

**The Relationship between the Exercise of Political
Power and Language during the Cultural
Revolution in Inner Mongolia – 1967-1969**

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Abstract

This is an analysis of the relationship between language contained in political documents and the exercise of power and authority from the Cultural Revolution in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China from 1967 to 1969. It is based on analytic methods found in the works of Foucault, Bourdieu, Gramsci and others. The material analysed falls into four periods. The first phase in 1967 saw the initial impact of the CR manifesting itself locally by causing conflict between two key entities in the IMAR – the army and student rebellion groups. The response by the Centre to this was the conduct of dialogues with the local groups, resulting in the issuing of a key document, the '13th April Decision,' to 'resolve' the local problems and impose hegemony from the Centre, through promoting standardised narratives and a specific ideology – CR Maoism. The second phase from 1967 to 1968 saw the implementation of this strategy through the attack on the local leader, Ulanfu. During this period the discourse to 'handle' the region was articulated promoting a narrative and ideology from the Centre in Beijing of power based on class, excluding any assertions of the primacy of ethnicity and nationality locally. The third phase from 1968 to 1969 saw the promotion by the Centre of the newly installed leader, Teng Haiqing, using this new discourse. In this period, a local enemy – the Inner Mongolian People's Party – was gradually articulated. The final phase in 1969 saw the social turmoil and violence caused by the purge of those claimed to be members of this party, and the withdrawal of support from the Centre for Teng Haiqing, resulting in his use of a self-critical language, the creation of an adapted narrative and ideology, conveyed through a new discourse in which the key issues of class and ethnicity/nationality were approached in different ways.

The focus of this thesis is the signification of power in language and discourse through this period, and the techniques by which to describe and understand this.

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Abbreviations Used in the Text

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CR	Cultural Revolution
CRC	Cultural Revolution Committee
CRG	Cultural Revolution Group
IMAR	Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region
IMPP	Inner Mongolian People's Party
IM Daily	Inner Mongolian Daily Paper
IM	Inner Mongolian
IM MR	Inner Mongolian Military Region
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China

Note on the Text


In this text I have used the standard Pinyin system, as set out in the 'Basic Rules for Hanyu Pinyin Orthography' issued by the Commission for Pinyin Orthography, State Language Commission PRC in 1988. For place names I have used the Mandarin Chinese version of Mongolian names, apart from Hohhot (Huhehaote in Chinese), due to its wide use in literature in English related to Inner Mongolia. Where possible I have indicated the Mongolian version of place names in footnotes. Inner Mongolia has a unique structure and was divided into seven Leagues (*meng* – equivalent of the administrative unit of a prefecture elsewhere in the PRC) and 49 Banners (*qi* – equivalent of a county). Due to the primary source material being in

Mandarin Chinese, proper names are either the Chinese names, or pinyin versions of transliterations from Mongolian into Chinese.

Because of the disparate primary source material used in this thesis, I have adopted specific referencing systems. Documents are referred to according to the numbers given in the bibliography of Chinese primary source material. I have also used more specific referencing systems in Chapter Two and Chapter Three which are explained after the first references in each of these chapters.

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
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Chapter One

A Framework within which to Understand the Relationship between the Exercise of Political Power and Language during the Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia – 1967 to 1969

This thesis addresses the question of the relationship between language and power by looking at selected documents from the campaign waged in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region as part of the Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic of China from 1967 to 1969 against what was claimed to be the New Inner Mongolian People's Party. Understanding of the promotion of power interests is achieved through analysis of the discourses used by participants in the Cultural Revolution at the time. Because discourse is socially rooted, details of the organisational and social context in which public language was produced during this period are presented. In the document types here – documents intimately related to the promotion of forms of political power – language is viewed as containing elements traded in a market in which certain expressions and keywords have capital, and others do not. Part of this process is constant negotiation and bargaining for this symbolic value. Another part is the role played by narratives and ideologies (with those sanctioned and those delegitimised) and the attempt to recruit these by groups and individuals. The overall objective is to reach a richer understanding of the pursuit and fulfilment of claims to power and the means to attain these through use of language.

1.1 The CR Nationally and the Situation in IMAR

The Cultural Revolution (CR) in the People's Republic of China (PRC) (usually seen as having started in 1966) was a complex movement. It varied from region to region. The general impetus for the movement came from a power struggle between national leaders and their supporters,¹ but how this was translated to the dynamics and priorities of China's various provincial centres varied greatly.² The one feature uniting these regional versions of the CR with that of the Centre (in Beijing, the seat of Party and state institutions) was the pursuit between competing blocks and groups for power and influence. Part of the CR's complexity derived from the erosion and destruction of the Chinese state. Established forms of authority were subverted, challenged and swept away, while new ones were created and promoted. This battle between the old and new order caused chaos. This is a characteristic of the CR as a whole.

The CR in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR) offers a dramatic example of this disjuncture between the movement's central course and its regional variations. While the Centre issued orders, guidance and regulations which shaped the course of the CR in the provinces there was great variation in the ways in which local power holders and faction leaders pursued their specific political aims, shaping them according to local priorities and preoccupations.³ The CR in IMAR, because of the region's particular geographical location and ethnic composition, was to take a unique course (see following section). The CR's exacerbating of unresolved tensions between ethno-political groups culminated in a bloody conflict which resulted in the

¹ The best general English language history of the CR remains Barnouin and Yu 1993. See for background to the origins of the CR MacFarquhar 1974, 1983, 1998. The most comprehensive (albeit controversial) Chinese language history of the CR is Yan and Gao 1986.

² A good account of the CR in Shanghai can be found in Perry and Li 1997.

³ This is not to claim that there was something monolithic or preordained about the Centre. In this thesis, the Centre is merely shorthand for a selected collection of recognised institutions, leaders and administrative structures and procedures and the public acceptance of specific political programmes these were seen as implementing and embodying. But obviously the concept of the Centre is changeable. Wherever 'Centre' appears beginning with a capital 'C,' this should be taken to the very specific meaning of Centre in the context of the main leadership base of the PRC at this period – Beijing, and the figures and organisations located there.

loss of (according to official figures) over 16,000 lives.⁴ The CR in IMAR, therefore, involved many of the issues of the impact of central practice and ideology on a region. It shows clearly how this power operated.

In this thesis, I plot this through its manifestations in language seen as discourse. The documents I look at show the main power-brokers in this conflict 'exercising' power, gaining power, and losing power. The key objective for this study is to show how, in written documents, one can track evidence of the exercise and promotion of types of power, and the dynamics between them through the evidence of language.

1.2 A History of the CR in IMAR

There were three key features of the CR in IMAR, serving to distinguish it from events in other provincial centres. These were: a combination of high levels of violence and social disruption, exceptional even in a time of violence like the CR; ethnic conflict, albeit expressed in a highly idiosyncratic manner (this is a key issue in this thesis); and the identification, as the CR proceeded, of a specific 'hidden enemy' unique to IMAR – the New Inner Mongolian People's Party (IMPP - *Nei Ren Dang* - labelled later in the CR campaign).⁵

While the Inner Mongolian area saw the earliest 'autonomous government' to operate within territory gained by the Chinese Communists in 1947 (two years before the founding of the PRC and of the IMAR) its previous history had been complicated by its relationship with the Mongolian People's Republic, created under Soviet patronage 26 years earlier.⁶ In the 1920s, the Inner Mongolian area was a site

⁴ Full figures and source given in next section.

⁵ It is important to make clear that there were in fact two 'IMPPs.' The 'old' IMPP was the one that existed in the 1920s. The 'new' party was claimed to have continued to exist underground after the establishment of IMAR in 1949. It was this latter entity which the campaign in the CR focussed on. In this thesis, IMPP refers to the 'new' party. If I am referring to the 'old' one, I will make this clear.

⁶ When referring to the entity that existed prior to 1947, I use the full form 'Inner Mongolia.' I use the acronym 'IMAR' (for 'Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region') for the entity that came into existence in 1947. The history of Inner Mongolia in the early 20th Century and the impact of the establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic can be found in Mei-hua Lan, 'China's New Administration in Mongolia' in Kotkin and Elleman 1999.

of conflict between various parties: the Soviets, Japanese, and the Chinese (split into the Nationalist and the Communists). The Mongolian population formed various parties and movements under the influence of these other larger groups. The most prominent was the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia (the 'old' IMPP), which held congresses from 1924 to 1926 and was closely affiliated to the Mongolian People's Party of the Mongolian People's Republic, and eventually to the Chinese Communists. This party's activities effectively ended in 1930, but it was to re-form briefly in 1945, to give expression to Inner Mongolian desires for autonomy, or a pan-Mongolian state.⁷ These ambitions were changed in 1947, when the political programmes of this party were superseded by the CCP. But the question in IMAR of political allegiance being based on ethnic identity, (which the existence of these parties raised) did not go away. They lay at the heart of the causes of the purges of cadres and people of Mongolian ethnicity in IMAR from 1967.⁸

Whether or not these organizations ever actually existed in the form claimed, their history was to return powerfully in 1967, both for individuals and groups. Political allegiance was a key issue during the CR. It was framed nationally in terms of loyalty to rightist or leftist parties, to the 'bad' Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping (the two main national 'enemies' of the CR) along with the Nationalists and Japanese invaders, as opposed to the 'good' Mao Zedong and the Communists. In IMAR, there was another kind of 'bad' allegiance, to a group whose political programme was labelled as splittist and treacherous. The membership of this group was based on ethnic identity.

Ethnicity was a central factor in this conflict, but ethnicity mediated through the PRC's very specific discourse of national minorities. This is a key issue in understanding the discourse of power analysed in this thesis. During the CR the dominant ideology proclaimed equality to all China's national minorities. In IMAR, there was an ethnic mix (approx 10% of the local population were ethnically Mongolian; the vast majority of the remainder were Han Chinese).⁹ Accusations of

⁷ This was the 'East Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.' See Tumen and Wang 1995, and Ulanfu's autobiography for the history of this.

⁸ This history is dealt with exhaustively by Atwood 2002.

⁹ Full statistics from 1570 to 1990 can be found in Hurelbaatar, 'A Survey of

loyalty to a political party like the IMPP with pan-Mongolian ambitions played on ethnic divisions that already existed. It is a fact that the majority of those accused of supporting IMPP were Mongolian.¹⁰ The resurrected history of the IMPP served as a means, be it deliberate or subliminal, to attack Mongolians and to accuse them of disloyalty, but to do this without explicitly mentioning ethnicity. This remains the most sensitive aspect of the CR in IMAR. Much of this thesis examines the complex code by which this was achieved.

The CR in IMAR formally started with an attack on the local IMAR Party secretary, Ulanfu (a Mongolian) from May to June in 1966 at the Qianmen Hotel meeting in Beijing. He was dismissed from his post the following month. In 1967, an IMAR CR Standing Committee was set up as a result of discussions in Beijing between CCP leaders and key local groups. The deputy commander of the Beijing Military District, Teng Haiqing, was brought in to head this and the IMAR Military Region. In effect Teng became the leading power-holder in IMAR during the early to middle CR period. Following speeches by, among others, Jiang Qing, one of the key persons on the Central CR Committee in Beijing in late 1967, on the need to 'dig and uproot class enemies' Teng Haiqing was eventually converted to the idea that the IMPP had continued its activity after 1949. This led to violent purges during the 'Party rectification' campaign from 1967 into early 1969. According to official figures, 16,222 people died as a result of the campaign, and 342,000 suffered injury.¹¹

Mongols in Present Day China: Perspectives in Demography and Cultural Change,' Kotkin and Elleman 1999, 194-7.

¹⁰ 'Mongols were the victims, and it was largely Han Chinese who organised their suffering' (Sneath 1994, 429).

¹¹ See Tumen and Zhu 1995, 1. Such 'official' figures are disputable. Jankowiak 1988 referred to local government internal estimates in 1976 putting the figure of those who died as a result of the purge closer to 50,000, and argued that this could be as high as 100,000. He also argued, based on field research he conducted in Hohhot in the mid-1980s, that the vast majority of these were Mongolian (Ibid, 276). Similar figures are given by Tsengelt Gonchigsuren in www.taklamakan.org/uighur-1/archive/4_03_1.html, 26th November 1998, in this case based on population growth rate statistics, and the fact that the Mongolian population in IMAR from 1965 to 1981 showed a shortfall of over 280,000 people.

The chaotic situation in the region caused the issuing of a Notice on the 22nd May to 'Rectify Mistakes and Thoroughly Implement Measures Concerning Inner Mongolia' after the Ninth Party Congress of the CCP in Beijing in April 1969.' Teng Haiqing was removed from his post. The most violent period of the CR in IMAR was over, something confirmed by the symbolic reduction of IMAR's area by shaving off huge tracts of land to three bordering provinces (a measure reversed in 1979). The remainder of IMAR was placed under the control of the 65th PLA Corps from Beijing.¹²

1.3 The CR in IMAR and its Relationship to the CR at the Centre.

As in other provinces and autonomous regions, the CR in IMAR was crucially influenced by directives and commands from the Centre. This influence either took the form of directives from the Centre which were specifically aimed at IMAR (e.g., the 'Decision of the Centre on How to Handle the Problem of IMAR' issued on 13th April 1967) or more general prescriptive documents aimed at the country as a whole which needing implementing in IMAR. The issuing of the '16th May Circular' by the Centre setting up the CR Group in 1966, for instance, had an immediate impact on IMAR, directly causing the Qianmen Hotel meeting held from May to June 1966 (already referred to). During this meeting Ulanfu and other local leaders were accused and then labelled using condemned ('rightist,' 'capitalist') categories from the discourse of the Centre. The most destructive period of the CR in IMAR was terminated by central leaders after the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969. The temporal parameters of the CR in IMAR, and the instigation for its most critical

¹² More details on the CR in IMAR can be found in Woody 1993, and a Chinese version using some of the same material in Song 2002. Tumen and Zhu 1995 is a comprehensive Chinese language version, albeit issued within the framework of Mainland China political orthodoxy on the CR and its interpretation and meaning. It ascribes the excesses of the CR in IMAR wholly to the influence of Kang Sheng. Its authors interviewed key participants, and also have full access to the Chinese archives. A contemporary account of the CR in IMAR can be found in Hyer and Heaton 1968, though here Ulanfu is credited with an active role in the region until well into 1967, and much greater credence is given to the actual existence of an underground 'nationalist' pan-Mongolian party. Both these claims have grown less tenable as more evidence about this period has appeared. See also Sneath 1994.

moments, therefore, were all directly related to events at the Centre.¹³ The CR in IMAR is impossible to understand outside the national context.

A manifestation of this is the fact that the CR both in IMAR and nationally was a movement with a literary aspect characterised by use of a particular language (see next section). The CR started with a dispute over literary texts – interpretations of Beijing Deputy Mayor Wu Han's play about a Ming official, Hai Rui, and its possible reference to Mao Zedong's dismissal of his Defence Minister Peng Dehuai in 1959. Language was central to the CR movement, both in directing and inciting participants, and in the creation of a specific discourse, a part of which is described in this thesis. To map this literary aspect, it is important to set out clear categories for the kinds of documents produced in the CR – notices, news-sheets, reports, along with a description of the organisational and institutional apparatus required to produce these. Only some organisations were authorised and resourced to produce reports.¹⁴ Plotting the similarities and differences between documents produced and the language they contained locally with material from the Centre shows much about the specifics of power and the use of language to promote this in the IMAR and the dynamics of the movement there.

1.4 The Language of the Centre in the CR

The special characteristics of language used during the CR has been noted: its violence, dogmatism, hyperbole, the use of specific metaphors and the reliance on an ideology of conflict between those labelled good and bad.¹⁵ Franz Schurmann wrote in his early study, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*:

¹³ Mao had set down the canonical statement on the relationship between the provinces and the Centre in his 1956 essay, 'On the Ten Major Relationships': 'To build a powerful socialist country it is imperative to have strong and unified planning and discipline throughout the country; disruption of this indispensable unity is impermissible' (Mao 1977, vol 5 294).

¹⁴ During the most chaotic periods of the CR the issue of authority was challenged to such an extent that it became largely a matter of which group had resources to produce materials containing ideology it supported.

¹⁵ Simon Leys noted this in 1973 when he wrote that 'one may say that in China people have at their disposal two levels of language, one human and natural, which allows them to speak in their own voice... and another one, mechanical and shrill, to talk about politics' (Leys 1978, 168).

'The Chinese Communists have developed a rich vocabulary which has in many ways changed the Chinese language. Ideas and terms have come into popular usage which never existed before... One of the major contributions of the practical ideology of the Chinese Communists has been the generation of these many new and useful categories and language. It has also given the Chinese a new manner of thinking.'¹⁶

Schurmann's study just predated the beginning of the CR. It indicates awareness of a specific use of language and its relation to a new ideology imported and adapted by the Communists.¹⁷ As part of the *Studies in Communist Chinese Terminology* issued from the late 1950s from the University of Berkeley, H C Chuang wrote *The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: A Terminological Study* and *The Little Red Book and Current Chinese Language*.¹⁸ These were the earliest systematic attempts to describe the impact of the CR movement on the contemporary language of the PRC. Chuang isolated some of the most striking features of language used in publications at the Centre like the *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* magazine. Use of colour categorization (black for bad versus red for good), for instance, and popular derogatory terms based on animals and superstitions. He also identified the manipulation of historical terms, and the metaphors and set phrases densely used in this new material.

A decade later, when the CR was already completed, Lowell Dittmer and Chen Ruoxi produced a systematic, broader treatment of language used during the CR. They looked at its distinctive rhetorical patterns, and at its use of colloquialisms and demotic language forms. They also identified the influence of key organizations and figures (such as Mao and Lin Biao) and the duplication of their styles in other documents.¹⁹

¹⁶ Schurmann 1966, 61-2.

¹⁷ Mao was very conscious of the need for a new kind of writing, especially in the 1942 essay, 'Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing.' Here he quoted Dimitrov: 'The masses cannot assimilate our decisions unless we learn to speak the language which the masses understand' (Mao 1965, vol 3 65).

¹⁸ Chuang 1967 and 1968.

¹⁹ Dittmer and Chen 1981.

In the last decade, several studies have used more sophisticated analytic techniques to examine CR documents. Shaorong Huang's *To Rebel is Justified: A Rhetorical Study of China's Cultural Revolution Movement, 1966-1969* used W R Brown's theory of social intervention to argue that the CR was a rhetorical, rather than a political movement, and that its rhetoric was dominated by the ideology of rebellion. Huang looked at the main articles of the movement which appeared in the *People's Daily* and speeches by leaders such as Lin Biao and Jiang Qing to plot this rhetoric of rebellion, and the fund of symbols on which it was constructed. He analysed the rhetoric of polemics, the rhetoric of exposure and the element of ritual both in the contexts and contents of written material from the CR period.²⁰

Mobo C F Gao, in his article, 'Maoist Discourse and a Critique of the Present Assessments of the Cultural Revolution,'²¹ dealt with the relationship between Mao-speak, as it was manifested in the CR, and post-CR accounts, in both Chinese and English, which, in a sense, struggle against this primary language. Gao argued that there is such a thing as Maoist discourse, and described some of its fundamental features (the division, for instance, between 'public' (*gong*) and 'private' (*si*)) which ran throughout the CR. As Gao stated: 'Maoist discourse was composed not only of values and policies, but also an organizational apparatus and disciplinary technology.'²²

The *Indiana East Asian Working Paper Series on Language and Politics in Modern China* contained articles on the language of Red Guards, government cadres, and the role of impoliteness in struggle discourse in the CR.²³ The most pertinent of these papers to my current study, although it did not relate specifically to the CR period, was Christopher Atwood's 'National Questions and National Answers in the Chinese Revolution: Or How Do You Say *Minzu* in Mongolian.' This dealt with the

²⁰ Huang 1996.

²¹ *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 1996, vol 26, no 3, 13-33.

²² *Ibid* 14.

²³ Available at www.easc.indiana.edu/Pages/Easc/working_papers/. The works include: Michael Schoenhals, "Talk About a Revolution: Red Guards, Government Cadres and the Language of Political Discourse," Elizabeth J Perry and Li Xun, "Revolutionary Rudeness: Notes on Red Guard and Rebel Worker Language in China's Cultural Revolution"; Michael Schoenhals, "Non-People in the People's Republic of China: A Chronicle of Terminological Ambiguity."

discrepancies between language of ethnicity and nationality in Mandarin (Han) Chinese, and Mongolian, and the problems this presents to ethnic Mongolians in the PRC. One final study that took a limited corpus of material, and performed detailed analysis on it, was Xiaoming Yang's *The Rhetoric of Propaganda: A Tagmemic Analysis of Selected Documents of the Cultural Revolution in China*. Yang used an idiosyncratic form of discourse theory, dividing the texts he looked at into particles, waves and fields. He used the distinction of emic (texts as seen from the producer's point of view) and etic (texts from the receiver's point of view) treatments to gauge how language-creators tailor their words to their audience.²⁴

While there is limited material in English on the language of the CR, there has been even less in Chinese. This is partially connected to scepticism in China about the sort of theoretical premises the practice of discourse analysis is based on. It may also simply be because the major theoretical works setting out types of discourse analysis methodology have only recently become available in China. There is some interest in the distinctiveness of CR language, attested to by the collection of CR phrases and slogans in the 1989 *Strange Events and Language from the Cultural Revolution*.²⁵ Beyond this there is, to the best of my knowledge, no analysis in Chinese of the language of the CR.²⁶

Michael Schoenhals admitted in the foreword to *Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics* that 'the existing literature on China turned out to have little to say about the political uses of language, and the literature on the language of politics was rarely, if ever, about China.'²⁷ This militated against a good understanding of the language contained in documents from a specific period of modern Chinese

²⁴ Yang 1994.

²⁵ See Jin and Chang 1989.

²⁶ The Hong Kong magazine *Ming Pao Monthly* published in April 2001 an analysis of 'The Theory of Violent Language' by Liu Zaihou of the Hong Kong City University Chinese and Translations Department, which covered the CR. This linked autocracy and violent language, looking at the increasingly slanderous language used in CR public speech, and at the construction, as the CR proceeded, of more elaborate labels for enemies from simple roots. It linked this 'violent' language to campaigns after the CR, and the general low credibility Mainland Chinese political language has to this day (*Ming Pao*, April 2001, 22-28).

²⁷ Schoenhals 1992, I.

history like the CR.²⁸ One helpful insight contained in some of the studies listed above (and Schoenhals's own) is the intimate link between the means of producing documents (their authors, institutions, publishers, their generic status, and the audience they were aimed at), the kind of language they used and the ideology they promoted. Another is to understand the importance of power during this period and the fact that documents and the language they contained occurred in a highly politicised context in which they contributed to struggles between separate forces and factions.

1.5 Power: Definitions and Context

The notion of power lies at the heart of the CR. The exercise of it, the claiming of it, the legitimization of some forms of power, and the institutions through which and by which power was expressed and its exercise facilitated. At one level, the CR can be described as a power struggle between Centre leaders (Mao Zedong on one side and Liu Shaoqi on the other), and between the factions from which they derived support and which they in turn supported. It involved claims on power between parties in specific localities where the Centre's struggle was duplicated. At another level, it involved conflicting claims to authority between families, and individuals in families.

This works at a fundamental level. Language (in texts or speeches) was a critical part of the negotiation for who had power and influence. An editorial in the *People's Daily* on 5th September 1966 famously described the CR as being a war where words were weapons. It was also described as a 'battle to touch the soul,' an ideological rather than a physical war.²⁹ CR documents of various genres (these are listed in Section 1.10) were produced with the aim of making a contribution to this power struggle. They were influential elements in a complicated struggle, a part of the promotion of ideological variants and power groups over others.

²⁸ In his own study Schoenhals used techniques from 'speech act' philosophers Grice and Searle, and applied them to a wider variety of CCP documents from 1949 onwards.

²⁹ *People's Daily*, 2nd June 1966 editorial.

A central part of this thesis is the identification of key terms in the discourse of the CR, and the way they can be shown to support the power claims of organisations, individuals and institutions, and how control of them functioned in the negotiation for authority and influence. 'Power' itself was actually a key term. In the CR frequent reference was made to 'seizing power' (*duoquan* – see Chapter Two, 2.1.9 for examples of this term in use) and its object, 'political power' (*zhengquan* – used for instance in the Maoist formulation: 'The fundamental issue of revolution is that of political power' (*Geming de genben wenti shi zhengquan de wenti*)). There is the related discourse of 'authority' (*quanwei*) and those who possess, or lack, the correct credentials to exercise this (an understanding of this is given in the negative label fixed to obliquely attack Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping at the beginning of the CR: 'Those in authority who take the capitalist road').³⁰ Power related to the movements of 'struggle' (*douzheng*) and upheaval that were declared to be parts of the process of rebellion and revolution within the discourse of the CR. It also related to the other key term imported into Chinese political discourse from Marxism – 'dictatorship' (*zhuanzheng*). If 'power' is cited as a keyword within the lexical universe that existed in the CR, was it one of what Griggs and Howarth called, in their contribution to *Discourse Theory and Critical Analysis* an 'empty signifier,' a 'means of representation that enable the welding together of internal differences'?³¹ Something that is meaningful because its edges are blurred; it can have packed into it whatever language users of the time wish to put.

The thinking of Michel Foucault gives insight into how power can be described and analysed, how its promotion is achieved and what part language plays in this. To Foucault, power was not an abstract entity, but an 'extremely complex configuration of realities'³² In his 1982 essay, "The Subject and Power" he outlined an understanding of how power operates:

'The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between "partners," individual or collective; it is a way in which some act on others. Which is to say, of course, that there is no such entity as power, with or without a capital letter; global, massive, or diffused; concentrated or distributed. Power exists

³⁰ There is also the related term, 'leadership power' (*lingdao quan*).

³¹ Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis 2000, 56.

³² Foucault 2000, 336.

only as exercised by some on others, only when it is put into action, even though, of course, it is inscribed in a field of sparse available possibilities underpinned by permanent structures... A power relationship... can only be articulated on the basis of two elements that are indispensable if it is to be a power relationship: that "the other" (the one over whom power is exercised) is recognised and maintained to the very end as a subject who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible interventions may open up.³³

A superficial understanding of power would equate it with a relationship of deep inequality between an actor and a passive sufferer, something along the lines of an act of violence under coercive regimes where one demands and the other complies. Foucault did not use this definition. In his understanding, power is not a confrontation, but a question of 'government,' – government here used in the sense of two parties seeking a *modus operandi*, a contract whereby they can pursue their interests, and negotiate: '...There is not a face-to-face confrontation of power and freedom as mutually exclusive facts (freedom disappearing everywhere power is exercised) but a much more complicated interplay.'³⁴ Here, the strategy of the power-holder is to use methods to convince the target of their power that they should perform certain actions, because they are in their interests, or they have no other option (even when they do). It is not a case of blankly demanding something, but of producing commands that 'key in' with specific preoccupations, fears, or needs of the audience. On this model, power is much more a duality or balance between competing forces rather than a function in a monolithic, settled structure.

Foucault stressed in his writings the need to appreciate how important institutions were in the establishment of power relations: 'Power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not a supplementary structure over and above "society" ...'³⁵ Foucault admitted that this model of power was derived from the Western background of the state and its influence, which in turn had its roots in the Christian ideology of the ruler as a pastoral figure, placing their exercise of power within a framework in which they were seen as teachers trying to bring about improvements and moral 'godliness.' In this history, the state individualized power – relating it to citizens who had a personal relationship with God and a responsibility to safeguard the

³³ Ibid 340.

³⁴ Ibid 342.

salvation of their soul. In this sort of context, the exercise of power was also deeply personal. Foucault argued for the development of this 'caring' deployment of power and process of individuation into the various 'regimes' of discipline and regulation for the self which came into existence from the 15th century onwards – medicine, the treatment of the insane, and of criminals, psychiatry, and finally a deeply individuated discourse of sexual identity, inscribing a specific form of subjectivity on the most private regions of the self.

This connects to Foucault's understanding of the role of knowledge in power relations. Foucault stated that 'it is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power.'³⁶ The disciplines and institutions created in the last 200 years in Foucault's work were connected to producing ways of knowing things, forms of knowledge, conventions, whereby certain practices and views are sanctioned and authorised and others excluded. To know, therefore, is not just to know something is the case, but to do this in a system, and knowing is to be empowered and enabled in that system. In producing knowledge, as Sara Mills says, one is also 'making a claim to power.'³⁷

The issue of power and its exercise had a historical genealogy. The state and its relationship to individuals along with their experience of forms of control in China developed differently to the West. Foucault's approach allows space for the recognition of this, but also acknowledgement of the principle that regardless of cultural context power is mediated through structures - institutions and organisations - and that it is exercised in ways that are visible and can be described. There is no mysterious ineffable entity called power, empowering those with access to it, lying outside the reach of rational investigation. This 'demystifying of power' is an attractive element in Foucault's approach. Even though the CR occurred in a culture where huge powers seemed to reside in certain actors and entities (particularly Mao and members of the CR Committee), these were operating in an environment in which there was competition from other groups and figures. The CR was not a

³⁵ Ibid 343.

³⁶ Foucault 1980, 52.

³⁷ Mills 2003, 69.

monolithic movement with a clear-cut direction from the beginning. It was a movement made up of different groups promoting different aims.³⁸

Foucault's understanding of power allows insight to a key component of the CR power struggle – the masses, or audience, who played an essential part in the negotiation and distribution of power, and were themselves significant power holders. No matter how rigid the context, speakers, those ostensibly exercising power, had to speak or act in such a way that could gain support from and enhance their power with the audience. In Foucault's work the audience is not a passive entity to be acted upon. Their reactions and judgements of their preoccupations and priorities shape the 'power' discourse and set its agenda.

Power in the CR, as in any other historical movement, can only be understood as the expression of certain aims, either by individuals or groups or factions, through an institutional and social framework towards an audience, whether of one person or a whole nation. There were means to compound and propagate this power through the generation of a specific language, or organisational structure. The techniques for the promotion of power are looked at in more detail below. The combination of language and the organisational context is the 'discourse.'

1.6 Bourdieu and the 'Market Place of Power'

Foucault provides a framework within which power is understood through the actions by which it is promoted – the actions by which one group or individual attains authority or influence over other groups. To paraphrase Barthes' comment on meaning, power is manufactured - created, contained and exercised by material institutions and recognised conventions and processes, and manifested through

³⁸ See Oksenberg's analysis of the varied sources of Mao's power in 'The Politician,' in Wilson (ed) 1977, *Mao Tse-Tung in the Scales of History* esp 81ff. Oksenberg located much of Mao's administrative power in his control of the communication process, but also his understanding of the 'duality' of power: 'For Mao, the keys to power were knowledge and popular support derived from the people's faith in the essential goodness and virtue of their rulers.' See also Pye 1992, 13 on the Chinese concept of power.

these. Power is signified, and visible. The work of Pierre Bourdieu offers further insight into the operations of power, and the part that language plays in this.

For Bourdieu, language's key part in the strategies of control and the negotiations between parties which are central to the exercise of power is self-evident. He makes clear that there is no such thing as a 'power' language, but that this very language is itself up for negotiation. There are a variety of different languages, all claiming their rights to power, operating in what Bourdieu metaphorically called a market.³⁹ In this market, 'speakers take into account – in varying ways and to different extents – the market conditions within which their products will be received and valued by others.'⁴⁰ There is not an 'official' language *per se*, but a language that has become official, and the speakers of which have been empowered by a process of competition and elimination. Such language, Bourdieu states, serves both 'internal and external markets.'⁴¹ It has to be aimed both at achieving influence within the political elite – effective power actors within specific societies – and recruiting power from the general society, where it aims to have effect. Finally, any language can only be empowered if there are institutions, processes, frameworks that back it up. The combination of these creates a power discourse. Bourdieu cites the statement of a judge passing sentence, which only has illocutionary force within the context of a court, with officials to carry out the sentence, and institutions within which the sentence can be implemented.⁴² Without these, the sentence would remain 'mere words.' Political language, too, relies on organizations, social structures and personnel to attain and maintain power.

If centres of power are dispersed, and language operates in a market, with certain forms of it acquiring status and influence while others are denigrated, then this also impacts on the producers of the language – the speakers and users, who seek to manipulate and recruit language to their specific agendas, and who therefore need to supplement and acquire political capital. Text assessment involves an understanding of the status of both the issuer of the text (e.g., the writer or issuing bodies) and the

³⁹ Bourdieu 1991, 57.

⁴⁰ Ibid editor's introduction, 18.

⁴¹ Ibid 183.

⁴² Ibid 75.

speaker of it (who is the speaker, from where, on whose authority are they speaking?) But this is not a one-way process. Texts do not acquire power because they are issued by power-holders. They also supplement and increase, or decrease that power. Speakers of high status have this supplemented by the use of language considered authoritative and persuasive. Speakers need to know which forms work best, and avoid those that do not. They need to know what can and cannot be said and where a society has set the verbal political habitus, just as an understanding of what goods are desired, and what not, is crucial to an understanding of a society's economy.

Language is also controlled through the material means of its dissemination, the 'media.' Bourdieu's metaphor of a 'market' is useful in understanding how a combination of control of the different means of dissemination and the meanings and structures within language contribute to the victory and legitimisation of certain language forms over others, and how this constitutes a discourse of power.

1.7 Hegemony, Narrative and Ideology

More fundamentally, power is delivered through control of the ideology – through the promotion, conveyed through conventionalised language forms, of certain thought-patterns and belief systems, with the assertion of these being 'truths,' along with the elevation of their associated vocabularies, and the concentration of capital in these areas. A second factor is in the promotion of narratives, presenting privileged versions of 'history.' Figures are placed in this narrative, legitimising their claims to influence, or vilifying them. Strategies are created whereby such 'histories' are either accepted or discredited. Once more, vocabularies are associated with specific (hi)stories, to convey them.

In the PRC, there was a state ideology of Marxism-Leninism, with very specific sources, a literature, practices and vocabulary, promoted from the Centre. The transportation of this to a provincial region like IMAR involved the issue of how much such central ideology was modified and changed to suit local circumstances. Such modification that happened occurred through a process of negotiation and contestation. In the material analysed in this thesis it is clear that there was perceived

to be a contending local ideology based on support for issues around ethnicity or national minorities in IMAR, opposed to the Centre's ideology predicated on the ultimate importance of class issues. This is dealt with in detail in Chapter Three.

The objective for the control of both the ideological and narrative agendas was to attain hegemony. Gramsci's notion of hegemony, which I draw upon here, is complementary to the view of the operations of power mapped out above. For him, according to Eagleton, hegemony is 'a whole range of practical strategies by which a dominant power elicits consent to its rule from those it subjugates. To win hegemony... is to establish moral, political and intellectual leadership in social life by diffusing one's own world view throughout the fabric of society as a whole, thus equating one's own interests with the interests of society at large.'⁴³ Such hegemonies are created through the support and promotion of ideologies on the basis of appeal and benefit. In the words of Raymond Williams:

'A lived hegemony is always a process... It is a realised complex of experiences, relationships and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits. In practice, this hegemony can never be singular. Its internal structures are highly complex.... It has to be continually renewed, recreated, defended and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not all its own.'⁴⁴

Such a concept of hegemony is broad and inclusive enough to contain opposition to it: 'The reality of any hegemony, in the extended political and cultural sense, is that, while by definition it is always dominant, it is never either total or exclusive. At any time, forms of alternative or directly oppositional politics and culture exist as significant elements in the society.'⁴⁵ When I talk of hegemony in this thesis, it will be in these terms: of a strategic promotion of ideological norms to negotiate acquiescence and agreement from an audience. A major means of achieving this is through the enlistment of 'keywords,' terms and vocabularies and attempts to monopolise them. 'Class' and 'national minority' are the two most powerful cases in the IMAR context.

⁴³ Eagleton 1991, 115-6.

⁴⁴ Williams 1977, 112.

⁴⁵ Ibid 113.

The support for ideologies comes partially from authorising narratives. This is well illustrated in the way the ideological system in the PRC was legitimised by appeals to a specific historical narrative which recounted the struggle for power by the Communists throughout the 1920s and 1930s, culminating in their success in 1949. It was a narrative which delivered control of moral terms and knowledge by portraying conflict between parties clearly marked as good and bad, with the ultimate just victory of those signified as good because of their holding to ideological 'truths' conveying important messages about 'oppression' and 'justice.' It also involved the elevation of a language associated with this ideology, through which it was conveyed. The 'liberation' of 1949 entailed acceptance of a canonical version of the history that led to it, and a way of viewing events afterwards. Any discourse from 1949 that aspired to legitimacy needed to do this by buying into this narrative. Power also lay within the authority to interpret this master narrative.

In practice narratives were not set in stone. They were available for contestation – sites of dispute in a similar 'market' of competing narratives claiming authority, just as 'power language' and ideologies were. During the CR there were many attempts to re-create the grand narrative of pre-1949 history, to redescribe the exploitation and struggle it contained, and to exploit these new narratives in legitimising groups and individuals participating in the new struggle, a struggle that was itself creating another, contemporary narrative. During the CR there was a re-evaluation of history after 1949, with intense conflict over areas deemed strategically necessary to legitimise claims to authority. The 'meaning' or interpretation of the mythical events prior to 1949 (mythical in the sense that they were seen as having symbolic importance far beyond their literal historical impact) was the key issue in this conflict. At the regional level, this process was manifested through competing parties 'buying in' to narratives they claimed were sanctioned by the Centre, fighting to claim some of the symbolic power by using what they saw as the signifiers of this. This became a route to acquire influence and power. In this thesis, I concentrate on how this happened in the IMAR – how the national narrative was framed locally, what were the key terms in this process, and how it was used to shape any local narratives available.

These issues also exist on the level of those who are authorised to speak, who are the key 'voices' in the texts looked at here. Many of these 'speakers' were engaged in a process of furthering their own aims or those of groups they supported and the ideologies that these represented. They were attempting to increase their own capital through the use of appropriate language, language that furthered their aims. The main speakers were leading members of the institutional framework which had been set up during the CR. But it is clear that they were placed in an ambiguous situation, leading a movement ostensibly to attack old sources and forms of authority and set up new processes, supporting a new ideology. How they negotiated this is important. They needed to use a lot of the signifiers and processes of the old authority, while at the same time attacking it. They needed to acquire status, and position themselves against figures who were previously empowered. They needed to attempt to acquire legitimacy and credibility, in a new context where ostensibly the old forms and patterns of authority, and the language through which this was conveyed, was questioned and subverted. This question of the status of specific voices, of their right to say certain things, and be received in certain ways, is a key part of this study. The 'right' of certain figures to speak in specific fora, to have their words disseminated, to use certain forms of language, to 'authorise' ideological points, and how they could mark this authority (along with how it was marked for them) is a major process, as is the strategy used to delegitimise and relegate other voices, with their ideology (or what was claimed was their ideology) and the narratives they sponsored. In the context of IMAR this was particularly marked, simply because the new voices needed to localise as part of their means of acquiring authority locally, but they also needed to demonstrate this authority in ways that were unthreatening to the Centre.

1.8 Techniques for the Analysis of Language

Foucault devised techniques by which to view the specialist languages of medicine and penology as they have evolved over the last two centuries, viewing them within institutional and social frameworks, the combination of which constituted discourse. Foucault was particularly sensitive to the means by which discourse related to social power, to claims to knowledge, and what part they played in power-relations and negotiations, and the signifiers for this. The school of critical discourse theory has

developed these techniques. Like Foucault, this has looked at the means by which power is promoted through discourse, and the intimate relationship between the two.⁴⁶ And like Foucault, it has accepted the historicity of all forms of discourse – their being produced in a distinct context and social ‘universe’ which limits the form they can take and their structure. But critical discourse analysis has gone further in showing discourse as a type of social action, and highlighting the fundamental contribution analysis of discourse can make in understanding political and social power.

Discourse analysis plots the means by which a combination of language forms and the social entities that create and are constituted by them promote ideologies and narratives in the interests of their objective of exercising hegemony. The means by which this is done and the outcomes are varied. Norman Fairclough referred in an analysis of contemporary English political discourse to methods of promotion and persuasion in place of assertion and coercion as being recognised as more likely to promote forms of hegemony in post-modern democratised societies. He cites the example of a consultation between a doctor and their patient as an example of a traditional exerciser of power now needing to demonstrate rather than assert their authority:

‘On the one hand, the doctor, as in traditional consultations, pursues an agenda which controls and determines the structure of the interaction, and this is manifest in the fact of the occurrence of the doctor’s question, assessment and directive. On the other hand, the doctor like the counsellor, in a counselling session, appears to cede much of the control and leadership of the interaction to the patient.’⁴⁷

In the material in this thesis, authority was largely asserted rather than demonstrated. But the same techniques by which to spot the operations of power-enhancement and promotion are still valid. Siegfried Jäger offered a suggested list of approaches to texts taken as example of discourse.⁴⁸ These can be summarised as characterizing the audience, and the institutional framework within which and through which a document is produced, (status of the organization or group publishing the piece,

⁴⁶ Van Dijk 1998, 1.

⁴⁷ Fairclough 1995, 101-102.

⁴⁸ In Wodak and Meyer 2001.

etc).⁴⁹ Overall assessment of any piece should also look at the material quality of the document. Well printed documents need good resources, good printing presses, paper (a scarce resource in the CR). In the CR, there was very limited access to this sort of equipment. Such access demonstrated influence and status. Assessment also includes what falls more traditionally into analysis of a piece's rhetorical components: its vocabulary and nomenclature, the keywords it contains (which give clues to the area of prime contestation), the authorities it names in the text explicitly, and those it implicitly relies on, its register (popular or specialist) and the voices it contains (monovocal or multivocal).⁵⁰

Such documents did operate in an ideological and institutional market place. They were products of people or groups within organisations of varying degrees of size and influence. They demonstrated closeness to conventional 'centres' of power either ideologically, through argument and appeal to sanction from the Centre, or institutional – through personal connection to the Centre. But the authority of the Centre was also often 'created' through these documents – they promoted its hegemony just as much as appealed to it to give them authority. They were parts of an attempt to accrue capital within this system, manufacturing influence by the use of designated and accepted speech forms, or by the appeal and exploitation of the symbolic capital of certain status figures or organisations (the Party, for instance).

1.9 Sources

Discourse analysis has largely been practiced on material texts, regardless of whether they are spoken or written in origin. This accepts that the vast bulk of discourse available for analysis from the past is in written rather than filmed or recorded form. The CR falls into this category. The examples of discourse analysed in this thesis actually exist in written documents.

Overall, this material arose in a highly politicised context within which there was very little production of non-ideologically motivated material. Even the little fiction produced during this period carried specific political messages. Written material was

⁴⁹ Ibid 54-55.

not produced for its own sake, but to carry messages which had organisational and institutional support. The ideological function of discourse was clearly set out in Mao's 'Forum on Literature and Art,' a document that was reissued on various occasions in the CR, which promoted the orthodoxy that literature needed to have social purpose. The material in this thesis was therefore created in an atmosphere in which any symbols were coerced into a specific politicised context, where they were present to carry messages, and in which the audience were deft at interpreting the 'true meaning' of texts beyond their literal meaning.

The second general feature of the environment within which CR material was produced was the division into official and unofficial documents, and the competition for influence and sanction between document-issuing entities. The main genres of official material are set out in the following section. The unofficial material, especially in the CR, was a rich undergrowth of various genres produced by Red Guard (Rebellious) groups, factions, and individuals.

The documents looked at in this thesis are ones that were intended to impact on and influence events in the negotiation and campaign to acquire power between various groups in IMAR from 1967 to 1969. At the beginning of this period, the dialogues between the Centre and local leaders, issued in April 1967, along with the formal document that was issued from them (the '13th April Decision') had the clearest impact in the power structure in IMAR. This resulted in the open denunciation of the previous leader in the region, Ulanfu, and the imposition of a new group of leaders led by Teng Haiqing. It also set in process the creation of new organisations to represent authority in the region – the revolutionary committees.

These documents prepared for the second grouping of material looked at, the various documents and speeches attacking Ulanfu and discrediting him locally. This is analysed in Chapter Three. The scope of this material is widest, ranging from 'official' denunciations of Ulanfu in the local Centre-supported press to attacks on him issued by the largest rebellious groups. But there was a consistency in their approach to Ulanfu, and in the strategies they contain by which to disempower him.

⁵⁰ Ibid 55-56.

Part of this material involved the use of Ulanfu's own statements from his period in power, and their location in a new context in which they were condemned and discredited.

The third grouping of material from late 1967 to early 1969 analysed in Chapter Four takes as its basis public speeches by the newly appointed local leader of the Military District (and of the IMAR CRG), Teng Haiqing. The speeches were delivered at specific meetings which had strategic importance. Teng's language illustrated the voice of the key local power holder. They offer an opportunity both to describe the signifiers of this power, the relationship with an audience, and the impact that this language had on the course of the CR locally. It is also important in looking at the basis for Teng's authority evidenced in these texts, on what he based his right to speak on. These speeches coincide with the period of greatest violence and disruption in IMAR.

The final period from April 1969 onwards covered by Chapter Five shows the impact of the edict from the Centre after the Ninth Party Congress to calm things down in IMAR. In this material documents attacking Teng Haiqing are set beside his own self-confessions, to plot the process of withdrawal of power both in the first person and externally, and to understand the management of this process whereby a person previously empowered became disempowered.

The common feature of these documents is that they were all political documents, intended to play a part in the promotions of new forms and carriers of power, and the denigration of others. They were 'public' documents, in the sense either that they were transcripts of public speech occasions, or were printed for wide dissemination among groups to be used in meetings, study sessions, or other public forum. The idea of a 'private reader' (along with any strong sense of individual writers with their own style and voice) and an existence for these documents outside of a specific context for their reception is untenable. There were means both by which these documents were produced (through governmental organisations, or unofficial organisations with pretensions to 'governmental-type' power) and specific ways in which they were received.

1.10 Genre of Material: Context

A principal means of understanding how CR literature was related to the exercise of types of power is to set out its generic categories and the status conferred them. Part of the project of discourse analysis has been to demonstrate the way that certain kinds of documents or speech acts might be seen to carry more formal authority and power than others. This is closely related to the institutional framework within which such documents are produced, and the kinds of support, and sanction that they convey. Producers of texts (whether they be speakers or writers) are part of a social world, working within frameworks in which they exercise power, and are sanctioned and enabled to exercise such power. In the context of a totalitarian system like the PRC in 1967-1969, with tight state control of the central symbols and institutional delivery mechanisms of power, the relationship between the speaker or issuer of any text and the institutional structure was highly managed. The enormous prestige conferred on the figure of Mao within this system is important to understand, along with the attempts to claim part of this prestige, to appropriate it and capitalise on it. The simplest strategy was merely to claim Mao's sanction by quoting his own words. But the symbolic power and the use of Mao was an issue of profound contestation. A similar principle applies to the canonical leaders around him – Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, and the radical leaders of the CR, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, etc. There were strategies for enlisting these figures to sanction campaigns, to promote and strengthen them. But there was always the possibility that such attempts would backfire, as the symbolic capital of such figures, and their currency, either changed, or became devalued. Lin Biao is the clearest example of this, with his fall in 1971.

The CR did see a variety of organizations competing in a market and laying claim to the key power-conferring symbolic figures and their words and language-forms. Entities came into existence outside the traditional organizations exercising social power and influence until then – the local Party organs, for instance, or work unit leadership structures. Rebellious groups, or revolutionary committees are the two clearest examples. These created their own documents. Underneath these more widely accepted new centres of authority were a host of lesser organizations, varying in size down to groups of only a few people, all claiming a form of authority, all

competing for sanction from the Centre. Such a market created a new context in which texts articulated strategies for power enhancement.

Among this material, ostensibly the most 'official' material was produced by sanctioned and recognised Party organs. This usually had a very definite and good quality production (print and quality of paper for instance) and belonged to well-established generic categories. The record of an address by Lin Biao before a group of revolutionary cadres written in *People's Daily*, or an article by Yao Wenyuan, one of the chief architects of what can be called a CR ideology at the Centre in the Party magazine, *Red Flag (Hong qi)* can be located very close, if not at the dead centre, of socially recognised power production in the PRC at this time. These documents had established means to be disseminated through the country, and played a part in influencing the CR locally, through study in the various types of groups who were the target audience. The contents were generally taken as instructions, not to be questioned, but acted upon and implemented. They were used as sanction or support for activities and other forms of writing produced by lower level units and groups.⁵¹ They therefore had an immediate basis for social impact.

This 'power producing' material from the Centre was duplicated on a local level, with specific figures (either heads of revolutionary groups of influential factions) or groups able to produce 'mediating' material with a similar amount of clout locally. In IMAR, for instance, Teng Haiqing, as the leader endorsed by the Centre, was able to demonstrate a credibility based on his closeness to the most recognised leaders from the Centre, and his words (while he enjoyed this favour) carried a particular significance, conveying the Centre's instructions to the locality. In a similar way, but in an institutional context, the local newspaper, the *IM Daily*, was the established means of disseminating news and instruction through the IMAR, and was another authorised (and empowered) conduit through which the Centre's instructions reached down from Beijing to Hohhot, and from there to other localities in the province (reflected there in their own local papers, if they existed).⁵²

⁵¹ On the function and layout of *People's Daily* and its relation to provincial papers, see Schurmann 1966, 58-68.

⁵² The *IM Daily* was itself a site for struggle, being overtaken by rival factions in early 1968 (see Tumen and Zhu 1995, 27 and Woody 1995, iii).

Beneath this 'elite' material (both in terms of quality and possession of the means and ability for wide dissemination) lay a raft of other types of material, some profoundly reliant on the higher material, some independent of it. The most parasitical material consisted of the verbatim reprintings of leaders' speeches issued by various groups. Mao's speeches existed in manifold (and sometimes variant) forms, reprinted in anything from news-sheets issued by rebellious groups to stencilled copies in the name of tiny groups. Locally, Teng Haiqing's speeches were issued individually by specific groups, or appeared in local news-sheets.⁵³ The variations were caused, sometimes, by one version being an 'official' one, issued after the speech had been delivered by the local newspaper or an arm of the new 'formal' structures of organisation and power, and the other having been taken down by a group while the speech was delivered and issued under the name of one of the various competing small groups. This illustrates the evident anxiety of different groups to make a claim on the words of recognised leaders and be empowered through them.

Under this material lay what can be described as more personally sponsored, or individually authored material – attacks on specific figures, reports of local events, personal narratives. This material varied from well-printed issues to stencilled or even handwritten documents. At the bottom was the largely ephemeral 'big character posters' (*dazibao*) produced in one-off versions, posted publicly, occasionally collated and issued in printed versions, usually swiftly superceded by posters for newer campaigns.⁵⁴

⁵³ Summaries of his speeches appeared in the 'Red Guard Reference Material' news-sheets issued daily by the IMAR Party Standing Committee Red Flag Alliance, and the CR Reference Materials magazine (*Wenge cankao*), issued by the 8th Construction Bureau. Single speeches were also issued by the IMAR Military District Office (on 12th July 1968), and the Hohhot Workers Union (13th December 1968). There were also stencilled copies of his speeches.

⁵⁴ Collections of 'big character posters,' largely originating from campaigns in Beijing, appeared in good printed copies for use by students. The impact of some of these posters was considerable. Leijonhufvud 1990 contains a comprehensive study of the history of 'big character posters,' and an in-depth study of some taken from a campaign in Beijing in 1974, towards the end of the CR. Beyond a couple of 'big character posters' contained in printed material I have collected, it has not proved possible to obtain any first-hand examples from this genre in IMAR from 1966-

There is one final distinction in considering the genre of material, which relates more to written than spoken sources. This is the level of restrictedness imposed on the material by its issuers, and the constraints on who had access to it. Some of the material analysed in this thesis was aimed at as wide an audience as possible, and was powerful because of this potentially large dissemination. But there were also internal documents which had a different kind of power. In many ways, these were the most typical power-documents, because they were disseminated amongst key decision-makers in the formation and execution of the CR movement, centrally and provincially. Such documents included the most restricted 'internal reference material' (*neibu cankao*), communications between leaders at the Centre, orders issued from them to other leaders, Party documents spread from the Centre down to Party members locally. Even in the 'chaos' of the CR these documents were influential. The summaries of talks between the Centre and provincial leaders in the early stages of the attack on Ulanfu in IMAR (analysed in Chapter Two) were very influential in the direction of the CR, though they only reached the wider public after several months.

The genre of materials that occurs in the CR material looked at here breaks down into the following categories:

- 'Speech' (*jianghua*): formal pronouncements, usually a record of a public announcement or exposition on a specific issue, often at high-profile meetings.
- 'Discussion' (*tanhua*): indicating a meeting between a leader or leaders and a group – either an organization or a delegation from a locality. A more informal means of conveying central messages to those deemed important in carrying these out.
- 'Formal report' (*baogao*): usually given at a high-profile meeting.
- 'Personally authored letter' (*xin*): not common in material from this period, but used sometimes to give the leaders a more personal, intimate voice.
- 'Opinion' (*yijian*): usually remarks noted down from a leader reflecting the Centre's prescriptions or ideology, but expressed more personally.

- ‘Instruction/direction’ (*zhiyi*): formal announcement of prescriptive guidelines.
- ‘Formal discussion’ (*zuotan*): used to record the content of meetings in ‘informal’ situations between leaders and delegations, or groups.
- ‘Notice’ (*tongzhi*): formal, impersonal announcement of policy.
- ‘Report’ (*huibao*).
- ‘Interjection’ (*chahua*): used to record less important utterances by leaders to local incidents or affairs.
- ‘Explanation’ (*shuoming*): used for formal enunciations of central policy by leaders.
- ‘Selection’ (*zhaibian*): common in collating incriminatory material to prove the guilt of someone – eg collections of Teng’s speeches used in 1969 to condemn him in his own words.
- ‘Instruction/directive’ (*zhishi*): used, for instance, applied to Mao Zedong’s ‘directives.’
- ‘Statement’ or ‘announcement’ (*shengming*).
- ‘Minutes’ (*jiyao*) or ‘draft minutes’ (*jiyaogao*), usually of ‘talks’ (*jianghua*).
- ‘Plan’ (*fang’an*).
- ‘News despatch’ (*tongxun*): used as the title of periodicals issued by some rebellious groups.
- ‘Criticise and revise’ (*pifu*): used in the campaign later in the CR in IMAR against Gao Jinming, a local leader initially felled and then reinstated during the course of the campaign.
- ‘Investigation’ (*diao cha*): used in material from 1969 in which Teng Haiqing was felled, and then investigated.

This presents a wide variety of material which fits into certain categories. *Baogao*, *zhishi*, *shengming*, *huibao* and *tongzhi* are the most formal. These followed specific conventions for textual organisation and presentation. Material issued under these headings was presented by their issuers as having particular claims on attention because of closeness to the formal institutions in which social power was located. Certainly, ‘notices’ (*tongzhi*) such as that issued from the Centre on 22nd May 1969 impacted critically on the resolution of the most violent period of conflict in the CR

in IMAR. These documents played a key part in the announcement and direction of various phases of the CR. Taken with the organisations and institutions detailed in the following section, and the various figures in authority and leaders of groups, these constitute the organisational mechanism of the CR.⁵⁵

Huibao, *yijian*, *jianghua*, *tanhua* and *chahua* were more closely linked to speaking occasions, and to the specific formats of these events. *Huibao* for instance, was related in this material from this period to specific types of meetings (detailed in Chapter One, 1.12), the output of groupings like the IMAR Cultural Revolutionary Committees (IMAR CRC) formal meeting, held four times from 1967 (when it was established) to 1969. *Jianghua* is a more common title, but usually related to the utterances of specific speakers with high status. *Chahua* was less frequently used, usually in briefer material recording the reactions of marked power-holders to reports or remarks of lower-level groups.

Zhaibian, *jiyao*, *diaocha* and *pifu* relate to a specific stage of the CR when new developments called for different types of material. Teng's fall, for instance, in mid-1969 after the Ninth Party Congress in Beijing meant that material was produced locally justifying his removal from power, either through collections of incriminating material (his speeches), or through his own self-examinations (this is analysed in Chapter Five). These materials are more reflexive and reactive, referring to the resolution of a previous stage of the CR and a new narrative for the movement being promoted from the Centre.

1.11 Sponsoring Organisations

These genres of materials give little information if considered separately from the organisations which issued them. The institutional framework within which texts were produced and vie for power and influence can be treated in two ways. One is through looking at the organisations themselves and their status, membership, access

⁵⁵ Almost all these were written, rather than spoken genres. The possible exception was 'report' (*baogao*) which could be verbally delivered. This says something about the greater acceptance of the authority of written rather than spoken words in the PRC at this time.

to senior leaders (in the new set up), etc. The second is through looking at the organisational framework within which this material was delivered (meetings, study sessions, struggle sessions). Both of these contributed to the extra-textual means by which texts created meaning, and in which they impacted on social activity and promoted certain interests above others. All of the text genres listed above were practical, and aimed at implementation, because of their profoundly political nature. The means by which they were implemented was therefore a major part of their 'meaning' – their significance and practical value, and the ways in which they can be seen as discourse.

The CR saw the creation of a host of vying organisations and entities in addition to those which had existed from the founding of the PRC in 1949. These longer established organisations (work units, government departments and ministries, law enforcement offices, etc) were the administrative framework by which the CCP had exercised power, and through which the Chinese people had experienced this power, interacted with it, and, to some extent, either collaborated with or adapted to it. From 1966 onwards new entities were created which competed with these older forms, and in some areas diversified the means by which the population experienced and interacted with power, and social organisation.

This paradigm change, both at the central and at provincial level, is best seen by looking at the description of organisations before 1966.⁵⁶ In the pre-CR structure power was devolved from the National Party Congress into the Central Committee (divided into Plenary and Extraordinary Meetings). This elected the Politburo and the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the ultimate decision-making groups. The Central Committee itself was split into committees and departments. At the provincial level, the Annual Party Congress elected a Party Committee, and a Standing Committee. At the city level, power was exercised through the Central Committee. At the most basic level, there were units of production (factories, mines,

⁵⁶ Schurmann 1965, 139, 187 and 188 dealt with the Party apparatus, the military and the judicial. Barnett's study, *Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China* also devoted considerable space to setting out the structure of Party control, from the Central Committee and the State Council, down to the various committees and groups through which the CCP exercised power at the provincial and work unit level (Barnett 1967, 18-38).

companies, co-operatives) or units of territory (streets, military regions, etc). All of these had a Party apparatus.⁵⁷

From 1966 onwards, new organisations were set up, parasitical on, and often antagonistic, to the structures that had existed previously. In May 1966, as a result of the '16th May Circular,' the CCP set up the CR Group. The IMAR version of this was set up on 4th August – the IMAR Party Committee CR Group. In June 1967, the IMAR CR Standing Committee Preparatory Small Group was set up, which Teng Haiqing chaired. This set in motion the establishment of local revolutionary committees in September and October of the same year, and culminated in the founding of the IMAR CRC itself on 1st November, approved by the Centre as the 'highest power organ in IMAR.'⁵⁸ This held plenary meetings in November 1967, and January, July and November 1968. In addition to this, an IMAR Revolutionary Committee Nucleus Group was also founded in February 1968. Parallel to this was the IMAR Military District and its various subdivisions and personnel (again with Teng Haiqing as leader). The fall of Ulanfu in 1967 effectively made a previously powerful CCP entity, the North East District Regional Bureau (of which he had been deputy secretary) defunct. Under the IMAR CRC were various work departments: a political department, a production and construction department, a political standing committee, PSB, transport section, agricultural section, etc.⁵⁹ The structure within the CRC was fluid. Some departments came into existence after 1967, some ceased functioning (e.g., the People's Courts). These were provincial level administrative organisations. There were also local versions.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Schurmann 1966, 139-148. These various power structures are shown in tabular form in Schoenhals 1996a, 358-360.

⁵⁸ See the official '*Nei Menggu zizhiqu, zhengzhi zhi*' (Directory of the IMAR, Political Supplement), Beijing 2001, 409. This recorded that supreme executive power passed to Beijing Military District IMAR in December 1969 after the splitting up of the area. See also Yellow Briefings 552, July 8th 1970, which showed that the IMAR CRC had three vice-chairs and 42 members, of which only two were Mongolian.

⁵⁹ For full list see '*Nei Menggu zizhiqu, zhengzhi zhi*' (cited above) 412 ff.

⁶⁰ Even within the IMAR region there were variations in the levels of violence and intensity of the CR. Tumen and Zhu 1995 stated that the Ulanhanben area (just north of Hohhot) was the worst hit place, because of the large proportion of the population who were Mongolian. The CR in the industrial, Han-dominated city of

Parallel to these 'formal' CR organisations were the 'informal' ones – the Red Guard (or Rebellious) groups which started coming into existence in IMAR from August 1966 onwards. As Lynn White III explained in the context of Shanghai, there were numerous categories of such groups, from those who regarded themselves as legitimate because of their good class background (workers) to the more radical groups (generally founded later) which described themselves as 'rebel factions.'⁶¹ In IMAR there were the following groupings:

- 'Combat division' (*zhandoudui*)
- 'Combat column' (*zongdui*)
- 'Liaison station' (*lianluozhan*)
- 'Army' (*bingtuan*)
- 'General headquarters' (*silingbu*)
- 'Headquarters' (*zongbu*)
- 'Small group' (*xiaozu*)
- 'Materials group' (*ziliaozu*)
- 'Office' (*bangongshi*)
- 'Headquarters' (*zhihuibu*)

The hierarchy among these groups was rigid. The largest were the combat divisions, of which the two most powerful in IMAR were the conservative 'East is Red,' 'Lianshe' and 'Jinggangshan' groups.⁶² These names acted like brands, with separate divisions set up as liaison stations in specific work units. One of the most active in the material analysed here was from the IM Teachers College. General headquarters were based on specific faction leaders, again spread over institutions like colleges, work units, factories. The Third Headquarters (*san silingbu*) was one of the powerful leftist factions active in Hohhot eventually supported by the Centre. Small groups were exactly that – gatherings of anything up to a few dozen people. Finally, the bias of these organisations was predominantly urban. They originated in

Baotou was different to the more politicised centre of Hohhot.

⁶¹ White 1989, 14.

⁶² 'Lianshe' also included a group under the name 'Fighting Troops of Genghis Khan.' See 'Yellow Briefings' 552, 8th July 1970, and Dreyer 1968, 7.

Hohhot or Baotou, the two prime urban centres of IMAR, and spread through liaison stations to other remoter areas.⁶³

These names were frequently tied to military style organisations, indicating the combative context within which they were created, and organisational closeness to other already-extant groups. Many of these rebellious groups were based in particular colleges or universities (IM University had a rich cluster of groups) or in specific work units, like the Railway Division.

The organisational sponsorship of a publication indicated something about both the credibility given at the time to such material, and the kinds of audience they were aimed at. Material published by Third Headquarters, for instance, was disseminated more widely than that originating from smaller groups. The Third Headquarters had the material means to produce good quality texts, and to organise larger meetings and campaigns.

Organisational sponsorship raises one final question, which concerns the place of authorship in CR documents. A feature of CR material in general and the material analysed in this thesis in particular, was their weak sense of individual authorship of specific texts. The recorders and writers were the functionaries of the specific power-holders speaking. Many texts were collectively authored. The style was not conducive to idiosyncratic or individualistic expressions. Generic, repetitive language was common. Appeals to authority – to Mao, or other central documents – were frequent. Authors, as such, were merely the means of transmission between a particular performance, and a wider audience, for whom they inscribed and broadcast their version of the speech-event.⁶⁴

1.12 Organisational Setting

Contributors to an early volume on discourse analysis stressed the importance of

⁶³ I am grateful for information in this passage to a source in IMAR.

⁶⁴ See Li 1999, 493 for a description of the ways in which the *Red Flag* magazine was used at meetings in the CR.

context in the analysis of spoken or written discourse.⁶⁵ Part of this drew inspiration from the school of linguistics founded by Grice, Austin and Searle where context of utterance was part of the integral meaning of a word ('I' or 'now' for instance, the meaning content of which changes each time these words are used). Texts are 'framed by the intentions and circumstances in which they are produced.'⁶⁶

Many of the documents analysed in this thesis were not just the product of the formal and informal organisations described above. They were also the result of specific public 'occasions' – meetings, rallies, conferences. Some of these were of a generic type with longstanding pedigree in post-1949 China – like Party meetings and study sessions. But there were also meetings created for the specific purpose of carrying the agitation the CR required forward – like struggle sessions and mass criticisms. These varied in size from small scale events, involving no more than a dozen people, to rallies with up to a 100,000 people participating. There were organisational formats for all of these, prescribing the sorts of speech act and appropriate discourse. The kinds of events at and for which this material was produced were more formal than, for instance, impromptu village level struggle sessions which, from eye-witness accounts, frequently descended into pure expressions of violence. The meetings between the Centre and local leaders in 1967 were regulated from a distance, by order and in well-established formats of communication between leaders and their subordinates. Teng Haiqing's speeches in 1968 were presented in 'important' local meetings, either within the context of the IMAR CRC, or to present Teng's ideas to as wide an audience of town and rural leaders as possible. Only in the material from 1969, during Teng's self-criticisms, was a voice placed in a context within which there was hostility and a demand for admissions of weakness.

Schrank and Bernstein warn in their contribution to the volume mentioned above that students can sometimes idealise 'the organisational setting or social and psychological characteristics of participants' in supplying context to specific discourse through which to understand it.⁶⁷ As detailed a knowledge as possible of

⁶⁵ Van Dijk 1985.

⁶⁶ Ibid vol 1, 62.

⁶⁷ Ibid 181.

the historical, and social context of a document, is necessary to avoid this. Unfortunately, such contextual evidence is not easy to find in this period. Beyond photographs displaying the physical layout of meetings (in, for instance, *IM Daily*) it has not been possible to trace or gain access to films or recordings of the performance of Teng at any of the meetings he addressed. There are some accounts of meetings written by participants. Wang Duo, one of the main targets of the campaign to unseat leaders in IMAR in 1967, the attack against whom is partly analysed in the next chapter, did refer to the meetings against him in his memoirs. But beyond referring to some of the participants, and the extreme 'tension' that was present in the atmosphere, he did not picture any meeting in great detail.⁶⁸ There were indications, within the texts, of the generic format of the events the material originated from (audience reactions in brackets, indications of the time and place where a speech occurred, and the number and type of audience). One way of supplying this context is through hypothetical 'templates' – to build up a picture from material in Beijing and elsewhere in China of what a typical provincial gathering addressed by the local CRC leader was like. While this is an unsatisfactory option, it is the best available until more first hand material comes up (if it ever does) which allows meetings in the CR in IMAR to be understood better. For the material here, a conceptualisation is offered of the kind of meeting or context in which it might have happened (if this is appropriate).⁶⁹

Sheila Fitzpatrick in her study, *Everyday Stalinism* attempted to understand the period of the Great Terror and the purges in 1930s USSR through depicting the sort of lives that most people were living then. But as she made clear 'the life these ordinary people lived was not, in their own understanding and probably ours, a normal life. For those who live in extraordinary times, normal life becomes a luxury.'⁷⁰ A similar thing could be said of the CR, which saw major disruptions of everyday patterns of life and organisational forms, from the suspension of formal

⁶⁸ Wang Duo 1992, 490 ff.

⁶⁹ It has proved virtually impossible to glean first hand accounts of such meetings in IMAR. During field research in April 2003, it was clear that the CR period was still too sensitive, and that virtually no one was willing to talk in any detail about their participation as activists. As in other regions of China, the CR in IMAR sometimes appears today to be a movement where there were only victims and no perpetrators.

⁷⁰ Fitzpatrick 1999, 1.

schooling to the mass movements of rebellious groups making revolution throughout the country, to a form of enforced internal migration for urban 'sent down youths' to impoverished rural areas. The CR saw a process of an ideology (Maoism) penetrating and prescribing the most minute details of behaviour, from the ritualistic 'daily readings' (*tian tian du*) from *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong* to the dominant display of Mao iconography within the personal space of the home, to the annexation of everyday language by Maoist slogans and phrases.

A study by Chinese historian Bai Ge set out in some detail the organisation and rituals of daily life in the CR for most people, and made it clear how central the sort of public meetings were both for the implementation of the CR, and for the fulfilment of its objectives. Meetings of various types were the vehicle through which the CR's main messages were disseminated to the mass audience the movement was aimed at. Bai Ge identifies several main generic types of such 'public occasions':

- 'Daily readings and memorizing passages' (*tian tian du – tian tian bei*): these were small scale meetings devoted to the memorizing of passages from Mao, from an idea originally started in the PLA and then extended in the CR to civilian society. The format was for one person to lead the reading of the chosen text, and for a discussion of the meaning of the text to follow this.⁷¹
- 'Vigorously study and application lectures' (*huoxue huoyong jiangyonghui*): centred on the study of Mao's words and how these were applied to everyday life, ranging in size from three or four members of the same household, to people in a unit.⁷²
- 'Struggle sessions' (*pidouhui*): perhaps the kind of meeting most closely associated with the CR. The paraphernalia of struggle sessions included the daubing of the meeting place with slogans, the use of props like boards to hang round the necks of the struggle session victims with their names crossed out in red ink, and the use of specific forms of public humiliation – the 'airplane position,' with the hands held behind the back of the victim

⁷¹ Bai Ge 1993, 106-108.

⁷² Ibid 112-115.

while they were being denounced. Under their seeming chaos, struggle sessions followed a set format. They began with the victim being summoned, and placed on stage. There then followed a process where those that wished to denounce the target could stand up in the audience, or get on stage and speak. The target had to acknowledge what was being said by bowing their heads. It was common for such sessions to involve violence.⁷³

- 'Study classes' (*xuexiban*): at a less dramatic level, there were the study classes, the formal means through which announcements were disseminated in society. These were also implemented as a result of Mao's edict to 'start study classes to sort out all sorts of problems.' Study classes split into: (1) cadre classes for the study of instructions from Mao' and other leaders, and Party documents; (2) work unit classes, where material considered relevant from cadre classes was passed down for wider study; (3) correctional classes, reserved for those with 'problems,' offering a chance for them to correct their attitude and 'admit mistakes' (*ren zui*). These classes were usually held in small meeting rooms or offices of specific work units, and frequently involved violence.⁷⁴

Further kinds of meetings are listed in an article from the *IM Daily* on 10th February 1968:

- 'Discussion meetings' (*zuotanhui*)
- 'Debates' (*taolunhui*)
- 'Report meetings' (*baogaohui*)
- 'Criticism meetings' (*pipanhui*)
- 'Meetings to communicate experiences' (*jingyan jiaoliuhui*)
- 'Meetings to remember past bitterness' (*kusitianhui*)

Meetings and public occasions like those listed here were prime means in implementing the CR. Others were also closely related to the delivery and dissemination of certain kinds of documents – reports, investigations, directives, etc.

⁷³ Ibid 115-117.

⁷⁴ Ibid 126-129.

The relationship between the institutional support in the form of these meetings to the carrying out of the CR, and the documents and public language used, is an important element in this study.

1.13 A Caveat

In dealing with the CR, one is dealing with a movement about which there are still many unresolved questions. This strongly applies to the CR in IMAR. According to Woody, the key archival material related to the 1967-76 period in IMAR was moved to Beijing by the Central Discipline Inspection Committee in 1981.⁷⁵ The materials at university and college libraries relating to this period, and at the IMAR library, is still restricted. Most of the materials used in this study were collected from a bookseller in Hohhot. From experience of living in Hohhot working as a teacher from 1994 to 1996, and being married to a Mongolian brought up in the city, I know it is still difficult to talk about aspects of the CR openly. This partly touches on the sensitive issue of aspirations by some Mongolians, however unrealistic, for greater autonomy, even independence, from the PRC. It also reignites the bitter experiences of those who suffered, and those who inflicted suffering, in the CR period. IMAR was an area that saw the most violence and upheaval in the CR, with the turmoil reaching such magnitude that the province was reduced in size after intervention from the Centre (in 1969), and its leaders changed twice (in 1967 and 1969). The CR is a period which raises many unanswered questions.⁷⁶ This means that there is a greater level of provisionality about the historical context used in analysis of documents in this thesis than there would be about many other areas of recent Chinese history. In the future, hopefully, more material for analysis will be released which adds to our knowledge of the interplay between specific leaders, and organisations, in the CR – and fill in the gaps about what happened in the more isolated areas of the province.

This connects to one of the central arguments in this thesis, that control of the keywords and vocabulary in a discourse is one of the main means of controlling

⁷⁵ Woody 1993, 34.

⁷⁶ Jankowiak 1988 referred to the continuing sense of grievance and anger at the CR in IMAR in the region two decades after it occurred.

narratives afterwards. At the moment, the material records of this movement are literally locked away, the source material hard to locate. This assists in the promotion of a specific 'official' history of the movement, without competition from other possible versions, and prevents a better understanding of the period.

1.14 Conclusion

Analysis of material from the CR in IMAR offers an opportunity within a highly distinctive context to see how political texts 'operated' in the competition between different centres of power, and how they contributed to strategies for power-enhancement. This involves three things: (1) the creation of new institutional vehicles through which to create texts, and organisational forms to deliver them (though capitalising on the authority and prestige of older forms); (2) competition over the hegemonic symbols conferring authority and legitimacy at this period, and the negotiation and struggle to acquire and demonstrate sanction from these among the newly created groups; (3) the process by which the speaker status of some privileged figures at the time was denigrated and devalued, while new ones attempted to promote their capital in the new political environment. All of this occurred in a highly localised context, in which edicts from the Centre, language and symbols also had to appeal to regional particularities – specifically the unique ethnic context in IMAR.

Analysis of this material shows that, at a time of seemingly rigidly hierarchical power structures and disciplines, a much richer geography of power was actually in place, with various figures and organisations playing to specific audiences. The political discourse of the CR is known for being highly ideological, strong in its exclusions and in labelling (married to a highly worked out form of Marxist-Leninist ideology) and emanating from clear power centres. In the IMAR material, one can work through the themes from the Centre of class and a narrative of class struggle with their associated terms, adapted to the local issues of national minority status (ethnicity) and a specific history of marginalisation.

The analysis in this thesis addresses three main areas. First, the ideological and narrative superstructures within which the discourse in documents were created and

had meaning, and which assisted their claim to power and influence is described. Secondly, the material and organisational means by which this ideology and narrative was carried, and the social context in which they had meaning, is set out. Finally a descriptive framework is offered for the signification of power – how authority was marked in the texts analysed here, in the control of key vocabularies, formal positions, and narratives. Analysis in these areas helps in understanding the larger issue of the relationship between the Centre's discourse and other areas of the PRC, the issue of the imputed hegemony of this discourse, and finally the relationship between politics and language in the PRC, with its specific authority structure. This issue feeds out into many areas, because the PRC is still a highly politicised culture where the need to maintain harmony and consensus between a complicated range of social and ethnic groups continues to this day. One could argue that the supreme challenge of Chinese politics has been to find an idiom tolerable to as many of these separate groups as possible. The CR used one option – a narrow, and in the end unsuccessful one, stressing conflict and struggle. One effect of the CR project has been a subsequent loss of faith in public authority discourse in the PRC – increasing cynicism and lack of belief in this public language. The issues discussed in this thesis, therefore, while they relate to what may seem a marginal, and esoteric campaign in a remote province of an (at the time) closed off country touch on the much wider issues of the attempts in the PRC to create a meaningful and believable public discourse – attempts which are ongoing to this day.

Chapter Two

'How to Handle the Problem of IMAR': The Centre Speaks with the Region - 1967

This chapter looks at dialogues between the Centre and local leaders from February to April 1967, which resulted in the issuing of the 'Decision of the Centre on How to Handle the Problem of IMAR' on 13th April 1967. This guided the course of the CR in IMAR until the Ninth Party Congress in 1969. The priorities of the Centre were articulated in this document and the dialogues leading to it. Together they show the Centre attempting to achieve ideological and political hegemony in IMAR by appropriating key terms to create a new 'authority' discourse, and by materially controlling the environment in which this discourse was deployed through the setting up of a new administrative and institutional framework. The symbolic capital and influence of Centre leaders was distilled into the prescriptive '13th April Decision,' issued as a mandatory, organising document defining the IMAR identity in the Centre's terms and thereby 'managing' and controlling it. The new 'authority' discourse achieved this management and control by excluding a key element of the local situation - the issue of national minorities - in the interests of the narrative and ideology of the Centre based on class. The promotion of this new discourse was partly achieved by the use of the status of central figures, competing with local ones, and demonstrating a greater claim to speak for the 'true' interests of the people of IMAR.

Section One: The Dialogues between the Central and Regional Leaders in Spring 1967 and the '13th April Decision'

2.1.1 Historical Context

By February 1967, the CR was eight months old. Its main impact on IMAR so far had been the dismissal of Ulanfu from his Party posts after the Qianmen Hotel meeting in August 1966 and the appointment of a new group of leftist leaders – Wang Duo, Wang Yilun (whose own falls figure in Section Two of this chapter) and Qian Xingyuan.⁷⁷ This leadership change was accompanied by the creation of a raft of rebellious groups (the Third Headquarters, etc), paralleling a process that was occurring nationally. One of these seized the *IM Daily* in January 1967.⁷⁸ Tensions between competing groups culminated on 5th February in the shooting of Han Tong, a student from the IM Teachers College, by Liu Qing, deputy director of the IM MR Military Training Department. This was an event heavy with symbolic meaning as it showed the conflict between the revolutionary masses and the military, encapsulating the competing objectives these two key power entities were pursuing – something particularly problematic as both were classified as good in the moral vocabulary of the CR.⁷⁹ This event in particular necessitated the initial dialogues between the Centre and local leaders analysed in this chapter. Zhou Enlai was the chief interlocutor for the Centre.

While the situation in IMAR was starting to develop in unique ways, reflecting its border status, it shared in the chaos and turbulence of the country as a whole. The Shanghai 'January Revolution' had resulted in the setting up of some revolutionary committees. The 'February Counter-Current,' partly a reaction to this, led some senior military and State Council leaders to criticise the whole CR project. The

⁷⁷ Woody 1993, ii. Background on the Qianmen Hotel meeting and its impact can be found in the recollections of one of its participants, Wang Duo 1992, 493 onwards. See also Song 2002, 62-63, and Tumen and Zhu 1995, Chapter One.

⁷⁸ See Yellow Briefs 55, 8th July 1970: 'The Red Guard attack on Party machinery throughout China reached a climax in January 1967... After a clash between pro-Maoist Red Guards and anti-Maoists at the *IM Daily* Offices... ordered troops stationed in Hohhot to surround the headquarters of the Red Guard organisations.'

⁷⁹ Tumen and Zhu 1995, 32.

ostensive apex of power in the PRC till then, the Politburo, was suspended, and informal briefing sessions (called 'central caucuses' or 'get togethers') chaired by Zhou Enlai and attended by members of the Central CR Group, and some of Lin Biao's generals, took its place. Revolutionary committees and mass organisations received official endorsement from the CR leadership in Beijing and ultimately from Mao. The setting up of alternative power structures sanctioned by these two events eventually resulted in a campaign to root out 'renegades' associated with Liu Shaoqi. It is against this background of restructuring and conflict that the IMAR situation must be viewed.⁸⁰

Despite the turmoil nationally, the situation in IMAR was sufficiently unstable to merit Zhou Enlai's personal attention.⁸¹ The records of the meetings analysed in this chapter and the '13th April Decision' emanating from them captured at a critical moment key features of the relationship between the Centre and IMAR. They illustrated the dynamics of power at this time, and the strategy by which the Centre sought to impose hegemony on the region through the promotion of one discourse over others.

2.1.2 Context of the Documents

A 'Compilation of Relevant Central Documents and Speeches by Responsible Central Comrades in Charge Concerning the Handling of the IMAR Problem' (*Zhongyang guanyu chuli Neimeng wenti de youguan wenjian he zhongyang fuze tongzhi jianghua huibian*) was issued by a liaison headquarters of the Hohhot Revolutionary Rebels on the 13th May 1967 in Hohhot. It was clearly marked as an internal document. The two page preface was issued in the name of IM Teachers Institute 'East is Red' Struggle Division, and the IMAR Party Organisation 'Jinggangshan' Revolutionary Rebels.⁸² The inscriptions at the front of the book

⁸⁰ The 'January Revolution' is described in Perry and Li 1997, Chapter Five.

⁸¹ The situation in Sichuan, because of the national profile of the local leader, was also viewed as being particularly serious. There are also records of discussions in Henan, Jiangsu and Xinjiang (correspondence with Michael Schoenhals, 16th July 2003).

⁸² *Jinggangshan* is a mountain in Jiangxi Province, Southern China, and an important location for CCP history. It was here that the CCP regrouped after the rift

from Mao stressed the primacy of the CCP, and the importance of Marxism-Leninism to unify thought. The contents of the dialogues pursued this theme, asserting control from the Centre, ideologically and organisationally, over the tense situation building up in IMAR.

Of the two issuing groups, the first was named as a Hohhot-based organisation. The second was affiliated to a major educational institution in Hohhot implicated and involved in the events that precipitated the documents, the shooting of the IM Teachers College student Han Tong. Both therefore belonged to the new category of organisations that had been created as parallel power-structures during the CR. The fact that they were able to issue a well-printed lengthy document shows that they had access to considerable resources. This impression of influence is supported by the confident declarative tone of the foreword.⁸³ The very issuing of such a document signified the organisations' ambitions to promote themselves and increase their status.

Although the formal '13th April Decision' by the Centre on how to handle the problem of IMAR (a two page document bearing the central number 126, 1967) was placed at the front, this was the product of the process pursued throughout the dialogues and other documents. The '13th April Decision' formalised certain key appointments and policy announcements made during and as a result of this process. It was in an impersonal style, in numbered paragraphs, distilling the critical points that had come out of the dialogues. It was an expression of pure authoritative language - universalised, prescriptive, with mandatory force.

These documents were collected within a context in which the situation in IMAR was 'problematized.' There was an overt and powerful statement in both the title of the work, and in the decision produced from it, that the situation in IMAR was a 'problem,' implying therefore that it needed management. This accounts for the investigative tone of the material, and for the sense of urgency and of needing to

with the Nationalists in 1927 and was the location for the first meeting between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.

⁸³ An interviewee in Hohhot who had been an activist during the CR claimed that the documents were 'extremely credible' because they had been issued by the 'East is

issue prescriptive language with which to deal with this. How this was defined is an important issue which is looked at in 2.1.13.⁸⁴

2.1.3 Document Credibility

The only indication of principles of how the collection was made was contained in the foreword, in which the 'editors' from the IM Teachers College 'East is Red' Battle Division and the IMAR Party Organisation '*Jinggangshan*' Revolutionary Rebels state that the collection 'has been taken down according to *corrected* records, mistakes are all our responsibility' (my italics).⁸⁵ The principles according to which this process of 'correction' was carried out were not set out. 'Summary' indicates that the material was selective. No indication was given of who originally recorded the material, or when or how this was done.

There are no indications of criterion for exclusion or inclusion, though it is evident that much material had been left out. A slow reading of each page of text takes three minutes. With allowances for interruptions, the performance of each page can be extended to five minutes. Based on this, the following calculations can be made about the material presented here against the time indicated at the start of each text for its duration:

Red' and '*Jinggangshan*' groups, the two largest 'rebellious group' organisations.

⁸⁴ '*Wenti*' can be translated as meaning 'issue.' However, Schoenhals 1993, iii also used 'problem.' This is consistent with the context of the 'Dialogues' and the '13th April Decision,' which deal with a situation of crisis in IMAR (the shooting of a student) and the sense of getting to the underlying causes of this. There had been a history of addressing the 'Mongolian question/problem.' In 1923, an early Mongolian activist under the name of Merse had written 'The Mongolian Question' (*Mengu wenti*) (Atwood 2002, 156).

⁸⁵ Ibid II.

Table 1A - '13th April Decision' Dialogues: Comparison of Stated Length of Meetings against Calculated Length:

Doc No*	No of Pages of Text in Collection	Time Indicated in Text	Calculated Time for Performance of Material Actually Recorded
Doc 1	10	2 hours	50 mins
Doc 2	14	3 hours 20 mins	1 hour and 10 mins
Doc 3	8	1 hour 40 mins	40 mins
Doc 4	9	3 hours 10 mins	45 mins
Doc 5	NA	No time indicated	NA
Doc 6	8	3 hours 20 mins	40 mins
Doc 7	10	3 hours 40 mins	50 mins
Doc 8	7	2 hours 30 mins	35 mins
Doc 9	9	1 hour 55 mins	45 mins
Doc 10	27	3 hours 50 mins	2 hours and 25 mins

(The numbering of the separate dialogues is set out fully in Section 2.1.4 below)

Docs 4, 6 and 7 show significant shortfalls between the calculated time and the time stated in the documents. On the basis of these calculations, only Doc 10 appears to be a reasonably complete record of a meeting. This was the meeting in which the Centre leaders issued judgement. Therefore it was the one with most prescriptive importance and power. Much of its language appeared in the formal '13th April Decision.'

There is an important question of how credible these records are of internal meetings with restricted participation, in view of these gaps and lacunae? Material previously classified as 'restricted' was frequently issued by competing factions as a means to demonstrate closeness and privileged access to those who were perceived as the main leaders, thereby helping these groups acquire credibility during the CR. But these publications varied greatly in quality and reliability.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ A common example is the innumerable copies of so-called internal speeches by leaders from the Centre that were stencilled or typed and issued by small groups. Many of these included material emanating from Mao Zedong, with versions of

Assessing these documents depends on a combination of finding supporting extra-textual evidence, either through witnesses or in other documents, and by looking at evidence supplied in the document itself (e.g., internal consistency). The credibility and status of the issuing organisation is also important. Material issued from the Centre by 'official' entities (e.g., *People's Daily* or the Party magazine, *Red Flag*) was closer to the sources of power, more under their management, and could demonstrate its claims to authority to an audience better than material issued locally, by rebellious organisations. The material contained in documents was politically influential if it was supported by the 'symbolic power' of the organisations issuing it. In many cases, local organisations used the issuing of material originating from the Centre to bolster their own credibility.

It is certain that the meetings recorded in these documents did take place, at the times and places stated and with the people listed in the document present.⁸⁷ This is supported by the reference made in other documents, for instance Wang Duo, a participant at the meetings in 1967, who recorded them in his 1992 memoirs. While by no means a comprehensive record, he at least confirmed the participation on each side, along with the location and broad atmosphere of the meetings.⁸⁸ The specific 'voices' attributed to Centre leaders who spoke most - Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, Zhou Enlai - were also consistent with material attributed to them elsewhere.⁸⁹ (For more on the expression of individual character allowed in these texts, see end of 2.1.6 below.) In addition, the documents followed events occurring at the time. So

speeches or utterances he had made. See Schram 1974, 49 onwards on the existence of variant Red Guard versions of Mao-speak, and principles used to assess their reliability.

⁸⁷ Tumen and Zhu 1995, 32-39 offers independent verification by historians based in China.

⁸⁸ Where there are differences these are minor. On page 511 of his memoirs, for instance, he recalled parts of the interrogation with Kang Sheng and Wang Li, adding words that were not recorded in the records contained here. In particular, he attributed a response by Wang Yilun to Kang Sheng's claims on page 63 of the dialogues that he had not known him being in Moscow in the 1930s. 'Yilun said,' according to Wang Duo's memoirs, "'You didn't know me, and I didn't know you.'" In the 1967 record, Wang Yilun was not so robust and was recorded as saying nothing.

⁸⁹ For an example translated into English of Kang's style see Schoenhals 1996a, 116-122. This excerpt, according to Schoenhals' editorial comment, 'suggests a paranoid and truly evil mind' (ibid, 93), a judgement supported by Kang's contributions to

the documents contain nothing that is contradicted by external evidence.

They are also internally consistent. This collection was marked as 'the first' (*di yi ji*). It incorporated the six meetings Zhou was known to have had with the representatives from the IMAR factions and organisations.⁹⁰ There was a second collection which contained speeches that Zhou and 'other responsible cadres' (Kang and Chen Bodo et al) gave to representatives of the IMAR groups and military in late April and May on the implementation of the '13th April Decision.' These speeches were not in dialogue form. The information between the dialogues is not contradictory. A demand in the third meeting between Zhou and the IMAR representatives for an investigative team to go to Hohhot is supported by the record of that visit from page 51 onwards. Similar connections occurred at the end of the first dialogue where Zhou requested more representatives come from IMAR to Beijing to offer evidence, and the second meeting, where they were shown as present. The combination of external and internal consistency would have been difficult to fabricate.

The real significance of these documents lies in the insight they give to the key relationship between the Centre and local leaders at a time when this was going through a period of crisis and negotiation. These dialogues show the strategies by which the Centre leaders used key vocabularies, narratives and ideological norms, to promote a 'solution' to IMAR, and to create an administrative framework by which to implement this. I look first at the structure of these documents, and the organisational and formal means by which they created a discourse of management by the Centre over the locality, and then the ideological and narrative means that supported this.

2.1.4 Contents: Document Types

The collection of materials, in addition to the '13th April Decision' and Foreword,

these dialogues.

⁹⁰ Wang 1992, 511. There was a second collection which contained speeches that Zhou and 'other responsible cadres' (Kang and Chen Boda et al) gave to representatives of the IMAR groups and military in late April and May on the implementation of the '13th April Decision.' These speeches were not in dialogue form.

contained a copy of a telegram, issued by the State Council and the Central Military Commission, summoning the relevant IMAR parties to Beijing. The contents listed six 'minutes of speeches' (*jianghua jiyao*) and four 'minutes of discussions' (*tanhua jiyao*). In addition, it contained three 'instructions' (*zhishi*). These ranged from 6th February 1967, only one day after the shooting of the student Han Tong, the event which had precipitated the crisis, to 13th April, and the formal issuing of the 'Central Decision.'

The minutes of talks and speeches can be listed according to the place they were held, the time they took place, their length, and participants from the Centre and the local side:

1. **Minute of Talks at the First Meeting Between Premier Zhou and Representatives of the Four IMAR Groups:** 10th Feb 1967, from 5:50 PM to 7:50 PM (2 hours), in a small meeting room in the Great Hall of the People, attended by Zhou Enlai and Xiao Hua from the Centre, and participants from IMAR Party Committee, IMAR Military District, Hohhot Third Group, and the Red Guard Army (*hongweijun*).⁹¹
2. **Minutes of Talks at the Second Meeting Between Premier Zhou and Representatives of the Four IMAR Groups:** between 16-17th Feb 1967 from 10:25 PM to 1:45 AM the next day (3 hours and 20 minutes) in the Great Hall of the People, attended by Zhou Enlai, Xiao Hua, and Zeng Shan from the Centre, and 25 representatives from the 'four organisations from IMAR involved in these talks' (listed above).
3. **Minutes of Talks Between Premier Zhou on his own and Representatives of Hohhot Third Headquarters:** 9th March 1967 from 4:50 PM to 6:30 PM (1 hour and 40 minutes) in the State Council Secretariat's Meeting Room, attended by Zhou Enlai, and representatives from his office, and personnel from the Hohhot Third Headquarters.
4. **Minutes of Talks at the Third Meeting Between Premier Zhou and Other Responsible Central Comrades and the Four IMAR Groups:** 18th March 1967 from 3:20 AM to 6:30 AM (3 hours and 10 minutes), in a small

⁹¹ *Hongweijun* – according to Tumen and Zhu 1995, 180 rebellious organisations

- meeting room in the Great Hall of the People, attended by Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Xiao Hua, Li Tianyou, Wang Li, Guan Feng, etc from the Centre, and the four IMAR groups (including Wu Tao and Gao Jinming, Wang Duo and Wang Yilun).
5. **Minutes of Talks Between the Director of the Central Investigation Delegation Comrade Li Tianyou and Representatives of the IM Teachers Institute Red Division: 18th March 1967 from 7:00 PM, in the Hohhot New Town Hotel, attended by Li Tianyou from the Centre, and Wu Tao, representatives from the *Red Flag* magazine, the *PLA Daily*, and from the Central CR Committee. Received locally by representatives of the IM Teachers Institute Red Division.**
 6. **Minutes of Talks Between Premier Zhou and Other Responsible Central Comrades Meeting on their own with Representatives of the IMAR Party Committee: 30-31st March 1967, from 9:40 PM to 1:00 AM (3 hours and 20 minutes) in the Fujian Room of the Great Hall of the People, attended by Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Li, Guan Feng, Yao Wenyuan, and representatives of the Central CR Committee, the office of Zhou Enlai, and the State Council, and key representatives of the IMAR Party Committee Gao Jinming, Wang Zaitian, Li Shude, Kang Xiuming, Li Zhi, and Wang Yilun and Wang Duo.**
 7. **Minutes of Talks at the Fourth Meeting Between Premier Zhou and Other Responsible Central Comrades and Representatives of the Four IMAR Groups: 6 -7th April 1967 from 10:32 PM to 2:12 AM (3 hours and 40 minutes) in the north east meeting room on the first floor of the Great Hall of the People, attended by Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Xiao Hua, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Li, Ye Qun (Lin Biao's wife), Li Tianyou etc (a total of 25 people from the Centre), and Gao Jinming, Quan Xingyuan, Li Zhi, Zhang Lu, Wu Tao, etc from IMAR. (It is noted that Wang Duo and Wang Yilun were specifically excluded from this meeting).**
 8. **Minutes of Talks Between Comrades Chen Boda and Kang Sheng Meeting with Zhou Wenxi, Representative of the Hohhot 'East is Red' Peasant Rebellious Commune: 7th April 1967 from 3:00 PM to 5:30 PM (2**

- hours 30 minutes) at Zhongnanhai Central compound, attended by Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and representatives from the Liaison office of the State Council, and from the Hohhot 'East is Red' Peasant Rebellious Commune.
9. **Minutes of Talks at the Fifth Meeting Between Premier Zhou and Other Responsible Central Comrades and Representatives of the Four IMAR Groups:** 12 -13th April 1967 from 11:50 PM to 1:45 AM (1 hour and 55 minutes), in the Anhui Room of the Great Hall of the People, attended by Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Xiao Hua, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Li, Guan Feng, Yao Wenyuan etc from the Centre, and representatives from the IMAR Party Committee, the Military Region, the Hohhot Third Headquarters, and the 'Red Guard Army.'
10. **Minutes of Talks at the Sixth Meeting Between Premier Zhou and Other Responsible Central Comrades and Representatives of the Four IMAR Groups:** 13-14th April 1967 from 11:00 PM to 2:50 AM (3 hours and 50 minutes) in the East Meeting Room of the Great Hall of the People, attended by Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Xiao Hua, Wang Li, Li Tianyou and other leaders from the Centre, and the four groups from IMAR.⁹²

For the timings of the meetings, five began in the late evening, and ended after midnight. One (Doc 4) took place from 3:20 AM to 6:30 AM. These timings are consistent with other testimony that the key participant, Zhou Enlai, maintained a ferocious time-table, holding meetings deep into the night, and that these specific talks were held to accommodate his other commitments.⁹³ Such anti-social hours also indicated a sense of urgency and crisis.

Secondly, the setting for the meetings ranged over all the locations of centralised power – various meeting rooms in the Great Hall of the People, but also meeting

⁹² Throughout this text the documents are referred to according to the numbers given in this list.

⁹³ Six years later, David Bruce, the first director of the US Liaison Office in Beijing, noted in his diary on 22nd May that the American journalist visiting Beijing at the time, Marquis Childs, had been granted a meeting with Zhou after being summoned at 11:00 PM at night. The meeting lasted till 2:30 AM (Bruce 2001, 74). The British diplomat Percy Craddock, then working at the Office of the British Chargé D'Affaires in Beijing, also testified that Zhou regularly worked till 3:00 or 4:00 AM (Craddock 1994, 49).

rooms located in the Centre leaders' Zhongnanhai compound, and the State Council. The meetings occurred in the key power places at the Centre and dictated how they were structured, participation, and the conventions regulating what sorts of things were sayable.

Thirdly, participation by Centre leaders at the meetings increased as they proceeded. Initially Zhou Enlai was on his own. But he was subsequently joined in later dialogues by Kang Sheng, Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao, all key national figures in the CR.

As already stated (see footnote 82 above) meetings between central and provincial leaders on 'handling' local problems were by no means confined to the case of IMAR. A 'Central Committee Decision on the Handling of the Sichuan Question' was issued on 7th May 1967, as a result of a 'late night meeting' the same day. This followed a very similar format to those dealing with IMAR, issued a month earlier, with the Centre leaders speaking in turn, culminating in Zhou Enlai's judgement.⁹⁴

2.1.5 Numerical Analysis

There were material, visible signs showing the power dynamics in these documents. The following table contains very approximate numerical information about the contents of this collection. This is executed on line rather than character count. It gives some quantitative information about collection contents, in particular the amount of language attributed to Zhou Enlai, to all other Centre leaders (cited above, and indicated in the texts with bold typeface for names) and to local leaders from IMAR. The breakdown for each of these groups, in numbers of lines, and percentages, and for the collection overall, is as follows:

⁹⁴ English versions available in China Topics, Yellow Briefings 437 (Rectification –

Table 1B: '13th April Decision' Dialogues: Numerical Analysis of Lines Numbers/% Attributed to Specific Speakers

Document No	Amount of Lines/% for Zhou Enlai	Amount of Lines/% for Other Central Leaders	Amount of Lines/% for Local IMAR Leaders	Total Lines
Doc 1	116 lines 47%		130 lines 53%	246 lines
Doc 2	236 lines 64%		135 lines 36%	371 lines
Doc 3	84 lines 46%		100 lines 54%	184 lines
Doc 4	135 lines 65%	66 lines 32%	7 lines 3%	208 lines
Doc 5*		60 lines 41%	87 lines 59%	147 lines
Doc 6	42 lines 22%	147 lines 78%		189 lines
Doc 7	119 lines 47%	14 lines 6%	119 lines 47%	252 lines
Doc 8		40 lines 23%	135 lines 77%	175 lines
Doc 9	95 lines 45%	11 lines 6%	103 lines 49%	209
Doc 10	468 lines 62%	275 lines 37%	7 lines 1%	750 lines
Total	1,295 lines 47%	613 lines 23%	823 lines 30%	2,731 lines
Total for 8 meetings Zhou Enlai was present at	1,295 lines 54%	513 lines 21%	601 lines 25%	2,409 lines

23), 18th August 1967, appendix B and C.

*This meeting was held in Hohhot, with Li Tianyou as the representative of the Centre.

For these meetings the Centre leaders, including Zhou, take up from 70% to 75% of the text. This indicates which side had the power to speak, or at least, whose words the editors believed were worth recording. The final, summarising document (Doc 10) is the most dramatic, with only 7 lines apportioned to the IMAR leaders. In previous documents (with the exception of Doc 4) the local leaders had been given reasonable opportunity to speak. Doc 10 represents the issuing of judgement, for the local leaders to silently accept.

There are other quantitative indications of who has control in the construction of these dialogues. The person who, for instance, had the first word, setting the terms for the discussion and the last word, concluding it. This is indicated in the following table:

Table 2: '13th April Decision' Dialogues :First and Last Words

Document	First Words	Last Words
1	Zhou Enlai	Zhou Enlai
2	Zhou Enlai	Zhou Enlai
3	Zhou Enlai	Local/Zhou
4	Kang Sheng	Zhou Enlai
5	Li Tianyou	Local leaders
6	Kang Sheng	Zhou Enlai
7	Zhou Enlai	Zhou Enlai
8	Kang Sheng	Kang Sheng
9	Zhou Enlai	Zhou Enlai
10	Zhou Enlai	Zhou Enlai

Zhou was not present for the meetings in Doc 5 and Doc 8. For all those at which he was present, he closed the meeting, offering the final words. At the opening of meetings, apart from two occasions at which Kang Sheng spoke, Zhou Enlai also

offered the first comments. This bounding illustrates control, and the material means by which Centre leaders sought to regulate the contribution of local voices within this discourse, signifying their hegemony.

This is supplemented by typography, which indicated the precedence given to Centre leaders by the placing of their names in bold type. Forms of address also indicate attitudes to hierarchy. Zhou Enlai was referred to throughout not by name but by his formal position, 'Premier' (*Zongli*). Kang Sheng was referred to by the respectful appellation, Kang Lao. In terms of turn-taking, and the information it gives about hierarchy, Kang Sheng spoke the most after Zhou Enlai among the Centre leaders. Information about hierarchy was also contained in the listings of attendees at the beginning of each dialogue, with the following composite order:

Zhou Enlai
Chen Boda
Kang Sheng
Jiang Qing
Zhang Chunqiao
Wang Li
Guan Feng
Yao Wenyuan

Zhou heads this group because he was accepted as third in the CCP hierarchy – the traditional ranking of his position of Premier, following Mao Zedong as Party Chairman and Lin Biao as Vice-Chairman. The others were placed according to their ranking in the highest organisation in the CR, the CR Small Group, set up on 28th May 1966 and listed in the 'Central Directive' in this order (with other members) on 30th August that year.⁹⁵

A further indication of power is contained in the way in which replies by local leaders in interrogations were sometimes embedded within the Centre leaders' statements. In Doc 6, for instance, during the interrogation by Kang Sheng of Wang

⁹⁵ *Zhongguo gongchandang da cidian* (Great Dictionary of the CCP) 1991, Beijing,

Yilun, Wang's responses were placed within parentheses, and remained part of the lines allocated to Kang, signifying subordination to them.⁹⁶

These documents contained language which contributed to a process that resulted in the issuing of the formal '13th April Decision.' In this process, they moved from an investigatory register, through interrogation, to judgement. Doc 1 contained, from pages 5-8, mostly questions issued by Zhou Enlai, signifying his power to ask, and answers by the local leaders. By Doc 10 questions were no longer necessary. Certainty had been achieved. This was signified by the dominance of monovocal statement, with lengthy monologues by Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng and Chen Boda.

2.1.6 Speaker Status: Zhou Enlai, the Locus of Power

In addition to the material indications of Zhou's authority (the amount of time he was shown speaking, his ability to open and close meetings, and to set the terms for discussion), and the institutional power derived from his occupying the position of third highest-ranking person in the Party, he also derived authority from his role in the narrative of 'official' PRC history. In this, Zhou was the most widely admired of the Centre's leaders, someone accepted as a mediator between contending groups. He had enormous moral capital from his own role in the CCP history.⁹⁷ Zhou derived the right to use certain vocabularies and forms of authority, therefore, from both his institutional status, and his personal role in a dominant narrative that

415 has the full listing.

⁹⁶ Ibid 63.

⁹⁷ 'It was common ground among the foreign community that if he [Zhou Enlai] felt it was time to leave' (Craddock 1994, 49). In recent years this image has been dented by evidence that Zhou was fully aware of the full excesses of the CR, and that he actively encouraged and participated in them through his stewardship of, among other organisations, the CR Central Case Examination Group, responsible for selection of victims and evaluating interrogations of key CR targets: 'Kang [Sheng] and Jiang [Qing] were deeply involved [in the Central Case Examination Group] and no doubt had their own agendas, but in the strictest of organisational terms they were under and *for* Zhou when they ordered people to be interrogated or to "ask for a vacation"' (Schoenhals 1996b, 111: emphasis in original). Zhou is more widely recognised now as a faithful, almost slavish implementer of Mao's instructions. The image these documents convey of Zhou supports this. Zhou located his prescriptions firmly within the context of implementing and carrying out Mao's CR. His tone towards some of the IMAR leaders was savage, for instance his treatment in Doc 11,

promoted his own history being an integral part of the PRC's revolutionary genesis and development.

In Zhou's own discourse, he located power in certain sources. In Doc 10 he set out the principal locations of power and guidance:

'We must propagate Chairman Mao's instructions about trusting and relying on the masses, trusting and relying on the PLA, and majority of the cadres trusting and relying on the great masses of the people.'⁹⁸

Zhou repeated this formulation in the same order throughout his summary: Mao's instructions, and the 'three trusts.' He offered another foundation for power in an earlier formulation:

'The highest orders of the Party are in accordance with the supreme interests of the people. The interests of the Party are to represent the greatest interests of the majority of the people.'⁹⁹

The sources legitimising power for Zhou were 'Party' and 'people.' But these terms only derived meaning from the discourse in which they operated.¹⁰⁰ The 'people' in particular was a complex term. As Zhou used it here it was in fact not an all-inclusive term (thus the shift from 'people' to 'majority of the people' in the passage above). The 'majority of the people' evidently excluded the 'bad elements,' the traitors and enemies that Zhou referred to elsewhere – those who have been termed the 'non-people.'¹⁰¹ How could these be a basis for legitimate power? But it was the grounds for inclusion in the good 'majority' that mattered. Did inclusion allow articulations of an identity encompassing national minority status or was it an attempt to impose a unified identity to which this sort of assertion of specific identity was a threat? This is a critical question in this thesis. Zhou's use of the term 'people' here was therefore not as bald a statement as it appears. While no conditions for its application and membership were set out, underlying it was a view of unity, and conditions on who could and could not be included. Dictating who the 'majority of

101 of the Wangs.

⁹⁸ Ibid 112.

⁹⁹ Ibid 99.

¹⁰⁰ See Chapter One, 1.5.

the people' were, and what terms were applied for membership was a key device for control in this discourse.

Zhou offered one additional indication of his right to use 'authoritative' registers. This is inferred from the importance he placed on following the instructions of the Centre (*zhongyang* – coterminous with the Central Committee) and of him speaking on behalf of the Centre, with its sanction. Citing the Centre as a source of authority however was not straightforward. The Centre was not a monolithic, unchanging entity, but a collection of leaders, institutions, organisations, some of them newly created to implement the CR. There were conflicting and contending claims to authority and influence between these constituent parts. When Zhou spoke in the dialogues of the need for IMAR leadership to implement the instructions from the Centre, he based the authority for this on the instructions of the Central CR Group, a key implementing entity from the CR period.¹⁰² But this was authoritative because its power was based on 'the higher authorities' – Mao, the Party, and Party ideology (Mao Zedong Thought). He stated at one point the various sources of authority:

'What is revolutionary organisation? To accept the leadership of Chairman Mao, and the Central Committee of the CCP, to take the path of socialism, to follow the "16th May Notice."¹⁰³

These can be arranged into the following categories:

Personal:

- Chairman Mao
- Vice Chairman Lin Biao
- The People

Organisational

¹⁰¹ Schoenhals 1994.

¹⁰² Ibid 48.

¹⁰³ Ibid 22. The '16th May Notice' was the launch document of the CR, resulting from a Politburo meeting at which Lin Biao had claimed a possible *coup d'état*. The document declared war on the revisionists and bourgeoisie in the Party. The practical impact of the circular was the establishment of the Central CR Group. Full text of the notice can be found in *Guoshi tongjian* vol 3, 445-447.

- The Central Committee of the CCP.
- The Party
- The Central Revolutionary Committee
- The PLA - specifically the Central Military Commission
- The 'good cadres'

Ideological

- Socialism
- Mao Zedong Thought
- Marxism-Leninism

Textual

- The '16th May Notice'
- The Centre's 'Principles on the Decision about the Problem of Qinghai.'
- The Centre's 'Decision and Comments (*piyu*) on the Problem of Anhui'
- The Central Military Committee's 'Ten Orders'
- The Central Party's '21st February Notice'
- The Central Military Commission's 'Eight Orders'

(The last five of these documents are stipulated for wide dissemination in IMAR in the eighth article of the '13th April Decision.'¹⁰⁴)

All of these were appealed to on separate occasions by Zhou and other Centre leaders to the local leaders as a basis for authority and authoritative utterance. Power during the CR in IMAR was materially manifested and carried by these separate entities and documents. They contained, in different ways, the symbolic capital and represented the market in which power and discourses competed.

There were dynamics and negotiations between these. The clearest statement on this question of the regulation of the relationship between these forces and the way in which power was negotiated between and through them came from Mao's chief propagandist, Chen Boda, who stated:

'Only with the great, glorious, correct CCP led by Chairman Mao, only with limitless faith in the masses, with the people full of faith in the CCP, can we then issue this kind of decision. This is a great victory for the proletarian CR path of Chairman Mao, a great victory for our proletarian CR! A great victory for the People! A great victory for the correct leadership of the Party! A great victory for all of the PLA!'¹⁰⁵

The symbolic capital of Chairman Mao, the CCP, the 'majority of the people', and PLA were all interlinked, and made one systematic whole. This constituted a discourse of power, discourse in the Foucauldian sense of elements that make no sense in isolation but need to be put together, and understood together, in order to produce meaning, not just in terms of language, but organisationally, socially, and ideologically.

One final aspect of power signified within these texts concerns the methods used to indicate the dynamics between the various speakers and groups. This involved the order the speakers were given, and the length of time and kind of language they were allowed. It was also indicated by the deference shown to speakers with the implication of status and hierarchy among them - the register used towards Zhou Enlai for instance. In his remarks in Doc 10 Xiao Hua made statements grounded on what Zhou had previously said, marking clearly that his basis for authority was located in Zhou.¹⁰⁶

In these documents power was not an abstract entity. It was something shown being used, felt and suffered. Power and authority were exercised through individuals, working within processes, institutions or systems which supported and promoted their strategies to influence and attain hegemony.¹⁰⁷ The sorts of authority listed above were only visible and effective through the personnel who voiced and articulated them, who 'represented' them and 'spoke on their behalf.' At the heart of this system lay the status conferred on specific 'mouthpieces' – Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Chen Boda. People whose position 'symbolised' the power accrued by the

¹⁰⁴ Ibid 2.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid 114.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid 117.

¹⁰⁷ Qiu 1998 gives a privileged description of this 'culture of power' and the processes of personalisation. She was the daughter of one of the generals linked to Lin Biao, who was incarcerated after his death in 1972.

Centre, and who made its exercise of power visible and meaningful. These specific figures had authority, and spoke not just for themselves but on behalf of the collective enterprise of 'the Centre.' They existed in a context in which their very acts of saying something gave it importance beyond its literal meaning. That Zhou said something was as important as what he said.

2.1.7 Local Participation

The local organisations who participated in the documents worked in a different market, and a different value was conferred upon their voices. In organisational terms, the most formally prominent entity was the IMAR CCP, and the Military District. The Third Headquarters and the 'Red Guard Army' were recently set up rebellious organisations, whose influence was dependent on the CR movement. Within the Party, Gao Jinming as chair of the IMAR CRC, and Quan Xingyuan as vice chair were the key personnel, followed by Wang Zaitian, Li Shude and Tang Xiuming, all of whom held prominent positions within the IMAR CCP. Wang Yilun and Wang Duo were also prominent members, the first as secretary. These latter two, however, were removed from power during the course of these dialogues. They were explicitly excluded from the meetings from 6th April onwards during the critical judgement period, after accusations of being the chief followers of Ulanfu in IMAR. For the Military District, Wu Tao was the chief representative. None of these local figures, however, made any significant statement recorded in these talks.

The dynamics of power between these figures becomes clear in the material issued locally in IMAR, where they were given more voice (see Section Two in this chapter). Extra-textual evidence shows that these talks were also a negotiation in which IMAR groups vied with each other for sanction from the Centre, competing to claim the symbolic capital released when Ulanfu was felled, and which they felt it was in the Centre's gift to dispense. Wang Duo explained the general agendas pursued by the new informal loyalist and rebellious groups.¹⁰⁸ A complicated local geography of power was evident, with military, government, and rebellious groups involved. Viewing these texts as a negotiation means the Centre can be seen as

¹⁰⁸ Wang 1992, 504-5.

acting like a judge, trying to resolve these differences and imposing a solution, through a 'discourse of management.' In these dialogues, the articulation of local interests was carefully managed. The language adopted by the local leaders and groups was subservient - offering evidence, serving as witnesses in a form of trial. Their voices therefore belonged overwhelmingly to the statement/answer registers. This signified their subordinate states, and their need to accept the terms of the discourse of the Centre, rather than presenting their own.

2.1.8 Themes

Each document in this collection pursued specific, discrete themes, framing the agenda of the discourse:

Doc 1: Interrogative register, prompted by the death of the student Han Tong, on 5th February 1967, and a desire to ascertain the general features of the current situation in IMAR.

Doc 2: Interrogation of representatives of 'Third Headquarters' and 'Red Guard Army' about their activities. Prescriptions on how the groups should continue to act.

Doc 3: Questioning of the 'Third Headquarters.'

Doc 4: Statements by leaders from the Centre about the kidnapping of *Red Flag* and *PLA Daily* journalists in IMAR.

Doc 5: Visit by representatives of the Centre to IMAR to investigate these kidnappings, and assert central control in IMAR.

Doc 6: Interrogation and denunciation by central leaders of Wang Yilun and Wang Duo.

Doc 7: Testimony by members of the Third Headquarters of violence in IMAR.

Doc 8: Questioning of local peasant group.

Doc 9: Final questioning of local groups, primarily about the reasons for their detainment of people.

Doc 10: Issuing of '13th April Decision.' Statements from leaders from the Centre.

The material fits into three broad categories: interrogation/questioning, statement (of evidence, etc) and finally judgements/issuing of decisions. The overall process of the documents was from questioning and statement/answer to judgement. This semi-legalistic process conferred an element of credibility. This was supplemented by the inclusion, at the beginning, and after Docs 1 and 2, of telegrams, resulting from the meetings, and summoning more witnesses to Beijing to participate. It was strengthened further by the physical relocation of the meetings to IMAR in Doc 5, and by the kidnapping of *Red Flag* and *PLA Daily* journalists recorded there, symbolically important because of its illustrating blatant violations of central directives and loss of control by the Centre. This provoked the need to reassert this control.

One element present throughout the dialogues was a sense of violence. The meetings in Beijing were necessitated by the shooting of the student, Han Tong. But the violence did not end there. Docs 7, 8 and 9 contain testimony on violence and forced detainment practised by local groups, with comment from those that practiced it and those that suffered it.¹⁰⁹ A witness called Bao Changsheng gave evidence of suffering, before one of the representatives of a group that had detained him.¹¹⁰ This direct confrontation with those who suffered brought the world of struggle and conflict which had prompted these documents into the texts themselves. Zhou in his final statements in Doc 10 explicitly outlawed violence:

'The Preparatory Small Group should consider this, there should be no

¹⁰⁹ The lengthiest and most detailed testimony of violence is given by Zhou Wenxi in Doc 11, 77.

¹¹⁰ Ibid 84

attacks. Without exception armed struggle is forbidden, and it is forbidden to hit, strike, rob, search houses, and seize people.’¹¹¹

Zhou’s exact formulation of the forbidden acts of violence was formalised by being incorporated into the ‘13th April Decision’ under Article Six. This was an example of the words from the dialogues then being made into prescriptive, impersonalised rules – of the process of formalisation which the dialogues illustrated in their culmination into the articles set out in the ‘13th April Decision,’ and of the imposition of authority through and by them.

The dialogues mirrored the violence of the context in which they were produced by the verbal violence they contained - the strong and intimidating denunciations, for instance, by Kang Sheng of Wang Yilun.¹¹² This also involved the violating act of Kang Sheng holding up what he claimed was a nude picture of Wang Yilun’s lover, a Chinese working as a spy for the USSR. Such physical props were deployed in a context in which the maintenance of social ‘face’ and integrity was important for credibility, for having social value and influence. These verbal attacks effectively struck, as speech acts, at the ‘face’ of a person, defacing and destroying it. Undermining a subject’s social position both to themselves and to an audience was one of the key objectives of struggle campaigns. Kang Sheng, in his aggressive and highly personalised language, pitted his own authority (which had higher currency as a leader from the Centre) against a local leader, questioning Wang’s testimony of his activities in the USSR in the 1930s, and his contribution to the revolution. In Doc 10, Kang offered a lengthy account of his own time in the USSR during this period, contradicting Wang’s own statement that he could not recall ever having met him despite being in charge of all CCP students studying in Moscow at that time. This irreparably damaged Wang’s credibility, culminating in Kang labelling him ‘a devil follower of the woman spy.’ Zhou compounded this by judging Wang to be ‘a bad man.’¹¹³

Violence did not figure as prominently as in other CR documents which contained far higher incidences of verbal violence – the use, for instance, of derogatory and

¹¹¹ Ibid 110.

¹¹² Ibid 102-104.

demotic terms, rudeness, and strategies of defamation of character.¹¹⁴ But the real force behind these attacks came from their emanating from Centre leaders. Kang Sheng's denunciation of Wang Yilun placed the full authority of a high ranking Centre leader against a local one. Such unequal forces in this market meant that Kang's words acted as judgements on Wang, similar to those delivered in a court of law.¹¹⁵ This itself was a form of violence, physically affecting someone's life.

In addition, because the dialogues took place over a period of two months, they were also affected by, and reacted to, the situation as it evolved in IMAR. Events did not stop with the death of Han Tong in early February. As in other areas during the CR, they continued to develop, sometimes at bewildering speed. Indeed events in IMAR necessitated the investigation team led by Li Tianyou visiting there in March to look into recent problem of journalists being taken into custody by local factions. What had been the leaders' priorities when they first convened were superseded by other more pressing ones over the course of the two months. The initial priority (addressing local grievances over the death of Han Tong, and sorting out which factions should receive the support of the Centre) developed into a more urgent process of imposing central control and stability by the end-period of the dialogues by putting in place new personnel chosen by Beijing.

2.1.9 Key Term

Power and the signification of power among individuals was a crucial issue in these documents. The key terms used in the discourse they contained connected to issues involving the negotiation of power. The term 'seizure of power' (*duoquan*), for instance, indicated anxiety about the location of power, of who currently had control in the market of forces wherein the currency of powers was established and the role of the language in these documents negotiating this. 'Seizure of power' was a term with good pedigree in the CR. The *Dictionary of Modern Colloquial Chinese* notes

¹¹³ Ibid 100.

¹¹⁴ See *IM Daily* 29th March 1968, 5, in which an associate of Ulanfu was called a 'small pest,' 'chameleon,' 'Ulanfu's turtle bastard,' 'bastard,' 'dog,' etc. Red Guard use of rudeness in their material is dealt with by Perry and Li 1993, section two.

¹¹⁵ Wang Duo even referred to the '13th April Decision' as 'the death sentence on Wang Yilun and me' (Wang 1992, 517).

that the term was used frequently from 1967-68, during the setting up of CR committees to 'seize the power' of 'capitalist roaders.' In that context it was used in Shanghai during the establishment of the commune in the 'January Revolution' of 1967. Mao himself had said then that 'the leftists seizing power, this is a good direction (to go in).'116 An article in the *IM Daily* on 24th January 1967 headed 'Every Member of the Proletariat Must Immediately Take Action, Implement the Great Alliance, and Completely Seize All Power' (*yiqie daquan tongtong duoguolai*) had accelerated the push by the many factions recently set up in IMAR to move on the more traditionally accepted centres of power.¹¹⁷

'Seisure of power' is used in various formulations 47 times in these documents, forming part of the accusation against the enemies in IMAR that were described and finally labelled. Sometimes members of the Third Headquarters and 'Red Guard Army' groups stated that this was their main aim, and that the CR legitimised their desire to 'seize power' from those who no longer had the mandate to use it:

'Zeng Wensheng: ...Recently we were the ones seizing power.
Zhou: Haven't others already seized power?
Zeng: They did it falsely...'¹¹⁸

In Doc 2 another participant of the local factional struggles talked of 'seizing power from the Postal Bureau.'¹¹⁹ Later in his first lengthy monologue in Doc 2 Zhou Enlai talked of seizing power in the context of struggle: 'The struggle to seize power is a struggle that takes a long time.'¹²⁰ Power, Zhou said, 'needs to be seized from the faction in the Party taking the capitalist road.' This was part of the positive process of power seizure, but there was a negative aspect which Zhou moved on to in a later document in which he criticised members of the Hohhot factions during a lengthy summary and list of prescriptions:

'Actually, holding big meetings to seize power... is seizing the power of the

¹¹⁶ Xiong 1993, 192. This information is supported by the entry for *duoquan* in Chao 1993, 148.

¹¹⁷ Tumen and Zhu 1995, 320.

¹¹⁸ Ibid 13.

¹¹⁹ Ibid 19.

¹²⁰ Ibid 20.

Party Committee... Can you also dictate the nature of your regional Party Committee and the political division of the Military District? Can you pick names before the Centre does? Doesn't seizing [this] power equate to seizing power [overall]? Do you have so much power?'¹²¹

In this discourse there were legitimate and illegitimate ways to 'seize power.' This was dependent on signifying separate centres from which power was seized and to which it was allocated, along with the process whereby this was done, and the evaluation of which of these were regarded as appropriate and legitimate. This necessitated a rich nomenclature of terms to map and describe this process – 'grasp' (*zhangwo*), 'determine' (*dingxin*), and the single term 'power' (*quan*). Zhou returned to this issue of legitimated 'power seizure' in a later dialogue with faction leaders:

'You continue to support one faction seizing power, forcing down another faction. You say seize power, and that the Centre then recognises this, but that's impossible.'¹²²

Parameters were set for the operations of power seizure, and for the spaces in which this term could be used within this discourse. The definition of the Centre was presented as the correct one. This exemplifies linguistic hegemony in a localised context. Zhou repeated the anxiety over local factions seizing power and assuming the Centre thereby immediately recognised this in the final document:

'Do you believe... that just because you seize power the Centre will recognise it, but that is impossible. How could the Centre be like that? Only the Nationalists could do that. What do you think the Centre is?'¹²³

The term 'seizing power' operated in a vocabulary rich with terms for struggle, conflict, and legitimacy. It assisted the imposition of hegemony from the Centre by legitimising certain means of gaining power within the discourse and outlawing others through giving an accepted conventionalised vocabulary to these processes. A similar process occurred in the labelling of enemies and the acts associated with them, thereby denoting a zone of acceptable and unacceptable acts, and statuses.

¹²¹ Ibid 47.

¹²² Ibid 73.

¹²³ Ibid 99.

2.1.10 The Labelling of Enemies and the Strategies for their Exclusion

These dialogues plotted a process of enquiry and interrogation moving towards the issuing of statement and prescription, accompanied by a refinement of certain terms to accord more closely with central usage. But they also saw a process of devising and applying conventionalised labels for enemies. The dialogues did not use the terms common at the time of 'hidden enemies' or 'enemies sleeping at our side' but the problem of who in IMAR was responsible for following the same line as Ulanfu and his masters, and the articulation of this in the discourse was important.

The labels and nomenclature for enemies was meaningful within the context of the master narrative described in Chapter One 1.7. These dialogues showed this process in action, with the suppression of the role of some previous CCP personnel from the history of the Party's struggles in the 1920s and 1930s and the accentuation of that of others. As the CR proceeded, a narrative was articulated within which claims were made about a group of 'splittists' keen to link up with the Mongolian People's Republic. It claimed that these enemies had been actively working within IMAR since the 1920s, continuing their activity underground after 1949. There were close parallels between the story centrally promoted of Liu Shaoqi and his treachery, and this local version. After identifying who the specific leaders of this group were in IMAR, it was then a case of 're-evaluating' their history in terms of the new master narrative.

While Kang Sheng did not specifically allude to Wang Yilun's harbouring splittist intentions at this stage, he did hint that Wang's account of his own history of working for the Party while in Moscow, of coming back to the sacred revolutionary locus of Yan'an, of the key moments in the life of a revolutionary such as entering the Party (and who had been the member to have effected this) was fabricated. In Kang's final attack on Wang he proposed and authorised a new narrative. In this, Wang had not worked for the CCP in Russia, but had been investigated at Yan'an. The conclusion of this had been that his 'history was unclear.' In the end, he 'was not a communist, not a revolutionary, not a leftist.'¹²⁴ His history contained

¹²⁴ Ibid 104-105.

contradictions and hiddenness. Here lay the space for treachery. This was the first step towards a more explicit narrative used later in the campaign, towards the end of 1967, when the existence of IMPP and its history were articulated (first to a restricted audience, and then, from 1968 onwards, publicly). At this stage, the general accusation of following the USSR within the terms laid out by the Centre was deployed as a means to reduce the credibility and influence of targets like the Wangs.

This process was supplemented by a 'moral/psychological' narrative, something that arose from the Manichean universe created by the ideology promoted during the CR. Chen Boda stated in the final dialogue:

'Now there is this sort of situation occurring, of bad people doing bad things, and of the good doing bad.'¹²⁵

This passage implied that there are certain people who were irrevocably bad, and that their badness was an unchanging quality in their character. The good, however, sometimes committed bad actions, but this did not change their intrinsic character. The only issue was to establish why they made this mistake. Zhou supplemented this in his concluding judgements when, specifically about the problem in IMAR, he stated that 'if bad people were not stirring things up, things wouldn't come to this pass.'¹²⁶ The idea of a set amount of people in society who are 'bad' and who had to be attacked was enshrined as an objective of the CR since its announcement in the CCP Central Committee 'Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Revolution' on 8th August 1966. This had divided people into four classes, with the good and comparatively good making up 'the vast majority.'¹²⁷ The final objective of the CR was to unite this 95% of cadres into the 'revolutionary left.'¹²⁸

¹²⁵ Ibid 115. Chen Boda returned to this theme at the meeting on the 27th April when he talked of Wang Yilun being a 'bad person doing bad' and of other comrades in the PLA being 'good people making mistakes' (Doc 11b, 24).

¹²⁶ Ibid 100,

¹²⁷ Schoenhals 1996a, 38-39. In fact, the '95% good, 5% bad' figure had a long history. Mao had referred to this in a speech made in 1959 (Schram 1974, 148) harking back to a position articulated in the party in the 1920s and 1930s.

¹²⁸ Schoenhals 1996a, 36.

These texts showed figures like Wang Yilun and Wang Duo clearly determined as enemies. There was a concurrent process of exclusion from participation in the discourse. In Doc 6, during the interrogation of Wang Yilun by Kang Sheng and Zhou Enlai, Wang's responses were not allocated specific lines, but either embedded in words attributed to the speakers from the Centre, or set apart in parentheses.¹²⁹ In Doc 7 and 9 both Wangs were specifically noted as being 'excluded' from the meeting. They did not figure in any of the lists for meetings after this, and it must be assumed that they were forbidden from attending. This textual indication of their 'subjugation' paralleled their own fall from full representation in the text to parenthesised, marginalized presence, and finally absence. In the last document, they were talked of in the third person (Zhou: 'Wang Yilun represents this sort of person.'¹³⁰) This journey from direct representation in the text to one of being judged, without right to response or voice, *in absentia* symbolised the process of loss of power that those who were victims of the CR experienced.¹³¹

2.1.11 Impact on CR in IMAR from the '13th April Decision': Sanction for Public Attack on Ulanfu

On its title page, this document was marked as an 'internal' publication for restricted circulation. This gave its initial readership a privileged position. The access to the meetings themselves, indicated in the separate documents, was carefully controlled. Zhou stated at the end of Doc 1 that 'it is not necessary to bring your secretaries tomorrow. The Party Committee, Military District and other groups just need one worker, that's enough.'¹³² Apart from Wang Yilun and Wang Duo's overt and signalled exclusion, there were also cases (in Docs 3, 5, 6 and 8) of meetings held with specific groups to the exclusion of others.

The attendance at the meetings is tabulated below. Asterisks indicate that the figure is approximate because of 'etc's in the text. Crosses indicate that only groups are

¹²⁹ Ibid 62-64.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 105.

¹³¹ It is represented most vividly in the CR martyr, Zhang Zhixin, who, it is recorded, before her execution in 1975 by firing squad, had her vocal chords cut so that she was unable to shout out before her death (see Jin 1993, 91).

¹³² Doc 11, 14.

listed as being in attendance without detailing specific numbers:

Table 3: `13th April Decision Dialogues': Levels of Attendance at Meetings:

Doc No	Central Attendance	Local Attendance
1	2	+
2	3	25
3	4	6*
4	8*	23
5	+	5
6	9*	10
7	36	76
8	4	+
9	14*	113
10	6*	+

In purely numerical terms, local participants outnumbered those from the Centre at all these meetings. Docs 7 and 9 indicate particularly large attendance. The other meetings, where figures or indications were given, were tightly restricted. There were criteria for the right to attend these meetings – permission to participate based on rank, on holding representative positions in organisations with objectives relevant to the Centre's agenda. The Centre had the right to set out these criteria, to say who could and could not attend. This was material control over the context of the meetings.

Another reason why the attendance at these meetings was carefully managed was the sensitivity of one of the central objectives – the articulation of a strategy to openly attack Ulanfu in IMAR. Although Ulanfu had been effectively disempowered since the Qianmen Hotel meeting in 1966, and was formally dismissed from his position as IMAR Party Secretary in August of that year, there had not as yet been any direct public attacks on him. This was changed by the simple announcement by Zhou in Doc 10 that `the problem of Ulanfu, the capitalist roader in the Party should be openly exposed in IMAR.'¹³³ Ulanfu was from this moment available for public

¹³³ Ibid 107.

attack.

The result of this was the publication of 'Strike Down Ulanfu' in *IM Daily* on 29th August, the first official attack to appear in the paper which named Ulanfu directly. From the publication of this article, Ulanfu became widely labelled as the symbolic and actual representative of Liu Shaoqi and the 'capitalist, anti-Party line' in IMAR. Attacks naming him had appeared before this date in IMAR, but only in local materials with limited circulation.¹³⁴ The *IM Daily* sanctioned further attacks of increasing levels of verbal ferocity, and greatly increased the scope of the anti-Ulanfu campaign. The Centre's dialogues on the problem of IMAR showed a partial process of sanctioning these open attacks on Ulanfu, of placing his proper name within a specific discourse, to perform a negative, oppositional function. The 'enemy sleeping at our side' who had mostly been referred to obliquely till then was now explicitly labelled.

An issue associated with participation is the ways of signifying the attitude of the central leaders to the audience they were addressing (this was especially clear in larger meetings like Docs 7 and 9). The participants at these meetings symbolically represented all the people of IMAR. It was on this basis that they were present. So while an authoritarian attitude was shown in specific encounters between leaders from the Centre and local ones in these documents, the audience as a whole represented a powerful constituency, and one which had to be appeased and satisfied. These texts give indications of extra-textual audience reaction - laughter, shouting, chanting of slogans. This culminated in the penultimate dialogue where the text indicated that the audience 'rise to their feet and shout: Long life to Chairman Mao! Long life! A long, long life!'¹³⁵ This ritualistic chanting of a generic slogan from the Centre was repeated by both the single voice of Zhou, and of the 'rebellious factions' at the end of the final meeting, showing an elision between the Centre and the region. The voices of each were as one, saying the same thing. A similar attempt to enlist the support of the audience occurred when Kang Sheng used a photo of a nude woman he claimed was once a lover of Wang Yilun (referred to in

¹³⁴ See, for instance, the pamphlet published on 29th June attacking Wang Duo discussed below in 2.2.3.

¹³⁵ Doc 11, 86.

the previous section). This elicited laughter.¹³⁶ It was also indicated in the climax of approving applause as Chen Boda made his final contribution in Doc 10 by praising Zhou Enlai¹³⁷ and called for 'protecting the relationship between the people and the PLA like a precious pearl.'¹³⁸ At these moments, the paradigm was promoted of the Centre leaders and local people speaking with one voice, according to common beliefs, with a common language. This language was the location of negotiations for its terms between the Centre and the locality, and the carrier and expression of hegemony.

2.1.12 We, I, You

The use of 'we,' 'I' and 'you' within the text relates to participation, to who was included and excluded by these terms. It also relates to the issue of how a collective voice, by claiming to speak on behalf of 'everyone,' was created, along with the question of who was granted the right to use this voice. Zhou set out these polarities between 'we' and 'you' in his first lengthy monologue in Doc 2. He talked of 'our great leader Chairman Mao,'¹³⁹ implying a collective project, verging on ownership, either by or of Mao. But in the details of his dialogue, the world split between the addresser, who is either 'I' or 'we' and the addressed, 'you.' There was a process from 'I' to 'we,' with the grander claims that 'we' can make, and the greater prestige accorded to this in this discourse:

'Zhou: ... You minds are a little overheated. Have you not thought, without Chairman Mao's leadership, or the protection of the PLA, how can you implement greater democracy? I know you haven't thought of this question, you are rubbing blackness on the face of the PLA. (The Premier angrily stands up) ... Among you there are quite a few leftists, I acknowledge that you are leftists, but in this matter you are mistaken, with people dying can you act like this? We do not know how many PLA soldiers heroically sacrificed themselves, so can we act like this? ... Comrades, you have struck mistakenly, you have struck Chairman Mao's PLA. Even if the Red Guards are wrong, we still can't say that (about) our Red Guards, not even publish it in papers. We can't curse them, nor speak about them, but need to protect the

¹³⁶ Ibid 104.

¹³⁷ Ibid 113.

¹³⁸ Ibid 115.

¹³⁹ Ibid 21.

honour of the proletariat...'¹⁴⁰(my underlining).

The key moment in this passage is the rhetorical transition from Zhou's talking from his own perspective, to his adoption of 'we,' without specifically identifying who this 'we' was, whether the Centre, the Party, the people or the local interlocuters. But Zhou strengthened his condemnation with the use of 'we,' changing to a more demanding voice. This passage contained two voices - 'I' and 'we.' Those addressed remained 'you' (*nimen*), plural, and presumably, from context, the specific groups that Zhou had been speaking to in this dialogue, the revolutionary factions that made up part of the IMAR delegation.

Zhou's use of 'we' in his condemnation revealed much about the sort of authority the text aimed to create, and the means it used to do this. 'We' here shows the promotion of a collective voice. Although used by a speaker from the Centre, it aimed to be inclusive, and to represent the local players, bringing them into its discourse, but also setting the terms within which they were sanctioned to speak. Within the text, such attempts at inclusivity were concealed. 'We' was presented in a context where it was a given that Zhou spoke for 'all the people' as one with them. It was through this underlying collectivity that the voice had impact and moral sanction. In using the term, Zhou promoted the attitude that what was said was from a common position, articulating a belief and attitude shared by everyone.

2.1.13 What was the Problem in IMAR? The Issue of National Minorities

These dialogues articulated the terms for what 'the problem' of IMAR actually was, how it could itself be labelled and discussed. Why did the conflict there merit this special attention by the Centre? Superficially, these dialogues were precipitated by the symbolically portentous event of the killing of the student Han Tong by a soldier. This represented a direct challenge to the unity of classes because it involved a member of one good class (Han Tong, one of the 'proletarian masses') being murdered by a soldier, a member of another good class, supposedly there to protect the first. So this pivotal event can be viewed purely in terms of class.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid 19-20.

But there was another dimension to this conflict and a further way to view the narrative and discourse being created of the revolutionary struggle in IMAR in 1967. One clue to this was the specific reference in the introductory material to Docs 1 and 6 to Zhou's asking the 'name and national minority status' of participants at the meetings.¹⁴¹ The unique feature of the situation in IMAR, mentioned in Chapter One, was the presence of a numerically small but politically significant population of Mongolians. The dialogues refer to this issue briefly and obliquely. They formulated the problem of IMAR in terms that did not refer to the presence of national minorities locally, but to centrally defined political considerations - allegiance, for instance, to outside forces (USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic), with no suggestion that this could be based on membership of a national minority group viewing their identity and political priorities within an ethnic rather than class framework.

Only in Doc 8 did one of the local leaders explicitly refer to this unique characteristic of IMAR:

'Zhou Wenxi: ... There is the 'Ba Bai' Commune, the Military District sent a so-called Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team there, under the pretext of linking up, but actually they were sent to stir up mass struggle, and fabricate national minority splittism. They did it very seriously. They said the Third Headquarters was counter-revolutionary, and we should not be hoodwinked, it must immediately retreat. They said there are no good Mongolians. Originally the unity between Han and Mongolian in this village was good, but after their propagating, ethnic conflict became very serious. Kids would come out and curse Mongolians, saying every day that there were no good Mongolians.'¹⁴²

This passage combines the 'class' terms - 'mass struggle' and 'counter-revolutionary' - with those connected to ethnicity - 'splittism,' 'unity between national minorities.' The discourse contained in these documents prior to this passage had placed the IMAR issue within the context of class struggle, of struggle against the Centre. Apart from Zhou's request to know the ethnicity of participants, both local and Centre participants were silent on the question of how Han and Mongolian had interacted within the complicated situation in IMAR since 1966 and how this made

¹⁴¹ Ibid 5 and 57.

¹⁴² Ibid 79.

the CR there different.

The marginalisation of this issue is shown by the fact that the only overt statement of an ethnic dimension to the IMAR 'problem' was made in these dialogues through a local voice - and that Premier Zhou did not pursue the issue and interrogate Zhou Wenxi further about the allegations he made. In the summarisation of the issue of IMAR in Doc 10 ethnicity did not figure. The 'problems' of IMAR were signified in these dialogues through the acts of specific figures (Ulanfu, Wang Duo, Wang Yilun). This let the 'problematization' of IMAR remain largely within a class framework, avoiding overt articulation of a 'class' versus 'nationality' clash. This was evidence of a highly managed and deliberate discourse, as was its result - the promotion of the idea that the removal of Ulanfu and the imposition of a new set of leaders in IMAR had resolved this issue. Implicit in this, at this stage of the discourse's development, was the hegemony of a class-based ideology. But as the turbulent course of the CR in IMAR was to prove, the issues surrounding the presence of minority groups in IMAR with a different ethnic background to the majority Han, and the basis in this of different ideological and cultural objectives, were not to be resolved simply by exclusion.

More localised voices still had to come to grips with formulating this problem. The *IM Daily*, for instance, in articles in January and February 1968 began to talk in some detail of national minority prejudice in Ulanfu's theories, of his placing an ideology of 'grassland landlordism' against the official ideology of class struggle. Ulanfu was accused of 'destroying the unity between Mongolians and Han.'¹⁴³ An enemy counter-discourse was enunciated, inspired by what was labelled as minority priorities. This is the central issue in Chapter Three.

The profound connection between identity and membership of a national minority group, how this related to the question of the 'people' and audience, and how they were constituted in these texts was touched on in 2.1.6 above. The 'people' was presented as a source of authorisation, the major constituency to which speakers appealed. But it was also a rhetorical 'empty' term, one which was manipulated and

¹⁴³ *IM Daily*, articles 13th Feb 1968.

recreated from speaker to speaker. In the language of the Centre, the 'people' were united. Those outside it were deemed enemies of the people. Membership of a national minority group was not relevant. Han or Mongolian were presented as complete equals. Any difference between them was suppressed. This idea was difficult to promote in an area like IMAR where history, culture, and language to the Mongolians suggested differences to the Han. The imposition of the term 'people' predicated on equality and unity, while promoted as serving collective justice and fairness, in fact also aimed to neutralise and weaken the power of local identity.

Because of this, 'the people' was a critical term in this discourse, a site of conflict and contestation. Prescriptions and orders were issued on behalf of the 'people.' This was one of the main paths to the legitimisation of the demands of authority. 'We' speak on behalf of the people, and were the people. But however uncontentiously the term was placed in the discourse of Centre leaders in these dialogues, in fact it occupied a fault line along which the demands of the Centre discourse and the locality to which this spoke came into conflict. In the Centre's discourse 'people' were unified and equal. This signified a key area where the Centre attempted to dictate the framework within which identity was articulated.

2.1.14 Zhou Enlai's Final Speech: The Organising Voice of Authority

These documents represented a process from interrogation to judgement – a process towards authoritative utterance. The culmination of this was the final collection of central leaders' statements in Doc 10. Zhou Enlai made the greatest contribution to this.

It is not clear in earlier documents whether Zhou's statements, and his direction of enquiry, were controlled by specific notes or objectives that he had. Advisors were shown as being present from his Office, but they were not shown as making any interventions or contributions. The level of control, therefore, was reactive, responding to the answers given by those interrogated, dealing with the questions that arose from what they said. It was this process of enquiry that necessitated the summons to other participants from IMAR at the end of Doc 1, and the trip to IMAR to verify the situation there in Doc 5 by a delegation from the Centre.

Doc 10 was different from the other documents in both length and format. It contained significant, extended monologous presentations by Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Xiao Hua and Chen Boda. These displayed varying levels of organisation and control. Zhou's was the lengthiest, and the one which showed the most organisation. He adopted a system of numbering throughout his talks in Doc 10. The first problem was announced on page 93, at the start of the dialogue. After interventions from Kang Sheng, he pursued the second problem on page 105, the third on page 106, the fourth and fifth on page 107, the sixth on page 108, the seventh on page 110, and the eighth on page 112. He offered a marked summary on page 114. This extended system of ordering implied a process of prior organisation before the meeting, and in an arena beyond the bounds of the previous dialogues recorded. The Centre leaders had consulted amongst themselves and, on the basis of the interrogations and evidence already gathered, formulated a consistent view with a unified voice, which Zhou was now presenting. These positions were arrived at before the meeting, as Zhou spoke throughout on 'behalf' of the Centre,¹⁴⁴ and did not unilaterally arrive at the positions taken here. Nor was he making these judgements and prescriptions on the hoof. He may have been reading from a prepared text, as some of the language was formulaic and uncolloquial (the praise, for instance, of the PLA on page 116). There was a gap between Docs 9 and 10, which was the decision process. This was made either in a restricted meeting with only leaders from the Centre present, or through written communication purely among the Centre authorities.

Zhou talked about eight issues, summarised thus:

1. Condemnation of previous leaders: Summation of the events in early 1967 in IMAR culminating in death of Han Tong. Condemnation of Ulanfu and his followers, labelling of them as 'conservatives' and 'capitalist roaders,' thus placing this in the context of the condemnation of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping at the Centre. This utilised the Centre categories in the local context and created a connection between the two narratives (of central and local

¹⁴⁴ See his use, for instance, of 'we' on page 99 when expressing the dissatisfaction of the Centre in the death of Han Tong and the attempts to blame it on other students.

placing this in the context of the condemnation of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping at the Centre. This utilised the Centre categories in the local context and created a connection between the two narratives (of central and local 'revisionism'). Defence of Wu Tao at the Military District Party Committee. Apportioning of responsibility in this highly personalised context on Wang Yilun and Wang Duo. (Here Kang Sheng offered the destructive counter-narrative of Wang Yilun and Wang Duo's history analysed in 2.1.10 above.)

2. Appointment of Liu Xianquan as commander of IMAR Military District: Opposition from Zhao Yongfu, leader of the '8-1-8' faction. Connection with Russian and Mongolian revisionism.
3. Creation of the IMAR CR Standing Committee Preparatory Small Group: Prescriptions on who can join, organisationally and in terms of specific people.
4. Rectification for revolutionary cadres and mass organisations and judgement on responsibility for Han Tong's death.
5. Sanction to openly condemn Ulanfu in IMAR.
6. Order to help revolutionary organisations recover and develop: Orders to 'vigorously use and study (*huoxue-huoyong*) Mao Zedong Thought' and the 'great linking up' (*da lian he*).
7. Rehabilitate those revolutionary cadres and groups that had been labelled 'counter-revolutionary': Send Deputy Commander Teng Haiqing from Beijing to IMAR to do preparatory work before Liu Xianquan.¹⁴⁵
8. Deeply propagate the principles of the Centre's '13th April Decision' on the 'Problem of Qinghai,' along with other key Centre documents.¹⁴⁶

The first 'issue,' on which Zhou spent the most time, was concerned with offering an interpretation of the past, and an authoritative narrative, supplied from the Centre, within which to apportion blame. This was located in particular figures, not groups. The other seven issues were prescriptions about the future and what should be done.

¹⁴⁵ Liu Xianquan evidently never went to IMAR to take up this position despite what it says in the '13th April Decision.' In his speech on the 27th April Zhou Enlai said that although Liu had been appointed, he had been unable to go to IMAR because of the problems in Qinghai he had been sent to deal with (Doc 11b 1967, 14).

¹⁴⁶ Qinghai also experienced particular difficulties at this stage in the CR necessitating the Centre's intervention – see note above (interview with Wu Di, April 2003).

Some of them (specifically Issue 6) were conveyed in generic language and tied to the idiom of national campaigns ('Vigorously Use and Study Mao Zedong Thought'). Others (Issue 2 and 7) ordered specific personnel changes in IMAR.

The actual implementation of some of the actions commanded in the 'issues' above can be specified. The setting up of IMAR CR Standing Committee Preparatory Small Groups stipulated in Issue 3 was fulfilled on 18th June. The sending of Teng Haiqing to IMAR spoken of in Issue 7 occurred three days after the meeting, on the 16th April. But the open attack on Ulanfu sanctioned in Issue 5, because it required preparation, both organisationally, and in terms of public opinion, was left till 29th August.

2.1.15 From the Individual Voice to the Formal Document: The '13th April Decision'

The judgements above were only effected within the formal '13th April Decision,' which carried them to the larger public for implementation. This was issued as document number 126 in 1967, to provinces and military organisations in the PRC. Like Zhou's final speech, the '13th April Decision' set out eight issues. These followed the same order that Zhou gave in his presentation in Doc 10, the first one dealing with issues of blame and culpability, the second with the appointment of new local leaders, etc.

The '13th April Decision' lifted specific key prescriptive sentences from Zhou's speech, almost word for word. In Issue 5, for instance, the decision read:

'The problem of Ulanfu, the power seizer in the Party taking the capitalist road, may now be openly exposed in IMAR. Wang Yilun must be isolated from the region, and Wang Duo should stop work and examine his attitude, and be given over to the masses for struggle and criticism.'¹⁴⁷

In Zhou's formulation, this had been:

'Number five, the problem of Ulanfu, the power seizer in the Party taking the capitalist road, may now be openly exposed in IMAR, deeply

¹⁴⁷ Ibid 2.

and from every angle. Last year at the North China Bureau meeting he was exposed, pulled off his high horse, and dismissed as First Secretary, Committee Commander and Political Commissar of the Military Region, leaving him with only the nominal title of Chairman. From the point of view of strategy, the most important consideration was the problem of Mongolian and Soviet revisionism, so this was not put out publicly in the papers. Struggle is something that must be slowly deepened. Now there is public criticism of the power seizers in the Party taking the capitalist road, now Tiananmen also has "big character posters." Last year I urged [not to publicly criticise], this year I don't.

'Ulanfu's problem should be openly exposed in IMAR, but not put in papers... (Chi: We want to pluck Ulanfu out to struggle against). At the moment don't pluck people out to take them back. Let's talk about this later. There are already many targets for your struggle.

'Wang Yilun must be isolated from the region, actually this evening he has already been taken into custody. (Warm applause).

'Wang Duo should stop work and examine his attitude, and be given over to the masses for struggle and criticism. (Warm applause). You are responsible for taking them back, guaranteeing you do things according to the rules' ¹⁴⁸ (my emphasis).

The sentences in bold occurred in exactly the same form in the '13th April Decision.' This omitted the background information that Zhou gave (about, for instance, the reasons why Ulanfu could not be publicly exposed before). As this was a finished written document, the interventions of the other speaker (Chi) and the extra-textual indications of the approval of the audience were absent, leaving only the key commands. One of these (Wang Yilun's incarceration) had already been implemented. The '13th April Decision' was an indication, in this instance, of the Centre's commitment to a leadership change in IMAR. It was a document to publicise this.

The '13th April Decision' was a written document, as opposed to the dialogues which, while written, represented, however imperfectly, spoken communication. Its register was impersonal. It contained no sense of voice, of a 'we' issuing and authorising it. Its judgements were conveyed in formal, prescriptive language to impose rules and orders. Zhou had still needed to argue, present a case, supply background on which to base decisions in his discussion of the recommendations.

He had needed to explain why Ulanfu was not openly attacked earlier, justifying it by remarking that struggle was something to be slowly deepened. He spoke as one of the most senior office holders in the Party and government. But he also spoke as one of the longest-standing and most admired leaders of the CCP since its foundation in 1921. His basis for authority was both institutional but also personal. This did not mean that he had no need to present forms of arguments distilled in the accepted central idiom of the CR at this stage in 1967. His discourse displayed appropriate deference to the current campaigns to 'Vigorously Use and Study Mao Zedong Thought' (Issue 6), and used the condemning categories of 'capitalist roader' and 'power seizer,' working within an accepted current narrative of the 'unprecedented purpose of the CR' (returning power to the revolutionary masses). It was the combination of these rather than any single element that created a power-discourse, and legitimised Zhou's right to say what he was saying and have it implemented.

The transformation of Zhou's language to the '13th April Decision' was the culmination of a process. Context or argument was replaced by the simple function of issuing prescriptions, which were to be acted upon. The '13th April Decision' was the material distillation of the power visible in Zhou's talk, a document produced after what was seen as a legitimate and legitimating process of investigation and dialogue (albeit in the unique and restrained terms outlined above), issued in a form which was socially accepted as authoritative and thereby influential. The 'Decision' pulled together the separate voices of the Centre and local leaders, issued in a monovocal text, its language standardized, its material issuing through the established channels and in recognised forms of other central edicts. The bold passages in the excerpt above had the force of universal rules and were placed in that form - using prescriptive language like 'should' (*yingdang*), 'must' (*yao*) and 'not allowed' (*buxu*). This indicated the level of permissions and sanctions the '13th April Decision' gave, and its objective of focussing on influencing action and events. Finally, the 'Decision' distilled the public language, carrying away the restricted element of the dialogues and paring it down to the essential audience-messages. In this language Ulanfu, Wang Yilun and Wang Duo were labelled as 'capitalist roaders,' and fitted into the narrative described above of good against bad, within a

¹⁴⁸ Ibid 107-8.

covert local history linked to a national one of revisionism and treachery. These formulations of labels culminated in 'conservative factions set up by Wang Yilun and other representatives of Ulanfu, the main power seizer in the IMAR region taking the capitalist road,' a label derived from the central slogans calling Liu Shaoqi the 'main person in the Party taking the capitalist road.' This illustrated the connection between the struggle at the Centre, with the language that this was carried through, and the local one. In details of its language, the '13th April Decision' showed a process whereby the hegemonic narrative and language from the Centre was imposed on situation locally by a process of adaptation.

2.1.16 Conclusion: Process and Power

One potentially misleading issue for students of Foucault is the stress he lays on the term 'power' and the assumption that this refers to political power, and to force, coercion and hierarchy. Kendall and Wickham argue that a better definition of power in Foucault's work would be to view the word more from its separate meaning as 'energy source.'¹⁴⁹ They quote Deleuze:

'Power is a relation between sources, or rather every relation between forces is a power relation... Force is never singular but essentially exists in relation to other forces, such that any force is already in a relation, that is to say power...Power, then, is not essentially repressive: it is not possessed, but is practised. Power is not the prerogative of "masters" but passes through every force. We should think of power not as an attribute (and ask "What is it?") but as an exercise (and ask "How does it work?")'¹⁵⁰

These documents show the process of 'power,' through the various 'loci' listed above - a process whereby, after interrogation and enquiry, constituting a form of negotiation, a formal position was achieved, aimed at resolving the conflict between the various power centres involved. This position, articulated and formulated in an institutionally and socially accepted way, was then materially issued within the target environment.

Ostensibly, the dialogues support a 'top-down' model of power, with centres of

¹⁴⁹ Kendall and Wickham 1999, 48.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 50.

authority issuing diktats and orders. They show the central voices imposing a political solution on a specific locality through the promotion of a discourse – a combination of ideology, narrative and the language this was conveyed through with its institutional support. However, as the local material and the history of the CR in IMAR thereafter showed, that imposition was unsuccessful. While the ‘13th April Decision’ specifically militated against violence, from 1967 onwards, unrest increased in IMAR (peaking in 1968). The terms and framework granted to the IMAR were centred on a specific concept of ‘unity’, with no space for the articulation of local ‘national minority’ identity. This strategy to control and manage the situation by the Centre in IMAR was to prove unsuccessful, but only after a destructive and concerted campaign in which many thousands lost their lives.

Section Two: Impact of the ‘13th April Decision’ in IMAR: The Mini-Campaign against the Wangs

2.2.1 June 1967: The Felling of Wang Duo and Wang Yilun

The ‘13th April Decision’ sanctioned open attack on Ulanfu, but this was not immediately implemented. The *IM Daily* did not issue the first attack using Ulanfu’s name until 29th August. Like Liu Shaoqi in the national campaign, Ulanfu was referred to indirectly till then as ‘the biggest power holder in the IMAR Party taking the capitalist road’ (*zizhiqu dangnei zui da de zou zibenzhuyi daolu dangquanpai*). Like Liu Shaoqi nationally, Ulanfu had occupied a prestigious and powerful position for almost 20 years. His removal needed sensitive handling.¹⁵¹ Thus the time between the issuing of the ‘13th April Decision’ and the public attacks was used for preparing the main constituency in IMAR.

Part of this preparation involved a preliminary attack on the smaller fry, Wang Yilun and Wang Duo. Both Wangs had occupied senior positions in the IMAR Party structure prior to 1966. Born in 1904 in Chifeng in Inner Mongolia, Wang Yilun had studied in the USSR in the 1930s before working at Yan’an. After 1949, he had

¹⁵¹ The mechanics of this ‘erosion and destruction of authority’ are looked at in the next chapter.

occupied positions of responsibility in the Party financial department, rising to the key posts of deputy and then Party secretary of the IMAR Party Standing Committee. This was the position he occupied at the start of the CR.¹⁵² Wang Duo was born in 1912, in Liaoning Province. He too had worked in Yan'an in the late 1930's, before moving to Inner Mongolia in 1945, and occupying a number of positions in the Party there. He had also, like the other Wang, worked as the deputy secretary of the local Party, and deputy director of the IMAR CRC. Both were ethnically Han, and both had served under Ulanfu.¹⁵³

And they had other things in common. Both enjoyed brief moments of ascendancy after Ulanfu's fall in 1966. Both, as a result of the discussions in Beijing, were labelled the 'representatives' (*daili ren*) of 'the biggest power-seizer' (Ulanfu) who remained unnamed for the time being. And both were attacked at the same time – mid-1967. This brief campaign against the Wangs is analysed through two main document types: the first, articles in the *IM Daily*, and the second an example of an attack pamphlet issued against Wang Duo in June 1967. Similar genres of material are looked at in the larger campaign of attack from August 1967 onwards after Ulanfu's public naming. This campaign showed that the '13th April Decision' created both the overall administrative framework (through the imposition of new personnel and through legitimising the setting up of new organisations) and the vocabulary through which to implement new forms of attack, against new targets. It also achieved this through the sponsoring of a new narrative, one in which the functions and role of the Wangs was reinterpreted, and they moved from being people in authority to figures of disgrace.

2.2.2 Mechanisms of Implementation

The '13th April Decision' was facilitated by the setting up of the IMAR CR Preparatory Committee, on 18th June, which issued a document on 1st July: 'How to Implement the Central Party 13th April Decision.' Large public meetings became a

¹⁵² Chi 2000, 507.

¹⁵³ Ibid, 516. Although Wang was effectively removed from power, he continued to be director of the Price Commission under the IMAR CRC until September 1968. Like Wang Duo, he was to return to power after the CR (*Nei Menggu zizhiqu zhi*

key means of disseminating the decision, after the founding of the Preparatory Committee. The *IM Daily* reported one held on the evening of 27th June at the Hohhot sports stadium, attended by '100,000 people.'¹⁵⁴ The meeting was labelled as a 'cable broadcast meeting' (*youxian guangbo dahui*) sponsored by the Third Hohhot Group.¹⁵⁵ The participants were the Third Group, Hohhot Railway Bureau, Hohhot suburb peasants, IMAR PSB, IM Teachers College, and 'representatives of proletarian groups from Hohhot organisations and work units.' These represented the key constituency in Hohhot for the '13th April Decision.'¹⁵⁶

The IMAR article presented this meeting on a metaphorical and an ideological level. Like the articles describing Mao's reviewing of the Red Guards in Tiananmen Square in 1966-67 at the beginning of the CR, great attention was paid to the physical context of the meeting, and its implicit signification. The article described the 'battle-like atmosphere' (*zhandou qifen*). Participants from the various organisations were described as 'raising the red flag, and holding the "Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong" in their hands,' making the stadium into a 'red sea.' The article described the people chanting ('Long live Chairman Mao!') before the 'targets' of the struggle were brought in. At this point the slogans changed from positive to aggressive: 'We will strike whoever seeks to bring back capitalist revisionism.' The slogans then became localised, with one indirectly referring to Ulanfu when it demanded 'resolutely strike the current overlord and his representatives Wang Yilun and Wang Duo.'

The ideological context of the article was explicitly from the '13th April Decision,' a document mentioned in the first paragraph as something that was to be 'resolutely implemented' (*jianjue guanche zhixing*). 'Seizure of power' operated as a key term in this discourse, as it had in the discussions in the Centre. The process of personalisation of power contained in the dialogues is shown in the focus on the Wangs, and the unnamed 'main person' representing the ideological crimes. The '13th April Decision,' figured as a judgement, something with quasi-legal status and

2001, 413).

¹⁵⁴ 29th June 1967, front page.

¹⁵⁵ 'Cable broadcast' here probably referred to the use of loud speakers at the meeting to relay it to the audience, and to work units in the city.

authority. At points in this article the Wangs were recorded as having committed 'counter-revolutionary crimes' (*fangeming zuixing*). Values and judgements were conferred on their actions because of the context arising from the '13th April Decision.'

The report of this meeting with its 100,000 participants in the *IM Daily* was motivated by the need to promote a new narrative and ideological paradigm. It propagated the significance of the '13th April Decision,' contributing to the creation of a new narrative. The record of the meeting in the newspaper was largely bare of particularities. It contained no individual voices, nor specifics of the actual arrangements of the meeting (timings, order of events, etc). It described something highly generic. The only specific addition was the mention of local place names:

'During the current period of the capitalist counter-revolutionary restoration of power, Wang Yilun, Wang Duo and their type have used the red flag to strike the red flag, hanging the "three alliances" signboard, to oppose the revolutionary alliances. [They] have used fascistic violent methods, madly seeking to seize power from the proletariat. In February and March, these ranks of counter-revolutionary revisionists gathered their puppets, not only seizing power in organisations, factories, schools and other work units in the Autonomous Region and Hohhot, but also in most areas throughout the region. In the places and work units they seized power, they implemented capitalist dictatorship.'¹⁵⁷

The crimes imputed to the Wangs 'and their type' in this paragraph were largely signified metaphorically ('used the red flag to strike the red flag'). Reference to the place and time when the crimes were performed was also in highly general terms. A time-frame was given, but no named organisations or work units. No individual voices were quoted in the text. The record of a specific event was subsumed within a larger story, the narrative imperatives of which overrode the need to convey any impression of the meeting as a specific event on its own. The meeting was significant because of its use in carrying an ideological point.

These reports excluded the issue of national minorities, representing the ideology promoted through and because of the '13th April Decision,' revolving around class

¹⁵⁶ Wang Duo described this meeting in his memoirs (Wang 1992, 523).

¹⁵⁷ *IM Daily* 29th June 1967, 1.

struggle and a need to 'rectify the Party,' ridding it of class enemies. Splittism, and the host of other terms which were to appear increasingly from August 1967 onwards were absent.

The impact of the '13th April Decision' and its attempt to set out the parameters within which discourse could operate after its publication is seen more distinctly in an article published on the 26th June, with the cumbersome title: 'Thoroughly Weed Out the Counter-Revolutionary Restorationist Crimes Committed by those Representing the Main Person in the Faction of Power Holders in the District Party Who Take the Capitalist Road, Wang Yilun and Wang Duo.' Here the '13th April Decision' was presented as offering a key moment to expose the 'IMAR underground black headquarters' and their 'opposition' (*duikang*) to the Centre. Before the '13th April Decision' was issued, the 'black underground' had 'confused good with bad, issued every kind of falsehood, cheated the majority of the workers, prevented the peasants working, stopped production, and made people take to the streets.' The '13th April Decision' was described in this narrative as 'a verdict from a court of law' (*panjueshu*), passing the death sentence on the 'schemes of the representatives of the main person taking the capitalist road power-seizure faction in our Party, Wang Yilun and Wang Duo.' The article, after deploying legalistic language, suggested that the '13th April Decision' was the legitimate endpoint in a process of judgement and sentencing, then reverted to the language of 'street' vernacular condemnation, calling the Wangs 'bastards' (*huaidan*) whose 'dreams have been smashed.' This mixture of registers indicated the intention both to legitimise the decision to the audience in IMAR, and to impose a more emotional atmosphere of 'heated condemnation.' The Wangs 'openly opposed the "13th April Decision," and undertook measures to oppose the Centre.' Their crimes were described as being against the the Centre and the authority exercised by the Centre on behalf of 'the people.'

The issue of power was also more explicitly articulated in this article:

'These fellows [the Wangs and who they represent] have already stolen quite a lot of power from our district and organisations in it. In these places and organisations, they have hung up the signs of the proletariat, but in reality implemented the dictatorship of capitalism. The fundamental purpose of our

CR is to seize back this power, completely take it back, and place it again in the hands of the proletarian revolutionary groups.’¹⁵⁸

Power figures as a substance in this discourse, passing from hand to hand. There was the same reliance on metaphor as in the previous IMAR article analysed above (‘hung up the signs’), along with the sense of this being ‘our CR’ and the article being read to, and therefore possessed, by an audience who ‘belong.’ This audience shared similar definitions and understandings of the key terms in the passage. It used the term ‘seizing power’ rooted in the context of the CR in 1967, arising from a situation in which factions and established organisations were competing against each other for legitimacy and influence.

The audience needed to interpret messages delivered indirectly through specific language forms in this discourse. This was most evident in the careful formulations to label enemies: ‘those representing the main person in the faction of power-holders in the district Party taking the capitalist road, Wang Yilun and Wang Duo.’ There was no doubt about who this was directed at, but the text was faithful to the courtesy of not directly naming Ulanfu, despite the sanction from the Centre to do so. This demonstrated sensitivity to the need to prepare the audience, both by a process of creating a new narrative of treachery and ‘hiddenness,’ and by implying the ‘crimes’ which the newly discovered enemies have committed to a new paradigm – a new framework, in which what was once viewed as legitimate and authoritative was now discredited. Changing the symbolic value of such figures was achieved through use of a new narrative, articulated by language structures signifying legitimacy and approval.

2.2.3 Localising the Attack: Pamphlet against Wang Duo

If on one level the *IM Daily* represented the ‘official’ discourse of IMAR at this time, there was also a mass of ‘unofficial’ material – pamphlets, articles, booklets, issued by groups of varying sizes in varying qualities. One of these, issued on 29th June 1967, was entitled ‘Indignantly Denounce the Towering Crimes of Wang Duo in the Great Proletarian CR’ (*Fennu shengtao Wang Duo zai wuchanjieji wenhua da*

¹⁵⁸ *IM Daily* 26th June 1967, 2.

geming zhong taotian zuixing). The sponsoring group was the Hohhot Revolutionary Alliance Headquarters (*lianluo zongbu*). This was an 18 page pamphlet in two parts; the first 13 pages is a narrative of Wang's crimes in the general context of the CR in IMAR; the second part was a five page chronology of Wang's activities in the CR since 1966. This demonstrated the imposition of the narrative structures set in place by the '13th April Decision' being applied to the personal histories of participants in IMAR.

There were two differences between this document, and the material appearing at the same time in the *IM Daily*. Firstly, Ulanfu was directly named. This happened at the beginning of the pamphlet, in the second paragraph. Secondly, there was explicit mention of the question of national minority issues and their importance in IMAR. A further difference was the rhetorical style of the document. Its use, for instance, of addresses to the audience, of rhetorical questions, exclamations, and metaphor. All of this gave the piece a colloquial tone. There were no indications, however, of its being the verbatim report of a speech, nor of any individual author. It belongs more to the genre of polemic pamphlets issued by factions and groups to promote their viewpoint. It is not possible to say if it was performed at a meeting of any sort convened by this faction for members, though the reading of such documents in this sort of environment was common in the CR, and the colloquial and rhetorical style of the piece would have lent itself to this.

This informal register creates a sense of unity, conveying the idea that the document's voice was at one with the audience, in effect being their voice. Throughout the piece, the audience was referred to as 'revolutionary rebellious allies, comrades.'¹⁵⁹ The final sentence was a slogan calling Mao 'the reddest reddest sun in our hearts' (my underlining). The familiarity extended to the use of direct addresses to the targets of the attack: 'I tell you, Wang Duo, crying for Ulanfu is the beginning of your tragedy.'¹⁶⁰ These addresses became stronger as the piece progressed: 'You are Ulanfu's right hand man, his mouthpiece, Ulanfu's blue-eyed boy, someone in the Party who had been pushing revisionism for Ulanfu for a long

¹⁵⁹ Doc 13, 1 and 13.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid 2.

time.’¹⁶¹ Part of the technique for reducing Wang’s ‘reputation’ or status was the use of his own words against him, with an interpretation (called ‘exposure’ in this discourse) of their real ‘hidden meaning’ offered after they had been quoted. This creation of opposition between quoted words and destructive, disrespectful comment brought the language of someone previously occupying a position with status and power down to ‘street level,’ accessible to public attack, in the same way that targets of the CR were humiliated, and their bodies exposed in public to violence.

The document contextualised the current attack on Wang within an atmosphere in which power was seen as highly personalised, with the credibility and capital of some figures brought against others in an environment of competing values. Unlike the dialogues with the Centre, where the appeals to power and sponsoring authority were more indirect and understated, here there was explicit invocation of the CR being a movement ‘personally started by Chairman Mao.’¹⁶² A similar expression was used about Mao’s ‘personally issuing the “16 Articles” on the 8th August,’¹⁶³ a ‘glorious document that illuminated the road of the CR.’ Mao had the highest value and authority in this market. Wang, in this document, was shown having none, ‘madly attacking and slandering the “16 Articles.”’ Specific labels signified his crimes. His new status was now one as an enemy: ‘Wang is IMAR’s biggest political profiteer (*toujishang*), the biggest political pickpocket.’ He was described in the new narrative offered by the pamphlet as ‘continuously cheating the Centre.’¹⁶⁴ The personal narrative of running against Mao and the Centre was symbolised by Wang’s issuing his own ‘black report,’ containing language from a counter-discourse which he himself wished to impose in order to attain hegemony in the IMAR struggle: ‘This black report is equally open opposition to the revolutionary path of Chairman Mao, confusing black with white, diverting people’s attention, twisting the general direction...’¹⁶⁵ Such personal language betraying individual political ambition was brought against the ‘correct language’ of the centrally produced *Red Flag* magazine, which in this part of the pamphlet was directly quoted to counter Wang’s ‘black

¹⁶¹ Ibid 3.

¹⁶² Ibid 1.

¹⁶³ Ibid 8.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid 12.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid 4.

report.’¹⁶⁶ Explicit examples of this ‘anti-language’ were given in the slogans imputed to supporters of Wang on page 6: ‘Leader of the leftists;’ ‘Make revolution with Wang.’

This was complemented by rhetorical devices to bolster the sense of informality and thereby convey disrespect for Wang. The use of interjections like ‘no, absolutely no,’ in the course of an argument,¹⁶⁷ repetition of phrases to structure sentences (‘You’re Ulanfu’s right hand man, you’re his blue-eyed boy, you’re the person taking the revisionist road for the longest time in Ulanfu’s party’¹⁶⁸); exclamations (‘Enough!’¹⁶⁹) commenting or indicating speaker attitude; use of colloquial sentence endings (e.g., *ya*¹⁷⁰); control of the discourse by the use of rhetorical questions (‘Has Wang Duo really changed? No!’¹⁷¹); invitations to the audience to ‘please listen’ (*qing ting*¹⁷²). All this was supplemented by vulgar language (‘a bastard from the Second School Work Group.’¹⁷³)

This location of various forms of power in figures and signification of their separate and competing values in discourse was accompanied by a localisation of the themes of the national CR, adapting these to appeal to the local audience addressed in this document. Part of this was the creation of a local narrative of subterfuge and treachery. All this worked within the parameters sanctioned by the ‘13th April Decision.’ In August 1967 ‘bearing enmity to the CR and hatred to the revolutionary masses,’ Wang Duo went to the Ximeng League.¹⁷⁴ Here he was accused of ‘deliberately propagating confusing accounts of the counter-revolutionary faction’s doing revolutionary actions, and in this way... seeking to turn the revolutionary masses into counter-revolutionary ones.’¹⁷⁵ Accounts of his crimes were localised

¹⁶⁶ Ibid 5.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid 2.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid 3.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid 9.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid 9.

¹⁷¹ Ibid 11.

¹⁷² Ibid 11.

¹⁷³ Ibid 8.

¹⁷⁴ In Mongolian, Shilingol.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid 6.

through the mention of specific individuals who he had allowed to be persecuted,¹⁷⁶ (although in this text some anonymity was conferred by use of only the family name rather than the full one). The key event of this narrative was the death of the student Han Tong, the occasion which provoked the dialogues leading to the '13th April Decision.' In this document Han figured as a 'martyr' whose murder had caused 'ten million (*yi qian wan*) Han Tongs to stand up.' There is a verbal echo back to Mao's words at the seminal moment in the founding of the PRC in 1949 ('The Chinese people have stood up') offering a connection to this 'good history.' But the key thing was the attribution within this discourse and the narrative it conveyed of symbolic capital to Han Tong and his death, viewing this as symbolising victory of the weak over the oppressors. The new narrative was itself a means to liberation. The knowing of it and its terms meant knowing the means for one's own liberation.

This localised narrative contained Wang's own reaction to the central meetings after the death of Han, where he and Wang Yilun were accused of 'continuing to be the play things' of 'the dynasty of Ulanfu' (*Ulanfu wangchao*),¹⁷⁷ meeting secretly, and issuing black reports in Ulanfu's name. There was a return to the same question which had dominated the dialogues from February to April 1967: do these people have 'the Centre in their eyes? Or Chairman Mao?' 'All they had in their eyes was the dynasty of Ulanfu,' the document declared.¹⁷⁸ The dialogues had entered the narrative, forming and managing it. They figured as 'a great victory for the CR. A hymn to the victory of Mao Zedong Thought reaching to the skies.'¹⁷⁹ Value had been apportioned to them. They and the '13th April Decision' were part of a narrative leading towards final victory (see 2.2.5).

2.2.4 Localisation and the Issue of National Minorities

The process of localisation was most clear in the much stronger language dealing with the issues of national minorities in these attacks. Whereas the central dialogues had mentioned these obliquely, this document was more explicit. In the preamble to

¹⁷⁶ Ibid 7.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid 12.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid 12.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid 13.

the piece, in the second paragraph on page 1, the author referred to Wang 'selling out big time to the traitor of the Chinese people, traitor to the Mongolian people Ulanfu, whose counter-revolutionary line is "don't divide, don't struggle, don't distinguish classes - what's good for the grassland workers is good for the grassland herdlords.'" The treachery presented fitted with the account of Liu Shaoqi's 'withering away of class struggle' ideology in the struggle at the Centre. The two conflicting discourses of national minority issues and class were indicated, with a connection made very early between the hegemonistic language of class, and its precedence over all other ideological categories. In words imputed to Ulanfu on page 2, the document showed that he had aimed to allow more Mongolians to take up positions of power in IMAR, just because of their being Mongolian. This connected to the grander though still indirectly expressed political mission to promote 'splittism.'¹⁸⁰ In this document, the concept of splittism was presented as 'national minority splittism' (*minzu fenliezhuyi*), with the implication that Ulanfu had been aiming for greater power for Mongolians in IMAR. The much more damning accusation that he was aiming for something beyond this, for a complete break with the PRC, and unification with the Mongolian People's Republic, was left unexplicated at this stage. The notion of the IMPP initially formulated in confidential reports to local Party leaders in November 1967 was to become the vehicle used to convey news of this spectacular treachery.

At this point, the formulation of Ulanfu's treachery was only halfway to its full expression in later attacks on him. He was labelled 'a great traitor to the Chinese people and a great traitor to the Mongolian people.' Frank Dikötter has talked about the creation of the invention of the Han as a race at the end of the Qing dynasty, and of racial or ethnic concepts in classical Chinese.¹⁸¹ This document used two formulations - *Zhonghua minzu* and *Zhongguo renmin*, against one formulation specifically relating to the Mongolians - *Mengzu renmin*. The concept of *Zhongguo renmin* could be seen as 'people of China,' without explicit mention of the political entity extant since 1949, the PRC (there had been other 'Chinas' before 1949). This term merely related to residence or occupancy of a geographically determined space, regardless of which ethnic groups they might claim to belong to. *Zhonghua minzu*

¹⁸⁰ Ibid 2.

was much more loaded, referring to the sense of a 'Chinese people,' a concept including minority groups within the confines of the PRC, and imputing them with an allegiance to the 'Chinese state' in the specific PRC manifestation. The term has meaning within the PRC discourse of national minorities and majorities, expressing and imposing a unified status and allegiance on all the groups included in it. As in the use of the central 'we' and 'people,' there was a process of exclusion, of enforced inclusivity in this. People were spoken of as 'Chinese' first, with their ethnic categorisation subsumed within this overriding hegemonistic term. How they negotiated their identity within this term was highly contentious, especially as they needed to find space for themselves here in competition with an overwhelming majority who belonged to a national majority – the Han.

2.2.5 Victory

The central dialogues resulting in the issuing of the '13th April Decision' showed power and the expressions of power as a process, through which interests were articulated and negotiated between groups and individuals. The reception and propagation of the '13th April Decision' in IMAR showed a similar process, along with the brief campaign against the Wangs. A new narrative of threat and of an ongoing struggle ran through these discourses, of dark and hidden enemies 'sleeping at our sides' who were gradually being dug up, and the need to establish support in this battle. There were grey, confused areas in this new, evolving discourse. The full labelling of those who were eventually named as the chief enemies was too sensitive to achieve without a process of audience preparation. Another factor was that subjects like splittism were contentious, and needed careful management. The '13th April Decision' and the documents that followed it only gradually articulated these issues.

Alongside the negative language of conflict and struggle there was the positive language of victory, of a battle being waged in which victory was assured. The editorial in the *IM Daily* celebrating the first anniversary of the publication of the '13th April Decision' in April 1968 expressed this. The official register of this

¹⁸¹ Dikötter (ed) 1997, 12ff.

document, its presentation as reflecting official policy, makes it valuable for assessing and quantifying the impact of the '13th April Decision' on the discourse of the CR in IMAR.

The opening words of the editorial were in the generic CR exaltation mode:

'The first anniversary of the "Decision of the Centre on How to Handle the Problem of IMAR" personally issued by our great leader Chairman Mao has now arrived. The 13 million peoples of all nationalities in IMAR, welcome in their own battle "red letter day" in the tempestuous class struggle. Today, on the publication of the great leader Mao Zedong's personal "13th April Decision" the proletarian revolutionary factions and the great revolutionary masses in our district who limitlessly love Chairman Mao's revolutionary path, are presently eliminating [Ulanfu] the representative of China's Khrushchev in IMAR Ulanfu, along with other Party scum, waging a heroic battle for the complete victory of the CR.'

This passage ended with a direct address to the 'proletarian revolutionary factions and great revolutionary masses' to 'unite, and launch a complete new attack on the treacherous alliance of Ulanfu and his anti-Party scum.'

Such language was supplemented by images of 'the red sun shining on the grassland of IMAR,' and of Mao's directives 'illuminating the victorious future path of the CR.' The grand narrative was of a 'two year long' battle which had been waged, 'attaining great victories.' Within this context, the '13th April Decision' had started a subsidiary process of local battle and conflict, which itself had resulted in 'us achieving victory together, a great victory for the glorious limitless Mao Zedong Thought, and a great victory for Chairman Mao's revolutionary path.'

In this battle, the enemies were named as 'the small group of rightists in the Party taking China's Khrushchev's line, representatives of the Nationalists and capitalists, and counter-revolutionaries.' But they were also referred to nine times in the page-long article as 'the anti-Party scum' (*candang-yunie*). Their actions were referred to in metaphorical terms: 'stirring up ill winds, setting ghost fires, creating falsehood and lies, pointing the spear towards those in positions of responsibility in the IMAR Party Committee.' These enemy actions were complimented by those of struggle - 'restoration of power' (*fubi*), 'seizing power' (*duoquan*), 'turning over power'

(*fang'an*), all delineating the space where this struggle was to take place. The Centre's narrative of a struggle between two lines was adapted to a local context: 'The current movement of great strategic meaning to dig up the black line of Ulanfu and cleanse the revolutionary masses of Ulanfu's poison is really the continuation and development of the struggle between the two classes, the two paths, the two lines in our district.' The Centre's story was therefore transferred to the local context, with all the necessary actors and actions added.

As in the document attacking Wang Duo, the editorial addressed the audience as 'battle friends, revolutionary comrades.' This created commonality, based on a unified ideology and an acceptance of shared enemies. The common ideology was bluntly summarised as 'life is contradictory, life is a struggle' at the end of the article. The '13th April Decision' figured as the expression of Mao's thought about the local situation, imputing enormous symbolic value to it. It was itself now part of a new localised master discourse, one which people used a common voice to speak in, sponsoring unified strategies and actions.¹⁸²

But in many ways, celebrating victory in such a context was contradictory, because if all life is struggle and conflict, then victory itself, and the position it created, was soon threatened again. The situation immediately reverted to a continuation of struggle, the appearance of new enemies, and the need to battle against them once more. If the '13th April Decision' was a glorious day for the struggle in IMAR, and a step closer to naming and then attacking the hidden enemies, it was also the beginning of a new period of struggle – the time when its message was superseded and new instructions and calls needed to be given. This was the contradiction at the heart of this revolutionary discourse. The new struggle was the full attack upon Ulanfu, analysed in the following chapter.

¹⁸² The '13th April Decision' indeed recurred as a canonized source of textual authority up till 1969. On the 8th January 1969 attack on another leader, Gao Jinming (analysed in Chapter Five) it was referred to as the 'death sentence on Wang Yilun and Wang Duo.' The 'Eight Conditions' were a 'beacon, an historical document illuminating the radiance of Mao Zedong Thought... publicly opening the new start of the CR in IMAR' (Doc 39, 11).

Conclusion

The dialogues between the Centre and regional leaders showed a journey towards the production of full authoritative, prescriptive language contained in the '13th April Decision,' exemplifying a new discourse aimed at 'managing' the region by asserting the hegemony of the Centre there. This was partly achieved by using the symbolic capital of the central leaders – their prestige and authority, and their ability to promote new narratives within which local events were interpreted, creating the framework for future courses of action. The leaders at the Centre had to claim certain vocabularies in order to promote their aims locally. They needed to push a sense of unity and overriding purpose. The ethnic constitution of the IMAR did not make this easy. The strategy used by the Centre in these dialogues was to attempt to suppress the existence of these local concerns, excluding them from the discourse. The issuing of the '13th April Decision' and the campaign against the Wangs set out the parameters of the CR locally. But the version of a unified identity and a language through and by which to convey this was to become the site for great negotiation and conflict. Far from being a final statement on 'handling' the IMAR, the '13th April Decision' was only the first event in a deepening of the crisis in IMAR.

Chapter Three

The Campaign Against Ulanfu - 1967-1968

The treatment of Ulanfu, Party secretary of the IMAR CCP and Chairman of the region since its foundation in 1947, was central to the CR in IMAR. In the campaign against him the impact of the discourse arising from the '13th April Decision' is shown for the first time. In the new narrative Ulanfu symbolised much of the specifics of the IMAR situation. For over 20 years he had represented and spoken for the region. He had a unique authority there. In the new order of the CR, this was a threat, particularly because dealing with Ulanfu involved confronting the issue of the meaning of nationality in an area with minorities. The main accusation against Ulanfu was to be that he spoke for the interests of one group - the Mongolians. This was taken as destroying the unity promoted by the Centre. The strategy to reduce his political 'face' and capital involved an attack on two main areas. The first was the promotion of the ideological hegemony of class. The second was the creation of a new narrative in IMAR, based not on a minority with a specific history, through which they were identified, but a common history between all national groups, in which patterns of exploitation and narratives of oppression were shared. The attack on Ulanfu's personal authority and prestige as a means to assert the primacy of central class ideology and narrative in IMAR was the first step towards the more widespread attack on the organization, the IMPP.

Section One: General Features of the Campaign

3.1.1 Ulanfu as Symbol: His Importance in IMAR

On his death in 1988 Ulanfu was described in his official obituary as a 'reliable communist soldier, distinguished Party and state leader, outstanding proletarian revolutionary, pre-eminent nationality work leader.'¹⁸³ But only 20 years before this he was viewed differently. He was 'a counter-revolutionary revisionist,' 'minority splittist,' 'Mongolian trash,' 'an outright aristocratic herdlord' married to a 'dog

¹⁸³ Bulag 2002, 208.

wife.' The invective reached its nadir in 1968 when he was referred to in rebellious group pamphlets as a 'bastard' and 'common enemy.' His immediate family was also subject to derogatory attacks. How can one understand this journey from holding the most influential positions in the region, able to speak directly to the Centre 'on behalf' of all the people of IMAR, empowered to use the most 'power-laden' language, to becoming the passive target of attacks? This journey from one end of the power spectrum to the other illuminates the dynamics of power in the CR in IMAR. This is done through the very specific discourse that was deployed to construct his fall and signify his changing power-status.

Ulanfu is central to an understanding of the CR in IMAR. He had played a major role in the region's politics and history from the 1930s onwards. He had headed the Party in the region, had been Chairman of the local civilian government, and taken the lead role in the military district.¹⁸⁴ This concentration of formal responsibilities in one person has never reoccurred in IMAR. Ulanfu had arrived at this through a history of interaction and service to the CCP. In Yan'an in the 1940s he reputedly helped the CCP formulate their policies towards minorities. At that time he built a strong relationship with the leaders-to-be, Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi.¹⁸⁵ This paid off in the 1950s and 1960s, when his direct link to them, and his posts as alternate member of the Politburo and second secretary of the North China Bureau of the CCP, meant that he was able to lobby for interests he believed important for the IMAR. But Ulanfu also had political capital of his own. He had joined the Party in 1925, and had impeccable credentials through his participation in the early revolutionary movements. He was originally a protégé of Li Dazhao, who was also influential in the early career of Mao Zedong. In addition to this, Ulanfu could claim to represent a further constituency, the Mongolians, who were important allies for the Communists in the Northern Chinese campaigns. Through this combination of positions and relationships, Ulanfu accrued influence and authority. He was central to the narrative of revolutionary history in the IMAR, and to its new identity, and had immense symbolic importance.

But there was ambiguity and hybridity at the heart of Ulanfu's symbolic power.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid 213.

Bulag argues in his chapter on Ulanfu in *The Mongols at China's Edge* that his political career fits into two narratives. One was the centrally sponsored version, in which he was seen as a model representative of the 'national minorities,' faithful to the project of the centralised (and overwhelmingly Han) Chinese state from its inception, a guard against splittism, and a preserver of 'national unity' (a narrative temporarily suspended in the CR but which returned in the late 1970s). The second was the localised version in which he promoted Mongolian interests in the region as far as possible in the face of demographic inequality (at that time, Mongolians made up only 10% of the IMAR population) and political reality (which meant acknowledging the general indifference of the only players that might have helped IMAR become independent in the 1930s and 1940s, the Mongolian People's Republic and the USSR).¹⁸⁶

Throughout his career Ulanfu had to face two constituencies – the Centre, and the locality - and perform in their separate discourses. He appeased the Centre, with their assertion of the primacy of national unity (i.e. unity to the Chinese state created in 1949), to which any strong expressions of Mongolian cultural and political identity was viewed as a strategy for autonomy. But his power in IMAR was based on his constituency there, in particular the Mongolians, on whose support he relied to have credibility. As Bulag stated, Ulanfu lived 'between two worlds.'¹⁸⁷ A Mongolian who could not speak Mongolian, he was one of the few minority cadres who attained high positions within the CCP. He distilled many of the key features of the problematic relationship between the Centre and IMAR - the desire for national unity on the one hand, and for greater regional autonomy on the other. The treatment of him in the CR showed this relationship at breaking point. The prime territory was the conflict over which should take priority, class relations (social ones) or those based on national minority status (and therefore on ethnicity).¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁵ Ibid 220.

¹⁸⁶ This is not to assert that Ulanfu was viewed by all Mongolians as acting for their benefit. See Bulag 2002, Chapter Five, for a description of the tensions and different versions of Mongolian identity that existed, along with the non-Mongol Dauer minority who also lived in IMAR, and articulated their own competing sense of identity – in this case as the minority under another minority (Mongolian).

¹⁸⁷ Ibid 207.

¹⁸⁸ Ulanfu's power was sufficiently potent that even after the attacks in the CR he was to return to positions of influence in post-Maoist PRC (he was appointed a vice

3.1.2 The Attack on Ulanfu: Chronology and Structure of the Campaign

Ulanfu's position on nationality was signalled as problematic as early as 1965 when he was accused of being 'soft' on Mongolian class enemies within the CCP.¹⁸⁹ At the Qianmen Hotel meeting of the North China Bureau, of which he was second secretary in May 1966 he was attacked for opposing the Centre (ironically by the then Chinese President Liu Shaoqi, who was himself about to become the chief 'villain' of the CR). Ulanfu's failure to understand the key importance of class struggle according to Deng Xiaoping, another attendee of the meeting, led to his dismissal from his Party posts by the Centre in August 1966. This was followed by his removal from his Military District chairmanship in November, leaving him only with the nominal title of Chairman of the region. This was taken from him in 1968.¹⁹⁰

The further meetings from February to April 1967 analysed in Chapter Two resulted in the '13th April Decision' which sanctioned open attack on Ulanfu. Here the local campaign against him mirrored that against Liu Shaoqi and other key figures centrally. Before Ulanfu could be openly attacked a certain amount of preparation and management was needed. He was not named directly in an *IM Daily* editorial as 'the key representative in the IMAR taking the capitalist, revisionist road' until 29th August 1967 (though he was directly named as early as June in rebellious group publications with more limited audience in IMAR).¹⁹¹

In material attacking Ulanfu toward the end of the period (winter 1967 to spring 1968) there was a more explicit mention of the IMPP. Just as there had been a period when Ulanfu was under attack, but not yet named within the discourse directly, so one can plot a similar journey from the indirect to the direct explication of an 'enemy' counter-organisation, the IMPP. It is impossible to impute this to some

premier in the 1980s before his death in 1989). The attempt in the CR to deny him power, therefore, proved to have temporary impact, as was the unsuccessful parallel attempt to deal with the class/nationality clash.

¹⁸⁹ Woody 1993, ii.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ This article twice referred to the fact that it was permissible to 'openly name' Ulanfu.

grand design at the opening of the CR in IMAR. On the other hand the extension of the attack, from individuals to supposed groups and organisations, indicated the increasingly ambitious scope of the movement as it proceeded. Although the campaign against Ulanfu continued after 1968 (well into the 1970s, in fact), it was most concentrated in late 1967 and early 1968, when other factors (IMPP being the most important of them) had yet to feature. After the spring of 1968 the IMPP, as a named entity, became the key element to the campaign in IMAR. Ulanfu from this stage merely came to represent or symbolise this.

A key feature of the campaign against Ulanfu was that his removal in 1966 was not just symbolic but physical. From this date, till his formal rehabilitation and return to public positions in 1978, he was not allowed back to IMAR. Most of the time he was either under house arrest in Beijing, or, towards the end of the CR, in Hunan.¹⁹² Unlike Liu Shaoqi centrally, or Wang Duo and Wang Yilun locally, Ulanfu was not made available for public attack, nor subject to denunciation or violence in person. This meant that he was an 'invisible' presence in the attack documents aimed at him. None were 'performed' before him or upon him, as some of the attacks on the Wangs were. His absence restricted the opportunity to extend the violence of the language into violent actions on him as a person, but increased the symbolic aspect of the attack. More than other targets (e.g., the Wangs, in the dialogues looked at in Chapter Two, whose voices at least appeared, even if symbolically marginalized by being put in parentheses) Ulanfu's voice in the CR was mediated through edited quotations from his own works and speeches, or simply through the attribution of words to him. His direct contemporaneous voice within this discourse did not figure. He always spoke from the past, controlled and managed in the narrative in which he had been confined.

3.1.3 The Labels for Ulanfu

Ulanfu's 'name,' his reputation, needed careful handling. Its devaluation and destruction took preparation. A strategy was needed to disempower him in the new discourse. The various labels used for Ulanfu in the material analysed here indicate

¹⁹² Bulag 2002, 226-7.

the pre-occupations of the campaign against him, and its general policy direction.

- 1) July 67 The oldest and biggest splittist in IMAR.
- 2) July 67 A princely aristocrat (*wanggong guizu*) worming his way into the Party.
- 3) Sept 67 Counter-revolutionary revisionist, splittist element Ulanfu.
- 4) Sept 67 The chief representative of China's Khrushchev in IMAR.
- 5) Sept 67 A power holder in the Party (*dangquanpai*) taking the capitalist road.
- 6) Sept 67 The typical dutiful son (*xiao zi xisun*) of landlords, herdlords, and capitalists.
- 7) Oct 67 A jackal from the same lair (*yiqiu zhehe*) as Liu Shaoqi.
- 8) Oct 67 The modern Genghis Khan.
- 9) Oct 67 A representative of the nobility inside the CCP.
- 10) Oct 67 The sworn enemy of the working people of all nationalities.
- 11) Oct 67 A time-bomb (*dingshi zhadan*) buried in the northern border region.
- 12) Oct 67 The representative within the Party of Inner Mongolian feudal herdlords, landlords, bureaucrats and upper class clergy.
- 13) Jan 68 The arch criminal destroying the national minority policies in the district, cities and the autonomous region. The black hand of IMAR.
- 14) Jan 68 The watchdog for feudal herdlords.
- 15) Feb 68 The biggest rightist in the IMAR CCP.
- 16) Feb 68 Scum of the Mongolian nationality (*menggu minzu de bailei*).
- 17) Feb 68 The sworn enemy (*bugong daitian de sidi*) of all nationalities
- 18) April 68 Careerist, schemer, double-dealer (*liang mianpai*).
- 19) May 68 Chief representative of the nationalist counter-revolutionaries in IMAR.
- 20) May 68 The backstage boss of cow ghosts and snake spirits (*niugui-sheshen*).
- 21) May 68 The black manipulator of landlords, rich [peasants and herdsman], counter-revolutionaries, [as well as] bad and rightist elements.

By 1969, Ulanfu was simply 'the leader of a treacherous anti-Party clique.'

These labels illustrated the two narratives in which Ulanfu existed: those which are generic and lifted from the discourse of the Centre and those that relate specifically to the situation in IMAR, and made little sense applied outside it. 18, for instance, was used about Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping in the central campaign, as was 21 which used generic labels (the 'five bad classes') and a generic noun ('black backstage boss'). Reference in 12 and 14 to the category of 'herdlords' (*muzhu*) was specific to IMAR. Similarly, reference to Ulanfu as the 'Ghenghis Khan' of the modern times was also a label originating locally. Between these two categories fell a number of labels lifted from the central discourse and adapted to local use (3 and 4, for instance) which placed Ulanfu in a hierarchy of villainy directly related to the 'bad elements' he represented at the Centre.

These labels showed the importance of class classification in the condemnation of Ulanfu. Eight of the labels (3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 14, 19 and 21) condemned Ulanfu because of his representing the rights of specific bad classes. But others focused on the claims about Ulanfu's 'nationalism.' He was simply a 'national splittist element' (*minzu fenliezhuyi fenzi*). The reference to Genghis Khan belonged to this group. Ulanfu was labelled as the enemy of 'all national groups.' These labels showed a process of increasingly free and unbridled attacks on him, from the formulaic labels in 1 and 2, to the outright and contemptuous denunciations of 16 and 18. They plot the process whereby someone's social face and influence was dismantled and represent the gradual devaluation of the 'currency' of Ulanfu's authority. They stand as the material indications in this discourse of his loss of formal power in the region.

3.1.4 Ideology and Nationality: the Centre's Position

At the heart of the campaign against Ulanfu was the attack on the discourse and ideology of nationality (*minzu*) and national minorities (*shaoshu minzu*) which had been promoted in the PRC since 1949. And central to this was the management of the relationship between the majority Han and the sorts of identities allowed the PRC's various designated minorities. This was politically and culturally sensitive.

There was a history of how the terms of this discourse had been set and the vocabularies created. In the Republican Period (1911-1949), the canonical statement on the relationship between China's national groups was contained in Sun Yatsen's assertion of the equality of all groups 'in the context of integration and eventual assimilation.' The American 'melting pot' was a powerful inspiration for this model. According to Sun, there were five major ethnic groups: Han, Manchu, Mongols, Hui and Tibetans.¹⁹³ But as Bulag pointed out, the position of ethnic groups in China (beyond the Han) was different from America because for many of these (many more than the five ordained by Sun) there was a memory, sometimes very recent, of having been parts of independent or semi-independent territory.¹⁹⁴ For these minorities, the desire to preserve identity went hand-in-hand with control and special rights over specific territories. Central promotion of unification could therefore be read as trying to pursue a process of colonisation.¹⁹⁵ The Mongolians of IMAR fell into this category.

Mao had made explicit statements about the issue of national minority self-determination early in his career. In a declaration to the Inner Mongolian people in December 1935 he had stated that 'only by fighting with us can the Inner Mongolian nation preserve the glory of the epoch of Genghis Khan, avoid the extinction of their nation, embark on the path of national revival and obtain independence and freedom like that enjoyed by the nations of Turkey, Poland, the Ukraine and the Caucasus.'¹⁹⁶ But such an explicit endorsement of support for the region's independence was not elevated to official ideology in the canonical works of Mao Zedong published after 1949. From the 1950s the key label was 'national minority' (*shaoshu minzu*), placing groups within the greater entity of the new PRC. This was used ostensibly to guarantee some level of independence for these groups, and to satisfy their contending claims, whilst preserving national unity.

Mao's works (the ones that appeared in the official five volume *Selected Works* edited and sanctioned by the Centre, which should be regarded as one of the main

¹⁹³ Atwood 2002, 103 and Atwood 1993, 7.

¹⁹⁴ Bulag 2002, 18-19.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid 105.

¹⁹⁶ Schram (trans) 1999, 71.

distillations of ideological orthodoxy) contained few explicit treatments of nationality issues.¹⁹⁷ The treatise 'On Coalition Government' (originally published in 1945) contained a very short section on 'The Problem of Minority Nationalities' in which all national groups within the PRC were assured equality and unity (but not autonomy).¹⁹⁸ This message occurred throughout Mao's official works.¹⁹⁹ By the time of Mao's influential 1956 Statement, 'On the Ten Major Relationships' the majority Han were instilled with the task of 'actively help[ing] the minority nationalities to develop their economy and culture.' But the 'unity of nationalities' was still important.²⁰⁰ A year later in 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' Mao merely stated that 'it is imperative to foster good relations between the Han people and the minority nationalities.'²⁰¹ Mao admitted here that 'local nationality chauvinism' was as much an issue as Han chauvinism. This was enshrined in the 'Constitution of the Communist Party of China' adopted in September 1956, in which it stated that 'our country is a multi-national state... The Communist Party of China must make special efforts to raise the status of national minorities... The Party opposes all tendencies to great-nation chauvinism and local nationalism, both of which hamper the unity of nationalities.'²⁰²

This entered the local discourse in IMAR. In the quotes attributed to him in a 1967 pamphlet (issued by the Hohhot Revolutionary Alliance Headquarters) Mao Zedong spoke about the 'Han having positively to help national minorities implement policies to develop economic and cultural construction,' of 'liberating the national minorities' and of 'us uniting with all national minorities, regardless of whether they are big or small... we wish to unite with them.'²⁰³ This sense of patronage over the minorities was distilled in the metaphor of the PRC being a 'great family' which must be protected against splittism. The master ideology in the CR from the Centre, which promoted the importance of unity, and the reduction of nationality and

¹⁹⁷ See Martin 1982 for the evolution of the Mao canon, especially 4-11 on the sanitising of Mao's original works and their development to 'state ideology.'

¹⁹⁸ Mao Tse-tung, vol 3, 305.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, vol 5, 35: 'It is of vital importance to unite with the minority nationals.'

²⁰⁰ Ibid, 296.

²⁰¹ Ibid, 406.

²⁰² 'Documents of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Sept 1956-April 1969,' vol 1, Union Research Institute Hong Kong 1971, 3.

²⁰³ Doc 13, 2-3.

minority questions to ones of social, class relations, effectively closed off the option of granting the larger freedoms for regions that Mao had talked of in 1935.²⁰⁴

3.1.5 Class

Orthodox communist ideology had introduced the predominance of class over ethnicity, whether framed in terms of nationality or otherwise. In the key statements on the issue of nationalities the commitment to 'equality' and liberation transcended all other issues. 'The capitalists,' Lenin was quoted as saying, 'always put nationality demands first... But the proletariat believes that nationality demands should serve the interests of class struggle.'²⁰⁵ The aim of Marxism was to guarantee that 'all national minorities are equal (*pingdeng*), and have self-determination (*zijuequan*), the workers of all groups joining up.' The expression of differences based on ethnicity or nationality was, in the end, an attempt to assert unique rights, to claim a privileged position. It was a means whereby the old class antagonisms could be reintroduced into the relations between national minority groups, to assist the dominance of one group over another. Class was the predominant relationship and ethnic/nationality relationships had to be translated into class-type ones to make sense in this system.

Mao Zedong had not taken the leading role in introducing the Marxist-Leninist discourse of class and class struggle to China, as Luk made clear in his history of the formation of Chinese Communist thinking in the 1920s.²⁰⁶ It was a project in which many Chinese had participated. Even something as fundamental as the concept of a proletariat or peasantry took a long time to define properly: 'The founders of the CCP... were often indiscriminate in treating the workers and peasants as one broad category of social elements.'²⁰⁷ But the key point, and the one that Mao was to exploit to such political effect, was the primacy of class relations above all others,

²⁰⁴ 'Theoretically, the Party's position has always been that so-called "nationality characteristics" are in reality only the characteristics of the bourgeoisie of that nation: there is a natural harmony of interests between workers and peasants the world over. Thus, all national struggle is in reality class struggle' (Dreyer 1968, 4).

²⁰⁵ Doc 68, 2-3.

²⁰⁶ Luk 1990.

²⁰⁷ Luk 1990, 165.

and their connection to means of production or land use. He was also adept at adapting this to the situation in China.

Mao's position on class had been set out early in his intellectual career. The opening words of the first essay in the official version of his *Selected Works* had answered the famous question: 'Who are our enemies? Who are our friends?'²⁰⁸ with a list of good and bad social classes:

- Landlord and comprador class
- Middle bourgeoisie
- Petty bourgeoisie (including owner peasants, master handicraftsmen, lower level intellectuals, small traders)
- Semi-proletariat (semi-owner peasants, poor peasants, small handicraftsmen, shop assistants, peddlers)
- Proletariat

While these categories had been refined over the 30 years from 1926 to the 1950s, the fundamental principles of classification and the need for social categories had not changed.

In an area with significant numbers of national minorities like IMAR, the assertion of standard central class labels was problematic. At the root of this lay the different histories and cultures between Han and Mongolian. In the IMAR many Mongolians were not, historically, economically dependent on settled agrarian cultivation as the Han settlers were. They were mainly pastoralists and their relationship to the land and land ownership was therefore different.²⁰⁹ This left the Centre with a choice: either special terms needed to be created in public discourse to convey (and accept) this difference, or the central categories were rigidly imposed. There was a long history of the process of management of these two competing pressures. The CR

²⁰⁸ 'Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society,' March 1926 in Mao 1963-1977, vol 1, 13ff.

²⁰⁹ See 'Grassland Identities' in Bulag (forthcoming): 'Pastoralism as economic and social practice adapted to the sociology of the grasslands and dating back to antiquity, has become the ultimate cultural symbol defining the core of Mongol

saw the peak of the latter option, but it had been a contentious issue since 1949. Bulag's retelling of the complicated history of land reform in IMAR after 1949 illustrated this well. In the initial movement, redistribution of land was based on classifying people in IMAR according to class labels from the discourse of the Centre. But the blanket imposition of these labels was unsuccessful. A CCP document in 1949 admitted that local unrest was common because of this process: 'In the pure and semi-agricultural pastoral areas, the pastoral economy has suffered severe damages. IMAR had few tenant Mongolian farmers. Pastoral farming was ill suited to land reform.'²¹⁰ So initial policies of equal treatment based on the centralised class ideology had to be adapted to the local situation. The discourse was adapted and localised.

In the CR such accommodation disappeared. The attack on Ulanfu saw people divided into two broad categories: national ones, and those applicable to specific local conditions. These are set out in the table below:

Table 4: Attack on Ulanfu Material: Differences in Class Nomenclature between the Centre and IMAR

National Class Labels (Used Locally)	Purely Local Class Labels
'Landlord' (<i>dizhu</i>)	'Herdlords' (<i>muzhu</i>)
'Rich peasants' (<i>funong</i>)	'Rich herdsmen' (<i>fumu</i>)
'Capitalists' (<i>zibenjia</i>)	'Herder-workmen' (<i>mugong</i>)
'Colonisers' (<i>zhimin</i>)	'Herders' (<i>mumin</i>)
'Proletariat' (<i>wuchanjieji</i>)	'Nomadic herders' (<i>youmu</i>)
'Bourgeoisie' (<i>zhongchanjieji</i>)	'Lamas' (<i>lama</i>)
	'Princely aristocrats' (<i>shangceng wanggong guizu</i>) ²¹¹
	'Poor herdsmen' (<i>pinku mumin</i>), also conveyed by the Mongolian term <i>yadumalaqin</i> *
	'Poorish herdsmen' (<i>zhongdeng mumin</i>) also conveyed by the Mongolian term <i>yadulikemalaqin</i> *

identity.'

²¹⁰ Bulag 2003, 119-120.

²¹¹ Mongolian leaders installed by Qing authorities and claiming descendency from Genghis Khan.

* Both transliterations from Mongolian words into Chinese characters.

The attempts to articulate and accommodate 'special' circumstances and deal with them within the central discourse can be located in this vocabulary. The success or failure of this vocabulary to convey to the audience in IMAR the real social and cultural situation there best demonstrated the success of the hegemony of the Centre and the project which had been ongoing since the late 1940s when the land reform programme was instigated of imposing a sense of identity rooted in class, not ethnicity.

This process had the potential to cause great conflict. The use of central terms based on 'class' labels, while superficially attempting to accommodate the specifics of IMAR, was underpinned by the Centre's claim that class analysis was based on universal criterion. The acceptance of the universality of class terms and the ideology supporting them was not negotiable. It was to be imposed. In the CR, where the discourse and ideology of class reached its most extreme form, the IMAR was not seen as a 'special' area. Such special areas did not exist. In this context, wanting local adaptations to the master terms only betrayed a darker purpose - the desire for local autonomy and independence.

This was the basis for the main accusation against Ulanfu. In presenting nationality considerations as equal to or more important than class ones Ulanfu had betrayed the Centre's ideology. The Centre presented class ideology as being 'in the best interests' of the audience in IMAR, whether the audience was Mongolian or Han Chinese. But the IMAR CR campaign saw overwhelming violence against a far larger proportion of Mongolians than Han. The language of class and its hegemony was used to attack the national minority, Mongolians, and frame them as enemies. This assertion of the primacy of class over nationality labels also appealed to the Han majority of the IMAR audience. As in Gramsci's concept of hegemony, power relations are based on forms of consent, and dynamics between ruled and ruler. The condemnation of Ulanfu's 'minoritising'²¹² policies in the CR played to Han

²¹² 'Minoritising' was an expression to convey Ulanfu's promotion of policies that supported the national minorities, asserting these above those that promoted class interests or considerations.

grievances over how they had been treated in the early land reform campaigns, and threatened over their status in the IMAR as it was. Despite what it said about the primacy of 'national unity,' the CR campaign exacerbated this conflict.

3.1.6 Ulanfu's Counter-Ideology

Ulanfu was presented not just as having destructive, negative influence but as representing and promoting his own 'counter-ideology' articulating and materially embodying the primacy of 'nationality' over 'class' in a common language. In 'Criticise Ulanfu, Encourage Battle,' published in August 1967, the attack essay referred to the following 'Ulanfu' counter-policies:

- 'Don't struggle, don't distinguish, don't divide according to class' (*bu dou, bu fen, bu hua jijie*): the assertion of the special social composition of IMAR, based on ethnic, not class, composition.
- 'Stable, broad, long' (*wen, kuang, chang*): this originated in Ulanfu's prescription that the revolution in IMAR should be slower because it must be 'stable, with broad policies, and last longer.' This was seen in the text as demanding policies different from those implemented in areas where the Han were in the majority.
- The 'theory that revolution harms production' (*'geming pohuai shengchan' lun*): an attempt not to implement full-scale revolution by pretending that such a revolution would damage the material well-being of the local people.²¹³

In this attack, it was claimed that these policies were based on a 'common language' (*gongtong yuyan*) shared by Ulanfu and 'China's Khrushchev' (Liu Shaoqi). The guiding ideology of this was labelled as the 'theory that class struggle will die out' (*jieji douzheng ximielun*).²¹⁴ Another policy imputed to Ulanfu was to promote

²¹³ Doc 18, 12-13.

²¹⁴ Ibid 15. A theory based on the idea that the persistence of class difference under

greater minority unity so that they had more say in the areas in which they lived. This turned into the demand that they be 'the masters in their own territory' (*shaoshu minzu dangjia zuozhu*).²¹⁵ Connected with this was the 'minoritising',²¹⁶ of organisations and cadres in IMAR (*zizhi jiguan minzuhua, ganbu minzuhua*). Most comprehensive of all was the reference to the 'three foundations' (*san ge jichu*), encapsulating the key points from a speech Ulanfu made to the IMAR Party Committee in late 1965, in which he had demanded progress in 'politics, economics, and culture.' In all of these areas, Ulanfu was accused of committing major ideological 'crimes' (not mistakes - his actions were seen as deliberate). For culture, Ulanfu was accused of indirectly promoting the study of Mongolian by demanding 'a common language' for all cadres to work in.²¹⁷

The more serious accusation was that Ulanfu had produced an ideology with its own discourse in opposition to the Centre. In this counter-ideology (materially represented by the quotes taken from Ulanfu's work and assembled as evidence of his darker purpose) a key vocabulary of 'minoritising' was asserted, in contradiction to the one of unity through common class labels from the Centre. An article on 6th March 1968 accused Ulanfu of having a 'national minority viewpoint' (*minzuguan*). In this article the basis of 'nationality viewpoint' was Ulanfu's 'three foundations.' This was the area in which Ulanfu was attacked.

3.1.7 Narrative

The class ideology of the Centre was promoted through being encapsulated in an historical narrative, legitimising the right for certain privileged groups to use key terms and monopolise these within the new discourse. In this narrative, exploitation had ended in the seminal moment of liberation in 1949. 1949 was the watershed

socialism meant that class struggle must still be waged. Maoists believed that the dictatorship of the people meant that while class contradictions continued to exist, they could be solved peacefully. They accused 'rightists' of assuming that economic and material progress would lead to the dying out of class struggle on its own.

²¹⁵ Doc 16, Issue 17, 7, echoing the CCP's ideal that the proletariat should be masters in their own house.

²¹⁶ Increasing proportion of members of minorities serving as officials in local government.

²¹⁷ Doc 4, Issue 17, 7.

between the old and new history. The new history had, as its foundation, the acceptance of the centrality of class and common class labels. Liberation was based in this history on social, not ethnic identity. The key terms in the new discourse conveying this history and narrative were class not ethnic ones.²¹⁸

Such a narrative had no space for the notion of a group of people not belonging clearly to the system of exploitation articulated and labelled in it. The experience of exploitation was universal, as was the language through which it was conveyed. The idea of IMAR having a 'special history' with its own narrative based on nationality rather than class labels was only evidence of destroying national unity and going against the people and the Centre. Acceptance of the Centre's class ideology in IMAR therefore also meant acceptance of the Centre's historical narrative. It was not possible to accept both the primacy of class, and a historical narrative that accommodated a special Mongolian history. If class was paramount, IMAR history was one of competing classes, with the oppressed marching towards liberation just like the national one. 'Exploitation,' 'liberation,' 'progress,' the keywords in the new discourse, were not based on ethnic labels.

This issue of narrative works in many areas and on many levels. In the analysis that follows, it was located in the treatment of Ulanfu, and the significance and interpretation of his own history. It was in his history that the conflict between the two narratives – a local one and the one from the Centre - was represented. He was shown as setting and defining himself within a narrative in which legitimate power and authority were attributed to nationality (and therefore ethnic) identity, not class. Ulanfu's symbolic value - and the threat he was seen as posing – was sited here.

²¹⁸ Apter and Saich 1995 describe the narrative of Chinese revolutionary history as being rooted in the Yan'an experience where Mao's life was symbolic of redemption through revolution.

Section Two: The Attack

3.2.1 Material Carriers

The material carriers of the attack on Ulanfu fell into two very broad categories. The first was contained in a series of articles and items in the *IM Daily*. This constituted the 'official' attack on Ulanfu. Its language was more restrained (illustrated by the late naming of its main target). In this material, the ideological factor was more important, presenting criticisms of Ulanfu within the broader terms of his representing local opposition to instructions from the Centre on class and class struggle. There were some accounts of specific public meetings, in which voices were recorded representing the condemnation of Ulanfu by different sections of the IMAR public. This material represented the public attack on Ulanfu and his power base.

The second band of material was more varied, sponsored by specific factions. Its criticisms were fiercer, and conveyed by more aggressive language. Within this category there were a variety of sub-genres. One of the most common was collections of Ulanfu's own 'black sayings' (as they were frequently called) with editorial comment and notation. Another was prose narratives or chronologies of Ulanfu's 'black counter-revolutionary deeds.' As the first type of material presented a counter-language, a 'language of the enemy' from the other side, so the second type presented the 'counter-history,' the history that had occurred to support this language, with other named individuals, a detail of the organisations and histories that this narrative of treachery had contained. A final kind of material, but less well represented in the collection analysed here, was purely ideological attack - presentation and analytic discussion of the ideological heresies attributed to Ulanfu.

The producers of this material indicated who the administrative implementers in the 'new history' were. The *IM Daily* carried the voice of the new establishment, close to the Party and revolutionary committee, with their capital to call on and supplement. The other material arose from the varying groups competing with each other, speaking to different memberships, attempting to either enhance their own status or denigrate others, with affiliations varying from universities to work units.

Some groups were set up to specifically attack Ulanfu, demonstrating participation in the CR.

3.2.2 Ideological Attack in the Official Material

This section analyses two articles from the *IM Daily* which contain attacks on Ulanfu on the ideological level from early 1968. The first, published on 15th January 1968, was entitled 'Ulanfu's Arch Crimes Destroying the National Minority Policies in the Leagues, Cities and the Autonomous Region.' The second, from 6th March 1968, was entitled 'Criticise Ulanfu's Nationality Viewpoint (*minzuguan*).'

The 15th January article was authored by Leng Xiongxiang. No affiliation was given. It is divided into four sections, each carrying a label for Ulanfu: (1) 'activist peddler of 'peaceful democracy in the new era'; (2) 'faithful guard-dog of the feudal herdlords'; (3) 'sworn enemy of the dictatorship of the proletariat;' (4) 'chief leader of the national minority splittists in the IMAR Party.' The introit to the piece was set within the master narrative, viewing the founding of the PRC as the moment when all classes and national minorities were liberated from exploitation. It also asserted the primacy of Mao and the Centre in this liberation:

'On 1st October 1949, and the founding of the PRC, the end came to the bitter time of the "100 years of humiliation, and the disunity of 500 million people" of all the national groups of our people, and implemented the unprecedented unification (*tongyi*) of the country and unity (*tuanjie*) of all the national minorities within China... The national minority areas, cities, and autonomous regions are one manifestation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a part of the composition of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country... This is a glorious example of our great leader Chairman Mao using Marxist-Leninist nationality theories to solve the problem of nationality in China... A great victory for Mao Zedong thought.'

This was the strong assertion not only of the categories from the Centre ('proletariat'), of the power holders (Chairman Mao and the Party) and of the carriers of their ideological expression (Mao Zedong Thought, Marxism-Leninism), but also of the absolute primacy of the objective of the Centre of 'unity,' and ownership of this concept and term in 'our country,' the country of 'all national minorities.

The writer took the key-phrase that 'the principal issue for revolution is one of power' from the Centre's discourse. In IMAR this was distilled into a struggle between the dictatorship of the 'princely aristocrats' (*wanggong guizu*), the 'big herdlords, big landlords, and the big capitalists,' and the construction of 'the political power of all national groups.' As 'the region's Khrushchev,' Ulanfu had 'openly opposed Chairman Mao in his project of building a new democratic country led by the proletariat.' Ulanfu's true purpose in opposing the Centre's ideology of the dictatorship of the proletariat was to realise his 'dream of a greater Mongolian empire' (*da Menggu diguo*), and to protect the bad local classes while they continued their exploitation. It was critical for the coherence of this ideology that one accepted a specific version of the past, in which the classes outlined above had indeed followed the patterns of oppression described. 'Exploitation' (*boxue*) and 'oppression' (*yapo*) were the key actions in this historical narrative, addressed or applied to the 'good' classes, those liberated after 1949. The article claimed that Ulanfu had denied his audience empowerment by refusing them recourse to class language, to the means to identify their social position, and therefore to justify their demands and work towards liberation based on this. 'Herdlords,' Ulanfu is claimed to have said, 'do not have class in their heads.' This proved Ulanfu's 'denial' of class. What Ulanfu had allegedly done, since 1949, was to reproduce the old patterns of exploitation, through protections of the chief actors, the 'feudal herdlords, the upper classes of the nationality groups and the upper levels of the religious leaders' against 'the poor herders.' This was perfectly compatible with the analysis of pre-1949 exploitation.

One of the key means to impose unity was through organisational and linguistic standardisation. Ulanfu was accused in this article of opposing this by promoting 'minoritisation' (*minzuhua*) of the organisations of autonomous rule. He was also accused of mounting campaigns that promoted nationality interests: 'making national minorities the lords,' leading to 'the dictatorship of nationalism,' and 'the nationalism of the leadership organs in the IMAR CCP.' To achieve this, Ulanfu had appropriated key terms from the legitimate discourse of the Centre, like 'dictatorship' and 'joining up,' but changed them by placing them in an illegitimate 'nationality' context: 'The state is always a class state, and political power is always "class political power."' Nationality was not the key. Class relations were. Attempts

to nationalise concepts and institutions from the Centre were merely a means to create disunity by undermining the hegemony of class.

Ulanfu's specific political ambition had been to subvert the unity of a country built on class relations with 'splittist' notions, dividing the classes from one national minority to another, and destroying their common ground for revolution and liberation. He himself had worked for a 'Greater Mongolian Empire' under the dictatorship of capitalists. The ideological basis of this 'new empire' would build on what was labelled in the article (and which figured heavily in the labelling of Ulanfu's thought throughout the campaign against him) as the 'three theories' (*san ge lilun*), a counter-ideology to the 'correct thinking' from the Centre in this universe of starkly opposed forces and ideas. The 'three theories' were political, economic and cultural:

- Political: To have both Mongolian and Han in the organisational headquarters (in effect, to have a higher proportion of Mongolians in authority locally than the Centre deemed necessary).
- Economic: 'Mongolians can graze sheep, and so can the Han' (supporting Mongolian-pastoral patterns of land use against centrally promoted agrarian ones).
- Cultural: 'Study two languages. With a common language, there is a common heart' (reference to the use of different scripts in Mongolian People's Republic and IMAR – see following section).

Ulanfu's theories were sited in the three critical areas where the Centre authorities needed to exercise control. Admitting a 'national' dimension in any of these conceded legitimacy to national minority demands and to identity being rooted in something other than class. The Centre promoted, instead, a 'common political basis,' a 'common economic basis,' and finally a 'common cultural basis,' through the ideologies respectively of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Marxism-Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought. These, they asserted, were the firmest foundations of

unity.

The assertion of commonality was a theme of the second *IM Daily* article from 6th March 1968. Unlike the earlier article, 'Criticism Ulanfu's Nationalism' was the product of two groups, rather than individually named authors - the Central Party North Bureau Organisation (Red Alliance) and the IMAR Hohhot City Red Guard Third Division. This disseminated the idea that Mao's 'national minority struggle is an issue of class struggle,' the most 'scientific, most penetrating, most beautiful summary' of Marxist-Leninist teaching on the issue of nationality. Marx, the article declared, had said that 'national minority groups have different class organisations.' In any group of national minorities, there existed classes and class struggle. Conflicts within such groups were due to 'class struggle.' The article mentioned the same narrative of exploitation and oppression as the first: 'In old China, oppressing the labouring people in the national minority groups were the imperialists, the counter-revolutionaries of the Nationalist Party, and the counter-revolutionary classes in all minority groups.' The labouring peoples in these groups, both Han and national minority, shared common enemies. They fought a 'common struggle' (*gongtong douzheng*). And with the victory of the CCP in 1949, they shared a common liberation: 'From the first day of the founding of the PRC, all nationalities joined up to become a friendly, co-operative family.' This metaphor of the 'big family' of China (*da jiating*) was meant to exercise a powerful emotional hold over those to whom it was directed, constructing a sense of kinship and allegiance in a constituency that was in fact very diverse.

A new term in this article, however, was that of 'class struggle,' a key import from central Maoism, and one of the most powerful prescriptions of the political programme of the CR. Class struggle, the necessary antidote to exploitation and oppression from the historical narrative outlined above, was the means to liberation, to the realisation of justice in the new society. Mao's concept of 'national minority struggle in the end being class struggle' was juxtaposed in the article to a direct quote from Ulanfu, who was said to have declared that 'nationality contradictions are the main thing, class contradictions are secondary.'

3.2.3 The Problems of a Common Language

The issue of Ulanfu's attitude to a 'common' language' (*gongtong yuyan*) also appeared in this article: 'When he says that if there is a common language then there is a common attitude, this is clearly the old tune of class compromise theory (*jijie tiaohelun de laodiao*). Although the oppressors and those oppressed in a minority group have the same language, their attitude is utterly opposed.' The promotion of a 'common language' was more directly related to the specific use of Mongolian or Chinese in other quotes. In a speech in 1965, Ulanfu was quoted as saying:

'In IMAR we have two types of language and writing... In IMAR now there are many Mongolians who can't speak Han Chinese, and even in pastoral areas there are Han who can't speak Mongolian. From now on cadres should be able to speak both languages. You speak Mongolian, and I also speak Mongolian. If you speak Han Chinese, I speak Han Chinese. Mongolians can speak Mongolian, and Han Chinese cadres also can speak Mongolian... If we have a common language, we have a political foundation, and economic foundation. A common language reflects a common heart.'²¹⁹

In the *IM Daily* on 3rd February 1968 in an article attacking Ulanfu, this statement was taken as 'a denial of class struggle':

'In a class society, our common attitude must have a class aspect. Because the position of the proletariat and the capitalists is not the same, they all have their own "attitude." Chiang Kai-shek, and Derzhinsky, even though they had a different language, had the same "counter-revolutionary" attitude. The great mass of revolutionary peoples, even though their language and writing are not the same, have a common class attitude. We all love Chairman Mao, and resolutely wish to push forward along the path of socialism.'

Superficially this declared that the fundamentals of ideology transcend language. But there was also a sense in which this was a suppression of greater use of Mongolian, and a reaction against the symbolic unity coming from the common spoken language between the Mongolian People's Republic, and Mongolians in IMAR.²²⁰ Thus the condemnation of Ulanfu when he was accused of trying to use the same written alphabet as the Mongolian People's Republic (cyrillic), and not the old script traditionally used in IMAR, and the banishment from early 1968 onwards

²¹⁹ Doc 3, Issue 16, 16.

of the few words in Mongolian that had appeared on the front page of the *IM Daily*. The common language, in the end, was that of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and class analysis and struggle. This cut across specific languages, signifying adherence in the discourse to the view that there was a fundamental ideological body of truth beyond language, but that only the language of the Centre could adequately convey this truth.

3.2.4 Material from Other Organisations: Using the Words of Ulanfu to Condemn Himself

A major part of the 'smashing' of Ulanfu's authority was the use of collections of his own words against him. This type of attack was effective as it meant the enemy themselves was directly exposed through their own words, giving greater credibility. This appeared in material produced by smaller groups.

The collections of quotes took a number of forms. In the autumn of 1967, a special series of four 'CR Materials' (*Wenge cailiao*) was issued by the Hohhot Revolutionary Rebellion Liaison Head Office 'Criticize and Struggle Against Ulanfu' Liaison Station.²²¹ A total of 91 pages covered every part of Ulanfu's career. In another document (analysed in more detail below) the 'Mobilize the Battle to Criticise Ulanfu' (*Pi Wu gu zhan*), issued by the Third Group, IM Teachers College 'East is Red' Battle Division in August 1967, quotes from Mao on national minorities were followed by a theoretical essay condemning Ulanfu, before moving into the quotes themselves, though this time in the form of three columns - Ulanfu's 'counter-revolutionary language,' paralleled with Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping's language, and finally a column with the 'directives' of the Central Committee of the CCP's Mao Zedong, and Lin Biao.²²² There was a 'parallel text' system, with 'correct ideology' (designated with the honorific title of 'instructions' (*zhishi*)) set against both the 'counter-ideology' at the Centre of the two named thought-criminals, Liu and Deng, and then their local representative, Ulanfu with his own local counter-ideology. While Liu, Deng and Ulanfu were set down as personally

²²⁰ See Bulag 2002 for more on this issue of the use of Mongolian versus Chinese.

²²¹ Doc 21.

²²² Doc 18.

sponsoring their own thought, Mao and Lin's 'instructions' were presented as having the sanction of 'the CCP.'

A further collection of quotes from August 1967, 'Confessions of a Counter-Revolutionary' (*Fangeming de zibaishu*) issued by the Hohhot Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Headquarters appeared in several separate parts, each covering specific periods in Ulanfu's career.²²³ As such it operated as an eclectic collection of some of Ulanfu's works, and was used to supply evidence of his treachery towards the Centre. A final variant of the 'collection of quotes' genre was the use of a 'secret speech' by Ulanfu in 1965. This was critically deconstructed through using isolated quotes rather than the publication of the whole speech, and appeared in 'Excerpts from Ulanfu's Black Sayings' (*Ulanfu heihua zhailu*) from the Hohhot Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Headquarters 'Struggle and Criticize Ulanfu' Alliance.²²⁴

²²³ Doc 17.

²²⁴ Were these CR collections credible records of what Ulanfu actually said? As in the assessment of the records of discussions in Chapter Two, similar principles of assessing internal and external consistency apply. There are opportunities to compare quotes from the same source used in different collections. The collection of the 1st July and the 'CR Material' 16, 16 quoted the same occasion, with only minor editorial differences. The same quote occurred in Aug 1967 though in truncated form (Doc 17, 22). An edition of Ulanfu's *Selected Works* published in IMAR in 1999 did include some of the speeches quoted in the CR materials. In several instances the differences between these was significant. In the Aug 1967 collection it quoted Ulanfu as stating in June 1946 at a cadre meeting '...we should pay attention to this problem, we need to take notice of the demands for the Mongolian people's independence (*zhongshi Menggu renmin duli de yaoqiu*) and acknowledge their self-consciousness (*zijue*) and need to prepare to acknowledge their independent spirit' (Doc 17, 11). But in the record of this in Ulanfu's *Selected Works* it became: 'We should take note of this [the problem of national minorities]. We should take notice of the demands of Mongolian minority people (*zhongshi Mengzu renmin de yaoqiu*) and acknowledge their self-government (*zizhi*)' (my underlinings). The final sentence was omitted (Ulanfu 1999, vol 1, 18). In the same edition, the editors also imputed to Ulanfu a quote that, in Ulanfu's *Selected Works* was clearly attributed to Stalin (Doc 17, 12 and Ulanfu 1999, 276). None of these meant that the CR versions were misquotes from the original versions. The 1999 *Selected Works* had gone through the same process of ideological sanitisation and editorial correction as Mao's *Selected Works*, and it might be that they themselves were 'inaccurate' versions. All one can conclude without seeing the precise original of each speech was that there were variant versions reflecting the different political environments they had been produced in. The main difference however is that the CR collections could contextualise and editorially 'bind' their quotes in a way that managed the

These collections of quotes contained language which, at one point, was authoritative and said by someone occupying formal positions of power, but now relegated to legitimate objects of denigration and attack. There was heavy editorial control, with the assertion of editorial management of the presented language. The final document mentioned above, 'Excerpts from Ulanfu's Black Sayings,' contained Ulanfu's language lifted from a single speech event. The document began with a foreword setting the context of the 'secret report.' This stressed its restrictedness, and made clear that it contained language opposed to the Centre. It also clearly stated that the objective of the publication was to 'thoroughly expose, and deeply, widely, and fiercely criticise' the speech. The editors finally set out the principles on which the quotes were arranged and selected from the speech, reducing it from more than 90,000 characters down to 'a fraction.' It was not possible to produce the whole speech, they stated, not just because of its length, but also because 'in many places it is illogical (*yuwu-lunci*), chaotic (*lazi-linluan*), and simply without order (*mozhi-suoyun*).'

The quotes from the speech itself were split into five sections:

- 'Madly oppose great Mao Zedong Thought, try to establish "Ulanfu Thought."'
- 'Flaunt the characteristics of IMAR, twist the nature of the democratic revolution, advocate the road of peaceful transition.'
- 'Deny class struggle, give in to theories of "exploitation is justified" and class surrender.'
- 'Cook up theories of splittism, scheme to build a feudal, bourgeois independent kingdom.'
- 'Curse Beijing, Tiananmen, oppose the Centre, completely advocate building a feudal, capitalist independent kingdom.'

Under each of these main headings, there were a number of sub-sets. In the first, for instance, there were three:

reader's or user's reception of them.

- ‘Cursing Mao Zedong Thought [by calling it] a doctrine, scheming to use Ulanfu Thought as a substitute for Mao Zedong Thought.’
- ‘Distort the basic principles of Chairman Mao about the problem of national minorities, deny the basic class nature of the problem of national minorities.’
- ‘With “opposing copies” as an excuse, twist Chairman Mao’s “three revolution” movement, deny the universal guiding meaning of all directives and policies issued by Chairman Mao.’

There was a limited menu of actions ascribed to Ulanfu in the headings and in those throughout the other four sections. Primarily, Ulanfu’s words were presented within the context of ‘opposition’ (*fandui*), ‘denial’ (*fouren*), ‘elimination’ (*mosha*), along with ascribed verbal acts like ‘distort’ (*cuangai*), ‘excuse’ (*jiengkou*), and ‘curse’ (*chouma*). These were crimes against the true narrative of history (to ‘distort’ and ‘misrepresent’ it), against the Centre (‘oppose,’ and ‘curse’ it), and the ideology of Mao Zedong Thought (‘twist’ and ‘deny’) which were the manifestations of the Centre’s hegemony. In essence, these covered the key areas where Ulanfu was taken as opposing and resisting this hegemony.

The quotes covered the themes identified in the ‘official’ material contained in the *IM Daily* articles in 3.2.2 above. First of all, Ulanfu was presented as arguing for a ‘specific IMAR reality’ different to the reality dictated from the Centre. ‘We need to first understand what the real nature of IMAR is,’ Ulanfu was quoted as saying, ‘then secondly, how we link up the reality of IMAR with Mao Zedong Thought.’ This, it implied, was taking things the wrong way. The reality of IMAR came through the reality designated to it from the Centre. In the editorial comments on the first section, it was even claimed that Ulanfu labelled Mao Zedong Thought as a ‘doctrine’ (*jiaotiao*). This again was the locality ‘counter-labelling’ entities from the Centre. Mao Zedong Thought was not a doctrine (with its implications of dogmatism and formal canonization), but the simple presentation of truth. Use of other terms about it was taken as a threat, an attempt to inscribe and control it within a different discourse.

The second area where Ulanfu's words were used against him was the accusation that he attacked the ideological unity of the Centre. Ulanfu was cited as using the keywords, 'unity,' 'nucleus,' and the correct slogan 'Mao Zedong Thought is the unity of minority groups.' But in saying that 'the problem of national minorities is the problem of [defining] people,' Ulanfu was guilty of placing the issue of nationality as central to the categorisation of the 'people.' In the 'correct' Maoist classification system, based on Marxist-Leninist thought, people's main social identity was based on class, not nationality. Here Ulanfu 'denies the true class nature of the national minority problem.'²²⁵

An example of the placing of Ulanfu's words against the Centre's 'class' ideology was in the context of economism. His talk of a 'landlord class' was labelled as 'in truth out-and-out feudalism.'²²⁶ This reached a symbolic level, in the final selection of quotes, where Ulanfu was seen as 'cursing Tiananmen and Beijing,' the symbols in the PRC of centrality, unity, and the hegemony of the new political system. The editors talked of these places as being the 'heart of our ancestral land, the centre of the world's revolution,' with Ulanfu 'cursing the symbol (*xiangzheng*) of the great motherland, Tiananmen.' In Ulanfu's counter-discourse, he had appropriated the symbolic capital of Mao, and of the central material signifiers for the power, Tiananmen Square, Beijing. In striving to make Baotou the centre for the iron and steel production in China in the 1950s, Ulanfu had betrayed his desire to set up a power centre alternative to Beijing, an 'independent kingdom' with its own nationality ideology, and its own geographical symbolism, competing with that of the Centre.²²⁷ In this new context, Ulanfu's seemingly innocent quote 'to build Baotou, and to continuously build up the autonomous region' was re-interpreted as the sinister blueprint for the construction of an independent country. Taking the economy, and not class struggle, as the key term, Ulanfu was quoted as saying that 'from the point of view of economics, things can only really start from IMAR.' In this new state, Ulanfu would supplant Mao Zedong in the symbolic pantheon. In the new geography, in which IMAR was at the centre, Chairman Ulanfu was the new leader, returning to the ambitions much CR material in IMAR claimed the

²²⁵ Doc 63, 4.

²²⁶ Ibid 9.

²²⁷ Ibid 17.

Mongolians always had: to recapture the glorious power exercised by them in the Genghis Khan period seven centuries before, to resurrect this period of hegemony over the Han (this is looked at in more detail in 3.2.9 below).

The use of a single speech dramatically illustrates not only the attempt to contrast the currency of one kind of language against the other and thereby discredit it, but also the tight material controls exercised by the editors on a text. The original was heavily contextualised. It was split up and placed in headed, separately bounded sections. Its form was redesigned. The ambition of the editors was clearly to use the words of the condemned Ulanfu against himself, and for him to participate in his own prosecution, something that his physical absence from IMAR meant he was unable to do in person. Ulanfu's language distilled the 'counter-language,' and the need for it to be policed and controlled by the restraints of editorial markers.

The collection of Ulanfu's quotes contained in the 'CR Materials' (*Wenge ziliao*) printed in September and October 1967 was from more diverse sources. The quotes range from 1945 to 1966, just before Ulanfu's effective silencing by being removed by the Centre from formal positions of power. The quotes ranged from Ulanfu's speech at a preparatory meeting for the celebrations of IMAR's twentieth anniversary,²²⁸ to talks to local leaders, to instructions. The full range of material was as follows:

- 'Speeches' (*jianghua*)
- 'Instructions' (*zhishi*)
- 'Interjections' (*chahua*)
- 'Reports' (*baogao*)
- 'Talks' (*tanhua*)
- 'Summaries' (*zongjie*)
- 'Statements' (*fayan*)²²⁹
- 'Opening words' (*kaimuci*)

²²⁸ A moment of great symbolic importance in the region, to which several years preparation was devoted. See Bulag 2002, 226 for contemporary accusations of Ulanfu's darker purposes in marking this event as a celebration to prepare for local independence.

- ‘Declaration’ (*xuanyan*)
- ‘Secret talks’ (*mitan*)
- ‘Remarks on a piece of writing’ (*piyu*)
- ‘A letter’ (*yi feng xin*)
- ‘Regulations’ (*guiding*)

Of these, the most numerous were ‘speeches’ (*jianghua*) followed by ‘reports’ (*baogao*). In ‘CR Materials 20,’ the vast majority of the quotes were taken from speeches. There were, in addition to the genres above, some materials from Ulanfu’s essays and books. However, these were exceptions. The bulk of the material was from specific ‘speech occasions’ - speeches, talks, or reports at Party and local meetings. None were given in their entirety, nor was there any indication of where the materials were sourced, though some indicated that they were summaries, which implied a longer written source, recorded elsewhere.

The collection was arranged according to particular categories connected with verbs or actions Ulanfu was accused of performing:

- ‘Openly opposing’ (*gongkai fandui*) Chairman Mao’s heroic theories of national minority struggle.
Within this section, the verbs ‘speaking nonsense’ (*hushuo*), ‘denying’ (*fouren*), and ‘advocating’ (*guchui*) were used as headers to sub-sections.
- ‘Opposing’ giving prominence to Mao Zedong thought, ‘attacking’ (*gongji*) the mass movement to live and study Chairman Mao’s great works.
In this section, ‘excuse’ (*jielou*) was used.
- ‘Be hostile to’ (*choushi*) and ‘strike’ (*dadao*) the masses of the people.
‘Beautify’ (*meihua*) and ‘rely on’ (*yikao*) the aristocrats.
- ‘Oppose’ (*duikang*) the three revolutions.

²²⁹ Including ‘summary statements’ (*fayin caogao*).

- 'Openly resist' (*dizhi*) the leadership of the Centre, 'destroy' (*pohai*) the unity of the motherland.

In this section, 'threaten' (*yangyan*) was used.

Similar patterns of using specific negative and positive verbs of actions are found in the other collections in this series. These included 'resist' (*kangju*), 'soak' (*paozhi*), 'deny' (*mosha*) and 'push forward' (*tiaofa*).

These 'framing' verbs indicated how Ulanfu's words were manipulated into positions of active opposition through context. While the real subject of the sentences imputed to Ulanfu was often abstract, ideological issues, the verbs framing them in the CR collections created an atmosphere of physicality and struggle. Ulanfu's language was presented as speech-acts of dissent in their own right, able to damage and threaten like physical violence. The editorial language had to control these 'dangerous' quotes. Ulanfu's words were policed, under suspicion. This was the means by which they were disempowered in the new discourse, and their value decreased.

This larger collection offered a picture of Ulanfu's sustained treachery, reaching back to the 1940s when he was the most prominent supporter of the CCP in 'pre-Liberation' Inner Mongolia. In the previous official founding narrative of the PRC, Ulanfu was the national minority leader closest to the Centre, fighting alongside them against the common enemy of the Nationalists. He had been instrumental in IMAR's establishment as an autonomous region within the PRC, stopping it becoming an independent state. He was a comrade of the CCP.

In the new CR narrative Ulanfu had not become a splittist. He had always been one. There were no chronological principles to the arrangement of Ulanfu's words. Quotes from the 1940s stand next to those from 1965. The impression is of a steady and unchanging 'opposition' which was ahistorical and had not developed during the huge political upheavals of the time. Nor were the very different contexts within which Ulanfu spoke at different periods explained. In 'CR Materials' No 16, under the heading 'Advocating "Pushing Forward the Upper Class"...,' Ulanfu's words

were placed together from a speech before the IMAR had even been established in February 1947, a declaration at a speech to the Party in 1953, a national (*quanguo*) meeting in 1955, a central (*zhongyang*) meeting in 1956, and the preparatory meeting for the IMAR 20th anniversary celebrations in 1965.²³⁰ Regardless of context, Ulanfu had always been a criminal.

One of the longest quotes presented in the collection was from a speech in June 1946, to cadres in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Movement (*zizhi yundong*), an organisation predating the formal creation of the IMAR. At this meeting, Ulanfu had talked about the characteristics of the Mongolians. 'Mongolians,' he was claimed to have said, 'are a soft minority group.' They had their own history of exploitation. They were reliant on the politics, economics, and culture of other national minorities:

'Because the Mongolians are simple, they are not clear about [what] the [Communist] Eighth Route Army [is], nor about how we differ from the Nationalists... They also have a characteristic. In the beginning, they never trust, but as soon as they start to trust you, then they do so completely... Mongolians worship their idols to excess. Whatever is in their heads they believe to be correct.'

Ulanfu's analysis was presented as ahistorical, broad generalisations on the immutable characteristics of the Mongolian people. No attempt was made in the collection of CR material to present any development in his position. This material only became meaningful within the specific master narrative from the discourse of the Centre outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Before 1949, there were patterns of exploitation based on class membership common to all, including national minority groups. In 1949, these injustices started to be rectified. The ideology of the CCP was shown to be true and victorious. Ulanfu, who had presented himself as a friend and supporter of the CCP ideology, was actually working within the new system for the interests of the old exploiters, the upper classes. They may well have been Mongolian upper classes. But their ethnicity was irrelevant. What mattered and had meaning in this discourse was their class.

²³⁰ Doc 16, Issue 16, 14.

Such a narrative was motivated by a utilitarian view of history. Telling and retelling history served to show how class conflict and struggle could be used for liberation. The key issue for participants in the CR was to hold the grand template of this history against the individual histories of people, to define their place in this master narrative as either exploiter or exploited. Ulanfu's case was one of the trickiest. While using the 'form' of the ideology of CCP communism, he had actually been promoting his own interests based on an alien ideology. The quotes were offered as proof of this. They were not questioned, and the only context within which they were set was the 'history as liberation from class exploitation' one described above, in which they were immediately condemned and criminalised. Their articulation of ideological key points through narrative led to the second major area of contestation - the recreation of a history to follow the terms of the ideological attack, asserting class over national minority/ethnicity issues.

3.2.5 The Narrative Attack: Ulanfu's History and Actions

The terms of debate were set in the ideological attack analysed above. Class was asserted. Nationality/ethnicity issues were secondary. The Centre's narrative based on class liberation was promoted. A narrative asserting 'specifics' of IMAR history and Mongolian identity was rejected. The issue was not just therefore Ulanfu's 'counter-ideology,' but the meaning given to his own history, the symbolic importance contained and conveyed by it, and the master narrative within which it was set.

The 'CR Materials' No 16 began with a description of the meaning of Ulanfu's personal history interpreted in the terms and discourse of the new narrative:

'For more than 20 years from the IMAR Movement to the socialist revolution, this "contemporary godfather" [Ulanfu] has all along pushed forward splittism, madly opposing the red, red sun in the hearts of all nationalities, Chairman Mao, wantonly opposing Mao Zedong Thought limitlessly believed in and revered by people of all nationality groups. He separately raised the banner, falsifying the heroic thesis of Chairman Mao about the national minority struggle, trying in vain with the "problem of minorities" to deny class, class contradictions, and class struggle. Distorting the truth by despicable means, by "pushing forward class problems" and promoting "capitalist class politics" in opposition to pushing forward Mao

Zedong Thought. With monstrous audacity, using “minority characteristics” and “local characteristics,” “looking at things from a practical viewpoint,” etc, and “IMAR characteristics” theory, he denies the leading policies of Mao Zedong Thought are those of the whole Party and country. Attacking the mass movement of living and studying Chairman Mao’s works, shouting himself hoarse, talking up the feudal upper classes, twisting the unity of Chairman Mao’s Thought, advocating class co-operation, vainly trying to re-organise the ranks of the exploiting classes, hatefully, he denigrates working people, opposing the revolutionary masses.’²³¹

This contained a rich vocabulary of actions, some conveyed through standardized idioms - four-character expressions (*chengyu*), such as ‘monstrous audacity’ (*goudan-baotian*), ‘shout oneself hoarse’ (*shengsi-lijie*), ‘distorting the truth’ (*toutian-huanri*). The central hegemonic ideology was distilled in the formulation ‘Mao Zedong Thought,’ or personalised by being attached to Mao’s symbolic figure.

Even in describing the actions of Ulanfu, the language was highly symbolic. It was not fixed in reference to specific events but operated on a very general level. The reference, for instance, to ‘banners’ denoted abstract thoughts but conveyed this metaphorically. Ulanfu’s crimes were ideological ones, but they were conveyed in ways that made them seem like actions. His own ‘ideology’ was separated from the main text by quotation marks. It was distilled into sound-bites or slogans – support for ‘minority characteristics’ (*minzu tedian*), and ‘regional characteristics’ (*diqu tedian*).

3.2.6 The Narrative Attack: Specifics

‘New Account of Nasty Goings-On in Ulanfu’s Mansion’ (*Ulanfu dizhu zhuangyuan choushi xinbian*) produced by the Third Group of Red Guards, in Hohhot, on the 1st November 1967 offered a sustained narrative attack.²³² A document of 32 pages, with a foreword sponsored by the IM University ‘Jinggangshan’ Corps ‘Zhongnanhai’ Section, it was divided into three sections. The first, ‘The Place Where Counter-Revolutionary Restorationist Experiments are Done,’ concerned a report Ulanfu made on the inspection of a mansion, a ‘landlord yard.’ The second, simply entitled ‘Landlord, Hegemonist, Hooligan’ was an attack on the

²³¹ Doc 16, Issue 16, 1.

'contemporary Cixi,' Ulanfu's wife.²³³ The final, and by far the longest section (it runs from page 14) was called 'New Account of Nasty Goings-On' and was divided into eight separate sections. This pamphlet contained material that worked on two levels. First, it promoted an attempt to denigrate Ulanfu by attacking his kin in IMAR. Secondly, it supported a specific narrative in which the past and the present were recast within the terms of a struggle between Ulanfu and the Centre. For both of these purposes, specific rhetorical and symbolic devices were used.

The introduction set out the general context for the attack. The founding of the IMAR CRC was directly mentioned, a 'great victory for the all-conquering Mao Zedong Thought, and a great victory for Chairman Mao's revolutionary line.' It was also a 'great victory for the "13th April Decision."' This set out the hierarchy: the metaphors for the ideology of the Centre, Mao Zedong Thought, and Chairman's Mao's Revolutionary Line, asserted at the head, with the manifestation of what was now taken as their local expression, the '13th April Decision,' afterwards. There was also the assertion that this work was the 'expression of denunciation for the counter-revolutionary revisionist Ulanfu, and of limitless love for the great revolutionary masses of the people.' The work was declared to be a 'gift given to our red political power, the IMAR CRC,' and to the '13 million people *of all nationalities* in our region' (my italics). The location of power within institutions and of its symbolic signification was immediately clear.

The introduction referred to an underlying programme of violence and purposeful destruction. The writers talked of 'the revolutionary masses of all our area picking him [Ulanfu] up, smashing him to the ground, and kicking him down. Let us rain down 100,000 kicks on the body of the counter-revolutionary revisionist element Ulanfu, and then a 100 million blows, so that he will never rise up again.' Ulanfu's body was a metaphor for the whole 'enemy' corps. Actions against it were actions against all enemies. This figure paralleled what Foucault talked of in using the treatment of the body of the condemned during a punitive process as a means of

²³² Doc 24.

²³³ Cixi was Dowager Empress of China at the end of the Qing Dynasty, and a figure associated with the weakening of China and its exploitation by foreigners at this time.

symbolising society purging itself. Within this language which promoted committing violence upon a symbolic body there was a tightly built symbolic world. Although in written words, the attacks that followed could be seen as part of these 'kicks' rained upon a body – speech acts of aggression in a war against someone condemned. In utter contrast to this rhetorical aggression, the foreword ended with a note of courtesy to the readers: 'We hope that our battle comrades, the great masses of the proletarian revolutionary elements, together with the revolutionary comrades, will offer their precious comments [on this work].'

3.2.7 Xiao Yingzi Village: Symbolic Importance as the Locus of the Conflict between Central Hegemony and Local Dissent

This was an attack grounded on a narrative taken from the Centre but placed in a specific local domain, an area within which Ulanfu's family and close allies worked, a place in which Ulanfu's power was exercised and which physically symbolised that power. The pamphlet began, for instance, with a paragraph on Xiao Yingzi, a village-sized division in the Tuqi Banner in Wumeng League between Hohhot and Baotou, with 39 'households,' 22 of whom were poor, seven from the middle peasantry, and ten who were landlords, with a population of 143 people. This was the 'home' of Ulanfu's 'Dowager Empress Cixi,' his wife Yun Liwen, a place where 'for five years, Ulanfu undertook counter-revolutionary experiments.' This was the location for Ulanfu's treachery, illustrating his schemes against the Centre, and his attempts to steal the symbolic capital of the Centre's icons. A mini-chronology of the history of Xiao Yingzi was set out, related to speeches Ulanfu had made demonstrating his purpose there: 'Xiao Yingzi is a Mongolian village, a laboratory pushing forward the linking of agriculture, herding, and forestry for several years to the south of the Daqing mountains.'²³⁴ The text contrasted this with Dazhai, the commune in neighbouring Shanxi Province promoted by the Centre as a model in the CR. Xiao Yingzi was Ulanfu's 'capitalist independent kingdom.' The setting of Dazhai, the focus of a national campaign sanctioned by Chairman Mao, against Ulanfu's own, Xiao Yingzi, was symbolically important. Ulanfu's place, like his family, belonged to the 'counter-world,' the 'counter-narrative.' This embodied the

²³⁴ Doc 24, 4.

general antagonism set out between Ulanfu's imputed splittist ambitions and the 'correct path' of the Centre.

This theme of the symbolic importance of Xiao Yingzi returned at the end of the pamphlet. It was in this place that 'one can see the real character of Ulanfu' (*Ulanfu jiu jing shi shenme huose*).²³⁵ It was here that Ulanfu and his 'lackeys stirred up fires, and let ghosts out.' This description of the crimes underscored the metaphoric nature of the attack. Ulanfu's words were used against him. The attack stated that his claim that 'there was little exploitation in Xiao Yingzi before Liberation' was labelled 'arrogant and bragging.' The real issue of Xiao Yingzi was set out at the beginning. In this place, the intention was to 'raise up' nationality criterion in denial of class-based criterion, not to implement the dictatorship of the proletariat against the Mongolian landlords.²³⁶ The text stated that Xiao Yingzi was the same as other places in the PRC, after quoting Mao on the primacy of class struggle in history.²³⁷ Despite the victory of the Communist revolution, Ulanfu's family in Xiao Yingzi had set up a 'castle' opposed to the revolutionary dictatorship. Ulanfu had declared that the area was a Mongolian one. 'If we acknowledge history, we must acknowledge that the land is Mongolian land,' he is claimed to have said. In a struggle against a local called Yun Erdan, who had tried to implement the Centre's class reforms, Ulanfu and his family had tried to seize power. Xiao Yingzi had become the site where the assertion of power and ideology based on nationality had come face to face with the class ideology sponsored by the Centre, thus distilling the main ideological conflict of the CR in IMAR.²³⁸

²³⁵ Ibid 27.

²³⁶ Ibid 3.

²³⁷ Ibid 2.

²³⁸ There are parallels in the use of Xiao Yingzi village in the campaign against Ulanfu and his wife, and the attack on Liu Shaoqi's wife Wang Guangmei and her championing of her experiences in Taoyuan Village during the CR. See 'Pseudo-Four Clean-ups and Real Restoration – a Report of the Investigation Made into Four Clean-ups Movement in the Taoyuan Production Brigade Conducted by the Top Person in Power Taking the Capitalist Road,' (*People's Daily* 9th September 1967) and Dittmer 1998, 81 for Mao's take on this.

3.2.8 Guilt by Association: The Attack on Ulanfu's Family

This narrative was centred on exploitation as the primary characteristic of powerlessness. Ulanfu's 'corrupt' were seen as the main practitioners of exploitation:

'Yun Liwen's family were originally in the Wumeng League and Lingge'er Banner, Siqinwanqi Village. From small, Dageqin [previously referred to as Yun's father] lived the life of a playboy, an aristocrat. Living off the rent... he didn't work but achieved the life of a parasite. Occasionally getting up, eating, drinking, playing, chatting, tagging along behind his dog-father on a horse hitting pigs... Or on a cart, going all over the place, up and down mountains, playing in the water...'²³⁹

This image drew from that of the decadent exploitative 'aristocratic classes,' personalising the grand themes of the master narrative in a local context, bringing them close to the target audience, who could then be made to feel the hurt and damage these exploiters had brought.

The second part of the narrative attack was on Ulanfu's relatives. Food was the symbol to convey this sense of privilege and corruption. This was carried by the mini-narrative of someone who worked for Yun's family, Gu Chengxi. In 1928, the pamphlet stated, at the most disastrous time, when inflation was soaring and there was a famine, 'in this kind of time, the more difficult it is, the more rich people have the chance to get richer.' At this time, 'ugly Yun' (*Yun chouchou*) defaulted on Gu Chengxi's wages. The most powerful means to convey Gu's abject servitude was to describe Gu's wife '[having to] cook for the Yun family for over ten years.' The text listed the many parties and occasions when the Yun family banqueted, 'eating big fish and fatty meat, eating and drinking the fat of the land and sea.' Gu's wife had to 'fry the vegetables and warm the alcohol, serving the food and holding the plates, mashing the tea and lighting cigarettes, without rest.'²⁴⁰ Grand metaphors were used to describe the disaster enveloping people in 1928. It was a 'year of many calamities' (*duozai-duonan*), with high winds, drought, and starvation, with people working 'until they fainted with hunger,' and many dying, 'fathers and mothers

²³⁹ Ibid 9.

²⁴⁰ Ibid 10.

selling their daughters and sons, and husbands their wives.' At this time, in order just to eat, people went over to the Nationalists to fight for them. But the Yun family 'ate white noodles every day,' and lived a 'life of dissipation' (*huatian-jiudi*) regardless.

After this stark depiction of the contrast between the exploiters and exploited classes in the 'old society,' the text attained a collective voice. There was a reminder that the narrative recalled the suffering and exploitation of 'our people.' History always has a message: 'We must always remember Chairman Mao's instructions, never to forget class struggle, never to forget the dictatorship of the proletariat. Smash Ulanfu, Yun Liwen and Yun Kanxiao and their type to the ground, kick them a 100,000 times, never let them get up again.'²⁴¹ The ideological prescriptions of the Centre appeared in the collective voice, before setting down the actions which were to be endorsed and promoted locally. The section ended with five slogans: the first against Liu Shaoqi, the second against Ulanfu, and the final three, positive declarations for the victory of the CR, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the leadership of Chairman Mao.

The counter-narrative drew on history in other ways. Exploitation was still an important connecting theme. In referring to Ulanfu's wife as an 'empress dowager' (*Cixi taihou*) the text deployed well-established stereotypes of imperial exploitation and feudalism, and drew on a collective memory of the injustices of the past, before the ending of the imperial dynasties in 1911. This was strongest in the final section, which referred to 'King U[lanfu's] visit to the ancestral grave (*shangfen*),' in which a journey in 1959 by Ulanfu and his family to Xiao Yingzi was described as an imperial procession, startling the local workers with the arrival of five jeeps, the front one of which was occupied by the 'modern day monarch, Ulanfu,' the second by the modern 'Cixi Empress Dowager,' his wife Yun, and the final one by the 'Prime Minister' (*chengxiang*, a special term used in China pre-1911).²⁴² A further example was the use of 'imperial edict' (*shengzhi*) issued by one of Ulanfu's 'lackeys.'²⁴³

²⁴¹ Ibid 12.

²⁴² Ibid 16.

²⁴³ Ibid 25.

This appeal to historical memory was also contained in the writing style, with its use of many literary and written forms, paradoxically paralleled by low-level abuse terms (see below in this section). In the final section the following classical terms were used:

Dao, 'to say'

Feiyou, 'not'

Qiyou, 'isn't,' 'wouldn't'

Wu, 'I'

Yue, 'say'

Ye, used at the end of sentences as a marker in classical Chinese

Gu, 'I,' used only by feudal princes in classical texts. Imputed to Ulanfu in this text.

It was unusual, outside of literary texts, to find these characters, though they were still widely understood by the educated who have studied classical Chinese. Deploying such 'elitist' and esoteric language within a document which was ostensibly part of a popular attack on behalf of the 'great masses of the people' seems contradictory, and gives a clue to the very diverse background of those producing material in the CR. This document was sponsored by the local university. Its authors were classified as 'intellectuals.' The literary nature of the material was compounded by the dense use of formulaic language (*chengyu*). In the description of Ulanfu's 'jeep' procession reference was made to the green plum trees and the 'fierce empty sunlit air.'²⁴⁴ It was also evident in the courtesy shown to the 'reader' (not listener), in the sentence: 'honoured reader, please note' (*duwei, qing zhuyi*).²⁴⁵ While this was produced by a highly literate author (or authors), it was also aimed at an audience that was assumed to have good literary and historical knowledge. This indicated the heterodox nature of the audience of this mass, popular movement, the CR, and the need for more than one register with which to speak to them.

The attack on Ulanfu's family had another strain. While some elements of the pamphlet's written style were literary and elegant, there was also a strong strand of

²⁴⁴ Ibid 14.

invective used for the accusations of the family's corruption and greed. Yun was referred to as Ulanfu's 'ugly wife' (*chou laopo*), a label that was both familiar (*laopo* is a more colloquial form for wife, a little like 'old woman') and derogatory (*chou*).²⁴⁶ She was also referred to as Ulanfu's 'dog wife' (*gou poniang*), who had a 'dog father' (*gou fu*). Yun's paternal grandfather was referred to as a 'drunkard, smoker, gambler' (*jiugui, yangui, dugui*).²⁴⁷ He was also a 'womaniser' (*segui*). Stronger terms occurred with the use of 'sons of bitches' (*gou zaizi*) about the Yun family. The culmination of this abuse was contained in the sentence which, under the sanction of the great proletarian revolution, condemned 'patriarch U(lanfu) (*Wu wangfu*) and his type to be plucked up and dumped in the rubbish bin of history' (*lishi lajixiang*), becoming as filthy and contemptible as a 'pile of dog's shit' (*buchi yu renlei de goupidui*).

The efforts to discredit Ulanfu through attacking his family shows the role played by class and family connections in the social and political context of the CR. Bulag makes clear that one of Ulanfu's vulnerabilities was that he had promoted close family members in IMAR, and could be accused of creating a personal power basis there.²⁴⁸ While this may have been entirely rational political behaviour in the PRC (both then, and to a lesser extent now) it conflicted with the stress from the Centre, which reached a peak during the CR, of the precedence of class relations over all other kinds of social connections. 'In the class society, there is only class love and class kinship.'²⁴⁹ It was inevitable that Ulanfu could be damaged through his family. Nationality did not need to be mentioned. They just needed to be related to him.

3.2.9 Getting Personal: The Direct Attack on Ulanfu

Ulanfu was not merely attacked through a place he was symbolically associated with and the behaviour of his close relatives. His own history and person were also directly criticised. His appearance was carefully described in the final section, during the 'procession' to the ancestral grave: 'Tall and fat, like a big pot, a high

²⁴⁵ Ibid 16.

²⁴⁶ Ibid 2.

²⁴⁷ Ibid 21

²⁴⁸ Bulag 2002, 213.

brow, flat nose bridge, long chin, thick lips, like a big monkey.’²⁵⁰ Such an attack, ostensibly on Ulanfu’s appearance, worked more by taking him as a symbol than an historical person. What he symbolised was made clear in the third section, where Ulanfu was attributed with words articulating a counter-ideology: ‘You are all Mongolian, you should paint gold on the faces of Mongolians, not make Mongolians’ faces black.’ Ulanfu was accused of using the promotion by the Centre of self-reliance (*zili gengsheng*) for his own ‘restorationist’ counter-revolutionary purpose. This culminated in the verbal sacrilege of taking the supreme slogan of Maoist fervour of the time, and transferring it directly to Ulanfu: ‘Long life to Chairman Ulanfu!’ (*Ulanfu zhuxi wansui*).

The only direct speech attributed to Ulanfu was a statement made to one of his supporters, He Yao.²⁵¹ The style attributed to him was highly literary, full of arcane terms, far removed from contemporary colloquial Chinese:

‘I must have He Yao as my extra pair of wings. You say a good man needs three helpers (*suyu shuo haohan sanbang*), like a tiger sprouting wings [to fly]. I will do great work. Just at the time I need someone, He Yao will become a high official of great use. You must know in your heart that in this way I will create an independent fiefdom.’

This language compounded the sense of Ulanfu as a symbolic rather than a literal figure, an Ulanfu who existed only within the text. Little was conveyed of his biography, of his actual policies or political positions. Ulanfu was made into a remote, almost mythical figure, so that even the voice he was given in the text looked unnatural.

In other documents Ulanfu’s chief crime of appropriating the symbolic power of others was accentuated. The most damaging of these was the accusation that Ulanfu had intended to become the ‘modern Genghis Khan.’ Genghis Khan’s centrality to Mongolian identity and history is well recognised. He was the great historical leader who showed that if Mongolians were united they would shake the world. His story encapsulated the memory of when the Mongolians ruled over a weak Chinese state

²⁴⁹ Doc 24, 11.

²⁵⁰ Ibid 14.

and had true self-determination and power. This golden age has dominated Mongolian collective memory ever since. Genghis Khan remains a contentious figure to this day, creating unease in Han Chinese, and feelings of lost greatness to many Mongolians.²⁵²

In 'Confessions of a Counter-Revolutionary' (*Fangeming de zibaishu*) published by the Hohhot Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Headquarters, in August 1967, a section contained quotes detailing Ulanfu's counter-thoughts on splittism and the creation of a new 'Ulanfu Dynasty' (*Ulanfu wangchao*). The editorial imputed to Ulanfu a desire to become a 'leader' (*lingxiu*) and 'saviour' (*jiuxing*) of the Mongolians, both phrases taken from the contemporary discourse about Chairman Mao. It was claimed that Ulanfu would do this on the grounds of being a saviour and leader of the minority group to which he belonged. He was not a real saviour for all people, because that needed to be based on class. Part of Ulanfu's method was to 'glorify Genghis Khan,' appropriating his symbolic capital amongst Mongolians for himself, 'chasing dreams of grandeur.' Ulanfu was quoted as saying during a speech to open the People's Congress in 1947 that Mongolians were the 'sons and daughters' of Genghis Khan and needed to unite around him. Their history was one of 'oppression, exploitation, humiliation... The sons and daughters of Genghis Khan must, for the glory of their ancestors and prosperity of the 10,000 generations of mothers, father, brothers, sisters, husbands and wives, unite to save themselves.'²⁵³ The oppression used in the central narrative was localized, and became oppression of the Mongolians, of a national minority by the majority group. Genghis Khan became the key symbol of the resistance to this outside oppression.

Ulanfu was accused in another document from the period of supporting those who wished to 'preserve the glory (*guangrong*) of the period of Genghis Khan.'²⁵⁴ In an ideological attack from 20th August 1967, the writer(s) started with words attributed

²⁵¹ Ibid 20.

²⁵² See Bulag 2002, 235 for the continuing importance of Genghis Khan in IMAR. Also Harrell 1995, 248 who describes Genghis Khan's importance as a symbol to Mongolians 'of ethnic/cultural survival of their group relation to the overwhelmingly dominant Chinese state and society.'

²⁵³ Doc 17, 13.

²⁵⁴ Doc 13, 17.

to Ulanfu in 1957, during an 'national minority work conference':

'[Ulanfu says] "Some Mongolians say I have done a good job on the relationship between us and the Han. I say this all comes from Genghis Khan and the development of history after that. If he hadn't handled relations with the Han well, how could the Yuan dynastic rule last 90 years?"

'This really lays it all out in the open. He [Ulanfu] wants to "do a good job on the relationship with the Han" [and] carry on Genghis Khan's "development of history," according to the method of Genghis Khan's rule "lasting 90 years." To tell the truth, Genghis Khan is the representative of the feudal exploitative classes. Lifting up Genghis Khan's dead spirit, and making it a model for Mongolian and Han unity, carrying on "development of history" from Genghis Khan, just means carrying on the history of exploitative classes, the continuation of national minority oppression and national minority exploitation.'²⁵⁵

In this local discourse attributed to Ulanfu, Genghis Khan was presented as a symbol of unity within the Mongolian community, and between Mongolians and Han (but in terms of creating a hierarchy - ruler (Mongolian) and ruled (Han)). In the discourse of the Centre, he was placed within the class categories of 'exploiter, oppressor,' a maker of disunity and discord. As a symbol Genghis Khan occupied the fault line between the two discourses. In one he was seen as positive, in the other as entirely negative. Ulanfu's attempts, evidenced in these texts through his words, to appropriate Genghis Khan's symbolic power was offered as proof that he subscribed to feudal, counter-revolutionary values.

In the foreword to the attack containing the words on Genghis Khan above, the authors also held out the real symbol of unity: 'Let us, holding high both hands, welcome the limitless glory of Mao Zedong Thought, lighting up the red new IMAR, the new China.'²⁵⁶ In the framework of the new narrative, Ulanfu figured as a secret supporter of 'China's Khrushchev' to whom he was linked as a representative and lackey. The only 'leader' (*lingxiu*) in IMAR, was Chairman Mao 'whom we [the people of IMAR] follow eternally, leading us to a future of victory.' As Xiao Yingzi was presented as a place of symbolic competition and opposition to the centrally supported model Dazhai, so too was the local narrative of Ulanfu's

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid, foreword.

experiments there set against the founding myth of the PRC and the symbol conveying the most value, Chairman Mao:

'On October 1st 1949, at Tiananmen, Chairman Mao solemnly declared the founding of the PRC. In these few years to 1965 it was like spring rain after a long drought, or like a hurricane stopping to let a tree grow at last. Under Chairman Mao's heroic leadership, it really is like an eagle spreading its wings to soar, or a horse galloping full speed ahead, every day moving towards communism. The people have never been this blessed, the "fatherland" (*zuguó*) never so strong and rich.'²⁵⁷

Chairman Mao personally figured in this central narrative, placed in a context where he symbolized oppression, liberation from strength through unity, ranged against Ulanfu and his local discourse promoting splittism and disunity.

3.2.10 Voices of Others: Reports of Meetings during the Campaign

The texts analysed in the sections above contained a restricted number of voices. They were either those of the Centre and its canon of ideological saints - Mao, Lenin, Stalin, Marx, Engels. Or they were of the condemned victims - Ulanfu and his supporters. Or they belonged to the editors of the collections. The narrative attack document was also, in its imposition of a specific literary and symbolic menu, monovocal. These texts were to instruct and guide the audience, to impose ideas on them, and lead them towards a correct position. As such, they were prescriptive in intent. What voice was allowed in the anti-Ulanfu Campaign, for those at whom this material was aimed, the 'great mass of the people' referred to so often in these texts, the 'workers and proletariat,' the 'exploited and oppressed classes,' the audience for whom the CR was part of a continuing programme of liberation, and in whose name the movement was carried out?

Rebellious group pamphlets claimed to contain the real voice of the audience. However, while rebellious groups presented themselves as being supported by broad constituencies, they were manifestly documents sponsored by factions, groups with a necessarily limited popular reach, competing with other similar groups of varying size and power. Only the *IM Daily* set out, in some reports, a range of voices of

²⁵⁷ Ibid 18.

participants from the approved CR classes, commenting and participating in the campaign against Ulanfu. These voices, in their condemnation, were used to serve as a reflection of the public denigration of Ulanfu's power, proof that his power base had turned against him and that he had lost his local mandate.

On 16th September 1967, a full page report in the *IM Daily* recorded a range of voices against Ulanfu. Of the five voices, four were classified as 'poor herdsmen' (*pinku mumin*). The exception was a 'herd worker' (*mugong*). The editorial introduction stated that the reports came from a 'cadre meeting' organised by the 'Xilinguole League Aabaga Banner proletarian revolutionary ranks'²⁵⁸ attended by the poor and semi-poor herdspeople. The purpose of the meeting was to implement the new directive of Chairman Mao to 'fiercely strike down the representative in IMAR of China's Khrushchev, Ulanfu.' The speakers were from communes (*gongshe*) or division in the league. All the pieces were by Mongolians.

As in the material analysed above, the relationship between central and local concerns operated in terms of ideological competition which was partially conveyed through the promotion of different kinds of narratives. All five contributions began with a quotation from Chairman Mao marking adherence to a central, unified ideology. The contribution by a man called Daoerqi was the most dramatic, containing a personal account of exploitation in the 'old society.' At that time, he said, his father worked for a 'herdlord' for a wage of ten yuan a month, enough only to buy a pair of shoes. His mother worked helping the herdlord's wife cooking. He himself worked with his mother, rewarded either with a sheep's tail for food or brick tea (the cheapest kind): 'In the cannibalistic society of the past (*chiren de jiu shehui*), our family scraped a living, unable even to support ourselves, with nothing to eat, nothing to wear, living a tragic life worse than a beast of burden (*guozhe niuma buru de beican shenghuo*).' The speaker asked rhetorically: 'What is the difference between this life and the exploitation of poor peasants by rural landlords in the feudal society?' This stressed the common currency of class exploitation. The narrative of exploitation and oppression in the old society, which was given generally in 3.1.7 was here placed in the history of an individual, given a specific

²⁵⁸ In Mongolian, Xilingol Aabag.

voice and context. For this person, liberation came when 'the sun which never sets rises higher above the grasslands.' Such liberation was conveyed through the person of Mao, through symbolism of his presence in IMAR, on the grasslands, and his direct intervention in the individual lives of the 'oppressed' classes there: 'Chairman Mao has liberated us herders who have suffered oppression, giving us a prosperous and happy life.' The enemy, in the person of 'IMAR's Khrushchev' Ulanfu, was attempting to destroy this happiness. In the new narrative, the bad of Ulanfu was balanced against the good of Mao.

This individual's narrative authenticated and gave credibility to the new history within which the CR worked. There was an unconditional acceptance of the Centre's ideology of oppression and liberation being based on class terms to frame identity, not ethnic ones. While this appeared to be a personal narrative, its terms were purely collective. The tale of oppression was one for which there were infinite variants but one basis. Each person's individual story had to be cast according to the context and framework supplied by the Centre. The imposition of the Centre's designs in such personal voices was shown by the fact that in this exercise of retelling history, the author generated from his or her personal story a moral, a message:

'We must never forget Chairman Mao's teaching, loving the things Ulanfu hates, hating the things Ulanfu loves, resolutely smashing the herdlord economy (*muzhu jingji*), resolutely raising up the banner of Mao Zedong Thought, persevering in violently striking down China's Khrushchev and his representative in IMAR, Ulanfu, pushing them into the water, this scum, ensuring that our glorious proletariat will never ever change colour.'

Qingbatu's piece talked of the 'evil objective' (*zui'e mudi*) of Ulanfu's 'restorationist capitalism,' which opposed Mao's teaching on social class and class struggle. Ulanfu was accused of using 'economism' (*jingjizhuyi*) to 'blind us, so we could not clearly see the socialist road, pulling us astray from the economy of people's communes.' The assertion of the primacy of class struggle was also made by Xiang Qizheng, who stated his criticisms of the Ulanfu and his faction within the central terms of 'bolstering their own selfish interests' (*sizi*), and weakening the 'public' ones (*gongzi*).²⁵⁹ The categories to which people belonged (poor peasant,

²⁵⁹ For the importance of the dichotomy between 'private' (*si*) and 'public' (*gong*) in

middle peasant) while adapted locally (herders, herdlords) were based on class, not nationality/ethnicity. The prime objective was the assertion of the dominance of 'dictatorship of the proletariat.' It was only in accepting this ideological framework that the specific voices had credibility and generated knowledge of such exploitation and the kinds of action needed to be freed from it. Such commitment was marked by adherence to a common ideology, a common narrative, and a common language.

Section Three: From Person to Institution. The Formulation of the IMPP

3.3.1 The Attack against Ulanfu as a Process

In the analysis of the dialogues between the Centre and the region in Chapter Two, they were described as a process moving through assessment of the local situation to a judgment by the Centre and the issuing of implementable prescriptions. A similar process occurred in the attack against Ulanfu. There was an initial process used to discredit and undermine his local status (this is best illustrated by the fact he could not be openly named in the early stages of the attack, to his full outing from mid-1967 and the expansion of 'targets'). The real strategy of the attack was the identification of a discrete 'faction' with a programme, a history, and institutional identity, within and through which it was claimed Ulanfu (and his supporters) attempted to realise their splittist ambitions. In naming Ulanfu, in describing his crimes, and his counter-ideology, and in labelling him, the organisations within which he was accused of attempting to work also come more clearly into focus. The key moment was the shift from attacking Ulanfu and his clique as a limited group of people, to talking about an underground party, with an institutional history, manifestos, documents, organisational structure. At this point the IMAR situation became much more dangerous. What had finally been identified was a vehicle for collective splittist intentions. This struck at the heart of the CCP's power locally and was a direct threat to their hegemony.

This entity, the IMPP, did not figure in the CR in IMAR until the end of 1967, at

about the time when the newly set up IMAR CRC under Teng Haiqing was implementing the centrally endorsed 'Party rectification' campaign.²⁶⁰ What was referred to until then as Ulanfu's 'creation of an independent kingdom' was now labelled as a whole party, connected to the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party which had been active in the 1920s. According to Tumen and Zhu, the true emergence of the IMPP as a local issue came when Ulanbaagen, a low level local official, was tasked by Teng Haiqing with producing evidence discrediting Ulanfu. At the heart of this lay the claim that there was a complete splittist counter-revolutionary party, the IMPP.²⁶¹ According to Woody, well into 1968 Teng was reluctant to accept that such a 'complete' organisation existed. But from April 1968, the claim was accepted, publicised, and from that point became the focus of the campaign in IMAR.²⁶² This introduced a new and explosive element into the local narrative; the existence of a 'counter-Party' institution as a vehicle through which splittism was promoted, embodying a separatist political programme. Treachery to the central unified Chinese state was no longer hidden. It was now explicitly labelled and could be described in the attack discourse.

3.3.2 'Thoroughly Smash the Counter-Revolutionary Fortress of Nationalism - the IMPP'

While the first public mentions of the IMPP did not occur till mid-1968, material like this document, published in December 1967 by the IMAR Hafeia United Committee and IMAR Language Committee, Philosophy and Social Science Research Institute 'East is Red' Alliance in Hohhot went into considerable detail about the IMPP.²⁶³ The 51-page pamphlet was marked as restricted and not for public use. As such, it was one of the earliest appearances in the CR of a description of the IMPP phenomenon.

The collection began with a 'highest directive' stressing the utter primacy of CCP unity. Only this guaranteed the unity of the PRC. After this, the foreword to the

²⁶⁰ Woody 1993, iv.

²⁶¹ Tumen and Zhu 1995, 53-54.

²⁶² Woody 1993, 6-7.

²⁶³ Doc 27.

pamphlet described the early history of the IMPP, and its roots in Inner Mongolian nationalism in the 1920s, with a list of early leaders, mostly drawn from the Mongolian upper classes. The foreword stressed the complex membership and strategy of the party from its foundation. During the period of Japanese occupation, the party had been dominated by 'traitors' (*maiguo toudi*), either high officials or officers. A Mongolian called Hefeia was identified as one of the key early leaders, and described as a 'Mongolian spy, Japanese spy, Nationalist lackey.' The greatest crime of this party was to 'stubbornly oppose the leadership of the CCP':

'They flagrantly advocated that Inner Mongolia had no working class (*gongren jijie*) according to the criterion of socialist economic development, therefore there was no necessity to organise a communist party. The only thing was Hefeia's IMPP. What was called the "Inner Mongolia People's Revolutionary Party" was the same in the main as the Mongolian Revolutionary Party, aimed at pushing forward the merger of Inner and Outer Mongolia. They tried to make out that IMPP and the CCP were "friends," brother-parties, who could communicate with each other, but there was [no question] of leadership.'²⁶⁴

In not accepting the leadership of the CCP, in rejecting its ideological hegemony, the IMPP had shown that its real purpose was to set up a 'separate country.' In 1946, Hefeia and his co-leaders 'had no option but to publicly dissolve the IMPP.' But at the same time, they set up a new 'IMPP' party, with a membership of young Mongolian intellectuals. This had a constitution, seal, and a committee. In fact, 'it was the same colour and type as the old IMPP.' It was this organisation which Ulanfu had followed. The so-called 'revolutionary path' which Ulanfu had taken was 'in fact one in which Ulanfu had violated Chairman Mao's [own] revolutionary path':

'Upwards of 20 years of Ulanfu's counter-revolutionary revisionist splittist crimes amply shows that all that Ulanfu has done while pretending to be a CCP member has actually been to faithfully continue the work of the IMPP.'²⁶⁵

This was a clear declaration that while Ulanfu might have appeared to have been working within the structures of legitimate power and accepted the CCP ideology, in

²⁶⁴ Ibid 2.

²⁶⁵ Ibid 3.

fact he belonged to a separate power-structure, and followed a separate strategy. Identification of the IMPP was the first step in exposing and then digging out those 'hidden enemies,' with their counter-institutions and objectives, and their own 'manifesto' containing an anti-Han chauvinist ideology (*fanhan-panhan*).

Following this introduction was a collection of supporting documents containing the counter-language of the IMPP. As in the attack against Ulanfu, words were quoted directly from the enemy. But in this case complete documents with full sourcing and documentary type attribution were offered. These ranged from the draft of the IMPP Constitution (*dangzhang*), to the instructions issued to the East Inner Mongolia IMPP, to a banner from 1945, and the summary constitution (*zong zhang*) of the Mongolian Communist Youth League. Over 40 documents were presented, some giving regulations and rules, others setting out structures and personnel, all contributing to the sense of a well-organised and comprehensive counter-entity operating by issuing 'decisions,' prescriptions and rules similar to the CCP itself, with a similar hierarchy and power structure.

The most vivid illustration of this presentation of the IMPP as a organisation was the setting out of an organogram, detailing the structure of the organisation: the Party Congress at the top, the Central Standing Committee Full Session below this, and then the Central Committee split between administrative and political functions, reaching down into the cities, leagues and banners, to cadres, and finally individual members. A structure like this paralleled almost exactly that of the CCP itself. It was, therefore, even more to be feared because it 'ghosted' the functions, and institutional set-up, of the CCP. It had a shadowing, underground structure, so that the members of one could occupy places in the other. The difference was not in its structure but in its ideology, in its pursuit of objectives opposed to those of the CCP:

'The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [IMPP] represents the common interests of the Mongolians and Mongolian people. It aims to implement the current stage of the system and struggle for Chinese new democracy... Its ultimate objective is to bring about in Mongolia a socialist communist system. This party leads a unified group of people from the Mongolian world, and is allied with the CCP, the Outer Mongolia

Revolutionary Party, and International Communism...²⁶⁶

The IMPP was not subordinate to the CCP, but presented as equal to it. The CCP was unable to accept this challenge to its hegemony, simply because its power was predicated on possession of a universal truth, one of the central tenets of which was its right to a monopoly of power in the PRC.

The documents in this pamphlet indicated the formulation of a new narrative, and detailed a counter-history. The narrative here was not based on individual accounts of exploitation and oppression. Instead, ostensibly it dwelt on the more factual presentation of personnel, structures, documents, events, from a 'parallel history,' a history that had disappeared underground in 1947. Now the time had come to dig this out and expose it. In practice this meant from 1968 to 1969 Mongolians (both those who were members of the Party and those who were not) became targets of a savage campaign.

Conclusion: A New Narrative

The impact of the Centre's discourse of the management of IMAR's problems distilled in the '13th April Decision' can be seen in the localized discourse in which Ulanfu was portrayed as a representative of a 'counter-ideology' within a counter-narrative, using a counter-language. The key issue during this period was the conflict between the centrally supported ideology of class, and a local one imputed to Ulanfu based on nationality issues. The destruction of Ulanfu's prestige and influence to the local audience was a logical objective for the new power structures implementing this discourse in IMAR.

An attack centred on Ulanfu only took things so far. The real crisis point came with the articulation of a counter-organisation, signifying aspirations for a fully independent Inner Mongolia. This entered the territory deemed forbidden by the discourse from the Centre, with its promotion of unity.

The campaign against Ulanfu was a means to implement the hegemony of the ideology of class over nationality, something implicit in the discourse arising from

²⁶⁶ Ibid 11.

the '13th April Decision.' It also delivered control over the keywords of political action – 'liberation' and 'justice' – and the key moments in the narrative of IMAR history and the contribution this made to the region's political identity: 'Because of the tumultuous CR led by our great leader Chairman Mao, Ulanfu's throne has been smashed (*wangye baozuo*), and the scum protected and collected by him swept away,' a contemporary attack concluded. 'Ulanfu is in the water, Hefaiia has fallen from his stage... We will completely smash the IMPP....This is the great will of the people (*renxin*), a great, urgent matter for the people.'²⁶⁷

The imposition and promotion of this new order fell to the leader appointed by the Centre in the '13th April Decision,' Teng Haiqing. The next chapter looks at his use of this language, and the narrative created through and by it.

²⁶⁷ Ibid 4.

Chapter Four

Teng Haiqing: The Voice of Power? -

1967-1968

From his appointment as a result of the '13th April Decision' in 1967, till his removal after the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, Teng Haiqing was ostensibly the most significant power-holder in IMAR. Teng's appointment was approved by the Centre. His voice carried the discourse of the central CR ideology with its legitimised and legitimising vocabulary into IMAR. He was in close contact with leaders in Beijing, and his terms of reference were initially set by them. He occupied the leadership positions in the newly created administrative organisations of the CR. Teng was the nexus of power in IMAR, and yet in the new context his position and voice illustrated two features of power holders. The first was the impossibility of imposing central hegemony on a local situation without adaptation or engagement. Teng's language dealt with the contentious issue of nationality versus class which had figured so much in the campaign against Ulanfu largely by mentioning it in ways heavily circumscribed by the parameters of the Centre's discourse. He initially attempted to use this discourse purely, refusing to engage with the audience in IMAR in terms that related to them, imposing the Centre's categories and language as a mechanism of control. But towards the end of his time in IMAR the narrative of the IMPP which began to appear in his language showed the impact the local situation had had on him. The second feature of Teng's period in IMAR showed the extreme insecurity of the power holders in the new system, and the shallow purchase of the new administrative structures. This was underpinned by Teng's own lack of symbolic power. Analysis of Teng's time in IMAR shows a discourse asserting power, and failing.

Section One: Context

4.1.1 Teng Haiqing: When he Held Power in IMAR and his Role

Mid-1968 to April 1969 was the period of greatest upheaval and violence in the CR in IMAR. This coincided with the high tide of Lin Biao's influence within the PLA, and the national establishment of the revolutionary committees, the main administrative achievement of the CR. And it also coincided with the central symbolic event, the expulsion of Liu Shaoqi from the CCP in October 1968, signalling a break with the previous course of the Chinese revolution. The skirmishes between the PRC and the USSR on the northern border in March 1969, and the Ninth Party Congress which ran from April to May of that year marked the end of the period. The Centre attempted to stabilise the situation after this.

One of the key movements of 1967-1969 was the purge associated with the 'Party rectification' campaign within the CCP. The impact of this in IMAR was profound, aggravating extant tensions, and ultimately bringing them to crisis level. In his chapter on the CR in IMAR in *Massacres of the CR* the Chinese scholar Wu Di argued that the 'Party rectification' campaign became in IMAR the primary vehicle through which to purge what was identified in November 1967 as IMPP. From April 1968, the campaign to 'dig and cleanse the IMPP' became a central pre-occupation.²⁶⁸ The anti-IMPP campaign itself ran through three main phases with varying degrees of intensity and violence: the 'opening' phase, from November 1967 to April 1968; the 'developing' phase from May to November 1968, and the most violent 'high-tide' phase, from November 1968 to May 1969.²⁶⁹

The critical figure in the CR in IMAR during this period, Teng Haiqing, had no links with IMAR before 1967. This is important in understanding his involvement there from 1967 to 1969, and his lack of capital and credibility in dealing with the situation which he had been put and spoke in. He was born in Anhui province and

²⁶⁸ Woody 1993, 7. Wu Di and Woody are the same person. Song 2002 and Woody 1993 contain portions of what is in fact a much longer unpublished history of the CR (interview with Wu Di, 17th March 2003).

²⁶⁹ Song 2002, 88.

joined the Red Army in 1930, working under Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping as commander of the political division in the Third Field Army during the Civil War in the 1940s. He studied at Nanjing Military College for five years from 1949, and was made a Lieutenant General in 1955, before moving to Shijiazhuang in Hebei Province to be the principal of the advanced infantry academy. In 1961 he was made Deputy Commander of the Beijing Military District before being despatched by the Centre to IMAR as a result of the '13th April Decision' in 1967.²⁷⁰

Teng differed from his predecessor Ulanfu not just because he was an outsider to IMAR, but also because he was ethnically Han. Theoretically, these two factors worked in his favour. He was not implicated in the complicated network of relationships that existed for Ulanfu, and for which Ulanfu had been criticised.²⁷¹ But it also meant that there were considerable problems in installing himself in Hohhot, once he had received instructions from the Centre.²⁷² Here he differed dramatically from Ulanfu, whose power was based on his own prestige and background in IMAR and on a narrative that showed personal involvement there. Ulanfu was also perceived as having devised his own ideology (albeit one labelled a counter-ideology), based on defending and explaining the conditions unique to IMAR. This credibility was strong enough amongst local people to require the lengthy campaign described in the last chapter to dismantle it. Finally, Teng was a military figure. His appointment seemed to assert the importance of the army factions over the new rebellious groups. This reduced the constituency in IMAR with whom he had capital and who were therefore likely to immediately accept him.

Teng mainly exercised his power through the new administrative positions created to implement the CR: as head of the CR Military District (the position to which he was appointed by the Centre on 16th April 1967), the IMAR Preparatory Commission (set up on 18th June 1967); the IMAR Cultural Revolutionary Committee (IMAR CRC), set up in November 1967, and the Central IMAR CRC Nucleus Group, set up

²⁷⁰ Tumen and Zhu 1995, 40.

²⁷¹ See Chapter 3, 3.2.6 at the end for more on this.

²⁷² Zhou Enlai in his speech on the 27th April 1967 referred to the refusal of the Military District to accept Teng when he went there, and the fact that he was working from the Railway Bureau as 'this is not under the army' (Doc 11b, 15).

on 13th February 1968. Teng's power was institutionalised within these four entities. The last three were short-lived, being disbanded in 1969.

Teng was an imposed leader. He was sent to be an administrator, conveying and implementing instructions, 'handling' a situation in the ways laid out in the '13th April Decision.' His immediate capital was located in assuming the position of a spokesperson on behalf of the Centre, using their discourse of management of the local situation.²⁷³ He did not have, and was not meant to have, power in his own right, as Ulanfu had. In his brief period in IMAR Teng was the servant of the Centre, attempting to deal with a situation he knew little about and had no background in, using categories that were imposed from outside. It was not surprising that his reaction to the complications of IMAR was crude and unsuccessful. His lack of a natural power base in IMAR was best illustrated by his removal. It took a concerted campaign to unseat Ulanfu, lasting over two years. But Teng's fall, after the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, was swift, taking only two months.²⁷⁴

²⁷³ This is reinforced by Teng being referred to during the early part of his time in IMAR as 'Vice Commander of Beijing PLA Units (South China Morning Post 7th November 1967, and broadcast monitored on 19th December 1967), rather than Chairman of the IMAR CRC, his pre-eminent local position.

²⁷⁴ His career after this was intriguing. He was sent for re-education to Hebei in 1970. He was recorded by Xinhua and other sources as having attended the memorial service for Chen Yi in January 1972, and being at the Korean National Day celebrations the same year. According to the same sources he attended military celebrations and hosted foreign military delegations (from Yugoslavia and Romania) throughout 1973 and 1974. He was posted as Deputy Commander of the Jinan Military District from 1975 to 1980. The last formal event of which he was recorded as being present was at the Leading Organs National Day on 8th August 1979 (Tumen and Zhu 1995, 295 and FCO archives). In an interview in 2003, Wu Di stated that in 1980 Teng had been discreetly retired off, and had gone to live in Shandong. Teng's previous revolutionary record, in particular his contribution to the wars in the 1930s and 1940s meant that he received top-level protection, and was never formally charged with the excesses of the CR in IMAR. He seemed genuinely not to have known of the extent of the violence in IMAR until his own fall in 1969, when he was brought face to face with some of those who had suffered during his 'reign.' These confrontations in struggle sessions against him (described in the following chapter) seemed to have scarred him. He was reportedly on medication in the 1980s for sleeplessness. He died in October 1997 in Beijing. Most mystifying of all, his name figured among those acknowledged as helping in the writing of the 1995 Chinese history of the CR in IMAR (Tumen and Zhu 1995, 338).

Teng's career in IMAR also illustrated one of the paradoxes of the CR. While the movement saw specific figures and factions accrue immense short-term power, there was a profound insecurity at the root of their authority. Andrew Walder described this in the broader context (though he cited the situation in IMAR at the time) when talking of the 'Party rectification' campaigns:

'Those who held authority in most of China early in 1968 occupied positions that were *ad hoc*, in hastily formed revolutionary committees, or "dictatorship headquarters"... People react differently when their livelihoods and even lives are at risk than when they are secure. People act differently when the personal consequences of their own actions can be very large. And the actions of thousands of individuals, all of whom alter their behaviour in similar ways, can cumulate into profound societal outcomes when the institutions that protect and constrain no longer work. These are the simple yet profound changes that Mao and his cronies wrought in Chinese society in late 1966 when they made clear that virtually any authority figure in the country could be suspected of being a traitor, and when they unleashed students and workers upon officials, and removed from them the protection of army and police.'²⁷⁵

This relates to Teng's situation. He had to perform in a new administrative context, yet according to a template of 'authority behaviour' expected from those exercising any form of power in the PRC, which in many ways had not changed. This was manifested in the way in which he spoke, and the assumption, by himself and others, of his right to say certain things. The new administrative context was highly provisional and unstable. It was one in which it was legitimate to question power-holders. In such a situation, Teng needed to play two roles – one as the new power holder, in a new political culture of rebellion and radicalness, and the other still acting according to the system in which power derived from personal patronage, and was highly centralised and clearly marked in certain conventional ways.²⁷⁶

In his speeches, Teng occasionally referred to the violent background of the times he was speaking in, and let this world enter and impact upon his own language. He talked, on 9th June 1968, of the 'formidable (*lihai*) armed struggle' in an

²⁷⁵ Walder 1996, 49-50.

²⁷⁶ This 'power insecurity' was present in the Centre. See Qiu's description of the bewildering arbitrariness of the power culture around Lin Biao before his fall in 1971. Qiu's account is particularly interesting as her father was one of those accused of being collaborators with Lin (Qiu, 1999).

organisation in Wumeng League²⁷⁷ and condemned those who exploited the anti-rightist campaigns to 'strike, smash, hit, burn, grasp and create an atmosphere of terror, pressuring the real "dig, cleanse" activists.'²⁷⁸ In the record of his talks with the group from Pingzhuang on 20th November 1967, one of the delegation members referred to those killed in the armed struggle in August in the district. But Teng did not explicitly invoke or condone violence. Unlike the 'lower-level' attacks analysed in the last chapter, Teng used a more dispassionate, remote style. His language itself was rarely violent. His use of expletives or 'taboo language' was, as is shown below, infrequent. His primary register was official, ordered and prescriptive, and the violent and convulsed world in which he spoke was kept far outside the discourse he spoke within, which proclaimed in its own structured hegemony based on carefully controlled definitions of order and unity.

4.1.2 Teng's Ideology

Teng was appointed to his position in IMAR without having an administrative power base there, or any of his own capital to build on. His condition as an outsider was compounded by his being a spokesperson for an ideology that asserted the hegemony of unity based in class. He represented and promoted this unity in the language he used, demonstrating allegiance through the use of a vocabulary with a clearly marked basis in central terminology, and working tightly within a framework inspired by it. This was signified by his speaking within the master narrative supplied from the Centre. He advertised this in his speeches by reference to the national campaigns, adapting them locally.

²⁷⁷ Doc 2, Issue 219, 1.

Table 5: Teng Haiqing Material: Central Campaigns and Local Variants

Campaign Name	First Appearance in the Centre	Teng's First Mention
The 'Great Alliance' (<i>dalianhe</i>)	Launched in a Centre document in September 1966. ²⁷⁹	Mentioned by Teng in February 1968.
The 'Three Unities' (<i>san jiehe</i>)	Representing the unity between the revolutionary masses, the PLA, and revolutionary cadres. Sanctioned by Mao in <i>People's Daily</i> article in November 1967. ²⁸⁰	
'Party rectification' (<i>zhengdang</i>)	First used in the 1940s. ²⁸¹	Referred to by Teng from 20 th April 1968.
'Arranging study classes' for Mao Zedong Thought (<i>ban xuexiban</i>)	Used in the early 1960s, but in the CR had the specific meaning of the main vehicle for class struggle and criticism. ²⁸²	Referred to by Teng in May 1968.
'Faction Nature' (<i>paixing</i>)	First used nationally in September 1967. ²⁸³	Used throughout 1968 by Teng.
'Great Criticism' (<i>da pipan</i>)	First used in 1968. ²⁸⁴	Appears from Teng's speech on 7 th July 1968.
'Unification' (<i>yiyuanhua</i>)	Used by Mao in a speech in March 1968. ²⁸⁵	Used by Teng from November 1968.

²⁷⁸ Ibid, 13.²⁷⁹ Xiong 1993, 155.²⁸⁰ Ibid 201.²⁸¹ Ibid 42.²⁸² Ibid 124.²⁸³ Ibid 200.²⁸⁴ Ibid 212.²⁸⁵ Ibid 222.

The campaigns marked out in Teng's speeches how he stayed close to the ideological themes pursued in the CR centrally. The 'Party rectification' campaign however occupied the fault-line where the central and local campaign differed, and caused a fracture between Teng's fidelity towards the Centre and the imperative to impose its demands, and the practical impossibility of doing this in a region like IMAR. Teng propagated this campaign in its central terms, but it had a structure and course locally that differed from its form elsewhere, because in IMAR, 'Party rectification' became the main means to target the IMPP, the brunt of which was borne by cadres and people of Mongolian ethnicity.

In the 'Party rectification' campaign in IMAR, the key area of contention and pressure were the importance of contradictions, and polarities and their interpretation and application to their description and analysis of the local situation in Teng's discourse. On the 3rd June 1968, in his speech to a Mao Zedong Thought Study Class, Teng had stated categorically that 'class struggle is not abstract.'²⁸⁶ In line with this stated dislike of 'abstraction,' contradictions were seen in purely concrete, embodied forms. 'The main contradiction,' Teng said on 25th November 1968, 'at the moment is still that between the revolutionary proletarian ranks and the small clique of power-seizers in the party taking the capitalist road.'²⁸⁷ Teng repeated this on 10th December 1968, adding that in IMAR this was manifested in the contradiction between the great masses of the region's proletariat and representatives of Liu Shaoqi and his people in the IMAR, 'the small capitalist faction taking Ulanfu as its leader.'²⁸⁸ More fundamental forms of contradiction were cited in the clash between the 'personal' (*si*) and 'public' (*gong*),²⁸⁹ and in the polarity between leaders and masses, what Teng cited as the 'mainstream' (*zhuliu*) and the 'side-current' (*zhiliu*).

The terms of this ideology were taken directly from the sanctioned and canonised theory of antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradiction in Mao Zedong's theoretical and political thinking. Mao's 'On Contradiction,' written in 1937, and

²⁸⁶ Doc 2, Issue 178, 1.

²⁸⁷ Doc 36, 3.

²⁸⁸ Doc 37, 7.

²⁸⁹ Doc 14, 3.

widely regarded as his most accomplished theoretical work, set out this ideology. Contradictions were described as all-pervasive: 'The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of nature and society, and therefore also the basic law of thought.'²⁹⁰ Mao's treatment of contradictions illustrated well his ability to import abstractions from the master communist ideology and to adapt and relate them to creating a new perception of reality in China. Contradictions pervaded the whole of Chinese society for Mao. They were meticulously described in his 'Ten Great Relationships.' The social acceptance of Mao's teachings on contradictions is exemplified in an editorial in the *People's Daily* on 5th April 1956 which baldly declared that 'society at all times develops through continuous contradictions.'²⁹¹ Linked to the ideology of contradiction was that of permanent revolution, struggle against nature, and the transformation of people through the working out of contradictions in society.

Teng talked of contradictions and polarities locally within this central ideological framework. Contradictions and conflict was embodied in his description of enemies and the good, and even between the description of 'open' and 'dark' enemy actions contained in his speech on 10th December 1968. This symbolised in its language the duality that it was attempting to describe:

'Now enemies are using two types of methods. One is open fight, but this open kind of fighting is very easy for us to see through. One is hiding themselves in a dark corner, scheming, firing arrows, using the rightist tendencies and capitalist factionalism of some comrades, spreading vicious rumours, creating splittism, showing off. This is the greatest danger at the moment.'²⁹²

He also encapsulated contradictions in the metaphors of the two paths or lines from the ideological discourse of the Centre as expressed in Mao's works: 'In the CR in IMAR, there is a battle between two classes, two paths, two struggle lines.'²⁹³ 'Our common path' Teng declared on 20th November 1967, 'is the path of socialism and

²⁹⁰ Ibid 201.

²⁹¹ Ibid 93.

²⁹² Doc 37, 7.

²⁹³ Doc 14.

communism.' Repeating a theme already mentioned, the 'non-abstract' nature of class struggle,' Teng continued on 22nd February 1968:

'Class struggle ... has specific people, specific enemies, two classes, two paths, two directions. This is not an abstract issue. The proletariat and capitalists are two classes. This is a concrete thing. There are two classes, and that means [there are] two paths [they take]. Capitalists take the capitalist path and the proletariat take the socialist path. If there are two paths then there must be a struggle between two directions. The struggle for two directions is really about what path you eventually take: that in the direction of proletarian revolution, or that in the direction of revisionist splittism. Real people take their steps along these paths.'²⁹⁴

The metaphor of the 'path' was applied locally when Teng talked, in 14th April 1968, of 'the CR from beginning to end being a struggle between two classes, two paths, two directions. Resolving this issue [of the two paths or lines], you then have the power of initiative. If you don't resolve it, you don't have the power of initiative. The Third Headquarters (*san si*) have still not resolved whether they go in Chairman Mao's revolutionary direction, or whether they are standing at a crossroads.'²⁹⁵ Teng called this 'a problem of standpoint' (*lichang*), of where someone's thought locates them. The ideology from the Centre supplied the context within which people and organisations were located to be meaningful and understood.

The right direction, Teng declared on 14th June 1968, was the direction of Chairman Mao, which is 'our destiny and our spirit, the basic guarantee of our victory. Chairman Mao's revolutionary direction is that of the proletariat, the basic direction of our Party, and of the masses. If you don't understand Chairman Mao's revolutionary direction, then you don't understand why we continue revolution under socialism, and whose revolution we wage.'²⁹⁶

Part of the ideological importance of the working through of contradictions in society, encapsulated in the metaphor of 'two paths and directions' used by Teng from the beginning to the end of his period in IMAR, was that it conveyed, in simple language, the complicated messages about class classification, and struggle

²⁹⁴ Doc 2, Issue 82, 4.

²⁹⁵ Doc 2, Issue 131, 1.

²⁹⁶ Doc 65, 4.

promoted by the Centre. Without directly mentioning the very difficult situation in IMAR (described in Chapter Three) it conveyed metaphorically the sense of social contradictions and the urgency needed to rectify them. The contentious area of nationality was managed by being left outside its terms.

Indeed, Teng's speeches were largely silent on the 'class versus nationality' problem that had dominated material attacking Ulanfu. Nowhere in his speeches, beyond isolated mentions of 'splittism,' did Teng set out, in any detail, a defence of the hegemony of the central language of class, as opposed to the claimed counter-ideology of nationality. Beyond the most orthodox presentation of the central dogma on class, Teng did not refer to the specific 'Mongolian' class categories mentioned in Table 2.1, Chapter Three, 3.1.5. Only in one document (8th January 1969) did he refer to Ulanfu in something a little more than generic, sloganised form. In Teng's discourse, the anti-IMPP campaign was purely a 'Party rectification' exercise. Teng's relative silence on the issue of nationality and class was all the more extraordinary in view of the fact that these documents covered a period in 1968 in which murder, torture, violence, and social dislocation, caused by these conflicts and overwhelmingly vented on people of Mongolian ethnicity were daily occurrences.²⁹⁷ This exemplified the strategy of exclusion, pushing the issue of ethnicity outside the discourse by undermining or simply ignoring its terms.

4.1.3 On Whose Authority Did Teng Speak?

Teng signified his self-consciousness to his power position in the frequent use of orders, judgements, or commands in his speeches. This demonstrated his belief in

²⁹⁷ According to Woody, Teng was unconvinced of the existence of the IMPP prior to April 1968: 'Teng Haiqing, as the person bearing overall responsibility in Inner Mongolia, and Gao Jinming as the one in charge of civilian affairs, disagreed about whether or not there really existed a New Inner Mongolian People's Party... Teng ... had misgivings. The reason for this was quite simple. As a recent arrival, he knew literally nothing about the situation in Inner Mongolia' (Woody 1993,6). Certainly, the most explicit mentions of the IMPP by Teng occurred well into 1968 – in, for instance, the speech on 25th November 1968. Mentions of nationality early in 1968 were very general. On 22nd February 1968, Teng referred to the struggle against Ulanfu simply as 'a struggle against the counter-revolutionary revisionist nationalist splittists alliance of Ulanfu.' Beyond this label, Teng said nothing more about nationality or an ethnic dimension to the struggle against him.

his occupying a place within a system in which his authority and its exercise was legitimate. He stated categorically at the beginning of several speeches that 'the situation of the CR throughout the country is very good, not just quite good (*dahao, bu shi xiaohao*). The situation in IMAR is the same as in the rest of China, very good, not quite good.'²⁹⁸ His audience accepted this confidence in his right to speak about the whole situation in IMAR and pass judgement on it. His words were reported in newspapers, and quoted by other leaders (see 4.3.5). The main indication of Teng's authority locally was that he was seen as having the power to speak and be listened to by the wider public.

Unlike some leaders at the Centre, Teng only once appealed to the formal positions he held as the basis upon which he had the right to speak in this material.²⁹⁹ For other speeches or speech events he did not state that he spoke as Chair of the IMAR CRC, or the Military District. In the majority of the talks he was indicated as 'Comrade' Teng (as is the case with references to him in *IM Daily*). In nine of the documents he was called 'commander' (*silingyuan*). In the remaining three documents he was simply 'Teng Haiqing' with no title. There were occasions when Teng made clear that he was giving his 'own opinion' (for instance, at the beginning of his speech on 20th February 1968) - but such personal opinions were merely to deliver orthodoxies and appeared more as a rhetorical strategy to adopt a colloquial register towards some kinds of audience.

Such reticence about citing formal administrative positions as a basis for the right to issue authoritative utterances betrayed the confusing environment within which

²⁹⁸ He repeated this judgement at the beginning of 25th March 1968, and during the speech on 14th June 1968. This was also a common phrase used in central leaders' speeches. See, for instance, Zhou Enlai's opening words on 27th November 1966 at the Revolutionary Rebellion Meeting in Beijing (recorded in '*Wuchanjieji wenhua da geming ziliao huibian, lingdao tongzhi jianghua*, (Great Proletarian CR Materials, Leaders' Speeches) part 4, published by the IM University in December 1966, 227. Another example occurs on page 256. Whether according to a formula or not, the important point is that Teng evidently felt he had the right or sanction to use this sort of language.

²⁹⁹ This was the speech on 21st February 1968, of which there are two versions. In the fuller verbatim version, Teng stated at the beginning that 'I represent the CRC of the IMAR, and send the warmest greetings to the student study council.' This was omitted from the summary version.

Teng spoke, with a new raft of organisations created as a result of the CR being set up, some competing with other 'non-official' entities within this new market. Teng's appeal to authority was therefore to a more fundamental basis. The first was derived from the Centre, and specifically sited in Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong Thought, along with its signifiers. The second was 'the masses.'

Teng's appeals to central authority, demonstrating direct sanction from them, were clear from the earliest of his speeches analysed here, that of the 5th July 1967 (two months after arriving in IMAR). Referring to the '13th April Decision' in that speech, and instructions 'personally approved (*zi pizhun*) by Chairman Mao,' Teng stated that 'because the Centre has adopted heroic, resolute measures, thoroughly smashing the black underground headquarters... and shattering the capitalist counter-revolutionary power-restorer counter-current... IMAR CR has entered a new period, following the healthy path opened personally by Chairman Mao developing towards the future.'³⁰⁰ Teng was buying into the symbolic capital of Mao, locating Mao in the discourse as a source of power and legitimacy. Teng was speaking on behalf of Mao when he demanded a personal response from his audience:

'This meeting is to lift high the red banner of Mao Zedong Thought, to carry out politics, to use Mao Zedong Thought as commander. We must cede absolute authority to Mao Zedong Thought in our heads. We must believe Mao Zedong Thought can solve all problems together. We don't want to try to use some twisted evil path to solve problems.'³⁰¹

In this speech, approval by the Centre was even invoked to endorse the good status of the local Third Headquarters: 'Third Headquarters is a model in IMAR of a revolutionary rebellion group, this is approved by the Centre.'

Later in the text, Teng posed the rhetorical question: 'Should we hit them [enemies] or teach and help them?' He resolved this by appealing to 'what Chairman Mao has taught us.' He referred to 'the cadres who have made counter-revolutionary direction mistakes. If, after these few people have made mistakes, the Centre points this out,

³⁰⁰ Doc 14, 1.

³⁰¹ Ibid 1.

[and they are] very quick to correct themselves, [and] stand on the revolutionary direction of Mao Zedong thought, [this] is good.'³⁰² The speech ended with a paean to the glory of the Centre, personified in Mao and Mao Zedong Thought. Teng stated that one should 'establish the complete authority of Mao Zedong Thought,' changing 'our world view.' One should 'study Chairman Mao's highest, newest directives, to direct our revolutionary practice.' We must 'propagate Mao Zedong Thought,' and finally 'develop a universal Mao Zedong education, for the rectification movement.'³⁰³

Teng's words were saturated with overt signifiers of Mao's and the Centre's authority. The local situation figured only insofar as it was seen through the categories from the Centre: 'In the CR in IMAR, we are going through the battle period of struggle between the two classes, two paths, two directions.'³⁰⁴ The chief responsibility for participants in the CR, therefore, was 'to criticise the power-seizers in the Party taking the capitalist path, criticise the small group of power-seizers taking the capitalist path in IMAR, and those taking the capitalist power-seizing path of the Ulanfu faction and his representatives.'³⁰⁵ These were not expositions of Mao's theories, and arguments for their relevance or validity in IMAR. They were assertions to be taken as fact and applied without adaptation in IMAR.

The formulation of instructions or statements from the Centre in Teng's speeches did not vary greatly. At its most paradigmatic it appeared in the speech on 9th November 1967, which, like Teng's other more formal speeches (21st February, 14th June, 12th July, and 10th December 1968) began with 'reverent greeting', the purest expression of Mao-adoration, lifted from the language of the Centre, the: 'Let us reverently send greetings together: greet the reddest reddest sun in our hearts, the contemporary Lenin, the greatest, most glorious leader of the proletariat of the whole world, Chairman Mao, a long and prosperous life.'³⁰⁶ This 'greeting'

³⁰² Ibid 6.

³⁰³ Ibid 8.

³⁰⁴ Ibid 3.

³⁰⁵ Ibid 3.

³⁰⁶ Ibid, 2. There are variants on this pattern. For instance, this was the only occasion in this collection when Mao was spoken of as the 'contemporary Lenin' (a phrase

rhetorically declared fidelity to the common symbol of Mao by the use of generic language. It was indicative of adherence to a collective rather than an individual language. Mao existed in this discourse not as an historical figure but a common symbol: 'The great masses understand "only with Chairman Mao, and Mao Zedong Thought, can we save China, save the world."' Teng called this a 'great truth' (*weida zhenli*). 'From a 100 million people's hearts will come the common cry, "Long life to Chairman Mao, 10,000 years, 100 million years!'" Teng at this point integrated into his voice in the text common slogans from the campaigns from the Centre: 'They will not fear heaven, or earth... they will smash the old thought, old culture, old customs, old habits from several thousand years of the exploiting class.'³⁰⁷ The assertion of the authority of the Centre was manifested through support for, and reliance on, central ideology, conveyed by common forms of language, common patterns signifying allegiance and acceptance. The Centre was present not only in thought, but in the actual words to convey that. The use of a common language signified Teng's participation in a common discourse of recognised power and authority.

Teng made his position as the transmitter of directives from the Centre to IMAR explicit. He talked on 25th March 1968 of the meeting between the Centre (Premier Zhou Enlai, Comrade Jiang Qing) with representatives from Tianjin, and their prescription to 'oppose the rightists.' 'I hope,' Teng stated after this, 'that all banners and towns and responsible people in work units can scrupulously investigate, and overcome the rightist tendency.'³⁰⁸ Teng's function as a disseminator or transmitter of messages from the Centre was strongest in the speech to artistic circles on 27th March 1968, in which he based his position on Jiang Qing's speech from November 1967. Here, the means of transmission were not direct quotes from Jiang's speech, but rather a reference to the 'encouragement' that her talk had given.³⁰⁹ Appeals to the Centre become more explicit when Teng talked of 'whether or not we follow Chairman Mao, and the Centre... The Centre almost

that originated from Lin Biao). Others mentioned the 'four limitesses' (12th July 1968).

³⁰⁷ The latter phrase referred to in Centre discourse as 'smashing the four olds.'

³⁰⁸ Doc 2, Issue 111, 4.

³⁰⁹ Doc 2, Issue 112, 1.

certainly will support the struggle to “dig up the black line, and cleanse [the enemy’s] poison.”³¹⁰

Ability to demonstrate the support of the Centre was important. The identification of the IMPP from November 1967 onwards meant that the focus for the CR in IMAR became different, and took an increasingly unique route. While the Centre supported class struggle nationally, it was not so clear whether it sanctioned the version of class struggle that was occurring in IMAR with its high levels of violence and disturbances. As the campaign got out of control, so the failure of the discourse set out in the ‘13th April Decision’ to actually manage the situation on the ground in IMAR grew more evident. Teng was placed in a position where he was exercising authority on the terms laid out by the Centre in the document, but in a situation where one of the key features in his environment, ethnicity, could not be clearly articulated – only excluded. This was to prove an unsuccessful strategy of control.

This was also a problem in the second basis for authority to which Teng referred to extensively in these speeches, the ‘great revolutionary masses.’ Teng talked on many occasions of the imperative to ‘trust the masses.’ ‘Truth is in our hands,’ he declared on 1st June 1968, ‘we must use Mao Zedong Thought, and trust the great revolutionary masses.’ At another point, Teng addressed this directly to his specific audience (and to the constituency they represented): ‘Now, revolutionary masses, the leaders have put you in the most important place. Politically they really trust you.’³¹¹ This was presented within the context of serving the people, arriving at a broad understanding of common interests, against the factions, and leadership groups, that were active until then. Teng’s main criticism of a group from IM University, from a transcription of a meeting with them on 28th June 1968, was simply ‘you do not trust the masses.’³¹² In his important speech to the plenary session of the IMAR CRC, he stated in more formal and prescriptive tones that ‘we must implement Chairman Mao’s line, we must resolutely trust and rely on the masses, mobilise the masses, and wage people’s battle.’³¹³ On many different kinds

³¹⁰ Doc 2, Issue 131, 2.

³¹¹ Doc 2, Issue 219, 4-5.

³¹² Doc 2, Issue 209, 3.

³¹³ Doc 32, 13. Similar formulations are used on 22nd February 1968, 12th March

of occasions, therefore, Teng reverted to the issue of 'trusting the masses,' implying that he was speaking on their behalf. On the 9th November 1967, he said: 'We must never part with the masses, we must always be responsible for the people, study from the people, we must honestly act as the "beasts of burden" of the people. Departing from the masses is irresponsible; one starts putting on the airs and graces of a high official.'

The pressure on the keywords 'people' (*renmin*) and 'masses' (*qunzhong*) was discussed in Chapter Two, 2.1.13, along with issues the contestation and negotiation over who was, and was not, included in these terms. 'Masses' in the discourse Teng used was a clear signifier of his allegiance to the Centre and its discourse. These were the 'proletarian' masses, the good masses, as opposed to the legion of enemies that also occurred in Teng's discourse – the rightists, power-seizers, capitalist roaders, and splittists. In trying to refer to the 'masses' or 'people' in a localised sense, Teng's discourse showed a clear disjuncture. The 'people' he actually spoke to, on whose behalf he claimed to be speaking, were from a specific place. As his time in IMAR proceeded, there were indications of an increasing awareness of a 'section' of these local people who were traitors, enemies, untrustworthy – the IMPP. The Centre's terms for the 'non-people,' class enemies, was unable to accommodate or correctly label these specific local enemies. This flew in the face of the declaration of the hegemony of the Centre's 'class' ideology, and the strategy to exclude the issue of ethnicity. So Teng's discourse became the site for the conflict between the assertions of the problem of IMAR in the Centre's terms, and an articulation of it in purely localised, ethnic terms.

Section Two: Teng's Words

4.2.1 The Teng Material

The material carrying this discourse and through which this negotiation for authority in IMAR occurred is listed in Appendix Two. This contains a very small portion of the material put out in Teng's name during the CR in IMAR. While it cannot be

1968, and at the end of the speech on 25th March 1968.

taken as in any way comprehensive, it contains examples from materials delivered at a broad selection of the various events and occasions at which Teng spoke. It covers the full period during which he was active in IMAR. It should also be stressed that this material was acquired randomly. It was collected from several sources with no other criterion than that the material came from the period 1967 to 1970 in IMAR.

Of these 34 documents in which Teng's words are recorded, there are:

- 18 speeches (either labelled 'important,' or 'draft')
- Three formal reports delivered at public occasions
- Three 'discussions'
- One 'informal discussion'
- One 'interjection'
- Two 'opinions'
- Three 'instructions'
- One 'record of comments'
- Two 'letters'

Only two of the documents recording Teng's words were written in origin. There are no examples of pamphlets authored by Teng, or articles in the *IM Daily* over the period he was active in the region, although there was an article bearing Teng's name which was published in January 1968 in the *People's Daily*. His public activity was almost wholly through speaking. His words were transcribed in various ways and presented in written form.

21 documents (marked by an asterisk in Appendix Two) were disseminated through the daily newsletter, 'Red Flag Internal Reference Material' (*Hongqi neican*), issued by the IMAR Party Committee Red Flag Alliance Headquarters. All of these carried under their mast the label of 'internal' publications, which were not to be disseminated 'to outsiders.' Their intended readership was therefore limited to those in this organisation. Editions of the 'Red Flag Internal Reference Material' also carried speeches and instructions from Centre leaders and the Party. On the 12th

April 1968 Teng's speech was placed after Zhou Enlai's instructions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing issued on 10th October 1968, and a reprint of an article from the *Liberation Daily* published in Beijing originally on the 27th February 1968. There was also a short 'Instruction from the Centre' on the 'Issue of Arranging Study Classes in Yunan.' Placing Teng's speeches amongst such prestigious material issued by the Centre enhanced their status. Those marked in Appendix Two with a cross appeared in a similar news-sheet, the 'CR Dictatorship,' issued by the Eighth Division of the Construction Project Department. This was also marked as 'internal' material. Those with double crosses in Appendix Two occurred in the 'Struggle Notice' news-sheet (*Zhengduo tongxun*). Of the remaining documents, the issuing authorities were as follows:

1. 5th July 1967 - Hohhot Revolutionary Alliance Headquarters
2. 12th July 1968 - IMAR Military District "Support the Left" Office
3. 10th December 1968 - Hohhot Workers Union

For the documents of the 5th July and 9th November 1967, and 21st February and 14th June 1968 no issuing authority was indicated. These were some of the administrative organisations, new and old, to which and through which Teng spoke – the carriers and conveyers of his voice, and the social entities within which his power was enacted. Setting out these groups maps out the organisational geography within which Teng, with signifiers of support from the Centre in his discourse, negotiated influence and authority.

4.2.2 How Teng's Words Were Taken Down

The most common form of transcription in this material was 'corrected record.' All of these documents carried a disclaimer that the original producer of the words had not checked these versions.

- One (27th March 1968) was a transcription from a recording.
- The speeches of the 9th November 1967, and 21st February, 14th June, 12th July, 25th November and 10th December 1968 were presented as complete

records of either what Teng said, or what he had intended to say. The last of these began with an address to the audience ('Comrades!'). The one on the 12th June 1968 ended with three generic slogans ('Long live the victory of Mao Zedong's CR line, long live the limitless glory of Mao Zedong Thought, long live the great leader, great commander Chairman Mao!')

- The speeches from 12th March, 1st June and 28th June 1968 were presented as dialogues, with the voices of others present in the text.
- That of 17th July 68 was presented as the voice of Teng and other leaders within a text, similar to a newspaper report conveyed through the third person.

There were some indications within these texts of the kinds of editorial control and manipulation exercised over Teng's reported words before being issued in the forms in which they finally appeared. For the discussion on 14th April 1968, the compilers of the speech (activists at IM University and IM Workers College) indicated at the end of their 'synthesised version' that 'there is a small section which was not recorded, and has not been set down here. This corrected record has many parts that are not the original words, but convey the core meaning.'³¹⁴

There were also variations in the insertions in the texts. The transcription in dialogue form of Teng's 'Speech' on 1st June 1968 indicated in brackets at one point that attendees of the meeting laughed. In another (25th March 1968) the speech ended with the simple addition in parentheses of 'slogans' (*kouhao*).³¹⁵ In the speech on 27th March 1968, two days later, 'shouting slogans' was indicated twice in the closing two paragraphs of Teng's speech with applause indicated earlier.³¹⁶

The transcribed speech of 14th June 1968 showed in two places the words 'unclear' (*bu qing*) in parentheses, implying that these versions were either taken from handwritten records, taken down during the speech itself, or (less likely) from a recording.³¹⁷ Finally, two of the speeches are available in separate versions. The

³¹⁴ Doc 2, Issue 131, 3.

³¹⁵ Doc 2, Issue 111, 4.

³¹⁶ Doc 2, Issue 112, 4 and 2.

³¹⁷ Doc 65, 6 and 11.

speech to the 'Study Mao Thought Propaganda Division Class of Hohhot Workers' on 10th October 1968 was issued separately by both the Hohhot Workers Conference, in a single pamphlet on 13th December 1968, and as part of the 'Struggle Notice' on 19th December 1968. There are no variations between these two versions.

4.2.3 Kinds of Meeting and the Audience Attending

Teng had a wide constituency. He spoke not just to organisations and groups in Hohhot, but also to representatives from Hailar (northern IMAR), Zhemeng League (southern IMAR), Pingzhuan (a small town near Hohhot), Yimeng League (bordering Shanxi in southern IMAR), Wumeng League (around Hohhot in central IMAR), Guyang Town (near Baotou), and Baotou. His words, therefore, were aimed at groups that came from all parts of IMAR. He addressed these people in person at the following sorts of occasions:

- 'Meetings' (*huiyi*)
- 'Mass meetings' (*dahui*)
- 'Meetings/granted interviews' (*jiejian*)
- 'Study meetings' (*xuexihui*)
- 'Party committee meetings' (*dangweihui*)
- 'Discussion meetings' (*zuotanhui*)
- 'Enlarged Plenary Committee Meetings' (*quanwei kuoda huiyi*)
- 'Study classes' (*xuexiban*)

A listing compiled from a summary of world broadcasts made during the CR showed that Teng spoke to a large number of groups from early on in his time in IMAR. On 18th September 1967 he attended a mass rally of 60,000 workers to celebrate the founding of the Preparatory Committee for the Workers Congress in Hohhot, at which he 'delivered an important speech.'³¹⁸ He was recorded as having attended various events to establish organisations (the founding of the Factory

³¹⁸ Sourced at *Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East (SWB FE) 2575/B/8 22.9.67*, FCO archives.

Revolutionary Committee on Sept 20th, and the Hohhot Municipal Revolutionary Committee on 3rd October). He spoke for the first time as Chairman of the IMAR CRC at a 'mammoth rally' on 1st November 1967. The summary also recorded him speaking at study classes, sessions of the IMAR CRC, rallies, Mao Zedong Thought Classes, wired broadcast rallies, to propaganda teams, student groups and military. It was in this organisational context that Teng's language was meaningful and meant to have impact. This was the world that he spoke to.

In terms of political importance the highest-exposure events analysed here were the speeches Teng gave at the Plenary Committee meetings. There were a total of four of these: the first from 3rd to 5th November 1967, the second from 6th to 8th January 1968, the third on 5th July 1968, and the final one from 3rd to 19th November.³¹⁹ These made up the administrative backbone of the CR campaign in IMAR from late 1967 to 1969, and were the main vehicle for the regional CRC, of which Teng was Chairman. The other meetings listed above were more generic to the CR as a whole (see Chapter One, 1.12 for more detail on the kinds of meetings in the CR). What differentiated them was the kind of people indicated as attending. These were grouped as:

- 'People in charge' (*fuzeren*)
- 'Working personnel' (*gongzuo renyuan*)
- 'Representatives' (*daibiao*)
- 'Members' (*chengyuan*)
- 'Leaders' (*lingdao*) / 'leading comrades' (*lingdao tongzhi*)

The organisations are listed in the third column of the table in Appendix Two, and consisted of the following:

- 'Revolutionary rebel factions' (*geming zaofanpai*)
- 'Revolutionary committees' (*zizhiqu geming weiyuanhui*)
- 'Study conference'
- 'Railway bureau'

³¹⁹ These are listed in the chronology contained in Tumen and Zhu 1995, 319-335. The final meeting lasted well over a week, at a point when the newly appointed

- 'Preparatory groups of the revolutionary committees' (*geming weiyuanhui choubei xiaozu*)
- 'Leadership small groups' (*lingdao xiaozu*)
- 'Advanced work units' (*xianjin danwei*)

Some of these were created during the CR (e.g. the first and second) and were generic in the sense that they existed throughout the country. Others existed prior to the CR, and outlasted it (bureaux [*ju*] and work units [*danwei*])

For those speech occasions that do indicate specific participation there were the following details:

- The meeting on 20th November 1967 with delegates from Pingzhuan, took place in Teng's office, and lasted an hour and 35 minutes. Four people were named as attending.
- The meeting on 24th November 1967 took place in the Xincheng Hotel, Hohhot, and ran from 3:40 PM to 4:40 PM in the afternoon. Five people were named as attending.
- The speech on 29th February 1968 took place in an office in a guest house in Baotou, and ran from 9:40 AM to 1:30 PM. Five people are named as attending.
- The Instructions on 9th June 1968 involved representatives from Guyang's '490 Division,' the 'Battle Division,' and 'Guyang Middle School Mass Group with responsible people from other work units.'
- The discussion on the 17th July 1968 involved 'work units and representatives from Kanghou, Ningcheng, Baotou, Erzhi, and Hohhot Aviation Factory and Fifth Middle School... along with another 17 work units.'

The differences in Teng's register and tone in front of these various groups was evidence for the ways he adapted his language to the occasions at which he spoke. It also signified awareness of a 'market' of organisations and the differences in their

leadership in IMAR was already beginning to fracture and experience difficulties.

value encoded in the kind of language used with them. The report that Teng delivered to the plenary CRC meetings on 12th July 1968 was extremely formal, and used patterns and structures modelled on central leader speeches of the period. Teng's meeting on 1st June 1968 with the 'three comrades from IM Teachers College' contained many colloquialisms, and used a much less formal register. The use, for instance, of the sentence ending 'what' (*sha* - northern Chinese dialect for *shenme*), and Teng's exclamation at one point that 'there's nothing great about this' (*mei shenme liaobuqide*). This was made even more colloquial in the speech on 7th July 1968 when Teng simply used the same phrase but with *sha* instead of *shenme*.³²⁰ This descended at some (rare) points into the use of invective. In his speech on 14th April 1968 Teng said to the Hohhot Third Headquarters: 'saying that Baotou is a capitalist restorationist [place is] bullshit (*fangpi*).'³²¹ Responding to a report by one of the participants on the talk cited above from 1st June 1968, Teng merely stated: 'Blockheads! (*caobao*) They are blockheads!' And on 31st May 1968, Teng talked of a member of the Workers Union, Bai Mingzhi, who was a 'bastard' (*huaidan*). The range of voices that Teng used, therefore, ran between these parameters; the very formal, for the most formal meetings, to a less structured colloquial style for small-scale meetings. At the formal meetings, it was clear that Teng's style was dictated both by the genre of leadership-speeches of the time, and by the responsibility to convey and represent messages from the Centre to the local audience, themselves critical players in the CR in IMAR.³²²

Finally there is the issue of the amount of time Teng spoke. Based on rough calculations for the speeches that appear to be verbatim records of what he said (five minutes to read aloud for closely printed material, three minutes for double-spaced material, making allowances for audience interruptions, etc), Teng's set speeches were lengthy events. For a formal event Teng spoke at on 14th June 1968, the speech ran to 16 closely printed pages, which would come to a total of 80 minutes speaking time. The verbatim record of the speech on 12th July 1968 came to 28 double-spaced pages – approximately 84 minutes. The shorter speech on 25th November 1968 came to ten pages – 50 minutes. That of 10th December 1968 13 pages – 65 minutes.

³²⁰ Doc 2, Issue 215, 2.

³²¹ Doc 2, Issue 131, 3.

³²² The styles and registers Teng used, and their function, is looked at in 4.2.5.

These were the speeches most clearly marked as verbatim records. Other speech occasions were either clearly summarised (and marked as such), or, for the one document in which specific start and finish times were indicated (29th February 1968) evidently heavily edited. Indeed this specific document mentioned that part of the meeting was taken up with Teng listening to other reports, which were not recorded.

In terms of preparation, records like that of 7th July 1968 were of Teng's impromptu and unscripted remarks. But the lengthier speeches on the set-occasions mentioned above were prepared, in some form – perhaps even in the form in which they were presented in the documents. It is unlikely that Teng wrote these speeches himself, but rather had them prepared by his officials. Schoenhals described the process through which Lin Biao's speechwriters went, and what contribution he finally made to the words he delivered at formal events publicly.³²³ Mao Zedong had a similar group of assistants and writers working for him (led by Chen Boda). Certainly Teng had some resources in terms of officials and administrators to support him. Woody mentioned that Teng's speech on 27th March 1968 was drafted by his secretary, Chen Xiaozhuang, who had 'in turn gotten most of his material from Ulangbagan,' the Mongolian official who had been tasked with collecting material on the IMPP.³²⁴ The extent to which Teng's speeches were the product of the official, bureaucratic machinery or his own creation, however, is impossible to tell from the documents alone.

4.2.4 The Dissemination of Teng's Words

While the circulation of the versions of his speeches analysed here was wide, it could not have exceeded that of the *IM Daily* which remained the main official propaganda mouthpiece throughout the CR period in IMAR. Access to this means of propagation was one of Teng's most powerful advantages as a leader, and administratively and materially one of the key means to disseminate his words.

³²³ Schoenhals 1992, 70-71.

³²⁴ Woody 1993, 1. Probably this is the 'Secretary Chen' that figured in the note of the meeting on 31st December 1968.

A report to members of cultural and artistic circles Teng gave on 27th March 1968, and the article in the *IM Daily* arising from it almost a month later (24th April) illustrates the sort of transformation from Teng's private voice used with a small group, to a wider, public one. Whereas the record of the speech itself in the 'Red Flag Internal Reference Materials' contained no comments or editorial, merely a record of Teng's words (in 'corrected record' form), the article in the newspaper lacked direct quotes. Instead, Teng's words were paraphrased, delivered in the third person, and placed within a very specific contextual framework, within which value judgements were rendered on the importance and use of the original speech event:

'Comrade Teng Haiqing's speech at the IMAR Cultural Circles Meeting on 27th March has aroused a great response. Following this the situation of struggle in the great cultural yard (*wenhua dayuan*) has undergone rapid change... Those die-hard followers of Ulanfu who a few days ago were hiding in secret offices, planning their attack, along with the representatives of the cultural yard stuck in the corners - chameleons, black counsellors, and bad people like that - are frightened and being picked up one-by-one.'

While the speech, and the article 'inspired' by it in the *IM Daily* share the same purpose of spreading Teng's message, they use different methods. Teng declared the objective in his speech at the beginning: 'to push forward the mobilisation of the masses in the artistic and cultural worlds, completely to open [up] class struggle.' The sanctions that Teng cited was the speech by Jiang Qing in November 1967, which inspired decisions at the IMAR CRC Second Plenary Meeting, and instructions from Premier Zhou and the Centre in February on cultural and artistic matters. Teng's speech was highly localised and personalised. He condemned the Zhemeng League CRC, accusing them of 'aiming their spear towards the Central CRC,' and defended 'Zhao Baowen,' a good comrade who had made some mistakes, but who had been picked out for struggle and criticism by the Zhemeng League CRC. 'I believe that the majority of rebellious factions are good,' Teng declared.³²⁵ Later in his speech, he said, 'I'm not going to go through this blow by blow, but just let you all think about it. That is enough... I trust that no matter which work unit is involved, the majority of the masses, and the revolutionary masses wish to push the CR forward thoroughly.'³²⁶

³²⁵ Doc 2, Issue 112, 2.

³²⁶ Ibid 3.

The *IM Daily* article was written in the third person. It had no individual voice. Comparisons of the article and the speech's conclusions illustrate the journey from a personal voice to an impersonal public one within this discourse. Teng closed by stating:

'Comrades, the class struggle in IMAR is very complicated, very violent, the struggle in the cultural and artistic circles more complicated, more violent. ...In the educational department, the health department, and all other work units, in this CR, although they have had many successes, [they] still have many problems, and they should investigate themselves like the cultural and artistic circles.... Enemies now use the rightist tendency of our leaders, and the rightist thinking of our rebellious groups, and intend to creep in that way. We need to unify the masses, rely on the masses, respect the spirit of the revolutionary masses. In revolution we must mobilize the masses. If you don't, you fear the masses, and are not real revolutionaries...' ³²⁷

In the *IM Daily*, the final message was a collectivised one:

'Let us lift high the red banner of Mao Zedong Thought, under the correct leadership of the IMAR CRC... preserve the highest levels of revolutionary investigation, see through the schemes of counter-revolutionaries, overcome the rightist tendency in thought of some in our ranks...'

This illustrated the different functions of these documents. The first was a direct announcement by Teng, based on his own authority, and the use of a personal voice to convey specific prescriptions and instructions. The second was a generalisation of the first voice, the propagation of a message through the original words of Teng and their expansion into general instructions. There was a single message underlying both these, but conveyed in two different registers and working in different ways in the various constituencies in IMAR.

4.2.5 The Register of Utterance

Teng's exercising of authority was most signified by his frequent use of a prescriptive register. In almost every speech or meeting in this collection, his primary language activity was to instruct, pass orders, regulate, and to tell his audience what to do. In the speech on 9th November 1967, he set out 'seven major

³²⁷ Ibid 4.

responsibilities' for participants in the CR (though here he was transmitting these from a 'notice issued by the IMAR CRC'). The language was to propagate: 'immediately to lift up,' 'continuously to deepen,' 'to do well' (*gaohao*), 'grasp revolution,' 'positively build.' These activities were addressed to 'all levels of members of the CRC,' 'to the great masses of the revolutionary organisations,' 'all battle lines, all departments, all work units.' This was to be done 'with all one's heart' (*quanxin quanyi*), 'politically, intellectually, theoretically.' Some of these prescriptions were explications of campaigns or slogans of the Centre. Both these general headings were lifted from the Centre's discourse, and were common at this stage in the CR. Teng used imperatives throughout this explication: 'must' (*bixu* and *yao*), 'definitely' (*yiding*), 'absolutely not allowed' (*juebu chongxu*).

A high proportion of Teng's prescriptions appeared even in minutes of dialogues. The same list given for the first document above also appeared on 31st December 1968. Despite being a year apart (albeit an exceptionally tumultuous year) Teng's commands remained the same: grasp revolution, arouse the masses, and continuously push ahead with the 'Vigorously Use and Study Mao Zedong Thought' classes.³²⁸ Such commands did not figure as part of an argument. They signified in language a speaker who was demonstrating their right to authority simply by the use of such language alone.

Teng used other registers to signify his authority:

- Judgemental register: Judgements on how various regions and areas had succeeded in implementing the anti-Wang Zaitian campaign on 22nd February 1968, and most commonly in the assertion of the 'general situation being good,' both in the IMAR, and in the country.³²⁹ The latter was a phrase taken from the discourse of the Centre.³³⁰

³²⁸ Doc 37, 2.

³²⁹ See, among others, 25th March 1968, 1.

³³⁰ 'The current CR is in a great good situation' (*yipian da hao xingshi*), (*People's Daily* New Year editorial, 1st Jan 1968, in *Guoshi tongjian*, vol 3, 1966-76, Beijing 1995, 673).

- Positive register: Language contained in the paeans of praise for Mao in the introduction to the speech on 21st February 1968, and the dense use of superlatives ('most,' 'greatest'). On 31st May 1968 Teng talked of 'a great victory for the revolutionary path of Chairman Mao.'³³¹ This victory was not related to any specific event, but set within a metaphorical context of 'the proletarian revolutionary masses standing on the path of Chairman Mao.'
- Expository register: Explanation or transmission of the ideology of the Centre. In a speech on 29th May 1968, Teng offered thoughts on 'the dictatorship of the proletariat.' 'The best is army leadership, which really has no factionalism. Comparatively good people can participate. Leadership power will be grasped. Without a period of experimentation before, it is hard not to make mistakes. The basic responsibility of "the dictatorship of the masses" is to mobilise them, educate them...'³³² Expositions that Teng offered were very closely linked to prescriptions for a programme of action, either preparing the way for these or explaining them. Teng's prescription on 20th November 1967, to a delegation that 'you must definitely carry out well the "Great Alliance" and the "Three Unities"' was followed by explanation:

"Great Alliance" is unification in thought, [but] unification still needs a leadership class. Start from the IMAR CRCs. If you want to set up CRCs, you must have the "three foundations:" This must be done according to Chairman Mao's instructions, resolving well the problems of cadres. [The main task] is to strike down capitalists, not raise capitalists up. Mistakes must be resolved according to the principles of "unity - criticism and self-criticism - unity."³³³

The definitions of concepts here were lifted straight from the Centre's ideology. This discourse was motivational. Its aim was to bring about improved actions and correct behaviour. All explanations therefore were linked to demands for implementing a certain prescribed course of action, and were rooted in a discourse in which certain actions were already judged morally correct, and others condemned.

- Interrogative register: On 30th May 1968, Teng asked a series of questions to delegate members. The issue of the function of questions in Teng's discourse

³³¹ Doc 2, Issue 219, 6.

³³² Doc 3, Issue 31, 4.

³³³ Doc 2, Issue 34, 4.

is looked at in the next section. In these cases, it is clear that Teng was seeking specific responses before beginning further delivery of judgement, and then prescription. Interrogation was therefore closely linked to a programme of instruction.

- Self-critical register: What later became the prime feature of Teng's discourse after his removal from power in 1969 was the smallest part prior to that. While there were occasions when Teng admitted making mistakes, such admissions of error were conveyed as collective ones - 'our failings,' 'our faults.'³³⁴ There was little sense of Teng's authority having space within it for responsibility and personal accountability. Only when Teng was removed from power was it possible (indeed, did it become necessary) for his voice to accommodate admissions of failings.

In addition to these various different registers in Teng's discourse, which showed the interaction with his audience and his attitude to them, there were also the variations in formality. His use of a formal register was seen in his speech on the 10th December 1968. In this, a generic beginning offering praise to Mao was followed by a report on 'the general situation,' and the 'current characteristics of the class struggle.' Teng spoke primarily in a collective voice, using 'we' rather than 'I':

'After propaganda groups entered each work unit, [they] did great work, achieving great results. They have lifted high the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought, grasped well Mao Zedong Thought classes, opened and developed the "three faithfuls" movement, making Mao Zedong Thought enter deep into their hearts. They have grasped firmly the struggle between the two classes, two paths, two directions, especially grasping the great criticism and "Party rectification," pushing forward struggle, criticise, reform in each work unit.'³³⁵

The language consisted primarily of slogans from the Centre, or campaign names. There was little space for a personal voice.

³³⁴ E.g.: 'I heard I said some nonsense on 13th September, about the basic contradictions from Ulanfu having been resolved. I forgot how I said this, but if I did, it was a mistake, and should be retracted' (25th October 1968). And the more contrite 'Today [I] intend to express a few opinions. These are very incomplete, and not totally correct' (27th March 1968 in Doc 2, Issue 112, 1).

³³⁵ Doc 37, 13.

But at other times Teng also used an informal register. In his meeting on 22nd February 1968, he started off:

'This doesn't count as a report (*busuan shenme baogao*), but Comrade Wang Jinbao wanted me to speak at this meeting, I've not prepared. He asked me to speak. I don't expect to go on for very long.'³³⁶

The transcriptions of Teng's dialogues showed him at his most informal in this material. On the 30th May 1968, he was recorded as using the colloquial '*gao*' for 'to do, carry out.'³³⁷ He also used the sentence ending '*ma*.'³³⁸ His informal register was even evident in giving prescriptions: 'Bad people shouldn't have complaints. You see who is bad, then you need to resolutely pluck them out. Plucking out bad people doesn't need someone to authorise it. It only needs you to pluck out bad people, and the CRC will support you. And if the CRC doesn't [offer] support, then I'll criticise them.'³³⁹ This exercising of authority through a colloquial rather than a more formal, personally sponsored style had its uses. It served to build capital with the audience, a small group specialising in 'plucking out' enemies. Teng was demonstrating closeness to the people he was talking to, addressing them in language that implied no distance. Mao's speeches contain similar demonstrations of closeness. Before being polished and refined they were frequently in a highly colloquial register, promoting his image as the 'people's leader' able to use the language of common men, not a representative of elitist power interests.³⁴⁰

This 'informalisation' of Teng's register extended to using expletives, another similarity with leaders from the Centre like Mao, who famously littered his speeches with swear words and slang.³⁴¹ There was considerable tolerance on the part of the

³³⁶ Doc 2, Issue 82, 2.

³³⁷ Dittmer and Chen imputed increased usage of this in the CR to the influence of Mao, who had a preference for these simplified verbs (Dittmer and Chen 1981, 23).

³³⁸ This '*ma*' refers to the sentence ending corresponding approximately to 'OK,' and not the question marker particle, which is also pronounced '*ma*.'

³³⁹ Doc 2, Issue 181, 2.

³⁴⁰ An example of this is the first, unedited (and chaotic) version of Mao's 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' in MacFarquhar, Cheek and Wu 1989, 131 onwards.

³⁴¹ Schram described Mao as 'Rabelaisian in speech' (Schram 1974, 8). Schram quoted the following from a speech Mao gave to the Tenth Plenum in 1962 in which he claimed Peng Dehuai had said: 'You fucked my mother for twenty days, can't I

audience for public use of 'bad' language. On 14th April 1968 Teng, as an aside, declared that one opinion is 'bullshit' (*fangpi*).³⁴² In the fuller version of Teng's speech on 21st February 1968, he quoted a Party secretary in a factory who said: 'You are still fucking (*ta made*) implementing the counter-revolutionary line.'

Finally, there is the issue of the other voices contained in Teng's discourse, which were included in these records. Formal speeches like that on 10th December 1968 were monovocal texts which represented the words Teng said on their own, with no other interventions or additions. But other voices appeared in separate texts. The unadorned and transmitted voice, for instance, of the quotes from Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, marked clearly, or embedded within Teng's words. The parenthesised words of the unnamed audience, whose response to parts of what Teng said was deemed worthy of being recorded, acting as a reminder that these texts existed and had meaning in a social context and were publicly enacted. There were voices that Teng assumed within his talks, the opposition he created in his discourse, marked by phrases like 'people who say,' and allowed to enter into the text either as proxy enemies, or opponents, or simply to represent those who thought erroneously.³⁴³

4.2.6 Rhetorical Features

If Teng had anything approaching a personal voice, it was shown most clearly in the specific rhetorical patterns he used. Teng partly used dense repetition of key phrases. There is also the rhetorical use of questions, and of polarised structures ('either... or') in his speeches and talks. The speech of the 20th February 1968 contained the following introduction:

'Chairman Mao is the greatest (*zui weida*) Marxist-Leninist of the modern times, the greatest teacher of the whole country and the world's revolutionary peoples, the most outstanding leader, the most heroic commander, the most correct helmsman. He is the modern Lenin, the greatest authority of the modern world for revolutionary people.... Mao Zedong Thought is the peak of contemporary Marxism-Leninism, the highest, most living Marxism-Leninism, the exemplary most advanced thought of mankind.'³⁴⁴

fuck your mother for twenty days.' Mao's response? 'All this fucking messed up the conference and the work was affected' (ibid 194).

³⁴² For more examples, see 4.2.3 above.

³⁴³ See following section.

³⁴⁴ Doc 31, 1-2.

There then followed six shorter sentences, all beginning with the mantra: 'It is the great leader Chairman Mao....' Patterned repetition like this was a constant feature of Teng's spoken style. On 9th November 1967, though at the end of the speech, Teng repeated 'quick' (*kuai*) at the beginning of sentences five times.³⁴⁵ On 25th March 1968, in explaining the importance of struggle, Teng stated 'this affects the implementation of Chairman Mao's battle strategy in our district, it affects the problem of the movement of 13 million revolutionary people in IMAR, it affects whether or not the newly made red power can be consolidated, and in a word, it affects the issue of whether or not the CR can be carried forward in our area.'³⁴⁶ The hierarchy within repetition here was to start from the top (Mao) and move down. On 14th June 1968, he launched four longer sentences in the middle of a speech, with the formulation 'undertaking big criticism.'³⁴⁷ On 12th July 1968, he used the following words:

'The great dissemination, great broadcasting, great implementing of the glorious limitless radiance of Mao Zedong Thought is just now washing away all the filthy water, sweeping all the dark corners. The revolutionary people of all nationalities, limitlessly love, limitlessly believe, limitlessly have faith in, limitlessly worship Chairman Mao, Mao Zedong Thought, Chairman Mao's revolutionary direction's feelings towards the proletariat, increasingly consolidating, increasingly deepening, increasingly developing, making deep changes in the mental outlook of the people. In other words, use Mao Zedong Thought to command together, to push forward together, to lead together, to change together.'³⁴⁸ (All my underlinings.)

As Teng prescribed 'unity,' especially the importance of unity of thought, he exemplified this in a unified, tightly patterned public language. These examples were indications of preparation and management. This was language used in a monovocal setting, rather than a situation of dialogue where there was always the possibility of interruption and premature closure of the repetition, (for examples of which see the angry and unplanned audience interjections during Teng's self-criticisms in Chapter Five). This uniformity of voice signified adherence to the Centre's ideology, which was the source of its sanction.

³⁴⁵ Doc 64, 8.

³⁴⁶ Doc 2, Issue 111, 2.

³⁴⁷ Doc 65, 8.

Teng frequently used rhetorical questions. This mirrored the ideological polarity, offering, on most occasions, 'either/or' modalities, without open-ended questions which might lead to a number of (unwanted) answers: 'So in the end was Ulanfu a Communist seizing power from the Nationalists, or a Nationalist supporter seizing power from the Communists?'³⁴⁹ 'Have you implemented this or not? Have you seen it or not? Who have you hit?'³⁵⁰ At other times, what seemed framed as a question was actually a statement of rhetorical condemnation: 'So I'd like to ask, this is what kind of stance, what kind of feeling, what line?'³⁵¹ At other times, questions were also rhetorical exclamations: 'Any sort of mass movement can't be totally without trouble, utterly free of chaos. This sort of thinking is too naïve. How could this be possible?'

Questions did not function in Teng's discourse to open up issues or embark on enquiry. For Teng, questions were answered before they were asked. They were used in order to make rhetorical points. The polarity created in the speech on 5th July 1967 was easily resolved by the delivery of 'correct' solutions from Mao Zedong Thought:

'What do we say to cadres who have been lost in battle? Losing requires the shedding of blood as a price. What can we do? Do we strike them or educate and help them? Chairman Mao has taught us, real long term military victories are few. Even losing, we can still summarise experience and go on to win.'³⁵²

In the instructions Teng gave on 14th April 1968, he stated: 'What kind of problem is this? Is it moaning about the great mass of the people? Or is it the leaders? It's not about the masses, it's the leaders.'³⁵³

There were other uses to which Teng put questions. On the same occasion on the 14th April 1968, he used a series of questions to create cumulative effect:

³⁴⁸ Doc 32, 3.

³⁴⁹ Doc 2, Issue 232, 2.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Doc 37, 10.

³⁵² Doc 14, 5.

'We must seize power till we are completely victorious. IMAR has so many traitors, spies, cow ghosts and snake spirits, bastards... our rebellion factions have a small number of bad people... For whom does Bai Mingjie's rebellious faction rebel? For whom does Zhang Zhipeng's rebellious faction rebel? They are carrying out counter-revolutionary activities. How can we put up with them not distinguishing between us and the enemy? How can that be OK? We revolutionaries need to take the path of socialism. Are they taking the path of socialism? They are carrying out capitalist power-restoration. How can we get together with enemies [like this]?'³⁵⁴

Such questions were parts of an attack. They were used to set up assertions that were finally shown as absurd. They functioned in a strategy to expose the illogicality and wrongness of the alternative discourse – creating an opposition within the language which was then dismissed as untenable and wrong.

Teng sometimes created 'other voices' in his speeches, articulating these untenable positions, which he attributed to unnamed people and groups. These were then attacked. In the report on the 25th March 1968, Teng said 'there are people who fear (*you ren pa*) saying they support agitating and causing chaos.'³⁵⁵ Teng's motive in this section was to show how 'causing chaos' (*laobao-fantian*) was useful and therefore permissible in the current context and gave these words a new meaning – an example of controlling terms of the discourse. A little later in the same speech he talked of 'a few comrades' who made mistakes in their work, recognised this, and changed. He held this against 'a few old counter-revolutionaries,' attempting to aim their 'spear at the PLA, and the headquarters of the proletariat,' proving themselves to be 'old capitalists' in the process. Such positions acted as the voice of the 'counter-discourse.'

With these rhetorical features, Teng's overall objective was to create unity and exercise control. They signified his allegiance to the master discourse within which he operated. The final objective was a 'pure discourse,' a language of 'unified thought and theory' that demonstrated, by its tightly co-ordinated surface features, unity with the Centre and the language emanating from there. But they were also signifiers of the sort of control Teng wished to exercise over what he said, and his

³⁵³ Doc 2, Issue 131, 1.

³⁵⁴ Ibid 2.

³⁵⁵ Doc 2, Issue 111, 2.

audience's reaction. They indicated the tight parameters within which he allowed interaction with this audience.

4.2.7 Teng's Symbolic World

Accompanying and reinforcing these stylistic commonalities, there were also striking similarities among the symbols and metaphors that Teng used. These acted as a key link and signifier of unity with the ideology of the Centre, from which many of them were taken. Beyond the metaphor of the 'path' mentioned in 4.1.2 above, there were also the core metaphors that related to actions, to descriptions of enemies, and to Mao Zedong Thought and Chairman Mao. While these were a further demonstration of Teng's acquiescence in his discourse to the hegemony of the Centre and his participation in that, they also reveal the area where Teng had to localise his language.

The Centre-inspired campaign that Teng and other local leaders prosecuted in IMAR from mid-1968 onwards was labelled the 'dig and cleanse' (*su/wa*) campaign. Teng referred to the 'meeting held in Baotou on the Mao Zedong Thought study classes' in his speech on 14th June 1968 as being 'an heroic mass meeting, communicating experiences of class struggle, a mobilizing meeting to push forward the "dig and cleanse" struggle.'³⁵⁶ The whole speech itself was entitled 'Set up Mao Zedong Study Classes, Grasp Revolution, Great Criticism, and Lift the "Dig and Cleanse" Struggle in our Region to a New Level,' making clear the key function played by the idea of digging and cleansing at this stage. On 12th July 1968, Teng talked of the current campaign 'washing away filthy water, sweeping all the dark corners.'³⁵⁷ He combined both 'digging' and 'cleansing' when he said later in the same speech: 'A great pile of diehards of Ulanfu's anti-party, unchanging capitalist roaders, traitors, spies and cow ghosts and snake spirits and splittist elements have been flushed away by the "dig and cleanse" struggle.'³⁵⁸ This sentence was preceded by the idea of enemies being 'poisonous' (*liudu*), of them needing to be 'cleaned up' (*suqing*). A

³⁵⁶ Doc 65, 1.

³⁵⁷ Doc 32, 1.

³⁵⁸ Ibid 4.

similar idea occurred on 14th April 1968: ‘...the struggle to dig the poison of the black direction.’³⁵⁹

Combined with the central metaphors of actions against the enemy – ‘digging, cleansing’ – went metaphorical descriptions of what the enemy did. Teng frequently talked of enemies ‘having an arrow pointed at the Party.’ In a combination of Teng’s creating an ‘assumed voice’ and this metaphor, he said on 14th July 1968: ‘A little time before, weren’t there people saying “Hohhot has already completed capitalist opinion and organisation,” “the digging and cleansing struggle” was “going along the Liu-Deng path,” inciting divisions among the ranks of the revolutionary rebellion factions, disseminating falsehood, aiming the arrow at the newly created red power?...’ On 31st May 1968: ‘Within the rebellion groups there are some bad people, a minority, aiming their arrow at the CRC, aiming it at the PLA, aiming it at the proletarian revolutionary ranks.’³⁶⁰ This was a metaphor that could be used both about the bad or the good. On 14th April 1968, Teng said that ‘we must always aim the arrow at Ulanfu.’³⁶¹ And it was also used by other voices within the texts. A member of the ‘Seizing Traitors Station’ on 30th May 1968 said that ‘as soon as we seize the bad people in the rebellion factions, then there are people who say that we must aim the arrow at the rebellion factions themselves.’³⁶²

Set against these negative metaphors were the positive ones, references to Mao as a weapon, and to Mao Zedong Thought as a light: ‘Our weapon is Mao Zedong Thought, leading the revolution, leading production,’³⁶³ ‘The main means for the struggle in the PLA was to use Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon (*yi Mao Zedong sixiang wei wuqi*);’³⁶⁴ ‘Mao Zedong Thought lights up the grassland of IMAR;’³⁶⁵ ‘Comrades, today the overall situation in IMAR is very good. Mao Zedong Thought lights up the grasslands. IMAR is flying forward towards the future!’³⁶⁶ This last example demonstrated in one small paragraph the operations of the hegemony of

³⁵⁹ Doc 2, Issue 131, 1.

³⁶⁰ Doc 2, Issue 219, 6.

³⁶¹ Doc 2, Issue 131, 1.

³⁶² Doc 2, Issue 181, 2.

³⁶³ Doc 2, Issue 219, 3.

³⁶⁴ Doc 65, 7 and Doc 32, 12.

³⁶⁵ Doc 2, Issue 219, 2.

symbols from the Centre and how they were transformed and adapted to local conditions. 'The current overall situation being very good' was a formulation used by Centre leaders in speeches in the CR. It was common to have Mao Zedong Thought referred to as a light 'lighting up China.' In this case, its beams fell on the grasslands of IMAR. Teng used other metaphors. The idea of 'setting fire' to the situation in IMAR,³⁶⁷ of the enemies being dressed in 'outer clothes,' concealing their real identity,³⁶⁸ and of them 'leading people by the nose,'³⁶⁹ and attacking us 'in our castle.'³⁷⁰

The atmosphere of this period in the CR created a heightened sensitivity to and fear of hidden enemies. The campaign to attack these concealed and malevolent forces was formulated within and through the metaphor of 'digging, cleansing, seizing, plucking out.' Such language could be interpreted as an endorsement for physical violence, and on some occasions this was what happened. But the language was also its own form of violence. Just by speaking it users were acting violently. Their very acts of uttering this language made them participants in the campaign.

Teng himself was also moving towards the articulation of something, within the narrow and constrained boundaries in which he spoke in this language, which was unique to IMAR. The utterance of 'dig and cleanse' in the context of IMAR, with its imprecation to hunt down enemies, created an atmosphere in which the IMPP and the crimes of splittism and treachery that it embodied were more fully articulated. This is the position that Teng reached in mid-1968: the naming of a discreet group of people in local society, with an ideology, organisational structure, aims – and a nationalist agenda. This process is best understood by looking at specific speeches Teng gave over this period.

³⁶⁶ Doc 65, 1.

³⁶⁷ Doc 3, Issue 31, 2.

³⁶⁸ Doc 2, Issue 131, 2.

³⁶⁹ Doc 2, Issue 219, 3.

³⁷⁰ Doc 2, Issue 178, 2. A metaphor stemming from Mao's 'Bombard the Headquarters' 'big character poster' issued in 1966.

Section Three: Specific Speeches

4.3.1 Introduction

The three documents containing Teng's words analysed here were his speeches on 14th June 1968, 12th July 1968, and 8th January 1969. The first is significant because it launched the 'dig and cleanse' campaign, the second because it was delivered at the critical Third Plenary Meeting of the IMAR CRC (which saw a stepping up of the campaign to root out IMPP members in IMAR) and the third because it is the most focussed and sustained attack on Ulanfu and the IMPP issued by Teng in this material.

4.3.2 'Set up Mao Zedong Thought Study Classes, Grasp Revolution, Great Criticism, Push the "Dig, Cleanse" Struggle in our District to a New Level': The Speech on 14th June

According to Wu Di's analysis of the three phases of the 'Party rectification' campaign in IMAR, this speech occurred early in the second 'developing' phase, which ran from May to November 1968.³⁷¹ It was delivered to a meeting (*huiyi*) of the IMAR 'Setting up Mao Zedong Thought Classes, and Great Revolutionary Criticism Campaign.' The key terms in the speech were 'dig and cleanse.' They were initially presented as 'the great "dig the black line, cleanse the running poison" people's war, currently developing.'³⁷² In IMAR, this became 'digging up the dead party elements of Ulanfu, the splittists, and the diehard capitalist roaders, traitors, spies... deepen the great criticism, join up the digging of the black line and the cleansing of running poison, organisation of revolution and revolutionary thought, giving a new form to the "dig and cleanse" struggle in IMAR.' 'Comrades,' Teng declared later, 'our IMAR CR is entering an extremely important key moment. We are faced by a task both glorious and arduous. We must push the "dig and cleanse" campaign to a new level, opening a mass movement to cleanse the ranks (*zhengdang*). This great "dig and cleanse" struggle is a very strong political and

³⁷¹Song 2002, 88.

³⁷²Doc 65, 2.

strategic struggle.³⁷³ The 'dig and cleanse' campaign was already referred to as 'great' (*weida*), just as the CR was referred to as 'unprecedented.'³⁷⁴

'Dig and cleanse' was subsumed within the larger ideology of the 'struggle between the two lines,' and the sponsorship of this by Mao Zedong and Lin Biao. Here the appeal to the Centre was clearest. In IMAR, Teng stated, 'the main thing is to oppose rightism.'³⁷⁵ Opposing rightism was a key part of the struggle between two lines, 'our destiny and soul, the basic guarantee of our victory'³⁷⁶ from Chairman Mao. The 'dig and cleanse' campaign was part of the process of opposing rightists and implementing the correct line, based on the instructions of Chairman Mao.

After the introductory opening two paragraphs of the speech the first three pages were devoted to clearly marked instructions from Mao and Lin on the current basic strategies of the CR. These operated on a very general level:

'Chairman Mao has taught us, the proletarian CR is actually under the condition of socialism, a great political revolution of the proletariat against capitalist and exploiting classes, the continuation of the struggle of the CCP and leaders of the great revolutionary masses of the people with the Nationalists, the continuation of the struggle between the proletariat and the capitalists.'³⁷⁷

It was within this master narrative that the 'dig and cleanse' campaign in IMAR was prosecuted, with the categories within which to understand actions dictated by the Centre: 'According to the continuation of revolution under the conditions of socialism according to Chairman Mao's theory, line, strategy and policy [we should see] whether or not the fundamental contradictions between the proletariat and the capitalists *in our region* has been thoroughly resolved...'³⁷⁸ (my italics). According to these 'measurements' the 'development of the struggle in the region was uneven. Some places, some work units have yet to thoroughly start class struggle.' The

³⁷³ Ibid 10.

³⁷⁴ Ibid 6.

³⁷⁵ Ibid 5.

³⁷⁶ Ibid 4.

³⁷⁷ Ibid 2.

³⁷⁸ Ibid 3.

prescription carrying on from the full implementation of the Centre's commands was to 'dig and cleanse,' 'dig thoroughly,' so that this 'struggle will gain great results.'³⁷⁹

Struggle, particularly the struggle between the lines, was set out in detail during the first part of Teng's speech to 'progressively improve the class and line struggle consciousness of the leaders and great revolutionary masses of the people.'³⁸⁰ Under the hegemonic concepts of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the 'pushing forward of the struggle between the two lines' was asserted as being something 'permeating every area, every aspect, no one can avoid it.' This concept of struggle between the two lines was 'our revolutionary staff,' 'our destiny and soul, the fundamental guarantee of our victory,' but it was primarily ascribed to Chairman Mao. 'Chairman Mao's revolutionary line is the proletarian class line, the fundamental path of our Party, and of the masses.' The struggle between the two lines was also labelled as 'the fundamental consciousness of a revolutionary,' a question Teng finally formulated as one of 'where you stand.'³⁸¹

The location of this speech was Baotou. Teng praised Baotou for carrying forward the revolutionary struggle at the beginning of his speech, with his words of praise clearly linked to the Centre: 'A great change has happened in the current situation of the revolution in Baotou... All of Baotou, has flown forward along the revolutionary course of Chairman Mao. This is a great victory for Mao Zedong Thought.'³⁸² Later he cited specific organisations in Baotou, relating the 'dig and cleanse' campaign directly to them. He referred to the Baotou Iron and Steel Works, 'opening and developing an earth-shattering revolutionary battle' taking inspiration from Vice Chairman Lin Biao's words: 'Baotou Iron and Steel Works implementing the "dig and cleanse" campaign, has given us a great and important experience.'³⁸³ This organisation, with its 'method, plans, focus, objectives,' was held up as a model for those that had failed, or fallen behind, in implementing Mao's general instructions.

³⁷⁹ Ibid 3.

³⁸⁰ Ibid 4.

³⁸¹ Further sanction from Centre leaders was taken from Jiang Qing: 'From the 12th November last year when Comrade Jiang Qing talked to artistic circles in Beijing, this started the "dig the black line, cleanse the running poison" people's battle' (ibid 9).

³⁸² Ibid 1.

Only two places in the text overtly mentioned issues of nationality. The first was simply the inclusion of the 'national splittists' in the list of enemies presented to be dug out and cleansed at the beginning of the speech. The second elaborated on the distinction between 'agricultural' (*nongqu*) and 'herding' (*muqu*) environments:

'The main thing is for agricultural areas to study Kanghou, Ningcheng, and the 4th May Division, and other advanced work units' experience. Herding areas must mainly study the experience of Wushenzhao Commune and Narenbaolige Commune... Agricultural and herding areas can't adopt factory methods. They have their own characteristics, but the content is still to grasp class struggle in study classes, and thoroughly implement the criticism of Ulanfu... in the herding areas.'³⁸⁴

Speaking in a context dominated by the implementation of the campaign of 'Party rectification' and in an area in which the Mongolian minority was severely affected, Teng hardly mentioned national minority issues. The Centre categories of class struggle he used and the two lines which supplied the overall ideological context of his speech were not related to the issue of nationality, but presented in their own terms. Whereas the material in the previous chapter focussed on accusations of Ulanfu and his supporters promoting a nationality discourse over a class-based one, for Teng nationality barely registered. In the closing parts of Teng's speech, he referred to the organisational prescriptions of the CR that had to be implemented locally. These were relayed firstly as fulfilment of the Centre's instructions, and secondly purely within the terms that the Centre designated - setting up study classes, grasping revolution, organising 'great criticism,' and implementing the 'dig and cleanse' campaign.

The hegemony of the Centre was demonstrated finally in the victory mode which Teng adopted:

'Comrades, IMAR is now in the midst of the high tide of revolution. The situation is good. We must closely follow the great leader Chairman Mao, closely follow Chairman Mao's great battle strategy, always grasp the great direction of struggle... push forwards for victory, develop the great good situation, to achieve the complete victory of the Great Proletarian CR.'³⁸⁵

³⁸³ Ibid 9.

³⁸⁴ Ibid 9-10.

³⁸⁵ Ibid 16.

The victory referred to was also victory for the central language, for the standard discourse from the Centre of the CR, with use of generic slogans and categories. It demonstrated that Teng was to be a transmitter, a propagator between the Centre and the region. He was a spokesman for the new history, the new world being declared from the Centre, carrying its liberating message into the locality. But the definite parameters imposed from the Centre on the issue of nationality were a problem to formulate in IMAR, where its very identity and history were saturated with these issues, and could not be managed in this discourse by total exclusion.

4.3.3 'Raise High the Great Red Banner of Mao Zedong Thought, Fully Implement Chairman Mao's Latest Directives, Firmly Grasp Class Struggle, Push for the Full Victory of the Proletarian CR': Teng's Report to the Third Plenary Meeting of the CRC, 12th July 1968

The enlarged Third Plenum of the IMAR CRC met in July 1968. According to Woody, it was this meeting, presided over by Teng and Wu Tao, that formally passed a resolution calling for the elimination of the IMPP. This was intended to prepare the way for the full-out purges of Party officials that continued into 1969.³⁸⁶

The plenums of the CRC were key meetings in the CR, the main administrative mechanism for the implementation of the movement. Decisions they issued had significant authority. Speaking as the Chairman of the Plenary Meeting, Teng made a report that was therefore a key means to disseminate a pronouncement from the Centre to local officials and activists. This gives an opportunity to see Teng speaking within the new organisations, and exercising power through them.

The 12th July report was not as preoccupied with ideological issues as the speech analysed above, but was structured towards prescriptions and instructions. It consisted of five sections. The first was a positive assessment of the results of the CR in IMAR so far. The second was a description of current enemies and their activities. The third described recent problems in the region. The fourth and fifth were instructions for the coming year. Like the 14th June speech, the key campaign referred to was the 'dig and cleanse' one: 'The broad direction of the "dig and

³⁸⁶ Woody 1993, 15.

cleanse" struggle is completely correct, the results the best.' ³⁸⁷ As on 14th June, Teng described the 'dig and cleanse' struggle as 'a mass movement with a strong policy nature.' ³⁸⁸ It was tied closely to the other master campaigns of 'cleansing the ranks' (*zhengdang*) and 'faction-nature' (*paixing*). ³⁸⁹

Legitimacy was supplied by regular appeals to the Centre, to Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin: 'The PLA, created by Chairman Mao, directed by Vice Chairman Lin, raising the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought, has built a great victory in the Great Proletarian CR.' ³⁹⁰ At the root of this were the requirements for unity, for which adherence to Chairman Mao and the instructions and ideology from the Centre was critical. The key slogan was 'unification' (*yiuanhua*): 'We must implement unified leadership... We understand that politically unification comes from Mao Zedong Thought. Organisationally, [we act] according to Chairman Mao's instructions... Experiences teaches us that without resolutely doing things according to Chairman Mao's instructions... we will not be victorious in class struggle.' ³⁹¹ Mao's thought was a light ³⁹², and a weapon. ³⁹³ He was present at the beginning of the speech, in the generic 'four limitesses' intoned by Teng, and at the end, in the 'long life to Chairman Mao.'

The structure of the speech and its rhetorical devices indicated a consciously major public announcement. At the beginning, the language was absolute: 'In the last half year, the development of the situation in IMAR and the country as a whole is the same, completely proving the Great Leader Chairman Mao's heroic theories.' ³⁹⁴ As in the title, there was dense usage of 'complete' (*quanmian*), 'limitless' (*wuxian*), 'thoroughly' (*chedi*) and 'most' (*zui*). Decisions reached at the previous enlarged plenum six months earlier were 'correct' (*zhengque de*). ³⁹⁵ The fruits of victory already gained by the 'dig and cleanse' campaign were 'huge' (*juda*): 'In the last half

³⁸⁷ Doc 32, 6-7.

³⁸⁸ Ibid 17.

³⁸⁹ Ibid 25.

³⁹⁰ Ibid 5.

³⁹¹ Ibid 21-22.

³⁹² Ibid 3.

³⁹³ Ibid 12.

³⁹⁴ Ibid 2.

³⁹⁵ Ibid 6.

year, the results of our work have been huge, the main, great direction is correct, the main current is good.³⁹⁶ This hyperbole appeared in the assessment of the current status of the region and the function of the present in the narrative of history then unfolding: 'The alliance between our army and the people has never been as good as it is now.'³⁹⁷ Amongst the prescriptive modes that Teng used, therefore, there was also this promotional mode, pushing forward a positive image of the 'great current situation' in the region, stressing benefits and positive images for his audience, asking them to participate in the positive campaign to 'dig and cleanse' enemies. But in fact this language was occurring during a period of social turbulence, when acts of mass violence were happening, something hardly discernable from the positive tone of the language.

Teng based his judgements and prescriptions on an appeal to the 'proofs of experience' over the last six months, and not the Centre's sanction alone. 'The "dig and cleanse" struggle experience proves that we must respect Chairman Mao's "help, criticise, unite" policy.'³⁹⁸ And again: 'The last half year's experience has proved that if you want to do this "dig and cleanse" struggle well, then you must arouse the masses.'³⁹⁹ And: 'The experience of the last half year of class struggle has made us realise...'⁴⁰⁰ The basic conclusion of this half year of 'experience' alluded to in these various references was summed up in one sentence: 'Limitlessly to believe Chairman Mao's revolutionary line.'⁴⁰¹ Just as the administrative campaign promoted by Teng was the setting up of 'Study Mao Zedong Thought Classes,' so his speech was saturated by a pedagogical sense of the 'teaching' function of revolutionary experience. Teng's talk of the final guarantee of the revolutionary path being 'the objective laws and scientific conclusions of class struggle' was consistent with this use of 'superlatives' and appeals to 'what experience proves.'⁴⁰² Struggle was based on scientific truth, precluding the need for any further demonstrations. The formulation he used halfway through the speech encapsulated this: 'Facts prove.'

³⁹⁶ Ibid 8.

³⁹⁷ Ibid 5.

³⁹⁸ Ibid 15.

³⁹⁹ Ibid 14.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid 11, 14, 16 and 18.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid 11.

⁴⁰² Ibid 17.

Indeed, within the framework of proof that Teng used (instructions from Mao as basis of proof, backed up by experience) he created a perfectly consistent 'CR Logic':

'(a) The practice of the "dig and cleanse" campaign makes us realise deeply, (b) that only when you strike down enemies, (c) can you then represent the basic interests of the great masses of the people, (d) and this is then greatest protection for the people'⁴⁰³ (my markers).

Within this discourse, such arguments were logical. If you have (b) based on experience (a), you can then draw the first conclusion (c), from which you infer (d). Of course, the critical issue was whether you were justified in asserting (a) in the first place. But in this discourse, such an issue was foreclosed - (a) was axiomatic. It created its own kind of knowledge, meaningful within the discourse.

Teng's final basis of appeal was the people, the 'great masses,'⁴⁰⁴ who must be 'trusted' and 'relied on,' but also 'mobilised,' and 'aroused.'⁴⁰⁵ The 'positive' nature of the masses stood against the enemies, who in this speech were referred to as: 'counter-revolutionary revisionist roaders,' 'feudalists, Japanese imperialists, Soviet and Russian revisionists, Nationalist counter-revolutionaries.'⁴⁰⁶ Enemies who 'steal revolutionary slogans,' 'use and stir up capitalist factionalism,' 'hide themselves in dark corners, stirring up ill winds, setting ghost fires, creating rumours, firing hidden arrows...'⁴⁰⁷ Enemy actions were conveyed through metaphors, compatible with the overall symbolism of the discourse of the Centre of the CR. Within the ranks of the enemies, there were the hard and soft enemies, the hard-line minority splittists, and those who were simply not clear about the issue of nationality politics, traitors and spies, those who merely had some political problems in their past, 'cow ghosts and snake spirits,' and those who had bad family backgrounds.⁴⁰⁸

Closely related to the issue of enemies, and how they were distinguished, was that of the crime of splittism. Teng articulated the special dimension of the 'dig and cleanse'

⁴⁰³ Ibid 14.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid 13.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid 14.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid 5.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid 7.

campaign in IMAR in this report more fully than in that of the 14th June. He referred more explicitly to Ulanfu's counter-ideology labels - the 'theory of being special,' and 'stable, long, wide,' (see Chapter Three, 3.1.6 above)⁴⁰⁹ and their impact in the area. But the particular issues for the CR in IMAR were articulated in terms of the area's geopolitical, rather than ethnic specificities: 'We must see that our region is a border one, and that class struggle is more complex... For a long time, Ulanfu's counter-revolutionary party alliance politically and organisationally has pushed forward counter-revolutionary revisionism, and splittism, creating a seriously bad result.'⁴¹⁰ Apart from its label and the mention of Ulanfu's 'counter-ideology,' there was no more detail on the danger of splittism.

But Teng did mention the IMPP once. The entry of this label into the public discourse of the key representative of the Centre in IMAR at this time was an important moment. The IMPP was to become the focus of the campaign from July 1968 onwards. It signified something far more threatening than Ulanfu's own ideological unsoundness and heresy, which had been the focus of the early stages of the campaign. The IMPP was a counter-organisation, with rules, institutions, ideology, a purchase on a constituency, and most feared of all, a political programme – pan-Mongolian unity. Like a doctor finally diagnosing a sickness and being able, through the act of classification, to prescribe its treatment, so the real 'enemy hidden at our side' could only be dealt with when named openly. With the explicit entry of the IMPP into Teng's discourse, this moment had come. It marked the point when the true enemy had come into sight in IMAR. Now the battle could commence for the 'new history,' the new narrative, and the relegation of the old narrative and world to the 'dustbins of history.'

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid 18.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid 24.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid 8.

4.3.4 'Instructions Issued by Comrade Teng on January 8th at 4:00 in the Afternoon after Hearing the Work Report of the Wumeng [League] CRC Leaders'

Teng's assertion of Mao's hegemony in this text was categorical:

'The leaders' and masses' movement should happen in the spirit of Chairman Mao's latest instructions, fully mobilising the masses, implementing Chairman Mao's newest directives. If Chairman Mao says we should firmly grasp "Party rectification," then that is what we are going to do, acting according to Chairman Mao's instructions, doing things according to his thought. We must see that if we do things the way Chairman Mao wants, everything will be good.'⁴¹¹

Mao was the centre of this discourse, all things regulated 'according to what he instructs.' Such a categorical base also sponsored uncompromising prescriptions. Teng talked in the first part of his speech of his audience 'having' (*yingdang*) to see, having to seek truth from facts, having to speak from this direction, having to speak clearly, having to do things according to the way Chairman Mao instructed. This is accompanied by 'not' (*bu yao*) blaming those responsible, of being 'certain' (*kending*) of being part of the 'main stream' (*zhuliu*).⁴¹²

Teng's instructions to the Wumeng League leaders also contained the strongest statements in the collection of material analysed in this chapter. It attacked Ulanfu on the grounds of supporting the IMPP. IMPP was set in the overall context of the 'Party rectification' campaign of which it was 'a part, not the whole.'⁴¹³ But while 'organisationally' IMPP was a small part of the activities of traitors, involving only a minority of people, a high priority was given to opposing it, redirecting the boundaries of the movement in IMAR. In this new narrative, 'Ulanfu had been a counter-Party traitor, opposed to Chairman Mao, opposed to socialism for 20 years.' Ulanfu was the 'big boss' (*zong toumu*) of IMPP. His history has been a double one, using the Party against the Party, protecting counter-revolutionary elements. In 'smashing IMPP, we are smashing the basic foundation of Ulanfu's counter-

⁴¹¹ Doc 40, 12.

⁴¹² Ibid 13.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

revolutionary activity.' The IMPP was described as purely a 'counter-Party, counter-revolutionary' organisation, with no mention of the claim that nationality was the basis for membership of it.

Teng confirmed that this struggle had class, not nationality, as the key element:

'It is worth noting that quite a few of the IMPP plucked up in Jining [City] were Han... Of course, there is the problem of Han entering the IMPP. How can we understand this? It's not hard to understand. It's happened in other regions. We can't understand this from the point of view of nationality, but from the world view of class. It's a counter-revolutionary problem, not some nationality problem.'

The tone was defensive. A person's national minority status in this struggle was considered irrelevant.⁴¹⁴ Teng's main declaration (which he said 'we are preparing to issue to the Centre soon') was that 'Ulanfu had organisation and plans' for the IMPP.⁴¹⁵ Ulanfu's main crime was that he had set up and supported 'counter-organisations.' Ulanfu's own words in his speeches were offered as the proof for this.⁴¹⁶

There was also the only example in these texts of Teng being directly challenged at a meeting. Talking of the situation in Wumeng, he declared 'Wumeng has done so many [people], x 10,000 or more [no specific figure given in the text – merely a cross], but as part of 13 million this is not that much.' At this point, in parentheses, someone merely named as Zhou interjected: 'That statistic isn't confirmed.' Teng's response to this was a brusque: 'The problem isn't about a few tens of thousands, it's about how to pluck people out and criticise them, so that there are fewer and fewer enemies.'⁴¹⁷ Teng could not have complained about the unsettling situation that he found himself in, however, as he embraced the prescription from the Centre

⁴¹⁴ At this point, the text indicated in parentheses, that 'the record sent by Wumeng of this part and our record differ, and has been corrected over the phone by Comrade Chen Xiaozheng' (Teng's Private Secretary - see 4.2.4), an indication perhaps of how contentious the content was perceived to be, and the need for careful clearance of it.

⁴¹⁵ Doc 40 14-15.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid 15.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid 12.

to welcome 'chaos.'⁴¹⁸ There was also ambiguity in Teng's repeated attacks on 'leaders,' the 'responsibility of the leaders,' and the hegemony of the masses. At the point when Teng was making the largest and most categorical statements, and talking about the 'local enemy' in the most explicit fashion, he was also experiencing what many other leaders of that period, according to Walder's analysis (see 4.1.1 above) were going through – the utter transience and insecurity of occupying powerful positions in the CR. Within four months, Teng Haiqing's reign in IMAR was over, and he would himself be the victim of vitriolic, angry attacks.

4.3.5 Other Leaders' Voices

While Teng held the main positions of administrative and organisational power in IMAR from 1967 to 1969, he was not the only leader, but one of a group of about half a dozen who had influence and authority in the region. His words must finally be put in context alongside these other leaders' voices, to locate a common discourse for figures in authority in IMAR during this period.

The main leaders Teng worked with were Gao Jinming, who was the head of civilian affairs in IMAR, and had worked as Ulanfu's deputy until 1966, before becoming a founding member of the IMAR CRC and Wu Tao, who was Teng's deputy in the IMAR Military District, a position he had in fact held prior to 1966. Gao was a Manchu by ethnicity; Wu was Mongolian.

Wu Tao's speech on the 5th November 1967 at the First Plenary Meeting of the CRC has clearly marked deference to Teng Haiqing in its opening: 'About the problems and responsibilities of the current situation, Comrade Teng has made a systematic announcement, with which I totally agree.'⁴¹⁹ As with Teng's main public speeches, Wu's opening tone was positive: 'The current situation in IMAR is excellent, it has never been as good as this.' The newly-established CRC was taken as a symbol of this.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid 13.

⁴¹⁹ Doc 26. This speech had the title 'Concerning the Problem of Strengthening the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.' In the version in my possession, there was no sponsoring organisation linked to the copy, nor any indication of how it was

Wu also agreed with Teng in stressing the utter primacy of Mao. The current 'excellent situation' in IMAR was 'a victory of Mao Zedong Thought, a great victory for the revolutionary path of Chairman Mao.' Like Teng, Wu utilised sanctioned repetitions when talking of Mao Zedong Thought: 'We must never ever forget (*nian nian bu wang*) class struggle, never forget the dictatorship of the proletariat, never forget practicing politics, never forget to lift high the great red banner of Mao Zedong Thought.' Wu's statement in this speech of the source of the CRC's power in Mao was categorical. The CRC was a 'structure with temporary powers, a political authority/organ.' (*yi ge linshi quanli jigou, shi zhengquan jiguan*), a part of the structures for the dictatorship of the proletariat set up 'under Chairman Mao's leadership':

'Where does the source of our power come from? From the heroic leadership of Chairman Mao, directed along the path of the proletarian revolution by Chairman Mao, from the bitter struggles of the proletarian factions. Our power is from Chairman Mao, from the proletarian revolutionary factions and working people. We have power on behalf of the proletariat and the workers... We must make the best of this power, grasp it well, use it well.'⁴²⁰

To use power well was, 'according to Mao Zedong Thought,' to practice dictatorship of the proletariat. The people were also cited as the other source of power, the 'real heroes, the iron walls, who we must trust and rely on. The people know the most, their eyes are the clearest, their power the greatest.'⁴²¹

In asserting the hegemony of Mao, in his statement of the ideological primacy of class, and the doctrine of the two paths and of the need to 'trust the people,' Wu's words were 'united' with Teng's. However, Wu differed from all but the last of the Teng documents looked at in this chapter in the strength and detail of his attack on Ulanfu. Wu Tao had held positions of responsibility in IMAR since 1959. He was also ethnically Mongolian. His familiarity with the local situation therefore meant he had more personal credibility than Teng when speaking about it. 'The foundations of

recorded.

⁴²⁰ Ibid 9.

⁴²¹ Ibid 11.

society in IMAR are very complicated,' he stated.⁴²² They were not complicated for ethnic reasons, however, according to Wu, but because of IMAR's strategic position, and the actions of 'Soviet revisionists' who have sent spies in to destabilise the area, and American-supported Nationalist operatives, and the 'landlords and rich counter-Party, bad and rightist' elements who 'want to gang up with foreign enemies.' Reflecting his responsibility for military issues in IMAR, Wu offered details of the evidence for 'enemy activity' in IMAR. 70 cases of 'receiving enemy broadcasts' from the 'American Chiang [Kai-shek] clique.' 290 so far in 1967 of 'counter-revolutionary slogans, handbills,' 59 of these alone in Hohhot, 337 cases of 'spy propaganda materials.'⁴²³ Wu Tao called Ulanfu 'the contemporary patriarch' (*dangdai wangye*) sitting on his 'throne' (*baozuo*) with 'his lackeys' representing 'the feudal aristocrats, herds-lords, landlords, capitalists. Although Ulanfu and his lackeys have already been knocked to the ground, politically, intellectually, theoretically they still haven't been knocked out. 20 years of their evil influence and running poison and the roots of this are very deep. They haven't been cleansed yet.'⁴²⁴

Gao Jinming's speech to the 'Second Plenary Meeting of the Hohhot Red Representatives Meeting' on 18th February 1968 was marked as 'an important report, which should be carefully studied by all groups.' It was published in the 'Red Flag Internal Study Materials,' as were many of Teng's speeches.⁴²⁵ Gao, like Wu, referred to 'Commander Teng' and what he had instructed. But he cited the sanction from the Centre as his main basis of support at the beginning of his speech: 'The Centre definitely supports our work in the last period, our direction is definitely correct.'⁴²⁶ Declaring closeness to the Centre also, however, carried its risks of exposure. He stated on the same page that 'the Ninth Party Congress will be held this year.' In fact, it was four months into the next year, 1969, before the long delayed Congress was finally convened.

⁴²² Ibid 5.

⁴²³ Ibid 6.

⁴²⁴ Ibid 3.

⁴²⁵ Doc 2, Issue 106.

⁴²⁶ Ibid 1.

This speech was more explicit on the issue of nationality, and on the claim that Ulanfu had 'made a minority autonomous region.' Gao also appealed to the sanction of the Centre on this issue: 'We need to do things according to Chairman Mao's instructions; a minority autonomous region is a new development in the Marxist-Leninist treatment of the issue of national minorities by Chairman Mao.' This was something other countries had not done. The inevitable progression of the future narrative of history, according to Marxist-Leninist ideology, was to see country boundaries disappear, and to see 'nationality become less and less, not more and more [important]:' Nationality divisions in society needed to be 'dissolved.'⁴²⁷ The 'disintegration of nationality issues' was a 'natural development.' In referring to Ulanfu, Gao personalised this issue: 'Who is Ulanfu?'⁴²⁸ But the admission into his discourse of a question also allowed entry for doubts: 'We haven't resolved this issue [of who Ulanfu is].' It was only 'very likely' that he was in fact a Soviet Mongolian revisionist spy, a traitor to the CCP. Gao spelt out the complicated narrative of Ulanfu's background, of his connections of treacherous organisations and to a network of exposed criminals and spies. He also gave a detailed chronology of the IMPP, founded in 1925, with its original leaders, and its connections to the Nationalists. Asserting the hegemony of class over nationality Gao declared that 'what [parts of the IMPP wanted] was not to classify people according to class, but according to nationality. They didn't want a revolution for the Mongolians, they wanted revisionism, they didn't want a revolution for the Han, they wanted revisionism for them. It seemed like they were for class distinctions, but in fact they were for nationality ones.'⁴²⁹ Revolution was the common liberation of all national groups. It was achieved through awareness of class and class struggle. The real crime of the IMPP in Gao's formulation was to pretend to their constituency that they were representing the interests of a national minority group, the Mongolians, when in fact they were all along supporting the bad exploiting classes.

Gao Jinming's voice in the IMAR CR was noteworthy because despite having served as his right hand man for some years he was Ulanfu's first enthusiastic denouncer at the Qianmen Hotel meeting in 1966 in Beijing. But, as is shown in the

⁴²⁷ Ibid 5.

⁴²⁸ Ibid 2.

⁴²⁹ Ibid 2.

next chapter, he in turn was accused by the outsider Teng of being 'too soft' in carrying out the 'Party rectification' campaign in IMAR, labelled a rightist and removed from power in October 1968. He was reinstated after the 'Ninth Congress' in April 1969, only to be felled again in 1970. His career illustrated the insecurity of leaders in the CR and the dangers of someone who, while declaring that the 'true objective of the "dig and cleanse" campaign is to rid the Party of bad elements'⁴³⁰ was, in fact, entirely dependent on this Party for their power, and was as much at the mercy of its decisions as those labelled enemies.

Conclusion

Ideologically and stylistically, Teng's was a borrowed voice, parasitical in content and form on the discourse of the Centre. Despite the fact that Teng spoke in such a tumultuous and unique period, what he said and how he said it was marked by a rigid adherence to the ideological parameters and classifications from the Centre. Teng came to IMAR with little sense of the audience and constituency he had there. Unlike Gao and Wu who at least showed awareness of the complicated nature of the struggle going on in IMAR, Teng's main function was the categorical imposition of the Centre's edicts and instructions on IMAR.

Working within these parameters, Teng's attempts to articulate the specifics of IMAR were to take him towards an acceptance of the existence of a counter-party, the IMPP. The increasing prominence of this in his discourse was framed purely in terms of its violations of the Centre's class ideology. Nationality, with the issues of ethnicity subsumed within this, hardly existed for Teng. His voice was to speak within, and of, the new history, the new master narrative being promoted in IMAR, of unity based on class identity, and liberation from class-oppression through struggle.

Teng's position as an outsider, with only the support of the Centre to rely on, meant that he was organisationally profoundly insecure exercising power in IMAR and influencing events there. His appeals were constantly to the Centre. He himself had

⁴³⁰ Ibid 1.

no local credibility, and implemented the 'dig and cleanse' campaign in such a way that its excesses caused the Centre finally to remove and criticise him. More generally Teng's language showed the insecurities of all power holders at this stage in the CR – the impossible pressures put on them to faithfully implement instructions from the Centre leadership that was itself fractured and chaotic, with only very specific symbolic high-grounds like Mao and his statements taken as utterly unquestionable, and to locate and appeal to an audience and constituency locally. In the case of IMAR, the audience was in fact riven by factions, different interest groups, the most deeply divided being those along the lines of nationality classification, something that could not be sympathetically addressed in the discourse of the Centre at that time. It was unsurprising that barely 24 months into his time in IMAR, Teng was unceremoniously removed, and exposed to attack. Material from this time is the subject of the final chapter.

Chapter Five

The Politics of Saying Sorry: The Fall of Teng

Haiqing - 1969

The material looked at in this chapter comes from the final stage of the 'digging and cleansing' IMPP period in IMAR during the CR. At its heart was the power change after the Ninth Party Congress in Beijing, when a new narrative was established and promoted by the Centre, necessitating the withdrawal of support for Teng Haiqing and his removal from formal power. This was signified through the self-criticisms which Teng performed in the summer of 1969, dominated by the language of submissiveness, apology and admission of culpability, and aimed at negotiating both for the Centre and Teng. In this new power paradigm the audience figure differently than in earlier material – a new register was used towards them. More of their voices appeared in the material. The treatment of the issue of ethnicity and national minorities remained highly controlled and sensitive, but the particular treatment of Mongolians was allowed for the first time a new voice. This material demonstrates the complex dynamics of power in the CR, its language signifying the Centre's attempts to respond and engage to the situation in IMAR. Analysis of Teng's voice finally offers the opportunity to understand what it meant to be 'in' and 'out' of power in the CR, how this was signified in discourse, and what the mechanics of power being taken away were.

5.1 General Context of the Fall of Teng

The material in this chapter was dominated by one event – the Ninth Party Congress, convened in Beijing in April 1969, the first for over 11 years. This Congress formally marked the end of the most violent periods of the CR nationally. It saw the adoption of a new Party constitution in which Lin Biao was described as Mao's successor. Only 19% of the Eighth Party Congress membership was re-elected, marking a sea change in the PRC's leadership.⁴³¹

⁴³¹ Schoenhals 1996a, 371.

The impact of the Party Congress in IMAR was dramatic. This derived from the issuing of a single utterance from Mao Zedong that 'excesses had been committed in the course of the movement to rectify the Party' in IMAR.⁴³² This was encapsulated in the '22nd May Directive' from the Centre that figured so prominently in local literature. This judgement by the Centre on the CR in IMAR suffering from 'excesses' (*kuodahua*) was repeatedly used in the main accusations against Teng, sanctioning the attacks on him.

This was the briefest period in the IMAR CR movement. But like the 1967 dialogues and the '13th April Decision,' it marked a decisive intervention by the Centre in events in IMAR, and the concerted attempt to impose a new narrative and ideology, through which it distanced itself from the violence that had occurred from 1967 to 1968, and which had been based on the existence of the counter-party, the IMPP. Teng was critical in this process, acting as the fall-guy taking responsibility for the previous excesses, becoming the mouthpiece of the new register of contrition and apology, within a discourse in which the strategies of management of the issues in IMAR was approached in a different way, with the use of different narratives and keywords. His apology was to prove a highly political act, dominated by the continuing need both to assert the Centre's hegemony, but to do this by adapting it and renegotiating its terms. Teng's removal from power was most clearly signified by his physically leaving the region in December 1969, for re-education in Tangshan, Hebei province. The PLA 65th Corps was sent from the Beijing Military Region to control what was left of IMAR. A new leadership was put in place, and the period of Teng's authority was over.

5.2 The Attacks on Gao Jinming – Early 1969

In terms of strategy, the campaign against Teng was similar to the earlier one against Ulanfu. Like the earlier attack, which was preceded in mid-1967 by a mini-campaign against the two Wangs (see Chapter Two), a shorter attack on Gao Jinming preceded that on Teng. Gao, ethnically a Manchu, had been active in IMAR since moving there from Shaanxi province in 1946. He had worked himself up to

⁴³² Woody 1993, v.

being Ulanfu's deputy by the time of the Beijing Qianmen Hotel meeting in May 1966. According to Woody, Gao had attacked Ulanfu with particular ferocity at this meeting, and had served as one of the founder members of the IMAR CRC under Teng.⁴³³

In October 1968 Gao was dismissed from his posts. The case against him, according to the attack published in the 'Great Criticism Battle Paper,' on 20th March 1969 was that he had 'denied class struggle, propagated the idea that all state owned enterprises had no class struggle, sung the praises (*meihua*) of capitalists, boasted about the capitalist productive abilities... opposed putting politics first.'⁴³⁴ In addition, he was guilty of 'restorationism' (*fuci*), and of splittism. His friends were the 'soviet revisionists.' Gao was 'an enthusiastic follower of Liu Shaoqi and Ulanfu.'

The campaign against Gao signified the creation of a new narrative, both for Gao's history and for the CR in IMAR up till his fall from grace. An attack published on 8th January 1969 ('Thoroughly Destroy Gao Jinming's Smooth Words on "Representing the Correct Line"') in the 'Great Criticism Battle Paper' took the February Counter-Current as the critical moment of the whole CR till then, redirecting its meaning and significance. But all of Gao's previous history in the region was also re-examined and re-narrativised. 'What exactly has Gao's Jinming's past been like? What's he been doing these last 17 years? Has he been following the proletarian revolutionary path of Mao Zedong all along?'⁴³⁵ The immediate focus for the attack on Gao was his closeness to Ulanfu from the time of his arrival in IMAR. He was guilty by association. The campaigns from the Centre against Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping had offered inspiration for the local attack on Ulanfu, and been the model for this. Gao in turn was accused of promulgating the same 'splittist and revisionist policies' in Baotou, where he had been active, as Ulanfu sponsored in the region as a whole.

⁴³³ Woody 1993, iii.

⁴³⁴ Doc 39, 20th March 1969, 3.

⁴³⁵ Ibid 8.

This signified one of the characteristics of the CR – the conflict over narratives, and meanings imputed to recent Chinese history. Gao's fall illustrated many features of this battle. Events he was involved in or actions he committed that were positively appraised in the 'old history' became 'black counter-currents' or 'crimes' in the new narrative. At the Qianmen Hotel meeting, a key moment in the creation of the new IMAR history, Gao performed faithful service by attacking Ulanfu. But in the narrative promoted in this early 1968 material, Gao's participation in this event was re-created: 'At this meeting which played a decisive part in the struggle against Ulanfu, Gao Jinming did not take part with his full heart.' Because of their 17 year association, Gao had proved incapable of attacking Ulanfu, but had sought to protect him through 'ensuring that his "associates and followers" were left in place.'⁴³⁶

In following this private programme, Gao was also guilty like Ulanfu of working against the Centre and its hegemony. He had 'sung a tune contrary (*dachang fandiao*) to our great leader Chairman Mao's teachings.'⁴³⁷ This failure to serve the Centre was supported by evidence. In early 1967, attending a meeting in Beijing, he failed to relay accurately how violent the situation in IMAR was.⁴³⁸ Gao Jinming 'doesn't trust the Centre above, or the revolutionary masses below,' the attack declared.⁴³⁹

An important ingredient of the attack on Gao was the mixture of using denunciations based on 'mistakes' (*cuowu*) and 'criminal behaviour,' or 'guilt' (*zuixing*). The attack on Gao from 20th March 1969 referred to above talked of the 'crimes' he had committed which needed to be thoroughly reckoned with.⁴⁴⁰ At the end of this attack, the authors talked of 'the need to thoroughly clear out and criticise Gao Jinming's towering crimes in pushing forward along the counter-revolutionary revisionist and splittist path.'⁴⁴¹ Mao Zedong's word offered the standards of judgement in this process of proving Gao's 'guilt.' Halfway through the attack, they were reproduced, with the statement that they 'proved' (*zhengming*) the 'crimes'

⁴³⁶ In fact, the exact opposite had happened. See above.

⁴³⁷ Doc 39, 3.

⁴³⁸ Ibid 9.

⁴³⁹ Ibid 15.

⁴⁴⁰ Doc 39, 20th March 1969, 6.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid 16.

(*zui'e*) which Gao had committed. This prefigured the talk of 'mistakes' and 'crimes' in the material against Teng, and the kind of processes offered in the various documents to prove 'culpability' fulfilled an equally important role. The attack on Gao therefore set out the parameters of a new narrative within which new forms of power were needed, with an appropriate discourse to convey these. This prepared the way for the full attack on Teng, and the removal of his authority.

5.3 Teng's 'Confessions': From Demand to Apology

Teng Haiqing no longer speaking in a context in which he was empowered was signified by his discourse being dominated by a register not of prescription and the right to use imperatives and commands (seen in the last chapter), but by one of apology and admissions of culpability. This materially illustrated the extreme insecurity of those occupying positions of power in the PRC during the CR. In 1968, Teng delivered orders to organisations and units of every size and variety in IMAR, and spoke directly on behalf of the Centre as its mouthpiece and main representative. But by 14th June 1969 he was reduced to saying this:

'Comrades... My mistakes are very serious... I have committed crimes against the people, and harmed them, and towards Chairman Mao. To him I plead guilty (*qingzui*). Those comrades labelled as IMPP include many old people who have lost their sons and daughters, many young people who have lost their wives and husbands, many children who have lost their fathers and mothers. I am the guiltiest in making these great mistakes... I have let down (*duibuiqi*) these comrades, let down Chairman Mao, let down the 13 million people of IMAR, let down the revolutionary people of all nationality backgrounds.'⁴⁴²

The removal of support at the Centre meant that the value of Teng's words in the new market had decreased. This was compounded by the organisational changes that had occurred – the setting up of a new institution (see following section), signifying new power priorities and objectives, accommodating admissions of mistakes made in the previous order. The illocutionary force of Teng's words was affected by this – he spoke to different groups, with different objectives and sanction. The context in which he had exercised power had changed, and his new voice was partly brought

⁴⁴² Doc 55, 1-2.

on by a need to renegotiate in this new situation. The sort of power he exercised now was therefore affected by the national and local context.

This was primarily created by the Ninth Party Congress with its embodying the criticisms of excesses by those implementing the CR in certain regions, which formed a new narrative, a new authoritative framework through which to assess and describe recent events. A letter sent by Teng, Wu Tao and Li Shuda from Beijing on the 4th April to Quan Xingyuan and 'other comrades on the Standing Committee,' issued at the beginning of the Congress (which had started formally on 1st April) was primarily in prescriptive mode, because at the time Teng still notionally had formal authority. The authors referred to the Ninth Congress as one 'with historic significance and great contemporary importance.'⁴⁴³ In his response to the letter written by Teng and others, Quan Xingyuan reiterated that the Congress was 'great, glorious and correct' (this despite the fact that it had yet to start).⁴⁴⁴ According to these letters, a new meaning was imposed from the Centre on the issue of 'unity' and of the enemy. Instead of being all around, the enemy were in fact a 'tiny minority.' The key issue now was to 'implement policies' (*luoshi zhengce*), a phrase which would be heavily used in the ensuing months. These policies included processes of criticism for individuals and organisations (a process Quan began by criticising the units and areas that had refused to disseminate Teng and Wu's messages from the Centre during the preparations for the Congress).⁴⁴⁵

Declarations of the 'spirit' of the Ninth Congress (*jiuda de jingsheng*), and of the 'people of all nationalities in IMAR raising the great red flag of Mao Zedong Thought and letting it fly in the great billowing wind of the spirit of the Ninth Congress were contained in a statement issued on 12th May 1969 by the Political Work Section of the IMAR CRC. This was the first document in the material analysed in this chapter in which Teng was openly criticised. The key issue was how to implement this 'spirit,' specifically stated to be 'thoroughly criticising Teng Haiqing's leftism.' 'This was a good new stage in the current proletarian CR being

⁴⁴³ Doc 44, 1.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid 3.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid 4.

waged,' the authors stated, and a 'concrete manifestation of the spirit of the Ninth Congress in IMAR.'⁴⁴⁶

At this stage in the campaign, it was still unclear which policies were to be implemented. As the following sections show, ostensibly these new policies turned out to be more moderate, aimed at carrying more of their constituency with them. They were therefore set up as a direct rebuke to the excesses of Teng and those associated (or deemed to have been associated) most closely with him.

The material attacking Teng also involved the emergence of a number of voices which had hitherto been suppressed, and their inclusion within the discourse he used. While the primary material was Teng's own self-confessions and criticisms, his direct voice ceased to dominate. Even texts 'authored' by him, such as his examinations, included critical and lengthy interjections from the audience dictating their direction and tone.

5.4 Anti-Teng Material: New Organisations

The new context in which Teng found himself speaking from April 1969 is signified by the raft of adapted organisations he spoke to, or which issued his self-confessions or criticisms by others of him:

- IMAR CRC Political Work Group
- Hohhot CRC Standing Committee Branch for Criticising Teng Haiqing's [Practice of Being] "Leftist in Appearance, but Rightist in Reality."
- IMAR Fifth Section of the Mao Zedong Thought Great School Station of the Alliance to Criticise Teng.
- Alliance to Criticise Teng at the Hohhot PSB Organisation Revolutionary Great Criticism Station.
- The 8th Construction Company "*Jinggangshan*" Alliance.
- IMAR CRC Standing Committee Organisation Joint Committee for Criticising Teng.

⁴⁴⁶ *Jiji shengming* (Urgent Declaration), Hohhot, 12th May 1969.

- IM University “*Jinggangshan*” Criticise Teng Liaison Headquarters.
- Hohhot Railway Bureau Liaison Headquarters.
- Hohhot Workers Union.

As the material carriers of Teng’s new voice, and constituting the institutions and administrative structure within which his words were enacted, these organisations reveal much about how the environment had evolved to accommodate the new narrative and culture of power. Many of these grew from previous entities. A ‘declaration’ (*shengming*) issued by the Hohhot CRC Revolutionary Masses’ on 14th May 1969 announced the creation of the second organisation above, tracing its sanction to the ‘spirit of the Ninth Congress,’ and acting in accordance with the ‘16 Articles’ issued by the Centre on ‘how mass organisations should arrange themselves.’⁴⁴⁷ The objective of the new group would be to ‘criticise Comrade Teng Haiqing’s counter-revolutionary path, protect Chairman Mao’s proletarian path, saving Comrade Teng and the other comrades who have made serious mistakes (*cuowu*), making them return to the correct path of Chairman Mao.’ The organisations saw their main function as part of a positive campaign of correction, rather than the prosecution of accusations against criminals and enemies.

The ‘anti-Teng’ material falls into the following genres:

- Teng’s own words (letter, self-criticisms)
- Formal announcements
- Copies of speeches by local leaders newly in place after the Ninth Congress
- Narrative attacks
- Letters from other smaller groups directed at the central leaders
- ‘Core Statements’ (*zhongdian fayan*)

Many of the prose attacks, and reprinting of Teng’s self-criticisms, were contained in the ‘801 News Report’ newsletter, produced by the Construction Corps, and in

⁴⁴⁷ *Yanzhong shengming* (Serious Declaration), Hohhot, 14th May 1969.

'Study Materials' produced by the CRC Committee of the construction department.⁴⁴⁸

A wide range of voices with varying registers were used against Teng. Minutes of a meeting focussed on how to implement the 'spirit' of the Ninth Party Congress in IMAR held from the 28th April to 5th May 1969 (and issued on the final day) gave some indication of this. Of the 30 people present, the majority were representatives either of various parts of the Workers Union (*gongdaihui*), or leaders or members of sections of the 'Third Hohhot Red Union,' with the remainder coming from the IMAR Workers Propaganda Leading Department Group. The document was presented as a synthesis of the opinions of all these groups.⁴⁴⁹

Deeper into the anti-Teng campaign were the voices of new leaders. These appeared in the document issued on 27th May 1969 by the IMAR CRC 'deputy leader' Lei Daoyu, and his colleagues Wang Zhiyou, and Xi Guangda. The first and second of these professed 'humility' before their audience (a register looked at later in discussing Teng's tone), and issued their statements grounded much more in terms of their own perspectives and experience, rather than speaking on behalf of the Centre or any other more general authority.

There were also documents directly issued from local organisations, like the letter from the IM University '*Jinggangshan*' Criticise Teng Alliance Station on the 5th July, to Zhou Enlai (named simply as 'Premier' (*zongli*) in the letter), Chen Boda, Kang Sheng (called Kang Lao, use of a familiar appellation), and Jiang Qing. The democratic notion of a direct approach from a small, provincial faction to the leaders at the Centre is striking, and indicated something of the complicated geography of power in the CR. This was compounded by the fact that the authors of the letter asserted ownership over their opinions, rather than merely presenting them subserviently.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁸ These news-sheets also published materials issued by local groups, such as the Zhaomeng Balin Banner Alliance (17th July 1969) and the Xilingoule Banner CRC United Investigation Group (15th June 1969).

⁴⁴⁹ Doc 46.

⁴⁵⁰ They stated, for instance, in the opening paragraph: 'We are preparing to reflect to the leaders at the Centre our opinions over correcting mistakes with a rightist,

Between these two local extremes were the interjections contained by members of the groups Teng appeared before for his examination. Greater audience participation was permitted in these meetings compared to the public meetings from earlier parts of the CR in IMAR campaign analysed in previous chapters. In these transcripts, there were voices interrupting, correcting and challenging Teng from members of the Railway Bureau, and 'organisations under the Study Mao Zedong Thought Great School.' The role of the audience in Teng's confessions is looked at in more detail below, but it is an example of material displaying a more multivocal, varied composition, and of a challenge to monovocal authority utterances.

The inclusion of so many voices, from local groups, individuals, organisations, pointed to a crisis of authority at the time, and were symptomatic of the renegotiations among power groups. The Ninth Congress, with the importation of its symbolic importance into IMAR, had sanctioned the promotion of a new evaluation of the 'Party rectification' campaign, and the unique course it had taken in IMAR. This new narrative had challenged the monopoly narrative promoted by previously dominant voices, which had been categorical in tone, and clearly signified their absolute correctness. The entry of other voices, contradicting this certainty and monovocality, was a major change. The conveying of Teng's voice embodied this, issued now not through texts largely containing his unchallenged voice, but ones in which dissenting and contradicting 'other voices' were also present, competing with his.

5.5 Anti-Teng Material: Strategies

There were common features between the campaign against Teng, and the previous one against Ulanfu, beyond the fact that the initial stages were ostensibly aimed at other targets. A key means to discredit Teng was to attack him using his own words. A similar method was used with Ulanfu. A collection of Teng's 'counter-sayings' (as they were now labelled) was pitted against the correct language of the

opportunistic tendency in national minority policy made by Comrade Teng, taking notice of minority soldiers in the PLA, and strengthening the unity of national

'instructions' (*zhishi*) of the Centre, Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin in a 25 page 'Selection' from May 1969.⁴⁵¹ As with Ulanfu, Teng's words were taken as indications of specific counter-categories of thought: pushing for 'independence,' setting up a separate power-basis for himself in IMAR, opposing the Centre. Paradoxically these were the accusations that Teng had levelled at Ulanfu. The most striking of these was that Teng was a new kind of splittist. The term was shorn of all its pro-national minority connotations in this context. As a Han Chinese, who did not originate from IMAR, and who had been in power while a devastating campaign had been waged against local Mongolians, it was impossible to say that Teng had worked on a positive agenda to empower minorities. He was simply accused of being ambitious and pursuing personal glory.

The other accusation against Teng was his support for violence. There were many examples of his speaking in prescriptive mode against violence in copies of his speeches issued when he was still supported by the Centre.⁴⁵² By the time he was out of favour in 1969, however, he was labelled as a keen promoter of unrest. In the May 1969 collection of quotes from Teng, in the third section entitled 'Teng's Serious Acts of Pressing, Confessing and Excesses,' Teng gave the following instructions to a Wumeng League CRC group on 8th January 1969:

'Undertaking a bit of armed struggle [and] going on from this is good. Quick results are what is wanted. Battling enemies, [with] a high positive attitude to struggle, hating the enemies for these things, all help maintain the positive spirit of the masses.'⁴⁵³

minorities.'

⁴⁵¹ Doc 45.

⁴⁵² E.g., Teng's speech on 5th July 1967 where he criticised violence at local struggle sessions: 'I say that revolutionary rebellion factions shouldn't act this way, it's not a high way to act, it's low' (Doc 14, 6). On 24th November, he stated when told of armed struggle in Wumeng League that 'we should not use sticks and guns to hit people, but adopt unifying education...not pressure them' (Doc 2, 29th November 1967, 3). Even in the depths of the 'Party rectification' campaign, on 10th December 1968, Teng condemned those who 'struck, tore, ripped, hunted houses, grasped people, and created an atmosphere of terror... destroying the healthy development of the campaign' (Doc 2, 19th December 1968, 9).

⁴⁵³ Doc 45, 5.

Context was the means by which Teng's words were manipulated and then condemned. In the original copy of Teng's instructions from this meeting issued on the 12th January 1969 in 'Struggle Notice' these words had occurred in a more complicated context. The main subject he pursued there was the importance of implementing Chairman Mao's policies, and the fact that many organisations, because of lack of understanding and incomplete appreciation of the depth of Mao's thinking, had not achieved this. He also made clear the main issue was not the battle between who seemed left and right but how to carry out instructions properly. The earlier version read:

'Those doing leftist work while actually being rightists are the minority. The majority don't allow policies to be grasped, [thinking that] undertaking a bit of armed struggle, [and going on] from this is good. "Quick results are what is wanted. Battling enemies, [with] a high positive attitude to struggle, hating the enemies, these things all help preserve the positive spirit of the masses." Leaders also bear responsibility [for this]. They haven't set out the policies clearly.'⁴⁵⁴

In Teng's original words, he criticised an attitude he was ascribing to other people, signifying this by the use of quotation marks. But six months later, with the final part of the piece left out, this was presented as the direct expression of his own sanctioning of violence. Words he used to characterise others were now manipulated to seem like his own, signifying the decrease of their political capital in the new market created after the '13th April Decision' for Ulanfu, and the Ninth Party Congress for Teng.

A second common element of the campaigns against Ulanfu and Teng was the disrespectful register with which both were referred to. Just as Ulanfu had become 'Old Ulanfu,' 'Prince Ulanfu,' along with a host of other derogatory labels (see Chapter Three, 3.1.3), so Teng was referred to as 'Old Teng' or simply 'Teng Haiqing' without the respectful 'Comrade,' indicating a closeness and familiarity between the issuer of the documents and Teng himself.⁴⁵⁵ Wu Tao referred to Teng as 'Little Teng Haiqing' in his speech of 13th June,⁴⁵⁶ an even more belittling label

⁴⁵⁴ Doc 40, 12th January 1969, 13.

⁴⁵⁵ Doc 48, 4.

⁴⁵⁶ Doc 56, 17th July 1969, 4.

probably sanctioned by the fact that Wu Tao was still a local leader at the time. The implication of this addressing of Teng in the same way as others was clearly marked as something he was expected to feel (and did feel) uncomfortable about when one of his interrogators simply demanded of him: 'What's so dangerous about some young students and you discussing a few issues?'⁴⁵⁷ The 'reduction' of the space between the 'leader' Teng, and his audience implied in these familiar forms of address was a key means of conveying his lack of authority in the new context in which he spoke.

While Teng was spared the intense invective which had been levelled at Ulanfu, one way in which the two campaigns did differ was the active part Teng was made to play in discrediting himself, and the fact that he participated in this in person. In his self-criticism of 14th June, Teng directly quoted words he had previously used, and then denounced them: 'I have said: "The branch name of the CCP is what is sinks or swims by, and in fact this is an IMPP branch." This is totally incorrect slander against Chairman Mao's Thought.'⁴⁵⁸ Teng was within his own denunciation, making it first rather than third person. Behind this lay the simple withdrawal of sanction from Teng, his voice no longer occurring in an administrative and ideological context where he could rely on support.

5.6 Teng's Mistakes and Crimes: The Basis for Denunciation

In the new narrative created after the Ninth Party Congress Teng's role changed from a power holder, to one of someone accused of not understanding the situation in IMAR and being an outsider:

'Teng Haiqing, he doesn't understand the real situation in IMAR, he doesn't start out from how things really are in IMAR, he doesn't investigate, doesn't research, objectify, but is happy to exaggerate the enemy feelings (*diquing*) and view IMAR as a black nest, countering the high hopes of Chairman Mao towards the 13 million people of IMAR.'⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁷ Doc 53, 2nd July 1969, 2.

⁴⁵⁸ Doc 52, 2.

⁴⁵⁹ Doc 51, 25th June 1969, 8.

In the new narrative, Teng was an outsider, someone who had intervened, who had no capital locally. At the same time as he was denounced in this narrative for making mistakes, there was also a process of mitigation being prepared for him. He had come to a situation blind, and acted from ignorance, not with malice aforethought.

The keyword in the discourse used in this process against Teng (and one he used himself in his self-criticisms) was 'mistake' (*cuowu*). There was also a category of 'crimes' (*zui*), though this was used less frequently. An attack on Teng published in the '801 News Report' on 25th June 1969 had divided Teng's mistakes into political, military, organisational and intellectual ones. Within and across these categories, the main mistakes Teng was accused of committing were:

- Encouraging and sanctioning violence.
- Opposing the centre, and placing himself in competition to Mao in IMAR.
- Being contradictory in his statements.
- Being unfaithful to the Centre.
- Supporting the exploitative classes.

The one area where Teng was accused of committing crimes rather than making mistakes was to have 'not had the Centre in his eyes.' 'He cheated the Centre,' the attack continued, 'and suppressed the people, trying to set up "Teng's independent kingdom." This is historical proof. Comrade Teng Haiqing was guilty. We must criticise Comrade Teng Haiqing's mistakes, [but] we must thoroughly rectify Comrade Teng Haiqing's "leftist" opportunism crimes (*zuixing*).'⁴⁶⁰ As argued in the last chapter, Teng had started off following the Centre's ideology closely, using its discourse. But the articulation of a unique aspect to the struggle in IMAR, the IMPP, had brought conflict and problems. In the material condemning him this was cited as the failure to understand the Centre's prescriptions about how to handle the problem in IMAR. But in the stronger of the material analysed here, this failure was seen as a deliberate distortion of the Centre's instructions.

⁴⁶⁰ Doc 51, 10th July 1969, 1.

The small ideological part of the attack on Teng focussed on the idea that he had 'opposed' or 'threatened' the Centre through a 'theory of many centres' (*duo zhongxinlun*). This appeared in the '801 News Report' 17th July 1969, with a series of quotes from him. Teng had competed with the Centre, and tried to set up a parallel power structure in IMAR. A similar grouping of material issued in May 1969 claimed that Teng had wished to create his own 'kingdom' (*gao duli wangguo*). Quotes were used stating that Teng wished to see the IMAR CRC become independent, and in which he criticised the Centre's management of industry as opposed to the local one.⁴⁶¹ But these attacks lacked the edge of those against Ulanfu and the IMPP, where issues of a national minority trying to assert its wishes for independence came closest to the area where the Centre was most sensitive. The accusations of Teng working for an 'independent kingdom' were standard means to slander someone who was being cast as incompetent or inefficient. None of Teng's ideological or political objectives were set out, as they had been against Ulanfu. It was a label, the most powerful label among several, used to criticise him and indicate dissatisfaction in his failure to handle the situation in IMAR as the Centre had prescribed, in the discourse they had devised.

5.7 Nationality: The Breaking Point

The most dramatic sign in Teng's new discourse of a paradigm-break with the previous one was the admission that the brunt of the purge of the IMPP had been borne by Mongolians. But this was still framed in such a way that control over the key terms for the discourse and the ideology it carried was asserted. Teng was accused of stating in a speech that 'the targets for the development of the IMPP were cadres of Mongolian nationality, and students, in both large and small schools. The other was working people.'⁴⁶² A more general criticism of the nature of the campaign Teng had helped wage in IMAR was contained in the '801 News Report' on 25th June: 'Regarding the problem of national minorities, Teng Haiqing took the chance given him by the "dig the IMPP" to purge the national minority cadres, thinking that they were unreliable. He labelled a large number of them IMPP, forbade the use of their languages, and didn't respect their characteristics, seriously

⁴⁶¹ Doc 45, 18-19.

against the Party's policies on national minorities, destroying the unity between nationality groups.'⁴⁶³

Teng admitted in his self-criticism on 23rd June that 'in some work units 80% of those who were national minorities were labelled as IMPP.'⁴⁶⁴ But neither Teng, nor his accusers in these documents, spoke of the IMPP purge being mostly aimed at, and suffered by, Mongolians. Both are located in the broadest context of treatment of 'minorities.'

The most explicit link between the IMPP purge and the open persecution of Mongolians in this material was contained in a stencilled 'Open Letter' to the central leaders issued on 5th July 1969:

'Comrade Teng Haiqing supports capitalist proletarian minoritisation, dragging a large number of local and military Mongolian cadres over to Ulanfu's black line, pushing them towards Ulanfu. Chairman Mao says "We must believe that more than 90% of cadres are good or relatively good." Under the mistaken leadership of Comrade Teng Haiqing's thought, from the IMAR Party down to work unit level, more than 90% of Mongolian cadres have been labelled as IMPP. A leader of the Yimeng Kangxi Banner, Li Wenju, even said: "Support for IMPP is based on nationality. There are no good Mongolians. Ulanfu is their godfather. Now he's being fucked, and so should they.'"

This admission by some of the voices in the anti-Teng campaign that national minorities in general, and the Mongolians in particular, had suffered in the purge of the IMPP was supported by the appearance of a statistical, factual register in the discourse. Careful tabulation of numbers and percentages of those in specific work units and areas who were victims in the campaign were set down:

'95 cadre workers in the commune and organisations under it, 48 labelled as IMPP, making 52%. Of the 50 Mongolians 32 were labelled as IMPP, making 64%. Of 34 Communist Cadres, 16 were Mongolian, and all of these were labelled IMPP.'⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶² Doc 51, 16th June 1969, 4.

⁴⁶³ Doc 51, 25th June, 7.

⁴⁶⁴ Doc 51, 26th July 1967, 3.

⁴⁶⁵ Doc 51, 17th July 1969, 1.

A similar rendition of statistics was presented on 29th July, this time for work units and communes in Zhemeng League. This statistical data gave the overwhelming impression that, whatever the type or size of the organisation, Mongolians had been the main victims. This was presented as a brute fact. No questions were raised as to why a far higher proportion of Mongolians figure in the statistics than other groups. The extremely sensitive question of whether the Centre had pursued policies in IMAR that led to the victimisation, persecution and slaughter of a national minority on the basis of their ethnicity was omitted from this discourse. All that was allowed was the admission that Teng had 'misadministered' the area and made mistakes.

This was a great symbolic moment, marking the discourse off as very different from what had preceded it. The terms had changed – the sort of hegemony arising from the '13th April Decision' with its terms of management and control had changed, in response to the situation in IMAR spiralling out of control and violence reaching unacceptable levels. But the central issue of the assertion of the hegemony of class over national minority terms was not conceded or softened. The new discourse still sought to exercise control, and was an indication of the realisation that the best route to this was to concede the suffering of Mongolians, but not to interrogate this further and change the prime ideological terms.

5.8 Keywords: 'Rectify' and 'Sorry'

The keywords in the previous stages of the CR in IMAR had delineated the main territory for contention between competing forces and signified the process of control and its mechanisms. In 1967, 'people' and 'power' were at the forefront, within a discourse aimed at aggressive management of IMAR and tight definition of the constituencies there. 'Class' and 'nationality' dominated the central period, highlighting the ideological conflict between two opposing factions, the Centre and a perceived local 'counter-party'. But in the terminal phase of the CR, the key terms became ones indicating the strategic points to regain control in a situation that had got out of hand. Here 'pacifying,' 'admission of mistakes,' 'apology,' and 'rectification' were central, achieved and implemented by organisational processes of mass-criticisms and self-criticism, and conveyed in a register of submissiveness and admission of culpability.

The criticism from the Centre of the conduct of the CR in IMAR provoked the open publication of data on the suffering from the purge of the IMPP. This was seen as a situation meriting rectification. From May 1969 onwards, therefore, the term 'rectify' (*pingfan*) became central in the anti-Teng material. Wu Tao (at the time the deputy leader of the IMAR CRC and the Military District), on meeting a delegation from Zhemeng League on 30th June 1969 had said:

'We need to thoroughly give rectification to those who have suffered, according to the instructions from the Centre, notices, and the "165 Notice." Politically, intellectually, organisationally, we need to thoroughly rectify. We need to restore the good name of politics and rectify organisationally. Intellectually we need to undergo criticism of mistakes, and really give rectification to those struck down as "counter-revolutionaries" and IMPP, and followers of other types of bad organisation. Especially intellectually, we need rectification, real and complete rectification. Intellectual rectification is very important. We undergo criticism; bad thoughts are cleaned out... [Ending up by] having real class feeling, this is the result of a thorough cleansing.'⁴⁶⁶

This dense use of one term, 'rectification,' (seven times in the passage above) made clear the importance of this in the new stage of the campaign. Rectification, as a term and process, was promoted by Wu Tao and other leaders at the time of the '24 Character Directive' contained in the 'Central Notice' issued on the 22nd May that had originally criticised Teng. In this the key prescriptions was to 'strengthen unity, correct mistakes, summarise experience, implement policies, stabilise organisations, unite against a common enemy' (*jiaqiang tuanjie, xiuzheng cuowu, zongjie jingyan, luoshi zhengce, wending jushi, gongtong duidi* – in total 24 characters). Parts of this directive appeared in other material. In his self-criticism of 14th June, Teng stated that 'if you don't criticise me, then that's not "implementing policy" (*luoshi zhengce*).'⁴⁶⁷ It also appeared on the 'Resolution' issued by the Hohhot Workers Union on 6th July, labelled as the 'concrete policy of the Centre resolving the issue/problem of IMAR.' To compound the hegemony of this statement, the 'Resolution' continued: 'All steps to go behind Chairman Mao's strategy, and to leave the great direction of the current movement and the "24 Character" policy are mistaken, and are against unity.' The negative language of mistakes, admissions of

⁴⁶⁶ Doc 56, 17th July 1969, 1.

⁴⁶⁷ Doc 52, 1.

culpability and crimes was balanced by the promotion of a new policy and direction, embodied in the '24 Character Directive' offering a new solution to the 'issue/problem' of IMAR.

The other keyword in this discourse was 'sorry.' By necessity, Teng was the key performer of that term. Clustered around its performance were the issues of for whom Teng was saying sorry (himself, or the Centre he had represented till then), why he was saying sorry (to fully repudiate a form of power that had failed, or to serve as a fall-guy for the Centre, which could continue to exercise power in the area once he had taken the flack for them), and to whom he was saying sorry (the 'people' of IMAR – the national minorities, the broad masses of the people, the leaders, the 'wounded'), and finally how he said sorry (the form of words he used, the way they were issued). Teng's very utterance of the term 'sorry' distilled critical issues of the relationship between the exercise of power in the CR and language. It showed how someone who once issued orders, prescriptions and demands was placed in a position where they had to request forgiveness (leaving aside the kind of forgiveness this actually was) from their audience or constituency. Teng's apology served many functions, and proved to be a rich speech act.

5.9 Teng's Self-Criticisms: The Context

Two full length versions of self-criticisms Teng Haiqing performed on the 18th June⁴⁶⁸ and the 23rd June 1969⁴⁶⁹ are looked at in this section, along with a stencilled two page fragment of a further self-criticism from the 14th June⁴⁷⁰, and the criticism of Teng's examination of 24th June published on 17th July.⁴⁷¹ These are only a small sample of what was evidently a busy schedule of self-examinations. The first open criticisms of Teng occurred on 9th May. However, it was likely that he started to actively participate in self-criticisms after the issuing of the '22nd May Circular.' In

⁴⁶⁸ Issued in Doc 51, 24th June 1969.

⁴⁶⁹ Issued in Doc 51, 26th July 1967.

⁴⁷⁰ Doc 52.

⁴⁷¹ Doc 56.

the opening words on the 18th June, Teng stated that 'in the recent period, I have done probably 30 criticisms before the masses.'⁴⁷²

The written records make clear these events were not brief. The first was 13 closely printed pages, the second 12. Assuming five minutes to perform each page, this would mean a minimum of an hour each. The 18th June performance, however, was clearly marked as a 'uncorrected record,' and therefore was likely to be only a summary rather than a verbatim record. In addition, both events clearly involved heavy audience participation and interjection. Shouts, slogans and questions were marked, suggesting that the actual events from which these documents emanated were rowdy affairs, militating against the smooth delivery of a single text. Indeed, according to Wu Di, Teng's more tumultuous confrontations with his audience sometimes descended into physical violence against him (see below).

There was the important issue of general context. In all four documents Teng was clearly stated as performing an 'examination' (*jiancha*). This draws on a history of CCP discipline, and was a genre that had a 40 year pedigree in the CCP.⁴⁷³ It was, in fact, one among several methods used by the CCP (including struggle sessions, mass criticism rallies, the writing of self-confessions). While some of these were adopted for use in the CR, they were not invented then but existed before. This had been well documented elsewhere.⁴⁷⁴ Yang Jiang, for instance, in her novel about the 1954 'four clear-ups' campaign (the first large-scale campaign waged against intellectuals after 1949) vividly described public meetings at which such examinations were

⁴⁷² The first 'confession' Teng seemed to have produced was a written 'examination' with Wu Tao and Li Shude while at the Ninth Party Congress on 19th April 1969, confessing to four types of mistakes (see Tumen and Zhu 1995, 236).

⁴⁷³ See Luk 1990, 217 for first use of self-criticisms in China in 1927.

⁴⁷⁴ The roots of struggle sessions in the rectification campaign in Yan'an carried out in 1942/3 was well documented in Apter and Saich 1994, especially 59-68 which deal with the anti-Wang Shiwei and Wang Ming campaign. These were prototypes of the later, larger scale CR sessions. Struggle sessions against the landlords were a common occurrence in the land reform campaign launched immediately after the Communists came to power in 1949. Thurston 1987 described these in Chapter Four of her study of the ordeal of intellectuals in the CR, paying particular attention to the mass-session against Wang Guangmei, the wife of Liu Shaoqi (121-124). Excerpts from Wang Guangmei's interrogation record are contained in Schoenhals 1996a, 101-116.

undertaken.⁴⁷⁵ The most striking feature of the CR version of such ‘examinations,’ however, was the frequency in which they descended into violence and the lack of safeguards from this. According to Wu Di, Teng was physically attacked at some of these meetings, by those he had caused so much suffering to. In one case, a mother simply handed her recently born child to him, and demanded that he rear it as the father had been killed in the IMPP purge.⁴⁷⁶

As in the geneology that gave rise to the specific cultures or power in the PRC, the history of confessions in CCP sheds light on these generic constraints in which Teng operated, and the ways in which certain styles of speaking were sanctioned and others excluded. Pamela Lubell’s study of the CR argues that both the CCP and Nationalist used the legal tradition of ‘confessions’ to demonstrate ‘generous leniency to the offender who confessed.’ This politicisation of the legal practice of confession also drew on ‘the Confucian approach to self-rectification.’ Confession, Lubell states, while becoming ‘increasing public and coercive in its twentieth century political culture... still... facilitated the demonstration of benevolence on the part of the ruling authority, placing the latter in an enhanced moral light.’⁴⁷⁷ Seen in this framework, Teng was renegotiating with the Centre, in a manner and language which it legitimised and recognised. He spoke with his own voice, but in an imposed convention which both dictated what he had to say and signified obedience to an outside authority.

Teng spoke, according to these documents, before two organisations. On the 18th June he went before the Hohhot Railway Bureau “Locomotive” Section (*Hutieju “huochetou”*).⁴⁷⁸ On the 23rd June he addressed the ‘Great Mao Zedong Thought School for the executive organs of IMAR’ (*Neimeng zhixin jiguan Mao Zedong sixiang da xuexiao*). The stencilled fragment was also from the Railway Bureau, though from an occasion four days before the full 23rd June version. The Railway Bureau was of particular significance to Teng, for it was from them that he had

⁴⁷⁵ Yang 1988. The second and third parts of this novel described several such struggle sessions, and the production of documents of self-criticism and confession by the participants.

⁴⁷⁶ Interview 17th April 2003.

⁴⁷⁷ Lubell 2002, 13-14.

⁴⁷⁸ Here locomotive was used in a metaphorical sense, as the ‘engine’ of revolution.

operated when he had first arrived in Hohhot. The Military District Headquarters, his natural base, actually refused to accept him.⁴⁷⁹ This special debt made his tone towards them familiar and close: 'Today, I have come to the Hohhot Railway Bureau to receive the criticism by the great mass of the proletarian revolutionary classes and the great revolutionary masses of my criticisms. This is a great lesson for me.'⁴⁸⁰ Both the printed complete self-criticisms were produced in the '801 News Report,' though one was issued by the Construction Department Eighth Bureau First Company Workers Union, and the other by the Construction Department Eighth Bureau First Company 'Jinggangshan' Alliance. Both of these versions were marked as restricted.

5.10 Starting to Say Sorry

The speech act which reveals the most about Teng's new power status was that of apologising. Apologising signified a new attitude to his audience, and reflected the fact that he was placed now in a context in which the value of his previous formal positions and the institutional support he appeared to have was replaced by one where had to speak on his own, without claiming to represent the Centre, or anyone else.

Teng began his criticism on the 18th June thus:

'Comrades! Today, with the most anguished feelings, I come to examine all of the mistakes I have made to the people of all national groups in IMAR. My mistakes are very serious, I am resolved to change my serious errors. Recently, the revolutionary masses have undertaken criticism towards me, in every banner, city, village and all other places. In the recent period, perhaps 30 times, the great revolutionary masses have undertaken criticism towards me. This is the greatest care and support of the great revolutionary masses towards the CRC, and it is also politically the greatest education for me, and the greatest good and help. I am grateful from the depths of my heart, warmly welcoming the criticism and help of these comrades. I am resolved after examination to continue going among the masses, receiving their criticism and help, using practical means to rectify my serious mistakes.'

⁴⁷⁹ Woody 1993, iv.

⁴⁸⁰ Doc 52, 1.

This was formulaic ('my serious mistakes,' 'I am resolved'). Proof can be found for how formulaic it was in the similar patterns of the opening of the examination on the 23rd June:

'Comrades! Today, with most anguished feelings, I come to examine the serious mistakes I have made to our comrades in the organisations under the Mao Zedong Thought Great School. My mistakes are extremely serious. In the recent spirit of the great revolutionary masses according to Chairman Mao's 22nd May Directive and the Centre towards IMAR's instructions, launching a mass movement to criticise Teng Haiqing's mistakes, the situation is very good. Recently, the IMAR Nucleus Small Group's members have regularly held meetings with comrades from all banners, towns and villages. The revolutionary masses have exposed and criticised me to my face. At the same time, I have been to several units, receiving the criticism of the masses towards me. The great revolutionary masses follow closely Chairman Mao's great strategy, and are resolutely implementing the instructions of the Centre. This shows the greatest care and support by the great revolutionary masses and the CRC. It is also the greatest political education for me, and the greatest good and help. Going through the experience of the great revolutionary masses recently has made me understand the seriousness of my mistakes. Two days ago in the evening I heard some of the cadres of our Great School expressing criticism of my mistakes. I am deeply grateful. I welcome the criticism and help of comrades. I am resolved to correct my mistakes according to the recent instructions from the Centre, going amongst the masses to receive their criticism and help, using practical means to rectify my serious mistakes.'

The common structures and phrases between these versions indicate a generic language of apology, something rehearsed and prepared. In both examinations, Teng was undertaking a 'performance,' performing the speech act of apology. In speech acts, the very act of saying something is taken as fulfilling what is said as long as it meets certain performative criterion. In promising something, for instance, the saying of a promise is itself the act of promising. A criterion for this, and for the speech act of apologising, is that it should be performed truthfully and with sincerity, and in an appropriate context (you can't apologise to someone you have done nothing wrong to). Promises or apologies which are false or insincere do not meet the performance criterion: both are better described as lies. Teng's admission of mistakes and the apology he offered in these two examinations do raise issues about the sort of speech act he was performing, and whether he had actually fulfilled the criterion for it. In this context, the performance of an 'apology' speech act was framed by expectations of how the apology should be said, to whom, and through

which language. Teng's apology was very structured and formulaic. When he talked in the first and second speech of having 'anguished feelings' he expressed this by the use of a saying (*chengyu*) that is to say, through a cliché – *wanfen chengtong*. And he apologised not to specific individuals, at this stage, but toward generalities – 'the great mass of people,' organisations and large entities.

The act that Teng was performing also signified something about the new situation in which he was placed, and its impact on how he could exercise power and authority. Like a judge declaring a sentence, but this being meaningful only when there are institutions to implement this sentence, Teng's previous discourse had been possible in a context in which he occupied formal positions of authority in IMAR, where the Centre's support for him was clearly signified, and this served to legitimise his authority. This illustrates the importance of social context in both creating and supporting the authority claims in discourse. In the new situation, Teng's words had no illocutionary force because this context had been removed. He could no longer speak as the head of anything, but only as an individual who had made mistakes.

Teng's 'apology' was an act of negotiation as much as one of contrition. He was performing to two audiences – the Centre, to whom he needed to demonstrate obedience, and to negotiate forgiveness to maintain his capital with them, and the local audience, to whom he had to act as the main fall guy for the recent failed campaign, accepting blame on behalf of the Centre without giving the impression he was apologising in their place for mistakes their instructions had inspired. Teng's apology functioned as part of a negotiation with these two separate parties. In both cases, it was to perform damage limitation – to admit mistakes as far as possible, but not in such a way that the credibility of the Centre was challenged, and to maintain the best chance of Teng emerging from the process still able to work for the Centre. His apology was not an abnegation of power – a removal and disassociation from it. In fact, Teng's apology was an act to manage the destruction and damage that the previous failed paradigms and narratives had led to.

While using a personal voice, Teng was not speaking as an individual. He did refer to his history in IMAR, to when he came, and to the narrative of the new post-Ninth

Congress CR. But this history was conveyed through public events. It could not be seen as a personal one, sponsored by an individual voice: 'I came to IMAR on the 18th April 1967, for two years I have not worked well, especially after November 1968,' he stated on the 18th June. In the new narrative Teng attempted to create he admitted misinterpreting the situation in IMAR: 'I started to believe that the most serious animosity came partly from the Manchurian period (*weiman shidai*), partly from the Mengjiang⁴⁸¹ period... and partly from Ulanfu's small clique opposing the Party.⁴⁸² I put all these parts together, and believed that there were many enemies.'⁴⁸³ In the final part of both his examinations he took responsibility for these mistakes and the impact that they had in IMAR. The interventions of the audience made Teng more precise about his accountability: 'I wish to admit my crimes to Chairman Mao, and to the great mass of the people. I have let down (*duibuqi*) the people, and let down Chairman Mao.'

The keywords in Teng's speeches for the admission of culpability were 'mistake' (*cuowu*), 'crime' (*zui*) and the associated 'confess/own up to having committed a crime' (*renzui* or *qingzui*), 'letting down' (*duibuqi*) and 'sorry' (*baoqian*). The final term, 'sorry,' is the one that depends most on an individual performing the speech act in a specific context to be meaningful. At one stage on the 23rd June, Teng directly apologised to Gao Jinming. On the 18th June, towards the end of his examination, he offered a series of personal apologies to named comrades in specific work units, in a highly formal manner - '*zengli daoqian*.' Such apologies to specific individuals culminated in the final apology: 'I have let down the rebellious factions of IMAR, I say to the revolutionary groups of the whole region I am most deeply sorry.'

But what did Teng say he was apologising to these people and groups for? In the third person attacks on him referred to above, he was accused of opposing the Centre, creating his own power base in IMAR, promulgating violence, implementing

⁴⁸¹ A reference to the Japanese label imposed on Prince De Wang's Mongolian Borderland Administration in the 1930s and 1940s.

⁴⁸² All oblique references to periods when parts of IMAR aspired to independence (though in Ulanfu's case, this was an accusation unique to the CR).

⁴⁸³ Doc 51, 24th June, 2.

policies in the 'Party rectification' campaign that targeted minority cadres. On 23rd June, Teng stated that his crimes were:

'Destroying the three unities of the revolution, and the great unity of the revolution, destroying the relations between nationality groups, and between the army and the people, the cadres and the masses, upsetting the great measures of Chairman Mao, pushing back the process of struggle, criticism and change in IMAR, seriously influencing the productivity of agriculture, grasslands, and industry.'⁴⁸⁴

He went on to talk of the impact of his administration in the areas of rail transport, and the production of food and power. Such failure to succeed in practical areas was due, in Teng's own words (and here there was unity between what he said, and the accusations contained in other material against him) to his refusal to obey the instructions of the Centre: 'The things that I wanted to disseminate [from the Centre] I did so, and those that I didn't want to, I didn't.'⁴⁸⁵ The key act that Teng had committed was to 'disobey' (*weifan*) the Centre and Chairman Mao: 'Previously I had run counter to Chairman Mao's teaching, I didn't seek evidence [in accusing people of being IMPP] but just wanted verbal admissions (*kougong*).' During interrogation later Teng repeated that 'I have violated Mao Zedong Thought, I have not done things according to Chairman Mao's instructions.'⁴⁸⁶ In this way, Teng had 'cheated' the people.⁴⁸⁷

Teng admitted earlier in this examination that he had not understood or appraised the situation in IMAR properly: 'Under the development of my "leftist" tendency thinking, I believed that the "Party rectification" campaign in IMAR had not been done thoroughly, that it needed to continue, from the beginning of the "Party rectification" campaign, I continuously opposed rightism.'⁴⁸⁸ At the end of 1968, Teng stated that he had been given material showing that the IMPP had 60 sections, and 12 party committees. 'I believed this,' he said, 'but in fact this material was all extracted under pressure and torture.'⁴⁸⁹ It was this issue of the physical suffering of

⁴⁸⁴ Doc 51, 26th July, 11.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid 8.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid 7.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid 5.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid 2.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid 2.

the Party members and others in IMAR accused of being IMPP which most aroused the audience's anger. Teng's breaching of his responsibility for this, and his apology, along with any explanation for its causes, is worth quoting at length:

'All of the people of IMAR, all of the cadres, love Chairman Mao, are faithful to him, faithful to his Thought, and limitlessly love Chairman Mao's line. The sky of IMAR is Chairman Mao's sky, the earth is the earth of his Thought. Because of the mistake of my serious "leftist" tendencies the feelings and trust of the great mass of the people of IMAR towards Chairman Mao has been shaken. This evil is very serious. Because of this mistake, many of our cadres have suffered. We still don't have a final figure. If we say in the whole region that 100,000 people have suffered from being dug up as IMPP, that is still 100,000 people. If there are five people in each household [these victims come from], it doesn't matter if we say we've dug 100,000, 200,000, several hundred thousand, this isn't a problem of giving or taking a few hundred thousand, this is thousands of people politically being struck, with their families, their children, their relatives, all of them receiving political damage. This destroys the relations between national groups, and relationship of those above and below. For this crime you can't use figures and numbers, or economics, no numbers can reflect it. The most serious thing is that, of our national minority cadres, in some work units 80% of these have been labelled IMPP, and in some others 100%. And there are others that say that our great leader Chairman Mao is not the leader of the Mongolians, [that] the leader of the Mongolians is Ulanfu. This completely slanders our national minorities and the great revolutionary mass of the Mongolians.'⁴⁹⁰

Teng's new discourse allowed public admission that Mongolians had suffered in the CR, but control was still signified over this deeply sensitive part of the discourse by the failure to articulate reasons for why they had suffered. The Centre's policy of 'unity' between all groups was still asserted as paramount, its value unaffected by the recent events in IMAR waged to defend the same concept of unity. Teng's 'apology' was a political act, connected as much to the promotion of central interests in the IMAR as had his previous prescriptive language. It was an act to control the accepted bounds of discourse, and then negotiate. He admitted to this situation in IMAR being caused by 'my leftist tendencies.' But he did not go beyond this. Even the audience's goading did not prompt him to ask what 'specific' feature of IMAR he had so badly misunderstood. As in previous terms of discourse used in the CR in IMAR, his apology was aimed at foreclosing certain lines of enquiry and blocking others off. His prime objective, as in many apologies, was to appease the receiver,

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid 3.

the audience, to satisfy at least their most urgent needs for rectification, so that their anger did not push the movement in directions that were not desired. His role was that of a scapegoat, and his activity still to deliver control – to control the discourse of anger and attrition so that it did not stray towards the most sensitive sources of grievance and hurt.

5.11 The Audience

Prime evidence of the new political context Teng spoke in was the greater awareness of an audience, signified by the other voices, attempting to break into his, to hold him accountable in his examination, and of his needing to report and answer to these external questions. He no longer employed the monologue of authority attempted in the previous period where he had institutional and organisational support to speak within, but was open to the voices of others entering his discourse and effecting and dictating its terms.

There was no indication in either record of the number of people Teng was speaking too, nor are any of the questioners named. On both occasions they were marked merely as 'the masses.' Also on both occasions, their interjections occurred almost halfway into Teng's own words. This indicated that at least at the beginning, the format of these meetings meant that Teng was not prompted by directed questions, but had the responsibility to present his case. In both versions, there were indications of slogans, and other impromptu interruptions. In talking about Gao Jinming, Teng stated:

'I believed that in criticising Ulanfu, Gao was looking to bolster his own position, and that he was aiming the arrow at me, at me myself. (Slogans: Teng Haiqing making false accusations against the revolutionary cadres has completely failed to stick. Old Teng has got to admit his crimes to Chairman Mao, we will definitely not let Old Teng slip away. If Old Teng doesn't surrender then we'll call for his death).'⁴⁹¹

⁴⁹¹ Doc 51, 26th July, 5.

Such impromptu expressions of anger were unmarked, and stand against the evidently more planned questions that the examination started with when Teng's main presentation had terminated.

In terms of what participation was allowed, both examinations were different. The audience on the 18th June was more restive. Their first interjection occurred at the point (which Teng also mentioned on 23rd June) where Teng said he believed there were 60 sections of IMPP in IMAR, and 12 party committees (see section above). 'What evidence did you have for this?' they asked (their contribution was marked as 'interjected' (*chashuo*)). But Teng did not relinquish control: 'Wait till I've finished speaking.' The tone of the first lengthy exchange was equally negative:

'Question interjected: How many died after being labelled as IMPP in IMAR?

Teng: I don't know. There's no way of estimating this.

(Audience slogans).

Question interjected: Was there any evidence for IMPP?

Teng: The IMPP was a small secret organisation, I made that clear just now.

Question: You made this clear? So what organisations were under IMPP? How many? Where?

Teng: I don't understand, Comrades, please forgive me.

(Audience slogans).

Teng: I want to continue making things clear.

Question: Tell us clearly, how big was IMPP?

Teng: The excesses I've committed were because I didn't see this organisation's size clearly. If I had then I wouldn't have made this mistake.

Question: How long were you digging up IMPP in IMAR?

Teng: From November 1967, about a year.

Question: How many did you dig up, and how many were interrogated to death?

Teng: I'm not sure.

Question: Are you making a joke at the expense of the 13 million people of IMAR?

Teng: I'm guilty of this...

Question: At the same time, why don't you set out to the masses the situation of the IMPP?

Teng: I still haven't grasped how many were dug, how many died...

Question: You said the high level organisations of IMPP have basically been destroyed, you did say this didn't you?

Teng: I said that, the main thing was 60 sections, 12 party committees being destroyed, that's what I said.

Question: So say once more, was there or wasn't there an IMPP?

Teng: Today I've no way to answer that question speaking for my own part.

Question: You've got to explain all this clearly about a secret organisation.

Teng: I'm unable to.

Audience: This isn't a sincere examination you're making. Your attitude to the 13 million people of the whole region is dishonest. Teng wants to slip away. Let's temporarily halt his examination, and let the persecuted speak.⁴⁹²

As in the attack on Ulanfu, the function of questions was to assert rather than enquire. Teng still had some ability (and inclination) to obstruct the lines of enquiry directed at him simply by asserting either that he did not know, or did not wish to answer. Trying to negotiate with the audience, or their speaking representatives, with a 'please forgive me' (here using *yuanliang* rather than *daoqian*) was evidently not successful. Teng's 'performance' on this occasion was judged 'insincere,' not 'from the heart' (*chengxin chengyi*). This indicated awareness, at least among some of the audience, that they were not in fact being offered an 'apology' on the terms they wanted it, and indeed were unlikely to get one.

On 23rd June, Teng declared that he felt 'very close to the comrades criticising him,' and that many were those who had received persecution.⁴⁹³ On this occasion, while the audience interrogation that was recorded was shorter than that on the 18th June, the tone was still prescriptive and firm: 'You must answer,' the interrogator/audience demanded.⁴⁹⁴ The audience also repeatedly insisted that Teng answer the specific questions put to him, and answer them 'frankly' (*zhengmian*).⁴⁹⁵ The interjection of the audience at this point showed the competing purposes between them and Teng.

The fact that Teng was now speaking in a new context, in which he needed to react more to the audience, and enter into dialogue with them was reflected in the ability of the questioners to frame some of the terms of his discourse. This is clear in the different structures of each examination. In both, they open with Teng's univocal presentation, according to a generic template. But in each case the audience reacted slightly differently, meaning that the shape and form of Teng's full examination differed.

⁴⁹² Doc 51, 26th July, 2.

⁴⁹³ Ibid 7.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid 7.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid 8.

This was most evident in the final apology that Teng offered in each examination. On the 18th June his apology was finally to specific individuals and groups – to named entities – to people of the IM Teachers College like Ding Keming, to all the ‘revolutionary rebellious factions in the region,’ to the ‘workers propaganda groups’ and the ‘army propaganda groups’ (*junxuandui*), culminating in an apology to ‘the IMAR proletarian revolutionary factions,’ and to the ‘great masses of the IMAR revolutionary factions, and to the rebels of IMAR.’⁴⁹⁶ The final arbiter in this hierarchy of power was the ‘13 million people of IMAR,’ to whom he ‘acknowledges mistakes, and admits culpability’ (*ditou renzui*).⁴⁹⁷ The apology on 23rd June was more in terms of the acts that Teng accused himself of committing:

‘The evil consequences of the mistakes I have committed... have destroyed the three unities of the revolution, and the great unity of the revolutionary masses, destroyed the unity between national minorities, and between the army and the government, and the cadres and people, disturbing the great strategy and measures of Chairman Mao, setting back the criticism, struggle and reform process in IMAR, seriously influencing agricultural and industrial productivity...’⁴⁹⁸

In this later examination, there were no lists of people to whom Teng specifically addressed apologies. He spoke instead to groups: ‘My mistakes have struck (*daju*) the revolutionary cadres, struck the poor and middle peasants, struck the poor and middle herdsmen, struck workers, struck Red Guards, pressured these comrades, struck them politically and spiritually, damaging them, physically harming them...’⁴⁹⁹ This was an admission of responsibility, but it was not an apology. In the fragment from 14th June, Teng’s apology was almost immediate, and to the ‘class brothers’ (*jieji xiongdi*) who Teng called ‘his own’: ‘I have let down these comrades, let down Chairman Mao, let down the 13 million people of IMAR, let down the revolutionary people.’⁵⁰⁰

Perhaps this was because Teng was before an audience he could feel were more hostile to him, and to whom he had to display more humility – to whom, in a sense,

⁴⁹⁶ Doc 51, 24th June, 11-12.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid 12.

⁴⁹⁸ Doc 51, 26th July 11.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid 11.

⁵⁰⁰ Doc 52, 2.

from the beginning he had to negotiate, by using a more submissive tone and manner. But there were still vestiges of Teng's older prescriptive and authoritative registers in his examinations. On the 23rd June, Teng slipped into command mode: 'No matter which comrades, they should do things in IMAR according to the great leader Chairman Mao's "22nd May Notice," and the instructions from the Centre about how to do work in IMAR.'⁵⁰¹ This 'command' culminated in the need to 'criticise Teng Haiqing's mistakes,' the 'heart at the heart of the "24 Character Directive."'

The disruptions and interruptions in these examinations showed the dynamics between Teng's voice and the people he spoke to. Teng may have been apologising but he was still talking on behalf of, and with the protection, of larger powers – those at the Centre, who had sent him to this place about which he knew almost nothing, and to whom he had constantly answered. His apology was part of a process which had been ongoing since the start of the CR – how to handle the problem of IMAR, how to manage and control it according to the template given by the Centre. His failure to indicate any recognition of the unique ethnic element in IMAR showed his discourse excluding the thing that was most important.

This element was not only excluded by him but also by the audience. In Teng's examination, the audience never pressed him on it. Their questions concerned numbers, whether there was or was not an IMPP, but it never got close to the deeper question of why this movement against a 'counter-party' should have effected so many Mongolians. The main function of his apology therefore was to ensure that the specific power structures he had worked on behalf of were not affected or damaged by the ill advised policy that had been implemented in IMAR since 1967 and the Centre's main interventions. His apology was structured to maintain the very forces and ideas for which, ostensibly, he was apologising. His reward was to be taken from IMAR at the end of 1969, to undergo a process of re-education in Tangshan, Hebei, and be posted to Jinan, northeast China from 1975 to 1980 as Deputy Military Commander. By 1980 however his position was untenable (due to the trials of others, particularly the Gang of Four implicated in the CR) and he retired. He was

⁵⁰¹ Doc 51, 26th July, 5.

never formally held accountable for what had occurred in IMAR during his tenure there, and was spared a trial due to his impeccable credentials before 1967, and protection from the Centre.

5.12 The Use of Teng's Apology

Teng's apology had symbolic power and value, and could be used in the campaign. His participation in his own criticism was also of great symbolic importance. On the 17th July, one of the key organisations before whom Teng had already performed examinations, the Railway Bureau, produced a joint issue of the 'Great Criticism Battle Report' and 'Workers Information' entitled '50 Problems – in Response to Comrade Teng Haiqing's Examination of the 24th June.' This was with the Hohhot Workers Union.⁵⁰²

The opening section of this ten page document made clear that however thoroughly Teng may have been fulfilling his duty to offer examinations, there was dissatisfaction with what he had said and the manner he had said it. This specific document was the result of an examination carried out at 4:00 PM on the 24th June (a day after the second of the two examinations analysed above). This had been before University and school students (they are described as 'school masses' – *xuexiao qunzhong*). It is recognised that Teng had been performing such criticisms for over a month, as a result of the interventions of the Centre after the Ninth Party Congress. But he had needed to do this so often because he 'ignored (*wushi*) the instructions of our Great Leader Chairman Mao about IMAR's problem, he did not see the many criticisms the leaders from the Centre had issued of his mistakes, he did not see the serious criticisms the revolutionary masses of IMAR had made of his mistakes.'⁵⁰³ In the end, the authors of this document stated, the key problem for Teng was 'his attitude (*taidu*) towards Chairman Mao, towards the Centre, and towards the revolutionary masses.' This was at the heart of the mistakes he had made, and continued to make in failing to undertake correct examinations. The authors had faith that the process of criticism would be successful. Teng was no longer the issuer

⁵⁰² Doc 56.

⁵⁰³ Ibid 1.

of commands, and demands for enactment, but the subject of patient processes of correction upon which he was being operated – Foucauldian regimes of correction: ‘Teng can certainly be educated, certainly his soul can be touched, he is able to do a full examination.’ But until this point the audience had been ‘disappointed.’

In this document, criteria were set out for what might constitute a successful examination. The Centre had already presented these in asking for an ‘honest, sincere and reformed attitude’ (*laoshi... gaihao de taidu*). The critical issue was again one of ‘manner,’ the way in which Teng expressed his mental attitude through the performance in public of the examination, and the way in which this was interpreted and read. At the heart of this was the notion of ‘sincerity,’ of him adequately meaning what he said and the audience recognizing it. Teng had, according to this document, failed to do this.

The means by which Teng was assisted towards proper examination, and the corrections it would bring about, was through questions. The function of questions in this document firstly revealed the lacunae in Teng’s previous words through interrogation, through locating the spaces and gaps left in what he had already said. It is not clear from this document what its practical function was. As it referred to a previous examination Teng had undertaken, rather than one being prepared, it was not specifically made as material to be used against Teng at a future examination. Nor was it clear how Teng was supposed to have replied to these questions. The final sentence however, does infer that Teng was meant to respond or react to the questions in some way: ‘Comrade Teng must soon issue an honest, heartfelt, and conscientious answer.’⁵⁰⁴ As in material analysed in previous chapters, the function of the questions was sometimes not to elicit answers, but to expose, denounce, be noted. The document can be seen as part of an ongoing process, a movement of interrogation, declaring and propagating the new forms of knowledge that had been created since the the Ninth Congress.

This was reflected in the various ways the questions were framed, and in the categories into which they were placed. While the opening introductory section of

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid 10

the document set the context, and was in the third person, referring merely to Teng, the questions were all issued to 'you' [Teng] and, where issuers were mentioned, indicated as coming from 'us' or 'we' (*women*). Some of the questions were framed with courtesy - 'please answer' (*qing huida*). But others were issued as 'imperatives' – you 'must answer' (*bixu huida*). A further category was the simple 'do you or don't you' (*shi bu shi*) either/or dichotomy. And the least used formulation – to 'beg' (*qiu*) Teng to reply, with its shades (possibly sardonic) of submissiveness. What expectations did the framers of these questions have about the answers they were likely to hear? Questions for instance of simple fact, such as those asking how many died or were wounded in the 'Party rectification' campaign could, theoretically, have a simple numerical reply (however difficult it was to assess this, or unlikely Teng was to admit to a figure). But the question about 'what in fact are your feelings to Chairman Mao' touched the rawest of nerves, and were issued as a denunciation in the form of a question. Any likely response was necessarily complicated, and needed to be carefully framed.

The categories into which the questions were placed were also indicative. These were:

1. Attitude towards Chairman Mao, and towards the proletarian headquarters.
2. Concerning the IMPP problem.
3. Concerning the problem of Gao Jinming.
4. Concerning the Fourth Plenary Session of the IMAR CRC.
5. Concerning other comrades.
6. Concerning the handling of the revolutionary rebellious factions.
7. On 'unity' and 'democracy.'

The issue of the Centre and obeisance to its symbolic power was placed at the front. Teng's key crime was to 'oppose' (*duikang*) these various representations of the hegemony of the Centre: Chairman Mao, the proletarian workers headquarters, the revolutionary path of Chairman Mao.⁵⁰⁵ For this crime, Teng 'must admit culpability.' A manifestation of this was his distortion of the Centre's language, his

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid 1.

failure to disseminate instructions properly, or to do so selectively.⁵⁰⁶ As with Ulanfu, Teng's words were deployed against him, cited as indicating 'his attitude towards the Centre.'⁵⁰⁷ His words were brought against Mao's and the Centre's, offered as samples of a now discredited and outlawed counter-discourse.⁵⁰⁸ This tension was distilled in the formulation: 'We want to ask, does the word of the Centre and of Chairman Mao count, or does your word count?' The concept of 'count' (*suan*) is difficult to translate well outside the context of PRC political culture. It is close to the idea of what someone says going, who has authority and whose capital is recognised within a system. A question towards Teng in this context was motivated by exposing his own ambition: 'Does the Centre and Chairman Mao lead you, or you lead the Centre?'⁵⁰⁹ The value of Teng's authority was no longer recognised; his capital was exhausted.

The issue of the meaning of the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the IMAR CRC only served to highlight that part of the objective of these questions was to promote the new narrative, one in which Gao Jinming was no longer a villain or a counter-revolutionary, but had been 'rectified,' and in which the Fourth Plenary was the ultimate expression of Teng's errors and ambition. The questions were based on an understanding of the 'real situation.' Teng had failed to disseminate the Centre's narrative of criticising the February Counter-Current of 1968, and implementing the newly open criticism of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping.⁵¹⁰ In the newly promoted history, previously discredited figures like Gao Jinming and those around him were now returned to public discourse as acceptable.

As though to compound the radical reversal in Teng's function in this new narrative, the authors of the document referred approvingly to Teng's admission of 'supporting some groups and suppressing others' (*zhi yi pai, ya yi pai*):⁵¹¹ 'This is some progress.' What was expected from Teng was 'honesty, sincerity,' according to the criterion in the new narrative. His 'attitude' or 'bearing' was no longer that of issuer

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid 2.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid 3.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid 4.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid 4.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid 6.

⁵¹¹ Ibid 8.

or commander, but object of criticism and correction – a new model of wrongness and how to rectify it. Both in the act of being able to question, and the kinds of questions asked, this document was evidence of the new power dynamics in IMAR. Such questions indicated the power to interrogate and question (and therefore doubt and denounce) those who were previously unavailable for treatment like this.

5.13 Teng's Final Words

In their section dealing with the 'Problem of Other Comrades' the authors of the '50 Questions' for Teng had asked why Teng had stayed so close to certain other local leaders like Wu Tao, and why he had issued documents collectively, in his and their name, even while it was clear he was working against them, and allowing them to be publicly accused of being criminals and 'issuers of poison.'⁵¹²

As an individual, Teng may have had some strategy behind the apologies and admissions of guilt he was performing, beyond the commands from the Centre and local pressure. In this case, possibly it was to stay close to these other leaders in order to share blame, and for a measure of protection. Part of the new tone that Teng had to adopt can be seen in a letter issued on the 31st October 1969, with Wu Tao, to Gao Jinming:

'Jingming... Please could you tell the proletarian revolutionary faction comrades of Hohhot that, under the heroic leadership of the proletarian headquarters by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin, the CR in IMAR has achieved great success, although in the recent brief period a few shortfalls and mistakes have occurred on the practical work front. But the main current is good. The responsibility for this is ours, we can't blame all of this on the comrades.... The criticism of us by comrades [shows] great love and help. We are grateful from our hearts. We have heard that "big character posters" are being stuck along the streets in Hohhot. We hope that comrades will not do this, because in this way it can be used by class enemies. [If] you have opinions about us, you can write "big character posters" and send them to the IMAR CRC Office. Comrades, please don't worry (*fanxin*). If we have [committed] mistakes, then we will be able to correct them. Let every one unite, and fight against the common enemy.'⁵¹³

⁵¹² Ibid 7.

⁵¹³ Doc 59.

There were signifiers of respect, even for issuing of 'requests' or orders in this letter: 'Please could you tell...We hope... Please don't worry.' The tone Teng and Wu used was a submissive one. These were not demands, but requests, to be accepted or rejected. They had minimal prescriptive force. This was compounded by the absolute acceptance of the 'love and help' of the comrades and their criticisms. The only negotiation was to look towards 'common enemies' to whom 'we' should give no advantages. Here Teng and Wu's tone searched for a commonality with those they were addressing, some grounds on which to base 'unity,' marked in the last sentence. Teng no longer issued 'notices,' 'instructions,' but a 'letter,' to another 'comrade.' Teng and Wu Tao, in this document, had become 'two comrades,' addressing another 'comrade,' ostensibly in an atmosphere of parity.

Teng's capital in IMAR was almost exhausted. Whatever purpose it had served sending him to the region had evidently not worked. After the partitioning of IMAR, and its reduction in size in July 1969, the PLA 65th Corps from the Beijing Military Region was sent to assume control of what was left of the region on 19th December. From this date, Lieutenant General Zheng Weishan, based in Hohhot, was in control of the military and civilian government of the region. Teng and the previous leaders (including Wu Tao and Gao Jinming) were sent to Hebei. Teng's involvement with IMAR was over.

5.14 The Dominant Register: Submissiveness

As it proceeded the CR created its own narrative. Power interests and objectives in the CR changed. There was a dialectic between the policies and discourse of management from the Centre, and the implementation of these and how events unfolded in IMAR. The key factor was the various strategies used from 1967 to 'handle' the situation in IMAR according to the Centre's objectives, and within the parameters of its ideology. April 1969 was a landmark in signalling a paradigm change in which a previous strategy of management was abandoned and new one sanctioned and supplemented.

In terms of discourse this is signified by the fact that the dominant register of documents from May 1967 to April 1969, was one of prescription, command, and denunciation. In this language, power was clearly marked. After 1969, there was space for apologies, admissions of mistakes and guilt, but only through the mediated voice of Teng. There was space for the voices of those who had been silent hitherto – marked as enemies and criminals.

The tone of submissiveness also extended into the voices of those ostensibly being aided by the 'Party rectification' campaign. Gao Jinming, at a meeting on the 12th June 1969 before 'seven leagues and two cities,' speaking still as a formal position-holder on the IMAR CRC, concluded his words with the hope that the delegates 'can forgive us, and help us.' 'If you agree with this idea [of organising further meetings to discuss the mistakes that had been committed] we will arrange it, setting a specific time.'⁵¹⁴ Wu Tao said to a Zhemeng League delegation on 30th June, 1969: 'Firstly, to the wounded, to those in their families, we offer comfort... To those wounded, we express our apologies. We accept the criticism and education from our comrades.'⁵¹⁵ Wu Tao demonstrated the closeness of the wounded, of those who had been harmed, to the speakers: 'The wounded are our own brothers and sisters. They are our mothers and fathers, and our daughters and sons.'⁵¹⁶ This signified a closing of the distance between those speaking in positions of power and those people they were addressing by the use of a more 'intimate' register.

At the heart of this however was the same promotion of a notion of commonality and common interests, with a unified language and symbols to convey this, as had ostensibly been behind the attack on Ulanfu and the IMPP. An attack on Teng from the 29th May combined these well when, after the initial declaration of the goodness of the situation of the CR in IMAR, and the victory of the spirit of the Ninth Congress, the authors adopted the collective language of deference and submission to the Centre: 'Let us together wish our dearest dearest great leader Chairman Mao a

⁵¹⁴ Doc 49, 28th June 1969, 7.

⁵¹⁵ Doc 55, 1.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid 3.

long and healthy life, a long and healthy life... Let us cry together: Long life to Chairman Mao! A long, long life to Chairman Mao!’⁵¹⁷

A key objective of the CR from the issuing of the ‘24 Character Directive’ had been to ‘create unity’ (*tuanjie yizhi*). The process of correction was aimed at supporting this policy. Unity could be found by appealing to the grand symbols of Mao, and the Centre. But it had to be rooted in addressing the common grievances of the audience, and in offering them appeasement. One of the central objectives of this part of the campaign, therefore, was to reassert, and reconvey, a concept of unity through a common language, a unity which the previous stages of the CR in IMAR had also been aimed at supporting, but which had evidently failed. The trick for the new stage of the CR was to re-assert the importance of the same unity, in unified language, even though in fact this differed from what had been promoted previously.

5.15 Conclusion: Saying Sorry and Staying in Power

In this final stage of the CR campaign in IMAR, the language used indicated a dramatic shift from the exercise of power through categorical statement and prescription to the strategic use of submissiveness, admissions of guilt and mistakes. In this new context, there was a new market of forces, new values and priorities, with the symbolic capital and credibility of certain figures like Teng re-evaluated, and their rights to use certain kinds of language removed. This was paralleled by the creation of a further, new raft of organisations and institutions, parasitical in their turn on those created earlier in the CR, but now working in the new narrative to attack Teng.

This new stage of the CR discourse reveals one thing: that while there could be flexibility about certain figures and their values, the primary areas maintained their value. In the new discourse, the symbolic capital of Mao, and the Centre, was not up for negotiation, and remained the dominant currency. The most sensitive areas (of ethnicity and nationality) were left untouched in this discourse. A new narrative accommodating Mongolian grievances was structured in such a way that while there

⁵¹⁷ Doc 49, 1.

were open admissions of Mongolian casualties, this was not imputed to the Centre's policies asserting the hegemony of class over national minorities.

Underlying Teng's apology was the importance of maintaining this credibility of the Centre. His performance was more in the nature of a sacrifice, on behalf of the larger powers who he served. The voice of one of these, Kang Sheng, when he met with the IMAR group during the Ninth Party Congress on 7th April made this clear: 'I have not seen you for two years...I am not clear about the situation in IMAR.' But the Centre had one proclamation to make through Kang:

'The class struggle and "Party rectification" in IMAR has been successful, it's the main current, and is good. But we need to understand, Chairman Mao has taught us, never to forget class struggle. We need to do class struggle properly, we need to grasp policy. Policy is the fate of the Party. If we don't grasp policy, we can't do things thoroughly, things become chaotic. The majority of Mongolians in IMAR are good. Spies, Mongolian traitors, the landlords, rich, counter-revolutionaries and bad are the minority... You need to have faith that the majority of Mongolian cadres are good, or relatively good. You don't need to say every time a Mongolian cadre makes a mistake it means they are IMPP... That's impossible, impossible.'⁵¹⁸

In the end, this was a sentence upon Teng, the indication of removal of support. The Centre was now the supporter of moderation, fairness to all national minority groups. And Teng, from being the chief prosecutor, had become a new type of enemy.

⁵¹⁸ Doc 51, 29th July 1969, 5.

Conclusion

Michel Foucault stated that power was something performed rather than achieved:

'I am not referring to power with a capital P, dominating and imposing its rationality upon the totality of the social body. In fact, there are power relations, they are multiple. They have different forms.'⁵¹⁹

Foucault's conceptualisation of power captures two things: that power is a force rather than an entity, which emanates from disparate centres, and that it is negotiated. Analytically, his framing of the keyword power also brings to the fore the need to plot the ways in which power is visible, and how it can be located and described.

Discourse is both the signifier and the carrier of power - discourse understood in this thesis not just as the language in documents recording speech and written communication of individuals and groups, but the institutional, organisational and social context in which language is created, deployed, enacted, and structured. Such a framework acknowledges that discourse is activity – that language and the utterance of language is action, and one of the main means to promote, negotiate and signify relations of power.

The environment of the CR was a highly politicised one – and one in which the issue of power was central. But as Foucault noted, such power, while initially seeming highly centralised and stratified, was in fact dispersed. There was a constant process of bodies, groups, and individuals competing for power, power delivered through control of vocabulary, ideology and narratives. The process of the CR saw various authority paradigms – powers rather than Power, as Foucault said – manifested and signified in variant ways. Bourdieu's metaphor of the market has been a useful way to tease out this phenomenon of competing power forms and languages, and the processes of legitimisation they underwent to gain social acceptance. The establishment of institutional structures, organisations and their associated discourses also impacts on the creation of forms of knowledge, and how these relate

⁵¹⁹ Quoted in Mills 2003, 35.

to power. The CR saw the legitimisation of certain ways of knowing, sanctioned revolutionary experiences, and narratives, providing the grand frameworks within which things were meaningful and 'known.'

Analysis of discourse has occurred through looking at the cultural superstructure and the material manifestations of this. I have looked at ideology, the processes by which an ideology gains dominance. How it is manifested and carried through certain legitimised language structures and how they deliver hegemony – the promotion and acceptance, in Gramsci's terms, of consensus and audience buy-in.

The power situation in IMAR distilled these general themes. It involved the negotiations for influence in the region between a political power centre in Beijing, itself undergoing transformation and change, and local parties. In terms of the CR in IMAR's own narrative, the main issue from 1967 to 1969 was the management of the conflict between the Centre's assertion of the hegemony of the ideology of class, and the framing of a counter-ideology in the region based on the hegemony of nationality/ethnicity. This created the parameters within which the CR in IMAR moved. Power based on class was promoted in the Centre's discourse as bringing unity and strength. Power based on ethnicity/nationality was excluded on the grounds that it was divisive. Accompanying this was the parallel process of asserting a narrative which followed the national template, of IMAR's being liberated in 1949 from a history in which exploitation based on class had existed, in opposition to what was framed as a local counter-narrative based on nationality and splittism. There was also a process of trying to make ideologies or narratives contrary to these dominant ones unsayable, or socially so dangerous or taboo to say that they could only be hinted at indirectly. The fact, for instance, that the very issue of the conflict between class and nationality/ethnicity was only articulated indirectly in the key '13th April Decision,' then more fully articulated in the attack on Ulanfu, but largely dropped from sight in the language used by Teng Haiqing, signified a process of management by exclusion.

Material control of these areas of ideology and narrative delivered several key areas:

- 1) Throughout the CR in IMAR, there was a process of attempts to control the discourse through conveying specific meanings to keywords like 'liberation', 'justice', 'right', 'people.' Moral vocabularies of 'right' and 'wrong', and good and bad actions were contested and negotiated. A nomenclature of class, localized and grounded in acceptance of the Centre's ideology delivered control of the description and labelling of participants, and thus framed their identity. The articulation of an enemy, and the creation of knowledge of that enemy through the attack on Ulanfu and then the IMPP assisted in a program of exclusion and dominance.
- 2) There was contestation over the symbolic capital of particular figures, and the authority they were seen as conveying – specifically the immense capital of Mao and what he symbolized (the legitimate and legitimising source of power). Ulanfu, and other local figures, were ranged against this and set up in competition to them. Mao's power was signified in the discourse by the use of specific centrally sanctioned descriptions, slogans and set phrases.
- 3) There was clearly signified rights to use certain discourses (and at the same time be empowered by these discourses) while in power, and the withdrawal of this after falling from power. The career of Teng Haiqing illustrates this. When 'in power,' and authorized, he was able to use prescriptive language, signifying his speaking on behalf of the Centre. In the period after his fall from power his language was dominated by apologies, self-criticisms, and the highly political use of 'sorry' to negotiate both with the Centre, and the audience. He had lost his right to speak prescriptively.
- 4) The role of the symbolic capital of organizations and their material ability to produce documents, recruit people, gain status, and have the right to issue 'authority' language, and give authority to the people speaking to and in them.

The impact of the ideological and narrative superstructure from the Centre, and its being a means of conveying and promoting forms of power through specific empowering discourses in IMAR has been tracked during the key phases through

looking at the elements set out above in the detail of the documents. Power was a process involving the pursuit of variant objectives by different and evolving organizations and groups in these documents, the progress of which created its own internal narrative. There was initially a dominant discourse of the CR from the Centre, based on the political priorities there – national unity around an ideology of ‘correct’ Marxism-Leninism against the reactionary ‘rightists’ who were viewed as the enemies betraying the true course of the revolution. But this discourse, with its slogans from the Centre, its organizational support, the narrative of history it promoted, and the figures it sought authorization and legitimacy from, was adapted to IMAR. The first stage of this adaptation in 1967 culminated in the ‘13th April Decision,’ a case of the Centre’s discourse setting out a strategy of hegemony by ‘managing’ or ‘handling’ the problems in IMAR through definition of them, and the assertion of a new top leadership structure for the locality.

The second ‘implementation’ phase of this ‘management’ discourse manifested itself in the attack on the previous leader of the region, Ulanfu, and the destruction of his symbolic capital by locating him within a counter-discourse and counter-narrative – based on the hegemony of the ideology of national minority status over class. This process was accompanied by the setting up of a raft of new organizations, and a new ‘authority’ language in the region. This was a destructive phase, in which the priority was largely to attack the signifiers of power, both ideological and symbolic, of what was described as the ‘old’ order and power structure.

The third phase of the development of the discourse can be found in the public, language of Teng Haiqing, and the viewing of this as the carrier of the new ‘authority’ language. Teng’s response to the ‘management’ of IMAR was simply to deal with the most contentious issue – nationality versus class – by the pure assertion of the latter and the exclusion of the former, framing issues only within ways directly sanctioned by the Centre. But the gradual articulation of a whole ‘counter-organisation’ in IMAR, the IMPP, which Teng started to talk of in late 1967 onwards shows the sort of pressures he was under in using a discourse that sought to impose hegemony, rather than negotiate it. Framing the IMPP in terms purely from the Centre led to dislocation. The proclamation of unity, and the

irrelevancy of national minority issues, actually co-existed with a movement in which a huge number of Mongolians were persecuted and killed.

The final phase shows Teng Haiqing's removal from a position in which he was able to issue authoritative utterances. His register moved from prescription to the highly political use of apologies to negotiate both on behalf of the Centre in IMAR, and with them for his survival and future.

In each phase of this process, there was a dialectic between the paradigm supplied by the Centre, through ideological and narrative superstructure, and the signifiers of this, and the impact of and reaction to this locally. This caused a change in each of the phases and the materials looked at. Throughout this process, the key issue was how palatable the 'compromise' negotiated discourse was to either side. There was a two-way process in which participants in the local CR signified closeness and sanction from the Centre in various ways, and the Centre sought to impose hegemony on a situation which received local support.

In each of these stages, certain forms of knowledge were sanctioned. Foucault argued that power and knowledge were intimately connected – that institutions, power centres, organisations pursued claims to power through establishing discourses that permitted some forms of knowing while suppressing or excluding others. Throughout the CR in IMAR, even in a local context, there was a steady readjustment of the terms within which the campaign unfolded. What was considered knowledge at one stage was superseded at the next by new claims to truth, within new narratives and ideological paradigms. This process of control of the terms of knowledge lay at the heart of how power was acquired and directed in the CR and it can be plotted through the signifiers found in discourse, with the environment in which this were implemented and located.

Appendix One: Key Central and Provincial Meetings, Establishment of Organisations and Publications Concerning Anti-IMPP Campaign during CR in IMAR - 1966-69

Key*Italicised Type - Documents*

Ordinary Type – Meetings

Underlined Type – Establishment of organisations

Meetings at the Centre	Centre Meetings with IMAR	IMAR Provincial Level Meetings
1966 (All in Beijing unless otherwise stated)		
<u>4th – 18th May</u> Enlarged meeting of the politburo of the Central Committee of the CCP – <i>Issued 16th May Circular setting up the CR Group</i> <u>1st June</u> <i>People's Daily published 'Sweep Out Cow Ghosts and Snake Spirits'</i>	<u>21st May – 25th July</u> (Formal meetings held from <u>7th June to 20th July</u>) Qianmen Hotel meeting, Beijing- attended by Party leaders from the Centre and IMAR personnel (<i>Issuing of Restricted Report 'On Ulanfu's Problems,' accusing Ulanfu of splitism</i>) <u>4th June</u> Cadres of colleges and schools hold meetings in Hohhot to 'arouse masses' for CR.	
<u>19th –21st July</u> Meeting of Regional Party Secretaries and Members of CR Group <u>24th July</u> Enlarged meeting of the CR Group <u>1st –12th August</u> Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee CCP		<u>4th August</u> <u>Setting up of IMAR Party Committee CR Group</u> <u>5th August</u> Three day criticism meeting held at IM University
<u>5th September</u> State Council issued notice on groups coming to Beijing - start of 'big alliance'		<u>19th August – 22nd August- 24th August-27th August.</u> Series of rallies held by IMAR Party <u>27th August</u> Creation of Rebellious Factions as result of the meetings above (ie 'Ersi' and 'Sansi')
		<u>4th November</u> IMAR Party Committee holds cadre meeting.
1967		
<u>4th – 5th January</u> Setting up of Shanghai People's Commune <u>23rd February</u> February Counter-Current. Central decision on support of army of CR Group.		
<u>March-April</u> Central Work Conference <i>Final defeat of Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi</i>	<u>16th Feb – 13rd April</u> Series of meetings in Beijing between central leaders and IMAR parties.	<u>18 June</u> <u>Setting up of IMAR CR Standing Committee Preparatory Small</u>

	<u>13th April</u> <i>Central Party Decision on How to Handle the Problem of IMAR</i>	<u>Group</u> <u>1st July</u> <i>Preparatory Committee issue 'How to Implement 13th April Decision.'</i> <u>2nd July</u> Military District discuss IMAR
<u>Aug</u> Meeting of the Central CR Group <u>9th Aug</u> Meeting of the Central and Regional Military leaders		<u>17th August</u> Preparatory Committee convenes district meeting to discuss '13 th April Decision.'
		<u>29th August</u> <i>IM Daily published open attach on Ulanfu</i>
		<u>September/October</u> <u>Setting up of Local Revolutionary Committees (Hohhot Revolutionary Committee set up on 18 October)</u>
		<u>1st November</u> <u>Setting up of IMAR CRC</u> <u>3rd – 5th November</u> First meeting of IMAR CRC. Issued 'Concerning the Resolution of the Situation of the CR in IMAR.'
<u>9th – 12th November</u> Jiang Qing – Speeches on art and culture broadcast nationally. This set off the 'dig and cleanse' campaign.		
<u>1968</u>		
		<u>6th – 8th Jan</u> Second Meeting of IMAR CRC. Teng Haiqing attacked Ulanfu.
		<u>23rd Jan</u> <u>Small group to deal with IMAR problem established under Li Shude.</u>
	<u>4th February</u> Teng Haiqing and Li Shude report in Beijing to the CR Small Group. <u>6th February</u> Committee meeting of leaders of IMAR CRC openly acknowledged the IMPP problem.	<u>13th Feb</u> <u>Founding of IMAR Revolutionary Committee Nucleus Group.</u>
	<u>18th May</u> Series of meetings throughout IMAR spreading the 'Dig and cleanse' campaign	<u>13th April</u> Lengthy speech by Teng to mark first anniversary of publication of '13 th April Decision.'
		<u>5th July</u> Third Plenary of IMAR CRC. IMPP comes to forefront.
		<u>30th Aug – 4th Sept</u> Standing Committee of IMAR Revolutionary Group convened. Decision to organise IMAR Study Mao Zedong Thought School
<u>13th – 31st October</u>		

Meeting of 12 th Plenum of 8 th Congress in Beijing. Teng and Wu Tao attend. (Liu Shaoqi expelled from Party)		
		3 rd - 19 th Nov Fourth Plenary Session of IMAR CRC.
		11 th Nov IMAR Central Military District convened meeting
1969		
	Feb Meeting in Beijing between Teng Haiqing and provinces of IMAR on 'How to Handle IMPP.'	
1 st - 24 th April Ninth Congress of CCP Beijing		
28 th Apr First Plenum of 9th CCP Central Committee	13 th - 19 th May Central meeting on IMAR attended by IMAR CRC and IMAR Military District leaders. <i>Issued Notice on 19th May on 'Rectifying Mistakes and Thoroughly Implementing IMAR's Current Work.'</i>	
	22 nd May Centre issues 'Notice' on IMAR.	
		5 July IMAR split after central decision.

Sources: Lieberthal 1976, Tumen and Zhu 1995, Woody 1993, *Neimenggu da shiji* 1997, Wang Feng (ed) 1998, and *Dangdai Neimenggu jianshi*.'

Appendix Two: The Speech-Occasions of Teng Haiqing (See Chapter Three)

When Given (with Doc no in Bibliography)	Genre	Where - to which Audience	Type of Recording (if Indicated)	Approx Page Length
1967 5 th July (Doc 14)	Speech (<i>jianghua</i>)	To leaders of revolutionary rebellion elements in schools and colleges from the Hohhot Third Headquarters.	Draft written summary (<i>jilu-gao</i>)	8 pages
1 st August (in Doc 2 Issue 99)	Discussion (<i>tanhua</i>)	To representatives of Hailar Revolutionary Rebellion Group.	Précis (<i>zhaiyao</i>)	1 page
9 th November (in Doc 64)	Speech	To a mass meeting (<i>dahui</i>) of organisation working personnel in the IMAR committee.	Verbatim record	8 pages
24 th November* (in Doc 2, Issue 37)	Speech	To representatives of the Zhemeng Conference.	Corrected record (<i>jilu zhengli</i>)	4 pages
1968 20 th February* (in Doc 2, Issue 78 and Doc 31)	Speech	To representatives of Hohhot Study Conference and Hohhot Railway Bureau Study Conference.	2 versions: précis and full speech	4 pages/16 pages
22 nd February (in Doc 2, Issue 82)*	Speech	To IMAR artistic circles attending a Study Mao Zedong Thought meeting.	Important speech	5 pages
29 th February* (in Doc 2, Issue 108)	Speech	To members of the Yimeng Revolutionary Preparatory Committee.	Verbatim	4 pages
12 th March* (in Doc 2, Issue 103)	Speech	To small group of leaders at the <i>IM Daily</i> , and responsible people at the Hohhot Third Headquarters.	Not indicated	2 pages
25 th March*	Report	To IMAR meeting of	Précis record	4 pages

(in Doc 2, Issue 111)	(<i>baogao</i>)	representatives of study classes.	(<i>jilu zhaiyao</i>)	
27 th March* (in Doc 2, Issue 112)	Report	To members of cultural and artistic circles.	Corrected according to recording (<i>gen luyin zhengli</i>)	4 pages
31 st March* (in Doc 2, Issue 115)	Letter (<i>xin</i>)	To IMAR Nucleus Small Group.	N/a	1 page
14 th April * (in Doc 2, Issue 131)	Discussion	To committee members and working personnel of the Hohhot Third Headquarters.	From combining summaries issued by IM University and Workers College	2 pages
20 th April* (in Doc 2, Issue 141)	Opinion (<i>yijian</i>)	With Wu Tao, in Beijing, on the issue of 'cleansing and constructing the Party.'	Conveyed via Li Liang by phone	1 page
29 th May+ (published that day, but no date of delivery given, in Doc 3, Issue 31)	Speech	To Wumeng Revolutionary Standing Committee.	Précis record	2 pages
30 th May* (in Doc 2, Issue 181)	Discussion	To 'plucking out' stations.	Précis record	3 pages
3 rd June*	Speech	To a meeting of whole region to	Corrected	3 pages

(in Doc 2, Issue 178)		discuss setting up Mao Zedong Thought Study Classes, and 'great criticism' experience.	record	
31st May* (in Doc 2, Issue 219)	Important instructions (<i>zhongyao zhishi</i>)	On meeting Zhouzi County CRC Plenary Committee.	Summary record	4 pages
9 th June* (published with 20)	Important instructions	To Guyang Area Proletarian CR.		3 pages
14 th June (in Doc 65)	Speech	To meeting on the current situation of setting up study Mao Zedong Thought classes in IMAR, and the great criticism movement.	Corrected record	16 pages
15 th June* (in Doc 2, Issue 232)	Speech summary	To responsible people in Wuda Town, at Baotou, with three other CR leaders.	Summary	2 pages
28 th June* (in Doc 2, Issue 209)	Important instructions	To IM University CR Group.		2 pages
6 th July* (in Doc 2, Issue 214)	Important speech	At plenary session of IMAR Nucleus Group Third Meeting.		1 page
7 th July* (in Doc 2, Issue 215)	Interjections (<i>chahua</i>)	To the representatives of Zhemeng Group at the Third Plenary Meeting of the IMAR.		2 pages
12 th July (Doc 32)	Report	To the Third Plenary Meeting of the IMAR CRC.	Verbatim	28 pages
17 th July* (in Doc 2, Issue 227)	Informal discussion (<i>zuotan</i>)	IMAR Standing Committee leaders meeting in small group with representatives of 17 advanced work units.		2 pages
30 th October	Opinion	To a 'Party rectification' meeting.	Transmitted	4 pages

(in Doc 34)			via Li Dechen	
25 th November (in Doc 36)	Speech	To 'Construct China' Committee Fourteenth Plenary Enlarged Conference.	Corrected record	10 pages
10 th December++ (in Doc 37)	Speech	To the Study Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Division Class of Hohhot Workers.	Verbatim – two versions	13 pages
1969 31 st January++	Record of comments on IMAR problems	To <i>IM Daily</i> , and Third Headquarters.	Corrected record	4 pages
6 th January++	Opinion in a letter	No address.		2 pages
8 th January++ (in Doc 40)	Instructions	To Wumeng CR Committee in response to a report delivered verbally.	Draft summary	5 pages

Appendix Three: Illustration of Material from 1967-1969

Plate One: Example of stencilled pamphlet produced by local rebellious group: *Liangtiao luxian, liangzhong mingyun de da juexian* (The Great and Decisive Battle Between the Two Paths and the Two Fates) IM Teachers University 'East is Red' Battle Group, 8-1 Division, Hohhot November 1966 (Doc 10).

Plate Two: Internal reference materials containing the dialogues and foral '13th April Decision': *Zhongyang guanyu chuli Neimenggu wenti youguan wenjian he zhongyang fuze tongzhi jianghua huibian (di yiji)* (A Compilation of Relevant Central Documents and Speeches by Central Comrades in Charge Concerning the Handling of the IMAR Problem, Vol One) Hohhot Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Headquarters, Hohhot 30th May 1967 (Doc 11).

Plate Three: Official documents produced on red-letter headed paper by the IMAR CRC Preparatory Small Group, containing the 'Decision on Resolutely Implementing the Central Party, State Council, Central Military Commission CRC Small Group Decision on 6th June [1967].'

Plate Four: Sample of materials produced by liaison group in Hohhot during anti-Ulanfu campaign: *Wenge ziliao* (CR Materials) Nos 17. Hohhot Revolutionary Rebellion Liaison Head Office Criticize and Struggle Against Ulanfu Liaison Station, Hohhot, September 1967 (Doc 21).

Plate Five: Sample of news-sheet produced by rebellious group affiliated to university in Hohhot: *Dong fang hong* (East is Red) IM Teachers University Revolutionary Committee Revolutionary Education Office, Hohhot, 5th December 1967 (Doc 29).

Plate Six: Sample of *Hongqi neican* (Red Flag Internal Reference Material) produced by IMAR Party Committee Red Flag Alliance Headquarters on 6th June 1967, containing speeches by Teng Haiqing in a meeting with comrades from the IM Teachers College.' (Doc 2).

Plate Seven: Sample of printed copy of speech by Teng Haiqing on 14th June: *Daban Mao Zedong sixiang xuexiban, benzhuo geming dapipan, ba wo qu wa su douzheng tuixiang xin jieji*, (Set up Mao Zedong Thought Classes, Grasp the Revolutionary Great Criticism, Push the Dig and Cleanse Struggle of Our Region to a New Level), no date but probably 1968. (Doc 69).

Plate Eight: Speech by Teng Haiqing: *Teng Haiqing silingyuan zai huabei jianshe weiyuanhui di si shi liu ci quanwei (kuoda) huiyishang de zhongyao jianghua* (Commander Teng Haiqing's Important Speech at the 46th (Enlarged) Plenary Meeting of the North China Construction Commission) Construction and Work Department Eighth Section First Company Revolutionary Committee Office, Hohhot, 25th November 1968 (Doc 37).

Plate Nine: News-sheet produced in latter part of campaign against IMPP: *Zhengdou tongxun* (Dictatorship Newsletter) Hohhot Masses Revolutionary Command Centre, January 1969 onwards (Doc 40).

Plate Ten: Material from the attack on Teng Haiqing: *Da pipan zhanbao* (Great Criticism Battle Paper) Hohhot Workers Union et al, Hohhot, 1st February 1969 (Doc 39).

历史洪流中的命运

大决战

——内蒙师院文化大革命五个月的历史回顾

内蒙古师范学院东方红战斗纵队

《八一》战斗队

一九六六·十一

(内部材料, 不准翻印, 外传)

中央关于处理内蒙
问题的有关文件和中央
负责同志讲话汇编

(第一集)

革命造反

呼和浩特革命造反联络总部印发

一九六七年五月三十日

1/2/67
3

內蒙古自治区革命委员会

筹备小组文件

內蒙古自治区革命委员会筹备小组
中国人民解放军內蒙古军区

关于坚决贯彻执行中共中央、国务院、 中央军委、中央文革小组六月六日通令的决定

(一九六七年七月一日)

自六月六日中共中央、国务院、中央军委、中央文革小组颁布通令以来，许多单位学习、贯彻的比较好，维护了无产阶级文化大革命的秩序和无产阶级专政的权威，促进了无产阶级革命派的大联合，提高了斗争的水平。

但在某些单位中，至今没有得到认真贯彻，甚至一些坏分子和反革命分子，乘机捣乱，以极“左”的面目出现，竭力破坏“七条通令”的贯彻，打、砸、抢、抄、抓的歪风至今没有刹住，正常的“四大”得不到保护。这是一个严重问题，必须立即行动起来，打击歪风，树立正气，切实维护无产阶级专政的权威，一定要把“七

Quads

702
4

文革資料

—17—

內蒙古黨委機關紅旗聯合總部印

1967年9月

烏蘭夫反革命修正主義 言論摘編(二)

——篡改區域自治的無產階級專政性質，
陰謀搞獨立王國，復辟資本主義

呼和浩特革命造反聯絡總部批斗烏蘭夫反黨集團聯絡站編

一九六七年七月

22

特大喜訊

我們偉大領袖毛主席

身體非常非常健康

精力非常非常充沛

這是全中國和全世界人民的最大幸福

讓我們共同祝願

我們的偉大領袖，我們心中最紅最紅的
紅太陽毛主席萬壽無疆！萬壽無疆！萬壽無疆！

十一月二十一日晚，我院革命領導幹部、原武裝部付部長王文閣同志，向全院革命師生匯報了出席北京軍區學習毛主席著作積極分子代表大會的情況。

王文閣同志首先以萬分激動的心情，向大家報告了一個振奮人心的特大喜訊：在十一月十三日下午六時，我們偉大的領袖毛主席和他的親密戰友林彪付主席以及周恩來、陳伯達、康生、江青等同志，接見了出席北京部隊和空軍三個會議的同志。當他談到毛主席身體非常健康，精力非常充沛時，整個會場歡聲雷動，一片沸騰。我東縱戰士和全院革命師生員工抑制不住內心的激動，手揮紅彤彤的毛主席語錄，一遍又一遍地高呼：毛主席萬歲！毛主席萬萬歲！祝毛主席萬壽無疆！萬壽無疆！萬壽無疆！

我們偉大領袖毛主席的接見，不但是王文閣同志的最大幸福，也是全院革命師生員工最大的幸福，是對我們無產階級革命派最大的關懷，最大的鼓舞，最大的鞭策。全院東縱戰士和廣大革命師生員工絕不辜負偉大領袖毛主席的期望，決心在當前偉大的教育革命中，把活學活用毛主席著作的運動推向新高潮，做“斗私”的先鋒，“批修”的闖將，將無產階級文化大革命進行到底！決心永遠讀毛主席的書，聽毛主席的話，照毛主席的指示辦事，做毛主席的好戰士。決心永遠忠於毛主席，忠於毛澤東思想，忠於以毛主席為首的無產階級司令部，忠於以毛主席為代表的無產階級革命路線。



要斗私，批修。
不破不立。破，就是批判，就是革命。破就要講道理，講道理就是立，破字當頭，立也就在其中了。

毛澤東

東方紅

2

1967.12.5

內蒙師院革命委員會教育革命辦公室主辦
教育革命簡訊

红旗内参

内部刊物 严禁外传 177 1968年6月6日

原内蒙古党委红旗联合总部编印



民族斗争，说到底，是一个阶级斗争问题。

毛泽东

滕海清司令员接见内蒙师院郭是海、董玉华、

薛贵元三同志重要讲话

(6.8年6月1日晚，郭、董、薛三同志向滕司令员汇报了师院1.7年(1.9-12年——6.8年)以来国共两党斗争情况，汇报了挖肃斗争以来，师院的广大无产阶级革命派同特木尔巴根代理人，乌兰夫死党分子斯荣的斗争情况。认为由于师院阶级斗争的特点，特木尔巴根的势力重新上台，集中在斯荣周围，当前挖肃斗争阻力重重，斯荣卷土重来，恢复旧制度，恢复旧秩序，恢复特木尔巴根王朝的危险性很严重。)

(当汇报到斯荣最近猖狂反扑的时候)

滕：我就不信斯荣打不倒，党委红旗态度怎么样？

答：(要坚决打倒)

滕：我就不信党委红旗打不倒斯荣！

(当汇报到宝音扎布、斯荣、留金锁、金增等一小撮人对特古斯、戈瓦假打真保的阴谋时)

滕：你让他策划嘛，怕什么？

(当汇报到斯荣、特木尔巴根的势力重新登台，控制一部分权力时)

滕：你让他暂时控制一个时期嘛！

你们不要着急，天是塌不下来的，资本主义复辟不了，只要牢牢掌握斗争大方向，该怎么搞就怎么搞，我就不相信特木尔巴根不倒，斯荣不倒，保乌兰夫的人那么多，都保不住，他还被打倒了！不要着急，好的同志站错了队，站出来就好了。你们的工作前阶段有缺点、错误，认识问题，没什么了不起的。有时间找你们两派开个会，看怎么解决。

(当汇报到原院党委、政治部、教务处上层机构的复杂情况及上层机构中的某些人一直挑动革命队伍中的内部团结时)

滕：行政机构要彻底改造！好人有些错误，还是要当好人看待，面不要那么宽，(指打击对象)坏人是坏人，放的宽不策略。坏人捂盖子是捂不住的，将来总得揭开盖子。不要把他们看得那么了不起，天是塌不下来的。整个内蒙的问题都能解决了，多少顽固堡垒都摧垮了，不信你们那里的问题就解决不了，相信毛泽东思想一定能胜利！不要那样着急，可以解决的，不会解决不了的。整个内蒙问题都解决了嘛！你们一个小小的角落就解决不了，他比乌兰夫还厉害！我就不相信他比刘少奇、乌兰夫的势力还强大，只要有毛泽东思想，只要按毛主席革命路线办事，那就没关系，迟一天早一天总会解决的，那样着急干嘛？这个打不倒，那个打不倒，真的好人打不倒，坏人怎么打不倒？！保杨成武的人那么多，他也打倒了嘛！保乌兰夫的人有多少！真理在我们手里，有毛泽东思想，要相信广大革命群众，四、五百教师、干部，革命的还是多的，捂盖子的有可能是犯错误的，不要相信他有那么大力量，他在外面搞个包围圈，就能把你包围起来？广大革命群众是相信革命委员会的，哪个单位只要我们不让动，他就不能动。斗争是复杂的，但是不要看得那么复杂；复杂是对的，但可以解决，不信解决不了。不信你们师范学院就解决不了。没那个事。人家压你，你怕啥？内蒙革命委员会不表示态度，他能压垮你？你没有毛泽东思想就能压垮；你有毛泽东思想就压不垮。

前一个阶段在社会上你们是有些被动，转过来就好了嘛！主动向敌人进攻，就会有阻力。

孔之孔

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7

大办毛泽东思想学习班，狠抓革命大批判，把我区“挖、肃”斗争推向新阶段

——六月十四日滕海清同志在内蒙古自治区大办毛泽东思想学习班、革命大批判现场会议上的讲话——

(根据记录整理，未经本人审阅)

同志们，

首先让我们共同敬祝我们伟大的导师、世界革命的伟大领袖毛主席万寿无疆！万寿无疆！

敬祝我们伟大领袖毛主席的亲密战友林副主席身体健康！永远健康！

我从三月初离开包头到现在，已有三个多月了。在此期间，包头市的革命形势发生了巨大的变化。包头市革命委员会和支左联合指挥部高举毛泽东思想伟大红旗，在毛主席革命路线的指引下，在人民解放军的有力支持下，充分发挥工人阶级主力军的作用，各项工作取得显著的成就。毛泽东思想更加深入人心了，阶级斗争向纵深发展了，已经出现了一派生气蓬勃的新的战斗局面。整个包头市在毛主席的革命航道上飞速前进。这是毛泽东思想的伟大胜利，这是包头市广大人民群众艰苦奋斗的结果。我代表内蒙古自治区革命委员会、内蒙古军区向包头市八十万人民和包头地区的中国人民解放军致敬！

在包头市召开的全区大办毛泽东思想学习班、革命大批判现场会，是在全区革命斗争不断深入的大好形势下召开的。这个大会开得很好。这是个群英会，是个阶级斗争经验的交流会，是一个进一步搞好“挖、肃”斗争的动员大会。这对于全区进一步大立毛泽东思想，进一步搞好“挖、肃”斗争，夺取无产阶级文化大革命的全面胜利具有重大意义。我希望把这些先进经验很快传播、普及，在全区开花结果，成为推动这一场“挖、肃”斗争的巨大的动力。

同志们，今天内蒙古地区整个形势一片大好。毛泽东思想照亮了内蒙古草原。内蒙古在飞跃、在前进！

首先是一个波澜壮阔的活学活用毛泽东思想的群众运动已经形成。从今年三月全区学代会召开以后，出现了一个毛泽东思想大传播、大普及的新高潮。全区有七百万革命群众参加了毛泽东思想学习班的学习。从城市到农村牧区，从学校到工厂、街道，从集体单位到家庭，大办学习班。学习毛主席著作，大搞斗私批修，处处蔚然成风，普遍开展了“三忠于”活动，人们的精神面貌发生了深刻的变化。在这个伟大的群众运动中，先进集体和个人不断涌现，继杭锦旗、宁城县等先进单位出现以后，又出现了包钢、包头二冶、杭后的五四大队等先进集体，出现了学赶超的新局面。“数风流人物，还看今朝。”一代新人正在毛泽东

31

25.11.6
8



最 高 指 示

历史的經驗值得注意。一个路綫，一种观点，要經常讲，反复讲。只給少数人讲不行，要使广大革命羣众都知道。

滕海清司令员在華建革委会 第四十六次全委(擴大)會議上的重要講話

(根据記錄整理)

建工部八局一公司革命委员会办公室
(一九六八年十一月二十五日)

Tan 21/12 20/1/69 9



最高指示

政策和策略是党的生

命，各级领导同志务必充

分注意，万万不可粗心大意。

革命群众

总指挥部

第七期 一九六九年一月二十日

(内部刊物 严禁外传)

最高指示

清理阶级队伍，一是要抓紧，二是要注意政策。

政策和策略是党的生命，各级领导同志务必充分注意，万万不可粗心大意。

关于当前清理阶级队伍中

应注意的几个问题的通知

① 在党的八届扩大的十二中全会精神的鼓舞和推动下，全区广大革命群众紧跟毛主席的伟大战略部署，认真贯彻执行了伟大领袖毛主席关于清理阶级队伍，一是要抓紧，二是要注意政策的指示，狼反了右倾机会主义路线，全区清理阶级队伍的工作迅猛发展，形势大好，越来越好。两个多月以来，对敌斗争取得了巨大胜利，运动发展是健康的，主流是好的，这是运动的主流和本质。运动中出現某些问题，这是难免的，只要我们坚决按照毛主席的指示办事

最高指示

什么人站在革命人民方面，他就是革命派，什么人站在帝国主义封建主义官僚资本主义方面，他就是反革命派。

大批判战报

主办单位

呼市工代会、呼三司红代会、直属机关大学校、内蒙古日报社、文化战线、教育战线

一九六九年二月一日

第四期

最高指示

民族斗争，说到底，是一个阶级斗争问题。

帮兇的嘴脸

——揭穿高锦明参予泡制“三基论”
发动宫廷政变等反革命事件的真相

打着“反乌英雄”旗号，伪装革命的高锦明，至今还有不少人没有认识他的真实面目。为了使人们弄清高锦明的本来面目，不妨看看他在乌家王朝肮脏宴席上占着一席多么重要的位置。大量铁的事实证明，高锦明不仅不是什么“反乌英雄”，而且是乌兰夫反党叛国集团的得力干将，是乌兰夫的重要帮凶之一。

“他们既要反革命，就不可能将其真相掩盖得十分彻底”。现在是彻底撕下伪装，揭穿高锦明参予泡制“三基论”，发动“宫廷政变”等反革命事件真相的时候了。

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(Note: Entered in order of date of publication. Primary source materials are referred to in the text according to the number they are given here. * refers to serials. N.p = no publisher indicated. N.d.= no date indicated on document).

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Pre 1966

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1967

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