date, and apply theoretical and methodological improvements to the study of territorial conflict and regime change. These will be addressed in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.

Chapter 3: Theoretical framework: Territorial disputes, regime stability, and democratisation

Introduction

The previous chapter provided an overview of the main theoretical contributions of the Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT) to the study of the democracy-peace nexus. In summary, ReSIT offers new insights into the dynamic between regime type and international conflict, claiming that external threats have the propensity to centralise power within states (Gourevitch, 1978; Thompson, 1996). As mentioned in Chapter 2, ReSIT proposes that states which are more peaceful in their foreign relations are, over long periods of time, more likely to develop democratic structures. This challenges the assumptions of Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), which claims that the dyadic peace can be explained by peaceful dispositions of democracies. According to ReSIT, democracies tend to be at peace with one another because of existing 'zones of peace', which developed independently of regime type, and tend to promote democratisation. Furthermore, the opposite also holds true: states which are frequently involved in military disputes are more likely to remain autocratic, or become more autocratic over time. It is this inverse logic of ReSIT that will become the main focus of this chapter as well as the thesis more generally. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the most important contribution to the ReSIT literature is that provided by Gibler (2010), who proposed that territorial disputes have a much more centralising effect on the regime because they affect the bargaining dynamic between the leader and other elites. This chapter will outline Gibler's (2010) theoretical contributions in more detail and highlight space for potential improvement. In particular, although Gibler's (2010) theory aims to explain long-term democratisation, it does not make a distinction between autocratic instability and democratisation. As a result, it is assumed that if autocracies do not democratise, they must also be stable and centralised. This chapter will demonstrate that the study of regime stability and democratisation

needs to be conducted in separation, and proposes that territorial disputes affect both regime stability *and* democratisation. In order to do this, the chapter will be split into four sections.

The first section will provide a detailed outline of Gibler's (2010) contribution to the field, and outline its main shortcomings, which were already contextualised in Chapter 2. The second section will demonstrate why autocratic instability does not always lead to democratisation, and that this confusion stems from the focus on autocratic *spells* rather than autocratic *regimes*. The third section will apply ReSIT to the literature on the ruler-elite bargaining dynamic within autocratic regimes with the help of recent comparative authoritarianism literature. It will demonstrate that territorial disputes are likely to have a stabilising and centralising effect on autocratic regimes. The section will also explore how other factors, such as regime type, wealth, petroleum national resource dependency, or ethnic and religious fractionalisation, might affect this relationship. The fourth section will focus explicitly on how territorial disputes might affect the chances of democratisation in autocratic regimes, and argue that the effects are separate from those on autocratic stability. It will also explore how other factors commonly discussed in the democratisation literature might affect this relationship, with a particular focus on autocratic regime type, wealth, and petroleum dependency. Throughout the third and fourth section, particular attention will be paid to the way in which autocratic regime type (military, monarchic, single party or multiparty) affects the relationship between territorial dispute and autocratic stability, and territorial dispute and democratisation.

As a result, the chapter will set out the four main research questions to be tested in this thesis: How do territorial disputes affect the survival of autocratic regimes? Are there significant differences in how various types of autocratic regimes respond to territorial disputes? Are autocratic regimes less likely to democratise as a result of territorial dispute involvement? And finally, are the chances of democratising as a result of territorial dispute involvement different in various types of autocratic regimes?

This chapter makes a number of important theoretical contributions to the ReSIT and Comparative Politics literature. First, it makes the crucial distinction between autocratic *spells* and *regimes*, which is often overlooked by IR literature. It also provides a robust theoretical justification for maintenance of this distinction as its usefulness as an analytical heuristic. Second, this thesis represents the first time a ReSIT study accounts for the type of autocratic regime – military, single party, monarchic or multiparty – when explaining the changes in the leader-elite interaction as a result of territorial threats for both autocratic stability and democratisation. Third, it is the first study to look explicitly at the links between territorial disputes and regime stability, and to provide a theoretical framework that explains this relation. This will hopefully spark further research on the relationship between territorial threats and regime change in the Comparative Politics and IR literature.

Territorial disputes and power centralisation: an appraisal of Gibler's contribution

Unlike previous explanations of how interstate conflict affects domestic institutions, as discussed briefly in the previous chapter (Gourevitch, 1978; Thompson, 1996; Rasler and Thompson, 2005), the account developed by Gibler's (2010) focuses explicitly on the leader – opposition interaction within the country. He analyses both democracies and autocracies, concentrating on the 'rally around the flag' effect, which is defined as a rise in patriotism and sense of national unity that arises in all states as a result of involvement in highly salient disputes. He then argues that these 'rally effects' lead to institutional centralisation at the level of national governance. By resting part of his argument on the diversionary theory of war, he argues that elites within all types of regimes are likely to temporarily suspend their opposition against the incumbent in an event of salient military threat. In authoritarian regimes, this happens for two reasons. First, as proposed by the Selectorate Theory discussed in Chapter 2, the ruling elites tend to benefit from private goods provision networks introduced and controlled by the incumbent, and

any threat to the state is also a threat to these networks (Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, 1999). Second, external threats such as war 'can force an imposed leader on the elites, lead to occupation of the country and the overthrow of their elite status, or cause chaos in the country after a defeat' (Gibler, 2010: 524). Since elites do not want to lose their political influence and economic rents, they tend to rally behind the leader and allow them much greater access to resources in times of war as means of preserving the *status quo*. Because regime elites tend to be the greatest check on a leader's power, the leader is likely to take advantage of the situation and try to further institutionalise powers granted during wartime conditions. Once the conflict is over, the opposition will find it much harder to return to their previous bargaining dynamic within the ruling coalition.

There are a number of innovations Gibler's (2010) theory offers to current ReSIT theories. As part of his main contribution, he develops the notion of salient threats, distinguishing between standard militarised disputes and territorial conflicts, and argues that the latter is more likely to result in the rally effect among the political opposition. Building upon previous theories of international conflict (Vasquez, 1995, 2004; Senese and Vasquez, 2003; 2008), Gibler (2007; 2010) Gibler argues that territorial disputes tend to be more threatening than other types of conflict, even in the absence of mass casualties. After all, land is critical to a nation's identity, security and prosperity (Gibler, 2007: 510). In fact, as Gibler (2012: Ch.5) demonstrates, dispute involvement predicts an increase of over 10,000 troops in states targeted by territorial claims, while no similar effect was observed in states involved in other types of disputes with their neighbours. Additionally, as Gibler points out, research suggests that border disputes have the propensity to result in a higher log of casualties than those resulting from other forms of disputes (Senese and Vasquez, 2003) and are less likely to be settled without resorting to violence (Gibler, 2010: 521; Vasquez, 1995). Because of their high salience, territorial disputes result in greater efforts to demonise the rival state and mobilise the general public and the elite to work with, not against, the current regime. This in

turn makes it more difficult for the opposition to voice nonconformist attitudes, lowering the position of the adversaries within the state (Gibler, 2010: 521).

However, it is important to note that for territorial disputes to have the centralising effect on autocratic regimes, the states involved in the dispute must be contiguous. Territorial threats made by an overseas or non-neighbouring state are not only rare, but also less likely to incite the same degree of national anxiety and domestic centralisation (Gibler, 2012). This is consistent with the realist literature reviewed in Chapter 2, which claimed that international conflict happens predominantly between contiguous states. This contribution to ReSIT studies is of particular importance, given that many previous works which did not make a distinction between types of disputes found little or no evidence to support reversed second image hypotheses (Crescenzi and Enterline, 1999; Mousseau and Shi, 1999, James *et al.*, 1999). In addition, Gibler and Miller (2014) recently suggested a further extension of the theory, demonstrating that territorial conflict is likely to result in much higher state capacity, effectively increasing the oppressive powers of the regime, and reducing the likelihood of intrastate conflict.

While the theory provides an original and important contribution to the field of IR, it has a number of limitations, which stem from its engagement with DPT. The first of these, addressed below, is that even though, for the first time, the theory distinguishes between democratic and autocratic responses to territorial disputes, it is limited by its state-centric approach. As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is key to engage with Comparative Politics literature on regime change studies when a theory is attempting to explain changes in domestic structures of states. Second, while Gibler's (2010) argument focuses on the interaction between the ruler and his opposition, it does not engage with the extensive Comparative Politics literature on the bargaining dynamic within authoritarian regimes. This is understandable, as Gibler's (2010) theory is meant to apply to both democratic and autocratic states. Nevertheless, to achieve its full explanatory potential, it is necessary to devote more attention to the bargaining dynamic specific to authoritarian regimes, especially the processes that might lead to the incumbent consolidating their power

within the polity vis-à-vis the elites. For this reason, this thesis will focus on authoritarian regimes only. This is because concentrating on a single type of polity makes for a more in-depth analysis, allowing for disaggregating authoritarian regimes into sub-categories and testing how different forms of autocracies (e.g. military, monarchic or party based regimes) might respond to various forms of salient threats. By developing a theoretical framework for how different forms autocracies might respond to territorial disputes, the thesis will hopefully demonstrate that the inconclusive results of previous ReSIT studies have been a result of making a false assumption that all autocracies operate in the same manner purely by virtue of being non-democratic. Disaggregating despotic regimes into sub-categories will add theoretical depth not only to ReSIT, but also other mainstream approaches like democratic peace theory, paving the way to improved standards of regime analysis. Moreover, focusing only on authoritarian states allows for a better test of the theory, since non-democracies have a greater potential for institutional change. The mechanisms which facilitate centralisation are already present. Namely, the government is likely already controlling a much larger portion of material and political resources than elites in other regimes. Whereas all leaders seek to expand their power (Gibler 2010; Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, 2003), dictators are likely to face less disincentives in extending their influence than democratic rulers.

In summary, Gibler's (2010) arguments build upon the previous body of ReSIT literature, focusing specifically on the effects of salient conflict on the power dynamic between ruling elites. Furthermore, Gibler's innovations has is made ReSIT more specific and testable by focusing on territorial disputes, which tend to be more threatening than standard interstate conflicts (Gibler, 2007; Gibler and Tir, 2010, 2013). Nevertheless, as stated above, the theory lacks interdisciplinary focus and theoretical depth. This thesis will develop Gibler's (2010) theory to explore new ways of testing it propositions.

The importance of distinguishing between autocratic *spells* and autocratic *regimes*

Unlike the IR scholarship, Comparative Politics literature makes a crucial distinction between regime instability and democratisation, acknowledging that even if an autocratic regime fails, it does not necessarily mean it will democratise. Hence, the Comparative Politics literature makes a key distinction between autocratic *spells* and autocratic *regimes*. Autocratic spell, congenial with the standard IR definition of autocratic states, refers to the total number of years a given regime, or a succession of autocratic regimes, has ruled in a particular country without interruption. In the IR literature, with the exception of state failure or foreign invasion, autocratic spells end exclusively in democratisation. In comparative authoritarianism studies, on the other hand, autocratic regimes are often defined as a set of un-democratic rules for choosing leaders and policies in a given period of time in a particular state, rather than periods of undemocratic rule (Geddes *et al.*, 2014). When autocratic regimes end, they can end in democratisation, but they are even more likely to simply transition into another form of autocracy (Wright *et al.*, 2015). This means that an autocratic spells can contain a number of successive autocratic regimes within it. This distinction between autocratic regimes and autocratic spells is particularly pertinent to ReSIT, given that the theory assumes that disputes make autocracies more stable, focusing only on the rate or the likelihood of democratisation limits the scope of analysis. For example, if one is only looking at autocratic spells, the period of autocracy in Sierra Leone between 1971 and 2007 might appear relatively stable, with 37 years of uninterrupted authoritarian rule. However, a closer look at the durability of particular regimes reveals a different image: within this period, Sierra Leone transitioned 6 times into 7 different types of autocracy, with the average duration of each regime lasting just over 5 years.¹⁰ If an autocracy is meant to become more stable as a result of territorial conflict, one would expect that it would also be more resilient to internal coups and elite turnovers. However, the

¹⁰ Source: *Autocracies of the World* dataset, Magaloni *et al.* (2013)

situation in Sierra Leone reveals that durable autocratic spells do not necessarily reflect regime stability and autocratic resilience.

Following the discussion above, it is one of the main theoretical contributions of this thesis that assumptions put forward by ReSIT, especially in reference to autocratic states (Gibler, 2007, 2010), are applicable to autocratic regimes. In fact, if the theory is correct, not only should autocratic regimes be less likely to democratise – they should also be less likely to transition into any other form of regime. In summary, any form of regime transition should be less likely under the conditions of salient international threat. Furthermore, as will be outlined in the sections below, this proposition is also supported by some of the most recent literature on autocratic regime stability. Furthermore, it is crucial to note that the literature on the survival of a singular leader and the survival of a regime overlaps, and similar factors often cause each to be overthrown (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). For example, when a leader is overthrown, a democratic or autocratic regime change is likely to happen, but at times the internal opposition might simply replace the ruler with an alternative and the regime will continue uninterrupted (Geddes *et al.*, 2014). Hence, while leadership changes often end in regime change, the ousting of a leader can happen without it. Therefore, it is important to not only review the mechanism that causes territorial threats to centralise the power of the leader, but also some evidence which suggests that territorial disputes affect three other factors crucial to regime survival: elite loyalty, mass support, and a weak and fractured opposition (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a).

The section below will first briefly review the Comparative Politics literature on this subject, and then demonstrate that the main propositions put forward by ReSIT clearly overlap with some of the most recent theories in Comparative Politics on autocratic leader and regime survival.

**Comparative Politics literature on the stability of autocratic regimes:
The ruler-elite interaction**

Despite common misconceptions about authoritarian regimes inherent in the field of IR, autocracies are rarely controlled by a single individual with an unlimited cap on power. In fact, upon establishing their rule, leaders tend to rely on the support of the elites, who, 'jointly with the dictator, hold enough power to be both necessary and sufficient for survival' (Svolik, 2009). An incumbent's authority is, therefore, always delegated to a certain extent. Leaders must maintain stable support from the elites, or risk facing a rebellion, which could result in the incumbent being immediately ousted from power (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Magaloni, 2008). Given that the majority of regimes are 'overthrown by the government insiders such as other government members or members of the military or the security forces' in what is commonly known as a *coup d'état* (Geddes, 2003; Haber, 2006; Svolik, 2009: 478), leaders have strong incentives to prevent elite dissatisfaction. Hence, maintaining elite loyalty is one of the most important elements in prolonging the rule of a given regime. Leaders and ruling cliques have two major instruments available to them to mobilize elites in their favour and maintain elite loyalty: they can either make policy concessions, or distribute rents (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006: 2). In the first scenario, leaders might either make sizeable compromises on crucial policy issues, or commit to power-sharing by allowing the elites to stake out high-level positions, such as in the security forces or in key decision-making bodies (Boix and Svolik, 2013). Additionally, they might be encouraged to become members of a unifying institution, such as a party or the military, to allow them to bargain collectively, rather than individually (Geddes, 2003; Magaloni, 2008). In the second scenario, the leaders might distribute resources in the form of rents to maintain continuous loyalty from their supporters (Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, 2003). The second scenario will be discussed later in the chapter.

Assuming that ruling cliques and leaders are self-interested power maximisers, they will always try to acquire more power at the expense of the ruling coalition (Svolik, 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). This tension between the leader and the elites is the 'central problem of authoritarian governance' (Svolik, 2009: 480). As described by Svolik (2009: 480-482). When power is first delegated to the leader, they emerge as the 'first among equals', their powers checked by the ruling coalition. However, with time, the leader might attempt to increase her power vis-à-vis the elites. Equally, the elites might be concerned that the ruler will divert the economic or military resources away from them, and use it to strengthen the leader's position and violate the initial power-sharing agreement. Once the leader accumulates enough power and weakens the elites to the point that the threat of a coup is no longer credible, the leader can enjoy an undivided, and unchecked, rule. Although the elites can follow a similar path and try to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the ruler, certain qualities of authoritarian regimes make this move rather unlikely. Namely, the executive bodies are usually controlled by the leader, placing them in a more advantageous position for power-grabbing.

In the case that a coup staged by the internal opposition is unsuccessful, its organisers are likely to face imprisonment or death, making it a very costly operation. For this reason, elites are extremely unlikely to stage a coup when the power-sharing agreement is not directly violated. Similarly, if the elites are too weak and disorganised to conduct a successful plot, they will most likely prefer to stay at the mercy of the leader instead of organising a rebellion.

In summary, the credibility of a threat of rebellion depends largely on the strength of the elites relative to the leader. If the internal opposition is weak, the leader can comfortably increase their power, making any potential coup even less likely to succeed. On the other hand, if it is the leader who is weak, a smaller proportion of allies are required to stage an effective plot (Boix and Svolik, 2013). The next section of the chapter will put forward the original claim of this thesis that

territorial dispute involvement has a strong influence on the leader – elite interaction within autocratic regimes, weakening the bargaining position of the elites, and strengthening the position of the leader, as originally suggested by Gibler (2010). This, in turn, increases the stability and longevity of autocratic regimes.

Territorial disputes and the ruler-elite interaction in autocratic regimes

Having outlined the importance of the ruler – elite interaction for the centralisation of power within authoritarian regimes, the chapter will now apply Gibler's (2010) framework to further evaluate how the credibility of rebellion threat might be influenced by territorial dispute involvement. It is argued that the rally effects of territorial dispute involvement leads to fractionalisation of opposition groups within the ruling coalition, making it more difficult for potential plotters to organise. Furthermore, the large presence of army troops as a result of territorial conflict allows the leader to conduct purges in the name of increasing state security, and to eliminate potential opposition more easily. Moreover, the section will argue that economic hardship as a result of war efforts, coupled with fractionalised opposition, makes it easier for the leader to redirect the resources away from the elites. All of the factors above contribute to smaller checks on the incumbent's power, which are unlikely to return to their normal level immediately after the conflict has been resolved.

As outlined previously in this chapter, the presence of salient threats is likely to result in a 'rally effect', meaning that previously polarized opposition groups within the ruling elites will either begin to support the leader, or temporarily suspend their plotting activities for the duration of that threat. According to Gibler (2010) and Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (2003), any foreign intervention will seem far less desirable than the current *status quo*. In line with empirical research on decision-making under conditions of potential risk, individuals tend to greatly exaggerate the chances of catastrophic outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1978; Levy, 1998). Even if the likelihood of foreign invasion as a result of territorial conflict is relatively

small, the elites are likely to perceive them as real. Given that potential invaders are hostile towards the incumbent regime, they are also likely to actively purge the newly acquired territories from the leader's supporters – the current elites. The prospect of losing one's position, freedom, or life as a result of conflict provides additional incentives for the elites to make all the efforts necessary to allow the leader to solve or win the dispute. Because state survival is treated as a priority, nonconformist attitudes and actions are less likely to be tolerated (Gibler, 2010). Any efforts to co-opt the elites against the incumbent are likely to be subsequently compromised. The tension within elite groups is likely to be heightened as a result of splits, with some former opposition members deciding to side with the regime. Due to a lack of transparency and a high level of secrecy within authoritarian regimes, especially among opposition groups, this change of preferences is unlikely to be visible to potential coup plotters. As a result, the chances of mistakenly co-opting government informants increase significantly. Organising a successful rebellion becomes much more costly, and elites are likely to abandon their anti-regime activities until the threat has passed.

The mechanism outlined above make it easier for the incumbent to 'divide and conquer' the opposition within regime elites. The more fragmented and disorganised a leader's opponents, the less likely they are to credibly threaten them with a successful rebellion. Knowing this, the incumbent is likely to capitalise on their short gained power and institutionalise their newly acquired position (Gibler, 2010). Once the conflict is over, and the elites are significantly weakened, the leader is unlikely to voluntarily decrease their standing and restore the previous balance of power. Hence, territorial dispute involvement makes autocratic regimes more centralised and, as a result, less likely to be overthrown by in favour of any other regime. Correspondingly, the absence of territorial disputes and a stable security environment reduces the need for a unified national and political front. In the long-term, in an absence of salient threats, the opposition might proceed to question the *raison d'être* of centralized political power and as a result attempt to

slowly increase their bargaining position. If the opposition is successful, and given that other necessary conditions are satisfied, these changes might lead to a process of challenging the incumbent. Although the absence of exogenous threats cannot be seen as a guarantee of power decentralisation, it might be a factor that significantly increases the likelihood of its occurrence (Thompson, 1996). Therefore, one of the primary hypotheses of this thesis is that involvement in territorial disputes makes autocratic regimes more stable. This hypothesis will be empirically tested in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

Nevertheless, although territorial disputes are typically thought to have a similar impact on all types of autocratic regimes within the ReSIT literature, this assumption is likely to be informed by an overly reductionist approach to the study of autocracies. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the wider IR literature often presupposes that all autocracies operate in the same manner purely by virtue of being non-democratic. However, one of the most important findings of the comparative authoritarianism research in recent years is the fact that structural features of autocratic regimes have a significant impact on their stability and longevity (Geddes, 2003; Magaloni, 2008; Wright *et al.*, 2015). Therefore, the second crucial theoretical contribution of this thesis is the application of the Comparative Politics literature to the ReSIT framework outlined above. The relevant literature and theoretical assumptions will be discussed below. However, before moving on to discussing in detail how territorial disputes might affect stability in each autocratic regime type, it is worth briefly considering a number of other potential threats to autocratic regime longevity commonly discussed in the literature, and how they might be affected by the presence of territorial threats.

Additional factors increasing stability of autocratic regimes

While territorial disputes are likely to change the nature of the leader-elite interaction in a regime in favour of the ruler, there are a number of other ways in which territorial disputes contribute to regime stability. Autocratic stability is enhanced by territorial conflicts in three ways: by increasing elite loyalty in the regime, by keeping the external opposition to the regime weak, and by increasing popular support for the regime. The text below will first briefly outline the importance of these three elements, before the thesis addresses how territorial disputes might affect them in later sections.

Elite loyalty

As commonly discussed in the literature and as mentioned above, elite loyalty is one of the most important factors in guaranteeing regime survival. In order for the ruling clique to survive in power, they need to maintain elite loyalty. In essence, the more loyal the elites, the less likely they are to organise a coup. Apart from keeping the ruler in power, autocratic elites additionally perform a range of functions that guarantee the survival of the regime: they might mobilise public support in favour of the regime, intimidate political opposition, or perform important security roles within the regime (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a: 57-58; Magaloni, 2008; Brownlee, 2007). As Frantz and Ezrow (2011a) point out, the decision to support the regime is a cost-benefit calculation: if the benefits of supporting the regime (economic rents, political career, policy influence) outweigh the costs, then the elites are likely to remain loyal and continue providing their support to the regime. Elites are likely to defect from the regime if the economic rents are not satisfactory, and if the regime opposition presents a challenge so significant that the likelihood of regime failure or democratisation seems imminent (Ibid.). If the elites are dissatisfied, they are likely to defect to the opposition, increasing its strength and the possibility of a successful coup or other form of power turnover.

Weak external opposition

Another factor contributing to long-lasting and stable autocratic regimes is a weak and fractured external regime opposition. Its weakness relative to the regime is crucial, mainly because the opposition poses a major threat to the elites currently in power. A strong opposition can co-opt crucial members of the ruling elite, organise public rallies against the government, and mobilize the public to vote for opposition parties where elections are a key part of the regime structure (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a: 56). The greater the influence of the opposition on the public, the more likely the regime is to collapse. A good example of a capable opposition movement mobilising civil society against the regime and co-opting the elites are the Arab Spring protests in Egypt where the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood group and their allies ultimately led to a substantive regime change and the overthrowing of Hosni Mubarak (Nepstad, 2011).

Public support for the regime

In terms of public support, most political scientists agree that autocratic leaders rely on popular support from their citizens at least to some extent (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). The absence of public support makes ruling elites susceptible to mass protests, and strengthens the opposition who are likely to take advantage of the anti-establishment mood in the regime. In order to maintain public support, leaders usually distribute public and private goods to the population. As a result, one of the largest threats to public support for the dictatorship are financial crises and economic downturns. If regimes are no longer able to redistribute private and public goods, they might either lose the support of the population, resort to repression, or rely on legitimization strategies in order to maintain support (Gerschewski, 2013).

The effects of territorial threats on elite loyalty, opposition strength and popular support within autocracies

As mentioned previously, territorial threats are likely to have impact on elite loyalty, opposition strength and mass support for the regime. Hence, it is crucial to outline the main mechanism that allows it to happen. While there are a number of factors that can influence the above, the elements most relevant to the theoretical premises of this thesis include access to rents, control of the security apparatus, and the presence of a unifying ideology. They are briefly described below, followed by the analysis of how the effects of territorial disputes on regime stability might be affected by them.

Access to rents

Access to rents is particularly important to the survival of autocratic regimes. As Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (2003) point out, private goods provision is one of the most important factors allowing rulers to maintain the loyalty of the elites. Through supporting the regime, elites have access to a number of financial benefits typically unavailable to the opposition or the general public – these include tax relief, direct money transfers, bribery, investment opportunities, or economic policy influence. If the government is unable to continue private goods transfers to their elites, or the opposition is strong enough to provide such transfers themselves, elite members might begin to defect because the costs of supporting the regime are no longer outweighed by financial benefits.

Additionally, public and private goods provision also significantly contributes to the mass support for the regime. For example, in order to maintain government popularity and prevent mass unrest in face of the Arab Spring protests, Bahrain offered one-off hand-outs to its citizens in the form of \$2,500 per family, while

Kuwait offered up to \$4,000 per family (The Economist, 2011). More often, regimes provide incentives in the form of public goods, through services such as healthcare, childcare, or education (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011: 56). As a result, one of the largest threats to public support for the dictatorship are financial crises and economic downturns. If regimes are no longer able to redistribute private and public goods, they might lose the support of the population. This is an important factor to bear in mind when discussing the impact of military disputes on regime stability. After all, presence of a territorial dispute might lead the regime to increase its spending on the military and divert resources away from public goods provision. Similarly, territorial conflicts that lead to war might put such a strain on financial stability of the regime that even rents to the elites could be temporarily withheld. Hence, serious economic crises caused by war can have a devastating effects on regime stability.

On one hand, Gibler (2010) argues that war effort should make it easier for political rulers to centralise control over resources and justify tax increases and resource extraction on the basis of grave national emergency. On the other hand, interstate conflict is likely to make resource extraction more difficult for the regime. This is likely because losing control over some part of the country's territory is likely to influence the regime's ability to collect taxes. For example, while China planned to centralise resources and fund its war effort in the Third Sino-Japanese War through increased tax collection, the indiscriminate Japanese bombing of Chinese territory made extraction too difficult to carry out (Zielinski, 2016: 19). Hence, the problems caused by military conflict might have little to do with the opposition from the taxpayers. Instead, they are likely to be complicated by damaged infrastructure and logistic difficulties. In addition to the above, it is also important to consider that war-making might result in financial crisis due to extensive and prolonged war expenditure, as well as additional destruction of the country's *economic* infrastructure.

Despite the argument above, the risk of financial crisis as a result of territorial conflict increases only if the dispute escalates to a full-scale, prolonged military confrontation. While territorial disputes do indeed run a high risk of escalating to war, a vast majority of them never do (Gibler, 2012). Hence, in most cases, the process of resource extraction might actually be easier, because of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect discussed earlier. It is likely that in the presence of direct threats to territorial integrity of the country, the public and the elites will be more likely to allow the regime to centralise control over the economy for the benefit of national security. Hence, increases in taxation are more likely to be tolerated by the public, leading to more resources being controlled by the government. Similarly, much of the current literature suggests that greater military spending in face of external threats might actually increase economic growth: this is because military expenditure leads to the development of new infrastructure and provides a more secure climate for future investment in the country (see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Shieh *et al.* (2002), and Yildirim and Öcal (2016)). Hence, this thesis assumes that territorial disputes will not pose any significant danger to the regime’s ability to buy support from the elites and the public. This is because the thesis investigates the effects of territorial disputes rather than rare instances of interstate war.

Control of the security apparatus

The control of the security service, military and police is crucial for the regime to contain the external opposition to the regime and prevent public unrest. During a period of territorial conflict, it is likely that rulers will proceed with increased spending on the military, and enact greater degree of central control over the security apparatus within the country. For example, increased spending on military and police forces can help increase harassment and prosecution of the opposition members, while being justified on national security grounds. A similar situation

took place in the People's Republic of Poland in 1981. Faced with the threat of a military intervention by the USSR, the leader of the Polish Communist Party Wojciech Jaruzelski introduced martial law, justifying it as the only effective means to prevent Russian invasion; this ensured that the opposition members were contained, and no public demonstrations were allowed to take place between 1981 and 1983 (Mastny, 1999). The greater the penetration of the society by the military and security services, the easier it is to eliminate potential opposition and prevent anti-regime plots. Hence, it is assumed that territorial threats lead to the strengthening of the regime by providing it with a justification to use force against the opposition.

Unifying ideology

Finally, territorial disputes can help regimes maintain ideological unity, and maintain elite and public support for the government. For example, some scholars argue that nationalism can serve a unifying function in many regimes, or amplify the existing ideology within the regime (Baum, 2006). Hence, nationalism can serve a similar function to that performed by ideology (e.g. communism in USSR or China) or religious and dynastic mythologies (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nepal). For example, many colonial states in Africa used nationalism not only in their fight for independence and subsequent state building, but also to justify single party rule and suppress opposition (Kissane, 2014: 11). The 'rally around the flag' effect discussed earlier in the chapter is a case in point: faced with the possibility of loss of territory and foreign invasion, individuals are more susceptible to idealise the historical and cultural heritage of their nation. Since regime elites are often seen as symbols of the state, any anti-government and anti-regime action is likely to result in accusation of treason. Actions which can be justified by preservation of territorial and cultural integrity of the nation will often be met with support from the general population and the elites. This includes aforementioned collection of taxes, anti-

opposition activities, and banning public demonstrations and protests. An example of ideology where nationalism is a major contributor to the sustenance and legitimation of the regime is North Korea. Since 1950s, the Juche ideology of self-reliance in the communist single-party regime has been strengthened by nationalism arising from a real or perceived threat from western imperialist power attempting to overthrow the regime. The territorial nature of the dispute between North and South Korea, and the US military interference in the diplomatic efforts since the ceasefire in 1953, has made it easier for the regime to legitimise tight security measures, strict border control, and food rationing (Chen and Lee, 2007). Hence, it is assumed that regimes find it easier to sustain high levels of elite and public support when they are faced with a territorial claim from another country.

Disaggregating autocratic stability

The previous section of this chapter has demonstrated how Gibler's (2010) theory of the relationship between territorial dispute involvement and power centralisation in autocratic spells can be applied to the survival and stability of autocratic regimes. Territorial disputes decrease the bargaining power of the elites, reducing the credibility of the rebellion threat in autocratic regimes. They are also likely to allow the regime to weaken political opposition and maintain stable support from the public due to nationalist sentiment. Nevertheless, comparative authoritarianism literature suggests that certain forms of autocracy are more likely than others to have structural characteristics that result in the regimes being strong even in the absence of territorial disputes. Therefore, it is likely that the relationship between territorial dispute involvement and autocratic survival might not be observed in all types of autocracy. The section below outlines some of the most prominent research in the field, and explains why territorial dispute involvement is likely to have a significant stabilising effect on military and competitive authoritarian regimes, but not on dominant-party regimes or monarchies.

Some of the most influential literature on autocratic survival demonstrates that certain power-sharing agreements make autocratic regimes less centralised. As mentioned above, autocratic leaders might often enter into these power-sharing agreements with the elites in order to demonstrate their commitment to redistribute power and rent to their supporters. In a bid to guarantee elite loyalty, leaders might allow the elites better channels for collective bargaining through membership in a unifying institution such as a political party or the military. While there are many different typologies of autocracies commonly used in the Comparative Politics literature, most studies distinguish between military, monarchic, and party-based autocracies.¹¹ However, the literature rarely makes the distinction between competitive party regimes, which allow genuine, although often unfair, political competition (Magaloni *et al.*, 2013); and dominant, or single-party regimes, where only one political party is allowed to exist within the political arena. Because competitive or multiparty regimes have been shown to be much less stable than single party regimes, this chapter will distinguish between them, and formulate separate theoretical assumptions on their response to territorial dispute involvement. The section below will discuss how regime structures affect the relationship between territorial dispute and regime stability.

Military regimes

As demonstrated by Geddes (2003), military regimes are one of the least stable autocratic regime types. This is because military juntas frequently use the rhetoric of ‘guardianship’ in justifying their rule, presenting it as a critical transitory period that restores order and much needed stability (Loveman, 1994). As it is frequently witnessed in the case of military coups, the army often presents itself as the only institution capable of temporarily restoring order in times of instability. This has often been the case in Turkey, where the military legitimized its violent take-over of

¹¹ Many other typologies exist, and a detailed justification for the use of this particular typology in the thesis can be found in Chapter 4.

power with a constitutionally granted authority to step in if a democratically elected government becomes less democratic, or the regime goes against the principle of secularism outlined in the Ataturk constitution (Jenkins, 2007). Given the fact that military regimes present themselves as interim regimes, every additional year in office makes them more susceptible to the erosion of trust from both the public and the political class (Graf, 1988). This problem is magnified by the fact that unlike elites in all other types of autocracy, military personnel, including the highest ranking members of the junta, are primarily interested in the survival of the military rather than remaining in power (Geddes, 2003). As a result, the military is likely to prefer to step down and relinquish control of the state if they perceive the integrity of the military to be threatened by internal splits or factionalism (Ibid.). In this sense, they are different than other types of autocratic elites, because the end of rule does not necessarily mean the end to one's career. This is because most military elites simply return back to the barracks in the event of a regime failure (Ibid.) In addition to valuing the integrity of the military organisation over other concerns, members of the junta are also socialised to possess a number of other unique preferences. For example, they tend to place very high value on the regime's independence from civilian control, territorial cohesion of the state, internal discipline, hierarchy, and order (Ibid.: 54).

Given that the military is primarily concerned with the survival of the army and the protection of the territorial integrity of the state, territorial disputes are likely to increase the cohesion within military regimes because the involvement of the army in the civilian sphere is likely to increase significantly. While this might be helpful to a number of autocracies if the military is loyal to the regime, only in military regime - where the *regime* and the *military* are practically synonymous – this is expected to always result in stronger rule by the junta. In addition, nationalism might also make it much easier for military regimes to punish any potential defections from the regime on the grounds of treason. This, in turn, is likely to discourage regime elites from defecting to the opposition.

Additionally, the heightened sense of national unity resulting from the perceived threat from outside will likely increase the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the public, strengthening the 'guardianship' rhetoric of military autocracies, and effectively prolonging their lifespan. An example of this in practice is the adoption of nationalist ideology by Soekarno in Indonesia during the period of Japanese and Dutch occupation (Rudolph, 2006: 21). To legitimise his rule, Soekarno defined the Indonesian nationalism against the persistent threat from the colonial powers: by nationalising Dutch businesses, pursuing 'territorial integrity' through annexing Dutch West Papua in 1963, and legitimising his rule against the persistent spectre of neo-colonial imperialism (Winet :17). By adopting the rhetoric of guardianship that was intrinsically linked to the nation's territorial integrity, Indonesian military regime managed to increase its internal legitimacy and ensured regime continuity (Aspinall, 2015). In a similar fashion, other military regimes are also likely to be successful in spreading nationalist ideology that legitimises their rule. As a result, military autocracies are expected to last much longer as a result of territorial dispute involvement.

Monarchic regimes

Unlike military regimes, monarchies are some of the most stable forms of autocracy, with the most unified and loyal elites, and so are unlikely to be strongly affected by territorial disputes. Most monarchies are characterised by a dynastic style of rule where the ruling elites are members of the same family. This means that a vast majority of state security apparatus – including the military apparatus - are directly controlled by the members of the same family, who all have a stake at upholding the power of the current regime (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011: 243). Regimes in which the rule is non-dynastic, on the other hand, tend to be characterised by an extremely centralised system of power, with almost absolute and unchecked power given to the monarch (Ibid.). In both types of monarchies, the threat of rebellion or coup is unlikely to be very credible: in dynastic regimes, a rebellion would involve a

change of leader, rather than a change of regime because all members of a family have strong incentives to maintain the status quo; in non-dynastic regimes, on the other hand, the power is so centralised in the hands of one person that a successful coup is very unlikely. The centralised power means that the government has direct control over most resources, allowing the ruler or the ruling family to 'buy off' any member of the elites tempted to defect to the opposition more easily than in other regimes (Gause III, 1994). Additionally, it is worth noting that most monarchies are currently located in the Middle East – a region particularly rich in natural resources. As a result, most Arab monarchies are also rentier states, able to provide large sums of money to both the elites and the general population, as in the case of Kuwait and Bahrain mentioned in the previous section of this chapter. The number of elites in monarchies also tends to be particularly small (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010) which means that monarchs find it easy to maintain continuous support even in less wealthy regimes which rely on foreign aid or tourism to 'fund' their support (Escribá-Folch and Wright, 2010). Moreover, monarchies are normally characterised by particularly high levels of oppression which ensures that opposition stays weak and fragmented (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). Hence, the penetration of the society by security personnel is already high, making it unlikely that the regime will benefit from additional military involvement in society and state offices.

Finally, the dynastic or religious aspect of many monarchies guarantees strong elite loyalty due to blood ties and the frequent incorporation of historical and religious mythologies into their legitimisation strategies (Schlumberger, 2010). For example, Saudi Arabia has used the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam as a powerful legitimisation tool which portrays the history of the Al-Sa'ud tribe as closely connected to that of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011: 247). This portrayal of ruling dynasties as symbols of ancient glory allows monarchies to maintain support from both the general public and the elites themselves. Coupled with unlimited access to rents and strong family ties among

the elite means that monarchic regimes such as Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are remarkably resilient to external and internal shocks. In fact, the resilience of monarchies is so strong that that they were the only type of autocracies to survive the Arab Spring without a single regime transition (Yom and Gause, 2012; Bank, Richter, and Sunik, 2015).

As a result of the above, it is unlikely that monarchies will be particularly susceptible to a unifying effect of territorial threats. This is not because territorial threats do not affect the elites or the opposition, but rather because the regime elites are already loyal and extremely unlikely to defect to the opposition due to strong family ties. Furthermore, the religious and mythological legitimization strategies along with strong redistributive capabilities mean that the general population is already strongly in favour of the regime.

Single party regimes

Similarly to monarchies, single party regimes also enjoy a great deal of regime stability (Geddes, 2003; Frantz and Ezrow, 2011b). According to the literature, single party regimes in many ways resemble monarchic regimes because of sustained regime loyalty, and the ability to maintain support through the use of unifying. The elite unity is usually guaranteed because the party is usually in control of the wealth within the regime, and serves as the only source of patronage for the elites (Magaloni, 2008). This monopoly on political and economic privileges means that elites typically have very few incentives to defect to the opposition, who is excluded from participating in politics (Brownlee, 2007; Hess, 2013: 3). Although elite numbers are much larger in single party regimes than in monarchies, the party additionally serves as an arbitrator to all internal splits and disputes, ensuring that those who have lost out today will be rewarded in the future by distributing crucial party positions to loyal members of the political class (Brownlee, 2007). The above features mean that factionalism poses significantly less threat to single party

autocracies, and on occasion, can even benefit the regime because institutionalised intra-party bargaining can help identify and address conflict (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). Strong and unified elites, which rarely defect to the opposition, contribute greatly to the strength of the party leaders, allowing them to exert their influence over much longer periods of time than in military or multiparty regimes (Brownlee, 2007). Additionally, the longevity and unity of elites in single-party regimes is guaranteed by the process of power succession which is organised in a way which allows the regime to survive even after the death or abdication of the party leader (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011). The smooth process of power turnover is one of the main reasons for the continuous survival of the single-party regime in China despite the economic and ideological transformation the country has undergone since the 1950s (Zeng, 2014). Finally, the adoption of a unifying ideology such as communism in China or Vietnam can serve as a tool for increasing popular support and elite unity. Hence, single party regimes might not benefit from nationalism to the same extent as military or multiparty regimes. It is possible, however, that foreign threats might enhance the ideology already in place, as it is done in North Korea, where aspects of protectionism, nationalism and communism serve to stabilise a regime if it is struggling economically or undergoing a serious internal crisis of legitimacy. Nevertheless, due to the internal cohesion of most single-party regimes, and the ability to address conflict through intra-party bargaining, involvement in territorial disputes is unlikely to have much effect on the longevity of single party regimes. Similarly to monarchic regimes, elites in single party regimes are already relatively unified and pose very little threat to the leadership. In essence, a single institution in the form of a party makes the power sharing commitment between the ruler and her elites more credible, and a coup less likely (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011b). Hence, like in monarchies, territorial disputes are unlikely to further help centralise power within single-party regimes.

Multiparty regimes

Finally, multiparty regimes, like military regimes, are expected to become more centralised as a result of territorial dispute involvement. As explained earlier, multiparty regimes are a type of autocracy where a ruling party allows opposition to exist in the public sphere, where the opposition can form political parties or participate in elections and the legislature. These types of regimes usually arise when the incumbent elites are weak and unable to maintain political power through media, controlling elections, or maintaining elite unity (Way, 2005: 233). A good example of such regimes were the newly independent former members of the USSR, where the sudden collapse of the Soviet state has deprived the ruling elites of the organisation, training and tools necessary to maintain a high degree of political control; even in the absence of a strong civil society or opposition, the ruling elites in multiparty regimes of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus were not strong enough to contain frequent challenges to their power (*ibid.*). As a result, while politics in multiparty regimes are still biased in favour of the incumbent, the threat from opposition is real, and the ruling elites are often easily removed from power. This was the case in Ukraine, where pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych was ousted in a series of uncoordinated and mainly disorganised protests led by a weak political opposition during the Euromaidan crisis of 2014 (Onuch, 2014). Given the relative weakness of the ruling elites, and the status of the opposition within multiparty regimes, the competition during government elections is unfair, but often real (Magaloni *et al.*, 2013: 8), with electoral fraud often exposed and contested by the public and the opposition. A good example of elections being successfully contested in multiparty regimes is the so-called 'Orange Revolution' in Ukraine, where the perception of vote rigging in 2004 led to widespread protests and the subsequent revote in 2005.

Although definitions vary, the concept of a multiparty regime closely corresponds with 'electoral authoritarianism' (Schedler, 2013), 'competitive authoritarianism' (Levitsky and Way, 2002), or 'semi-democracy' (Knutsen and Nygård, 2015). In

multiparty regimes, like in military regimes, splits among elites are a particularly frequent phenomenon, although for a different reason. Given that regime opposition is institutionalised, it is likely to be significantly stronger than in other forms of autocracy. Like in democracies, governments can change often, and tend to have a very limited grip on power (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). Although elections do not make multiparty regimes more democratic, they do open the political arena to a wide range of actors usually excluded from the political process in other autocracies. This has the potential to weaken the coalition government and strengthen the opposition. Given that multiple parties are allowed to operate, the elites can, and frequently do, change sides. Unlike in other regimes, however, they usually do so openly. For example, many high-profile figures within Venezuela were able to openly criticise and defect from the ruling party due to widespread accusations of corruption and right-wing politics that were holding back the Bolivarian Revolution (Handlin, 2017: 161). All of this makes for fractured and weak government elites, and a capable, if fragmented, opposition. The strong opposition and weak leadership mean that, similarly to military regimes, multiparty autocracies are usually short lived and unstable (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). However, these institutional weaknesses of the regime are also what makes the effect of dispute involvement more pronounced.

While multiparty regimes are naturally unstable and short-lived as a result of their structural design outlined above, territorial conflict has the capacity to centralise power in a way that strengthens the leader and weakens the opposition. For example, if the regimes territorial integrity is threatened, then it is likely that the incumbent will be allowed to go beyond what is typically accepted in order to consolidate their power within the regime. The rally around the flag effect described in previous section will empower the weak ruling elite, and provide a theme that can unify them in face of opposition. If the ruling party takes the opportunity to strengthen their position through nationalist rhetoric, then the fragmented opposition is unlikely to present a strong challenge to the incumbents.

The recent events in Ukraine provide a good example of this mechanism in practice. While Ukraine emerged as a relatively weak and fragmented regime after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the recent annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 had given the elites the scope to extend their power. As the Ukrainian-Russian tensions rose, the Ukrainian elites proceeded with a series of legislation passed behind closed doors; these laws prohibit street protests, criminalize anti-government "slander", and require organizations with foreign funding to register as "foreign agents" (Applebaum, 2014). Since 2016, the ruling clique has established itself even more powerfully in Ukraine, with the presidentialisation of politics, and most major institutions such as law-enforcement agencies, the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government, the electoral commission and the media falling under the direct rule of President Petro Poroshenko (Minakov, 2017). It is clear that the institutional weakness of the Ukrainian multiparty regime was the very feature that allowed it a greater scope for political centralisation since 2014. The ruling elite, finding itself in a newly acquired position of power has the opportunity to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the weak and fragmented opposition. A similar process is expected to take place in other multiparty regimes faced with direct claims to their territorial integrity.

In summary, it is assumed that military and multiparty regimes will become more centralised as a result of territorial dispute involvement than either monarchic or single party regimes. Although many more classifications of autocracy exist in the comparative authoritarianism literature, Chapter 4 will demonstrate that the above classifications provide the greatest methodological advantage for testing the assumptions of this thesis. The hypothesis that certain types of autocracies are more likely to become centralised as a result of territorial dispute involvement will be empirically tested in Chapter 6 of this thesis.

The section below will briefly review additional theoretical literature on regime stability. This is done to ensure that all major explanatory factors have been taken

into account when designing quantitative tests of the assumptions outlined in this chapter. It is important to ensure that the relationship between territorial disputes and regime stability cannot be better explained by other factors, such as economic development or petroleum dependency.

Additional factors affecting autocratic stability

Apart from regime type, a number of other factors that affect regime stability have been identified by the comparative authoritarianism literature. These include wealth, economic reliance on petroleum revenues, and societal divisions within the country. The section below will briefly review how these factors are likely to contribute to the stability and longevity of autocratic regimes.

As mentioned throughout this chapter, access to rents plays a crucial role in the ability of the ruler to buy the support of the key elites in the country (Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, 2003). Overall, the literature on the impact of wealth on the leader-elite interaction suggests that higher levels of economic prosperity increase the stability of autocracies, and makes them less likely to transition. As previously mentioned, Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (2003) proposed that the level of economic development is likely to reflect the amount of financial resources available to the leadership that would help 'buy' the loyalty of the elites and silence the opposition. Furthermore, high GDP levels are likely to legitimise the regime in the eyes of the public, which is unlikely to oppose a government that promotes the wealth of its citizens (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). Finally, extremely low levels of GDP per capita are a likely indicator of a financial crisis, a well-known factor increasing the likelihood of regime change (Gasiorowski, 1995). Hence, it is expected that high levels of wealth are likely to reduce the likelihood of autocratic regime failure.

Moreover, rents might be more accessible to elites if they are obtained from resources that do not require additional taxes being imposed on the general population and regime elites. Being able to redistribute public and private goods

without the need to disenfranchise the tax-payer is of great advantage to autocratic rulers. While autocracies can obtain non-tax revenues in a variety of different ways, by obtaining greater levels of foreign aid (Ethiopia), monopolising access to private sector finance (Taiwan) or receiving contributions from proxy-owned private sector businesses (Russia) (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 10-11), the vast majority of literature focuses on the importance of petroleum extraction for the stability of authoritarian regimes (Ulfelder, 2007; Ross, 2012; Wright *et al.*, 2015). As Wright and colleagues (2015: 289) point out, revenues drawn from petroleum production allows the leaders to protect themselves from a potential coup or rebellion by providing extensive benefits to their citizens, supporters and even opposition. An example of this can be easily observed in oil-rich Gulf States where, in the wake of the Arab Spring protests, Bahrain's ruling family distributed as much as 2,650 US dollars to every Bahraini family in order to stop dissent (Al Jazeera, 2011). Although some studies question the finding that oil-rich regimes are more stable (Lucas and Richter, 2016), the bulk of empirical research generates strong support for the oil-autocratic stability nexus (Ulfelder, 2007; Andersen and Ross, 2014; Wright *et al.*, 2015). Hence, it is expected that autocracies that rely on petroleum for a large portion of their income will be more stable.

Finally, many researchers suggest that societal divisions have a destabilising effect on both autocratic and democratic regimes. For example, ethnically and religiously diverse countries are thought to be at a higher risk of internal conflict due to ethnic nationalism or religious intolerance (Ignatieff, 1993; Huntington, 1996), produce political institutions that are of much poorer quality (Alesina *et al.*, 2003), and lower state capacity (Gibler and Miller, 2014). Hence, following other Comparative Politics studies (e.g. Escribá-Folch and Wright, 2010), this thesis will assume that ethnic and religious fractionalisation increases the likelihood of autocratic regime failure.

Having discussed how territorial dispute involvement might impact the durability of autocratic regimes in the context of a much wider literature on autocratic stability, this chapter will now explain how territorial threats might affect democratisation in authoritarian regimes. Most importantly, the section below will demonstrate that

research on democratic transitions cannot be conducted in isolation from the extensive Comparative Politics literature on the determinants of democratic transitions. The focus of the section below will thus be on the importance of accounting for autocratic regime type when discussing the relationship between territorial disputes and democratisation. The discussion on the methodological contributions of this thesis to the study of democratisation from an IR perspective will be discussed further in Chapter 4.¹²

Territorial dispute involvement and democratisation

As discussed earlier in this thesis, one of the most important contributions of ReSIT to the current IR literature is the suggestion that external threats, and recent territorial disputes, are likely to result in a lower likelihood of democratisation. While the section above demonstrated that the theory can be successfully applied to autocratic regime survival, this part of the chapter will explore the theoretical contribution of this thesis in relation to the study of ReSIT and democratisation, as well as how this contribution can be understood in the context of current democratisation research. Most importantly, this chapter will demonstrate the importance of accounting for the structural features of autocratic regimes when explaining democratisation. In this regard, this thesis aims to improve the standard of research on regimes change by incorporating the most recent theoretical developments from Comparative Politics research. The theoretical assumptions outlined in the section below will be tested in Chapter 7.

Previous sections of this chapter have demonstrated that ReSIT can be applied to the study of autocratic survival as well as democratisation. However, the original formulation of the theory stated that power centralisation, which follows dispute involvement, will make the transition to democracy less probable. Just as the

¹² The main methodological contribution to ReSIT in relation to democratisation is the use of dichotomous rather than continuous measures of democratic transition.

autocratic opposition within a regime is likely to become more divided, so should the civil society opposition and interest groups pushing for liberalisation. Naturally, if the regime is centralised and strong, it is not only less likely to transition, but also less likely to transition to a highly decentralised regime form, such as a democracy.

Moreover, territorial disputes will also make democratisation the least favourable option if regime change is to occur at all. As many scholars have previously suggested, this is because democracy is often associated with a weak executive and a slow decision making process. These are two factors that make it appear as highly disadvantageous if the regime is involved in a highly threatening territorial dispute. The system of checks and balances, as well as the need for public support when deciding on war participation, makes democracies less likely to react to threats in a timely fashion and therefore less likely to emerge victorious in war (Levy, 1988; Russett, 1993: 38-39; Rosato, 2003: 587). The long reaction time inherent in democratic decision-making processes makes them appear 'unfit' for war (Levy, 1988: 659-60). While little empirical support for these claims exist in the academic research (Desch, 2008; Bausch, 2015), the perception of democratic systems as weak and incapacitated has often appeared as a theme in the discussion of war and regime type (de Tocqueville, 1975: 234-235; Morgenthau, 1967: 241; Kennan, 1977: 3-4, all cited in Levy, 1988). Therefore, it is not only expected that territorial disputes will increase autocratic stability, but that they will also hinder the process of democratisation in autocratic regimes. This proposition will be tested in Chapter 7.

However, as with autocratic stability, there is a host of other crucial factors that might affect the chances of democratisation within autocratic regimes. While some of them have been incorporated into previous ReSIT research, others, like autocratic regime type, have not. An additional theoretical contribution of this thesis is the claim that democratisation as a result of territorial dispute might depend on the structural features of autocracy. Due to time and space limitations, only general expectations will be outlined below, and a further study of the moderating effects of regime type will be needed in the future. Nevertheless, to the

best of my knowledge, no study to date has disaggregated authoritarian regimes when testing the propositions of ReSIT. Hence, the analysis in Chapter 7 provides a genuine contribution to the field.

Disaggregating democratisation

As mentioned previously, in the past two decades the Comparative Politics literature made extraordinary progress in relation to our understanding of how autocratic regimes operate, and the processes involved in democratisation. While the section on autocratic survival made explicit assumptions about how each autocratic regime will respond to democratisation, the same set of assumptions will apply to democratisation. It is expected that regimes most likely to transition to democracy will also be most likely to be affected by territorial disputes. This is because the highest occurrence of democratisation occurs in regimes whose power structures are relatively decentralised, and leaders rarely enjoy a firm grip on power.

For example, in military regimes, power is often distributed among members of the junta, and leaders and elites are rarely preoccupied with power-grabbing, given that the survival of the army is often valued more than political influence. Hence, military regimes are thought to be one of the most likely regime types to leave power via negotiated settlement that results in democracy (Geddes, 2003, 2007). However, as mentioned previously, military rulers are also very unlikely to step down if they perceive a threat to the territorial integrity of the state. While leaders might refrain from centralising power for personal reasons, they might do so for national security reasons. As mentioned before, territorial integrity of the state is, after the institution of the military itself, one of the most important motivations for the junta. Therefore, while military regimes are likely to democratise in times of peace, they will be unlikely to democratise under conditions of territorial threats.

Similarly to military regimes, multiparty regimes are also considered to be more likely to transition into a democratic system. In fact, the majority of transitions from competitive autocracies to another form of regime have resulted in democratisation (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007: 152). This is because the addition of limited competition introduced by the incumbents can, and often does, lead to a more substantial positive change in the long run (Howard and Roessler, 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Donno, 2013). Hence, power is relatively decentralised because the opposition is much stronger and more organized than in other types of autocracies. While not entirely free from persecution and harassment, it is nonetheless allowed to operate in the open. Given how decentralized the relations between the rulers and the opposition are in multiparty regimes, it is not surprising that they are much more likely to democratise. However, this decentralization gives the leaders more scope to strengthen their position in the face of territorial disputes. Like in military regimes, the relatively decentralised and pluralistic distribution of power puts the leader in a position to increase their influence. Overall, the effects of territorial dispute involvement on democratic transitions are expected to be more pronounced in military and multiparty regimes.

On the other hand, no such regularity is expected to occur in single-party regimes and monarchies. As mentioned previously, both types of regime are usually highly centralised, and tend to be followed by another form of autocracy (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). Hence, given that the likelihood of democratisation is already extremely low, it is possible that single-party and monarchic regimes might be less affected by territorial disputes than military and multiparty regimes. This is not to say that they will not be affected at all. What this simply suggests is that their response will be much less pronounced than that of military and multiparty regimes.

Other factors affecting democratic transitions

Having discussed how each autocratic type might respond to territorial disputes, it is important to consider a number of additional factors important to the study of democratisation. Two of them are usually cited as particularly important: economic development and reliance on petroleum revenues. Unfortunately, due to time and space constraints, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to paint a full picture of the debate and the links between economic prosperity and democratization. Given the wealth of research within the area, and the strong empirical link between wealth and democracy, the influence of wealth on democratization will be accounted for in Chapter 7. However, for theoretical reasons, wealth will be expected to have no real impact on the chances of democratisation. This is because while the classical version of Modernisation theory assumes that higher levels of economic development make democratisation more likely due to various societal changes within the country,¹³ the theory is at odds with the assumptions made earlier about the stabilising effects of wealth on autocratic regimes. Given that wealth is expected to make autocracy more stable, it is highly unlikely that the same factor is likely to make democratisation more likely at the same time. In essence, wealth increases the stability of all types of regimes – autocratic *and* democratic. Fortunately, Przeworski and colleagues (2000) provide a convincing account of how the relationship between wealth and democracy can be reconciled with the relationship between wealth and autocratic survival. Their empirical work demonstrates that while wealth does not lead to democratisation, it might help young democracies survive, explaining the association between democracy and wealth observed in so many empirical studies (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997).

¹³ For example, economic development is said to lead to a higher rate of urbanisation, better standard of education, the development of the middle class and an increased rate of political participation. The newly transformed society can eventually no longer be supported by centrally governed structures, leading to a collapse of dictatorial regimes and the development of democracy (Lipset, 1959; Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, 1992). Simply put, the better-off the citizens, the less likely they are to tolerate oppressive regimes (Epstein *et al.*, 2006).

Additionally, the impact of petroleum revenues will also be controlled for in Chapters 6 and 7, with the expectation that oil-dependent autocracies will be less likely to democratise. In the past, many scholars theorised that the rents produced by petroleum extraction would slow down or even stop the process of democratisation altogether (Ross, 2001). While the empirical research on the links between oil dependency, regime stability and democratisation often overlaps (see for example Ross, 2012), the premise guiding the relationship between oil dependency and democratisation is somewhat different from the one guiding the relationship between oil dependency and regime stability. For example, while petroleum revenues are expected to strengthen the position of autocratic leaders by allowing them to 'buy off' the opposition, there is a separate mechanism involved in the oil-democracy relationship. More specifically, it is often claimed that when regimes depend on oil revenues rather than taxation for their income, they will be less likely to respond to the demands for greater representation from their citizens. If the government imposes taxes on assets that are mobile, citizens will often choose to hide them or move them abroad. Hence, if leaders want to keep extracting taxes from their population, they need to commit to protecting their interests by creating representative institutions that help the citizens hold the leader to account (North and Weingast, 1989). However, when states are rich in natural resources such as petroleum, they rarely need to enter into such agreement with the population, generating enough income from the extraction itself (Ross, 2001). Without the possibility of withdrawing their financial support for the regime, the citizens lose important political leverage vis-à-vis the ruling class (Herb, 2005; Ross, 2011). In summary, the presence of oil is likely to result in lower chances of democratisation (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Wiens, Poast and Clark, 2011; and Ross, 2012).

Finally some scholars have speculated that societal divisions in the form of ethnic and religious fractionalisation might make democratisation less likely. As mentioned previously, ethnic and religious fractionalisation are likely to lead to less stable

autocratic regimes. However, some scholars additionally propose links between ethnic and religious fractionalisation and democratic transitions (Horowitz, 1985; Dahl, 1989). Despite these claims, ethnic and religious fractionalisation is not expected to make democratisation less likely. This is because most of the theoretical claims put forward by scholars relate to factors making regimes less stable and therefore more likely to fail generally rather than just democratise. Furthermore, this is because the empirical evidence linking societal divisions and democratisation is mixed at best (Gasirowski, 1995; Bernhard *et al.*, 2004; Wright, 2008; see also the discussion in Coppedge, 2012: 292-95). Instead, it is expected that other factors, discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 will make increase the likelihood of democratisation. These include the withdrawal of financial and political support for autocratic regimes after the end of the Cold War (Levitsky and Way, 2010), a prior history of democracy in the country (Escribá-Folch and Wright, 2010), and the prior number of regime changes within the country (Przeworski *et al.*, 2000; Gassebner *et al.*, 2009), all of which are expected to have a significant impact on the likelihood of democratisation in autocratic regimes. Therefore, while ethnic and religious fractionalisation scales are used as independent variables in Chapters 5 and 6, which relate to autocratic stability, they are not used as dependent variables in Chapter 7.¹⁴

Conclusion

In summary, the theoretical analysis of the IR and Comparative Politics literatures above demonstrated that the main assumptions of ReSIT can be applied to the study of both autocratic regime survival and democratisation. By demonstrating the importance of shifting the unit of analysis from autocratic spells to autocratic regimes, this chapter has demonstrated that territorial disputes are just as likely to

¹⁴ Although fractionalisation scales will not be included as independent variables in Chapter 7, separate survival regressions models were built to ensure that neither ethnic fractionalisation nor religious fractionalisation significantly influenced democratisation. As expected, there was no statistically significant relationship between ethnic fractionalisation and democratisation, and religious fractionalisation and democratisation.

affect the stability of singular autocratic regimes as they are to affect autocratic spells. This is an important contribution of this thesis, because the focus on autocratic spells and democratisation can conceal internal instabilities within autocratic regimes. As discussed above, many long-lasting and apparently stable autocratic spells contain a number of short-lived and volatile authoritarian regimes. However, for theoretical claims of ReSIT to hold true, territorial disputes should prolong the life of autocratic *regimes*, not spells. The analysis above demonstrates that there is wealth of theoretical literature within the field of comparative authoritarianism to support such a claim.

The second original contribution of this chapter was to apply ReSIT's theoretical framework as developed by Gibler (2010) to the discussion of leader-elite interaction within autocratic regimes. Hence, this thesis will test the proposition that autocratic regimes are less stable as a result of territorial dispute involvement (Chapter 5). It will also test the proposition that territorial dispute involvement has a greater impact on military and multiparty regimes, but has less of an impact on single party regimes (Chapter 6). Finally, Chapter 7 will test the standard ReSIT proposition that states that territorial disputes are less likely to democratise as a result of territorial disputes, while at the same time controlling for the effects of structural features of various types of autocracies.

Yet, before engaging these research aims, the next chapter will outline the methodological contributions of this thesis, as well as the procedures used to test the hypotheses outlined in this chapter. It will present the rationale for using quantitative methods and regime change as the unit of analysis.

Chapter 4: Methodology and methods

Introduction

In order to test the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter, the thesis will use a large N quantitative study of all autocratic regimes between 1951 and 2008. The main tool of analysis is survival analysis and specifically the Cox Proportional Hazards regression model. The study employs two dependent variables: the time to regime change (Chapters 5 and 6) and time to democratisation (Chapter 7). The main independent variables used are: a) territorial dispute involvement, b) the structural characteristics of the autocracy, c) wealth, and d) petroleum dependency. While the four main independent variables are the most crucial predictors of regime transitions, a number of other control variables are also employed, based on insights from previous research on the determinants of regime change and democratisation. They will be discussed briefly later in this chapter.

The thesis uses an interdisciplinary approach to testing the propositions put forward by the Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT) scholarship, and applies a new and innovative methodology – survival analysis – which is still under-utilised within the field of International Relations, despite its many advantages. The main original contributions outlined in this chapter are methodological rather than theoretical in nature, yet they are no less crucial than the contributions outlined in Chapter 3. The single most important contribution is the use of methodology that goes beyond the current standards of the IR discipline, and thus improves on the dyadic research design, continuous measures of democracy, and the traditional blanket approach to autocratic regimes. More specifically, the thesis places its focus on singular regimes as units of analysis, in contrast to pairs of states or singular countries. This allows it to account not only for the determinants of democratisation, but also for the determinants of regime transition more generally. Furthermore, the focus is placed on regimes, rather than states, and their domestic structures are studied independently from those of their rivals. Unlike all of the

ReSIT studies conducted to date, it uses a theoretically-driven dichotomous distinction between democracies and autocracies, thus greatly improving the standards of regime measurement in IR. Finally, to the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the first ReSIT study to disaggregate autocratic states and acknowledge structural differences between the four main autocratic types (military, monarchic, multiparty and single party). The choice of autocratic regime typology (Magaloni *et al.* 2013) allows the analysis to distinguish multiparty regimes, which are becoming one of the most prominent autocratic types, but which are still often unaccounted for in other typologies (Cheibub *et al.*, 2010; Geddes *et al.*, 2014).

The chapter is divided into six parts, all of which will focus not only on the advantages of the methods and measurements used, but also their limitations. With this in mind, this chapter aims to explain, in detail, all of the procedures employed to answer the research questions posed in this thesis, and identify potentially problem areas that could bias the conclusions of the analytical chapters. All strategies adopted for minimising bias will be detailed in what follows, and their shortcomings will also be addressed.

In the remainder of this chapter, the first part will justify the quantitative, longitudinal design of this study. The second part will describe the theoretical and operational definitions of the main concepts applied in the study, along with a careful justification for the definitions and measurements used. The third part will outline the premises of survival analysis and discuss the main reasons it was selected to address the research questions of this thesis. The fourth section will discuss the final sample, the process of merging and transforming the datasets, and the issue of censored and missing data. Section five will then describe how the models used to test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3 were developed. Finally, the conclusion will outline potential directions for further research, while discussing the strengths and limitations of the methods used in this thesis.

Research design

A large-N quantitative study

As mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter, the thesis employs a quantitative research design in order to test the assumptions made in Chapter 3, namely, that some autocratic regimes are likely to be more durable, and less likely to democratise as a result of international conflict engagement. Before moving to discuss the methods used to analyse the data in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, this section will briefly justify the use of an empirical approach to the fields of International Relations and Comparative Politics, and explain why a quantitative research design is the most appropriate approach for answering the research questions of this thesis.

The choice of quantitative methods over qualitative analysis is especially pertinent to the study of regime change and territorial dispute involvement for a number of reasons (Braumoller and Sartori, 2004). First, it allows for aggregating data from a large number of cases. This is particularly important for this study, given that ReSIT claims that territorial threats will have an effect on *all* autocratic regimes. In order to test this, all available cases of autocracies need to be subjected to the same process of investigation. Due to time and space restrictions, this process is only feasible using a large N quantitative study.

Second, the use of quantitative analysis helps to establish whether evidence for the theory under test is significant, or merely a result of chance, allowing for better generalizability of results. In the context of the discussion in Chapter 3, the effect of territorial disputes on different types of autocracies is assumed to be universal across all groups of cases.¹⁵ In order to confirm that the observed relationships are not a result of chance, the research must be designed with the intention of generalizability. Case studies and small-scale comparative research design, although

¹⁵ Although Chapter 3 proposes that different types of autocracy will respond to territorial disputes in different ways, these responses are still assumed to apply across all regimes within a given category. For example although military regimes are assumed to respond to territorial disputes in a different way than military regimes, all single party regimes are still expected to react in a similar manner.

extremely useful in theory-building, or to answer alternative research questions, are limited when it comes to testing theories that claim to explain general patterns and regularities. Statistical analysis with large samples allows for establishing whether the effects of territorial threats on regime durability can be seen to be simply the result of chance or whether effects are more regular and predictable, giving this sort of approach a major advantage for testing theories of regime change over other alternatives. Third, given the multitude of causal mechanisms at play when accounting for regime change and democratisation, it is important to be able to determine whether territorial threats have a real impact on regime transition, or whether the relationship can be explained by some other intervening or control variable. The major advantage of the scientific method over other types of design is the fact that it can control for the impact of alternative explanations of regime change.

Finally, apart from being suitable for testing ReSIT, quantitative methodologies have further advantages in the social sciences. The evidence gathered does not only serve to provide support for the hypotheses of this thesis, but it also functions as a tool for evaluating competing theories and propositions, such as modernisation theory discussed in Chapter 3. Research is conducted in a rigorous and consistent manner, with a reflexive approach to the limitations of the conclusions drawn from the analysis. All units of analysis are subject to the same measures and processes, making selection bias less likely, and increasing the potential validity of the study. Detailed coding procedures make concepts explicit, leading to a greater understanding of what, and how, it is being measured. The research can then be replicated and evaluated by other social scientists. This is especially pertinent given that the majority of studies testing the propositions of ReSIT have used a scientific approach.¹⁶ The transparency of quantitative research allows one to establish why the results in this thesis might differ from those of other studies, and how exactly the present research improves upon them. Moreover, the methodological clarity allows other scientists to evaluate the results of analytical chapters of this thesis

¹⁶ See for example James *et al.* (1996), Crescenzi and Enterline (1999), Mousseau and Shi (1999), Rasler and Thompson (2005), Gibler (2007), Gibler (2010), Gibler and Tir (2013), Gibler and Miller (2014).

and suggest potential drawbacks, leading to greater quality of future scientific research within IR and comparative politics.

Nevertheless, the scientific method is not without shortcomings. Naturally, the data is subject to availability, and due to many uncontrollable factors some cases might be omitted or rejected, causing the potential for biased results. Moreover, even in longitudinal studies, data is only available for particular periods of time. In this thesis, the timeframe is 1951-2008, meaning that the conclusions drawn from the analytical chapters cannot be reliably generalised beyond this period. Finally, while the use of the scientific method in the social sciences allows for testing general proposition on a wide range of data, it naturally results in a great deal of reductionism because of the large amount of information being classified into a relatively small number of categories. Undoubtedly, the use of the scientific method has its advantages and disadvantages, but the careful collection, classification and analysis of data driven by strongly developed theoretical and practical arguments can reduce the bias significantly. A great deal of reflexivity and caution mean that potential mistakes and grey areas can be identified, and their impact minimised or accounted for.

Longitudinal design

Given that the aim of this thesis is to uncover patterns of regime transition over time, a longitudinal design will be used to test the hypotheses. This study aims to uncover not only whether territorial dispute involvement is associated with time to regime change and democratisation, but also whether this time is affected by time-varying covariates, such as territorial dispute involvement, wealth or dependency on oil in the current year. For this reason, a longitudinal design has a number of advantages over the alternatives. For example, a cross-sectional study could not account for the effect of time-varying factors, because the data in cross-sectional studies only captures the relationship between variables within a very short time period (a month or year) (Blossfeld *et al.*, 2014: 14). It would also have been

impossible to determine whether the relationship between variables varies across different temporal domains, for example the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Given the research questions and the widespread availability of longitudinal data in both International Relations and Comparative Politics, the thesis will adopt a longitudinal design with the years between 1951 and 2008 as its temporal domain.

Unit of analysis

Although many ReSIT studies have tested the theory's propositions on pairs of two countries (dyads), this study will use the regime as the sole unit of analysis. This is so for two reasons. First, the dyadic design is mainly useful in attempting to determine the causes and processes of international conflict between a pair of states or regimes in the second image approach. When time to democratisation or regime survival is the dependent variable of study, a dyadic approach makes little sense. While some resit studies attempted to measure time to *joint* democratisation within a dyad of conflicted countries, this approach, is guided by the desire to conform to the standard IR practices rather than sound methodological and theoretical reasons. Many recent scholars have noted that even within the confines of the second image of the causes of conflict, the discipline of IR of has tested dyadic relationships to such an extent that little original and interesting information can be brought to existing debates (Enia and Jones, 2015), and even the standard DPT research begun to move toward a monadic approach (see for example Caprioli and Trumbore, 2006; Souva and Prins, 2006; Boehmer, 2008). For these above reasons, more recent studies of ReSIT have begun to adopt a more appropriate unit of analysis, looking at the longevity of an autocratic spell within a single country, rather than a par of conflicted countries (Gibler, 2010; Gibler and Tir, 2013). Unlike other ReSIT studies, and as explained in Chapter 3, the unit of analysis is an autocratic regime, as opposed to autocratic spell. It is worth noting that there are usually multiple autocratic regimes within a

country, and each regime is treated as a separate subject.¹⁷ Through its use of regime as its unit of analysis, this thesis improves on the already existing research by adopting a new, interdisciplinary methodology, which does not merely aim to refute the results of previous dyadic studies of DPT or ReSIT, but develops an alternative, more theoretically informed, mode of enquiry. Having outlined the main features of the research design, the chapter will now move to discuss the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables used in the analytical chapters, including a more detailed definition of the term 'regime'.

Operationalization of key variables

Dependent variables: defining and measuring regime change and democratisation

In order to operationalize the terms *regime change* and *democratisation*, some definitions need to be established. The term *regime* in the most basic way was defined by Geddes and colleagues (2014: 1) as a 'set of formal and/or informal rules for choosing leaders and policies'. This thesis will follow a more specific definition developed by Magaloni *et al.* (2013: 6) who further describes regimes as a 'source of policy making, institutions or rules that structure intra-elite interaction and competition, and composition and selection of the executive and political leaders'. Regimes can be both autocratic *and* democratic, although the thesis only analyses regime change from one autocratic regime to another type of regime (autocratic *or* democratic). Once the regime undergoes democratisation, the resulting democratic regime is excluded from the sample. If the new democracy undergoes an autocratic reversal, it is included back into the sample. It is worth noting that because this thesis focuses on autocratic regimes only, autocratic reversals and democracy-to-autocracy transitions will not be examined this thesis.

¹⁷ Although the regime spells within each country are treated as separate cases, their risk of transition is not considered independent from one another. The issue of interdependence will be addressed later in the chapter.

A regime transition is hereby defined as an event that occurs when a given regime ceases to exist and is replaced by another regime. This means that the current set of rules that govern that particular regime changes to another set of rules (Geddes *et al.*, 2014). Nevertheless, to count as a transition, the change of rules has to be accompanied by a significant change to the structure of intra-elite competition and interaction, as well as the manner of selection of the executive and political leaders, as defined by Magaloni and colleagues (2013). This means that regimes are only treated as having undergone a transition when the regime change is serious enough for one type of autocracy to be coded as structurally different from the original regime, i.e. when a single party regime transitions to a military regime or a democracy.¹⁸ However, if a state undergoes a change from one type of military regime to a different type of military regime, even if significant policy-making and leadership changes follow, the regime is coded as *not* having transitioned.

As a result, it is important to note that a regime might undergo a number of coups and leadership changes, which are merely designed to oust the current leader without changing the overarching regime structures. Such changes do not count as regime change in this study. This distinguishes regime transitions from leadership transitions, which are a separate field of inquiry in the IR and Comparative Politics research community (see for example Goemans *et al.*, 2009, and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). It is also important to note that this definition differs greatly from many operational definitions provided within the framework of international relations, which often defines 'regime change' as any substantial change to the Polity or Freedom House score. However, because IR studies of regime change are primarily interested in democratisation, these differences will be discussed in the section below.

¹⁸ The thesis recognises four different types of autocracy: military, monarchic, single party and multiparty regimes. For more discussion see the section on the operationalisation of independent variables in later sections of this chapter.

In the Magaloni *et al.* (2013: 8) data, the date of regime transition is marked by the first set of elections, the date of a *coup d'état*, or the date on which multiple parties are banned or allowed, provided that these changes lead to a genuine structural regime change. Finally, regimes which end but do not result in a transition to another country (for example North Yemen, Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia) are not coded as having transitioned, and are instead coded as *censored*. A detailed discussion of censoring can be found in the later sections of this chapter.

Specifying continuous versus dichotomous measures of democracy in Chapter 7

While the definition of regime change is a relatively straightforward issue in Comparative Politics, the definition of what constitutes a democratic transition is far more problematic, mainly because of the discrepancies in the operational definitions of a democracy. As mentioned earlier, this thesis will make an original methodological contribution to the IR literature investigating democratisation by using a dichotomous measure of democratisation. Moreover, newly transitioned regimes will have to meet essential criteria in order to be classified in accordance with the definition provided by Przeworski *et al.* (2000) and Magaloni *et al.* (2013). This means that states either fully democratise or remain autocratic, depending on whether they meet the set out criteria. However, before moving to discuss the measurement of democracy used in this thesis, the section below will explain why the use of dichotomous and theory driven operationalization of democratic transition is a major contribution and improvement on the current standards of democracy measures within the existing literature.

In the discipline of IR, and, until recently, in the field of Comparative Politics, the operational distinction between democratic and autocratic regimes has been based on a small number of continuous indicators such as Freedom House, Vanhanen, or Polity IV scales. This is the case despite the fact that methodological literature within IR has concluded that operational definitions of democracy based on

continuous measures produce unreliable and often heavily biased results (Gleditsch and Ward, 1997; Munk and Verkilen, 2002; Treier and Jackman, 2008; Vreeland, 2008; Cheibub *et al.*, 2010), Polity IV and other democracy-autocracy scales remain the gold standard for measuring regime change in the field of IR (Plümpert and Neumayer, 2010), and, as a result, also within the ReSIT tradition.¹⁹ Unfortunately, due to limitations of space, not all criticism of continuous measures can be listed in this chapter. As a result, the section below will focus on three limitations in particular. Namely, their lack of content validity, their lack of construct validity, and the incorrect assumptions they make about the nature of democratic transitions.

The first criticism of continuous measures of democracy is their lack of construct validity. Regimes are considered democratic based on the value they had scored on some particular scale, rather than because they conform to some pre-specified criteria of what constitutes a democracy. For example, Polity IV has two separate regime scales, one measuring the degree of democracy, and one measuring the degree of autocracy within a given state, ranging between 0 and 10 each. For a final Polity score, the autocracy score is subtracted from the democracy score. The resulting scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) (Marshall *et al.*, 2014: 16). As pointed out by the authors themselves, there are 'no necessary conditions' for characterizing a political system as democratic or autocratic (Marshall *et al.*, 2014: 15). Although Marshall and colleagues (2014) have not established a threshold themselves, many researchers agree that in order to be considered democratic, a state needs to meet a certain score, which usually falls between the values of 6 and 7.5. Because it is a score, and not a particular regime feature that determines the regime type, a regime can be considered to be a democracy *even if it does not meet essential criteria for being democratic*. Given that what classifies a state as a democracy is an arbitrary change on the scale, continuous measures of democracy lack essential construct validity. To improve on the current methodology within IR and some Comparative Politics literature, the

¹⁹ See for example: Mousseau and Shi (1999), James *et al.* (1996), Gibler (2007), Gibler (2010), Gibler and Tir (2010), or Gibler and Braithwaite (2012).

thesis adopts a strict set of criteria for deciding what constitutes democracy, making sure all states that are defined as democracies share the same essential features and therefore preserving basic construct validity.

Second, in order to construct a continuous scale of democracy, a wide variety of indicators is usually used, reducing the essential content validity of the measure, and increasing the likelihood of measurement errors (Cheibub *et al.*, 2010). For example, Freedom House (2016) uses a number of arbitrary democracy indicators, which stretch the concept beyond the minimal definition and include features such as freedom of speech, civil rights, and economic equality. Polity IV, on the other hand, uses components such as party fractionalisation or the presence of civil war in a country (Vreeland, 2008; Cheibub *et al.*, 2010). These indicators correlate with, but are not necessarily determinants of, democracy. This has negative implications for research because it inhibits the scope of analysis. For example, if one includes a measure of inequality in the definition of democracy, the potential links between social justice and democratic institutions are no longer available as a subject of empirical research (Munk and Verkilen, 2002: 9). Similarly, including the presence of civil war as a determinant of democracy makes it difficult to establish a genuine relationship between domestic conflict and regime type. Instead, it is far more desirable to define democracy narrowly and study its causes and consequences, rather than resolve such issues by a 'definitional fiat' (Alvarez *et al.*, 1996: 18). Dichotomous measures do not define democracy broadly, and, as a result, do not suffer from these limitations.

Finally, it is worth noting that the use of continuous measures of regime type has a significant impact on the theoretical assumptions that underpin the studies that use them. Polity IV, Freedom House and Vanhanen scales imply that the path from an open to closed polity is linear: as states become less autocratic, they simultaneously come closer to becoming a democracy. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily the case in practice, and the likelihood of democratisation is often independent of the initial level of competitiveness in the state (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a: 11). In fact, many autocracies have been shown to adopt democratic institutions and processes as a

means of survival, rather than in an effort to democratise (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2008; Boix and Svobik, 2013). Hence, the adoption of 'democratic' institutions, which would position a state higher on the scale of democracy in reality, often consolidates autocratic regimes making them less likely to democratise. Dichotomous measures of democracy, on the other hand, make no baseline assumptions about how close a given state is to democratising.

By steering away from continuous measures of democracy such as Polity IV or Freedom House, the thesis will improve upon methodology used by other researchers not only in the field of IR generally, but also specifically within the ReSIT tradition, where all of the research conducted to date relies on democracy-autocracy scales to operationalize democratic transitions (James *et al.*, 1996; Mousseau and Shi, 1999; Reiter, 2001; Gibler, 2007; Gibler and Tir, 2010, 2013). Given the popularity of unreliable measures of democracy within the field of IR, the choice of dichotomous measures is a particularly important methodological contribution of this thesis.

Specifying Democratisation in Chapter 7

The following section will briefly outline the conditions that must be met by an autocratic country in order to undergo a democratic transition. Although democratic transition is a dependent variable in Chapter 7 only, the operationalization has serious implications on the thesis in general, because only regimes that do not conform to these criteria are included in the study. Hence, the operational definition of democracy is important in the sense that it defines the entire sample of this study. As mentioned previously, the study employs the criteria for democracy used by Magaloni *et al.* (2013), which are in turn based on the work of Przeworski *et al.* (2000). In order to classify as a democracy, a regime must include (Magaloni *et al.*, 2013: 6):

a) A civilian government as the main source of policy making;

- b) Competitive political parties that interact and run the government through a legislature;
- c) An executive that is institutionally constrained or checked by other parts of the government;
- d) Largely open, competitive, fair and free elections, which are used to select the political leadership.

In addition, Magaloni *et al.* (2013) do not use the alteration rule for classifying democracies, meaning that a regime can be coded as having transitioned to democracy, even if the incumbent leader has not yet had the chance to lose power in popular elections. This is an important improvement, because other datasets, such as Cheibub *et al.* (2010), use alteration rules to classify *all* ambiguous cases as autocracies. Hence, they effectively skew the sample through a non-random selection process (Ulfelder, 2006). To minimise the likelihood of type II errors, Magaloni *et al.* (2013) supplant the alternation rule with the requirement of constraints on the executive power (Magaloni *et al.*, 2013: 6-7). This means that the leader cannot be able to overrule a potential loss in free and fair elections. For more details, and for specific examples, see Magaloni *et al.* (2013).

Independent variables

External threats

The impact of external threats on a state's domestic organisation has been at the heart of ReSIT theory and research (Hintze, 1994; Gourevitch, 1978; Thompson, 1996; Gibler 2007, Gibler and Tir, 2010; Gibler and Miller, 2014), and as such is intrinsically linked to a wider body of scholarship in IR, including DPT research, all of which have set accepted standards for measuring international disputes, conflicts and disagreements.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the focus of this thesis is purely on disputes that are territorial in nature. This is because territorial issues are more important than other forms of disputes or armed conflicts in predicting regime stability and democratisation. Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 3, territorial threats are so significant that they have an effect on regime stability and regime transition even if they are never realised, for example, the claiming party never uses military power in order to seize the target's territory. As a result, the operational definition of territorial dispute is as follows: *participation in any military or non-military dispute over the possession or control of some part of a contested territory* (Gibler and Miller, 2014). It is important to reiterate that unlike with studies conducted prior to Gibler's (2007; 2010) research, territorial disputes do not refer to armed conflict, but simply disagreements over territory that may, or may not, be military. Hence, the term 'dispute' differs significantly from that adopted by James *et al.* (1999) or Reiter (2001), who use militarised interstate disputes (MID) from the Correlates of War data as their independent conflict variable to test ReSIT. It also differs from other studies (Crescenzi and Enterline, 1999; Mousseau and Shi, 1999; Reiter, 2001) in that it does not capture war participation. For more discussion on why territorial disputes are a more suited measure of threat than international militarized conflict or even wars, see Chapter 3.

In order to code for the presence or absence of territorial threats, this thesis uses replication data from Gibler and Miller's (2014) *External Territorial Threat, State Capacity, and Civil War* study. Gibler and Miller (2014: 639) use the Huth and Allee (2002) original territorial claims dataset which examines all territorial disputes (armed and un-armed) between all pairs of states in the international system between 1919 and 1995. They then extend the dataset to 2007 by examining all territorial claims that were on-going in 1995 and determining whether they had ended by 2007 in accordance with Huth and Allee's coding procedures (*ibid.*). The data is then coded so that the state, rather than a pair of states, is the unit on analysis. Finally, the territorial dispute variable is lagged one year in order to ensure

that it is the territorial dispute involvement variable that increased the likelihood of regime change or democratisation, rather than the other way around. Hence, although Gibler and Miller's data only extends until 2007, the dataset used in this thesis extends to 2008.

In addition to the above, Gibler and Miller's (2014) data differs from Huth and Allee's (2002) original dataset by limiting the observations to territorial claims made by neighbours (contiguous states). This distinction between claims made by contiguous and non-contiguous claims is important, because, as explained in Chapter 3, the argument that territorial threats may have an impact on domestic organisation of states *only applies to neighbours*. While the use of Gibler and Miller (2014) data limits the observation in this dataset from the original 62 years (1950-2012) to 57 years (1950-2007, and, after lagging of the territorial variable, to 1951-2008), the resulting temporal domain of the dataset is still superior to other currently available datasets using similar measures of territorial claims. For example, the aforementioned and widely acclaimed Huth and Allee (2002) dataset extends only to year 1995. Similarly, the Issue Correlates of War (Hensel, 2001; Hensel and Mitchell, 2015), which records territorial, maritime and river claims currently only extends to year 2001.

Limitations

Although the Gibler and Miller (2014) replication data is the most suitable one for this study, it has a number of limitations that must be acknowledged. First, it does not distinguish between the target and the initiator of a territorial dispute, making it difficult to determine which regime is experiencing a sense of greater threat from the disagreement. However, this is a limitation that is specific not just to Gibler and Miller's (2014) data, but all monadic conflict datasets. When states or regimes, not dyads, are the units of analysis, they can be both targets and initiators at the same time, especially if they take part in multiple disputes at the same time. For example,

the monarchy in Saudi Arabia has been subject to a very large number of claims from other states (Iraq, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iran, Oman and others). At the same time, it has also initiated many of its own claims towards the same or different countries (Qatar, Iraq, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait and others). Such a situation is not rare, given that when one state makes a claim to another state's territory and then seizes it, the target state often responds with making its own claim to that territory, making it very difficult to determine when a state stops being initiator and becomes a target instead. Hence, identifying the target is very difficult except for a very limited number of non-reciprocated territorial conflicts, making such measurements unfeasible. Instead, it is more useful to simply identify a territorial dispute as a threat both parties.

The second potential problem with this data is the fact that the 'territorial dispute' variable is a dummy variable and as such, it cannot measure the intensity or the severity of threats. One, if a regime is engaged in a dispute, it is always coded as 1, even if for that given year it was engaged in multiple disputes. For example, Tanzania was involved in a military dispute with Uganda between 1974 and 1979, but was not involved in any other disputes with any other state for that period. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, was involved in a number of disputes with Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Iraq or United Arab Emirates throughout the observation period. However, both states are coded in the same way (1 for the presence of a dispute, 0 for lack of dispute) despite Tanzania having only 1 rival, while Saudi Arabia has multiple. As such this data cannot capture the intensity or potential multiplicity of the territorial threat. Although this data could be coded by looking at Huth and Allee's (2002) disputes on an individual basis, this would be extremely time-consuming and goes beyond the scope of the present investigation, and thus must be relegated to future research. Two, as mentioned before, this variable would be coded 1 for a regime involved in a diplomatic dispute over a territory, but also 1 for a regime that went into war over that territory. As such, the severity of conflict is also not differentiated.

Finally, some cases from the original Huth and Allee (2002) dataset are lost due to both parties in the dispute needing to be contiguous. For example, while Indonesia's claim to the Malaysian islands of Sipadan and Ligitan between 1980 and 2007 is coded as a dispute, the Philippines' claim to the Malaysian Sabah region, which started in 1962, is not coded at all because the two states do not share a land border. As a result, Malaysia is coded as conflict-free between 1962 and 1980 despite being involved in a territorial dispute. However, as reiterated by Gibler (Gibler, 2012; Gibler and Miller, 2014), his theory applies to contiguous states only, hence the loss of data should not have a significant impact on the conclusions of the study.

Despite the limitations above, the Gibler and Miller (2014) dataset is still the most suitable data for answering the research question of this thesis, given that it is the only dataset which codes *all* territorial disputes, records them in a monadic format, and extends them as far as the year 2007. Given that the issues discussed above cannot be easily addressed due to limitations in time and space, their impact will be considered throughout the following Analytical Chapters (Chps. 5, 6 & 7) and the Conclusion of this thesis. Having considered the strengths and weaknesses of the measure of territorial threats, the chapter will now move to discussing the typology of autocratic regimes used in this thesis.

Regime typology

As explained in Chapter 3, the following thesis will distinguish between various types of autocracies based on their structural characteristics. The following section will explain why the Magaloni *et al.* (2013) (hereafter MCM) typology is used to distinguish between autocracies in analytical Chapter 5, 6 and 7. The discussion will be divided into two parts. The first part will explain the importance of using only one typology in data analysis by expounding the dangers to research validity and

reliability of alternating multiple regime classifications. The second part will outline the reasons the MCM datasets are best suited for the thesis by comparing it to other data collections in the field. MCM is considered more fitting for answering the research questions of this thesis because it includes multiparty regimes in the typology, and because it does not include residual categories for mixed and hybrid regimes (Magaloni *et al.*, 2013).

The datasets discussed along with the MCM in the upcoming section are:

- GWF: the Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2013) data, which is based on the Geddes (2003) typology;
- WTH: Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius (2013) dataset based on the Hadenius and Teorell (2007) typology; and
- CGV: Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) dataset based on the typology by the same authors.

For ease of comparison, see Table 1 below, which includes a list of all major differences between the datasets.

The importance of using only one typology

Before justifying the choice of typology of autocratic regimes, it is worth noting that only one typology will be used throughout the thesis. This is an important point given that many researchers use autocratic regime typologies interchangeably,²⁰ in order to demonstrate the robustness of their results, despite the practice being strongly criticised by much of the methodological literature within Comparative Politics (Casper and Tufis, 2003; Cheibub *et al.*, 2010; Wilson, 2014). This is often done for three reasons. First, different typologies often use similar language to

²⁰ See for example Charron and Lapuente (2011), Cornell (2013), and Hankla and Kuthy (2013). Cornell (2013) is a good example of the practice: in order to test her claim that democracy aid has a varying effect on rulers across different types of dictatorships, she tests her assumptions using Hadenius and Teorell (2007). To check for robustness, she then uses the CGV dataset with a similar typology.

describe a particular regime, referring to military regime, monarchies, or party-based autocracies. Second, they often use similar criteria to classify regimes. Third, certain measures in the datasets often strongly correlate with each other. These apparent similarities lead many scholars to wrongly believe that they can be treated interchangeably (Casper and Tufis, 2003: 196). Nevertheless, autocratic typologies diverge substantially in both theoretical and methodological terms. The problems of using these datasets interchangeably are outlined below.

Table 1. Comparison of major Comparative Politics datasets with categorical regime typologies

Typology	Dataset	Temporal domain	Autocratic types	Hybrid categories
Geddes, Wright, and Franz (2013)	<i>Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transition</i>	1945 – 2010	<i>Monarchy Military Single-party Personalist</i>	<i>Party-personal Military-personal Party-military Party-personal-military Indirect military Theocracy Oligarchy</i>
Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013)	<i>The Authoritarian Regimes Dataset</i>	1972 – 2010	<i>Monarchy Military No-party Single-party Limited multi-party</i>	<i>Party-less Military-multiparty Military no-party Military one-party One-party monarchy No-party monarchy Multiparty monarchy Theocracy</i>
Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010)	<i>Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited</i>	1946 – 2008	<i>Monarchic Military Civilian</i>	-
Magaloni (2008) Magaloni, Chu and Min (2013)	<i>Autocracies of The World, 1950-2012</i>	1950 – 2012	<i>Monarchy Military Single-party Multiparty</i>	-

First, the datasets+, although similar, contain irreconcilable typological differences. Some datasets chose to code all party and civilian regimes in a similar way (GWF, CGV), while others tend to distinguish between different types of party governments such as competitive (multiparty) and dominant (single party) systems.

Because some typologies do not recognise 'multiparty' regimes, no meaningful comparisons of results can be made, because the datasets do not measure the same concepts.¹ Furthermore, for the same reason, some datasets like GWF code some multiparty regimes as democracies and exclude them from their dataset.²¹

Second, all datasets vary in their treatment of ambiguous cases. When particular governments meet the requirements of more than one category, some dataset use residual categories to classify them. Some use the 'hybrid' classification (GWF and WHT), while others (CGV and MCM) code contentious cases based upon the features that are most prominent in the polity. This means that in a number of cases, in which regimes were classified as 'hybrids', the same datasets were classified as ideal types by others, making it impossible to compare the predictions generated with the use of different datasets.

Third, all datasets employ different operational definitions of democracy. Some datasets have a strict set of criteria that a polity must meet to be classified as democratic (MCM, GWF, CGV), while some use continuous measures discussed earlier, such as Polity and Freedom House data, to distinguish between free and un-free states (WTH). The datasets that use strict criteria vary greatly in respect to features they consider essentially democratic. Although measures of democracy often correlate strongly, they have been shown to produce divergent results (Casper and Tufis, 2003).

Finally, all of the datasets are subject to biases, which lead to further coding discrepancies. While biases are an inherent part of any large-scale data collection and classification, they are usually consistent within the dataset because they stem from the same conceptual and theoretical background. For example, some datasets might consistently over-emphasize the role of the military when deciding upon ambiguous cases that display both military and civilian features. Others might tend to focus less on the mode of power maintenance and more on how the incumbent has been removed from power when deciding on how to code controversial

²¹ The regime in Bosnia since its inception in 1992 is a good example. Magaloni *et al.* (2013) code it as a multiparty autocracy, while Geddes *et al.* (2013) exclude it altogether by coding it as a democracy.

polities. They will also vary in their interpretation of historic events. For example, CGV codes Poland between 1981 and 1988 as a military regime due to martial law imposed by General Jaruzelski in mid-1983. GWF and MCM, on the other hand, code it as a single-party regime because the Polish United Workers' Party was considered by them to have had a much greater influence on Polish politics than the army within that period (Magaloni *et al.*, 2013: 27). Wilson (2014) further cites Nicaragua, Colombia and Brazil as other cases where researchers do not agree on the way the regimes should have been coded as a result of different interpretations of historic events. As discussed below, these biases have serious implications for research results, and as a result, the typologies should and will not be used interchangeably.

While there are many more discrepancies between the datasets mentioned above, they will not be considered here due to limitations in time and space.²² The above points have clearly illustrated that apparent similarities between the datasets turn into irreconcilable differences upon closer examination. Due to conceptual and technical differences, the categories within each dataset will contain a moderately different set of cases. Although most unambiguous observations will be coded in a similar manner by all of the datasets, the occasional discrepancies make the predictions of a study that uses them interchangeably extremely sensitive to outliers (Wilson, 2014). This in turn reduces the external validity of research. Furthermore, using differing measures to test hypotheses is likely to produce inconsistent findings, threatening the construct validity of the studies. For these reasons, as stated previously, only one dataset will be used in the study.

²² The reader might have already noticed, for example, that the datasets differ in terms of 'start' and 'end' dates of the same regimes, because the critical points during which regime change occurs is subject to interpretation.

The typology: military, monarchic, multiparty and single party autocracies

It was previously discussed that most major datasets in Comparative Politics have a similar basis for judging autocratic regimes. These include the institutional make-up of governments, the ruler selection and replacement mechanisms as well as the mode of political power maintenance. To some degree, they also all have a similar mechanism for distinguishing between military and civilian governments (Wilson, 2014). Nevertheless, depending on the research questions the datasets aim to answer, they use different categories for classifying cases.²³

The typology used in this thesis comes from the Magaloni *et al.* (2013) dataset. It is considered to be superior to other datasets for two reasons. First, it includes a category for multiparty regimes, unlike GWF and CGV. This is important, because as mentioned previously, multiparty regimes had replaced single-party and military states as the most common form of autocracy after the Cold War (Magaloni, 2008: 2). Ignoring this major shift in authoritarian politics would put the research at risk of being out of touch with current events. Furthermore, it has become evident in recent years that multiparty regimes are idiosyncratic (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). Although many researchers used to think of electoral dictatorships as merely ‘façade democracies’ (Crespo, 2004) or transitional states that would eventually become democratic, competitive authoritarianism is now widely regarded as a unique type of autocracy, with distinct power arrangements (Diamond, 2002; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Magaloni, 2008; Levitsky and Way, 2010). Although elections remain unfair and the executive is often unconstrained, the nature of elite-leader interaction in multiparty regimes is strikingly different from that in single-party states. Not accounting for these discrepancies is a serious flaw in the any research wishing to account for structural differences between autocracies.

The second major advantage of MCM is its exclusion of ‘hybrid’ and ‘mixed’ regimes from its typology. While some datasets like GWF or WTH provide categories for regimes that do not meet positive criteria for identification, MCM follows CGV in

²³ See Table 1 for a comparison of typologies.

asserting that creating residual categories is never an effective solution (Cheibub *et al.*, 2010: 197; Magaloni *et al.*, 2013: 2). Firstly, residual categories decrease external validity of scientific research. Hybrid class represents cases that do not fit any particular type of regime, meaning that no unifying feature can describe this group of regimes. Lumping them together makes it difficult, if not impossible, to draw meaningful conclusions from observed relationships. Secondly, residual categories created by some datasets constitute a large proportion of the overall typology. For example, WTH include 14 different categories of regime combinations,²⁴ 6 of which are a combination of two different regime types. Some of these categories include only a handful of cases within them. There is only one polity that fits WTH description of one-party monarchies,²⁵ 2 polities that fit the description of theocracy²⁶ and 3 polities that fit the criteria of a multiparty monarchy (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007).²⁷ Similarly, GWF have 10 distinct categories despite having only 4 ideal types of regimes. One of them, the party-personalist-military category includes only 4 cases (Geddes *et al.*, 2014).²⁸ Categories including a handful of cases have a sample size so small that meaningful analysis can be difficult, if not impossible.

The MCM dataset, on the other hand, provides only 4 different types of authoritarian regimes and does not create residual categories for regimes with mixed or uncertain characteristics. As Magaloni and colleagues (2013: 2) emphasize, seemingly hybrid regimes are often categorised as 'mixed' due to certain 'window-dressing institutional features'. That said, the authors of MCM do make an effort to uncover the essential, underlying regime characteristics behind those façade practices. For example, if the access to the positions of power is controlled by the military, yet the state also displays some features of a party

²⁴ A full list of authoritarian regime types in Hadenius and Teorell (2007) includes: Multiparty traditional, partyless, dominant party, military multiparty, military traditional, military no-party, no-party traditional, military one-party, one-party traditional, one-party monarchy, traditional monarchy, no-party monarchy, multiparty monarchy and theocracy. Additional types in the dataset include rebel regimes, occupied states, states at civil war, states in transition, democracies, and the 'others' category.

²⁵ Islamic Republic of Iran 1975-1978.

²⁶ Afghanistan 1996-2000 and Islamic Republic of Iran 1979-2003.

²⁷ Jordan 1989-2000, Morocco 1977-2003 and Tonga 1996-2003.

²⁸ Egypt 1953-2010, Indonesia 1967-1999, Syria 1964-2010.

system, it will be classified as a military regime because the *effective* control is held primarily by the armed forces (Magaloni, 2008: 731; Magaloni *et al.*, 2013: 8). This technique allows for determining the true nature of a regime and avoiding the ‘hybrid’ classification. See table 2 for the information on how each regime type was operationalized by Magaloni *et al.* (2013), along with examples.

Table 2. Summary of the authoritarian regime type operationalisation in Magaloni *et al.* (2013)

Autocratic type	Definition	Examples
<i>Monarchy</i>	The incumbent is selected among the members of a royal or dynastical family who is in charge of principal decision-making, including the choice of a potential successor. The monarch or the royal family must be in effective control of policy making and it cannot be delegated to the legislature, the party or the military.	Nepal (1951 – 2008*) Saudi Arabia (1769 – 2006) Oman (1932 – 2008*)
<i>Military</i>	The principal positions of power are controlled by the military, and the power is shared through the institution of the armed forces, as opposed to party or the royal family. It is not sufficient for the incumbent to merely have a military background or be the leader of the armed forces at the same time to classify as a military regime – the effective control over positions of power must reside with the armed forces in general.	Argentina (1976 – 1983) Somalia (1962 – 2008*) Myanmar (1969 – 1990)
<i>Single-party</i>	All politics within the state must be conducted under the banner of a single, civilian party, and, for the most part, the presence of another political party must be constitutionally prohibited. The legislature must be composed of the ruling party members only.	China (1949 – 2008*) Malawi (1966 – 1994) Tunisia (1963 – 1987)
<i>Multiparty</i>	The ruling party must allow other political parties to compete in the elections. The competition is unfair and biased in favour of the ruling party, but it is real. More than one party has to be represented in the legislature in order for the state to be considered ‘multiparty’.	Bosnia (1992 – 2008*) Central African Rep. (1979 - 1981) Lebanon (1975 – 2008*)

* - Ongoing (right-censored) regimes

Source: Magaloni *et al.* (2013: 8-9) and Magaloni (2008: 731-33).

Resources

In order to measure the effects of wealth on regime transition and democratisation, the thesis employs one measure of tax revenue income, and one measure of non-tax revenue income. The operationalization of those concepts, along with data sources used, is discussed below.

Wealth

In order to measure tax-generated wealth, this thesis follows benchmark and methodologically acclaimed studies in the area (Przeworski *et al.* 2000, Przeworski and Limongi, 1997) in utilising GDP per capita converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates.

In the standard approach to measuring wealth, most researchers typically use unadjusted GDP for each country or regime, and then converted these rates to a single currency - typically US dollars- using standard exchange rates for ease of comparison. Although relatively straightforward, such a method is hardly reflective of the amount of goods that can be bought with that currency within each country. After all, the prices of food, accommodation, or services vary depending on region and particular countries. An individual earning 20,000 US dollars a year would have a much lower standard of living in Norway, where goods and services are expensive, than in Bolivia, where goods and services are cheap. For this reason, the measure of per capita GDP will be adjusted to account for how much the currency would be worth within each of the countries under investigation (purchasing power parity), measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis international dollars (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013).

Two sources of data were used in order to cover the temporal domain of the thesis, as well as all regimes classified in the MCM typology of autocracies. In a vast majority of cases, the thesis used data from the Maddison Project, which is available between 1950 and 2007. Other datasets on GDP figures have a much more limited observation period. For example, the IMF and World Bank records

start in 1980, Eurostat data is mostly unavailable until the mid-1990s, and the Penn World Tables, despite having a temporal domain of 1950-2009, does not begin records on certain states until quite late, or excludes them altogether. Unfortunately, these states are often autocratic regimes such as Cuba, North Korea, USSR or Yugoslavia, and as such are of particular interest of this study. Excluding them from the analysis would most likely bias the results, given that the data would not be missing at random. Because the Maddison Project data includes these states and covers the observation period used in this thesis, it is considered the most suitable source for data on regime wealth.

Finally, in the rare cases where Maddison Project data was missing (see section 4.5. of this chapter), it was supplemented with data from Total Economy Database (TED), which uses a number of highly reliable sources such as the OECD, Eurostat, United Nations, and Asian Development Bank databases, and adjusts their figures to 1990 Geary-Khamis international dollars (De Vries and Erumban, 2015). This makes the two datasets particularly compatible, and reduces the potential for additional errors with manual conversion.

Limitations

While some scholars are sceptical of the data provided by Maddison (2007), this criticism is mainly directed at the estimates which extend back beyond the year 1820, and reflect the wider scepticism referring to whether data on economic performance of states before that time can ever be reliably collected (Clark, 2009). Given the temporal domain of this thesis (1951-2008) the risk of data being based on incomplete data or assumptions is minimal.

Oil dependency

As discussed in Chapter 3, recent research suggests that petroleum dependency has a particularly strong effect on autocratic regime stability (Ulfelder, 2007; Ross, 2012; Wright *et al.*, 2015) and democratisation (references needed). While there are different ways to measure reliance on non-tax revenues, in order to determine the impact of oil dependency on dependent variables in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the thesis will use a measure supplied by Gibler and Miller (2014), which is based on the Fearon and Latin (2003) dataset. As a general rule, a state is considered to be reliant on oil as a major source of non-tax revenues if fuel exports 'constitute more than a third of total merchandise exports' (Gibler and Miller, 2014, appendix: 3). This is a time-varying variable, meaning that regimes are only recorded as dependent on oil (coded 1) in the period where their exports constitute a third of their total exports, but recorded as non-dependent on oil (coded 0) in time periods when this share drops below 30%.

Limitations

The measure of petroleum dependency as the only source of non-tax revenues is not without its limits. Although oil is certainly one of the major sources of revenues for some autocracies, it is certainly not the only one. Diamonds, foreign aid, or even tourism can add a considerable amount of income into to the coffers of some autocratic regimes (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Nevertheless, such income is particularly difficult to measure, because the information on money received in donations or coercively extracted by the state is rarely recorded and shared. For these reasons, and because the impact of economic indicators on regime stability is of secondary concern in this study, the thesis will be limited to controlling for oil dependency only. While the time and space limitations of this thesis make it difficult to include more measures on non-tax revenues, future studies could focus on foreign aid and alternative natural resources as additional indicators of wealth.

Additional control variables

A number of additional control variables have also been used in analytical chapters of this thesis and the rationale for their inclusion and details of their composition are briefly discussed below. In Chapters 5 and 6, where the dependent variable is time to regime change, additional control variables include ethnic fractionalisation and religious fractionalisation measures. In Chapter 7, where time to democratisation is the main independent variable, additional control variables include the presence of Cold War, history of democracy, and the sum of all past regime transitions in the country between 1951 and 2008. Finally, all three analytical chapters will include a measure of political instability.

Specifying additional control variables in Chapters 5 and 6

As discussed in Chapter 3, much of the literature suggests that religious and ethnic fractionalisation is likely to be a good indicator of poor quality of political institutions (Alesina *et al.*, 2003), the onset of civil war (Horowitz, 1985; Huntington, 1996; Ignatieff, 1993) and lower state capacity (Gibler and Miller, 2014). Given that all of the above factors are likely to decrease the stability of autocratic regimes, the fractionalisation measures are designed to capture some of these effects. These measures are used to establish whether more diverse countries result in more unstable autocracies similar to other Comparative Politics studies (e.g. Escribá-Folch and Wright, 2010). The data on fractionalisation is obtained from Gibler and Miller (2014) who base them on the measures developed by Alesina *et al.* (2003). The separate ethnic and religious fractionalisation indices reflect the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to two different ethnic or religious groups (Alesina *et al.*, 2003: 158-59). Hence, the higher the score on the scales, the more fractionalised is the state.

Specifying additional control variables in Chapter 7

History of democracy

In Chapter 7, three control variables typically thought as important predictors of democratisation are used in addition to territorial dispute involvement, wealth, and oil-dependency. These are the *history of democracy* variable, the *sum of past transitions* variable, and a variable indicating the presence of the *Cold War*. First, it is assumed that autocratic regimes in countries that have previously experienced democratisation might be more likely to transition to democracy again (Przeworski *et al.*, 2000; Smith, 2004). It is likely that these regimes have stronger pro-democracy civil opposition to the current elite than regimes in states that have never been democratic (Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010).

Sum of past transitions

Furthermore, the *sum of past transitions* variable is meant to denote a level of political instability in a country that might be indicative of a future transition to democracy. The sum of past transitions measure is calculated by counting the number of transitions (democratic or non-democratic) which have taken place in a given state since 1951 for each of the autocratic regimes in a sample. The expectation is that the more regime transitions occurred in the past, the more likely the current regime is to undergo the process of democratisation.

For most autocratic countries analysed in the thesis, the history of previous transitions is complete because they were not independent or recognised as independent prior to 1951. However, a number of countries begun before 1951 and have undergone an unspecified number of transitions that cannot be observed in the dataset. For example, the earliest record for Thailand starts in 1951 (for a regime that started in 1932) and continues through to 2008. Since 1932, Thailand has undergone a total of 8 regime transitions. In its entire history as a nation state, Thailand might have undergone many more transitions, but this information is not

available. For this reason, transition history refers to the history of transitions between the inception of the regime that enters the analysis in or after 1951, and the end of analysis time in 2008. While not entirely accurate, this information can still help generalise about the level of regime stability within the country.

Cold War

In line with previous research, the *Cold War* variable will be used as an indicator of Western support for autocratic regimes around the world (Escribá-Folch and Wright, 2010, Gibler, 2010). Much of the literature suggests that prior to 1989, autocrats enjoyed financial and political support from the West, and with the advent of the post-Cold War era, this support has been withdrawn in favour of an increasing pressure to democratise (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Buraczynska, 2016). Current literature suggests that many of the democratic transitions in the post-Cold War era were a direct result of mounting foreign pressure to develop representative structures (Levitsky and Way, 2010; 2013) making this a particularly important control variable.

Political instability

Finally, in all three analytical chapters of this thesis, an additional measure of *political instability* is used. The political instability measure is taken from the Gibler and Miller (2014) replication data, and measures institutional and political changes within the regime, which do not necessarily lead to a regime transition, but might suggest political instability and institutional uncertainty. The data used to calculate political instability comes from the Unified Democracy Scores measure, which incorporates Freedom House, Polity IV and Vanhanen (2000) data on a state's democracy level. Although such continuous measures have been criticised earlier in the chapter, this referred to their usefulness for measuring democracy, rather than indicating political changes within the regime. As the latter, the continuous measure does not measure any complex concepts or a critical juncture in the state's history, but rather changing rules and norms of political behaviour, and does not

make inferences about the meaning or implications of such changes. A state is operationalized as politically unstable ‘if it experiences a two-standard-deviation change in its UDS democracy score in the three years prior to the observation year’ (Gibler and Miller, 2013: 641). List of all variables used in the dataset can be found in Table 3 below.

Table 3. List of all variables used in the thesis (chapters 5-7)

Variables	Variable type	Notes
<u>Dependent variables</u>		
<i>Regime transition</i>	Dummy variable indicating a transition to another form of regime in a given month	Coded 0 for all months when the regime has not experienced a transition, and 1 for the month in which the transition has occurred.
<i>Democratisation</i>	Dummy variable indicating a transition to democracy form of regime in a given month	Coded 0 for all months when the regime has not experienced a democratic transition, and 1 for the month in which the democratic transition has occurred.
<u>Independent variables</u>		
<i>Territorial threat</i>	Dummy variable indicating involvement in a territorial dispute	
<i>Democracy</i>	Dummy variable for democratic regimes	
<i>Military</i>	Dummy variable for military regimes	
<i>Monarchy</i>	Dummy variable for monarchic regimes	
<i>Multiparty</i>	Dummy variable for multiparty regimes	
<i>Single party</i>	Dummy variable for single party regimes	
<i>GDP per capita</i>	Gross Domestic Product per capita, PPP adjusted	Measured in constant 1990 international Gheary-Khamis dollars
<i>Oil dependency</i>	Dummy variable indicating a substantial petroleum dependency in a country in a given year	
<i>Political instability</i>	Indicator variable for political change on the Unified Democracy Scores scale	Coded as one if a state experienced a two standard deviations change in their USD score in the past 3 years
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>	Continuous variable	Based on Alesina <i>et al.</i> (2003)
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	Continuous variable	Based on Alesina <i>et al.</i> (2003)
<i>History of democracy</i>	A dummy variable indicating a past history of democracy in the country	Only democracies included in the dataset by Magaloni <i>et al.</i> (2013) are considered
<i>Sum of past transitions</i>	Variable indicating the number of past regime transitions (democratic and non-democratic) in the country	
<i>Cold War</i>	Dummy variable for the presence of the Cold War	Coded 1 for any time between January 1951 and December 1989

Data

Having operationalized all of the concepts used in the analysis in the empirical chapters, this section will briefly discuss all potential issues and limitations of the dataset compiled for the purposes of this thesis. The following section will discuss data transformations, the treatment of missing values, as well as cases that were excluded from the analysis. As mentioned previously, three separate datasets have been used to produce the final dataset for this study. See Table 4 for the summary of the temporal domain of each dataset, as well as the variables that were drawn from it.

Table 4. Table summarizing the datasets used in the thesis (chapters 5-7)

Dataset	Temporal domain	Variables
Magaloni <i>et al.</i> (2013) <i>Autocracies of the World 1950-2012</i>	1950-2012	<i>Regime type</i> <i>Regime transition</i>
Gibler and Miller (2014) <i>External Threats, State Capacity, and Civil War</i> replication data	1946-2007	<i>Territorial threat</i> <i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i> <i>Religious fractionalisation</i> <i>Political instability</i>
The Maddison Project Database	AD 1-2010/ 1950-2008	<i>GDP per capita (PPP)</i>
Total Economy Database	1950-2014	<i>GDP per capita (PPP)</i>

The observation period (1951-2008)

Table 4 clearly demonstrates that the common temporal domain of all datasets is the time period between 1951 and 2008 (the temporal domain was 1950-2007 before lagging the territorial dispute variable by one calendar year). Given that most ReSIT and democratic peace studies have employed a much longer observation period to test their propositions, usually spanning between 1817 and the 21st century, the temporal domain of this thesis might appear restricted and

insufficient. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that most IR studies of the second and reversed second image hypotheses employ the Polity IV data to test their hypotheses. As a result, while their observation periods might be much longer, the reliability of their conclusions and the validity of their research design might be negatively affected by their choice of regime change measures. In the context of the discussion of regime type and regime transition measurements discussed above, the shorter time frame of this study is a necessary limitation. As such, it is comparable to other studies of democratisation and regime transition within comparative politics,²⁹ and recently, also research from the ReSIT tradition, which employs the monadic approach to studying regime change and domestic structure changes.³⁰ Finally and most importantly, there exists, to my knowledge, no reliable source of data for the classification of regimes that extends before the year 1946. As a result, a study concerned with disaggregating the effects of territorial threat on various types of autocracies must constrict the lower band of its observation period to the middle of the 20th century. It is also worth noting that one advantage of the 1951-2008 observation period is that it extends 18 years beyond the fall of the Iron Curtain, and as such allows this thesis to test for the competing effect of the Cold War on the process of democratisation, as mentioned in the Literature Review Chapter 2.

The sample

Within the 1951-2008 time period, the dataset records 314 regimes as autocratic. Table A1 in Appendix A lists all autocratic regimes in the sample, with their exact start and end date. Three distinct problems are apparent when looking at Table A1. First, it is clear that some regimes (marked in bold) are yet to undergo a transition as of 2008. Second, some regimes (marked with an asterisk) end before 2008, yet

²⁹ For example, Magaloni (2008): 1950-2000, Escriba-Folch and Wright (2015): 1977-2006; Wahman *et al.* (2014):

³⁰ For example, Reiter (2001): 1960-1992, Gibler and Tir (2013): 1950-2001; Gibler (2010): 19750-2000

are still coded as not having transitioned. Finally, many regimes are recorded as having begun before 1951, for example, Mexico, whose multiparty regime starts in 1917. The first two issues are known as right-censoring, while the third issue is known as left-truncation (delayed entry). The section below will explain which regimes are affected by these issues and why, as well as discuss the potential implications they might have on the analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

Right-censoring

Right censored regimes are those autocracies which have not yet failed by the time of the last observation in the dataset (end of 2008), or which have ceased to exist, but are not coded as having transitioned. In the first case, it is assumed that the regimes will eventually transition, but there is no information on when such a transition might occur. As a result, they pose a problem of missing data in standard regression analysis, and their risk of transition is impossible to assess. This type of right-censoring is the most common reason for regimes being coded as not having transitioned. Examples include Saudi Arabia (monarchy), Chad (multiparty regime), Mauritania (military regime), and China (single party regime).

The second cause of right-censoring happens when a regime simply ceases to exist, without being coded as having transitioned. This is a much less common case of censoring in the data, constituting only 9.1% of all censored cases (6 out of 77). The 6 cases include:

- The military regime in Somalia, which ceased to exist in December 1990, but which did not transition to another form of regime due to the severe spell of anarchy which ensued in the country;
- Single party regime in Yugoslavia, which disintegrated in 1992, without an identifiable 'successor' regime;

- Single party regime in Czechoslovakia which disintegrated in 1992 into two separate political regimes: democratic Czech Republic and democratic Slovakia, once more, without an identifiable 'successor' regime;
- Single party regime in East Germany, which ceased to exist as a result of its unification with West Germany;
- Military regime in North Yemen, which ceased to exist as a result of its unification with South Yemen;
- Military regime in Syria, which ceased to exist due to Syria joining the United Arab Republic with Egypt in 1968. Syria re-enters the dataset as a separate military regime once the United Arab Republic disintegrates 1962.

It is worth noting that although Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are coded as censored because the entire political apparatus changed or shifted as a result of the political changes, the break-up of USSR is treated as a transition, rather than a right-censored event. The breakup of USSR signified a serious political change accompanied by a significant loss of territory, but a historical and cultural continuity between Russia and USSR meant that the break-up of USSR was treated as a transition from a single-party regime to a multiparty regime. In Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, however, the multinational element was a crucial part of the system, with all countries actively taking part; hence, it would be too great a leap to identify Serbia as the natural successor of Yugoslavia, or Czech Republic/Slovak Republic as a successor of Czechoslovakia. The nations lost by the USSR (e.g. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia or Belarus) are coded as distinct political regimes that emerged between 1991 and 1993.

Left-truncation

In addition to the above, some regimes which exist and enter the observation period in January 1951 have begun *prior* to 1951, a problem otherwise known as left-truncation, or delayed entry. Left-truncation occurs when the regime enters the

analysis after it has already begun. This means that the regime was at a risk of transition even before it entered the observation period, and as a result no information is available on why it had survived this long. Examples include the multiparty regime in Mexico, which began in 1917, or the military regime in the Dominican Republic, which began in 1930.

There is a possibility that there is something specific about regimes that have survived so long as to be included in the study in 1951, while all other regimes have failed. As such, regimes that originate prior to 1951 might be significantly more durable, and therefore bias the sample. Unfortunately, this is a serious yet unavoidable limitation of this type of data. It will be discussed in more detail further in the thesis and should be borne in mind when considering the results.

To address the issue of censoring and delayed entry in the data, the thesis employs survival analysis as a main modelling tool. Survival analysis has been designed specifically to help minimise the biases introduced by these issues. Both delayed entry and censoring will be discussed in more detail in the later section of this chapter, which discusses survival analysis as the most appropriate tool for dealing with this type of data.

Data transformations

In order to merge the data from the four distinct datasets (see Table 4) certain transformations were made, which are described in detail below. First of all, the data on regime type and regime transition in Magaloni *et al.* (2013) was originally recorded in the 'one observation per year per regime' format. Given that all remaining datasets were coded in the 'one observation per country per year format', there were no significant issues with merging the datasets, because all datasets contained the variables recording date (year) and country identifiers (the Correlates of War country code), there were no significant problems with merging the data.

The data has further been transformed to regime-month period instead of the original regime-year format. This was done for two reasons. First, the Magaloni *et al.* (2013) dataset records the exact date of a regime start and end. However, because the data is coded in a regime-year format the start and end dates are rounded. In other words, the year of the transition is coded as the antecedent regime if the change has occurred on the 1st of July or later, and as the subsequent regime if the change has occurred before the 1st of July (*ibid.*: 10). Unfortunately, because of that rule, the exact start and end of a regime is imprecise, and this makes a particular difference with regimes that last less than a year.

Second, states that have existed for less than 18 months are all considered to have lasted 1 year, i.e. one unit of time. This poses a significant problem for the analysis. In survival analysis, subjects who transition within the same year of entering the observation period ($t=0$) are excluded from the analysis, because they are considered to not have been exposed to a risk of transition for any length of time (the subject has transitioned at the same time it has entered the observation). From the survival analysis standpoint, no time has passed between the entry and the transition event, and the subjects are therefore excluded from the analysis. This problem could be solved by adding a small constant c (e.g. 0.001) to the total duration of all regimes which were coded as lasting one year. However, this would mean that all regimes coded in this way would be exposed to the risk of failure for exactly the same amount of time (the value of the constant) despite actually lasting different amount of time (e.g. 3 months and 9 months). A more time consuming, but a more reliable option, was simply to transform the dataset into a regime-month format, and manually adjust the start and end dates of all regimes in the dataset (Cleves *et al.*, 2010). Because only yearly data is available for all other independent variables, they have been left unchanged, and their values for a specific year have been copied to reflect all 12 months within the regime. See Table 2A in Appendix A for an example of how this was done for Sierra Leone.

Recording the date of regime transition

The date of regime transition is usually marked as the exact day, month and year of change. Given that the data used in this thesis is recorded in monthly format, some rounding had to be applied. For example, in 1985, Nicaragua has transitioned from a single party regime to a multiparty regime. The multiparty regime is coded to have begun on the 10th of January 1985, so the beginning of the regime in the dataset has been recorded as January 1985. As a result, the end of the previous single party regime is coded as December 1984, even though the regime really ended in on the 9th of January 1985.

In some cases, when a regime begins after the 20th day of a given month, its beginning is coded as the following month. For example, Azerbaijan, which became independent as a result of the breakup of USSR, is recorded as starting on the 25th of December 1991. However, because it started so late in the month, it is recorded in the dataset as having begun in January 1992 instead. The rounding-up results in loss of detail, however, it nevertheless provides a major improvement on datasets that apply the yearly rounding rule, which sometimes results in accuracies as large as 6 months (see for example Cheibub *et al.*, 2010; Magaloni *et al.*, 2013; Geddes *et al.* 2014; Wahman *et al.*, 2014).

Loss of data

Finally, some cases had to be dropped from the analysis due to complete lack of data availability. This data includes all regimes in countries with population smaller than 500,000 people, which are not recorded in the Maglioni *et al.* (2013) dataset. Because these states are included in the Gibler and Miller (2014) data, they had to be dropped. Examples include Bahamas, Barbados, St. Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, and St. Kitts and Nevis. As discussed in the previous parts of this thesis, categorical

classifications of autocratic regimes should not be applied interchangeably. Hence, no alternative source of data was available to classify these small states.

This poses considerable problems for the analysis, given that small states tend to often be islands, and island regimes should be considered relatively more secure from territorial claims than land-based regimes, given that they rarely share land with their neighbours. Some research has demonstrated in the past that from a historical perspective, island states were more likely than other states to develop democratic regimes in a historical perspective (Thompson and Rasler, 2004). Given that no regime classification for such small states exists, this has to be considered as an unavoidable limitation of this study. Future research should obtain information on the structural classification of regimes within small states, and attempt to establish whether the conclusions of this study can extend beyond the current sample of 314 large autocracies.

Missing data

Given that the final dataset has been created using various sources, not all information in the dataset was complete. When that was the case, an effort has been made to obtain the relevant data from alternative sources. Fortunately, the only variable with missing data was the GDP per capita from the Maddison Project. No information on GDP per capita was available for the entire observation period in East Germany, China, Argentina and Cyprus, as well as Bosnia between 1992 and 1994. To correct this, data from the Total Economy Database was used. As the operationalization section described, wealth in both datasets is measured in the same units, making such substitutions relatively easy. The only time data was not substituted was the case of the single party regime in East Germany, where the only accessible information on wealth was available from 1960 onward. As a result, East Germany is excluded from the analysis for 120 months between the beginning of 1951 and the end of 1960.

Having outlined all major data transformations, reductions and limitations, the chapter will now justify the use of survival analysis as the main modelling tool in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. As mentioned previously, it is the best method of dealing with a large proportion of censored or delayed entry cases in the dataset, but it also possesses a number of other useful advantages, which are described below.

Methods

Survival analysis: advantages and limitations

In order to determine the relationship between international conflict and regime transition, the thesis will utilise survival analysis as its primary method of investigation. *Survival analysis is a statistical tool that allows calculating the average time it takes for a certain event such as war, revolution or regime change to occur under varying conditions* (Mills, 2011: 1). An event history is a record of events that have happened to a specific sample of cases – in this case, a sample of all available autocratic regimes.³¹ Survival analysis, also known as event history analysis in social sciences, was originally used in engineering to record the time it took for machinery to stop working, and investigated different conditions that would influence how long a given piece of equipment would last. In social sciences, events consist of a qualitative change that occurs at some specific point in time, including divorces, deaths, wars, riots, regime changes or economic crises (Allison, 1984). In Survival analysis, one estimates how long it should take for an event to happen by examining the conditional probability of the event occurring within a given time interval (Mills, 2011). This type of analysis can help to answer a number of questions about events, among them questions about how long it normally takes for a regime to change to another form of autocracy, or transition to democracy, and how particular circumstances increase or decrease the probability of that

³¹ The following section will focus solely on the justification for the use of survival analysis as a main analysis tool, and does not discuss sampling and data. Sampling and data is discussed later in this chapter.

change happening. In short, survival analysis helps answer not only the question of whether the event has occurred or not, but also when it occurred, providing much analytical leverage over other methods of comparative analysis of longitudinal data (Box- Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004: 183). Given that this thesis asks about the determinants of the time-to-regime transitions (Chapters 5 and 6) and time to democratisation (Chapter 7), the specific time to event will be referred to as autocratic regime survival in Chapters 5 and 6, and democratisation in Chapter 7. This important distinction will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

When discussing regime or spell duration, the thesis will also often use terms such as survival or durability. All three terms refer to the same concept, namely, the time it takes for a given regime to end (transition to another regime) or democratise. All empirical chapters will aim to determine how involvement in territorial disputes influences the time it takes for those events to occur in structurally different types of autocracies. It is worth noting that while it is generally seen as a separate group of methodologies, survival analysis is really just another form of a regression model which uses different likelihood estimators than a standard OLS regression (Mills, 2011).

The survival function

In simple terms, a survival function reports the probability of a unit – here, a regime – surviving beyond a certain time t . Assuming T to be a non-negative variable denoting the time-to-regime transition, a survival function stands as follows:

$$S(t) = 1 - F(t) = \Pr(T > t) \quad (1)$$

As seen above, a survival function is simply the reverse cumulative distribution function of time-to-regime transition (T). A survival function describes the probability that there is no regime change prior to time t . At the inception of the regime ($t=0$), the probability of survival is always 1, and this probability decreases

towards 0 as t approaches infinity. As a result, the survival function is a monotone, non-increasing function of time.

Another crucial function in survival analysis, derived from the survival function, is the hazard rate function $h(t)$. A hazard rate at t equals the ratio of the probability density function at t to the survivor function at t :

$$h(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \rightarrow 0} \frac{\Pr(t + \Delta t > T > t | T > t)}{\Delta t} = \frac{f(t)}{1 - F(t)} = \frac{f(t)}{S(t)} \quad (2)$$

In other words, a hazard rate is the instantaneous rate of failure, or the (limiting) probability that a regime transition occurs in a given interval, conditional upon the regime having survived this long. The hazard rate is always equal or greater than 0 (no risk of transition), and can extend into infinity (certainty of failure at that instant).

From the hazard function (and, therefore, from the survival and the cumulative density and the probability density functions), one might in turn derive the cumulative hazard function, which measures the total amount of risk accumulated by a regime up to time t :

$$H(t) = \int_0^t h(u) du = \int_0^t \frac{f(u)}{S(u)} du = - \int_0^t \frac{1}{S(u)} \left\{ \frac{d}{du} S(u) \right\} du = -\ln\{S(t)\} \quad (3)$$

To determine the mean and median regime duration given a random failure time T with a probability density function $f(t)$, the following functions are used:

$$\text{Mean} = \mu_T = \int_0^{\infty} t f(t) dt = \int_0^{\infty} S(t) dt \quad (4)$$

$$\text{Median} = \tilde{\mu}_T = Q(0.5) \quad (5)$$

Thus, the median is defined simply as the 50th percentile of the failure time distribution, and signifies the time at which 50% of all regimes have failed. The median is often a much more useful descriptive tool for survival statistics, given that the distribution of survival times tend to have particularly long tails, making

the values of the mean misleading and unreliable. As a result, this thesis will mostly refer to the median survival time for autocratic regimes in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

The Semi-Parametric Cox Proportional Hazards Model

Although there are various types of survival analysis models, each with its distinct set of advantages, discussing all of them in detail is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this section will briefly explain the particular modelling techniques used, and why they are the most suitable for the type of data used in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

In order to perform the majority of data analyses in the empirical chapters, the thesis will employ the Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) model, which asserts that for every j -th subject in the dataset, the hazard rate is:

$$h(t|\mathbf{x}_j) = h_0(t) \exp(\beta_1 \mathbf{x}_1 + \dots + \beta_k \mathbf{x}_k) \quad (6)$$

With the $\beta_1 \dots \beta_k$, the regression coefficients, to be estimated from the data.

The main benefits of the Cox model, which is widely applied in the social and biomedical sciences alike (Cleaves *et al.*, 2010; Alison, 2014), are derived from the fact that it uses the partial likelihood estimation method. This, in turn, has three main advantages (Guo, 2010):

First, unlike other models,³² the Cox regression makes no assumptions about the distribution of the hazard rate over time and the baseline hazard function, $h_0(t)$, can be left un-estimated (Cleaves *et al.*, 2011). This means that the hazard rate can take on any shape, for as long as that shape is similar for all subjects: for any two regimes at any point in time, the ratio of their hazards is a constant (Ibid., Alison, 2014). Hence, no prior knowledge of the shape of the hazard function for autocratic regimes is needed. This is a considerable advantage on alternative modelling strategies, given that misspecification of the shape of the hazard function can lead to misleading results about the regression coefficient (Cleaves *et al.*, 2011: 130).

³² For example, the Gompertz-Makeham or Weibull models (see Rodríguez, 2010).

Furthermore, while the proportionality of the hazard function seems to be a trade-off for the semi-parametric approach to estimating the baseline hazard function, it can be easily extended to accommodate for non-proportional hazards (ibid.)

Second, the estimates of the model depend only on the ordering of the events, rather than the times at which the events have actually occurred (Guo, 2010). More specifically, the results of the regression are based on forming, at each event-time, the collection of subjects which are at risk of that event occurring, and then maximising the conditional probability of failure (Cleves *et al.*, 2010: 145). Because of that, monotonic transformations of the event times make no substantial differences to the coefficient estimates (Guo, 2010). Finally, it should be noted that models estimated using Cox PH regression lack intercepts, which is simply incorporated into the baseline hazard function $h_0(t)$.

Advantages of survival analysis

As mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter, quantitative analysis methods can pose a wide variety of challenges due to the assumptions that need to be satisfied in order for the results to be fully reliable. While there are a number of reasons why survival analysis is the most appropriate tool for analysing regime duration, the single most important reason is that, unlike in OLS regression, the assumption of normally distributed residuals does not have to be met.

This means that, unlike in OLS, the distribution of differences between the predicted value of the dependent variable (\hat{y}), and the actual value of the dependent variable (y) are not assumed to be random. This assumption is particularly useful for the data at hand. When it comes to regime transition, it would be unrealistic to assume that the risk of regime change or democratisation changes proportionally over time. Regimes might, for example, be at the greatest risk of failing within the first 5-10 years of existence before they 'consolidate', and at a low risk of failure thereafter. Alternatively, they might face the greatest risk of failure in the first 10 years of their existence, experience a period of consolidation,

and once more, be at a higher risk of failure after a given period of time has passed. The distribution of failure times is almost always non-linear, and can often be exponential, curvilinear, or even bi-modal: as a result, it cannot be reliably handled by standard OLS regression (Cleaves *et al.*, 2011). As mentioned above, in survival analysis the distribution of the baseline hazard rate can take on any shape, and what is more, that shape does not have to be pre-determined before the analysis. This means that the analysis does not rest on unrealistic assumptions.

The second big advantage of survival analysis is that it extracts meaningful information from data that would typically be lost during logistic regression. While logistic regression can estimate the likelihood of an event occurring, this rarely constitutes a particularly insightful piece of information in regime change studies. While many states might eventually become democratic, we know nothing more than the fact that the event has eventually occurred. For example, if half of autocracies in the sample eventually become democratic at the end of the observation period, all one knows are that the probability of the transition was 50%. Survival analysis, on the other hand, can provide insight into how long it took for the states to democratise. As a result, one obtains information not only about the probability of democratisation, but also *when* it has occurred relative to other transitions, and which factors might have facilitated the process. This is especially important given that most regimes do, eventually, undergo some form of a regime change. Simply relying on the likelihood of that event adds relatively little to the existing knowledge. In addition to the above, there are three specific features of the survival analysis, and the Cox model more specifically, that will improve the validity of the analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. They are discussed below.

Handling right-censored and delayed entry regimes

First, unlike OLS or logistic regression, survival analysis can handle missing data with ease, with a much lower likelihood to produce biased estimations. This is particularly important given that by the end of the observation period in 2007,

many regimes have not yet transitioned to another form of regime. This means that the information on the final outcome of the duration period is unknown, creating a problem of right-censoring in statistical analysis discussed earlier in this chapter. In standard regression, right-censored cases are coded as missing data and produce highly biased estimations (Mills, 2011; Allison, 2014). As a likelihood-based approach, survival analysis adjusts the model for the instance of event non-occurrence (right-censoring) in each of the observations, making the bias much less likely to ensue (Prinja *et al.*, 2010). Similarly, survival analysis is better equipped to handle delayed entry cases. In semi-parametric models like the Cox model, one can simply omit the regime from the analysis during the truncation period. This is because the regime cannot be treated as if it was at risk prior to 1951, because the only reason it is observed to begin with was because it survived until 1951 (Cleves *et al.*, 2010: 35).

Time-varying covariates

Second, the Cox model is the first of its kind to allow time-varying covariates in survival analysis, making it especially pertinent for this thesis. Most independent variables in this thesis, including the presence of a territorial threat and GDP per capita, change their value over the lifetime of a particular regime. The Cox model can account for those with the following adjustment to equation (6) above:

$$h(t) = h_0(t) \exp\{\beta_1 \mathbf{x}_1 + \dots + \beta_k \mathbf{x}_k + g(t)(\gamma_1 \mathbf{z}_1 + \dots + \gamma_m \mathbf{z}_m)\} \quad (7)$$

Where $z_1 \dots z_m$ are the time-varying covariates, and where the estimation has a net effect of estimating regression coefficients ($\gamma_1 \dots \gamma_m$) for a covariate $g(t)z_i$, which is a function of the current time (StataCorp, 2013: 129). Given that the data is in a regime-month format, with a different yearly value for each time-varying covariate, no further action was needed to accommodate the variables (Ibid., Cleves *et al.*, 2010: 193).

Within-country correlation of regime transition and democratisation

Finally, the Cox model can adjust the estimations for a possible correlation within each country. After all, certain countries are more prone to regime change than others for various historical, socioeconomic and cultural reasons that cannot be accounted for with reductionist methods of inquiry. For example, countries like Thailand or Turkey have a particularly prominent history of regime transitions, increasing the hazard of transition for each regime in a way that cannot be explained with the data at hand. In order to account for this possible within-country interdependence, the regime will be clustered within countries. Clustering adjusts the standard errors to account for the within-country interdependence, and will be performed and discussed throughout Chapters 5-7.

Limitations of the Cox model and diagnostic tools used in analytical chapters

As a result of the features discussed above, survival analysis is the analytical tool of choice for a large number of social scientists interested in the determinants of regime change and democratisation (Ghandi and Przeworski, 2008; Ulfelder, 2007; Magaloni, 2008; Geddes *et al.*, 2014; Knutsen and Nygård, 2015). Nevertheless, despite its many advantages from the study of regime transitions, survival analysis has certain limitations which must be borne in mind when analysing the data and drawing conclusions.

Informative censoring

One of the most important limitations to consider is the assumption of non-informative censoring. For example, regimes that did not experience the event when the study has ended, or have for some reason dropped out from the sample are assumed to be at the same risk of regime transition or democratisation as all other regimes that *have* experienced them. If, for some reasons, there is something distinctive about them (informative censoring), the estimates produced by survival

analysis might be biased. Unfortunately, no tests exist that could determine whether the censored population is, or is not, informative (Allison, 2010).

In case of all censored countries, which have not yet failed by 2007, the reason is the unavailability of data for the period after the year 2007, rather than an inherent feature of the surviving regimes. However, when it comes to regimes that were censored *prior* to 2007, there is no guarantee that these regimes are not substantially different from the rest of the sample. The regimes in question are the single party regimes in Yugoslavia, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, and the military regimes in Somalia, Syria, and North Yemen, as discussed previously in this chapter.

However, the important aspect of the coding to bear in mind when discussing informative censoring is that all of the regimes listed above do indeed meet the practical criteria for a regime failure. The only reason they are not coded as having failed, is because they do not meet the theoretical criteria for a *transition*. Typically, survival analysis would not distinguish between a failure that results in a transition, and a failure that results in the regime ceasing to exist. The regimes were coded as censored due to theoretical considerations (no identifiable 'successor' regime, or unification with another regime), rather than something inherently different (informative) about them. In purely practical terms, all of the regimes have not survived. Because of this, and because these cases constitute less than 2% of the entire sample, informative censoring is not considered a problematic issue for the data analysis performed later in the thesis.

Tied failures

As mentioned previously, the estimates of the Cox model depend on ordering the events rather than the actual times at which the events occurred (Guo, 2010). Because sometimes two or more regimes are likely to transition at the exactly same moment in time (tied failures), it may be difficult to calculate the probability of that

transition, given that the probability of a transition is conditional on the number of regimes that have *not* transitioned at that given time. There are many methods of handling ties within the data; among them are the Efron and Breslow approximation methods. While both are relatively accurate, Efron approximation can sometimes bias the regression coefficients when many ties are present within the data (Li, 2010). As a result, the thesis will use the Breslow approximation method across the models in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. This approximation is also a standard method for handling tied failures for many types of statistical software (see for example: Stata Corp, 2013).

Model building and diagnostic tools

The thesis employs step-wise models, introducing one variable at a time, based on their theoretical importance. Theoretically relevant covariates will be retained in the model regardless of whether they produce significant results or not. This is done to observe the impact each additional covariate has on the effect of the previously introduced covariates, and to make sense of the underlying patterns within the data. Some data will be transformed to ensure a linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables, and all the details of these transformations will be discussed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, a number of diagnostic tests will be conducted on all of the models included in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

The relative contribution of each variable in the model will be established using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1973). AIC will also help determine fit of the final models relative to the other models for a given regime type. In general, the lower the AIC score, the better the quality of the model relative to each of the other models. AIC estimates the trade-off between the goodness of fit of the model and the relative complexity of the model. Once a model containing all covariates is built, it will be compared to the model that contains all covariates with the addition of important interactions between the main predictors. AIC will be used to

determine whether the interactions help improve model fit. The model with the lower AIC score will then be chosen, and all further analysis will be based on that model. AIC is preferred to the BIC as it includes a penalty for the number of variables included in the model (Atkinson, 1981; Posada and Buckley, 2004).

The functional form of all continuous variables included in the models with the lowest AIC scores will be tested by plotting their Martingale residuals. This is done to establish whether the variable has a linear effect in the model as expected, or whether it should be transformed to fulfil the assumptions of a Cox regression. In addition, all models will be tested for the essential assumption of proportional hazards based on the Schoenfeld residuals. The detailed results of these tests, as well as individual plots for all covariates in the best fitting models will be included in the appendices for each chapter.

Finally, a link test (Pregibon, 1980) will be performed on all models throughout the analysis to determine whether the models have been specified correctly. In case of the link test producing significant results (indicating a misspecification of the model), covariates responsible for the misspecification will be transformed accordingly, and separate tests will be performed to ensure that the new models are also specified correctly. More details on all of these tests and their interpretation can be found in Chapter 5.

Multicollinearity

Since multicollinearity can be a serious problem in Cox regression models, all variables used in this thesis have been subjected to a multicollinearity test using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in order to ensure that the predictors used in this thesis are not highly correlated with one another. In order to perform the tests, a standard OLS regression been run for each subset of the independent variables used in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The dependent variable for models testing for multicollinearity in Chapter 5 and 6 was time to regime change, while the OLS

regression testing for multicollinearity in Chapter 7 used time to democratisation as its dependent variable. The interaction terms between variables that are included in the main models of this thesis have not been part of the regression models build for the purpose of these tests. This is because interaction terms are likely to cause a high degree of multicollinearity between the original terms and the interaction term, while not actually indicating any serious correlation problems between the main predictors. In general, VIF scores that are below 10 (or sometimes 5) are considered to indicate acceptable level of multicollinearity between independent variables (Chatterjee and Price, 1991). As can be seen in Tables A4-A11 in Appendix A, all scores range above 1 but below 2, indicating no serious issues for the models used in this thesis.

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted a number of crucial methodological debates within the field of IR and Comparative Politics, highlighting the methodological improvements of this research on previous work in the same area. It is clear that while the scientific approach to measuring the impact of territorial threats on domestic change is one of the best approaches to discerning patterns of change over time in a large number of autocratic regimes, it still has a number of potential limitations. The most important ones include the fact that while the results of the analytical chapters might be generalizable, they can only be generalised to large autocracies that took part in a territorial dispute with a neighbouring state. Furthermore, the results only apply to the time period under investigation of this study, namely, the years between 1951 and 2008.

Every effort has been made to identify all theoretically important predictors of regime change and democratisation available. Future studies could also aim to control for the impact of economic crises or economic growth as opposed to wealth, to investigate whether these relationships could change the relationship between territorial threats and whether regime transition is affected by them.

Although the methods employed in this thesis are not without their limitations, they are the best available methods and the state of the art in the field, thus contributing to the current ReSIT literature in three main ways. The first contribution is made by employing a dichotomous measure of regime transition and democratisation. This improves the standards of measurement of IR due to it having a much greater level of content validity. Second, the thesis distinguishes between various types of autocratic regimes, as discussed in Chapter 3, and includes multiparty regimes as a distinct, idiosyncratic regime type. The thesis investigates not only democratic transition, but also transition to other types of regimes, investigating general regime longevity and stability. Finally, the thesis employs a state of the art methodology, the Cox proportional hazards regression to investigate its claims. It is in the next three chapters this methodology will be used to demonstrate that territorial disputes have a significant impact on the duration of autocratic regimes, and their chances of democratisation.

Chapter 5: Territorial disputes and autocratic regime survival

Introduction

As outlined in Chapter 3, this thesis addresses four research questions: how do territorial disputes affect the survival of autocratic regimes? Are there significant differences in how various types of autocratic regimes respond to territorial disputes? Are autocratic regimes less likely to democratise as a result of territorial dispute involvement? And finally, are the chances of democratising as a result of territorial dispute involvement different in various types of autocratic regimes?

The following chapter will address the first research question. More specifically, it will test whether territorial disputes affects the stability in all types of autocratic regimes, without distinguishing between autocracies based on their structural characteristics. The specific effects of each type of autocracy on this relationship will be instead discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 will investigate whether territorial dispute involvement has a significant impact on regimes' likelihood of democratisation, and explore the how this relationship changes depending on structural features of autocratic regimes.

The main findings of this chapter suggest that as it was expected in Chapter 3, dispute involvement made autocratic regimes more stable and less likely to transition into any other form of regime – democratic *or* autocratic. However, this relationship was only significant for regimes that do not depend on petroleum production for part of their income. This is an interesting and novel finding, which suggests that rentier states are less prone to the centralising effects of territorial disputes. It is possible that salient threats might increase the stability of regimes which do not have easy access to funding (such as petroleum wealth) which can be immediately spent on enhancing the strength of the military. Chapter 6 will further

explore whether the same relationship is observed when structural features of autocratic regimes are accounted for in the models.

This chapter provides an original and important contribution to both the IR and Comparative Politics literatures. It is the first study to date to demonstrate that the premise of ReSIT is correct in relation to the stabilising effects of external threats. By utilising some of the most recent Comparative Politics literature, the chapter makes a crucial distinction between regime change and democratisation, and tests the proposition that territorial disputes affect regime stability, rather than spell stability. Finally, the results of this chapter demonstrate that the theoretical assumptions made by the ReSIT literature ought to be considered by mainstream Comparative Politics scholars. This chapter provides empirical support for the proposition that territorial disputes helps explain regime stability when the regimes are not dependent on oil production, demonstrating the need to further develop research in this area.

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, the main aims and purposes of the analysis will be set out, along with a brief summary of the main theoretical claims outlined in Chapter 3. The section will reiterate the main assumptions about the expected linkages between territorial dispute involvement and autocratic regime stability. Furthermore, the section will also outline the theoretical reasons for the inclusion of other crucial predictors of regime stability typically considered in the Comparative Politics literature. The chapter will then move on to discuss the main methodological procedures, and the data analysis section, which begins with descriptive statistics and diagnostic tests, followed by detailed testing of the hypotheses. The conclusion section will discuss the main findings of this chapter, and discuss their implications for the wider literature and the thesis more generally.

Theory

Distinguishing between autocratic spells and autocratic regimes

As explained earlier in the thesis, autocratic spells are the total number of years an autocratic regime, or a succession of autocratic regimes, have ruled in a given country without interruption. An autocratic regime is defined here as a set of undemocratic rules for choosing leaders and policies in a given period of time (Geddes *et al.*, 2014). As noted in Chapter 3 the theoretical assumptions of ReSIT can be applied to both autocratic spells *and* autocratic regimes, given that the more durable the *regime*, then the more durable the *spell* of autocracy.

Given that most research on the implications of external threats for the domestic organisation of states focuses primarily on democratisation, this chapter makes an original contribution by examining the issue from an alternative perspective. This is important, because this thesis takes into account the fact that regime failure in autocratic states does not always end in a democratic transition. In fact, upon transition most autocracies are followed by another form of autocracy, and, the implications of this type of regime change are often overlooked by political scientists (Wright *et al.*, 2015). Nevertheless, autocracy-to-autocracy regime changes have serious implications for transitioning states. For example, when the Sandinista movement overthrew the Somoza military dictatorship in Nicaragua in 1979, the country underwent a series of drastic economic, social, political, and cultural changes. Similarly, the long history of regime instability in Thailand has had a major impact on Thai society and economic development. And while regime instability in Thailand has made it possible for two short spells of democracy to occur between 1951 and 2012, 75% of transitions were from one autocratic regime to another,³³ resulting in a number of prosecutions, elite turnovers, expropriations,

³³ In the Magaloni *et al.* (2013) dataset used in this thesis, between 1950 and 2012, Thailand has transitioned 8 times, with 6 of those changes being an autocracy-to-autocracy transitions: in 1973, Thailand's military regimes transitioned into a multiparty regime, to democracy in 1975, to military regime in 1976, to multiparty regime in 1979, to military regime in 1980, to democracy in 1992, to military regime in 2006, and back to democracy in 2008.

as well as legal, social and political turmoil (see for example Morell, 1976 and Case, 1995).

Understood in this way, autocratic regime stability is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it increases the chances of democratisation because a democratic transition can only occur once an autocratic regime has failed. On the other hand, it also increases the chances of a transition to another form of autocratic regime. The impact of autocratic regime change is unpredictable, but certainly real. Given that, to the best of my knowledge, all of the current literature on ReSIT focuses on autocratic spell durability rather than autocratic regime stability, it is crucial to address this important gap in the literature by investigating whether territorial dispute involvement prolongs the longevity of autocratic regimes, shielding them from coups and political plots, and thus preventing *both* democratisation and autocracy-to-autocracy transition. And indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3, much of the theory on the centralising impact of conflict engagement in political regimes focuses on the same elements traditionally viewed as increasing regime stability more generally, rather than simply protecting them from democratisation. The next section turns to examining the effects of territorial disputes on autocratic regime transitions.

The effects of territorial disputes on autocratic regime transitions

As discussed in the Chapter 3, the biggest threat to authoritarian regimes comes from the inside. The opposition as well as certain factions within the elites might have strong incentives to oust the current leadership and install their own candidates in their stead. This threat of rebellion, inherent in all autocracies, serves as a bargaining chip between the rulers and the elites. Its magnitude is likely to have a significant influence on the distribution of power within the state. The strength of the threat depends on a number of factors, but the three identified as the most vital are usually: the strength and the unity of the opposition, the loyalty of the elites, and the support from the general population (Frantz and Ezrow,

2011a). If the opposition is weak, elites remain loyal, and the masses relatively content, the chances of a regime change, unless it is executed by some external force, are relatively small.

By drawing on the 'rally around the flag' literature, ReSIT emphasizes the effects a threat to national security is likely to have on the interaction between the leaders and the elites. First, highly salient territorial disputes are likely to unify polarised elites. Even if the ruling factions disagree with the leadership, they are likely to unify in face of a significant threat in order to prevent it from materialising. Preventing the breakdown of state authority, at least temporarily, is expected to take priority over factionalism. In most cases, any significant loss of territory and state integrity are going to be seen as less desirable than the current *status quo*. Second, the 'rally' effect is likely to make the costs of actively plotting against the leader too high for the potential opposition. As argued in the Chapter 3, the high-risk context of territorial disputes might severely weaken and fracture the opposition, who will in turn find it much harder to co-opt other members of the elite. Finally, the 'rally' effects make it more likely for the general population to support the current regime due to the increased feeling of nationalism, which often accompanies international disputes, especially the ones that are territorial in nature. All of the above factors are expected to significantly strengthen the position of the leader vis-a-vis the elites by discrediting the threat of rebellion. It is worth noting that territorial disputes only have temporary effects on elite structures within autocracies, and it is up to the leadership to attempt power consolidation. Whether this is possible depends on a number of factors that are highly contextual, and beyond the scope of this quantitative analysis. If the opportunity is seized, the regime is likely to become more centralised, and the chances of the elites to overthrow the current leadership decrease significantly. Therefore, the first hypothesis of this thesis states that:

Hypothesis 1: Autocracies facing territorial threats are at less risk of regime transitions than regimes that are not facing such threats.

Other factors affecting regime durability

Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter 3, other factors affecting regime stability are also considered in this and the next chapter. While the literature on the effects of economic development and regime stability is mixed, this chapter will assume that wealth has a stabilising effect on autocratic regimes. The limited discussion on the impact of wealth on the leader-elite interaction suggests that that higher level of economic prosperity increases the durability of autocracies, making them less likely to transition. Most prominently, Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (2003) have proposed that the level of economic development is likely to reflect the amount of financial resources available to the leadership that would help 'buy' the loyalty of the elites and silence the opposition (Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, 2003). Furthermore, high GDP levels are likely to legitimise the regime in the eyes of the public, which is unlikely to oppose a government that promotes the wealth of its citizens (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). Finally, extremely low levels of GDP per capita are likely an indicator of a financial crisis, a well-known factor increasing the likelihood of regime change (Gasiorowski, 1995). Hence, it is expected that wealth is likely to reduce the likelihood of autocratic regime failure.

Moreover, this chapter will also assume that petroleum dependency and assume that oil-dependent autocracies are at less risk of transition than autocracies, which are not relying on oil. The rationale for this assumption was explained in more detail in Chapter 3.

Finally, some scholars have argued that ethnic and religious fractionalisation might have a significant effect on the level of political polarisation within the state (Easterly and Levine, 1997), potentially affecting overall regime stability (Escribá-Folch and Wright, 2010). As such, both types of fractionalisation are expected to increase the likelihood of regime transitions within autocracies.

In summary, the literature and theory section above has emphasised the main factors likely to contribute to the survival of autocratic regimes outlined in Chapter

3. It has demonstrated how the ReSIT theory fits within the Comparative Politics literature, and demonstrated that its assumptions can be used to investigate the impact of territorial disputes on the longevity of autocratic regimes. Furthermore, the above section has engaged with other theories of regime transition within the Comparative Politics literature, including those on economic development, oil dependency, and ethnic and religious fractionalisation. This combination of perspectives has helped establish that all variables used in the analysis have clear theoretical reasons to be included in the models and are likely to produce significant results. What follows below is a description of the methods used to conduct the analysis in the current chapter. The first part of the methodology will briefly review the unit of analysis, as well as the main transformations performed on the predictor variables used in the models. The methods used are briefly summarised, along with all diagnostic tools used to investigate the robustness of the results. The chapter then moves on to the wider analysis of results, and concludes with the implications for the overall thesis and wider scholarship in general.

Data and Methods

Data

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the dataset employed in this chapter is a custom made file compiled from three separate data sources. The 'Autocracies of the World' (Magaloni *et al.*, 2013) dataset, discussed at length in the previous chapter, is used to distinguish between various types of autocracy (military, monarchic, multiparty and single party), as well as to differentiate between democracy and authoritarianism. For definitions as well as operationalization of those and other crucial concepts, see Chapter 4. The dataset contains a total of 90,850 regime-months, with 54,774 (60.3%) of those being authoritarian. The unit of all univariate

and multivariate analyses of this chapter is the hazard ratio of regime transition at a particular moment in time, although certain descriptive statistics include the regime itself as a main subject of investigation. The transition is understood as regime change regardless of whether the change was peaceful or violent. Furthermore, the transition is understood to have occurred only if the overarching regime type has changed. In the rare instances where a country has undergone a transition without changing the structures of the state (i.e. transitioned from one type of multiparty regime to another multiparty regime), the regime is understood as not having transitioned. The temporal domain of the data spans from 1951 to 2008, and in order to minimise the bias resulting from left-truncation of the data, all regimes are treated as if they originated in 1951 (Cleves *et al.*, 2010).

Variables

While the typology adopted in this thesis distinguishes between five different regime types (democracy, military, monarchic, multiparty and single party regimes), this chapter will focus on the very broad understanding on autocracies as *regimes that do not fit the criteria of being democratic*, according to the minimalist definition of democracy discussed in Chapter 4. While this chapter aggregates all autocratic regimes and treats them as if they responded to territorial threats in a similar manner, the next chapter (Chapter 6) will explore how structural features of autocracies affect the relationship between territorial threat and regime transition.

Dependent variable: regime transition

As mentioned in Chapter 4, transition is a binary indicator variable, coded 1 in the last month of the regime existence if a country transitions, or 0 in all other instances. States that begun before or after 1951 and have not yet transitioned by 2008 are always coded as 0. The transition variable includes both autocracy-to-autocracy transitions (for example, a transition from a military to a single party regime) as well as democratic transitions (for example, a transition from multiparty

regime to a democratic regime). Once a regime becomes a democracy, it is excluded from the analysis. If the democracy within the excluded regime breaks down, it is included back into analysis.

Independent variables: transformations

The section below will briefly discuss the functional form of the continuous variables used in this chapter, as well as any transformations applied to them for the purposes of this chapter.

Out of all of the variables available for analysis in this chapter, only three are continuous. To reduce the impact of extreme values on the relationship between the predictors and the dependent variable, the functional form of the *GDP per capita*, *ethnic fractionalisation* and *religious fractionalisation* variables had to be explored.

GDP per capita

As discussed in Chapter 4, the variable measuring the level of economic development within autocracies is recorded in yearly GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, and measured in 1990 international Gheary-Khamis dollars. Like the territorial dispute variable, it is lagged 12 months given that the effects of development on regime transitions is likely to be somewhat delayed. Because the distribution of GDP per capita is not even among autocracies, with a vast majority of states having a relatively low level of income, and a very small minority having a disproportionately high income, the data is right-skewed, and requires a logarithmic transformation to ensure that the relationship between regime duration and economic development is linear. Figure 1 demonstrates the distribution of income before and after the logarithmic transformation. In order to

transform GDP, the common logarithm with the base 10 has been applied to the data. This means that while interpreting the models in this chapter, every single unit increase in the *log(GDP per capita)* variable should be interpreted as a tenfold increase in GDP per capita in each of the regimes.

In addition, Figure 2 shows the relationship between *log(GDP per capita)* and analysis time is linear after the transformation. For comparison, Figure 2 also includes the graphical representation of the relationship between the non-transformed GDP per capita and time.

Ethnic fractionalisation and religious fractionalisation variables

Figure 3 demonstrates the distribution of values on the ethnic and religious fractionalisation scales as constructed by Alesina *et al.* (2003). It is clear from both histograms that the data is normally distributed among the sample of autocracies, with no major right- or left-skew. Given that ethnic and religious fractionalisation values do not vary over time, there is no need to investigate their distribution over time using a scatterplot or a linear prediction.

Additional variable transformations

In order to estimate the baseline survival, hazard and cumulative hazard functions for the best fitting model, all predictor variables in the models have to be set to the value of zero. While typically the purpose of the baseline functions is to estimate the function given the *minimal* risk of regime transition, this and future analytical chapters of this thesis will estimate baseline functions based on average values of predictors. This is done, because a minimal risk of transition is often based on

Figure 1. The distribution of GDP per capita before and after the logarithmic transformation




Figure 2. A scatterplot of the relationship between *GDP per capita* and analysis time before and after the logarithmic transformation





Figure 3. The distribution of the *ethnic fractionalisation* and *religious fractionalisation* variables



unrealistic values of the main predictors and can be hard to interpret in a way that would make a meaningful contribution to what does, and what does not, increase the likelihood of regime failure. Hence, all of the baseline models in this chapter will be set for regimes with no territorial disputes, an average GDP per capita income, no recent history of political instability, no oil-dependency, and a minimal value of both ethnic and religious fractionalisation. Given that most autocratic regimes fit these criteria, the estimation of the above baseline function is more realistic, and more helpful in understanding the impact of territorial disputes on the hazard of regime change.

In order to aid the estimation of baseline functions, the original untransformed GDP per capita variable was centred on its mean, before being logarithmically transformed. A mean score for the untransformed GDP per capita was estimated at 2,869 GK\$, and then log transformed ($\log_{10}(2869) = 3.70$). All of the $\log(\text{GDP})$ scores were then subtracted with 3.70, meaning that when the centred $\log(\text{GDP})$ is set to 0 when estimating baseline functions, it is set to its original, untransformed mean. This assures that while their value is equal to 0, it is actually indicating a mean income among autocratic regimes.

Methods

As mentioned in Chapter 4, all three quantitative chapters in the thesis will employ survival analysis to investigate the effects of conflict on authoritarian regime duration. This is a particularly suitable method given the numerous issues that arise in regime duration data, which were discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The sections below will address each of the methods used in order to address these issues.

Relaxing the independence assumption

Typically, in most regression analyses, including survival analysis, it is assumed that all units of analysis are independent from one another. However, as discussed in

Chapter 4, it is likely that regime transitions might be more likely in some states and less likely in others. For example, due to some unobservable factors, some states might be particularly prone to multiple regime transitions (Turkey and Thailand) while others might be exceptionally stable (Malaysia and China). To account for this, the assumption of independence will be relaxed in the analysis by clustering the observations within countries. Thus, while autocratic regimes are assumed to be independent from one another *between* countries, they are assumed to be interdependent *within* countries, and the standard errors are adjusted accordingly to reflect this (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). This relaxation of the independence assumption ensures that the results from this and further analytical chapters are more valid and reliable.

Model building and comparison

In this and future chapters, models will be built using the stepwise forward selection method process using only one regression type, namely, the Cox Proportional Hazards analysis. Unfortunately, global and absolute measures of model fit are typically unavailable for survival analysis models, and as a result, only the *relative* fit of the model can be used to compare individual models (Allison, 2010: 422). Furthermore, standard likelihood ratio tests used to compare relative model fit are also unavailable for models with relaxed assumption of independence (Stata Corp, 2011). Nevertheless, this is not a major problem, given that the stepwise forward selection method is used in this thesis to understand how the relationship between predictors and the dependent variables change as more predictors are added to the model, rather than to determine whether particular variables significantly improve the model fit.³⁴ To aid the selection of the final model, the analysis will be guided by Akaike Information Criteria scores and p-values of individual predictors, rather than directly comparing model fit. In general,

³⁴ As an exception to this, Wald tests for model fit improvement in a nested model will be performed to confirm that the addition of an interaction between time and a variable with time-varying effect significantly improves model fit.

the lower the AIC score, the better the quality of the model relative to each of the other models. AIC is in many ways superior to other measures of model fit, such as the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) because it includes a penalty for the number of variables included in the model. As a result, all theoretically important variables will be retained regardless of their contribution to the model, unless stated otherwise.³⁵

Testing the proportional hazards assumption

Given that the Cox survival analysis assumes that the hazard of regime transition does not vary over time, each variable in the model will be investigated for the violation of the proportional hazards assumption using:

- The graphical 'log-log' plot for dummy variables;
- The graphical examination of the Martingale residuals for continuous variables; and
- The Schoenfeld residuals test for all types of variables (both graphically and non-graphically) to seek violation of the PH assumption globally (across the entire model) and individually (among singular variables).

In the instance of the 'log-log' plot, if the PH assumption is met, the survival lines plotted for each value of the variable are expected to be parallel to one other. In the case of Martingale residuals, residuals are plotted against the values of the continuous variables with the expectation that the local linear regression (LOWESS) is parallel to the x-axis. Finally, in the case of Schoenfeld residuals, it is expected that the global test for the PH assumption is insignificant. That is, the hypothesis that the PH assumptions are violated can be safely rejected. If the p-value is below 0.05, the PH assumption has been violated. In the graphical representation of the

³⁵ At times, variables that are not of crucial theoretical importance, and whose effect is not statistically significant, might be dropped from the models. This will happen if there are concerns over the proportion of predictors in the model relative to the failure count. This is particularly likely in later chapters, where less failure events will be available for analysis in the models.

Schoenfeld test, it is expected that the overall distribution of values will be linear and parallel to the x-axis, akin to the Martingale residual test.

In case of a PH violation, a number of solutions will be applied to account for the time-varying effects of the predictors. First, the problematic variables will be identified. Second, a Cox proportional hazards model with an interaction between the problematic variable and time will be fitted, and a Wald test will be performed to investigate whether the model fit improves significantly. If the interaction with time is significant, and the model fit improves as a result of including time varying covariates, it will be retained in the model. Once all time-varying effects of predictor variables are established, an additional model including all of the standard covariates and covariates with time-varying effects will be fitted using a Royston-Parmar flexible parametric analysis. This is done because unlike Cox PH regression, Royston-Parmar regression makes it easier for time-varying effects to be accommodated in the analysis, while at the same time allowing for greater flexibility of the hazard function, which is much smoother and easier to interpret than the results of a Cox model with time-dependent effects (Royston and Lambert, 2011). Royston-Parmar models split the time scale of the function at points known as knots, and allow the coefficients to vary according to data distribution in each of the sections. It then re-joins them at the knots, resulting in a function which is more true to the data, and much smoother, than that produced by parametric and non-parametric models. The use of Cox and Royston-Parmar models to test the assumptions outlined in the beginning of the chapter will increase the overall robustness of the analysis.

In addition, given that the Royston-Parmar model is in many ways superior in graphically representing survival, hazard and cumulative hazard functions (Royston and Lambert, 2011), it will be used throughout this and future analytical chapters as the method of choice for visualising the results of the models. This can be done, because the results of the Royston-Parmar models do not tend to differ in terms of effect significance and magnitude from standard Cox non-PH models (Royston and Lambert, 2011).

Additional diagnostic tests

In addition to testing for the crucial PH assumption, a number of diagnostic tests will be performed to ensure that the results are valid.

First, for every model built using the Cox analysis, a link test (Pregibon, 1980) will be performed on all models throughout the analysis to determine whether the models have been specified correctly. In case of the link test producing significant results (indicating a misspecification of the model), covariates responsible for the misspecification will be transformed accordingly, and separate tests will be performed to ensure that the new models are specified correctly. A separate test will be performed for each model, and if the addition of a predictor causes concerning results, a further investigation into the continuous form of the variable will be performed, including an addition of potential transformations of the variable.

Finally, the functional form of all continuous variables included in the models with all covariates will be tested by plotting their Martingale residuals. This is done to establish whether the variable has a linear effect in the model as expected, or whether it should be transformed to fulfil the assumptions of a Cox regression.

Data analysis

The data analysis section will test the hypothesis put forward in the initial section of the chapter. To reiterate, these hypothesis state that:

Hypothesis 1: Autocracies facing territorial threats are at less risk of regime transitions than regimes that are not facing such threats.

Additionally, a number of other assumptions are made about the remaining predictors in the models. Overall, it is expected that the wealthier the regime, the

less likely it is to transition to another form of regime. Additionally, autocracies that depend on oil will also be less likely to fail. The factors likely to reduce the likelihood of transition include high levels of ethnic and religious fractionalisation, as well as a recent history of political instability.

Before moving onto testing the main hypothesis, some basic descriptive statistics are performed to investigate the underlying patterns and trends inherent in the data that might have an effect on how the model results are interpreted. The analysis section will then move to test the hypothesis and other assumptions in Models 1-8, which are built using the forward selection process. The proportional hazard assumption will be tested, and the implications of these and other diagnostic tests will be discussed. Finally, the conclusion will discuss the implications of the findings for this chapter, as well as the relevant literature and the thesis more generally.

Descriptive statistics

The aggregated autocracies in the dataset had a median duration time of 10.8 years. This means that 50% of all non-censored regimes in the sample have failed by the time they reached 10.8 years. Given this short median duration, it is perhaps unsurprising that autocratic regimes have a high occurrence of regime transitions, with 77.3% of all 314 regimes within the sample transitioning at some point between 1951 and 2008.

Due to the frequent occurrence of regime failures in the sample, it is curious that only about 50.4% of all regimes that have eventually transitioned experienced a serious spell of instability in the year before (Table 5). This proportion increases when the censored and non-censored regimes are considered separately, with almost 71% of all regimes that have eventually transitioned experiencing some type of instability throughout their history, compared to only 48.6% of regimes which were yet to fail by 2007, or ceased to exist without transitioning. This demonstrates that

although most regimes that transition experience *some* form of instability within their lifetime, this is not always the case. Furthermore, instability is more likely to occur a number of years before the transition, rather than immediately before it. It indicates that regime transitions can often be sudden and unpredictable, and measures such as Polity IV or Freedom House (which comprise the final instability scale) might not reflect such changes particularly well. However, this does not mean that instability is not strongly associated with the likelihood of regime transition, and this relationship will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. Table 5 also demonstrates that even amongst those states which have not transitioned by 2007, or have disintegrated (as in the case of regimes in Syria and Yugoslavia), almost a half of all regimes (48.6%) have experienced some form of instability, demonstrating that sudden institutional or political changes are not synonymous with regime change.

Table 5. Autocratic transitions and instability in different contexts

The experience of instability	Proportion (N)	Total
<i>One year before the transition, if eventually failed</i>	50.4% (122)	242
<i>At some point during regime duration, if eventually failed</i>	70.7% (171)	242
<i>At some point during regime duration, if never failed</i>	48.6% (35)	72
<i>At some point during regime duration, all regimes</i>	64.6% (203)	314

Figure 4 summarises the territorial dispute, oil-based economy and instability statistics for all autocratic regime-months in the sample, as well as the percentage of all autocratic regimes that have experienced territorial disputes, instability, and oil-dependency. As seen in Figure 4, only 44% all regime-months have been spent within the context of territorial disputes, experienced by less than half of all

autocracies in the sample. It appears that although autocracies tend to be considered particularly conflict prone by the International Relations research community, less than half of the regimes in the sample have ever been involved in any type of dispute over a territory in their entire lifespan. Either territorial disputes are not as frequent as other types of conflict among autocracies, or their tendency to get involved in disputes might often be overestimated. Given that territorial disputes have been found to be one of the most dangerous type of disagreement, with the highest propensity for hostilities escalation (Senese and Vasquez, 2003), the latter is more likely to be true.

Unsurprisingly, only a small number of autocracies within the sample are oil-rich, with less than a 5th of the regime-months were spent in the condition of oil-dependency, and only 14% of all autocracies in the sample ever exporting significant amounts of petroleum.

Only 14% of autocracies in the sample have relied on oil for revenues. It was expected that oil-reliant regimes would also tend to be wealthier than other forms of autocracy, which is confirmed below in Figure 5. Finally, Figure 4 expands on some of the claims made when analysing Table 5. While 65.6% of all regimes in the sample have experienced instability at some point in their existence, only 4.9% of all regime-months have been spent experiencing instability. This suggests that instability, although relatively frequent among autocracies, tends to occur in short spells of time.

Unsurprisingly, GDP per capita among autocracies in the sample is very unevenly distributed, with a disproportionately large standard deviation and a relatively low median value (see Table 6, also Figure 1). Per capita income is in fact so unevenly distributed that 75% of all autocracies earn less than 8.4% of what the top earning autocracies do. Among the richest nations in the sample are the Middle Eastern monarchies such as Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates, as well as Singapore. The above regimes have frequently reached over 20,000 GK\$ dollars in GDP per

Figure 4. Summary statistics for *territorial dispute*, *oil dependency*, and *political instability* variables as proportions of regime-months, and proportion of all autocracies affected





Figure 5. Mean untransformed GDP per capita income in oil dependent autocracies



capita income over their duration. Unsurprisingly, the autocracies with oil-based economy are more likely than other regimes to have high GDP per capita, as shown in Figure 5, emphasizing the importance of controlling for the influence of oil on the relationship between economic development and regime transitions. Some of the countries with the longest history of petroleum-based economy (50 or more regime-years of oil-dependency) include Syria, Libya, Venezuela, Egypt, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. However, the mere fact of oil-dependency might not be a good predictor of the country's wealth, given that the measure does not distinguish between countries whose economies are mostly based on oil from those whose oil production reaches only 30% of domestic exports. Similarly, the length of oil-dependency is not always an adequate measure. For example, some regimes, like the monarchy in the United Arab Emirates, have only been oil-dependent for a relatively short time, yet still managed to reach the position of the wealthiest autocracies in the sample. As a result, the measure of oil should only be tested in conjunction with the level of GDP per capita, given that it is the income generated from oil that is likely to be the true predictor of regime transition, rather than oil itself.

Table 6. Summary statistics for the untransformed GDP per capita measure

Statistic	GDP per capita (GK \$)
<i>Mean</i>	2868.8
<i>Median</i>	1704.0
<i>Standard deviation</i>	3481.8
<i>75% (3rd quartile)</i>	3581.0
<i>Minimum value</i>	203.0
<i>Maximum value</i>	42916.0

Regimes reaching the lowest levels of GDP per capita in the sample (less than 400 GK\$) are mainly found in the Sub-Saharan Africa, and include those in Congo Kinshasa, Chad, Guinea, Ethiopia and Malawi.

Figure 6 below demonstrates the box plots for the distribution of values of the ethnic and religious fractionalisation variables. As discussed above, both measures have a relatively normal distribution, without any skews to the data. However, as seen in Figure 6, there are some differences when it comes to the distribution of scores between the two scales. The median for ethnic fractionalisation (0.48) is higher than that for religious fractionalisation (0.43), suggesting that higher scores on ethnic fractionalisation scale are more common than on the religious fractionalisation scale. Furthermore, although the scores are distributed fairly evenly across the scale, the maximum scores set out by the upper whisker on the religious fractionalisation scale are lower than those on the ethnic fractionalisation scale, once again suggesting that ethnic fractionalisation might tend to be more severe than religious fractionalisation within the sample.


Similarly to the geographical distribution of the low-income regimes, the most ethnically and religiously fractionalised regimes can also be found in Sub-Saharan Africa, partly to their colonial history, and partly due to other causes such as lower levels of urbanisation, or tropical location (Green, 2013). The most ethnically divided countries (over 0.9 score on the fractionalisation scale) include Liberia and Uganda, while the most religiously divided countries (over 0.8 on the fractionalisation scale) are Malawi and South Africa.

Having discussed some of the most common trends among autocratic regimes, the analysis section will now move to testing the proportional hazards assumption of Cox survival regression using univariate analysis.

Results of univariate diagnostic tests

As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, the models are built using a forward selection process. However, before fitting the models, the proportional hazard assumption was tested using the graphical 'log - log' plots, Schoenfeld

Figure 6. A box plot summarising the distribution of *ethnic fractionalisation* and *religious fractionalisation* variables



residuals and Martingale residuals described earlier. A univariate Cox survival model has been fitted for each variable, and a graphical and non-graphical representation of the diagnostic Schoenfeld residuals test was created for each of the predictors separately (Figure A1 and Table A1 respectively, Appendix B). It should be noted that these results are likely to change when the variables are entered into final models all at once, and these results should be compared with those from the final Cox proportional hazard model discussed later in the chapter (Table A2 and Figures A4-A6). As such, the initial figures are merely indicative of potential problems with the variables, and should not be treated as final. Additionally, non-adjusted and adjusted 'log-log' plots discussed in the section above have been plotted in Figures A2 and A5 (Appendix B) respectively. In the first test, the smoothed Schoenfeld residuals are plotted against analysis time for each covariate. To pass the test, the line should be parallel to the x-axis. The graphical tests in Figure A1 demonstrate that the proportional hazards assumption is most likely violated for the *political instability* variable, whose effects on regime transitions vary over time. No other variable has shown a consistent violation of the test in Table A1 and Figure A1.

Nevertheless, the results of the 'log-log' plot PH tests are concerning: neither of the dummy indicator variables considered in this chapter meets the conditions needed to pass the test. In order to meet the proportional hazard assumption, the lines for each level of the covariate (0 and 1) in Figure A2 must be parallel to one another. Neither the *territorial dispute* nor *oil dependency* indicators have passed this test, which means that their effect on autocratic survival rates might not be proportional over time. In fact, the survival curves for both variables cross at least once (*oil dependency*) or on a number of occasions (*territorial dispute*). The survival curves for the *political instability* variable do not cross, but they are visibly not parallel to one another, and as such do not pass the test.

Finally, the Martingale residual test of the continuous covariates examines the functional form of the variables (Figure B4 in Appendix B). In order to pass the test, the Lowess (locally-weighted scatterplot smoother) smoothed regression line should be parallel to the constant at $y=0$. Unfortunately, just as in case of categorical predictors, the effect of continuous predictors on the hazard of regime transition seems to vary over time. The Lowess function is clearly not parallel to $y=0$ neither for *log(GDP per capita)*. This suggests potential problems with both the proportional hazards assumption, as well as the functional form of this predictor.

Given the violations observed in the graphical and non-graphical tests, the results must be treated with caution, and a separate Royston-Parmar model with time varying effects is fitted in the final stage of the analysis (Model 8 in Table 9). However, given that the results of these tests are not yet final, the hypotheses will be tested using the proportional hazards Cox model, and the time varying variables will be finally identified by including the interaction between analysis time and the covariate into the models, and testing for an improvement in model fit, as well as statistical significance of these interactions. As mentioned in the methods chapter, only covariates whose interaction with time has significantly improved model fit will be included in the final Royston-Parmar Model 8 (Table 9).

Multivariate analysis: testing the hypothesis

Models 1-6 in Table 7 below are standard PH Cox survival analysis models built using the forward selection process. As seen in Model 1, territorial dispute involvement, when tested on its own, has no effect on the hazard ratio of regime transition in autocratic states, showing little support for Hypothesis 1. In Model 2, the addition of GDP per capita does not influence the relationship between territorial disputes and regime transition, but it appears, initially, that the higher the GDP per capita of the autocracy, the less likely it is to transition to another form of regime. This initially confirms the assumption that wealth reduces the risk of

regime failure. As expected, the addition of oil dependency indicator in Model 3 does influence the relationship between wealth and transitions, with *oil dependency* rendering the effects of *log(GDP per capita)* on transitions insignificant. Model 3 demonstrates that regimes that are relying on petroleum production are almost 50% less likely to undergo a regime transition than states that do not rely on petroleum production. In Model 3, the previously significant effects of GDP per capita are no longer significant, suggesting that *oil dependency* explains the relationship between wealth and transition better than *log(GDP per capita)*. The results indicate that countries rich in oil tend to also have a high GDP per capita, but it is the oil production, and not the income, that leads to autocratic stability. Nevertheless, this effect disappears once regime instability is accounted for in Model 4, and the effects of oil on transitions remain insignificant once more variables are included in the model.

In fact, the addition of the *political instability* variable appears to have an effect on a range of relationships in Model 4. Accounting for *political instability* seems to re-introduce the significance of the effects of GDP per capita on regime transitions, where a tenfold increase in per capita income results in a regime being 57% less likely to transition than without the hypothetical income increase. Furthermore, the effects of *oil dependency* have largely diminished and are no longer significant. What these results suggest is that the *instability* variable is most likely highly correlated with both the independent predictors (*territorial dispute*, *log(GDP per capita)* and *oil dependency*) and the independent variable (*regime transition*). To clarify these relationships, Table 8 presents a correlation matrix for all variables included in Models 1-6. It is clear from Table 8 that instability is in fact strongly correlated with all independent variables apart from ethnic fractionalisation. This is not surprising, given that typically, some degree of correlation usually exists in non-experimental data. However, it is the direction and strength of the correlation that is important in this particular case.

Table 7. Multivariate Cox regression estimates for all types of autocratic regimes

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)
<i>Territorial disputes</i>	0.782 (0.11)	0.783 (0.11)	0.813 (0.12)	0.710** (0.09)	0.716* (0.09)	0.718* (0.09)
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>		0.536* (0.13)	0.638 (0.16)	0.565** (0.12)	0.622* (0.13)	0.619* (0.13)
<i>Oil dependency</i>			0.573* (0.13)	0.683 (0.15)	0.637 (0.15)	0.635 (0.15)
<i>Political instability</i>				21.467*** (3.31)	21.550*** (3.29)	21.370*** (3.22)
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>					1.565* (0.34)	1.637* (0.38)
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>						0.848 [□] (0.21)
Proportional hazards test	$\chi^2 = 2.31$ df (1) p = 0.129	$\chi^2 = 8.01$ df (2) p = 0.018	$\chi^2 = 9.67$ df (3) p = 0.022	$\chi^2 = 6.17$ df (4) p = 0.003	$\chi^2 = 14.83$ df (5) p = 0.011	$\chi^2 = 15.63$ df (6) p = 0.016
Link test		$\beta = 0.605$ p = 0.417	$\beta = 0.264$ p = 0.627	$\beta = -0.278$ p < 0.000	$\beta = -0.239$ p = 0.001	$\beta = -0.234$ p = 0.001
Partial log likelihood	-1198.53	-1192.94	-1189.68	-990.22	-988.71	-988.54
AIC	2399.063	2389.878	2385.354	1988.434	1987.42	1989.08

Notes:

Models estimated using a sample of 314 regimes in 125 countries, with 242 regime failures.

Breslow method for handling ties.

RP model is fitted using 4 degrees of freedom for time-constant effects.

RCS – restricted cubic spline

□ 0.05 ≤ p < 0.1

* 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05

** 0.001 ≤ p < 0.01

*** p < 0.001

Surprisingly, while *political instability* is negatively and significantly correlated with most variables associated with regime stability, it is *positively* correlated with the *territorial dispute* variable. This means that while the *territorial dispute* variable (after the addition of *political instability* in Model 4) is negatively correlated with the hazard ratio of regime transition, it is positively correlated with instability. This suggests that while regimes involved in territorial disputes are more likely to experience sudden bouts of instability, they are less likely to transition into another form of regime.

Table 8. Correlation between predictor variables and the independent variable included in Models 1-8 in Table 7

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Territorial dispute</i>	<i>Log(GDP)</i>	<i>Oil</i>	<i>Instability</i>	<i>Ethnic fract.</i>	<i>Religious fract.</i>	<i>Transition</i>
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	1.000	0.010*	0.119***	0.022***	-0.008	0.004	-0.009*
<i>Log(GDP)</i>	0.010*	1.000	0.376***	-0.012**	-0.235***	-0.094***	-0.018***
<i>Oil</i>	0.119***	0.376***	1.000	-0.029***	0.083***	-0.114***	-0.016**
<i>Instability</i>	0.022***	-0.012**	-0.029***	1.000	0.007	-0.038***	0.137***
<i>Ethnic fract.</i>	-0.008	-0.235***	0.083***	0.007	1.000	0.193***	0.010*
<i>Religious fract.</i>	0.004	-0.094***	-0.114***	-0.038***	0.193***	1.000	-0.004
<i>Transition</i>	-0.009*	-0.018***	-0.016**	0.137***	0.010*	-0.004	1.000

It is possible that the lack of significant relationship between territorial dispute involvement and the hazard ratio of regime transition is due to the fact that regimes experiencing instability are also likely to experience territorial disputes, but both variables affect the likelihood of transition in different ways. Accounting for instability, however, reveals the true relationship between territorial disputes and transitions. As seen in Model 4, and in Models 5-8 afterwards, autocracies involved in territorial disputes experience between 28% and 30% less risk of transition than those not involved in territorial disputes, providing support for Hypothesis 1. Moreover, apart from the fact that instability has an impact on the relationship between the initial predictors and the dependent variable, it also has a particularly strong effect on the hazard of regime transition. Autocracies that have experienced instability in the year before were almost 21.5 times more likely to undergo a transition than those that have not experienced instability. This effect is highly significant ($p < 0.001$) and remains consistent in Models 4-8, although the magnitude of the effects decreases when the time-varying effects of the instability are accounted for in Models 7 and 8. The consistently strong, positive and significant effect of instability on regime transition suggests a considerable support for the

initial assumption that an episode of political instability the year before is likely to increase the likelihood of regime change.

Finally, in Models 6 and 7, *ethnic* and *religious fractionalisation* variables are added to test the assumption that divided societies are more likely to experience regime failures. Nevertheless, it appears that while ethnic fractionalisation has a significant impact on the hazard ratio of autocratic transitions, religious fractionalisation does not increase the hazard ratio of transitions. The effects for ethnic fractionalisation are strong and statistically significant, with one unit increase on the scale making an autocracy as much as 57% more likely to transition, and 64% more likely to transition when ethnic fractionalisation is also accounted for in Model 7. Although the results from Models 5 and 6 do not support the initial assumptions, they are somewhat consistent with some of the suggestions put forward by Alesina *et al.* (2003: 158), who found that religious fractionalisation might not have the same effects on political regimes as ethnic fractionalisation. However, unlike Alesina *et al.* (2003), who claim that religious fractionalisation might actually be *positively* correlated with good quality of political institutions because it serves as a proxy of tolerance and freedom in a country that allows its citizens to practice the religion of their choice, no such positive effect was observed in Models 6-8. The impact of religious fractionalisation on the hazard of regime failure is not statistically significant.

Having included all covariates in Model 6, it is crucial to re-examine the proportional hazards tests. As seen in Table 7, the global proportional hazards test based on Schoenfeld residuals is significant to the $p < 0.05$ level. The detailed test results included in Appendix B (Table A2) show that instability is the only variable showing significant deviation from the assumption. The graphical test of Schoenfeld residuals in Figure A4 (Appendix B) confirm that only the instability variable appears to be violating the proportional hazards assumption. Furthermore, the Martingale residuals test of indicates no issues with the functional form of the three

continuous variables included in Model 6: *log(GDP per capita)*, *ethnic fractionalisation*, and *religious fractionalisation*. Nevertheless, the log-log plot test of adjusted categorical predictors included in Model 6 demonstrates that even when the survival curves are adjusted for other covariates in the model, the proportional hazards assumption is still violated for all three variables (see Figure A5 in Appendix B). Just as in the log-log plots for the unadjusted predictors, the survival curves cross for *territorial dispute* and *oil dependency* variables, and are visibly non-parallel for the political *instability* variable.

As a result of these violations, separate models will test whether any significant interaction between time and the effects of each covariate in the model exists, introducing one interaction at a time, and assessing model fit using Wald tests and AIC scores. The analysis has indicated that the effects of instability do in fact significantly interact with time, and its inclusion in the model lowers the AIC score and improves relative model fit (Wald test $\chi^2=13.75$, $df(1)$, $p<0.001$). Surprisingly, the interaction between the effects of religious fractionalisation and time were also significant, and were the only other interaction which has increased model fit significantly ($\chi^2= 7.14$, $df(1)$, $p=0.008$) and lowered the AIC score. The addition of all other possible interactions has resulted in no improvement, and has in fact increased the AIC scores. This is surprising, given that *territorial dispute* and *oil dependency* variables have crossing survival curves, suggesting disproportionate effects over time. However, their interaction with time is clearly insignificant, and reduces model fit. As a result, the interactions between those variables and time were not retained in Models 7, 8 and 9. Instead, because the *territorial dispute* variable is the most theoretically important predictor in all models, its non-proportional effect will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter.

Finally, Models 7, 8 and 9 present the last models of the chapter. Model 7 is a Cox proportional hazards model with the inclusion of the *political instability - time* and *religious fractionalisation - time* interactions, Model 9 includes all significant

interactions between the predictors, and Model 9 is a Royston Parmar flexible parametric model which is estimated in a similar way to Model 8, but allows the relationship between variables to vary more easily than Cox model, improving model fit. The results in Model 7 are fairly similar to that from Model 6 in Table 7, but the AIC score is lower. This suggests that controlling for the time-varying effects of *religious fractionalisation* and *political instability* improves model fit. Model 8 presents the results of a full model that includes all interactions between the predictors, which also lowers the AIC score.

The interaction term between wealth and political instability was statistically significant. Model 9 in Table 9 suggests that the effects of instability increase with a tenfold increase in wealth. Comparing two regimes which did not experience any instability the year before, an tenfold increase in GDP per capita while all other variables are held constant yields a hazard ratio equal to 0.277, and therefore the rate of regime change is decreased by $(100\% - 27.7\%) = 72.3\%$ with every tenfold increase in income. However, when comparing two regimes which *did* experience instability the year before, a tenfold increase in income while holding all other variables constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to $\exp(-1.284 + 1.444) = \exp(0.16) = 1.17$. This is an increase of 17%, meaning that autocracies which experienced instability become only 17% more likely to transition to another regime with a tenfold increase in wealth. Both relationships were statistically significant.

Furthermore, the interaction between religious and ethnic fractionalisation was also statistically significant. Model 9 in Table 9 suggests that the effects of ethnic fractionalisation increase with the increase in religious fractionalisation. Comparing two regimes that did not experience a theoretical increase in religious fractionalisation, one unit increase in ethnic fractionalisation while all other variables are held constant yields a hazard ratio equal to 0.801, and therefore the rate of transition is decreased by 20, but the relationship is not statistically significant. This means that ethnic fractionalisation only has an effect on the

likelihood of regime transition when coupled with religious fractionalisation. Comparing two regimes experience one unit increase in religious fractionalisation, an additional one unit increase in ethnic fractionalisation while holding all other variables constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to $\exp(-0.212 + 1.793) = \exp(1.581) = 4.860$. This is an increase of 486%, meaning that autocracies which experienced one unit increase in both ethnic *and* religious fractionalisation at the same time were almost five times more likely to fail than regimes that only experienced an increase in ethnic fractionalisation.

Moreover, the relationship between oil dependency and territorial dispute involvement was also statistically significant, and has considerable implications for the findings of this thesis. For regimes that do not have oil, the effects of territorial dispute while all other variables are held constant yields a hazard ratio equal to 0.69. This means that the rate of regime change is decreased by $(100\% - 69\%) = 31\%$ at times directly following territorial disputes for states not dependent on oil. This relationship is statistically significant. Comparing two regimes which are dependent on oil, participation in territorial disputes while holding all other variables constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to $\exp(-0.371 + 0.756) = \exp(0.385) = 1.470$. This is an increase of 47%, but this relationship is not statistically significant, meaning that the relationship between territorial disputes and regime failure only holds for regimes that do not depend on oil. This important finding will be discussed in the conclusion section of this chapter.

Finally, the results in the RP Model 9 and Cox Model 8 are comparable, with the exception of minimal changes to the values of the *territorial dispute - oil dependency* interaction, and the significance of the *political instability* predictor. The first one is a result of minor changes to the p-value, which are to be expected, while the latter are a result of better accounting for the time-varying effects of the *political instability* variable.

Table 9. Multivariate Cox and Royston Parmar regression estimates for models with time-varying effects

Variables	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9 (RP)
	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	0.713* (0.10)	0.648** (0.092)	0.690** (0.10)
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	0.619* (0.13)	0.279*** (0.075)	0.277*** (0.07)
<i>Oil dependency</i>	0.625 (0.16)	0.405** (0.11)	0.427** (0.12)
<i>Political instability</i>	10.682*** (2.36)	0.074* (0.09)	0.174 (0.22)
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>	1.579 [□] (0.37)	0.751 (0.29)	0.809 (0.27)
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	0.469* (-0.16)	0.183** (0.10)	0.241** (0.12)
<i>Political instability * time</i>	1.006*** (0.00)	1.004** (0.00)	---
<i>Rel. fractionalisation * time</i>	1.005* (0.00)	1.004 [□] (0.00)	---
<i>Log(GDP per capita)* political instability</i>	---	5.045* (2.00)	4.239*** (1.73)
<i>Territorial disputes * oil dependency</i>	---	2.322 [□] (1.04)	2.130 (0.99)
<i>Rel. fractionalisation * ethnic fractionalisation</i>	---	6.342* (5.37)	6.006* (4.43)
RCS 1	---	---	2.965*** (0.52)
RCS 2	---	---	1.445* (0.26)
RCS 3	---	---	0.892 (0.07)
RCS 4	---	---	1.000 (0.03)
RCS1 (<i>Political instability</i>)	---	---	1.525** (0.24)
RCS2 (<i>Political instability</i>)	---	---	1.078 (0.17)
RCS3 (<i>Political instability</i>)	---	---	0.933 (0.07)
RCS1 (<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>)	---	---	1.383 (0.33)
RCS2 (<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>)	---	---	0.821 (0.21)
RCS3 (<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>)	---	---	1.119 (0.15)
Constant	---	---	23.542*** (19.79)
Proportional hazards test	$\chi^2 = 4.01$ df (8) p = 0.856	$\chi^2 = 3.81$ df (11) p = 0.975	---
Link test	$\beta = -0.035$ p = 0.292	$\beta = -0.009$ p = 0.793	---
Partial log likelihood (pseudo l.l.)	-978.11	-966.99	(-222.26)
AIC	1972.23	1955.99	486.52

Table 9, continued.

Notes:

Models estimated using a sample of 314 regimes in 125 countries, with 242 regime failures.

Breslow method for handling ties. RP model is fitted using 4 degrees of freedom for time-constant effects, and 3 degrees of freedom for time-varying effects.

RP – Royston Parmar model

RCS – restricted cubic spline

▣ $0.05 \leq p < 0.1$

* $0.01 \leq p < 0.05$

** $0.001 \leq p < 0.01$


*** $p < 0.001$

Goodness of fit

Before moving to the discussion of graphical representations of the relationship between territorial dispute, oil, and regime failure, it is important to discuss the goodness of fit of the models estimated in this chapter. This is done to assess whether the models fit the data well, and to compare the model fit of the model with no interactions (Model 7) to the fit of a full model that includes the interactions (Model 8). This will be done using the Cox-Snell residuals (Cox and Snell, 1968). It is expected that if a Cox model fits the data well, then the true cumulative hazard function will have an exponential distribution with a hazard rate of 1 (Cleves *et al.*, 2010: 219). Figure 7 below presents the results of Cox-Snell test for Models 7 and 8 respectively. In Figure 7, the red line is a standard exponential distribution with a hazard function equal to 1. The blue line, on the other hand, is a Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard function with the Cox-Snell residuals as the time variable, and regime change as a failure variable.

As we can see from the figure below, the model does not fit the data perfectly. While at smaller values of analysis time the cumulative hazard function has an exponential distribution close to 1, there is some considerable deviation from this distribution in the right hand side of graphs for both models. This is to be expected, given that prior failures and censoring reduce the effective sample considerably (Cleves *et al.*, 2010: 222). In other words, sizeable variability is quite

Figure 7. A cox-Snell residual test for Cox regression Models 7 and 9



common for large values of time where the sample gets much smaller, and should not be a cause for too much concern (Stata Corp, 2013). While some sources interpret even small deviations as bad model fit (Cleves *et al.*, 2010; Abdelaal and Zakria, 2015) it is crucial to note that these sources usually refer to the goodness-of-fit of models estimated using clinical trials and experimental data, and as such have very low tolerance to potential variability. Overall, the models fit the data relatively well at smaller values of time. The older the regimes are, the less reliable the models are at predicting the likelihood of regime failure. This means that it is easiest to predict the likelihood of failure of relatively young regimes using variables tested in this chapter, but as the regimes get older, factors such as income, territorial disputes, or fractionalisation become less likely to explain the likelihood of failure. This is natural, given that there are many potential factors which the models cannot account for. Some causes of longevity are due to contextual variables such as historical events, cultural factors, or the nature of the ideology adopted by the leadership. Any model based on quantitative data will be largely limited in explaining all aspects of authoritarian survival, especially in the case of regimes which survived a particularly long period of time. Finally, the variation on the right hand side of the graph is somewhat smaller on the test performed for Model 8, suggesting that the addition of interactions makes the model fit the data better. This is not surprising, given that the AIC score for Model 8 was lower than that for Model 7.

Graphical interpretations of Model 9 results

Having presented and interpreted the main results of the models in Tables 8 and 9, this chapter will now proceed to graphically demonstrate the effects of territorial disputes on the survival of autocratic regimes. First, the section will estimate the average survival and hazard rates for all regimes based on Model 9 estimates, to then proceed with graphically interpreting how territorial dispute involvement

impact the survival rate of regimes which are not dependent on oil. Although many other relationships between the predictors in Model 9 and regime failure were significant, due to time and space limitations, they will not be graphically interpreted. Instead, this section will only focus on territorial dispute involvement because of its theoretical importance to this thesis.


Estimating baseline survival hazard and cumulative hazard functions

The baseline hazard, survival and cumulative hazard functions estimate the survival and failure statistics of all autocracies over time. They estimate survival and hazard statistics when values of all variables in the models are set at 0, or, as in the case of *log(GDP) per capita*, at their mean scores. The survival and hazard functions are therefore estimated for autocracies with mean GDP per capita, no oil dependency, no recent history of territorial disputes or political instability, and minimal ethnic and religious divisions. The results are shown in Figure 8.

It is apparent from the graph in Figure 8 that when the above conditions are met, survival rate of autocracies is relatively low, with only about 32% of all autocracies surviving 58 years, or the entire period of the analysis. The probability of surviving the first 5 years as a new autocracy in these conditions is very high, at 80%. The median survival time stands at about 29 years.

The second graph in Figure 8 is the rate of transitions within the dataset at a particular unit of time, provided that the regime has survived until that particular moment in time. It is clear from the graph that the rate of transitions (number of regime changes per month) is at its highest in the initial stages of regimes' existence, rising steeply until the regime reaches about 2 years, and then declining afterwards. When autocracies reach 7 years the rate of transitions per month declines, falling steadily but slowly as regimes become older. The cumulative hazard

Figure 8. Baseline survival, hazard, and cumulative hazard functions obtained from Royston Parmar Model 8



of transition is also included in Figure 8, and shows that at first, the risk of transition is accumulated relatively quickly, to then accumulate at a slower rate past the initial 2 years of regime's existence.

The above estimates of regime trajectory are not surprising: it is plausible to expect that young, unconsolidated autocracies, even when potential risk factors are minimised, should have a higher transition rate in the initial stages of their existence. Young regimes are unconsolidated and vulnerable, and the opposition might find it easier to call their legitimacy into question. Furthermore, a considerable amount of time might pass between the new regime might receive endorsement from the most influential groups within the society (i.e. religious organisations). These findings are not dissimilar to those presented by the research on the key stages of democratic survival. For example, Svoboda (2015) has shown that democracies are also at a higher risk of transition to a non-democratic regime in the initial stages of their existence, with that risk largely reduced as the regimes consolidate. The graphs in Figure 8 suggest that when it comes to the struggles of regime consolidation, as noted by Göbel (2011), autocratic and democratic regimes might be surprisingly similar.


Territorial disputes and oil dependency

Having established the hazard of transition faced by autocracies at an average level of risk with no recent instances of territorial conflict, it is worth examining how this survival rate changes following territorial dispute involvement. Given that the impact of territorial disputes was only significant for regimes that were not dependent on oil, graphs in Figure 9 show the difference in survival curves for states recently involved in territorial disputes at different values of the *oil dependency* variable. As clearly seen below, regimes involved in territorial disputes the year before that are not dependent on oil have a much higher survival rate than regimes involved in territorial disputes that are oil-dependent, holding everything

else constant. The difference is statistically significant (the confidence intervals do not include the 0 value), and the difference increases with the age of the regime. Overall, the older the regime, the greater the difference between survival rates in these two groups. It is worth remembering that the difference between the baseline survival (*territorial dispute*=0 & *oil dependency* = 0) and both curves in Figure 9 were not statistically significant, and they will not be explored graphically.

Having discussed the interaction between *oil dependency* and *territorial dispute*, as well as their combined effect on regime change, the chapter will now move to discussing the main findings of this section in relation to the next two chapters of this thesis, as well as the wider literature.

Figure 9. A comparison of the *territorial dispute* variable effects on autocratic regime survival, at different values of *oil dependency* variable



Discussion and conclusion

At present, the literature on the effects of external threats is focused solely on the duration of autocratic spells, and the impact of international disputes and territorial conflicts on democratisation. As a result, other forms of regime change – such as autocracy-to-autocracy transitions – have been largely overlooked. This chapter has filled the gap in the IR literature by demonstrating that ReSIT assumptions can also be applied to regime durability more generally. Given the serious impact regime changes have on the political and social lives of their citizens, as well as the international arena more generally, this chapter is a key contribution to the field.

The analysis section of this chapter has resulted in a number of crucial findings, which have implications for future research on regime stability and durability within IR and Comparative Politics. The hypothesis that autocracies that are involved in territorial disputes are at less risk of regime transitions has been partially confirmed. While in models with no interactions territorial dispute involvement has a positive impact on regime stability, making all autocracies more likely to survive, the inclusion of an interaction term between oil dependency and territorial disputes has revealed that only regimes which do *not* depend on oil are less likely to fail as a result of territorial dispute involvement in the previous year. This is a very interesting and novel finding, which has no precedent either in ReSIT or the Comparative Politics literature to date.

The finding can be explained in two ways. First, as the literature suggests, the advantages of non-tax revenues in the form of oil dependency help stabilise autocratic regimes (Morrison, 2009; Wright *et al.*, 2015). The easy access to resources can be used to silence potential opposition, to buy elite loyalty, or redistribute the spoils to the population without the need to raise taxes. Rentier regimes where spoils distribution already helps stabilise the regime, territorial disputes might simply have no further stabilising effect. Nevertheless, when regime elites do not have access to funds generated by the sale of natural resources, it

might be harder for them to prevent the fragmentation of their support network. Moreover, when fewer spoils of the office are available, some autocratic governments might even choose to use violence as means of suppressing opposition, rather than financial incentives (Wintrobe, 1990). In those circumstances, the unifying effects of territorial disputes might be more pronounced.

The second potential explanation is that oil wealth has an impact on the perception of threat posed by territorial dispute. Wright and colleagues (2015) have demonstrated that regimes that are rich in oil tend to have a higher level of military spending. It is possible that when territorial disputes happen in oil-rich countries, their ability to instantaneously increase defence spending provides the citizens, elites and the opposition with much greater degree of security. The smaller the perceived threat of a territorial dispute, the less likely the regime is to be affected by it.

The above findings have important implications for both the current literature on ReSIT within the field of IR and the regime stability literature within the field of Comparative Politics. First, it is clear that under certain circumstances, recent involvement in territorial disputes decreases the hazard of failure, supporting the novel proposition of this thesis that these disputes decrease not only the likelihood of democratisation, but decrease the likelihood of transitions more generally. Second, these findings provide an important contribution to the field of Comparative Politics which only recently begun focusing on regime survival more generally (Wright *et al.*, 2013), and rarely considers the potential effect of international relations on the likelihood of democratic and/or autocratic transitions. In terms of its contribution to the IR literature, this chapter has provided support for the thesis that autocratic regimes become more stable as a result of territorial disputes – a thesis often proposed by ReSIT studies in relation to democratisation, but never before examined empirically.

Finally, the likelihood of transition was shown to be affected by a number of additional factors. Overall, low levels of wealth, higher levels of *both* ethnic and religious fractionalisation and the presence of political instability in the year before have all been shown to increase the likelihood of transitions. While the relationship between wealth and transitions was statistically significant in all circumstances, it was more likely to lead to regime transitions when the regimes have not experienced any political instability the year before. Nevertheless, it is important to note that there were some issues with the linearity of the wealth predictor used in the models of this chapter, with certain tests indicating that the relationship between wealth and regime transitions is non-linear. This possibility will be further explored in Chapter 6 below, which, by disaggregating authoritarian regimes, will provide a better insight into the relationship between wealth and transitions for every type of autocratic regime. The disaggregation of autocratic regimes into military, monarchic, multiparty and single party regimes will also provide a further insight into whether structural features of authoritarian regimes moderate the effects of territorial disputes on regime change. While the results of this chapter indicate that all autocratic regimes are affected by the predictors discussed above in the same manner, it is likely that, as theorised in Chapter 3, significant differences between these responses exist depending on the institutional context of the regime. These are likely to be dictated by the structural organisation of the elite-leader interaction, which has already been shown by many researchers to affect the transition rates of autocratic regimes (Geddes, 2007; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Göbel, 2010). While the current chapter has made an important contribution to ReSIT theory, the next chapter will explain in more detail why disaggregating autocracies matters for both the field of International Relations and Comparative Politics, and investigate the varying effects of territorial disputes on military, multiparty, monarchic and single-party autocracies.

Chapter 6: Territorial disputes and autocratic regime survival, by regime type

Introduction

The previous chapter has tested the proposition that territorial disputes stabilise authoritarian regimes, and make them less likely to transition to another form of regime, both democratic *and* autocratic. Unlike other tests of the Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT), the focus of Chapter 5 was on autocratic *regime* survival, rather than autocratic *spell* survival. This is because the main assumptions of ReSIT about the impact of territorial threats on autocratic *spell* durability often allude to factors which are not only likely to decrease the chances of an autocracy democratising, but also regime failure more generally. The overall conclusion of the previous chapter was that territorial disputes do, in fact, significantly decrease the likelihood of autocratic regime failure, demonstrating strong initial support for the Reversed Second Image understood in the context of this thesis. Nevertheless, as discussed at length in Chapter 3, the International Relations literature focusing on ReSIT, but also more generally, often overlooks the significance of structural differences between different types of autocracies, and how these differences might affect the relationship between territorial threats and autocratic regime survival. In fact, most autocratic regimes are usually treated within the IR literature as similar to one another purely by virtue of not being democratic. In order to address this shortcoming and demonstrate the importance of accounting for structural features of autocracies, the following chapter will disaggregate autocratic regimes into four distinct types: military, monarchic, multiparty and single party regimes. The chapter will demonstrate the theoretical importance of disaggregating any analysis of autocratic regime survival, and set the theoretical and analytical foundations for the final analytical chapter, which will demonstrate how territorial

threats affect the likelihood of democratisation for each of the autocratic regime type.

As explained above, this chapter will address the second research question of this thesis, namely: are there significant differences in the way military, multiparty, single party and monarchic regimes respond to territorial disputes? In order to answer this question, the chapter will first reiterate the main research on different types of autocratic regimes discussed previously in Chapter 3, and outline how different structural characteristics might impact the relationship between territorial disputes and regime failure in each autocratic type. In addition, the expected variations in the impact of wealth and oil dependency will be discussed as well. Once the theoretical assumptions are outlined and the hypotheses are formed, the chapter will then move to discuss how the data analysis in this chapter will differ from the analysis in Chapter 5 and reiterate the main procedures undertaken to test the hypotheses in the Data and Methods section. The chapter will then proceed to analyse the failure data for each autocratic type separately, with a brief discussion of results. Once the diagnostic tests and graphical representation of results are outlined and analysed, the chapter will move to the discussion of the results in relation to the current literature on ReSIT, the hypotheses outlined earlier in the chapter, as well as the results of Chapter 5.

The main findings of this chapter are of great theoretical and analytical importance to both the ReSIT literature and the International Relations literature more generally.³⁶ Namely, they demonstrate that the results of aggregate analysis from Chapter 5 do *not* correspond to the disaggregated results of analysis in this chapter. While Chapter 5 demonstrated that regimes that are not dependent on oil are significantly less likely to transition into any other form of regime if they took part in a territorial dispute the year before, the following analysis does not support these findings. When autocracies were disaggregated into separate sub-samples,

³⁶ Some sections of this chapter have previously been presented as part of a working paper entitled 'Disaggregating Autocracy: International Conflict and the Durability of Authoritarian Regimes', delivered at the *Conflict, Security and International Order* research workshop at the Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies, University of Bath, on 30th of June 2016.

only military and single party regimes appeared significantly affected by territorial disputes, with no clear effect on multiparty and monarchic regimes. Moreover, while in single party regimes, the relationship between dispute involvement and transition was only significant for oil dependent regimes, the effects of dispute involvement on regime failure in military regimes was significant regardless of oil dependency. This has important implications for the IR literature as a whole, given that most studies overlook the importance of structural differences between autocracies, which are still treated as largely similar purely by virtue of being non-representative. The analysis has also important implications for the literature on ReSIT, as well as literature concerning the longevity of military and single party regimes, which will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. In summary, the main findings are that military regimes and single party regimes are the only types of autocracy that are less likely to fail as a result of territorial dispute involvement.

Theory

Previous Comparative Politics research and theoretical assumptions

Chapters 3 and 5 presented a detailed account of the effects of territorial disputes on the likelihood of autocratic regime failure. Territorial disputes were theorised to present a particularly salient external threat, whose consequences might be even more severe than standard non-territorial militarized disputes often discussed in the ReSIT literature (Gibler and Tir, 2014; for examples of this literature see Midlarsky, 1995; Gates *et al.*, 1999; Mousseau and Shi, 1999).

Territorial threats in the form of territorial claims are likely to unite the otherwise polarised elites and weaken the opposition who might suspend their anti-regime activities until the conflict is over. In addition, the support from the population is also likely to increase in the face of territorial threats. All three of the above

features are commonly thought to be some of the best predictors of authoritarian regime survival in the Comparative Politics literature (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a)

Nevertheless, it is crucial to recognise that autocratic regimes are vastly different from one another in the way their elites and opposition are organised, as well as the level of legitimacy commonly enjoyed by the regime among the general population (Geddes, 2003; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). As part of the original contribution of this thesis, it is theorised that these differences are likely to have a direct impact on the type of effect, if any, territorial threats are likely to have on autocratic durability.

As previously mentioned, the four main types of autocracy considered in this thesis and in the current Chapter are military, multiparty, monarchic and single party regimes. The following section will briefly outline the literature on the elite and opposition status in each of these autocratic types, as well as the potential effect territorial disputes might have on their survival trajectories. For a detailed explanation of each of the individual assumptions, see Theoretical Chapter 3.

The first assumption of ReSIT theory is that threats to the domestic territory controlled by the regime are likely to unify previously polarised elites, and temporarily increase their loyalty, making them less susceptible to defect to the opposition. However, the theory should also take into account the fact that monarchies and single party regimes have a tendency for *particularly* strong elite support even in absence of foreign threats in the form of territorial disputes. This is because in monarchies, the majority of power tends to be centred in the hands of the royal family. Blood ties between elite members ensure that the royal family remains united in face of major political challenges (Billingsley, 2010: 120). In the same manner, elites in monarchies are more likely to work together to ward off any threats from regime opposition, and are very unlikely to cooperate with rival factions. Any actions taken against the regime are ultimately actions taken against

the royal family itself.³⁷ As a result, the elites in monarchies tend to be particularly resistant to external influence. The internal cohesion of monarchies is further evidenced by the fact that in these type of autocracy, the royal family tends to occupy the highest posts in the state, such as the head of security services or the military, making an anti-regime coup particularly difficult (Lucas, 2012: 147).

Secondly, monarchies are characterised by their tight control over state resources, allowing them to 'buy off' any potentially threatening opposition groups (Gause III, 1994). The small and unified elites in monarchic regimes such as Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are so remarkably resilient to external and internal shocks that they were the only type of autocracies to survive the Arab Spring without a single one of these monarchies transitioning to another form of regime (Yom and Gause III, 2012; Bank, Richter, and Sunik, 2015). As a result, it is unlikely that monarchies will be particularly susceptible to a unifying effect of territorial threats. This is not because territorial threats do not affect the elites or the opposition, but rather because the elites are already loyal, and the opposition fractured and weak.

A similar situation is likely in single party regimes, although for different reasons. Generally, single parties are considered relatively stable (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Hess, 2013). Akin to the royal family in monarchies, the party is usually in control of the wealth within the regime, and serves as the only source of patronage for the elites (Magaloni, 2008). This monopoly on political and economic privileges means that elites have very little incentive to defect to the opposition (Hess, 2013: 3; Brownlee, 2007). Although the elite numbers are much larger in single party regimes than in monarchies, the party additionally serves as an arbitrator to all internal splits and disputes, ensuring that those who have 'lost out' today may expect to be rewarded in the future (Brownlee, 2007). The above features mean

³⁷ It is worth noting that the above does not mean that family members are unlikely to try and oust a particular leader in favour of another one. On the contrary, such events might happen regularly in monarchic regimes (for examples of succession struggles in Saudi Arabia, see Gause III (2015); for an example of members of royal family ousting their relatives from power in Oman, see Owen (1970)). Nevertheless, replacing a leader is not synonymous to replacing an entire regime structure. This difference is crucial, and has already been discussed in Chapter 3.

that factionalism poses significantly less threat to single party autocracies and can on occasion even benefit the regime (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). Strong and unified elites that rarely defect to the opposition contribute greatly to the strength of the party leaders, allowing them to exert their influence over much longer periods of time than in military or multiparty regimes (Brownlee, 2007).

A different type of relationship is expected in the military and multiparty regimes. Military regimes are particularly prone to splits within the elites due to the fact that army-led regimes often enjoy very little legitimacy. This is because military juntas frequently use the rhetoric of 'guardianship' in justifying their rule, presenting it as a critical transitory period that restores order and much needed stability (Loveman, 2004). Given this rhetoric, every additional year in office makes the regime more susceptible to the erosion of trust from both the public and the political class (Graf, 1988). This problem is magnified by the fact that unlike elites in all other types of autocracy, military personnel, including the highest ranking members of the junta, are primarily interested in the survival of the military rather than remaining in power (Geddes, 2003). Both junta leaders and the elites are likely to withdraw from power if they perceive the integrity or cohesion of the military as endangered by factionalism or internal disputes (ibid.). While the above factors make for weak and unstable regimes in times of peace, the conflict is likely to have a stabilising effect due to its strong impact on the military elites' *raison d'être*. The 'guardianship' rhetoric of military autocracies, coupled with their explicit commitment to protecting the physical integrity of the state and its borders, mean that the elites are likely to be particularly susceptible to rally behind their leadership when a threat materialises. Any defections to the opposition are likely to be severely punished and perceived as treason. As a result, military autocracies are expected to last much longer as a result of armed conflict engagement.

In multiparty regimes, like in military regimes, elite splits are a particularly frequent phenomenon, although for a different reason. Given that regime opposition is institutionalised, it is likely to be significantly stronger than in other forms of autocracy. Like in democracies, governments change often and tend to be much

weaker than in other forms of autocracy (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). Although elections do not make multiparty regimes more democratic, they do open the political arena to a wide range of actors usually excluded from the political process. This has the potential to weaken the coalition government and strengthen the opposition. Given that multiple parties are allowed to operate, the elites can, and frequently do, change sides. Unlike in other regimes, however, they can usually do so openly, and without the fear of retribution. This makes for fractured and weak elites, and a very capable, if fragmented, opposition. The strong opposition and weak leadership mean that, similarly to military regimes, multiparty autocracies are usually short lived and unstable (Ibid.). However, these institutional weaknesses of the regime are also what make the effect on territorial disputes more pronounced: the centralisation of power in the hands of the leader is possible not because there is something inherent in multiparty regimes, but simply because there is a scope for it to happen. Leaders are likely to take any opportunity to formalise their new-found support in case of temporarily stronger bargaining position, and the institutional weakness of non-democratic legislatures, being susceptible to frequent changes and abuses, makes it easier for it to become formalised.

In summary, it is expected that monarchies and single party regimes which possess the features that make them naturally durable are unlikely to be strongly affected by the presence of territorial threats. However, naturally less stable regimes such as military and multiparty regimes are expected to be less likely to fail as a result of territorial dispute involvement. Hence the two main hypotheses of this chapter state that:

Hypothesis 2: *Military and single party regimes are less likely to fail if they are involved in territorial disputes, compared to when they are at peace.*

And:

Hypothesis 3: *The longevity of monarchic and single party regimes will not to be affected by territorial disputes.*

In addition to the above, and as discussed in Chapter 5, additional variables are likely to affect the longevity of authoritarian regimes. For example, high GDP per capita is likely to make the regime less likely to fail, as the tax revenues are likely to be used to buy off potential opposition. Oil wealth in particular, as a form of non-tax revenue, is likely to result in more stable and strong regimes. This is because oil can be used to easily buy support from the general population by engaging in widespread redistributive policies. While it is also very likely that these factors might be context dependent, and have a different effect depending on regime structures, the formulation of these differences is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this chapter will be more exploratory in nature, and will try to explain the potential differences on a case-by-case basis, where appropriate.

Data and Methods

Data

Similarly to Chapter 5, the following chapter employs a combination of all three datasets mentioned in the Methods Chapter 4: the 'Autocracies of the World', the Gibler (2014) dataset, and the Maddison Project dataset, with some additional use of the Total Economy Database. The sample size is the same as in the previous chapter, comprising of 314 authoritarian regimes across 125 countries. However, unlike Chapter 5, the following chapter will not analyse all autocratic regimes in an aggregate way. Instead, models will be fitted across four separate samples of authoritarianism, as defined by Magaloni *et al.* (2013): military, monarchic, multiparty, and single party regimes. The precise definition of each regime has been discussed in Chapter 4, and Table 10 briefly summarizes the main distinguishing features of each autocratic type. The regimes are distinguished based on the ultimate source of power and rule making within the regime.

Unlike the analysis in Chapter 5, the following analysis will be conducted on four separate samples, each corresponding to one of the autocratic regime types. Table 11 briefly summarizes the number of observation-months, countries, regimes, and failures by the type of autocratic regime.

While at least 50% of all regimes in each sample have failed between 1951 and 2008, it is clear that the very small sample of monarchic regimes is particularly problematic. Only 12 monarchies have failed within the observation period, meaning that any analysis performed on that particular sample must be treated with caution. Given a very small sample size, and the relatively high number of predictors expected to be fitted into the models, the MPV scores are expected to be too small for multivariate analysis. As a result, only univariate analysis of monarchic regimes will be performed, and the results of this analysis will serve as guidance only, given the very low reliability of such results.

Variables

Dependent variable

In each of the four samples, the dependent variable is the time to regime failure. As in the previous chapter, a failure constitutes a violent or non-violent regime transition and includes both autocracy-to-autocracy changes, as well as instances of democratisation. The variable is a dummy variable coded 1 for transition (failure), and 0 if no failure occurred in a given month.

Table 10. Types of autocracy: military, monarchic, multiparty and single party regimes, as defined by Magaloni *et al.* (2013)

Autocratic type	Definition	Examples
<i>Monarchy</i>	The incumbent is selected among the members of a royal or dynastical family who is in charge of principal decision making, including the choice of a potential successor. The monarch or the royal family must be in effective control of policy making and it cannot be delegated to the legislature, the party or the military.	Nepal (1951 – 2008*) Saudi Arabia (1769 – 2006) Oman (1932 – 2008*)
<i>Military</i>	The principal positions of power are controlled by the military, and the power is shared through the institution of the armed forces, as opposed to party or the royal family. It is not sufficient for the incumbent to merely have a military background or be the leader of the armed forces at the same time to classify as a military regime – the effective control over positions of power must reside with the armed forces in general.	Argentina (1976 – 1983) Somalia (1962 – 2008*) Myanmar (1969 – 1990)
<i>Single party</i>	All politics within the state must be conducted under the banner of a single, civilian party, and, for the most part, the presence of another political party must be constitutionally prohibited. The legislature must be composed of the ruling party members only.	China (1949 – 2008*) Malawi (1966 – 1994) Tunisia (1963 – 1987)
<i>Multiparty</i>	The ruling party must allow other political parties to compete in the elections. The competition is unfair and biased in favour of the ruling party, but it is real. More than one party has to be represented in the legislature in order for the state to be considered 'multiparty'.	Bosnia (1992 – 2008*) CAR (1979 - 1981) Lebanon (1975 – 2008*)

Notes:

* – Ongoing (right-censored) regimes

CAR – Central African Republic

Source: Magaloni *et al.* (2013: 8-9) and Magaloni (2008: 731-33).

Table 11. Summary statistics on the four samples used for disaggregated analysis in this chapter

Regime type	Total number of observations in the sample (regime-months)	Total number of regimes in the sample	Number of regimes that ended in a failure	Percentage of regimes that ended in a failure
<i>Military</i>	15,646	104	94	90.40%
<i>Monarchic</i>	6,904	21	12	57.10%
<i>Multiparty</i>	15,504	118	74	62.70%
<i>Single party</i>	16,720	71	62	87.30%
Total	54,774	314	242	77.07%

Independent variables and transformations

Given that the current chapter repeats the procedures from the previous chapter on a disaggregated sample of autocracies, the same independent variables will be fitted in the models. This includes three categorical variables (*territorial disputes, oil dependency, political instability*), and three continuous variables (*wealth, ethnic fractionalisation and religious fractionalisation*). The continuous variable recording the GDP per capita of each autocracy has been logarithmically transformed to achieve more normal distribution of the variable across the samples.³⁸ The histograms for untransformed and transformed wealth variable can be found in Figures 10 and 11 respectively. Logarithmic transformation not only reduces the skewness of the distribution (see Figure 11), but also makes the relationship between time-to-failure and wealth more linear (compare Figures 12 and 13). Furthermore, it is important to note that the effect of wealth on regime change in Chapter 5 was non-linear. For this reason, this chapter will closely monitor the functional form of the *log(GDP per capita)* variable, and include a transformation of the variable where appropriate to account for the non-linearity.

³⁸ As in Chapter 5, the base of the logarithm was equal to 10. This means that a one point increase in the *log(GDP per capita)* variable signifies a 10-fold increase in the regime's GDP per capita.

Figure 10. A histogram of the untransformed GDP per capita variable, by regime type




Figure 11. A histogram of the logarithmically transformed GDP per capita variable, by regime type




Figure 12. A scatterplot of the untransformed GDP per capita variable, by regime type





Figure 13. A scatterplot of the logarithmically transformed GDP per capita variable, by regime type



After the Royston Parmar models are fitted for each regime type, and the results are discussed, a graphical representation of the survival curves will be presented. For the purposes of that analysis, all continuous variables will be centred on their means, since baseline hazard functions estimate survival probabilities with all coefficients set at 0. Whenever variables are centred, a brief summary of their mean values will be given for ease of interpretation.

Methods

Similarly to the procedure in Chapter 5, the analysis will proceed as follows. First, a univariate analysis for each of the four autocratic samples will be performed for purposes of diagnostic tests described below. Second, a stepwise forward selection Cox survival analysis model will be fitted for each regime type. One variable at a time will be added to the models, in order of theoretical importance similar to that in Chapter 5. Once all variables are fitted, potential interactions will be taken into account. The interactions will only be retained in the final model if they are statistically significant, or if they significantly improve model fit.³⁹ Once all variables are fitted in the model, and all potential time-varying effects are accounted for, the analysis will proceed with fitting a Royston-Parmar flexible model for the purposes of graphical data representation and improved model fit where time-varying effects are present.

Once the models have been fitted and discussed, the chapter will proceed with graphical representation of the changes in survival probabilities affected by independent variables included in the models. Due to time and space limitations, only the effects of variables that had a significant impact on the hazard of failure will be presented and discussed. Furthermore, for reasons mentioned above, apart from a general discussion of baseline functions for each regime type, only survival probabilities will be graphed in the further sections of the Data Analysis section.

³⁹ When interactions are fitted, a Wald test will be used to determine whether the addition significantly improves model fit.

Diagnostic tests

A number of tests will be performed on both univariate and multivariate models. They are performed to test the proportional hazards assumption (log-log plots, graphical and non-graphical Schoenfeld residuals), test the linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables (Martingale residual tests, link test), and the overall fit of the model (AIC scores, Cox-Snell residuals tests). While the results of all tests will be recorded in Appendix C or directly below the models in Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14, not all of them will be discussed due to lack of space. Instead, they will be discussed when a suspected violation of one of the core assumptions of the model or a significant lack of fit are suspected. Similarly to procedures employed in Chapter 5, a univariate Cox analysis for each independent variable will be performed. It will be followed by a Schoenfeld residuals test, both graphical and non-graphical, and the results will be recorded in Appendix C. Given that the proportional hazards assumption cannot be tested in the final model,⁴⁰ a separate final Cox model will be fitted, to test (graphically and non-graphically) whether the proportionality assumption is still violated when all of the covariates are included in the model. This will always be the last Cox model in the analysis.

If the Schoenfeld residual tests are not satisfactory, the interaction between the problematic variable and time will be added to a separate Cox model. If the interaction is significant, or if the model fit is improved, then the interaction will be retained in the model, and will be included in the final Royston-Parmar model.

If the continuous variables in the models (*log(GDP per capita)*, *ethnic fractionalisation* and *religious fractionalisation*) show signs on non-linearity in a Martingale residuals test, or the link tests of the multivariate Cox regression indicate that the functional form of the predictors might be non-linear, a transformation of the problematic term will be added to the model. If the added

⁴⁰ Royston-Parmar models do not allow for proportional hazards test, because the models were specifically designed to overcome the assumption of proportionality of hazards (Royston and Lambert, 2011). However, time-varying effects should only be included in final RP models if the data analysis results suggest that such an effect exists. For this reason, Cox models are used before fitting the RP model to test for the presence of time-varying effects.

transformed term has a significant impact on the dependent variable, and the link test results are satisfactory ($p > 0.05$), the transformed predictor will be kept in the model. Finally, all of the final Cox models will be subject to goodness-of-fit tests based on the Cox-Snell residuals test.

As mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5, Akaike information criteria will be used where appropriate to determine the contribution of predictors and their interactions to the overall fit of the model (Akaike, 1973; Posada and Buckley, 2004).

Data analysis

While the overall purpose of this chapter is to perform a repetition of the analysis from Chapter 5 on four separate samples of autocracies, two new hypotheses have been proposed about the effect of territorial disputes on the durability of each type of autocracy. In short, the main purpose of this chapter is to test whether military and multiparty regimes are indeed more susceptible to the centralising effects of territorial disputes than monarchic and single party regimes. The main assumption of this chapter is that typically durable regimes, such as monarchies and single party regimes, already enjoy a great deal of elite unity and tend to have weak and disorganised political opposition. Hence, the effects of territorial disputes will be weak or non-existent. On the other hand, regimes particularly prone to elite splits and disunity - military and multiparty regimes - will be likely to experience a greater degree of stability as a result of territorial disputes. Hence, it is expected that military and multiparty regimes will be less likely to fail as a result of territorial disputes.

To test these new assumptions, as well as a set of assumptions about the effects of wealth, oil dependency, political stability and ethnic and religious fractionalisation from the previous chapter, the following section will proceed as follows. First, a brief descriptive analysis of the most theoretically important predictors in the model (territorial dispute, wealth, oil dependency) will provide a setting for the

multivariate analysis to follow. Given the disaggregation of the sample, we will not be able to discuss all of the predictors in much detail. Second, the analysis will proceed by discussing the fitting of a model for each type of autocracy, and the results will be briefly summarised in four separate sections. Second, a graphical representation of the results will be presented and discussed. Finally, and most importantly, the results will be compared to the results from Chapter 5, and discussed in relation to the hypotheses posed in the current and previous chapter. The analysis starts with descriptive statistics concerning all four types of autocracy.

Descriptive statistics

Given that the literature on the survival of various types of regimes broadly agrees that military regimes are some the least durable types of autocracy (Geddes, 2003), it is perhaps unsurprising that Table 12 indicated that 50% of all military regimes have failed within just over 8 years of their existence, confirming the claims within the literature discussed in Chapter 3 that military regimes might struggle to legitimise their rule, and are particularly prone to elite splits, resulting in frequent breakdowns.

Table 12. Duration and transition statistics for each autocratic regime type

Regime type	Median duration (years)	Mean duration (years)	Number of regimes	% of transitions (N)
<i>Military</i>	8.3	12.5	104	95.8% (94)
<i>Monarchic</i>	28.1	27.4	21	57.1% (12)
<i>Multiparty</i>	8.8	11.0	118	62.7% (74)
<i>Single party</i>	19.6	19.6	71	87.3% (62)

Furthermore, multiparty regimes appear to be equally short-lived to military regimes. This finding confirms previous research, which has demonstrated that the competitive nature of multiparty regimes affects their stability (Knutsen and Nygård, 2015). Although expected, this is a finding with serious implications for the literature on party-based regimes, which often group multiparty and single party regimes into the same category of longevity (see for example: Geddes, 2003; Brownlee, 2007). Table 12 above clearly demonstrates that single party regimes are much more durable than multiparty regimes, with 50% of single party regimes failing after 19.6 years, compared to 8.8 years for multiparty regimes. This finding signifies a crucial structural difference between regimes that allow competition, and those with dominant-party systems that monopolise the political arena. It appears that competition and institutionalised elite turnover does not necessarily serve the purpose of stabilising autocratic regimes, and that a strong grip on power often characterising single party regimes might be a more successful political strategy.

Similarly to single party regimes, and confirming the expectations laid out in Chapter 3, monarchic regime is one of the more stable types of regime. Furthermore, they are the most durable type of autocracy, exceeding the median duration of single party regimes by 8.5 years on average. It is worth noting that because of this extraordinary durability, monarchic regimes are particularly likely to be censored, with only 57% of regimes in the dataset ending in regime failure. This small number of failures greatly limits the validity of the conclusions drawn from what might affect the longevity of monarchic governments. This point will be reiterated when discussing the monarchy-specific results in later sections of this chapter.

In addition to the regime-specific median duration times, it is worth noting that military and single party regimes are particularly likely to result in failure within the 1951-2008 period of observation, with almost 96% and 87% of regimes ending in a transition respectively. This is, however, unlikely to reflect any inherent structural

features of the military and single party regimes, but rather the fading popularity of these particular types of authoritarianism around the world.

Given that this chapter treats all regime transitions, democratic or non-democratic, as a failure event, it is worth considering the transition statistics for each autocratic type. It is evident from Table 13 below that although the greatest proportion (31.8%) of all regime transitions does in fact end up in democratisation, this pattern is very variable across various types of autocracies. For example, the less durable types of autocracy (military and multiparty) have a relatively high proportion of democratic transitions as a result of regime breakdown (42.6% and 33.8% respectively). However, while most military regime breakdowns end up in democratisation, most multiparty breakdown results in a transition to military regimes (36.6%). This counters the assumption that multiparty regimes are ‘transitioning’ regimes that will ultimately democratize. On the whole, military regimes, and not multiparty regimes, are most prone to democratisation in the event of a breakdown. A more detailed discussion on this point will be made in Chapter 7.

Table 13. The most common types of regime transition outcomes, by regime type

Regime type	TYPE OF TRANSITION					Total
	<i>Democracy</i>	<i>Military</i>	<i>Monarchy</i>	<i>Multiparty</i>	<i>Single party</i>	
<i>Military</i>	42.6% (40)	- -	0% (0)	47.9% (45)	9.6% (9)	100% (94)
<i>Monarchy</i>	16.7% (2)	66.7% (8)	- -	8.3% (1)	8.3% (1)	100% (12)
<i>Multiparty</i>	33.8% (25)	36.5% (27)	0% (0)	- -	29.7% (22)	100% (74)
<i>Single party</i>	16.1% (10)	41.9% (26)	0% (0)	41.9% (26)	- -	100% (62)
<i>Total</i>	31.8% (77)	25.2% (61)	0% (0)	29.8% (72)	13.2% (32)	100% (242)

The point most evident from Table 13 above, and most relevant for the current chapter, is the fact that the more durable autocratic regimes are at the same time most likely to transition into another form of autocratic government upon regime failure. In fact, over 83% of monarchies and 84% of single party regimes transition into an alternative form of autocracy, rather than a democracy. This is in contrast to the more 'democracy-prone' military and multiparty regimes, which are also, at the same time, relatively short lived. This indicates a potential that factors that stabilise certain types of autocratic regimes might also at the same time make it less likely for the state to transition into a democracy once the regime disintegrates. Hence, if territorial disputes contribute to the longevity of autocratic regimes, they might also, by extension, contribute to the lower likelihood of eventual democratic transition once the country breaks down. Although Table 13 does not include any significance tests, its contents suggest that the longevity of autocratic *regimes* might not be entirely independent from the longevity of autocratic *spells*. Investigating the effect of territorial disputes on regime longevity is an important contribution to the study of democratisation more generally, and this is precisely what this Chapter aims to accomplish.

Finally, before the multivariate analysis begins, it is worth noting that there is a considerable number of regimes which last a particularly short, or a particularly long amount of time. Some of them are left or right censored, whilst others are particularly short-lasting regimes, which were already briefly discussed in Chapter 3 in reference to the methodological and data organisation issues. Table 14 lists the shortest lasting autocracies by regime type, with the military regime in Benin in 1963 lasting only 2 months, the monarchy in Cambodia being under observation for only the last 4 months of its long rule (delayed entry), the 8-month long multiparty regime in the Dominican Republic (1952-1953), and a 7-month long single party-regime in Iraq (1979-1980).

Table 14. Minimum values of regime duration in the dataset, by regime type

Regime type	Minimum duration in months	Regime
<i>Military</i>	2	Benin (1963)
<i>Monarchic</i>	4	Cambodia (1954/1955 [†])
<i>Multiparty</i>	8	Dominican Republic (1952-1953)
<i>Single party</i>	7	Iraq (1979-1980)

Notes:

[†] - delayed entry cases (regime begun before 1951)

In contrast, the longest lasting cases in Table 15 below are those regimes that have not yet failed by the end of the observation period. They include the military regime in Egypt, the monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, the multiparty regime in Malaysia, and the single party regime in China. While Tables 14 and 15 demonstrate the longest and shortest lived regimes, there are many more regimes that have lasted a similar time span. Both tables present the difficulties that will be faced while performing the survival analysis in the later section due to the high number of potential outliers. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned in Chapter 4, the exceptionally high number of outliers in all autocratic types means that any attempts to exclude them from the analysis will result in a failure to properly capture the true nature of autocratic longevity. After all, it is natural that some factors, such as path dependency, culture, sudden external shocks or ideology that are responsible for extreme values of regime duration cannot be captured by quantitative analysis. While this is a serious limitation of this Thesis, it is also an unavoidable one. Therefore, to exclude extreme cases from the analysis and branding them as ‘outliers’ would be to wrongly assume that there is something unusual or unexpected about the natural variation in longevity between the regimes under analysis.

Table 15. Maximum values of regime duration in the dataset, by regime type

Regime type	Maximum duration in months (years)	Regime
<i>Military</i>	676 (56.3)	Egypt (1952-2008*)
<i>Monarchic</i>	696 (58.0)	Jordan (1950-2008*†) Saudi Arabia (1951-2008*†)
<i>Multiparty</i>	604 (50.3)	Malaysia (1957-2008*)
<i>Single party</i>	696 (58.0)	China (1951-2008*†)

Notes:

* - right-censored cases (no transition by 2008)

† - delayed entry cases (regime begun before 1951)

Finally, when it comes to the distribution of dispute involvement among the four autocratic types, the pattern is much less clear. Table 16 below suggests that the most durable regimes, monarchies, are also most likely to have ever been involved in a territorial dispute, at 71%. Military regimes slightly overtake single party regimes when it comes to dispute involvement, with 57% involved in disputes compared to 54% respectively. Multiparty regimes, on the other hand, seem to be least likely to be involved in territorial disputes, at only 36%. Although no clear pattern is visible, it is more likely to emerge *within* the four groups, and the expectation is that within those regime types, those which live longer were also more likely to have been involved in a territorial dispute during their lifetimes.

Multivariate analysis

The section below will report on the findings from three separate models fitted for military, multiparty and single party regime, and a univariate analysis for monarchic regimes. The results will be briefly discussed and a graphical representation of the significant effects will be presented. A more detailed discussion of these results will

follow in the final section of this Chapter. The analysis starts with the sample of failures within military regimes.

Table 16. Territorial dispute involvement, by regime type

Regime type	Percentage of regimes ever involved in a territorial dispute (N)	Total
<i>Military</i>	57% (59)	100% (104)
<i>Monarchic</i>	71% (15)	100% (21)
<i>Multiparty</i>	36% (43)	100% (118)
<i>Single party</i>	54% (38)	100% (71)
Total	49% (155)	100% (314)

Military regimes

Before proceeding with the analysis, it is worth considering the proportionality of hazards assumption violations that might potentially affect the reliability of the results below, as well as the functional shape of the continuous predictors from univariate analysis. In univariate visual Schoenfeld tests, *territorial dispute* and *political instability* variables show signs of potential violations (Figure A1 in Appendix C), but non-visual tests indicate no serious issues (Table A1). Moreover, once all tests are performed on predictors from multivariate models, no signs of violations are observed (Table A2 and Figure A4, Appendix C). While the log-log plots for *territorial dispute* suggest potential problems, as survival curved cross on multiple occasions (Figure A2), these problems disappear upon adjusting the plot for the influence of other variables in the final Cox model (Figure A5). Problems persist, however, for the *oil dependency* and *political instability* variables. Hence,

the results for both should be treated with caution. Nevertheless, neither of the Schoenfeld residuals tests has indicated serious problems, and the interaction between the variables and time was non-significant in both Cox and RP models. As a result of potential problems with *oil dependency* and *political instability* variables, their effects upon regime failure in military regimes will be interpreted with caution.

Univariate martingale residuals tests suggest that the relationship between *log(GDP per capita)* and *regime failure* is non-linear (Figure A3). Upon including a square term of *log(GDP per capita)* in the model, and the linearity problem disappears (see Figure A6). In addition, the square term of *log(GDP per capita)* is significant in Model 3, and thus was retained in further models.

Table 17 presents the results of the forward selection models fitted for a sample of 104 military regimes, with a 90.4% failure rate. While, at first, territorial disputes do not seem to affect the failure hazard of military regimes (Models 1-4), the effects become significant ($p < 0.01$) once *political instability* is included in subsequent models (Models 5-11). This is very similar to the result of the analysis in Chapter 5, and most likely happens because of the correlations between disputes, instability, and the hazard of failure discussed in Chapter 5. In Model 7 including all of the covariates, the likelihood of failure of a military regime involved in a territorial dispute decreases by 35% compared to a military regime *not* involved in a territorial dispute, when the effects of all other variables are held constant. However, when an interaction between territorial dispute and political instability is included in Model 11, it turns out that that the relationship between dispute involvement and regime failure changes depending on the political stability of the regime.

Comparing two military regimes that did not experience instability the year before, military regimes experiencing territorial disputes are 60% less likely to fail than military regimes not involved in a dispute. However, comparing two military regimes that did experience instability the year before, an involvement in a

territorial dispute results in a hazard ratio of $\exp(-0.914 + 0.791) = \exp(-0.123) = 0.884$. This means that there is an 11.6% reduction in the hazard of failure, but the relationship is not statistically significant. Hence, in military regimes, the stabilising effects of territorial disputes are only observed in regimes that experience no prior instability.

As expected, GDP per capita has a negative and significant effect on the hazard of military regime failure. However, as mentioned previously, the Martingale residual tests in Appendix C has clearly shown that there were some functional problems with the wealth variable, similarly to these observed in Chapter 5. The martingale residual tests for a multivariate Cox Model 10 in Appendix C, which include a square term for the $\log(\text{GDP per capita})$, suggest that the addition of the square term was sufficient to resolve this issue (Figure A6). The original and the squared term of the $\log(\text{GDP per capita})$ variable are jointly significant in Model 11 ($\chi^2=10.75$, $p=0.013$). Hence, it is clear that the effects of wealth on regime change are non-linear, and they also vary depending on the level of the *political instability* variable.

In Model 11, comparing two regimes which do not experience any political instability the year before, a regime with a tenfold increase in wealth will experience an almost 100% reduction in the likelihood of failure, but only until the income reaches 3630.78 \$ GK⁴¹. After the regime reaches this level of income, every tenfold increase in wealth will significantly *increase* the likelihood of failure.

For two military regimes which *have* experienced political instability the year before, holding everything else constant, a tenfold increase in wealth results in a hazard ratio of $\exp(-13.006 + 0.791) = \exp(-12.215) \approx 0.000005$. This means that for military regimes that experienced instability recently, the reduction in hazard ratio is greater, but also close to 100%. Once again, this relationship is non-linear, and once a certain level of wealth is reached, the risk of transition begins to increase

⁴¹ The coefficient for $\log(\text{GDP per capita})$ is -13.006, while the coefficient for squared $\log(\text{GDP per capita})$ equals 1.825. Hence, following the quadratic formula, the turning point is estimated as follows: $x = -(-13.006)/(2(1.825)) \approx 3.56$.

Given that the base for the logarithmic transformation was 10, the GDP value at which the effect weakens is calculated:

$10^{3.56} \approx 3630.78$ (GK dollars).

with the increase in wealth. When wealth stays at the same level, the effects of *political instability* on regime change in military autocracies are not significant in Model 11. This suggests that unlike in aggregate analysis in Chapter 5, in military regimes, political instability only increases the likelihood of transition in wealthier regimes.

The effects of both religious and ethnic fractionalisation were close to, or barely significant in Models 6 to 10, but only religious fractionalisation has a positive and significant effect on the hazard of regime failure in the final model. In Model 11, one unit increase on the religious fractionalisation scale makes it over 2.6 times as likely that a military regime will fail, holding everything else constant.

Table 17. Multivariate Cox and Royston Parmar regression estimates for military regimes

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	0.766 (0.16)	0.758 (0.16)	0.717 (0.15)	0.716 (0.15)	0.660* (0.12)	0.659* (0.13)	0.648* (0.13)	0.645* (0.12)	0.381** (0.11)	0.421** (0.13)	0.401** (0.12)
<i>Log(GDP pc)</i>	---	1.097 (0.37)	0.000*** (0.00)	0.000*** (0.00)	0.000** (0.00)	0.000* (0.00)	0.000** (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000** (0.00)	0.000* (0.00)	0.000*** (0.00)
<i>(Log(GDP pc))²</i>	---	---	9.641*** (6.17)	9.950*** (6.50)	5.568** (3.64)	6.361* (4.72)	7.011** (4.93)	3.024 [□] (1.81)	8.164** (5.54)	4.045* (2.68)	6.201** (3.90)
<i>Oil dependency</i>	---	---	---	0.413* (0.15)	0.731 (0.21)	0.751 (0.22)	0.642 (0.20)	0.732 (0.22)	0.631 (0.19)	0.752 (0.22)	0.622 [□] (0.17)
<i>Political instability</i>	---	---	---	---	25.849*** (5.87)	14.273*** (6.14)	15.481*** (6.20)	0.065 (0.12)	18.074*** (4.77)	0.073 (0.14)	0.235 (0.45)
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation.</i>	---	---	---	---	---	1.006 [□] (0.00)	1.005 [□] (0.00)	2.303 [□] (0.98)	2.561* (1.06)	2.457* (1.07)	2.628* (1.11)
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	2.280* (0.84)	1.213 (0.54)	1.159 (0.55)	1.144 (0.52)	1.206 (0.52)
<i>Log(GDP pc) * pol. instability</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	6.964** (4.27)	---	6.076* (3.79)	4.261* (2.67)
<i>Territorial dispute * pol. instability</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	2.357* (0.90)	2.033 [□] (0.78)	2.205* (0.85)
RCS1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	5.978*** (1.13)
RCS2	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.719* (0.36)

Table 7, continued.

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)
RCS 3	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.905 (0.09)
RCS 4	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.969 (0.03)
Constant	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.000*** (0.00)
AIC	721.516	723.356	717.139	712.122	528.212	526.009	524.967	523.362	526.999	523.216	110.57
Proportional hazards test (global)	$\chi^2 = 0.57$ df (1) p = 0.452	$\chi^2 = 1.06$ df (2) p = 0.589	$\chi^2 = 0.05$ df (3) p = 0.997	$\chi^2 = 0.37$ df (4) p = 0.985	$\chi^2 = 3.54$ df (5) p = 0.617	$\chi^2 = 3.12$ df (6) p = 0.793	$\chi^2 = 3.33$ df (7) p = 0.853	$\chi^2 = 2.81$ df (8) p = 0.945	$\chi^2 = 3.90$ df (8) p = 0.867	$\chi^2 = 3.14$ df (9) p = 0.959	---
Link test	---	$\beta = 0.45$ p = 0.971	$\beta = 0.22$ p = 0.701	B = 0.32 p = 0.292	B = -0.21 p = 0.030	B = -0.15 p = 0.025	B = -0.16 p = 0.025	B = -0.06 p = 0.407	B = -0.10 p = 0.214	B = -0.02 p = 0.784	---
Partial log likelihood	-359.758	-359.677	-355.57	-352.06	-259.11	-256.35	-257.11	-253.68	-255.50	-252.61	---

Notes:

Models estimated using a sample of 104 regimes in 63 countries, with 94 regime failures. Breslow method for handling ties. RP model is fitted using 4 degrees of freedom for time-constant effects.

HR – hazard ratio

S.E. – standard error

RP – Royston-Parmar

RCS – restricted cubic spline

☐ 0.05 ≤ p < 0.1 * 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05 ** 0.001 ≤ p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Monarchic regimes

As mentioned previously, the number of failures is exceptionally low for all monarchies between 1951 and 2008. Given that there are only 12 monarchic failures, complex models are at a serious risk of over-fitting, producing unreliable, and mostly insignificant, results. For this reason, a separate univariate Cox regression model has been fitted for each independent variable. The implications and interpretation of the results will be more limited, but the analysis itself will be more reliable. While the Royston-Parmar model was feasible for univariate analyses with no time-varying effects, it was not possible to account for time-varying effects in RP models because the initial values in the model were not feasible due to over-fitting. As a result, no RP models will be fitted for the sample of monarchic regimes.

Additionally, a separate Cox multivariate model (Model 8, Table 18) has been fitted, including a time-varying effect of oil dependency and ethnic fractionalisation, which have shown to be problematic in visual Schoenfeld residual tests in Appendix C (Figure B1 and Table B1).⁴² Model 8 was estimated for guidance purposes only, and should not be treated as a model which reliably estimates the effects of the covariates on the failure hazard of monarchic regimes. The model will not be used nor analysed when graphical representation of the predictors on regime failure is discussed, and it will not be assessed for goodness-of-fit later on in the chapter. The model was mainly fitted to estimate whether the inclusion of political instability would make the effects of territorial disputes on regime failure statistically significant. Although unreliable, Models 1 and 8 suggest that territorial disputes might have no effect on longevity of monarchies. Similarly, *oil dependency* and *religious fractionalisation* probably do not have a significant effect on monarchic regimes, but it cannot be stated with full certainty due to limitations of the estimates. Finally, estimates in Model 8 suggest that a one-point increase on fractionalisation scale reduces the likelihood of failure by almost a 100%, and a history of recent political instability increases the likelihood of failure by almost 280

⁴² It is worth noting that the diagnostic tests for monarchic regimes in Appendix C are estimated for guidance only, as the scarcity of data points makes the test results very hard to interpret, as even small variations will cause considerable 'wiggles' in the fit line.

times. Unfortunately, a much larger sample of monarchic failures is needed to correctly and reliably estimate the effects of these variables on monarchic survival. As a result of the above limitations the null hypothesis that disputes significantly affect longevity of monarchic regimes cannot be rejected.

Table 18. Univariate and multivariate Cox regression estimates for monarchic regimes

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	0.653 (0.44)	---	---	---	---	---	---	3.264 (1.59)
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	---	0.185** (0.12)	---	---	---	---	---	0.001 (0.01)
<i>Oil dependency</i>	---	---	0.394 (0.23)	0.243 (0.20)	---	---	---	3.013 (5.97)
<i>Oil dependency * time</i>	---	---	---	1.002 (0.00)	---	---	---	1.010* (0.00)
<i>Political instability</i>	---	---	---	---	11.231** (8.51)	---	---	279.558* (683.98)
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>	---	---	---	---	---	0.007* (0.01)	---	0.000** (0.00)
<i>Ethnic fract. * time</i>	---	---	---	---	---	1.029 [□] (0.02)	---	1.021 (0.03)
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.977 (1.21)	0.208 (0.25)
Proportional hazards test (global)	$\chi^2= 1.20$ df(1) p = 0.273	$\chi^2= 0.06$ df(1) p = 0.801	$\chi^2= 0.22$ df(1) p = 0.638	$\chi^2= 0.66$ df(2) p = 0.720	$\chi^2= 1.79$ df(1) p = 0.181	$\chi^2= 1.86$ df(2) p = 0.394	$\chi^2= 0.00$ df(1) p = 0.981	$\chi^2= 5.41$ df(8) p = 0.713
Link test	---	$\beta = -0.02$ p = 0.976	---	$\beta = -1.74$ p = 0.547	---	$\beta = 0.22$ p = 0.290	$\beta = -11161$ p = 0.490	$\beta = 0.06$ p = 0.165
AIC	65.26	59.49	63.58	65.29	56.95	62.08	65.77	51.34

Notes:

Models estimated using a sample of 22 regimes in 21 countries, with 12 regime failures. Breslow method for handling ties.

HR – hazard ratio

S.E. – standard error

RCS – restricted cubic spline

[□] 0.05 ≤ p < 0.1 * 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05 ** 0.001 ≤ p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Multiparty regimes

The univariate diagnostic visual and non-visual Schoenfeld residual tests for multiparty regimes indicate that apart from the *log(GDP per capita)* variable, all other predictors do not violate any of the proportional hazards assumption (Table C1 and Figure C1 in Appendix C). Furthermore, although the wealth variable fails the test in univariate analysis, when other variables and interactions are included in Model 7, the proportional hazards assumption is clearly met in multivariate visual and non-visual Schoenfeld residual test (Table C2 in Appendix C). It appears that while on its own, *log(GDP per capita)* is problematic, when its potential correlation with other predictors is accounted for in the final Cox model, the proportionality of hazards violations no longer hold. In addition, the detailed non-visual Schoenfeld residuals test in appendix C (Figure C4) confirms that *log(GDP per capita)* does not violate the proportionality assumption in a multivariate model ($\chi^2=1.01$, $df(1)$, $p=0.314$).

When it comes to 'log-log' tests of proportional hazard for multiparty regimes, it appears that for larger values of time, the survival curves for different values of the *territorial disputes* variable cross. This suggests that for older multiparty regimes, participating in territorial disputes might actually *increase* the risk of failure, as opposed to decreasing it (Figure C2 in Appendix C). This effect does not disappear when other covariates are adjusted for in Figure C5, and therefore it is worth noting that this disproportionality might have an impact on the significance of the effect of territorial disputes on multiparty regime survival in all of the models in table 19 below.

Having discussed the diagnostic tests, this section will now move to discussing the results from the forward selection Models 1-8. It was assumed that similarly to military regimes, the likelihood of failure in multiparty regimes would be significantly and negatively affected by the presence of territorial disputes. However, as clearly visible in Models 1 – 8, even when the effects of all other covariates, including *political instability*, are accounted for, territorial disputes do not have a significant impact on the hazard of failure in multiparty regimes. This

provides strong evidence against hypothesis 1. Nevertheless, as discussed above, this lack of significance might be affected by the disproportionality of the effect of territorial disputes on regime failure observed in diagnostic tests in Appendix C. As a result, no clear conclusions can be drawn, but further research could establish whether military regimes might be affected by territorial disputes differently at different stages of regime longevity.

Similarly, *oil dependency* and *ethnic and religious fractionalisation* do not have a statistically significant impact on the failure of multiparty regimes. Interestingly, wealth has a significant negative impact on regime failure in Model 2, but the effect disappears once the effects of oil dependency are accounted for in Model 3. However, once the effects of previous political instability are taken into account in Models 4-6, neither wealth, nor oil dependency, have a significant effect on multiparty regime failure.

It appears that oil dependency, which is positively correlated with wealth, explains regime survival better than wealth in multiparty regimes. Nevertheless, it also appears that instability, which is negatively correlated with oil and wealth, once accounted for, explains this relationship even better in Models 4-6. This suggests that wealthy and oil rich multiparty regimes are simply much less likely to experience political instability in the first place. When they do, however, neither oil, nor wealth had a significant effect on the likelihood of multiparty regime failure.

Finally, an interaction between wealth and lack of instability has been included in Models 7 and 8, which are Cox regression and Royston-Parmer regression models respectively. It appears that when a multiparty regime is stable, a tenfold increase in wealth results in a $(100\% - 27.3\%) = 72.7\%$ reduction in the hazard of failure, compared to stable multiparty regimes that do not experience increase in wealth. Similarly, comparing two multiparty regimes that *did* experience instability the year before, a tenfold increase in wealth leads to hazard ratio of failure that is equal to $\exp(-1.298 + 2.302) = \exp(1.004) = 2.73$ for regimes that did experience the wealth increase, compared to regimes that did not. This means that military regimes that more wealthy regimes that experience instability are much more likely to fail than poorer regimes experiencing instability.

Table 19. Multivariate Cox and Royston Parmar regression estimates for multiparty regimes

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8 (RP)
	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	0.871 (0.21)	0.823 (0.21)	0.849 (0.22)	0.759 (0.17)	0.758 (0.17)	0.771 (0.17)	0.695 (0.16)	0.716 (0.16)
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	---	0.446* (0.17)	0.529 (0.21)	0.676 (0.25)	0.673 (0.25)	0.664 (0.25)	0.261** (0.12)	0.273** (0.12)
<i>Oil dependency</i>	---	---	0.326* (0.18)	0.404 (0.21)	0.404 (0.21)	0.408 (0.21)	0.445 (0.22)	0.412 (0.20)
<i>Political instability</i>	---	---	---	11.059*** (2.73)	11.055*** (2.71)	10.773*** (2.66)	0.002* (0.01)	0.010 (0.03)
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>	---	---	---	---	0.983 (0.38)	1.105 (0.45)	0.831 (0.35)	0.997 (0.38)
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	---	---	---	---	---	0.62 (0.28)	0.754 (0.35)	0.646 (0.28)
<i>Log(GDP per capita) * political instability</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	14.779* (12.07)	9.991** (8.01)
RCS 1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	4.285*** (0.54)
RCS 2	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.525*** (0.16)
RCS 3	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.851* (0.05)
RCS 4	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.996 (0.04)
Constant	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	19.185* (26.59)
AIC	598.57	595.57	592.66	525.40	527.40	528.44	520.05	245.15
Proportional hazards test	$\chi^2 = 0.36$ df (1) p = 0.547	$\chi^2 = 3.59$ df (2) p = 0.166	$\chi^2 = 4.61$ df (3) p = 0.203	$\chi^2 = 2.23$ df (4) p = 0.694	$\chi^2 = 2.34$ df (5) p = 0.800	$\chi^2 = 2.06$ df (6) p = 0.914	$\chi^2 = 2.35$ df (7) p = 0.938	---
Link test	---	$\beta = -0.64$ p = 0.609	$\beta = -0.11$ p = 0.848	$\beta = -0.22$ p = 0.265	$\beta = -0.22$ p = 0.262	$\beta = -0.16$ p = 0.371	$\beta = 0.02$ p = 0.804	---
Partial log likelihood	-298.28	-295.79	-293.33	-258.70	-258.70	-258.22	-253.02	---

Notes:

Models estimated using a sample of 118 regimes in 86 countries, with 74 regime failures.

Breslow method for handling ties. RP model is fitted using 4 degrees of freedom for time-constant effects, and 3 degrees of freedom for time-varying effects.

HR – hazard ratio

S.E. – standard error

RCS – restricted cubic spline

☐ 0.05 ≤ p < 0.1 * 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05 ** 0.001 ≤ p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

This is an important finding given relatively little is known about what makes multiparty regimes more stable and less likely to transition to another form of regime. More discussion of this particular finding will be provided in relation to the findings about the likelihood of democratisation of multiparty regimes in Chapter 7, as well as the Conclusion chapter of this thesis.

Single party regimes

Before moving to analysing single-party regimes, it is worth noting some of the concerns connected to the violation of proportional hazards assumption. In appendix C, visual and non-visual Schoenfeld residuals tests have revealed that the effects of political instability quite clearly vary over time (Figure D1). Similarly, detailed non-graphical tests from univariate analysis show that instability violates the proportionality hazards assumption ($\chi^2= 8.85$, $df(1)$, $p=0.003$) (Table D2). When included in Model 5, the interaction between *political instability* and *time* was statistically significant ($p<0.001$). It also contributed to the model significantly, with a Wald test indicating significant improvement in model fit between Models 4 and 5 ($\chi^2= 17.97$, $df(1)$, $p<0.001$). As a result, the interaction was retained in the model. Figure D4 and Table D2 in Appendix C additionally demonstrate that in a full Cox model, once the time interaction is accounted for, *political instability* no longer appears problematic.

While *territorial disputes* variable shows weak sign of violation, with the p-value for univariate tests i 0.05 ($\chi^2 = 6.51$, $df(1)$, $p= 0.011$), the interaction between *territorial disputes* and *time* was insignificant. Furthermore, the multivariate Schoenfeld residual tests indicate that once other predictors in the model are included, *territorial disputes* variable is no longer problematic, and a multivariate non-graphical Schoenfeld residuals test comes out insignificant ($\chi^2 = 0.68$, $df(1)$, $p= 0.411$) (Table A2 in Appendix C).

Similarly to monarchic and multiparty regimes, single party regimes do not appear significantly affected by territorial disputes when the effects of all other variables are held constant in Model 7. This partially confirms the assumption that territorial disputes have little effect on elites in single party regimes because their structural features already guarantee a high degree of elite cohesion. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that while *territorial disputes* have no effect on their own, they do interact significantly with the *oil dependency* variable in Models 9-11.

In Model 11, single party regimes that do not depend on oil are not significantly affected by territorial dispute involvement. However, comparing two single party

regimes which *are* dependent on oil, participation in territorial disputes while holding all other variables constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to $\exp(-0.212 + 1.573) \approx 3.902$. This is an increase of over 290%, and the relationship is statistically significant. Finally, unlike other types of autocracy, single party regimes are significantly less likely to fail as a result of oil dependency when not affected by territorial disputes, with a $(100\% - 50.06\%) = 49.04\%$ reduction in democratisation rate.

In addition to the above, *political instability* has a significant effect on the likelihood of single party regimes' failure, increasing their hazard of transition between 4 and 5 times in Models 5-9, where the interaction between *political instability* and *time* variable has been included in the Cox model. In addition, in the Royston-Parmar Model 10, where the time-varying effects of instability are accounted for, the effects of instability are similar in magnitude to those from a Cox regression in Model 4, as the rate of regime failure as a result of recent political instability increases almost 20 times. While the Cox model 10 identifies the interaction between time and instability as significant, the RP model 10 does not, which likely explains the change in the magnitude of the effect of instability between models 9 and 10. Given that Royston-Parmar models are more reliable when accounting for time-varying effects of independent variables, the RP model predictions are considered to reflect the magnitude of the effect more accurately.

Finally, ethnic fractionalisation has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of failure in single party regimes. The likelihood of regime failure increases almost 131 times in the Royston Parmar Model 10 for every increase on the ethnic fractionalisation scale. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the standard error is particularly large, signifying a very large variability in the predicted scores. This means that in some instances, the magnitude of the effect of ethnic fractionalisation will be very large, whilst in other instances it will be particularly low. Hence, the actual magnitude in the regression might not capture the data particularly well. The standard error is larger than the actual estimate in Models 8-10, and even though it is statistically significant, it is considered *scientifically* insignificant.

Table 20. Multivariate Cox and Royston Parmar regression estimates for single party regimes

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10 (RP)	Model 11 (RP)
	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	0.697 (0.21)	0.644 (0.20)	0.617 (0.19)	0.704 (0.20)	0.786 (0.24)	0.829 (0.25)	0.878 (0.26)	0.962 (0.28)	0.720 (0.20)	0.869 (0.24)	0.809 (0.24)
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	---	0.437* (0.16)	0.389* (0.15)	0.418* (0.17)	0.479 (0.21)	0.570 (0.27)	0.619 (0.30)	9.255* (9.89)	8.699* (9.06)	7.857* (6.60)	0.546 (0.24)
<i>Oil dependency</i>	---	---	1.503 (0.54)	1.466 (0.56)	1.219 (0.55)	1.096 (0.55)	1.032 (0.52)	1.159 (0.56)	0.475 (0.18)	0.599 (0.26)	0.506* (0.17)
<i>Political instability</i>	---	---	---	22.273*** (7.52)	4.392** (2.34)	4.418** (2.33)	4.160** (2.15)	5.105** (2.72)	5.209** (2.78)	19.880*** (6.92)	18.079*** (6.03)
<i>Political instability * time</i>	---	---	---	---	1.012*** (0.00)	1.012*** (0.00)	1.012*** (0.00)	1.012*** (0.00)	1.012*** (0.00)	---	---
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>	---	---	---	---	---	1.269 (0.19)	1.445* (0.26)	129.571** (199.66)	146.540** (227.37)	130.871*** (172.49)	1.299 (0.20)
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.364 (0.20)	0.262* (0.16)	0.308 (0.19)	0.438 (0.24)	0.587 (0.32)
<i>Log(GDP per capita) * ethnic fract.</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.005** (0.01)	0.005** (0.01)	0.006*** (0.01)	---
<i>Territorial dispute * oil dependency</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	3.999* (2.63)	5.192** (3.34)	4.823** (2.65)
RCS 1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	2.894*** (0.53)	2.917*** (0.58)
RCS 2	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.171 (0.16)	1.178 (0.17)
RCS 3	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.971 (0.06)	0.958 (0.06)
RCS 4	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.032 (0.04)	1.038 (0.04)

Table 20, continued.

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10 (RP)	Model 11 (RP)
	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)
RCS 1 (<i>political instability</i>)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.413 (0.36)	1.402 (0.39)
RCS 2 (<i>political instability</i>)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.856 (0.16)	0.788 (0.14)
RCS 3 (<i>political instability</i>)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.966 (0.09)	0.980 (0.10)
Constant	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.100 (1.55)	2.798 (3.87)
AIC	430.94	432.12	432.12	359.89	349.48	349.42	349.21	344.20	343.462	112.49	114.49
Proportional hazards test (global)	$\chi^2 = 6.51$ df (1) p = 0.011	$\chi^2 = 7.12$ df (2) p = 0.029	$\chi^2 = 8.56$ df (3) p = 0.036	$\chi^2 = 8.51$ df (4) p = 0.075	$\chi^2 = 1.69$ df (5) p = 0.890	$\chi^2 = 1.46$ df (6) p = 0.962	$\chi^2 = 1.42$ df (7) p = 0.985	$\chi^2 = 2.71$ df (8) p = 0.951	$\chi^2 = 2.62$ df (9) p = 0.977	---	---
Link test	---	$\beta = 0.273$ p = 0.929	$\beta = -0.309$ p = 0.724	$\beta = -0.285$ p = 0.083	$\beta = -0.037$ p = 0.661	$\beta = -0.021$ p = 0.802	$\beta = 0.006$ p = 0.933	$\beta = 0.074$ p = 0.252	$\beta = 0.067$ p = 0.280	---	---
Partial log likelihood	-215.44	-213.47	-213.057	-175.94	-169.74	-168.71	-167.61	-164.10	-162.73	(-40.24)	(-40.25)

Notes:

Models estimated using a sample of 71 regimes in 64 countries, with 62 regime failures. Breslow method for handling ties. RP model is fitted using 4 degrees of freedom for time-constant effects, and 3 degrees of freedom for time-varying effects.

HR – hazard ratio

S.E. – standard error

RCS – restricted cubic spline

□ 0.05 ≤ p < 0.1 * 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05 ** 0.001 ≤ p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001


A similar relationship is apparent when an interaction between *log(GDP per capita)* and *ethnic fractionalisation* is included in Models 8-10. A tenfold increase in GDP per capita, coupled with one point increase on ethnic fractionalisation scale, results in a greater likelihood of regime failure. At the same time, a tenfold increase in GDP per capita also results in a large increase in the likelihood of failure for every unit increase in ethnic fractionalisation scale. However, like above, all of these estimates have unusually high standard errors, and will be considered scientifically insignificant. The final model (Model 11) will not include the interaction between ethnic fractionalisation and wealth.

Goodness of fit

Having analysed the results from models fitted to all four samples, it is important to assess the goodness of fit of the model. This will be done using the Cox-Snell residuals (Cox and Snell, 1968). It is expected that if a Cox model fits the data well, then the true cumulative hazard function will have an exponential distribution with a hazard rate of 1 (Cleves *et al.*, 2010: 219). Figure 14 below presents the results of Cox-Snell test for each of the regime types for models including interactions and excluding interactions. The Model fitted for monarchic regimes in the previous section has been omitted, given the obvious unreliability of the estimates as a result of low sample size. In Figure 14, the red line is a standard exponential distribution with a hazard function equal to 1. The blue line, on the other hand, is a Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard function with the Cox-Snell residuals as the time variable, and regime change as a failure variable.

As we can see from Figure 14, the data does not fit the model perfectly, with some large variability in the right-hand tail in all three models. This is to be expected, given that prior failures and censoring reduce the effective sample considerably (Cleves *et al.*, 2010: 222). In other words, sizeable variability is quite common for large values of time where the sample is very small, and should not be a cause for

Figure 14. Cox-Snell residual tests for the Cox regression models with and without interactions




too much concern (Stata Corp, 2013). While some sources interpret even small deviations as bad model fit (Cleves *et al.*, 2010; Abdelaal and Zakria, 2015) it is crucial to note that these sources usually refer to the goodness-of-fit of models estimated using clinical trials and experimental data, and as such have very low tolerance to potential variability.

Overall, the models fit the data relatively well at smaller values of time. The older the regimes are, the less reliable the models are at predicting the likelihood of regime failure. This means that it is easiest to predict the likelihood of failure of relatively young regimes using variables tested in this Chapter, but as the regimes get older, factors such as income, territorial disputes, or fractionalisation become less likely to explain the likelihood of failure. This is natural, given that there are many potential factors that the models cannot account for. Some causes of longevity are due to contextual variables such as historical events, cultural factors, or the nature of the ideology adopted by the leadership. Any model based on quantitative data will be largely limited in explaining all aspects of authoritarian survival, especially in the case of regimes that survived a particularly long period of time.

Graphical representation of results

Finally, the chapter will now move to graphically represent the relationship between dispute involvement and regime failure in military and single party regimes, using the Royston-Parmar model estimations. Before this is done, however, the baseline hazard, survival, and cumulative hazard functions for all regime types will be described and analysed. As noted previously, baseline models are estimated for regimes with an average GDP per capita, no oil dependency, no recent history of territorial disputes or political instability, and minimal ethnic and religious fractionalisation. The *log(GDP per capita)* variable has been centred for each regime type separately, given the discrepancy in the distribution of this variable discussed in the Data and Methods section of this chapter.

Figure 15. Baseline survival, hazard, and cumulative hazard functions obtained from Royston Parmar models, by regime type



It is clear from Figure 15 that at the lowest level of risk, single party regimes have the highest rate of survival, while multiparty regimes have the lowest rate of survival. For military and multiparty regimes, the survival probability decreases fairly steadily throughout the life of the regime, while for single party regimes, the decrease in survival probability is most prominent within the first 30 years of their existence, and then decreases at a slower rate.

Where hazard functions are concerned, it is very clear from the second graph in Figure 15 above that the functions are not monotonic. For multiparty regimes, the hazard is higher than that of other regimes at *all* times, and is highest in the first two years of the regime's existence. That risk then decreases sharply, and stabilises at around 5 years of age. The trajectory is similar for military regimes, where the risk of failure is highest within the first two years, and then decreases until around 11 years of age. However, unlike in multiparty regimes, the risk then increases slightly again after 11 years and continues to rise slowly over the regime's lifetime. Finally, single party regimes are at the highest risk of failure within their first year. At around 9 years that hazard increases again for 10 years, and past the 19 years of age, the risk of failure for single party regimes decreases fairly steadily. The rate of hazard accumulation for each regime is additionally reflected in the third graph in Figure 15 above.

Due to limitations of time and space, this chapter will only graphically evaluate the impact of the most theoretically important predictor in the models – the presence of territorial disputes. The survival curves will only be graphed in instances where the impact of territorial disputes, or their interaction with another variable, was statistically significant. The results of this analysis are presented below.

Military regimes

Figure 16 examines the difference in military regime survival at different values of the territorial dispute variable. This relationship was statistically significant in Model 11, with military regimes with no prior instability involved in disputes being almost 60% less likely to transition than regimes not experiencing territorial

disputes and not experiencing instability, holding everything else constant. Figure 16 demonstrates that at all times during their existence, military regimes are much more likely to survive, with the difference in effect increasing with the age of the regime. The more established the regime, the more likely they are to be stabilised by territorial disputes, providing no prior experience of instability. The confidence intervals in the right-hand graph in Figure 16 indicate that this relationship is statistically significant only once regimes reach 5 years of age. Furthermore, in Model 11, there were significant differences in the way dispute involvement affected regime survival at different values of the *political instability* variable. When affected by territorial disputes, military regimes were 11.6% less likely to transition if they were experiencing instability than if they were not experiencing instability, holding everything else constant. While Figure 17 confirms that this difference in failure hazards also translated into survival probability for military regimes, the difference in survival is not statistically significant, with 0 being included in the 95% confidence interval. This means that while there are significant differences in hazard ratio of failure at different values of political instability for affected regimes, this does not translate into a significant difference in survival probability over time.

Single party regimes

Finally, Figure 18 presents the differences in survival probabilities between single party regimes that were affected by territorial disputes and are dependent on oil, and single party regimes that were affected by territorial disputes and are not dependent on oil. While this difference was statistically significant for hazard ratios in Model 11 (Table 20), this relationship does not translate into survival differences over analysis time due to large 95% confidence intervals including the value of 0. Hence, while single party regimes were on average 4.5 times more likely to fail if involved in disputes and dependent on oil than if involved in disputes and not dependent on oil at any given unit of time, this does not mean that they has a consistently higher probability of survival over the entire analysis period. The

Figure 16. Military regimes: Differences in survival functions, by past dispute involvement




Figure 17. Military regimes: Differences in survival functions by past dispute involvement at different values of the *political instability* variable





Figure 18. Single party regimes: Differences in survival functions by past dispute involvement at different values of the *oil dependency* variable



chapter will now proceed with discussing the results of this section in the conclusion below.

Discussion and conclusion

The analysis above aimed to test the hypotheses: that while the duration of military and multiparty regimes is likely to be prolonged by their involvement in territorial disputes, monarchic regimes and single party regimes are likely to remain unaffected. In addition, the analysis aimed to test whether other hypotheses from Chapter 6 are also applicable on a disaggregated sample of authoritarian regimes.

In summary, the analysis has demonstrated that while military regimes are significantly less likely to fail as a result of territorial disputes, such conflicts have no significant effect on multiparty regimes. It was assumed in Chapter 3 that military and multiparty regimes are particularly prone to experience elite splits, and hence are able to benefit from the centralising effect of external threats to territorial integrity of the state. The finding that military regimes are not influenced by territorial conflicts has important implications on the theory outlined in Chapter 3. Two potential explanations are offered for the finding that only military, but not multiparty regimes, are less likely to fail as a result of territorial disputes.

First, it is possible that the proneness of multiparty regimes to elite splits was overstated in Chapter 3. While much of the literature suggests that multiparty states are short lived and unstable, a significant portion of it argues that in fact, multiparty regimes are exceptionally resistant to factors that usually lead to autocratic breakdown. It is possible that elites in multiparty regimes are stronger due to their unique ability to manage and intimidate opposition, as well as increase their legitimacy with the use of regular multiparty elections. An example of such regimes could be the Russian Federation under the rule of United Russia and Vladimir Putin (2000-present), or Mexico under the rule of Institutional Revolutionary Party (1929-2000). However, while it is undoubtedly true that some competitive autocracies included in the Magaloni *et al.* (2013) definition of

multiparty regimes are exceptionally durable, their median duration time is very short compared to monarchic and single party regimes,⁴³ as shown in the analysis section above. Hence, while it is true that elites in certain competitive autocracies might use the features of the system to prolong their rule, this and other studies have shown that on average, multiparty regimes are considerably less stable than other forms of autocracy.⁴⁴

Given that multiparty and military regimes are comparably prone to failure, the explanation for the divergence in how they are affected by territorial disputes must lay somewhere else. It is possible that while elite splits are likely in both autocratic types, the presence of institutions significantly changes the scope for power centralisation within multiparty regimes. While many scholars consider the presence of institutional power turnover in multiparty regimes as a mere tool of regime legitimisation, it is possible that the presence of institutions genuinely prevents power centralisation. It is possible that similarly to democracies, even weak and unstable institutions can prevent the ruling elites from establishing a stronger grip on the regime infrastructure. Given that power centralisation is the key aspect contributing to regime longevity, the inability to centralise in response to territorial disputes could explain why multiparty regimes are not affected by such conflicts. Nevertheless, it is still possible that multiparty regimes are less likely to democratise as a result of territorial conflict. After all, while they might not be more likely to survive in such conditions than at peace, it is possible that when a transition *does* happen, multiparty regimes will be more likely to transition to another form of autocracy as opposed to a democratic system.

While territorial disputes had no significant impact on multiparty regimes, it made military regimes significantly less likely to fail, thus providing partial evidence for Hypothesis 1. The effect was significant and strong, and it likely explains why in aggregate analysis, all authoritarian regimes seemed to be affected by territorial disputes. This is a particularly important implication of this chapter. It is clear that

⁴³ 8.8 years, compared to 8.3 years for military regimes, 28.1 years for monarchic regimes, and 19.6 for single party regimes. See Table 12 of this chapter for more detail.

⁴⁴ See Gurr (1974), Epstein *et al.* (2006), Gates *et al.* (2006), Hadenius and Teorell (2008); Goldstone *et al.* (2010), and Knutsen and Nygård (2015). The reader should bear in mind, however, that all of the abovementioned studies use slightly different definitions of competitive authoritarian regimes.

authoritarian regimes should always be disaggregated in quantitative analysis, lest the researchers run the risk of drawing false or misleading conclusions from their work. Despite results from Chapter 5 indicating that *all* autocracies are more durable as a result of military conflict, it is clear from the analysis in Chapter 6 that these effects are only strong and significant for military regimes. Similarly to results in Chapter 5, the effects of territorial disputes only become significant when political instability is accounted for in the models. This was theorised to be the case due to the fact that while territorial disputes are correlated with lower risk of transition, they were also correlated with a higher risk of political instability.⁴⁵

Surprisingly, despite the fact that Hypothesis 2 stated that single party regimes will not be affected by territorial disputes, the data analysis above has shown that under certain conditions, single party regimes are much more likely to fail when involved in this type of conflict. More specifically, when their economy is dependent on oil, single party regimes experiencing territorial conflict were much more likely to fail. This is a very interesting and important finding, which suggests that in single party regimes, the access and monopoly over non-tax revenues changes the dynamic of the territorial dispute – centralisation relationship. It is possible that when oil-rich countries do get involved in territorial disputes, the disputes might be more serious in nature, and more likely to lead to war. War might be more likely because the territory in question is most likely also oil-rich, and therefore more valuable to both warring parties. A war might be more likely than a simple dispute to lead to an overthrow of a regime, since they might end up in foreign occupation and eventually, an overthrow of a regime. Nevertheless, it is unclear why this interaction is only significant for single party regimes but not for other types of autocracies, and future research could address these findings in more detail.

In the final stages of the analysis, monarchic regimes appear unaffected by territorial disputes, although it is unclear whether this is due to them being naturally centralised, as discussed in Chapter 3. The small number of monarchic failures in the dataset made building a complex model difficult, and the results are

⁴⁵ See Chapter 5 for more details.

largely unreliable. Hence, the null hypothesis that territorial disputes do not affect monarchic regimes cannot be rejected. As a result of this small sample, monarchic regimes will not be a part of the analysis in Chapter 7. Instead, Chapter 7 will focus on estimating the likelihood of democratisation for military, multiparty and single party regimes only.

In addition, it is worth noting that when disaggregated, not all regimes were affected by the control variables in a similar manner as on an aggregate level in Chapter 5. While wealth reduced the likelihood of failure in multiparty regimes, the effect was quadratic for military regimes, and non-existent in single party regimes. This effect was significant in all regimes in the aggregate model in Chapter 5. Similarly, ethnic fractionalisation only increased the likelihood of failure in military regimes, while oil reduced the likelihood of failure in single party regimes only. These results have strong implications for further research within the field of International Relations, where autocratic regimes are usually analysed on an aggregate level. This chapter has clearly shown that structural features of autocratic regimes have an important impact on their survival and might be affected by different types of predictors. Further research ought to focus on establishing a theoretical and empirical basis for models built specifically for each of the autocratic types.

Finally, it is crucial to discuss the implications of the findings discussed above for the wider literature on ReSIT, as well as regime survival literature within the field of Comparative Politics. First, it is apparent that the ReSIT assumptions can be applied to military regimes. They appear to be more susceptible than other types of regimes to the centralising effects of territorial disputes. It is possible that military regimes, which often fail due to the fact that the military rulers find it difficult to legitimise continuous rule of a 'guardian' or 'transitory' regime, find a new source of legitimacy in the presence of external threats to the state's territorial integrity. Second, given how little attention has so far been paid to ReSIT within Comparative Politics, it is now paramount that more research is done on the importance of conflict – territorial or otherwise – on the survival of different types of autocracy.

Having discussed the implications stemming from the analysis in this chapter and the significance of its findings, the thesis will now turn to testing the assumption put forward by the original ReSIT research: that authoritarian regimes are less likely to democratise in the presence of territorial disputes. The analysis will be conducted on three types of autocracy: military, multiparty and single party regimes.

Chapter 7: Territorial disputes and democratisation, by regime type

Introduction

Chapters 5 and 6 tested the proposition that territorial dispute involvement makes autocratic regimes more durable. Chapter 6 has demonstrated that the effects of territorial dispute involvement varies for different types of autocracies, with military regimes being particularly likely to be affected: military autocracies were significantly less likely to transition into any form of regime, democratic and autocratic, when affected by a territorial dispute the year before. Overall, Chapters 5 and 6 have provided empirical support for one of the theoretical propositions of this thesis, namely, that external existential threats to the regime in the form of territorial disputes make autocratic regimes less likely to transition.

Nevertheless, the scope of analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 was very broad. While there was clear evidence that certain types of regimes might be less likely to fail as a result of territorial disputes, it remained unclear whether territorial disputes also decrease the likelihood of these regimes democratising. This question is of crucial importance, given that the original proposition of Reversed Second Image theory (ReSIT) states that external threats – especially in the form of territorial disputes (Gibler 2010; Gibler and Tir, 2013) – will make democratisation much less likely. This is an issue of crucial importance not only to the theoretical and empirical literature, but also to policy-makers more generally. First, the efforts to help regimes transition into stable democracies have been largely limited to foreign aid and external pressure. If the propositions of ReSIT are correct, it will mean that more effort needs to be made to mediate between neighbours who have unsettled claims to one another's territory. Second, much of the policy directed at stabilising relations in heavily conflicted regions such as the Middle East have focused on democracy promotion as means of securing peace (Russett, 2005; Buraczynska, 2016). If territorial disputes do in fact make democratic transitions more difficult, then attempts to provide security to unstable regions should be refocused on standard diplomatic solutions, rather than forceful regime change. While this thesis

does not focus on democratic survival, it is possible that young democracies might find it harder to survive in territorially contested regions, as traditional ReSIT research also suggests.

While Chapters 5 and 6 analysed all types of regime change, the following chapter will focus specifically on the impact of territorial threats on democratisation and test whether the propositions of ReSIT are still applicable once important methodological improvements are made. Hence, the following chapter will address two final research questions of this thesis: Are autocratic regimes less likely to democratise as a result of territorial dispute involvement? And, are the chances of democratising as a result of territorial dispute involvement different in various types of autocratic regimes?

Although the previous empirical literature by Gibler and colleagues has found a connection between democratisation and territorial dispute involvement, the research is largely limited to studies that rely on problematic measures of the independent variable, focusing on the level of democracy within democratic and autocratic regimes, rather than discussing democratic transitions more specifically, as detailed in Chapter 4. This is a considerable limitation, given that continuous measures of democracy face serious methodological and theoretical problems, as also discussed in Chapter 4. Moreover, none of the IR literature testing ReSIT accounts for the differences in which the unique structural features of authoritarian regimes might moderate the relationship in question. This chapter will utilise methods commonly used in the well-developed Comparative Politics literature to improve the interdisciplinarity of the IR and ReSIT research. By using a dichotomous measure of democratic transition, focusing solely on autocracies, and controlling for the impact of structural features of different autocratic regime types, the chapter will produce results which are robust, reliable, and in line with more recent methodological and theoretical development from the field of Comparative Politics.

The main findings of this chapter partially confirm ReSIT, namely, the argument that territorial disputes reduce the likelihood of democratisation. A significant negative relationship between territorial dispute involvement and the hazard of

democratisation exists, and the effects are statistically significant even when two different measures of dispute involvement are used and all relevant controls are accounted for. Furthermore, when the alternative measure of dispute involvement is used, the results of a Cox model further suggest that the magnitude of the relationship between territorial dispute involvement and democratisation depends specifically on the *type* of autocracy within the state. Nevertheless, further analysis is needed in the future to fully confirm the findings below. Moreover, the chapter suggests that when preceded by political instability in the regime, wealth has a significant positive impact on the process of democratisation. Furthermore, oil-dependency, as expected, significantly decreases the likelihood of democratic transitions in all types of autocracies.

Theory

Previous research and theoretical assumptions

Unlike chapters 5 and 6, the following work focuses on the main theoretical assumption of the more recent versions of the ReSIT, namely that territorial disputes make autocratic regimes less likely to democratise. This is because ReSIT assumes that external threats increase the legitimacy of the current government and reduce elite polarisation in autocratic regimes. Hence, the stronger and more legitimate the autocracy in the eyes of the elites and the public, the less likely the regime is to fail. It is naturally assumed that the less likely a regime is to fail, the less likely it is to democratise in line with the original assumptions of ReSIT. The presence of external threats such as the threat to territorial integrity of the country, is likely to result in country-wide support for the ruling autocratic elites, and any anti-regime activity, including pro-democratic endeavours, are likely to be suspended. It is assumed that the political elites are unlikely to take any political risks at times of potential existential threats to the country's territorial integrity. Hence, in line with the literature, the first hypothesis of this chapter states that:

Hypothesis 1: *All types of autocracies will be less likely to democratise as a result of territorial dispute involvement.*

Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, the ReSIT literature, including Gibler's influential research, does not account for structural variations within autocracies. These shortcomings emerge as a result of the focus on early state formation research within the ReSIT literature, and the use of large temporal domains often spanning from as early as the 19th century (see for example Midlarsky, 1995; Gates *et al.*, 1999; Mousseau and Shi, 1999; Gibler and Tir, 2013). One of the major contributions and original arguments of this thesis is precisely that it is crucial to address the possibility that some types of autocratic regimes might be more susceptible to territorial threats than others. This is intuitive for a number of reasons. First, extensive research in the field of comparative authoritarianism has demonstrated that some forms of autocracy are simply more susceptible to the popular demand for democratisation, or even foreign pressure for more representative regime structure. Second, the legitimising effects of territorial dispute involvement are likely to be effective in regimes that base their legitimacy around the rhetoric of guardianship and state defence. Chapter 6 has already demonstrated that territorial conflicts only affect the survival of military regimes, suggesting that accounting for the autocratic regime type is an important theoretical and methodological contribution to the study of ReSIT. Furthermore, Chapter 3 has outlined in detail the extensive research that suggests that certain types of regimes might be more susceptible to the process of democratisation than others. In summary, it is expected that military and multiparty regimes are most likely to democratise, while single party and monarchic regimes are least likely to democratise. This is because monarchic and single party regimes rarely end in democratic transitions, and are characterised by particularly high resilience to internal conflict even in the absence of territorial conflicts (Geddes, 2007; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). In contrast, both military and multiparty regimes tend to be prone to democratisation due to unstable relations between the regime elites, and relatively weak internal legitimacy (Geddes, 2007;

Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Magaloni, 2008). Therefore, it is possible that the legitimising and centralising effects of territorial disputes will be observed in more fragile regimes like multiparty and military regimes, but not in others. Therefore, it is expected that:

Hypothesis 2: *There are significant differences in the way territorial disputes affect the chances of democratisation in different types of autocratic regimes.*

Moreover, this chapter will also investigate a range of other explanatory factors commonly associated with democratisation in comparative politics and IR research. These include economic growth, which is usually assumed to increase the likelihood of democratisation, as well as oil dependency and the Cold War period, are typically assumed to make democratisation much less likely. They are briefly summarised below.

Economic development

Since the main focus of the thesis is on the effect of territorial disputes for democratisation, the models in this chapter must account for economic development but assume no significant relationship between wealth and democratisation. The inclusion is important because wealth is one of the key predictors of democratisation according to many important models in the literature, as Chapter 3 previously outlined. The relationship between economic growth and the likelihood of democratisation is one of the most researched and discussed phenomena in the study of democratic transitions and democratic survival (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski *et al.*, 2000; Boix and Stokes, 2003). As part of modernisation theory research, much of the literature has claimed that higher levels of economic growth result in greater likelihood of democratic transition due to various micro-economic processes associated with economic expansion. This includes higher levels of literacy and political participation, economic

industrialisation, and the growth of the middle class (Lipset, 1959; Moore, 1966). Nevertheless, the relationship between growth and democratic transition has been challenged on many occasions in the past (Przeworski *et al.*, 2000), and while a growing body of more recent studies report a significant positive relationship between dynamic democratic transitions and economic growth (Epstein *et al.*, 2006; Gassebner *et al.*, 2009; Boix, 2011), the theoretical assumptions of modernisation theory are at odds with the findings in Chapter 5. More specifically, it was shown that wealth increased stability of autocratic regimes, rather than destabilise them. Hence, the models account for the potential impact of wealth but assume, in line with much of the literature, that higher levels of wealth will *not* result in greater risk of democratisation.

Oil dependency

Similarly to the expectations put forward in Chapters 5 and 6, and consistent with findings of these two chapters, it is expected that reliance on oil exports make it less likely for all types of authoritarian regimes to democratise. This is since revenues created from oil extraction make it easier for regimes to ‘buy off’ opposition and increase the well-being of their citizens without the need to raise taxes. Although some researchers have challenged this proposition, claiming that the negative effects of rent-seeking are outweighed by the fact that oil revenues contribute positively to the country’s GDP and therefore increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of democratisation (Herb, 2005). Nevertheless, a more recent empirical analysis concluded that although oil does have an indirect pro-democratic effect by raising GDP levels, the direct antidemocratic effects remain stronger (Alexeev and Conrad, 2009; 2011). As a result, it is expected that oil dependency will have a negative impact on the likelihood on democratisation in all types of autocracies.

Foreign pressure

Within both the IR and Comparative Politics traditions, indicators of foreign pressure on authoritarian regimes have been used in the past to predict the likelihood of democratic transitions (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Gibler and Tir, 2013). One of the most common indicators of foreign influence is a temporal split between the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. In summary, both bodies of research suggest that with the advent of unipolarity, Western democracies have withdrawn their financial support to autocratic regimes, and instead begun to exert pressure on them to develop more democratic structures (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Buraczynska, 2016). The financial support enjoyed during the Cold War years had a similar effect to that generated by oil-revenues: increasing domestic income without the need to raise taxation, making it easier for autocrats to buy the portions of elites who were willing to cooperate, and violently repress those who were not (Boix and Stokes, 2003: 29-30). Nevertheless, the importance of the temporal split between Cold War and post-Cold War period is not merely a question of non-tax revenues. Much of the current literature suggests that democratisation in the post-1989 era was a combination of withdrawing funds and an increase in foreign pressure to develop more representative structures (Levitsky and Way, 2010, 2013). Hence, the end of the Cold War is expected to result in a higher likelihood of democratisation.

Finally, a number of additional explanatory and control variables will be included in this chapter. First, as in previous chapters, a measure of political instability will be included in all models. Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that political instability was a very strong and consistently significant predictor of autocratic survival. This chapter will aim to determine whether the presence of political instability is also connected to the likelihood of democratisation. Second, a number of studies have claimed that one of the most important predictors of democratisation is a past history of democratic transitions, as well as number of past transitions and breakdowns (Przeworski *et al.*, 2000; Smith, 2004). This measure has also been used in IR research on ReSIT specifically. Given that past history of transitions and

breakdowns is one of the most robust indicators of regime change, it is important to include them in this chapter to be able to compare the results generated by Gibler and colleagues with the results of this chapter. Both measures are expected to have a positive impact on the likelihood of democratisation.

Data and methods

Much of the methods employed in this chapter do not differ from the procedures in Chapters 5 and 6. The data sources, the analysis method, and the diagnostic tests and procedures remain the same. Nevertheless, there are three important differences between this chapter and previous analytical chapters of this thesis (chps 5 and 6). First, this chapter uses a different dependent variable, measuring time-to-democratisation, as opposed to the general time-to-regime failure as in Chapters 5 and 6. This was done to test the proposition of ReSIT that external threats in forms of territorial disputes not only reduce the hazard of regime failure more generally (Chapters 5 and 6), but might additionally reduce the hazard of democratisation.

Second, some variables used in Chapters 5 and 6 to investigate the determinants of regime survival have been dropped from the models in Chapter 7. This was done primarily because some variables that were theoretically important to estimating the hazard of regime failure were no longer applicable to establishing the hazard of democratisation. Moreover, the models in this chapter will now include a number of new variables that are of key importance to estimating the likelihood of democratisation, and were discussed in the section above. A discussion of how these variables were coded and the methodological implications of the above changes will be discussed in the sections below.

Third, to ensure the robustness of results, this chapter tests ReSIT propositions using two separate measures of territorial dispute involvement, as explained in the section below.

Data

The data used in the following chapter comes from the same sources as the data in analytical Chapters 5 and 6. Namely, the ‘Autocracies of the World’ dataset (Magaloni *et al.*, 2013), the Gibler (2014) dataset on territorial disputes and the Maddison Project dataset on regimes’ economic performance, and some additional data from the Total Economy Database to compensate for missing information from the Maddison Project dataset. For this reason, the sample for aggregate analysis of autocratic regime survival remains at 314 autocracies across 121 countries in the period between 1951 and 2008. It is crucial to note that the change in the dependent variable from ‘time-to-regime-failure’ to ‘time-to-democratisation’ meant that the number of failure events has significantly decreased. While there were 242 failure events in Chapters 5 and 6, there are only 77 failure events in this chapter. This poses some important methodological challenges to the main aims of this chapter.

First, as demonstrated in Table 21 below, the number of instances of democratisation varies widely across the different regime types. While this strongly supports the main propositions of this thesis, that these differences must be accounted for when testing ReSIT, it also makes the procedures undertaken in Chapter 6 very difficult to replicate. For example, only 2 monarchic regimes in the sample have democratised in the 1951-2008 period.⁴⁶ Similarly, only 10 single party regimes did. This means there are not enough cases to divide autocratic regimes into separate samples in order to perform the analysis. This was previously carried out in Chapter 6 due to concerns that hazard ratios for various regime types would violate the proportional hazards assumption crucial to the Cox survival analysis regression used in this thesis. This chapter instead investigates the effects of territorial disputes on autocratic regimes while accounting for structural differences between them. To do so, a categorical regime type variable will be included in all

⁴⁶ Both instances of monarchies democratising occurred in Nepal. The first instance of a monarchy replaced by democracy occurred in 1991. The democracy then collapsed in 2002 to give way to monarchy. The monarchy lasted until 2006, with Nepal undergoing yet another democratic transition. Interestingly, Nepal is also the only country in the sample where a country has ever reverted back into monarchy.

models of this chapter, and potential problems with proportional hazards assumption violation will be closely monitored and reported.

Table 21. Summary statistics of the sample

Regime type	Total number of observations in the sample (regime-months)	Total number of regimes in the sample	Number of failures (democratisation)
<i>Military</i>	15,646	104	40
<i>Monarchic</i>	6,904	21	2
<i>Multiparty</i>	15,504	118	25
<i>Single party</i>	16,720	71	10
Total	54,774	314	77

Dependent variable

As stated above, the dependent variable in this chapter is time-to-democratisation. It was discussed in Chapter 4 that for the purposes of this thesis, democratisation is understood as a zero-sum process: regimes either undergo a complete process of democratisation, or are considered fully autocratic. Many past studies have seen democratisation as a process rather than an outcome (Epstein *et al.*, 2006). This is particularly the case in the IR tradition of regime change studies (Gates *et al.*, 1999; Mousseau and Shi, 1999; Gibler, 2010; Gibler and Tir, 2013). Instead, one of the main original contributions of this thesis is to use of dichotomous measure of democratisation. The importance of this particular methodological choice is outlined in detail in section 3.1.2 of Chapter 4. In order to classify as democratic, the new regime must include the following features (Magaloni *et al.*, 2013: 6):

- a) A civilian government as the main source of policy making;
- b) Competitive political parties that interact and run the government through a legislature;

c) An executive that is institutionally constrained or checked by other parts of the government;

d) Largely open, competitive, fair and free elections, which are used to select the political leadership.

Finally, regimes are classified as democratic if they fulfil all of the above criteria even in absence of power alteration (Magaloni *et al.*, 2013). This means that that a regime is be coded as democratic even if the incumbent leader has not yet had the chance to lose power in popular and competitive elections. The democratisation variable is coded as 1 if a transition to full democracy occurred and 0 if no democratisation has occurred in a given month. Instances of other regime transitions (for example, from a military to multiparty regime) are also coded as 0.

Independent variables

A number of categorical variables included in models in Chapters 5 and 6 are also theoretically important to understanding the process of democratisation. These variables include oil dependency and political instability variables. For a discussion on how these variables were coded, see Chapter 4, as well as the Methods sections in Chapters 5 and 6. Additionally, one continuous variable used in previous chapter – *wealth* – has also been retained due to its theoretical importance. As discussed previously, wealth is operationalised as yearly GDP per capita measured in international Geary-Khamis dollars, and adjusted for purchasing power parity (Bolt and van Zanden, 2014).

Like in Chapters 5 and 6, GDP per capita was logarithmically transformed to reduce the left-skewness of its distribution and making the relationship between time-to-democratisation and wealth more linear. For details of this transformation, see Chapter 6, and especially Figures 10, 11, 12 and 13.

New independent variables

In addition to the variables used in previous chapters, four more important predictors of democratisation have been considered, including an alternative measure of territorial dispute involvement discussed later in the thesis. These are listed in Table 22 below, along with the coding procedure for each of the new variables.

Limitations

It is worth noting that the *number of previous transitions in the country* and *history of democracy* variables cannot fully account for historical occurrence of democracy and regime transitions within 314 autocracies and 147 autocratic spells in the sample given that the observation period begins in 1951. This means that even if a country has experienced a period of democratisation before 1951, but this democracy failed before it could be observed, it cannot be accounted for in the analysis. Similarly, some countries that existed before the observation period begun could have undergone multiple regime transitions that could not be observed and recorded. Due to space, time and data availability limitations, this issue could not be addressed has to be taken into account when conclusions are drawn about the impact of these predictors on the likelihood of democratisation.

Methods and diagnostic tests

The analysis section of this chapter is split into two sections. The first section uses the time-varying measure of lagged yearly involvement in a territorial dispute by the regime in power, as used in Chapters 5 and 6, and explained in Chapter 4. The

Table 22. Summary of additional independent variables used in this chapter

Variable	Description	Variable type	Coding procedures
<i>Territorial dispute history</i>	A variable indicating whether the regime was ever involved in a territorial dispute during its lifetime	Indicator	Coded 1 if the regime has even been involved in a territorial dispute since its inception, and coded 0 if the regime was not involved in a territorial dispute.
<i>Cold War</i>	A variable indicating the presence of the Cold War	Indicator	Coded 1 for all months between January 1951 and December 1989, and 0 for all months between January 1990 and December 2008.
<i>Sum of past transitions</i>	Number of previous regime transitions in the country (including non-democratic transitions)	Continuous	A variable ranging between 0 and 9, indicating the total number of previous transitions that took place in the country between 1951 and 2008.
<i>History of democracy</i>	variable indicating a history of democracy in the country	Indicator	A variable indicating whether the country has a history of being a democracy at any point between 1951 and 2008. Coded 1 if the country has been a democracy at any point before the current regime took power, and 0 if this is not the case.

second section, on the other hand, will perform the analysis on the same sample of autocracies, but will use an indicator variable measuring whether the regime has ever been involved in a dispute in its lifetime (see Table 22 above). This is done to increase the robustness of the results, and ensure that the relationship between territorial disputes and democratisation exists across different measures, and is not merely a statistical artefact of this chapter.

In both sections, univariate analysis of the effects of all predictors on the dependent variable will be performed for the purposes of diagnostic tests. In Section 1, this will be followed by an aggregate stepwise forward selection model using Cox survival analysis regression. In Section 2, due to limitations in time and space, only full models will be fitted and discussed. Finally, in Section 3 interactions between regime type and predictors will be performed on a full sample, as well as on a limited sample of military and multiparty regimes for reasons of data limitations discussed above. Once all models are fitted in both sections, multivariate diagnostic tests will be performed and the results will be included in Appendix D.⁴⁷ For details on the exact methodological procedures and the tests used in all of the chapters, see methods sections of Chapters 5 and 6.

Data analysis

The following analysis section will investigate the two hypotheses of this chapter in the following manner. First, a summary of the new variables introduced in this chapter for the first time – history of democracy, the sum of past transitions, and Cold War – will be briefly outlined, and their relationship with democratic regime change will be discussed. This will provide a setting for the multivariate analysis, where models with and without interactions will be fitted for all autocracies in the sample. Next, a separate analysis section will fit a similar model, but using an alternative measure of territorial dispute involvement. While the standard measure

⁴⁷ Due to the very limited sample, Royston-Parmer models could not be fitted for all of the final models in this chapter. However, where RP models could be fitted, the results will be briefly discussed for comparison. The models will not be included in the regression tables in this Chapter.

is a time-varying indicator of territorial dispute involvement in the past year, the new measure is a dummy indicator of whether the regime has ever been involved in a territorial dispute during its lifetime. A graphical representation of the most important predictors is offered in the final section of data analysis, along with the discussion of the Cox Snell residual test results. Finally, and most importantly, the results of this chapter will be discussed in relation to the wider literature on ReSIT and democratisation.

Descriptive statistics

Table 23 presents the distribution of the failure events (democratisation) among four types of autocracy analysed in this chapter: military, multiparty, monarchic, and single party regimes. As expected based on previous discussions in Chapters 3 and 6, monarchic and single party regimes are the least likely types of regime to transition to democracy, with less than 10% of all monarchies and only 14% of single party regimes in the sample undergoing a transition. This is unsurprising, given that these two forms of regime also tend to be most stable, as discussed throughout the thesis. On the other hand, military and multiparty regimes are most likely to transition to democracy upon regime failure, with a fifth of all multiparty regimes, and over a third of military regimes becoming democratic.

Table 23. The distribution of democratisation events in the sample, by regime type

Regime type	Number of regimes	% of transitions ending in democracy (N)
<i>Military</i>	104	38.5% (40)
<i>Monarchic</i>	21	9.5% (2)
<i>Multiparty</i>	118	21.2% (25)
<i>Single party</i>	71	14.1% (10)

The differences in the proportion of regimes that eventually democratise during the observation period (Table 23) have important implications for further analysis. First, it is clear that not much can be known about the reasons for democratisation in monarchic regimes, given only two instances of regime transition. Similarly, the sample size of democratic failures in single-party regimes is equally concerning. This information will be particularly relevant when discussing the validity of the findings later in the data analysis section. Nevertheless, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn from Table 23. The differences in the instances of democratisation between multiparty and single party regimes reiterate the need to distinguish between these two types of autocracy. This is important, given that the literature on elections in autocratic regimes often does not make this distinction, often arguing that elections have the effect of making autocracies more, rather than less, stable (Ghandi and Lust Okar, 2009). Nevertheless, it is evident that when genuine competition is permitted in multiparty regimes, the regime might become more vulnerable to potential democratisation, as some of the more recent literature suggests (Howard and Roessler, 2006; Donno, 2013).

Figure 19 below shows the distribution of the instances of democratisation within the sample by decade. The bar graph on the left suggests that the number of democratic transitions has been steadily increasing since the 1950s, but has sharply decreased again in 2000s. Nevertheless, the instances of democratisation as a proportion of all regime changes has actually been more frequent in the 1980-2007 period than in the 1951-1979 period, with the highest proportion of democratisation in the past decade (2000-2008). These statistics confirm much of the speculation in the literature that a much higher rate of democratisation has occurred since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the changes begun to take place much earlier – since the beginning of the 1980s – and an arbitrary split between the Cold War and post-Cold War era might not fully reflect the third wave of democratisation. This is also important given that the definition of democracy in this thesis is relatively strict. Much of the literature speculates that the effects of Cold War were superficial, and resulted in a high

proportion of hybrid, or multiparty, regimes (Levitsky and Way, 2010). While this is certainly true to a certain extent the withdrawal of financial and political support for authoritarian regimes at the end of the 1980s has also clearly resulted in a greater rate of democratisation around the world. This data further highlights the importance of including the Cold War variable into the models built in Tables 26 and 27 of this chapter.

In addition to the above, it is important to account for the fact that regime history and the likelihood of democratising might be correlated, as suggested by much of the literature reviewed earlier in this chapter. The descriptive tables below demonstrate the median time to democratisation depending on whether the country has previous experience with democracy (Table 24), and the mean sum of past transition in the country (Table 25). It is evident from Table 24 that autocratic regimes in countries with a prior experience of democracy had a median duration time that was much lower than autocracies with no prior experience of democracy, with the difference of almost five years. The above duration time comparison strongly suggests that the likelihood of democratisation in autocratic regimes might be associated with previous regime experiences. Nevertheless, it is important to also note that this association is not entirely reliable, given that no knowledge of past transitions is available for regimes which entered the sample in 1951, but originated *before* this date.

The relationship visible in Table 24 might simply reflect the fact that there were fewer instances of democratisation in the 1951-1979 time period than in the 1980-2008 period (see Figure 19). Nevertheless, very few countries outside of the European continent had a history of representative parliamentary democracy prior to 1951, and many of the countries in the sample did not exist until the post-colonial era which begun in the 1960s. Hence, it is still likely that prior experience of democracy might be genuinely associated with the duration of autocratic spells within authoritarian regimes. In a similar manner, it is likely that inherent lack of stability measured by sum of past regime transitions has an impact on median duration of autocratic regimes and spells.

Figure 19. Democratic transitions by decade, 1951-2008




Table 24. Median regime duration, by history of democracy in the country

Experience of democracy	Median regime duration (years)	N
<i>History of democracy</i>	7.2	32
<i>No history of democracy</i>	11.9	282
Total	12.5	314

Table 25. Median regime duration, by sum of past regime transitions in the country

Sum of past regime transitions	Median regime duration (years)	N
<i>Transition $N < 3$</i>	17.8	127
<i>Transition $N \geq 3$</i>	6.4	187
Total	12.5	314

Table 25 demonstrates that similarly to the results for history of democratisation, autocratic spell and regime duration times are affected by their transition history. Given that the mean number of past transitions in sample was 2.9, the threshold for comparison of the two groups was set at 3 past transitions. Overall, regimes in countries with fewer than three transitions at the moment of transition have a median duration time that is over 11 years higher than that for regimes with a transition history equal to or greater than 3. This provides an initial confirmation that the sum of past transitions might have a significant impact on the hazard ratio of democratisation later on in the analysis. The more often a regime changes, the more likely it is to democratise at a given time period. This finding corresponds with much of the comparative politics literature previously demonstrating that the number of prior regime changes is a powerful predictor of democratisation (Przeworski *et al.*, 2000; Simth, 2004). Furthermore, it demonstrates tentative support for some of the speculation made in the conclusion of Chapter 6. Namely, it

provides evidence that more stable autocracies might also be less likely to democratise, even in the event of eventual regime change. Hence, it is perhaps unsurprising that some of the most durable autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa region such as Egypt or Libya did not actually transition into democracies as a result of the Arab Spring, but became multiparty regimes instead. Spells of genuine democracy are more likely to be observed in countries such as Turkey and Thailand, which undergo frequent regime change in relatively short periods of time. The measure of the sum of past transitions can be considered a proxy measure of the overall stability within the country. Clearly, it is possible that stability of autocracy in a country is negatively associated with the hazard of democratisation.

The next section will report on the findings from a number of models investigating the hazard ratio of democratisation in authoritarian regimes. These models provide the basis for testing the theoretical claims presented in Chapter 3, as well as the wider proposition of ReSIT, that external threats – here in the form of territorial disputes – make democratisation more likely to occur. The results of these models will determine whether the theoretical claims of this thesis are supported by empirical evidence, or whether alternative explanations should be explored. Following a discussion of initial diagnostic tests, two sets of models will be fitted for two different measures of territorial dispute involvement.

Results of univariate diagnostic tests

Before discussing the results of multivariate analysis, it is important to consider whether any of the predictors included in the models are likely to violate the proportional hazards assumption.

The univariate visual Schoenfeld residual tests indicate that the territorial dispute and political instability variables might violate the PH assumption (Figure A1, Appendix D). While the issues are unlikely to be serious for the time varying *territorial disputes* variable because non-visual tests indicate no PH violations in

($\chi^2=0.04$, $df(1)$, $p=0.850$), there is a significant violation for the *political instability* variable ($\chi^2=8.44$, $df(1)$, $p=0.004$) (Figure A3, Appendix D). This is unsurprising, given that *political instability* has caused similar violations in Chapters 5 and 6. For this reason, an interaction between the time variable and *political instability* will be automatically included in all models that investigate the impact of instability on the likelihood of democratisation. Multivariate PH tests (visual and non-visual) when such interaction is included report no PH violations in the models in further analysis (see Table A2 and Figures A6 and A7 in Appendix D). Additionally, all Royston Parmar (RP) models will control for the time-varying effects of the political instability variable to ensure the PH violation is not skewing the results.

In unadjusted log-log plots for all variables included in the model, significant problems are observed for *territorial disputes*, and *regime type* variables (Figure A3, Appendix D). After adjusting for other variables included in further models, only the *regime type* variable still poses challenges to the PH assumption (Figure A4, Appendix D). While most variables were adjusted for all of the predictors included in the final model in table 26 below, the plot for the *regime type* variable could only be adjusted for territorial dispute and *log(GDP per capita)*. Including any further independent variables in the adjusted log-log plot was causing over-adjustment due to the very small failure rate of monarchic and multiparty regimes, resulting in no observations. While the plots for military and multiparty regimes were proportional and parallel even after full adjustments (Figure A4), the problems in calculating appropriate plots for monarchic and single party regimes suggest that the analysis of the causes of democratisation for these two types of autocracy might be very limited. Due to this very small sample size, the interactions between independent variables that include autocratic regime type might not produce valid or reliable results. For this reason, the interpretation of the factors increasing the hazard of democratisation for monarchic and single party regimes will be treated with caution.

Finally, univariate Martingale residual tests have indicated no linearity problems for either the *Log(GDP per capita)* variable, nor for the *sum of past transitions* variable (Figure A5, Appendix D). Further multivariate Martingale, Link and Schoenfeld tests

will be performed on fitted models throughout the chapter to ensure that linearity and hazard proportionality assumptions are not violated. The results of these tests are included in Tables 26 and 27 underneath the models. The details of all of the tests mentioned above have been outlined in Chapter 5.

Multivariate data analysis

Table 26 presents the results of the forward selection models fitted for a sample of 314 autocratic regimes with a democratisation rate of 24.5% (N=77). The territorial dispute variable is a time-varying variable lagged 1 year. This means that when the variable is coded as 1 for a particular year, the regime was involved in a territorial dispute in the year before. This is a variable originally coded by Gibler and Miller (2014), and such a measure is commonly used in the tests of ReSIT.

The models start with the inclusion of regime type as a control variable in Model 1, and the introduction of the most important independent variable – *territorial dispute* – in Model 2. Contrary to what was expected based on theoretical consideration in Chapter 3, the *territorial dispute* variable appears to have no significant impact on the hazard ratio of democratisation in any of the Models 1-6 which exclude interactions, and its effects only become significant once history of democracy is accounted for in Model 7. This is an interesting finding, especially given that history of democracy and territorial disputes are not highly correlated, and a separate model fitted to investigate whether the interaction term between them is statistically significant returned no significant relationship ($p=0.998$). Furthermore, the p-value for territorial disputes changes relatively suddenly from $p=0.143$ in Model 6 to $p=0.045$, which means that the results did not become significant due to very minor changes in the p-value.

The results remain statistically significant, or close to statistical significance ($p<0.10$) in all of the other Cox models in Table 26. Territorial dispute involvement has a negative and statistically significant impact on the hazard of democratic transition in any given month, with an average impact of regimes being only 60% as likely to

transition to democracy when involved in a territorial dispute the year before. This initially confirms the assumptions of ReSIT theories that autocracies have smaller chances of democratising after facing external threats to their existence. However, it is important to note the novelty of the findings. All ReSIT studies to date which used survival analysis find this relationship to exist when assessing spell, not regime, duration. Hence, this chapter makes a significant contribution to the literature by demonstrating that territorial threats also have an impact of *regime* duration, even when other important factors, such as structural type of autocracy, past history of transitions, oil dependency or other factors are accounted for.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that this relationship ceases to show up when a different type of survival analysis is used. The Royston-Parmer model (Model 10), despite being said to usually produce comparable results to those returned by Cox analysis (Royston and Lambert, 2011) shows results with no significant impact on the hazard ratio of democratisation ($p=0.104$). This suggests that the results are not robust, and that the relationship between territorial disputes and democratisation, is unlikely to be very strong. This change in the significance of the relationship is most likely caused by the fact that RP models are better at accounting for time-varying effects of problematic variables, in this case, *political instability*. As reported in Chapters 5 and 6, the *political instability* variable is correlated with the *territorial dispute* variable, and it is likely that this effect partially explains why a better fitting model accounting for time-varying effects, reduces the significance of the dispute-democratisation relationship. This chapter will return to this finding later on in this section, where an alternative measure of territorial dispute involvement will be tested in separate models.

Unsurprisingly, other predictors were also very important in explaining the hazard ratio of democratisation. Single party regimes were consistently less at risk of democratisation than military regimes, being only 44% as likely as military regimes to democratise. The differences between other types of regimes also existed, but became insignificant in later, more complex models.

Table 26. Multivariate Cox and Royston Parmar regression estimates with a time-varying measure of dispute involvement

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10 (RP)
	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)
<i>Military</i>	(Ref.)	(Ref.)	(Ref.)	(Ref.)	(Ref.)	(Ref.)	(Ref.)	(Ref.)	(Ref.)	(Ref.)
<i>Monarchic</i>	0.105* (0.10)	0.106* (0.1)	0.083* (0.09)	0.102* (0.11)	0.108* (0.1)	0.129* (0.11)	0.188* (0.16)	0.199 (0.17)	0.282 (0.23)	0.368 (0.32)
<i>Multiparty</i>	0.605 [□] (0.16)	0.571* (0.15)	0.510* (0.14)	0.448** (0.13)	0.894 (0.25)	1.032 (0.3)	1.226 (0.36)	0.925 (0.28)	0.956 (0.30)	0.88 (0.23)
<i>Single party</i>	0.222*** (0.07)	0.213*** (0.07)	0.208*** (0.07)	0.178*** (0.06)	0.293** (0.13)	0.348* (0.16)	0.411* (0.18)	0.393* (0.17)	0.414 [□] (0.19)	0.438* (0.16)
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	---	0.803 (0.20)	0.764 (0.19)	0.815 (0.2)	0.676 (0.18)	0.607* (0.15)	0.558* (0.14)	0.633 [□] (0.16)	0.498* (0.14)	0.699 (0.15)
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	---	---	2.474* (0.94)	3.303*** (1.18)	2.776*** (0.73)	2.436*** (0.56)	3.188*** (0.79)	3.808*** (0.98)	1.032 (0.64)	1.174 (0.68)
<i>Oil dependency</i>	---	---	---	0.266* (0.14)	0.533 (0.26)	0.58 (0.27)	0.651 (0.31)	0.529 (0.28)	0.010*** (0.01)	0.017*** (0.02)
<i>Political instability</i>	---	---	---	---	14.820*** (6.89)	13.982*** (6.5)	11.806*** (5.68)	12.402*** (5.88)	0.024 (0.06)	0.162 (0.39)
<i>P. Instability * time</i>	---	---	---	---	1.013** (0.00)	1.013** (0.0)	1.014** (0.00)	1.013** (0.00)	1.013** (0.00)	---
<i>History of democracy</i>	---	---	---	---	---	2.410*** (0.63)	1.511 (0.43)	1.213 (0.32)	1.301 (0.39)	1.123 (0.28)
<i>Sum of past transitions</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.218*** (0.07)	1.205*** (0.07)	1.205** (0.07)	1.145* (0.06)
<i>Cold War</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.491* (0.15)	0.142*** (0.08)	0.132*** (0.07)
<i>Cold War * Instability</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	4.568* (3.29)	3.017 [□] (1.95)
<i>Log(GDP pc) * Instability</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	5.667* (4.30)	4.522* (3.39)
<i>Cold War * Oil</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	16.902*** (14.23)	11.874* (12.37)
<i>Sum of transitions * Oil</i>	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.666*** (0.22)	1.497** (0.23)
RCS 1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	3.277*** (0.94)

Table 26, continued.

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10 (RP)
	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)
RCS 2	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.591* (0.37)
RCS 3	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.871 (0.08)
RCS 4	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.007 (0.04)
RCS 1 (<i>Political instability</i>)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.792 [□] (0.58)
RCS 2 (<i>Political instability</i>)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.794 (0.20)
RCS 3 (<i>Political instability</i>)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1.024 (0.13)
Constant	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.063 (0.11)
Proportional hazards test	$\chi^2 = 6.62$ df(3) p = 0.085	$\chi^2 = 6.83$ df(4) p = 0.145	$\chi^2 = 6.16$ df(5) p = 0.291	$\chi^2 = 8.70$ df(6) p = 0.191	$\chi^2 = 1.97$ df(8) p = 0.982	$\chi^2 = 2.17$ df(9) p = 0.989	$\chi^2 = 3.10$ df(10) p = 0.979	$\chi^2 = 4.43$ df(11) p = 0.956	$\chi^2 = 359$ df(15) p = 0.999	---
Link test	---	$\beta = -0.304$ p = 0.34	$\beta = 0.159$ p = 0.377	$\beta = 0.097$ p = 0.467	$\beta = 0.002$ p = 0.955	$\beta = -0.014$ p = 0.685	$\beta = -0.021$ p = 0.554	$\beta = -0.021$ p = 0.300	$\beta = 0.016$ p = 0.562	---
AIC	718.61	719.6689	714.1466	703.9862	450.7973	445.991	440.21	437.59	422.68	121.92
Log likelihood (pseudo log l.)	-356.30	-355.834	-352.073	-345.99	-217.399	-213.996	-210.11	-207.79	-196.34	(-37.96)
Wald test for equality of HR:										
<i>Monarchy = multiparty</i>	$\chi^2 = 3.23$ p = 0.072	$\chi^2 = 2.91$ p = 0.088	$\chi^2 = 2.86$ p = 0.091	$\chi^2 = 1.94$ p = 0.164	$\chi^2 = 5.28$ p = 0.022	$\chi^2 = 5.69$ p = 0.017	$\chi^2 = 4.99$ p = 0.026	$\chi^2 = 3.12$ p = 0.077	$\chi^2 = 1.98$ p = 0.160	$\chi^2 = 0.92$ p = 0.337
<i>Multiparty = single party</i>	$\chi^2 = 8.42$ p = 0.004	$\chi^2 = 8.14$ p = 0.004	$\chi^2 = 6.99$ p = 0.008	$\chi^2 = 7.31$ p = 0.007	$\chi^2 = 6.20$ p = 0.013	$\chi^2 = 5.82$ p = 0.016	$\chi^2 = 6.09$ p = 0.014	$\chi^2 = 3.19$ p = 0.074	$\chi^2 = 2.51$ p = 0.113	$\chi^2 = 3.17$ p = 0.075
<i>Monarchy = single party</i>	$\chi^2 = 0.58$ p = 0.447	$\chi^2 = 0.50$ p = 0.479	$\chi^2 = 0.73$ p = 0.394	$\chi^2 = 0.28$ p = 0.600	$\chi^2 = 1.33$ p = 0.250	$\chi^2 = 1.52$ p = 0.218	$\chi^2 = 1.12$ p = 0.290	$\chi^2 = 0.85$ p = 0.355	$\chi^2 = 0.27$ p = 0.604	$\chi^2 = 0.04$ p = 0.848

Notes: Royston Parmar models estimated using 4 knots for the main model, and 3 knots for the time dependent model using default settings for knot locations. Breslow method for handling ties.

RCS – restricted cubic spline HR – hazard ratio S.E. – standard error
[□] 0.05 < p < 0.1 * 0.01 < p < 0.05 ** 0.001 < p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Throughout models in Table 26, wealth was a strong and significant positive predictor of democratisation. Regimes were between 2.4 to 3.8 times as likely to transition to democracy with every 10-fold increase in GDP per capita in the year before. These findings are surprising, given that wealth has a stabilising effect on some autocratic regimes in Chapter 6. The findings of this chapter are in line with those presented by the Modernisation Theory scholars, who suggest that development and democratisation are strongly correlated (Epstein *et al.*, 2006; Boix, 2011).

Three other important predictors of democratisation are *political instability*, *sum of past transitions*, and *Cold War*. As expected based on the literature overview presented earlier in this chapter, sum of past transitions and a post-Cold War era were both positive and strong predictors of democratisation. With every additional past regime transition, autocratic regimes were over 20% more likely to democratise. Autocracies in the Cold War era were only 50% as likely to democratise in a given month as autocracies in the post-Cold War era (Model 8, Table 26)

Given the strong and positive impact of instability on regime transition in Chapters 5 and 6, it is not surprising that *political instability* has a similar effect on the hazard ratio of democratisation. In fact, the experience of political instability in the year before, with the time varying effects of it included, makes autocratic regimes more than 12 times more likely to transition into democracy in the final model without interactions (Model 8). The interaction between political instability and time remain significant through all Cox regression models (Models 5-9). In addition, the effects of *oil dependency* on the hazard of democratisation were also significant in Model 4, but they become insignificant when the effects of *political instability* are accounted for in Model 5.

Finally, this section will discuss all of the significant interactions between the main predictors in the model. First, although it was expected that interactions between the regime type variable and other indicators will be statistically significant, no interactions were significant on either the full nor limited sample of autocratic regimes, and the null results are not reported. More importantly, the interaction

between regime type and the territorial dispute variable was also not significant. This means that null hypothesis of no moderation effect of regime type on the dispute-democratisation relationship cannot be currently rejected.

Nevertheless, Table 26 includes a number of other significant interactions. While the main effects of oil were not statistically significant in Model 8, the interaction between oil dependency and Cold War period has a strong statistically significant effect. In the post-Cold War era, autocracies which depended on oil for their revenues were only about 6% as likely to transition to a democracy as autocracies that did not rely on oil in the same time period. It appears that the effects of oil dependency are strong and statistically significant in the post-Cold War era, but were not during the Cold War itself.

Furthermore, the effects of instability on the hazard ratio of democratisation also have a more pronounced effect in the Cold War period. Instances of political instability during the post-Cold War period were only 20% as likely to lead to democratisation as those which occurred during the Cold War. This means that during the Cold War, bouts of domestic instability were more likely to result in democratisation compared to the post-Cold War period. This could be explained by the fact that instability was a major cause of transitions to democracy when they were still relatively infrequent in the Cold War period, but became less important as an explanation when a host of other factors came into play after 1989. These include external pressure, withdrawal of funding for autocratic regimes by Western powers, or the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War period, instability was simply less important for explaining democratic regime change.

Finally, the interaction between *oil dependency* and the *sum of past transitions* was also statistically significant. The negative impact of oil dependency on the likelihood of democratisation increased with every additional instance of past regime change in the country. Comparing two regimes with no oil dependency, every increase in the sum of past transitions while all other variables are held constant yields a

hazard ratio equal to $\exp(0.186) = 1.204$.⁴⁸ Thus, the rate of failure is increased by 20.4% with an increase of 1 in the sum of past regime changes in the country. This relationship is statistically significant (see Model 10, Table 26). Comparing 2 subjects that do rely on oil for their income, every increase in the sum of past transitions while holding all other variables constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to $\exp(0.186 + 0.510) = \exp(0.696) = 2.006$. Hence, for regimes that relied on oil, every additional regime change in their history made them twice as likely to democratise. This is a surprising finding, given that presence, rather than absence of oil revenue, was expected to stabilise autocracy and prevent democratisation. Nevertheless, it appears that the more frequently regime changes occur in a country, the more likely oil dependency is to lead to democratic transitions. Lack of stability in oil-wealthy countries seems more likely to result in democratisation than lack of stability in countries with no oil. It is possible that where oil revenues failed to strengthen the regime, they increase the chances of democratisation because they contribute to the overall level of wealth. As it is widely believed, and as shown previously in this section, wealth increases the chances of democratisation.

The interaction term between wealth and instability was also statistically significant. Overall, Model 10 in Table 26 suggests that the effects of instability increase with the increase in wealth. Comparing two regimes which did not experience any instability the year before, a tenfold increase in GDP per capita while all other variables are held constant yields a hazard ratio equal to $\exp(0.031) = 1.031$, and therefore the rate of democratisation is increased by only 3% with a tenfold increase in income. Thus, the rate of democratisation stays relatively unchanged for regimes with no instability, because a value of 1.030 is very close to 1.000. Comparing two regimes which did experience instability the year before, a tenfold increase in income while holding all other variables constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to $\exp(0.186 + 1.735) = \exp(1.921) = 6.826$. This is an increase of almost 700%, meaning that autocracies which experienced instability become almost 7 times more likely to transition into democracy with a tenfold increase in

⁴⁸ The raw coefficients discussed in this section are obtained from the same models as these reported in tables 6 and 7, but due to space limitations they are not reported here. Tables 6 and 7 report hazard ratios instead, which are exponentiated version of the coefficients reported here.

wealth. This result suggests that the alternative modernisation story outlined by Przeworski *et al.* (2000) could also be correct. Regime transitions occur as random events due to many internal and external occurrences, but wealthier contexts make it more likely that these exogenous or endogenous shocks will ultimately end in democratisation.

Multivariate data analysis with an alternative measure of territorial dispute involvement

Although the theory in Chapter 3 stated that the chances of democratisation should be lower in the year following involvement in a territorial dispute, the models in Table 26 produce inconsistent results, suggesting that the relationship between territorial disputes and democratisation varied depending on the choice of regression method and could be a statistical artefact caused by the time-varying effects of *political instability*. In order to ensure that the results in this chapter are robust, and that all possible alternative connections between territorial disputes and democratisation have been captured, the section below will consider an alternative predictor of territorial dispute involvement (see Table 27).

Instead of a time-varying dichotomous variable reflecting regime's involvement in a dispute *the year before*, Models 11 to 18 in Table 27 will include a measure of whether the regime has *ever* been involved in a territorial dispute during its tenure. It is worth noting that this is a measure of whether a particular regime, and not a country or an autocratic spell, has been involved in a dispute. For example, the single party regime in Equatorial Guinea (1969-1979) has been involved in a territorial dispute in 1973. Therefore, the dummy variable indicator is coded as 1 for the entire duration of the regime. However, the following military regime in Equatorial Guinea (1979-1992) has never been involved in a dispute, and as a result the indicator variable is coded as 0.

The assumption is that while dispute involvement the year before has an immediate effect on the likelihood of regime transition in certain cases (see for example its effect on military or single party regimes in Chapter 6), it might not have an immediate effect on the hazard of democratisation. For example, unlike autocracy-to-autocracy transitions,⁴⁹ the process of democratisation might require a much slower pace of change, and any changes to the likelihood of democratisation as a result of territorial conflict might not be immediately observable.

Hence, the hypothesis of this chapter which stated that territorial dispute involvement will make democratic transitions less likely remains unchanged. However, *the way in which territorial dispute is measured* is altered to check whether the results presented in Table 26 are robust and applicable across many different measures of territorial dispute involvement.

Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning, that the new measure of dispute involvement history does not violate the proportional hazard assumption. While a small non-linearity can be observed in visual Schoenfeld residuals test (Figure A9), non-visual tests, and adjusted log-log plots show no signs of any serious problems (Figure A9 and Figure A10). Finally, no violations (visual or non-visual) are observed for tests performed on multivariate models in Figures A11 and A12, and Table A3 in Appendix D. The section below will analyse the findings presented in Table 27 below.

It is evident that in all models in Table 27 that, holding everything else constant, having ever been involved in a territorial dispute lowers the hazard of democratisation relative to regimes which never took part in a territorial conflict. These results are also statistically significant in both Cox and Royston Parmar models. In a full model that includes all interactions, having a history of territorial

⁴⁹ Autocracy to autocracy transitions might often happen as a result of violent takeovers or military coups, while this is not common in regards to democratisation. While it is possible for democracy to come about as a result of violent protests or revolutions, these are assumed to take much longer to mature than a military coup performed by a small clique within the elite or opposition.

disputes decreases the hazard of democratisation by 60% (HR = 0.405). These results are highly significant with p-values in all Cox models including the main effects only being lower than 0.001. What is more important, however, is the fact that unlike in the previous section, the interaction between territorial disputes and regime types is statistically significant (Model 13). In a full sample that includes all regime types, monarchic and single party regimes are more likely to be affected by territorial disputes than military regimes. Monarchic regimes that were involved in a territorial dispute were only about 2% as likely to democratise as military regimes involved in a territorial dispute.

Similarly, single party regimes were only 19% as likely to democratise as military regimes under the same conditions. There were also near-significant differences between multiparty and monarchic regimes ($p=0.068$), with multiparty regimes less likely to have the hazard of democratisation negatively affected by disputes than monarchic regimes. These results, although providing support for Hypothesis 2 that different types of autocracy respond differently to external threats, do not confirm the assumptions made about which types of regimes will be most likely to be affected. First, military regimes were not more likely than other types of autocracy to be affected by territorial disputes. This suggests that even though immediate external threats in the form of past year territorial dispute involvement made them less likely to fail in general (Chapter 6), it did not make them any less at risk of democratising.

Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind that while the hazards were proportional for military and multiparty regimes, this was not the case for neither monarchic, nor single party regimes. Therefore, analysis on a limited sample of autocracies whose hazards are proportional to one another (military and multiparty regimes) can increase the validity of the results by demonstrating that the results of the analysis are not misleading due to assumption violations. Moreover, it is important to remember that there were only two instances of democratisation among monarchic regimes in the dataset. If monarchies, for example, were disproportionately affected by a history of territorial disputes, the relationship between territorial disputes and democratisation for monarchic regimes might

skew the results for all types of autocracies. A similar phenomenon was already observed in the case of regime failure and military regimes, where the analysis of all regime types in Chapter 5 has shown a significant effect for all regimes, but upon more detailed analysis in Chapter 6, the relationship was significant only in military regimes. To test this possibility, a separate analysis has been conducted on a limited sample of military and multiparty regimes only using Cox regression (Model 14) and the Royston Parmar regression (Model 16). The limited sample includes 222 regimes and 65 instances of democratisation. In both models, history of territorial dispute involvement still has a negative and significant impact on the hazard of democratisation. There were no statistically significant differences in the way military and multiparty regimes responded to territorial disputes using the new measure. While the significance of the results has decreased, they are still statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level even in a Royston Parmar model. Therefore, it is safe to reject the null hypothesis that territorial disputes have no impact on the likelihood of democratisation.

The final Royston Parmar model (Model 17) includes the full sample, but only these predictors which were statistically significant, excluding history of democracy, which had no statistically significant effects on democratisation in any of the full models, and the interaction between *political instability* and *Cold War* variables. While this interaction is statistically significant in Cox models, an RP model taking into account the time-varying effects of instability has rendered this interaction non-significant. This final model will be used for the purposes of graphical representation of the results in the section below.

Table 27. Multivariate cox and Royston Parmar regression estimates with a dummy measure of past territorial dispute involvement

Variables	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16 (RP)	Model 17 (RP)
	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)	HR (S.E.)
<i>Military</i>	(Ref.)	(Ref.)	(Ref.)	(Ref.)	(Ref.)	(Ref.)	(Ref.)
<i>Monarchic</i>	0.256 (0.23)	0.366 (0.32)	1.490 (1.15)	---	0.413 (0.37)	---	0.383 (0.35)
<i>Multiparty</i>	0.949 (0.27)	1.006 (0.31)	1.130 (0.41)	1.082 (0.33)	0.909 (0.22)	0.999 (0.25)	0.926 (0.23)
<i>Single party</i>	0.403* (0.17)	0.446 (0.21)	0.732 (0.44)	---	0.440* (0.16)	---	0.370** (0.13)
<i>History of dispute</i>	0.437*** (0.11)	0.405*** (0.10)	0.537 (0.17)	0.509** (0.13)	0.595* (0.12)	0.616* (0.14)	0.591* (0.13)
<i>Log(GDP)</i>	3.889*** (0.99)	1.097 (0.68)	1.081 (0.70)	0.900 (0.56)	1.196 (0.69)	1.154 (0.66)	1.031 (0.61)
<i>Oil dependency</i>	0.578 (0.29)	0.012*** (0.01)	0.013*** (0.01)	0.037*** (0.04)	0.019*** (0.02)	0.044** (0.04)	0.018*** (0.02)
<i>Political instability</i>	11.309*** (5.31)	0.030 (0.07)	0.037 (0.09)	0.008 (0.02)	0.189 (0.45)	0.058 (0.15)	0.101 (0.24)
<i>Pol. Instability * time</i>	1.014** (0.00)	1.013** (0.00)	1.015** (0.00)	1.011* (0.01)	---	---	---
<i>History of democracy</i>	1.297 (0.34)	1.368 (0.41)	1.316 (0.38)	1.148 (0.34)	1.130 (0.28)	0.997 (0.24)	---
<i>Sum of past transitions</i>	1.243*** (0.07)	1.236*** (0.07)	1.231*** (0.07)	1.267*** (0.08)	1.167** (0.06)	1.212*** (0.07)	1.166** (0.06)
<i>Cold War</i>	0.535* (0.16)	0.157** (0.09)	0.153** (0.09)	0.189** (0.10)	0.142*** (0.08)	0.180** (0.10)	0.319*** (0.08)
<i>Instability * Cold War</i>	---	4.362* (3.10)	4.446* (3.22)	5.216* (3.72)	2.978 (1.93)	2.933 (1.93)	---
<i>Instability * Log(GDP)</i>	---	5.163* (3.92)	4.756* (3.74)	7.401* (6.13)	4.313 (3.24)	5.493* (4.43)	6.075* (4.35)
<i>Oil * Cold War</i>	---	15.825*** (12.51)	16.681** (15.20)	7.854** (6.15)	11.639* (11.95)	8.948 (10.01)	11.613* (12.51)
<i>Oil * Sum of past trans.</i>	---	1.648*** (0.22)	1.611*** (0.20)	1.487** (0.20)	1.474** (0.22)	1.314 (0.23)	1.481** (0.22)
<i>Monarchic * dispute history</i>	---	---	0.017*** (0.02)	---	---	---	---
<i>Multiparty * dispute history</i>	---	---	0.769 (0.41)	---	---	---	---
<i>Single party * dispute history</i>	---	---	0.191* (0.13)	---	---	---	---
RCS1	---	---	---	---	3.332*** (0.97)	4.071*** (1.53)	3.425*** (1.01)
RCS2	---	---	---	---	1.583* (0.36)	1.616 (0.43)	1.554 (0.36)
RCS3	---	---	---	---	0.867 (0.09)	0.847 (0.10)	0.858 (0.09)
RCS4	---	---	---	---	1.004 (0.04)	0.991 (0.04)	1.003 (0.04)
RCS1 (<i>pol. Instability</i>)	---	---	---	---	1.821 (0.60)	1.740 (0.73)	1.745 (0.57)
RCS2 (<i>pol. Instability</i>)	---	---	---	---	0.781 (0.19)	0.803 (0.23)	0.801 (0.20)
RCS3 (<i>pol. Instability</i>)	---	---	---	---	1.029 (0.13)	1.059 (0.15)	1.036 (0.14)
Constant	---	---	---	---	0.056 (0.10)	0.039 (0.07)	0.068 (0.13)

Table 27, continued.

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6 (RP)	Model 7 (RP)
Proportional hazards test	$\chi^2 = 3.18$ df(11) p = 0.988	$\chi^2 = 3.38$ df(15) p = 0.999	$\chi^2 = 4.92$ df(18) p = 0.999	$\chi^2 = 2.84$ df(13) p = 0.998	---	---	---
Link test	$\beta = -0.020$ p = 0.517	$\beta = -0.012$ p = 0.656	$\beta = -0.014$ p = 0.596	$\beta = -0.025$ p = 0.528	---	---	---
AIC	431.92	418.60	420.02	368.26	119.70	136.80	115.82
Log likelihood / (<i>pseudo log l.</i>)	-204.96	-194.30	-192.01	-171.13	(-36.85)	(-47.40)	(-36.91)
Monarchy = multiparty	$\chi^2 = 2.06$ p = 0.152	$\chi^2 = 1.22$ p = 0.270	$\chi^2 = 0.12$ p = 0.729	---	$\chi^2 = 0.72$ p = 0.401	---	$\chi^2 = 0.65$ p = 0.419
Multiparty = single party	$\chi^2 = 3.33$ p = 0.068	$\chi^2 = 2.21$ p = 0.137	$\chi^2 = 0.42$ p = 0.516	---	$\chi^2 = 3.28$ p = 0.070	---	$\chi^2 = 3.43$ p = 0.064
Monarchy = single party	$\chi^2 = 0.32$ p = 0.573	$\chi^2 = 0.06$ p = 0.811	$\chi^2 = 0.60$ p = 0.438	---	$\chi^2 = 0.00$ p = 0.947	---	$\chi^2 = 0.00$ p = 0.966

Wald test for equality of HR:

<i>Monarchy = multiparty</i>	$\chi^2 = 9.90$ p = 0.002
<i>Multiparty = single party</i>	$\chi^2 = 3.28$ p = 0.070
<i>Monarchy = single party</i>	$\chi^2 = 4.25$ p = 0.039

Notes:

Royston Parmar models estimated using 4 knots for the main model, and 3 knots for the time dependent model using default settings for knot locations. Breslow method for handling ties.

HR – hazard ratio

S.E. – standard error

RP – Royston Parmar

RCS – restricted cubic spline


☐ 0.05 < p < 0.1 * 0.01 < p < 0.05 ** 0.001 < p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Goodness of fit

Similarly to procedures employed in Chapter 5, the section below will discuss the goodness of fit of models estimated in Tables 26 and 27 where different measures of dispute involvement have been used. This will be done using Cox-Snell residuals (Cox and Snell, 1968). As discussed in Chapter 5, if the models fit the data well, the true cumulative hazard function will have an exponential distribution with a hazard rate of 1 (Cleves et al., 2010: 219). Figure 20 below demonstrates the test for four models: Models 8 and 9 using the standard measure of territorial dispute, and Models 11 and 12 using the new measure of territorial dispute. The reason for using Model 12 instead of Model 13 with regime type – dispute interactions was the intention of comparing two models that included exactly the same predictors, but a different measure of territorial dispute involvement. The use of Model 13 rather than Model 12 could bias the results in favour of the new measure of territorial disputes where model fit is considered.

In Figure 20 below, the red line represents a standard exponential distribution with a hazard function equal to 1, and it is against the red line that the Nelson-Aalen distribution of the models will be tested against. First, it appears that models estimated using a dummy indicator variable for a history of dispute involvement (Table 27) provide a slightly better fit, with less variability in the right-hand side of the graphs. While the models seem to fit the data much better at smaller values of analysis time, this is not surprising, and is expected, given that censoring and prior failures reduce the effective sample considerably (Cleves *et al.*, 2010: 222). Moreover, large variation in data for small samples is quite common for large values of time (Stata Corp, 2013). Hence, the conclusion of the Cox-Snell residual tests is that models in Table 27 fit the data better, but are still mainly useful for estimating the hazard of democratisation at smaller values of analysis time, or when autocratic regimes are relatively young. As regimes get older, factors such as income, dispute involvement, or sum of past transitions become less useful in explaining democratisation. This is, once again, not surprising given the wealth of potential contextual and path dependency causes of democratic transitions.

Figure 20. Cox-Snell residuals tests of Model 11 and Model 13, with and without interactions



Graphical analysis

Finally, this section will analyse the graphical representation of the effects of two most important predictors in the model – dispute involvement history and regime type. All of the baseline survival functions have been estimated at zero values of all predictors. The *log(GDP per capita)* variable has been centred for the purposes of estimating these functions, meaning that the baseline function is estimated at mean value of wealth for all autocratic regimes. Overall, the survival and hazard functions in Figure 21 are estimated using the limited Royston Parmar Model 17 which only includes statistically significant predictors, unless specified otherwise. The survival and hazard functions are estimated for regimes which were never involved in a dispute, have an average income per capita, have no oil dependency, no recent instances of instability, have no past instances of regime change, and exist in a post-Cold War era. As evident from Figure 21, the baseline probability of survival falls sharply in the first 5 years of regimes' existence, after which the rate of decreasing probability of survival slows down but continues to fall steadily, with only over half of all autocracies democratising by the time they reach 58 years of age. The vulnerability to democratisation in the early years is also visible in the baseline hazard function, with the hazard rate rising sharply within the first 3 years, and falling sharply afterwards, and decrease slowly thereafter. Just like the survival and hazard functions estimated in Chapter 6 for regime failures, autocracies are most at risk of democratising in their very early years.

Figure 22 demonstrates the difference in survival and hazard rates for regimes which were involved in territorial disputes at some point (*dispute history* = 1), and those that were not (*dispute history* = 0). While it appears that a history of dispute involvement increases the hazard of democratisation and decreases the probability of autocratic survival, these confidence intervals for the differences between the functions suggest much variation in the effects of territorial dispute involvement. The differences between survival functions appear to be statistically significant only after regimes reach about 25 years of age, while the differences in hazard functions not appear significantly different from one another at any age of the regimes.

Therefore, while most regimes are at the highest risk of transitioning to democracy in the early stages, territorial disputes only affect the rate of survival for regimes which have already survived a certain amount of time – here, about 25 years.

Although the Royston-Parmar Model 17 did not include the interactions between regime type and history of territorial dispute involvement due to computational issues of estimating a regression model on a very small sample of failures, a visual representation of what such a relationship would look like is presented in Figure 23. The calculations are based on the Cox regression model using the same variables as those included in Model 17 for comparability, and the results are comparable to those in Model 13.

From Figure 23, it is clear that the difference in survival rates for different values of the territorial dispute measure are most pronounced for monarchies. If they were affected by a territorial dispute in the past, monarchies were at almost no risk of democratising. The differences were less pronounced for military and multiparty regimes, which confirms the findings from Model 13. Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that even in a model estimated on a limited sample of military and multiparty regimes, the effects of territorial disputes were still statistically significant (Model 14). Once again, it is visible in Figure 5 that the older the regime is, the more likely the likelihood of democratisation is to be affected by territorial disputes. To conclude, it appears that hypothesis two also finds empirical support in this analysis, given that democratisation process in monarchic and single regimes is significantly more likely to be affected by territorial dispute history than the democratisation process in military and multiparty regimes.

Figure 21. The survival and hazard functions for a limited Royston Parmar regression estimates




Figure 22. Difference in survival functions, by past dispute involvement





Figure 23. Differences in survival rates for different values of the territorial dispute measure, obtained from a Cox model



Discussion and conclusion

The data analysis of this chapter aimed at testing two hypotheses: that regimes affected by territorial disputes have lower chances of democratisation, and that there are important and significant differences in the way different autocracies are affected by territorial disputes when it comes to their chances of democratisation. It was assumed in Chapter 3 that multiparty and military regimes will be more affected by territorial disputes relative to monarchic and single party regimes, and the finding that the hazard of regime failure in military regimes is significantly affected by territorial disputes in Chapter 6 further suggested that military regimes in particular will be less likely to democratise when under salient external threat. Overall, the analyses above have demonstrated that all types of autocratic regimes are significantly less likely to democratise when involved in a territorial dispute the year before. Moreover, the findings were more robust, and of higher statistical significance, when an alternative measure of territorial dispute involvement was used. In both types of analysis, autocracies were on average only about half as likely to experience democratisation as autocracies which were peaceful, everything else being constant. Various robustness checks were performed to ensure the findings apply to all types of autocracies, and are not just a result of a particularly strong association for one sub-type of autocratic regime. A limited sample analysis of military and multiparty regimes, where the number of instances of democratisation was much higher than for single party and monarchic regimes, has confirmed that the relationship was still statistically significant, although to a lesser extent. Hence, the results of this chapter provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that territorial dispute involvement lowers the chances of democratisation in all types of authoritarian regimes. This relationship was observed even though the analysis was only performed on autocratic regimes, and the process of democratisation was conceptualised in a very strict manner, counting only fully successful and complete transitions into representative democracy. Hence, the methodological improvements of this chapter did not result in null results. On the contrary, the results confirm all of the major assumptions of ReSIT even though a more

methodologically strict approach was taken in the analysis above. This suggests not only that the Reversed Second Image Theory ought to be reconsidered by the IR research community, but also that its propositions should be seriously considered by the Comparative Politics literature concerned with the study of democratisation.

A second important finding of this chapter was that the magnitude of the relationship between territorial dispute involvement and the hazard of democratisation was dependent on the type of autocratic regime type, providing support for the second hypothesis. However, two important aspects of this relationship need to be considered. First, the moderating effect of regime type was only present when an indicator variable of territorial dispute was used in later analysis. The same interaction was not observed when the original measure of territorial dispute involvement was used. Hence, the results are not very robust, and should be treated with caution. Second, contrary to expectations, the regimes which were most affected by territorial disputes were single party and monarchic regimes, rather than military and multiparty regimes. This is particularly surprising, given that military regimes were least likely to fail as a result of territorial disputes in Chapter 6. While this finding is interesting, it is important to consider that it only applied to an indicator measure of past conflict involvement, rather than the time-varying measure of dispute involvement. Hence, it is likely that the type of measure had an influence of the result in this respect. For example, given that monarchic and single party regimes last longer on average than military or multiparty regimes (see Chapter 6), they might have simply had more time and opportunities to become involved in a dispute at some point in their lifetime. This would explain why the moderation effects are only observed for one type of dispute involvement measure, but not the other. Hence, more research into the interaction between regime type and dispute involvement when explaining democratisation is need in future. A potential solution to the small sample size of monarchic and single party regimes would be a creation of a dataset that extends the observation period further back than 1951. However, such an extension does not guarantee a greater number of monarchic failures that end in democratic transitions specifically

because monarchies are unique in their ability to resist change and decentralisation of power, as mentioned in Chapter 3.

Finally, it is worth noting the effect of the control variables included in the models on the likelihood of democratisation. As expected, and in line with much of the quantitative literature testing the propositions of modernisation theory, an increase in GDP had a positive and statistically significant impact on the likelihood of democratisation. This is an important finding, given there is some controversy still remains about whether wealth and democracy are merely correlated, or whether an increase in wealth actually contributes to an increase in the likelihood of transition. Overall, this chapter has demonstrated that controlling for other factors, an increase in wealth makes all types of autocratic regimes more likely to democratise. What is more, when coupled with instances of recent political instability within the regime, the relationship was even more pronounced, indicating that when they are relatively affluent, regimes experiencing domestic problems are even more likely to experience democratic regime change. This suggests empirical support for both Przeworski's (Przeworski *et al.*, 2000) and classic version of modernisation theory (Lipset, 1959). Oil dependency had a negative and significant impact on the hazard of democratisation, and a higher degree of internal regime instability measured by the sum of past regime transitions had a positive and significant effect on the hazard of democratic transitions.

The findings of this chapter are important, because they provide empirical support for the claim that territorial disputes do in fact hinder democratisation, even when all of the other important predictors of democratisation are included. This means that significant efforts to help countries in conflict ridden areas such as the Middle East should focus on territorial dispute resolution. It also means more efforts need to be made to solve territorial disputes even in the absence of militarised conflict. Stabilising border relations in South East Asia might help some regimes transition into a more democratic form. It is also possible that new democracies might also benefit from increased territorial stability, although more research needs to be conducted to find if the assumptions of this thesis also hold for young democracies.

Having discussed the findings of this chapter, the thesis will now move toward a more general conclusion which will address the findings from all three analytical chapters. The conclusion will relate them to the theoretical assumptions put forward in Chapter 3 and discuss them in relation to the wider literature on ReSIT and Comparative Politics. The conclusion will outline the main contributions and limitations of this thesis will be discussed in detail, and make recommendations for further theoretical and empirical research in the field.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

Summary of the thesis

The main purpose of this thesis was to test the assumptions of Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT) in the context of major theoretical and methodological advances in the field of Comparative Politics. More specifically, the dissertation investigated whether involvement in territorial disputes makes autocratic regimes more stable and less likely to democratise. The distinction between autocratic stability and democratisation was important, because many influential Comparative Politics studies demonstrated that these two phenomena are not synonymous. For example, many non-democratic spells may last a long time and project an image of internal stability, but in reality they often contain a number of distinct and short-lived autocratic regimes within them. If territorial disputes result in power centralisation, then it is important to show that they not only hinder democratic transitions, but also other types of transitions as well. This is a crucial contribution to the field, because the current ReSIT literature, in line with much of other IR research, is still focused on states rather than regimes as their main unit of analysis. This thesis demonstrated that a shift of attention from states to regimes can yield important results, and increase our understanding of what happens in autocracies in regions where hard borders between neighbours remain a heavily contested issue. The thesis also demonstrated, for the first time, how different types of autocratic regimes might react to territorial disputes. This is important because the IR literature still considers all non-democratic regimes to operate in a similar manner. As shown in this thesis, this is a very problematic approach because different autocracies are affected by territorial disputes, oil dependency, wealth, and a host of other variables in strikingly different ways.

One of the most important findings of this thesis was not only that regime stability and democratisation are separate phenomena, but that even when such a

distinction was made, the main assumptions of ReSIT were still supported: external threats in the form of territorial disputes make autocracies both more stable *and* less likely to democratise. Nevertheless, the distinction was still an important one to make. As Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrated, territorial disputes affect autocratic stability only in some of the autocratic regime types while the process of democratisation is affected in *all* types of autocracies. This is an important and original finding. First, because it demonstrates that causal mechanism is different for each of these processes, as suggested in Chapter 3. Second, it because it highlights the importance of controlling for autocratic regime type in statistical models estimating regime stability and democratisation.

Findings of the thesis

As shown in Chapter 5, if regime type was not accounted for, territorial disputes had a significant stabilising effect on all types of autocracies that depended on oil extraction for their income. However, when regime type *was* included as a control variable in Chapter 6, it became clear that treating all autocracies in the same manner, as it is often done in IR literature, can produce unreliable results and should be avoided where possible. In Chapter 6, it became clear that all military regimes experienced the stabilising effects of territorial dispute involvement in the previous year, regardless of oil dependency, while only those single party regimes that were *not* dependent on oil for their income did. Multiparty regimes remained unaffected, while the small sample size of monarchic regime transitions proved too unreliable to confidently judge the effects of territorial disputes. This is an important finding. It suggests that military regimes are particularly prone to centralise and stabilize as a result of territorial threats. This is likely due to the type of legitimizing rhetoric they often employ. One of the most often cited reason for military regime instability is the fact that they are often presented as ‘temporary’ or ‘transitional’ regimes that are geared at restoring order in an unstable environment. It is therefore likely that the presence of territorial disputes can be framed by military leaders as a destabilising and threatening context that demands

further penetration of the political and public sphere by the military. Further qualitative studies could focus specifically on uncovering the relationship between territorial disputes and the strength of military dictatorships. This is an important step for ReSIT: a shift in focus from International Relations to an explicitly comparative framework would help establish it as a free-standing and independent theory of regime change.

Unexpectedly, single party regimes *did* experience stabilising effects of territorial disputes, despite all expectations. This finding is especially interesting given that only single party regimes that were *not* rentier states were significantly affected by territorial disputes. As mentioned in the conclusion of Chapter 6, this is most likely because oil rents provide an easy way to fund a large military that can counteract the territorial threat posed by a neighbouring state. It could also mean that richer regimes that can fund larger and stronger militaries might be the ones to also initiate the dispute. Unfortunately, given that the data in this thesis could not investigate the initiator or target of the territorial dispute, there was no way to test this possibility. Future research on the military behaviour of oil dependent countries – especially single party regimes – could provide some useful insights into this proposition.

Additionally, the fact that multiparty regimes were not affected by disputes was also unexpected. The strong standing of the political opposition in multiparty regimes was assumed to leave scope for power centralisation as a result of territorial disputes. Nevertheless, it is possible that the increased role of institutions in multiparty regimes makes it harder for regime elites to perform quick power grabs, even if outside threats present an opportunity to do so. It is possible that while inherently unstable and short-lived, with a high chance of both democratising and transitioning back into a different form of authoritarianism, multiparty regimes might be more resilient to power centralisation thanks to their unique institutional design. However, as shown in Chapter 7, multiparty regimes were at a smaller hazard of democratisation when they had a history of territorial disputes. Hence, it is possible that while they do not become more stable as a result of dispute involvement, when they do transition, that transition might be into an autocratic,

rather than democratic regime. This is an interesting possibility, and of particular importance given the growing popularity of competitive authoritarianism since the end of the Cold War. Future large-N quantitative studies could explore this proposition further, and investigate whether unstable border relations with neighbours might be the factor that decides about the future success of democratisation in multiparty regimes.

Finally, the fact that all autocratic regimes were significantly less likely to democratise as a result of territorial disputes is very promising for the future of ReSIT research. Surprisingly, all types of autocracy were affected, and the hindering effects of dispute history were particularly pronounced in monarchic and single party regimes. Nevertheless, the small sample of democratic transitions in monarchic and single party regimes calls for a great deal of caution when interpreting the moderating effects of regime type.

In addition to the main results discussed above, a further interesting finding relating to the relationship between wealth and regime change should be highlighted. While increases in per capita income made some regimes more stable, this effect varied depending on other variables included in the model - such as political instability or ethnic fractionalisation - or was non-linear. This further highlighted the importance of looking at each type of autocratic regime separately, as their specific structural characteristics are likely to have a very unique way of interacting with an increase in wealth. Curiously, despite wealth being more likely to stabilise certain regimes, it was also more likely to lead to democratisation in regimes experiencing political changes. This is an interesting and important finding given the current discussion on modernisation theory within the Comparative Politics literature. In Chapter 7, higher levels of wealth significantly increased the hazard of democratisation for regimes that were experiencing institutional changes, but not in stable regimes. This supports Przeworski *et al.*'s (2000) version of modernisation theory: while wealth can help regimes democratise, it will only do so while the country is already undergoing a process of changes that in itself is not necessarily caused by wealth. This is an interesting finding that warrants further inquiry into the relationship between democratisation, political instability, and per capita income.

Limitations of the thesis

Having discussed the main findings of the thesis, it is important to outline its main limitations. This section will first outline methodological limitations, and then suggest some ways in which the theoretical framework of the thesis could be improved upon in the future.

The first important limitation of the thesis was related to the proportional hazards assumption of the models used to test the hypotheses. While survival analysis is in many ways superior to other regression techniques due to its ability to reduce bias caused by censored cases, the method is very sensitive to model specifications. When estimating the hazard of failure (in this thesis, regime transition or democratisation), the hazard for each value of the independent variable had to be proportional over time. While this thesis took great care to ensure that appropriate measures were taken to reduce these biases, certain concerns still remain. For example, in each chapter, a number of diagnostic tests have been performed to ensure that problematic variables were appropriately dealt with either by including their interaction with time (Cox models) or by specifying a separate effect by using Royston-Parmar analysis. However, certain variables could not be treated this way. For example, hazard ratios for different types of autocracies were very different, and hence disproportional. While the disaggregation of analysis into sub-samples of autocratic regimes in Chapter 6 solved this problem for the issue of regime stability, a similar measure could not be taken when investigating the hazard of democratisation. This is mainly because in Chapter 7, the sample of democratic transitions was very small, with only 77 cases in total. This meant that for certain regime types such as monarchies or single party autocracies, this amounted to only 3 and 12 instances of democratisation respectively. Given that the differences between these regimes were theorised *precisely* because of their disparate structural features, disproportional hazards are not surprising. However, the small number of events meant that the sample in Chapter 7 could not be disaggregated in a similar manner to that in Chapter 6. While a separate analysis performed on military and multiparty regimes (whose hazards were proportional), has still

confirmed the assumption that territorial disputes make democratisation less likely in certain autocratic regimes, the findings are much less reliable and robust for monarchic and single party regimes. One solution to this problem would be to perform qualitative research that would help expand the temporal domain of existing datasets to before 1951 and increase the number of democratisation events. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that democratic regime change was very rare before 1950s, and especially so among the more stable regimes such as monarchies and single-party regimes. It would also be very difficult to properly estimate the nature of regime structures in countries before 1950s, which is partially the reason for so many regime typologies dating to 1946 at the very earliest, as mentioned in Chapter 4. As mentioned above, a qualitative investigation into the relationship between territorial dispute involvement and democratisation in single party and monarchic regimes could be performed to overcome the issue of small sample size encountered in this thesis.

The second important limitation of this thesis was the fact that the regime typology used in this thesis does not include personalist regime category. This is a considerable limitation that should be addressed by further studies that could use an alternative typology to test the impact of external threats on autocratic regime change. As explained in Chapter 4, the rise of multiparty regimes around the world meant that a dataset which controlled for competitive and non-competitive party regimes was of crucial importance. Unfortunately, while Magaloni *et al.* (2013) account for this crucial distinction, they do not include a category for personalist regimes. However, such inclusion could add an important contribution to our understanding of power centralisation. For example, future research could explore whether non-personalist regimes are more likely to transition into a personalist regime as a result of territorial dispute involvement. The theory outlined in Chapter 3 suggests that this is likely to be the case. Unfortunately, the time and space constraints of this thesis as well as emphasis on multiparty regimes meant that this possibility could not be explored here. A further criticism of the typology used in this thesis could be that it did not distinguish between dynastic and non-dynastic monarchic regimes. Nevertheless, this distinction is more useful for qualitative

rather than quantitative studies, because a further disaggregation of monarchic regimes would make the analysis of democratisation in these regimes even more challenging.

The third important limitation of the thesis was that it could not explore all aspects of territorial dispute involvement. For example, it remains unknown whether territorial disputes are equally threatening to both regimes that were affected by them. This is an important limitation because it is likely that targets of territorial disputes might be more likely to feel threatened than their initiators. Nevertheless, monadic datasets – especially useful for regime change studies – make the distinction between target and initiator very difficult: if a regime is involved in more than one territorial dispute in a single year, monadic regimes make it very hard to record information on who was the target or initiator of these disputes. Furthermore, territorial disputes are very dynamic and rarely one-sided. It is likely that disputes are initiated by one party, only to be settled and then re-initiated by the previous target of the dispute. Hence, it is often impossible to confidently state which side was more to blame for the dispute. One way to potentially account for the magnitude of such threat in the future would be to control for relative military capabilities of each side in the dispute, but as mentioned above, monadic datasets make collection of such data very difficult.

Implications of the thesis

While the thesis has limitations that warrant further replication studies, using alternative methods and sources, some preliminary implications of the findings can still be discussed. In summary, the thesis demonstrated that border security is an extremely important factor when explaining the successes and failures of autocratic regimes. It is worth remembering that foreign policy efforts that aim to secure international peace in conflict-ridden areas are still largely focused on democracy promotion, whether by peaceful or non-peaceful means. These efforts usually include foreign aid, market liberalisation to increase economic growth, and even forceful regime change. Yet, this was done with relatively little success (Downes

and Monten, 2013). The focus on internal, rather than external, drivers of regime change could explain why some regimes do not transition despite international efforts to secure free and fair elections in places like Afghanistan or Egypt. The results of this thesis suggest that in order to help countries liberalise, more efforts should be made to help them stabilise and normalise their border relations with neighbours rather than interfering with their domestic affairs. As suggested by Gibler (2007), this might also apply to regions that are at a first glance regions low in international conflict, but where borders remain a contested issue. However, as mentioned before, such an approach should be taken with caution. After all, stable security environments also have the propensity to destabilise autocratic regimes, but do not necessarily lead to democratisation. It is possible that such approach could be detrimental to regions with a history of violent regime change. After all, a more stable security environment could strengthen the opposition, and lead to a violent turnover of power that would not benefit the regime's population.

Finally, the findings of this thesis could have implications on the current research on democratic breakdown in Central and Eastern Europe. While there is no evidence that young democracies are more likely to break down as a result of territorial threats, it is undeniable that the rhetoric promoting illiberal democracy in Hungary and Poland has coincided with the emergence of serious territorial threats from the Russian Federation after its invasion of Crimea. However, the inability to quantify such threats provides yet another limitation of quantitative ReSIT studies. Territorial threats can exert real influence on domestic policies of states even in the absence of explicit claims to another country's territory.

Future research agenda

This thesis has investigated the claim that involvement in territorial disputes makes autocratic regimes more stable *and* less likely to democratise. One of its main contributions was the explicit theoretical and methodological distinction between autocratic stability and democratisation – two phenomena typically seen as

synonymous in the IR literature. This is an important crucial contribution to the field, which will hopefully result in more research being devoted to the study of regime survival in the context of international organisation of states. A further contribution of the thesis was its explicit focus on autocratic regimes, which allowed it to distinguish between various forms of autocratic structures, and developing a more specific theoretical framework that explains their responses to international events.

Nevertheless, while the explicit focus on autocratic regimes was necessary to understand the process of autocratic regime change and democratisation, the effects of territorial disputes on regime survival in *democracies* remain unclear. As a result, future studies should aim to uncover whether territorial dispute involvement has a significant impact on the likelihood of democracy-to autocracy transitions, or the quality of democratic governance in affected regimes. This is especially important when investigating the likelihood of autocratic reversals in unconsolidated democracies which might be more vulnerable to institutional changes. As this thesis has demonstrated, the presence of multiparty competition in autocratic regimes might render them less prone to be affected by territorial disputes, and a similar relationship may be observed in young democracies. Hence, it is important to establish whether ReSIT applies to all types of polities, or only those which are autocratic.

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Appendix A: Supplementary materials for Chapter 4

Table 1A. List of all regimes contained in the sample

Country	Regime type	Regime beginning	Regime end
Afghanistan	<i>Monarchic</i>	January 1951	June 1973
	<i>Military</i>	July 1973	December 1979
	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1980	March 1992
	<i>Military</i>	April 1992	May 2002
	<i>Multiparty</i>	June 2002	December 2008
Albania	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	April 1991
	<i>Multiparty</i>	May 1991	March 1992
Algeria	<i>Single party</i>	July 1962	May 1965
	<i>Military</i>	June 1965	April 1999
	<i>Multiparty</i>	May 1999	December 2008
Angola	<i>Single party</i>	February 1976	August 1992
	<i>Multiparty</i>	September 1992	December 2008
Argentina	<i>Military</i>	January 1951	April 1958
	<i>Multiparty</i>	May 1958	February 1962
	<i>Military</i>	March 1962	September 1963
	<i>Multiparty</i>	October 1963	June 1966
	<i>Military</i>	July 1966	September 1973
	<i>Military</i>	March 1976	November 1983
Armenia	<i>Multiparty</i>	December 1991	December 2008
Azerbaijan	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1992	December 2008
Bahrain	<i>Monarchic</i>	August 1971	December 2008
Bangladesh	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1972	October 1975
	<i>Military</i>	November 1975	May 1981
	<i>Multiparty</i>	June 1981	March 1982
	<i>Military</i>	April 1982	August 1991
Belarus	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1992	December 2008
Benin	<i>Single party</i>	August 1960	September 1963
	<i>Military</i>	October 1963	December 1963
	<i>Single party</i>	January 1964	November 1965
	<i>Military</i>	December 1965	April 1970
	<i>Multiparty</i>	May 1970	October 1972

	<i>Military</i>	November 1972	November 1975
	<i>Single party</i>	December 1975	March 1991
Bolivia	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1951	October 1964
	<i>Military</i>	November 1964	September 1982
Bosnia	<i>Multiparty</i>	March 1992	December 2008
Botswana	<i>Multiparty</i>	October 1966	December 2008
Brazil	<i>Military</i>	March 1964	February 1985
Bulgaria	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	November 1990
Burkina Faso	<i>Single party</i>	August 1960	December 1965
	<i>Military</i>	January 1966	November 1990
	<i>Multiparty</i>	December 1990	December 2008
Burundi	<i>Monarchic</i>	July 1962	November 1966
	<i>Military</i>	December 1966	May 1993
	<i>Military</i>	August 1996	May 2003
	<i>Multiparty</i>	June 2003	December 2008
Cambodia	<i>Monarchic</i>	November 1953	February 1955
	<i>Multiparty</i>	March 1955	March 1975
	<i>Single party</i>	April 1975	May 1993
	<i>Multiparty</i>	June 1993	December 2008
Cameroon	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1960	August 1966
	<i>Single party</i>	September 1966	March 1992
	<i>Multiparty</i>	April 1992	December 2008
Cape Verde	<i>Single party</i>	July 1975	March 1991
Central African Republic	<i>Multiparty</i>	August 1960	November 1962
	<i>Single party</i>	December 1962	December 1965
	<i>Military</i>	January 1966	August 1979
	<i>Multiparty</i>	September 1979	August 1981
	<i>Military</i>	September 1981	October 1993
	<i>Military</i>	March 2003	May 2005
	<i>Multiparty</i>	June 2005	December 2008
Chad	<i>Multiparty</i>	August 1960	March 1962
	<i>Single party</i>	April 1962	March 1975
	<i>Military</i>	April 1975	May 1984
	<i>Single party</i>	June 1984	November 1990
	<i>Military</i>	December 1990	March 1997
	<i>Multiparty</i>	April 1997	December 2008
Chile	<i>Military</i>	September 1973	February 1990
China	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	December 2008

Colombia	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1951	October 1951
	<i>Single party</i>	November 1951	May 1953
	<i>Military</i>	June 1953	July 1958
Comoros	<i>Military</i>	June 1975	February 1990
	<i>Multiparty</i>	March 1990	April 1999
	<i>Military</i>	May 1999	May 2002
	<i>Multiparty</i>	June 2002	February 2004
Congo Brazzaville	<i>Multiparty</i>	August 1960	November 1963
	<i>Single party</i>	December 1963	July 1968
	<i>Military</i>	August 1968	August 1992
	<i>Multiparty</i>	September 1992	December 2008
Congo Kinshasa	<i>Multiparty</i>	July 1960	November 1965
	<i>Military</i>	December 1965	February 2001
	<i>Multiparty</i>	March 2001	December 2008
Cuba	<i>Military</i>	March 1952	October 1954
	<i>Multiparty</i>	November 1954	December 1958
	<i>Single party</i>	January 1959	December 2008
Cyprus	<i>Multiparty</i>	August 1960	January 1983
Czechoslovakia	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	May 1990
Djibouti	<i>Multiparty</i>	July 1977	December 1981
	<i>Single party</i>	January 1982	November 1992
	<i>Multiparty</i>	December 1992	December 2008
Dominican Republic	<i>Military</i>	January 1951	May 1961
	<i>Single party</i>	June 1961	November 1962
	<i>Multiparty</i>	December 1962	August 1963
	<i>Military</i>	September 1963	July 1966
	<i>Multiparty</i>	August 1966	July 1978
Ecuador	<i>Multiparty</i>	November 1961	June 1963
	<i>Military</i>	July 1963	October 1966
	<i>Multiparty</i>	November 1966	January 1972
	<i>Military</i>	February 1972	July 1979
	<i>Military</i>	January 2000	November 2002
Egypt	<i>Monarchic</i>	January 1951	July 1952
	<i>Military</i>	August 1952	December 2008
El Salvador	<i>Military</i>	January 1951	May 1984
Equatorial Guinea	<i>Single party</i>	January 1969	July 1979
	<i>Military</i>	August 1979	April 1992
	<i>Multiparty</i>	May 1992	December 2008

Ethiopia	<i>Monarchic</i>	January 1951	February 1975
	<i>Military</i>	March 1975	May 1991
	<i>Multiparty</i>	June 1991	December 2008
Gabon	<i>Multiparty</i>	August 1960	March 1964
	<i>Single party</i>	April 1964	September 1990
	<i>Multiparty</i>	October 1990	December 2008
Gambia	<i>Multiparty</i>	February 1965	July 1994
	<i>Military</i>	August 1994	March 1997
	<i>Multiparty</i>	April 1997	December 2008
Georgia	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1992	January 2004
Germany East	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	December 1989
Ghana	<i>Single party</i>	March 1957	January 1966
	<i>Military</i>	February 1966	July 1969
	<i>Military</i>	January 1972	September 1979
	<i>Military</i>	January 1982	November 1991
	<i>Multiparty</i>	December 1991	December 2000
Greece	<i>Monarchic</i>	January 1951	March 1967
	<i>Military</i>	April 1967	May 1975
Guatemala	<i>Military</i>	July 1954	June 1966
	<i>Multiparty</i>	July 1966	February 1970
	<i>Military</i>	March 1970	December 1985
Guinea	<i>Single party</i>	October 1958	March 1984
	<i>Military</i>	April 1984	September 1995
	<i>Multiparty</i>	October 1995	December 2008
Guinea-Bissau	<i>Single party</i>	September 1974	October 1980
	<i>Military</i>	November 1980	July 1994
	<i>Multiparty</i>	August 1994	June 1999
Haiti	<i>Military</i>	December 1951	December 1962
	<i>Single party</i>	January 1963	January 1985
	<i>Multiparty</i>	February 1985	January 1986
	<i>Military</i>	February 1986	November 1990
	<i>Multiparty</i>	December 1990	September 1991
	<i>Military</i>	October 1991	October 1994
	<i>Multiparty</i>	November 1994	December 2008
Honduras	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	September 1956
	<i>Military</i>	October 1956	November 1957
	<i>Multiparty</i>	December 1957	September 1963
	<i>Military</i>	October 1963	January 1982

Hungary	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	April 1990
Indonesia	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1951	February 1966
	<i>Military</i>	March 1966	September 1999
Iran	<i>Monarchic</i>	January 1951	January 1979
	<i>Single party</i>	February 1979	December 2008
Iraq	<i>Monarchic</i>	January 1951	June 1958
	<i>Military</i>	July 1958	June 1979
	<i>Single party</i>	July 1979	February 1980
	<i>Multiparty</i>	March 1980	September 1984
	<i>Single party</i>	October 1984	April 2005
	<i>Multiparty</i>	May 2005	December 2008
Ivory Coast	<i>Single party</i>	August 1960	May 1990
	<i>Multiparty</i>	June 1990	December 1999
	<i>Military</i>	January 2000	November 2000
	<i>Multiparty</i>	December 2000	December 2008
Jordan	<i>Monarchic</i>	January 1951	December 2008
Kazakhstan	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1992	December 2008
Kenya	<i>Single party</i>	December 1964	March 1966
	<i>Multiparty</i>	April 1966	October 1969
	<i>Single party</i>	November 1969	November 1992
	<i>Multiparty</i>	December 1992	January 2003
Korea North	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	December 2008
Korea South	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1951	July 1960
	<i>Military</i>	May 1961	February 1988
Kuwait	<i>Monarchic</i>	February 1963	December 2008
Kyrgyzstan	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1992	December 2008
Laos	<i>Military</i>	April 1960	May 1962
	<i>Multiparty</i>	June 1962	November 1975
	<i>Single party</i>	December 1975	December 2008
Lebanon	<i>Multiparty</i>	June 1975	December 2008
Lesotho	<i>Multiparty</i>	October 1966	November 1984
	<i>Single party</i>	December 1984	December 1985
	<i>Military</i>	January 1986	March 1993
	<i>Multiparty</i>	April 1993	December 2008
Liberia	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	March 1980
	<i>Military</i>	April 1980	November 1990
	<i>Multiparty</i>	December 1990	December 2005
Libya	<i>Monarchic</i>	December 1951	August 1969

	<i>Military</i>	September 1969	December 2008
Madagascar	<i>Multiparty</i>	July 1960	April 1972
	<i>Military</i>	May 1972	June 1977
	<i>Single party</i>	July 1977	August 1991
	<i>Multiparty</i>	September 1991	July 1993
Malawi	<i>Multiparty</i>	July 1964	June 1966
	<i>Single party</i>	July 1966	April 1994
Malaysia	<i>Multiparty</i>	August 1957	December 2008
Mali	<i>Single party</i>	October 1960	October 1968
	<i>Military</i>	November 1968	March 1991
	<i>Single party</i>	April 1991	January 1992
Mauritania	<i>Single party</i>	December 1960	June 1978
	<i>Military</i>	July 1978	April 2007
	<i>Multiparty</i>	May 2007	July 2008
	<i>Military</i>	August 2008	December 2008
Mexico	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1951	June 1997
Mongolia	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	April 1990
	<i>Multiparty</i>	May 1990	June 1992
Morocco	<i>Monarchic</i>	March 1956	December 2008
Mozambique	<i>Single party</i>	July 1975	October 1994
	<i>Multiparty</i>	November 1994	December 2008
Myanmar (Burma)	<i>Military</i>	October 1958	January 1960
	<i>Military</i>	March 1962	December 2008
Namibia	<i>Multiparty</i>	March 1990	December 2008
Nepal	<i>Monarchic</i>	January 1951	May 1991
	<i>Monarchic</i>	June 2002	April 2006
Nicaragua	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1951	June 1979
	<i>Single party</i>	July 1979	December 1984
	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1985	April 1990
Niger	<i>Single party</i>	August 1960	March 1974
	<i>Military</i>	April 1974	May 1993
	<i>Military</i>	February 1996	December 1999
Nigeria	<i>Military</i>	January 1966	September 1979
	<i>Military</i>	January 1984	May 1999
	<i>Multiparty</i>	June 1999	December 2008
Oman	<i>Monarchic</i>	January 1971	December 2008
Pakistan	<i>Military</i>	December 1958	May 1962
	<i>Multiparty</i>	June 1962	March 1969

	<i>Military</i>	April 1969	July 1973
	<i>Military</i>	July 1977	November 1988
	<i>Military</i>	October 1999	April 2008
Panama	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1951	December 1954
	<i>Military</i>	October 1968	November 1989
Paraguay	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	July 1954
	<i>Military</i>	August 1954	April 1993
	<i>Multiparty</i>	May 1993	March 1996
Peru	<i>Military</i>	January 1951	June 1956
	<i>Military</i>	July 1962	June 1963
	<i>Military</i>	October 1968	April 1980
	<i>Multiparty</i>	April 1992	May 2001
Philippines	<i>Multiparty</i>	December 1965	January 1987
Poland	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	May 1989
Portugal	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	April 1974
	<i>Military</i>	May 1974	June 1976
Qatar	<i>Monarchic</i>	September 1971	December 2008
Romania	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	May 1990
Rwanda	<i>Multiparty</i>	July 1962	February 1965
	<i>Single party</i>	March 1965	June 1973
	<i>Military</i>	July 1973	December 2008
Saudi Arabia	<i>Monarchic</i>	January 1951	December 2008
Senegal	<i>Single party</i>	August 1960	February 1978
	<i>Multiparty</i>	March 1978	March 2000
Serbia and Montenegro / Serbia	<i>Multiparty</i>	May 1992	September 2000
Sierra Leone	<i>Military</i>	April 1967	March 1971
	<i>Multiparty</i>	April 1971	May 1978
	<i>Single party</i>	June 1978	April 1992
	<i>Military</i>	May 1992	March 1996
	<i>Multiparty</i>	April 1996	April 1997
	<i>Military</i>	May 1997	February 1998
	<i>Multiparty</i>	March 1998	April 2002
Singapore	<i>Multiparty</i>	August 1965	March 1968
	<i>Single party</i>	April 1968	September 1981
	<i>Multiparty</i>	October 1981	December 2008
Somalia	<i>Military</i>	October 1969	December 1990
South Africa	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1951	April 1994

Spain	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	May 1977
Sri Lanka	<i>Multiparty</i>	March 1983	January 1989
Sudan	<i>Military</i>	November 1958	May 1965
	<i>Military</i>	May 1969	April 1974
	<i>Single party</i>	May 1974	March 1985
	<i>Military</i>	April 1985	March 1986
	<i>Military</i>	July 1989	December 2008
Swaziland	<i>Monarchic</i>	September 1968	December 2008
Syria	<i>Military</i>	January 1951	August 1955
	<i>Multiparty</i>	September 1955	January 1958
	<i>Military</i>	March 1962	December 2008
Taiwan	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	June 1987
	<i>Multiparty</i>	July 1987	February 1996
Tajikistan	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1992	December 2008
Tanzania	<i>Single party</i>	December 1961	October 1995
	<i>Multiparty</i>	November 1995	December 2008
Thailand	<i>Military</i>	January 1951	September 1973
	<i>Multiparty</i>	October 1973	February 1975
	<i>Military</i>	November 1976	March 1979
	<i>Multiparty</i>	April 1979	February 1980
	<i>Military</i>	March 1980	September 1992
	<i>Military</i>	September 2006	January 2008
Togo	<i>Single party</i>	May 1960	December 1966
	<i>Military</i>	January 1967	January 1994
	<i>Multiparty</i>	February 1994	December 2008
Tunisia	<i>Multiparty</i>	March 1956	December 1962
	<i>Single party</i>	January 1963	October 1987
	<i>Multiparty</i>	November 1987	December 2008
Turkey	<i>Multiparty</i>	May 1954	May 1960
	<i>Military</i>	June 1960	September 1961
	<i>Military</i>	March 1971	September 1973
	<i>Military</i>	September 1980	October 1983
Turkmenistan	<i>Single party</i>	January 1992	December 2008
USSR / Russia	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	December 1991
	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1992	December 2008
Uganda	<i>Multiparty</i>	April 1966	November 1969
	<i>Single party</i>	December 1969	January 1971
	<i>Military</i>	February 1971	March 1979

	<i>Multiparty</i>	April 1979	July 1985
	<i>Single party</i>	August 1985	February 2006
	<i>Multiparty</i>	March 2006	December 2008
United Arab Emirates	<i>Monarchic</i>	December 1971	December 2008
Uruguay	<i>Military</i>	February 1973	February 1985
Uzbekistan	<i>Single party</i>	September 1991	December 1994
	<i>Military</i>	January 1995	December 2008
Venezuela	<i>Multiparty</i>	January 1951	November 1958
	<i>Multiparty</i>	April 2002	December 2008
Vietnam North / Vietnam	<i>Single party</i>	July 1954	December 2008
Yemen North /Yemen	<i>Military</i>	January 1951	September 1962
	<i>Monarchic</i>	October 1962	May 1990
	<i>Military</i>		
Yugoslavia	<i>Single party</i>	January 1951	December 1991
Zambia	<i>Multiparty</i>	November 1964	November 1972
	<i>Single party</i>	December 1972	October 1991
	<i>Multiparty</i>	November 1991	October 2008
Zimbabwe	<i>Multiparty</i>	November 1965	December 2008

Table A2. The original coding (regime-years) for Sierra Leone between 1992 and 2002

Date	Regime ID	Country	Regime type	Transition	Transition date	GDP
1992	10	Sierra Leone	Military	0		845
1993	10	Sierra Leone	Military	0		855
1994	10	Sierra Leone	Military	0		865
1995	10	Sierra Leone	Military	1		766
1996	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	1	03.29.1996	569
1997	12	Sierra Leone	Military	1	05.25.1997	454
1998	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0	03.10.1998	441
1999	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		404
2000	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		409
2001	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		458
2002	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	1	05.14.2002	553

Table A3. The new coding (regime-months) for Sierra Leone between 1996 and 1999

Date	Regime ID	Country	Regime type	Transition	Transition date	GDP
Mar-96	10	Sierra Leone	Military	1	03.29.1996	569
Apr-96	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		569
May-96	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		569
Jun-96	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		569
Jul-96	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		569
Aug-96	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		569
Sep-96	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		569
Oct-96	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		569
Nov-96	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		569
Dec-96	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		569
Jan-97	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		454
Feb-97	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		454
Mar-97	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		454
Apr-97	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		454
May-97	11	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	1	05.25.1997	454
Jun-97	12	Sierra Leone	Military	0		454
Jul-97	12	Sierra Leone	Military	0		454
Aug-97	12	Sierra Leone	Military	0		454
Sep-97	12	Sierra Leone	Military	0		454
Oct-97	12	Sierra Leone	Military	0		454
Nov-97	12	Sierra Leone	Military	0		454
Dec-97	12	Sierra Leone	Military	0		454
Jan-98	12	Sierra Leone	Military	0		441
Feb-98	12	Sierra Leone	Military	1	03.10.1998	441
Mar-98	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		441
Apr-98	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		441
May-98	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		441
Jun-98	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		441
Jul-98	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		441
Aug-98	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		441
Sep-98	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		441
Oct-98	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		441
Nov-98	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		441
Dec-98	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		441
Jan-99	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		404
Feb-99	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		404
Mar-99	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		404
Apr-99	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		404
May-99	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		404
Jun-99	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		404
Jul-99	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		404
Aug-99	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		404
Sep-99	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		404
Oct-99	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		404
Nov-99	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		404
Dec-99	13	Sierra Leone	Multiparty	0		404

Table 4A. List of multicollinearity statistics for Chapter 5 estimated using ordinary least squares regression (independent variable: time to regime change)

Independent variables tested	VIF score	1/VIF
<i>Log(GDP) per capita</i>	1.27	0.786034
<i>Oil dependency</i>	1.25	0.800792
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>	1.14	0.873657
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	1.06	0.943019
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	1.02	0.982436
<i>Political instability</i>	1.00	0.996412
Mean	1.12	

Table 5A. List of multicollinearity statistics for military regimes in Chapter 6, estimated using ordinary least squares regression (independent variable: time to regime change)

Independent variables tested	VIF score	1/VIF
<i>Log(GDP) per capita</i>	1.49	0.673384
<i>Oil dependency</i>	1.28	0.782312
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>	1.15	0.871487
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	1.12	0.892737
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	1.09	0.919503
<i>Political instability</i>	1.02	0.985198
Mean	1.19	

Table 6A. List of multicollinearity statistics for monarchic regimes in Chapter 6, estimated using ordinary least squares regression (independent variable: time to regime change)

Independent variables tested	VIF score	1/VIF
<i>Oil dependency</i>	1.55	0.643608
<i>Log(GDP) per capita</i>	1.51	0.663180
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	1.06	0.941316
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	1.06	0.945909
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>	1.04	0.961736
<i>Political instability</i>	1.00	0.997667
Mean	1.12	

Table 7A. List of multicollinearity statistics for multiparty regimes in Chapter 6, estimated using ordinary least squares regression (independent variable: time to regime change)

Independent variables tested	VIF score	1/VIF
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>	1.22	0.816741
<i>Log(GDP) per capita</i>	1.21	0.829477
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	1.09	0.915429
<i>Oil dependency</i>	1.07	0.938825
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	1.03	0.973087
<i>Political instability</i>	1.01	0.988456
Mean	1.10	

Table 8A. List of multicollinearity statistics for single party regimes in Chapter 6, estimated using ordinary least squares regression (independent variable: time to regime change)

Independent variables tested	VIF score	1/VIF
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>	1.31	0.761303
<i>Log(GDP) per capita</i>	1.24	0.807027
<i>Oil dependency</i>	1.17	0.851086
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	1.17	0.853378
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	1.09	0.914128
<i>Political instability</i>	1.01	0.994658
Mean	1.17	

Table 9A. List of multicollinearity statistics for Chapter 7, estimated using ordinary least squares regression (independent variable: time to democratisation) with the time-varying measure of territorial dispute involvement

Independent variables tested	VIF score	1/VIF
<i>Monarchic regimes</i>	1.55	0.647039
<i>Multiparty regimes</i>	1.78	0.560979
<i>Single party regimes</i>	1.68	0.596655
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	1.07	0.932936
<i>Log(GDP) per capita</i>	1.36	0.737984
<i>Oil dependency</i>	1.27	0.78445
<i>Political instability</i>	1.03	0.969177
<i>History of democracy</i>	1.26	0.795863
<i>Cold War</i>	1.22	0.817825
<i>Sum of past transitions</i>	1.54	0.649121
Mean	1.38	

Table 10A. List of multicollinearity statistics for Chapter 7, estimated using ordinary least squares regression (independent variable: time to democratisation) with the dummy measure of territorial dispute involvement history

Independent variables tested	VIF score	1/VIF
<i>Monarchic regimes</i>	1.55	0.646124
<i>Multiparty regimes</i>	1.77	0.565012
<i>Single party regimes</i>	1.66	0.601848
<i>Territorial dispute history</i>	1.1	0.907371
<i>Log(GDP) per capita</i>	1.35	0.738847
<i>Oil dependency</i>	1.29	0.773194
<i>Political instability</i>	1.03	0.969417
<i>History of democracy</i>	1.25	0.79869
<i>Cold War</i>	1.23	0.811907
<i>Sum of past transitions</i>	1.55	0.645435
Mean	1.38	

Appendix B: Chapter 5 diagnostic tests

Table A1. Non-visual univariate Schoenfeld residuals test

Variables	RHO	χ^2 value	Degrees of freedom	p-value
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	-0.089	2.31	1	0.129
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	-0.103	4.53	1	0.033
<i>Oil dependency</i>	0.051	0.65	1	0.421
<i>Instability</i>	0.244	18.51	1	0.000
<i>Ethnic instability</i>	0.080	2.51	1	0.113
<i>Religious instability</i>	0.043	0.60	1	0.439

Figure A1. Univariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables.




Figure A2. A 'log-log' plot of the categorical predictors, obtained from univariate analysis




Figure A3. Univariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors




Table A2. Multivariate Schoenfeld residuals test results (Model 8)

Variables	RHO	χ^2 value	Degrees of freedom	p-value
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	-0.003	0.0	1	0.961
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	-0.050	0.8	1	0.372
<i>Oil</i>	0.086	2.3	1	0.127
<i>Instability</i>	0.045	0.7	1	0.399
<i>Instability * time</i>	-0.081	2.0	1	0.162
<i>Ethnic instability</i>	-0.045	0.4	1	0.525
<i>Religious instability</i>	0.010	0.0	1	0.888
<i>Rel. instability * time</i>	-0.008	0.0	1	0.910
Global test		4.0	8	0.856

Figure A4. Multivariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables (Model 8)




Figure A5. A 'log-log' plot of categorical predictors from multivariate analysis (Model 8)





Figure A6. A plot of Martingale residuals for all continuous covariates from multivariate analysis (Model 8)



Appendix C: Chapter 6 diagnostic tests

A. Military regimes

Table A1. Military regimes: Univariate Schoenfeld residuals test results

Variables	RHO	χ^2 value	Degrees of freedom	p-value
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	0.08030	0.58	1	0.448
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	-0.05196	0.33	1	0.566
<i>Oil</i>	-0.02159	0.04	1	0.834
<i>Instability</i>	0.16854	2.65	1	0.103
<i>Ethnic instability</i>	0.03839	0.13	1	0.714
<i>Religious instability</i>	0.13790	1.75	1	0.186

Figure A1. Military regimes: Univariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables in the model without interactions




Figure A2. Military regimes: Unadjusted log-log plots for categorical variables




Figure A3. Military regimes: Univariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors in the final Cox model




Table A2. Military regimes: Multivariate Schoenfeld residuals test results (Model 10)

Variables	RHO	χ^2 value	Degrees of freedom	p-value
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	-0.056	0.21	1	0.649
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	-0.058	0.23	1	0.635
<i>Log(GDP per capita)²</i>	0.055	0.20	1	0.657
<i>Oil</i>	0.050	0.16	1	0.690
<i>Instability</i>	0.018	0.02	1	0.890
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>	-0.097	0.91	1	0.339
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	0.093	0.51	1	0.474
<i>Log(GDP per capita) * political instability</i>	-0.003	0.00	1	0.978
<i>Territorial dispute * political instability</i>	0.052	0.2	1	0.652
<i>Global test</i>		3.14	9	0.959

Figure A4. Military regimes: Multivariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables in the model, including interactions (Model 10)




Figure A5. Military regimes: Log-log plots for categorical variables (Model 10)







Figure A6. Military regimes: Multivariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors (Model 10)



B. Monarchic regimes

Table B1. Monarchic regimes: Univariate Schoenfeld residuals test results

Variables	RHO	χ^2 value	Degrees of freedom	p-value
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	-0.26136	0.92	1	0.337
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	-0.08794	0.08	1	0.775
<i>Oil</i>	0.16518	0.29	1	0.593
<i>Instability</i>	0.38148	1.88	1	0.170
<i>Ethnic instability</i>	0.52351	3.37	1	0.066
<i>Religious instability</i>	0.00831	0.00	1	0.980

Figure B1. Monarchic regimes: Univariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables in the model without interactions




Figure B2. Monarchic regimes: Unadjusted log-log plots for categorical variables





Figure B3. Monarchic regimes: Univariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors in the final Cox model



C. Multiparty regimes

Table C1. Multiparty regimes: Univariate Schoenfeld residuals test results

Variables	RHO	χ^2 value	Degrees of freedom	p-value
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	0.07496	0.43	1	0.513
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	-0.21751	3.60	1	0.058
<i>Oil</i>	0.04666	0.16	1	0.691
<i>Instability</i>	0.05416	0.23	1	0.632
<i>Ethnic instability</i>	0.08918	0.68	1	0.409
<i>Religious instability</i>	-0.04599	0.15	1	0.701

Figure C1. Multiparty regimes: Univariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables in the model without interactions




Figure C2. Multiparty regimes: Unadjusted log-log plots for categorical variables




Figure C3. Multiparty regimes: Univariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors in the final Cox model




Table C2. Multiparty regimes: Multivariate Schoenfeld residuals test results (Model 7)

Variables	RHO	χ^2 value	Degrees of freedom	p-value
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	0.04864	0.17	1	0.682
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	-0.13001	1.01	1	0.314
<i>Oil</i>	0.08396	0.34	1	0.562
<i>Instability</i>	-0.05199	0.25	1	0.618
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>	0.07232	0.32	1	0.571
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	-0.05333	0.15	1	0.695
<i>Log(GDP per capita) * political instability</i>	0.0506	0.23	1	0.629
<i>Global test</i>		2.35	7	0.938

Figure C4. Multiparty regimes: Log-log plots for categorical variables (Model 7)




Figure C5. Multiparty regimes: Multivariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables (Model 7)





Figure C6. Multiparty regimes: Multivariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors (Model 7)



D. Single party regimes

Table D1. Single party regimes: Univariate Schoenfeld residuals test results

Variables	RHO	χ^2 value	Degrees of freedom	p-value
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	-0.3073	5.66	1	0.017
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	0.0274	0.05	1	0.824
<i>Oil</i>	0.0376	0.08	1	0.771
<i>Instability</i>	0.3909	8.14	1	0.004
<i>Ethnic instability</i>	-0.0224	0.03	1	0.864
<i>Religious instability</i>	-0.0658	0.32	1	0.569

Figure D1. Single party regimes: Univariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables in the model without interactions




Figure D2. Single party regimes: Unadjusted log-log plots for categorical variables






Figure D3. Single party regimes: Univariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors in the final Cox model




Table D2. Single party regimes: Multivariate Schoenfeld residuals test results (Model 9)

Variables	RHO	χ^2 value	Degrees of freedom	p-value
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	-0.1088	0.68	1	0.411
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	0.0585	0.23	1	0.630
<i>Oil</i>	0.0436	0.04	1	0.849
<i>Instability</i>	0.0076	0.00	1	0.953
<i>Instability * time</i>	0.0393	0.04	1	0.835
<i>Ethnic fractionalisation</i>	0.1161	0.84	1	0.360
<i>Religious fractionalisation</i>	-0.1004	0.59	1	0.444
<i>Log(GDP per capita) * ethnic fractionalisation</i>	-0.1163	0.76	1	0.385
<i>Dispute * oil dependency</i>	0.0314	0.05	1	0.828
<i>Global test</i>		2.62	9	0.977

Figure D4. Single party regimes: Multivariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests (Model 9)




Figure D5. Single party regimes: Log-log plots for categorical variables (Model 9)







Figure D6. Single party regimes: Multivariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors (Model 9)



Appendix D: Chapter 7 diagnostic tests

Table A1. Univariate non-visual Schoenfeld proportional hazards tests

Variables	RHO	χ^2 value	Degrees of freedom	p-value
<i>Military regimes</i>	---	---	---	---
<i>Monarchic regimes</i>	0.028	0.06	1	0.807
<i>Multiparty regimes</i>	0.024	0.04	1	0.832
<i>Single party regimes</i>	0.336	7.52	1	0.006
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	-0.071	0.40	1	0.526
<i>History of territorial dispute</i>	-0.042	0.14	1	0.709
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	-0.069	0.37	1	0.545
<i>Oil</i>	-0.164	2.09	1	0.148
<i>Instability</i>	0.283	6.31	1	0.012
<i>History of democracy</i>	-0.088	0.59	1	0.443
<i>Sum of past transitions</i>	0.043	0.13	1	0.719
<i>Cold War</i>	0.084	0.54	1	0.463

Figure A1. Visual univariate Schoenfeld residual tests




Figure A2. Visual univariate Schoenfeld residual test: regime categories




Figure A3. Unadjusted log-log plots for all categorical predictors (Table 6 only)




Figure A4. Adjusted log-log plots for all categorical predictors (Table 6 only)




Figure A5. Univariate Martingale residuals test





Figure A6. Visual multivariate Schoenfeld residual tests (Model 9)




Figure A7. Visual multivariate Schoenfeld residual tests: regime categories (Model 9)




Table A2. Multivariate non-visual Schoenfeld proportional hazards tests (Model 9)

Variables	RHO	χ^2 value	Degrees of freedom	p-value
<i>Military regimes</i>	---	---	---	---
<i>Monarchic regimes</i>	-0.114	1.45	1	0.229
<i>Multiparty regimes</i>	0.112	1.27	1	0.259
<i>Single party regimes</i>	-0.045	0.20	1	0.656
<i>Territorial dispute</i>	0.013	0.02	1	0.893
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	-0.025	0.05	1	0.827
<i>Oil</i>	0.003	0.00	1	0.983
<i>Instability</i>	-0.037	0.11	1	0.742
<i>Instability * time</i>	-0.022	0.06	1	0.799
<i>History of democracy</i>	-0.068	0.32	1	0.572
<i>Sum of past transitions</i>	0.030	0.08	1	0.779
<i>Cold War</i>	0.069	0.60	1	0.438
<i>Instability * Cold War</i>	-0.059	0.49	1	0.484
<i>Instability * Log(GDP pc)</i>	0.045	0.16	1	0.687
<i>Oil * Cold War</i>	0.087	0.55	1	0.459
<i>Oil * Sum of past transitions</i>	-0.066	0.22	1	0.641
Global test		3.59	15	0.999

Figure A8. Multivariate Martingale residuals test (Model 9)





Figure A9. Univariate visual Schoenfeld residual test for the new measure of territorial disputes




Figure A10. Log-log plots for the new measure of territorial disputes, adjusted and unadjusted




Figure A11. Visual multivariate Schoenfeld residual tests (Model 13)




Figure A12. Visual multivariate Schoenfeld residual tests: regime categories (Model 13)




Table A3. Multivariate non-visual Schoenfeld proportional hazards tests (Model 13)

Variables	RHO	χ^2 value	Degrees of freedom	p-value
<i>Military regimes</i>	---	---	---	---
<i>Monarchic regimes</i>	-0.034	0.05	1	0.830
<i>Multiparty regimes</i>	-0.010	0.01	1	0.924
<i>Single party regimes</i>	-0.058	0.28	1	0.594
<i>History of territorial dispute</i>	0.026	0.06	1	0.809
<i>Log(GDP per capita)</i>	0.016	0.02	1	0.881
<i>Oil</i>	-0.113	0.56	1	0.455
<i>Instability</i>	0.020	0.03	1	0.857
<i>Instability * time</i>	-0.022	0.06	1	0.807
<i>History of democracy</i>	-0.107	0.55	1	0.457
<i>Sum of past transitions</i>	-0.007	0.00	1	0.958
<i>Cold War</i>	0.114	0.80	1	0.372
<i>Instability * Cold War</i>	0.063	0.57	1	0.448
<i>Instability * Log(GDP pc)</i>	-0.006	0.00	1	0.954
<i>Oil * Cold War</i>	-0.119	1.17	1	0.280
<i>Oil * Sum of past transitions</i>	0.000	0.00	1	0.998
<i>Military regimes * territorial dispute history</i>	-0.052	0.22	1	0.642
<i>Monarchic regimes * territorial dispute history</i>	0.015	0.01	1	0.912
<i>Multiparty regimes * territorial dispute history</i>	0.085	0.59	1	0.443
<i>Single party regimes * territorial dispute history</i>	---	---	---	---
Global test		4.96	18	0.999

Figure A13. Multivariate Martingale residuals test (Model 13)

