**Urban governance and mega-events in an era of globalisation:**

**A comparison of the London 2012 and Beijing 2008 Olympic Games**

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# Abstract

Since the 1980s the hosting of mega-events has been a globalised practice in entrepreneurial urban governance. A spectacle that lasts only weeks is portrayed by event promoters as capable of generating legacies for decades. In addition to stimulating the short-term local economy and job market, accelerating urban landscape transformation and raising a city's profile are the two strongest claims made by cities when bidding for hosting rights. However, a careful comparison of the London 2012 and Beijing 2008 Olympics shows that only half of the story has been told. The transformation of the urban landscape and place branding campaigns not only are engendered by, but also engender, the delivery of mega-events; through which standardised Games delivery is enabled and so too the smoothness and profitability of the Games.

What is the implication of this? Data collected from semi-structured interviews and questionnaire surveys conducted in London and Beijing suggest that the festivity derived from hosting mega-events may be temporary, but the implications are not. Through observing the negotiation in Games-led regeneration/development and place branding, this project finds that the standardisation requirement for delivering the Olympic Games provides a shortcut for the standardisation of urban spaces. Cities tend to be planned in a standardised way to maximise their urban growth, irrespective of their social and political settings. In the negotiations between the Olympic Games as a globalising power and host cities' localised aspirations, the repercussion is a standardised, undemocratic urban space.

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# Preface

The festivity of sporting and cultural events has always fascinated me. Participating in local events is perhaps the most delightful way, subjective though it may be, to get to know a place and its people. More precisely, the manner in which an event is hosted projects the kind of place and the kind of people that the hosts wish to be perceived as being. However, a gap between the festival and the everyday life of the place is almost inevitable. The greater the event is, the wider the gap becomes, and the wider the gap becomes, the greater the sense of loss that will be left. To observe the wide gap and the great loss taking place in urban spaces there is no better candidate than the Summer Olympic Games, since it is hard to find any other event of a greater scale.

Choosing the London 2012 Olympics and Beijing 2008 Olympics as case studies was obvious for me. Being a Taiwanese who has undertaken a Master's degree in the UK has allowed me to conduct such a comparison, and to collect fieldwork data both in London and in Beijing. Travelling across different disciplines, across diverse cultures and across different geographical continents, this project has been imbued with the resourceful pursuit of empirical data, rigorous intellectual analysis and strong academic ambition.

# Acknowledgements

*'To whom much is given, much should be given back'.*

Chinese proverb

Doing a PhD is a journey of solitude; however it is also a journey which cannot be completed alone. In the past four years of PhD study I am more than grateful for the tremendous help I have received from so many people.

First of all, I would like to cordially thank my supervisor, Dr Simon Parker, who has always been there throughout my entire PhD study. From the conceptualisation of the research to the writing of thesis, I have had no doubt about the intellectual guidance and mental support I can seek from him.

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Without the support from my mother, father and brother, I could never have completed this thesis. My mother in particular, has provided unconditional love, encouragement and help in this long journey. Thanks to the advancement of communication software, time and spatial distances are no longer problems, and family support from Asia is just a click away.

And last but not least, I would like to show my gratitude to the Taiwan Government, whose grant enabled this project.

# Declaration

I declare that this thesis is a presentation of original work and I am the sole author. This work has not previously been presented for an award at this, or any other, University. All sources are acknowledged as References.

# Chapter 1 - Introduction

In 1989 David Harvey published an influential article entitled *From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism*, which called attention to the transition towards entrepreneurialism within urban governance. He argued that against the background of the global economic recession in 1973, local states faced a situation of reduced central subsidies and increased service provision responsibility. Since then, entrepreneurialism has become indispensable for local governments, which need to provide the most and best public service possible with the least money from taxpayers. Four years later, seeming to affirm the paradigm transformation proposed by Harvey (1989), Osborne (1993) suggested that the way to reinvent government and '[make] it work again' (Osborne, 1993: 3) was to be more 'flexible, adaptable and innovative' (Osborne, 1993: 2), in a nutshell, to be more entrepreneurial.

The emergence of entrepreneurialism cannot be separated from the fierce competition that exists between places and cities in particular. Inter-urban competition to a large extent nurtures local entrepreneurialism and urban entrepreneurial leaders apply their ideas to various cities and regions. The making of a good business and people climate is critical in developing competitive advantages, and urban economic growth has become a vital indicator in evaluating the performance of local governments and politicians. Business investment and setup, short-term tourist visits, and long-term inhabitation, are being fought for by many different cities. The competition for resources puts pressure on local governments and provides them with the incentive to pursue profits and act like entrepreneurs; the amelioration of social conditions in urban spaces comes second to urban economic growth (Harvey, 1989).

With the growing intensity of inter-urban competition, the dramatic tendency and eye-catching ability of mega-events make them a popular instrument within inter-urban competition. In the roster of mega-events, the Olympic Games lead in terms of the legacy it leaves behind and the spotlight it places on host cities. The 'space-time compression' brought about by advances in communication and transportation (Hall, 2006) has gradually made hosting the Olympic Games more attractive than hosting World Fairs. The real-time excitement of watching sporting competitions engendered by technology is an element that World Fairs cannot provide. In addition, the experience of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games proved the potential profitability that can be derived from global sponsorship and the

sale of broadcasting rights. Consequently, hosting the Olympic Games seems more than worthwhile for geographical leaders in a highly competitive world.

Why is hosting the Olympic Games so tempting? To answer this question one should approach it from the considerations of both national and local states. Although a city, rather than a country, hosts the Olympics, it also constitutes a 'universally legitimate way [for countries] to present and promote their national identities and cultures' (Dolles and Söderman, 2008: 148). 'Strongly emotional responses, such as intense loyalty', can easily be evoked by the 'uncertain outcomes' of sporting events (Dolles and Söderman, 2008: 149). The delivery of the Olympics is also a perfect opportunity for a host country to demonstrate mobilisation and organisation ability, both to the world and its citizens.

For the municipal governments of host cities, hosting the Olympic Games involves no fewer stakes and impact than the legacy which local leaders intend to leverage. Just two weeks of competition delivers decades of benefits, could the prospect be any more rewarding? The rewards come via two interrelated channels: one tangible and the other intangible. The former involves the acceleration of urban development or regeneration, and is the most common Olympic incentive stressed by event promoters. Cities are economically incentivised by the Olympic Games because they are potentially a catalyst 'for job creation, business growth, infrastructure improvement and community development' (OECD, 2011: 12). The Olympic Games can stimulate the inward investment necessary for grand projects or for redevelopment projects, which without the Olympic Games may not be introduced to a locality in such a short period of time or on such a scale. An event like the Olympic Games accelerates and magnifies urban transformation. For cities eagerly pursuing urban growth, the capital and investment that flows into host cities is incomparably tempting. However, the diversion of resources and the bypassing of normal democratic procedures is the other side of the coin. The concentration of resources on the beautification of the urban landscape, rather than addressing the latent but often urgent social needs, tends to be a feature of Games-driven regeneration. Furthermore, accelerating the pace and enlarging the scale of construction also shrinks the space for democratic participation.

The other reward channel for host cities pertains to the intangible but conspicuous impact of place promotion. In order to attract capital, tourists and target inhabitants, cities and nations need a showcase for selectively communicating to a target audience, i.e. place branding. At least for the two weeks of the Games, a spotlight from all around the world will be fixated on the host city, offering an unprecedented opportunity for the host city and

country to demonstrate how they are an ideal place. The external branding effect allegedly enhances internal civic pride and also creates a sense of togetherness. The coming together of domestic and foreign spectators is in itself, a '[display] of devotion and celebration' (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006: 17). In place branding the ideal place image that residents perceive to be representative and the place image that branding practitioners like to use so as to maximise the attracting of external visitors, usually diverge and conflict. In regard to the Olympics, this common conflict seems to have become reconcilable, or at least matters less, because the festiveness and 'sportive nationalism' (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006: 17) easily outshine it.

The regenerative and place branding effects are the most sought after and justified Olympic legacies. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) has endeavoured to build the Olympic brand as one that is aware of community welfare and the local legacy. Facing harsh criticism concerning Olympic gigantism and the resultant post-Games financial debt and 'white elephants', the IOC remains insistent on the potential of the Games to benefit local communities as long as there is proper management of the Games delivery. In the Olympic Charter, one 'mission and role of the IOC' is 'to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries' (IOC, 2014: 16-17). A similar statement was stated in a more elaborative manner in the Games report produced by the Olympic Games Study Commission, which accentuated the IOC's role as a 'responsible organization' to ensure 'the most positive legacy of venues, infrastructure, expertise and experience' were to be left (IOC, 2003: 5). Furthermore, the only way to achieve the mission was 'through careful definition of the Olympic Games "standard" requirements and through firm control over the constant inflation of expectation' (IOC, 2003: 5). Hence the IOC's stance was that with careful definition and execution of the IOC's requirements of the Games' delivery and controlled Olympic aspirations of the host cities and countries, the overspending problem and the lavish tendencies associated with Olympic Games delivery would be avoided.

However, the empirical situation potentially reveals the opposite. The primary driver for the Olympics machine to work continually is its profitability for the host localities, the IOC, and the different tiers of the Olympic sponsors. Potential profitable commercial partnerships contribute over 40% of Olympic revenue (IOC). The revenue generated from the sale of broadcast rights is 'the principal driver of the funding of the Olympic Movement and the Olympic Games' (IOC). Unsurprisingly, the high level of financial contribution from sponsors and the buyers of broadcast rights are due to the expectation of even higher investment

returns. The delivery of the Games has as a result involved equipping the various sponsors with the means to maximise profits and investment returns. From the perspective of the host cities and host countries, the pressure to provide 'the best Games ever'[1] is so compelling because it symbolises the host's ability both to stage a magnificent Games and to create a profit-making engine during the two weeks of the event.

In spite of the accentuation of post-Games legacies, maximising the profits during the time of the Games is thus the unspeakable secret known by all. Enhancing the confidence of the locals, boosting the economy of host cities/countries, and engendering the improvement of physical facilities, are the inevitable side effects when the Olympic profit-making mechanism starts to function. This is because hosting the Games is so highly profitable that they are largely welcomed by potential host localities. Rather than the commonly heard rhetoric that the post-Games legacy is what inspires cities to bid for the host rights, juxtaposing the dubious and failed legacy promises of past Games with the zealousness of hosting the Olympic Games conveys the message that cities are not inspired by what happens after but during the Games.

To ensure the smoothness and profitability of each delivery of the Olympic Games, the implementation of a high degree of standardisation is necessary. More than 100 years of experience in organising the modern Olympic Games has enabled the IOC to develop a well-established procedure for delivering the Games. In order to effectively monitor the progress of the delivery of the Games by the Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG):

> The IOC administration engages in protracted liaison processes to maintain standardization of the Olympic event in its planning and ultimate delivery … Decentralization is relatively low during early years of the OCOG's formation as guidance and steering from the IOC is under way. As OCOGs gain experience and gravitas in their size and maturity, and as the complexity of the task increases so decentralization of power towards them is observed. (Theodoraki, 2010: 89)

Furthermore, despite the practical concerns entailed by decentralisation to OCOGs during the later stages, the scope of decentralisation towards and the discretion of the OCOGs is confined within 'operational levels during the games to prevent delays in dealing with problems and challenges that arise in venues' (Theodoraki, 2010: 89).

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[1] 'The best Games ever' was a phrase frequently used by the former IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch (in office from 1980 to 2001) in the closing ceremony of each Olympic Games. 'With the transition to Jacques Rogge, the phrase started to fade away' (Kassens-Noor, 2012: 2).

Sticking to standardisation and being reluctant to delegate powers to the OCOG uncovers a stark irony in the claim that staging the Olympic Games enables a host city to reveal its local characteristics and for the local residents to foster a stronger sense of community. During the bidding process prospective host cities always strive to demonstrate their local uniqueness and how these geographically bounded characteristics may distinguish them from other rivals. Nevertheless, rather than delivering the Olympic Games in a manner that allows the host cities to stage their own show, the Olympic Games is more like 'a "show" which is permanently "on the road", taking a "caravan" from nation to nation and city to city every four years' (Roche, 2000: 137). While there is the view that each city's 'unique cast of characters' is capable of providing an exclusive Olympic 'drama' with their own colour (Hiller, 2013: 33), the standardised process demanded by the IOC leaves few discretionary powers to host cities; the visual presentation of opening and closing the ceremonies is perhaps the most localised feature in the entire delivery of the Olympic Games.

## 1.1   What Inspired this Project?

Globalising practices, such as hosting mega-events, restructure 'urban socio-spatial transformation in the contemporary world' (Short, 2004: 7), but how exactly does hosting mega-events restructure cities? Whitson and Macintosh (1996) sought to analyse this through the re-composition of the urban economy. The flourishing of the leisure consumption industry has produced localities dedicated to tourism development, a significant avenue through which 'to attract outside money'  from around the world (Whitson and Macintosh, 1996: 280). Cities reimage and restructure themselves accordingly, in terms of both physical space arrangement and economic activity composition. In addition, the 'post modernisation of industrial cities' is a 'further contextual factor' contributing to the booming leisure industry (Whitson and Macintosh, 1996: 280). To revive rundown and depressed industrial areas, since the 1990s North American and European cities have fervently re-imaged themselves into 'places with things to see and things to do' (Rowe and Stevenson, 1994: 180; Whitson and Macintosh, 1996: 280). The reimaging and restructuring of cities impels physical spaces to give way to semiotic spaces (Rowe and Stevenson, 1994: 179), and 'semiotic values [to be]… translated into commercial values' (Whitson and Macintosh, 1996: 286).

In the 'symbolic space-economy' (Smith, 2005: 217), places are marketed and sold to generate more sales of all kinds (Whitson and Macintosh, 1996: 286). A mega-event, like the

Olympic Games, represents a golden opportunity for cities to not only erect scaffolding in the physical world, but to purposefully play with the semiotics of the symbolic world. If we intend to understand how mega-events restructure cities, it is thus necessary to extend 'our understanding of planning beyond the manipulation of the physical environment to the conscious management of signs and symbols' (Short, 2004: 11). For this reason, this dissertation will focus on regenerative and branding effects in order to deconstruct this globalising practice in urban space.

In order to take full advantage of the concentrated spotlight, host countries tend to engage in facelift-type projects as part of the Olympics-driven regeneration. The 'erection of landmark structures' and 'extensive urban waterfront development' (Hiller, 2000: 439), tend to deviate from local needs; consequently, despite failing to alleviate social problems, the delivery of the Games does accelerate and catalyse improvements in the built environment. The resultant investment and tourist flow into the locality further contributes to a scenario of economic prosperity. This explains why repeatedly broken promises can still be made in every instance of the Olympics, and why the inflated rhetoric of legacies and social benefits can remain intact.

In terms of place-branding effects, the usually adverse relationship between external brand image and internal brand identity seems to be reconciled in the Olympic process. The selection of brand association focusing on attracting an exogenous audience is usually in conflict with how a place is perceived by its local audience, the local residents. Through taking 'local time and space and [linking] it to transnational or global time and space' (Hiller, 2013: 33), the Olympics enables local citizens to comfortably abandon parochialism and embrace nationalism, while simultaneously enjoying their imagined identity as a global citizen (Horne, 2007).

Coupled with the celebrative atmosphere, the selected and embellished external brand image inversely influences local aspirations; the compliments from foreign media and outsiders mitigate the anxiety about the unknown future of legacy delivery. This is the reason why the demonstration of foreign media coverage to domestic citizens is crucial while the Games are in progress, as it is a testimony of the successful delivery of the Games, a diversion from focusing on legacies and an enhancement of the festive atmosphere.

## 1.2 Research Questions

The above discussion reveals that only half of the story has been told, and leads to a question which cannot be sufficiently answered by a focus on legacies. If cities indeed aspire to host the Olympic Games for the sake of legacy, the disappointing legacies of previous editions should reasonably discourage such aspirations and the willingness of cities to bid. Yet they do not appear to be, meaning that something further must explain the fervent Games-hosting behaviour of cities. Ascertaining the motivation for hosting the Olympic Games helps to achieve the ultimate goal of this project, namely to understand the impact of staging a mega-event on urban governance.

A question inquiring into the respective Olympic aspirations of chosen cases provides a good starting point to facilitate subsequent enquiries. In spite of the fact that the literature in mega-events and in the Olympics (which is discussed in Chapter 2) has revealed abundant knowledge about what incentivises cities to bid for hosting rights, there are always some incentives that outweigh others, due to the conditions of the different host cities. As a result, initiating the intellectual flow of this research from a 'what' question provides an opportunity to investigate the conditions of the chosen cases. The first research question is consequently a 'what' question in approaching the elements selected by the cities to justify their Olympic bids.

➢ *1. What aspirations did London and Beijing have in bidding to host the Olympic Games in the first place?*

The selection of each host city's Olympic aspirations is individualised; however, it is scarcely possible to know how cities' aspirations are framed and directed. Different languages and discourse work in different communicative contexts, and different host cities' Olympic aspirations should not be perceived as emerging out of thin air. Furthermore, the Olympic Games might assist in realising these aspirations, but this does not mean that they could only be realised by hosting the Games. The potential benefits offered by the Games are not entirely conditional on the hosting of mega-events, although the presumption of the link tends to imply a specious equation between mega-event holding and the potential benefits.

As a result, rather than taking 'Olympic legacies' as an expression with a fixed meaning, it is helpful to separate the Olympics from the legacies. Challenging and destabilising the link between the delivery and aspirations of the Olympic Games is paramount here, and in doing

so, the possibility of regeneration and branding without the Games become imaginable. More importantly, this represents a step closer to capturing the role of the Olympics in framing the discussion around and directing the agenda of urban governance. The second research question is thus formulated as follows:

➢ *2. How have these aspirations been constructed by the Olympics?*

The previous two research questions centre on the hosting of the Olympic Games: first pertaining to what cities wanted to achieve in hosting the Games and second how these goals were related to the Games. The purpose in formulating these two questions is to facilitate the last one:

➢ *3. What does the construction of Olympic aspirations mean for the urban governance of host cities?*

Other than the two weeks of the festival, each city's Olympic aspirations certainly are part of the legacy bequeathed to host cities. However, since the relationship between hosting the Games and Olympic aspirations should not be taken for granted, the way in which these aspirations are constructed could reasonably be expected to have greater and longer implications on host cities. Thus, by choosing two different cases, this last research question helps unearth whether the Olympic Games, as a globalising force, is strong enough to flatten localised particularities and create a standardised Olympic space, or even a standardised urban space.

## 1.3 Background to the Chosen Cases

Before reviewing the literature and analysing the fieldwork data, an introduction to the chosen cases will assist in framing the discussion of this thesis. The London 2012 and Beijing 2008 Olympic Games are the two cases selected for this project. The reasons for these selections and their theoretical potential are discussed in Chapter 3; this section concentrates only on the background of these two editions of the Olympic Games.

### 1.3.1 The London 2012 Olympics

The London 2012 Olympics, including the Paralympic Games, lasted from 27th July to 9th September 2012. In addition to advancing the athletes' experience and Britain's sporting development, one of the visions of the London's Games, as stated in the Candidature File,

was 'benefiting the community through regeneration' (BOA, 2004: 17). Lea Valley, 'London's poorest and most disadvantaged area' (BOA, 2004: 23), was the stage for both the Olympic Games and the regeneration. Administratively speaking, the Olympic area included six boroughs in East London, Barking and Dagenham,[2] Hackney, Newham, Tower Hamlets, Greenwich and Waltham Forest, which were designated as the Host Boroughs of the London 2012 Olympics. In order to seize on the chance of regenerating East London, the host boroughs 'formed themselves into a loose alliance, a small team called the Host Borough Unit'[3] (Interviewee L04[4]).

Although the London 2012 Olympics have been termed a catalyst for East London regeneration, whether London should have bid for the hosting right remained contentious until 2003.[5] Entrusted by the Stakeholders Group of that time, Arup, a global engineering and design consultancy with experience of large projects in many countries, including the 2008 Beijing Olympics, conducted a cost-benefit analysis in January 2002 and submitted the conclusions to the Stakeholders Group four months later. This assessment was used by the Department of Culture, Media and Sports (DCMS) as a basis for seeking the UK Parliament's support for London's bid for the 2012 Olympics. However the DCMS's argument did not fully convince Parliament due to the fact that the costs produced by the report were taken as 'impenetrable, estimated [and] aggregate' by Parliament (Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2003: 5).

In addition to the over simplification accusation made by Parliament, the Select Culture, Media and Sport Committee also called the issue of facilities into question. With the background of an austerity economy, the Committee insisted that 'all options should be considered from temporary construction and subsequent demolition, to a full range of alternative uses after the Games' (Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2003: 5). However,

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[2] The London Borough of Barking and Dagenham was added as the sixth host borough in April 2011.

[3] After the London 2012 Olympics, the host borough unit renamed itself as the Growth Borough Unit, referring to itself as 'the UK's strongest potential growth area', seeking to provide 'a lasting legacy of renewal for what has traditionally been London's and the UK's poorest area and a major boost for UK plc' (Growth Borough Unit).

[4] One of the interviewees for the London case; details about the selection of the interviewees in both cases is provided in Chapter 3.

[5] The voting for the next host city of the Olympics takes place seven years prior to the Games commencing. Therefore, in the case of the London 2012 Olympics the decision for the host city was made in 2005.

with the Wembley National Stadium already under construction at that time, the Government's prudence in its decision-making was questioned by the Committee.[6]

Another issue the Committee highlighted was the divergence of local opinions in staging the Games in East London. Officers of some East London boroughs believed that staging the Games in the Lea Valley was a necessity for kick-starting transportation infrastructure improvements. The opinion of local officers' echoed what the then Mayor of London Ken Livingstone stated later in 2008 after winning the bid: 'I didn't bid for the Olympics because I wanted three weeks of sport. I bid for the Olympics because it's the only way to get the billions of pounds out of the Government to develop the East End' (Davies, 2008). In contrast, local community groups expressed disagreement with the 'concerted local authority stance' because Lea Valley was not 'derelict land needing restoration' but 'a tranquil and precious green lung' (Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2003: 14).

Despite the disputes, there was a strong feeling that London should participate in the bid for the 2012 Games. The IOC has a tendency to choose host cities in different continents rotationally, and the 2012 Olympics was expected to be a European Games. In the oral evidence submitted to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee on 14th and 15th January 2003, the then Secretary of State for DCMS, Tessa Jowell, expressed her view about why she thought London should participate in the bid:

> '[It] is in East London that you get the synergy between the space required for Olympic development and the planned regeneration … [Also] 2012 will be a European Games and after that the IOC will move to another continent.' (Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2003: 23)

That is, 2012 would be a 'now-or-never' opportunity for the UK to host the Olympics. A week after the Committee's report was published the Cabinet decided that the Government would back a London bid.

In Singapore on 6th July 2005, London was awarded the right to host the Games of the XXX Olympiad by the IOC. London's winning can significantly be attributed to two points. Firstly, the IOC had been concerned about the 'over-spending and gigantism' (Richard W.

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[6] 'London might end up with a stadium at Wembley, specifically built with the capacity to host the Olympics without legacy issues, and another in East London, actually built to host the Games, with an uncertain future. If this duplication were in fact to occur, much of the responsibility would lie with the sporting bodies and agencies whose discussions with each other, and with Government, have led to this confusion' (Culture Media and Sport Committee 2003: 18).

Pound, 2003: 4) (Richard W. Pound, 2003: 4)(Richard W. Pound, 2003: 4)(Richard W. Pound, 2003: 4)(Richard W. Pound, 2003: 4)(Richard W. Pound, 2003: 4)(Richard W. Pound, 2003: 4)(Richard W. Pound, 2003: 4)(Richard W. Pound, 2003: 4)(Richard W. Pound, 2003: 4)(Richard W. Pound, 2003: 4)(Richard W. Pound, 2003: 4)(Richard W. Pound, 2003: 4)(Richard W. Pound, 2003: 4)of the Olympics in recent years, and in London's candidate file, the bidding team emphasised that 'excellence without extravagance' was the guideline for London staging the Games (BOA, 2004: 19). They further promised in the same document that existing and temporary facilities would be used wherever possible, and '[new] structures [would] be confined to carefully selected legacy venues that [would] fill significant gaps in London's sports infrastructure' (BOA, 2004: 11). According to the IOC's evaluation report on the candidature cities, 55% (18 out of 33, Table 1.1) of the competition venues were under construction or waiting to be built when London was bidding in 2005.

**Table 1.1:  Construction status of venues**

| Total number of sports venues to be used | Existing | | Under construction or planned, irrespective of the Games | Games dependent | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No work required | Work required | | Permanent | Temporary |
| 33 | 13 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 9 |

Source: IOC Evaluation Commission (2005: 71)

The other contribution was made by the strong link between the Olympics and the regeneration project in East London; combating social exclusion 'through participation in sport' has played a significant part in the Olympic movement (IOC- Sport and Environment Commission, 1999: 26). The same document elaborated on and explicitly stated 'the priority development of sports infrastructure and equipment in the marginalized regions' (IOC- Sport and Environment Commission, 1999: 27). Choosing Lea Valley as the Olympic stage echoed the IOC's call for putting resources aside for the marginalised and the disadvantaged. As a result, the bidding team of London pointedly put the regeneration projects and the positive legacies for the local neighbourhood in the Candidature File. With regard to the Olympic brand having been tainted by extravagance and elitism, the London endeavour was undoubtedly in line with the social responsibility the IOC intended to impose on the Olympic host cities.

## 1.3.2   The Beijing 2008 Olympics

The Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics lasted from 8th to 24th August 2008, and the Paralympic Games from 6th to 17th September. The main stage for the Olympic Games, Wali Village, had its administrative headquarters in Beijing's Chaoyang District and the events were held in north Beijing. 'New Beijing, Great Olympics' was the motto of the Beijing 2008 Olympics stated in the Candidature File, which demonstrated Beijing's ambition to use the Games to 'speed up its modernisation and integration into the international community' (BOBICO, 2000a: 3). It was not implicit that Beijing wanted to seize the Olympic brand to leverage the branding process for Beijing and China. From this point of view, compared to London's inward focus on East London regeneration and Britain's sports legacy, Beijing's bid presented a denser display of outward showcasing.

In the final round of the ballot in 1993 Beijing lost out to Sydney for the hosting rights for the 2000 Summer Olympics by two votes (BOCOG, 2010a: 12). This failure to succeed with an Olympic bid largely solidified Beijing's resolution to win the second time it bid. When preparing for the second bid, 'all the regrets' of Beijing's previous failure, according to the official report produced by Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games (BOCOG) two years after the 2008 Summer Olympics, were transformed into 'greater enthusiasm' to 'embrace the world' (BOCOG, 2010a: 12). This enunciation linked the first bid with the second one, not only through the practical experience learned from failure, but through the Chinese people's even more heated aspirations and support for Beijing's second bid (BOBICO, 2000a: 5). The tight articulation between Beijing's bidding for the Olympics and nationalism can be statistically perceived; although the extremely high percentage was abnormal, Beijing enjoyed much stronger support from its citizens than its competitors for the hosting right. A few months before the hosting city for the 2008 Olympic Games was announced, a massive poll conducted by Gallup and another one by the IOC indicated that 94.9% and 96.4% of citizens, respectively, supported Beijing's second bid (BOCOG, 2010a: 119).

In Beijing's Candidature File, the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bidding Committee (BOBICO) sought to depict Beijing and China as a friendly place with a welcoming atmosphere. The commonly raised concerns about China and Beijing were addressed in the Candidature File, for example the quality of air in Beijing had to 'meet Chinese and WHO standards' (BOBICO, 2000b: 15) during the Games and the quality of the drinking water also fully met the WHO standards from 1996 to 2001 (BOBICO, 2000b: 17). The frequently criticised issue of human rights and freedom of information in China was also dealt with

through imposing 'no restrictions on journalists in reporting on the Olympic Games' (BOBICO, 2000a: 5). Beijing presented itself not only as welcoming as the host of the Games, but as functioning as the bridge between 'the cultures of East and West'.[7] Hosting the Olympics was characterised as an unprecedented opportunity to:

> Harness the spirits of Olympism to the economic dynamism of modern China, with its rich complex of ancient and contemporary culture. New Beijing will be a cultural bridge for the celebration of the human creativity of the peoples of China and the world. (BOBICO, 2000b: 5)

In addition to the welcoming brand image, Beijing sought to forge throughout the Candidature File, the full integration of the Olympic Games into its existing development trajectory as another emphasised idea. As opposed to London's 'excellence without extravagance' guideline (BOA, 2004: 19), Beijing's Candidature File never stated it was going to deliver an economical Olympic Games, instead, only the commitment and financial ability of 'the Chinese and Beijing Municipal Governments' to support the Games were guaranteed (BOBICO, 2000a: 71). In addition, 'brand new and exciting venues' were explicitly stated as projects to be looked forward to in the letter of the then Mayor of Beijing to the IOC (BOBICO, 2000a). According to the IOC's evaluation report on the candidature cities, 59% (22 out of 37) of the competition venues were under construction or waiting to be built when Beijing was bidding in 2001 (IOC Evaluation Commission, 2001: 65). Despite this, the integration of the Olympic facilities into the 'future social and sporting development of the city' (BOBICO, 2000c: 39) and the presence of the facilities 'as a long term legacy for the city and its people' (BOBICO, 2000a: 71) were repeatedly stressed.

Compared to the Candidature File for London which put a relatively greater weight on East London regeneration, the post-Games legacy is weak when compared to the strong outward-looking emphasis presented by Beijing. The focus on the endeavours of creating a harmonious, welcoming and friendly environment for outsiders can be seen everywhere within the documents. The more apparent inward-looking elaboration was on Chinese people's support and aspirations for the Games, but the coverage on more specific legacies for locals and for Beijing was relative less. A comparison between the background of the London 2012 and Beijing 2008 Olympics is shown in Table 1.2.

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[7] Cited from the letter of Liu Qi, then Mayor of Beijing, to the IOC in Beijing's Candidature File (BOBICO, 2000a)

**Table 1.2: A comparison of the backgrounds to the cases**

|  | London 2012 Olympics | Beijing 2008 Olympics |
|---|---|---|
| Date | 27th July to 9th September 2012 (Paralympic Games included) | Olympic Games: 8th July to 24th August 2008<br>Paralympic Games: 6th to 17th September 2008 |
| Main stage | Lower Lea Valley, East London | Wali Village, North Beijing |
| Characters of the main stage | London's poorest and most disadvantaged area | Farm land before expropriation, which had been reserved for hosting the Olympics since 1990s (to be discussed in Chapter 4) |
| Support by the citizens | Some disputes between levels of government and the local community | Supported by over 90% of citizens (polls conducted by Gallup and IOC) |
| Primary urge for bidding | • The 2012 Olympics would be a European one – a 'now-or-never' opportunity for the UK<br>• The synergy of the Games and East London regeneration | • Losing the first Olympic bid to Sydney in 1993 resulted in a strong resolution for the second bid<br>• Accelerating Beijing's modernisation and integration into the international community |
| Focus in the Candidature File | Excellence without extravagance | A welcoming brand image |
| Percentage of competition venues waiting to be built (when bidding) | 55%, 18 out of total 33 | 59%, 22 out of total 37 |
| How legacy was portrayed in the Candidature File | Benefiting the East London local community | Facilities integral to the needs of Beijing and the city's people |

## 1.4   Thesis Organisation

Through investigating the negotiation between globalised standardisation and localised particularities, this project aims to understand what hosting the Olympic Games, or mega-events in general, brings to urban governance. Urban regeneration and place branding in the Olympic delivery process are the two analytical channels utilised for the purpose of this study. A literature review on the paradigm shift in governance is presented in Chapter 2, and exploring the closer links and blurred boundaries between the public and private sectors, the paradigm shift provides a good understanding of the emergence of urban entrepreneurialism.

As mentioned earlier, inter-urban competition together with domestic conditions compel local governments to take an entrepreneurial stance. Urban entrepreneurialism is rooted in the pursuit of urban development, thus a review on growth machine and urban regime theories initiates the discussion. This is followed by the repercussions of development-oriented entrepreneurialism: burgeoning creative and knowledge-based economies and state-led gentrification. A brief description of the development and evolution of the modern Olympic Games is then provided. Having set the scene, a discussion on the role of delivering the Olympic Games and other mega-events in general, in urban governance will be conducted, and the reason why urban regeneration and place branding are pivotal to perceiving the impacts of the Olympic Games on urban governance will be more clearly elaborated in this chapter too.

Composed of three parts, Chapter 3 sets out the methodology and practical data collection methods. The first part demonstrates the advantages of choosing the comparative case study method, and the basis for making inferences. The second part explains how the fieldwork and data collection was carried out, namely through semi-structured interviews and a qualitative questionnaire survey. Data saturation helped to guide the process of fieldwork and data collection. The final part summarises how all the methodological efforts were employed as part of interpretive research, which is the reconstitution of multiple realities.

Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 outline the framework for the data analysis of this project and contain both a literature review and empirical data on the topic. Chapter 4 deals with the urban regeneration in the Olympic process in London and Beijing. The chapter is composed of three sections, each of which consists of an analysis of the London and Beijing cases. The first section covers the social and economic transformation in the two cities before and after the Games, and is followed by the transformation of the built environment in the delivery of the Olympics. This section begins with a historical examination of the centralisation of power in regeneration projects derived from public private partnerships (PPP) in the UK and the role of urban planning in pre- and post-reform China. The historical discussion will assist in gaining an understanding of the Olympics-driven regeneration in London and the Olympics-upgraded infrastructure modernisation in Beijing. The final section of this chapter focuses on the issues of participation and consultation in Olympics-led regeneration and land expropriation in particular. The scenario in London reveals the intersected relations between PPP and participation, while in contrast Beijing, due to its socialist legacy and the lack of a developed

civil society, presents a disparate image from the participation and consultation of the West, although it should not be assumed that there is no civil participation.

Chapter 5 turns the focus from the tangible regeneration and improvement of the urban landscape to the intangible but most conspicuous dimension of the Olympic legacy; place branding in the Olympic process. Starting with the identification function and relational nature of a brand, corporate branding is argued to be a better analytical tool than product branding, in order to grasp the latitude and longitude of a place brand. The place branding of the London 2012 and the Beijing 2008 Olympics are analysed through their external and internal branding campaigns. The rebranding of Britain and London featured in the creation of inclusive and welcoming brand images, which resonated with citizens across the country. The rebranding of China and Beijing was characterised by disassociation from the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and the use of traditional Chinese culture. Internally, China's longstanding civilisation legacy was drawn upon and emphasised, and criticism from abroad was also used to consolidate nationalism. Internal branding as a goal in its own right and the manipulation of cultural heritage was found in both cases.

Chapter 6, the final chapter of this thesis, provides a rigorous comparison of the two cases. Based on the discussions in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the comparison between London and Beijing in terms of their respective urban regeneration and place branding in the Olympic process is presented in tables in order to easily observe the disparities and similarities between them. The research questions set out in Section 1.2 are answered based on the comparative knowledge generated by the project. Finally, a reflection on the theoretical review in Chapter 2 will be conducted, providing as holistic evaluation of the negotiation between globalised standardisation and localised particularities; that is to say, the impacts of the hosting of mega-events on urban governance.

# Chapter 2 - Mega-Events in Urban Governance

## 2.1   Chapter Introduction

In an era of globalisation, hosting mega-events is attractive for entrepreneurial local states to secure competitive advantages in inter-urban competition. Mega-events are inherent to 'dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance' (Roche, 2000: 1), so the publicity effects for host cities are almost certain. Publicity is commonly needed by cities at different scales, take the Olympics as an example. Global cities like London and Paris do not need a boost from mega-events to raise global awareness of them, yet still bid for the hosting rights so that they can stay 'active and keep their profile up with other global cities' (Shoval, 2002). Cities of a medium scale, like Manchester and Vancouver, participate in bidding as well, as being awarded the hosting rights is definitely a plus for these cities, but surviving until the finalist stage is also good for publicity. Even bidding by smaller cities or towns for the Winter Olympic Games 'is an effective and cheap way of promoting a little-known ski resort' (Hill, 1992: 97).

In addition to the intangible dimension, the tangible regeneration of urban landscape is a strong post-event legacy. Building stadiums and improving infrastructure are the mega-projects that are frequently initiated or accelerated by staging mega-events. Since a global event is coming to town, it is necessary to renew the built environment to showcase and accommodate global spectators, and since there is a definite deadline to meet, subsidies from central government and resources from private investment are necessary in a timely fashion. Physical and economic regeneration and the delivery of mega-events can, as a result, plausibly justify each other (Essex and Chalkley, 1998: 189). This also explains the reason why mega-events are normally 'tied to major regeneration, canal or waterfront development' (Ritchie et al., 2009: 146).

To attract and retain mobile people and capital (Hall, 2006: 59) in immobile localities is the ultimate goal in inter-urban competition. In staging mega-events the enhancement and regeneration of place and 'the promotion of selective place information' provide strong competitive advantage for cities to win over people and capital (Hall, 2006: 60). Nevertheless, not only is the actualisation of the promised legacy questionable with regard to enormous debts (Gold and Gold, 2008; Horne, 2007; Surborg et al., 2008), the social impacts should not

to be overlooked. After all, the use of mega-events conforms to entrepreneurialism and shows a tendency for 'quick though ephemeral fixes to urban problems' (Harvey, 1989: 13).

Bidding for the hosting right for mega-events is consequently analogous to a skirmish before a 'grand war' among cities for people and capital. To analyse this phenomenon in urban governance, this chapter starts with the shift in the paradigm in public administration, i.e. the management of government and the consequential state-civil society relations. Reviewing this paradigm shift assists in focusing on the subsequent discussion, entrepreneurial urban governance. To cope with the pressure from domestic subsidy cuts and international competition, local states have begun to choose entrepreneurialism, which basically conforms to 'the grooves already established by market logics' (Smith, 2002: 428). In market logic the ability of local authorities to make a profit equates to its governability. The section on entrepreneurial urban governance evaluates the strategies adopted by local authorities to boost economic profit. Growth machine and urban regime theories help to capture the relationship between economic growth and urban governance. This is followed by an analysis of the making of creative and knowledge-based economies as a profit-making tool for local states. According to profit-oriented logic, gentrification is the scenery of urban space and has become a strategy for urban development.

Mega-events, more specifically the Olympic Games, against this backdrop have evolved over time too. Although once viewed as an economically inviable option for cities, profiting through hosting the Olympics was proved possible by the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. Since then entrepreneurial local states have been keen on staging these global shows, and the Games have largely conformed to the profit-making necessity of local entrepreneurialism. Coupled with a development-centric mindset and gentrification as an urban strategy, mega-events have developed into a fast, easy toolkit utilised by local states in place competition.

## 2.2 Paradigm Shift – From New Public Management to Network Governance

The role of government in a society is conditioned by the wider social, political and economic background within which it is situated and thus it evolves with time. In the 1980s the public sector was criticised for lacking efficiency and effectiveness; inefficient intra-organisational management and ineffective public service delivery. The rise of New Public Management (NPM) can thus be attributed to the need for government reform. The fact that

NPM was viewed as a capable reforming tool rested on two assumptions, with the first being the relationship between results-oriented evaluation mechanisms and the performance of the public sector. With regard to the rule-obedience tendency, the public sector tended to ensure that the process of policymaking and implementation was compliant with legal requirements, while the focus on results evaluation was less than adequate. The advocators of NPM believed that any improvement in the efficiency of the public sector hinged on a performance evaluation mechanism that stressed results rather than process (Hood, 1995: 95). In short, results-oriented evaluation provides incentives for and also places pressure on public sectors to perform more efficiently.

The other assumption lies in the relationship between the separation of tasks and the higher quality of service delivery; this disjunction between policymaking and policy execution makes 'uncertainties more manageable' (Klijn, 2012: 203). Policymaking is the work domain exclusive to elected officials, who have the democratic legitimacy to act as the 'brain'. In contrast, the limbs are only in charge of realising the will of the brain, that is policy implementation. The strict differentiation between politics and public administration is thought to be capable of increasing internal efficiency. The clear division of tasks enables multiple actors to perform the jobs of the limbs— departments in the public sector, agency-type organisations in the public sector and actors from the private sector— through contracting out services or different combinations of the above. In NPM the implementation of public policy is no longer monopolised by the public sector. Therefore, the size of the government can be slimmed down and the quality of the public service can be improved because the government, as skilful buyers, can decide which actor or combination of actors are the most preferable limb for delivering the service in question (Klijn, 2012: 205).

These two assumptions are nonetheless questionable in practice. To begin with, the inclusion of multiple actors into the policy process, even just during the phase of implementation, incurs a communication cost, which is barely covered by NPM. Rhodes (1996) argues that NPM's obsession with objectives results in a diversion of priorities and is contrary to human principles. The mechanisation of policy implementation ignores the dimensions that empirically demand more concern than achieving objectives, such as diplomatic skills, establishing trust, and preserving trust between the public sector and service providers (Rhodes, 1996: 663). When more actors are involved, the transaction costs rise; moreover the neglecting of inter-organisational costs and management may obstruct the pursuit of intra-organisational targets, which NPM values the most (Rhodes, 1996: 663). It is also for this

reason that the importance of networks management arises. The advocating of task separation to improve internal efficiency has been empirically challenged too. The precondition for task separation is the separability of tasks. The difficulty of specifying what is to be privatised, agentified or contracted out, emerges when it comes to a more complicated policy area. This is why NPM is 'more suitable for relatively simple problems' (Klijn, 2012: 205).

Although within NPM the private sector takes some of the responsibilities from governments, the vertical relationship between public sector and private sector remains. This can be understood through the how, what and when, of the separation of tasks. How to separate tasks and what to relinquish remain the power of the state. Contracting out is more like contracting down in NPM, and the domain of the tasks available for relinquishing lies exclusively within policy implementation. The borderline between politics and public administration, and between elected officials and technocrats, cannot be erased, as only the brain can make policy decisions, while the limbs are simply the agents for execution.

The self-transformation of governmental entities in the NPM approach imposes moral hazards on the public sector. In the 1960s the focus of a managerial government was the 'provision of services, facilities and benefits'; it was a time when the fulfilment of social needs remained the central mission of the government (Harvey, 1989: 3). Managerialism implies the responsibility of the governing machinery in two dimensions, managing the government, and more importantly, managing problems within society. In the 1980s NPM had a strong privatisation and contracting-out inclination, although it shared its core concern of efficiency with the managerialism of the 1960s, '[threatening] to eliminate democracy as a guiding principle in public-sector management' (Kolthoff et al., 2006: 10). The efficient use of every penny or every minute may be the primary concern in business, but it should not be the only, not even the primary, value to be pursued in public management.

Frederickson (1999: 301) considers governmental entities to be more 'public-regarding', with greater values of 'justice, equality and equity' than their non-governmental or private counterpart. What fundamentally distinguishes state agencies from other actors is selflessness, by which it is meant putting trust in the decisions made by public officials to serve only the interests of the public. Despite these decisions often involving 'some to sacrifice and others to gain', the selflessness of the public sector can always be the source of trust whenever 'several private interests are adversely affected' (Frederickson, 1999: 302).

Needless to say, this selflessness quality is undermined by the obsession with efficiency and the transformation to a business-like and self-serving government.

With the rise in the number of critics of NPM, the emergence of the concept of network governance in 1990s witnessed a shift in paradigms; the efficiency of public management and the fulfilment of policy goals no longer occupied the discourse of government reform. Unlike NPM's 'intra-organisational focus' on efficiency improvement and goal-oriented tendencies, network governance pays attention to the interactions and inter-dependencies between organisations; the focus has been diverted again from the outcomes back to the processes. As Peters and Pierre (1998: 232) note, the difference in orientation between NPM and network governance, the former is about results while the latter is about processes, have significant implications in practice, since 'public administration to a great extent is centred around procedural rules and regulations.' The vagueness or even lack of process elaboration of NPM further makes it an introverted organisational theory (Peters and Pierre, 1998: 232-233). Network governance, in contrast, is a political theory (Peters and Pierre, 1998: 232), straightforwardly dealing with the building/mutation of governments' steering capability when rowing is no longer an option. While NPM chooses to reduce 'red tape' into more manageable performance indicators, network governance promotes the public sector to steer via the capability of networking and inclusion. This is what differentiates network governance from traditional Weberian public administration. Although process outweighs results in both, Weberian hierarchic bureaucracy emphasises the process of due procedures, whereas governance recognises the significance of networking in the policy process.

In the simplest terms, network governance can be understood as governing through networks (Rhodes, 2012: 35), and its conception is attributable to the failure of the market and the state (Jessop, 2000: 15-17). Networks describe the status of how actors around policy issues interact with each other and governance is the process of managing it (Rhodes, 2012). Participating horizontally and voluntarily, actors in networks are connected in an interdependent manner in terms of resources and power, but simultaneously 'retain their operation autonomy' (Torfing, 2012: 101). However, interdependence and horizontality do not guarantee equality within a network. 'Asymmetrical resource dependency' occurs because the resources each actor possesses are imbalanced (Klijn, 2012: 207). Notwithstanding this, power asymmetry derives from resources and not from institutionally-

designed vertical relations; more importantly, they remain interdependent in the face of power asymmetry (Klijn, 2012: 207).

Both NPM and network governance appreciate the inclusion of actors from the non-public sector into the policy process, whereas they propose different timings of entry based on different considerations. NPM invites external actors only into the phase of policy implementation as a way of maximising efficiency, whereas governance believes that including them at an earlier stage is a must for achieving better decision-making. Allowing 'a well-informed decision-making process' (Torfing, 2012: 107) is thus the greatest strength of network governance. The advocating of network governance as a better governing approach rests on the assumed essentiality of networks of this kind in policymaking and implementation. Because of this, flexibility is a necessary element in network management (Klijn, 2012: 208) i.e. governance, and the network has to be sufficiently flexible to allow the early inclusion of actors from non-public sectors. Despite the synergies that network governance may bring, Torfing (2012: 103) notes that governance through networks cannot be the best solution in all types of policy areas, rather it is a particular fix and only good at solving 'wicked problems' (Klijn, 2012; Torfing, 2012), when 'the policy problem is uncertain' and the different views involved are highly adverse (Torfing, 2012: 103).

The lack of quality associated with network governance also undermines its stability. Failure to conduct productive negotiations 'may lead to stalemate, poor and biased decisions, or directionless consensus' (Torfing, 2012: 107). Similarly, it can be extremely difficult to redefine and readjust objectives that apply to all participatory parties within a network 'in the face of continuing disagreements' (Jessop, 2000: 18). The management of networks becomes pivotal in the governing process, thus meta-governance is promoted to address the failure of network governance. The point of network governance, as mentioned above, is to connect interdependent actors and tackle 'wicked' problems. In meta-governance, the 'wicked' problem is the network governance itself, and the focus of meta-governance is consequently the 'values, norms and principles' (Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009: 819) of the governance network in question.

As one of the actors in the network, the representative from government agencies is usually, but not necessarily, the meta-governor in a governance network, since the criterion is who has 'what it takes' to enjoy this central position (Torfing, 2012: 108). The mission of a meta-governor involves managing the 'complexity, plurality and tangled hierarchies' (Jessop, 2000: 23) in the network. In the simplest terms, meta-governance is 'the governance of

governance' (Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009: 819; Sørensen and Torfing, 2009: 245). Moreover, since the aforementioned simplest definition of governance is governing through networks, meta-governance can also be perceived as the governance of governing through networks. This presents an immediate challenge to the purpose of promoting network governance. As Sørensen and Torfing (2005: 203) argue, while the introduction of meta-governance may provide the benefits of '[facilitating and constraining] the policy process in self-regulating networks without necessarily retreating to hierarchical command and domination', it also renders the running of network governance to be always 'in the shadow of hierarchy'.

➢ **Short conclusion of paradigm shift**

The paradigm shift from NPM to governance signifies the dynamics of the increasing 'complexity and fragmentation' (Rhodes, 2012: 34) of social problems and the resultant change in the way governments govern regimes. In the 1980s criticism of the lack of efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector was a catalyst for the importation of business management tools and the multiplication of policy implementers. Despite the privatisation of public agencies and the cooperation of private service providers, NPM remains in nature an organisational theory associated with target achievement and pays less attention to the relationships between state and civil society. In contrast, network governance in the 1990s moved the focus from intra-organisation to the external environment; recognising the interdependency of resources between actors, network governance advocates governing through networks. In the face of the highly likely situation of deadlock, governance resorts internally on the tool within the network, meta-governance conducted by a meta-governor, although networks might therefore always be shadowed by hierarchies.

The inclusion of other actors into policy processes, a common characteristic shared by NPM and network governance, implies the relinquishing of the monopoly of governing power. While both of involve this element, the involvement of external actors in policy processes is not new, since 'the interaction between public and private actors' characterises democratic governments (Torfing, 2012: 103). What can be regarded as being a new occurrence in the past three decades is the fact that this inclusion has been intentionally institutionalised as an 'efficient and legitimate way' of governance (Torfing, 2012: 103). Another noteworthy point in the process from NPM to governance is the increasingly blurred differentiation and boundary between the public and private sector. In NPM, the adoption of business tools remains an intra-organisational focus and within the scope of policy implementation. However, the early inclusion of actors in a governance network implies the possibility of

adverse interests battling and influencing agenda setting and policymaking, although the capacity of the state does not subsequently shrink, since its capacity has been transformed from 'direct control' to influence exercising (Peters and Pierre, 1998: 226). How the state positions itself in a governance regime and its consequent interaction with civil society demands closer examination, and the following section is dedicated to a portrait of the entrepreneurial scenario in urban governance.

## 2.3   Entrepreneurial Urban Governance

The general trend toward network governance expands the scope for observing urban policymaking. The electoral process and formal power transaction seems unable to grasp the dynamics of the formation and implementation of local policy. Rather, a non-unitary, less rigid and more interactive imagination may better serve the function of explaining the urban policy process; in other words, network thinking. Policy networks are defined by Rhodes (2006: 426) as 'sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policymaking and implementation.' This definition pinpoints two significant notions of policy networks which distinguish them from traditional government-centric policy analysis. When recognising the fact and legitimacy of non-governmental actors in the policy process, the importance of different levels of government and their interactions are not diminished. In addition, the beliefs and interests of network participants can be treated as changeable and negotiable. People participate in a policy network only when they have a particular interest to protect or specific belief to advocate; however, this does not preclude the possibility of these interests and beliefs being altered, compromised or even abandoned.

With the paradigm shift from NPM to network governance, steering supplants rowing as the ideal governing undertaking of states. 'The task of government is to enable socio-political interactions; to encourage many and varied arrangements for coping with problems and to distribute services among the several actors' (Rhodes, 1996: 657). The skills needed to facilitate various coalitions in differing policy areas and to tap most profit from such coalitions matter more than ever. The power of governments rest more on their capability of 'inducing actions' than 'on simply issuing commands' (Stone, 1993: 24).

In tandem with this fundamental change of governing behaviour, the domestic and international conditions of the past three decades have nurtured urban entrepreneurialism. Echoing the appeal of NPM in government restructuring, that is boosting efficiency and

effectiveness in the public sector with tools used in businesses, entrepreneurialism encourages governments to be 'more flexible, entrepreneurial [and] decentralized' when local governments are also being asked by their citizens 'to do more with less' (Osborne, 1993: 2). As its name suggests, entrepreneurialism encourages public sectors to innovate, risk and take a pro-economic growth stand (OECD, 2007b: 3). The root of the critical circumstances that arose for local authorities can be traced back to the recession during the 1970s, when due to the severe fiscal problems of the time, central states started to shift the financial burden and reduce subsidies to local authorities. Since then the responsibility to ensure 'full employment' in the UK, for example, has shifted from the state to local councils (Harvey, 1989: 4). Similarly, a reduction in 'federal redistribution and local tax revenues' in the US (Harvey, 1989: 4) has resulted in a tide of decreasing central subsidies and increasing local government burdens around the same time. Local governments thus started to suffer from the pressure to be independent.

The pressure from the international arena was no less than the domestic challenges faced by local authorities. Resource competition amongst localities shapes the entrepreneurial behaviour of local leaders, although the phenomenon of geographical areas competing with one another is not new. Geographical competition was present in the 1970s, for example when states and regions competed for foreign investment and office setup (Smith, 2002: 447). However, inter-urban competition derived from the tide of globalisation announced a ferocious fight for already scarce resources. Increasing financial reliance on soliciting external resources, as opposed to the equalisation of tax revenue from central government, can be identified as occurring over recent decades (Harding, 1997; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). In entrepreneurialism the most celebrated local governments are those capable of generating foreign investment and attracting attention.

The efforts undertaken by entrepreneurial local authorities as a consequence of inter-urban competition can be narrowed down to the pursuit of urban development. This section thus begins its discussion with a review of growth machine theory and urban regime theory, both of which envisage coalition-based urban development policy formation as an alternative to a pluralist focus on institutional design. Under the umbrella term of policy networks, the wider analytical scope of the growth machine and urban regime aids in understanding the highly complicated and extra-local Olympic process. With the bourgeoning of knowledge-based industries, the making of a creative city has gained in momentum, due to its supposed

potential to boost urban economies. As a consequence of entrepreneurialism, gentrification has become a prevalent strategy in development-oriented urban governance.

### 2.3.1   Pursuit of Urban Development

Viewing the enlargement of population and other consequential physical development as the indices of urban growth, Molotch (1976) describes and analyses the formulation and operation of growth coalition in US cities in the 1960s and 1970s. He argues that the creation of urban policy is largely in the hand of land-based elites, such as real estate agents, retailers and local media. The growth coalition is formed by these people and the local government on the basis of their shared interests derived from the growth of the city. Due to the common stake that they have in the city, they not only consolidate themselves to pursue urban growth, but also advocate the pro-growth ideology to the wider community. They endeavour to forge a 'we feeling' among the general public and deliberate on the consequential relationship between local growth and economic development. Local governments also play an irreplaceable role in the mechanism; the forming of a 'business climate' to attract industry through policy incentives, such as 'favourable taxation, vocational training, law enforcement, and "good" labour relations' (Molotch 1976: 312), is essential for promoting growth. Although private corporations make decisions autonomously on where to invest or set up offices, these decisions are never neutrally or naturally generated; generally, they are the outcome of local policies. In short, it is the growth coalition's promotion of local 'boosterism', the community's acceptance of growth (Molotch, 1976: 315), and the exercise of 'geobribes' (Smith, 2002) through governmental power that turn locality into a growth machine.

However, the depiction of urban growth's ability to generate the economic wellbeing of the general residents in the locality was questioned and debunked by Molotch as untested and misleading. To begin with, locals, who basically have no stake in land-based interests, accept or support local boosterism due to their belief that urban growth brings about increased job opportunities. This also explains why a pro-growth ideology ambivalently receives support from the working class, and that sometimes trade unions even form a constituent of a growth coalition. As Molotch (1976: 320) argues, what the growth machine does to the employment rate in the locality is not job creation but in fact is job distribution. The relatively high mobility of the working class further renders 'programs of local job creation largely irrelevant to long-term rates of unemployment.' An irony occurs at this point because the higher job insecurity of local workers, which derives from their less mobile tendencies compared to workers from outside, often leads to stronger support for the

growth coalition. The mismatching of urban growth as an employment measure is only part of the story, as in the long run, local boosterism reinforces both the existing power relations in the locality and the inequality of resources distribution. Therefore, urban growth as a solution to the economic and employment problems of a locality is a myth. In Molotch's (1976: 318) terms, the enlargement of the population, the consequential local economic development and market expansion, frequently only benefit a small portion of the population, the land-based class and vested interests, at the expense of the majority in terms of both monetary and non-monetary gains.

In contrast to the growth machine's narrow attention to land-based urban development, the urban regime offers higher applicability cross-nationally (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). Derived from the parentage of political economy (Stone, 1993; Stone, 2005), urban regime theory neither views the mode of production as the infrastructure determining all other social activities, including politics, nor does it reduce the significance of economy, as pluralists do, to 'one of several discrete spheres of activity' (Stone, 1993: 2). Through his case study of Atlanta's urban politics, Clarence Stone asks 'how local communities are governed', and how 'problem-solving priorities' are established and pursued (Stone, 2005: 328-9), and determines that this hinges on regime-building capacity. A regime is a coalition based on informal arrangements, 'by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions' (Stone, 1989: 6). Due to inadequate resources and limited scope, governments need to enlist cross-sector cooperation in order to materialise policy goals. Governability thus equates with the ability to form a viable regime, which entails the mobilisation of resources, solicitation of support from governmental and non-governmental participants, and assimilation of fluid, diverse interests within a coalition; a regime is a resource mobilisation tool. Whether the 'resources commensurate with… [a regime's] main policy agenda' (Stone, 1993: 17) can be mobilised is a test for the governmental authority's leadership, which is 'the creative exercise of political choice' (Stone, 1993: 25).

Commensurate resources are brought in by suitable participants, and what kind of participation is required is determined by the issue to be addressed (Stone, 2005: 313). Participants from the non-governmental sector are by no means exclusive to business actors; however, it is perilous to underestimate their influence on urban politics, because there is a strong link between business investment and economic prosperity, and because important resources are in the hand of businesses (Stone, 1989: 7). Stone (2005: 314) further clarifies

that while in US politics business is a frequent partner in many coalitions, their participation is a resource-driven outcome. The necessity for business participation does not preclude the need for other resources from other non-governmental participants. Assembling commensurate resources is key to the birth and life of a regime.

The formal electoral process is only part of the story in urban politics. Even with formal positions in office, the possibility of making political choices and implementing political change only exists in circumstances in which commensurate resources can be assembled. Without the ability to build a regime, such resources can scarcely be mobilised. '[A] regime is empowering. Its supporters see it as a means for achieving coordinated efforts that might not otherwise be realized' (Stone, 1989: 4). As such, resources are translated into power through regime building. As Rokkan (1966: 105) succinctly appraised, 'votes count but resources decide'.[8] If resources decide, it is not surprising that urban politics tend to mirror 'the inequalities of society's system of social stratification' (Stone, 2005: 329). This also explains 'why many social programs fail or never rise above the level of triage operations' (Stone, 2005: 334). The more marginalised a regime, the more difficult it would be to pass the threshold of materialising political change (Stone, 2005: 313).

Social inequalities, therefore, provide the answer not to 'who rules?', but 'who achieves?' (Harding, 1997: 293). 'Who rules?' is a question focused on the 'power over' someone, and it treats power as the eternally fought over relationship between those who control and those who resist. The 'cost of compliance' is born by the controller in such a way that it refrains the superordinate from disregarding resistance at will (Stone, 1993: 9); this is the social control model of power. In contrast, urban regime theory proposes another dimension of power, the social production model. It has a specific concern with the 'power to' put political choice into action. That is, who manages to materialise the set goals? Who has the power to achieve? In the social production model, the cost of being an outsider is born by the subordinate, so much so that there are incentives in being to be a coalition insider, further increasing the power of the superordinate (insiders). As a result, according to Stone (1993: 8), 'politics is about the production rather than distribution of benefits.'

If politics is the production of benefits, the longevity and solidity of a coalition hinge greatly on the achievability of its goal. While people's preferences are drawn to immediate and approximate benefits and susceptible to social interactions (Mossberger and Stoker,

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[8] Cited in Stone (1993: 8).

2001; Stone, 1993), 'participation is still purposeful' (Stone, 1993: 17). That is to say, people only participate when they perceive the goal as feasible. As Stone (1993: 13) bluntly concludes, 'achievable goals are attractive, difficult-to-achieve goals are unattractive.' Development oriented regimes are thus expected to be prevalent in urban politics for the 'selective incentives it generates' (Stone, 1993: 24). While in the long run, whether economic benefits will exceed investment is an open question, 'tangible and immediate' gains may serve as a reinforcement in keeping actors joining (Stone, 1993: 24). Moreover, even in the face of dubious general benefits, a development project can always easily put on an outfit called 'improvement' (Stone, 1993: 24). Thus, due to both material and moralistic reasons, 'economic development and a favorable climate for business investment' tend to be prioritised in agenda setting (Stone, 2005: 328), as a regime pursuing such goals is more durable than others.

Based on an analysis of urban governance in the US, both the growth machine and urban regime recognise the advantageous status of development projects in agenda setting, and they pinpoint the governing power of cross-sectoral coalitions in shaping urban policies. However, they indicate differences in terms of their respective views on coalition formation and the role of states. The growth machine views land-based interests as the basis to drive elites together. Their common interests serve to mitigate potential conflicts among each other, and further motivate them to promote a pro-growth ideology to remaining members of the community. Even outside the land-based coalition, community members tend to support pro-growth policies because of the illusory link between urban growth and job opportunities.

Regime theory devalues the power of such inculcation, and the argument that 'a set of strategically positioned and resource-rich actors impose their will on others', simplifies the scenario of urban politics because of the negligence of fluid preferences (Stone, 1993: 13). In urban regime theory people are drawn together and assemble resources to achieve what is potentially achievable. Perceived feasibility is therefore a requirement for regime building (Stone, 1993; Stone, 2005), and hence the creation of a policy is not only about one group of people imposing their preferences on the other. Preferences are fluid and susceptible to perceived feasibility; 'intention is partially shaped by the situation' (Stone, 1993: 13). This is the difference between 'power over' some people and 'power to' achieve something. In the latter, even the superordinate, those in the governing coalition, are subordinate to their perception of the situation.

The other divergence between the two involves the role of local authorities. In viewing local governments as a captive of the pro-growth coalition, growth machine theory does not provide an adequate explanation for why 'most, but not all', local leaders are pro-growth (Harding, 1999: 679). If local governments are hijacked by the growth coalition, it follows that there should be universal domination of economic development policies across cities, yet this is not what results. Conversely, in regime politics, '"stateness" guarantees no given level of effectiveness' (Stone, 1993: 17); in other words, being in office does not equate to being able to make political change. For governmental authorities, inducing actions outweigh issuing commands (Stone, 1993: 24), and rather than being a captive of business participants, local states consciously and purposefully endeavour in resource mobilising and action motivating in a governing coalition.

To some extent, both the growth machine and urban regime are localists[9] (Harding, 1997: 294; Haughton and While, 1999: 6), as they tend to downplay extra-local factors, such as 'the changing demands of higher levels of government or external investors' (Harding, 1997: 294). Parker (2004: 127) contends that the power the central government is able to exercise 'at every level in the management of the urban system' is largely ignored by the growth machine approach. Indeed, all politics is local, with the global restructuring of the economy being locally comprehended and responded to. As Stone (2005: 333) states, '[even] if global capitalism is the overall setting, human agents devise responses, and these responses take into consideration factors much more proximate than the international economy.'

Nevertheless, what accounts for a locality's economy is not locally bounded any longer. Globalisation has caused the 'delocalization of society', in which local economies' prosperity increasingly hinges on 'economic and political forces beyond their borders' (Logan et al., 1999: 84). Moreover, even taking 'the localized effects' of global restructuring into account may remain inadequate in terms of theoretical analysis, because reading off global change from local change is garbling and misleading (Ward, 1996: 431). The relationship between globalisation and urban governance does not amount to a unidirectional flow imposed from

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[9] Harding (1999: 677) later claimed that since neither the growth machine nor urban regime deny the influence of 'forces beyond immediate locality', they cannot be viewed as the same as 'most "localist" accounts'. However, I argue that the understatement, not the denial, of extra-local forces is what qualifies a localist approach.

the former onto the later; forces of different scales are 'intermeshing' and changes are variably mediated (Ward, 1996: 431).

Furthermore, they both place great interest on the politics of coalition and production, as opposed to consumption (Harding, 1999: 676). Such interest is understandable with regard to the long tradition of US urban politics, where there is high reliance on the business sector to pursue economic development, and it is because of this that the applicability of the growth machine and urban regime to UK cities is questioned. Harding (1997: 299) for example, maintains that inner circles of policy making certainly exist in European cities too, yet their 'local *grivita'* is simply not enough to constitute a growth machine or regime. Relatively less financial dependence on local businesses and the greater role of governmental authorities in urban economic development in Europe in general, and Britain in particular, reduce the leverage of the development machine/regime.

However, this scenario has changed since the 1980s. As noted above, the prevalence of urban entrepreneurialism can now be seen not only in North America, but also in British and other European cities. Thanks to the importation of 'philosophy, culture and ideology' from the other side of the Atlantic, the business sector has been strongly incorporated into urban regeneration projects in Britain[10] (Ward, 1996: 427). Not confined to the regeneration of urban landscapes, policy areas which entail greater business involvement are ostensible. As Stone (2005: 314) explicitly argued, '[economic] development and showcase projects such as hosting the Olympics often hold a position of high priority, and for such projects, business involvement may be quite important.'

For entrepreneurial cities, which essentially equate governability with economic development, there are two implications offered by the growth machine and urban regime. The first is the prioritisation of development policies, which the growth machine treats as the outcome of the orchestrated manoeuvres of land-based elites, while regime explanation points to the achievability of resource mobilisation. The ultimate consequence is the increasing influence of the business sector on urban governance. Second, while the local interplay between politics and the economy are captured in both, entrepreneurial cities are in the midst of inter-urban competition and global economic restructuring, with the result that their localist tendencies leave a black hole for globalisation. Following the thread of

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[10] When considering regeneration in the UK, the encouragement of public private partnerships (PPPs) and the resultant power concentration is more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 4.

entrepreneurial urban governance, the next section analyses another widely adopted instrument in the advancement of urban growth, creative and knowledge-based economies.

## 2.3.2  Creative and Knowledge-Based Economies

The making of a business climate, the measures taken for attracting business investment and office setup, has been widely utilised in place competition. Malecki (2004) refers to this provision of 'low wages, docile labour and low taxes' as 'low-road' strategies. Driven by the ideology of place branding (Smith, 2002: 447), cities, rather than nations or regions, have become the main actors of place competitions since the 1990s. At around the same time, 'high-road' strategies,  which demand policymakers recognise the decisive role of knowledge and networks in economic development, started to replace the low-road and occupy a dominant position (Malecki, 2004). Such high road strategies were touted by Malecki (2004: 1103) as capable of bypassing the 'disadvantages of competition' derived from imitation-based urban competition. Nonetheless, he also recognised the prevalence of low-road strategies as unavoidable; imitation is much easier than innovation (Malecki, 2004: 1109).

The high-road strategies echo creative cities as an approach of promoting urban growth. Contrasting with the 'conventional view' that values 'cost-related factors' for firms as the key to urban economic success, Florida (2003: 6) claims the importance of attracting human resources has trumped that of attracting multinational capital. The previous and dominant focus on how enterprises choose where to locate should be diverted to how these creative people decide where to live (Florida, 2002: 223). Based on this view on human capital theory, he suggests that urban policymakers plan the space to meet the needs of the so-called 'creative class'. In this logic, the creative class is crucial to the prosperity of a city in the creative economy, because this is the population capable of bringing a dynamic vibe to a city, captivating more creative people and engendering a flourishing circle of creative economy; they are the secret to urban economic prosperity and jobs. Understandably, local states should thus plan cities in a way that caters for and welcomes the creative class and endeavour to foster 'technology, talent and tolerance that are critical in the 'economic geography of creativity' (Florida, 2003: 10). The remark of the Mayor of Malmoe, Sweden, epitomises the creative circle aspired to by urban policymakers: 'People ask where I shall *[sic]* live? Here are the brightest brains, here I want to live' (Leif, 2006: 8).

Both the strategies of creative cities and of high-road competition focus attention on the knowledge-based economy and differentiate it from the approach of attracting firms through taxes and subsidies. Indeed, knowledge-based and creativity-centralised economic policies may be more challenging to conduct or imitate for cities for the following two reasons. Firstly, the creation of a 'people climate' is more complicated than that of a 'business climate' because eventually the target remains the number of companies in a city, as companies either follow the trace of creative people or are set up by them (Florida, 2002, 2003). The 'flow of brains' (Leif, 2006: 9) is the treasure to fight for, but the reason why those knowledge workers are precious is because the companies that generate jobs follow them. Competition for human capital thus does not fully replace that for multinational capital, rather it expands its scope; another way of understanding this is to view the former as false competition. While cities have been caught in a 'be-creative-or-die' position to 'harness creativity' of all kinds for 'economic ends' (Dreher, 2002), the provision of preferable conditions for firms does not cease. Urban competition has become even more diverse and encompassing in this regard.

The other reason involves the discursiveness of people's preferences, or more precisely, the discursiveness of the composition of talent. The criteria for a good business climate can be rationally discerned through the logic of economic efficiency, whereas the conditions for a good people climate can hardly be induced in the same way, and are prone to change over time. What creative people want is a funky lifestyle with a range of exciting and new experiences, and all of the activities they engage in have the one ultimate purpose which is 'to validate their identities as creative people' (Florida, 2003: 9). The aspirations of the creative class to inhabit in a city with diversity ironically corresponds to how diversified their preferences and tastes can be. The 'magnetic qualities of a place' are basically soft, intangible and mutable, since incessant stimulation and challenge are coveted by the new talented class (Peck, 2005: 744). The life expectancy of projects catering for inconstant tastes is rather short because there is always something newer and cooler happening; what is new and cool at the moment, easily becomes outdated and dull in the next. Long-term investment and plans can rarely survive in this scenario, and instead urban planning is analogous to a gamble of speculating and predicting needs because being constantly 'on the lookout for the next big thing' is a must for city governors, whilst '[standing] still' is dreary and not creative enough for the new class (Peck, 2005: 762).

Whether the new class really exists is another factor that complicates the picture; the purported creative talents are more of a discursive composition and less of a homogeneous class. The creative class that Florida (2002) has alleged to have emerged and dominates in the creative era consists of a super-creative core and creative professionals. The super-creative core are those who engage in 'the highest order of creative work [such] as producing new forms or designs that are readily transferrable and widely useful' (Florida, 2002: 69). Creative professionals also work in creativity-intensive industries, but what differentiates them from the super-creative core is that the widely useful and transferrable production is only the by-product of their work, since originality is not inherited in their job descriptions (Florida, 2002). The composition of the creative class is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which shows that components range from practitioners in the legal service, public policy arena and financial industry, to academics, artists and thought leaders. The commonality of the components of the creative class across diverse industries is probably its knowledge-based nature. Nevertheless, this immediately begs the question, what jobs do not involve a certain degree of knowledge use of any kind? Furthermore, assuming the shared knowledge-based nature to be valid, is this sole commonality strong enough to unify their tastes and preferences in life?

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                    ┌─────────────────────┐
                    │    Creative class   │
                    └─────────────────────┘
                       /              \
        ┌──────────────────┐    ┌────────────────────┐
        │ Super-creative core │  │ Creative professionals │
        ├──────────────────┤    ├────────────────────┤
        │ Scientists, scholars, │ │ Managers, organization │
        │ arts occupations       │ │ experts, brokers,       │
        │ and thought leadership │ │ consulting, legal       │
        │ of modern society      │ │ financial and political │
        │                        │ │ practitioners           │
        └──────────────────┘    └────────────────────┘
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
**Figure 2.1: Composition of the creative class**
Source: based on Florida (2002) and Krätke (2012)

Despite, or because of, their heterogeneity, labelling and enclosing these people under the single title of the 'creative class', offers an easy solution and a beacon for urban governance. Although fostering a knowledge-based industry and stepping onto high-road competition are arduous for many cities, flattering and privileging a particular group of the population seems to be much more straightforward and achievable. Policies specifically designed to benefit a particular type of people can hardly be referred to high-road, and are not especially innovative either. As Peck (2005: 749) notes, the investment in soft infrastructure is not rocket science and not that costly either, so that 'the creativity script' can

easily be translated 'into certain forms of municipal action.' The pursuit of creative power, however, cannot be productively administered or established by top-down governmental intervention (Malanga, 2004; Peck, 2005: 749-750). The creative hubs/quarters in a city have always been a product that have 'emerged organically from cultural producers and fringe workshop areas with lower rent/lands and looser controls' (Evans, 2009: 1031). It is exactly because of this spontaneous emergence that cultural diversity and authenticity are worthy of celebration. Given the 'fuzzy notions of creative class, innovation and cluster processes and benefits' (Evans, 2009: 1032), the translation from creative power to economic strength is better viewed as a contingency, rather than a premeditation, otherwise 'hollow promises' tend to be the only thing left to 'resident communities and enterprises' (Evans, 2009: 1031).

Being disappointed is not the end of this creative story. Urban policies that follow the logic of creative cities successfully accommodate 'interurban competition, gentrification, middle-class consumption and place marketing' (Peck, 2005: 740). All of these neoliberal agendas within the urban space have been operationally reduced to a catchy equation: urban creativity equals economic prosperity. Despite the lack of empirical evidence for this equation in terms of the magnetic effects of talent and the alleged resultant job creation (Malanga, 2004), it remains appealing to urban governors. Trapped in the deadlock of inter-urban competition, cities, as mentioned above, cannot stand to stand still while others are ferociously engaged in creative engineering, and gentrifying urban space to foster the hip and bohemian lifestyle becomes the norm.

### 2.3.3   Gentrification as an Urban Development Strategy

**A.  Arts-led gentrification**

Ruth Glass coined the term 'gentrification' in 1964 to describe the evacuation of the working class by middle class newcomers in London:

> [Many] of the working class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle classes— upper and lower...Once this process of 'gentrification' starts in a district, it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working class occupiers are displaced, and the whole social character of the district is changed. (Glass, 1964: xviii)

The process of gentrification initially happened in Glass's time, as part of the revival of inner cities, especially in New York and London during the 1950s, and was widely spread to European cities in the 1970s (Smith, 1996: 51). Over three decades, gentrification was a

phenomenon which took place around the residential use of land. The gentrifiers at that time were the members of student movements in the 1960s, who were then the members of 'the cultural new class [and work] in design and advertising, journalism and the media' (Ley, 1996: 192). Gentrification in the 1970s can essentially be viewed as having been initiated by artists. Economically disadvantageous artists were the pioneers of arts-led gentrification, and in their search for affordable habitats, they played the role of 'explorers and regenerators' and invigorated 'the run-down areas' in inner cities (Krätke, 2012: 146). In addition, the cultural new class was not compatible with, or accepted by, the mainstream middle class culture and thus had a need to resettle in tattered neighbourhoods in the search for new possibilities. As Caulfield (1989: 625) depicts it, dilapidated areas of inner cities afforded more capacity for 'difference and freedom, privacy and fantasy, [and] possibilities for carnival.'

The sanctuary for ecstasy and liberation did not last long, as with the settling of the artists, 'the artistic aura ... [transformed] the meaning and value of space – and thereby its economic value' (Ley, 1996: 191). Allured by the trendy atmosphere of the artistically gentrified urban quarters, the more affluent 'subgroups of the creative workforce and other sectors' priced out the artists (Krätke, 2012: 146). The emigration of the pioneering artists ironically undermined the primary factor that pulled the middle class into the quarter, its 'creative atmosphere', and further facilitated another round of gentrification because the displaced artists needed to find another affordable location (Krätke, 2012: 146). The interchange of roles between the gentrifiers and the displaced is therefore a norm.

## B. State-led gentrification

Since the 1990s, gentrification has been embedded in globalisation and 'generalized as a central feature of ... new urbanism' (Smith, 2002: 430). Searching for a low-priced and trendy habitat is no longer the only driving force of gentrification and therefore it was redefined by Slater as 'the transformation of a working-class or vacant area of a city into middle-class residential and/or commercial use' (Slater, 2009: 294). These two definitions, made at an interval of half a century, differ from each other in terms of the gentrifiers' use of land, but both highlight the most important characteristic of gentrification, the depriving of space by the wealthy of the poor, i.e. class conflict.

Gentrification in this phase is not derived from economic necessity anymore; rather, the struggle for the use of space in inner cities denotes the dominance of one class and the resistance of another. As Smith (1996: 25) put it, 'remaking the geography of a city ...

simultaneously rewrites its social history'. In the same book, and in subsequent publications, he elaborates on the revanchist deliberation of local governments in reclaiming urban space and the enforcement of social controls to preserve urban spaces for the upper middle class (Smith, 1996, 2002). Rather than taking the positive stance of the emancipatory explanation[11] made by Caulfield (1989), Smith critically maintains gentrification to be a revanchist action, which can be traced back to the economic recession of the 1970s.

Uncertainty during recessions has incubated the ideological need of the middle-class to take back inner city space. A sense of economic insecurity has fostered a tendency for self-interest and made sympathy for disadvantaged people luxurious (Smith, 1996: 219). The rationale behind the revanchist city is that 'the poor and minorities … stole inner city from the respectable classes' (Lees, 2000: 399), so it is necessary and justifiable for the middle class to take revenge and retake the city. Gentrification, highly compatible with the goal of evacuating the minorities from inner city, 'has been an integral part of the revanchist city' (Smith, 1996: 44). Reminiscent of the unstoppable tide of gentrification depicted by Ruth Glass 50 years ago, its ubiquity is not confined to a local or domestic policy, but is more of a universal practice (Smith, 2002: 437).

Revanchist gentrification targeting the disadvantaged and anti-gentrification movements, ironically bolster one another. With increasingly antagonistic and revanchist atmospheres within urban spaces, the intensity and organisation of social movements have been magnified in order to resist repression by entrepreneurial local governments. The unification of varied strands of social appeals, 'homeless, squatting, housing, and other anti-gentrification movements and organizations' (Smith, 2002: 442), is evidence of a heated revanchist gentrification. In contrast, heightened repression by local states testifies to the effectiveness of anti-gentrification movements; the more influential these anti-gentrification movements are, the more coercive the 'repressive tactics' (Smith, 2002: 442). '[A] more hostile environment for progressive urban movement' (Mayer, 2006: 93) has emerged, and in these circumstances minorities are easily demonised as accountable for the scale of social upheavals. A plausible justification is thus available: urban politicians and police forces exercise severe social controls in the name of ensuring that a city is a safe and harmonious habitat, of course for the middle class (Smith, 1996, 2002). The revanchist tendency can

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[11] In contrast to the critical view of Neil Smith's revanchist explanation, Jon Caulfield perceives gentrification as the repercussion of emancipatory motives, which 'liberated middle-classes, united different people in the central city and created opportunity for social interaction and tolerance' (Slater, 2004: 1193).

hardly be proclaimed as ecological or emancipatory; rather, gentrification is a purposive action to boost urban development.

## C. Why do local governments take part in/facilitate revanchist action?

Following the development of the revanchist city, it is necessary to discern the reason why (local) states are engaged in or facilitate the process of gentrification. Gentrification incentivises local governments with an inclusive and glamorous urban image. Although it has never appeared in the ostensible language of urban policy, gentrification has been the essence of urban development in recent decades; instead, 'terms like urban renaissance, urban revitalisation, urban regeneration and urban sustainability' are commonly seen (Lees, 2008: 2452). Therefore, the criticism and class conflicts inherent in gentrification have been dismissed and covered up by the sugar-coating of social mixing and social inclusion (Lees, 2008: 2452). The idea of 'socially mixed neighbourhoods' (Lees, 2008: 2451) is hard to object to because the diversity it suggests makes it seem benign.

It is not only the gentrifying of dilapidated neighbourhoods in the name of social mixing that is reprehensible, as whether social mixing is a goal worthy of being pursued is also questionable. As Atkinson (2006: 829-830) argues, '[if] diversity is to be encouraged, it may be possible only through a vision of a vibrant city, rather than an enforced social blend at the neighbourhood scale.' One of the functions of a neighbourhood is to provide a sense of belonging and safety for residents. Institutionally mixing people from diverse backgrounds may well endanger a homogeneous neighbourhood's original functions as a 'defensive protection from attack' and a haven to rest from the frustration caused by social and economic powerlessness (Peach, 1996: 387). In addition, what gentrification brings to old neighbourhoods, as Lees (2008) argues, is probably not greater social integration but a wider distance between different groups. In contrast to how social mixing has normally been portrayed within policy discourse, the frequency of social interaction is greatest in homogeneous communities, and what gentrification results in is the 'tectonic juxtapositions of polarised socio-economic groups rather than socially cohesive communities' (Lees, 2008: 2458).

Nevertheless, revitalising a run-down area through gentrification is an appealing approach for local states. On the surface, the economic potential generated by gentrifiers and the improvement in statistics make gentrification a cure for abandoned areas (Slater, 2009: 302). By replacing 'a working-class or vacant area' with a space for the residential or

cultural purposes of the middle class (Slater, 2009: 294), gentrification provides an immediate and apparent solution to the unpleasant abandonment of space. However, gentrification and abandonment are indeed two sides of the same coin (Marcuse, 1985: 197). The gentrification in one locality simultaneously incurs the abandonment of where these gentrifiers come from because of the reduced demand in those areas. Just as Glass described, gentrification continues in a continuous cycle, and 'a vicious circle is [consequently] created in which the poor are continuously under pressure of displacement and the wealthy continuously seek to wall themselves within gentrified neighbourhoods' (Marcuse, 1985: 196). The circle created by gentrification and abandonment summarises contemporary urban regeneration, and makes the underprivileged destined for constant displacement.

## 2.4   Mega-Events and the Olympic Games

Mega-events and hallmark events are two terms that appear interchangeably in the literature, and pinpoint and accentuate the extraordinary scale and impacts of the events they represent. Each of them can be defined as 'major one-time or recurring events of limited duration, developed primarily to enhance the awareness, appeal and profitability of a tourism destination in the short and/or long term' (Ritchie, 1984: 2). Two criteria for mega-events can be extracted from this definition, with the first being the definiteness of the timeframe of mega-events. Mega-events demand an abnormal amount of resources to be concentrated in one place in order to generate a great deal of global attention. Such investment can only be made for a limited duration due to not only the confined resources of organising authorities, but the decreasing interest of the public in the spectacles as time goes by. Second and more crucial, is the motivations of bidding cities. The definition provided by Ritchie (1984) more than 30 years ago seems to confine the purpose of hosting mega-events to tourism, whereas the bulk of the subsequent literature has provided empirical data as evidence for the expansion of the scope of the host cities' mega-aspirations. For example, a study by Andranovich et al. (2001) on the aspirations, organisation and legacies of the three American Olympic Games revealed some differences between them as a result of their respective local conditions and the international scenario when the Games were staged. In their research, while they found that boosting tourism was the primary aim of the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, the 1984 Los Angeles and the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympics held more hybrid Olympic aspirations, such as social and physical regeneration, and place branding.

From the perspective of potential host cities, the Olympic Games is legitimately the most influential and attractive mega-event of the present day. Although some may argue that the attention and tourists from around the world attracted by the FIFA World Cup cannot be underestimated either, its influence tends to be geographically dispersed because the bidding unit is a nation rather than a city, and as in the case of the 2002 FIFA World Cup when it was co-hosted by Japan and South Korea, there is sometimes more than one host nation. Hence, in terms of the concentrated attention, the enticement of the Olympic Games for cities easily outstrips that of the FIFA World Cup.

In spite of the current phenomenon that cities compete for the hosting rights of mega-events one after another, the Olympics were not very desirable or welcomed by nations and local regions until 30 years ago. In 776 BC the Olympic Games were dedicated 'to the Olympian gods and were staged on the ancient plains of Olympia' (IOC, 2012a). This was a time when the Olympics was endowed with moral responsibility because 'sport was the springboard for renewed moral energy' (IOC, 2012b). The first Olympic Games of the modern times was held in 1896 in Athens, and since then the Olympics has been 'formed by … political and cultural forces and conflicts' (Roche, 2000: 99). The transformation of its status and role hinges largely upon international relations and the past ideological battles between various states. What has not changed too much is that sports can never simply be sports, and hosting cities and countries have not merely confined competitions within their respective stadia, but extended them to political, cultural and economic arenas. Based on the temporal categorisation of Shoval (2002), the following section discusses the different historical phases of the Olympic Games according to their scale, function and organisation.

**A. The first phase: from 1896 to the inter-war period**

The three Olympic Games that followed the first in 1896 were held on a very limited scale and merged into the World Fairs events, which were more highly regarded than the Olympic Games during this period. During the inter-war period, athletics matches directly symbolised the ideological competition between communism, fascism and imperialism (Roche, 2000: 99). Not only was the Olympic Games manipulated 'to propagandise ideology and to display power' (Roche, 2000: 122), but the staging and participation or non-participation in these events were viewed 'as significant resources in [the] conduct of foreign policy' (Roche, 2000: 104).

## B. The second phase: from the 1950s (post-war period) to 1984

In the 1950s 'advances in photography and the widespread use of radio' (Shoval, 2002: 589) signified the second phase of Olympic development. Although the Olympic Games was ideologically and diplomatically utilised, the World Fairs still enjoyed higher status in the previous phase because they were a relatively more straightforward stage for showcasing national power. However, the wider implications of audio-visual media marginalised the World Fairs' demonstration function since political propaganda could be disseminated through photos and radio or TV programmes, and the decline in World Fairs provided a subtle opportunity for the Olympic Games. Nations and cities still lacked the enthusiasm to vigorously participate in the Olympics due to the limited prevalence of television and the resulting limited profitability of selling broadcastings right (Shoval, 2002: 589). This also determined the high financial reliance on the IOC, and thus the power asymmetry between the IOC and host cities. In this post-war phase the countries interested in the Olympics were either those defeated in the Second World War or newly arising countries; the former aimed to stand on the world stage with a 'new sets of values' and the latter needed to attract the world's attention to 'their achievements and agendas' (Shoval, 2002: 589). Thus, the utilisation of the Olympic Games in this phase started to depart from ideological battles and to focus on the needs of the host nations. The efforts made to renew or establish the image of a nation can be regarded as the beginning of place branding. Nonetheless, the branding unit at this time remained the nation of the host city, rather than the city itself.

## C. The third phase: from 1984 to 2000

The Olympic Games in Los Angeles in 1984 was a turning point in Olympic history. The fact that Los Angeles was the only serious and viable contender for hosting the 1984 Olympic Games left the IOC with little leverage in bargaining with the financial responsibility for the Games (Andranovich et al., 2001: 119; Whitson and Horne, 2006: 74). Consequently, the bid committee of Los Angeles was enabled 'to negotiate an unprecedented contract with the IOC', and rather than the city, the ultimate financial guarantor of the Olympic Games was the OCOG of Los Angeles and the Notional Olympic Committee (NOC) of the US (Andranovich et al., 2001: 119). That is also why since then the IOC has determined that 'there shall in future always be a good choice of aspiring host cities' (Hill, 1992: 90).

Financially speaking, the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics was the first Games that was almost entirely sponsored by the private sector (Andranovich et al., 2001: 119), and a new

financial model of hosting the Olympics, which 'finely tuned commercialism with cost-consciousness in the face of limited public funds', has emerged since then (Gold and Gold, 2008: 306). Not only was there a heavy reliance on private sponsorship, but the 1984 Olympics also ended the impression of a financial deficit as the destined outcome of hosting cities, as in the case of the 1976 Montreal Olympics. The Los Angeles Olympics generated a surplus of $215 million (Essex and Chalkley, 1998: 192) and thus the Games became a tool for tangible infrastructure regeneration, rather than as in the past, where there was only intangible 'visibility, prestige, or symbolism' (Shoval, 2002: 590).

The partnership and collaboration between the public and private sector has become a paradigm for Olympic delivery since then. Nevertheless, the reduced public financial burden also implies the weakened justifiability for public control since the vast majority of the budget is not from general funds (Andranovich et al., 2001: 119). The heavy financial reliance on private investment in the delivery of the Games proved to be problematic in the Atlanta 1996 Summer Olympics. The organisers of Atlanta 1996 hoped to encompass the multiple and even competing goals of increasing civic pride, boosting the local economy, and building a cultural city image in one Olympic package, and ultimately, the Olympic investment of Atlanta did provide returns economically, especially for the local business community. However the city image was too heavily commercialised to carry cultural elements within it, and the negative social impacts were severely criticised too (Andranovich et al., 2001: 126; Gold and Gold, 2008: 308).

The enlarged scale of the Olympic Games also reflected the soaring amount of sponsorship required from private corporations, although 'there does not seem to be a lack of sponsors … to make such a large investment' (Ponsford and Agrawal, 1999: 26). This fact simply indicates that the foreseeable, or at least prospective, returns are expected to be much higher than the costs, and the benefits that private sponsors' look forward to are multi-dimensional. In addition to enlarging market share or amplifying brand awareness,  although neither may be the main motives since the corporations capable of sponsoring the Olympic Games are always the big and renowned ones, 'the other target groups are the community as a whole, distributors, suppliers, investors, and competitors' (Ponsford and Agrawal, 1999: 26).

This phase also witnessed the rise of global spectators bred by the prevalence of live broadcasting; people from every corner of the world can watch the Olympic Games live with no temporal and spatial confinement. The broadcasting rights have thus become extremely expensive, since the size of the global viewership is equal to the size of potential consumers.

The Olympic Charter (IOC, 2014: 20) states that the broadcasting rights of the Olympic Games exclusively belong to the IOC, who are entitled to sell and negotiate the price with interested networks. Furthermore, a new system introduced in 1996 bundled the rights for broadcasting Summer and Winter Olympic Games together as a package (Shoval, 2002: 585). This saves the hassle of the host city having to negotiate with different TV networks in different countries and simultaneously strengthens the power of the IOC. The revenue made from the deals is shared between the IOC, international sports federations, and the NOC.

Since the Los Angeles 1984 Olympics, the transaction price of the broadcasting rights has risen dramatically in every Olympic Games (Shoval, 2002: 586). The fees for the television rights for the Olympics in the 1984 Los Angeles were more than eight times that of the 1976 Montreal Games (Horne, 2007), and television fees have become the main contributor of the Olympic revenue for host cities (Andranovich et al., 2001; Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Gold and Gold, 2008; Horne, 2007; Ponsford and Agrawal, 1999). With the prevalence of television, the commercialisation of sports hatched by 'the media discourse on place competitiveness' and 'the growth of corporate and government interests' in mega-events (Hall, 2006: 60) is growing.

**D.  The fourth phase: from 2000 to the future**

If the third phase was characterised by the profitability of hosting the Olympic Games, this phase sublimates and elevates the exercise and impact of such profitability to another level. Economic growth, attracting tourists and investment, municipal infrastructure enhancement, social and physical urban renewal, place branding or rebranding, and boosting civic pride, are all encapsulated in the delivery of the modern Olympic Games. The competitions in the stadium have been well infused with the neoliberalism concept of competition. This is also why the craze for hosting the Olympic Games shows no sign of ceasing and has even become a colossally 'extended extravaganza' (Whitson and Horne, 2006: 74) even in the face of constant criticism of disappointing economic returns, negative social impacts and underused 'white elephants'.

The imperative for cities to compete with one another penetrates them at all scales, even those on the 'A list'. For example, a study by Shoval (2002: 597) on the motives of London and New York for submitting an Olympic bid reveals a need to 'stay ahead of rivals' and a sentiment of retaining their statuses as world cities. Global cities have an imperative to compete and win. In the case of London, Shoval quoted from one of his interviewees that:

'London must fight to maintain its cultural, economic, political ... status because of the competition from other cities such as Paris, Berlin, Frankfurt' (Shoval, 2002: 596). In other words, rather than maintaining the *status quo*, they have to participate in the competition in order to retain the *status quo*. For cities of a smaller scale, the opportunity of hosting the Olympics cannot be forgone because it carries heavy weight in providing a platform for showcasing and aggregating resources of various kinds. As Hall (2006: 64) observes, hosting mega-events nowadays is vital in inter-urban competition in at least three dimensions: upgrading infrastructure, enriching the economy and validating governability (to secure mega-events). It appears to be a pill that cures every urban illness.

Since the third and fourth phases of the history of the Olympic Games, the maturity of the Olympic sponsorship scheme has been an integral part of, or even the driving force behind, the Games. The sale of broadcast rights, The Olympic Partner (TOP) sponsorship programme and OCOG domestic sponsorship also massively contribute to the revenue of the IOC in each Games delivery. The prevalence of television set ownership has trebled the price of Olympic broadcasting rights over the last 20 years (Figure 2.2); the global audience for the 2008 Beijing Olympics reached 3.546bn, and rose further to 3.635bn for London 2012 (IOC, 2015: 21).



**Figure 2.2: Olympic marketing revenue from the sale of broadcast rights, TOP programme and OCOG domestic sponsorship**
Data source: IOC (2015: 6)

Such an enormous reach inspires sponsorship from numerous global corporations. This is not merely due to the global visibility derived from the popularity of television, but the prestige which the Olympic concept enjoys as a brand (de Moragas Spa et al., 1995: 26). More than a quadrennial international sporting competition, the Olympics has been regarded by global consumers as a brand associated with 'modernity' and 'excellence' (de Moragas Spa et al., 1995: 26), as well as promoting 'international cooperation and brotherhood'.[12] Such moral values associated with the Olympic brand are scarcely achievable by, or comparable with, any other international sporting events.

As a result, it is not surprising that for private corporations, generously sponsoring the Olympic Games, whether through the IOC's TOP programme or through OCOG's domestic scheme, is a worthwhile investment. As can be seen in

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[12] International Sport, Culture and Leisure Marketing 1985. *TOP: The consumer view. An international research survey into sponsorship of the Olympic Games*, cited in de Moragas Spa et al. (1995: 26).

Table 2.1, the Olympic revenue generated from broadcast rights, sponsorship, ticketing and licensing has steadily grown from US$ 2,630 million two decades ago to US$ 8,046 million in the recent quadrennium (2008-2012). Numerically speaking, it is undeniable that the delivery of the Olympic Games is generating more and more income for the actors involved. Hence, to ensure the continuous occurrence of profit maximisation in every Olympic Games, it is necessary for the IOC to 'define in detail the nature of the event and its organisation and financing, and control the use of such things as the Olympic symbols in the course of this' (Roche, 2000: 137). As the driving force to power the production of a space for the production and consumption of the Olympic Games, the Olympic Family, IOC, NOCs, international sports federations, OCOGs and sponsors, have a strong financial incentive to ensure profit generation through the standardisation of procedures. The extravagance and lavishness of the Games delivery is consequently unsurprising.

**Table 2.1: Olympic marketing revenue: the past five quadrennia**

| Source | 1993 – 1996 | 1997 – 2000 | 2001 – 2004 | 2005 – 2008 | 2009 – 2012 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Broadcast | 1,251 | 1,845 | 2,232 | 2,570 | 3,850 |
| TOP Programme | 279 | 579 | 663 | 866 | 950 |
| OGOC Domestic Sponsorship | 534 | 655 | 796 | 1,555 | 1,838 |
| Ticketing | 451 | 625 | 411 | 274 | 1,238 |
| Licensing | 115 | 66 | 87 | 185 | 170 |
| Total | 2,630 | 3,770 | 4,189 | 5,450 | 8,046 |

All figures in USD millions

All figures have been rounded to the nearest US$1 million.
Does not include NOC domestic commercial programme revenues.
Source: IOC (2015: 6)

## 2.5  Chapter Conclusion

This chapter started with a description of the paradigmatic shift from NPM to governance, which signalled the changing role of state and its relationship with civil society. Although some literature sees NPM and network governance as largely in the same family, since they both 'downplay the public-private dichotomy' and stress the importance of competition (Peters and Pierre, 1998), focusing attention on their diverse primary concerns and on the issues they respond to is more inspirational for understanding their impacts. NPM's ultimate concern is efficiency, and in response to the criticism of inefficiency, NPM was known in the 1980s for having an intra-organisational reform approach. Management tools in the private sector, the strict separation between policymaking and implementation, and the marketisation of public service delivery were all promoted and adopted by governments.

Network governance, dissatisfied with NPM's obsession with results and performance indicators, recognises interdependency and focuses on relationships and negotiations at the inter-organisational level. The focus of public administration has also shifted from the dimension of governmental management to how states position themselves in civil society. For NPM, inclusion and cooperation with the private sector in policy implementation serve the purpose of maximising efficiency and optimising performance. In contrast, the process orientation renders network governance as having to include and cooperate with the private sector at a much earlier phase than NPM does. It is believed within network governance that the input of opinions from multiple actors can lead to more rounded decision-making, which

is why network governance is perceived to value input legitimacy, as opposed to NPM's stress on output legitimacy (Klijn, 2012).

The shift from NPM to network governance also testifies to the obsolescence and collapse of the high wall between the public and private sector. The increasing role of the private sector in policy processes is even more apparent at local level. Harvey (1989) sharply points out that there has been a cross-national and cross-ideological transition from managerialism to entrepreneurialism in local governance since the late 1980s. In the face of downsized subsidies from the central state and increased demands from citizens, local authorities needed and were encouraged to be more entrepreneurial and innovative. Creatively conceiving methods to provide more and better public services with less resources equates with good governance (Osborne, 1993). Profiting is even more of a virtue than cost reduction, and domestic pressures and scarce resources provide a hotbed for the prevalence of inter-urban competition.

As the root of other neoliberal problematic derivatives (Peck, 2005: 761), zero-sum inter-urban competition comprises entrepreneurial urban governance. In the name of enhancing competitiveness and boosting economic growth, entrepreneurial local states restructured urban space to 'privilege the functional elites within the neoliberal model of society' (Krätke, 2012: 147). The logic of competition 'becomes the motor force for progress' (Atkinson, 1999: 63) within urban economies.

In this project, the growth machine and urban regime have been selected in order to discern the relationship between economic growth rationale and urban governance. Both inquire as to how development policies have gained a privileged, prioritised position within US urban politics. While they provide different explanations for coalition formation and the role of states, they both place great concern on the importance of coalitions and the politics of production. These attributes are largely rooted in the peculiar circumstances of US local politics, and their applicability in the UK is more disputed. However, their focus on stakeholder elites is certainly important when it comes to mega-event bids and implementation strategies.

The cross-national prevalence of entrepreneurialism significantly assimilates the focus of urban governance in different countries. The consequences conform to US-focused political economy analysis, with an increasingly strong influence of and reliance on the business sector, especially in development and promotion projects. The hosting of mega-

events epitomises these attributes. Notwithstanding this, the loophole apparent in both models' downplaying of the role of extra-local forces would be even more clear in the delivery of mega-events; the entire sponsoring and spectacle system could not function without place competition and globalisation as its setting.

The strategies for pursuing urban growth can be reduced to the creation of a good business and people climate. To create a business climate, cost-related tools, such as tax reductions, are commonly used by local states. Some literature regard these as a low-end strategy, which is based on inter-urban imitation and fails to catch the essence of the knowledge-based economy (Malecki, 2004). In contrast, the creation of a people climate is viewed as the key to urban economic success. The making of creative cities (Florida, 2002, 2003), which allows for the generation of a cool lifestyle and the inhabiting of it by young and well-educated creative talents, has been well incorporated into urban planning.

It is thus unsurprising that the gentrification of urban spaces has been widely practised and generalised (Smith, 2002: 441). As opposed to the tide of arts-led gentrification in the 1960s, as depicted by Glass (1964), gentrification since the 1990s has intersected with the process of globalisation and has featured a high reliance on state and corporate financial power. Both gentrification nowadays and its counterpart half a century ago, invoke the change of space use and thus the culture and social relations of the gentrified locality. What is worth pointing out is the revanchist policy discourse employed by the current state-led gentrification (Smith, 1996, 2002). The state-endorsed rationale provides justification for the middle and upper classes to be insensitive to the disadvantaged and the minorities in cities and facilitates an encompassing realm of gentrification.

➢ **Mega-events in urban governance**

Hosting a mega-event like the Olympic Games is a brilliant instrument for local states against the backdrop of inter-urban competition. There has been a transformation in the role and function of the Olympic Games during different historical phases (Shoval, 2002). In the century since the first modern Olympic Games held in 1896 to the hosting of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, the Games have ranged from being regarded as a clash of ideologies to a platform to showcase the power of the host country. The Olympics was not as welcome as it is today by prospective host cities, especially after the huge debt Montreal had to shoulder after hosting the 1976 Games (Andranovich et al., 2001; Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Gold and Gold, 2008; Ritchie et al., 2009). The 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, which demonstrated a new

financing model for staging the Games and the potentiality for host cities to economically profit, marked the start of a new era in Olympic history.

From host cities' perspective, hosting mega-events like the Olympic Games serves to provide multiple benefits at once, although not for all. These events nowadays endorse and justify mega-projects and spatial Imagineering. The changing approach of governing urban space from managerialism to entrepreneurialism connotes the marketed urban space, the geographic bribery of urban policies (Smith, 1996: 427), and a consumption-based urban economy (Roodhouse, 2009: 89). All of these strategies are designed to create a business or a people climate in inter-urban competition, which has operated as an 'external coercive power' (Harvey, 1989: 10) on local states. Hosting mega-events is unexceptionally a manifestation of such coercive power. The potential benefits to look forward to are the strongest justification for the enormous investment in the festival.

The existing literature on mega-event legacies can be categorised according to three interrelated research focuses. A great proportion of the studies on mega-events are dedicated to short-term and long-term economic benefits evaluations (Preuss, 2004, 2006; Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2006; Tien et al., 2011). Pyo et al. (1988) evaluated tourism stimulations of six Summer Olympics from 1964 to 1984. The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games was an exemplar for a private-funded model and the lucrative potential of delivering the Games, yet the economic return of hosting mega-events demonstrates 'fewer examples of success', with hosts burdened by severe financial debt (Cornelissen and Swart, 2006: 110). These failures can partly be attributed to soaring levels of optimism concerning the profitability of hosting a mega-event at local scale. While a mega-event is capable of pulling external visitors into town, it may simultaneously push local residents out, who leave in order to avoid 'the invasion of mega-event visitors, as occurred frequently when Atlanta hosted the Olympics' (Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2006: 424). Even when an event-led economic windfall seems to be bolstered, the empirical results are subject to scepticism due to theoretical omissions and errors (Baade, 2006).

Other studies focus on the penetration of hosting mega-events through its ability to transform urban landscape. With the anticipation that a global event is to be held in the foreseeable future, it is easier and faster for local states to accumulate the required capital from both the central state and private investment for regeneration and infrastructure, which would otherwise take longer or even never happen. Money spent on physical regeneration becomes plausible and justifiable, and the pace of regeneration is also accelerated because

there is a clear deadline beforehand, when preparations for staging the show have to be completed (Essex and Chalkley, 1998: 201).

Nevertheless, 'the regeneration punch' promised by the Olympics does not always materialise, and sometimes the Games even catalyse 'deep urban decomposition' (Hammond, 2011). While upgraded infrastructure and renewed neighbourhoods may indeed comprise post-event benefits and legacies, the acceleration of urban transformation also means the diversion of resources from social policy areas and bypassing normal democratic procedures.

A more disturbing dimension here is that of slum clearance, carried out in the name of showing the best of a host city to the world. A report by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) in 1996 declared that hosting mega-events was 'one of the most common justifications' for beautification projects like slum clearance' (Greene, 2003: 163). As a globalising power, a mega-event engenders 'staged cities', in which 'an image of "development"' is constructed and the 'landscapes of the urban poor' are 'actively concealed' (Greene, 2003: 163). The mass eviction of a marginalised population almost becomes a global norm of mega-event delivery. A few empirical cases have been explored by Olds (1998) on three mega-events which Canada either hosted (Expo '86 in Vancouver; the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics) or bid for (the 1996 Summer Olympics in Toronto), Shin (2009) on the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics, and Steinbrink (2014) on the most recent case, Rio de Janeiro, which was the host city for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics.

Despite the social crisis which hosting mega-events may thereby incur, they remain enchanting to entrepreneurial cities. Gaffney (2010), who traversed decades of Rio de Janeiro's urban development, revealed that mega-events wrapped social relations and space use in accordance with the logic of global political economy. By fixing urban space, funnelling public monies into private interests, and cultivating the Olympic-disciplined bodies, mega-events transform host cities into realms of consumerism and exacerbate existing social inequalities (Gaffney, 2010: 26-27). Yet local states actively downplay or even intentionally forsake these negatives and embrace development-oriented urban governance.

The final category in the literature concerns the ostentatious effects of hosting mega-events, namely place branding. With the global limelight fixated on one spot, host cities and countries endeavour to seize the precious opportunity to change their external place image, and 'selective images ... to a target audience' (Gold and Gold, 2008: 301) are showcased. Zhang and Zhao (2009) examined the effectiveness of Beijing's city branding at the 2008

Summer Olympics, and found a mismatch between the attractiveness of the city image and its authenticity. With special reference to the 2002 FIFA World Cup, Lee et al. (2005) argued that an enhanced destination image of South Korea certainly exists in the minds of those who visited, specifically due to the mega-event in question, but less so among those who did not.

Not only can the external image be enhanced, but also a host city's 'local pride and community spirit' (Malfas et al., 2004: 214). In the competitive bidding process 'the construction of local and national identities' (Wamsley and Heine, 1996: 81) weighs no less than the creation of an external place image, as the degree of popular support enjoyed has been a criteria in choosing the host city. More profoundly, the hosting of mega-events also provides a golden opportunity to boost local identity, national pride, and a sense of togetherness. While social engineering has been seen in Eastern editions of mega-events (Broudehoux, 2012; Choi, 2004), such attempts are also noticeable in Western countries. Hargreaves and Ferrando (1997) and MacRury and Poynter (2010) investigated the paradoxes and reconciliation among different scales of civic identity with reference to the Barcelona 1992 and London 2012 Olympics, respectively.

The potential legacies of hosting mega-events, as a result, can be summarised from the literature into three strands: stimulating the local and domestic economy, accelerating urban development and regeneration, and place-branding effects. A proper evaluation of the local economic benefits engendered by the Olympic Games would however take several years and huge resources (Gratton et al., 2006: 43). With regard to this difficulty, this project treats the social and economic transformation of the chosen cases as part of the East London regeneration and of Beijing's modernisation ambitions.

Regarding urban regeneration and city branding as the two primary legacies that are crucial to urban governance, this PhD project has chosen the London 2012 Olympics and the Beijing 2008 Olympics to analyse urban regeneration and city branding in the Olympic process. The next chapter on methodology elaborates on why these two cases were chosen and how data were collected and interpreted in this project.

# Chapter 3 - Methodology and Research Design

## 3.1  Chapter Introduction

In adopting an interpretive approach, which recognises the difference between natural and social science and views social reality as the interpreted 'product of its inhabitants' (Blaikie, 2007: 131), this project aims to understand the process of social reality rather than explain it. In interpretive research people formulate their understanding and perspectives on social realities according to their personal experiences. Moreover, since no human lives in isolation, an individual's subjective interpretation of the world is also 'negotiated socially and historically', and inevitably 'formed through interaction with others' (Creswell, 2009: 8). Ontologically, this project takes a stance of multiple social realities; epistemologically, it contends that knowledge about these realities can only emerge through understanding the process.

By evaluating the Olympic legacies bequeathed to host cities, this project aims to reveal the influence of hosting the Olympics on urban governance. The delivery of an Olympic Games is a process of social reality, from bidding and staging to legacy. This process itself incurs multiple interpretations due to the diverse stances of its stakeholders. Rather than seeking to establish whose interpretation and opinion is (closer to) the truth, this project focuses on the articulation of these interpretations, and their underlying and unspoken significance. Not only are they socially constructed, but the events taking place and policies implemented are formulated by the interpretations of social actors.

Such an interpretive stance fundamentally influences the research design, which ' is a logical plan for getting from here to there' (Yin, 2014: 28);  'here' means the questions that the research tries to answer, while 'there' means the answers to these questions. The design can be metaphorically understood as an intellectual itinerary, travelling from the questions to their answers. The key to answering research questions is not searching for the one and only social reality, but revealing different social realities constructed by different actors. By juxtaposing and analysing these interpretations, a meaningful and valuable contribution can be made.

Before elaborating upon the methods of accessing multiple interpretations, this chapter needs to temporarily divert attention to the rationale behind conducting a

comparative study and the selection of the cases. Section 3.2 discusses the study's theoretical contribution by comparing two distinct cases. Rather than selecting cases with similar backgrounds, intentionally comparing cases with dichotomised socio-political contexts is more advantageous in building theory because it has the potential to transcend parochialism, encourage conversation across different contexts, and more importantly, facilitates a cross-national appraisal of the Olympic Games.

Section 3.3 describes the methods and implementation of data collection. The type of research questions is key in making decisions regarding data collection methods. Based on the three research questions set out in Chapter 1, the methods chosen to access interpretations from various actors are therefore designed. However, the socio-political contexts are so diverse between the two cases that these methods need to be adjusted accordingly. This project is methodologically innovative in terms of the variety of information sources accessed. With reference to the existing literature, most studies on mega-events adopt a top-down analytical approach, using official policy papers, media coverage and expert interviews as sources of data. Some studies do cover the views of citizens of the host cities and countries through surveys, but their respondents were the general publics of the cities in question. The geographical span of a city is several times the size of the Olympic site itself, which is usually situated on the relative periphery. Citizens outside the Olympic neighbourhood understandably tend to care less about the Games, because they have relatively less stake in their successful delivery. Surveying them and incorporating their views as part of local opinion is thus unfocused, somewhat misleading and ultimately waters down the opinion of those who are genuinely influenced. This project, in consequence, only accessed and included citizens of the Olympic neighbourhood in each case, and their viewpoints are counted as local opinion.

## 3.2   A Comparative Case Study

A case study involves either single or multiple cases (Yin, 2014: 18), which is why a comparative study is definitely a case study since it entails using cases for conducting a comparison. However, looking at it the other way is not necessarily true and the most obvious reason is that a case study may only involve a single case so that a comparison is impossible to make. More importantly, a case study involving the juxtaposition of data collected from multiple cases does not comprise a comparative study, as it is only possible to identify 'similarities and differences' among cases without further comparison (Pickvance,

1986: 164). In spite of the fact that the monograph of each case in a comparative study is as indispensable as it is in a case study, a comparative study denotes 'a higher level of abstraction' (Pickvance, 1986: 180). For the purpose of comparison, singling out certain features in one or more cases and thereby conceiving a theoretical structure is necessary. Nevertheless, the devotion to details and complexities of case description tends to sacrifice the pursuit for intellectual abstraction (Pickvance, 1986: 180). It is thus essential for a comparative case study to retrieve a fine balance between an in-depth monograph and a reductionist abstraction.

### 3.2.1   Potentiality for Comparison in Urban Studies

Recognising the nature of a comparative case study as such brings about a question: what targets is a comparative case study trying to achieve through retrieving this balance? One of the functions of conducting comparative studies is to 'become aware of diversity and overcome ethnocentricism' (Pickvance, 1986: 162). The acknowledgement of diversity further forces the researcher to revisit 'theoretical interests in a topic' and to reconsider what the essential features are and what the non-essential ones are (Pickvance, 1986: 163). Pointedly, in urban studies, strategically using comparative methods for a more democratic research interest has been advocated. McFarlane (2010) suggested an alternative epistemology of regarding comparisons in urban studies as 'a potential site of politics ... [and] as a strategy for destabilizing the assumptions and limits of knowledge' (McFarlane, 2010: 8). In so doing, the parochialism in comparative urban studies is undermined, and the exploration and advancement of knowledge are unleashed.

Robinson more specifically challenged the categorisation of cities and the inter-categorical incommensurability (2006, 2011), and picked the entwined relationship between modernity and developmentalism. To label a certain type of urban life, that is the lifestyles in West European and North American cities, as modern simultaneously determines the non-modern 'others and elsewheres'. The cities in the ranks of the non-modern thus need to follow the one and only developmental trajectory to achieve the one and only end—modernity (Robinson, 2006: 4). In such a framework, the cities that have already completed the route of development and those that have not are reasonably incommensurable. Rather than viewing 'the diverse flows and borrowings' among different urban spaces and urban governances as uni-directional, a one-way 'copy' process from the underdeveloped/ developing to the developed, she advocated recognising the multi-directionality of the flows

and borrowings and envisioning a 'cosmopolitan imagination' of comparative studies in urbanism (Robinson, 2006: 78).

Comparative urban studies are potentially capable of enhancing mutual understandings and facilitating dialogue between cities, whereas this aim, according to McFarlane and Robinson, cannot be achieved in a conventional comparative framework. In order not to replicate ethnocentrism and parochialism in urban comparative studies, it is imperative to normalise all the cities in the world, since they are all 'distinctive and unique rather than exemplars of any category' (Robinson, 2006: 171). Further 'similarities and differences ... are promiscuously distributed across cities' (Robinson, 2006: 63), so in respect of that, any categorisation according to their economic, cultural and political characteristics is basically arbitrary, overly reductionist and ultimately futile. All cities are equally unique and ordinary; all cities are ordinary cities (Robinson, 2006).

Treating all cities as equally ordinary is advantageous when the distinctiveness of chosen cases is to be appreciated. In spite of the need to recognise the interlocked and hierarchical relations among cities that have been 'used by global capital as "basing points"' (Friedmann, 1986: 71), normalising cities breeds mutual and 'creative learning across the experiences of diverse kinds of cities' (Robinson, 2006: 7). Otherwise, even if the cities chosen for comparison traverse the ranks of the developed and the underdeveloped/developing, the argument and inference derived from the comparative analysis remains following the trajectory of developmentalism— a one-way process for non-modern cities to copy the routes of the modern ones.

The appreciation of the similarities and differences between cases traverses the entire scope of the project. If a comparative study is potentially able to destabilise the matter-of-fact but unconducive democracy/autocracy, capitalist/socialist, developed/underdeveloped, and Western/non-Western dichotomies, this project may contribute to this mission through the selection of two cases as dichotomised as possible in terms of the above criteria. Therefore, how the same Olympic process has been paved by two completely diverse cities and whether the dichotomies lead to similar or different interpretive answers to the research questions can be revealed. As a project intending to compare the process of the same mega-event taking place in the two cities, it is worth noting that the searching for and proving of causal relations is not the aim of the project. Neither similarities nor differences between the interpretative answers of the two cases are attributable to one or more causes. Rather than a causal explanation of variables, the value of a small qualitative case study lies in the

exploration and revelation of dynamic processes. Moreover, this feature makes the approach of inferences applicable for a comparative case study more discriminating. The following section elaborates on the topic.

### 3.2.2 Inferences and Generalisations

Qualitative research provides an opportunity to 'research into the processes leading to results' (Gillham, 2000: 11). Capturing the relatively open and non-linear characters of case studies, Dubois and Gadde (2002) proposed the 'systematic combining' approach to conducting case studies, which allows the co-evolution between a theoretical framework and empirical findings throughout the research progress; therefore, the unanticipated variables or relations can be discovered. Nevertheless, its beauty and ugliness boil down to the same root. The capability of case studies in unveiling 'the interaction between a phenomenon and its context' (Dubois and Gadde, 2002: 554) simultaneously makes setting boundaries for the research a challenging task. In the face of the continuity of reality and the interrelatedness between empirical activities, a case study demands the researcher to constantly review the confines of the research, and as a result, eliminate the parts unfit for 'the final jigsaw puzzle' (Dubois and Gadde, 2002: 560).

It is this unceasing interplay between theory and findings, and the nonlinear reframing, redirecting and reviewing that feature within case studies. As Yin (2014: 40) argues, rather than being mistaken as sample units, case(s) in a case study should be regarded as 'the opportunity to shed empirical light about some theoretical concepts and principles.' Cases do not equal sample units, and regarding cases in this way fundamentally challenges the applicability of statistical inferences and statistical generalisations, which have been widely used in quantitative studies. Rather, case studies can and should only make logical inferences because the number of cases involved will never meet the law of probability and therefore make any statistical inferences unjustified. Increasing the number of cases in a case study may achieve other analytical purposes, but statistical generalisability can certainly not be one of them (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Small, 2009; Yin, 2014).

Statistical significance is not the only route toward generalisation. Instead, the inference and generalisation of a case study should be guided by and grounded in theoretical and logical analysis. In spite of the co-developing and co-shaping nature between a theoretical framework and empirical data, the researcher should only enter the field site with 'articulated preconception[s]' (Dubois and Gadde, 2002: 555) and always 'consider the

phenomena in the light of framework' (Dubois and Gadde, 2002: 559). Besides resorting to theories, logical coherence is the major criterion for evaluating the quality of a case study (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Small, 2009). On the grounds of logical coherence, analytic generalisation, which uses theories as an inference tool and aims to reach 'a conceptual level higher than that of the specific case' (Yin, 2014: 41), is attainable and exactly what a case study demands.

## 3.3 Fieldwork and Data Collection

The fieldwork for the project was reviewed beforehand by and under the approval of the ELMPS ethics committee at the University of York. The fieldwork was composed of two parts: fieldwork in London and fieldwork in Beijing, and six months and four months were spent in London and Beijing, respectively. The London fieldwork started in August 2013 and continued to January 2014, and the Beijing fieldwork ran from March 2014 to June 2014. The two-month interval between the sets of fieldwork was deliberately retained to allow time for conducting preliminary data analysis and reviewing the London fieldwork process as the foundation for the Beijing part. In spite of some operational adjustments in data collection, which will be elaborated on in the following sections, the fieldwork in both London and Beijing consisted of semi-structured interviews and questionnaires.

A major advantage of conducting case studies is 'the opportunity to use many different sources of evidence' (Yin, 2014: 119). Assembling evidence from various sources is significant, because it forms the basis for validity assurance. Rather than undertaking this before or after data collection, assuring validity is a task embedded in and conducted throughout the process of data collection. Creswell and Miller (2000) summarise nine ways of ensuring validity in qualitative research, depending on the paradigm a research is affiliated to and the lens a researcher chooses to view it through for validity purposes.[13] Amongst these, the use of disconfirming evidence is the main strategy chosen in this project. Rather than undermining the cohesiveness of the project, the presentation of disconfirming evidence can 'confirm the accuracy of data analysis' (Creswell and Clark, 2007: 212) and solidify the interpretation. The juxtaposition of both the confirming and disconfirming evidence, firstly, is more practical because 'in real life evidence for themes ... diverges' (Creswell and Clark, 2007: 212) rather

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[13] The nine ways include triangulation, member checking, audit trail, disconfirming evidence, prolonged engagement in the field, thick description, researcher reflexivity, collaboration, and peer debriefing (Creswell and Miller, 2000).

than just converging or corroborating. In addition, negative data also delimits the interpretations drawn, and reveals the opportunity for elaborating on the minute differences between confirming and disconfirming evidence, which may not have been recognised before. The difference signifies the necessary conditions that make the inference applicable, and provides a boundary and falsifiability for the research.

Hence the search for both confirming and disconfirming evidence is incorporated into the data collection process. In the following sections, the methods used for the data collection are described. Semi-structured interviews and qualitative questionnaire surveys were conducted with different types of respondents. In both cities the questionnaire survey was undertaken after some interviews had been held. The information obtained from the interviews facilitated the development of the theoretical framework, and therefore altered the composition of the questionnaire and how questions were formulated.

### 3.3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews

#### A. Formalities to ensure that ethical research is conducted

The interview is commonly used in qualitative studies because it is fruitful for obtaining in-depth information from key informants. In this project, semi-structured interviews were conducted with informants ranging from central and local civil servants, to people in academia, LOCOG/BOCOG, NGOs, legacy management agencies and placemaking companies/initiatives. The length of the interviews ranged from 25 minutes to two hours, lasting one hour on average. The venues for conducting the interviews were either cafes or the workplace of the interviewees, depending on their preference. In total, 10 of the 11 interviews in London were held face-to-face and only one was conducted via email as per the interviewee's preference, whereas all of the 16 interviews in Beijing were conducted face-to-face.

All of the interviewees received an 'Information Leaflet for Interviewees' at least three days prior to the interview (see Appendix B). The leaflet provided the interviewees with information about the researcher, the topic of the project, how the interview was going to be conducted, how the information they provided would be used, the protection of their anonymity and their freedom to drop out before the completion of the research if they wished. In both cities, an outline of the interview questions was emailed to the interviewees prior to the interview if requested. On the day of the interview, interviewees were asked to

sign an 'Interviewee Informed Consent Form' (see Appendix C) before the interview commenced. Assuming that they acknowledged the information provided in the previously sent leaflet, the form also enquired of their willingness to be audio recorded during the interview and sought their permission to use direct quotations from their interview in the final research report.[14] The dates for conducting each interview, their respective willingness to be audio recorded and permission to use direct quotations are shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.

**Table 3.1: Permission for audio recording and direct quotation from London interviewees**

| No. | Date | Permission for audio recording | Permission for direct quotation |
|---|---|---|---|
| L01 | 10th April 2013 | Yes | Yes |
| L02 | 3rd June 2013 | Yes | Yes |
| L03 | 12th June 2013 | Yes | Yes |
| L04 | 24th July 2013 | Yes | Yes |
| L05 | 20th September 2013 | Yes | Yes |
| L06 | 10th October 2013 | Yes | Yes |
| L07 (by email) | 11th September 2013 (Questions sent) 4th October 2013 (Reply received) | N/A | Yes |
| L08 | 4th December 2013 | Yes | Yes |
| L09 | 16th December 2013 | Yes | Yes |
| L10 | 17th January 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| L11 | 20th January 2014 | Yes | Yes |

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[14] The interview in London conducted via email was slightly different. Along with the Information Leaflet for Interviewees, a list of question was sent to the interviewee, and a reply with answers to the questions was emailed back three weeks later. Although this interviewee did not physically sign the Interviewee Informed Consent Form, the anonymity protection was explained and permission for using direct quotations was obtained via email.

**Table 3.2: Permission for audio recording and direct quotation from Beijing interviewees**

| No. | Date | Permission for audio recording | Permission for direct quotation |
|---|---|---|---|
| B01 | 9th April 2014 | No | Yes |
| B02 | 4th April 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| B03 | 8th April 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| B04 | 9th April 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| B05 | 16th April 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| B06 | 7th May 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| B07 | 22nd May 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| B08 | 26th May 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| B09 | 4th June 2014 | No | Yes |
| B10 | 5th June 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| B11 | 6th June 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| B12 | 24th June 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| B13 | 17th March 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| B14 | 17th March 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| B15 | 17th March 2014 | Yes | Yes |
| B16 | 17th March 2014 | Yes | Yes |

**B.    Before securing the interview: approaching and snowballing**

The accessibility of potential interviewees was an issue at the beginning of the fieldwork process. Given that prospective interviewees are experts in a particular part of Olympic delivery, they are likely to receive many interview requests, and be tightly guarded by gatekeepers. As a result of deliberate self-insulation, such experts are barely reachable because they 'are more conscious of their own importance' (Richards, 1996: 200). With regard to the inaccessibility of prospective interviewees, this project decided to use snowballing, an unrepresentative sampling method, to proceed with the interviews. However, the representativeness of the interview list is not an issue, as what should be anticipated from elite interviewing, [15] rather than the 'truth', is the mindset and perceptions of the interviewees (Richards, 1996: 200). The purpose of conducting both expert interviews and a questionnaire survey, is not in approaching and discovering a single reality, but rather in reaching saturation— 'data adequacy', which is 'operationalised as collecting data until no

[15] Leech (2002b: 663) elucidated an operational definition for an elite interviewee – 'an expert about the topic at hand'. What differentiates elite interviewees from others accordingly is not their socio-economic status but whether the interviewee knows more than the interviewer does. Regarding this, calling them expert interviewees as opposed to elite interviewees may better capture such a feature. Expert interviewees and expert interviews are thus the terms used hereafter in the thesis.

new information is obtained' (Morse, 1995: 147). Instead of statistical representation, data saturation determines the quality of a case study (Small, 2009: 28).

Although snowballing can be a method used to expand an interviewee list, how to get 'snow' in the first place remains a challenging and frustrating task. Web-searching for potentially suitable interviewees may seem arbitrary and unmethodical, but it is the most practical, and indeed is an inspirational, approach to start from. In the circumstance of lacking any contact channel to prospective interviewees, web-searching enables a preliminary contour of the targeted people and organisations to be drawn. The first step is always the hardest, and web-searching assisted in taking the first step in the London interview work. In London, the first and second interviewees were approached through contact information obtained via the internet. Once the 'snow' was acquired, making a snowball was only a matter of time (though it remained an issue because rejections to interview requests still occurred even when introduced by acquaintances). The remaining nine interviewees were all introduced by people I had interviewed before. In order to maximise the odds and speed up the progress, I strove to provide them with a 'convincing motivation' (Burnham et al., 2008: 235) for seeing me by tailoring my email invitation to each prospective interviewee and conceiving my project from diverse angles that might be of interest to them. In addition, courteous reminders were invariably sent to prospective interviewees if no reply was received three days after sending an email invitation.

The Beijing interview work had a different start to its London counterpart. Before heading to Beijing in March 2014, some initial contacts were made through Dr Sabrina Chai of the Department of Social Policy and the Office of International Relations at the University of York. These two channels allowed me to access academics in Beijing, in particular, those working in the Humanistic Olympic Studies Center at Renmin University of China. After the initial stage, the snowballing in Beijing was similar to that in London.

There are two noteworthy features to the interview work in Beijing. Firstly, emails and text messages were the more socially preferred ways of communicating with London interviewees, whereas interviewees in Beijing were in favour of telephone contacts and communication apps came second; emails were more used as a file transferring tool. Personal connections, secondly, mattered (more than expected), and the transition from a prospective interviewee to an interviewee could be rather smooth if I was 'introduced' by someone they already knew. In the course of the interviews, the ones who introduced me, i.e. the acquaintances of the interviewees, were intentionally or unintentionally alluded to by the

interviewees, and these occurrences were much more frequent in Beijing than in London. The two points referred to here, provide a portrait of conducting interview work in a world dominated by personal connections.

➢ **Selection of interviewees**

Interviewees in London and Beijing were selected according to the theoretical framework; thus key informants who worked, or are still working, in Games-led regeneration/development or place branding were targeted. In terms of Games-led regeneration and development, London interviewees included people who had worked on organising planning applications for the Games (Interviewee L02), who played a central role in drafting the framework of east London regeneration (Interviewee L04), and who are experienced in the integration of east London regeneration and communicating with local communities (Interviewees L09 and L10). With regard to place branding and post-Games legacy, I interviewed people who brought about socio-economic changes in the Olympic neighbourhood through cultural activities (Interviewee L03 and L06), who managed and coordinated the progress of the post-Games legacy from the central government side of things, and who ensured the progress of east London regeneration from the local side of things (Interviewees L05 and L07). Key informants specialising in stakeholder relations (Interviewee L08), responsible for the management of some Olympic venues (Interviewee L11), and who challenged delivery of the Games (Interviewee L01) were also among the list of London interviewees.

In Beijing, people who ensured that construction requirements were met (Interviewee B02), planned the overall construction of Games-led facilities and were later responsible for post-Games management of an Olympic venue (Interviewee B09) were interviewed in order to identify the targets of Games-led physical transformation. To delve deeper into the mechanism of urban development in China, I interviewed highly experienced experts and practitioners in regeneration projects in Chinese cities (Interviewees B04 and B12), and a former village cadre in charge of the communication and negotiation of Games-led land expropriation (Interviewee B13). For the branding campaigns of the Beijing Games, people who conceived and coordinated the design of logos (Interviewee B05) and utilised concentrated visual icons to manage the image landscape of the Olympic site and Beijing (Interviewees B03, B08 and B11) were interviewed  to identify the messages which the Beijing Olympics sought to convey. As discussed later in Chapter 5, various run-up activities were also an integral part of place branding campaigns. As a result, I interviewed cultural activities

planners (Interviewees B06 and B10) to understand the precise function of these activities in the delivery of the Olympic Games. Those involved in the social impact dimension of the Olympic Games Global Impact (OGGI) project (Interviewee B01), and who were responsible for the integration of the Olympic spirit and Beijing's social development (Interviewee B07), were interviewed in order to evaluate the intangible legacy left behind.

**C.  After securing and during the course of an interview: semi-structured and flexible interviews**

The interview questions for this project were semi-structured and flexible. As Burnham et al. (2008: 244) comments, adopting a semi-structured design retains the flexibility to develop and amend the interview structure when new information is obtained as research progresses. However, it does not mean that a researcher should walk into an interview site with no or less than enough preparation. As previously discussed, in the co-evolving relations between the theoretical framework and empirical data, an 'articulated preconception' (Dubois and Gadde, 2002: 555) needs to be constructed before conducting each interview. Only by carrying out interviews with the theoretical framework and research questions in mind can the co-evolution be possibly attained.

Adopting a semi-structured interview as the approach for expert interviewing was a decision made after clear consideration. That interviewees possess more expert knowledge in a specific field was the key purpose behind interviewing them. Talking to expert interviewees was not simply about receiving answers to the preconceived questions, but was about allowing their knowledge as experts or insiders to bring new discoveries and further mould the structure of future interviews. This cannot be done without the help of a flexible structure, a semi-structured interview. It is this mindset that renders expert interviewing and semi-structured interviewing a perfect match.

The flexibility of the semi-structured interview presents itself not only within each interview but also between different interviews. The information or new discoveries gained from previous interviews can often be the nutrition for future ones; the questions asked in subsequent interviews can therefore be closer and closer to the core of the research interest. Terming the approach as sequential interviewing, Small (2009) borrowed from the insight of Yin (2014) to differentiate cases from sample units and treated each interview as a case. This extrapolation of a case study logic recognised the flexibility of the semi-structured interview and extended it to sequence, such that with the refinement of interview questions as

research proceeds, 'an increasingly accurate understanding' (Small, 2009: 24) is constructed. The more interviews one conducts, the closer to saturation one gets.

All interviews in this project were conducted in this manner. The interview questions were structured according to the theoretical research framework outlined in Chapter 2, and a question asking the interviewee to describe their job content kicked started each interview. Their job content, currently or previously related to urban regeneration or city branding, was the most important criterion for selecting the interviewee. What followed the job description was six to eight questions related to either urban regeneration or city branding, depending on the background of each interviewee. The questions asked in each interview varied according to the expertise and experience of the interviewee. After eliminating questions concerning the interviewee's identity, questions for different interviewees are available in Appendix A. It is worth clarifying that unlike quantitative research, the standardisation or replication of questions across interviews is not, and should not be, followed. The way to achieve saturation is enquiring of the right person with the right questions; instead of a one-size-fits-all list of questions, a good match between the interviewee and the questions being asked should be pursued.

Asking interviewees to describe their own job at the very beginning of every interview provides two advantages. One is to ease the interviewees by talking about something they are familiar with, rather than activating their defensive shield by asking 'big' questions from the start. As Leech (2002a: 666) suggests, sensitive questions should be kept 'until the middle or toward the end of the interview.' The other subtler advantage is that if their personal portrait of the job content diverged from my preconception, the subsequent questions could be adjusted accordingly. Otherwise, the entire interview could possibly be jeopardised by asking questions that are unsuitable for the person to answer. What is worse, unfortunately, is that there is indeed such a thing as a dumb question in an interview, and asking it undermines a researcher's professionalism and credibility and quite easily makes interviewees' lose patience or 'dumb-down their answers' (Leech, 2002a: 665).

Listening is the core element to a successful in-depth interview and this has been emphasised in the literature on qualitative research methods. Not only attentively listening, but inspiring interviewees to elucidate their views can elicit more information and new discoveries. As a result, how to create an encouraging atmosphere for the interviewees to talk at ease is an art to be mastered. Academics call this practice establishing a rapport, which entails the interviewer trusting and respecting the interviewee and the information provided

(DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006: 316). Rapport makes the allusion to sensitive and central questions more natural and acceptable for the interviewee (Burnham et al., 2008: 243). The establishment of a rapport has been a central concern in the interview work of this project. In the course of each interview, I conceived myself as being somewhere between a listener and a discussant, interestedly listening with circumspection, actively discussing and appropriately challenging where answers needed clarification.

**D.    After an interview: transcribing and data analysis**

To unleash the potential of semi-structured expert interviews, a preliminary data analysis was conducted alongside the interview work. The concurrence between the two assists in constructing a better understanding of the research questions and informs one about what to ask and who in the succeeding interview work (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006: 317). As mentioned in the section on formalities, permission for audio recording was sought before each interview, and except for the person interviewed by email, the interviewees in London all agreed to be audio recorded, while two out of the total 16 interviewees[16] in Beijing declined. Immediately after each interview the in-interview sketch was developed into a more comprehensive note before the memory started to fade. In cases where audio recording was not permitted, this was especially essential.

For the recorded interviews, transcribing was an exhausting but inevitable task if a thorough and sophisticated data analysis was to be conducted. I listened to each interview recording at least three times, and more than that for those containing pivotal or intricate information. At the first time of listening, striving to gain an overall understanding, I would also write down the key points. During this phase I tried to simply break down the prolonged recording into several sections and to faithfully write down what I heard. The second listening was dedicated to noting more details and interpretation-oriented work. I paid special attention to and made a precise transcription of the key points I had picked up on during the first listening. Moreover, my personal annotation and interpretation of how their responses correlated with my theoretical framework were also undertaken during this phase. The third,

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[16] 16 people were interviewed as part of the Beijing fieldwork. However, the nature of the interviews requires clarification. Interviewees B1-B13 were expert interviewees; as are all the London interviewees (Interviewee L01-L11). Interviewees B14-B16 are employees of the property management company so do not fit the definition of expert interviewee. Rather than soliciting their knowledge as experts, I therefore interviewed them mainly to familiarise myself with how job allocation and land expropriation were implemented, and the types of job which people (pre-existing residents) have undertaken. The setup of the company is more thoroughly discussed in 3.3.2.

and usually the last, time of listening to each interview enabled me to thoroughly inspect the content. After listening to each interview three times, I assigned a few keywords to it, and the keywords generated from each interview were gathered together and mapped for argument building. A one-hour interview recording took five to six hours of processing, from the first listening to assigning the keywords.

### 3.3.2   Qualitative Questionnaire Survey

**A.    Rationale for a qualitative questionnaire survey**

As opposed to the capability of semi-structured interviews to delve into insiders' perceptions, the questionnaire was useful for sketching people's attitudes to the delivery and legacy of the Olympic Games. Similar to the logic of case studies, the surveys in this project conducted in both cities were qualitative rather than quantitative, and the numerous survey respondents were cases rather than sample units. In spite of the fact that a questionnaire has commonly been assumed as a quantitative data collection method, what differentiates a quantitative and a qualitative orientation is not the method for data collection itself, but the objective behind conducting a questionnaire survey. As Jansen (2010) notes, while a quantitative questionnaire is designed and conducted to understand how characters within a given population are distributed through statistical parameters, a qualitative one aims to understand, within a given population, how diversified these characters are. Concisely, one is to access information about distribution, whereas the other is about diversity.

If the aim of conducting a qualitative questionnaire survey is to learn how diversified the subject matter is and what varieties there are, the process of survey work is indeed analogous to that of interview work. Both are undertaken for achieving the status of saturation. In this view, no single opinion is more or less significant than another because it is the existence of a particular viewpoint that counts, rather than the number of people holding that viewpoint. As a result, the number of respondents in a qualitative questionnaire survey varies depending on, similarly to the scenario in interview work, the quantity needed for arriving at saturation. The more diversified a population is, the more respondents will be needed for saturation. In qualitative research, saturation can only be attained through the exhaustiveness of information accessed; statistical representativeness has nothing to do with saturation.

**B.     Design of the questionnaire**

In order to understand local residents' views about the Olympic legacy, this project referenced the Olympic Legacy Research – Quantitative Report conducted by BMRB Sport and prepared for the Central Office of Information (COI) and DCMS in October 2007, and added questions that suited the research structure. Basically identical in content, the questionnaire used in Beijing was translated from the London questionnaire (in English) into Mandarin and localised to cater for the scenario in China. Although I am Taiwanese and a native Mandarin speaker, the translated Mandarin questionnaire was reviewed by two other native Mandarin speakers who also speak English to ensure correct translation. Furthermore, the localisation of the questionnaire was also a necessity, especially in respect of the different language uses in Taiwan and China, although people from the two locations can communicate in Mandarin. Two local residents in Beijing were therefore sought to read the Mandarin questionnaire before the survey was formally conducted to check that the wording was suitable for the locals. Except for the issues discussed above, the questions asked in both cities were the same. Both the English and Mandarin versions of the questionnaire are available in Appendix E. The questionnaire was composed of four segments and consisted of 25 questions in total.

- Segment 1: Degree of participation in and general perception of the Olympic Games
- Segment 2: Olympic legacies of urban regeneration/development
- Segment 3: Olympic legacies of city branding
- Segment 4: Demographic information of respondents

Appendix D demonstrates the design of the London and Beijing questionnaires. The Beijing questionnaire was largely the Mandarin translation from the London version with few amendments to accustom local scenario. In both cities, single response and multiple responses questions, as shown, were included. Questions with multiple responses were designed to enquire of respondents' modes of participation in the Games (Question 1), perceptions on changing for the better and/or worse in the neighbourhood of the Olympic site (Question 7 and Question 8), and on the dimensions thought to be successfully marketed due to the Olympics (Question 14).

The response options were designed to cater for the nature of each question. A scale of 1 to 10 was used for Questions 2 and 3 to measure how positive respondents were towards the Olympics both before and after the Games. The four response options for Question 6— for the better, for the worse, some better some worse, and not at all—

triggered respondents to contemplate how they felt about the change or lack thereof taking place in East London since the city won the Olympic bid. Except for the questions mentioned above, demographic questions and multiple responses questions, three response options were used for the remaining questions. Rather than choosing the widely used five-point Likert Scale, a scale of three points was better suited to this project. Being positive/negative, being aware/unaware and agree/disagree were what these questions were designed to explore; the difference between 'strongly' and 'slightly' are not the focus of this project. In other words, the direction outweighs the strength of the attitudes.

Questions 18 to 25 were designed to access the demographic information of respondents. Some of the questions in this section were formulated differently for respondents in London and in Beijing. In the London version the response options for occupation were modified from the Standard Occupation Classification (SOC 2000) groups, whereas this classification was not appropriate for Beijing respondents. Furthermore, while most response options for demographic questions were close-ended in London, most questions in this segment demanded open-ended answers from the Beijing respondents. The consideration of the different measures used will be elaborated in the next section.

## C.    Conducting the survey

➢  **London**

While gathering local residents' opinions on the Olympic legacy was the primary purpose for conducting the questionnaire, the survey was diversely conducted in London and Beijing. In London, local residents were defined as people who, when the survey was conducted, either lived in one of the six Olympic host boroughs or are constantly around the area of the host boroughs.[17] The host borough residents and the people who were around the area had one thing in common, which was that the area of the Olympic host boroughs was part of their everyday life. Identifying only these people as qualified respondents could ensure the usefulness of the information obtained from the survey. Of the 126 valid samples collected, 89 respondents (70.7%) were residents in one of the host boroughs, 28

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[17] The method of identifying whether a respondent was constantly in and around the host boroughs area was by asking their residence at the time of the survey, which had to be within one hour by car of one of the six host boroughs, for example, Essex. The second question asked why they were in the area at the time of the survey, and if the respondent commuted to, shopped or dined in the area at least once a week, then they were identified as 'being constantly around the area of host boroughs', otherwise, they were not a qualified respondent for the questionnaire.

respondents (22.2%) currently lived in other London boroughs, and 9 respondents (7.1%) lived in nearby London (within one hour by car). The distribution of the survey respondents' residences is shown in Table 3.3.

**Table 3.3: Distribution of London survey respondents' residences**

| Current residence | | Frequency | Percentage | Cumulative percentage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Living in Olympic host boroughs | Barking & Dagenham | 15 | 11.9% | 11.9% |
| | Greenwich | 4 | 3.2% | 15.1% |
| | Hackney | 20 | 15.9% | 31.0% |
| | Newham | 21 | 16.7% | 47.7% |
| | Tower Hamlets | 20 | 15.9% | 63.6% |
| | Waltham Forest | 9 | 7.1% | 70.7% |
| Not living in Olympic host boroughs (but constantly around the area of the host boroughs) | Other London boroughs | 28 | 22.2% | 92.9% |
| | Nearby London | 9 | 7.1% | 100.0% |
| Total | | 126 | 100.0% | |

From mid-August to the end of September 2013, a street survey was conducted during the daytime at public venues within the six London host boroughs, such as local parks, the Olympic Park, in front of underground stations, and in shopping centres. Each respondent took from five to 15 minutes depending on how much information they were willing to share. In the course of the street survey I asked respondents each question in turn, and identified which response option was closest to their answer and then confirmed with the respondent if this was the option best describing their opinion. I was the only interviewer for the street survey so that the standards for identifying respondents' answers could remain consistent. Confirming the answers given with the respondents helped affirm the accuracy and thoughtfulness of each response. Not only were respondents' answers ticked but their additional opinions were written down on each questionnaire. Respondents were encouraged and prompted to elaborate and clarify their opinions. The reason why this method was employed was that both the why and what of respondents' opinions were essential to the project.

The qualitative method of a conducting survey is empirically fruitful too. While people on the street generally displayed a friendly, welcoming attitude towards my approaching them, the extent to which they were willing to share information increased according to the

amount of time I spent talking to them. Even if some respondents were suspicious of my intentions in asking the questions, once I sincerely explained my research and the contribution I would like to make, they became quite enthusiastic about answering and discussing their opinions. Each respondent was surveyed for the questionnaire in a manner analogous to structured interviewing. Establishing rapport with survey respondents is thus as important as with expert interviewees.

➢ **Beijing**

Conducting the questionnaire survey in Beijing presented a completely different scenario from the London counterpart. A street survey could not be successfully conducted in Beijing. I presented myself in the neighbourhood of the Beijing Olympic Park[18] called Wali Village, and tried to talk to the locals about their opinion of the mega-event of six years ago. Most let me introduce my intention and myself, and then told me that either they were not interested in the topic or they did not have time to answer my questions, even though they were apparently just wandering around or waiting in front of a school to pick up their children. A few people simply cut my introduction and asked me to find someone else; I hardly had time to take out my questionnaire when the conversation was already brought to an end. I went to various sites in the neighbourhood of the Beijing Olympic Park at different times for seven days but only achieved a limited number of respondents. From my observation, most of the prospective survey respondents simply wanted to avoid this unnecessary interaction with a stranger and to end the conversation as soon as possible. My approach to them seemed to effectively trigger their self-defence system and they had highly cautious attitudes towards strangers. The simple refusal to have any contact with a stranger presented a stark contrast to the scenario of the street survey in London.

The opinion received from interviewees indicated the same thing— they did not perceive conducting a street survey in the Olympic neighbourhood as a practical or effective way to access the local opinion I intended to explore. In their opinion, the fact that the Beijing 2008 Olympics took place six years prior to the time when the survey was being conducted and that the land expropriation started in the 1990s, made tracking down the original local residents' whereabouts rather difficult. Within this period of 20 years, the composition of the

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[18] Beijing Olympic Park consists of the National Stadium (Bird's Nest), Olympic Forest Park, National Aquatic Center (Water Cube), China Science and Technology Museum and National Convention Center, Grand Skylight Catic hotel, InterContinental Beijing Beichen, Tennis Court in Beijing Olympic Park and Multi-function Broadcasting Tower (Linglong Tower).

residents had changed to a certain extent and they had already moved and scattered (interviewee B15). Randomly asking people on the street, even in the Olympic neighbourhood, did not allow access to local opinions because those who were evicted or forced to move as a result of the Olympics were not accessible in this circumstance. This could not be considered a good means to the end of accessing the opinions of those who had been affected by the Games.

The difficulties encountered with the street survey in Beijing and the remoteness of time were not the only concerns that dominated my approach to accessing local opinion. During the Beijing Games, an institution was specifically set up to deal with joblessness as a result of the Olympics. Established for job allocation and provision for the former residents of the Olympic sites, the institution is a property management company in charge of the maintenance and management of the physical infrastructure in Beijing Olympic Park. Before the Chinese Government's acquisition of the land in Wali Village for the Olympics, farms occupied the area and the residents there worked in agriculture-related occupations. The acquisition hence rendered the pre-existing residents both homeless and jobless, and the Government established the company and formed employment contracts with various residents there. These newly-contracted employees worked, and still are working, as security guards, cleaners or gardeners in Beijing Olympic Park.

The existence of such an institutionalised and centralised mechanism for the allocation of evictees provided me with a good access point for obtaining information about local opinion. Comparatively speaking, London lacked such an institution so that a street survey became the most viable and effective way to access local opinion. In contrast, the mechanism of allocation, or more precisely centralisation, of some of the evictees was a bonus for data collection in Beijing, especially when the delivery and the land expropriation for the Olympics was such a long time ago.

The employees in the property management company qualified as the type of local residents I had intended to approach. They had lived in Wali Village for quite some time and were directly affected by the hosting of the Olympics. With the assistance of acquaintances, which overrules everything in China, I was allowed to distribute my questionnaire in the company to the employees present. It was something of a pity that the face-to-face surveying, as used in London, was not allowed in the property management company which I contacted. However, given the culture of Chinese society, it may have been beneficial to allow survey respondents to complete the questionnaire in private. Face-to-face surveying implies a risk of

being identified, which could reasonably undermine the authenticity and accuracy of their answers. For those who seemed willing to share more information with me, I also asked them to leave their contact details at the end of the questionnaire. This can be deemed as having been effective, as responses were diverse instead of unanimously positive, in contrast to what may be anticipated from surveys conducted in China. Eventually, 39 completed questionnaires were received, and two respondents left either their email address or telephone number.

Methodologically speaking, the replication of data collection methods in two different field sites may seem to be an ideal scenario. This ideal lies in the assumption that the similarity of data collection methods warrants comparability between the data collected from each site. Nevertheless, the purpose of data collection and fieldwork is not to mirror the methods used but to obtain useful and meaningful data. The means capable of achieving this target is a good one. With regard to the practical differences of the time when land expropriation and the Olympics took place, and to the institutional designs, the methods for conducting questionnaires in the two sites should be differentiated and were non-interchangeable. Conducting a street survey in Beijing was not a good means to achieve the target, whereas distributing questionnaires in a company established for job allocation would be inconceivable in London. Consequently, conducting a survey of the employees, rather than a street survey of random people in the neighbourhood, was the methodologically superior approach in Beijing.

However, what needs to be pointed out is the effects that are likely to have been incurred by their status as employees in the company. Respondents might tend to reveal more positive attitudes if they had received monetary compensation for their expropriated land and accepted a job due to the loss of their occupation as farmers. The ideal situation would be to access the pre-existing locals both with and without access to the compensation mechanism. Nevertheless, in the face of the practical difficulties of accessing the pre-existing residents who had scattered and who had no access to either monetary compensation or job allocation, the employees in the company represented part of the jigsaw of local opinion. As mentioned above, a strong advantage of the case study was the use of multiple sources of data; the other part of the jigsaw, although unattainable from first-hand fieldwork data collection, was not missing. The search for negative data (disconfirming evidence) proceeded from second-hand sources available within the literature. The positive or negative viewpoints

of the pre-existing residents were just one of the multiple sources of data, and accessing them took the project a step closer to saturation.

## 3.4   Chapter Conclusion: the Reconstitution of Multiple Realities

Data were collected from various sources in order to reconstitute multiple realities. Second-hand data, such as policy papers, bid documents and legacy progress reports after the Games were used both to inform background knowledge of the two cases, and to supplement the data inaccessible from fieldwork, for example the opinions of pre-existing residents of the Beijing Olympic site who had no legal entitlement to compensation.

The second data source were the interviews with experts, and semi-structured interviews with key informants of Games-led regeneration and branding in both cities provided deep and broad information missing from the public domain. The third source was the qualitative questionnaire survey conducted with local citizens in the two host cities. Rather than approaching the general public of the host city, I conducted my questionnaire with those who had directly experienced the changes in the Olympic neighbourhood. Focusing on directly affected residents provides focused information about possible discrepancies between policy discourse, media coverage and people's feelings about the Games.

Through the second-hand data, semi-structured interviews and qualitative questionnaire survey, how the process of Games-led regeneration/development and place branding have been variously conceived, implemented and interpreted, would be identified. All data collection helps triangulate the information available and enables an unbiased, non-discretionary conclusion. As each piece of information represents no more than one side of the story, it was not treated as unquestionably authentic and credible. However, detecting the authenticity and credibility of each piece of information has not been, and should not have been, the task which I conducted. As an interpretive piece of research, the existence of multiple realities is believed, and each piece of information is appreciated because it contributes to the reconstitution of multiple realities. Rather than a process of searching for merely one answer, facilitating the reconstitution of multiple realities guides both the research design and data collection.

Choosing two cases with starkly diverse backgrounds furthers the theoretical potential of the comparison. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Olympic Games have a strong tendency for

homogenising host cities. To perceive the impact of the Games on urban governance involves evaluating the negotiation between globalised standardisation and localised particularities; hence, a comparison of the dichotomised would be better than one of the similar. In the following two chapters, the two strands of Games-led regeneration/development and place branding in the two cities are elaborated on, with the negotiations evaluated as part of the conclusions of the thesis.

# Chapter 4 - Urban Regeneration and Development in the Olympic Process

## 4.1 Chapter Introduction

> Regeneration is not simply about bricks and mortar. It's about the physical, social and economic wellbeing of an area; it's about the quality of life in our neighbourhood. (ODPM, 2001: 3)

The regeneration of a neighbourhood often involves complicated goals. The promotion of healthy lifestyles, economic stimulation and renovation of physical landscapes are all dimensions which a regeneration project intends to tackle. The complexity of these goals contributes to the challenge of resource mobilisation and interest negotiation. However, the grand scale and eye-catching ability of a mega-event justifies and accelerates the regeneration and development of host cities. With a mega-event coming to town, resources become easier to mobilise and conflicting interests more negotiable. Moreover, as discussed in Section 2.4, Games-led regeneration and development projects are essential to the profitability of the Olympic Games. The hosting of the Games and regeneration/development are consequently mutually enhancive.

The mutuality between regeneration/development and hosting the Games does not explain the reason why Games-led regeneration/development would incentivise potential host cities. Temporarily drawing attention back to the discussion in Section 2.3 helps illuminate the role of regeneration/development in entrepreneurial urban governance. First, for entrepreneurial governments, governability and legitimacy comes from the ability to boost urban growth, and creative and knowledge-based economies have been promoted and state-led gentrification *de facto* implemented in the pursuit of urban growth. Neither could be promoted or implemented without the help of regeneration/development of the designated area. Secondly, the literature review on the growth machine and urban regime shows that policies with development or promotion orientation enjoy an advantageous status in local agenda-setting, due to either the strong bond of common land-based interests in growth coalition (growth machine) or the relatively high achievability of commensurate resources drawn to immediate material gains (urban regime).

Hence, hosting a mega-event is an ideal option for entrepreneurial cities, and is in accordance with urban growth driven governing logic. As illustrated later in Section 4.2 and

4.3, regeneration-accelerating and development-promoting effects were revealed in both cases. London's Games has been portrayed as the catalyst for East London regeneration and even capable of closing the gap between East London and its neighbouring areas. Beijing's Games, in spite of relatively less focus on stimulating development, sped up the city's modernisation trajectory in both intangible and tangible senses, e.g. by improving air quality to meet international standards, even if only temporarily, and building massive highways during the years preparing for the Games. In both cases the delivery of the Games reflects the consequences of Games-led regeneration/development. London's Games-led regeneration has been criticised as catering to outsiders' needs, while Beijing's pursuit of a glorious image has contributed to real estate development in the name of culture and urban landscape beautification.

These consequences hardly feature at all in discourse around Games-led regeneration and development, but are actually experienced by the neighbourhood. Section 4.4 thus interrogates participation and consultation in the process of Games-led regeneration and development. Despite civil participation being understood and conducted very differently by London and Beijing, in both cases it has served as a manipulative mechanism, designed and implemented to enable delivery of the Games.

## 4.2   Social and Economic Transformation

### 4.2.1   London - Achieving Convergence

The main stage of the London 2012 Olympics is located in the Lower Lea Valley, East London, which is the most disadvantaged area in London and one of the poorest in Europe (OECD, 2011). The Olympics was thus portrayed as capable of bringing 'a legacy for the community' and stimulating 'a vital economic regeneration' in the area (BOA, 2004: 23). That the area had suffered from socio-economic deprivation was not only on the official publication but was experienced by residents there as part of their everyday lives. There was nearly a consensus among all the interviewees I talked to that something needed to be done in order to tackle the poverty issue and the consequential widespread deprivation in the area.

Figure 4.1 is a map of London showing the mean house price in different London boroughs in Q03 2012, and it is apparent that the house prices in the Olympic boroughs were between the medium and the low side of the spectrum. Represented in a coral colour on the map, house prices in the London boroughs of Waltham Forest, Newham and Barking and

Dagenham were the lowest, Tower Hamlets and Greenwich were slightly higher, and Hackney was the highest among the Olympic boroughs. The household income estimates in the different London boroughs also demonstrated the same tendency, and Table 4.1 presents the total mean annual household income estimate in London boroughs in 2012. Among the six Olympic boroughs, only Tower Hamlets, ranked at 19, was in the middle section of the 33 London boroughs, and the others were all in the lower tier; Waltham Forest, Barking and Dagenham and Newham were the bottom three boroughs across London. The disparity of household income estimate between the Olympic boroughs and other London boroughs in 2012 can be more clearly observed through Figure 4.2.



**Figure 4.1: Mean house price across London boroughs in Q03 2012**
Source: http://www.newham.info/

**Table 4.1: Total mean annual household income estimate for 2012**

| No. | Borough | Income |
|-----|---------|--------|
| 1 | Kensington and Chelsea | £113,490 |
| 2 | City of London | £97,030 |
| 3 | Westminster | £79,140 |
| 4 | Richmond upon Thames | £74,800 |
| 5 | Camden | £66,710 |
| 6 | Wandsworth | £64,740 |
| 7 | Hammersmith and Fulham | £61,580 |
| 8 | Merton | £55,950 |
| 9 | Kingston upon Thames | £55,820 |
| 10 | Bromley | £53,870 |
| 11 | Islington | £53,780 |
| 12 | Barnet | £53,540 |
| 13 | Harrow | £48,190 |
| 14 | Sutton | £48,020 |
| 15 | Lambeth | £47,570 |
| 16 | Southwark | £46,840 |
| 17 | Ealing | £44,990 |
| 18 | Haringey | £44,850 |
| 19* | Tower Hamlets | £44,530 |
| 20 | Redbridge | £44,490 |
| 21 | Croydon | £44,240 |
| 22 | Hillingdon | £44,090 |
| 23 | Hounslow | £43,790 |
| 24 | Havering | £43,430 |
| 25 | Bexley | £43,380 |
| 26* | Greenwich | £43,150 |
| 27 | Lewisham | £42,320 |
| 28* | Hackney | £41,400 |
| 29 | Enfield | £40,600 |
| 30 | Brent | £38,970 |
| 31* | Waltham Forest | £38,570 |
| 32* | Barking and Dagenham | £33,260 |
| 33* | Newham | £33,220 |

*Olympic boroughs

Data source: http://data.london.gov.uk/

**Figure 4.2: Total mean annual household income estimate for 2012**
Data source: http://data.london.gov.uk/

With respect to the degree of deprivation and the tendency of gentrification in the area, the host borough unit set 'convergence' as the principle for the area's regeneration. The principle of convergence is that 'within 20 years the communities who host the 2012 Games will have the same social and economic chances as their neighbours across London' (Growth Borough Unit). In short, it aims to converge or close the socio-economic gap between the host boroughs and the rest of London. However, interviewee L04, who drafted the framework of East London regeneration, alluded to the perils of the deception of and illusion resulting from numbers on paper. 'Convergence will automatically happen in terms of numbers' through the gentrification process led by 'new people moving in' (Interviewee L04); the degree of deprivation seems to have been alleviated, whereas the situation is worse in reality. While viewing gentrification as something 'inevitable and not necessarily a bad thing' since it 'often leads to improvements e.g. in educational standards, public realm, etc. from which existing residents can benefit', the Growth Boroughs Unit sought to make sure that the existing residents 'who will remain deprived irrespective of gentrification' had 'access to the opportunities that derive from economic growth' (Interviewee L07, ensuring the achievement of convergence between East London and its London neighbours).

Against this background, the Strategic Regeneration Framework (SRF) was designed as 'a response from the host boroughs and their partners' to fulfil 'the promise of [the Olympic] legacy benefits for communities' (The Host Boroughs, 2009: 10). It was symbolically and politically significant in two senses; firstly, as the interviewee who has been active in anti-Olympics movements pinpointed, it signified a turn in the Olympic regeneration discourse from 'economic and environmental' focused to comparatively more 'social policy' based (Interviewee L01). Furthermore, it was 'fundamentally a political document rather than a technical one' because along with the change in regeneration discourse, its aim was 'trying to stir the politicians into some sense of responsibility' (Interviewee L04, drafting the framework of East London regeneration) for the situation in the area of the host boroughs. In other words, keeping the Olympic legacy of regeneration at a high political profile gave birth to SRF. Stressing the importance of 'a clear understanding of the inter-relationship between the symptoms of deprivation' (The Host Boroughs, 2009: 11), SRF listed seven indicators[19] of deprivation to 'achieve socio-economic convergence ... within a 20-year timeframe' (The Host Boroughs, 2009: 14) and aimed to publish an annual report henceforward.

The SRF's Action Plan of 2011-2015 further grouped the measures taken to achieve convergence into three broad themes (The Host Boroughs, 2011):

- Creating wealth reducing poverty
- Supporting healthier lifestyles
- Developing successful neighbourhoods

The crosscutting relations between different deprivation symptoms were expected to be more effectively and efficiently tackled. However, the annual reports of 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 showed divergent progress or a retreat on different themes.

**A.   Creating wealth and reducing poverty**

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[19] The seven indicators are: 1) creating a coherent and high-quality city within a world city region; 2) improving educational attainment; skills and raising aspirations; 3) reduce worklessness, benefit dependency and child poverty; 4) homes for all; 5) enhancing wealth and wellbeing; 6) reduce serious crime rates and anti-social behaviour; and 7) maximising the sports legacy and raising participation levels.

As Figure 4.3 shows, the gap in 'economically active people in employment' between the host boroughs and London in general, the key measure of the theme, shrank from 2009 to 2012 but then widened in 2013 (The Host Boroughs, 2013: 44; 2014: 52). In terms of the sub-indicators in the theme, the ones associated with pupils or teenagers present a better outlook compared to other indicators, such as the unemployment rate, median earnings for full-time workers and the working age population qualified to at least Level 4 (The Host Boroughs, 2013: 44; 2014: 52).



**Figure 4.3: People in employment**

**B.    Supporting healthier lifestyles**

This theme uses life expectancy as the key measure, which reveals a promising tendency from 2009 to 2012[20] and shows a mixed scenario for individual indicators. Among the various indicators, 'Obesity level in school children in year 6', 'Recommended adult activity (3 times 30 minutes per week)' and 'No sport or activity (0 times 30 minutes per week)' were the least promising (The Host Boroughs, 2013: 45; 2014: 53). This ironically contradicts the legacy ambition of promoting 'grassroots sports in community and ... a sporting habit for life in young people' (HM Government and Mayor of London, 2013: 21). Although there seemed to be a substantial increase from 2005 to 2013, 1.4 million people, in the population engaging in weekly sporting activity across the country (HM Government and

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[20] The data for 2013 were not available in the annual report 2013-2014.

Mayor of London, 2013: 21), the discrepancy persisted or even increased in the school children's obesity levels between the host boroughs and the rest of London.

## C.    Developing successful neighbourhoods

The final theme focuses on crime reduction and affordable housing provision. The performance of crime reduction, measured as 'Violent crime levels: Violence against the person, per 1,000 population', fluctuated and was slightly reduced by 0.4 points during the four-year period (The Host Boroughs, 2013: 46; 2014: 54). My street survey in the host boroughs demonstrated a similar result, with 14.3% of all respondents reporting that general neighbourhood safety was improved after the Olympic Games as opposed to the rest who did not feel there were notable changes in this respect (Figure 4.4). Among those who felt there was improved safety in the area, some talked about it feeling 'safer to walk on the street', or felt okay to 'go out during night-time' but had not dared to before the Games (survey respondents). In terms of affordable housing provision (Figure 4.5), with the long-term target of 50,000 additional housing units to be provided in the host boroughs area, 14,000 affordable homes had been delivered by 2014, which exceeded the original target of 12,000 affordable homes delivery in the area (The Host Boroughs, 2013: 46; 2014: 54).



**Figure 4.4: Dimensions that have changed for the better after London winning the bid**

**Figure 4.5: Provision of affordable housing units**

The evaluation on the convergence performance exhibits the theme of reducing poverty as the most deep-rooted one. The widening gap of the unemployment rate in particular heightened the imperativeness of 'a significant step change' to increase prosperity (The Host Boroughs, 2013: 18). The opinion of Interviewee L08, who specialises in stakeholder relations, coincides with the evaluation results. He regarded enabling the existing residents to 'have the skills to benefit from the jobs going around in the area' as the fundamental issue for East London regeneration (Interviewee L08).

### 4.2.2    Beijing - Speeding up Modernisation

Unlike the London 2012 Olympics designating East London regeneration as one of the crucial legacies, neither renewing dilapidated neighbourhoods, nor combating destitution or social deprivation was Beijing's Olympic dream. Its slogan, 'New Beijing, Great Olympics'[21] (BOBICO, 2000a: 3) demonstrated its ambition to step onto 'the world city roster' (Zhang and Zhao, 2009: 251). 'To speed up its modernisation and integration into the international community' was what Beijing claimed the Olympic Games could bring to the city (BOBICO, 2000a: 3). For Beijing, the modernisation project involved not only upgrading the physical infrastructure but also meeting the international standards of environmental protection and enhancing the degree of civilisation. As a result, 'Green Olympics, High-tech Olympics and People's Olympics'(BOBICO, 2000a: 3) were its key concepts. These reflect the environmental,

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[21] The motto of the Beijing 2008 Olympics was 'New Beijing, Great Olympics' in the Candidature File submitted to the IOC in 2000. Its motto was later changed and officially announced as 'One World, One Dream' in 2005. 'New Beijing, Great Olympics' then became its slogan after the change.

economic and industrial, as well as the cultural and civil, goals that Beijing wanted to achieve through hosting the Games. As a result, the following discussion is structured according to these three dimensions, as well looking at the modernisation progress of Beijing over the last two decades.

## A.    Green Olympics – environmental dimension

A Green Olympics promises to provide a clean environment, and the improvement in Beijing's air quality was the central promise of the Green Olympics. Beijing promised to provide a 'nice and clean environment' for the athletes and spectators, and ensured that the Games would operate in an eco-friendly manner (BOBICO, 2000a: 53). The change in air quality in the 2000s is presented in Figure 4.6, which shows how often annually the air quality index (AQI) was at or above level two.[22] Revealing an upward tendency in general, it presents a highly notable increase in the year before the Olympic Games were staged and then stays roughly at the same level, which was also the peak, from 2009 to 2011. It seems that the delivery of a Green Olympics did not create a permanently green Beijing, as least not in terms of the air quality, and the apparent air quality advancement only took place at the peak time of the Games preparation, which was about two years before the Games.

However, China's official air quality data has long been distrusted by the international and domestic publics. In 2008 the US Embassy in Beijing set up a monitoring station on its roof and has published hourly PM2.5[23] readings ever since. While these are 'not fully verified or validated', and are merely for 'the express purpose of providing US citizens living and traveling abroad actionable health information related to air pollution' (United States Department of State), these figures have succeeded in irritating the Chinese Government because they indicate an unpromising, if not altogether gloomy picture of Beijing's air quality since the Games. Since the Chinese Government's public warning for 'foreign missions to respect China's laws and stop issuing the data' (Branigan and Reuters, 2012), the question of air quality has carried much political weight.

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[22] AQI is graded into six levels, from level 1, the best, to level 6, the worst.
(see http://airnow.gov/index.cfm?action=aqibasics.aqi and http://aqicn.org/map/hk/)

[23] PM 2.5 refers to the particle matter less than 2.5 micrometres in diameter. These particles are called '"fine" particles and… believed to pose the greatest health risks' (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2016).

**Figure 4.6: Air quality at or above level 2 in Beijing**
Data source: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics

As the readings from the US Embassy have been seen by domestic Chinese citizens, the air quality in Beijing never ceases to be a huge health concern for its citizens. A documentary about air pollution in China, *Under the Dome*, made by the Chinese journalist Chai Jing in 2015, further provoked uproar for exposing the severity of air pollution in Chinese cities. Moreover, backed up by input from officials in China's environmental protection department, the documentary effectively aroused public suspicion of the issue because it documented 'how little leverage they have with public and private industry to enforce anti-pollution laws' and how environmental regulations have been 'steamrolled in China's industrial expansion' (Beaumont-Thomas, 2015).

**B.    High-tech Olympics – economic and industrial dimensions**

Hosting cities hope that the Olympic Games will provide an economic stimulus, and Beijing likewise had expectations of the 'Olympic economic boom' (BOCOG, 2010c: 300). Figure 4.7 demonstrates that since 2000 there has been a steady increase in citizens' annual disposable income in both urban and rural districts of Beijing. Urban disposable income has been somewhere between 2.14 and 2.32 times its rural counterpart during the period, and the Engel's coefficients[24] of both urban and rural citizens (shown as lines in Figure 4.7) were around the same at 36% (urban, 36.3%, and rural, 36.7%) in 2000 and then have fluctuated in the past 15 years. What is worth noting is that over a decade, the gap between the two lines

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[24] Engel's coefficient is the ratio of food expenditure to total expenditure. It is one of the indicators used to measure the degree of wealth, as follows: above 59% - poverty; 50-59% - adequate food and clothing; 40%-49% - well-off; 30%-39% - relatively affluent; and below 30%: wealthy.

has been enlarged by 3.9 percentage points (urban, 30.8%, and rural, 34.7%). Figure 4.8 presents Beijing's regional GDP and its annual rate increase from 2000. The undulate line in the graph presents a general upswing pattern for the annual rate between 2000 and 2004, hitting a peak of 14.5% in 2007, and then a significant drop by 5.4% in 2008; afterwards, the annual increase rate fell between 7.3% and 9.1%. These two figures suggest two things, firstly, the annual disposable income of both urban and rural citizens in Beijing has substantially increased, and the income gap between the two groups has not apparently grown since 2000, whereas the consumption pattern for the two groups is more diverged now compared to 2000. Secondly, an Olympic economic boom might indeed have occurred during the preparation years, but the effects faded away almost immediately after the Olympic closing ceremony.



**Figure 4.7: Annual disposable income and Engel's coefficients of Beijing urban and rural residents**
Data source: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics

**Figure 4.8: Regional GDP and annual increase rate in Beijing**

Data source: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics

Having enjoyed rapid economic development since the 1990s (BOBICO, 2000a: 19), Beijing hoped for more than an overall economic boost, but focused on the domains that particularly contributed to its modernisation trajectory. In addition to providing one million new jobs in various industries during the Games preparation time, the Beijing Olympics 'also promoted industrial restructuring, corporate brand image and managerial innovation' (BOCOG, 2010c: 300). Two of the industries focused on were 'the telecommunications and information technology industries' which had enjoyed 'rapid growth' and were expected to 'be further enhanced by hosting the Games' (BOBICO, 2000b: 5). Figure 4.9 illustrates the incremental growth of the expenditure on Beijing's research and development over the last decade.



**Figure 4.9: Research and development expenditure in Beijing**

Data source: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics

## C.    People's Olympics – civil dimension

In the dimension of the People's Olympics, Beijing portrayed itself as 'home for a time-honoured oriental civilisation' and emphasised the Chinese philosophy of harmony in promoting cultural exchanges (BOCOG, 2010a: 23). In terms of the Olympic legacy, hosting the Games would also deepen economic growth and social development since the Reform[25] (BOCOG, 2010a: 15). The Beijing Olympics claimed to successfully promote the culture of volunteering and make the city a friendlier place for both citizens and visitors. The spirit of volunteering was designated as the spiritual legacy of the Beijing Olympics (BOCOG, 2010c: 268), and up to 2012, there were 1.53 million volunteers registered in the database of the Beijing Volunteer Foundation (北京商报, 2012).

Another ambition for Beijing in hosting the Olympics was to transform China 'from a sports country to a sports power' (Beijing BODA, 2011). The promotion of a healthy lifestyle

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[25] Unless otherwise clarified, 'Reform' refers to a series of economic reform policies launched at the Third Planetary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP in 1978. The official end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 also represented the start of its legacy. The severe economic hardship left by the ten-year catastrophe (1966-1976) endowed the subsequent CCP leader, Deng Xiaoping, with both responsibility and the opportunity for economic revitalisation.

The Reform, launched by Deng, could be empirically discerned into four interrelated dimensions: rural reform, urban reform, macroeconomic reform and open-door policy (Zhang, 2000). In the most succinct sense, rural, urban and macroeconomic reform could all be touted as salvaging the frozen economy and depressed productivity by providing incentives. Rural reform replaced the commune-based production system with a contract-based one: which, after deducting the contracted quota to the state, allowed the trade of excess agricultural produce on the free market and thus encouraged higher production (Zhang, 2000: 9). In urban areas, a similar policy tool was used: state owned enterprises were allowed to sell their products 'after fulfilling the state-fixed quotas' (Zhang, 2000: 12). In terms of macroeconomic reforms, reorienting revenue arrangements towards both state owned enterprises and local authorities, as well as shifting price structures at least partly in accordance with market logic were the focal points (Zhang, 2000). State owned enterprises thus transformed from 'executors of state orders' into 'independent economic actors' responsible for 'their own economic performance' (Zhang, 2000: 12). However, impeded by socialist legacy, the road of reform has been long and bumpy.

The last, but most conspicuous to the world, part of the Reform was the open-door policy. The decade-long internal friction had contributed to a great lag between China and the world. It was acknowledged by Chinese leaders that modernisation required the infusion of 'foreign science, technology, capital and management skills' (Zhang, 2000: 20). Open-door policy began in 1979, with the opening up of SEZs and provision of preferential investment treatment in these zones. With this proving successful, more coastal cities were opened to FDI in the late 1980s. In 1990 the establishment of Putong New Zone in Shanghai was a further step in the open-door policy; the projection of Shanghai into a world-leading technological and financial city involved a transition from a location-based economic policy to an ambitious industrial strategy (Zhang, 2000: 21-24).

and the regular exercising of the masses were taken as the foundation for this ambition and Beijing's modernisation. A government report published in 2005 noted there was an increase in the number of Beijing citizens who had a weekly exercising habit compared to the rate in 2000. As Figure 4.10 shows, both among males and females, the proportion rises in urban districts but declines in rural districts, again indicating the divergence between urban and rural patterns in Beijing. Another survey conducted in 2012 indicated that the proportion of Beijing citizens in general taking weekly exercise grew to 82.9% (Beijing BODA, 2012). The boost in mass sports participation is regarded as inseparable from the Olympic contribution and essential to Beijing's modernisation and civilisation.



**Figure 4.10: Citizens engaging in a weekly exercising habit in Beijing**
Data source: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Sports

## 4.3   Transformation of the Built Environment

Physical transformation is the most tangible and perceivable part of urban regeneration, and renewal of the built environment has been portrayed as the first priority for improving a dilapidated neighbourhood. The provision of a better infrastructure is a powerful tool because it is capable of not only answering local people's cry for community improvement, but also generates demonstrable performance for the politicians in office. For both the community and politicians, physical regeneration is desirable because it is the literal face of the locality. The face-lift of the built environment has consequently been a primary 'measure to present a city as an attractive place to live and work' (OECD, 2007a: 31). The more attractive a city looks, the higher potentiality for growth it has; in other words, physical improvement has been widely utilised for achieving urban growth.

Advanced technologies and means of transportation enable the geographical segmentation of the production process, but in contrast, strengthen the need for the physical

concentration of major control functions (Fainstein, 2001: 34). Corporations' decision-making does not take place in rural areas because of the agglomeration of the economy significantly assists the process of transactions. This is plausible not only because these corporations would like to reduce cost through sharing tangible materials, but also due to the advantage derived from 'the social ambience' (Fainstein, 2001: 27) engendered by their accumulation in a locality. It is a must for a city to arrange physical space corresponding to its wider strategic position in the world, as a city's physical arrangement will significantly decide its odds in the competitions it engages in. According to the description made by Fainstein (2001) of relations between the financial boom in the 1980s and property development, the physical setting in a city in this regard is both the cause and the result of social and commercial activities. This is the reason why physical improvement is crucial to urban growth and thus a primal part in the regeneration process. It is never merely a viewable making and upgrading; it is a symbol of a series of political and economic decisions.

As elaborated in Chapter 2, the pursuit of urban growth is pivotal to entrepreneurial urban governance and constantly enjoys higher priority in agenda setting, as a result of either common land-based interest (growth machine theory) or higher perceived feasibility (urban regime theory). In other words, without the potential stake, regeneration and development projects could hardly have proceeded. It is the resources mobilisation and profits maximisation effects of hosting the Olympic Games that accelerates the regeneration and development projects in urban space. The following two sections discuss the characteristics of the physical improvement of urban space in the UK and China, and then focus on Games-led regeneration in the London case and Games-led development in the Beijing case.

### 4.3.1   London - Games-Led Regeneration

**A.    Regeneration in the UK – public private partnerships and power centralisation**

In the UK with the growing prominence of entrepreneurial governance, PPPs have played a considerable role in the policy process. PPPs have been institutionally encouraged by central government, and the consequent power centralisation has featured in the process of physical regeneration. Central government's efforts are not straightforwardly positioned for motivating regenerating the urban environment but for encouraging local authorities' partnerships with private the sector. The rational and economic reason for forming a PPP is to '"join up" the diverse resources and competences of actors from the public, private and voluntary sectors' (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004: 52). Taking advantage of the synergistic

effects, transforming the organisation culture in the public sector or extracting financial benefits from actors external to the partnership can all be the purposes of forming a PPP (Mackintosh, 1992).

The adoption of 'partnership, and multi-agency provision and collaboration' was the doctrine in the 1990s (Roberts and Sykes, 1999: 43), regardless of the position of the party in office on the political spectrum. The political consideration of the Conservative Party, in office from 1979-1997, demonstrated much of Mackintosh's (1992) transformative and budget enlargement functions of partnerships. Viewing privatisation as the key to revitalising the British economy, Thatcher's government enthusiastically sold public assets and introduced PPP in the 1980s to achieve 'wider political objectives' (Hastings, 1996: 254). Firstly, the 'emphasis upon competition and partnership' demonstrates the fact that 'central government determines the "rules of the [regeneration] game"' (Atkinson, 1999: 63) and thus that central government is the entity that has power due to its role as the resources allocator. Local governments and local private businesses, in contrast, are largely constrained actors. The central government's objective of diminishing 'local-authority activism' (Fainstein, 2001: 39) was decisively served through providing financial grants to the local governments.

Secondly, in line with the Conservative Party's preference for privatisation, through partnerships with the private sector, 'the bureaucratic, non-entrepreneurial working style or culture' (Hastings, 1996: 254) of local governments was undermined and even transformed. A series of local regeneration fund-bidding programmes were introduced during the 1990s, such as the City Challenge in 1991 and Single Regeneration Budgets in 1994 (Davies, 2002), which empirically set PPP as a precondition for local authorities to be subsidised since the funding tended to be 'limited to groups of organisations which are willing and able to form partnerships' (Hastings, 1996: 253-4). PPP was inherited and ironically was further promoted by New Labour during Blair's incumbency from 1997, when it was deliberately used 'to make a virtue out of the mixed economy of local service provision' (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004: 55). The New Labour government's favouring of PPP was essentially derived from its sceptical attitude toward local autonomy, which was rooted in the central government's fundamental distrust of the ability of local public officers (Davies, 2002: 315).

As a result, over the past three decades local governments' cooperation with different sectors has been encouraged, and to some extent, is 'the only way to access' (Parker, 2010: 88) the necessary financial resources for local regeneration projects. The formation and implementation of individual partnerships was designed to cater for the criteria set by the

central government. For the partnerships that were formed with the purpose of budget enlargement, a top-down bureaucratic structure and a weaker role for local businesses characterised such collaborations (Davies, 2002: 308). Central government has been the most powerful actor in the process; local authorities are the followers and leaders at the same time, by following the demands from the central government and leading local private actors to fulfil the partnership's mission of budget enlargement.

To summarise, PPP in the UK has always involved more than the simple division of labour or the complementation of resources and ability between different sectors. The consideration of effectiveness and public service improvement has never been the whole story, since the substantial association between successful regeneration and governance through partnership 'has been barely articulated by the government' (Hastings, 1996: 253). Rather, PPP has been a machine made to provide the fund access function (Davies, 2002; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004: 55; Mackintosh, 1992). Through the central government's deliberate enforcement, British politics has consequently revealed a tendency of power concentration. As Davies (2002: 319) argues, local partnership in the UK was utilised by the central government to 'purchase added leverage over a range of local stakeholders'; rather than eroding the state's power, governance through partnership in the regeneration process may actually provide the state machinery with a new apparatus to exercise influence on the local. The repercussions are the reinforcement of the existing vertical power structures.

## B.    The London 2012 Olympics

### ➢ The Olympics as a catalyst for East London regeneration

In London, a pivotal rule for the game of regeneration is 'to create the basis for private investment' (Interviewee L02, responsible for organising Games-related planning applications). This was especially so for the Olympics because sole public investment could not achieve the large-scale regeneration required in East London. As one of the five themes[26] of the London 2012 Olympic legacies, and also the only tangible one, the regeneration of East London was always the centre of public attention and disputes. As noted by Tessa Jowell, Secretary of State for DCMS in 2003, it was the synergistic consideration that resulted in the Lea Valley being chosen as the Olympic site. In London's Candidature File submitted to the

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[26] The five themes of the legacies of the London 2012 Olympics were sport and healthy living, regeneration of East London, economic growth, bringing communities together, and the legacy of the Paralympics (HM Government and Mayor of London, 2013).

IOC, the positive impact of the Olympic Games on East London regeneration was further elaborated on and described by the bidding team as a:

> Major catalyst for change and regeneration in East London, especially the Lea Valley, levering resources, spurring timely completion of already programmed infrastructure investment and leaving a legacy to be valued by future generation. (BOA, 2004: 23)

The language used and the message transmitted here epitomises how hosting mega-events has been justified in the past three decades by event promoters. The mega-event is portrayed as capable of boosting the influx of necessary resources, accelerating infrastructural improvement, and most commendably, fitting in well with the pre-existing long-term urban plan.

➢ **Change for the better, change for whom?**

The proposed improvements in East London driven by hosting the London 2012 Olympics were not only contained in the propaganda spread by event promoters and the policy goals set by different levels of government, as there was also a consensus among local people in East London. According to the data collected from my street survey in East London, half of the total respondents felt that East London has changed for the better since London won the bid in 2005, followed by 28.6%, who did not feel there was any change. Of these 28.6% of survey respondents, many expressed the view that during and right after the Games, the surroundings had changed for the better and made people feel safer. However, when the street survey was conducted in the summer of 2013, a year after the Olympic Games, the improvement on the surroundings had not really lasted and it had returned to what it was like before the Olympics. In addition, 18.3% had ambivalent feeling about the changes—some better, some worse— whilst 3.2% felt changes had been for the worse (Figure 4.11).

**Figure 4.11: Whether London has changed for the better**

Among the respondents of my London street survey who felt there have been positive changes, 34.1% mentioned the improvement in transportation infrastructure and 53.2% talked about the increase in recreational amenities (as shown in Figure 4.4). In terms of transportation, the Government and some local authorities in the host boroughs insisted that staging the Games in the Lea Valley had been necessary for improving the area's transportation infrastructure. When considering the transport improvement brought about by the Games, Interviewee L02, previously responsible for organising Games-related planning applications, indicated the synergy between staging the Games and the progressive transportation changes; the tunnel rail link north of the Thames had made Stratford well served and this offered a strong reason for the Olympic site selection. In addition, 'the improvement of public transport [in Stratford] was not appreciated before the Olympics but it is now' (Interviewee L02, responsible for organising Games-related planning applications). The Mayor of London at the time, Ken Livingstone, took a similar stance when backing the relationship between the Games and the redevelopment of East London. After winning the bid, he said in 2008 that he bid for the Games not because he wanted 'three weeks of sport but … because it's the only way to get the billions of pounds out of the Government to develop the East End' (Davies, 2008).

In terms of recreational amenities, some survey respondents said they had more places to go to than before; 'facilities improved a lot, cleaned and fixed up' and 'lots of things popped up'. A large number of survey respondents also talked about the better look of the

area as a result of building improvements. In general, people who felt the positive changes in East London had the strongest feelings about it being better looking, making it more attractive to outsiders.

To attract outsiders through improving the built environment echoes the observation from the OECD (2007a: 31) mentioned at the beginning of this section; physical regeneration as the key to unleashing urban growth. Who can benefit from the accelerated process of physical regeneration as a result is the follow-up question. Better transportation links are beneficial to both locals and outsiders, whereas the provision of recreational amenities is a separate issue since it involves a fundamental decision on who the target clients are. Almost all of the survey respondents who felt the enhanced quantity and quality of recreational amenities in East London mentioned Westfield Stratford City, and some only mentioned it. From the local residents' point of view, Westfield was not built for them but to 'attract people to come from outside' (survey respondent). Furthermore, the intended spill-over effects, the arrival of the Westfield shopping centre was also meant to increase the prosperity of the surrounding area because outsiders would also conduct economic activities in the neighbourhood, did not actualise because Westfield is adjacent to Stratford underground station so people just visit there and leave. The emergence of the Westfield shopping centre may even have negatively affected the small businesses surrounding it because it has made it more difficult for them to survive (survey respondent). Another survey respondent commented: 'Westfield is like an island in Stratford', which is reminiscent of the development process of Canary Wharf.

The difference between the types of industry may also need to be taken into consideration. Interviewee L11, responsible for the management of some Olympic venues, talked about the prospective spill-over effects from London's Olympic sites and thought it fundamentally differentiated itself from Canary Wharf from the very beginning of the industry strategy. In his viewpoint, Canary Wharf 'displaced local people, it moved them out to develop the area ... it was a new piece of city, financial district but not relevant to them [local people].' In other words, the high threshold of financial industry doomed Canary Wharf to be an island situated in the sea of poverty of East London. As the manager of some Olympic sites, he indicated the advantageous future of the Olympic surrounding areas derived from the low threshold and high resilience of the leisure industry. 'The leisure industry, by its very nature, isn't high-tech. You don't have to have a degree. You can start at a low level and walk your way through it' (Interviewee L11, chief manager of some Olympic

venues). The jobs generated by the leisure industry are those that can be occupied by local people, and in addition, the leisure industry stands well or even prospers during a recession because people 'spend their money on having a good time, when times are bad' (Interviewee L11, chief manager of some Olympic venues). He consequently thought the scenario in the Olympic area differed from Canary Wharf because the leisure industry could be related to local people.

➢ **The cost efficiency of hosting the Games**

The locals' doubts about the applicability of hosting the Olympic Games in East London emerged before the Cabinet decided to support London's bid. As mentioned in Section Chapter 1 -1.3.1, a report produced by the Culture Media and Sport Committee (2003: 5) indicated the divergence of local opinions on staging the Games in the East End. While there has been disagreement on the appropriate scale and means of regeneration of East London, the fact that this area needs to be changed or redeveloped can hardly be denied. The host boroughs area suffers from the problems of pollution, unemployment, obesity and a shorter life expectancy compared to other parts of London, and a wide gap exists between low incomes and high housing prices (Bernstock, 2010; Butler, 2003: 2470). Interviewee L04 (who drafted the framework of East London regeneration) viewed the disadvantageous position of people in East London as 'morally not right' while the other side of London enjoyed the fruits of economic success. These environmental, economic and social predicaments provide a hotbed for widespread deprivation, which gives the locals a difficult life and a bleak outlook. As a result, Interviewee L02 (responsible for organising Games-related planning applications), in spite of admitting to the existence of a 'regional impact' brought about by the Olympics, insisted on the need 'to do something' to change an area with such a high level of deprivation and 'not making an apology for crediting somebody who actually has transformed [it].'

Tackling deprivation can hardly be objected to, but how to do so can generate a lot of disputes. Although Lower Lea Valley would be 'under development pressure anyway', Interviewee L01 (anti-Olympics activist) did not think it should be 'quite on the scale of the Olympic process.' According to the street survey conducted a year after the Games were held in the host boroughs, 48.4% thought hosting the Olympics had been a good and effective way to regenerate East London (Figure 4.12). However, effectiveness does not equal optimality, and only 31.7% believed it was the best way to achieve this goal (Figure 4.12). A large number of survey respondents expressed the opinion that hosting the Olympics was an effective but expensive way to enable regeneration because it was able and had to concentrate resources

in a short period of time, and it might not have been a good bargain after all with respect to the huge amount of money spent. Some survey respondents further questioned the necessity of hosting the Olympics as a means for regeneration because they believed a certain proportion of resources inevitably had to be invested in temporary Games spectators, and there was always a more direct and cost-effective alternative for East London regeneration. The Government and event promoters might argue about the Olympics being a must and that the inflows of resources were used in long-term regeneration projects rather than temporary Games facilities. It is, however, undeniable that the locals in East London had some doubts about the appropriateness of linking hosting the Games and the regenerative works.



**Figure 4.12: Whether staging the Games was the best way for East London regeneration**

Nevertheless, this does not invalidate the Olympics as a catalyst for East London regeneration, and neither does this presume the failure of East London regeneration as an Olympic legacy. One explanation that can be made is that a long timescale is involved, and Interviewees L09, L10 and L11 all stressed that the regeneration of East London was a long-term plan which would take two decades to complete, so that it was still premature to make a final judgement. Another train of thought from the Government underlines the discrepancy between what has been done and what has been acknowledged. Interviewee L05 has been responsible for managing and coordinating the progress of the post-Games legacy from central government. She expressed her view on the Olympic legacy delivery and thought that there have been a 'huge amount of positive activities happening but a lot people don't know about it' (Interviewee L05). This concern evokes the issue of building and maintaining trust

between levels of government and local people, and will be discussed further in the section on participation and consultation.

## 4.3.2   Beijing - Games-Led Development

### A.   Urban planning in China: from for-production and for-consumption

The effective control over land in China, an agriculture-based country with tremendous territory, has been a primary task for every emperor in Chinese history. In the thousands of years of the imperial regime, the territory of jurisdiction was an indicator of state power and substantially determined the amount of agricultural revenue that could be extracted. Land, in its most original capacity, has been a literal means of production for the Chinese. When the People's Republic of China was established by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, land was even more extensively utilised for the generation of food and taxation, and also for the achievement of state development targets in a planned economy. As the word 'planning' basically equates to a planned economy, the planning of a physical space was integral to the whole economic plan, and by all means served to 'achieve national economic and social development targets' (Wong et al., 2008: 300). Despite the existence of work units and local governing institutions, *de facto* local governance barely existed before the 1980s in China. Not much by way of autonomy was delegated to local authorities; before then, local and regional politics were an extension of central government (Friedmann, 2005: ix), and the land under the local jurisdictions had been exploited to realise the state's will.

The Reform launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 announced China's transition from a socialist to a market economy.[27] Externally, China's open door policy welcomed and attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) to the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) of Shenzhen, Xiamen, Shantou, Zhuhai and, later, Hainan. This was in the hope that the benefits of south-eastern coastal development would diffuse to the inner territories and pull the Chinese economy back from 'the verge of collapse' following the Cultural Revolution (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005: 11). However, the encouraged investment and strengthened prosperity in coastal cities not only failed to diffuse the economic income to the central and western territories, but it contributed to the wealth inequality between the east and the west, and also to the exploitation of resources in the inner territories (Wong et al., 2008: 301). A more

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[27] See footnote 25.

comprehensive approach to physical planning to mitigate these social and environmental tensions thus became imperative. From 1978 onwards, the Reform changed the pattern of the Chinese economy and provided space for the emergence of physical planning.

Physical planning was designed by the CCP as the tool to ameliorate a 'fragmented spatial structure' (Wu and Zhang, 2008: 150) and enhance the efficiency of land usage in post-Reform China. However, the road to a rational land arrangement was rocky. The open door policy led Chinese cities and regions to join the rally of neo-liberalised cities that pursue urban growth through competing for highly mobile and increasingly discriminating exogenous resources (Harvey, 1989: 11). Coupled with the disjuncture were conflicting land plans derived from inter- and intra-region competitions, and the legacy of a socialist economy, which also deterred the coherence in regional planning. Based on research in rural villages in China, market transition theory (MTT) predicted the shift of 'power and privilege' from redistributors to direct producers in the transition from redistributive to competitive economies since 'the determinants of socioeconomic attainment' had been altered as well (Nee, 1989: 679). In other words, MTT argued for a path-breaking effect led by market forces from different social strata along the trajectory of the Chinese economic Reform.

However, along with the amendment made by Nee in 1991,[28] the socialist legacy remained omnipresent, and former cadres remained influential. Path-dependent effects seemed to outweigh reforming efforts, especially in urban areas. While Nee argues that there was a substantial transformation of the power structure based on his rural villages study, he had reservations about the applicability of MTT to urban cities because the partial reform that occurred, a dual system of a market economy and communist political regime, tended to give former cadres advantageous positions of power whereby disproportionate and unfair benefits accruing to them were even greater than before (Nee, 1989: 679).

With urban land becoming lucrative, the residual power of socialist institutions complicated the picture of urban planning. Administrative decentralisation after the economic Reform had significantly increased local governments' discretion (He and Wu, 2005) despite the centre retaining a huge amount of control. The ownership rights of land in China remained monopolised by the state but the use rights belonged to the local government where the land was situated. Compared to the era of the planned economy, local

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[28] See Nee (1991), although this amendment was criticised by Guthrie (2000: 732) as 'a weak move for a strong theory' as it deprived the MTT of its falsifiability.

governments were delegated with heavy responsibilities for the provision of welfare but were simultaneously motivated to pursue local economic growth (Wu and Zhang, 2008: 150; Xu, 2008b: 167). The tendency was particularly forceful at the beginning of the Reform when the state deliberately limited its reach to local areas, thereby demonstrating a commitment to ceasing 'the pernicious behaviour of the pre-Reform era', such as allowing the existence of local governments' extra-budgetary accounts which could barely be taxed (Xu, 2008b: 167). While the reconfiguration of central government's role in local economies has been 'an open-ended and conflictual process' (Xu, 2008b: 168) and monitoring policy institutions have been tasked with regulating local economic development in the last decade (Wong et al., 2008: 300; Wu and Zhang, 2008: 150; Xu, 2008b: 167; Zhang and Wu, 2008: 219), the market-friendly[29] direction of the economy has provided a hotbed of entrepreneurial governance in Chinese cities.

In contrast, local states often find themselves struggling with pre-Reform power sources and institutions within their jurisdictions. Hsing's (2006) study on the politics of urban land planning from the late 1990s to the late 2000s demonstrated that in the attempt to unleash the exchange value of urban land through physical planning, local governments constantly encountered strife with, as she termed it, 'socialist land masters', who were a socialist legacy of :

> The tiao-kuai (條塊) matrix in China's bureaucratic structure... [and] consisted of central-level government agencies, Party and military units and state-own enterprises that [were] physically located in the jurisdiction of municipal governments, but [were] mainly subject to the vertical administrative control of the tiao (條). (Hsing, 2006: 576)

In other words, under the state ownership rights land policy, the use rights of urban land belonged to two masters, the socialist one and the municipal one, and this fact largely undermined municipal governments' manoeuvrability in conducting physical planning because the land parcels the socialist masters owned were usually of better quality and a greater quantity due to the rationale of the planned economy (Hsing, 2006: 580). When the lease of land use rights was permitted in 1988, the rivalry between the two became more intense, and land masters developed their development companies and endeavoured to

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[29] In 1982 Deng Xiaoping defined post-Reform China as 'a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.' In spite of the pro-market inclination of the *de facto* economic development in China, 'the market was to complement the plan, not to replace it (*jihua wei zhu, shichang wei bu*)' (Liew, 2005: 333).

make profits through selling use rights to private developers. Furthermore, even without the pressure of being re-elected, the prospect of career promotion still drove local government officials to seek economic growth (He and Wu, 2005: 21). With the pressure of fiscal independence, the obstacles of the socialist legacy and the aspirations of political performance, urban growth-obsessed local governments tended to fail to deliver rational urban planning and even be challenged by the legitimacy of their governance (Hsing, 2006: 591).

The zealous land lease activities predominantly contributed to a construction boom in the 1990s. Economic growth and housing privatisation gave rise to the soaring demand for urban dwellings and eventually demand-led urban restructuring (He and Wu, 2005: 6). Initially, numerous hutongs (small alleys) and old houses were knocked down because they were dangerously dilapidated for public safety reasons.[30] With accelerated land lease activities allowing more space for residential and commercial use, enhancing the housing conditions of local residents was no longer the only impetus in the late 1990s, and instead became of secondary importance through 'the recognition of the relative economic value of inner city sites' (Leaf, 1995: 150). The justification for demolition became questionable, and despite the sometimes conflicting priorities,[31] the profitability of urban land was widely appreciated and was focused on by different levels of local governments. The pursuit of the exchange value exceeded improvements in the use value.

The booming urban growth brought about by the rising number of construction sites since the 1990s is actually at an environmental and cultural expense. Agricultural land has been turned over to non-agricultural to create more space for development and this has caused environmental tensions around the carrying capacity of the land (Wong et al., 2008: 302). A crisis also emerged along cultural and historical dimensions; cultural values and old lifestyles evaporated with the massive demolition of old buildings labelled as derelict, dangerous and non-progressive, and the local identity embedded in these ancient courtyards was superseded by modern high-rise building complexes (Ouroussoff, 2008). At this stage,

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[30] The 'Weigai system', see Yutaka et al. (2004: 21)

[31] Compared to local authorities, the Chinese state places more importance on social equity since the maintenance of stability has been a strong focus of the CCP's governance. Different levels of local governments generally share the same aspirations of urban economic growth. While municipal governments tend to promote 'integrated and balanced development between districts', the governments at a district level take more consideration of their accountability to their constituencies and inter-district competition (Leaf, 1995).

the function attached to land was transformed from production in the past-planned economy to consumption in post-Reform China (He and Wu, 2005: 4). A brief timeline of the major events mentioned above in Chinese urban development is shown in Figure 4.13.



**Figure 4.13: Timeline of Chinese urban development**

**B.    The Beijing 2008 Olympics**

➢  **A bid that had to be won**

Winning the hosting right for the 2008 Summer Olympics was a necessity for China, as Beijing submitted its first Olympic bid in the early 1990s and lost to Sydney in the final round of the IOC's voting for the host city of the 2000 Olympics in 1993. Beijing's slogan for the 2008 Summer Olympics, 'one world, one dream' raised its bidding conceptualisation to the highest symbolic level, one which could hardly be trumped if Beijing was going to bid for a third time. A comment from the interviewee who planned the overall construction of the Games-led facilities explicitly revealed Beijing's resolution to win this time: 'We needed to present the best we had to the IOC in order to win the bid. We had tasted failure once before and could not afford to lose again' (Interviewee B09).

As a result, catalysing urban regeneration projects in Beijing was less vital than maximising the odds of winning the bid. Compared to London's site choice, made out of synergetic consideration (as the quote from Tessa Jowell above mentioned), Beijing chose the northern part of the city out of pragmatism. The land in the north had been reserved for stadium construction for many years. The transportation, hotels and relevant infrastructure were well equipped, due to the hosting of the Asian Games previously, and were capable of

hosting the Olympics (Interviewee B09, Games-led construction planner and chief manager of a post-Games Olympic venue). However, while the northern section involved 'less necessity for demolition' since it was also the site for the earlier Asian Games, this decision 'may also kill the opportunity to use the Olympics to improve southern Beijing' (Interviewee B04). The national stadium is in line with the Central Axis of Beijing, which had been the centre of Beijing's urban development (Interviewee B04, expert in Chinese urban regeneration projects) because 'the Central Axis and surrounding areas form a masterpiece of ancient and contemporary urban planning' (National Commission of the People's Republic of China, 2013). In short, between prospective synergy and pragmatism in bidding, the latter apparently exceeded the former for Beijing.

Despite the predominance of pragmatism, the Olympics enhanced the construction boom in Beijing since it '[enabled] Beijing to concentrate municipal and national resources on expanding the city's development capacity' (Shin, 2012). The construction boom had existed in all the major Chinese cities long before Beijing won the Olympic bid, and even secondary cities across all of China had been undergoing a development frenzy for some time. The China Economic Review (1993) had already reported that the business strategy of international hotel chains had turned from saturated big cities to secondary ones in provinces, with a resulting construction phase taking place. From neither a temporal nor a spatial perspective can one say that hosting the Olympics was the main driver for the enormous amount of new buildings that emerged in Beijing, since the construction boom started in the 1990s, and in fact, occurred in different parts of the country simultaneously. In this regard, it does not seem plausible to say that restructuring the urban landscape was Beijing's central purpose for hosting the Games since it did not lack investment or resources for urban development. A booming city does not require a mega-event to speed up its physical development.

However, as some interviewees and statistics indicated, hosting the Olympics should be regarded as a great leap forward in Beijing's urban infrastructure. Beijing is a city endeavouring to modernise itself to join 'the lineup of world cities' (Brenner and Keil, 2006: 277). The interviewee responsible for meeting construction requirements for staging the Games argued the necessity for Beijing to have 'high-end [sports] facilities', noting 'it is necessary to newly build them and make them permanent' (Interviewee B02). Furthermore, from 2001 to the end of 2007, the length of all the roads in Beijing grew from 2,500km to 4,500 km, and six subway lines were added between 2002 and 2008, extending the number from two to eight (BOCOG, 2010: 186). Seven interviewees explicitly said they felt either the

surroundings had undergone a great change or the infrastructure in the city had significantly improved after the Olympics (Interviewees B02, B04, B07, B09, B10, B12 and B13). However, as mentioned above, the development and transformation in a developing country, especially considering China's enormous geographic scale, which substantially increases its leverage in negotiations with foreign investors, are always huge even without the Olympics. A difference should be recognised between physical renewal in urban space as one of the major aspirations for hosting the Olympics and the infrastructural improvement brought about by the Olympics.

In terms of residents' feeling about the change in the local area in the Olympic delivery process, surveys of local residents showed that 89.7% of all respondents felt that Beijing had changed for the better, while the remaining 10.3% felt that some dimensions had changed for the better while others had changed for the worse. When asked about the dimensions in which they perceived the changes, 64.1% felt that there were better prospects for the job market and business opportunities, while 59% and 53.8% felt there had been improvement in the provision of local amenities and of recreation, respectively. In terms of the dimensions in which they felt it was worse than before, 'transportation and traffic' was named by 66.7% of total survey respondents, which was higher than for all other dimensions. The detailed numbers of how survey respondents felt about the change to the local area in the Olympic process is shown in Figure 4.14.



**Figure 4.14: Dimensions that have changed after Beijing won the bid**

➢ **Beautification of the urban landscape**

In order to present its best face to the world, Beijing began the demolition of urban dwellings, and the evacuation of pre-existing residents in the city reached a peak during the preparation for the Olympics. Traditionally spacious courtyard living for one family had become crammed with four or five households, and a 'substantial slum-clearance program' seems to have been a necessity for the Chinese Government (Ouroussoff, 2008). Excluding migrant workers who have always been absent from Chinese official records, an investigation conducted by the Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction (COHRE) claimed that the population directly affected by demolitions or relocations during the preparation years for the Olympics numbered 165,000 per year, which was double its annual counterpart between 1991 and 1999 (Fowler, 2008: 7). 'China's paradoxical status as a market economy led by an authoritarian state' (Broudehoux, 2007: 389) efficaciously expedited standard operation procedures in terms of land acquisition and mega-events delivery, namely demolition, eviction, compensation and relocation.

The CCP's precipitant and ruthless move put itself in the predicament of provoking social unrest. The enormous funds endorsed in the vanity projects and the government and event promoters' Olympic fervour uncomfortably contrasted with the widening income gap, the repressed dissent, and the forced evictees. Consequently, as soon as officially coming to power in 2004, Hu Jingtao initiated 'a series of measures to address mounting tensions and appease social discontent' (Broudehoux, 2007: 392). Furthermore, in an attempt to regain public support for the Games, efforts were spent in infusing the Games with the national pride and triumphs of the Chinese.[32] With the possibility that these measures worked to maintain stability within Chinese society, a good portion of the evictions and relocations influenced residents to regard their personal inconvenience and disadvantage 'as a worthy sacrifice' (Broudehoux, 2007: 389) for the glory of China. An interviewee who previously worked as the head cadre of a village, where the national stadium is situated today, recalled his communication with the villagers and said that they were mostly farmers before the land expropriation and had lived there for decades:

> The beginning was not really smooth. It's not because the residents were against the Olympics but because of their emotional attachment to the land ... [After some negotiation] generally speaking they were all quite supportive of

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[32] How the hosting of the Olympics was used to enhance civic pride and nationalism as a tool for internal branding will be further discussed in the next chapter.

> the country's big event without unreasonably asking too much [amount of compensation]. Most residents feel very proud of the fact that current Olympic Park was previously their own home. They feel connected to such a great event and will be proudly telling the story to their friends. (Interviewee B13, former head cadre of a village at the Olympic site)

As a chief cadre in charge of the negotiation among the villagers, the demolition company and the municipal government, his opinion may be biased. Another interviewee experienced in land expropriation and residents' relocation in China expressed a more pragmatic view. When facing the fate of land expropriation, local residents would calculate:

> the cost-benefits between being a nail house[33] and cooperating with the Government. When your opponent is the Chinese Communist Party, like in the case of the Olympics, the odds of winning are very small. However if you are facing private developers, the time you can endure as a nail house might largely determine the amount of compensation you can get in the end. (interviewee B04, expert in Chinese urban regeneration projects)

➢ **Games-driven cultural redevelopment**

Along with social discontent, mass scale demolition also put the CCP in confrontation with cultural conservationists and the international media. Compared to the past half century since the CCP took control of China, as revealed in Figure 4.15, *hutongs* vanished at an incomparable speed during the two decades between the 1990s, when big construction sites sprang up, and the 2000s, when Beijing prepared for the Olympic Games. With pressure from conservationists, domestically and internationally, and with the purpose of retaining an immaculate image of the Beijing 2008 Olympics, the CCP ironically had to slow down the pace of demolition.

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[33] 'Nail house' (dingzihu) is Chinese slang describing the last remaining house on a construction site, from which residents refuse to move or be relocated. As a result, the house cannot be demolished and doggedly remains on the site like a nail.

**Figure 4.15: Map of demolished *hutongs***
Source: Ouroussoff (2008)

In 2004, 15 historic conservation districts were added to the Conservation Planning of 25 Historic Areas in Beijing Old City that had been announced in 1990.[34] Areas covered by the conservation plan can only be 'reconstructed in such a way as to retain their original design, but should not be demolished or expanded' with the exception of the 'illegal structures within courtyards', which were to be demolished (Fowler, 2008: 22). An interviewee working on a regeneration project in Beijing, which is situated in one of the historic conservation plan's districts, discussed the organic regeneration approach adopted by her team. In the Government's view, she argued, an appropriate agent to regenerate 'an area demanded cultural conservation like this' should not come from the private sector because they 'may not be able to fulfil the mission since the area will tend to be commercialised and the historical and cultural values will disappear' (Interviewee B12). According to this interviewee,

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[34] The first and second assignation of the historic conservation planning district is available at http://www.beijing.gov.cn/rwbj/lsmc/wwyc/bjlswhjq/ [accessed on 29 March 2015].

the organic regeneration approach takes much longer than the traditional way because they spend the first few years untangling the local social fabric, investigating cultural and historical roots, ascertaining different types of local residents and their diverse expectations in the regeneration process, and start the action plan by establishing modelled nodes and expanding them.

The transition from massive demolition to cultural conservation seems to be a friendlier approach for the neighbourhood and offers a brighter future. Nevertheless, Shin (2010: S53), who researched the mechanism of conservation in Nanluoguxiang, Beijing, argued that 'urban conservation in practice facilitates the revalorisation of dilapidated historic quarters.' Such forged-through-conservation cultural quarters, in many cases, involve the bizarre and boring juxtaposition of restored/remade historical buildings and modern restaurants and shops for the tourists to '[soak] up the phony cultural atmosphere' (Ouroussoff, 2008). After all, the 'heritage/culture-based visitor economy' is popular among local authorities since it has a relatively low threshold to cross (Evans, 2009: 1006). 'No ordinary people's place' (Shin, 2010: S51) is the repercussion of a gentrified local space. Moreover, in respect of the political calculation, the assigning of conservation areas is a wise way to reconcile the dilemma between the urge for cultural conservation and the desire for urban growth (Zhang, 2008: 195). The pace and scale of demolition taking place in Beijing was accelerated after the approach of 'symbolic urban preservation' began (Zhang, 2008: 195), which justified redevelopment undertakings since places outside of the conservation list were unworthy of being preserved (Shin, 2010; Zhang, 2008: 195).

In addition to promoting urban growth through cultural conservation, the boom in the cultural creative industry after the Olympics also fostered rent-seeking behaviour in China. Accompanying the CCP's deliberation on mobilising patriotism and forging public support for the Games through the power of culture, in 2006 the cultural and creative industry was included in China's national development agenda as one of a number of prioritised industries. As one of the country's economic focuses, culture started to be regarded as capable of making money (Interviewee B11, image landscape designer at BOCOG). The appreciation of the cultural and creative industry's profitability led to a distorted integration between culture and the built environment. Interviewee B05, who conceived and coordinated the design of the logos for the Games, talked about his personal experience of being invited to a southern city in China to facilitate a 'cultural and creative zone' but he eventually refused to participate in the plan because it looked more like real estate development in the name of the cultural

creative industry. As part of a high-flying industry in China, these zones are capable of gathering the resources necessary for development. The clustering of art studios and craft firms was intended to achieve both an economy of scale and have a catalytic effect on the individuals and the organisations within the areas (Evans, 2004: 73). Moreover, such clusters may also incubate 'the images for an aesthetic economy' (Lloyd, 2006: 46) in the surrounding of the creative zones. However, both Interviewees B05 (designer and coordinator of logos for the Games), and B06 (planner of cultural activities), did not feel that China had reached a phase of development that allowed for the correct pursuit of a culture creative industry, believing that the creation of creative zones was 'sugar-coating' paving for urban growth.

## 4.4 Participation and Consultation

The inclusion of actors from a wider social base into the policy process seems to scarcely be objected to. Civil participation, in the policy design phase, has been regarded as capable of infusing local wisdom and information about genuine social needs so as to improve public service quality. A study by Parés et al. (2011) into regeneration projects in Catalonia, Spain, showed that a greater level of civil participation facilitated approaches with greater comprehensiveness and a stronger inclination to achieve 'social and community development' (Parés et al., 2011: 240). After policy implementation it can provide feedback on service delivery (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004), and citizens' presence in the policy process also disciplines and scrutinises the 'out-of-touch and self-interested politicians' (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004: 55). However, there is always a discrepancy between who should be ideally included and who virtually has the access to participate. If the participants are those who have vested interests and are already in the policy process, the promotion of participation will be a catalyst for deeper social inequality. As Arnstein (1969: 216) indicates, the 'redistribution of power' should be the cornerstone of any participation mechanism, otherwise it is doomed to be an institutionalised container for the frustration of the powerless and for the consolidation of existing power relations.

With the strong localisation and variation of policy targets, the regeneration of urban space is a policy area that demands a greater level of civil participation. Although in empirical terms, participation in an urban regeneration project may well reflect the aforementioned lack of power redistribution.

The first problem is derived from the asymmetry of resources within a so-called 'community'. When it comes to civil participation, 'community' often refers to the

congregation of local residents, as opposed to levels of government and developers. The reference nonetheless implies a delusion that the constituents of a community have unified opinions and ideals. The delusion of unification is questionable because the constituents enter the process with diverse interests, aspirations and self-recognition in terms of their role in the participation scheme, and thus use different strategies to achieve their respective targets (Dargan, 2009). Moreover, it tends to consolidate existing stratification within a community, because those with more socio-economic resources are usually the ones being heard, while others go unheard and ignored. Resources and power possessed by local authorities, developers and constituents of the community can only become more asymmetrical. Given the complex interests involved, participants need to pass a high threshold of knowledge, encompassing both community development and negotiation skills, if they want to be heard and to play a non-tokenistic part in a scheme. Compared to resourceful levels of government and well-connected developers, representatives from a community can barely reach the knowledge threshold necessary to achieve substantial changes in the design and implementation of regeneration projects.

Objective conditions of the regeneration project in question only worsen the situation, and time pressure is an example. '[The] externally imposed, although internally interpreted, timetable' (Atkinson, 1999: 69) and the urge to provide fast outcomes for regeneration undertaking, limit the possibility and scope of civil participation. The spirit of meaningful participation, time-consuming opinion exchange and negotiation, in nature contradicts a regeneration policy's pursuit of a fast outcome. The necessity of making decisions often leaves little room for addressing wider social problems deriving from 'a neo-liberal understanding of globalization' (Bailey, 2010: 325). Thus, in urban regeneration projects a participation scheme can hardly be participatory. With regard to stakeholders, given the public attention and external pressure entailed, the greater the scale of a regeneration project the less participatory its scheme will be.

Regeneration and development projects led by the Olympic Games do not yield genuine participatory participation schemes, and the cases studied here epitomise the limited space for civil participation in Games-led regeneration/development. The Olympic Games functions as a coercive external force, which significantly shrinks the space for wide community participation. It imposes a non-negotiable temporal deadline for the hosting cities and also numerous spatial constraints due to the detailed and well-developed standard operation procedures provided by the IOC; its venues cannot be easily altered and the

specifics have to meet rigid criteria. Coupled with diverse aspirations in the neighbourhood concerning the coming of the Games, the powerlessness of local communities in the face of the neo-liberally constructed mega-event intensifies the conflicts between those who have the power for agenda-setting and those who do not. The scale and pressure to stage the show prefigures the difficulties of devising a well-rounded legacy plan for neighbourhood improvement. Despite this, the post-Olympics legacy is the justification and a necessary part of the bid for virtually every host city.

In the case of London 2012, East London regeneration was the leading component of the legacy and inseparable from London's winning of the Olympic bid. Yet as tightly associated with local people's lives as it may be, Games-led East London regeneration has not provided much participatory space for local residents. As discussed below, the Olympic-framed discourse of East London regeneration has rendered the imagination, discussion and aspiration of regeneration projects as rather limited. In Beijing, while the political regime is utterly different from that in the UK, the low extent of genuine civil participation in Games-led regeneration is shared. Participation in Beijing's Games-led development is nothing but a formality for successful land expropriation.

In both cases, echoing the previous discussion, undistributed power, asymmetrical weaponry, and subjectively interpreted external conditions for the regeneration/ development project all diminish the prospects for participatory participation. Civil participation is a necessity that enables the Games, not the other way round. The following sections discuss in detail the empirical findings regarding the London 2012 and Beijing 2008 Games.

### 4.4.1   Civil Participation in London

#### A.   The intersected relations between participation and partnership

As mentioned in Section 4.3, partnership with the private sector has been institutionally encouraged by the UK central government since the 1980s. When New Labour came to power in 1997, it stated; 'partnership and participation are twin pillars ... [of] the "modernisation" of public services and the renewal of local democracy' (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004: 65). PPP can be a means of enhancing and an indicator for assessing the extent of civil participation, since there have been more actors involved in the policy process. Conversely, strengthened participation can also be a means for PPP to identify potential

partners and stakeholders during the early stage (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004). Interviewee L09, working as the supervisor in a consultation company based in London, talked about the measures they usually take to identify and access potential stakeholders whom they would like to engage in the regeneration project. In addition to web-searching community groups and consulting local authorities, hosting pop-up events is an approach they constantly adopt. According to his description, the activities aimed at gathering local people with different backgrounds together, are actually able to diversify the interests being heard in the regeneration partnership through their mere participation. Of the three to four hundred people they talk to during a one-day event, at least twenty or more are bright and willing to contribute. What they usually do is make these people 'members of the community lead-in groups… to complement that kind of the existing groups, who are always there and usually always saying the same things' (Interviewee L09, facilitating local consultation on East London regeneration).

However, the relationship between the two pillars is not always harmonious. As an essential constituent of entrepreneurial urban governments, PPPs prevalence does not necessarily contribute to participatory governance. Though the information is much more accessible to the general public than before, the circle of decision-making remains formulated by local authorities and business representatives and is inaccessible to citizens (OECD, 2007a: 52). A study by Lowndes and Sullivan (2004) concluded that participation may be even more unachievable in the context of partnership. Representativeness is one of the most immediate issues when it comes to participation; civil participation through partnership insinuates both the representation ability (the possibility of being represented) and the represented-ness (the fact of being represented) of the community individuals. However, the idea of community representatives draws questions itself, since it tends to measure representativeness through locality rather than through the variety of interests within a neighbourhood. The repercussion is the replication of social exclusion because 'the most disadvantaged groups' are often the most easily excluded ones from 'community associations and activities' (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004: 61). In civil participation, the greatest danger lies in that:

> Those who shout the loudest are the ones you listen to. They [claimed to be] representing the majority view, they have time, they're organised and that happened quite often… People said they represented other people but they're not representing anybody. They represent themselves. (Interviewee L11, chief manager of some Olympic venues)

**B.    Participation in the service of the Games**

The deferring to the opinion community is particularly arresting when it comes to local consultation meetings associated with the Olympic Games. While in theory the aim of encouraging participation is to access local needs and recruit local wisdom to the policy process, the consultation meetings in practice reveal the direct and indirect contempt with which opinion from the local community is held. A citizen who once attended the consultation meeting about East London regeneration felt frustrated because her opinion on how the facilities in the Olympic Park could have been improved were not taken seriously. 'It's just small things, like having more swings for kids, talking about no pay phone in the park … [These are] easy but never happen after the meeting' (survey respondent). One of the interviewees also described the frustration encountered by people who attended consultation meetings about Games-led East London regeneration, stating that this circumstance:

> Has not been easy for local people because while they tried to actively engage in consultations, some of them were even being shouted down … it's not really about consultation but more like promotion: telling people what's going to happen. (Interviewee L01, anti-Olympics activist)

This scenario reflects Arnstein's (1969) depiction of the type of civil participation which lacks power redistribution, some of which may be merely tokenistic,  for placatory purposes, or even manipulation in the name of participation.

A vicious circle is thus created between participation tokenism and local citizens' distrust. Foley and Martin (2000: 481), who based their study on two British regeneration initiatives, City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget, indicate the low levels of influence of representatives from the community and voluntary sector compared to local authorities and business representatives, despite all being 'equal partners in formal terms'. Cameron and Davoudi (1998: 250) make a similar observation of the same initiatives, concluding that community representatives were provided a place for a presence rather than a voice. The ritualism and tokenism of civil participation does nothing but intensify local citizens' distrust, and a lack of substantial influence also leads to low willingness to participate (Foley and Martin, 2000: 486; Head, 2007: 452).

The fact that it was decided to stage the London 2012 Olympic Games in the Lower Lea Valley may indeed have been a catalyst for the area's regeneration, but simultaneously, it obscured the purpose of local participation and largely limited the scope for public

consultation. With the approaching of the Games, their successful and smooth delivery is the top priority for every hosting city, and London was no exception. Interviewee L06, working in the non-public sector and helping bridge the artistic community with the Olympic neighbourhood, regarded the institutions and the implementation of participation mechanism as designed for 'making some things happen' and not for 'consulting people about what they thought the Games should or shouldn't be' (Interviewee L06). The importance of meeting the legal requirements for consultation on the delivery of the Olympics exemplifies what 'making it happen' through civil participation meant in the battle between local communities and authorities. Conducting consultation meetings was like a defensive shield for the authorities because the judicial review was:

> The vehicle by which many communities try to obstruct. The only way to make sure you don't have to do a judicial review is to follow the process very strictly. You have to make sure you don't give somebody opportunity because you didn't consult. (Interviewee L02, responsible for organising Games-related planning applications)

What should be drawn from civil participation in theory, local needs and local wisdom, can hardly be found in the delivery of the Games. The scale of regeneration involved meant it was regarded as 'a big strategic issue on how we use this incredible piece of land' and unsuitable for consultations by its nature (Interviewee L04, drafting the framework of East London regeneration). Another interviewee who had previously worked in the London Development Association (LDA) argued similarly about the priority of the regeneration at this scale and the practicality of consultations when it came to the Olympics. He thought it was always good and necessary to talk to people before a project commenced, whereas 'there're some things which are open to influence and some things aren't ... [The] biggest thing is to identify the opportunity and make them work more effectively' (Interviewee L06, bridging the artistic community with the Olympic neighbourhood).

Prioritising the delivery of the Olympics not only subjected civil participation to servicing the mega-event but delimited the agenda circling around the Lower Lea Valley regeneration. Coupling Lower Lea Valley regeneration with the Olympics simply deprived the imagination of regeneration master planning of independence, independent from the coming of the Games. The Olympics was further used to narrow the discussion to the event-related issues, and even to divert the sensitive issues aroused, a process which Harskamp (2006) terms 'Olympic translation'. The adaptation effects provided by the Olympics in local consultations redefine the meaning of regeneration, dominate policy discourse and suppress

the debate on event-unrelated issues. As Interviewee L01 (anti-Olympics activist) indicated, while the official publication was occupied by two themes, the development progress of the stadium and the regeneration legacy, the former was hardly the focus of the local community. The latter, as the main concerns of the locals, was poorly narrated in a 'vague, visionary and picture-based' way that 'didn't address the controversies' (Interviewee L01, anti-Olympics activist).

### C. Local trust and the management of expectation

With the highly rigid and uncompromising nature of the Olympic Games, what can and should become the topic for consulting with local communities is crucial to the success of civil participation. As mentioned above, local people who attended consultation meetings did not feel that their opinion had influenced the decision-making. Among those who had not been to consultation meetings about the East London regeneration, the majority of people, my street survey showed that 56.3% (See Figure 4.16) of them did not feel that their opinion would have been taken seriously, while 13.5% strongly believed that their opinion would have been taken into consideration. Some of the survey respondents said that the authorities 'would do whatever they want' regardless of what the locals said. Most of the locals were unwilling to participate in consultations, not to mention collaborate with local authorities, because they felt 'there [was] no benefit to them' for doing so (Foley and Martin, 2000: 486). These responses explain why building and maintaining local trust has been a repeatedly mentioned topic among the interviewees from local authorities, a consultation company and the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC).

**Figure 4.16: Whether their opinion as a local would be taken seriously if they had the chance to attend consultation meetings**

The management of expectation can be viewed as an advanced measure to maintain local trust. Since the big issues, such as the venue of the stadium, are neither adjustable nor suitable for local consultation, as discussed above, it becomes imperative to frame the discussion within the sphere that is open to be influenced. In other words, consultations with local communities about comparatively minor issues also means the finalisation of major issues without consulting locals. Interviewee L09 said they have been very careful to not give people unrealistic hopes because:

> People only do trust you when they see something they said has had an impact on the scheme. That's why we are very keen to track these impacts all the way through. And we're also very keen to say, just because you ask for it doesn't mean it's going to happen but we will try (Interviewee L09, facilitating local consultation on East London regeneration).

Similarly, the interviewee responsible for integrating diverse dimensions of East London regeneration talked about the key to conduct consultations being to:

> Make sure that you do what you said you're gonna do and to manage people's expectation. [To] make sure the people understand the process of regeneration and don't think they're gonna get something which they're not ... If we start to do things which we said we won't do or we promise things which don't materialise, then participation doesn't really continue to happen. (Interviewee L10, integrating diverse dimensions of East London regeneration)

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Atkinson (1999) provides a discourse analysis of the UK government's guidance instructing strategic partners to conduct community participation for regeneration projects. He finds that the promotion of participation was a means used to contain intractable social demands and to construct civil compliance. 'Through the inculcation of a series of obligations', a way of thinking and communicating has been internalised and incarnated with community representatives, which automatically engendered their 'self-censorship' of what was practical and rational to demand (Atkinson, 1999: 67). Expectations of local participants is thereby managed and delimited within what is considered achievable.

The management of expectation reflects the recognition that successful civil participation hinges on the degree of local trust engendered. This further leads to some more fundamental questions: what can be counted as successful civil participation? why is it important for civil participation to be successful? is civil participation a means for helping to make some higher goals materialise or a goal itself with intrinsic value? More specifically, is the purpose of civil participation to empower locals to voice what matters to their everyday life in the locality, or to help make the government's will materialise?

A philosophical debate is not the point of this thesis; rather, how civil participation was facilitated and implemented by practitioners in the regeneration process should be the focus of discussion. For them, civil participation is undoubtedly an instrument for the successful delivery of policy goals. Moreover, Interviewee L11 thought this instrument had not always been facilitating, but instead had sometimes impeded the progress of regeneration. He thought there had never been:

> A simple answer. The simple answer would be 'we should consult people more'. But why, on what, and what we're looking to achieve? You need to be careful, otherwise you can suck the life out of the organisation. And it doesn't really take you anywhere. (Interviewee L11, chief manager of some Olympic venues)

In line with this notion of engaging with civil participation, Interviewee L10 (integrating diverse dimensions of East London regeneration) thought one could only judge the success of participation within a 20-year timeframe to see if East London had been transformed into a better place and if the local people were better off. This means that successful regeneration is the prerequisite of successful participation, not the other way round. She further implicitly elaborated about the challenge of civil participation, which, in her opinion, was not to ensure everyone was included all the time because:

> Somebody will always feel left out [or] feel not participating fully ... Involving people is always challenging and always needs to be very carefully handled so that's the greatest challenge: to do it right, to do it where it's appropriate [and] to do it meaningfully. (Interviewee L10, integrating diverse dimensions of East London regeneration)

Hence, based on the interviews I conducted in London, the need to manage expectation is derived from the need to ensure the progress of Games-led regeneration. The higher goal is the successful delivery of the Olympic Games, while civil participation in the process of Games-led regeneration is certainly necessary, but far from participatory.

## 4.4.2 Civil Participation in Beijing

### A. Participation shadowed by a lack of civil society

➢ **Communities as a part of state rather than of society**

Participation denotes rather a different meaning in China compared to its usage in the Western context. Based on the assumption of the existence of a civil society, which is 'open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting [and] autonomous from the state' (Diamond, 1999: 221), participation is the 'active involvement in changing the character of a continuing community' (Shin, 2008: 2) conducted by the members of the civil society. The assumption of civil society made by Diamond (1999) poses an instant question about what participation means and what measures in the policy process are taken by the citizens to maximise their interests in a country where a civil society independent from the state is missing. As a result, it is necessary to discuss the impact of the socialist legacy on the configuration of participation in contemporary urban China.

In the era of planned economies, the boundaries between the public and private spheres were blurred. Work units were not only the space for work but the locus of social service provision and 'the perfect institution for regimenting life during after-work hours' (Friedmann, 2005: 79). These hours were saturated by political mobilisation and spiritual education, which successfully internalised public interests into individuals' private lives, if there were any. Work units were the ubiquitous and infiltrative means to ensure the operation of communism and statism. Rather than being a spontaneous and active engagement to influence the policy process, conversely, participation in China was for a long time an unspoken political obligation. Just as the word 'plan' immediately revives the

memory of the planned economies era, participation in China signifies the state's comprehensiveness and effective social control. With the advancement of the economic Reform and the compulsory sale of housing stock in the housing reform of 1998, the system of work units was substantially dismantled (Gui and Ma, 2014: 59), and an alternative mechanism to replace the function of the work units in society consequently became imperative.

It was against this backdrop that the idea of community started to gain importance and changed from an abstract concept to an institutionalised model within policy discourse (Bray, 2006: 531). Community building had been promoted since the 1990s for 'the reconstruction of grassroots organisations' (Gui and Ma, 2014: 60). It became a predominant part of policy discourse to legalise and rationalise the existing grassroots organisations and institutions (Bray, 2006). In the official guidance issued by the Ministry of Civil Affair in 2000, the areas that were specifically demarcated and managed by residents' committees were officially announced as communities to fill the gap left by the dismantling of work units and state-owned enterprises (Ministry of Civil Affairs 民政部, 2000). Rather than the manifestation of civil power, communities in urban China are thus the lowest level of urban governance. The state communities function as welfare and medical service providers, maintainers of neighbourhood security and social stability, healthy and civilised lifestyle promoters, as well as spiritual and socialism educators (Ministry of Civil Affairs 民政部, 2000).

In contrast to the state's endeavour of building communities, the growing of homeowners' associations can be viewed as a phenomenon deriving from the prosperous capitalist market in the post-Reform era. The over accumulation of capital in China's open market necessitates an outlet to absorb its surplus. Investment in the built environment, as Harvey (1982) notes, constitutes a secondary circuit of capital accumulation and resolves the over accumulation problem of the first circuit. The heated real estate market gave birth to a new class of homeowners in urban China, though only using rights in law since the land is monopolised by the state. In the desire to protect their own rights, homeowners' associations emerged and grew, with the aim to exercise stronger influence on the management and development of their neighbourhoods through turning the focus-dispersed individual homeowners' demands into power-centralised collective ones (Breitung, 2014: 146). The homeowners, who are eager to be more influential in neighbourhood affairs, undoubtedly threaten the interest of the residents' committees within communities. The conflicts

between and strategies used by the two have been well documented (Gui and Ma, 2014; Guo and Sun, 2014; Huang, 2014).

The emergence of homeowners' associations imposes not only conflicts of interests for residents' committees but also gives rise to misgivings by the local state. The local state, would like to make it obligatory for homeowners' associations to shoulder the financial responsibility of maintaining and upgrading the neighbourhood infrastructure, but along with the CCP, is cautious of these associations' potential implication as a source of social power (Gui and Ma, 2014: 60) that may be strong enough to 'challenge [the state's] fundamental authority' (Enserink and Koppenjan, 2007: 467). As well as having to deal with the inherent conflicts of interests discussed above, homeowners' associations are under constant surveillance and face hurdles erected by residents' committees who sometimes politicise the homeowners' appeals in order to provoke repressive measures against them from higher levels of government and thereby obtain leverage (Gui and Ma, 2014). The situation renders homeowners' associations simply capable of protecting the rights of owned property (Yip, 2014) and reduces them to 'specific interest groups' representing only themselves (Breitung, 2014: 164). They consequently remain far from being a representative and noteworthy body able to bring about more participatory politics.

➢ **Policy formulation vs. implementation**

In addition to the formal and informal institutions at the lowest level of urban governance, the socialist legacy also strongly influences the approach individual citizens use to maximise personal interests. The fact that communities in urban spaces are the products of the state's top-down facilitation provides little space for organised social power. In this circumstance, participation is comprehended and implemented disparately by the Chinese. Participation has been defined as the endeavours of the stakeholders to 'influence and share control over priority setting, policy-making, resource allocations and access to public goods and services' (The World Bank Group, 2013). This definition focuses on the efforts made by stakeholders to influence the phase of decision-making, or the even earlier phase of agenda setting, namely participation in this sense takes place as policy formulation. Communities in China conversely are a 'state organised space' (Shin, 2008: 2) and can hardly be a platform for the formulation of local voices. This fundamentally alters Chinese citizens' expectations and aspirations of their efforts spent in participation.

The communist system does not exclude the possibility of people participating (Cai, 2004: 429). When and how civil participation is conducted varies from the above definition of The World Bank Group (2013). Instead of aiming at influencing policy formulation, the phase of policy implementation provides more leeway for Chinese citizens to manoeuvre, which is due to two institutional reasons. As Shin's (2008) study on civil participation in the urban regeneration process revealed, firstly, local residents are basically barred from entry into the policy design process, which is dominated by local governments and developers. The huge importance and influence of local partnership between the two is reminiscent of the scenario of urban regeneration in the UK. The lack of a legal requirement in China for accessing local residents' opinions at this stage makes the power asymmetry even more extreme. Local residents are only 'invited' to be present at a very late stage of implementation, when a public demonstration of local residents' 'support for the program' (Shin, 2008: 10) is needed by local governments. In other words, participation in this sense is better understood as policy notification or confirmation rather than engagement.

The second relates to the locus of accountability in the Chinese political system. The lack of elections makes local officers more responsive to pressure from their superiors than to requests from locals (Cai, 2004: 427). As a result, there has been widespread recognition that in order to guard personal interests, resorting to power is more effective than a judicial approach (Cai, 2004: 428). It is against this backdrop that the appeal system was invented in China, and this allows the general citizen to approach higher levels of administrative authorities if they feel their interests have been unjustly encroached upon by local officials at a lower level; the history of allowing citizens to access higher authorities can be traced back to the Warring States Period (Shi, 1997: 60). Nowadays, specific agencies which respond to citizens' appeals, expressed either by letter or in person, are set up at different levels of government. In addition to resolving the problems that local authorities fail to address, from the state's point of view, the appeal system is also an instrument for supervising local bureaucrats and their policy implementation, as well as discerning the opinions and the situation of the local populace (Cai, 2004: 435; Shi, 1997: 60). Although the new law, enforced on 1st May 2014, placed a lot of restrictions on citizens' right to appeal to inappropriately higher levels of government, the appeal system remains a pivotal approach for rights remedy among the general populace and an influential way of circulating information between the state and society.

The road for citizens to make appeals is a rocky one, as the performance evaluation of local governments and the career promotion of local bureaucrats are significantly related to the number of appeals lodged (Cai, 2004: 438). A high number of appeals signifies poor governance on the part of the local authority, and the more appeals which are lodged, the weaker the governor of a precinct becomes.  Every constituent in the entire hierarchy has a stake in the number of appeals made, consequently, local authorities are strongly incentivised to deter citizens' initiatives in the first place, even if it sometimes demands violent repression (Cai, 2004: 439). A further successful approach to the upper level does not guarantee the success of guarding citizens' rights. Generally speaking, Chinese bureaucrats have a certain amount of administrative discretion to determine whether and how to deal with an appeal coming to their door, with the decision depending on a bureaucrat's subjective judgement of 'the nature of the issues and of the political power of the officials involved' (Shi, 1997: 61). Issues that are too intractable to handle tend to lead to a decision of dodging them and transferring them to other relevant agencies (Shi, 1997: 62), which  hugely increases the cost for the appellants[35] since it takes time for the case to be moved between agencies.

The appeal system arises from the symptoms of institutional failure, and the emergence of the system implies the insufficiency of an existing governance hierarchy, as it is a failure of governance at the lower levels that requires the intervention of upper ones. However, this requirement does not derive from the supervising function within formal institutional design, but hinges on the initiative of citizens who have been oppressed. Rather than an institutional force, the individual or collective citizens' subjective and spontaneous actions are the driving force of the process. As an influential way of participation for Chinese citizens, the appeal system shows an intense colour of the rule of man from its emergence to its implementation.

The tendency for Chinese citizens to participate at a late stage of policy implementation, or even later to lodge appeals as a way of participating after the damage has already occurred, does not necessarily mean popular opinion is being neglected when policies are designed. Even in Mao's era, officials at different levels were required to 'obtain information on what ordinary citizens were thinking and integrate it with government policy during the policy formation stage' (Shi, 1997: 45). Public opinion still matters to the governors

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[35] Being transferred to other agencies may not necessarily mean the failure of an appeal. See Shi (1997: 62) for the opportunities and the risks appellants encounter in the process of complaint transferring.

of a communist state. However, what differentiates such information gathering from participation is that citizens' opinions are passively collected and active opinion input through civil participation is neither encouraged nor welcomed. Hence, civil participation in China is more visible during and after policy implementation.

The socialist legacy of residential committees and the existence of the appeal system are indicative of an important fact, which is the highly suspicious attitude of the state towards collective civil actions. In light of its great concern about their formation, the state confines homeowners' associations to the domain of property rights through endorsing residents' committees as the community governors. Organised social power cannot exist without numerous constraints. In this circumstance, citizens cannot seek substantial support or resources from grassroots interest groups, as in democratic states, but must resort to the appeal system in order to make claims. Despite the fact that citizens always try to make collective appeals so as to raise awareness and maximise their odds, the collectiveness only exists for their collective appeal, and neither extends nor is expanded to wider social claims. Similar to homeowners' associations, it is nearly impossible for appellants to become a social power with sufficient representability. The state not only constrains the development of social organisations but retains itself as the only source of help when citizens are in need. In the case of the Olympics, it was impossible for local citizens to participate in the policy formation stage and their participation was rather limited even during the phase of policy implementation. As Shin (2008: 4) argues, contemporary regeneration in urban China is encompassed by the demolition of physical buildings, the displacement of pre-existing residents and the dissolution of long-standing communities. The preparation for the Beijing 2008 Olympics operated in a similar manner.

**B.    Mediated land expropriation**

➢ **Development of Wali Village**

Wali Village and the surrounding area where the Olympic Park is located, has undergone two transformations as a result of the Asian Games in 1991 and the Olympic Games in 2008. With its proximity to the athletes' village for the Asian Games, Wali Village and its surroundings prospered from this mega-event and was regarded by the developers and the urban rich as 'the foreigners' area' and 'the central living area' in Beijing in the late 1990s (新浪房产). However, this prosperity did not last long, as it encountered a problem shared by numerous other new towns, the lack of supporting systems. This transformation of

the area driven by the Asian Games was limited to the physical dimension and was not accompanied by supporting infrastructure, such as parks and schools (新浪房产).

The repercussions of speedy and poorly-planned development soon led to investors' abandoning the area and leaving it as a rural-urban fringe. As a rural-urban fringe, Wali Village in the early 2000s provided its villagers with both the means to improve its livelihood, through the renting out of cheap accommodation for immigrant workers, and the decayed conditions of unsafe neighbourhoods (Interviewee B13, former head cadre of a village at the Olympic site) and this was the time when Wali Village underwent its second transformation. In fact, the area had been chosen for hosting the Olympics when Beijing lost its first Summer Olympic bid to Sydney in 1997 (Interviewees B04 and B13) and the land expropriation also started off at around that time. The years between 1999 and 2003 were the time when 'major land expropriation took place' (Interviewee B02, responsible for meeting Games-led construction requirements); less demolition, investment and transformation were involved (Interviewee B04, expert in Chinese urban regeneration projects), and more hotels, better transportation links and relevant infrastructure were introduced for the Asian Games (Interviewee B09, Games-led construction planner and chief manager of a post-Games Olympic venue).

These are the reasons why Wali Village was finalised as the Olympic site. According to interviewees who were former residents of Wali, the transformation of the area brought about by the Olympics was huge (Interviewees B13, B14 and B15); low-rise buildings were replaced by modern high-rise ones (Interviewee B14, employee of the property management company), and the general neighbourhood conditions were much improved (Interviewee B13, former head cadre of a village at the Olympic site).

➢ **Concerns about compensation**

The transformation and improvement of the area, like all regeneration projects, came at a price. To be have one's home expropriated is something unpleasant, and Interviewee B13 (former head cadre of a village at the Olympic site) admitted some 'unhappy incidents' did occur at the beginning of the demolition process, and that this was quite understandable because:

> How many times a man can encounter demolition in life. People didn't understand the procedure and the compensation so some sort of unhappy incidents happened. The hearsay circulated in the neighbourhood and some

> people blocked the road, etc. ... [But] as long as you clearly explained the situation to the villagers, they are actually decent and reasonable people ... [and] also generally quite proud of and supportive of it (the Olympic Games). (Interviewee B13, former head cadre of a village at the Olympic site).

As opposed to interviewee B13's positive view of the villagers' mentality, another interviewee provided a more pragmatic description of what the villagers' mentality was. It did not take too much effort for the cadres to talk to and persuade the villagers because 'they understood and accepted this (the Olympic Games) was going to happen. In this respect, it's never a problem ... People cared more about some practical aspects, compensation, jobs, etc.' (Interviewee B15, employee of the property management company).

From the contents of the interviews, the residents did not seem to be provided with much space to exert influence, even on the practical beneficial issues that they were most concerned about. In China, different levels of government investigate local people's opinions on development projects before formal announcements of land expropriation are made (Interviewee B04, expert in Chinese urban regeneration projects), in order to minimise the potential challenges from the locals. As a result, order is more or less maintained in this situation because most of the conflicts have already occurred and been sorted out beforehand. The case of the Olympics demonstrates some differences from other regeneration projects due to its timescale for preparation. According to the interviewees who were former residents of the area, for local residents the issues were never about the Olympics being staged in the area or about the land expropriation, but about the compensation they were entitled to (Interviewees B13, B14 and B15). The conflicts (or, in some of the interviewees' terms 'unhappy incidents') occurred after the government announced the order of land expropriation.

➢ **Participation in the mediated procedure of land expropriation**

The procedures after the official order are composed of three phases, with the first phase commencing the moment an official order announced the time remaining before a property value evaluation was made. This was also the hardest time for the village cadres because:

> When the announcement came, we, the village cadres, tried to understand these contents first and then went to explain to our villagers. This was where the ambivalence is ... There were more than 20,000 people in Wali Village encountering this problem. These people were with different qualities, some

were reasonable and some were not. How to explain and talk to them was a very complicated question. When some sort of the unhappy incidents happened, the situation became chaotic. But after we explained the policy to the villagers, they started to understand. The members of the CCP and we, the village cadres, needed to be the exemplars for other villagers. (Interviewee B13, former head cadre of a village at the Olympic site)

It is not difficult to perceive that while he admitted the existence of some conflicts, he also tried to normalise and understate them. In addition, what this interviewee described can hardly be perceived as a process of two-way communication, but rather a one-way explanation or persuasion. Villagers' participation during this phase remained minimal and was limited to information notification.

The period between the property value evaluation and the compensation negotiation followed policy explanation by the village cadres. An evaluation company was in charge of evaluating how much each property was worth and could only enter properties in the village with the permission of village cadres. Once the step of 'entering households' began, 'things progressed very fast' (Interviewee B13, former head cadre of a village at the Olympic site). The evaluated value does not necessarily equate with the final amount of compensation, and the villagers had to take the evaluated price to negotiate compensation with the demolition company. Negotiating the compensation was probably the time when local residents' voices were heard the most during the entire process. This situation echoes Shin's (2008) finding that participation only occurred during the negotiation for compensation. Demolition companies, entering the process through the government's open bidding as evaluation companies, were delegated by the government to negotiate with the villagers within the legal compensation range. In the case of the Olympics, the villagers were compensated relatively well in terms of the living index compared to other regeneration projects (Interviewees B13, B14 and B15).

The last phase is the time for the villagers to choose the type of compensation. The expropriation of agricultural land in China involves both compensation for the property and a resolution for their joblessness, because the expropriation of land from farmers implies the deprivation of their means of production (Interviewee B15, employee of the property management company). Property compensation could have been 'the provision of another house unit according to the originally owned property' (Interviewee B04, expert in Chinese urban regeneration projects) or cash compensation. Since the necessity for residents' relocation was deregulated, cash compensation has become the major compensation

method. In the case of the Olympics, the villagers were monetarily compensated and entitled to purchase affordable housing units provided by the government (Interviewee B13, former head cadre of a village at the Olympic site). In terms of job resolution, villagers within the working age range had to choose from the 'from-farmers-to-workers' occupation transformation scheme or a one-off monetary compensation. The property management company that villagers accepted work from was established specifically for the allocation of the 'new workers' due to the Olympic land expropriation and were in charge of the maintenance of the communal areas of the Olympic Park. Along with the villagers, some village cadres also worked in the company.

The village cadres played an essential and tricky role in the process. They were the advocates for the expropriation order and the ones being displaced at the same time, although they never regarded themselves as the displaced nor recognised the conflict of interests their double roles incurred. Rather, they viewed themselves as the indispensable bridge between different actors, the government, the villagers, the evaluation company and the demolition company. In contrast, the villagers were provided with space merely in the second phase to negotiate property compensation and in the third phase to choose the type of joblessness resolution. Moreover, during the third phase the villagers were basically the objects of policy implementation and their acts of making choices were a requirement for the implementation to be completed. Any opinion from the villagers throughout the entire process needed to be expressed through the bridge, the village cadres, who would decide whether to communicate the opinion with other actors on the villagers' behalf or to contain it and then explain it and console the villagers. The cadres, consequently, functioned more as filters than as bridges.

Even though the villagers did have the chance to choose either monetary compensation or job allocation, and even though the village cadres seemed to be a bridge/filter, this cannot be viewed as genuine participation, as was the case in London. The choice making in terms of compensation type was merely a procedure in the land expropriation process. The function village cadres provided, as mentioned above, was more of one-way notification than a two-way communication. Hence, despite the existence of the aforementioned mechanism, the local residents did not really feel that the system was participatory.

When asked if they had ever expressed any opinions or talked to village cadres about the issue of Olympic-led land expropriation, except for the one survey respondent who did

not provide any answer, all of the survey respondents answered 'no' to this question. This result can be interpreted differently; it could be that the survey respondents literally did not express any opinion or discuss the issues, or that they did conduct some sort of opinion-expression or discussion, but subjectively, they did not perceive it as expression or discussion. Finally, it could also be that they did so but chose to fabricate their answer to this question. While each survey respondent might provide the same answers out of diverse reasons, what is certain and applicable to all the possible interpretations mentioned above, is that the scope of participation was extremely limited and possibly non-existent, and more importantly, the lack of civil society possibly undermines people's confidence in saying what they think or in admitting what they did.

## 4.5  Chapter Conclusion

The boosting of urban growth has been a key indicator of the governability of entrepreneurial cities, and the regeneration and development accompanying the delivery of mega-events significantly contributes to the pursuit of urban growth. This chapter has thus analysed the question of Games-led regeneration and development, in order to more clearly perceive the impact of hosting mega-events on entrepreneurial governance.

The chapter approached this by using three dimensions: social and economic transformation, transformation of the built environment, and participation and consultation. For the London Games, East London regeneration was the focal point of the legacy master plan, and to shrink the gap between East London and its London neighbours was consequently the most robust justification for soliciting political support for the hosting of the Olympics. While the improvement of East London was hardly objected to, whether staging the Olympic Games in the Lower Lea Valley was the best approach, and who has benefited from the Games-led regeneration, remains debatable. In the case of Beijing, the hosting of the Olympics was utilised to accelerate the modernisation and development of Beijing. The transformation of the urban landscape is nothing but an integral part of its modernisation trajectory, and thus the beautification of the urban landscape and grand infrastructure projects both featured in its Games-led development.

In spite of these differences, the two cases shared a remarkable resemblance in the lack of genuine civil participation. In the case of London, civil participation and consultation were used to manage local expectation and to avert potential obstruction, while in Beijing, the lack of civil society and public culture, as one might have assumed, led to the

impracticality of civil participation in the policy-making process. Chinese citizens may seek to negotiate with developers or manoeuvre the manner of policy implementation in a way which can squeeze benefits or minimise loss, but this is limited to a local and smaller scale. When it came to hosting the Olympic Games, citizens barely had any bargaining power, as their opponent in this battle is the CCP, and this is illustrated in the land appropriation process for the Beijing Olympics. Considering themselves as a bridge to communicate between different actors, the village cadres in fact functioned closer to the promoter and implementer of the state's will. Hence the analysis can legitimately lead to the argument that while the nuances between the two cases cannot be neglected, the lack of genuine civil participation in Games-led regeneration and development is a common feature irrespective of the type of political regime.

# Chapter 5 - Place Branding in the Olympic Process

## 5.1 Chapter Introduction

The notion of place branding was first introduced to academic research in Simon Anholt's (1998) article 'Nation-Brands of the Twenty-First Century' in the *Journal of Brand Management*. He dated the history of place branding back to Alexander the Great, who understood the importance of place image and 'that a deliberate policy of managing that image pays dividends' (Simms, 2008). Place branding has been a widely and historically conducted practice 'as long as cities have competed with each other for trade, populations, wealth, prestige or power' (Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2005: 510). However, what Alexander the Great did hundreds of years ago is more like place marketing, rather than place branding. What is the difference between the two?

Kavaratzis (2005) argues that the distinction between city branding and city marketing lies in communication. Brand involves 'the choice and appropriate treatment of variables', all of the composing elements of a city and the interventions conducted by local states contribute to brand communication (Kavaratzis, 2005: 337). Hence, city marketing is only part of the branding exercise of a city. City branding includes the endeavours conducted by and the incidents taking place within a city's brand communicative framework, whereas city marketing tends to focus on 'the formal, intentional communication ... like all forms of advertising, public relations, graphic design, the use of a logo, etc.' (Kavaratzis, 2005: 337).

Such a definition renders place branding broad and discursive. Anholt (2011) postulates that branding should only be the consequential effects of ordinary domestic governance, and a good brand image for a nation 'can only be earned ... rather than constructed or invented (Anholt, 2008: 2). In order to disenchant the misleading spell generated by the term 'branding', he replaces it with a 'deliberately unsexy term "competitive identity"' (Anholt, 2011: 8). In short, place branding is 'not about communication but about policy change', the change of domestic/local policy process into a 'clear, coordinated and communicative' manner (Anholt, 2008: 2). The appeal made by Anholt (2006, 2008, 2011) brings the use of place branding back to the essence of policy process. He argues the non-existence of a technique dedicated to branding, be it a commercial product or a geographical place; 'countries are judged by what they do, not what they say, as they have always been' (Anholt, 2011: 6).

The opposition to the exercise of place branding, however, demands closer inspection of the meaning of a place brand. Thinking retrospectively, the nascent idea of nation brand, for Anholt (1998), was about the interplay between a famous commercial brand and the provenance of its country *per se* as a brand. Sometimes, the branding effect of a country is so strong that making a 'fictitious provenance' through, for instance, using exotic nomenclature for the brand, can be a real shortcut for the product brand to 'obtain a halo of recognition, maturity and respect' (Anholt, 1998: 396). This operation is based on conceiving the power of a place brand through the products made in the place; this is also known as place/country of origin branding (Kavaratzis, 2005; Kotler and Gertner, 2002).

As high as the added value brought by the place brand may be, this is not the place branding that this PhD project is interested in. Neither is it the place branding that attracts (local) states to be fervently aligned with and that triggers heated debates about the applicability of commercial branding to place branding in academia. Despite the fact that a place brand adds recognition and reputation to a product, a place brand is meaningless without the product as its carrier. This is far from place branding because it is products rather than the places that are being branded. A place brand in this framework functions more as beautiful packaging for a product; people may pay more for products with beautiful packaging but no one would solely pay for the beautiful packaging without getting a product. Here, a place brand is reduced to place brand image.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the cutting of subsidies by central government and inter-urban competition forced local states[36] to take an entrepreneurial stance, which made marketing 'accessible to city administrators' and gave them the ability to evaluate their governability (Kavaratzis, 2004: 59), drawing external attention to pull in capital and target people. This is where city branding starts to reveal its merits, as in order to attract capital and people, local states aim to manipulate or change 'the way places are perceived by specified user groups' (Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2005: 512). This amounts to a kind of place management, guided by a city's brand, and in this sense, city branding is not only about marketing communications, but a centreline for local states and brand managers 'to integrate, guide and focus place management' (Kavaratzis, 2005: 334). Kapferer (2011: 189) has similarly advocated the need to 'manage the city by the brand', which acts as 'a lever of

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[36] With regard to the urban focus of this project, the discussion on place branding will focus on the spatial scale of cities.

collective consciousness and commitment to accelerate social change.' In other words, urban policies are directed by city branding, at least to the extent of attracting capital and people.

This on the surface, stands in contrast to Anholt (2008), who regards the branding effects of place as a consequence of successful policy implementation made in a coherent, communicative manner; yet these two views greatly overlap in substance. While, as Anholt (2008) suggests, a good brand image for a city can be considered the contingent outcome of a conglomeration of urban policies, a city's brand identity may still function as the centreline, guiding the direction of policymaking; the brand image of a city would be less contingent thereby.

Positioning policymaking, rather than place branding, at the centre of urban governance illustrates the fundamental difference between commercial and place branding. As with the adaption of a business management tool to the public sector, transferring the idea of branding from products to places demands an inspection of its applicability (Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2005). Before engaging in case analysis, a short sketch of the applicability of place branding, as well as the conflicts and interactions between external and internal branding, needs to be outlined.

### 5.1.1 Branding and Place Branding

A brand is defined as a 'name, term, design, symbol, or any other feature that identifies one seller's good or service as distinct from those of other sellers' (American Marketing Association, 2012: 8), and this definition reveals the identification function and relational nature of a brand. The significance of a brand lies in its relationships with different actors, as it facilitates differentiation from competitors, communication with consumers, and consolidation of a firm's employees. A brand differentiates a company's product from that of other competitors in the market, even though their products may in fact be similar. 'A strong enough brand is able to create barriers of entry ... [to impede] other firms from entering the market' (Keller, 2013: 35). The communication function for consumers is probably the most intuitive function of a brand. '[Brands] provide a shorthand device or means of simplification for their product decisions' because based on their comprehension and impression of a brand, consumers can make purchase decisions more efficiently without searching for and comparing other products in the market (Keller, 2013: 34). In short, a brand reduces consumers' cost to decide.

Branding internally to a firm's internal employees has received growing attention both in academia and in industry. Derived from this definition, a brand is a communication tool used to send messages to external consumers, and more subtly, to a firm's employees. While in other industries employees may not be at the frontline facing consumers and actually delivering the brand, unlike in the service industry (Balmer et al., 2011; Keller, 2013), the influence of internal branding nonetheless is apparent. As Marshall (2013) points out, 'the only brand that will really work' is the one 'that best motivates the team.'

The focus of the traditional marketing approach on external consumer branding may require some diversion to internal employee branding. Making sure that employees are still on the same page as the brand is critical to a company's 'sustainable competitive advantage' (Balmer et al., 2011: 1522), and failure to so may render 'the team disconnected, and at worst dismissive or cynical' (Marshall, 2013). This is also why some companies have viewed 'the brand relaunch as the big internal motivator ... [which] reframes employees' views of the company, energizes them on a new mission, and deeply engages them in a new approach' (Marshall, 2013).

The importance of internal branding is especially true in place branding. Two key points can be extracted from the above discussion on internal branding, the first being that a brand failing to internally motivate risks alienating its members and rendering them aloof or even sceptical. As will be shown in the two cases, whether the external brand image of a city can resonate with citizens is essential to the success of a branding campaign. This is why considerable endeavours were spent both in London and Beijing to inspire the public not only to participate in the Games, but also to affiliate themselves more firmly to the locality. Second is the intrinsic value of internal branding, whereby the re-launch of a brand is used as an internal motivator, and internal branding can be more than beneficial in branding externally to consumers. Fostering civic consciousness and local identity is a crucial task in the Olympic process. Enhanced civic pride provides a strong momentum for development-oriented agendas.

Internal branding can certainly find its position unassailable in place branding, but this does not adequately validate the applicability of product branding to place branding. It is possible and common for products to be 'modified, withdrawn from the market, re-launched and repositioned or replaced by improved products' (Fan, 2006: 7). When it comes to places, a city can at best be rebranded, but can hardly be withdrawn or re-launched, even if it is rebranded, its historical and social legacy still exists and continues to haunt the place brand.

This is why hosting a mega-event represents a golden opportunity for the rebranding of a place; the aura of the event can externally wash off the negative connotations of the existing brand image, and internally subdue local people's pursuit of the authenticity and representability of a brand image, which usually clashes with the glamour that place brand managers seek to project.

Moreover, unlike a product brand with clear legal ownership, a place brand exists 'in the public domain', and is essentially open to any party to 'exploit and manipulate the "brand" image to achieve its end' (Fan, 2006: 8). The lack of a specified owner incurs problems not merely in legal terms, as it often generates disputes among diverse or even adverse stakeholders; whose brand is it? who should be represented in the place brand? These are not rare conflicts, especially when brand managers prefer 'immediate buy-in and co-option over meaningful dialogue and challenge' (Houghton and Stevens, 2011: 45). Ooi (2011: 60) pursues a similar argument, namely that 'complex messages of history and societal changes' of the locality tend to be submerged in the pursuit of an attractive place brand.

Due to the applicability issue of product branding, an analytical tool able to better grasp the latitude and longitude of a place brand is demanded. Corporate branding comes into play in the insufficiency of product branding. It 'brings to marketing the ability to use the vision and culture of the company explicitly as part of its unique selling proposition' (Hatch and Schultz, 2003: 1042). Hence, while the end object to be sold remains products, the focus of branding has been extended from product to corporate, because the elements that make a product the way it is count more than the product itself. Corporate branding captures the latitude of place branding by encompassing multiple place products and incorporating the constituents of the place into respective products. 'Applying corporate branding to places demands a treatment of the place brand as the whole entity of the place-products, in order to achieve consistency of the messages sent' (Kavaratzis, 2008: 46). As such, whether the product is a tourist spot or an industrial park, the place brand can infuse relevant and beneficial elements.

Through its resonance with key stakeholders in facilitating their sense of belonging (Hatch and Schultz, 2003: 1046), corporate branding is able to capture the longitude of place branding. A successful place brand entails the ability to strengthen stakeholders' identity with a place with the passage of time, be it a nation, region, city or neighbourhood. This echoes the previous discussion about the importance of internal branding. Similar to the mutually influential relationship between internal corporate identity and external corporate image

(Balmer et al., 1997), civil identity and city image have a strong influence upon each other. A city brand can hardly succeed without the endorsement of its citizens, which demands the input of indigenous culture in brand building (Bennett and Savani, 2003; Hankinson, 2004; OECD, 2007b). The opposite is also the case, as a positive city image magnifies civic pride, local identity and citizens' sense of belonging (Bennett and Savani, 2003; Kavaratzis, 2004; OECD, 2007b).

However, city branding strategies rooted in entrepreneurial urban governance have a tendency to emasculate 'local identity' and replace it 'with repetitious mass-produced images' (OECD, 2007b: 47). The branding strategy which 'targets corporate investors and upper-class urban professionals' may fail to 'correctly reflect or promote' the reality of locals' life experiences, and eventually lose their support for the city brand (OECD, 2007b: 33). The overstatement of attractiveness and a deficiency of authenticity (Ooi, 2011) can render cities as 'clones with the standardization of certain features' (Insch, 2011: 10), while failing to recognise 'the stake that residents have in shaping and enhancing a city's brand' could significantly discount the power of a brand (Insch, 2011: 8). Moreover, this imbalance often leads to local residents' aloofness with or even hostility towards a city brand, which is 'negatively perceived by potential business migrants who assess residents' wellbeing and satisfaction compared to rival locations' (Insch, 2011: 9). This is why the constitution of a place brand should be based upon the social and cultural fabric of the locality.

It is thus both challenging and imperative for a city brand to be inspiring, both internally and externally (Kapferer, 2011: 187). More importantly, the interaction and negotiation between the external and internal branding constitutes the contour of a place brand. For example, the narratives of heritage 'may communicate the local to the global network… but, critically, they are often far more intensely consumed as inner-directed or internalised, localised mnemonic structures' (Graham, 2002: 1006). Pursuing this thought, the ultimate goal of place branding may not be the external branding effects but the internal ones, as counterintuitive as it may sound conducting external branding is actually for the purpose of internal branding. As Ashworth (2001) notes, '[a] place is sending messages to itself.'

In the delivery of the Olympic Games, the place branding of the host city and country demands less effort, and at the same time, more caution. When a city stages a mega-event, it also puts the city on a global stage. Coupled with the festive atmosphere, the high-density media coverage and external attentions concentrated on the city can easily be transmuted

into the citizens' national identity and civic pride. This is particularly evident in the case of the Beijing 2008 Olympics. In contrast, being exposed to the dazzling limelight also means being closely scrutinised, and the glory and prestige gained by staging a mega-event is always accompanied by the hazards of unwanted disclosure. This is the reason why place brand communication, both external and internal, is perhaps more important than at any other time.

## 5.2   Nation and City Branding in the London 2012 Olympic Games

### 5.2.1   External Branding of London and Britain

As frequently pointed out in the literature, the regeneration of East London was the strongest post-Games legacy promised by London's bid for the 2012 summer Olympics. However, the branding opportunity provided by the Olympic Games is one that no host city can afford to forsake. A place branding campaign, 'the GREAT Britain', was [therefore] launched in 2012 to capitalise on the excitement and interest generated by the Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympics and Paralympics' (GREAT Britain). Retrospectively, the official document published in 2008 named the demonstration of the UK as 'a creative, inclusive and welcoming place to live in, visit and for business' (DCMS, 2008: 60) to be one of the five promised legacies the Games was committed to deliver.[37] This promise can be viewed as the summary of the brand image that the UK wanted to deliver through this Olympic opportunity. To realise the brand image, externally it was essential for the UK to equip itself with 'the capacity for better training at all levels in key skills sectors', while internally, the Cultural Olympiad, 'the most ambitious celebration of British culture and creativity' was vital for 'bringing the UK together' (DCMS, 2008: 60).

The document indicates two facts about the place branding strategy of the London 2012 Olympics. Firstly, the geographical scale for place branding through the London 2012 Olympics was not merely limited to the municipal level, but was intentionally extended to the inclusion of the whole of Britain. This particular attempt can be attributed to the previous two unsuccessful experiences of British nation rebranding. One was the rebranding campaign, Cool Britannia, in the 1990s, which has been degraded as a failed example of a nation

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[37] The five promised post-Games legacies were: 1) making the UK a world-leading sporting nation; 2) transforming the heart of East London; 3) inspiring a generation of young people; 4) making the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living; and 5) demonstrating that the UK is a creative, inclusive and welcoming place to live in, visit and do business in (DCMS, 2008).

branding exercise (Dinnie, 2008; Fan, 2006; Werther, 2011). This brand aimed to exaggerate the 'dynamic living colour image of national identity' for Britain, partly to answer the wariness of British corporations which did not see how the 'backward-looking and aloof' British brand image could benefit them when doing business (Dinnie, 2008: 30). Nevertheless, the asymmetrical accentuation of the avant-garde and creative accomplishments failed 'to resonate with the internal or domestic audience of the campaign, the British public', or more precisely, it failed to resonate with British citizens outside of London (Werther, 2011: 4).

The other was the rebranding campaign for the Millennium Dome Experience in the 2000s, and its failure was even described as a cultural disaster (McGuigan and Gilmore, 2002; Werther, 2011). Celebrated as, and shouldering the responsibility of, '[embodying] at once the spirit of confidence and adventure in Britain and the spirit of future in the world' (Lyall, 1998),[38] the Millennium Dome was hugely incriminated for the over-influence of sponsoring corporates in terms of both 'behind-the-scenes deals' and 'the ideological construction of meaning' of the Dome (McGuigan and Gilmore, 2002). The grandiose physical architecture was depicted 'as a shell for neo-liberalism', which was a symptom:

> Of the imperilled standing of the public cultural alternative to commercial speech today... In the face of the taken-for-granted dominance of a place neo-liberal values and corporate machinations, there is little mass-popular resistance. (McGuigan, 2003: 686-687)

These two rebranding attempts provided a precious message for the place branding opportunity brought about by staging the Olympics: 'there is no way around citizens' participation in the branding process' (Widler, 2007: 149). The brand of Cool Britannia overly focused on the needs of benefiting business and the creative industry, and was unsurprisingly unrelated to the lives of most British citizens, let alone stepping onto the level of 'living the brand' (Anholt, 2009; Dinnie, 2008), while the brand of the Millennium Dome Experience distanced itself from the public even more so than its predecessor. As far as the end results are concerned, both brands were subject to the problem of representation and a lack of inclusion. Retrospectively speaking, the Millennium Dome Experience went beyond the poor selection of brand associations and entered the realm of an unjustified brand, which was exactly opposite to the brand image proclaimed by the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair. The brands of Cool Britannia and the Millennium Dome Experience denote that while the focus of nation branding is definitely the external audience, the internal audience, namely the citizens

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[38] From the words of the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair.

of a nation weigh no less than their external counterparts. As Anholt (2009: 2) maintains, 'without the support of the population', it is 'unthinkable' to make a substantial change to the nation brand image.

The branding of the London 2012 Olympics placed the idea of inclusion at a very high level. London's Candidature File stressed the image of being a culturally and ethnically diversified city with abundant creativity and enthusiasm towards sports. As one of 'the world's most diverse cities', London accommodates 300 languages (BOA, 2004: 11), be it:

> Greek or Gujarati, French or Farsi, the conversation often turns to sport. A devotion to sport unites Londoners and the United Kingdom as a whole. Ticket sales for weekend events can measure in the millions. (BOA, 2004: 11)

This deliberately vivid and detailed depiction reflects an intention to demonstrate a city brand of diversity and vibrancy. The place branding campaign was not confined to the municipal level, and staging the Games in London was also portrayed as an opportunity to unite the country through the language of sport. While the diversified and vibrant London was the main stage of the Games, the traditions and histories of Britain were not to be missed out; the mistakes made in the branding of Cool Britannia were to be resolutely avoided. London would welcome 'the world in a tradition that dates back centuries', use both 'historic and contemporary' 'iconic sites' 'as backdrops for events' (BOA, 2004: 11). '[D]ramatic innovation and pageantry' (BOA, 2004: 11) were both to be celebrated and presented (Figure 2.1Figure 5.1).



**Figure 5.1: The installation of national flags with Big Ben in the background, Summer 2012**

As a branding strategy that aims to unite the nation, celebrate traditions and celebrate diversity all at once, the London 2012 Olympics branded London and Britain at the same time, efficiently but painstakingly. The entire process from submitting and winning the bid to staging the Games was 'an instance for internal branding' in itself, and 'provides a platform for more successful re-imagining of the nation' (Werther, 2011: 8). The reconstruction of self-perceived Britain, Britishness and more specifically London (Werther, 2011: 8), was as a result embodied. The sufficient 'integration of all the stakeholders of the nation-brand' (Dinnie, 2008: 30) is a significant task; nevertheless, the selection of brand associations for a national brand had already proved to be a difficult mission judging the two previous rebranding campaigns for Britain. The high profile of London did not really help, adding difficulty in branding because interests and stakeholders from other geographical locations in the country and other less visible cultural contexts tended to be submerged by the shining aura of London, just like the brand of Cool Britannia. It is never easy to reconcile the adversity between these stakeholders and to produce a single powerful nation brand.

In contrast, the delivery of mega-events seems to allow for such a reconciliation to occur. The London 2012 Olympics wondrously seemed to smoothly contain these contradictions, and during the hype and frenzy of the Olympic Games, local and domestic citizens were provided with 'motivations, opportunities and cultural resources for defending and exercising identity and agency' (Roche, 2000: 225). Dan Ritterband, the then director of marketing and 2012 communications for the Greater London Authority (GLA), commented that 'London is about the juxtaposition; it's the old with the new; it's a conceit. The whole city is a city of contradictions' (quoted in Jones, 2012). Hence, 'trying to explain the capital's nature and appeal in a single image or slogan ... is difficult and, probably, wrong' (Jones, 2012). If juxtaposition is the keyword for the branding of London along with the Olympic Games, the nation branding enlarged the scale and complicated the picture of juxtaposition. Through 'the jointly appreciated, and possibly even shared' (Chalip, 2006: 113) celebrations, mega-events enable the space and justification for citizens to spontaneously abandon parochial conflicts of interest and amiably embrace the joy with other constituents of the imagined community (Anderson, 1983). For place branding, reconciling the usually irreconcilable is the mega-effect endowed by mega-events.

Generally speaking, the London 2012 Olympics was used to 'improve the UK's image at home and abroad' (DCMS, 2008: 65). Specifically, it was promoted as a 'GREAT place to visit and in which to study, do business and invest' (VisitBritain, 2012: 10). With the financial crisis

erupting in 2008, the reputation of London 'as the home of financial services was seriously tarnished' (Dan Ritterband, quoted in Jones, 2012). Hence, a certain proportion of the branding focus during the Games delivery was on 'bringing big business events such as congresses and conventions into London' (Jones, 2012). According to the report on the Olympic legacy progress published a year after the Games, 90% of the four-year target in business and investment increase had been achieved in the first year after the Games, which included '£2.5 billion of additional FDI', '£1.5 billion of Olympic-related high-value opportunities' from overseas and '£5.9 billion of additional export sales from Olympic-related promotional activity' (HM Government and Mayor of London, 2013: 46).

In terms of tourism, which was identified by the UK Government as one of the most Olympic-impacted sectors, 'better accommodation, transport and tourist facilities' were planned to be provided in order to generate another '£2.1 billion for the tourist industry' (DCMS, 2008: 65). Showcasing 'the UK as an exciting, welcoming, dynamic destination' to attract 'more British people to holiday at home' and more tourists from 'emerging economies ... such as China and India' to visit the UK was the branding focal point (DCMS, 2008: 65). The aforementioned report published in 2013 showed that the number of international visitors and the total amount of their spend in the UK increased by 1% and 4%, respectively (HM Government and Mayor of London, 2013: 14).

The long-term ambition to brand Britain as a tourism destination was to use the Games 'as a springboard ... to attract 40 million visitors annually by 2020' (VisitBritain, 2012: 5). Numbers seem to provide a positive prospect for the Olympic-branding attempt, as according to data from VisitBritain (2015), as opposed to the slight annual increase in the number of visits in 2012 of 0.93%, the annual increase in both 2013 and 2014 was above 5%, with the number of visits in 2012 being 31.08 million, 32.69 million in 2013 and 34.38 million in 2014 (Figure 5.2). The total number of nights spent in the UK reveals even more promising tendencies, as following an apparent downturn of 2.13% in 2012, the total nights spent in the UK rose by 6.64% and 7.78% in 2013 and 2014, respectively (Figure 5.3).

**Figure 5.2: Number of visits to the UK from 2012 to 2014**
Data source: VisitBritain (2015)



**Figure 5.3: Number of total nights spent in the UK from 2012 to 2014**
Data source: VisitBritain (2015)

The local perspectives on the external branding effects, according to the street survey conducted in the host boroughs, indicates a more complicated picture. As for the marketing effects for Britain, 67.5% (Figure 5.4) of all respondents felt that the London 2012 Olympics had shown the world that Britain is a creative and welcoming place, with an emphasis on

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'diversity and inclusion' (survey respondent). Another respondent commented on the branding of Britain as a successful campaign because 'we're a show-off country and good at marketing.' While these respondents strongly agreed with the Olympics' publicity function for Britain, they also felt separated from the publicity because it was unrelated to their lives. One respondent said that the Olympic Games was 'not for Newham people'. In other words, hosting the Olympics was great for promotion and attracting exogenous people, but from where they stood, not for the locals. This tendency can also be seen in response to the question about their pride as British residents after the Games, which will be discussed in the section on the internal branding of the London Games.



**Figure 5.4: Whether Britain has successfully branded itself through hosting the Games**

Survey respondents were also asked about their opinion on London's branding relating to various dimensions. In total, 77% of all respondents affirmed the marketing effects for London's tourism, with 65.1% thinking that hosting the London 2012 Olympics would benefit business and investment activities, whereas the positive effects for residential purposes dropped to 38.9% (Figure 5.5). The respondents either did not have strong feelings about the association between 'hosting the Olympics' and 'it is good to lead a life in London', or they thought there would be a possibility of the Olympics promoting London as a good residential location to work or study in, but that the marketing effects for residential purposes might be discounted with regard to the cost of living in the city. One fifth of the respondents did not feel that hosting the London 2012 Olympics generated any marketing benefits for London in

any way, since London was already an impressive city and attractive to lots of people even without the Olympics.



**Figure 5.5: Dimensions that London has successfully branded itself through hosting the Games**

Along with the external branding of Britain and London, the development of the creative and leisure industries was benefited and facilitated. A UK-wide Cultural Olympiad ran for four years before the Games and was the core framework that aimed to produce a synergy between tourism and the creative industries. This was branded as a 'once in a lifetime' event for domestic and international world-class artists 'to showcase their creativity' and for 'people all over the UK' to experience it (Arts Council England and LOCOG, 2013: 2). Despite the fact that the UK was 'positioned as a cultural and creative world leader', which largely marginalised the benefits 'singlehandedly' brought about by the Cultural Olympiad, it still impacted significantly 'on the approach to cultural programming in the UK' (Arts Council England and LOCOG, 2013: 23). These impacts can particularly be perceived through the scale, diversification and innovation of the cultural events. In the four-year period of the Cultural Olympiad from 2008 to 2012, there were 177,717 cultural activities and 20.2 million attendances (Arts Council England and LOCOG, 2013). Cultural diversity was also presented and appreciated through providing a platform not only for 'talented and culturally diverse UK artists' but for artists from 'countries who are sometimes neglected to share their work with UK-wide audiences' (Arts Council England and LOCOG, 2013: 9).

Another conspicuously stressed aspect within the Olympiad was the innovative approach for curating cultural events. Artists were invited and encouraged to 'think big [and]

dream up ideas' that normally rarely 'had the chance' to be realised (Arts Council England and LOCOG, 2013: 10). The element of innovation could be seen in the venues of these events too, as in order to engage 'non-traditional arts audiences', rather than cultural venues such as museums and galleries, 'the use of public realms, parks, streets, squares, shopping centres' also featured in the Olympiad (Arts Council England and LOCOG, 2013: 10). In short, the approach was to let arts walk into local people's lives, not the other way round. This corresponds to the methods described by the interviewee who bridged the artistic community with the Olympic neighbourhood. For a locality suffering from a high level of deprivation and unemployment, he admitted:

> It's true that some people just don't have time but actually what you'll get in this neighbourhood is that lots and lots people are really ordinary… like everybody else and some people do end up being interested in arts and culture… there aren't this rigid separation between classes and groups of people (Interviewee L06, bridging artistic community with the Olympic neighbourhood).

He further elaborated the approaches adopted in practice in order to make arts a part of local people's lives:

> It might be that the artists would come and work in the schools where your children go to and through that relationship would improve the quality of education. So if you're a parent, you end up being interested in the impact of the presence of the artists on the life of your children. It could be one relationship. It could be that the artists help with the public project like improving the park and the artists would work with the people who are in the park and make the park a better place. They might end up improving something that local residents are really keen to see happen… You can do lots and lots of things that would affect that person, affect their family and affect the area they live in.' (Interviewee L06, bridging artistic community with the Olympic neighbourhood).

### 5.2.2   Internal Branding of London and Britain

The external and internal branding of a place are inseparable; Kapferer (2011: 188) researched the branding of Paris and argued that citizens were the 'first and foremost' reason why cities are made. Hence all branding slogans and other branding campaigns should reflect citizens' 'sense of belonging, pride, and symbolic proximity' (Kapferer, 2011: 188). As an 'extraordinary rather than recurrent occurrences in the life of a city' (Gold and Gold, 2008: 302), the Olympic Games undoubtedly endows a host city and nation with a precious place-

branding opportunity to increase publicity and improve its reputation. In the process of external branding, internal branding effects, positive or negative, simultaneously take place.

A strong reason for staging the Games in East London was to take advantage of the synergy, as noted by Tessa Jowell in Chapter 1, between East London regeneration and the Games. 'What the Government wanted to do was to see the Olympics happen; they brought in billions, that's the money we'd never seen in the local areas [of East London]' (Interviewee L04, drafting the framework for East London regeneration). However, as discussed in Chapter 4, some survey respondents remained suspicious of the necessity to host the Games. Similar to the comments made by Interviewee L04, some of the local residents in the Olympic neighbourhood tended to feel that 'lots of money was spent on the useless, like the stadium, we don't want stadiums!' (Interviewee L04, drafting the framework for East London regeneration). Moreover, the physical transformation in the area, as discussed in Chapter 4, was basically affirmed by most of survey respondents, but they revealed the feeling that these tended to be beautification efforts to attract outsiders. There seems to be a conflict in the place brand image between the constructed one and the locally identified one. Owing to the gentrification-oriented urban development strategy and the resultant repercussion of what Shin (2010: S51) called 'no ordinary people's place', the battle for the physical use of space was extended to the clash between an attractive brand or an authentic brand (Ooi, 2011). This clash impacted not only the brand image for external promotional purposes but the degree of citizens' local identity. As Interviewee L09 (facilitating local consultation on East London regeneration) highlighted, physical regeneration and community identity can benefit each other and 'destroy one another too'.

Hosting a mega-event inevitably brings a tremendous tangible transformation to the locality, which naturally arouses the emotions of local people, which is the frenzy derived from mega-events. Host states and local states all endeavour to make full use of the sentiment and turn it into magnified patriotism, civic pride and local identity. Hence, the aforementioned Cultural Olympiad was designed not only for showcasing Britain and London but for facilitating community engagement. Resonating with the internal audience is 'both an end in itself and a necessary precondition' (Ashworth, 2001) for place branding. Before the official opening ceremony of the London's Games on 27th July 2012, the lengthy run-up events provided the function of internal branding for quite a few years. The numerous activities and long timescale of the Cultural Olympiad at this point should not be confined and defined as an external branding campaign. Instead, the function of engaging people in these

events and the mere holding of the events in the neighbourhood should be acknowledged. As Chalip (2006: 115) maintains, 'social engagement' happens even without the need for people to physically participate in these events, 'the mere creation of celebratory space can be sufficient to foster social interaction'.

In this dimension, when survey respondents were asked if they had become more concerned than before about community events since the run-up to the London 2012 Olympics, 54.8% of respondents stated that their attention to what happened in the neighbourhood did not quite bear a relation to London hosting the Olympics, although 38.1% said they felt more connected to the community they lived in (Figure 5.6). Some respondents further explained that maybe it was not directly due to the delivery of the Games, whereas such a huge event happening in the neighbourhood did make them pay more attention to what happened around them. However, they also admitted that the rising attention to the space in their everyday lives reached a peak during the Games and started to decline afterwards.



**Figure 5.6: Whether more attention has been paid to local events/development due to hosting the Games**

The effects of internal branding in the Olympic process can also be observed through the intensity of local identity formation. The engagement of local community is not only beneficial to producing a celebratory image for the delivery of the Olympic Games, but is also a crucial part of identity creation. The ultimate goal of internal branding, as noted by Ashworth (2001), is to boost civic pride, social cohesion and identity with the place. Schemes for volunteering for the delivery of the London's Games, for example, were one of the methods to engage, 'inspire and motivate the most disadvantaged people' (DCMS, 2008: 66).

Interviewee L03 talked about the power of community engagement to bring people together, increase people's understanding of the neighbourhood, and eventually enhance 'pride and satisfaction about the neighbourhood in which you live' (Interviewee L03, changing the Olympic neighbourhood through cultural activities). He believed that 'the 2012 Games provided a perfect platform' to 'use the arts as the vehicle with which we can bring about social change and economic growth' (Interviewee L03, changing the Olympic neighbourhood through cultural activities).

Another interviewee took a much more reserved stance concerning the degree of change that the Games might engender, since in terms of 'the long-term change of the area… the Games was only a small part of the story. The Olympics is just a catalyst but not the whole story' (Interviewee L06, bridging artistic community with the Olympic neighbourhood). When asked whether, and how exactly, the Games enhanced a community sense within the Olympic neighbourhood, he answered:

> Overall I would say yes; however I don't think you can answer in any simple way. I think that the relationship is complex and changes over time… On the plus side the Olympics brought massive spending power. So it's invested in arts and culture, it's raised the profile of the area and it has changed the environment in a way that really benefited… It's made the area attractive. It has benefited the local artists and cultural entrepreneurs. The effects are both direct and indirect, direct in terms of artists being sponsored but also indirect in terms of wider, you know, just straightforward improvement of the environment of the area. On the negative side, the artistic communities depend on low property values, and in many ways they rent the area because it was a forgotten backwater. As the regeneration process drives the property values, that can make the area just, all of those cheap properties disappear.

Internal place branding at the London Games was also facilitated by the appreciation of cultural heritage. 'Discovering Places' was 'the only heritage strand' of the projects in the Cultural Olympiad (English Heritage, 2011: 12). With funding from English Heritage's building grant in 2008 and the Olympic Lottery Distributor in 2010, the 'Discovering Places' campaign ensured that heritage would be a part of the Cultural Olympiad, through 'develop[ing] and deliver[ing] a large-scale campaign to engage local people with their built, historic and natural environments' (Horan, 2013: 1). The Heritage Alliance, the delivering body of the campaign, 'worked with 400 partners to deliver just under 200 events' (Horan, 2013: 1) from 2010 to 2012.

Engagement of the locals with their surroundings provided an opportunity to see the place they are used to through fresh eyes, and thereby discover where they had never been to. These events were held to create bonds between the people and the place, as well as between the past and the present. As Lowenthal (2015: 104) puts it, '[t]he English continue to exalt their past, alike for tourists and themselves.' In the place branding in the Olympic process, such exaltation of the past was powered by the hosting of a mega-event to validate and reinvigorate the 'sense of entity and continuity, of evolution as a nation over more than ten centuries' (Lowenthal, 2015: 120).[39]

The street survey also examined the effects of hosting the London 2012 Olympics on local people's local and national identities. When asked if they were proud or had become even prouder of being a Londoner because of the 2012 Olympics, there was not a huge difference between the proportions answering 'Yes' and 'No'. As shown in Figure 5.7, 47.6% of survey respondents perceived themselves as having a greater pride in London because of the Olympics. The reasons they provided were either about the Games *per se*, such as 'it's a great show' (survey respondent), or due to the short-term social cohesion and community sense, like 'we joined together' (survey respondent). In contrast, 38.1% stated that whether they felt proud of London or not had nothing to do with the Olympic Games. In general, respondents tended to be more positive about this question. Respondents were next asked about whether their pride as a British citizen/resident had been strengthened by the London 2012 Olympics. The proportions answering 'Yes' and 'No' were approximately the same, at 44.4% and 43.7%, respectively (Figure 5.8). The reasons they provided for this question were similar to the reasons they provided for the previous one, with around one third of respondents who felt that their pride as a British citizen/resident had been strengthened by the Olympics, mentioning that during the Games people became 'close together as a nation' (survey respondent).

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[39] Integrated by Lowenthal (2015: 120) from Creighton, English National Character, 14– 15; Herbert Butterfield, The Englishman and His History (Cambridge, 1944), 113– 14; 'All Our Yesterdays', *EH Magazine 3* (Oct. 1988): 3.

**Figure 5.7: Feeling prouder as a Londoner due to hosting the Games**



**Figure 5.8: Feeling prouder as a British citizen/resident due to hosting the Games**

### 5.2.3 The Contours of Place Branding for the London 2012 Olympic Games

Learning from the previous two failed nation rebranding attempts, the rebranding of Britain and London this time demonstrated an apparent endeavour to resonate with an internal audience, British citizens, and efforts can be seen in various official publications and government reports. Through making 'creative, inclusive and welcoming' (DCMS, 2008: 60) characteristics associated with the nation brand of Britain, and through the numerous arts

events within the framework of the Cultural Olympiad, this external brand image of Britain seemed to provide the rebranding function that British businesses and tourism demanded. Internally, despite the fact that the physical improvement in East London made local people felt disassociated with the brand image, the run-up projects during the Cultural Olympiad enabled the appreciation of the British natural and cultural heritage, and a stronger understanding of the neighbourhood. The street survey showed that a proportion of respondents had a stronger civic pride as a result of the Games.

While inconsistency between local residents' ideal brand image and the image presented to cater for the needs of the commercial and tourism sectors remains in the face of a mega-event like the Olympic Games, this inconsistency does not seem to matter that much. Place branding is inherently 'the promotion of selective place information' (Hall, 2006: 59). Selection is invariably fraught with controversy, because the external image which place brand managers would like to project tends to clash with the identification of internal citizens to the locality. However, in the case of London, the hosting of the Olympic Games functioned not only as a giant magnet for limelight from around the world, but it also provided a subtler function, which was to reconcile the conflict between an attractive and authentic brand image (Ooi, 2011). The geographical host of the Games can conduct selective communication globally and locally; the pursuit of national pride, intensified by the manipulation and interpretation of cultural and natural heritage, triumphed over localised, parochial differences. In place branding, mega-events bring some mega-effects to town.

Such mega-effects signal the inseparability between place branding and urban governance. While analysis of place branding certainly cannot be isolated from outward-looking factors, namely the backdrop of inter-urban competition, as well as attempts to 'lock' mobile capital and people in immobile places, inward-looking motives demand no less attention. Echoing the discussion at the beginning of this chapter, internal branding is receiving growing attention in terms of its support for external branding campaigns, but this does not preclude it from being a goal in its own right. As Ashworth (2001) notes, inwardly sending messages to the locality, in the case of delivering the Olympics, helps boost civic pride, demonstrates mobilisation and organisational ability, and ultimately enhances ruling legitimacy. The mega-effects provided by a mega-event, the reconciliation between external and internal branding elements, signifies the inseparability between place branding and urban governance. Rather than a mere marketing tool for showcasing existing policy

performance and infrastructure, place branding indeed penetrates every vein of urban governance through the augmentation of civic pride, mobilisation scale and ruling legitimacy.

## 5.3   Nation and City Branding in the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games

### 5.3.1   External Branding of Beijing and China

As discussed in the case information in Chapter 3, the primary motive for Beijing in launching the Olympic bid was to rebrand the image of the country. The fact that the 2008 Olympic Games was primarily staged in Beijing did, as discussed in Chapter 4, accelerate the modernisation of China and the makeover of Beijing. However, when it came to the place branding effects, the branding focus in the Olympic process was more on China and relatively less on Beijing. The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games has been perceived as 'a "window" for the whole world to understand more about China and to see the rapid development achieved in recent decades' (Xinhua News Agency, 2008). As a rising economic entity with an ever increasing influence on the global stage, China fervently seeks 'approval for its past accomplishment, its current economic might, and its representation of approximately 20 per cent of the world's population' (Berkowitz et al., 2007: 171). In the review report of Beijing's delivery of the 2008 Olympics, the passion of China when submitting the Olympic bid was closely associated with the traditional assets and history of China. With 'a time-honoured oriental civilisation', BOCOG stated that through hosting the 2008 Olympic Games 'China would help promote, under the theme of "harmony, exchange and development", cultural exchanges' (BOCOG, 2010a: 23).

In the Beijing Candidature File, a frequent concept was the mutual understanding between China and the world. Some interviewees even revealed the idea that there has been an imperative not for rebranding but for clarifying what China is. From where they stood, China and the Chinese Government had been misunderstood or even stigmatised for too long. One interviewee bluntly opined about China's misunderstood global image and particularly unfair treatment by the international media:

> The world doesn't really understand us and has prejudices about us. They don't understand China and what the Chinese are like. The media play an important role in image making. Until 2008, we had already lots of interactions with the world but still not enough. The media coverage in particular. The international media provided biased coverage about us due to lack of understanding. They tend to take a negative perspective on what's happening in China. (Interviewee B10, planner of cultural activities)

Interview B09 felt similarly, and stressed the irreplaceable function provided by the Olympic Games; 'because of the Beijing Olympics, China is closer to the world and the world understands more about China' (Interviewee B09, Games-led construction planner and chief manager of a post-Games Olympic venue).

During the interviews, interviewees tended to emphasise the necessity for the world to understand China rather than discover China, and in Beijing's Candidature File, the words 'understanding' and 'mutual understanding' were frequently used. Choosing to use the word 'understand' or 'understanding' is a reflection on the mentality that China has been misunderstood. Therefore, the approach to reversing China's image is not to launch a new brand image, i.e. rebranding, but to let the world have a correct image of China, i.e. clarifying. A crucial difference between rebranding and clarifying lies in how the past is evaluated. Rebranding involves the depreciation of the past, such as in the rebranding of Liverpool and Sheffield. Rebranding attempts for these cities are rooted in the resolution to remove their industrial past, whilst attempts at clarifying would be to get rid ths past image but not necessarily the past *per se*. There may be nothing to be altered or discarded in the past, as the current unpleasant brand image comes from others' misunderstandings rather than something that needs to be changed.

To take the logic to its extreme, the necessity to clarify is nurtured by and nurtures self-victimisation. The more forceful the self-victimising penchant is, the more enthusiastic people are to stage a mega-event. Cha (2010: 263) compared the Beijing 2008 Olympics with those held in 1964 in Tokyo; each staging of the Games was domestically perceived by the respective population as the 'end of centuries of humiliation, victimization and shame'. The penchant for victimisation can be a powerful means to strengthen national resentment, patriotism and collectivism, which will be elaborated on later when it comes to the internal branding of China in the Olympic delivery.

Whether the attempt is called rebranding or clarifying, the initial step is to decide 'what image it wants the world to have' (Berkowitz et al., 2007: 168). Regarding hosting the Games as 'the culmination of a 100-year-old national dream' 百年圓夢 (Berkowitz et al., 2007: 167), China, in a nutshell, would like to be taken seriously as a superpower that should not be neglected. To present a strong brand image in an elegant manner, China conveniently and inevitably resorted to its profoundly traditional cultural assets. According to the interviewee who had previously been in charge of designing the athletic icons and image landscape for the Beijing 2008 Olympics, the ideal of BOCOG was to 'present traditional

Chinese culture to the world in a modern way' (Interviewee B05, designer and coordinator of logos for the Games). There were two reasons for China to seek branding resources by drawing on its heritage. Firstly:

> China is definitely one of the countries with the most affluent historical and cultural heritage. It makes sense for us to boost this part. [Secondly] modern China has not accumulated enough cultural assets to boost of to the world so seeking our ancestors' wisdom and accomplishments seems to be an effective way. But we can't make it like selling old stuffs. Modern interpretation and presentation are necessary.' (Interviewee B05, designer and coordinator of logos for the Games)

As stated in the conclusion of Beijing's Candidature File, the central theme of the detailed document was to demonstrate that Beijing was 'a city with an ancient civilisation undergoing dynamic changes' (BOBICO, 2000b: 131). The reinterpretation and transformation of these traditions constituted the brand association which China wanted to foster by hosting the Games.

In terms of local respondents' opinion, over half of all respondents felt positive about China's external image created through hosting the Olympic Games. When asked about whether China had successfully presented itself to the world as an open and strong country, 56.4% felt that the branding campaigns in the Olympic delivery successfully achieved this goal but 10.3% did not feel that hosting the Olympic Games enabled such a national brand image for China. The detailed proportions of different responses are shown in Figure 5.9.



**Figure 5.9: Whether China has successfully branded itself through hosting the Games**

The boosting of its abundant cultural and historical heritage was carefully utilised to fulfil China's strong ambitions to re-join the international community. Having worked in the Department of Cultural Activities at the BOCOG, Interviewee B10 (planner of cultural activities) elaborated on the relations between hosting the Olympics, the demonstration of Chinese culture and the attempt to officially announce China's rise as a superpower. In his view, hosting events was necessary because it provides:

> A platform for the intangible cultural heritage to modernise and prosper. As a platform, hosting events can provide new values for the culture heritage we appreciate. The bigger the event, the more powerful it will be to the society. Why does China host the Olympics? The Olympics is an event with huge international influence. It represents the Olympic spirit, so countries who host the Olympics make their contribution to the civilisation of human beings. In this regard, China hosts the Olympics to show that we're a part of the world and willing to contribute to the world. (Interviewee B10, planner of cultural activities)

The reconstruction of China's international image through the 2008 Olympic Games has been well documented in the literature. The desire to remake China's image was so intense that 'the smallest foul-ups in performance or execution of Games' were exaggeratedly avoided as they 'could ruin Beijing's best-laid plans' (Cha, 2010: 2363). Caution was fully exercised in visual presentations too, and the extreme precision in both the opening and closing ceremonies of Beijing's Olympic Games epitomised the obsession with perfection.

Interviewee B03 (managing image landscapes during the Games) mentioned that the figure of the dragon was initially considered but later rejected as an iconic design because in the Western context, it has been associated with evil. Interviewee B05 (designer and coordinator of logos for the Games) further expounded of the carefulness involved in conducting the process. Similar to the case of the dragon, the use of the image of the Great Wall:

> Was abolished because in the past the function of the Great Wall was to defend other ethnicities from entering and invading mainland China. The Chinese Government worried that might be associated with isolationism. The government was looking for a sign that could truly represent Chinese culture and at the same time would not generate any negative connotations... All the signs eventually chosen carry strong political meanings. (Interviewee B05, designer and coordinator of logos for the Games)

Negative associations were relentlessly avoided because removing the stain left by the Tiananmen Square massacre on 4th June 1989 was probably the first mission to accomplish

before any new brand could successfully be established. To 'eradicate the ghosts of the Tiananmen Square massacre', the space was 'no small coincidence' to be utilised by China to 'host several huge celebrations related to the Olympics' (Cha, 2010: 2363-2364). Tiananmen Square has 'turned itself from a bloody battle ground to a festive space' (Shin, 2009: 123). Collins vividly described the jubilant picture on 31st July 2001 at Tiananmen Square when it was announced that Beijing was to be the host of the 2008 Olympic Games:

> Instantly the sky was ablaze with the colours of an exuberant firework display and, soon after, top leaders headed by President Zhang Jemin and Premier Zhu Ronji, acknowledged the enthusiastic acclamation of an ecstatically joyful crowd gathered in front of the Millennium Monument. Soon Tiananmen Square was alive with a heaving, flag-waving throng, embracing each other, unfurling streamers, singing patriotic songs and dancing in delight. (Collins, 2002)

In order to proceed with the detachment from the massacre, the creation of a harmonious atmosphere and a stable society to welcome the Olympics was a necessity. Any form of turmoil was intolerable because it jeopardised the perfection of the Games, the image of a nation-wide civil support and China's new brand. The Candidature File described Beijing as 'characterised by stability and order' (BOBICO, 2000b: 37), and 'the maintenance of stability and order' has been a top priority in the CCP's governance and was especially so in the delivery of the Games (Interviewee B05, designer and coordinator of logos for the Games). The world's attention was undoubtedly concentrated on the grandeur of the opening and closing ceremonies that China desperately presented, while 'the price for that limelight is intense criticism and attention to the country's flaws' (Cha, 2010: 2375).

The violation of human rights was one of the main concerns of China in staging the Games. To ease worries, China ensured in the Candidature File that there would be 'no restrictions on journalists in reporting on the Olympic Games' (BOBICO, 2000b: 5). The promise could be equivocally viewed either as China's earnestness to finally respect the freedom of information circulation, even though this is merely part of human rights and the freedom was only granted on issues related to the Olympic Games, or as in itself an irony because there was a need for China to make such a promise. The situation turned out to be even worse due to the numerous obstacles foreign reporters encountered, and the IOC needed to strongly remind China that 'they had to honor the promise to provide free access to the internet for foreign reporters' (d'Hooghe, 2014: 236-237). Eventually, foreign reporters could freely access the internet but only foreign and not domestic journalists, 'shortly before the start of the Olympic Games' (d'Hooghe, 2014: 237).

To remind the world that China was the locus of an ancient civilisation and to disassociate itself from the stereotype of being a human rights violator was part of its Olympic rebranding. In short, the image was of a strong and peaceful country. However, the attempt at image change does not equate with the same resolution in behavioural change. The Chinese researcher Luo Qing highlighted that when the IOC announced that Beijing was to be the host of the 2008 Olympic Games, they 'thought they could change China. I think the Chinese Government wanted only to change the world's image of China' (cited in Yang and Genser, 2015). This view has been evidenced by plentiful occurrences of arrest and the harassment of dissidents and activists, together with the mysterious missing six human right lawyers after a recent crackdown in Beijing, which was described by the official press agency Xinhua as 'nothing more than a legitimate law enforcement action, and should not be interpreted as a human rights issue' (Phillips, 2015), as well as the regression in China's ranking in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index from 167th in 2008 to 175th in 2014 (Boykoff, 2015). The external brand image of China after the 2008 Olympic Games is undoubtedly strong, but not really peaceful.

### 5.3.2 Internal Branding of Beijing and China

> The socialist country we want to establish is the one with high level of both material civilisation and spiritual civilisation. By spiritual civilisation what I mean is not only education, science and culture, which are definitely necessary. Moreover, I also mean the communist ideologies, aspirations, beliefs, disciplines, the stance and principle of revolution and comradely relations, etc. (Xiaoping Deng 邓小平, 1980)

The concept of constructing a socialist spiritual civilisation was first introduced in the fourth plenary session of the 18th CCP's Central Committee in 1979 (新华网 Xinhuanet). Spiritual education, more commonly known as political propaganda or thought work, has been a critical task in the CCP's governance, and its importance lies in its capability to maintain the stability of society and the economy. Spiritual civilisation is particularly significant when there is a huge event taking place like the Olympic Games.

The delivery of the Beijing Games entailed spiritual education to ensure social stability during the time of the Games and to motivate public support for the Games. Spiritual education as the internal branding for the Olympic Games commenced before Beijing was awarded the hosting right. Soon after BOBICO was founded, it began the call for logo design applications from the public and 'received more than 2,000 submissions for logo designs and

30,000 suggested mottos for the Beijing Olympic bid' (BOBICO, 2000a: 33). The public call for applications carried more utility for political mobilisation than for genuine logo seeking, since 'accepting logo applications from the public and recruiting professional design companies or institutions into the Olympic logo design process' (Interviewee B05, designer and coordinator of logos for the Games) were both adopted. Interviewee B08, who worked on the image and landscape crew of the Beijing Games, acknowledged that:

> From a professional perspective, I don't think calls for public ideas is a very useful way to obtain good design works because good works are produced in a professional system… However, as an approach of marketing and public education, a call for public ideas remains helpful. Calling for public ideas and inviting creative professionals are, as a result, both needed. Where there is no need to do such marketing, sending invitations to specific creative professionals is a more useful way to get things done… but when you're going to promote your products and campaigns, it is necessary to engage the public. (Interviewee B08, image landscape planning and implementation during Games)

As mentioned in the previous section, the graphic design of the Beijing Olympic Games was a deliberate and delicate calculation of the CCP to correctly, precisely and exclusively deliver the brand messages they wanted to deliver. The officially and internationally presented images, logos and mottos were, and had to be, the products of professionals. However, through the process of calling for applications from the public, the bidding and the delivery of the Games became not only the business of the state but also the aspiration of the people. It successfully linked the glory of the nation with that of every individual Chinese (Interviewee B01, involved in the social impact dimension of the OGGI project). As the BOCOG President Liu Qi said in an interview, 'the success of the Beijing Olympic Games is the grand victory of Chinese people' (邹云 et al., 2008).

The enhancement of civic pride was reflected in the survey results too. As shown in Figure 5.10, 94.9% of respondents felt that their pride as a Chinese citizen was increased, either definitely or to some extent, due to the delivery of the Olympic Games. This extremely high percentage coincided with the strong domestic support for Beijing's Olympic bid as mentioned in Section Chapter 1 -1.3.2. What is noteworthy, is the slightly lower percentage of respondents who felt prouder as a Beijing resident, either definitely or to some extent, due to the Olympic Games, and as shown in Figure 5.11, this percentage is 87.2%. The stronger pride as a Chinese citizen than as a Beijing resident can reasonably be expected, after all, as discussed before, the external branding strategy of Beijing's Olympic delivery focused more

on branding China than branding Beijing; Beijing was more analogous to a display window for China. People in Beijing tended to feel stronger about their identity as a Chinese citizen than a Beijing resident. The situation is the reverse of London's case, where as a result of the Olympic Games more people felt prouder as a Londoner than as a British citizen/resident. Comparing the two cases, it is noticeable that the internal branding effects, the enhancement of civic pride, was influenced by the external branding strategy.



**Figure 5.10: Feeling prouder as a Chinese citizen due to hosting the Games**



**Figure 5.11: Feeling prouder as a Beijing citizen due to hosting the Games**

Hosting the Olympic Games was in itself an unprecedented opportunity for an internal branding campaign that could not be forsaken. Mega-events have been widely used by the

state to divert attention from domestic problems to the spectacles; for at least a couple of weeks before the opening ceremony the media was largely concerned with Games-related news. As a country that has publicly announced spiritual civilisation as a policy, internal branding cannot be alien to China. Hosting the 2008 Olympics allowed the Chinese Government to 'mobilize the population around a common goal' (Brady, 2009: 1) and to 'promote national cohesion' (Broudehoux, 2007: 392). Discussion on domestic problems, such as income inequality and civil unrest, were spontaneously muted.

In addition to passively acting as a fig leaf for domestic issues, the Olympic spirit was further incorporated into the Chinese Government's spiritual civilisation propaganda. From the Olympic Torch Relay to the opening and closing ceremonies, the design of these programmes could all be regarded as 'vital to promoting Olympic values and embracing all Chinese people with the Olympism' (BOBICO, 2000b: 3). Even before winning the Olympic bid, various communication and education programmes were launched to 'imbue the athletes and people in China with the spirit of Olympism' (BOBICO, 2000b: 117). Running from 2001 to 2008, these programmes were:[40]

> Guided by central themes emphasizing the harmonization of social and economic growth with sustainable development, the identification of 1.25 billion Chinese people with the goals of Olympism, and the social, economic, sporting and technological legacies for the Olympic Games. (BOBICO, 2000b: 117)

The rhetoric of the Olympic spirit was highly compatible and complementary to the Chinese Government's policy of social control through spiritual civilisation. In order to enforce the Olympics-infused spiritual civilisation, Olympic knowledge was 'disseminated' in the '556 Olympic Education model Schools ... among 400 million Chinese youths' (BOCOG, 2010b: 261). Staging the Olympics in China was summarised as nourishing 'Beijing and the whole nation', whereby 'all the Chinese people [would] draw inspiration from the Olympic spirit and values' (BOCOG, 2010b: 261). Interviewee B11, previously in charge of image landscape design at BOCOG, specified that 'one of the targets of Beijing Olympic Games was to cultivate Chinese people's mentality through the diffusion of Olympic spirit.'

While the role of culture has been increasingly emphasised by the Chinese government in external branding (Brady, 2009: 9), it is also serviceable for boosting civic pride and

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[40] These programmes are different from the Beijing Games-related cultural events, which ran from 2005 to 2008.

nationalism through encouraging people's appreciation of Chinese culture. Hosting the Olympics provided Chinese people with the opportunity to revisit traditional culture, and 'to think about the meanings of China, state, people and responsibility' (Interviewee B07, who helped integrate the Olympic spirit with Beijing's social development). As a country which is good at 'doing big things' (Interviewee B05, designer and coordinator of logos for the Games) and 'social mobilisation' (Interviewee B04, expert in Chinese urban regeneration projects), the realisation of the Olympic dream provided a perfect space for the CCP to launch 'massive', 'long-term' and pervasive propaganda (Brady, 2009: 11). Image landscape was used, which was defined as 'during a specific period of time, a specific space occupied by the visual icons for vibe creation' so that 'a concept or an idea could be transmitted' (Interviewee B11, image landscape designer at BOCOG). Its target audience was both 'external visitors and foreign reporters and internal local citizens' (interviewee B11, image landscape designer at BOCOG). 'We not only placed posters in the Olympic venues, but also in the entire city, so that local people could be immersed in the Olympic vibes' (Interviewee B08, responsible for image landscape planning and implementation during the Games). In the name of presenting the best of the Chinese to the world, slogans educating people to be civilised and cultured, and volunteers instructing people queueing for buses, were spread to every block in the city. Figure 5.12, Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14 are some examples of the slogans/posters present on Beijing streets during the time of the Games.



**Figure 5.12: Poster of the Beijing Olympic slogan - One World, One Dream**
Photo credit: Hope Tseng[41]

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[41] http://hope-in-chaos.blogspot.co.uk/2008/06/blog-post_30.html#more

**Figure 5.13: Slogan posters**

Translation (from left to right):

1. Glorify your country, honour the Olympics.
2. Welcome the Olympics, be civilised. I participate, I'm devoted, I'm happy.
3. Deliver the People's Olympics, establish civilised Chaoyang (an administrative district in Beijing).

Photo credit: Hope Tseng[42]



**Figure 5.14: Slogan banner**

Translation: Welcome the Olympics of the century, establish a harmonious society.

Photo credit: Hope Tseng[43]

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[42] See footnote 41.

In addition to making a visual landscape in the city, internal branding was also conducted through various programmes and events. Interviewee B10 (planner of cultural activities), who once served at the Beijing Spiritual Civilisation Office, stressed the importance of cultural and sporting events for the city and the inhabitants within because:

> A city with lots of cultural and sporting events has higher social and economic prosperity. Hosting events is necessary for a society because it provides information and recreation for the members within. Some people don't see the importance of these events to a city and think them useless and wasteful. In my opinion, a city without the willingness to host events is a city in trouble because it must be colourless and lifeless. (Interviewee B10, planner of cultural activities)

At this point, the link between physical development and spiritual civilisation has been established. This echoes the Western thinking of Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the IOC and regarded as the father of the modern Olympic Games, that 'sport was the springboard for renewed moral energy' (IOC, 2012b) and the Eastern Confucian thinking that the development of 'physical strength in tandem with moral values and intelligence' is the way 'to be an educated and useful person' (Xu, 2008a: 13). The mingling of the philosophies of Confucianism and the Olympic spirit explains the reason why the Olympic spirit was repeatedly seen in Beijing's Candidature File and posters on the street. The internal branding in the Olympic delivery enhanced nationalism and a sense of togetherness but also infused every person in China with a 'correct' way to lead life. Through the incorporation of the Olympic spirit, the Chinese Government perpetuated spiritual civilisation as the moral promotion of physical wellness.

In spite of the fact that it is highly possible for spiritual civilisation to be perceived as a means of social control, the people under this control, the Chinese people, might not necessarily have been opposed to it or may even have perceived it as necessary and positive. Nearly two thirds of the interviewees felt nostalgic about the orderliness of the city and the friendliness of people during the Olympics. They reminisced about the festiveness and the enthusiasm during the Games and deeply felt the necessity for the Chinese Government to enforce the ideals of a spiritual civilisation. For example, Interviewee B03 (responsible for landscape images during the Games) thought that in the post-Olympics period the task of the Chinese Government was to make the Olympic spirit last and to transform it in different timings. She further elaborated:

[43] See footnote 41

Campaigns of different themes are introduced at different times to influence the public and change the behaviour of Beijing citizens. When these campaigns are promoted, I believe the methods used and experience gained in the Olympic delivery remains very useful; what has been changed is only the theme of the campaign but the approach of use is the same… Education is also very important. Civil etiquette education and long-term guidance need to be provided. In Beijing, the power of communities is immense, like residents' committee in the community. As a local and small organisation in urban governance, a residents' committee is usually a policy promoter which places posters in the community (interviewee B03, responsible for landscape images during the Games).

In the survey conducted with the employees of the property management company, two respondents expressed the opinion that the citizenship quality of Chinese people needed to be improved. Only 5.1% of respondents replied that their attention to the development and changes taking place in the neighbourhood in which they lived had not increased after the Beijing's Games, while 82.1% replied that they cared about local affairs slightly more than before the Games (Figure 5.15). With the rapid economic development within a socialist regime, the restoration of collectivism and a community sense among the Chinese population was an effective tool to defend against the increasing public demands for personal freedom. While people labelled as 'cutting themselves off from the masses' and 'lacking collective spirit' (Wang, 1995b: 153) will not find themselves in trouble, as occurred in the pre-Reform planned economy, the type of behaviour they exemplify remains morally discouraged in Chinese society.



**Figure 5.15: Whether more attention has been paid to local events/development due to hosting the Games**

When I conducted my fieldwork in Beijing in the summer of 2014, banners, slogans and posters promoting the spiritually civilised Chinese population and volunteers maintaining order in the city remained a feature of the urban landscape. As in the quote from Xiaoping Deng at the beginning of this section, both material civilisation and spiritual civilisation are important for the development of China, or more precisely, for the consolidation of the CCP. Considering that it was at the beginning of China's economic Reform when the construction of socialist spiritual civilisation was launched, not imperceptibly, the concept of spiritual civilisation has been a bolster for the CCP to pursue material civilisation within a socialist political regime. Hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games provided an opportunity for internal branding, namely spiritual civilisation, which enabled the CCP's heightened maintenance of social stability, the revalorisation and re-appreciation of Chinese culture, and the rebirth of nationalism and collectivism. As Interviewee B10 (planner of cultural activities) summarised, the most valuable Olympic legacy of the Beijing Games was the 'internal mutation within the [Chinese] society.'

### 5.3.3    The Contours of Place Branding for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games

In terms of the place branding of the Beijing Games, attempts to externally rebrand or clarify China as a peaceful, rising country and wash away the stain left by the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 could not have been more evident. The utilisation of traditional Chinese culture and ancient civilisation aimed to demonstrate the strength, grandeur and harmony of China. Internally, Chinese culture and the Olympic spirit were incorporated into the ongoing spiritual civilisation of the Chinese population. An image landscape dominated by slogans and posters with moral education mottos has often been a feature of Beijing, but during the Games the density of propaganda items was even greater. Not surprisingly, this focus on spiritual civilisation in tandem with the staging of the Olympic Games strengthened levels of civic pride, collectivism and nationalism.

The Games also solidified the governance of the CCP, despite criticism by the global media of China. Even though promoting mutual understanding between different cultures, East and West was one of the most significant themes of the Beijing Games, criticism from Western media was used by the CCP to highlight the differences between China and Western countries, and the unfair treatment which China was perceived to have endured (Interviewee B01, involved in the social impact dimension of the OGGI project). Criticism of the Chinese government was portrayed by the CCP as an attack on the entire Chinese people. Internally,

both nationhood and support for the CCP was thereby strengthened, while externally, this delicate twist symbolically placed the Chinese people 'in front of these bullets' (Interviewee B01, involved in the social impact dimension of the OGGI project).

The place branding in the delivery of the Beijing Games epitomised a Chinese way of 'representing, valuing and using the past' (Wu, 2014: 851). Resorting to ancestors and seeking resources from heritage was adopted by China and Beijing's place branding; heritage is treated 'as a carrier of virtue' by Confucian scholars, with 'public moral decline' depicted 'as times when "people whose hearts are no longer ancient" (ren xin bu gu, 人心不古 )' (Wu, 2014: 863). The past is admired and aspired to by Chinese people, especially when the present is less than pleasant. However, the use of the pastis in the sense of heritage rather than history. As Lowenthal (1998: 7) explains, '[h]istory seeks to convince by truth, and succumbs to falsehood. Heritage exaggerates and omits, candidly invents and frankly forgets, and thrives on ignorance and error.'

The place branding of China and Beijing amid the Olympic process rested on the manipulation of traditional culture. In external branding, Chinese culture was portrayed as a precious, peaceful heritage, while in internal branding terms, this cultural heritage provided a boost for Chinese citizens' faith in Chinese culture and patriotism towards the motherland. The elements to be selected from Chinese culture involved, as noted by a few interviewees, careful deliberation. As what was utilised was not authentic history but fabricated heritage (Lowenthal, 1998), how and what to fabricate in order to both externally ensure a place image of openness and internally to arouse patriotism, become a matter of either success or disaster.

To 'practice heritage is to bring the meanings of the past into our interpretive horizon' (Wu, 2014: 863), although our interpretive horizon is lined with several competing narratives. In the place branding of the Beijing Games, while cultural heritage was externally deployed to present China's peace-loving nature, it could hardly be seen as a peace-making gesture that the CCP leveraged the criticism of it to accentuate the differences between China and Western countries. Internal branding revealed a similar paradox too, as traditional cultural elements were borrowed to boost civil pride, as the present can be 'a thousand times deeper' when it is 'backed by the past' (Woolf and Schulkind, 1985: 98).

The delivery of the Games provided China with the opportunity to revisit its traditional culture and afford it symbolically higher status. Ironically, an unprecedented speed and scale

of *hutong* demolition was undertaken, until protests from domestic and international preservationists had risen to a level which might have imperilled the glamorous delivery of the Beijing Games. The *hutongs* were then transformed from a symbol of outmodedness and dilapidation to a treasured piece of heritage. In this sense, cultural heritage in the place branding of the Beijing Games was not intrinsically embedded with consistent value, but contingently subjective to practical usage.

## 5.4   Chapter Conlusion

The place branding effect of hosting a mega-event is '[perhaps] the most eagerly sought and most elusive benefit' (Gold and Gold, 2008: 301) for places when competing for the hosting right. Place branding, however, is an idea borrowed from product branding in the business world and has triggered many doubts on the applicability of branding to places. Places certainly cannot be branded simply in the way a product is branded. Consequently, this chapter started with a brief outline of the applicability issues from product to place branding, and found that corporate branding may be a more compatible concept for places to adopt. Corporate branding is capable of capturing the latitude and longitude of a place brand, because it resonates with and deepens the identity of a brand's internal constituents.  After all, 'place branding works best when the values of a brand are rooted in the aspirations of the people' (OECD, 2007b: 33). Overlooking internal citizens' brand identity and aspirations almost certainly undermines external place branding effects.

More importantly, internal branding not only assists with external branding, but is a goal in its own right. The place banding campaigns of both London and Beijing revealed the strong effects of internal branding. In London's case, the change of its external image as a result of the Games may be less apparent, because it already enjoyed a very strong brand image in the minds of tourists and investors. In contrast, the effects of internal branding were relatively stronger. The street survey in London revealed that nearly half of all respondents felt prouder as a Londoner or being British due to the hosting of the Games. In Beijing, while the external image of China is controversial, that it hosted an Olympics of grandeur and intensified spiritual education helped engender enhanced levels of civic pride. The two cases lead to a counterintuitive conclusion, namely that the Olympic Games may provide a stronger momentum for internal, and not external branding.

From this perspective, place branding is ultimately a tool in urban governance, as a place image may offer more than an external promotional and showcasing function. It can

more profoundly, be a form of 'social control, designed to create unity or a shared sense of identity within a specific place… [and] subdue internal discord or polarisation' (Barke, 1999: 489). Optimistically speaking, place branding as a governance tool may facilitate '[n]ew resources in form of ideas, capital and local knowledge' (Kavaratzis, 2008: 44)[44]. However, due to the competitive nature of entrepreneurialism, a strong inclination towards sameness among places tends to consume potential new resources.

Bizarrely, the use of cultural heritage for place branding does not help individualisation but in fact worsens homogenisation among places. Although the cultural heritage of a country or relic in a city is certainly unique and arouses strong emotional attachment among its citizens, the object(s) to which they focus their attachment and aspirations towards are not 'material artefacts' but the 'meaning' (Graham, 2002: 1004) of heritage. This is not because authentic material artefacts are unattainable, but the meanings are endorsed by present needs and thus are easier to embrace. This is why '[s]ites wilfully contrived often serve heritage better than those faithfully preserved' (Lowenthal, 1998: 14). Such contrived heritage is 'an economic resource', 'exploited everywhere as a primary component of strategies to promote tourism, economic development and rural and urban regeneration' (Graham, 2002: 1006). Pursuing this line of thought, the contribution made by the manipulation of cultural heritage to urban homogenisation is imaginable, as only heritage required by present needs is created (Graham, 2002: 1004). As a result, rather than countering the trend of urban homogenisation, cultural heritage is manipulated to cater to the supposedly unified taste of global consumers.

Echoing the business and people climate discussed in Chapter 2, cities competing for the same client base results in a sameness between city brands and a lack of unique selling points (Harvey, 1989; OECD, 2007b). Without a substantial basis to verify the flattering of a specific group of people, the abandonment of unique local characteristics and an alignment with 'hippy and trendy images' (Fan, 2006: 10) is doomed to result in a failed place brand.  In the Olympic process, the manipulation of cultural heritage is augmented in both external and internal branding. Externally, it accelerates the process of urban homogenisation significantly, due to the necessity for profit-making (discussed in Chapter 2), while internally, the opportunity provided by the Games to revisit and re-appreciate the grains of a country's

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[44] Quoted from Helbrecht I, 1994, Conflict, consent, cooperation: Comprehensive planning in Germany beyond market and state, in Braun GO (ed.), *Managing and Marketing of Urban Development and Urban Life*, Dietrich Reimer Verlag, Berlin, pp. 521-530

cultural heritage sufficiently enhances the civic pride of its citizens. As Graham (2002: 1008) explains:

> Traditions and narratives that are invented and imposed on space… the city— particularly the national or regional capital— becomes a landscape that embodies what is defined as public memory marked by its morphology (the ceremonial axis, the victory arch), monuments, statuary and street names. This urban landscape, in turn, becomes the stage-set for national and regional spectacle, parades and performances. Implicit within such ideas is the sense of belonging to place that is fundamental to identity.

## Chapter 6 - Conclusions

In an era of globalisation, 'cities compete to position themselves in the global flows of capital, images and narratives' (Short, 2004: 23). On the verge of the extinction of truly local affairs, urban governance comes inevitably under the influence of extra-local forces. The entrepreneurial capability to continuously attract global capital, tourists and talent is nowadays a crucial indicator for assessing the governability of local governments. Hosting mega-events has consequently been highly sought after by cities and countries, and the bidding for hosting rights has been subject to extensive competition among geographical places. The Summer Olympic Games is, in particular, the most prestigious and tempting prize for cities. The endeavours of local governments to secure the hosting right, the transformation of space use for the delivery of the Olympics, the post-Games legacies claimed to be delivered, and the repercussions for the host city and country, all demonstrate that urban space is less of a jurisdiction of corresponding local governments and more of a bargaining field for globalising forces and local resistance.

To facilitate the concluding remarks to this project, a succinct summary of the analysis of the two chosen cases is provided and presented in two tables for ease of comparison in Section 6.1. The differences and similarities between the two cases are compared and discussed in more detail in Section 6.2, while the three research questions (listed in Chapter 1) are answered in Section 6.3. The thesis concludes with Section 6.4 which presents the implications of the research findings. Through a careful review of the literature, case comparison and different sources of data collection, this project proposes two arguments. Firstly, while the hosting of mega-events is arguably a globalising force of standardisation, this does not mean that local particularities are unquestionably erased. Just as Knowles (2015: 10) concluded from a flip-flop's trans-local journey, 'globalization is more fragile than we think it is. It is more plural, more open and more motile.' However, to understand what hosting mega-events brings to urban governance, standardisation force provides more profound influences on and implications for host cities. As a result, my second argument maintains the standardisation of urban space, accelerated by hosting mega-events. Worthy of future exploration, standardisation prudence in entrepreneurial governance, based on the analysis of the two cases, contradicts democracy and engenders a manipulative, formalistic participation scheme.

## 6.1 Summary of Cases

The impacts of mega-events on urban governance are showcased by the negotiation between tendencies towards standardisation and localised Olympic aspirations. While the Olympic Games is a globalising force on host cities and comes pre-packaged with profit-driven standardised tendencies, in contrast, Games-led urban regeneration/development and place branding comprise the localised aspirations of host cities. This project pinpoints what mega-events bring to urban politics by observing this negotiation in two dimensions: urban regeneration/development and place branding. This section briefly summarises the findings of Chapters 4 and 5.

### 6.1.1 Urban Regeneration in the Olympic Process

In Chapter 4, urban regeneration in the Olympic process was discussed, and the analysis of comparing the two cases is presented in Table 6.1. Three dimensions of urban regeneration in the Olympic process are investigated: social and economic transformation, transformation of the built environment, and participation and consultation.

**Table 6.1: Urban regeneration and development in the Olympic process**

| Category | London 2012 Olympics | Beijing 2008 Olympics |
|---|---|---|
| *Social and economic transformation* | | |
| A keyword of the goal | Convergence | Modernisation |
| Approaches | 1. Creating wealth; reducing poverty<br>2. Supporting healthier lifestyles<br>3. Developing successful neighbourhoods | 1. Green Olympics<br>2. High-tech Olympics<br>3. People's Olympics |
| *Transformation of built environment* | | |
| Features of urban regeneration | PPP and power centralisation | A transition from for-production to for-consumption |
| The role of the Olympic Games | Catalysing East London regeneration | Beautifying and modernising Beijing |
| Issues incurred | 1. The beneficiary of the regeneration<br>2. The cost-efficiency of regeneration through hosting the Games | 1. A Games that has to be won<br>2. The beautification of urban landscape<br>3. The Games-driven culture redevelopment |
| *Participation and consultation* | | |
| The background of civil participation | The intersected relation between participation and partnership | Participation shadowed by a lack of civil society |
| The role of civil participation in the delivery of Games | 1. Participation in the service of the Games<br>2. Participation as a way of expectation management | 1. Only happens during or after policy implementation phase<br>2. In mediated land expropriation, participation as a means of compensation negotiation |

### A.    Social and economic transformation: a mixed picture

In the dimension of social and economic transformation, London's Games placed a big emphasis on the regeneration of East London and aimed to close the socio-economic gap between east and the rest of London. The Games was portrayed as capable of stimulating the necessary resources both from the public and private sectors in order to regenerate areas suffering from a high level of poverty and deprivation. Three approaches for combating poverty, living healthily and promoting neighbourhood development were set to realise this broad goal of convergence. In the case of Beijing, the modernising of the capital city was the primary goal in this dimension, and the approaches adopted were encapsulated in the commonly heard slogan of the Beijing Games, Green Olympics, High-tech Olympics and

People's Olympics. These approaches refer in more detail to the attempts of the Chinese to achieve the goal of 'modernisation' through catching up with international standards in terms of environmental protection, industrial restructuring and innovation, and the healthy lifestyles of Chinese citizens.

The two cases held diverse aspirations at the start of the Olympic journey but provided similarly mixed pictures of legacy realisation. In London, the sub-indicators in all three approaches presented both promising prospects, and reducing poverty seemed to be the most rooted and most difficult problem to tackle. Similarly in Beijing, the Olympic economic boom occurred in the preparation years but almost simultaneously dropped along with the closing curtain of the Olympic Games. In terms of the promotion of habitual exercise, the statistics seem to provide a promising outlook, although they also show a widened gap between urban and rural lifestyles. Lastly, Beijing's air quality never ceases to be a primary health concern, and there was a significant improvement in air quality in Beijing from 2007 to 2008, but since then it has remained at roughly the same level. It was the sky of the 'Olympic blue' as opposed to the 'default grey'; this situation is commonly joked about by people in Beijing that while the grey sky is the default colour, a blue sky can only be seen during high-profile international events. In the dimension of social and economic transformation, when comparing to the pre-Games claimed legacies, the Olympic Games can hardly be said to have left substantial benefits to the targeted areas in either case.

## B. Transformation of the built environment: the production of Olympic space for development and redevelopment

Regeneration in the UK has been characterised by the utilisation of PPPs because of the central government's deliberate encouragement through subsidy allocation. The involvement of external actors has been decisive for regeneration projects in order to obtain grants from central government. The change in the built environment and development of the local thus reveals a strong tendency for vertical power structuring. Regeneration in the London 2012 Olympic Games also showed how powerful extra local forces are involved in local development and redevelopment. As noted by one interviewee, regeneration in the UK is 'to create the basis for private investment' (Interviewee L02, responsible for organising Games-related planning applications). The situation regarding regeneration in the Olympic Games provides further evidence of this due to the enormous scale of the event. Hence, the production of the Olympic space facilitated the accumulation of capital and investment so that regeneration in East London could be catalysed. Who benefited the most in the Olympic

regeneration game and whether this was the best way to redevelop East London remains unsolved and debatable questions.

In terms of the case of the Beijing Games, it is necessary to first understand the meaning of land for Chinese rulers. Land was historically regarded as a primary means of production in China, and the planning of physical space was simply an integral part of the entire economic plan. Since the economic Reform in 1978, the socialist legacy and entrepreneurial municipal governments have made urban spaces the battlefield for land-based profits and the centre of consumption-oriented urban development. Focusing on the Games, the bid submitted in 2001 was the second Olympic bid Beijing had submitted so that there was an imperative for the city to win the hosting right for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. Based on this mindset, the transformation of urban space was to ensure the winning of the bid and the successful delivery of the Games. At the expense of historical cultural relics and the existing social fabric, the production of the Olympic space enabled and justified the beautification and modernisation of the urban landscape.

## C. Participation and consultation: lacking genuine empowerment

In contrast to the common assumption that participation and consultation empower the powerless, the two cases in this project reveal the opposite. Due to the grand scale and the numerous criteria demanded by the IOC, the Olympic Games barely allows space for civic participation. In the UK, regeneration projects have long been carried out through PPPs, which incubate the power concentration of central government and block channels of civic participation. When it came to the London's Games, the idea of participation was used to ensure that they went ahead. Due to the legal requirement to hold public consultation meetings, the facilitation of civic participation and consultation either amounted to an instrument of expectation management, or a shield against potential obstruction, thereby delimiting the scope of discussion and containing dissent.

Given its then lack of civil society, civic participation in Mao's China lost its essence of spontaneity and voluntariness; participation was regarded as a political obligation, to demonstrate that someone was neither 'cutting themselves from the mass' nor 'lacking collective spirits' (Wang, 1995a: 153). The economic reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 released participation from the cage of political obligation, but civic participation as a means of influencing policy-making remained impractical. Space for civic participation is only possible during or after the phase of policy implementation, and is also widely regarded by

the Chinese populace as a more effective approach for tweaking policy implementation in a direction favourable to them. The case of the Beijing Games revealed similar caution, as civic participation was predominantly confined to the area of compensation negotiations, and was merely a formality when it came to land expropriation. Village cadres provided an important function of communication between different actors, and facilitated the 'formality of participation'.

### 6.1.2 Place Branding in the Olympic Process

Chapter 5 analysed the place-branding effects in the Olympic process and a comparison of the results is presented in Table 6.2.

**Table 6.2: Place branding in the Olympic process**

| Category | London 2012 Olympics | Beijing 2008 Olympics |
|---|---|---|
| *External branding* | | |
| Target to achieve | To 'improve the UK's image at home and abroad' | Rebranding / clarifying China<br>1. To remove the 1989 Tiananmen massacre legacy<br>2. To re-join international community |
| Nation brand image | Creative, inclusive and welcoming | A strong but peaceful country |
| City brand image | A city brand of diversity and vibrancy | A shop window of China |
| Approach | Cultural Olympiad: cultural diversity and innovation | Accentuation of Chinese ancient civilisation and politicised visual design |
| The Olympic effects | The reconciliation of diverse brand images through common celebration | A strong brand image but not unquestionably peaceful |
| *Internal branding* | | |
| Target to achieve | To enhance civic pride and local identity | To ensure social stability and notional cohesion |
| Approach | 1. 'Discovering places'[45], a campaign designed to enhance local identity<br>2. The creation of festive space | Socialist spiritual civilisation<br>1. The utilisation of Olympism<br>2. Perpetuated political propaganda<br>3. The re-appreciation of Chinese cultural heritage |
| The Olympic effects | Offering an ideologically placeless cosmopolitan identity | Strengthened support of the Chinese Government's spiritual civilisation, social control and Chinese exceptionalism |

**A.    External branding**

The external place branding of the London Games can be explained by two interrelated features, the first being the central role played by London in the process. While both the Games in London and in Beijing co-branded the host city and host country in the Olympic process, the branding campaign in the Beijing Games was apparently more country centred

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[45] The campaign 'Discovering places' is the heritage strand of the Cultural Olympiad; see section 5.2.2.

than the London Games. With regard to London's glowing cosmopolitan image, 'the institutionally metropolitan character of 2012' was what the organisers desired to retain (MacRury and Poynter, 2010: 2963). The London '2012 Olympics offers a unique opportunity to refresh, restore and reframe "London" in the national and global imagination' (MacRury and Poynter, 2010: 2971). Through such re-imagination, the cosmopolitan nature of London was reinforced in the mind of locals, nationals and internationals. However, similar to the challenge encountered in previous place branding campaigns in Britain, the glamour of London tends to overshadow the rest of the country and further alienate people outside the capital. The city brand of London is comprised of diversity and vibrancy, which people outside London may not naturally relate to.

This leads to the second feature, which is internal resonance. The region-based design of the Cultural Olympiad and dispersed Games locations across the country ensured that Britain, not merely London, would benefit from the Games. A brand image of inclusiveness, which Britain sought to project, was embodied by this. Staging the Games in multicultural, multi-ethnic East London, as well as the public's ability to relate to the Games and national brand image, all helped communicate Britain's creativity, inclusiveness and sense of welcome to the world.

When considering place branding, tensions occur in both brand images and brand identities. A clash between the attractiveness and authenticity of a place brand image also took place in London. As indicated by some survey respondents and a couple of interviewees, the approach through which East London has been promoted and animated does not reflect how residents perceive the area and what a representable place image looks like. The erection of Westfield Shopping Centre, for example, pulls outsiders in but simultaneously pushes locals to the peripheries, and the spill-over effects are much more negative than positive. A shopping spree celebrating consumerism is hardly a representative image of East London, and is even rather offensive given the area's high unemployment rates.

People may respectively or simultaneously, identify themselves at local, regional and national scales. In the British context, a growing portion of people have dual identities (Heath and Roberts, 2008), and a declining number regard themselves as exclusively British; these scales of imagination may not always sit well with each other. Strong identification to regions and cities may engender detachment to the nation, but the promotion of inclusiveness may provide a way out of this dilemma. In this sense, inclusiveness is the acceptance of such dual

identities, 'for example, Welsh/British or Asian/British' (MacRury and Poynter, 2010: 2961), which spares people from having to decide which identity they are affiliated to.

At the London Games these long-existing struggles in place brand image and identity become reconcilable. The ecstatic levels of excitement and patriotic sentiment left parochial place image arguments firmly in the shade. What mattered was the number of medals won, the impressiveness of the show delivered, and the sense of togetherness long yearned for. The London Games, through the production of the Olympic space, replaced the social tensions underlying conflicts over place image with a temporary indulgent carousel, fed by an imagined sense of belonging as part of the national or even global community. This led to a sense of reconciliation due to the adoption of a new cosmopolitan identity.

In the external place branding of the Beijing Games, nation branding proved so intense that the city could be viewed merely as a shop window for China. The goal of these nation branding efforts was to clarify China in the minds of international onlookers, and thus reclaim the country's reputation. Therefore, this was about clarification rather than rebranding, and the mentality underlying clarification attempts is self-victimisation. Chinese culture was intentionally utilised to remind observers 'how much world history and Western modernization are actually indebted to Chinese civilization' (Manzenreiter, 2010: 36).

Traditional culture was the core of the Games-led place branding campaign, through which 'the dialogue with international audiences in Olympic discourse' was facilitated (Manzenreiter, 2010: 33). According to the interviews conducted, the selection and embodiment of traditional culture resulted from a process of careful political calculation. The possibility of any negative associations was avoided at all costs, and the presentation of the opening and closing ceremonies perfectly organised. All of this revealed the resolution to forge a welcoming, strong place brand of China to the world.

China also posed as part of the international community through the mere fact of staging the Games. The Beijing Games, China's 'coming-out party' (Cha, 2010: 2361), not only signified China's global role, but also sought to finally detach the country's image from the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, and the high influence and global visibility of the Games made it the perfect platform for this. Tiananmen Square was transformed from the incarnation of bloodshed and repression to a symbol of pride and festivity.

As explored in Chapter 5, while the clarification efforts of China's external place branding might be undermined by continued pollution concerns and human rights violations,

the challenging and hostile attitude of the international media was bizarrely appropriated, if not promoted, by the CCP in order to strengthen so-called Chinese exceptionalism. The Western approach, prioritising democracy and freedom, was thereby depicted as not the only possible form of governance and not appropriate for China. An 'alternative modernity' was thereby encouraged and solidified, in which 'the functionality and robustness of the collective' triumphed over the rights and freedom of the individual (Manzenreiter, 2010: 36). The grandeur and spectacle of the Beijing Games provided the best proof of the viability and success of this alternative modernity.

Several interviewees and survey respondents made the point that staging the Games was a great achievement, not only because of the magnificence inside the Olympic Stadium, but also the orderliness and friendliness on the street. These positive traits of the Beijing Games have been credited as due to the high organisational and mobilisation abilities of the CCP. What, though, is the implication of this?

**B. Internal branding**

The way in which physical space is transformed signifies not only the spatial arrangements, but largely reflects the type of place image which a city would like to present. Physical transformation impedes civic identity when the place image fails to reflect local citizens' understanding of the locality; it also results from social conflict between different groups in the city. At the extra-local scale, conflicts also occur; scales of imagination sometimes coexist (through the acceptance of dual identities) and sometimes clash (local or regional identities undermine the strength of national identity) with each other. Hosting a mega-event solves this problem by offering an ideologically placeless cosmopolitan identity (Horne, 2007; MacRury and Poynter, 2010). The adoption of such a global/cosmopolitan identity can take place in any host city, although this was most noticeable at the London Games, due to the city's longstanding cosmopolitan nature. As MacRury and Poynter (2010: 2963) pinpoint:

> The Olympic Games provide the host nation with an opportunity to re-present itself to its own population and to the wider world. For the Labour government and the organizers of 2012, the key themes of the games and its legacy were associated with achieving an ambitious domestic agenda that stressed… the achievement of a wider social and cultural renewal founded upon a new politics of identity, the egalitarian inclusivity of multiculturalism.

The Cultural Olympiad played a vital role in the creation of cosmopolitan identity. As a means of generating a festive Olympic space, it encouraged the local community to consume Games-related events. The heritage strand of the Cultural Olympiad related citizens to local places, connected the past to the present, and exalted citizens' pride as Londoners and/or Britons. Such a heightened sense of pride and belonging makes cosmopolitan identity viable. The adoption of cosmopolitan identity does not rest on the abandonment of the original identity at whatever scale; rather, it requires sufficient pride as a Londoner and/or a Briton for them to also regard themselves as cosmopolitan constituents. Hosting the Olympic Games enhances local pride by positioning the neighbourhood on the world stage, and the London Games in particular, accentuated the existing cosmopolitan attributes of London.

In this sense, place branding can be ubiquitous in urban governance. Contrary to the common idea that place branding mostly involves external message-conveying, in the case of London the internal reclamation of national pride and a sense of togetherness mattered much more. The docility of citizens was fostered by effective place branding because such patriotic sentiment to the country, its history and even its land, can be easily translated or manipulated. This is particularly arresting in urban governance, as staging the Games relates to citizens at the local scale.

The Beijing case, however, demonstrated an opposite tendency. The questionnaire survey showed that the Games provided a strongly enhanced national identity, which should not be a surprise given that the branding campaign was filled with the imagination and nostalgia of China, rather than Beijing. Maintaining social stability and national solidarity by boosting patriotism was a key goal for the CCP in Beijing. To achieve this goal, the values of the long-lived socialist spiritual civilisation were more intensively projected onto the Chinese populace.

A series of run-up and pupil education programmes was centred around the inculcation of the Olympic spirit. Various sorts of political propaganda, slogans and posters promoting a moralistic way of life are integral to modern China, and thus the inculcation of the Olympic spirit was not a novel idea to the Chinese people but merely an exogenous new tool, adopted to augment old spiritual civilisation mechanisms. As the world's most influential mega-event, laden with strong moral values, the Olympic Games was touted as the culmination of human civilisation. Yet Chinese people are also extremely proud of their own traditional culture, and constantly remind themselves and others about its contribution to the progress of world

civilisation. The hosting of the Beijing Games thus amounted to a legendary encounter between two great strands of civilisation.

This meeting broadened the scale of the CCP's spiritual civilisation. Physical bodily development is no longer a matter of personal life, but a moral obligation within the public domain. As a constituent of society, the personal body has a social and moral obligation to be healthy and contributory. Posters and slogans instructing people about the correct way to lead life have been pervasive in Beijing, where laziness is to be condemned and physical labour praised. With the assistance of the Games, the pursuit of bodily excellence is rendered both righteous and irrefutable, and human bodies are objectified as part of the collective, fused with social obligations.

This also justified the CCP's social control in other dimensions, evidenced by the findings of the interviews and questionnaire survey. The Games-fostered orderliness and friendliness were recalled, with people aspiring to the 'Olympic spirit' even after the Games had finished. The CCP's social controls mingle with the responsibility of Chinese people to contribute to the country.

Integral to the place branding of the Beijing Games, the manipulation and interpretation of heritage facilitated both external and internal branding. The open, welcoming external image which Beijing sought to present through a sugar-coated version of traditional Chinese culture may remain dubious in the face of the CCP's continued violations of human rights; yet the message sent to its internal citizens was affirmative and effective. The Games allowed the Chinese to re-appreciate their traditional culture and heritage, and feel proud of it. Through '[c]elebrating some bits and forgetting others, heritage reshapes a past made easy to embrace' (Lowenthal, 1998: 13). More importantly, echoing the remark of an interviewee (Interviewee B07, responsible for integrating the Olympic spirit and Beijing's social development), the Games-facilitated re-appreciation inculcated Chinese people with their responsibilities and what 'they should become' (Lowenthal, 1998: 19).[46]

## 6.2    Comparison: Differences and Similarities

The cases chosen by this project, the London 2012 and Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, were situated in dichotomous social and political backgrounds and aimed to realise diverse aspirations through hosting the Games. While contextualised differences do exist and reflect

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[46] Quoted from a Scottish custodian by Lowenthal (1998: 19)

their respective conditions, the bigger picture has proven rather similar. The differences and similarities represent the battle between localised particularities and globalised standardisation.

**Difference A.    Regeneration as opposed to modernisation**

In the urban regeneration/development strand, different focuses manifested themselves. The regeneration of East London was the focal point of London 2012, and the central basis for soliciting domestic political support. The idea that hosting the Games for the benefit of the decades ahead provided the strongest justification for urban regeneration framed around the Olympics. Closing the gap between the host boroughs and their London neighbours without the help of the Games was depicted as not so much a challenge, but as impossible. Internationally, the winning of the bid by London was attributed to its close link to East London renewal because the London bid's social and community concerns coincided with the Olympic brand image as a promoter of humanity.

In Beijing, however, accelerating the pace of urban improvement was hardly the primary purpose of hosting the Games. The Olympics did help accelerate improvement, but a booming city like Beijing was not lacking investment; Beijing aimed for modernisation, rather than simple regeneration and was in need of a better transport infrastructure and great sporting venues.

However, the acceleration effect in Beijing did not rest on the basis of boosting material resources, unlike in London. Instead, Beijing's modernisation rested on the difference between the collective imagination of what a modernised city should be like, and what Beijing then looked like.

**Difference B.    Prudence as opposed to extravagance**

Financially speaking, during the delivery of the Games the London event was carefully scrutinised in terms of its cost, largely against the background of austerity. The cost-effectiveness, environmental consciousness and temporary structure of the stadium were constantly heard about during London's Olympic delivery. It was continuously stressed that a great percentage of the funds spent during the Games was not exclusively for the Games but was beneficial to the local community as a post-Games legacy.

However, benefits cannot be equated to necessity. The Games might indeed assist in and accelerate the pace of East London regeneration, but this does not mean that regeneration ambitions could only be fulfilled by hosting the Games. Moreover, the Games actually complicated the picture, as remedies for local problems were diluted and less focused due to the very scale of the Games-led regeneration. As indicated by a London interviewee (Interviewee L01, anti-Olympics activist), regeneration endeavours of a smaller scale might better serve the purpose of neighbourhood improvement. In the face of such scepticism, economic prudence was necessarily the tone of the Games delivery.

Beijing, in contrast, was proud of and boasted about its grandiose stadium and presentation. The stark difference in terms of the approaches in Games delivery was epitomised by the amount they respectively spent on the opening ceremony: '£64 million spent in Beijing as opposed to London's £27 million' (Grix, 2013: 18). Extravagance has never been denied, nor hidden, as the delivery of the Games had to be equal to the nation's reputation in the world, therefore it was necessary to deliver the best and most lavish Games ever. Magnificence, precision and zero tolerance of faults in the delivery of the Games reflected China's intent, and it was imperative for the Games to showcase the 'real China' to the world.

Needless to add, there is no such thing as 'real China', as a place image is always the fruit of contemporary interpretation and the manipulation of past heritage. China exemplified such a tendency and as a heritage-abundant country, China aptly utilised, selected and omitted its cultural elements. Extravagantly presenting its place image simply provided a means of intensifying its clarifying strength.

**Difference C.    Confirmation as opposed to clarification**

In the scope of the external branding, the hosting of the London Games was an act of confirmation. First, it confirmed London's status as a world leading city, together with its corresponding capability and potential. London is a very high profile city with a strong place brand image, and its branding attempts therefore appear less imperative when compared to other cities of a smaller scale. However, London has its own international competitors, and staying active is a prerequisite in prevailing over these rivals, or at least in maintaining the status quo. Second, it confirmed to the world what 'Britishness' is. Through the incorporation of famous cultural icons and festive dancing, the opening ceremony of the London Games was a success in light-heartedly conveying the humour, vibrancy and collaborative spirit

inherent in 'Britishness'. British characters, already somewhat acknowledged by the world, were showcased, with the accentuation of comedy and music countering conservative impressions which have sometimes impeded the development of British business and trade.

Beijing, in contrast, regarded the Games as an unprecedented opportunity to clarify the world's apparent misunderstanding of China. The idea of mutual understanding between China and the world was repeatedly accentuated in Beijing's Candidature File, and by the Beijing interviewees. This was based on the belief that the true characteristics of China had not been properly perceived, nor had China's contribution to human civilisation been properly acknowledged, and thus clarification was necessary.

As explored in Chapter 5, the mind-set underlying place image clarification is one of self-victimisation. This tendency was reinforced by the relatively negative coverage of the Games on the part of the foreign media. Although this coverage was about the delivery of the Beijing Games and the CCP, the equivalence, or more precisely intentional mix-up advanced by the government, between the CCP and the Chinese people, successfully confirmed the idea that the world was somehow biased against China.

More subtly, these image biases were depicted by the CCP as largely rooted in fundamental disparities between China and Western countries. Such disparities demand diverse forms of governance, and the CCP's social control has, as a result, been solidified and justified. This is evidenced by some interviewees' nostalgic feelings about the Games' orderliness. Heightened social control and political mobilisation have thus been deemed as a governance form suitable and beneficial to China.

Despite of these differences, the two cases have numerous points in common. The differences, as mentioned above, are mainly derived from their respective self-identified disadvantages in place competition and the resultant diverse Olympic aspirations. However, the similarities presented in the two cases reveal more about how the hosting of mega-events, as a globalising force, influence the urban governance of host cities. These similarities show that delivering a mega-event like the Olympic Games may to a large extent transcend local diversities, establish conditionalities for host cities, and create a standardised Olympic space.

**Similarity A.     Olympic Games: an exogenous but befitting essentiality**

Whether hosting the Games is indeed a cost-effective way to realise host cities' regeneration and development ambitions is a question demanding closer examination. In both cases, interviewees involved in urban regeneration or development projects responded to this question in an intriguingly similar manner. What was articulated was the fine integration of the Olympic Games into the existing municipal plan, which was also the argument found in the official documents, such as the respective Candidature Files. The Games either accelerated the pace and catalysed the effects of regeneration (London), or upgraded the level and enlarged the scale of urban development (Beijing). Two underlying assumptions could be found from the discourse. Firstly, in spite of the prevalent criticism that mega-events disrupt everyday life and the social and political texture of the host city (Greene, 2003; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006), the Olympic Games in the two cases were both argued to be an exogenous but non-disruptive force of ordinary urban governance. Rather than the problematic disruption that causes a fundamental change in resource allocation and a shift in agenda setting, the Games was depicted by the official discourse as sublimating the existing municipal plan. In short, what was stressed is that the Games were neither disturbing nor distracting, rather they were integrating and befitting to ordinary urban governance.

The other seemingly contradictory assumption is the necessity of staging the Games for achieving a regeneration or development ambition. Although the regeneration or development projects had already been planned for in the existing municipal plan, only through hosting the Games could such a scale and level of completion be achieved. London's Candidature File explicitly stated that while the East London regeneration was an 'already programmed infrastructure investment', without staging the Games in Lower Lea Valley the East London regeneration 'would be slower, more incremental and less ambitious' (BOA, 2004: 23). Focusing on demonstrating its ability to successfully and smoothly deliver the Games, Beijing's Candidature File stressed that the city had been on the route of modernisation since the 1990s in various fields (BOBICO, 2000b). In the official report published two years after the Beijing Games, the accelerative function of hosting the Olympic Games and Beijing's modernisation drive were further articulated. It was stated that the concepts of the Beijing's Games, Green Olympics, High-tech Olympics and a People's Olympics, 'agree perfectly with Beijing's modernisation drive, and since the city won the Olympic bid, it has invested heavily to accelerate its development' (BOCOG, 2010b: 13).

**Similarity B.       Lacking space for genuine civil participation**

Contrary to the common expectation that compared to its Beijing counterpart the London Games involved a greater degree of civil participation and that local residents there were more empowered to advocate for what they wanted, there was an unanticipated resemblance in terms of the space for participation between the two cases. Civil participation can be tokenistic, limited or formalistic within the Olympic process. Indeed, there were some nuanced contextualised characteristics concerning how civil participation was carried out but the mindsets of conducting civil participation were fundamentally similar; rather than empowering local people, accessing local opinion, and obtaining local wisdom, participation in the Olympic process was designed to contain dissent and thereby enable the Games to go ahead.

**Similarity C.       The construction and politicisation of cultural heritage**

Being the capital city of countries with an abundant cultural heritage, both London and Beijing appealed to their constructed traditional cultural base as their emotional base for place branding. The Cultural Olympiad in London and the Olympic educational and cultural programmes in Beijing were used to conduct such culture demonstrations. Both cases featured the politicisation of culture and history to service their branding message communication. Place branding on the basis of traditional culture, in both cases, engendered 'an undisputed source of national pride' (Papadimitriou and Apostolopoulou, 2009: 94). The power of culture 'to create an image, to frame a vision, of the city' (Zukin, 2009) and to contain the contentions in place branding seem to be particularly magnified by the Games.

The fabricated, retouched and selected version of the past (heritage) is of use here. London's Cultural Olympiad was designed to unite Britain through the re-appreciation and rediscovery of British culture, history and natural scenery, while Beijing's careful selection of cultural elements and uncompromised pursuit of perfection conveyed a message to the Chinese people that China is a strong country, no less capable than any Western country. To achieve the goal of boosting national and local pride, fabrication and exaggeration are necessary, and as Lowenthal (1998: 9) maintains, '"correct" knowledge could not so serve, because it is open to all. Only "false" knowledge can become a gauge of exclusion. Heritage mandates *mis*readings of the past.'

In both cases place branding essentially rests on the selection of cultural heritage. In the London Games the selection of heritage aimed externally to confirm the status of Britain to the world, while internally arousing patriotism throughout the entire country. In the Beijing Games, the selection of heritage externally clarified the world's misunderstanding of China and internally restored the pride of the Chinese people. Fabrication rather than authenticity, faith rather than truth, speaks louder (Lowenthal, 1998). As Wu (2014: 852) puts it, heritage 'can be considered as a discursive practice that represents the past for the present interest.' Through such a practice, both the time we live in and we ourselves are enhanced. Endorsed by deliberate fabrication and selection, heritage is no longer an object to be passively appreciated, but a subject actively shaping and solidifying who we are.

**Similarity D.    The valuing and utilisation of internal audiences: citizens**

Most branding campaigns, either for products, corporations or places, pay relatively less attention to their internal audiences; however, the place branding in the Olympic process seems to reveal a different picture. In the two Olympic Games chosen in this project, although attempts were made as a result of diverse considerations, both cases sought to brand internally to their respective populations. For London this involved the inclusion of citizens of diverse ethnicities and from different geographical parts of Britain. The place branding campaign of GREAT Britain, specifically aimed to resonate with British citizens/residents, thereby engendering civic pride at a national scale and local identity in East London. In contrast, Beijing conducted vigorous internal branding campaigns to maintain social stability and strengthen nationalism. High levels of popular supportwere emphasised by Beijing's Olympic bid, so that the CCP was under pressure to uphold the population's Olympic enthusiasm throughout the delivery of the Games.

Internal branding campaigns assist in transforming a host city into a staged city (Greene, 2003), where what is on show is not only the Games but everything taking place within the staged city; city life and urban governance become part of the spectacle and are viewed by 'imaginary spectators'. In both cases, imaginary spectators play a vital part in the mechanism of internal branding and it is because of their gaze that citizens in the host city and country feel the imperative to strengthen civil togetherness and defend national or local reputations. In London, the usually irreconcilable brand associations became less important because of the aroused greatness of Britain, and civic pride in East London also outshone other disputes in the place branding. In Beijing, the staging effects encouraged the citizens to

behave in a more orderly way so that the best image of China could be presented to international audiences.

While some may highlight the temporary nature of the staging effects, it is not the duration but the repercussions in urban governance that matter. Those in London included reconciliation of normally conflicting place images and nostalgia about the glory of Britain, while those in Beijing encompassed the docility of citizens and solidified legitimacy of CCP governance. Hence, place branding is a governance tool in the sense that it can fundamentally reshape the way in which citizens perceive the city, the country and their relationship with them, which extends far beyond the weeks of the mega-event itself.

## 6.3   Answers to Research Questions

In attempting to explore the relationship between entrepreneurial urban governance and mega-events, this project aimed to answer three research questions as set out in Chapter 1 and the literature review on entrepreneurial urban governance and mega-events (Chapter 2), initiated the project. A paradigm shift in public administration from NPM to network governance denoted the increasingly blurred differentiation and boundaries between public and private sectors. Local states specifically echo the repositioning and restructuring of government, and entrepreneurial urban governance features in local governments' enthusiasm for enhanced competitiveness and boosting economic growth.

The prevalence of hosting mega-events cannot be separated from the pursuit of urban economic growth. Chapter 2 therefore referenced the growth machine and urban regime theories to discern the rationale for prioritising development-oriented policies in urban governance. In order to pull people and investment flow in, creative industries and state-led gentrification are facilitated, and against this backdrop, mega-events, like the Olympic Games, come into play. These serve entrepreneurial cities very well, due to their capacity to create a standardised profit-making space. Accelerating the pace of urban regeneration/development and magnifying the effects of place branding are undoubtedly the aspirations of mega-event hosts, but they simultaneously aid in the standardisation of urban space and ready for profit maximisation.

After summarising and setting the scene, the three research questions are now answered, as follows.

## 1. What aspirations did London and Beijing have in bidding to host the Olympic Games in the first place?

The two cases articulated completely diverse Olympic aspirations when submitting their bids. London portrayed the Olympic Games as a catalyst for East London regeneration, which would have happened anyway, but with the Games, the pace would be faster and the scale, greater. Beijing insisted that the Olympic Games would assist its modernisation ambitions and China's integration into the international community, which would have proceeded anyway, but with the Games, the pace would be faster and the effects, greater. On the surface, the Olympic Games are analogous to a cafeteria and the host cities and countries, consumers who can pick up whatever they want to suit their appetites. Mega-events like the Olympic Games are nevertheless not passive objects to be utilised by their geographical hosts. Rather, they are a globalising force capable of transcending local characteristics, and in the case of the Olympic Games, produce a highly standardised Olympic space. This is a space catering to profit-making. As a result, it is rooted in entrepreneurialism's tendency to pursue urban growth.

## 2. How have these aspirations been constructed by the Olympics?

The construction of Olympic aspirations derives from the standardised Olympic space. As discussed in Chapter 2, the production of this has the dual mission of ensuring smooth Games delivery, and optimising the profitability derived. The conduct and endeavours of a host city in urban regeneration/development and place branding are necessary ingredients for this to happen; that is, they are not only the aspirations of the hosts, but a necessity of Games delivery. In short, these aspirations have to be constructed in a way that is consistent with standardisation requirements for urban landscapes.

In the dimension of urban regeneration and development, as Roche (2000: 147) notes, 'any aspirations to becoming a "global Olympic city" necessitates the construction of an adequate material base.' While his point relates to the need to 'reconstruct and qualitatively upgrade' ICT infrastructure to ensure a reliable global broadcasting (Roche, 2000: 147), the development and renewal of urban landscape is indispensable for the production of Olympic space too. The making of 'the standard "Olympic city" or more critically "the Olympic Theme park"' (Roche, 2000: 137) is crucial to optimising the profit-making mechanism in the delivery of the Olympic Games.

Profit-driven standardisation was evidenced by both cases. The approach taken for East London's regeneration and development echoes the discussion of creative industries and state-led gentrification in Chapter 2. While the questionnaire survey conducted in London host boroughs showed that the Games did bring some positive changes to the neighbourhood, such as increasing a sense of safety and leisure amenities, a certain portion of respondents also testified to gentrified urban landscapes and increasing house prices. In Beijing, the modernisation of urban landscapes and improvements in infrastructure were surely the aspirations of the organisers, but the beautification of the landscape and demolition of *hutongs* were conducted to standardise the city and enhance its profit-making abilities. In the process of Games preparation, the initial demolition and subsequent conservation of *hutongs* highlighted the entrepreneurial and speculative features of urban planning in China. Overall, both cases exemplify mega-events' standardisation force on the urban landscape, which is derived from the profit-maximising necessity of hosting the event and of entrepreneurial urban governance.

The contribution to the standardisation of Games-led place branding campaigns derives from the sameness of the target group. As detailed in Chapter 2, the making of the business and people climate provokes glamour but also the identicalness of cities. In spite of the fact that a global convergence of consumers' tastes is rootless, similar place branding strategies are adopted; convention centres, shopping malls and iconic buildings invariably star in place branding campaigns.

In London's case, the effects of the usually irreconcilable place brand images helped achieve a coherent place brand, which chose attractiveness over authenticity and surrendered to consumption-based forces. Similar to the findings in the literature, the facilitation of creative industries and state-led gentrification are the *de facto* urban planning strategies with which to pursue urban growth. In China, the Reforms launched in 1978 have transformed urban space from for-production into for-consumption. This is evidenced by the mushrooming of cultural creative parks across the country, and the revalorisation of cultural heritage (Shin, 2010), all of which are regarded as the catalyst for boosting urban growth. Despite China's socialist history and lack of electoral pressure, Chinese urban governors are still under the pressure of performance review by their superiors, and are thus relentlessly tuned into the rhythm of entrepreneurialism.

In short, host cities' Olympic aspirations have to be constructed in a way which assists in standardisation, so that urban economic growth can continuously be attained.

Standardisation derives from the urge to pursue urban growth, which is the eternal mission and source of ruling legitimacy of entrepreneurial cities. In a large sense, the standardisation of urban space is not engendered by the hosting of mega-events. While profit-driven urban planning and branding campaigns targeting a similar client base are routines of entrepreneurial governance, the hosting of mega-events definitely precipitates the pace and magnifies the strength of this routine.

### 3. What does the construction of Olympic aspirations mean for the urban governance of host cities?

From the comparison of the two cases, this project dismantles the parcel of mega-events in urban governance. Mega-events exercise a force of globalised standardisation, but this does not mean homogenisation among cities. Pessimistically announcing the homogenisation of host localities as a result of irresistible globalising power is equally dangerous as optimistically viewing the hosting of mega-events as the redemption for showcasing local characteristics to defend against such irresistible globalising power. Recognising the co-existence of globalised standardisation and of localised particularities is the only way to capture and contextualise the relationship between mega-events and urban governance. After all, as a globalising force routinely taking place in different localities, mega-events, more than other globalisation practices, are legitimately said to be 'an "in here" rather than "out there" process' (Hudson and Medrano, 2013: 2).

Given this understanding, the implications which the constructed Olympic aspirations bring to urban governance can be appropriately evaluated. The pursuit of urban growth is the mission of entrepreneurial cities, and the standardisation of urban space assists in accomplishing this. The creation of festivity is the key ingredient for mega-events to reinforce the propensity of standardisation. The existence of a festive atmosphere is part of the spectacle, because the consumption of the Olympic Games by spectators constructs the production of the Olympic space. Both cases show that created festivity functions in keeping the events euphoric, gripping and extremely profit-oriented.

Internal branding assists in the creation of festivity. In London, the Cultural Olympiad assisted Britons in regaining their sense of national pride and local attachment. The adoption of a cosmopolitan identity was enabled due to the confirmed self-confidence necessary to stand on the world stage, and the imagined sense of belonging to the global community derived from the dense media coverage. In Beijing, China's longstanding spiritual education

mingled perfectly with and was intensified by hosting the Games. Inflated levels of patriotism and national pride were the score sheet of successful Games-led spiritual education. Festivity was therefore pumped through the equation between the medals won, national glory and personal identity.

The festivity derived from hosting mega-events might be temporary, but its implications are not. Urban standardisation assisted and propelled by created festivity shows no sign of retreating in the face of intensified place competition. In both cases, the Games were depicted as essential to each city's distinctive long-term urban plans, but the truth is that cities tend to be planned in a standardised way in order to maximise their urban growth, irrespective of their social and political settings. The standardisation requirement for delivering the Olympic Games provides a shortcut for the standardisation of urban space; thus the standardised Olympic space has transformed itself into the standardised urban space.

## 6.4 Concluding Remarks: A Standardised Undemocratic Urban Space

Mega-events like the Olympic Games undoubtedly provide a 'once-in-a-lifetime opportunity' for host countries (Papadimitriou and Apostolopoulou, 2009: 94), host cities, spectators, and lest we forget, the competitors. Pursuing sporting excellence at the Olympics is certainly a life-changing experience for all athletes and the enthusiasm aroused by the Games provides a lifelong memory for the spectators. This is a very great part of why it is called a 'mega-event'. Yet while all this may be true, the hosting of mega-events as a standardisation catalyst for host cities is not something that should be ignored.

Why is it so important to acknowledge the standardisation of urban space? There is, of course, already a great deal of criticism pertaining to the diminishing of local characteristics, urban competition based on detrimental mutual imitation, gentrification at the expense of disadvantaged minorities, and space use which prioritises exchange value over use value. However, the heavily shrunk space for civic participation is what I especially want to highlight.

Although host cities always claim that the Olympic Games are hosted for the people, participated in by the people, and utilised to improve the lives of the people, a comparison of the London 2012 and Beijing 2008 Games debunks such rhetoric. Due to the large scale and the tight delivery schedule of the Olympics, room for participation is inherently limited. The standardisation of urban space does not end with the closing of the Games; rather, it

perpetuates. Indeed, it is almost irreversible because entrepreneurial cities need to optimise their urban growth.

Thus for host cities of mega-events, the governance of urban space has not only been standardised, but nailed down, and civic participation, if any is allowed at all, makes scarcely any difference. In an era when the infiltration of globalised standardisation and the cry for stronger local empowerment both show no signs of abating, the clash between these two trends has rendered a highly manipulative, formalistic sop to civic participation, thereby bringing about a standardised, undemocratic urban space.

# Appendices

## Appendix A - Interview Questions

### A-1  London Interview Questions

#### Interviewee L01

1.  Do you feel the opinions and needs of east London's neighbourhoods were able to be conveyed smoothly to local councils?

2.  What kind of role do you think of the representatives of the neighbourhoods play in the consultation process? Directorial, advisory or simply tokenistic?

3.  In London's candidature file, London 2012 is explicitly stated as the 'major catalyst for change and regeneration in east London'. From your observation, has there been a significant change of east London's regeneration policy process since the bidding?

4.  To what degree do you think the displacement and eviction of local residents are associated with the Olympics? Has the Olympics strengthened the tendency?

5.  The hosting of the Olympics is claimed by event promoters as good for enhancing social cohesion, fostering togetherness and regaining civil pride. Do you think this has happened/ is happening in east London's neighbourhoods?

6.  Is there an attitude transformation in terms of time, i.e. before, during and after the Games? If any, what factors do you think cause this transformation?

7.  Do you think the minority groups in east London have suffered from stigmatisation or social cleansing due to the hosting of the Olympics?

8.  Do you think democratic procedures, transparency and accountability have been sacrificed in the process? If so, do you think it's acceptable if this is for the successful and effective delivery of the Games?

**<u>Interviewee L02</u>**

1.  Can you roughly describe your main role in Promoter Team (TPPT) at ODA?

2.  How the stakeholders are identified? Are the representatives of local citizens are statutorily recognized? Borough representatives?

3.  What kind of role do you think of the representatives of the neighbourhoods play in the consultation process? Directorial, advisory or simply tokenistic?

4.  In London's candidature file, London 2012 is explicitly stated as the 'major catalyst for change and regeneration in east London'. From your observation, has there been a significant change of east London's regeneration policy process since the bidding, qualitatively and/or quantitatively?

5.  The hosting of the Olympics is claimed to be good for enhancing social cohesion, fostering togetherness and regaining civil pride. Do you think this has happened/ is happening in east London's neighbourhoods?

6.  Is there an attitude transformation in terms of time, i.e. before, during and after the Games? If any, what factors do you think cause this transformation?

7.  Do you think the minority groups in east London have suffered from stigmatisation or social cleansing due to the hosting of the Olympics?

8.  How democratic procedures, transparency and accountability are ensured in the process?

**<u>Interviewee L03</u>**

1. Can you tell me more about how Hackey's i-city proposition has been integrated into Olympic Legacies?

2. What would you say about the relation between regeneration and creative industry?

3. Will you say the opinion of local community in hackney has been expressed before the decisions of regeneration are made?

4. In consultations, how the stakeholders are identified? Are the representatives of local citizens are statutorily recognized?

5. What kind of role do you think of the representatives of the neighbourhoods play in the consultation process? Directorial, advisory or simply tokenistic?

6. In London's candidature file, London 2012 is explicitly stated as the'major catalyst for change and regeneration in east London'. From your observation, has there been a significant change of Hackney's regeneration policy process since the bidding? Is the change qualitatively and/or quantitatively?

7. In your opinion, how to ensure the wider local community to have access to the facility and opportunity enabled by srtaging the Olympic Games?

8. The hosting of the Olympics is claimed to be good for enhancing social cohesion, fostering togetherness and regaining civil pride. Do you think this has happened/ is happening in Hackney?

9. In Hackney's local community, is there an attitude transformation in terms of time, i.e. before, during and after the Games? If any, what factors do you think cause this transformation?

### Interviewee L04

1. Can you roughly describe your main role at DCLG?

2. In London's candidature file, London 2012 is explicitly stated as the 'major catalyst for change and regeneration in east London'. From your observation, has there been a significant change of east London's regeneration since the bidding? If yes, in what way?

3. In general, do you think east London communities have benefited from the regeneration for the Olympics?

4. In public consultations, how the non-statutory stakeholders are identified?

5. What kind of role do you think of the representatives of the neighbourhoods play in the consultation process? Directorial, advisory or simply tokenistic? Could their opinion have an influence on the policy process?

6. The hosting of the Olympics is claimed by event promoters as good for enhancing social inclusion, fostering togetherness and regaining civil pride. Do you think this has happened/ is happening in east London's neighbourhoods?

7. Is there a transformation of people's attitude toward the Olympics, i.e. before, during and after the Games? If any, what factors do you think cause this transformation?

8. In the hosting of the Olympics do you think the east London neighbourhoods have suffered from stigmatisation as severely deprived and polluted?

**Interviewee L05**

1. Can you give me some examples about your work at the Cabinet office's legacy Unit?

2. Can the establishment of legacy Unit be regarded as a more constructive approach to the governance of legacy? Like a cross-sector team which can effectively manage resources and coordinate different interests? If so, how does it achieve these?

3. From the website of Legacy Unit, you're working withvarious bodies, such as LLDC, GLA and the Mayor of London, etc. Can you tell me about the relationship between the Legacy Unit and these bodies? Parallel or hierarchical? Is there any regular meeting or reviewing mechanism for the delivery of the legacy?

4. Can you tell me more about the challenges you have encountered when ensuring the legacy to happen?

5. I'm doing a street survey in the host boroughs of the Olympics. In terms of regeneration in east London, around a third of my respondents don't really feel that east London has changed. From the Government's point of view, how to ensure that local residents are the greatest beneficiary of the benefits generated from the Olympics?

**<u>Interviewee L06</u>**

1.  From your experience in Bow Arts Trust, what would you say is the relationship between community renewal / regeneration and creative industry?

2.  What practical aspects do you think creative services can serve for regeneration?

3.  In your opinion, how to ensure that local residents are the greatest beneficiary of the benefits generated from the Olympics? How to ensure the pace of social improvement can meet up with that of economic growth?

4.  In your opinion, has this kind of relation been implemented in the delivery of London 2012 Olympics?

5.  Do you think the enhanced community sense (or other benefits) in east London due to the delivery of the Olympics has lasted up to now?

6.  What would you say to the opinion that in the hosting of the Olympics east London has been stigmatised as severely deprived, polluted and hopeless?

7.  In your long experience involving in regeneration and place-making, what would you say is the greatest challenge in the process of using creative industry to achieve urban renewal?

**<u>Interviewee L07</u>**

1. Can the Growth Boroughs Unit be regarded as a more constructive approach to the local governance of east London? Like a cross-sector partnership which can effectively manage resources and coordinate different interests? If so, how does it achieve these?

2. What practical measures do you think the Growth Boroughs Unit can take to tackle with the issue of gentrification since it seems to be an inevitable consequence of regeneration and economic growth?

3. In your opinion, how to ensure that local residents are the greatest beneficiary of the benefits generated from the Olympics? How to ensure the pace of social improvement can meet up with that of economic growth?

4. Do you think the enhanced community sense in east London due to the delivery of the Olympics has lasted up to now?

5. What would you say to the opinion that in the hosting of the Olympics east London has been stigmatised as severely deprived, polluted and hopeless?

**Interviewee L08**

1. Can you roughly describe your main work at LLDC? What kind of role does LLDC play in the delivery of legacy? Coordination, steering or both?

2. From your experience, are local communities empowered enough to make a voice/ influence on public consultations?

3. What practical measures do you think the LLDC can take to tackle with the issue of gentrification since it seems to be an inevitable consequence of regeneration and economic growth?

4. In your opinion, how to ensure that local residents are the greatest beneficiary of the social and economic benefits generated from the Olympics? How to ensure the pace of social improvement can meet up with that of economic growth?

5. Beyond the boundary, like the Growth Boroughs Unit, like the Legacy Department in Cabinet office. Just like LLDC, they all aim to cross the boundaries and serve the functions of coordination and between different bodies. In your opinion, is there a possibility of overlapping responsibility? Is it meaningful and efficient to have multiple super-organisational bodies, which are all in charge of 'integration'?

**Interviewee L09**

1. Can you provide an example for the public consultation work that you conducted before?

2. From your experience, how to properly define stakeholders in a regeneration project? What kind of roles do local communities play in public consultations? Are they empowered enough to make themselves being heard or even have an influence on the decision making process?

3. In your opinion, how to mitigate the tension between the needs of property investors to pursue high land value and the needs of space users to have low rents and to live in an affordable neighbourhood?

4. What would you say is the greatest challenge in the process of initiating public and stakeholder consultations?

5. What do you think of the relation between physical regeneration and enhanced community identity? Do they mutually benefit from or sometimes clash with each other? In London 2012 Olympics is the relation between the two similar to other regeneration projects or is it a unique example?

6. Do you think the enhanced community identity in east London derived from delivering the Olympics has lasted till now?

7. In terms of hosting the Olympics in east London, some people say that for the regeneration at this scale public consultations are held more about to make Games happen and less about to consult with people. What would you say to this kind of opinion?

8. Some dissidents of the London 2012 Olympics infer that east London has been stigmatised as severely deprived, polluted and hopeless so that east London regeneration for the Olympics can be justified. What would you say to the opinion like that?

9. From your point of view, can public consultations increase the possibility of local residents being the greatest beneficiary of urban regeneration?

**Interviewee L10**

1.  Can you describe your main role at LLDC? What kind of role does LLDC play in the delivery of legacy? Coordination, steering or both?

2.  What would you say is the greatest challenge in the process of initiating public and stakeholder consultations?

3.  In terms of hosting the Olympics in east London, some people say that for the regeneration at this scale public consultations are held more about to make Games happen and less about to consult with people. What would you say to this kind of opinion?

4.  From your experience, how to properly define stakeholders in a regeneration project? What kind of roles do local communities play in public consultations? Are they empowered enough to make themselves being heard or even have an influence on the decision making process?

5.  What do you think is the relation between physical regeneration and enhanced community identity? Do they mutually benefit from or sometimes clash with each other? In London 2012 Olympics is the relation between the two similar to other regeneration projects or is it a unique example?

6.  Do you think the enhanced community identity in east London derived from delivering the Olympics has lasted till now?

7.  In your opinion, how to mitigate the tension between the needs of property investors to pursue high land value and the needs of space users to have low rents and to live in an affordable neighbourhood?

8.  Some dissidents of the London 2012 Olympics infer that east London has been stigmatised as severely deprived, polluted and hopeless so that east London regeneration for the Olympics can be justified. What would you say to the opinion like that?

**<u>Interviewee L11</u>**

1.  Can you describe your main role at Lee Valley Regional Park Authority? What kind of role does LVRPA play in the delivery of legacy?

2.  Lee Valley Regional Park Authority is 47 years old now. Has there been any transformation of its role since 2005 London won the bid? What does London 2012 Olympics bring to the park development? Any challenges in being incorporated into the wider Olympic legacy plan?

3.  If we think the Olympic legacies in different levels, we might have national, regional and local legacies. Can you explain what national, regional and local legacies are respectively in the development of Lee Valley Regional Park?

4.  In the process of park development, how to properly define stakeholders? What kind of roles do local communities play in public consultations? Are they empowered enough to make themselves being heard or even have an influence on the decision making process?

5.  With the severe social deprivation in the area, what practical measures are available for LVRPA to enhance the inclusion of local communities? How to ensure the local communities can benefit from the park investment?

6.  What do you think is the relation between physical regeneration and enhanced community identity? Do they mutually benefit from or sometimes clash with each other? In London 2012 Olympics is the relation between the two similar to other regeneration projects or is it a unique example?

## A-2  Beijing Interview questions

### Interviewee B01

1. 可否也请您谈谈当初参与OGGI这个评估项目之经验？

2. 请问在北京奥运的举办中，就您的了解，对于内外群体间的动员策略主要差异为何？我指的是对北京市民，中国其他地区的人民以及外国人士/媒体？

3. 可否请您谈谈在主办奥运的过程中，如何让当地居民觉得自己是北京奥运的一分子，拥有参与感，进而深化公民在后奥运时代参与公共事务之素养与能力？

4. 在奥运的举办过程中，请问您觉得当地居民之意见表达空间有多大？居民之意见表达，是否可能与奥运之顺利进行相冲突？

5. 举办奥运期间，许多外国媒体将焦点集中于中国的人权以及环境污染等问题。请问当时主办单位与政府如何针对此一状况采取措施？

6. 当地居民对北京奥运支持度是否随着时间有所改变？也就是说，在举办前，举办时和举办后，是否有态度上的变化？

7. 举办奥运常常被赞为具有促进社会和谐，建立团结意识与增强民族自信等功用。能否请您谈谈北京奥运在这一方面的成效如何？又，在时过近六年的今日，这些效果是否依然存在？

8. 官方数据显示，人文价值的展现是北京奥运的中心思想，对于北京的城市形象与中国的国家形象有着深远的影响。能否请您谈谈，如何将此种正面的形象长久地留在世人心中？在这五年多以来，北京是否有达到这样的目标？可否举例说明？

**<u>Interviewee B02</u>**

1．可否先请您谈谈，您之前任职于北京奥组委之工作内容及主要职掌

2．在为了筹备奥运兴建场馆的而进行农地征收的过程中，是否遭受到任何的阻碍？例如，不满意补偿金额？如何解决？

3．承上题，村民在这个过程中扮演了何种角色？是否有让村民表达意见的正式机制？可否进一步说明这是如何运作的？

4．在奥运的举办过程中，请问您觉得当地居民之意见表达空间有多大？居民之意见表达，是否可能与奥运之顺利进行相冲突？

5．被征收的土地主要是以农地为主，当地人口大多为农民。在土地被征收后，所谓农转工的机制是如何运作的？

6．依您的了解，北京市都市发展的政策规划，在2001年获得奥运主办权之后是否有显着的差异？有的话，主要是发生在质上还是量上，亦或两者兼具？

7．在您的观点中，硬性建设的更新改善与居民对当地的情感认同存在何种关系？可否请您在北京奥运的筹办中举一实例？

### Interviewee B03

1. 可否先请您谈谈，您在北京奥组委时，主要的工作内容与职掌？

2. 在您的观点中，硬性建设的设计改善，与居民对当地的情感认同存在何种关系？可否请您在北京奥运的筹办中举一实例？

3. 可否请您谈谈，您认为主办奥运与创意产业的发展存在着什么样的关联性？创意产业的发展是否在北京的经验中，两者如何达到互相协助的功效？

4. 人文价值的展现是北京奥运的中心思想，对于北京的城市形象与中国的国家形象有着深远的影响。能否请您谈谈，如何将此种正面的形象长久地留在世人心中？在这五年多以来，北京是否有达到这样的目标？可否举例说明？

5. 公众的广泛参与不仅仅是奥运成功举办的重要元素，更是推进社会的一大动力。可否请您谈谈在主办奥运的过程中，如何让当地居民觉得自己是北京奥运的一分子，拥有参与感，进而深化公民在后奥运时代参与公共事务之素养与能力？

6. 举办奥运常常被赞为具有促进社会和谐，建立团结意识与增强民族自信等功用。能否请您谈谈北京奥运在这一方面的成效如何？又，在时过近六年的今日，这些效果是否依然存在？

**Interviewee B04**

1． 依您的了解，北京市都市发展的政策规划，在2001年获得奥运主办权之后是否有显着的差异？有的话，主要是发生在质上还是量上，亦或两者兼具？

2． 在为了筹备奥运兴建场馆的而进行农地征收的过程中，是否遭受到任何的阻碍？例如，不满意补偿金额？如何解决？

3． 承上题，村民在这个过程中扮演了何种角色？是否有让村民表达意见的正式机制？可否进一步说明这是如何运作的？

4． 在奥运的举办过程中，请问您觉得当地居民之意见表达空间有多大？居民之意见表达，是否可能与奥运之顺利进行相冲突？

5． 被征收的土地主要是以农地为主，当地人口大多为农民。在土地被征收后，所谓农转工的机制是如何运作的？

6． 在您的观点中，硬性建设的更新改善与居民对当地的情感认同存在何种关系？可否请您在北京奥运的筹办中举一实例？

**<u>Interviewee B05</u>**

1. 您在北京奥运中负责的是奖牌与体育图标等的设计。可否先请您大概描述从比赛到成功获选的过程与时间进程？

2. 可否请您谈谈北京在举办奥运过程中，希望传达什么样的国家形象？

3. 可否请您谈谈北京奥运的设计管理这一部分？

4. 在您的观点中，硬性建设的设计改善，与居民对当地的情感认同存在何种关系？可否请您在北京奥运的筹办中举一实例？

5. 可否请您谈谈，您认为主办奥运与创意产业的发展存在着什么样的关联性？创意产业的发展是否在北京的经验中，两者如何达到互相协助的功效？

6. 人文价值的展现是北京奥运的中心思想，对于北京的城市形象与中国的国家形象有着深远的影响。能否请您谈谈，如何将此种正面的形象长久地留在世人心中？在这五年多以来，北京是否有达到这样的目标？可否举例说明？

7. 公众的广泛参与不仅仅是奥运成功举办的重要元素，更是推进社会的一大动力。可否请您谈谈在主办奥运的过程中，如何让当地居民觉得自己是北京奥运的一分子，拥有参与感，进而深化公民在后奥运时代参与公共事务之素养与能力？

8. 举办奥运常常被赞为具有促进社会和谐，建立团结意识与增强民族自信等功用。能否请您谈谈北京奥运在这一方面的成效如何？又，在时过近六年的今日，这些效果是否依然存在？

**<u>Interviewee B06</u>**

１． 可否先请您谈谈您在2008北京奥运的筹划与举办中，所扮演的角色与担当的职务？

２． 曾有受访者跟我表示，中国目前其实根本没有什么文创产业的发展，许多文创园区的建设最后只是沦为房地产开发的噱头，成为炒高地价的工具。请问您对此有和看法？

３． 可否请您谈谈，您认为主办奥运与创意产业的发展存在着什么样的关联性？创意产业的发展是否在北京的经验中，两者如何达到互相协助的功效？

４． 人文价值的展现是北京奥运的中心思想，对于北京的城市形象与中国的国家形象有着深远的影响。能否请您谈谈，如何将此种正面的形象长久地留在世人心中？在这五年多以来，北京是否有达到这样的目标？可否举例说明？

５． 公众的广泛参与不仅仅是奥运成功举办的重要元素，更是推进社会的一大动力。可否请您谈谈在主办奥运的过程中，如何让当地居民觉得自己是北京奥运的一分子，拥有参与感，进而深化公民在后奥运时代参与公共事务之素养与能力？

６． 举办奥运常常被赞为具有促进社会和谐，建立团结意识与增强民族自信等功用。能否请您谈谈北京奥运在这一方面的成效如何？又，在时过近六年的今日，这些效果是否依然存在？

**<u>Interviewee B07</u>**

1. 可否先请您谈谈您在2008北京奥运的筹划与举办中，所扮演的角色与担当的职务？

2. 在您的观点中，硬性建设的设计改善，与居民对当地的情感认同存在何种关系？可否请您在北京奥运的筹办中举一实例？

3. 可否请您谈谈，您认为主办奥运与创意产业的发展存在着什么样的关联性？创意产业的发展是否在北京的经验中，两者如何达到互相协助的功效？

4. 人文价值的展现是北京奥运的中心思想，对于北京的城市形象与中国的国家形象有着深远的影响。能否请您谈谈，如何将此种正面的形象长久地留在世人心中？在这五年多以来，北京是否有达到这样的目标？可否举例说明？

5. 公众的广泛参与不仅仅是奥运成功举办的重要元素，更是推进社会的一大动力。可否请您谈谈在主办奥运的过程中，如何让当地居民觉得自己是北京奥运的一分子，拥有参与感，进而深化公民在后奥运时代参与公共事务之素养与能力？

6. 举办奥运常常被赞为具有促进社会和谐，建立团结意识与增强民族自信等功用。能否请您谈谈北京奥运在这一方面的成效如何？又，在时过近六年的今日，这些效果是否依然存在？

**Interviewee B08**

1．可否先请您谈谈您在2008北京奥运的筹划与举办中，主要的担当职务？

2．对您而言，形象景观的定义为何？

3．请问您认为，北京奥运的形象元素，主要希望传达出什么样的讯息？

4．可否请您谈谈，您认为主办奥运与创意产业的发展存在着什么样的关联性？创意产业的发展是否在北京的经验中，两者如何达到互相协助的功效？

5．曾有受访者跟我表示，中国目前其实根本没有什么文创产业的发展，许多文创园区的建设最后只是沦为房地产开发的噱头，成为炒高地价的工具。请问您对此有何看法？

6．人文价值的展现是北京奥运的中心思想，对于北京的城市形象与中国的国家形象有着深远的影响。能否请您谈谈，如何将此种正面的形象长久地留在世人心中？在这五年多以来，北京是否有达到这样的目标？可否举例说明？

7．公众的广泛参与不仅仅是奥运成功举办的重要元素，更是推进社会的一大动力。可否请您谈谈在主办奥运的过程中，如何让当地居民觉得自己是北京奥运的一分子，拥有参与感，进而深化公民在后奥运时代参与公共事务之素养与能力？

8．举办奥运常常被赞为具有促进社会和谐，建立团结意识与增强民族自信等功用。能否请您谈谈北京奥运在这一方面的成效如何？又，在时过近六年的今日，这些效果是否依然存在？

**<u>Interviewee B09</u>**

1．可否先请您谈谈您在2008北京奥运的筹划与举办中，以及在现在后奥运时代，主要的担当职务？

2．北京奥林匹克公园的预定地是在公元2000年以前即被规划预定，有受访者跟我提及主要是因为此地的先天条件，周边既成体育设施较为完善。可否请您谈谈当初当局选址于此的考虑及原因为何？

3．在为了筹备奥运兴建场馆的而进行农地征收的过程中，是否遭受到任何的阻碍？例如，不满意补偿金额？如何解决？

4．承上题，村民在这个过程中扮演了何种角色？是否有让村民表达意见的正式机制？可否进一步说明这是如何运作的？

5．在奥运的举办过程中，请问您觉得当地居民之意见表达空间有多大？居民之意见表达，是否可能与奥运之顺利进行相冲突？

6．在您的观点中，硬性建设的更新改善与居民对当地的情感认同存在何种关系？可否请您在北京奥运的筹办中举一实例？

7．举办奥运常常被赞为具有促进社会和谐，建立团结意识与增强民族自信等功用。能否请您谈谈北京奥运在这一方面的成效如何？又，在时过近六年的今日，这些效果是否依然存在？

**<u>Interviewee B10</u>**

1. 可否先请您谈谈您在2008北京奥运的筹划与举办中，主要的担当职务？

2. 请问北京在举办奥运之过程中，如何体现出 *有特色，高水平的国家与城市形象*？而中国人文底蕴又在其中扮演何种角色？能否请您举些例子说明？

3. 请问您觉得硬性建设的改善与更新，是否能增强北京市民对北京市的情感认同与自信？例如大栅栏，798艺术区？

4. 就您曾任职于首都精神文明办之经验而言，请问您觉得奥运对与北京市民的精神文明有何影响？

5. 可否请您谈谈，您认为主办奥运与创意产业的发展存在着什么样的关联性？创意产业的发展是否在北京的经验中，两者如何达到互相协助的功效？

6. 曾有受访者跟我表示，中国目前其实根本没有什么文创产业的发展，许多文创园区的建设最后只是沦为房地产开发的噱头，成为炒高地价的工具。请问您对此有和看法？

**<u>Interviewee B11</u>**

1．可否先请您谈谈您在2008北京奥运的筹划与举办中，主要的担当职务？

2．对您而言，形象景观的定义为何？

3．请问您认为，北京奥运主要希望传达出什么样的中国形象？

4．在北京奥运的筹办中，是否可将北京这个城市视为是展现中国文化及形象的橱窗？相对而言，北京在地的城市形象比较不是展示的焦点？

5．在您的观点中，硬性建设的设计改善，与居民对当地的情感认同存在何种关系？可否请您在北京奥运的筹办中举一实例？

6．可否请您谈谈，您认为主办奥运与创意产业的发展存在着什么样的关联性？创意产业的发展是否在北京的经验中，两者如何达到互相协助的功效？

7．您认为政府在推动文创产业上，应当扮演的何种角色？曾有受访者跟我提及现在如雨后春笋般出现的智慧产业园区，与工业园区的本质差异。请问您对此有何看法？

8．曾有受访者跟我表示，中国目前其实根本没有什么文创产业的发展，许多文创园区的建设最后只是沦为房地产开发的噱头，成为炒高地价的工具。请问您对此有和看法？

9．人文价值的展现是北京奥运的中心思想，对于北京的城市形象与中国的国家形象有着深远的影响。能否请您谈谈，如何将此种正面的形象长久地留在世人心中？在这五年多以来，北京是否有达到这样的目标？可否举例说明？

**<u>Interviewee B12</u>**

1. 可否先请您谈谈大栅栏这个街区更新计划的缘起？

2. 在大栅栏地区更新的过程中，是否遭受到任何的阻碍？例如，居民不满意规划方向？如何解决？

3. 居民在这个过程中扮演了何种角色？是否有让村民表达意见的正式机制？可否进一步说明这是如何运作的？

4. 大栅栏地区是否有所谓的仕绅化问题？

5. 在您的观点中，硬性建设的更新改善与居民对当地的情感认同存在何种关系？可否请您在北京奥运的筹办中举一实例？

6. 依您的了解，北京市都市更新的政策规划，在2001年获得奥运主办权之后是否有显着的差异？有的话，主要是发生在质上还是量上，亦或两者兼具？

**Interviewee B13, B14, B15 and B16**

1． 北京市都市更新的政策规划，在2001年获得奥运主办权之后是否有显着的差异？有的话，主要是发生在质上还是量上，亦或两者兼具？

2． 在您的观点中，都市更新的利害关系人应当如何界定？当地居民在这个过程中扮演了何种角色？在北京经验当中，是否有让当地居表达意见的正式机制？可否进一步说明这是如何运作的？

3． 在奥运的举办过程中，请问您觉得当地居民之意见表达空间有多大？居民之意见表达，是否可能与奥运之顺利进行相冲突？

4． 都市更新的过程中，难免需要进行原居民的迁移以达到最大的整体效益。是否可请您谈谈在筹办奥运的过程中，这样的任务是如何进行的？遭遇的困难和解决方法为何？

5． 在您的观点中，硬性建设的更新改善与居民对当地的情感认同存在何种关系？可否请您在北京奥运的筹办中举一实例？

6． 当地居民对北京奥运支持度是否随着时间有所改变？也就是说，在举办前，举办时和举办后，是否有态度上的变化？

7． 举办奥运常常被赞为具有促进社会和谐，建立团结意识与增强民族自信等功用。能否请您谈谈北京奥运在这一方面的成效如何？又，在时过近六年的今日，这些效果是否依然存在？

## Appendix B - Information Leaflet for Interviewees

### B-1 London Information Leaflet for Interviewees

# INFORMATION LEAFLET

## About the researcher

I am Jen-Shin Yang, a PhD student in Politics at the University of York. I received my Masters degree in political sociology from the LSE in 2008 and went back to Taiwan, my home country, to work as a research assistant. These experiences helped me to become capable of ensuring the welfare of research participants. My research interest lies in how mega-events impact urban governance.

## For more information

If you would like to know more information about this research, please do not hesitate to contact me on 07907283193 or at jy680@york.ac.uk

## Can you help me?

I am working on my PhD research to understand the impacts of mega-events on urban governance through the policy networks of city branding and urban regeneration. I would like to invite you to take part in the project by sharing your knowledge about the London 2012 Olympics /Beijing 2008 Olympics through an interview.

## What is the research about?

The hosting of mega-events has become a trend in urban governance since 1980s. These events can not only attract global attention to the hosting cities but necessitate and catalyse the change of urban landscape. City branding and urban regeneration thus become the most essential incentives for cities to host mega-events. Choosing London and Beijing as cases, this research aims to understand how urban governance is impacted or challenged by the hosting of mega-events through the policies of city branding and urban regeneration, and whether these changes are incremental or qualitative.

## What is involved?

I will visit you at a public venue of your choice to ask you questions about urban regeneration and/or city branding for the Olympics. On the date of the interview, you can ask me any questions regarding the research and you will be asked to sign the Informed Consent Form before we start. The interview will last around 45 minutes to an hour. During the course of the interview I will take written notes and, only if you consent, make an audio recording.

## Can I change my mind?

Your willingness to participate in this research will always be respected in all circumstances. Although the information you provide is crucial to my research, you are free to change your mind anytime before the completion of the research. In this case the data provided by you will be destroyed. Also you can refuse to answer any particular question without the need to give a reason.

## Will I be identified?

Confidentiality and anonymity are highly respected in this research. Neither your name nor personal data will be revealed in the final report. However, your unique role and expert knowledge might make your identity inferable. Where this is the case I will explain the potentials for identification and give you the chance to decline an interview and to withhold your responses.

## How will the information I provide be used?

The information you provide during the interview will be for academic use only, and will be viewed only by me (and my supervisors if requested). It will remain strictly confidential.

You will be provided with a transcript of the interview, and the final thesis (assuming it is awarded) will be available electronically on request. A summary report of the thesis will be published on the CURB (Centre for Urban Research) website at the University of York as an open access document. The findings may also be written in some publications relevant to urban studies, public policy and city branding, etc.

**B-2　Beijing Information Leaflet for Interviewees**

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# <u>受访者说明书</u>

## 关于研究者

　　我是目前就读于英国约克大学的博士生，杨臻欣。在 2008 年时，我自伦敦政经学院获得政治社会学硕士，之后返回台湾在国立台湾大学担任由研究助理。这些经验使我清楚在做研究的过程中，应当如何确保研究参与者的权益。如果您想更深入了解我的研究内容或是有任何指教，敬请不吝与我联系。手机：18600474852，电邮：jy680@york.ac.uk

## 关于本研究

　　自 80 年代起，大型活动的举办已成为城市治理中一项重要元素。这些活动不仅仅能在短时间内将全球的关注集中于一地，并且大幅加速都市中的景观更新与设施改善，城市行销与都市更新因此成为各城市争相举办大型活动的重要诱因。因此，我的博士论文以 2012 伦敦奥运以及 2008 北京奥运作为研究案例，旨在了解经由城市行销与都市更新两政策网络的交互作用，大型活动将对主办城市的城市治理发生何种影响。

## 访谈将如何进行

　　在当天访谈正式开始前，基于对您权益的保护，您将被要求在受访者同意书上签字。访谈的过程中，我将询问您关于北京奥运的都市更新与国家城市形象等问题，您若对我的问题或是研究有任何疑义或不清楚之处，当然也欢迎您随时提出。整个访谈时程约莫 30-45 分钟，我将在期间做笔记。此外，在您同意的前提下，我也将对访谈进行录音以利研究分析。

## 访谈内容是保密的吗？会作为何种用途？

　　您的专业知识与宝贵经验将使我更透彻地了解对 2008 北京奥运，在此由衷地感谢您愿意接受我的访谈。本研究对受访者的保密性及匿名性十分重视，除非您同意，您的姓名及个人资料都不会出现在最终报告。然而基于您的特殊知识与角色，您的身分可能会被推论出来，若您对此甚为在意，在本研究完成前，您可要求特定资讯不出现在最终报告中，或是退出本研究。

　　您在访谈过程中提供的资讯将被严密保护，且只作为学术用途。此外，若我顺利获得学位，论文摘要也会放在英国约克大学城市研究中心（CURB，Centre for Urban Research） 的网站上。在未来我也将以本研究之发现为基础，投稿城市研究、城市行销或公共政策等相关刊物出版品。

</div>

## Appendix C - Interviewee Informed Consent Form

### C-1 London Interviewee Informed Consent Form

Research Project: Hosting mega-events: a policy instrument in urban governance—a Comparative study of London 2012 and Beijing 2008 Olympics

Researcher: Jen-Shin Yang

Email: jy680@york.ac.uk / Mobile: 07907283193

Please initial box

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the Information Sheet for Interviewees dated (date of interview) explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.

3. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I give permission for the researcher to have access to my anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials unless I agree to be identified, whereas I understand that my identity may, however, be inferred due to my unique role or knowledge. I have the opportunity to decline the invitation to participate in the interview in this circumstance.

4. I agree to audio recording in the course of the interview.

5. I agree to direct quotation of the interview content in the final report of the research.

6. I agree to the data collected from me to be used in future research.

7. I agree to take part in the above research project.

_____     _____     _____
Name of Participant                    Date                              Signature

_____     _____     _____
Name of Researcher                    Date                              Signature

Please initial box as appropriate and leave your email if you would like to receive a transcript of the interview and/or a summary report of the thesis.

☐ a transcript of the interview          ☐ a summary report of the thesis

Email: _____

**C-2  Beijing Interviewee Informed Consent Form**

# 受訪者同意書

研究主题：后奥运时代的城市治理–

　　　　以北京 2008 与伦敦 2012 奥运为例

研究者：英国约克大学博士候选人杨臻欣

电邮：jy680@york.ac.uk / 手机：18600474852

请划记

1. 我已阅读关于今日（訪談日期）访谈与本研究的受访者说明书，
   且有机会对于我不清楚之处提出问题。 ☐

2. 我是自愿接受访谈参与此研究，且有权利在本研究完成前的任何
   时点退出本研究。此外，在受访过程中，我有权力拒绝回答我不
   愿回答的问题。 ☐

3. 我清楚了解，我在访谈中的任何回答将受到严格保密，也了解除
   非我同意，否则我的名字与身分并不会被揭露。然而我也知道，
   基于我的特殊知识与角色，我的身分可能会被推论出来。如果我
   对此甚为在意，在本研究完成前，我可要求特定资讯不出现在最
   终报告中，或是退出本研究。 ☐

4. 我同意在访谈过程中录音。 ☐

5. 我同意在最终的研究报告中，对我的回答进行直接引用。 ☐

6. 我同意自我的回答中所获得的资讯，供作后续学术研究之用。 ☐

7. 我同意参与此研究。 ☐

| 受访者姓名 | 日期 | 签名 |
| --- | --- | --- |

| 研究者姓名 | 日期 | 签名 |
| --- | --- | --- |

请勾选您是否希望获得此次访谈内容整理，或本研究的结论摘要，并留下您的电邮。

☐ 访谈内容整理　　　　　☐ 研究结论摘要

受访者电邮：_____

## Appendix D - Questionnaire Design

### D-1  Design of London Questionnaire

| Section | Question | Single/ multiple response(s) | Response options |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Segment 1**. General perception and awareness of the Games | 01. Did you attend or watch any Olympic events? | Multiple | Watching the Games, opening ceremony or closing ceremony on TV or the Internet/ Watching live events on public big screen/ Attending the Olympics-related free events, including community activities or cultural events/ Attending ticketed events, i.e. the Games, opening ceremony or closing ceremony/ Volunteering during the Games/ Not at all |
| | 02. Before the Games, how positive were you about London hosting the 2012 Olympics? | Single | Scale from 1 to 10 |
| | 03. Since the Olympic Games have been held, how positive are you about the Games since they were hosted in London? | Single | Scale from 1 to 10 |
| | 04. Are you aware of any post-Olympic plans for your community, such as opening Olympic facilities and spaces to the public or educational or employment opportunities? | Single | Yes/ To some extent/ No |

| Section | Question | Single/ multiple response(s) | Response options |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Segment 2.** Legacy of urban regeneration in East London (Continued to the next page) | 05. Do you think hosting the Olympics is the best way for the Government to redevelop East London? | Single | Yes/ To some extent/ No |
| | 06. Since July 2005, when London won the Olympic bid, do you think East London has changed? | Single | For the better, to Q7/ For the worse, to Q8/ Some better some worse, to Q7 and Q8/ No, to Q9 |
| | 07. What has changed for the better? | Multiple | Affordable housing/ Schools or education/ Job or businesses opportunities/ Neighbourhood safety/ Recreational amenities, e.g., cinemas, gyms and galleries/ Public transportation or getting around/ Local amenities, e.g., place to eat and shop/ Other (please specify) |
| | 08. What has changed for the worse? | Multiple | Same as Q7. Affordable housing/ Schools or education/ Job or businesses opportunities/ Neighbourhood safety/ Recreational amenities, e.g., cinemas, gyms and galleries/ Public transportation or getting around/ Local amenities, e.g., places to eat and shop/ Other (please specify) |

| Section | Question | Single/ multiple response(s) | Response options |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Segment 2.** Legacy of urban regeneration in East London | 09. Are you aware that there have been public consultations about East London redevelopment? | Single | Yes/ Not sure, maybe, to Q12/ No, to Q12 |
| | 10. Did you attend any of the meetings? | Single | Yes/ No, to Q12 |
| | 11. Do you think your opinion expressed in the meeting(s) can influence East London redevelopment? | Single | Yes, to Q13/ To some extent, to Q13/ No, to Q13 |
| | 12. If you had the chance to attend, do you think your opinion would be taken seriously? (hypothetically) | Single | Yes/ To some extent/ No |
| **Segment 3.** Legacy of city branding (Continued to the next page) | 13. Do you think London hosting the Olympics has made you pay more attention to local events or local developments? | Single | Yes/ To some extent/ No |
| | 14. Do you think hosting the Olympics has successfully shown the world that London is a great place for such events? | Multiple | Travel or holidays/ Business or investment/ Residential purpose/ Other (please share)/ No, I do not think so |

| Section | Question | Single/ multiple response(s) | Response options |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Segment 3**. Legacy of city branding | 15. Do you think hosting the Olympics has successfully shown the world that Britain is a creative and welcoming place? | Single | Yes/ To some extent/ No |
| | 16. Do you feel that hosting London 2012 has strengthened your pride as a Londoner? | Single | Yes/ To some extent/ No |
| | 17. Do you feel that the hosting London 2012 has strengthened your pride as a British citizen/resident? | Single | Yes/ To some extent/ No |
| **Segment 4.** Demographic questions (Continued to the next page) | 18. Gender | Single | Male/ Female |
| | 19. In which of these groups is your age? | Single | Under 21/ 21 to 30/ 31 to 40/ 41 to 50/ 51 to 60/ 61 or older |
| | 20. Marital status | Single | Single or divorced or widowed/ Married or in a civil partnership |

| Section | Question | Single/ multiple response(s) | Response options |
|---------|----------|------------------------------|------------------|
| **Segment 4.** Demographic questions (Continued to the next page) | 21. Which of the following best describes your occupation category? | Single | Managers and senior officials/ Professional occupations/ Associate professional and technical occupations/ Administrative and secretarial occupations/ Skilled trades occupations/ Personal service occupations/ Sales and customer service occupations/ Process, plant and machine operatives/ Elementary occupations/ Unemployed or Self-employed/ Student/ Retired |
| | 22. What is your ethnic group? | Single | White: British, Irish or any other white background/ Asian or Asian British: Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi or any other Asian background/ Black or Black British: Caribbean, African or any other black background/ Chinese or other ethnic group/ Mixed/ Not stated |

| Section | Question | Single/ multiple response(s) | Response options |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Segment 4.** Demographic questions | 23. What is the last type of education that you have received, or which type of education are you receiving now? | Single | Elementary education/ Secondary education/ Further education/ Higher education |
| | 24. How many years have you lived in your current residence? | Single | Under 1 year/ 1 to 4 years/ 5 to 8 years/ 9 years or longer |
| | 25. Would you mind telling me the postcode of your residence? (This will not be identified and all information is confidential.) | Single | Open-ended, either recording postcode or London boroughs |

Appendices

**D-2  Design of Beijing Questionnaire**

| Section | Question | Single/ multiple response(s) | Response options |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Segment 1**. General perception and awareness of the Games | 01. 您是否参加过以下任何一项奥运相关活动? 可选多个 | Multiple | 在电视或网络上观看比赛、开幕或闭幕典礼/ 参与奥运免费活动，如小区活动或艺文活动/ 到现场观看比赛、开幕或闭幕典礼/ 担任奥运志愿者/ 其他活动 （请说明）/ 没有参与任何北京奥运相关活动 |
| | 02. 在奥运前，您对于北京举办奥运有多期待？ | Single | 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ 7/ 8/ 9 /10 （1 为完全不期待，10 为高度期待） |
| | 03. 举办奥运后，您认为奥运对于北京有多大程度的正面影响? | Single | 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ 7/ 8/ 9 /10 （1 为完全不期待，10 为高度期待） |
| | 04. 您是否知道在奥运举办后，关于奥运设施场地的开放使用，或其他奥运带动的相关计划，例如奥林匹克森林公园的开放使用，体育活动等? | Single | 算是清楚/ 大概知道一些/ 完全不了解 |

| Section | Question | Single/ multiple response(s) | Response options |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Segment 2.** Legacy of urban regeneration in East London (Continued to the next page) | 05. 您是否认为，主办奥运是政府进行洼里乡地区发展或更新的最佳方式? | Single | 一定是/ 多少算是/ 完全不是 |
| | 06. 自从 2001 年北京争取到奥运主办权后，您觉得北京变好了还是变差了? | Single | 变好了/ 有变好有变坏/ 变差了 |
| | 6-1 请问您觉得哪些方面变好？可选多个 | Multiple | 就业或商业机会增加/ 小区环境更加安全/ 房地产价格上升/ 居民素质提升/ 交通更加便捷/ 生活机能变好，如餐厅、杂货店、超市等数量更多/ 休闲文化娱乐设施增加，电影院、健身房、画廊等/ 其它方面改善，请说明: |
| | 6-2 请问您觉得哪些方面变差？可选多个 | Multiple | 就业或商业机会变少/ 小区环境变比较杂乱/ 房地产价格下跌/ 居民素质下降/ 交通不便或塞车严重/ 生活机能变差，如餐厅、杂货店、超市等选择变少/ 休闲文化娱乐设施选择变少，电影院、健身房、画廊等/ 其它方面变差，请说明: |

| Section | Question | Single/ multiple response(s) | Response options |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Segment 2.**<br><br>Legacy of urban regeneration in East London | 07. 您是否知道，关于北京奥运场地附近的土地徵收及更新资讯? | Single | 算是清楚/ 大概知道一些/ 完全不了解 |
| | 08. 您是否曾对于北京奥运场地附近的土地徵收及更新表达意见？例如跟村干事或官员讨论等等。 | Single | 表达过意见或讨论过/ 完全没有 |
| | 09. 如果表达过或讨论过的话，您认为您所表达的意见是否有影响力? | Single | 算有影响力/ 多少有一点影响力/<br><br>完全没有影响力 |
| | 10. 如果您有机会对于北京奥运场地附近的市地更新表达意见的话，您认为您所表达的意见是否有影响力？ | Single | 应该会有影响力/ 多少有一点影响力/<br><br>完全没有影响力 |
| **Segment 3.**<br><br>Legacy of city branding<br><br>(Continued to the next page) | 11. 北京办理奥运后，您是否对北京或地方发展更加关注? | Single | 变得更关注了/ 多少有更关注/ 完全没改变 |
| | 12. 办理奥运后，您认为北京在哪些方面获得了好名声？可选多个 | Multiple | 游客更想来北京玩/ 商人更想来北京投资/<br><br>外地人/外国人更想来北京居住/<br><br>其它方面的好名声，请说明： |

| Section | Question | Single/ multiple response(s) | Response options |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Segment 3.**<br><br>Legacy of city branding | 13. 您认为北京办理奥运，是否成功的让世界认为中国是个开放及强大的国家? | Single | 是，因为北京奥运让世界更加认识中国/ 多多少少吧/<br><br>否，我觉得世界对中国的看法跟办奥运没什么关系 |
| | 14. 办理奥运后，您是否因住在北京而觉得骄傲? | Single | 是，奥运让我对北京很骄傲/ 多少有一点骄傲/<br><br>否，跟奥运没什么关系 |
| | 15. 办理奥运后，您是否因身为中国人而觉得骄傲? | Single | 是，奥运让我对中国很骄傲/ 多少有一点骄傲/<br><br>否，跟奥运没什么关系 |
| **Segment 4.**<br><br>Demographic questions<br><br>(Continued to the next page) | 16. 性别 | Single | 男/ 女 |
| | 17. 请问您的出身年份是？西元 年 | Single | 20 岁以下/ 21 岁~30 岁/ 31 岁~40 岁/<br><br>41 岁~50 岁/ 5 岁~60 岁/ 61 岁以上 |
| | 18. 婚姻关系 | Single | 单身/离婚/寡居/ 已婚 |
| | 19. 请问您的籍贯是？ | Single | 北京/ 北京以外 |
| | 20. 请问您的教育背景是？ | Single | 小学以下/ 中学/ 职业学校/ 大学以上 |

Appendices

| Section | Question | Single/ multiple response(s) | Response options |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Segment 4.**<br>Demographic questions | 21-2 请问您在 2001 年北京获得奥运主办权当时，以及现在的职业分别是？<br>—北京获得奥运主办权时 | Single | 管理階層/ 專業或技術人員/ 行政或秘書人員/ 業務或客服人員/ 流程或機械操作人員/ 基層作業員/ 無業或自營/ 學生/ 退休人員 |
| | 21-2 请问您在 2001 年北京获得奥运主办权当时，以及现在的职业分别是？<br>—现在的职业 | Single | 管理階層/ 專業或技術人員/ 行政或秘書人員/ 業務或客服人員/ 流程或機械操作人員/ 基層作業員/ 無業或自營/ 學生/ 退休人員 |
| | 22. 请问您在该公司任职多久了？ | Single | 1 年内/ 1~4 年/ 5~8 年/ 9 年以上 |
| | 23. 请问您现在居住在北京市的哪个区域？ | Single | 东城区 (城区)/ 西城区 (城区)/ 朝阳区 (近郊)/ 海淀区 (近郊)/ 房山区 (遠郊)/ 通州区 (遠郊)/ 昌平区 (遠郊) |
| | 24. 请问您居住在现居地址多久时间了？ | Single | 1 年内/ 1~4 年/ 5~8 年/ 9 年以上 |
| | 25. 若我需了解更进一步的信息，请问您是否愿意接受后续的联系？<br>如果您愿意的话，请留下联系方式（电邮或电话） | Single | 愿意/ 不愿意 |

## Appendix E - Questionnaire

### E-1  London Questionnaire

1. **Did you attend or watch any Olympic events?**
   - ☐ Watching the Games, opening ceremony or closing ceremony on TV or the Internet
   - ☐ Watching live events on public big screen
   - ☐ Attending the Olympics related free events, including community activities or cultural events
   - ☐ Attending ticketed events, i.e. the Games, opening ceremony or closing ceremony
   - ☐ Volunteering during the Games
   - ☐ Not at all

2. **Before the Games, how positive were you about London hosting the 2012 Olympics?**

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Not at all            Completely

3. **Since the Olympic Games have been held, how positive are you about the Olympic Games were hosted in London?**

   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Not at all            Completely

4. **Are you aware of any post-Olympic plans for your community? Like opening Olympic facilities and space to the public or educational or employment opportunities?**
   - ☐ Yes  ☐ To some extent      ☐ No

5. **Do you think hosting the Olympics is the best way for the Government to redevelop East London?**
   - ☐ Yes  ☐ To some extent      ☐ No

6. **Since July 2005 when London won the Olympic bid, do you think East London has changed?**
   - ☐ For the better → **7** ☐ For the worse → **8** ☐ Some better some worse → **7 and 8** ☐ No → **9**

7. **What has changed for the better?**
   - ☐ Affordable housing
   - ☐ Schools or education
   - ☐ Job or businesses opportunities
   - ☐ Neighbourhood safety
   - ☐ Recreational amenities, e.g., cinemas, gyms and galleries
   - ☐ Public transportation or getting around
   - ☐ Local amenities, e.g., place to eat and shop
   - ☐ Other (please specify)

8. **What has changed for the worse?**
   ☐ Affordable housing
   ☐ Schools/education
   ☐ Job and businesses opportunities
   ☐ Neighbourhood safety
   ☐ Recreational amenities, e.g., cinemas, gyms and galleries
   ☐ Public transportation/getting around
   ☐ Local amenities, e.g., place to eat and shop
   ☐ Other (please specify)

9. **Are you aware that there have been public consultations about East London redevelopment?**
   ☐ Yes   ☐ Not sure/maybe → **12**        ☐ No → **12**

10. **Did you attend any of the meetings?**
    ☐ Yes   ☐ No → **12**

11. **Do you think your opinion expressed in the meeting(s) can influence East London redevelopment?**
    ☐ Yes → **13** ☐ To some extent → **13**    ☐ No → **13**

12. **If you had the chance to attend, do you think your opinion would be taken seriously?**
    ☐ Yes   ☐ To some extent      ☐ No

13. **Do you think London hosting the Olympics has made you pay more attention to local events or local developments?**
    ☐ Yes   ☐ To some extent      ☐ No

14. **Do you think hosting the Olympics has successfully shown the world that London is a great place for**
    ☐ Travel or holidays   ☐ Business or investment  ☐ Residential purpose
    ☐ other (please share)  ☐ No, I do not think so

15. **Do you think hosting the Olympics has successfully shown the world that Britain is a creative and welcoming place?**
    ☐ Yes          ☐ To some extent          ☐ No

16. **Do you feel that hosting London 2012 has strengthened your pride as a Londoner?**
    ☐ Yes          ☐ To some extent          ☐ No

17. **Do you feel that the hosting London 2012 has strengthened your pride as a British citizen/British resident?**
    ☐ Yes   ☐ To some extent      ☐ No

18. **Gender:** ☐ Male  ☐ Female

**19. In which of these groups is your age?**

☐ Under 21   ☐ 21 to 30   ☐ 31 to 40   ☐ 41 to 50   ☐ 51 to 60   ☐ 61 or older

**20. Are you**

☐ Single/ Divorced/ Widowed   ☐ Married/ In a civil partnership

**21. Which of the following best describes your occupation category?**

☐ Managers and senior officials
☐ Professional occupations
☐ Associate professional and technical occupations
☐ Administrative and secretarial occupations
☐ Skilled trades occupations
☐ Personal service occupations
☐ Sales and customer service occupations
☐ Process, plant and machine operatives
☐ Elementary occupations
☐ Unemployed/ Self-employed/ Mothering/ Retired
☐ Student

**22. What is your ethnic group?**

☐ White: British, Irish or any other White background
☐ Asian or Asian British: Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi or any other Asian background
☐ Black or Black British: Caribbean, African or any other Black background
☐ Chinese or other ethnic group
☐ Mixed
☐ Not stated

**23. What is the last type of education that you have received, or which type of education are you receiving now?**

☐ Elementary education   ☐ Secondary education
☐ Further education      ☐ Higher education

**24. How many years have you lived in your current residence?**

☐ Under 1 year   ☐ 1 to 4 years   ☐ 5 to 8 years   ☐ 9 years or longer

**25. Would you mind telling me the postcode of your residence? (This will not be identified and all information is confidential.)**

**E-2 Beijing Questionnaire**

您好，我是正在研究北京奥运的博士生，这份问卷主要是想了解您对北京奥运的一些想法，您的答案仅供学习研究之用。非常感谢您热心的协助！

博士生杨臻欣

1. 您是否参加过以下任何一项奥运相关活动？可选多个

　　□在电视或网络上观看比赛、开幕或闭幕典礼　□参与奥运免费活动，如小区活动或艺文活动

　　□到现场观看比赛、开幕或闭幕典礼　　□担任奥运志愿者

　　□其他活动　（请说明）　　　　□没有参与任何北京奥运相关活动

2. 在奥运前，您对于北京举办奥运有多期待？

　　□1　□2　□3　□4　□5　□6　□7　□8　□9　□10

　　（1 为完全不期待，10 为高度期待）

3. 举办奥运后，您认为奥运对于北京有多大程度的正面影响?

　　□1　□2　□3　□4　□5　□6　□7　□8　□9　□10

　　（1 为完全不期待，10 为高度期待）

4. 您是否知道在奥运举办后，关于奥运设施场地的开放使用，或其他奥运带动的相关计划，例如奥林匹克森林公园的开放使用，体育活动等?

　　□算是清楚　　□大概知道一些　　□完全不了解

5. 您是否认为，主办奥运是政府进行洼里乡地区发展或更新的最佳方式?

　　□一定是　　　□多少算是　　　□完全不是

6. 自从 2001 年北京争取到奥运主办权后，您觉得北京变好了还是变差了?

　　□变好了　　□有变好有变坏　　□变差了

　　6-1 请问您觉得哪些方面变好？可选多个

　　　　□就业或商业机会增加　　□小区环境更加安全　　□房地产价格上升　　□居民素质提升

　　　　□交通更加便捷　　□生活机能变好，如餐厅、杂货店、超市等数量更多

　　　　□休闲文化娱乐设施增加，电影院、健身房、画廊等

　　　　□其它方面改善，请说明：

### 6-2 请问您觉得哪些方面变差？可选多个

☐就业或商业机会变少　☐小区环境变比较杂乱　☐房地产价格下跌　☐居民素质下降

☐交通不便或塞车严重　☐生活机能变差，如餐厅、杂货店、超市等选择变少

☐休闲文化娱乐设施选择变少，电影院、健身房、画廊等

☐其它方面变差，请说明：

7. 您是否知道，关于北京奥运场地附近的土地徵收及更新资讯？

☐算是清楚　　　☐大概知道一些　　　☐完全不了解

8. 您是否曾对于北京奥运场地附近的土地徵收及更新表达意见？例如跟村干事或官员讨论等等。

☐表达过意见或讨论过　☐完全没有

9. 如果表达过或讨论过的话，您认为您所表达的意见是否有影响力？

☐算有影响力　　　☐多少有一点影响力　　　☐完全没有影响力

10. 如果您有机会对于北京奥运场地附近的市地更新表达意见的话，您认为您所表达的意见是否有影响力？

☐应该会有影响力　　　☐多少有一点影响力　　　☐完全没有影响力

11. 北京办理奥运后，您是否对北京或地方发展更加关注？

☐变得更关注了　　　☐多少有更关注　　　☐完全没改变

12. 办理奥运后，您认为北京在哪些方面获得了好名声？可选多个

☐游客更想来北京玩　　☐商人更想来北京投资　　☐外地人/外国人更想来北京居住

☐其它方面的好名声，请说明：

13. 您认为北京办理奥运，是否成功的让世界认为中国是个开放及强大的国家？

☐是，因为北京奥运让世界更加认识中国　　☐多多少少吧

☐否，我觉得世界对中国的看法跟办奥运没什么关系

14. 办理奥运后，您是否因住在北京而觉得骄傲？

☐是，奥运让我对北京很骄傲　　☐多少有一点骄傲　　☐否，跟奥运没什么关系

15. 办理奥运后，您是否因身为中国人而觉得骄傲？

☐是，奥运让我对中国很骄傲　　☐多少有一点骄傲　　☐否，跟奥运没什么关系

16. 性别：　☐ 男　　☐ 女

17. 请问您的出身年份是？西元 ＿＿＿＿＿＿ 年

18. 婚姻关系

    □ 单身/离婚/寡居    □ 已婚

19. 请问您的籍贯是？ _____

20. 请问您的教育背景是？

    □ 小学以下    □ 中学    □ 职业学校    □大学以上

21. 请问您在 2001 年北京获得奥运主办权当时，以及现在的职业分别是？

    北京获得奥运主办权时：_____

    现在的职业：_____

22. 请问您在该公司任职多久了？

    □1 年内    □1~4 年    □5~8 年    □9 年以上

23. 请问您现在居住在北京市的哪个区域？ _____

24. 请问您居住在现居地址多久时间了?

    □1 年内    □1~4 年    □5~8 年    □9 年以上

25. 若我需了解更进一步的信息，请问您是否愿意接受后续的联系？

    如果您愿意的话，请留下联系方式（电邮或电 _____ ）

## Appendix F - Questionnaire response frequency and percentage

**F-1  London Questionnaire Response Frequency and Percentages**

| Question | Response options | Frequency | Percentage | Single/ multiple response(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01. Did you attend or watch any Olympic events? | TV | 112 | 88.9% | multiple |
| | Big Screen | 24 | 19.0% | |
| | Free | 5 | 4.0% | |
| | Ticketed | 31 | 24.6% | |
| | Volunteer | 4 | 3.2% | |
| | No | 9 | 7.1% | |
| 02. Before the Games, how positive were you about London hosting the 2012 Olympics? | Not at all | 3 | 2.4% | single |
| | Level 2 | 4 | 3.2% | |
| | Level 3 | 8 | 6.3% | |
| | Level 4 | 7 | 5.6% | |
| | Level 5 | 27 | 21.4% | |
| | Level 6 | 9 | 7.1% | |
| | Level 7 | 11 | 8.7% | |
| | Level 8 | 33 | 26.2% | |
| | Level 9 | 12 | 9.5% | |
| | Completely | 12 | 9.5% | |
| 03. Since the Olympic Games have been held, how positive are you about the Olympic Games were hosted in London? | Not at all | 2 | 1.6% | single |
| | Level 2 | 2 | 1.6% | |
| | Level 3 | 3 | 2.4% | |
| | Level 4 | 5 | 4.0% | |
| | Level 5 | 10 | 7.9% | |
| | Level 6 | 7 | 5.6% | |
| | Level 7 | 14 | 11.1% | |
| | Level 8 | 33 | 26.2% | |
| | Level 9 | 31 | 24.6% | |
| | Completely | 19 | 15.1% | |

| Question | Response options | Frequency | Percentage | Single/ multiple response(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 04. Are you aware of any post-Olympic plans for your community? Like opening Olympic facilities and space to the public or educational or employment opportunities? | No | 67 | 53.2% | single |
| | To some extent | 19 | 15.1% | |
| | Yes | 40 | 31.7% | |
| 05. Do you think hosting the Olympics is the best way for the Government to redevelop East London? | No | 25 | 19.8% | single |
| | To some extent | 61 | 48.4% | |
| | Yes | 40 | 31.7% | |
| 06. Since July 2005 when London won the Olympic bid, do you think East London has changed? | No | 36 | 28.6% | single |
| | Some better some worse | 23 | 18.3% | |
| | For the worse | 4 | 3.2% | |
| | For the better | 63 | 50.0% | |
| 07. What has changed for the better? | Housing | 9 | 7.1% | multiple |
| | Education | 8 | 6.3% | |
| | Job | 29 | 23.0% | |
| | Safety | 18 | 14.3% | |
| | Recreation | 67 | 53.2% | |
| | Transport | 43 | 34.1% | |
| | Amenities | 12 | 9.5% | |
| | Other | 6 | 4.8% | |
| 08. What has changed for the worse? | Housing | 24 | 19.0% | multiple |
| | Education | 1 | 0.8% | |
| | Job | 4 | 3.2% | |
| | Safety | 1 | 0.8% | |
| | Recreation | 1 | 0.8% | |
| | Transport | 1 | 0.8% | |
| | Amenities | 4 | 3.2% | |
| | Other | 1 | 0.8% | |

| Question | Response options | Frequency | Percentage | Single/ multiple response(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09. Are you aware that there have been public consultations about East London redevelopment? | No | 87 | 69.0% | single |
| | Not sure/ maybe | 10 | 7.9% | |
| | Yes | 29 | 23.0% | |
| 10. Did you attend any of the meetings? | No | 36 | 28.6% | single |
| | Yes | 3 | 2.4% | |
| | Missing data | 87 | 69.0% | |
| 11. Do you think your opinion expressed in the meeting(s) can influence East London redevelopment? | No | 2 | 1.6% | single |
| | Yes | 1 | 0.8% | |
| | Missing data | 123 | 97.6% | |
| 12. If you had the chance to attend, do you think your opinion would be taken seriously? (hypothetically) | No | 71 | 56.3% | single |
| | To some extent | 35 | 27.8% | |
| | Yes | 17 | 13.5% | |
| | Missing data | 3 | 2.4% | |
| 13. Do you think London hosting the Olympics has made you pay more attention to local events or local developments? | No | 69 | 54.8% | single |
| | To some extent | 9 | 7.1% | |
| | Yes | 48 | 38.1% | |
| 14. Do you think hosting the Olympics has successfully shown the world that London is a great place for | Travel | 97 | 77.0% | multiple |
| | Business | 82 | 65.1% | |
| | Residential | 49 | 38.9% | |
| | Other | 1 | 0.8% | |
| | No | 24 | 19.0% | |
| 15. Do you think hosting the Olympics has successfully shown the world that Britain is a creative and welcoming place? | No | 15 | 11.9% | single |
| | To some extent | 26 | 20.6% | |
| | Yes | 85 | 67.5% | |

Appendices

| Question | Response options | Frequency | Percentage | Single/ multiple response(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16. Do you feel that hosting London 2012 has strengthened your pride as a Londoner? | No | 48 | 38.1% | single |
| | To some extent | 17 | 13.5% | |
| | Yes | 60 | 47.6% | |
| | Missing data | 1 | 0.8% | |
| 17. Do you feel that the hosting London 2012 has strengthened your pride as a British citizen/British resident? | No | 56 | 44.4% | single |
| | To some extent | 15 | 11.9% | |
| | Yes | 55 | 43.7% | |
| 18. Gender | Male | 65 | 51.6% | single |
| | Female | 61 | 48.4% | |
| 19. In which of these groups is your age? | under 21 | 8 | 6.3% | single |
| | 21 to 30 | 46 | 36.5% | |
| | 31 to 40 | 34 | 27.0% | |
| | 41 to 50 | 16 | 12.7% | |
| | 51 to 60 | 14 | 11.1% | |
| | 61 to older | 8 | 6.3% | |
| 20. Marital status | Single/ Divorced/ Widowed | 85 | 67.5% | single |
| | Married/ in a civil partnership | 40 | 31.7% | |
| | Missing data | 1 | 0.8% | |
| 21. Which of the following best describes your occupation category? (Continued to the next page) | Managers and senior officials | 8 | 6.3% | single |
| | Professional | 29 | 23.0% | |
| | Associate professional and technical | 13 | 10.3% | |
| | Administrative and secretarial | 4 | 3.2% | |
| | Skilled trades | 12 | 9.5% | |
| | Personal service | 9 | 7.1% | |

| Question | Response options | Frequency | Percentage | Single/ multiple response(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 21. Which of the following best describes your occupation category? | Sales and customer service | 14 | 11.1% | single |
| | Elementary | 1 | 0.8% | |
| | Unemployed/ self-employed | 11 | 8.7% | |
| | Student | 12 | 9.5% | |
| | Retired | 13 | 10.3% | |
| 22. What is your ethnic group? | White | 76 | 60.3% | single |
| | Asian or Asian British | 11 | 8.7% | |
| | Black or Black British | 21 | 16.7% | |
| | Chinese or other ethnic group | 3 | 2.4% | |
| | Mixed | 15 | 11.9% | |
| 23. What is the last type of education that you have received, or which type of education are you receiving now? | Elementary | 2 | 1.6% | single |
| | Secondary | 17 | 13.5% | |
| | Further | 26 | 20.6% | |
| | Higher | 81 | 64.3% | |
| 24. How many years have you lived in your current residence? | Under 1 year | 16 | 12.7% | single |
| | 1 to 4 years | 36 | 28.6% | |
| | 5 to 8 years | 24 | 19.0% | |
| | 9 years or longer | 50 | 39.7% | |
| 25. Would you mind telling me the postcode of your residence? (This will not be identified and all information is confidential.) | Barking & Dagenham | 15 | 11.9% | single |
| | Greenwich | 4 | 3.2% | |
| | Hackney | 20 | 15.9% | |
| | Newham | 21 | 16.7% | |
| | Tower Hamlets | 20 | 15.9% | |
| | Waltham Forest | 9 | 7.1% | |
| | X-Others | 37 | 29.4% | |

Appendices

**F-2 Beijing Questionnaire Response Frequency and Percentages**

| Question | Response options | Frequency | Percentage | Single/ multiple response(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01.您是否参加过以下任何一项奥运相关活动? 可选多个 | 在电视或网络上观看比赛、开幕或闭幕典礼 | 32 | 82.1% | multiple |
| | 参与奥运免费活动，如小区活动或艺文活动 | 9 | 23.1% | |
| | 到现场观看比赛、开幕或闭幕典礼 | 10 | 25.6% | |
| | 担任奥运志愿者 | 4 | 10.3% | |
| | 其他活动 | 1 | 2.6% | |
| | 没有参与任何北京奥运相关活动 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| 02.在奥运前，您对于北京举办奥运有多期待？（1 为完全不期待，10 为高度期待） | Level 1 | 0 | 0.0% | single |
| | Level 2 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | Level 3 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | Level 4 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | Level 5 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | Level 6 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | Level 7 | 1 | 2.6% | |
| | Level 8 | 2 | 5.1% | |
| | Level 9 | 11 | 28.2% | |
| | Level 10 | 25 | 64.1% | |
| 03.举办奥运后，您认为奥运对于北京有多大程度的正面影响？（1 为完全不期待，10 为高度期待） | Level 1 | 0 | 0.0% | single |
| | Level 2 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | Level 3 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | Level 4 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | Level 5 | 1 | 2.6% | |
| | Level 6 | 3 | 7.7% | |
| | Level 7 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | Level 8 | 13 | 33.3% | |
| | Level 9 | 4 | 10.3% | |
| | Level 10 | 18 | 46.2% | |

Appendices

| Question | Response options | Frequency | Percentage | Single/multiple response(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 04.您是否知道在奥运举办后，关于奥运设施场地的开放使用，或其他奥运带动的相关计划，例如奥林匹克森林公园的开放使用，体育活动等？ | 完全不了解 | 3 | 7.7% | single |
| | 大概知道一些 | 28 | 71.8% | |
| | 算是清楚 | 8 | 20.5% | |
| 05.您是否认为，主办奥运是政府进行洼里乡地区发展或更新的最佳方式？ | 完全不是 | 5 | 12.8% | single |
| | 多少算是 | 21 | 53.8% | |
| | 一定是 | 13 | 33.3% | |
| 06.自从 2001 年北京争取到奥运主办权后，您觉得北京变好了还是变差了？ | 变差了 | 0 | 0.0% | single |
| | 有变好有变坏 | 35 | 89.7% | |
| | 变好了 | 4 | 10.3% | |
| 06-1.请问您觉得哪些方面变好？可选多个 | 就业或商业机会增加 | 25 | 64.1% | multiple |
| | 小区环境更加安全 | 13 | 33.3% | |
| | 房地产价格上升 | 18 | 46.2% | |
| | 居民素质提升 | 18 | 46.2% | |
| | 交通更加便捷 | 18 | 46.2% | |
| | 生活机能变好，如餐厅、杂货店、超市等数量更多 | 23 | 59.0% | |
| | 休闲文化娱乐设施增加，电影院、健身房、画廊等 | 21 | 53.8% | |
| | 其它方面改善 | 1 | 2.6% | |

| Question | Response options | Frequency | Percentage | Single/ multiple response(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06-2.请问您觉得哪些方面变差？可选多个 | 就业或商业机会增加 | 3 | 7.7% | multiple |
| | 小区环境更加安全 | 11 | 28.2% | |
| | 房地产价格上升 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | 居民素质提升 | 3 | 7.7% | |
| | 交通更加便捷 | 26 | 66.7% | |
| | 生活机能变好，如餐厅、杂货店、超市等数量更多 | 3 | 7.7% | |
| | 休闲文化娱乐设施增加，电影院、健身房、画廊等 | 5 | 12.8% | |
| | 其它方面改善 | 2 | 5.1% | |
| 07.您是否知道，关于北京奥运场地附近的土地徵收及更新资讯? | 完全不了解 | 18 | 46.2% | |
| | 大概知道一些 | 20 | 51.3% | |
| | 算是清楚 | 1 | 2.6% | |
| 08.您是否曾对于北京奥运场地附近的土地徵收及更新表达意见？例如跟村干事或官员讨论等等。 | 完全没有 | 38 | 97.4% | single |
| | 表达过意见或讨论过 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | 遗漏值 | 1 | 2.6% | |
| 09.如果表达过或讨论过的话，您认为您所表达的意见是否有影响力? | 完全没有影响力 | 0 | 0.0% | single |
| | 多少有一点影响力 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | 算有影响力 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | 遗漏值 | 39 | 100.0% | |
| 10.如果您有机会对于北京奥运场地附近的市地更新表达意见的话，您认为您所表达的意见是否有影响力？ | 完全没有影响力 | 27 | 69.2% | single |
| | 多少有一点影响力 | 8 | 20.5% | |
| | 应该会有影响力 | 4 | 10.3% | |

| Question | Response options | Frequency | Percentage | Single/multiple response(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11.北京办理奥运后，您是否对北京或地方发展更加关注？ | 完全没改变 | 2 | 5.1% | single |
| | 多少有更关注 | 32 | 82.1% | |
| | 变得更关注了 | 5 | 12.8% | |
| 12.办理奥运后，您认为北京在哪些方面获得了好名声？可选多个 | 游客更想来北京玩 | 30 | 76.9% | multiple |
| | 商人更想来北京投资 | 26 | 66.7% | |
| | 外地人/外国人更想来北京居住 | 17 | 43.6% | |
| | 其它方面的好名声 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| 13.您认为北京办理奥运，是否成功的让世界认为中国是个开放及强大的国家？ | 否，我觉得世界对中国的看法跟办奥运没什么关系 | 4 | 10.3% | single |
| | 多多少少吧 | 13 | 33.3% | |
| | 是，因为北京奥运让世界更加认识中国 | 22 | 56.4% | |
| 14.办理奥运后，您是否因住在北京而觉得骄傲？ | 否，跟奥运没什么关系 | 5 | 12.8% | single |
| | 多少有一点骄傲 | 14 | 35.9% | |
| | 是，奥运让我对北京很骄傲 | 20 | 51.3% | |
| 15.办理奥运后，您是否因身为中国人而觉得骄傲？ | 否，跟奥运没什么关系 | 2 | 5.1% | single |
| | 多少有一点骄傲 | 19 | 48.7% | |
| | 是，奥运让我对中国很骄傲 | 18 | 46.2% | |
| 16.性别 | 男 | 17 | 43.6% | single |
| | 女 | 19 | 48.7% | |
| | 遗漏值 | 3 | 7.7% | |
| 17.请问您的出身年份是？西元　年 | 21 歲~ 30 歲 | 17 | 43.6% | single |
| | 31 歲~ 40 歲 | 14 | 35.9% | |
| | 41 歲~ 50 歲 | 6 | 15.4% | |
| | 51 歲~ 60 歲 | 1 | 2.6% | |
| | 遗漏值 | 1 | 2.6% | |
| 18.婚姻关系 | 单身/离婚/寡居 | 9 | 23.1% | |
| | 已婚 | 28 | 71.8% | |
| | 遗漏值 | 2 | 5.1% | |

| Question | Response options | Frequency | Percentage | Single/ multiple response(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.请问您的籍贯是？ | 北京 | 34 | 87.2% | single |
| | 北京以外 | 5 | 12.8% | |
| 20.请问您的教育背景是？ | 小学以下 | 0 | 0.0% | single |
| | 中学 | 2 | 5.1% | |
| | 职业学校 | 12 | 30.8% | |
| | 大学以上 | 25 | 64.1% | |
| 21-1.请问您在 2001 年北京获得奥运主办权当时，以及现在的职业分别是？ 一北京获得奥运主办权时 | 管理階層 | 1 | 2.6% | single |
| | 專業或技術人員 | 4 | 10.3% | |
| | 行政或秘書人員 | 15 | 38.5% | |
| | 業務或客服人員 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | 流程或機械操作人員 | 2 | 5.1% | |
| | 基層作業員 | 3 | 7.7% | |
| | 無業或自營 | 2 | 5.1% | |
| | 學生 | 12 | 30.8% | |
| | 退休人員 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| 21-2.请问您在 2001 年北京获得奥运主办权当时，以及现在的职业分别是？ 一现在的职业 | 管理階層 | 3 | 7.7% | single |
| | 專業或技術人員 | 5 | 12.8% | |
| | 行政或秘書人員 | 21 | 53.8% | |
| | 業務或客服人員 | 1 | 2.6% | |
| | 流程或機械操作人員 | 2 | 5.1% | |
| | 基層作業員 | 6 | 15.4% | |
| | 無業或自營 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | 學生 | 0 | 0.0% | |
| | 退休人員 | 1 | 2.6% | |
| 22.请问您在该公司任职多久了？ | 1 年內 | 0 | 0.0% | single |
| | 1~4 年 | 14 | 35.9% | |
| | 5~8 年 | 14 | 35.9% | |
| | 9 年以上 | 11 | 28.2% | |

| Question | Response options | Frequency | Percentage | Single/ multiple response(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 23.请问您现在居住在北京市的哪个区域？ | 东城区 (城区) | 1 | 2.6% | single |
| | 西城区 (城区) | 1 | 2.6% | |
| | 朝阳区 (近郊) | 26 | 66.7% | |
| | 海淀区 (近郊) | 5 | 12.8% | |
| | 房山区 (遠郊) | 1 | 2.6% | |
| | 通州区 (遠郊) | 1 | 2.6% | |
| | 昌平区 (遠郊) | 3 | 7.7% | |
| | 遗漏值 | 1 | 2.6% | |
| 24.请问您居住在现居地址多久时间了？ | 1 年内 | 1 | 2.6% | single |
| | 1~4 年 | 10 | 25.6% | |
| | 5~8 年 | 11 | 28.2% | |
| | 9 年以上 | 17 | 43.6% | |
| 25.若我需了解更进一步的信息，请问您是否愿意接受后续的联系？ | 不愿意 | 33 | 84.6% | single |
| | 愿意 | 6 | 15.4% | |

# Glossary

| | |
|---|---|
| AQI | Air Quality Index |
| BOA | British Olympic Association |
| BOBICO | Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bidding Committee |
| BOCOG | Beijing Organising Committee for the Games |
| BODA | Beijing Olympic City Development Association |
| CCP | Chinese Communist Party |
| COHRE | Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction |
| COI | Central Office of Information |
| DCLG | Department for Communities and Local Government |
| DCMS | Department of Culture, Media and Sports |
| ELMPS ethics committee | Economics, Law, Management, Politics and Sociology ethics committee |
| FDI | Foreign Direct Investment |
| FIFA | International Federation of Association Football |
| GLA | Greater London Authority |
| IOC | International Olympic Committee |
| LDA | London Development Association |
| LLDC | London Legacy Development Corporation |
| LOCOG | London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games |
| LVRPA | Lee Valley Regional Park Authority |
| MTT | Market Transition Theory |
| NOC | National Olympic Committee |
| NPM | New Public Management |
| OCOG | Organising Committee of the Olympic Games |
| ODA | Olympic Delivery Authority |
| ODPM | Office of the Deputy Prime Minister |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| OGGI | Olympic Games Global Impact Project |
| PPP | Public Private Partnership |
| SEZ | Special Economic Zone |
| SOC | Standard Occupation Classification |
| TOP | The Olympic Partner |
| UNCHS | United Nations Centre for Human Settlements |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

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