

iii: PATTERNS OF SHIP MONEY PAYMENTS

"All the shires of England are rated by the Lords and writs gone down to 'sess and gather moneys.... A notable revenue if it be paid every year, far better than tunnage and poundage, and yet that is paid too."

Reverend Garrard to the Lord Deputy, 1st September 1635.
(359)

Changes in response to ship money can be further documented from the Council's own accounting system, using Sir William Russell's accounts and Nicholas' reports on ship money in the sheriff's hands. These accounts, running from March 1635 until January 1641, are a comprehensive and very detailed source which has never been systematically exploited. Instead the standard reference for ship money payments has been Miss Gordon's article published in The Transactions of the Royal Historical Society in 1910, which is based upon an entirely different source, the Audit Office Declared Accounts.(360) Gardiner had drawn a picture of ship money which relied heavily on some of the sheriffs' reports, on the Venetian Ambassador's dispatches and on the correspondence between Laud and Wentworth. Indeed he saw ship money in political rather than in fiscal terms when he wrote,

"Nor was the pecuniary pressure of the ship-money great enough to be felt as crushing.... The real grievance beyond that which attends any demand whatever for money was that the King had deliberately treated the nation as a stranger to his counsels, and that if his claim to levy money by his own authority were once admitted the door would be opened to other demands of which it was impossible to see the limits."(361)

Miss Gordon's material changed this picture, far from being fiercely resisted ship money was a fiscal success yielding large sums of money for naval defence.(362) The success of ship money became one of the central tenets of the localist and revisionist critiques of whig history. Willing conformity replaced Gardiner's picture of duress and resistance. Anthony Fletcher argued that in Sussex the unpopularity and eventual collapse of ship money had little to do with grand questions of constitutional propriety, but rather more to do with the impact of the service on the local community.(363) John Morrill commented almost joyfully on the amazing collection rates,

"Between 1634 and the autumn of 1638, 90 per cent of the assessments were paid, an extraordinary achievement by seventeenth-century standards..."(364)

Kevin Sharpe dubbed ship money "the great success story" of the Personal Rule.(365) In his argument this success was a tribute both to the careful diligence of the Council and to the willingness of the subject to pay a properly organised tax for a stated national end. Ship money success between 1635 and 1639 therefore served to emphasise the role of war as a cause of political tension and disruption in early modern states, pointing to parallels with other continental powers. By this argument the Forced Loan created controversy during the late 1620s because the country was overburdened by the demands of war, and in its turn ship money collapsed because cost and conduct money and then the expectation of Parliamentary subsidies, wore out the tax payers' patience.(366) All

of this could be substantiated from the figures published by Miss Gordon. (367)

Yet the revisionist argument leaves some unanswered and troublesome questions, particularly about the way the Council regarded arrears and why they thought there should be "cheerful and ready payment". (368) If Morrill and Sharpe are right it looks as if the government got things completely out of proportion. Given the lack of information at the disposal of early modern governments and the obsessive natures of such dominant personalities as the King, Laud and Wentworth this could be true. It certainly seems odd for Nicholas to predict ruin, as he did in a memorandum written about October 1637.

"If there be not care taken to get in the said arrears, the business of shipping will in a short time by such latitude be lost, for the arrears for that service are more every year than other years.

The arrears for 1634/5 are about £1,133 10s 11d.

The arrears for 1635/6 still are £5,992 22s 7d.

The arrears for 1636/7 are still £20,224 12s 9½d."

(369)

Arrears of less than £30,000 out of a total demand of nearly £500,000 do not appear to justify his level of concern. Yet Nicholas did not lack information, and was nothing if not a careful and diligent servant of the King's: he had nothing to gain from promoting such views.

At the heart of this problem is a discrepancy of source material. Audit Office Accounts are not the only source for ship money payments, nor are they the most informative or the most comprehensive. They are not even the accounts the Council routinely

used. Official perceptions of ship money were heavily influenced by Sir William Russell's accounts, which were presented each week along with Nicholas' reports on the sheriffs. (370) Declared Accounts, on the other hand, were one-offs, produced for the King's inspection on the orders of the Council to the Admiralty Commission. They were part of the routine administration of the navy and as an indication of response to ship money they have many limitations. They reflect the state of payment at one given point in time, and that an arbitrary one sometimes years after the issue of the writs, with little relevance to the service itself. Miss Gordon stated

"it must be remembered that the earliest of these accounts was not made up before 1639, and in any given year, the amount in hand was very much less than the sum finally collected by the exertions of the council."

Nevertheless, she also wrote,

"These ship money accounts show exactly how much of the sum assessed on each county was actually levied in each year." (371)

The problem is they do not. Out of this confusion and inaccuracy have arisen.

Using Audit Office accounts actually distorts rather than illuminates the payment of ship money: this was never static and complexities cannot be revealed by a single account. The account for the 1635 writ, for example, was declared in 1639 with arrears of £4,036, but this shows the state of the account four years after the writs had been issued and after considerable and sustained pressure from the Council. (372) Payments for this writ illustrate how the

service changed over time. According to Sir William Russell's account for 7th October 1636, the last account before the next writs were sent out, the arrears were £20,544 1s. 2d.(373) At the issue of the 1637 writ in September 1637, 1635 arrears stood at £9,001 18s 7½d and Sir William Russell's clerk told Nicholas that no arrears had been paid to him since 21st July 1638.(374) In November 1638 this account was £4,744 behind.(375) By the autumn of 1639 the arrears were £4,536 12s 4d, at which point they remained.(376)

A county's obligation was fulfilled only by payment in full and examining payments for the counties week by week as the Council did produces some interesting results. The picture revealed is more subtle than the rather one dimensional picture presented in the Declared Accounts. Differences in response and in the commitment of the sheriffs can often be clearly documented. There is a world of difference between Monmouthshire for example, which paid the full charge of the first national writ by Christmas 1635, and Suffolk which took until February 1637 to clear its arrears; but both are represented as equally diligent in Gordon's tables.(377) Audit Office Declared Accounts cannot reflect the slow reduction of arrears or the intransigence of others. It took over three years to reduce the Northamptonshire arrears for 1635 from £2,015 in October 1636 to £308 5s shown on the Declared Account.(378) Somerset's arrears remained at £956 12s 1d after Hampden's Case, confirming fears that the county would never pay this money willingly.(379) On a smaller scale, the accounts confirm John Buxton's belief that the constables of Blotfield Hundred would default on £78 2s 11d: Norfolk arrears for 1637 stuck at this figure after January 1639, and the Council

eventually freed Buxton of any further responsibility in September 1640.(380)

Similarly according to Gordon's tables Shropshire's average arrears from 1635 until 1638 were 2.5 per cent each writ; this looks like a pattern of diligence comparable to Lancashire, but it is not.(381) Sir William Russell's accounts tell part of a different story. Response was prompt for the first writ, the first payment was made by 27th December 1635 and 96 per cent was paid before the next writ came into force.(382) John Newton was an unpopular sheriff, leaving a legacy of grievances and discontent for the next writ; but Sir Paul Harriss was able to manage the service successfully. The rate of payment was slightly slower than the previous year, and slightly slower than the national pattern. However, during the 1637 writ when the future Presbyterian William Pierrepoint was sheriff, payments became significantly slower than the national average. Two thirds of the charge was outstanding at the end of June 1638 after Hampden's Case; shortfall in the accounts was remedied over the next six months leaving an arrear of £172.(383) This pattern is not very surprising, given the awareness of legal proprieties manifest in the county both about muster-master fees and ship money and Pierrepoint's own views. It looks very much as if the county held on to its money until the judgement was given for the King, the argument for this is particularly persuasive because some Shropshire ship money collected under the 1639 writ was redistributed after the Long Parliament condemned the service as illegal.(384) The change from the pattern of the first two writs was more marked during the 1638 writ. Shropshire was one of the very last counties to pay Sir

William Russell, nothing was paid until Shrewsbury sent up £50 at the beginning of September 1639 and the sheriff was put under considerable pressure by the Lords in order to counter disaffection.(385) The Council's picture of ship money could be very different from that presented in the Declared Accounts.

To understand the Council's view of payments as well as to understand the response in the provinces it is necessary to go back to Sir William Russell's accounts. Most of ship money demanded in the writs was indeed paid and its successful collection was commented on by contemporaries, particularly by the Venetian Ambassador.(386) However, the political costs of prerogative taxation cannot simply be measured in terms of how much money was eventually paid in. Richard Cust's study of the Forced Loan has drawn attention to this. When he wrote

"by the end of November [1627] ... £243,776 had been accounted for. This compared very favourably with the £275,000 raised on the five subsidies granted by Parliament in 1628, and indicated that in financial terms the Loan had already been a considerable success. The cost of this politically, however, was extremely high."(387)

he effectively countered Conrad Russell's belief that the Loan was

"just another disagreeable and in the end inevitable demand for money."(388)

In the 1630s silence does not necessarily mean content, nor does payment necessarily mean compliance.

It is easy to understand why full payment was so important to the Council, because arrears created real problems. The needs of the

Navy exceeded the yield of ship money. Acute cash flow crises resulted in loans from the Exchequer and in Sir William Russell extending his own credit.(389) Even so Sir William complained to Nicholas in July 1636 that he had no money "except for crying things" until more ship money came in.(390) In an ideal world the Council would have liked the money in by 1st March following, before the fleet embarked, but this never happened. They then had to rely on creative accounting, because ship money was too new and too irregular a tax for the King to borrow on its strengths as he did with the subsidy. It is in this context that the Council's obsession with arrears becomes meaningful: reluctance to pay seemed incomprehensible in the face of a national emergency. To Laud and Wentworth attempts to shift and delay were further proof of the hold of disaffection on the people: indignation filled Laud when he wrote in November 1637,

"there is no Reason all publick Works should be put upon the Crown. And yet you see how unwilling the People are to contribute be it never so honourable or necessary for themselves."(391)

Hence arrears are still significant even when they seem exceedingly small. The average payment in John Lucas' assessment of Essex was less than the 10s minimum subsidy charge on land, but it was paid by twenty thousand people.(392) Sir Thomas Cholmondely's assessments on four hundred Cheshire villages varied from 11s 3d to £28, with the mean lying between £3 and £6.(393) The assessment for the 1637 writ in Wilhamstead in Bedfordshire charged an average of 6s 8d on seventy-seven landholders for a total of £25 10s 11d; the highest assessment was for £1 11s, the lowest 8d. There were fifteen

defaulters in this village when the sheriff William Boteler set out to tackle the arrears in the late summer of 1638, these fifteen owed £1 19s 4d which was pretty typical for Bedfordshire arrears that year. This must be a fairly average sort of picture of default.(394) An arrear of £50 represented the assessment on three or four substantial villages, £300 the assessment on a whole hundred, £1,000 considerable disaffection and discontent. Even wealthy defaulters like Hampden or Lord Saye owed £2 17s and £67 for their respective 1635 assessments.(395)

Focussing attention on the Declared Accounts and using them uncritically, has allowed historians to make claims which are not really valid and to minimise the political dimensions involved in payment. When John Morrill wrote,

The efficiency of the tax in the year of Hampden's Case (October 1637 to September 1638) was still over 90 per cent."(396)

he was not in fact correct: during this period 72 per cent of the money was paid, and payment during the hearing of the Case was slow. Around ninety per cent of the writ's total was eventually paid in to Sir William Russell, not during the period when the Case was in court but by the spring of 1640. This level of payment was the result of the unremitting labour of the King, the Lords and the Judges who sustained the pressure upon the sheriffs.(397) They knew they had to. The Earl of Leicester's man of business thought it was remarkable the King was getting any money,

"Men's judgments do much differ in the matter, some thinking that satisfaction was given, others otherwise, but in the interim the money is in collecting."

yet Nicholas's papers reminded the Lords every week that collection fell short of the previous year's response.(398) The Council became so worried by the spring of 1638 that, urged on by the King himself, they tried to push reluctant sheriffs into action, by urging those who had paid nothing to match the obedience of the majority. It was claimed that "a great part" of the ship money had been paid in most counties: in reality only half of the counties charged had paid 18 per cent of the total, with another 5½ per cent recorded as in the sheriffs' hands, (counting North and South Wales as one unit each).(399)

It is possible to assess the impact of the Case on ship money payments immediately after the judgement, by looking at the account for 30th June 1638 which was presented to the King in Council. Sir William Russell had received £109,391 5s 1d, and £87,023 2s 7d was outstanding.(400) The arrears were almost £30,000 more than at the same date a year before: a vindication of Archbishop Laud's analysis when he complained to Wentworth in May 1638,

"The King's monies come in a great deal more slowly than they did in former years, and that to a very considerable sum."(401)

Breaking down the payments county by county it is possible to see a distinct correlation between payment patterns and the sheriffs' reports over the previous six months, which had warned the Council about increasing dissatisfaction and disaffection.(402) There is a

similar correlation between some of the counties most in arrears and counties which had resisted the Forced Loan.(403)

Almost every county paid more slowly than the previous year, exactly as the Council complained to the sheriffs.(404) Although 55.6 per cent of the national total had reached Sir William Russell, this total indeed concealed a wide variety of response. Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire and Gloucestershire, counties which experienced considerable opposition to the service and whose sheriffs had been accused of covert disaffection, were very behind.(405) Arrears reflected the difficulties the sheriffs continued to find.

The account also illustrates the diligence and continuing devotion to the King's service shown by so many of the counties. The coastal counties of Sussex and Cornwall continued to pay their ship money promptly. So too did Lancashire. Sir Thomas Danby in Yorkshire found that the Case "did much retard the service in respect of the great expectation men had thereof", but he was still able to get in the money.(406) Other sheriffs found their counties were still for the most part obedient to the King's wishes, but even though recalcitrance was not widespread, the Case had strengthened disaffection. In a letter of 23rd May 1638, Sir Thomas Cholmondely told Nicholas in Cheshire,

"The general bruit of the late arguments of those Judges who have concluded against the ship money is so plausibly received by those who were before too refractory and countenanced by some of rank, that I have found more difficulty in that poor remain yet uncollected than in all the rest of the whole assessment. The service is so far already advanced that I hope this little remainder will not be much noted."(407)

Evidence from the accounts strengthens the argument that to be successful ship money needed to rest upon a foundation of common content and co-operation, and to be reinforced by faith and trust in the government itself. Information was power at a time when the government's ultimate aim was to turn the people away from faction and disobedience and back to a lost "simplicity of obedience." (408) In contrast to the *Forced Loan*, the Council had a considerable body of detailed and constantly changing information about the state of ship money accounts. (409) These acted as a check on the sheriffs and could be used to counter over-blown claims, such as the one made by Henry Hodges at the end of 1635. He boasted of considerable sums in hand was then asked to send it up promptly, and had to prevaricate his way out of embarrassment. (410) Such information put the Council in a position of strength, enabling them to keep up the pressure on men like Sir Alexander Denton or Lewis Harriss whose diligence was in doubt, and also to praise devotion in diligent sheriffs like Sir Edward Hussey. (411) On one occasion the Lords even apologised to a Devon sheriff for sending him a letter of rebuke, Sir William Russell they said had received his money the day the letter had been written. (412) The King himself took a personal interest in the accounts; he often looked over the first reports of payment for each writ, or checked the accounts of counties with persistent arrears. (413) Ship money accounts were sufficiently important to be sent from London when the King was in the North dealing with the Scots. (414) The King's identification with a service for "his most honourable occasions" acted as a spur and a justification for

diligence amongst the sheriffs, who were constantly warned that the price of default was "the King's high displeasure."(415)

From Sir William Russell's accounts it is possible to reconstruct the pattern of payments from the first writ until the service was abandoned at the end of 1640 and to use such material as an index of response. Given the detailed nature of the source this can be done both for national payments and for individual counties. It cannot be done for the City of London. As a rule the City furnished its own ships rather than hiring one from the Navy as the counties did, except for a charge during the 1634 writ and during the last writ when London paid £810 2s ship money to Sir William Russell.(416) The Lords always kept a strict eye on London, partly because of the attempts at disruption there and the possibility of a well-publicised episode of defiance, and partly because the ship money committee in London was implicated in corrupt and shady dealings.(417) The City fought hard against its obligations during the 1634 writ.(418) Assessment and collection were slower than the Council would have liked both for the 1635 and 1636 writs and resistance was experienced right down the social scale.(419) The City Chamber was forced to advance considerable sums to keep the service going, which it was virtually impossible to collect, and expected a similar commitment from parish officers.(420) The Court of Aldermen sent a committee to wait on the Lord High Admiral and explain to him that the City could not raise its ship money charge under the 1638 writ; the money was raised instead by the twelve principal Livery Companies.(421) Resistance to distraint and opposition via the courts were common and another drain on the City's public resources.(422) In

1639 defiance became public and outrageous; the Lords summoned the Lord Mayor and sheriffs to account and poured scorn on all excuses.(423) Something of London's reactions to ship money is mirrored in the experiences of the other home counties, particularly Middlesex. Sheriffs had reason to dislike "untoward Londoners".(424)

Figures 1 and 2 set out the national payment rates for all the ship money writs over the period of eighteen months from the issue of each writ. Figure 1 illustrates payment in cash terms, showing how much actual money was raised for each writ. Figure 2 sets out the same payments but as a percentage of the total amount of money required by each writ. The actual figures were taken from Sir William Russell's accounts and notes of payment sent from his office to Nicholas and are tabulated in Appendix One. The period of eighteen months was chosen for a number of reasons. It includes both the sheriff's year of office, and allows six months for the collection of arrears. In practice the amount of money the sheriff could get in during his year of office represented the sum which could be collected willingly. Once a sheriff had gone out of office he could not collect on his own authority but needed warrants from the succeeding sheriff; in addition many bailiffs attached themselves exclusively to the present sheriff and were reluctant to be involved in collecting arrears for a sheriff out of office.(425) At the end of his year the sheriff often had a hard core of arrears but lacked the practical authority to collect: as John Freake complained to the Council in a letter of 14th December 1636,

"for me to gather up the arrears now is very unpossible since I now have no command in the county nor house there and the bailiffs which were my servants fittest to

act by distress are now in the present sheriff's service."
(426)

Some sheriffs who were diligent tried to get the money in before they went out of office, regarding it as a point of honour and pride. (427) Others like John Mallett and William Bassett in Somerset or Thomas Wigmore in Herefordshire plodded on for years, trying to fulfil their obligations. (428) Collecting arrears could be a pretty thankless and expensive task, as Lewis Harriss under sheriff of Oxfordshire in 1635 and 1636 wrote to Nicholas,

"It is not unknown to you how hard a thing it is to collect the remanider of these accounts." (429)

In practice, once another writ came into collection, arrears were usually "many in number and small in quantity" collected "with much trouble, extraordinary charge and opposition." (430) As an illustration of this point, Sir Edward Hussey estimated that six hundred and fifty people were responsible for an arrear of £230 in the Wapentake of Elloe in 1636. (431)

Showing payments over the eighteen month time span also allowed meaningful comparisons between the writs: the administrative life of the 1635 writ stretched from August 1635 until the collapse of the service at the end of 1640, by definition there was less time to collect the outstanding arrears of later writs. As has been argued, different time-scales distort the usefulness of the Audit Office accounts. In addition, it usually took between four and five months for the first payments of the next writ to reach London, and another two to three months to get the service well-established. All

of these factors suggested that the effective administrative period for each writ was about a year and a half, by and large any money collected after that period of time was paid with "much grudging".(432)

"The less I receive and the longer I am in gathering it, the more trouble and charge is to me."(433)

So wrote Sir Thomas Penystone in May 1638, and as sheriff of Oxfordshire he knew what he was talking about. In general terms, the longer it took to collect ship money, the harder it became to collect it in full: this analysis applies equally well to both national and county totals.

Figures 1 and 2 show the changing payment patterns for ship money bear a close correlation to the changing political response to the service already discussed. The 1634 writ asked for £83,564 excluding the money London raised to pay for the hire of merchant ships and allowing for various alterations made in the charge.(434) Money was paid quickly and there were virtually no long-term arrears: almost ninety-five per cent of the charge had been paid in by the issue of the next writ in August 1635. Payment was willingly made after a period of confusion and attempted resistance: even allowing for difficulties in London and for grumblings about inequalities this was a very satisfactory state of affairs. The pattern for the first two national writs in 1635 and 1636 looks almost as good: each writ raised about ninety-five per cent of its charge within a year and a half of issue. This was a pleasing response, especially as ship money was new to the inland counties and encountered some determined

opposition. There were therefore, very real grounds for John Burghe's confidence expressed in a newsletter to Lord Scudamore in October 1637,

"I think that great tax of the ship money is so well digested (the honour of the business sinking into apprehension and amongst most enjoying an affection to it) I suppose will become perpetual, for indeed if men would but consider the great levies of money imposed in foreign parts for the service of the state, these impositions would appear but little burthens, but time can soften and firm minds to comply with public necessity."⁽⁴³⁵⁾

Yet the response was undoubtedly slower each year. Each year a smaller number of counties paid their full charge: under the 1635 writ twenty counties had paid in full within eighteen months, for 1636 eighteen counties, for 1637 and 1638 there were six and for 1639 none. A steady decline also in the actual rate of payment reflects the increasing complexity of rating and the cumulative administrative burdens the sheriffs had to deal with.

FIGURE 1: MONEY RAISED FOR SHIP MONEY 1634 TO 1640





FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE RATES OF PAYMENT FOR SHIP MONEY 1634 TO 1640



Behind declining payment rates lies a picture of discontent and alienation as well as of willingness and affection. Little by little content was undermined. The writs for 1637 and 1638 had a different profile from their predecessors. The 1637 writ was slower to collect and realised less of its charge than previous writs, thus three quarters of the money charged under the writs of 1634 was paid six months from issue, three quarters for 1635 eight months from issue, for 1636 nine months from issue and for 1637 thirteen months from issue.(437) In 1638 the Council decided to ask only for a third of the previous charge for national writs. Payment patterns were not that different from the previous year, the Scots having replaced Hampden as a focus for discontent, but the cash differences were very great. In 1638 writ the Council only asked for a little more than a third of the charge for the previous three years.(438) Less money was demanded from the whole country in 1638 than had been collected from the maritime areas in 1634. The yield was less too. £257,873 2s 9d was paid under the first two ship money writs by September 1636. Under the last two writs £98,286 4s 9d was paid by the end of January 1641.(439) Arrears continued to increase: the arrears for 1638 were proportionately twice as high as the arrears for 1637. The Council was aware of growing disaffection during the course of 1639, but they under-estimated its extent and the effect news of a parliament would actually have upon ship money.(440) In a newsletter of 6th August 1639, Rossingham said the Lords anticipated "two third part of the full sum, which is well worth"; they accepted there would be refusals but discounted any suggestion that "the people will never

be persuaded to pay any more of this ship money". They chose to believe

"indeed there may be many refusers of this ship money, but there be also many that will not give his Majesty any just cause of offence against them." (441)

Response to the 1639 writ was both qualitatively and quantitatively different even to the slower and more reluctant response of the previous two writs. It would be tempting to explain this change in terms of the impact of the Scots War, and to argue that the response to the last two ship money writs yielded the maximum amount of money which could be got from a country pressed by too many demands "when one great misse comes on the neck of another".(442) After all the sources abound in complaints of extreme poverty and heavy burdens.(443) Yet this argument will not stand closer examination. Under the 1638 writ every county paid something by 16th November 1639.(444) Only the four northern counties of Northumberland, Durham, Cumberland and Westmoreland, which the Council had exempted, failed to pay.(445) In addition the Council was still able to enforce obedience, and to deal effectively with the sheriffs of reluctant counties.(446) Under the 1639 writ, ten counties failed to pay anything to Sir William Russell. Counties, such as Yorkshire and Rutland which had paid readily in the past, defaulted. Other counties sent up pitifully small sums: Somerset paid £314 of £8,000, Gloucestershire £100 of £5,500 and Warwickshire £107 of £4,000. Only Devon, Lancashire, Cornwall, the counties of North Wales and Monmouthshire paid more than half their charge in spite of the

exhortations of the Council that the King had "rather more than less need" of timely payment.(447)

Tables V and VI itemise these changing patterns of payment. Percentages of ship money collected in each shrieval year was drawn up as an indication of willing payment, outstanding arrears for the opposite reason. In calculating arrears the full charge for Northumberland for 1635 and to Bristol for 1635 and 1636 has been included in all calculations. The Council did not remit their payments until September 1640 The variety of response is analysed in Table VII.

TABLE V: PERCENTAGES OF SHIP MONEY PAID EACH SHRIEVAL YEAR

County	1635	1636	1637	1638	1639
Berkshire	100	100	98.5	43.4	3.2
Buckinghamshire	89.6	50.4	55.5	55.4	0
Bedfordshire	91.4	70	63.3	35.3	0
Bristol	60	75.9	75	80	30
Cornwall	94.3	86.6	94.5	76.4	50.9
Cambridgeshire	92.9*	85.7	58.2	76.1	35.4
Cumberland†	100	100	92.2	Exempt	0
Cheshire	100	90.3	98.3	100	40
Devon	100	98.5	81.9	86	53.7
Derbyshire	100	100	65.4	56.1	14.2
Dorset	90.4	76	69.2	57.1	35
Durham	100	85	43	Exempt	0
Essex	68.7	95	95.2	54.5	4.1
Gloucestershire	85.6	90.9	69	74	1.8
Hampshire	95	97.7	99	83.1	62
Hertfordshire	93.6	80.6	69.3	58.1	0
Herefordshire	91.1	84.2	25	0	18.5
Huntingdonshire	92.9*	98.8	71.5	63.8	13.1
Kent	100	97.5	81.2	77	33.2
Lancashire	100	99.5	87.6	100	61.2
Leicestershire	100	53.3	68.8	95.2	26
Lincolnshire	98.5	99	52	44	17.4
Middlesex	87.8	77.8	73.2	74	19.3
Monmouthshire	100	100	98	99.8	53.3
Northamptonshire	66.4	72	45.9	37.7	0.53
Nottinghamshire	91.4	98.2	71.4	72	20.4
North Wales	94.6	96.7	72.4	68.5	61.6
Northumberland	47	66.6	57.1	Exempt	0
Norfolk	99.7	99.2	88	79.6	20.7
Oxfordshire	54.2	71.4	54.2	23	6.2
Rutland	100	100	100	100	0
Somerset	78.6	82.1	75.3	69.6	3.9
Surrey	88.2	77.5	82.9	65.5	19.5
Sussex	100	95.8	99.2	97.9	43.9
Suffolk	99.5	97.5	77	74.2	9.7
Staffordshire	100	73.3	79.3	31.2	0
Shropshire	96	90.3	72.5	49.5	2.5
South Wales	94.6	86.9	60.9	54.5	44.1
Warwickshire	64.1	79.1	68.2	20.6	2.6
Worcestershire	96	95	26.8	43.2	19.4
Wiltshire	96.2	59	53.1	13.6	8.3
Westmoreland†	100	100	65.7	Exempt	0
Yorkshire	100	98.8	85.2	78.5	0
National Average	90.3	87.8	72.4	61.9	20.3

* Joint writ 1635 only.

† Joint writ.

The figures are taken from the accounts of Sir William Russell:

SP/16/334/43, 28th October 1636; 370/62 28th October 1637;

400/114, 26th October 1638; 431/63, 26th October 1639;

470/50, 23rd October 1640.

TABLE VI: ARREARS OUTSTANDING AFTER TWO YEARS

County	1635	1636	1637	1638	1639
Berkshire	0	0	0.5	28.9	96.8
Buckinghamshire	6.1	22.8	23.3	20.3	100
Bedfordshire	2.4	3	8.4	64.6	100
Bristol	40	22.3	12.5	0	70
Cornwall	0	0	0	3.7	49.1
Cambridgeshire	1.4*	0	4	4.9	64.6
Cumberland+	0	0	7.7	Exempt	100
Cheshire	0	0	0.6	0	60
Devon	0	0	8.2	2.3	46.3
Derbyshire	0	0	3	20	85.7
Dorset	4.6	6.4	17.5	20	65
Durham	0	0	21.5	Exempt	100
Essex	15.6	0	1.5	1.3	95.9
Gloucestershire	5.1	4.5	6.1	16	98.2
Hampshire	4.7	0.7	0.8	2	38
Hertfordshire	0.7	2.9	11	34.8	100
Herefordshire	4.5	1.9	30.2	45	81.4
Huntingdonshire	*	0	4.2	30.7	86.9
Kent	0	2.5	10.1	11.3	66.7
Lancashire	0	0	4.3	0	38.8
Leicestershire	0	0	8.8	4.9	74
Lincolnshire	0	0	32.7	23.7	82
Middlesex	6.3	9.7	17.2	23.6	78.5
Monmouthshire	0	0	0	0	46.6
Northamptonshire	9.5	14.2	23.8	39	99.5
Nottinghamshire	0	0.9	0	16	79.6
North Wales	0	0.7	4.4	2	38.4
Northumberland	36.3	33.3	42.8	Exempt	100
Norfolk	0.02	0	1	2.9	78.7
Oxfordshire	17.1	13.8	19.5	23	93.7
Rutland	0	0	0	0	100
Somerset	13.2	2.8	3.8	11.9	96
Surrey	8.7	7.3	7.2	22.5	83.5
Sussex	0	1	0	0	56.1
Suffolk	0	0.6	1	13.2	90.3
Staffordshire	0	10	4	1.9	100
Shropshire	0.9	2.9	3.8	6.6	97.5
South Wales	4.1	2.5	7	1.8	55.9
Warwickshire	6.9	12.1	20	54.5	97.3
Worcestershire	0	7.9	32	38.4	77.1
Wiltshire	0.6	12.6	15.1	57	87.1
Westmoreland+	0	0	34.3	Exempt	100
Yorkshire	0	0	10.3	12	100
National Average	4.4	3.9	10.3	19.6	79.1
				19.1 including N	
				counties.	

* Joint writ 1635 only. + Joint writ.

The figures for 1635 are from SP16/364/32; for 1636 from SP16/400/113; for 1637 from SP16/431/62; for 1638 from SP16/476/5; for 1639 from SP16/4/3/103.

TABLE VII: PATTERNS OF SHIP MONEY PAYMENTS.

	1635	1636	1637	1638	1639
Percentage paid at the end of the shrieval year.	90.3	87.8	72.4	61.9	20.3
Percentage range of arrears	0.26 - 53	1.2 - 55	1 - 54.06	0.1 - 100	38.4 - 100
Number of counties paid in full	14	6	1	3	0
Number of counties in arrears	29	37	42	40	43
Percentage paid after two years.	95.6	96.2	89.6	81	-
Percentage range of arrears	0.02 - 40	0.7 - 33.3	0.5 - 42.9	1.8 - 100	-
Number of counties paid in full	21	18	5	6	-
Number of counties in arrears	22	25	38	37	-
Percentage paid after three years	96.3	96.4	91.4	-	-
Percentage range of arrears	0.4 - 40	0.4 - 33.3	0.5 - 57.1	-	-
Number of counties paid in full	19	18	6	-	-
Number of counties in arrears	24	25	37	-	-
Percentage paid at the last account	96.8	96.5	91.4	80.9	20.9

Sources.

1635: SP16/334/43; 364/32; 400/112; 449/18.

1636: SP16/370/62; 400/113; 427/91; 428/41; 449/18.

1637: SP16/400/114; 431/62; 448/6; 449/18.

1638: SP16/431/63; 476/53; 458/36; 38; 476/53.

1639: SP16/470; 473/103.

No arrears were paid in for the 1635, 1636 and 1637 writs after 28th March 1640.

County payments reveal different patterns of response. Some counties were consistently diligent. They paid in at a faster rate than the national pattern, had less arrears and fewer rating disputes to reach the Council Board than the average county. Lancashire is one such example: the county paid rapidly, the pattern being set by the fierce diligence of Humphrey Chetham in 1634 and 1635.(448) The full charge was met from 1634 to 1638, except for £172 10s for the 1637 writ. The county's charge was raised from £3,500 to £4,000 in 1636 with no adverse effects on payments. There are nevertheless, indications that ship money did create some tensions within the county: there were complaints the poor had been oppressed in the first assessments and that the clergy had been victimised, the borough of Wigan petitioned for relief on the grounds of poverty and decline, and there is a hint of Catholic-Protestant tensions in Liverpool.(449) All the other signs point to good working relationships amongst the gentry and a commitment to the King's service, Humphrey Chetham sought and received the help of the JPs in his neighbourhood, few gentlemen protested, even indirectly, and none were excluded from the Commission of the Peace for opposing ship money.(450) If there were any murmurings amongst the common people, which sheriffs of other counties found troublesome, these do not appear in the surviving sources.(451) The solidly Puritan area around Manchester paid without any apparent trouble, and there are no signs of any significant opposition until the last writ when the sheriff wrote "I perceive the county in general is very averse."(452)

In Cheshire the sheriffs and the Council successfully managed local response in order to minimise the impact of any opposition to

the service.(453) A similar care was exercised in Cornwall, where ship money was paid in spite of occasional mentions in the sheriffs' reports of gentry disaffection, poverty and resistance to distraint.(454) Here the gentry shared the Crown's objectives, particularly the safeguard the coasts against Moslem pirate raids. Their first concern right through to 1640 was the safety of the coasts and the defence of the shire, and there was more resistance to coat and conduct money than to ship money.(455) Other coastal counties continued to pay their ship money because they shared a common purpose with the Council: this holds true for the Cinque Ports, for Cornwall, Sussex and Hampshire, and to a certain extent for Devon. Paying ship money and fulfilling the subject's duty of obedience became a mark of distinction, as a Devon correspondent of Lord Cottington's wrote in February 1640,

"We have news of a parliament, but no man believes it. The ship money we are sure of, for every man feels it already, and although the rate be high (being £9,000) yet is there no grudging, so as I think we are the King's best subjects."(456)

Not all coastal counties were conformable, Somerset and Dorset were both troublesome and ship money became pretty contentious in Kent.(457) On the other hand a shared concern for naval defence could be a factor in the conformity of Suffolk or Norfolk, especially when the Council was keen to curtail the activities of the Dutch herring fleets.(458) Payment patterns again support this. Suffolk, dominated by Puritan gentry families like the Barnardistons was a model of obedience until the last writ.(459)

Underlying attitudes of conformity and obedience were more conducive to payment of ship money than the wealth of a particular county: Wales, poor and backwards as it was, was more willing to meet the King's needs than the affluent south-east. In other counties the key seems to be a close relationship with an important politician: Monmouthshire and Yorkshire are cases in point here. Monmouthshire was Herbert country. Yorkshire, a large and often tumultuous county, paid its ship money promptly under the eye of the Lord Deputy. Opposition only became public and damaging in 1640 when Strafford's opponents, like Sir Hugh Cholmley, broke their silence.(460) Whatever the different reasons for devotion to the King's service there were precious few rewards: the Council always punished disobedience and defiance yet they did little beyond the rhetorical to reward or encourage diligence.

A second pattern emerges which confirms a picture of a gradual alienation and loss of good will. The change for some counties came with the 1637 writ and the Council's efforts to achieve conformity by the force of law. Figures from Sir William Russell's accounts confirm Clarendon's opinion when he wrote,

"It is notoriously known that the pressure was borne with much more cheerfulness before ... men before pleasing themselves with doing somewhat for the King's service, as a testimony of their affection which they were not bound to do."(461)

Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Shropshire fit this pattern, so do Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire, Wiltshire, Surrey, Hertfordshire, Lincolnshire, and the midland counties of Nottinghamshire and

Derbyshire. A declining rate of payment coincided with increasing problems with resistance to distraint and episodes of violent opposition or resort to law. Steady decline in response was also experienced in Berkshire, Bedfordshire and Dorset during collection of the 1637 and 1638 writs. For other counties the turning point came with the news of a parliament. The most dramatic example of this is Rutland which had paid in full from 1635 but defaulted on the entire charge for the 1639 writ.

Payment patterns therefore mirror the inter-action between the local and the central governors, as well as reflecting the impact of particular disputes. Newcastle's arrears were the result of a devastating epidemic of plague in 1636 and an on-going battle with Northumberland and Durham about rating the coal mines.(462) Bristol was grossly over-rated for the first three writs, because the Council over-estimated the taxable base of the great trading centres. There were large arrears until the city's charge was settled at a reasonable proportion in 1638.(463) Warwickshire paid more slowly than any other county during the 1635 writ, delays being created by the bitter conflict over Coventry's assessment, the death of the sheriff and the need for a completely new assessment of the county.(464) Sir William Russell's accounts show that the county never recovered from this bad start and carried substantial arrears on every writ. The county gentry were aware of the implications of prerogative taxation as early as the benevolence of 1614 and the pattern of a half-hearted response, little communication with the centre and hidden disaffection bears many similarities to the county's reaction to the Forced Loan and distraint of knighthood.(465)

The abatement granted Coventry was a major change to the original instructions, but other counties experienced changes as great yet managed to reach full payment. Considerable sums were abated from Norwich and from Ipswich, yet both Norfolk and Suffolk had small arrears and eventually paid in full.(466) It is striking that Warwickshire gentry lacked effective channels of communication with the court, whereas when John Buxton faced problems in Norfolk his first reaction was to seek help from the Lord Marshall.(467) In Somerset discontent centred on the rating system.(468) Substantial arrears accumulated as a result of the county's dissatisfaction with Henry Hodges who was a singularly corrupt sheriff.(469) Under more honest and diligent men the county was pretty near the average rate of payment, even though there were still many disputes and fears that the people were "rude and addicted unto oppocision."(470)

The accounts therefore, reflect conscious political choices, part of changing relationships between the King and his subjects. Perhaps the best example to illustrate this argument is the Earl of Warwick's attempted sabotage in Essex and the Council's spectacular success in breaking this opposition. Essex's ship money payments mirror this exactly . During the 1635 writ Essex was one of the slowest and most contentious counties: opposition was centred in the hundreds most influenced by Warwick and his allies and Sir Humphrey Mildmay continued collecting right through 1639. The arrears remained in excess of £1,000. The next year the King and Council denied Warwick's calls for a parliament and put their authority behind the new sheriff.(471) The pattern for Essex was completely changed; the full sum was paid for the 1636 writ by March 1638, the

arrears for 1637 and 1638 were only 1.5 and 7.8 per cent respectively well below the national average for arrears under those two writs. For each of these writs the full sum assessed on the body of the county was collected and the arrears were owed by the corporations.(469) The sheriffs still had to cope with recalcitrance, but refusal to pay ceased to be the way in which opposition could be safely expressed.(473) Authority collapsed with the 1639 writ, investigations by the Attorney-General revealed that Martin Lumley the sheriff did

"wilfully and contemptuously forbear, neglect and refuse to put or cause the said writ to be put into execution."
(474)

Even under threat of prosecution in the Star Chamber, Lumley only paid 4 per cent of the charge to Sir William Russell.(475)

Other counties reveal a pattern of reluctance and dispute. A number of counties were consistently slower than the average, even though what constituted a typical response changed with successive writs. Thus, response in Northamptonshire, Buckinghamshire, Gloucestershire and Oxfordshire was always slow and patchy compared to the national pattern for each writ. Each of these counties needed what one sheriff called "persuasion and menacing", had a persistent hard core of default and a larger share of contentious disputes than other more conformable counties.(476) All four counties had JPs removed from the Bench for opposition and numbered many of the leading gentlemen amongst their most persistent refusers.(477) The gentry there were less willing than the gentry in other counties to

defer to the King and Council as the ultimate authority. Gentry factionalism played its part in these counties, Somerset was bitterly divided over ship money as was Northamptonshire.(478) Yet it was not the only factor. Buckinghamshire gentry were united in their hostility to the crown's religious and secular policies.(479) Other counties were polarised by faction such as Kent, Norfolk and Sussex but they paid their ship money most of the time.(480) The key here lies in different ideological perspectives not just in divisions within the ruling elites. Faction in Sussex centred around religious issues.(481) Likewise in Somerset the Poulett-Phelips rivalry fought to represent the county before the King.(482) The counties which were most recalcitrant about ship money were those which were unwilling to submit themselves to the authority of the prerogative where "generally the prime families there oppose [the ship money] much".(483) The nobility and the gentry in these counties did not seek to build bridges between court and country, rather they wanted the King to abandon new counsels and to change the direction of policy back along more traditional lines. It is no coincidence that these counties were associated with members of the circle of the Earl of Warwick and "the very Sinciput, the vertical point of the whole Faction" Lord Saye and Sele.(484)

Dissent was muted in the 1630s because of the absence of a parliament and from fear of the consequences. Sheriffs and even members of the government operated a system of censorship whereby discontent was toned down: caution governed what could be put into writing. Henry Hodges reported the constable of Tintinhull hundred for "foul and contemptuous words not fit to be related" to the

Council.(485) Caution also governed what could be said before the Board and convention dictated how it would be recorded. After all "my difficulty and my diligence", John Buxton was furious with the constables of Blotfield hundred for "bragging up and down in the county" and he was especially angry with Reynolds who

"hath bragged since his return from the honourable Board that God did strengthen him in such a marvellous manner that he answered boldly and undoubtedly for himself."

There is nothing in the Council's records to indicate what they might have said, the Clerk of the Council Register merely recorded their attendance and discharge under bond on 29th August 1638.(486) Ship money payments therefore can be used as an indication of how consent was withheld. Some of the slowest and most recalcitrant counties were strongly influenced by a tradition upholding parliamentary consent and the supremacy of the law over the King's prerogative. During the early writs these counties made up a significant proportion of persistent arrears. The seven counties of Buckinghamshire, Somerset, Oxfordshire, Gloucestershire, Warwickshire, Northamptonshire and Essex made up 73.4 per cent of the arrears on the 1635 writ unpaid at 21st July 1637, excluding the abatements granted for Northumberland and Bristol on the Council's orders.(487) Rating disputes and violent resistance combined with popular hostility to prerogative government, had a discernable effect on Northamptonshire's ship money payments.(488) Essex, Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire, Buckinghamshire and Gloucestershire, whose sheriffs were accused of disaffection in March 1638, had already established a pattern of disobedience and

reluctance visible in the accounts for the 1635 and 1636 writs.(489) With time other counties came to mirror these patterns of negligence and disaffection. This was particularly true in counties where there was an awareness of legal and constitutional questions, such as Shropshire and Lincolnshire.(490) Or where there was an established culture of an independent popular politics as in Dorset, where Sir Walter Earle "and others of the great ones" encouraged covert resistance, and as early as the 1635 writ the sheriff reported the common people paid their ship money as "drops of blood."(491)

Ideological outlook influenced the payment of ship money, for a commitment to the King's service was as much an ideological position as the one adopted by Lord Saye. The desire to serve the King, to uphold order and to maintain social deference by these means have been identified by Johann Sommerville as key features of absolutist ideology.(489) Many gentleman shared the concerns of Henry Peacham the author of "The Duty of All Subjects to their King", when he wrote

"if therefore wee must live under and obey the law, how much more the prince, that made and established it, yea who gives vigour and life to the law."(493)

The ship money accounts show that there was more at stake in paying the tax than a simple conflict of loyalties between county and country. In response to the King's needs John Whatton was true to his promise to do his uttermost in Leicestershire in 1639. Leicestershire ship money was usually paid in at the end of the sheriff's term and after the harvest was in, to speed things up Whatton urged the county to diligence, enforced distraint and advanced £450 of his own

money. Almost all the ship money was paid by 26th October 1639, not only quite a change from the previous two years but also a far higher payment than the national average.(494)

However, valuable and extensive as the accounts are they cannot reflect all the complexities of the service. To be understood they need to be put into context with all the other sources. They cannot show shortfalls which were concealed by the diligence of different sheriffs who advanced their own money and collected it later.(495) Nor do they reflect a straightforward process of collection and payment. Collection was more complicated than simply sending the money to London, as John Buxton found after the death of Sir Francis Astley in 1638 when it took weeks to sort out the exact state of Norfolk's ship money.(496) Truly creative accounting was practiced by Sir Humphrey Mildmay, who as the need arose borrowed money he had received as ship money for Essex and later paid it back from rents from his Somerset properties.(497) Sheriffs often held on to small sums until they accumulated into larger ones, warranting the expense and danger of sending up to London: William Walter, sheriff of Oxfordshire for the 1636 writ, asked Nicholas how much money did he need to collect before it needed to be sent up

"for I must accompany it to London myself, our country not being a place where any great trades are whereby I might have conveniency of returning money to London."(497)

Similarly, different ways of returning the money, such as bills of exchange or by arrangement for a safe return using commercial connections, could have an effect on the rate of payment.(499) There

was also the problem of exchanging the coin the money was collected in for gold suitable for payment into the Treasurer's Office. One sheriff of Monmouthshire confessed to Nicholas that he "used much diligence and entreaty to procure gold for silver" because he had been been paid in

"such ragged pieces as broken groats, quarter pieces of thirteen pence half-pennies, ten pence half-pennies, harpers and four pence half-pennies, that I have had much labour to number the same, the which I intend, God willing to change into good money or gold, and to send up the same very speedily into the office."(500)

What the accounts cannot show the hidden costs or disruptions of ship money to the local communities: many counties shared an experience of "divers abuses committed by officers in collecting the ship money as well against his Majesty as against the subject."(501) It was claimed in a remonstrance presented to the Lords in 1637, that in the parish of St James Clerkenwell the parish officers raised £114 5s 6d, far in excess of the £75 agreed in the assessment and paid to the sheriff of Middlesex.(502) Payment cannot be taken to mirror a picture of content or discontent, for this the accounts need to be put in the context of other sources. Full payment of Lincolnshire's £8,000 charge under the 1635 writ conceals the scandalous behaviour of Sir Walter Norton, who assessed £8,924 2s on the county, passed his accounts for £7,721 2s and pocketed £778 2s 6d plus £170 in bribes.(503) This was the most flagrant example of extortion to reach the Board, only its scale makes it out of the ordinary.

Nevertheless evidence presented to the Council stated quite categorically that,

"the reason gentlemen do not complain to the Lords of his Majesty's most honourable Privy Council is that they are unwilling to stand in competition with the mean felons as high constables now are."(504)

There is, therefore, a definite link between administrative incoherence, brought out by the ambiguities in the writs and Instructions, and political opposition. There was goodwill to draw upon as evidenced in the response to the first three writs and the remarkable degree of tolerance shown towards the problems of the service; but declining payment rates and the increasing problem of arrears suggest that the government squandered this. In the beginning the Lords were over-confident, as the Venetian Ambassador noted in early 1636

"from the example of the past they thought everything would be easy."(505)

Nothing ever shook them from their belief in the "natural obedience" of the people.(506) Any opposition was factiously created by "some malevolent spirits that labour to poison and censure the most honourable occasions".(507) As a direct result of the King's hostility to parliaments he chose to reject Warwick's advice in early 1637 and to endorse policies resolving ship money grievances by administrative and legal means.(508) The Lords then under-estimated how much opposition there would be to enforcement by the power of the law, nor did they realise that many subjects remained attached to the traditions a parliament symbolised in spite of events in the 1620s. By choosing to equate unhappiness about ship money with faction, disorder and the dangers of popularity, government became increasingly

insensitive and punitive towards the localites. Strafford told Bristol in May 1640

"the King was not to suffer himself to be mastered by the frowardness, or undutifulness of the people, or rather he conceived by the disaffection of particular men."(509)

King and Council failed to sustain a relationship of mutual respect with the provinces, because they did not listen, especially to what they did not want to hear. The effects can be clearly seen in the accounts.

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3. ST, III, p 1217.
4. T W 863.
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6. The classic exposition of localism is set out by A. M. Everitt, The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion, (Leicester, 1966); for discussion of the current state of debate see A.J. Fletcher, *National and Local Awareness in the County Communities*, in Tomlinson, p 151-174 and a review article by Hirst, HJ, 32 (1989), p 437-438.
7. Williams, The Tudor Regime, p 139-468.
8. A. Hassell Smith, County and Court: Government and Politics in Elizabethan Norfolk 1558-1603, (Oxford, 1974), p 333-342.
9. Holmes, Seventeenth Century Lincolnshire, p 47-90; and the same author's *The County Community in Stuart Historiography*, JBS, 19 (1980), p 54-73.
10. Reeve, BIHR, lix (1986), p 215-224.
For examples of the government dividing by affection see SP16/401/10 and 11.
11. Sir Robert Phelps' letters from Nathaniel Tompkins are in the Phelps Manuscripts in Somerset Record Office.
Sir John Isham's letters are in Isham Deposit and Isham Correspondence in Northamptonshire Record Office.
Sir Thomas Puckering's newsletters are published in the two volumes of C and T.
12. Coke: H M C Cowper MS, II, p 109; SP16/336/50; Derbyshire Record Office Gell MS, 56/27.
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Nicholas: SP16/320/48; PC2/47, p 37-8.
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13. Coventry Ship Money Book, f 14v; 16v.
D. H. Sachs, *Bristol's Little Businesses: the Corporate Town and the English State 1625-1641*, P and P, 111 (1986), p 67-105.
J. Fielding, *Opposition to the Personal Rule of Charles I: the diary of*

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14. The assumptions and conventions underlying Stuart government are set out in many works, but for a nice summary see, D. Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, (Oxford, 1985), p 9-44.

15. Lake, in Cust and Hughes, eds, Conflict in Early Stuart England, p 72-106.

Sommerville, especially p 9-111.

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K. Sharpe, Crown, Parliament and Locality: Government and Communication in Early Stuart England, EHR, ci (1986), p 321-350 under-estimates the force of ideology and over-states the government's willingness to listen to the localities.

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19. D. Hirst, Representatives of the People? Voters and Voting in England Under the Early Stuarts, (Cambridge, 1975), p 29-43; 65-89; 157-193.

R.P. Cust, Politics and the Electorate in the 1620s in Cust and Hughes, eds, Conflict in Early Stuart England, p 134-167.

20. Hassell Smith. County and Court, p 277-304.

21. A.G.R. Smith, Crown, Parliament and Finance: the Great Contract of 1610, in The English Commonwealth 1547 to 1640: Essays Presented to Joel Hurstfield, ed by P. Clark, A.G.R. Smith and N. Tyacke, (Leicester, 1979), p 121; 122.

22. Quoted by Sommerville, p 174.

23. Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, identifies anxiety as a common feature of seventeenth century outlook, p 37-8; 41; 106-145. For an interesting analysis of the way this influenced perceptions of

politics in popular drama see Butler, Theatre and Crisis 1632 to 1640, p 288.

24. Strafforde's Letters, I, p 420.

25. ST, III, p 1196.

26. For Phelips see below p 309-312.

Jessop, Sir Roger Twysden, p 38.

Clar ST P, II, p 47-8.

27. Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 125.

The sheriff of Cornwall in 1638 made a point of emphasising that it was the King's will no assessor should oppress the poor, SP16/418/15. For an example of the way in which people found it difficult to associate the more unpleasant aspects of ship money such as distraint and imprisonment with the King see Sir Francis Thornehaugh's letter of 18th May 1638 SP16/340/116.

28. Coventry Ship Money Book, f 52v.

29. The Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby of Scriven, Bart., ed by D. Parsons. (London, 1836), p 68.

30. H M C Cowper MS, II, p 73-4.

31. See below p 63-90; .

32. SP16/277/59.

33. STT Ship Money.

34. STT Ship Money.

35. SP16/300/75.

36. SP16/297/19; the Council's reply, telling the sheriff to assess everyone liable, is PC2/45, p 106.

37. H M C Sixth Report, p 278.

Notice the similarity to Sir Peter Temple's concern "whether shall the sheriff distraint for he is threatened to be sued if he do." STT Ship Money.

38. For example see SP16/313/105; PC2/46, 44; 46; SP16/316/92.

39. HMC Various Collections, IV, p 23.

40. WWM/Str P/6(167); C S P Ven 1632-6, p 466; 459. It is very hard to know how far these rumours actually spread because of incomplete collections of newsletters at this time, for example there are no surviving newsletters in Sir Thomas Puckering's collection for this period. During Hampden's Case, several of the critics of ship money made this point about emergency taxation being in anticipation

of a parliament, S T, III, p 965; 1134; 1199-1200.
Cust, p 245-6; 307-315.
For 1640 see below p 524-570.

41. J.A. Sharpe, in Reay (ed) Popular Culture in Seventeenth Century England, p 265-6.

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See below p 329-334; 473-498.

43. E.N. Lindquist, *The King, the People and the House of Commons: the problem of early Jacobean purveyance*, HJ, 31 (1988), p 552-557.

44. Smith, *The Great Contract*, in The English Commonwealth, p 130-135.

45. See above p 41-45.

46. See above p 169-173.

47. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 233

48. See the texts of the writs and Instructions, for example in STT Ship Money or SP16/332/39-58; 367/110; 111; 112; PC2/48, p 236-268.

49. Autobiography of Sir Symonds D'Ewes, II, p 132.

50. Norfolk R O, Norwich Assembly Proceedings Book f 310r.
It is interesting that there were "some murmurings" in Norwich against the ship money writ in 1634, PC2/44, p 390-1.

51. For examples see John Rylands Library, English MS 1091, or for the more informal methods of Sir Peter Temple, who seems to have held open house for a couple of weeks and let it be known he was available for consultation, STT Ship Money.

52. For some examples of assessment meetings see SP16/301/75; 335/64; 352/10; 371/10.

53. For general meetings see SP16/346/65; 96; 352/10; 371/10; 410/152; 412/40.
Sir Robert Banister, SP16/355/8.
For another example see the sheriff of Hertfordshire's consultation with the Lord Lieutenant, SP16/381/71.

54. SP16/315/6.

55. This certainly happened for example in Cheshire, SP16/305/19; 348/35; John Rylands Library English MS, 1091, f 10r-v; 25r; 27v; 28r-v; or in Derbyshire SP16/348/51; 389/95.
See below p 262-272.

56. STT Ship Money.
57. See above p 125-127.
58. Coventry Ship Money Book, f 8v.
59. This was a standard clause in the Instructions, for example SP16/369/13.
For an example of the sheriffs doing so see SP16/346/21.
60. SP16/418/15.
61. Coventry Ship Money Book, f 14r-14v.
62. SP16/354/48.
63. Dd/Ph/223/68.
64. A. Hassell Smith, *Militia Rates and Militia Statutes*, in The English Commonwealth, p 107.
65. *Quarter Sessions Records for the County of Somerset 1625 to 1639*, ed E.H. Pates Harbin, Somerset Record Society, xxiv (1908), p 181; 183; 186; 188; 189; 237; 242; 243; 247; 252; 256; 258.
Quarter Sessions Order Book Easter 1625 to Trinity 1637, ed S. Ratcliffe and H.C. Johnson, Warwick County Records, 1 (1935), p 226; 227; 230; 233; 235; 246; 248; 251; 252; 253; 257; 258; 260-1; 261.
Western Circuit Assize Orders 1629 to 1648, ed J.S. Cockburn, Camden Society, 4th Series 16 (1976), p 141-2; 169.
66. Hassell Smith, in The English Commonwealth, p 107.
67. SP16/304'6; E.W. Quintrell (ed), *Proceedings of the Lancashire Justices at the Sheriff's Table During Assizes Week 1579 to 1694*, Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, cxxi (1980) p 17-26.
State Papers Relating to Musters, Beacons etc in Norfolk, p 161; 205-9.
68. STT Ship Money.
69. Hassell Smith, in The English Commonwealth, p 107.
STT Ship Money.
See above p 130; 190.
70. PC2/47, p 298; 354; SP16/357/8; 70; PC2/47, p 433-4; 454-5.
71. SP16/381/57.
72. See Table V, VI and VII for payment patterns.
The first Buckinghamshire payment for the 1638 writ was made by the end of March 1639, by which time only eleven counties had paid, £900 of £1650 was paid by the end of June, and £1314 15s 3d by 23rd November 1639 - the last ship money ever paid to Sir William Russell from Buckinghamshire, SP16/415/76; 424/92; 433/4.

73. SP16/301/2.
74. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 231.
75. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 231.
76. N R O Montagu MS, 27/17-19; SP16/300/23; 39; 301/98.
77. PC2/45, p 181-2; SP16/301/98; 302/5; 535/110.
78. N R O Montagu MS 27/17-19; SP16/300/23; 39; 301/98; 345/98; 350/37; 351/63.
79. SP16/398/51; Bedfordshire Record Office. St John Manuscripts. J 1339 tabulates the rates for the first three ship money sheriffs to show how different were their valuations of the hundreds.
80. SP16/445/54i.
81. The escheator in 1640 blamed the previous sheriffs for the sorry state of Northamptonshire ship money, "the remissness of former sheriffs hath caused a wilful stubbornness in most men", SP16/465/13. W.J. Shiels, *The Puritans in the Diocese of Peterborough 1558 to 1610*. Northamptonshire Record Society, xxx (1979), p 106-7; 145; Cust. p 110-11; 166; 168; 218; 224-5; 233-4; 247; 298; 310. HMC Buccleuch MS, III, p 247; 253-65. SP16/376/111 sets out to demonstrate that the county needed to be re-rated to take into account the changes and shifts in the distribution of wealth created by enclosure.
82. SP16/331/261; 332/68; PC2/46, p 458; PC2/47, p 39; HMC Fourth Report, p 27. For an example of the kind of dealings Sir Walter Norton went in for, see the complaint of Richard Russell of Cowbit, PC2/47, p 470.
83. SP16/382/47.
84. SP16/371/54; 374/16; 378/11; 19; PC2/48, p 547.
85. PC2/45, p 112-3; SP16/335/32; PC2/47, p 14; SP16/380/58; 59.
86. SP16/417/43.
87. SP16/327/11.
88. For example. STT Ship Money; SP16/301/93; 303/84; 305/19; PC2/45, p 301-2; SP16/311/62; 347/15.
89. EL 6976.
90. SP16/314/94; 337/72; 345/58; 347/31
91. *Orders of the Shropshire Quarter Sessions*, p 1-2; PC2/50, p 251; PC2/51, p 314.

92. See above p 202-213.
93. Dd Ph/223/77; Barnes, Somerset, p 213-20.
94. There are numerous examples of this practice, see, for example: SP16/302/56; PC2/45, p 212; 238-9; SP16/304/80; PC2/45, p 432-3; PC2/46, p 54-5; 346/65; 347/31; PC2/47, p 166; 357; PC2/48, p 101.
For example, the sheriffs of Hertfordshire and Hampshire, and the bailiff of Westminster were told to consult their predecessor's rates. PC2/47, p 222; 223; 421.
95. SP16/346/95.
96. SP16/382/390.
97. Essex: SP16/379/79.
Cheshire: SP16/348/35.
98. SP16/378/78.
99. Coventry Ship Money Book, f 72v- 73r.
100. For dissatisfaction with Hodges see for example, SP16/535/69; Dd Ph/223/91; SP16/312/77; 330/15; SP16/389/26.
101. SP16/333/39-59; C S P D 1637, p 38; SP16/374/11; PC2/49, p 474-480; SP16/413/16; 414/89.
102. For example Worcestershire was assessed for the writ of August 1635 by 16th October 1635. SP16/299/74; Devonshire was assessed earlier than this by 12th September, SP16/297/35; dispute with Ipswich delayed the assessment in Suffolk until December 1635. the next year the writ was issued in October but Suffolk assessed by 16th November 1636, SP16/303/2; 335/64.
Flint, Lancashire, Surrey, Lincolnshire, Devon. Gloucestershire, Nottinghamshire, Berkshire, Yorkshire, and Norfolk had all settled their county assessments by February 1637, SP16/333/44;336/38; 53; 337/51; 338/8; 35; 36; 347/51; 75; 348/81; 82; B L Add MS, 27447 f 281.
Where there was dispute the whole process could take much longer, for example Dorset or Staffordshire during the 1636 writ, SP16/346/21; 349/88 and 88i and ii.
103. On the use of latitude see above p 125-126.
John Rylands Library, English MS 1091, f9-22v.
104. B L Add MS 33,575 f 19; 34; 35; Hertfordshire County Record Office, Hertfordshire County Records 82917; SP16/381/71; 387/46.
105. For example, SP16/346/83; 106; 109; 115.
106. For example, SP16/347/56.

107. 1635: Petition of Norwich 21st September 1635, SP16/298/15; Corporation and the Dean and Consistory Court of Lichfield, SP16/300/67 and 68, October 1635.

1636: Warwick petitioned at the end of December 1636, PC2/47, p 51.

Cranbrook hundred in Kent petitioned at the end of January 1637. PC2/47, p 101.

1637: Colchester petitioned against their charge in November 1637. PC2/48, p 363.

The hundred of Wells Forum petitioned against Sir William Portman's rates in Februsry 1638, PC2/48, p 609.

1638: Shrewsbury petitioned at the end of January 1639, PC2/50, p 66.

1639: there were far fewer petitions against rates for this writ but for an example see S R O. Acland Hood Manuscripts. Dd/AH/21/4; SP16/448/57 from the middle of March 1640.

108. The most disastrous example of this was Warwickshire during the 1635 writ, see below p 363-364.

Re-assessing slowed down the Norfolk collection in 1535. SP16/312/79.

109. SP16/357/105; 366/82; 536/91.

110. Coventry Ship Money Book. f 34.

111. SP16/298/73; 300/79; Coventry Ship Money Book, f 50r-53v; SP16/315/68; PC2/46, p 178-9; SP16/321/76; 322/8; 13; 326/6; 327/89; 330/35; 333/29; for the charges on the Warwickshire corporations see SP16/296/73.

112. Coventry Ship Money Book, f 12-15;20v ;22; 26r-v; 39v-43; 48r-v. The quotation is taken from Coventry Ship Money Book. f 51.

113. SP16/313/105.

114. Table V; SP16/401/8.

115. PC2/48, p 393.

116. The quotation is from SP16/412/13; see above p 137-8; 211-212.

117. Barnes. Somerset, p 117.

118. SP16/345/98; PC2/47, p 182; SP16/349/103; 350/37; 38 i & ii; 351/63; PC2/47, p 355-7; 357-8; SP16/356/7; 364/76; 77; 91. The quotation is from SP16/364/76.

119. SP16/365/16; 366/36; 370/83.

120. For an example of this see the handling of Canterbury PC2/45, p 396.

121. PC2/46, p 38-9; B L Add MS, 27,447 f 81; PC2/47, p 80; SP16/346/82; 347/3.

122. SP16/364/76; the original complaint from Cleyley Hundred is SP16/312/37.
123. SP16/347/23.
124. SP16/350/39.
125. SP16/351/62.
126. SP16/351/62.
127. PC2/47, p 279.
128. For examples of sheriffs being accused of local bias see SP16/351/56; 374/1; John Rylands Library English MS 1091, f 24r-25r; SP16/389/26; 427/79.
129. For example see, Sir Edward Baynton Clar St P, II. p 1; Keeler, p 101; Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 134. Life of Humphrey Chetham, p 74; 96. John Buxton, CUL Buxton MS. Box 96; SP16/397/46; 400/14; SP16/467/45; B L Add MS, 42153, f 84.
130. The quotation is from PC2/48, p 344.
131. The best surviving papers, showing how time-consuming this work was, are Sir Peter Temple's, STT Ship Money.
132. Bl Harl MS 3796 f 65.
133. See above p 202-213. The quotation is from SP16/467/45.
134. SP16/445/541.
135. J.R. Kent, The English Village Constable 1580 to 1640: the nature and the dilemmas of the office, JRS, 20 (1981), p 26-49; K. Wrightson, Two Concepts of Order: Justices, Constables and Jurymen in Seventeenth Century England, in An Ungovernable People: the English and their Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed J. Brewer and J. Styles, (London, 1983), p 21-46.
136. Wrightson, in An Ungovernable People, p 21.
137. SP16/357/160, Mr Caldwell remained refractory PC2/48, p 610; SP16/425/8.
138. SP16/303/12.
139. SP16/317/46; for the petition see SP16/313/11.
140. V.L. Slater, The Lord Lieutenancy on the Eve of the Civil Wars: the impressment of George Plowright, HJ, 29 (1986), p 279-296.

Fielding, HJ, 31 (1989), p 785-6.

STT 1582; 1583; SP16/417/47; 418/82; 86; 420/67; 421/109; 422/35.

141. SP16/350/3. The quotation of "armed" is from PC2/52, p 593.

142. SP16/390/62.

143. SP16/467/55.

144. SP16/328/49.

145. See above p 201-202.

For Thomas Wigmore see SP16/412/28.

For another example of approval for a firm line with lesser officers see, PC2/49, p 395.

146. SP16/456/31.

The phrase "the King's great necessity" is taken from B L Add MS. 11045, f 44.

Autobiography of Sir Symonds D'Ewes, II, p 129.

147. SP16/317/93.

148. SP16/302/24.

149. For examples see, SP16/433/22; 445/49; 76; 446/72; 448/21; 449/43 & 43i; 455/85; 457/22; 457/55 & 551.

150. See below p 424-498; 524-570.

151. Cust p 117-135; see above p 147-148.

152. C U L Buxton MS Box 96.

153. *Quarter Sessions Records for the County of Somerset 1625 to 1639*, p 255; 259; 267; 291; 306; 307.

Hughes, Warwickshire, p 109-110.

Nottinghamshire R O, *Quarter Sessions Order Book*, 22nd April 1637.

A. Crossley, *Early Modern Oxford*, in Victoria County History of Oxfordshire, ed by A. Crossley, p 145.

Weymouth and Melcombe Regis Minute Book, p 42.

154. For example, SP16/432/78; 451/18; 455/35.

155. SP16/399/13.

155. SP16/400/110.

156. For example see, SP16/417/5; 62; 456/21; notice the change since the 1636 writ when sheriffs were able to clamp down on recalcitrant constables far more quickly and harshly, see for example Sir Edward Hussey in Lincolnshire SP16/356/44 and 357/96 and 96i-vii; or William Walter in Oxfordshire SP16/349/92; 367/53 and 53i; 368/36; 389/29; *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 45.

157. SP16/406/77.
158. SP16/397/46 & 46i; PC2/49, p 397; 407; C U L Buxton MS Box 96; SP16/400/55. The quotation is from a letter from Philip Holman, the sheriff of Northamptonshire for 1638, about his dealings with high and petty constables. SP16/417/5.
158. SP16/346/82 and 83; 346/80.
159. SP16/418/5.
160. For examples of problems caused by collectors see. PC2/45, p 27 a carrier of Chester absconded with money; John Glasscock of Stamford Rivers refused to act as a collector, SP16/327/82; PC2/50, p 506; SP16/429/6: 9, concern collecting money from the executors of constables who had died without rendering accounts or some Shropshire constables who went off with the money they had collected, PC2/49, p 571.
161. Norfolk: State Papers Relating to Musters etc in Norfolk, p 224-5; SP16/347/56.
Northamptonshire: SP16/346/86.
162. SP16/418/5.
163. SP16/390/116.
164. Holmes. Seventeenth Century Lincolnshire, p 133.
165. Sir Peter Temple: STT Ship Money; PC2/46, p 287; Temple was summoned to account by the King, SP16/327/64.
Sir Paul Harriss: SP16/336/30; 337/72; PC2/49, p 294.
166. John Lucas: C and T, II, p 272; PC2/47, p 134.
William Bassett: SP16/362/83 and 83i; 363/11 and 11i and ii: PC2/48, p 207; SP16/367/28; 29; PC2/48, p 211; SP16/368/31; 378/36; 72; 379/28; 29; 385/95; 389/71; PC2/50, p 565-6; 642-3; SP16/429/42; PC2/50, p 658.
Sir Robert Banister, SP16/350/2.
167. The phrase "compulsive means" is quoted from SP16/352/67, although in a more confidential letter to Nicholas at the same date he confessed he hated doing this, SP16/352/68.
168. SP16/351/20; for Devon payment see SP16/354/7 15th April 1637 £8,092 paid for the county.
169. John Rylands Library English MS 1091, f 32v-35r.
170. John Rylands Library English MS 1091, f 27v; 33; SP16/390/57; the Council's letter is PC2/49, p 323.
171. SP16/428/68.

172. John Rylands Library English MS 1091, f 12.
173. *The Autobiography of Sir John Bramston*, p 107.
174. For an example of this kind of contrast compare the sheriff of Oxfordshire in 1637, SP16/382/39; 78; 385/63; 386/73; 389/131; 393/19; and the sheriff of Cheshire, John Rylands Library, English MS 1091 f 3-37; SP16/400/23.
175. Coventry City R O, A 16, City of Coventry Book of Payments 1561-1653, f 307; 311; 318; A7b, Chamberlain's Accounts, f 91.
176. SP16/336/16.
177. SP16/294/68.
178. See above p 114-116; 124; 142-143; 165-174; 179-179; 186-187; below p 456-463; 481-482; 525; 531; 546; 566-557.
179. See below p 425-493.
180. The King did not repeat the command to the clergy to preach on the duty of obedience to promote payment of the Forced Loan. Cust p 49-50; 62-7; N.R.N. Tyacke, Anti-Calvinism: the Rise of English Arminianism, (Oxford, 1987) p 157-160 on the controversy these sermons caused. During the ship money years the Crown preferred not to engage in public controversy with its opponents, a similar stance to Laud's views on doctrinal controversies, J. Sears McGee, *William Laud and the Outward Face of Religion*, in R. L. DeMolen, (ed) Leaders of the Reformation, (London, 1984), p 329.
For an indirect inference that obedience sermons were acceptable and commonplace see SP16/417/68, the petition of Dr. George Walker to the Council, claiming he had been falsely accused of preaching against ship money when he had preached on the theme of "Render unto Caesar", unfortunately the Lords did not believe him.
Sermons in favour of ship money were preached in Herefordshire. J. Eales, Puritans and Roundheads: the Harleys of Brampton Bryan and the Outbreak of the English Civil War, (Cambridge, 1990), p 129. A Devon vicar preached against Thomas Wise who had been sheriff of Devon as "a factious man and one who did not levy ship money". The Buller Papers, ed R.N. Worth, (Privately Printed, 1895), p 33-34.
181. Norfolk and Norwich: SP16/298/15; PC2/45. p 11-112; SP16/301/75.
Hereford and Herefordshire: SP16/303/19; PC2/47. p 357; SP16/361/109.
182. See above p 194-195; below p 318-334.
183. See below p 406-498.
184. Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion is the most detailed study of the implications of ideas set out in A.M. Everitt, *Social Mobility in Early Modern England*, P and P, 33 (1966), p 57-59 and J. Thirsk, *The Farming Regions of England*, in J. Thirsk (ed) The

Agrarian History of of England and Wales, IV, (Cambridge, 1967) p 1-112.

Cust, p 253-306 finds the ecological model a valuable tool of analysis in explaining response to the Forced Loan, but like response to ship money the pattern of resistance does not always conform to the general model.

A.L. Hughes, Local History and the Origins of the Civil War, in Cust and Hughes (ed) Conflict in Early Stuart England, p 224-253.

J. Morrill and D. Underdown debate The Ecology of Allegiance JBS, 26 (1987), p 451-479

185. See below p 473-498.

186. SP16/357/125; Cust, p 294.

187. See below p 473-498.

Cust, p 293-5; A.M. Everitt, The Local Community and the Great Rebellion, (London, 1969), p 18-22.

188. The quotation is taken from Sharpe. Introduction, in Sharpe, p 22-23.

P. Collinson, The Religion of Protestants, (Oxford, 1982), p 192.

C. Haigh, The Church of England, the Catholics and the People, in C. Haigh (ed) The Reign of Elizabeth, (London, 1984), p 195-219.

J.S. Morrill, The Church in England 1642-1649, in Morrill (ed), Reactions to the English Civil War, p 89-114.

189. Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 44, especially the quotations from the work of anthropologists.

The Church of England was widely regarded as a guardian of proper social order. J.S. Morrill, The Religious Context of the English Civil War, TRHS, 5th Series, 35 (1985), p 135-157.

190. Underdown, Revel Riot and Rebellion, especially p 44-105;

191. McGee, in DeMolen, (ed) Leaders of the Reformation, p 318-44.

Carlton, Charles I, p 63-4; 141; 161-2; 169.

A. Foster, Church Policies in the 1630s, in Cust and Hughes Conflict in Early Stuart England, p 193-223.

192. Collinson, The Religion of Protestants, p 146-7; 178. This is discussed in more detail p 418; 425-430; 478-479; 482; 484-489; 537-541; 555-557; 570.

193. Collinson, The Religion of Protestants, p 141-188; R.P. Cust and P.G. Lake, Sir Richard Grosvenor and the Rhetoric of Magistracy, BIHR, liv (1981), p 40-53.

On puritans and disobedience see Sommerville, p 46.

194. Sommerville, p 34-46; 69-80.

195. Lake, in Cust and Hughes (eds), Conflict in Early Stuart England, p 72-107; the phrase "religious component" is p 73, the longer passage quoted is from p 89.

196. See below p 418; 425-430; 478-479; 482; 484-489.
197. A. Everitt, *Suffolk and the Great Rebellion 1640-1669*, Suffolk Records Society, III, (1960) p 11-21; P. Collinson, *Magistracy and Ministry: A Suffolk Miniature*, in Godly People Essays on English Protestantism and Puritanism, (London, 1983), p 445-461.
198. D. MacCulloch, Suffolk Under the Tudors, (Oxford, 1986), p 315-347.
199. Hassell Smith, Country and Court, p 333-342.
See below p 406-498.
200. Collinson, The Religion of Protestants, p 140-188; 250-1.
201. The quotation is from Underdown. Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 121; Cust P and P, 112 (1986), p 60-90; see below p 456-457.
202. See above p 13-17.
203. WWM/Str P/15 (206).
204. See above p 37; 206; 208; 255; below p 297-298; 305; 448.
205. Fincham BIHR, lvii (1984) p 235.
206. SP16/327/140.
207. C S P Ven 1632-1636, p 335.
208. C115/M36/8443.
C S P Ven 1632-1636, p 335;
209. B L Harl 3796, f 65; Prynne An Humble Remonstrance, p 14-16; 17; 22-3.
210. Fincham BIHR, lvii (1984), p 235; STT 705; for similar rumours see B L Harl 3796 f 65-6; SP16/351/70;381/37; for an example of this kind of malpractice see the sheriff of Middlesex's letter to the Council of 9th June 1636, SP16/325/90, and for the effects on the service see for example T W 863, where William Boteler distanced himself from the potential dishonesty of the constables.
211. C U L Buxton MS Box 96.
212. Cust. P and P, 112 (1986), p 65; B L Add MS 22.959 f 55r-56v.
213. B L Eg MS 784 f 111, it is also interesting that Whiteway knew of refusals in London, Bristol and Exeter as they were happening f 110, C115/M36 8443 for the Bristol refusal, for London see above p 77-82.
214. SP16/298/47.

215. Sir Edward Hussey: SP16/382/47.
Sir Robert Phelips: SP16/290/75; 291/57; Dd/Ph/223/56.
216. Jessop Sir Roger Twysden, p 30; 34.
217. C115/M36/8439; 8442; 8443; 8444; 8445; 8447; 8448; 8449; 8450; 8451; 8453.
Those who subscribed to Rostingham's newsletters included the Earl of Northumberland, Lords Saye, Brooke, Conway and Scudamore. Bodleian Library Oxford, Tanner MS 65, f 79v: I am grateful to Clare Egerton for this reference.
218. C and T II p 263-284.
219. Examples of Rostingham's newsletters are SP16/362/31; 76; 417/110; B L Add MS 11045, f 43-4; 63; 72.
220. Lake, HJ, 25 (1982) p 805-825.
Underdown noticed the use of "courtier" as an insult among the common people in the West Country, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 127-8.
221. WWM/Str P/17(137); N R O Montagu MS. 4/101.
222. Sharpe, *Parliamentary History 1603 to 1629: In or Out of Perspective?*, in Sharpe, p 16-18; Reeve, p 172-225; 292-296, emphasises that this response was very much a response to Charles as king. Fear of future consequences was one of Holborne's arguments in favour of Hampden "were his majesty immortal as he deserves, and sure that his successors may be heirs to his virtues as well as to his crowns, we should wish the royal power might be free from political advise, and unlimited." S.T. III, p 970-971.
For awareness of the Thirty Years War see, F.J. Levy, *How Information Spread Among the Gentry*, JBS, 21 (1982), p 11-34.
223. See above p 19-20.
224. Prynne, An Humble Remonstrance, p 16.
225. For a similar analysis see Sir William Wilford's conversation with the King, SP16/422/65; William Bassett for example blamed Somerset's ship money troubles on "factious spirits", SP16/350/34.
226. S.T. III p 837-8.
227. S.T. III p 1076.
228. Quoted by C.V. Wedgwood, Thomas Wentworth First Earl of Strafford: a Revaluation, (London 1961), p 74.
229. J.P. Sommerville, *Ideology, Property and the Constitution*, in Cust and Hughes eds, Conflict in Early Stuart England, p 50-57.
See above p 31-214, and below p 453-454; 456-459.

230. *The Autobiography of Sir John Bramston*, p 107; 81; 80.
The relevant passage is quoted at the start of this section.
231. See above p 199-200; below p 405-423; 444-447.
232. Articles of Accusation Exhibited by the Commons House Now Assembled Against Sir John Bramston, Sir Robert Berkeley, Sir Francis Crawley, Sir Humphrey Davenport, Sir Richard Weston, Sir Thomas Trevor and Sir George Vernon., London 1641, p 32-33.
233. For examples see Sir Roger Twysden's *Commonplace Book*. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 234-6, and for discussion among the common people see SP16/395/40; 438/92.
234. Fincham BIHR, lvii (1984), p 234.
235. Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 106-145.
236. For an interesting example of this see the sheriff of Devon's letter where he asked Nicholas to verify a rumour that the King was against distraint, SP16/351/20.
Collinson, The Birth Pangs of Protestant England p 96: 106-112 points to the power of ballads as vehicles of social comment and social change.
237. Holmes in Order and Disorder in Early Modern England ed Fletcher and Stevenson, p 166-195.
Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 119-131.
For an amazingly frank account of the reactions of the Bedfordshire subsidy men to the Forced Loan see, *The Papers of Richard Taylor of Clapham*, ed by G.D. Gilmore, Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, 25 (1947).
238. Quoted by Fielding, HJ 31 (1988) p 783.
There is a striking similarity of language here to for example, Edmund Ludlow's *A Voyce from the Watch Tower*, ed A. B. Worden, Camden Society, 4th Series 21 (1978).
239. For example see SP16/290/75; 372/104.
240. SP16/382/78.
241. SP16/438/92.
242. SP16/350/54 and 541.
243. Strafforde's Letters, I, p 419.
244. See below p 430-432; 439-442; 447-448.
245. Cust, P and P, 112 (1986), p 62-3.
For examples of newsletters discussing foreign affairs see C115/M37/8471; N4/8615; N6/8691; 8697; C and T, II, p 238-240; 241; 249; 252-3; 271-2; 275-6.

246. Hirst, Authority and Conflict, p 129-130; 144.
247. C S P Ven 1632 to 1636, p 434.
248. John Rylands Library English MS 1091, f 11v.
250. Strafforde's Letters, II p 61 ; it is possible to see this emphasis as part of an increasing stress on punishment and terror in the relationship between governors and governed. see D. Hay, *Property, Authority and the Criminal law*, in Albion's Fatal Tree ed by D. Hay, P. Linebaugh, J.G. Rule, E.P. Thompson and C. Winslow, (London, 1975) p 40-9.
251. Cust. p 94-99; see above p 42-45; 67-69.
252. PC2/44, p 314.
253. SP16/278/101;282/51; PC2/44 p 333; 390-1; 476;477-8; 495-8; SP16/285/78; PC2/44 p 513; 563; 589.
For other factors see below p 424-498.
254. SP16/304/85.
255. For examples of these evasive tactics during the 1635 writ see, SP16/302/57; 304/8; 75.
256. Cornwall PC2/45, p 336-7.
Gloucestershire: SP16/311/42; PC2/45, p 387-8; SP16/318/69.
Oxfordshire: SP16/313/93; PC2/46, p 296.
Durham: PC2/46, p 110.
Buckinghamshire: SP16/331/44.
Northamptonshire: SP16/338/2.
Essex: SP16/335/67.
Warwickshire: SP16/336/4.
Nottinghamshire: SP16/312/43.
The significance of these tactics is discussed below p 432-439.
257. Dd/Ph/223/78.
258. Dd/Ph/223/71; 76, the constable for that year was William Hooper, one of Sir Robert Phelps' servants.
259. Sir Robert Phelps and Sir John Stawell had fallen out in the 1620s, Dd/Ph/223/136; 137.
Dd/Ph/223/71 drawn up in answer to Sir John Stawell's petition accused Sir John of trying to "distemper" a "business thus far advanced in quiet" "for the venting of particular spleen".
Phelips apparently chose Laud as his patron in this quarrel, Dd/Ph/223/76
260. For the petitions see, SP16/535/69; 290/75; 335/4; Dd/Ph/223/53; 54; 55; 78; SP16/304/60; 335/14; 356/8; 327/106 and 1061-vii; the Council lost patience and sought an end to "frivolous

petitions", SP16/327/106.

For Sir Robert's involvement with the JPs, see SP16/357/139; 140.

261. The quotation is used by Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 122; Sir Robert espoused various popular causes, he championed the rights of the poor farmers against the Crown in the Sedgemoor drainage schemes, the billeting of soldiers and church ales. Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 119; 127; T.G. Barnes, *County Politics and a Puritan Cause Celebre: Somerset Church Ales 1633*, TRHS. 5th Series ix (1959), p 103-122.

Kishlansky, Parliamentary Selection, p 10-17; 85-101; ; Russell, p 55-6; 149-151; 380-381.

262. Quoted by Cust p 153-4.

263. Cust, p 107-8.

264. Kishlansky, Parliamentary Selection, p 85-101.

265. Phelips lost out both ways, his credit with the county was undermined by Poulett who implied he had "forsaken the county and turned courtier" and he then lost his local offices for opposing Buckingham, Barnes. Somerset, p 37; 89-90; 269-70; 282; 284-7; 290-5.

266. Dd/Ph/223/50; 51; 54; 58; 71; 78; 79; Sir John Stawell tried to get evidence to incriminate Sir Robert by putting pressure on the vicar of Northover and the local officers Dd/Ph/223/83; for Hodges unpopularity see Barnes, Somerset, p 212; 216-7; 233-235.

267. The phrase "the King's high displeasure" was a fairly standard threat against recalcitrants, for example, PC2/50, p 616.

Sir John Stawell accused Sir Robert Phelips of abuse "by combination". Dd/Ph/223/76.

For an example of Sir Robert's dealings see his care for the constables of Tintinhull hundred, when he persuaded the Council to reference their petition to the Bishop of Bath and Wells to spare them the expense of travelling to London, SP16/374/28; PC2/48. p 486. The accusation of "a double reputation" came from Lord Poulett, and the phrase is quoted in Barnes, Somerset, p 289.

268. Keeler p 261; T W 861 and 862 for Sir Oliver Luke; for other Bedfordshire gentlemen see T W 862; 863; 865; 866.

The quotation is from S T, III, p 1076.

269. T W 863, Lord Cleveland describes the sheriff as "Cousin Boteler".

270. Russell, p 333-5.

271. Prynne, An Humble Remonstrance, p 15; 16; 18; 22.

Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 236.

Sommerville p 89-92, but notice the difficulty Coke found in accepting this, "if it is against reason it is against law" quoted p 92.

272. For earlier examples of these fears see, R.C. Munden, *James I and the 'growth of mutual distrust': King, Commons and Reform, 1603 to 1604*, in Sharpe, p 43-72; Croft, BIHR, lix (1986), p 155-171; Russell, p 55-6.
273. Lake, HJ, 25 (1982) p 812.
274. Lake, HJ, 25 (1982) p 809.
275. Lake, HJ, 25 (1982), p 805-825.
For an illustration of government views see the King and the Lord Keeper's speeches at the start of the 1628 Parliament. Lords Journal, 3, p 697-8.
276. WWM/Str P/15 (205); N R O Montagu MS 27/23.
On the significance of petitions as a form of political protest see Fletcher, The Outbreak of the English Civil War, p xxvi: 191-227.
See above p 256; below p 424-498.
277. The quotation is from an anonymous government memorandum from the reign of James I. SP14/190/44, I am grateful to John Morrill for telling me to look at this paper: for Staffordshire and Cheshire see SP16/345/76; PC2/45, p 212.
On the grand jury in general see J.S. Morrill, The Cheshire Grand Jury 1625 to 1659: A Social and Administrative Study, (Leicester 1976); Russell, p 59 describes the grand jury as a channel of grievances; and on the relationship between the gentry and the grand jury see R.P.Cust and P.G. Lake, *Sir Richard Grosvenor and the Rhetoric of Magistracy*, BIHR, liv (1991), p 43-5, and R. Lee, *Law and Society in the Time of Charles I: Bedfordshire and the Civil War*, Bedfordshire Historical Records Society, 65 (1986), p 57-107 which discusses the charges made to the Bedfordshire grand jury during the 1640s by Sir William Soteler, one of the former ship money sheriffs.
278. Nottinghamshire Record Office, DD4P/58/12; 13; 14; for the final version of the petition see SP16/407/42; it had a devastating effect on the collection of Herefordshire ship money according to the sheriff Henry Lingon SP16/410/23, for support for his analysis see Table V, VI and VII.
279. E.S. Cope, *Politics Without Parliament: the Dispute About Muster Master Fees in Shropshire in the 1630s*, Huntington Library Quarterly, 45 (1982), p 271-284.
280. Articles of Accusation, p 32-33; C and T, II, p 272.
281. SP16/376/96; B L Add MS 34,163 f 80.
282. *Somerset Assize Orders 1629 to 1640*, ed T.G. Barnes, Somerset Record Society, lxxv (1959), p 60.
283. SP16/427/31; 32.

284. For some examples see Hertfordshire. PC2/47, p 205; 322; 421; Bedfordshire PC2/47, p 211; Surrey PC2/47, p 308-9; Buckinghamshire PC2/47, p 298; 354; SP16/357/8; 70; PC2/47, p 433-4; 454-5; Shropshire PC2/48, p 328; Devon SP16/417/43; Middlesex PC2/46, p 105; Gloucestershire PC2/47, p 299-300; PC2/48, p 55; Oxfordshire PC2/47, p 347; Cornwall SP16/346/88.
285. For such a rebuke see the Council to Suffolk JPs PC2/46, p 177.
286. E L 7681; he was excluded from the Bench C193/13/2.
287. Memoirs of Sir Hugh Cholmley p 60-1.
288. SP16/349/23.
289. *Quarter Sessions Records for the County of Somerset 1625 to 1639*, p 237; 242; 243; 247; 252; 256; 258; 264; 276-7; 279-9; 280; 283; 285; 293; 305; 308; *Warwickshire Quarter Sessions Order Book*, p 226; 227; 230; 233; 235; 246; 248; 251; 252; 253; 257; 258; 260-1; 261; I am grateful to Martyn Bennett for the point about the Nottinghamshire JPs.
290. SP16/349/61.
291. SP16/333/341; PC2/47, p 288-300.
292. Coventry Ship Money Book, f 15; for the sheriff's views see f 13v-14v.
293. T W 865.
294. The Walsall Ship Money Papers 1635 to 1636, Collections for a History of Staffordshire Edited by the William Salt Archaeological Society. (1931) ed G.P. Mander, p 120.
295. SP16/374/65.
296. SP16/302/129; PC2/46, p 456; B L Add MS. 25.040 f 94; SP16/363/34.
297. SP16/380/49.
298. SP16/357/107.
299. H M C De L'Isle and Dudley MS, VI, p 175.
300. For examples see, Londoners: PC2/44, p 381; SP16/305/71; PC2/45, p 209; PC2/47, p 247; SP16/376/123.
Absentee landlords: SP16/315/50; PC2/46, p 94; STT Ship Money; PC2/46, p247-8; SP16/311/90.
Royal office holders: SP16/285/39; PC2/45, p 410; SP16/301/96; PC2/45, p 429; 311/36; PC2/45, p 429; PC2/47, p 31; 79; 97; 172; 252; 273-4; PC2/48, p 34.

301. SP16/341/32 for the Council's answer see PC2/47, p 257.
302. For other complaints see for example C U L Add MS Gg/29 f 118; PC2/47, p 39; Hertfordshire County Record Office, Hertfordshire County Records 82917; PC2/47, p 111; in STT Ship Money there are many offended clerics: SP16/355/171; PC2/47, p 423-4; PC2/48, p 428; PC2/48 p 609.
303. Hirst, JBS, 18 (1978), p 46-66.
304. SP16/301/2; PC2/45, p 403-4; ?; SP16/345/78; SP16/357/27; PC2/47, p 121; SP16/346/96)
305. PC2/47, p 307-8.
It was done at county level, see above p 268.
306. SP16/380/51.
307. For example, Norfolk R O, Aylsham Manuscripts, AYL/193 details local taxes including ship money rates in Hanworth, or Sir Thomas Pelham's ship money ratings for his Sussex properties. B L Add MS 33145, f 94r; 95r; 100v; 104r; I am grateful to Anthony Fletcher for bringing these to my attention. The Norfolk example is particularly interesting because the county had fixed rates for the hundreds but this still left scope for dispute in the parishes. the squire of Hanworth, Justice Doughty, paid the same charge on all four surviving rates, but there were considerable variations in the amounts levied on the thirty-four other people charged.
Fletcher, Sussex, p 204; Cust p 257-8.
308. SP16/364/64.
309. STT Ship Money.
310. C U L Buxton MS, Box 96; SP16/410/149.
The poverty of those owing arrears was a standard excuse from sheriffs faced with collection of arrears, for example Sir Alexander Denton B L Add MS, 11045 f 68. In returns made by the sheriffs the overwhelming majority of defaulters were described as very poor, for example SP16/365/70; 71; 376/106; 112.
311. STT Ship Money.
312. See also B L Add MS 33,575 f 19 for a JP keeping copies of the petty constable's warrants; and for the need to get and to do favours about ship money rates in Nottinghamshire and Middlesex, *Letters of John Holles*, III, p 491; 496. For the general duty of a JP to protect the poor see Sir Richard Grosvenor's advise to his son, Cust and Lake, BIHR, liv (1981), p 51.
313. STT Ship Money Box.
314. Dd/Ph/223/49; 50; 51; 60; 71; 74; 79; 83.

315. T W 861; 862; 863; 865; 866; 867.
316. Wilcox, Gloucestershire, p 130.
317. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 235.
318. For some examples see PC2/47, p 347; C and T, II. p 272; STT 1163.
319. SP16/376/121.
320. SP16/333/4; C U L Buxton MS, Box 96 Petition of Constables of Blofield hundred.
321. SP16/354/164. For changes in the Instructions see SP15/369/8-18.
322. B L Harl Ms 3796. f 65.
323. STT Ship Money.
324. T W 856.
325. For example, PC2/48, p 180.
326. For such examples see SP16/361/19; 385/1; 455/127.
327. See below p 329-334; 472-498.
328. SP16/372/103.
329. Fletcher, Sussex, p 205; Morrill, Revolt of the Provinces, p 27 imply this was a good thing.
330. See above p 44-45; 117-118; for the continuing fiscal burden on the less well off during the Civil War, but with an extraordinary and entirely unjustified view of the subsidy, see John Lilburne, England's Birth-Right Justified, in G.Aylmer, The Levellers in the English Revolution, (London, 1975), p 61-2. "When this Kingdom was in any way or possibility of subsistence, the auncient custome was, that Taxations should be raised by way of Subsidie, which is the most just, equitable and legal way ... but our new invented way, layes the burden hevily uopn the poore and men of middle quality or condition, without all discretion, and scarcely maketh the rich touch it with one of their fingers".
331. Haskell in Hampshire Studies p 83.
332. Fletcher, Sussex, p 206.
333. SP16/536/91.
334. For example, a Bedfordshire complaint that tenants and poor farmers were being charged 2s 4d per acre whereas their landlords

were charged at 2d, SP16/357/150. The Shilton complaint is SP16/376/98, it is undated but gives details of two oppressive "taxations", this would suggest that it dates from the 1636 writ or the very early days of the 1637.

335. STT Ship Money, Sir Robert Dormer was a defaulter in Oxfordshire SP16/336/51.

336. SP16/399/6.

337. SP16/343/26 & i; 49; 68; Laud, Works, VI Part II, p 482-3; SP16/345/17; 348/ 73; 74; 75; 76;78; 79; C and T, II, p 267-8; 278.

338. SP16/306/54.

339. Dd/ph/223/71; 74 show how Sir John Stawell manipulated rates in Tintinhull hundred in Somerset so that he paid about £18 10s for land worth £2800 a year.
Lindquist, HJ 31 (1988), p 551.

340. SP16/341/32.

341. B L Harl 3796 f 65.

342. Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 106-7.

343. SP16/417/52.

344. *Proceedings in the Short Parliament*, p 148.

345. This is like a reverse model of Underdown's argument that the experience of local government was an essential pre-condition for popular political consciousness. Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 123. Without the experience of prerogative government and the political tensions this produced questions about liberty and property would probably have remained abstract, for example Sir Harbottle Grimston's speech in the Commons, *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 67-8.

346. These are signs of tension not of opposition, for examples see Shropshire: SP16/347/31

Exeter: SP16/344/102.

Northamptonshire: SP16/346/86.

Oxfordshire: SP16/346/107.

Lincolnshire: SP16/356/44.

Cambridgeshire: SP16/349/50.

Leicestershire: SP16/409/165.

Herefordshire: SP16/410/23.

347. See above p 203-213.

348. Wales, SP16/418/64; 84; 420/33; the northern counties were exempted, SP16/409/45; Cheshire, SP16/417/14.

349. SP16/444/73; 457/93.

350. For examples see, SP16/386/52; 390/116; 157; 397/47; 395/92; 397/83; 407/50; 395/116; PC2/49, p 488
351. See below p 335-372, especially Tables V, VI and VII.
352. See below p 443-448; 454-455; 468-472; 483; 489-498.
For examples see SP16/389/33; 132; 390/100; 118; PC2/49, p 185.
353. Tyacke, in Russell, Origins of the English Civil War, p 119-143; Collinson, The Religion of Protestants, p 292-3; The Birth Pangs of Protestant England, emphasises the seventeenth century changes in the concept of England as a nation of God and he also says that the fears God was about to desert the nation were common, p 1-27.
354. Fletcher and Stevenson write "The system of local government did not merely allow participation: it was dependant for its smooth working on the active involvement of men of all ranks." *Introduction*. Fletcher and Stevenson (eds) Order and Disorder in Early Modern England, p 16; on the law Cynthia Herrup stresses that the law did not belong simply to one class of men, "there was not a single ruling class in England, but that within the ranks of propertied men there were several distinct ruling classes". C. Herrup, *The Counties and the Country*, in Eley and Hunt (eds) Reviving the English Revolution, p 293. Notice also the similarity to Conrad Russell's comment on the Forced Loan, "It threatened a co-operation between King and county gentry for which no substitute existed, and for which no substitute was desired.", Russell p 335, and the way in which ship money tended to broaden the social base of protest beyond the gentry.
355. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 144.
356. P. Croft, *Parliament, Purveyance and the City of London 1539 to 1603*, Parliamentary History, 4 (1985) p 32.
357. For the Crown's use of the law see above p 39-39; 44-45; 52-56; 165-214; and below p 453-454; 457-459; 467-472.. The quotation is from E L Harl MS 3796 f 65.
358. SP16/8/80.
359. WWM/Str P/15 (206).
360. Gordon, TRHS, 3rd series iv, (1910) p 141-162.
361. Gardiner, VIII, p 85.
362. Contrast Gardiner, VIII, p 92-4; 102-105; 200-203 with Gordon, TRHS, 3rd Series, iv (1910), p 141-153.
363. Fletcher, Sussex, p 208-9.
364. Morrill, Revolt of Provinces p 24.
365. Sharpe, in Tomlinson p 69.

366. Sharpe, in Tomlinson p 69-78; for the European parallels see J.H. Elliott, *England and Europe: a Common Malady?* in Russell (ed), The Origins of the English Civil War, p 246-257; and N. Steensgard, *The Seventeenth Century Crisis*, and J.H. Elliott, *Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe*, in G. Parker and L.M. Smith, The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, (London, 1978), p 26-56: 110-133.
367. For example, Holmes, Seventeenth Century Lincolnshire, p 134; Barnes, Somerset, p 207; P. Clark, English Provincial Society from the Reformation to the Revolution, (Hassocks, 1977), p 378; Lake, Northern History, 17 (1981), p 44-5; Fletcher in Tomlinson repeatedly uses Gordon's figures as an index of response, p 207-8.
368. Strafforde's Letters, II, p 110.
369. SP16/376/96.
370. See above p 64; 135; 139-140.
371. Gordon, TRHS, 3rd Series, iv (1910), p 142; 144.
372. Gordon, TRHS, 3rd Series, iv (1910), p 156-162; SP16/421/70.
373. SP16/333/30.
374. SP16/364/32; 367/29.
375. SP16/401/112.
376. SP16/428/41.
377. SP16/304/74; 346/41; Gordon, TRHS, 3rd Series, iv (1910), p 159; 160.
378. SP16/334/43; 401/8; Gordon, TRHS, 3rd Series, iv (1910), p 159.
379. SP16/400/112; 389/124.
380. SP16/389/9; 400/4; 55; 75; 110; 402/51 and i; C U L Buxton MS, Box 96; SP16/407/45; 410/64; 65; 410/151; 467/45.
381. See Table V and VI; Gordon, TRHS, 3rd Series, iv (1910), p 161; See below p 360.
382. See Tables IV, V and VI for patterns of payments.
383. PC2/45, p 183; SP16/301/84; 302/80; PC2/45, p 271-2; SP16/311/62; accounts SP16/305/39; for Pierrepont see Keeler, Members of the Long Parliament, p 306.
SP16/390/54; 393/81; 412/82.

384. Cope, Huntington Library Quarterly, 45 (1982), p 271-284; C and T, II, p 272; 274-5; *Orders of the Shropshire Quarter Sessions*, p 1-2;
395. SP16/428/40; see Table IV and above p 188-189.
386. C S P Ven 1636-1639, p 419.
387. Cust, p 4.
388. Russell, p 333-4.
389. See above p 61; 83-84; SP16/366/82.
390. SP16/328/76. see also SP16/432/9.
391. Laud, Works, VI Part II, p 515.
392. SP16/358.
393. John Rylands Library, English MS 1091. f 15r-21v.
394. T W 860 is the assessment; the arrears are T W 856 and 857; details of the arrears in Bedfordshire are given T W 855; 857; 858.
395. Hampden: S T, III p 847; B L Add MS. 142 f 44.
Lord Saye and Sele: SP16/315/121; PC2/46, p 345; SP16/422/9.
396. Morrill, Revolt of the Provinces, p 24; See Tables IV and V.
397. See above p 176; below p 467-472.
398. H M C De L'Isle and Dudley. VI. p 138: for example on 3rd March 1638 the account was £20,494 less than 4th March 1637; on 7th April it was £19,765 less than 8th April 1637; on 5th May there was £22,079 difference compared to 6th May 1637; on 4th August the difference was £32,165; £32,312 less on 6th October; £27,625 less on 3rd November 1638 than on 4th November 1637; on 1st December the difference was £22,155; notice the shortfall continued well after Hampden's Case was settled; SP16/385/21; 387/31; 389/98; 397/11; 400/16; 401/7; 404/8.
399. PC2/49 p 110; SP16/385/20; 385/21. The pressure came from the King, SP16/382/63; 385/34.
400. SP16/393/81.
401. Laud, Works, VI Part II p 524-5.
402. For example, SP16/390/62; 116;157: John Rylands Library English MS 1091 f 27v

403. Cust identifies the heartlands of resistance in Northamptonshire, Essex, Gloucestershire, Oxfordshire, Warwickshire and southern Lincolnshire, Cust, p 255; 297-8; 310; 334.
404. PC2/49, p 10; 123-4; 323-4; CUL Buxton MS box: 95,
405. SP16/393/31: Buckinghamshire had paid 15.6%, Oxfordshire 31.4%, Northamptonshire 5%, Gloucestershire 43.6%; the accusation against the sheriffs is SP16/386/88.
406. North Yorkshire Record Office. Cunliffe-Lister MS. bundle 25.
407. SP16/390/157.
408. The phrase is taken from SP16/447/27.
409. I owe the point about the Forced Loan to Richard Cust.
410. SP16/301/96; 304/37; 305/13.
411. Sir Alexander Denton: SP16/402/88; PC2/50, p 673; 681; B L Add MS 11045, f 68.
Lewis Harriss: PC2/48, p 363; SP16/380/2; 331/33; CSPD 1637-1638, p 304; PC2/50, p 148; 244.
Sir Edward Hussey: PC2/48, p 186.
412. PC2/47, p 300-1.
413. For example, SP16/364/24; 385/34; 390/87; 88; PC2/48, p 463; PC2/49, p 123-4; PC2/50, p 596.
414. SP16/427/47; Clar St P, II, p 1; H M C Cowper MS, II, p 237.
415. PC2/50, p 616.
416. SP16/473/103.
417. C S P Ven 1632 to 1636, p 314-5; SP16/301/96; PC2/45, p 443; 451-2; PC2/46, p 108; PC2/47, p 224; SP16/314/47; PC2/48, p 517-8; SP16/382/63; PC2/48 p 463; PC2/49, p 620-1.
418. See above p 77-80.
419. Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution, p 89-90; 293-4; H M C Seventh Report, p 73
420. Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution, p 89-90; 336-7; PC2/49, p 620-1; The Diary of Sir Thomas Aston, p 98
421. SP16/417/110; 442/139; PC2/51, p 294; SP16/452/53; Sharpe London and the Kingdom, II, p 118.
422. Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution, p 89.

423. SP16/456/44; E L 7842;7843.
424. SP16/335/67.
425. For examples of a range of arrears problems see
Cornwall: SP16/336/44.
Northamptonshire: PC2/47, p 183; SP16/348/72 1 and 11; PC2/47, p 239;
SP16/362/89; SP16/404/33; 410/57.
Herefordshire: SP16/307/71; 369/2.
Buckinghamshire: PC2/50, p 673; 681.
Northamptonshire: SP16/352/19 and 191; PC2/47, p 351-352;
SP16/398/19; 399/85; 404/133; 409/166; 428/68; 445/541.
Dorset: SP16/337/36
Middlesex: SP16/433/8; 9.
Hampshire: SP16/373/21.
426. SP16/337/36; see also for example SP16/372/3. also Nhants.
427. For example, SP16/366/36; 337/46; 420/133.
428. See above p 198; 203; SP16/467/45; Wigmore SP16/412/29 & 1
429. SP16/383/19.
430. SP16/336/44; 379/68.
431. SP16/356/45.
432. B L Harl 3796 f 65.
433. SP16/389/131.
434. SP16/302/45.
435. C115/N4/8617.
436. SP16/348/36; 386/48; 418/47; 476/53; 473/53
437. SP16/473/103; 476/53.
438. PC2/45 p 297-8; SP16/331/30.
- 439/ SP16/473/101; 476/5.
440. For arrears see Table VI; H M C Cowper MS, II, p 237.
441. BL Add MS 11,045 f 43-4.
442. SP16/450/115.
443. For example see SP16/417/62; 64; 418/57; 418/15;57;64; 422/36;
427/47; 445/124; 446/36; 448/62; 449/8; 12; 450/115; 451/181.
444. SP16/432/66.

445. See Table V, VI and VII.
446. See Table IV and above p 188-190
447. SP16/473/103; 453/5.
448. SP16/304/33; *Life of Humphrey Chetham*, p 82-4; 87-8.
449. SP16/341/32: PC2/47, p 257; SP16/363/54: PC2/48, p 113; SP16/336/38.
450. *Life of Humphrey Chetham*, p 87-8; Morrill, Revolt of the Provinces, p 25; C193/13/2.
451. Chetham feared this would be a problem but found it was not. *Life of Humphrey Chetham*, p 87-8; Morrill. Revolt of the Provinces, p 25.
452. SP16/445/1.
453. Lake, Northern History, 17(1981) p 45-55.
454. PC2/45, p 336-7; 351; SP16/314/65: PC2/46, p 259-50: SP16/346/88; PC2/48, p 462; SP16/418/15; 457/62: 453/104
455. I owe this point to Ann Duffin.
456. SP16/444/15.
457. Barnes pointed out that Somerset was responsible for more rating disputes than any other county, Somerset, p 211; for Dorset see Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 124; for Kent see Fincham. BIHR, lvii (1984), p 234-6 for gentry disquiet. and for the increasing problems with constables see PC2/49, p 415; PC2/50, p 19; 37; SP16/409/137; 143; 144; PC2/50, p 34; 43; SP16/410/1 and 11; PC2/50, p 63; 338; 356; 363; 365; 648.
458. I owe this point to Andrew Thrush.
459. See Table V, VI and VII.
460. Keeler, Members of the Long Parliament, p 56; WWM/Str P/16(106):Strafforde's Letters, II, p 110; Memoirs of Sir Hugh Cholmley, p 60-61.
461. As quoted in ST, III, p 844.
462. PC2/48, p 219; SP16/370/81. See the description of Newcastle after the devastating plague of 1636 by Colonel John Fenwick "Almost desolate, thy streets growne greene with grasse, thy treasurie wasted, thy trading departed as thou never yet recovered it.", Christ Ruling in the Midst of His Enemies or Some First Fruits of the Churches Deliverance, Reprints of Some Rare Tracts Chiefly Illustrative of the History of the Northern Counties, 4 Vols,

(Newcastle, 1878-9) p 10. I am grateful to Michael Gribbon for this reference.

Durham and the coal owners, SP16/366/18.

463. SP16/536/91.

464. See above p 120-121; 261; 272-273

465. Cust p 153; Hughes, Warwickshire, p 94-5; 100-4.

466. Norwich: SP16/301/; Ipswich: PC2/45, p 135; SP16/300/59 & i; PC2/45, p 199.

467. Hughes, Warwickshire, p 94-7; 108-113; C U L Buxton MS. Box 96.

468. Barnes, Somerset, p 211.

469. See above p 194-195, 273; and Table V, VI and VII.

470. The phrase is quoted from a letter of John Smyth to William Bassett, *Calendar of the Correspondence of the Smyth Family of Ashton Court*, ed by J.H. Bettey, Bristol Record Society, xxxv (1932), p 128

471. See above p 20; 153; 203-204, and below p 435; 444-445.

472. SP16/386/48, the county had paid by November 1637, SP16/371/70; 124; 467/45.

473. SP16/380/33; HMC Cowper MS, II, p 173-4; PC2/48, p 584; 611-2; PC2/49, p 67-8; 101; 142; SP16/389/120; 127; PC2/49, p 178-9; 192; SP16/390/42; 391/71; PC2/49, p 266; 281; 389; 407; 415; 420; SP16/420/57; 428/66; PC2/50, p 343.

474. B L Add MS 25,277 f 41-2

475. B L Add MS 25,277 f 21-47; SP16/473/103.

476. See Tables V, VI and VII; the quotation is from SP16/346/86.

477. C193/13/2;

478. See above p 194-196; 203-204; 266-267; 273-274; 309-312.
See below p 484-490.

479. A.M. Johnson, *Buckinghamshire 1640 to 1660: A Study in County Politics*, University of Wales M.A. Thesis 1963, p 1-44.

480. Kent see Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 232-6 ; Norfolk C U L Buxton MS, Box 96; Sussex, Fletcher Sussex, p 239-243

481. Fletcher, Sussex, p 241-3.

482. See above p 194-195; 309-312.

483. The quotation is from SP16/386/88; see below p 424-498.
484. See below p 432-439; 469-470; 473-498.
The quotation is from Strafforde's Letters, II, p 158.
485. SP16/290/75, also SP16/427/31.
See below p 405-423.
486. C U L Buxton MS, Box 96; SP16/400/110: PC2/49, p 407.
Another telling comparison is between the accounts of Sir Alexander Denton's convention before the Board in October 1639. Rossingham who had excellent sources gave details of Sir Alexander's refusal to answer on the legality of ship money, the Council Register merely noted his attendance and that his excuses were not thought adequate. B L Add MS 11045 f 68r and PC2/50, p 681.
See below p 414.
487. Based on Table VII; SP16/364/93.
488. Fielding, HJ, 31 (1988), p 769-788; see Tables IV, V and VI.
489. SP16/386/88; see Tables IV, V and VI.
490. See above p 183-184; 196-197; and below p 478-480; and see Tables V, VI and VII.
491. "Sir Walter Earle, Mr John Browne and some others of the great ones" SP16/367/2; the second quotation is taken from SP16/333/4; Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 120; 124; 132-135; 141-2; J.A. Casada, Dorset Politics in the Puritan Revolution, Southern History, 4 (1982), p 107-122; notice the similarity to Essex as described by Sir Humphrey Mildmay SP16/328/41; 337/35, and in Hunt, The Puritan Moment, p 233-310.
492. Henry Peacham, The Duty of All Subjects to Their King: As Also to Their Native Country, (London, 1639), p 4, I am grateful to Johann Sommerville who drew this pamphlet to my attention.
493. C U L Buxton MS, Box 96.
494. For example SP16/351/16.
497. P.L. Ralph, Sir Humphrey Mildmay: Royalist Gentleman. (New Brunswick, 1947), p 78-79.
498. SP16/376/109.
499. For examples of different means of exchange see:
Shropshire: bills of exchange and drapers from Shrewsbury, SP16/302/80; C S P D 1635 to 1636, p 204; SP16/352/82; 370/19; the sheriff of Montgomeryshire also used the Shrewsbury drapers, SP16/355/69.
Cornwall: the tin farmers brought the money up at the request of the sheriff, SP16/302/86; 303/19.

Lancashire: Humphrey Chetham used his business and family connections, *Life of Humphrey Chetham*, p 81; SP16/302/55; CSPD 1635, p 549.

Cheshire: Sir Thomas Delves returned his collection by some Manchester tradesmen, SP16/352/3.

Denbigh: the drover who had agreed to return the ship money let the sheriff down and he had problems finding another return, SP16/366/51.

Flint: returned by Alderman Blease of Cheshire and John Legingham of Cheapside, SP16/352/73.

Rutland: returned the money by "a great Lord", SP16/351/37.

500. SP16/421/73.

501. The phrase is taken from SP16/351/70. For other examples of this malpractice see SP16/376; PC2/47, p 239-240.

502. SP16/351/70

503. SP16/332/68; PC2/47, p 10.

504. SP16/381/31

505. C S P Ven 1632-1636, p 489

506. The phrase is taken from a letter from Dorchester to Sir Robert Anstruther, 28th February 1631 cited by Reeve, *Dorchester*, p 217.

507. B L Harl MS 3796 f 65.

508. See above p 208-214 and below p 444-445.

509. Reeve, p 9-57; see also above p 133-135; 143-145; 165; 168-169; 176; 178-187; and below p 406-498.

Quoted by Gardiner, IX, p 138; for earlier parallels see Reeve, p 58-171; 275-291.

"DANGER TO THE SUBJECT WHEN PREROGATIVE EXPRESSED":

OPPOSITION TO SHIP MONEY

"these are to certifiy you that as yet no money hath been or can be got in the said parish till such time you shall make known unto us a law or statute binding us thereunto, which law or statute when you shall make known unto us we will readily obey...."

Francis French constable of South Newington and Thomas Robbins to Sir Francis Norriss sheriff of Oxfordshire, 14th April 1636.(1)

"Paid for the town land for that unlawful tax of ship money 9s 10d"

Churchwarden's Account for 1637, Winfarthing Norfolk.(2)

"Monys? Wee'le rayse supplies what ways we please,
And force you to subscribe to blanks, in which
Wee'le mulct you as wee shalle thinke fitt. The Caesars In
Rome were wise, acknowledging no lawes
But what their swords did ratiye, the wives
And daughters of the senators bowinge to
Their wills as deities."

Lines from Phillip Massinger's play The King and the Subject, censored as "too insolent" by Charles I in June 1638.(3)

An evaluation of opposition to ship money is beset with difficulties, some stem from the nature of the source material, some from the conceptual framework surrounding political life and some from the relationship between the King and his subjects. In addition, it is essential to establish a proper historical and ideological perspective on opposition to the service, which allows it its own contexts and significance.

Severe constraints limited the expression of opposition as a direct result of changes in the political climate in the 1630s. The image of the Personal Rule as a golden age was not dreamed up by royalist propagandists, it was deliberately fostered by the King and

the Council at the time.(4) They wanted to create an alternative model of politics, to mark out the present as different from the strife of the recent past. Reasons for this were rooted in the intellectual as well as the political concerns of the King: Charles believed the way government was conducted would exercise a profound influence upon the governed, images of government which stressed law, reason, peace and harmony were therefore tools of political reformation as much as the beauty of holiness was the vehicle for spiritual reformation.(5) Exaltation of the monarch and the creation of a royal iconography were not new, in this Charles can be seen as the heir of his predecessors, of Elizabeth's cult of the virgin princess and mother of protestants, or James's sophisticated use of a theatre of power.(6) It is the development and refinement of the imagery of royal authority in a distinctly political and innovative way which marks out the Personal Rule, since its main concerns were to alter perceptions and to reform past errors. Malcom Smuts has emphasised the serious ethical and political concerns in court culture which

"lent support to an ambitious effort to transcend the limits that historical tradition had imposed upon the state and to establish government on the foundation of rational principles."(7)

Kevin Sharpe similarly urged historians to look beyond imagery and to re-examine the philosophical and political concerns in the court masques, describing them as "statements of faith" about "the doctrines of [Charles's] kingship, the creed of God's lieutenant on earth."(8)

"The masque's purpose was to look upward and to raise men's eyes to the higher understanding of mysteries. No

less the purpose of government was to elevate men to that knowledge by which they might order the turmoil of their own nature. Peace therefore was the aim of the government which saw its role as educating men to a higher understanding."(9)

Davenant's "Salmacida Spolia", the last masque performed at court in 1640, proclaimed

"All that are harsh, all that are rude,
Are by your harmony subdued;
Yet so into obedience wrought,
As if not forced to it but taught."(10)

The court developed its own remedies for vices of selfishness, decadence and faction: obedience, respect for tradition and the public proclamation of royal honour.(11) In a fallen world, where sin led men into oppression, disorder and rebellion, the lessons of history had to be relearned if order and harmony were to be restored in England.(12) All order depended on the first authority under God, the natural authority of the King and the exercise of the royal prerogative: "a subject and a sovereign", said Charles in a later more tragic setting "are clean different things".(13)

In this philosophy the splendour and mercy of the monarchy were essential remedies for sickness in the body politic, the peace that came with time, when passions were tamed, would cure the "distempers" of faction and disobedience.(14) Some of the most influential figures at court shared Laud's belief that "surfeited long on peace and plenty", the King's people had been seduced by "malcontents".(15) In the proclamations issued after the 1629 parliament the King had said time was needed to bring the people to "a better understanding of us and themselves".(16) The same theme,

that opposition was created by "ignorance" and "wilfulness", informed attitudes to the Crown's opponents during the years of the Personal Rule, when attracted by these images of virtue, tranquility and reason, believing that obedience was "natural", Charles deliberately distanced himself from opposition and marginalised its concerns.(17) The Lord Keeper's address to the Assize Judges of February 1637 took this line about ship money resistance:

"for the most part the subjects have shewed themselves most dutiful and obedient... but when his majesty heard of some refusals, though he had cause to be sensible of it, yet he was far from being transported with passion, but thought good to resort to the advise of you his Judges, ... as well for the direction of his course, as for the satisfaction of his subjects...."(18)

The King was determined to silence the voice of opposition, not just the voices of great nobles like Warwick or Saye but also lesser voices, controlling the discussion of politics in the press and in the theatre, curtailing ill-example and punishing offenders.(19) Again the point is, not that censorship was new since it was not, but that under Charles censorship became stricter in its interpretation of material. Prynne's "Histriomatrix" was condemned in 1632 on stricter grounds than usually operated,

"Itt is said, hee had noe ill intencion, noe ill harte, but he maye bee ill interpreted. That must be not allowed him in excuse, for he should not have written any thinge that would bear construccion, for hee doth not accompanye his booke, to make his intencion knowne to all that reades it."(20)

At first there seems to be an inherent contradiction between the public stress on the virtues of peace and the dreadful punishments the government inflicted, on Sir John Eliot or Burton,

Bastwick and Prynne.(21) Such punishments were intended to be exemplary: Charles saw his opponents as "wilful", a word associated with undutiful children in need of a father's loving punishment to teach them sense.(22) It was a commonplace in seventeenth century thinking to equate the patriarchal power of the father as head of the household with the power of kings:

for as we are born sons so are we born subjects".(23)

Equally commonplace was the view that disobedience was unnatural and sinful, breaking the fifth commandment to honour thy father and thy mother and running contrary to the teachings of scripture.(24) Just as the foundation of the family was the natural authority of the father and the natural obedience of his household, so this same duty of obedience was the foundation of civil government: many of the images used to describe the state were based upon such analogies, as the Arminian cleric Thomas Jackson wrote in his "Treatise of Christian Obedience",

"The regal power, which in process of time did spread itself over whole nations and countries, had its first root from that power which the fathers of families had over their children, their grandchildren and their posterity."(25)

All fathers possessed the right and the duty to punish their children, so too did kings. It was widely believed that the law ought to inspire fear to be effective, and that ill-example should be corrected for the general good, a point put with characteristic force by Wentworth when he wrote to Laud in October 1637 on the subject of Prynne,

"a Prince that loseth the Force and Example of his Punishments, loseth withal the greatest Part of his

Dominion, ..." (26)

Kevin Sharpe and Erica Veevers in different studies of the court have stressed a politics of love in the 1630s, yet, it is still important to remember that love can have different meanings and take different forms according to context. (27) Patrick Collinson has pointed out that in the conduct books depicting the ideals of marriage "love flows downwards, never upwards", and that the proper response to the love of father or husband was not a reciprocal love, but a necessary obedience. (28)

Charles consistently distrusted criticism: outside the realm of poetry he saw it as fundamentally disloyal, he did not see that it represented a continuing commitment to ideals of kingship, consultation and the giving of consent. (29) When the Venetian Ambassador wrote of the King in 1637,

"He is extreme in nothing, except that he persists with his sentiments, and anyone whom he has once detested may be sure that he will never recover his favour."

he hit upon one of the most striking of the King's characteristics. (30) This had undoubted political consequences, because, as Conrad Russell emphasised,

"In a monarchy, what drives a man into an 'opposition' stance is not his convictions, but the king's attitude to those convictions. A man is pushed into opposition not because the king disagrees with him, but because the king no longer wishes to hear him or be served by him." (31)

Charles had an exalted vision of kingship, he saw himself as responsible only to God for the welfare of his people and his realm, he modelled his own conduct against a very high personal standard.

and he deliberately reformed the court after his father's death to make it more decorous, an image of virtue.(32) Hesitant and cautious by nature, he was drawn to certainty and profoundly distrusted debate: this aspect of his character came out very clearly in a remark made during the debates about whether or not to call a new parliament in the aftermath of the Forced Loan,

"the question was of obeying the King, not of counselling."(33)

It was hardly surprising that Laudian theologians developed a religious cult surrounding the persons of the King and Queen, arguing that an absolute royal prerogative was rooted in the revealed word of God and in the nature of creation.(34)

The King's intransigence, his anger and his unforgiving attitude towards his people were publicly symbolised by the absence of parliaments during the 1630s. Discussing the Judges' Opinion on ship money in early 1637, some of Sir Roger Twysden's neighbours in Kent

"confessed the last parliaments had benee much to blame in their caryages towards hys majestie, but the goodness of monarchs had formerly forgot as great errors, and that those that had in the last parlyament carryed themselves ille had synce by hys majestie benee punisht according to justice;..."(35)

Reactions to the crises of the 1620s still shaped attitudes to politics: hope and caution were often intermingled. In the first years of the reign, in particular during the collection of the Forced Loan, the King's wishes and the King's honour had been given a very high public profile, this continued during the ship money service.(36)

Clarendon noticed a desire to serve and honour the King was a powerful motive for conformity amongst the gentry,

"when ship-money was transacted at the Council-Board, they looked upon it as a work of that power they were always obliged to trust, and an effect of that foresight they were naturally to rely upon."(37)

Political life was very fluid during the Personal Rule; although with hindsight there appears to be a pattern of inevitability this was not how events were perceived at the time, particularly during the two years from the late summer of 1635 until the autumn of 1637 when a determined assault was made on "new counsels".(38) Hope motivated the godly led by Warwick and Saye: hope not just for political power, but also for union between King and people to unite in the cause of Christ.(39) The early opposition to ship money was motivated by a desire to woo the King back to a parliamentary way, not to alienate him. Events were to show that a fervent commitment to the ideals of godliness and the traditions of parliamentary consent were incompatible with service to the King. Opposition was in this sense created by the King's political and religious ideals, by a process of exclusion. Its product was increasing despair, and this despair was all the more bitter because it followed a period of intense hope.

A number of other factors operated against the overt expression of articulate and principled opposition. For some men their sense of propriety made them gloss over an outright statement of disaffected opinion, because this was distasteful to the Lords: in a long letter to Laud, detailing the way he had negated Sir Richard Strode's attempted "presentment about the shipping business" to the Devon grand jury in August 1639, Lord Chief Justice Finch remarked,

"I have made your Lordship a true relation in substance, the particulars at large being unfit for a letter. My suit is you would acquaint his Majesty herewith, to whom perhaps fame may convey the noise of it."(40)

Caution also governed what could be said and how it could be said, even in private correspondence: the Earl of Clare told his son never to

"put yourself into any man's curtesy under the witness of your own hand, especially to be a critique in state matters."(41)

Caution put a deliberate, careful, barrier between centre and localities: as Rowland St John advised Edward Montagu

"It is observed to be a rule of discreet policy in general business to make a general answer, lest by descending too far into particulars something should be fastened upon which may produce an unexpected prejudice."(42)

Annabel Patterson, writing on the conditions of censorship in early modern England, found

"political censorship was so pervasive that it rose to the forefront, at least among intellectuals and to some extent all literate people, as the central problem of consciousness and communication."(43)

All private correspondence could be opened and read. Wentworth and Laud habitually used a cypher in their correspondence, and in a letter of 20th May 1639, Wentworth's regular, gossipy correspondent the Reverend Garrard acknowledged that on some subjects he could not write frankly.

"a Libel found at Ware, which although I have heard what it is, yet I must not write it, no, not to a Privy Councillor, lest I incur a Censure in the Star Chamber."(44)

A complex system of encoding, interpretation and ambivalence governed the communication of political matters: hence it is often difficult to distinguish between opposition per se, local disputes and power struggles, or simple reluctance because the information supplied could be deliberately vague, or could evaporate upon closer inquiry from the higher authorities.(45) Sir Robert Phelps, for example, confessed he could not remember whether he had in fact uttered indiscreet words in public against ship money but he admitted he might very well have done.(46) Early in 1638 witnesses could not be found to corroborate an accusation made against the Vicar of Pattishall in Northamptonshire, claiming he had preached on the theme

"though God hath now given us such a king in his wrath to lay such taxes upon us, yet we must pity him and pray for him."

and that his example encouraged his parishioners in their own resistance.(47) In October 1639 Sir Alexander Denton was accused of negligence and disaffection as sheriff of Buckinghamshire, having repeatedly refused ship money for his Oxfordshire properties,

"It was demanded of him by reason of his remissness in this whether he believed ship money were legal, but he made answer he was no lawyer therefore he lacked knowledge to determine things of that nature".(48)

"In a time where innocency protects no man" there were good reasons why people were hesitant in expressing their views.(49) There could be very severe consequences for those who transgressed the rules of discretion. As the King's proclamations promised, the MPs imprisoned after the 1629 session were publicly punished, according to Sir Robert Heath, so "that ages yet to come may be warned of their

folly".(50) Alexander Jennings the constable of John Hampden's village of Stoke Mandeville in Buckinghamshire, went to prison for years for proclaiming that ship money was contrary to the Petition of Right.(51)

"It is an evill time," Robert Woodford lamented in his private diary "and the prudent hold their peace who so departe|eth from evill maketh himselfe a prey."(52)

A parliament remained the safest as well as the most proper place to air grievances and to seek redress:

"For my Rule which I will not transgress," wrote Wentworth in a letter of 1625, "is Never to contend with the Prerogative out of a Parliament; nor yet to contend with a King but when I am constrained thereunto, or else make Shipwreck of my Integrity and Peace of Conscience..."(53)

Social context was similarly important; discontent had to be voiced in ways which were socially and legally acceptable, especially as all ranks of the governing classes feared the contagious effects of an ill-example amongst the common people.(54) In the Commons in 1628 Sir Dudley Digges suggested MPs would

"rather cover the power the subjects have than let it be spoken openly abroad, that mean men may not know it, which perhaps if they should would be inconvenient."(55)

The immediate past also had its lessons impact; John Reeve has pointed out that after the collapse of the 1629 session "political conflict was channeled into the legal sphere" and the courts were increasingly used in a political fashion, as a means of both expressing and curtailing dissent.(56) During Edward Stephens' attempt to question the legality of knighthood fines in 1630, Baron Trevor warned against covert opposition,

"no gentlemen should think themselves champions for the country by taking away any right for the King."(57)

As political discourse became more difficult, conditions of restraint meant anxieties were "displaced" into a more subtle, more nuanced language.(58) Claims that ship money was an "innovation" against custom and law and was unacceptable to the country, were part of the protests made about the 1634 and 1635 writs in London, Devon, Essex and Northamptonshire.(59) In each case it was possible to take cover behind a screen of localism, to express public consternation as one of London's lawyers did in December 1634, denying "they had animated the City to oppose the King's service".(60) In each of these places the next stage of opposition was localist in scope: delaying tactics, rating disputes, resistance to distraint.(61) The amount of hidden discontent is very difficult to measure, and glimpses of it often depend on the chance survival of sources. Why did the churchwarden of Winfarthing in Norfolk write in his accounts for 1637 "Paid for the town lands for that unlawful tax of ship money"?(62) Would Sir Walter Norton have told the Lords the "disaffected", "prime refractories" in Lincolnshire were "treading a parliament way" if he had not been desperately trying to save his own reputation?(63)

Opposition to ship money became a major tactic in a factional and ideological struggle created in part by the King's personality and in part by changes in the nature of politics, but it was also more than simply part of a power struggle amongst the ruling elites. It is here that ideology becomes important, and historiographical controversy becomes fierce. Revisionism undermined Gardiner's picture of polarity, of divided allegiances and of accelerating conflict,

earlier weakened by research into the socio-economic structures of early Stuart England. Detailed analyses showed that a clear cut court-country split could not be substantiated, that every man struggled for the King's favour and that it was very difficult to see later civil war allegiances in the politics of the 1630s.(64) In 1629 the angry dissolution of the parliament was greeted as a calamity; in the autumn of 1640, after the almost complete collapse of royal authority, a parliament was believed to be the only way for King and people to be reconciled.(65) It has been powerfully argued that divisions in England were debates within a consensus, employing the common languages of law, scripture and history, that there was no fundamental disagreement about the nature of government.(66)

Yet this view is in itself suspect on a number of counts, not least because it ignores the underlying conflicts of the Personal Rule and it underestimates the impact of the King's personality. It also presupposes that the constraints operating in favour of consensus were successful and that there was no legitimation for political conflict in most people's thinking. This was clearly not the case, and, as has already been argued both court-country imagery and anti-popery could perpetuate and justify conflict.(67) Furthermore, developments in seventeenth century thinking which promoted ideals of de jure and de divino authority for King and bishops were themselves responses to fear of anarchy and disorder in the state as a result of social and religious changes.(68) The idea of a single, normative political ideology is itself a by-product of anti-whigery; ideological conflict is assumed not to exist because it did not exist in the classic whig sense of opposing political camps, but this assumption

itself rests on too narrow a definition of ideology. Ideology can be seen as an explanation of the social structure and of the purpose of government, as a means of ordering chaos and legitimating the social order. Ideology also exists to explain and enable exercise of power in a society, and to provide a rationale for obedience.(69) Kevin Sharpe and Steven Zwicker have argued in favour of a shared discourse of politics and of common languages, but common vocabulary does not create a common meaning, nor a common ideological framework. In a seventeenth century context it is possible to think of multi-faceted meanings attached to such common words as salvation, assurance or godliness, or of the difficulties of interpretation opened up during Hampden's Case about the real meaning of *salus populi suprema lex*.(70) In this sense of divergent meanings and values seventeenth century society articulated several distinct belief systems.

The impact of much recent work has re-emphasised precisely this ideological diversity, and has found a collision of values in early modern society. Jonathan Dollimore described renaissance tragedy as charged with ideological conflict, where the divine order is destroyed by discordant elements from within society itself. Significantly he found these conflicts concentrated on questions of religion, law and the exercise of power: each man being "the focus of political, social and ideological contradiction."(71) The problem was how to contain and curtail dislocation and difference, without the destruction of church and state or the loss of valued traditions and liberties. A divinely-ordained kingship instituted for the common good was the starting point of all English political discourse, and, whilst

there was agreement about the ends of government and about the necessity of unity, there was considerable disagreement about the means which should be pursued to achieve those ends. Michael Mendle discovered a continuing debate about the three estates of the realm was a common concern linking England and Scotland, sixteenth and seventeenth century politics.(72) James Daly argued that there were a range of meanings attached to the term absolute monarchy.(73) Johann Sommerville's study of the relationship between politics and political thought in early Stuart England demonstrated that on an intellectual level there were clearly differentiated views about the nature of the state, of authority and of the law.(74) Dispute existed about the nature of the King's powers and about their extent, as well as about their application. In particular, the nature of the royal prerogative and the powers of the state were the subjects of heated controversies, affecting the conduct of political life at the centre and in the localities.(75) Politics was becoming more complicated and previously unquestioned assumptions were being challenged by the force of events: differences emerged about such matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the nature of the Church of England, the accountability of MPs to their electorates, the duty of obedience to the Crown.(76) The impact of London's spectacular growth in the early modern period is only just beginning to be explored as a challenge to existing political and cultural norms.(77)

If many of these difficulties arose because of structural weaknesses in the English state, they were further complicated by the King's identification with a specifically absolutist approach to politics and an Arminian dominance in the Church. As the gentry of

Kent noticed about ship money, he preferred command and compulsion to request, and he expected unquestioning obedience.(78) He was by temperament inclined to be reserved, "more willing not to hear than to hear" according to Laud, and as the Venetian Ambassador noticed in 1630 "the nature of the king here is such that he obliges no one either in deed or word."(79) This left very little room for compromise and accomodation.

Two distinct developments changed the nature of politics during the early decades of the seventeenth century, and in the 1630s were to make the aristocratic opposition to ship money a powerful and formidable challenge. The first of these was the development of political consciousness, manifest in the increasing sophistication of electoral politics, in the growing interest in national politics and national news and in attachment to what was believed to be traditional.(80) Buckingham's dominance at court led not only to appeals to a political constituency beyond Whitehall and Westminster, it also led to conflict between local and central government, between "patriots" or "country men" and "courtiers" and "creatures".(81) The second was a growing awareness that the interests of governments and of subjects did not always coincide, seen in the tensions that developed over taxation, the conduct of war or the role and value of parliaments.(82) As a result of these changes, political life fractured: the court ceased to be the sole focus of politics, tensions were perceived between court and country, and older patterns of acquiescence and loyalty were altered.(83) This in turn fostered debate, and political matters were to become increasingly important. The law courts, the masques, the theatre, sermons and newsletters

were all used as media for the dissemination of political ideas during the ship money years, in an increasingly sophisticated way.

In terms of the opposition to ship money, and indeed to the Personal Rule in general, the significance of these changes lay in their appeal to a basic conservatism, a deep-seated resistance to change. By rejecting the present trend in both politics and religion as innovatory, divisive and dangerous, opposition undermined the ideological basis of the regime and identified it as subversive. At the same time, longing for unity and the actual experience of dislocation made the traditional explanations of conspiracy and evil counsel seem credible. Contemporaries remarked upon the importance of custom to the common people, and recent research has confirmed both the ancient roots of popular legalism and the shared traditions of governors and governed.(84) Classical texts, especially Livy, Tacitus and Aristotle, likewise reinforced the idea that corruption would overwhelm all polities unless virtue was pursued and ancient glories reinvigorated by moral purity.(85) In England preservation of public virtue was linked to a veneration for parliaments, the common law and an aristocratic political order, and it was quite common to look to Europe and cite the examples of other states where the peoples' liberties had been lost to an aggresssive state.(86) In Sir Robert Phelps famous phrase:

"We are the last monarchy in Christendom that yet retain our ancient rights and liberties."(87)-

The strength and the depths of this appeal to the past cannot be over-estimated, because it pervaded the outlook of every social class. Rough rhymes and mocking music revealed the essentially conservative.

traditionalist outlook of many of the common people and the wide range of values they shared with their betters.(88) The Elizabethan cult of chivalric Protestantism drew its strength from a common heritage of courtly, popular and religious traditions.(89) Pamphlets, ballads and plays constantly used classical and Elizabethan models as their frames of reference, and, in the 1630s, when there were so many constraints on public debate of politics, the drama continued to evoke images of lost glory and to use the classical past to interpret the present.(90)

Historical and legal precedents lay behind what Derek Hirst has called "an aggressive, fiscally-inspired legalism in the 1630s"; yet as it evolved the ship money service aroused unease and disquiet at odds with its careful preparation and presentation by the Council.(91) The problem was one of structure: ship money was in essence a radical programme, using traditional forms and traditional language in an innovatory fashion, setting up a different sort of relationship between government and localities, using the law in a novel and ultimately disturbing way. In opposing it as an "imposition, an innovation, against the liberty of the subject and a bar to parliaments" Lord Saye's faction drew upon a wide body of support.(92) They shared a common vocabulary of conflict and vigilance, a common heritage in the law and a common discontent: a battle for power at court substantiated tensions and fears in a much wider context of popular politics. How that opposition was expressed depended upon a shifting balance between legal, political and religious grievances and certain cultural variables. Constraints operating against conflict and promoting consensus had to be

overcome: this meant finding an appropriate avenue of protest and an appropriate language. Political consciousness and a sympathy with communities beyond the purely local were also necessary as well as some legal sophistication and an ability to relate the tortuous arguments of the lawyers to the local situation. Aristocratic faction and the resort to law leading to Hampden's Case, reveals the wider context of hope, evangelical fervour, discontent and ideological division.

1: ARISTOCRATIC FACTION, HAMPDEN'S CASE AND THE RESORT TO LAW

"If Parliaments be taken away, mischiefs and disorders must needs abound without any possibility of good laws to reform them, and what readier way can there be to distractions betwixt the king and people, to tumults and disorders in the state than this?"

John Pym in the 1629 Session of Parliament. (93)

"The causes and motions of seditions are, innovation in religion, alteration of laws and customs, breaking of privileges, general oppression, advancement of unworthy persons, strangers, dearths, disbanded soldiers, factions grown desperate; and whatsoever in offending people joineth and knitteth them in common cause."

Francis Bacon, "Of Seditions and Troubles". (94)

The overwhelming ambition shared by the men who disliked "new counsels" and formed the core of opposition to ship money, was to serve the King. Included in their numbers were some of the most powerful and ambitious men in England, who were possessed of considerable landed and personal influence and had claims by birth to be included in the King's counsels. They were later dubbed by Windebank as "the rebels" or by Rosingham simply as "the country lords" and their number included Hertford, Bedford, Essex and Warwick, Brooke, Saye, Mandeville and Wharton. (95) Their friends and clients included leading county gentry like the Barnardistons, the Barringtons, John Hampden, Richard Knightley and Sir John Dryden, ambitious politicians like John Pym and lawyers like Robert Mason and John Crew. Bonds created by kinship and friendship linked them to other important groups: to the wealthy, mercantile families like the Cockayne family in the City of London, or Lord Falkland's circle at Great Tew, the Queen's faction at court led by Warwick's half-brother Lord Holland, and beyond that to the milieu of international

Protestantism centred around Elizabeth of Bohemia.(96) They were highly motivated and articulate politicians, working together in both Houses of Parliament in the 1620s and united by a common commitment to a a pro-war, pro-parliament and anti-Arminian political stance, described by Patrick Collinson and Simon Adams as political puritanism.(97)

These men regarded themselves as guardians of threatened values, particularly what they thought of as the values of the Elizabethan world. They represented a continuity with that world, most of their leaders were the heirs of the Protestants at Elizabeth's court and had served Prince Henry, the King's much lamented brother who had died in 1612.(98) They were also displaced men, leaders deprived of the chance to lead, slighted first by Buckingham and his creatures, and then by the career politicians of the Personal Rule. Clarendon described the Earl of Warwick as "in no Grace at Court", Saye as "of great parts and of the highest ambition", and he thought Essex was consumed with bitterness towards the court(99) It is striking how few of the great nobles actually had access to power in Charles I's counsels and how bitterly they resented their exclusion. Nor were they alone in their disdain, Saye's hostility to Laud as "a man of mean birth" was matched by Clarendon's astonishment when Bishop Juxon became Lord Treasurer in 1636.(100) Clarendon wrote of the Earl of Bedford "he only intended to make himself and his friends great at Court", and according to Lord Saye the aims of this group were to secure

"the king's wealth and greatness, as it may stand with their own rights and liberty, and the ende of his government."(101)

Allied with this was a longing for further reformation and dismay at present trends: commenting on the English scene in 1635, the exiled Protestant Samuel Hartlib wrote,

"Domestical, ecclesiastical, political discipline should be truly revived as the only means of reformation, which is utterly neglected or much corrupted, et the domestical quite decayed."(102)

However, the insurmountable barrier to their advancement lay in the dislike and the distrust the King felt for their views, believing they

"led a mult[itude] affect[ionate] into a tumult of disloyalty."(103)

He also detested the "popularity" of their power base: not democratic politics in any modern sense of the word, but rather traditions of godliness, popular legalism and participatory government which he believed were incompatible with authority and order.(104)

This group of the dispossessed became significant because they became organised and they continued to use the kinds of collective action first tried out during the Forced Loan, particularly non co-operation with prerogative policies and recourse to the courts to clarify the law.(105) Although the evidence is difficult, because it is incomplete and patchy, it is nevertheless possible to show that men who were unhappy with Church and State met regularly, acted collectively and were influential beyond their own immediate circles. The various colonial companies dedicated to policies of emigration, colonisation and privateering, provided one such point of contact, particularly the Providence Island Company.(106) Patronage of foreign Protestants was another common concern: Samuel Hartlib,

friend of the Queen of Bohemia and exiled in London, regularly saw, chatted to and borrowed books from Saye, Brooke, Pym, St. John, Bastwick and Hampden - Hartlib's Ephemerides, a sort of cross between a correspondence record and commonplace book, provides striking evidence of a circle of like-minded men out of sympathy with the present trend of affairs in church and state.(107) John Hampden took advise from his lawyer friends including Bulstrode Whitelocke, about ship money in early 1636.(108) Oliver St John, a cousin of Hampden and connected by marriage to the Barrington clan, was "my Lord Bedford's only favorite", his legal adviser, counsel for Burton, Hampden and Danvers and Pargiter, Northamptonshire gentlemen who doubted the legality of coat and conduct money.(109) Hampden's other counsel Robert Holborne acted for Hampden, for Lord Saye and for some of the London ship money defaulters.(110) Robert Mason was successively counsel for imprisoned MPs, for Edward Stephens in his Exchequer Case about knighthood fines and the Recorder of London responsible for the anti-ship money petition of early 1635.(111) Further evidence can also be gleaned from the round of social visits, characteristic of aristocratic life, and the contacts made with clients, dependents and tenants. Bishop Williams of Lincoln, dismissed from office because of his advocacy of "a parliamentary way" and enemy of Laudianism, was a cousin of Hampden and educated the sons of Hertford, Leicester, Pembroke and Salisbury in his household.(112) Philip Massinger, whose play "The King and the Subject" in 1638 was considered "too insolent" by the King, was also a friend of Lord Saye's nephew Henry Parker later author of "The Case of Ship Money Briefly Discours'd", "the first intellectually significant

political pamphlet of the Long Parliament era"(113)

Clarendon later described

"a kind of fraternity of many persons of good condition, who chose to live together in one family at a gentleman's house of a fair fortune, near the place where the lord Mandevil lived with others of that *classis* resorted, and maintained a joint and mutual correspondence and conversation together with much familiarity and friendship..."(114)

The diary of Thomas Dugard, a minor Warwickshire cleric whose patron was Lord Brooke, illustrates the range and diversity of the circle he moved in, united by dissatisfaction with Charles's policies. Through these contacts he met Lord Saye, Richard Knightley and John Pym.(115) Similar circles can be reconstructed from the Earl of Clare's letter books, and a glimpse of the friendships of like-minded godly men appears in Robert Woodford's diary or in the Winthrop correspondence.(116) Extensive ties of kinship and influence, a common commitment to traditions of godliness and the law, and above all keeping state, made these Lords prominent and familiar figures in many parts of southern and midland England. When Warwick in 1637 and Bedford in 1640 promised the King they would manage a parliament to everyone's satisfaction, they knew they could draw upon the support of extensive chains of loyalty.(117) This kind of frequent, reciprocal contact was particularly important in an age of personal politics, where loyalties were organised along deferential lines and where the traditions of good lordship still had a real meaning.(118) They were even more important given the narrow base of the Privy Council, the exclusive, elitist and cosmopolitan nature of court culture in the 1630s and above all, the King's withdrawn and distant

style of kingship.(119)

Contacts such as these help to explain how a community of interest developed between the godly and their neighbours, which was eventually to enhance the reputation and importance of political Puritanism. Part of the appeal of godliness lay in the way it reinforced the tradition, hierarchy and order thought necessary for society to function, by allowing each person a place and a role set out by God:

"God hath so disposed every one's several place, as there is not anyone, but in some respect is under another."
(120)

God's providence gave men laws, discernable through the use of "right reason" and sanctioned by history and custom; it followed that since God worked in human history, the laws and customs of the ancient past had God's sanction because he had allowed them to withstand the test of time.(121) Parallels can be drawn between respect for the scriptures as the revealed word of God and source of guidance for a Christian life, and the widespread veneration of legal documents, deeds and charters "as icons, both symbols and guarantees of abstract rights."(122) It was the authority of the law which made a commonwealth possible, and ensured that the people's liberties and the King's prerogative sustained each other in mutual harmony: this was common rhetoric, heard in parliaments and at numerous occasions of local government. An illustration of this view of the law as the life of the commonwealth can be seen in the charges to the grand jury of Bedfordshire, given in 1643 by Sir William Boteler who had been a diligent ship money sheriff responsible for the 1637 writ and who subsequently sided with the Parliament.

"1. First there is *Pax spiritualis*, A Spirituall Peace, A Peace betweene God & Man; & this is provided for by those Lawes which Concerne the Honour & service of Allmighty God. Then-

2. There is *Pax Politica*, A Politique Peace, A Peace of Authority and Subjection, A Peace of Commaund & Obedience, A Peace in the Literall Sense between Man & Man, but vyet in a figurative sense (By Vertue of *Dixi quod Dei estis*) it is Capable of a Diviner Title; & this peace is provided for by those Lawes which Concerne Us in relacion to the King. And then-

3. There is *Pax Oeconomica*, An Oeconomical Peace. A Peace of inhabitants as I may so call it, A peace of equality without any circumstances of distinction, in which the meanest subject hath an immediate interest as well as the greatest; & this peace is provided for by those Lawes which in a more generall manner are enacted for the good of the Body Politique."(123)

The strength of popular legalism and its potential as a political force has been seriously underestimated by historians preoccupied with localism. The high value placed on traditional ways united men of different social ranks, especially when they felt threatened by innovation. This encouraged an identification between respect for the law and a value for parliaments, with a pattern of participative government and an emphasis on political community. Lord Saye,

"had a very great authority with the discontented party throughout the kingdom, and a good reputation with those who were not, who believed him to be a wise man, and of a very useful temper in an age of license, and one who would adhere to the law."(124)

During the early 1630s the King's aversion to another parliament, the deaths of Abbot, Dorchester and Pembroke and the power enjoyed by Laud and the Spanish faction at court made this group increasingly marginal in court politics.(125) A major change came in January 1635 when Portland died. Rumours of a parliament began to circulate again, since Portland was thought to be the

architect of current policies and was believed to have forestalled a parliament in order to keep himself safe from impeachment.(126) The uncertainty which had characterised European affairs when ship money was planned in 1634, continued and was exacerbated by the efforts of the French to secure Charles in an alliance against Spain, after they entered the war in the spring of 1635.(127) Pro-French and pro-Spanish influences were used to press their candidates for the vacant office of Lord Treasurer on the King, and for the first time the Queen emerged as a significant political influence in her own right, now that her brother had sent Seneterre, who was charming and personable, to persuade her into "showing all affection for France".(128) The French had already proposed an alliance with England and the Dutch, but in the spring and summer of 1635 their influence was further strengthened by Sir Thomas Roe's overtures to the Dutch and to Elizabeth of Bohemia. Throughout 1635 and 1636 Roe warned Elizabeth that she must abandon grandiose plans for a land army which her brother found "neither fit nor feasible", overcome her detestation of the French and accept whatever help was on offer for her sons.(129) Thus, a powerful alliance of factions was created in the summer of 1635, united by hostility to the Spanish faction and dislike of English neutrality: the political scene of 1629 was re-created, including agitation for a parliament.(130)

Just after the first national ship money writs were issued in August 1635, the French Ambassador was being entertained by the Earl of Bedford.(131) According to the Venetian Ambassador in September 1635, the French, the Queen's party and the "puritans" were willing to offer the King not just "the affection of his subjects" but also "a

great sum of money" if he would summon a parliament.(132). During the beautiful Indian summer of 1635, he wrote,

"the greater part of the nobility is gathering in this city. But with the court away idleness and ennui abound, and they try to divert themselves by discussing what are considered the most essential affairs. So far as the special interests of the crown are concerned, some represent matters as they really feel them, others as they wish them to be. The one thing they all join in maintaining with vigour is the report that parliament will meet soon. Their confidence in this is due to the necessity in which they believe the king to be placed to assist the cause of the Palatinate.... But although this is a very essential point, it does not trouble them much at Court,..."(133)

Enthusiasm for war gripped "the gallants at court".(134) Over the next year and a half, whilst the Queen continued to press the King to go to war, those of the aristocracy who wanted to see a parliament set about a campaign of resistance to ship money. This was the first form of opposition, before it became clear that the King would not abandon the service and before it became apparent that he was also prepared to go to war without summoning a parliament. The horrible spectre of war without parliamentary support had dire implications for Warwick and Saye's faction, it represented a significant break with tradition and it would consign proponents of a more traditional approach into a perpetual, political darkness.

Initially, resistance to ship money concentrated on delaying tactics with the aim of forcing the King to abandon ship money, as refusals and resistance to ship money had done in 1628.(135) The writs and the sheriffs' warrants to the constables called for prompt action to safeguard "the safety and defence of his Majesty's subjects in these troublesome and warlike times."(136) This could be

interpreted as a prelude to a parliament.(137) It is also possible there was a legal rationale behind these delaying tactics because during Hampden's Case Sir Humphrey Davenport found against the Crown on the grounds that the original writ of 4th August 1635

"being a writ irreturnable,... is to command a positive thing to be done within such a time; if it be not done accordingly, there is an end of the force of that writ... and being not returnable, is but dead in law..."(138)

This point was not made by Hampden's own counsel, but the circumstances of 1638 were radically different: Holborne and St John were anxious to prove that ship money was a tax needing parliamentary consent, and in its existing form contrary to the liberty and property of the subject.(139) Lord Saye's own case questioned the sufficiency of the writ as authority for distraint.(140) Lack of clear evidence means the grounds for other protests, such as the Earl of Lincoln's, are obscure.(141) Nevertheless, some of the most acute legal minds were part of the Saye-Brooke-Warwick circle, including John Pym who was at this time staying with Richard Knightley in Northamptonshire where the service became bogged down in delay and prevarication, and where there was an early resort to law at a local level.(142) There is also a striking co-incidence in the outbreak of Somerset rating petitions organised by Sir Robert Phelps: Sir Robert had regular newsletters from London and the first Somerset petitions reached the Council in the spring of 1635, just as rumours of a parliament were circulating.(143)

"Treading a parliament way" involved using the disputes and unhappiness engendered by the service to undermine its acceptability to the King and the Lords.(144) From September 1635 a number of

counties closely associated with the Saye-Warwick circle emerged as particularly troublesome. On 19th October the chief constables of Bloxham hundred in Oxfordshire told Sir Peter Wentwrth, who was the sheriff, that they could not charge the hundred for £209 ship money because the men they had summoned to help them assess denied the authority of the warrant. They refused to give the names of any of the doubters and they refused to make the assessment themselves, similar replies came from some of the petty constables in Banbury hundred.(145) A couple of months later Sir Peter wrote "the service hath a strong opposition", which was concentrated in the northern part of the shire where Lord Saye's influence was very strong, where there was gentry resistance to the service, and where opposition was voiced in legal and ideological terms.(146) In Northamptonshire a bitter contest about the way to rate the county brought assessment to a halt until December 1635.(147) Once Sir John Dryden had been forced to abandon his own assessment, he settled upon the statute of 23 Henry VI cap 3 as his way out, confessing that he believed it was illegal for him to continue as sheriff after he had spent twelve months in office.(148) After the Council ridiculed that idea, rating disputes at hundred, parish and personal level blossomed.(149) When Charles Cockayne replaced Sir John he found the service surrounded by hostility throughout the time of his shrievalty: at the beginning of October 1636, with only a month left of his term of office he confessed to Archbishop Laud

"I have in obedience to his Majesty bent my uttermost endeavour to perform the service imposed upon this county for shipping; wherein (contrary to my hope - and expectation) I find much difficulty, for since few or none will pay what they are assessed without distress; others either wilfully oppose or disturb my servants and

officers in making distresses... And Lastly others intending (as I conceive) to hinder this service, will by no fair persuasion yeld their assistance for the equal assessing of themselves, inhabitants and other tenants within their parishes according to due proportion; wherupon in obedience to your gracious commands for expedition I have imposed the whole tax of some towns on some of the sufficientest inhabitants, and caused ditresses to be made accordingly;..."(150)

In Essex the hundreds of Ongar, Harlow, Rochford, and Barstaple, most closely associated with the Earl of Warwick and his connections and fierce in their resistance to the Forced Loan, were at the centre of resistance.(151) They harrassed the sheriff Sir Cranmer Harriss, refusing, delaying, prevaricating and disputing about ship money well into 1636.(152) The new sheriff Sir Humphrey Mildmay battled on, but he was convinced resistance was being encouraged from above. In July 1636 he told the Lords,

"I will do the uttermost of my duty to bring in all behind ... and hope your Lordships will think I do what I can from piece to piece, for I protest there is no penny that is not forced, God help me, amongst the people."
(153)

At the end of the year he blamed the worst arrears in the country on "a generation of discipliners, very zealous in all causes that concern the hindrance of his majesty's service", encouraged by the active support of "such as I hope the board knows right well... and what their good wills are to this service."(154)

This same community of opposition, between nobility, gentry and the local communities can be discerned in other counties. In a letter of 19th December the sheriff of Gloucestershire reported he had collected £2,900 of the county's charge of £5,500 but faced considerable passive resistance,

"Divers men give dilatory answers and others stand mute and say nothing."(155)

A month later he wrote "Divers of the chiefest gents of the county have paid nothing" and that there were refusals to return amongst the petty constables in the hundreds of Slaughter and Kingsmill.(156) The Lords suspected collusion between landlord and tenants, and refusers included Lord Saye, Nathaniel Stephens, Henry Poole and John Dutton.(157) In Warwickshire, where Lord Brooke's influence lay and where Ann Hughes found significant continuity in the gentry's hostile attitudes to prerogative taxation, Sir Greville Verney was convinced covert opposition lay behind the rating disputes in the county:

"in point of cunning they think to put off the payment and none shall appear to be in default." he wrote on 22nd may 1635, and on 25th May he told Nicholas, "it groweth to be a piece of cunning in the country not to agree of any levies or assessments but to leave me to be puzzled herein...."(158)

There is a interesting glimpse of Buckinghamshire in Sir Peter Temple's angry remark to his mother in July 1636, when he believed that the King had seriously misjudged him:

"The business is that Mr Sheriff did possess the King that I was as backward as any of the gentlemen of the country."(159)

Gentry hostility, Puritan opposition and local resistance may also help to explain the extraordinary dilatoriness of the Bedfordshire sheriffs Humphrey Monnoux and Richard Gery, especially as the Bedfordshire subsidymen had publicly decided in 1626 "Not to give to his majesty in this way, but in a parliamentary way."(160) The second sheriff Richard Gery summarised his difficulties in April 1636:

"my predecessor in office having gathered up whatsoever would willingly and readily be paid, the residue that is left to collect having to be compelled and forced by authority or not to be had. The liberty men take in their discourse concerning the service in public and in private meetings, the many complaints of the parties grieved by unjust and unequal taxes that come before me by your Lordships' special reference and otherwise, are numerous and retard the service, making it a work of much difficulty..."(161)

In July 1634 the Chancellor of the diocese of Lincoln wrote of "great abettors" of ecclesiastical nonconformity in Buckinghamshire and Bedfordshire; in the summer of 1636 Nicholas singled out the sheriffs of these counties as negligent in the extreme and in early 1637 the three senior members of the St John family, the Earl of Bolingbroke, his oldest son Lord St John and his brother Sir Beauchamp St John were removed from the Commission of the Peace.(162) A similar picture emerges in Dorset where the first sheriff was Sir Thomas Trenchard "a favourer of the Puritans" whom the Council suspected of deliberate negligence.(163) In the spring there were substantial arrears from the tithing of Charminster where he lived and his brother was closely questioned by the Lords.(164) Sherborne hundred, power base of the the Digby family and their "multiplicity of tenants", delayed, petitioned, questioned and did not pay.(165) Leading godly magistrates, Sir Walter Earle and John Browne the sheriff's own brother-in-law, were refusing to pay ship money throughout 1636 and encouraging recalcitrance amongst their dependents.(166) Old alliances were revived: Sir Walter Earle had refused the Loan, he and Lord Saye were old allies.(167) Rumours of extortion and oppression of the poor aggravated the situation and John Freake wrote to Nicholas in October that "the poorer sort ... pay this like drops of blood"(168)

Where there is sufficient evidence this picture of delay, prevarication and attempted sabotage in the hope of a parliament can be confirmed at a more immediately local level. Sir Walter Norton's blatant dishonesty revealed significant unease and discontent amongst the gentry of Lincolnshire.(169) This would probably have been concealed behind successful collection of the county's full charge in 1635, had not Sir Walter been desperate to use anything to discredit his enemies. He named Lord Saye, the Earl of Lincoln, the Bishop of Lincoln, as well as some of the Deputy-Lieutenants, Charles Ogle, Sir John Hatcher, Sir John and Sir Christopher Wray and Sir Anthony Irby as ship money defaulters in March 1636.(170) Later in the year Sir Walter accused them of "treading a parliament way" and claimed his public credit was being destroyed by "those who were the principal opposers of the loan and prime refractories against the ship".(171) Banbury, Bedford and Northampton, citadels of godliness closely tied to leading county families, were all slow and troublesome.(172) The borough of Marlborough, dominated by Sir Francis Seymour, was persistently in arrears and the bailiff was rebuked by the Lords at the end of August 1636.(173) Seymour's brother the Earl of Hertford had been sent for about ship money the previous autumn, and Sir Francis himself believed the service was illegal: in 1639 he was quite frank with the Lords

"he had against his conscience, and upon the importunities of his friends, paid that money twice, but now his conscience would suffer him no more to do a thing (as he thought) so contrary to law and to the liberty of a subject,"(174)

In Cambridgeshire Samuel Wright, the parson of Doddington, was

rebuked by the Lords for taking legal action against the constable, and his patron Sir John Peytom, yet another man known to be out of sympathy with present counsels, was subsequently removed from the Commission of the Peace.(175) This legal action involving questioning distraint by a writ of replevin shares many common features with a similar attempt by William Strode in Somerset, which Barnes considered to be a deliberate sabotage.(176)

The initial impact of this disobedience is hard to measure and by late 1635 there were contradictory reports about the effectiveness of opposition. Garrard wrote to Wentworth, "I do not hear of any numbers that are refusers", whereas at the same time the Venetian Ambassador reported that "many refused" ship money payments and "very many declare them notable".(177) In November 1635 the Prince Palatine arrived in London: he was welcomed with feasts and public celebrations "both in the Court and out of it" and offered support by many of the leading noblemen, including Bedford and Warwick and the Queen's men Northumberland and Holland.(178) However, the King did not react in the way it was hoped he would. His first response was to summon those of the leading men who were unhappy and to speak to them in person, his second was to continue with plans for a war but not to commit himself to a parliamentary way.(179) In a confidential dispatch written in code on January 11th 1636, the Venetian Ambassador told the Doge,

"The most ardent parliamentarians think of renewing their activities and of devoting their last efforts to induce the king, if possible, to convoke parliament. They use many means to this end and do not neglect the most subtle and artful. The reluctance to pay the contributions for the new fleet is not placed among the least, while on the other side everything is done to show the king the necessity of being well armed at sea;... They further let

it be understood that they will afford his Majesty every satisfaction that he can desire, as they are determined not only to keep their eyes on the present, but on what may happen in the future, and to procure in every way the welfare of the kingdom, the unimpaired reputation of the crown and above all not to depart in any way from the king's pleasure, whom they will always be ready to serve. With these vain hopes they go about with smooth and flattering words, promising themselves some happy result; but those who are more judicious and less prejudiced know that this is merely running after shadows, because all experience has shown the king immovable and determined about not taking this step..."(180)

Against this group who were trying to get into power from the outside, were ranged those who already had power in their hands and were afraid of the consequences of an aggressive foreign policy and a heavy dependence on a parliament. In 1635-7, in contrast to 1628 or 1639, no-one actually in the Privy Council was pressing for a parliament, even though some like Lord Keeper Coventry were "most affectionate" to the Palatine cause.(181) In February 1636, the King's brother-in-law the Duke of Savoy urged him "to treat with his arms in his hands".(182) When Arundel returned home from Ratisbon in disgust at the end of 1636, he used

"round dealing... in telling his Majesty that all faire meane with Austria is in vaine for doing any good for the Elector Palatine."(183)

None of the King's closest advisers seem to have been in favour of a parliament.

It is possible to identify three distinct shades of opinion within the Privy Council during 1636 and 1637. Closely identified with the existing trend of pro-Spanish neutrality were Windebank, Laud, who was afraid a parliament would deprive him of his offices if not his life, and Wentworth who believed that his own honour and

credit, as well as the King's, would be destroyed. Wentworth clearly believed that any promises of a compliant parliament were worthless:

"Good my Lord," he urged Laud in April 1637, "if it be not too late use your best to divert us from this War: for I forsee nothing in it but Distractions to his Majesty's Affairs and mighty Dangers to us that must be Ministers, albeit not Authors of the Counsel. It will necessarily put the King into all high Ways possible, else he will not be able to subsist under the Charge of it: and if these fail, the next will be but the sacrificing those that have been his Ministers therein. I profess I will readily lay down my Life to serve my Master, my Heart should give him that very freely; but it would something trouble me to find even those, that drew and engaged him in all those Mischiefs, busy about me themselves in fitting the Halter about my Neck, and in tying the Knot sure that it did not slip, as if they were the Persons in the whole World the most innocent of Guilt, howbeit in truth as Black as Hell itself, and on whom alone the Punishment ought to lye."
(184)

In spite of the Queen's attempts to woo Cottington, he continued to protect Spanish interests at court.(185) A second group were the moderate Councillors who had played a significant role in urging the King to summon a parliament in 1628, principally, Manchester and Coventry whose aim seems to have been to secure a balance between the prerogative, as seen in ship money management, and the possibility of a successful parliament.(186) Attached to this group were those who wanted to serve the King as he desired, Juxon, Finch, and probably Coke. The third group had links with the Queen's faction and with groups outside the court, these were the pro-French, pro-war party including Northumberland, Pembroke, Lennox and Hamilton.(187) War and a parliament were not necessarily synonymous for these men, as can be seen in Hamilton's attempt to get Cranfield back into government in 1637; a parliament was desirable but their most important priority was to protect the cause of the Prince

Palatine.(188) The character of the Council at this time, therefore made it far more likely that ship money would be retained rather than abandoned, regardless of the pressures for a French alliance and a war.

This analysis of the Privy Council in 1636 helps to explain the line of action which was taken against opponents of ship money who were willing to use disobedience as a means of putting pressure on the King. What the Council did was to undermine the power base of the Saye-Warwick group, by trying to break the community of interest they had in the localities. Dilatory tactics were reported to the Council from Oxfordshire, Gloucestershire, Essex and Buckinghamshire in December 1635.(189) Gentry refusals in Cornwall, obstructive JPs in Suffolk and wealthy tax payers absconding from Bristol were all dealt with in the early months of 1636.(190) The Lords kept a close eye on London and Middlesex ship money, keeping the authorities there under constant pressure after a slow start to the service and curtailing the opportunity for public protests.(191) In February 1636 the Venetian Ambassador believed opponents of ship money were fighting for a lost cause, "only grasping at shadows."(192) A hard line was taken against sheriffs, constables and bailiffs from counties associated with persistent problems and support was given to sheriffs like Sir Humphrey Mildmay and William Leigh who were willing to put duty to the King before other loyalties.(193) Other sheriffs such as Sir Peter Temple in Buckinghamshire and Sir Greville Verney in Warwickshire were forced into diligence by fear of the King's displeasure and by the Council's unremitting pressure for names, details, sales of distresses, action on rating disputes, money

to Sir William Russell.(194) In the summer of 1636 measures were taken to undermine collusion between Lord Saye and his Gloucestershire tenants, and against suspected abuse of lordships of hundreds, where bailiffs employed by gentry opposed to the service were frustrating collection.(195) The whole power base of opposition was openly attacked at the end of the year when sheriffs were ordered to return the names of JPs, Deputy-Lieutenants and Lord Lieutenants who had refused to pay ship money or had been distrained. The Commission of the Peace was then purged, and opponents of the service dismissed from the Bench.(196)

The association between aristocratic support for the Prince Palatine, dislike of ship money and desire for a parliament was intensified with the second ship money writ issued in October 1636. Delaying tactics and disruptions were continued, although they had not succeeded in destroying the service and they did not convince Charles "he must of necessity have recourse to parliament."(197) Two methods were then adopted in order to challenge the existing status quo publicly. The first was legal dispute: Lord Saye and his son-in-law the Earl of Lincoln were both involved in suing local officers who had distrained their goods for assessments in Gloucestershire and Lincolnshire.(198) Lord Saye's case achieved considerable publicity and was discussed in political circles at court and in the localities, but it was not the only challenge to the legality of ship money made during the early months of the 1636 writ.(199) Much to the annoyance of Sir Humphrey Mildmay, Thomas Lathom an Essex Loan refuser with a ship money grudge went

"running to the King's Bench to encumber us with suits to the great loss and disturbance of us that are alas

tormented."(200)

William Stroude of Barrington in Somerset, another loan refuser, initiated a tortuous legal complaint, using a writ of replevin to disturb Somerset ship money and to question the honesty of its local administration.(201) Legal challenges made in London, Gloucestershire and Shropshire were frustrated by the actions of the Judges.(202) The reasoning behind these tactics is obvious. By late 1636 the King was confident that he could fight a defensive war on behalf of his nephew, using the naval strength paid for by ship money, a legal judgement against ship money would make any such non-parliamentary course impossible.(203) The first version of Prynne's "An Humble Remonstrance", condemning ship money as illegal and insupportable, was probably written at this time before the Judges' Opinion changed the definition of the service. It was discreetly circulated.(204)

The second tactic used was to appeal directly to the King on behalf of the kingdom and the Palatinate cause. In December 1636 the Earl of Danby "moved as many believe by the incitement of the leading men of the realm" wrote to the King:

"He took the liberty to represent to him the extent of the outcry of the people and the discontent of the great, and the scandals which seem imminent everywhere, because in a manner never before practised and repugnant to the fundamental laws of the realm, they proposed to continue to burden his subjects with impositions and extraordinary taxes, without caring about undermining the prerogatives which their forefathers always and they themselves up to the present time had enjoyed in complete liberty.... He begs him to consider how good it will be to satisfy his subjects by summoning a parliament."(205)

Charles was furious. A month later in January 1637 Warwick spoke to the King and told him to his face:

"his tenants or farmers were all old and accustomed to the mild rule of Queen Elizabeth and King James, and could not bring themselves to consent to such notable prejudices. They would consider their fault too grave if they died under the stigma of having, at the end of their lives, signed away the liberties of the realm and of their own free will deprived their posterity of those benefits which had been left to them uncontaminated as a sacred treasure by their ancestors....He therefore begged his majesty to have a gracious regard for the content of his subjects which is none other, after all than his own service, since all are most desirous of sacrificing to the will of their master their substance, their blood and their children, if they saw it was done by the proper chanel,..."(206)

"Secret meetings" of many of the nobility took place at the same time and in "a final effort to bring the forms of government back to their former state", plans were being made to petition for a parliament.(207) There were certainly plans to present a version of Prynne's "Remonstrance" against the legality of ship money, although these were abandoned.(208)

Nevertheless some still cherished hopes that the King would prefer to avoid legal confrontation:

"There is some kind of hope that some of them have", wrote Rossingham in his newsletter of 7th February 1637, "that my lords grace and some others of the Lords, will join the King to remit this trial, to let fall the ship money, then call a parlizment. But, for aught I can learn, this is a most fond fancy."(209)

Such plans and speculations were frustrated by the Crown's moves towards legal conformity, and by an aggressive attack upon opponents of ship money amongst the better sort.(210) The King's counsel forestalled the hearing of Lord Saye's case "upon an action of trover" which Saye wanted heard in the King's Bench and not at the assizes.(211) In February 1637 Charles personally asked the Judges to

endorse the present structure of ship money and their apparent conformity was rapidly and widely publicised.(212) Permission was then given for any legal cases involving ship money to be heard, although some of the Kent gentry presumed the King now had such an absolute legal right that they doubted "whether my Lord say did well to bring it to a tryall".(213)

The Venetian Ambassador believed "fear of the penalty" rapidly destroyed the credibility of aristocratic opposition to ship money with the common people.(214) Yet Clarendon identified the Judges' Opinion as a turning point, away from willing obedience, towards reluctance, fear and opposition.(215) Conformity was not uniform or cheerful. Sir Roger Twysden described "a kind of defection in their very looks" when the Judges' Opinion was read at the Maidstone Assizes.(216) At the end of February Sir Robert Banister wrote to Nicholas:

"In my last letter I expressed my hopes of bringing the county of Northampton to a payment of ship money at the last assizes... and I rather believed in their conformity for that the Judges' Opinion being declared for the legality of those proceedings would have so satisfied the people, that they would have proceeded to assessing and paying with more readiness than formerly... But they failing my expectation I have been enforced to entreat you to make known my proceedings to their Lordships..."(217)

In Cambridgeshire the sheriff reported there were no refusers but people in his county were "backward and slow as men that are loath to part with their money."(218) In Rutland Sir Edward Harrington experienced few real difficulties,

"except some few towns wherein some particular persons do obstinately refuse to pay anything (as they pretend a matter of conscience) and so by their ill example they do not only hinder the towns wherein they dwell, but

encourage other towns to do the like, which doth put me to much trouble. I have distrained some of them and am resolved to take the same course with the rest, if they still persist and stand out; and I punish the choicest of them that have good personal estates by raising their assessments to a greater proportion than they were before."(219)

In March 1637 Garrard sent news to Wentworth of the appeal made by Sir Henry Anderson "a little man who served much in Parliaments" to the King:

"to whom I hear he made a most Parliamentary Speech, disliking the Ways they went in these Times, dissuading the King wholly from further taking the Ship-Monies, and moving his Majesty to return to the old way by parliaments."

The King was reported to be "very angry at his Boldness and Sauciness".(220) Charles did not like having his hand forced, and Wentworth advised him to be more secure of his independence of faction before risking either a war or a parliament. In a memorandum written at this time the Lord-Deputy's advise ran counter to Charles's first inclination for a naval war secured by ship money. Wentworth did not under-estimate his opponents, he recognised them as formidable enemies and he saw the success of ship money as more precarious and partial than other more ostensibly confident commentators.

"I am not able to resolve myself, whether the Shipping Monies be brought in this Year as readily as they were in the last, or be as universally assented to, and settled in such a Perfect Way, as to ground so great an Action upon the uninterrupted constant payment thereof. Or whether his Majesty being engaged in a War might embolden the ill-affected to grow more peevish and backwards in their payments, finding him not at so much Leisure to bridle and discipline their Untowardness as in Time of Peace... If thr Fleet now going forth should fall into any Misfortune... what Likelihood is there, that the Subject will presently without Stop, make up the Breach by, a

second Levy? That failing, what other Means hath the Crown to reinforce and restore it without calling a parliament, and what Wisdom doth advise the summoning one in a Time so conditioned."(221)

Public scorn was poured upon those who opposed the service, but other evidence indicates that the government took the challenge of opposition seriously.(222)

Clamp down on defaulters proceeded according to the formula devised of writs of certiorari, mittimus and scire facias.(223) Political and religious dissidents were also taken in hand. Warwick was probably warned not to engage in any more ship money obstruction in Essex, possibly being threatened with loss of his local influence.(224) In June Star Chamber proceedings were initiated against Lord Saye for depopulating three Lincolnshire farms and enclosing pastures.(225) Action was also taken against the Providence Island Company.(226) Severe and exemplary punishments were imposed on Burton, Bastwick and Prynne.(227) Bishop Williams of Lincoln, who was something of a popular hero, was disgraced, heavily fined and imprisoned. Robert Woodford heard stories that both Prynne and Williams were likely to loose their heads.(228) In August the Earl of Lincoln was examined by the Attorney and Solicitor Generals, possibly in connection with his ship money objections.(229) Serious efforts were made to identify the anonymous author of a remonstrance against ship money, which was circulating in manuscript form. Oliver St John, by now counsel for Lord Saye, was also suspected of helping frame the answers Burton made in his defence against the charge of scandalous libel. The Council created a sensation when St John's papers were seized by Sir William Becher in May 1637, searched and

returned.(230) The papers for Lord Saye's case were ostentatiously sealed, but it is possible the Lords were looking for copies of the reomonstrance, which had actually been written by William Frynne.

This episode is shadowy, but is remarkably similar to the Cotton case in 1629, in which St John was involved, and where the government attempted to control the circulation of a manuscript tract written in the reign of James I and advising the King to "secure your state and to bridle the impertinency of parliament."(231) "An Humble Remonstrance" was potentially much more dangerous, because, it denounced the structure of a present policy as contrary to law, tradition and the best interests of the kingdom. In many ways it was similar to the pamphlets and separates associated with opposition to the Forced Loan; but this sort of material circulated in the 1620s addressed the subject, "An Humble Remonstrance" was a product of the Personal Rule, it appealed to the King himself.(232) Much of its legal argument, claiming that ship money violated the ancient statutes protecting the subject's liberties, would be employed by St John and Holborne during the ship money case.(233) The author was remarkably well-informed on the subject of ship money grievances, even those which were more attributable to rumour and misinformation than to actual reality. It summarised the fiscal weight of ship money at fifteen subsidies a man in 1634 and three or four a county in 1635, claiming this was an extraordinary burden when tunnage and poundage was three or even six times its Elizabethan level.(234) In addition the burden was unequally imposed, weighing more heavily on the poor than on "great officers, earls and lords", crushing "poor farmers" and driving the humblest and weakest in society into destitution.(235)

Sheriffs and bailiffs, it was claimed, abused their power, citing the example of Sir Walter Norton in Lincolnshire.(236) Other grievances were material, such as the inefficiency of the naval administration designed to serve the service, or misappropriation of funds away from their proper purpose.(237) Some were legal,

"the stopping of some legal proceedings by replevin or habeus corpus to bring the right and lawfulness of this tax to a fair, just and speedy public trial",

or violation of ancient traditions given by rights of charter and prescription concerning taxation, and abuse of his Majesty's trust "of purpose to keep off a parliament."(238)

Even if ship money could legally be imposed by prerogative, Prynne argued the Crown should not employ it. The service destroyed trade, ruined poor farmers, caused deflation in rents and goods

"so that the poor will not be able to live and subsist, nor the rich to keep hospitality or train up their children... to serve your Majesty and their country, if this tax should continue."(239)

Furthermore, the poverty of the oppressed made it difficult for them to afford redress, which "stops the current of the common law".(240) In foreign affairs he said ship money intensified naval rivalry with the Dutch and the French, thereby maintaining the wars against the Queen of Bohemia and "serves chiefly (as we humbly conceive) to advance the Spaniards monarchy and designs".(241) Finally the service created "a dangerous precedent" of peace time taxation amounting to three or four subsidies. Backed by unworthy councillors, "from low degree... and having no posterity of their own to care for", ship money was supported by spurious claims of legality and history made

by those acting out of "fear and flattery".(242) He concluded by advising the King to allow a speedy hearing in the courts and to respect his coronation oath.(243) Here was a formidable combination of rhetoric, respect for sacrosanct traditions in the ancient statutes and a detailed knowledge of particular grievances. Its condemnation of the present trends in counsel was particularly wide, embracing the real and the assumed grievances created by the first two ship money writs, as well as attacking foreign policy decisions. The exposure of ship money's administrative weaknesses must have been based on an acute awareness of what was actually going on in the provinces, and displays a remarkable consistency with the kind of complaints the Council itself received.(244) Loathing for unworthy Councillors combined also with an implied distrust of the King, who by Prynne's account could be manipulated against the interests of his own people and his own family.

"An Humble Remonstrance" went "up and down in men's hands above this half year" before the Council got hold of it.(245). Laud told Wentworth he thought it full of "most mischeivous and dangerous [inferences]", likely to do more damage than arrears, resistance and dilatory sheriffs.(246) Nothing was found amongst St John's papers, but in August Laud got a copy from Bishop Williams who got his copy through personal contacts. It remained anonymously ascribed to "some young Lawyer", although Laud wanted to know who the author was. Like the satirical prints circulated from Holland or the plays in the popular theatre, it can be seen as criticism aimed against the present trends in government, alternately wooing and chastising the King.(247)

The King and the Council were concerned to silence dissent and to destroy any political impact it might have, yet in June Hawkins told Leicester that "the next terme the business of the Ship Money is to be argued by the King's Counsell and one Mr Holborn and Mr St John".(248) The Crown was confident in the legality of the ship money service, and was eager for a judgement to secure it against further protest.(249) Laud's counsel had done a great service in pointing out a major weakness in the legal structure which had been swiftly remedied.(250) During the hearing itself Sir John Bankes was remarkably sure of his own case and of his ability to answer any objections. In addition the King gave permission for all the records to be available to Hampden's lawyers.(251) Other protests were undermined or forestalled, but Hampden's Case falls into a different category from these, because the Crown itself was the plaintiff, it was in a position of strength. After considerable pressure from the Lords Sir Peter Temple eventually returned Hampden as a ship money defaulter in Buckinghamshire for the 1635 writ, under the commands of a writ of certiorari dated 9th March 1637. Writs of mittimus and scire facias followed.(252) Hampden's counsel then asked foroyer of all the writs involved, complaining their client

"hath been grievously vexed and disquieted, and that unjustly; because he saith, that the aforesaid several Writs above mentioned, their Returns and Schedules to them annexed and the matter in them contained, are not sufficient in law to charge..."(253)

This demurrer was answered by the Attorney General, and the Barons of the Exchequer were to give judgement after counsel had been heard for both sides and after the twelve Judges had given their advise.

Opponents of ship money also sought clarification of the law, to show that ship money was against the law and custom of England;

"their object", wrote the Venetian Ambassador in his "Relation of England, "being to make it known that they have not consented to pay. They attach themselves to the law as to an asylum and dispute the question under the protection of these, their sole aim being that the laws may be seen to be violated, and they themselves acting under compulsion."(254)

The arguments in Hampden's Case revolved around a number of familiar issues of liberty and property. The first was the question of public consent and whether prerogative taxation violated this. Some in the Council saw consent to taxation as a privilege granted by Kings: as Laud wrote in February 1628

"subsidyes are due by the laws of God, nature and nations, and Parliament have but their deliberations and consents for the manner of givinge."(255)

The second was the relationship between the King's prerogative and the law, whether the prerogative could be circumscribed by statute and common law in general or only in specifics. The opinion of "a great Lord that hath been a judge", recorded in one of Garrard's 1635 newsletters to Wentworth illustrates the Council's attitude:

"Tis true this writ hath not been used when tunnage and poundage was granted, now 'tis not but taken by prerogative, ergo this writ is in full force."(256)

As John Reeve has argued, the King and the Council upheld the first answer given to the Petition of Right, "saving the royal prerogative".(257) This answer was used to justify researches into the historical basis of ship money in 1634, because it left the Crown with freedom to use its prerogative powers for defence.(258) Yet,

the Crown's increasing tendency to exploit legality and to create new structures upon what Clarendon called "a foundation of right" was contentious and divisive.(259) Sir Edward Coke's belief in harmony, that "the common law hath so measured the prerogative as it cannot prejudice the subject" was put under increasing stress.(260)

Outside the court, other people had a different perception of the law from that of the Council, who saw it as "an old and trusted servant of the King".(261) The idea of that there ought to be a difference between what Justice Berkeley called "a rule of government" and a "rule of law" was deeply offensive, even though it was acknowledged that "salus populi suprema lex".(262) Sir John Bramston believed that opponents of prerogative government had a widespread and pervasive influence:

"Those whoe had binn factious and trublesome in the Parliament house easilie influenced in euery countie some to refuse payment of the proportions they were taxed at; amongst others John Hampden esquire of the countie of Bucks... (263)

Similarly Sir Antony Weldon warned the Council against

"malevolent spirits... [who] oppose and blemish the matter for the nation's sake."(264)

At gentry and at popular level, traditions of parliamentary consent were valued, as was an awareness of a parliament as a guardian of proper values. In 1636 the churchwardens of Beckington were ordered to rail in their communion table as an altar, but warned Bishop Pierce "they thought they could not answer it to a Parliament."(265) The same year in Lincolnshire, Sir John Wray, Deputy-lieutenant, Loan refuser and parliament man, said openly "he would pay any lawful

assessment but will not pay this."(266) At the Gloucester assizes in the summer of 1636, Robert Hoblins told Baron Davenport he would not pay ship money "because it was not granted by Parliament."(267) The atmosphere of legal dispute also had its impact upon response to the service, exacerbated by the refusals of leading men. On 30th June 1637 the Council received a petition from John Bradley, constable of North Musham in Nottinghamshire against John Coude attorney-at-law, who used his influence to undermine payemnt in the parish, threatened Bradley and said his "authority was naught and not worth a bit of bread."(268) A few months later Thomas Barton's wife in Brigstock in Northamptonshire refused to yield to the sheriff's bailiffs, saying "we would answer it before better men than the sheriff was."(269)

News of Hampden's Case came at a time when there was a lively and in places intense, interest in the legality of ship money, and reactions varied. Anthony Mingay told Framlingham Gawdy in a letter of 13th June 1637 that Hampden's demurrer "is all the talk of London at present."(270) The Venetian Ambassador described a general astonishment,

"Everyone wonders at the king's goodness in allowing the public discussion of such a nature."(271)

and believed this liberty encouraged the dissemination of "libels and pasquinades", breeding discontent based upon an increased political awareness.(272) A certain amount of cynicism was generated when a new ship money writ was issued in September 1637 and the administration proceeded as usual: as Hawkins remarked to Leicester in December this "doth determine the Argument yet in hand".(273) The issues raised generated "great expectation", and passion "both sides

being so well persuaded of their [tenets]".(274) Accounts of the trial give brief glimpses of a court charged with feeling:

"The business now talked of in town, is all about the question of ship money, the King is pleased to give way to those subjects that refuses to pay, whereof Mr John Hampden is one, to have their counsel to argue the case in point of war, in the Exchequer Chamber before all the Judges.... I cannot relate any particulars because I heard it not, although I was up by peep of day to that purpose. I was so far from getting into the room that I could not get near the door by two or three yards, the crowd was so great."(275)

The issues raised by the Case were both weighty and controversial, involving the correct interpretation of the law and from that the balance of the relationship between King and subject, liberty and property. Airing such issues was in itself extraordinary, as Justice Crawley remarked at the beginning of his argument:

"This is the first cause that ever came to judgment of this kind, that I know of. Kings have not suffered their rights of sovereignty to be debated at the bar as now it is; for these are Arcana Regni, not fit for public debate."(276)

The Case was also extremely lengthy, the hearing began in late October 1637 but the judgement was not given until the middle of June 1638.(277) Speeches were copied out by hand and not only circulated but "sold at 10s a piece in London" in response to public demand.(278) Opinions on the Case itself shifted around violently during late 1637 according to who had last spoken and achieved the most recent impact. Sir Thomas Knyvet thought St John "argued for the subject very bravely and boldly".(279) Hawkins wrote that the Solicitor General Sir Edward Littleton

"is confident that with some distinctions he shall blow most of what hath been said, which is now the expectation of most lawyers and others."(280)

A fortnight later he believed the Crown had considerable ground to make up, and in consequence "the matter wilbe left more doubtfull than it was at first."(281) Richard Bentham told his patron Robert Throckmorton that Sir John Bankes the Attorney General was "much plauded" for his argument, and

"He produced one record so argued which I confess is unanswerable, which was that a parliament sitting the King sent forth writs for the gathering of ship moneys, and the parliament did not meddle with it."(282)

Others believed the weight of precedent supported Hampden's side, "to his purpose unanswerable".(283)

The lengthy arguments used by St John and Holborne, Littleton and Bankes were essentially political arguments couched in legal terms. Patterns established by history, custom, precedent and statutes were sought to explain both the present trend in politics and to argue for their reformation. At the heart of the debate lay the definition of ship money, and dependent on that definition was the relationship between the prerogative and the law. The crucial question was whether ship money was a tax or a service, whether the King was asking for ships or money. Littleton argued,

"law of property must give place to the law of nature for the common defence."(284)

and Sir John Bankes later said,

"this power is 'inter jura summae majestatis', innate in the person of an absolute king, and in the persons of the kings of England."(285)

St John and Holborne argued from a different position altogether,

stating that the existence of ship money was contrary to Magna Carta and the statutes against arbitrary taxation including the Petition of Right.(286) They claimed the great weakness in the King's case was that he could not show the existence of an emergency, sufficient to warrant an extraordinary charge for defence.(287) The King undoubtedly had the right to call upon his subjects to aid him in the defence of the kingdom, but St John said:

"His Majesty is the fountain of justice; and though all justice which is done within this realm flows from this fountain, yet it must run in certain and known channels."(288)

The King also had a reciprocal duty to act according to law, which meant that, if the existing means such as tunnage and poundage were inadequate for the needs of naval defence, then the proper way to charge the subject was through parliament. Holborne said the subject had "an absolute property in his lands and goods" which was violated by the writ of 4th August 1635, by the mittimus and the scire facias.(289) In addition the time-scale of the writ was far longer than the forty days required to summon a parliament: a pertinent point when the third national writ was in collection.(290)

The administrative structure of the service was both attacked and defended. Hampden's counsel claimed ship money ran contrary to statute and common law, the King already had customary dues for defence, and furthermore there was nothing like the present service in the practice of the past.(291) The Crown's law officers on the other hand said that parliamentary consent was irrelevant because the power of defence was inherent in the office of the King and "kings were before parliaments."(292) Historical precedents supported rather

than denied the present structure of the service, including the use of the sheriffs and levying money from inland as well as coastal counties.(293) Summoning of a parliament was best left to the "wisdom" of a king and not defined by an arbitrary time limit.(294) In any case Magna Carta was forced from a "distressed king" and the ancient statutes could bind the prerogative only in the particular and never in the general.(295) Arguments about tunnage and poundage were irrelevant since no act was in force, and the Petition of Right could not apply in this case:

"It was never intended," said Sir John Bankes repeating the arguments rehearsed in the Privy Council Committee of 1634, "that any power of the king, by his prerogative should be taken away or lessened by it. I dare be bold to affirm it, for I was of that parliament, and was present at the debate, that there was never a word spoken in that debate of taking away any power of the king for the shipping business."(296)

Littleton remarked on "a binding authority" in the Judges' Opinion of February 1637, which would have satisfied all men "in former ages".(297)

Over the following two terms the Judges were to give their opinions on the legality of the service

"and that on the matter in dispute," wrote the Venetian Ambassador in January 1638, "will serve as irrevocable confirmation of the law.... Previous custom leaves it absolutely doubtful...."(298)

The Judges gave their arguments in order of reverse seniority. Beginning on 22nd January 1638, Weston, Crawley and Berkeley all found for the King. At the start of the next term on 14th April, Croke broke the pattern: sustained by his wife's support, he overcame his fears "of any Danger or Prejudice to him or his Family" and

dissented against the majority, as he had said he would after the enforced uniformity of February 1637.(299) Trevor and Vernon found for the King. On 28th April both Hutton and Jones gave their opinions. Hutton made a fierce and passionate defence of parliaments, and Judge Jones found "this once" for the King "meteor like hung between heaven and earth."(300) Denham found on a legal technicality for Hampden, he "amended his opinion as a codicil to his will", Garrard wrote in excited fervour to Wentworth.(301) On 28th May, Chief Baron Davenport demolished the legal validity of the administration and found for Hampden, as did Bramston on 18th June who calmly dissected the inadequacies in the Crown's case that ship money was not a tax with great skill.(302) Lord Chief Justice Finch advanced the case for the prerogative, creating a furore in the court.(303) It was the narrowest of possible verdicts: seven judges for the King, five for Hampden. Of the five who found for Hampden, only Croke and Hutton urged a parliamentary course, whereas Denham, Bramston and Davenport's judgements revealed the administration to be a tissue of legal fictions. In their eyes the prerogative power of the King was being badly applied: criticism which matched the disruptive experience of ship money in the localities.(304)

Between them the seven judges who found for the King produced a comprehensive legal basis on which to base royal power. Weston concluded that it was dangerous for King and subject alike to place limitations on the King's power, and limit the King only to a parliamentary consent.

"all this while the matter is not so great it is but parting with a little money... in former times they have been careful not to leave too much power to the king, but you would leave so little as would bring him in contempt

at home and abroad,... it is no means to keep back a parliament, for there are many other causes of calling a parliament."(305)

All of the Judges who found for the Crown denied the validity of Holborne's line that 20s today could be £20 tomorrow: "unless," said Weston "you suppose injustice in the king", a point both St John and Holborne were at pains to deny.(306) Crawley gave the prerogative the power

"if the necessity and danger of the commonwealth be such as it cannot stay for the calling of parliament... to impose taxes, without common consent in parliament."(307)

Everyone listening must have recognised the context of the 1620s from much of what the Judges said. Most of them blamed the subjects, only Hutton attempted to repair the damage by urging the King to forgive.(308) Berkeley denied ship money was a tax, not being

"within the ancient acceptation or signification of the words Aids, Mises, Prizes, Taxes or Tallages,...the principal command is not to levy money, it is to provide a ship...."(309)

Holborne's claims on behalf of parliamentary consent were in his opinion "utterly mistaken". Parliament he said

"by the fundamental law of England, the parliament is 'commune concilium et regis et regni', that it is the greatest, the most honourable and supreme court in the kingdom; that no man ought to think any dishonourable thing of it; yet give me leave to say that it is but a Concilium; to say so is not to dishonour it: the king may call it, prorogue it, or dissolve it, at his pleasure; and whatsoever the king doth therein is always taken for just and necessary."(310)

The law could not and should not so bind the King because the safety of the kingdom was the highest law.(311)

"The law itself is an old and trusty servant of the king's; it is his instrument or means which he useth to govern his people. -I never read nor heard that Lex was Rex; but it is common and most true, that Rex is Lex for he is lex locuens, a living, a speaking, an acting law."(312)

In words which had a lasting impact, Vernon stated that "a statute derogatory from the prerogative doth not bind the king".(313) Trevor argued that ship money was for the general good and the "subjects [were] not prejudiced by it, either in their dignities or properties in their goods".(314) Jones found the complexities of the Case and the immense public interest involved in it, both perplexing and difficult:

"If this be a lawful prerogative...", he asked, " then how can it be said the subject's property is invaded?"(315)

He found precedents did support charging ship money on the inland as well as the coastal counties, and it was not comparable to the Forced Loan because it was a service and not a tax. His great difficulty lay in the receipt of money, he could only give judgement for the King

"with this limitation and condition, that none of it comes to the king's purse, for if it do my opinion is against it."(316)

The most ruthless and uncompromising views were taken by Lord Chief Justice Finch, which Clarendon believed

"made ship money much more abhorred and formidable than all the commitments by the Council-table and all the distresses taken by the shrieves in England;..."(317)

Finch identified the importance of the Case, which he said "weighed in one balance" the rights of the prerogative against the liberty and property of the subject.(318) He upheld the legality of the 1635 writ

and replied to Croke and Hutton's exaltation of parliaments by saying that,

"a parliament is an honourable court, and I confess it an excellent means of charging the subject and defending the kingdom; but yet it is not the only one."(319)

He too remembered the factious and disruptive parliaments of the previous decade, blemished by "the tares of discontent", and reminded the court that only "all opportune appearance of obedience and dutifulness" would "redeem this lost privilege".(320) The origin of all sovereignty lay with the King alone on land and at sea, and this service was part of the King's sovereignty.(321) It would be manifestly unreasonable for the law to give the King the duty to defend the kingdom without giving him also the means to do so, imposing upon his people the duty of obedience and putting their estates and persons at his service.(322) After he had repeated the precedents in favour of ship money and shown that it was perfectly compatible with the common law, he maintained that private property must give way to public necessity in a time of emergency.(323) God trusted the King, so must the subject, "expectancy of danger" was sufficient ground and the King alone was to establish the existence of danger.(324) Political considerations constantly intruded into his argument:

"Do we not see our potent neighbours, and our great enemies heretofore, were they not prepared for war;... As long as this danger remains, I shall bless God for such a king as will provide for the defence of the kingdom timely, and rejoice to see such a navy as other nations must veil to; and we are not in any case of safety without it, and should lose our glory besides."(325)

The Judges who found for Hampden were all eminent men.

Bramston and Davenport were two of the three senior judges of England. Croke and Hutton were "great lawyers and most religious and honest men", and, in Sir Symonds D'Ewes' opinion, "did outbalance six of their puisnes in all men's opinions".(326) Taken together their opinions destroyed the King's case that ship money was a service and not a tax: Croke and Hutton argued out of respect for deeply-held beliefs, which were widely-shared, Bramston, Davenport and Denham exposed legal weaknesses amounting to dishonesty. Croke and Hutton's arguments had been laid down in Prynne's "An Humble Remonstrance", neither of them doubted that ship money was a tax and was therefore in violation of liberty, history and the law.(327) Like Pyn they clearly believed

"there are some laws which are co-essential and con-natural with government, which being broken, all things run into confusion."

so that it seemed incredible for the law to allow the King such extensive powers as must prejudice the subject.(328) Croke maintained that the service was the product of "imagination" and totally without precedent, it was illegal and in contravention of the maxim the King can do no wrong.(329) Without a parliament the service was open to endless abuse.

"I hold for my part, that no necessity can allow a charge which is in contravention of the laws.... it is done by a misinformation that it hath usually been done.... The King we know is a most pious and just king, that he will do nothing against his laws; if he did know it to be against law, he would never desire it."(330)

Hutton took a similar line, although he was as concerned with details as with general principles. Part of the King's prerogative was to

maintain justice, and justice was being frustrated by the collection of ship money, which was clearly a tax:

"it appears plainly by the record, there was no ship prepared at all; then if no ship, no writ can be had against him for disobedience. It is known to all the world, it is not ships, but Ship-Money: Ship Money is in every man's mouth. It hath a name of preparing ships, but the end of it is to prepare ships, as in Yorkshire £12,000."(331)

Justice Berkeley had maintained that free Englishmen could not be taxed at will, therefore the King's just prerogative enabled the collection of ship money within the law. Hutton turned this powerful rhetoric to his advantage:

"the subjects of England are free men not slaves, free men not villains. Here is no apparent necessity of an invasion; therefore by law, they cannot be thus compelled to part with their interest in their goods."(332)

Judgement in "matter and form" had to go for Hampden.(333)

Justice Jones said he could only find for the King if the King did not receive the money, and Justice Weston was troubled about the terms of the scire facias used to levy ship money arrears.(334) Bramston and Davenport used the disquiet they shared with Hutton on this matter to highlight the structural anomalies, which in their opinions undermined the exercise of legitimate prerogative power. Davenport said that it was not a question of whether the mandates of the original ship money writ were good in law, because they undoubtedly were; yet the writ itself was not good, because its commands were contradictory.(335) It commanded the good men of Buckinghamshire to pay the charge but set the task of assessment on one man, the sheriff, when by precedent it should have been carried

out by a commission of jurors.(336) The power given to the sheriff in this respect was both arbitrary and illegal.(337) In addition the writs of certiorari and mittimus could not revive the first writ, because this was a writ non-returnable:

"to command a thing to be done, if it be not done accordingly, there is an end to the force of the writ."(338)

In other words, if Hampden refused to pay his 20s, then the King had no remedy in the courts to compel payment. A scire facias could not be issued because the writ of 4th August 1635 commanded the preparation of a ship and there was no evidence at all that a ship had been provided nor any evidence provided of collectors to whom Hampden might have been accountable.(339) The King could not legally receive the money in his "proper coffers":

"nothing is put upon the record to bring this to the king:.. So the judgement required on this demurrer is upon the matter 'oneratur', and shall by no colour come to the king. God knows it belongs to him and that deservedly; but in a legal course non constat."(340)

Hampden ought not to pay ship money, not because it was arbitrary or illegal, but simply because in law there was no-one to whom he owed money.(341) Like Denham, Davenport could not accept the transfer of the mittimus to the Exchequer upon the tenor of a record and not the record itself, without the record itself the scire facias could not be executed.(342) Bramston was perfectly willing to establish the general principle that ship money "is no tallage but a service".(343) However, he showed that the 1635 writ only mentioned the threat of danger and did not establish the legal existence of any national emergency: upon this contingent fact hung all of Crawley's claims

about the power of the prerogative to raise moneys in an emergency.(344) He agreed with Davenport on the inadequacies of the scire facias.(345) Like Davenport he was unhappy about the decision, yet each man felt that the King's case ran in circles and therefore "non constat."(346)

On 12th June the Attorney General moved for judgement which was duly entered for the King.(347) Nicholas told Sir John Pennington and added that "the business goes on well and quietly", but the Venetian Ambassador was struck by the

"incredible maledictions against the judges... with talk against the laws sufficient to cause a revolt among the people."(348)

Kevin Sharpe has argued that "the final decision, unwelcome though it was may have resolved more legal doubts than it aroused."(349) Yet the whole airing of the legal debate and the issues it raised had an impact upon perceptions of the service, which Clarendon noticed when he wrote:

"the major part of men...looking upon these proceedings as a kind of applause to themselves, [thought] to see other men punished for not doing as they had done; which delight was quickly determined when they found their own interest by the unnecessary logic of that argument no less concluded than Mr. Hampden's."(350)

Several of the Judges remarked upon this interest. Justice Jones described a divided and articulate public opinion:

"some have taxed them that have gone, or will go with the king, as though they were fearful, and went about to captivate the liberty of the people, and take away their goods. Some are taxed on the other side, if on the contrary, thye are given to popularity."(351)

Finch deplored the "vulgar censure" which "hath exercised itself upon every one that hath delivered himself upon this matter".(352) Croke certainly prepared his opinion for circulation, and added points culled from the other arguments to support his own conclusions.(353) He was also called before the King to give a fuller account of his reasons.(354) Hutton was hailed by Robert Woodford as "a man of courage" and accused of treason for his opinion by a Northamptonshire cleric called Harrison.(355) Bramston's decision to find for Hampden was known before it was given in court, on 8th June Christopher Montagu wrote to his father

"there is none of doubt of my Lord Bramston for the country."(356)

The clearest evidence that debate about the legality of the service was perceived as part of an ideological division is found in the private news diary of Walter Yonge, who noted each Judge's opinion and ascribed to each in turn the labels "pro rege" or "pro patria".(357) Confirmation of Yonge's perceptions can be gleaned from the censorship of public discussion. Laud suppressed an undergraduate debate at Oxford "about the Legality of Ship Money; as also whether the Addita and Alterata in the Scottish Liturgy did give just Cause of Scandal."(358) The King himself marked out a passage on arbitrary taxation and abuse of the law in Massinger's play "The King and the Subject", as "too insolent and too bee changed."(359)

The impact of the Case was profoundly disturbing to the King and the Council. As has already been argued the Case marked a turning point away from moderation and towards enforcement on the part of the government, whilst at the same time response in the

localities changed from conformity to reluctance.(360) Wentworth and Laud were convinced that moderation had not served the King's best interests. Laud was anxious even when he believed "the argument in the Exchequer Chamber will go current enough for the King", for

"if be so carried that the conformable party be scorned by the refractory, the most orderly men will be disheartened, and the business itself may miscarry."(361)

Wentworth feared faction and linked Hampden with opposition for opposition's sake: in November 1637 he told Laud

"Mr Hambden is a great Brother, and the very Genius of that Nation of People leads them to oppose as well civilly and ecclesiastically all that ever authority ordains for them; but in good faith were they right served, they should be Whipt Home into their right Wits, and much beholden they should be to any that would thoroughly take pains with them in that Kind."(362)

By May 1638, after the uniformity of judicial opinion had fallen apart, observers became uneasy about the consequences. John Burghe told Lord Scudamore "these opinions of some of the Judges will be a great hindrance in levying of ship money hereafter."(363) Laud believed his worst fears were about to be realised:

"The Accidents which have followed upon it already are these; First, The Factionary grown very bold. Secondly, the King's Monies come in a great deal more slowly than they did in former Years and that to a very considerable sum. Thirdly, It put thoughts into Wise and Moderate Men's Heads, which were better out;..."(364)

Evidence from the accounts and the sheriffs' reports confirmed this picture of declining sympathy.(365) An anonymous memorandum sent to the Council in the spring of 1638 warned of impending unrest in difficult counties.

"I have many good reasons to doubt, that there will appear ere long some great refusals in divers shires to pay the

ship money when it shall be demanded as namely in Essex, in Oxfordshire, in Buckinghamshire, in Northamptonshire and most of all in Gloucestershire, where I conceive there will be a more general refusal than in any county. But one place may perhaps, grow easily to take fire from another. And though the sheriffs of the said counties pretend to be true servants to the King, as namely Sir Robert Pointz in Gloucestershire, yet even he will be scarce able to do that within his desires, by reason that generally the prime families there oppose it much; and I know he hath said privately to a very confidant friend, that if he must commit all the refusers and distrain all their chattel, within his charge, there will not be found prisons or penfolds enough in the country to receive them. And the sheriff of the other four counties (and especially he of Bucks who is Sir Alexander Denton) are not held by such as know them best, to be very well in this particular for the King's service, howsoever they spake words of duty. For privately, they listen very much to their kindred and friends who (to speak very modestly) are known to be hollow-hearted to the King. and I can (if there be occasion) give particular account, both of their names and of their reasons also for every word I have said here.

I hear it doubted that there will be no great unanimity in the vote of the Judges concerning the King's absolute right, but perhaps they may agree in condemning Hampden for this time as having been defective but without concerning the merits of his cause."(366)

Some of the most diligent sheriffs reported a sharp increase in recalcitrance and in outspoken opposition during the spring of 1638.

In Huntingdonshire, Sir John Hewett complained,

"I have been told by a constable to my face, they are not to pay now.(367)

William Boteler asked for more active support from the Lords when he found "so sudden and so general a backwardness in the King's service" in Bedfordshire.(368) In Somerset William Cox wearied by endless disputes said,

"upon rumour of the Judges' opinion no man will pay but suffer their cattle to stand in the pound, or replevy or wound them if they see them taking any distress."(369)

Sir Francis Thornehaugh blamed Croke and Hutton for "making men more backward than they would have been" and in Cheshire Sir Thomas Cholmondely found Croke and Hutton's opinions encouraged resistance amongst "those who were before too refractory and countenanced by some of rank."(370) Thomas Harrison believed one of his grounds for accusing Justice Hutton of treason was

"by report near his dwelling, and upon his own knowledge the people of the county of Northampton do deny to pay the Ship-Money, being moved thereunto by some treasonable words, which Judge Hutton did deliver in his Charge at the Assizes there against the lawful levying thereof,..."(371)

Some sheriffs urged the Council on to stricter and sterner measures to curb disaffection, partly because when faced with disobedience they did not know how to overcome it.

Hampden's Case did not mark the end of legal confrontation over ship money. The King and the Council continued to refine the legal structure of the service, attempting to make the service itself an annual charge.(372) The sheriffs were to be increasingly pressured in a drive for full collection and legal accountability.(373) A few months later Lord Saye revived his King's Bench case and took it before the Judges, affirming

"if their Lordships would say it were law then he would yield, but otherwise not to the wronging of his country."(374)

In the localities William Cox's fears of violence and resistance and "of perpetual suits if we proceed in this kind", were realised, particularly in difficult counties.(375) The words of the Judges who found for Hampden were to have far-reaching consequences in this

context, becoming part of an increasingly articulate political consciousness, which linked religious and secular grievances, aristocratic faction and popular politics, the English and the Scots in a single conspiracy threatening law and true religion. To understand why and how this happened it is necessary to examine the wider context of discontent and opposition.

111: OPPOSITION IN A WIDER CONTEXT

"people should forbear the payment and he would excuse them for a pottle of sack."

Thomas Robbins of South Newington in Oxfordshire, June 1636.(376)

"That within the said time aforesaid, you the said Richard Powell have... in the parish church of Pattishall aforesaid preached dangerous and seditious doctrine to your parishioners there by secretly and covertly endeavouring to persuade your parishioners to stand out and not pay the ship money.... And by your means and persuasion all your parishioners refused and would not pay the ship money imposed upon them, and for not paying their goods were distrained on by lawful authority, which you understanding of took occasion in your sermon the next Sunday following... to inveigh against tyrants and tyrannical princes that laid cruel, unjust and tyrannical taxes upon their subjects...."

Articles Objected Against Richard Powell Vicar of Pattishall in Northamptonshire in the Court of High Commisssion.(377)

"Then is the danger when the greater sort do but wait for the troubling of the waters among the meaner, but then they may declare themselves."

Francis Bacon, "Of Seditious and Troubles".(378)

Overt opposition to ship money, articulated in terms legal principles and calling into question the direction of government policies, was appropriate to the rank of men like Warwick and Saye. The aim of this section is to illustrate the links between aristocratic faction and local opposition, by explaining the forms of protest available and by pointing to an acceleration of conflict over ship money. The relationship between reluctance, refusal, opposition and disobedience was not fixed: how opposition was expressed depended upon how the balance between local and national priorities was interpreted in each area and during each writ. To understand the wider context of

opposition it is important to remember that political conflict was seen as dangerous and disruptive, whilst the social order was also seen as fragile.

In this context the language of protest becomes especially significant. To some people ship money was an innovation, against custom and against law. Before 1638 however, such language was largely confined to the private or to the local sphere. The only petition describing ship money as a legal innovation was made by the City of London's petition in early 1635, claiming exemption from payment "by ancient privileges, grants and acts of parliament". It was unsuccessful.(379) Yet ship money rates were denounced as implicitly and explicitly against local custom in rating disputes.(380) Similarly, sheriffs, like Sir Thomas Aston in Cheshire in 1635, were concerned because the needs of the service established a "dangerous precedent".(381) In private too the significance of taxation was discussed. Sir Symonds D'Ewes believed the despotism of the Turks and the French was sustained by arbitrary taxation, leading to misery and poverty.(382) In 1637 when the legality of ship money became a controversial issue, Sir Roger Twysden recorded the views of his gentry neighbours in Kent, who believed by law and custom the kings of England "had not an absolute power". They also discussed the differences between a voluntary contribution raised in 1588, and "this way which was compulsory", they talked of recent history and found it puzzling that the inland counties had not been charged before in the 1620s, "this king beeing out with Fraunce and Spayne both."(382) "Approved histories", of France and of the Italian states

pointed to the dangers to public liberty when taxations were imposed at pleasure.(383) Some of the Kent gentry were critical of the administrative inconveniences of ship money, but

"were persuaded this way would not last... that new laws did rather lose their own credit than abolish that which time, use and approbation had contributed to old."(384)

Others were disturbed because the need for a parliament had been undermined not only by ship money but also by the punishments inflicted in Star Chamber and the use of prerogative courts to settle the kingdom's grievances.(385) Recent developments gave the King an unprecedented legal power, greater it was believed than in France or Tuscany where the state raised money by impositions or needed the consent of the law courts.(386) A judgement in the King's favour would have dire consequences:

"none could expect a parliament, but on some necessity not now imaginable..."(387)

Yet they believed the Petition of Right would make the Judges

"affirm it legal, but with such limitations at least as might overthrow the business... That the judges did not make but declare how the law stood, and nothing did take of, the reputation of judgments themselves, or from the givers of them more, than the crossing of known maxims of law, of which they held this chief that a king of England could lay no tax but by parliament."(388)

Protests made at the assizes and using the grand juries of the counties need to be seen against this background of concern for innovation, and fears that accepting ship money obediently and

quietly might create a new and unwelcome precedent to burden the future.(389)

Fear of the multitude and of the dangers of popular unrest has been seen as an increasing concern of those in government under the early Stuarts. Custom played an important part in shaping popular political consciousness, and unrest was often created by violation of perceived law and custom.(390) Hostility was often expressed towards oppressive laws and towards evil ministers. Thus, in March 1636 Dr Lambe examined John Lewes of Rothwell in Northamptonshire:

"he would have the Council make better laws than have been."(391)

In 1639 Thomas Hall of Bodicott in Oxfordshire claimed that,

"on any complaint the Lords of the Council were very treacherous men."(392)

What evidence there is about popular attitudes to taxation suggests that the common people were attached to the traditions of parliamentary consent and it has been argued that ship money came to be seen as an oppression in these terms.(393) Warnings that "contentment" could be easily undermined and of "great clamour and noise of injury and pressure, especially among the poor and unable people" were therefore taken seriously, both by the sheriffs and by the King and Council.(393) This was one way of getting relief without reverting to a statement of outright hostility. Writing to William Bassett on behalf of the hundreds of Portbury and Bedminster in January 1637, John Smyth asked for time to settle a rating dispute about ship money,

"By which meanes your selfe may come the easier by the money and the difference be composed with lesse charge upon the poore inhabitants. Otherwise I feare you will finde the people rude and addicted unto oppocision."(394)

The other consequence of fear of popular unrest was that the authorrity of landlords and Justices was used to contain or curb protest. Gentlemen who opposed the service were nevertheless concerned about social unrest and the danger to order presented by popular violence. On 29th September 1636 at Newnham in Fawsley hundred in Northamptonshire Richard Smith was distrained for 50s ship money, set on him by the sheriff when he refused to assist in the assessment. Smith retaliated by arresting the sheriff's servants and went to Richard Knightley "who did sharply reprove the said Smith."(395) This was in spite of Knightley's own involvement in legal resistance to the service and his close connections with Lord Saye's circle and the lawyers like John Crew. Nor did this careful check on local affairs prevent him from being involved in rating disputes during the next writ.(396)

The expression of ship money as a burden was made openly, explicitly and frequently. The service could be seen at different times and in different ways as an individual, collective or national burden. The sense of injustice was cumulative in its effect, and ran contrary to the hopes and the orders of the King and the Lords.(397) Nevertheless this was the form of opposition most likely to get redress, especially as a satisfactory settlement promoted further affection to the service and could produce a sharp competition for the King's favour. Peter Lake has argued that this was indeed the

case in Cheshire.(398) Such opposition could take many different forms, varying from the individual petition, to the collective action implied in a hundred or county-wide dispute or in the use made of the grand juries.(399) The immediate local context is always important in any attempt to unravel the intricacies of rating disputes. In Somerset general dissatisfaction with Henry Hodges, and the personal rivalries of Sir Robert Phelps undoubtedly exacerbated discontent with ship money; yet, some of the hundreds remained consistently discontented with any rate proposed.(400) After Warwick's defiance of 1635-1637, Essex ship money disputes changed from outright refusal to rating disputes, they did not disappear.(401) Sheriffs often complained of the poverty of their counties generally, distinguishing between ability and willingness to pay: Sir John Oglander told Nicholas in March 1638 that the coastal villages from Emsworth to Christchurch "are so poor as they are not able to pay" and extreme care was need in handling them, whereas arrears from the Hampshire corporations did not deserve any tolerance.(402)

A sense of burden, oppression and injustice affected the terms in which opposition to ship money was expressed, but the forms of opposition also varied. Ship money was identified as a grievance in a number of quite distinct ways. As the evidence from Sir Roger Twysedn's commonplace book shows, the identification of ship money as an explicit and deliberate "bar to parliaments" was made.(403) Some commentators believed that this kind of opinion was commonplace, and was deliberately stirred up in the interests of faction.(404) Officially the Crown contrasted the diligence of the many with the

perverse and ignorant disobedience of the few; but Laud believed many hands and many purses were against the King's case during the ship money trial and the government was always concerned about the contagious effects of ill-example.(405) Evidence from a number of counties shows that ship money was identified as illegal and possibly dangerous to the future of parliaments well before Hampden's Case. Such views were voiced in Gloucestershire and in Lincolnshire during 1635 and 1636.(406) Calls for a parliament were officially discouraged during the Personal Rule, and often the most informative sources about popular perceptions of the need for a parliament are found in either private sources such as Woodford's diary or Sir Roger Twysedn's commonplace book, or in rumour such as the one Rossingham picked up in early 1637.(407) Most significantly a parliament remained a powerful symbol of unity: a "Poem of Joy" presented to the Prince Palatine in late 1635 glorified the memory of Queen Elizabeth and anticipated the defeat of the Catholic powers,

"Though Pope and's Kings Raigne...
T'Imbroyle ye world wth blood, and wrongfull Action
yet heere set rest in both, wth Comforts Heare
Christ and high Charles, will still be brothers Deare
And wth true patience, yett you doe endure
Heav'n and Earths Parlyaments can make itt sure."(408)

The cumulative unpopularity of ship money reinforced an idealised image of a parliament, as a guardian of law and as the place where conflicts would be easily and naturally resolved.(409)

Hostility to ship money was sometimes voiced in terms of outright illegality, as in the examples of Alexander Jennings or Robert Hoblins or in the little note on the Winfarthing

churchwarden's account recording payment for "that unlawful tax" in 1637.(410) Other people were far more cautious about a public statement, like Sir Alexander Denton in 1639.(411) The law was not clear on the service, partly because ship money was new, at least in its present form.(412) As a result there was a continuous interest in legality, fostered both by the resistance of Warwick, Saye and Hampden and by the high profile the Judges gave the service during their assizes.(413) The terms of the writs, emergency taxation in time of danger and evident necessity were open to public debate. Richard Rose of Lyme Regis was reported to the Lords in October 1637 for disparaging the fleet going forth to maintain the King's dominion in the narrow Seas:

"What foolery is this, that the country in a general peace be thus much taxed and oppressed with the payment of great sums to maintain the King's titles and honours,..."(414)

The Kent gentry were able to link public explanations given to justify ship money and the condemnation of Burton, Bastwick and Prynne. Laud claimed in answer to their charges of innovation that the prayer for the navy had been left out "in a late book of fast" because

"the kinge having neyther then nor now any declared enemy.... This made much discourse how the king could have any necessity that had no enemy."(415)

Rossingham had earlier written that

"The West Country people have no great belief that the King's ships will do any good against the Turks."(416)

Against this background of legal dispute Sir William Monson's writings on ship money become intelligible as part of a battle for hearts and minds. In his account of Lindsey's fleet in 1635 he condemned

"many idle, factious and scandalous reports invented and spread abroad... to the dishonour of the King, and no less imputation of his ministers of state, saying that the fitting out of such a fleet was but made a colour and excuse to draw money from the multitude."(417)

"A Discourse directed to the Subjects, exhorting them to pay Ship Money" was possibly written to counter the public failure of the navy during Tromp's attack on the Spanish fleet in the Downs in October 1639.(418) Monson scorned the Dutch as nothing but fishermen who could not hold their drink, covetous and hypocritical,

"we want not precedents that all the flourishing and civil commonwealths of the world have been subdued and conquered by as mean and rude people as they are."

and he urged Englishmen to "contribute now whilst you have something."(419) It is not known whether Monson circulated his tracts, or for whom he wrote them. The fact that he wrote them at all implies a perceived need on the part of some in office to counter the negative impact of such propaganda as "The Kingly Cock", a satirical print produced in Holland for circulation in England. Its image of Charles, asleep in his chair, his sword unbuckled, lulled by the Spanish Ambassador's flute and his gifts of treasure and children's toys, was deeply unflattering.(420)

Figure 2: Crispin de Passe, The Kingly Cock, c. 1637



Figures in this print include the King of France, the Prince Palatine, Prince Rupert and their brothers and sisters, the Unheroic Courtier, the Hispaniolized Courtier, and the Earl of Arundel returning from the Emperor with a packet marked "Nihil opo Paqu est". Notice the guest waiting ready at Dover.

Interest in news and the ability to comment upon the trends in government was part of a developing political consciousness, which in turn led to an articulate expression of opposition to ship money. This is confirmed by the change in awareness, seen in a movement from sporadic examples of defiance offered for example by the constables of South Newington, through a heightened sense of conflict in the sheriffs' reports during Hampden's Case and intensified by an informed perception of ship money as unlawful, particularly in unsettled areas.(421) In July 1638 William Walker, constable of Wymersley hundred in Northamptonshire was accused by Carew Stockwell of criticising both ship money and the Council in forthright and uncompromising terms.

1. Being asked by me when we should pay our ship money, his answer was he hoped never; and his reason was, because it was stayed. And being further questioned by me upon what ground, he jeeringly replied, because he thought they were ashamed of it.
2. He said that ship money was an intolerable exaction, burden and oppression upon the land.
3. He the said William Walker did believe that without doubt that the ship money here in England would cause the like stirs that were now in Scotland, before it were long.
4. He said the King was under the law as much as any subject, and that he could do nothing of himself without his subjects.
5. Being pressed upon the lawfulness of ship money and that from the determination of the Judges themselves, he confessed that some Judges had determined it to be law, but the best and most honest had not."(422)

Awareness was by no means universal, some areas such as Lancashire or Wales remained steadfastly loyal to the King's commands and present little or no evidence of outright disaffection.(423) Yet the essential point is that during the 1630s several different traditions

of political expression were fused into a radical criticism of government and society. Derek Hirst and Mark Kishlansky in their different ways have seen the 1630s as a crucible of political consciousness amongst the franchised classes.(424) Martin Butler has argued that this change was expressed in popular drama, which was violently anti-Catholic, detested prerogative courts and prerogative remedies and saw the common man and godly lords as guardians of threatened virtues. Popular drama depicted the government as ungodly, oppressive and unresponsive: much of this picture could be mirrored from the actual experience of ship money and was expressed in real hatred of Laudianism.(425) Popular plays, like popular ballads, examined the meaning of liberty and held the claims made by government propaganda up to scrutiny. Yearning for what were thought of as traditional values reinforced hatred of innovation. Many writers articulated criticism of the court and yearned for a return to more traditional values, in the circles around the court as well as in the old-style drama in the popular tradition.(426) It is therefore possible to describe a spectrum of dissatisfaction, and "a broad and angry linguistic consensus" identifying the evils of the court, made the discourse of politics possible.(427)

This experience of alienation and exclusion was also confirmed in the language of anti-popery, and dissatisfaction was linked to the image of God's anger against a sinful nation. From the ambiguity surrounding prerogative taxation arose ideological differences about the law, much of which was aired not just in the courts but also in the pulpit. Edward Sparhawk preached at a christening sermon in early

1636, against "heavy impositions", "cursed adorations" and "the doubling of taxes".(428) Giles Randall denounced oppression, social injustice and usury in November 1636. The evidence of witnesses taken down by Huntingdonshire JPs shows how a religious vocabulary was used to understand political themes. The two men who accused Mr Randall to the Council said that he explicitly condemned ship money as "among the many sins that caused the wrath of God to lie heavy upon this nation." Other witnesses interpreted what Randall had said along lines familiar from their experience: William Bedell recalled Randall saying "the taking of the loan money was oppression", Edward Thurston remembered themes of God's anger calling for the people's repentance, believing ship money "was a great occasion to hinder God's mercy from us."(429) Other evidence reaching the Council pointed to the active involvement of clerics in resistance to ship money, such as Richard Powell the vicar of Pattishall who was believed to have encouraged non-payment and resistance to distraint.(430)

The implications of this association between Puritanism and resistance to ship money go beyond the ranks of the clergy, because of the association of opposition to the service with lay Puritanism. In certain circles at court Puritanism was regarded with an extreme hostility, amounting to terror and loathing:

"the doctrine of predestination is the root of all Puritanism", wrote Dr Samuel Brooke to Laud, "and Puritanism is the root of all rebellion, and all disobedient intractableness in parliament, and all schism and sauciness in the country, nay in the church itself."(431)

Wentworth believed Hampden and Saye were motivated by both religious and political discontent in opposing ship money.(432) This perception of threat was not confined simply to a minority view at court. Ballads sold during the 1620s had identified Puritanism with explicit disobedience and opposition to the King's prerogative:

"A Puritan is he whose heart is bent
To cross the king's designs in Parliament...
So that with his wit and valour he doth trye,
How the prerogative he may deny."(433)

There are signs this view was becoming more widely held in the counties during the 1630s. Sir John Lambe, whose own particular paranoia informed his activities, blamed Northamptonshire ship money troubles on "Sir John Dryden and his Puritan constables" and kept Laud regularly informed on the service there.(434) Sir Humphrey Mildmay disliked "a generation of discipliners" who made his life difficult in Essex.(435) Similarly, Sir Henry Skipwith sheriff of Leicestershire for the 1636 writ, denied the validity of rating complaints made to the Lords "by some Puritans that are so near Northamptonshire that they savour too much of the disobedience of those parts."(436) Another Northamptonshire clergyman Thomas Harrison believed Justice Hutton's opinion on ship money encouraged people to,

"overthrow [the King's] royalty and supremacy,... Our duties are to tell the people their duties... And as *neither king nor God will suffer any divine to conclude in heresy, so neither doth his majesty give his judges leave to conclude in sedition,...* For I say still we are not to question the king's actions; they are only between God and his conscience."(437)

In this analysis the common people were easily seduced out of their loyalty and persuaded into disobedience by the workings of faction and authority itself was undermined.

This belief in political alienation was not confined to those who disliked self-conscious godliness, it became part of the way some of the godly viewed the world. The enemies of the kingdom were different but the danger was just as real. Robert Woodford's diary points to the dissemination of Popish plot conspiracy theories amongst the ranks below the gentry, in which the experience of ship money was linked to court Catholicism and persecution of the godly remnant.(438) Thus Woodford asked God to,

"ease us of this great and heavy tax if it be thy will
and grant us that the whole kingedome may live in
p[er]fect peace... and in thy fear seeking the p[ro]motion
of thy glorious gossell."(439)

The explanation of conflict he developed drew upon his own experience of the bitter Burton Latimer rating disputes, linked local events in his own mind with the political exclusion of the "godly and gracious" Saye and Brooke, and helped create a sense of community with the Scots.(440) Few sources are as detailed as Woodford's diary, or reveal as clearly the conflict which could exist between private conviction and public conformity; but there are occasional glimpses of this kind of religious fervour. Mathew Stephenson, one of the two Norfolk constables in conflict with John Buxton, boasted that God "did strengthen him in such a marvellous manner that he answered boldly and undoubtedly for himself" before the Lords.(441) One of Sir Peter Temple's Leicestershire tenants, Insley the miller of Lutterworth, was

sent to the Fleet for refusing to act on the sheriff's warrants. His faith sustained him:

"I thank the Lord I am in good health and merry, no wit daunted for suffering in a good cause, and do desire that you and the rest of my friends do stand valiently for the truth as I trust the Lord will enable me to do... and ley you not be dismayed, for I trust God in his god time will deliver me from this place with credit."(442)

A sense of mission and struggle against a sinful world, as well as the stress placed upon political participation, links these obscure local officials to the great lords like Warwick, Brooke, Saye and Lincoln.(443) Many of the godly were "precise not turbulent", like the reverend Mr Dod, who served the great houses at Canons Ashby and Fawsley.(444) However, this attitude of passive obedience was increasingly difficult to sustain when confronted by the dangers of Popery; anti-popery gave an ideological rationale for disobedience. It also created a community of grievances uniting those who resisted and those who were acquiescent but troubled, like Woodford.(445) When ship money was seen as part of a cumulative attack upon law and true religion the result was considerable distrust of the government, in a few, like Woodford, a distrust even of the King himself.(446) Perceptions of abuse, exaltation of the "country" as a haven of virtue, the popularity of the "godly and gracious" lords, and a trust in parliament as an instrument of reconciliation, obscured real awareness of structural problems facing English government.(447) These perceptions in turn sustained the extraordinary resistance to government which brought down the Personal Rule, and led to the

identification of what Sir Cheney Culpeper called the dangers of "Civil and Ecclesiastical Babylon".(448)

At a local level there were three main forms of protest used against ship money. These can be roughly described as individual, communal and institutional using the law courts. The context of protest, both in time and in place is very important. Insubordination of the social order was too dangerous to be easily tolerated or encouraged from above, but there were ways opposition could be expressed which sustained order and hierarchy, rather than threatening it.(449) It was proper for leading men, in their different communities to tackle ship money grievances, just as it was proper to use established avenues of protest, such as petitions to JPs or to the Assize Judges.(450) It was not wise to allow unrest to get out of hand, as happened in Long Buckby in Northamptonshire when Sir John Hanbury's bailiffs came to distrain in January 1638,

"women, boys and children with pitchforks and their aprons full of stones...[werel shouting 'Knock them down.' 'Beat out their brains.' 'Hang them rogues.'(451)

Anthony Fletcher estimated that only a small percentage of violent incidents are recorded in the sources and that the vast majority of disputes were settled informally.(452) A Justice was expected to take active steps to keep the peace in his locality, as a reflection on his own honour he should,

"step in betwixt those that be at variance as (by reason of his learning, wisdom, authority and wealth) he is like to prevail more by his entreaty than is another man."(453)

Accounts of violent incidents which reached the Lords, could represent problems the local community was unable to resolve or was unwilling to deal with. In either case they represented serious matters.

Opposition was most dangerous and most effective when it was an expression of communal action. In northern Oxfordshire, Gloucestershire and the Western Division of Northamptonshire, opposition was nurtured and sustained by some of the nobility, the gentry and the middling sort, acting in conjunction.(454) So too was opposition in the Puritan areas of Essex such as Chingford, Hatfield Broad Oak and Fyfield.(455) It was difficult to settle these disputes because so many people were involved and because the focus of discontent was so nebulous. The parishioners of Chingford visited Sir Humphrey Mildmay "in heaps about their rate for ship money".(456) It was also difficult to pin down and to punish offenders, who could simply disappear as some Northamptonshire constables did, or, as Sir Robert Pointz found in Gloucestershire in 1637, were too numerous to punish.(457)

On a smaller scale, Sir William Brereton and his tenants were involved in refusals in Cheshire, and a Mr Barnardiston of Smallwell in Cambridgeshire refused to pay in 1635 and encouraged his neighbours and tenants to do the same the next year.(458) Richard Knightley was persistently associated with rating disputes during the first two ship money writs in Northamptonshire: in Fawsley, Hamfordshoe and Guilsborough hundreds.(459) Resistance sanctioned by the leaders of local communities, what Sir John Stowell called "abuse

by combination" was far more difficult to break than simple recalcitrance amongst the constables.(460) So too was abuse by combination amongst the common people themselves, such as agreeing not to set a rate or to resist distress common in fenland Lincolnshire or the textile-producing villages in the west country.(461) The support of the gentry was often covert and implicit rather than explicit. Bulstrode Whitelocke said "the knowing gentry" were behind opposition, and although it is often difficult to prove this assertion, it is to some extent confirmed by the Council's own preoccupation with ill-example.(462) In Dorset, for example, opposition in 1636 was subdued by distraining leading gentry.(463) In some places the men who were constables, assessors and collectors of ship money were often consistently hostile towards the service. Popular resistance was more common and more disruptive in areas where the gentry were also hostile, but it was not simply created by the gentry. John Stacey, the constable of Hallingbury Magna in 1635, said he would not pay if the parish would bak him, and he would return himself as a defaulter.(365) Resistance was part of a shared political culture, which had its roots in religious, legal and social bonds. The assessors of Great Kimble in Buckinghamshire returned themselves as well as John Hampden as ship money defaulters in obedience to a writ of certiorari.(465) Recognition of this common bond is shown in the way Nathaniel Fiennes and John Hampden took up the causes of constables in the parliaments of 1640, or in Sir Peter Temple's visit to the miller of Luttworth when he was in the Fleet.(466)

The pattern of resistance changed between 1635 and 1640 so that communal protest became more widespread and more violent. In the early years of the service, opposition was largely passive: communal action centred on the rating dispute. For example, in Buckinghamshire, Hertfordshire and Surrey collection of the 1636 writ was slowed down by rating disputes.(467) In Hampshire the only really persistent defaulter was Lord Arundel of Wardour. Violence was by and large confined to individual grievances.(468) Resistance to officers then became more common, involving outright violence, for example in rescuing distrained goods, and leading to reluctance by officers to serve once the sheriff had gone out of office,

"some of my best bailiffs have forsaken me", lamented Sir John Hanbury in a letter to Nicholas on 21st January 1639, "and will not meddle any more in that service."(469)

A few days later the Council ordered Sir John Parsons to summon the bailiffs who would not act on sir Alexander Denton's warrants to distrain for Buckinghamshire arrears, to rebuke them and to sack any who were negligent.(470) A sense of resentment, often engendered by earlier disputes about the rates led to open resistance, including the local officers: this is what happened at Brigstock in Northamptonshire.(471) Refusals to serve in any capacity, to assess, levy, collect or supervise payment led in turn to the collapse of the service during the last writ when the usual sanctions against disobedience failed.(472)

Different methods of protest could be used to express opposition, the terms of which could shift between local interests, legal questions, delay and disobedience. Refusals to rate, or to agree

to a rate were particularly effective avenues of protest, enabling a number of different grievances to be expressed and always allowing for the possibility of obedience. Somerset rating disputes, for example, meant that the county did not pay a substantial proportion of its 1635 ship money, whilst expressing a perfect willingness to do so once the rates were settled.(473) In Hertfordshire rating disputes in early 1638 became newsworthy because of rumours the county was unwilling to pay until Hampden's Case was settled.(474) Few people were as bold as Edmund farmer of Daventry who drove off the sheriff of Northamptonshire's bailiffs with the words:

"he never paid the money he was taxed at and he never would and that it was a good deed to beat such drunken, rationally rogues as they were out of town."(475)

Yet this could be a difficult course to hold, involving resistance not just to the claims of the King but also to those of neighbours and friends: as Sir John Oglander wrote to John Worsley during collection of Hampshire ship money for 1637,

"as you are a gentleman whome I love and respect, soe I desior you not to fforce mee to distrayne your goodes for his Majjesltie's shipmoneys. I shoalde br very [loath] to doe itt to anye, espetiolly to yourselve; as ye moneys must be payd to his Majjesltie, soe there is littel reason yt I shoalde besydes my paynes and care paye itt out of mu owne purse."(476)

Prevaricating about payment, refusing to hand money over until the last possible moment, was another effective sabotage technique: the Earl of Warwick denied being a ship money defaulter, in spite of sums outstanding in Essex and in Northamptonshire.(477) Richard Spencer tried a similar tactic in Kent, when he

"did long stand out, being sick or one some other excuse styll put off ye undersheriff who was sent to him,...tyll not long before Christmas 1636 a friend of hys dyd pay ye money.. both without hys will and knowledge."(478)

Rich men like Mr Bacon in the Burton Latimer dispute, and poor men like two Hertfordshire husbandmen summoned before the Council in June 1636, denied they were disaffected by saying they had never been asked for any money.(479) Passive resistance, allowing the sheriff to distraint, made a point about obeying the King albeit reluctantly.(480) Resistance to distress, involving violence, the rescue of distrained goods or driving away the bailiffs, was a line followed by some bold enough to stand out or sometimes by communal action. Violence was not the only means of resisting distress, which could be just as effectively thwarted by such tactics as mowing hay meadows, or being deliberately obstructive with details of "name and property".(481) Refusing to buy distrained goods was another way of undermining collection: the mayor of Banbury said the distresses taken for 1635 ship money were still "rotting" unsold over a year later.(482) At any stage three possibilities were always open, to choose conformity, to appeal to the King and the Council or to resort to law.

The law courts were used by different sections of society to clarify the law and to resolve conflict: this applied just as much to the resolution of local rating disputes as to questions involving the nature of the prerogative like the ship money case. The courts served to widen political awareness of the ship money service by giving prominence to the wider questions of obedience and conformity as

well as of opposition. The Assizes were regularly used to broadcast the Crown's views on obedience to the service, as well as to resolve disputes.(483) On the other hand the Lords feared public disputes, both because they were divisive and because they were used to intimidate officers trying to do their duty; yet attempts to control access to the law was interpreted by some as proof of tyranny.(484) The relationship between resort to law and opposition is a complex one. The Lords feared lawyers were behind disputes: they asked Insley of Lutterworth to name the "counsellor" from whom he had taken advise about not obeying the sheriffs warrants.(485) Some of the Council's suspicions were well-grounded. Threat of legal action was used at a local level to undermine obedience. In Banbury the mayor felt he was opposed at every turn and did not know how to proceed.(486) Lord Falkland sued the bailiff who distrained him in Dacorum hundred in Hertfordshire for 1635 ship money, making the bailiff afraid to act the next year.(487) Lord Saye did the same in Lincolnshire.(488) Francis Sawyer of Kettering in Northamptonshire rescued his horse after it was distrained, assaulted the constable and bailiff and tried to sue them. He was reported to the Lords, examined by the Attorney General and ordered to conform: instead he arrested the bailiff and refused to pay costs and compensation.(489) Two tithing men from Somerset complained in July 1636 because they were being threatened both with violence and with arrest by powerful men local men "full of law",

"which distrubance", the sheriff told the Lords, "if suffered and not presently redressed will prove so prejudicial tothe service as there will be little more

money paid though I use my greatest diligence."(490)

Two and a half years later these threats had taken effect. Samuel Foy late high constable of Horethorne hundred was returned as negligent by the late sheriff of Somerset William Avery. He petitioned the Lords for discharge, saying he doubted the validity of the sheriff's warrants to distrain and did not execute them "in regard many of those who refused were persons of great quality with whom he is no way able to contend."(491) The frequency of law suits involving ship money, and the Lords' hostile attitude towards them, may have heightened a sense of illegality, and made ship money into a common grievance. Certainly disputes were common enough to be seen as a grievance during the Short Parliament.(492)

How widespread opposition was and what sympathy it enjoyed is a difficult, if not an impossible question to answer. Opposition was much more consistent than has hitherto been allowed by historians. There are striking similarities between resistance to the Forced Loan and opposition to ship money. A few examples illustrate this continuity. The northern part of Oxfordshire was still influenced by the "ill example of a neighbouring lord", and the gentry and the middling sort together opposed ship money in Theydon Garnon in Essex, where there had been a mass refusal of the Loan by the subsidy men.(493) Some men, who achieved publicity or were notable because of their rank, such as Warwick and Saye, Hampden or his cousin Sir Alexander Denton, were consistent in resisting what they saw as an illegal service.(494) Some were associated with the Prince Palatine and the defence of the Protestant cause, like Lord Craven who was a

persistent ship money defaulter in Oxfordshire.(495) Some were parliament men or lawyers like John Crew, Sir Arthur Haselrigg, Lord Falkland or Denzil Holles.(496) Not all of them persisted in refusal, but many were involved in different forms of opposition as well as refusal to pay. In the ranks below the gentry, particularly in counties where there was a persistent pattern of opposition there is a surprising degree of consistency in opposition, surprising given some of the assumptions made about the apolitical nature of English provincial politics.(497) Some of the Oxfordshire constables were returned to the Lords as recalcitrant or negligent year after year after year.(498) Other men were consistently involved as troublemakers in a variety of guises. Richard Robbins of Long Buckby was delinquent in 1635 and 1636, in 1637 another Robbins was involved in resistance.(499) Richard Knighton of Irthlingborough was implicated in Northamptonshire's disaffection from 1636, ending up as the foreman of the grand jury who petitioned against ship money as a grievance in response to the last writ.(500) Much of this evidence undermines any simple picture of localism which relied for its credibility upon the separation of local and national, elite and popular politics.

Other people who initially paid ship money and were cooperative, shared the same opinions as the disaffected but did not wish to be involved in outright opposition. For other people, and for other communities there was a movement from initial acceptance, through complaint and passive resistance to defiance. The activities of many gentry reflect this pattern: Sir Oliver Luke, Sir Francis

Seymour, Sir John Jennings, and Sir Hugh Cholmley, whose own opposition brought the whole liberty of Whitby Strand with him in 1639.(501) So too does the experience of communities which were persistently troublesome; these places were more troublesome in more ways than quieter places, using different forms of protest at different times, and facing more and more complicated administrative difficulties. Manshead hundred in Bedfordshire, the Chiltern hundreds in Buckinghamshire and the Somerset hundreds illustrate this movement from protest, to opposition and resistance.(502) In the process, political culture was broadened, to include the ranks below the gentry and to draw the godly and the multitude together. It was also intensified by a new awareness, linking traditions of godliness with those of parliamentary consent, in defence of the law and true religion. The ideology informing opposition became more sophisticated as part of these changes in political awareness, and in response to the changing nature of the service: events made theories of a Popish plot much more credible as time passed, and deepened the alienation of King and people.

REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 4

The title for the chapter is taken from Lord Saye's speech in the House of Lords, during the debate on the King's first answer to the Petition of Right in May 1628, E L 7785.

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2. Norfolk R O, PD/78/47.
3. The Plays and Poems of Philip Massinger, ed P. Edwards and C. Gibson, (Oxford, 1976), I p xxix.
4. R.A. Anselment, Clarendon and the Caroline Myth of Peace, JES, 23 (1984), p 37-54; Smuts, Court Culture, p 254; 264-265.
5. T. Osiona, Rhetoric, Logic and Poetry: the Formal Cause, in The Age of Milton ed C.A. Patrides and R.B. Wadington, (Manchester, 1920) p 306-337; for the analogy with Arminianism see McGee in DeMolen ed Leaders of the Reformation, "Right worship was the way to right belief and therefore to social and political order under the sacred king. It was the way to 'godly rule'."p 329; Smuts sees parallels between religion and court culture, Court Culture, p 227; also interesting is the identification of the King as a "an agent of redemption", p 234-233.
6. C. Haigh, Elizabeth I, (London, 1938), p 88-105; J. Goldberg, James I and the Politics of Literature, 2nd Edition, (California, 1999).
7. Smuts, Court Culture, p 269.
8. Sharpe, Criticism and Compliment, p 211
9. Sharpe, Criticism and Compliment, p 205.
See also Smuts, Court Culture, p 257-97; Veevers, Images of Love and Religion, p 191-205.
10. As quoted by Sharpe, Criticism and Compliment, p 252. Martin Sutler has pointed out the ambiguity inherent in these lines, in a review article HJ, 32 (1989), p 432.
11. Smuts, Court Culture, p 171-177; 183-209; 245-276.
12. Smuts, Court Culture, p 253-262..
13. For political ideas see Smuts, Court Culture, p 217-238; Sommerville, p 9-50.
The quotation is taken from Charles's speech before his execution, C.V. Wedgwood, The Trial of Charles I, in R.H. Parry, ed The English Civil War and After 1642-1658, (London, 1970), p 56; 11.

14. "Distempers" was a common metaphor to describe what was considered wrong with the 1628 session, see Sharpe in Tomlinson, p 56, and p 57.

15. Laud, Works, I, p 45; the Venetian ambassador Correr believed domestic peace had softened the English and made them more likely to let their ancient liberties fade away, C S P Ven 1628-1639, p 296.

16. Stuart Royal Proclamations, II, p 229.

17. The phrases "ignorance" and "wilfulness" are taken from the King's letter to the Judges sent with the second ship money case in February 1637, ST, III, p 342-4.

The idea of "natural" obedience is taken from a letter from Dorchester to Sir Robert Anstruther, 28th February 1631 cited by Reeve, Dorchester, p 217.

18. ST, III, p 342.

19. See above p 69-70; 80-81; 179-184.

20. Quoted by Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation, p 107; for the general background see, p 24-111; her judgement on John Donne "For Donne, the human product of state censorship was not the heroic individual whose outspokenness deserves written memorial, but the deeply-divided half-felicious self." p 93, has a bearing on the effects of censorship generally.

21. Sir John Eliot died in the Tower and was denied burial in his family vault, Reeve, p 290.

Burton, Bastwick and Prynne were branded, mutilated and imprisoned by order of the Star Chamber in 1637, ST, III, p 711-755.

22. Also Wentworth's view, Wedgwood, Strafford: A Revaluation, p 84-85.

23. Quoted by Amussen in Order and Disorder in Early Modern England, ed Fletcher and Stevenson, p 198; for an example of its use see St John's first day's argument, ST, III, p 260.

24. Sommerville p 27-34; Amussen, in Order and Disorder in Early Modern England, ed Fletcher and Stevenson, p 199.

25. Quoted by Sommerville, p 31.

26. See above p 131.

Strafforde's Letters, II, p 119; the letter is misquoted by C.V. Wedgwood, Strafford, (London, 1935), p 206.

27. Sharpe, Criticism and Compliment, p 265-301; Veevers, Images of Love and Religion, p 65-74; 110-119; 180-205.

28. Collinson, Birth Pangs of Protestant England, p 89; for a similar point in a literary context, Goldberg, James I and the Politics of Literature, p 213.
29. Sharpe, p 292-6; even in poetry there were difficulties, Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation, p 19; 107; M. Butler, Politics and the Masque: "Salmacida Spolia" in J. Sawday and T. Healy, eds War Is All the World About, (forthcoming), I am grateful to Martin Butler for telling me about his essay.
30. C S P Van 1636-1639, p 297.
31. Russell, in Tomlinson, p 147.
32. Sharpe, in Starkey, ed The English Court From the Wars of the Roses to the English Civil War, p 226-260.
For contemporary confirmation of this change at court see Veivers, Images of Love and Religion, p 37; C S P Van 1632-1636, p 353; L. Hutchinson, Memoirs of Colonel Hutchinson By His Widow Lucy, ed C.H. Firth, (London, 1906), p 69.
33. Quoted by Cust p 33
34. Smuts, Court Culture, p 219-233.
35. Fincham, SIHR, 57 (1984), p 233.
36. See above p 31-33; 39-41; 44-45; 30-31; 164-179; 426; 430'-432; 449-451; 524-525.
37. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, I p 87.
38. See below p 424-473.
39. See below p 430-432; 439-445; 449-451.
40. SP16/427/31.
41. Quoted by Cust, P and P, 112 (1986), p 33.
42. N R O Montagu MS, I , f 60, as quoted by Sharpe in Tomlinson p 67-8, and checked against the original.
43. Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation, p 17.
44. For fears about private correspondence see for example, Letters of John Holles, III, p 430; 463; Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation, p 208-209.
Laud and Wentworth regularly used a cypher, for example, Strafforde's Letters, II, p 66; Laud, Works, VII, 385; Garrard's letter is Strafforde's Letters, II, p 351.
45. Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation, p 17-21; 43-119.

46. Dd/Ph/223/56; 58.
47. SP16/383/46; PC2/49, p 15-16; 103-4.
48. B L Add MS, 11045 f 68; for his refusals in Oxfordshire see SP16/422/9; 10.
49. Lord Clare to Lord Haughton 9th June 1537, *Letters of John Holles, III*, p 497.
50. Quoted by Reave, p 101.
51. See above p 199.
52. Quoted by Fielding, *HJ*, 31 (1939), p 784.
It should be clear by now that I profoundly disagree with Kevin Sharpe's reading, "Sheriffs who might have drawn some advantage, certainly some sympathy from the Council, from attributing delays to nice constitutional scruples seldom refer to objections of principle." Tomlinson p 73.
53. Strafford's Letters, I, p 33.
54. This point was made by Hirst in Sharpe, p 131.
55. Quoted by Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 123.
56. Reave, JRS, 25 (1986), p 28.
57. Quoted by Hammersley, History, 63 1960 p 21.
58. Patterson, Censorship and Interpretation, p 19.
59. For London see p 77-80; for Devon see p 74-75; for Essex and Northamptonshire p 195-196 266-267; 306 ; 364-366; 473-493.
60. C115 M35-8442.
61. For London see p 77-80; for Devon see p 74-75; for Essex and Northamptonshire p 195-196 266-267; 306 ; 364-366; 473-493.
62. Norfolk Record Office, PD/73/47.
63. SP16/331/26; 336/73.
64. Russell, p 1-34; Morrill, Revolt of the Provinces, p 14-31 and Sharpe, Criticism and Compliment, p 1-53 reject the neat analogies of Zagorin's court-country division.
Selections used by L. Stone, Social Change and Revolution in England, (London, 1965) showed how difficult it was to link social, economic and political factors and how the reality revealed by research was infinitely more complicated than generalisations about the nature of revolution allowed.
J.N. Ball, Sir John Eliot and Parliament 1624-1629, in Sharpe,

p 173-208.

Russell, p 425.

Fletcher's Outbreak of the English Civil War, argued very strongly against "the straitjacket of the whig tradition" but stressed "personal idealism, collective emotion and ideological passion", p 407-408.

65. See above p 17-18; below p 536-537; 542; 555-556; 570.

66. See for example, M. Kishlansky, The Emergence of Adversary Politics in the Long Parliament, Journal of Modern History, 49 (1977), p 617-640; Russell, p 1-34; Sharpe, Introduction, in Sharpe, p 1-43; Sharpe and Zwicker, Politics of Discourse: the Literature and History of Seventeenth-Century England, Introduction p 1-20.

67. See above p 301-308.

68. P.G. Lake, Presbyterianism, the Idea of a National Church and the Argument from Divine Right, in Protestantism and the National Church in Sixteenth Century England ed P.G. Lake and M. Dowling (London 1937), p 193-224.

69. In defining ideology I have used some of the new work in literary criticism, especially T. Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction, (London, 1986), which seem to me to be more subtle than the rather crude labels used by historians.

70. Sharpe and Zwicker, Politics of Discourse, p 1-20. In Criticism and Compliment, p 294 Sharpe says "a common language did not necessarily mean a shared ideology or attitude."

71. J. Dollimore, Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries, (Brighton, 1984), quotation, p 50; p 3-26; 47-50; 53-103.

72. M.J. Mendle, Dangerous Positions: Mixed Government, the Estates of the Realm and the Making of the 'Answer to the XIX Propositions, (Alabama, 1985), p 21-137.

73. J. Daly, The Idea of Absolutism in Seventeenth Century England, HJ, 21 (1978), p 227-250.

74. Sommerville, p 1-188.

75. For an example of contemporary discussion of the prerogative concerning ship money see, B L Harg MS 321, f 153v-154r; Fincham, BIHR, 57 (1984), p 232; for other examples of conflict generated by this see also Cust in Conflict in Early Stuart England ed Cust and Hughes, p 31.

76. See above p 30-372; 424-498; 544-545; 550..

77. Butler, Theatre and Crisis, p 84-289; Smuts, Court Culture, p 53-67; P. Burke, Popular Culture in London, in Reay, ed, Popular Culture

in Seventeenth Century England, p 39-42; J.E. Farnell, *The Social and Intellectual Basis of London's Role in the English Civil Wars*, Journal of Modern History, 49 (1977), p 641-659.

78. Fincham, BIHR, 57 (1984), p 233.

79. Quoted by Hirst, Authority and Conflict p 138; C S P Ven 1629-1632, p 323.

80. See above p 289-334; below p 473-493.

81. Hirst in Sharpe p 132-7; Cust, p 43-46; 188-193; 317-321. The Earl of Clare's letter frequently use the term "patriot" to describe those out of favour, for example *Letters of John Holles*, III, p 399.

82. See below p 424-498.

83. Reeve, p 216; Butler, Theatre in Crisis, p 251-280; for an example of the way these changes had begun to affect outlook see W.R. Prest, *The Art of Law and the Law of God: Sir Henry Finch in Puritans and Revolutionaries*, ed Thomas and Pannington, p 94-117.

84. See above p 289-334.

85. I owe this point to Jonathan Scott.

86. See above p 473-493; Hirst, Authority and Conflict, p 34-89; Smuts, Court Culture, p 94-98; Sommerville, p 57-114; 145-138.

87. Quoted in C.S.R. Russell, The Crisis of Parliaments: English History 1509-1660, (Oxford, 1971), p 301.

88. H. Ingram, *Ridings, Rough Music and Mocking Rhymes in Early Modern England*, in Reay, ed, Popular Culture, p 166-197.

89. Smuts, Court Culture p 15-50; F. Yates, *Astraea*, (London, 1976), p 29-120; Collinson, Birth Pangs of English Protestantism, p 130--2.

90. See below p 484.

91. Hirst, Authority and Conflict, p 99.

92. BL Harl MS 3796 f 65.

93. As quoted by C.S.R. Russell, *The Parliamentary Career of John Pym*, in The English Commonwealth, ed Smith, Tyacke and Clark, p 163.

94. Francis Bacon, *Of Seditious and Troubles*, in The Essays of Francis Bacon, (London, 1950), p 61.

95. C S P D 1640, p 634; B L Add MS 11045, f 112.

96. STT Box 17; Cliffe, Puritan Gentry, p 193-225; Russell, in The English Commonwealth, ed Smith Tyacke and Clark, p 150-151; D. Hirst, Unanimity in the Commons, Aristocratic Intrigues and the Origins of the English Civil War, Journal of Modern History, 50 (1978), p 51-63; Smuts EHR xciii (1978), p 26-45; for Hartlib see below n 107.
97. J. Flemion, The Nature of Opposition in the House of Lords in the Early Seventeenth Century: a Reevaluation, in Peers, Politics and Power: the House of Lords 1503-1911, (1986), p 5-20; Collinson, Religion of Protestants, p 132.
98. Religion of Protestants p 183-189; Hunt, in Reviving the English Revolution, ed Eley and Hunt, p 305-332.
99. The Earl of Clare complained of "the poor respect they make of the nobility" compared to Queen Elizabeth's time Letters of John Holles, III, p 427; Cust, p 317-319; Clarendon, p History of the Rebellion, I, 242; 241.
100. For Saye's opinion E. Manning, The Aristocracy and the Downfall of Charles I, in B. Manning, ed Politics, Religion and the English Civil War, p 131; Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, I, p 131-2.
101. Quoted, G. Bankes The Story of Corfe Castle, p 139-141.
102. Sheffield University Library, Hartlib Papers. Ephemerides. HA 50, 29 sig E-F/16.
103. Proceedings in the Short Parliament, p 53.
104. See above p 39-41.
105. Cust, p 126-252; Reeve, p 210-225..
106. Reeve, p 210-213.
107. Sheffield University Library, Ephemerides 1634 HA/50:29/2/sig A11; A12; A13:1; A13/8; B/C9; D/E3; D-E/11; F-G/14; G-H/12; Ephemerides 1639-1640 HA/50/30/4 sig A5; I am grateful to Mark Greengrass for bringing Hartlib's Ephemerides to my attention.
108. Whitelocke, Memoirs of English Affairs, p 25.
109. The quotation is from Barrington Family Letters 1628-1632, ed A. Searle, Camden Society, Fourth Series, 23 (1933), p 116; for general information on St John see DNB.
110. D N B; B L Add MS 22,959 f 56r-v.
111. Reeve, p 124; 128; 142; 145; 150; Hammersley, Leonard, History, 63 (1978), p 30-34; DNB.
112. Reeve p 23; C and T, I , p 358-9; Manning, in Manning, ed Politics, Religion and the English Civil War p 65.

113. Butler, Theatre and Crisis, p 89; M.J. Mendle, *The Ship Money Case, 'The Case of Ship Money', and the Development of Henry Parker's Parliamentary Absolutism*, HJ 32 (1989), p 513-536.
114. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, p 242-3.
115. Hughes, HJ, 29 (1936), p 771-793.
116. Letters of John Holles, III, p 346; 348; 363; 434; 435; 440-1; 448; 450; 460; 461; 463; 474; 476; 495. all illustrate a wide variety of connections including other great nobles, the Bishop of Lincoln and some of the ship money sheriffs of various counties; Fielding, HJ, 31 (1938), p 769-733; Winthrop Correspondence, III and IV, generally.
117. C S P Ven 1635-1639, p 124-125; C. Roberts, *The Earl of Bedford and the Coming of the English Revolution*, Journal of Modern History, 49 (1977), p 600-616.
118. For a similar argument see Hirst, Journal of Modern History, 50 (1978), p 60-61
119. See above p 164-173.
120. As quoted by Amussen, in Order and Disorder in Early Modern England, ed Fletcher and Stevenson, p 193; see also Collinson, Religion of Protestants p 151-2.
122. Holmes, in Order and Disorder in Early Modern England, ed Fletcher and Stevenson, p 192; on theatrical use of Magna Carta as a symbol of liberty see Theatre in Crisis, p 72-74; for a ship money equivalent see the use the men of Ely made of an ancient record in their dispute with Cambridgeshire SP16/297/33.
123. Quoted by Ross Bedfordshire Historical Record Society 65 (1986) p 79.
124. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion I, p 242.
125. Reeve, p 99-187; 292-294..
126. C S P Ven 1629-32, p 177; Reeve p 204-207; Alexander, Charles I's Lord Treasurer, p 134-221.
127. See above p 82-93; Adams in Tomlinson., p 100.
128. The quotation is taken from Seneterre's dispatch of 12th April 1635, Smuts EHR xciii (1978), p 31; WWM/Str P/15(9); Walters, Images of Love and Religion, p 71-84; Smuts EHR xciii (1978), p 26-45.
129. Hibbard, Charles I and the Popish Plot, p 31; Smuts EHR xciii (1978), p 36-38.
130. C S P Ven 1632-1636, p 440; 444; Hibbard, Charles I and the Popish Plot, p 19-36.

131. Smuts EHR xciii (1978), p 37.
132. Smuts EHR xciii (1978), p 37.
133. C S P Ven 1632-1636, p 466.
134. Letter of Conway's quoted by Smuts, Court Culture, p 250.
135. Cust, p 33-34.
136. Leicestershire Record Office, Barker Manuscripts, D E 730/3(19) warrant of the sheriff of Rutland to the chief constables of Martinsley Hundred.
137. See above p 254-257.
138. ST, III, p 1212.
139. See below p 451-453; 457-459.
140. See below p 443.
141. D and F, II, p 272. Rossingham's newsletter refers only to rumours.
142. Sheffield University Library, HA/50/31/3.
143. Sir Robert Phelip's newsletters from Nathaniel Tompkins are in Phelips Manuscripts in Somerset Record Office, although none survive for this particular date.
144. The quotation is from SP16/331/26.
145. SP16/302/90.
146. See above p 137; 191-192; 140.
147. See above p 195-196; 266-267.
148. SP16/301/96; 98.
149. For examples of 1635 rating disputes in Northamptonshire see N R O Weedon Beck 1443, Vestry Minutes Book; Burton Latimer Parish 55p/504 Constables Accounts p 41; 42; 51; 52; 61; 62; 63; SP16/312/37; PC2/45, p 386; 406; 313/111; 314/97; 327/64; 352/191.
150. SP16/333/2.
151. Rowe, Transactions of the Essex Archaeological Society, Third Series, 1 (1964), p 160-163; Cust, p 260-284.
152. These are ship money difficulties in Essex until the issue of the next writ: SP16/301/95; 96; 302/4; 29; PC2/45, p 235; SP16/304/38; 81; 305/14; PC2/45, p 403-404; 444-445; 445-446; 469; 488-489;

PC2/46, p 57-58; SP16/319/29; 94; PC2/46, p 75; 118; 135; SP16/321/24; 241; PC2/45, p 117-118; 182; SP16/327/117; PC2/46, p 287; SP16/328/49; 49i; 50.

For Essex ship money payments see Tables V, VI and VII

153. SP16/328/49.

155. SP16/304/73.

154. SP16/337/37.

155. SP16/304/75.

156. SP16/311/78; 79.

157. Willcox, Gloucestershire, p 36; PC2/46, p 245; SP16/332/6; 245/66.

158. Hughes, Warwickshire, p 94-109; SP16/321/76; 322/8

159. STT 2059.

150. SP16/301/96; *Papers of Richard Taylor of Clapham*, p 107.

161. SP16/436/30.

162. Lee, Bedfordshire Record Society, 65 (1986), p 11-30. the quotation is from p 23; SP16/329/73; C193/13/2.

163. The quotation is from Cliffe, Puritan Gentry, p 190; SP16/303/19; PC2/45, p 265-266; SP16/302/78; 79; 303/34

164. SP16/319/24; 319/39.

155. The quotation is from Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion p 171; for Sherborne hundred problems see PC2/45, p 435; SP16/317/38; 341/23; for Digby and Bristol's later views see below p 551.

166. SP16/319/89; for his family connections see Keeler, Members of the Long Parliament p 118; for his Puritanism see Cliffe, Puritan Gentry p 190; Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion p 224 describes him as a Parliamentary zealot; both men were excluded from the Commission of the Peace C193/13/2.

167. Cust, p 233.

168. SP16/351/70; the quotation is from SP16/333/4.

169. See above p 196-197; 370.

170. SP16/315/121.

171. SP16/331/26; 336/78.

172. Banbury: Collinson, The Birth Pangs of Protestant England, p 137-139; Cust, p 233; 297-298; for ship money see PC2/46, p 296.

- Bedford: Lee, Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, 65 (1986), p 11-12; Bedford paid £130 of £200 on 10th February 1636, SP16/313/78, but no more.
- Northampton: W.J. Shiels, *The Puritans in the Diocese of Northampton 1558-1610*, Northamptonshire Record Society, 30 (1979), p 103; 119-130; Cust, p 233; 297-298; for ship money see PC2/46. p 191-192.
173. PC2/46, p 337-338; Keeler, p 337.
174. WWM/Str P/15 (206):Clar St P, II, p 47.
The Seymour's were also family connections of the Knightleys, Shiels, Northamptonshire Record Society, 30 (1979), p 103; 118.
175. PC2/46, p 164; 218; Cliffe, Puritan Gentry, p 239; C193/13/2.
176. Barnes, Somerset, p 222-224.
177. Strafforde's Letters, I, p 491; C S P Ven. 1632-1636, p 489.
179. The quotation is from Strafforde's Letters, I p 506; Butler English Literary Renaissance, xii (1933), p 321-3
180. C S P Ven. 1632-1636, p 500-501.
181. Sir Thomas Roe's opinion as quoted by Butler English Literary Renaissance, xii (1933), p 322.
182. H M C Denbigh MS, p 19.
183. H M C Denbigh MS, p 47.
184. Strafforde's Letters, II, p 66.
185. Havran, Caroline Courtier, p 134-5.
186. See above p 54-56 ; 88-90; 174-175.
187. Smuts EHR xciii (1978), p 26-45.
188. M. Prestwich, Cranfield: Politics and Profit Under the Early Stuarts, (Oxford, 1966), p 547-553, Cranfield was sounded out about financial strategies for funding defence by land and sea. Similar projects were dreamed up by Nicholas and by some of Secretary Coke's circle, SP16/535/52; H M C Cowper Ms, III, p 153.
189. SP16/301/96; 304/75; 305/14.
190. PC2/45, p 336-337; PC2/46, p 177; 195.
191. SP16/301/96; PC2/45, p 472; 443; 457-458; 472; PC2/46, p 108; 114 SP16/325/90; PC2/46, p 256; for London in 1634-1635 see above p 77-81.
192. C S P Ven. 1632-1636, p 515.

193. For examples from November 1635 to November 1636 see:
Buckinghamshire: STT Ship Money; PC2/46, p 105-6; 109; 275; 280-281; 287; 298; SP16/327/113; PC2/46, p 304; 306; SP16/328/27; PC2/46, p 329-330; SP16/331/3; 44; 332/3; PC2/46, p 437; 438; 462.
Northamptonshire: PC2/46, p 275; SP16/302/24; 314/971; 327/9; PC2/46, p 287; SP16/327/113; 331/67; 338/2; 21-iii.
Essex: SP16/301/95; 96; 302/4; 29; PC2/46, p 235; SP16/304/38; 31; 305/14; PC2/46, p 403-404; 444-445; 445-446; 469; 438-439; PC2/46, p 57-58; SP16/319/29; 34; PC2/46, p 57-58; 75; 113; 135; SP16/321/24; 24i; PC2/46, p 117-119; 182; SP16/327/117; PC2/46, p 241; 237; SP16/328/49; 49i; 50.
Oxfordshire: SP16/313/51; 316/92; 318/75; PC2/46, p 163-164; SP16/325/71; 329/59; PC2/46, p 419.
Gloucestershire: PC2/46, p 387-388.; SP16/318/60; 320/33; PC2/46, p 154; SP16/331/39; 40; PC2/46, p 345; SP16/332/6.
Warwickshire: PC2/46, p 336.
Bedfordshire: PC2/46, p 135-136; SP16/320/65; PC2/46, p 311-312; 359-360.
194. For Sir Peter Temple see STT Ship Money: STT 907; and see above p 130; 190.
Sir Greville Verney: SP16/311/15; PC2/46, p 178-179; SP16/321/76; PC2/46, p 330; 446.
195. PC2/46, p 259; SP16/331/45; 332/6.
196. See above p 200.
197. C S P Ven 1636-1639, p 99; for examples see Laud, Works, VII, p 303-304; PC2/47, p 134; SP16/346/36; 107; 107i; PC2/47, p 155-156.
198. C and T, II, p 273; SP16/347/96vii.
199. See above p 170; 297-298; below p 445-6; 473-475.
200. SP16/361/19; Lathom had already tried to sue Sir Humphrey Mildmay's servants in the Court of Steward and Marshall, and the case was transferred in June 1637 to the King's Bench where it was never properly settled, P.L. Ralph, Sir Humphrey Mildmay: Royalist Gentleman, p 84-86.
201. PC2/47, p 75; SP16/345/33; 35; PC2/47, p 109-110; SP16/351/3; 355/54; 357/65.
202. Rushworth, II, p 323-324; SP16/392/70; Articles of Impeachment, p 33; C and T, II, p 272; 274-275.
203. Strafforde's Letters, II, p 53.
204. The preface to the 1643 account of An Humble Remonstrance describes its history.
205. C S P Ven 1636-1639, p 111.

206. C S P Ven 1636-1639, p 124-125.
207. C S P Ven 1636-1639, p 124-125.
208. Rushworth, II, p 359-364.
209. C and T, II, p 275.
210. See above p 170-173.
211. C and T, II, p 278.
212. See above p 170-173.
213. see above p 170-173; Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 235.
214. C S P Ven 1636-1639, p 159.
215. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, I, p 35-38.
216. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 232.
217. SP16/343/64.
218. SP16/349/50.
219. SP16/349/117.
220. Strafforde's Letters, II, p 56.
221. Strafforde's Letters, II, p 60-61.
222. See above p 170-173.
223. See above p 158-159.
224. Rowe, Transactions of the Essex Archaeological Society, Third Series, 1 (1964), p 162.
225. Bard, BIHR, 1 (1976), p 182; SP16/362/60.
226. Smuts, EHR, xciii (1978), p 40; Butler, English Literary Renaissance, xii (1983), p 341-342.
227. ST, III, p 711-824.
228. Fielding, HJ, 31 (1988), p 730; Butler, Theatre in Crisis, p 237; 243; H M C Ninth Report, p 496.
229. Clar St P, II, p 1.
230. SP16/362/31; 76.
231. Reeve, p 158-164, the quotation is from p 159.

232. Cust, p 168-183.

233. See below p 457-459: Prynne, An Humble Remondtrance, p 3-6; (all refernces are taken from the 1643 edition as this was the one published with Prynne's approval)

234. Prynne, An Humble Remonstrance p 14, Prynne's remarks on the level of charge in 1634 were criticised by Gordon as "strikingly inaccurate", but this is not necessarily so. Prynne talked of the burden per man not on the City as a whole, and as was argued in Chapter 1, the use of the subsidy as a model for London ship money did produce some very heavy personal burdens because of the differences in structure between the two taxes. Gordon, TRHS, 3rd series, iv (1910), p 150.

235. An Humble Remonstrance, p 14-15.

236. An Humble Remonstrance, p 15.

237. An Humble Remonstrance, p 16.

238. An Humble Remonstrance, p 16.

239. An Humble Remonstrance, p 17.

240. An Humble Remonstrance, p 17.

241. An Humble Remonstrance, p 17-18.

242. An Humble Remonstrance, p 18-23.

243. An Humble Remonstrance, p 30-31.

244. See above p 287-334.

245. LaudWorks, VII, p 364-365.

246. LaudWorks, VII, p 364-365.

247. Lamont, Marginal Prynne, p 55; LaudWorks, VII, p 364-365; ;Butler, Theatre in Crisis, p ; 30-35; M. Butler, English Literary Renaissance, 13 (1983), p 319-344; 251SL, III, p 846-853)

248H M C De L'Isle and Dudley MS, VI, p 117.

249. See above p 173-175.

250. Laud, Works, VII, p 333; PC2/48, p 123.

251. See below p 457; SL, III, p 942.

252. STT Ship Money Box, Attorney General to the sheriffs and under-sheriffs of Buckinghamshire 11th February 1637, 27th April 1637; the return is in E 202; SL, p 846.

253. ST, III, p 855-856.
254. C S P Ven 1636-1639, p 299.
255. As quoted by Cust, p 79
256. WWM/Str P/14 (260).
257. Reeve, BIHR, lix (1986), p 224.
258. B L Harg MS 321, f 149v.
259. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, I, p 55; Reeve, p 155-163.
260. Quoted by Reeve, Dorchester, p 54-55.
261. ST, III, p 1101.
262. Rushworth, II, p 323-324; Russell in The English Commonwealth, ed Smith, Tyacke and Clark, p 163-164.
263. Autobiography of Sir John Bramston, p 68-9.
264. B L Harl MS 3796, f 65.
265. Quoted by Underdown, Revel, Riot and Rebellion, p 126.
266. SP16/336/78; Cust, p 309; 334; Keeler, Members of the Long Parliament, p 400-401.
267. Articles of Accusation, p 33.
268. SP16/362/83 and 331.
269. SP16:372/104.
270. H M C Gawdy MS, p 164; for other evidence of interest see B L Add MS, 2259 f 56; Coventry Ship Money Book. f 36r "This Michaelmas Term... the matter in law touching the writ for ship money hath been *often argued pro and con in the Exchequer Chamber*".
271. C S P Ven 1636-1639, p 332.
272. C S P Ven 1636-1639, p 332; 376-377.
273. H M C De L'Isle and Dudley MS, VI, p 1140.
274. H M C De L'Isle and Dudley MS, VI, p 133; C115/N4/8619.
275. B L Add MS 42,153 f 75; Strafforde's Letters, II, p 167; amongst those listening on different days were the steward of Northampton Robert Woodford and Sir Humphrey Mildmay 1635 ship money sheriff for Essex, H M C Ninth Report, p 496; Ralph, Sir Humphrey Mildmay, p 146.

276. SL, III, p 1078.
277. H M C De L'Isle and Dudley MS, VI, p 129; SP16/393/29; SL, III, p 1251.
278. The Life, Diary and Correspondence of Sir William Dugdale, ed W. Hamper, (London, 1827), p 134; Strafforde's Letters, II, p 140; the Venetian Ambassador evidently read some, C S P Ven 1636-1639, p 363; for examples of surviving copies of the speeches, see H M C First Report, p 14; 31; H M C Second Report, p 3; 93; H M C Third Report, p 75; 121; 365; H M C Fourth Report, p 46; 374; SP16/413/120; C U L. Additional MS. 117/27; 30; B L Eg MS. 2333; Bedfordshire R O, Lucas MS, L 23 54; H R O IL 3423; 3341; F H 59; 533; 4154; Hertfordshire Record Office, Verulam MS, XII A 20; 21; E L 6977; 6978; 7977A; H M 723.
279. B L Add MS 42.153 f 75.
280. H M C De L'Isle and Dudley MS, VI, p 132.
281. H M C De L'Isle and Dudley MS, VI, p 136.
282. Warwickshire Record Office, Throckmorton Collection, CR 1293, Box 60 Folder 210.
283. Strafforde's Letters, II, p 130.
284. SL, III, p 924.
285. SL, III, p 1017.
286. SP16/336/72.
287. Articles of Accusation, p 33.
288. SL, III, p 951.
289. SL, III, p 970.
290. SL, III, p 918-921.
291. SL, III, p 856-923; 952-1014.
292. SL, III, p 923-962; 1014-1065; the quotation is from p 1026.
293. SL, III, p 1032-1047.
294. SL, III, p 1047.
295. The quotation is from SL, III, p 1052; p 1051-1060.
296. SL, III, p 1056.
297. SL, III, p 941.

298. C S P Ven 1636-1639, p 353.
299. Whitelocke, Memorials of English Affairs, p 22.
300. H M C Ninth Report, p 497.
301. WWM/Str P/18 (80).
302. ST, III, p 1202-1216.
303. ST, III, p 1216-1243; Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, I p 89.
304. See above p 289-334.
305. ST, III, p 1076.
306. ST, III, p 1076.
307. ST, III, p 1081; 1083.
309. ST, III, p 1094-1095.
310. ST, III, p 1101.
311. ST, III, p 1102.
312. ST, III, p 1098.
313. ST, III, p 1125; see also p 1085; 1189.
314. ST, III, p 1128.
315. ST, III, p 1186.
316. ST, III, p 1191.
317. ST, III, p 1216-1243; Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, I p 89-90.
318. ST, III, p 1217.
319. ST, III, p 1226.
320. ST, III, p 1226-1229.
321. ST, III, p 1226.
322. ST, III, p 1226-1229.
323. ST, III, p 1226-1237.
324. ST, III, p 1234.
325. ST, III, p 1234.

326. The Autobiography, II, p 131.
327. Compare ST, III, p 1127-1181; 1191-1201 with An Humble Remonstrance, p
328. ST, III, p 1129; 1134; 1136; 1140.
329. As quoted by Russell in The English Commonwealth, ed Smith, Clark and Tyacke, p 163.
330. ST, III, p 1129; 1134; 1136.
331. ST, III, p 1198.
332. ST, III, p 1201; for Berkeley's opinion see ST, III, p 1090.
333. ST, III, p 1201.
334. For Jones see ST, III, p 1191; for Weston see ST, III, p 1077.
335. ST, III, p 1206-1208.
336. ST, III, p 1207.
337. ST, III, p 1207-1209; this was also Bramston's view, ST, III, p 1249.
338. ST, III, p 1212.
339. ST, III, p 1213.
340. ST, III, p 1213.
341. ST, III, p 1213. Finch tried to answer these objections by arguing that Hampden was liable because he was one of the tenants named in the ship money writ and the certiorari, and that the scire facias was a new action, ST, III, p 1241-1242.
342. ST, III, p 1213-4.
343. ST, III, p 1249.
344. ST, III, p 1249.
345. ST, III, p 1215-1216; 1250.
346. ST, III, p 1213;
347. ST, III, p 1251-1254
348. C S P Ven 1636-1639, p 429.
349. Sharpe, in Tomlinson, p 74.

350. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, I, p 90.
351. SL, III, p 1182.
352. SL, III, p 1252.
353. Hertfordshire Record Office, Verulam MS, XIII A 20.
354. SL, III, p 1140-1181.
355. Strafforde's Letters, II, p 167; 170; 180-181; SL, III, p 1370-1382.
356. N R O Montagu MS, 4 f 101.
357. B L Add MS 35331, f 68r-v.
358. Strafforde's Letters, II, p 181.
359. The Plays and Poems of Philip Massinger, I p xxix.
360. See above p 175-177; 213-214.
361. Laud, Works, VII, p 382.
362. Strafforde's Letters, II, p 138; for Laud's reply see Laud, Works, VII, 397-398.
363. C115/N8619.
364. See above p 175-177; 213-214.
365. See above p 139-140; 176; 213; 287-288; 343-345.
366. SP16/386/88; it is undated although the editor of the calendar provisionally dated it as March? 1638.
367. SP16/389/131.
368. SP16/390/62; there was a similar situation in Surrey, SP16/389/132; in Essex, PC2/49, p 192, in Warwickshire, PC2/49, p 185, in Norfolk SP16/389/9; PC2/49, p 193; SP16/390/133; in Somerset SP16/389/124; PC2/49, p 283; and in Oxfordshire, SP16/393/19.
369. SP16/389/124.
370. SP16/389/124; 390/116/157; John Rylands Library, English MS 1091, f 27v.
371. SL, III, p 1377.
372. See above p 176-178.
373. See above p 131-132; 133-135; 176-177;

374. B L Add MS 22959, f 56.
375. SP16/389/124; see above p 156-157; 333-334; below p 494-495.
376. SP16/327/126.
377. SP16/383/46.
378. Essays of Francis Bacon, p 63.
379. Rushworth, II, p 266.
380. See above p 193-194; 202-205; 258-277; 312-313; 329-331.
381. SP16/327/11.
382. Fincham, BIHR lvii (1984), p 233.
383. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 233-234; 236-7.
383. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 233-234; 236-7.
384. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 235.
385. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 235-236.
386. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 236.
387. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 236.
388. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 236-237.
389. See above p 313-315.
390. See above p 304-306; 313-314; 329-334.
391. SP16/317/16.
392. SP16/468/124.
393. The quotation are from SP16/327/11; PC2/49, p 28.
394. *Calendar of the Correspondence of the Smyth Family of Ashton Court*, p 127-128.
395. SP16/333/211.
396. SP16/338/2; 21; 211; 349/17; 351/211 ; N R O C2857.
397. See above p 329-334.
398. Lake, Northern History, 17 (1983), p
399. See above p 289-334.

400. Barnes, Somerset, p 203-243.
401. See above p 364-365.
402. SP16/385/118; PC2/49, p 70-71; SP16/387/83; 84; 388/40; 57; PC2/49, p 253.
403. See above p 474-475.
404. See above p 454.
405. See above p 170; 179-184; 407-408; Laud, Works, VII, p 382.
406. See above p 304; 438.
407. See above p 39-40; 474-476; see below p 487-488; C and T, II, p 275.
408. As quoted by Butler, English Literary Renaissance, 17 (1983), p 324.
409. Russell, in Tomlinson, p 145-150; see below p 535-542; 570.
410. See above p 199; 415; 304-305; 405;
411. See above p 412-415.
412. See above p 41-48; 83; 169-173; 254-255.
413. See above p 455-457.
414. SP16/370/1.
415. Fincham, BIHR, lvii (1984), p 237.
416. C and T, II, p 252.
417. Navy Records Society XLIII (1912), p 226.
418. Navy Records Society XLIII (1912), p 211-219.
419. Navy Records Society XLIII (1912), p 213-219; the first quotation is from p 217 and the second from p 218.
420. The print called "The Kingly Cock" is reproduced from Butler, English Literary Renaissance, xii (1983), p 325.
421. Compare, for example, the difference in defiance between the constables in South Newington, William Walter's partly successful attack on recalcitrance, Sir Thomas Penystone's hard slog in 1637, John Doyle's troubles in 1638 and the outright refusal and disobedience of Oxfordshire in 1639, see above p 136; 137; 140; 191-2; 424; 524; 559.

422. SP16/395/40.
423. See above p 360 and Tables V, VI and VII.
424. Hirst, Representatives of the People?, p 151-153; Kishlansky, Parliamentary Selection, p 108-112.
425. Butler, Theatre in Crisis, p 181-280; see above p 299-334; Tyacke, in Russell, ed The Origins of the English Civil War, p 138-143; Cope, Politics Without Parliament, p 44-93; Lake in Conflict in Early Stuart England, ed Cust and Hughes, p 92-97.
426. Butler, Theatre in Crisis, p 251-280; Sharpe, Criticism and Compliment, p 265-301.
427. The quotation is from Butler, Theatre in Crisis, p 247.
428. SP16/350/541.
429. SP16/361/641: see above p 180.
430. SP16/383/46.
431. The quotation is from C. Carlton, Archbishop William Laud, (London, 1987), p 121.
433. As quoted by Carlton, Archbishop William Laud, p 121.
434. SP16/318/6; Laud, Works, VII, p 303-304.
435. SP16/337/34.
436. SP16/346/109.
437. ST, III, p 1378-1379.
438. Fielding, HJ, 31 (1988), p 769-788; for the context of these fears see Collinson, Birth Pangs of Protestant England, p 1-27.
439. The quotation is from Fielding, HJ, 31 (1988), p 781.
440. The quotation is from Fielding, HJ, 31 (1988), p 787-788; see p 784 for Scots. For other examples of this link see SP16/438/92; below p 538-543.
441. SP16/400/110.
442. STT 1163.
443. See above p 293-308; 313-315; 329-334; 424-430.
444. The quotation is taken from *The Worthy Sayings of Old Mr Dod in Two Parts*, in Tracts Relating to Northamptonshire, (London, 1881), p 12.

445. See above p 305; 451; Fielding, HJ, 31 (1988), p 782.
446. See above p 289-334; Fielding, HJ, 31 (1988), p
447. Butler, Theatre in Crisis, p 251-279; Fielding, HJ, 31 (1988), p
448. See below p 538-543; Sheffield University Library, HA50/13/20A.
449. See above p 312-317; 323-324.
450. See above p 312-317.
451. SP16/379/132
452. Fletcher, in Order and Disorder in Early Modern England
Fletcher and Stevenson, p 28.
453. As quoted by C.Herrup, The Common Peace: Participation and the
Common Law in Seventeenth Century England, (Cambridge, 1987), p 54.
456. The quotation is from Sir Humphrey Mildmay's diary as given in
Ralph, Sir Humphrey Mildmay, p 76.
457. SP16/389/88.
458. Brereton. PC2/45, p 468; Barnardiston SP16/354/59.
459. SP16/338/2; 2i; 2ii; 349/17; 351/211 ; N R O C2857.
460. The quotation is from Dd.Ph/223/76.
461. For example see;
Lincolnshire: SP16/338/38; 352/67; 68; 354/49i; 357/96; 96i-vii;
366/3i; 385/75; 386/87; 390/29i; 445/52.
West country: SP16/319/89; PC2/47, p 166; 311-312; SP16/354/170;
PC2/47, p 414-415; 422; SP16/355/137; PC2/48, p 137; SP16/390/40.
462. Memoirs, Biographical and Historical of Bulstrode Whitelocke, ed
R.H. Whitelocke, (London, 1860), p 120.
463. SP16/367/2.
464. SP16/320/19.
465. B L Add MS 142, f 44.
466. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 284; *Diary of Sir Thomas
Aston*, p 45; Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, p 3-4.
467. Buckinghamshire: PC2/47, p 298; 354; 433-434; 454-455; PC2/48, p
136-137; 157-158; 201-202.
Hertfordshire: PC2/47, p 130; 132; SP16/346/96; PC2/47, p 147-148;
SP16/352/8; 354/48; PC2/47, p 421.

Surrey: SP16/335/62; PC2/46, p 453; SP16/346/106; PC2/47, p 183-184; SP16/348/53; 54; 350/3; PC2/47, p 301; 308-309.

468. PC2/48, p 358.

469. SP16/409/166.

470. SP16/410/124.

471. SP16/345/78; 372/108; PC2/48, p 42.

472. See below p 524-570.

473. Barnes, Somerset, p 209-219; for the arrears see Table VI.

474. Cope, Life of a Public Man, p 151; B L Add MS, 33575, f 19; 34; 35; SP16/381/71; 387/46.

475. SP16/399/85; a similar line was taken by Sir John and Sir Christopher Wray, SP16/331/26; 336/78.

476. The Oglander Memoirs ed W.H. Long (London, 1888), p xxii-xxiii.

477. SP16/337/41; N R O, Z A 443.

478. As quoted by Cope, Politics Without Parliament, p 115.

479. N R O, I C 2357; PC2/46, p 298; SP16/327/124; 125.

481. SP16/361/19; 385/1.

482. SP16/361/25

483. See for example, Fincham, BIHR, lvii, p 232; H M C Various Collections, VII, p 417-419; ST, III, p 1374; Western Circuit assize Orders, p 150; 156; 169; SP16/427/31.

484. See above p 15-16.

485. STT 1163.

486. SP16/366/19.

487. SP16/376/106.

488. SP16/357/96vii.

489. SP16/341/50; 398/19; PC2/49, p 422; 436; SP16/399/27; 46; 412/112; 112i; PC2/50, p 470.

490. SP16/363/11; 11i-11i.

491. SP16/443/82.

492. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 37.
493. Oxfordshire: Cust, p 289; SP16/336/511; 346/106; 371/65; 422/9; 10.
Theydon Garnon: Cust, p 280; PC2/46, p 57-58; SP16/317/43.
494. See above p 414; 424-472.
495. Gardiner, VIII, p 204; SP16/422/9; 10; Lord Craven's arrears were owed for several places in Chadlington hundred which was at the centre of Oxfordshire rating disputes in 1636, see above p 137.
496. John Crew: SP16/344/108.
Sir Arthur Haselrigg: SP16/350/91.
Lord Falkland: SP16/376/106.
Denzil Holles: SP16/303/13; 85; PC2/48, p 613; SP16/451/13; 131.
497. For Example Morrill, Revolt of the Provinces, p 13; 14.
498. For example Thomas Roberts of South Newington, SP16/327/126; 367/531; 368/33; 389.23; 468/123; 124.
499. PC2/47, p 43-44; SP16/386/84; PC2/49, p 528; SP16/389/23.
500. SP16/376/?; 400/27; 409/48;
501. Sir Oliver Luke: T W 861.
Sir Francis Seymour: Clar St P, II, p 47-48.
Sir John Jennings: See above p 197-198; PC2/49, p 5-6.
Sir Hugh Cholmley: Memoirs, p 60-61.
502. Manshead hundred: PC2/46, p 359-361; T W 856; 863.
Chiltern hundreds: STT Ship Money; PC2/47, p 298; 354; 433-434; 454-455; PC2/48, p 136-137; 157-158; 201-202; these hundreds experienced significant gentry opposition to the benevolence and the Forced Loan, and the gentry were not afraid to turn to a popular appeal for support, Cust, p 162-164; 310.
Somerset hundreds: 1635: PC2/45, p 404; SP16/330/15; 355/14; 365/3.
1636: SP16/348/47; PC2/47, p 256; PC2/48, p 187-188; SP16/357/23; 372/15; PC2/48, p 211.
1637: SP16/378/68; PC2/48, p 611; SP16/389/26; 390/63; PC2/49, p 295.
1638: SP16/442/49; PC2/51, p 254.
1639: S R O, Dd/AH/21/4; SP16/448/57; PC2/51, p 412-413.
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"A DYINGE THINGE": THE COLLAPSE OF SHIP MONEY

"There is a general report of a parliament to begin the 13th day of April next (after the parliament in Ireland), notwithstanding the writ we have gone forth for ship money..."

Roger Holland to the Earl of Bridgewater, 17th December 1639.(1)

"I have done my uttermost endeavours for collecting of his Majesty's ship money, but find the county so generally averse to the payment thereof and all officers so timorous and slack in the execution of my warrants that his Majesty's service thereby is very much retarded and hindered: for few or none will pay but by distress, nor will any assist an officer therein, but threaten to sue them if they distrain and tell them that a sheriff's warrant is not sufficient warrant to bear them out; so that they and the service are thereby much disheartened." Rudolph Warcopp, Sheriff of Oxfordshire to the Council, 17th September 1640.(2)

The question of whether to issue more ship money writs was first discussed in the summer of 1639 and reported in Rossingham's newsletter to Lord Scudamore of 6th August:

"I have heard it was true, and that lately resolved here to send out new writs for ship money, not as they went out the last year, a third part and no more but the full sum shall be required which amounts unto £218,000 and 500."(3)

Although the Lords recognised that the service did create a considerable amount of hostility they were confident

"though all do not pay many will,... all which may amount to two third part of the full sum which is very well worth, especially since it is generally concluded there will be as great necessity to send out a fleet for the guarding of the narrow seas this year, as there hath been in any one of the former years, which hath been much to the preservation of the King's honour and puissance amongst foreign nations."(4)

During the Short Parliament Lord Keeper Finch cast more light on this period of uncertainty and hesitancy when he said

"That his Majests intention was that noe writts should have issued this Yeare but that he was compelled to it for these weighty considerations.

1. That there was a necessity for him to prepare an Army to reduce his disaffected subjects in Scotland wheunto his owne private coffers were not sufficient.

2. All Neighbouring Princes were preparing greate fleetes And that his Majests dominion over the seas which was soe much to the honor and splendor of this Nation would have beene lost; And Trading much impayred,....

3. Those of Algiers were going to have 60 shippes to seato infest our Marchants tradinge into the streights."(5)

Given all of these considerations it was not surprising that the Council handled the service with care, and between August and November when the new writs were actually issued the Lords undertook a wide-ranging review of the administration. In the same August newsletter Rossingham discussed continuing efforts by the Crown's legal officers to strengthen the enforcement of the service to give it a greater element of compulsion and to make the sheriffs more accountable, "that the high sheriffs ought to make good out of their own estates what they leave uncollected."(7) Other changes were certainly meditated. In November Nicholas wrote that the writs "be made returnable a purpose", thereby correcting one of the administrative weaknesses revealed during Hampden's Case, and the sheriffs were to be given more power at the local level:

"in case the mayors of corporate towns shall not assess and levy the sums charged on them, then the sheriffs shall enter, assess and levy".(8)

A great deal of care and detailed local knowledge was used in the selection of new sheriffs, particularly as it had already been

decided that "ill-chosen" sheriffs were responsible for the problems of the 1638 writ.(9) Nicholas's notes on the choice of sheriff in Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Somerset and Lincolnshire dated 10th November 1639 show the Lords wanted to bring in well-affected men of good local standing as well as to bridle the ill-affected. With the added administrative burden of Scottish affairs it was important that every thing should be done to make the service more straightforward in the counties and less demanding of Council time. The Lords still believed that local compliance would follow if the sheriffs were well-affected and there were sufficient powerful sanctions against disobedience. Sir John Evelyn under consideration for Wiltshire "hath £1500 an able man, but I cannot commend his affections", William Burrell of Lincolnshire was "a person of no knowledge or esteem in the county being a stranger", in Gloucestershire Mr Bathurst and Sir Humphrey Tracey were both "able men, I know not their affections but they have friends who have promised to free them", in Somerset where the possible candidates included the "very refractory and disaffected" William Stroude, Nicholas concluded "It is impossible that there will be a well-affected man in this county which is full of faction."(10) A few days later on 15th November the Lords "called before them" the prospective sheriffs of previously difficult counties - Berkshire, Kent, Lincolnshire, Oxfordshire, Somerset, Buckinghamshire, Sussex, Hertfordshire, Northamptonshire and Cambridgeshire- and "did give them a strict charge to have a care of the assessing and collecting of his Majesty's ship moneys."(11) There was a general expectation that a harder line would be taken this year: Leicester's secretary Hawkins wrote to him that on 28th November,

"The writts for ship money are now ready to goe forth, and, as I am told, to be accompanied by a Proclamation, and then it is supposed refractory men are to be punished."⁽¹²⁾

Action was also taken to curb refractory local officers. On 1st December 1639 the King in Council ordered all bailiffs of hundreds were to give security to execute the sheriffs' warrants for ship money because "of the inconvenience and hindrance brought upon his Majesty's service by such grants as have been passed of hundreds unto private persons", the Attorney General was to proceed by quo warranto against any who neglected or refused the present service and the late sheriffs were to return the names of defaulting officers who acted "obstinately and rebelliously". All new constables were also to be given warrants from the incoming sheriff to enable them to assess, levy and collect the sums outstanding for the 1638 writs.⁽¹³⁾

At the same time Nicholas's preparatory statements argued in favour of an increase of one sixth above the 1637 levels for the service to a national total of £254,760: the aim was to compensate the King for the drain on his own revenues and no doubt to alleviate the impact of anticipated refusals. "This list was not approved of", nevertheless the Council increased the notional cost to the counties of borrowing the King's ships by raising the charge per tun of shipping: the impact was the same but it seemed less provocative to ask for the same amount of money. As far as surviving sources indicate there was never any intention to repeat the reduced charges of 1638. Plans were also approved "that there may be allowable 6d in the £ given for collecting up ship money, which will be but £25 upon a

£1000" as an incentive for shrieval diligence: the allowance would be payable for full payment by 5th April 1640.(14)

TABLE VIII: ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR THE 1639 WRITS

<u>Required</u>	<u>1637</u>	<u>Discarded List</u>	<u>Approved List</u>
Ships	45	44	45
Men	8,428	8,330	6,738
Tonnage	21,040	21,040	16,832
Charge	£210,400	£254,760	£210,400

All of these include the charges on London.

Sources: PC2/49, p 466-474; SP16/432/40; 41.

The new writs and Instructions were issued piecemeal between the third week in November and the first week in December, but the decision to summon a parliament made on 5th December did not alter the Council's determination to continue pressure for collection of ship money.(15) Expectations of a parliament had been gathering force since the autumn of 1638 as the Scottish situation deteriorated. Although the Venetian Ambassador remarked on

"the ill will of the people, who become ever bolder in their cries for the meeting of a parliament in this kingdom also."(16)

Lord Cottington told Wentworth the King would not "hear of a Parliament."(17) Only the direst necessity persuaded him to change his mind. The "chief movers" for a summons, according to Laud's diary, were Laud himself, Wentworth and Hamilton, who promised the King a conformable parliament. Even after Wentworth's 1634 success in Ireland, the prospect of an English parliament was viewed with apprehension and a resolution was voted at the same time "to assist the King in extraordinary ways, if the Parliament should prove

peevish."(18) Bellievre the French Ambassador reported the King's intention was

"to hold a parliament in his own fashion, and by this means render himself absolute in this country."(19)

Summoning a parliament and issuing ship money writs when taken together proclaimed the King's continuing commitment to the ideals of new counsels: this was as clear a signal as was ever given that Charles was not prepared to bargain with his prerogative rights however necessary for redress of general grievances. In Clarendon's view the government was deliberately harsh at this particular time, adopting a policy of non-conciliation,

"That it might appear that the Court was not at all apprehensive of what the Parliament would or could do; and that it was convened by his majesty's grace and inclination, not by any motive of necessity; it proceeded in all respects in the same unpopular ways it had done: ship money was levied with the same severity; and the same rigour used in ecclesiastical courts, without the least compliance with the humour of any man; (20)

The Venetian Ambassador thought there was little point in the decision

"to levy vigorously the old tax called 'ship money'... as the people openly resisted payment in the past it is feared that very perilous difficulties may be encountered in carrying this into effect."(21)

The Court and the Council itself were divided by bitter factional struggles, in spite of the dreadful situation with the Scots. Nicholas wrote a gloomy letter to Sir John Pennington in the middle of December, describing the changing scene with forboding:

"I pray God [the parliament] may succeed as well for the good of the kingdom, as the news of it is acceptable to all men in this kingdom. The writs for ship money this next year are sent out, and shall proceed notwithstanding

the assembling of a parliament , which is much marvelled at by many discreet and well-affected men.... It will not be long after Christmas before we shall, as I hear, have a new Secretary of State in place of Sir John Coke who is much decayed, and albeit I cannot commend him for anything, yet I wish we have not a worse in his room for seldom comes the better. There is very much labouring by divers to be parliament men, but I think they will be happiest who are not of the House."(22)

Divisions between the pro-French and pro-Spanish factions created a battle over who should succeed Coke as Secretary of State and who should be Lord Keeper after Coventry's death in January 1640. The Queen's influence secured both places for men of her choosing, Sir Henry Vane the Younger as Secretary instead of Strafford's choice of the Earl of Leicester, and Lord Chief Justice Finch instead of Coventry's own recommendation of the moderate and respected Littleton.(23) Relations with France and Spain continued to be strained and anxious.(24) These divisions at the heart of government were to have important consequences when the parliament did meet and in the handling of grievances.

The general reaction both to the new writs and to the new parliament was one of astonishment.

"We have some assurances of a parliament," Sir Symonds D'Ewes told his brother on 30th December, "and yet ship money being now pressed for also at one and the same time makes all men wonder, and makes me despair of any happy success in a public council."(25)

An anonymous correspondent of Lord Cottington's from Devon, wrote with cynical bitterness,

"We have news of a parliament, but no man believes it. The ship money we are sure of, for every man feels it already,...."(26)

Distrust of the King's intentions was evident in the rumours Bellievre picked up "that the army was to be raised, not fight the Scots, but to intimidate Parliament." (27) "The newes of the Parliament still is confirmed" wrote Woodford in his diary on 13th December. (28) Contrary to the Council's hopes the service got off to an extremely slow and hesitant start, confusion was created when "all our talk is of a parliament" but there was no sign of the writs for elections until February. (29) In early January the Council received the first of a series of protests about the new, higher rate for ship money when the sheriff of Kent reported that at the assessment meeting for the county held at Maidstone there were objections raised against the charge of £8,000 for 640 tuns of shipping. (30) The Board replied that the King

"has issued every year out of the Exchequer very great sums of money over and above what has been paid by the several counties... which charge has been every year much increased through the slow payment of the moneys required." (31)

As an incentive for early payment the Lords then allowed Kent to charge £6,400 providing Sir William Russell received this full sum by the 20th February. Three days later it was decided to make this a general privilege and a letter was sent to all the sheriffs except Kent to this effect on 10th January 1640, reminding them that this year ship money needed "more than ordinary diligence." (32) The general reaction was not very encouraging, even in previously diligent counties. Within days of each other in early February 1640, the sheriffs of several previously exemplary counties reported formidable difficulties. The sheriff of Monmouthshire told the Lords

"I cannot possibly accomplish your commands so speedily as is expected unless I give the county just cause to exclaim upon me by levying unequally".(33)

The sheriff of Lancashire wrote of

"unnecessary delays of the high constables and the backwardness of the people" and that "the country in general is very averse to the payment of this money".
(34)

The sheriff of Cheshire confessed

"such is the poverty of this country and the grievances thereof... I was forced to promise redress by a new divisionn of the whole county... otherwise we must not expect the shipping to be paid without rigour and much discontent."(35)

An anonymous correspondent of Lord Cottington's returned favourable news from Hampshire and Devon where it was claimed there was "no grudging", nevertheless the overall picture was of increased discontent, marked by refusals and recalcitrance.(36)

On 13th February the new Lord Keeper's address to the Assize Judges created a sensation by delivering a stinging rebuke to the sheriffs in particular and the subjects in general.

"[The sheriffs] will look through their fingers and see when and whom they please, sometime for reward, partiality or affection or fear of offending Great Ones or offending a multitude. For this they have no plea... For I will be bold to say, it is a base and unworthy part to suffer it to enter into the heart of any man, that we the subjects of England, that have so just and gracious a King, to imagine that unless urgent necessity did require, that his Majesty would charge himself and his subjects without cause. All the world knoweth he reapeth no benefit by it, and certainly it is a malignant humour to think the contrary. The regality of it hath been already determined, upon as great, a solid and weighty debate, as ever was in any cause in Westminster Hall. It was his Majesty's goodness to have it so. And yet I know not how it comes about, I hope it is out of misapprehension or false intimation put into the hearts of his people that there is not alacrity and cheerfulness given to the

obedience of his Majesty's writs for ship money, that his affection and care of his people doth require."(37)

It has already been noted that there was little direct correlation between the ability and the readiness to pay ship money, and that some of the poorest areas of England and Wales were amongst the most diligent and consistent in their payments, as some of the wealthiest were steadfast in their reluctance.(38) These poorer areas however, felt the full impact not only of the bad harvests of 1638 but also of the military charges for the Scots campaign, and this inevitably took its toll on the pattern of ship money payments during the last writ. This was particularly important in the Welsh counties, in the North and in Cornwall.(39) The sheriffs' reports during February and March merely added more details to a depressing picture. Even dutiful, diligent sheriffs were not receiving money at any great speed as the sheriffs of Northumberland, Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Rutland and Hertfordshire all reported in the middle of February.(40) Some counties, such as Norfolk, which had in previous years been largely compliant, became much more difficult.(41) The next few months were to show that even where the sheriffs were sanguine and confident, the control of the service had moved out of their hands and its outcome depended on other factors and other powers in the counties.

This facet of the service can be clearly seen in the counties which had an established pattern of difficulty. In Bedfordshire the sheriff Richard Childe was forced to tax the hundreds himself, could not get any help from the petty constables and was now

"informing myself how I may subdivide the tax... that it may be done indifferently and to avoid clamour if

possible."(42)

In Northamptonshire the receipt of the new writ for ship money led not to diligence but to a petition of the grand jury at the Kettering sessions on 8th January 1640, denouncing ship money as "a great and insupportable grievance lying upon us and the country" and drawn up with the connivance of that inveterate enemy of the service Richard Knighton of Irthlingborough. The Justices ordered this petition to be read in open court. Yet subsequent investigation by the Lords drew a blank: in the face of local hostility, the Lords were unable to find out who "penned" it.(43) The sheriff Sir Christopher Yelverton in a long letter of extreme frankness, detailed the hostility of the general population as well as the reluctance of the local officers,

"I should think myself truly happy if your Lordships did but truly understand the conditions and posture this county is in. It is a great body charged with humours, apt to be inflamed. For the greatest part fixed and resolute in their refusal and in the opposition to this service, which I fear hereafter your Lordships will better discern.... My Lords in obedience to your commands, I have troubled you with as perfect and true a relation as my memory will supply me with, both of what I have done and how far I have waded into a business of wherein as yet I can find no bottom."(44)

The Lords in their turn gave him little sympathy, replying on 11th March,

"We have with patience read your tedious letter...you endeavour to prepare an excuse for doing nothing."(45)

Exactly the same line was taken with the sheriffs of Lincolnshire and Somerset, where the sheriffs could not proceed because of refusals to assess and in Somerset's case because of another round of rating

disputes "by this devise to distract and retard the service".(46) In distress Sir Thomas Wrothe told the Lord Keeper

"I assure your honour there is no such artifice to make this service intricate and impossible and raise disturbance among the vulgar..."(47)

"Truly my Lord I do find in this place so much delay and unwillingness... to pay the ship money, that it seems almost impossible in my year to get in half that which is laid upon this county, and much less the whole sum in so short a time as is required, notwithstanding my daily labour and care."(48)

In Huntingdonshire the local officers ignored the sheriff's requests for copies of the assessments so that he was forced to set the assessments for about a hundred villages on the constables, bailiffs and "best men".(49) In Oxfordshire refusals to assess went hand in hand with legal disputes, in Buckinghamshire and in Essex the sheriffs were able or willing to do very little, in Herefordshire and in Dorset violent resistance was tolerated, perhaps encouraged by some of the gentry.(50) The sheriff of Berkshire George Purefoy summed up a situation which could apply equally to any of these negligent counties.

"I meet with such obstacles I know not which way to turn myself", he wrote to the Council on 26th March "the more I press the speeding thereof according to the Lords' directions, I find the work nothing at all advanced.... But truly Sir, to deal plainly with you, I conceive the main ground of the slackness at this present more than heretofore is the expectation they have of the parliament, that it will be represented to the King as a grievance, whereby they hope to obtain remission thereof." (51)

The parliament was summoned to meet on 13th April: by 11th April Sir William Russell had received £12,042 10s 7d and £3,997 was known to be in the sheriffs' hands.(52)

Anxiety about the parliament was exacerbated by the long delay

before the actual issue of the writs in February.(53) When the elections took place a deep-seated hostility to the present trend in politics was revealed in the country at large. Secretary Windebank disparaged the elections as "very tumultuary".(54) Nor were such perceptions confined to men who feared popularity and disorder: Edward Phelps observed that the elections were "like to produce great factions in all parts."(55) The evidence highlights a profound lack of sympathy for the government:

"in times so desparate," asserted Sir Edward Dering "I would contribute no help to any Privy Councillor or deputy-lieutenant."(56)

In his study of influence in parliamentary elections under the early Stuarts, John Gruenfelder found that government influence reached its nadir in the elections of 1640: in spite of the King's efforts to mobilise the influence of the Lord Chamberlain, the Duchies of Cornwall and Lancaster, the Queen's Council, the Council of the Marches and the Judges in Wales, the majority of the court's candidates were rejected either at selection or at election.(57) Moreover, it is very clear that this rejection of influence was a deliberate response to Crown policies, this is evident, for example, in the different fates of candidates selected by the Earl of Northumberland as head of the Percy family and those nominated through his authority as Lord Admiral.(58) Localism and anti-popery, two of the most powerful forces in Stuart politics, combined to undermine the credit of the King's servants, though not of the King himself. In this sense the elections represent a commentary on the trend of government in the 1630s, of the court's sixty-one candidates

in the spring elections, forty-seven were outsiders from the communities they were nominated to represent.(59) Anti-popery and anti-Arminianism together produced a formidable opposition to court candidates. Norwich was convulsed by violent loathing of Bishop Wren.(60) Edward Nicholas's reputation was attacked during the Sandwich elections by "a most false and scandalous aspersion" that he was a papist.(61) The influence of the "country lords" was ranged against the court, for example dividing Warwickshire into contesting court and country factions.(62) Puritan clergy also played a significant role in the elections in Gloucestershire, Northamptonshire and Essex where candidates chosen for selection were opponents of prerogative government and of "an opinion of much zeal to the zealous."(63) Henry Neville told the Council that the Earl of Warwick's clerical clients "preached often out of their own parishes before the election" in support of the godly candidacy of Sir Harbottle Grimston and Sir Thomas Barrington.(64) A sense of mission and "hopes for some reformation by the intended parliament" as John Tinker wrote to John Winthrop in February 1640, added to the urgency of public affairs and appealed directly to traditions of Godly magistracy.(65) Certainly on a personal level Sir Nathaniel Barnardiston relied upon God's "covenant and his [call]" to help him to "serue for my countrey in the Parliament" as knight of the shire for Suffolk.(66) A sense of individual and collective mission to protect and champion true religion and the liberty of the subject was shared by many of the MPs who sat at Westminster in the Short Parliament:

"his Majesty, I believe hath as greate affection to parliaments as ever and I hope hee shall find us as

affectionate hearted to serve him." Said Sir Francis Seymour on 16th April, "But wee must not doe him a disservice in neglecting the Commonwealth..."(67)

Fusion of religious and civil grievances, so necessary for the credibility of a popish plot, was part of the legacy of the ship money service.(68) This influenced not only the ruling elites but called upon deep-seated popular prejudices in explaining the crisis facing England. It also promoted political activity and deepened a common loathing of present politics: as Sir Roger Twysden noticed during the bitterly contested Kent election,

"Trwly the common people had been so bytten by the ship money they were very averse from a courtier."(69)

By virtue of its structural organisation, ship money was felt as a grievance amongst a wider spectrum of tax payers and across a wider geographical distribution than previous parliamentary taxes, and its impact had been particularly hard on the middling sort and the poor. In its operation too, the traditions of consent, patterns of participation and the independence of the localities were cumulatively undermined.(70) Above all the grievance of ship money was not a simple question of heavy taxation, rather it was a complicated and convoluted mixture of burden and outrage, since the service was widely believed to be illegal, unjust and divisive.(71) In a real sense therefore it violated the political sensibilities of the freeholder class who had expressed their reluctance "Not to give to his majesty... but in a parliamentary way" in the recent past.(72) These political grievances were made sharper by the perceptions of religious danger and a sense of community, in some places though not

in all, with the Scots. This sense of a common cause was particularly strong in the anonymous literature aimed at a mass market. A poster nailed up by the apprentices during the 1639 campaign against the Scots claimed that ship money was being spent on Sir Kenelm Digby the friend of the Jesuits, "the queen's mother and the frogs of hell in Somerset House."⁽⁷³⁾ A popular satirical broadside circulating at about the same time entitled "Reasons that Ship and Conduct money Ought to be Paid" linked court Catholicism and prerogative revenues together as part of a plot to bring in popery: these monies were raised

"for setting up the mass and maintaining idolatry, as it is begun but not yet, as was intended, brought to perfection, praise be to God and the Scots whom he made an instrument. That the Pope's nuncio takes, and has these five years taken great pains in perverting his majesty's simple subjects... he must be well rewarded of ship money....

we must needs go against the Scots for not being idolatrous, and will have no mass among them, yet coat and ship money must be had to go against them to reduce them to obedience....

That it is not permitted to talk of a parliament to redress these abuses, nor to hear the Scots but ship and conduct money are the sinews wherewith we are to go to war against them. And the papists in the meantime do make a laughing stock of us..."⁽⁷⁴⁾

These works drew upon the imagery, the fears and the prejudices of popular political and religious culture. Discontent was becoming visible as disobedience, and it was affecting the ranks below the gentry. In the report made sometime in 1639 of "disloyal and seditious words of certain non-conformists" from Kylesby in Northamptonshire, the vicar Nicholas Darton complained about Andrew Lee, who

"to strengthen the hands of the factious reported abroad these scandalous words; viz: that his Majesty's taxes were

more intolerable than Pharaoh's taxes upon the Israelites and though he were constable and should have stood up for his Majesty, to beat down disloyal spirits, yet waxed extraordinarily against his Majesty's designs.... The same Andrew Lee (to dishearten as I conceive others from paying his Majesty's taxes) said most seditiously, that the ship money went the wrong way and that those who received it did not account thereof...

Lastly, one John Barfoot as I was speaking to some of my neighbours, that I did hope his Majesty would soon quell the Scots that were rebellious, most factiously and most disloyally replied unto me thus (viz). It may be not (saith he) but that it is the will of God that England's pride shall have a fall."(75)

A similar picture of disloyalty was visible in Bedfordshire where a clergyman called Kelly was convicted at the assizes in March 1639 for "seditious and scandalous speeches" and for disseminating Scottish propaganda.(76) The political legacy of this combination of fervent Protestantism, popular legalism and localism can be seen in the Lincolnshire election rhyme quoted by Rossingham in one of his newsletters:

"Choose no shipp shreive, nor court atheist,
No fen drainer, nor Church Papist."(77)

In terms of popular politics, ballads and plays both drew upon a sense of hope and expectation of justice. Hawkers sold Martin Parker's ballad:

"We may be assured of this
If anything hath been amiss
Our King and State will all redress
In this good Parliament.(78)

In the theatre plays in the popular tradition depicted the evils of the day in satiric and often scurrilous verse, whilst the jigs or afterpieces dealt with politics, news and satire like "an animated newspaper cartoon, a bold and brutal caricature of political events and

motives."(79) These plays were strongly conservative in sentiment, looking to a glorious past where good lords counselled the King, parliaments dispensed justice and true Protestants flourished in royal favour rather than court Papists.(80) The interplay between politics and the theatre is evident for example in the attacks on judges, bishops and patentees in verse dramas such as Heywood's "Reader, Here You'll Plainly See Judgment Perverted by These Three" and Richard Braithwaite's "Mercurius Britannicus".(81)

Grievances aroused by the Scottish War, coat and conduct money and the pressing and billeting of soldiers were also seen as part of the same spectrum of legal abuse arising from the absence of parliament. Hostility towards the court and a longing for reformation in Church and State were fostered by the King's reluctance to summon a parliament once the Scottish situation deteriorated and the Covenanters became defiant in their rebellion.(82) In April 1639 a preacher in John Rous's parish was handed a bill by the parish clerk, which he refused to read out but Rous found it sufficiently interesting to copy out in his diary:

"John Commonweathsman of Great Britain, being sick of the Scottish disease, desires the prayers of this congregation for a parliament."(83)

In January 1640 Sir Thomas Roe warned that "The raising of troops before a parliament begets discourse and censures of several sorts".(84) Derek Hirst found electoral hostility to the Deputy-Lieutenants was voiced in Middlesex, Kent, Buckinghamshire, Norfolk and Northamptonshire. A more forthright political consciousness, able to perceive and to express national as well as local grievances, was

thus a crucial legacy of the 1630s.(85) Petitions and lists of Instructions communicated the wishes of the country both to MPs and to the Parliament in general, and this element of constituency pressure gave an added dimension to politics in the spring of 1640. Expectations ran high in London, amongst the godly and in areas of the country where the people believed themselves suffering from abuses of the prerogative, such as in the fenlands of Lincolnshire.(86) As Lady Brilliana Harley wrote,

"The effect of this Parliament will not be indifferent, neather good nor evell, but eather very good or ells the contrary."(87)

For many the natural response to such fears was to turn to prayer. On 10th April 1640, three days before the parliament was due to meet, Robert Woodford recorded in his diary

"a general fast was held... privately in England, Scotland and Germany ut dic. p. success of the Parliament."(88)

Nehemiah Wallington attended similar prayer meetings on that date in London and remembered 1640 as

"a praying year; for that year was a troublous and sad year with the people of God."(89)

Hopes of redress, and the interpretation of recent events which sustained it, were regarded with deep suspicion by those like Doctor Sibthorpe who saw "Bellum Episcopale" as "Rebellio Puritanica."(90) All of these events looked very worrying, given the hostility which existed at court towards the dangers of popularity, and the earlier fears voiced about the "wisdom" of calling a parliament "in a Time so conditioned" by necessity(91) After the tumultuous Essex election

Henry Neville advocated a revised qualification of £20 to replace the forty shilling freeholder franchise and bring it back to the narrower fifteenth century base, before inflation and population growth had widened the franchise base.(92) Even before the parliament met tensions were heightened in the localities. Lord Maynard spurned

"popular assemblies where fellows without shirts challenge as good a voice as myself"(93)

and in Northamptonshire Robert Woodford found Sir John Isham, normally friendly and hospitable,

"was altered towards me in respect that I was for Sir Guilbt Pickeringe at the eleccon."(94)

Fears that the parliament would prove refractory, or that the King and his people would not be reconciled were thus already significant before April 1640 and the elements of a self-fulfilling prophesy were present.

When the Short Parliament met on 13th April 1640 the King's address to both Houses was very brief,

"There was never kinge had a more greate and weighty cause to call his people together then myselfe. I will not trouble yow with the particulars; I have informed my Lord Keeper, and commanded him to speake; and desire yor due and serious consideracon."(95)

A further tactical error was made in Finch's speech which caused astonishment by its insistence on supply rather than counsel and its total omission of English grievances:

"I perceive by the parliament manner," wrote Rossingham to Conway on 18th April, "that the King's speech and that of the Lord Keeper give little hope of a continuing parliament; not one word of the ship money when the Lord Keeper spoke of that act of tunnage and poundage which they expected."(96)

With the government already isolated by its failure to get its candidates elected to the Commons, this heavy handed attitude created confrontation with the Commons. Clarendon was later to commend the MPs of the Short Parliament as "sober and dispassioned men", "willing to fall to the work", but their perception of what that work should be was different from the King's.(97) The opening speech by Grimston on 16th April showed this:

"the case I shall putt is a case of greater dainger here at home domesticall, and is therefore so much the more daingerous because it is home bredd and runnes into the veynes.... as the case now stands with us I conceive there are ": points very considerable in it, the first is what hath been done in any way to impeach the Liberty of the Subject contrary to the Peticon of right, the second is who have been the authors and causers of it."(98)

Although Sir Benjamin Rudyard then urged moderation in "the bedd of reconciliacion betwixt King and people", Sir Francis Seymour reiterated the stress on grievances, both religious and secular and including the administration of ship money.(99) On the next day Rous and Pym too linked spiritual and secular grievances. Pym's denunciation of ship money echoed Justice Croke's judgement of two years previously and was designed to reverse the appearance of legality which Hampden's Case had given to the service:

"It is true it hath the countenance and coullor of a Judgm[en]t for it, but such a Judgm[en]t as is contrary to all other Judgm[en]t of the Lawe; being ag[ains]t all lawe and haveing noe booke for it,..."(100)

Petitions presented to Parliament by the constituencies complained of grievances across a broad spectrum of fiscal, governmental and religious abuses, and these created different

priorities from those of the Crown. One source, written with Puritan sympathies, described the shock created when the petitions from Middlesex, Suffolk and Northamptonshire were read on 17th April:

"which petitions [?]stunned ye royalists more yn any thing, to see county joyne together against ye new and illegall courses; of which petitions some before hand sayd, yt they wr ye Scottish Govern[an]t wanting only hands."(101)

Yet MPs felt themselves bound by a double loyalty, both to the King and to "the Country (whom we serve)".(102) Ship money was a major grievance needing redress, but consideration of this was complicated by the question of legality. The nature of the grievance depended upon whether the service ought to be regarded as legal or should be seen as an abuse of the prerogative.(103) After Hampden's Case the Lords proclaimed the legality of ship money, although many men were unhappy with what that revealed about the ability of the law to protect the liberty and property of the subject, or were convinced that the Judges had decided on improper grounds. It was clear the country, in the widest sense of the word, expected MPs to re-examine the service as "a burden unknowne to our fathers, insupportably grievous to ourselves" and "to endeavour a full and perfect redresses therein".(104) The petition from Hertfordshire explicitly raised the whole question of "ye legality".(105) Sir Henry Mildmay rebuked the "undecent" humming which greeted Sir Francis Seymour's assertion

"If wee should graunt the King Subsedyes before our Grievances are debated and redressed our Judgem[en]ts may very well be questioned, and it may give the Country (whom wee serve) cause to blame the men whom they have chosen as consenting to their Sufferance and it may like wise bee taken as Confirmacion of our Greivances." (106)

This line of argument alarmed members of the government sitting in the Commons. The Solicitor General Herbert reacted very swiftly to Sir Hugh Cholmley's call not "to depart ere wee lay a Brand upon ship money" on 18th April:

"All respect to those that speake for the liberty and property of our goods. Yet those that speake not with moderation reserve not the respect usually given to this house. If wee upon soe deliberate a iudgment whoe are sworne to mayntayne a just prerogative shall upon a minute say wee shall lay a Brand upon soe great a iudgment least the King receive preiudice of us that proceed soe suddenly."(107)

Three days later the Lord Keeper assured the House of Commons the King would be happy to accept any form of revenue for naval defence if ship money was obnoxious to them,

His Majesty "never had soe much as a thought to make it an annuall revenue; noe nor at any tyme any private benefitt to himselve, but it was for the consideracon of the glorye, dignitie, and splendor of the English nation; And that every particular person had his share in the benefitt of it without which wee should by this tyme have found the woe of it....

That for the proprietye of or goods and liberty of or persons, [the King] would be as forward to graunte us them as wee could bee to aske."(108)

On 23rd April the Commons went into a Committee of the Whole House "for consideration of the Kings busines".(109) Rudyard opened the debate with a characteristic plea for moderation, mutual trust and harmony with the King, he agreed the "commonwealth was a most miserable spectacle" but pressed for a "happie conclusion" of supply first.(110) There was a long silence, followed by vehement protests that it was impossible to ignore the grievances of the kingdom: it was also impossible to ignore a legacy of distrust,

"The great trust of the Common wealth not to be betrayed...." declared Sir Francis Seymour, "Tould us to

trust his majesties if noe more but to trust his majestie it were fitt, but when our proceedings shalbe made false glosses of noe use, as in our petition of right wee have cause to fear the woorst."(111)

The call was made for a conference with the Lords on the three heads of grievances, religion, property and liberty in parliament.(112) Pym pointed out that two distinct issues were at stake, both of which needed to be resolved; these he called "Impossibility & necessity", and he warned

"wee shall not discharge the trust in us, if wee give any thing before [ship money] be taken away."(113)

The House voted in favour of a conference with the Lords the following afternoon and that redress of grievances should take precedence over supply.(114)

News of this was immediately taken to the King, who panicked and called an emergency meeting of the Council.(115) On Strafford's advise, the King went the next day to address the Lords, to ask them to declare that supply must precede redress.(116) Strafford was clearly afraid of a long delay, should the Commons follow procedure similar to that of the Petition of Right.(117) Councillors advised the Lords to mediate with the Commons for an immediate supply because of the pressing danger of the Scots.(118) Lord Saye disagreed, he warned "Not to make more hast then speed" believing the danger of a broken parliament and the subsequent "distraccons at home maybe most dangerous."(119) Others feared that the House of Commons would interpret such a vote as a breach of their privilege in money

matters.(120) The Lords voted in favour of supply first by sixty-one votes to twenty-five.(121)

In the Commons' debates on 23rd and 24th April were dominated by the question of propriety of goods, during which the legality of ship money, and whether it was proper for the House to question a judgement were part of fiercely contested arguments.(122) As in 1638 during Hampden's Case no-one doubted that it was the King's duty to defend the kingdom nor that it was the subject's duty to aid him in this, where the dispute lay was in the choice of means - a point neatly made by Sir John Strangeways:

"Wee must Complayne of the Legality for the money has bin soe well dispended, that wee have noe cause to Complayne ells."(123)

During the debate links were made between legal grievances: privileges of parliament, freedom of speech, military charges, ship money, the forest laws and "in denying Iustice in courts of Westminster in poynt of property of goods".(124) As Mr Vaughan put it, as long as Hampden's Case stood, "a new writt may be revived & wee are never the nearer [redress of grievances] then but as if there had never bin a parlament."(125) The differences in perception between government and subject were brought out on 2nd May: Sir Neville Poole claimed "That wee have not a property in our goods" to which the Controller replied "It is a fallacy that hee that hath noe propriety in his goods cannot give."(126) From the grievances of the Commonwealth it was a logical step then to consideration of annual parliaments, requested in some of the petitions.(127) Intermission of parliaments was the cause of all their troubles St John said, as Pym

had earlier(128)

All such arguments became endlessly circular unless it were possible to decide upon the nature of the grievance ship money represented. In spite of Hampden's Case the debates on 24th April and 2nd May could not decide whether ship money was encompassed in the meaning of the Petition of Right, although St John and Pym both insisted that it was and was therefore utterly illegal.(129) If on the other hand ship money was a legal and proper part of the prerogative, on what grounds and at what price could the Commons ask for it to be suspended or "let fall"?(130) This was an especially pertinent point because of the Judges' insistence during Hampden's Case that no act of Parliament could take this right away from the Crown.(131) From this point arose the fears about property of goods and the emotional rhetoric about freemen and vassals which echoed Justice Hutton's earlier opinion.(132) Mr Peard shocked Solicitor General Herbert and the Controller when he

"Said that there was a greate question about the manner of supplye slaves he said did but restore; but free men give Shipp-money hee said invaded the propertye of or goods and that it was necessarye to settle the poynte whether we had anythinge to give or not. Said a päsident of it nowe might hurt the child unborne and if ship money should nowe be gathered it would become a President. Hee held it necessary first to determine the propertye of goods and soe take away that abominacion of Ship money;..."(133)

Communal anger was sustained by a dual sense of outrage: the ancient statutes had not protected the subject's liberty and property and the Judges had exceeded their proper authority when they tried to bind the high court of parliament by a judgement in the Exchequer Chamber.(134) Underlying the unease and the anger was a profound

distrust of the government, a belief that "a new writt may be revived" and the "groanes and cryes of our Country" would be ignored.(135) Those who spoke on the 2nd May pointed to the real dilemmas facing the House, on the one hand, as Nathaniel Fiennes said, there was the question of public trust given to MPs by their "Countryes", on the other, as Sir Henry Mildmay warned, there was the danger that the King would simply dissolve the House if they were "too nyce".(136)

To the King these tortuous deliberations were a "preposterous course" when he had given his word for redress and the kingdom was in such danger from the Scots,

"To consult innovacon of Religion, and Property in Goods, and priviledges of parlement, and soe putt the cart befor the horse."(137)

King and Councillors constantly reiterated the point that the Parliament had been summoned precisely because "the necessitys ar[e] soe urgent that there can be no delay."(138) MPs debated whether they should proceed by remonstrance with the Lords, by petition as they had in 1628 or by act of parliament. They argued also over whether they should hear the Judges or the King's Counsel and re-examine the legal evidence used in Hampden's Case.(139) Yet even declaring ship money illegal was felt to be inadequate: the Yorkshire MPs pushed for relief of military charges, Edward Kirton warned "others could invent as well as Mr Noye and wee must expect new oppressions".(140) Falkland, Hyde and St John all pointed out the need to end "the grievance of leavying money out of parlament."(141)

"Take heed," urged Lord Digby on 2nd May, echoing his father's earlier advise to the Lords, "least our love to our present prince should lead us to institute a president to posterity...Let his majestie releve our grievances & restore us to our liberty, he then may, not onely command our purses but our hearts. Money is but the nerves and sinews of war but engaged affections the soule of it."(142)

Divisions within the Council itself were to have a crucial influence on the last few days of the parliament. During the debate on 2nd May Herbert pressed the Commons for a commitment to agree to a specific proposal from the King regarding ship money, but because of the late hour he was unsuccessful.(143) On Sunday May 3rd the King summoned a Council meeting to discuss what should be the price of withdrawing ship money. It was agreed to take the ship money judgement before the Lords where it could be reversed upon a writ of error.(144) Vane urged Charles to ask for twelve subsidies payable over three years, whereas Strafford viewed this proposal with horror believing this was far too high a price when other grievances were as yet unanswered and he finally persuaded the King to ask for eight subsidies.(145) Strafford urged Charles to appeal directly to the Commons, to "put it upon their affections directly for supply".(146)

Yet the next day Vane brought an offer to abandon the present collection of ship money and "give way for the utter abolishing of it in such a way as to you shall seeme best" in return for twelve subsidies payable over three years. He asked for "A Present and positive answer and noe delay".(147) This offer was was yet another example of Charles's habit of "saying 'never' and then retreating", it was a measure of his desperation, but it did not help because it was made after passions had been aroused and fears which were

tentative in the early days of the Parliament had appeared to be confirmed.(148) Vane could have argued quite credibly that Strafford's advise had already created more problems than it solved since the Crown lost a great deal of good will in the attempt to pressurise the House of Commons into granting supply by the resolution taken in the Lords on 24th April.(149) Absence of trusted and respected voices from the Council and the court exacerbated a failure of communication. On 4th May no mention was made of any concessions on the legality of ship money, information which could very well have brought arguments to a satisfactory conclusion. The atmosphere in the House had changed considerably during the long debates on the question of legality. The confusions and tensions of this change are highlighted in an exchange between Kirton and the Controller. To Kirton legal clarification seemed essential

"If not [the legality] be voted we looze the Lustre of the gyft because wee know not if Legall or illegall."

but the Controller saw this as unnecessary since he was

"sorry to see us soe nice, in that which within 2 moneths wee would soe gladly have embraced & to stand upon impertinencies."(150)

Like the debates on the 2nd, the debates in a Grand Committee on 4th May were long, passionate and ultimately inconclusive. Vane's proposal "appeared too be a contract" which created a stalemate rather than a resolution.(151) When the House was in Committee Sergeant Glanville spoke with great bitterness against the service, declared it illegal in all its forms and denounced the judgement in Hampden's Case as "damned and impious".(152) He and others continued

to speak of their readiness to grant supply and to serve the King.(153) However, there were also signs that sympathy was turning away from duty and towards an unacceptable questioning of royal will, especially as some of the more outspoken members, Sir John Wray and earlier Pym, spoke against buying ship money and purchasing war. Pym asked for enlightenment about royal policies but others spoke with the familiar voice of parliamentary obstruction.(154) Secretary Vane asked the House an impossible question,

"Playne dealing is the best way, would know playnly if the Legality were voted whether [t]hen would we give the 12 subsidies."(155)

There was at this stage no clear way out of the dilemmas of legality and supply and the decision was taken to ask for more time. Clarendon later maintained that the House was ready to supply the King as "a testimony of our affection, without any release of ship money" and that after the House adjourned both Vane and Herbert took "a worse representation of the humour of the House than it deserved" back to the King.(156) He was also given news that Pym was planning to present a petition the next day, which would unite the grievances of England and Scotland and call upon the Lords to unite with the Commons.(157) It now appeared there was going to be a re-creation of the disastrous public disloyalty of 1629.(158) After days of tortuous argument, the King still had no subsidies and the kingdom was in as great a peril as it had been when the Parliament met three weeks before: from the Crown's perspective the House of Commons appeared obsessed with its own privileges, misled by demagogues and tainted by suspicion of treason.

An emergency Council session met at six o'clock in the morning of 5th May, and eventually a majority agreed to a dissolution.(159) The Speaker was woken from his bed and told not to go to the Commons "lest yt [thely shold urge him to preferre any petition to ye upper house."(160) Instead the Commons were summoned to the Lords' chamber where Charles addressed them all:

there can noe occasion of my coming to this house be soe unpleasing to mee as this at this time, ... I may say if there had bin any meanes to have given an happy end to this parlament it was not your Lordships fault that it was not soe....I shall not trouble you long with woords, it is not my fashion. What I offred the last day to the house of Commons, I thinke it is well knowne to you all, how they accepted it. I thinke it aswell knowne. My Lords you knowe at the first I expressed my selfe by my Lord Keeper, that delay was woorse danger then refusing. I would not putt this fault on all the whole house, I will not iudge soe uncharitably. But it hath bin in some fewe cunning and ill affectioned men, that have bin the cause of this misunderstanding. I shall onely end as I began, giving your Lordships thanks for the care you had of myne honour. Desiring you to goe on & assist mee for the mayntayning of Government and the libertyes of the people, that they soe much smart at. For my Lords, noe King in the world shalbe more carefull to mayntayne the propriety of theyr goods, the liberty of thyr persons & true Religion then I shalbe....

The Lord keeper then added:

My Lords & you gentlemen of the house of Commons the kings Majestie doth dissolve this parlament."(161)

That day the Council met and the decision was made, following the contingency plans laid down in December 1639, that

"the shipping money [was] to be put vigorously into execution."(162)

Some of the Lords persuaded the King he would be able to to meet his commitments by means of prerogative revenues: the political scenario was in many ways reminiscent of 1626 when a parliament had been dissolved without granting necessary supplies and a heavy

burden of guilt had been laid on the House of Commons.(163)

Secretary Windebank wrote to Sir Arthur Hopton on 11th May:

"This is a very great disaster; but there was no other way, and his Majesty hath wherewithal to justify himself to God and the world, that the fault is not his, having offered redress of all their grievances, and particularly that which they call so, the shipping money."(164)

Such was also the rationale made public in the King's declaration which was published on 22nd June to explain his reasons for the dissolution.(165) Richard Cust has drawn attention to a strong element of continuity in the government's reaction to the dissolution of a parliament from 1626 to 1640, emphasising that the same fears motivated their course of action and were used in the public explanation of it.(166) Such continuity in perception helps to explain why and how the King and the Council took the line of action they did. However, their's was not the only interpretation put forward to explain political calamity, and in this discrepancy of outlook lay the point of conflict over the next six months. This is vividly illustrated in a letter Benjamin Gostlin wrote to John Winthrop on 8th May,

"the Lord be mifericyful vnto us and turne the Kings hart or else to this Land in my foolish Iudgment is nothing to be expected but confushion and as for the Roote of all this and the prodigious Frute that from it spring will be nedles for me to relate for I Know you Know it all ready in part and the rest will suddenly be related, therefore i will be silent onely i speake trewly it greue my hart to thinke of the misery that is approaching if god [be] not the favorable for he alone must doe it the other mayne hope being now frustrate."(167)

Once again, as in 1628 or 1636-7 a period of intense hope was followed by equally intense despair.

As in 1629, action was taken against those men blamed for the failure of the Parliament: on Council orders Lord Saye, Lord Brooke, Pym, Hampden and Sir Walter Earle had their lodgings searched and turbulent MPs, including Crewe, Bellasys, Sir Hugh Cholmely and Sir John Hotham were questioned for their speeches about grievances.(168) As, in 1629 also there were serious fears that popular hostility would erupt into rebellion.(169) The political vacuum nurtured chaos and disobedience. Writing to the Earl of Leicester, Hawkins said

"All good men are sorry for the breach and every one standeth agaze what will next be done."(170)

In the provinces anti-Catholic panics led to mutiny, riot and disorder and sustained a climate of fear and crisis.(171) In London the Venetian Ambassador thought there was "an open revolt against the present government" focussed upon Laud.(172) A week after the dissolution Laud's house at Lambeth was attacked in the middle of the night by a mob of about twelve hundred people,

"who knocking at the gate, said that they must needs speak with his Grace of whom they would ask (as they termed it) but the civil question; and it was who was the cause of breaking up the Parliament."(173)

According to the Earl of Bridgewater's newswriter the King regretted his decision within a little more than a week and asked whether there were any precedents for re-summoning a dissolved parliament.(174) Devotion to the Palatinate cause re-surfaced as hostility and hatred to court Catholicism were sharpened by recent events.(175) Rumours spread that the Queen, in league with her mother and the Spanish Ambassador, had persuaded the King to dissolve the Parliament on the promise of Spanish aid to subdue the Scots.(176) Satirical

broadsheets and ballads confirmed what news and rumour suggested: by the time the King's 'Declaration' was published in late June, John Castle thought the King had already lost the battle for the hearts and minds of "the common people".(177)

Against this turbulent background the Council attempted to enforce the collection of ship money, and to uphold prerogative rights that had been publicly vilified in the Parliament. There was no attempt at public conciliation, for, as Windebank told Conway in words that echoed similar decisions in 1626,

"As the case now is, his majesty must resort to other counsels and ways for the preservation of the monarchy, which if they become more burdensome they [the King's subjects] may thank themselves."(178)

A formidable task lay ahead of the Lords: Sir William Russell's account for 4th May showed that only £11,752 had been received. Ill example set by the gentry was having a detrimental effect on collection, fear of legal action led to a refusal to distraint and to outright violence.(179) On 6th May the Council decided to send a letter of rebuke to the sheriffs, telling them that the King had "rather more than less" need of ship money now the Parliament was dissolved and ordering half the money to be paid in by 31st May and half by 24th June.(180) The sheriffs of London and Middlesex and six of the counties "in manifest contempt of our crown and authority" were marked out for prosecution in the Star Chamber by the Attorney General, and examined over the next month.(181) A committee of the Lord Keeper, the Lord Privy Seal, the Lord Chamberlain, the Earls of Dorset and Salisbury and the Lord Chief Justice Littleton was set up on 20th May to bring in all ship money arrears "with all possible

expedition".(182) They relied on rebuke, summons and bonds for dutiful behaviour employed as sanctions during previous writs, backed up by the threat of Star Chamber.(183) These methods had little impact upon resistance to the service which was intensified by the events of the Parliament, especially as it seemed that the Parliament had confirmed the taint of illegality. In a letter of 30th may 1640 Sir John Gore sheriff of Hertfordshire confessed he had employed his "best endeavours" but had only managed to levy £50,

"the country is in general averse to the payment of it,... so that the service is now grown more difficult and not to be effected in so short a time by the sole endeavours of the sheriff."(184)

John Agarde the sheriff of Derbyshire reported a similar situation there, as had the sheriffs of Lancashire, Norfolk and Worcestershire,

"And I find such opposition and evil affectedness in the greatest part of the county that since the dissolution of the last parliament they do not forbear to dare me and bid me distrain at my peril, giving forth threatening words against me."(185)

The mentality behind this resistance is revealed in a report of seditious words alleged against Richard Lacy of Warwick who,

"did affirm that the levying of ship money is an illegal course and for proof alleged the authority of the Speaker of the Lower House, who, as he said, did affirm that the tax of ship money is contrary to law...."(186)

Reaction in the counties was far from the exemplary diligence urged by the Lords. This is not to say that the service ground to a complete halt, it did not. By midsummer in Surrey Sir William Elliott told his brother-in-law Sir Symonds D'Ewes that

"we have had a great deal of conduct money brought in and for my part I have paid both that and the ship money lately."(187)

In Yorkshire, the threat of Star Chamber moved Sir Marmaduke Langdale out of his dilatoriness so that the constables were assessing and levying during the summer.(188) Yet the overall picture was discouraging. In a number of counties ship money was collected but never dispatched to London: some sheriffs shared Sir Nicholas Martyn's fears about transporting money "in these dangerous and doubtful times of soldiers"; in others the Lords believed money was collected but purposely detained in the localities in expectation of another parliament and a declaration of illegality.(189) There was no diminution in the incidence of violence, resistance to distraint and disruption in the communities, and even though the Council received letters assuring them that the sheriffs were not negligent but impotent, the Lords refused to believe in the extent of disaffection. They reminded the sheriff of Huntingdonshire now was a time "for acting and performing your duty" and told the sheriffs of Cardiganshire and Bedfordshire that their "frivolous excuses" would not be tolerated.(190) In Oxfordshire the constables of previously troublesome hundreds of Wotton and Bloxham denied the sheriff's power to assess, refused to execute his warrants or to give bond and were committed to gaol. The bailiffs pointedly ignored the sheriff's summons to a meeting at the Bear in Oxford, some of the constables would not part with money collected and the sheriff and his son were injured in a skirmish occasioned by the taking of distresses.(191) In Cheshire Sir Thomas Powell compared the payment of ship money to "water squeezed out of a sponge almost dry"; unable to call upon the constables, the trained bands "nor the power of the county", he could

not sell distrained goods and faced violence and legal resistance in this previously conformable county.(192) In September he lamented lack of support from the Lords when he had to deal with the hostility of all classes of men:

"we poor sheriffs must receive countenance and encouragement sometime from the Board, otherwise these great ones will trample us down and his Majesty's business also."(193)

The extent of disaffection can be seen from Sir Thomas Powell's description of an assault upon his servant James Pendleton: the assailants said

"my bailiffs and servants were arrant thieves and rebels and that the sheriff was no better than a rebel, being neither friend nor true subject to his Majesty..."(194)

Resistance was not confined simply to a refusal of ship money, but was exacerbated and intensified by the burden of coat and conduct money. Robert Woodford recorded in his diary that coat and conduct money could not be collected in Northamptonshire and, although "the high sheriff distreynes somewhat violently for ship money" only one payment of £32 6s 4d was received by the Treasurers of the Navy.(195) In Buckinghamshire Thomas Archdale confessed the most consistent response he encountered was a blank hostility:

"some of [the constables] have assessed the inhabitants, but most of them either answer that they are unlearned or know not the abilities of the inhabitants and so cannot rate them; whereupon I have endeavoured to further them but cannot procure the former assessments, and would willingly rate them myself yet the towns and inhabitants being so many, it is impossible I should inform myself to rate them myself by their abilities, moreover I have gone to the constables in person pressing them and giving them warrants to distrain the goods of those that refuse; and have gathered about £50; and have omitted no ways and means whereby I might further his Majesty's service but have pressed the service as far as

I durst for fear of raising mutiny."(196)

How much of this resistance was connived at or encouraged by the gentry of the county it is impossible to know, suffice it to say that a few years later Richard Grenville had absolutely no difficulties in obtaining copies of the ship money rates and raising money for the Parliament.(197) Not a penny of Buckinghamshire ship money was paid to the Treasurers of the Navy after 23rd November 1639 and only £8 10s of a demand for £2,600 coat and conduct money was collected in the summer of 1640.(198)

The question of the legality of prerogative powers and thereby the definition of the relationship between subject and government became once again a contested part of the political agenda. In London Richard Chambers revived his ship money case against Alderman Bromfield in the King's Bench, taking George Peard the outspoken Devon lawyer as his counsel.(199) Coat and conduct money was questioned by Pargiter a Northamptonshire gentleman who was imprisoned because he would not pay and applied for a writ of habeus corpus requiring the cause of imprisonment to be shown in accordance with the Petition of Right. The government was saved from a legal quagmire only by the decision to rescind coat and conduct money in favour of commissions of array.(200) Newletters carried details of these disputes, of the resistance to Charles's demands for loans from the London aldermen and the defiance of the Scottish and Irish Parliaments: the administrative, financial and military weaknesses of the government and its inability to command support were constantly exposed.(201) The Saye-Brooke circle still cherished hopes of a new

parliament and were drawing increased support. By the summer some of Strafford's enemies were withdrawing from their association with the court to make new alliances: Northumberland, Pembroke and Holland all tried to avoid identification with unpopular policies. Contacts made and sustained during the 1630s now became politically significant as support was rallied.

"Such as resided about London," wrote Henry Sampson in his day book, "met together frequently and gave intelligence by Mr Samuel Hartlib and Mr Frost, to those in the country of affairs. Ere long they gave themselves a more general summons to come all up, who not only came themselves, but brought up such country gentlemen as they could confide in."(202)

The French Ambassador Montreuil, delighted at the fall of the Spanish party at court, cultivated Pym and the enemies of new counsels.(203)

Public doubt, public disobedience and the increasing isolation of the court fed into each other and served to intensify and strengthen resistance to Crown policies. Their impact was to undermine the carefully constructed chain of command, obedience and respect for authority which made the ship money experiment possible and successful. This can be seen not simply in the open defiance of local officers and the sheriffs' collective inability to collect money, it can also be seen in the way that suppressed hatred for ship money led to a re-emergence of grievances against those who had alienated local opinion by too much zeal for the King's business. Some of these disputes dated back five years to the early days of the ship money writs. In Cheshire Sir Thomas Aston was forced to defend his honour in public against rumours that he had over-assessed the county to his own profit during his shrievalty in 1634-5.(204) Sir John

Stanhope's widow revived her late husband's grudge against John Gell for "rigorous", "unreasonable" and "illegal proceedings" in raising £200 more than he should have by the 1635 writ in Derbyshire.(205) Old antagonisms in Norwich and in Salisbury involving John Anguish and Robert Hyde were revived and influenced local politics.(206) Previously covert gentry resistance became more overt and more outspoken in its opposition to the service.(207) A Herefordshire man appointed collector of his hundred, would not act on the sheriff's warrant following receipt of the ship money proclamation, declaring boldly,

"he thought shipping money unlawful, and therefore would not pay it, nor would he put any such warrant into execution, until he had advised with his counsel whether he might be compelled thereunto."(208)

Sir William Bellasys told the Council in June that in the Islandshire part of Northumberland no more ship money could be had because of the opposition of some men of good quality and the fears an invasion by the Scots.(209)

The resistance of communities as distinct from that of individuals also intensified during the summer months. The sheriffs and the escheators confirmed that resistance was no longer sporadic or isolated, but, as in the more difficult counties during the earlier writs, opposition was endorsed by the whole community -the gentry, local officers and the tax paying community.(210) In Melbourne in Cambridgeshire where the rich would not pay, "the whole multitude" rescued the ship money collectors who were being arrested by the bailiffs on warrants from the sheriff. A crowd of thirty-or forty men and women, young lads and children was urged by William French to

throw stones at the bailiffs and, when the JPs met three weeks later on 7th July 1640, the jury would not convict in spite of the sworn evidence of five or six witnesses.(211) The collective sense of legal wrong sustained in the ship money debates during the Short Parliament fostered boldness and led to the articulate expression of grievances. In Berkshire, on 11th July, the grand jury petitioned the King against the burdens imposed by

"sundry grievances by officers deriving their authority from your Majesty, but being directly contrary to your laws established in this kingdom."

They asked for "all their rights and liberties which they desire by their Petition of Right", citing "the illegal and insupportable charge of ship money as high as ever, though the subjects were not able to pay it the last year being but a third part."(212) This petition was commented on, as was a similar petition drawn up by the gentry of Yorkshire and presented to the King in August.(213) Sir Hugh Cholmley described this, in somewhat extravagant language:

"in a pretty high style; for in substance (though not in plain terms) it imported that the county would not lie longer under those pressures: and it being the first that did with a bare face complaine of the king's prerogative which went high in those times did something startle the Council."(214)

Hawkins told Leicester,

"yet some counties speake higher. Wee are all out of order and no great likelihood of amendment...."(215)

Such opposition took its toll on the service. Between 9th May and 14th August the accounts rose from £15,032 10s 5d to £34,534 11s 5d.(216) Between 28th August and the last account of 31st December

1640 the total sum went up to £41,856 15s 1d.(217) In this way the different forms of resistance, rating disputes, recalcitrance, violence, legal action and community resistance, discussed in previous chapters, became too widespread and too general for the Council to control and the service collapsed.

This fact was increasingly presented to the King and the Lords during the summer of 1640. In London the collection of ship money assumed a reverse model to the contained resistance of 1635: legal disputes, resistance to distress, unwillingness to proceed with collection in spite of Council pressure and a "bold and presumptuous" stance by the Common Council of London.(218) Confrontation came on 6th July when the Lord Mayor was called in to explain why the ship money was so slow: Strafford said,

"If the matter had brought money to the Lord Mayor's purpose, or the Chamber of London, he would easily have found a way to have got it, but it being for your Majesty's service, and to come to your coffers, the Lord Mayor hath no means to levy it.'

'My Lord', (answered the Mayor), 'I would it might stand with his majesty's good pleasure and the wisdom and conscience of your Lordships to manage the five wards of the City and to try what might be done in this particular, wherein I have applied all the care and diligence I possibly have been able, but without any fruit, but it may be there would be no difficulties for your Lordship.'"(219)

Belief in the need for diligence and in their ability to compel obedience given a sufficiently powerful sanction continued to shape the Lords' response. On 10th July, on the advise of the Lords, the King ordered the Lord Mayor to answer his contempt in the Star Chamber.(220) By order of the King in Council on the same day "solicitors" were to be appointed "to solicit and call upon the

sheriffs for the due execution of the writs".(221) The escheators in the counties were instructed to report on the diligence of the sheriffs.(222) Preparations to prosecute some of the sheriffs and under-sheriffs continued to be made.(223) These stern measures taken by the Lords were pretty ineffectual. The escheators' reports, which came in gradually between 6th August and 5th October, reiterated the message of the escheator of Warwickshire and Leicestershire's final report:

"by reason thereof of the general dislike of this service in that county [of Warwickshire] it hath not been and cannot be that done there which is required."(224)

In August for the first time the full force of a royal proclamation was used to enforce the service, ordering all officials to act upon the ship money writs immediately, to levy arrears and to pay in all of the current balance by 1st October. Familiar themes of disaffection and wayward disobedience were re-emphasised, and no attempt was made at public conciliation or compromise:

"His Majestie, out of His Princely care of the defence of this Realm, and safety of his subjects... Did as well for divers yeers past, as in November last direct his severall Writs.... and therefore his Majestie, as he cannot but censure the most his Sheriffs and others his Ministers, of great neglects... So He will now expect from them as undelayed and faithfull performance of the same, without favour or connivance.... upon pain of High contempt against His Majestie, and to be further proceeded with, and punished according to the quality of their offences, in that which so much importeth the publicke good and safety of the Kingdom."(225)

This proclamation failed in its object. Yet one of the most striking things about the failure of the ship money experiment is that the government never once expressed any sense of error; moderate

councillors had acknowledged that the Forced Loan was a political and legal mistake, no such admission was made about ship money, even at a time when a public gesture of conciliation could have done much good.(226) Although in his declaration after the Short Parliament the King said he would remedy grievances, it was clear that he would not pay any heed to what he saw as criticism of his prerogative powers.(227) Far from conciliating the hearts and minds of his people, the attitude taken by King and Council only served to deepen alienation and hostility. Nehemiah Wallington wrote that "whereas before, ship money was paid, now I heard of none that would pay it" and considered it one of the signs that God's favour was returning to England after the ill-omened dissolution of the Parliament in May.(228)

This attitude of public disdain barely concealed the reality of government crisis. Little was gained from attempts to get financial help from Spain and the Pope, and much political capital was lost in sending an army believed to be dominated by Irish and Welsh papists against the Scots.(229) In the middle of August Dr Castle wrote to the Earl of Bridgewater that the King

"was in a great passion" against the Lords because of the shortages of money "asking them what were become of their great promises of getting money, when they councilled him to break off this parliament.... There hath been raised at court within these six or five days a report that his Majesty speaks of calling a parliament again, and great wagers are offered to be laid that we shall have a parliament before All Hallows, which God grant may fall out to be true."(230)

Summoned to answer the Attorney General in the Star Chamber Sir Symonds D'Ewes was surprised to find London empty at the end of

August.(231) Some of the Lords were sent to the localities to summon obedience and loyalty and the King on his own decision travelled north to join his army.(232) On August 20th the Scots invaded England, calling upon the English to recognise that they shared a community of grievances and a common need for a parliament.(233) The political situation continued to deteriorate with the petition of the peers for a parliament in direct contravention of the King's proclamation eleven years earlier.(234) Although the Council shared Laud's view

"to be put to the King, that we are at the wall, and that we are in the dark.."

Charles decided to revive the medieval Council of the Peers, last summoned in the reign of Edward III, rather than summon another parliament.(235) At the end of August Windebank, backed by the Lords and by the Queen's faction, urged the King to take Bedford and Essex into his confidence if not his service, to "sever" them from "ill affected company" and to create "some sweetening of the Lords and people".(236) To bring these lords into government would have entailed more compromise than Charles or Strafford were prepared to tolerate.(237) Charles felt the Council in London were merely frightened and lacking in necessary resolution:

"I could wish ye would show as much stoutness there as ye counsel me here."(238)

The signs are that the lords would not have come in without redress of grievances and a return to a parliament way. "The urging of ship money and the prosecution of the sheriffs in the Star Chamber for not levying of it" was cited as a grievance in the petition of the

peers, signed by the "country Lords", including Bedford, Warwick, Essex, Hertford, Saye, Brooke and Mandeville and presented on 6th September.(239) Both Essex and Bedford expressed their reluctance to be other than "private persons" and "for remedy of present troubles, they thought a parliament the best".(240)

With Scottish forces holding Newcastle the failure of ship money faded into insignificance: as Sir John Byron wrote in a letter of 24th September to Lord Newburgh

"some honey the King may suck out of this weed that hereafter the ship money will be thought but a toy."(241)

On the same day Nicholas compiled a memorandum on the subject of paying for the army and the navy until a parliament should meet. Nothing illustrates as vividly the gap in perception and expectation between the administrative wing of the government and the King's subjects: some counties wrote Nicholas had all, a half or a third of their ship money in hand "which are like to be detained for particular men's advantage", and he wondered whether the arrears of £150,000 would be paid upon a royal promise "for the utter abolishing of it by act of parliament".(242) Two days later Charles accepted the advise of the peers at York to summon a parliament for 3rd November.(243) Attempts to get in the money during October were dismal failures.(244)

Thus ship money disappeared from the Privy Council's agenda as quietly and as inconspicuously as it had appeared in 1634.(245) There is no surviving evidence to indicate when or where or how the Lords decided that the service was irretrievably lost: in November 1640 Laud noted,

"We hear that ship-money is laid aside, as a thing which will die of itself."(246)

The last account was prepared by Sir William Russell on 16th January 1641, and Auditor Bingley was ordered to review the final figures at the end of that month.(247) The agonised discussions of law, legality and the nature of the prerogative which characterised the Short Parliament debates on ship money were never repeated in the Long Parliament.(248) Events of the summer months convinced MPs it was no longer possible to restore consensus without attacking the architects of "new counsels" and destroying its legal foundations.(249) The Long Parliament met in an extraordinary atmosphere of exultation, religious fervour and hope:

"Out of all question some great work is here intended," declared Sir John Wray, "something extraordinary is here to be decreed or else God and the king beyond all our expectations, at the last breach, would never so soon have cemented us again to meet in this great council."(250)

REFERENCES TO CHAPTER 5

The title of the Chapter is taken from a comment by Mr Controller in the Commons on 23rd April 1640 "he looked upon shipmoney as a dyinge thinge", *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 172.

1. E L 7865.
2. SP16/467/80.
3. B L Add MS 11045, f 43.
4. B L Add MS 11045, f 43-4.
5. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 165-6.
7. B L Add MS 11045, f 44.
8. SP16/431/80; 432/33.
9. SP16/432/33.
10. Sir John Evelyn see Keeler, Members of the Long Parliament, p 169-170; SP16/434/43.
11. PC2/51, p 38 New sheriffs had to be found for Berkshire, Northamptonshire and Sussex when these gentlemen got themselves out of the office before the writs had to be executed, see Appendix 2.
12. H M C De L'Isle and Dudley MS, VI, p 207.
13. PC2/51, p 109-110.
14. SP16/431/80; see above p 146-147; 355-356; and Table VII.
15. Writs for Bristol and Middlesex 18.11.39 SP16/432/70; 71; Instructions, SP16/PC2/51, p 121-134 1.12 ; the administration was set up by the usual order on 15th December, PC2/51, p 187-189; E L 7814.
16. C S P Ven 1636-1639, p 500.
17. Strafforde's Letters, II, p 246.
18. Laud, Works, III, p 233.
19. Hibbard, Popish Plot, p 148.
20. Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, I, p 172.
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28. H M C Ninth Report, p 498.
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31. SP16/441/52
32. SP16/441/88.
33. SP16/444/70.
34. SP16/445/1.
35. SP16/445/24.
36. SP16/444/15; for examples of begruding see, Salisbury, SP16/443/27; 448/63; Northamptonshire, SP16/445/541; Hertfordshire, SP16/62; Cambridgeshire, SP16/445/75; Herefordshire, SP16/446/72; 78; Bristol SP16/447/64; Staffordshire, SP16/452/10; Newcastle, SP16/445/36; Lincolnshire, SP16/448/21; Sussex, PC2/51, p 411-412; Norfolk, SP16/450/1.
37. Nalson, An Impartial Collection of Great Affairs of State, I, p 287, reported by Hawkins to Leicester, H M C De L'Isle and Dudley MS, VI, p 231.
38. See above p 360- 362; and Table V, VI and VII.
39. Cornwall: SP16/449/12.
Welsh counties: SP16/444/70; 445/77; 446/36; 448/13; 62; 449/2; 33; 450/33; 115.
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40. SP16/455/36; 42; 49; 50; 52; 62.
41. SP16/450/1; PC2/52, p 448.
42. SP16/445/49.
43. SP16/447/35; 46.

44. SP16/445/541.
45. PC2/51, p 355-6.
46. Lincolnshire, SP16/448/21; PC2/51, p 388-389; Somerset, S R O , Acland-Hood Manuscripts, Dd/AH/21/4; SP16/448/57; 78; PC2/51, p 412-3; the quotation is from SP16/448/57.
47. SP16/448/57
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50. Oxfordshire: SP16/450/57; PC2/52, p 431-432; 460; 462.
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Herefordshire: SP16/446/72; 78.
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51. SP16/449/8.
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54. Clar St P, I, p 196
55. Quoted by Kishlansky, Parliamentary Selection, p 109.
56. Quoted by Kishlansky, Parliamentary Selection, p 111.
32. SP16/441/88.
57. Gruenfelder, Influence in Early Stuart Elections, p 184-197.
58. Gruenfelder, Influence in Early Stuart Elections, p 194.
59. Gruenfelder, Influence in Early Stuart Elections, p 196.
60. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 279.
61. SP16/448/33.
62. Gruenfelder, p 189-192.
63. Gloucestershire: SP16/448/79; *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 147-8; 153-6.
Northamptonshire: SP16/449/4; Bedfordshire Record Office, J 1369; B L Add MS 11045, f 128r-v.
Essex: SP16/449/48; the quotation is from SP16/448/79.
64. SP16/449/4.

65. Winthrop Correspondence, IV, p 205.
66. Winthrop Correspondence, IV, p 218.
67. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 140.
68. See above p 329-334; 405-498.
69. Sir Roger Twysden, *Certaine Considerations Upon the Government of England* ed J.M. Kemble Camden Society, first series, 45 (1849), p xliv.
70. See above p 289-334.
71. See above p 329-334; 405-498.
72. Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, 25 (1947), p 107.
73. Hibbard Charles I and the Popish Plot, p 126..
74. SP16/438/93.
75. SP16/438/92.
76. Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, 65 (1986), p 34.
77. B L Add MS 11045, f 99v.
78. As quoted by Firth, TRHS, 3rd Series, vi (1912), p 41.
79. Butler, Theatre in Crisis, p 228-250; the quotation is p 241.
80. Butler, Theatre in Crisis, p 181-250.
81. Butler, Theatre in Crisis, p 249-250.
82. Cope, Politics Without Parliament, p 178-179.
83. B L Add MS 22,959, f 57.
84. Quoted by Hirst The Representative of the People?, p 151.
85. Hirst, The Representative of the People?, p 151-3.
86. Hirst, The Representative of the People?, p 187.
87. As quoted in General Introduction to *The Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 70
88. H M C Ninth Report, p 498.
89. Historical Notices of Events Occurring Chiefly in the Reign of Charles I by Nehemiah Wallington, ed R. Webb, 2 Volumes, (London, 1869), I, p 132.

90. STT 1890.
91. Strafforde's Letters, II, p 61.
92. SP16/449/48.
93. The quotation is from Cust in Conflict in Early Stuart England, ed Cust and Hughes, p 139.
94. The quotation is from Woodford's diary as given by Fielding, HJ, 32 (1988), p 786.
95. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 115.
96. SP16/450/88; for the text of the Lord Keeper's speech see *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 113-123.
97. History of the Rebellion, I ,p 183; 174.
98. *Proceedings in the Short Parliament*, p 135; 136-7.
99. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 139; 140-143.
100. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 153; for Croke see ST, III, p 1129.
101. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 234, the editors consider the source to have Puritan sympathies, p 33.
102. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 140.
103. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 55.
104. The quotation is from the petition from the county of Essex, *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 276.
105. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 278.
106. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 143; 140.
107. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 17; for Cholmley's hostility to the service see Memoirs of Sir Hugh Cholmley, p 60-61; *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 17; 56; 107; 129; *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 161.
108. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 165-166; there is some confusion about the actual date of this speech in the source material, Cope and Coates dated the speech 21st April and reported to the Lords on 22nd, *Proceedings in the Short Parliament*, p 303, but Sir Thomas Aston's Diary, which was unknown until Judith Maltby found it in the 1980s, dates it 22nd April, *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 28-29)

109. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 169; for the fullest texts of the debate see *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 169-174; *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 35-44.
110. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 170.
111. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 38.
112. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 39.
113. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 41-42.
114. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 174; 237.
115. B L Add MS 11045, f 112v; Secretary Windebank's rough notes of the meeting survive in SP16/450/113.
116. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 69-71.
117. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 74-75.
118. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 73; for other Councillors see p 72; 75; 77; 78.
119. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 72; 74; 78.
120. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 72; 75.
121. SP16/451/39.
122. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 169-176; 221-224; *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 35-60.
123. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 55-58.
124. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 55-58, the quotation from Pym is p 58.
125. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 43.
126. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 126; for the intellectual context of this debate see Sommerville, p 145-163; 173-183.
127. For petitions see *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 275-278.
128. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston* p 58; *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 155.
129. St John, *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 17; 104; 107; *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 185; Pym, *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 42; 136.
130. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 243.

131. ST, III, p 1235; see above p 462; Holborne was amongst those who made this point, *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 194. This continued to be a controversial area, Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, p 73-74.

132. For examples of freemen and vassalage see, *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 143; 172; for the Judges opinions see St, III, p 1201.

133. *Proceedings in the Short Parliament*, p 173; Peard was very outspoken and according to Rossingham he offended the Judges by what he said in the debate on ship money on 30th April, B L Add MS 11045, f 115r; his mother was probably a ship money defaulter in Barnstaple where her son was the deputy-recorder, SP16/376/1371; Keeler, Members of the Long Parliament, p 299..

134. For example, in Pym's speech of 17th April, *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 149-150; Grimston, *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 3; Sir John Wray, p 39; St John, *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 105; Sergeant Glyn, *ibid* p 105-6; Sir Walter Earle, *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 134. See also the debate on 30th April, *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 100-109. The Judges' exaltation of the Exchequer Chamber continued to inspire anger in the 1640s, for example Sir Cheney Culpeper, Sheffield University Library, HA/50/13 (57B).

135. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 43.

136. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 124-5.

137. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 70.

138. The quotation is from *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 70; for examples of Councillors urging speed, see *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 69-70; 71; 72; 73; 75; 77; 120; 170; 171; 176-177; 187-188; 193.

139. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 37-38; 41; 43-44; 49-50; 56-58; 87; 97-109; 121-144.

140. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 190.

141. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 137, for St John see p 134.

142. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 124; for Earl of Bristol's opinion see *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 77-78.

143. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 127.

144. Gardiner, IX, p 113.

145. Hardwicke State Papers, p 246-248; Rushworth, II, p 1306; ship money' annual worth was approximately four subsidies a year, see p// below.

146. As quoted by Gardiner, IX, p 113.
147. C.S.R. Russell, *The British Problem and the English Civil War, History*, 72 (1987), p 410.
148. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 37-38; 41; 43-44; 49-50; 56-58; 87; 97-109; 121-144.
149. This subject dominated debates 27th-29th April, *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 67-87.
150. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 139.
151. The quotation is from *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 194; see *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 193-197; *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 128-144.
152. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 195; *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 130-132.
153. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 131; 132; 137.
154. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 131; 132; for Pym see p 125; for obstructionism see for example Sir Francis Seymour, p 130; Kirton p 129; Sir Robert Cooke, p 131; not all took a negative view, see Sir Hugh Cholmley p 132; Price, p 133; Vaughan, p 136; Sir Benjamin Rudyard, *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 194; Slingsby, p 197. Aston's *Diary* confirms only part of Clarendon's account, *History of the Rebellion*, I p 178-9.
155. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 143.
156. Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, I, p 182. Sir John Bramston's *Autobiography* confirms his condemnation of the Councillors in the Commons, *Autobiography of Sir John Bramston*, p 66.
157. Gardiner, IX, p 116-117.
158. C. Thompson, *The Divided Leadership of the House of Commons in 1629*, in Sharpe, p 245-284; Reeve, p 71-98.
159. Laud, *Works*, III, p 284.
160. *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 243.
161. *Diary of Sir Thomas Aston*, p 144-145.
162. SP16/452/31; for the earlier decision see *Clar St P*, II, p 81-2.
163. R.P Cust, *Charles I and a Draft Declaration for the 1628 Parliament*, *Historical Research*, lxxiii (1990), p 143-161.
164. *Clar St P*, II, p 83-4.

165. His Majesties Declaration to All His Loving Subjects of the Causes Which Moved Him to Dissolve the Last Parliament, (London, 1640).
166. Cust, Historical Research, lxiii (1990), p 143-161.
167. Winthrop Correspondence, IV, p 237-238.
168. Winthrop Papers, IV, p 243-4; E L 7832; 7833; 7834.
169. Reeve, p 99-116.
170. H M C De L'Isle and Dudley MS, VI, p 261; see also Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, I, p 78; Winthrop Papers, IV, p 241.
171. R. Clifton, Fear of Popery, in The Origins of the English Civil War, ed Russell, p 158; 161-3; E L7835.
172. C S P Ven 1640-1642, p 47.
173. E L 7833.
174. E L 7834; Clarendon gives a corroborating account of this, History of the Rebellion, I, p 183-4..
175. Hibbard, Popish Plot, p 151 quotes a motto scratched on the window of the King's chamber "God save the King; God confound the queen and all her party; God grant rule in this kingdom to the count Palatine"; for earlier parallels in 1630 see Cope, Politics Without Parliament, p 15; for later see Hibbard, Popish Plot, p 167.
176. Hibbard, Popish Plot, p 151.
177. E L 7338.
178. SP16/452/69.
179. SP16/450/29; for examples of ill example see Denzil Holles and Lady Ashley in Dorset, SP16/451/13 and 13i; Suffolk, SP16/451/18 and 18i; Cliffe, The Puritan Gentry, p 216-217; Cheshire SP16/450/28 and 28i; legal fears and distraint problems, Norfolk, SP16/450/1; Oxfordshire PC2/52, p 460; 462; Staffordshire, SP16/452/10.
180. SP16/452/53; 453/5.
181. H M C De L'Isle and Dudley MS, VI, p 267; B L Add MS 25,277 f 21-48; SP16/453/106; 455/12; 13; 14; 15; PC2/52 p 513; 559.
182. PC2/52, 505-6.
183. For examples from May to July 1640, see:
Rebukes: SP16/453/5; PC2/52, p 590; 591; 592; 593; SP16/453/74.
Summons: SP16/453/98; 107; 454/41; PC2/52, p 528; 550; PC2/52, p 597; E L 7842.

Bonds: SP16/455/43 is unusual in being a bond of £3,000 set on the sheriff of Herefordshire; Examples of rebuke, summons and bonds. Star Chamber: PC2/52, p 587; E L 7843.

184. SP16/455/85.

185. SP16/456/28; Lancashire 455/35; Norfolk, SP16/456/21 and 211; Worcestershire, SP16/455/127; 457/22.

186. SP16/458/110; for earlier parallels with the billeting of soldiers see Cust and Hughes, *After Revisionism*, in Cust and Hughes, eds, Conflict in Early Stuart England, p 31.

187. B L Harl MS 382, f 88; for earlier dilatoriness see PC2/52, p 619.

188. Sheffield City Library, Wheat Collection, 846; 841; for Sir Marmaduke Langdale's dilatoriness see SP16/452/53; 455/12; on 13th July the Council believed "a good part" of the money was collected.

189. The quotation is from SP16/458/42; for money collected but believed by the Lords to be detained see SP16/458/70; PC2/52, p 629; PC2/53, p 33-4; for money retained for local redistribution see The Buller Papers ed R.N. Worth, (privately printed, 1895), p 23, I am grateful to Ann Duffin for this reference; *Orders of the Shropshire Quarter Sessions*, p 1-2; for evidence of money collected but not received by Sir William Russell, see SP16/467/11.

190. SP16/458/73; PC2/52, p 643.

191. SP16/458/80; 81.

192. The first quotation is from SP16/460/35, the second from SP16/466/46; for Cheshire see SP16/450/28; 35; 459/21; 466/46; 58.

193. SP16/466/58.

194. SP16/466/58.

195. H M C Ninth Report, p 498-499; for Northamptonshire's payment see SP16/456/37, account for 6th June 1640.

196. SP16/463/861.

197. For rates made in 1641-1642 see Richard Grenville's notebook, Buckinghamshire Record Society, 13 (1965), p 91-108.

198. SP16/433/4 is the last payment recorded for Buckinghamshire, for the lack of response to 1639 see Table V; Gardiner, IX, p 141.

199. SP16/457/36;104; for Peard see *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, p 172-173.

200. SP16/457/36; 104; Gardiner, IX, p 161-3.

201. Gardiner, IX, p 149-164, SP16/457/36; 104; E L 7836; 7837; 7838; 7839; 7841; 7842; 7843; 7844; 7845; 7846; 7847; 7848; 7849; 7851; 7852; 7853; 7854; 7855; 7856; 78571 7859; 7860; 7861; 7862; 7868; 7869; 7872; 7874.
202. Hibbard, Popish Plot, p 164-167; B L Add MS 4,469 f 74v, as quoted by Hibbard, Popish Plot, p 165 and checked against the original.
203. Hibbard, Popish Plot, p 167.
204. Lake, Northern History, 17 (1981), p 67.
205. Derbyshire Record Office, Gell MS 56/6; other evidence confirms that levying beyond the total did happen in Derbyshire in 1635, H M C Cowper MS, II, p 150; 170; Gell asked the Lords what he should do with the surplus he had collected, Gell MS 28/6; 31/33.
206. B L Add MS 42,153 f 84; Keeler, Long Parliament, p 72; 228; Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, p 83; 98-99.
207. Cheshire, SP16/459/21; 460/35; Cambridgeshire, SP16/463/43; 431; Shropshire, PC2/52, p 592; 664; Suffolk, PC2/52, p 631; Gloucestershire, PC2/52, p 591.
208. SP16/466/77.
209. SP16/457/18.
210. For example Cornwall SP16/457/62; Dorset SP16/463/26.
211. SP16/463/43; 43i; 431i.
212. SP16/464/42.
213. SP16/463/33.
214. Memoirs of Sir Hugh Cholmley, p 62.
215. H M C De L'Isle and Dudley MS, VI, p 315.
216. SP16/452/100; 463/106.
217. SP16/465/36; 473/103.
218. E L /7358; /8390; /842; /843; the quotation is from EL 7838.
219. E L 7842.
220. E L 7843.
221. PC2/52, p 625.
222. PC2/52, p 652-3.

223. PC2/52, p 627; 664; SP16/461/73; the threat was still being used, PC2/52, p 683.
224. SP16/468/49.
225. Stuart Royal Proclamations Volume II, p 729-730.
226. Cust, p 80-90 points to some interesting similarities and differences between 1628 and 1640.
227. See for example his reaction to the Yorkshire petition, Memoirs of Sir Hugh Cholmley, p 63-64.
228. Wallington, Historical Notices, I, p 134-137; the quotation is from p 134.
229. Hibbard, Popish Plot, p 152-157; Fletcher, Outbreak of the English Civil War, p xxiii.
230. E L 7849.
231. B L Harl MS 379, f 71.
232. E L 7837; 7844; 7848; 7849; 7851; 7852.
233. Cope, Politics Without Parliament, p 195-6.
234. Cope, Politics Without Parliament, p 197-198.
235. P. Yorke, Miscellaneous State Papers From 1501-1726, 2 vols (London, 1778), I, p 170; Cope, Politics Without Parliament, p 197-200.
236. Clar St P, II, p 94-9; 97.
237. Gardiner, IX, p 205.
238. Quoted by Gardiner IX, p 206.
239. E L 7872; for the epithet "country lords" see Rossingham's news letter, B L Add MS 11045, f 112v; C S P D 1640, p 634; Clar St P, II, p 11-112.
240. Clar St P, II, p 111-112.
241. SP16/468/27.
242. SP16/468/17.
243. E L 7864.
244. PC2/53, p 33-34; for the accounts see Appendix 1; for payment patterns see Table V: VI: VII.
245. See above p 31-56.

246. Laud, Works, IV p 589.

247. SP16/476/53; 104; PC2/53, p 86-91.

248. Something which struck John Morrill, *The Religious Context of the English Civil War*, TRHS, 5th series 34 (1984), p 155-157.

249. For evidence of antagonism towards those associated with new counsels: Laud, Works, III, p 237; Oxinden Letters, p 187; H M C De L'Isle and Dudley MS, VI, p 348-349; 364-365; H M C Fourth Report, p 51; 53; for the early days of the Long Parliament see Fletcher, Outbreak of the English Civil War, p 1-41.

250. As quoted by Fletcher, The Outbreak of the English Civil War, p 2.

CONCLUSION

"New counsels" came to an ignominious and inglorious end, with the collapse of the Personal Rule and the political and military disasters of 1640. The overwhelming nature of this failure has dominated the history of the 1630s ever since, making the defeats of 1640 seem inevitable. Yet the apparent tranquility of the Personal Rule, dubbed serene, quiet and halcyon days, has always challenged any simplistic explanations of accelerating conflict. In depth study of ship money, as an experiment in government and as an interface between governors and governed, ideology and practical politics, points to some interesting and provocative conclusions, which help to explain the nature of political life under Charles I.

The first of these is the central importance of the King himself. The King's personality, his political and religious priorities, his choice of councillors and his working relationship with them determined the direction of politics in the 1630s. In this sense the traditional label of a "Personal Rule" is appropriate: this is so because the King's preferences had such a marked influence on politics, religion and culture. The period of this study, 1634 to 1640, reflects the ambitions and hopes shared by King and Council and supported by many of his subjects: to restore order in government after the chaos and humiliations of the 1620s, to give the monarchy its rightful lustre, to secure English dynastic and trading interests abroad and to do so with honour, to promote English sea power, to pursue the glory of true religion and the service of God in England. These were perceived as glorious ends, exalted by poets, painters and

in royal propaganda. The King's ability to stamp his wishes on politics in this way was further enhanced by the devotion surrounding English kingship. Desire to serve the King and belief in his essential goodness were powerful political and religious forces during this period. Even the experience of what many regarded as misgovernment did not diminish kingship: the King's servants not the King himself carried the blame.

The desire for political harmony, the union of King and people under God and the law, was the strongest political sentiment in early Stuart politics. Yet this longing for unity was also disruptive and divisive, because the ideological consensus on which it was premised did not exist. Changes in politics, culture and religion challenged consensus so that there was no agreement on how this state of harmony could be regained, nor how it could be maintained. The imagery of English political life was very powerful, employing immense emotional rhetoric to draw a picture of a mythical English past where there was no discordance between image and reality. The cult of Queen Elizabeth, developed under James I and Charles I, bore little relation to the realities of Elizabethan politics yet the supposed harmony of the past was a rebuke to a turbulent present struggling to resolve its own problems. In the same way court culture during the Personal Rule created a mythology of the present, centred upon the King and Queen and the themes of love and reconciliation. Nevertheless, King and Council shared fears about disloyalty, disobedience and disaffection, about ill-example and the dangers of aristocratic opposition. They were suspicious of popular politics, afraid of the implications of religious radicalism and did their best

to encourage an attitude of passive obedience to royal commands, using fear as much as love to inspire conformity.

An exalted vision of parliaments, and the relationship of law, liberty, ancient tradition and godliness inspired those like Saye and Hampden who opposed the service. They too desired to serve the King, to respect tradition and to promote the Protestant cause in Europe, they too relied upon an idealised vision of the Commonwealth. Saye, Essex, Bedford and their supporters reacted against their exclusion from power, attempting to woo, to persuade and by 1640 to force the King to abandon prerogative government and Laudianism. Their dislike of the regime and their attempts to change the direction of politics were a continuous theme of the 1630s; this opposition took different forms and found different avenues of expression according to context. These were men who were ambitious politicians, eager for office and able to recognise the administrative and structural difficulties facing the government, in finance, in foreign policy and in relations with the localities. Whether they would have been able to achieve all that they promised the King in 1637, in a parliamentary way, is another matter.

Examination of the Council's handling of the ship money service shows that they recognised the weaknesses in English government and were prepared to tackle them but without resort to a parliament. The legacy of the 1620s was a bitter one, convincing the King and others who served him that nothing could be done in a parliamentary way at the present. In their analysis, faction, the sway of demagogues and short-sighted obsession with sectional interests had undermined all attempts to deal with the real difficulties facing government, even

in a time of war and even when the King's own honour and the safety of the kingdom were at stake. Ship money tackled some of the most serious fiscal weaknesses exposed during the 1620s, such as the narrowness of the declining taxation base and the weaknesses of local assessment and management of royal revenues. The Council tried in this way to create a sense of national community and of common purpose shared by King and subject, where the mutual duty of defence was carried out within a framework of duty and obedience and with respect for local rights and liberties as well as concern for equality and social justice. In this task they had three chosen instruments. First, the legal weight of the service, in the writs themselves and in the machinery for assessment and collection. This stress upon legalism led also to the public definition of the service by the Judges in their Opinion of February 1637 and in Hampden's Case. Second, the concentration upon the sheriffs as agents of royal power and as intermediaries between centre and localities. Third, was the power and prestige of King, Council and Judges, placed behind the service. The sheer volume of ship money material collected by the Council, the number of petitions, hearings, summons, letters and accounts highlight the importance of the service. This material shows prerogative government at its most creative and its most dogmatic. The careful evolution of the administration, the way information was gathered so that the Lords could respond effectively to local circumstances and the Council's willingness to tackle fundamental issues such as the rating system must be set against the pressures they put on the sheriffs, their obsession with obedience and their inability to understand the importance of consent.

Yet ship money in the localities was never as straightforward an issue as the Lords would have liked. Sheriffs, borough authorities and constables all had to balance local interests, local practices and local needs against the demands of the service. Pressure from the Lords was often at odds with the need for consultation and consent in local affairs, even in counties where the collection of ship money was on the whole successful. Questions of liberty and property aired in the parliaments of the 1620s and by the Crown's opponents in the law courts during the 1630s, became politically sensitive because of the diffusion of political consciousness during this period. Ship money broadened this defence of liberty beyond the claims of parliamentary privilege and beyond the ranks of the gentry, because the broad nature of the service and the techniques the Council used to manage it presented controversial issues and controversial choices to those in the localities. Newsletters, ballads, plays, gossip and rumour revealed a different picture of England from that of the court masque. In addition the deep-seated conservatism of English society made people suspicious of what was new, radical or innovative and this bred a cumulative dissatisfaction with ship money. The causes of that dissatisfaction were often functional or structural weaknesses, such as rating disputes or the oppression of the poor, but they were interpreted as proof of the weaknesses and limitations of prerogative government. The blame for this fell on evil councillors around the King, on a service that gave too much power to men not fit to exercise it as sheriffs, constables or bailiffs: an argument made more persuasive by the active work of the Arminians and the outrage caused by the exploitation of the forest laws, monopolies and

new impositions.

Desire to serve the King as he wished to be served was balanced not just against respect for local traditions and liberties but also against respect for what were seen as the ancient liberties of the kingdom. One of the most striking things to emerge from this study has been a re-emphasis on the political and symbolic importance of a parliament. The image of law as the guardian of order, liberty and justice was similarly powerful. Political life was shaped by the absence of a parliament in a number of ways which had a critical bearing on the ship money service. Ship money was above all the child of non-parliamentary government, it was designed to strengthen the Crown against the dangers of faction and disruption at home and of powerless isolation abroad. Its peaceful administration and successful payment were seen as tributes to stability, order and social harmony, necessary after the disruptions of the late 1620s. The success of ship money was, therefore, a real tribute to unity of purpose between Crown and people: in 1637 Charles regarded himself as the happiest monarch in Christendom when he compared England to other war-torn and strife-ridden kingdoms in Europe. Yet the burning issues of the 1620s did not go away, and appearance of calm in the 1630s is often deceptive, not least because the absence of a parliament limited the ways in which discontent could be voiced. The international defence of Protestantism and the Palatinate cause continued to be real influences on the direction of policy, most vividly seen in the war-scare during the early years of ship money and the attempt to get the King to call a parliament. Aristocratic protest led by the Saye-Warwick group, and designed to draw England into active defence of

Protestantism in Europe achieved spectacular publicity with legal defiance. In a lesser way other people and other communities registered their protests in ways appropriate to rank and to circumstance, often using avenues of protest not specifically designed to register political grievances. The dangers surrounding the expression of political dissent, as well as the changing impact of the service as it continued year in and year out, mean that opposition to ship money took different forms and had a different intensity according to context, time and place. Insights from the study of popular politics, literature and political culture have reinforced a picture of complex discontent, becoming more articulate, more general and more influential from 1637-8 onwards.

The two years of 1637 and 1638 were turning points for new counsels in a number of ways. Government entered a new and aggressive phase with the prosecution of Burton, Bastwick and Prynne, Hampden's Case and the beginnings of the Scottish business. A period of hope came to an end when the King did not engage in the European war, did not call a parliament and turned to aggressive legalism to strengthen the administration of ship money. The earlier stress upon unity, reason and tranquillity was undermined by the reality of discontent. Moderate counsels, which had shaped response in the early years of ship money were less influential compared to a hard-line attitude and an obsession with disobedience. Increasing stress was placed upon the relationship between the Council and the localities. At the same time changes at court were to have profound consequences. The influence of the Spanish faction revived and intensified. Court Catholicism came more strongly under the influence

of Spain with the arrival of Marie de Medici and the growing influence of George Con. Popery and tyranny, the twin devils of the English political imagination, assumed a tangible form encouraging the link between religious and secular grievances, making the management of ship money seem proof of a design to subvert the laws of God and man. Troubles in Scotland, the weight of coat and conduct money, the King's aversion to summoning parliament in 1639 continued this process of alienation; existing fears were fed, not created, by events between 1637 and 1640.

This is not to argue that the collapse of the Personal Rule was a foregone conclusion. In the Short Parliament, hatred of ship money existed side by side with a desire to balance the interests of the King and the subject and to act according to law and duty. Even after the service collapsed and was abandoned, ship money left a dual legacy. One was the hatred of prerogative taxation, which was utterly damned by the Long Parliament. The other was a recognition of fiscal reform, used by Pym in his subsidy changes and by local governors in their assessments for Civil War taxation. Yet conflict remains an essential feature in this analysis of the politics of high prerogative. Differences in ideology were manifested in different conceptual frameworks surrounding law, authority and government. To the King and Council, the law was an emanation of the King's authority and the Church was the peaceful community of the faithful under the governors God had given them. To others, law was the product of community, working through history, tradition and consent. The King was the first servant of the law, and the Church was the community of the godly under divine and holy rule. Although there was

a common consensus about the ideal of peaceful government by the King under God, there were very different visions of the Commonwealth. The results were politicisation, alienation and fragmentation, a diffusion of political consciousness feared by King and Council. Events also showed that fervent Puritanism had a double-edged sword, it could support and foster godly magistracy yet it could also have radical and subversive implications in justifying resistance to authority -something more apparent to Laud in his anxiety than to aristocratic leaders in their confidence.

This ideological ferment operated as a shifting set of variables, depending upon context, the impact of previous history and fear, whether of the multitude, of Popery or of arbitrary government and the subversion of fundamental laws. The recent past was constantly being reinterpreted in order to understand the present. Thus obedience and conformity were essential in the years 1634 to 1637 because of the shadows cast by the 1620s. Discontent voiced tentatively and handled with moderation was re-drawn as a prelude to the more outspoken opposition and harsher measures for conformity which characterised the administration after 1637. Finally, the totality of collapse in 1640 redrew even this period of anger and despair as a necessary prelude to inevitable failure. In this process much of the subtlety, complexity and fluidity of political life was removed from the account. Much of what has been assumed since then about the nature of the ship money service depends on its reinterpretation as a cause of the English Civil War. To subsequent generations ship money was no longer part of political reality, rather, it symbolised two different versions of the evil which led to

civil war, proof of the wickedness of the King ensnared by Civil
Babylon, or proof of the wickedness of a generation lost in wilful
disobedience.

APPENDIX ONE: DATA FOR SHIP MONEY PAYMENTS.

The following tables reproduce the figures used for the statistical calculations which formed the bases of Figures 3 and 4 in the text. All payment figures are taken from Sir William Russell's accounts in the Domestic State Papers, unless indicated by *. Sometimes the week's payment was too small to warrant the time and trouble of producing a new certificate; in these circumstances Nicholas usually received a note from Sir William Russell's office with details of the new payments. For these weeks I have simply added the sum onto the previous total.

The period of eighteen months after the issue of the respective writs was chosen for a number of reasons. It enabled comparison of payment patterns over a long enough period of time to cover the sheriffs' collection during the year of their shrievalties and six months collecting arrears. The exception to this pattern is the 1635 writ which was managed by two sheriffs, and for the significance of this the reader is referred to Chapter 3. This length of time also made it possible to look at collection after the issue of the next writ. It also made it possible to compare rates of payment under the several writs: for example, the 1635 writ had an administrative life of four years from its issue in August 1635 until the autumn of 1640 when the Council was still prepared to pursue defaulters. In practice very little more money was actually paid off the accounts more than eighteen months after the writs had been issued. The writs were issued at different dates in each year, therefore it was decided to

represent the passage of time by numbers on the appropriate axis of the graphs, rather than by trying to indicate the date in historical time. The date on which each set of writs were issued is indicated below:

20th October 1634.
4th August 1635.
12th September 1636.
9th October 1637.
5th November 1638.
18th November 1639.

The Tables give details of payments up to the account of Sir William Russell's which is approximately eighteen months from the relevant date above, with the exception of the 1639 writ which was abandoned in December 1640. It is important to note another difference between the 1639 writ and previous writs: London collected its own ship money and hired ships to fulfil its obligations under the writs, but in the face of very considerable opposition to collection, the Council ordered the City to pay Sir William Russell. This means that the final payment includes £810 2s of London ship money: the counties paying ship money under the 1639 writs therefore paid £41,046 13s 1d under the 1639.

TABLE 1: PAYMENTS FOR THE 1634 WRIT

<u>REFERENCE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>PAYMENT OF SHIP MONEY</u>
PC2/44, p 359*	30th January 1635	£1,800
SP16/284/43	8th March 1635	£15,673
SP16/284/82	14th March 1635	£19,449 2s 10d
SP16/285/27	21st March 1635	£22,849 2s 10d
SP16/285/54	28th March 1635	£35,395 15s 4d
SP16/286/8	1st April 1635	£36,378 7s 11d
SP16/286/79	12th April 1635	£50,640 7s 9d
SP16/287/5	18th April 1635	£57,535 14s 11d
SP16/287/53	26th April 1635	£62,056 4s 11d
SP16/288/29	3rd May 1635	£66,413 16s 9d
SP16/290/90	13th June 1635	£69,134
SP16/291/26	20th June 1635	£77,383 1s 1d
SP16/293/42	5th July 1635	£77,831 1s 1d
SP16/302/45	21st July 1635	£79,298 9s 1d
PC2/45, p 297-8*	23rd December 1635	£79,385 7s 9d

TABLE 2: PAYMENTS FOR THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS OF THE 1635 WRIT.

REFERENCE	DATE	PAYMENT OF SHIP MONEY
SP16/300/3	18th October 1635	£21
SP16/302/45	21st November 1635	£13,081 10s
SP16/302/98	28th November 1635	£20,613 12s 7d
SP16/303/64	5th December 1635	£22,873 12s 7d
SP16/303/29*	12th December 1635	£24,773 13s 7d
SP16/304/74	19th December 1635	£34,333 13s 7d
SP16/305/39	27th December 1635	£41,333 0s 7d
SP16/311/11	2nd January 1636	£44,026 3s 7d
SP16/311/70	16th January 1636	£46,544 8s 7d
SP16/312/70	23rd January 1636	£55,870 6s 5d
SP16/312/75	30th January 1636	£72,465 13s 3d
SP16/313/41	6th February 1636	£95,447 0s 6d
SP16/313/104	13th February 1636	£115,992 17s 9d
SP16/314.100	27th February 1636	£130,146 0s 6d
SP16/315.48	4th March 1636	£134,467 2s 6d
SP16/315/126	11th March 1636	£140,004 19s 2d
SP16/316/20	18th March 1636	£143,399 6s 10d
SP16/317/127	26th March 1636	£146,224 6s 10d
SP16/318/4	1st April 1636	£152,634 12s 9d
SP16/319/27	23rd April 1636	£154,106 16s 8d
SP16/320/31	7th May 1636	£157,066 16s 8d
SP16/321/13	14th May 1636	£158,692 0s 9d
SP16/321/60	20th May 1636	£159,386 2s 6d
SP16/322/30	28th May 1636	£162,393 3s 4d
SP16/325/44	3rd June 1636	£167,933 4s 8d
SP16/326/3	10th June 1636	£168,233 5s 4d
SP16/326/51	17th June 1636	£169,109 19s 2d
SP16/328/5	2nd July 1636	£169,741 18s 4d
SP16/328/44	8th July 1636	£170,561 18s 4d
SP16/329/54	28th July 1636	£171,957 15s 7d
SP16/330/53	20th August 1636	£174,127 16s 6d
SP16/331/34	10th September 1636	£178,487 15s
SP16/332/13	24th September 1636	£178,777 16s 6d
SP16/333/30	7th October 1636	£181,970 6s 9d
SP16/334/43	28th October 1636	£182,930 1s 6d
SP16/335/44	11th November 1636	£183,447 3s 9d
SP16/336/48	25th November 1636	£186,373 8s 8d
SP16/337/48	16th December 1636	£187,349 18s 3d
SP16/343/46*	7th January 1637	£187,867 2s 3d
SP16/344/48	20th January 1637	£188,331 15s 9d
SP16/346/41	4th February 1637	£188,968 11s 2d
SP16/348/36	25th february 1637	£190,290 16s 9d

TABLE 2: PAYMENTS FOR THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS OF THE 1636 WRIT

REFERENCE	DATE	PAYMENT OF SHIP MONEY
SP16/346/99	11th February 1637	£22,564 13s 2d
SP16/347/43	18th February 1637	£30,804 13s 2d
SP16/349/31	4th March 1637	£43,054 13s 2d
SP16/349/90	11th March 1637	£43,213 13s 2d
SP16/350/27	18th March 1637	£51,952 13s 2d
SP16/350/79	24th March 1637	£66,327 13s 2d
SP16/351/55	31st March 1637	£68,572 13s 2d
SP16/354/7	15th April 1637	£71,911 13s 2d
SP16/354/64	22nd April 1637	£77,488 13s 2d
SP16/354/130*	29th April 1637	£82,568 13s 2d
SP16/356/36	13th May 1637	£105,133 13s 2d
SP16/357/95	26th May 1637	£125,956 2s 2d
SP16/361/13	3rd June 1637	£127,006 2s 2d
SP16/361/60*	10th June 1637	£127,916 2s 2d
SP16/362/36	23rd June 1637	£131,127 0s 7d
SP16/363/7	1st July 1637	£137,746 0s 7d
SP16/363/74	8th July 1637	£139,526 0s 7d
SP16/363/128	15th July 1637	£141,492 0s 7d
SP16/364/33	21st July 1637	£143,892 0s 7d
SP16/365/22	5th August 1637	£144,042 0s 7d
SP16/365/89*	16th August 1637	£144,744 0s 7d
SP16/366/30	25th August 1637	£148,207 9s 7½d
SP16/367/13*	2nd September 1637	£155,561 9s 6d
SP16/367/56	9th September 1637	£158,578 16s 4d
SP16/367/81	16th September 1637	£159,619 2s 4d
SP16/368/108*	23rd September 1637	£159,719 2s 4d
SP16/369/76	30th September 1637	£161,469 2s 4d
SP16/370/20	14th October 1637	£168,551 16s 8d
SP16/370/62	21st October 1637	£171,368 14s 11d
SP16/371/70	28th October 1637	£172,800 6s 2d
SP16/371/124	11th November 1637	£175,141 2s 5½d
SP16/372/47	18th November 1637	£177,842 0s 5½d
SP16/373/16	25th November 1637	£180,021 12s 1½d
SP16/374/8	2nd December 1637	£184,491 5s 9d
SP16/378/22	16th December 1637	£195,015 5s 9½d
SP16/379/120	6th January 1638	£185,904 12s ½d
SP16/381/79	27th January 1638	£186,828 6s 8d
SP16/382/34	10th February 1638	£187,028 6s 8d
SP16/383/8	17th February 1638	£187,149
SP16/386/48	24th March 1638	£187,488 16s
SP16/389/96	5th May 1638	£188,077 2s 3d

TABLE 3:PAYMENTS FOR THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS OF THE 1637 WRIT.

<u>REFERENCE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>PAYMENT OF SHIP MONEY</u>
SP16/381/80	10th February 1638	£8,814
SP16/382/35	17th February 1638	£21,988 0s 6d
SP16/383/9	24th February 1638	£29,218 11s
SP16/385/20	3rd March 1638	£35,758 11s
SP16/385/61	10th March 1638	£39,004 10s
SP16/385/93	17th March 1638	£42,163 15s
SP16/386/47	24th March 1638	£45,131 15s
SP16/386/76	31st March 1638	£50,531 15s
SP16/387/36	7th April 1638	£52,451 15s
SP16/387/71	14th April 1638	£60,851 15s
SP16/388/17	24th April 1638	£67,173 15s
SP16/388/58	29th April 1638	£71,722 15s
SP16/389/97	5th May 1638	£84,236 11s 9d
SP16/390/54	12th May 1638	£89,926 1s 9d
SP16/390/120	19th May 1638	£93,596 1s 9d
SP16/391/29	26th May 1638	£97,216 1s 9d
SP16/392/49	9th June 1638	£102,106 16s 1d
SP16/393/11	16th June 1638	£107,511 5s 11d
SP16/393/41	23rd June 1638	£108,471 5s 1d
SP16/393/81	30th June 1638	£109,391 5s 1d
SP16/395/26*	7th July 1638	£109,448 15s 1d
SP16/395/52	14th July 1638	£110,075 15s 1d
SP16/395/59*	21st July 1638	£110,120 15s 1d
SP16/395/93	28th July 1638	£111,643 15s 1d
SP16/397/10	4th August 1638	£116,340 15s 1d
SP16/397/41	11th August 1638	£119,038 15s 1d
SP16/397/63	18th August 1638	£120,478 15s 1d
SP16/397/78	25th August 1638	£123,010 12s 10d
SP16/398/1	1st September 1638	£125,165 9s 1d
SP16/398/27	8th September 1638	£125,816 19s 1d
SP16/398/73	15th September 1638	£129,304 19s 1d
SP16/398/123	22nd September 1638	£132,034 19s 1d
SP16/399/33	29th September 1638	£132,879 19s 1d
SP16/400/15	6th October 1638	£134,636 1s 8d
SP16/400/34	13th October 1638	£136,958 11s 8d
SP16/400/66	20th October 1638	£142,297 13s 4d
SP16/400/114	27th October 1638	£143,655 6s 4d
SP16/401/6	3rd November 1638	£146,246 12s 11d
SP16/401/56	10th November 1638	£150,411 13s 5d
SP16/402/9	17th November 1638	£152,737 13s 5d
SP16/402/47	24th November 1638	£159,003 18s 1d
SP16/404/7	1st December 1638	£159,686 18s 1d
SP16/404/78	15th December 1638	£163,255 0s 1d
SP16/409/30	5th January 1639	£164,044 18s 11d
SP16/410/41	26th January 1639	£165,831 5s
SP16/412/18	2nd February 1639	£167,636 0s 7d
SP16/412/82	9th February 1639	£168,179 15s 7d
SP16/413/8	16th February 1639	£169,194 2s 11d
SP16/413/59	22nd February 1639	£170,469 8s 1d
SP16/414/68*	9th March 1639	£170,947 11s 8d

SP16/415/116
SP16/418/47

16th March 1639
27th April 1639

£171,026 17s 6d
£171,862 17s 8d

TABLE 4: PAYMENTS FOR THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS OF THE 1638 WRIT.

REFERENCE	DATE	PAYMENT OF SHIP MONEY
SP16/413/10	16th February 1639	£460
SP16/413/61	22nd February 1639	£524
SP16/414/68	9th March 1639	£564
SP16/414/117	16th March 1639	£3,822 8s 8d
SP16/415/28	23rd March 1639	£6,872 8s 8d
SP16/417/50	6th April 1639	£10,922 8s 8d
SP16/417/89	13th April 1639	£11,922 8s 8d
SP16/418/27	20th April 1639	£12,902 8s 8d
SP16/418/79	27th April 1639	£15,469 6s 5d
SP16/420/53	4th May 1639	£18,069 6s 5d
SP16/420/149	11th May 1639	£20,111 4s 5d
SP16/421/80	18th May 1639	£22,064 16s 1d
SP16/422/11	25th May 1639	£26,337 16s 1d
SP16/423/9	1st June 1639	£27,339 7s 10d
SP16/423/59*	8th June 1639	£27,799 7s 10d
SP16/423/114	15th June 1639	£28,066 8s 8d
SP16/424/57	22nd June 1639	£28,281 9s 9d
SP16/424/92	29th June 1639	£30,192 9s 4d
SP16/425/28	6th July 1639	£32,044 16s
SP16/425/66	13th July 1639	£33,009 16s
SP16/426/14	20th July 1639	£33,409 16s
SP16/426/56	26th July 1639	£33,870 16s
SP16/427/11	3rd August 1639	£34,583 13s
SP16/427/36	10th August 1639	£35,873 13s
SP16/427/59	17th August 1639	£36,163 13s
SP16/427/83	24th August 1639	£36,532 13s
SP16/427/109	31st August 1639	£36,700 13s
SP16/428/40	7th September 1639	£38,210 19s 6d
SP16/428/73	14th September 1639	£39,543 9s 9d
SP16/429/5*	21st September 1639	£39,666 9s 9d
SP16/429/44	28th September 1639	£39,908 12s 9d
SP16/430/40	5th October 1639	£40,660 12s 9d
SP16/431/6	12th October 1639	£41,722 12s 9d
SP16/431/42*	19th October 1639	£42,162 12s 9d
SP16/431/63	26th October 1639	£43,220 1s 6d
SP16/432/7	2nd November 1639	£45,229 1s 6d
SP16/432/30*	9th November 1639	£45,659 1s 6d
SP16/432/66	16th November 1639	£46,818 6s 1d
SP16/433/4	23rd November 1639	£50,066 6s 1d
SP16/433/45	30th November 1639	£51,317 6s 1d
SP16/435/47	7th December 1639	£51,735 14s 11d
SP16/435/78	14th December 1639	£53,010 14s 11d
SP16/441/38	4th January 1640	£53,101 4s 11d
SP16/441/103*	11th January 1640	£53,460 4s 11d
SP16/442/120	25th January 1640	£53,460 13s 8d
SP16/444/11*	1st February 1640	£53,472 13s 8d
SP16/444/53	8th February 1640	£53,888 0s 4d
SP16/444/63	15th February 1640	£54,693 19s 2d
SP16/446/12	22nd February 1640	£55,003 13s 10d
SP16/446/56*	28th February 1640	£55,280 13s 10d
SP16/448/7	14th March 1640	£55,690 3s 5d

SP16/449/17*	28th March 1640	£55,837 3s 5d
SP16/450/70*	11th April 1640	£55,837 15s 5d
SP16/452/1001*	9th May 1640	£56,035 13s 5d
SP16/453/99	16th May 1640	£56,236 19s 8d

TABLE 5: PAYMENTS FOR THE 1639 WRIT.

REFERENCE	DATE	PAYMENT OF SHIP MONEY
SP16/446/14	22nd February 1640	£1,463 7s 7d
SP16/446/56	28th February 1640	£1,622 11s 7d
SP16/448/8	14th March 1640	£3,811 9s 2d
SP16/448/60	21st March 1640	£4,511 9s 2d
SP16/449/17	28th March 1640	£7,052 1s 7d
SP16/450/29	4th April 1640	£11,752 10s 7d
SP16/450/70	11th April 1640	£12,042 10s 7d
SP16/450/119	18th April 1640	£12,302 14s 7d
SP16/451/51	25th April 1640	£13,364 16s 7d
SP16/452/14	2nd May 1640	£13,689 16s 7d
SP16/452/100	9th May 1640	£15,032 10s 5d
SP16/453/100	16th May 1640	£16,440 6s 5d
SP16/455/92	30th May 1640	£18,810 6s 5d
SP16/456/37	6th June 1640	£23,489 7s 10d
SP16/457/11	13th June 1640	£25,639 11s 3d
SP16/457/85	20th June 1640	£26,766 11s 3d
SP16/458/37	26th June 1640	£28,208 0s 2d
SP16/459/24	3rd July 1640	£28,918 11s 9d
SP16/459/75	10th July 1640	£30,388 18s 9d
SP16/461/11	24th July 1640	£31,830 19s +
SP16/461/35	31st July 1640	£32,770 16s 6d
SP16/463/58	7th August 1640	£33,795 19s 6d
SP16/463/106	14th August 1640	£34,534 11s 5d
SP16/465/36	28th August 1640	£36,109 9s 9d
SP16/467/32	11th September 1640	£36,513 8s 10d
SP16/467/106	18th September 1640	£38,072 8s 10d
SP16/469/17	2nd October 1640	£39,390 6s 2d
SP16/469/70	9th October 1640	£39,780 6s 2d
SP16/470/50	23rd October 1640	£40,538 18s 10d
SP16/471/31	6th November 1640	£41,158 18s 7d
SP16/472/30	27th November 1640	£41,539 12s 7d#
SP16/473/103	31st December 1640	£41,856 15s 1d

+ The City of London paid in £500 at this date.

The City of London paid in another £210 2s at this date.

APPENDIX TWO: SHIP MONEY SHERIFFS IN THE ENGLISH COUNTIES

<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>SHERIFF</u>
BEDFORDSHIRE	1634	Humphrey Monnoux.
	1635	Richard Gery.
	1636	Henry Chester.
	1637	John Charnock and William Boteler.
	1638	William Plummer.
	1639	Richard Childe.
BERKSHIRE	1634	Humphrey Dolman.
	1635	William Barker.
	1636	Sir Richard Harrison.
	1637	Sir George Stonehouse.
	1638	Humphrey Hyde.
	1639	George Purefoy.
BUCKINGHAMSHIRE	1634	Sir Peter Temple.
	1635	Heneage Proby.
	1636	Sir Anthony Chester .
	1637	Sir Alexander Denton.
	1638	Sir John Parsons.
	1639	Thomas Archdale
CAMBRIDGESHIRE AND HUNTINGDONSHIRE	1634	*Robert Balam.
CAMBRIDGESHIRE	1635	Sir Ludovic Dyer.
CAMBRIDGESHIRE	1636	Sir John Carleton.
	1637	Thomas Chycheley.
	1638	Thomas Wendy.
	1639	John Crane.
CHESHIRE	1634	*Sir Thomas Aston.
	1635	All collected by Sir Thomas Aston.
	1636	Sir Thomas Delves.
	1637	Sir Thomas Cholmondely.
	1638	Philip Mainwaring.
	1639	Sir Thomas Powell.
CORNWALL	1634	*Hugh Boscawen.
	1635	John St. Aubin.
	1636	Sir Richard Buller.
	1637	Francis Godolphin of Godolphin.
	1638	Francis Godolphin of Treveneage.
	1639	Richard Treville.
CUMBERLAND	1634	*Richard Barwiss.
	1635	William Lawson.
	1636	Sir Patrick Curwen.
	1637	Sir Thomas Dacre.
	1638	Sir Timothy Fetherstonehaugh.
	1639	William Pennington.
DERBYSHIRE	1634	John Gell.
	1635	John Milward.
	1636	Sir John Harpur.
	1637	Sir John Curzon.
	1638	John Shalcross.
	1639	John Agarde.

DEVONSHIRE	1634	*Sir Thomas Drew.
	1635	Sir Thomas Heale.
	1636	Dennis Rolle.
	1637	Sir Thomas Wise.
	1638	Sir John Pole.
	1639	Sir Nicholas Martin.
DORSET	1634	*Sir Thomas Trenchard.
	1635	John Freake.
	1636	Richard Rogers.
	1637	Sir John Croke.
	1638	Richard Bingham.
	1639	William Churchill.
DURHAM	1634-	*Sir William Belasys served as
	1639	sheriff throughout.
ESSEX	1634	*Sir Cranmer Harriss.
	1635	Sir Humphrey Mildmay.
	1636	John Lucas.
	1637	Sir William Luckyn.
	1638	Sir William Wiseman.
	1639	Martin Lumley.
GLOUCESTERSHIRE	1634	*Edward Stephens.
	1635	William Leigh.
	1636	Sir Richard Ducey.
	1637	Sir Robert Pointz.
	1638	John Codrington.
	1639	Sir Humphrey Tracey
HAMPSHIRE	1634	*Sir White Beconsawe.
	1635	Richard Whitehead.
	1636	John Button.
	1637	Sir John Oglander.
	1638	James Hunt.
	1639	Richard Major.
HEREFORDSHIRE	1634	William Scudamore.
	1635	Thomas Wigmore.
	1636	Roger Vaughan.
	1637	Henry Lingen.
	1638	Sir Robert Whitney.
	1639	Thomas Alderne.
HERTFORDSHIRE	1634	William Priestley.
	1635	William Leman.
	1636	Ralph Freeman.
	1637	Thomas Coningsby.
	1638	Thomas Hewitt.
	1639	John Gore.
HUNTINGDONSHIRE	1636	Sir Thomas Cotton.
	1637	Sir John Hewitt.
	1638	Sir Thomas Lake.
	1639	Sir William Armyn.
KENT	1634	*Edward Chute.
	1635	Sir William Culpeper.
	1636	Sir George Sandys.
	1637	Thomas Henley.
	1638	Sir Edward Masters.
	1639	Daniel Polhill.

LANCASHIRE	1634	*Humphrey Chetham.
	1635	All collected by Humphrey Chetham.
	1636	Richard Shuttleworth.
	1637	Roger Kirkby.
	1638	Sir Edward Stanley.
	1639	Robert Holt.
LEICESTERSHIRE	1634	Francis Saunders.
	1635	John Pulteney.
	1636	Sir Henry Skipwith.
	1637	Sir Richard Roberts.
	1638	John Whatton.
	1639	William Halford.
LINCOLNSHIRE	1634	*Sir Walter Norton.
	1635	Sir William Pelham.
	1636	Sir Edward Hussey.
	1637	Sir Anthony Irby.
	1638	Thomas Grantham.
	1639	John Brownlow.
MONMOUTHSHIRE	1634	*George Milburn.
	1635	Henry Probert.
	1636	Thomas Morgan.
	1637	William Herbert.
	1638	Nicholas Moor.
	1639	John Milburn.
LONDON AND MIDDLESEX	1634	*John Highlord and John Cordell.
	1635	Thomas Soame and John Gaynor.
	1636	William Abel and Jacob Garrard.
	1637	Thomas Atkin and Edward Ridge.
	1638	Isaac Pennington and John Wollaston.
	1639	Thomas Adams and John Warner
NORFOLK	1634	*Sir John Wentworth.
	1635	Sir Edward Barkham.
	1636	William Paston.
	1637	Sir Francis Astley(d) and John Buxton.
	1638	Augustine Holl.
	1639	Thomas Wyndham.
NORTHAMPTONSHIRE	1634	Sir John Dryden.
	1635	Charles Cockayne.
	1636	Sir Robert Banister.
	1637	Sir John Hanbury.
	1638	Philip Holman.
	1639	Sir Christopher Yelverton.
NORTHUMBERLAND	1634	*Sir John Delaval.
	1635	Sir William Carnsby.
	1636	Sir William Widdrington.
	1637	Thomas Foster and Thomas Middleton.
	1638	William Orde.
	1639	Sir William Belasys
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE	1634	Sir John Byron.
	1635	Hardolph Wasteneys.
	1636	Sir Francis Thornehaugh.
	1637	Lord Chaworth(d) and Viscount Chaworth.

	1638	Thomas Williamson.
	1639	Edward Neville
OXFORDSHIRE	1634	Sir Peter Wentworth.
	1635	Sir Francis Norris.
	1636	William Walter.
	1637	Sir Thomas Pennystone.
	1638	John Doyley.
	1639	Rudolph Warcopp.
RUTLAND	1634	Sir Francis Bodenham.
	1635	Sir Henry Mynne.
	1636	Sir Edward Harrington.
	1637	Lionel Falconer and Edward Andrewes.
	1638	John Barker.
	1639	Thomas Lovett.
SHROPSHIRE	1634	John Newton.
	1635	Robert Corbett.
	1636	Sir Paul Harriss.
	1637	William Pierrepoint.
	1638	Sir Richard Lee.
	1639	Humphrey Kinnaston.
SOMERSET	1634	*Henry Hodges.
	1635	John Malett.
	1636	William Bassett.
	1637	Sir William Portman.
	1638	Thomas Avery.
	1639	Sir Thomas Wrothe.
STAFFORDSHIRE	1634	Humphrey Worley.
	1635	Richard Pyott.
	1636	Sir Edward Littleton.
	1637	Sir John Skerrington.
	1638	John Skrimshaw.
	1639	John Bellott.
SUFFOLK	1634	*Sir John Barker.
	1635	John Rowse.
	1636	Sir Philip Parker.
	1637	Sir Anthony Wingfield.
	1638	John Clench.
	1639	Sir Symonds D'Ewes.
SURREY AND SUSSEX	1634	*Sir William Culpeper.
	1635	Sir William Morley.
SURREY	1636	Sir Anthony Vincent.
	1637	Nicholas Scoughton.
	1638	Sir John Gresham.
	1639	Sir John Howland.
SUSSEX	1636	Sir Edward Bishop.
	1637	Anthony Fowle.
	1638	Anthony Foster.
	1639	Edward Apsley.
WARWICKSHIRE	1634	Richard Murden. (d)
	1635	Sir Greville Verney.
	1636	Sir Thomas Leigh.
	1637	Sir Edward Underhill.
	1638	John Lisle.
	1639	George Warner

WESTMORELAND	1634-	Francis Clifford Earl of Cumberland
	1639	served as sheriff throughout.
WILTSHIRE	1634	Francis Goddard.
	1635	Sir George Ayliffe.
	1636	Sir Neville Poole.
	1637	Sir Edward Baynton.
	1638	John Grubbe.
	1639	John Potterne.
WORCESTERSHIRE	1634	John Savage.
	1635	Sir William Russell.
	1636	Sir John Rous.
	1637	Edward Dingley.
	1638	Thomas Greaves.
	1639	John Winford.
YORKSHIRE	1634	*Sir John Hotham.
	1635	Sir William Pennyman.
	1636	Sir John Ramsden.
	1637	Sir Thomas Danby.
	1638	Sir William Robinson.
	1639	Sir Marmaduke Langdale.

* Denotes a sheriff who administered the 1634 writ.
The 1635 writ was administered by the sheriffs for 1634, who remained in office until Christmas 1635, and the sheriffs for 1635, who went out of office at Michaelmas 1636.

SHIP MONEY SHERIFFS ADMINISTERING THE JOINT WRITS IN WALES

COUNTY	YEAR	SHERIFF
ANGLESEY	1634	*Edward Wynne.
	1635	All collected by Edward Wynne.
	1636	William Bulkeley.
	1637	Pierce Lloyd.
	1638	Richard Bulkeley.
	1639	Owen Wood.
BRECON	1634	John Lewis.
	1635	John Herbert.
	1636	Charles Vaughan and Sir William Lewes.
	1637	David Gwynne.
	1638	Meredith Lewis.
	1639	Henry Williams.
CARDIGAN	1634	*Hector Philips.
	1635	All collected by Hector Philips
	1636	Thomas Price.
	1637	John Steadman.
	1638	John Lloyd.
	1639	Richard Price.
CARMATHEN	1634	*Thomas Vaughan.
	1635	All collected by Thomas Vaughan.
	1636	Sir Reece Rudd.
	1637	Roland Gwynne.
	1638	Henry Jones.
	1639	John Harriss Davies.
CARNARVON	1634	*John Wynne.
	1635	All collected by John Wynne.
	1636	William Lewis.
	1637	William Thomas.
	1638	Sir William Williams.
	1639	William Hookes.
DENBIGH	1634	Hugh Lloyd.
	1635	All collected by Hugh Lloyd.
	1636	William Wynne.
	1637	Edward Morriss.
	1638	Sir Thomas Powell.
	1639	Richard Langford.
FLINT	1634	*Peter Griffith.
	1635	All collected by Peter Griffith.
	1636	Thomas Mostyn.
	1637	Thomas Whitley.
	1638	John Eyton.
	1639	Ralph Hughes.
GLAMORGAN	1634	*Watkin Lougher.
	1635	All collected by Watkin Lougher
	1636	William Wynne.
	1637	Hugh Nanney.
	1638	Griffith Lloyd.
	1639	James Phillips.
MONTGOMERY	1634	Thomas Ireland.
	1635	Meredith Morgan.

	1636	Arthur Price.
	1637	John Newton (also sheriff of Shropshire 1634).
	1638	Richard Price.
	1639	Edward Morris.
PEMBROKE	1634	*John Scurfield. (d)
	1635	John Wogan.
	1636	Sir John Stepney.
	1637	John Phillips.
	1638	Thomas Warren.
	1639	George Carew.
RADNOR	1634	Morgan Vaughan.
	1635	Morgan Lewis.
	1636	Evan Davies.
	1637	John Price and Brian Crowther.
	1638	Robert Williams.
	1639	John Powell.

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	2,541	Nicholas Papers.
	2,715	Gawdy Papers.
	2,883	Hampden Case Notes Taken Down by Judge Charleston of Ludford.
	2,986	
Hargrave Manuscripts	321	Book of Legal Prededents, Notes on Council Meetings, etc.
Harleian Manuscripts	379	Letter Book of Sir Symonds D' Ewes.
	383	Papers of Sir Symonds D' Ewes.
	2093	Cheshire Ship Money Papers.
	2173	Cheshire Ship Money Papers
	3796	Exchequer Papers.

BEDFORDSHIRE RECORD OFFICE

Chester Muniments,	CH	Papers of Henry Chester.
Trevor-Wing Manuscripts	TW	Papers of Sir William Boteler.
St John Manuscripts	J	Northamptonshire Ship Money Papers.
Lucas Manuscripts	L/28/54	Judge Croke's Argument.

BIRMINGHAM CITY RECORD OFFICE

Coventry Manuscripts Papers of the Lord Keeper Coventry.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Buxton Manuscripts	Box 96	Papers of John Buxton, Sheriff of Norfolk.
Additional Manuscripts	Ee/32	Historical Tracts.
	Gg/129	Miscellaneous Papers.
	22	Patrick Papers.
	I1/V/19	Hampden Case Papers.
	I1/V/27	Hampden Case Papers.
	I1/V/30	Hampden Case Papers.

CAMBRIDGESHIRE RECORD OFFICE

P 109/10/2 Littleport Church Wardens' Accounts.
Cottenham Constables' Accounts.

CHE'HAM'S LIBRARY MANCHESTER

Chetham Manuscripts.

COVENTRY CITY RECORDS OFFICE

A35	Coventry Ship Money Book.
A16	City of Coventry Book of Payments 1561- 1653.
A7b	City Chamberlain's Accounts.

DERBYSHIRE RECORD OFFICE.

D258 Chandos-Pole-Gell Manuscripts,
Boxes 28, 30, 31, 41, 56, 58, 59.

GLOUCESTERSHIRE RECORD OFFICE

D304a Ducie Family Papers.

HAMPSHIRE RECORD OFFICE

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Papers of Sir Thomas Jervoise.

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E L Ellesmere Manuscripts.
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STT Stowe-Temple Manuscripts.

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Hertfordshire County Records 82917.
D/P 26 A Book of Old Rates for Bushey Parish.
XII/A/20, 21 Gorhambury Papers: Papers of Lord
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English Manuscripts 1091 Letter Book of Sir Thomas
Cholmondely.

LEICESTERSHIRE RECORD OFFICE

Barker manuscripts DE/730. Papers of Sir Francis
Bodenham.

LINCOLNSHIRE ARCHIVES OFFICE

Whitcote Deposit Asw. 9/1/20 Notebook of Ship Money
Payments in 1639.
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NORFOLK RECORD OFFICE

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c1623-c1666.
Miscellaneous Collections MC/48/60 624X8
Ship Money Rate for Kingland.
Norwich Assembly Proceedings Book Norwich A B 1613-1642
Church Wardens' Account PD/78/47.
for the parish of Winfarthing.

NORTHAMPTONSHIRE RECORD OFFICE

D(CA) Dryden of Canons Ashby Collection.
C Cockayne Collection.
IL Isham of Lamport Collection.
IC Isham Correspondence.
FH Finch Hatton Collection.
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