

**China's Confucius Institute in the Discourse of  
Power in International Relations:  
A Case Study of the Confucius Institute in Africa**

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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## **Abstract**

More than 30 countries in the world sponsor a Language and Culture Promotion Organisation (LCPO), disseminating their own languages, cultures and other knowledge to people of different nationalities. The Confucius Institute (CI), as one such organisation, was set up by the Chinese government in 2004. This thesis uses the example of the CIs in Africa to examine the role of the CI in a two-dimensional power analytical framework. This framework was built on the key elements of both traditional understanding of power in international relations and Foucault's conception of power. In the first dimensional analysis, the CI is seen as a concrete entity. The material and strategic support for the construction and operation of this organisation is elaborated. The second dimensional analysis adopts a Foucauldian perspective where the CI is deconstructed. It demonstrates the CI's power technology, including its power structure, power techniques and power instruments. By examining the power effects produced by the CI's power technology, the thesis argues that the CI plays a positive role in promoting China's national interest in Africa and China-Africa relations.

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## Acronyms and abbreviations

AHRDF	African Human Resources Development Fund
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BCT	Business Chinese Ability Test
CC	Confucius Classroom
CI	Confucius Institute
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
HSK	Chinese: Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (汉语水平考试), English: Chinese Proficiency Test
HSKK	Chinese: Hanyu Shuiping Kouyu Kaoshi (汉语口语水平考试), English: Spoken Chinese Proficiency Test
IR	International Relations
LCPO	language and culture promotion organisations
MTC SOL	Master of Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages
NEPAD	The New Partnership for Africa's Development
NBC	National Broadcasting Company
PRC	People's Republic of China
UN	United Nations
WW2	World War 2
YCT	Elementary and Secondary School Level Students' Chinese Language Ability Test

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

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### 1.1 Modern China-Africa Relations: Stages and Features

This thesis studies the work of the Peoples' Republic of China's (PRC) Confucius Institute (CI) in Africa to determine the role that the CI plays in Africa with regards to the promotion of China's national interest and in assisting the development of China-Africa relations. In the context of this thesis, it is necessary to explore the background of China's relationship with Africa - in particular the role of educational cooperation and exchange between these two global actors.

The People's Republic of China was established in 1949 by Mao Zedong and an independent Africa began to emerge in the 1950s. In the past several decades, relations between China and Africa have experienced several different stages. According to Larkin (1971), the period between the 1950s to the 1970s can be divided into two stages: the first stage from the Bandung Conference in 1955 to the breakdown of China-Soviet relations in late 1957 and early 1958, and the second from 1958 when China established diplomatic relationships with Morocco and Algeria through to the end of the 1960s. The second period saw the development of China's diplomatic relationships with a number of African countries.

Extending the time span from the 1950s to 2000, He (2000) divides the period into three stages. The first stage is from the 1950s to the 1970s when ideological and

political factors determined China's foreign policy. The second stage covers the whole of the 1980s during which China focused on its economic and social development and reforms. Chinese foreign policy also became more pragmatic and economy-driven during this period. The end of the Cold War forced many countries to adjust their domestic and foreign policies, and He's third stage can be regarded as the whole of the 1990s. During this period, China on the one hand focused on practicing "non-interference in other countries' internal affairs"; whilst on the other hand, it explored cooperation with Africa in different areas including economics, technology, infrastructure, culture and education.

Zhang (2007)'s categorisation of China-Africa relations includes the period after the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. Zhang suggests that there are four stages in contemporary China-Africa relations. The first stage runs from the foundation of the Peoples' Republic of China, to May 1956 - just before the establishment of a new China-Egypt diplomatic relationship. During this period, both sides were fighting for independence and had not established official diplomatic relations. The establishment of this new China-Egypt diplomatic relationship on 30 May 1956 signified the beginning of Zhang's second stage and this stage runs until January 1983 when China proposed the Four Principles on China-Africa Economic and Technological Cooperation. This period has seen the establishment of 46 separate China-Africa official diplomatic relationships, the replacement of the Republic of China (Taiwan)'s UN seat by the PRC with the support

of African countries, and the communist ideological influence in a number of African countries' political systems. China's economic aid to Africa served as an important foundation for the new bilateral ties. From January 1983 to October 2000 before the creation of the FOCAC, China began the transition of its foreign policy from ideology-oriented to economy-oriented and started to explore cooperation and investment opportunities. The fourth stage emerges from October 2000 when the FOCAC was created. The establishment of FOCAC manifests in the strategic partnership between China and Africa, and the FOCAC holds ministerial conference every three years.

Despite the many different proposed ways of categorizing the phases of development of China-Africa relations since 1950s, there are some common views on the importance of certain political principles and discourses. Specifically, under Mao's control, the relations were shaped by a strong anti-imperialism and communism principles; while under Deng's leadership, a more active and pragmatic model of mutual economic win-win exchanges emerged. From 2000, the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) diversifies, systematises and institutionalises this relationship, lifting it to a new level. Based on these views and from a more general Chinese perspective, contemporary China-Africa relations can be divided into the following three stages (See Table 1.1): the first period is from 1950s to late 1970s when China was under Mao's control. The second period is from late 1970s when China announced its opening-up reform to the end of 1990s. The third period starts

when the FOAC was established.

**Table 1.1** Stages of Modern China-Africa Relations

Stages	Guiding Chinese political thoughts	China-Africa relations		
		International background	Mechanisms	Features
1950s-1970s	Mao Zedong thought: class struggle and contradiction, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and anti-hegemonism	Bandung Conference, rivalry between the US and Soviet Union	Five Principles of China-Africa and China-Arab Relations, Eight Principles of Chinese Economic and Technological Aid	Political and ideology-centred, one-off projects
1980s-2000	Deng Xiaoping theory: modernisation, economic development, reform and opening up	Washington Consensus, the end of Cold War	Four Principles on China-Africa Economic and Technological Cooperation, Five Points Proposal	Economy-oriented, pragmatism, projects in diverse fields
After 2000	Hu Jintao: harmonious society and scientific development Xi Jinping: Chinese dream, the Belt and Road	The rise of China	FOCAC	Institutional, systematic and comprehensive cooperation

(Source: Author)

### 1.1.1 1950s – 1970s: Political and Ideological Comrades

During this period, China, under Mao’s control, was newly founded and eager to make political friends. Domestically, China focused on class struggle and contradiction, which led to the Cultural Revolution (Gabriel, 2006). Internationally, China followed the principles of anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and anti-hegemonism. In 1955, the Bandung Conference was held and seen as a milestone conference for Asian and African countries. This conference aimed to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism or neo-colonialism of the United States, the Soviet Union and any other imperialistic countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000a). One year after the conference in 1956, China and Egypt set up a formal diplomatic relationship – the first formal diplomatic

relationship between China and an African country. During the 1960s, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited Africa three times. Between 1963 and 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice-Premier Chen Yi toured ten African countries, and during this trip Zhou announced the *Five Principles of China-Africa and China-Arab Relations*. The five principles are:

1. China supports the Arab and African peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism and colonialism and to win and safeguard national independence
2. China supports the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the Governments of Arab and African countries
3. China supports the desire of the Arab and African peoples to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of their own choice
4. China supports Arab and African countries in their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful consultations
5. China holds that the sovereignty of the Arab and African countries should be respected by all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarter should be opposed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.)

Resonating the spirit of the Bandung conference, these five principles stress the support for anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and anti-alignment. They also highlight the support for African people to achieve solidarity and sovereignty by their own choice. Together with these five principles, Premier Zhou also put forward the *Eight Principles of Chinese Economic and Technological Aid* on 15 January 1964 in Mali.

These eight principles, as outlined by Chin and Frolic (2007), are:

1. Emphasize equality and mutual benefit
2. Respect sovereignty and never attach conditions
3. Provide interest-free or low-interest loans
4. Help recipient countries develop independence and self-reliance
5. Build projects that require little investment and can be accomplished quickly
6. Provide quality equipment and material at market prices

7. Ensure effective technical assistance
8. Pay experts in accordance with local standards

These principles declared the mutual relationship between China and Africa. As the first principle shows, the Chinese government “never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Although these principles indicate China’s contributive role to Africa’s development, China during the Maoist period saw itself as a comrade-in-arms with African countries that would help them to oppose imperialism and colonialism and to fight for independence and development (Snow, 1994). In this sense, China through its aid to Africa established a political allegiance instead of a donor-recipient relationship of the type maintained by many Western countries with African states.

One of the monumental Chinese aid projects during this period is the Tan-zam Railway. This project lasted 6 years from 1970 to 1976 and cost around 500 million US dollars – the second largest foreign-aid project undertaken by China in Africa.<sup>1</sup> The building of this railway was both politically and psychologically important to African countries because Western donors were unwilling to work in the project’s complex environments and profit-minded donors rejected the project on economic grounds (Snow, 1994). Because of projects like the Tan-zam Railway, Snow (1994) argues that Maoist China showed the South a lot of what the North could not do, so

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<sup>1</sup> As of December 2016, the largest Chinese foreign-aid project to Africa was the African Union Conference Centre which was built from 2009 to 2011. XINHUA NEWS AGENCY. 2010. *中国外援 60 年：对外援助之花在国际合作中绽放* [Online]. Available: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-07/19/c\\_12348963.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-07/19/c_12348963.htm) [Accessed 4 December 2016].



that China could be seen as a champion of the Third World<sup>2</sup> and ultimately win the support of African countries on a range of political and economic issues. For example, in 1976, at the 26<sup>th</sup> United Nations General Assembly, 26 African countries voted to support PRC as the sole legal representative of China in the UN among all 78 total supportive countries. As Yu (1974) concludes, African people believed, at least till the early 70s, that Chinese assistance was given to them for wholly altruistic reasons and that it came with no strings whatsoever were attached.

Education exchange and cooperation during this period featured the simple exchange of students and teachers. China did not have the economic capability to initiate systematic and extensive educational programs, and China's education and research quality were far less developed and recognised than those of the West.

The first exchange of students took place in January 1956 when Egypt sent 4 students to learn painting, philosophy and agriculture in China. In addition to this, China invited 4 Egyptian scholars to give lectures in China. In exchange, China despatched one English teacher and 7 students to study the Arabic language, culture and history at Cairo University. Following on from this, increasing numbers of students and teachers were exchanged by both sides although China temporarily suspended the exchange during the Cultural Revolution from 1967 to 1972. By the end of 1980s, 43

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<sup>2</sup> The 'Three World theory' was postulated by Mao Zedong. The theory had a three world configuration: the first world includes the two super powers the US and the Soviet Union; the second world consists of Australia, Canada, Europe and Japan; and the third world or the 'new' south comprises Asia (except Japan), Africa and Latin America. YEE, H. S. 1983. The Three World Theory and Post-Mao China's Global Strategy. *International Affairs*, 59, 239-249.

African countries had sent 2,245 students to study in China and China had sent more than 250 students and teachers to Africa. The exchanges of students and teachers during this period, mainly relied on governmental scholarships and agreements (China Africa Education Cooperation Writing Group, 2005).

From the 1950s to the 1970s, China and Africa formed a cooperative relationship built on their common ideological beliefs of anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and anti-hegemonism along with their shared political aims of national emancipation and independence. However, both China and Africa were in the early stages of exploring their development pathways and were economically weak during this period. Aid projects, such as the Tan-zam Railway, and the new education cooperation and exchange projects such as the Governmental Scholarship Students, were one-off projects. Well organised, structured and enduring cooperation projects such as the Confucius Institute were, at the time, beyond the capacities of both sides.

### **1.1.2 1980s – 2000: From Ideology to Pragmatism**

Mao died in 1976 and China, under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, entered the reform and opening-up phase in 1978. This period stimulated China's economic vitality and creativity and extended China's foreign policy into the economic field. Ties between China and Africa also shifted from an ideologically-motivated alliance to a more pragmatic and diversified relationship. Liu (2008) noted that at the end of the 1970s the passion between China and Africa had already calmed, and that the ideological

foundation that had sustained the countries' relationship had weakened. The importance of national emancipation was superseded by a desire for domestic economic development. The 12<sup>th</sup> National Assembly of the Chinese Communist Party held in 1982 marks a policy shift from emphasising a "war and revolution" to prioritising "peace and development". Li (2007) also points out the shift in China's foreign policy, from "economy serving diplomacy" to "diplomacy serving economy". That is to say, China had realised that it should not use its limited economic resources to achieve ambitious diplomatic aims but instead, its diplomatic activities should contribute to its economic development. Based on this shift in motivations, China began to look for a new approach that would better serve its aspirations in the world. A new way that would not only use ideological standards to determine whether to be closer to or further away from a country, but that would actively support the development of the Chinese economy in an increasingly globalised world. In terms of its African policy, China began to construct a two-sides mutual beneficial relationship (Liu, 2008), and this change can be found in Chinese leaders' proposals to Africa in 1980s and 1990s.

During his visit to eleven African countries between 1982 and 1983, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang reiterated the promotion of South-South cooperation and added a new principle – *diversity in form* – to China's foreign aid principles (Brautigam, 2008). Subsequently, Premier Zhao announced the *Four Principles on China-Africa Economic and Technological Cooperation* in 1983, namely:

1. Equality and mutual benefit
2. Pursuing practical results
3. Diversity in form
4. Mutual development

These new principles adopted a different approach with the Eight Principle of 1964 because the Four Principles focused primarily on mutual economic benefits rather than mutual political and ideological support. Also, the Four Principles are seemingly more realistic and pragmatic in their nature. That is to say that by pursuing practical and measurable results, China would not be providing unrealistic and unsustainable aid and projects. Thirdly, the cooperation should be diverse, including traditional cooperation of infrastructure contraction as well as cooperation in human resources training, technology and investment (Li, 2006).

During this period, the Western agenda was dictated by the Washington Consensus which set the rules and designed standard models, such as the Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs), for the development of Africa and other developing countries (Williamson, 2004). These models require countries to make internal changes to their political-economic structures based on the West's rules. On the contrary, China did not want African countries to make such changes. China accepted that instability in Africa, such as the five coups in African states from 2003-2010, was a part and parcel of doing business with Africa (Holslag, 2011). The motivation for this alternative approach, as Yuan (2011) suggests, was that when African countries were put under

pressure to make structural changes oriented by the West, China was making changes in its own domestic economic structure and deliberately seeking an alternative approach from the Western method. Also, China was focused on how to build a mutually beneficial relationship founded on the common aims of *development with African countries*, while the West seemed determined to *change Africa*.

The early 1990s saw the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. With the disappearance of the rivalry between the United States and the USSR, African geopolitics also changed. Whilst China continued to develop its relationship with Africa by forging closer political, economic, cultural and educational links, Western attention to Africa seemed to wane. In 1996, the Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited six African countries and put forward a new *Five Points Proposal* which included:

1. Being sincere and friendly, becoming trustworthy and all-weather friends
2. Treating each other equally, respecting each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs
3. Seeking mutual benefits and development
4. Strengthening consultations and working closely in international affairs
5. Towards the future, creating a better world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000b).

This proposal stressed reliable friendship, sovereign equality, non-intervention, mutual benefit and international cooperation and these points add to and build on China's established foreign policy towards Africa. They reiterated the importance of

strengthening unity and cooperation between the two sides. The proposal continued and enriched the existing Chinese African policy and could be seen as an important foundation for the establishment of the FOCAC in 2000 (Naidu and Mbazima, 2008; Li, 2012).

While China has begun to “fully expand the African market” in the 1990s (Zhang, 2007, p.59) and showcased its economic success model to Africa, the West was questioned about the efficiency and usefulness of the Washington Consensus. As Robertson et al. (2007) noticed, during the 1990s, the Washington Consensus had been criticised that the Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) were undermining the capacity of low-income countries to ensure stability and social cohesion. Although the West was trying to adjust its plans and introduced the *good government* strategy which considered more non-economic elements in the economic processes, this new strategy did not represent a complete break from the Washington Consensus. In contrast, China’s engagement with Africa, as Sautman and Yang (2007) argue, makes China seem like a lesser evil when compared to the West. Besides, China’s own successful economic development model and the win-win cooperation model offer an alternative to African countries in terms of their own development and trade partners (King, 2007; Davies, 2007).

Because of China’s reform and opening-up and its pragmatic policies, China has experienced impressive economic growth since the 1980s that has contributed to the

growth of education cooperation and exchange between China and Africa. During this period, not only did the numbers of exchange students increased dramatically, but also China and Africa began to conduct joint projects between educational institutes. In the 1990s, 5,569 African students studied in China - double the total number of African students who studied in China in the previous 40 years. It is worth noting that among these African students, 1,580 of them from 42 African countries were self-funded students (China Africa Education Cooperation Writing Group, 2005). The appearance of self-funded African students can be seen as a new channel of educational exchange. More importantly, it shows that China had generated a level of attractiveness to African students.

Although China had not initiated the CI project during this period, it had begun the exploration of teaching Mandarin Chinese overseas and had established the *Hanban* (short for the standing office of the National Leading Group of Teaching Chinese Overseas) in 1987 (Ministry of Education, n.d.-b). This will be further elaborated on in Chapter 4 when I discuss the establishment of the CI.

Also in this period, Chinese higher educational institutes began to help their African counterparts to build new academic institutions and laboratories. By 2003, China and 21 African countries had engaged in 43 higher education and research cooperative projects, and had established 21 collaborative laboratories. For example, China's Zhejiang Agricultural University (Now part of Zhejiang University) assisted

Cameroon's Yaounde No 1 University to set up a Microorganism Laboratory, in which China invested 2 million RMB (approximately 286,000 US Dollars). In less than 10 years, this laboratory project produced 33 Master's students and 12 PhDs (China Africa Education Cooperation Writing Group, 2005). Compared with the single form of student exchange which directly benefitted individual students and possibly the students' home country in the long term, these cooperation projects between Chinese and African educational institutes were carried out *in Africa*, introducing China's advanced knowledge to Africa, establishing joint power technology with Africa and training students and professionals for Africa. In this way, African educational institutes, the local people and the African countries can benefit from these projects more directly and efficiently. These educational cooperation projects between Chinese and African institutes can be seen as a new model for China-Africa educational cooperation and exchange, and this model was further developed during the following stage during which the FOCAC was set up.

### **1.1.3 After 2000: Comprehensive and Institutional Development**

In October 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was established under the joint initiative of China and Africa with the purpose of further strengthening friendly cooperation between China and African countries (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Website, 2013). The FOCAC brings together leaders of China, 52 African states that have established diplomatic relations with China (as of 31 December 2016,) and the Commission of the African Union every three years. The first FOCAC



Ministerial Conference announced the Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development which states a revised five principles of cooperation between the two sides:

1. Equality and mutual benefit
2. Diversity in form and content
3. Emphasis on practical results
4. Pursuit of common progress
5. Amicable settlement of differences (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Website, 2009)

These five principles can be seen as a reaffirmation and development of Premier Zhao's Four Principles (1980s) and President Jiang's Five Point Proposal (1990s) in China-Africa cooperation, because they cover the essence and content of the two previous guiding principles. This Programme covers a wide range of cooperative areas including inter-governmental cooperation, trade and investment, engineering and infrastructural projects, finance, debt, tourism, migration, agriculture, natural resources and energy, science, technology, culture, medical care and public health, education and human resources, environment and bio-diversity, arms control, and international affairs. This programme captures all possible areas that the two sides can work together and brings China-Africa relationship to an all-directional, institutional and new strategic partnership (Zhang, 2007).

Since the 2<sup>nd</sup> FOAC Ministerial Conference, each conference reviews the follow-up actions of the previous conference and adopts a new action plan that lays out the work required for the next three years (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Website,

2012). These action plans include detailed, practical and traceable projects in the cooperative areas shown in the first FOCAC's Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development. For example, the 2<sup>nd</sup> FOCAC action plan reviewed the use of the African Human Resources Development Fund (AHRDF) which was set up in the first FOCAC Ministerial Conference and set a new goal of training up to 10,000 African personnel with the help of the AHRDF in the next three years. The 3<sup>rd</sup> FOCAC action plan states that the goal set in the 2<sup>nd</sup> FOCAC action plan has been successfully achieved, because China has trained over 10,000 African professionals in various fields under the AHRDF. On completion of this goal, China pledged to increase input to the AHRDF and train another 15,000 professionals for African countries in the next three years. In terms of education cooperation, the number of Chinese governmental scholarships offered to Africa increased from 5,500 stated in the 4<sup>th</sup> FOCAC action plan to 18,000 of the 5<sup>th</sup> FOCAC action plan and then reached 30,000 in the action plan of the 6<sup>th</sup> FOCAC. With the implementation of these action plans, China supplanted the US and became Africa's largest trading partner in 2009 (Perry, 2010).

These FOCAC action plans seem to look more like China's *aid* plans to Africa rather than *cooperation* plans. For example, the words *帮助(help)* and *援助(assistance)* (from China to Africa) appeared 12, 21, 17, 32 and 33 times in the past five action plans respectively. King (2007), Yang (2009) and Yuan (2011) noticed that China always use the word *cooperation* rather than *aid* because of its desire to emphasise

its *win-win* policy approach to Africa.

The concept of win-win was initially brought in in the context of economic cooperation, as China's African Policy shows, a new type of strategic partnership with Africa features political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). Eventually, the win-win concept has been used in many areas between China and Africa and the FOCAC can be seen as a good example.

In summary, the China-Africa relationship in this period shows a strong shift from political engagement to economic engagement by both sides and a move to a more diverse, comprehensive and flexible approach. In other words, it changed from a traditional political-based relationship focused on the similarities and mutual support of each other's political culture and values, to a multi-layered cooperation in governments, economics, education, human resources, investment and more.

The establishment of the FOCAC in 2000 also lifted China-Africa educational cooperation and exchange to a new level as the educational cooperation and exchange become more systematic and comprehensive and more financial support is provided. From 2000 to 2016, six FOCAC Ministerial Conferences have been held. The 1<sup>st</sup> FOCAC Ministerial Conference held in Beijing published the Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development which uses one section to illustrate China's pledges on expanding cooperation in education and

human resources development. The main points include:

1. Grant more scholarships to African students to study in China, continue to send teachers to Africa to help local institutions of higher learning improve their disciplines and specialties;
2. Set up channels of communications between universities of the two sides for the study of the Chinese and African civilizations;
3. Establish an African Human Resources Development Fund (AHRDF) and gradually increase financial contribution to the Fund for the training of professionals of different disciplines for African countries;
4. The two sides agree to work out country-specific training plans through appropriate channels, identify specific co-operation projects and facilitate their implementation (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Website, 2009)

This programme inherited and reiterated China's educational policy to African in 1990s, such as the exchange of students and teachers, and the cooperation between universities of two sides. Additionally, this programme extends the previous policy by setting up an African Human Resources Development Fund (AHRDF), and designing country-specific training plans and specific cooperation projects. The establishment of AHRDF shows China willingness of investing more in education cooperation and exchanges, and the country-specific plans and projects could be carried out more efficiently and effectively as they target specific countries to deal with specific problems and situations.

Following this programme, the action plans of the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> FOAC Ministerial Conferences put forward more detailed educational cooperation measures and these measures were enriched step by step (see Table 1.2). Generally, these measures, according to their types and models, can be classified into four categories: scholarships, training, funded projects and joint establishments. The first

three categories focus on China's aid to Africa, the fourth category – joint establishments – involves both China and Africa in building cooperative projects and joint institutes. The Confucius Institute (CI) belongs to this category and was first written in the action plan of the 3<sup>rd</sup> FOCAC Ministerial Conference, and the following 3 FOCAC action plans all stated the continuous support of the development of the CI.

**Table 1.2** Educational Cooperation and Exchange Measures in FOCAC Action Plans

FOCAC Plans	Action	Scholarships	Trainings	Funded projects	Joint establishments
2 <sup>nd</sup> Ministerial Conference (2003, Addis Ababa)	FOCAC		increase financial contribution to AHRDF for the training of up to 10,000 African personnel;		
3 <sup>rd</sup> Ministerial Conference (2006, Beijing)	FOCAC	increase the number of Chinese government scholarships from the current 2,000 per year to 4,000 per;	increase input to AHRDF and train 15,000 African professionals; train a number of educational officials as well as heads and leading teachers of educational institutes in Africa;	help African countries set up 100 rural schools;	establish Confucius Institutes;
4 <sup>th</sup> Ministerial Conference (2009, Sharm el Sheikh)	FOCAC	provide 5,500 Chinese government scholarships by 2012;	train 20,000 African personnel; invite 200 African administrative personnel to attend MPA <sup>3</sup> programs in China; make a US\$1.5 million contribution to support NEPAD's projects <sup>4</sup> to train nurses and maternity assistants; train 1,500 African school headmasters and teachers; invite 100 African post-doctors to conduct scientific researches;	50 China-Africa friendship schools; make a US\$1.5 million contribution to support NEPAD's projects to train nurses and maternity assistants;	20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education; Continue to promote the Confucius institutes; 100 joint research and demonstration projects;
5 <sup>th</sup> Ministerial Conference (2012, Beijing)	FOCAC	provide 18,000 government scholarships;	implement the "African Talents Program" and train 30,000 African	provide US\$2 million annually under the framework of the UNESCO trust fund to	continue to implement the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and

<sup>3</sup> Master of Public Administration degree

<sup>4</sup> The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is an economic development program of the African Union, aiming to aims to provide an overarching vision and policy framework for accelerating economic co-operation and integration among African countries. <link: <http://www.nepad.org/>>

		professionals;	support education development programs;	African Institutions of Higher Education; continue to promote the establishment and development of the Confucius Institute and Confucius Classrooms; sponsor 100 programs by academic institutions and scholars of the two sides; propose to implement the "China-Africa Think Tanks 10+10 Partnership Plan";
<b>6<sup>th</sup> FOCAC Ministerial Conference (2015, Johannesburg)</b>	offer 2,000-degree education opportunities in China and 30,000 Chinese government scholarships;	train for Africa senior professionals on government administration for national development through the Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development; <sup>5</sup> train 200,000 local African vocational and technical personnel and provide Africa with 40,000 training opportunities in China.	support the continued implementation of UNESCO-China Funds-In-Trust;	continue to implement the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education; support African universities in establishing China research centres and vice versa; welcomes the inclusion by African countries of Chinese language teaching as part of their national education systems; continue to support Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms;

(Source: FOCAC website. Link: <http://www.focac.org/eng/>)

In the above sections, I have briefly showed the different forms of China-Africa education cooperation and exchange, including the one-way educational aid, such as governmental scholarships, and the joint establishments, such as laboratories and institutes set up in Africa. Local joint establishments can be more beneficial for the

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<sup>5</sup> Initiated by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2015, the Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development was set up in Peking University, aiming to review and share the successful experience of China and other developing countries; to build a teaching and research system of national development by integrating theory and practice; to cultivate high-level talent equipped with comprehensive theoretical knowledge, a broad international vision and open mindedness, talent capable of working for national development and making decisions in light of national conditions for developing countries. <link: <http://www.isscad.pku.edu.cn/>>

local side for the following reasons: first, this model is more economic and convenient. This is because local joint establishments are set up *in Africa*, and advanced Chinese knowledge, technology and professionals are brought in here too. Local students can study or do research in these joint establishments without travelling to China. Second, this model intends to help local educational institutes establish systematic knowledge and discipline. The joint laboratories and research centres bring in advanced knowledge, technology and academic disciplines which can be systematically learnt, absorbed and developed by local students, researchers and professionals. Compared with the individual scholarship students who study in China and come back on their own, this model could also help local countries to gather a group of talented people and build a research team, which extends the knowledge of the joint establishments locally. Third, these establishments can be more effective, because they can conduct projects to deal with local country's specific issues, meet local country's specific demand and produce real short-term benefits. For example, China's Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University has been working with South Africa's KwaZulu-Natal province for ten years to carry out a poverty alleviation project through teaching local people fungus growing skills. A collaborative research centre and more than 30 production bases have been established locally, from which local people can learn the new skills, grow fungus and earn extra income by selling the products. This poverty alleviation project, as South Africa's President Office concludes, is the most influential and effective poverty alleviation project in this country (Wang, 2016).

Although the creation of the above listed joint establishments *in* Africa is of benefit to Africa in many ways, it should be noted that a number of these joint establishments, such as the CI and the 20+20 Cooperation Plan, were created by the Chinese government. Since the win-win approach was adopted by China to deal with China-Africa relations from the 1980s, I am interested to find out if and how these collaborative projects and establishments are equally beneficial for China. Specifically, why China has initiated these kinds of joint projects, how these establishments manage the operational challenges created by the involvement of individuals from both sides, what kind of power technology has been constructed in these joint institutions and what kind of role these establishments play in terms of promoting China's national interest. Therefore, I chose one joint educational establishment – the Confucius Institute – as the case study of this thesis to look for answers to these questions.

## **1.2 A Portrait of the Confucius Institute**

The Confucius Institute (CI) is an organisation established by the Chinese government in 2004 to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries. Ms. Zhili Chen, the Minister of Education and later Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, suggested using the most prominent figure of Confucianism to name this institution (Nie, 2008). Zaharna (2014) suggested that naming the institute after the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551-479 BC) was



intended to symbolise the longevity of the Chinese culture and the longevity envisioned for the initiative. Additionally, Confucianism is considered by the Chinese people to capture the essence of the Chinese culture that is permeated with Confucian values (Dell, 2008).

The CI usually operates around the world in co-operation with local universities, colleges or governments. Since its creation, it has led to the establishment of a sister programme – the Confucius Classroom (CC) – which partners with local secondary schools, primary schools or school districts. Since the first CI opened its door in November 2004 in South Korea, a network of 512 CIs and 1073 CCs had been created by the end of 2016. These centres provide direct links between 140 countries and regions with China through around 2 million CI students (Hanban Website, 2016a). Among similar organisations, only the Alliance Francaise and the British Council cover more than 100 countries; however these organisations were established 120 and 80 years ago respectively (British Council, n.d.-a; Alliance Francaise, n.d.). Martin Davidson, Chief Executive of the British Council and Klaus-Dieter Lehmann, President of the Goethe Institute, conclude that the development of the CI has been as rapid as the development of Chinese economy and that the progress that the CI has made within a decade took the UK, France, Germany and Spain several decades to achieve (Phoenix Satellite Television, 2012b). King (2014) suggests that the development of the CI is possibly the largest language promotion project the world has ever seen.

Together with the CI's extraordinary development, there exists a plethora of research, discussions and debates on the role of the organisation, among which the most commonly used term to describe the practical function of the initiative is "soft power". The CI was established to promote the Chinese language and culture, and a country's language and culture are often regarded as 'soft' national resources in comparison to 'hard' resources such as military, economy, territory, population, and natural resources. The soft resources delivered by the CI are intended to help China establish a positive image and to advance its position in international environments. This is because they can generate '*soft effect*', such as making a country more appealing to foreigners and other countries, rather than forcing one's will through coercion and threat that could be elicited by a strong military or through inducements or payments that could be achieved by a strong economy (Nye, 2005; Cho and Jeong, 2008; Wang and Lu, 2008; Ding and Saunders, 2006; Paradise, 2009; Rebol, 2011; Liu, 2007; Guo, 2008; Lee, 2010; Yang, 2010; Hubbert, 2014; Kurlantzick, 2007).

Nye (2004b) stated that culture is one important source of soft power; however, by creating the terms of soft power and hard power, Nye not only divides national resources into soft and hard, but importantly he introduces a power that could *attract* others rather than coerce others. As he defines it, soft power is "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments" (Nye, 2004b, p. x), whilst hard power is the ability to force others, through threats or reward, to do

what they would otherwise not do (Keohane and Nye, 1998). Simply put, in behavioural terms, soft power is the ability to attract and hard power is the ability to coerce and induce.

The soft power effect is what the CI has been designed to produce. As the CI website shows, the CI has “provided scope for people all over the world to learn about Chinese language and culture”. By doing this, it has become a bridge of “reinforcing friendship and cooperation between China and the rest of the world” (Hanban Website, 2016a). This statement resonates with the essence of Nye’s soft power theory, because the logic here is simple: by helping foreign people to know more about Chinese language, culture and other positive Chinese knowledge, the CI intends to generate attraction to foreigners so that they will befriend with China. Consequently, China can have a better reputation on the world stage and gain a favourable position in international environments.

But what is the real situation? Firstly, it has been widely observed that the CI is a tool of China’s soft power or the CI contributes to China’s soft power, but the establishment of the CI does not automatically bring about desired effects. One can only argue the CI is a soft power tool once he or she has evaluated the CI’s attractiveness towards foreigners and examined the attitudes of those who are involved in the activities of the CI. I have not seen systematic research that assesses the appeal and demonstrates the soft power effects of the CI. Secondly, some

incidents and controversial issues that have involved the CI, such as the closure of a number of CIs in the US, Canada, Japan, France and Germany, have shown that in some places, the CI had for a variety of reasons, elicited suspicion or even repugnance instead of attraction. It is true that (Nye, 2004b) acknowledges that soft power resources vary depending on the social context and are not necessarily attractive to all audiences in all circumstances. However, current literature does not explain why the CI, in these incidents, became a failing soft power tool. Thirdly, each CI is a joint venture between China and a local institute in a foreign country. Current discussions on the CI seem to only focus on the CI's contribution to China while ignoring the benefits to the local partners in the host country. One could argue that the reason why local partners want to establish a CI with China is because they receive immediate material benefits, such as the minimum 100,000 US Dollars CI set-up funds or annual subsidy in some cases. Here, the material benefits should be seen as payment or reward provided by China to entice local partners to cooperate, but in Nye's soft power and hard power theories, these methods clearly belong to the exercise of hard power (Nye, 2004b). Therefore, the claim that the CI is a soft power initiative seems to be fundamentally problematic and this will be further discussed in the literature review chapter.

### **1.3 The Confucius Institute and Foucault's Conception of Power**

Although the soft power theory does not seem to be solid enough to explain the CI phenomenon, it did assist me in developing a foundation of understanding of power

in international relations and this led me to look for answers to the questions that I had during the critique of soft power.

First, it must be admitted that language and culture are important elements of a country's national resources, but they are intangible and immeasurable, not like the tangible resources such as population, economy and military. The CI is an organisation disseminating China's soft national resources such as Chinese language, culture and other positive Chinese knowledge. Why does China set up the CI and disseminate its language, culture and positive knowledge?

Second, it seems easy to find examples that show that a country uses its tangible resources, such as military and economic power to obtain preferred outcomes; but language and culture are intangible and impossible to grasp, so how can a country use them to obtain preferred outcomes?

Third, when tangible resources are applied to solve international issues, such as using military forces to intervene in international disputes, the process and immediate effects are easy to see and feel; but how do intangible resources, such as language and culture, work and what effects would they create in an international environment?

To answer these questions, one needs to investigate how these soft national

resources work in a more intangible and non-material sense of power. Unlike traditional power theorists who argue that the dissemination of these resources can automatically lead to positive outcomes (Morgenthau, 1967; Carr, 1964; Schweller, 1993; Zakaria, 1998; Waltz, 1988), Foucault provides a productive, dynamic and diffused notion of power. This notion of power does not see power as a concrete property or a single one-way relationship between the ruling and the ruled. Instead, power is understood as a network of relations, a power technology and a perpetual motion that is sustained by the dynamics of power/knowledge. All human individuals are inevitably drawn into this network of power and are circulated, controlled, transformed and constituted by a whole set of disciplinary mechanisms, techniques and procedures. The operations of these mechanisms and techniques are based on certain norms, truth and knowledge; and this fundamental operation of power on human bodies aims to install these norms, truth and knowledge to them and transform them in all types of disciplinary institutes, such as factories, armies and schools, to be useful subjects for these institutes as well as for the society. While the operation of power produces subjects, it also produces new forms of knowledge and many other effects that could be re-applied to the operation of power. This is the dynamics of power and knowledge, which sustains and perpetuates the society. In short, through his political anatomy of social organisations, Foucault shows us how power operates through a whole set of invisible disciplinary mechanisms, techniques and procedures in space, and produces its subjects, knowledge, truth and other effects (Foucault, 1995; Foucault, 1982; Foucault, 1996b).

According to Foucault's concept of power, the CI, like all social institutes, should also be seen as a disciplinary institute which establishes a comprehensive power technology (Foucault, 1995). This power technology is a combination of the CI's power structure, the CI's norm, and the CI's power techniques and instruments. The Chinese language and culture, as a form of knowledge, should be seen as an important part of the CI's norm. Within the CI's power structure, the operations of power techniques and instruments aim to instil the CI's norm into the individuals who are involved in the CI's activities and transform them to be the CI's institutionalised subjects. These subjects would not only be able to speak Chinese language and understand Chinese culture, but also become useful for the CI and, possibly for other CI-related organisations and presence. By speaking the Chinese language and understanding the Chinese culture, the institutionalised foreign individuals would communicate effectively with Chinese people and understand them easily, and possibly, have less conflict with them; by creating institutionalised subjects that are useful for the CI and other Chinese institutes, the CI could use them to help China promote its national interest in foreign countries. Here, I felt that I found a good analytical framework that could explain the role of language and culture, especially through the power technology of the CI, in producing desired power effects.

#### **1.4 Research Questions and Thesis Outline**

In the course of the following chapters, my principal aim will be to examine the role of the CI in Africa and how the CI is beneficial for China's national interest in Africa and China-Africa relations. The Chinese government released its first African Policy Paper in 2006 and the second one in 2015 (FOCAC Website, 2006; Xinhua News Website, 2015). Comparing these two documents, one can find that both emphasize the importance of promoting China-Africa relations in the long term and developing mutual beneficial cooperation, whereas the second Africa policy paper, released at the second summit of the FOCAC when Chinese President Xi Jinping and African leaders gathered in Johannesburg, not only enriches the content of the first policy paper by proposing new cooperative areas and objectives, but also elaborates China's African foreign policy objectives in a more comprehensive, in-depth and inclusive way:

Under the principle of "establishing and developing comprehensive strategic and cooperative China-Africa partnership and consolidating and bolstering the community of shared future between China and Africa", the second African policy paper points out that China aims to promote the "all-round development of China-Africa cooperation" which includes the promotion of political mutual trust, cooperation in international affairs, economic and trade cooperation, development cooperation, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, peace and security in Africa, and exchanges and cooperation in consular, immigration, judicial and police areas (Xinhua News Website, 2015). This policy paper suggests that China use its



“advantages in development experience, applied technology, funds and market [to] help Africa overcome the two major bottlenecks constraining its development – backward infrastructure and inadequate professional and skilled personnel” (Xinhua News Website, 2015).

This policy paper also highlights the importance of the Confucius Institute by stating that “China will continue to set up more Confucius Institutes in African countries” (Xinhua News Website, 2015). Although the CI is only mentioned in the section of “expanding exchanges and cooperation in culture and sports” (Xinhua News Website, 2015), it may play a much bigger role that could also include the promotion of education and human resources development in Africa, the sharing of knowledge between China and Africa, the popularisation of Chinese technology and businesses in Africa, and the enhancement of mutual understanding and recognition between Chinese and African people. In this sense, the CI may play an important role that includes not only expanding cultural exchange and cooperation by teaching Chinese language and culture to African people, but also contributing to the realisation of other China’s foreign objectives in Africa. In other words, the CI may play an key role in the formation of the “community of shared future between China and Africa” (Xinhua News Website, 2015).

Based on the above understanding of China’s African policy objectives and the CI’s potential connections with these objectives, I need to dissect the organisation and

search for answers to the main research question by pursuing the following lines of enquiry:

- Why and how was the CI initially established?
- What is the formation of the CI's power structure?
- How does the organisation operate?
- And most importantly, what effects have been produced by the CI in the host countries?

The answers to these questions rely on an empirically-grounded analysis of the case of the various CIs in Africa in a two-dimensional power analytical framework. The theoretical resources for this framework will be primarily derived from Foucault's works on power and subject, supplemented by traditional understandings of power in international relations. In the first dimensional analysis, I aim to find out why and how the CI's concrete substance is set up in the first place. In the second dimensional analysis, I want to examine what the CI's power technology is like and what power effects have been produced through its operation.

The remainder of this thesis is divided up as follows: in Chapter 2, I review the relevant literature on the CI and other equivalent language and culture promotion organisations (LCPOs) in the discourse of power. I discuss the established understandings of LCPOs and show that there is a notable gap in the existing literature. In order to fill in this research gap, I bring in Foucault's understanding of power which is useful at explaining the *how* of power. I then undertake an examination and a critique of Foucault's power theory in parallel, which illustrates both the strengths and problems of his power theory. At this end of this chapter, I

formulate a two-dimensional analytical framework through combining the key elements of both traditional understandings of power and Foucault's conception of power for my case study of the CI in Africa.

With this analytical framework in place, Chapter 3 provides the methodology or the "hierarchy of considerations" of carrying out this research (Hammond and Wellington, 2013). It includes the rationale for the application of particular research methods, the implementation of data collection and analysis, and the management of possible practical and ethical issues related to the empirical work.

I then introduce my analysis. Chapter 4 examines the strategic and material supports given to the CI by the Chinese government in terms of its establishment and operation, aiming to find out how the CI is set up in the first place and how it sustains itself materially. Because Foucault's power theory only demonstrates the power operations *inside* of social institutions without explaining how these institutions are established initially, I draw the traditional understandings of power in IR which provide material thinking on power resources and strategies of social entities to elaborate on the point before examining what is happening inside of the CI. This is the first dimension of my analysis, which sees the CI as a concrete entity or a tangible thing and explains how it was strategically and materially established.

Chapter 5 launches the second dimension of my analysis. That is to say, I examine the

CI *internally* to understand the power technology of the CI. By drawing up the CI power structure and analysing its power techniques, I show what the power technology of the CI is like and how power operates within the CI. Over the course of the analysis, I attempt to give an explanation on the paradox of Foucault's power theory – why on the one hand Foucault's notion of power is a dominatory notion of power and on the other hand individuals seem to be able to resist the operations of power.

By examining the power effects of the CI in Chapter 6, I demonstrate how these effects contribute to the dynamics of the CI's power/knowledge, as well as what kind of subjects are produced by the CI. I find that the CI's institutionalised subjects, the CIs and other forms of Chinese presence in Africa have formed a community of common destiny which binds them together.

Chapter 7 draws together my discussions on the material and strategic support of the CI, the internal power operations of the CI and the effects produced by the CI to argue that the CI has been playing a positive role in promoting China's national interest in Africa. Finally, I illustrate the limitations of this thesis that can be further explored.

### **1.5 Contributions**

This project offers some insights into how a country might use both its tangible

resources, such as human resources and financial support, and intangible resources, such as language and culture, to promote its national interest overseas.

As for my case study of the CI in Africa, China invests its tangible resources to set up the organisation. Once the organisation – a physical body – has been set up, an invisible power technology starts to operate inside of the physical body – based on certain norms including language, culture and other intangible resources – that transforms local nationals to be useful subjects for China as well as eliciting other useful power effects for the expansion and consolidation of China's presence in Africa. Hence, the CIs in Africa contribute to the promotion of China's power network and national interest in Africa.

In the course of developing this thesis, I hope to fulfil a secondary purpose: to contribute to debates about how Foucault's work might better be put to use in IR. Specifically, I have developed a two-dimensional power analytical framework. In the first dimension, I understand the CI in the discourse of traditional understanding of power. That is to say that I examine the CI as a concrete entity or a physical object. The resources it gets from China and China's ability to use these resources are key to establish and support the substantive body of the CI. The analysis in this dimension allows me to reveal the construction of the organisation. However, the establishment of an organisation does not automatically lead to the realisation of its aims. Therefore, in the second dimension, I adopt a Foucauldian perspective and examine

the power technology of the CI. In other words, I need to look at what is underneath the CI's concrete shell and how power operates inside of its physical body. This allows me to understand the power structure, power techniques and instruments of the organisation. In order to understand whether the power technology of the CI functions well, I also need to examine the power effects of this organisation. What power effects are produced by the CI determines what kind of role the CI is playing. By comparing the power effects with its power intention, I will be better able to understand the value of the organisation. Although the case study of this project is the CI in Africa, the two-dimensional power analytical framework could be generalised to examine the CI in other continents, or other countries' LCPOs, or perhaps other international organisations.

An additional contribution of this thesis lies in the re-interpretation of the co-existence of power and resistance in Foucault's conception of power. In Chapter 2, I point out a seemingly paradoxical thought in Foucault's power theory: the co-existence of power and resistance. Foucault's power theory is built on his theoretical proposition of the "death of man". Before an individual is constituted by power to be a subject who can speak, think, judge and act, he is only an unconscious, silent and easily influenced body. Power plays a fundamental role in producing self-identical subjects (Foucault, 1995; Foucault, 1982; Foucault, 1996b). Although Foucault argues his notion of power is a positive notion of power, his conception of power should be seen as an essentially dominatory notion of power because

everyone is weaved in the power relations and everyone is under the transformation of the disciplinary power regime. But Foucault in his later work states where there is power there is resistance (Foucault, 1998; Foucault, 1980b; Foucault, 1996a), how can power at the most fundamental level constitute human beings into self-identifying subjects whilst in the meantime these subjects are able to resist this power transformation because of their instinctive awareness that might be out of the control of this power? The analysis of my empirical data found that resistance occurs secondarily to the fundamental transformation of power as a form of effect. The appearance of resistance can be understood from two aspects: first, resistance could happen between different subjects who are produced by different power technologies; second, resistance could happen within one subject who is constituted by different power technologies.

## Chapter 2

### Literature Review

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This chapter aims to accomplish three tasks. The first task is to review the existing literature on the CI and similar language and culture promotion organisations (LCPOs), to identify which theories and analytical frameworks have been applied to the research of these institutes. This will aid in the detection of problems and gaps in existing research on the discourse of power in IR, and to provide a rationale for undertaking this research.

In an attempt to complement the existing research, the second task is to introduce Foucault's conception of power, to discuss his main themes and the essence of his power theory, and to highlight any fundamental problems with his theory in the current literature. Following on from the above two tasks, the third task is to design a model of a two-dimensional power analytical framework for my case study of the CIs in Africa by combining Foucault's conception of power with traditional understandings of power.

#### 2.1 Literature on LCPOs and the CI

More than 30 countries in the world sponsor at least one language and culture promotion organisation (LCPO) overseas. An LCPO refers to an organisation established and sponsored by a country to disseminate its language, culture and other forms of positive knowledge to people of different nationalities. These LCPOs



usually describe themselves as benign organisations aiming to promote international cultural cooperation and reinforce understanding between countries and peoples, but it can be argued that the real role of these organisations has not been fully explored. Existing literature shows that attempts to understand the role of these organisations predominantly rely on the theories informed by traditional understandings of power in international relations. That is to say, these institutes are usually seen as a useful tool or element of a country's cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy or soft power/new public diplomacy (Cull, 2008a; Hartig, 2010; Rawnsley, 2009; Nye, 2004a; Yang, 2010). Notably, existing academic literature on the CI accounts for the majority of the research on LCPOs.

### **2.1.1 Traditional Understanding of Power**

The notion of "power" underlies most analyses of politics and international relations. In traditional power theories, despite the numerous definitions of power, there are two principal approaches to power analysis: one sees power as a property or resource, and the other treats power as the ability to achieve an objective.

For those who see power as a physical resource, power equals the possession of tangible and intangible resources. Tangible resources can be a country's geography, natural resources, industrial capability, military strength, economic strength and population whilst intangible resources may include a country's culture, national morale, diplomacy and political system (Morgenthau, 1967; Carr, 1964; Schweller,

1993; Zakaria, 1998; Waltz, 1988). The more power resources of both types that a country has, the more likely this country will win a favourable position in international affairs and diplomacy. For example, Simonds and Emeny (1935), Sprout and Sprout (1945, 1962), and Wight (1946) claim that states with the most military power can be considered as “Great Powers” in world politics. In their eyes, these national resources can be possessed by international actors like a commodity and can be partially or wholly transferred or alienated. Thus, Mearsheimer (2001, p.57) argues that power “represents nothing more than the specific assets or material resources that are available to a state”.

However, in world politics there are many examples where the possession of the relevant assets or material resources did not produce the outcome commensurate with the power or the resources that would be predicted by these theories, as demonstrated by the failure of the United States in the Vietnam War. Thus, Guzzini (2010, p.7) has noted, “control over resources ... does not necessarily translate into control over outcomes”. Consequently, the rational choice made on the basis of given interests defined in terms of power, expectations, value and conventions may instead play a more important role in terms of outcomes (Keohane, 1984). In other words, the ability to use power, i.e. who uses what power resources in what ways and in what situations for what purposes, must be clearly identified. Baldwin (2002) notes that Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) first developed this approach of power analysis where they “conceive of power as a relation in which the behaviour of actor A at

least partially causes a change in the behaviour of actor B” (Baldwin, 2002, p.178). March (1955), Simon (1957), Dahl (1957), Nagel (1975), Oppenheim (1976) and others further developed this concept of power. Among them, the views of Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes are central to understanding this approach.

Dahl famously formulated power as follows: “A has power over B to the extent to which A can get B to do something which B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957, pp.202-3). Bachrach and Baratz (1962) further explore this formula of power by suggesting that A can also prevent B from doing what B otherwise would. In these two understandings of power, there is always a coercive force exercised by A over B. Based on these two views above, there arises another question: can B *voluntarily* do something that A wants him to do? Lukes (1974) argues that if B did, it would still indicate an application of power, because it means that A uses power strategies to prevent B from having grievances by shaping his or her perceptions, cognitions and preferences in a way that he or she accepts his or her role in the existing order of things - either because he or she can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because he or she sees it as natural and unchangeable, or because he values it as divinely ordained and beneficial. And he describes this exercise of power “the supreme and most insidious” (Lukes, 1974, p.24).

Indeed, in Lukes’ assessment, A could implement effective strategies to shape B’s perceptions, cognitions and preferences and avoid B’s discovery of its real interest,

therefore, A has power over B. However, given the primacy of national interest in international relations, it could also be argued that B might have been encouraged, if subliminally, by its own unspecific interests (perhaps in the long term) to do as A desired. In this sense, B would also use strategies towards A in this power relationship. So power is not determined by a one dimensional relationship between strong and weak parties. Lukes fails to include this point in his discussion. Apart from this, he also fails to explain what kind of strategies can be used to shape someone's perceptions, cognitions and preferences. In other words, the means of achieving B's willingness to do something A wants him to do remains undiscovered.

The followers of traditional power theories continue to look for answers to the questions in Lukes' formulation of power and they seem to have reached a consensus that language, culture, political value and other intangible resources could help a country to shape foreign people's mind and make them do something willingly for it (Nye, 2004b; Cowan and Cull, 2008; Keohane and Nye, 1998). From this assumption, a number of terms and conceptions have been created including cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy and soft power that are commonly applied to the analysis of LCPOs.

### **2.1.2 LCPO as Cultural Diplomacy Tool**

Cultural diplomacy can be defined as "an actor's attempt to manage the international environment by making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas

and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad” (Cull, 2008b, p.33). This definition reflects the essence of traditional understandings of power: first, it sees cultural resources as a form of power resources that are possessed by a nation; second, cultural diplomacy reflects a country’s ability in using these resources to leverage the international environment for the achievement of its desired outcome.

Because the principal responsibility of LCPOs is to deliver a country’s cultural resources to foreign people, they are usually seen as a cultural diplomacy tool such as the British Council, Italian Cultural Institutes and the Confucius Institute (Cull, 2008b; Cull, 2009). In the context of cultural diplomacy, Maack (2001) analyses the cultural strategies of three countries’ LCPOs and their libraries, the British Council, Alliance Française and United States Information Agency, in Francophone Africa during the Cold War. He notices that Britain, France and US employed similar strategies in cultural efforts, including language instruction, library collections and services, cultural programs, and book donations. Pentlin (2008) points out the importance of the Goethe Institute in terms of understanding Germany’s cultural diplomacy in the twentieth century, because the Goethe Institute’s predecessor Akademie was seen as a means of spreading ‘superior’ German culture to other countries by the Nazi regime and the institute was the largest cultural-political organisation of the Nazi State in Europe. Although Hartig (2010) disagrees with the view that the CI is the Chinese version of Germany’s Goethe Institute or Britain’s British Council due to the lack of the principle of non-intervention by the government,

he still argues that the CI is a tool of China's cultural diplomacy albeit with Chinese characteristics. Schneider (2009), in her review of the US' cultural diplomacy and its programs, suggests that an organisation like the British Council, should be housed in and indirectly linked to the US' State Department in order for the country's cultural diplomacy to thrive.

Other researchers using the cultural diplomacy theory include Katakura (1979)'s studies of the Japan Foundation, Wilfert-Portal (2008)'s studies of Alliance Française and Borjian (2011)'s studies of British Council, which all see the LCPOs as a cultural diplomacy vehicle which plays an important role in the country's foreign policy and relations with other countries.

According to the above scholars, the LCPOs should be seen as a cultural diplomacy tool because they deliver a country's cultural resources to foreign people. By doing so, they assume that a country could eventually be in a more favourable position for managing its international relations. Here, there is a consensus among those who treat LCPOs as a cultural diplomacy tool: the promotion of a country's cultural resources overseas can automatically lead to the achievement of a country's favourable position in international relations. This view derives from the first approach of traditional power analysis, thus the same problem can be found here: why making its cultural resources and achievements known to foreigners can help a country manage the international environment? How do cultural resources influence

foreign people? Rich cultural resources do not necessarily translate into desired outcome. The consideration of how to use these resources in what situations for what purposes is perhaps more important than the actual possession of such power resources.

### **2.1.3 LCPO as Public Diplomacy Tool**

With an extension of the meaning of cultural diplomacy, Cowan and Cull (2008) define public diplomacy as an international actor's attempt to advance the ends of policy by engaging with foreign publics. They suggest that the exercise of public diplomacy comprises of five elements: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international broadcasting. As with the definition of cultural diplomacy, one can also find the essence of traditional understanding of power in the definition of public diplomacy: first, culture and other intangible resources, such as media and the Internet, are still seen as important resources to support the use of public diplomacy; second, public diplomacy emphasises on a country's ability of managing international environment by engaging with foreign publics, which does not only include the one-way dissemination of culture, political value and other intangible resources, but also involves listening to foreign people's ideas, communicating with foreign individuals and exchanging them with its own citizens.

Based on this framework, Cull (2008a), in his book on the history of the US

Information Agency (USIA) from 1945 to 1989, discusses how the USIA used its resources, such as VOA,<sup>6</sup> films, cultural and exchange-of-persons programmes, and libraries to reach foreign publics. He argues that the USIA served as an effective vehicle for the US' public diplomacy, especially in the era of the Cold War. By the same token, d'Hooghe (2007, p.29), in her discussion of the rise of China's public diplomacy, highlights that the CI is an "instrument of" and "latest addition to" China's public diplomacy. Similarly, Rawnsley (2009, p.285) suggests that China's approach to public diplomacy has focused on the economy and culture, and that "the culture approach is centred within the new Confucius Institute". Zaharna (2010), Flew and Hartig (2014) all agree that the CI has become a central part of Chinese public diplomacy initiatives, but they give extra attention to the network of the CI and describe the CI as a *networked* public diplomacy initiative, because the network could reach and engage more foreign publics, and consequently have more potential implications for the operation of public diplomacy. In the same framework of public diplomacy, Hartig (2015, p.3) suggests that through the work of the CI, the Chinese government could utilise foreigners' fascination with the Chinese language and culture to attract international partners to co-finance the CIs and thus partially contribute to China's international charm offensive. But one would argue that the reason for international partners supporting and co-financing the CI is not only due to the attraction of Chinese language and culture, but also because of these international partners' own interests.

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<sup>6</sup> Voice of America (VOA) is a United States government-funded multimedia news source and the official external broadcasting institution of the United States. Link: <http://www.insidevoa.com/>



Indeed, public diplomacy extends the meaning of cultural diplomacy and highlights the importance of engaging foreign publics in achieving an international actor's foreign policy ends, and the LCPOs do play an important role in engaging foreign individuals in their activities. But the question of why the engagement of foreign people in the LCPOs' activities can lead to the achievement of favourable position in international environment remains unanswered. It seems implicit that foreign individuals can automatically become supportive of and attracted to the proactive country, once they have been involved in the LCPOs. If so, how does this happen and what is the transformation process like?

#### **2.1.4 LCPO as Soft Power Tool**

By coining and popularising the term *soft power* since 1990s, Nye seems to focus on answering the question on public diplomacy of why the engagement of foreign people could help a country to achieve favourable position in international environment (Nye, 1990b; Nye, 1990a; Nye, 2004b). Melissen (2005) and Wang (2011) suggest that soft power can be seen as the new public diplomacy, because soft power aims to engage foreign publics as well as to *attract* them to do what the proactive country wants. Put another way, soft power refers to the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments (Nye, 2004b, p.X). Here, one can find the overlapping interpretation of power between soft power and Lukes' concept of power. Whilst Luke's does not explicate the specific factors that

make others do something voluntarily, Nye (2004b) finds that soft power relies on the sources of a country's culture, political and social values, and foreign policy.

As I have mentioned in my introduction chapter, the majority of existing research on the CI examines the CI from a soft power perspective. Including Nye (2005) who cites the creation of CI as one example of China's soft power, Cho and Jeong (2008); Wang and Lu (2008), Ding and Saunders (2006), Starr (2009), Paradise (2009), Rebol (2011), Liu (2007), Guo (2008), Lee (2010), Yang (2010), Hubbert (2014) and Kurlantzick (2007) all look at the CI through a soft power lens. There is a common consensus in their argument: the CI is a soft power tool or the CI contributes to China's soft power, because the CI disseminates China's language, culture and other positive information to foreign individuals, that can influence foreign peoples' minds in a positive way and win their hearts. Consequently, the CI would help China to create a favourable position in international environment and achieve its national interest overseas.

This logic again reflects the problem inherited from traditional understanding of power. That is to say that there is an assumption that the promotion of China's language, culture and other positive information could lead to a favourable position for China in the international environment. If language, culture and other intangible power resources can transform people by shaping people's mind and making them more receptive to ideas and concepts that support Chinese international ambitions, then what is the transformation process like? Also, since the essence of

demonstrable soft power is to show the ability of getting what a country wants through attraction, to apply the soft power label to the CI is to acknowledge that China has been attracting foreign nationals to it through the CI.

However, few scholars have examined the effects of the CI to find out whether the CI truly deserves the soft power label. As one of them, Procopio (2015), through her case study of the CI in South Africa, argues that the CI is only a *partially* effective tool of China's soft power. She first admits that language and culture delivered by the CI are effective in terms of encouraging students to express positive opinions about China; however she does so without examining what the transformation process is like. She then argues that the CI is only partially effective because the two executive parties of individual branches of the CI have only "nuanced" but not complete trust; and the future prospects of the CI students, with regard to their personal and professional lives, are inadequately advocated by the CI. Here she seems to suggest that the effectiveness of the CI relies on the effectiveness of both the executive level and the student level. But the CI is a systematic and massive project involving Beijing's CI Headquarters, many Chinese ministries and departments, each individual CI's Board of Directors, the Chinese and local directors, administrators, teachers, students and other forms of Chinese presence including Chinese private-sector companies. In order to fully assess the effectiveness of the CI, one must examine the power hierarchy of the CI at all levels, considering the contributions made by all of the different actors in this hierarchy.

The application of soft power on the CI has another problem. The essence of soft power is to introduce an attractive notion of power rather than a threatening or intimidating notion of power. If the CI represents China's soft power, it should be able to generate attraction to foreign individuals so that they will comply with the strategic aims of the CI and China. However, through its work the CI has attracted a great deal of suspicion, concerns and criticisms that in some cases even led to the closure of several centres. The negative views on the CI are easy to find: Brady (2008), Fan (2008) and Sheffenhagen (2008) see the CI as an undisguised propaganda tool of the Chinese government. Shigesato Toshiyuki, former director of the university affairs board of the Osaka Sangyo University in Japan, even described the CI as a "spy agency" that is gathering cultural intelligence. His criticisms led to the abolishment of the CI in this university in March 2010 (People's Daily Online, 2010). However, the majority of the concerns around the work of the CI relate to its alleged interference in academic freedoms (Paradise, 2009; Mosher, 2012; Sahlins, 2015; Schmidt, 2010; Chey, 2008). For example, Sahlins (2015) describes the CI as an academic malware to the freedom of western academia; both Paradise (2009) and Mosher (2012) label the CI a "Trojan Horse" because the CI could "subvert, co-opt and ultimately control western academic discourse on matters pertaining to China" (Mosher, 2012, p.2). At the peak of the discussions about the CI, the ChinaFile Conversation invites more than 20 American scholars, journalists and officials to have a debate over the CI (ChinaFile, 2014). Here, the discussions on the nature and function of the CI, and the

derogatory labels that they use, show that the CI does not always elicit attraction. Instead, the CI seems to have become an example of failing soft power. Therefore, the application of the conventional soft power theory on the analysis of the CI is not appropriate either.

### **2.1.5 A Notable Gap in Existing Literature**

Despite the numerous interpretations of the CI and other LCPOs, discussions regarding the nature of these organisations seem to be restricted to one dimension: is an LCPO a tool of a country's cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, or soft power and why? First of all, the terms cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, soft power do not seem to show obvious distinctions (Hartig, 2010) because they all derive from traditional understandings of power and refer to a country's ability in managing the international environment through using certain intangible resources, such as culture, to influence foreign people's mind, make them attracted to the proactive country and to do things in the way that the country wants. This prescriptive use of labels renders the debates on the nature of the CI less meaningful. Secondly, there is a common assumption that the promotion of Chinese language, culture and other forms of positive knowledge will automatically lead to the promotion of China's influence and presence overseas, because these intangible national resources can affect foreign perceptions and attract them to China's agenda. But what is the process of transforming people's mind actually like? This question leads to the third problem of current literature: the CI, like other LCPOs, is merely seen as a concrete

entity in its tangible shape, a fixed reality of China's extended resources and presence, an objective tool of China's foreign diplomacy, and a physical vehicle to transport China's influence via the promotion of Chinese language and culture. But no research has systematically examined how the CI operates under its concrete shell and what effects the CI has produced.

Without answering these questions, I will not be able to fully understand the real role of the CI in China's national interest overseas and China-Africa relations. That is to say, in order to answer my main research question, I must *deconstruct* the CI to examine its *internal* operations of power and discover how Chinese language, culture and other forms of Chinese knowledge transform foreign individuals. I must also endeavour to find out what effects have been generated through my case study of the CIs in African countries. Only by examining the internal operations and effects of the CI, can I accurately establish what kind of role the CI is playing. Since traditional understandings of power are not able to provide enough theoretical references for this task, I had to source another more applicable power theory. I found that Foucault's conception of power seems to provide an analytical framework to answer my research question and consequently fill in this research gap.

## **2.2 Foucault's Conception of Power**

McNay (2003) and Smart (1985) point out that the theme of power should be seen as the cornerstone and underlying continuity in Foucault's entire oeuvre, although the

notion of power was not directly addressed and analysed until the publication of his most well-known book *Discipline and Punish*. Foucault emphasises the fundamental yet evasive nature of the notion of power in his research by saying if anyone can answer “what is power”, he would “provide an answer to everything” (Foucault, 2003, p.13).

Despite the important position of power in his research, Foucault never properly defines the word “power”. For him, power is a mysterious thing: it exists everywhere; it takes effect and produces effects everywhere. If Foucault’s power theory can serve as a good analytical framework for my case study of the CI in Africa as well as bridging the gaps in the current research on the institute, it may be able to help me explain how power operates inside of the CI and how language, culture and other forms of knowledge transform foreign individuals, and what effects this institute has produced. The following sections will critically examine the “how” of power in social institutions as Foucault demonstrates in his works.

### **2.2.1 Power and the Body**

Echoing Nietzsche’s “God is dead”, Foucault announces the “death of man” in *The Order of Things* (Huijer, 1999, p.62). That is the death of the *modern* man: the autonomous, controlling, rational, self-constituting, self-present, self-evident, transcendental self of Cartesian and Kantian philosophy, which is assumed by conventional political theories. For Descartes, “I think, therefore I am”; for Kant,

there is an epistemological dualism between the knowing transcendental subject and the object that it seeks to know. Ontologically, the dualism of the modern man is one between the transcendental ego, reason, consciousness, soul or mind which transcends not only the body but also the individual person; and an empirical, desiring, passionate, embodied person who is determined and controlled by the transcendental ego. According to this understanding, when we do something, we feel we know why we do this and how we should do this, because we are “fully endowed with consciousness; an autonomous and stable entity, the ‘core’ of the self, and the independent, authentic source of action and meaning” (Hall, 2001, p.79).

Foucault has always adopted an anti-essential, anti-objective and anti-empiricist attitude to deconstruct the so-called rational human subjects. As he describes his efforts, “in short, it is a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its role as originator” (Foucault, 1991b, p.118). Hence, he explicitly rejects the soul/body dualism - especially the idea that the soul, mind or consciousness is primary and is thought to exist somewhere outside of power relations (McLaren, 2002). He says, “what troubles me with these analyses which prioritise ideology is that there is always presupposed a human subject on the lines of the model provided by classical philosophy, endowed with a consciousness which power is thought to seize on” (Foucault, 1980b, p.58). Instead, he argues that the *body* should take priority: “I wonder whether before one poses the question of ideology, it wouldn’t be more materialist to study first the question of the body and the effects of power on it”



(Foucault, 1980b, p.58).

Based on this standpoint, Foucault prioritises the body as the site of operation and exercise of power, and argues that power operates on the body to produce the soul, the psyche, subjectivity, personality and consciousness; and in turn, it is through this soul that power is exercised on the body (McLaren, 2002). This notion of subjectivity, as commented by Deleuze (2006), is a “folding” or doubling: the inside is an operation of the outside; the exterior produces the interior (the soul) by a doubling, a folding, a reflecting back on itself. In this sense, the human subject is constituted by the various operations of power in history and culture that impinge on him. To be more specific, power exerted on us makes us what we are - bodies subjected to power; before being constituted to be a subject who can speak, think, judge and act, “man” is only a marionette-like, subservient, silent and manipulable body. In other words, human subjects are not originators of what they do; instead, they have been produced as such subjects who are able to do things in such ways. As Foucault concludes, the rational modern man “is an invention of recent date”(Foucault, 1973, p.422); it is “the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces” (Foucault, 1980b, pp.73-4). This view is splendidly demonstrated in his analyses of the relations between power and body in *Discipline and Punish*.

### **2.2.2 Disciplinary Power and the Subject**

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault articulates a history of western European forms of punishment. He traces the dramatic transformation of the way in which power was exercised through punishment. But his aim is not to provide a balanced, scholarly account which weighs up all the available facts, instead, as Elden (2001) indicates, he wants to show that the history of punishment is part of his more general project of a genealogy of the subject, a history of how the modern man is created.

*Discipline and Punish* begins by describing the regime of torture, the dominant form of justice up until the mid-eighteenth century. This power of the sovereign includes practices such as burning, flogging, execution and quartering by horses to punish those who rebelled against laws and to show the monarch's ultimate superiority. Yet at the same time, the attendance of the populace to the spectacle brought an element of potential instability to these punishment practices because the criminal could appear as an anti-hero - especially where the punishment was seen as unjust. In some cases the people turned to revolt against the authoritative figures and freed the condemned man. This unstable form of punishment, because of its disadvantages, was later replaced by a more carefully calculated regime.

This reform of punishment emphasises the specification and classification of crimes – it called for a system of classification in which crimes would be separated and distinguished from one another, assigned their proper places, and matched with corresponding punishments. These punishments would then function as a system of

signs, each signifying a particular crime. The new punishment method would discourage people from criminal behaviour because they could see that every crime had its corresponding punishment. The aim of this new method was not to affect the criminal's body, but rather to influence or control the minds of the population at large. As Foucault noted, this discourse provides a general recipe for the exercise of power over men: "the 'mind' as a surface of inscription for power, with semiology as its tool; the submission of bodies through the control of ideas; the analysis of representation as a principle in a politics of bodies that was much more effective than the ritual anatomy of torture and execution" (Foucault, 1995, p.102).

Against the background of the increasingly individual specification of crime and punishments, Foucault realised a rather inexplicable phenomenon – the adoption of imprisonment became a universal technique of punishment. This penal method did not aim to produce punishment as signs corresponding to various crimes, as in the system demonstrated above; instead, it was designed to operate directly on the body and soul of the criminal. That is to say that prisoners would be made to work in the space of prison to instil a renewed work ethic; they would be isolated from one another, meditate upon their crimes and come to comprehend their guilt; they would fall into a relationship with the supervisors who train them with purposeful exercises, help them repent of their guilt, teach the knowledge of crimes, and ensure they do not commit the wrongdoings again in the future. In this way, the prison produces a particular kind of subjectivity.

From the above, Foucault presents three technologies of punishment: 1) the old monarchical regime of torture; 2) the regime aimed to individually relate crimes and punishments as a publicly comprehensive discourse to discourage people from criminal behaviour; and 3) the regime aimed to operate secretly in an enclosed institution, producing signs as well as trained bodies and souls.

Foucault finds that the third regime won out over the first two in the history of punishment because the power model operates not only on the bodies as the first technology does, but also affects the souls as the second technology does; or simply, it produces useful subjects more completely. From this point, he raises the topic of “discipline” – the techniques of institutionalised supervision and training. He realised that such techniques were developed for various applications in complex social institutes, such as monasteries, armies, hospitals, schools and factories. Therefore, it is not surprising that these techniques also found their way into the justice system through the development of prisons because by the time of the birth of the modern prison, disciplinary techniques were well integrated within all other spheres of social life.

The technology of disciplinary power is a virtual and invisible combination of power structure, power techniques, power instruments and power effects, rather than a physical and visible entity. Individuals cannot see or feel the operation of this

technology on their bodies, but a whole set of techniques, methods, standards and values associated with normalisation has been regulating them imperceptibly. In his discussion of the disciplinary power, Foucault highlights four techniques that produce subjected and practised bodies – “docile” bodies.

The first technique is *‘the art of distribution in space’*. As he writes, discipline requires a comparatively enclosed space as “the protected place of disciplinary monotony” (Foucault, 1995, p.141). Schools, armies, hospitals and factories all have such enclosed space. In this space, each individual has his own place and each place has its individual. Operating within this structure, one can easily recognise the presence and absence of an individual, supervise their conduct and assess, judge and calculate their qualities and merits. Additionally, the space itself is usually distributed according to different uses and to correspond not only to the need of supervision, but also to disrupt dangerous communications and create a useful space - such as the isolated space for contagious patients and separate cells for prison inmates.

Also, in the disciplinary space, the ranks of the individuals are interchangeable. The rank is neither a territory nor a place. Discipline individualises bodies by not giving them a fixed location but by distributing and circulating them in a network of relationships. In short, “the disciplines create spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical” (Foucault, 1995, p.148).

The second technique is through the *'control of activity'*. In the above-mentioned space, what the individuals should do, when they do it and how they do it are decided, regulated and controlled by the head of the hierarchical space in order to achieve the best efficiency and effects. Through the control of their activities, the individuals are offered up to new forms of knowledge, they are neither "speculative physical bodies" nor "bodies imbued with animal spirits nor rational mechanical bodies"; but become bodies of exercise, bodies manipulated by authority and bodies of useful training (Foucault, 1995, p.155).

The third technique is through *the 'organisation of geneses'*. This technique aims to design a detailed plan for capitalising the time of individuals - accumulating in each of them, in their bodies, in their forces or in their abilities in a way that is susceptible of use and control, such as, a school syllabus or an educational programme. With the guidance of this plan, bodies are imposed upon with tasks that are both repetitive yet different, that are both graduated and constrained. This exercise serves to economize the time of life and accumulate it in a useful form through the mediation of arranged time. (Foucault, 1995, p.161)

The fourth technique is through the *'composition of forces'*. Disciplinary power constructs a machine that maximizes its effect through a concerted combination of its elementary parts. In other words, not only does discipline distribute bodies, extract from them and accumulate them, but also compose forces in order to obtain

an efficient machine. Foucault finds that this technique is achieved in several ways. First, it makes the body become an element that may be placed, moved, articulated on others. The body is a segment in a whole ensemble; it is constituted as a part of a multi-segmentary machine. Second, it combines various chronological series to form a composite time. The time of each must be adjusted to the time of the others so that the maximum quantity of forces may be extracted from each and combined with the optimum result. Third, imposing a precise system of command. All activities of the disciplined individuals must be punctuated and sustained by brief and clear injunctions. The orders are prearranged artificial codes. The individuals do not need to understand them but must catch and react to them immediately and unconditionally. (Foucault, 1995, p.162-167)

Foucault argues that these four disciplinary techniques create out of the bodies an individuality that is endowed with four characteristics: cellular, organic, genetic and combinatory (Foucault, 1995, p.167). In this sense, Foucault announces that “discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (Foucault, 1995, p.170). Foucault further discovers that disciplinary power also uses three instruments that influence individual’s soul by internalising the norm to the individuals. In other words, these instruments apply on the bodies of the objectified individuals and finally produce useful subjects.

The first instrument is *hierarchical observation*. Foucault states that the exercise of discipline must depend on a mechanism that coerces by the means of observation. The hierarchical observation is a pyramid structure which gives it a “head” to supervise the individuals; at the same time, the head is also supervised by the very individuals. In this sense, it is the structure as a whole that functions as a network of relations and produces the power to constantly and silently supervise individuals from top to bottom and from bottom to top and laterally. The overall effects of practices escape everyone’s own intentions. Discipline makes possible the operation of a relational power that sustains itself by its own mechanism – the uninterrupted calculated gazes (Foucault, 1995, p.177). This technique of supervision is a physics of power which operates according to the laws of optics and mechanics, and does not use force or violence.

The second instrument is *normalising judgment*. Foucault emphasises the role of *norm* in disciplinary mechanisms. He writes “the power of the Norm appears through the disciplines” (Foucault, 1995, p.184). It is the principle of a rule to be followed, the standard to be measured against, the knowledge to be learned and the core values to be internalised. With the guidance of this norm, any disciplinary institute can normalise its individuals by comparing, differentiating, hierarchizing, homogenizing and excluding them. Disciplinary power punishes those who do not measure up to the rule and those who depart from it; and awards those who follow, respect and move towards or even better it. Punishment and reward are used to reduce the gaps



between individuals. Therefore, the norm can be considered as the rule of the judgment, and the power of normalisation tends to not only impose homogeneity as a corrective force, but also measure gaps, determine levels and render the differences (Foucault, 1995, p.184).

The third instrument is *the examination*. Foucault writes that “the examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalising judgment. It is a normalising gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish” (Foucault, 1995, p.184). He finds that the examination is always highly ritualized; it combines the ceremony of power and a form of the experiment - the deployment of force and the establishment of truth. It also manifests in the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected. To be more specific, because of the constant observation, the individuals are always visible, and the examination holds them in a mechanism of objection. Besides, the examination situates the individuals in a network of writing; each individual is captured and fixed in a whole mass of documents about him, which makes each individual a “case” or gives each of them his own individuality as his status.

Through the formation of a whole series of codes of disciplinary individuality, the individual becomes a describable and analysable object, and the cases of individuals constitute a comparative system that makes possible “the measurement of overall

phenomena, the description of groups, the characterisation of collective facts, the calculation of the gaps between individuals, their distribution in a given 'population'" (Foucault, 1995, p.190). With the examination at the centre of the disciplinary procedures, each individual is given the "true" self as a subjected being, and is observed and judged whether he is likely to lead to a docile, useful and practical life (Marshall, 1990).

Foucault finds that the disciplinary power technology exists in all social institutes which constitutes a disciplinary society. The authoritative figures of normality, such as doctors, teachers, scientists and officials, assess and diagnose the individuals according to a normalising set of assumptions in a certain space and individuals are controlled, transformed and constituted through the disciplinary power techniques and instruments to be useful subjects. As he writes, a body "may be subjected, used, transformed and improved"; some methods can be used to control the operations of the body, assure "the constant subjection of its forces and impose upon them a relation of docility-utility" (Foucault, 1995, pp.136-137 ). Foucault further uses the model of the Panopticon to illustrate the above technology of disciplinary power.

### **2.3.3 The Panopticon and Power Structure**

The most famous mode of disciplinary power that Foucault cites in *Discipline and Punish* is the Panopticon - an architectural design put forth by Jeremy Bentham in the late 18<sup>th</sup> Century for prisons, insane asylums, schools, hospitals and factories. Literally,

Panopticon means “all-seeing”. This architecture, as Elden (2003) notes, to a large extent shows the essence of Foucault’s conception of power and can be seen as the culmination of his disciplinary power. Clearly, the Panopticon has become an iconic idea presented by Foucault to understand the society in which we live today. The Panopticon is a structure like this:

“at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other” (Foucault, 1995, p.200).

In this structure, each prisoner is securely confined to a cell from which he is seen from the front by the supervisor in the central tower and the side walls prevent him from coming into contact with his companions in the peripheric ring; the central tower could use “blinds” and other instruments to make the presence or absence of the inspector unverifiable. Therefore, “in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen”(Foucault, 1995, p.201 & 202). In this situation, the inmate never knows whether he is being looked at in any given moment but “he must be sure that he may always be so” (Foucault, 1995, p.201).

Due to the architectural design of the Panopticon, constant and hierarchical observation acts as a control mechanism, and a consciousness of constant

surveillance is internalised. In this structure, power has its principle not so much in a person but in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights and gazes. It creates a relationship in which all individuals in this structure are involved. Instead of using violent methods, such as torture of physical bodies, the Panopticon automatises power by creating a visible and unverifiable power situation, and this situation, as Foucault believes, produces a real subjection of the individuals.

Given the effective architectural and operational system of the Panopticon, Foucault believes that the Panopticon should be seen as “a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use” (Foucault, 1995, p.205). It can be used “to treat patients, to instruct school children, to confine the insane, to supervise workers, to put beggars and idlers to work” (Foucault, 1995, p.205). The structure of the Panopticon, in Foucault’s opinion, “makes it possible to perfect the exercise of power” (Foucault, 1995, p.206). The Panopticon is also a metaphor that allowed Foucault to explore the relationship between power and body in a disciplinary situation, such as the CI. It not only shows that power exists in relationships and operates with intentions, but also implies another core meaning of his power theory - the productivity of power.

#### **2.2.4 The Productivity of Power and the Dynamics of Power/Knowledge**

Foucault states that “there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives” (Foucault, 1980a, p.95). For example, the Panopticon is to keep and

transform prisoners to be good people; schools are to educate students to be useful members of society. However, “people know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what what they do, does” (Foucault, cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p.187). This is to say, power is intentional, but the intention or purpose may or may not be realised in the end because nobody is able to know what will happen in the end. This is because whilst the intention is shaped by the operations of power and many effects are produced, the initial intention may be only part of the overall effect, or may be totally excluded from the effects. Foucault explains this in the *Productivity of Power*.

Foucault writes *Discipline and Punish* to show “a veritable technological take-off in the productivity of power” (Foucault, 2002, p.120). With the operations of disciplinary power on human bodies, as shown above, individuals are produced to be useful subjects. In other words, each individual is made into a “case” which has been characterised and given a set of identities or meanings by disciplinary institutes. For example, prisons give prisoners a whole series of “brandings” which show that they have committed crimes. Similarly, schools give students exam marks and degree levels to show who were good students and who were not. These labels, images or brandings have been inscribed in their identities for the society and its institutes to recognise, differentiate, arrange and use. Apart from the subject being produced by power as an important power effect, there are many other effects of the fundamental implication of power.

In his discussion of the Panopticon, Foucault emphasises that the Panopticon is also “a laboratory” (Foucault, 1995, p.203); because of the power of “eyes” within the structure, the Panopticon can carry out experiments to test which punishments on prisoners, according to their crimes and character, are the most effective ones. Likewise, schools allow teachers to try out which teaching methods on students are the best ones. By the same token, the panoptic structure of hospitals enables doctors to verify which medicines administered to patients are the most successful ones.

Conversely, the new effective means of punishments can be employed to the prisons and promote the efficiency of prisons; the better teaching methods could improve the pedagogy and be applied in schools to strengthen the power to educate; and the new medicines can contribute to the overall ability and range of the hospital’s power to cure. From these examples, it is easy to find that new knowledge comes from observing others in the panoptic structures; and in turn, the new knowledge is applied again in the institutes to promote the effects and legitimate further exercises of power. In other words, the operations of power create new knowledge, and the new knowledge continues to be used in the operations of power.

As Gillan and Lemert (1982, p.86) interpreted, “the effectiveness of power is knowledge, and the effective of knowledge is ... power”. This process is sustainable and non-stop, power and knowledge are “two sides of this single process” (Ball, 1990,

p.5). Therefore, Foucault writes that “the formation of knowledge and the increase of power regularly reinforce one another in a circular process ... any growth of power could give rise in them to possible branches of knowledge ... It is a double process: an epistemological ‘thaw’ through a refinement of power relations; a multiplication of the effects of power through the formation and accumulation of new forms of knowledge” (Foucault, 1995, p.224). In short, power and knowledge are fused and interdependent in Foucault’s power theory because of their direct implication of one another.

From the above, it is not hard to understand why Foucault says “power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (Foucault, 1995, p.194). The panoptic architecture and disciplinary mechanisms, which rely on the dynamics of the power/knowledge, are integrated into all social institutes, exercising a power of normalisation and producing effects that enable society to develop and sustain itself. In this sense Foucault argues that he has provided a positive and productive notion of power which is different from the repressive notion of power as demonstrated by conventional power theorists.

### **2.2.5 An Essentially Dominatory Notion of Power**

Foucault distrusts the understanding of power in a repressive sense in the first place and sets him out to look for a different notion of power. He finds that traditionally

there are two hypotheses of power: “one argues that the mechanisms of power are those of repression”, Foucault calls it Reich's hypothesis. “The other argues that the basis of the relationship of power lies in the hostile engagement of forces”; Foucault calls this Nietzsche's hypothesis (Foucault, 1980b, p.91). Reich analyses power in terms of its mechanisms of repression. He sees power as a repressive force: power represses nature, the instincts, class, and individuals. While Nietzsche's hypothesis of power mainly focuses on the relationships of forces: power is analysed primarily in terms of struggle, conflict and war, and the ultimate result of this competition of forces is that one side is victorious over the other in the sense of war. In this hypothesis, repression could still be seen as the political consequence of war. Therefore, Nietzsche's analysis of power is also essentially repressive. Foucault suggests that both Reich's hypothesis and Nietzsche's hypothesis are linked with the meaning of “repression”; however he wants to find a positive and productive model of power.

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault demonstrates that disciplinary power is the “original source of all forms of social control” (Poulantzas, 2000, p.69), constantly producing all kinds of subjects and other effects. Foucault seems to have provided a notion of power that is positive and productive. However, some scholars do not fully agree with this view. McNay (2003), Giddens (1984), Dews (2007) and Goffman (1991) argue that Foucault's notion of power is a totalising and essentially undifferentiated notion of power which can be seen as a metaphysical notion of power and that this



account of a normalising disciplinary power leads to a situation that his positive and productive notion of power would become an essentially dominatory model of power. The reason Foucault's power seems to equal an unmitigated domination rather than a positive force lies in two aspects: it is impossible for one to escape, and it is impossible for one to resist. Or simply, in Foucault's model of power, freedom is impossible.

For the first aspect, power in Foucault's opinion always involves relationships of power (Fornet-Betancourt et al., 1987) that permeate the whole of society, operate in the form of a chain, and are exercised through a productive network which extends everywhere and in which everyone and everything is caught (Foucault, 1995). In his discussion of the Panopticon and prisons in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault shows that society can be seen as a "carceral archipelago" (Foucault, 1995, p.297), because the panoptic architecture and disciplinary mechanisms are integrated into all social institutions. The individuals, after being produced and leaving one disciplinary institute, will inevitably and automatically enter another one; they are constantly under the control of the disciplinary regime. No one can escape from this power situation or this network of power.

For example, when students are at schools, they are constituted by the power technology of schools and given different "brandings", such as their marks and degrees in different subjects; when they graduate from or leave schools, the other

social institutes, such as factories, hospitals, governments and companies, identify and judge them according to their brandings given by schools, and choose the suitable ones to work for them. Therefore, it is impossible for individuals to escape the power regime once they have entered it. As such Magill (1997) raises a questions as to how an individual, imbued with and sustained by systems of discipline and surveillance, can achieve true freedom.

For the second aspect, following his theoretical proposition of the “death of man”, Foucault develops the essentially technical bodily control notion of disciplinary power in *Discipline and Punish*. Human bodies are always under a ruthless disciplinary regime which instils systems of normalising control, and the subjects demonstrate no material resistance to the operations of power (McNay, 2003; Dews, 2007). As Foucault writes, discipline produces a “real subjection” of the individuals (Foucault, 1995, p.202). Likewise, in his later work, such as the first volume of *The History of Sexuality (HS)*, Foucault shows that power saturates the bodies and embraces them in order to administrate sex. Everyone is “under the spell” of telling the truth of sex and no one can resist or even identify the “imperious compulsion” to confess (McNay, 2003). Therefore, Foucault provides us an essentially dominatory notion of power, although he sets himself out to look for a positive power that is the opposite to the repressive power as shown in Reich's and Nietzsche’s hypotheses.

### **2.2.6 Incompatibility of Power and Resistance**

It is interesting that, in his later work, Foucault says several times that where there is power, there is resistance (Foucault, 1998; Foucault, 1980b; Foucault, 1996b). This statement seems to indicate that the individuals are able to refuse the transformation or resist the disciplinary regime. If one is able to resist, one must be an autonomous being endowed with instinctive consciousness and the capacity for rational and intentional actions. However, Foucault distrusts all symbolic, non-material and psychological factors, such as the notion of ideology, desire and representation in the beginning. The statement that “where there is power, there is resistance” seems to be fundamentally problematic.

Following *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault develops the ideas of autonomy and freedom of man in his work on governmentality (Foucault, 1991a). According to Death (2013), governmentality is a complex and contested bundle of concepts, approaches and ideas, which have at their heart the notion that power can work through practices of freedom as well as simply domination or coercion. From this theme, he wants to find out how to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern other, by whom the people will accept being governed and how to become the best possible governor. McNay (2003) identifies an important difference between the theories of disciplinary power and governmentality: disciplinary power is an objectivising power that operates in systems of social regulations as “an endless play of domination” because it tends to transform the individuals into the objects of docile bodies, but governmentality introduces a form of power which has greater

differentiation between an act of violence or dominance and the actions of free individuals and between relations of force and consent, and defines power as a both objectivising and subjectivising force. This view shows a great leap in Foucault's theorisation of power as he begins to take into consideration the individual's consciousness and he endows the capacity for rational, intentional and autonomous action onto individuals, while his previous notions of power only focus on the material effects on the bodies, and the soul or the mind and associated concepts of personality, consciousness and subjectivity are merely the effects of the operations of power upon the body. The constitution of subjectivity therefore, is extended to include two meanings: "subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge" (Foucault, 1982, p.781). However, subjectivity remains to be perceived in a negative sense because the process of subjection either relies on the control of an external party or comes from the form of internalisation of social norms.

Despite the expansion of the meaning of subjectivity, it is clear at this stage that Foucault has acknowledged the importance of individual's consciousness and rational activities, and that the subjects can be originators of what they do. After this, Foucault concerns himself with themes of "the techniques of the self" and "aesthetics of existence"(Foucault, 1990; Foucault, 1988). He traces history back to ancient Greece where the Greek ethics is not essentially concerned with religious problems such as Christianity; nor is it related to any legal institutional system such

as the disciplinary power. From there, he finds that only when people, such as the Greek nobles, treat their life as a piece of art and focus on the aesthetics of existence, can they begin to create themselves, tell the truth by themselves, and consequently resist modern power technologies and achieve freedom of life. In other words, the replacement of the techniques of the self to the techniques of domination provide the possibility of freedom. It is easy to note that individuals at this stage, have been given full autonomy and reflexivity by Foucault, although they are only some privileged minorities.

As shown above, it seems that in Foucault's later works subjects become self-determining entities who are able to creatively express themselves and capable of autonomous action. This is contrary to his theoretical proposition of the death of man, because on the one hand Foucault argues that power, at the most fundamental level, moulds human beings into self-identical subjects; whilst on the other hand he implies that subjects are able to resist the power because of their instinctive consciousness that might be beyond the control of this power (Dews, 1984). Foucault leaves a fatal dilemma here.

Dews (1984), Habermas (1991), Rajchman (1985), Rochlitz (1991), McNay (2003) and Eagleton (1990) note that the notions of "resistance", "the techniques of the self" and "aesthetics of existence" in Foucault's later works are generally theoretically unelaborated - especially with regard to the social implications. Fundamentally, it is

because the autonomous and self-determining subjects in his later works overthrow his theoretical proposition of the death of man. To be more specific, the precondition of the efficiency of disciplinary power is that individuals are seen as docile and obedient bodies that can be mastered and fabricated to the power relations and made useful; but the subjects in Foucault's later works become autonomous and self-creative - they are able to resist the power apparatus through exercising the techniques of the self and to achieve an aesthetics of existence. As Norris (1993, p. 33) writes, Foucault's subject is merely a "place-filler, a recipient of moral directives which issue from some other, heteronomous source of authority, and which cannot be conceived as in any way belonging to a project of autonomous self-creation." Therefore, power and resistance seem to be two incompatible and paradoxical themes in Foucault's overall conception of power.

### **2.2.7 Searching for Answers to Resistance**

As shown in the previous section, Foucault does not provide a persuasive explanation to the appearance of resistance in his analyses. Due to the fact that resistance exists everywhere and happens all of the time, this theoretical gap needs to be filled. For Foucault, the constitution of the subjects is only through corporeally centred disciplinary power on manipulable bodies in social institutions and this power is essentially a dominatory mode of power. Critics including Butler (1997), Rose (1984), McNay (2003); Hall (2001), Clarke (2008); Spivak (1988), Goffman (1991), Dews (2007), Habermas (1990) and Norris (1993) have argued that Foucault simplifies the

way through which the subjects are constructed to be hegemonic social relations and neglects the influence of other different types of experiences. That is to say that Foucault ignores the influence of other factors in the operations of power and in the constitution of the subjects, such as economic, psychological, biological, material and many other factors. Perhaps it is due to the lack of the consideration of these factors that Foucault is unable to explain his conception of resistance.

From his research of the asylums, Goffman (1991) points out that Foucault's total institutions can be said only to represent 'aspects of surveillance and discipline' in a highly purified form, because the asylums embrace everyone and there is a process of 'civil death' following people's entry to these institutions. These characters of the asylums demonstrate the fundamental differences with other social contexts. Dews (2007) argues that Foucault's analysis of institutional power only examines how power relations are installed in institutions but ignores the resistance from those subject to power. He finds that Foucault's analysis of the disciplinary power focuses on the techniques of the official representatives of the institutions, for example the designer of and head of the institutions, but not on the voices and bodies of those being controlled. In this sense, Foucault fails to consider any "other" knowledges, such as a prison subculture or customs inherited from the past. Those who are in control may encounter these problems and come into conflicts with those being controlled. Therefore, he argues that Foucault significantly overestimates the effectiveness of the disciplinary forms of control. Clarke (2008), in his examination of

how cultural identities are constructed, suggests that although Foucault provides a very clear analysis of the social construction of the identity, he lacks reference to the psychological factors, such as emotion, passion or motivation, in the dynamics of power/knowledge. He then turns to Franz Fanon and Slavoj Zizek whose theories show that cultural identities are not only socially constructed, but also psychologically constructed. Spivak (1988) criticizes Foucault and Deleuze's argument on the role of the intellectual in politics to show that the oppressed cannot always speak to their oppression directly because of the constitutive contradictions in capitalist society that structure desires and experience and that are mediated and effaced through the work of ideology. She explains that "however reductionist an economic analysis might seem, the French intellectuals forget at their peril that this entire over-determined enterprise was in the interests of a dynamic economic situation requiring that interests, motives (desires), and power (of knowledge) be ruthlessly dislocated" (Spivak, 1988, p.280). Moreover, Rose (1984), in her critique of post-structuralist theory through inquiring the relationships between the subject (natural consciousness) and the authority of law (reason), points out that Foucault puts too much emphasis on the effects of a corporeal power over the bodies but lacks the consideration of how other forms of institutionalised power, such as legal definitions of the person, contribute to the construction of the modern individual. The simplified account of power ignores the complex relations that exist in all different forms of institutional power and reduces the related issues of legitimacy and illegitimacy to a technology of control. By the same token, McNay (2003) argues



that Foucault focuses on the covert operations of disciplinary power and dismisses juridical forms of power, which greatly simplifies the paradoxical role of legal power in capitalist society. The shift from a feudal system of capital punishment to the establishment of the modern judicial order is unilaterally explained as the spread of bio-power by Foucault. Again, Habermas (1990) points out that Foucault's notion of power is unable to explain the complex character of modern society and he suggests that the formulations of individuals should not only be regulatory but also constitutive of autonomous and reflexive modes of identity.

In short, it seems that Foucault emphasises the disciplinary practices at the expense of a consideration of the various other practices and factors that also constitute the social realm. In these practices, individuals might resist the normalising pressure exerted over their lives through their activities, perhaps also in an invisible way. According to these critics, with the considerations of the influence from both discipline and other practices on the individuals, the subjects seem to be no longer just an effect of bodily disciplinary power, but a comprehensively constituted modern man. Hence their resistance may be easy to perceive and understand. They may be right to some extent, but this searching for answers to resistance will continue in my analysis of the CIs in Africa.

### **2.3 A Two-dimensional Power Analytical Framework**

Foucault emphasises that the purpose of his work is to identify "where [power]

installs itself and produces its real effects” (Foucault, 1980b, p.97). His examination of the small-scale and micro-level social institutions and the disciplinary power strategies addresses the problem of “how” of power (Foucault, 1995). Applying his power theory to the analysis of a specific social institution could help researchers to explain the “how” of power of this institution. Specifically, with Foucault’s productive and dynamic notion of power, one may be able to understand what the power technology of an institution is like -i.e. what power structure of this institution has, how disciplinary power techniques and instruments operate on the individuals of this institution, what subjects and other power effects are produced and whether these effects are beneficial to this institution and other related institutions.

However, to ensure the operation of a social institution, having a disciplinary power technology installed is not enough; practical and material considerations must be made. For example, how much financial support can be invested to create and sustain the operations of the institute, what human resources are available to start and operate the institute and what strategies can be used to induce or persuade potential partners and employees to join this institute?

Foucault’s discussion of power is based on pre-existing social institutions, such as hospitals and prisons and he does not discuss these practical considerations (Foucault, 1995). However, these things must be considered in the first place before examining what is happening inside of the institutes. When applying Foucault’s

power theory to examine a specific institution, I want to not only understand how power operates inside of it and what power effects are produced, but and of equal importance, why and how this institution was established in the first place and how it sustains itself materially. Therefore, a comprehensive examination of a social institution requires researchers to draw on traditional understandings of power in IR which provide material thinking on power resources and strategies of social entities as discussed above, and to combine these views with Foucault's framework of power. In this way, the analysis of a social institution can be undertaken at two dimensions:

In the first dimension, the traditional understandings of power provide the theoretical sources of explaining why and how a social institution's concrete substance is established in the first instance. That is to say, one must establish what the founder of the institution wants to achieve from this institution and what material and strategic support the founder provided to set up and sustain the institution. This dimension shows the construction of the social institution.


In the second dimension, Foucault's power theory will be used to deconstruct the institution, i.e. to examine what the power technology of the institution is like. This virtual and invisible technology of power combines the following elements:

1. What the power structure is like
2. What norm the power structure has and what the techniques and instruments are used to install the norm to individuals
3. What power effects are produced and how power effects contribute to the

dynamics of power/knowledge (Foucault, 1995)

There is a precedence relationship between these two dimensions: the construction of a social institution must happen before the deconstruction of this institution and the former should be seen as the precondition of the latter. The logic of this two-dimensional power analytical framework can be further illustrated in the following Chart 2.1:

**Chart 2.1 the Logic of the Two Dimensional Power Analytical Framework**



(Source: Author)

In this chart, axis X represents the first power dimensional analysis, i.e. the material power resources an institution receives. Axis Y refers to the second power dimensional analysis, namely, the operation of power technology of this institution. As discussed above, the operation of an institution needs both sufficient and strategic material support and the installation of an effective power technology. An institution will not be able to operate if it does not have support from both aspects -

as shown in area C of the chart. An institution will also not work if it only has support from one of the above aspects. That is to say, an institution can be designed to have its power intention, power structure and power techniques, but it will not be able to operate if it has insufficient material support. Similarly, area D shows the situation that an institution has sufficient material support, but it does not have a functioning power technology to take advantage of its material support. Hence, the institution fails too. An institution, if falling into the situation shown in area B, would be able to operate, because it has support from both X and Y. However, the success of the operation will depend on the consideration and management of the elements of both X and Y.

The design of axis X derives from traditional understandings of power and considers the material support an institution receives and whether the support can be strategically used to make positive contributions to the construction of the institution. Here, the elements of X include both material support and the strategy of using it. Material support can consist of financial support, human resources, material reward, advanced technology and other substantial support that are available and sufficient for the institution to use. The more material support an institution can receive, the more likely it can suffice itself and operate well, and vice versa. However, abundant material support does not automatically lead to positive results, as discussed in section 2.1.1. It must also be used in smart ways (Guzzini, 2010). The smart ways refer to the strategy used by the founder of the institution, or the founder's ability of

using any possible material support available to it in a smart way that would make others work for and contribute to the construction and operation of the institution. In this sense, the founder's ability of assessing specific situations, adopting suitable approaches and wielding proper material incentives are essential in terms of the establishment of the institution. Therefore, the combination of both material support and smart strategy determines the success of an institution on its X axis.

The idea shown on the Y axis comes from Foucault's conception of power which investigates the invisible but universal power technology of social institutions (Foucault, 1995). Not only does each social institution have its physical body that is sustained by its material support, it also constitutes an invisible and dynamic power technology that constantly produces its effects. The power technology of an institution is comprised of its power structure, disciplinary power techniques and instruments, its power effects and the dynamics of its power/knowledge (Foucault, 1995).

In terms of power structures, Foucault uses the Panopticon to demonstrate a perfect power structure that automatises the exercise of power (Foucault, 1995). However, there is no evidence to show that the Panopticon has ever been built. Hence, the perfect power situation created by the Panopticon may never exist in practice. However, this philosophical metaphor does show the panoptic structures – a structure essentially similar to the Panopticon – that exist in all social institutions, be

they families, schools, classrooms, hospitals, armies or factories (Foucault, 1995). Because the power structures of these social institutions are not as perfect as that of the Panopticon, the efficiency of the exercise of power in these institutions must be compromised. For example, inmates in the separated cells of the Panopticon are not able to communicate with each other so that they can only receive the knowledge imposed by the supervisor and become docile subjects. But students in modern schools are allowed to communicate, so that they receive knowledge from both the teachers – the supervisors in the central tower of schools' panoptic structure – and their classmates. In this sense, the school's power structure cannot guarantee the sole and pure flow of knowledge from the teachers to students because each student is also receiving knowledge from other students.

Similarly, the inmates of the Panopticon are not able to know whether the supervisor is in the central tower or not because of the reflection mechanisms or blinds used by the supervisor on the central tower windows. Therefore the inmates must always assume they are under the surveillance of the supervisor and consequently behave in compliance with the rules of the supervisor. However, in modern social institutions, for example in hospitals, patients can always call or visit the doctors when they need them. The doctors, despite their supervising position in a hospital's panoptic structure, must not hide their presence from the patients. Therefore, when examining the panoptic structure of a social institution, one must understand the power structure and evaluate the power situation of this institution. Specifically,

what the hierarchy of this power structure is, who is in the central tower, who is being supervised, how power flows between them, how transparent the supervisions from different directions are and why some supervisions are more transparent while others are not. Identifying the panoptic power structure of a social institution is the first step of exploring its power technology.

The second element that needs to be evaluated on axis Y is the power techniques and instruments used in the power structure. In his discussions of disciplinary power, Foucault identifies four power techniques: the art of distribution in space, the control of activity, the organisation of geneses, the composition of forces, and three power instruments: hierarchical observation, normalising judgment and examination. These power techniques and instruments exercise on human bodies and aim to produce useful subjects (Foucault, 1995). They should be seen as seven sub-elements of the second element of axis Y. Again, one can find the use of these power techniques and instruments in the model of the Panopticon in a perfect way. But in modern social institutions these power techniques and instruments are exercised in different ways at different levels and with different degrees.

For example, in Panopticon, the enclosed space is strictly distributed to cells, the central tower and the space in between. The hierarchy is simply and fixed: the supervisor and the prisoner (Foucault, 1995). However, in modern social institutions, the hierarchy is much more complicated. In the army, there is a series of military



ranks, and accordingly the power space is distributed to adopt people who possess these ranks. Also, these ranks change from time to time to accommodate changing situations and operational requirements.<sup>7</sup> By the same token, the norm of the Panopticon prison is a series of rules, exercises and knowledge that aims to transform criminals into good citizens (Foucault, 1995). However, the norm of modern schools is a series of knowledge, standards and skills that discipline the students and enable them to work for different sectors of the society. Also, the use of examinations may be more frequent in schools than in factories, and the form of examinations in armies must be different with that in hospitals. Therefore, one needs to assess each of the seven sub-elements of axis Y's second element when exploring the power operation of a specific institution, i.e. how each sub-element is exercised and how they impact the overall power operation of this institution.

The operation of power inevitably produces power effects (Foucault, 1995). In order to understand the effects of an institution's power technology, one needs to examine what power effects have been produced by the power operation of this institution. Therefore, power effects are the third element to be considered on axis Y.

Power effects can be shown in different forms. Foucault (1995) states that truth, knowledge, reality and subjects are all produced by power. To be more specific, in his discussion of the Panopticon, Foucault points out that the supervisors of the

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<sup>7</sup> For example, British Army officer ranks changed several times in history, usually after wars. Link: <http://www.army.mod.uk/structure/32321.aspx> [accessed 18 Dec 2016]


Panopticon can try multiple different methods of punishments on prisoners and choose the most effective. Here, the power operation of the Panopticon produces new knowledge, such as the effective punishment methods. This new knowledge can be applied to the Panopticon to improve the further power operation of the Panopticon. The mutual supportive relationship between power and knowledge trigger the dynamics of a power/knowledge nexus. Additionally, the aim of the Panopticon prison is to transform criminals into good and useful citizens who are able to re-enter society. During this transformation process, the detainees become institutionalised subjects of the Panopticon. Again, the Panopticon presents a perfectly controlled power model that produces desired power effects (Foucault, 1995). In real practice however, social institutions produce many different effects - both desired and unintended. For example, it is common to see employees in a company resign from their job because they are not happy with their salary, their working environment or their employer. Here, resistance appears as a negative power effect. Why resistance happens, how resistance impacts the power effects of a social institution and how resistance contributes to the dynamics of power/knowledge of this institution needs to be included in the evaluation of power effects – the third element on axis Y.

Furthermore, social institutions do not always produce desired subjects. For example, military training is intended to produce loyal and disciplined soldiers who listen to the officers and fight for their country, yet there are always recruits who refuse to

adapt to training demands and trained soldiers who 'refuse to soldier'. Although those who reject the institutionalisation process may be considered to not be useful to the organisation, they are still useful in at least two ways: firstly, the organisation can learn from their negative response and consequently consolidate or change their methods and secondly, their explanation as to their actions could provide useful information for their peers on the nature of the organisation's power structures. Therefore, what kind of subjects are produced by a social institution and their usefulness must also be considered in the assessment of an institution's power effects on axis Y.

This two-dimensional power analytical framework qualifies a comprehensive examination of a social institution, because it investigates how an institution is constructed materially in the first place (axis X) as well as deconstructing the institution to reveal the operation of the invisible and virtual power technology (axis Y). The examination of a social institution must consider the elements on both axis X and Y. All functioning social institutions fit into area B of Chart 2.1. This can be demonstrated in Chart 2.2 which is an enlarged view of area B. In this chart, point B1 and point B2 represent two institutions. B1's power technology is more efficient than B2's while B2 has more material support than B1 does. B1 may present a more ideal situation than B2, because B1 receives less material power resources but its power technology operates more effectively. In contrast, B2 receives more material power resources, but its power technology is less effective than B1's.

**Chart 2.2 Area B of the Two Dimensional Power Analytical Framework Axes**



(Source: Author)

Applying this two-dimensional power analytical framework to my case study of the CI in Africa, I hope to fill the research gap of LCPOs. Specifically, by carrying out a two-dimensional power analysis of the CI, I will not only show how the CI is established materially and strategically, but also demonstrate how Chinese language, culture and other forms of positive Chinese knowledge, as a norm of the CI, are installed to the individuals by the CI's power techniques and instruments within the CI's power apparatus. More importantly, it will help me find out what kind of subjects and other effects have been produced by the CI, from which I will be able to understand the actual usefulness of this organisation and its real role in China-Africa relations.

## **2.4 Summary**

I began this chapter by reviewing existing literature on the CI and other LCPOs. There, I found that current research on the CI sees the CI as a tangible tool or a physical

vehicle of a country's cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy or soft power. These views essentially reflect the traditional understandings of power in international relations where power is either understood as the possession of resources or as the ability of mobilising these resources for certain outcomes. Because the CI is designed to disseminate Chinese language, culture and other forms of intangible resources to foreign people, scholars argue that the CI can automatically help China achieve its foreign policy aims by winning foreign nationals' minds and hearts. However, nobody has yet explained how language, culture and other forms of knowledge transform peoples' mind or what the result of the transformation is.

In order to answer these questions, I borrowed from Foucault's insight of power that shows its strength in understanding the social mechanisms of power and in deconstructing the traditional understanding of human subjects and social entities. Therefore, in the second part of this chapter, I introduce Foucault's conception of power by showing the essence of his power theory as well as discussing possible failings in this conception in the hope of addressing them during the analysis of my case study.

Towards the end of this chapter, I explained that in empirical studies, Foucault's conception of power is only effective in terms of analysing internal power operations of social institutes. In order to understand why and how an institute is established in the first instance and how it sustains itself, some realist and material calculations

need to be included in the overall analyses of an institute.

Therefore, a two-dimensional power analytical framework assessing both material considerations of power as shown in traditional understandings of power in IR and Foucault's invisible and virtual technology of power has been created. With this new two-dimensional theoretical framework of power as the guideline of carrying out this project, I will be able to examine both the internal operations of power techniques and outside material support and strategic considerations of my case of the CI in Africa.

## Chapter 3

### Methodology

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This research aims to examine China's international language and culture promotion organisation the Confucius Institute and to establish what kind of role the CI is playing in Africa in terms of China's national interests and China-Africa relations. This chapter demonstrates "the hierarchy of considerations" of carrying out this research (Hammond and Wellington, 2013, p. 109). In it I will depict the rationale for the application of particular research methods, i.e. why the use of certain methods, designs and procedures is suitable in terms of collecting data for the purpose of answering my research questions. I will also provide a critical understanding of the methodology, wherein how I use my research methods and tools to collect data, how I analyse the data and explain how I deal with possible ethical and other potential issues related to the empirical work will be detailed.

#### 3.1 Study Design

My research is a case study of the CIs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Among the 49 Sub-Saharan African countries, 30 of them have 42 CIs, as shown in Table 3.1. This table also shows the CIs' Chinese partner organisations and the year of establishment. Figure 3.1 presents a map of Africa and each of the coloured Sub-Saharan African countries have at least one CI. From these CIs, I selected several as sub-samples.

Case studies require researchers to use interview data and other sources, such as

documentary data, to examine a phenomenon or “case” as it changes over time (Gephart, 2004). In order to analyse my specific case, I collected data from primary and secondary sources by using two methods: interviews and documents. The triangulation of these methods and sources, in other words, the ways of increasing the credibility and validity of my case study, will be demonstrated below.

**Table 3.1:** Confucius Institutes in Sub-Sahara Africa (as of 31/12/2016)

Country	Number of CIs	Local partner	Chinese partner	Year of Establishment
Angola	1	Agostinho Neto University	Harbin Normal University & CITIC Construction CO., LTD	06/02/2015
Benin	1	University of Abomey-Calavi	Chongqing University Jiaotong	21/10/2009
Botswana	1	University of Botswana	Shanghai University Normal	30/05/2009
Burundi	1	University of Burundi	Bohai University	03/07/2012
Cameroon	1	University of Yaounde II	Zhejiang University Normal	09/11/2007
Cape Verde	1	University of Cape Verde	Guangdong University of Foreign Studies	28/07/2015
Cote d'ivoire	1	University of Felix Houphouette Boigny	Tianjin University of Technology	28/05/2015
Equatorial Guinea	1	National University of Equatorial Guinea	Zhejiang International Studies University	25/01/2016
Eritrea	1	National Board for Higher Education	Guizhou University of Finance and Economics	05/06/2013
Ethiopia	2	Technical, Vocational Education and Training Institute of Ethiopia	Tianjin University of Technology and Education	12/05/2010
		Addis Ababa University	Tianjin University of Technology and Education	26/11/2013
Ghana	2	University of Ghana	Zhejiang University of Technology	May-2013



		University of Cape Coast	Hunan City University	06/06/2016
Kenya	4	University of Nairobi	Tianjin Normal University	19/12/2005
		Kenyatta University	Shandong Normal University	05/06/2009
		Egerton University	Nanjing Agricultural University	21/10/2012
		Moi University	Donghua University	01/03/2015
Liberia	1	University of Liberia	Changsha University of Science & Technology	18/12/2008
Madagascar	2	University of Antananarivo	Jiangxi Normal University	13/11/2008
		University of Toamasina	Ningbo University	19/09/2014
Malawi	1	University of Malawi	University of International Business and Economics	Aug-2013
Mozambique	1	Eduardo Mondlane University	Zhejiang Normal University	16/04/2012
Namibia	1	University of Namibia	China University of Geosciences	23/08/2013
Nigeria	2	University of Lagos	Beijing Institute of Technology	May-2009
		Nnamdi Azikiwe University	Xiamen University	Mar-2008
Republic of Congo	1	University of Marien Ngouabi	University of Jinan	01/03/2013
Rwanda	1	University of Rwanda	Chongqing Normal University	01/04/2009
Senegal	1	University of Dakar	Liaoning University	03/12/2012
Seychelles	1	University of Seychelles	Dalian University	Nov-2013
Sierra Leone	1	University of Sierra Leone	Gannan Normal University	Sep-2012
South Africa	5	Stellenbosch University	Xiamen University	01/01/2009
		University of Cape Town	Sun Yat-sen University	01/07/2010
		Rhodes University	Jinan University	20/08/2008
		Durban University of Technology	Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University	20/02/2014
		University of Johannesburg	Nanjing Tech University	04/07/2014

Sudan	1	University of Khartoum	Northwest University	Normal	17/12/2009
Tanzania	2	University of Dodoma	Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics		28/04/2013
		University of Dar es Salaam	Zhejiang University	Normal	09/10/2013
Togo	1	University of Lome	Sichuan International Studies University		30/10/2009
Uganda	1	Makerere University	Xiangtan University		19/12/2014
Zambia	1	University of Zambia	Hebei University of Economics and Business		01/09/2010
Zimbabwe	1	University of Zimbabwe	Renmin University of China		05/03/2007

(Source: CI Headquarters Website: [www.hanban.org](http://www.hanban.org))

**Figure 3.1:** Confucius Institutes in Sub Sahara Africa (as of 31/12/2016)



(Source: CI Headquarters Website: [www.hanban.org](http://www.hanban.org))

### 3.1.1 Sampling of Cases

There are 42 CIs in 30 Sub-Saharan African countries and all them are potential

destinations for study. I chose to visit 7 CIs in 4 African countries during my fieldwork: 3 CIs and 1 CI in two southern African countries (Country A and B), 2 CIs and 1 CI in two eastern African countries (Country C and D) respectively. In these countries, I also took the opportunities to visit 6 other countries' equivalent organisations for the purpose of comparing them with the CI (See Table 3.2 below).

**Table 3.2:** CIs and Other LCPOs Visited During Fieldwork

Country	Location in Africa	Development level <sup>8</sup>	Diplomatic relations with China <sup>9</sup>	Number of CIs visited	Names of CIs	Other LCPOs visited
A	South	Medium	Since 1990s	3	CI1, CI2, CI3	FA1, BC1, GI1
B	South	Low	Since 1970s	1	CI4	BC2
C	East	Low	Since 1970s	2	CI5, CI6	FA2, FA3
D	East	Low	Since 1960s	1	CI7	—

(Source: Author)

Bryman (2012) indicates that samples of qualitative studies should demonstrate the diversity, heterogeneity and homogeneity of the cases. My samples satisfy these requirements.

Firstly, the CIs are located in four different countries in different parts of Africa allowing me to understand similarities and differences that these CIs have in general - especially in terms of their development models and strategic focuses.

<sup>8</sup> The country's development level is based on the United Nations Human Development Report, 2013. Link: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report> [Accessed 06/05/2014]

<sup>9</sup> The situation of diplomatic relationship between China and African countries is based on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China. Link: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/> [Accessed 06/05/2014]

Secondly, these countries have different levels of economic and political development, which gives me a chance to see if the CIs receive different levels of material support from China and the African countries depending on the economic conditions of the host country.

Thirdly, these countries include “old friends” as well as “new friends” of the Chinese government. This enables me to compare the operations of different CIs and find out whether the CI develops well in the countries of China’s “old friends” or not as well in “new friends” countries.

Fourthly, the CIs have different lengths of existence in Africa, including some of the oldest ones and youngest ones. The examination of the operations of the new and old CIs will help me to establish whether they adopt different development models, and how power and knowledge transfer and sustain between them.

Finally, in two countries I visited two and three different CIs respectively. The comparison between different CIs in a single country contributes to my understanding of whether and how much the CIs work together, whether they adopt a same model in one country, whether they have the same levels of Chinese and local supports and why some CIs seems more successful than the others.

### **3.1.2 Interview**

By employing the qualitative research method of interviewing members of a CI I am able to understand the CI's goals, material support, structure, operational mandate and function as seen from different stakeholder perspectives (i.e. interviewing relevant officials, CI staff, CI students and others involved in the activities of the CIs). Therefore, qualitative interviews have been chosen as the main method to collect my primary data. I chose a face-to-face interview methodology because I wanted to demonstrate a "symbolic commitment" to accessing the participants' voices (Hammond and Wellington, 2013, p.91). Telephone or Skype interviews also proved to be productive - especially when I only needed to clarify or confirm some key information that I had collected from the interviewees. As for the open extent of the interviews, due to the fact that I have fairly specific issues to cover and a list of core questions (see Section 3.1.2.3), I used in-depth semi-structured interviews.

### **3.1.2.1 Identify Interviewees**

As mentioned in Chapter 1, my main research question is to examine the real role of the CI in China's foreign policy and China-Africa relations. According to the two-dimensional power analytical framework formulated in Chapter 2, my data collection needs to cover five key issues of the CI: its purpose, its material support, its power structure, its power operations, and its power effects. In accordance with these aspects, I have identified the following types of interviewees and marked their relevance to the five issues (see Table 3.3 below). It is worth noting that each type of interviewee has varying relevance to all five issues, the marks in the table only

highlight the most relevant aspects/focuses of each type of interviewees.

**Table 3.3:** Relevance between Interviewees and Research Issues

Type of interviewees	Purpose of CI	Structure of CI	Material support of CI	Operational strategies of CI	Power effects of CI
CI directors	X	X	X	X	X
CI administrative staff		X		X	X
CI teachers		X	X	X	X
CI students			X	X	X
Chinese partner's officials	X	X	X	X	X

(Source: Author)

Interviewing both current and former Chinese and local directors allowed me to develop a full understanding of the five aspects as they apply to each different type of stakeholder.

The administrative staff members are usually employed by the local partners, but they follow instructions from both directors and serve both Chinese staff and local students. As an important link between both the Chinese and local sides, they have much to say about the CI - especially in terms of its management structure and operational strategies.

Chinese teachers are sent by Hanban to the individual CIs and spend more time with the students compared to the people mentioned above. Listening to their comments about CI activities enabled me to understand how they define their mission as a CI teacher, what kind of support they receive, what kind of knowledge they are teaching, what teaching methods they are using, what difficulties they have in working in an unfamiliar country. All of the information gathered informs my

understanding of the five aspects of the CI within the two-dimensional power analytical framework.

CI students are located at the bottom of the hierarchical power structure of the CI and subject to the power strategies all of the time. Talking with them informed me about the knowledge that they are developing in their studies with the CI, what they are thinking about the future, what they aspire to progress on to after studying at the CIs. Understanding the nature of the students that are the product of the power structure of the CI is vital to assessing the CI's power effects.

Interviews with Chinese partner university officials helped me to understand why Chinese universities are eager to set up CIs overseas and consequently I was able to understand what the goals of the CI project are, how the Chinese side supports these projects, how they are involved in the power structure of the CI and how the CI produces power effects that may be beneficial to them.

A number of Chinese scholars have conducted research on the CIs in Africa and published several papers on this topic. Talking to them would prove to be helpful for me to understand how they conducted their research, which theories they used and which gaps remained in this research area. Additionally, I was able to compare their views with those of the western scholars, identifying the main differences in an effort to avoid placing my discussion of the CI within the same dimension.

### **3.1.2.2 Recruitment Strategies**

As discussed in my literature review, the CI has experienced a number of politically sensitive incidents in some countries. Miles (1970) points out that all politically vulnerable bureaucracies would be resistant to systematic study or observation by outsiders. The key political figures of these organisations are a significant security concern to these organisations. Because of the risk that any researcher looking at these organisations could discover and publish something negative and disadvantageous to them, the researchers can be regarded as a potential threat to the stability of these organisations. Although the CI may not be classified as a typical political organisation, the staff of the organisation could have been resistant to my research and refused to participate in my interviews. Bearing this in mind, I began to recruit participants for my fieldwork.

Because I had no previous direct contact with the majority of my desired interviewees, the traditional method of “snowballing” (Burns, 2000) became my main technique of recruiting. Before beginning my recruitment drive, I identified several key contacts:

1. Seven African CI directors (one local director and six Chinese directors). I sent visit request emails to the Chinese and local directors in all Sub-Saharan Africa CIs (see an example in Appendix 4) excluding those in the countries which were not



recommended for travel by the UK government foreign travel advice website. Nine directors in nine CIs permitted my visit. Due to some visa issues, I finally met seven of them. With their introduction, I met other individuals of the CIs, including directors, administrators, teachers and students.

2. A UK university scholar who works in the CI system as the local director of a UK university's CI. This contact helped me to contact potential interviewees in both China and Africa. He also allowed me to volunteer at the UK university's CI and to organise some activities.

3. A university friend who used to work in the foreign affairs office of a leading Chinese university in teacher training which hosts one of the 19 Hanban's Chinese International Promotion Bases. She introduced me to a number of her colleagues who were involved in the CI project and who were willing to be interviewed.

4. A professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences whose expertise is China-Africa relations. She participated in my interview and introduced me to two other Chinese scholars whose research area is China-Africa relations.

5. A UK university scholar introduced me to one of his students who used to work in a western country's LCPO in Africa. Through this student's introductions, I gained permission to visit three centres of this organisation located in three different

countries. I also sent visit request emails to another two European countries' LCPOs in Africa and four branches accepted my request.

### 3.1.2.3 Interview Questions

My interviewees include people with different positions and nationalities, therefore, one uniform set of questions was not an appropriate methodology. I had to choose or prioritise the questions that I wanted to cover in the interviews according to the positions of the interviewees. Additionally, the wording, sequence and format of these questions needed to be delivered differently according to the different interview situations. In order to capture diverse individuals' views effectively, I needed to tailor the questions to accommodate the different groups of participants.

Kumar (2011) suggests that a researcher should prepare an "interview guide" (i.e. a loose list of interview questions), as a starting point for the interviews. Based on my research questions, the framework of "reminders" and the interviewees' hierarchical levels towards these reminders demonstrated above, my interview guide included the following core questions for different groups of informants:

**Table 3.4:** Core interview questions for CI directors

Most relevant key issues	Core Questions
Purpose of CI	What is the goal of the CI? What is the annual / 5-year plan of the CI?
Structure of CI	What is the structure of the CI's board of directors? What is the management structure of the CI?
Material support of CI	How was this CI established? What is the investment model of the CI?
Operations of CI	How do you become a CI director? What activities does the CI have? How can a CI become a model CI?
Power effects of the CI	What is the relationship between the CI and local Chinese/local businesses? What is the relationship between the CI and local Chinese communities?

	What is the relationship between the CI and local Chinese embassies?
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(Source Author)

**Table 3.5:** Core interview questions for administrative staff

Most relevant key issues	Core Questions
Structure of CI	What is the management structure? What the relationship between the Chinese side and local side?
Operations of CI	How do you become an administrative member? What activities does the CI have? What programs does the CI have? What are your responsibilities?
Power effects of the CI	What have you learnt about China from this job? What is the relationship between the CI and local Chinese/local businesses? What is the relationship between the CI and local Communities? What do the CI students do after finishing their courses in the CI?

(Source: Author)

**Table 3.6:** Core interview questions for teachers

Most relevant key issues	Core Questions
Purpose of CI	What is the goal of the CI? What is your mission as a CI teacher?
Material support of CI	Why do you want to be a CI teacher? Is this a good job and why?
Structure of CI	What is the structure of the CI's board of directors? What is the management structure of the CI?
Operations of CI	How did you become a CI teacher? What are your responsibilities as a CI teacher? What activities does the CI have? What is the annual/5-year plan of the CI? What teaching materials do we use?
Power effects of the CI	What is the relationship between the CI and local Chinese/local businesses? What is the relationship between the CI and local Communities? What is the relationship between the CI and local Chinese embassies? What jobs do the students do after finishing the course?

(Source: Author)

**Table 3.7:** Core interview questions for students

Most relevant key issues	Core Questions
Material support of CI	Why do you choose to study in the CI? What benefits have you received from the CI?
Operations of CI	How did you know the CI? How do you like the CI and the teachers? How do you learn Chinese? What materials are you using? What else have you learned here apart from the language? What activities did you attend?
Power effects of the CI	What do you want to do after finishing the course? What is your view about China?

(Source: Author)

**Table 3.8:** Core interview questions for CI Chinese partner's officials

Most relevant key issues	Core Questions
Purpose of CI	Why does the Chinese university/company want to set up this CI?
Material support of CI	How was this CI established? What is the investment model of the CI?
Structure of CI	What is the structure of the CI's board of directors? What is the management structure of the CI?
Operations of CI	What activities does the CI have?

	How do you select CI directors and teachers? What is the annual/5-year plan of the CI?
Power effects of the CI	What is the relationship between the CI and this university/company? Do we receive CI students for further study or work? How to select them?

(Source: Author)

**Table 3.9:** Core interview questions for Chinese scholars

Most relevant key issues	Core Questions
Purpose of CI	Why does the Chinese government initiate the CI project?
Material support of CI	Why the CI develops so rapidly worldwide? What kinds of resources are available for the development of the CI? What is the investment model of the CI?
Power effects of the CI	What problems have happened to the CI and how these problems are addressed? What kind of role the CI is playing in China's foreign policy?

(Source: Author)

Hammersley and Atkinson (2007, p.33) note that during fieldwork, sometimes the next moment of data collection is informed by the information and patterns discovered from preceding sources, and “the original problems are transformed or even completely abandoned in favor of others”. Because it is impossible to foresee the interviewee’s responses to my core questions, I often picked up new lines of enquiry regarding the core issues from their responses and asked auxiliary questions on those matters. As a consequence, many other sub-questions and new questions were added to these lists.

### 3.1.3 Documentary Data

Apart from the primary data collected from interviews, documents also offer the researchers useful information. Documents can be text-based or non-text-based. The majority are text-based, in the forms of “written text” and “electronic text”, including public documents, such as media reports or government reports, procedural documents such as minutes of meetings or financial accounts, or personal documents like diaries. Some of these documents are “grey literature”, namely, the

documents which are produced on all levels of government, business and industry in print and electronic formats, but they usually do not enter normal channels or systems of publication, distribution, bibliographic control, or acquisition by booksellers or subscription agents (Burnard, 2004; Soule and Ryan, 1999). Non-text-based documents are “visual data”, such as photography, video, film and television (Ritchie, 2003). For this research, I have collected the following types of documents:

### 3.1.3.1 CI Documents

I collected 162 sets of text-based documents and 4 non-text-based documents (videos) that are directly related to the CIs. The majority of them are grey literature. Table 3.10 shows the numbers of documents I collected from each CI. Although I collected more documents in some CIs than the others, I consistently compared one CI’s documents with the interview data gathered at this CI, others CI’s documents and interview data to find out these CIs’ genetic similarities. Additionally, a number of the documents that I collected from one CI are applicable to all other CIs - such as the Hanban document of Chinese teachers’ rules and regulations, the Excellent CI Chinese Volunteer Teacher application form and a CI staff training centre’s PowerPoint slides for training on how to invigilate Chinese tests.

**Table 3.10:** Numbers of documents collected from CIs

Country	CI visited	Number of documents collected
A	CI1	26
	CI2	12

	CI3	5
B	CI4	32
C	CI5	67, including 4 videos of Chinese Bridge Competition
	CI6	21
D	CI7	3

(Source: Author)

In order to answer my research question, the chosen analytical framework requires my data collection to cover five key issues of the CI: its purpose, its material support, its power structure, its power operations, and its power effects. The relationship between the key issues and the documents is shown in table 3.11 below. A number of documents are useful to support the analysis of more than one key issue. Due to the large number of documents, I categorise the documents into different types and each type is followed by several document examples. A full list of documents is attached as Appendix 1.

**Table 3.11: Relevance between Key Issues and Documents**

Key issues	Relevant document types	Relevant document examples
Purpose	Agreement and constitution	A CI establishment agreement between a CI's Chinese partner and a local partner; A CI teaching station establishment agreement between a CI and a local school; A CI partner university's local alumni association constitution
	Application	A CI establishment application letter for Hanban from a local partner;
	Plan	A CI's establishment plan; A CI's development plan;
	Training	A Hanban document explaining the missions and significance of CI Chinese teachers;
	Supportive document	President XI Jinping's congratulatory letter for the first global Confucius Institute Day; A letter from a local government's governor supporting the establishment of a new CI;
Material support	Agreement and constitution	A CI establishment agreement between a CI's Chinese partner and a local partner; A CI teaching station establishment agreement between a CI and a local school;

	Application	A CI's Chinese partner's application of setting up Hanban scholarships; A CI Chinese partner's application of Hanban scholarships
	Notice	A Hanban's notice on the appropriation of funds; A CI Chinese partner university's notice of recruiting CI Chinese directors worldwide;
	Regulation	A document of Gongpai teacher's material benefits management regulations;
	Supportive document	A letter from a local government's governor supporting the establishment of a new CI; Two lists of books donated by Hanban;
	Summary and report	A CI's application report for initial operational funds;
Power structure	Agreement and constitution	A CI establishment agreement between a CI's Chinese partner and a local partner; A CI teaching station establishment agreement between a CI and a local school;
	Regulation	A Hanban document of Chinese teachers' rules and regulations; Two CIs' administrative regulations;
	Notice	A CI Chinese partner university's notice of recruiting Chinese directors worldwide; Pre-Notice of the 9th Global Confucius Institute Conference and agenda (Chinese and English versions)
	Summary and Report	A CI board meeting report; A meeting summary for the first meeting between two sides of a CI; A document listing the CI members of a Chinese partner university;
Power operations	Regulation	Two CIs' administrative regulations; A CI handbook for Chinese teachers and directors; A document of international Chinese teacher standard 2012;
	Notice	A CI Chinese partner university's notice of recruiting Chinese directors worldwide; A Hanban notice for CI volunteer teachers about leaving, retaining and judging their work;
	Training	A CI's Chinese degree course syllabus; A CI's language test papers; Chinese Bridge Competition review materials; PowerPoint slides for training CI teachers and directors;
	Application	CI teacher/director evaluation forms;
	Summary and report	A Chinese university CI office's annual report;
Power effects	Summary and Report	A Chinese university CI office's annual report; A work report of a CI Chinese partner's delegation visiting its African partner; A Hanban form containing the CI local director's information; Two lists of local Chinese companies and their cooperation with CI; Three CIs' monthly work reports;

(Source: Author)

Apart from the documents collected during fieldwork, I also collected research materials from the Hanban website, including the CI's Constitution and By-laws,<sup>10</sup> CI's Scholarships selection rules,<sup>11</sup> Annual CI Conference schedules,<sup>12</sup> and CI volunteer selection process chart.<sup>13</sup> For the sake of a continuous, meaningful and unified coding system, all documents are numbered in the format of "document type + number", such as Application 13 and Regulations 20.

### **3.1.3.2 News Articles**

Employing social media to assist my methodology, I subscribed to the official Wechat public accounts of the CI and the Xinhua News Agency of Africa to receive news about the CI and China-Africa issues on a daily basis. This was the most convenient way for me to collect latest information about the CI. Using these tools, I was able to save relevant news to my note-taking software. Additionally, I subscribed to the weekly briefing of the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University, Pambazuka News,<sup>14</sup> New African News<sup>15</sup> and the BBC from which I also read news articles about the CI.

## **3.2 In the Field**

On beginning my research travels to Africa, as Miles (1970) suggests, I kept a diary

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<sup>10</sup> [http://english.hanban.org/node\\_7880.htm](http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm) [accessed 3 April 2015]

<sup>11</sup> <http://cis.chinese.cn/> [accessed 3 April 2015]

<sup>12</sup> <http://conference.chinese.cn/conference/huigu/index.html> [accessed 3 April 2015]

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.hanban.org/volunteers/> [accessed 3 April 2015]

<sup>14</sup> Pambazuka News website: <http://www.pambazuka.org/>

<sup>15</sup> New African News website: <http://newafricanmagazine.com/>



from the first day of my field experience in which I wrote down new ideas, observations, inferences etc., in as complete detail as possible. This record of reflection on my thinking helped me interweave the details of my research into the texts, discussions and appendices of my written analysis.

The fieldwork in Africa was conducted from 18 June to 22 August 2015 in four African countries. During this trip, I had 76 informants and 74 of them took part in my interviews. The length of interviews ranges from about 40 minutes to 90 minutes depending on individual circumstances and availability. Apart from one telephone interview, the remaining 73 were all conducted face-to-face. During my fieldwork in China from 21 August to 15 September 2014, I had 9 informants including one Chinese director, two previous CI teachers, four Chinese scholars in China-Africa relations and two CI Chinese partner universities' officials. In total, I had 85 informants during these two trips (see Table 3.12 below). It is worth mentioning that I interviewed more CI Chinese directors than CI local directors, because only the CI Chinese directors in country B, C and D replied to my visit request emails although I sent visit request emails to both Chinese and local directors. Besides, from my observation in these countries, the Chinese directors seem to be more in charge of the CIs than the local directors, which I will further elaborate in Chapter 5 when I examine the power operations of the CI; while in western countries, such as in the UK, the local directors tend to actively take part in the CIs' daily operation and decision making process.

**Table 3.12:** Summary of Fieldwork Informants in Africa and China

Country	A	B	C	D	China	Total
Chinese director/deputy director	5	1	2	1	1	10
Local director/deputy director	3	0	0	0	0	3
Admin staff	1	1	0	2	0	4
CI teachers	9	9	3	0	2	23
CI students	7	8	5	2	0	22
Other LCPOs' staff	3	3	2	0	0	8
Other LCPOs' students	0	0	6	0	0	6
Others	1 local teacher at a CI teaching station	0	2 Chinese government scholarship students graduated from a CI's Chinese partner university and involved in the local university's new CI	0	0	3
Chinese scholars	0	0	0	0	4	4
CI Chinese partner university's officials	0	0	0	0	2	2
<b>Total</b>	29	22	20	5	9	85

(Source: Author)

Apart from the above informants who are closely related to the CI, during my fieldwork in Africa I also met and had conversations with employees of a Chinese real estate company and a Chinese construction company, a Chinese businessman and a leader of a Chinese Chamber of Commerce in an African country. These people did not officially participate in my interviews, but they provided useful information that intrigued me to observe the relationship between the CI and other forms of Chinese presence in Africa. Although it is not difficult to notice that the CIs in developed countries, such as in the UK, also try to link themselves with other forms of local Chinese presence, such as providing Chinese classes to local Chinese communities or posting job adverts for local Chinese companies, the scale seems to be much smaller due to the limited Chinese presence in these western countries.

Group interviews were undertaken several times during my fieldwork. Sometimes because I had more potential interviewees but I did not have enough time to talk with them individually; sometimes, I found that two or more people with similar experience and position in a same group were less nervous and more receptive to my questioning. As Finch and Lewis (2003) point out, a focus-group approach can help the interviewees to have more “spontaneity” and can also help the researcher make the atmosphere more relaxed and get more critical opinion. During a group interview, the individuals “listen, reflect on what is said, and in the light of this consider their own standpoint further”, and then the whole discussion “moves to a deeper and more considerable level” (Finch and Lewis, 2003, p.171). It is possible that in a group interview the individuals may choose not to share relevant information because of the presence of the other interviewees. To avoid this influence, I compared the data collected from group interviews with that from individual interviews and followed up with the interviewees from group interviews individually if I needed to confirm or clarify information.

Apart from my active fieldwork in Africa and China, I also took every opportunity to meet and talk to other people related to the CI in other places, increasing the number of my informants to 94 in total. For example, when I attended a conference in an American university, I spoke with the university’s CI local director (the only director). Similarly, I spoke to the managing director and a student of a German CI when I took part in a workshop in a German university. In the UK, not only did I

interview people within the CI system, I also spoke with the directors and staff of another two European countries' LCPOs. Although these informants are not in Africa, their information can still contribute to my analysis of the organisation, particularly with regards to the establishment of the power structure and the comparison between different organisations. It is worth mentioning that I also have personal experience of volunteering in a UK CI for 12 months where I not only helped with the organisation and promotion of its activities, but I also made use of its resources to organise a series of academic activities that related to China issues. This experience allowed me to closely observe the material support, operations and effects of the CI.

The end of my fieldwork did not mean the end of data collection. I often asked for my informant's contact details during fieldwork and I kept in touch with them afterwards. During the analysis process, I communicated with them through emails and messages when I needed to confirm certain information or ask further questions about certain issues. On occasion, they messaged me about the problems they were facing and asked for my advice and opinion. In short, data collection continued after fieldwork; and the new data collected in this way can be seen as an extension of the interviews, therefore, I added these interactions into the transcriptions of the interviews.

When time allowed, I usually did not conduct interviews with the informants immediately, but spent some time with them building up closer relationship and

more trust, and observing the operation of the organisation to grasp a better understanding of the situation. In this way, I was able to not only ask more specific questions according to the specific situation, but also to gain more details from the interviewees because they were less vigilant. It was also likely that the interviewees would provide me with their honest opinions about the CI due to the fact that we had established initial trust in our relationship. However I continued to ensure the triangulation of different methods and data. For example, I asked the same question to different interviewees in a same CI and in different CIs; I compared what the interviewee's answer with what is written in the CI documents.

Moreover, in some cases, the informants acted and spoke differently during formal interviews in comparison to how they engaged during casual conversations. A number of interviewees gave short, official answers during interviews, yet shared more detailed information and expressed critical views during informal conversations. Occasionally, I was made aware of their sensitivity to political issues when they spoke about the organisation, for example, one interviewee said "if you ask questions about the government and political things, I will not answer" before the interview. Therefore, I kept notes of what was said during our casual conversations. I will further explain how I dealt with such ethical issues in Section 3.5.

### **3.3 Data Analysis**

When it comes to the analysis of the data I have collected through the above

methods, I followed Hycner (1985)'s "step-by-step" guidelines on the phenomenological analysis of interview data and Weston et al. (2001)'s development and evolution of a coding system. Both of their methods aim to maximise the validity and reliability of a research. Combining their advice with the practicality of my own study, I carried out the following procedures in my data analysis:

First, I transcribed interview recordings. Second, I needed to gain a sense of the whole interviews. To do this, I listened to the recordings and read the transcriptions for several times. Third, before beginning the process of coding, I created a "storyline", namely, a short paragraph that reminds me of the purpose of my study and informs me as to which concepts and themes I wanted to engage in my analysis.

The storyline of my research is:

With a two-dimensional power analytical framework, my research aims to find out if and how the CI enhances China's national interests in Africa and China-Africa relations. To answer this, I need to find out the CI's goal, material support, power structure and operational mechanisms. Also, I need to examine what kinds of effects the CI produces.

Fourth, I began the coding process. The process of creating codes can be both pre-set or open and I used both of them. I started with creating pre-set codes. Based on my theoretical framework, I considered the CI as a disciplinary institution and China's foreign policy tool. In terms of analysing it, first I needed to know the primary norm of this institution - in other words, what kind of role the initiators of the CI want it to

play, what responsibilities the CI should bear, simply, what is the purpose of the CI? The operation and development of the CI should follow this primary norm. Therefore, the code “**purpose**” is created.

Once the purpose had been established, I wanted to discover how the CI was set up. Foucault’s power theory, as explained in the literature review, seems to be effective in terms of analysing the operations of power once an institution has been set up; however, he rarely talks about how an institution can be set up in the first place. That is to say, apart from the panoptic architecture and disciplinary strategies, the establishment of an institution needs support from many aspects: how much financial support can be invested to create such an institute, how many human resources are available to start the project, what strategies can be used to induce or persuade potential partners and employees to join this project, and most importantly, does the initiator have the resources and do they use strategies in effective and intelligent ways to achieve their aims? Also, in the long term, can these material resources and strategic considerations be continuously supplied to ensure the sustained operation of this institution? Therefore, I needed to draw on sources of traditional understanding of power and create the codes of “**resources**” and “**strategies**” under the theme of material and strategic support of the CI.

After identifying the material and strategic conditions for setting up the structure and maintaining the operation of the CI, Foucault’s theory is applied again to

examine what the structure of the organisation is like, how power operates inside it and what effects are produced. In Foucault's view, the four disciplinary techniques, as shown in literature review, produce subjected and practised bodies, consequently, four codes can be applied and these are: **"distribution in space"**, **"control of activities"**, **"organisation of geneses"** and **"composition of forces"**. This helped me to collect the information needed to present how the CI transforms the individuals into objectified bodies. Through "distribution in space", I wanted to find out what the enclosed space of the CI is like, what different positions are designed, who is allowed to enter this space and become a stakeholder, what kind of hierarchy is established and how these positions circulate. Through "control of activities", I hoped to know what activities the CI has and how the head of the hierarchical structure controls the activities to achieve the best efficiency and effects, e.g. what the individuals should do, when they do this and how they do this. From "organisation of geneses", I wanted to identify the detailed plans of the CI, such as the annual plan or the ten-year development plan. From "composition of forces", I aimed to understand what elementary forces the CI has, how the CI mobilizes and combine its elementary forces, and what forms of orders are used.

Together with the four techniques, the three instruments of "hierarchical observation", "normalizing judgment" and "examination" are operated on the individuals to produce institutionalised subjects and other power effects. Accordingly, the codes of **"hierarchical observation"**, **"normalizing judgment"** and **"examination"**



are created to search for data that depicts how the CI produces its subjects through instilling its norm and knowledge to the subjected bodies.

From the code “distribution in space”, I drew a whole structural picture of the CI. With the data collected under “hierarchical observation”, I was able to further identify who the “head” of the CI is, what the hierarchical relations among different individuals are, and how the hierarchical observation works inside of the space of the CI. **“Norm”** is highlighted by Foucault, not only because it goes through the disciplinary power, but also due to the fact that it is the principle, standard, core values and knowledge of any disciplinary institute. Therefore, the data collected under “normalizing judgment” can be used together with the data collected under the above codes of four techniques to find out what the norms of each position, activity and plan are, how individuals are compared, differentiated, hierarchised, internalised and homogenised against the norms. The instrument of the examination is also integrated with the four techniques. Data collected under “examination” contributed to my understanding of how the individuals are identified, normalised, judged, progressed, selected and used by the CI, because examination is the ultimate tool of testing if an individual has become a useful and subjected body, or a useful subject.

Despite the fundamental problem of Foucault’s power concept and the incompatibility of his notions of power and resistance, resistance does appear

everywhere. Therefore, I wanted to identify where and when resistance occurs in the operations of the CI, so I create the code **“resistance”**. After examining different forms of resistance, I hoped to discover why resistance occurs during the operation of a dominatory disciplinary power. After all, power is productive, and Foucault states that the reason for him studying power was to find out how human beings are produced as subjects. He also indicated that the subject is only one of the many effects of the fundamental implication of power (Foucault, 1995). With regard to the CI, I wanted to examine what kinds of subjects are produced by the institute, so I created the code **“subjects”**. I also hoped to find out what other related effects are produced by the CI and whether these effects are useful not only for the CI but also for other forms of China’s presence in Africa. Therefore, I create the code **“other effects”**. In summary, the pre-set codes and their relationships to existing power theories are as follows:

**Table 3.13:** Codes and Their Relations to Existing Power Theories:

Pre-set Code	Secondary code	Tertiary code	Foucault’s conception of power	Traditional power theories
Purpose			Primary norm of the institution	
Resources				Possession of power resources is the precondition of using power
Strategies				The ability of translating the control of resources into desired outcomes
Disciplinary power	Distribution in space		Power operates in all types of disciplinary power technologies	
	Control of activities			
	Organisation of geneses			
	Composition of forces			
	Hierarchical observation			
	Normalizing judgment	Norm		
	Examination			

Resistance			A gap in Foucault's power theory	
Power effects	Subjects		The operation of power generates all types of effects that are useful for the society and its institutions.	
	Other effects			

(Source: Author)

The above codes are the starters of my codebook. Fifth, I uploaded all of my transcriptions and documents into NVivo and used these codes to label each transcription and document. Many other codes emerged from this process as emergent codes and I added them into the codebook. During this process, I wrote notes about ideas and insights that emerged because they were not only an important part of the analytical process, but also suggested new interpretations and connections with other data. Sixth, I re-examined the codes and decided on which codes did not work or conflated other ideas from different codes, and I broke down a number of codes that contained too much data into sub-codes in order to better organise the data. Seventh, I continued the coding process by using the refined codebook until no redundant, similar or flourished codes appeared. In this process, not only did I develop new insights about my research topic, but I also built up an embryonic structure of my analytical chapters. As Charmaz (2006, p.45) writes, coding “generates the bones of your analysis... [I]ntegration will assemble those bones into a working skeleton”.

### **3.4 Validity and Reliability**

According to Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), validity refers to the truth interpreted, as the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to

which it refers; and reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions.

In terms of validity, Silverman (1993) suggests two ways: first, a researcher can compare different types of data (e.g. documents and interviews) and different methods (e.g. observation and interviews) to see whether they corroborate one another. Second, one can bring findings back to the subjects being studied. Here, a triangulation of diverse methods and data is important. As Mathison (1988) and Olsen (2004) show, triangulation is seen as a strategy for corroborating findings and as a test for validity of the research, and it is not aimed merely at validation, but at widening and deepening the researcher's understanding. Yeung (1997) indicates that in the process of triangulation, comparing and contrasting different sources of findings if they are addressing the same phenomenon is necessary. For my case, the research methods include interview, observation and document, and my informants show a diversity of nationalities, positions and experiences. I constantly compare the data from different sources and individuals during coding and analysis. Sometimes, triangulation did illustrate contradictions between different sources, and in these cases I looked for other data which could support either side of the contradictions.

When considering reliability, my aims were to keep the fieldwork and data collection methods consistent and to find different informants in one certain venue and same

type of informants in different venues. Apart from the new questions emerged during the fieldwork, I asked the same main questions for each interview to create coherence of data. I gave the respondents sufficient time to speak in order to gain diverse and adequate data as well as to carry out systemic and comprehensive interpretation and analysis. In terms of documentary data collection, I followed the three main official sources of the CI's Wechat platform, Xinhua News Agency Africa's Wechat platform and the CI's official website to ensure that the factual information was consistent and accurate.

### **3.5 Ethical Issues**

It is noteworthy that my Ethical Review Application Form was approved by the University Research Ethics Committee on May 6<sup>th</sup> 2014, the Ethics Reference Number is PVAR 13-070; and my Fieldwork Risk Assessment Form has been approved by the Head of School of Modern Languages and Cultures, University of Leeds on March 18<sup>th</sup> 2014. In this section, I will discuss the main ethical issues I faced in my research and outline how I tailored my research design to deal with these issues.

#### **1. Informed Consent**

I informed all informants about the background, topic and purpose of my research before or when I met them and gained their consent before conducting the interviews or collecting documents. For interviews, I showed interviewees the information sheet of my research and asked them to sign the consent form. Both

documents are attached in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3. In the case that the informants did not want to participate in the interviews formally or the consent form was not available due to the luggage delay caused by the airline company, I gained the participant's verbal consent before collecting data from them.

## 2. Privacy

I kept the anonymity of all informants and institutes I visited. No identifying information about them, such as names and countries, is revealed in this thesis. When using quotes or certain data that can be traced to a specific individual or institute, I concealed any information that reveals the informant's identity and changed the wording and structure of the sentences on condition that the meaning remains the same.

## 3. Harm and Exploitation

Harm is closely related to the issues of informed consent and privacy mentioned above. In order to cause less stress or discomfort for my informants, I always tried to create a trusting and supportive environment during my interviews and visits to the institutes by practicing the first two principles. I also bore in mind that there is a boundary between myself as a researcher, and the people I met during the trips and that I should not become too close to them. As for the issue of exploitation, I always made it very clear that they are in no way required to participate if they do not wish to. I also informed any key contacts the importance of not exploiting participants.

#### 4. Consequences for future research

I cannot foresee any negative implications for future research arising from this project. There was no willing deception, and participants were involved in and informed about the project from start to finish.

### **3.6 Limitations**

Although case study is a preferred strategy when the investigator has little control over events, when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context, and where the investigator wants to have a holistic understanding of the situation and phenomenon (Kumar, 2011; Yin, 2003), I needed to be aware of some weaknesses of the case study methodology. As Easton (1995, p.379) suggests, there are three main weaknesses: some case studies are simply rich descriptions of events from which the readers are expected to come to their own conclusions. Others are really examples of data that appear to provide, at best, partial support of specific theories or frameworks and are used in a quasi-deductive theory testing way. A third kind employs multiple “case studies” in a way that suggests that they are relying on some notion of statistical generalisation. In order to avoid the first problem in my own case study, I invested in theory to keep some intellectual control over the burgeoning set of case descriptions (Weick, 1979). As for the second problem, a stronger reliance on theory helps to reduce the negative effects. Regarding the third problem, I always keep in mind that case studies cannot build on statistical inference,

but have to rely on analytical inference.

Regarding the geographical diversity of my cases, I have visited 7 CIs in 4 southern and eastern Sub-Saharan African countries, but I did not visit the CIs in western and northern Sub-Saharan African countries. This research may not be able to reflect the overall representativeness of African CIs. In order to minimise the impact of this problem, I have collected and used documentary data about western and northern Sub-Saharan African CIs. Additionally, five of my interviewees formerly worked in two western African CIs: one Chinese director worked for more than five years in one western African CI, and two Hanban teachers also served in two western African CIs for one year each. Additionally, one volunteer teacher and one Gongpai teacher both worked in a western African CI for one year. They informed me with comparative views generated from their professional experience in different CIs.

In terms of the range of my interviewees, I did not manage to visit and interview the CI Headquarters' officials despite numerous attempts to contact them. The lack of interview data from the top level of the CI's power structure, i.e. the CI Headquarters, could impact my analysis of the CI's power intention and the CI's power operation at the higher level. I used secondary data, such as the CI Headquarters' officials' speeches, newspaper and TV interviews, to minimise the negative impact from this perspective.



Another limitation of this study could be the lack of interview data from local CI directors. That is to say that I successfully interviewed nine Chinese CI directors in four African countries during my fieldwork in Africa, but I only managed to interview three African CI directors in one African country. This could generate a certain level of bias for my analysis of individual CI's power intention, power operation and power effects. The triangulation of different sources and types of data, such as interview data from local administrative staff and locally employed Chinese teachers, helped me to minimise the negative impact.

## **Chapter 4**

### **The Establishment of the CI**

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In Chapter 2, I reviewed traditional power theories in international relations and Foucault's conception of power. Informed by the wisdom of both approaches, I formulated a two-dimensional power analytical framework. This new power analytical framework allows me to examine the CI more comprehensively because it does not only require me to find out why and how the CI as a concrete entity was established in the first place, but also requires my investigation of what is happening inside of the CI's concrete shell, i.e. how power operates inside of the CI and what effects are produced by the CI. In other words, I need to carry out an external examination of the material establishment of the CI as well as an internal inspection of power operations and effects inside of the CI. Simply put, the first dimensional analysis shows the construction of the CI and the second reveals the deconstruction of the CI. This chapter focuses on the first dimensional analysis of the CI.

As indicated in my literature review, the idea of the first dimensional analysis derives from traditional understandings of power which either see power as the possession of resources or the ability of using these resources to achieve certain outcomes. Sufficient power resources and the ability to make efficient use of them underpins the establishment of any social organisation. For the CI, I needed to find out why China established the CI, how China invests its resources to evolve the CI, and how China maintains the CI both materially and strategically. This chapter will carry out

the first dimensional analysis of the CI by answering these questions successively.

#### **4.1 Power Intentions of the CI**

Foucault states that power is always exercised with a series of aims and objectives (Foucault, 1998). These aims and objectives are the principles to be followed, the standards to be measured against, and the dominant norms to be internalised in the operations of power. To make clear the aims and objectives of the CI is to demonstrate the power intentions of the CI. In other words, the aims and objectives of the CI indicate why the CI is set up and what China expects to get from the CI project.

In Chapter 2, I have shown that the CI and other LCPOs are usually seen as a country's tool for achieving its foreign policy aims and for promoting its national interests overseas. These LCPOs understand that they are bearing important responsibilities given to them by their founding countries. For example, the British Council openly displays that it is part of the UK's foreign policy by stating on its website that its work used to be included in a review of all UK foreign policy commissioned by the then Foreign Secretary in the 1970s (British Council, n.d.-b). Similarly, the Goethe Institute website demonstrates its close ties with the German Foreign Office by stating that it took over all overseas German cultural institutes on the initiative of the head of the arts sector of the Foreign Office in late 1950s and early 1960s. It adds that the new Goethe Institute international network "signals an

intensification of Germany's foreign cultural policy" (Goethe Institute Website, n.d.).

The role of the Goethe Institute in Germany's foreign policy was revealed more directly and deeply by an African Goethe Institute director who said, "Goethe Institute was founded in 1951, shortly after WW2. The idea was to help bring back Germany to the international community, because the image of Germany was quite negative after WW2... Culture is a good tool to re-establish communication with your neighbours and the rest of the world". He emphasised that his institute has three roles: strengthening the role of the Germany language, fostering the intercultural dialogue between Germany and the hosting countries, disseminating information about Germany to contribute to education and culture (Interview 13).

Like these LCPOs, the CI sees itself as China's foreign policy initiative. The official *CI Development Plan 2012-2020* published on the CI Headquarters website states that the CI is to fit in with the needs of China's public diplomacy and cultural exchanges. The CI should play its role as a cultural communication platform and contribute to the friendship between China and other countries (Hanban Website, 2013a). The overarching purpose of the CI has been interpreted more bluntly by the officials and individuals of the CI. Ms Chen Zhili, previous Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the former CI Headquarters Council Chairwoman, writes in her article marking the CI's 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary that the CI "plays a positive role of introducing China and explaining China to the world, ...

[and] eliminating foreigners' misunderstanding towards China" (Chen, 2014). This view can be considered to be the main purpose of the CI and it has been widely accepted by African CI directors. A CI Chinese director stated that, "the CI is a national strategy. China's economy is strong now; we also need to let the foreigners know how Chinese people live, why China chose such political system. We need to let them know the real situation of China from the CI, not from western media like the New York Times, BBC and NBC" (Interview 45). Another CI Chinese director reiterated this point by saying that "70% world information is disseminated in English, learning about China only through non-Chinese media cannot lead to a fair and comprehensive understanding of China" (Interview 41). These comments reflect an expectation that the CI is or is to become a new channel of delivering Chinese knowledge, to play an important role in establishing a new and positive image of China, and to serve as a new window for foreigners to look at China. Through the CI, they hope that the local people will gain interest in and affection towards China, so that they do not feel intimidated by Chinese presence in their country or on the global stage.

Because all African CIs are joint-ventures between the Chinese side and the local African side and each CI has both Chinese and local directors, whether the local directors agree and accept the CI's principal aims and objectives is vital for the operation of this organisation. A local director said, "although our primary focus is language teaching, we have a very important role in changing perceptions about

China. The CI actually carries through interpretations about China... the CI is the face of China in [this university]... a lot of tensions and misperceptions [towards] China need the platform of the CI to address them” (Interview 51). A local co-director seconded the view, “I think the CI is a very good concept, I think it will alleviate certain stereotypes regarding China as an emerging economy. It helps to understand the country better, the culture, the people; local people will not be intimidated by foreign presence as such” (Interview 12). Similarly, another CI local director said, “I suppose [the CI] is part of China’s foreign policy and expansion of the promotion of Chinese language and culture”, through the CI, we learn about China and Chinese government, and “CI provides other opportunities, such as scholarships, to learn in China” (Interview 15). These CI local directors’ comments show that they share similar views with their Chinese colleagues that the CI is a part of China’s foreign policy and therefore it should play its role in building up a good image of China in Africa.

From the above, the power intentions of the CI seem to be clear. That is to say, the CI is seen on both sides as an element of China’s foreign policy and it is considered that it should play an important role in demonstrating a positive image of China thus changing foreigners’ perception of China. Indeed, no power is operated without aims and goals, or simply, power is intentional; but the intention or purpose may or may not be realised in the end. One can set the goals, but he is not able to know what will happen in the end. As Foucault says, “people know what they do; they frequently

know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does" (Foucault, cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p.187). This is because the intention is always shaped by the operations of power and many effects are produced, the initial intention may be only part of the overall effects, or may even be totally excluded from the effects. The CI's power operations and effects will be addressed in the next two chapters.

#### **4.2 Hanban and the CI**

Once the goal of establishing a CI has been set, the next task is to establish the physical presence of the organisation. Currently, the CI Headquarters and an organisation called Hanban share the same website and offices. The Chief Executive of the CI Headquarters is also the Director General of Hanban. Hanban (汉办) in Chinese is short for the standing office of the National Leading Group of Teaching Chinese Overseas (国家对外汉语教学领导小组办公室) which was set up on 24 July 1987. This organisation was originally affiliated to the State Council as a temporary coordinating organisation which was led by the State Education Commission (later the Ministry of Education) and consisted of members from nine organisations including eight ministries and commissions of the State Council and Beijing Language Institute. From 1998, representatives from three more ministries and commissions joined Hanban and Beijing Language and Culture University withdrew from it (Ministry of Education, n.d.-b).

In 1996, Hanban became a *Shiye Danwei* directly affiliated to the State Education Commission (later the Ministry of Education) and gained independent legal person status. The registered name is the Centre for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language Development, Ministry of Education (Hanban) 教育部对外汉语教学发展中心 (国家汉办). *Shiye Danwei* is a unique term in the Chinese governmental structure inherited from the Planned Economy System before China's reform and opening up in the late 1970s. According to the *Interim Regulations of Shiye Danwei Registration and Management* issued by the State Council in 1998, *Shiye Danwei* refers to non-profit social organisations with the purpose of promoting social welfare and benefits, which are run by government bodies or other organisations funded by national assets, and they devote themselves to working in the areas of education, science, culture and religion. Despite the complexity of *Shiye Danwei* in China, they share some typical features: *Shiye Danwei* are established and maintained by the government. The government determines the establishment, size, cancellation of their registration, and directly organizes and manages their activities. Additionally, all funds of *Shiye Danwei* come from the government (Lian, 2007).

In 2006, the name of the National Leading Group of Teaching Chinese Overseas was changed into the National Leading Group of Chinese Language International Promotion (国家汉语国际推广领导小组); accordingly, the name of the office was changed to the Office of Chinese Language Council International (国家汉语国际推广领导小组办公室) (Ministry of Education, n.d.-c). On 21 March 2008, the State



Council issued a notice on the setting and re-organisation of its advisory and coordinating organisations, the National Leading Group of Chinese Language International Promotion was revoked (Hebei Jigou Bianzhi Website, 2010). Henceforth, Hanban only refers to the Shiye Danwei of the Centre for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language Development, Ministry of Education (Hanban/General Headquarters of Confucius Institute) 教育部对外汉语教学发展中心（国家汉办/孔子学院总部）<sup>16</sup> (Ministry of Education, n.d.-a). Hanban / General Headquarters of Confucius Institute is now governed by a Council which is chaired by a Vice Premier of the Chinese State Council and composed of 16 representatives from ministries, commissions, departments and organisations of China's central government.<sup>17</sup> The position of the executive director of the CI Headquarters is equivalent to a vice-minister in China's central government (Hanban, n.d.).

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<sup>16</sup> After the establishment of the CI and CI Headquarters, the name was extended to include General Headquarters of Confucius Institute 孔子学院总部.

<sup>17</sup> Chair, Vice Chairs and Executive Council Members of the 5<sup>th</sup> Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters (2016) include:

Chair: Madam Liu Yandong, Vice Premier, State Council of the PRC

Vice Chairs:

Mr Yuan Guiren, Minister, Ministry of Education

Madam Qiu Yuanping, Minister, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council

Madam Jiang Xiaojuan, Deputy Secretary-General, State Council

Mr Yu Weiping, Vice Minister, Ministry of Finance

Executive Council Members:

Mr Qian Hongshan, Assistant Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr Wang Xiaotao, Vice Chairman, National Development and Reform Commission

Mr Hao Ping, Vice Minister, Ministry of Education

Mr Zhang Xiangchen, Deputy China International Trade Representative (vice ministerial level)

Mr Ding Wei, Vice Minister, Ministry of Culture

Mr Nie Chenxi, Vice Minister, State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television; President, China Central Television

Mr Wu Shangzhi, Vice Minister, State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television

Mr Ren Qiliang, Vice Minister, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council

Madam Cui Yuying, Vice Minister, State Council Information Office

Mr Zhou Mingwei, Director (Vice Minister), China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration

Mr Wang Gengnian, President, China Radio International

Madam Xu Lin, Chief Executive, Confucius Institute Headquarters; Director General of Hanban (Source: Confucius Institute Magazine, 2016 January)

In 2004, Hanban drew up the Chinese Bridge Project (also known as the Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language Project 2003-2007 Work Schemes) which was approved by the Chinese State Council. This project consisted of nine missions:

1. Confucius Institute;<sup>18</sup>
2. China-America Online Language Teaching;
3. Production of Teaching Material and Phono tape, Videotape and Multimedia;
4. Local and Foreign Chinese Teachers Training;
5. Building Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language Bases in Key Chinese Universities;
6. Chinese Proficiency Test (HSK);
7. World Chinese Conference and the “Chinese Bridge” Competition;
8. “Chinese Bridge” Foundation and Chinese Library Overseas;
9. Infrastructure Projects (Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language Theory Development, Information Technology Development)

Among these missions, the CI is probably the most important and influential one, under which the other missions seem to be supporting and integrated with the CI.

On 15 June 2004, the then Chinese president Hu Jintao witnessed the signature ceremony of the establishment of a CI in Tashkent Uzbekistan, signifying the beginning of the ambitious CI project (Chen, 2014) which then developed at the rate of establishing a new CI per week on average (Wan and Jiang, 2015). On 21 November 2004, the first CI opened its doors in Seoul, South Korea and on 9 April 2007, the CI Headquarters was established within Hanban to coordinate and organise the large number of CIs worldwide.

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<sup>18</sup> Ms. Zhili Chen, the Minister of Education and later Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress suggested using the most prominent figure of Confucianism—Confucius—to name this institution after (Nie, 2008, p.35).

### **4.3 Material and Strategic Support of the CI in Africa**

Since the inception of the CI, the CI project has experienced a dramatic growth: the first CI opened in November 2004 in South Korea; four years later in 2008, 249 CIs and 56 Confucius Classrooms (CCs) had been established in 78 countries and regions. In December 2011, the numbers of CI and CC had risen to 358 and 500, and the number of countries owning CIs and CCs had jumped to 105. By the end of 2016, a network of 512 CIs and 1073 CCs had been created, linking 140 countries and regions with China, among which 42 CIs had been established in 30 Sub-Saharan African countries. To establish so many new centres in such a short space of time, the CI clearly received sufficient material and strategic support from both China and from local African countries. In examining the scale of this support, one must admit that the growth of China in the past few decades has generated some attraction to Africa and this kind of attraction also supports the development of the CI. As the Pew Research Centre's survey of eight African countries shows, a median of 65% of Africans express a positive opinion of China. In Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal and South Africa, there are 70%, 60%, 52%, 51% and 49% people who think it is important to have a strong relationship with Beijing (Pew Research Centre, 2013).

During my fieldwork in Africa, I have witnessed China's strong presence in Africa. For example, the television screens in a new, Chinese-built international airport terminal were broadcasting China's CCTV international news channel (fieldwork note 15 August 2015). A new five star hotel in a southern African country's capital city was

being built by a Chinese company and will be operated by the Chinese (fieldwork note 20 July 2015). Advertisements of the Chinese telecom giant Huawei and other Chinese products appear on the large advertising billboards in airports, by the roads and on the buildings in every city I visited. Even the vendors in different countries' tourist attractions introduced their products to me in Chinese. In recent years China has become the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest economy in the world and has surpassed the US to become Africa's largest trading partner (Dews, 2014). Local African people have already seen the Chinese presence in their countries and they have welcomed the opportunities that this brings. As one CI local director pointed out to me, "look, what we must admit is you can't wash away China, not here, not in Africa. China is overtaking the EU to become the biggest trade partner in [the African country]; China is the major partner in all African countries. The CI gives us an opportunity" (interview I15).

African CI students also stated that learning Chinese may bring them new opportunities. As one student explained, "I found that in my zone, my neighbourhood, there are many Chinese people. They have companies, but it's difficult to communicate. When I saw the CI, I know it's my chance to learn Chinese" (Interview 27). Similarly, another two students see business opportunities in the Chinese presence: one student stated, "Chinese government is investing more in [this country] and Africa [compared with other countries]. Being a [local person] who can speak Chinese will open up a lot of opportunities. So I decided to learn Chinese"

(Interview 38). Another agreed saying, “I want to do business with the Chinese. I find products from China are everywhere I go in [this country]. I need to learn the language to collaborate with China” (Interview 7). Adding to this point, a local teacher of a CI’s teaching station believed that “Mandarin will be one of the three main languages in the world”. She also highlighted that “in terms of business, learning the Chinese culture is also important. I see the CI as a positive opportunity, strategically forward, not just in cultural development, but in terms of business” (Interview 51).

From these comments, we can see that that the attractiveness of China has, in part at least, been derived from the rise of its economy and international influence. This contributes to the realisation of the idea of the CI. On top of that, many other material and strategic factors, as shown below, promote the phenomenal growth of the CI.

#### **4.3.1 Support from Leaders**

The Chinese bureaucratic system itself should be seen as a power technology which has its own panoptic power structure, its authoritative figurers holding the “central tower”, and all types of power techniques and instruments that exercise on the individuals and produce power effects. The Chinese bureaucratic system includes many smaller bureaucratic agencies, such as the CI, local governments, schools and hospitals. All these smaller bureaucratic agencies have their own power technologies.

The operation of these power technologies relies not only on the invisible power techniques and instruments, but also on the material support, such as financial support and human resources support, that they receive from their superior administrative units. Both elements are necessary for the healthy operation of these systems and institutes.

As a government affiliated and funded organisation, the support of Chinese leaders' is vital to the establishment and operation of the CI. This kind of support is evident in several ways. First, paying a visit to the CIs seems to have become an important part of Chinese leaders' foreign visits and how to receive high-level Chinese leaders' visit has become part of CI Chinese directors' training programme (Training 24). Since Xi Jinping became the President of China in 2013, he has visited Africa twice. During his first visit, he witnessed the opening ceremony of the 4<sup>th</sup> CI in South Africa with South African President Jacob Zuma on 27 March 2013 (Hanban Website, 2013c). During his second visit in December 2015, the students of the CI at the University of Zimbabwe were invited to perform at the welcoming dinner hosted by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (Hanban Website, 2015a). During his visit to Zambia in March 2016, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress, Zhang Dejiang, paid a visit to the CI at the University of Zambia, donated 3,000 books and passed the key of the Chinese built CI building to Zambia's Vice President Inonge Wina (Hanban Website, 2016b). By the end of 2011, all nine members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had visited

the CIs. Former Chinese President Hu Jintao himself had visited the CIs at least 16 times (Dangjian Website, 2011).

Second, Chinese leaders show their support of the CI in their speeches and official documents. On the occasion of the first global CI Day, both President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang sent the CI their congratulatory letters. Premier Li writes that “I wish that Confucius Institutes will move forward ... inherit and carry forward the philosophy of ‘harmony is most precious’ and ‘harmony without uniformity’,” (Supportive document 1) and Xi expresses the view that “Confucius Institutes belong to China and even more so the world. Chinese government and people will consistently support the growth of the Confucius Institutes” (Supportive document 2). In his speech at the opening ceremony of the 5<sup>th</sup> ministerial conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the then Chinese President Hu Jintao said “China and Africa have set up 29 Confucius Institute or Classrooms in 22 African countries... we should ... strengthen exchanges in education, culture, science and technology ... and increase contacts between youth, women, people’s organisations, media and academic institutions of the two sides. In this way, we will provide intellectual inspiration and cultural support for China-Africa cooperation and win even greater popular support for China-Africa friendship” (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Website, 2012). In the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018) published after the 6<sup>th</sup> FOCAC Ministerial Conference, it states that “the Chinese side welcomes the inclusion by African countries of Chinese

language teaching as part of their national education systems and will support more African countries in their efforts to establish Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms”, and the statement of supporting the CI appears in the action plans of the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> FOCAC Ministerial Conferences (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Website, n.d.).

By showing their support to the CI, the leaders, as the authoritative figures of the bureaucratic system, are telling their subordinates that the CI is important to the national strategy, so we must ensure the CI develops well. In order to achieve this goal, relevant organisations and individuals must provide sufficient support to the CI. The support from different sections of the Chinese government is revealed in a 2010 report to the CI Headquarter Council by the Chief Executive of the CI, Xu Lin. In this report, she stated that the Ministry of Education guides Hanban in formulating the Confucius Institutes Development Plan; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests the Chinese embassies and diplomatic missions to offer service and support for Confucius Institutes; the Ministry of Finance continues to ensure financial input; the National Development and Reform Commission incorporates the development of Confucius Institutes into the Twelfth Five-year National Development Plan; the Ministry of Commerce initiates the aid project of the Confucius Institute in different countries; the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs of the State Council strengthens the training of Chinese teachers; the Ministry of Culture and the State Council Information Office provides cultural products to Confucius Institutes; the State



Administration of Radio, Film and Television supports CCTV 4 and 9 in developing Chinese teaching programs; China Radio International works on the radio Chinese teaching programs and overseas CRI Confucius Classrooms; the General Administration of Press and Publication supports the publication and exporting of Chinese textbooks overseas (Xu, 2010b). Here, eleven Chinese ministries and governmental organisations assist in the development of the CI and play their different roles in providing the necessary material support to the CI from different sources. The leaders' support can be seen as one of the most important factors that contributes to the dramatically fast development of the CI, because the leaders are able to utilise their privileged positions in the hierarchical power structure to not only deliver a normative message that the CI is important, but also to mobilise the necessary material support to the CI.

#### **4.3.2 Advertising Effect**

The CI Headquarters website explains that it is the local partners in-country who take the initiative to apply to have a CI established with them. So the establishment of the CIs to some extent is demand-driven or a response to foreign partners' needs. However, before the CI became popular, Xu admitted that China took the initiative to persuade the first 27 foreign partners to set up the first 27 CIs. One of the 27 CIs' local directors described how Hanban approached to them: "it was an approach of Hanban to the University. Once Hanban approached to us, it helped us to identify a Chinese partner university as well ... Hanban suggested various universities and asked

[us] to partner with them. It wasn't Hanban's choice but [ours]. [We] were given the options" (Interview 15).

These 27 university leaders were invited to attend the first World Chinese Conference in Beijing in 2007. In this meeting, they received CI plaques from top Chinese leaders witnessed by more than 5,000 foreign students, government officials, top university presidents, sinologists and school teachers from 67 countries. As Xu indicates, this event effectively advertised the CI and strongly stimulated the conference participants. As a result, more than 100 foreign universities required to set up a CI in the following six months (Phoenix Satellite Television, 2012b). Among the top 200 world universities, 70 had established their CIs by the end of 2012 (Hanban Website, 2013b). These included: Columbia University, Stanford University, the University of Edinburgh, the University of Manchester and the University of Sydney. Xu suggested that the reputation of the foreign partner universities weighs heavily in the selection process (Phoenix Satellite Television, 2012a). This view is confirmed by the CIs in Africa where it is easy to demonstrate that African CIs' local partners are consistently the top-performing universities in the African countries. One Chinese director explained that once the best university in a certain African country has become a CI partner, in principle the CI Headquarters and local Chinese embassy will not set up other CIs unless they are geographically required (Interview 48).

The CI Headquarters now holds a Confucius Institute Conference annually that is attended by Chinese leaders and representatives from CIs worldwide. The Conference announces different awards for excellent CIs and CI leaders, runs several seminars with discussions to promote the development of the CIs, and exhibits new CI books and teaching materials for different CIs to select.

It is the case that the more well-known partners join this large, elitist group, the more other potential partners want to join. It is the same as the advertising effect which constitutes a norm or a consensus – establishing a CI is in high demand and only good universities are chosen by Hanban to receive a CI. As one CI local director explained, the idea of setting up a CI in his university came from the deputy director of internationalisation of the university who saw the best university of another African country had established a CI. This deputy director consequently advised the Vice Chancellor to establish a CI in his university as well. The Vice Chancellor thought it is a good idea and in the end a new CI was set up (Interview 51).

#### **4.3.3 A Joint-venture**

It can be found that all African CIs are joint ventures formed with both Chinese side and local side, and each CI has a Chinese director and a local director. The majority of the CI partners are Chinese and local African universities and a few are local governmental organisations and companies. This mode makes the CI different from the UK's British Council and Germany's Goethe Institute, because both operate

without a local partner and there is only one director for each centre. However, Spain's Cervantes Institute and Portugal's Camoes Institute share some similar joint-venture features with the CI.

As an academic director of a Cervantes Institute explained, her institute has an agreement with a local university and under this agreement, the university provides the building to the institute and the institute provides teachers to the university (Interview 40). Similarly, a director of a Camoes Institute confirmed that her institute and the partner university's Portuguese department are very much integrated. The university provides spaces, technical and other support to the institute's activities whilst the institute provides native Portuguese teachers and scholarships to the university (Interview 18). However, these two institutes only have one director who is employed by the institutes' headquarters.

This joint venture co-operation model of the CI means that both Chinese and local sides are involved in the operation of the institute, and the two directors who have equivalent positions in the CI's hierarchical structure must have a consensus in terms of implementing power intentions and norms in the CI. Although there is always the possibility that the two sides may not work well with each other (and this has occurred in some CIs which I will discuss in the next chapter), this joint venture model does bring considerable material benefits to the development of the CI.

Firstly, the joint venture mode allows the CI to be easily embedded in the local partner's system, giving the CI an automatic official status. As two CI local directors explained, the CI is regarded as a part of the university – either as a research institute or as a part of the international department (Interviews 15 & 51). One CI Chinese director also felt that the university sees the CI as its own institute, and the CI's information and activities are included in every issue of the university's newsletters (Interview 52).

In three African CIs, I noticed that the CIs' official letterhead sheets all have the official logos of both the CI and the local university (fieldwork notes 9 July, 21 July and 7 August 2015). This indicates that the CI secures an official status either as a part of or a partner to the local university. Because the local universities accept and integrate the CIs into their systems, the CIs automatically receive the universities' care and protection. As one Chinese director said, "if anything bad happens, the local university is responsible for us" (Interview 14).

Secondly, once the CI has become a part of the local partner, it can make use of the partner's existing premises, human resources and social relations without spending more time setting up its own. The offices and classrooms of all CIs I visited are located in the local partners' buildings or in their affiliated organisations. The local directors of these CIs are also employees of the local partner universities. Among the seven CIs I visited, two CIs' local directors are also the heads of the local partner

universities' international offices; three local directors are also the deans of the local partner universities' departments or schools; one local director is also the Vice-Chancellor of the university and one local director is also a professor of the university. These local people have high local social status, established local social networks and easy access to local communities. With their help, the CI can develop and expand easily in the African countries. As a CI teacher explained, "when the CI wants to establish new teaching centres, the local director talks with local schools about it, because he knows local schools' principals" (Interview 41). A CI local administrator felt that they, as the CI's hosts, have the responsibility to help the Chinese who are foreigners and make them feel safe and happy in the local country (Interview 33). During my fieldwork, a CI local director flew to another local university with the CI Chinese deputy director to finalise the agreement for setting up a CI teaching centre there (fieldwork note 25 July 2015). In another CI, a number of new Chinese teachers had just arrived from China, the CI's local side arranged their accommodation, showed them around campus, briefed them on some local dos and don'ts, and drove them to see some local attractions (fieldwork note 12 July 2015).

In a sense, the CI local members all have dual identities – one is the identity given by the CI, either as a local director or an administrator; the other is the identity constituted in the local country, either as a professor in a local university or a dean of a university department. These dual identities represent dual meaning and dual

responsibilities. They utilise the local identities to help in fulfilling the responsibilities of their CI's identities and possibly vice versa on other occasions, such as using their CI identity to win a Chinese award. Of course, it is possible that some CI local members do not fully practice their dual identities and that they ignore the responsibilities attached to their CI identity. When this happens, the CI would not develop as well as the ones where local members fully exercise the role given to them by the CIs. This point will be revisited in the next chapter as I explore the power operation inside of the CI.

Thirdly, this joint venture mode requires the local side to provide certain levels of financial support and human resources to the CI. The constitution of the CI shows that the funds for each of the CI's annual projects should be based on a principle of approximately 50-50% share from both sides. Although none of my informants told me the exact percentage of the CI's funds from each side, the material support from the local side is easy to identify. In all CIs that I visited, the CI offices and classrooms are provided by the local partner universities; the local partners also hire at least one local administrative member to assist in the work of the CI. Chinese staff's accommodation, medical insurance and vehicles are wholly or partly paid for by the local partners (fieldwork notes 24 June 2015, 30 July 2015; Interviews 39, 41, 15, 24 & 55). This material support from local partners undoubtedly contributes to the overall operational costs of the CIs, which means China does not need to bear the large burden of investment for the CIs solely. The joint venture mode utilises both

sides' material support and therefore should work for both sides' expectations.

Indeed, the idea of the CIs reflects a win-win spirit.

#### **4.3.4 A Win-win Spirit**

The CI will not be welcomed in a country if it is merely beneficial for the Chinese side.

It must also be seen as beneficial for the local side. It can be found that the CI's power structure shows respect to both sides by allocating two directors – a Chinese director and a local director. Both directors have equal positions and neither side is superior or subordinate to the other. All big decisions need to be made with permission from both sides. As a CI local director highlighted, the two directors must make joint decisions about everything involved in the CI. Neither of them can make executive decisions without approval from the other person (Interview 51).

Additionally, each CI establishes a Board of Directors and the board members are taken from both sides. According to an African CI's establishment agreement and another African CI's regulations and rules, the number of board members and the component ratio of two sides are determined through consultation. A local member and a Chinese member rotate as the head of the CI board (Agreement and constitution 1, Regulation 5). The Board of Directors of an African CI I visited consisted of seven members: three local members and four Chinese members including the local university's vice chancellor and the Chinese university's council chairman. The vice chancellor became the first chairman of this CI's Board of



Directors (Summary and report 4). Again, this design of CI board of directors shows respect to local partners though involving them in the leadership equally, making them feel accepted and invested in this partnership. Because both sides are working together with equal status in the CI's power structure, they can supervise each other laterally. This arrangement gives both sides a sense of security as one would notice any harmful behaviour from the other immediately and take any necessary action.

Secondly, African CI partners show strong interest in working with China, having exchanges with Chinese universities and learning advanced technology from the Chinese side. The CI offers an ideal opportunity for them to achieve this goal. In an African university's application letter to the CI Headquarters for establishing a new CI, the university's Vice Chancellor writes that the establishment of the CI will help bring the Chinese partner university's cutting-edge knowledge of a certain industry to the university and the local country, which will change the current small-scale production, high cost, and over-reliance to governmental protection of this industry (Application 11). A CI local director confessed that the initial idea of setting up the CI at the university was because the Vice Chancellor sees the CI "as a good vehicle to strengthen the ties between [the university] and China and Chinese universities" (Interview 51).

These statements from the African side show that they do not see the CI as a danger or a threat. Instead, they hope that through the platform of the CI, advanced

knowledge and vibrant communications can be brought in to facilitate their own development. To satisfy such requirements from the African side, China initiated the *20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education* initiated in the 4<sup>th</sup> FOCAC Ministerial Conference as a form of Chinese educational aid to Africa, aiming to establish a new type of one-to-one inter-institutional cooperation model between 20 Chinese universities (or vocational colleges) and 20 African universities (or vocational colleges). The establishment of three CIs I visited have been benefited from this plan (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Website, 2010, Application 11, Regulation 5, Interview 11).

It is also noticeable that setting up a CI is not necessarily a one-way interest from the local partner to the Chinese partner. The Chinese universities are encouraged too. Within China's educational system, "setting up CIs overseas has become a trend among Chinese universities", a CI Chinese partner university's international office leader said, "it is always bad for a Chinese university to have a gap [of not having a CI]". Besides, the level of a Chinese university's internationalisation is evaluated by its superior governmental bodies or education research companies who publish the rank of the universities. This international office leader pointed out that if a university does not have overseas teaching organisations such as the CI, the evaluation index of overseas influential ability of the university would be very low, which has a bad impact on the overall rank of the university (Interview 54). Therefore, Chinese universities are under pressure to establish CIs imposed from the outside.

However, it cannot be denied that some Chinese universities also would like to learn the new knowledge of local universities and foreign countries through the platform of the CIs. In terms of the Chinese universities who partner with African universities, several have an African studies department. Having a CI with an African partner university would provide much convenience to their research on Africa. For example, a Chinese university which has a strong African studies department has established three CIs with three leading African universities, and several teachers of the Chinese university have utilised the platform of the CI to do some research (Interview 55). In this sense, the CI can be seen as a platform of exchanging knowledge because it delivers Chinese knowledge to African countries and vice versa. Of course, the Chinese knowledge delivered by the CI tends to be positive about China, while the knowledge collected from the local countries by the Chinese side seems to be less selective. This point will be further discussed in the next chapter.

Thirdly, there are immediate material benefits provided by the Chinese side to the local partners. According to the Constitution and By-laws of the CI, for each newly established CI, the Chinese side will provide aid to its initial operation in form of a set amount of funds of at least 100,000 US Dollars. Whilst it is true that the constitution of the CI also shows the funds for each CI's annual projects should be based on the principle of approximately 50-50% share from both sides, the real situation seems to be that the Chinese side sometimes provides more than the foreign partners -

especially for African CIs. As the Chief Executive of the CI Headquarters, Xu Lin, pointed out, most African CIs are equipped with poor teaching facilities and infrastructures and African CI teachers and volunteers' living standards are also comparatively lower than those in developed regions, so the CI Headquarters "gives CIs in Africa extra help" (Ren, 2012). She stated that in 2009, CI Headquarters provided 4,010,000 US Dollars to all African CIs - 190,000 US Dollars for each on average (Ren, 2012). In some cases, the African local partners cannot provide enough space to host or sustain the CI, the Chinese side offers to build or extend CI buildings or other types of buildings to host the CI. The CI's African local partners that benefited from this aid include the University of Zambia, Agostinho Neto University in Angola, the University of Dakar in Senegal, the University of Dar es Salaam, Eduardo Mondlane University in Mozambique, TVET Institute of Ethiopia, the University of Nairobi, the University of Liberia, the University of Lagos and the University of Tamatava, Madagascar (Hanban, 2016, 152, 124; Liaoning University CI Office, 2015; Hanban, 2015b; Hanban, 2015a; Ren, 2012).

In each CI that I visited, I saw many books that had been donated by Hanban. One new CI's book list shows that 965 different books were donated by Hanban and that each book has a certain number of copies (Supportive document 3). According to Xu, in the single year of 2009 Hanban donated 140,000 teaching materials and books to African CIs – an average of 5,800 copies for each (Ren, 2012). Some CIs have created a library to take advantage of these books. The immediate material benefits also

include smaller benefits for the local individuals, such as a local directors' allowance and local staff's opportunities for visiting China free of charge (Interview 10, Supportive document 6). These material benefits can be seen as incentives that attract the local partners to join and work for the CI project.

#### **4.3.5 Sufficient Human Resources**

The CI's power structure, according to its specific purposes and hierarchical design, is distributed into thousands of small spaces, and each space needs an individual to fill in and play his part in the operation of the whole structure. For example, in the first half year of 2015, 2,497 Chinese volunteer teacher vacancies needed to be filled (Notice 15). Thanks to China's ample human resources and the CI Headquarters' recruitment strategies, the provision of such a large workforce becomes possible.

According to the *2016 Chinese Universities and Subjects Evaluation Report* published by Wuhan University's Research Centre for Chinese Science Evaluation, as of 23 February 2016, 278 Chinese universities offer degree courses of Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages (Research Centre for Chinese Science Evaluation, 2016), and 108 Chinese universities offer a Master of Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages (MTCSOL) degree course (National Education Steering Committee for MTCSOL, 2016). The current students and new graduates of these courses account for the majority of CI teachers who initially join in the role of Volunteer Teacher. Chinese university students studying other subjects can also apply to become a CI

teacher so long as they pass Hanban's interviews, tests and training. Additionally, current teachers at Chinese educational institutes can apply to become a CI teacher, usually in the role of Gongpai Teacher. The Gongpai teachers whom I interviewed include university teachers and secondary school teachers. These Chinese educational institutes provide enough candidates to fill in the CI's teacher job vacancies.

Additionally, the Chinese educational institutes have sufficient candidates to fill the CI's Chinese director vacancies. The Chinese partner university can select a candidate from its current employees or from other qualified individuals. Six CIs' Chinese directors whom I met are from the CIs' Chinese partner universities and one director was selected by the CI's Chinese partner university through open recruitment, although her employer is another Chinese university. According to these Chinese directors, the selection of higher level members of the CI, such as the Chinese director, seems to be more difficult than provisioning low level volunteer teachers because of the conflicts of interest between the CI and the Chinese educational institutes. This point again will be further elaborated on in the next chapter where the discussion of the co-existence of power and conflicts takes place.

From my interviews, I also realised that most Chinese teachers did not choose African CIs as their first choice of work place because they associate Africa with difficulties, diseases, wars and less developed situations (Interviews 46, 21, 3, 25, 30

& 34). In order to encourage people to work in Africa, the CI Headquarters provides more subsidies and other material benefits. For example, CI volunteer teachers in Africa receive 1,000 US Dollars a month from CI Headquarters, 200 US Dollars more than those working in developed countries. According to the *2016 University Graduates Employment Quality Research Report*, new Chinese university Bachelor's degree graduates' starting salary is 3678.8 RMB (about 550 US Dollars) per month (Zhang, 2016). Comparing this salary with the monthly salary of 1,000 US Dollars for CI volunteer teachers, the volunteer teachers feel satisfied. As several volunteer teachers mentioned, they are very happy with this job because this is their first job after graduation which not only gives them a good salary, but also provides an opportunity to see the world outside China (Interviews 14, 16, 34 & 21). For Gongpai teachers, their salary doubles the amount of volunteer teachers' salary and their employment with their Chinese educational institutions must be securely maintained. This is required by the Ministry of Education and Hanban (Interviews 3 & 53, Notice 1, Notice 2).

Also, the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Education classify poor, developing and unsafe countries into five categories depending on the level of hardship (in a scale from 1 to 5, 1 being slightly difficult and 5 being extremely difficult). Nearly all African countries fall into these categories: 7 African countries in category 1; 10 African countries in category 2; 18 African countries in category 3 and 14 African countries in category 4. If a Chinese Gongpai teacher chooses to working in a country

belonging to category 1, they can receive 180 US dollars extra subsidies a month; if they choose to work in a country belonging to category 5, the extra subsidies will rise to 1,500 US dollars per month. If the teacher's partner also goes to this country, the partner can receive one third of the subsidies as well. At a higher level, a CI Chinese director can receive 400 US dollars extra as position allowance. Moreover, Chinese teachers working in those countries can also receive 400 US dollars (for category 1) or 600 US dollars (for category 2 and above) transportation allowances if the CIs' foreign partners do not provide any vehicle or transportation allowance. Those teachers who have worked in the countries belonging to category 2 and above will be given priority in promotion of jobs and academic titles (Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Education, 2011).

Apart from the material benefits offered by the Chinese central government, the CI's Chinese partner universities may provide extra incentives too. One CI's Chinese partner university sets up a CI Director Fund, which allows the Chinese director to manage and use an extra 100,000 RMB per year (fieldwork note 3 August 2015). Another CI's Chinese partner university gives its African CI Chinese director and Gongpai teachers an extra amount of 50,000 RMB per year as a form of position subsidy (Summary and report 1). Since the CI Development Plan 2012-2020 states clearly that in the long term locally employed Chinese teachers will account for the majority of CI teachers, the CI Headquarters encourages the CI students who receive CI scholarships and complete a degree in TCSOL in China to teach Chinese in the local



CIs by offering to pay 5 to 10 years' salary for them (Ren, 2012). By doing so, the local CIs can expect to have continuous waves of local human resources to fill in the CIs' teacher vacancies.

#### **4.3.6 Open to the People**

The main job of the CI is to disseminate the Chinese language and culture to local individuals. As soon as a local individual enters the power space of the CI, the CI's normalising process on the individual begins. Whether local people enter the power space of the CI, how many people enter the space and how long they stay in the space determine the overall effects of the CI. While the detailed discussion of this process will be shown in the next chapter, this section will find out how the CI allows local individuals to enter this organisation in the first place. The CI's efforts in attracting local individuals to enter its power space are evident in the following areas.

During my fieldwork, one of my strongest impressions is that African CIs are open to everyone who wants to study the Chinese language or attend CI activities, regardless of their background, race, age and financial situation. First, the tuition fees are affordable or even free for local people. This is confirmed by all my interviewees who are students. If the students cannot afford the tuition fees, the CI can exempt the fees (Interviews 55 & 20). If the students cannot pay the fees in a lump sum, they can pay in instalments (Interview 20). Together with reduced tuition fees, the CI provides

generous scholarships for good students. One CI teacher stated that the students can pay the tuition fees in a number of ways, so long as the students pass a certain level of HSK,<sup>19</sup> they can gain a scholarship which is much more than the tuition fees (Interview 14). Another CI teacher stated that if a student passes HSK level six, 1500 RMB scholarship will be awarded to him or her immediately (Interview 55). The CIs also offer various kinds of free cultural activities for local people to attend. In 2012, African CIs organised about 600 cultural activities for their partner universities and local communities and more than 400,000 local people attended (Ren, 2013).

Second, in order to reach more students, each CI is eager to expand its network and presence in the local African country. One southern African country's CI has already established 12 teaching stations at the secondary and primary schools of the region. The Chinese director of this CI stated, "when we chose schools to set up teaching stations, we don't see if the school is a key school or not; we hope to reach different classes and different races" (Interview 41). This view is echoed by two CI teachers in another southern African CI, as they stated, "we welcome people of all social statuses" (Interview 14). Another four CIs I visited have established several teaching stations in local schools and the two comparatively new CIs were planning to open new teaching centres in their local areas (Interview 51, fieldwork notes 31 July 2015). Two CIs also spent money advertising their classes and activities on local newspapers

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<sup>19</sup> The Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK) (Chinese: 汉语水平考试), translated as the Chinese Proficiency Test, is China's only standardized test of Standard Chinese language proficiency for non-native speakers such as foreign students and overseas Chinese. The test is administered by Hanban/CI Headquarters. Link: <http://www.chinesetest.cn/gosign.do?id=1&lid=0> [accessed 6 May 2015]

and television channels (Interviews 24 & 14) and one CI used local postal services to deliver CI leaflets to local people's houses (Interview 52). All of these marketing efforts are intended to make the CI known to more local people, so that more people will engage with the CI.

In contrast to the CI's open approach to local people, three other country's LCPOs that I visited in Africa seem to take a very different approach. I visited two centres of a European country's LCPO. In order to enter one centre in a southern African country, myself and the other visitors needed to get permission from an entrance security guard who checked my passport. At another centre in another southern African country, I and my bag needed to go through security inspection machines before I entered the centre (fieldwork notes 25 June and 23 July 2015). This kind of security check is not welcoming and may put off their interest of visiting the centres in the first place. An academic manager of one of the LCPO's also admitted that the tuition fees are very expensive for local people and that they do not provide scholarships or free study opportunities for poor students (Interview 23). Although the other two European countries' LCPOs are more accessible for local people, one does not have scholarships and the other has very limited scholarships. However, both confirmed that they do not provide free learning opportunities for poor students (Interviews 19, 13 and 6).

#### **4.3.7 Continuous Incentives**

Once local individuals have entered the CIs, the CIs try to keep them within the power structure. To be more specific, attending a CI's artistic performance or other event would only inform local individuals with some positive Chinese knowledge which may be forgotten in a few days. This is only the beginning of the normalising process of the CI's power technology. In order to complete this process and produce institutionalised subjects that may be beneficial to the CI, the CI must keep local individuals in the power structure long enough. To achieve this, the CI uses many forms of material incentives.

All of the CI teachers whom I interviewed said that they always encourage their students to study Chinese and to take the HSK tests. If the students pass a certain level of HSK, they can apply for CI scholarships and study in China. With their teachers' encouragement, some CI students whom I interviewed were working hard to achieve this goal. As a CI student said, "[the Chinese director] told me that when I pass HSK 3 and HSKK, she can push the scholarship for me. She told me it will be easy, because the CI wants to have [local] teachers; they will be giving us scholarships ... [besides] getting a visa to China is much easier than getting a visa to the UK - especially if you get the CI scholarship" (Interview 38). I keep in touch with a CI student whom I interviewed in August 2015. When I interviewed him, he was learning Chinese in a CI and preparing to take HSK 2. He passed HSK 2 in May 2016 and received a CI scholarship to study Chinese language at a top Chinese university for one semester from September 2016 to January 2017. He is now studying in China

and going to take HSK 3 and 4. His plan is to pass HSK 3 first and get a one year CI scholarship to continue his Chinese language study in China and then pass HSK 4 which will qualify him to apply for a CI scholarship or other type of Chinese scholarship to do a Master's degree in China. This student is just one beneficiary of thousands of CI scholarship awardees.<sup>20</sup> The CI Headquarters published a list of different types of CI scholarships and the Chinese universities who accept such scholarship students in 2015. The category of CI scholarships includes Scholarship for Students of Master's Degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages (MTC SOL), Scholarship for Students of One-Academic-Year + MTC SOL, Scholarship for Students of Bachelor's Degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Language (BTC SOL), Scholarship for One-Academic-Year Students, Scholarship for One-Semester Students, and Scholarship for Four-Week Students; and 145 Chinese universities accept all or certain types of these scholarship students (Notice 5).

In 2012, the CI Headquarters extended the scholarships to PhD level by launching the "Confucius China Study Plan". This plan consists of six subprograms: Sino-foreign Joint PhD Subprogram, PhD in China Subprogram, "Understanding China" Visiting Scholar Subprogram, Young Leaders Subprogram, International Conference Subprogram, and Publishing Subprogram (Confucius China Study Plan Website, 2013). A previous CI student who is now employed locally as a Chinese teacher in an African country's secondary school has benefited from this plan. This student completed her

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<sup>20</sup> According to the CI's 2015 Annual Report, 8,754 foreign students received CI scholarships to study in China in 2015. Link: <http://www.hanban.org/report/index.html> [accessed 01 July 2016]

MTCSOL in China with a CI scholarship and now she received a PhD scholarship of this plan (CI WeChat platform, 5 April 2016).

Apart from the scholarships, the CI organises a series of intercultural activities. Every year, CI summer/winter camps invite CI students to visit China. Local students only need to pay for their flight tickets and visa application fees whilst the CI Headquarters orchestrates the two-week activities in China and covers all costs of accommodation, transport, training and activities. According to Xu and my interviewees, considering the local situation of Sub-Sahara Africa, the CI Headquarters sometimes covers 50% of African students' international travel expenses and extends the period to three weeks (Xu, 2010a, Interviews 52, 24 & 31). Two CI students whom I interviewed said that the summer camp trip opened their eyes and made them want to go back to China again. Therefore, they decided to study Chinese in the CI and expect to return to China in the future (Interviews 17 & 43).

Additionally, the CI organises the Chinese Bridge Competition every year. Each CI selects its top students to attend this competition. The students compete in the local country first, then local winners are invited to compete with students from all over the world in China. Of course, the trip expenses are covered by Hanban and winners receive different forms of awards. For example, the winner of the 13<sup>th</sup> Chinese Bridge Competition received full CI scholarships for degree courses in China plus return

international flight tickets and those who won the 3<sup>rd</sup> prize were awarded a semester's scholarship to study Chinese in China plus return international flight tickets (Chinese Bridge Website, 2014).

As I mentioned above, after the CI students have completed their degrees in China, the CI Headquarters is willing to pay 5 to 10 years' salary if they choose to teach Chinese in their home countries' CIs. One CI I visited has already employed two local Chinese teachers of this type (Interviews 39 & 17). By providing continuous material incentives to the individuals, the CI keeps these individuals in its power technology. In this way, the CI's invisible normalising power techniques and instruments constantly exercise on the individuals, transforming them to be the CI's institutionalised subjects.

#### **4.4 The Establishment of the CI: Summary**

In this chapter, I carried out the first dimensional analysis of the CI, i.e. the establishment of the concrete entity of the CI. To be more specific, in the first section, I illustrated the power intentions of the CI by discussing why the CI was created in the first place. Next, I demonstrated how the CI is integrated within the Chinese bureaucratic system and where the CI positions itself in this system. Once these two points have been made clear, I explored how the CIs develop and expand in Africa and what strategic and material factors contribute to the dramatic growth of the CI.

Firstly, the leaders' support clears away possible obstacles that may exist in the bureaucratic system and elicits the necessary support from all aspects within the system. Effective marketing makes a good start point for the development of the CI internationally. Secondly, the joint venture cooperation mode and the win-win spirit of the CI involve both China and local countries, which not only shows respect and equality, but also brings benefits for both sides. Thirdly, the sufficient financial and human resources supports provide the necessary preconditions for the establishment, operation and expansion of the CI. These material supports help to engage both Chinese and local individuals into the operations of the power technology of the CI.

In summary, this chapter demonstrates the construction of the CI. Once we have identified how the CI has been established and how individuals have entered the power space of the CI, the next task is to examine how the power technology of the CI works and what power effects are produced. These issues will be addressed in the next two chapters.



## Chapter 5

### Power Operations of the CI

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In Chapter 2, I reviewed the existing literature on LCPOs. There, I found that current research on these institutes sees them as a tangible tool of a country's foreign policy and there is common assumption that the promotion of a country's language and culture can automatically lead to the realisation of a country's national interest overseas. However, as yet, no scholar has carried out systematic research to deconstruct the institutions, to examine the internal operations of power, and to explain why and how the promotion of language, culture and other forms of knowledge - these intangible resources – through the tangible LCPOs can increase a country's national interest overseas or improve its relationships with other countries.

The previous chapter has shown why and how the tangible and substantive body of the CI was established. However, traditional IR power theories do not provide the insights required in order to examine the invisible power operations within a social institute. Through my research, I found that Foucault's conception of power provides an appropriate analytical framework to complete this task because he explains the "how" of power in social institutes. That is to say that he finds that all social institutions have a power technology in which disciplinary power operates through power techniques and power instruments on human bodies and constantly produces its effects (Foucault, 1995; also, see Chapter 2). Therefore, I will apply this Foucauldian analytical tool to my empirical material in this chapter and I will present

data on a range of power techniques and instruments in the CI. I will argue that the use of these power techniques and instruments can be understood as efforts to create the CI's institutionalised subjects that are useful for the CI and also possibly for other Chinese institutes and organisations.

Additionally, in this chapter I will continue to refine my exegesis of Foucault, looking in detail at the problem of the co-existence of power and resistance. Against this background, I will examine a range of empirical examples of resistance and conflicts that I witnessed in CIs in Africa. On the basis of this analysis, I will suggest that the appearance of resistance is not due to the lack of considerations of economic, psychological, biological and other factors that critics of Foucault may have claimed (Goffman, 1991; Dews, 2007; Clarke, 2008; Spivak, 1988; Rose, 1984; McNay, 2003; Habermas, 1990). Instead, resistance is created out of the operations of power as an effect, and it happens secondarily to the fundamental operations of power on individuals.

### **5.1 The Power Structure of the CI**

As discussed in Chapter 2, in Foucault's view, all social institutions have a panoptic structure as a protected enclosure for the operation of power. This enclosure constitutes a pyramid structure which allows the hierarchical observation to function from top to bottom, from bottom to top and laterally. This section will explore and delineate the power structure of the CI.

### **5.1.1 The “Central Tower” of the CI**

According to the constitution and by-laws of the CI, the organisation forms a Council which has the duties of formulating and amending the constitution and by-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, examining and approving the development strategies and plans of global Confucius Institutes, examining and approving annual reports and working plans of the headquarters, and discussing issues of significance concerning the development of Confucius Institutes. This Council governs the CI Headquarters and how it carries out its daily operations, including the management of each individual CI (Hanban Website, n.d.). The constitution and by-laws of the CI should be seen as the principal norm of the CI as it is the rules of conduct for this organisation. Because the council has the ability to design this principal norm, to decide any other significant issues affecting the CI and supervise the work of the CI Headquarters, it should be seen as the central tower of the CI or the top of the CI’s pyramid structure.

Within the Council, the head of this structure is the Chair, followed by the Vice Chairs, the Executive Council Members, and the Council Members. Currently, the council is chaired by Ms Liu Yandong, a member of the CCP Central Committee Political Bureau and a Vice Premier of the State Council. Current vice chairs and executive council members include the minister of education, a vice minister of finance, a vice minister of foreign affairs, a vice minister of national development and the reform commission, and other senior leaders from Chinese central government’s ministries and commissions (as of July 2016). Although ten out of the fifteen council members

are the heads of the board of directors of CIs overseas, the majority of the council is provided from the Chinese side. For example, there are 34 members in the 5<sup>th</sup> Council, among which the Chair, the Vice Chairs and the Executive Council Members are all Chinese officials. Only 10 out of 15 Council Members are Heads of the Board of Directors of CIs in foreign countries (Confucius Institute Magazine Online Version, 2016). As expected, the staff composition of the council shows that the top level of the CI is chaired and predominantly held by Chinese members; hence the supervision from the central tower of the CI is predominantly controlled by the Chinese side.

Below the Council of CI Headquarters, each individual CI has its own council which supervises and governs each individual CI. For example, the establishment agreement of a southern African CI states that “the Confucius Institute shall have a Board of Advisors and the two parties nominate members of the Board of Advisors. The Board of Advisors shall have the responsibility for the operation of the Confucius Institute” (Agreement and constitution 1). Because the management of individual CI in Africa involves both the Chinese personnel and the local personnel, the individual CI board of advisors also includes members from both sides. Unlike the CI Headquarters Council which is predominantly controlled by the Chinese side, the individual CI’s Council is rotationally chaired by a local member and a Chinese member and it can have members of equivalent status from both sides (Summary and report 19, Regulation 5). Although the staff composition of individual CI’s councils shows that the CI is a joint venture aiming to achieve a win-win cooperation

between China and the local partner, the operation of an individual CI must primarily follow the rules of the CI headquarters. As the CI constitution and by-laws state, all CIs have “the obligation to observe the measures and regulations set forth in the Agreement and this Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes... [and] the obligation to accept both supervision from and assessments made by the CI Headquarters” (Hanban Website, n.d.). Two CIs’ Board of Directors’ Responsibilities also state that “the Board must ensure the thorough implementation of CI Headquarters’ policies and decisions” (Regulation 5). In practice, the local side also generally recognises that the CI project is part of China’s foreign policy. As one local director explained to me, “I suppose [the CI] is part of China’s foreign policy and expansion of the promotion of Chinese language and culture” (Interview 15). This is echoed by another local director, “our primary focus is Chinese language teaching, we also have a very important role in changing local people’s perceptions about China” (Interview 51).

Although both the Chinese and local sides seem to have reached a consensus regarding the CI’s goals, it is common to see that the local side plays a less active role in achieving these goals than the Chinese side. As one CI Chinese director noted, “I want to set up a teaching centre at a local secondary school, but I haven’t received any reply [from the school] ... It would be better if local director can help, but [the local director] cares little about the CI, he is not interested in such things” (Interview 45). Similarly, a former CI Chinese director explained that, “the local director is the

VC of the university; he is only serving for the CI part-time and is too busy to care about the CI” (Interview 39).

All of my interviewees who served as CI teachers confirmed that it is the Chinese directors who took charge of the CI’s daily operations and that they rarely saw the local directors, let alone discuss CI issues with them. Six Chinese directors whom I met during the trip also admitted that they are the *de facto* operators of the CIs. The design of the cooperation mode of the CI intends to give each side equal status and responsibilities in terms of the operations of the CI; however the lack of involvement from the local side seems to have led to the result that the “central tower” of individual CIs is also predominantly controlled by the Chinese side.

From the above, it can be concluded that at the highest level, the central tower of the CI’s overall panoptic structure is the Council of CI Headquarters which is predominantly occupied by the top officials of Chinese central government. At a lower level, each individual CI in Africa has its own Board of Directors as its central tower which includes equivalent members from both Chinese and local sides, whilst still following the rules and regulations of the CI Headquarters. The practical reality exposed during my fieldwork shows that although the central tower of each individual CI is filled with equivalent members from both sides, the local members seem to be less involved than the mode would predict. This results in a situation whereby the central towers of the CI, including the CI Headquarter Council and

individual CI Board of Directors, are predominantly controlled by the Chinese side; therefore, the panoptic structure of the CI as a whole is predominantly supervised by the Chinese “eyes”.

### **5.1.2 Distribution of the CI’s Power Space**


Below the Council of the CI Headquarters, the CI’s power space is purposefully distributed to smaller sections at multiple levels with different names and responsibilities.

First, the CI Headquarters is set up to coordinate and manage the large number of CIs worldwide. Within the CI Headquarters, 20 divisions have been created (as of July 2016) to deal with different aspects of the CI’s daily operation. The distribution of CI Headquarters’ space can be shown in a pyramid structure (see Figure 5.1): under the supervision of the CI Headquarters Council, the CI Headquarters oversees the daily operation of this organisation. In order to deal with the different aspects of work involved in the daily operation, the CI Headquarters is then distributed into 20 different divisions. For example, the Division of Volunteers Affairs manages CI volunteers. The Division of Chinese Testing and Scholarship administrates HSK exams and scholarships. The Division of Asian and African CIs, the Division of American and Oceania CIs, and the Division of European CI manage the CI’s issues in multiple continents. This distribution of space, on the one hand, ensures direct supervision on a level by level basis whilst simultaneously making this supervision easier because

each distributed space has its assigned activities and the supervisors can clearly see whether these are being fulfilled.

It is worth noting that this distribution of space is not fixed. It changes to suit new situations and meet new demands. For example, the CI Headquarters currently has 20 divisions (as of July 2016), whilst in 2014 there were 19 divisions. A new Editorial Division of CI Magazine was created to focus on the publication of 11 multilingual versions of CI magazines.


**Figure 5.1** Panoptic structure of CI Headquarters



At a lower level, the space of each individual CI is distributed according to its specific local situation. The previous section has shown that each individual CI has its Board of Directors as the central tower of the panoptic structure or as the “head” of its pyramid space. Below this, there are positions of directors – usually one Chinese director and one local director, administrative staff, teachers – local Chinese teachers and teachers from China, and students (as shown in Figure 5.2).



**Figure 5.2** Panoptic structure of individual CIs



(Source: Author)

The above two diagrams illustrate that the space of the CI has been hierarchically distributed into different levels, divisions and positions. Once an individual enters the space and fills a position, he automatically receives a label or title that is related to the CI. All my interviewees understood their positions in the CIs, such as director, volunteer teacher and level 2 student. In this sense, the CI has created a situation that everyone has their own place, each place its individual, and everyone receives a meaning or purpose from occupying this space.

Although the position in the CI may be fixed, the individuals who take them are not. They are circulating, rotating and exchanging between these positions, but the speed is different. The CI Constitution and By-laws states that the CI Headquarters Council members' term of service is two years and that they can pursue reappointment for one term; however Vice Premier Ms Liu Yandong has been chairing the CI Headquarters Council since 2008 and current CI Headquarters executive director Xu Lin has been holding this position since 2005 (As of June 2016). These top

authoritative positions of the CI oversee the implementation of the CI's power intentions and initiate the supervision of the CI's power structure, therefore, as Foucault might argue, the less frequent flow of the individuals holding top positions could ensure the consistency of supervision and implementation of power intentions in the operation of power.

At a lower level, the Chair of each individual CI's Board of Directors is rotationally taken by the partner leaders of each side. Although the individuals who take the positions of CI directors and teachers have specified term of service too - usually two to four years for the Chinese directors (Notice 1, Interviews 52, 9 & 11) and one to four years for Chinese teachers (Interviews 16, 25, 32 & 20), their circulation within the structure is more common and obvious than top CI leaders. For example, a current eastern African CI's Chinese director used to work as the Chinese director of a western African CI (Interview 52). Two volunteer teachers used to work in Thailand's CIs for one year before being transferred to work in an African CI (Interviews 46 & 16). Two previous volunteer teachers who worked in two western African CIs for two years have now been promoted to be Hanban teachers<sup>21</sup> in an eastern African CI and a southern African CI respectively (Interviews 14 & 21). Compared with the slower flow of individuals who hold top positions in the CI, the more frequent circulations and updates of middle and low level individuals in the CI

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<sup>21</sup> A Hanban teacher's salary is twice as much as a volunteer teacher's salary and a Hanban teacher enjoys similar status and benefits of a Gongpai teacher, but their focus is to serve for the CIs. CI OFFICE OF BEIJING FOREIGN STUDIES UNIVERSITY. 2014. 关于公开招聘孔子学院专职教师的通知. Available: <http://oci.bfsu.edu.cn/archives/6372> [Accessed 11 April 2016].

helps the power structure of the CI to avoid rigidity and the stagnation of human resources.

One Hanban teacher explained to me that the reason for her being transferred to this CI is because the CI wants to benefit from the successful experience of her previous CI to change the comparatively disappointing situation of this CI (Interview 14). Similarly, one eastern African CI's Chinese director used to be the Chinese director a western African CI that won the title of "Excellent CI". This director said that she was appointed as the Chinese director of this new African CI with the hope that she could bring the previous successful management experience to her new organisation (Interview 52). In this sense, the circulation of individuals synchronises with the circulation of knowledge. To be more specific, good operational experience in a certain CI can be brought into other CIs by the individuals and this practice could improve the overall quality of the CIs.

However, if the circulation is too frequent, the individuals may not have enough time to get used to a new environment or to fully engage with the work of the CI. During my fieldwork, several CI students told me that they felt that the change of teachers is too frequent. As one student said, "the teachers are great, but the change of teachers is frequent. It is sometimes difficult to get used to a new teacher, for example, the accent, the teaching style. It takes a while to adjust. When you have adjusted, then they go. It would be nice to have the same teacher" (Interview 43).

The CI volunteer teachers account for the majority of CI teachers and they also acknowledged that this is a problem; however they seemed to have no other choice. As one CI volunteer teacher said, “Hanban is not like other schools where you can be promoted in professional ranks or become a permanent teacher after three years’ service continuously. Hanban doesn’t have this, so the flow of teachers is very frequent; teachers change every year” (Interview 44).

Where teachers would like to continue in a given role, they may find that they are confronted by other, more practical concerns. For example, several volunteer CI teachers explained that, “we want to stay here, but we fear that if we stay here long, we get nothing when we come back. We asked Hanban if they can give us a secure job or recommend us to a good job when we come back, Hanban officials said, we prefer Gongpai teachers” (Interview 25). Therefore, some teachers felt that “the CI is not well-organised, it does not seem very official. The frequent coming and going of teachers does not make it a system” (Interview 21); “that’s why we don’t feel the cohesiveness of this organisation” (Interview 25). This problem seems common in all CIs. Because this problem came out as a result of the CI’s power operations, I will return to examine how the CI attempts to address this problem in the next chapter.

From the above two figures of the CI’s structure, it can also be seen that the distribution of space and the levels of positions are ranked. The higher the rank is, the more benefits a person can get. Individuals are constantly encouraged to work

hard by being given expectations of higher positions, wages, scholarships and other incentives. For example, if a volunteer teacher becomes a Hanban teacher, his salary would be doubled and he would enjoy other social benefits as permanent public school teachers. Among the people whom I met during my fieldwork, one previous part-time volunteer teacher of a southern African CI passed Hanban's tests and interviews and became a Hanban teacher of the CI (Interview 44). Seven current CI volunteer teachers who want to work for the CIs in the long term are also planning to take Hanban's tests and interviews to become a Hanban teacher (Interviews 31, 16 & 25). In a group interview with a CI director and two CI teachers, the CI director encouraged the teachers by saying "I heard some CI directors used to be volunteer teachers; they then became Hanban teachers and finally became directors. So you should work hard" (Interview 41). It has been shown that the CI students hold the lowest position of the structure, but they have the largest opportunities for progression. For example, a current locally employed CI teacher was a Chinese undergraduate degree student in this CI. He passed the HSK test and won a chance to study at the CI's Chinese partner university. After graduation, he came back to his home country and became a teacher of the CI. Another local teacher of this CI followed the same path (Interview 36). Six students I met during the fieldwork are determined to do the same (Interviews 27, 29 & 38). To summarise, in the space of the CI, the distribution of individuals, the circulation of individuals, the promotion of status and the exchange of knowledge among the individuals happen concurrently.

### 5.1.3 Hierarchical Observation of the CI

By identifying the central tower and presenting the space distribution of the CI, I have drawn the outline of the CI's panoptic structure. Inside of this structure, the hierarchical situation allows the "head" to supervise the individuals, and at the same time, allows the individuals to observe the head as well as their peers. The power of "eyes" functions through a network of relations, from top to bottom, from bottom to top and laterally, to see if everyone is doing the "right" things in this space. As Foucault states, "its functioning is that of a network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bottom to top and laterally; this network 'holds' the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive from one another: supervisors, perpetually supervised" (Foucault, 1995, pp.176-7). In this section, I will demonstrate how the CI's observation operates at all levels of the hierarchy and how everyone is caught up both in surveying and in being surveyed.

First, it has been made clear in the above sections that the structure of the CI is set up and designed by China and the central tower is predominantly held by the Chinese top officials. Therefore, the supervision from top to bottom is by the "Chinese eyes". To be more specific, in the CI's hierarchy, the supervision originates from senior leaders in China and then descends through the CI Headquarters Council, CI Headquarters, individual CI's Boards of Directors, CI Directors, CI teachers/administrators and finally reaches the local CI students. As one CI local administrator described, "[A] is the local director, below him is the Chinese director,

then a manager, and then me” (Interview 49). In this top-down observation, the superiors need to make sure they can see all subordinates. In order to do so, they must situate the subordinates in their sight.

At the top level of the structure, the Chief Director of the CI Headquarters needs to report to the CI Headquarters Council annually. For example, in the Report of the 2010 Work Plan of the CI Headquarters, Xu Lin informs the members of the Council what the CI has achieved in 2009, proposes the CI work plan for 2010 with five main points and asks council members to review and comment (Xu, 2010b). In one of her television interviews, Xu admitted that in order to get financial support from the Ministry of Finance, she had visited the organisation 60 times a year to report and discuss financial issues of the CI (Phoenix Satellite Television, 2012b). Because of the hierarchical design of the CI, the chief director must report to the superior organisations, such as the Council and the Ministry of Finance, to receive their authorisation for future operations. By reporting to these organisations, she provides information about her work, and in this way, she situates herself in the supervision of her superiors.

At a lower level, each individual CI must report on its work to the CI Headquarters annually. One of the CI Chinese directors’ training courses is to teach directors how to write the annual work report of a CI. An annual work report should include the CI’s annual work plan (Chinese language teaching, cultural activities, festival celebrations,

HSK tests, programs of going to China, seminars, teachers' training etc.), annual budget, implantation of Hanban's prescriptive projects, regional CI conference, global CI conference, CI's daily management and other issues (Training 24). This information addresses all aspects of work of a CI. By examining the information submitted by the directors, the CI Headquarters is able to see and assess what a CI has done in the past year.

Asking subordinate individuals to provide required information is one of the methods for supervisors to implement downward supervision. This can be seen as passive supervision, because supervisors can only see what the subordinates have shown. When passive supervision is used, there is a possibility that the subordinate individuals, for their own interests, may provide inaccurate or false information to the supervisors. This would certainly affect the transparency of the sight because the supervisors would not be able to observe the real situation. Therefore, the supervisors must also proactively supervise the subordinate individuals. From the CI Headquarters website, it is very easy to find news about Chinese leaders' visits to the CIs. In the short period from January to August 2016, the Chair of the CI Headquarters Council, the First Lady of China, the President of China, the Vice Minister of Education, the Chairman of the CPPCC National Committee and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC paid visits to seven CIs in different countries. On 2 December 2011, Liu Yandong and Xu Lin visited the CI at the University of Botswana. During this trip, they observed a Chinese lesson; asked



students questions such as “how long have you learnt Chinese?” and “Do you like Chinese?”; visited the CI’s office and library; listened to the two directors’ work report and expressed their wishes and expectations to the future of the CI (Shanghai Normal University News Website, 2011). Through this visit, Liu and Xu, as the top supervisors of the CI, could see and understand the situation of this specific CI with their own eyes. In this way, the supervisors exert downward observation directly onto the individuals to gather first-hand information about the situation of the organisation. The use of proactive supervision could make up for the disadvantages of passive supervision and ensure the smooth flow and transparency of downward supervision. The CI has been using both methods.

Second, the supervision can be lateral. Lateral supervision happens between individuals holding similar positions in the hierarchical structure. They have equal status and stay at the same level so that they can supervise each other easily to see if they are working correctly and effectively. In the hierarchy of the CI, lateral supervision takes place all of the time between students, between teachers and between administrators, and between CI directors. One common remark that I heard during the fieldwork is that the mutual supervision between the directors from two sides can lower the possibility of misusing the CI’s funds. In a southern African CI’s financial system, the local director is the principal signatory and the Chinese director is the secondary signatory. All expenditures require signatures from both signatories (Interview 55). One eastern African CI’s Chinese director also confirmed that the use

of CI funds needs signatures from both directors (Fieldwork note 28 June 2015) and this rule is written in the CI's agreement on the use of the CI funds (Agreement and constitution 3). However, lateral supervision has a potential flaw: it could offer the individuals who supervise each other an opportunity to collaborate for their common self-interests. For example, two CI directors could work together to embezzle the CI's funds. If this happens, lateral supervision loses its positive effect. To prevent this, the supervision from the top must be consistently exerted to remind the individuals that they are also under the supervision from other directions.

Regarding the CI's financial management mode, the CI Headquarters has chosen some CIs to pilot auditing practices and suggested that each CI from 2015, should audit the Chinese funds regulatory and have the local partner's audit department or third-party auditors carry out auditing every year or every two years. The audit report must be submitted to the local partner and the CI Headquarters (Notice 13). This auditing of CI funds serves as supervision from the top which constantly reminds each CI that the use of CI funds is not only supervised laterally by directors from two sides, but is also supervised by the CI Headquarters and local partners through audit reports. The combination of lateral supervision between two directors and downward supervision from the superiors could largely prevent the misuse of a CI's funds.

Lateral observation contributes to the healthy operation of the CI, as shown above. It

also encourages competition between the individuals within the organisation. That is to say, lateral observation exists between individuals holding similar positions and these individuals enjoy similar status, privilege and other benefits. If an individual is promoted or receives more benefits, others would feel left behind and are encouraged to catch up. One southern African CI's Chinese director said that their university has opened several CIs in Africa and one of them in another country has been awarded the title of Excellent CI by Hanban. She saw this and explained that "our pressure is great because we want to make the same achievement too" (Interview 24). In an eastern African CI's two years' development plan, it states clearly that the "role model" of its development is another CI in the same country (Plan 11). One southern African CI's local director told me that he just finished visiting a CI in another country. He learnt that the CI will have a CI building part-funded by China and so he is now thinking of applying for this financial assistance (Fieldwork note 19 June 2015). These examples show that these CI directors compare themselves with other directors and that they also compare their CIs with other CIs. When they find that other directors and other CIs have achieved better results or have received more benefits, they want the same. In this sense, lateral observation encourages competition between CI directors and different CIs and this competition can contribute to the overall improvement of the CIs.

Third, the CI's power structure also allows bottom-up supervision to occur. However, the supervision from this direction seems to be much more limited and less

transparent. In his discussion of the programme of the Panopticon, Foucault points out that the supervisor in the central tower could use “blinds” or other instruments to make his presence or absence unverifiable (Foucault, 1995). In other words, the supervisor can be seen by the subordinate individuals and the higher his position is, the more individuals can see him; but he can take advantage of his privileged position and choose to show what he wants the individuals to see and hide what he does not want the individuals to see. The supervision from bottom to top in the CI also reflects this strategy.

In each annual CI conference, the Chair of the CI Headquarters Council delivers a keynote speech. This speech summarises what the CI has achieved and what the CI’s future plan is. In her keynote speech entitled “Towards a New Decade of Confucius Institute” at the Opening Ceremony of the 9th Confucius Conference, the Chair of the CI Headquarters Council Ms Liu Yandong pointed out that the CI has established 475 CIs and 851 CCs in 126 countries, with over 3.45 million registered students. She adds that in the past 10 years, the CI has reached out to some 500 million people with over 100,000 cultural exchange activities, invited 140,000 teachers and students and principals from 120 countries to visit China and attracted over 500,000 students from 100 countries to join a “Chinese Bridge Competition”. She proudly describes the first Confucius Institute Day that took place on 27 September 2014 saying, “from the first morning ray in New Zealand to the late sunset in Hawaii, celebrations went on for 36 consecutive hours, spanning across 22 time zones and being participated in by over

10 million people". She also added an inspirational story to this speech explaining that Professor Andrzej Kapiszewsky of Jagiellonian University in Poland was diagnosed with terminal bone cancer in 2006 and had only three months to live. "He chose to do something meaningful during the last days of his life, that is, to establish the first Confucius Institute in Poland". Under the joint efforts of the two sides, the first CI in Poland - Krakow Confucius Institute was successfully opened and "Professor Kapiszewsky accomplished his last wish before he passed away" (Hanban, 2014).

By delivering this speech at the conference, Ms Liu situates herself in the sight of hundreds of conference participants who are CI partners' leaders, CI directors, CI administrators and other staff. However, she is selective about what she wants the audience to hear because of her privileged position in the hierarchy. As the top leader of the CI, she wants the organisation to sound appealing and hopeful, so in her speech she chose to deliver positive information to the individuals by showing the CI's great achievements and humanitarian stories. She chose not to mention any negative or controversial incidents that happened to the CI in the same year, such as the closure of the CI at the University of Chicago<sup>22</sup> and Xu Lin's controversial behaviour at the 20th Biennial Conference of the EACS (European Association for Chinese Studies),<sup>23</sup> because this information is not favourable at all to create a

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<sup>22</sup> In April 2014, more than 100 university professors signed a petition calling for the school to shutter its on-campus Confucius Institute. The university decided to not continue the CI when current contract finishes. Available:

<http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/09/26/thanks-but-no-thanks-university-of-chicago-tells-confucius-institute/>. [accessed 7 July 2015]

<sup>23</sup> In the 20th Biennial Conference of the EACS (European Association for Chinese Studies), Xu Lin ripped promotional material about the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation from the conference programme. Available: <http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=14894>. [accessed 6 July 2015]

positive image of the CI. Therefore, although the CI allows the subordinate individuals to supervise their superiors, what they see is probably only what the superiors want them to see.

Indeed, the design of the CI's power structure gives supervisors the ability to selectively display information to subordinate individuals and the supervision from bottom to top seems to be controlled by the supervisors. However, the individuals may feel uncomfortable or even disagree with the information that is selectively shown to them. For example, the goal of CI teachers is to teach Chinese language to CI students and to help them achieve a certain level of this language. The teachers, as supervisors of the hierarchical structure of classrooms, use selected information and teaching methods to teach the students. When a teacher is teaching, they situate themselves in the supervision of the students. Any responsible teacher would want to show their best side and use the best part of their knowledge and teaching methods to make sure the students are equipped with required knowledge. The CI teachers often received positive feedback from the students; words such as amazing, very good, friendly, patient, were commonly used by the students to describe their teachers (Interviews 51, 27, 7 & 26). Despite this, some students have negative comments about their teachers. For example, one student said, "I think the teachers teach clearly, but not for all students. If the students don't know [the teaching language], they may find it hard to understand" (Interview 27); a student in another CI revealed that because the change of teachers is frequent. "It is sometimes difficult

to get used to a new teacher, for example, the accent, the teaching style. It takes a while to adjust” (Interview 43).

The students also made some negative comments on the teaching materials, “the books we use are a lot more formal, not spoken Chinese. It would be nicer if we have books that focus on the spoken language. A lot of books here are written by Chinese people; for [local] learners, it’s not always practical. Even the [local language’s] explanations are not clear sometimes... the materials we have are good, but not updated. If we could use more blogs, online information, that would be good” (Interview 43); “the books they have are actually more suitable for the Chinese rather than for us” (Interview 51). These students’ comments about the teachers and teaching materials indicate that the students were sometimes dissatisfied with what they are seeing and experiencing in class, although the teachers try to selectively show their best to the students.

It seems that the supervision from bottom to top could cause disruptions or even conflicts to the exercise of supervision from the top as the individuals at a lower level start to question or even challenge their supervisors. However, this kind of resistance or conflict is essential to the dynamics of power/knowledge, because supervisors could utilise this unfavourable situation to improve their work by actively dealing with this resistance or conflict that appear during power operations. This will be further elaborated in the next chapter when I discuss how the CI dealt with the

resistance and how the dynamics of power/knowledge works to improve its operations.

To summarise, in the power structure of the CI, supervision exists at all levels and at all directions. Because the design of the hierarchy allows the supervisors, especially the top ones, to selectively show themselves to the subordinate individuals, the observation from bottom to top looks much less transparent and powerful than the one from top to bottom. However, the point I would like to make here is that because of the panoptic structure of the CI, everyone is supervising each other as well as being supervised by others, so that everyone must be constantly aware of the gaze to which they are exposed. The power structure has automated power by creating a constant visible power situation. The internalisation of the inculcation of supervising and being constantly supervised eventually elicits an attitude of continuous self-surveillance, which means that everyone is subject to the supervision of their supervisors as well as their own. This is the precondition of normalising and transforming an individual into a subject.

#### **5.1.4 A Spatial Division in the CI's Power Structure**

Based on Foucault's analysis of the Panopticon, the above sections demonstrate what CI's power structure is like and how this hierarchical structure allows surveillance to function. However, each individual CI in Africa is a joint-venture between at least one Chinese partner and one local partner. This forms a division in



the CI's panoptic structure: the division between the Chinese side and the local African side. This division can be strategically utilised to promote the hierarchical observation of the CI, as previously demonstrated in the lateral observation of the CI. However this division can also seem to disable the panoptic design and affect the functioning of hierarchical observation.

In the above section, I explained that each individual CI has its panoptic structure in which the "central tower" ensures a unified observation from top leaders, namely the CI Board of Directors including CI directors, to subordinate individuals, i.e. the CI administrators, teachers and students. Because each CI Board of directors consists of both Chinese members and local members and its daily operation is undertaken by the two directors, it requires the two sides to work together and to carry out the hierarchical observation together, in order to implement one set of unified rules with one unified strength, and ultimately achieve one unified goal. How well the two sides work together, to a large extent, determines how effective the observation from the top to bottom is. In other words, if the two sides cannot work well together, they cannot effectively implement the observation of their subordinate individuals, nor can they effectively supervise the actions of the individuals and make sure they are doing the right things.

As one local director of a southern African CI stated, "the relationship between two directors is absolutely essential. The success of a good CI depends on how well the

two work together. A lot of misconceptions and misunderstandings could happen” (Interview 51). This view is echoed by a Chinese director of a southern African CI, “why some CIs did not develop well? [Because] some CIs cannot get along well with the local side” (Interview 48). These two directors may be right, because the division of the CI has caused problems that affect the operations of the CIs.

First, the Chinese side has a paradoxical attitude towards the involvement of the local side. The advantages of the involvement of the local side have been discussed previously in Chapter 4 and these advantages are also acknowledged by the Chinese side. However, having a local director can be both advantageous and disadvantageous. One southern African CI’s deputy Chinese director explained, “if they are involved too much, we cannot carry out our activities; if they care too little, it won’t work either” (Interview 24). It was frequent to hear the Chinese members’ complaints about the local side. Another southern African CI’s Chinese director elaborated, “I quarrelled with the dean of language department several times. I quarrelled for teaching materials as well. We sacrificed ourselves to come here and provide Chinese teaching to them, but they are ungrateful” (Fieldwork note 13 July 2015). Several CI teachers said that “local staff are doing things slowly and delaying things; if we Chinese people do this by ourselves, the efficiency would be much better”(Interview 20); “[local staff] cannot do things in right orders and we cannot communicate with them clearly” (Fieldwork note 19 August 2015); “the local staff should be here at 8 am to work, but it is 9 am and they are still not here ... if a light is

broken, it takes them a month to fix it” (Interview 14); “as long as something is solely decided by the Chinese side, it will be completed successfully and efficiently. The CI asked local staff to make some banners several times, but every time they made mistakes and were not punctual” (Interview 55). One previous CI volunteer teacher added, “in terms of the structure, I think it’s not necessary to have two sides work together; having the local sided involved is not of much use” (Interview 20).

Second, the local members seem to have the same level of discontent towards the Chinese side. One southern African CI’s local director disagreed with the way the CI was set up and managed, he said, “in many cases of the CI in Africa, they jump in and then try to sort things out as they go along. For me, it is not the logical way of doing it” (Interview 51). This is reiterated by another southern African CI’s local co-director, “I know China works differently, sometimes things happen in an ad-hoc fashion. We need a streamline for sure: this thing will happen in January, and that thing will happen in March etc. The CI needs to have a clear aim about what they want to do” (Interview 2). The first local director continued, “[in the CI] we teach [local] people Chinese etiquette, but nobody teaches Chinese people [local country]’s etiquette. The CI can also offer services to Chinese companies; it must be a two-way process. The CI must show they also want to learn from the local country, otherwise local people say the Chinese want to take over the country” (Interview 51).

At a lower level, a locally employed administrative member said, “sometimes, [my

job] is boring. Because comparing to my last job, I don't do a lot of things. It is boring to stay without doing anything. No challenge, I like challenges ... There are problems, like communication. Sometimes, we don't take part in the teaching process, we are in an extra place, just like this"; he then started to draw two separated circles that do not intersect each other on a piece of paper. He pointed at these two circles and continued, "one is [local staff] and one is the Chinese. When Chinese colleagues need something, some help, some problems with the house, street, police, immigration, passport, [they come to us] ... we communicate in English and solve problems. When we are in the meetings, the language used is Chinese, we don't understand anything about Chinese. We have to be in the meeting, but the meeting is in Chinese. Two different countries, two companies. You can't share ideas" (Interview 33).

This situation has been mirrored in another CI's Chinese teacher, "we had meetings every week. The local director doesn't attend, local staff don't attend either. We tell them if they have things to do. They can't speak Chinese, but it doesn't affect their work" (Interview 39). Not just within the CI, "the school's financial department is not interested in managing finance for us. They are not paid extra for doing this. So sometimes I need to give them some gifts. After all, it is difficult in terms of reimbursement" (Interview 48), one Chinese director raised another example of discontent from the local partner.

From the above, an interesting situation has been highlighted: within in the same

organisation of the CI, there exist two camps - the Chinese one and the local one. Each side has a strong identity as “us” and treats the other side as “them”. Although both sides are working in the same CI, they do not always consider that they share the same identity as the CI’s employees. According to Foucault’s theory about power and the subjects, it seems easy to understand why this happened. It is because the Chinese subjects and their identities are constituted in the power technology of China with Chinese norms, while the local individuals are produced to be the local country’s subjects in the local country’s power technology. Due to the differences of these two comparatively separate power technologies, the individuals from the two sides hold different identities, use different languages and have different work styles and habits. As a consequence, resistance or even conflicts seem to be inevitable during the integration of two sides. However, all of these conflicts above seem to emphasise the point that the establishment of the CI is necessary in terms of minimising the conflicts because the CI can be seen as an amalgamation of the two comparatively separate power technologies. When the intersecting power space gets bigger, the norms may become more shared and accepted and consequently the conflicts between the different groups of subjects constituted in the different power spaces may become less.

Here, it seems that Foucault’s question of the co-existence of power and resistance can be explained. First, the view that Foucault’s notion of power is still a dominatory notion of power has been confirmed again, because everyone is imbued with a

unique set of power technologies in the society which produce his unique way of thinking and acting. No one is able to resist the transformation in the disciplinary power regime. This process happens at the fundamental level.

Second, it also seems to be true that different groups of individuals resist and cause conflicts all the time. Are the individuals resisting the power that moulds them into self-identical subjects? No, because resistance happens at a different level with the fundamental power transformation process. That is to say, everyone is transformed to be a subject by a certain set of disciplinary power technologies; different sets of power technologies constitute different subjects with different identities, souls, behaviours and other characters, just like the members in the two camps of the CI. Once a subject has been produced by a certain set of power technologies, their behaviours and their identities are defined by this power technology. When he tries to interact with subjects constituted by other different power technologies, their different identities, different ways of thinking and different ways of acting are likely to clash and cause conflicts. Therefore, the resistance and conflict happen at a different level, secondary to the fundamental transformation of the subjects.

The resistance and conflicts caused by the division of the CI reflects the conflicts between different subjects constituted in different power technologies. Resistance and conflict can also happen within a subject, because no subject is constituted by a single, self-sustained and independent power technology. Every individual is under

transformation of a combination of different power technologies which includes various forms of disciplinary power regimes. The section below will further explore the second type of resistance.

## **5.2 The Normalisation of the CI**

Section 5.1 has shown the power structure of the CI and discussed how surveillance runs through the whole structure and creates a constant visible power dynamic. In this structure, the individuals now know they are being supervised; they must also understand how their supervisors expect them to behave. That is to say, before they can submit to the rules of conduct which surveillance is attempting to enforce, they must know these rules. These rules are the norms of the power structure.

Emphasised by Foucault, norm holds a central role in the operations of disciplinary power. As he writes, “the power of the Norm appears through the disciplines” (Foucault, 1995, p.184). Each power structure has a norm and this norm is the principle of a rule to be followed, the standard to be measured against, the knowledge to be learned and the core values to be internalised. Each individual in this power space needs to understand the norm, follow it and measure himself against it. Together with a binary mechanism of punishment and reward based on the judgement of whether and how much the individuals conform to it, the individuals are expected to internalise the norm. This “power of normalisation” not only “imposes homogeneity”, but also “individualises by making it possible to

measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another” (Foucault, 1995, p.184). In short, normalisation is the process in which individuals are constituted to be subjects of a certain power technology. When this process is complete, disciplinary power reaches its basic aim – to increase the “docility-utility” of people (Foucault, 1995). To examine the normalisation of an organisation, the first step is to identify the norm of this organisation and the next is to find out what tactics are used to instil the norm to the individuals.

### **5.2.1 The Norm of the CI**

The norm of the CI includes a whole collection of knowledge, rules, regulations and orders that need to be followed and internalised by the individuals. First, as discussed in the intentions of the CI, the objects and aims of the CI can be seen as the dominant norm which guides the operations of this organisation. Following this norm, the CI has created a whole set of other norms for individuals to observe and follow. At the top of the set, the CI Headquarters Council designed the Constitutions and By-laws of the CI which should be seen as the overarching norm of all CIs. The 8 chapters of this document display the principles, services, structure, application, funds, administration, rights and obligations of this organisation. These clauses must be followed by all CIs.

For the near future, the CI Headquarters has blended its purpose and goals into the



*Development Plan of Confucius Institute 2012-2020*, which serves as the dominant norm of the CI before 2020. This plan sets forth the background, general requirements, development goals, major tasks, major projects and security measures of the CI. Under general requirements, the guiding principle of the plan is “fitting for needs of our country’s public diplomacy and cultural exchanges, grasping the opportunity, distributing reasonably; taking Chinese language teaching as the main body and the promotion of quality as the core, aiming to run every CI well, fully playing the CI’s role as a comprehensive cultural communication platform, in order to make a due contribution in terms of pushing Chinese language to enter the world and promoting China’s friendship with other countries”.

The five major tasks include highlighting development focus and improving quality and standards, establishing teaching and management human resources system, establishing and improving international Chinese materials and teaching materials system, establishing and improving Chinese examination service system, and actively carrying out cultural exchange activities. The seven key projects are: building teacher training bases, setting up volunteer teacher database, carrying out international Chinese teaching material projects, reinforcing Confucius Institute Online, carrying out Confucius China Studies Program, setting up a Model Confucius Institute, and Carrying out CI brand development Projects. The supporting measures section highlights the approach of the cooperation between the CI and local Chinese companies, “the Chinese companies which are going abroad shall support local CIs;

the companies are encouraged to set up scholarships to reward excellent CI students; CI students shall be considered first in terms of employment; the companies which employ many local people and have the conditions of running a CI are encouraged to set up a CI”.

According to the development goals, the numbers of the CI and CC shall be 500 and 1000 respectively by 2015, the number of students shall reach 1.5 million and the number of teachers shall reach 50,000. By 2020, the CI shall complete its global layout in general and achieve the unifications of quality standard, examination accreditation, teacher selection and training. Besides, a comprehensively functional and widely covered Chinese language culture global dissemination system shall be established by and large, and Chinese shall become one of the languages that are widely learnt and used by foreigners (Hanban Website, 2013a).

In addition to this macro plan, individual CIs design their own development plans as the dominant norms to guide each individual CI’s operations. For example, one eastern African CI’s development plan states that “we aim to build the Confucius Institute at [the local university] into a sustainable centre of Chinese language teaching and learning, a centre of cultural exchange and a centre for test and accreditation with localised teaching staff, and having a significant positive impact on the social and cultural life of [the country] and East Africa. The specific objectives are to establish 8 teaching centres, have 16 teachers and volunteers, and about 2000

registered students". To achieve this, the plan lists four measures: first, improve hardware facilities and quality of instruction; second, promote cultural exchange and expand institute influence; third, increase enrolment scale and establish a test centre; fourth, enhance teacher training and implement teacher localization. Under each measure, details of what actions need to be taken are listed (Plan 13). Similarly, another comparatively new eastern African CI's two years' development plan illustrates that the goal of this CI is to become a nationally recognised Chinese language and culture promotion organisation and a China-Africa culture and education exchange platform with its specialisation in a specific industry. In the coming two years, the CI will develop a teaching centre in the city centre and offer classes to local citizens, it will have a test centre which enables students take Chinese language tests and it will also establish a China-Africa Research Centre, China-Africa [industry] Research Centre and prepare to apply to run a Chinese degree course in the local partner university (Plan 11).

As previously discussed, the CI is a joint venture between China and local countries - especially for the individual CIs, therefore in theory the norm should be designed by both sides. The panoptic structure of the CI Headquarters has shown that the head of this organisation – the CI Headquarters Council – is dominated by Chinese top officials, so the primary norm, such as the CI's Constitution and By-laws and the *Development Plan of Confucius Institute 2012-2020*, is designed by the senior actors to represent China's national interest. Individual CIs include members from both

sides, hence the norm of individual CIs should be designed by both sides to represent both partners' interests. However, according to the Constitution and by-laws, individual CIs' norms must follow the primary norm of the CI Headquarters yet the local side of individual CIs sometimes chooses to not fully play its role as norm-makers (as I have demonstrated in section 5.1.1). Therefore, it can be suggested that the primary norm of the CI is devised by the Chinese side and primarily represents China's national interests.

Second, the primary task of the CI is to teach local people the Chinese language and to disseminate Chinese culture and other forms of Chinese knowledge. The language, culture and knowledge are all part of the norm of the CI. As discussed in the hierarchical observation of the CI in section 5.1.3, the panoptic structure gives the head the privilege to selectively show what they want the individuals to see, and to hide what they do not want the individuals to see. In terms of the CI's language teaching and cultural dissemination, the head of the CI can utilise this privilege and purposefully select and deliver the Chinese language, culture and knowledge that are beneficial for its own interest.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the CI Headquarters donates thousands of books to each CI, some of the books are teaching materials. These teaching materials teach simplified Chinese characters and the Pinyin pronunciation system to students. These resources are used in mainland China and are different from the Chinese

characters and pronunciation system being used in the Republic of China (Taiwan), Hong Kong, Macau and Singapore. Because the local members of the African CIs do not know a great deal about Chinese language teaching, they allow the Chinese actors to take charge of the design of Chinese curriculums and teaching plan. For example, a former Chinese director whose CI has built a Chinese degree programme for the local university admitted, “the degree curriculum was designed by ourselves... it took us one whole year to do this” (Interview 39); several CI teachers confirmed that the CIs’ teaching plans were designed by themselves based on Hanban’s books (Interviews 20, 46, 14 & 55).

Regarding the dissemination of Chinese cultures and other forms of Chinese knowledge, the CI chooses elements that paint China in an attractive light. In the collection of questions for the 13<sup>th</sup> Chinese Bridge Chinese Proficiency Competition for Foreign College Students, participants were required to remember answers to questions including,

- China has many canals, among which one is 1801 kilometres, the earliest and longest canal in the world, and on a par with the Great Wall of China. What is the name of this canal?
- Who is called the Father of World Hybrid Rice?
- On 18 April 2013, Time magazine published the list of the most influential people in 2013, who is the Chinese tennis player selected as an ‘idol figure’?
- On 14 December 2013, a spacecraft landed on the moon and signified that China become the third country after the USSR and the USA who achieved the soft landing on another planet. What is the name of this spacecraft? (Training 8).

These questions aim to highlight to the students the great achievements of China. By

knowing the answers to these questions, the participants may build admiration and affection towards China.

In one southern African CI's Chinese culture teaching resources folder, I observed subfolders titled "the art of tea", "Kung Fu", "paper cutting", "Chinese poems", "calligraphy", "Tai Chi", "Chinese dance", "Chinese history" and "Chinese medicine" (Training 13). The students of that CI have learnt some Chinese knowledge through these cultural activities. They told me that "we've learnt how to prepare traditional tea, how to serve, how to drink. We understand Chinese traditional festivals, such as spring festival. We learnt about the Chinese knot, Chinese films, dances, singing, Taichi, calligraphy and characters" (Interview 27). All CI directors and teachers I met said they organise activities during Chinese festivals, such as Spring Festival and Mid-Autumn Day, and they invite students and local people to experience the traditions of these festivals. Hanban's news coverage about such events is too voluminous to count. By attending cultural activities, individuals repeatedly receive different forms of enjoyment through seeing, tasting and listening to the things that are labelled with unique Chinese characteristics in a comparatively short period of time. Therefore, these cultural activities provide good opportunities for local people to internalise positive knowledge of China. As one CI administrative member posted on her WeChat platform about a dumpling making event, "the dissemination of Chinese culture is not restricted to language teaching, real practice is also very important. This event is not only about making dumplings, the more important thing

is to tell the stories out of the dumplings, to communicate and share with students” (WeChat screen shot on 23 April 2016).

Third, many rules, regulations and orders are derived from the dominant norm as sub-norms are important for the CI, because they stipulate “code of conduct” for all aspects of the CI’s operations in detail. The individuals are expected to follow these norms and their actions are always measured against them. According to a list of regulations used by one CI for its internal management, a CI should have the following regulations: CI Chinese Director’s Responsibilities, Chinese Teachers’ Responsibilities and Management Regulations, Local Chinese Teachers’ Responsibilities and Management Regulations, Administrative Staff’s Responsibilities and Management Regulations (Regulation 7).

During my fieldwork, I observed two CIs’ internal Collections of Regulations (Regulation 5). Both documents include the following sections: Board of Directors’ responsibilities, Chinese Director’s Responsibilities, Local Director’s Responsibilities, Teacher Management Regulations, Student Management Regulations and Administrative Staff Responsibilities. Apart from these written norms, it was also common to see that the authority figures of the CI, such as the Chief Executive of the CI Headquarters, CI directors and CI teachers, give verbal orders to the subordinate individuals. These verbal orders should be seen as the norms of the CI too, because these orders form parts of the “code of conduct” of the CI and should be followed by

the individuals.

I have so far demonstrated the power structure of the CI which allows the hierarchical observation to function through a network of individuals. The purpose of the hierarchical observation is to supervise everyone and to ensure that everyone is behaving correctly. Here, the norm plays an essential role in defining what is “right” and what is “wrong”. With norm as the guidance and hierarchical observation as the tool, the normalisation of the individuals in the power structure of the CI begins the process of creating the “docility-utility” out of individuals and the constitution of institutionalised subjects of the CI.

### **5.2.2 The Control of Activities in the CI**

The norm of the CI spells out what the CI individuals should and should not do in the power space. Meanwhile, the authoritative figures of the CI can utilise the hierarchical design of the panoptic structure to see whether the individuals conform to the norms. Generally speaking, the CI seems to have done a good job in this regard. However in some cases, the individuals knew what they should do, but they did not do it. For example, one CI’s local deputy director read her job description, “my work with the CI is as dedicated by the co-director of the CI; he will direct me to assist and perform certain functions. I represent [local university] and [department where the CI is affiliated] director as co-local director of the CI, representing when he wants me to present; convening local advisory group ... represent [local university] to



work with the CI from time to time at the request of the co-director; also, work with the advisory group, to prepare strategic plan and operational plan..." (Interview 2). This statement shows what the CI has asked this person to do. Since the job description requires her to work with the CI from time to time and prepare the strategic and operational plans of this CI, I asked "what are the strategic plans and operational mode of the CI", "what is the future plan of this CI" and "what is your relationship with Chinese teachers"; her answers were "I need to meet [the Chinese director] and discuss further", "I need to discuss with [the Chinese director] about this too" and "[the Chinese director] hasn't told me anything about the teachers" respectively (Interview 2). On the date of this interview, she had been in that position for more than four months.

The local deputy director's answers reveal that although the CI has spelt out her responsibilities in the job description, she did not follow the rules and perform her duties. If her supervisors – the two directors – enforce her to carry out her responsibilities, this deputy director would perform much better.

In order to confirm this, I spoke to the Chinese director who told me that he had argued fiercely with the local director several times about teaching arrangements and teaching materials, and complained that the local director is not interested in working for the CI and nearly all daily operations are carried out by himself and the Chinese staff. In a weekly meeting of the CI, I only saw the Chinese director and

Chinese members in attendance (Fieldwork note 13 July 2015). It is clear to me that in this CI the unified supervision from the top to bottom is broken because the two directors did not work together well. The Chinese director seemed to choose to only supervise the Chinese sides, while the local director seemed to situate themselves out of the daily operation of the CI. Without unified supervision from both directors, the local deputy director seemed to be able to escape from the power network of eyes. Therefore, she could choose not to do the things that she was supposed to do. This example shows that in order to enforce individuals to do what they should do according to the norms of the institute, the control of activities must work with effective supervision.

By the same token, for volunteer teachers, the CI Headquarters issued an official document with around twenty clauses regarding how they should conduct themselves (Regulation 16). For example, in clause 7, it states that during teaching volunteer teachers must follow the leadership, guidance and assistance of local embassies, Hanban overseas representative offices and volunteer teacher managers, follow local partner's leadership. In clause 8, it writes that volunteer teachers should email the work report to Hanban and home organisation every term or every half year. Equally, in their agreement with Hanban, volunteer teachers are *not* allowed to do certain things (Agreement and constitution 4). For example, in clause 3.2.2, “[volunteer teachers] should not attend activities harmful for Chinese national interests, not attend illegal organisations”; in clause 3.2.3, “during serving period,

[volunteer teachers] should not pursue any academic diploma or degree. Apart from Chinese teaching activities, [volunteer teachers] should not do other jobs.” The agreement also lists ten activities and circumstances will automatically lead to the abolishment of this agreement, including “[volunteers] violating China and local country’s laws, harming CI’s reputation, changing visa type or personal status without written permission from Hanban and local embassy”.

Despite the detailed regulations above, CI teachers sometimes choose to not follow the rules. For example, I met one CI teacher who refused to be sent to a new teaching station by her director because she had several concerns. First, she believed that their gender increased their vulnerability to the risks of the new environment, so it would be better to send male teachers to this new teaching station which is far from the CI. Second, she had not finished her current job in the CI and she wanted to complete the current job before taking up other major tasks (Interview 14). In this CI, although the CI director enforced her teacher to do certain things and the regulations of the CI stated that the teachers should follow the leadership of the CI, the teacher decided to not cooperate. The reasons she gave that include, “being a female is more vulnerable than male” and “completing my current job should be prioritised”, intimate that she has been constituted as a subject with certain established values by other power technologies before she falls into the transformation of the CI’s power technology. She compared the pros and cons of the new situation with her established values and chose to take the one that may be

favourable to her. Therefore, when she was given a new task by the leaders of the CI which is in conflict with her previously established thoughts, she was likely to resist. I heard from her that in the end the CI director sent two teachers who are a couple to work in the new teaching centre because they were new to this country and they can look after each other.

From the above, it can be seen that the CI has designed a set of rules and regulations that aim to regulate and control the activities of CI individuals. Through the tactic of controlling individuals' activities, docility is expected to be created out of the individuals. However it is common to see that some individuals do not always follow the regulations and resist the control. Sometimes, it is because this tactic lacks support from effective hierarchical observation; and sometimes, it is because the individual's established values and thoughts prevail over the enforcements of orders from the CI. The second reason also explains the co-existence of power and resistance from another perspective, i.e. resistance could happen within a subject. This is because any individual is under the transformation of different power technologies at the same time; a previously established truth by one power technology may fall foul of a new truth imposed by a new power technology. The subject may choose to resist or accept either of the truths based on her own interest in the specific situation.

### **5.2.3 The Organisation of Time in the CI**

Foucault indicates that the control of activities will be more effective if it works with *the control of time*. This technique of time controlling should be seen as “machinery for adding up and capitalizing time” by “taking charge of the time of individual existences; [by] regulating the relations of time, bodies and forces; [by] assuring an accumulation of duration; and [by] turning to ever-increased profit or use the movement of passing time” (Foucault, 1995, p.157). The CI uses all types of time organisation tools, such as time-tables and itineraries, to manage and accumulate individual’s time in the operations of the CI. Consequently, the individuals should do things in accordance with a series of regulations and rules, and they should do these things within a certain period of time. Capturing the individual’s time and maximising the use of it according to a series of plans and schedules can make the operation of the CI more efficient.

One of the CIs that I visited had recently opened its Chinese undergraduate degree courses in its local partner university. The syllabus of this degree consists of 125 pages, detailing a carefully orchestrated plan of how to capitalise and maximise the time of students for the best effects (Plan 16). In section 7 of this syllabus, it states that “the proposed course lasts four years, representing a total of 7,200 hours (including direct contact hours and independent study hours)”; these hours are split into different semesters and courses, as shown in the table below:

**Table 5.1: An African CI's Chinese Undergraduate Degree Course Syllabus**

	Semester 1				Semester 2					
	Hr/S	CD	II	Cr	Hr/S	CD	II	Cr		
academic year 1	The country's own language I	4	64	86	5	Portuguese II	4	64	86	
	Study Methods and Life Skills	4	64	56	4	Elementary Chinese II	4	64	86	
	Elementary Chinese I	4	64	86	5	Understanding Chinese Speaking II	4	64	56	
	Understanding Chinese Speaking I	4	64	56	4	Chinese Characters II	4	64	86	
	Chinese Characters I	4	64	56	4	Chinese Speaking II	4	64	116	
	Chinese Speaking I	4	64	86	5	Chinese Culture	4	64	86	
	China Overview	4	64	26	3					
	<b>Total</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>416</b>	<b>484</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>516</b>	
	academic year 2	The country's own language III	4	64	86	5	The country's own language IV	4	64	86
		Chinese Speaking Production I	4	64	116	6	Translation Methodology	4	64	116
Chinese Reading I		4	64	56	4	Chinese Reading II	4	64	56	
Basic Chinese Writing I		4	64	56	4	Chinese Speaking Production II	4	64	116	
Teaching Chinese		4	64	116	6	Basic Chinese Writing II	4	64	56	
Chinese Intermediate I		4	64	86	5	Chinese Intermediate II	4	64	86	
<b>Total</b>		<b>24</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>516</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>516</b>	
academic year 3		Advanced Chinese I	4	64	86	5	Advanced Chinese II	4	64	86
		Chinese Reading III	4	64	56	4	Reading Chinese Newspapers and Periodicals	4	64	86
		Chinese Translation Practice I	4	64	176	8	Chinese Audio-Visual-Speaking	4	64	116
	Linguistic Theory	6	96	114	7	Translation Practice II	4	64	176	
	Supplementary discipline I	4	64	116	6	Supplementary discipline II	4	64	116	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>352</b>	<b>548</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>580</b>	
	academic year 4	Chinese Descriptive Linguistics	4	64	116	6	Internship II	8	128	232
		Chinese Classical Literature I	4	64	116	6	Chinese Classical Literature II	4	64	116
		Internship I	8	128	232	12	Supplementary discipline IV	4	64	116
		Supplementary discipline III	4	64	116	6	Supplementary discipline V	4	64	116
<b>Total</b>		<b>20</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>580</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>580</b>	

Table 5.1 divides the 4 years duration into successive and parallel 8 semesters, each of which finishes at a specific time, so that the individual's time is broken down into "separate and adjusted threads" (Foucault, 1995, pp.157-8). In semester 1, there are 7 subjects as parallel segments which must be completed by the end of the semester, so that student's time is broken down to fit in the learning of these courses accordingly. In order to pass the examination for each subject, gain its credits and proceed to the next level's study, students must make the most of the limited time to remember the knowledge of different subjects. Unconsciously, students' activities become more efficient and economic. Also, learning is a progressive process in which the threads of time are organised "according to an analytical plan – succession of elements as simple as possible, combining according to increasing complexity" (Foucault, 1995, p.158). In semester 1 of academic year 1, students start with learning Elementary Chinese 1 and other basic modules; while in semester 2 of academic year 3, students are progressed to learn advanced Chinese 2 and even translation. Therefore, the organisation of time does not only divide time into different segments, it must also comply with the individuals' learning patterns. By dividing individuals' time into successive and progressive segments, the degree course of the CI is designed to capitalise and maximise the use of everyone's time during the whole studying period of this degree.

This CI's syllabus could be considered a perfect example of organising individual's time in the CI among all CI's time organisation methods. However, a number of

teachers in this CI expressed their concerns to this elaborately designed syllabus. Two teachers said that they don't think there are enough Chinese classes in the syllabus because local students have never learnt Chinese before being enrolled to this degree course. "Starting to learn Chinese from university is like climbing onto a platform that is too high" (Interview 30). This concern is confirmed by a former Gongpai teacher who had worked for two years in a western African CI which established a Chinese degree in 2008. Dozens of students have graduated with a Chinese degree. This Gongpai teacher said many graduated students' Chinese level is not good enough; "the Chinese level of some graduated students is even worse than that of the students who only studied in China for one year" (Interview 55). Another former CI Chinese director of an eastern African CI which had also established a Chinese degree course admitted that "we have a problem that there are not enough classes" (Interview 39).

It seems that the Chinese staff generally agreed that there are not enough Chinese classes for Chinese degree courses, which leads to the result that some students' Chinese ability may be not as high as expected. This leads to the question of why do they not increase the number of Chinese lessons? Two Chinese directors told me the reason: "we must follow the local university's degree construction model to design the Chinese degree" (Interview 39). According to the local university's degree course model, "in each semester we can start 5 to 6 courses and each course only has 3 hours of class time every week; one semester last for 15 weeks, so each course only



has 45 hours class time. How can this be enough for a degree?" (Interview 52). These statements imply that although the Chinese members wanted to control the design of the degree syllabus and extend students' study time, they must follow the local partner's rules because the CI is part of the local partner university. This can be seen as another conflict that happens when two different power technologies with two different norms try to interact.

The above example shows how CI degree students' time is controlled. The time of CI teachers is also controlled by the CI. During my interviews, I asked the CI teachers who have worked in the CI for more than one year to describe their one-year experience in the CIs. Their experiences are similar, so I use a southern African CI's volunteer teacher as an example. In October of the previous year, the teacher saw the CI's notice of recruiting new volunteer teachers. She was studying TCSOL and was interested in the job. She applied by registering on Hanban's volunteer teacher management online system. After one week, she received an interview invitation. She passed the interview and Hanban's psychological test successfully in November, she was then required to attend a one-month training programme at a CI's training centre in a Chinese university from March the next year. The training, accommodation and travel expenses were covered by Hanban. At the end of the training, she passed another exam and became a qualified CI volunteer teacher. From April to June, she followed Hanban's instructions to obtain her visa, booked flight tickets and made other pre-departure arrangements. She arrived in the CI in early

July and started her work there. Her time in the CI was arranged by the CI director. She was required to teach four lessons in the afternoons of Tuesday and Thursday every week. Because she was also doing some administrative work, the CI Chinese director asked her to submit a brief report every day. She mentioned that Hanban also requested volunteer teachers to submit a report every three months, so she submitted the first report to Hanban by the end of October (Interview 46). This example shows that in the 12 months' time since the teacher saw Hanban's recruitment notice and submitted her application, her time has been divided into several segments: application and interview from October to November, training from March to April, preparation from May to June and working in the CI from July. During her time serving in the CI, the director further divided her time into smaller segments such as teaching lessons on certain days and submitting administrative report every day. The CI's arrangement of the teacher combined the control of the teacher's activities as well as the organisation of her time, which capitalises her time by using her specific capacity in specific times.

It is also worth mentioning that the tactic of the organisation of time always works with setting deadlines for tasks and activities. The deadlines constantly remind the individuals how much time they still have, therefore they must arrange their remaining time wisely and try their best to complete the activities before the deadline. The above two examples both have set deadlines, and the CI Headquarters also set some deadlines for its development: the dominant norm of the CI – the

*2012-2020 CI Development Plan* – clearly states that “by 2015, there shall be 500 CIs and 1000 CCs, the number of students shall reach 1,500,000 ... the number of qualified full time and part time teacher shall reach 50,000 ... by 2020, the global layout of the CI shall be completed with unified quality standard, unified examination and ratification, unified methods of sending and training teachers” (Hanban Website, 2013a). In order to achieve these goals in the limited time, the CI must use its time wisely and effectively by economising and accumulating everyone’s time with the help of all types of programmes, schedules and timetables.

#### **5.2.4 The Composition of Forces in the CI**

The above sections have shown that in the structure of the CI, individuals are distributed into their own space, and their activities and time are orchestrated by the CI. However, with thousands of individuals in more than 500 CIs and 1000 CCs all over the world, the CI also needs a system of composition to organise these individuals, put them in order and combine them concertedly. As Foucault (1995, p.164) states, “[d]iscipline is no longer simply an art of distributing bodies, of extracting time from them and accumulating it, but of composing forces in order to obtain an efficient machine”. That is to say that only when the individuals are distributed, accumulated and combined in order, can the CI operate smoothly and efficiently. To achieve the concerted composition of forces, the CI needs a “precise system of command” (Foucault, 1995, p.166). The CI has created the following tools in its system of command.

First, the CI instructs the individuals through official documents. According to CI Headquarters' website, the position of the executive director of the CI Headquarters is equivalent to a vice-minister in China's central government (Hanban, n.d.), and in China's bureaucratic system, the CI Headquarters, as a Shiye Danwei directly affiliated to the Ministry of Education, has the power to issue official instructions to lower governmental bureaus and institutions and ask for their assistance. Within the CI's bureaucratic system, Hanban's official instructions certainly have the same effect. When Hanban/CI Headquarters requires its individuals to achieve a specific task, it usually issues an official notice detailing the "who", "why", "what", "when" and "how" of this task, hierarchically delivers the message to relevant organisations, and asks them to do it accordingly.

For example, on 14 October 2014, Hanban/CI Headquarters issued an official notice *Regarding Organising Applications for Chinese Volunteer Teachers Needed in the First Half Year of 2015* to the education departments of Chinese provincial level regions and ministry-affiliated universities (Notice 15). This document states that 647 volunteer teachers will be needed and selected from CI's Chinese partner universities and 1,850 volunteer teachers will be selected from other educational organisations. A list of the positions and requirements are attached with the notice. This official document lists the requirements of this position, selection process and deadlines. This official document can be seen as the norm of this specific volunteer teacher

application process, therefore, it requires Chinese educational organisations to follow it by selecting and submitting qualified candidates to fill in these positions before the deadlines. This single official document accumulates China's human resources by reaching all China's educational organisations and mobilising thousands of Chinese teachers and students to apply for the positions within a restricted time. It can be seen from here that official instructions play an important role in composing CI's individuals.

Once the volunteer teachers have been selected, they will be distributed into different organisations where they will receive the training. After training, they will be combined again and sent to different CIs in different countries. For example, Xiamen University's Southern Base of CI Headquarters/Office of CI Affairs undertook one of the 2015 volunteer teachers' training tasks and received 134 new volunteer teachers on 9 March. After six weeks training, these teachers will be grouped and sent to Thailand, Latvia, the USA, Myanmar and Brunei (Hanban Website, 2015c). From the above, it can be seen that the individuals of the CI are effectively accumulated through CI's instructions, distributed during the training process and combined before being dispatched to different countries. The whole volunteer teacher selection process shows a concerted composition of forces.

Second, the individuals are composed by verbal orders. In one southern African CI's weekly meeting, the Chinese director verbally issued the following orders: 1. In office,

staff should use cups with CI logos to drink their drinks. 2. Teacher A will teach the Chinese lessons for a Chinese company's local employees from next week. 3. Teacher B will teach in a local secondary school's CI teaching station from next semester, once a week. 4. Teacher C will teach the lessons for evening interest class from next week. 5. On Saturday and Sunday, everyone will go to a local supermarket and hold an exhibition stall to advertise the CI to local people (fieldwork note 13 July 2015).

In one southern African CI's Chinese lesson, the teacher taught the students to read several new words. She read the words one by one and said "read after me please", and all students followed. She then selected individual students by calling their names to read the words one by one. Next, she paired up the students, and in the pair, she asked one student to test the other student the pronunciations of the words and vice versa. In the end, she asked all students to read the words again and again without her reading the words first (fieldwork note 20 July 2015). In these examples, the individuals are accumulated, distributed and combined through verbal orders according to different purposes. In this way, the authoritative figures are able to effectively use the individuals' forces and achieve the best result. Therefore, verbal orders also constitute an important part of the system of command of the CI.

The above two tools have proved to be useful in terms of composing the CI's forces; however sometimes they can lose effectiveness. Although Hanban issues official documents to China's provincial education departments and asks them to organise CI

teacher applications as mentioned above, the possibility of provincial and lower level education departments not passing on the documents because of their own interests should not be excluded.

During my fieldwork, I met several Gongpai teachers. One Gongpai teacher is a Chinese middle school's English teacher. He "accidentally saw a Hanban notice of recruiting teachers [that was issued to the local educational bureau]. Surprisingly, such notice was never passed on to [his] school before". He completed the application form right away because he met all the requirements of the notice. He then submitted the form to the local education authority and expected them to submit it to the provincial education department and then to Hanban. However, only few days before the deadline, he found this application document was not submitted by the local education authority. By the time he had reclaimed the document and submitted it to the provincial education department by himself, he had already missed the deadline. He "nearly begged them to see if [he] can submit it as a standby". Out of surprise, in the end he was selected and was "probably the only middle school teacher in the province"; however the good news did not last long, "the school principal did not allow [him] to go". He then visited the director of the local education bureau, "the director was quite open. There was no reason to not let [him] go. He agreed to let [him] go". "It is extremely difficult for a middle school teacher to become a CI teacher", he concluded, "after my case, we never saw such Hanban notices again. My partner [who is also a middle school teacher] also wanted

to apply for this position, but local education authority said they did not receive the notice while provincial education authority insisted they had passed it on” (Interview 53).

After I talked with another Gongpai teacher and a Chinese partner university’s international department director (Interviews 3 & 54), the reason of this resistance became clear. “We cannot bear to let [a teacher] go [to a CI],” the director said. It must be admitted that the Gongpai teachers who hold permanent positions in Chinese domestic schools are valuable assets to their institutes. For example, the above middle school teacher has been teaching in the school for more than 20 years. Considering the level of teaching skills and knowledge possessed by this individual, it is difficult and time-consuming to find a replacement. Although Hanban compensates 3,000 RMB per person per month to the schools whose teachers are teaching in the CIs, in the case that both Hanban and China’s domestic schools want talented teachers, resistance from domestic schools seems to be inevitable. Therefore, the middle school teacher feels that “although the Hanban document makes clear that the teachers who serve in the CI should be taken into consideration first in terms of promotion, the school won’t follow this guidance, because it is not fair for other teachers who are working in the school while you are working in the CI” (Interview 53).

The above example shows the resistance from Chinese domestic schools and the



conflicts of interests between the CI and Chinese domestic educational institutes. The leaders of Chinese schools do not always want their teachers to leave and work for the CI because this means that they will suffer a reduction in their own capacity. Although CI Headquarters issued official documents to Chinese domestic education institutes and asked their assistance in terms of CI teacher recruitment, some schools were reluctant to follow this command or even chose to ignore the command. This resistance from the Chinese schools seems to have disrupted the efficiency of this tactic; however the CI does not turn a blind eye to this resistance. This will be further discussed in the next chapter as it is an important part of the dynamics of power/knowledge.

### **5.2.5 The Examination of the CI**

In the above sections, I have shown the CI's panoptic power structure, identified the CI's norms and revealed the CI's invisible disciplinary tactics. The hierarchical observation enables authoritative figures of the CI to exercise these disciplinary tactics on the individuals with the guidance of the norms. The individuals become institutionalised and objectified elements that can be regulated, mobilised, arranged and combined for the operations of the CI. However, one more instrument is needed to decide whether the individuals have met the norms of the institute, whether they have internalised the norms to themselves and whether they have reached the expectation of the authoritative figures. This instrument, according to Foucault, is examination.

Through examination, everyone is given a score, a level, a title, a rank or a status as a truth attached to him, upon which he will be recognised by others. When discussing the instrument of examination, Foucault uses the example of schools which have uninterrupted and repeated examinations during the entire length of teaching to argue that students are transformed to be subjects by examination to a whole new field of knowledge. The CI's major task is to teach Chinese language to foreigners and some African CIs have established Chinese degree courses, so the CI should also be seen as an educational institute and it does use different forms of examination in its operations.

First, to examine students' Chinese language ability, the CI has designed a collection of tests including HSK (Chinese Proficiency Test), HSKK (Spoken Chinese Proficiency Test), YCT (Elementary and Secondary School Level Students' Chinese Language Ability Test) and BCT (Business Chinese Ability Test). All of the teachers whom I met during my fieldwork said that they encourage their students to take these exams. For students who are studying a Chinese degree or want to gain a CI scholarship to study in China, taking a language exam and passing a certain level is a must. Once a student has sat in a language test, they receive a score and a certificate showing which level they have reached. The score and certificate is one of the truths given to the student by the CI that makes them a recognisable and analysable object. By looking at the score, the CI can decide whether they are qualified to be awarded a degree or given

a scholarship. With this score, other Chinese organisations, such a Chinese university or a Chinese company, can also understand the person's Chinese ability and assess whether they should be accepted to study or work.

Although the Chinese language test is only a test of examining the individuals' one single aspect of Chinese knowledge, it is essential to evaluate whether the students have mastered the language. If they have, they could read, listen to and learn more Chinese on their own. This would enable them to enter a wider field of Chinese knowledge. In other words, once the individuals have mastered the language, they would be able to internalise the Chinese knowledge that is written and spoken in Chinese by themselves, which can be seen as the beginning of the transition to self-constitution. In this way, they would be able to start constituting and transforming themselves in the field of Chinese knowledge without requiring any external supervision. This should be seen as one of the ultimate goals that the CI wants to achieve. As one CI Chinese director said, "we hope the CI can equip students with enough Chinese language skills, so that in the future they can learn more in China or in their own country on their own. This is our biggest goal" (fieldwork note 3 August 2015).

I have noticed that several African CIs have built Chinese degree courses in their local partner universities. As I have shown in section 5.2.3, a Chinese degree systematically internalises Chinese knowledge to the students as well as constantly examines the

students throughout their study period. The syllabus of a southern African CI's Bachelor's degree course in Chinese language, culture and literature, as shown in table 5.1, requires the students to internalise the Chinese knowledge of different subjects and pass several examinations in the four years' study before they can be awarded a degree. To be more specific, after one semester's study of Chinese Elementary One including 64 hours' class learning and 86 hours self-learning, the students must take the final exam which accounts for 60% of the overall score of the course, and the remaining 40% relies on their performance in class and assignments. Only when the students have passed the exams, can they receive the 5 credits worth of this course. Apart from this course, the students need to take exams of courses including Chinese Classic Literature, Reading Chinese Newspapers and Periodicals, Chinese Characters, Chinese Translation Practice, and Chinese Descriptive Linguistics. These exams aim to show whether the subjects have reached the level required and whether they can pass onto the next level. After successfully completing this systematic study of Chinese knowledge and passing sufficient exams, the degree students are expected to be equipped with advanced Chinese language skills which allow them to further explore in the regime of Chinese knowledge on their own. In this way, they would be able to constitute themselves, more thoroughly, to be subjects with Chinese knowledge. The next chapter will elaborate this further with examples of such subjects.

In the middle of the CI's hierarchical structure, the teachers are also constantly

examined. First, they need to submit their application forms and pass Hanban's interviews and psychological exams. In the interviews, candidates are examined in terms of their Chinese knowledge, English skills, teaching skills and Chinese talents. The psychological exam is designed to test if a candidate is psychologically suitable for this position. Only when a candidate has passed both tests, can he enter the next stage – training. After a certain period of collective and intensive training, usually one month, the candidates need to pass another examination at the end of the training. Once they have passed the training's examination successfully, the candidates become qualified to work for the CI and their information is collected by the CI Headquarters and saved in the teacher resource database (Interviews 3 & 14).

During and after the term of service, the teachers are still constantly examined. According to Hanban's *International Chinese Volunteer Teacher Management Regulations*, the teachers need to submit a work report to Hanban by email every half year or every year and at the end of their service, the teachers need to submit Volunteer Teacher Service Evaluation Form. In this form, teachers are required to illustrate their teaching time, students' levels, module names, teaching materials, related research, social activities (conference attended), and work summary. By submitting the report and form to Hanban, the teachers are under the normalising gaze and examination of their supervisors who decide whether they have done a good job. If they pass the examination of Hanban, the teachers will receive a Chinese Volunteer Teacher Honorary Certificate from Hanban. For those who performed

better, they will receive an Excellent Chinese Volunteer Teacher Honorary Certificate (Regulation 17).

From the examination of CI teachers, it can be found that everyone's information is collected through documentary techniques such as forms and reports, which makes each teacher a describable and analytical "case". According to their documents, the authoritative figures of the CI are able to compare one with another, classify them and select them. In the end, the authoritative figures give their judgement and conclusions to the teachers based on the institute's norms, and this judgement and conclusion is shown in the form of certificate. By issuing a certificate to a teacher, the authoritative figures attach a label to them as an established truth in the CI.

At a higher level, both Chinese director and local directors are also under the CI's institutional examinations. Like the teachers, the Chinese directors must pass the tests of interviews and training before being appointed as directors. For example, the Chinese directors need to pass the test of using CI's project budget and final accounts examination system during their training (Exam paper 2). During and after their term of service, the directors not only need to submit their annual work report to Hanban, but also need to draft annual report of the CI. If qualified, they will also apply for the titles of Excellent CI and Excellent Director of CI (Notice 17). To examine the local directors, the Chinese side also needs to fill in a CI Local Director Information Form which shows the position, academic degree, contact details, whether he/she can

speak Chinese, whether he/she is a Chinese descendant, the frequency of him/her contacting Hanban and his/her attitude towards China. In the end of the form, there is a gap for CI officials to write their conclusions (Summary and report 12). Again, examination, through its documentary techniques, makes each individual a case which is not only under the constant normalising gaze of the authoritative figures, but also judged, classified and labelled by them. In this sense, Foucault argues that examination combines hierarchical surveillance and normalising judgement and it completes the subjectification of individuals by establishing truths to each of them.

The instrument of examination applies labels to the individuals and illustrates how much the individuals have conformed to the norms. Foucault finds that a binary mechanism of punishment and reward is always used during examination to praise those who have reached the norms and to punish those who do not measure up to the rule or depart from it. In educational institutes, Foucault cites Demia (1716) to argue that a teacher “must avoid, as far as possible, the use of punishment; on the contrary, he must endeavour to make rewards more frequent than penalties ... when the teacher is obliged to use punishment, to win the heart of the child if he can before doing so” (Foucault, 1995, p.180). The CI adopts this method. For example, based on certain set of norms, the CI Headquarters selects “Excellent CIs”, “Excellent CI Individuals” and “Excellent Chinese Partners” annually. As previously discussed in lateral observation in section 5.1.3, the CIs which do not get such honorary titles may feel pressure and they would work harder to aim to achieve the same in the future. It

seems clear that this technique does not only award the CIs which have reached the norms of the CI, but also has the function of reducing gaps between the CIs. In this way, homogeneity can be imposed and the overall quality and development of the CIs worldwide can be improved.

Foucault suggests that examination has another feature – it is always highly ritualised to demonstrate the establishment of truth. Such rituals of the examination and the establishment of the CI's truth can be commonly found during the power operation of the CI. For example, the final few rounds of the 14<sup>th</sup> Chinese Bridge Competition for foreign college students are broadcast by China's popular Hunan TV Station (Hanban Website, 2015b). During this competition, Hunan TV used the form of reality show to ritualise the semi-finals of this competition, which enabled the program to achieve the first place among all China's provincial TV stations in terms of audience ratings. The final round of the competition was presented at a state-of-the-art indoor studio and attended not only by the competitors but also by famous Chinese singers, television personalities and professors, which makes this event more like a celebrity show. During the rounds of the competition, the contestants need to finish different tasks according to the rules of the competition; in the meantime, they put themselves under the normalizing gaze of the authoritative figures of the competition – the judges. The judges examine these contestants, promote those who have met their expectations to the next round and eliminate those who have not measured up to their standard. The decision made after the



judges' examination is the truth given to the contestants. After successive examinations from one round to another, the final winners were chosen. These winners receive trophies, certificates or other forms of labels which demonstrate the establishment of truth from the authoritative figures at the award ceremony. By broadcasting this event to thousands of television audience members, the CI creates a situation that the establishment of truth is witnessed and accepted by the public. In this way, the establishment of truth was strengthened and reinforced.

From the above, the examination of the CI first imposes a principle of compulsory visibility on the individuals by introducing them into the field of documentation. With the documentary techniques, such as filling forms, taking interviews and submitting reports, each individual becomes a case. Each case is then judged and measured against the norms of the CI, and in the final rituals of the examination, each case is given a label as a truth given by the CI. This truth shows the meaning, status and identity of the individual, according to which, the individual will be identified by others. Once the truth has been established, the institutionalised subject of the CI has been produced.

### **5.3 Power Operations of the CI: Summary**

This chapter focuses on the examination of the CI's internal power operation. I firstly demonstrated the panoptic structure of the CI in which the central tower utilises the hierarchical structure to implement the normalising gaze. That is to say that I

explored the hierarchy of the CI. Unlike the Panopticon, the space I have described was not a matter of walls, cells and one-way glass windows. Rather, it was produced and reproduced by the individuals, such as the Chair of the CI Headquarters Council, the Executive Director of the CI, CI directors, CI teachers and whoever used that space, through their dealings with one another.

I examined a range of empirical observations of surveillance practices in the CI. Against the homogenous effects of the Panopticon, these observations were sometimes disrupted and suspended because of resistance and conflict from the individuals. I noted that there is a division between the Chinese side and the local side in the CI's power structure and I have suggested that this division could be one of the reasons why resistance or even conflicts were found in the CI. Also in examining this division, I attempted to give an explanation about why on the one hand Foucault's notion of power is a dominatory notion of power and on the other hand individuals are able to resist the operations of power. That is to say, different power technologies produce different subjects. When different subjects try to interact, resistance and conflicts could happen between them.

Next, I explored the normalising techniques in the CI's power structure which are used to produce its institutionalised subjects. I started by describing the norm of the CI: a collection of knowledge, rules, regulations and orders that are set and expected to be followed and internalised by the individuals. I then examined how the CI used

the disciplinary techniques and instruments that are discovered by Foucault in the normalisation of individuals. Again, resistance and conflicts were common to see during the exercises of these techniques on the individuals. The techniques of power seemed to resemble tactics in an ongoing battle for docility. From here, I attempted to explain the co-existence of power and resistance from another perspective: resistance and conflicts could happen within a subject, because each individual is constituted to be a subject by a combination of different power technologies. A previously established truth by an old power technology may clash with a new truth imposed by a new technology. The subject may choose to resist the old truth or the new truth depending on which is more favourable in a specific situation.

Also in this chapter, I have pointed out that although the operations of power inevitably cause resistance and conflicts and to some extent these resistance and conflicts affect the operations of power, they are essential for the CI to sustain its operations through the dynamics of the power/knowledge. I will further elaborate this in the next chapter because resistance and conflicts should be seen as the effects of power operations. Towards the end of this chapter, I have shown that the disciplinary instrument of the examination finalises the normalisation of individuals in the CI and institutionalised subjects of the CI has been produced. In the next chapter, I will also examine what these institutionalised subjects, together with the CI's other power effects, are like.

## Chapter 6

### Power Effects of the CI

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In chapter 4, I completed the first dimensional analysis of the CI. That is to say, I discussed why and how the CI was established in the first instance, what material support is available for the CI, and how this support is strategically mobilised to enable the establishment of the CI's objective body. Put simply, I illustrated the physical construction of the CI.

As a result of this analysis, we can recognise the power intention of the CI, i.e. the aims and objectives of the CI, but we do not know whether this intention is actually achieved. Because this intention is shaped by the operations of power inside of the organisation and many effects can be produced, this question requires individual consideration. The initial intention may be only part of the overall effects, or may be totally excluded from the effects. As Foucault states, "there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives" (Foucault, 1980a, p.95), but "people know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does" (Foucault, cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p.187). This means that in order to find the real function of the CI, I also need to examine how power operates within the CI and what power effects are produced.

Chapter 5 focuses on the examination of the CI's power operations. There, I launched

the second dimensional analysis of the CI to deconstruct this organisation and find out what is happening inside of its concrete shell. Specifically, I demonstrated the CI's power technology by showing how the CI utilises its hierarchical panoptic structure to exercise its normalising power techniques and instruments on individuals in its power regime. As I have discussed in chapter 2, once a power structure has been established and the disciplinary power has been exercised on the individuals, power effects are automatically being generated and the dynamics of power/knowledge are inevitably triggered. Chapter 5 has shown that the CI functions as a sophisticated disciplinary machine which operates in a protected space and exercises its power on the individuals that it touches, thus this chapter needs to demonstrate the CI's power effects and the dynamics of power/knowledge. By comparing the power effects with the CI's initial power intention, I will be able to illustrate, in the conclusion chapter, whether and to what extent, the CI has played its role in China's national interest and China-Africa relations.

### **6.1 The Dynamics of Power/Knowledge in the CI**

In the previous chapter, I have shown that resistance and conflicts occurred during power operations of the CI as an important and inevitable power effect. Resistance can be seen as the demonstration of disagreement with the norms and disciplinary power of social institutes. It can find expression in mild forms, such as individuals' complaints about an institute's management style, or individuals' inaction following authority figures' orders. If resistance is not responded to properly or even ignored in

the early stages, it would be worsened and shown in more fierce and visible ways such as conflicts and protests. The fierce and visible forms of resistance could bring more negative impacts or even lead to the collapse of the institute.

In a sense, it is impossible to prevent incidents of resistance and conflicts from occurring as no social institute shares the perfect power technology of the Panopticon. Perhaps it is what Foucault means by saying where there is power, there is resistance (Foucault, 1998; Foucault, 1980b; Foucault, 1996b). Undoubtedly, these incidents of resistance and conflicts affect the operations of power, because they disrupt the flow of observational gaze, slow down the normalising process and elicit unexpected negative effects. Therefore, policies and procedures on how to deal with resistance are essential for the healthy and sustainable development of a social institute. If resistance remains in a controllable level and is treated properly, it can positively contribute to the dynamics of power/knowledge and sustain the power operation of a social institute. On the contrary, if resistance is not treated properly or ignored, it could create visible conflicts which could lead to more unexpected and negative impacts on this institute. The CI has been developing rapidly in the past 12 years, which seems to show that the CI has treated its resistance effectively.

Firstly, resistance can be easily identified during the CI's power operation. It has been shown that the CI is a joint venture between the Chinese side and local African side. Although the design of this mode is intended to create a balanced power situation

between the two sides, it can also be demonstrated that these two sides sometimes do not cooperate well. One former Chinese director of an African CI told me that the current joint venture mode is already a modified mode based on resistance and conflicts caused by the CI's previous management mode. He explained, "in the CI's early development, the local director was *the* director and the Chinese director was the deputy director. But the local directors didn't know Chinese language and they didn't know Chinese culture either. The local side did not understand the characteristics of Chinese language teaching ... [therefore], the original cooperation mode of 'the local side being the primary and the Chinese side being the secondary' caused many problems" (Interview 39). Having realised this problem, the CI eventually adjusted its cooperation mode and changed the directors' titles to "Chinese director" and "local director" which continue to be used in today's mode (I39). In this example, the resistance of the cooperation mode prompted the CI to change its balance of power at the executive level. Specifically, resistance appeared during the operation of the CI and informed the CI about this problem. Consequently, the CI assessed this problem and attempted to eliminate the resistance caused by this problem by adjusting its power structure to balance these two directors. Resistance, in this instance, serves as a form of new knowledge which promotes the further operation of the CI. Here, resistance triggered the dynamics of power/knowledge of the CI.

Despite these types of changes, other forms of resistance or conflicts still constantly

arise between the two sides. The CI continues to assess these problems and tries to deal with them positively. Xu Lin, Chief Executive of CI Headquarters, pointed out in her 2013 Work Report of the Confucius Institute Headquarters to the Confucius Institute Headquarters Council that some CIs do face problems, such as “uneasy communication between Chinese and foreign directors” (Xu, 2014). Xu admitted that the CI is making contact with local countries, teachers, students, schools, universities and governments all the time, conflicts are inevitable. As she said, “during exchanging and integrating, there must be some confrontations, conflicts and contradictions [between the Chinese side and local side]” (Hanban Website, 2015d). To minimise the source of resistance and conflicts from the Chinese side, Xu, in her 2014 Work Report of the Confucius Institute Headquarters to the Confucius Institute Headquarters Council, stated that some CI Chinese directors “cannot meet the requirements”, so the CI Headquarters will “conduct a study and census on Chinese-partner universities operating 3 or more Confucius Institute, to thoroughly sum up experience on the selection of Chinese directors, targeting problems and solve them with effective measures, and to practically enhance the quality of selected and dispatched Chinese directors” (Xu, 2015).

Based on her proposal, the Academy for Confucius Institute Directors has been under construction in China’s Xiamen University since 2014. Once it begins to operate, it will be able to provide 3,600 training opportunities to CI directors and key teachers annually (Xiamen University Admissions Office for International Students Website,



2014). The establishment of the Academy for CI Directors should be seen as the CI's effort to deal with current problems at CI directors' level as the Academy aims to provide CI directors "normative, systematic and standard training" and make them better at understand their roles, ways of cooperation and code of conduct (Hanban Website, 2015d), so that in the future the CI directors' resistance can be mitigated. Additionally, the themes related to how these two directors can work together were discussed in the panels of the 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> CI Annual Conferences.<sup>24</sup> These efforts show that the CI picked up the problems during the operations of the CI, assessed them, and has tried to respond to them positively.

Apart from the conflicts between the Chinese and local sides, Chapter 5 revealed resistance from CI teachers. The CI teachers, especially volunteer teachers, resist the operation of the CI in some cases, because they do not seem to be able to get a permanent position in the CI although their current salary is satisfactory. Among all interviewees who are CI teachers, the most mentioned concern is that the CI cannot give them *Bianzhi*. In China, if a person has *Bianzhi*, they have a permanent position in a governmental organisation or a government funded organisation, and enjoy all types of social welfare. Simply, having *Bianzhi* means holding a golden bowl. Without *Bianzhi*, life faces instability. As the teachers said, "in the future, doing TCSOL is the

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<sup>24</sup> In the 5<sup>th</sup> CI Annual Conference, one theme of the Directors Forum is "strengthening the effectiveness of Chinese and local directors' cooperation mechanism". In the 6<sup>th</sup> CI Annual Conference, one theme of the Directors Forum is "the quality and responsibility of CI directors". In the 9<sup>th</sup> CI Annual Conference, one theme of the Directors Forum is "Chinese and local directors' division of work and cooperation". In the 10<sup>th</sup> CI Annual Conference, one theme of the University Presidents Forum was "the support from the Chinese and local partner university presidents to the CI". (Source: Confucius Institute Conference Website. Link: <http://conference.chinesecio.com/conference/huigu/01.html>. [accessed 12 Dec 2016])

best option and it is my favourite work. But practically speaking, this way won't go far. I don't have a stable place, I don't have Bianzhi either. I am just a contract employee" (Interview 31); "if the Bianzhi issue can be solved, I can do this job for the rest of my life" (Interview 14); "being a CI volunteer looks like a good thing by outsiders; but for volunteer teachers, long term serving won't work. On the one hand, we don't have Bianzhi; on the other hand, staying abroad too long would make us unfamiliar with China" (Interview 34). Without Bianzhi, the teachers also lose the opportunity of being promoted in professional job levels and titles. As they admitted, "in the long term, I will have higher goals and I need to be improved; a space for my growth is needed. The CI does not have this" (Interview 16); "Hanban is not like other schools where you can be promoted in titles or become a permanent teacher after three years' service continuously. Hanban doesn't have this, so the flow of teachers is very frequent; teachers change every year" (Interview 44). Some teachers have raised these issues to Hanban, and there have been some changes.

Hanban initiated the Hanban Professional Teacher (汉办专职教师, hereafter Hanban Teacher) project from 2012 which allows some CI Chinese partner universities to employ a certain number of Bianzhi employees for the CI and CI volunteer teachers will be considered first for these positions. For example, Beijing Foreign Studies University has set up 21 CIs, and there are 30 Hanban teacher vacancies for the first round of employment (CI Office of Beijing Foreign Studies University, 2014).

In a list of Hanban teacher vacancies in different universities published in 2013, Dalian University of Foreign Languages, Renmin University, Tianjin Foreign Studies University, Jilin University and Xiamen University all provide Bianzhi vacancies (Notice 32). Although different universities have different regulations about these positions and the number of these roles seems like “a drop in the ocean” compared with thousands of teachers employed by the CI, this project has shown the CI’s attempts at resolving the problem. This effort of tackling the CI teachers’ Bianzhi issue again shows that the CI has not ignored the resistance that occurs during its power operation. Although the resistance and conflicts affect the CI’s power operation to some extent, they also send a warning message as a form of new knowledge, to the CI’s authoritative figures, which may prompt them to look for solutions of these problems in order to minimise the negative effects. By doing so, the CI can improve its overall power operations. In this sense, the dynamics of power/knowledge triggered by resistance and conflicts serve as an important self-improving mechanism.

Although the appearance of resistance and conflicts provides the opportunity for the CI to learn new knowledge from the problems of its operation, it does not mean that the CI will try to deal with all resistance or fix all conflicts after assessing the situation. In Chapter 4, I have shown that the CI is part of China’s foreign policy, hence it should present China’s national interest. In Chapter 5, I have found out that the “central tower” of the CI is predominantly held by top Chinese leaders who designed the

primary norm of the CI. If resistance and conflicts occurring in the CI are essentially against the norm of the CI and China's national interest, the CI would not devote itself to negotiating non-negotiable issues or tolerating intolerable actions.

As I have discussed in Chapters 1 and 5, the incidents that have occurred in several western countries' CIs led to the closure of several CIs. For example, the closure of the CI at Canada's McMaster University was caused by a CI teacher who quit her job and complained to local Human Rights Tribunal that her CI employment contract forced her to hide her belief in Falun Gong. Falun Gong is seen as an illegal heresy in China, therefore the same applies in the CI as a Shiye Danwei of China which needs to obey Chinese laws and ban such belief. However in Canada, Falun Gong is regarded as a spiritual movement or a harmless belief (Bradshaw and Freeze, 2013). Here, the clash between the norm of the CI and the norm of Canada caused overt conflicts. The CI could choose to minimise this conflict by relaxing or adjusting its employment regulations; however this issue is against China's core norm and core national interest, so the situation eventually became non-negotiable and the two sides chose to close the CI. Although the CI in this Canadian university closed unexpectedly and unpleasantly, the CI is still able to gain new knowledge from this incident. For example, it would have a better understanding of Canadian laws and local university's employment regulations, or it may also check its employees' background more carefully before deploying them to a position of responsibility.

From the above, it can be seen that power operation produces resistance and conflicts. From resistance and conflicts, new knowledge can be gained to further power operation. Although resistance and conflicts serve as an important part of the dynamics of power/knowledge, it does not mean that they should be encouraged. On the contrary, institutes try to minimise resistance and smooth the power dynamics. As mentioned above and in Chapter 5, resistance and conflicts negatively impact the efficiency of power operation. Therefore, it is important for an organisation to detect and handle resistance before it gets worse. The CI has utilised its hierarchical structure and power mechanisms to collect knowledge of resistance and deal with it.

In Chapter 5, I have illustrated two types of supervision from top to bottom: the proactive supervision which requires the supervisor to be on the scene and see what is happening in the power structure with his own eyes, and the passive supervision by which the supervisor sees what his subordinates submit to him to see. Both methods allow the supervisor to collect new knowledge and both also have their pros and cons.

For the CI, senior figures can carry out proactive supervision by visiting some CIs and observe what is happening there, but with so many CIs all over the world it is impossible for them to visit all CIs and supervise them at all times. They therefore rely on passive supervision by asking their subordinates to submit the information

they want to know. Here, the use of forms and reports plays an important role in the collection of new knowledge. First, the CI asks the individuals to submit work reports and evaluation forms. Every year, the CI Headquarters asks the CI's Chinese partners to submit their CI work report (Notice 22). This report does not only include the achievements and good practices of the CIs, but also highlights the problems the CI had and asks for suggestions of responses to these problems. In a CI, Chinese partner university's CI Work Summary 2014 (Summary and report 1), the problems of university's CIs are listed. For example, the CIs in different countries developed unequally, the CI positions lack attraction to the university's teachers and the CIs' responsibilities and workloads are getting wider and heavier (Summary and report 1). Additionally, both CI Chinese directors and teachers need to submit their annual or end-term evaluation forms. The Director Evaluation Form requires the Chinese directors to detail the CI's performance, achievement, shortcomings and suggestions (Summary and report 9). The Teacher Evaluation Form asks the Chinese teachers to write down the difficulties and problems they had during the serving time, their achievements and shortcomings and their suggestions as to how to respond to these problems (Summary and report 14).

For individual CIs, they use similar tools too. In her work report to a council meeting of an east African CI, the Chinese director writes about the problems the CI currently has. For example, the full-time administrator is still not decided and the Chinese modules are still not part of the local university's core modules (Summary and report

21). In an eastern African CI, its evaluation system allows the students to assess their teachers, local members to assess the Chinese members, and teachers to assess each other. These assessments are carried out in the forms of questionnaires and open questions, and people's names are anonymised (Interview 14). Through these assessments, the leaders of the CI would be able to understand the problems and then deal with them accordingly. These examples show that the CI utilises its hierarchical structure and supervision instruments to collect new knowledge that is produced during its operation. From this new knowledge, the leaders of the organisation hope to understand what should be done to improve the current situation and consequently facilitate the overall development of the CI.

It is also worth mentioning that more than 10,000 Chinese teachers and more than 1,000 Chinese directors attend the CIs all over the world every year (Zhang, 2012), serving as a point of the CI power network and disseminating the Chinese knowledge to local individuals. While they are doing this, they also fall into the power regime of the foreign countries. For example, in Africa they gain new knowledge of the local countries through seeing local environment, learning local customs and experiencing local cultures; they also obtain African identities from the CIs' local partners and host countries. When they return to China, they transmit this new African knowledge to the CI and China and make their African identities known to Chinese people, which not only promotes Africa's power/knowledge in China to some extent, but more importantly constitutes a useful database that may be useful for not only the CI but

China's further exercise of power in these foreign countries.

For example, the Evaluation Form for Hanban Volunteer Chinese Teachers also requires the teachers to write if the local partner cares about them enough, if the local security situation is good and if local people are friendly to them (Summary and report 14). Moreover, all of the CI teachers that I met during my research visits who were still students in Chinese universities had written or were planning to write their degree theses on their teaching or learning experience at the African CIs. This new knowledge could help the CI and Chinese institutions to assess and adjust the CI's current operation in these countries. Similarly, a CI Chinese director said she has learnt the local peoples' characteristics and ways of doing things and everything she encountered in the African CI has become valuable data for her own humanities research database (fieldwork note 1 August 2015). Similarly, a CI Gongpai teacher used the opportunity of being a Gongpai teacher in a western African CI to collect research data, such as local Chinese companies' development situation (Interview 55). Their research on African issues would positively contribute to the overall knowledge body of China's African studies. More commonly, the African CIs' Chinese staff post pictures, stories and experiences of their life in Africa on WeChat platform and other Chinese social media networks, which disseminates the knowledge of Africa to a wider community in China, and consequently promote Africa's power/knowledge in China.



In short, the CI's power operation constantly produces resistance from its individuals and the resistance serves as a good opportunity for the CI to gain knowledge that could improve its further operation. In a wider power network of China, the CI serves as a platform to collect new knowledge through different individuals in different foreign countries. The collection of this knowledge that is brought back to China could contribute to China's overall understanding of the world, which would be useful for China's power operation at the world stage. Therefore, the CI is not only distributing Chinese knowledge to other countries, it also collects knowledge from its operation to facilitate the further operation of itself as well as that of China.

## **6.2 The Subjects of the CI**

The above section has demonstrated how resistance, conflict and new knowledge are generated through the operation of the CI as the CI's power effects and how these effects trigger the dynamics of the power/knowledge of the CI to further its operation. The power operation of power exercising on the individuals also produces another important form of effect – the subjects. Foucault argues that the basic aim of disciplinary power is to increase the “docility-utility” of people (Foucault, 1995). In other words, all social institutes aim to cultivate the individuals in their power technologies and transform them to be subjects that are useful for these institutes and the society. In this section, I will examine what kind of subjects the CI attempts to produce and whether they are useful for the CI and possibly also for other forms of China's presence in Africa.

### **6.2.1 The Subjects and Their Usefulness**

In one of the African CIs which has established Chinese degree courses, my interview with one African student was conducted in Chinese. The student completed his bachelor's degree in Chinese offered by the CI and then attended the CI's Chinese partner university with a CI scholarship to complete a MTC SOL degree (Master of Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages). When I met him, he was completing a degree-required internship, teaching Chinese at the CI's Chinese clubs which were set up in several local secondary schools. After several years' directed study in the CI and the CI's Chinese partner university, his Chinese language ability has reached native speaker's level. This student admitted that it is now easy for him to find a job in his home country because there is so much Chinese presence. He added that one of his classmates has already been employed by a local company as a translator because the company is using Chinese equipment and technology. Although he had not graduated when I met him, he had established contacts with a number of Chinese travel agents. When Chinese tourists come to visit this country, he will be contacted and become a local tour guide with an income of 100 US dollars per day which, according to him, is a very good salary in this African country. He explained that his dream is to work with friends and open his own tourist company for Chinese tourists (Interview 17).

With his introduction, I met another CI student who was inspired by him and was

taking Chinese lessons in a CI. He said his goal is to pass HSK and get a Chinese scholarship to study international relations or international marketing in China. It seems that his future is very promising, because a new CI's director has told him that after completing a degree in China, "[he] can come back and teach at [the CI] and market it" (Interview 38). A winner of an eastern African country's Chinese Bridge Competition who also studied in China for one year has become the administrator of a new CI in this country (fieldwork note 5 July 2015).

Generally, it can be seen that more and more individuals who used to study in the CIs come back to teach in the CIs or work for the local countries' Chinese companies or other companies that are related to China. In one western African country, the local CI has six locally employed teachers and 100 CI's degree students are now teaching Chinese in the secondary schools all over the country. In 2015, this CI recommended more than 100 students to work for local Chinese companies (Xinhua Africa Wechat Platform, 2015). A previous Gongpai teacher of this CI concluded that the main reason of local people studying Chinese is because they can go to China, work in local Chinese companies or work in local governments after gaining the Chinese language skill and degree in the CI (Interview 55). These opportunities attract more and more local people to learn Chinese in the CI, as can be seen in a message posted by the Chinese director on WeChat that stated, "In 2016, 2015 and 2014, 1737, 1310 and 644 local students took the HSK and HSKK exams respectively." (WeChat screen shot on 4 December 2016). These figures show a 270% increase of candidates in three

years.

The examples of CI students being employed by African CIs, Chinese companies and other China-related organisations are easy to find. A previous CI Chinese director said that one of his former students intends to complete his Master's degree in China and go back to his home country to teach Chinese (Interview 9). One locally employed (African) CI teacher told me in Chinese that "I did my Bachelor's degree in this CI, then I went to [the CI's Chinese partner university] and completed my Master's degree. When I came back, the CI employed me. Now I am an employee of [the CI's local partner university]" (Interview 36). A Gongpai teacher told me that a Chinese real estate company is doing business in an eastern African country and it works with the CI. The company asked the CI to select several good students and sponsored them to study for one or two years in a Chinese university. These students needed to sign a contract with the Chinese company and to agree to work for it after completing study in China. Six students joined this program in two years (Interview 53, Summary and report 15).

Similarly, a CI local administrator said that "[from his CI] a previous student is now working for the local Chinese embassy and 12 students were sent to China to do an internship; if they are good, they will be employed by local Chinese companies (Interview 10). One CI Chinese director also confirmed that "we received many requests from local Chinese companies and Chinese people who asked us to

recommend suitable employees. The students who study well have many opportunities” (Interview 11). The CI at the University of Nairobi organised a graduate fair for Chinese enterprises and CI graduates to meet on the 30<sup>th</sup> of November 2016. 21 Chinese enterprises brought 500 job vacancies to this event (China Daily, 2016). The role the CI plays can be concluded by a CI student’s statement, “the CI is like a link to introduce some job opportunities for good students” (Interview 38).

The above examples show that the CIs in Africa do not only teach Chinese language and disseminate Chinese culture to local individuals, but also receive their students to work for them or serve as a platform to introduce the students for other forms of Chinese presence in Africa, such as Chinese companies or local companies doing business with China. Because of their Chinese identities and skills gained from the CI, the CI students are recognised and accepted by different types of Chinese presence in Africa. Also, the students gained material benefits, such as good jobs and opportunities of visiting China.

When I visited a centre of a western country’s LCPO in Africa, the academic manager of the centre clearly told me that they not a “recruitment agency” so they will not introduce their students to this western country’s local businesses (Interview 23). In contrast, the CIs in Africa have various co-operations with local Chinese companies and other forms of Chinese presence. During my fieldwork, I visited several Chinese

companies and stayed in a Chinese real estate company's staff accommodation for a week. The Chinese employees indicated that China's domestic market is rather saturated. "Returning to China means being jobless", so they need to find new investment areas and opportunities overseas (fieldwork note 12 August 2015). A CI director told me that the Chinese Ministry of Commerce has released official internal documents to ask local Chinese companies to work with the CIs. The Chinese companies should support the CIs and the CIs shall play a positive role in winning a favourable investment environment for the Chinese companies (fieldwork note 29 July 2015).

Local Chinese embassies also serve as platforms to organise meetings for the CIs and local Chinese companies to collaborate. In one of the meetings held in an eastern African country's Chinese embassy, the Chinese embassy staff, all local CIs' Chinese directors and ten local Chinese companies' top leaders gathered together and discussed how to work together and benefit each other (fieldwork note 1 August 2015). I noted a list of Chinese companies in Africa and their cooperation projects with local CIs. In this list, a southern African country's CI provided Chinese language trainings to locally employed management staff in the local branches of Bank of China and China's ZTE Telecommunication Company. Sinohydro Group and China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group works with this CI to carry out charitable activities for local people and to provide Chinese education to local schools. In an eastern African country, China Sichuan International Cooperation donated about 7,600 US

dollars to sponsor 10 local students to study at the CI. Xinhua News Agency worked with the CI and an eastern African country's Internet company to develop the Internet Chinese Education project for this African country. In a southern African country, China's Henan Yafei Geo-Engineering Technology International Cooperation sponsors the CI local partner university's annual "Confucius Institute Cup" Ping-Pong Championship (Summary and report 15). This list goes on and on, showing the different cooperation projects between the CI and local Chinese companies.

The CI at Angola's Agostinho Neto University is the first CI established with a Chinese company, CITIC Construction Company, as a partner. This CI will run directional training classes designed for local Chinese companies' needs and the students will be equipped with Chinese language as well as work skills (CPC News, 2014). Other than the large state-owned companies and organisations, the CI also works with many local private companies owned by or related to Chinese people and business. In one CI's newsletter, I read that a local leading hospitality company's officials visited and asked the CI to provide Chinese language training to the local employees, because 70% of the company's clients are now Chinese. The CI and the company have reached a preliminary intent on cooperation (Summary and report 30). The employees of an eastern African country's hotel which received Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's foreign visit delegation also asked the local CI to provide Chinese training to its employees (Interview 38).

The CI is a not-for-profit language and culture promotion organisation, but the Chinese companies are doing business in Africa. They are two different types of organisations, the reason they work together can be explained as follows. First, this cooperation is encouraged by the Chinese government as shown in the above examples. In China's power structure, both the CI and state-owned Chinese companies need to follow the instructions of the central government. Second, the subjects produced by the CI can speak Chinese, understand Chinese culture and know the Chinese manner of dealing with things. It would be more beneficial and convenient for Chinese companies to employ these subjects than to employ local people who do not speak the Chinese language or understand Chinese culture. Third, if the subjects produced by the CIs in Africa can find good jobs or have a good future in Chinese companies or other China-related organisations, they would serve as good examples and encourage other local individuals to attend the CIs' courses and activities. In this sense, the CI and other forms of Chinese presence in Africa benefit and promote each other and form a win-win relationship.

It has been shown above that the CI is not operating overseas on its own. It works closely with local Chinese governmental bodies, Chinese companies and other forms of Chinese presence. The CI's students, after being trained by the CI and other Chinese institutes, can become a Chinese teacher, a Chinese translator, a Chinese tour guide or a Chinese company's employee or have other jobs that are related to the CI and China. The CI should no longer be seen as a language and culture



promotion organisation, but an institute that produces useful subjects for all kinds of Chinese presence in Africa. The network of more than 42 CIs in 30 Sub-Saharan African countries could produce thousands of subjects who are useful for China's presence in Africa.

### **6.2.2 The Formation of a Community with Common Destiny<sup>25</sup>**

As demonstrated in the above section, the CI, the Chinese companies, China-related organisations and the CI's subjects have formed a network that binds them together. This network circulates and flows from one point to another endlessly. To be more specific, the establishment of the CIs provides local individuals the chance to study Chinese language, skills and degrees, and understand Chinese culture. The CIs use various strategies, as shown in Chapter 4, to attract local individuals to enter its power space, undergo the exercise of its power techniques and instruments, and to produce subjects with CI's identities, such as a Chinese language level certificate, a Chinese academic degree or even a recommendation letter written by a CI director. The local African individuals' experiences in the CI and their CI identities are recognised by the CI and China-related organisations, so that they can find a China related job or pursue a China related career that include teaching Chinese in the local

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
<sup>25</sup> It is worth noting that the term Community of Common Destiny (命运共同体) has been used in Chinese political discourse since 2011 (see below links), but the term in this thesis emerged from the analysis of my case study in a Foucauldian power analytical framework. Therefore, I did not aim to echo what this term might mean in the Chinese political discourse.

In Chinese political discourse, the term was firstly introduced in the China's Peaceful Development White Book published by the State Council Information Office of the PRC on 06 September 2011. Link: <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2011/Document/1000032/1000032.htm> (accessed on 04 June 2017). Chinese President Xi Jinping used this term in his speeches at various national and international occasions, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the 70<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly and the Conference of the 95<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the CCP. Link: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-08/17/c\\_1119401010.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-08/17/c_1119401010.htm) (accessed on 04 June 2017).

countries, working for companies and organisations that need Chinese skills, or studying a higher degree in Chinese universities.

The subjects benefit from their CI identities. In the meantime, they contribute to the expansion and growth of Chinese knowledge and Chinese presence in the local African countries because they join the Chinese power network as well as disseminate the Chinese knowledge to more local individuals. Consequently, China's national power and influence are likely to increase because of the expansion of its power network. When China becomes stronger, the individuals' Chinese identities and skills gained through the CI can become more recognised and accepted locally, thus the individuals can enjoy more real benefits, such as pay rise or more job opportunities. In turn, once these subjects have obtained more benefits and higher social status because of their Chinese identities, they will likely reinforce these identities by continuing to support the CI and other forms of Chinese presence locally. Additionally, other African individuals may be encouraged by these positive examples and choose to enter the CI's power technology. This can be seen as a sustainable and virtuous cycle which involves everyone who has gained and benefited from his Chinese identity because of the CI as shown in Chart 6.1. In this sense, the CI, its subjects, the Chinese companies, other forms of Chinese presence in Africa have formed a community with the common destiny where all players have a stake in each other's success.

**Chart 6.1 A Community with Common Destiny Formed by the CI**



(Source: author)

In order to strengthen and consolidate this community with common destiny, the CI has initiated another project – the Confucius Institute Alumni Association and Confucius Institute Foundation since 2014 (Xu, 2015). For the CIs in Africa, one of the four conference themes of the 2015 Joint Conference of CIs in Africa is the establishment of the CI’s alumni association (Notice 10). The first CI Alumni Association in Africa has been established in November 2016 by the CI at University of Sierra Leone. This alumni association “encourages former students, employees and other individuals who have participated in or supported the CI to join” and “welcome organisations which have close cooperative relationships with CI and individuals who have made special contributions to the CI to take part in”.

Egypt’s ambassador to Sierra Leone, as a representative of the CI’s alumni, delivered

a speech at the launching ceremony of this alumni association (Confucius Institute WeChat Platform, 17 November 2016). This new effort on the part of the CI can be seen as an attempt to gather together those who have been given Chinese identities by the CI, keep them in the power network of the CI and combine their knowledge and wealth to further the development of not only the CI but also China in general.

From here, apart from the role of teaching the Chinese language and disseminating Chinese culture and positive Chinese knowledge, the second and perhaps more important role played by the CI is clear - producing subjects that are useful not only for the CI but also for a wider scope of Chinese presence in Africa. The CI creates the usefulness out of its subjects in regards to the development of the CI and other forms of Chinese presence in Africa. From the CI, a community of common destiny has been formed, in which local subjects' benefits are closely tied with their Chinese identities and the rise of China, therefore, with more and more local individuals being produced to be the CI's institutionalised subjects, China is more likely to promote its national interests in Africa and China-Africa relationship is more likely to be enhanced.

### **6.2.3 Subjects in Favour of China**

As I have shown, the CI has been playing a positive role in creating a community of common destiny in Africa that involves local African individuals, the CIs, Chinese companies and other forms of Chinese presence in Africa. The CI has also been

attempting to produce subjects who are in favour of China. During my fieldwork, I read two poems written by two CIs' students:

*My Encounter with China*

[Student name]

A place so surreal/awesome, this was a benediction  
China, truly a country with a distinction  
For an [African country] citizen like me, it felt like fiction  
China, a country so fly, more of a levitation.

I heard once someone say 'Heaven is a place on earth.'  
China, an incarnation of heaven to me  
My experience there a surrogate of awe  
I love my country but when I came back I felt so low.

If China was a bride I would be the groom  
The sight of her would make me drool  
The wedding would have to take place as soon  
Because I fell in love with China, love bound to bloom.

To [this African country] I came back with an eternal smile  
A smile etched in me, it would never fade away with time.  
A country where any human would find to be a good charm  
A charm not to disarm but to treasure for its pleasure.

For that chance to go to china  
I am forever grateful, for nothing before was ever finer  
My excitement never stops to simmer  
For I had never met pastures as greener.

Beauty was fed into my eyes  
Almost a perfection, this country I thought was a lie  
You would think the country was built by a supernatural  
Because it's constitution made me fanatical.

Back to where I was bred  
My fellow citizens were fed  
Fed on the elegance of a country  
A country called China to loveliness is a perfect symmetry.

Xiexie China, for the happy conception

This was my ideal fancy, far from my imagination  
A deviation from what was normal, a salvation  
A redemption from dreams to experiences, because of a nation.

If I was a storyteller, the story would never end  
But if it was to end, it would end with the trend,  
“Happily ever after,” To end a chapter  
Of a story of a country that will never lose lustre.

Should we therefore all love China? Yes we should.  
Should we therefore all study Chinese language? Yes we should.  
Should we therefore all adopt Chinese culture? Yes we should.  
And should we therefore all kiss China? A kiss of life we should.

This poem was written by a student who was studying in an eastern African CI and won a winter camp trip to China. After the trip, he wrote this poem which was then published in the CI's newsletter. This student had decided to apply for a one year CI scholarship to study in China and he was chosen to represent the CI to compete at the 15<sup>th</sup> Chinese Bridge Competition in the local country (Summary and report 30).

A second poem written by a CI student:

My heart and head have arrived in China  
My body here is still studying Chinese  
Swallowing and absorbing all knowledge from the teachers  
My soul becomes extremely joyful and happy  
Thank this god-like gift  
The future life is able to be born again  
Having found my blessings  
[The African country] is the elephant  
You are the tusk  
(A CI Teacher's Wechat Platform on 08 October 2015, translated from the country's native language)

These two poems vividly demonstrate the students' affection for China and indicate the successful constitution of the subjects who are in favour of China. Apart from writing poems to express their affection towards China, one student of the CI at Cameroon's University of Yaounde II wrote a song to voice his passion about Chinese language and Chinese culture. This song is called 一起来学汉语吧 (Let's Learn Chinese Together) and a video version has been produced by the CI in which the student, CI teachers, other CI students sing it in Chinese, French and English (Video link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o5Hgmyn3NI8>). The lyrics are as follows:

Es tu prêt, a apprendre le chinois? Nous t'attendons tous.  
面对如此黑的夜，星星眨着眼睛。我还记得那个夜，我不停找寻你。  
可是你并没出现，我感觉如此想念。我走遍每个角落，只为见到你。  
C'est vrai que la distance, nous éloigne tres souvent,  
Mais la vie a plus de sens, quand des autres on apprend.  
Moi 'enseigne le 中文, a ceux qui ne parlent pas chinois,  
Et la tout de suite mon vœux : viens apprendre le chinois.

坐摩托车，骑自行车，走路来学汉语 (apprendre le chinois)，一二三四五六七...  
一起来学汉语吧，中国欢迎你，来学汉语吧，呀哩嘞嘞嘞  
一起来学汉语吧，让你交更多朋友，来学汉语吧，呀哩嘞嘞嘞  
一起来学汉语吧，分享中国文化，来学汉语吧，呀哩嘞嘞嘞  
一起来学汉语吧，一切皆有可能，来学汉语吧，一切皆有可能。

It is true that distance can always separate us.  
But life has more meaning, when we learn from others.  
I'd like to teach Chinese, to those who don't speak Chinese.  
And right now my wish, come and learn Chinese.

几个月以来，我们并着肩走过。那么熟悉那么近，却没有惺惺相惜，  
可是一点不担心，让我们慢慢前进，汉语在等着你，中国欢迎你。  
坐摩托车，骑自行车，走路来学汉语 (aprends le chinois) .一二三四五六七...  
一起来学汉语吧，中国欢迎你，来学汉语吧，呀哩嘞嘞嘞  
一起来学汉语吧，让你交更多朋友，来学汉语吧，呀哩嘞嘞嘞  
一起来学汉语吧，分享中国文化，来学汉语吧，呀哩嘞嘞嘞  
一起来学汉语吧，一切皆有可能，来学汉语吧，一切皆有可能。

(Zhejiang Normal University Hanban Wechat Platform 17 December 2016)

This song again vividly illustrates the students' passion for the Chinese language and culture after studying in the CI. As he emphasises in the song, "learning Chinese makes everything possible". This has now become the Song of the CI at the University of Yaounde II, encouraging more local people to learn Chinese.

Similar examples of local individuals understand more about China and build affection towards China through the CIs were easy to find during my fieldwork. The statements from the CI students include, "in the past, I didn't know what Chinese people are like; after studying [in the CI], I know we need to respect each other, Chinese people are working hard. Before, we didn't have clear information about China, only from movies, no direct communication with Chinese people. Now the CI has Chinese people" (Interview 26). "The local Chinese people are different from CI teachers" (Interview 29). "After learning [in the CI], I started to realise [China] has a deep culture; the country is very interesting and beautiful" (Interview 38).

The African student whom I interviewed in Chinese told me that during his undergraduate studies in Chinese he had an opportunity chance to visit the Chinese cities of Tianjin and Beijing. After that visit, his interpretation of China had changed completely because China was far more advanced than he thought. As he said, "once you've been there, you want to go there again. The difficulties of communication with Chinese people encouraged me study Chinese well in the CI" (Interview 17).



During a group interview with four students, all agreed that “definitely, our views towards China changed after coming to the CI” (Interview 43). One of them highlighted, “there are a lot of things people don’t know and don’t understand about China. When you see it, it is different from TV and other information. Before we went to China, we saw China as the factory of the world and that the country is backwards” (Interview 43). Several CI teachers also confirmed that some students become more and more interested in China once they have studied in the CI for a while - especially after they have had a chance to visit China in person. As one CI teacher said, “I used to have a student who did not want to go to China at all. Instead, he wanted to go the US. After visiting Shanghai, he said, ‘this is New York!’” (Interview 14).

Once the students have been normalised with positive feelings about China, it can be expected that they will enter a larger power technology of China by involving themselves more in the activities of the CI as well as other forms of China’s presence. It is common to hear current students expressing their goals and ambitions of working for China-related businesses in the future: “In the future, I hope to either work for the Chinese embassy or an international Chinese company in [his country] as a link between [his country] and China” (Interview 38); “I want to do business with Chinese” (Interview 7); “I will definitely do something China-related” (Interview 52); “when I graduate from here, I want to study in the university in [a Chinese city]” (Interview 48); “it would be good to work for a company which has relations with

China” (Interview 43); “[my dream] is to get a Master’s degree in China, then I want to do business linking China and [my home country]” (Interview 35).

These local individuals do not only become subjects with positive Chinese knowledge, they also start to speak for China. When I asked one CI’s local director’s opinion on the negative news of the CIs in some western countries, he said, “look, what we have now is that you can’t wash away China. Not in [this country], not in Africa, China is overtaking the EU as the major trading partner in [this country] ... China is the major partner in all African countries... The CI gives us an opportunity... [This country] has got no issues with China. China, as far as we are concerned, is not like any other countries who look after their own interests. Some people mentioned China’s neo-colonialism... But when [a western country] walked in, there were no negotiations; with the Chinese, at least we can negotiate and set limits in terms of what we do... what we are trying to do is to overcome the negative sentiments, by showing positive activities” (Interview 15). Similarly, one CI local director in a western country took the initiative during my interview to explain that the CI is not a propaganda tool as some people claimed. He said he can even show the public all his emails with Hanban to prove that the process of establishing the CI is a “clean sheet” (Interview 18).

It has been presented in Chapter 5 that the CI provides positive knowledge about China as one important part of its norm, to the individuals during its power

operations. The above examples have shown that the CI's power operation seems to be effective and successful because it has been attempting to produce subjects who are in favour of China.

The CI endeavours to involve more and more local people to attend its activities or study the Chinese language and therefore, it can be expected to produce more and more subjects who are in favour of China. In the long term and in a wider scope, these subjects will likely play a positive role in promoting China's interest as well as China-Africa relations. However, it must also be acknowledged that not all local individuals involved in the CI's power technology will become subjects who are in favour of China, although I did not meet any during my fieldwork. Additionally, the African individuals' positive feelings about China may be only temporary and short-lived. For example, after attending the British Council's activities, the individuals may find the UK is more attractive than China is. But the CIs do not only aim to attract local individuals to enter its power structure, but also endeavour to transform them with their power technologies and instruments to be useful subjects for the CIs as well as other forms of Chinese presence in Africa. In a community of common destiny as shown in the above section, the African individuals are more likely to be supportive of China and Chinese presence in Africa.

### **6.3 Power Effects of the CI: Summary**

The reason Foucault highlights power is productive is because power operation

always produces all manner of different power effects. For my case study of the CI, in order to discover what kind of role the CI is playing, I need to examine what power effects the CI has produced. I began this chapter by demonstrating the dynamics of the CI's power knowledge because it is triggered and driven by the new knowledge generated during the operations of power. I have shown that there are two ways of knowing new knowledge and furthering operations of the CI: one is through resistance and conflicts and the other is through supervision.

From resistance and conflicts, the authoritative figures of the CI are forced to address the existing problems, assess the situation and come up a solution for these problems if necessary. The resistance and conflicts themselves can be seen as a form of knowledge or as an agent of bringing new knowledge to the supervisors. The CI can also initiate the knowledge collection process without letting the conflicts happen. In order to do so, the CI utilises its hierarchical structures to proactively supervise the situation and gather new knowledge from the individuals. This exercise allows the CI to understand the current situation of this organisation, detect the problems and address them before they become visible conflicts.

After illustrating the ways the dynamics of power/knowledge work in the CI, I then examined another important power effect, the subjects. My fieldwork data show that the CIs in Africa have been attempting to produce the subjects who do not only have a positive attitude towards China but also become useful for the CIs and other

forms of Chinese presence in Africa.

Most importantly, because the subjects benefit from their Chinese identities, skills, degrees and other Chinese labels, they are bound with the CI and other Chinese presence in their local countries. These subjects, the CI and other Chinese presence have fundamental stake in each other's success. In this sense, the CI has created a community with common destiny which overshadows its role of language and culture promotion but reveals a more important role played by the CI.

## **Chapter 7**

### **Conclusion**

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This study focuses on China's language and culture promotion organization, the Confucius Institute (CI), using the case study of the CI in Africa to investigate its role in promoting China's national interests overseas and in developing China-Africa relations. In the previous chapters, I have completed the analysis of this institute using a two-dimensional power analytical framework.

In this chapter, I will revisit the main research question and its sub-questions, illustrating how they are related to each other in the two-dimensional power analytical framework. I will also show how my findings have answered these questions and explain how my work has filled in a research gap in the current literature. Finally, at the end of this chapter, I will identify the limitations of this study that lend themselves to further investigation.

#### **7.1 A Summary of the Findings**

In Chapter 1, I posed the main research questions of this research: 'what is the role of the CI in Africa and how the CI is beneficial for China's national interest in Africa and China-Africa relations?'

This question has been answered methodically in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 with an empirically-grounded analysis of the case of the CIs in Africa using a two-dimensional

power analytical framework proposed and designed in Chapter 2. This two-dimensional power analytical framework qualifies a comprehensive examination of an organisation because it requires the researcher to not only find out why and how the concrete entity of an organisation is set up materially and strategically in the first place, but it also deconstructs the organisation to examine its invisible and virtual power technology. By assessing the power structures, power operations and power effects of the organisation, the researcher can argue the effectiveness of this organisation in comparison with the initial power intention of this organisation.

#### **7.1.1 Why and how the CI was set up?**

Chapter 4 focuses on answering why and how the CI was established. In order to understand the role of the CI, I first need to understand the power intention of the CI. To be specific, why the CI was established, what China wants the CI to achieve in terms of its national interests and whether the CI has received sufficient material and strategic support from China for it to form and develop.

My research illustrates that the Chinese government hopes the CI can play a positive role in changing foreign people's perceptions of China and eliciting their affection for China. In order to achieve this, the Chinese government provides considerable material and strategic support to establish and develop the CI. First, the CI receives Chinese top leaders' enduring support and it occupies a high position within the hierarchy of China's central government. Its Council is chaired by a vice-premier and

the position of the executive director of the CI Headquarters is equivalent to a vice minister in China's central government (Hanban, n.d.). Second, China initially utilised the first World Chinese Conference to effectively market the CI and then continued the advertising effect by selecting high-achieving foreign universities as CI's foreign partner universities. Third, the CI adopts a joint venture mode. This mode brings material benefits to the CI, such as its automatic official status, the use of local partner's existing premises and resources, and the local partner's financial and manpower contributions. This mode also makes local partners feel wholly invested in this partnership because each Africa CI has at least one Chinese director and one local director who have equal positions and responsibilities. African CI partners can learn advanced knowledge from China through the platform of CI and vice versa. The local partners can also receive immediate material benefits, such as teaching facilities and opportunities to visit China. Fourth, the Chinese government and its subordinate organisations use different forms of incentives to attract sufficient manpower from China to work for the CI. Finally, local CIs present a welcoming and inclusive position and employ many different forms of incentives to attract many local people to attend activities and to study in the CI. Therefore, I found that the CI's rapid development benefited significantly from the sufficient material support it received and the effective strategies it adopted.

In this chapter, I observe the CI as an objective social institute, as a concrete entity and as a substantive organisational body. I emphasise the importance of material



support for the CI, including financial and human resources support. I also explain how this material support, combined with power strategies, is employed to create and enrich the physical presence of the CI. The analysis of the CI from this aspect reflects the traditional understandings of power which either see power as the possession of power resources or as the ability of using these resources to achieve certain goals. In short, this chapter demonstrates the construction of the material reality of the CI and completed the first dimensional power analysis of the CI.

### **7.1.2 How does the CI operate?**

The establishment of the CI and the dissemination of Chinese language and culture do not automatically lead to the achievement of its power intentions. There are two more questions to be answered before one can discuss the role that the CI is playing.

- First, how does the CI transform and institutionalise foreign individuals with positive Chinese knowledge?
- Second, what effects has the CI produced in relation to itself, China and other forms of Chinese presence in Africa?

Addressing these questions leads to the second dimensional analysis of the CI in Chapter 5 that examines what is happening inside the physical body of the CI, namely the internal power operations of the CI.

The second dimensional analysis of the CI adopts a Foucauldian perspective, because Foucault presents a power theory that explains the “how” of power in social institutes by revealing the invisible four power techniques, i.e. the art of distribution

in space, the control of activity, the organisation of geneses, and the composition of forces, in addition to the three power instruments – hierarchical observation, normalising judgment, and examination. The second dimensional analysis requires the researcher to assess each of the power techniques and instruments in respect of the CI's power operation.

In order to answer the question of “how does the CI operate and transform foreign individuals with positive Chinese knowledge?”, in Chapter 5 I firstly focused on drawing a detailed picture of the CI's power structure through revealing its hierarchical surveillance, spatial tactics and divisions of power space. Next, I examined the power operation process of the CI which relies upon the panoptic power structure and hierarchical surveillance.

The power operation process is essentially a normalising process because the operation of the CI aims to install the norms of the CI to the individuals. I then presented the norms of the CI, such as Chinese language, culture, positive Chinese information and other forms of knowledge. Next, I illustrated how the invisible power techniques and instruments are used to impart these norms to the individuals and discipline them, through a series of empirical examples. My findings show that the CI's power structure, power techniques and instruments generally operate well in Africa in terms of normalising the CI's individuals and producing CI's subjects, although I also revealed empirical examples that the individuals resist and sometimes

cause visible conflicts during the exercise of normalising power on them.

According to Foucault, disciplinary power and its normalising process intend to create the “docility-utility” of individuals (Foucault, 1995), I consequently set out to find out why these incidents of resistance or even conflicts occur, and offered an explanation to the paradox of Foucault’s co-existence of power and resistance that was discussed in Chapter 2. Specifically, the analysis of my empirical data found that resistance happens secondarily to the fundamental operation of power as a form of effect. The appearance of resistance can be understood from two aspects. First, resistance could happen between different subjects who are produced by different power technologies. Second, resistance could happen within one subject who is produced by different power technologies. This explanation addresses a gap in Foucault’s overall understanding of power.

### **7.1.3 What power effects has the CI produced?**

According to Foucault, power operation inevitably produces power effects (Foucault, 1995). Effective power operation usually generates desired power effects, while unsound power operation generally produces negative power effects, such as visible conflicts and unsatisfactory subjects. But both positive and negative power effects can be useful for the further power operation of a certain organisation. For my case study of the CI, I used Chapter 6 to demonstrate the second part of the second dimensional power analysis of the CI, examining what power effects have been

produced by the CI.

First, as discussed in Chapter 5, resistance is a form of power effect. I showed how resistance can play a positive role in terms of intriguing and sustaining the CI's dynamics of power/knowledge. My findings have shown that the CI did not ignore resistance and other forms of negative power effects but attempted to address them and choose suitable ways of dealing with them. In this way, the CI improved its operation. The CI also plays a role in collecting new knowledge from local countries through different individuals. This new knowledge, again, can be used to facilitate not only the power operation of the CI, but also China's power operation at the world stage.

Second, I focused on another important effect of the CI – the subjects. Through a series of empirical examples, I illustrated that the subjects produced by the CI's power technology become fond of and interested in China. In this regard, the CI seems to have achieved its initial power intention as identified by the Chinese government. But this seems to be the only direct effect the CI has created. A deeper and more profound role played by the CI lies in its relations with other forms of Chinese presence in Africa. As shown in Chapter 6, the subjects produced by the CI's power technology, because of their Chinese language skills, Chinese degrees and other CI identities, can be employed by the CIs, local Chinese companies and other institutions related to China, and contribute to the development and expansion of

these institutes. In this sense, the CI has produced subjects that are useful for the improvement of the institute as well as the enhancement of other forms of Chinese presence in Africa. In turn, the development and expansion of these institutes provide more opportunities and benefits for those individuals who have Chinese identity and skills acquired through the CI. When these individuals benefit more from their Chinese identity, they are likely to continue their support of the CI and other Chinese presence. This circulation extends the power network of the CI to a much larger scale, forming a community of common destiny that binds subjects with Chinese identities and other forms of Chinese presence in Africa together.

I then pointed out the principal role of the CI - producing subjects who are useful for the CI and other forms of Chinese presence in Africa. In this sense, the CI can be seen as a useful tool to realise China's national interest in Africa. Additionally, because those local subjects rely on their Chinese identities given by or via the CI, and are bound with different forms of Chinese presence in Africa, they are less likely to oppose the CI and China because of their own interest. With more and more local individuals entering the community formed by the CI, more and more people can be expected to become favourable to and useful for China, thus China's relations with the African countries can also be expected to be improved.

## **7.2 Limitations**

This research has revealed the role of the CI in promoting China's national interest in

Africa and in assisting China-Africa relations. Not only does the role lie in its purpose of delivering positive Chinese knowledge and constituting subjects who are in favour of China, but can also be observed from the fact that the CI has been involving local African individuals, together with other forms of Chinese presence in the CI's power technology, to form a community of common destiny. In this community or network of power, the individuals, the CI and the other forms of Chinese presence rely on each other and promote and facilitate each other for their common benefits. In this regard, the CI successfully promotes China's national interest and the relationship between China and Africa.

Based on my research, there are at least three areas for future research. First, this research is a case study of the CIs in Africa and it would therefore be useful to compare the CIs in Africa with the CIs in other continents or to compare the CIs in developing countries with the CI in developed countries. Applying the two-dimensional power analytical framework to examine the CI in other places, one may find the similarities and differences in terms of the CI's power intention, material and strategic support, power structure, power operation and power effects.

Second, this research adopts a Chinese perspective to examine the CI's role in promoting China's national interest and China's relations with African countries. This research also interviewed more Chinese directors than local African directors. Future research may adopt a local perspective and investigate the CI's role in terms of local

country's national interest and its relationship with China. By doing so, one can enrich the examination of the role of the CI in international relations.

Third, this research examines the role of China's language and culture promotion organisation (LCPO) – the Confucius Institute. Future research could conduct a comparative study of different countries' language and culture promotion organisations employing a two-dimensional power analytical framework to reveal the general role of LCPOs in a country's foreign policy and in international relations.

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## **Appendix 1: Documents collected during fieldwork**

### 1) Text-based documents:

Agreement and constitution 1 – A CI agreement between Hanban and an African partner university,

Agreement and constitution 2 – An agreement of setting up a new teaching centre between a CI and a local institute,

Agreement and constitution 3 – An agreement on the use of the CI funds between the Chinese partner and the local partner, and its supplementary agreement,

Agreement and constitution 4 – An agreement between a Chinese teacher and the dispatching organization

Agreement and constitution 5 – A CI partner university's local alumni association constitution

Agreement and constitution 6 – A CI performance agreement between two partners

Agreement and constitution 7 – An agreement of setting up a Chinese test centre between Hanban and a CI

Application 1 – A CI Chinese director application form

Application 2 – An application form of CI project fund/initial fund

Application 3 – Two CIs' application forms requiring new teachers from Hanban,

Application 4 – Two student application forms for Chinese Bridge Competition

Application 5 – 2015 Confucius Institute Day Program Application Form

Application 6 – Two documents of two CIs' budget forms

Application 7 – A Excellent CI Chinese volunteer teacher application form

Application 8 – A candidate recommendation form for the 2014 CI individual performance excellence award

Application 9 – An application form of 2014 CI of the year award

Application 10 – A sample form of recommended scholarship students from a CI to Hanban

Application 11 – A letter submitted by an African university to Hanban applying for the establishment of a new CI

Application 12 – A CI Chinese partner's application of Hanban scholarships

Application 13 – A Chinese test centre application form

Application 14 – A CI Chinese test registration form

Certificate 1 – A CI's certificate of attendance

Exam paper 1 – A CI's 2nd level final examination paper

Exam paper 2 – A CI director's final accounts training test paper

Notice 1 – A notice of recruiting a CI Chinese partner's Chinese directors worldwide,

Notice 2 – A Hanban document asking provincial authorities and national universities to recommend CI Chinese directors

Notice 3 – A table listing the CI volunteer teacher vacancies for the second half of 2015,

- Notice 4 – A Document of 2015 CI scholarship application guidance
- Notice 5 – A Document listing host institutes accepting CI scholarships students 2015
- Notice 6 – A CI Chinese partner university’s requirements for selecting CI staff overseas
- Notice 7 – Ten different CI course introductions of a CI
- Notice 8 – A Hanban notice on the launch of CI digital edition for mobile media
- Notice 9 – Pre-Notice of the 9th Global Confucius Institute Conference and agenda (Chinese and English versions)
- Notice 10 – Notice of 2015 Joint Conference of CIs in Africa (Chinese and English versions)
- Notice 11 – Hanban’s suggests for 2015 Confucius Institute Day
- Notice 12 – Hanban’s notice on the appropriation of funds
- Notice 13 – A Hanban document of suggestions regarding regular auditing of Chinese funds for CIs (Chinese and English version)
- Notice 14 – A CI Chinese partner university’s notice of recruiting CI teachers,
- Notice 15 – A Hanban document asking provincial authorities and national universities to recruit CI volunteer teachers for the first half of 2015,
- Notice 16 – A Hanban notice for CI volunteer teachers about leaving, retaining and judging their work
- Notice 17 – A Hanban document of the notice on selecting the 2014 CI of the year and nominating individual performance excellence award
- Notice 18 – A Hanban document introducing the project of “expert team going abroad and training local Chinese teachers” and application forms
- Notice 19 – A Hanban document of the implementation plan for the “CI Head Teacher Position” (Chinese and English versions)
- Notice 20 – A notice on taking the survey of 2015 cultural activities needs
- Notice 21 – A Hanban document asking CIs to prepare conference material for the 9th global CI conference
- Notice 22 – A Hanban notice requiring individual CI’s annual report
- Notice 23 – A list of contact persons of CIs in different countries
- Notice 24 – A notice of introducing “Confucius Institute (Classroom) Website Establishment” program
- Notice 25 – A notice of introducing Hanban’s news publication procedure
- Notice 26 – A CI’s introduction leaflet
- Notice 27 – A Hanban document of agreeing the dispatch of a CI director
- Notice 28 – Two CI’s brief information cards
- Notice 29 – Two notices of the 12th Chinese Bridge Competition trails in two African countries
- Notice 30 – A CI’s writing competition notice
- Notice 31 – A CI’s Chinese language program introduction
- Notice 32 – CI professional teacher reserve universities and quota allocation table
- Plan 1 – A plan for a CI activity
- Plan 2 – A job list and schedule of a CI Chinese director

Plan 3 – Agenda of 2015 Joint Conference of CIs in Africa (Chinese and English versions)

Plan 4 – An itinerary of a CI Chinese partner’s delegation visiting the local partner

Plan 5 – A schedule of a CI’s opening ceremony

Plan 6 – An itinerary of a CI local partner delegation’s visit to the Chinese partner

Plan 7 – An itinerary of a CI local government delegation’s visit to the Chinese partner

Plan 8 – A CI Chinese partner’s work plan on issues related to CI

Plan 9 – A CI’s establishment plan

Plan 10 – A proposal of establishing a new CI written by both the Chinese partner and local partner

Plan 11 – A CI’s two-year development plan

Plan 12 – Two CIs’ Chinese course syllabuses

Plan 13 – A CI’s development plan

Plan 14 – A CI’s mandarin training course timetable

Plan 15 – A CI’s classroom arrangement table

Plan 16 – A CI’s Chinese degree course syllabus

Regulation 1 - Document of Hanban’s volunteer teachers recruitment procedures,

Regulation 2 - Hanban document of Chinese teachers’ rules and regulations,

Regulation 3 - Hanban document listing the things Chinese staff need to do after finishing work overseas,

Regulation 4 – Two documents of two CIs’ Finance Management System and Rules

Regulation 5 – Two documents of two CIs’ regulations

Regulation 6 – A document of a CI’s teaching norms

Regulation 7 – A document listing the regulations and materials needed for the management of a CI,

Regulation 8 – A document of international Chinese teacher standard 2012

Regulation 9 – A document of CI volunteer teacher tea ceremony training room regulations

Regulation 10 – A document of CI volunteer teacher Taichi training regulations

Regulation 11 – A document of CI volunteer teacher handcraft training room regulations

Regulation 12 – A document of CI volunteer teacher calligraphy training room regulations

Regulation 13 – A document of CI volunteer teacher dancing training room regulations

Regulation 14 – An electronic book of CI’s regulations and rules

Regulation 15 – An electronic book of CI teachers’ points for attention

Regulation 16 – An electronic book of overseas Chinese teachers management methods

Regulation 17 – A document of Chinese volunteer teachers management regulations

Regulation 18 – Hanban’s basic requirements of CI directors and teachers

Regulation 19 – Gongpai teacher’s material benefits management regulations

Regulation 20 – Six Chinese universities’ CI scholarships application requirements and

regulations

Regulation 21 – A document of introducing how to support the CI scholarship recipients' flight tickets to China

Supportive document 1 – Premier LI Keqiang's congratulatory letter for the first global Confucius Institute Day

Supportive document 2 – President XI Jinping's congratulatory letter for the first global Confucius Institute Day

Supportive document 3 – Two lists of books donated by Hanban,

Supportive document 4 – A list of Panda toys required from Hanban

Supportive document 5 – A letter from an African local government's governor supporting the establishment of a new CI

Summary and report 1 - Two CIs' 2014 annual work summaries written by the CI Chinese partner universities,

Summary and report 2 – A Meeting summary for the first meeting between two sides of a CI

Summary and report 3 - One daily work report for the Chinese director written by a volunteer teacher,

Summary and report 4 – A work report of a CI Chinese partner's delegation visiting its CI African partner,

Summary and report 5 – A summary of the preparatory meeting before the first official council meeting of a CI,

Summary and report 6 – A summary of a meeting between a CI Chinese partner university's officials and students from the CI's local country who are studying in the Chinese partner university,

Summary and report 7 – A summary of a CI Chinese partner university officials' preparatory meeting for the CI,

Summary and report 8 – A document introducing a CI's projects initiated by the Chinese partner,

Summary and report 9 – An Annual (End-Term) Evaluation Form for Chinese Director

Summary and report 10 – A summary of a meeting discussing a CI's budget

Summary and report 11 – A CI's annual balance sheet

Summary and report 12 – A CI local director's information form

Summary and report 13 – A document of a CI director's speech at the end of staff training

Summary and report 14 – A CI volunteer teacher evaluation form

Summary and report 15 – A list of local Chinese companies and their cooperation with CI

Summary and report 16 – A summary of a CI's committee meeting

Summary and report 17 – A report of a CI board meeting

Summary and report 18 – A summary of a CI Chinese partner university's visit to its local partner

Summary and report 19 – An application report for initial operation funds

Summary and report 20 – A CI’s financial report on the use of initial and operational funds

Summary and report 21 – A CI’s report on CI work for the board meeting

Summary and report 22 – Three CIs’ monthly work reports

Summary and report 23 – A CI lecture and seminar summary form

Summary and report 24 – A CI’s monthly briefing to Hanban

Summary and report 25 – A survey about CI Chinese partner’s work experience

Summary and report 26 – A satisfaction survey about HSK Standard Tutorial teaching books

Summary and report 27 – A CI’s Chinese club topics

Summary and report 28 – An electronic folder of a CI’s activities

Summary and report 29 – A list of a CI’s activities

Summary and report 30 – A CI’s monthly news letter April 2015

Speeches 1 – Three CI students’ speech documents for Chinese Bridge Competition

Training 1 – A booklet of CI volunteer teachers’ Q and A,

Training 2 – A booklet of CI volunteer teachers’ notes upon arrival,

Training 3 – A booklet of all Chinese embassies’ contact details, local emergency numbers and useful Chinese official, language and culture websites,

Training 4 – A Hanban document listing the qualities and characteristics a CI volunteer teacher should have,

Training 5 – A Hanban document explaining the missions and significance of CI Chinese teachers,

Training 6 – A Hanban leaflet of introducing the volunteer teacher project,

Training 7 – A Hanban document explaining how to teach the first lesson well,

Training 8 – Three Chinese Bridge Competition documents listing 30 questions about Chinese language, Chinese culture and Chinese national knowledge respectively that the competitors need to prepare,

Training 9 – A document folder including teaching content for a six-week business Chinese course,

Training 10 – A document folder including teaching content for the first class,

Training 11 – A document of lecture slides for Chinese core values,

Training 12 – A document of teaching Chinese geography,

Training 13 – A document folder including teaching information about Chinese tea, Chinese Kung Fu, Chinese paper cutting, Chinese poems, Chinese calligraphy, Chinese dance, Chinese history, Chinese medicine and Chinese Taiji,

Training 14 – PowerPoint slides for training CI staff about HSK test (two documents)

Training 15 – PowerPoint slides for training CI staff about the combination of examination and teaching,

Training 16 – PowerPoint slides for training CI staff about the development of the CI and Chinese tests

Training 17 – PowerPoint slides for training CI staff about online test system

Training 18 – PowerPoint slides for training CI staff about invigilating Chinese tests

Training 19 – PowerPoint slides for training CI staff about CI Activities in Community  
Training 20 – PowerPoint slides for training CI staff about integrating CI into universities  
Training 21 – An electronic book of teaching Chinese as a foreign language lesson teaching skills  
Training 22 – PowerPoint slides for training CI staff about CI’s exchange programs  
Training 23 – PowerPoint slides for training CI staff about CI project budget and financial accounts (two sets)  
Training 24 – PowerPoint slides for training CI staff about annual reports and high level officials visits  
Training 25 – An electronic book of teaching Chinese as a foreign language lesson games  
Training 26 – PowerPoint slides for training Chinese staff about Hanban’s Chinese language teaching materials 2014  
Training 27 – A new Chinese test centre staff training document  
Training 28 – A document introducing how to operate the online tests for those who want to get Chinese test invigilator qualification  
Training 29 – A manual for administering HSK and HSKK  
Training 30 – A document of HSK and HSKK exam procedures  
Training 31 – A Chinese test fees settlement chart  
Training 32 – PowerPoint slides of training CI staff to organize activities  
Training 33 – A Hanban document of using HSK and YCT as evaluation method for foreign student delegations to China

## 2) non-text-based documents

Video 1 – two videos of CI students’ performance at local African country’s Chinese Bridge Competition  
Video 2 – An international conference organized by an African CI  
Video 3 – A new CI’s opening ceremony reported by China’s Central Television



## Appendix 2 Information Sheet



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### Information Sheet

You are invited to participate in a doctoral research project on the Confucius Institute in Africa. Please kindly read this information sheet before the interview.

#### **Purpose of the Study**

The current study will focus on the role of the Confucius Institute (CI) in China-Africa relations. The purpose of the study is to look at whether and how the Confucius Institute can minimize conflicts between China and African countries for the purpose of creating a favourable international environment for China's peaceful rise, and what are the differences between the Confucius Institute and other countries' equivalent organizations (e.g. British Council, Goethe Institute, France Alliance).

#### **Procedures**

If you agree to participate, you will be asked to take part in an open-ended interview about different aspects of the Confucius Institute or other countries' equivalent organizations, for example, the purpose of the institute, the role of the institute and the structure of the institute. The interview should take 30 to 60 minutes to complete.

#### **Data Protection and Confidentiality**

The answers to questions will not be related to you personally, and no questions will be asked about your personal details. All information discussed during the interviews will remain confidential. Your names will be anonymized in my research.

#### **Taking part in the study is voluntary**

If you choose not to take part in the study or opt out of the interview at any point, you will not be penalized in any way. If you have any questions about this study, please contact me at [lisiyuan43@gmail.com](mailto:lisiyuan43@gmail.com) or +44 744 9361 586.

Sincerely,

Siyuan Li

Ph.D. Candidate in East Asian Studies and Centre for International Business

University of Leeds, UK



## 研究项目说明书

您受邀参加旨在研究“非洲孔子学院与中非关系”的博士论文调研。受访之前请先阅读以下的同意条款。

### 研究背景

本课题侧重从中国外交政策的角度研究孔子学院在中非关系中的角色与作用。本课题的研究问题是：孔子学院是否可以减小中国与非洲各国的潜在冲突，从而为中国的和平崛起创造有利的国际环境？同时，本研究还将比较中国的孔子学院与其他国家的类似机构（比如，英国文化委员会，法语联盟，歌德学院）。

### 程序

如果您同意参与该研究，您将参加一个开放式采访，采访问题可能包括孔子学院的目的、角色、结构、运行方式等。该采访大约占时一个小时。

### 您的回答将会被保密

对您在采访中提供信息和回答进行分析和引用时，都不会联系到您本人，并且不会涉及您的名字或任何个人隐私。

### 自愿性参与原则

如果您选择不参与该研究项目，或者希望在采访过程中中途退出，您的利益不会受到任何形式的损坏。如果您对该研究项目尚有疑问，请与我联系：（电子邮件）[ML09S2L@leeds.ac.uk](mailto:ML09S2L@leeds.ac.uk)（英国手机号）+44 744 9361 586

### 李思远

全英中国学研究所/国际商务系博士研究生  
白玫瑰东亚研究中心  
东亚研究系  
英国利兹大学

## Appendix 3 Consent Form



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### CONSENT FORM

#### 知情同意书

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Project: This project is to examine the role of China's Confucius Institute in China-Africa relations and the differences and similarities between the Confucius Institute and other countries' equivalent organizations.

项目课题：中国孔子学院在中非关系中的角色及孔子学院与其他国家类似机构的异同

Name of Researcher: Siyuan Li

研究者：李思远（东亚研究系）

Supervisors: Dr Kweku Ampiah and Dr Hinrich Voss

导师：Kweku Ampiah 博士（东亚研究系）和 傅恒昕博士（国际商务系、利兹大学商务孔子学院院长）

Please write Y (YES) if you agree or N (NO) if you disagree in all boxes

请在方格里打勾（表同意）或打叉（表不同意）

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 16/06/2015 explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.

我确认我已经阅读并理解制表日期为 2015 年 6 月 16 日的研究项目说明书，并且有机会对这个项目提问。

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.

我明白我的参与是自愿的，我可以在任何时间退出而且不需要给出任何原因也不会有任何消极后果。除此之外，如果我不想回答特定的问题，我可以选择拒绝回

答。

3. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research.

我明白我的回答会被严格保密。我允许研究人员接触和使用我的匿名回答。我明白我的名字不会与任何研究材料联系，我不会在研究报告或结果中被识别出来。

4. I agree this interview can be recorded.

我同意这个访谈可以被录音。

5. I agree for the data collected from me to be used in future research.

我同意从我这里获得的信息可以被用于以后的研究。

6. I agree to take part in the above study.

我同意参加以上的研究课题。

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Participant 参与者姓名      Date 日期      Signature 签字

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Person 采访者      Date 日期      Signature 签字  
taking consent.

**Appendix 4 An Example of Visit Request Email to CI directors in Africa** (English version to local directors and Chinese version to Chinese directors)

**1. English version:**

Dear \_\_\_\_\_,

I hope this email finds you well. My name is Siyuan Li and I am a PhD researcher at the University of Leeds in the UK. My supervisors are Dr Kweku Ampiah (East Asian Studies) and Dr Hinrich Voss (Centre for International Business). My research examines the role of China's Confucius Institute (CI) in China-Africa relations and compares the differences and similarities between the CI and other countries' equivalent institutes.

I am planning to do my academic fieldwork in Africa from June to September 2015. I was wondering if I could take this opportunity to visit the CI at the University of XXX and do some interviews with you, your colleagues and students. And if possible, could you please suggest a time that is convenient for you?

My research project has passed the University's ethical review and risk assessment. I attach my consent statement below for your reference. Please feel free to ask if you have any questions. I am looking forward to hearing from you.

Best Regards,

Siyuan

## 2. Chinese version:

尊敬的\_\_\_\_\_，

您好！

我是英国利兹大学东亚研究系和国际商务系联合培养的博士研究生李思远。我的博士课题以非洲孔子学院为例，研究其在中国外交及经济方面所起的作用，并将其与其他国家的类似机构进行比较。我的博士导师是利兹大学商务孔子学院的外方院长 Hinrich Voss 博士和东亚研究系的 Kweku Ampiah 博士。

我目前正为博士论文搜集研究数据，计划今年 6 到 9 月份在非洲采访。您是 XX 大学孔院的中方院长，我也期望在非洲考察期间去拜访贵机构，并在您方便的时候采访您和贵机构工作人员，以搜集相关研究数据，希望能得到您的许可，并告诉我一个您合适的时间。此外，由于我也计划 4 月份回国采访，我想请问您在中方合作院校 XX 有没有相关人士和部门可以介绍我采访，非常感谢！

我的研究课题已经通过利兹大学研究伦理委员会的审查，所有数据搜集和分析都将保密，不会对外公开。关于我的研究课题的具体内容，请您参见附件中的“采访知情同意书”。如果您对此还有任何问题，请随时与我联系。

期待您的回复！祝您工作顺利、身体健康！

祝好，

李思远