

**Islam, Secularity, and the State in Post-New Order Indonesia:
Tensions between Neo-Modernist and Revivalist Leaderships in
the Muhammadiyah, 1998-2005**

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Abstract

This thesis explores how Muslims negotiate Islam, secularity and the modern state (Chapter 1) through examining the views of Muslim leaders in Indonesia during the colonial and postcolonial periods (Chapter 2), and, in particular, through a case study of the leadership of the Muhammadiyah – one of the two largest Islamic organisations in the country (Chapter 3). In the main body of my thesis I focus on the post-New Order period (1998–2005) when Indonesia underwent a transition from state authoritarianism to experiments with democracy. During this time of new political freedom, various Islamic movements pushed for the Islamization of the state, revisiting earlier debates with supporters of secularism following Indonesia's independence. Notably, this changing context also exposed tensions within the Muhammadiyah between more marginal revivalists and more dominant neo-modernist groupings with rather different conceptions of Islam's relationship to the state and secularity. To investigate this further I undertook fieldwork in Indonesia between 2012 and 2013, adopting qualitative research methods to consult the organisation's archives, other publicly available material and interview both revivalist and neo-modernist leaders at different levels of the Muhammadiyah: 11 central board members, 8 *ulama* and 16 activists (Chapter 4). Analysing their different responses to three key post-New Order debates about the relationship between Islam, secularity and the modern state – the position of Islam in the constitution (Chapter 5); the position of *shari'a* in the law (Chapter 6); and regarding non-Muslim leadership (Chapter 7) – my main argument is that in contrast to the revivalists who support a *shari'a*-based state, Muhammadiyah neo-modernist opinion tends to endorse the idea of the 'neutrality' of the state while still supporting the public recognition (and even prioritisation) of Islamic identity. My research shows that having higher education and/or wider engagement in organizations concerned with democracy, human rights, and religious pluralism is a significant influence on the extent to which Muhammadiyah leaders develop such neo-modernist ideas. Nevertheless, I also conclude that the wider post-New Order political context of conflict between revivalists and secularists, typically saw neo-modernists, and particularly those in the Muhammadiyah central board, seek points of convergence with revivalists that would maintain the movement's overall unity.

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Introduction

The relationship between Islam and the modern postcolonial secular state has produced heated debate in many Muslim-majority countries, including Indonesia, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, and Pakistan (Mandaville, 2007: 49–51). Most Islamic leaders in those countries, especially those holding revivalist views, want Islam to be at the foundation of their states – to be the source of state law and of their political and economic systems. On the other hand, secularists in these countries want their states to be based on a more or less indigenised version of western modernity, comprising nationalism, socialism or capitalism, which have usually sought to separate religion and the state, with a ‘neutral’ religious influence on the public sphere (Mandaville, 2007; Fox, 2008). Consequently, while each general approach summarises a range of positions, secularists have typically been in conflict with revivalists (sometimes also referred to as ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ or ‘Islamists’ in the literature) on this issue.

In certain areas of political science, Islam is regarded by scholars like Bernard Lewis (1988; 2002) and Samuel P Huntington (1993; 1996) as the root of Muslims’ contested relationship with modern political formations; they contend that Islam is not compatible with the secular nature of the modern state. For instance, Lewis (1988; 2002) argues that the Islamic legacy from the formative and classical period, and particularly in the Prophetic era, shows that Islam did not separate religion from the state. Thus, Lewis argues, this integrated relationship between the two entities is a principle of Islamic doctrine. Huntington (1993; 1996) implicitly described Islam as a civilization that is not in accordance with western modern

values such as secularism and democracy. The widespread adoption of Islamism¹ since the 1970s in countries with predominantly Muslim populations shows, according to Huntington (1996), that Islam has encouraged its adherents to campaign against the secular nature of the modern state. It is for this reason, Huntington (1996) argues, that the future of global politics will involve clashes between Islam and western civilization.

Many scholars have challenged this position, arguing that Islamic doctrine is open to multiple-interpretations (Effendy, 2003) – i.e. its teachings, including its relations to politics, can be interpreted in different ways by different Muslims (Ayoob, 1979; 2008) – or else that the integration between Islam and the state is the main position that is adopted by Islamists (or modern ideologically-driven revivalists), but is not part of Islam itself (Ayubi, 2005; Mandaville, 2007). For these scholars, the post-colonial era was that in which Islamists attempted to counter western modernity in Muslim countries.

Although many studies have shown that Muslims hold diverse views about the relationships between Islam and the state, few of them have attempted to elaborate on the extent to which contemporary Muslim modernists or neo-modernists coexist within the same organization with revivalists, negotiating their views about Islam's place in the public sphere and in relation to the modern secular state amongst themselves. Islamic neo-modernism is a term introduced by Fazlur Rahman (1982), often considered a (neo-)modernist himself, to describe the trend of contemporary or post-colonial modernism.² Rahman (1982) divided Islamic

¹ Islamism is the ideology of Islamic movements that believe that Islam provides for a comprehensive way of life, not only in terms of the cultural aspects of life, but also in terms of the economic and political ones (see Huntington, 1996; Roy, 2004).

² It is worth noting that both classical and neo-modernism favor the modernization of Islam by reinterpreting Islamic doctrines in order to reconcile Islam and modernity. Nevertheless, due to their different contexts, they expressed this in different ways. Classical modernism was interested in

modernism into classical and contemporary forms. While the former arose during the colonial period, the latter emerged during the post-colonial era. Unlike classical modernism which “was a response both to continued internal weaknesses and to the external political and religio-cultural threat of colonialism” (Esposito, 2010: 125), neo-modernism was a ‘progressive’ response to the rising trend of Islamic revivalism during the 1970s in many Muslim countries like Egypt, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia (see Esposito, 2010: 158-202). My research will contribute to this discussion by focusing on the views of both neo-modernist and revivalist leaders but with special attention to how the former sought to co-exist with the latter in a changing political context. Since 1990s neo-modernist³ leaders have become quite dominant at different levels of the Muhammadiyah – a modernist Islamic movement established in Indonesia during 1912 – and I will explore how their positions contrast with revivalist leaders on three key debates concerning Islam and the state during the post-New Order period (1998–2005). This study thus investigates the longstanding tensions between modernism and revivalism within the Muhammadiyah, and explores the extent to which there has been negotiation and compromise between leaders concerning the issues of: 1) Islam’s place within the state constitution, 2) *shari‘a*’s place within state law, and 3) the validity of non-Muslim leaders.

developing (Western) modern practical knowledge, modern education mixing Islamic subjects with (Western) ‘modern’ sciences, and modern institutions. Contemporary modernism or neo-modernism is not only concerned with classical issues but also current questions of Islam-state relations such as democracy, human rights, citizenship, religious pluralism, and multiculturalism (see Esposito, 2010; Rahman, 1982; Barton, 1997). In contrast to classical expressions of revivalism and Islamism, which argued against Western ‘secular’ systems of governance, neo-modernists saw such modern concepts as key to the development of the social, economic, and political life of contemporary Muslim societies, but still sought to root them in Islamic doctrines and tradition. Further explanation on this issue can be seen in section 1.4.2.

³ Although Islamic neo-modernism has been evident in the Muhammadiyah since the second half of the 1980s through Syafii Maarif and Amien Rais, its role became stronger in the 1990s under these two figures’ leadership. They represented the shift of modernism to neo-modernism in the movement. Further explanation is given in Chapter 3 (section 3.6).

This research aims to answer the following key research questions: (1) to what extent and how do neo-modernist and revivalist wings coexist at different levels of the organization? (2) how do the neo-modernist and revivalist leaders at different levels of the Muhammadiyah conceptualise the position that Islam should have in the state constitution (3) how do they understand *shari'a* and its relationship with state law? and (4) to what extent do they trust or distrust non-Muslim leadership at the national level? By leaders at different levels of the organization I mean the central board members, its *'ulama*, and activists. The central board is the highest structure and the decision-maker of the organization; Muhammadiyah *'ulama* are the element in the movement playing important role in shaping the religious views of Muhammadiyah members; and the Muhammadiyah activists are figures affiliating with the organization and were involved in social or political activities.

Negotiating religion and politics in the Islamic world

New discourses on the relationship between Islam and politics began to emerge during the early modern age or colonial context as Muslims encountered Western models of the modern state and began to initiate their own reforms. Under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's leadership (1881–1938; ruled 1923–1938), the Ottoman Empire eventually became a secular-nationalist republic, with the Islamic caliphate⁴ being disbanded in 1924. Ataturk's aim was to separate Islam from politics, and this provoked heated debate among Muslims, not only in Turkey, but also in other Muslim countries such as Egypt and India. The discourse concerning the

⁴ The caliphate had been a powerful symbol for the unity of Muslims from the classical period (of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, Umayyads, and Abbasids) until the medieval and early modern periods, when the most significant Muslim empire – the Ottoman Empire – also adopted it.

relationship between Islam and the state became more complex and highly contested in the post-colonial age as the (modern) revivalism associated with Islamism actively opposed the failing political legitimacy of secular nationalism in newly independent Muslim nations (see Esposito, 2010).

Muslims generally adopt one of three positions in response to this issue: secularist, Islamic modernist or neo-modernist, and revivalist (Mandaville, 2007; Rahman, 1982). The secularist favours separating Islam from the state by privatizing religion, whilst the (neo)modernist attempts to reinterpret or modernise Islamic teachings in order to make them compatible with the modern state,⁵ and the revivalist wants there to be more space for Islamic identity and Islam's public role within the state. In this thesis I will pay more attention to Islamic modernist, and particularly neo-modernist, as well as revivalist views concerning the issue of the relationship between Islam and the state than to secularist ones, as my research focuses on the debate between these two groups and particularly the response of neo-modernists to revivalists.

It is worth noting that proponents of both Islamic (neo)modernism and revivalism are concerned with how Islam fits within the modern secular state. I argue that instead of clashing with examples of western civilization such as the secular model of the modern state, as Huntington (1996) considers Islam to do, Muslims – not only (neo)modernists but also revivalists – attempt to negotiate their view on Islam and the secular state, as shown by the range and shifting of positions, from conservative to progressive or neo-modernist, and the emergence of post-revivalism or post-Islamism among a new generation of revivalists (Bayat 2007).

⁵ It is worth noting that the (neo-)modernist has different views from the secularist in terms of the role that they think that Islam should play in a modern society and state. The (neo-)modernist holds that religion can still play a role in these two domains, but that this requires Islamic teachings to be reinterpreted in order to make them compatible with the modern state and society (Rahman, 1982; Esposito, 2010).

The ideas of Ali Abdur Raziq (1888-1966) – a prominent modernist thinker from Egypt – can be cited as one cause of how Islamic modernism shifted to be more progressive (‘liberal’) in the later modern period. Raziq’s modernism was inspired by Jamaludin Al-Afghani⁶ (1839–1897) and Muhammad Abduh⁷ (1849–1905), both of whom campaigned for reinterpreting Islamic traditions in light of Western modernity (Mandaville, 2007). However, while Afghani favoured the idea of Pan-Islamism,⁸ and Abduh attempted to combine a reformed version of Islamic jurisprudence with the modern Egyptian state, Raziq (1925) considered any type of state structure to be permissible for Muslims as long as the state is concerned with the ethics established by the Prophet, such as the commitment to form a just government, to protect human rights, and to eradicate corruption. In other words, the secular state, as represented by western states, is acceptable so long as the state pursues ethical goals and standards. Thus, Raziq shifted Islamic modernism in a more ‘liberal’ direction.

Conversely, Rashid Rida’s views show how Islamic modernism has sometimes shifted to become more conservative or revivalist in the past. Rida insisted that the state must play a role in establishing public piety among Muslims, and called on Muslims to revive the caliphate after Mustafa Kemal Attaturk eradicated it in 1924. Unlike Afghani and Abduh, Rida wanted religion (Islam) and politics (the state) to be integrated. Rida’s thoughts also inspired many revivalist figures, including Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), to develop their revivalist ideas (Ryad, 2008).

⁶ Afghani was a well-known modernist figure who promoted the development of Western science in the Muslim world (see Kurzman, 2002).

⁷ Abduh’s main focus was the reform of Islamic law and Islamic education (see Kurzman, 2002).

⁸ In Arabic, pan-Islamism (*al-wahda al-Islamiyya*) means ‘the unity of Islam’. The ideology of pan-Islamism is to unite Muslim countries as one entity to fight against western colonialism (see Landau, 1993: 248).

In the revivalist camp, Hasan al-Banna, Abul A'la Maududi (1903–1979), Sayyid Qutb, and Khomeini (1902-1989) were some of the prominent figures that established the ideology of *din wa dawlah* (religion and state) during the Twentieth Century (Esposito, 2010; Bayat, 2007). Scholars including John Esposito (2010), Olivier Roy (2004), and Peter Mandaville (2007) classify these figures as modern revivalists or Islamists. These Islamists regarded the early period of Islam to provide the ideal and ‘unchangeable’ basis for contemporary politics and society, and believed that Islam provides a complete set of doctrines for guiding human life, not only in relation to spiritual life, but for social life, the law, politics, and economics as well. Their ideas spread and developed through Islamic movements such as the *Jama'ati Islami* (founded in India in 1941) and the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in Egypt in 1928) in these and other Muslim countries. Throughout the Twentieth Century, and especially in the postcolonial period from the 1960s and 1970s onwards, these Islamist movements attempted to counter the secular nation-state, which was facing its own crises of legitimacy as a result of failures in economic development and democratization in these countries.

Like the modernists, the revivalists – including Islamists – shifted their positions, although to a more limited degree. Experts such as Olivier Roy (2004) and Asef Bayat (2007) view these changes (particularly those of Islamist movements) to be the result of their interactions with modern political systems. Political competition with other (secular) parties, establishing political coalitions in government, and legislating in the parliament require Islamist groups to negotiate with other groups and reach compromises. These shifts in Islamist movements have been occurring since the 1990s in numerous countries, including Iran, Egypt, and Indonesia. Roy (2004) and Bayat (2007) refer to this new branch of Islamist

movements as post-Islamist (post-revivalist) movements. These post-Islamist movements show different features to traditional Islamist groups in relation to their dealings with secular states. Instead of criticizing democracy and pushing the state to implement *shari'a*, these movements campaign for programmes concerned with education, poverty, and anti-corruption. Such agendas, to some extent, have led to a blurring of the lines between contemporary post-Islamist movements and Islamic neo-modernism. However, unlike neo-modernism, post-Islamism is still conservative in theology (faith and ritual) but pragmatic in social and political affairs (see Bayat, 2013).

Islam and the state in late colonial and post-colonial Indonesia: from contestation to negotiation

Like the Muslim countries mentioned above, Indonesia has also been debating the relationship between Islam and politics during the first half of the Twentieth Century – the late colonial to the early post-colonial period. I will argue that even though Islamic leaders initially clashed with the proponents of the western modern state, the clash encouraged Islamic leaders to re-evaluate their ideals. The clash and contestation in the late colonial and early post-colonial era led the new generation of Islamic activists to amend the views of their seniors as a response to the changing political context. Instead of maintaining a stand-off between two different civilizations, some Islamic leaders thus started to reconcile Islamic teachings with the secular state.

During the late colonial period (1900–1945) there was a significant increase in the influence of the discourse of nationalism. Due to Dutch colonial policy on

education in the Dutch Indies,⁹ aristocrats – who mostly were *abangans*¹⁰ – were the Indonesian social class that were most advantaged by colonialism. After graduating from Dutch schools, they grew to become an indigenous intelligentsia, advocating an independent Indonesia in the form of a modern and secular state (Latif, 2008).

Early evidence of the discourse on the relationship between Islam and politics in Indonesia can be found in *Bintang Hindia* magazine, which was established jointly in 1902 by Abdul Rivai (1871–1937), a Sumatran studying in the Netherlands, and Clockenner Brousson (b. 1871), a Dutch Army officer who lived in Indonesia (Laffan, 2003: 95). The magazine called on people from the Dutch Indies to use territory or land, local culture, and local language as the basis of their collective identity. This idea, as Laffan (2003) explains, was based on the editors' concern that Javanese and Malay people often identified themselves as *bangsa* Islam (Muslim people), instead of Javanese or Malay people. These three aspects (land, local culture, and local language) could be categorised as being the basis for a 'secular' ethno-nationalist identity. The concern of the editors implicitly indicates that they attempted to counter the pan-Islamic ideas that emphasised the unity of Muslim countries based on their common religion, which were campaigned for by Indonesian students coming back from Cairo, and by Cairo magazines such as *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* (the Strongest Bond, established in 1884) and *al-Manar* (the Beacon, established in 1898) that were maintained by 'modernist' thinkers like

⁹ The 'Dutch Indies' referred to territory in the archipelago that was occupied or colonised by the Netherlands (see Laffan, 2003).

¹⁰ *Abangan* was a term that Clifford Geertz introduced to describe people who recognised themselves as Muslims, but were not strictly committed to performing Islamic rituals such as 5-times prayer, fasting in Ramadan, and pilgrimage to Mecca. They typically came from lower classes, and Geertz classified the religious character of Javanese Muslims in terms of three basic types: *santri* (pious Muslims), *priyayi* (aristocrats), and *abangans*. Like many other scholars, such as Koentjaraningrat (1963) and Kim (1996), I disagree with Geertz's decision to include *priyayi* in the typology, because *priyayi* is a social class, while *santri* and *abangan* are aspects of religious character. I prefer to classify Indonesian Muslims in terms of *santri* and *abangan*, and divide the *abangan* into two types: 1) lower class *abangan* and 2) aristocratic *abangan* (see section 2.2.).

Afghani, Abduh, and Rida. These periodicals were read by Islamic leaders, particularly those that were interested in religious reform.

The contestation between ‘secularist’ intelligentsias and Islamic leaders over the conception of nationhood was the context in which Islamic periodicals such as *al-Imam* (established in 1906), *al-Munir* (established in 1911), and *al-Islam* (established in 1916) were published. These magazines attempted to show that Islam provides doctrines on nationhood. Borrowing Michael Laffan’s analysis (2003), this Islamic idea or movement, which he called ‘Islamic nationhood’, had similarities with the secular conception of nationhood, which called on people to base their shared identity on their common language, land, and history. However, Islamic nationhood also associated national identity with Islam on the basis that Muslims comprised the majority of the archipelago’s population, and connected the movement with other Islamic countries worldwide in fighting against western colonialism (Laffan, 2003).

From the 1920s to the early 1940s, the disputes between advocates of these two different concepts of the relationship between Islam and politics increased. During this time, greater numbers of western-educated intelligentsias campaigned for ‘secular’ nationalism and a modern secular state through their articles in the mass media and via public speeches, with Soekarno – the first President of Indonesia (1945–1966) – being one of the intelligentsia to actively campaign for these political ideologies. Nationalism was perceived by Soekarno as the most appropriate ideology for binding ‘the Indonesian people’ together, and he held that it should be based on common culture, language, and history (Latif, 2008; Assyaukanie, 2009). He regarded a ‘secular’ state, like that which had been constructed by Mustafa

Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, to be the best model for the relationship between Islam and the state (Assyaukanie, 2009).

Islamic leaders such as Agus Salim (1884–1954), the Chairman of Sarekat Islam (the Islamic Union or called SI); Ahmad Hassan (1888–1958) (a prominent figure of the Islamic Association/Persis); and Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993) (the chairman of the Masyumi – an Islamic party established in 1945) were involved in a series of mass media debates against Soekarno and other secularist thinkers during 1925–1940 (Assyaukanie, 2009; Federspiel, 2001). They argued that the notion of modern secular nationalism undermines Islamic identity and the possibility for a form of public Islam. Most Islamic organizations during this late colonial period, particularly the Sarekat Islam (SI), favoured Pan-Islamism and the integration of Islam and the state (i.e. having Islam as the national identity). In 1911, the SI became the first Islamic party (Effendy, 2003; Latif, 2008), and although other Islamic organizations like the Muhammadiyah – the main focus of this thesis – did not state their positions regarding the state and Islam publicly, most of their leaders joined the SI (Alfian, 1989). This implicitly suggests that they supported the idea of Pan-Islamism and the integration of religion and politics more generally.

The contestation between these two groups continued in the early post-colonial period while Indonesia was deciding on the form that the state and the state constitution would take. A formal committee named the ‘Investigating Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence’ – the *Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (BPUPKI) – was established on 29 April 1945 (Boland, 1971; Benda, 1958). Within this committee, proponents of the secular state and the Islamic state debated and fought for their respective positions. While the former sought state-neutrality from religious affiliation, the latter argued that Islam should

be involved in the state in a number of ways: 1) the state should be based on Islam; 2) Islam should be recognised as the official religion of the state; 3) the Indonesian president must be a Muslim; 4) *shari'a* must be state law for Muslims. Borrowing Arskal Salim's¹¹ analysis (2008), a constitution will be regarded as Islamic if it mentions one of these four points. Thus, these Islamic leaders were fighting for an Islamic constitution.

A couple of hours before the state constitution was released publicly on 18 August 1945 (one day after Indonesian independence), the Islamic leaders withdrew their demands for the four constitutional tenets mentioned above after being advised by a secularist representative – Mohammad Hatta (the first Vice President of Indonesia) – to do so as a result of the threat made by Eastern Indonesian to separate from Indonesia if ‘the Islamic constitution’ was released.¹² The Islamic leaders agreed to replace these four demands with a statement in the constitution that asserted: “the state is based on the One and Only God” (*Negara berdasarkan Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*). Thus, Islamic leaders made a strong concession on their ideals.

However, it is worth noting that this concession was not a robust one, being a rushed decision that many Islamic leaders – particularly those who were not involved in the committee – felt disappointed with. Eliminating the four points, particularly the fourth one, was perceived as a move that isolated Islam from public life (Effendy, 2003; Boland, 1971). Heated debate amongst the political elites of these two different groups continued during the next two decades (between 1957–1959 and in 1968) at the parliamentary level. During this period, most Islamic leaders – particularly from modernist and revivalist organizations represented in the

¹¹ Arskal Salim is an Indonesian scholar who is an expert in Islam and law. Recently, he has worked as a lecturer on Law in the University Western Sydney, Australia.

¹² Further explanation can be found in section 2.4.

Masyumi party¹³ – continued to campaign for *shari'a* to be implemented as state law. There was a perception among these Muslim elites that Islamic leaders who did not fight for the formalization of *shari'a* showed a weak commitment to Islam. This was the dominant social and political landscape of the 1940s–1960s (Assyaukanie, 2009).

A significant new set of negotiations about the relation between Islam and the state began in the 1970s and culminated during the 1980s and 1990s. This new direction was initiated by some members of the new generations of Islamic activists, mostly coming from youth organizations affiliated to the Masyumi, such as the Association of Islamic Students (HMI) (Latif, 2008; Kersten, 2015). They criticised their seniors' views concerning the relationship between Islam and the state, and commentators such as Greg Barton (1999; 1997; 1995) referred to this movement as 'neo-modernism' because it negotiated Islamic tradition with 'contemporary issues' like democracy, secularity, religious pluralism, and human rights. Even though most of them came from modernist organizations, they had deep understandings of traditional Islamic knowledge. Their critical views were originally influenced by Abdul Mukti Ali (1923-2004) and Harun Nasution (1919-1998), neither of whom are affiliated with Islamic traditionalist groups, but are scholars in Islamic studies that graduated from McGill University in Canada. These two scholars became the Minister of Religious affairs and the Rector of the Jakarta State Islamic Institute (IAIN Jakarta) respectively during the 1970s (Kersten, 2015).

The period between the 1970s to the 1980s was also the era in which the New Order government performed its modernization programmes. One of their most important agendas was to modernise Muslims' understandings of their religion (see

¹³ The Masyumi was established in 1945 and disbanded by President Soekarno in 1960 (see Boland, 1971; Assyaukanie, 2009).

Kersten, 2015). This programme on the modernization of religion had some success, with Indonesia taking a different direction to other Muslim countries, where Islamism grew and attracted many of the younger generation of well-educated, middle class Muslims. By contrast, in Indonesia, most of this social class were impressed by neo-modernist ideas. Concerns about the substance of Islam – such as human rights issues, religious pluralism, and democracy – were some of the important factors that attracted them to the movement.

The Muhammadiyah and the state in post-New Order Indonesia

After the fall of the New Order regime in Indonesia in the middle of 1998, which led to Indonesia's transition to democracy, the number of Islamic revivalist organizations there increased significantly. The rapid growth of these movements was a consequence of the political turmoil during the transition to democracy in the post-New Order period (Ghoshal, 2004: 506). Experts such as Sorensen (1993) state that both euphoria and extremism tend to increase at such times. At these moments, various Islamic movements – particularly Islamic revivalists – came to have the opportunity and the right to express their ideas, and their organizations thus developed in this period in Indonesia.

These Islamic revivalist movements attempted to Islamise society and push the secular state towards applying *shari'a* in public life. One revivalist organization – the Hizbut Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI) – even campaigned to establish a caliphal political system (an Islamic state). The HTI is a transnational movement that originated in Palestine and then spread to many Muslims countries, and its main focus – campaigning for the establishment of a caliphate (a transnational Islamic states) – has led the movement to be regarded as 'radical' (Taji-Farouki, 1996).

However, the movement does not use violent means to achieve its ends, utilizing seminars, public meetings, mass demonstrations, and publications to campaign for ideas such as the implementation of *shari'a* (like other Hizbut Tahrir (HT) movements worldwide), whereas organizations such as the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) do use violent means in pursuit of their ideals. The FPI has not hesitated to attack and destroy places that they accuse of providing immoral activities, such as prostitution and the sale of alcohol drinks. Furthermore, none of these revivalist organizations tolerate a neo-modernist or liberal interpretation of Islamic teachings (Jamhari and Jahroni, 2004: 2–8).

Inevitably, exponents of revivalism have clashed with exponents of the secular state, with their campaign targeting non-Muslim and secularist leadership in the 1999 General Election and pushing for the state to make *shari'a* part of the state constitution in 2000–2002 (see the detailed account of this provided in Chapters 5 and 7). During this election, revivalist groups called on Muslims to refrain from voting for ‘secular’ parties – those in which the majority of parliamentary candidates are non-Muslims and secularists. They argued that such ‘secular’ parties and candidates would not be sympathetic to Muslims’ political interests (Dijk, 2002). The amendment of the constitution (1999–2002) that occurred due to Indonesia’s political reform was also used by revivalist groups to campaign for the insertion of the ‘seven words’ into the constitution. The ‘seven words’ asserts the right of Muslims to implement *shari'a* as a form of state law. The year 2002 saw the climax of the dispute about Islam’s place in the state constitution, which did not just occur between revivalists and secularists, but between these two groups and neo-modernists as well.

This dispute presented a challenge for the Muhammadiyah, as an Islamic organization in which revivalist and neo-modernist wings have coexisted, particularly during the beginning of the post-New Order era (Boy, 2007; Burhani, 2013). Unlike Pradana Boy (2007) and Ahmad Najib Burhani (2013), who described the two wings as conservative and progressive, I prefer to classify them as revivalist and neo-modernist. For me a position described as “to prevent Islam from outside influences - including Western modernity - which may spoil the purity of Islamic teachings” (Boy, 2007: 13) is best described as revivalist (see Rahman, 1982; Esposito, 2010); and the “attempt to promote new and flexible responses to contemporary [or post-colonial] issues in Islamic discourses” (Boy, 2007: 13) is best described as neo-modernist (see also Rahman, 1982; Barton, 1997; Esposito, 2010). On the one hand, the Muhammadiyah had neo-modernist figures who were also the top leaders in the central board of the movement at that time, such as Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Amin Abdullah, and Munir Mul Khan, and they wanted the state to retain a ‘neutral’¹⁴ Islamic identity. However, they were aware of a revivalist outlook and faction within the movement. Maarif, for instance, realised that his neo-modernist (‘liberal’) view was often criticised by the revivalist wing, particularly in relation to his understanding of *shari‘a* and the views he had expressed in 2002 about rejecting *shari‘a* part of the state constitution.¹⁵

Although the Muhammadiyah claimed to be ‘modernist’ since its creation (under Dahlan’s leadership, 1912–1923) due to its doctrines inspired by modernist leaders in Egypt like Afghani, Abduh, and Rida (Federspiel, 1970), a revivalist¹⁶

¹⁴ By the ‘neutral’ from Islamic identity I mean that the state does not mention Islam as state religion or give privilege for Islam.

¹⁵ Interview with Ahmad Syafii Maarif, 20 September 2012.

¹⁶ Experts such as Fazlur Rahman (1982: 136) and John L. Esposito (2010: 116–125, 149–156) classify two types of Islamic revivalism: ‘pre-modern’ and ‘modern’, with Rahman (2010: 136) calls the later one ‘neo-revivalist’. The pre-modern type is concerned by the mixture of Islamic rituals

outlook also emerged during early development of the movement, and became stronger under the leadership of the 1930s (Alfian, 1989; Burhani, 2004; Shihab, 1995; Federspiel, 1970). As I will show in this thesis, the ‘new’ leadership had a revivalist orientation that influenced the Muhammadiyah, contesting its modernist orientation. Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah (1875–1945) – known as Haji Rosul – and his followers are regarded by scholars such as Federspiel (1970) and Alfian (1989) as the figures that nurtured Islamic revivalism in the Muhammadiyah movement during the 1930s and 40s. These new leaders developed tenets about purification that challenged the previous leaders’ views regarding local culture and dress. The issues of women delivering speeches to male audiences, the funeral, and wearing the *kebaya* (a local Javanese dress) were some of the topics raised by these revivalists (Alfian, 1989; Burhani, 2004). They perceived these practices to not be in line with Islam, and were more focused on ritual issues.

During the post-colonial context, this conservatism or revivalism was not only applied to theological or ritual issues, but also to the relationship between Islam and politics. From 1945 through to the 1960s, numerous Muhammadiyah leaders, together with Islamic figures from various other organizations, struggled for *shari‘a* to be made part of the state constitution. There were three specific occasions at which the leaders’ fight for this culminated: during 1945, when Indonesian leaders created their first state constitution; during 1957–1959, when the Indonesian leaders of the Constituent Assembly that was elected in the 1955 General Election attempted to review and revise the state constitution; and during 1966-68, when the first

and faith with ‘foreign’ beliefs that they refer to as syncretism, and they attempt to purify the doctrines. The modern revivalist or neo-revivalist is critical of Western modernity or Westernism that penetrates into Muslim countries, believing that Islam provides doctrines that cover all aspects of human life, and they thus endeavour to strengthen the role of Islam in public life (Rahman, 1982; Esposito, 2010). However, in this thesis, I prefer to describe both as being part of the revivalist movement. (More explanation on this issue is provided in section 1.4.3.).

meeting of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) took place under the New Order government. It is worth noting that the Muhammadiyah's position was represented through the Masyumi party, except during the last phase of the fight to make *shari'a* part of the constitution. From 1945 to 1960, the Muhammadiyah officially supported the political orientation of the Masyumi party (Federspiel, 1970; Boland, 1971; Syamsuddin, 1991; Assyaukanie, 2009). After the Masyumi was banned in 1960 by the Old Order regime, and was not permitted to revive by the New Order government in 1968, many prominent leaders of the Muhammadiyah, together with former activists of the Masyumi, founded the Parmusi (Indonesian Muslims' party), with the political aspirations of the movement thereafter being expressed through this new party (Effendy, 2003). However, soon after its formation, the New Order government realised that the Parmusi was campaigning for the constitutionalization of *shari'a*, as the Masyumi had in the previous era. In response to this, the government took control of the Parmusi in 1970 by replacing its top leaders with those of its own choosing. Thus, since the 1970s, Muhammadiyah leaders' have not expressed their political aspirations through political parties.

Although the trend of fighting for the constitutionalization of *shari'a* declined among Muhammadiyah's leaders during the 1970s and 80s, a research done by Din Syamsuddin (1991) revealed that the movement still expressed a 'revivalist outlook' during this period through lobbying the government to promote Islamic political interests by introducing Islamic family law (marriage law) and compulsory religious education in schools, as well as to reject the law mentioning the Pancasila¹⁷ as the sole foundation for all mass organizations. Therefore, in contrast to Boy (2007), who asserted that the wave of conservatism emerged twice in the

¹⁷ Pancasila is the philosophical foundation of the state, which consisted of five core features that the state should pursue and protect: 1) a belief in God, 2) humanism, 3) nationalism, 4) democracy, and 5) social welfare (Ismail, 1995).

Muhammadiyah – in the 1930s after the death of Dahlan, and in the post-New Order period – I argue that conservative or revivalist ideas continued to play a significant role in the organization from the 1930s through to the 1980s, when there were new political opportunities for neo-modernists to engage with the state as it sought to balance out the ‘threat’ from revivalism, after which the revivalist gradually began to decline, only to be consolidated again during the beginning of the post-New Order era.

The shift in the Muhammadiyah’s outlook during the mid-1990s occurred as progressive (neo-modernist) figures gradually began to dominate the top levels of leadership in the movement’s central board, with their domination culminating at the beginning of the post-New Order era (1998–2005). At this time Syafii Maarif was regarded as the ‘locomotive’ and ‘umbrella’ of the neo-modernist wing, especially during the time at which he was the chairman of the organization. Many neo-modernist figures were appointed under his leadership, both at the top and lower levels of the central board. Furthermore, he supported the establishment of new institutions concerned with issues about Islam, democracy, human rights, and religious pluralism.

I argue that this increasing domination of Islamic neo-modernism in the Muhammadiyah, together with a clash between Islamic groups and secularists over the relation between Islam and the state, encouraged a consolidation in the revivalist wing of the Muhammadiyah movement during the beginning of the post-New Order period. The release of the *Tabligh* magazine maintained by the Majelis Tabligh (the division of preaching) in 2003 was one indication of this consolidation. As one of the revivalist leaders explained during an interview,¹⁸ the magazine aimed to counter

¹⁸ Interview with Amir (pseudonym), a central board member, 16 October 2012.

‘liberal’ ideas in the movement. Through this magazine, revivalist figures of the Muhammadiyah came to have an outlet for criticizing the progressive or neo-modernist ideas in the organization, and those seen at the national level. The *Muktamar*¹⁹ 2005 marked the peak of the revivalist wing’s resistance, when they campaigned against neo-modernist (‘liberal’) figures being elected as members of Muhammadiyah’s central board (Boy, 2007). To some extent, I agree with Boy’s (2007) and Burhani’s (2013) contentions that the rise of the Muhammadiyah’s conservative (revivalist) wing was influenced by the infiltration of Islamist movements – such as the Tarbiyah of PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) and the HTI – into the organization. However, in my view, it does not mean that the revivalist ideas were adopted from outside the movement. My findings suggest that very few of the revivalist figures in the Muhammadiyah affiliated with these Islamist organizations. Their ideas had been developing from within the organization itself.

Consequently, the Muhammadiyah’s ability to defend a vision for Islam that was compatible with the secular state was called into question during the beginning of the post-New Order era (1998–2005) because, as well as having a neo-modernist tendency, the movement was also associated with a resurgent revivalism. This research will investigate the extent to which neo-modernist and revivalist Muhammadiyah leaders had to negotiate ideas of Islam and the secular state during the post-New Order period (1998-2005) and especially neo-modernist leaders’ responses to the new challenge of revivalism as political context changed.

¹⁹ The *Muktamar* is a congress of the Muhammadiyah at which new Muhammadiyah central board members are elected. It is conducted every five years.

Cultural and social capital of Muhammadiyah leaders

In the 1970s and 80s the political orientation of Islamic movements was undermined by the New Order government's restrictive policies in various ways. For example, by banning the revitalization of the Masyumi party, forbidding the involvement of former leaders of the Masyumi in new Islamic political parties, obligating Islamic organizations to use Pancasila as their sole ideology, and forcing middle class Muslim civil servants to remain disengaged from Islamic parties (see Effendy, 2003; Crouch, 2010). This clampdown on revivalism represented an opportunity for neo-modernist leaders in the Muhammadiyah with distinctive cultural and social capital to increase their influence. During this period their scholarship became established and eventually they came to dominate the central board of the Muhammadiyah at the beginning of the post-New Order period (1998-2005).

The terms cultural and social capital were introduced by the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu (1986). Bourdieu, to some extent, unites cultural and social capital in one formation called symbolic capital (Moore, 2008). While he defines cultural capital as the resources accumulated and/or transformed through heritage and education, he describes social capital as the resources accumulated through socialisation or social relationship which shape people's capacities and orientations (see Bourdieu, 1986; Moore, 2008: 101-118). In this regard the concept of the habitus is important. Habitus is meant by Bourdieu as principles in people's mind or consciousness that guide them in behaving, practicing, doing and choosing positions (see Maton, 2008: 49-66). It is shaped by many aspects of social life such as family, neighborhood, social group, and education. It is worth noting that family, neighborhood, and social group are regarded by Bourdieu as social capital, whereas education as cultural capital (see Bourdieu 1986; Moore, 2008). Thus both cultural

and social capital reproduce advantage and to some extent enable social mobility and/or advancement in particular socio-political fields.

In the case of a new generation of neo-modernist Muhammadiyah leaders their cultural and social capital – and so their resources for responding to particular socio-political contexts – had been transformed by the experience of pursuing master’s and/or doctoral programmes. Firstly, they combined education in Islamic studies with the study of subjects such as political science, sociology, history, and philosophy. This new engagement with the social sciences supported a new conception of Islamic knowledge that was more critical and contextualized. Secondly, they often studied in the liberal democratic contexts of the West, something that impacted them both personally and intellectually. Syafii Maarif, Amien Rais, Amin Abdullah, Din Syamsuddin, and Munir Mul Khan are all examples of neo-modernists in the Muhammadiyah board who possess postgraduate qualifications.

While the cultural and social capital of these established neo-modernist Muhammadiyah leaders was accumulated at least in part overseas, during this period, the social and cultural capital of a significant number of younger Muhammadiyah leaders was also being transformed at home in an increasingly globalized and arguably ‘post-Islamist’ (Bayat 2013) Indonesia during the beginning of the post-New Order era. Many were becoming involved for the first time with organizations concerned with religious pluralism, human rights, and democracy. They not only discussed issues such as tolerance with those outside their own movement, perhaps for the first time, but also began to build networks and relationships with wider social groups concerned with similar ideas. The clampdown on revivalist groups and the courting of neo-modernists in the post-New Order

context encouraged them to join such organizations as part of the effort to counterbalance Islamic revivalist ideas.

The term social capital is also used by Robert Putnam (see Putnam, 1993; 2002). Even though Putnam and Bourdieu both see social capital as a pivotal resource for attaining social benefit, they have different emphases in their work (see Manza, 2006). While Bourdieu highlights that social capital is convertible into other forms of capital such as economic and cultural capital,²⁰ Putnam focuses on the relationship between social capital and the question of social integration.²¹ He defines social capital as resources consisting of norms of reciprocity, networks, and trust. By the norm of reciprocity he means mutual expectations expressed by members of the social groups that support common benefit (Putnam, 1993: 172); while by networks he means social interactions, participation, or relationships outside the family. Putnam regards this as social capital because those who participate in such wider-ranging interactions and relationships generally have more information about more people, their character, and potential for future business or other sorts of cooperation (Putnam, 1993). He further notes that networks can ‘bond’ or ‘bridge’ people (see Putnam, 2002). So-called ‘bonding capital’ connects networks focused on more inward-looking and sectarian groups like religion-based organizations and ethnicity-based associations. Furthermore, the purpose of this bonding network is to obtain benefit for the in-group. In contrast, ‘bridging capital’ and networks aim to bridge (and potentially ‘link’) different religious and ethnic

²⁰ Bourdieu views social capital as value that can be converted into other resources, especially economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986: 241-258; Moore, 2008: 101-118). People’s affiliation to a family, ethnicity, or social class is regarded by Bourdieu as social capital. This capital provides certain advantages which are helpful for obtaining certain purposes like achievement in education, career, or the economy. The decision to continue studying at higher education for instance, for Bourdieu, is not only a financial issue, but is also influenced by social class, background or family culture. This means that social capital is converted into cultural capital.

²¹ In this light I analyze how these younger Muhammadiyah leaders’ engagement in organizations that are concerned on religious pluralism, human rights and democracy influences their trust to non-Muslim leadership as will be elaborated more detail in Chapter 7.

interests to the common good and so have wider benefits. Bridging is regarded by Putnam as the most important type of capital and networks for strengthening social integration (Putnam, 2002; Manza, 2006). I argue that this quality – networks with wider social groups concerned with religious pluralism, human rights, and democracy – illuminates the neo-modernist (as opposed to revivalist) orientation and practical activism of younger Muhammadiyah leaders who became involved in political parties and non-government organizations concerned with universal issues of the common good.

Putnam defines trust as feeling confident to conduct business or to deal with others. The absence of suspicions, doubt, and anxiety is key in making decisions or transactions (see Putnam, 1993; 2002). In politics this means that people do not perceive the appointment of political role-holders with religious or ideological backgrounds different to their own as a threat. Such trust is still problematic in the Indonesian context. Christian figures, to some extent, are still perceived negatively by Muslims, especially Islamic revivalists (see Mujani, 2003). They assume that Christians will make Indonesia a ‘secular’ or non-Islamic state. My study demonstrates that trust in non-Muslim leadership is found among neo-modernist Muhammadiyah leaders who are engaged in ‘secular’ political parties and non-government organizations concerned with democracy, religious pluralism, and human rights. This is in line with Putnam’s view (Putnam, 1993; 2002) that in being committed to mutual obligations, trust encourages wider networks.

Literature review

Serious research has already been undertaken concerning modernist outlooks in the Muhammadiyah. Arbiyah Lubis’ work (1993) compared the Muhammadiyah’s

theological views developed in the organization with those of Abduh's in order to examine the extent to which Abduh's theology influenced the movement. Lubis found that the Muhammadiyah has been more conservative than Abduh in terms of the relation between rationality and revelation, as well as on the issues of human freewill and predestination. Thus, Lubis concluded that the Muhammadiyah has not adopted Abduh's views very comprehensively, but only certain aspects of his thought, such as the importance of modern education.

Unfortunately, Lubis' study did not explore the shifting Islamic orientations of the Muhammadiyah from one period to another. I argue that revivalist and modernist outlooks have been fluctuating and co-existing within the organization since the post-Dahlan period. The changing social and political context in which it has existed, and the changing configuration of the Muhammadiyah's leadership in response to these changing political opportunity structures – as well as the varying resources of the movement in terms of the educational backgrounds of different sets of leaders across the generations – have all contributed to this fluctuation (cf. Fox 2012; Putnam 1993).²²

Shihab (1995) has studied the shifts in the Islamic orientations of the Muhammadiyah from its modernist origins to its revivalist consolidation, and emphasises the shift of the Muhammadiyah's attitudes towards Christian movements, particularly during the colonial era. Another similar study was conducted by Burhani (2004), who focused on the Muhammadiyah's changing

²² Fox (2012) explores how the resources and opportunities available to key political actors in society influence their ability to organize and mobilize. He is interested in how religion is used by these actors (e.g. states, religious institutions and movements, and so on) to legitimize their political projects. He also uses these factors to contextualise and qualify the typical emphasis on belief and identity as drivers of religion-based politics in some scholarship e.g. in the work of Huntington cited above. Thus Fox outlines an approach that takes the situational and relational dynamics of political context seriously. In terms of resources, these can include material resources (buildings, media, finance); human resources (congregations, networks, leadership) and intangible resources (ideology, symbols, motivation). Political opportunity structures include the particular status of religion in a given nation-state and the nature of the political system at any given time e.g. democracy.

attitudes towards Javanese culture during the colonial era, and found that in the period of its founder, Ahmad Dahlan, the organization was closer to Javanese culture, but this diminished as the leadership adopted a more revivalist outlook. However, Burhani's studies have nothing to do with the Muhammadiyah's role in dealing with issues relating to the modern nation-state, focusing instead on the Muhammadiyah's different attitudes to Javanese culture in the colonial era.

Studies of the Muhammadiyah movement and politics have been conducted by Alfian (1989) and Syamsuddin (1991). Alfian focuses on its role during the colonial era, while Syamsuddin highlights the New Order period. Alfian (1989) concluded that although the Muhammadiyah is not a political organization, it contributed significantly to politics through its responses to Dutch policies, especially concerning education and religious freedom for Islamic movements. Unfortunately, Alfian's (1989) study does not elaborate on the extent to which the Muhammadiyah discussed Islam and the state. Like Alfian, Syamsuddin (1991) explores the Muhammadiyah's relationship with politics. Syamsuddin (1991) argues that the New Order policy restricting Islamic movements, particularly those that have an Islamic political orientation, led the Muhammadiyah to become disengaged from the political domain. However, the Muhammadiyah was still concerned with fighting for Islamic political interests during this period, but it shifted to a 'persuasive' approach that involved lobbying the government and parliament.

Most research therefore focuses on the colonial, the Old Order, and the New Order periods, with studies focusing on the post-New Order period being rare. As far as I am aware, Pradana Boy's (2007) and Ahmad Najib Burhani's (2013) study²³

²³ Boy conducted this research for his masters degree (2005-2007) from the Australian National University (ANU), while Burhani contributed a chapter for a book entitled 'Contemporary Development in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the Conservative Turn', edited by Martin van Bruinessen (2013).

are the only pieces of research to be undertaken on the Muhammadiyah in the post-New Order period. According to Boy (2007) and Burhani (2013), there are two wings in the Muhammadiyah – the conservative and the progressive. They describe the conservative wing as those who pursue the purification of the Islamic faith and its rituals from syncretism (the amalgamation of different religions) and local traditions that are perceived not to be in accordance with ‘true’ Islam. The progressive wing, by contrast, contend that it is necessary to conceptualise Islam as compatible with modern values such as religious pluralism and rationality. Consequently their studies help to show the coexistence of progressive (neo-modernist) and conservative (revivalist) factions within the movement, which is one of the main concerns of my research. Boy (2007) focuses on the debate over the issue of religious pluralism and the relation between rationality and revelation rather than on how these conservative and progressive wings discuss Islam and the secular state. That is, his focus is on the debate between the conservative and progressive wing that occurred during the congress of the Muhammadiyah in 2005. Burhani’s (2013) main focus, meanwhile, is on the dynamics seen in the progressive movement in the Muhammadiyah from 1995 (under Amien Rais leadership) until 2010, and the emergence of the conservative wing post New Order. Burhani (2013) argues that conservatism is not part of the nature of the Muhammadiyah and, like Boy (2007), contends that the emergence of this wing in the post New Order was influenced by external factors.

In this thesis my contention however is that Boy (2007) and Burhani (2013) ignore how these two wings of the Muhammadiyah debate Islam and the secular state. This was one of the heated topics between the proponents of the Islamic state and the secular state during the beginning of the post-New Order. Therefore my

research investigates how the neo-modernists and the revivalists in the Muhammadiyah conceptualise the relationship between Islam and the state in the post-New Order context (1998–2005), as well as the extent to which the neo-modernists especially negotiate their different views.

The structure of the thesis

Chapter 1 develops a conceptual framework for examining Muslims' positions in relation to the relationship between Islam and modernity, particularly with reference to the concept of the nation-state and its tendency towards secularity, which undermined the significance of traditional notions of *umma* (Muslim community) and the position of *shari'a* (Islamic jurisprudence). Most Muslims realise that the key structures of politics and society have been transformed in modernity. They debate the issues of how and to what extent Islamic concepts and institutions can be reconciled with that of the nation-state.

Chapter 2 elaborates on the broader relationships between Indonesian states (the colonial and post-independence Indonesian governments), Islamic movements and society from the pre-colonial period through to its more recent post-colonial development. I argue that the repressive attitude taken by the Old Order government towards revivalist and modernist movements during the 1960s and by the New Order government between 1966 and the 1980s encouraged new generations affiliating with those groups to re-conceptualise the relationship between Islam and the state. These new generations campaigned for a modern form of Islam to legitimise the secular nature of the modern state.

Chapter 3 investigates the position of the Muhammadiyah in dealing with Islam, society, and the state from the colonial to the post-colonial age. I examine the

social and political context within which the organization emerged and developed from the colonial through to the recent post-colonial period (1912–1990s). I also explore the early ideology of the movement and its views on the relation between Islam and the state. I will argue that even though the Muhammadiyah is widely perceived as being a modernist movement, its ideology in fact swings between revivalism and modernism from one period to another. This chapter helps me to investigate the nature and the ideology of the Muhammadiyah, the resources of the social classes that its elites and members come from, and the power relations among the leaders at different levels of the organization as well as the impact of all these factors on the swings in its ideology and ability to take advantage of political opportunities.

Chapter 4 reflects on the methodologies applied in collecting data in Jakarta and Yogyakarta during 2012–13. Using qualitative research methods, I consulted archives and interviewed 11 Muhammadiyah central board members, 8 Muhammadiyah *‘ulama* and 16 Muhammadiyah activists, including leaders with mainly neo-modernist but also revivalist orientations in my sample. The research relies on the investigation and interpretation of events and discourses related to the Muhammadiyah movement that appeared during the period of democratic transition in Indonesia during 1998–2005.

Chapter 5 presents a case study investigating the views of neo-modernist and revivalist leaders from various levels of the Muhammadiyah towards an amendment that was made to Article 29²⁴ of the Indonesian constitution (UUD 1945) at the beginning of the post-New Order period (1999–2002). This period witnessed the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic state, and the amendment of the

²⁴ Article 29 of the constitution outlines the relationship between religions and the state.

constitution was seen as a necessary step in supporting democratization. The purpose of the case study undertaken in this chapter is to examine how neo-modernist and revivalist leaders conceptualize the position that they believe that Islam should take in the state constitution and the extent to which they made concessions to each other concerning their views. I argue that Muhammadiyah leaders with neo-modernist orientations wanted the state constitution to remain 'neutral' with respect to Islamic identity, and for this reason they rejected the amendment of article 29 of the constitution, whilst also being convinced that the constitution already represents Islamic values. On the other hand, revivalist Muhammadiyah figures asserted that the state should play a significant role in developing religious piety, and that this role should be mentioned in the constitution. The majority of central board members and *'ulama* had studied Islam in combination with modern approaches to sociology, political science, and philosophy, which led to their being many Muhammadiyah leaders who held critical positions about the insertion of the seven words into the constitution. However, these neo-modernists, particularly those who were board members, also attempted to reach compromises that accommodated revivalists' aspirations demanding the formalization of *shari'a*, as shown by the official stance taken by the Muhammadiyah.

Chapter 6 investigates the responses from the Muhammadiyah neo-modernist and revivalist leaders' to *shari'a*-based district regulations. These district regulations were generated during the period 2000–2006, particularly in 2003, and gave rise to a national debate between politicians (secularists and Islamists) and leaders of Islamic organizations such as the Muhammadiyah, the Council of Indonesian *Ulama* (MUI), and the NU. In this chapter, I limit my investigation of the regulations to the period

from 2000 to 2005. I use this case study to examine how they understood *shari'a* and its relation with state law, and the extent to which they made compromises with each other concerning their views about the relationship between *shari'a* and state law. I argue that even though they have different perceptions about what *shari'a* is, both neo-modernists and (most) revivalists considered it to be the parliament's role to review and make decisions on the issue of whether to make *shari'a* law. They recognized that, in a modern state, parliament should be the authoritative body for creating legislation, and that this applies to *shari'a* as well.

Finally, Chapter 7 investigates how the neo-modernist and revivalist leaders of the Muhammadiyah view non-Muslim leadership in the majority Muslim state, paying special attention to the 1999 General Election – the first election conducted in the post-New Order period. The investigation examines the extent to which neo-modernists and revivalists from the Muhammadiyah trust non-Muslim leaders at the national level, and the extent to which they have made compromises between themselves over these views. I argue that most neo-modernist and revivalist members of the central board and *'ulama* want non-Muslims to be prevented from dominating leadership positions in both the government and the parliament. However, they offer different arguments to justify their positions. These arguments show the extent to which they distrust non-Muslim leadership.

In conclusion, this thesis argues that while the neo-modernists of the Muhammadiyah leadership tend to endorse the neutrality of the state in terms of any specific commitment to reproducing Islamic identity, the revivalists support a *shari'a*-based state. The dynamics of political context and opportunities, together with higher educational background and resources of the Muhammadiyah leaders and/or their engagement in organizations concerned with democracy, human rights,

and religious pluralism, tend to strengthen their neo-modernist orientation. However, the political context of the post-New Order, in which the proponents and opponents of the secular state were in conflict, led the neo-modernists, particularly in the central board, to give priority to common interests shared with the revivalist wing.

Chapter 1

Muslims and the Nation-State in Modernity

1.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a conceptual framework for examining the position of Muslims in relation to Islam and the concept of the nation-state. Scholars such as Fazlur Rahman (1982), John Esposito (2010), and Andrew Rippin (2005) have categorized Muslims into different types of groups based on their orientations to modernity. Even though they do not specifically describe Muslims' responses to the nation-state, their general classifications of Muslims' orientations are helpful here: secularist (secular modernist), (classical and contemporary) Islamic modernist, and Islamic revivalist.²⁵ The secularist wants to remove Islam from the sphere of the state, whilst the modernist, particularly the contemporary modernist or so called neo-modernist,²⁶ favours a reinterpretation of Islam for dealing with the modern state, and the revivalist seeks to formalize *shari'a* in the state. I rely on the typology mentioned above to map and investigate the different ideological orientations of the Muhammadiyah's leaders, as well as the Muhammadiyah's general swing between modernist and revivalist orientations over time, as different constituencies have

²⁵ I do not include Islamic traditionalism in this category, even though it is one of the main types of Muslim orientations mentioned by the scholars above. The driving idea of the traditionalist is that the legacy of Islam inherited from the *'ulama* and Sufis should be maintained. During the classical and medieval periods, they were the partners of Islamic rulers in managing society and the state through Islamic law and other institutions. These long experiences of the *'ulama* and Sufis generated Islamic traditions. In general, traditionalists tend to be conservative in their responses to modernity. However, this emphasis on the preservation of Islamic tradition does not mean that they will always support a conservative position for dealing with modernity. Recent cases in Indonesia show that many traditionalist figures have become proponents of Islamic neo-modernism (Rahman, 1982) or liberal Islam (Barton, 2002). There is thus a new generation of traditionalists whose members are attempting to reinterpret 'tradition' in the light of modernity.

²⁶ I agree with Fazlur Rahman who divides Islamic modernism into classical and contemporary periods, and calls the latter neo-modernism (see Rahman, 1982). Further explanation can be found in section 1.4.2.

gained power. Muhammadiyah's leaders have had various Islamic orientations, with both of these typologies, but not secularism, being found within the leadership level.

Given that the nation-state is part of the discourse and the structural transformation associated with modernity, this first chapter will proceed by explaining the significance of the context of modernity and the modernization process within Muslim countries, before going on to elaborate on the wider concept and context of the modern state (nation-state). I examine the meaning of modernity through exploring its general history in European societies. Modernity is best defined in terms of the structural transformation of politics, economics, society, and culture (Hall, 1992). Viewed in this way, the nation-state is one of the defining elements of modernity and modern societies, and the unique combination of the 'nation' (i.e. the idea of a people) and the 'state' (i.e. the system of governance) distinguishes it from previous models of states such as empires and monarchies.

In this chapter I argue that the modern concept of the nation-state, in particular its tendency towards secularity, is perceived by many Muslims – but especially the revivalists – as having undermined the value of traditional notions of *umma* (the Muslim community) and *shari'a* (Islamic law). Most Muslims realize that key aspects of the structures of politics and society have been transformed under modernity, but still debate how and to what extent Islamic concepts and institutions can be reconciled with the adoption of the nation-state.

In the first section, I explain that, as one of the elements of modernity, the concept of the nation-state provided 'new ideas' for strengthening the state in terms of administration, territory, sovereignty, and national identity. By the beginning of the Twentieth Century, many states had been transformed into nation-states (Tilly, 1975), with the rulers and the elite in numerous countries believing that nation-states

should be developed because they strengthened the political authority of rulers as well as binding their people together emotionally and psychologically.

In the second section I investigate the typology of Muslim responses to modernity. I affirm that the modernization programmes conducted by Muslim rulers in their countries during the colonial and the post-colonial eras resulted in dilemmas and polarizations among rulers, *'ulama*, the intelligentsia, and ordinary people. On the one hand, these rulers acknowledged that Muslim countries were backward, while on the other hand they debated the extent to which adopting Western-influenced modernity was a good solution to their lack of development.

In the next section, I investigate different Muslims' conceptions of the nation-state, especially in relation to the notion of the *umma* (the Muslim community). I argue that the concept of the nation-state was controversial within Muslim societies because it undermined the idea and the significance of *umma*, especially for revivalist activists, who came to be identified as Islamists. Although Islamists generally accept the nation-state while pursuing a global Islamic movement (cf. Roy, 1994), they simultaneously seek for the re-Islamization of politics, the public sphere and the state. Most political groups, with the exception of the secularists, regard Islamic-based notions of community as having some important place in the state, even if it is only a symbolic and rhetorical one (Hourani, 1981; 1962; Eickelman and Piscatori, 2004). However, the Islamic modernist, especially the neo-modernist, is more accommodating towards the idea of a 'secular' nation-state and do not tend to classify people (or citizens) based on their religious heritage, even though they may want people of a certain ethno-national heritage to retain certain political privileges.

In the final section of the chapter, I examine Muslims' views about the nation-state in relation to the integration of *shari'a* within the state. The withdrawal of the presence of religious authorities from the public sphere – for example, religious courts and *ulama* roles – is a key problem about modernity for many Muslims. From the Classical period (7th–13th Century) through to the Medieval period (14th–18th Century), Islamic empires such as the Umayyads, the Abbasids, and the Ottomans had institutionalised *shari'a* formally in varying degrees. The state as a caliphate or as an Islamic empire enabled them to do this. Therefore, some contemporary Muslim leaders, especially Islamists, feel disappointed about the secularizing withdrawal of *shari'a* from the state.

1.2 Modernity and the nation-state

Modernity can be defined as the political, economic, societal and cultural transformation that began occurring in Sixteenth Century Europe and continues to the present day (Held, 1992; Hamilton, 1992; Hall, 1992). According to Stuart Hall (1992: 5–7) the main characteristics of modernity include the new ways of thinking that emerged from the transformation of politics, economy, society, and culture, as well as these transformations themselves. The common features marking the change to modernity are the shift from imperial, feudal, and monarchy-based states to modern states; from the domination of divine knowledge to the domination of the empirical sciences, from the supremacy of 'divine' political power to secular authority, and from traditional economic systems to capitalism.

One of the important political aspects of modernity was the emergence of the modern state – the so-called 'nation-state'. Beginning from the Eighteenth Century, the concept of the nation-state gradually came to replace other ways of organizing

states, such as empires, feudal systems, and monarchies, particularly within Europe (Tilly, 1975). During the pre-modern era, these previous forms of state organization were dominant worldwide (see Held, 1992; 72–75), and many factors contributed to the shift from ‘traditional’ states to the modern state. The transformation process was complicated, including:

Struggles between monarchs and barons over the domain of rightful authority; peasant rebellions against the weight of excess taxation and social obligation; the spread of trade, commerce and market relations; the flourishing of Renaissance culture with its renewed interest in classical political ideas (including Athenian democracy and Roman law); changes in technology particularly military technology; the consolidation of national monarchies (notably in England, France and Spain); religious strife and the challenge to the universal claims of Catholicism; the struggle between Church and State (Held, 1992: 83).

The exact causes of change varied between countries, but this section focuses on the main reasons that scholars have proposed for the emergence of the nation-state.

Charles Tilly (1975), Michael Mann (1986), and David Held (1992) all argue that warfare was one of the main factors that propelled ‘traditional’ political systems towards nation-states in Europe. Wars between European states in the medieval period forced these states to seek endorsement from their people, particularly for obtaining financial support for these wars. Michael Mann’s (1986) report showed that the British state’s largest expenditure between the Twelfth and the Nineteenth century was on the military. The British state’s mobilization to acquire financial support for international wars from its people can be seen in the rapid increase of its income during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Held, 1992: 91; Tilly, 1975). A similar pattern can also be seen for Austria, Prussia, and Russia (Held, 1992: 92). Wars and their costs encouraged states to insist on territorial consolidation, the centralization of administration, and the monopoly of political

power (Tilly, 1975: 42; Dahl, 1989). In other words, the cost of wars was the impetus for the development of nation-states. However, it is worth noting that the rise of nation-states in countries colonised by Western powers during this period (particularly Muslim states) was different. Their development did not correlate with the warfare factor (Lapidus, 2002) and, in the next section, I will elaborate on how nation-states developed in the Islamic world.

The idea of the modern 'nation-state' consists of two different concepts: the nation and the state. The nation carries ethnic associations that can be defined in terms of a people or a community. However, in modernity, the idea of the nation is not 'given' because of the expansive scale on which 'the community' must be imagined (Gellner, 1983: 6). For Anderson, the nation is 'invented' and 'imagined' through creating a common language, culture, and set of goals among people who have never met (2006: 6–7; cf. Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). Historically, a key communication medium for achieving this end was the newspaper. Gellner (1983: 7) contends that it is when people recognize that they share a common culture that they are likely to build a nation.

The existence of the nation is necessary for the idea of the nation-state. However, this does not mean that the nation must *precede* the establishment of the state, and I disagree with Gellner's contention that the concepts of 'nation' and 'state' have always emerged separately and independently (Gellner, 1983: 6). Gellner is right to hold that both nations and states can appear in different situations and may not influence each other. However, this has not always been the case. There is no monolithic pattern that applies to different countries here. For instance, in Europe, political circumstances such as international wars encouraged rulers and states to consolidate their power by centralizing their administrations and mobilizing

support from the people (Tilly, 1975). In other words, states came first here, and played a role in establishing nations. However, in colonial states like Indonesia, the nation emerged earlier than the state (Latif, 2008; Lapidus, 2002). I conclude that there are at least three possibilities for how nations and states appear: 1) both the nation and the state emerge independently, 2) the nation appears earlier and initiates the establishment of the state, and 3) the state consolidates and mobilizes a people by creating a nation. However, soon after the modern state was established, it was required to consolidate the nation. People in the nascent nation-state consisted of many tribes, ethnicities, or cultures, and such diversity may have been feared as a source of conflict. Therefore 'creating' a common language, culture, and set of goals could have been a necessary step for reinforcing the imagined community of the nation and thus strengthening cohesion among the people (Anderson, 2006).

While the notion of the nation is a cultural one, the concept of the state is understood in a more institutional way. The imperial, feudal, and monarchy-based states of the past were more likely to face political instability than the modern state, which is more capable of holding its power and maintaining stability (Giddens, 1985). This is because the political power of the modern state is not divided between the competing and diverse political interests of different groups (Held, 1992: 79–80). Therefore, the nation-state is better able to maintain power and to establish more harmonious relationships between the rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed.

Fixed territoriality is one of the characteristics of the modern state. As Anthony Giddens (1985) and David Held (1992: 88) argue, one difference between the nation-state and other earlier forms of state is the firmness that the former places on territorial boundaries. Even though empires, feudalist states, and monarchies also

had borders to separate their territory from other states, their boundaries were more likely to be in flux as a result of marriages between rulers of different states, invasions, and / or internal conflicts between central authorities and local elites (Giddens, 1985; Held, 1992). Royal marriages sometimes even led to the unification of different states, and invasions to the merger of two or more countries. Conversely, internal conflicts sometimes led certain parts or areas of states to separate and establish new states. Only in the modern nation-state have the boundaries of states become more firm and secure (Held, 1992).

Governing is another central characteristic of the modern state. Unlike empires and other forms of state that simply rule their people by requiring peripheral or district rulers to pay taxes to the central authority, the nation-state governs as well as rules (Held, 1992: 79). By governing, the nation-state not only claims, subordinates or domesticates certain areas, but also treats, serves, empowers, and develops them, which means that the unification of administration is a key tool for governing. According to Giddens (1987: 172), it is the unity of administration rather than a common language, culture, or set of goals that is most central in bringing people together in the nation-state.

To govern effectively, a government requires legitimacy from the people. In the nation-state, people are regarded as the source or origin of sovereignty (Rousseau, 1994) – that is, the ‘real owner’ of the sovereignty is the people, not the government. People mandate their sovereignty to the government, and the government is conferred the legitimacy to rule and govern on their behalf (Held, 1992: 105–106). Of course, this causes the nation-state to be closely connected with democracy, even though the two are different entities. In the Western world, the

history and character of the modern nation-state has tended to implement democracy rather than other forms of state.

The legitimacy that the governments of nation-states hold in the modern period also means that they are the only body that has the authority to use force to implement punishment (see Guibernau, 1996: 47). Thus, another characteristic of the nation-state is their monopoly over jurisdiction and force (see Giddens, 1985: 17–31). Unlike the empires that allowed religious institutions to govern their respective followers through their own religious doctrines (laws), such as the Ottoman Empire (which ruled from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century), the nation-state forbids other institutions from punishing or judging people (see Salim, 2008: 35–40). In the nation-state, the laws and punishments made by the government are applied to all people regardless of their religions or ethnicities.

This monopoly over jurisdiction and force results in the state centralization of law and the marginalization of other law-makers, such as traditional elites and religious institutions. This separation of religions and the state, known as secularism, is an ideology that limits or eliminates religion's role in the state and the public sphere (see Smith, 2008) with the putative aim of eradicating the irrational influence of religious doctrines (Asad, 2003). Although the sources of law in the modern nation-state might be partially (or largely) grounded in religions (as well as local traditions), they have to be discussed and approved by the public and / or its parliament to be valid. This is a crucial procedure in the modern nation-state (Asad, 2003), and the implications that this secular character of the nation-state have for Muslim societies, together with their responses to it, are examined in sections 1.4 and 1.5.

As one of the key elements of modernity, the nation-state has wrought ‘new ideas’ in terms of political administration, sovereignty, and common identity. The nation-state increases the political power of rulers or governments (Giddens, 1985; Held, 1992), yet retains the sovereignty of the people (Rousseau, 1994), and unites them through a particular ‘imagined community’ of national identity (Anderson, 2006). The success of modern states in stabilizing domestic politics in Western European nations, as well as in enabling them to subordinate and control colonies and to improve their position in the global economy, has encouraged other countries to adopt and develop the concept of the nation-state, as we shall now see in relation to the Muslim world (Held, 1992).

1.3 Early modernization in Islamic world

Most of the Islamic world initially encountered Western modernity through colonialism (Hunter, 2009: 3–32). The penetration of the Ottoman Empire through the political and economical power of European nations like Britain at the end of the Eighteenth Century is often initially traced to France’s conquest of Egypt in 1798. At this time, Muslims came face-to-face with modernity in terms of modern military power, technology, administration and sciences (Lapidus, 2002: 489–493, 512–516). By the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century, European countries such as France, Britain, and the Netherlands had occupied and colonized many Muslim countries, from Africa to Asia (Esposito, 2010: 174). During this occupation, these colonial governments both inspired and encouraged Muslim rulers to build modern institutions such as hospitals, laboratories, schools, courts, and modern administration (Rippin, 2005: 175; Hodgson, 1974: 216).

Modernization programmes were initiated by the respective colonial governments in Muslim countries including Indonesia, under the rule of the Netherlands;²⁷ Malaysia under the British;²⁸ and Egypt under the French (Latif, 2008; Lapidus, 2002; Nasr, 2001). These modernization programmes generally aimed to politically strengthen the position of the colonial regime over their colonies and increase their economic exploitation of them (Nasr, 2001; Held, 1992: 96; Tilly, 1990: 15). These modern administrations, by unifying local rulers under one centralized system, helped the colonial governments to control the local elites and the population more widely (Piscatori, 1994: 79–80). In addition, the more these European countries improved their administration, human resources, and the economies of these colonies, the greater the economic benefits that they accrued from these countries (Held, 1992). For instance, the Dutch government's policy of developing modern schools in Indonesia (one of its colonies) provided modern education for young Indonesians in both Indonesia and in the Netherlands, and this ultimately supported the colonial government's rule of the country (Lapidus, 2002: 656–658) through providing it with indigenous people that had graduated from modern schools to appoint as local government figures and bureaucrats (Latif, 2008). These well-educated Indonesians became the new middle class elites. In both the colonial and post-colonial period, this social class was the main driving force supporting the modernization of Indonesia, as they tended to support the idea of an independent, but modern and secular nation-state.

²⁷ Indonesia was colonized by the Netherlands for more than two hundred years, and by Japan for two and a half years (1942–1945). Indonesia acquired its independence in August 1945 (Latif, 2008).

²⁸ Malaysia was colonized by Portugal and the Netherlands in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries respectively, and by the British in the middle of the Nineteenth Century. It became independent in 1947 (Lapidus, 2002: 675–680; Nasr, 2001: 31–40).

In contrast to Indonesia and Malaysia, Muslim rulers in the Ottoman Empire,²⁹ Iran, and Egypt³⁰ had already attempted to develop modern militaries, economies, and politics by the Nineteenth Century. According to Ira M Lapidus (2002), the leaders of these countries tried to consolidate their power through modernization programmes – particularly in administration and the military. Lapidus (2002) thus argues that modernization programmes were grounded on pragmatic reasons, but he ignores the more fundamental reasons why Muslim rulers preferred to adopt the Western style of military – economics and politics. In my view, Muslim rulers’ attempts to modernize should be seen as emerging from the impression that Western (European) modernity made on them in terms of its economic and political advances. In this regard, I agree with Shireen T Hunter (2009: 9), who argues that Muslim rulers had begun doubting the superiority of Islam and became attracted to the supremacy of European powers, adopting Western modernity in an effort to improve Muslim’s political, economical, and social lives.

Furthermore, they built modern schools with the aim of producing new generations that were capable of supporting modernization in these countries (Lapidus, 2002). Although these Muslim rulers faced various challenges in providing modern schools and transforming Islamic traditional schools – particularly from conservative *‘ulama* – these countries were relatively successful in creating new elite classes and intelligentsia with modern visions (Latif, 2008; Lapidus, 2002). These new members of the elite and the intelligentsia became the new generations of modernists and secularists during the following period of Turkish and Egyptian modernity.

²⁹ In the Ottoman Empire, modernization began in the Seventeenth Century, and the drive to modernize increased in the Nineteenth Century (Lapidus, 2002: 493–495).

³⁰ France lost its political authority in Egypt after its defeat by the British in 1805 (Lapidus, 2002).

The modernization programmes that had been started by previous leaders or rulers were thus strengthened by these new elites, who were more ‘secular’ than their predecessors, having mostly studied in Western schools and thus lacking traditional Islamic educations (Lapidus, 2002; Latif, 2008). The Turks, under the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) regime (1912–1918) and Mustafa Kemal’s government (1921–1938), for instance, were more secular than they had been in the Ottoman Tanzimat era (1839–1876). One of the impacts of this modernization was a decline in the roles of traditional *‘ulama* in Muslim states, especially in Turkey and Egypt (Lapidus, 2002). As we shall see in the next section, the decline of religion’s authority within the state and within wider society that resulted from modernization programmes became the most controversial issue concerning the relation of Islam and modernity for both Muslim scholars and rulers in the colonial and postcolonial eras.

1.4 A typology of Muslims’ responses to modernity

The modernization occurring in Muslim countries led to many dilemmas for Muslim scholars and leaders, and generated significant innovation and polarization (see Rippin, 2005: 175–200; Hunter, 2009). In this section I set out a well-known classification of Muslims’ responses to modernity, delineating four main ideal types of response which are of particular relevance for advancing thinking about my research – i) secularism, ii) Islamic modernism and neo-modernism, and iii) Islamic revivalism (Rahman, 1982; Kurzman, 2002; Barton, 1997; Mandaville, 2007; Esposito, 2010; Rippin, 2005). Although scholars may use more complex labels to describe these three different orientations, overall they have the same general equivalence for my purposes. That is, respectively they involve: 1) marginalizing or

privatizing Islam (secularism); 2) modernizing Islam (modernism and neo-modernism); and 3) Islamizing modernity (revivalism). Though, as we shall see in my case study of the Muhammadiyah in contemporary Indonesia, the contextual reality of modern developments in the Muslim world is routinely more complex and evolutionary than such a simple mapping might suggest, and on the ground seemingly clear distinctions between orientations can intersect, these three general patterns are still a useful starting point for identifying trends that have spread and been developed among Muslims since their early encounters with modernity up until the present day.

1.4.1 Secular modernists or secularists

As described above, the secularists under discussion are Muslims who embrace Western modernity and hold that Islam should be kept out of the public sphere and state legislation (see Esposito, 2010: 126, 169; Rippin, 2005: 198, 277; Rahman, 1982: 63). This position is generally grounded in believing in a Western superiority of politics, economics and science (Hourani, 1981). Furthermore, the secularists hold that Muslim backwardness in these key areas of modern life has resulted from defunct social-political systems and stagnated ways of thinking inherited from classical and medieval *'ulama*. As a result, secularists hold that the best way forward for Muslim countries is to replace the old systems and traditional states of mind with a modernization strategy that tends to mimic Western modernity.

During the colonial period and the early independence of Muslim countries, as we have already seen, this secularist position was represented by rulers – particularly in the Ottoman empire and Egypt (Lapidus, 2002: 493–496, 512–521) – who imparted this secularist approach towards modernity to local rulers and

intelligentsias that had graduated from Western education and formed a new middle class working in state administration and bureaucracy (Lapidus, 2002: 657-658; Piscatori, 1994: 77). I discuss the influence of the secularist orientation in Indonesia in Chapter 2 (section 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5).

1.4.2 Islamic modernists and neo-modernists

When modernism first emerged in the colonial period and even as it developed further in the post-colonial age, its proponents were mostly scholars, particularly those with expertise in Islamic studies. However, they had also graduated in or learned Western modern social sciences. Thus, they were not only well-educated and middle class scholars, but also Muslim scholars, who felt responsible for preserving Islamic values in the state and society. Therefore, their educational background – at least in terms of their basic education – was mainly from traditional Islamic schools. However, with the Muslim rulers at the time seeking to adopt forms of Western modernity, these scholars encountered modern ideas. In the Ottoman Empire, the modernist ‘Young Ottomans’ at the end of the Nineteenth Century, were well-educated members of society that attempted to revitalize Islam and support modernization. Namik Kemal (1840–1888), Ibrahim Shinasi (1826-1871), and Ziya Pasha (1825-1880) were the most prominent Islamic modernist figures in the Ottoman period. Modernists in Egypt also emerged around the end of the Nineteenth Century, with Jamaluddin Al-Afghani (1839–1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) being the famous modernist figures there. Both of these modernists had a deep understanding of both classic Islamic literature and Western modern knowledge. They campaigned for a modern interpretation of Islam, and attempted to reform

Muslims' understanding of Islam in order to improve Islamic civilization (Kurzman, 2002; Hourani, 1981). They can be said to represent 'classical' modernism.

Islamic modernism can be divided into classical and contemporary forms (see Rahman, 1982). As discussed above, the former emerged during the colonial period (around the 19th - first half of 20th Century), whereas the latter grew during the post-colonial era. Experts such as Fazlur Rahman and Greg Barton name contemporary modernism as Islamic neo-modernism (see Rahman, 1982; Barton, 1997). In principle both classical and contemporary Islamic modernism are very similar. Both suggest that Islam possesses within it the spirit of modernity which is something that both positively embrace (Kurzman, 2002; Rippin, 2005). Modernists attempt to find a compromise between Islam and modernity by reinterpreting religious doctrines – a project that distinguishes them from the secularists. These two types of Islamic modernism, like the secularists however, believe that the backwardness of Muslim society is rooted in traditional attitudes and practices. Therefore, both forms of modernism think that it is necessary to reform conservative outlooks by adopting and making use of modern ideas.

However, due to quite different contexts (i.e. colonial and post-colonial), Islamic modernism and neo-modernism have a somewhat distinctive focus and orientation. As a response to “internal weaknesses and to the external political and religio-cultural threat of colonialism” (Esposito, 2010: 125), classical modernism was concerned with topics such as the use of rationality in understanding religion, the modernization of Islamic education by combining Islamic subjects with ‘secular’ lessons, the necessity to study (Western) modern sciences, and the development of modern institutions or organizations. In contrast, contemporary modernism or neo-modernism not only pays attention to classical modernist issues but is also interested

in topics concerning the relationship between Islam and the modern state such as democracy, human rights, citizenship, religious pluralism, and multiculturalism (see Esposito, 2010; Rahman, 1982; Barton, 1997).

The post-colonial era saw the majority of newly independent Muslim countries like Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia attempt to deal with such issues in the context of nation-building and a new global world order still based on a power deficit between the West and the Rest. In this period, particularly since the 1970s, there was a resurgence in Islamic revivalism as an overtly political project. This attracted many young, newly urbanised Muslims, who fought against the alien, ‘secular’ and rather unsuccessful Western ideologies which had been implemented by Muslim rulers. These revivalists perceived that such modernization projects only benefited political elites and particular social classes (the middle and upper classes). This implies that “government promises and development programs had created rising expectations that often went unfulfilled” (Esposito, 2010: 162). Neo-modernists attempted to counter this revivalist discourse and assure Muslims that concepts of democracy, human rights, etc were necessary to the development of Muslim states and managing the new political order in often heterogeneous societies (in terms of religion as well as ethnicity). Moreover, they tried to convince Muslims that such ideas are rooted in Islamic doctrines and tradition. In other words, due to ever more complex social, cultural, economic and political contexts, contemporary Islamic modernism or neo-modernism has had to develop or extend the spirit of classical modernism by defending the legitimacy of reinterpreting Islam in order to deal with the challenges of today.

The neo-modernists have different views to secularists in terms of the position or role that Islam can play in a modern society and state. The neo-

modernists still hold that religion has a role to play in those two domains, but they require Islamic teachings to be reinterpreted to make them compatible with the nation-state and modern society (Esposito, 2010: 126-127; Rippin, 2005: 188). They are convinced that Islam has the spirit of modernity, and hold that rationality, equality, the empirical method, egalitarianism, democracy, an appreciation of plurality, and constitutionalism are all shared values of modernity and Islam (Barton, 1997; Rahman, 1982; Esposito, 2010). In addition, the neo-modernists hold that the Islamic jurisprudence and theology that Muslim societies practice and accept are human interpretations that are affected by the social and cultural conditions in which they are adopted (see Rahman, 1982). In their opinion, these interpretations are not absolute doctrines that it is forbidden to amend. Therefore, neo-modernists suggest that it is justifiable and necessary for Muslims to critique their existing beliefs and practices, and to reinterpret them in light of modernity. Consequently they call on Muslims to learn from and engage with Western modernity even though its first articulation comes from non-Muslim societies. Modernity, as conceptualized by the neo-modernists, consists of good values (Kurzman, 2002; Rahman, 1982; Hourani, 1981).

1.4.3 Islamic revivalists

There are two types of revivalist: pre-modern and modern (Esposito, 2010: 116–125, 149–156), although Fazlur Rahman (1982:136) refers to the modern revivalist as a neo-revivalist. The former type was developed by, amongst others, the Wahhabi movement³¹ in Saudi Arabia in the Eighteenth Century. The Wahhabi and other

³¹ The Wahhabi movement was established by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab in the 18th Century (see Al-Rasheed, 2007).

similar movements appeared before Muslims came into contact with Western modernity, which is why scholars such as Fazlur Rahman (1982) include Ibn Taymiyya – a prominent Muslim scholar from the Fourteenth Century – as a pre-modern revivalist. The important point emphasized by the pre-modern revivalist movement was that the comparative decline in the wealth and development of Muslim countries in comparison to Western ones was caused by Islamic doctrines becoming mixed with ‘foreign’ beliefs (Rahman, 1982). The mysticism coming from outside the Islamic tradition was regarded as one of the ‘foreign’ beliefs that penetrated the Muslim world (see Esposito, 2010), and ‘anti-mysticism’ was campaigned for by both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Hence, they held that the best way to improve Muslim countries’ social and political situations involved reforming Muslim beliefs by ‘purifying’ them.

Modern revivalism, better known as Islamism, emerged after modernization policies had been applied by Muslim regimes (Mandaville, 2007: 57–58; Esposito, 2010: 149–150). These revivalists criticized Muslim governments that adopted modernity and eliminated religion from the public sphere, conceiving of modernity as the root of moral decline, and thus a misguided ‘solution’ for improving Muslim countries. Although they accept the need for the nation-state and democracy to some degree, they attempt to modify it in order to make it fit with Islamic doctrines (Mandaville, 2007; Nasr, 1996). They think, for example, that the sovereignty of people that is emphasized in the nation-state and democracy is subordinate to the sovereignty of God (Esposito, 2010; Nasr, 1996), which means that the will of people has to be placed beneath the will of God. In other words, democracy, for the Islamist, should be based on *shari‘a*. Abul A’la Maududi (1903–1979), the founder of the Jama’ati Islami in Pakistan, is categorized as the father of Islamism. Maududi

introduced the concept of Theo-democracy (Nasr, 1996: 84; Esposito, 2010: 152), and although he accepted general elections, the partition of state powers (executive, judicative, and legislative), and the formulation of state law by the legislative institution, as commonly found in the democratic system, he also emphasized that the law should never contradict *shari'a*.

Even though the pre-modern and modern revivalists display similarities with regards to their projects of purifying the faith and its rituals and establishing Islamic piety (see Wiktorowicz, 2005), they thus have different emphases. The latter insists not only on Islamizing individuals through training and summons, but also on Islamizing the state and the public sphere (Roy, 2004; Mandaville, 2007). In other words, the modern revivalist or Islamist is more aggressive than the pre-modern one in responding to modernity.

Proponents of Islamism generally come from urban, well educated, and lower middle class society (Roy, 1994: 49–53). Most Muslim Brotherhood (MB) activists and followers, for instance, from its inception to the present day, have been professionals and students.³² On the one hand, its members are familiar with and accepting of modernity due to their educational backgrounds. On the other hand, they feel disappointed with modernity due to the social problems they see modern society having brought with it (Roy, 1994). Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) is one of the examples of how a well-educated figure that had a ‘close connection’ with Western modernity viewed many aspects of it negatively (Kepel, 2005).

The Islamist perceives both the secularist and the neo-modernist to have been ‘Westernized’ (Esposito, 2010: 149–156; Nasr, 1996). Like the modernist and neo-modernist, the Islamist calls on Muslims to revise their old systems and

³² The MB was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) in 1928 (Mandaville, 2007).

traditional outlooks but, unlike modernists and neo-modernists, Islamist Muslims must refer to Islam and be selective in their adoption of Western modernity (Esposito, 2010: 118; Rippin, 2005: 92–94). According to the Islamist, Islam is a comprehensive way of life (Mandaville, 2007; Nasr, 1996), and all solutions about human life are explained by it. They insist that it is thus the task of Muslims to revitalize Islamic doctrines in order to enable Muslims to improve their lives. In addition, like the modernist and the pre-modern revivalist, the Islamist regards *taqlid* (followed strictly and uncritically) to certain *madhhab* (schools of Islamic jurisprudence) to be the main problem that led Muslim society to become backwards (Esposito, 2010), as *taqlid* forbids Muslims to think outside of the *madhhab*. As a solution to this problem, they promote ‘going back’ to the *Qur’an* and the *Sunna* alone (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and doings), and thus avoid the classical and medieval ‘*ulama* literature that they see as being the problem. Nevertheless, in contrast to the modernist, the Islamist does not recommend the use of modernity as a tool for interpreting these two sources, because they believe that the *Qur’an* and the *Sunna* explain, or at least give guidance to, ‘worldly’ affairs (for economic, political, and social issues).

1.5 The nation-state and *umma*

This section argues that the concept of the modern state has been controversial within Muslim societies since its emergence in the Nineteenth through to the first half of the Twentieth Century and that this has increased in the post-colonial period as secular aspects of the nation-state were seen by revivalists to undermine Islamic identity (see section 1.2.). This was the period during which Muslims began encountering modernity through colonialism, and at the end of which they were

seeking to free their countries from colonial states to form their own modern independent states during the post-colonial period. The polemics concerning territoriality, national identity, and the concept of *umma* (Muslim community) represented the prominent issues engaged with by Muslims during this period (see Piscatori, 1994: 76–117).

It is worth noting that views concerning *umma* vary between Muslim groups. For the revivalist, the *umma* is crucial, and should not be eliminated by other identities such as the national identity (Nasr, 1996; Hourani, 1981; Mandaville, 2007; Esposito, 2010). The neo-modernist shares this view to some extent, but reconciles Islamic identity with the secular values of the nation-state (Lapidus, 2002; Hourani, 1981; Piscatori, 1994; Esposito, 2010). However, for the secularist, the concept of *umma* has no place in the modern state, and they instead fight for ‘national identity’, which implies solidarity beyond religions (Hourani, 1981; Esposito, 2010). I will elaborate on these positions in greater detail below.

The secularists show the greatest support for the establishment of the nation-state in Muslim countries. As mentioned earlier (see section 1.3), secularists were mainly bureaucrats who had worked under the colonial administration, and were well educated, having Western educational backgrounds (Lapidus, 2002). These Western educational backgrounds, together with their involvement in modern state administration, led them to view the adoption of the nation-state positively.

Whilst the Ottoman Empire remained, the secularists regarded such traditional political systems with their absolute power of the sultan as one of the main factors weakening Muslim countries (see Piscatori, 1994: 76-77; Hourani, 1981: 183). By the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Century, many parts of the Ottoman Empire, such as Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Greece, Serbia,

Romania and Bulgaria had separated from the Empire and established their own states (Lapidus, 2002: 492; Hourani, 1981: 183), and these were soon followed by other parts of the Ottoman in the Middle East and Africa (Lapidus, 2002: 493). This separation convinced the secularists that the empire form of state organization could not bind and unify the state (Piscatori, 1994), and prominent secularist intelligentsia such as Ziya Gokalp (1875–1924) campaigned for nationalism and the development of a nation-state in Turkey (Hourani, 1981: 185; Lapidus, 2002: 499). In line with this campaign, the CUP regime (1912–1918) and Mustafa Kemal's government (1921–1938), which had secularist orientations, insisted on establishing a modern Turkish nation-state (Lapidus, 2002: 497–498). A similar path was also being followed in Egypt around the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Century, with Western-educated secularists such as Mustafa Kamil (1874–1908), Lutfi Sayid (1872–1963), and Sa'ad Zaghlul (1860–1928) campaigning for Egyptian nationalism and the development of a modern nation-state (Lapidus, 2002: 518–519; Hourani, 1981: 185).

These secularists implicitly suggested that the concept of *umma* was not relevant within the context of the nation-state due to its sectarian nature and the contradictory loyalties it would require (see Piscatori, 1994: 76). On the one hand, Muslims would be required to be loyal to the nation-state or the national identity, which is over and beyond their religious identity and limited to a particular territory. The unification of different ethnicities, cultures, and languages is an end emphasized by the modern state. On the other hand, Muslims would need to have Islamic solidarity, which is implicitly required by the concept of *umma*, both at the local and the global contexts. As the secularist argued, the latter obligation could clash with

the former, and so religious identity became a barrier to the unity of the Turkish and Egyptian nations (Lapidus, 2002).

The secularist considers nationalism to be suitable for binding people emotionally in a particular nation-state (Hourani, 1981; Lapidus, 2002), by which they mean instilling a sense of belonging to a particular state based on a common territory, culture, set of goals, language, and history (see Anderson, 2006: 1–8). Unlike the concept of *umma*, which emphasizes solidarity among Muslims, the concept of nationalism passes beyond religion and ethnicity. Every nation-state endeavours to establish nationalism in order to unite its people emotionally (Anderson, 2006), and although nationalism is not one of the main principles of the nation-state (Giddens, 1987), strengthening the sense of nationalism among the people is required for consolidating the nation (Held, 1992).

In contrast with the secularist, the Islamist accepts that *umma* requires a form of solidarity based on Islam that goes beyond the boundary of territory (Hourani, 1981; Nasr, 1996; Piscatori, 1994). Even though the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was not anti-nationalism and anti-nation-state during the colonial and post-colonial periods, for instance, they still emphasized the importance of Muslim solidarity (Hourani, 1981: 187). The form of state that almost all Islamic rulers favoured in the classical, medieval, and pre-modern periods (such as the *Umayyah*, the *Abbasiyah*, and the Ottoman) ensured the Islamist that the concept of *umma* would be appropriate under the caliphate system (an Islamic empire state). Unlike the empire system seen in the Ottoman Empire (Fifteenth to Eighteenth Century), which enabled Muslims to enhance their solidarity through their Islamic identities regardless of their locations, the Islamist sees the nation-state to require Muslims to

undermine such primordial and sectarian cohesion (Salim, 2008: 33-38) as everyone in a nation-state must prioritize a form of solidarity based on a common territory.

The revivalist perspective was ambiguous over its acceptance or rejection of the concept of the nation-state, however (Piscatori, 1994). The revivalist insisted that Muslims should underpin their solidarity based on Islam, and that this goes beyond the boundaries of territory. The idea of pan-Islam³³ was popular among Muslim leaders in the Nineteenth Century, and through it Muslim leaders imagined the unity of the Muslim community going beyond particular geographical areas. The integration of the community that pan-Islam stressed was based on a spirit of reforming the Islamic world from backwardness, particularly from its subordinate status to European countries (see McLoughlin, 2010). However, this idea of pan-Islam also led revivalists to support the concept of the nation-state (Piscatori, 1994: 77–78), as they thought it would enable Muslims to become stronger and more capable of fighting against European colonial political powers on the grounds that only by getting independence would they be able to establish a globally unified Muslim community. As a result, the spirit of pan-Islam paved the way for the establishment of the nation-state in Muslim countries (Piscatori, 1994).

Even though revivalists came to view the nation-state as appealing, they disagreed with the idea of removing Islamic identity from the modern state and making it secular. Therefore, they conceived the nation-state as being religious, similar to the state of Medina established by the Prophet Muhammad in the Seventh Century, in which religious communities such as Muslims and Jews were considered to be the components of the state (Salim, 2008). Thus, religious identity still played

³³ Pan-Islam calls on Muslims from different countries to unite in solidarity through their Islamic identity. This movement was campaigned for by Jamaluddin al-Afghani in the Nineteenth Century in response to the decline of Islamic political power with the end of the Ottoman Empire and the domination of European power through the colonization of Muslim countries (see Laffan, 2003).

a significant role in shaping the society or nation for them. Although these different communities had similar interests in defending the state from external threats, they had different political rights. The revivalist expected the state to be politically dominated by Muslims and objected to being governed by non-Muslims. For them, Islam encourages Muslims not to let non-Muslims be their leaders, which indicates that the concept of the nation-state the revivalists envisioned was a sort of Islamic (nation) state – a modern state that emphasizes Islamic identity.

For the neo-modernist, there is no contradiction for Muslims between loyalty to the nation-state and the Islamic values represented by *umma* (Piscatori, 1994: 77–94). They argue that their solidarity to local and global *umma* is not eliminated when they are loyal to the nation-state. That is, Muslims can express both loyalties at the same time. Thus, the neo-modernist disagrees with the secularist about the concept of *umma* (Lapidus, 2002; Hourani, 1981), with the former holding that the modern state can be supported without eliminating Islamic solidarity. However, neo-modernists stress that Islamic solidarity must not be allowed to lead to a form of sectarianism in which the state gives political privileges to Muslims and discriminates against non-Muslims. It is noteworthy that the concept of the nation-state that the neo-modernist imagines is not the same as that of the Islamist. The neo-modernist does not consider religion as a factor for classifying people. It means that the people have equality, regardless of their religion and ethnicity.

Thus, religious pluralism plays an important role for the neo-modernist (Lapidus, 2002), by which I mean the equality of political rights that all religious communities have, including to choose and to be chosen in parliamentary and presidential elections. For the neo-modernist, given that the nation is bound by a common language, culture, and set of community aims, religious diversity can be

carefully maintained. This implies that particular religions cannot be allowed to dictate the identity or foundations of the state.

1.6 The nation-state and *shari'a*

The concept of the nation-state requires the state to be the single authoritative institution for making and enforcing laws, as briefly explained in section 1.2 of this chapter. This monopoly over jurisdiction is based on the unification of the administration that serves citizens (people who live in the nation-state) regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds (Salim, 2008). In other words, a national law should be made for all a nation's people, not just for certain religious communities. In the nation-state, laws are generated by government or parliament (the institution responsible for legislation) and operated by 'secular' (state) courts that are not affiliated with any religious community.

The secular principle of this nation-state detaches religions or religious elites and institutions like *'ulama* and Islamic courts from the state, which are then no longer law-making bodies. In contrast, the authority of law-making and administration was given to each ethnic and religious leader under the Ottoman Empire (see Salim, 2008: 35–40), which meant that each religious follower would be administered by their respective religious elites or institutions.

I argue that the withdrawal of religious authorities such as *'ulama* and religious courts were the main cause of the controversies regarding the organization of the state for Muslims. The marginalization of the religious courts was perceived by many Muslims – particularly revivalists – as embodying the decline of the role of *shari'a* in the state (see Esposito, 2010; Salim, 2008). Although *shari'a* was defined by most Muslims in the Classical period as the principles and values of Islamic

teachings, it was later interpreted by many Muslims as comprizing the jurisprudential aspects of Islam, as presented in *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). This shift in the understanding of *shari'a* amongst Muslims was described by Muhammad Said al-Ashmawi (1998) as the evolution of the meaning of *shari'a*. Ashmawi contended that the domination of *fiqh* emerged as a consequence of Muslims' needs to implement Islamic teachings in their daily lives, not only in relation to rituals but also in relation to the economy, politics, and jurisdiction. Under the Islamic caliphate (*Umayyaa*, *Abbasiya*, and Ottoman), Muslim rulers used *fiqh* for their administration to varying degrees, particularly for the jurisdiction of Muslims. The role of *fiqh* in the past compared to its role in the era of the nation-state, in which the state centralized the authority of jurisdiction within secular authority, was one of the crucial factors that led Muslims to perceive *shari'a* as being in decline.

For secularists – for example, for the Turkish government under Mustafa Kemal – the declining role that *shari'a* was playing in the state was regarded as a positive step for the modernization of Muslim countries (see Piscatori, 1994; Rippin, 2005; Hourani, 1981). It was in accordance with their aim of privatizing Islam, and they viewed most of *shari'a* to be obsolete in relation to contemporary social life. Instead of reinterpreting *shari'a* in an attempt to make it compatible with contemporary social needs, they aimed to remove it from the state altogether (Esposito, 2010: 126; Rippin, 2005: 198; Rahman, 1982: 63). For the secularist, *shari'a* is a domain of faith that leaves no space for rationality (Asad, 2003: 186), and thus threatens to restrict the government and its people from making informed, rational choices about the laws that are suitable for the people. As a result, secularists replaced *shari'a* with numerous Western laws (Hourani, 1981; Lapidus,

2002), which they viewed to be based on rationality and to be better designed for managing and maintaining social and political life. The modernization of the state through the removal of *shari'a* from the constitution and from legislation meant that the secularist became seen as being hostile to Islam. However, it is likely that many of the proponents of this group were Muslims who were committed to Islamic principles and rituals (Hourani, 1981; Esposito, 2010).

In contrast with the secularist, the revivalist insisted on the need to formalize *shari'a* (i.e. to make *shari'a* state law) by arguing that one of the vital functions of the state is to support Muslims in implementing Islamic teachings (Nasr, 1996; Al-Rasheed, 2007). They emphasized the importance of religion or *shari'a* in people's lives in both the public and the private domains (see Rippin, 2005; Esposito, 2010; Rahman 1982). This foundation led them to reject the privatization of *shari'a* campaigned for by the secularist as, for them, the history of the Islamic caliphate during the Classical and Medieval periods showed the valuable role that the state can play in protecting and establishing *shari'a*. The revivalists saw the rulers in these periods as not only using *fiqh* to manage the state, but also to support Muslims in improving their commitment to *shari'a*.

To some extent, the revivalist (particularly the Islamist) could accept other foundations for laws – such as local traditions and rationality – so long as they were in line with *shari'a*, as the sovereignty of the people emphasized in the nation-state should be under the sovereignty of God. This means that people's reasons are subordinate to the 'rationality' of God for the Islamist, so *shari'a* must provide the most fundamental guidance and foundation for generating law.

Nevertheless, the Islamist is stricter and more literal than the neo-modernist in terms of their interpretations of *shari'a*. Consequently, it is likely that laws based

on rationality, local tradition or Western law will clash with *shari'a* as it is perceived by the Islamist. Abul A'la Maududi's views provide an example of this. Maududi emphasized that when the conclusions of the process of reasoning in the parliament contradict those of *shari'a*, people should obey *shari'a* and ignore rationality (Nasr, 1996; Esposito, 2010), and did not place 'the common good' as the determining factor for deciding whether certain laws should be accepted or not.

The neo-modernist disagrees with the secularist policy of removing *shari'a* from the state, but also opposes the revivalist policy of basing legislation on *shari'a* and placing the role of human rationality in political decision-making below that of 'God's will' (see Esposito, 2010). The neo-modernist acknowledges the importance of *shari'a* for Muslims, but conceives of *shari'a* as guidance revealed by God to support humans in maintaining their lives and solving their problems. *Shari'a*, for the neo-modernist, is the set of abstract principles and ethical values provided by Islamic teaching on how to live, including for social justice, punishment for criminals, and equality before the law regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion (Hourani, 1981). Therefore, the neo-modernist perceives *shari'a* as being able to accommodate rationality, local tradition and Western law. Moreover, for the neo-modernist, doctrines of *shari'a* or Islamic jurisprudence that are no longer compatible with modern life should be reinterpreted. In their opinion, *shari'a* thus consists of two elements: 1) ethical values that are unchangeable and 2) interpretations of ethical or prudential principles that lead to different values based on the features of the society in which they are applied (Esposito, 2010). According to neo-modernists, the second type of values – context-relative ones – are those that are most frequently found in the *shari'a*. These values are represented by schools of law in jurisprudence such as Ja'fari, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali. Hence

shari'a has led to diverse interpretations on how Muslims should live based on the various schools or groups that have interpreted it and their different historical contexts. The domination of the second type of values in Islamic jurisprudence (*shari'a*) – which have been made at different periods in response to particular historical contexts – is also the factor that makes them incompatible with the modern state and modern society. The reinterpretation of *shari'a* by the neo-modernist is thus intended to review and evaluate the second set of *shari'a* values in order to make them compatible with the contemporary context, based on the underlying principles found in the *Qur'an*.

1.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that, through the new ideas offered by modernity, the nation-state challenges Muslims to deal with the significance of *umma* and the implementation of *shari'a* as state law. Many Muslims – especially revivalists – perceive the nation-state to require Muslims to shift their loyalties from Islam to ‘secular’ political authority, and to undermine the place of Islamic teachings in their social and political lives.

Muslim responses to this challenge consist of three types: 1) the elimination of Islam from the state, 2) the modernization of Islam, and 3) Islamizing the nation-state. The various responses that Muslims take to the nation-state indicate that they have different understandings about the issue of loyalty and the place of Islam in the state.

For the secularist, Islam should be located in the private sphere. They insist that the state and public life need to be free from religious authority and identity, and regard rationalism, modern science and other modern tools to be more appropriate

ones for states to use so that they can develop the economies, politics and achievements of Muslim countries.

While the secularist attempts to expunge religion (Islam) from the state and other public spheres, the revivalist insists on placing Islam as the foundation for modern Muslim societies. Even though revivalists acknowledged that Muslim countries needed reform to enable them to develop and catch up with Western nations, they insisted that reviving a 'pristine' form of Islam in society would solve these problems.

I have argued that the neo-modernist, by contrast, occupies the centre-ground between these two positions – privatizing Islam and Islamizing the state. On the one hand, the neo-modernist did not want to remove Islam from the state and public life. On the other hand, they did not see all aspects of Western modernity negatively. The solution for the neo-modernist was thus to reinterpret Islamic teachings in the light of modernity (see Rahman, 1982; Hourani, 1962; Kurzman, 2002: 3-27). In other words, the neo-modernist sought to modernize Islam in order to enable it to better support Muslim countries in catch up to more developed Western nations.

The neo-modernist movements were poor in terms of propagating their ideas. Proponents of neo-modernism were mostly scholars or academics, and this made it difficult for them to mobilize support from middle class and lower class Muslims, who made up the majority of the society. Neo-modernist ideas became an interesting discourse for scholars, but did not have a significant impact on Muslim societies. Moreover, this approach to modernization was seen by revivalists as providing justifications and support for secularist points of view.

The lack of influence that neo-modernist ideas had within wider Muslim societies was not duplicated for revivalists. Due to the instructions of their doctrines,

which require activists to become preachers, they received support from the grass-roots and lower classes of Muslim societies. In addition, this group also created organizations and social movements to support them in spreading their ideas and campaigning for their goals. The Muslim Brotherhood and the *Jama'ati Islami* were the most prominent revivalist organizations, with the Muslim Brotherhood in particular having a significant influence on contemporary Islamic movements worldwide.

This chapter has enabled me to move on to explain how Muhammadiyah's leaders have attempted to form a sort of compromise between Islam and the (secular) nation-state. The typology of Muslims' responses to modernity and the nation-state can now be used to investigate the Muhammadiyah and its leaders' Islamic orientations in greater depth. I will use this typology to map out the development of a specific Islamic ideology within the organization, which is seen particularly at the leadership level.

Chapter 2

The Relationship between Islamic Movements and the State in Post-Colonial Indonesia

2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I investigated the typology of Muslims' responses to the concept of the nation-state. The secular orientation of the nation-state is a challenge for Muslims who are attempting to deal with the concept of *umma* and the implementation of *shari'a*. I argue that the modern state has had a significant impact on the position of Islam in relation to the state and the public sphere, and that the concept of the nation-state is one that evokes impassioned arguments among Muslims. As a result, Muslims produce three types of responses related to dealing with the modern state: to marginalize Islam (secularist), to Islamize the modern state (Islamic revivalists), or to modernize Islam (Islamic neo-modernist). This mapping of Muslims' responses will help me to explain how Islamic movements in contemporary Indonesia deal with modernity, in particular the nation-state.

This chapter elaborates on the social and political context in Indonesia within which the subjects of my research – Muhammadiyah leaders – operate. Thus, I start by sketching the broad relationship between Islamic movements and the state, particularly in post-colonial Indonesia. I argue that the repressive attitude toward revivalist movements that the Old Order government took during the 1960s and the New Order took between 1966 and the 1980s encouraged new generations affiliating with modernist groups to re-conceptualize the relationship between Islam and the state. These new generations campaigned for a modern form of Islam to legitimize the secular nature of the modern state.

In the first section I explore the early emergence of Islamic kingdoms in coastal areas (13th Century) and inland areas (17th Century) of Indonesia, looking at how they interacted and negotiated with local religions and traditions. Whilst the syncretic character of Islam that was developing in the inner geographical regions of Indonesia was supported by ordinary people and aristocrats, those who had just returned from the pilgrimage or study in Mecca held concerns about Islamic ‘purification’, and this led to a polarization between Muslims in *abangan* and *santri*. The use of the terms *santri* and *abangan* comes from Clifford Geertz (1960) and M. C. Ricklefs (2007), who adopt them to discuss Javanese religions. *Santri* is used for ‘devout Muslims’ – either traditionalist, revivalist, or modernist; whereas *abangan* is used for ‘nominal Muslims’, who have a greater focus on Javanese (local) beliefs and values.

The next part of the chapter will then elaborate on Indonesian Muslims’ encounters with Western modernity. The restriction of Western educational provision to aristocrats, most of whom were *abangan*, generated an upper class society that supported the secular character of the nation-state. I argue that the differences between the *santri* and the aristocrat *abangan* in terms of how they ‘interact’ with modernity led them to conceptualize the relationship between Islam and the state differently. Due to their Islamic educations, as well as their networks with other Islamic movements worldwide, most of the *santri* favoured the infusion of *shari‘a* within the modern state. On the other hand, the aristocratic *abangan*, who obtained modern Western educations and were involved in colonial government, became secularists and thus supported a secular vision of the state.

Following this section, I then go on to explicate and analyse the debate between revivalist leaders and secularist figures regarding the formulation of the

Indonesian constitution in 1945, and its reformulations after the first general election in 1955. The crux of these debates centred on disputes about the place of Islam in the state. The process of formulating a new Indonesian independent state in 1945 and revising the new constitution during 1955–1959 became a field of contestation between revivalists and secularists. Although the revivalist leaders accepted that Islamic identity and *shari'a* would not be included in the constitution by the end of the debate in 1945, they still campaigned for *shari'a* to be implemented as law by the state. This was evident after the first election, where they fought for *shari'a* again during the Constituent Assembly during 1955–1959.

The last two sections of this chapter investigate Islamic movements during the New Order period (1966–1998). I argue that the first phase of the New Order government (1966–1980s) adopted a repressive attitude towards Islamic movements as a result of the governments' worries that Islamic revivalist movements, especially those with political orientations, would undermine *Pancasila* as the foundation of the state and society. The campaigns for *shari'a* to be included in the constitution by revivalist groups (during 1945, 1955–1959 and in 1968) were the primary cause of the state's caution and subsequent repression of this movement, as the government viewed that formalization of *shari'a* as something that would represent a milestone in establishing an Islamic state (Salim, 2008).

The final section of the chapter argues that despite the bad relationship between the president and the military, who were allies at the beginning of the New Order, the rise of contemporary Islamic neo-modernist thought in the Indonesian public sphere that supported the secular character of the modern state contributed to making the President feel secure about the future of Islamic movements. These two

factors encouraged the shift of government's attitude towards Islamic political interests.

2.2 Islamization in Indonesia: the emergence of *santri* and *abangan* in the colonial period

Although there are indications that people within the Indonesian archipelago³⁴ had converted to Islam before the Tenth Century CE, a significant numbers of Muslims did not emerge in the archipelago until the Thirteenth Century (Ricklefs, 2001: 3–4), when the first Islamic kingdom, the *Samudera Pasai*,³⁵ was established (Ricklefs, 2001). This kingdom was located in North Sumatra, in the coastal area of Aceh.



Figure 1. Map of the Samudera Pasai Sultanate

Indonesian people encountered Islam through international trading with Muslim traders from China and India, and especially with Arabs since the early periods of Islamic history (the 7th Century) (Drakeley, 2005). These ‘foreign’

³⁴ Scholars use the term ‘The Indonesian Archipelago’ to refer to Indonesia and its different areas (see Ricklefs, 2001; Laffan, 2003; Azra, 2004).

³⁵ The Sultanate of Samudera Pasai existed from the Thirteenth through to the Sixteenth Century (Ricklefs, 2001; Drakeley, 2005; Lambourn, 2004; Crow, 2000).

Muslim traders came to and remained in Indonesia for periods of time before returning to their home countries. They contributed in the process of converting Indonesian people living in coastal areas – important sites for international trading at the time – to Islam (Ricklefs, 2001). Initially, the process of conversion took place via marriages between ‘foreign’ Muslims and indigenous people. Furthermore, these traders often acted as preachers, as most Muslims believed that they were obliged to preach Islam to non-Muslims, and thus significant numbers of indigenous people began to convert to Islam. This factor could explain why the earliest Islamic kingdoms – such as the Samudera Pasai, Aceh,³⁶ and Demak³⁷ – emerged in coastal areas, whilst the interior regions of Indonesia were still dominated by Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms, especially Java.

³⁶ The Sultanate of Aceh was established in the late of Fifteenth Century. It was located in North Aceh, near to the Samudera Pasai (Ricklefs, 2001; Hadi, 2004).

³⁷ Demak was established in the Fifteenth Century and located on a Javanese island. The kingdom was initially part of Majapahit, which was a kingdom influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism, whose king then converted to Islam and transformed the kingdom to an Islamic one as a result (Ricklefs, 2007: 179-189; Carey, 2007).



Figure 2. Map of the Aceh Sultanate



Figure 3. Map of Demak Sultanate

Many scholars have attempted to investigate why great numbers of indigenous people converted to Islam in Indonesia during the 13th Century (Drakely, 2005; Ricklefs, 2001; Azra, 2004). Ricklefs (2007), for instance, argues that the form of Sufism (the mystical aspect of Islam) that dominated in the Islamic world at that time was the main factor that attracted Indonesian people to convert to Islam. According to Ricklefs, mysticism was a belief system that Indonesian people – particularly those who lived on Javanese islands – were greatly interested in. In contrast to Ricklefs, Steven Drakeley (2005) argued that the conversion to Islam was stimulated by practical considerations – that as Muslim trader networks dominated international trading in Indonesian ports during the 12th or 13th Century, it was beneficial for the local traders to convert to Islam in order to make it easier for them to build relationships with these ‘foreign’ Muslim traders. In my view, these two arguments could complement each other. The local traders may well have felt comfortable in converting to Islam when they thought it would enhance their network with the Muslim traders, because the character of Sufism was tolerant and accommodative towards indigenous cultures. Hence, even after converting, they could still act in accordance with their ‘original’ beliefs, which would have been made easier by the fact that Sufism was similar to their ‘local’ mysticism (Bruinessen, 1995; Azra, 2004).

It is worth noting that the development of Islam in these coastal areas was significantly influenced by the dynamics seen in other Muslim countries, especially those from which the foreign traders came, such as Arabs and Indians. Given that the reform movement of Sufism occurred began around 16th – 17th Century in Mecca, it also impacted on the Indonesian sultanates (Azra, 2004). The reform of Sufism was meant to purify it from heresy, with its proponents attempting to revise

it to be in accordance with the *Qur'an* and the *Sunna* (Azra, 2004). Therefore, these sultanates aimed to purify Islam from local and un-Islamic beliefs and rituals, and adopted violent means to pursue this purification. For example, under the advice of Nuruddin al-Raniri (d.1658) – a *Shaikh al-Islam* (official leader of *'ulama*) of the Sultanate of Aceh – Sultan Tsani (ruled 1636–1641) killed a group of Muslims who were regarded to be performing a 'heretical' form of Sufism (see Azra, 2004). Similar 'purifications' were also enacted by the successors of the Sultan, although they did not adopt the violent methods of their predecessor. It is worth mentioning that this 'purification' was not like that seen in the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia during the Eighteen Century, which rejected Sufism entirely, but rather attempted to make Muslims' beliefs and practices more in accordance with orthodox Islam. Hence, this reform still accepted Sufism, accommodating local beliefs and traditions as long as they were in line with principles of Islamic faith (orthodox Islam) (Azra, 2004).

The establishment of the Mataram Sultanate in Java in the Seventeenth Century marked the shift in Islamic political power from the coastal locations to the inner areas of Indonesia (Ricklefs, 2007: 3). Although the kingdom was officially Islamic at this time, local Javanese beliefs and rituals³⁸ still dominated the character and behaviour of the sultanate. In this period, most Javanese people living in these inner regions held on to deeply-rooted Javanese beliefs that were strongly influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism (Carey, 2007; Ricklefs, 2007). Given that these religions had been part of Indonesian worldviews since the First Century, it was no surprise that they had penetrated the Javanese faith substantially.

³⁸ Detailed descriptions of the concept of Javanese mysticism can be found in Ricklefs (2007, 2008).



Figure 4. Map of the Mataram Islamic Sultanate

Since the beginning of the sultanate system, sultans had attempted to unite Islam with Javanese beliefs. Sultan Agung (ruled 1613–1645), for instance, combined the Islamic and Javanese calendars into a new hybrid. This type of approach to their unification was continued by his successors, especially by Sultan Pakubuwana II (ruled 1726–1742) (Ricklefs, 2006, 2007). Therefore, the sultans played a significant role in creating a particular character of Javanese or indigenous Islam, and this kind of Islam enabled people in Java in particular to feel more accommodating towards Islam by removing the dilemma of choosing between being Muslim or being Javanese. On the one hand, they embraced Islam as their religion, whilst on the other they retained Javanese faiths, such as believing in Ratu Kidul – the local Goddess of the Southern Ocean (Ricklefs, 2006).

The rising awareness about Islamic identity that was seen among *hajis*³⁹ by the middle of the Nineteenth Century interrupted this ‘psychological acceptance’ of a hybrid position by Javanese people. Although there had been found pilgrimage activity around the Seventeenth Century as shown from Indonesian ulama networks (see Azra, 2004), the Nineteenth Century was a time at which the number of

³⁹ Muslims who have performed the *hajj* pilgrimage in Mecca are referred to as *hajji*.

Indonesian pilgrims increased significantly (Laffan, 2003; Ricklefs, 2007) as a result of improvements in infrastructure brought about by the opening of the Suez Canal, the role of travel agents, and the large steamships provided by the Dutch colonial government that enabled Indonesian Muslims to perform their pilgrimage much more easily (Laffan, 2003; Hurgronje, 2007). Thousands of people began to travel to Mecca every year, and most of them stayed more than one year, either for economic reasons or for study (Hurgronje, 2007). The majority of these Indonesian pilgrims were merchants, in addition to some children from aristocratic families (Hurgronje, 2007). It can be concluded that this early modern form of pilgrimage to Mecca was an Indonesian middle-class phenomenon.

There were at least three reasons for Indonesian Muslims to go to Mecca – to perform *hajj*, to trade, and to study Islamic sciences (Hurgronje, 2007: 237). Most of the Indonesian pilgrims who went to study Islamic disciplines stayed at the Java colony, in which many students of archipelago origin (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Thailand) lived. This colony was like a boarding house for the students, and they studied under *'ulama* – a position that had been officially created by *Shaikh al-Islam* (an official leader of *'ulama*) of Mecca, mainly as a result of interpreting the teachings of the *Qur'an*, *Hadith*, and *Fiqh*.

After their return to Indonesia, both those who just gone to perform *hajj* and those who had studied for several years in Mecca and Medina tended to have strengthened Islamic identities, dressing like Arabic people (Hurgronje, 2007: 258–259). They perceived what they had observed in *Haramayn* (Mecca and Medina) to be the 'true Islam', and some of them attempted to bring Muslims more into line with this 'true Islam', which polarized Muslim societies to become loyal to either

their Islamic identity or their local identity, while some of them aimed to significantly ‘purify’ Muslims’ beliefs and practices.

Javanese Muslims who performed pilgrimages to Mecca were alerted that the syncretic Islam performed by the Mataram rulers and people was different to the ‘true Islam’ that they saw in Mecca (Ricklefs, 2007; Hurgronje, 2007). In other words, these *hajis* were influenced by revivalist ideas requiring Muslim rituals to be in line with the *Qur’an* and the *Sunna*. Soon after their return, they sought to correct other Muslims’ beliefs and practices to follow the ‘true Islam’. As a result, many Javanese people – both from the elite and the lower classes – responded negatively to them. This revivalist movement thus generated a boundary between Muslims who were committed to ‘true Islam’ and those who were still loyal to ‘Javanese Islam’ (Ricklefs, 2007).

According to Ricklefs (2007: 84–104), this was the time at which the identities of *abangan* (nominal and syncretic Muslims) and *santri*⁴⁰ (‘devout’ Muslims) appeared. Clifford Geertz invented this typology as a result of fieldwork he conducted in Java in the 1950s, but Geertz did not focus on the origin of *abangan* and *santri*, as Ricklefs did. Thus I will rely more on Ricklefs’ work here. Geertz (1960) categorized Muslims in Java into three types: *santri*, *abangan*, and *priyayi* (an aristocratic class of Javanese society). According to Geertz (1960), most *santri* came from the middle classes, *abangan* from the lower classes, and *priyayi* from the upper classes. Both *abangan* and *priyayi* were Muslims but, as Geertz (1960) explained, *abangan* did not observe Islamic rituals such as five-times daily prayers, while *priyayi* were more proud of their Javanese identities. Ricklefs (2007) adopts these classifications and descriptions in his work.

⁴⁰ The term *santri* compounds traditionalist, revivalist, and modernist positions (see Geertz, 1960).

I disagree with the way in which Geertz and Ricklefs categorize *priyayi* together with *santri* and *abangan*. My critique follows Koentjaraningrat (1963) and Kim (1996) by arguing that the *priyayi* social class is different in nature from the two categories of Muslims, which are related to religious character, and hence it is not appropriate to compare them. I prefer to divide the *abangan* classification in two: 1) lower class *abangan* and 2) aristocrat *abangan*. As Ricklefs (2007) explains, the word ‘*abangan*’ comes from the Javanese language, and means ‘red’. The word was often contrasted with ‘white’, with white signifying kindness, trueness, obedience, and niceness, and red marking badness, cruelty, rebellion, and disobedience (Ricklefs, 2007: 84–104). This indicates that *abangan* was a loaded term that revivalists used to define those who, according to their critique, did not take the ‘right path’.

The term *abangan* refers not only to lower classes, as Geertz and Ricklefs suggest, but also to *priyayi*, as most *priyayi* at that time did not conduct Islamic rituals like *santri* did, and were more committed to their Javanese identities (see Geertz, 1960). In addition, there were many *priyayi* that did not like *santri* movements at this time (see Ricklefs, 2007).⁴¹ Most *priyayi* preferred to replace their Javanese beliefs with Western modernity (secularism) than with ‘true Islam’ (Islamic revivalism) (see Latif, 2008). This was clearly shown when the colonial government offered the *priyayi* the chance to study in Dutch schools and work in the colonial administration during the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries – a policy based on their political ideology of using the *priyayi* as the main agents for modernizing Indonesia (Benda, 1958: 344).

⁴¹ However there were some *priyayi* who could be categorized as *santri* because they were devout Muslims with Islamic educational backgrounds. In addition, some of the later generation of *priyayi* would become prominent activists of Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam (Latif, 2008: 64).

Thus there is good evidence that the syncretic character of Islam that developed in the inner areas – which was supported by both members of the lower class and the aristocracy – versus the rising agenda of the Muslims who had just returned from pilgrimages to purify Islam from syncretism led to a polarization of Muslims as *santri* and *abangan*.

2.3 Indonesian Muslims and modernity

Indonesian Muslims interacted with Western modernity via two different means: through Islamic modernist thinkers in Egypt and through Western educations (either undertaken in Indonesia through the schools established by the Dutch government or in the Netherlands). Given that the colonial government's policy restricted educations to the aristocracy, most *santri* – who were middle class Muslims, particularly its elites – studied modernity using Islamic modernist thinkers in Cairo, especially through Rashid Rida's (1865–1935) writings. Their basic educations were undertaken in Islamic schools (*madrasas*), and they learned a form of Western modernity that had been blended with Islamic teachings (Latif, 2008). In other words, they learned Islamic modernism through Islamic modernist scholars. These two aspects – their educational backgrounds and their learning using Islamic modernist thinkers – affected the extent to which the *santri* (within their respective organizations) responded to issues relating to Islam and modernity in Indonesia. They were caught between the modernism of Abduh and the revivalism of Rida, with most tending to adopt a revivalist rather than a modernist orientation.

In Indonesia these Islamic revivalists and modernists during the colonial period were also known as '*kaum muda*' (young group). They were contrasted with '*kaum tua*' (old group) whose basis was in traditional *pesantren* (Islamic schools)

and conservative Islam (see Abdullah, 1971; Saleh, 2001). These terms derived from West Sumatera during the 20th Century where a puritan group called *kaum muda* attempted to purify Islam from local beliefs and traditions that were assumed not to be in accordance with Islam.

Most of these (*santri*) Muslims became activists in key Islamic organizations such as the 1) Jam'iyat Khair, 2) Muhammadiyah, 3) Sarekat Islam (SI), and 4) Persatuan Islam (Persis). I will say a little more about each now. 1) Jam'iyat Khair (the Association for the Good) was founded in 1905 by Muslim scholars of Arab heritage. Activists were interested in the reformist ideology developed by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida (Latif, 2008). 2) The Muhammadiyah was established in 1912 in Yogyakarta. Its main activities are in Islamic education, health, economics, and social charities (Alfian, 1989). 3) Sarekat Islam (SI) (the Association of Islam) was the first Islamic political organization to be established in Indonesia (1911). Initially (1905), Sarekat Islam was named Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI) (the Association for Muslim Traders), and aimed to unite Javanese Muslim traders in competing against Chinese traders in Java. Later, its activists developed political interests, which led them to expand the organization's concern to politics and to change its name from SDI to SI. SI was dominated by middle class Muslims – both by aristocrats and merchants with Islamic reformist agendas (Latif, 2008). Interestingly, despite their economic and political concerns, they gave the organization an Islamic identity. Lastly, 4) Persis was established in 1923 by reformist Muslim scholars (Federspiel, 2001). All these Islamic organizations were the 'institutions' by which those (*santri*) middle class Muslims expressed and disseminated their ideas, as well as interacted or

communicated with Islamic modernist scholars from Egypt and other areas (Laffan, 2003).

Although there were some *santri* from aristocratic families who had the opportunity to study at Western (Dutch) schools in either Indonesia or the Netherlands during the early Twentieth Century (Latif, 2008: 64), I could not see evidence of their contributions in conceptualizing modernist or neo-modernist interpretations of Islam. It is likely that, due to their poor understandings of Islamic subjects, they could not do so. To be a modernist scholar who is capable of reinterpreting Islam (like Abduh and Sayyid Ahmad Khan) requires the mastery of both Islamic knowledge and Western modernity (see section 1.3). These aristocrat *santri* came from *santri* families and performed Islamic rituals, as *santri* commonly did. Regardless of their Western educational background, as Geertz (1960) and Latif (2008) note, *santri* tended to join Islamic organizations or Islamic parties. For this reason, most of these aristocrat *santri* preferred to join the Sarekat Islam, the Persis, or the Muhammadiyah (see section 2.4).

As was mentioned in the previous section (section 2.2), the *priyayi* (or the aristocrats) were the social class that took the most advantage of the modernization programme provided by the Dutch government in Indonesia. They received the majority of the Western education that was offered to Indonesians from the middle of the Nineteenth Century onwards. The colonial government attempted to utilize this traditional ruling class (*priyayi*) as agents for modernizing Indonesia (Benda, 1958), so, for the government, the *priyayi* were the most appropriate social class to engage in the programme. Although most *priyayi* were Muslims, many of them were *abangan*, so they did not support Islamic revivalism (Ricklefs, 2007), and the majority would in fact have felt threatened by Islamic movements. During the

preparation of Indonesia's independence and its constitution in 1945, these aristocrats became the proponents of the Indonesian secular state, and can thus be categorized as secularist Muslims.

I argue that the different way in which the aristocratic *abangan* and *santri* 'interacted' with modernity caused them to conceptualize the relation between Islam and the state differently. The *santri* wanted to Islamize the modern nation-state, and can thus be categorized as revivalist or Islamist, whilst the *abangan* tended to separate Islam from the state, and can thus be best described as secularist. This divergence encouraged a polemic on the concept of the nation-state in the years before Indonesian independence in the Twentieth Century. The debate between Soekarno (an aristocrat *abangan*) and Ahmad Hassan and Ahmad Nasir (who were *santri*) in the mass media during the 1920s was one example of this (see Latif, 2008). Hassan and Nasir argued for the sovereignty of God being higher than the sovereignty of the people, while Soekarno argued for the opposite (Latif, 2008; Assyaukanie, 2009).

The *santri* wanted to penetrate the nation state with Islamic concepts, but were also relatively accommodative of modernity, as indicated by their support for the establishment of a modern nation-state instead of a caliphate or an Islamic state. Nevertheless, they insisted on the modern state being Islamized. In the official meetings regarding Indonesian independence held by the Investigating Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) and the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) during July–August 1945, the *santri* persistently demanded that the state be based on Islamic foundations and that it implement *shari'a* for all Muslims (Ismail, 1995; Assyaukanie, 2009).⁴² This shows

⁴² A detail description of *santri* attempts to Islamize the state is provided in the next section – 2.4.

that, although the *santri* accepted the idea of having a nation-state, they also wanted to Islamize the state by placing Islam as its foundation and applying *shari'a* as state law for Muslims.

Unlike the *santri*, the aristocrat *abangan* wanted a secular state that held no specific religious identity (see Rippin, 2005; Esposito, 2005, Lapidus, 2002). Although most *abangan* were Muslims, they did not have any problem with being both Muslims and secularists at the same time. According to them, both the Islamic faith and its rituals are private affairs that should be separated from the state domain. This idea was expressed by both Soekarno and Muhammad Hatta (Latif, 2008; Assyaukanie, 2009), who came from aristocrat and *abangan* families and studied in the Dutch educational system, with Hatta obtaining a Bachelor of Law degree from Utrecht University in the Netherlands (Latif, 2008). It is worth noting that their concept of a 'secular' state was not hostile towards religions per se, but one that functioned to protect people's rights to embrace and perform religious teachings and promoted a harmonious life for religious followers in Indonesia (Assyaukanie, 2009).

2.4 The quests for an Islamic and a secular modern state

Western education in Indonesia during the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries generated many scholars, leaders, and bureaucrats who were wanted to establish and develop a 'secular' modern state. In the educational institutions established by the Dutch, numerous Indonesians from aristocratic families studied aspects of modernity, such as modern administration, medical sciences, law, journalism, and technological sciences (Lapidus, 1988: 560). After graduating from these schools, most of them worked in local administrations under the Dutch colonial government,

in hospitals, in printed mass media companies, and in the state courts. It was not surprising that this new middle class were more ‘ready’ to conceptualize and manage an independent modern state than the *santri* who lacked a modern Western educational background.

As a result, these Western educational graduates dominated the committee for the preparation of Indonesian independence. At the beginning of 1945, Indonesian leaders were consolidating their preparations for Indonesian independence and, supported by the Japanese colonial government,⁴³ these Indonesian leaders created an Investigating Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence known as *Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (BPUPKI) on 29 April 1945 (Boland, 1971; Benda, 1958). This institution aimed to discuss what form the proper type of state for Indonesia should take, and to formulate it within a constitution. The members of the BPUPKI consisted of sixty-two Indonesian people, most of whom were aristocratic *abangan* – the social class whose members had mostly received Western educations. Only fifteen of the sixty-two members were *santri* (from Islamic traditionalist and revivalist organizations) (Ismail, 1995: 21; Mangkusasmito, 1970: 12). In other words, the majority of BPUPKI members were secularists.

As the previous section (2.3) contended, the secularists supported the creation of a secular modern state that was neutral with regards to religious identity (Assyaukanie, 2009). In the forum, Soekarno, a prominent secularist, claimed: “we wish to establish a state ‘all for all’... not for just one group... we would found a state which all of us supported.”⁴⁴ Another secularist, Soepomo, supported Muhammad Hatta’s arguments:

⁴³ Japan occupied and colonized Indonesia during 1942–1945 (Laffan, 2003).

⁴⁴ Soekarno, quoted in Ismail (1995: 34-35).

The honourable member Mohammad Hatta has already explained in some detail that in a unitary state of Indonesia affairs of state should be separated from religious matters...

Creating an Islamic State in Indonesia would mean setting up a state that is going to link itself to the largest group, the Islamic group. If an Islamic State is created in Indonesia, then certainly the problem of minorities will arise, the problem of small religious groups, of Christians and others. Although an Islamic State will safeguard the interests of other groups as well as possible, these smaller religious groups will certainly not be able to feel involved in the state. Therefore, the ideals of an Islamic State do not agree with the ideals of a unitary state which we all have so passionately looked forward to ...

Hence I propose, and declare myself to be in agreement with, the point of view of those who want to establish a *national unitary state* ... which transcends all groups, and respects and is aware of the special identity of every group, both large and small. As a matter of course religious affairs will be separated from state affairs in this national unitary state.⁴⁵

The secularists offered *Pancasila* as the philosophical foundation of the state, which consisted of five core features that the state should pursue and protect: 1) a belief in God, 2) humanism, 3) nationalism, 4) democracy, and 5) social welfare (Ismail, 1995). The secularists intended *Pancasila* to provide a basis for a state in which all religions were accommodated, and in which no religion was prioritized over any others (Latif, 2008, Assyaukanie, 2009, Ismail, 1995; Boland, 1971). Although *Pancasila* contained a principle acknowledging God, the state did not declare any particular religion (including Islam) to be an official Indonesian religion.

Islamic leaders on the committee responded negatively to this aspect of *Pancasila*, with Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (Ismail, 1995: 46), the chairman of the Muhammadiyah from 1942 to 1953 being one of its most outspoken critics. In the forum he said:

Honourable gentlemen! If you wish to establish a just and wise government in our state based on noble moral conduct and democratic deliberations and

⁴⁵ Soepomo, quoted in Boland (1971: 19-20).

tolerance without any compulsion in religion, then establish a government based on Islam, because Islam provides all of this (Ismail, 1995: 46).

And he continued:

... in order that Indonesia become a strong and stable state, I propose that the establishment of a free state of Indonesia be based on Islam, because this will be in conformity with the fundamental aspiration of the majority of people (who are Muslims). ... Do not neglect the aspiration of 90 percent of the people (who are Muslims) (Ismail, 1995: 46).

This statement from Hadikusumo received support from all the Islamic leaders, both within the BPUPKI and outside of it, who appealed to both the majority Muslim population and the superiority of Islam over other religions as reasons to fight for Islam as the foundation of the state.

The issue of the foundation of the state thus became a heated debate between the supporters of Islamic leaders and secularists. Even though the polarization seen within this episode could not be directly mapped on to the clash between *santri* and *abangan* during the Nineteenth Century (see section 2.2.), there was nonetheless a consistency of grouping, with all the *santri* supporting the revivalist position and the *abangan* favouring the secularist one.

As the debate did not lead to a resolution, the BPUPKI created a committee of nine people to reach a compromise on this issue (Ismail, 1995; Latif, 2008; Boland, 1971). The committee comprised Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, Ahmad Soebardjo, and Muhammad Yamin as the supporters of *Pancasila*; Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Haji Agus Salim, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (from an Islamic revivalist organization), and Abdul Wahid Hasyim (from an Islamic traditionalist organization) as proponents of Islam as the foundation of the state; and A.A. Maramis as the single Christian representative.

After lengthy debate this commission reached a solution that accommodated the interests of all parties – the Jakarta Charter. *Pancasila* was agreed to provide the foundation of the state, but the first principle was amended to: “belief in God with the obligation to practice *shari‘a* for its adherents (Muslims)”. These additional words later came to be known as ‘the seven words’ of the Jakarta Charter. Additionally, the Jakarta Charter also stipulated that the President of Indonesia be a Muslim and acknowledged Islam as the state religion (Effendy, 2003: 31; Boland, 1971: 33). Although the Islamic leaders in the commission were not successful in their goal of securing Islam as the basis for the state, the Jakarta Charter was warmly accepted by most Indonesian Muslim leaders. They expected that Indonesian Muslims would be able to live under the light of *shari‘a*, as they believed that Islam was *din wa daulah* (united in a religion and a state). For many secularists, the Jakarta Charter was regarded as the best outcome they could hope to achieve, although some members of the BPUPKI objected to it, including Lathuharhary (a Christian), and Hoesain Djajadiningrat and Wongsonegoro (both of whom were aristocrat *abangan*) (Ismail, 1995: 52–53). Those who rejected the Jakarta Charter argued that the implementation of *shari‘a* by the state would clash with customary laws and would force Muslims to be religious. Neutralizing the situation, Soekarno stated that the Jakarta Charter was the best political compromise that could be reached (Boland, 1971) – a statement that attempted to remind other members, particularly the secularists, to obey the agreement reached by the small committee. On 16 July 1945 the Charter was finally approved by the BPUPKI, and was used as part of the preamble for the Indonesian constitution. In addition, ‘the seven words’ were also included in Article 29 of The Constitution as a legal guarantee that it was obligatory for the state to formalize *shari‘a* for all Indonesian Muslims.

However, some secularist figures still wanted to revise the Jakarta Charter, as they were worried that it would negatively affect the unity of the Indonesian nation. This was indicated by their efforts to persuade the Islamic leaders who were involved in the BPUPKI to eliminate some ‘disturbing’ points of the charter (Ismail, 1995; Latif, 2008). The establishment of the PPKI (a committee which was the substitute of the BPUPKI, aiming to prepare Indonesian independence) on 7 August 1945 also marked the time when the secularists tried to renegotiate the Jakarta Charter. Twenty-seven Indonesian scholars and leaders were appointed as members of PPKI, while Soekarno and Muhammad Hatta were elected as the chairman and vice-chairman of this commission respectively. The Islamic leaders only had four representatives – Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Wahid Hasyim,⁴⁶ Teuku Hasan,⁴⁷ and Kasman Singodimedjo.⁴⁸ Muhammad Hatta arranged an unofficial meeting with these Islamic representatives, where he told them that several days ago some Christian figures from Eastern Indonesia had demanded that he cancel the Jakarta Charter and eliminate ‘the seven words’ (*shari‘a*) from the constitution, otherwise the eastern part of Indonesian would separate from Indonesia and create its own state (Hatta, 1982: 60).

Hatta was successful in persuading these Islamic leaders to cancel the agreement in the Jakarta Charter. Thus, in this meeting, the PPKI eliminated ‘the seven words’ and revised the clause to “belief in the One and only God”. After the declaration of Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945, the PPKI chose an Indonesian President and validated the constitution, which was known as *Undang-*

⁴⁶ Wahid Hasyim was the chairman of the Nahdatul ‘*ulama*’ (NU), an Islamic traditionalist organization, from 1946–1953 (Barton, 2002).

⁴⁷ Teuku Hassan was an activist of the Muhammadiyah, with expertise in law, which he studied at Leiden University (Latif, 2008). Due to his educational background, he is likely to be from an aristocratic *santri* family.

⁴⁸ Kasman Singodimedjo was an activist of the Masyumi – an Islamic political party consisting of Islamic organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and the NU – and a professor of law (Latif, 2008). His profession indicates that he came from the aristocratic *santri* circle.

Undang Dasar (UUD) 1945. The elimination of the Jakarta Charter and the retraction of ‘the seven words’ from the constitution meant that Indonesian Muslims did not have the right to implement *shari‘a* in the state.

This represented a significant problem for the Islamic leaders that were chosen to be representatives, as they had to placate their followers as well as the other Indonesian Islamic leaders who were disappointed with this outcome. It is perhaps surprising that there was no clear manifestation of social unrest or reprisals for this outcome. This indicates that the Islamic leaders were able (to some extent) to ensure their followers accepted the PPKI’s final decision. However, I argue that the acceptance of the decision did not mean that the Islamic leaders agreed to *shari‘a* being marginalized from the state arena.

The acceptance of the PPKI’s verdict shows that Islamic leaders adopted an ambiguous position regarding the status of the nation-state. Although they accepted the new independent ‘secular’ state, they were still planning to fight for ‘the seven words’ at the next available opportunity, and this lack of commitment to supporting the revised constitution confirmed their revivalist orientations – i.e. it confirmed their acceptance of the modern state, and their commitment to a state based on Islamic morality. They received their first opportunity to put these plans into action within the Constituent Assembly (Feith, 2007: 284), which was inaugurated in 1956 and was comprised of 514 members who were appointed through the first general election conducted in 1955. From this total number of members, 230 seats were representatives of Islamic leaders of the Masyumi⁴⁹ (112 seats), the NU (91 seats), and other Islamic parties (27 seats) (Effendy, 2003). On the other hand, the

⁴⁹ The Masyumi was established on November 1945 as the one and only Islamic political party for all Indonesian Muslims. At that time, all Islamic revivalist and traditionalist organizations were members and supporters of the Masyumi. Nevertheless, competition and conflict led the NU to resign from this political party and form its own in 1952 (the NU party), leaving the Muhammadiyah as the dominant supporter of Masyumi (Effendy, 2003; Latif, 2008).

secularists won 284 seats consisting of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) (119 seats), the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) (60 seats), the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo) (16 seats), and other parties (89 seats) (Effendy, 2003). The main duty of the Assembly was to amend and reformulate the constitution as the government and a number of Indonesian leaders had stated that UUD 1945 did not represent a fully developed constitution. They opined that the constitution was invalidated as it was formulated in too short a time and within a critical situation that involved significant contestation (Ismail, 1995). Therefore, Indonesian leaders expected that the Constituent Assembly would be able to contribute to the formulation of an improved Indonesian constitution.

The representatives of Islamic parties again raised the 'old' issue – the implementation of *shari'a* within the state's sphere of responsibility and legislation. They also criticized the Indonesian secularist leaders who had cancelled the Jakarta Charter. Isa Anshari, for instance – a politician from the Masyumi – accused the secularists of betraying the agreement of the Charter requiring the implementation of *shari'a* within state legislation. He stated that it was 'dishonest politics' for the Islamic clauses requiring Muslims to practice *shari'a* and the Indonesian president to be a Muslim to be deleted from the constitution (Ismail, 1995: 57; Effendy, 2003). Most Islamic leaders regarded this charter as a binding political compromise among Indonesian leaders that could not be annulled by commissions like the PPKI.

These criticisms from Islamic parties led to a heated debate in the Assembly, with the secularists again rejecting the proposal to embed *shari'a* in state legislation and insisting on preserving *Pancasila* and keeping the state neutral with regards to religious identity. The debate in the Constituent Assembly resulted in deadlock as neither side could gain the required majority of 2/3 of the Assembly, and neither

group wanted to compromise (Effendy, 2003; Boland, 1971). This situation was regarded as a critical one by President Soekarno, who feared that worse conflict could follow. As a result, the President issued a decree in 1959 that disbanded the Assembly and asserted UUD 1945 to be the final constitution (Feith, 2007).

After this decree, the relationship between Islamic leaders (organizations) and the government declined further, however. Most Islamic leaders were even more critical of the government, with the exception of the NU leaders, who acted pragmatically to increase their own power through building close connections with the government (Latif, 2008; Effendy, 2003), which led to NU leaders holding the position of Indonesia's Minister of Religion⁵⁰ from 1953. This conflict did not provoke the NU into becoming critical of the government or keeping its distance from it, and consequently the government became more trusting of NU leaders, retaining them as the exclusive leaders of the Ministry. A similar relationship was not seen between the government and Islamic revivalist leaders, however, with President Soekarno even accusing some prominent Masyumi leaders of being involved in a rebellion. As a result, the Masyumi was disbanded by the government in 1960, and its leaders were imprisoned until the collapse of the Soekarno regime in 1966 that came about as a result of the economic crisis, at which point the regime was replaced by the 'New Order' government (Feith, 2007).

⁵⁰ The Ministry of Religion was established in 1946. The Ministry was under the control of Masyumi figures from the time of its creation, although these figures originally came from the NU, Muhammadiyah, and Sarekat Islam. In 1952 the NU separated from Masyumi and created its own political party, using this to build a close relationship with the government and, as a result, President Soekarno gave the Ministry of Religion to the NU from 1953 until the collapse of his power in 1966 (Latif, 2008: 280–285).

2.5 New Order attitudes toward Islamic movements

The emergence of ‘the New Order’ (1966 to 1998) was accompanied by high expectations from many Islamic leaders, especially revivalists and modernists, who hoped that the new government would be more accommodative of Islamic interests. It is worth noting that the rise of the New Order relied on the support of Islamic organizations, especially Islamic youth movements like the Islamic Student Association (HMI).⁵¹ These Islamic organizations, together with other youth organizations, mobilized mass movements on the streets and within government offices to protest and condemn the ‘Old Order’ government and its allies – particularly the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)⁵² – for the economic crisis that occurred during the 1960s (Latif, 2008: 300–305). PKI was regarded by Islamic organizations as being anti-Indonesian, because they perceived it to be atheist and hostile to religion. Besides, the PKI was the strongest supporter of President Soekarno during the latter period of his reign (1950s–1966). Soon after the New Order was established, President Soeharto (the second President of Indonesia after Soekarno) marginalized Soekarno’s supporters and followers, especially those who were involved with the PKI. Consequently, the PKI’s leaders and followers became the main targets of the government. There were mass killings of its members by the government involving youth Islamic organizations – especially paramilitary wing of the NU –, with thousands dying (Hindley, 1970: 39; Latif, 2008: 289–290). The Islamic organizations thus not only played an important role in delegitimizing the Old Order regime, but also in destroying its strongest ally, the PKI. In addition,

⁵¹ HMI is an abbreviation of *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (Islamic Student Association). The organization was established in 1947 and has an Islamic reformist ideology. It is associated with the Islamic political party Masyumi (Effendy, 2003).

⁵² The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was established in 1920 by Marxist Indonesian nationalists, and became one of three dominant parties (PNI, the President’s political party; Masyumi; and PKI) in the Old Order period. Its main supporters were people from rural and lower class societies (Latif, 2008).

President Soeharto liberated all the Islamic leaders who had been jailed by the previous regime (Boland, 1971: 135–149). This was interpreted by Islamic leaders as suggesting that the new government would accommodate the interests of Islamic groups.

However, it was clear that the New Order government's attitude towards Islamic movements – especially Islamic political movements – was not so different to that of the Old Order government's. Although the President allowed Muslims to be active in Islamic political parties and to form new ones, he rejected some Islamic leaders' proposals to revitalize the Masyumi, and did not allow senior figures of the Masyumi to participate in a new Islamic political party (Crouch, 1981: 201). The government was suspicious that these senior Islamic leaders would still attempt to campaign for the formalization of *shari'a* unless they were subdued.

It is important to mention that the New Order behaved very differently to Islamic movements during two different periods of its rule. During the first two decades of its rule (1966–1988), the government restricted Islamic movements, particularly those with political aspirations, whereas during the last decade of its rule (1989–1998) it tried to establish close relationships with numerous Islamic movements (see Hefner, 2000). I argue that during the first phase of its rule, the New Order government adopted a repressive attitude towards Islamic movements due to the government's worry that the Islamic movements would undermine *Pancasila* as the foundation of the state and society.

During the first two decades of its rule, the New Order government controlled Islamic political movements. For instance, it interfered to change the leadership of the Parmusi (the Indonesian Muslims' Party), an Islamic political party which was founded in 1968 by younger generations of the Masyumi. The

appointment of a prominent senior leader of Masyumi – Mohammad Roem – as the chairman of Parmusi was the factor that led the government to become involved in a coup to replace this leader with one who had a close connection with the government (Crouch, 1978: 261–262). This government interference indicated that they did not provide ‘a space’ for senior leaders of the Masyumi in the political sphere due to their anxiety that these leaders would again stir up interest in the issue of embedding *shari‘a* in state legislation. Furthermore, the government also forbade all civil servants (employees working under the government) from being activists or members of certain political parties (Ward, 1974: 11). Through a regulation issued in 1970, the government decreed that civil servants have to be loyal to the government, and this rule implicitly forced them to support the government’s political party – *Golongan Karya* or *Golkar* (the Group who serves the government). This regulation significantly affected Islamic parties such as the Parmusi, because most of its members had been civil servants (Effendy, 2003). Both factors – the omission of prominent senior figures of the Masyumi and the 1970 regulation – meant that the Parmusi, which was regarded as the representation of the Masyumi, lost its appeal among urban and, as a result, only received 5.36 percent of the votes in the 1971 general election. This was a significant decline in comparison to the 20.9 percent that Masyumi received in the 1955 election (Effendy, 2003: 48), whilst the NU party remained relatively static, with 18.4 percent in 1955 (Feith, 1957: 58) and 18.67 percent in 1971 (Effendy, 2003: 48).

In addition, the government issued a regulation in 1973 that impacted negatively on both traditionalist and revivalist Islamic political parties. They merged all the Islamic parties, including the Parmusi and the NU party together as one, named *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or the PPP (the United Development Party).

As a result, there were then only three political parties: the PPP, the Golkar, and the PDI⁵³ (a blend of nationalist, socialist, and Christian parties) (Effendy, 2003: 49). Initially, it was good that the PPP could unite Muslim voters. Compared to the 1971 general election, in which Islamic parties received a 27.12 percent of the total vote between them, the result of the 1977 general election – in which they received 29.29 percent of the total vote as a single party – meant that they could secure their constituency (Effendy, 2003: 49). However, it was obvious that instead of increasing the quantity of its supporters, this merger brought the party into conflicts that were related either to ideology or to power-sharing. As a result, the votes that the party received began to significantly decrease – to 27.78 percent in 1982, then to 15.97 percent in 1987 (Effendy, 2003: 49). Moreover, beginning in 1973, the position of Minister of Religious Affairs – which had been exclusively occupied by the NU since 1953 – began to be given to Muslim scholars with modern educational backgrounds, including Abdul Mukti Ali⁵⁴ and Munawir Syazali.⁵⁵ This was because the regime intended to implement programmes requiring the modernization of the religious understanding of religions' adherents, particularly Muslims (see Kersten, 2015: 37-38).⁵⁶ As a result, no representatives of Islamic political parties remained in the cabinet from this time on.

After weakening Indonesia's Islamic political parties, the government then attempted to dilute the Islamic ideology of Islamic mass social organizations. A

⁵³ The PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) was mainly made up of former supporters of President Soekarno, most of whom were secularist Muslims, *abangan*, and members of lower class society, whilst a small number were Christians and socialists (Vatikiotis, 1993; Ricklefs, 2012).

⁵⁴ Abdul Mukti Ali became the Minister of Religious Affairs during 1973–1978. He is a Muslim scholar who obtained his doctoral degree majoring in Islamic Studies from McGill University in Canada in 1970s. His organizational background is as a member of the HMI – the youth wing of the Masyumi (revivalist party) (Assyaukanie, 2009; Latif, 2008).

⁵⁵ Munawir Syazali was the Minister of Religious Affairs during 1983–1993 (two periods). He graduated with a Masters in Politics from George Town University, USA. He was an activist of GPII (an Islamic youth organization with a revivalist orientation) (Latif, 2008).

⁵⁶ From 1978–1983, the Ministry was run by an individual with a military background – Ratu Alamsyah Prawiranegara.

regulation obligating all social and political organizations to use *Pancasila* as the sole foundation of their movements was issued by the government during the 1980s. In 1982, the President proposed the regulation in the People's Representative Assembly (DPR).⁵⁷ There was no objection from the DPR, and both the PPP and the PDI then substituted their Islamic ideology to that of *Pancasila*. In 1985, the government issued *Undang-Undang Keormasan* (the Regulation for Mass Organizations), emphasizing that socio-religious and student organizations had to adopt *Pancasila* as the sole ideological foundation of their organizations (Effendy, 1988: 58–128). This regulation, as Effendy explains, was based on the government's suspicions that there were groups that were trying to replace *Pancasila* with other ideologies, such as communism and Islamism.

These government policies – which either directly or indirectly impacted on Islamic political parties and Islamic social organizations – led many Islamic leaders to become frustrated, and feel that the government had intentionally marginalized Indonesian Muslims' interests. Although most Islamic organizations finally accepted the regulation and replaced their Islamic ideology with *Pancasila* officially, they did so begrudgingly and under compulsion, and heated debates continued within Islamic organizations like the Muhammadiyah and the HMI (Latif, 2008; Assyaukanie, 2009). Some of those who opposed the regulations became more critical, however, and began protesting the government through religious public meetings (*tabligh akbar*) in Jakarta in 1984, but this led to a backlash in which the government intimidated and imprisoned these 'rebels' and suppressed and restricted the discourse of Islamism within the public sphere even more. Consequently, Islamic leaders who disagreed with the New Order policy towards Islamic movements came

⁵⁷ See Suharto (1985: 11).

to see the government as being hostile to Muslim society in general. This poor relationship between the government and most Islamic leaders continued until the end of 1980s, at which time the government sought to re-evaluate their policy towards Islamic leaders for their own ends.

2.6 The rise of Islamic neo-modernism and the shift in the state's attitude to Islamic groups

The poor relationship between Islamic leaders and the state became a major concern for some of the younger generation of Islamic leaders seeking for a way to re-conceptualize the relationship between Islam and the nation-state at the beginning of 1970s (Latif, 2008). The issue of *shari'a* becoming state law had been raised several times (in 1945, 1957–59, and 1966-1968) by Islamic leaders, and had led to government reprisals against Muslim political organizations, so this became a vital point for these new generations to address (Effendy, 2003). Although the Islamic leaders had always been defeated by the secularists, they never gave up fighting for the formalization of *shari'a* within state legislation. This ongoing aim partially contributed to the development of Islamic social organizations, which were compelled to support their Islamic parties' goals unless they would be regarded as betraying Islam. However, the younger generations believed that this required the organizations to keep their distance from the government, and to keep out of economic, educational, and legal debates about the future of the nation-state (Barton, 1999). In other words, they saw that Muslims, even though they made up the majority of religious adherents in the Indonesian population, could not participate significantly in the development of Indonesia.

These younger Islamic leaders were the generation that grew up in the middle of the 1960s after the collapse of the Old Order regime, as members of youth Islamic organizations such as the HMI⁵⁸ (the Islamic Student Association), the PII⁵⁹ (the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement), the IPNU⁶⁰ (the Student Association of the NU) and the PMII⁶¹ (the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement) (Latif, 2008). They included Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendy, Ahmad Wahib, Dawam Rahardjo, and Abdurrahman Wahid.⁶² Among these figures, Nurcholish Madjid was the most prominent young Islamic leader, and was active in expressing Islamic neo-modernist ideas during the beginning of the 1970s (Kersten, 2015: 37; 2011). He studied in Islamic traditional schools (*pesantren*), obtained a bachelor degree from the State Islamic University (IAIN) of Jakarta in 1968, and later pursued a doctoral programme in Islamic Studies at Chicago University in the United States of America (1978–1984) (Barton, 1997). This educational background contributed to his deep understanding of Islamic doctrines and modernity. In addition, Madjid was the chairman of the HMI for two periods (1966–1969 and 1969–1971), and this position as the chairman of a large Islamic student organization led him to become actively involved in public discussions. While Madjid lived in Jakarta, Djohan Effendi, Dawam Rahardjo, and Ahmad Wahib were members of a limited discussion group conducted regularly in Yogyakarta between 1967 and 1971, which was supervised

⁵⁸ The HMI was established in 1947 by Muslim university students. Its activists had close relationships with Masyumi leaders (Latif, 2008).

⁵⁹ The PII was established in 1947. The organization was provided for school students. Its activists had close relationships with Masyumi leaders (Latif, 2008).

⁶⁰ The IPNU was established in 1954, and provided for school students who affiliated with the NU (Latif, 2008).

⁶¹ The PMII was established in 1960, and provided for university students who affiliated with the NU (Latif, 2008).

⁶² Abdurrahman Wahid was the Chairman of the NU (an Islamic traditionalist organization established in 1926) from 1984–1999, and President of Indonesia from 1999–2001.

by Abdul Mukti Ali⁶³ – a Muslim scholar who had just finished his doctoral degree majoring in Islamic Studies from McGill University in Canada, and who later became Minister of Religion in 1973 (Effendy, 2003: 69–70).

This group was active both through their organizations and as scholars in conducting discussions exploring the relationship between Islam and modernity, particularly in relation to the nation-state (Kersten, 2015). Moreover, they participated in the public discourse on this topic in magazines, newspapers, and public discussions, and their ideas were deeply controversial with their seniors. Indeed, most of these younger leaders joined organizations that were associated with Islamic modernist movements, with few of them coming from traditionalist Islamic organizations. I argue that the concern of the younger modernist generations about the poor relationship between their seniors and the state was the main factor that forced them to attempt to resolve this problem. In contrast to this group, the traditionalist NU still had a working relationship with the state (see further explanation in section 2.4.). Hence, its younger generations did not face the significant challenges that the younger modernist did. It is worth mentioning that Abdurrahman Wahid was one of the younger traditionalists who shared a common vision with the younger modernist leaders. Abdurrahman Wahid's father, Wahid Hasyim, was the Minister of Religion during the Old Order and, unlike his colleagues, who had been active in Indonesia during the middle of the 1960s, Abdurrahman Wahid had studied at al-Azhar in Egypt for two years, at the University of Bagdad in Iraq for several years, and at the University of Leiden in the

⁶³ During his time in the position of Minister of Religion, Mukti Ali played an important role in encouraging State Islamic Institutes (IAIN) – Islamic higher education institutions maintained by the government – to reform their curriculum in order to support substantialistic thinking about Islam (Kersten, 2015). This form of thinking involves “a reinterpretation [of Islam] focussing on the substance of Islamic teachings rather than its formal aspects” (Kersten, 2015: 37). Harun Nasution (1919–1998) – Mukti Ali's colleague, who also graduated from McGill University-Canada – was the most prominent Rector of IAIN-Jakarta during the 1970s, and was central in initiating the reform of the curriculum (see Kersten, 2015).

Netherlands for several months during 1963–71 (Barton, 2002: 83–101). Soon after he returned to Indonesia, he participated actively in public discourse through the mass media.

These new generations attempted to reconceptualise Islam in a way that was compatible with the nation-state. Their concern went beyond Islamic ‘modernist’ organizations, like the Muhammadiyah. Initially, the Muhammadiyah was perceived as an Islamic modernist movement due to its criticisms of the traditional form of Islam performed by rural Muslims and its introduction of a modern system of Islamic education during the colonial period (for further explanation, see section 3.3). However, in the 1980s, numerous scholars, including Nurcholish Madjid, questioned the modernist character of the Muhammadiyah on the basis of its conservative concerns focusing on the purification of rituals and faith (Boy, 2007). Unlike Azyumardi Azra who stated that the Muhammadiyah is an organizationally modernist movement but a theologically conservative one (Boy, 2007), I think that it is more accurate to say that during 1930s–1980s the movement expressed a broadly revivalist character. This can be seen from its focus on purification and its involvement in supporting the Islamization of the law (its support of the struggle for the seven words during 1945, 1957–1959, and 1966–1968).

Its new generations endeavoured to establish an updated form of Islamic modernism, however. Many scholars, including Greg Barton (1997) and Fazlur Rahman (1982), refer to this new type as Islamic neo-modernism. They argue that the difference between modernism and neo-modernism is that, while the former only focuses on (Western) modern practical knowledge, the latter is also concerned with (Western) modern political and culture and society such as democracy, the separation of religion and state, human rights, religious pluralism, religious freedom,

and multiculturalism (see Barton, 1997; Rahman, 1982). Their difference was caused by different contexts; colonial for the classical modernism and post-colonial for neo-modernism. In the colonial context modernists attempted to survive from colonialism and called for modernizing their social life by adopting (Western) modern sciences. While in post-colonial era, particularly during 1970-1980s, neo-modernists endeavoured to counter revivalist movement rising in this period contesting secular ideology of the rulers. Moreover, neo-modernist tried to convince Muslims that secular ideology is rooted in Islamic doctrines and tradition. Further explanation on this issue can be seen in section 1.4.2. It is noteworthy that the modernist and neo-modernist share a common view in terms of their concerns on how to reconcile Islam with modernity. I agree with Barton and Rahman's use of 'neo-modernism' for describing this new type of Islamic modernism.

These neo-modernists argued that the basis for the *Pancasila* was similar to that of the Medina Charter that was created by the Prophet Muhammad, as both aimed to bind various religious followers under a common vision. According to their interpretation, under the Prophet Muhammad's leadership, the Medina Charter accommodated religions without prioritizing one religion over others (see Madjid, 1991: 11-18). In their opinion, the *Pancasila* functioned in a similar way to the Medina Charter. Hence, they concluded that it is not right to position the *Pancasila* as being in conflict with Islam, and thus Muslims should distinguish between the sacred doctrines of Islam that cannot be reinterpreted or changed, and the profane ones that can be reconceptualised. For them, Islamism, as campaigned for by their predecessors, was not a sacred doctrine, because neither the Qur'an nor the Prophet ever commanded or instructed Muslims to establish an Islamic state. The concept of

the Islamic state was conceptualised by later Muslim generations from the Twentieth Century (see Madjid, 1991).

This new understanding of Islam justified *Pancasila* and the nation-state without ignoring the pride of Muslim societies. Given that these new generations constructed a historical basis of Islam that was in accordance with *Pancasila* and the nation-state, they were not betraying the goals of Islamic communities. They deconstructed the ‘old goal’ of aiming to make Islam superior to other religions and implementing *shari‘a* as a state law for Muslims. In other words, they had begun creating new goals that placed Islam alongside other religions as a contributor towards Indonesian development. Although their ideas were controversial, and were resisted by many senior Islamic leaders, they gradually began to attract support from younger urban Muslims.

The Islamic neo-modernism offered by these younger leaders also justified the positions of those who were active in ‘secular’ parties, especially in the Golkar, many of whom were civil servants who affiliated with Islamic organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and the HMI (for further details, see section 2.5). Previously, those who participated in the Golkar had been regarded as opportunists, and as betrayers of Islam. Islamic neo-modernism, however, emphasized that the substance or values of Islam could be maintained without Islamic symbols. Madjid introduced a well-known saying: “Islam yes, Islamic parties no” (Madjid, 1970: 2) – a slogan that was used to describe the idea that Islamic values such as humanism, egalitarianism, human rights, welfare, and social justice are obligatory for Muslims, but this does not mean that Muslims have to participate in or vote for Islamic parties. For Madjid (1970), Muslims were allowed to be involved in any parties, including secular ones, so long as they fought for Islamic values.

These Islamic neo-modernist ideas strengthened the trend for Islamic activists to join Golkar, most of whom came from Islamic 'modernist' organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and the HMI. Although some of these activists were still loyal to the PPP (Islamic party), the majority were attracted to the government's party. They assumed that the chance to contribute significantly to the development of the state was the more important goal, and that it would be easier for them to find positions in bureaucracy, parliament, or other government-affiliated institutions (see Effendy, 2003; Latif, 2008; Assyaukanie, 2009).

I argue that the rise of the neo-modernist orientation among the younger generation influenced the government's attitude towards dealing with Islamic political interests, even though this was not the only factor that had an impact on it. By the end of the 1980s, the New Order government had shown its shifting attitude toward the political orientation of Islamic movements by implementing Islamic family law, building numerous mosques and founding an institution for Islamic alms called BAZIS (*Badan Zakat, Infaq, dan Sedekah*) (Effendy, 2003: 151–166), which helped Muslims to collect donations nationally for supporting Islamic education, healthcare for poor Muslims etc. Furthermore, some younger Islamic leaders from the HMI, including Akbar Tanjung and Mar'ie Muhammad, were appointed as government ministers, whilst many other Islamic activists (particularly from the HMI and the Muhammadiyah) were selected to become members of parliament (Hefner, 2000: 142; Effendy, 2003). In addition, the government supported the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia (ICMI) at the beginning of the 1990s. This association was a medium used by Islamic scholars and leaders to influence government policies on economic and social affairs (Hefner, 2000).

Here, I partially agree with Robert Hefner's (2000) and Michael Vatikiotis' (1993) argument that this shift in government attitudes occurred as a result of President Soeharto seeking new allies after realizing that a number of prominent military leaders were no longer loyal to him. Up until this point, the President had relied on military support to consolidate his power, as Soeharto himself was a military General, and the highest commander in the military at the collapse of the Old Order. The weakness of the President's control over the military at the end of the 1980s was also documented by William Liddle (1992: 61), an expert on Indonesian politics.

However, Hefner (2000), Vatikiotis (1993), and Liddle's (1992) analysis places too much emphasis on the relationship between the President and the military, ignoring the shifting cultural dynamics that were seen at the end of the 1980s. I argue that, in addition to the loss of military support, the influence of Islamic neo-modernist thought had grown considerably within the Indonesian public sphere, and that this also contributed to the weakening of the President's concerns about the political designs and opposition of the Islamic movement. The Islamic figures that the President appointed in his cabinet were sympathizers towards Islamic neo-modernism such as Akbar Tanjung and Mar'i Muhammad. The leaders in the ICMI – the Islamic organization that was expected to be the think tank of the government – were mostly sympathizers towards neo-modernism, or not revivalists at the very least (Hefner, 2000). This shows that the government expected these Islamic movements to be dominated by neo-modernist groups, which could legitimize his power and be used to counter the potential political threat from the military. The shift also indicated that the government was not afraid that the rise of

these Islamic figures or groups would threaten religious plurality or the secular nature of modern Indonesia.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the polarization that occurred between Muslims in relation to the secular character of the nation-state. During the preparation of Indonesian independence in 1945, Muslims divided themselves into revivalists and secularists, with revivalists seeking to include *shari'a* in the state constitution and insisting that any President must be a Muslim, and secularists insisting that the state remain religiously neutral. This polarization had begun to occur with the first emergence of the idea of the nation-state among Indonesian leaders during the colonial period at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, and continued during post-colonial Indonesia.

The secularists were aristocrats who received benefits from the Netherlands' policy for modernizing Indonesia, which provided this upper class society with privileges for obtaining modern educations in either Indonesian or Holland with the aim of developing modernity in the country. After graduating, members of the aristocracy were given positions in bureaucracy, supporting the colonial administration. This is why the aristocrats were 'well-prepared' to continue managing the state when Indonesia was freed from colonialism, as they already held a conception of the modern state that was relatively secular.

Unlike the secularists, most revivalists were not aristocrats, so they did not have opportunities to study in Western educational settings, only being able to access Islamic schools. Even though they learned about modernity – particularly from Islamic modernist thinkers in Egypt, such as Abduh and Rashid Rida – what

they were taught about modernity was different from the aristocrats. The form of modernity developed by these Egyptian modernist thinkers had been reinterpreted and reconceptualised, so the future Indonesian Islamic leaders studying modernity in Egypt received different teachings on how to construct the nation-state.

The polarization between revivalists and secularists in post-colonial Indonesia had its roots in the colonial era. The revivalists derived their outlooks from the *santri* (devout Muslims), while the secularists' attitudes came from the *abangan* (nominal Muslims), particularly the aristocrat *abangan*. The factor that united the lower and the aristocrat *abangan* was their loyalty to Javanese or local beliefs. Although they were officially Muslims, they were not strict in practicing Islamic rituals, which they mixed together with the Javanese faith. Similarly, the *santri* consisted of the lower and middle classes, with the background of the lower class *santri* being one of Islamic traditionalists living in rural areas as farmers, while that of the middle class *santri* was as revivalists, living in urban areas, mostly working as traders.

I also argued in this chapter that the repressive attitude that the Old Order (especially at the end of its rule) and the New Order (at the beginning of its rule) took toward revivalist movements encouraged new generations affiliating with revivalist groups to re-conceptualize the relationship between Islam and the state. Unlike their seniors, who fought for *shari'a* to be incorporated into the state's constitution and legislation, these new generations campaigned for a neo-modernist form of Islam that legitimized the secular nature of the modern state.

Chapter 3

The Muhammadiyah's Changes in Attitude towards the Nation-State in Indonesia

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter explained the relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia, particularly during the post-colonial period. I argued that the repressive approach adopted towards revivalist movements with political orientations by the Old Order government in the 1960s, and by New Order from the 1960s to the 1980s, encouraged younger revivalist generations to re-conceptualize the relationship between Islam and the state.

In this chapter, I investigate how the Muhammadiyah has dealt with the relationship between Islam, society, and the state from the colonial through to the post-colonial period. I elaborate on the social and political context from which the organization emerged and developed, and explore the early ideology of the movement, as well as its swings from one period to another. The Muhammadiyah's ideology has not remained monolithic or static. During the early phase of the movement it showed modernist leanings (Jainuri, 1997) through its support of the Dutch government's establishment of 'secular' schools, and its calls for Muslims to study modern sciences and to interpret Islam rationally. However, there were also significant indications that the Muhammadiyah also developed revivalist ideologies later on. Its numerous efforts to purify Islam from local traditional elements and to Islamize the state indicate that the Muhammadiyah came to be strongly driven by a revivalist outlook. I will argue that these different features of the Muhammadiyah should be explained by the fact that its ideology has been contested by its leaders

and activists. This chapter helps me to investigate the nature and the ideology of the Muhammadiyah, the social classes that its elites and members come from, the power relations among the leaders at different levels of the organization and the impact of these on the swings in its ideology.

In this thesis I do not make use of Munir Mulkhan's (2000) classification of the different orientations within the Muhammadiyah because I think it only has relevance in a particular local area. In his ethnography of Wuluhan,⁶⁴ a small district in East Java, Mulkhan (2000) asserted that there are four wings in the Muhammadiyah, namely: i) al-Ikhlās (a puritanical faction that is very hostile to 'un-Islamic' local tradition); ii) Dahlan's faction (those who are puritanical but more tolerant of local or Javanese tradition); iii) the Muhammadiyah-NU faction (those who have a background in NU families and tradition but have officially 'converted' to the Muhammadiyah); and iv) the Marhaenis Muhammadiyah faction or Nationalist Muhammadiyah (those who were supporters of the PKI and PNI, but then joined the Muhammadiyah after 1965). However, I think that Mulkhan's typology is only relevant in Wuluhan. The majority of inhabitants there are farmers with most being supporters of the PKI (a Communist party) and PNI (a secular nationalist party led by Soekarno, the first Indonesian president). Based on my research I could not observe the same four-fold typology more widely. Furthermore, no other research confirms it. Even Mulkhan (2000: 9) himself emphasized that the trend in Wuluhan which saw farmers join the Muhammadiyah deviated from the general picture. Generally Muhammadiyah members from farming backgrounds represent under 10% (Mulkhan, 2000: 9).

⁶⁴ Wuluhan is the area in which Mulkhan conducted his anthropological research in 1990. Its inhabitants were dominantly supporters of PKI (Indonesian communist party) and PNI (nationalist party belonged to the first President of Indonesia). In 1965-1966 the Indonesian military (ABRI) and Islamic civilian paramilitaries killed thousands of PKI supporters and marginalized PNI activists. To save themselves from this massive killing, they joined the Muhammadiyah (see Mulkhan, 2000).

I begin by describing Ahmad Dahlan's life, educational background, class background, and social networks. I argue that these all contributed to shaping his thoughts and concerns about modernist Islamic ideas. As he studied at Mecca for several years, built close relationships with scholars and activists who were concerned with reforming Muslim faith and practice, and came from an aristocratic social class that the Dutch colonial government had expected to be the main 'home-grown' means for modernizing Indonesia, Dahlan was influenced by both Islamic modernist thinkers and secular modernist thinkers.

The next section will then discuss the Muhammadiyah under Dahlan's leadership (1912–1923) and argue that the Muhammadiyah had a modernist character under Ahmad Dahlan's leadership, as he was a modernist scholar campaigning for modernist ideas through this organization. His support for religious pluralism indicated by his dialogue and openness to 'truth' from numerous different sources (religions), and his belief that rationality was the main tool for understanding religion show that Dahlan was a modernist rather than a revivalist, as scholars such as Suaidi Asyari (2007) have argued. Through the Muhammadiyah, Dahlan attempted to adopt Western modernity whilst nurturing Islamic piety and preserving Javanese identity.

In the next part of the chapter I proceed to examine the Muhammadiyah immediately after Dahlan's leadership (1923–1932). The dynamic of political context and the change in leadership resulted in a shift to the Muhammadiyah becoming critical of the state and hostile towards Christian movements, even though it still appreciated Javanese identity. Its new leaders were inspired by idea of Pan-Islamism and Islamic identity, and I argue that its revivalist ideology began to emerge during this period.

The following part of the chapter will then explore the next step in the development of the movement (1932–1940s). The revivalist ideology became even stronger during this period due to the increasing influence of the Wahhabi in Mecca that spread to Indonesia through Indonesian pilgrims and students. The movement began to criticize and eliminate culture and tradition, which were perceived as not being in line with ‘true’ Islam. I argue that the shift in the composition of Muhammadiyah’s elites and members from those with Javanese aristocrat *santri* backgrounds to members who were traders contributed to the nurture of the revivalist ideology.

The final section investigates the Muhammadiyah in post-colonial Indonesia. I argue that the revivalist ideology continued to grow stronger in the organization, and led the Muhammadiyah to participate in campaigning for the importance of Islamic identity in the modern nation-state. As a result, the movement came into opposition with the government, particularly during the Old Order (1945–1966), although there was some change of attitude among the elites during the New Order government (1966–1998). I argue that during the New Order era, the Muhammadiyah elites were theologically conservative, but politically pragmatic. ‘*Ulama* (singular: ‘*alim*) and intelligentsia went in two different directions, but they did not disturb each other.

3.2 Ahmad Dahlan

Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan (1868–1923), the founder and first chairman of the Muhammadiyah, was a Javanese *santri* aristocrat,⁶⁵ and the son of a *chatib* or *ketib*

⁶⁵ The aristocrats were the social class who received privileges to access Western (Dutch) education in Indonesia during the colonial period. Most aristocrats were *abangan* (nominal Muslims),

(religious functionary) at the Sultanate of Yogyakarta⁶⁶ – an Islamic kingdom established in Central Java in 1755. His father and grandfathers were the royal officials (*chatib*) in religious affairs appointed by the Sultan. Besides his activities as a *batik* (a Javanese cloth trader), Dahlan himself was appointed as one of the twelve members of the *chatib*, replacing his father after his death – a position passed from fathers to their sons. The *chatib*, established in the Mataram Sultanate during the Sixteenth Century,⁶⁷ were royal servants, and those who occupied this position were thus regarded as members of the (lower and *santri*) aristocratic class (Alfian, 1989: 144). Being from a family of *santri* aristocrats, Dahlan was educated in Islamic traditional schools (*pesantren*) and spent several years in Mecca⁶⁸ studying Islamic subjects. It is thus no surprise that although he was an aristocrat, and thus had the opportunity to study at Western (Dutch) schools, his family preferred to send him to Islamic schools. He studied in Mecca for several years between 1890 and 1905, going to Mecca twice – first when he was twenty-two years old (1890) and the second during 1903–1905 (Shihab, 1995). He studied in Mecca under the supervision of Syekh Ahmad Khatib Al-Minangkabawi (1860–1915), an Indonesian Muslim scholar from Minangkabau, West Sumatra.

A decade before Dahlan established the Muhammadiyah, he had publicly asserted that mosques in Yogyakarta were facing in the wrong direction. Based on the astronomic science he learned from Mecca, he believed that Muslims conducting

but a few of the aristocrats were *santri* (further information about aristocrats and *santri* can be found in section 2.3).

⁶⁶ The Sultanate of Yogyakarta was the continuity of the Sultanate of Mataram (see section 2.2). The declining of the Mataram, as the result of a war with the Dutch colonial government, had split the Sultanate into the Yogyakarta and the Surakarta Sultanates in 1755 (see Carey, 2007).

⁶⁷ Further information about the Mataram Sultanate is provided in section 2.2.

⁶⁸ Mecca is the holy city of Muslims in Saudi Arabia, where the Prophet Muhammad was born, and where Islam grew and developed during the 6th Century (Hurgronje, 2007).

prayer (*salat*) in the mosques did not face the *qibla*⁶⁹ correctly. Therefore, Dahlan recommended that members of the *chatib* change the worship direction of mosques. His call was rejected by some *chatib*, and this resulted in conflict due to Dahlan's response, insisting on revising the direction of *salat* through marking the new direction in the mosques. Those who disagreed with Dahlan's movement mobilized people and destroyed Dahlan's small mosque near to his house. This conflict led the Sultan of Yogyakarta to send Dahlan to Mecca for two years (1903–1905) in order to diffuse the tension (Alfian, 1989). It is worth mentioning that this issue marked Dahlan's early reform movement after his return from his first pilgrimage to Mecca (Asyari, 2007). His conflict with other *chatib*, his second pilgrimage to the holy city, and his encounter with a secular modernist organization – the Budi Utomo – contributed to the shift in Dahlan's later movement, which became more concerned with the modernization of Islamic education and Islamic interpretation (Alfian, 1989).

Dahlan's initiative in campaigning for reform was inspired by Islamic figures that he knew when he was staying in Mecca. It is not clear when Dahlan came to reject *taqlid* (following and performing strict forms of *madhhab*) for all schools of law (*madhhab*) or where he actually studied. Ahmad Khatib, who was Dahlan's supervisor, was not a scholar (*'alim*) who denied *taqlid* for *madhhab*. He was an *Imam* (religious supreme leader) of the Shafi'i *madhhab* in Mecca. However, Khatib was different to the previous *Imam*, Syekh Nawawi al-Bantani (d.1897) – an Indonesian Muslim scholar from Banten, West Java (Laffan, 2003). Khatib was well known for being a Shafi'ite scholar who was critical of the local culture in Minangkabau, which he perceived as not being in line with Islamic teachings. In

⁶⁹ *Qibla* is the direction of Muslims' worship, at which the *Ka'ba* (the oldest sacred building established by the Prophet Ibrahim) is located.

addition, Khatib did not prohibit his pupils from reading Islamic modernist literature, such as the work of Jamaludin al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida. He even suggested that his students read their ideas (Laffan, 2003: 112; Alfian, 1989: 102), and although there were rumours that his reason for encouraging his students to read these modernist thinkers was to make them capable of criticizing modernist thoughts, this was still a progressive attitude that was not found among other traditionalist Muslim scholars in Mecca at the time. Regarding this issue, Deliar Noer (1973) – an Indonesian scholar in the Islamic movement – suggested that it was Dahlan’s personal effort that led him to be a modernist (Noer, 1973). It was probable that after arriving in Mecca, the freedom that Dahlan’s supervisor provided him with enabled him to develop his modernist ideas through reading Abduh and Afghani.

Dahlan’s encounter with modernist ideas continued after his return to Indonesia. He often read *al-Manar* – a magazine maintained by two modernist scholars, Abduh and Rida – and after returning from his second pilgrimage, he became closer to an Islamic organization named Jam’iyyat Khair (the Association for the Good), which was founded in 1905 in Indonesia. This organization was maintained by Arabic Muslim scholars and descendants of the Arabic people, whose activists were interested in the modernist thought developed by Afghani, Abduh, and Rida. These similar interests led Dahlan to become involved in the Jam’iyyat Khair, and Dahlan was put on to Abduh’s works and the magazine *al-Manar* through their activists (Jainuri, 1997: 28).

Besides his activities in the Jami’iyyat Khair, Dahlan was also involved with a secular modernist organization called Budi Utomo since its establishment in Yogyakarta in 1908. The purpose of this organization was to support Javanese

people, particularly the aristocratic class, in dealing with the Javanese culture and modernity, and to achieve this end the organization focused on education. The membership of Budi Utomo was limited to Javanese aristocrats alone, with most of its members being royal officials of the Yogyakarta Sultanate and Dutch officials, such as local administrators and teachers at Dutch schools (Koentjaraningrat, 1989: 76–78; Nagazumi, 1972). As Dahlan was part of this aristocrat network, he was invited to join the organization. It is worth mentioning that Dahlan was initially the only *santri* aristocrat to join the Budi Utomo, which fits with Geertz's (1960) and Ricklef's (2007) findings that *santri* tended to join Islamic organizations. Later, Dahlan asked other *santri* aristocrats who were board members of the Muhammadiyah to join the Budi Utomo. It seems that leaders of the Budi Utomo felt comfortable with Dahlan's religious views, and hence allowed Dahlan to teach Islamic subjects in Budi Utomo's schools (Niel, 1984: 17), even appointing him as one of the heads of a division in the Budi Utomo organization.

3.3 The Muhammadiyah in the Dahlan Period

Dahlan's educational background and relationships, particularly with the Budi Utomo, led him to gather close friends and students, most of whom were *santri* aristocrats,⁷⁰ and to establish an Islamic organization named Muhammadiyah in 1912 (Alfian, 1989: 152). Support from the Budi Utomo was very important in helping Dahlan gain permission from the Dutch government to do this, as strict requirements for establishing organizations were set by the government. In addition,

⁷⁰ The first leaders of the Muhammadiyah were mostly Javanese (*santri*) aristocrats, as can be seen from the label in front of their names – *Raden* or *Mas*. They were: Mas Pengulu Abdullah Sirat, Raden Haji Ahmad, Haji Abdul Rahman, Raden Haji Sarkawi, Mas Gebajan Haji Muhammad, Raden Haji Jaelani, Haji Anis, and Mas Tjarik Haji Muhammad Pakih. Dahlan himself was labelled Kyai Mas Ahmad Dahlan (Alfian, 1989: 144).

the Budi Utomo assisted the Muhammadiyah in developing modern Islamic schools, particularly in providing teachers and designing ‘modern’ subjects for these schools. This close relationship led some Budi Utomo elites and members to also join and become officials of the Muhammadiyah (Alfian, 1989: 158).

The main activity of the Muhammadiyah in this formative period was in providing education. In 1912, the organization established a school in which ‘secular’ and religious subjects were both taught (Alfian, 1989: 169), and this school was subsidized by the Dutch government which, through the department of Religious Affairs, had guaranteed that native schools providing religious and ‘secular’ subjects would receive funding (Alfian, 1989: 169). I could not find any information on the exact number of schools that were operated by the Muhammadiyah in the Dahlan era, but in Yogyakarta alone, by the end of Dahlan’s leadership (1923), there were at least four schools run by the organization (Alfian, 1989: 170–171).

Whether the Muhammadiyah during its early period and leadership by Dahlan was a revivalist or modernist movement is debatable. Suaidi Asyari, in his doctoral dissertation, noted that Dahlan himself had a similar outlook to the Wahhabists in Saudi Arabia in the Eighteenth Century. This was indicated by Dahlan’s campaign criticizing the direction of *qibla* in Yogyakarta’s mosques, which did not face exactly towards Mecca (Asyari, 2007: 32–34). For Asyari, such a criticism was typical of the Wahhabist movement, and hence he concluded that Dahlan also held a Wahhabist outlook during the formative period of the Muhammadiyah. In contrast to Asyari, Muhammad Alfian (1989) – a scholar who conducted his doctoral research on the Muhammadiyah and Politics in the Dutch Colonial Era – asserts that under Dahlan’s leadership, the Muhammadiyah adopted a

pragmatic outlook (Alfian, 1989: 150), which can be seen in its strategy of building close relationships with non-Muslim organizations, such as Christian movements and the Dutch colonial government.

I argue that Dahlan was neither Wahhabist nor pragmatic, however, but rather an Islamic modernist scholar who campaigned for modernist ideas through the Muhammadiyah. I agree with Jainuri's contention that Dahlan was, theologically, a modernist figure, as he held that 'truth' need not originate from a certain group or religion, but could emerge from numerous sources (Jainuri, 1997: 70; Hadjid: 10).⁷¹ He criticized Muslim leaders who claimed that they were in possession of 'the ultimate truth' from God, and who rejected 'truths' from other groups. Furthermore, Dahlan asserted that happiness lay in using rationality to understand Islam (Dahlan, 2002: 346), which indicates that Dahlan placed rationality at a central position for understanding revelation. This position shares similarities with those of Afghani, Abduh, and Ahmad Khan (the prominent modernist scholars living in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries) (see Esposito, 2010; Binder, 1988; Rahman, 1982; Kurzman, 2002). Based on this view of rationality, Dahlan suggested that Muslims should build a dialogue among religious followers and discuss religions rationally in order to find the 'truth' inherent in their teachings (Salam, 1962: 59; Jainuri, 1997: 72).

Furthermore, Dahlan stated that although Islam was revealed by God, Muslims received Islam through interpretations of '*ulama* that were influenced by their social and cultural settings (Jainuri, 1997: 113). In addition, he did not regard the Arabic language as being part of the Islam, so allowed Muslims who had difficulty memorizing the *Qur'an*'s verses and prayers in Arabic during *salat*

⁷¹ I had difficulty in accessing Dahlan's articles, as he only wrote a few articles, and some of them have been lost. Dahlan's Islamic thought was mostly communicated through his students.

(prayer) to use their own languages (Javanese or Malay). He also recommended that *'ulama* use vernacular language in delivering speeches at the Friday sermon (*khutbah Jum'at*) (Burhani, 2004: 64). The use of vernacular language in both prayer and speeches at the Friday sermon were very controversial, particularly among traditionalist *'ulama*, and I argue that this adoption of religious pluralism, tolerance, rationality, and modern ideas enabled and encouraged Dahlan to form close relationships between the Muhammadiyah and other groups, such as Christian missionaries, 'secular' activists, and the Dutch colonial government.

Dahlan not only promoted his pluralist and rationalist ideas in lectures, but also demonstrated them in his social and political life. He did not hesitate to learn from 'secularist' movements such as the Budi Utomo or to be an activist for them, and worked with the Dutch government to develop modern schools. These sorts of practices were shunned by other Muslim leaders and scholars of the time, and Dahlan was often mocked by traditionalist Muslim scholars for being a false Muslim scholar (Alfian, 1989: 162–163), who also chided that Dahlan's movement was a Christian organization masquerading as an Islamic movement (Jainuri, 1997: 108; Salam, 1968: 12–13).

Through this organization, Dahlan hoped that the *'ulama* in the Muhammadiyah would become *berkemajuan* (progressive) (Alfian, 1989: 149), and used to tell his students to "be progressive *'ulama*" (Wirjosukarto, 1965; Alfian, 1989). The term 'progressive', as Umniyah (one of Dahlan's students) explained, was supposed to capture the idea of *'ulama* who understand the development of the modern world and can provide themselves with 'secular' knowledge (Wirjosukarto, 1965: 58).

Dahlan's modernist ideas were institutionalized in the Muhammadiyah. He also taught his modernist interpretations to his students and to Muhammadiyah members through regular religious meetings (*ta'lim*), established modern schools providing 'secular' subjects –as taught in Dutch schools – and Islamic subjects (*Qur'anic* studies, Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), Islamic faith (*aqidah*), Islamic morality (*akhlak*), and the history of Islam), as taught in Islamic traditional education (Alfian, 1989). It can be concluded that the schools attempted to produce devout Muslims who were also aware of and familiar with modernity. These Muhammadiyah schools attracted students from middle class and lower class families, particularly those who did not have the opportunity to study at Dutch schools. Although the Muhammadiyah under Dahlan was a small organization, whose boards were dominated by Javanese aristocrats that were affiliated with Dahlan's family and friends and existed only in Yogyakarta, it nonetheless played a significant role in establishing Islamic modern education.

As a result, the Muhammadiyah movement attracted Javanese aristocrats, merchants, and other middle class Muslims from Java and beyond. This upper and middle class asked Dahlan to expand Muhammadiyah outside Yogyakarta (Alfian, 1989; Burhani, 2004; Asyari, 2007), and some representatives of the Budi Utomo from outside Yogyakarta even offered Dahlan support to establish Muhammadiyah's branches in their locations after hearing him speak at a Budi Utomo congress in 1917 (Asyari, 2007: 54). I argue that there were two reasons why secular aristocrats in the Budi Utomo became more interested in getting involved with and expanding the Muhammadiyah. The first, as mentioned above, was that many Budi Utomo elites were involved in establishing and developing the Muhammadiyah from the very beginning, so probably felt that the Muhammadiyah was part of the Budi

Utomo. The elites of the Muhammadiyah were also Javanese aristocrats, and Dahlan himself was the headship of the Budi Utomo. Additionally, however, Dahlan's ideas concerning Islam and modernization fitted the Budi Utomo's mindset, as can be seen from the fact that they allowed Dahlan to teach Islamic subjects in Budi Utomo schools.

Therefore, I argue that the main factor that attracted these upper and middle class Muslims to Muhammadiyah was not a puritan or revivalist character – such as the purification of Islamic rituals, faith, and behaviours – but its modernist nature, indicated by its support of modern schools, the high place it accorded to the role of rationality in religion, its inclusiveness of Christian and other non-Islamic movements, and its emphasis on the value of combining Islamic and 'secular' knowledge. It is certain that, during this chapter of its history, the Muhammadiyah did not have the revivalist outlook that was later developed after Dahlan's death.

It is not clear whether the modernist Islamic nature that the Muhammadiyah had during Dahlan's leadership contributed to its attitudes toward political and religious issues such as nationhood and the Islamic state, as there was no obvious evidence indicating that the Muhammadiyah even discussed the concept of nationhood and the state at this time. However, the discourse of nationhood has been found in periodicals (magazines, newspapers, and journals), such as *Wazier Indie*,⁷² *al-Imam*,⁷³ *al-Munir*,⁷⁴ and *al-Islam*,⁷⁵ published by Islamic groups at the beginning

⁷² *Wazier Indie* was regarded by Michael Laffan (2003: 145–147) to be the first newspaper published in Batavia in 1878 that mentioned the concept of *umma* and nationhood.

⁷³ *Al-Imam* was a periodical established in 1906, maintained by Syeikh Tahir Jalaludin al-Azhari, an 'alim born in Minangkabau, West Sumatra, Indonesia. Although al-Imam's office was in Singapore, where Tahir Jalaludin lived for the rest of his life, al-Imam spread widely amongst Indonesian revivalist and modernist 'ulama. In addition, Tahir Jalaludin's former students – prominent revivalist 'ulama in West Sumatra such as Haji Rosul (full name, Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah – the founder of the Muhammadiyah in West Sumatra) (1875–1945), Haji Abdullah Ahmad (1878–1933), and Syeikh Muhammad Djamil Djambek (1860–1947) – were regular contributors for al-Imam. They studied in Mecca under the supervision of Syeikh Ahmad Khatib al-Minangkabawi and Syeikh Tahir Jalaludin in the 1890s (see Laffan, 2003).

of the Twentieth Century in Indonesia (Laffan, 2003: 148–180). It is probable that Sarekat Islam (SI) was utilized to accommodate the political views of the Muhammadiyah, because many elite members of the Muhammadiyah joined the movement.⁷⁶ At the same time, the Muhammadiyah itself was more focused on education, and largely avoided dealing with political issues.

Although no explicit discussion concerning Islam and national identity has been documented within the Muhammadiyah during the Dahlan period, their dress codes and use of language at this time suggest that the organization was trying to form compromises between Islamic, Javanese, and Western identities. Dahlan and other Muhammadiyah elites always dressed in either Javanese aristocratic or Western styles, wearing trousers and a tie instead of Arabic dress, as traditionalist *'ulama* did. Thus, it appears that they wanted to emphasize the idea that being a devout Muslim does not require people to reject their Javanese identities or all aspects of Western culture. This 'blending' of cultures was performed through several mediums, as seen in their utilization of both the Javanese and the Islamic calendar in official Muhammadiyah letters, and their use of Javanese or Latin script rather than Arabic *pegon*⁷⁷ (Burhani, 2004; Ricklefs, 1998: 37). I suggest that there were two reasons why the Muhammadiyah chose to blend Islam, Javanese, and Western culture. The first was that, during Dahlan's leadership, Muhammadiyah was still based in Yogyakarta – the centre of Javanese culture, which was preserved

⁷⁴ *Al-Munir* was published by Haji Abdullah Ahmad, a revivalist *'alim* from Minangkabau, who studied in Mecca (see Laffan, 2003 for further details).

⁷⁵ *Al-Islam* was a periodical published by Sarekat Islam (SI) in 1916 (see Laffan, 2003 for further details).

⁷⁶ It was not clear whether the SI regarded all religious followers (Muslims, Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists) to have the same rights and obligations as citizens. On the one hand, the SI conceptualized nationhood to include people who live in the same region regardless their religions. On the other hand, the organization considered Islam to be the common identity for uniting Indonesian people (Laffan, 2003: 166–169).

⁷⁷ *Pegon* is the Javanese or Malay language that uses Arabic script. Most traditionalist *'ulama* used the *pegon* in writing, as they regarded the Arabic script as 'superior' to other forms (Ricklefs, 2007).

by the Sultan of Yogyakarta and other Javanese aristocrats. Consequently, the organization did not want to challenge or create conflict with the strong Javanese identity there. Moreover, the elites of the organization were also Javanese aristocrats, who had to respect for their old traditions. The second reason was that the Muhammadiyah emphasized the idea that adopting Western forms of dress, script, and sciences did not mean that Muslims were betraying their religion or their Javanese identity. In other words, the movement was attempting to pave the way for Javanese middle class Muslims to become more involved with the modernization programme of the Dutch government, whilst simultaneously preserving their Javanese identity and enhancing their Islamic values.

3.4 The Shift in the Muhammadiyah's attitudes towards the colonial state after Dahlan

A gradual change in the composition of Muhammadiyah's main supporters had occurred by the end of Dahlan's leadership. In general, the Muhammadiyah's supporters during its formative period could be classified into three groups: *santri* aristocrats, 'secular' aristocrats, and traders. Ahmad Najib Burhani called the two former groups *priyayi-santri* and *non-santri priyayi* (Burhani, 2004). The first group was the founder of the organization, while the second and the third were those that were empathetic with the movement.

Initially, the 'secular' aristocrats – whom Budi Utomo's activists and members were categorized as – played a significant role in supporting the movement (see section 3.3), but this had gradually declined by the end of Dahlan's period of leadership. I disagree with Burhani's (2004) contention that Budi Utomo activists

left the Muhammadiyah after Dahlan invited two prominent communist party (PKI) leaders to deliver a speech at a Muhammadiyah forum. According to Burhani (2004), the PKI was known as a radical nationalist movement that was confronting the Dutch government, and Budi Utomo activists were not comfortable with the Muhammadiyah having a close relationship with the PKI. The information provided by Burhani does not prove that the Muhammadiyah or Dahlan built a close relation with this communist party, however, and Muhammadiyah's relationship with the SI was more likely to be the factor that caused Budi Utomo activists to keep their distance from the Muhammadiyah which, during the 1920s, was critical of the colonial government (Latif, 2008). It is worth noting that after the 'secular' aristocrats left the organization, the merchants became the most significant supporters of the Muhammadiyah along with the Javanese *santri* aristocrats. This composition of the organization provided the background for the next choice of leader after Dahlan's death in 1923.

Although K H Ibrahim (1874-1934)⁷⁸ was the official successor to Dahlan, and was known to share similar Islamic views with him – he studied at Islamic traditional schools and spent seven years studying Islam in Mecca – his role as the leader of the organization (from 1923 until 1932) was really subordinate to Fachruddin (d.1929),⁷⁹ the vice-chairman of the Muhammadiyah, who was more dominant in directing the organization. Fachruddin occupied this position from 1923 until 1929 and, in addition to his position as vice-chairman, he was also the treasurer of the central board of the SI. Fachruddin was the most prominent person connecting the Muhammadiyah with this Islamic political organization – an organization that

⁷⁸ K H Ibrahim was a *santri* aristocrat, a brother of Dahlan's wife, and one of the *chatib* of the Yogyakarta Sultanate (Alfian, 1989).

⁷⁹ Fachruddin came from a *santri* aristocratic family of the Yogyakarta Sultanate, and had graduated from Dutch schools (Alfian, 1989).

the Muhammadiyah had been building a close relationship with since Dahlan's leadership, and within which Muhammadiyah leaders had been exclusively in charge of the department of religious affairs in 1919, with Dahlan as the chief of the department. After the death of Dahlan, Fachruddin was the Muhammadiyah representative that played the central role in mediating between the two organizations (Alfian, 1989).

As the real successor of Dahlan in the Muhammadiyah, Fachruddin's background was different to his predecessor's. He represented a 'lay intelligentsia' (a scholar whose expertise is in 'secular' subjects, such as politics, law, and economy) rather than an *'alim* (an Islamic scholar whose expertise is in religious issues). Besides being an activist of the Muhammadiyah, the SI, and the Budi Utomo, he also joined *Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging* – the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV) – a socialist-communist organization.⁸⁰ Moreover, from 1916 through to the 1920s, he was a chief editor and co-editor of magazines such as *Islam Bergerak* (Islam moves), *Medan Muslimin* (the Field of Muslims), and *Sri Diponegoro*, which was established and maintained by a Marxist-minded Muslim activist, Haji Misbach. This background, especially his close relationship with Marxist figures, made Fachruddin a fairly radical and critical activist. The magazines that he edited often published articles that were critical of the Dutch administration and Christian missions. The Dutch labelled *Sri Diponegoro* as one of the periodical magazines published by Fachruddin, as radical leftist publication (Shihab, 1995; Alfian, 1989: 201).

⁸⁰ ISDV was a communist organization created in 1914 by Marxist-oriented Dutch figures. It later became the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1920, and was led by Marxist-oriented Indonesian nationalists (see Latif, 2008).

Fachruddin's involvement in the SI and his close connection with SI leaders such as Tjokroaminoto, Haji Agus Salim, and Surjopranoto⁸¹ led him to be a proponent of pan-Islamism (Alfian, 1989: 202). In contrast to Dahlan, he was more interested in political issues than educational movements, and although he still represented the Islamic modernists to an extent, he expressed more critical views towards Christian movements and Dutch government than Dahlan (Alfian, 1989; Shihab, 1995).

Fachruddin's interest in the idea of pan-Islamism led the Muhammadiyah to become more involved in criticizing the Dutch government's policies relating to Islamic movements. As a result, there was a shift in the way the organization interacted with the state. The Muhammadiyah's critical responses to the '1925 *Guru Ordonantie*' (the 1925 teacher ordinance)⁸² was one example of this. For the Muhammadiyah's leaders, this ordinance indicated that the Dutch were aiming to restrict Islamic preaching, and the Muhammadiyah branch in West Sumatra was highly critical of the ordinance.⁸³ Consequently, the Dutch did not implement the ordinance in West Sumatra. Following their success on having this policy proposal

⁸¹ These three figures came from *santri* aristocratic families and graduated from Dutch schools. After graduating they encountered Islamic figures such as syekh Ahmad Khatib al-Minangkabawi, and became more connected with Islamic movements (Latif, 2008).

⁸² The ordinance was applied by the Dutch government to restrict preachers or *'ulama* from giving lectures in Indonesian Muslim societies. The ordinance stated that a preacher who wanted to deliver a lecture had to get permission from the local government or the native authorities. In addition, a preacher was required to keep a record of the pupils or audience members attending his lecture and the content of the course that he gave, in case the native authorities wanted to check it. Furthermore, the native authorities had the power to withdraw the rights of a preacher to give lectures whenever they deemed it necessary, and those who did not obey the ordinance would be punished (Alfian, 1989: 213). This type of ordinance had actually already been released in 1905, and the Dutch were simply replacing it with a new one in 1925, that was not significantly different to the previous one.

⁸³ In 1928 the colonial government planned to apply the ordinance in Minangkabau, West Sumatra, but the Muhammadiyah Minangkabau responded to it by conducting a congress attended by eight hundred *'ulama* from West Sumatra and one representative from the Dutch administration. The congress made a petition stating that they rejected the implementation of the 1925 *Guru Ordonantie* in Minangkabau. Although some traditionalist *'ulama* attending the congress did want to support this petition, and left the event before it finished, the petition was successful in stopping the Dutch plan (see Alfian, 1989).

retracted, the critical voices from the Muhammadiyah branch in Java became more audible and, in 1931, the Dutch freed Muhammadiyah preachers from the ordinance.

Another example of the Muhammadiyah's critical voice can be seen in its complaint to the Dutch related to their support of Christian movements. According to Alwi Shihab (1995: 283):⁸⁴

The period of Fachruddin (1923–1929) was probably the most dramatic stage in terms of the Muhammadiyah's encounter with the Christian missions. The Muhammadiyah became more hostile, assertive, and militant in its open criticism.

During the 14th Congress of the Muhammadiyah in 1925, for instance, the organization openly criticized the Dutch administration for, on the one hand, reducing subsidies for Muhammadiyah's clinics and poor-houses by fifty percent whilst, on the other hand, increasing its financial support for Christians (Shihab, 1995: 285; Alfian, 1989: 209–210). For the Muhammadiyah, this reduction in their funding indicated that the state was discriminating against Islamic social movements and attempting to weaken them. As G. S. Bousquet (1940: 3)⁸⁵ has observed, the change in the way that the Muhammadiyah dealt with the state was caused by the Dutch policy in Yogyakarta of overtly undertaking Christian missionary activities.⁸⁶ The increasing support for Christian movements in the Javanese Island produced through the Christian schools, poor-houses, clinics, hospitals, and social charities that the Dutch funded was perceived by the Muhammadiyah as an attempt by the Dutch to convert Javanese people to Christianity (Shihab, 1995).

⁸⁴ Alwi Shihab is an Indonesian scholar who undertook research entitled "the Muhammadiyah Movement and its Controversy with Christian Mission in Indonesia" (1995).

⁸⁵ G. S. Bousquet was a French scholar who observed this Javanese island around the 1930s.

⁸⁶ Christian missionaries had just been allowed to operate in Indonesia in 1855 by the government (Alfian, 1989: 208). Nevertheless, their action was limited to certain areas, excluding this Javanese island. This regulation was legislated through "a new act for East Indies Government", but the regulation was repealed in 1923. Consequently, all Christian missionaries were allowed to proselytize in the whole colony of the Netherlands (Alfian, 1989).

It is worth noting that, during this period, the Muhammadiyah still combined Islam, Javanese traditions and Western culture in its practices, like Dahlan had, and as the Muhammadiyah congress held in Yogyakarta in 1925 showed, with Fachruddin and other Muhammadiyah leaders attending in both Javanese and Western dress (Peacock, 1978: 39). Even during the next congress conducted in Solo in 1929, the Muhammadiyah instructed its activists and delegates to dress in their own local (traditional) clothes.⁸⁷ It is noteworthy that the idea of the Indonesian nation was clearer in 1928, when people from all areas under Dutch political control were united in viewing themselves as part of one nation (Indonesia)⁸⁸ and calling for their independence from the colonial government. Hence, by wearing their local dress in the congress, Muhammadiyah members were attempting to negotiate Islam with the Indonesian identity that consisted of many local cultures. Instead of dressing in Arabic clothes, the organization absorbed indigenous dress without worrying about accusations of being un-Islamic. However, in contrast to the Dahlan period, the Muhammadiyah during Fachruddin's leadership began to see other religions, particularly Christianity, as being threat and rivals. The organization looked suspiciously at the Dutch government, and stated that the government would like to marginalize Islam and turn Indonesia Christian.

3.5 The Muhammadiyah and the rise of Islamic revivalism

While the central board of the Muhammadiyah, particularly the Muhammadiyah in Java, adopted a more modernist orientation – even whilst becoming more critical of

⁸⁷ This instruction was mentioned in the agenda of a book entitled *Program dan Agenda Kongres Moehammadijah ke-XVIII Jang terbesar di Solo* (1929).

⁸⁸ In 1928, many young organizations coming from Java, Sumatra, Maluku, and Sulawesi conducted a congress and declared themselves bound by one nation, one motherland, and one language – Indonesia. In addition, they called for Indonesian independence from the colonial Dutch government (Latif, 2008).

the colonial state in its later development – Islamic revivalist ideas began to gain strength within some parts of the Muhammadiyah, especially in West Sumatra. The revivalist outlook was indicated by the view that Islam should be purified from local traditional beliefs and practices. This change in perspective was greatly influenced by Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah – known as Haji Rosul (1875–1945) – a reformist ‘*alim* and the founder of the Muhammadiyah in Minangkabau (Burhani, 2004: 81; Alfian, 1989: 258–259). Haji Rosul studied in Mecca under the supervision of Syekh Ahmad Khatib Al-Minangkabawi and Syekh Tahir Jalaluddin Al-Azhari (1869–1956),⁸⁹ and his critical views on customary law and local traditions were strongly influenced by them.

Minangkabau was the first area in which revivalist movements, beginning with the *Paderi* movement,⁹⁰ had existed, and it is worth noting that the *Paderi* movement was largely Wahhabis in nature. This movement ‘physically’ fought against *kaum adat* (the proponent of local culture) at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century. Haji Rosul encountered some of the ideas of Islamic revivalists before being supervised by Ahmad Khatib and Tahir Jalaludin, and he focused on criticizing and attacking all practices that he did not agree with or that he deemed to not be in line with the *Qur’an* and the *Sunna* (the Traditions of the Prophet) (Noer, 1973: 37). For instance, he rejected the celebration of *kenduri* (a traditional ceremony involving public prayer and a ritual meal that was held when someone died) when his father passed away (Peacock, 1979: 259; Noer, 1973: 37; Burhani, 2004: 81). He warned Minangkabau Muslims that performing rituals or practices

⁸⁹ Syekh Tahir Jalaludin Al-Azhari was a cousin of Syekh Ahmad Khatib al-Minangkabawi, who came to Mecca with him. His last name ‘al-Azhari’ was a label given to him because of his study at the al-Azhar, Cairo. Tahir Jalaludin studied in Mecca for twelve years, and then continued his study at the Al-Azhar University for four years. At the Al-Azhar, he not only encountered Abduh’s modernist thoughts, but also formed a close relationship with Abduh’s great pupil, Rashid Rida. After finishing his study at the Al-Azhar, Tahir Jalaludin returned to Mecca to help Ahmad Khatib supervise Malay students from 1897 until 1899 (see Laffan, 2003).

⁹⁰ A brief explanation concerning the *Paderi* movement can be found in section 2.2.

that were not based on both the *Qur'an* and *Sunna* would be punished by Allah (God). Furthermore, he criticized the native authorities, stating: “those who rule with laws which are not originated from Allah are the deviators from religion, oppressors, and hypocrites” (Alfian, 1989: 261). In addition, he demanded that Muslim women veil, and forbade them from wearing *kebaya*.⁹¹ This demand was made as a prescription to Muhammadiyah women activists, mostly in Java, who did not veil and wore *kebaya*. Even Dahlan’s wife, who was the chairman of Aisyiyah,⁹² did not veil properly, and several Muhammadiyah congresses held in Java used *kebaya* to represent the national identity of the Muhammadiyah.

The differences between the Islamic revivalism represented by Haji Rosul and the Islamic modernism of the Muhammadiyah’s Javanese *‘ulama* led to a clash during the Nineteenth Congress of the Muhammadiyah in Bukit Tinggi (West Sumatra) in 1930. Haji Rosul objected to a joining session in which men and women sat in the same room and in which a woman was a speaker (Peacock, 1979: 261; Alfian, 1989: 263–264; Burhani, 2004: 82). Rosul considered it sinful for a woman to publicly speak in front of a male audience, and asked the committee to cancel this joining session, but his request was countered by some Muhammadiyah *‘ulama* from Java, and both Rosul and his opponents based their arguments on the *Qur'an* and the *Sunna*. It is not clear whether or not the session was finally cancelled, but it was obvious that Haji Rosul still insisted on his ideas, and did not want to compromise with the Javanese *‘ulama*. This clash of ideas clearly showed the differences in the Islamic characters of the Muhammadiyah in Java developed by Ibrahim and Fachruddin on the one hand, and the orientation of the Muhammadiyah in West

⁹¹ A *kebaya* is a fitted women’s blouse, which is a traditional dress for Javanese people (Burhani, 2004).

⁹² Aisyiyah is the Muhammadiyah’s organization for women, established in 1917 (see Alfian, 1989).

Sumatra developed by Haji Rosul on the other, with Haji Rosul being more strict and literal in his understanding of Islamic doctrine.

Several years after the death of Ibrahim (d.1932) and Fachrudin (d.1929), the Islamic revivalist character of the Muhammadiyah increased significantly, not only in West Sumatra, but in other regions including Java as well. Federspiel (1970: 65) observed:

...the effort to expunge *bid'a* (innovation in rituals) and *churafat* (superstition) was given more attention, apparently because of the interest of a new leadership and the expansion of the movement onto Sumatera where Muslim modernists had already taken up the issue. Moreover, it was about this time that the real issues involving *bid'a*, that is, change in accepted ritual, became prominent in Java.

Haji Rosul came to be regarded as the intellectual father of the Islamic revivalist in the Muhammadiyah, especially in Minangkabau (Alfian, 1989: 260). In Pekalongan (Central Java), for instance, Rosul's revivalist ideas were developed by his student and son-in-law, Ahmad Rashid Sutan Mansur. Sutan Mansur was the leader of the Muhammadiyah in Pekalongan, and the representative of the Muhammadiyah in Aceh and Kalimantan before being elected as its chairman from 1953–1959 (Burhani, 2004: 82). Another of Rosul's students, Fakhri Hasyim, also preached his ideas in Surabaya, East Java, and was supported by Kyai Haji Mas Mansur, a great *'alim* from Surabaya, who also later became the chairman of the Muhammadiyah (1936–1942).

In the 1930s, the Muhammadiyah institutionalized its revivalist character through the Majelis Tarjih.⁹³ Initially, the task of the Majelis Tarjih was to deal with the religio-legal problems that arose between the Muhammadiyah and traditionalist

⁹³ Majelis Tarjih is a division of the Muhammadiyah with the duty of formulating Muhammadiyah's religious assessments of ritual issues. The department was established in 1928, and aimed to eliminate different outlooks among Muhammadiyah's *'ulama* towards performing rituals (Burhani, 2004).

'ulama, and among the Muhammadiyah *'ulama* themselves, but later, the Majelis Tarjih was developed to be a council with the authority to produce *fatwa* (legal opinions) for Muhammadiyah preachers and activists. These *fatwa*, in turn, aimed to guide Muhammadiyah's preachers or *'ulama* in what to deliver in their lectures. The *fatwa* issued by the Majelis Tarjih mainly explained the *bid'a* or religious practices that were not in line with the *Qur'an* and *Sunna* (the Prophet Muhammad's sayings and behaviour), and made the Muhammadiyah's *'ulama* and activists more aware of religious issues such as rituals (a typical concern of revivalists).

In addition, the Wahhabi movement's increasing penetration into Indonesia strengthened the revivalist outlook of the Muhammadiyah. After conquering Mecca in Saudi Arabia in 1924, the prestige of the Wahhabi movement was increasing among Indonesian reformist Muslims, including in the Muhammadiyah. The similar doctrines held by the Wahhabi and the Muhammadiyah – to return to the *Qur'an* and the *Sunna* and to purify Islamic rituals and the Islamic faith – gave the Muhammadiyah empathy for the Wahhabi movement. The Muhammadiyah even felt honoured when people attached the label of the Wahhabi to the organization, as seen at the 24th Congress of Muhammadiyah in 1932, at which the welcoming yell given by native people was “Wahhabi!! Wahhabi!! Wahhabi!!” (Hamka, 1946: 10, 108). During this period, the Muhammadiyah thus became strongly revivalist in character, leaving its modernism behind.

The rise of this revivalist orientation led the organization to be stricter in dealing with the national (local) culture. It recommended that its activists dressed as the prophet Muhammad and early Muslim generations had, and attempted to Islamize Indonesian Muslim society by controlling the way people dressed and

behaved. The ideological underpinning of the organization at this time was to re-establish the golden age of Islam represented by the Prophet and his companions.

3.6 The Quest for an Islamic Nation State and the emergence of Islamic neo-modernism

There was no significant shift in the composition of the Muhammadiyah's followers and leaders or its Islamic orientation during the 1940s. *Santri* aristocrats and traders were still its main members (85%), while farmer and working class members only accounted for a small percentage of its following (15%) (Alfian, 1989: 189). The heads of the organization were mostly *'ulama* and merchants (Peacock, 1978: 50), most of whom were trained in Islamic education. These educational backgrounds and the institutionalization of Islamic revivalist ideas led the Muhammadiyah to support 'Islamizing' Indonesian society and the state, and the discourse of *bid'a* became the trademark of its preaching and its schools.

Its revivalist nature also led the Muhammadiyah to fight for the establishment of an Islamic state when its chairman, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (1942–1953), was invited to be one of the sixty-two members of the BPUPKI⁹⁴ charged with preparing the constitution for Indonesian independence in 1945. He became the most vocal of all the Islamic figures⁹⁵ in confronting secularists who campaigned for the secular state (Ismail, 1995: 45–47). Although the Muhammadiyah still had some scholars who had graduated from Dutch education as its members – such as Teuku

⁹⁴ The BPUPKI was the Investigating Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence established on 29 April 1945. The purpose of this body was to discuss and decide what type of state that was most appropriate for Indonesian people and to formulate it within the future constitution of Indonesia (see Boland, 1971).

⁹⁵ The members of the BPUPKI consisted of sixty-two Indonesian people, most of whom were Muslims that had graduated from 'western' schools and universities. Only fifteen members were representatives of *santri* (and came from both Islamic traditionalist and reformist organizations) (Ismail, 1995: 21; Mangkusasmito, 1970: 12).

Hasan, who studied Law in Leiden University (Latif, 2008) (see also section 2.4.) – their influence was subordinated under the Muhammadiyah’s *‘ulama* views about the relationship between Islam and the state.⁹⁶

The Muhammadiyah’s revivalist orientation led it into significant conflict with the government (the Old Order) and to criticisms of their positions. It seems that the principle doctrine of the revivalists – to command Muslims to conduct good deeds and forbid them from doing evil or sin (*al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar*) – contributed to the movement attempting to control the government’s behaviour. As a result, even though Muhammadiyah leaders were involved in parliament and cabinet during the 1940s and 1950s, the organization did not hesitate to oppose President Soekarno whenever they deemed this to be necessary. Compared to the NU⁹⁷ – that started to ally with the government, and supported all of its secular policies from 1953 onwards – the Muhammadiyah was in constant conflict with the President, and this conflict increased further during the 1960s. The conflict was based on the Muhammadiyah’s dissatisfaction with government policy marginalizing Islamic leaders, disbanding the Masyumi⁹⁸ in 1960, and jailing some of its leaders. The poor relationship between the Muhammadiyah and the government remained until the Old Order regime collapsed in 1966.

The rise of the New Order under President Soeharto in 1966 brought new optimism among Muhammadiyah leaders. After their proposal to revitalize the

⁹⁶ According to Yudi Latif (2008), Teuku Hasan and Kasman Singodimedjo (an activist of Masyumi) were the two persons who attempted to persuade Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (the chairman of the Muhammadiyah) to eliminate the Jakarta Charter and the seven words from Indonesian constitution during the PPKI meeting conducted a couple of weeks before the declaration of Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945.

⁹⁷ The NU adopted a traditionalist outlook, and favoured conservative *sunni* political views under which political rulers are obeyed so long as Muslims are allowed to perform their worship (Tantowi, 2008: 32). From the Old Order until the beginning of the New Order (1966–1971), the NU had a close relationship with these regimes, and its members received Ministry positions in the cabinet (Latif, 2004: 341).

⁹⁸ Further explanation about the Masyumi can be found in section 2.4.

Masyumi party was rejected by the President, however, the Muhammadiyah leaders, together with other Islamic organizations (except the NU) established a new Islamic political party named Parmusi⁹⁹ (Indonesian Muslims' Party) in 1968. The dominant role of the Muhammadiyah's leaders in Islamic politics was indicated by the election of two Muhammadiyah cadres – Jarnawi Hadikusuma and Lukman Harun – as the chairman and general secretary of the Parmusi party (Assyaukanie, 2009: 100). The goal of this party was to fight for Indonesian Muslims' interests, such as the implementation of *shari'a* in the state (see Ward, 1970).

During the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, most Muhammadiyah leaders preferred to oppose the government rather than to cooperate with them or support government policies. However, a few Muhammadiyah figures, such as M.S. Mintaredja¹⁰⁰ were accommodative to and cooperative with the state. Mintaredja was even appointed as a Minister during two periods of the New Order government – as State Minister (1968–1973) and Social Minister (1973–1978) (Assyaukanie, 2009: 100). Moreover, many Muhammadiyah members were civil servants as, at the beginning of its rule, the New Order government recruited numerous people with 'modern' educational background to work as bureaucrats. Members of middle class society – both Muslim and non-Muslim – who studied at state ('secular') schools, Christian's schools, or Muhammadiyah schools benefited most from this policy. Consequently, Mintaredja's position was seen by these Muhammadiyah members as being an 'umbrella' for their engagement with the 'secular' state as bureaucrats. It is important to note that during the 1960s and 1970s,

⁹⁹ Further explanation about the Parmusi can be found in section 2.5.

¹⁰⁰ M.S. Mintaredja graduated from an Indonesian Islamic University with a bachelor degree and studied Law through a non-degree programme at Leiden University. The government also appointed him as the chairman of the Parmusi through political interference in the party in 1970, as they disliked the fact that a prominent Masyumi figure, Mohammad Roem, had been selected as the chairman of the party in 1969 (see Ward, 1970; Crouch, 1978: 262; Effendy, 2003: 45–47).

many revivalist Muslims still felt uncomfortable working as civil servants, because they perceived this to be sinful work within an ‘un-Islamic’ government.

Although Mintaredja shared a similar vision to other Muhammadiyah leaders regarding securing Muslim interests, he preferred to accommodate the government and struggle from ‘within’ to achieve Muslim aspirations, for instance, through getting financial aid for Muslim education and involving Muslims in bureaucracy as well as in the cabinet. He conceptualized his movement as fighting for ‘material victories’ rather than ‘formal victories’, by which he meant fighting for practical achievements rather than for the more ideological revitalization of the Masyumi and establishment of *shari‘a* as state law (Mintaredja, 1971).

Mintaredja’s position as the chairman of the Parmusi and a Minister enabled him to bridge the gap between Muhammadiyah leaders and the government to an extent. Some Muhammadiyah figures, like Lukman Harun – the former chairman of the Parmusi who was initially a proponent of the implementation of *shari‘a* – also shifted their positions to become more accommodative of the state, with Harun joining and becoming the head of the government party, the Golkar.¹⁰¹ Thus, there is evidence to suggest that the Muhammadiyah remained theologically conservative but started to become politically pragmatic. On the one hand, the discourse of revivalism remained strong amongst Muhammadiyah *‘ulama* or preachers whilst, on the other hand, the organization began to build close relationships with the government, and did not respond negatively to the modernization project of the New Order.

However, although Mintaredja was able to connect Muhammadiyah’s leaders with the government, there was also a split within the Muhammadiyah. In

¹⁰¹ Further explanation about the Golkar can be found in section 2.5.

my opinion, the gap between the Muhammadiyah scholars that graduated from ‘secular’ education and its *‘ulama* with their Islamic educations was the main problem. While the *‘ulama* were mainly trained in Islamic subjects and learned modernity through Islamic modernist thinkers such as Rashid Rida, the Muhammadiyah intelligentsias were experts in ‘secular’ subjects and poor in Islamic subjects. Consequently, both of these groups were unable to negotiate between Islam and modernity. It can be said that they walked in different directions, but did not disturb each other. Generally, Mintaredja represented a good blend of the two positions, however, as he graduated from an Islamic university and then studied Law through a non-degree programme at Leiden University. Unfortunately, he did not contribute significantly to the negotiation between Islam and modernity (the secular state).

The emergence of two scholars – Amien Rais¹⁰² and Syafii Maarif¹⁰³ – altered the playing field in the split of Muhammadiyah ideology, however (see Kersten, 2015). These two scholars graduated from Chicago University in the United States, in 1981 and 1982 respectively, and both had deep understandings of Islamic subjects because they studied Islam and Islamic movements from their undergraduate degrees through to their postgraduate degrees. It is noteworthy that before they graduated from the doctoral programme, they were known as proponents of the Islamic state. However, their intensive encounters with secular and Islamic neo-modernist ideas led them to become proponents of Islamic neo-modernism.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Amien Rais was selected as the vice-chairman of the Muhammadiyah during 1990–1995, and was the chairman of the organization during 1995–1998. He resigned from the position in 1998, when he established the National Mandatory Party (PAN), and was elected as the chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), serving in this role from 1999–2004.

¹⁰³ Syafii Maarif replaced Amien Rais as the chairman of the Muhammadiyah during 1998–2000, and was also appointed to be the chairman of the organization from 2000–2005.

¹⁰⁴ Amien Rais was supervised by Professor Leonard Binder – a scholar interested in progressive Islamic movements – and Syafii Maarif was supervised by Professor Fazlur Rahman – an Islamic neo-modernist thinker (see Kersten, 2015). During his study with Rahman, Maarif was

In 1982, Amien Rais publicly argued that the Qur'an does not instruct Muslims to establish an Islamic state. He contended that there is no such concept as an Islamic state in the *Qur'an*. This holy book, according to him, only provides ethical guidance for establishing a state, and centres on issues concerning justice, equality, humanity, freedom, and public participation in politics (Latif, 2008: 388).¹⁰⁵ Syafii Maarif stated that *Pancasila* is comparable with the Medina charter, which valued all religious followers and bound them within one state (Maarif, 1988: 149-163).¹⁰⁶ Under their influence, the Muhammadiyah accepted *Pancasila* as the sole ideology of the organization during the Muhammadiyah congress in 1985,¹⁰⁷ conceptualizing it as an ideology that consists of Islamic values.

The choice of Amien Rais as chairman and Syafii Maarif as vice-chairman of the organization in 1995 led the elite level of the Muhammadiyah to become more progressive (see Kersten, 2015). Amien appointed a number of Muhammadiyah neo-modernist scholars, including Amin Abdullah, Munir Mul Khan, Syamsul Anwar, Syafii Anwar, and Haedar Nashir to support him. Before 1995, these figures were known as neo-modernist Muhammadiyah scholars, but some of them were outside the organization, and others were not in leadership positions within the Muhammadiyah board. Consequently, the involvement of these scholars and activists at the top level of the organization caused the Muhammadiyah's concerns about social reform to rise significantly. In this period, the Majelis Tarjih was also reconceptualised as a division not just for issuing *fatwas* concerning rituals, but also for discussing Islam and social-political problems. The department was renamed the

impressed and influenced by his neo-modernist ideas. Details of the story can be read in Maarif's autobiography (Maarif, 2006).

¹⁰⁵ Yudi Latif, quoted from *Panji Masyarakat*, an Islamic magazine belong to an Islamic group associated with revivalists and modernists, Number 376/1982.

¹⁰⁶ Syafii Maarif's explanation of *Pancasila* and the Medina Charter can be found in his doctoral thesis, written in 1982. This thesis was translated into Indonesian and published in 1988.

¹⁰⁷ The government forced all social organizations to adopt *Pancasila* as the foundation of their organization. Further explanation about this policy can be found in section 2.5.

Majelis Tarjih and the Proliferation of Islamic Thoughts (MTPPI) (Kersten, 2015). The neo-modernist leaders of Muhammadiyah applied the contextual method, which enabled these neo-modernist scholars to reconstruct responsive interpretations concerning Islam and social problems.

These neo-modernist figures also strengthened the neo-modernist orientation of the Muhammadiyah through responding to contemporary social-political problems rather than ritual issues (Boy, 2007: 100–111). Some of the issues they engaged with were the relationships between Christians and Muslims, *shari'a* and *Pancasila*, Islam and human rights, and Islam and democracy. They attempted to modernize Islam through reinterpreting Islamic doctrines in order to make them compatible with the modern Indonesian state. In 1995, Amien Rais even conceptualized the meaning of *tawhid* – the principle doctrine in Islam – as a means for deconstructing the authoritarian political system developed by President Soeharto.

Amien characterised *tawhid* as a call for democracy and egalitarianism. According to him, only God has supreme and absolute power, while rulers or presidents are human beings that can get things wrong (see Rais, 1987). Thus, Amien justified the idea of society's opposition to the state and freedom of expression by reinterpreting Islamic doctrine, and his critique of the government between 1995 and 1998 contributed to the rise of people power that collapsed the New Order regime in the middle of 1998.

3.7 Conclusion

The ideology of the Muhammadiyah, from its early development through to the post-colonial period, varied substantially. The purification of rituals and faith on the

one hand, and the social reforms based on modern interpretations of Islamic doctrine on the other, are the two main points that have been contested by the Muhammadiyah's leaders. The more the Muhammadiyah emphasized the ideology of purification, the more revivalist the organization became. This was seen especially when Muhammadiyah's leaders and its *'ulama* criticized the mixture of Islamic rituals and local practices whilst ignoring the social reform issues that were needed by Indonesian Muslim society, and when it contested the government's modernization programme in during the post-colonial period.

It is clear that the influence that Islamic movements in the Middle East – particularly those in Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century – had on the Muhammadiyah's ideology was also varied. Afghani, Abduh, and Rida were not the only Muslim thinkers that contributed to the development of Muhammadiyah's Islamic nature. The Wahhabi movement also attracted Muhammadiyah activists during its early days and, as a result, the Muhammadiyah was as an organization at a crossroads during the post-colonial era – trying to decide whether to be part of the puritan Wahhabi movements (revivalist), a modernist movement, or somewhere in between the two positions.

Dahlan's Islamic nature was able to attract not only *santri* aristocrats and middle class Muslims to the Muhammadiyah, but also Javanese 'secular' aristocrats, with the latter participating significantly in maintaining and developing the organization. Consequently, the main supporters of the Muhammadiyah during Dahlan's leadership were Javanese *santri* aristocrats and Javanese 'secular' aristocrats. It is noteworthy that the dominance of these two social classes in the leadership positions of the organization influenced the Muhammadiyah's attitude in dealing with Islam, Western modernity, and the local (Javanese) identity. Their

social class compelled them to appreciate and preserve their old traditions, and thus they formed compromises between Islam and the Javanese culture. These compromises were displayed by the style of dress that the leaders chose for their daily life and for the official meetings of the organization, such as the annual congress, as well as by the use of Javanese rather than Arabic script in the official letters of the organization and the utilization of both the Javanese and the Islamic calendar in the organization's timeline. Furthermore, the presence of Javanese 'secular' aristocrats alongside Dahlan's leadership also contributed to the Muhammadiyah's choice of modernization projects such as modern education. Instead of confronting the Dutch government, the Muhammadiyah cooperated with the colonial government and helped Indonesian Muslims – particularly *santri* aristocrats and the middle class – to adopt modern culture. The change in the Muhammadiyah's main supporters during the 1920s to *santri* aristocrats and merchants led to a shift in the organization's attitude toward the state. The Muhammadiyah became critical of it, and began to characterise the colonial government as an infidel power that sought to harm Indonesian Muslims.

The gap between the educational backgrounds of Muhammadiyah's leaders – from the *'ulama*, who studied Islamic subjects and held little secular knowledge on the one hand, to the intelligentsias, who had 'secular' educations but little knowledge of Islamic doctrine on the other hand – caused the organization to experience difficulties in reconciling their approach towards Islam and the 'secular' modern state. This led the Muhammadiyah to a revivalist position – especially among its *'ulama* – from the 1930s until the 1970s. During this period, the Muhammadiyah tended to accuse the state of being 'un-Islamic' for not implementing *shari'a* as state law. Therefore, the organization experienced

difficulty in co-operating with the government, especially with the Old Order during the end of its rule (1960s) and the New Order during the beginning of its rule (in the 1960s and 70s). The emergence of Muhammadiyah leaders who had both Islamic and 'secular' educations in the 1980s, however, enabled the Muhammadiyah to negotiate better between Islam and the secular state.

Chapter 4

Research Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses and justifies the methodology that was adopted to conduct the fieldwork in this thesis and the challenges that arose as a result of its use. As I explained in the Introduction, my research question investigates the coexistence of contemporary modernist (neo-modernist) and revivalist in different levels of the Muhammadiyah, their view, and the extent to which they negotiate their view on the relationship between Islam and the state in the post-New Order era with special reference to three issues: the proposed amendment of Article 29 of the Indonesian Constitution, *shari'a*-based district laws, and non-Muslim leadership in the 1999 General Election. I argue that this research question is best approached using a qualitative methodology. Unlike a quantitative methodology, emphasizing generalization, the qualitative method focuses on developing a deep understanding of the motivations and reasons of particular groups and individuals (Schofield, 2002; Bryman, 1989) through exploring and interpreting data. In this regard, my research relies on the investigation and interpretation of events and discourses related to the Muhammadiyah movement that occurred in post-New Order Indonesia during 1998–2005.

The fieldwork for this research was conducted in Jakarta (the capital city of Indonesia) and Yogyakarta from September 2012 to January 2013, with a greater amount of this time being spent in Jakarta than in Yogyakarta. Jakarta was selected as the primary location of my fieldwork for two reasons. First, Jakarta was the centre

of public discourse and dispute during the beginning of the post-New Order period. Protest actions, public meetings in large fields, clashes of ideas between the proponents and opponents of the government, and contestations of opinions between revivalists, neo-modernists, and secularists all took place in this city. Together with the central board members of the organization, Muhammadiyah's lower-level leaders in Jakarta were more likely to be involved in the discourse than those who lived in other areas. Moreover, even though the organization's headquarters are located in Yogyakarta, its Jakarta office became the centre of its activities when national politicians visited to discuss national issues with its leaders. The organization thus, in practice, has two head offices – one in Jakarta and one in Yogyakarta. Second, the Muhammadiyah's leaders and members' backgrounds vary in terms of ethnicity as well as Islamic ideology. Jakarta was known as the centre of economic growth, especially during the New Order government (1966–1998), and attracted many economic migrants from different areas of Indonesia. As a result, there is a broader range of ethnicities amongst Muhammadiyah leaders in Jakarta. Yogyakarta was chosen because this is where the official headquarters of the organization have been located since its formation. All of original archives are generated, or at least validated, from this office, and many of the central board members lived in Yogyakarta and worked in this city (although they often spent a couple of days in Jakarta for organizational affairs).

This chapter begins by explaining the standpoint of the researcher. I examine the extent to which my position as a member of the community that I was studying impacted on the research. I use the scholarly discourse of researchers such as Robert A. Segal (1983) and Kim Knott (2005) to explore and inform this reflection. These authors debated whether researchers should take outsider positions in order to be

objective and impartial concerning the objects of their study. I argue that to make the research conducted by an insider objective, impartial and critical, the researcher should implement the participant-as-observer model suggested by Knott (2005).

The following section provides my reasons for adopting a qualitative methodology. A case study approach – the norm for qualitative research – was used to examine the research questions. Three different cases that Muhammadiyah leaders engaged with were investigated to examine the research questions (the proposed amendment of Article 29 of the Constitution, *shari'a*-based district regulations, and the selection of non-Muslims in the general elections of 1999).

The next section describes the three methods employed for collecting data: documentary analysis, interviewing, and participatory observation. I reflect on the methodological issues arising from my investigation of Muhammadiyah's documents, including its official letters (both public and internal), reports of its periodical congress and annual meetings, its magazines, and articles written by its members. Then I reflect on the semi-structured interviews I conducted with eleven central board members of the Muhammadiyah during 1998–2005, eight of its *'ulama*, sixteen of its local activists living in Jakarta, and three non-Muhammadiyah public intellectuals. Finally, I provide my reflections on observations of Muhammadiyah religious meetings (*pengajian*), particularly relating to how the religious authority of Muhammadiyah's *'ulama* is constructed and their opinion on the Islam-state relationship.

In the final two sections of the chapter I discuss my analysis of the data and the ethical issues that arose from the research. I used qualitative data analysis to analyse documents, and for transcription and fieldwork notes (Bryman, 2008). This method helped me in understanding and developing the issues I needed to elaborate

on during my fieldwork-based chapters. In the ethical section, I highlight how the main ethical issues arose during the data collection and in relation to maintaining the data. I show that my research does not have the potential to deceive or harm either my respondents or the organization I was studying. The confidentiality of interviewees has been protected by several means, such as anonymizing respondents and using pseudonyms.¹⁰⁸

4.2 The researcher's standpoint

Certain factors and attributes suggest that I should be regarded as an insider or participant in this research. First, a couple years before joining (the branch of) the Muhammadiyah in Jakarta, I was often involved in debates concerning the purification of the Islamic faith and Islamic rituals with my friends, who were traditionalist Muslims. It is worth noting that since my time as a senior high school student in a *madrassa* I have been influenced by Islamic modernist figures such as Buya Hamka,¹⁰⁹ and revivalist ones such as Ahmad Hassan,¹¹⁰ whose ideas I read in books including *Tafsir al-Azhar* (Hamka, 1986), *1001 Tanya Jawab tentang Islam* (1001 Questions and Answers on Islam) (Hamka, 1962), and *Soal Jawab tentang berbagai Masalah Agama* (Questions and Answers on Various Problems of Religion) (Hassan, 1968).¹¹¹ I was impressed with their ideas because they provided rational arguments that were also in accordance with the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* (the prophet's sayings and doings). I just realized several years later that such ideas had

¹⁰⁸ Only 3 central board members that are mentioned in their real names (Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Amin Abdullah, and Haedar Nashir).

¹⁰⁹ Buya Hamka (1908–1981) was a famous figure in the Muhammadiyah and the Chairman of the Indonesian 'ulama Council (MUI) from 1975–1981.

¹¹⁰ Ahmad Hassan (1887–1958) was a famous scholar and a member of an Islamic organization in Indonesian called PERSIS (the United Islam). His book *Soal Jawab tentang berbagai Masalah Agama* was popular among Muhammadiyah preachers.

¹¹¹ I got these books from my father, who was a fan of Masyumi's and Hamka's writings.

been developed by the Muhammadiyah. To some extent, it can be said that, culturally and ideologically, I was a member of the Muhammadiyah before officially joining the organization.



Figure 5. Map of Jakarta

Second, I officially became a member of the Muhammadiyah in 1996 through a *pengajian* (religious meeting) conducted by a branch of the Muhammadiyah near to my house. This *pengajian* was taught interchangeably by Muhammadiyah *‘ulama* who were lecturers of Islamic studies at Islamic universities. I eagerly participated in this weekly *pengajian*, my main motive not being to improve my faith – as I had been taught Islamic faith for around twelve years (from elementary through senior high school in a *madrasa*) – but to discuss ideas of Islam and modernization, as I was an undergraduate student in Islamic

Studies at a Muhammadiyah University in Jakarta at the time.¹¹² Unlike some other *pengajian* I attended, this Muhammadiyah *pengajian* welcomed engagement with disputes and critical discussions.

It is worth noting that my recent involvement with the Muhammadiyah has been in a more academic capacity. Since 2003 I have been appointed as a lecturer of Islamic studies at the University of Muhammadiyah in Jakarta.¹¹³ In addition, I was actively involved in an association of Muhammadiyah young thinkers called *Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah* or JIMM¹¹⁴ from 2003–2007, campaigning for the modernization of Islamic thoughts in the Muhammadiyah through national newspapers, books, and a workshop.

Being an insider probably provides more net advantage for this research than being an outsider would. I understand the kind of feeling that Muhammadiyah members experience when they find syncretism within their society, and why Muhammadiyah *'ulama* and preachers tend to campaign for the purification of faith and rituals in most of their religious meetings. I have thus not just been participating in and observing Muhammadiyah *pengajian* and lectures for six months, or one year, but for more than ten years. Hence, I am familiar with the different contents of Muhammadiyah lectures taught by *'ulama* that have graduated from university on the one hand, and those delivered by *'ulama* that have only received an education from an Islamic schools (*madrassa*) on the other. Moreover, I also have experience of the gradual change from being a revivalist and modernist as a teenager to a neo-

¹¹² It is not necessary to be a Muhammadiyah member to be a student at a Muhammadiyah university. Many of my classmates are still members of the Islamic traditionalist organization the NU.

¹¹³ Membership of the Muhammadiyah is required to be a lecturer at a Muhammadiyah university.

¹¹⁴ The JIMM was established in 2003 by Moeslim Abdurrahman (a Central Board Member of the Muhammadiyah from 2000–2005) and Syafii Maarif (the Chairman of the Muhammadiyah from 1998–2005). The JIMM aimed to support the rise of young intellectuals in the Muhammadiyah, and hence was an umbrella organization for young Muhammadiyah intellectual movements (see Abdurrahman, 2008; Kersten, 2015).

modernist in adulthood through studying at university. I understand, more or less, how this process can work, and the types of conflict of faith that can occur in Muhammadiyah members' minds. During my teenager years, I tended to view the purification of faith and rituals as important, and to criticize Islamic traditional practices because I assumed them syncretic. I even favoured Islamic ideas about purifying Indonesian society that were anti-modern and sectarian. Nevertheless, after two years studying in university, I had encountered and engaged with the neo-modernist ideas of Nurcholish Madjid, which opened my mind to the idea that interpreting the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* requires us to consider their contexts. I became critical of my previous position, and thus the influence of neo-modernist views led me into a position of conflict with revivalist ideas.

As an insider, I am aware of the pitfalls of bias in interpreting and describing the topic. A sense of belonging can hinder a researcher's impartial and critical views, and this may result in an apologetic study. I will consider and respond to the views of religious studies scholars such as Robert A. Segal (1983), who contend that researchers on religion should be objective, critical, and adopt an outsider position. I argue that, although an insider, I was not a complete participant in this research (Knott, 2005). I am aware that objectivity, an impartial stance, and a critical account are not the characters of a complete participant researcher (Knott, 2005: 247).

Participant observation is usually divided in two: into insider and outsider. Kim Knott (2005: 246–254) further divides these into four types of participant observation, breaking insiders into 1) complete participants and 2) participant-as-observers, and outsiders into 1) complete observers and 2) observer-as-participants. The participant-as-observer is the category that I fitted into in this research. As Knott (2005: 246–249) has noted, the participant-as-observer is a scholar who is

researching his or her own (religious) community. Unlike the complete participant, the participant-as-observer aims to produce academic work based on the ‘scientific’ method –employing an impartial, objective, and critical view to interpreting and analyze their data. However, it is worth noting that there is no such value-free knowledge (McLoughlin, 2000; 2007). My position as an academic who favours a neo-modernist orientation and is critical of revivalist ideas influences, to some extent, the way I conduct this research, such as my choice of respondents and interpretations of the data. Reflexivity, as McLoughlin (2000) argues, is a key concept for negotiating between my own subjectivity and the objective interpretation in generating knowledge.

4.3 The research approach

This research used a case study approach, which is “a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidences” (Robson, 1993: 146). This approach is often used in qualitative research (Bryman, 1989: 142), and involves the study of persons, organizations, events, or policies (Thomas, 2011). In qualitative research, case studies may be used to examine theories, to explore new insights of certain cases, or to examine other similar case studies (Bryman, 1989: 145–146). Thus, my research adopts an exploratory approach, attempting to produce new insights through conducting an in-depth exploration of the Muhammadiyah organization, its leadership and relevant events pertaining to the organization.

I explore the Muhammadiyah leaders’ efforts to negotiate the different views held by Muhammadiyah members with regard to Islam and the state in relation to three cases: 1) the amendment of Article 29 of UUD 1945 during 2000–2002, 2) the

shari'a-based district laws implemented by some district government since 2000, and 3) the election of non-Muslim leaders in the 1999 General Election. With reference to the first case, I elaborate on how Muhammadiyah leaders at different levels of the organization conceptualized the relation between Islam and the state in the state constitution. In relation to the second, I investigate the Muhammadiyah leaders' definitions of *shari'a* and the position they held it should have in the state. For the third case, I examine what the Muhammadiyah leaders thought about non-Muslim leadership and its impact on the issue of formalizing *shari'a* as state law. According to Bryman (1989: 143), it is possible to focus on more than one case using a case-study approach, and doing so can enable the findings for each case to be compared and enhanced.

4.4 The research method

The three methodological techniques I used to collect data – documentary analysis, in-depth interviewing, and participant observation – provided me with data from a wide range of sources and multiple answers for my research questions, which supported me in comparing, cross-checking, interpreting, and analyzing the data (Mason, 2002). The first two methods of data collection were planned from the beginning of my studies in September 2011, but I also decided to utilize participant observation after realizing that my participation in two religious lecture groups (*pengajian*) between 1996 and 2005 would be useful for this research. When I conducted fieldwork during September 2012–January 2013 I revisited these *pengajian*. Further explanation of this is provided in the sub-sections below.

4.4.1 Documents

Documents cover a broad range of sources, including newspapers, magazines, letters, diaries, autobiographies, and photographs (Bryman, 2004: 380–381). This research used official documents deriving from the Muhammadiyah, comprising official Muhammadiyah letters released to the public, the results of the *Muktamar*¹¹⁵ and the *Tanwir*,¹¹⁶ and Muhammadiyah's magazines (*Suara Muhammadiyah*¹¹⁷ and *Tabligh*¹¹⁸).

I did not face significant difficulties in accessing the official public letters and the reports of the *Muktamar* and the *Tanwir*. Soon after I arrived in Jakarta in September 2012, I contacted the secretary of the central board of the Muhammadiyah, verbally informed him about my research topic and asked his permission to access the documents in the Muhammadiyah office. Although no strict procedure was required of me, I provided the administration with a formal letter from the University of Leeds to make sure that the organization was relevantly and appropriately informed about my research and thus to meet the ethical requirements for collecting data from the organization, particularly its documents.

The official letters, as well as the results of the *Tanwir* and the *Muktamar*, were provided to me as both hard and soft copies. Initially, I received hard copies of the letters from the head official administrator¹¹⁹ of the Muhammadiyah office in Jakarta, whom I asked for the letters relating to the three cases I am studying. I realized at that time that the central administration of the Muhammadiyah is not in

¹¹⁵ The *Muktamar* is a congress of the Muhammadiyah at which new Muhammadiyah central board members are elected. It is conducted every five years.

¹¹⁶ The *Tanwir* is an annual meeting of the Muhammadiyah, attended by the central board and all Muhammadiyah branch officials. In this meeting the Muhammadiyah discusses and evaluates its positions and projects, and makes programmes.

¹¹⁷ *Suara Muhammadiyah* has been published since 1915.

¹¹⁸ *Tabligh* was released in 2003.

¹¹⁹ The administrator and I were known to each other (see section 4.2).

Jakarta, but in its other office located in Yogyakarta, where the organization was established. Thus, the soft copy of the document was only available in Yogyakarta, and I obtained this when I visited the city to interview some central board members of the Muhammadiyah.

This was also the case when I asked for the report of the *Tanwir* and the *Muktamar*. I found the hard copy of the document I required in Jakarta, but I was given the soft copy at the Yogyakarta office. This document is placed in the Jakarta Muhammadiyah's library, located on the first floor of the Muhammadiyah office, and bound as a book that is classified based on year and period of publication. The library is accessible to the public, and its staff told me that many students come to their library for research purposes.

All of these documents were released in the public domain. I could not get access to letters or other official documents that were not released for the public, such as complete transcriptions of the *Tanwir* 1998–2005 and the *Muktamar* 2000. These transcriptions would have been useful for investigating the events and the concerns of participants further (i.e. the Muhammadiyah elites and activists). The staff at the Yogyakarta office did not tell me why they could not provide these transcriptions. I guessed that the organization might not save the transcriptions of the events well, and could not find the report, or that they may not have transcribed the events at all. Therefore, I relied on the public-domain documents that I accessed. My situation accorded with some of Bryman's (2008: 522) comments about insider observation:

Many researchers have to rely on public-domain documents alone. Even if the researcher is an insider who has gained access to an organization, it may well be that certain documents that are not in the public domain will not be available to him or her.

It is worth noting that these documents did not provide any account of why they were created. Of course, they helped me in identifying the issues that arose in the relevant contexts, but not to clearly understand the political context surrounding them. As Atkinson and Coffey (2004) argue, documents do not necessarily accurately and comprehensively represent the situations in which the relevant discourse was produced. In light of this, Bryman (2008: 526–527) states that documents require further documents to enable a wider picture of the issues to be developed. I considered the possibility that the Muhammadiyah's magazines (the *Suara Muhammadiyah* and the *Tabligh*) may document the wider context and issues considered relevant by the Muhammadiyah, and gained access to the magazines in the Muhammadiyah's library in Jakarta to follow up this line of enquiry.

The Muhammadiyah appeared to adopt a different attitude in the way it maintained these magazines. The *Suara Muhammadiyah* was well documented, arranged and bound for each year, so I easily found all the collections of the period I was interested in (1998–2005). The *Tabligh* was not documented well, however. The different parts of the series were not compiled, and the volumes were not complete. The librarian advised me to ask the *Majelis Tabligh*¹²⁰ administrators whether they piled up the magazines. However, the administrators said that they did not compile the magazines officially. Fortunately, one of the board members of the division had a bound copy of all the volumes I needed at his house – something that he did for his own interest, so I copied the series and pages of the magazine related to my research topic from this member.

It is interesting to consider why the Muhammadiyah differed in how it maintained these two magazines. The difference was unlikely to be simply because

¹²⁰ The *Majelis Tabligh* is a division in the Central Board of the Muhammadiyah that focuses on developing preaching aspects in the Muhammadiyah. The *Tabligh* magazine is maintained by this division.

the *Suara Muhammadiyah* was published since 1915, while the *Tabligh* only launched in 2002, as this consideration alone would not determine the value attributed to these two magazines or the information they contained. As Bryman notes, “documents are windows onto social and organizational realities” (2008: 526). That is, the ideological orientations that the magazines display could reveal the kind of Islamic organization that the Muhammadiyah is. An administrator in the Muhammadiyah office informed me that the *Tabligh* encouraged the hatred of Indonesian Christians, Shi’a, and Westernization. In addition, one of the Muhammadiyah activists told me that, around 2004, Syafii Maarif – the former chairman of the Muhammadiyah from 1998–2005 – was very angry with those who were responsible of the magazine due to the provocative topics that it raised.¹²¹ Based on this information, I argue that the ‘different’ Islamic views adopted by the *Tabligh* magazine were the central reason that it was not well documented. Although the central board members did not ban the magazine, its chairman had given warnings to its editors.

4.4.2 Interviewing

The interview method is a very important technique in qualitative research, and is the method most widely used by such researchers (Bryman, 2004: 319). Through the interview, the researcher can gain in-depth information about the views or perspectives of interviewees (Bouma and Atkinson, 1996). In other words, this method can provide more information or ideas than researchers could find through

¹²¹ This information was provided through an informal discussion with a Muhammadiyah activist.

documents and observation alone. In addition, the interview may provide additional or different perspectives for understanding events or documents.

My fieldwork utilized semi-structured interviews as I aimed to explore a fairly focused range of phenomena. This kind of interview enabled me to address specific issues that I had decided to examine in advance (Bryman, 2004: 323), whilst retaining a degree of flexibility so that the interviewees could explain and expand on issues that they thought were relevant, necessary or important.

I selected four categories of respondents for interviews: i) Muhammadiyah central board members at the top and lower levels of the organization during 1998–2005; ii) Muhammadiyah *‘ulama* in Jakarta; iii) Muhammadiyah activists who were either officials of the Muhammadiyah branch in Jakarta during 1998–2005 or associated with youth-wing organizations of the Muhammadiyah; and iv) public intellectuals who were outsiders of the organization, but who were concerned about issues regarding Islam, society and the state. The first three categories provided a sample of Muhammadiyah leaders to address my research’s focus on investigating the extent to which neo-modernist and revivalist wing coexist at different levels of the Muhammadiyah, their view and the extent to which they negotiated their position on Islam and the nation-state.

I applied purposive sampling to select the interviewees, which is a method based on the relevance of the sample to the research questions (Bryman, 2008: 458). This meant that all the leaders were chosen because they were best suited to answer my questions regarding what, how, and why Muhammadiyah leaders took certain actions within a particular period. That is, central board members were selected due to their pivotal position as the decision-makers of the organization; whilst Muhammadiyah *‘ulama* were chosen due to their pivotal role in shaping the

religious views of Muhammadiyah members, either at the middle-level or the grass-roots level. The group of Muhammadiyah activists comprise Muhammadiyah figures who were involved in maintaining Muhammadiyah activities in Muhammadiyah branches. I selected *'ulama* and activists who lived in Jakarta for my sample because of their heterogeneity in terms of Islamic orientations, and because of the city itself – in which protests, clashes between revivalists and secularists, and heated debates about the issue of the relationship between Islam and the state have been taking place in recent history (see section 4.1).

Initially, I planned to choose *'ulama* and activists from five different locations in Jakarta in order to represent the five Muhammadiyah branches (*Pimpinan Daerah Muhammadiyah* or 'PDM') in the city: Central Jakarta (Jakarta *Pusat*), West Jakarta (Jakarta *Barat*), East Jakarta (Jakarta *Timur*), North Jakarta (Jakarta *Utara*), and South Jakarta (Jakarta *Selatan*). However, I changed this plan after realizing that classifying these Muhammadiyah members based on their locations was problematic because they could have stakes in different locations in the city. For example, *'ulama* and activists living in West Jakarta could be involved in Muhammadiyah branches near their homes, but work in South Jakarta, and thus be involved with Muhammadiyah branches close to their offices and homes. Therefore, even though I visited all five locations, I did not use location as a factor for choosing respondents. In other words, in relation to locations within Jakarta, the respondents were chosen at random. I will now explain how I recruited the respondents to participate in my research in the subsections below.

4.4.2.1 The central board members

Identifying potential respondents from central board members, especially those who were neo-modernists, was not difficult. I am familiar with the neo-modernists through their written work in books, journals and the mass media, as well as through the public lectures I often attended. However, identifying revivalists was a bit more of a problem, as I have not frequently read their books or articles in the national mass media. The *Tabligh* magazine¹²² was one of the important sources that I utilized to identify revivalists, together with consultations with friends who are Muhammadiyah activists. I found that revivalists were dominant in certain divisions, such as preaching, while neo-modernists were distributed through many divisions, especially in politics and public policy, education, and economics.

I started to communicate with many of the prospective interviewees by phone, informing them about my research project, and asking for their postal or email addresses so that I could send them an official letter describing my research and a consent form to fill out if they wanted to participate. After a couple of days, I confirmed through text message or by phone whether they wanted to participate in the research or not. If they agree to participate, I made an appointment at a place of their choosing. Many of them were happy to conduct the interviews in their offices, while the rest invited me to their homes or accommodations. I asked them for their signed consent forms before beginning the interviews.

The neo-modernist figures were quick and agreeable in responding to my invitation to participate in the research, whereas some of the revivalists seemed to be hesitant. One revivalist even ignored the invitation after a short phone conversation. He was known as a figure who was responsible for raising sensitive issues, such as

¹²² For further information about the *Tabligh* magazine, see section 4.4.1.

the Christianization or proselytization found in the *Tabligh* magazine. As a substitute, I asked a member of the *Majelis* Tabligh who was involved in maintaining the magazine about this figure's behaviour during his activities as a board member. From my experiences in the interviews, revivalists are not 'closed' people. During the interviews, they were overt in stating and explaining their viewpoints. However, they did not seem to be comfortable being contrasted with other central board members, especially with neo-modernists like Syafii Maarif.

I selected five out of eighteen of the board members from the top level of the organization and six out of approximately two hundred board members from the lower level (chiefs and members of departments in the organization). Six of them were neo-modernists, while the rest were revivalists. They were all male. Many of the central board members, particularly at the top level, lived in Yogyakarta. However, they often came to Jakarta, either for Muhammadiyah events or on their own business, so I held interviews with many of them in Jakarta. Only a small number preferred to be interviewed in Yogyakarta due to their tight schedules. The interviews lasted between forty and ninety minutes, and were all recorded. I questioned the interviewees on Muhammadiyah's ideas as well as their own perspectives about the relation between Islam and the state, Muhammadiyah's definition of *shari'a* and its position in the state, and how they assess non-Muslim leaders.

4.4.2.2 Muhammadiyah 'ulama

Unlike Islamic traditionalist organizations such as the Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) – which defines 'ulama as those who maintain *pesantren*,¹²³ and must have a deep

¹²³ *Pesantren* are Islamic traditional schools that teach classical Islamic literature, such as Islamic theology, Sufism, Islamic jurisprudence, and *Qur'anic* exegesis.

knowledge of Arabic and several important classical Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) pieces of literature – the Muhammadiyah does not have such strict requirements in defining their *'ulama*. Given that the Muhammadiyah does not follow any particular school of Islamic jurisprudence (*madhhab fiqh*), Muhammadiyah *'ulama* are not required to master any particular books on classical Islamic jurisprudence. Based on my observations and interviews, Muhammadiyah *'ulama* are those who have a mastery of Islamic subjects, as indicated by their educational backgrounds, and teach Islamic lessons, either in formal classes in universities or schools, Friday sermons in mosques, or informal religious meetings like *pengajian*. Further explanations about the classification of Muhammadiyah *'ulama* and how they developed is provided in section 5.6.

I selected eight Muhammadiyah *'ulama* in Jakarta based on their gender, age, educational background, and Islamic orientation. The respondents consisted of five males and three females. Five of these respondents were well educated (three male and two female), with three graduating as doctors and two studying for masters in Islamic studies. The remaining respondents (two male and one female *'ulama*) did not have higher academic backgrounds in Islamic subjects, although two of them studied for a bachelor's degree for a couple of years, but did not finish and did not take Islamic subjects, which means that their basic knowledge of Islamic subjects was derived from madrasas (Islamic schools) and autodidact. Four of the respondents had neo-modernist orientations, and four were revivalists.

Four respondents were figures that I was already familiar through seminars or informal religious meetings conducted by the Muhammadiyah, who I phoned to inform about my research project and to ask if and how I could send them the participant information sheet. After making appointments, I gave them the

information sheet and the consent form through email, and the interviews were conducted in their offices. I found three other respondents – including their phone numbers – through these interviewees, and I used a similar approach to invite these potential respondents for interviews. Most of the interviews were conducted in the participants' offices.

I also selected a respondent whilst attending Friday prayer, who was delivering Friday sermon (*khutbah Jum'at*) at a Muhammadiyah mosque. I had intentionally visited the mosque in order to seek for respondents, and talked to this individual after the prayer had finished, asking about his activities and background. Afterwards, I informed him about my research project and gave him the information sheet detailing my profile and research topic. I then provided him with a consent form and asked him whether he would consider participating in the project. After a short conversation he agreed to participate, and offered for the interview to be conducted in his home. The interview was then scheduled for a couple of days later.

The interviews with these *'ulama* investigated the Muhammadiyah's and the participants' own positions and perspectives on the three case study topics – the relation between Islam and the state in the constitution, their understandings or definitions of *shari'a* and its position in the state, and their views on non-Muslim leaders. These interviews took between sixty and ninety minutes, and all of them were recorded apart from one interview with a male *'alim* (singular of *'ulama*), which I took written notes for instead.

It was easier to find Muhammadiyah *'ulama* with higher academic degrees than those without such educational backgrounds in Jakarta. Most of these *'ulama* held masters or doctoral degrees in Islamic studies and worked as lecturers. This member-characteristic was confirmed by some board members from the division of

preaching,¹²⁴ and during the interviews I found that these *'ulama* not only had good knowledge in Islamic subjects, but also in contemporary social and political sciences. They were all aged between 40 – 60 years.

I found that most *'ulama* who do not hold higher degrees come from older generations – aged 60 or over. In addition to preaching, most of these *'ulama* worked as teachers in Islamic schools or as traders. Their educations in Islam were obtained from *madrasa* or *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school),¹²⁵ and many held the opinion that studying Islam in Western universities weakens Muslims' faiths. One of them even expressed the belief that those who study in the West will work for 'western interests' and, as such, I did not feel comfortable conducting a formal interview with him, or to record our conversation. I only wrote some important points I thought relevant to explore in my research when I got back home.

4.4.2.3 Muhammadiyah activists

To identify potential respondents from the category of Muhammadiyah activists, I again relied on my networks. My membership of the Muhammadiyah since 1996, together with my involvement in an Association of Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals called JIMM (*Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah*), the youth wing of the Muhammadiyah (*Pemuda Muhammadiyah*), and a non-government organization organized by Muhammadiyah activists meant that I already knew some of the respondents well – in particular the younger activists – and I also asked for their help in finding other respondents. I used similar approaches to those used in recruiting *'ulama* to recruit these activists (see subsection 4.4.2.2).

¹²⁴ From informal conversations with board members from the preaching division of the Muhammadiyah, October 2012.

¹²⁵ Graduating from a *madrasa* or *pesantren* does not automatically qualify people as *'ulama*. They are only regarded as *'ulama* after they show their competence through preaching at community or educational institutions.

I chose sixteen Muhammadiyah activists on the basis of their age (older vs. younger), gender (male vs. female), and educational background (Islamic studies vs. non-Islamic studies). I could find no revivalist figures among the respondents. Initially, I thought that some of them were revivalists, but in fact they were not. Seven activists were in the age range 50s – 60s, whilst nine were in the age range 20s – 40s. All of the activists had graduated from universities, but none of them held a doctoral degree. Their paid employments varied, and included lecturers and teachers, staff in Islamic social charities belonging to Arabic countries, politicians, activists of non-government organizations (NGO), parliamentary staff, and traders. I asked them to reflect on the Muhammadiyah's views relating to the amendment of Article 29, district law, and the 1999 election, and used these three cases to investigate their opinions about the relationship between Islam and the state in the constitution, the definition of *shari'a* and its position in the state, and their trust of non-Muslim leaders. I interviewed them in cafés and restaurants, their offices and homes, and in mosques. All of the interviews took between sixty to ninety minutes, and were all recorded.

Some of the activists who came from non-religious study backgrounds, especially the older participants, were hesitant to take part in the research as they thought they did not know much about the issues because their concerns in Muhammadiyah, so far, had focused on education and social charity. The younger activists from non-religious study backgrounds were more confident in demonstrating their ideas, however, perhaps because their positions were more 'independent', and so they were less worried about their opinions not according with mainstream Muhammadiyah *'ulama* opinions.

4.4.2.4 Public intellectuals

In this fieldwork, I define ‘public intellectuals’ as scholars with expertise in sociology, anthropology, law, or philosophy, with a focus on Islam and Muslim societies in Indonesia. These academics or researchers are not affiliated with the Muhammadiyah, but are actively involved in discussing their ideas in the Indonesian public sphere through seminars, television talk shows, books, and articles in the mass media. Hence, their names are widely known by the public. Given that my interviews concerned the Muhammadiyah, I sought academics who had also conducted research on the Muhammadiyah movement or its representatives.

I selected three academics as respondents after considering several aspects related to their expertise, concerns and activities. I initially planned to choose four, but could not find another one that met the requirements outlined above. I performed similar steps in recruiting them to be respondents as I did with ‘*ulama* and activists (see subsection 4.4.2.2).

Their analyses of the Muhammadiyah were mostly objective and did not hold back on criticism, even though they knew I was a Muhammadiyah activist. One of the respondents did initially seem hesitant to make critical remarks about the organization, but after ensuring him that I was interested in understanding a more comprehensive view of the Muhammadiyah, he started to become more critical. The interviews were recorded and conducted in the respondents’ offices as well as in public places (a coffee shop).

4.4.3 Participant Observation

Participatory observation is commonly used by qualitative researchers, particularly ethnographers and anthropologists (Bryman, 2004: 291–293). This method involves

researchers living in and interacting with the communities that are the objects of their research for a period of time (Davies, 1999).

My participant observation was carried out in two different *pengajian* in Jakarta at the end of 2012, which were selected because of their different characters. The first *pengajian* is trained interchangeably by Muhammadiyah *'ulama* with masters or doctoral degrees in Islamic studies, while the other is taught continuously by one *'alim* with a *madrasa* educational background. These two *pengajian*, which I have participated in since 1997, are located near to my parents' house.

The first type of *pengajian* has been undertaken weekly by one of the Muhammadiyah branches since 1995. Initially, the *pengajian* was conducted in the houses of members of the group, mostly in the house of its chairman. Due to a proposal made by this community, its activities have been conducted in a mosque belonging to the Indonesian government's Department of Tax since 2000, which is located near the Muhammadiyah branch's office. The teachers of the *pengajian* are Muhammadiyah *'ulama* who are lecturers at Jakarta Islamic State University (UIN) and two Muhammadiyah Universities (UMJ and UHAMKA) in Jakarta. These *'ulama* were also board members in the central branch or other branches of the Muhammadiyah. The *'ulama* taught different subjects, including Islamic theology, Islamic jurisprudence, and *Qur'an-Hadith* exegesis to an audience made up of individuals who live near to the location. Even though they are not formally bound by certain requirements, they all have membership cards for the Muhammadiyah. This kind of *pengajian* is commonly conducted by the Muhammadiyah branches.

The second *pengajian* is not officially maintained by the Muhammadiyah. This *pengajian* is permanently conducted in a prayer house called a *musolla*¹²⁶ and organized by an *'alim*, who is not involved structurally in the Muhammadiyah and is helped by his family and 'students'. This *'alim* teaches *tafsir* (interpretation) of the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* weekly. It is worth mentioning that the *pengajian* has been running since the 1960s and is taught permanently by one teacher, with this position being inherited from one generation to the next, passed down within a family. The current teacher is the third generation, and is the son-in-law of the previous teacher. Its audience consists of people who do not affiliate with any Islamic organizations. Culturally, most of them are traditionalists that are Batavian in ethnicity (indigenous people of Jakarta), some of whom have become puritans (a form of revivalism) through attending the *pengajian*. This type of *pengajian* is not common in the Muhammadiyah, and indicates that *ulama* without higher educational backgrounds are not central to the movement, especially in Jakarta.

It is worth noting that my observations of the *pengajian* occurred longitudinally but unsystematically. In other words, I observed these activities continuously from one period to another. During the fieldwork, I attended the *pengajian* every week for three months, and in the past I often participated in the forum similarly. However, I could not regard my participation in the past (before 2012) as part of my fieldwork even though I could still remember the experiences clearly, as such memories do not constitute participant observation. This longitudinal observation was unsystematic because I did not have similar questions from one observation period to another. In light of this, I attempted to reflect on the questions that had arisen during my time spent in the *pengajian*. I revisited these

¹²⁶ *'Musolla'* derives from Arabic language, and means a place for performing worship (*salat*). It is commonly used by Indonesian people, especially in Jakarta. *Musolla* are smaller than mosques, and are never used for Friday ceremonies.

pengajian in 2012 in order to discover how their religious authority is constructed, what relationships exist between their teachers (*'ulama*) and their audiences (students), and their opinions on the relationship between Islam and the state.

4.5 Data analysis

After completing the data collection through the fieldwork in Indonesia, I then went on to classify the data, which required different approaches for the different sources of data. The data from the interviews was fully transcribed before being analysed. This process was time-consuming, taking approximately 1.5 to 2 months. As the interviews were conducted in Indonesian, I did not translate the transcription into the English language. Translating transcription involves interpreting the text, so I left the transcription in its original expression in order to prevent the need to 'interpret an interpretation' when I went on to the coding and analysis stage. After coding and analysis, I selected statements to cite, and translated them into English so that they were ready to be included in my written text. I followed the same process for the documents – translating them into English as soon as I had chosen particular sentences to quote.

Unlike these two forms of data, my fieldwork notes were already written in English. The notes were my reflections on observations within two *pengajian*. They were not systematic or structured descriptions, and due to the observation's focus on investigating how religious authority was established in these *pengajian* and what their opinions are on the relationship between Islam and the state, I simply wrote my thoughts and interpretations on this issue after making the observations. Although the notes were already interpretations of the *pengajian*, I still needed to code them and to generate themes.

Analysing data in qualitative research requires the active understanding of researchers. The documents, the transcriptions of the interviews, and the fieldwork notes do not speak by themselves, but require the researcher to interpret the texts. This means that researchers must use particular strategies in dealing with texts (see Bryman, 2008: 538–539).

The qualitative data analysis begins by coding the texts based on the research questions. The coding involves interpreting the texts in order to find general concepts or issues. Therefore, the coding indirectly generated themes, which I then developed into issues that I explored in the fieldwork chapters. Although I am aware of NVivo, I preferred to code manually.

4.6 Ethical Issues

Ethical issues arise in all research processes, from their beginnings through to their ends. However, it is often during the process of producing and storing the data that the crucial ethical dimensions of the research arise. My major concerns for this research involved how to treat the participants properly and to anticipate and respond to all the possible consequences of the field research for all the stakeholders.

I began by informing the participants of my position as a researcher before asking them if they would be happy to perform an interview. I provided all potential participants with information sheets describing my research topic, detailing the funding for my research, how they could participate in my research, and their rights as respondents in terms of their involvement and their data. This ensured that the participants had enough information about all relevant aspects of my research – including the general ideas and objectives of my research and their rights to reject or

withdraw from my research at any time – for their agreement to participate to be voluntary and informed. I translated the information sheet into Indonesian to ensure the respondents clearly understood what they were being asked to consent to.

Secondly, I required the participants to sign the consent form before the interview began. The signing of the form aimed to confirm that they had voluntarily and intentionally chosen to be involved in the research as respondents. The consent form also emphasized that I guaranteed the confidentiality of the respondents.

This leads to a third point – that my research respects the confidentiality and anonymity of all the participants and their data. I was rigorous in maintaining the confidentiality of any personal information that arose during the course of my research. It is required that only I and my supervisor have access to the information arising in the process of the research, and I ensured that I correctly saved and protected all the data that I collected. I have protected the identities of the participants to prevent them from feeling vulnerable after the completion and dissemination of the research. No information about them is fed back to the hierarchy of the Muhammadiyah organization – e.g. to the central boards or other level leaders. All contributions by participants were kept anonymous by masking the names of the respondents, who are referred to using pseudonyms.¹²⁷ Audio and textual data referring to research participants have been stored in securely passworded computers to prevent any irresponsible dissemination of the information.

¹²⁷ All respondents are pseudonymous, except 3 central board members (Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Haedar Nashir, and Amin Abdullah).

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the methodological issues that arose through the process of conducting my fieldwork in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, Indonesia. I explained that my research focus on how Muhammadiyah leaders think about the relationship between Islam and the nation-state is best investigated through the qualitative method. This method places an emphasis on the investigation and interpretation of events and discourses related to the Muhammadiyah in the post-New Order era.

The standpoint of the researcher is one of the pivotal methodological issues in qualitative research. Given my position as an insider of the organization I was studying, I discussed the extent to which this factor might impact on the research. In line with scholars such as Kim Knot (2005), I contended that researchers are not always required to adopt outsider positions in order to be critical and impartial towards the objects of their research. It is possible for insiders to be critical and objective as participants-as-observers.

This research adopted a case study approach – an accepted norm within qualitative research. Three different cases were used: 1) the amendment of Article 29 of the Indonesian constitution, 2) *shari'a*-based district regulations, and 3) the Indonesian general elections in 1999. I explored how Muhammadiyah leaders viewed these three issues, especially relating to the relation between Islam and the state in the constitution, the definition of *shari'a* and its position in the state, and assessment on non-Muslim leaders and the implications of this in relation to the concept of the modern nation-state.

I used three methods for collecting data: documentary analysis, interviewing, and participatory observation. The documents that I analyzed comprised the official letters that the Muhammadiyah released to the public, the outputs of the

Muhammadiyah's periodical congress and annual meetings, the Muhammadiyah's magazines, and articles written by Muhammadiyah leaders. The content of these documents is expansive, and the issues covered by them are very broad, but my research questions guided me in selecting which documents were relevant for my project.

I followed a similar process in conducting my interviews. Semi-structured interviews were conducted using research questions and more detailed guidelines to ensure that the interviews were focused. However, unlike the structured interview that is typically employed in quantitative research, the semi-structured interview still provides enough flexibility for respondents to answer questions and expand on or bring in issues that they believe to be important and relevant. I selected three kinds of leaders from the organization as interviewees: official leaders from the central structure of the organization; figures who were formally engaged with the organization but who had a more local scope (in Jakarta); and religious leaders who had religious authority among the Muhammadiyah elite and its broader members, and who live in Jakarta. Jakarta was chosen as the primary geographical locus of the study due to the heterogeneity of the ethnic backgrounds of Muhammadiyah leaders there. The city has been an economic 'magnet' for many Indonesian people, and is also the capital city of Indonesia, where the central government is located. At the beginning of the post-New Order era, the public debates, protest actions, and mass movements relating to the topic under study mostly took place in Jakarta. In addition, Islamic movements representing neo-modernist and revivalist ideologies mostly emerged in this city and campaigned for their ideas there. I also hypothesized that Muhammadiyah leaders in Jakarta would be more involved in the discourse concerning Islam and the state.

Participatory observation was also conducted in two different *pengajian* in order to explore how religious authority is constructed in the Muhammadiyah how the discourse of the relationship between Islam and the state was in this community. I have participated in these *pengajian* for more than ten years, but revisited the *pengajian* when I conducted the fieldwork in 2012. As a result, the observation is longitudinal, but not designed systematically. The observation aimed to investigate how the religious authority of Muhammadiyah *'ulama* is constructed and what their opinions are on the relationship between Islam and the state.

I utilized qualitative data analysis that enabled me to identify more detailed concepts and issues raised by respondents, documents, and observations. This analysis began by coding the data, which indirectly led me to generate topics, which supported my development of the themes (*shari'a* and the state constitution; *shari'a* and the state law; and non-Muslim leadership and its impact on the formalization of *shari'a* in the state) for the fieldwork-based chapters.

Last, but not the least, my research protected the interests of the participants and the Muhammadiyah, and safeguarded against deception or harm arising through the research process. Their confidentiality was maintained through anonymizing their identities and using pseudonyms.

Chapter 5

Conceptualizing the Relationship of Islam and the State: The Debate on the Amendment of Article 29 of UUD 1945

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a case study investigating the views of Muhammadiyah leaders from various levels of the organization to an amendment that was made to Article 29¹²⁸ of the Indonesian constitution (UUD 1945)¹²⁹ at the beginning of the post-New Order period (1999–2002). This period witnessed the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic state (Crouch, 2010: 3), and the amendment of the constitution was seen as a necessary step in supporting democratization. When the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR)¹³⁰ discussed Article 29 of the constitution – which concerns the relationship between religion and the state – it was thus unavoidable that the discourse on ‘the seven words’ of the Jakarta Charter¹³¹ reappeared in the public sphere. Some Islamic revivalist organizations, such as the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), the Indonesian Holy Warrior Assembly (MMI), and the Indonesian Islamic Party of Liberation (HTI) argued that the political and economic crisis that took place during 1997–1998 – at the end of the New Order period – occurred as a result of the absence of an Islamic state in Indonesia (see

¹²⁸ Article 29 of the constitution outlines the relationship that is taken between religions and the state. Further explanation on the article can be found in chapter 2 (sections 2.4).

¹²⁹ Further information on the UUD 1945 can be found in chapter 2 (section 2.4).

¹³⁰ The MPR is the highest political institution, whose roles include appointing and discharging Presidents, generating the General Guidance for State Direction (GBHN), and amending the constitution.

¹³¹ ‘The seven words’ of the Jakarta Charter say: “belief in God with the obligation to practice *shari’a* for its adherents (Muslims).” It states that the state can implement *shari’a* for Muslims. Detailed explanation of ‘the seven words’ can be found in chapter 2 (section 2.4).

Hasan, 2006: 12), and called for representatives of Islamic parties in the MPR to fight for the 'seven words' to be inserted into the constitution.

The purpose of the case study undertaken in this chapter is to examine how neo-modernist and revivalist Muhammadiyah leaders from various levels of the organization conceptualized the relationship between Islam and the state within the post-New Order context, to what extent their social and cultural backgrounds or social and cultural capital influence their views, and to what extent they negotiated their views in dealing with the issue. 'Muhammadiyah leaders' here comprise: 1) its central board members, 2) Muhammadiyah *'ulama* (sing. *'alim*), and 3) figures who are involved in its local branches – i.e. activists. These three groups of Muhammadiyah leaders have different roles and functions in the organization. The board members are structural leaders at the highest level of the organization; the *'ulama* are preachers and educators, and are concerned with Islamic piety and the transfer of Islamic knowledge among Muhammadiyah members; and the activists are 'cadres', many of whom are not only active in Muhammadiyah branches, but also intensively engaged in organizations outside the Muhammadiyah. Although the Muhammadiyah is officially labelled as a 'modernist movement', its revivalist and 'modernist' orientations have been contested by its leaders since its formative period, and a mix of neo-modernist and revivalist groups are seen within these three levels of Muhammadiyah leader in the post-New Order period.

I will argue that Muhammadiyah leaders with neo-modernist orientations wanted the state constitution to remain neutral with respect to Islamic identity, and for this reason they rejected the amendment of article 29 of the constitution, whilst also being convinced that the constitution already represents Islamic values. On the other hand, revivalist Muhammadiyah figures assert that the state should play a

significant role in developing religious piety, and that this role should be mentioned in the constitution. The shift in the educational backgrounds or cultural capital of the central board members and *'ulama* to a majority that had studied Islam in combination with modern approaches to sociology, political science, and philosophy, led to their being many Muhammadiyah leaders who held critical positions about the insertion of the seven words into the constitution. However, these neo-modernists, particularly those who were board members, also attempted to reach compromises that accommodated revivalist's aspirations demanding the formalization of *shari'a*, as shown by the official stance taken by the Muhammadiyah.

This chapter contributes to the discourse on Islam and the Indonesian constitution, and provides a case study on how an Islamic organization whose leaders have two different Islamic orientations – neo-modernist and revivalist – have dealt with this issue. Even though Nadirsyah Hosen¹³² (2006) has investigated the debate among Muslims concerning the amendment of Article 29 of the Indonesian constitution (UUD 1945) in the post New Order era,¹³³ he has not paid attention to the Muhammadiyah and the extent to which different social and cultural backgrounds have influenced Muslims' views on this issue, or how these two different groups within the same organization (i.e. the Muhammadiyah) interact and negotiate their positions.

This chapter begins by outlining the national political context within which the constitutional reform was made. The debate about the relationship of religion and the state in Indonesia emerged when MPR members began discussing the need

¹³² Nadirsyah Hosen is an Indonesian scholar who majored in Islamic law. He is an associate professor at the school of law, University of Wollongong Australia.

¹³³ In his study, Hosen (2006: 419) argues that "Indonesian Islam follows the substantive approach of *shari'a*, not the formal one".

to amend some parts of the constitution, and I argue that the Islamist parties that raised the issue took this opportunity to attract Muslims' attentions back to this old and sensitive issue. This section primarily uses a literature review to discuss this historical context.

The next section explores the responses of Muhammadiyah's central board to the amendment of Article 29. Considering the rejection of 'the seven words' to be a sensitive issue, these neo-modernist leaders did not initially drive the Muhammadiyah to take an official position on this issue. However, the intensification of the demands made by some Islamic fractions in the MPR – especially by the PPP and PBB – together with the pressure from some Islamic organizations fighting for the seven words to be added to the constitution led the central board members to respond more assertively by releasing an official letter explaining the reasons behind their rejection of the seven words.

The following section then examines the Muhammadiyah's official position on the amendment. I argue that the central board attempted to reconcile the views of its neo-modernist members with those who adopted a revivalist approach. Although the Muhammadiyah rejected the call to insert the seven words into the constitution, the organization supported the effort to implement sharia as the basis for state law.

I then proceed to explore the critical voices of the revivalists of the central board, who are mainly represented by the Majelis Tabligh (the division of preaching). The revivalists expressed their dissatisfaction with the official Muhammadiyah position, accusing the neo-modernist figures of corroding Muhammadiyah ideology.

The next part of the chapter then investigates Muhammadiyah's *'ulama's* views on this issue in order to examine the extent to which this section of the

organization – regarded as the most authoritative in religious affairs – supports the Muhammadiyah’s official position. I argue that *‘ulama* with educational backgrounds limited to madrasas tend to have revivalist orientations, whereas *‘ulama* who have gone on to higher education tend to balance their Islamic views with neo-modernist ideas. This was indicated by a variety of Islamic orientations that I observed among *‘ulama* with masters or doctoral degrees in Islamic studies.

In the final section of this chapter I explore local-level Muhammadiyah members’ opinions on neo-modernism and revivalism in order to examine the extent to which the Muhammadiyah’s position on the amendment is rooted in or reflected by their views. I found that most of these members had neo-modernist views and rejected the seven words. I argue that older and younger activists have been shaped by two different contexts: the social context in which the Muhammadiyah was endeavouring to modernize its views concerning Islam-state relationships in the New Order period (the mid-1980s) impacted on older activists’ views concerning the relation between Islam and the state; and the contestation between secularist, neo-modernist, and revivalists on defining the position of religion in the state at beginning of the post-New Order period impacted on younger activists’ views on this relationship.

5.2 Democratic transition and the amendment of the constitution

The changes that occurred to the Indonesian government after Soeharto¹³⁴ announced his resignation as president on 21 May 1998 did not ensure the shift from authoritarian to democratic political conditions sought by the proponents of the

¹³⁴ Soeharto was the second President of Indonesia, ruling from 1966–1998. His regime was named the ‘New Order’ to differentiate it from the previous regime (the Old Order), ruled by President Sukarno from 1945–1966.

reformation movement.¹³⁵ Even though Soeharto had resigned from his position, his loyalists still remained. Instead of conferring his power to the MPR, Soeharto gave it over to Habibie – then Vice President – who was well known as being Soeharto’s most trusted ally (Hefner, 1999: 51). Having joined the cabinet in the 1980s after graduating from a doctoral programme in Germany, Habibie had already been given the authority to develop the aeroplane industry. In 1992, when Soeharto was re-elected for the next five years, he had intended to select Habibie as the vice President, but his conflict with some high-level military figures forced the President to alter this plan (Hefner, 1999) as the military wanted the Vice President to be taken from their ranks. In 1997 Soeharto was finally able to make Habibie Vice President – one year before the political crisis occurred. Thus, Habibie was perceived as being simply an extension of the previous regime. This perception was enhanced by the fact that more than half of the cabinet that Habibie created came from Golkar¹³⁶ – the ruling party of which Soeharto was an advisor, and most of whom had worked under the New Order government (Crouch, 2010: 21).

Doubts about Habibie’s commitment to reforming the political and economic systems led people to demand that his presidential term not be allowed to continue until the end of the period, which still had three years left to run. Some even demanded that Habibie resign immediately. It is worth noting that there were three broad responses to the transmission of the presidency. The first came from those who did not consider the transfer to be in accordance with the law (Dijk, 2001: 301). In their opinion, the law requires a transmission to be made and the president to be sworn in by the MPR. As such, they asked the MPR to take power and to establish a

¹³⁵ The reformation movement attempted to topple the New Order regime. The supporters of this movement mainly consisted of scholars, university students, and Non-Government Organization activists. They believe that the political and economic systems applied by the regime were the main factors that led to the economic crisis in Indonesia (see Crouch, 2010; Dijk, 2002).

¹³⁶ Further information about the Golkar can be found in chapter 2 (section 2.6).

presidium. This position was supported by some retiring military elites and academics. The second group, represented by left-wing students, took a more radical position, not only rejecting the validity of Habibie presidency, but also regarding the MPR as illegitimate because its members were elected under the previous authoritarian regime and thus could not accommodate the people's aspirations. This faction argued that the people should be able to elect a committee of people (Dijk, 2001: 302-03) who would then be responsible for conducting a general election. The last group – who received the widest support from the general public – argued that the transfer represented the best among the available choices. According to them, to create a presidium or a committee of people would be riskier than continuing with the current Vice President and MPR, and might lead the state into chaos (Dijk, 2001: 302). Despite their differences, it should be noted that all three factions nonetheless shared the view that the Habibie government, the presidium, or the committee of people should only be provisional governing entities to be used until a permanent government could be established through a general election, which they all wanted to be conducted as soon as possible. This shared vision united them in pressuring the government to set an early date for an election.

Habibie's administration, which referred to itself as the 'Reformation government', responded appropriately to this pressure, focusing not only on preventing political chaos, but also on ensuring the public that the government was committed to reforming the political system. Habibie did not take long to announce that a general election would be conducted by 1999. To make the election more open, the government revoked a regulation restricting the number of political parties that could run for government (Crouch, 2010: 24). Consequently, it supported the establishment of new political parties. The three extant political parties of that era

(the Golkar, PPP, and PDI)¹³⁷ were perceived by people to be unrepresentative of the spirit of the reformation, and thus new parties that embodied different political interests were sought. The government's pursuit of freedom of expression was made even clearer in their elimination of restrictions on the mass media and laws on subversion (Crouch, 2010: 24, 27).¹³⁸ This new political sphere guaranteed that people could both express their ideas and criticize the government without fear of imprisonment.

The Habibie administration was relatively successful in transmitting power from the provisional government to the permanent and more legitimate ruling body. Even though Habibie was not allowed to be a presidential candidate in 1999 as a result of his rejection by a majority of MPR members, his administration's achievements were widely appreciated due to its facilitation of the most democratic election to be conducted since 1955.¹³⁹ The election not only resulted in a strong executive institution, but also a representative MPR and People's Representative Assembly (DPR).¹⁴⁰

The spirit of reform encouraged the new political elites in the MPR to make changes to the Indonesian constitution. They perceived the constitution to not be clear enough in the limits it placed on presidential power vis-à-vis the MPR, DPR, and people sovereignty (Crouch, 2010: 53). The six re-elections of Soeharto over a period of thirty-two years, the lack of DPR members that were critical of the government, the restrictions on freedom of expression, and the control on political and social organizations were regarded as some of the central weaknesses of the

¹³⁷ Further information about the PPP and PDI can be found in chapter 2 (section 2.6).

¹³⁸ The New Order used this subversive law to imprison those who criticized its policies (see Crouch, 2010).

¹³⁹ The 1955 election was the first one to be conducted under Soekarno presidency, and 172 political parties participated in it (see Feith, 2007).

¹⁴⁰ Further explanation about the 1999 general election is described in chapter 7, section 7.2.

constitution. Although most political representatives in the MPR agreed that the constitution required amending, some – mostly secularists from nationalist parties and military officers – were reluctant to do so. They worried that the amendments might re-stimulate divisive debates, especially on the relation between Islam and the state (Dijk, 2001). It is worth noting that widespread political debates on this issue had occurred three times previously: during the preparation of Indonesian independence in 1945; after the first (1955) general election during 1957–1959; and at the beginning of the New Order in 1966–1968 (Salim, 2008: 85–87). For them, the *Pancasila*¹⁴¹ – the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian (secular) state that prevents certain religious identities from being part of the state – was a guiding principle that should not be discussed any further. However, after internal debates, the MPR finally decided to amend the constitution. The amendments started on October 1999, and the People’s Consultative Assembly agreed to revise it in four sessions that would be conducted annually, with each session taking between one to two weeks.

Initially, all the fractions of the MPR agreed not to touch certain articles of the constitution due to their principality, but some Islamic parties took this opportunity to call for the amendment of Article 29, which designated the relationship between religions and the state. Originally, Article 29 stated two principles: 1) “the state is based on belief in the One and Only God”; and 2) “the state guarantees freedom of all citizens to express their beliefs.” It was the first principle that some Islamic parties¹⁴² wanted to amend. In particular, the United Development Party (PPP) and the Crescent Moon party (PBB) demanded that ‘the

¹⁴¹ Further explanation on the *Pancasila* can be found in chapter 2 (section 2.4).

¹⁴² Islamic parties are those which use Islam as their foundation.

seven words'¹⁴³ of the Jakarta Charter be inserted into this article of the constitution (Salim, 2008). The PPP is an Islamic party whose members are mostly traditionalist Muslims, while the PBB is supported by urban Muslims, many of whom were former supporters of the Masyumi party.¹⁴⁴

I argue that these Islamic political parties' behaviours could not be separated from the rise of Islamic revivalist movements that were demanding for the state be Islamized. Many Islamic organizations were established at the beginning of the post-New Order period, with the abolition of the 'sole ideology'¹⁴⁵ by the MPR in 1998 giving people the freedom to practice any political ideologies (such as religion and socialism) that were forbidden during the New Order government. The political and economic crisis that took place in 1997–1998 also encouraged a growth in Islamic movements that publicly promoted Islam (*shari'a*) as the solution to the crisis. Some of these include the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), the Indonesian Holy Warrior Assembly (MMI), the Indonesian Islamic Party of Liberation (HTI), and the Communication Forum of the Followers of the *Sunna* and the Community of the Prophet (FKAWJ). All these groups believe that secularism is at the root of the crisis (Hasan, 2006), where they take 'secularism' to mean the absence of *shari'a* or Islamic systems in the economy, politics, and law. Masdar Hilmi (2010: 1-8) categorises these groups as utopian Islamists. He distinguishes them from meliorist Islamists.¹⁴⁶ While the latter adjusts to the 'secular' political system and tries to Islamize it, the former is strict in refusing the 'secular' system even though their

¹⁴³ 'The seven words' are found in the statement: "the state is based on belief in the One and Only God *with the obligation to carry out shari'a for its adherents*". (The words in italics are (the translation of) 'the seven words'). A detailed explanation of 'the seven words' can be found in chapter 2 (section 2.4).

¹⁴⁴ Further explanation of Masyumi is provided in chapter 2 (section 2.4).

¹⁴⁵ Further explanation concerning the sole ideology can be found in chapter 2 (section 2.5).

¹⁴⁶ Masdar Hilmi (2010) classifies the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) as meliorist Islamists due to its tendency to be pragmatic in dealing with religious pluralism and other issues of democracy, particularly during the 2004 General Election in Indonesia.

rejectionism is non-violent. Although these groups did not have a large amount of followers compared to the NU and the Muhammadiyah, their voices were nonetheless very influential in the public sphere. These Islamic parties also intended to accommodate the revivalist groups, of which many of their activists and followers were members.

5.3 Muhammadiyah's central board members' rejection of the constitutionalization of *shari'a*

Discourse on the amendment of Article 29 first appeared in the second annual session of the MPR in 2000. Feeling satisfied with the results of the previous session in 1999 – which revised the authority and limitations of the President and the DPR, as well as the relationship between them – the MPR continued to discuss further articles of the constitution, one of which was Article 29. Although they had initially agreed to refrain from touching this article, the PPP and PBB initiated the discussions by proposing adding ‘the seven words’ to the first point of the article, arguing that, in a democratic state, people have the right to express their ideals. Moreover, outside the MPR/DPR building, around five thousand people had gathered, mobilized by ‘new’ Islamic organizations such as the FPI and HTI to pressure the MPR to amend Article 29 (see Hosen, 2005, 2006). There was a perception among these organizations that factions or figures that disagreed with the idea of inserting ‘the seven words’ into the constitution must also reject *shari'a*.

In response to this, Ahmad Syafii Maarif (the chairman of Muhammadiyah at the time), together with other prominent Islamic leaders such as Hasyim Muzadi (the chairman of NU) and Nurcholish Madjid (a famous Muslim scholar) publicly asked

the MPR to refrain from inserting ‘the seven words’ into Article 29 of the constitution on the grounds of the negative impact it would have on the plurality of the nation-state. Reflecting on the event that took place more than ten years ago, Maarif explained his argument at the time:

To mention one religion in the level of a state constitution will encourage disintegration. Furthermore, it will be inconsistent with the spirit of togetherness. At the beginning of the constitution, it says that the state is based on the One and Only God (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa). It indicates that the state belongs to all religious adherents. Therefore, to mention one religion in the constitution would be not in line with the spirit of plurality and togetherness.¹⁴⁷

These prominent figures – especially Muzadi and Maarif – were regarded as the leaders of mainstream Muslims as they were the heads of the two largest Indonesian Islamic organizations at the time.

However, Maarif’s statement was not absolutely representative of the opinion of the central board of the Muhammadiyah at that time. The central board is the highest authority in Muhammadiyah – the decision-making level of the organization as a whole. It consists of between 13 and 20 figures, including a chairman, vice-chairmen, a general secretary, a vice secretary, a general treasurer, and a vice general treasurer. These figures are appointed through a ‘general election’ within the organization known as *Muktamar*, which is conducted every five years. Through the *Muktamar*, the representatives of Muhammadiyah branches – numbering approximately 2,000 activists – elect thirteen board members. From the formative period until 2010, all of the board members were male. Although the Muhammadiyah has a special female organization called Aisyiyah,¹⁴⁸ it only started

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Ahmad Syafii Maarif, 20 September 2012.

¹⁴⁸ The Aisyiyah was established by KH Ahmad Dahlan’s wife in 1917 and, like the Muhammadiyah, it also has branches in all Indonesian areas (see Burhani, 2004).

to provide a position for women in the central board in 2010, since which time the chairman of Aisyiyah is automatically appointed as a central board member. The programmes of the central board are supported by twenty divisions, covering a range of areas: the reform of religion, preaching, education, economy, politics, law and human rights, health, philanthropy, etc. Staff in these divisions are appointed by the central board members and, like the board members, they work on a voluntary basis. Although these divisions are part of the central board, they have less power than the central board members, and all the proposals that the divisions make and the programmes that they work on need to be reviewed and sanctioned by the central board members. Due to this structural hierarchy, I have divided the central board into two levels: the top level and the lower level.

Maarif realized that his opinion at the time did not represent Muhammadiyah's position. In other words, his view was not an official expression of the central board, but based on his own considerations and concerns as a Muslim intellectual:

The Muhammadiyah did not state a certain [official] opinion about the issue. Muhammadiyah was silent at the time [in the second annual session of MPR, in 2000]. That is what the Muhammadiyah usually performs. Although the Muhammadiyah is independent and can fund its activities from its own finance, the Muhammadiyah was careful [when] saying something related to the government or politics. The Muhammadiyah does not want that its *Amal Usaha* [education and social activities such as schools, universities, hospitals, and charity institutions] will be bothered because of its statement. As long as the government or people do not like me because of my Islamic views, I do not care.¹⁴⁹

Maarif thus left it to other Muhammadiyah figures to decide whether to agree or disagree with him. His neo-modernist ideas concerning this issue, published in books and by the mass media, aim to influence Muhammadiyah members, however:

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Maarif, 20 September 2012.

“I wrote my ideas (concerning the relationship of Islam and the state) in articles and books so that Muhammadiyah activists will learn it. It depends on them whether they agree or not.”¹⁵⁰ Maarif recognized that there were some Muhammadiyah central board members (especially at the lower level) who were disappointed with his public statement. He reports that they considered the position that he expressed to be corrosive to the ideas of Ki Bagus Hadikusumo – the former chairman of the Muhammadiyah – who was involved in formulating the constitution and who struggled for an Islam-based state in 1945. When I requested information on how central board members’ responded to his public statement on the issue, Maarif observed:

There were two opinions. The first agreed with me. But most of them were silent. The second regretted my statement. The conservative wing of Muhammadiyah said that I have betrayed Muhammadiyah’s predecessors, such as Ki Bagus Hadikusumo.¹⁵¹

From the information provided by Maarif, I concluded that the central board members (in both the top and lower levels) with similar opinions to Maarif preferred to remain silent, while those who disagreed with him reacted and complained (further discussion of Maarif’s critics is provided in section 5.5). Although the Muhammadiyah provided no official statement of their position in 2000 regarding the issue of the amendment, neo-modernist figures claimed that most of the central board members in the top level agreed with the Maarif’s statement, as explained by Amin Abdullah – a member of the top level with a neo-modernist orientation:

Shifting from theocracy to nation state is not an easy for those who do not understand the idea of constitutionalism. They who are attempting to insert ‘the seven words’ into the constitution do not understand the idea of

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Maarif, *ibid.*

¹⁵¹ Interview with Maarif, *ibid.*

constitutionalism. The founding fathers that made the constitution (UUD 1945) have [a] deep understanding of this idea, developed in western countries. This idea, then, transforms to be a concept of nation state. I am sure that most of the top leaders of the Muhammadiyah in the central board also understand about this concept. Hence, they preferred that things such as ‘the seven words’ not be mentioned in the constitution.¹⁵²

I argue that Maarif considered this issue to be sensitive for the Muhammadiyah because the organization was historically involved in supporting the idea of ‘the seven words’ becoming part of the constitution. First, in 1945, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo insisted on inserting ‘the words’, even though he finally altered his position due to rumours of state disintegration that might occur if ‘the words’ were mentioned in the constitution.¹⁵³ Second, through the Masyumi party, Muhammadiyah and other Islamic leaders revived the discourse of ‘the seven words’ in the Constituent Assembly during 1957–1959, which resulted in a deadlock and the disbandment of this institution by the then President.¹⁵⁴ Unlike the NU, which preferred to ally with Soekarno’s (ruling) political party in supporting the ‘secular’ constitution, Muhammadiyah’s leaders opposed it. Third, at the beginning of the New Order in 1966-1968, Muhammadiyah’s leaders again tried to campaign for ‘the seven words’. At this time, they expected the government to be more accommodative to Muslim interests because many Islamic organizations had played a significant role in delegitimizing the Old Order regime (Effendy, 2003).¹⁵⁵ Thus, for more than two decades (1945–1968), Muhammadiyah had openly favoured the constitutionalization of ‘the seven words’, and Maarif therefore did not feel comfortable in presenting his position as the official Muhammadiyah position.

¹⁵² Interview with Amin Abdullah, 23 November 2012.

¹⁵³ Further information about Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and this topic can be found in sections 2.4 and 3.6.

¹⁵⁴ A further explanation of this can be found in section 3.6.

¹⁵⁵ A further explanation of this can be found in section 3.6

Personally, however, Maarif did not feel hesitant to air his views and to be condemned by other Muhammadiyah figures:

I do not care if there is a cadre who resigns from Muhammadiyah because I refused the seven words in the constitution. It has happened once and then, I said, one person disappears, but one thousand new cadres will come.¹⁵⁶

Although other central board members in the top level did not participate in public debate in 2000, this did not mean that they disagreed with Maarif. The central board of the organization in this period was dominated by neo-modernist figures such as Syafii Maarif, Amin Abdullah, Din Syamsudin, Abdul Munir Mul Khan, Dawam Rahardjo, and Haedar Nashir, who were well known as Muhammadiyah figures that supported religious pluralism, the rational interpretation of Islam, the neutral role of religion in the state, etc. Their educational backgrounds include a combination of Islamic studies, political sciences, sociology, history, and philosophy. Amin Abdullah, for example, graduated from *madrassa Mu'allimin* (Muhammadiyah Islamic school for elementary and higher levels), obtained a bachelor's degree in Islamic philosophy, and focused on Islamic and Western Philosophy for his master's and doctoral programme, which he studied for in Turkey. Din Syamsuddin, who later became the chairman of the Muhammadiyah for two periods (2005-2015), studied in a *madrassa* or *pesantren* during elementary school and high school, and then pursued his master's and doctoral study in the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) in the United States of America, focusing on Islam and politics. Munir Mul Khan – another top-level Muhammadiyah figure – has a similar profile. After his madrasa education, he studied comparative religions for his bachelor's degree, and sociology of religion at both master's and

¹⁵⁶ From an interview with Maarif, 20 September 2012.

doctoral levels. Maarif himself, although studying in the faculty of history, focused on the issue of Islam and politics in both his master's and doctoral theses. Moreover, he studied Islam in a madrasa during his youth.¹⁵⁷ Like Maarif, Haedar Nashir (the chairman of Muhammadiyah for the period 2015–2020) is concerned with issues about Islamic movements even though he studied sociology from bachelor's to doctoral level. Their critical academic backgrounds or the development of their cultural capital encouraged all of them to develop a modern interpretation of Islam.

In contrast to the second annual session of the MPR in 2000, in which Muhammadiyah's voice was represented by Maarif alone, other Muhammadiyah central board members formally supported Maarif's rejection of the amendment by the time of its fourth session in 2002. Thus Maarif's response came to be confirmed as Muhammadiyah's official position.¹⁵⁸ I argue that the intensification of the demands made by some Islamic factions – especially by the PPP and PBB – together with the pressure exerted by some Islamic organizations through the public sphere led Muhammadiyah's top-level leaders to state their position more formally and openly.

It is worth noting that, in rejecting the inclusion of 'the seven words' within the constitution, the neo-modernists at the top level of the central board emphasized the importance of both Islamic and modern aspects of the constitution. Haedar Nashir put it thus:

Indeed, the struggle in formalizing *shari'a* through inserting 'the seven words' of the Jakarta Charter is counterproductive. Article 29 is a national consensus. Even though democratic political system enables people to propose again 'the seven words' I would emphasize that the article is a final agreement.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ Further information about Maarif's educational background is provided in section 3.6.

¹⁵⁸ See the letter No.10/EDR/I.0/I/2002.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Haedar Nashir, 1 October 2012.

His argument makes it clear that the neutral position of the state in Article 29 was a final agreement reached by the Founding Fathers, many of whom are Islamic leaders. It is a treaty between various groups that have different ideological and religious orientations, but have endeavoured to establish a common vision related to the relationship of religion and the state, and these are the underlying principles for the establishment of a modern state. This is its ‘modern’ aspect. Another neo-modernist figure in the central board, Salim (pseudonym), contended that Article 29 of the constitution was *already* Islamic: “Article 29 has already mentioned that the state is based on Islam, because belief in the One and Only God (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*) is only clear in Islamic faith.”¹⁶⁰ He thus highlights that there is an Islamic aspect already expressed in the article. Although all the top-level central board members supported Maarif’s rejection of the amendment of Article 29, they held different positions on the relationship between *shari’a* and the state, as can be seen in the letter that Muhammadiyah issued in response to this issue.

5.4 The negotiations between neo-modernist and revivalist orientations in the Muhammadiyah

The Muhammadiyah’s official reasons for rejecting the constitutionalization of the seven words were announced in letter No.10, entitled “*Penjelasan Sikap Muhammadiyah tentang Penegakkan Syariat Islam dan Perubahan Pasal 29 UUD 1945*” (The Clarification of the Muhammadiyah’s Stance on the Implementation of *Shari’a* and the Amendment of Article 29 of the Constitution).¹⁶¹ This was

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Salim (pseudonym), a central board member, 16 October 2012.

¹⁶¹ The letter No.10/EDR/I.0/I/2002.

published a couple of weeks after the MPR made its final decision on the amendment. The last paragraph of the letter indicates that it is especially addressed to Muhammadiyah officials and members, to enable them to understand why the organization rejected the amendment of Article 29.

That is all the explanation of the Muhammadiyah's standpoint toward the amendment of Article 29 of UUD 1945. Hopefully this explanation could be used as reference and guidance for all Muhammadiyah boards and members.¹⁶²

The publication of this letter was driven by complaints made by the Muhammadiyah's internal central board and its members, as well as by non-Muhammadiyah figures.¹⁶³ This is also addressed in the letter:

Related to various opinions and responses on [the] statement of the chairman of the Muhammadiyah (Ahmad Syafii Maarif), as well as questions concerning Muhammadiyah's position on the amendment of Article 29, the central board explains as follow:...¹⁶⁴

Even though other central board members acknowledged that the Muhammadiyah's voice about the amendment was represented by its chairman, and they supported his message, the organization also formulated its own reasons for rejecting the amendment. These formulations not only involved neo-modernist figures from the top-level of the board, but revivalist ones like Yusuf (pseudonym) as well, as Yusuf informed me: "I was involved in formulating the letter that aimed to clarify why the Muhammadiyah chose such a position."¹⁶⁵ Scholars like Pradana Boy (2007) categorized Yusuf as a conservative or revivalist figure, and he is known as an *'alim*.

¹⁶² See the letter No.10/EDR/I.0/I/2002.

¹⁶³ Interview with Yusuf (pseudonym), a top-level central board member, 2 October 2012.

¹⁶⁴ The letter No.10/EDR/I.0/I/2002.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Yusuf, *ibid*.

He specialized in Islamic studies until doctoral level. One of his degrees was obtained from a Middle Eastern university.

Letter No.10 of the Muhammadiyah argues that their rejection of the amendment was grounded in several considerations:

The Muhammadiyah takes the view that to explicitly insert the words “*with the obligation to carry out shari’a for its adherents*” in the first point of Article 29 of UUD 1945 is not a correct strategy, and is not productive or beneficial. This conclusion is based on Muhammadiyah’s consideration of political reality, particularly the power constellation in the MPR, the relationship between religions in Indonesia (especially in some areas that are not harmonious), and the constellation of international politics that would affect Indonesia.¹⁶⁶

The letter thus provides three reasons for rejecting the amendment. The first is that it is not the right time to pursue the amendment because of the political climate. It is contended that it would *not be possible* to achieve the desired result due to a lack of political support for the amendment within the MPR. Therefore the Muhammadiyah expressed the concern that because the failure of the amendment was virtually guaranteed, the manoeuvre would be remembered as the most decisive defeat of political Islam in Indonesian history if they were seen to pursue it too vigorously.¹⁶⁷ The amendment of the article was only supported by two Islamic parties, and less than 15% of MPR members. The second reason was grounded in inter-religious relations. The organization was worried that inserting the seven words into the constitution would worsen the relationships between followers of different religions, especially in locations in which Muslims and Christians were already in conflict.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ The letter No.10/EDR/I.0/I/2002.

¹⁶⁷ This argument from the letter was supported by the comments of one of the central board members during an interview, 1 October 2012.

¹⁶⁸ During the period 1999–2002, the Muslim and Christian community in Moluccas were engaged in a civil war. The war also involved some Islamic organizations based in Jakarta and Java, such as the MMI, the FKAWJ, and the FPI. They sent fighters from the civilian organization called the *Laskar Jihad* (the Holy Fighter Troops) to support Muslims in the battle (see Hasan, 2006).

The third reason it provided was that, as the political image of Indonesia is international in scope, developing an Indonesian Islamic constitution would be negatively perceived in international circles, which could worsen the economic and political crisis that the country was experiencing.

It is worth noting that the arguments provided in the letter, particularly the first and the third points, are quite different to those presented by Maarif. While Maarif emphasized that ‘the seven words’ would jeopardize the spirit of ‘togetherness’, the letter is vague concerning whether the issue of ‘togetherness’ involves the political calculation in the parliament or the international response. In my view, the letter indicates that the Muhammadiyah has not clearly and permanently rejected the pursuit of an amendment to include the seven words within the constitution, but simply held that it was not appropriate to consider the issue whilst the country was struggling with the crisis. As far as the letter is concerned, there is no statement that rejects the idea that the seven words should be inserted in the constitution in principle. The letter thus appears to attempt to find a compromise between the views of Maarif and other neo-modernist leaders of the Muhammadiyah on the one hand, and the revivalist group of the Muhammadiyah on the other.

Furthermore the rejection of the amendment expressed in the letter enabled the Muhammadiyah to refrain from undermining the significance of the state in supporting the Islamization of society. The letter clearly mentions that the struggle to Islamize legal regulation (the law) could be undertaken through lobbying the legislative institution (the DPR).¹⁶⁹ The Muhammadiyah has good access to political parties, and many Muhammadiyah cadres have become involved in large political parties since the beginning of the Old Order period. Furthermore, the organization

¹⁶⁹ See letter No.10/EDR/I.0/I/2002.

has a privileged position in the PAN (National Mandatory Party),¹⁷⁰ because a previous chairman of the party, Amien Rais (1998–2005), was a former Muhammadiyah chairman (1993–1998), and many of this party's leaders and constituents are Muhammadiyah activists or members. Therefore, the Muhammadiyah assumed that these factors could support the organization in fighting for its aspirations through conventional political means.

The organization concluded that the Islamization of society should thus be conducted through formal political channels:

At the moment, the Muhammadiyah assesses that besides the cultural preaching (*dakwah kultural*) and other kinds of preaching, the implementation of Islamic teachings structurally could be done at the level of the law (*undang-undang*). Through the DPR, the Muhammadiyah hopes that existing laws or laws that will be made are not contradictory with *shari'a*. The Muhammadiyah, through lobbying and its cadres in the DPR, will always attempt to revise the laws that are not in line with Islamic teachings, and will produce laws that are in accordance with Islam in the future.¹⁷¹

Instead of rejecting the intervention of religion within the public sphere, the organization ensured its members that it would seek to 'Islamize' state law or regulations in order to support the establishment of Islamic society. I argue that this statement represents a sort of compromise –accommodating revivalist idealism by holding that laws should be in accordance with Islamic teaching and *shari'a*, whilst not clearly defining what this means. For the revivalist, it might mean the implementation of Islamic law or jurisprudence as state law (see section 6.4). But for the neo-modernist, it might be perceived to suggest that as long as state law is *in accordance* with the principle values of Islam, it is already Islamic *enough* (see

¹⁷⁰ The PAN was established in 1998 by M Amien Rais (the Chairman of the Muhammadiyah during 1993–1998). Even though its elites consisted of figures from various backgrounds (not only from the Muhammadiyah), its constituencies were mostly comprised of Muhammadiyah members (see Mujani and Liddle, 2004).

¹⁷¹ See letter No.10

section 6.4.). In other words, *shari'a* has multiple meanings, which differ for neo-modernist and revivalist Muhammadiyah members. A more detailed picture of this complexity will be elaborated in Chapter 6 (section 6.4), where *Perda Syariah* (*shari'a*-based district law) is discussed.

5.5 Critical views from the revivalist wing of the central board

The Muhammadiyah's position regarding the amendment was not free from internal critiques. The *Tabligh* (2003: 41, 49) – a magazine maintained by the revivalist-orientated division of preaching (*Majelis Tabligh dan Dakwah Khusus*) in the central board – released an edition expressing its disappointment with some of the Muhammadiyah leaders' rejection of the constitutionalization of 'the seven words'. According to the magazine, the position of the central board members' was in direct contradiction with those of the great Muhammadiyah figures of the past, who fought for 'the words' (Tabligh, 2003). They regarded the position of the central board members to have altered the Muhammadiyah in such a way that it was no longer committed to Islamizing the state. These central board members, together with Indonesian Christians and non-Muhammadiyah secularists, were perceived to have played an important role in stopping the amendment (see Tabligh, 2003), and the magazine implicitly categorized them as Muslim enemies.

Moreover, many of the board members in the revivalist division stated that the official Muhammadiyah position was one that was only held by a small number of its elites. One of these revivalist board members, Amir, said that: "instead of [being] based on [the] grass roots level, the Muhammadiyah's standpoint was

elitist.”¹⁷² Amir, who has a revivalist orientation, is a preacher who often delivered Islamic lessons in the Muhammadiyah religious meetings and Friday sermons in mosques. His educational background includes a bachelor’s degree in Islamic Studies. A similar opinion was also expressed by Rayhan, a board member of the same division, also with a revivalist orientation. He stressed: “the decision (expressed in letter No.10/EDR/I.0/I/2002 published by Muhammadiyah) did not represent all of the central board’s aspirations.”¹⁷³

I was informed by Salim, a neo-modernist figure from the top level of the central board, that “before the Muhammadiyah officially released letter No.10 (2002), the chairman was invited by some of these revivalists to clarify the reason behind the refusal of the amendment.”¹⁷⁴ According to Salim, this was one of the factors that encouraged the central board to issue the official letter explaining their political calculations and the reasons for their decision.¹⁷⁵ These Muhammadiyah revivalists could not accept the arguments of the chairman and other neo-modernist board members, and considered these elites to have been influenced by ‘liberal Islam’ – a pejorative term that Indonesian revivalists use to label those who develop rational approaches towards Islam.

It is worth noting that such critiques were part of their disagreement with the liberal (neo-modernist) Islam that had arisen in the organization under Maarif’s leadership. Rayhan, a lower-level central board member and well-known revivalist figure of the Muhammadiyah, said that “when Syafii Maarif was the chairman of the organization, Muhammadiyah’s thought in Islam was corrupt.”¹⁷⁶ Unlike his predecessor, Maarif, together with some prominent top-level central board members

¹⁷² Interview with Amir (pseudonym), a lower-level central board member, 16 October 2012.

¹⁷³ Interview with Rayhan (pseudonym), a central board member, 2 November 2012.

¹⁷⁴ Interview with Salim (pseudonym), a central board member, 16 October 2012.

¹⁷⁵ Interview with Salim, *ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Rayhan (pseudonym), a central board member, 2 November 2012.

such as Haedar Nashir, Amin Abdullah, Dawam Raharjo, and Abdul Munir Mulkhan, were assumed to be more interested in issues of religious pluralism, human rights, and democracy. These neo-modernists often wrote articles criticizing conservative understandings of Islamic teachings through books, magazines, and national newspapers. Even though their Islamic thoughts cannot be regarded as identical with the position of Muhammadiyah, their personal ideas became unavoidably associated with the organization, and the revivalists thus perceived the Muhammadiyah to have gradually moved towards a liberal stance that was at odds with the movement's core principles.

Thus, the chairman of the Muhammadiyah, together with some of its other leaders, such as Dawam Rahardjo, Munir Mulkhan, Amin Abdullah and Moeslim Abdurrahman, came to be considered as figures who had attempted to spread liberal Islam through the organization (*Tabligh*, 2004: 20-21),¹⁷⁷ and were believed to be responsible for the emergence of liberal Islam among Muhammadiyah's younger activists. Some institutions, such as the Maarif Institute,¹⁷⁸ the Network of Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals (JIMM),¹⁷⁹ and the Centre for the Study of Religion and Civilization (PSAP)¹⁸⁰ represent neo-modernist Islam. These organizations, run by younger Muhammadiyah activists, attempted to revitalize and develop the 'modernist' character of the Muhammadiyah that they believed to have

¹⁷⁷ See "Para Pengibar Bendera Liberal" in *Tabligh* vol.2 No.9, April 2004.

¹⁷⁸ The Maarif Institute was established in 2002 by some Muhammadiyah scholars such as Muslim Abdurrahman, Abdurrahim Ghazali, and some younger activists. Its name, which derives from Syafii Maarif's last name, is meant to show appreciation of Maarif's thoughts, which they perceived as having the potential to enlighten the Muhammadiyah movement (see www.maarifinstitute.org).

¹⁷⁹ The JIMM was established in 2003 by Moeslim Abdurrahman and Syafii Maarif. It was meant to support the rise of young intellectuals in the Muhammadiyah. Hence, the JIMM was an umbrella organization for the various young Muhammadiyah intellectual movements (see Abdurrahman, 2008).

¹⁸⁰ The PSAP was founded circa 2000 by Muhammadiyah scholars including Syafii Maarif, Din Syamsuddin, Amin Abdullah, Sukidi Mulyadi, and Pramono Tantowi. The organization is concerned with the issues of Islam, Muhammadiyah, politics, and democracy (see www.psap.or.id).

existed in the formative period of the organization. Even though these institutions are not formally connected to the Muhammadiyah, many central board members from the preaching department of the central board disapproved of their existence. They were worried that the public would associate these organizations with the Muhammadiyah, and feared that “this big Islamic organization, which is committed to purification of faith and rituals, would significantly shift to be liberal Islam.”¹⁸¹

The release of the *Tabligh* – the revivalist Muhammadiyah magazine – in 2003 came on the back of resistance to the perceived infiltration of Islamic neo-modernism (liberal Islam) into the Muhammadiyah. According to Amir, the board member who maintained the magazine, “the initial motivation to launch the magazine” was “to respond liberal Islam in Indonesia, especially in the Muhammadiyah.”¹⁸² Another board member, Rayhan, who was also editor of the magazine, observed:

The motivation initiating the establishment of the *Majalah Tabligh* was that we (the central board) needed a magazine that could describe Muhammadiyah’s understandings on Islam. At the time, we were facing Islamic liberal thoughts, campaigned [for] by proponents, some of whom were Muhammadiyah figures. These liberal thoughts should be countered by the Muhammadiyah.¹⁸³

Liberal Islam was perceived by revivalists as being misled from ‘the straight faith’, and as propagating hostile perceptions of Islam. The magazine enthusiastically criticized Maarif and other Muhammadiyah leaders who were assumed to be liberals.¹⁸⁴ The values and ideologies strongly criticized by the magazine were secularism, Islamic liberalism, and pluralism – values that it condemned for converting or shifting Muslims away from Islam.

¹⁸¹ Interview with Amir (pseudonym), a central board member, 16 October 2012.

¹⁸² Interview with Amir, *ibid.*

¹⁸³ Interview with Rayhan (pseudonym), a central board member, 2 November 2012.

¹⁸⁴ Interview with Zaim (pseudonym), a lower-level central board member, 18 October 2012.

Although the magazine was critical of some of the top leaders of the central board, the organization did not disband it. The “board only warned the editors not to use provocative words in criticizing certain figures or ideas.”¹⁸⁵ It seems that the board realized that Muhammadiyah supporters not only consisted of neo-modernists, but also of revivalists, as Salim explains:

This situation can be regarded as a balancing movement, correcting the organization. On the one hand, the Muhammadiyah has a quite liberal magazine, and on the other hand it has a more fundamentalist one. These two periodicals could leave the Muhammadiyah in a moderate position. When the organization [too] extreme ‘left’ or ‘right’ positions, these magazines would correct it. As long as the board can control the periodicals, there is no problem for the Muhammadiyah.¹⁸⁶

I perceived Salim to be a quasi-neo-modernist figure who often accommodated a revivalist aspiration. He was involved in the division of preaching, together with many revivalists of the next period (2005–2010).

It is worth noting that the critical voices mainly came from members of the division (the department of preaching) who used this magazine in an attempt to prevent the spread of liberal Islam in the organization. They perceived one of the main goals of their division to involve preventing the spread of liberal forms of Islamic character, as they aim to propagate the ‘true’ Islam for Muslims, not only in big cities, but also in remote areas of Indonesia. Rayhan, an editor of the magazine, contended:

For the department, it is obligatory to enlighten and clarify Muslims with an Islamic understanding that is in accordance with the Muhammadiyah. The vision of the department was to propagate the *tawhid* (the oneness of God) and *tajrid* (purification). The *tajrid* is a very important action that we have to perform in order not to deviate from principles of Islamic faith. Unlike *furu’iyah* aspects, which are *fiqh* and part of the *ijtihad* that the

¹⁸⁵ Interview with Salim (pseudonym), a central board member, 16 October 2012.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with a central board member (anonym), 16 October 2012.

Muhammadiyah tolerates, the deviation of the faith is intolerable. Hence the division is concerned in purifying Muslims' faiths.¹⁸⁷

One of the most important programmes conducted by this division is to inculcate Muhammadiyah cadres with a revivalist ideology, and the magazine is used as one of the vital sources for propagating and nurturing this.

The failure of some 'liberal' figures to be re-elected in the Muhammadiyah *Muktamar* (a periodical Muhammadiyah congress) in 2005 was interpreted by Muhammadiyah revivalists as being due to the magazine's success in stigmatizing the liberals. They believed that the opposition to liberal Islam in the Muhammadiyah had successfully united *Muktamar* participants against giving these figures high positions in the organization. Rayhan, the editor of the magazine said:

We had [a lot of] interest at that time. In several editions before the *Muktamar*, we really attempted to describe who our enemies were. The issue of liberal Islam was very sensitive in local branches. Finally ... liberal figures were not elected as the thirteen top leaders. I think this was not a success in marginalizing people, but it was sort of a Muhammadiyah triumph in protecting its ideology.¹⁸⁸

This contest of ideas within the central board also affected some Muhammadiyah universities. During 2004–2007, these institutions became stricter in preventing liberal Islam from being taught within Islamic studies,¹⁸⁹ which is an obligatory subject in all faculties of the Muhammadiyah universities. Its content and teaching is coordinated and controlled by the vice-rector of the universities, who usually has an academic background in Islamic studies. In other words, these vice-rectors, to some extent, can be classified as Muhammadiyah preachers or '*ulama*.

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Rayhan (pseudonym), a central board member, 2 November 2012.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with Rayhan, *ibid*.

¹⁸⁹ As a lecturer in Islamic subjects, and being quite active in voicing Islamic neo-modernist ideas in my classes, as well as in articles in newspapers, I could empathise with the difficulties being experienced by lecturers placed in this situation.

There was one case in which a lecturer in a Muhammadiyah university was fired because he presented liberal ideas in his class and supported them in newspapers. His efforts to get his job back failed even though he asked for help from the chairman of the central board of the Muhammadiyah in 2007.¹⁹⁰

5.6 The *'ulama*: Islamizing the state versus negotiating Islam

As with the central board of the organization, I found neo-modernists and revivalists among Muhammadiyah's *'ulama* as well, with both ideologies being seen amongst the older and younger generations of the *'ulama*. It is worth noting that all the Muhammadiyah *'ulama* who had not gone on to higher education expressed a revivalist orientation, whereas those who graduated from higher education adopted a mixture of the two positions of Islamic orientation. Based on this finding, it seems clear that the educational backgrounds of madrasas produce a revivalist orientation. However, the knowledge that *'ulama* gain from higher education leads them to negotiate their revivalist views with the ideas of neo-modernism, accounting for the varied Islamic orientations found among the *'ulama* with master's and doctoral degree in Islamic studies.

This section thus distinguishes between two types of *'ulama* based on their different cultural capital. The first type comprises those who only studied Islam in a *madrasa* (Islamic schools from primary through to senior high school) or a *pesantren* (an Indonesian madrasa whose students stay within the institution). And the second type comprises those who not only studied Islam in a *madrasa*, but in

¹⁹⁰ Interview with Saiful (pseudonym), a young activist of the Muhammadiyah, 25 November 2012.

higher education as well. I will describe the sociological backgrounds of these two groups of *'ulama*, together with their views on the issue of the 'seven words'.

5.6.1 The first type of Muhammadiyah *'ulama*: Islamizing the state

The first type of Muhammadiyah *'ulama* do not continue to study Islam in higher education. After finishing their study in madrasas or pesantrens, they upgrade their knowledge on Islam through self-learning. Jainuri (63), a male *'alim*, became a teacher in a madrasa in Jakarta soon after finishing his studies at a pesantren in Central Java, and became a preacher at the end of the 1970s. He was not interested in continuing his education as his objective at the time was to develop a madrasa established by his father. He improved his knowledge on Islamic subjects by reading Islamic literature and magazines, and made money by working as a teacher in a madrasa and teaching *Qur'anic* exegesis for Batavian (ethnic Jakarta) communities.

Even though some of this group tried to pursue bachelor's degrees in either Islamic studies or other subjects, none of them completed them. Darori (60), a male *'alim*, registered for a bachelor's degree in Islamic studies, but his financial situation forced him to end his education. However, he continued to teach Islam through *pengajian* in a Muhammadiyah branch near to his house. Because his salary as a preacher was not enough to cover living costs in Jakarta, he established a small printing agency there. This small company has continued to develop. Nuriyah (55), a female *'alim*, was also a university student majoring in psychology who did not finish her study. Being an activist of Aisyiyah (a Muhammadiyah organization for females only) and preaching Islam under this organization's programmes has been a weekly activity for her since her youth. She earns her money through teaching that

guides individuals, families, and groups in how to read the *Qur'an*, together with thematic *Qur'anic* exegesis.

It is important to mention that because Muhammadiyah does not adopt a *madhhab* (an Islamic jurisprudence school) position, its religious authority does not derive from classical Islamic literature. Unlike traditionalist (NU) *'ulama* – students who are educated in a *pesantren* (Islamic traditional schools) and taught using classical or medieval Islamic literature – the first type of Muhammadiyah *'ulama* commonly train their pupils in religious meetings about the *Qur'an*, *Hadith* (prophet saying and habit), and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence).

Darori, for example, often delivered moral lessons based on the *Qur'an*. He starts by telling his audiences about relevant issues in Indonesia, and then often cites a verse of the *Qur'an* to justify the explanations he gives for his position on these issues. His teachings are often thematic, showing that the use of *Qur'an* in delivering Islamic lessons is the key for making his audiences accept his positions and recognize his religious authority. His authority *is* recognized by the Muslim community surrounding his house, and is indicated by the fact that people refer to him as an *ustadh* (religious teacher). Furthermore, he is also regularly invited to be a *chatib* or speaker for Friday prayer in the mosques near his house.

Nuriyah delivers Islamic lessons at weekly religious meetings in an Aisyiyah building in Jakarta. Her audiences are comprised of women who live near this office. The audience regarded her as an authority in Islamic subjects, with one audience member telling me that she feels enlightened by her talks, which often correlate daily life problems with the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*.¹⁹¹ Her audiences do not care where Nuriyah studied Islam, or about the extent to which she has a mastery of

¹⁹¹ Interview with Afifah (pseudonym), one of Nuriyah's pupils, 19 November 2012.

classical Islamic literature. As one of her pupils observed: “the important thing in assessing whether a religious teacher can be regarded as good or not is his or her morality (daily behaviour).”¹⁹²

However this does not mean that all of the first type of Muhammadiyah *‘ulama* do not learn from other sources, such as literature written by medieval *‘ulama*. Jainuri, for instance, often prepared for teaching *Qur’anic* exegesis by reading *Tafsir ibn Katsir* by Ismail ibn Katsir (d.1373), and for teaching Islamic rituals and *fiqh* by reading *Bidayatul Mujtahid* by Ibn Rushd (d.1198). In addition to classical literature, Jainuri also read contemporary books, such as *Tafsir al-Maraghi* by Mustafa al-Maraghi (d.1945), *Tafsir al-Azhar* by Hamka (d.1982), *Tafsir al-Mishbah* by Quraish Shihab (born 1930s), and *Fiqh al-Sunnah* by Sayyid Saabiq (d.2000). Jainuri was a permanent teacher of Islamic subjects for some local ethnic (Batavian) communities. Unlike Darori and Nuriyah, who preferred to choose particular topics for each *pengajian*, Jainuri taught *Qur’an-Hadith* exegesis and Islamic jurisprudence.

Few of these *‘ulama* used the *pengajian* (religious lecture) in their Muhammadiyah programme. Nuriyah taught her Islam lessons in the Aisyiyah office so that her pupils or audiences were aware that this activity is part of the Muhammadiyah programme. Moreover, when she invited other people to attend her teaching, she announced that the activities were part of Muhammadiyah. Nevertheless, when she teaches as a private teacher, she does not present the programme as a Muhammadiyah activity.

Conversely, many *‘ulama* do not conduct the *pengajian* under the Muhammadiyah agenda. Darori, for instance, often taught his pupils in a public

¹⁹² Interview with Anisah (pseudonym), one of Nuriyah’s pupils, 19 November 2012.

mosque close to his house, which has nothing to do with the Muhammadiyah. Thus, it was not clear to the students whether he was teaching a Muhammadiyah programme or not, although they knew that he was a Muhammadiyah *'alim*. I found a similar pattern in Jainuri's teaching. Jainuri taught in many of the communities of Batavian around his house in Jakarta, and his pupils came from different *madhhab* (school of law / jurisprudence) backgrounds, including Shafi'i and Hanbali. The students did not feel that they were attending a Muhammadiyah *pengajian* because there was no indication that they were, even though they knew that Jainuri had a Muhammadiyah orientation in terms of his understanding of Islam. As one of his students put it:

Ustadh Jainuri is kind of *'alim* who wants to revise Muslims' faith and ritual just like Muhammadiyah does. He always referred to Muhammadiyah decisions in terms of conducting Ramadhan fasting and *Idul Fitr*.¹⁹³

This indicates that these kinds of *'ulama* were marginal, with their activities and ideas not representing the official discourse of Muhammadiyah. This category of *'ulama* favours the Islamization of the state, asserting that that 'the seven words' are the guarantee that the state will support Muslims in performing Islamic teachings. Based on the observations and interviews that I conducted in Jakarta, I concluded that most of these *'ulama* tend to disagree with the Muhammadiyah's position on the amendment. When I asked Nuriyah about its position, she stated:

The role of a state is very important for Muslims to perform Islamic teachings comprehensively. Implementing *shari'a* in the state through 'the seven words' is Indonesian Muslims' dream that has been buried since 1945 because Muslim leaders were too tolerant to non-Muslims. In fact, *Allah* (God) commands us to be assertive to infidels.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ Interview with Firdaus (pseudonym), a student at a *pengajian* taught by Jainuri, a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 5 January 2013.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with Nuriyah (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 19 November 2012.

When I posed a similar question to Darori, he responded:

If we have a huge political power in the MPR, ‘the seven words’ of the Jakarta charter should be fought for to be part of the constitution. If we do not have such a power, at least we speak out and remind the public about the necessity of the seven words.¹⁹⁵

Although their role in shaping their students is significant – as shown by my conversation with some ordinary people who are active in attending religious meetings taught by Jainuri, one of the *‘ulama*, indicating that they favour ‘the seven words’ – their role in the Muhammadiyah in general is less influential. There are few of the first type of Muhammadiyah *‘ulama* in large cities like Jakarta in comparison to the second type. Indeed, I had difficulty finding such *‘ulama* in the city.

5.6.2 The second type of Muhammadiyah *‘ulama*: modernizing Islam

The second type of Muhammadiyah *‘ulama* are those who graduated from universities with master’s or doctoral level degrees. After finishing their study in *madrasas* or *pesantrens*, they pursued higher education, and most of them obtained master’s or doctoral degrees in Islamic studies. They generally work as lecturers in Islamic studies at universities that belong to Muhammadiyah. Four out of the five Muhammadiyah *‘ulama* that I interviewed – Sholihin (50), Masykur (55), Baligoh (45), and Zarkasyi (50) – all worked at Muhammadiyah universities in Jakarta and began their careers more than ten years ago. The other *‘ulama*, Rabitah (50), taught at the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta. This state university specialized in

¹⁹⁵ Interview with Darori (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *‘alim*, 7 October 2012.

Islamic studies such as Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic theology, and *Qur'anic* exegesis although, for the last five years, this university has developed 'secular' faculties, such as economics, political science, and medical science. There are many other Muhammadiyah *'ulama* who work as lecturers at the UIN. However, more of this group of *'ulama* works in Muhammadiyah institutions than in the UIN. To be appointed as a lecturer in the Muhammadiyah requires proving one's engagement with the Muhammadiyah organization and getting a recommendation from a Muhammadiyah figure. For the UIN, on the other hand, Muhammadiyah members have to compete with other non-Muhammadiyah academics through formal testing conducted by the department of Religious Affairs of the Indonesian government, as the UIN belongs to the state.

The rise of the second type *'ulama* cannot be separated from the significant growth in Muhammadiyah's higher educational provision since the 1970s. The New Order government programmes that aimed to improve the economy through providing jobs for well educated people encouraged the Muhammadiyah to develop its higher education. Since that period, 172 higher educational institutions of the Muhammadiyah have been established, consisting of 109 academies and 63 universities throughout Indonesia.¹⁹⁶ More than half of these are located on a Javanese island on which every two out of three Indonesian people live. These Muhammadiyah educational institutions, including non-Islamic study ones, are obliged to provide lessons about Islamic studies in all faculties and departments and at all levels. Providing Islamic subjects is thus central to all Muhammadiyah higher education. In addition, government legislation for lecturers No.14/2005 requires all lecturers teaching at the undergraduate level to have master's degrees, and all

¹⁹⁶ See www.muhammadiyah.or.id

lecturers teaching at a postgraduate level to have doctoral degrees.¹⁹⁷ It also requires Muhammadiyah institutions to produce lecturers with high competencies that specialize in Islamic subjects. The necessity to provide competent lecturers in Islamic studies has led the Muhammadiyah to use lecturers with master's and doctoral qualifications. For example, one Muhammadiyah *'alim*, Zarkasyi, was encouraged by the university he works in to pursue both a master's and a doctoral degree.¹⁹⁸ Baligoh started her career as a lecturer in Islamic jurisprudence circa 1996, and her senior lecturer also suggested that she improve her competency by pursuing a master's and a doctoral degree.¹⁹⁹ Working as lecturers forced both of these academics to upgrade their education all the way up to doctoral level.

In contrast to the first type of *'ulama*, many of these second types of Muhammadiyah *'ulama* are found in Jakarta, where numerous Muhammadiyah higher educational institutions operate. This city is one of the areas in which many Muhammadiyah campuses were established. Two out of five Muhammadiyah colleges in this city are universities consisting of more than six faculties, and these five campuses absorb as well as generate many *'ulama* with master's and doctoral qualifications and abilities.

Unlike the first type of *'ulama*, most of the second type do not provide ongoing education for a relatively fixed community. Even though they also act as preachers in mosques or *pengajian*, which are conducted either by Muhammadiyah or non-Muhammadiyah teachers, their main area of preaching Islam occurs within the campus classroom. My interactions with lecturers of Islamic studies in a Muhammadiyah university in Jakarta during my fieldwork in 2012, as well as during

¹⁹⁷ See article 46 point (2a) and (2b) of Law No.14/2005.

¹⁹⁸ Interview with Zarkasyi (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 31 October 2012.

¹⁹⁹ Interview with Baligoh (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 31 October 2012.

2003–2007, enabled me to conclude that the purpose of this teaching is both to transfer Islamic knowledge and to nurture religious piety among students.

The religious authority of this type of *'ulama* originates from their teaching activities in classes, the sermons they deliver in *pengajian*, and their academic degrees in Islamic studies. They have expertise in the subjects of Islamic jurisprudence, the exegesis of the *Qur'an* and *Hadith*, and Islamic theology. Masykur, Solihin, Rabitah, and Baligoh were all trained in Islamic jurisprudence and all teach the subject in their classes. Meanwhile, Zarkasyi focused on theology and exegesis of the *Qur'an*. Therefore, these *'ulama* do not merely refer to the *Qur'an* and *Hadith* to support their analysis, as the first type of *'ulama* do. Although their teachings also aim to generate pious Muslims, they are more concerned with how to transfer their knowledge to their students.

In contrast to the first type of *'ulama*, the second type of Muhammadiyah *'ulama* show a variety of Islamic orientations. Their educational backgrounds have led them to a greater degree of engagement with the ideas of modernity and the nation-state, and thus to hold a higher degree of agreement with the Muhammadiyah's rejection of 'the seven words'. Zarkasyi (a male *'alim*) and Rabitoh (a female *'alim*), for example, both rejected 'the words', and can be categorized as neo-modernist *'ulama*. When I asked Zarkasyi about the amendment of Article 29, he responded:

I think it was the right choice for the Muhammadiyah to refuse the seven words because, politically, our relation with the *Pancasila* is ideal for Indonesian Muslims, [by which] I mean that the *Pancasila* is able to accommodate Muslims' interests as well as to protect the unity of the Indonesian state.²⁰⁰

²⁰⁰ Interview with Zarkasyi, 31 October 2012.

Zarkasyi thus implicitly stated that Article 29 already has the facet of managing Muslims' interests on the one hand, and keeping religious identity separated from the state on the other, and is therefore best left alone. He associated Article 29 with *Pancasila* because the first principle of *Pancasila* is the same as the first verse of Article 29, stating a belief 'in the One and only God.' Besides citing verses of the *Qur'an*, Zarkasyi also often quoted Islamic modernist scholars' views, including those of Muhammad Abduh and Ali Shariati. Zarkasyi elaborated their ideas in order to strengthen his interpretations and arguments. This character is commonly found among neo-modernist thinkers. Rabitah (another neo-modernist 'alim) adopted a similar position to Zarkasyi, asserting that Article 29 already supports an Islamic position and needs to go no further:

What is the meaning of the words *Yang Maha Esa* (The One and Only God), as mentioned in Article 29, as well as in the first point of the *Pancasila*? It means *syahadat asyhadu alla ilaha illallah* (I confirm that there is no God except Allah). When people say *syahadat*, they are committed to their saying, and will perform Islam as they believe. Hence, the Muhammadiyah's refusal in order to reject a concept of Islamic state is kind of an effort to preserve unity of Indonesian nation. This is just the same as what has been done by Muhammadiyah figures in the past (1945). We have to realize that our nation consists of various ethnicities, cultures, and religions, and therefore any efforts to unite the nation should be pursued as long as they do not destroy Muslims' faith.²⁰¹

Although she agreed with the rejection of the constitutional adoption of the seven words, she thus highlighted what she took to be the Islamic dimension of Article 29.

It is worth observing that the possession of a master's or doctoral degree did not universally accord with 'ulama support for a 'secular' state. Some 'ulama with these educational backgrounds still adopted a revivalist support for 'the seven words'. Masykur held a doctoral degree in Islamic jurisprudence, and when I asked

²⁰¹ Interview with Rabitah (pseudonym), a female Muhammadiyah 'alim, 26 November 2012.

him about the Muhammadiyah's rejection of the constitutional adoption of the seven words he replied:

Muhammadiyah officials who reject the seven words do not understand the history of the role of Muhammadiyah figures that have formulated and fought for the constitutionalization of 'the words' in the past. In my opinion, the insertion of these 'words' is only [aiming] to guarantee that Muslims can perform their religious teachings comprehensively. The negative impact of the absence of the state is that, nowadays, most Muslims [have a] lack of understanding of Islam and are less committed to it.²⁰²

Although supporting the Islamization of the state, Masykur does not hold that this state should be an Islamic one, as he suggested that such a right should also be given to other religious followers.²⁰³

5.7 The activists: Nationalizing Islam

5.7.1 Profile of Muhammadiyah activists

Muhammadiyah activists – officials or board members in Muhammadiyah branches – are generally well-educated middle-class Muslims. Few of them have doctoral degrees, but most of them have bachelor's and master's degree in Islamic studies, humanities, or social sciences.

Few of the activists have studied in Middle East universities, with most having studied for their master's degrees at Western universities – particularly those of the young generations. Sa'id (55) is one of the few older activists that studied in a Middle Eastern university. Ayni (37), a young female activist, obtained her master's degree from a European university after graduating from a university in Cairo,

²⁰² Interview with Masykur (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 24 October 2012.

²⁰³ Interview with Masykur, *ibid*.

Egypt. Meanwhile, Somad (39), a young male activist, after finishing a master's degree in an Indonesian university then pursued a second master's in a Western university, followed by a doctoral degree from an Indonesian university.

Activists' ages ranged from 25-39 (younger activists) and 40–70 (older activists). The younger activists are usually active in youth wings of the Muhammadiyah, such as the Association of Muhammadiyah Teenagers (IRM), the Association of Muhammadiyah Students (IMM), the Association of Young Muhammadiyah (PM), and Nasyiatul Aisyiah (NA). These groups are structurally connected with the Muhammadiyah, but have autonomy in terms of appointing their own board members and managing their own organizations. Almost all of these youth wings of the Muhammadiyah target students in either schools or higher education. Their activities consist of programmes for broadening and deepening their members' knowledge on Islamic studies, the history and ideology of the Muhammadiyah, and contemporary social and political issues. Their organizational career moves to the Muhammadiyah or Aisyiah when they reach their 30s or 40s. However, some of them remain active in these youth organizations (the PM or the NA) after they move to the Muhammadiyah or the Aisyiah. The movements target schools, higher educational institutions, and professionals, which leads the youth wings as well as the Muhammadiyah itself to be dominated by middle class, well educated, and urban members of society. This trend has been seen since the establishment of the youth institutions in the 1960s.

Common jobs of activists include positions as lecturers, teachers, activists for Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), politicians, members of the parliament (DPR/MPR), staff of DPR, staff in the social organizations owned by Middle Eastern countries, and traders. The activities of activists – both younger and older –

in ‘secular’ political parties, NGOs, and parliament enable them to build networks with various religious adherents, ethnicities, and secular groups. Farid (35), a young male activist for an NGO that focuses on issues of human rights and religious pluralism, for example, has a close relationship with non-Muslim activists who are concerned with the same issue. He is often involved in conducting programmes that involve cooperating with other institutions, including non-Islam-based organizations. Harun (48), an older male activist and a politician from a secular-nationalist party, also works with others from a diverse range of backgrounds and affiliations. The elites and supporters of his party have various different ethnicities, ideological orientations and religious affiliations, so working in the party requires him to accept this diversity and to share common visions with activists from the same party that have very different beliefs and backgrounds. Furthermore, his party’s ideology – fighting for a ‘secular’ state – has led him to communicate and cooperate with other movements that have similar concerns.

5.7.2 Muhammadiyah activists’ views on the amendment

Muhammadiyah activists – both older and younger – are quite univocal in terms of their opinions on the amendment of Article 29. All of the activists that I interviewed, regardless of their age or gender, expressed agreement with Muhammadiyah’s official position. In other words, they were all adherents of the neo-modernist orientation, and held that Islam and the state already possess the appropriate relationship with each other. However, although their rejection of the amendment was univocal, they offered different arguments to support their positions. I will categorise these arguments into three broad groups.

The first type of argument was advanced by older activists, who tend to already view Article 29 as containing Islamic aspects. Although they accept Muhammadiyah's standpoint, they justify it by arguing that the constitution and the state already adopt a broadly Islamic approach. When I asked Hasyim (57) – an older male activist working as a lecturer in a Muhammadiyah university – about the amendment, he responded:

The essence does not lie in 'the seven words'. The Muhammadiyah, since a long time before the establishment of the Indonesian state, has been struggling in shaping Muslim society to live in accordance with Islam, not in terms of its formality but its substance. ... The essence of the seven words is *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (the One and Only God), as mentioned in UUD 1945 and the *Pancasila*. The principle of Islam is *tawhid* – belief in the One and Only God. Therefore, all of the details should be referred to as the *tawhid*. The *tawhid* implies that Muslims should perform any activities based on the *tawhid*.²⁰⁴

As noted in the previous section, the phrase 'the One and Only God' is mentioned in Article 29 of the constitution as well as in the foundation for the state – the *Pancasila*. Hasyim perceived these two principles of the state to be more associated with Islam than with other other religions, and thus believed that Islam already has a 'special place' at the heart of the state. Nevertheless, the concept of *tawhid* that is implicitly mentioned in the constitution does not mean that the state is Islamic, as another older activist who graduated with a bachelor's degree in Islamic studies from a Middle Eastern university and now works in a charity foundation belonging to a Middle Eastern country pointed out:

All groups agree to appreciate *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (the One and Only God). For Muslims, this word means *tawhid* and Indonesian citizens have to appreciate the *tawhid*. The establishment of the Department of Religious

²⁰⁴ Interview with Hasyim (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 1 November 2012.

Affairs (*Departemen Agama*) is part of the implementation of the *tawhid*. However, this country could be regarded neither as secular nor Islamic.²⁰⁵

The second form of argument supporting the rejection of the amendment subordinates Islam under the national interest. For this group of Muhammadiyah neo-modernists, so long as national leaders have formed a consensus concerning the relationship between Islam and the state, Muslims should accept this. Talhah (37), a younger male activist who works in a social organization stated:

It is clear that our founding fathers ... that some of them are Muhammadiyah figures, [and] have decided Article 29 as the description of the relationship between religions and the state. Such an agreement has been discussed seriously by them. I think it is a final agreement that should not be disturbed.²⁰⁶

This sort of argument thus understands national interest and consensus as providing the parameters that determine when and whether political decisions should be obeyed and accepted. Its proponents do not try to find grounds of compatibility between the article and Islam, but take political consensus to be authoritative in matters of the state.

The third argument against the amendment emphasizes the need to find universal Islamic values rather than appealing to formal or traditional Islamic doctrine. For its supporters, these universal values can be discovered through contextualizing Islamic teachings. As explained by Harun (45), an older male activist working as a politician, “sacred aspects should be detached from those values in order to make them accepted by all Indonesian citizens regardless of their religious backgrounds.” Majid (32), a younger male activist pursuing a master’s

²⁰⁵ Interview with Sa’id (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 12 December 2012.

²⁰⁶ Interview with Talhah (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 17 October 2012.

degree in politics and working as a staff assistant of parliament member, made a similar point:

I think it is not necessary to insert the seven words into the constitution. It is enough to use the substance of the seven words in regulations or laws. What I mean with the substance of Islam is its universal values. We can fight for inserting these universal values into the laws.²⁰⁷

This argument thus holds that Islamic teachings should be incorporated into the constitution without any explicit reference to Islam.

These opinions thus indicate that neo-modernist views are dominant amongst Muhammadiyah activists. The increased popularity of this neo-modernist orientation among both older and younger activists was influenced by two different factors. The older activists are the product of the modernization of Islamic thought within the Muhammadiyah from the mid-1980s through the 1990s. This was a time during which the Muhammadiyah was attempting to solve the problems that it was being caused by the New-Order government's policy that prohibited Islamic organizations from having Islamic political orientations. One of the obvious examples was the regulation obligating all social organizations (including Islamic organizations) to use the *Pancasila* alone as the foundation of their organizations (see sections 2.5. and 3.6 for further explanation of how Muhammadiyah dealt with this issue). Thanks to a number of Muhammadiyah leaders with a deep understanding of Islamic subjects and modernity, such as Amien Rais and Syafii Maarif (see Kersten, 2015), the Muhammadiyah was able to negotiate the *Pancasila* and Islam.²⁰⁸ The modernization in this period mainly discussed Muhammadiyah's theological understanding of the compatibility between the *Pancasila* (secular) state and Islamic

²⁰⁷ Interview with Majid (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 5 November 2012.

²⁰⁸ Further explanation on this discourse was provided in chapter 4.

teachings. This modernization of Islamic thought involved a kind of self-reflection and critical review of the stagnancy of the Islamic ideas held by the Muhammadiyah, and became more obvious in the 1990s when Rais and Maarif led the organization (Kersten, 2015). I argue that this sociological and political background contributed strongly to shaping older activists' mindsets on the relation between Islam and the state.

In strong contrast with their seniors, younger activists' have grown up in an intellectual and ideological context in which revivalist movements demanding the Islamization of the state increased during the post-New Order period. This encouraged neo-modernist figures in the central board of the Muhammadiyah to strongly voice their rejection of revivalist ideas, and disseminate their neo-modernist messages to the wider community. This actions involved younger activists, and gradually shaped their views concerning the relationship between Islam and the state. These younger activists were former board members in the youth wings of the Muhammadiyah, such as the IRM, IMM, PM, and NA. Together with their seniors, they established and maintained institutions focusing on religious pluralism, democracy, social justice, and human rights. The organizations they established at the beginning of the post-New Order period included: The Center for the Study of Religion and Civilization (PSAP), the Maarif Institute, the Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual Network (JIMM), the Center for Dialog and Cooperation among Civilizations (CDCC), the International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), and the Center for Moderate Muslim (CMM) (see Boy 2007; Kersten, 2015). Although each of these institutions has a different emphasis, they all attempt to counter revivalist ideas that they perceive as being threatening to the future of the Indonesian nation-state and democracy.

5.8 Conclusion

Muhammadiyah's official position on the amendment of Article 29 and the reasons given for it in letter No.10 (2002), particularly concerning the issue of 'the seven words', could be regarded as an attempted compromise between the neo-modernist and revivalist figures of the Muhammadiyah. In contrast to Maarif's argument that the inclusion of 'the seven words' would disturb the religious plurality of the state, the Muhammadiyah official position was that it was not the right time to introduce the seven words into the constitution for three reasons: 1) the lack of political support for this amendment in the MPR, 2) the current conflict between Muslims and Christians, and 3) the responses of the international public.

However, the position that the Muhammadiyah took was still problematic from the revivalist perspective. Their disagreement with the Muhammadiyah's official position expressed their disappointment with the rising move towards liberal Islam within the organization that had been developing since Maarif had led the organization. This critical stance was articulated by a number of central board members from a division that campaigns for what it believes to be the central message of the Muhammadiyah – 'true' Islam.

A mixture of neo-modernist and revivalist outlooks is also found among the Muhammadiyah's *'ulama*. Their cultural capital or level of educations and types of preaching activities contribute towards shaping their views in a neo-modernist or revivalist direction. Those who have only studied in madrasas and preach to their communities tend to be revivalists, while those who have continued their study into higher education and teach Islam through an academic approach tend to develop towards neo-modernism. I argue that the more the *'ulama* encounter ideas of

modernity and the nation-state in particular, the more they are likely to negotiate their views on the relationship of Islam and the state. However, it is worth mentioning that the *'ulama* take themselves to be the guardians of 'true' Islam (see Zaman, 2002), and hence they experience a greater resistance towards an acceptance of a 'secular' state. Thus, there are a number of *'ulama* with master's or doctoral level degrees that still hold revivalist views.

Muhammadiyah activists are less 'burdened' or conflicted on this issue. Besides having less responsibility to preserve the 'traditional' Islamic views of the Muhammadiyah, these activists have established diverse networks with other people and groups from different religious or ideological backgrounds through their activities in 'secular' organizations. In my opinion, this is one of the main factors that encourages them to reject 'the seven words'. Although they still appreciate Islam and look for Islamic aspects in the foundation of the state (UUD 1945 and the *Pancasila*), they prefer to emphasize the universal values of Islam in the constitution. These neo-modernist activists emerged during the beginning of the post-New Order period.

Chapter 6

The Secularization of *Shari'a*: Recognizing the Role of Parliament in Producing Law

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I argued that the neo-modernist leaders of the Muhammadiyah wanted the state constitution to remain neutral²⁰⁹ with respect to religious identity, and for this reason rejected the amendment of article 29 of the constitution. Many of them also expressed the opinion that article 29 already represents Islamic values. On the other hand, revivalist figures from the Muhammadiyah wanted the state to play a more significant role in controlling the religious piety of Muslims by inserting ‘the seven words’ of the Jakarta Charter into the constitution.

In this chapter, I investigate Muhammadiyah leaders’ responses to *shari'a*-based district regulations. These district regulations were generated during the period 2000–2006, particularly in 2003, and gave rise to a national debate among politicians (secularist and Islamist) and leaders of Islamic organizations such as the Muhammadiyah, the MUI, and the NU. In this research, I limit my investigation of the regulations to the period from 2000 to 2005. More precisely, I focus on the opinions that neo-modernist and revivalist Muhammadiyah leaders from different levels of the organization have about this issue.

I use this case study to examine how adherents of neo-modernism and revivalism understand *shari'a* and its position within the modern state, and to what

²⁰⁹ By the ‘neutral’ from Islamic identity I mean that the state does not mention Islam as state religion or give privilege for Islam.

extent these two different groups negotiate their positions to form compromises. I argue that even though they have different perceptions about what *shari'a* is, both neo-modernists and (most) revivalists consider it to be the parliament's role to review and make decisions on the issue of whether to make *shari'a* law. They recognize that, in a modern state, parliament should be the authoritative body for creating legislation, and that this applies to *shari'a* as well.

This chapter contributes to the discourse of *shari'a* and the nation-state in post-New Order Indonesia. It fulfils a hole ignored by scholars such as Arskal Salim (2008). Salim's research²¹⁰ focused more on the interaction between *shari'a* and the nation-state in the post-New Order era. He did not pay attention to how neo-modernists and revivalists understand *shari'a* and its position in the state, or to how the two different groups (in the Muhammadiyah) negotiate their positions to find an organizational position of compromise regarding a secular state versus an Islamic state.

This chapter begins with a description of the trend for developing *shari'a*-based district regulations (*Perda Syari'ah*) in several regions, including Aceh, South Sulawesi, and West Java. I also elaborate on the social-political situation within which the legalization on *shari'a* in the bylaws took place. Most of the exposition in this section is based on a literature review. I argue that the formalization of *shari'a* within district regulations represents a kind of political persuasion that is used by the heads of district governments to enhance their credibility in the eyes of Muslim communities, and thus to gain support from them. This is a consequence of district

²¹⁰ Salim (2008: 2) argues that "attempts to formally implement *shari'a* in Indonesia have always been marked by a tension between political aspirations of the proponents and opponents of *shari'a* and by resistance of the secular state".

autonomy and direct election, which have led to the rise of Islamic identity in the public sphere.

In the next part of the chapter I go on to investigate the opinions of top-level central board members of the Muhammadiyah about issues raised by *shari'a*-based district regulations. I argue that there were two causes of the Muhammadiyah's central board members' silence concerning the *Perda Syari'ah*. First, Muhammadiyah's central board members felt reluctant to criticize *shari'a*-based district regulations, especially in Aceh. There were two reasons for this: the unstable political situation in the region; and the fact that a prominent Muhammadiyah leader was campaigning for the legalization of *shari'a*. Although its board members tend to be committed to the religious neutrality of the state – as indicated by their response to the amendment of article 29 of UUD 45 in 2002 (see section 5.3 and 5.4) – they had to consider the position of the central government, and the central government, along with many Aceh leaders and *'ulama*, considered the formalization of a comprehensive *shari'a* to be the best solution for stopping the separatist movement in Aceh. Secondly, Muhammadiyah's board members didn't see these regulations as being harmful to the development of the nation-state more broadly, so considered it best to not interfere with the position of the state.

In the next section I explore Muhammadiyah's central board members' opinions on the meaning of *shari'a* and its role in the modern state. The neo-modernists of the central board define *shari'a* as a set of principles or values that aim at the common good – a definition that can also be found in sources outside Islam. For the revivalists, however, *shari'a* is seen as a set of ritual and social regulations for Muslims. I argue that although the neo-modernists and revivalists conceptualize the kinds of laws that can be categorized as *shari'a* differently, both

consider it to be the role of parliament to review and make decisions about whether to make *shari'a* state law.

In the next section, I examine Muhammadiyah *'ulama's* views on the same issue. I argue that both revivalist *'ulama* – especially those who studied Islam not only in madrasas but also in higher education – and neo-modernist *'ulama* emphasize the role of parliament in legislation involving *shari'a*. However, they differ in their starting points, with neo-modernists beginning from rationality, with the exception of family law, whilst revivalists proceed by 'interpreted *shari'a*' in all its aspects, including family law. Consequently, neo-modernists and revivalists have common opinions about family law, both holding that it should be based on 'interpreted *shari'a*'.

In the last part of the chapter I explore the opinions of Muhammadiyah activists. I argue that almost all of the activist are neo-modernists. They not only emphasize the role of parliament in secularizing *shari'a*, but also start from rationality instead of 'interpreted *shari'a*'. However, older activists tend to use 'interpreted *shari'a*' for family law, like neo-modernist *'ulama*.

6.2 Regional autonomy and *shari'a*-based district regulations

The early post-New Order (Habibie) government attempted to save national integrity by giving local governments more authority. The centralized power of the previous regime (1966-1998) was regarded as one of its repressive characteristics. Using its central authority, the government took natural resources from different regions and strictly controlled their elites (Crouch, 2010). This not only led to poverty in the regions, but also forced the people there to eliminate their ethnic identities as the central government enforced a form of cultural uniformity in order to strengthen

‘nationhood’. Consequently, the fall of the New Order government in the middle of 1998 resulted in many regions becoming more autonomous, and some of them, such as Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya (Papua), even attempted to become separate countries. In fact, these three regions had been struggling to establish their own states for two decades, far before the political crisis. However, the crisis provided a new impetus for them to increase their efforts. Because of this situation, many reformation leaders called upon the government to decentralize its authority in favour of regional autonomy, and the new government quickly obliged.

It is worth noting that the decentralization of politics was a combination of “statesmanlike consideration and hard-noised of self-interest”, as James Manor observed (1999: 90). On the one hand, the idea of regional autonomy that national leaders campaigned for aimed to save national integrity, as well as to create a local government that was more accountable to the people and more appreciative of local identities. On the other hand, political self-interest also motivated some of these leaders. Crouch (2010: 92), for example, notes that by offering regional autonomy, Habibie and the Golkar²¹¹ party probably expected to improve their image and court sympathy from the public to offset the poor public image they had accrued from being part of the authoritarian (New Order) regime. MPR’s²¹² ‘radical’ action indicated that it was still dominated by Golkar politicians at the time. Through issuing a decree²¹³ in November 1998, the MPR called on the government to implement regional autonomy. Responding to the MPR, the Habibie government released National Law No.22 on Regional Government²¹⁴ at the beginning of 1999, several months before the general election. At the time, Golkar representatives in the

²¹¹ Further information about Golkar can be found in chapter 2 (section 2.6).

²¹² Further information about MPR can be found in chapter 5 (section 5.1).

²¹³ See MPR decree No. XV/1998.

²¹⁴ See the Law on Regional Government No.22/1999.

parliament strongly supported the Law and, as Crouch (2010: 94) observes, there was no critical voice censuring the draft of the regional autonomy bill in parliament.

Based on this law, regional governments consisting of 27 level-one regions (provinces) and around 300 level-two regions (districts) received greater authority and control for managing their administrations. They were permitted to maintain their own natural resources as well as to produce regional regulations (*Perda*) for maintaining social and political order as well as local identity in their respective areas. Some provinces, such as Aceh, were given even more political authority to encourage them to remain as part of the country. Ryaas Rasyid, the Director-General for General Governance and Regional Autonomy in the Department of Home Affairs (1998–1999) and the main architect of regional autonomy, stated that this regional autonomy, as it is conceptualized within the law, is not far removed from federalism.²¹⁵ This indicates that radical changes were being implemented by President Habibie and the Golkar party to assure the public that the state had become much more democratic, as well as to present themselves as political transformers, altering Indonesia from an authoritarian power to a democratic state.

Regardless of the initial motives of this decentralization of politics, the autonomy that was given to regional governments led many of them to issue *shari'a*-based regional regulations. This trend occurred most quickly and frequently in districts with a history of implementing *shari'a* in the past (Bush, 2008), and included Aceh, South Sulawesi, West Java, West Sumatra, and Tangerang (Banten). The extent to which the different regions embedded *shari'a* in the district regulations varied notably.

²¹⁵ See the magazine *Gatra*, 17 November 1999, quoted by Crouch (2010: 92).

Among these regions, Aceh was the most prominent in implementing *shari'a*. For five decades (1950s-1990s) this region was involved in a rebellion in which it attempted to separate itself from the Indonesian state and establish an Islamic state. Even though the Old Order and the New Order government were relatively successful in marginalizing Aceh leaders and groups that resisted the central government, these regions had been actively fighting for Aceh independence for many years. Undeniably, the fall of the New Order in 1998 and the spirit of democratization that followed provided a new impetus for Aceh people to push for independence from Indonesia. Consequently, the Habibie government responded more seriously to Aceh. Through Law No.44, a special autonomy for Aceh was issued in 1999, with the central government guaranteeing that Aceh was permitted to implement *shari'a* comprehensively, as follows:

- 1) Management of religious life is operated by implementing Islamic *shari'a* for Muslims in social life. 2) Regional government can develop and organize religious life as mentioned in point 1, but it is required to preserve religious harmony among various adherents of religions.²¹⁶

Even *'ulama* had significant positions in promulgating and evaluating the district law in Aceh, and this is addressed in the law:

- 1) The region can create an institution of which its members are *'ulama*. 2) The institution as mentioned in point 1 is independent and functions to give consideration on regional regulations including managing government, development, and Islamic social and economic order.²¹⁷

Furthermore the *'ulama* institution was given an equal status to the local government and parliament:

²¹⁶ See Law No.44/1999 chapter 2 article 4 (translated by me).

²¹⁷ See Law No.44/1999 chapter 5 article 9 (my translation).

What the article means by ‘independent’ is that the position of the institution is not under Governor and the parliament (DPRD), but they are equal. Consideration of this institution could be *fatwa* (religious opinion) or advice given textually or verbally that is able to be used for formulating regional regulations.²¹⁸

The Habibie government expected this special autonomy to diminish Aceh’s desire to separate itself from the Indonesian state. Through its regional regulations, called *Qonun* (Law), the Aceh government implements *shari‘a* not only in family law, but also in ritual obligations, such as fasting in *Ramadhan* and Friday prayer, as well as in criminal conduct.

The rest of the regions did not receive special autonomy like Aceh, but could still use *shari‘a* through regional or district regulations. The regulations later became publicly known as *Perda Syari‘ah* (*shari‘a*-based regional regulations), which, as Arskal Salim (2007: 126) argues, can be classified into three groups – those which aim to: 1) solve social problems and manage public order in order to be in line with Islam teachings (prostitution, gambling, alcohol drink), 2) ensure the ability for students and those who want to marry to read the *Qur‘an*,²¹⁹ and 3) strengthen Islamic identity in dress (e.g. veiling for students and civil servants, Islamic dress for male and female Muslims). These three categories can be found averagely in those districts. The *Perda* grew significantly from 2000 until 2006, its growth peaking in 2003 (Bush, 2008: 178–179).

Interestingly, the heads of these district governments came from secularist parties such as the Golkar and the PDIP.²²⁰ These two parties received the most votes in the 1999 election for local parliament (DPRD), particularly in the five aforementioned regional areas, which were conducted at the same time as the

²¹⁸ See Law No.44/1999 (my translation).

²¹⁹ This regulation was made to ensure that every Muslim has ability to read the *Qur‘an*.

²²⁰ Further information on PDIP can be found in chapter 2 (section 2.6).

national election. This meant that the local parliament (the DPRD) was dominated by these two parties' representatives. Thus, at this time, the heads of regions and districts were appointed by the DPRD and, as a result, many heads of districts were led by Golkar and PDIP figures. As these parties had secular political orientations, it is interesting to question why they offered *shari'a*-based regulations.

Robin Bush, an American political scientist who worked for the Asia Foundation (TAF)²²¹ in Indonesia, found that most of the regions in which *shari'a*-based regulations were employed were the bases of the *Darul Islam* (DI) or *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (TII)²²² movements:

Of the 53 districts and municipalities that have such regulations, 23 have a history of involvement with Darul Islam and its military wing, the Indonesian Muslim Army (TII). Moreover, no less than 50 of the 78 regulations in my compilation were issued in former Darul Islam/TII strongholds (Bush, 2008: 183).

Therefore, Bush concluded that the DI/TII history of these regions was a significant factor in leading their heads to produce such regulations – the heads attempted to strengthen their credibility by generating *shari'a*-inspired bylaws.

In my opinion, however, Bush attributes too much importance to the influence of the DI/TII movements. Although the DI movement did have an influence in encouraging the heads of the regions to produce the regulations, especially in the three regions – Aceh, West Java, and South Sulawesi – this did not make the DI/TII movements the most significant factors. This can be seen from the fact that similar *shari'a*-based local ordinances could also be found in other regions

²²¹ The TAF is a foundation located in Jakarta, Indonesia, and was established by the American government in order to support democratization in Indonesia.

²²² The *Darul Islam* (the Islamic area) or *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic Soldiers) was the separatist movement that attempted to establish an Indonesian Islamic State called *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII). The movement emerged in the late 1940s in West Java, and then spread to Aceh and South Sulawesi at the beginning of the 1950s (see Bush, 2008). At the time, the government accused many Masyumi leaders of being involved in supporting the movement.

that had nothing to do with the DI/TII movements, such as in West Sumatera, Banten, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Madura (East Java), Palembang, Batam, and Riau. This suggests that it was the regional autonomy implemented in 1999 and the direct election of local governments that began in 2005 that themselves led to the incumbents deliberately seeking out issues that were the concerns of the people in the respective regions, and that the rise of Islamic identity in the public sphere (indicated by dress, activities, and discourse) was the main factor that led the heads of these regions to produce the regulations. All of the regions that have produced these regulations are locations of historical great Islamic kingdoms. For many years, Islamic teachings have blended with local culture in these areas to create one entity. Even after Indonesian independence, these areas still thus represented Islamic culture, albeit in combination with local tradition. Consequently, the transitional period and regional autonomy encouraged Muslims in these regions to revive their local identities, – i.e. their Islamic identities. These people’s concerns were seen by the incumbents as being the central means through which they could strengthen and consolidate their power.

6.3 The Muhammadiyah’s position: leaders’ positions on the regulations

During Syafii Maarif’s leadership (1998–2005), the Muhammadiyah did not make any official statement about their position on the *shari‘a*-based district regulations. As Fauzan, a lower-level central board member with a revivalist orientation put it:

I knew that at that time the central board members of the Muhammadiyah have asked the division of law of the Muhammadiyah to study the district regulations that were being complained about by public. However, there was

no clear finding reported by the division, so the Muhammadiyah did not take an official standpoint on these regulations.²²³

In line with this information, I could not find any explanation by a Muhammadiyah official or any special letter on the organization's position on these regulations. Even when many DPR members demanded that the central government revoke the *shari'a*-based district regulations in June 2006, with the NU officially supporting and the MUI²²⁴ officially rejecting this DPR demand, the Muhammadiyah still preferred to remain silent.²²⁵

I argue that there were two reasons for the Muhammadiyah's attitude on this issue. The first was that its central board members were reluctant to criticize these *shari'a*-based district regulations, especially in Aceh. This was due to a number of factors: the terrible political situation in the region, and the fact that a prominent Muhammadiyah leader was campaigning for the legalization of *shari'a*. Although board members supported the concept of religious neutrality in the state – as indicated by their response to the amendment of article 29 of UUD 45 in 2002 (see section 5.3. and 5.4.) – the central government and many Aceh leaders and *'ulama* considered the formalization of a comprehensive *shari'a* to be the best solution for stopping the separatist movement in Aceh. When I asked why the Muhammadiyah did not give a particular response to the issue of *Perda Syari'ah*, Haedar Nashir, a neo-modernist board member, told me:

²²³ Interview with Fauzan (pseudonym), a central board member, 9 September 2012.

²²⁴ MUI is Indonesia's top Muslim clerical body. The council comprises all Indonesian Muslim groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam (Persis), and Al Irsyad. It was founded by the Indonesian New Order under the Soeharto administration in 1975 as a body for producing fatwas and for advising the Muslim community on contemporary issues (Basya, 2011: 70).

²²⁵ The chairman of the Muhammadiyah in 2006, Din Syamsuddin, said that the Muhammadiyah has not yet discussed these *shari'a*-based bylaws, and thus that the organization has no official standpoint on the issue (see www.tempo.co.id, downloaded December 2013).

We think that the comprehensive application of *shari'a* in Aceh [is being done for] crucial reasons related to [the] separatist movements of Aceh. Therefore, we merely obeyed central government's decision that guarantees Aceh to formalize *shari'a*. In addition the person who was responsible to formulate the *Qonun* was the chairman of the Muhammadiyah branch in Aceh. We know that he is kind of person who is moderate in understanding the relation of *shari'a* and the state. Therefore, we let Aceh people decide what they think to be the best for Aceh.²²⁶

Thus, as Nashir explains, one of the Aceh figures supporting the implementation of *shari'a* was the leader of Muhammadiyah in Aceh, who was also known as an Aceh *'alim*. This Muhammadiyah *'alim* persuaded the central board members that using the *Qonun* would appease the separatist movement in Aceh, a point backed up by Yusuf, another central board member with a revivalist orientation:

The chairman of the Muhammadiyah branch of Aceh was significantly involved in producing the *Qonun*. He explained to the central board why the *Qonun* should be implemented. He said that Aceh people needed to trust the central government. The formalization of *shari'a* was a good way to make people trust the government and to stop the separatist action.²²⁷

The second reason for the Muhammadiyah not taking an official position on this issue was that many central board members of the Muhammadiyah, including the neo-modernist figures, thought that these regional regulations would not develop significantly outside of Aceh, and thus did not pose a serious threat to the existence of the modern nation-state. They opined that, in most regions, the production of these regulations was encouraged by political interests rather than by ideological foundations. Hence, they concluded that the trend would end when political targets had been accomplished. In addition, promoting Islamic dress and skills in reading the *Qur'an*, as well as banning alcoholic drinks and prostitution, were perceived by many neo-modernist figures of the Muhammadiyah as being acceptable goals in a

²²⁶ Interview with Haedar Nashir, a central board member, 1 October 2012.

²²⁷ Interview with Yusuf (pseudonym), a central board member, 2 October 2012.

modern nation-state. These aims, especially the last two (abolishing alcohol and prostitution), were regarded as ones that had been designed to prevent society from moral degradation. This opinion was informed by Nashir, the neo-modernist leader:

In other regions, such as South Sulawesi, *shari'a*-inspired district regulations were utilized as political commodities²²⁸ of the elites. Soon after the elites got 'power', the trend of making such regulations decreased. In West Java and other areas, the district government mostly emphasized the important of reading *Qur'an*, wearing proper dress, banning alcohol drinks and prostitution. They merely intended to strengthen the good behaviour of society. So far we (the central board) have not seen that these regulations will become *hudud* (Islamic law taken from the *Qur'an* and *Sunna*).²²⁹

According to Nashir, even though the Muhammadiyah supports the establishment of the modern nation-state, this does not require the organization to call for all religious teachings to be expunged from public life. Thus, the nation-state that the Muhammadiyah imagines is not that of a Western European secular state. This point was explicitly addressed by Nashir when I asked him about the implications of his (and the Muhammadiyah's) position for the nation-state:

Eliminating all *shari'a* – what is called *de-syariatisasi* – will merely copy the construction of Western European society that emerged from struggling against religions. This struggle generated new 'religions', such as democracy and human rights, which are secular. We think that Indonesian should not comprehensively copy such a Western format. I would like to mention a case as an example. I think you already know how the institution of marriage in Western society has declined significantly. There are only a few people who still respect it, while most of them prefer not to officially marry. This major shift is one of the impacts of secularism in the West. We do not want such a situation to happen in Indonesia.²³⁰

²²⁸ By 'political commodities' he means issues raised by elites to appeal to voters or their constituents.

²²⁹ Interview with Haedar Nashir, 1 October 2012.

²³⁰ Interview with Haedar Nashir, *ibid*.

In addition to these two reasons, the Muhammadiyah thinks that letter No.10 issued in 2002 (see section 5.4) implicitly explained Muhammadiyah's position on *shari'a*-based bylaws, as Nashir explained:

As far as the formalization of *shari'a* is concerned, the central board deemed that the letter No.10/EDR/I.0/I/2002 concerning the Muhammadiyah's position on the formalization of *shari'a* and the amendment of article 29 was sufficient.²³¹

Based on my interpretation in the previous chapter, the paragraph in the letter which Nashir is referring to indicates that the Muhammadiyah would support state law being in line with *shari'a* (see section 5.4). Thus, by not criticizing the implementation of regional regulations, the Muhammadiyah has demonstrated its consistency on these issues. However, as I argue in the next section, the meaning of *shari'a* varies between neo-modernist and revivalist interpretations, which leads the central board members to hold differing views on these issues.

A small number of neo-modernist central board members clearly and publicly rejected the *shari'a*-inspired bylaws, but only after they were no longer members of the board. Syafii Maarif was one of these figures. In July 2006, he wrote an article for an Islamic national newspaper, the *Republika*, in which he has a permanent weekly column called *Resonansi* (resonance). The article was published a couple of weeks after the DPR demanded that the central government revoke these *shari'a*-based regulations. This DPR action led to numerous public responses, especially in the form of support from secularist groups and opposition from Islamic revivalist groups. Maarif wrote:

²³¹ Interview with Haedar Nashir, *ibid.*

As a young nation-state, we really have to be careful in maintaining this nation-state. Do not repeat the mistakes of the previous regime (the New Order regime) for four decades. Otherwise, as a nation, we will be collapsed and broken to small parts. We have to prevent this tragedy from happening. If we fail in stopping this process of disintegration, it will lead us to a political disaster: Indonesia will disappear from the map of history.

Therefore, any effort in fighting for political aspirations should consider the condition of the nation-state that is still young and fragile. The willingness to formalize Islamic teachings to be district regulations is not proper. It is right that Islamic teachings could be integrated into district regulation, but not in the format of formalistic (textual or conservative forms of) *shari'a*. The formalistic *shari'a* could weaken the foundations of the nation-state. And it is very dangerous. The struggle for anti-moral degradation is one of the main agendas of all groups' efforts in this nation-state. Therefore, such a struggle should be pursued under the first principle of the *Pancasila* (Maarif, 2006).

Because he was no longer the chairman of the Muhammadiyah, the public recognized that Maarif's opinion did not represent the Muhammadiyah's position. Critical voices addressing Maarif's article focused on his position as a professor of a university, not as a figure of the Muhammadiyah.

As usual, Syafii Maarif regards himself as 'the father of the nation' who really cares about the integration of the Indonesian nation. He also perceives himself as 'the saver of the nation'. Of course, this position is ideal. Unfortunately, Syafii forgets that in several parts of his articles he offends many figures who are his friends – Muslim leaders. The words that he used are not wise, or ones that one would expect a professor aged over 70 years old to use. He has introduced the term *preman berjubah* (criminals who wear pious dress) to describe an Islamic group that he does not like.

This time in his article in the *Republika*, he also used sarcastic and pejorative terms that attempt to humiliate those who are fighting for the formalization of *shari'a*. For example, he used terms such as *otak-otak sederhana* (simple brains), *kedunguan* (stupidity), etc. I think that these terms should be avoided by a professor (Husaini, 2006: 20).

The critic Adian Husaini was a central board member in the preaching division of Muhammadiyah, who is a well-known revivalist figure. This indicates that the revivalists from the board disagree with those who campaigned against the *Perda Syari'ah*; and that the revivalists do not feel hesitant to engage in public debate with

prominent neo-modernist figures of the Muhammadiyah like Maarif, the former chairman of the organization.

Another prominent Muhammadiyah figure who clearly rejected the *shari'a*-inspired regulations was Dawam Rahardjo, a central board member during 2000–2005. He criticized the bylaws through public seminars and an article published by a national magazine in 2006. Like Maarif, he was no longer a central board member due to a change in leadership at the end of 2005. Indeed, he had even been expelled from the Muhammadiyah at the beginning of 2006 because of his advocacy of the Ahmadiyah – an Islamic sect perceived by many Muslims to be deviant due to its belief that there was another Prophet after Muhammad.²³²

These two prominent figures' obviously felt more able to express their independent critiques of the *shari'a*-inspired regulations after they left the central board. I could not find any comments on this issue in the mass media by these figures from the time that they were board members in the Muhammadiyah, although they were known as public intellectuals that often expressed their opinions through articles published by the mass media. This suggests that, whilst being leaders of an Islamic social movement, they attempted to respect the views of other board members with different Islamic orientations.

²³² The Ahmadiyah is regarded by many Indonesian Muslim leaders as being deviant, and as having no right to exist in Indonesia. Problems with the Ahmadiyah have been rising since the beginning of 2000. Dawam Rahardjo was one of a number of prominent Muslim scholars that defend the existence of this sect. During 2005–2013, there was a significant amount of violence directed towards Ahmadiyah followers, including the destruction of their properties, the murder of members, and driving them out of their homes/areas.

6.4 Neo-modernist and revivalist views on *shari'a* and the intersections between their views

Although the Muhammadiyah did not critically respond to the *shari'a*-based district regulations, the neo-modernists of the central board hold critical and rational interpretations of *shari'a*. The neo-modernists define *shari'a* as the principles or values that comprise the common good, which can also be found from other sources outside Islam. As Nashir explained: “*shari'a* is [the] fundamental values or [the] substance of Islam. These fundamental values could be in line with rationality or with local values.”²³³ This means that Nashir interprets *shari'a* as comprising universal values, not detailed and particular laws of Islamic jurisprudence. The term ‘substance of Islam’ that was used by Nashir in the interview is often used by Indonesian Islamic ‘liberal’ scholars for describing universal teachings that might have any basis: rationality, religion, or tradition.²³⁴ For the neo-modernists, *shari'a* is defined as a path consisting of high objectives or fundamental purposes, as Amin Abdullah, a neo-modernist figure in the central board explained:

There are two meanings of *shari'a*. The first is the *maqosid al-shari'ah* (the high objectives of *shari'a*). The *maqosid al-shari'ah* means that *shari'a* is not defined as particular Islamic law. The key word here is the *maqosid*. I believe that many Muhammadiyah central board members favour this view. Of course, we can find different opinions at a lower level of the board, as well as in its local branches. The second is interpreted *shari'a*. This second meaning defines *shari'a* as Islamic doctrine or law, interpreted by *'ulama* in a particular period.²³⁵

²³³ Interview with Haedar Nashir, 1 October 2012.

²³⁴ Michael Feener (2007: 182-221) has observed that the development of Islamization in the Indonesian public sphere around the beginning of 2000 was increasingly dominated by substantivists, instead of formalists. These substantivists (both ‘modernists’ and traditionalists) campaigned for reinterpreting classical Islamic jurisprudence or *fiqh*, theology, and Quranic exegesis in light of modern values like human rights, democracy, religious pluralism, and gender equality.

²³⁵ Interview with Amin Abdullah, a central board member, 23 November 2012.

For neo-modernists like Abdullah, the Islamic jurisprudence developed by particular *madhhab* is not *shari‘a*, but ‘interpreted *shari‘a*’. By interpreted *shari‘a* he means “*shari‘a* or Islamic teachings that were interpreted by *‘ulama* living in the medieval and classical period”.²³⁶

This conception of *shari‘a* is different from that of the revivalists on the board, who perceive it conventionally, as a set of ritual and social regulations for Muslims. The revivalists, as Rayhan explains, perceive *shari‘a* as “Islamic jurisprudence or particular Islamic law which was constructed by classical and medieval *‘ulama*.” Another revivalist figure on the board, Yusuf, emphasized that formalizing *shari‘a* means making Islamic law state law: “customary law and Islamic law are equal and both of them could be legalized.” Yusuf conceptualized *shari‘a* as a set of Islamic laws for managing and controlling Muslims’ acts.

Even though the Muhammadiyah neo-modernists and revivalists differed in their definitions and understandings of *shari‘a*, they intersected in their belief that the authority to legislate state law should be held by parliament (DPR). The reason that revivalists considered it to be parliament’s role to review *shari‘a* are outlined by Yusuf:

The Muhammadiyah has similar opinions to other experts of law – that customary law and Islamic law are equal and both of them could be legalized. Therefore, if there are groups that demand to create Islamic legislation, it is false to say that these groups would break national consensus. The Muhammadiyah disagrees with saying that those who took law from the *Qur’an* and *Hadith* or *Sunna* are fighting for establishing an Islamic state. It is not fair to say this, while taking law from the Netherlands is accepted. Could we say that they want to establish a Netherland state? However, given that Indonesia is not an Islamic state, Islamic law cannot automatically be national or regional law. To be state law, Islamic law should be legislated through the parliament.²³⁷

²³⁶ Interview with Amin Abdullah, *ibid*.

²³⁷ Interview with Yusuf (pseudonym), a central board member, 2 October 2012.

Thus, on the one hand, Yusuf agrees with the implementation of *shari'a*-inspired regulations like *Perda Syari'ah*. On the other hand, however, he requires the legislation for this regulation to be conducted either by parliament or local parliament. This means that although he strongly supports *shari'a* becoming state law, he realizes that parliament – as a secular modern institution – is the most authoritative body for examining whether it is proper to ratify *shari'a* or not.

Accepting the legislative authority of a 'secular' parliament indicates that both the neo-modernists and revivalists of the central board favour the secularization of *shari'a*. By the secularization of *shari'a* I do not mean the separation of Islam and the state. This term refers here to the penetration of Islam by non-divine elements like rationality and local tradition (see Salim, 2008; Layish, 1978). This approach to the secularization of *shari'a* is similar to those described by Aharon Layish (1978) and Arskal Salim (2008), who both hold that it is the parliament that must formalize *shari'a*. For them, a debate in the parliament using rationality would destroy the divine character of *shari'a*. Consequently, although they hold that whether or not *shari'a* is accepted as law is absolutely dependent on the rational arguments supporting the position it advocates, these arguments should not try to determine what *shari'a* is or says.

However, even though both the neo-modernists and revivalists from the central board emphasized the role of the parliament, they differed in their views about what kind of law can be categorized as being *shari'a*. This is consistent with each of their definitions of *shari'a*, as explained above. Nasir, a neo-modernist figure, implicitly defines all laws deriving from any sources as *shari'a* so long as they are in line with the principle values of Islam:

For us (the central board of the Muhammadiyah), as long as the national and local regulations have been in line with substances of Islam, we do not think it is necessary to legalize or formalize *shari'a*. We realize that this view is different to those of other Islamic organizations attempting to formalize *shari'a* in Indonesia.²³⁸

His understanding of *shari'a* leaves a significant space for the role of rationality in producing law, and the law will be regarded as *shari'a* as long as it provides benefits for the people. In other words, the authority to consider whether or not regulations are *shari'a* is rationality, not the revelation (the *Qur'an* and *Sunna*). On the other hand, the revivalist describes *shari'a* as particular outputs of Islamic jurisprudence (see Yusuf's explanation above). The difference between the neo-modernist and the revivalist is thus that the former grounds *shari'a* in rationality and the common good, while the latter grounds it in revelation.

6.5 'Ulama: secularizing *shari'a* vs establishing a *shari'a*-based state

6.5.1 The First type of 'ulama: *shari'a*-based state

The first type of Muhammadiyah 'ulama tends to legalize all parts of *shari'a* in a formalistic or textual format. In these 'ulama's opinions, the Muhammadiyah's highest goal is to establish a *shari'a*-based state, as Nuriyah (a female 'alim) contends:

Muhammadiyah's objective, as formulated by KH Ahmad Dahlan, is to campaign for Islam to be established in all parts of life in order to generate a

²³⁸ Interview with Haedar Nashir, 1 October 2012.

true Islamic society. If people could understand this objective, it means that the Muhammadiyah is fighting for the establishment of a *shari'a* state.²³⁹

What this type of *'ulama* means by a '*shari'a* state' is the comprehensive implementation of *shari'a* in the state, as seen in Aceh. Darori, a male *'alim*, explains this as follows:

I agree with the legalization of *shari'a* as implemented in Aceh. I realize that there are many critiques of this, arguing that it is kind of radical Islam. For me, Islam is a radical religion. Could you imagine the meaning of the *Qur'an*'s verse *lakum diinukum waliyadin* meaning 'for you is your religion and for me is my religion'? It means that we have to hold strongly to our religion no matter what others say about us. In other words, *anjing menggonggong kafilah jalan terus* (dogs bark, traders ignore them; the show must go on). I think Aceh's case is great. I hope that other regions would follow Aceh. I do not mind to see those who perform adultery (intercourse before marriage), those who have been engaged in sexual play, and those who drink alcohol to be punished harshly. These *shari'a* regulations are aimed to prevent criminality and misbehaviour.²⁴⁰

It is worth mentioning that, among the regions that have produced *shari'a*-inspired regulations, Aceh is the only one that implements a comprehensive form of *shari'a* (for family law, morality, ritual obligations, and criminal conduct) (see section 6.2).

However, these *'ulama* would prefer for people to understand *shari'a* before it is formalized. They argue that educating people about *shari'a* could make them feel satisfied, and comfortable being committed to *shari'a*. Nuriyah, one of these *'ulama*, expressed her disappointment concerning the introduction of *shari'a*-inspired district regulations that were not well prepared and did not consider people's awareness about *shari'a* beforehand:

In my opinion, Islam is not like what is described by them (its critics) and represented by the district regulations. The regulations might desecrate or become a boomerang for Islam, because the regulations are not well

²³⁹ Interview with Nuriyah (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 19 November 2012.

²⁴⁰ Interview with Darori (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 7 October 2012.

prepared. Moreover, people are not yet well informed about *shari'a*. Therefore, to teach people on *shari'a* is the first step that we have to take before legalizing it.²⁴¹

Nuriyah cited Aceh as an example of her dissatisfaction:

Aceh is the example. Its society is not conducive for Islamic law. When I visited this place during the earthquake and Tsunami disaster (2004–2005), it seemed that they were less fanatic (pious). They did not perform *subuh* (obligatory prayer in the morning). In fact, we provided the dress for prayer. I concluded that before legalizing *shari'a*, the society should be educated about what *shari'a* is. After they really understand *shari'a*, we can turn it into law.²⁴²

Educating people on *shari'a* before introducing it as law is an obvious course of action to undertake from the perspective of these *'ulama*. A similar opinion was also expressed by Darori:

I prefer to educate people or society through preaching or religious meetings in order to make them committed to *shari'a*. In my preaching, I begin with their daily activities. For example, I suggest to them that 12 O'clock in the afternoon is the time for *Dzuhur* prayer. I emphasize that conducting prayer is part of *shari'a*. This is also the case with alms, fasting in Ramadan, pilgrimage to Mecca for those who have the ability in terms of money and the physical ability to do so. These all are [forms of] *shari'a* that we have to internalize through our preaching. Establishing *shari'a* should start from the family.²⁴³

This *ulama's* view could be categorized as a combination of the structural and cultural approaches from the revivalist movement. On the one hand, they want a *shari'a*-based state to be established, which is the political objective of revivalists like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Indonesia. On the other hand, they place the priority on teaching Muslims about *shari'a*, which is the key style of the cultural movement of revivalists like Wahhabi. The difference between the structural and

²⁴¹ Interview with Nuriyah, 19 November 2012.

²⁴² Interview with Nuriyah, *ibid*.

²⁴³ Interview with Darori, 7 October 2012.

cultural approaches is that the former regards education on *shari'a* as the first step to be taken before it becomes law, while the latter emphasizes Islamizing individuals and society through education as being its primary goal. The former opinion is most common among the first type of Muhammadiyah *'ulama*.

6.5.2 The second type of *'ulama*: secularizing *shari'a*

The second type of *'ulama*'s views concerning the 'secularization of *shari'a*' – i.e. the use of the parliament in legalizing *shari'a* (see section 6.4.) – consisted of two different approaches. The first is that taken by neo-modernist *'ulama*, who opine that offering universal values of *shari'a*, excluding family law, is the best way to position *shari'a* vis-a-vis national and local laws, and many members of the Muhammadiyah hold this view. The second is that taken by revivalist *'ulama*, who favour laws based on 'traditional' or 'interpreted' *shari'a*. By traditional or interpreted *shari'a*, I mean Islamic jurisprudence developed by one of the Islamic schools of law (*madhhab*). There are fewer that take this second approach.

Those *'ulama* who adopt the first approach are quite similar to the neo-modernists of the central board, emphasizing that only the principles of Islam should be adopted under state legislation. For them, defining *shari'a* as universal principles aims to find 'common truths' as well as to prevent people, particularly non-Muslims, from feeling discriminated against. This view was clearly articulated by Zarkasyi, a neo-modernist *'alim*:

From my point of view, religion (Islam) has to give a foundation of values for the system of the state. This is an important agenda that we have to voice [support for] continuously. It may be said with the term 'Islamization' or whatsoever, but the emphasis is on the values, not its formalistic shape. Those Islamic values have to contribute to characterizing our nation-state, not only in the political system but also in economics. I would emphasize

again that the important aspect is that of values because, it is through values that we easily meet, dialogue, and interact with others (non-Muslims) due to their universal character. Our struggle can be a common struggle of all Indonesian people.²⁴⁴

A similar comment was made by Solihin, another neo-modernist *'alim*:

I suggest offering universal values of Islam so that people, including non-Muslims, will not reject them due to their universality. I believe that these universal values will be accepted by all groups. In my view, the rejection of *shari'a*-based legislation is caused by its formalistic (textual) form. As a result, it not only non-Muslims that reject *shari'a*, but some Muslims as well.²⁴⁵

However, unlike the neo-modernists of the central board, these *'ulama* disagree over whether to define all elements of *shari'a* as universal values. For these neo-modernist *'ulama*, some parts of *shari'a*, especially family law, have to be turned into legislation in their 'traditional' form (as revealed by the *Qur'an* and *Sunna* or Islamic jurisprudence that is developed by one of four mazdhab), but made law only for Muslims. Zarkasyi explained his stance on this issue as follows:

There are some parts of *shari'a* that have to be turned into legislation. Therefore, I do not say that our agenda is *only* to offer universal values of *shari'a*, even though I agree that this is the most *fundamental* thing that we have to do. There are elements of *shari'a* that we have to campaign for in order to be formalized such as family law (marriage and inheritance). We are happy that this Islamic law has been already accommodated and turned into legislation by the government.²⁴⁶

In my opinion, the boundaries of the secularization of *shari'a* that is sought by these neo-modernist *'ulama* remain ambiguous. On the one hand, their understanding of *shari'a* relies heavily on rationality, whilst on the other it forbids rationality from being significantly involved. They demand for Islamic family law to be turned into

²⁴⁴ Interview with Zarkasyi (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 31 October 2012.

²⁴⁵ Interview with Solihin (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 11 September 2012.

²⁴⁶ Interview with Zarkasyi, *ibid*.

state legislation in its ‘traditional’ form, and thus justify *shari‘a*-based district law by rationalizing it. As Solihin, a neo-modernist ‘*alim*, explains:

In my view, district regulations in Banten have nothing to do with *shari‘a*. I could not find the term of *shari‘a* in the regulations. It is more related to arranging social neatness, for example: 1) a woman is prohibited to go out alone at night, because it might cause bad rumours, 2) alcoholic drinks are restricted. I think these two regulations are not related to *shari‘a*. These all are about how to produce good social order.²⁴⁷

In addition, these neo-modernist ‘*ulama* want the state to be involved in controlling religious piousness or the morality of Muslims as Rabitah, a neo-modernist female ‘*alim*, clearly argues:

If Muslims do not want to perform their duties, the state has to be involved in persuading and making them obey Islamic teachings through regulations. A Muslim cannot say that this is my own body and my own money so that it is up to me to do what I want to do. If we refer to a verse in *Al-Baqoroh*: 256, it is mentioned *la ikroha fi al-din* – no coercion in participating in religion (Islam). This is certainly part of our faith. However, when we are already Muslims, we have to implement Islamic teachings, such as conducting prayer, dressing Islamic clothes, etc. Therefore, if Muslims do not perform these religious obligations I think *Ulil Amri* (the government or state) should be involved in making them to do so.²⁴⁸

This shows that the neo-modernist ‘*ulama*’s conception of the secularization of *shari‘a* is different from that of the neo-modernist from the central board.

Unlike the neo-modernist ‘*ulama*, the revivalist ‘*ulama*’s view tends to support turning ‘interpreted’ *shari‘a* into state law. They argue that ‘interpreted’ *shari‘a* should be implemented by the state because it is good, not only for Muslims, but for non-Muslims as well. Masykur, a revivalist ‘*ulama* who received his doctoral degree in Islamic jurisprudence, argued for this conclusion as follows:

²⁴⁷ Interview with Solihin (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah ‘*alim*, 11 September 2012.

²⁴⁸ Interview with Rabitah (pseudonym), a female Muhammadiyah ‘*alim*, 26 November 2012.

As Muslims we have to believe that the *Qur'an* is *rahmatan lil alamin* (a blessing for all humankind), so that Islamic law which derives from the *Qur'an* is *rahmatan lil alamin*. However, as Islamic doctrine mentions, we are not allowed to force non-Muslims to obey our religious teachings. In my opinion, Islamic law should be implemented for all Indonesian citizens. If the Indonesian state is an Islamic state, Islamic law has to apply to all people, no matter what their religions are. Even though our country is not an Islamic state, and I fully agree that we should not establish an Islamic state, *shari'a* still has to be put into operation through the parliament.²⁴⁹

By *shari'a*, Masykur means Islamic law or jurisprudence in its 'traditional' form.

Even though Masykur tries to reinterpret the 'traditional' form of *shari'a*, his interpretation does not provide a significant 'space' for rationality:

I have ever been asked: "what is the punishment for corruptors according to Islam?" I have answered that the heads of the corruptors have to be cut. I reinterpret from a verse of the *Qur'an* instructing Muslims to cut the hands off thieves. Why do I interpret like this? Because the corruptors not only harm people, but also the state.²⁵⁰

In addition, Masykur opined that Islamic family law has to be regulated for Muslims.

This indicates that the revivalist of the second type '*ulama* intersects with the neo-modernist '*ulama* in holding that Islamic family law should be turned into state legislation. However, their views have different foundations. While the neo-modernist grounds his view in rationality and the common good, the revivalist grounds his in formalistic *shari'a*. Their outputs could be dissimilar as well. The neo-modernist might define all law as *shari'a* regardless of its sources, whereas the revivalist strictly regards only laws deriving from Islamic jurisprudence as *shari'a*.

²⁴⁹ Interview with Masykur (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah '*alim*, 24 October 2012.

²⁵⁰ Interview with Masykur, *ibid*.

6.6 The activists: secularizing *shari'a*

In contrast to the views of the members of the central board and the *'ulama*, I could find no revivalist ideas among the Muhammadiyah's activists, with none of them supporting the idea of a *shari'a*-based state. Besides emphasizing the authority of parliament in making legislation, most of the activists gave rationality a significant place in dealing with *shari'a* and state law.

Like the neo-modernists of the central board and the *'ulama*, the younger neo-modernist activists of the Muhammadiyah defined *shari'a* in terms of universal values. Adil, a young Muhammadiyah activist who was an activist of a mosque and now works as a lecturer, said that to be committed to the *Pancasila*, the constitution and laws is to be performing *shari'a*.

If the government from the top until the bottom and common people are able to behave in accordance with the *Pancasila*, UUD '45 (Indonesian constitution), and law, I think they already perform *shari'a*.²⁵¹

Shari'a is thus understood by Adil in terms of having good values and behaving in a way that is in line with the foundations of the state (*Pancasila*) and the constitution. This definition or understanding of *shari'a* does not limit it to Islamic law or Islamic jurisprudence, as the revivalist conceives it. Adil does not care about making Islamic jurisprudence into laws. The crucial aspect, according to him, is making Muslims behave well:

We do not need to legalize *shari'a*. The most important thing we have to focus on is how to make Muslims role models for others in terms of good behaviour. What we need is to consider how to be nationalists and religious.

²⁵¹ Interview with Adil (pseudonym), a younger Muhammadiyah activist, 18 December 2012.

Therefore, what we have to emphasize is good values – that certainly is in line with the substance of Islam.²⁵²

Moreover, these younger neo-modernist activists are critical of the formalistic *shari‘a* that regional governments have made into legislation. The *shari‘a*-based district regulations are perceived by them as simplifying the roots of social problems and discriminating against women. Talbiyah, a female activist who was also involved in an NGO focusing on gender issues, observed:

Using coercion – like laws or regulations for making people pious – is not right. I do not agree with those who said that the factor causing rape is the women who dress sensually. This is one of the reasons why local government obliges women to wear the veil or Islamic dress. I would say that the logic or argument in judging rape cases is discriminative when it looks at women not as victims. In my opinion, light punishment – that only jails rapists for 3 years – is the root of the criminality that has to be revised by the government.²⁵³

For revivalists like the FPI and the HTI, women’s dress is often cited as the root of sexual harassment. A verse of the *Qur’an* from chapter 24:31²⁵⁴ is interpreted by revivalists as an important Islamic principle that requires women to cover their hair. In contrast to the views of revivalists, these young Muhammadiyah activists perceive “Islamic teaching related to women’s dress as a sort of ‘interpreted *shari‘a*’

²⁵² Interview with Adil, *ibid.*

²⁵³ Interview with Talbiyah (pseudonym), a female Muhammadiyah activist, 18 December 2012.

²⁵⁴ “And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what must ordinarily appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands' fathers, their sons, their husbands' sons, their brothers, or their brothers' sons or their sisters' sons, or their women or the servants whom their right hands possess, or male servants free of physical needs, or small children who have no sense of the shame of sex, and that they should not strike their feet in order to draw attention to their hidden ornaments. And O you Believers, turn you all together towards Allah, that you may attain Bliss” (*Qur’an* 24:31).

which is not *shari'a* itself.”²⁵⁵ In addition, they argue that piousness cannot be measured by veiling. As Talbiyah put it:

Wearing the veil cannot be coerced. Many female Muslims prefer not to wear the veil, but they are committed to Islamic teachings. Although they do not wear veil, their soul is Islamic. Therefore local governments should not make such a *shari'a*-inspired regulation a law.²⁵⁶

These activists argue that even though the state guarantees freedom of belief and freedom of expression, when any local government wants to turn a belief into a state law, it has to be reviewed by the public, the government, and parliament. In other words, Muslims are allowed to demand that the state formalize *shari'a*, but the proposed interpretations of *shari'a* need to be examined by the state and its citizens to determine whether they are appropriate and acceptable or not. Farid, a young activist who was involved in an NGO concerned with issues of religious pluralism and democracy stated:

Given that the function of the state is to accommodate all groups' views and not to be a partisan of any particular group, the state should be impartial or neutral. Therefore moral issues, which are subjective, should be reviewed in the public sphere in order to be consented to as state law. This is the principle of a nation-state. The state is neither religious nor secular. Principally, every single group is allowed to voice their ideas. This is their right that is guaranteed by the state. Nevertheless, no one is allowed to force their ideas to be implemented without negotiating them in public sphere with other groups. Their aspiration has to be contested within the public sphere and has to be fought for through the parliament or the government.²⁵⁷

This review process aims to prevent the state from being discriminative and irrational in producing laws that would negatively impact on social order. In addition, it is hoped that this review process will be able to reduce the divine

²⁵⁵ Interview with Farid (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 10 September 2012.

²⁵⁶ Interview with Talbiyah, 18 December 2012.

²⁵⁷ Interview with Farid (pseudonym), 10 September 2012.

character of *shari'a*. Besides the importance of contesting ideas in the public sphere, the key emphasis of these young neo-modernists was 'aspiration':

The procedure that Muslims have to pursue is to absorb people's aspiration in respective locations. For example, *shari'a*-based district regulations in certain areas are accepted by all elements of the society in that place. This indicates that both Muslims and non-Muslims see that the regulations have common advantages for the wider population, not only for Muslims. A prohibition on alcoholic drinks, for instance, might be supported by all people due to their negative impacts on the younger generation. Now, some regions also demand to creation legislation making *shari'a* law, as Aceh did. As long as it is the aspiration of the majority, and it is in accordance with the constitution and regulations in respective regions, and as long as there is no conflict with other religious groups' aspirations, I think it is no problem. However, I disagree with religious groups' attitudes forcing local government and people to accommodate their aspirations by using violent methods.²⁵⁸

For these neo-modernists, the procedure that Muslims need to follow in order to be able to secularize *shari'a* thus involves reinterpreting *shari'a*. This means, first of all, finding the principles that underlie items of Islamic jurisprudence, and then finding ways to apply these principles in contemporary contexts. They provide the example that cutting a hand off those who steal others' property is equal to 'cutting' the power or freedom of thieves by jailing them:

I think the most important thing is the substance or spirit of the *Qur'an*. For example, the *Qur'an* mentions that those who steal others' property – their hands have to be cut off. In Indonesian law, thieves are jailed. This means that their freedom or their ability to steal has to be cut. This is the example of the substance of God's message.²⁵⁹

According to these neo-modernists, without reinterpreting *shari'a* within the contemporary context in which we live, Muslims might undermine the objectives of *shari'a*. As Farid, a young neo-modernist activist put it:

²⁵⁸ Interview with Zulfikar (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 17 October 2012.

²⁵⁹ Interview with Bayhaki (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 17 September 2012.

Look at the *shari'a*-based district regulations. These regulations undermine the meaning of *shari'a*. Because the bylaws regulate people to wear veil and Islamic dress as well as control women by restricting them with night hours. I think they undermine the high objectives of *shari'a*.²⁶⁰

Instead of attempting to make the state more Islamic, these activists endeavour to secularize *shari'a*. I conclude that this kind of view is most commonly found among Muhammadiyah activists who works as lecturers in the faculty of humanities, as politicians, as staff of parliament members, or who are involved in NGOs that are concerned with human rights and religious pluralism.

Like the younger activists, older activists also define *shari'a* in terms of universal values, and hold that parliament should have the sole authority in making legislation as well as for reviewing the formalization of Islamic jurisprudence. Regarding the position of *shari'a* in national and local regulations, Sa'id – an older activist – stated:

I think this is related to *taknin* (legalization). The product of law is a consensus in the DPR (parliament). All of the laws, such as *perdata* (civil law), *ahwal al-syakhsyah* (family law), and *pidana* (criminal law) have represented *shari'a*. Even though the terms used by these laws are different, their substance is in accordance with *shari'a*. Fighting for turning *shar'i* laws into state laws is more acceptable than legislating *shari'a* in a formalistic shape. The Muhammadiyah favours this view. Hence we are still fighting for inserting religious values into laws through democratic systems.²⁶¹

The term '*shar'i* law' here refers to laws or regulations that are in accordance with principle values of *shari'a*. Sa'id thus expresses the opinion that the Muhammadiyah supports the legislation of *shari'a* through the parliament. Nevertheless, according to

²⁶⁰ Interview with Farid, 10 September 2012.

²⁶¹ Interview with Sa'id (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 12 December 2012.

him, the Muhammadiyah does not perceive *shari'a* in a formalistic (textual) form or as Islamic jurisprudence.

However, the older activists exclude family law from this review process, holding that many aspects of family law have a divine character:

Marriage is a *mu'amalah* affair (relationship among humans) that is closely related to religious affairs. Therefore, the procedure of the marriage cannot use other practices outside Islamic teachings. In other words, although the marriage is *mu'amalah* (a secular affair), it has a *ta'abudi* aspect (a divine purpose).²⁶²

This means that family law, which is a part of Islamic jurisprudence, should be made into law, but only for Muslims. Even though parliament is still the authoritative body in terms of creating legislation based on family law, these older activists reject the use of other sources for such legislation, such as Western law or customary law.

It is worth noting that the way in which these older activists understand the secularization of *shari'a* is quite different from that held by their juniors. While the elders require particular Islamic jurisprudence for family law, the younger activists assert that any source could provide the foundation for the family law (local tradition, Islamic jurisprudence, or rationality).

6.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that both the neo-modernists and most of the revivalist Muhammadiyah leaders from various levels of the organization recognize the authority of parliament in producing state laws, and require parliamentary review when proposals to implement *shari'a* laws as state laws are made. This indicates that

²⁶² Interview with Hasyim (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 1 November 2012.

Muhammadiyah leaders accept, at least to some extent, the secular nature of the modern state. By 'the secular nature' I mean the significant role that modern institutions rather than religious institutions play in the state. The greater the role of modern institutions is, the lesser the role of religious belief. Parliament's function in producing law, for example, involves the use of rational thinking instead of religious considerations in generating regulations.

However, neo-modernists and revivalists hold different views regarding the extent to which parliament can justifiably generate *shari'a*. This is because they understand *shari'a* differently. For the neo-modernist, *shari'a* is concerned with establishing universal values and a common good, and can be derived from any sources, such as rationality and local laws. As a result, the neo-modernist regards any laws produced by the parliament as *shari'a* so long as they are in line with universal values and the common good. Whereas for the revivalist, *shari'a* is Islamic jurisprudence generated by *'ulama*, particularly classical and medieval *'ulama*. Consequently, they would not regard products of the parliament as *shari'a*, but only laws that reflect Islamic jurisprudence. Therefore, legislating *shari'a* for the revivalist means fighting for the implementation of Islamic jurisprudence or formal *shari'a*. This is why many revivalist groups, including those in the Muhammadiyah, think that influencing or controlling parliament is necessary for the process of turning *shari'a* law into state law as shown in Chapter 7.

This chapter indicates that even though the neo-modernists in the central board favour substantive *shari'a*, they have also accommodated Muhammadiyah's revivalists' aspirations, as shown by their silence towards the implementation of *Qonun* (law) in Aceh in 1999. Furthermore, these neo-modernists think that the *shari'a*-based district regulations would not threaten religious plurality and religious

neutrality, which is the character of the Indonesian modern state. This position shows that neo-modernists in the movement prefer to compromise some of their progressive views in order to avoid clashes with revivalists that have the potential to be organizationally harmful.

Chapter 7

Understanding Views concerning non-Muslims Leadership in the Majority Muslim State

7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I investigated Muhammadiyah leaders' views on *shari'a* and its position in the modern state with particular reference to *shari'a*-based district regulations. I argued that both the neo-modernist and (most of) the revivalist leaders of the Muhammadiyah considered it to be parliament's role to review and legislate on *shari'a*. They held the position that parliament should be the authoritative legislative body in a modern state, including for decisions about whether to make *shari'a* laws state laws. However, they differed in their perceptions of the extent to which the laws produced by the parliament could be regarded as being *shari'a* laws.

In this chapter, I investigate how the Muhammadiyah's leaders view non-Muslim leadership in the majority Muslim state, paying special attention to the 1999 General Election – the first election conducted in the post-New Order period. The election was a complex 'field' of contestation, particularly between the Islamic revivalist groups that wanted the state to be dominated by Islamic figures and were demanding that the state become more Islamic on the one hand, and the secularist or nationalist groups that wanted the state to be neutral from a religious identity. The revivalist groups felt threatened because they thought that the secularists would undermine Muslims' political interests.

The investigation of this chapter focuses on the extent to which neo-modernist and revivalist Muhammadiyah leaders distrusted non-Muslims that ran for parliament or government during the 1999 General Election. By 'distrusting them', I

mean holding concerns that these people from outside their group will endanger or threaten them or their interests (see Inglehart 1999 and Mujani 2003).

In this chapter I argue that most neo-modernist and revivalist members of the central board and *'ulama* want non-Muslims to be prevented from dominating leadership positions in both the government and the parliament. However, they offer different arguments to justify their positions. These arguments show the extent to which they distrust non-Muslim leadership. The position of revivalists is fairly simple – non-Muslim leadership would prevent Muslims from formalizing *shari'a* in the state. In contrast to the revivalists, however, neo-modernists hold a variety of positions on this issue, including that: 1) non-Muslims would not be as enthusiastic as Muslim figures in formalizing *shari'a*; 2) non-Muslims do not understand how to formulate Muslim political interests, such as the regulations for alms; and 3) the democratic state requires the representation of the majority of the population in the state. Among neo-modernists of the Muhammadiyah, only those who are involved in 'secular' organizations that are concerned with pluralism have a high-level of trust in non-Muslim leadership, refusing to adopt a discriminative attitude based on religious affiliation.

This chapter contributes to exploring the extent to which Muslims – in this instance Muhammadiyah figures – trust or distrust non-Muslims, and why they hold the attitudes they do. Many researchers (e.g. Inglehart, 1999; Mujani, 2003) have found trust in others to be low within Muslim society. Inglehart's study utilized data from the 1990–1991 and 1995–1997 World Values Surveys taken from more than 60 societies consisting of various religions around the world, including Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Hinduism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. Turkey, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, and Nigeria were the sample of countries that had the most dominant

Muslim societies. Inglehart's study aimed to discover the relationship between trust and democracy, but he did not provide any detail about the kind of Muslims he surveyed in the research. Meanwhile, Mujani's research aimed to examine the compatibility between Islam and democracy by studying Indonesian Muslim society at the beginning of 2000. Although Mujani has already briefly classified the NU (traditionalists), the Muhammadiyah (modernists), and the PKS (Islamists) in terms of their distrust of non-Muslims, he did not provide much detail on Muhammadiyah leaders' views on this issue.

This chapter begins by describing the wider political context that existed after the collapse of the New Order in 1998, particularly during the 1999 General Election. I argue that the political transition – within which many groups enthusiastically expressed their ideas – led to Islamic revivalist wings being in conflict with secularist groups, and that this clash was an external conflict that consolidated Islamic revivalist groups.

In the next section, I explore Muhammadiyah's position regarding non-Muslim parliamentary representatives by looking at its response to the PDIP's²⁶³ political manoeuvre of making many non-Muslims parliamentary candidates. I show that although the central board of Muhammadiyah was dominated by neo-modernist leaders, it took a similar position to the revivalist groups in warning Muslims against voting for parties that may not accommodate Muslim aspirations. I argue that many of the neo-modernist figures in the central board favoured the idea of

²⁶³ The party was initially named the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party), but it was changed to the PDIP (the Struggle for Indonesian Democratic Party) in 1998 due to internal conflicts that resulted in a dual leadership structure. Historically and ideologically, the PDIP has relations with Soekarno's political party – the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party). The PNI existed from 1945–1960s, and had a secular orientation. In 1973 the New Order instructed it to change its name from the PNI and to merge with other nationalist-secular, socialist, and religious (non-Islam) political parties, such as Parkindo (a Christian party). Consequently, the party was not only supported by *abangan* (the main supporters of Soekarno and the PNI), but also by Christians.

‘proportionalism’ – the idea that a democratic state requires the representation of a majority of the population in the state.

In the next section, I move on to investigate Muhammadiyah *‘ulama*’s perceptions on the same issue. I argue that many of the second type of *‘ulama* (those who studied Islam not only in a madrasa but also in higher education) – both neo-modernist and revivalist – tend to see non-Muslim leadership negatively.²⁶⁴ Nevertheless, their views and arguments are very different to those of the first type of the *‘ulama* (those who studied at a madrasa only). I argue that these second type of *‘ulama* began to implement critical and contextual approaches because they did not see Christians and Jews as threatening enemies to Indonesian Muslims.

In the last part of this chapter, I explore Muhammadiyah activists’ views on the same issue. I argue that most of the activists who are engaged with secular organizations and cooperate with wider communities, especially non-Muslim groups, trust in non-Muslim leadership because of their social capital. However, there is also evidence showing that it is their neo-modernist views in the first place that encourage them to become involved with these organizations and to cooperate with non-Muslims.

7.2 External conflict and internal cohesion

An Extraordinary Session (SI) of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR)²⁶⁵ conducted on 11–13 November 1998 aimed to resolve the political crisis that arose after the transfer of the presidency from Soeharto to Habibie on 21 May that same

²⁶⁴ 3 out of 5 of the *‘ulama* that I interviewed said they distrusted non-Muslim leaders.

²⁶⁵ The MPR was the highest political institution, with the authority to formulate and amend the Indonesian constitution and to appoint presidents and vice presidents, including to revoke their status if they violated the constitution.

year. After the transfer, many national figures had rejected the legitimacy of Habibie, while others approved of the transfer but regarded him as being just a transitional president who was there to keep the government running whilst the MPR appointed a real president (see section 5.2). The MPR's decision to arrange the SI was influenced by this political situation, and some of the important agenda to be discussed by the SI of the MPR thus included the status of President Habibie's position and the schedule for the general election.²⁶⁶

The SI provided an opportunity for the proponents and opponents of Habibie's legitimacy to display their power. The former group, consisting of a thousand protesters, particularly students, attempted to pressure MPR members by demonstrating outside the MPR building at which the SI was being conducted. This group rejected the legitimacy of Habibie, and demanded that the SI of the MPR revoke Habibie and establish a presidium consisting of national public figures, which would then be expected to arrange and conduct a general election (see Dijk, 2002). On the other hand, the latter group²⁶⁷ supported military officers in mobilizing thousands of young Muslims united in a militia named *Pam Swakarsa* (the military's paramilitary groups) to support the legitimacy of the President and to prevent the protesters from disturbing the SI (Dijk, 2002: 340–343).

The dispute over the legitimacy of the President consolidated Islamic groups with revivalist orientations. It is worth emphasizing that many supporters of the President were Islamic revivalist organizations, such as the DDII,²⁶⁸ KISDI,²⁶⁹ and

²⁶⁶ The general election that was planned for 1999 aimed to select new DPR (national parliament), DPRD (local parliament) and MPR members. The new MPR would then appoint a president and a vice president.

²⁶⁷ Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid did not support this action (see Dijk, 2002).

²⁶⁸ The DDII (the Assembly of Indonesian Islamic Preaching) was established by prominent Masyumi leaders at the beginning of the New Order period in the 1970s (the Masyumi were the largest Islamic party during the Old Order). Many revivalist figures, including Muhammadiyah

KAMMI²⁷⁰ (see Dijk, 2002).²⁷¹ These organizations were known to support the vertical mobilization of Islamic figures into the government and parliament (see Hefner, 2000). On the other hand, the opponent group consisted of: 1) many retired ‘secularist’ military leaders,²⁷² 2) PDIP leaders, 3) many non-Muslim religious leaders, and 4) student organizations with ‘secular’ and socialist orientations, such as the Forum of City (*Forkot*)²⁷³ and the Forum for the Communication of Student Senate Jakarta (FKSMJ)²⁷⁴ (Dijk, 2002). The different constituencies within the opponent group – especially the first three – were known to favour the idea of the state being religiously neutral. Due to the opponents’ backgrounds, the revivalists perceived them as an alliance of secularist and Christian groups (Dijk, 2002).

I argue that the clash between these two groups involved a kind of external conflict that led Islamic groups to become united. As the political scientist Arthur A. Stein (1976) theorized, external conflicts lead to internal cohesions (see also Friedkin, 2004). The revivalist group perceived that Islamic figures had more political positions in the government under the Habibie regime, and thus any disruption to the government was seen as a threat (see Dijk, 2002: 331). It is likely

leaders, joined the organization. Further explanation about the Masyumi can be found in chapter 2, section 2.5 (Latif, 2008).

²⁶⁹ The KISDI (the Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World) was established in 1987 by revivalists (see Hefner, 2000).

²⁷⁰ KAMMI (the Unity of Action of Indonesian Muslim students) was established in 1997 by activists of the *Dakwah* movement called *Tarbiyah*, which later established an Islamist party named the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Experts associate the ideology of the movement with the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt (Machmudi, 2006).

²⁷¹ Amien Rais (Muhammadiyah) and Abdurrahman Wahid (NU) were some of the figures that supported the President. However, these two figures were different from other proponents of this group in terms of defending the SI MPR. They disagreed with government action that mobilized civilians to defend the SI from protesters (see Dijk, 2002).

²⁷² At the end of the New Order, the Indonesian Military (TNI or ABRI) split into two factions: ‘green’ (Islamic) and ‘red’ (secularist). The green faction supported the ICMI proposal to give more political positions to Muslim (revivalist) figures (see Hefner, 2000).

²⁷³ The Forkot was an organization established by students in 1998, which demanded Soeharto’s resignation.

²⁷⁴ The FKSMJ was a forum of numerous internal student organizations from many campuses in Jakarta. It was established in 1998, and arose as a response to the economic and political crisis in 1998.

that their perception was based on the fact that many prominent leaders of Islamic organizations – including Malik Fajar (Muhammadiyah), Adi Sasono (ICMI), A.M Saefuddin (PPP),²⁷⁵ and Hamzah Haz (PPP) – were ministers in Habibie’s cabinet. Habibie himself was the chairman of the ICMI, an Islamic organization, one of whose goals was to increase the role of Muslims in the state (Hefner, 2000: 128–160). Due to ICMI’s position, Habibie was favoured by many revivalist leaders, and had a close relationship with them (see Hefner, 2000: 145–160). Therefore, the opponent groups’ attempt to delegitimize Habibie put them in conflict with this revivalist group.

This conflict between the revivalists and the group that they perceived to be a coalition of the secularist and Christian block became stronger during the 1999 General Election²⁷⁶ as the result of the PDIP (a secularist party) having more than 40% of non-Muslims amongst its parliamentary candidates (*caleg*).²⁷⁷ A couple of days before the election, many Islamic organizations, including the MUI, DDII, ICMI, and FPI,²⁷⁸ called on Muslims not to vote for parties that had many non-Muslims as their *caleg*. At least forty Islamic organizations shared and supported this idea with varying principles, including not to choose parties in which: 1) more than 15% of their *caleg* were non-Muslims, 2) the religious affiliations of their *caleg* were not clear (*abangan*), or 3) the interests of Islam were not represented (see Dijk, 2002: 441–442). These calls were made either by individual organizations or in joint statements. Dijk (2002) reported that Islamic groups disseminated the call through

²⁷⁵ Further information about the PPP (an Islamic party) can be found in chapter 2, section 2.6.

²⁷⁶ The 1999 election was conducted on 7 June 1999.

²⁷⁷ The exact number of the non-Muslim candidates from the PDIP was not clear. Based on Amien Rais’ and Hartono Mardjono’s estimations, it was between 40% and 80% (see Dijk, 2002: 440).

²⁷⁸ Further information about the FPI (Islamic Defender Front) can be found in chapter 5, section 5.2.

the Friday sermon, through pamphlets distributed at mosques, and during *tabligh akbar* (mass religious meetings). The MUI even placed an invocation in newspapers as an advertisement (Dijk, 2002: 442). Although they did not explicitly state the name of any party, it was well understood that their opposition particularly targeted the PDIP – the secularist party which the most prominent secularist and non-Muslim figures had joined.

7.3 The central board: the *seruan* and the different perceptions of neo-modernists and revivalists

Like many other Islamic organizations, the Muhammadiyah was involved in the campaign against the PDIP during the 1999 election. On 31 May 1999, seven days before the election, the Muhammadiyah expressed its point of view concerning the issue. The organization released a *seruan* (a letter of statement) concerning what Muslims should do for the election:

The first General Election in the period of reformation (post-New Order government) on 7th June 1999 is not only the implementation of the people's sovereignty but it will also have a significant impact on the future of *umma* (the Muslim community) and the nation. Therefore, the central board of the Muhammadiyah calls on Muslims, particularly Muhammadiyah members, to do as follows: 1) to use their rights to vote in the General Election properly and responsibly based on their conscience and basic rights as citizens; 2) to choose one of the political parties representing the Muslim community's interests and really fighting for reform; 3) not to vote for a party in which the majority of its parliamentary candidates would not accommodate and fight for Muslims' aspirations (PP Muhammadiyah, 1999).

The message emphasized by the Muhammadiyah's letter was similar to the one in the MUI's letter (below), which the revivalist groups supported:

1) The Indonesian nation, especially the *umma*, should use their voting rights in a correct and responsible manner according to their innermost heart by voting for the political party that is believed will be able to struggle for the aspiration and interests of the *umma*, nation and state; 2) The *umma* should vote in a sincere manner, and with the intention of obeying God, for one of the political parties that puts forward serious Muslim candidates, and those who possess good moral character; 3) The *umma* should be on guard against the return of communism, authoritarian and secularist governments by means of political parties that have an incipient hatred of Islam and the glory of the Republic of Indonesia; 4) The *umma* should surrender to Allah and pray that the election will be conducted in a peaceful, democratic, just and honest manner, so that the Indonesian nation can rid itself of various crises and place the new Indonesian society in the shelter of Allah's blessing (see Ichwan, 2005: 57).

As can be seen from point 3 in both the Muhammadiyah's and the MUI's letters, both organizations were worried that some groups would not support Muslims' interests. Even though the points do not clearly mention what kind of group they are addressing, the discourse around them indicated that the groups they were referring to were Christians (see Dijk, 2002). This kind of distrust is typical of revivalists, who believe that Jews and Christians will always harm Muslims (see also Mujani, 2003: 153). This revivalist belief is based on an interpretation of the *Qur'an* – *surah al-Baqara* (female cow): 120 – which says: “and the Jews will not be pleased with thee, nor will the Christians, till thou follow their creed” (translated by Pickthall, 2000: 6).

However, this overlap between the MUI and the Muhammadiyah does not mean that the central board members of the Muhammadiyah held the same position as revivalist movements like the FPI and the HTI, because many figures in the central board interpreted the letter differently. Their diverse perceptions of the meaning of the letter show the neo-modernist and revivalist leanings of the members of the central board of the Muhammadiyah in the post-New Order era.

For the revivalists of the central board, the letter was an expression of Muhammadiyah's worry that non-Muslim or Christian parliamentary candidates might prevent Muslims from getting what they are justifiably entitled to. Yusuf – one of the central board members during this period – put it as follows when I interviewed him:

That Muslims should dominate the parliament is an appropriate expectation due to their majority number in the Indonesian population. So far, what the Muhammadiyah was worried about was that many agendas proposed by Muslims would be rejected by Christians. I think it is not good if Muslim efforts in fighting for a Muslim community's interests were rejected by Christians for the reason that Indonesia is not an Islamic state. In my opinion, although Indonesia is not an Islamic state, as a majority, Muslims have rights. I would like to describe an example. When Muslim students demand to establish a mosque in a campus that belongs to the state, it is not good if the rector of the campus says that the campus cannot permit it because this state is not an Islamic state. This is not good. It does not mean that the Muhammadiyah prioritizes Muslims' rights and discriminates against others. For the Muhammadiyah, the government should approve or accommodate all religion-based communities such as Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists. What the Muhammadiyah disagrees about is that they would prevent Muslim aspirations due to their reason that this state is not an Islamic state.²⁷⁹

Yusuf works as a lecturer in Islamic studies in a Muhammadiyah university in Yogyakarta. His educational background, majoring in *Qur'anic* exegesis, shows that he is a type of *'ulama*. Even though his view is a moderate one – he wants the state to be fair with all religious adherents – he also implicitly expressed a distrust of Christians. Additionally, what he has in mind by 'Muslims' interests' are sectarian affairs, such as establishing mosques. In other words, he is not convinced that non-Muslim parliament members would support Muslims in implementing *shari'a* as state law.

Moreover, the revivalist figures in the central board were generally satisfied with the Muhammadiyah's decree, regarding it as being 'on the right track'. For the

²⁷⁹ Interview with Yusuf (pseudonym), a central board member, 2 October 2012.

revivalist, it is important to warn *umma* to be cautious with non-Muslims, as Rayhan, a revivalist Islamic studies lecturer observed:

I think that this Muhammadiyah appeal is really in line with Muhammadiyah belief. Muhammadiyah is well known as a movement committed to the *Qur'an* and the *Sunna* (the Prophet's Sayings and Behavior). One of the *Qur'an's* pieces of guidance is related to how Muslims choose their leaders. And at that time, the Muhammadiyah had a moral obligation to remind Muslims and its members not to choose non-Muslim candidates as members of parliament. I believe that it is not possible for those who are non-Muslims to campaign for Islamic interests or aspirations. Therefore, it was normal for the Muhammadiyah to release such a press release. If the Muhammadiyah had not done so, Muslims and its members would have been confused and misled.²⁸⁰

In contrast to the revivalists, neo-modernists did not see the alliance of secularists and Christians as a threat. The reason behind the release of this Muhammadiyah decree was given a different explanation by Ahmad Syafii Maarif (a neo-modernist and the chairman of the Muhammadiyah at the time) when he was interviewed by the mass media the day after the letter was released to public:

Experience for 40 years during an authoritarian government under the last period of the Old Order (1960s) and the New Order (1966-1998) provides a good lesson for *masyarakat* (society or people) to be aware of. *Masyarakat* have to be able to assess whether certain parties support democratic values consistently or not. I believe that *masyarakat* know parties that, since the beginning, have been consistently fighting for democracy. Those parties might not be perfect, but they have been gradually getting better. As long as those parties show that they want to be better, we have to support them (Republika, 1999).²⁸¹

Instead of mentioning secularist or non-Muslim groups as potential threats to *umma*, as the revivalist groups did, Maarif warned people about parties that could potentially harm democracy. Most people would thus take this warning to refer to the Golkar, due to its position as the ruling party under the authoritarian government

²⁸⁰ Interview with Rayhan (pseudonym), a central board member, 2 November 2012.

²⁸¹ "Amanat MUI dan PP Muhammadiyah" in *Republika*, downloaded 13 June 2013.

(New Order period), and people would thus perceive Maarif as recommending other parties like the PPP (an Islamic party established in 1973). It is worth emphasizing that Maarif does not explicitly suggest that people choose an Islamic party, and this suggests that he was not primarily concerned with the threat of non-Muslim groups. Moreover, when I asked Maarif what the letter meant by ‘Muslims’ aspirations’ he defined them as demands related to general problems that could affect all Indonesian citizens:

Muslims are the majority in this country, and most of them are poor. Therefore, Muslims’ interests mean that we have to be concerned with the problem of poverty. By solving this problem, we indirectly solve a national problem. We need a parliament and a government that have a good vision on this issue, and who are brave enough to make decisions.²⁸²

Thus, unlike the revivalists, Maarif does not thus understand Muslims’ interests as things related only to Islamic identity, such as the implementation of *shari‘a* within the state.

Haedar Nashir – another neo-modernist figure of the central board and a lecturer in sociology – clarified his understanding of the letter by adding that any political parties could campaign for Indonesian Muslims’ aspirations. In an article entitled “*Agenda Partai Politik Islam*” (The Agenda of Islamic Political Parties), published a couple weeks after the general election, Nashir asserted:

Political parties that are formally based on Islam often claim themselves as Islamic parties and as fighters for Islamic interests or aspirations. In certain contexts, and as verbalism, it is valid for them to do so. Nevertheless, in a wider context and more substantially, such a claim needs to be examined, especially in terms of their political behaviour and the plurality of *umma* [the Muslim community] itself.

Considering the plurality of Muslims [in terms of their understanding on Islam], Muslims who are outside the Islamic parties also have rights to act on behalf of Islam. Muslims who are active in non-Islamic (secular) parties,

²⁸² Interview with Syafii Maarif, 20 September 2012.

such as the PAN and PKB²⁸³ – and even in the Golkar and PDIP – are part of the Muslim community and have the same rights as those who are active in Islamic parties. Islam is not a monopoly of those who are in Islamic parties. If they are monopolizing, it means they are reducing Islam to be exclusively possessed by certain Muslim groups. Obviously, this kind of monopoly is contrary to the substance of Islam (Nashir, 1999b: 37).

Throughout this article Nashir emphasized that Islam, or Muslims' interests, are not only represented by Islamic parties, but also by secular parties in which Muslims are involved. As long as these secular parties campaign for an agenda that is in accordance with the substance of Islam, Nashir regards them as fighters for Islamic aspirations. Given that almost all of the 'secular' political parties, including the PDIP, were dominated by Muslims at the leadership level, Nashir would say that all parties could fight for Muslims' interests.²⁸⁴ Reviewing his article, I concluded that he was attempting to reinterpret the Muhammadiyah's letter – particularly points 2 and 3, which called for Muslims to vote for parties representing and accommodating Muslims' interests.

Given that the neo-modernist figures dominated the top level of the central board, and their backing would thus be needed to issue the letter, we need to ask why the neo-modernists supported it. During the period 1998–2000, there were few figures that could be regarded as revivalists, and therefore it is unlikely that there was even any heated debate in the central board about whether or not the Muhammadiyah should join other Islamic organizations warning Muslims about the potential 'threat' in the 1999 general election.

²⁸³ PKB (the Party of National Renaissance) is a NU-based party established by Abdurrahman Wahid (former chairman of NU period 1984-1999 and President of Indonesia in 1999-2001).

²⁸⁴ According to some experts, such as Mujani and Liddle (2004), a political party was defined as secular for this election if it did not mention Islam clearly in either its organizational foundations or its name. From 48 parties participating in the 1999 General Election, 32 were classified as being secular, 14 as Islamic (9 using an Islamic name and being based on Islam, 5 using an Islamic name but being based on Pancasila), and 2 as Christian (see also Ichwan, 2005: 55).

I argue that many neo-modernists in the central board, however, supported the idea that a democratic state needs to be run by politicians that are representative of the majority of the population in the state. Nashir, one of the neo-modernist figures from the central board, emphasized this when I asked him why the Muhammadiyah had issued the letter:

Democracy should be realistic. Considering proportion is really important. If we do not consider the proportion, there will be instability. I think it is not a discriminative or sectarian attitude when the Indonesian founding fathers required that presidents of Indonesia have to be Muslims. This is the sort of democracy that people choose. And the democracy established by each country is not required to be the same. Therefore, the concept of ‘distributive justice’ [sharing out portions according to numbers] is important in an Indonesian democratic state.²⁸⁵

From this statement, it can be inferred that it was likely that many other neo-modernists in the central board also supported this notion, as can be seen from the Muhammadiyah’s decree mentioned above. This idea is similar to that held by ICMI activists when this Islamic modernist/neo-modernist organization was in its golden era at the end of the Soeharto regime (1992–1998). Many ICMI activists supported the government and parliament being dominated by Muslims. They called the idea ‘proportionalism’ (Hefner, 2000), which holds that democracy requires state figures to proportionality represent the (majority of the) population. Proportionalism emerged as a response from Muslim activists to the government’s domination by Christians during the first and second decades of the New Order government (see Hefner, 2000). Thus, I think that Nashir and other neo-modernist figures from the Muhammadiyah were representatives of this ICMI spirit, and that the Muhammadiyah neo-modernists’ interests intersected with the Muhammadiyah revivalists’ interests to some extent in criticizing the PDIP for not considering the

²⁸⁵ Interview with Haedar Nashir, 1 October 2012.

‘majority’ as an important variable in determining its parliamentary members. In other words, the neo-modernists were disappointed that the PDIP had selected many non-Muslims as its parliamentary candidates.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that not all neo-modernists in the central board favoured this idea. Maarif offered a slightly different position when I interviewed him, saying: “in a democratic state it would be natural that the majority would represent in the government and parliament. We (Muslims) do not have to be anxious about that.”²⁸⁶ For Maarif, democratic general elections naturally result in the representative majority running the parliament and the government. He disagreed with the idea of ‘proportionalism’. This is why Maarif emphasized different considerations to those mentioned in the Muhammadiyah letter when he was interviewed by the mass media one day after the letter was released.

7.4 The ‘*ulama*’s attitudes concerning non-Muslim leadership

7.4.1 The first type of ‘*ulama*: the distrust of non-Muslim leadership

Unfortunately, I could not find any commentary on the issue of non-Muslim leadership during the 1999 General Election from these ‘*ulama* as they did not write any articles or other documents that could be analysed. Therefore, I rely solely on their reflections. In the interviews, I questioned these ‘*ulama* about whether they knew about the discourse that existed when Muhammadiyah released the decree, what their responses were to the decree, and what their opinions were about the issues mentioned in the decree.

²⁸⁶ Interview with Syafii Maarif, 20 September 2012.

They told me that they experienced the controversy through television and newspaper media. Darori, for instance, read the commentary on the issue by *Republika* – an Islamic newspaper. In addition, given that the polemic was also the lead news on TV, he also assimilated information from the electronic media. These *'ulama* understood that the Muhammadiyah was one of the Islamic organizations calling for Muslims to vote for Islamic parties and Islamic parliamentary candidates. However, none of them were certain about the details of Muhammadiyah's decree.

All of the first type of Muhammadiyah *'ulama* represented the revivalist orientation in terms of their views concerning non-Muslim leadership. I argue that these *'ulama* absolutely distrust non-Muslims, particularly Christians, and believe that God warns Muslims not to appoint non-Muslims as their leaders because they will mislead Muslims. As one of the *'ulama*, Darori, put it:

It is dangerous to appoint non-Muslims as our leaders, either in parliament or government. Allah (God) really loves Muslims. In the *Qur'an surah* (chapter) *An-Nisa'* verse 144,²⁸⁷ He begins by calling us with a favoured name *'Mu'min'* (the believer), and continues by warning us not to choose *'orang kafir'* (unbelievers) to be our leaders. This means that Allah indeed does not want us to be in danger and misled. This verse is really clear. If we do not obey His commandment, we will endanger ourselves ... I believe that unbelievers would lead us to hell, while Muslims would bring us to the heaven.²⁸⁸

Darori thus held that appointing non-Muslims as their leaders would result in the destruction of Muslim communities. Another *'alim*, Nuriyah, made a similar claim:

I agree with the Muhammadiyah's letter warning Muslims not to choose non-Muslims to be leaders. This call is really in accordance with Islamic teachings. Of course, we have to choose Muslims who are qualified, and those who seriously fight for Islam. The *Qur'an* clearly mentions that we (Muslims) are not allowed to appoint Jews, Christians, and other unbelievers

²⁸⁷ "O ye who believe! Choose not disbelievers for (your) friends in place of believers" (translated by Pickthall, 2000: 30).

²⁸⁸ Interview with Darori (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 7 October 2012.

to be our leaders. I really agree with the Muhammadiyah's position. In addition, the *Qur'an* also reminds us that Jews and Christians will never like us until we join their religions.²⁸⁹

Unfortunately, the distrust that these Muslims have of people from other religions appears to be shaped by their religious educational background. Their Islamic education encourages an uncritical approach towards understanding the *Qur'an*, placing emphasis on strengthening traditional Muslim beliefs instead of studying Islam critically. This sort of education is commonly practised by both traditional and 'modern' madrasas and *pesantrens* in Indonesia, which all aim to generate pious Muslims, as well as generations who are able to teach, preach, and defend Islam (see Bruinessen, 2008; Hasan, 2008). That is why those who graduate from these institutions and do not go on to higher education tend to avoid critical approaches to interpreting *Qur'anic* verses related to non-Muslims and their leadership, such as verse 144 of *an-Nisa'* (the women) and verse 120 of *al-Baqara*. In other words, these revivalist *'ulama* tend to adopt and practice a textual approach to interpreting the *Qur'an*, and Fazlur Rahman (1982) argues that this is what leads Muslims to hold on to conservative views. The belief that *Qur'anic* verses are relevant for all contexts and always apply literally is the main characteristic of the conservative approach to understanding the *Qur'an* (see Rahman, 1982).

7.4.2 The second type of *'ulama*: revivalist and neo-modernist orientations

I also could not find any documentation relating to this type of *'ulama's* views concerning the issue of non-Islamic representatives in parliament and government. Again, I gathered data by seeking the *'ulama's* recollections and reflections about

²⁸⁹ Interview with Nuriyah (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 19 November 2012.

the event, their responses to the issue at the time, and their opinions about the topic. Like the first type of the *'ulama*, they also knew about the polemic through TV and newspapers. They also understood that the Muhammadiyah had shared and expressed the same opinion as other Islamic organizations, and most of them knew about the decree released by the Muhammadiyah, particularly points 2 and 3 emphasizing not voting for parties and parliamentary candidates that would not accommodate Muslims' aspirations or interests.

I argue that most of the second type of *'ulama*, including neo-modernist ones, tend to view non-Muslim leadership negatively,²⁹⁰ but their views and arguments were not similar to those of the first type of *'ulama*. This group provided at least two types of reasons for their views. First, one of them held that non-Muslims would fight for Muslims' interests less enthusiastically than Muslims. This argument was advanced by Rabitah, a neo-modernist female *'alim*:

We have to choose leaders who are committed to Islam. How could Islam be implemented, how could Muslims live properly, and how could Muslims' interests be accommodated if the leaders were non-Muslims? We cannot hope much that non-Muslims will fight for Muslims' interests.²⁹¹

Unlike the first type of Muhammadiyah *'ulama*, she does not see non-Muslims (Christians and Jews) as enemies who pose a threat to Muslims. She only doubts that non-Muslims would be concerned with Muslims *as a priority*.

Second, most of these *'ulama* believed that non-Islamic religions such as Christianity and Judaism are less able to provide good leaders. The *'ulama* argue that religion has a significant influence in creating good and bad leaders, contending

²⁹⁰ 3 out of 5 of the *'ulama* that I interviewed distrusted non-Muslim leaders or the idea of having non-Muslim leaders.

²⁹¹ Interview with Rabitah (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 26 November 2012.

that non-Muslim (Indonesian) leaders do not have strong commitments to justice for all groups, as Solihin, another neo-modernist (male) *'alim* explained:

We believe that Muslim leaders will be more likely to fight for justice for all people. One of the most important duties of a leader is to implement justice on the Earth. Based on history, we can say that a righteous world will appear when leadership positions are held by Muslims, but this has not been the case with non-Muslim leadership. The most obvious recent example was Myanmar. Before receiving a leadership position in the parliament, a prominent political figure (Aung San Suu Kyi) seriously endeavoured for democracy and human rights. However, when she came to hold a good position in parliament, she ignored Rohingya Muslims that were being discriminated against and killed by a dominant ethnic group. There was no voice from her mouth to defend Rohingya Muslims. She did not campaign for human rights for this case. It is also the case with the American government claiming that they fight for human rights and justice. They stated that killing an Israeli is a human crime, but they did not say so when civil Palestinians were killed by Israeli troops. We know from history that Jews lived happily and peacefully under Muslim power. When the prophet Muhammad led Madinah, he gave Jews freedom to live in the city and to express their beliefs.²⁹²

This *'alim* thus believed that an Islamic background provides a greater guarantee that political figures (in Indonesia) will be good leaders, while non-Islamic backgrounds don't give a strong enough moral grounding to prevent leaders acting morally weakly or hypocritically.

This neo-modernist view is similar to those of revivalists from the second type of *'ulama*. Masykur, a revivalist *'alim*, stated: "I doubt that non-Muslim leaders could run a just government – their religion could not support them to be good leaders."²⁹³ Defending his opinion, Masykur asserted that if people (non-Muslims) regard non-Muslim leaders as good, this assessment might be based on a perspective that is sectarian and subjective:

²⁹² Interview with Solihin (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 11 September 2012.

²⁹³ Interview with Masykur (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 24 October 2012.

Is it true that non-Muslims could provide justice? Whose parameters or measurements will we use to assess whether they could implement justice or not – our parameters or theirs (non-Muslims)? This is the problem. It is not surprising that many Muslim leaders doubt (distrust) non-Muslims. It is right to say that British leaders are good, but it is according to their society, who are mostly Protestants. In other words, these leaders are regarded as righteous because they are assessed by their own society, which has the same religious background.²⁹⁴

Consequently, revivalists of the second type of *'ulama* disagree with the idea of letting non-Muslims dominate the government or the parliament.

As this second type of *'ulama* does not see Christians and Jews as being major threats or enemies to Indonesian Muslims, I argue that these *'ulama* began to implement critical and contextual approaches to interpreting the *Qur'an*. By 'critical and contextual approaches' I mean relating the *Qur'an* or particular verses to the social and political contexts in which the verses were revealed (Rahman, 1982). The cultural capital of these *'ulama* – the possession of masters and doctoral degrees – supports them in being more critical in their interpretations of the *Qur'an*. These programmes of Islamic studies in Indonesia – especially at the doctoral level – encourage their students to adopt contextual approaches for understanding the *Qur'an*. Hermeneutic, sociological, and anthropological methods are viewed as the approaches that enable students to be critical in interpreting particular verses. However, it is worth noting that these methods do not automatically lead the students to support neo-modernist or liberal ideas, such as favouring non-Muslim leadership. This is why the view of the second type of Muhammadiyah *'ulama*, including the neo-modernists, still see non-Muslim leadership negatively, even though they are more moderate than the first type of *'ulama*. I agree with Saiful Mujani's (2003) argument that past experience, political contexts, and the relations

²⁹⁴ Interview with Masykur, *ibid*.

between Muslims and non-Muslims can all influence Muslims' trust of non-Muslim leaders. This argument is supported by the explanation of mistrust provided by Solihin, one of the neo-modernist Muhammadiyah *'ulama*:

Bad experiences during the New Order, when some Christian figures held strategic positions in the government, reminded Muslims that Christian leadership tended to harm Indonesian Muslims, particularly those who campaigned for the implementation of *shari'a* in the state.²⁹⁵

A clearer expression of the contextual approach was provided by two other *'ulama* from this cluster with neo-modernist outlooks. Baligoh, a female *'alim*, whilst suggesting that Muslims should seek national leaders with Islamic backgrounds, also emphasized the importance of leaders' commitments or track records:

As long as there are potential Muslims to be chosen, we have to prioritize [choosing] them. I agree with Ibn Taymiyah, who says that we can choose a just leader even though he is a non-Muslim. However, this should only be done in an emergency situation in which there is no potential Muslim leader to be selected. For example, if there were only two options: a) a corrupt Muslim, or b) a just non-Muslim, we should choose the non-Muslim.²⁹⁶

Despite the fact Baligoh still perceives choosing Muslim leaders to be ideal, the distrust of non-Muslims is not her reason for choosing Muslims over them. She implicitly emphasizes that an Islamic religious background is not a prerequisite of good leadership. Another *'alim*, Zarkasyi, expressed a similar view:

In my opinion, the most important thing is their [the leaders'] commitment to justice, and their competence in managing the diversity of Indonesian society. Religion is not the main factor causing a leader to be good or bad. In the Indonesian context, we need to consider whether leaders have a commitment to humanity and the public good, instead of considering their religious backgrounds.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ Interview with Solihin, 11 September 2012.

²⁹⁶ Interview with Baligoh (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 31 October 2012.

²⁹⁷ Interview with Zarkasyi (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah *'alim*, 31 October 2012.

When I asked him about verses 120 of *al-Baqara* and 144 of *an-Nisa*, to which the revivalists often refer, Zarkasyi responded:

These verses have various interpretations. For conservative *'ulama*, they believe that the verses warn Muslims to be cautious with Christians or other non-Muslims. However, for me, this is not the only interpretation of those verses. I prefer to locate the verses in the context in which they were revealed.²⁹⁸

Zarkasyi's view shows that he holds a neo-modernist outlook, which pays attention to the context in which *Qur'anic* verses were revealed in order to discover the underlying principles of the messages delivered by God, and then applies these principles to contemporary contexts in order to produce the appropriate contextual guidance and rules (Rahman, 1982: 5).

7.5 Activists' trust in non-Muslims and the influence of social capital

In this section I argue that most of the activists who are engaged with secular organizations and cooperate with wider communities – especially with non-Muslim groups – trust non-Muslim leaders. They do not view the appointment of non-Muslims leaders or the domination of non-Muslims in government and parliament as being problematic. The important point for them is that a leader should be committed to the universal values of Islam. They define the universal values of Islam as the principles that are regarded by all moral agents as good, such as justice. Bayhaki (38) – a young activist who is a lecturer and a member of staff for a parliamentary member – put it as follows:

²⁹⁸ Interview with Zarkasyi, *ibid.*

What I mean by universal values of Islam is like providing justice. Justice is part of Islamic teaching. Therefore, anyone who establishes justice should be appreciated, including non-Muslims. Their faith, which is not Islam, is their business with God, not with us.²⁹⁹

Bayhaki thus implicitly stated that religion has nothing to do with good or bad leadership or social conduct. As long as figures are committed to acting virtuously, this neo-modernist activist deems that they are eligible to be appointed as leaders. In addition, Bayhaki identified a precedent that a historic Islamic empire set in appointing non-Muslims to be a significant part of its federal government:

According to my interpretation, we have to reject leaders whose behaviour is not in accordance with Islamic teachings in its universal meaning. I am not an expert in history, but let's have a look at the golden age of Islam. There were many non-Muslims appointed as leaders in federal government under the Abbasiyah Empire (which ruled from the 8th to the 13th Century). Were there no other potential Muslims to be appointed? I do not think so. As long as they were committed to virtue or good values, they would be appreciated by the central government of Islam. Therefore, we need to reject Muslim candidates as well if their track records are not good.³⁰⁰

In line with his fellows, Farid (36) – a young neo-modernist activist who is involved in a NGO concerned with issues of humanity and religious pluralism – emphasized that distinguishing leaders based on their religions represents a type of sectarian attitude.

We need to assess their (parliamentary candidates') competence regardless of their religion. I think it is un-wise to demand proportional [representation] based on the religious majority by asking parties to set up as many as possible Muslim candidates. If people do so, it will lead this nation into a sectarian situation. And it would easily lead to disintegration. This sectarianism is not in line with the principle of plurality of this nation.³⁰¹

²⁹⁹ Interview with Bayhaki (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 17 September 2012.

³⁰⁰ Interview with Bayhaki, *ibid.*

³⁰¹ Interview with Farid (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 10 September 2012.

All these young activists were thus critical of the decree that the Muhammadiyah issued in relation to the 1999 General Election. Majid (32) – a young activist and member of staff for a parliamentary member – stated: “personally I disagree with the Muhammadiyah’s decree. Non-Muslim candidates would probably be better in terms of fighting for national interests, such as mining projects.”³⁰² This view was supported by Farid, who said that sectarian ideas are disliked by most young Muhammadiyah activists:

I think that voices calling on Muslims to vote for Islamic parties or Muslim candidates were not significant among the young generation of the Muhammadiyah. This indicates that sectarian issues were not central among the youths. Of course, this issue will always appear during the General Elections. This tendency was caused by the sense that the majority has that they should be respected by the minority.³⁰³

Given that all of the activists who disagreed with sectarian ideas were involved with ‘secular’ organizations and had relationships with broader communities, I argue that this social capital influenced the way they dealt with the issue of non-Muslim leadership. By social capital, here, I mean their personal and collective resources and abilities reproduced, accumulated and developed through social position, networks, e.g. Putnam uses the term to refer to different capacities for civic engagement including the levels of trust in relationships with others (see Putnam, 1993; cf Fox 2012). In other words, this social capital supports them in developing neo-modernist understandings of the *Qur’anic* verses that relate to non-Muslims. There is further evidence to support my argument here. Several years ago, Bayhaki reported that his view on non-Muslims was quite conservative: he assessed religious pluralism negatively and distrusted non-Muslim leaders. However, after several

³⁰² Interview with Majid (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 5 November 2012.

³⁰³ Interview with Farid, *ibid.*

years working for a parliamentary member, which has required him to interact with many people from various different backgrounds, he changed his mind. The shift in his orientation indicates that his engagement with a secular institution and his network with wider communities contributed to nurturing his neo-modernist views.

However there were also reverse indications showing that these activists' engagement with secular organizations and their networking with broader communities were influenced by their neo-modernist views in the first instance. For some activists, their trust in non-Muslims appeared to be part of what encouraged them to become involved in these organizations and to work with non-Muslims. Farid provides an example of this trend. A couple of years before he joined the NGO for which he now works, his articles showed that he supported religious pluralism. Hence, his decision to become involved in an NGO focusing on issues of religious pluralism was an expression of his trust in non-Muslims. What happened with Farid is in line with Robert Putnam's argument that "trust lubricates cooperation. The greater the level of trust within a community, the greater the likelihood of cooperation" (1993: 171). This does not mean that activities in secular organizations and networks with broader communities do not contribute at all to developing worldviews, as I already explained above. Putnam himself recognizes the contribution of this factor, observing that "cooperation itself breeds trust" (1993: 171). I argue that these two possibilities exist among Muhammadiyah activists.

As activists of Islamic organizations, these young neo-modernists realize the pivotal position of the *Qur'an*. Therefore, they do not ignore the verses of the *Qur'an* that relate to non-Muslim leadership (120 of *al-Baqara* and 144 of *an-Nisa*), but instead reinterpret them in the way that is explained by Majid, a young

Muhammadiyah activist and member of staff for a parliamentary member from a secular party:

In my opinion, in electing leaders, we need to refer to the *Qur'an*. I realize that there are verses mentioning that Muslims are not allowed to choose non-Muslims to be their leaders. However, I think these verses should be interpreted contextually. As far as I know, the verses were revealed to the Prophet Muhammad when he was making a covenant with Jews in Madinah who had deceived Muslims and could not be trusted anymore. It happened in the past, and in a particular context. In the contemporary context, I think that there is no problem if non-Muslims become our leaders. Our constitution has already guaranteed Muslims' rights. There is nothing we have to be worried about.³⁰⁴

Like neo-modernists of the second type of Muhammadiyah *'ulama* (see section 7.4.2.), neo-modernist activists also often use critical and contextual interpretations to overcome the contradictions between their neo-modernist views and the *Qur'an*.

I found that the profiles of the Muhammadiyah activists that distrust non-Muslim leadership are in line with their social capitals. I argue that the less the activists are involved in 'secular' organizations, and the less they cooperate with other religious followers, the less likely the activists will be to trust in non-Muslim leadership. Adil's profile is one such example. Although he is a neo-modernist activist (see his neo-modernist views in section 5.7.2. and 6.6), he distrusted non-Muslim leadership. Adil works as a lecturer in a Muhammadiyah university, and is not a member of any 'secular' organizations that facilitate his cooperation with people coming from different ideological or religious backgrounds. When I asked him about the issue of non-Muslim leadership, he responded:

I think it is good that the Muhammadiyah suggested that Muslims not vote for non-Muslims, because it is already mentioned in the *Qur'an*. ... In case

³⁰⁴ Interview with Majid (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 5 November 2012.

there are two options of candidates, I prefer to choose the Muslim candidate.³⁰⁵

A similar view was expressed by Hasyim, an older activist who worked as a lecturer in a Muhammadiyah higher education in Jakarta, and has not been involved in any interfaith movements:

In its decree, the Muhammadiyah prevents Muslims from choosing parliamentary candidates who are not committed to Islam. I really agree with this decree. And it is the principle of the Muhammadiyah. The *Qur'an* says that only in emergency conditions can we choose non-Muslims. As long as Muslim candidates are still many, we are not allowed to vote for non-Muslims. To obey this principle is obligatory. The purpose is to enhance Islam itself.³⁰⁶

Nonetheless, none of these activists displayed the sort of high-level distrust that I found among the first type of Muhammadiyah *'ulama*, who believed that non-Muslims would endanger Muslims if they were appointed as leaders (see section 7.3.1). The kind of distrust most commonly found among these activists is that of believing that it would be unlikely for non-Muslim government or parliamentary members to support the interests of the Muslim community. That is, they do not think that non-Muslims would be able to articulate or formulate the Muslim community's aspirations for enhancing Islam in the state and society. This distrust has nothing to do with feeling threatened by non-Muslims, but rather represents a form of scepticism about the capacity or ability of non-Muslims to formalize *shari'a* in a practical form, as Somad, a prominent young Muhammadiyah member explained:

As long as there are Muslim candidates, we have to choose Muslims, even though we need to interact and make relationships with non-Muslims. This is

³⁰⁵ Interview with Adil (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 18 December 2012.

³⁰⁶ Interview with Hasyim (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 1 November 2012.

because there are some important affairs in the state that the Muhammadiyah thinks will only be solved by Muslims. It is not possible for us to expect non-Muslims to manage the law of *zakat* (alms) or *haji* (pilgrimage to Mecca). We feel easier to ask Muslim parliament members or a Muslim government to deal with these affairs rather than non-Muslims.³⁰⁷

Although their understanding of the *Qur'anic* verses is more critical than that of the first type of Muhammadiyah *'ulama*, their views could still encourage sectarian feelings. Verses 120 of *al-Baqara* and 144 of *an-Nisa* are interpreted quite differently by them. To some extent, they are able to reinterpret and diminish the perception of the 'evil character' of non-Muslims described by the *Qur'an*. However, they do not totally extinguish the sectarian ideas from the *Qur'an*.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the way in which neo-modernist and revivalist Muhammadiyah leaders from various levels of the organization view non-Muslim leadership in the state, paying special attention to exploring the extent to which these leaders distrust non-Muslims, the reasons for this, and the consequences of this distrust in relation to their desire to see the formalization of *shari'a*.

These findings overlap with those of Inglehart (1999) to some extent, showing that Muslims' trust of non-Muslims is often low. However, my study revealed more detailed perspectives about what this distrust is a distrust *of*, the extent to which these different groups of Muslim distrust non-Muslims, and why they do. The findings also share some overlaps with those of Mujani (2003) – that Islamists (revivalists) tend to distrust non-Muslims. Unlike Mujani, however, who argued that most Muhammadiyah figures trust non-Muslims, I have shown that there

³⁰⁷ Interview with Somad (pseudonym), a Muhammadiyah activist, 18 October 2012.

is a complex range of perspectives held by the neo-modernists and revivalists of the Muhammadiyah.

Educational background and engagement with secular organizations outside the Muhammadiyah are both factors that influence Muhammadiyah figures' perceptions of non-Muslim leadership. Higher levels of education generally correlate with more critical interpretations of *Qur'anic* verses that are negative about non-Muslims. The difference between the first and the second type of Muhammadiyah *'ulama* provides support for this. The former, who have only graduated from madrasas, generally see non-Muslim leadership as a large threat that endangers Muslims – as a non-contextual reading of the *Qur'an* suggests; whereas the latter, who have graduated from Islamic higher education, tend to be critical in their interpretation of this information in the *Qur'an*, not believing that the *Qur'an* meant such information to apply to every possible context.

Young Muhammadiyah activists placed a high level of trust in non-Muslim leadership, and the correlation between this trust and their engagement with NGOs and secular political parties also provides support for my argument; the more that activists are involved with secular organizations, the more likely they are to trust non-Muslims. For these activists, Muslims have no need to worry about non-Muslims occupying or dominating the parliament or the government.

This study has not only exposed issues about trust and distrust in non-Muslim leadership, but also revealed a correlation between Muslims' expectations of their domination of state institutions (parliament and government) and the process of the formalization of *shari'a*. The domination of Muslim figures in the parliament and government would enable them to reconcile the secular nature of the modern state with *shari'a*.

Conclusion

The post-New Order government that came to power in 1998 marked the beginning of Indonesia's transition to democracy, but the freedom of expression granted by the democratising regime allowed Islamic revivalist movements the political space to push the state to formalize *shari'a* as state law. This led them into a conflict with supporters of the 'secular' state. Although it is often claimed that Indonesia is not a secular state, the state constitution does not mention the implementation of *shari'a* as state law or require the Indonesian president to be a Muslim. This is viewed by Islamic revivalist movements at least as an indication of 'secularism'. Most other Muslim countries mention in their constitutions either that the state is an Islamic state or Islam is the state religion (see Salim, 2008: 79-80). This means that these states regard Islam as a source of at least some of their state law. Only a few Muslim countries such as Indonesia do not make such claims or, as in the case of Turkey, have proclaimed themselves as a secular state. The proponents of a secular state in Indonesia want the state to remain 'neutral' from holding a particular religious identity, and one that does not force religious adherents to act in accordance with the tenets of their traditions. In this thesis I have shown that during the post-New Order period this conflict empowered and consolidated revivalist groups, including the revivalist elements within the Muhammadiyah. However, the aspirations of the revivalists also created new tensions with the neo-modernist wing of the movement that had begun to dominate the Muhammadiyah after 1995.

My research has investigated how the Muhammadiyah dealt with the relationship between Islam and the state during the post-New Order era (1998–2005). Previous studies of the Muhammadiyah have rarely focused on the post-New Order period, with Pradana Boy (2007) and Najib Burhani (2013) being the only two

exceptions. However, both of these studies ignore a very important topic arising in this era – the relationship between Islam and the state. To address this gap, the present study has undertaken qualitative research as was explained in Chapter 4. Although I am an insider to the Muhammadiyah movement, I adopted a participant-as-observer approach to the research with the aim of producing the most impartial understanding of the object of the research that I could (Knott, 2005). However, I acknowledge that there is no completely value-free knowledge or understandings of phenomena (McLoughlin, 2000). My social life and personal values – as a Muhammadiyah member and a holder of an Islamic neo-modernist orientation – will inevitably have influenced my interpretations in this study to some degree despite my desire to remain objective.

This study has attempted to answer the following questions: how, and to what extent, do the neo-modernist and revivalist leaders coexist at different levels of the Muhammadiyah? How do the neo-modernist and revivalist leaders at different levels of the Muhammadiyah conceptualize the position that Islam should have in the state constitution? How do the neo-modernist and revivalist leaders in the Muhammadiyah understand *shari'a* and its relationship with state law? To what extent do the neo-modernist and revivalist leaders in the Muhammadiyah trust or distrust non-Muslim leadership at the national level?

My study shows that neo-modernist and revivalist orientations are found at the three different leadership levels of the Muhammadiyah. In talking about Muhammadiyah leaders at different levels of the organization I am referring to central board members of the Muhammadiyah, Muhammadiyah *'ulama*, and Muhammadiyah activists. The central board is the most pivotal position in the Muhammadiyah, as its members are the decision-makers for the organization; whilst

the Muhammadiyah *'ulama* are figures who have religious authority and play important roles in shaping the religious views of Muhammadiyah members, either at the middle-level or the grass-roots level; the Muhammadiyah activists are those who were officials of the Muhammadiyah branch in Jakarta during 1998–2005, or who were associated with youth-wing organizations of the Muhammadiyah.

The central argument of this thesis has been that while the neo-modernists endorse the neutrality of the state from a perspective still grounded in Islamic identity, the revivalists support a *shari'a*-based state. In general terms, the dynamics of changing political contexts and opportunities in recent decades (Fox 2012), together with the social and cultural capital or resources accumulated by leaders in terms of higher educational background, and/or engagement in organizations concerned with democracy, human rights, and religious pluralism (Putnam 1993; Bourdieu, 1986), has tended to extend classical modernism into a neo-modernist orientation in the Muhammadiyah, contributing to a shift away from revivalism. The shift is the result of intensive everyday experience, practice and negotiations which sees the re-invention not only of what is meant and understood by 'Islam', but also 'the secular state'. The Muhammadiyah's neo-modernist leaders have thus attempted to produce a new interpretation of Islam that is in line with the secular state, as well as a new conception of a secular state that does not undermine Islam. However, the political context of the post-New Order in which the proponents and opponents of the secular state were in conflict, also led the neo-modernists, particularly in the central board, to think carefully and pragmatically about common religious and political interests still shared with the revivalist wing, as explained in Chapters 5–7. These shifts, negotiations, revisions, compromises and reformulations show the complexity of how Muslims with a particular theological and/or political orientation

respond contextually and relationally to issues of modernity, and particularly to the secular state.

As Chapter 1 showed, scholars are agreed that there are three common forms of Muslim response to the modern nation-state: secularism (secular modernism), Islamic (neo-)modernism, and Islamic revivalism. Islamic neo-modernism is a contemporary 'form' of classical modernism. The difference between the two reflects changing contexts and concerns. The post-colonial context, which witnessed the emergence of ever more complex issues regarding the relationship between Islam and the state, encouraged the emergence of Islamic neo-modernism. Neo-modernists developed and extended the spirit of modernism. Like classical modernism, neo-modernism is concerned with rationality and modern education, but neo-modernism also pays attention to the issues of democracy, religious pluralism, freedom of religion, human rights, and multiculturalism by reinterpreting Islamic doctrines and tradition in order to be compatible with contemporary challenges. Unlike in the colonial context in which classical modernism attempted to help Muslims survive colonialism and called for the resurgence of Islamic civilization, in the post-colonial context neo-modernism endeavoured to support Muslims in managing the modern nation-state in which its peoples are heterogeneous in terms of religion and ethnicity. These neo-modernist ideas were also a response on the rising Islamic revivalism during 1970-1980s contesting 'secular' ideology of their (secularist) rulers. These different ideal types indicate that Islam is not a fixed belief and value system, but even so such an abstract schema cannot fully capture the extent to which tradition is also linked dynamically to situational action and interaction among differently positioned religious, social and political actors (McLoughlin 2007). Secularists, neo-modernists, and revivalists all have different

perceptions of the role that Islam should play in the modern state and carry forward their agendas dependent on different political opportunity structures and the resources they have available to mobilise at any given time (Bourdieu, 1986; Fox 2012; Putnam 1993).

Such political and social dynamics influence and shape religious revivalists and neo-modernists' perceptions of the relationship between Islam and the state, as shown in Chapter 2. This Chapter explained, for instance, how the political repression of Islamic (revivalist and modernist) movements in the first two decades of the New Order (1966–1998) encouraged younger generations, particularly modernists, to generate a 'new form' of Islam often referred to as Islamic neo-modernism. The latter re-formed and changed their understanding of Islam and its relationship with the state dynamically in order to meet the new challenges, opportunities and situations they were confronted with at a time when they also increasingly had the academic, intellectual and social resources available to them to undertake such rethinking.

The case study of the Muhammadiyah movement in Chapter 3 similarly revealed that a shift in political context during the colonial era was followed by changes in the orientation of the Muhammadiyah leadership. Even though the movement is known as having modernist origins, a revivalist orientation has also been present and has been developing since this time, contesting modernist ideology. Different leaders of the organization with different social and cultural capital or resources, at different times and given changes in the political environment and opportunities (e.g. K.H.A. Dahlan 1912-1923; K.H. Ibrahim 1923-

1932; K.H. Mas Mansur 1936-1953; Sutan Mansur 1953-1959)³⁰⁸ have influenced the swing between modernism and revivalism.

The importance of political context and social and cultural capital to the swing between modernism, revivalism, and neo-modernism in the Muhammadiyah was also evident at the end of the New Order era (1990s) and beginning of the post-New Order era. During the post-New Order era, neo-modernist figures were dominant in the central board, both at the top and lower levels. They were scholars, mostly those who had obtained doctoral degrees and whose expertise combined Islamic and ‘secular’ subjects, particularly in the ‘critical’ humanities and social sciences. Many of these board members had played a role in the board since 1995, under Amien Rais’ leadership, including figures such as Syafii Maarif, Amin Abdullah and Munir Mul Khan. The end of the 1980s and the 1990s saw the Muhammadiyah attempt to respond to critics, including the New Order government, which suggested that the movement was too conservative.³⁰⁹ Not least to retain influence at a time when the secular governments of Muslim states were fearful of Islamic revivalism, neo-modernist figures within the movement who had the right social and cultural capital to enable such a move, sought to take advantage of this new political opportunity and position themselves as ‘moderate’ Muslims that the state could do business with. Their role became even more significant during 1998–2005, particularly after 2000, when Maarif was selected as the chairman of the Muhammadiyah. During this period, neo-modernist figures were also chosen by the *Muktamar* – a congress of the Muhammadiyah that is conducted every five years, and at which new Muhammadiyah central board members are elected. These figures

³⁰⁸ The last two Chairmans more expressed revivalist orientation in the movement (Burhani, 2004). Revivalism seemed to be the best choice for expressing anti-colonial spirit of the movement.

³⁰⁹ This conservatism (revivalism) in the Muhammadiyah during 1945-1970s was the result of its inability to expand the spirit of classical modernism, which is to modernize Islam, in responding to the Islam-state relationship in the post-colonial Indonesia context.

endeavoured to move the Muhammadiyah in a more neo-modernist direction, not only with respect to its programmes, but also in terms of appointing even more staff with neo-modernist orientations in Muhammadiyah divisions such as its educational department and *Majelis Tarjih* (a division producing fatwa).

Consequently, the opportunities for and influence of revivalist figures in the Muhammadiyah decreased during this era, and the revivalist wing came to be centralized in a particular division named *Majelis Tabligh*, which focused on proselytizing activities. In contrast to the neo-modernists, the educational background of its leadership was in Islamic studies though most held higher education qualifications. Before the collapse of the New Order, they did not aggressively criticize the neo-modernists perhaps because they lacked political opportunities. However, in the freedom of the post-New Order context – with revivalist groups in general having the opportunity to contest proponents of the ‘secular’ state – the revivalist wing of the Muhammadiyah was emboldened. The dispute over the amendment of Article 29 of the Indonesian constitution concerning the relationship between Islam and the state was the pivotal issue over which these revivalists came to strongly oppose the neo-modernist wing of the Muhammadiyah, with the neo-modernists joining the proponents of the secular state in rejecting the amendment.

However, ultimately concerns to keep the Muhammadiyah internally strong and harmonious encouraged the neo-modernists of the central board to compromise with revivalists in the movement. Although neo-modernist figures were dominant in the board, they attempted to accommodate revivalists’ aspirations to some degree, although this did not always satisfy the revivalist wing. As shown in Chapter 5, for instance, whilst neo-modernists such as Syafii Maarif (chairman of the

Muhammadiyah, 1998–2005) argued that the state constitution should emphasize religious neutrality and respect religious pluralism, the official position of the Muhammadiyah (letter No.10/EDR/I.0/I/2002) emphasized the lack of political support in parliament for an Islamic state, the conflict between Muslims and Christians in Moluccas, and the negative response from the international world towards such a state structure.

The Muhammadiyah's official line thus adopted a more pragmatic defence of the neo-modernist position based on various political calculations. It indicates that although the central board officially endorsed the neo-modernist position, they did not always do so using neo-modernist arguments and justifications. By using more pragmatic arguments, the central board of the Muhammadiyah hoped that its rejection of 'the seven words' for instance would not place it in direct ideological conflict with the views of its revivalist faction.

Chapter 6 also proves how the neo-modernists in the central board tried to accommodate – or, at least, to not disturb – revivalists' aspirations. Instead of criticizing *shari'a*-based district laws (*Perda Syariah*) in several regions of Indonesia as the NU and some neo-modernist figures did, the central board of the Muhammadiyah remained silent on this issue. Even though the neo-modernists have a substantive understanding of *shari'a* and its relationship with state law, they did not want to directly oppose revivalists' basis for supporting the formalization of *shari'a* in district law in places such as Aceh and Sulawesi. Neo-modernists such as Syafii Maarif (2006) and Dawam Rahardjo (2006) opposed this district law by arguing that the *Perda Syariah* could weaken the foundations of the nation-state, and that to force Muslims to be 'pious' would harm the principle of Islamic teaching *per se*. However, Maarif and Rahardjo did begin to publicly criticize the very concept of

shari'a-based bylaws after they had ceased to be board members in the organization. But, as board members, neo-modernists considered the *Perda Syariah* to represent a kind of compromise between the modern state – which is not an Islamic state – and the aspirations of Indonesia's majority population, who are Muslims. This compromise, as one of the board members observed, is expressed in the Muhammadiyah's letter No.10/EDR/I.0/I/2002.

The neo-modernists of the central board even attempted to partially justify the movement's revivalist aspirations by using 'modern concepts', as shown in Chapter 7, when the revivalist groups fought against a secularist party. Like revivalist groups, the central board officially released a letter calling on Muslims not to vote for parties that had a large number of non-Muslim parliamentary candidates in the 1999 general election. However, instead of using the revivalist argument that non-Muslim leadership would threaten Muslims' interests, the neo-modernists appealed to the idea of *proportionalism*. The term *proportionalism* here represents the idea that the composition of the government and parliament should be representative of the majority of the population. In other words, the neo-modernists of the central board emphasized the principle of democracy – that the state should represent the voice of the majority. This concept of *proportionalism* somehow seems to make the 'sectarian' idea more politically elegant.

In addition to the members of the central board, I found that neo-modernist and revivalist orientations among the Muhammadiyah's *'ulama* also reveal the extent to which political contexts and cultural capital contribute to Islamic orientation. Neo-modernist *'ulama* are generally represented by the younger and more educated generations of the organization, who are under sixty years of age, have master's or doctoral degrees, and work as lecturers of Islamic studies. Most of

them affiliate with the *Majelis Tarjih* (the division in the Muhammadiyah producing *fatwas*). As the ‘new’ generation, the resources or social and cultural capital associated with their ‘intellectual spirit’ grew under the modernization ‘agenda’ of the New Order era (1980s-1990s) and, therefore, they were influenced by considerations of how to respond to critiques of the Muhammadiyah’s conservatism and so gain greater access to power in society.

Conversely, revivalist ‘*ulama* are often members of older generations, with more ‘traditional’ educational backgrounds. Their average age is around sixty years old, they tend to have graduated from *madrasas* or *pesantren*, and they generally make money from preaching or trading. Unlike the younger generation, the cultural resources and social capital associated with their ‘intellectual spirit’ was influenced by the legacy of revivalist idealism associated with the Masyumi and Parmusi, Islamic political parties through which the Muhammadiyah expressed its political aspirations between 1945 until the 1960s. In other words, and as is clear from other examples in the Muslim world per se, particular political and social contexts shaped this first generation’s Islamist revivalism in a way that was very different in a rapidly changing world for second or third generation Islamist revivalism and modernism from the 1980s and 1990s onwards (cf. Esposito and Voll 2001). These revivalist ‘*ulama* play a less significant role than the neo-modernist ‘*ulama* in the upper echelons of the Muhammadiyah movement but they remain influential at the grassroots. While the neo-modernist ‘*ulama* teach Islamic subjects in religious meetings that are conducted officially by the Muhammadiyah, the revivalists usually preach to the communities in which they live.

Unlike the revivalist ‘*ulama*, who favour the creation of an Islamic state, the neo-modernist ‘*ulama* are concerned with the preservation of the public role of

Islam in its ‘new’ or ‘modern’ form. Therefore, although the neo-modernists favour state neutrality from Islamic identity, as shown in Chapter 5, they attempt to ensure that Islam is *already* represented in the state. The neo-modernist ‘*ulama* argue that the constitution has already been able to accommodate Muslims’ interests, and the article of the constitution mentioning ‘The One and Only God’ has confirmed Islam’s position, because the concept of oneness is very clear in Islam. Chapter 6 also indicates that even though the neo-modernist ‘*ulama* favour a substantive understanding of *shari‘a*, they support making *shari‘a* state law through parliament. This shows that formalistic *shari‘a* is still important for these neo-modernist ‘*ulama* – and particularly those that are related to family law – but they let the parliamentary institution be the authoritative body in reviewing whether particular formalistic *shari‘a* is suitable to be implemented as state law. In Chapter 7, we saw how most neo-modernist ‘*ulama* stood by revivalists in opposing voting for non-Muslim parliamentary candidates. However, instead of using the revivalist argument that non-Muslims would threaten and/or harm Muslim political aspirations, these neo-modernist ‘*ulama* cast doubt on the capability of non-Islamic religions to shape good leaders, and raised concerns about the lack of knowledge that non-Muslim parliamentary members would have for formulating *shari‘a* as state law.

Based on these case studies, I conclude that the revivalist ‘*ulama* is the prototype of the Muhammadiyah ‘*ulama*. All of the ‘*ulama* that graduate from madrasas favour the revivalist orientation. Conversely, the neo-modernist ‘*ulama* is ‘a new type’ of Muhammadiyah ‘*ulama*. Their experiences and critical reflections in higher education have led them to reflect on and develop their new understandings of Islam, how it is best interpreted and performed, and its relationship with the state. Most ‘*ulama* in big cities like Jakarta are now neo-modernists.

In contrast to the members of the central board and the *'ulama*, there were few revivalists among Muhammadiyah activists. This does not mean that there are no revivalists among the activists of the Muhammadiyah, but those who have revivalist orientations, particularly among the younger generation, are now more likely to join revivalist or Islamist organizations such as the Tarbiyah movement, HTI or PKS. These organizations are more 'traditional' and clear-cut in terms of their commitment to Islamizing the state and society, and revivalist activists are more engaged with them than with the Muhammadiyah. Therefore, the revivalists' role is not now strong amongst the movement's activists.

2000–2005 marked the era in which the Islamic neo-modernist orientation emerged significantly among the younger generation of the Muhammadiyah. Their average ages were less than 50 years, and they generally held Bachelor's or Master's degrees. The domination of neo-modernist figures in the central board, as well as during the post-New Order period – in which the revivalist movements consolidated their agenda of pushing the state to formalize *shari'a* – encouraged these activists to campaign for and develop neo-modernist ideas. Many of them, particularly the older activists, also joined 'secular' political parties, whereas younger activists became involved in non-government organizations (NGO), most of which were established by their neo-modernist seniors and are concerned with issues such as democracy, human rights, and religious pluralism. At a time when there was a 'battle for Islam' among Muslims of different orientations, the younger activists expected that they would be able to counter the influence of revivalist movements through such political engagement. Their educational background and activities with 'secular'-oriented movements contributed significantly to the extent to which they had the resources to negotiate interpretations of Islam and its role in the state. Younger

activists with this sort of life experience as well as cultural and social capital produced more ‘liberal’ understandings of Islam than their seniors.

In contrast to the neo-modernists in the central board and the *‘ulama*, the Muhammadiyah’s neo-modernist activists (especially its younger ones) have also felt freer from the ‘burden’ of responsibility to the movement per se. They do not have to consider how to accommodate the revivalist wing’s aspirations or how to preserve the role of religion in the public sphere. Even though they are similar to neo-modernist *‘ulama* in terms of perceiving the parliament as the body that legislates *shari‘a*, neo-modernist activists nonetheless have more ‘liberal’ ideas than *‘ulama*. For them, Islam is not the only source of *shari‘a* – as long as the law is in line with the public good, it can be regarded as expressing *shari‘a*. In terms of non-Muslim leadership, these activists do not see a necessary correlation between good leadership and religious affiliation. With respect to the modern state, they criticize sectarian views that discriminate against people in contesting political power based on representatives’ religions.

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List of abbreviations

- BAZIS:** Badan Amil Zakat, Infak dan Sedekah (government-sponsored agency for zakat, alms, and donation management)
- BPUPKI:** Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Investigating Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence)
- CDCC:** Center for Dialogue of Culture and Civilization
- CMM:** Center for Moderate Muslims
- CUP:** Committee for Union and Progress
- DDII:** Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication)
- DI:** Darul Islam (House of Islam)
- DPR:** Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People Representative Council or National Legislature)
- DPRD:** Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Provincial Legislature)
- FKAWJ:** Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah (Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet)
- FKSMJ:** Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta (Communication Forum for intra-Campus Student Organization in Jakarta)
- FPI:** Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front)
- GBHN:** Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (General Guidance for State Direction)
- GOLKAR:** Golongan Karya (Party of the Functional Group)
- HMI:** Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Indonesian Students Muslim Association)
- HTI:** Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Indonesian *Hizbut Tahrir*)
- ICMI:** Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Intellectual Muslim Association).
- IAIN:** Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Islamic Institute)

ICIP: International Center of Islam and Peace

IMM: Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (Association of Muhammadiyah Students)

IPNU: Ikatan Pelajar NU (Student Association of the NU)

IRM: Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah (Association of Muhammadiyah Teenagers)

ISDV: *Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging* (Indies Social Democratic Association); a socialist-communist organization

JIL: Jaringan Islam Liberal (Islamic Liberal Network)

JIMM: Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah (Network of Young Intellectuals of the Muhammadiyah)

KAMMI: Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union).

KISDI: Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World).

Masyumi: Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims).

MB: Muslim Brotherhood.

MMI: Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Jihad/Fighters Movement).

MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)

MUI: Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Council of Indonesian *Ulama*)

NGO: Non-Government Organization

NII: Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesia Islamic State).

NU: Nahdlatul Ulama (Renaissance of Islamic Scholars).

PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandatory Party).

Parkindo: Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party)

Parmusi: Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesia Muslims' Party).

PBB: Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon Star Party).

- PDIP:** Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party).
- PDIP:** Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle).
- Perda:** Peraturan Daerah (District Regulation)
- PERSIS:** Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union).
- PII:** Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Pupils).
- PK:** Partai Keadilan (Justice Party).
- PKI:** Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party).
- PKB:** Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (Party of National Renaissance).
- PKS:** Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party).
- PMII:** Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Student Movement)
- PNI:** Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party).
- PPKI:** Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence)
- PPP:** Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party).
- PSAP:** Pusat Studi Agama dan Peradaban (Center for Study of Religion and Civilization)
- SDI:** Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trading Association).
- SI:** Sarekat Islam (Association of Islam).
- TAF:** The Asia Foundation
- TII:** Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Soldier)
- UHAMKA:** Universitas Muhammadiyah Prof. Dr. Hamka (University of Muhammadiyah of Prof. Dr. Hamka)
- UMJ:** Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta (University of Muhammadiyah Jakarta).
- UUD:** Undang Undang Dasar (Indonesia Constitution).

Note on Transliteration

For the transliteration of terms, words and phrases in Arabic, I have adapted the style used in a variety of international journals of Islamic or Religious Studies, and simplified them by reducing the diacritics. I use the right facing apostrophe (‘) referring to the letter ‘ayn (ع - e.g. *shari‘a* and *bid‘a*) and the left facing apostrophe (’) for *hamza* (ء - e.g. Qur’an). I do not use *hamza* when it is located at the beginning or end of the word (e.g. *‘ulama*, instead of *‘ulama’*; *umma*, instead of *’umma*). Other letters such as ح – th (*hadith*), ذ – dh (*dhikr*); and ش – sh (*shaykh*) have been used as counterparts in English in this way.

For Indonesian versions of religious terms originally coming from Arabic, such as *ulama* and *syariah*, I prefer to arabize them (e.g. *ulama*; I prefer to use the word *‘alim* (Ar.) for its singular and *‘ulama* (Ar.) for its plural meaning). Unless when they are used in formal term like *Perda Syariah*.

Glossary

Below is a glossary of the words in Arabic (Ar) and Indonesian (Ind) that appear in my thesis.

Abangan (Ind): A ‘nominal’ Muslim in dominant discourse. Syncretic Javanese culture; its beliefs and practices combine Hindu-Buddhist, animistic-Javanese, and Muslim elements.

Akhlaq (Ar): Islamic morality.

Aqidah (Ar): faith, belief, or creed.

‘**Alim** (Ar) (plural. ‘*ulama*): Religious scholars.

al-Amr bi al-ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar (Ar): Enjoining good and preventing evil.

Bangsa (Ind): Nation.

Batik (Ind): Javanese dyed textile.

Berkemajuan (Ind): Progressive.

Bid‘a (Ar): Literally, ‘innovation’. Its proper opposite is *sunna*. However, in popular speech, *bid‘a* has come to indicate ‘heresy’.

Chatib or Ketib (Ind): Religious functionary e.g. at the Sultanate of Yogyakarta, an Islamic kingdom established in Central Java in 1755.

Churafat or Khurafat (Ind. from Ar. *al-Khurafah*): Similar practices to ‘superstition’.

Dakwah (Indo. from Ar. *da‘wa*): Call, invitation, preaching, mission.

Din wa daulah (Ar): Religion and State.

Fatwa (Ind. and Ar): A technical term used in Islamic law to indicate a formal legal judgement or view.

Fiqh (Ar): Islamic Jurisprudence.

Hadith (Ar): This Arabic word has a large number of meanings, including ‘speech’, ‘report’ and ‘narrative’. It also has the very important specialist sense of *tradition*, i.e. a record of the sayings and doings of the prophet Muhammad and his companions, and as such is regarded by Muslims as a source of Islamic law, dogma and ritual, second only in importance to the Qur’an itself.

Hajj (Ar): Pilgrimage. This is one of the five pillars of Islam. All Muslims, provided that a number of conditions, including good health and financial ability are present, have a duty to make a pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in their lifetimes.

Hajji (Ar): Muslims who completed the *hajj* pilgrimage.

Haramayn (Ar): Area of Mecca and Medina.

Hudud (Ar): fixed punishments for certain crimes such as adultery or fornication and theft.

Ibadah (Ind, from Ar. *’ibada*): Worship, devotional action or observance required by the Islamic faith, e.g. *salat*.

Ijtihad (Ar. and Ind.): In jurisprudence this term means ‘the exercise of independent judgement’ unfettered by case law or past precedent.

Imam (Ind. from Ar.): Commonly it means leader of prayer. However in particular contexts (such as in Mecca in the 19th Century) it means a religious supreme leader of particular schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

Jihad: (Ind, from Ar. *al-Jihad*): Struggle.

Ka’ba (Ar): Literally ‘cube’. The *Ka’ba*, which is in Mecca, is a cube-shaped building within the precincts of the Great Mosque of Mecca.

Kaum adat (Ind): The proponent of Indonesian local culture.

Kebaya (Ind): A fitted women's blouse, which is a traditional dress in Java.

Kenduri (Ind): a traditional ceremony involving public prayer and a ritual meal held when someone dies.

Khutbah (Ind. from Ar. *khutba*): Sermons, in particular the sermon delivered during the Friday prayer in the mosque.

Kafir (Ar): Unbeliever, infidel.

Madrasa (Ar): School or place of education, often linked to, or associated with, a mosque. The *madrasa* was a primary focus for the study of the Islamic subjects.

Madhhab (Ar): This Arabic word has a range of meanings, including 'ideology', 'doctrine', 'creed', and 'movement'. In Fiqh it indicates one of the four major schools of law.

Muktamar (Ind): A congress of the Muhammadiyah at which new Muhammadiyah central board members are elected. It is conducted every five years.

Musolla (Ind. from Ar. *Mushalla*): A place for prayer. In the Indonesian context this means a small 'mosque' or place for prayer.

Pegon (Ind): The Javanese or Malay language that uses Arabic script. Most traditionalist *ulama* in Indonesia during the colonial period used the *pegon* in writing, because they regarded the Arabic script as 'superior' to other forms.

Pengajian (Ind): Religious learning.

Perda Syariah (Ind): Shari'a-based district law.

Pesantren (Ind): Islamic boarding schools.

Piagam Jakarta (Ind): The Jakarta Charter – an agreement made by BPUPKI concerning the relation between Islam and the state in the constitution.

Piagam Madinah (Ind): The Medina Charter – an agreement between Muslims and non-Muslims in Medina under the rule of the Prophet Muhammad.

Priyayi (Ind): A Javanese aristocrat.

Qibla (Ar): The direction of Muslims' worship, at which the *Ka'ba* (the oldest sacred building established by the Prophet Ibrahim) is located.

Qonun (Ind): Exclusively refers to Regional Regulations produced by the legislature of Aceh from the year 2002 onwards, whether or not relating to Islamic norms.

Qur'an (Ar): Often spelled in English as Koran. Literally this words means: 'Recitation'. The Qur'an is Islam's holiest book, being the uncreated word of God revealed through Jibril (Angel Gabriel) to the Prophet Muhammad.

Raden or Mas (Ind): Label for Javanese male aristocrats given in front of their names.

Salat (Ind. and Ar.): Ritual prayers. Five specific periods of prayer a day is the ritual required in Islam.

Santri (Ind): A devout Muslim.

Shahadat (Ind. from Ar. Shahada): Profession of faith.

Shahadatain (Ar): The two phrases of the testimony of faith in Islam.

Shari'a (Ar): Islamic canonical law based on the teachings of the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet.

Shaykh (Ar): Old man, chief – title of respect for Islamic religious leader, tribal head, master of *sufi* order.

Tabligh Akbar (Ind): Religious public meetings

Tafsir (Ar. and Ind): Exegesis, interpretation, commentary, especially relating to the *Qur'an*.

Tajrid (Ar): Purification

Ta'lim (Ar): Religious lecture

Tanwir (Ind): An annual meeting of the Muhammadiyah, attended by the central board and all Muhammadiyah branch officials. In this meeting the Muhammadiyah discusses and evaluates its positions and projects, and makes programmes.

Tawhid (Ar): Declaration of the oneness of Allah. Belief in that Oneness or Unity, monotheism. This is one of the most fundamental Islamic doctrines.

'Ulama (Ar. sing. *'alim*): Religious scholars.

Umma (Ar): (Muslim) community, people, nation.

Undang-Undang Keormasan (Ind): The regulations for mass organizations released by the New Order government in 1985.

Ustadh (Ar): Teacher who has religious authority on Islamic subjects.

Wahhabi: A movement influenced by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab in the 18th Century Arabia.

al-Wahda al-Islamiyya (Ar): Pan-Islamism.

Zakat (Ar): Often transliterated *Zakah* (plural. *Zakawat*) – obligatory alms tax which constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam.

Zuhr (Ar): mid-day obligatory prayer.

Appendix A: Participant Information Sheet

Participant Information Sheet

(2 June 2012)

Title of the Research Project:

“Negotiating Islamic Identity and the Secular State in a Period of Democratic Transition: The Muhammadiyah in Post-New Order Indonesia”

1. Invitation

I would like to invite you to participate in my research project about how the Muhammadiyah negotiated its ideas about Islam and its relationship to the secular state in a period of democratic transition in post-New Order Indonesia. My name is Muhammad Hilali Basya. I am a Ph.D student in Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Leeds, Britain. My study is funded by the Ministry of Education of Indonesia (DIKTI's scholarship). My occupation is a lecturer of Islamic studies at the University of Muhammadiyah, Jakarta (UMJ). I obtained my bachelor degree (S.Ag) from UMJ, while my master's degree (MA) was taken at Leiden University, the Netherlands. My academic background and my research interests are Islamic studies, particularly Islamic reformist movements, Islam and politics, Islam and modernity.

Before deciding whether you want to participate or not, it is necessary for you to understand what the research is about, why the research is being done, and what the research will involve. Please read the following information carefully. You may want to discuss it with others. You can also ask me if there is anything unclear or if you need more information.

Thank you for reading this sheet.

2. What is the project's purpose?

The aim of this project is to analyse how the Muhammadiyah negotiated its understanding of Islam and the secular state during the period of democratic transition around 1998-2005. There are three cases that will be studied: 1) the Muhammadiyah's responses to public polemic about the amendment of article 29 (the regulation about the relation of religion and the state) of the Indonesian constitution that occurred around 2000 until 2002, 2) the Muhammadiyah's responses to the public policy concerning the insertion of *shari'ah* in district laws (*Perda syariah*), and 3) Muhammadiyah's behaviour during the 1999 and 2004 General Elections. Through studying these three cases I would like to examine how the Muhammadiyah interpreted Islam in

the framework of nationhood and the extent to which the Muhammadiyah reinterpreted *shari'a* (Islamic law) as being compatible with the secular state.

3. Why have I been chosen?

You have been chosen as: 1) members of the Muhammadiyah's central board in the period 1998-2005. I believe that you know much or were involved in formulating decisions and discourse in the Muhammadiyah. 2) Muhammadiyah ulama (religious scholars) in Jakarta who interact with local Muhammadiyah members or non-members in religious meetings. 3) Muhammadiyah activists who were officials in Muhammadiyah branches in Jakarta in the period 1998-2005. 4) Public intellectuals who are outsiders yet concerned with the Muhammadiyah movement, particularly in the post-New Order.

4. Do I have to take part?

It is entirely up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep. You will also be asked to sign a general consent form.

N.B. You can withdraw from the research at any time and you do not have to give a reason.

5. What do I have to do?

You will be asked to give one continuous interview at an agreed time and date to me as the project researcher in a relaxed, quiet place, and free from background noise. The place to conduct the interview will be mutually agreed. The interview will last about 1 to 1.5 hour. The researcher would ideally like to record your answers to various questions on a MP3 or a voice recorder. It is also possible for me just to listen or to take some key notes from your answers.

Some questions require only short factual responses concerning your background, while others are intended to allow you to give more in-depth information and opinion about Muhammadiyah behaviour or attitudes related to the three cases.

6. What are the possible benefits of taking part?

Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the project, it is expected that this work will support them in reflecting on past events, particularly related to the Muhammadiyah movement in dealing with Islam and the secular state in democratic transition.

7. Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?

My research will carefully protect the anonymity and confidentiality of all participants and their data. Access to the information collected from you will be restricted to me and my supervisor. I will store, protect and destroy the data I have gathered appropriately.

8. Will I be recorded, and how will the recorded media be used?

Your permission will be requested to make a MP3/voice recording of your interview. The anonymised recordings will be used only for analysis and for illustration in conferences or presentations. No other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed to access the original recordings.

9. What will happen to the result of the research project?

The final outputs of the research will be my Ph.D thesis and probably a book or a journal article. To obtain a summary of the research contact Muhammad Hilali Basya at the address given below.

10. Who is organising and funding the research?

This is my Ph.D research and it is funded by the Ministry of Education of Indonesia (DIKTI scholarships).

11. Contact for further information

Muhammad Hilali Basya

Ph.D Student in Theology and Religious Study, The University of Leeds,
The United Kingdom, LS2 9JT.

Email address: trmhb@leeds.ac.uk, hilaly_basya@yahoo.com

Appendix B: Participant Consent form

Participant Consent Form

Title of Research Project: Negotiating Islamic Identity and the Secular State in a Period of Democratic Transition: The Muhammadiyah in Post-New Order Indonesia

Name of Researcher: Muhammad Hilali Basya

Initial the box if you agree with the statement to the left

- 1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated [2 June 2012] explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.
- 2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline (If you want to withdraw, please contact the researcher through email; trmhb@leeds.ac.uk).
- 3 I understand that my responses will be kept confidential. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research.
- 4 I agree for the data collected from me to be used in future research. I agree to give my permission to the researcher to record audio voices during the interview and use accordingly as mentioned in the information sheet.
- 5 I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform the principal investigator should my contact details change.

Name of participant
(or legal representative)

Date

Signature

Lead researcher

Date

Signature

To be signed and dated in presence of the participant

Copies:

Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form, the letter/pre-written script/information sheet and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and dated consent form should be kept with the project's main documents which must be kept in a secure location.

Appendix C: Interviewees Information

A. Central board members (11)

1. A Syafii Maarif: 70s, male, Doctor of History. 20 September 2012
2. Haidar Nashir: 60s, male, Doctor of Sociology. 1 October 2012
3. Amin Abdullah: 60s, male, Doctor of Philosophy. 23 November 2012
4. Salim: 60s, male, Doctor of Sociology. 16 October 2012
5. Rima: 50s, male, Doctor of Politics. 30 November 2012
6. Suaib: 60s, male, Doctor of Politics. 20 November 2012
7. Zaim: 50s, male, Master of Law. 18 October 2012
8. Yusuf: 60s, male, Doctor of Islamic Studies. 2 October 2012
9. Fauzan: 50s, male, Master of Islamic Law. 9 September 2012
10. Amir: 50s, male, Master of Islamic Studies. 16 October
11. Rayhan: 60s, male, Master of Islamic Studies. 2 November 2012

B. Ulama (8)

Non-higher education (2)

1. Darori: 60s, male, graduated from pesantren. 7 October 2012
2. Jainuri: 60s, male, graduated from pesantren. 15 September 2012
3. Nuriyah: 60s, female, graduated from madrasa. 19 November 2012

Higher education (3)

1. Masykur: 50s, male, Doctor of Islamic Law. 24 October 2012
2. Zarkasyi: 50s, male, Master of Islamic Thought. 31 October 2012
3. Solihin: 50s, male, Doctor of Islamic Law. 11 September 2012
4. Baligoh: 50s, female, Doctor of Islamic Law. 31 October 2012
5. Rabitah: 50s, female, Doctor of Islamic Law. 26 November 2012

C. Activist (16)

Older

1. Hasyim: 70s, male, Master of Islamic Thought. 1 November 2012

2. Sa'id: 60s, male, Master of Qur'an and Hadith exegesis. 12 December 2012
3. Sahid: 60s, male, Master of Qur'an and Hadith exegesis. 2 November 2012
4. Ayat: 50s, male, Bachelor of Politics. 19 October 2012
5. Hata: 50s, male, Doctor of Politics. 19 October 2012

Younger

1. Farid: 30s, male, Master of Islamic Studies. 10 September 2012
2. Bayhaki: 40s, male, Master of Islamic Education. 17 September 2012
3. Somad: 40s, male, Doctor of Islamic Philosophy. 18 October 2012
4. Zulfikar: 40s, male, Doctor of Islamic Law. 17 October 2012
5. Talhah: 40s, male, Bachelor of Islamic Studies 17 October 2012
6. Majid: 40s, male, Master of Politics. 5 November 2012
7. Samad: 40s, male, Master of Politics. 6 November 2012
8. Adil: 40s, male, Master of Education. 18 December 2012
9. Fakhriyah: 50s, female, Master of Arabic Literature. 16 November 2012
10. Aini: 40s, female, Master of Islamic Studies. 7 November 2012
11. Talbiyah: 50s, female, Master of Sociology. 18 December 2012

D. Public Intellectuals (3)

1. Luthfi Assyaukani, 13 November 2012
2. Yudi Latif, 15 January 2013
3. Budhy Munawar Rahman, 28 January 2013

Appendix D: Permission Letter submitted to PP-Muhammadiyah

Perihal : **Pengantar penelitian mengenai Muhammadiyah, Islam, dan politik di Indonesia**

Lampiran:

- Lembar keterangan mengenai penelitian,
- Surat persetujuan dari University of Leeds
- Surat pengantar dari pembimbing Disertasi S3.

Kepada Yang Terhormat,
Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah
di
Tempat

Assalamu ‘alaikum wr.wb.

Teriring salam semoga bapak/ibu Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah dalam keadaan sehat wal’afiyat dan selalu dalam lindungan-Nya.

Bersama surat ini, saya bermaksud memberitahukan penelitian saya mengenai “Muhammadiyah, Islam, dan Politik pada tahun 1998-2005”. Metode penelitian yang saya ambil selain meneliti dokumen/buku/arsip, adalah melalui wawancara, terutama terhadap Pimpinan Pusat, Ulama Muhammadiyah dan Aktifis-aktifisnya yang tinggal di wilayah Jakarta. Penelitian ini dilakukan dalam rangka menyelesaikan disertasi S3 saya di University of Leeds, Inggris..

Berikut adalah data lengkap saya:

Nama	: M. Hilali Basya MA.
Tempat, Tanggal Lahir	: Jakarta, 21 Mei 1976
Program/Universitas	: Ph.D/ University of Leeds, Inggris
Alamat rumah di Jakarta	: Jl. H. Syatiri no.21 Ulujami Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan, 12250

Demikian pengantar dan permohonan dukungan terkait penelitian saya.

Terimakasih atas perhatian bapak/Ibu Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah.

Wassalamu’alaikum wr.wb.

Jakarta, 1 Agustus 2012

M. Hilali Basya, MA.