

**Representing Animals in the Deliberative System: the Foxhunting Debate**

**By:**

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**Executive Summary**

Despite the enactment of the Hunting Act 2004 over a decade ago, foxhunting remains the most controversial animal issue in British politics. This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the foxhunting debate in the deliberative system. It begins from the normative position that animals are deserving of political representation and that deliberative democracy can enhance animal protection. The empirical analysis is evaluated from a deliberative systems perspective. I draw upon John Dryzek’s (2009) conception of the deliberative system to identify and analyse the discourses around hunting. The characteristics and commitments of four discourses on hunting are examined in public space. I go on to track the progress of these viewpoints into empowered space through an analysis of the hunting debate in Westminster and examine the connective tissue between public and empowered spheres.

The empirical analysis utilises Q methodology, interviews and documentary analysis to appraise how inclusive and deliberative the hunting debate is. I find that despite the entrenchment and hostility, deliberative moments can be found across the system. However, analysis of the debate in Westminster reveals that transmission of public discourses is hampered by the adversarial nature of Parliament. The strength of party politics prevents the hunting debate from gaining meaningful dialogical traction and the British political system undermines deliberative capacity *and* animal protection.

This thesis contributes to the emerging empirical literature on deliberative systems. It innovates in its approach to analysing public space, and contributes to ongoing scholarly debate on the ways in which the deliberative system is operationalised. The research also makes advances in the area of representation and animal protection. My findings suggest that animal protection organisations should adopt a more deliberative approach, but that currently the British political system is open to neither animal protection nor deliberative democratic goals.

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**Glossary of hunting terms**

*Covert* (pronounced *cover*): a small patch of woodland or shrubbery where a fox might hide

*Drag hunting*: where hounds and hunt follow an *artificial* scent

*Earth*: a fox den or some sort of underground space where a fox might hide or live

*Flushing*: the act of forcing a quarry out into the open where it can be either pursued or killed more easily. The current Act allows the use of two dogs to flush to guns, meaning that the dogs are used to chase or frighten the animal into an open area where it can be shot at close range

*Hawking*: using a trained bird of prey to hunt

*Hounds*: the pack of dogs used in hunting are usually referred to as hounds

*Hunting the clean boot*: following a scent trail laid by a human runner, using bloodhound rather than foxhound dogs

*Huntsman*: the person responsible for the hounds’ housing, training and control out in the field

*Lamping:* hunting at night using a bright light to reflect animals’ eyes in the dark. Rabbits and foxes will also remain motionless in the light, making it easy to shoot them at short range

*Master of the Hunt/Hunt Master*: person in charge of the overall hunt on the day and in the day-to-day operations

*Quarry*: the animal being hunted

*Terrier work*: the practice of sending a small dog (terrier) into an earth after a fox or other animal. The terrier will either flush out the quarry to be killed, or hold it underground whilst it is dug out by the terrier men who oversee the process

*Trail hunting*: where hounds and hunt follow a scent laid with fox urine by the hunt

**List of Acronyms**

APGAW: All-party Parliamentary Group for Animal Welfare

CA: Countryside Alliance

DEFRA: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

EFRA: Environment, food and rural affairs

EVEL: English Votes for English Laws

FOI: Freedom of Information

IFAW: International Fund for Animal Welfare

IRA: Irish Republican Army

HSA: Hunt Saboteurs Association

LACS: League Against Cruel Sports

RSPCA: Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

SNP: Scottish National Party

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# Chapter One: introduction

## Section 1.1: why hunting?

Hunting with dogs is the most controversial animal issue in the history of British politics. Hunting wild mammals using more than two dogs was banned in England and Wales in 2004 under the Hunting Act.[[1]](#footnote-1) Although the Act covers wild mammals including deer, hare and mink, it is the fox who has received the most attention (Pardo and Prato 2005, p143). This thesis provides an in-depth, contemporary analysis of the hunting debate situated in the deliberative system. Ultimately, I find that despite polarisation, deliberative moments can be found throughout the system. However, this is undermined by the level of entrenched views in the debate and by the political system itself. This chapter outlines the key themes and contributions of the research and lays out the structure of the thesis. It also provides a brief introduction to the hunting debate and the context in which the research has been carried out.

The practice of hunting with dogs[[2]](#footnote-2) varies across the UK, but features the same core elements. Hunting with dogs as covered in this thesis refers to organised hunts.[[3]](#footnote-3) Hunting does occur outside these boundaries but is not the focus of this research. During an organised hunt, the quarry is pursued by a pack of dogs that have been trained to follow their scent. The hunted animal may vary, as may the breed of dog. Members of the hunt may follow and direct the hounds on horseback but this is not always the case; additional people follow on foot and many hunts are conducted entirely on foot. Within an organised hunt there are specific roles for the hunt staff and formal rules to which hunt followers generally subscribe. Following the hunting ban, hunts were left with two legal options to continue the activity: drag hunting and trail hunting. Drag hunting involves laying an artificial scent whereas the latter lays a scent of fox urine. In both cases, the scent is laid by a member of the hunt. Trail hunting is controversial given that in following the scent of fox urine, hounds may unwittingly hit on the scent of an actual fox and kill it. This is prohibited by the Act, although two dogs may be used to flush a fox out of covert to be shot at close range. As ever, the devil is in the detail: in order for a successful criminal prosecution to be brought, it must be demonstrated that there was the *intention* to hunt illegally, rather than an accidental kill.

The *practice* of hunting has been studied extensively in anthropology. Garry Marvin (see for example, 2000; 2003; 2007) has written extensively on the social and cultural complexities of hunting. The *practice* of hunting with hounds is not the focus of this thesis. Rather, my research focuses on the *debate around hunting*. I do not attempt to evaluate hunting, or to make an argument for or against the practice. I do however endorse Marvin’s point that hunting cannot be understood by explicating the event itself in isolation (2000, p190). Where Marvin looks to practices and meaning within hunting, I turn to the political contestation surrounding the debate.

In the time preceding the bill and the decade that followed, hunting became a divisive political issue. This debate conjures up arguments about the rural/urban divide, class warfare, the rights of animals and the right to hunt them. In 2002 hundreds of thousands descended on London at the ‘Liberty and Livelihood’ march in a protest to highlight rural needs but ostensibly in protest of the proposed ban. In the eleven years since the Act, the hunting debate has remained salient. Lobbying organisations have been active during this time: the Countryside Alliance (CA) to repeal the ban and the League Against Cruel Sports (LACS) and Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) to monitor and prosecute illegal hunting. The 2010 Coalition Agreement stated that the government would find Parliamentary time to debate hunting again. The Conservative Party officially favours a free vote on repeal. In 2013, speculation mounted that the Act could be relaxed. However, it was not until the Conservatives won a majority in the 2015 General Election that this speculation looked likely to become reality. In July 2015 amendments were proposed by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and a 90-minute Commons debate and vote was scheduled under the rubric of a Statutory Instrument (SI). This was cancelled at the last minute; further discussion on this issue is reserved for later in the thesis. The furore around the election and the proposed amendments make 2015 the ideal timeframe for analysis. This thesis focuses analysis around the events of 2015 to give an up-to-date empirical analysis of the deliberative health of the hunting debate.

Although hunting appears to be an animal issue, at the time of the ban animals did not feature heavily in debate. Anderson (2006) and Toke (2010) discuss the growing relevance of party politics in the hunting debate and how the CA took on a broader political remit in order to mobilise the public. Despite being founded from an amalgamation of field sports societies (Toke 2010, p207), the CA became the self-appointed representative of rural Britain. Playing on the real challenges facing the countryside at the time, the CA appealed to a perceived rural/urban divide (Anderson 2006, p722). The Alliance took an overtly political route; canvassing against anti-hunting Parliamentary candidates through the ‘Vote OK’ campaign, pitched in broader terms to win wider appeal (Toke 2010, p209). This contributed to public debate around the time of the ban broadening out to beyond hunting: rural identity and the nature of the British countryside itself.

Plumb and Marsh (2013) demonstrate the increasingly politicised nature of the hunting debate in Westminster. Over time the hunting debate came to reflect party political divisions more than animal welfare concerns. There are a range of possible explanations for this: the sheer number of hours devoted to debating the bill left Members of Parliament (MPs) saturated by the issue, views entrenched and arguments well-trodden. Foxhunting infamously took up over 700 hours of Parliamentary time in comparison to the seven hours dedicated to debating the invasion of Iraq (Plumb and Marsh 2013, p313). Throughout this time hunting became increasingly party-driven, with higher party cohesion seen particularly within the Conservatives. As party politics increased in significance, there was a noticeable shift away from animal protection concerns to predictable party slurs.

Whether the hunting ban was framed as an attack on British rural identity, or a reflection of resentful class divisions – both constructions are symptomatic of the marginalisation of animals in politics. Woods (1998; 2000) corroborates this in his analyses of political representations of animals in the British countryside, noting that ‘although animals are central to these debates, they are also voiceless and powerless and remain marginalised from political processes’ (1998, p1219). Increasingly, rural issues are part of mainstream political debates, bringing with them contested discourses on nature and rurality. Although animals are central to these constructs, ‘this centrality brings with it neither voice nor power, and animals remain perhaps the ‘ultimate neglected rural other’’ (1998, p1233). The politicisation of the hunting debate is symptomatic of this marginalisation.

Despite the amount of time that has been spent debating hunting, the issue remains unresolved: the current government are sticking to their manifesto commitment carried over from the last Parliament. Lobbying organisations are active in campaigning. A cursory analysis of more recent pro-hunting literature suggests that the hunting debate has perhaps evolved in the past decade to focus more on the animals affected. Recent publications from the Countryside Alliance are notable in their discursive shift to conservation and animal welfare arguments for hunting with hounds, as opposed to the defence of rural identity (Countryside Alliance 2012). Whilst this could signal an important move to place animals back at the heart of this debate, this shift is not necessarily conducive to animal protection (Parry 2015).

The 2015 proposed amendments offer a contemporary window through which to revisit the hunting debate and assess if and how the debate has evolved since the ban. The aims of the thesis go beyond a timely analysis of the hunting debate. Below I outline the theoretical approach I use through which to approach the hunting debate. Ultimately, I argue that deliberative democracy and animal protection are highly compatible, and the empirical analysis proceeds with this in mind.

## Section 1.2: theoretical approach

The two key theoretical concepts underpinning this thesis are discursive representation and deliberative democracy – specifically deliberative systems. Here I outline each in the context of this thesis. Both are covered in detail in chapters two and three respectively. These two concepts provide the normative lens through which the later empirical analysis proceeds.

### Section 1.2.1: discursive representation

If we accept that non-human animals are deserving of political representation (as I argue in chapter two), then the challenge is how to do this. I argue that the representation of discourses – rather than individuals – is conducive to ensuring as many perspectives as possible are given a voice in political processes. Drawing on Michael Saward’s (2006a; 2006b) work, I suggest that knowledge and reflection of objective interests are not the most important aspects of representation. Instead, I emphasise the creative nature of representation whereby the representative always creates some elements of the representation; it is never merely a reflection of the represented. This helps address a challenge posed to representing animals: how can we ever know enough to represent them? My approach argues that although we can never know animals in this way, this need not be the central concern of representation.

Discursive representation acknowledges the creative aspect of representation. Discourses have an endurance that an individual opinion does not. A discourse consists of stories and narratives that weave together individual opinions into a *shared* viewpoint. It provides a common frame of reference for understanding different issues. As Dryzek (2005) points out, discourses also contain rhetoric and metaphor as crucial ingredients. This helps give discourses a powerful communicative resonance that is particularly relevant to animals. Although discursive representation is weakly anthropocentric given that it relies on an exclusively human mode of communication (Parry forthcoming), it is also this element that makes discourses a potentially valuable tool to advance the representation of animals.

The narratives emerging from pro-animal discourses can have a profound communicative power. This is particularly important in the context of deliberative democracy, where deliberators should ideally be reflexive and open to changing their preferences: persuasive language can help achieve this. Rhetoric and metaphor, in a deliberative context can help provide a common framework or point of reference from which deliberation can grow through appealing to shared values (Dryzek 2005, p19). Animal rights protagonists may use the language of universal human rights to advocate nonhuman rights. Conversely, appealing to common descent or group identity may be used to justify nationalist discourses. Rhetoric in itself is neither bad nor good inherently, but it is *powerful*. It is a crucial part of how humans relate to and ascribe value to animals. As Dryzek (2005, p9) points out, it is how people make sense of the world.

Discursive representation is not necessarily good for animals; it is no guarantee of advancing animal protection. But it is a valuable form of political representation for animals. Studying discursive representations of animals can expose claims which are taken verbatim, and interrogate them. When contested in a deliberative space – whether in the public sphere or a structured forum – marginal discourses like animal rights have a greater chance of being given serious consideration than they do currently in the public sphere and amongst policymakers. It is only when discursive representation is played out against a deliberative backdrop that those who are voiceless can be heard in a meaningful political way.

### Section 1.2.2: deliberative democracy

Elstub *et al* (2014, p3) point out that ‘not just any form of democracy will achieve environmental goals’; the same can be said for animals. The underlying philosophy of aggregative democracy is *individual* self-interest – voting is an individual act. Conversely, deliberative democracy argues in favour of *collective* discussion and reasoning. Deliberative democracy is a ‘talk-centric’ (Chambers 2003) approach to democracy. Many deliberative theorists argue that the requirements of deliberative democracy are conducive to achieving environmental goals (e.g. Dryzek 2000; Eckersley 2004). I argue that the same is also true for animal protection goals (Parry 2016). I follow the expansive definition of deliberative democracy outlined by Stevenson and Dryzek (2014, p25; see also Dryzek 2000; 2010; Young 1999). The features summarised below are discussed in detail in chapter three.

**1. *The inclusion of all affected interests (including future generations and non-human nature)*:** all those affected by the outcome of a collective decision should be able to participate – or at least be represented – in the decision making process. There is no theoretical reason why this should not extend to animals.

***2. Truthfulness, respect, reason-giving, non-coercive persuasion, and efforts to be constructive in finding mutually acceptable outcomes:*** authentic deliberation should involve participants being honest in their motivation and argument. All interests under consideration should be respected, and deliberators should present their arguments in a respectful manner, giving equal consideration to different positions. Mutual respect provides opportunity for animal advocates to be listened to. It requires that all arguments are listened to and not merely dismissed *prima facie*.

**3. *Prioritisation of public goods, common interests, and generalisable interests over sectional (and especially material) interests*:** once we accept that the interests of all those affected should be included in deliberation and afforded equal respect, deliberators must necessarily consider interests beyond their own. Eckersley argues that this ‘enlarged thinking’ (2004, p116) makes deliberative democracy a good match for promoting ecological interests because it invites citizens to view issues in terms of common interests.

**4. *Reflexivity*:** reflexivity is the most important feature of deliberation when it comes to animal issues. As Humphrey and Stears point out, the moral and philosophical demands of animal rights theory are far removed from the majority of peoples’ *modus operandi* (2006, p411). Reflexivity requires a person to reflect on their own positions and preferences and to revise, adapt – or even reconfirm – those preferences based on new information and arguments.

I utilise a deliberative systems approach to analyse the hunting debate. In a structured deliberative forum, researchers look for the above features of deliberation within that setting. By contrast, the deliberative system envisages a division of labour between different settings in which communication occurs (Dryzek 2009). This has two key advantages. Firstly it enables a broader approach to deliberative democracy that examines deliberation in the real world rather than within the structural confines of a mini-public. Secondly, since it is not necessary to achieve all deliberative principles in every setting, deliberative systems allows for the possibility that non-deliberative actions may contribute to overall deliberative capacity. This is particularly relevant given that many forms of animal activism fall outside the deliberative realm (Humphrey and Stears 2006).

The deliberative system has been conceptualised as a set of spaces interacting, having some effect on each other and an overall outcome. Different sites of communication might include public meetings, media, activism and political elites (Mansbridge 1999, p211). The systemic approach provides an empirical framework through which to evaluate deliberative democracy. Once evaluation moves to a systemic level, it is no longer necessary to achieve the highest procedural quality in a single setting because *overall* deliberative capacity (Dryzek 2009) is evaluated. This is not to say that individual settings need not be deliberative at all (Owen and Smith 2015). In this thesis I provide an analysis of the deliberative health of the hunting debate in each setting of the system as well as overall systemic capacity. I build on Dryzek’s (2009; with Stevenson 2014) model of the deliberative system, with some novel distinctions in how the analysis is operationalised.

### Section 1.2.3: operationalising the deliberative system

Dryzek’s (2009) outline of the deliberative system is the best suited to empirical research. My operationalisation of the deliberative system draws primarily on Dryzek’s, with some adaptations. The system is evaluated through examination of inclusivity, authenticity and consequentiality.

***Private Space:*** informal conversations that will usually be inaccessible for analysis as they take place between friends, family or colleagues in private locations. This sort of talk is important because it may form the basis for views that are then articulated in public. Mansbridge (1999) argues explicitly for the embedding of such ‘everyday talk’ in the deliberative system. Since such conversations are not usually publicly available, it is impractical to pursue analysis of private space. However, I found that many of my research participants shared personal conversations and experiences. These experiences were often central to their views on hunting; participants drew on childhood memories or conversations with friends to articulate their views. This meant that although not an explicit aim, this thesis does give some insight into private space.

***Public Space*:** separate from state and formal decision making arenas, public space can include communication between and amongst members of the public, activists or the media. Key actors in the hunting debate include the RSPCA, LACS and the CA. Here communication is ideally unrestricted and anyone can participate. Sites may include discussions online or in person, and could include deliberative forums and public meetings. Public space is evaluated empirically through analysing the interplay of discourses (see sections 5.2 and 5.3). Inclusivity is primarily sought in public space.

In the Dryzekian deliberative system, public space is primarily analysed by first identifying the range of existing discourses and then evaluating the balancing of contesting discourses. In my analysis I identify the range of discourses using Q method, but take a different approach to evaluating the interplay of discourses. I shift focus from looking at different settings in which different discourses are present, to a qualitative analysis of the discourses themselves. This approach is discussed in detail in chapter five (section 5.1). For the time being it will suffice to say that through analysing the deliberative quality of the discourses themselves, it is possible to assess whether they preclude or enable deliberation. This retains focus on core deliberative ideals, without becoming too preoccupied with achieving ideal deliberation in all settings.

***Empowered Space:***primarily decision-making arenas. Here I focus on the legislature and evidence from House of Commons and Lords debates, supplemented by interviews. My analysis of empowered space has two aims: to examine the extent to which public discourses are reflected in empowered space, and to assess the deliberative quality of the hunting debate in Westminster.

***Transmission:*** encompasses the mechanisms by which messages are transmitted from public to empowered space. I focus on three outlets through which messages are transmitted in the deliberative system: the Daily and Sunday Telegraph newspapers, LACS and an anti-hunting Conservative group, Blue Fox.

***Accountability:*** conceptualised by Stevenson and Dryzek (2014, p1867) as empowered space providing an account of actions to public space. In my analysis, I examine narrative accountability (Mansbridge 2009) through looking for accounts given by actors in empowered space. My analysis covers accounts that have been proffered publicly as well as those that were elicited by me through interviews.

***Meta-deliberation:*** the capacity of the system to reflect and self-correct. Meta-deliberation is reflection upon the state and terms of the hunting *debate.* Meta-deliberation is examined alongside accountability in chapter eight. The two should be mutually reinforcing: if accountability is lacking, the ideal system should reflect on this and take measures to improve accountability. Similarly, if a system partakes in meta-deliberation and self-correction, accountability should be an element under consideration.

Dryzek’s system also includes a component of *decisiveness* – the extent to which the deliberative system has an impact on the issue under consideration. I exclude this element for two reasons. For one, the cancellation of the July 2015 debate effectively removed the decisive element. If the vote had gone ahead it would have been feasible to assess the extent to which deliberation in other settings had influenced the resulting decision. Secondly, the system is evaluated according to the criteria of inclusivity, authenticity and consequentiality. I argue that decisiveness can be examined under the rubric of consequentiality: to what extent does communication in public space influence the debate in empowered space?

My analysis of the deliberative system builds on Dryzek’s model and makes a number of original contributions to deliberative systems literature, discussed later in this chapter. Contributions include a discourse-level analysis of public space and challenging Dryzek’s conceptualisations of public/private spaces and transmission. These findings are informed by the empirical research carried out in the thesis which included Q methodology, interviews and document analysis. The methodology section below outlines the approaches utilised in the thesis.

## Section 1.3: methodology

This is an interpretive piece of work. It is underpinned by an anti-foundationalist philosophy upholding that there no discoverable objective reality waiting to be uncovered by a detached researcher. This is not to say that there is no such thing as objective reality *per se*, but rather a rejection of the notion that research can unproblematically, through certain methods, reveal objective truths about the world. Instead, I accept the possible existence of an objective reality, but maintain that all knowledge about reality is subjectively acquired. This underlying position is articulated most clearly in chapter two, where I argue that knowledge of animals’ objective interests is not the central concern of political representation. This is not to claim that animals do not have interests – in fact, I argue that they *do* possess interests – but that we can never have access to those interests in order to represent them. Instead, representative claims about animals are always subject to contestation. Claims derived from natural sciences are likewise contestable, because their representation takes place in a specific discursive context that is imbued with values and beliefs.

These philosophical foundations have implications not only for the theoretical arguments presented in chapters two and three, but for the research methods employed. The methods utilised here reflect the view that knowledge of social phenomena is subjective, contextual and ‘discursively laden’ (Furlong and Marsh 2002, p26). I take an exploratory approach to the empirical analysis that tries to unpack the underlying meanings and context surrounding the hunting debate. Since this position holds that preferences are not fixed or predetermined, it makes sense intuitively that in empirical assessment deliberative scholars ought to take this into account in their choice of research methods (see Bevir and Ansari 2012).

Ercan *et al* (2015) put forward a compelling argument for the value of interpretive methods in studying deliberative systems in particular. There are several key features of the systems approach that interpretive methods are well-placed to tackle; ‘making sense of ‘the deliberative system’ and what it is intersubjectively thought to contain, but also to highlight disjunctures and contestations across the subjective beliefs of actors’ (2015, p9). They highlight the potential of interpretive methods to distil the different components of a deliberative system as well as an understanding of the context within which they sit and perhaps most importantly, the connective tissue that links different sites or transmits claims.

In this thesis I provide an examination of the deliberative qualities and capacity of the hunting debate that is context-specific. Doing so enables a rich insight into viewpoints on hunting and the ways in which they are re-presented and articulated in different sites of the deliberative system. Concomitantly, ‘generalisability…must be sacrificed in favour of depth and nuance’ (Geddes 2016, p31). The aim of the thesis is not to make generalisable claims about the hunting issue in other contexts. Nonetheless, the empirical insights given here do provide an in-depth understanding of the debate that may shed light on similar animal issues across different contexts. Furthermore, the empirical findings presented are articulated in relation to broader debates, in particular the ways in which the deliberative systems approach is operationalised, and scholarship in animal ethics. In employing an interpretive approach to empirical study, I aim to ‘help us understand how deliberation takes place in practice, and then feed this pragmatic perspective back to theoretical debates’ (Ercan *et al* 2015, p17).

### Section 1.3.1: Q methodology

Q methodology is a robust method of identifying shared understandings on a given topic. It was developed by William Stephenson in 1935 as an inverted form of factor analysis that correlates individuals as variables, rather than tests or questions as variables (van Exel and de Graaf 2005, p1). The easiest way to introduce Q methodology is by using this as a point of departure, as Stephenson did. In a survey, questions are strategically constructed by the researcher. On occasion a Likert scale is similarly determined by the researcher. When we answer a survey question we conform to this linear, bipolar scale. However, this does not account for how respondents *interpret* the scale or the question. Conversely, Q aims to understand individual subjectivity and the relationship between different subjective viewpoints.

A Q study involves an individual sorting a set of items into an order that is significant to *them* (Brown 1980, p6). In most cases, these items (Q-set) are statements - though it is possible to use pictures or other representations (see Hardy *et al* 2014). These items are open to interpretation by the participant; the manner in which they arrange the Q-set is meaningful to them specifically. Significantly, participants sort the statements in a holistic manner (van Exel and de Graaf 2005, p3) – prioritising the items means participants must compare different aspects of their own opinion, making it a reflective and thoughtful process. The completed arrangement comprises a subjective map of that individual’s viewpoint. These are then analysed using factor analysis, a statistical method which enables the comparison of the individual Q-sorts and identification of like-minded individuals into clusters. Clusters can be interpreted into narratives or *discourses*. Q identifies relationships between participants’ subjectivities, rather than relationships between statements as in survey research.

The underlying philosophical assumptions of Q methodology are commensurate with the interpretive approach outlined above. Q takes seriously the subjective experiences of individuals (Dryzek 2005, p40). It does not take questions or statements in isolation, but employs a holistic approach whereby participants make their own meaning (Brown 1997) by sorting a set of statements in relation to each other. Each statement in the matrix thus only makes sense relative to the placement of other statements. The aim of Q is to identify shared viewpoints in a way that takes into account the active construction of meaning by participants in the study. The factors that emerge from a Q study are not pre-determined by an externally imposed scale or definition (Cross 2005, p211), though the process of factor does by necessity impose some unity on the resulting viewpoints.

Of course, the researcher still plays an important and central role in the process – I was responsible for selecting the final set of statements to be sorted, though they are derived from interviews. Likewise, the interpretation of mathematical factors into discourses is the sole responsibility of the researcher. However, an interpretive approach recognises that ‘any understanding of social and political phenomena is shaped by the experiences and perspectives of those involved’ (Ercan *et al* 2015, p5). Consequently the analysis presented in this thesis has been shaped by my own perspective as it has by those who participated in the research.

***Why use Q methodology?***

There are myriad reasons to use Q methodology to identify public discourses on hunting. Firstly, the definition of a discourse followed here (see Dryzek 2005, p17) matches the concept of a factor in Q as ‘the way a particular individual, in particular circumstances and at a particular time, relates to, and forms conceptions of, certain aspects of the world’ (Barry and Proops 1999, p338). Furthermore, Q facilitates the ordering of subjective viewpoints into clusters which, upon interpretation, are revealed to have the ‘structure and form’ (Brown 1986, p58) analogous to a discourse. The transformation from statistical factor to discourse involves close interpretation of interview material alongside the statistical data.

Q has been applied extensively to animal issues (see for example, Byrd 2002; Chamberlain *et al* 2012; Kalof 2000; Sickler *et al* 2006) and can be particularly fruitful in illuminating a debate that has been dominated by polarisation, as is the case for the hunting debate. Q has the potential to reveal perspectives more complex than the typical dichotomies (Chamberlain *et al* 2012, p33). Due to the statistical element there is also the possibility of factor analysis revealing an unexpected viewpoint or the absence of an expected one. In identifying the existing discourses on hunting with dogs, I aim to provide an in-depth analysis of existing viewpoints that will explore how animals are represented and help evaluate the deliberative quality of the discourses themselves.

The supposed division between animal welfare and animal rights features prominently in the hunting debate with animal welfare advocated by both sides of the argument: the CA cites hunting with dogs as being ‘at least as humane in welfare terms as any alternative and has unique welfare benefits’ whereas the Hunting Act is considered ‘bad for welfare’ (CA 2012). Anti-hunting campaigns characterise it as ‘cruel’, ‘inhumane’ and ‘barbaric’ (RSPCA 2016). Beyond division on welfare implications of the practice itself, concepts of animal welfare and animal rights have also been utilised in the hunting debate to attack the ‘other side’. The RSPCA for example, has received condemnation from the pro-hunting lobby and mainstream media for allegedly betraying its animal welfare tradition and transforming into an animal rights organisation. The general implication here is that animal rights is predominantly an extremist, anti-liberal institution to be feared and hated.[[4]](#footnote-4) Animal rights, according to this account, is closely associated with a political agenda and is even accused of comprising ‘so-called animal lovers who are, in truth, nothing of the kind’ (Western Morning News 2015). The propagation of the welfare/rights binary is indicative of the politicisation of debates on animal issues generally. Despite the assertion that animal issues perhaps *should* transcend partisan politics (interview HC3; HC5), no animal issue can be resolved without addressing the concomitant ‘people issues’ that inevitably surround them. Regarding Grizzly Bear conservation in Canada, Chamberlain *et al* (2012, p2) point out that although scientific evidence and knowledge is sufficient to address the issue, bear conservation remains controversial due to conflicting human values. In the case of foxhunting, there is arguably less scientific evidence on the various aspects of foxhunting (including depredation, effective population control, population numbers and welfare aspects). Yet even if there were, conflict would still emanate. It is therefore essential to explore the values and beliefs that structure different perspectives on hunting. What Q can do is ‘clarify the details of ideological positions (such as the fundamentalists and welfarists represent), often revealing distinctions not present in media and other public accounts’ (Brown 1996, p17).

Uncovering potential nuances beyond pro/anti and welfare/rights dichotomies through discourse analysis can help disaggregate underlying values and perhaps discover points of convergence. This is important for the hunting debate because dividing lines between pro/anti and welfare/rights are drawn so sharply and help paralyse the debate. Moreover, these binaries have a negative impact on the animal protection movement and its goal. Alasdair Cochrane (2013) has argued persuasively that in practice there is no fundamental distinction between animal welfare and animal rights, and in dividing itself into these two camps, the animal protection movement only weakens and is left vulnerable to others further dissecting it along these lines (see also Brown 1996; Garner 2006).

My Q study of the discourses around hunting sheds some analytical light on the murky dichotomies that dominate the hunting debate. The study also explores how animals are represented through discourses and assesses the deliberative quality of the discourses themselves as part of the evaluation of public space and the deliberative system. In producing factors based on actual rather than presumed differences, Q method is able to transcend the pro/anti divide in the hunting debate and illuminate possible sites of consensus which could form the foundation for future deliberation. Even for those who consciously place themselves in certain camps, participants may be surprised by their resulting placement in the analysis (Ascher and Brown 1987, p102-103).

### Section 1.3.2: interviews and documentary analysis

Alongside Q method I also employ semi-structured and unstructured interviews. Interviews were carried out at three different stages of the research. The first set of semi-structured interviews took place in November 2014. These preliminary interviews were designed to help construct the concourse from which to select Q-statements. The second round of interviews accompanied the Q-sorts, which I carried out face to face with participants between April and June 2015. Conducting the sort in person allows participants to share their frustrations and add comments about their Q-sort which they feel are relevant. Essentially this helped ensure that people were able to fully express their viewpoint, beyond the actual Q-sort. In the Q-sort interviews I took an unstructured approach. I asked participants to elaborate their views on the statements they felt most strongly about, but left the rest of the conversation open. This approach yielded rich material which was useful in interpreting the statistics produced by factor analysis in the Q study. There are a variety of statistical criteria to aid with factor analysis and these techniques[[5]](#footnote-5) were used in parallel with understanding developed from interviews.

Following the Q study, the four resulting discourses formed the basis for further empirical analysis of empowered space and transmission. I conducted documentary analysis of Parliamentary debates, newspaper articles and publications from campaign organisations. I undertook two rounds of analysis for each document: firstly, all documents were coded for each discourse. This involved close analysis of content to determine which, if any, of the four discourses were represented. This was not a mutually exclusive process; many articles examined contained traces of more than one discourse. Following this, articles were coded a second time for authentic deliberative quality. This included six separate codes: respect; reflexivity (or lack of); reason-giving (or lack of); persuasion (including coercion); effort to look for mutually acceptable outcomes; and appealing to generalisable or sectional interests. This enabled me to appraise the deliberative quality of the debate, including the non-deliberative features which are endemic to the hunting debate.

A third set of interviews conducted with MPs and Peers complemented documentary analysis of empowered space. Interview questions were designed to broadly reflect the Discourse Quality Index (Steenburgen *et al* 2003; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014). In reality, interviewees did not always answer the questions in the way I expected. Interview questions were designed to encourage reflection on the hunting *debate*; interviewees sometimes instead spoke about *hunting* and reiterated arguments for or against it. However, this was an interesting finding in itself and arguably reveals just as much about the nature of the hunting debate and how embedded views are. Furthermore, this is an interpretive piece of work that allows for interpretation of interview questions on the part of participants. Sufficient interview material was collected to analyse deliberative quality and draw some conclusions.

Ultimately, these combined methods support my exploratory approach to this research. In taking a more inductive approach to the Q study, data collection provided a trove of rich qualitative material that formed the basis for further analysis of other settings in the system. An unstructured approach to interviews yielded substantial benefits in terms of the stories and experiences that participants shared. Although this approach was more labour and time intensive, it was really this material that brought the Q study results to life from statistical factors to lively, impassioned discourses. The vividness of this material then provided a solid basis for later analysis.

It must be acknowledged openly that I am not a neutral analyst in this research. I have my own normative position and this undoubtedly has shaped the thesis and my analyses. However, this is an interpretive research project that does not claim objectivity in the first place. I am opposed to the practice of foxhunting and am motivated by animal protection. Nonetheless, my primary normative conviction lies in the argument that deliberative democracy can do much to enhance animal protection. I went to great effort to ensure that the viewpoints of those who disagree with me were included in this research. Although some of those organisations and individuals declined to take part, many others were happy to participate and I maintain that the empirical work undertaken in this thesis represents the range of viewpoints on hunting. There remains the possibility that some viewpoints may have been excluded from the Q study. In order to try and ensure that this was not the case, participants were asked during the Q sort and interview if they felt anything was missing from the set of Q statements, and were invited to reflect on the method itself. Furthermore, saturation point was reached during the first stage of the study (interviews to construct the concourse) where the same arguments were reiterated. Extensive interviews and discussion were carried out alongside the Q sort so that if participants were dissatisfied with the sorting process, they had the opportunity to express their views more fully.[[6]](#footnote-6) This additional information proved invaluable during the interpretation stage. The accounts of the four discourses presented in this thesis utilised material from interview and does not rely on the factor analysis alone.

In this thesis I do not attempt to evaluate the practice of hunting or offer arguments for or against it. This is beyond the scope of my knowledge and interests. The aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the hunting debate, based on the normative argument that deliberative democracy is conducive to enhancing animal protection goals.

***Protecting participants’ identity***

All participants in this research have been anonymised, with three exceptions. During fieldwork participants were given the option to remain anonymous, and many did; a number were happy to be identified. However, given the contentious nature of the hunting debate, I decided after careful consideration to maintain anonymity for everybody. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it is of utmost importance that participants do not, through their participation in this research, receive unwarranted attention relating to their viewpoints on hunting. Secondly, the research focus is *what* is said, not *who* says it; drawing attention to the identity of participants does not add value to the research and its objectives. There are three exceptions, where the identity and views of the participants in question are: a) well known publicly in the hunting debate; b) their identity is highly relevant to the debate. Furthermore, the nature of their involvement in the debate makes concealing their identity implausible as their views are easily recognisable. The implications of this are that demographic information is not provided on participants. Limited biographical information can be found in Appendix 1.1.

Q methodology does not aim to establish that certain groups of people subscribe to certain viewpoints. The sample size is small and participants were selected strategically (see Watts and Stenner 2012, p70) according to a diversity of viewpoints on hunting. Whilst this did ensure recruiting people with a range of experiences (for example, a background in hunt sabbing or participation in countryside sports), demographic characteristics such as age or gender were not taken into consideration as part of the recruitment strategy. Whilst I acknowledge that the inclusion of this information may have produced some interesting findings, any inferences from this would be extremely limited given that the aim of Q is not to make generalisable claims about the views of the general public of a wider population and the participants were not selected with this in mind. However, Q can be considered a kind of generalisation: the factor arrays are themselves generalisations, but as Steven Brown puts it, ‘the generalizations are to the universe of subjectivity communicability rather than to the universe of demographic characteristics with which surveys are concerned’ (email correspondence, 17th August 2015). In other words, Q aims to capture the relevant shared viewpoints on the topic at hand, and generalises about those shared views rather than generalising to who holds those views (see also Thomas and Baas 1992).

## Section 1.4: original contributions

This research makes significant contributions in two major areas, deliberative democracy and animal protection. In addition to this the thesis straddles political theory and empirical social science. It brings together cohesive theoretical foundations with an extensive body of empirical findings. The thesis has implications for deliberative systems theory, animal ethics literature and the animal protection movement. It is also the most in-depth and contemporary analysis of the hunting debate in Britain. Previous studies have analysed the role of prominent actors and organisations (e.g. Anderson 2006; Plumb and Marsh 2013; Toke 2010); this thesis identifies and tracks the progress of hunting discourses in different sites in the deliberative system in a holistic manner.

***Deliberative Democracy***

The predominant approach to analysing public space in the deliberative system involves assessing the balance of discourses in public space (see Stevenson and Dryzek 2014). This emphasises inclusivity as the primary criterion for evaluation. Ideally communication in public space should be unconstrained and ‘multiple perspectives articulated’ (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, p35). In public space, authentic features of deliberative communication may be absent. This is not problematic from a systems perspective because it is not necessary to find all features of deliberation in one time and place. It may also be the case that non-deliberative actions harbour deliberative benefits that come to fruition at some later point. However, the assertion that non-deliberative acts have deliberative benefits remains vague without empirical analysis (see Owen and Smith 2015; Hadley 2015a).

To focus on the balance of discourses in public space is to consider ‘who is saying what and where?’ This involves examining different settings and analysing which discourses are contested in that space. I take a distinct and novel approach. Rather than focusing on settings, in this thesis I examine the substantive content of each discourse and evaluate its deliberative quality. I look to discursive substance to draw inferences about contestation. This approach helps shift focus from individual interactions to discursive ones. This offers an insight into the qualitatively different ways in which discourses are contested: what implications does this have for systemic deliberative capacity? We can talk about the deliberative benefits of non-deliberative acts, but what of antagonistic or polarising contestation? Is the contestation of discourses in public space necessarily uniform in substance and is it always good? Owen and Smith (2015) raise this question when they caution systems theorists against an over-reliance on the balance of discourses in public space. My approach enables evaluation of authenticity at the discursive level as well as inclusivity. On the one hand, if contestation between discourses is merely *ad hominem*, then it offers less substantive deliberative potential. On the other, there could be cases where name-calling induces reflection. These claims require empirical investigation. It is not sufficient to assume latent deliberative credibility. My approach is a step in this direction; analysing discourses enables us to keep analysis at a higher level than individual exchanges, which is more conducive to a systemic approach. However, it also responds to Owen and Smith’s reservations by upholding the importance of deliberative quality in public space.

The thesis also contributes to emerging debates and literature on deliberative systems through empirical analysis of public/private space and transmission. Whilst Dryzek’s model is the best suited to empirical research, the division of the deliberative system into distinct settings is in reality problematic. In my analysis, the distinction between private and public space is downgraded in importance. Although there is a conceptual division, this is not maintained on empirical investigation. Research participants often shared experiences that fell into a quasi-public space. For example, hunt sabotaging is not formally a public act and like much direct action activism is somewhat clandestine in nature. It seems absurd however to consider it as part of private space given that it takes place out in the open countryside, often on public land, and is usually captured on video. In addition, participants often shared personal experiences and conversations that did not take place in public forums, but were essential ingredients in peoples’ viewpoints. These kind of conversations are akin to ‘everyday talk’ and contribute to preference-formation (Mansbridge 1999). Beyond preference-formation, direct and personal experiences of hunting were foundational to some discourses (see section 4.2). Dryzek suggests that private space is inaccessible in the deliberative system, but my research offers some limited insight into conversations that may be thought of as private. In a real-life deliberative system, private and public space are difficult to distinguish in qualitative analysis.

My analysis of transmission in chapter seven further highlights the complexities of studying deliberative systems in the real world. Conventionally systems theorists conceptualise transmission as from public to empowered space (see Boswell *et al* forthcoming). In order for a deliberative system to be democratic we can expect concerns from the public sphere to reach decision-makers, who respond accordingly. A deficit occurs when this linear transmission from public to empowered space is blocked somehow (Ercan *et al* 2015, p12) However, my analysis of three transmission mechanisms finds that transmission flows across and within different settings in the deliberative system – not just in a linear fashion.

Ultimately this raises questions about how we conceptualise the deliberative system for empirical research. My findings suggest that the components of Dryzek’s deliberative system are not as distinct as one might hope. In doing so, I provide an impetus for systems theorists to further develop theory-led models that take into consideration the messiness of the real world deliberative system.

***Animal ethics and animal protection***

The thesis also makes an important contribution to the burgeoning field of animal ethics and politics (see for example, Cochrane 2010; Garner and O’Sullivan 2016). This research contributes to existing literature by examining in detail the theoretical compatibility between animal rights and deliberative democracy. This runs contra to previous analyses of the two (see Humphrey and Stears 2006; Hadley 2015a) that have focussed on incompatibility. I unpack the relationship between deliberative democracy and animals in far more depth than previous scholars. Furthermore, I introduce the notion of the deliberative system as a feasible framework through which to analyse animal issues. Importantly, the systems approach recognises that direct action activism can contribute to deliberative democracy. Nonetheless, I maintain that such tactics be deployed with caution and reflexivity (Parry forthcoming).

This research comprises the most in-depth study into the hunting debate and attitudes towards hunting. The empirical findings provide a contemporary analysis of the debate, but also go beyond this topic. The Q study aptly demonstrates how views on hunting are intimately linked to broader attitudes towards animals and nonhuman nature. This shows that the hunting debate is not only about hunting – it is about animal ethics, the British countryside, rights and politics. Moreover, my findings illustrate the high correlation between two animal protection perspectives – rights and welfare – which are often expounded as mutually exclusive. This is an important finding for the animal protection movement: pro-hunting lobbyists frequently attempt to divide the movement by highlighting the supposed binary between welfare and rights. My work shows that for hunting at least, these two viewpoints have far more in common than not.

## Section 1.5: structure of the thesis

The thesis is comprised of nine chapters. The empirical work is ostensibly divided according to the components of the deliberative system. The first two chapters focus on theory and provide a solid foundation for the analysis that follows. The first chapter provides an introduction to the central elements of the research project and outlines the significance and contribution of this thesis, to both deliberative democracy and animal protection.

The second chapter is a comprehensive discussion of the political representation of animals. It begins by outlining why nonhuman animals deserve representation in the first place. Primarily I argue that animals have interests that are directly affected by political decisions, and that this justifies their inclusion under the all-affected principle of democracy. My argument draws on established concepts in animal rights and green political theory, but ultimately seeks to justify the representation of animals from within democratic theory. The remainder of chapter two is dedicated to reviewing the existing literature on nonhuman representation. Finally, I outline discursive representation as the most feasible approach to representing animals.

Chapter three covers deliberative democratic theory, the theoretical framework through which the hunting debate is evaluated. The aim of this chapter is to establish that deliberative democracy can enhance animal protection; this is necessary to justify a deliberative analysis of the hunting debate. I first provide an overview of the theory and its various developments over the past 25 years. The second part outlines the compatibility of deliberative democracy with improving animal protection. In this section I also consider challenges and objections to a deliberative approach. The final part of the chapter is dedicated to deliberative systems and considers how the systems approach might alleviate some of the prior objections.

Chapter four is a comprehensive analysis of public discourses on hunting. This includes the Q study and results in a step-by-step guide of the entire process. This is followed by a narrative descriptive account of the four discourses. Chapter five follows on from here with my analysis of inclusivity and authentic deliberation in public space, based on the qualitative data collected during the Q study. The analysis employs a novel approach to evaluating public space that examines the characteristics of the discourses themselves, rather than individual communicative sites.

In chapter six, I move on to analyse the hunting debate in empowered space. The analysis comprises documentary analysis of Parliamentary debates pertaining to hunting, complemented by interviews with MPs and Peers. The aims of this chapter are twofold: I first examine the extent to which the debate in empowered space reflects the four public discourses; secondly I provide an assessment of deliberative quality in Westminster. I also discuss the themes of class war and party politics which proliferate in empowered space.

Chapter seven examines transmission in the deliberative system. I analyse three key mechanisms in the hunting debate – a leading anti-hunting lobbying organisation, a pro-hunting broadsheet paper and a Conservative anti-hunting group. All three use very different methods to transmit messages, with varying levels of deliberative quality. Notably, my analysis shows that transmission does not only occur in a linear way from public to empowered space but can take place within and across different settings in the deliberative system.

Accountability and meta-deliberation are covered in chapter eight. I look for a minimal form of accountability – empowered space providing narrative account of its actions to others in empowered and public space. Unfortunately, even this type of accountability is lacking in the hunting debate. It is difficult to obtain a clear account of the decision-making process behind the 2015 proposed amendments to the Hunting Act and there are no formal accountability mechanisms. Meta-deliberation appears at moments, with individuals well aware of the polarised nature of the hunting debate. In public space in particular, there appears to be an interest in a more deliberative debate. However, these ambitions occur only at the individual level with nothing to indicate systemic reflexivity.

Chapter nine draws together the analyses from throughout the thesis and provides an evaluation on the capacity of the entire deliberative system. Here I analyse the hunting debate in terms of its inclusivity, authenticity and consequentiality in turn. I also discuss the limitations of my research and lay out possible future research. Finally I consider the future of the hunting debate and suggest ways in which deliberative capacity might be enhanced.

# Chapter Two: representing animals

**Introduction**

Representative democracy, once perceived as the poor relative of direct democracy (Urbinati and Warren 2008), has in recent years received renewed attention in democratic theory. Traditional models of representation emphasise the election of representatives by a territorially-defined constituency. Such an approach cannot account for the complexity of political representation today. Increasingly the represented are diffuse; political representatives are not always authorised through election. The purpose of this chapter is to establish a normative theoretical basis for the discursive representation of animals. These arguments are further developing in the following chapter on why deliberative democracy offers the conditions under which animal representation can flourish. Together, these two concepts form the normative basis for my empirical analysis of the hunting debate. It is first necessary to outline why animals are deserving of political representation in the first place. My reasoning here draws primarily on democratic and green political theory to establish a firm *political* basis for the representation of animals. I revisit concepts of political representation to address the challenge of representing nonhuman animals. Ultimately, I argue that it is possible to achieve political representation of animals through discourses.

The chapter proceeds in three parts. I first offer a justification of animal representation that relies on established democratic principles. The second section reviews relevant literature on nonhuman representation. I utilise Michael Saward’s ‘representative claim’ (2006a, 2006b) as an analytical lens through which to focus my critique of previous contributions to representation. The final section introduces the concept of discursive representation and outlines the reasoning behind its endorsement in this thesis. I build on Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2008) advocacy of discursive representation and go further in highlighting how it is particularly well-suited to the representation of animals. Although discursive representation of animals already occurs in reality, I argue that interrogation and contestation of such discourses could serve to support animal protection goals – particularly when deployed under deliberative conditions.

## Section 2.1: why animals matter

Before considering how to go about representing animals, it is first necessary to outline *why* animals ought to be represented in the first place. I argue primarily that animals possess interests and that those interests demand political representation. If we accept that animals’ interests are affected by political decisions, then animal perspectives should be taken into consideration in the democratic process. The all-affected principle of democracy justifies the inclusion of animals in democratic processes (Parry forthcoming). They are affected by democratic decisions and thus deserve political representation in decision-making processes. The arguments advanced below take one step back in a sense, to justify the notion that animals have interests in the first place. Nonetheless, my reasoning is rooted within democratic theory to provide a distinctly political approach to the representation of animals.

In accordance with ‘classic’ deliberative principles (Mansbridge 2010, p10) Habermas emphasises reciprocity and consensus. Decisions reached through deliberation should be those that all those affected would agree to ‘insofar as the latter participate in rational discourses’ (Habermas 1996, p127). This definition of reciprocity and rationality precludes the inclusion of animals given their inability to deliberate rationally in human terms. However, Eckersley (1999) argues that this not is a robust justification for excluding nonhuman nature. Obviously in the case of animals reciprocity is lacking – an animal cannot assent to a human decision or come to an agreement in a contractual sense. This fact is used to refute the notion of animal rights; an animal cannot claim its rights and what’s more, it cannot reciprocate by respecting the rights of others. This forms part of Habermas’ reasons for excluding animals from his discourse ethic. Likewise, Rawls excludes animals from his theory of justice on this basis (Garner 2013). Habermas emphasises the priority of rational argument in deliberative dialogue. The privilege of rationality has since been critiqued from within deliberative democracy itself (see for example, Chambers 2003; Dryzek 2010; Young 1996) and is examined in detail in the following chapter. For the time being it will suffice to say that excluding communication other than rational argument raises significant moral issues and risks excluding animals as well as a variety of humans.

The Rawlsian notion of reciprocity – that in order to be a rights-holder, one must be able to actively claim it – is false. As Joel Feinberg points out, it is not necessary to understand a political concept in order to benefit from it (1974, p47). I may still benefit from having universal human rights, as enshrined by international law, even if I do not understand the concept of ‘rights’. Furthermore, it is not necessary for me to actively claim that right *for myself* – my claim still exists. I may never need to claim it myself, but that doesn’t mean that my claim ceases to be valid.[[7]](#footnote-7) Feinberg goes on to point out that rights can, and are, claimed by proxies on behalf of infants and other humans who cannot exercise reciprocity and rationality themselves. For Feinberg, the morally relevant feature that merits representation is not whether someone or something can actively claim their rights. Instead, he considers whether a being will benefit from the bestowment of that right, or be injured by its denial. Animals and future generations are ‘the sorts of beings that *can* have rights’ (1974, p50; emphasis in original); they have interests, which arise from the fact that they can directly benefit or be harmed from the actions of others. And the reason they can directly benefit is because they have a value, in and of themselves (see also Cochrane 2013, p658; Eckersley 1999, p39). Feinberg juxtaposes this against ‘mere things’ – objects that may have a value to others such as a building with aesthetic and cultural value – but that do not have ‘a good of their own’. In other words, we might seek to preserve an antique building, but this is not done for the sake of the building itself, but for the sake of the value it brings to others (1974, p49). By contrast, animals have some level of consciousness and a capacity for suffering which entails the possession of interests.

Possession of interests is a *morally relevant characteristic* (Garner 2013). How and if interests are satisfied has a real consequence on how life goes for that animal (Cochrane 2013, p658); it has a direct impact on the lives of animals; it affects their well-being, welfare, health, and death. It is not difficult to think of examples. Policy regulating farming practices affects animals on multiple levels regarding slaughter, breeding programmes or housing facilities. Communicative competence is *not* a morally relevant characteristic. By positing communicative competence as a defining characteristic, Habermas is vulnerable to a number of objections. The argument from marginal cases is a well-worn one: if Habermas excludes animals on the basis that they are communicatively incompetent then he necessarily also excludes humans that are similarly disadvantaged, including babies and people with severe cognitive impairment. This leaves him in a rather morally uncomfortable position, exacerbated by his privilege of rational argument which leads to further exclusion – of alternative forms of communication such as rhetoric, storytelling or other linguistic devices (see Young 1996, 1999).

There is an alternative response to Habermas here – that nonhuman animals and nature *are* communicatively competent, and that humans should recognise this capacity. Dryzek (2000) has argued that nonhuman nature is both political and social - part of the social realm that Habermas excludes it from. Dryzek, in an attempt to ‘rescue communicative rationality from Habermas’ (2000, p148) extends this capacity to the nonhuman realm by recognising nature’s discursive agency through nonverbal means. Eckersley (1999) suggests that Habermas’ exclusion of nature from the social realm arises from his assertion (in early works) that our relationship with nonhumans is and should be always instrumental, scientific and objective in nature. For Habermas, the overriding principle when it comes to deliberative democracy is the capacity to communicate in the necessary discursive terms. Because animals do not possess this capacity, they *cannot* be admitted into the discursive social realm (Eckersley 1999, p34-5). To do so would be to rely upon metaphysical speculation and folkloric interpretation of nonhuman nature (on his view), since we can only ever know nature through our own human understanding. However as Eckersley points out, positing scientific knowledge as instrumental and objective is a *faux pas* on Habermas’ part. Scientific knowledge - no matter how rigorous - is still politically and socially situated in some way. It is produced for some reason, funded by some body, used to support and refute various ethical positions. Science has a context and ethical dimensions; it is never completely free from the social realm in the way that Habermas suggests.

Dryzek’s approach is not built on this basis, however. Instead he seeks to reconcile the Habermasian approach with green political theory by offering a theory of green democracy that recognises the communicative capacity of nonhuman nature. He does this by suggesting that ‘audible’ signals emanate from our biological surroundings. If humans could learn to ‘listen effectively’ (2000, p149) then we might be able to understand feedback from nature and effectively respond to its needs. Dryzek is not alone in wanting to bring nature into the social and political realm; Hobson draws attention to the fact that animals ‘intersect daily lives as food, pets, amusement, wildlife, neighbours, helpers, nuisance, etc.; and thus constitute a pivotal part of socialities and political economies’ (2007, p251). This intersectionality means that animals are an intrinsic part of human discourses and political processes. However, even if we accept that nature can communicate in the way described by Dryzek, this still does not reach Habermas’ standard of rational communicability (Eckersley 1999, p37).

Recognising the role of animals in the human and social realm is necessary, especially on a practical level. Human lives intersect animals’ in so many ways and this interaction is one way of encouraging people to care more about animals’ plight. However, Feinberg notes that the protection of a ‘mere thing’ is carried out not for the value of that thing-in-itself, but because its preservation has a value for others. To value animals because it also benefits humans in some way is to treat them as ‘mere things’, because it is done for *our* benefit, not *theirs*. Animals have a value in themselves, regardless of human benefit or interaction. Communicative competence and human-animal interaction are both morally irrelevant: nonhuman animals possess interests regardless of their relation to humans.

It is worth noting at this point that Feinberg makes a distinction between sentient animals (having some level of consciousness, and possessing interests) and nonsentient nature (which he takes to include plants and possibly ecosystems). He argues that these ‘things’ cannot have interests, because they cannot themselves directly enjoy the benefits of a right or duty bestowed upon them. Feinberg does recognise that plants are a step up from inanimate objects, and that is possible to talk of what is good or bad for a plant in itself. However, he points out that it is also possible to talk of what is good or bad for inanimate objects in a trivial sense, and concludes that plants are *not* the type of thing that can possess interests and thus do not merit representation (1974, p9). Cochrane (2013, p658) draws a similar distinction; although plants can have ‘biological goods’ that are necessary for their survival or flourishing, this is quite different to being capable of conscious experience which is necessary in order to derive benefit from something. For Cochrane the capacity for conscious experience provides a powerful basis for animals possessing rights, unlike plants that are not capable of such levels of consciousness. This thesis is primarily concerned with sentient nonhuman animals and not nonsentient nature. I endorse Cochrane’s position: animals have a level of consciousness that also deems them to have interests, and that interests are sufficient to demand representation.[[8]](#footnote-8) This is not to say that nonsentient nature is not worthy of political representation. Nonsentient nature also intersects with politics, is affected by policy outcomes and deserves inclusion in democratic processes. However, to lump animals and all of nature together is to do disservice to both. They are different types of things with different qualities which should be recognised accordingly. This distinction, although important and relevant for nonhuman representation, is not *morally relevant*. The thesis is concerned with the representation of animals and not nonsentient nature. However, the arguments put forward here draw heavily on green political theory and arguably are applicable to nonsentient nature as well as animals.

## Section 2.2: the political representation of animals

So far I have argued that the possession of interests is sufficient to demand the political representation of animals. However, this does not tell us anything about *how* to represent them. In deliberative democracy, the ‘inclusion of all affected interests’ principle (in the ideal situation) does not require representation, instead advocating for direct participation of the affected parties (Eckersley 1999, p26). However, when someone is unable to articulate their own interests, how can other deliberators possibly consider them? In the case of animals *representation* is necessary if they are to be given equal consideration.

How might we go about representing animals in an appropriate way for deliberation? Pitkin’s classic (1967) account considers four formulations of representation: formalistic, descriptive, symbolic and substantive. For our purposes the most relevant relationship is substantive representation – where the representative acts for or on behalf of the interests of the represented (Hendriks 2009b). In all four definitions Pitkin emphasises the relationship between principal (the represented) and agent (representative). Since a substantive representative is supposed to act in the best interests of the represented, the key question for Pitkin is whether representatives act in a way that advances these interests. For animals however, this is problematic: how do we know exactly what their best interests are?

Similarly in Pitkin’s other three views on representation, the relationship between principal and agent is also crucial. In formalistic representation, the agent is *authorised* by the principal via the medium of elections to represent their interests. There is usually some negotiation between the two, on exactly what the representative will do once elected. This helps form the notion of *accountability* – if these agreements are not kept to, then the principal or constituent has the opportunity to demand an explanation, revoke authorisation from the agent, or remove them from the process completely at the next election. The agent also has the opportunity to explain their actions to the principal. It is obvious why this account of representation is unsuitable for representing animals; the elements of authorisation and accountability - central to the above account - are absent and not even possible in the case of nonhuman animals (O’Neill 2001, p483).

This also rules out another possible mode of representation, the ‘politics of presence’ (Phillips 1996, p141) or descriptive representation (Pitkin 1967). The politics of presence is often advocated for the representation of other marginalised groups in society, in virtue of the chosen representative sharing some relevant characteristics or shared identity with the represented group. This is premised on the basis that *who* does the representing is important, rather than solely focusing on *what* is being represented. Beyond authorisation, it is a form of legitimacy. In crude terms and for illustrative purposes, it comes down to saying that a white man cannot represent a black woman. This is in contrast to – but not necessarily at the exclusion of – the ‘politics of ideas’ (Phillips 1996, p141) or symbolic representation (Pitkin 1967) where the most important thing is *what* is being represented. This is the liberal notion that agents are authorised to represent *ideas*, regardless of what shared identity they may or may not have with the constituency. A pure politics of presence will not be possible in the case of animals. However, the politics of presence is arguably impossible with regards to marginalised human groups as well, once we acknowledge the internal diversity amongst any group with some sort of shared identity. As Eckersley astutely notes, ‘a female representative can hardly speak for all women; a black representative can hardly speak for all blacks and so on. No-one, it seems, can ever stand in for anyone else’ (1999, p30).

Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) develop this argument further, suggesting that it is impossible to fully represent even a single individual as a whole. An individual at any one time subscribes to a number of overlapping or even contradicting identities, ideas and perspectives. Tanasescu echoes this sentiment in what she terms ‘the irreducible multiplicity of subjects’ (2014, p14). Her terminology is borrowed from mathematics, but she essentially argues along the same lines as Dryzek and Niemeyer. Even when the represented might appear on the surface to be a unified whole, it is in its very essence, multiple. The implications for representation are that ‘to claim presence as unproblematic and self-evident and unity of identity as primary is misleading’ (Tanasescu 2014, p47). In other words, anyone claiming to represent a seemingly well-defined constituency, or even a single individual, as a well-defined, bounded thing, is not giving the whole picture – and in fact *can never* give the whole picture.

This is the line of argument that Saward (2006a; 2006b) draws attention to in his analysis of representational dynamics. Saward emphasises the aesthetic and creative elements of the representative process, highlighting that although ‘no representation captures everything about those represented’ (O’Neill 2001, p486), representation also makes visible aspects that without it might not have been made visible to an audience. A useful analogy is made with art (see Saward 2006 p310, Tanasescu 2014, p45); a painting (or even a photograph, for that matter) will never be an exact replica of its subject. Painted from a particular angle, other viewpoints will be negated. The subject’s appearance under different light conditions will not be captured in a single artistic moment. On the other hand, the painting will ‘make visible’ (Saward 2006a, p313) elements that could not have been enjoyed just by virtue of the subject’s presence – the stylistic interpretation of the artist, perhaps an underlying symbolic meaning:

It is a picture, a portrait, an image of that electorate, not the thing itself. It is no closer to being the thing itself than a Rembrandt self-portrait was to Rembrandt himself (Saward 2006a, p310).

There are limits to the artistic analogy; namely that political representation inherently includes appraisal of the represented, whereas the painter is not similarly obliged (Tanasescu 2014, p46). However, the analogy still serves to illustrate the aesthetic aspect of representation. The discursive psychology employed by Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) and Tanasescu’s irreducible multiplicity both ground Saward’s representative dynamics in the context of political representation, where we can speak of (in the first instance) representing humans. What then, of animals? Casting doubt on the ‘unproblematic whole’ of the standard account of representation, Saward’s work makes more complex the process of representing humans. By suggesting that the represented can never be taken as a given whose interests can be ‘read off’ (2006a, p310), even traditional territorially defined constituencies seem to be more problematic, if it is never possible to *fully* represent them. By the same token, recognising the represented as inherently multiple and complex also opens up the possibility for more innovative forms of representing nonhuman animals.

According to the classic account of representation summarised at the outset, questions about representing animals might go something like, “how can you ever know what an animal’s interests are, in order to represent them?” This question suggests that, in order to represent an animal, we first need to know what its interests are, in order to reflect them through representation. The issue is then how to discover these interests and decide who might be the best representative of such interests. However, this question does not take into account the constructed nature of the representative process and the assertion that representation is *never* simply a reflection of the represented. I argue that whilst animals do have interests and these merit representation, precise knowledge of those interests need not be the central concern of representation. With this in mind, the proceeding section examines existing offerings for representing nonhuman nature and considers the ways in which they have advanced the representation of nonhuman animals.

### Section 2.2.1: Goodin’s Internalisation and the ascription of value

Robert Goodin (1996) agrees that the interests of nonhuman nature ought to be represented in political decision-making. However, Goodin suggests that nature’s interests are objective and discoverable: ‘to be discerned rather than creatively construed’ (Saward 2006b, p189). He goes on to argue that in a deliberative setting, nonhuman nature can be represented through a process of internalisation, whereby deliberators incorporate the interests of nature into their own interests. These are then expressed during deliberation. Goodin acknowledges that under this system, it is unlikely that ‘people will necessarily internalise nature’s interests completely or represent them perfectly’ (1996, p844) but that perhaps under the circumstances, internalisation is the best that can be currently hoped for.

Saward’s objection is that although Goodin recognises that people are unlikely to internalise or represent nonhuman interests perfectly, he appears to assert that nature holds a package of discoverable interests, and it is only human ineptitude that prevents their discovery and reflection:

The idea that in principle these interests *could be* represented ‘completely’ or ‘perfectly’ reinforces their presumed single and unalterable character. These interests require no active mediation and little interpretation; the appreciator’s role remains that of a passive receptor. Interests are to be *read off* nature, not *read into* it (Saward 2006b, p189; emphasis in original).

Although Goodin breaks with the traditional account of electoral and aggregative democracy – arguing against the notion of one person, one vote democracy (1996, p844) his approach does not take into account the possibility that representation is always created in some sense. By contrast, I argue that the knowability of the represented is not the central concern of the representative process because there is no such thing as the ‘unproblematic whole’. This enables us to readdress that common objection to representing animals – “how can you know what the animal actually needs or wants?” - by saying that this is not our central concern. This is not to say that some sort of knowledge about animals is not necessary to represent them – but we have to accept that *we can never have exact, precise knowledge*. This is not necessarily a hindrance. Saward points out that since all claims to representation are just that – claims – then they are not infallible but rather contestable, and should be contested. This is not only indicative of the dynamic nature of representation – rather than a static reflection of fixed interests – but also marks the suitability of a deliberative setting in which claims are open to contestation. This is also what Goodin advocates, quite rightly suggesting that the interests of nonhuman nature are more likely to receive equal consideration under deliberative conditions than otherwise.

A further issue in Goodin’s internalisation relates to the fundamental value of nonhuman nature itself. The way in which he envisages internalisation is reminiscent of Habermas (1996):

…nature’s interests will be represented by people only if those people come to internalize and incorporate nature’s interests within their own – only if, in the weakest sense of ‘interests’, people come to *take* an interest in nature’s interests (Goodin 1996, p844; emphasis in original).

This appears to suggest that for internalisation to occur people must situate the interests of nonhuman others in their own interests. Like Habermas, stimulus for representation is derived from human-animal interaction. In Goodin’s defence, he does not assert this as a normative position (unlike Habermas) nor does he limit the interests of nature to those invoked by such interactions (1996, p844). This is a fundamental question though: what is the value of nature, if we can never really have perfect knowledge of it (regardless of representation)? For Habermas, nature’s value is instrumental, found in human-animal interactions (Eckersley 1999). He is particularly keen to avoid ascribing a sentimental or mythical value to nature, which he fears will occur if he were to admit nature entirely into the ‘human’ social realm. This is because Habermas wishes to retain focus on rationality and argues that we can only ever ‘know’ nonhuman nature through objective, scientific knowledge. He fears that admitting normative ideas that are not based on such knowledge risks detracting from rationality in the discourse ethic (Dews 1995, p162).

Habermas’ concern here, I argue, is partly rooted in a particular conception of representation which relies on the representative to act as a reflector of the represented’s interests. In order to do this, we need access to and understanding of the interests of the represented; this is much harder to achieve with animals than humans, it would seem. In this chapter however I argue for a different conception of representation, where knowledge of interests is not the central focus. Moreover, I suggest that the ascription of value that Habermas appears to fear can actually be a positive aspect in the political representation of animals. It is through such rich linguistic devices that animals are represented in a way which is often more powerful than the technicalities of science. This constructivist emphasis is also emphasised in Saward’s representative claim (2006a), discussed later in this chapter.

There is a caveat accompanying the constructivist perspective. Whilst rejecting the Habermasian divide between ‘nature’ and ‘the social’, Vogel (1997) maintains that nature can only be valued morally in virtue of human-animal relations, because that value is constructed discursively through (exclusively human) language. So although he collapses the initial dichotomy, nature is still denied any sort of *agency* in a moral sense (Eckersley 1999, p39). For Vogel, without the discursive construction of value there is no value at all. Moreover, he maintains that discursive democracy must be essentially anthropocentric because after all, only humans can participate in it. Eckersley’s response is that

we should value other life-forms not only for the services and/or aesthetic delight they provide humankind, but also for their own sake, because they have their own unique modes of being and flourishing, their own special forms of agency (1999, p39).

Vogel’s point is that we can only ever know animals through a human lens, and thus can never know nature completely on its own terms. I agree that we can only ever know animals through our own human understanding. But even if these interests are not discoverable, this does not preclude attempting to represent them. Discursive representation of animals can give a sort of *added value* to animals in a pragmatic sense. Talking about animals is an important way in which we humans come to appreciate the value of other species. A fox living in Northamptonshire may well have interests and intrinsic value in itself that I can never fully understand. But when I talk about it in a certain way, it creates a stronger link between humans and animals and can help communicate the value of that animal. This communicative power is especially important in deliberation where the aim is for deliberators to consider the position of others. One of the strengths of Goodin’s internalisation lies in its reliance on the articulation and contestation of animal interests. In this sense, Goodin does advocate a *sort* of discursive representation. The distinction between discursive representation and Goodin’s approach is that the former is rooted in the constructivist understanding of representation, as expounded in section 2.3 of this chapter.

Goodin suggests that the internalisation of animal interests is an imperfect, best-we-can-hope-for solution. Unfortunately, I suspect that even this is overly optimistic when we consider the extent to which animals are marginalised. He considers how parents or guardians are assumed in some sense to represent the interests of their children, to ‘speak and act on their behalf’ (1996, p843) and that this incorporation of interests is uncontroversial. In this case, legitimacy is derived from shared identity with and knowledge claims about the represented child. If we move from talking about human children to nonhuman animals, what begins as something uncontroversial suddenly becomes quite radical; the idea that a person can internalise the interests of an animal to the extent that they consider them on equal footing with their own interests. At this point in time, assuming that this kind of cognitive innovation is perhaps overly optimistic. Goodin’s internalisation is a valuable and feasible contribution to the representation of animals. But given their current marginalisation, animals at present require a stronger mode of representation that is based not only on individual internalisation but also on shared understanding articulated externally.

### Section 2.2.2: Dobson’s proxies and liberal leanings

A stronger solution is advocated by Andrew Dobson (1996) in his notion of proxy representation for animals. Dobson suggests that representatives are chosen from the lobby or movement community that is focused on the interests of the represented, such as the animal rights movement or environmental lobbies. Of course, it is unlikely that these movements have a single, unified position on many issues but this is not a problem in itself because ‘the issue will be settled by democratic debate – but only ever temporarily and always subject to democratic scrutiny’ (Dobson 1996, p133). This is in line with Saward’s argument that representative claims are just that – claims – and are always contestable. However, although Dobson acknowledges that we cannot know what the *exact* interests of other species are, he does suggest that

…we can pretty safely say that the interest of the species (let us say) that is being represented lies in being assured of the conditions to provide for its survival and its flourishing. The problem of knowledge, then, is one of knowing what the conditions for fulfilling the interest are, rather than what the interest itself is (Dobson 1996, p137).

Whilst the above can be attributed to common sense and is *practically reasonable*, it may still be problematic. Dobson suggests that the interests of other species are easily ‘read off’ and discoverable, and proposes what those interests are likely to be. Saward (2006b) argues in doing so, Dobson himself is part of the representative process, and the assumptions he makes about interests as survival and flourishing are significant because

The assumptions about flourishing and needs look general and reasonable, but in theory they are not the only ones that proxies might come up with. They are the theorists’ creations, his preferred representations of the problem. The creations are theoretical, but they are also political in a deep way: they involve particular claims about what interests are, how they need to be construed (Saward 2006b, p187).

Dobson, the theorist, participates in the representative process himself by making certain claims about interests, and putting forward the idea of a proxy representative that will stand for the needs of animals. There is nothing objectionable about this in itself, but examining such representative claims in light of Saward’s arguments illuminate aspects of the process that could otherwise remain obscured.

Dobson’s proxies are closely attached to traditional accounts of electoral representation. Keen to retain the central tenet of accountability, he suggests that proxy representatives could be elected from a proxy constituency. This is partly because he is committed to the one person, one vote democratic model (1996, p136) but also because an elected representative is likely to prove more effective when they can be held accountable by an electorate come election time (1996, p127). Although Dobson’s concern over accountability are justifiable,[[9]](#footnote-9) it is primarily related to accountability in the *liberal* democratic sense. According to Dryzek, Dobson (and Goodin, incidentally) are in the ‘making the most of liberal democracy’ camp (1996, p110) – they sit within the paradigm of liberal democracy and entailing institutional arrangements. Dobson seeks to represent animals within existing political institutions; representation tied to elections in well-defined constituencies. Dryzek instead suggests radical and systemic changes to existing democratic processes to ensure the inclusion of nonhuman nature.

### Section 2.2.3: Dryzek’s listening and legitimacy

Dryzek suggests that nature[[10]](#footnote-10) *does* have communicative capacity and that recognising this capacity is key to advancing the representation of nonhumans. He suggests that through ‘effective listening’ it is possible to interpret signals from nature (Dryzek 2000, p149). Saward is still critical; along with Goodin and Dobson, Dryzek seems to suggest that representation is a passive process on the part of the representative. Although he brings alive the represented with a sense of self-directness,[[11]](#footnote-11) the representative is still seen as a passive reflector of the ‘signals’ they receive (2006b, p190). However, Dryzek’s radical biocentric approach signals an important departure towards attempting to understand nature on its own terms. Although I ultimately argue for a more anthropocentric approach to representation through discourses, my approach is not entirely at odds with Dryzek. Indeed, it is possible to imagine a discourse that ‘listens’ to nature or animals. The only objection here is the assumption that a representative will simply repeat what they ‘hear’; this denies the performative aspect of representation. Nonetheless, Dryzek’s approach offers a possible solution for legitimacy in the representation of nonhumans.

It is self-evident to suggest that a representative should have some basis on which to justify their claims. It seems unreasonable that just anyone should suddenly decide they stand for the needs of animals (although of course, in everyday life this happens *all the time* – because whenever we speak about animals we are making a representative claim). Dryzek’s solution is that those closest to an ecological site or issue are best placed for ‘listening’ to its signals. Together they form a legitimate political unit centred on ‘awareness on the part of their human inhabitants of the biological surroundings that sustain them’ (2000, p157). This is more legitimate than a traditional constituency that is often defined arbitrarily. Nonetheless it is not difficult to imagine a situation where potential representatives disagree fundamentally about what their biological surroundings are potentially ‘saying’. This appears to certainly be the case regarding hunting. For the Countryside Alliance the British countryside is a landscape that has been man-made[[12]](#footnote-12) and it is man’s responsibility to maintain and manage it. Some anti-hunt groups conceive of the countryside as a rural idyll that absent man’s interference is a flourishing wilderness. Both viewpoints occur within a single bioregional boundary. Who is correct does not matter here. What matters is that such claims are contested in a deliberative setting, which is exactly what Dryzek envisages through his theory of discursive democracy.

Who exactly makes these claims remains crucial to the issue of representation because, in the case of animals, knowledge claims are the only possible source of legitimacy in the representative process. O’Neill (2001) points out that with nonhuman nature, elements of legitimacy are lacking – authorisation and accountability. O’Neill’s solution is that *some* legitimacy can be derived from knowledge on the part of the representative. In some ways this is a weak version of the politics of presence and Dobson’s proxies – someone with insight into the animal in question could legitimately represent it. However, O’Neill is at pains to remind us that such knowledge claims are just that – claims – and always contestable. Moreover, knowledge claims will always be socially and politically situated. Thus, because ‘the spokespersons for nature speak in different voices…such contestable forms of representation are the best we can hope for. Hence, disputes about the legitimacy of representation will properly remain at the centre of the deliberative politics of the environment’ (O’Neill 2001, p496-7).

Although it seems relatively uncontroversial to suggest that representatives have some insight into the subject they claim to represent, Tanasescu suggests that the role of such knowledge ‘is one of support rather than trump card: we can never gather enough knowledge about an-other that would also tell us how this being is to be represented’ (2014, p49). In other words, whilst knowledge of an animal or animals is important in the representative process, it is not the be all and end all of representation. Representation is never a simple reflection of the interests of the represented. Saward (2006a; 2006b) and Tanasescu (2014) argue that to focus on knowledge of objective interests and reflecting those interests is to actually *deny* the essential nature of the represented, whether that is a human or humans, nonhumans or nonsentient nature:

…the task of the political representative is to make visible certain beings that would otherwise remain invisible. But this activity does not have to rely on a predefined being of the represented, nor does it have to suppose the existence of interests that can be plucked from the consciousness or the mere existence of another (Tanasescu 2014, p46).

Tanasescu goes on to argue that the key concept central to representation ‘is not anything to do with objectivity, or the real interests of non-humans, but rather the kinds of relations that we want to promote’ (2014, p49). This is a particularly powerful statement. When asked the question, “how can you represent animals when you don’t know what they want?” we can now respond by saying what is important in representing animals is promoting a particular type of relationship with animals. For example, any vegan will know that they are frequently asked questions like “what if you had some rescued chickens and they just laid the eggs by themselves – would you eat them then?” or “what if the milk is free-range and organic and ethically produced - would you drink the milk then?” There are a variety of pithy retorts available, but for our purpose the relevant response is that in abstaining from all animal products, I advocate a particular relationship with animals: one that does not use the things they produce for my own ends. This is a representation because in advancing this type of relationship, I am implying that the animals concerned should be treated in this way – so I am saying something about the animal itself: it is a thing that should be treated in a certain way. And in order to do this I am not necessarily saying anything about the objective interests or my knowledge about animals. Rather, this representation embodies arguments presented earlier about why animals ought to be represented in the first place. Representation does not sit in a vacuum but is imbued with social meaning and context. Underlying context and meaning form the basis of discourse; this is the mode of representation that I argue is most suited to representing animals.

## Section 2.3: the multiple self

Tanasescu (2014) borrows from Badiou’s mathematical lexicon the term ‘irreducible multiplicity’ – the notion that an individual is not a unified thing but it is, in its very essence, multiple. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) employ this line of reasoning in their advocacy of discursive representation, finding their inspiration in discursive psychology. Tanasescu asserts that it is the process of representation itself that posits the notion of unity onto the represented (2014, p47). This is in line with Dryzek’s definition of a discourse as

…a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts. Discourses construct meanings and relationships, helping to define common sense and legitimate knowledge (2005, p9).

Discursive representation enables the inclusion of more than just interests in representation. Interests do not exist in a vacuum, void of context and pre-existing values. Discursive representation recognises this; each discourse bringing with it a set of assumptions and judgements (Dryzek 2005, p9) from which those interests may have been constructed. Analysing discourses enables us to acknowledge the normative baggage that comes with seemingly uncontroversial assumptions; illustrated by Dobson’s assumptions about survival and flourishing (1996, p137; Saward 2006b, p187).

Elster’s ‘multiple self’ (1986) suggests that it is never possible to fully represent an individual – instead representation is a *partial* view of the represented: giving *some* of their interests and values (Dryzek 2010, p5). Consider again the analogy with art: the painting can never incorporate every aspect of its subject. Consequently it is impossible to represent the individual so prized by liberal representative democracy (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008, p5). Instead we are left with an incomplete portrait. It is up to the representative to complete the painting and provide the finishing flourish: this is the aesthetic element of representation. The point about the multiple self is that it engages with and subscribes to a number of different and multifaceted ideas, identities, values and discourses. We arrive at the multiple self because the diversity found within groups is also true of an individual; we are confronted with a diversity of viewpoints within one individual. If the whole individual cannot be represented, what *can* be? It may not be possible to represent a whole person, but it is possible to represent a whole discourse.

## Section 2.4: discursive representation

If political equality is to be upheld, there must be an alternative to liberal representation ensuring that as many perspectives as possible are voiced. This is crucial when it comes to representing nonhumans. Those without a voice need to be heard and given the opportunity to participate in the political process in some way. One of the reasons that deliberative democracy is favoured by green political theorists is that deliberative conditions are a better way of ensuring that such perspectives are heard, as opposed to political communication collapsing into a ‘marketplace of ideas’ (Hendriks 2009a, p179) where the loudest and most powerful voices are more likely to dominate.

Discursive representation is the most suitable and feasible way of ensuring that as many viewpoints as possible are represented. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) suggest this may be the case even for well-defined human constituencies. The need to represent as many viewpoints as possible is especially astute given that animals lack the ability to participate directly. Moreover, for discursive representation proportionality is not given as much significance as in liberal aggregative democracy; there is a value in all discourses being shared, even if there are no corresponding constituents to articulate them – hence the importance of a ‘devil’s advocate’ type role (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008, p482).

Discourses have an endurance that a single opinion on a topic does not share. A discourse can consist of stories and narratives that may weave together individual opinions into a *shared* viewpoint. It is a viewpoint shared by a number of people, and provides a common frame of reference for understanding different issues. Discourses may overlap and share certain features. Most importantly, overlaps may form points of convergence which the deliberative process can foster. The fact that discourses are shared viewpoints means that there are likely to be points that can be agreed upon, even if there are other areas where there is profound disagreement (see Gutmann and Thompson 1996).

It is worth noting that discursive representation may be the preferable option for representing humans as well as animals. As Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) point out, issues such as climate change and international trade are global; increasingly tackled on an international or supranational level. Thus the classic accounts of representation are found wanting – the represented are no longer (although of course, Saward would argue, have never been) well-defined, bounded territorial entities; typically *demoi* are fractured and hard to define (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008; Hendriks 2009b). Furthermore, potential representatives are diffuse and similarly hard to define. Both Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) and Hendriks (2009b) draw attention to how the increasing significance of governance networks problematises classic accounts of representation. For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), although the global political authority on climate change action, lacks direct authorisation and accountability from a defined constituency. It is possible however to reconceptualise notions of authority and accountability, as Stevenson and Dryzek (2014) do in their analysis of global climate governance. They seek both in the extent to which discourses found in the public sphere and civil society are reflected by decision-making bodies such as the IPCC. Hendriks (2009b) suggests that most forms of political representation are now without authorisation and accountability in the traditional sense, meaning that democratic legitimacy must necessarily be sought in other places.

### Section 2.4.1: the communicative resonance of discourses

Dryzek (2000) warns against anthropomorphising in discursive representation, but it must be acknowledged, as Vogel does, that human representations of animals will likely be constructed in relation to human understanding and value. Discursive representation is weakly anthropocentric, given that it relies on an exclusively human mode of communication. However, it is the linguistic content of a discourse that also makes it potentially valuable tool to advance the representation of animals.

Saward (2006b) suggests that the aesthetic aspect of representation - from which emerges the likes of metaphor and rhetoric – could be beneficial in strengthening nonhuman representation. He interprets the work of Dryzek and the other green political theorists discussed here as providing a powerful set of metaphors which are in themselves ‘potentially powerful political arguments, aesthetically compelling and culturally resonant representations of nature’ (2006b, p196). The point here is that the representation of an animal, even if it seems far removed from the animal itself and its actual experience, can still have real, political consequence for that animal (Baker 2001, p197). The narratives emerging from pro-animal discourses can have a profound resonance and communicative power. This is particularly important in the context of deliberative democracy, where deliberators should ideally be reflexive and open to changing their preferences: such persuasive language can be key to achieving this. Rhetoric and metaphor are key ingredients in a discourse and in a deliberative context can help provide a common framework or point of reference from which deliberation can grow through appealing to shared values (Dryzek 2005, p19). For example, animal rights protagonists may use the language of universal human rights to advocate nonhuman rights. Conversely, appealing to common descent or group identity may be used to justify acts in nationalist discourses. Rhetoric in itself is neither bad nor good inherently, but it is *powerful*. Moreover, such rich language is a crucial part of how humans relate to and ascribe value to animals and nature. As Dryzek (2005, p9) points out, it is how people make sense of the world.

Woods (2000) aptly illustrates the political significance of discursive representation in his analysis of representations of the fox in hunting debates. One such representation is ‘the fox as sporting foe’ where the fox is represented as ‘an equal and cunning contestant’ (2000, p184). This representation has been long established in folklore and literature, but Woods shows that it also had an impact on hunting debates in the 1990s, demonstrating the resonance of discourses in political decision-making. He also outlines a discourse of ‘vicious vermin: the fox as pest’ (2000, p186) in which the fox is conceptualised as a threat to livestock, and even humans. Similarly, Jerolmack (2008) charts the discursive construction of the pigeon as vermin in the United States, through a longitudinal analysis of newspaper content. He points out that as human territory expands, human-animal interactions inevitably increase and in cities especially, humans and animals live alongside each other. Urbanised animals like the fox and pigeon animals are often represented as invading and infesting human space, and are seen as ‘out of place’ because they do not fit into the established human conception of where the animal ‘should’ be. Whilst Woods points out that this discourse often employs scientific knowledge to ‘prove’ its arguments, Jerolmack (2008, p10) notes that a frenzy of anti-pigeon sentiment in the 1960s was fuelled by a single commentator in the New York Times who spawned the now well-known representation of pigeons as ‘rats with wings’ – a pertinent example of the resonance of metaphor in the representation of animals. Both authors note that despite discursive appeals to the contrary, these discourses rarely quoted actual statistical evidence supporting claims that the pigeon or fox posed a threat to public health and livestock, respectively (Jerolmack 2008; Woods 2000, p187). The ability of discursive representations to outgrow the evidence on which they were originally based demonstrates the power and resonance of metaphor and rhetoric as a crucial ingredient of a discourse.

**Conclusions**

Notably, the above examples show that discursive representation is not necessarily good for animals. They do however, serve to illustrate the communicative resonance of discourses about animals. I uphold that discursive representation alone is no guarantee of advancing animal protection. Rather, discursive representation already occurs in day-to-day life, but that it can also be a valuable form of political representation of animals. In particular, studying discursive representations of animals can expose and interrogate claims which are taken verbatim. Discourses can be examined for the ways in they represent animals. This is the purpose of the Q study presented in chapter four of this thesis. Here it becomes clear that discursive representation does already occur and furthermore that it is not necessarily good for animals. However, I maintain that discursive representation is an important representative vehicle for animals, for the reasons outlined in this chapter. It is with this in mind that the later empirical analysis proceeds.

When contested in a deliberative space – whether in the public sphere or a structured forum – marginal discourses such as animal rights have a far greater chance of being given serious consideration than they do currently in both the public sphere and amongst policymakers. It is only when discursive representation is played out against a deliberative backdrop that those who are voiceless may actually be heard in a meaningful political way. This chapter and the next can be understood as mutually reinforcing. Discursive representation offers a feasible vehicle for animals to be represented politically; deliberative democracy offers the conditions most conducive to animal protection goals. In the following chapter, I outline the ways in which deliberative democracy can benefit the representation of animals.

# Chapter Three: deliberative democracy and animals[[13]](#footnote-13)

**Introduction**

This chapter provides theoretical justification for the deliberative approach employed in the thesis. Ultimately, I argue that a deliberative democratic approach to animal protection is not only theoretically compatible with animal protection goals but also could serve to produce more animal-friendly outcomes. I go on to argue that deliberative systems is the best approach through which to analyse animal issues. The aim of the chapter is to establish a strong theoretical foundation for empirical analysis of the hunting debate. This is necessary to justify why it is worth evaluating the hunting debate from a deliberative perspective in the first place; it must first be shown that deliberative democracy and animal protection are compatible.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first provides an overview of deliberative democratic theory. Here I introduce the expansive definition of deliberative democracy endorsed here, and consider each feature of deliberation in turn and its relevance to animal protection goals. I then go on to consider the possible circumstances of deliberation. In the final section I introduce deliberative systems as a framework to respond to normative and evaluative challenges.

## Section 3.1: deliberative democracy

Deliberative democracy has played a prominent role in democratic theory in the past twenty years – a myriad of theoretical contributions and an expanding empirical portfolio is testament to this. In this section, I distil various conceptions of deliberative democracy and distinguish it from aggregative forms.

Elstub *et al* (2014, p3) point out that ‘not just any form of democracy will achieve environmental goals’. The same can be said for animals. The underlying philosophy of aggregative democracy is individual self-interest – voting is an individual act. Conversely, deliberative democracy argues for public debate, reasoning and collective judgement. Most relevant for animals is that in deliberative democracy, interlocutors ideally consider all relevant viewpoints above and beyond their own self-interests. This is not the case in aggregative democracy, where ultimately each vote belongs to each person; there is no motivation for collective reasoning or public justification because voting is ultimately a private act. The aggregative emphasis on proportionality in democracy is likewise not transferred to deliberative democracy, which emphasises the importance of hearing all relevant voices in the debate. Given that animals are perhaps the most marginalised group in our society and unable to voice their own anguish, deliberative democracy offers an opportunity for them to be given consideration in public debate. In other forms of democracy, marginalised voices are much more likely to be pushed out of the arena. Ultimately, many deliberative theorists argue that the requirements of deliberative democracy are more conducive to achieving environmental goals (e.g. Dryzek 1990; 2000; Eckersley 2004) than the conditions of aggregative democracy. I argue here that the same is also true for animal protection goals.

Deliberative democracy argues for a ‘talk-centric’ (Chambers 2003) approach to democracy, specifically placing *deliberation* – a particular type of communication – as the central tenet of democratic decision making. Political decisions should be made through a process of deliberation. Legitimacy is derived from the extent to which affected parties have been able to participate in this process (Dryzek 2010a, p22). The talk-centric approach is contrasted with liberal and rational choice notions of democracy, where individual preference aggregation is the basis for making decisions. An important distinction is that according to rational choice theory, citizens’ self-interested preferences remain unaltered throughout political participation, making voting a feasible method of collecting preferences. On the other hand, deliberative democracy holds that the social and interactive process of political participation may alter preferences, and that citizens are capable of responding as an active part of that process (Elster 1997, p11). Preference transformation is not a settled matter amongst deliberative scholars: it was a central element of early formulations of the theory but empirically, the relationship between preference change and deliberation is harder to establish (Baccaro *et al* 2016). That notwithstanding, the most important implication for animals is that deliberation can have a transformative effect on participants to become ‘more public-spirited, more tolerant, more knowledgeable, more attentive to the interests of others, and more probing of their own interests.’ (Warren 1992, p8). This is possible without complete preference transformation. If deliberation can encourage people to re-consider their relationship with animals, then it has potential to produce more animal-friendly outcomes than preference aggregation.

Deliberation is a type of collective communication through which shared understandings or decisions are arrived at:

Debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participant (Chambers 2003, p309).

Theoretical interpretation has been far-reaching concerning what exactly should count as deliberation. In Habermas’ early focus on procedural communicative action (1984), deliberation was restricted to rational argument and aimed to achieve consensus. In subsequent years theorists have sought to accommodate critiques from agonist and difference scholars (Dryzek 2000, p79). The definition of deliberative democracy I endorse enjoins the latter strand of thinking. The circumstances of deliberation are similarly multifarious and are considered later in the chapter. Suffice to say that deliberation can be found in a variety of settings, from structured ‘mini-publics’[[14]](#footnote-14) to everyday conversations between private individuals.

The late Iris Marion Young (see 1999; 2001) argued persuasively that deliberative democrats ought to embrace an expansive definition of deliberation because privileging rational argument de-values other types of communication. Concomitantly, this privileges the most articulate participants and gives them a disproportionate influence (see also Chambers 2003; 2009). This is a particular challenge for animal advocates: as well as occupying powerful positions, animal use industries are likely to be well-versed in rational-scientific discourses. As discussed in the previous chapter, discursive representations of animals frequently utilise rhetorical devices such as metaphor and emotive imagery (see section 2.4). Following a restrictive definition of deliberation would exclude forms of communication that animal advocates may rely upon.

There are also compelling theoretical reasons for adopting this stance. The most important is *inclusivity*. If deliberation is to be democratic, it must be inclusive. According to the all-affected principle of democracy, all those affected by a political decision should be able to participate (or have their position represented) in the decision-making process. To realise the all-affected principle, deliberative democracy *must* embrace a diverse array of communication styles. To remain tied to pure rationality is to exclude those who are not able to communicate in such terms – a large swathe of humans as well as animals. Dryzek’s (2000, p1-2) definition of deliberation endorses ‘argument, rhetoric, humour, emotion, testimony, or storytelling, and gossip’. This is not to say that all communication counts as deliberation. Deliberation retains ‘the requirement that communication induce reflection upon preferences in non-coercive fashion’ (Dryzek 2000, p2). Below I follow the outline of deliberative democracy provided by Stevenson and Dryzek (2014, p25). In addition, I delineate the features of deliberation and provide a detailed discussion of how deliberative democracy is conducive to achieving animal protection goals.

## Section 3.2: deliberative democracy and animals

### Section 3.2.1: the inclusion of all affected interests (including future generations and non-human nature)

All those affected by the outcome of a collective decision should be able to participate – or at least be represented – in the decision making process. Regarding animals, inclusivity becomes even more fundamental. The all-affected principle comprises a powerful *political* demand for the inclusion of animals in deliberative democracy that can be upheld whether or not one subscribes to the moral justifications presented in chapter two (Parry 2016). If we take the all-affected principle of democracy seriously, then all those who are affected by a political decision ought to be able to participate or be represented. There is no theoretical reason why this should not transcend the species barrier. Animals are affected by politics and should thus have their interests or perspectives represented in some way. But being voiceless as they are, animals are rendered the ultimate marginalised group in our society. Deliberative democracy offers animals a serious chance to discursively ‘get into the room’.

The all-affected principle also applies even if there is no one present able to articulate a position themselves. Discursive representation offers a vehicle for animals to be heard, whilst deliberative democracy offers the opportunity for them to be *listened* to. Deliberative conditions enhance the opportunity for marginalised viewpoints to be given serious consideration and contested in the public sphere, rather than being dismissed at face value.

### Section 3.2.2: truthfulness, respect, reason-giving, non-coercive persuasion, and efforts to be constructive in finding mutually acceptable outcomes

Authentic deliberation entails sincerity in motivation and argument – strategic acts such as bargaining and coercion are out. All interests under consideration should be respected and deliberators should present their arguments in a respectful manner. ‘Finding mutually acceptable outcomes’ is conceptualised through Gutmann and Thompson’s ‘economy of moral disagreement’ (1996, p91) where participants present their arguments within a mutually acceptable framework, even when there is profound disagreement.

Mutual respect provides the possibility for animal advocates to be listened to. Listening is as important in deliberation as talking and is necessary for reflection (Ercan and Dryzek 2015, p242; McCoy and Scully 2002, p121). Mutual respect also demands that all arguments are listened to and not merely dismissed *prima facie*. Radical[[15]](#footnote-15) philosophies such as animal rights are more likely under deliberative conditions to be given serious consideration than they currently are in public debates.

Respect also demands that communication is conducted in a respectful manner. Gutmann and Thompson (1996) advocate that deliberators present their arguments in terms that are mutually acceptable to interlocutors. Humphrey and Stears (2006) note that animal rights activists often employ the opposite tactic – exaggerating the moral distance between positions and couching arguments that will self-consciously shock an audience. They cite the book *Eternal Treblinka* (2006, p411) which compares the plight of factory farmed animals to the Holocaust. They go on to argue that the *exaggeration* of moral disagreement is necessary to ‘kick-start the process of reconsideration’ needed to prompt serious consideration of animal rights philosophy. Gutmann and Thompson themselves recognise that this is necessary in some cases and can even strengthen mutual respect if it means alternative positions are considered as a result.

Humphrey and Stears go on to argue that deliberative democracy *undermines* inclusivity due to the behavioural restrictions outlined above such as the exclusion of coercion. They suggest animal rights activists are democratically justified in employing coercive tactics to change behaviour. Coercion is justified, they say, because activists are in a disadvantaged position relative to powerful animal use industries. They thus need to elbow their way onto the public and political agenda. I agree with Humphrey and Stears on this point. Their argument is strengthened further if we consider animals themselves as a marginalised group (Parry forthcoming). I disagree however, that deliberative democracy prohibits such actions. D’Arcy (2007) points out that deliberative theorists do support the inclusion of non-deliberative actions on the premise that they enhance deliberative capacity further down the line. Without empirical analysis however, the implications of permitting non-deliberative actions in the name of further deliberation remain somewhat woolly (Hadley 2015a). This thesis adds some empirical grist to this debate, through evaluating the potential of non-deliberative acts on overall deliberative capacity (see sections 7.4 and 9.3.1).

### Section 3.2.3: prioritisation of public goods, common interests, and generalisable interests over sectional (and especially material) interests.

Once we accept that the interests of all those affected should be included in deliberation and afforded equal respect, deliberators must necessarily consider interests beyond their own. Eckersley (2004, p116) argues that this ‘enlarged thinking’ (Arendt 1961) makes deliberative democracy a good match for promoting ecological interests because it invites citizens to view issues in terms of common interests. This is intertwined with the ‘effort to find mutually acceptable outcomes’ (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, p25), according to which deliberators present their arguments in terms acceptable to others even when their views differ substantially. This combination makes deliberative democracy particularly promising for addressing ecological concerns:

Public spirited deliberation is the process by which we learn of our dependence on others (and the environment) and the process by which we learn to recognise and respect differently situated others (including nonhuman others and future generations). It is the activity through which citizens consciously create a common life and a common future together, including the ecosystem health and integrity that literally sustain us all (Eckersley 2004, p115).

There is a caveat here. Eckersley’s focus in her advocacy of deliberative democracy is primarily ecological: addressing climate change; habitat destruction; resource extraction, and so on. Animals *qua* animals are not the focus of her *Green State*, and there are limits to animal and environmental comparisons. With regards to climate change, Stevenson and Dryzek (2014, p68) point out that ‘a range of vital public goods is at issue, most notably the Earth’s capacity to sustain life. Common-interest appeals can be made to moral principles that ought to be shared by all.’ Many environmental goods can be understood as public goods. Forests consume CO2, provide habitat for various animals and peoples, provide recreational and aesthetic enjoyment to humans, and so forth. These common interests provide a communicative framework in which deliberators can present their arguments.

With regards to animals, it is feasible that enhancing animal protection is less easily understood as a public good. This could reduce the ability to ‘find mutually acceptable outcomes’, absent a substantive shared framework of reference. Protecting animals may be seen as prioritising a sectional interest and a catalyst for pitting animal interests against human interests. Alasdair Cochrane (2013) offers a compelling way of overcoming this. He conceptualises animal and human interests as part of the same whole in his appeal for ‘sentient rights’ – focusing on what we share in common with nonhumans rather than setting us up against each other. In doing this Cochrane (perhaps unwittingly) subscribes to the deliberative principle of appealing to generalisable interests: it is not difficult to appeal to our shared capacity to suffer.

The prioritisation of common or public interests also necessitates that deliberators consider issues in terms beyond their own narrow, short-term self-interests to include animals. Existing evidence from mini-publics appears to support this claim. A recent Citizens’ Jury in South Australia supported a policy of mandatory de-sexing for cats and dogs. This was advocated by the state government as a policy response to the number of pets euthanised in the state each year.[[16]](#footnote-16) Alongside de-sexing, jurors recommended a raft of additional reforms related to cat and dog ownership, from compulsory registration of cats to an education campaign encouraging responsible pet ownership. In this case, mandatory de-sexing for cats and dogs was justified from the animal’s health perspective: female cats and dogs face health risks and higher mortality from breeding. Conservation of native animal species was also a key factor; de-sexing reduces the overall number of roaming cats that kill indigenous wildlife. It is therefore reasonable to infer that support for mandatory de-sexing reflected the juror’s concern for animal interests.

However, looking more closely at the jury’s decisions, it is clear that there is a more complex process at play than simply shelving their own interests in favour of cats and dogs. Evidence was given from a range of perspectives that encompassed arguments from ecology, economics and human perspectives. The jury considered the prevalence of dog attacks by intact male dogs and the financial burden of sheltering and euthanising unwanted pets for the state. This is precisely what a mini-public *should* do – offer deliberators every relevant perspective on the issue. But it also means that animal interests might not be the deciding factor in producing an animal-friendly outcome.

The question is, does it matter? If the outcome of a deliberative process is favourable to animals, does it matter why or how that decision is reached? There is sometimes a tendency within animal rights forums to condemn those who, for example, go vegan for health reasons, or perhaps reduce meat consumption for environmental reasons – on the basis that they are not motivated by animal rights or welfare concerns.[[17]](#footnote-17) From a deliberative perspective this is not problematic, since it reflects appeals to generalisable and public interests. Furthermore, we are unlikely to encounter *any* animal issue that does not have a human dimension, given that the majority of animal protection issues stem from human-animal interactions. De-sexing results in healthier dogs *and* fewer dog attacks on people. There need not be a conflict here. Moreover, the inclusion of all-affected interests includes dog owners, breeders, the local community and various other human interests whose viewpoints should also be considered. The Jury’s final report reflected a range of generalisable and public interests, which included concern for animals. Public interests are rarely one dimensional; that deliberation considers the full range of perspectives should not be seen as detrimental to animal protection. This simply reflects the inevitable entangled reality of human-animal relations.

### Section 3.2.4: reflexivity

Reflexivity is the most important feature of deliberation when it comes to animal issues. As Humphrey and Stears point out, the moral and philosophical demands of animal rights theory are far removed from the majority of peoples’ *modus operandi* (2006, p411). Reflexivity requires a person to reflect on their own positions and preferences and to revise, adapt – or even reconfirm – those preferences based on new information and arguments.

However, reflexivity also requires that animal advocates are open to revising and reconsidering their preferences in light of new information. This could present a challenge for the compatibility of animal rights advocacy and deliberative democracy. Humphrey and Stears point out that animal rights activists may feel antipathetic to deliberative democracy because they are not committed to the ideals of deliberative democracy - they are committed to the animal rights cause. Hadley (2015b) takes up this line of argument when he considers the possibility of animal rights as a functional religion. He points to empirical research (especially Jamison, Wenk and Parker 2000) suggesting that animal rights plays a religion-like role in the lives of some highly committed animal rights activists. This is not to suggest that this is the case for all animal advocates or activists.[[18]](#footnote-18) Rather, Hadley is concerned with the most zealous of animal activists because it is their activities that are most likely to conflict with democratic theory – violence or threats, for example. The implication of the functional religious thesis is that

When a person invests so much of their identity in a set of values and related practices associated with a particular religion, it is safe to say that in cases when the authority of the ‘identity’ values and practices are pitted against values and practices that do not have comparable significance in their lives, the religious values will prevail (Hadley 2015b, p15).

Hadley’s point is essentially the same as Humphrey and Stears’ – that animal rights will, for some highly zealous activists, trump deliberative ideals every time. But Hadley’s consideration of the functional religion thesis make a compelling point. The goals of activists and deliberative democrats may diverge significantly. Someone deeply committed to animal rights – if we suppose the functional religion thesis to be sound – will not only prioritise animal rights ideals over deliberative ones in how they act, but also in how they think. They are unlikely to be flexible in their position if they are so committed to their beliefs and this poses a considerable obstacle to reflexivity, mutual respect and finding mutually acceptable outcomes.

This concern may be somewhat abated if we can show that deliberative democratic ideals are also conducive to achieving animal protection goals - precisely what this chapter of the thesis sets out to do. Hadley’s second point is that theorists must be clear in exactly what the purported benefits of non-deliberative actions are. I also address this point later in the thesis (sections 7.4 and 9.3.1); considering the various costs and benefits of non-deliberative actions (2015b, p21) to both deliberative ideals *and* animal protection goals. Elsewhere I have argued that an over-reliance on non-deliberative actions may actually harm the animal protection movement through alienating its intended audience, as well as undermining deliberation (Parry forthcoming).

## Section 3.3: whither deliberation?

Hendriks (2006) posits a useful distinction for framing discussion of where deliberation should take place. ‘Micro’ deliberation is defined as structured deliberative fora that fit within and work alongside existing institutions and are designed to achieve authentic deliberation. ‘Macro’ deliberation refers to unconstrained communication in the broader public sphere, separate to and often working against the state (Habermas 1962; see also Fraser 1990). Macro deliberation focuses on facilitating the open contestation and interchange of ideas and discourses within civil society or public space, and how they in turn influence decision-making (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008).

Micro deliberative events that conceive of deliberation as an activity between political elites (Boswell 2013, p626) run the risk of excluding activist groups altogether and thus leaving out potentially the best representatives of animal interests. Moreover as Parkinson (2003; 2006) points out, micro deliberative forums involving citizens are by necessity small-scale affairs, meaning that in practice they exclude the majority of those affected by the collective decision or outcome. However, high quality deliberation cannot be achieved on a larger scale because the greater the number of participants, the less opportunity there is for dialogical communication (Chambers 2009). Parkinson terms this ‘deliberative democracy’s scale problem’ (2006, p5): deliberative democracy claims that decisions are legitimate to the extent that those affected have had the opportunity to deliberate on that decision – but if the majority of those affected are excluded from the actual deliberation, then what reason do they have for accepting a deliberative outcome as legitimate (2003, p181; 2006, p5)?

Macro deliberation may be a remedy for Parkinson’s scale problem. Locating deliberation in the broad public sphere and separate to formal state structures inevitably includes a wider array of actors and interests. Locating deliberation in the public sphere also revives the critical aspect of deliberative democracy, the loss of which is lamented by Dryzek (2000, p28). He argues that a Habermasian oppositional public sphere capable of challenging the state is better equipped for tackling complex environmental issues.

Deliberation on this scale consists of an interchange of ideas and arguments through discourses. Discursive representation removes the need for every actor to participate in deliberation. It is relatively straightforward to see why discursive representation is the preferable model when considering deliberation on a mass scale. As elaborated in chapter two (section 2.4), although the array of individual opinions will be impossibly vast, it is plausible to represent shared understandings through discourses.

However, macro deliberation is still vulnerable to some of the same criticisms as micro deliberation: exclusion and a lack of democratic legitimacy. The circumstances under which communication occurs in the public sphere are hardly ideal deliberative conditions. Hendriks warns of the potential for macro deliberation to dissolve into a ‘marketplace of ideas’ (2009a, p179) wherein absent the behavioural restrictions of a micro deliberative design, it is simply the loudest voices that dominate (Hendriks 2006, p494). Deliberation can be further distorted by the initial circumstances in which public communication takes place. Powerful interests are able to dominate debate through their access to additional resources and power (Young 1999, p156). Concomitantly, resource-poor interests are marginalised and excluded – leaving macro deliberation lagging in democratic legitimacy for the same reasons as micro deliberation. Shapiro highlights this inequality in his critique of Gutmann and Thompson’s *Democracy and Disagreement*, suggesting they pay scant attention to the deliberative deficit caused by ‘powerful players who make it their business to shape the terms of public debate through the financial contributions they make available to politicians and political campaigns’ (1999, p34).

Hendriks problematises this further, concluding that neither micro nor macro deliberation alone can provide adequate answers to these problems. She argues that micro deliberative events always sit within a macro political context that will never be completely devoid of the accompanying power relations. Thus Shapiro’s concern about powerful interests shaping public debate is equally applicable to a micro deliberative forum amongst a small group of decision-makers both directly due to the influence of political lobbying (1999, p35) and indirectly because of the structures and political system that the debate is situated in (Hendriks 2006, p502). The unequal distribution of power is particularly potent when it comes to animal issues: industries supporting animal use are generally rich in capital, resources and access to power. These industries hold an immense amount of influence. Aside from the ability to shape the substantive *content* of some discourses, they also have the power to dominate discursive *space* itself, squeezing out marginal perspectives altogether. Even in the case of hunting with dogs – which has been illegal for ten years – the debate over hunting is still very much alive and it has been argued by activists that this is due to the power and access of the pro-hunting lobby.

My own analysis acknowledges the potentially distortive effect of powerful players in the hunting debate. This is relevant not only in shaping public debate but also in decision-making arenas, given that hunting continues to be a highly politicised and controversial issue in Parliament. Therefore, my analysis tracks the progress of discourses on hunting in different discrete spaces. Hendriks suggests an integrated approach to deliberative democracy that recognises the interconnectivity of different spaces in a systemic manner. This enables us to examine deliberation as it occurs in different settings, as well as evaluating overall deliberative capacity.

## Section 3.4: deliberative systems

The deliberative system has been conceptualised by Mansbridge (1999) as a set of spaces related not in a necessarily mechanistic manner, but nonetheless interacting and having some effect on each other *and* an overall outcome:

Through talk among formal and informal representatives in designated public forums, talk back and forth between constituents and elected representatives or other representatives in politically oriented organizations, talk in the media, talk amongst political activists, and everyday talk in formally private spaces about things the public ought to discuss…the full deliberative system encompasses all these strands (Mansbridge 1999, p211).

The systemic approach offers scholars an empirical framework through which to evaluate deliberative democracy, and a normative account of deliberative democracy that recognises the deliberative potential of actions that under ‘micro’ (Hendriks 2006) deliberative conditions would be excluded. Once evaluation of deliberative quality moves to a systemic level, it is no longer necessary to achieve the highest procedural quality in a single deliberative moment or forum, because *overall* deliberative capacity (Dryzek 2009) is evaluated. This is not to say that individual settings need not be deliberative at all; rather it advocates a division of deliberative labour across different spaces.

Dryzek (2009; with Stevenson 2014) has provided the most empirically feasible conception of the deliberative system in the emerging literature. My analysis begins with this model and through empirical analysis in the later chapters, suggests possible adaptations to the ways in which the system might be operationalised (see sections 5.1 and 6.5). Dryzek’s system describes the different settings in which different deliberative features are sought as follows (see Dryzek 2009, p1385-6; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014 p27-9):

***Private Sphere*:** informal conversations that will usually be inaccessible for analysis as they take place between friends, family or colleagues in private locations.[[19]](#footnote-19)

***Public Space*:** spaces or settings where communication takes place and is openly accessible. Separate from state and formal decision making arenas, public space can include communication between and amongst members of the public, activists or the media.

***Empowered Space*:** settings where collective decisions are made - including governments, networks, organisations or actors that together contribute to collective decisions, such as advisory groups, experts, cross party groups and committees.

***Transmission*:** the mechanisms by which messages are transmitted from public to empowered space; may include campaigns by activist groups, media reporting or even voting behaviour.

***Accountability*:** the ways in which decision-makers (in empowered space) provide an explanation of their actions to the public.

***Meta-deliberation*:** the ability of the entire system to reflect on itself and self-rectify.

***Decisiveness*:** the extent to which deliberation or communication in the rest of the system actually impacts on substantive outcomes.

The system is evaluated not according to how it lives up to deliberative ideals sought in a single deliberative forum such as a Citizens’ Jury, but against the systemic criteria of inclusivity, authenticity and consequentiality (Dryzek 2009; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, p32). In a healthy deliberative system, *authenticity* should be sought in all settings. Authenticity refers to the standard features of deliberative communication outlined above. *Inclusivity* – the inclusion of affected interests – should be present in some sense in all settings as well, but is primarily sought in public space since this is where communication is unconstrained and ideally, anyone can participate. However, this is not to say that all these deliberative features are sought or even desirable in a single setting, forum or debate. Indeed, as will be argued, it could be important that animal activists have a viable presence in public space than it is for them to adhere to authentic deliberative ideals – inclusion may be more important than authenticity *in public space*. In fact, a growing number of deliberative scholars (see Curato, Niemeyer and Dryzek 2013; Dryzek esp. 1990; Parkinson 2006; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014) suggest that it is the distillation and contestation of different viewpoints that constitutes a healthy deliberative public space. This position emphasises the importance of challenging dominant narratives and crystallising new and emerging discourses. This may involve accepting non-deliberative actions if they contribute to inclusivity in public space - which in turn informs deliberators in empowered space of marginalised perspectives that are given consideration and ideally contribute to the decisive outcome.

Let us consider what this might look like in the case of hunting using an example of direct action activism – hunt sabotaging (sabbing). Hunt saboteurs (sabs) directly intervene in the activity of organised hunts. The primary aim is to disrupt the hunt in order to minimise the chance of a quarry being caught and killed by the hounds (which is illegal if a pack of hounds are knowingly allowed to track and kill the fox, mink, hare or deer). Sabs employ a variety of tactics to distract the hounds from a scent, including mimicking the Huntsman’s horn to get the pack to change direction, and spraying artificial scent to try and draw the dogs off a quarry’s scent. The secondary aim of the sabs is to cause enough disruption to cause the hunt to be called off altogether. Hunt sabbing is a classic example of what Humphrey and Stears term ‘cost-levying’: trying to change someone’s behaviour by imposing such costs on them that they are compelled to do so (2006, p405). On this basis, sabbing as a standalone action is clearly non-deliberative: it constitutes coercion and makes no effort to find a mutually acceptable outcome. But in the deliberative system, non-deliberative actions may still harbour some deliberative potential. Sabbing arguably contributes to inclusivity through its high visibility. Hunt sabs usually film their activities, including graphic footage of animals being killed, and verbal and physical encounters between sabs and hunters. Through the production and dissemination of video footage, sabs ensure that their perspective is seen by a wider public. This not only gives the sabs themselves visibility, but it also constitutes a form of mediated representation of the hunted animals. This fits well with Saward (2006a; 2006b) and Tanasescu’s (2014) conceptualisation of representation discussed in chapter two: representation is the process by which objects and subjects are made visible to an audience. In this sense hunt sabs are representative claim-makers, offering the video footage as a representation of hunting and the hunted, to the wider public as audience. In this way it is reasonably easy to see how sabbing contributes to inclusivity in public space: it enables the inclusion of evidence that would otherwise not have been available for discussion (Parry forthcoming). In quite a literal sense, it includes the viewpoint of the hunted animal.

However, Owen and Smith (2015) caution against evaluation at the systemic level alone, pointing out that a proliferation of discourses does not necessarily make for a healthy deliberative system. This is a valid concern. As Ercan, Hendriks and Dryzek have recently pointed out:

Simply including more voices and meanings into the system does little if there are blockages in the deliberative system, or if the system has a kind of ‘attention deficit’ that precludes the interaction (and transmission) across different sites and thus hinders the rearrangement of democratic possibilities (2015, p12).

The reverse can also be true – deliberation in empowered space may appear to be highly respectful and rational, but if it exists in isolation to public deliberation it will be similarly lacking:

Even if a legislature has a high quality and well informed debate…*the deliberation looks less adequate in the context of a system that permits highly unequal campaign contributions* or enables the media to frame the issue…A systemic approach allows us to see more clearly where a system might be improved, and recommend institutions or other innovations that could supplement the system in areas of weakness (Mansbridge *et al* 2012, p3-4, emphasis added).

The systemic approach thus enables us to acknowledge and evaluate the distortive effect of unequal power distributions discussed above. Significantly, it also allows for the admission of non-deliberative actions on the condition that they contribute to overall deliberative capacity or further deliberation elsewhere in the system. Both these points make deliberative systems an ideal approach for analysing the hunting debate. But the systemic approach to deliberative democracy is not simply opening up deliberation to endorse an ‘anything goes’ approach. This is the concern articulated by Hadley (2015a) and Owen and Smith (2015), though Hadley’s concern is not directed with the systems approach *per se*. He highlights a lack of clarity in the admittance of non-deliberative actions: are threats, violence or property damage acceptable in the name of furthering deliberation? Owen and Smith are concerned that evaluating overall systemic capacity could result in an apparently healthy deliberative system without any individual sites being at all deliberative. I address this concern directly in chapter five by providing a discussion of the deliberative quality of public discourses. I consider the deliberative quality of discourses on hunting by assessing the extent to which they utilise reason-based arguments, appear respectful and open to considering alternative discourses. Through analysing the discourses themselves, my analysis retains focus on core deliberative ideals. This novel approach speaks to Owen and Smith’s concern by taking into account both the contestation of discourses *and* deliberative quality in public space, without becoming preoccupied with individual settings.

My approach focuses on the contestation of discourses in public space, but upholds concern for authentic deliberation at the discursive level. Contestation is a slippery term to pin down, but it is important to recognise that a *clash* of perspectives is not the same as deliberative engagement. It matters how perspectives are generated, disseminated and exchanged, and it matters in public space as well as amongst decision-makers. I argue that this is a particularly important point when it comes to animal protection. As Humphrey and Stears point out, animal rights philosophy is outside of the majority of peoples’ ‘sticky’ frames of reference (2006, p407). Reflexivity – the ability to reflect on one’s own preferences and reconsider them in light of increased information and understanding – is vital if animal advocates wish to persuade the public. Furthermore, it is possible that those in empowered space (which may include policymakers and animal use industries) ‘may be persuaded through a more prominent use of rational message appeals’ (Brown and Quinn-Allan 2015, p4). In this case then, a more deliberative public sphere could be the best-placed advocate for animals.

The role of transmission mechanisms in the system are also crucial. Even with a healthy, deliberative, bountiful public space, perspectives do not simply leap into the deliberations of decision-makers in government and elsewhere. Messages and discourses from public debate must be *transmitted* somehow to empowered space, and here again I argue that – especially in transmission – it is crucial to examine *how* messages are enacted (Boswell 2016; Boswell *et al* forthcoming). This is particularly pertinent if we assume that Brown and Quinn-Allan’s suggestion is sound - if those in empowered space may be more amenable to rational messages, then there is reason to suggest that a more deliberative approach to animal protection may be conducive to achieving animal protection policy goals, as well as the reflexivity necessary amongst the public for individual behaviour change as well.

### Section 3.4.1: conceptualising the deliberative system

I draw primarily on Dryzek’s (2009) conception of the deliberative system as outlined earlier in the previous section. However, my analysis is distinct in several important respects, explained below. Below I provide an overview of the conception of the deliberative system I employ here.

***Public and Private Space*:** although I follow Dryzek’s conceptual distinction between public and private space, this distinction is collapsed somewhat in my empirical analysis, for reasons that will be explained. In the Dryzekian deliberative system, public space is primarily analysed to: [a] identify existing discourses; and [b] to gauge the balance and contestation of these discourses. In my analysis, I retain [a] but shift the focus of [b] to a more qualitative analysis focused on deliberative quality rather than an account of the different settings in which different discourses are present. The aim of this approach is to retain focus at the discursive level, rather than returning to the evaluation of individual sites or settings. For one, this is more suitable for my analysis since I track the progress of discourses between different sites in the deliberative system. Secondly, I provide a response to Owen and Smith’s concerns. Through analysing the deliberative quality of the discourses themselves, it is possible to assess whether they preclude or enable deliberation. This retains focus on core deliberative ideals, without becoming too preoccupied with achieving ideal deliberation in all settings. A detailed introduction to this approach is given in chapter five (section 5.1).

In chapters four and five, I discuss in detail my empirical research on discourses in public space. For the time being, it will suffice to say that the nature of hunting debate in reality makes it difficult to retain a strict distinction between public and private space. Testimony from study participants often fell into a quasi-public space; hunt sabotaging is not formally public and like much direct action activism can be somewhat clandestine in nature. It seems absurd however to consider it as part of private space given that it takes place out in the open countryside, often on public land, and is usually captured on video. In addition, participants often shared personal experiences and conversations that did not take place in a public forum, but nonetheless were essential ingredients in peoples’ viewpoints. These kind of conversations are akin to ‘everyday talk’ and contribute to preference-formation (Mansbridge 1999). Moreover, direct and personal experiences of hunting became foundational to some discourses (see section 4.2). Dryzek suggests that private space is inaccessible in the deliberative system, but my research offers some limited insight into conversations that may be thought of as private. I argue that in a real-life deliberative system, private and public space are difficult to distinguish upon empirical analysis. It is for these reasons that for the purposes of my analysis, the distinction between private and public space is downgraded.

***Empowered Space:*** settings in empowered space refer primarily to spaces directly related to Parliament but not restricted purely to the executive. I include in my analysis debates in the House of Commons and House of Lords, as well as interviews with MPs and Peers. Documentary analysis of debate transcripts is used to identify evidence of discursive content and deliberative quality. Semi-structured interviews were designed to assess deliberative quality and support the document analysis. Interview questions were structured to broadly follow the Discourse Quality Index (Steenburgen *et al* 2003) in order to give an indication of deliberative quality. This approach to interviews was employed by Stevenson and Dryzek (2014) and yields a qualitative insight into deliberative quality (see Appendix 2.2 for interview guide).

From the above analysis it will be possible to gauge which discourses present in public space are also present in empowered space and thus will identify which, if any, discourses have dropped off the radar; the next task will be to try and determine how and why this may have happened.

***Transmission:*** transmission in the broadest sense encompasses all the mechanisms by which messages are transmitted from public to empowered space. I focus on three key outlets through which messages are transmitted in the deliberative system: the mainstream print media, an anti-hunting charity and an anti-hunting party political group. I focus in the main part on anti-hunting mechanisms given that the impetus of this thesis is animal protection. In addition, it appears that on the surface, the current situation is a victory for the anti-hunters. Yet even a cursory analysis of the political furore surrounding events in July 2015 show quite clearly that the decision had very little to do with the impact of anti-hunting campaigners. Concomitantly, it is important to analyse how anti-hunting campaigners transmit their messages – since the hunting issue has not been completely put to bed.

It is crucial in the analysis of transmission mechanisms to note the power dimensions involved in the hunting debate on both sides. In some cases, public space bleeds into empowered space: politicians closely affiliated with various pro or anti-hunting lobbying organisations, for example. This has a potentially distortive effect on deliberative capacity and it needs to be borne in mind. Most worryingly, direct partisan links between the public sphere and empowered space undermine the possibility of a vibrant, Habermasian oppositional public sphere (1962) as inevitably, dominant discourses from empowered space leak into public space and may not be recognised as politically vested. Moreover, these links can constitute a transmission mechanism in themselves and probably rather successful ones, with such individuals serving as a kind of personal messenger directly into empowered space.

***Accountability:*** accountability comprises, in the broadest sense, empowered space explaining its actions to public space. In some sense, the decision to postpone the vote on amendment can be seen as a form of accountability: an action that responded to the apparently anti-hunting majority of public opinion. However, as noted above, a closer look at the political dynamics surrounding the decision do not appear to be a democratic response to public interest. Here I use material from interviews with MPs to build a picture of narrative accountability, through examining the reasons behind [a] the proposed amendment and [b] the decision to postpone the debate on it.

***Meta-deliberation*:** originally defined by Thompson (2008), meta-deliberation is the extent to which the system is able to reflect on itself and self-adjust accordingly. I draw on materials from Q study participants and interviewees in empowered space to consider the possibility of meta-deliberation in the hunting debate.

I do not include Dryzek’s component of decisiveness in my deliberative system as I consider that decisiveness - the extent to which deliberation in deliberation in different parts of the system has an impact on substantive outcomes - can be encapsulated under the evaluative criterion of consequentiality.

**Conclusions**

In this chapter I have outlined the theoretical justification for exploring the potential of deliberative democracy and introduced the empirical framework employed in this thesis. This is necessary in order to summarise why the hunting debate should be evaluated from a deliberative perspective. This chapter sought to establish compelling reasons to suggest that deliberative democratic processes may be conducive to enhancing animal protection in both theory and practice. However, as discussed here, this approach is not without its challenges, theoretical and practical. I suggest that the only way of addressing such challenges is the deliberative systems approach which provides a normative justification of non-deliberative actions. Importantly, the systemic approach also gives us an evaluative framework through which to appraise the role of non-deliberative actions on two levels; in terms of contributing to or undermining both deliberative capacity *and* in achieving animal protection goals. In the proceeding chapters, I provide a qualitative empirical analysis of the British hunting debate in the deliberative system, beginning with discourses in public space.

# Chapter Four: discourses in public space

**Introduction**

Public space in the deliberative system comprises settings where communication takes place and is openly accessible. Separate from state and formal decision making arenas, public space can include communication between and amongst members of the public, activists, campaign organisations or the media (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, p27-9). From a systems perspective, deliberation in public space consists of the interchange of discourses on the issue at hand. This chapter identifies and describes four contemporary discourses on hunting. The findings presented in this chapter form the basis for further analysis in later chapters. The discourses identified here are tracked into empowered space and examined in transmission mechanisms. The four discourses identified illustrate the complexity of the hunting debate, beyond pro/anti dichotomies. Most importantly, my findings also shows a close correlation between animal welfare and animal rights positions – two viewpoints that are often juxtaposed in the hunting debate.

I use Q methodology to identify discourses on hunting in public space. There are myriad reasons for this. Firstly, the definition of a discourse used in the thesis (see Dryzek 2005, p17) matches the concept of a factor in Q as ‘the way a particular individual, in particular circumstances and at a particular time, relates to, and forms conceptions of, certain aspects of the world’ (Barry and Proops 1999, p338). Furthermore, as Brown (1986, p58) points out, Q facilitates the ordering of subjective viewpoints into clusters which, upon interpretation, are revealed to have the ‘structure and form’ analogous to the structure of a discourse. The transformation from statistical factor to discourse involves close analysis and interpretation of interview material alongside the statistical data.

Q has been applied extensively to animal issues (see for example, Byrd 2002; Chamberlain *et al* 2012; Kalof 2000; Sickler *et al* 2006) and can be particularly fruitful in illuminating a debate that has been dominated by conflict and polarisation, as is the case for the foxhunting debate. In identifying the existing discourses on hunting with dogs, I aim to provide an in-depth, nuanced analysis of existing viewpoints that will explore how animals are represented and help evaluate the deliberative quality of the discourses themselves. Q has the potential to reveal perspectives more complex than the typical dichotomies (Chamberlain *et al* 2012, p33). Uncovering potential nuances beyond the pro/anti and welfare/rights divides can help disaggregate underlying values and beliefs and indicate the possibility for authentic deliberation. Examining discourses on hunting is especially important in this regard because the dividing lines between pro/anti and welfare/rights are drawn so sharply and effectively paralyse the debate. Writing on the contribution of Q to the study of animals and society, Brown also notes that

Before the sides become too solidified and resistant to appeals for moderation, therefore, it is important for those persons concerned about the mistreatment of animals to try and clarify the character of the presumed polarities involved, to display those clarities to the parties involved, and to uncover avenues of compromise and mutually-acceptable strategy (1996, p17).

My Q study sheds light on the murky dichotomies that appear to dominate the hunting debate. The study also explores how animals are represented in discourses. I offer a novel approach for evaluating deliberative potential in public space, through exploring the inherent characteristics of the discourses themselves to assess whether they allow for or foreclose the possibility of authentic and inclusive public deliberation. In producing factors based on actual rather than presumed differences, Q method illuminates possible points of convergence which could form a foundation for future deliberation.

The chapter proceeds in two main sections. In the first, I provide a step-by-step guide to the Q study which identifies the existing discourses on hunting. The second part is a narrative account of the four resulting viewpoints. Chapter five goes on to discuss authentic deliberation in public space, based on findings from the Q study presented in this chapter.

## Section 4.1: the Q study

***Defining the research question for the study***

The primary aim of the Q study is to identify the current discourses on hunting in public space. The study also explores how animals are represented in discourses, and appraises the deliberative quality of the hunting debate.

***Designing the Q-set***

The set of statements given to participants to sort is the Q-set. It is designed to be as representative as possible of the overall debate. Nine semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to construct the *concourse* (the totality of communication on hunting). Interviewees were selected to capture a range of viewpoints in the hunting debate and included people who took part in drag hunting or countryside pursuits,[[20]](#footnote-20) animal protection and environmental organisations, and PhD researchers interested in the topic. Some took part in a professional capacity whilst others gave their personal opinion. Interviewees were selected through existing contacts and emailing organisations known to have a position on hunting. Special effort was taken to try and ensure that a range of viewpoints were represented in the concourse, and organised hunts, lobbyists and activist groups were invited to participate in interviews and the Q study. Demographic information such as gender or age was not collected and is not considered relevant in Q.[[21]](#footnote-21) The purpose is to delineate shared perspectives, rather than identifying groups of people.

Prior to interview I selected five themes to retain focus in interview: position on hunting, people, place, animals, and politics. These themes were broad and inclusive; interviewees were at liberty to expand on any other issues they felt were relevant. Following interviews, I coded the transcripts using NVivo into the four themes. 248 excerpts were initially extracted from the data as potential Q-statements. Consolidating these into a workable size Q-set demanded rigorous content analysis. This involved reducing the overall number of statements whilst retaining as much as possible the original sentiments expressed. Duplicate statements were amalgamated and synthesised into single statements. Statements that were diametrically opposed were also consolidated into positive-only statements. As well as reducing the number of statements, negative statements were also removed. For example, the statements ‘it’s a sort of a natural way of predator control; it removes the sick and the old and the infirm’ (P25) and ‘the argument that they take only the old and infirm foxes is actually not the case’ (P31) could be consolidated into a single positive statement that participants can agree or disagree with. Neutral and non-committal statements such as ‘I'm not 100% disapproving of fox hunters’ (P5) were removed because although this is a valid viewpoint, participants should be able to express this by placing other more strongly worded statements like ‘there is no place for hunting in a modern civilised society’ (P31) towards the centre of the scale to indicate their neutral stance.

Following content analysis 52 statements remained which formed the final Q-set. A pilot study was conducted with the aim of ensuring that the Q-statements were comprehensible and representative. Six colleagues conducted the pilot and the Q-set was edited for clarity according to the feedback provided. The full list of Q-statements is available in Appendix 4.1. A animal lover version is provided in Table 1.

***Table 1: The Q-set with factor arrays***

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Statement Number | Shortened Statement | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 1 | Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predators | 0 | +4 | +5 | 0 |
| 2 | Hunting is dangerous for the horses | +1 | -1 | +4 | +2 |
| 3 | Hunting is an important British tradition | -5 | +1 | +1 | -5 |
| 4 | The hunting debate is polarised and can be irrational | 0 | +5 | +1 | -1 |
| 5 | The majority of rural communities are against hunting | +1 | -4 | -3 | +1 |
| 6 | Humans exploit the countryside for selfish reasons | +3 | +1 | +4 | +3 |
| 7 | People who work with animals have a different attitude to them | 0 | +4 | +2 | 0 |
| 8 | The British countryside isn’t entirely natural | +1 | +3 | 0 | +1 |
| 9 | The British countryside only exists because of man’s investment | -2 | +3 | -2 | +3 |
| 10 | People hunt because they’re adrenaline junkies | -1 | 0 | -1 | -1 |
| 11 | There’s a violent undercurrent around hunting | +2 | -4 | -4 | +1 |
| 12 | There’s no nice way to kill any animal | -2 | +1 | +3 | +3 |
| 13 | Wildlife is better off without human intervention | 0 | -2 | +4 | +4 |
| 14 | Humans should only intervene in nature if it is for the animal’s benefit | 0 | -4 | 0 | 0 |
| 15 | Farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural policies | -1 | +2 | +3 | -3 |
| 16 | Everything people enjoy about hunting can be done with drag hunting | +1 | -1 | +3 | +1 |
| 17 | Being out in the countryside is really important to me | +2 | +4 | +5 | 0 |
| 18 | During a hunt, the dogs cause damage and disruption | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 19 | Drag hunting is less disruptive for the local community | +1 | -1 | +1 | 0 |
| 20 | Hunting is just a form of pest control | -4 | -3 | -3 | -4 |
| 21 | Hunting is an important social activity and supports the rural economy | -3 | +2 | +1 | -2 |
| 22 | Hunting is a gratuitous form of cruelty on animals for the sake of entertainment | +3 | -5 | -6 | +5 |
| 23 | Hunting is the most effective way of controlling the fox population | -6 | +2 | -1 | -6 |
| 24 | Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fittest’ relationship | -5 | +3 | 0 | -4 |
| 25 | I consider myself to be an animal lover | +4 | +6 | +2 | +2 |
| 26 | I think the way the dogs are kept for hunting is cruel | 0 | -2 | -5 | 1 |
| 27 | I see posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-ho!’ when I think of hunting people | -1 | -3 | -2 | -1 |
| 28 | Most people on a hunt are at the back and never see the animal being killed | -1 | +1 | 0 | -1 |
| 29 | People should respect animals as sentient individuals | +6 | +2 | 0 | +6 |
| 30 | Urban people haven’t got a clue about rural life | -4 | -1 | -1 | -2 |
| 31 | People in the hunting community think they can do what they like | +1 | 0 | -1 | +2 |
| 32 | The class structure favours and sustains hunting | +2 | -3 | -4 | +4 |
| 33 | The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding rural policies | -3 | 0 | -1 | -3 |
| 34 | The police would rather catch anti-hunters than illegal hunters | -1 | -2 | 0 | +2 |
| 35 | Worse things for animals than hunting should have been banned first | -2 | 0 | +1 | -2 |
| 36 | My main concern about hunting is how the animal is killed | +2 | 0 | -1 | -2 |
| 37 | All animals should be treated equally | +5 | 0 | -1 | +1 |
| 38 | Hunting is very difficult to regulate | +1 | 0 | +1 | -2 |
| 39 | The fox population needs to be controlled | -2 | +3 | +3 | -4 |
| 40 | There’s a big difference between killing animals for food and for sport | +3 | -2 | +2 | -1 |
| 41 | We should give animals the same moral consideration as humans | 0 | -3 | -2 | +3 |
| 42 | We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing wolves to the UK | -2 | -1 | -4 | +1 |
| 43 | I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes | -3 | +2 | -3 | -5 |
| 44 | Hunting wild animals is only OK if you need to do it to survive | +2 | -6 | -2 | 0 |
| 45 | Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong things | -4 | +1 | +1 | -3 |
| 46 | I try to look at hunting from the animals’ perspective | +3 | +1 | -2 | +2 |
| 47 | It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics | -3 | -1 | 0 | -1 |
| 48 | Being soft about animals is not really in their best interests | -1 | +2 | +2 | -1 |
| 49 | The only population out of control is us humans! | -1 | -2 | +6 | +4 |
| 50 | There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society | +5 | -5 | -5 | +5 |
| 51 | The hunting debate should include a wide range of people and viewpoints | +4 | +5 | +3 | 0 |
| 52 | Terrier work is a particularly cruel and unfair practice | +4 | -1 | -3 | +3 |

The sorting matrix for participants to place the Q-statements was designed according to a quasi-normal distribution on a 13-point scale from -6 (most disagree) to +6 (most agree). A platykurtic distribution[[22]](#footnote-22) was chosen to enable participants to make fine distinctions between statements (Watts & Stenner 2012, p80).

***Table 2: Blank matrix***

Values under each column indicate the number of statements in each column only

***Selecting the participants***

69 potential participants were initially contacted. A range of organisations, professionals and private individuals were contacted through email and existing contacts. These included pro- and anti-hunting organisations, activists, animal protection organisations, organised hunts, shooting, conservation and farming associations, academics, landowners and public figures. Previous interview participants were also invited. Additional participants were recruited through personal contacts in person and online. All participants were selected strategically to ensure a range of views. Some participants had no direct experience of hunting but strong views on the topic. The criterion for participating was to have an ‘interesting, informative and relevant viewpoint’ (Watts and Stenner 2012, p71).

Out of the 69 contacted, 33 conducted the Q-sort and completed an unstructured interview with me between May and June 2015. The recommended number of participants in a Q study (P-set) varies in the literature. Webler *et al* (2009, p11) recommend a statement-participant ratio of 3:1, whereas Watts and Stenner (2012, p73) suggest 40-60 participants. However, Brown emphasises that Q only requires sufficient participants to establish the existence of distinct viewpoints and that the ratio of statement: participant is ‘really not relevant in Q method’[[23]](#footnote-23) (email correspondence, 24th February 2016). A larger P-set does not add additional substance or credibility to the results, since the purpose of Q is *not* to generalise the results to a wider population (Watts & Stenner 2012, p72).

The majority of participants have been anonymised at their own request. The full list of participants can be found in Appendix 1.1 along with biographical information where relevant. Participants are hereafter referred to individually as P1 – P33.

***Administering the Q-sort and interview***

Q-sorts were conducted face-to-face in locations around England. 32 interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. Conducting the Q study face-to-face is preferable for several reasons. It offers participants the opportunity to ask questions and the researcher to offer practical guidance. Meeting in person also enabled me to conduct unstructured interviews alongside the sort. The in-depth material gleaned from interviews proved invaluable in interpreting the discourses. Participants were also able to fully express their views and were not just limited to the Q-sort itself. This was important as the Q-statements are open to interpretation which frustrated some participants. Conducting the Q-sorts face-to-face enabled participants to express this, which is not possible with an online sorting tool.

Some participants were frustrated at being ‘forced’ into the quasi-normal distribution. One participant abandoned the matrix altogether and distributed the statements freely. PQMethod allows for the entry of Q-sorts that do not fit the distribution so this participant was still included in the analysis; distributing the statements outside of quasi-normal distribution does not affect the overall outcome or factors produced by the Q study (Brown 1971; Cottle and McKeown 1980). Other participants took note of the forced nature of the distribution, but still completed the sort within the confines of the matrix:

So we're grading these now? So you're guiding me down a road that says these three are less important than these two? But then I could say that all five of these ought to be in that row. Difficult cause…one word...alters the whole meaning and the concept of what you're actually saying… (P30)

The time taken to complete the Q-sort and interviews varied from twenty minutes to over three hours due to the unstructured approach to interview. I prompted participants to explain their choices at the extreme ends of the scale but otherwise left conversation open. This yielded substantial qualitative benefits. Participants shared emotions, stories and personal experiences which brought the narratives to life and helped transform statistical factors into rich, tangible discourses.

***Conducting the factor analysis using specialised Q software***

Factor analysis in Q methodology enables the grouping of participants into clusters. From this it is possible to analyse the actual relationships between individuals’ perspectives. Q remains an essentially interpretive methodology but factor analysis provides a systematic foundation for interpretation, given that it reveals real statistical relationships between participants (Stevenson 2015, p5).

PQMethod is a free software package designed specifically for factor analysis in Q methodology (Schmolck 2014). Once all the data is entered, PQMethod creates a correlation matrix showing all the relationships and variance in the study.

***Factor Extraction***

The first step is to extract a number of factors. Factors are ‘portions of common or shared meaning’ that are present in the correlation matrix (Watts and Stenner 2012, p 98). Factor extraction takes away these portions of commonality from the entirety of relationships in the study. Following Watts and Stenner (2012, p100), I used Centroid extraction to extract seven factors from the study. Brown suggests (1980) seven factors as a good point from which to start deeper analysis. Following extraction, PQMethod produces an unrotated factor matrix. This can be found in the full output of the Q-analysis in Appendix 1.5. Examination of the unrotated factor matrix helps indicate the number of factors that might be retained for the final analysis. A range of statistical criteria can inform the decision as to how many factors to retain. Factors should have an eigenvalue of >1 and have two or more significant loadings. Factor loadings indicate the extent to which each Q-sort is associated with that factor. Significance in this study is >0.36 (p<0.01).

Brown (1980) is ambivalent towards various statistical options and advocates the importance of judgement. According to the statistical criteria, the unrotated matrix suggested that five of the seven factors should be retained for rotation. However, I followed Brown’s (1980) advice and retained all seven factors for rotation. There is nothing to lose by retaining seven factors for rotation and retaining more factors than necessary is helpful during the rotation process in further strengthening significant factors (see Brown 1980, p223).



***Factor Rotation***

Brown (1980, p224-226) provides a useful analogy for the factor rotation process. He describes a transparent sphere containing various dots embedded within it. The arrangement of dots looks different depending on how and where one holds the sphere; turning it this way and that in the hand. Factor rotation is akin to moving the sphere and examining it from different angles. The dots embedded in the sphere are the participants’ Q-sorts – their position does not move; we simply look at them from different perspectives. Rotation is, in crude terms, simply a matter of finding the best seat in the house to watch the show from. The factors extracted in the previous step can now be thought of as a definitive exemplar of that particular shared viewpoint. The aim of rotation is to align each factor axis as closely as possible to a cluster of Q-sorts. The closer a factor axis is to each Q-sort the more closely a participant is associated with that factor. Theoretically it is possible to have someone in the study align 100% to one factor, but this is unlikely because a factor is a hypothetical idealised Q-sort. Factor rotation ‘aims to position each factor so that its viewpoint closely approximates the viewpoint of a particular group of Q-sorts, or perhaps just one or two of particular importance’ (Watts and Stenner 2012, p127).

Figure 1 shows Factors 1 and 2 before and after rotation, for illustrative purposes. Prior to rotation there are two distinct clusters of participants. However, neither factor axes 1 or 2 do a very good job of fully explaining either cluster as it stands; neither is closely aligned with the factor axes on offer. Whilst this might seem bizarre, Watts and Stenner point out that this is not unusual given that Factor 1 accounts for the most common ground between the Q-sorts. Therefore, the relationships to F1 show us ‘a somewhat blurred amalgamation, of what these otherwise disparate viewpoints hold in common’ (2012, p118). Following rotation, the picture is improved with each cluster more closely approximated to the positive poles of Factors 1 or 2.


***Fig. 1***

Factors 1 and 2 before rotation Factors 1 and 2 after rotation

PQMethod enables both automatic (Varimax) and manual rotation of factors. Varimax operates on a purely statistical level. It therefore cannot take into account the ‘substantive reality’ of the debate. Watts and Stenner suggest that manual rotation may be more suitable if the study is interested in a marginalised viewpoint (2012, p 123). With this in mind I used Varimax followed by manual rotation (see Watts and Stenner, p126). Using Varimax provides validity in statistical terms, whilst a small amount of judgemental rotation enabled me to bring out subtle nuances that more closely resemble the qualitative evidence.

Following rotation of all seven factors, four factors were retained for the final analysis. These four factors met the statistical criteria discussed above and fitted the substantive reality of the debate. The final solution explains 55% of the total variance amongst participants. The rotated factor matrix is shown in Figure 2.

***Fig. 2 Rotated factor matrix***

The final step is to ‘flag’ certain Q-sorts to create factor arrays. Factor arrays are a hypothetical Q-sort – what it would look like if a person had a 100% loading on that factor. Factor arrays always differ slightly from actual Q-sorts, since a factor array ‘is simply a *best-possible* estimate of the factor’s viewpoint’ (Watts and Stenner 2012, p143; emphasis in original). PQMethod automatically flags defining Q-sorts which are used to create each factor array. Automatic flagging was used with one exception for Factor 3. P29 loads on Factor 3 but confused the poles of the distribution for two statements. Other than two statements the rest of the Q-sort was completed without problems. For this reason P29 has not been flagged as this would skew the array disproportionately. P20 loaded on F3 and F2 and was flagged for the Factor 3 array. This is because P20’s interview was particularly fruitful in elaborating the views of Factor 3. The factor array scores are shown in Table 1 (p55).

Figure 2 (p66) shows the rotated factor matrix with the final four factors with flagged sorts marked ‘X’. A number of Q-sorts that have significant loadings on both factors 1 and 4. These two factors are 76% correlated and 11 Q-sorts are considered ‘confounded’ as they load significantly on both factors. However, both factors 1 and 4 do have a number of high-loading Q-sorts on them (>0.60) and have been retained as distinct. It is not unusual to retain correlated factors in Q methodology (Jeffares and Skelcher 2011, p1261). The high correlation of these two viewpoints makes sense from an explanatory perspective: both factors are against hunting so their overlapping is entirely sensible. This corroborates the claims of discursive representation; persons subscribe to a number of overlapping identities and discourses (section 2.3). Varimax rotation also produced the correlated factors as distinct rather than two manifestations of one dominant factor, demonstrating that the differences are real rather than imposed. The subtle distinctions between the two were further elaborated during interview. The proceeding section provides a narrative interpretation of each factor into discourses.

## Section 4.2: four discourses on hunting

***Two discourses of Animal Protection: liberal-progressive and critical-radical.***

Perspectives 1 and 4 are statistically the same factor with a correlation of 76%. However, there are some key distinctions and subtleties. Below I discuss both factors under the heading of *animal protection*, followed by a discussion of each. Parentheses indicate statement number and the scores given by factors 1 and 4 respectively for that statement.

Together the animal protection viewpoints account for 30% of the total study variance and 17 participants are associated with either one of its variants or both. They are opposed to hunting. Animal protectionism strongly agrees that people should respect animals as sentient beings that can suffer and feel pain (S29, +6, +6). It strongly disagrees with the argument that hunting replicates the natural ‘survival of the fittest’ relationship (S24, -5, -4) and rejects that hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling the fox population (S23, -6, -6). Neither is hunting merely a form of pest control (S20, - 4, -4). Animal protectionism also rejects cultural justifications for hunting and does not believe that hunting is an important British tradition (S3, -5, -5). Hunting is not an important part of being *British*; *British traditions* are not necessarily something we ought to uphold; and ultimately *tradition* itself is a fallible phenomenon:

What is a British tradition? Slavery was a British tradition. Our involvement in slavery and empires and colonialisation were also British traditions but we kind of stopped being involved in them for particular reasons. You know, traditions are human constructions...so to defend something as tradition, it reifies it, it takes out the human ability, that human kind of participation, and it treats it like it's always been kind of like that whereas traditions can be modified, adapted in particular kind of ways... (P24)

I don't think any traditions...should be protected that harms any animal or human...if a tradition puts someone at risk, removing that tradition does not stop us from being British, will not stop us recognising each other as being British...to suggest that they won't to me is obviously ridiculous...we should respect different cultures but we can't make excuses for things that do harm to animals and humans, just because of the fact that they're a tradition (P4).

Animal protectionism does not think that the hunting community should have more of a say in deciding rural policies (S33, -3, -3). Animal protectionism does not really subscribe to the stereotype of hunting people as posh, upper-class types shouting ‘tally-ho!’ (S27, -1, -1), although it’s not something they feel strongly about.

### Section 4.2.1: liberal-progressive animal protectionism (factor 1)

Factor 1 has an eigenvalue of 5.93 and explains 18% of the study variance. 17 participants are significantly associated with Factor 1. Out of these, 10 are also associated with Factor 4, suggesting that these participants subscribe to both discourses. Factor 1 is termed liberal-progressive. It shows a liberal tendency in that those aligned with this position believe that all viewpoints should be valued in debate and that people are entitled to their own opinion. It is progressive in that there is an emphasis on what modern society should look like: hunting is seen as an outdated throwback that has no place in today’s Britain.

The liberal-progressive position holds animal sentience and respect for animals (S29, +6) in high esteem. The main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is killed (S44, +2). This concern reflects the liberal-progressive attitude to animals more broadly, applying to ‘all the other animal abuses you might miss, like the way they’re slaughtered and everything else’ (P23):

I suppose…I am one of those people who will eat meat, but I’m one of those hand-wringing lefty liberal types who tends to be a princess when it comes to the stuff he’s eating. So I guess perhaps the reason it’s so important to me is because I can go to bed feeling relatively the same, rather than going to bed every night thinking, “That chicken I just ate – how was it killed?” (P18)

It is morally permissible to use animals under certain circumstances, dictated by [perceived] necessity and humane treatment. Concomitantly liberal-progressivism disagrees that there is no nice way to kill an animal (S12, -2) because there are ‘more humane ways of killing animals…it’s OK to slaughter an animal, providing it's done humanely, providing it doesn't suffer, and also it's done on a needs basis, so for food, we wouldn't condone it for entertainment’ (P15).

Hunting wild animals could be justifiable if you need to do it to survive (S44, +2) because there is a big difference between killing for food and killing for sport (S40, +3). Hunting with dogs however is not an effective way of controlling the fox population (S23, -6). It is not a form of pest control (S20, -4) and does not replicate a survival of the fittest type relationship (S24, -5). These arguments are rejected because of ‘the scientific evidence that it's cruel, the scientific evidence that it doesn't work’ (P14). The emphasis on scientific evidence is also reflected in how liberal-progressives try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspective (S46, +3):

I'm a zoologist and I do that as a profession, and I'm a specialist in animal behaviour, so I'm that kind of zoologist that always tries to look from how the animal would look at it...so the question of what do they feel, can only be answered if you try to learn it from the animal's perspective (P10).

The liberal-progressive view does not think that it is silly to say that animals share human characteristics (S47, -3). All animals should be treated equally (S37, +5) although this leads to divergent interpretations. For some, equal treatment means considering each animals’ *welfare* equally. For others it means becoming vegetarian or vegan because ‘they’re all the same, they’re all unable to communicate, clearly they do have feelings, so if it was the deer, or the dog that was in the place of the fox, why would that be different?’ (P26).

Hunting is nothing more than inflicting gratuitous cruelty on animals for the sake of entertainment (S22, +3) and there is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society (S50, +5):

I think as with other modern attitudes, particularly 21st century, we’ve moved into a different place of awareness as regards animal life. As we have with gay people, people of colour, many other things and I think…there is no place for taking pleasure in hunting another species, particularly where there’s no necessity involved in it….apart from gaining pleasure (P23).

Liberal-progressivism does take pro-hunting arguments into account because it holds that debates should include a diverse range of people and viewpoints (S40, +4). ‘In general, the debates about anything should include all viewpoints and as wide range of people, so I think that's just, life in general’ (P27). The liberal-progressive position shows a desire for a diverse and open debate about hunting. The conviction that everyone can bring something to the table is reflected in the disagreement with the notion that people who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue about how rural life works (S30, -4). This is seen as insulting – ‘some of them read books!’ (P32); likewise the assertion that anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong things (S45, -4). The liberal-progressive discourse rejects the suggestion that hunting is an important social activity for people living in the countryside (S21, -3). There is also distaste for how arguments over ‘rural life’ are used as tools in the hunting debate:

It’s a fallacy, it’s the assumption that you can only understand a thing if you are a part of that world… It’s a lie, as far as I’m concerned. It’s a complete lie. It’s the type of attitude that prevents any actual dialogue between the two different sides because it’s this kind of attitude of a split between one extreme and another extreme, which annoys me (P18).

The liberal-progressive viewpoint comprises a pragmatic opposition to hunting based on a strong conviction in animal welfare and a rejection of the arguments offered in favour of hunting. There is a desire for a more rational, evidence-based debate on hunting that should include all relevant parties even if we disagree with them. Liberal-progressivism is open to considering alternative viewpoints. The anti-hunting stance is indicative of attitudes towards other animals and is underpinned by an animal welfare ethic.

### Section 4.2.2: critical-radical animal protectionism (factor 4)

The critical-radical stance shares a great deal with the liberal-progressive perspective but is distinctive. The primary differences can be seen in factor 4’s indifference to open debate, and an emphasis on the role of structural and political factors in the hunting debate. This factor has an eigenvalue of 5.06 and accounts for 15% of the study variance. 11 participants are significantly associated with this position; 10 of these are also associated with factor 1. Factor 4 has been termed critical-radical. In short, this position critically reflects on the power structures that accommodate hunting, including the class structure. It can be seen as radical in its advocacy of equal moral consideration for animals, and in its condemnation of the farming industry. I use the term radical to mean radical in comparison to the other factors in the study.

Critical-radicalism rejects pro-hunting arguments that hunting is an effective way of controlling foxes (S23, -6) or replicates a natural relationship (S24, -4). It also rejects the argument that the fox population needs to be controlled (S39, -4) because ‘they're territorial, they produce more young than the territories available…the population numbers, is controlled solely by the breeding territories available’ (P11).

This position does not believe the hunting community should have more of a say in deciding rural policies (S33, -3) and does not think that farming interests should be a priority (S15, -3). Critical-radicalism is critical of the farming industry more broadly. Defending hunting as a way of protecting livestock is ‘not because of their poor little baa-lambs getting slaughtered, but because they're thinking of the monetary value they're going to lose’ (P3). Hunting is viewed in this context:

I see the management issue as very much stemming from farming interests. So it's about managing...managing but managing for what purpose? What are you trying to achieve through that management you know, the management that's going on isn't for the sake of wildlife. I don't buy this stuff about custodians of the countryside...a huge swathe of farming practices are you know, quite destructive... (P16).

Critical-radicalism upholds that our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and interest (S6, +3). It rejects the idea that the British countryside only exists because of man’s investment and management (S9, -3) and argues that ‘the British countryside is *shit* because of man's management of it’ (P11). What’s more, ‘farmers have a pretty cushty[[24]](#footnote-24) deal on the whole, from all the benefits they get from not managing or managing the land, because they’re considered very important to the economy, they’ve always had an easy ride with the government’ (P17).

The critical-radical viewpoint has a *structural* view of the hunting debate. The class structure favours hunters (32, +4). That hunting remains controversial at all reflects the powerful position that the community occupies. Critical-radicalism reflects on the historical power structures that hunting symbolises:

There was place for hunting in previous civilised societies…and there was a huge hierarchical structure where hunting played part of it...we are in a democracy, that hierarchy doesn't exist anymore, hunting remains one of the few relics of the medieval times where people still use the terms such as master and servant...it's a relic of a time when values were very different… (P10)

Power relations still shape the hunting debate today because ‘it involves key elements of the upper echelons of society shall we say, to put it politely’ (P3). The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting campaigners than people hunting illegally (S34, +2). Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant attitude that they can do what they like (S31, +2). Critical-radicalism connects this attitude to the treatment of animals. Critical-radicalism does not believe that huntsmen respect the foxes (S3, -5) – ‘it’s just…bloodlust’ (P11, P17).

I have a very clear memory of being ridden down by the then Sheriff of Northamptonshire shouting "Get out of my fucking way you bloody peasant!"...and this myth about them caring about their horses and caring about their dogs, the vast majority of dogs used in hunting never make the grade, and are brutally killed...I've seen huntsmen laughing at the side of the road whilst their horse is being put down…I don't see how they can be so heartless about other living creatures, but then I suppose if that's the environment you've grown up in, and that's all you've known... (P3)

Critical-radicalism does not care much about having a diverse debate on hunting (S51, 0). It does not suggest that people are incapable of thinking rationally about hunting (S4, -1) but reasoned discussion is not a priority. Critical-radicalism suggests that we should give animals the same moral consideration as humans (S41, +3). There is no nice way to kill an animal (S12, +3), because ‘for me there’s just no nice way to take a life’ (P17). Despite these beliefs critical-radicalism does not align as an animal lover (S25, +2) as much as other discourses.

Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting suffering and gratuitous cruelty on animals for the sake of entertainment (S22, +5).

...a lot of the lads I've seen on the hunt, they're very much in that…it's this, the great chase. Whether it's the ultimate aim to kill an animal - well obviously it is the aim to kill the animal - but whether they all see that, or that is just dismissed as the final conclusion....err, it sounds awful, and you'll have to forgive me for the expression, but it's like, the end bit is like the orgasm, if you know what I mean. They're not interested in that. It's all the leading up to it and when that [the kill] happens at the end, that's it, and they're on to the next one...they're off down the pub or whatever... (P30)

The critical-radical opposition to hunting is political and structural in nature. It is critical of the structures that enable hunting and the system that continues to protect them. The arrogance of privilege in hunting is tied to a lack of respect for animals.

### Section 4.2.3: countryside management (factor 2)

Factor 2 has an eigenvalue of 4.31 and accounts for 13% of the study variance. 10 participants are significantly associated with this factor, two of whom are also associated with factor 3. It is important to qualify that not everyone associated with this viewpoint self-identifies as pro-hunting.

Countryside management strongly disagrees that there is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society (S50, -5). It also disagrees that hunting wild animals is only justified for survival reasons (S44, -6). Hunting is not *just* a form of pest control (S20, -3). The fox population needs to be controlled (S39, +3). Hunting with dogs ‘is a form of wildlife management. It involves pest control, and it involves sport, but it is not one of those things. It's a combination of those things’ (P33). Hunting is an effective way of controlling the fox population (S23, +2) and replicates the natural ‘survival of the fittest’ relationship (S20, +3).

Hunting is an important social activity for people living in the countryside (S21, +2) and being out in the countryside is important to countryside management (S17, +4). The British countryside isn’t entirely natural (S8, +3). It exists in its current state because of man’s investment and management of it (S9, +3):

…wherever you want to go in the countryside, it's not natural, you'll see...oats, barley, wheat, you'll see a ploughed field; you'll see maize, you'll see grass....the countryside is a working countryside. If we left the countryside entirely on its own, we'd be looking at a jungle. That's the bottom line, I think (P7).

Countryside management argues that intervention in nature is necessary for a variety of reasons beyond just for the wild animals’ benefit (S14, -4). Wildlife is not better off without human intervention (S13, -2) as ‘there are plenty of times when conservation gets out of balance, because there is an overburden of one thing over another’ (P12).

This discourse is characterised by an overt love for animals (S25, +6): ‘the suggestion is that people who go hunting are not animal lovers, but I think every one of them will tell you that they are animal lovers’ (P25). It vehemently disagrees that hunting is a form of gratuitous cruelty for the sake of entertainment (S22, -5) because ‘when you actually meet people who do go hunting, it's just not what they're all about’ (P5). It also rejects the posh, upper-class stereotype of hunting people (S27, -3); ‘I can guarantee I'm not posh. I can guarantee I don't go around the countryside shouting tally-ho, and I can guarantee that's a load of nonsense, that statement!’ (P7) There is no undercurrent of violence and aggression around hunting (S11, -4).

This viewpoint suggests that people are against hunting because ‘the majority of people don't understand it’ (P33). It disagrees that if hunts listened to local communities they would see that the majority of people are against it (S5, -4), because ‘they're fully aware of listening to people…and whether most people are against it or not...I think they know they're right, and so, so what’ (P33).

Countryside management agrees that hunting is a very polarised issue and people don’t think rationally about it (S4, +5). There is a desire for a diverse debate including a range of viewpoints and people (S51, +5). However, ‘people have very preconceived views of hunting’ (P25). One participant talked about wanting to have a debate based on reasoned argument (P6). He didn’t see arguments such as the class structure as favouring hunters (S32, -3) as *arguments* against hunting, but superficial reactions to *people* who go hunting. Despite this frustration, countryside management are not willing to say that people who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue how rural life works (S30, -1). This reflects a ‘yes *and* no’ feeling rather than indifference. Despite support for hunting, countryside management does not feel strongly about the importance of hunting as a British tradition (S3, +1). Although ‘it is a tradition - whether it’s important or not…it’s not, you know…it’s not the end of the world if we don’t hunt, is it?’ (P19).

This discourse presents an argument that being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the time is not really in an animal’s best interests (S48, +2). People who work with animals have a different attitude than those who have animals as companions (S7, +4). In relation to hunting, ‘animals in the wild, have to be viewed differently to animals under our control, ’cause they are in the wild, so you have to deal with disease, number control, injured animals, in a different way’ (P33). It is problematic when people have the same attitude to foxes as they do to their pet dog at home (P6). Instead, huntsmen *respect* foxes (S43, +2; emphasis added). Countryside management considers the difference in working attitude in some depth:

Well you take people that work with animals - you’ve got farmers, gamekeepers…they’re dealing with animals as part of a natural process for a different end. The gamekeeper is working with loads of…what are wild animals that he’s breeding, like pheasants…yet he’s building them up in a confined environment. Yet he’s gonna go out one Saturday morning and shoot the damned lot. Or…take a farmer that’s producing young sheep, producing lambs…the effort he puts into birthing those lambs…and yet he knows in six months they’re going for meat! So it is…it’s not…a derogatory attitude, but it is totally different to the proverbial mean on top of the 57 omnibus.[[25]](#footnote-25) Totally different attitude. But it’s not…there’s no hatred in it - it’s the opposite! Because he’s breeding them because that’s his industry, that’s his job…on the converse of that is…some people who work for animal care and welfare, can’t see that there’s a need to limit populations, or that the animal is being bred for something totally different. Like game birds…the people that have the care of the animal try to do the best for it whilst it’s alive, but they know at the end they’re gonna destroy it. Whereas some that work for animal welfare, think that life is virtually…infinity really - well it isn’t (P28).

There is not a big difference to killing animals for food or sport (S40, -2) because ‘killing is killing - in many cases it's led a far worse life being a food produced animal than it has being a wild animal that's been killed for sport…I'd rather eat shot pheasant than I would, intensively reared chicken, that's never seen outside’ (P5).[[26]](#footnote-26) People should treat animals with respect as sentient beings (S29, +2) but we should not give animals the same moral consideration as humans (S41, -3). Some of those aligned with this position were baffled by the claim that the only population out of control is humans (S49, -2) because ‘it's got all sorts of terrible implications’ (P33). One participant asked whether it suggested enforced human sterilisation (P6).

The countryside management viewpoint encompasses a stewardship approach to the British countryside and wildlife. Hunting with dogs is part of the manager’s toolkit. Countryside management loves animals and the countryside but this has a specific meaning that is very different to animal protectionists.

### Section 4.2.4: sporting libertarianism

Factor 3 has an eigenvalue of 2.87 and is the smallest factor, accounting for 9% of the total study variance. Seven participants are significantly associated with this factor, with two also associated with factor 2. Factor 3 and factor 2 correlate 51%. Both support hunting but differ in some aspects. The discourse has been termed sporting libertarian because it provides a defence of hunting as a legitimate sport rather than one of wildlife management. There is also a distinct libertarian streak in that proponents of this discourse expressed the view that hunting should be allowed even if others strongly disagree.

Sporting libertarianism believes that farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predators (S1, +5). This involves controlling foxes because the fox population does need to be controlled (S39, +3) and farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural policies (S15, +2). It is not convinced that hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling foxes (S23, -1). Several participants discussed more effective ways of killing foxes and pointed out that ‘the hunt, they might get one, they might get two foxes on a day, which is nothing...whereas obviously, people who go out shooting the foxes, they can have like six, seven foxes in a night’ (P29). Nonetheless this position strongly disagrees that hunting is merely inflicting gratuitous cruelty for the sake of entertainment (S22, -6):

I’ve done a lot of hunting in various forms, and at no point have I ever thought about deliberately inflicting suffering and injury and stuff to an animal. Yeah, they get killed, we all die and everything else…but I don’t go out and think about being as painful and as cruel as possible…I was more wrapped up in the whole process of how things worked…the amount of effort put into training dogs, looking after them, the process of tracking, hunting, hawking…for me, hunting’s not about creating pain, misery or anything else…it’s a sport. And, I think it’s one of the most natural sports that we do…and it’s one of the things that we spend too much time suppressing and not doing… (P20)

The sporting libertarian view argues that that hunting is a legitimate sporting activity and should be allowed to continue. It is not the most effective way of controlling foxes, but it does contribute in some way and ‘we do it for the farmers. We’re not going out to terrorise round the country’ (P8).

Sporting libertarianism strongly disagrees that there is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society (S50, -5). It is ‘utter bullshit’ (P20) and ‘there is a place for hunting, I think that’s like saying there’s no place for football in a modern society…it’s a sport that not everyone agrees with. I don’t like football, doesn’t mean there’s no place for it in a modern society’ (P21). This illustrates the libertarian aspect to this discourse: *just because some people don’t like what you’re doing, doesn’t mean you should stop doing it.* As a consequence it thinks that anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong things (S45, +1) sometimes. Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils (S35, +1).

Sporting libertarianism views the human population as out of control (S49, +6) because ‘the amount of people that you see that…to get a house, to get money from the government, from us – they’re just bang out…they don’t really care, as long as they get a house and everything they want paid for, so that’s where I think we’re at…humans are out of control…’ (P22).

Sporting libertarianism sees the human impact on the countryside (S6, +4) as negative. Being out in the countryside is really important (S17, +5) ‘and it's slowly disappearing…the human demand on housing etc is taking it further and further away, and killing a lot of habitats for animals’ (P9). Humans are destructive and selfish. Their interfering nature extends to interactions with wildlife. Like critical-radicalism, sporting libertarianism agrees that wildlife is better off without human intervention (S13, +4) because we should ‘let them sort theyselves [sic] out naturally’ (P29). It is not a good idea to re-introduce higher predators like wolves to the UK (S42, -4). This is not only ‘completely bizarre and stupid!’ (P9) but it is another way of interfering with wildlife (P20). Sporting libertarianism maintains a distance between humans and animals. It does not try to look at things from the animal’s perspective (S46, -2). Sporting libertarianism is cautious about describing itself as an animal lover (S22, +2). It has an ambivalent view of the term and doesn’t think that being soft about animals is in their best interest (S48, +2) because

...an animal lover should be someone who provides what’s best for the animal, not for them. It might be better for you to sit and cuddle your dog, but is it better for the dog? If you sit and cuddle your dog, are you an animal lover? For me, you’re not. You are a self-centred emotional person…you’re not taking into account what the dog needs, you’re just taking into account what you want (P20).

Sporting libertarianism does not think that we should give animals the same moral consideration as humans (S41, -3) because ‘human rights outweigh all animals, full stop. Why? Not a clue. I don’t know why, because we’re no more than an animal’ (P20). It does agree that there is no nice way to kill an animal (S12, +3) but they accept this as an inevitable fact of life. Sporting libertarianism does think that hunting is dangerous for the horses (S2, +4) and participants cited personal experience of this. It does not think that the way that the dogs are kept for hunting is cruel (S26, -5). In fact ‘they've got big thick beds, they all live in a pack together, they're split between dogs and bitches just because of fighting and stuff, but...they love it, and it's lovely to hear them sing, like of an evening, about 5, 6 o’ clock, you'll hear them singing, and it'll travel down the valley, and it's really nice to hear’ (P8).

Sporting libertarianism does not think that the class structure favours hunters (S32, -4). In fact an inversion of the class argument is given – ‘it is funny in’t [sic] it. I think the emphasis on fox hunting, is all to do with class. It’s this bloke with his red jacket on, people can’t stand it, they can’t stand the thought of it’ (P20). From this perspective, some people are anti-hunting because they dislike the upper-classes. Sporting libertarianism also rejects the posh upper-class stereotype (S27, -2). It points out that ‘some of them…are at the other end of the…social spectrum…it’s quite a wide variety of people, especially in the countryside. I don’t think I’ve ever heard anyone shout tally-ho, unless they were taking the mickey[[27]](#footnote-27)!’ (P28).

The sporting libertarianism discourse supports hunting with dogs as a legitimate sport. Although it does help control fox numbers there are far more effective ways. There is fatalist seam running through this viewpoint, with the condemnation of spreading populations and damage to the environment seen as an inevitable result of the human condition.

**Conclusions**

This chapter has provided a detailed account of the methodology used to identify and analyse current discourses around hunting. The narrative account given here provides an in-depth insight into the hunting debate that demonstrates the complexity of views on hunting: beyond the pro/anti dichotomy. Most importantly for the animal protection movement, my findings indicate the extent to which viewpoints typified as animal welfare and animal rights are in reality intertwined and very similar. Nonetheless, there are some important distinctions that were drawn out in the narrative analysis. Notably, the difference between the liberal-progressive and critical-radical positions is perhaps less to do with the discursive representation of animals and more to do with underlying political assumptions about individual agency and power structures respectively.

Chapter five further analyses the findings outlined here, to provide an assessment of deliberative quality in public space. Here I take a novel approach in evaluating the deliberative potential of the discourses themselves.

# Chapter Five: deliberative quality in public space

**Introduction**

In this chapter, I analyse the four discourses on hunting to explore the deliberative potential of the hunting debate in public space. Taking the discourses identified in chapter four, I assess the deliberative quality of the hunting debate through analysing the discourses themselves. I consider inclusivity in the deliberative system as the extent to which discourses engage and contest each other in a substantive manner. I also consider how each discourse represents animals in their arguments for or against hunting. Finally, I discuss moments of authentic deliberation shared by participants. I first outline the novel approach taken to analysing deliberative quality in public space. The analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates that despite the polarised views and vitriolic nature of the hunting debate, deliberative moments do occur. I present evidence from the Q study interviews highlighting moments of geniality and humour between pro- and anti-hunting advocates. However, it must be emphasised that such moments are the exception rather than the rule. Furthermore despite such moments, analysis of the discourses themselves reveal that some are closed to alternative viewpoints, precluding the opportunity for meaningful deliberation. This means that although there may be convivial moments in the debate, meaningful dialogue may still not be possible.

## Section 5.1: a novel approach

In this chapter, I focus on the substance of discourses themselves to explore how they enable or preclude discursive deliberative contestation on hunting. Rather than looking at settings and interpreting how discourses are contested and deployed by actors, I look to discursive content to draw inferences on the possibilities for deliberation in public space.

The predominant approach to analysing public space in the deliberative system has involved evaluating inclusivity by assessing the balance of discourses present in different settings in public space (see Stevenson and Dryzek 2014). This approach emphasises inclusivity as the primary criterion for evaluating deliberative democracy in public space. Ideally, communication in public space should be unconstrained and ‘multiple perspectives articulated’ (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, p35). It is expected that in public space, authentic features of deliberative communication such as respect may be absent but this is not problematic from a systems perspective because it is not necessary to find all features of deliberation in one time and place. Similarly, it may be the case that non-deliberative actions have deliberative benefits that come to fruition at some later point. Stevenson and Dryzek’s approach assumes that discourses ‘need to be done’ (see Leopold and Winkel 2013). That is to say, a discourse requires an actor to deploy it. Subsequently their analysis focuses on just that: how and where actors deploy various discourses in public space. Here I employ a different approach that emphasises the importance of substantive discursive content as an indication of inclusivity in public space.

Whilst I recognise that discourses still require actors to perform and communicate them, I also uphold that discourse itself ‘determines actors’ abilities and capacities to act’ (Leopold and Winkel 2013, p7). Discourse can constrain and enable actors. Furthermore, as argued in chapter two (section 2.4.1) discourses can have a communicative legacy that resonates with those who subscribe to them and can outlive evidence of the situation. This gives discourses themselves a kind of interdependent agency along with actors: discourse itself can shape actors just as actors shape discourse. This is particularly pertinent for animal representation, given that animals rely on human actors to represent them in discourse. The rich, emotive language used to represent animals in the four hunting discourses can also be analysed to evaluate the different ways in which discursive representation occurs.

My approach can be seen as a sort of inversion of Stevenson and Dryzek’s: rather than looking at settings and interpreting discursive substance, I look to the discursive substance and draw inferences about balance and contestation. There are limitations to this approach; I do not assess the deployment and balance of discourses in public space so cannot make any final conclusion about the overall health of public space in these terms. In a sense, I go back one step to analyse the potentially deliberative quality of the discourses themselves. There are good reasons for taking this step backwards. Firstly, it heeds the warning of Owen and Smith (2015) that systems theorists ought not to evaluate deliberative democracy solely on the balance of discourses. Their concern is derived from the systemic focus on the contestation of discourses and the theoretical assumption that non-deliberative acts can harbour deliberative potential: it is not enough to assume latent deliberative credibility. By looking *inside* the discourses, it is possible to examine whether its commitments and characteristics enable or preclude possibilities for inclusive deliberation in public space.

Most important for this kind of analysis is to look at how the discourses contest alternative viewpoints. Although in a trivial sense, discourses cannot (without actors to deploy them) contest ‘each other’, each discourse does contain arguments against its counterparts. I examine how discourses ‘react’ to opposing viewpoints and evaluate the deliberative nature of these features.

In addition to analysing the character of discourses, this section also offers an insight into moments of authentic deliberation. Participants were asked during interview to reflect on their personal experiences and conversations around the hunting debate. This allows a valuable glimpse into the sort of ‘everyday talk’ that Mansbridge (1999) cites as important in the deliberative system. These encounters occur in a kind of twilight zone between private and public space in the deliberative system. Stevenson and Dryzek (2014, p27-8) conceptualise the private sphere as informal discussion that takes place within households and contributes to socialisation and preference-formation. Meetings between hunt saboteurs and organised hunts may take place in plain daylight and on public land but they are not enacted ‘in public’ in the same way that say, a town hall meeting about hunting might be. Similarly, participants recounted conversations they had participated in about hunting that took place with friends or colleagues – not necessarily in public forums. Nonetheless, these encounters cannot be considered as being part of the private sphere according to Stevenson and Dryzek because they do not take place within the household, according to the traditional public-private distinction. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to address the empirical limitations of this conceptual barrier; here I simply point out that the experiences of interviewees discussed in this chapter do not fit neatly into either public or private space as conceptualised by current systems theorists.[[28]](#footnote-28)

I rely on the subjective interpretation and reflection of participants, and on my own interpretation. Whilst this has inevitable limitations, it is quite in keeping with the emphasis on operant subjectivity endorsed by Q methodology; subjects make their own meaning. Moreover, the factor analysis means that those shared viewpoints do have some objective validity: the relationships between individuals and distinct clusters do really exist, insofar as the statistics reflect the constellation of individual Q-sorts. Factors 1 and 4 *do* have a lot in common, but the question of how they engage deliberatively is one for interpretive analysis.

## Section 5.2: inclusivity in public space

In this section I analyse the possibility for inclusive deliberation on hunting in public space. I do this by examining the ways in which the four discourses converge and disagree. This gives an indication of inclusivity. It enables me to evaluate how open to alternative viewpoints the four positions appear to be, which may facilitate or constrain the possibility of deliberation. For example, the liberal-progressive position appears to value alternative viewpoints in a debate. That it is also highly correlated with critical-radicalism is a positive indicator for inclusivity; this position values diverse views and has considerable points of agreement with another position already.

By examining how discourses counter or agree with each other, it is possible to see whether alternative perspectives are dismissed out of hand or consideration given to actual arguments. If the latter prevails, then the chances for inclusive deliberation are greatly diminished because broader perspectives will not be given serious consideration.

***Liberal-progressive and critical-radical: united we stand?***

The liberal-progressive position follows a liberal modality. It upholds that anyone can have an opinion on hunting and rejects ‘the assumption that you can only understand a thing if you are a part of that world’ (P18). In order for a constructive debate, a diverse range of viewpoints should be included. This means that ‘people shouldn't necessarily be judged based on stereotypes...there is a lot wrong with various different viewpoints but we should at least come at them like everyone has something valuable to say, and unless we do that I don't think we can have a proper debate about it’ (P4). There is a pragmatic streak in the liberal-progressive position:

…why the hell would I want to include people that I completely disagree with in this, but to actually solve the problem in the long term, you need to involve all the parties because actually if you exclude people, people tend to become quite upset about it and they find a kind of issue with it because “well you're excluding our viewpoint, why aren't you speaking to us, why aren't you helping us out? why aren't you paying attention to our - why are you doing x, y and z?” (P24)

This suggests that liberal-progressivism is relatively inclusive. Liberal-progressivism also uses reason-based argument to contest the claims of countryside management. The two differ most over the functionality of hunting and both use references to scientific evidence. Three participants loading on the liberal-progressive position and three aligned with countryside management cite scientific evidence to support their claims. Notably all those who did this were professionals working in animal protection or lobbying organisations. Evidence cited refers either to the welfare implications for hunted animals or regarding fox control. The RSPCA (P14) referred to evidence considerably more than any other participant in the study.

Evidently the liberal-progressive and critical-radical perspectives are closely intertwined. They converge primarily on their opposition to hunting and diverge on more general claims about animals. It is possible to see liberal-progressivism as animal welfare and critical-radicalism as animal rights: liberal-progressivism emphasises the difference between killing animals for food and for sport; food is a necessity whereas sport is not. Critical-radicalism does not see as much of a distinction. It is perhaps relevant that all participants loading on critical-radicalism are either vegetarian or vegan, which may influence their views. However, a number of participants subscribing to the liberal-progressive and countryside management also discussed their vegetarianism.

But to distinguish factors 1 and 4 as welfare/rights is too simplistic. Analysis of interview material shows further differences between the two. In crude terms, the liberal-progressive asks “what sort of person would go hunting?” whereas the critical-radical questions “what sort of system allows hunting?” Both positions are guilty of *ad hominem* in that they attack the personality of hunters. This is connected to the claim that hunting is a form of gratuitous cruelty that people enjoy. Both the liberal-progressive and critical-radical viewpoints use personal experience to support the attack on personality:

…the hunt saboteurs call them blood junkies, and when I saw it I understood why…they’re avid on it, it’s this thing that fills them and fills the atmosphere…and when they’re all onto this little creature, who might have gone down a hole in terror or is fleeing in terror…it’s the pleasure that they’re getting from chasing, harming and killing…and I know that’s been discussed in human terms…but I don’t know how much it’s been talked about in relation to killing and it needs to be talked about, because really it’s what drives it. It’s the pleasure that drives it, whatever else you say, it’s what they’re addicted to…it’s a sort of sexualised pleasure, which might sound exaggerated but you feel it…all the terriermen are on it and the huntsmen are on it, and…it’s very very disturbing…it disturbs me still…. I see it in them, and that’s quite a hard thing to live with (P23).

Divergence occurs on *why* both positions think there is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society. On the one hand, liberal-progressivism offers an argument from modernity that ‘hunting is a hangover of tradition and honour – it’s old, it’s cruel, it serves no purpose or benefits for the vast majority of modern life’ (P18). On the other, the critical-radical perspective provides a structural explanation: there are ‘social, class and other issues surrounding it which generally are in favour, in terms of the power distribution, promote hunting rather than restrain it’ (P16). It is within this context that hunting is viewed as a relic of a past hierarchical system. The privileged position of the hunting community allows the practice to continue and the issue to be controversial. One former activist points out that ‘the people involved in hunting are powerful, influential figures - they have friends in the media, friends in the judicial system, they can make life very difficult’ (P3). This critique of the status quo makes critical-radicalism a counter-hegemonic discourse. It challenges assumptions about conservation, the countryside and wildlife.

Despite these differences, liberal-progressive and critical-radical position have more in common than not. The majority of participants loading on these two factors subscribe to both in different measures. The two discourses share most similarity with each other against pro-hunting discourses over a distaste for hunting beyond disagreeing with it for functional reasons. This high correlation is promising for helping to overcome the perceived binary between animal rights and animal welfare. One participant loading relatively high on both critical-radical and liberal-progressive factors discussed his views on this debate:

This division only occurs in very few countries where the history of animal protection is longer…therefore it comes from a longer social dynamic…But now it’s converging…no one is talking about animal rights or animal welfare anymore...except people that still live in the past, that still think there’s that difference between…it’s a very simplistic view of what animal protection is… 20 – 30 years ago, you could tell, who is an animal protectionist. They would look like a hippy-ish type. You can’t now. There’s no way you can say, in London, this is vegan this is not vegan…the looks and the ideology have changed. For the hunters they don’t know that, they still don’t know…but why would they? That’s the thing…if they live in a world of hunting and masters and servants, and people in red coats on horses, and they…that’s it, that’s their world and they…they’re bound to have a narrow look at the world, and not realise the colourful diversity there… (P10).

The above quote demonstrates the potential for factors 1 and 4 to draw on their common ground, which could serve to strengthen the argument against hunting. This participant also exemplifies the hybridity of the two overlapping factors. He encompasses the liberal critique of the *individuals’* outdated behaviour, whilst referencing the ‘masters and servants’ and ‘medieval feudal’ *structure* in which he situates hunting that is reminiscent of the critical-radical position. This nuanced perspective gives reason to be cautiously optimistic about the animal protection movement overcoming the perceived dichotomy between animal welfare and animal rights. The considerable overlap between the two perspectives demonstrates for the study participants at least, the two are not as easily distinguishable as at first impression.

***Sporting libertarianism vs. the world***

The anti-hunting critique of *people* that hunt (rather than hunting *per se*) is at the core of contestation between anti-hunting discourses and the sporting libertarian position. They disagree vehemently over motivations for hunting and the place of hunting in modern society. Sporting libertarianism employ individualistic rhetoric to defend hunting: ‘I think everyone's entitled to their own opinion, and their own pursuit of pleasure, if hunting is their way of doing it, then, great...’ (P9). Sporting libertarianism contests anti-hunting positions with *tu quoque*: pointing out perceived inconsistency in other’s arguments. *Tu quoque* literally translates as ‘you too’ and in argumentative form, comprises a type of *ad hominem* argument. I do not draw any conclusions here on the fallacious nature or otherwise of this type of argument (for this discussion, see Lagerspetz 1995). However, it is perhaps relevant here that a classic example of *tu quoque* is remarkably similar to the approach taken in sporting libertarianism:

The classical example of this fallacy is the reply of the hunter when accused of barbarism in sacrificing unoffending animals for amusement. The reply is to ask the critic, 'Why do you feed on the flesh of harmless cattle?' The sportsman here is guilty of an argumentum ad hominem in that he does not try to prove that it is right to sacrifice animal life for human pleasure, but merely that it cannot consistently be decried by the critic because of the critic's own special circumstances, in this case of his not being a vegetarian (Copi 1978, p90).

Sporting libertarianism shares encounters with ‘antis’ out in the field which have influenced their dislike of anti-hunting views and form an example of *tu quoque*. Participants recounted stories of hunt saboteurs targeting horses or hounds – ‘spraying stuff in the hounds’ eyes’ (P8) or ‘hit a horse on the legs with a baseball bat, to try and stop the hunt’ (P20). Unsurprisingly, this really makes their blood boil and is used as evidence of hypocrisy; those allegedly trying to protect one animal injure other animals trying to achieve this. Sporting libertarianism also uses *tu quoque* against anti-hunting positions when people are happy to eat meat and wear leather but are against hunting. This intolerance of inconsistency is a point where sporting libertarianism and critical-radicalism could actually converge. Both argue that there is no nice way to kill an animal – death is death. Here sporting libertarianism conflicts more with liberal-progressivism because

someone died for those things that you’re stood in, something died for that car with the leather chair, something died so you can get in your car and drive rather than walk to work…so my opinion is, unless you live in the middle of a field, in a yurt, you burn your own shit, grow your own food… then you kill as many animals as I do. The only difference is, I’m open about what I kill, you deny what you kill…just ‘cause you don’t actually stick the bullet in it, doesn’t mean you didn’t kill it…it’s all about supply and demand. Don’t demand what you want, then those animals don’t die (P20).

However, sporting libertarianism agrees with liberal progressivism that killing for sport and killing for food are different. This is a potential convergence but the sporting libertarian discourse does not elaborate much on this claim. There is a perceived difference in *kind*, rather than a normative difference in *motivation* that liberal-progressivism sees (i.e. killing for food is necessary). For sporting libertarianism, killing for sport and food overlap in the case of shooting game. Here the sporting death is preferable because ‘natural is probably the better way’ (P22): the hunted animal has led a decent life out in the wild.

The sporting libertarianism viewpoint also contests the claim that hunting is cruel. It cites the quickness of the kill by foxhounds. This relates to the above point that a ‘natural’ death is better for the animal in question. Definitions of the ‘natural’ are contested across and even within discourses. For both sporting libertarianism and critical-radicalism ‘natural’ entails leaving animals alone, free from human interference. However, for critical-radicalism this means not hunting and leaving wildlife to live freely in their habitats. For sporting libertarianism and countryside management, there is an appeal to nature where what is perceived as *natural* is also *right* because the animal killed lives in the wild and has had a good life. In addition, hunting with dogs is a way of harnessing what could feasibly happen in the wild. However, sporting libertarianism also agrees with critical-radicalism that most of the time wildlife is better off without human intervention. This is not the case for the countryside management position, which advocates an active human role in managing wildlife and use this as a justification for hunting.

All four discourses are engaged with each other in different ways, overlapping and polarising. The least disagreement is unsurprisingly between the discourses that share the same position on hunting. Points of disagreement also occur at different discursive levels. There is both ontological and normative disagreement between critical-radicalism and countryside management. The two discourses disagree over *the nature of the problem* as well as *what should be done about it.* Because of the first-level disagreement over whether the fox population needs controlling at all, proponents of these two discourses are unlikely to progress onto *how* this is done. Similarly, where the pro-hunting discourses believe that farmers have a duty to protect their livestock, critical-radicalism counters that ‘farmers don’t have a duty to keep livestock in the first place’ (P16). Negative correlation between the pro- and anti-hunting discourses shows that there is little convergence between the two camps. The only statements that come close to convergence are primarily about drag hunting as an alternative, but these statements were also the least salient for all four positions. In other words, the only points of agreement are also the points people don’t really care about. Fundamental disagreement is not necessarily disastrous for deliberative democracy. Contestation is cited as an indication of a healthy deliberative public sphere (see Dryzek 2001; Mouffe 1999); my analysis indicates ample opportunity for the contestation of discourses on hunting.

Discursive contestation alone is not sufficient to satisfy the normative demands of deliberative democracy. To evaluate on a systemic level we must look at the character of the debate in public space. Agonism may be fruitful in democracy but whether the hunting debate can be described as agonistic is much less certain. We know that fundamental disagreement exists, but in order to fully evaluate deliberative capacity it also necessary to examine the authentic nature of exchanges across this division.

In the final section of this chapter I offer an insight into authenticity in public space through interviewees’ experiences of hunting and the hunting debate. Whilst this does not allow us to draw comprehensive conclusions, it does provide a glimpse of communication in public space.

## Section 5.3: authenticity in public space

***The prioritisation of generalisable interests over sectional interests – representing animals***

Prioritising generalisable interests over material and sectional ones is a core feature of authentic deliberation. It is also essential to the successful representation of animals in deliberation because in order to consider the needs of non-human animals, deliberators must give serious consideration to the viewpoint of such a differently-situated other. What this might actually entail for animals is a moot point; each discourse provides a different interpretation of the needs of animals and these interpretations should be open to critique and contestation in the public sphere. Going beyond sectional interests has two requirements. Firstly, that no one stakeholder or interested party should be able to dominate deliberation and decisions – this is a standard deliberative condition. But in this context, overcoming sectional interests also requires that purely human interests do not trump animal interests merely in virtue of them being human interests. This is not to say that non-human animals should always be prioritised either, nor does it require that animals and humans be considered equals. It simply requires that all positions require rigorous defence and justification for their claims and that all *arguments* be considered equally. Therefore, examining how animals are represented in the hunting discourses is at the same an examination into the extent to which generalisable interests are considered.

Animals are represented prominently across all four discourses. Both liberal-progressive and critical-radical discourses base representation in the argument that animals are sentient beings that can suffer and feel pain. This terminology is less salient for countryside management and sporting libertarianism. However, those subscribing to the countryside management position also rated themselves as animal lovers higher than any other viewpoint. Sporting libertarianism also clearly cares for animals and shows the most concern about the danger of hunting for horses and in defending the way that the hounds are kept for hunting.

In both anti-hunting positions, interviewees use stories and personal experience to build an affective argument for animal sentience. Several participants cited childhood experiences that had shaped their views from a young age:

It goes back to my childhood and my uncle's slaughterhouse, and seeing the terror in their eyes, the screams, that drove home to me very clearly that animals do suffer, they do feel emotions, and again seeing - growing up in the countryside and seeing cows crying for their calves that had been taken away, yeah....it's very clear to me that animals do suffer, they do feel pain, fear, terror...and a lot of emotions that we do as well. It's something that's haunted me for much of my life (P3).

The first hand experiences recounted by participants are important elements of these two discourses because they serve to build empathy with non-human animals and represent them as capable of pain and suffering: characteristics in common with humans. I argue that this constitutes an appeal to generalisable interests akin to Cochrane’s (2013) call for ‘sentient rights’ and demonstrates some deliberative potential within both anti-hunting positions.

Pro-hunting advocates also use personal experience to support their arguments but not in relation to animal sentience. Sporting libertarians and countryside management instead recount personal encounters with anti-hunting campaigners that were hurtful and upsetting – these encounters are discussed later in this section.

All four positions portray nonhuman animals as moral patients in some way; due some kind of moral obligation from humans. Humans are moral agents (the duty-bearers). This is seen most explicitly in the anti-hunting positions in their endorsement of sentience. Sentience is a morally relevant characteristic that affords animals the status of being a moral patient. The liberal-progressive position also maintains that respect for sentience should be applied equally to different animals (S37, +5). By contrast sporting libertarians think that different animals should be treated differently:

Your persona has to be different when you’re dealing with a prey animal or a predator…if you approach a predator the same way you approach a prey animal, you’re going to get two totally different responses from them….you can’t dominate a horse like you can dominate a dog, because the prey animal’s mentality is different (P20).

Proponents of the countryside management position similarly argue that there is a difference between wild and domesticated animals. They need to be treated differently because ‘wild animals don't share the same characteristics exactly as domestic animals…otherwise they'd be traumatised every hour of the day, and they probably wouldn't last very long’ (P33). The underlying argument is that wild animals do not feel fear in the same way as domesticated animals or humans. Thus they do not suffer the level of trauma that anti-hunting campaigners claim they do during the hunt (see Countryside Alliance 2012). It is unclear where this leaves *wild* animals as moral patients. However, the ascription of moral patiency to animals in general is evident in pro-hunting discourses because ‘they deserve to be looked after’ (P7). Though the sporting libertarian position is less than enthusiastic about the concept of an ‘animal lover’, proponents do acknowledge that animals are due something, morally speaking: ‘not so much as loving the animal, as giving the animal respect and basically giving it what it deserves, what I think it should have’ (P22).

Advocates of both sporting libertarianism and countryside management feel that farmers have a duty to protect their livestock. This suggests that livestock are due protection from human custodians. However, whilst some participants explicitly talked about the injuries that farmed animals can suffer – ‘when you see what a fox or a badger can do to animals’ (P29) others discussed the importance of protecting livestock for economic reasons – ‘that’s their living, that’s their income, that’s their life’ (P21). Prioritising farming interests shows a preference for sectional interests. This is sharply contested by those who subscribe to critical-radicalism:

Why should farmers always get special bloody treatment?! You know, they just have a complete...you know, they get all of the subsidies, people somehow think they can do no wrong, even though they've pretty much destroyed the countryside, well the biodiversity in the countryside, and somehow we all owe them this infinite gratitude… (P11)

Liberal-progressive and critical-radical advocates appeal to animal sentience which can be conceptualised as an interest held in common with humans (see Cochrane 2013). Pro-hunting discourses emphasise difference across animals and across the human/animal border. Divergent representations of animals come down to two key differences. The first is as above: disagreement over whether different characteristics (i.e. domesticated, wild or working) are morally relevant. In other words, disagreement is over whether these differences determine different moral statuses and treatment.

The second disagreement is over *respect for animals*. All four viewpoints discuss their respect for animals but come to different conclusions. For liberal-progressivism and critical-radicalism, respecting an animals’ sentience means not hunting because ‘that word respect, means politeness, love, caring…if you’re polite loving and caring you don’t rip apart somebody else’ (P26). Critical-radicalism goes further in stipulating that respect entails giving animals the same moral consideration as humans. For both countryside management and sporting libertarianism, respect can mean killing an animal, but doing it properly: ‘you can go and shoot a fox out in the park if you want, but they should be treated with respect really’ (P7). In other words, ‘hunting’s very very simple. It either gets away, or it dies. There’s no in between’ (P20). Death in this manner is quick and the quarry does not suffer unduly.

Analysing the discursive representation of animals in the hunting debate shows us that all four positions do consider animals with care and in some depth. Pro- and anti-hunting representations divide in whether they appeal to generalisable or sectional interests. Whereas anti-hunting perspectives appeal to the capacity to suffer (as well the notion of human progress and modernity), pro-hunting viewpoints tend to emphasise sectional interests (farming), and appeal to perceived morally relevant differences between animals.

***Truthfulness, respect, reason-giving, non-coercive persuasion, and efforts to be constructive in finding mutually acceptable outcomes.***

It is not possible within the scope of this analysis to accurately assess the level of truthfulness or sincerity of the claims made by each discourse. Here I offer a tentative account of moments of deliberation in public space. These draw primarily on interview material where participants discussed their personal experiences of hunting and encounters with interlocutors. Whilst this does not constitute evidence of the health of public space, they do provide some indication of the possibility for authentic deliberation occurring.

Encounters between anti-hunting activists and hunters out in the field were characterised by most participants as intimidating and sometimes violent on both sides. In fact, all four discourses contain the acknowledgement that aggression is present to varying degrees.

Two participants who had witnessed hunt sabbing talked about the level of discipline necessary to effectively disrupt a hunt. They recognised that this was not always the case but that on occasion avenues can open up for respectful exchanges out in the field:

…they did have a conversation with some hunt riders who asked them what they were spraying, and they showed them what they were spraying and they exchanged names and had a reasonable discussion…so it can happen, it can be done….and I think it was hunt sabs were very good, in that they don’t display any hatred or aggression themselves, they’re very disciplined…and I think this opened the door for the hunt followers to be curious about them…cause they thought they were spraying something dreadful that would harm the hounds, and they said “no it’s just citronella” “oh, we spray that on our horses to keep flies off…” (P23)

Others recalled moments of genial conversation, humour and even helping each other out:

…you would have a bit of banter…I think there are people on both sides who could sit down together...it actually used to happen quite a lot, when we were sabbing, so when they had done something, that they knew would piss us off, we'd be like, “right, we're gonna break your windows tonight” you know [laughs] and they'd kind of be like, “yeah fair enough, we know that was out of order!” and things like that, so you know we'd kind of tolerate each other, up to a point, and then something would happen, and one side would be like “no no no, you've crossed the line, you know now it's payback” and the other side would be like “yeah you're right, that was…” (P11)

Hunt sabbing is by itself not deliberative as it involves coercion. From a systemic perspective we also need to consider the impact that sabbing has on debates in the broader public sphere and beyond. Although it is clear that respect can exist between sabs and hunters out in the field, public debate around hunting does not capture these moments. Instead, most media typically focus on violent exchanges between hunters and activists[[29]](#footnote-29) as the rule, so although exceptional deliberative moments of ‘mutual understanding’ (P11) do occur, they become lost in the vitriol of public-facing debate. It would however be naïve to exaggerate the prevalence of camaraderie in the field; participants struggled to recall instances that were not overwhelmingly antagonistic.

All four discourses contain reason-based arguments to varying extents. Countryside management in particular emphasises the importance of rational deliberation. As well as expressing desire for a diverse debate, it focuses on technical arguments around hunting. Advocates of the countryside management position also appear open to listening and finding a mutually acceptable solution:

I think it’s important that the hunting community is ready to listen to the arguments about the things that people don’t like about hunting, and argue why hunting is important, and work to come up with a…compromise…that I mean, it’s not gonna please everybody, it’s impossible to do so…but I think the hunting community at the top is much more open to discussing and working out things we could do better than people give them credit… (P25)

However, on analysis it becomes clear that the countryside management discourse also inherently denies the possibility of listening to others. It employs an appeal to authority that dismisses those who disagree as ignorant. The countryside management perspective argues that those who oppose hunting do not understand it. If they did understand they would probably agree with the practice (P25, P33). This illustrates a lack of respect and consideration for alternative viewpoints. By contrast liberal-progressivism emphasises the need to listen to other’s viewpoints, even if this ‘kind of makes my eye twitch a bit’ (P24).

Many participants from both sides of the debate were surprisingly optimistic for a future, more deliberative debate on hunting. Some participants offered suggestions as to how this could be achieved. For some, this was contingent on who would be involved in the conversation and should exclude the most extreme. It should hinge on small points which the sides can agree on. For one former hunt master (P6), hunting was primarily about conservation and he believed that focusing debate on the conservation aspect could be a point of common interest. An anti-hunting advocate also suggested that ‘if you can identify those areas where there is already agreement where people didn't expect there to be any agreement, then you've got quite a good opportunity to then talk about the things where there might not be so much agreement...’ (P31). Another suggestion came from a PhD researcher specialising in animal sentience. She suggested that the ‘scientific community needs to weigh in with views on what it thinks is acceptable what isn't acceptable’ because ‘who better to do that than people who have done studies or performed research on the effects of culling’ (P13).

There is evidence from both sides of efforts to find a mutually acceptable outcome. The most enthusiasm for this comes from those who subscribe to the liberal-progressive and countryside management positions. However, the mutually acceptable outcome is not about the practice of hunting itself but about the terms and conditions of the hunting *debate*. There was remarkable enthusiasm for the prospect of a more constructive debate. The barrier to realising this is that ‘there's an expectation that the other side - in inverted commas - isn't going to listen or be willing to understand the point of view’ (P31).

***Reflexivity***

Moments of reflection can be discerned from participants within the study. Doing the Q-sort is a thoughtful process and some participants reflected on their own views as a result:

I had real issues with the idea of how this links with being a vegetarian....I do eat meat, and a lot of these views make you question it quite a lot, placing these views makes you think “well there's quite a lot of hypocrisy in this” - they are still harming the animal, they are still being killed for a means to an end mentality, and it's an interesting position to take...it pushes you beyond the boundaries of whether or not hunting should occur... (P4)

Despite the dichotomous nature of the debate, it appears that reflexivity can occur. One participant who hunts the clean boot[[30]](#footnote-30) recounted an instance where some photos of her hunt were posted on Facebook and one poster commented “cruel, no thanks”. She responded by explaining exactly what drag hunting entailed, and posted information about her local hunt. ‘Very nicely, the lady came back and said “oh, that's really interesting, thanks for clarifying” so I guess when you give people the opportunity to talk about it, it’s nice to know…’ (P5). Another participant got in touch to tell me that participating in the Q study had prompted them to try going vegan.

Several participants discussed how their views on hunting changed over the years. Two talked about how their views had changed since childhood from pro- to anti-hunting. In the other direction, Jim Barrington, who previously worked for the League of Cruel Sports, is now a consultant for the Countryside Alliance. He gradually came to believe that, for LACS, ‘the banning of hunting was more important than actually coming to some sort of animal welfare improvement, and that to me, was very unsettling’. This illustrates that preference transformation *is* possible in the hunting debate.

The biggest challenge to reflexivity lies within the inherent characteristics of the discourses themselves: the presumption of rightness and reasonableness. With the exception of liberal-progressivism (which acknowledges uncertainty on some aspects of hunting) there is a sense within each discourse that it occupies *the most reasonable position* and it is *others* that need persuading. Some people – ‘few and far between’ (P30) – will be persuaded, the majority not. The onus for persuasiveness lies with the other. Responsibility for not being persuaded also lies thither: if *you* are not persuaded, then *you* are unreasonable. The countryside management view on anti-hunting positions points to misunderstanding and ignorance of hunting. Inversely, hunt sabbing – like other disruptive activism – is premised on the same assumption: that those who hunt are not open to reasonable discussion so drastic action is required (see Humphrey and Stears 2006). One’s own fallibility is not considered. This leaves us with a bizarre paradox. In a debate so characterised by profound disagreement, there is no discursive space for disagreement because to disagree is simply to be wrong.

This is perhaps not surprising. The hunting debate has waged for a considerable amount of time, and ‘people get quite bitter and angry…because you do become very jaded, it's a hell of an emotional toll on you, mentally and emotionally’ (P3). It is symptomatic of this emotional toll that viewpoints have become more entrenched; continually re-reified through adversarial media coverage and Parliamentary debate (see Plumb and Marsh 2013). Such perceived intractability leads to resentment and resignation. Even someone who works in hunting reached the point where ‘if someone wants to get stuck into a hunting debate, I can't be bothered really...and the trouble with debating, not so much debating, I work seven days a week, on hunting, I go home in the evening, that's the last thing I wanna talk about, to be honest’ (P7).

**Conclusions**

Analysis of the interplay across discourses on hunting reveals a number of ‘deliberative moments’ (Goodin 2005). There remains a substantive void between pro- and anti-hunting positions but there is substantive argumentative exchange between the discourses themselves. Possibilities for authentic deliberation are glimpsed in how discourses engage with each other. In addition, anecdotal evidence from participants indicates that moments of mutual respect and reflection can occur. These reveal the complex and contradictory nuance of the debate that is overlooked in mainstream media coverage. It is beyond the scope of the Q study alone to draw concrete conclusions of the overall deliberative health of public space; this analysis has sought to highlight the characteristics of each discourse on hunting that may enable or preclude deliberation in public space.

In the following chapters I explore the extent to which these four discourses found in public space are present and influence debate about hunting within Parliament, as well as the ways in which discourses from public space are transmitted to empowered space.

# Chapter Six: empowered space

**Introduction**

Empowered space in the deliberative system encompasses settings in which authoritative decisions are made. These settings take different forms including actor-networks that collectively produce decisions. Parliamentary debates are one such site within the legislature that contributes towards collective decision-making; other settings include select committees, hearings or advisory agencies amongst others. In this chapter, I provide a content analysis of Parliamentary debates in the House of Commons (HC) and House of Lords (HL), supplemented by semi-structured interviews. The chapter first examines the extent to which public discourses are represented in Parliament and goes on to consider the deliberative quality of the hunting debate in Westminster. I find that although all four discourses are represented, there is considerable distortion from the original discursive characteristics. Most notably, the hunting debate in Westminster is dominated by party politics and class warfare – elements that are almost entirely absent in public space.

Parliamentary debates often conclude with a vote on the topic at hand, though not every debate results in a collective decision. However, debates are ‘designed to assist MPs and Lords to reach an informed decision on a subject’ (Parliament UK 2016). Therefore we might expect such debates to be potential sites of deliberation. Furthermore, in July 2015 a proposed amendment to the Hunting Act 2004 brought hunting back into public debate. Around this time Westminster debated the topic twice. In addition, hunting was discussed in several other debates in both Houses. This provides ample opportunity to analyse the nature of the hunting debate in a part of empowered space. Of course, Parliamentary debates are not usually considered a bastion of deliberative debate. Indeed, conventional understandings have conceptualised them as ‘cheap talk’ (Austen-Smith 1990) – dominated by electoral and party political messages (Bächtiger 2014, p146). According to this account, we should not expect Parliamentary debates to yield much in the way of substantive argument, never mind deliberative quality. Nonetheless, such debates are a key communicative site in empowered speech; some deliberative scholars maintain that legislature debates can contribute to deliberative capacity through additional information provision and preference consolidation (Bessette 1994). However, as Bächtiger (2014, p151) points out, such assumptions must be assessed empirically.

The aims of this chapter are twofold. First, I establish the extent to which public discourses on hunting are reflected in Parliamentary debates. I use oral debate transcripts and interviews with Members to evaluate which discourses appear to have ‘made it’ into Westminster. The second part of the chapter assesses the deliberative quality of the hunting debate in Westminster. Nine interviewees[[31]](#footnote-31) were asked to reflect on their experience of the hunting debate in Westminster with questions structured broadly according the Discourse Quality Index[[32]](#footnote-32) (DQI) to give a qualitative indication of deliberative quality (Steenburgen *et al* 2003; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014). The interview guide can be found in Appendix 2.2. The chapter proceeds in two broad sections. In the first, I discuss evidence from Parliament of the four discourses on hunting. I address each discourse in turn and discuss its translation into empowered space. This is followed by an outline of two pseudo-discourses which are prominent themes in Westminster but not in public discourses: party politics and class war. The second part assesses the deliberative quality of the hunting debate in empowered space. Prior to this however, I first outline the background of the hunting debate in Westminster in 2015.

***Context***

In 2015, the coalition of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties was replaced with a majority Tory government. Even in their prior 2010 manifesto, the Conservative party had pledged their commitment to hold a free vote on repeal of the Hunting Act 2004. Although this was not achieved in the previous Parliament, it remains a manifesto commitment and the 2015 general election campaign reignited debate over possible repeal of the Hunting Act.

I analyse the whole of 2015 because the lead-up to the election and the subsequent debates provided a wealth of material to study. The incidents of July 2015 also provided focus as well as a spike in public and political interest in hunting, making it an ideal time frame. On the 9th of July, Secretary of State for DEFRA Liz Truss MP announced that a ‘small number of technical amendments’ had been proposed to the Hunting Act. The proposed amendment was to change the number of dogs allowed to flush out a quarry. Currently the Hunting Act limits the number of dogs used to flush to a maximum of two; the proposed amendment would remove this limit but the law would still prohibit the killing of the animal by the dogs. The government suggested that the amendment would bring the law in England and Wales in line with that of Scotland. A Commons debate and vote was scheduled for the 15th of July but the government unexpectedly cancelled it on the 14th of July. At the time of writing (Oct 2016) the amendment debate is listed on the DEFRA website as ‘postponed’ (Gov.uk 2015).This turn of events caused a furore in the Commons which was further compounded by the upcoming debate on English Votes for English Laws (EVEL) - also scheduled for the 15th of July. The hunting amendment became embroiled in EVEL because the Scottish National Party (SNP) announced their intention to vote on the proposed amendments to the Hunting Act. Some commentators subsequently argued that the SNP only weighed in on the hunting issue to undermine the Conservative government. Furthermore, when the government cancelled the scheduled debate on hunting, it was suggested in Parliament that this was so that the EVEL bill could go through Parliament first. This would have enabled the government to exclude the SNP from future debates on the Hunting Act. As a result of these events, hunting was discussed at a range of debates including the daily Business of the House briefings and the EVEL debate in the Commons.

I analysed the content of eighteen transcripts of 2015 Parliamentary debates. Eleven of these are from July 2015. Three debates were specifically dedicated to discussing the Hunting Act 2004. Transcripts were downloaded from Hansard Online, a free online database of Parliamentary affairs, and analysed in NVivo. Debates that mentioned hunting were initially selected and then narrowed down to those that specifically refer to foxhunting or the Hunting Act. For example, a Commons debate on trophy hunting in Africa was excluded from the analysis as it was not considered relevant. Material from debates is complemented by nine interviews. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with nine MPs and Peers from November 2015 to January 2016. Interviewees were selected for their known interest and participation in the hunting debate. Party affiliation was not taken into consideration for selection, although the significance of party politics became evident during the analysis. Interview questions were structured to broadly reflect the DQI, giving an insight into the quality of deliberation. Interviewees were asked to reflect on their experiences of the hunting debate in Westminster, as well as the decisions surrounding the proposed amendment to the Hunting Act.

Transcripts of both debates and interviews were analysed twice using NVivo: firstly for evidence of the four public discourses on hunting and secondly for deliberative quality. This entailed textual analysis of debate and interview transcripts to determine which, if any, of the four discourses were represented. Transcripts were then coded a second time for authentic deliberative quality. This included six separate codes: respect; reflexivity (or lack of); reason-giving (or lack of); persuasion (including coercion); effort to look for mutually acceptable outcomes; and appealing to generalisable (or sectional) interests. This enabled me to appraise the deliberative quality of the debate, including the non-deliberative features which are endemic to the hunting debate.

## Section 6.1: public discourses in empowered space: relatively unscathed

***Liberal-Progressivism***

Out of 18 debate transcripts and nine interviews analysed, there were 24 references to the liberal-progressive position in nine documents. Out of the four discourses, the liberal-progressive viewpoint is the most prevalent.

All central aspects of this discourse are evident in the debates. The animal welfare ethic that underpins opposition to hunting is present. The killing and use of animals is permissible ‘but killing them in a manner which is best described as done for sport or fun, is not the humane way to dispose of vermin or nuisance’ (interview HC1). Some interviewees rejected pro-hunting arguments around wildlife management and pest control as ‘totally implausible’ (interview HC4). Markedly, examples of liberal-progressivism appear almost word-for-word in transcripts and are noted in italics.

…the killing of animals for pleasure had *no place in a civilised society”* (Angela Eagle, HC Deb 15 July 2015, vol598 c955)

…it’s subjecting a *sentient animal* to *unnecessary cruelty*…and you know, we’re better than that. *As human beings, we’ve progressed beyond that* (interview HC4)

I think it’s like cock fighting and bear baiting and dog fighting…it’s in the dustbin of history and that’s where it belongs (interview HC5)

My Lords, our society accepts the killing of animals for specific purposes. Does the Minister agree with me that such *killing should be strongly justified*, should be carried out in as *humane a manner as possible* and should be done by competent individuals acting in a cool and dispassionate but compassionate way? Furthermore, will he go so far as to agree with me—I doubt that he will—that in a civilised society like ours, we should do all we can to *dissuade individuals from pursuing leisure activities for pleasure which result in the killing of animals?* (Lord Trees, HL Deb 15 July 2015, vol764 c577)

One reference to the liberal-progressive viewpoint is found in a Lords debate on Public Life and Values. In this instance one speaker referred to the importance of having the concept of ‘a loyal Opposition within the British system which can oppose the Government, question them, and state publicly that they are prepared to replace them, while still not being considered traitors’ (Lord Addington, HL Deb 16 July 2015, vol764 c99). This was raised in relation to the hunting debate as ‘one of those occasions when…horns, hooves and forks were pushed into the hands of both sides who did not love each other or the rest of the world, or cuddly animals, or understand the countryside’. In other words, tribal tendencies in the hunting debate forced out opportunities for constructive debate and disagreement.

There is a caveat here: though liberal-progressivism is the most prevalent discourse in empowered space, there are more references to party politics than to the liberal-progressive position. Moreover, liberal-progressivism is frequently deployed *alongside* party political rhetoric:

From Labour’s point of view, getting this sorted out is part of the same approach to animal welfare that underlines our position on the badger cull, and our wish not to see the ban on hunting with dogs watered down or removed. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) has said: “Our Labour values tell us that we have a moral duty to treat the animals we share our planet with in a *humane and compassionate way*” (Richard Burden, HC Deb 2 March 2015, vol753 c220WH).

It is vital to bear in mind that although liberal-progressivism has ‘made it’ into Parliamentary debate, it has gained an additional party political flavour. However, this is not uniform and some emphasised that they ‘don’t regard animal welfare as a remotely party political issue, never have’ (interview HC5).

***Countryside Management***

Countryside management is the second most prevalent discourse seen in empowered space, with 12 references in nine sources. Key elements of the discourse are reflected in both interview and debate transcripts. Overall, this entails support for hunting but as in public space, not everyone who appears to subscribe to this viewpoint is necessarily pro-hunting. Parentheses show statement number from the Q study and the score for the countryside management public discourse.[[33]](#footnote-33)

Support for hunting in debates was broadened to country sports in general including hawking, shooting and angling. This was raised in three debates not directly related to hunting. All three debates emphasised the point that ‘shooting, hunting and fishing put an enormous amount back into my constituency’ (Ian Liddell-Grainger, HC Deb 1 June 2015, vol596). Whilst this is a strand of the countryside management position, in public discourse there is less emphasis on the social and economic contribution of hunting (S21, +2). Support for hunting as a British tradition (S3, +1) also appeared stronger in Westminster, with the Secretary of State for DEFRA declaring ‘I completely agree that *hunting is important for rural communities. It is traditional and part of the fabric of our countryside’* (Elizabeth Truss, HC Deb 12 March 2015, vol594; emphasis added).

The most explicit examples of countryside management are seen in discussions around wildlife management:

Those of us who are responsible for management, believe that you know, *loving nature and respecting wildlife*, also means taking some hard decisions from time to time about *reducing the population or managing some element of the population* (interview HC2).

We have a duty of care towards animals, I absolutely believe that. But *our duty of care towards our pet dog, or horse, or pet cat, or goldfish, is* *very different to our duty of care towards the fox who* lives in the wood at the end of our garden or the hare that lives in the field. They’re completely different. And what we, what I am absolutely certain about, is that *we have a duty to manage the wildlife* that lives on our little island…on our side of the debate, what we want to see are these large, healthy populations of healthy animals, but in balance with other populations, with other species, that’s in balance with prey and predator. And *the other side of the argument does not understand or accept that* (interview HL1).

The argument that wild animals do not experience fear in the same way as humans or domesticated animals is also made by some *anti*-hunting advocates, who assert that ‘nature is pretty red in tooth and claw, let’s face it’ (interview HC5). Despite not supporting hunting, one interviewee was ‘not sure a fox or another animal gets as bothered by being chased as much as we think it’s bothered, because animals are pursued all the time’ (interview HL3).

The countryside management position is clearly represented in empowered space. This is perhaps unsurprising given that a number of MPs and Peers have declared interests in hunting and are current or former members of the Countryside Alliance. The direct link between pro-hunting lobbying organisations in public and empowered space is worrying from a deliberative systems perspective; it increases the likelihood that powerful players are able to disproportionately influence the debate in their favour. However, there are also Members with connections to the RSPCA and anti-hunting organisations – so this does not only work one way.

Some aspects of the countryside management discourse appear slightly exaggerated in empowered space; the social and cultural significance given to hunting is more prominent in Parliament than public discourses. It is unclear why this is the case; perhaps Members are employing a sort of plebiscitary rhetoric (Chambers 2003) to appeal to voters for whom hunting is a key issue.

## Section 6.2: public discourses in empowered space - now you’re exaggerating.

***Sporting Libertarianism***

Sporting libertarianism has 11 references found in six sources. Two references appeared in debates and these refer to the broader benefits of countryside pursuits. This is consistent with the Q study, where participants loading on this factor discussed their participation in countryside sports. There are also references to how much sporting libertarianism values the countryside (S17, +5). For those advocating country sports, taking part is synonymous with appreciating the countryside:

Shooting is a sport that gives me the chance to enjoy the country air, and to chase up pheasants; usually, my dog thinks it can catch them before I can shoot them, but that is just one of those things…the benefits of country sports are not always physical; they can also bring peace of mind…I just hope that the Members here in Westminster Hall today…*recognise the benefits that country sports bring to all of us*. Hopefully the Minister can appreciate that, even if it is from a different point of view to my own, and understand that *country sports are very important, even integral, to the countryside and who we are* (Jim Shannon, HC Deb 28 October 2015, vol601 c164WH).

Also present is the sporting libertarian conviction that although hunting is justified as a sport, it nonetheless makes *some* contribution to controlling foxes:

It does demand that *there is some utilitarian value from the activity, in some cases however small, to justify it*. And I can live with that. Engaging in a sport where there is no utilitarian value, you know whether it’s economic, ecological, welfare, social and things like that, is difficult to justify. And that’s why it’s so easy to justify - despite the words of our opponents - and draw a big line between that and things like badger baiting, and I think there’s an absolute distinction (interview HC2).

The most notable aspect of sporting libertarianism in the debates is the suggestion that anti-hunting viewpoints are motivated by ‘class war’:

I think lots of antis… genuinely believe that hunting is an appalling thing, but behind it is they genuinely think we are appalling people, for political reasons, *they think we are toffs*, all that business, you get all that strand of argument, that hunting goes on because farmers daren’t say no to the local hunt, because they’ll be victimised, you know, do people genuinely think that’s true, in the 21st century? Don’t be so silly. And so, *it’s the idea that it’s the upper classes riding roughshod over the working man*, there are some people who think that, but I don’t really think that’s a seriously held view. There are some people that think it, it’s bollocks, honestly (interview HL1).

I think some of the trouble around farm animals is – and you won’t get much of this said publically – and I think this is a connection with animal rights rather than animal welfarists make…a lot of people think when it’s farmers, and “we don’t think they don’t look after their animals very well anyway, and *they all drive around in range rovers* so…you know actually, I haven’t got a lot of sympathy with that part of the argument, and *they’re vicious bastards and they want to kill the wildlife*” – so I don’t think much thought goes into the opposition position (interview HC2).

The core elements of sporting libertarianism are present primarily in interview, and to a lesser extent in formal debates. As with countryside management, some elements of the discourse are exaggerated in Westminster. The ‘anti-class’ strand of argument (arguing that anti-hunting people are motivated by class warfare) is articulated more strongly in empowered space. This is discussed in detail later in the chapter.

***Critical-radicalism***

The critical-radical discourse, highly correlated with liberal-progressivism, encompasses a critique of hunting that emphasises structural power relations. It also advocates equal moral consideration for animals. The key argument of this position is that hunting is enabled by power structures in the current British political system. It is particularly critical of the status quo and the farming industry. Critical-radicalism is the least prevalent discourse in empowered space, with six references in just three sources.

The gratuity of hunting is emphasised as ‘sadistic slaughter’ (Geraint Davies, HC Deb 14 July 2015, vol598 c748). Green Party MP Caroline Lucas called on the government to extend the Hunting Act to cover grouse shooting and hare coursing instead of ‘proposing yet more cruelty to animals’ (HC Deb 12 March 2015, vol594). However, just one interviewee explicitly expressed the structural elements of the critical-radical position who pointed out that ‘they’re enormously more powerful…you know when they’ve got Prince Charles on their side and royalty and the richest and most influential people in society are among the people that defend foxhunting’ (interview HC4). The same person also raised the critical-radical objection to farming:

I remember during the foot and mouth epidemic,[[34]](#footnote-34) seeing farmers sobbing at their farm gates, about the fact that their animals are going to die, I mean the myth behind, this Walt Disney myth is that these animals, if it wasn’t for the foot and mouth, were going to live, a long happy life, a contented life, until they became geriatric and rickety, and then they would go off to a retirement homes for female cows, to die a peaceful death…I mean farming…most of the animals die very young in a brutal way, I mean farming is brutal… (interview HC4)

However, alongside the arguments encompassed by critical-radicalism, there is also significant distortion of the discourse. Content analysis revealed two pseudo-discourses both arguing against class warfare in the hunting debate. The strange thing is that both argue against a discourse that is nowhere to be seen in public space.

## Section 6.3: political distortions

### Section 6.3.1: the class war phantom

The two counter-attacks on class warfare are peculiar because what they argue *against* is almost entirely absent from the discourses in *public* space. The class structure *is* relevant to the critical-radical discourse, but does not exhibit a ‘vitriolic dislike of the people involved [in hunting]’ (interview HC2) as it stands accused by some in empowered space. The arguments given by critical-radicalism refer to the structural and systemic elements that facilitate hunting and its continued controversy – with less emphasis on the individuals involved. Indeed, some Q study participants explained the behaviour of hunters in structural terms: ‘I don't see how they can be so heartless about other living creatures, but then I suppose if that's the environment you've grown up in, and that's all you've known’ (P3).

In Parliament, both pro- and anti-hunting advocates attack the class war phantom. Hunt supporters accuse animal rights advocates of propagating class warfare and not caring about animals. This is reminiscent of the sporting libertarian discourse. Conversely, anti-hunting advocates refute class warfare since ‘not only is it wrong to play the class card, because it’s about animals not social class, it’s also very stupid’ (interview HC3). This position argues against class warfare on two levels. First, it detracts from animal welfare arguments against hunting. Secondly,

…surely common sense should dictate to such individuals that it’s not sensible to pursue the argument on the Tory toff part of it because there are so many Tory voters out there who don’t agree with it, you know…all the data shows that the majority of Tory voters don’t like it. So it’s *really* stupid, to play the Countryside Alliance game of dividing public opinion by playing the class line. That’s exactly what they want. So it’s not even clever politics. Playing into their hands completely (interview HC3).

There is however, scant evidence of the class war argument in public discourse. Indeed, none of the four discourses scored the statement (S27) about ‘posh, upper class types’ shouting ‘tally-ho’ highly. Whilst some admitted that the stereotype vision made them laugh at first (P1), it was not taken seriously. The arguments relating to class in critical-radicalism do not endorse the posh stereotype that some in Westminster appear to criticise. The closest sentiment to class war comes from within sporting libertarianism where a few participants suggested that anti-hunting campaigners have a sort of reverse snobbery towards the hunting community (P20).

In relation to public discourses on hunting then, the anti-class argument is something of a straw man. In Parliamentary debates though, something peculiar happens; the class war phantom takes centre stage:

I loathe foxhunting—I think it is barbaric—and cruelty to animals wherever in the world I see it. I do not want any succour to be given to the Tories’ toff friends, dusting down their red coats, getting out their silly little bugles and lustily shouting “Tally ho!” in the mirror as they prepare to savage and ravage poor, defenceless foxes in the name of sport. That appals me (Pete Wishart, HC Deb, 15 July 2015, vol598 c971).

Here there are elements of the critical-radical position – the objection to gratuitous cruelty for the sake of entertainment – accompanied by a somewhat pantomime-like attack. It is arguably the case that underneath this antagonistic veneer, this is still critical-radicalism. There is an indication that the consideration of structural factors and the privileged position of the hunting community remains:

I would be interested in it because of our relationship with other species, and I think it leads to many other things…we have an argument at the moment, of whether we go to war or not, and those who sit on top of horses, and get half pissed and sit around in clown’s outfits ya-rooing and tally-hoing across the countryside, well they’re the sort of people who want to dress up and charge into war with other countries, although it’s every time we go to war, they want to punch above their weight, militarily…but I think they also relate together, certain attitudes and certain myths and dreams and delusions…it’s still alive, this feeling of land of hope and glory (interview HC4).

However, the rhetoric used here is different from the discursive substance of critical-radicalism as seen in the Q study. The most marked difference is the introduction of party-political rhetoric seen in the transcripts. This distorts the critical-radical discourse, and every other discourse besides.

### Section 6.3.2: and the party political held sway over all…

Party politics dominates the hunting debate in Parliament. This is unsurprising given the adversarial structure of the Commons.[[35]](#footnote-35) Plumb and Marsh’s (2013) analysis of Commons debates on hunting in the run-up to the Hunting Act finds something similar: the debate became increasingly politicised over time prior to the introduction of the ban. However, their analysis does not consider the content or role of public debate on hunting. The prevalence of party politics is significant given the corresponding lack of politicisation seen in public discourses on hunting. There are 52 party political references to hunting in 20 different sources.

There are three main modes of party political references seen here which I term bolstering, attacking and cross-party solidarity. Bolstering refers to a Member using the hunting issue to promote their own party’s achievements:

This has been an interesting week for animal welfare campaigners, who know that they can always rely on the Labour party…no other mainstream political party can equal our track record on delivering for animals, be they domestic pets or wild animals. Whether it is legislating on hunting with dogs, fighting to protect wild animals that are being exploited in circuses or introducing the Animal Welfare Act, we have a strong legacy (Andy Slaughter, HC Deb 16 July 2015, vol598 c384WH).

Bolstering is used sparingly, accounting for just three references. It is also used solely by Labour and the SNP. The latter is in reference to the manner in which the proposed amendment was abruptly shelved; occurring in the same week that EVEL was debated in the Commons. This led to the two issues pooling somewhat in debates despite repeated government attempts to emphasise otherwise.

Far outweighing bolstering are instances where hunting is used to attack political rivals. Some references to hunting are purely figurative – ‘talk about hunting—the problem for the Labour party is that every single fox they had was shot yesterday in this Chamber’ (Chris Grayling, HC Deb 9 July 2015, vol598 c454). Many attacks were directed at the government and relate to the ‘shambolic’ (Kevin Barron, HC Deb 14 July 2015, vol598 c746) manner in which the government handled the hunting issue during the week of July 14th. Prior to the cancelled debate, attacks were primarily directed at the government’s perceived attempt to repeal the Hunting Act ‘by the back door’ through the amendment. Following cancellation, attacks escalated to condemn ‘the absolute farce of their botched attempt to wreck the Hunting Act’ (Angela Eagle, HC Deb 16 July 2015, vol598 c1082).

The majority of party political attacks in debates were directed at the Conservative Party and the government. Interviews also indicate party political point-scoring in the other direction:

…what they’re actually interested in is the politics of this…If they can kick the Tory toffs in the balls, then that’s what they’ll do, that’s what they want to do. On the other hand, are we interested in kicking the socialists in the balls? Not really, I couldn’t give a damn (interview HL1).

Animal rights campaigners are accused of not really caring about animals (this is also hinted at in sporting libertarianism) but instead harbouring a political agenda. It is not immediately clear what this alleged political agenda looks like but the attack is two-pronged; against the Left *and* against animal rights, for the same reason. Both stand accused of disliking the people involved in hunting rather than the practice itself. For Labour and the SNP, the hunting debate is a chance to ‘give Cameron a kick in the goolies[[36]](#footnote-36)’ (interview HL1).

There is some evidence of cross-party solidarity on hunting. A sizable minority of Tory MPs are openly opposed, and a small handful of Labour Members are pro-hunting. This indicates that ‘there’s some accommodation’ (interview HC1). Two interviewees who oppose hunting spoke explicitly about cross-party support for retaining the Hunting Act and argued that animal welfare should not be a partisan issue. Some pro-hunting advocates also argue this. The difference is that whilst anti-hunting Members point out the shared ground between parties, pro-hunting advocates suggest that MPs are so divided on the hunting issue that they will never publicly agree with the Conservative line:

In here there seems to be a bit of reasoned argument followed by a tribal vote. And you know I can have conversations around this building with Labour colleagues who will say, “the whole thing’s rubbish, we should never have done it, it’s you know a throwback to the 70s Labour Party, but you know it’s sort of in the blood and we have to go through with it” and so when it actually comes to the crunch – apart from a few notable exceptions like Kate Hoey – they’re not prepared to take a principled stand. That, I suspect, probably applies to one or two of our colleagues as well, but it is a subject which uniquely, generates heat rather than light (interview HC2).

Notably, anti-hunting Conservative MPs are shielded from attack by party colleagues – acknowledged but not subject to the same vitriol that anti-hunting Labour MPs are. This suggests that party loyalty takes priority over hunting. Conversely, most anti-hunting MPs appear more focussed on cementing opposition to hunting rather than party unity. Nonetheless, even when there is cross-party solidarity over hunting, the issue is still wielded to score political points:

It was an act of cowardice by the Government to deny this House a democratic vote on fox hunting, just because the nasty, blood sports party has become too nasty even for many of its own MPs. When can we express the settled view of the country and of MPs that the tormenting and killing of defenceless animals for fun is not acceptable? (Paul Flynn, HC Deb 16 July 2015, vol598 c1094)

Party political antagonism dominates the hunting debate in Parliament to the extent that it outweighs the representation of the discourses on hunting found in public space. Most notably this takes the form of the class war phantom which is paraded around Westminster and rolled out for public spectacle. The most damaging intonation for animals is that the critical-radical discourse is expressed in tandem with the ‘tory toff’ stereotype. In this sense the discourse is truly distorted from its public space genesis. It is deeply disappointing that – for whatever reason – this counter-hegemonic discourse is twisted in this way. It undermines the foundations of the critical-radical discourse, and leaves it all the more vulnerable to attack from all sides. Moreover, it detracts from the fact that the critical-radical discourse is a counter-hegemonic position that challenges the British political system.

Examining the connective tissues that enjoins public debate to Parliament may illuminate this distortion somewhat and is addressed in the following chapter. The remainder of this chapter considers the deliberative quality of debate in empowered space.

## Section 6.4: deliberative quality in empowered space

***The prioritisation of generalisable interests over sectional interests***

Sectional interests clearly play a dominant role in the hunting debate in Westminster. Party politics is a classic example of prioritising sectional interests over generalisable ones. This is further complicated by the fact that both pro- and anti-hunting camps accuse *each other* of promoting sectional interests; pro-hunting advocates accuse their adversaries of party politics, whilst some anti-hunting accuse the other of promoting the narrow interests of one section of society:

Oh God, nobody’s remotely interested in that [animal welfare]. It’s interesting – we attempt from time to time to bring it back to that, but it’s very hard – nobody’s that bothered actually and you know the curious thing is, even when we come up with evidence, which we do from time to time, that demonstrates the animal welfare consequences of a ban, that actually leave wildlife in a worse place than where it started – couldn’t worry people less. The sensible ones yeah but in here – couldn’t worry people less. Couldn’t give a damn about that. As long as they’re punishing Tory toffs. That’s really important (interview HC2).

…a pampered, feather-bedded, rural society, that is forever whining and complaining, and part of that is their sport is being denigrated, by people from the towns who don’t understand it… (interview HC4)

It is difficult to distinguish appeals to generalisable interests in amongst the sectional mud-slinging, made harder by the fact that most references to sectional interests are accusations rather than appeals. There is however, some evidence of appealing to generalisable interests.

The ‘enlarged thinking’ demanded by deliberative democracy requires interlocutors to consider perspectives beyond narrow self-interests (Eckersley 2004, p116). This would require putting party politics and purported class warfare to one side, and couching arguments in terms that others can reasonably accept. It also requires the consideration of animals in the debate, as discussed in the proceeding chapter. This approach is taken up quite explicitly by a small minority who focus efforts on re-iterating arguments around animal welfare and rejecting party politics:

Class war…I think it does the greatest disservice to the debate. It really does. Of all the arguments against foxhunting, the class argument is the very worst. And it completely undermines us. To make it an argument about social class is to demean the debate about animal welfare, and the cruelty aspects to all of this…I don’t care who hunts, I don’t care how rich they are or whether they’ve got titles or not...I actually think…I could even understand if you’ve generations of hunting in your family, why you might feel passionate about it. I just don’t agree that you should be able to kill – to chase an animal to its death, in that way…in the name of sport (interview HC3).

The interest in animal welfare was echoed by several anti-hunting advocates who generally agreed that ‘I’m not saying there aren’t people who have other agendas but I’m sure the core of it is about animal cruelty’ (interview xHC). Interviewees recognised that other interests may play a role for some in the hunting debate; ‘the vast majority of the people who support the ban care about animals…of those who vote against the ban…I’m not sure what their motivation is but it’s certainly not about animals’ (interview HC1).

Alongside limited appeal to animals, many MPs appeal to public opinion; polls have consistently cited public opinion as against hunting (Ipsos Mori 2015; YouGov 2015). Opinion polls cannot be conceptualised as a generalisable interest in the deliberative sense. They rely on preference aggregation and impose preference scales on respondents. An opinion poll does not represent deliberative public opinion and thus it cannot truly represent public interest. However, I argue that the *appeal* to public opinion does constitute an *attempt* by MPs to go beyond sectional interests. Although from a deliberative viewpoint, public opinion is not a generalisable interest, opinion polls are seen by MPs as representative of public interest. This appeal is especially important for anti-hunting MPs given that ‘there are so many Tory voters out there who don’t agree with it’ (interview HC3). From this perspective, public opinion is *perceived* as an appeal beyond sectional party interests.

One MP discussed the involvement of the SNP in the hunting debate. Whilst the majority of MPs either scolded the SNP for interfering in the issue or dismissed their role, this person pointed out that there are two cross-border hunts that ‘just roam backwards and forwards over the border and there’s no reason why they shouldn’t’ (interview HC5). In this case, the SNP arguably *do* have an interest in the Hunting Act (which currently only applies in England and Wales) and are justified in participating in the debate: ‘you could say it was a fairly tenuous one, but probably you could say no more tenuous than parts of Wales, or Greater London for that matter…I don’t think there is a Westminster Hunt, as far as I know’ (interview HC5). This example comprises a further appeal to something beyond sectional (in this case, English) interests.

Anecdotally, it is well known that MPs receive more communication regarding animal welfare from constituents than any other issue. Therefore, appealing to animal welfare is arguably a democratic appeal as well:

This is an important matter. Our inboxes this week show, I am sure, how interested the public are in animal welfare. I am sure that, like me, other hon. Members have had several hundred emails about the proposed revisions to the Hunting Act 2004. That confirms for me that we are a nation of animal lovers and that the British public care deeply about animal welfare (Andy Slaughter, HC Deb 16 July 2015, vol598 cc379-380).

This bolsters justification for the involvement of the SNP, as Pete Wishart noted: ‘I had hundreds if not thousands of requests from my constituents to come to the unitary UK Parliament to express their concerns on the issue’ (HC Deb 15 July 2015, vol598 c964). Appeals to public opinion were relatively commonplace in formal debates, in particular to reproach the government for attempting to repeal the Hunting Act ‘through the back door’ rather than in an open debate and free vote.

In this case, the most deliberative democratic line of argument – appealing to public opinion – is also the most animal-friendly option. Although public opinion cannot be classed as an appeal to public goods or generalisable interests, it is an attempt to go beyond sectional interests. Furthermore, although opinion polls are typically not deliberative, it seems that MPs perceive them as representative of public opinion and invoke poll results on democratic grounds. Although this falls short of deliberative democratic standards, from a systems perspective the attempt to go beyond sectional interests can contribute to overall deliberative capacity.

***Truthfulness, reason-giving and (non) coercive persuasion***

In ideal deliberative settings, interlocutors should be sincere in the arguments they present, and their motivations: strategy and bargaining is out. Persuasion is by ‘the force of the better argument’ (Habermas 1984), not *quid pro quo* or threat. My analysis shows that these three deliberative features – truthfulness, reason-giving and non-coercive persuasion – are entangled in reality: an MP may vote for or against hunting for strategic reasons – if it is perceived to help further their career, for example. In this case, they have not been persuaded by reasoned argument, but by ambition. This goes against both truthfulness and reason-giving. Congruently, whoever may have persuaded them that voting a certain way may impact on their career is guilty of bargaining or coercion. In what follows, I discuss examples truthfulness, reason-giving and persuasion (and their antonyms) in empowered space.

Bargaining seems to occur at different sites related to hunting. ‘Cameron made a pledge didn’t he to the Countryside Alliance, because they mobilised an army to help people in certain seats get elected –Vote OK. And the *quid pro quo* was, we’ll do something about the Hunting Act’ (interview HC5). According to this account, the current government is committed to their manifesto promise of a free vote on repeal in exchange for purported electoral gains in the past two general elections. The Vote OK campaign claims to have assisted the Conservative Party in securing marginal seats by garnering support for Tory candidates who support repeal (see also Anderson 2006; Plumb and Marsh 2013; Vote OK 2016).

Bargaining and coercion may also occur between MPs and party whips. Anecdotally, it was suggested that some MPs, especially new or young ones, could be persuaded to vote with the government or abstain in a free vote. One interviewee, on the topic of anti-hunting Conservatives, recounted:

Probably about 30 die-hards, who would vote against it [repeal], come hell or high water. Quite a few others might well abstain…they probably think “well I don’t feel terribly strongly about this” and then the whips would say “well it won’t look very good, the Prime Minister won’t be terribly pleased if you vote against it, you’ve got a career ahead of you, so it might be better if you just quietly weren’t here” and they might say “right OK I won’t bother…” (interview HC5)

One interviewee had themselves ‘sacrificed an embryonic ministerial career’ by voting against the government in a past government bill related to hunting – showing that despite the presence of bargaining in Parliament, not everyone is persuaded.

Hunting has certainly been over-debated (Plumb and Marsh 2013) in Westminster and interviewees pointed to the level of entrenchment on all sides. This sometimes led them to accuse interlocutors of taking no interest in reasoned argument and being closed to the possibility of persuasion by the force of the better argument.

It would be unfair to assert that the hunting debate in Westminster entirely rejects the force of the better argument. However, some interviewees reduced reason-giving to just providing evidence. Although some suggested that evidence is shelved in favour of tribal politics – ‘they’re not remotely interested’ [in evidence] – the commitment to evidence-based policymaking was re-iterated: ‘I do think producing evidence is important. At least in here. And evidence which will stand a bit of a stress test’ (interview HC2). The House of Lords was cited as ‘a house that respects expertise, and respects evidence, I think…values facts, and facts-based argument’ (interview HL3) which takes its scrutiny role seriously and is less party political. The role of evidence regarding hunting appears contested with disagreement over evidence on two levels. Firstly, over whose evidence is the most valid – ‘I cannot believe, that Labour has all of the compassion and evidence that exists in this building any more than I believe the Tories have that. It’s the fact that it divides on party lines that shows how little the facts apply’ (interview HC2). Secondly there is disagreement over whether objective evidence exists, with one interviewee ceding that ‘we don’t have a lot of evidence from an animal welfare point of view about the effect of hunting’ (interview HL3) and another noting that ‘government will always admit that they will get evidence, and they will get science, and they will apply their values and their political philosophies to that’ (interview HL2). This is of course where reason-giving and evidence can part company – one can still provide reasons for supporting or opposing hunting without the presence of evidence. One interviewee in particular exemplifies this point, providing reasons other than evidence for their view on hunting:

…people will argue about the precise welfare issue, whichever side they’re on…and I think until we have more information, it doesn’t get you anywhere, you can argue back and forth. What is undisputable in my mind, is if you hunt, you have voluntarily decided you wish to pursue something for enjoyment, which involves killing an animal. Wouldn’t you like to think about that? Go away and ponder it and whether you should be doing that. Aren’t there lots of other ways you could enjoy yourself? It’s not as if you need the food, or the enjoyment, is it? (interview HL3)

Nevertheless, some appear committed to the notion of evidence alone as the persuasive catalyst. One interviewee suggested that ‘we [the pro-hunting advocates] have to change the nature of the argument and provide people with evidence that is so compelling, that it permits them to take another view’ (interview HC2). Ironically, this is analogous to a preeminent position in the animal protection movement, embodied by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals’ (PETA) 2009 video ‘if slaughterhouses had glass walls’. It is predicated on the assumption that if everyone had access to compelling evidence (in this case animal suffering in abattoirs), they would change their view and concomitant behaviour. Regarding hunting, this assertion seems contradictory given that the same person also claims that ‘when it became party politicised like that, there was no going back’– which seems to suggest that MPs are *not* receptive to rational argument.

A further twist on the debate over evidence comes in the form of a submission in October 2013 to Owen Paterson, then Secretary of State for DEFRA, which highlights doubts over a research paper which supports the 2015 amendment. The article, published by the Federation of Welsh Farmers’ Packs[[37]](#footnote-37) argues that lamb depredation by foxes is a problem in upland areas and this is worsened by the current limit of two dogs allowed to flush to guns (Naylor and Knott n.d.). The proposed amendment to be debated in July 2015 increased the number of dogs allowed. Freedom of Information (FOI) releases from DEFRA show that officials had concerns over the claims presented in the article, along with inconsistency and confusion over whether the paper had, at the time the amendment was tabled, been peer reviewed. In a further FOI release in August 2016, DEFRA claimed that the paper was reviewed but failed to disclose the outcome of the review. This is discussed in detail in chapter eight.

Overall, there is some indication that reasoned argument is valued and utilised in the Parliamentary debate on hunting. However, persuasion on this basis appears much more limited, with a myriad of strategic and tactical motivations apparent. This prevalence also makes truthfulness or sincerity difficult to discern, although most interviewees seemed to believe that people are sincere - even if they are ‘wrong’:

I think their views may be misguided or wrong, but that’s not the same as being dishonest…I think lots of antis, most antis are sincere, in that they genuinely believe that hunting is an appalling thing, but behind it is they genuinely think we are appalling people, for political reasons, they think we are toffs, all that business (interview HL1).

***Respect***

In the deliberative system one might reasonably expect deliberation between political elites to encompass a higher level of mutual respect than in the messy public sphere. However, anyone familiar with the House of Commons may infer that this is not the case. Heckling and jeering are the rule rather than the exception in this House, but as Mansbridge *et al* (2012, p7) suggest, partisan heckling – whilst itself non-deliberative – may serve other deliberative purposes such as pointing out faults in government reasoning. Unfortunately as the Commons debate on amendment was abruptly cancelled, this opportunity was lost.

Perceived levels of respect varied greatly amongst interviewees making it unwise to generalise. Debates in the House of Lords were described as ‘very courteous…there’s a great respect, for knowledge and expertise. I mean, I’ve been amazed and gratified and humbled by the response of others’ (interview HL3). This was a general impression of debates in the Lords without specific reference to hunting. Outside of formal debates, interviewees indicated lower levels of respect for purported adversaries – and the feeling is mutual:

…we are viewed with absolute loathing, we are treated as if we are paedophiles. And in fact there’s a very strong strand in the animal rights movement that thinks that people who hunt are automatically cruel to all animals and therefore probably cruel to people…they think we are despicable, cruel, wicked evil people. I don’t think that of them, I think they’re misguided and rather pathetic, and uninformed…but do I have any respect for them? No not really (interview HL1).

It is difficult to parse out levels of respect within a single setting in empowered space because interviewees tended to generalise beyond the confines of Westminster, as the above quote indicates – referencing the animal rights movement rather than interlocutors within Parliament. The same can be said of one anti-hunting advocate, who referred to ‘deep seated inbreeding and stupidity’ amongst parts of a ‘pampered, feather-bedded, rural society’ (interview HC4). In some sense these generalisations vindicate the discursive approach taken here; people refer to broader attitudes rather than actors. These instances indicate a deep lack of respect. Such insults are sometimes expressions of discursive substance. The latter quote echoes the argument made by critical-radicalism in its condemnation of the societal structure associated with hunting; the former shows alignment with the countryside management position in asserting that anti-hunting campaigners are ignorant. However, the antagonism that they incite, colourful as it may be, is ultimately unhelpful in constructive debate.

Sarcasm and biting humour are ever present in the Commons. As Mansbridge *et al* assert, this is used to expose perceived incompetency or faults of government (2012, p7). The majority of these verbal attacks related to the manner in which the proposed amendment was handled and the ensuing confusion:

It seems as though the Scottish National party now has almost a magical omnipotent power. As soon as we announce our intention to exercise our democratic rights in the House and vote on a measure announced in the business statement, it miraculously disappears. Such is this omnipotence that we are seemingly credited for the election result in England, the near-death of the Liberal Democrats and the crisis in Labour, and now we are the saviours of the English foxes (Pete Wishart, HC Deb 16 July 2015, vol598 c1084).

As amusing as such jibes are it is unclear how exactly they contribute to the hunting debate. Whilst statements such as this play an important role in criticising government, they do not progress the debate on hunting. The antagonism seen between some pro and anti-hunting advocates perpetuates the exaggeration of moral disagreement between interlocutors. Humphrey and Stears (2006) argue that the exaggeration of moral disagreement is justifiably employed by some animal rights activists. Highlighting the distance between those who hunt and those do not hunt, on their account, encourages an audience to think about the issue in a different light. However, the exaggeration of moral disagreement seen in empowered space cannot be evaluated in the same way as it might be for activists. Firstly, the hunting debate has been waged for so many years in Parliament that this approach is unlikely to persuade anyone to change their mind. Secondly, it can be justified on the basis that such shock tactics help activists get issues onto the agenda. Parliamentarians are not exactly marginalised activists. Finally, such a lack of respect cuts off the chance of meaningful dialogue. It frames pro- and anti-hunting advocates as adversaries with a moral gulf between them, rather than interlocutors connected by even a rickety bridge. As one interviewee points out:

…it’s very difficult to be flexible against an opponent, a debating opponent, who’s completely inflexible – where do you go to? It’s the Israeli position against Iran - if Iran wish to destroy Israel, quite how do Israel debate with them? If the IFAW,[[38]](#footnote-38) League Against Cruel Sports line is that all fox hunters are evil and fox hunting must be banned full stop, where do we have a debate? (interview HL1)

Overall mutual respect is low in the Parliamentary hunting debate. Aside from the predictable jeering in the Commons, interviews revealed a deep lack of respect for alternative viewpoints outside both Chambers. Whilst this may be relatively good-natured (these people do continue to work with each other, after all), the lack of respect between some pro- and anti-hunting advocates stifles opportunity for constructive dialogue and progress in the hunting debate.

***Efforts to be constructive in finding mutually acceptable outcomes and reflexivity***

Here I discuss two deliberative features together, as in the hunting debate they become almost inseparable: efforts to find mutually acceptable outcomes are hampered by a lack of reflexivity on all sides.

For some, the existence of the Hunting Act is itself the end point: ‘I think they’ve got an acceptable solution, personally. And the fact that the hunts are still functioning [using artificial scent], that ought to be, from my point of view, acceptable to the majority’ (interview HC1). There is thus little appetite to re-address the issue – despite the government’s manifesto commitment:

You look at the amount of time, the inordinate amount of time that’s been spent on this, whichever side of the fence you’re on, there are really rather more burning issues than foxhunting that this place ought to be dealing with. I mean and our attitude is mainly, we’ve done it, we’ve put it to bed, it’s not satisfactory, it’s not, we can live with it. So we should live with it, and move on. I mean, if we’re doing animal welfare legislation I’d much rather do something really serious that gets to grips with puppy farming, for example, or factory farming, for example… (interview HC5)

That Parliament has spent a disproportionate amount of time on the hunting issue was echoed by others. Several interviewees mentioned other animal welfare issues that they felt to be more pressing, in particular factory farming. For anti-hunting advocates, this means putting the hunting issue to bed: ‘the Hunting Act is on the statute book. There’s nothing to resolve’ (interview HC3).

Pro-hunt advocates appear more optimistic about the possibility of a different mutually acceptable outcome. The proposed amendment was cited as ‘a significant move in that direction’ given that ‘what was on offer was nothing remotely resembling repeal…hunting with dogs in its traditional form would have remained illegal’ (interview HC2). Discussion around a mutually acceptable outcome is somewhat obscured by the existence of the Middle Way Group, an expired all-party Parliamentary group originally set up as a movement for regulated hunting by Jim Barrington. As this was framed as an alternative, ‘middle way’ – pro-hunt advocates tend to refer to this option as a mutually acceptable solution or compromise because ‘we always said, yeah, don’t mind being regulated, it’s a bit of a bore being regulated but most things in this world are’ (interview HL1). By contrast, anti-hunting advocates discredit the Middle Way as ‘something set up by the hunting industry and run by the paid clown Lembit Öpik[[39]](#footnote-39)’ (interview HC4). To them, the Middle Way was never a mutually acceptable solution. Moreover as one interviewee points out, ‘the Middle Way…won’t make progress on this issue, because positions became so entrenched, last time round, all those years ago’ (interview HL2). According to this interviewee, the amount of time spent debating the hunting bill (as long ago as the late 1980s until the Act was passed in 2004) served to entrench views to a point of no return. The chance for compromise passed years before the Act even came into fruition, ‘and it certainly ain’t gonna happen now’ (interview HL2).

The perception that views are deeply entrenched on hunting – with no possibility of compromise – indicates a lack of reflexivity. Reflexivity demands that interlocutors reflect on their own preferences and are open to revising or reconsidering them in light of new information and arguments. For some in Westminster, it is simply that ‘I don’t think there’s anything new to say about it’ (interview HC5). For others, the possibility of changing minds – that is, the minds of others – is still present ‘if some interesting new piece of information or evidence comes up’ (interview HC2). However – as in public space – the onus for reflexivity lies with those who disagree.

Despite apparent rigidity, I argue there is some indication of *individual* reflexivity; interviewees provided some insightful reflections on the hunting debate itself. It is possible that this indicates a kind of meta-deliberation – the ability to reflect on the deliberative system itself as a whole. This is discussed in detail in chapter eight. Indeed, the MPs I spoke with were more than capable of situating themselves in the debate and acknowledging their own position: ‘I think for those polarised on either side of the argument, like me – the view is entrenched. You ain’t gonna change my mind, ever…’ (interview HC5). In fact, there appears to be a good deal of reflection on the nature of the hunting debate. The recognition that the ‘class war’ approach is a mistake is indicative of this: in response to the knowledge that a majority of Tory voters ostensibly oppose hunting, some Labour MPs seek to ensure that these voters and MPs are not alienated by presenting hunters as the Tory toffs (interview HC4). This is an interesting example because whilst it can be interpreted as reflexive and appealing to more generalisable interests, it could at the same moment be seen as a purely strategic move: adopting a particular rhetoric to win over an audience (see Chambers 2009).

Both pro- and anti-hunting advocates do believe, however, that there are a group of MPs ‘in the middle’ who do not hold strong views on hunting and are the most open to persuasion. This constructed group, usually new or young MPs, are the target group for both sides in the debate as their allegiance may, in the Commons, make all the difference in a future free vote on repeal. Those MPs that occupy the ‘grey area’ (interview HC5) may constitute the most plausible site for meaningful contestatory deliberation in Westminster, as more polarised MPs and lobbyists seek to persuade them. However, the hunting debate in Westminster is ultimately about picking sides, not collective reasoning. Because after all, ‘you either think that hunting with dogs is fine or you don’t, so it’s quite hard to see how you bridge that ground’ (interview xHC).

**Conclusions**

It is difficult given the adversarial and accusatory tone of the hunting debate in Westminster, to draw solid conclusions on the nature of empowered space. All is not lost: my analysis shows that all four public discourses on hunting appear to be present in some form. Countryside management and liberal-progressivism in particular are clearly represented. This is positive from a deliberative perspective as these two positions also emphasise the importance of a diverse debate on hunting. However, neither of the two perspectives are represented in Parliament without some additional party politics thrown in. Furthermore, the sporting libertarian and critical-radical positions, although still recognisable, are distorted and exaggerated by spectral class war and sectional mud-slinging. Ultimately, I suggest that the barriers to meaningful dialogue and progress stem from the same discursive obstacles presented in chapters four and five. That hunting has been debated so extensively in Westminster has served to entrench positions on either side, making the issue almost intractable in the eyes of interlocutors. Furthermore, a lack of reflexivity precludes meaningful deliberation on hunting. This is of course greatly hindered by the nature of debates in the House of Commons, where ‘a ten second intervention on prime ministers’ questions…is equivalent to something like 72 and a half years on European Standing Committee B… more effective than making a well-researched, detailed, speech’ (interview HC4). In other words, there is no appetite in the Commons or the British press for rational, deliberative argument.

In the following chapter, I analyse three transmission mechanisms to assess how messages are transmitted into empowered space, and examine whether transmission can account for the distortions seen in Parliament.

# Chapter Seven: Transmission

**Introduction**

This chapter examines three transmission mechanisms in the deliberative system. Transmission describes the means by which claims are transmitted between different sites in the deliberative system. In this case, I assess three key actors in the hunting debate and consider the extent to which they promote or hinder deliberative capacity. The chapter proceeds in four sections. The first three comprise the respective analyses of three transmission mechanisms. I focus on the discursive claims made by each, followed by consideration of deliberative quality. The final section discusses the three and makes some comparisons. In particular, I consider the distinctive features of each mechanism and the implications they have for deliberative capacity. I also consider the conceptual implications of my analysis, and highlight the need to go beyond a narrow understanding of transmission in the deliberative system. It is important to note that the analysis given here is intended to provide an insight into different transmission mechanisms. My conclusions are limited to the three cases presented and serve merely to illustrate the different ways in which ideas are transmitted.

I employ documentary and video analysis to examine three transmission mechanisms in the hunting debate. The first is coverage from broadsheet papers The Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Telegraph. The Daily and Sunday Telegraphs are partisan newspapers owned by the Telegraph Media Group. Although the two papers are run separately with different editorial teams, they often use the same stories. Moreover, stories from both publications are also published under the same website, Telegraph.co.uk. For this reason, I analyse both the Daily and Sunday Telegraph together and hereafter refer to coverage as The Telegraph.[[40]](#footnote-40) The Telegraph is openly pro-hunting.

The second mechanism analysed comprises the news feed from the Blue Fox website. Blue Fox – also known as Conservatives Against Fox Hunting – was set up in 2010 by Lorraine Platt and her husband Chris Platt, the then-Chairman of a local Conservative Association in Surrey. Blue Fox campaigns on hunting and other animal issues including the badger cull and most recently, farm animal welfare. The group is intended primarily as a support system for Tory MPs who wish to stand up against hunting and related activities – which involves going against the party line. Blue Fox is a form of direct transmission given that they retain control over the how and what of their claims. Here I analyse 25 articles from the Blue Fox 2015 news feed. This is complimented by insights from an in-depth interview with Lorraine Platt, co-founder and director of Blue Fox. The group uses social media to promote their message and the website and has just under 10,000 ‘likes’ on Facebook and 4,000 Twitter followers.[[41]](#footnote-41)

The final analysis is a sample of videos taken from the League Against Cruel Sports (LACS) YouTube channel. I analyse 11 videos published during 2015 related to hunting. I choose to examine videos for two main reasons. Firstly, LACS invites visitors to their website to share their campaign videos as a ‘great way of getting the message out there’ (LACS 2016b). Secondly, video footage is central to the campaign against hunting as it can provide visual evidence of exactly what goes on – be that illegal hunting, images of animal cruelty, or violence propagated by either side. The LACS YouTube page has less than 2000 subscribers. However, the videos analysed here all have between 3375 and over 274,000 views each[[42]](#footnote-42) (LACS 2016).

These three mechanisms were chosen for their prominence in the hunting debate, and for their diverse approaches to transmission. In selecting them, other mechanisms are obviously excluded and my analysis of transmission is limited in this regard. It was not possible within the confines of this thesis to undertake a rigorous or systematic analysis of the three transmission mechanisms and this is a limitation of the analysis. Further discussion of these limitations and recommendations for future research on transmission are reserved for chapter nine.

It might be considered odd not to include the RSPCA as a mechanism in this chapter. Indeed, the RSPCA is a pervasive actor in the hunting debate, performing roles in each site of the deliberative system. But the RSPCA and hunting could comprise an entire thesis in itself - a history and politics far more convoluted than a partial chapter could allow. The RSPCA’s opposition to foxhunting has drawn heavy criticism, particularly from the Countryside Alliance who along with commentators, have fuelled the assertion that the RSPCA has become an animals right organisation with a political agenda rather than an animal welfare organisation as it was originally founded. Within the past year its new chief executive has publicly ceded this point and apologised for the organisation becoming ‘too political’ (Mendick 2015). Analysis of the RSPCA as a transmission mechanism deserves more attention and explication than is possible in this chapter. My aim here is to provide an insight into diverse forms of transmission mechanism, rather than a comprehensive analysis of one organisation. This is not to say that the RSPCA has been neglected altogether in the thesis; the organisation is represented in the Q study as a key actor in public space.

## Section 7.1: transmission in the deliberative system

As Boswell *et al* point out, ‘a *deliberative* system is more *democratic* if it can foster the transmission of claims and ideas across different sites’ (forthcoming, p1; emphasis added). Transmission mechanisms are the ways in which ideas – in our case, discourses – are carried through various sites. Transmission mechanisms may not be deliberative in themselves. However, they can be examined to evaluate the contribution they make to the overall deliberative system (Dryzek 2009). Recent debate in deliberative systems literature has also focussed on the role of ‘coupling’ – linkages between different communicative sites (see Hendriks 2015; Mansbridge *et al* 2012). Whilst this is clearly another important relationship in the deliberative system, my analysis focuses exclusively on transmission. This is because as Hendriks (2015, p46) points out, transmission emphasises ‘flows and blockages in communication’ – which is in keeping with the discursive approach employed here.

Transmission mechanisms take different forms; they may be direct mechanisms in which an organisation seeks to communicate its specific message to decision-makers – through campaigns, petitions or lobbying. Indirect mechanisms include traditional and social media, whereby layers of interpretation and filters are applied during the transmission process. Direct mechanisms may also undergo a filtering process; the distinction is that in direct transmission mechanisms, adherents to a discourse retain control over what to transmit, and how. They may choose to omit some aspects and amplify others (Boswell *et al* forthcoming, p21). Ultimately, this results in some transformation of a discourse as it appears in empowered space – as seen in chapter six. Boswell (2016) documents how a critical counter-narrative on child obesity in the UK and Australia was watered down and ‘fizzled out’ when proponents presented it to decision-makers. In this case, the most critical aspects of discourses on obesity were negated when proponents of the discourse presented their views in empowered space. In public space, this discourse was particularly critical of the fast food industry and advertising. When the organisation who promoted the narrative presented a final report to government however, this critique was considerably muted (Boswell 2016, p17). Given the transformation of the critical-radical discourse in empowered space, it is plausible that something similar occurs with the hunting debate.

Conventionally systems theorists have focussed on transmission from public to empowered space, through deliberative mini-publics, various media or discourse and narrative (see Boswell *et al* forthcoming). This makes sense intuitively; in order for a deliberative system to have some semblance of democracy, we can expect concerns from the public sphere to reach decision-makers, who then respond accordingly. A deficit occurs when this linear transmission from public to power is blocked somehow (Ercan *et al* 2015, p12). However, the empirical reality suggests that transmission, direct and indirect, can be multidirectional. My analysis shows that transmission also occurs from empowered space to public space, and within public space.

Most important for this thesis is the Westminster distortion of the critical-radical discourse. Party politics and the class war phantom serve to distort this viewpoint from a structural critique to a barely-there caricature of outdated stereotypes. This eruption – not present in the original discourse - may be explained by what happens during transmission. Analysis of transmission is vital not only for overall deliberative capacity. Evaluation could also provide important insights for animal protectionists: if messages are not getting through to politicians, or become warped out of all recognition, it is important for the movement to understand how and why this happens.

Media coverage is a form of indirect transmission; messages transmitted may be subject to interpretation or distortion that those occupying public space cannot control. We can reasonably expect the Telegraph, for example, to transmit pro-hunting messages; this is neither surprising nor particularly interesting. However, we should be alert to the manner in which messages are transmitted, as well as content. Although a transmission mechanism may not be deliberative in itself, it may still be able to strengthen deliberative capacity. As Boswell *et al* put it, it is important not only to establish that transmission occurs, but also ‘how, under what conditions, and to what effect’ (forthcoming, p6).

## Section 7.2: the Daily and Sunday Telegraph

I used the LexisNexis database to select and download 35 articles from the Daily and Sunday Telegraph papers on hunting.[[43]](#footnote-43) The Telegraph is openly pro-hunting and my analysis does nothing to contradict this assumption. However, it is also clear that the Telegraph appears to more closely resemble the politicised debates of Westminster than the four discourses found in public space. It is worth noting at the outset that the articles I analyse are written by a variety of authors. For the most part these are reporters, correspondents and editors who work for the Daily or Sunday Telegraph. In a few cases however, pieces have been written by authors who have an active interest in hunting. This includes Clive Aslet, editor of Country Life magazine[[44]](#footnote-44) and Robin Page, a former TV presenter noted for his views on the countryside.

The Telegraph represents an almost equal blend of sporting libertarian and countryside management discourses, with 14 and 13 articles respectively containing discursive elements. Hunting is a ‘matter of pest control, transformed by centuries-old pageantry into a leisure activity’ (Telegraph View, 2015a). The wildlife management argument, central to countryside management, is emphasised:

The Countryside Alliance has said that using hounds "provides a unique method of wildlife management, being selective, testing and non-wounding" by mimicking packs of wolves (Hope 2015a).

Also key to this discourse is the notion that the British countryside requires active management, a point which is highlighted through a quote from David Cameron:

…to me, the countryside is - and should be - a living, breathing, working environment, not a museum. We must ensure appropriate protections for our magnificent landscapes, but we should recognise just how many of them, like the stone walls and grass fields of the Cotswolds, are man-made (Cameron quoted in Dominiczak 2015a).

Alongside the countryside management position, sporting libertarianism is prominent, but appears primarily in its distorted, politicised form. Whereas the original discourse gives little significance to the idea that hunting is an important British tradition (S3, +1), this is vastly exaggerated in the Telegraph – perhaps even more so than in empowered space: ‘when countryside traditions were challenged by the then Labour government, communities rallied around something that has defined Britishness for centuries’ (Telegraph View 2015b).

The importance of hunting as a social activity for those in rural communities is also a strong theme throughout, as it is in empowered space (section 6.3); ‘a quarter of a million people of all views, classes and conditions have come together on Boxing Day to celebrate what is a very traditional British activity’ (Sawer 2015). Emphasis here is on the ‘classless’ appeal of hunting – ‘Jimmy Hill,[[45]](#footnote-45) the late football player and broadcaster, rode to hounds’ (Telegraph View 2015b). The classless appeal of hunting is indeed a feature of the sporting libertarian discourse (section 4.2.4). However, in the Telegraph this defence of hunting also enables an attack on the class war phantom. This in turn opens up into the vitriolic point scoring seen in Westminster:

I thought the era of ignorant sentimentalism and class-motivated hatred about hunting had passed on the glorious day that Labour lost the 2010 general election. How wrong I was (Heffer 2015a).

It is a shame these people have swallowed the illiberal, urban propaganda of Leftists who mistakenly think foxhunting is a pursuit confined to the landed gentry, and who hate it for class reasons and not out of concern for animal welfare (Heffer 2015b).

The origins of the ban reveal a great deal about what motivated it. Tony Blair, then Prime Minister, used the offer of a hunting ban to mollify some of his more Left-wing MPs (Telegraph View 2015a).

The majority of politicised diatribe is aimed at Labour and the SNP, particularly in the aftermath of the amendment debacle. At this point, hunting as an issue becomes somewhat lost amongst reporting on EVEL and is used as an ominous example of the SNP’s threat to the United Kingdom:

The barefaced perfidy of the SNP's decision to rat on their pledge not to vote against legislative measures that did not affect their constituents has been breathtaking…But, then, for all who know this lot, were any of us really surprised? This is, after all, a cult-like movement that knows no principle that it won't abandon and no promise it won't ditch in pursuit of its one and only goal - the break-up of the United Kingdom (Cochrane 2015a).

It is notable that even the Conservative government are not free from criticism here; the Sports Minister Tracey Crouch (an MP patron of Blue Fox and openly opposed to hunting) is heavily criticised for her condemnation of hunting in an article titled ‘if only we could consign Tracey Crouch and her views on foxhunting to history’ (mocking her own words about consigning fox hunting to history). The article in question also takes on a latent sexist overtone, noting that she is ‘the first ever Tory minister to take maternity leave’ and that David Cameron ‘could tell her to shut up’ (Moore 2015).

Tracey Crouch’s view - that fox hunting should be consigned to history – is reminiscent of the liberal progressive discourse. There are some references to anti-hunting positions throughout the Telegraph coverage, including four mentions of the RSPCA, who reflect the liberal-progressive discourse. These are vastly outnumbered by references to the Countryside Alliance (CA) however, who are directly quoted or cited in 15 of the 35 articles. Of particular interest is the manner in which coverage advances a politicised explanation for anti-hunting activism:

According to Tim Bonner of the Countryside Alliance, the number of saboteurs was far greater in the Eighties and Nineties, when hunting became a symbolic target for anti-Thatcherite demonstrations (Aslet 2015).

The war between sabs and hunters goes back to at least 1963, when the HSA was founded. Its high point was in the 1980s and 1990s, when numbers were boosted by mass unemployment (Dodds 2015).

This tone is reminiscent of Parliamentary debates dating back to 2004. When the ban was introduced, debate was highly politicised. Anti-hunting Labour MPs were accused of ‘wanting to pay back the Conservatives for their decisions on the miners and other things that their Government did in the 1980s’ (Lembit Öpik quoted in Plumb and Marsh 2013, p321). At points, this construction of hunt saboteurs goes even further, with associations made between these ‘politically motivated hardliners’ and other nefarious activities:

These black-clad individuals may be likened to the anarchists who batten on to marches in central London in order to smash windows and create mayhem. In some cases they may be the same people (Aslet 2015).

Even more worrying for animal activists is the same author’s comparison between hunt sabs and ‘terrorist organisations such as the IRA[[46]](#footnote-46)’ due to hunt sabs typically dressing to conceal their identity.

The Telegraph coverage of hunting is the antithesis of deliberation. The above quotes aptly illustrate a deep lack of respect for alternative viewpoints which is antagonistic and divisive. It is nonetheless a relative success for the pro-hunting lobby given the amount of citations that the Countryside Alliance receives. Most significant for the deliberative system is that the Telegraph coverage appears to resemble the hunting debate in Westminster more than it does any of the original four discourses. The exaggeration of the sporting libertarian viewpoint, the party politicisation and the class war phantom all feature more heavily than any discursive remnants. This has implications for our understanding of transmission in the deliberative system: if those claims are not present in public discourses on hunting, where are they being transmitted from? This is discussed in the final section of the chapter.

## Section 7.3: Blue Fox Group

I analyse 25 articles from the Blue Fox website newsfeed in 2015.[[47]](#footnote-47) Newsfeed articles sometimes included external extracts including blogs, letters sent to MPs and candidates and extracts from reports. The Blue Fox Group (also known as Conservatives Against Fox Hunting) was established in 2010 by two Conservative supporters who,

…when we were canvassing for the Conservative Party, we were asked by people on the doorstep about the fox hunting issue. And we thought well, we don’t agree with this policy, so we decided to develop a website, a homemade website, in our sitting room, on the PC and take it from there….and we had a huge immediate response to this website, from the public, and we realised really early on, that it was something that a lot of people cared about, this repeal issue, to keep the hunting ban in place (interview Lorraine Platt).

The group primarily provides information, support and publicity for Tory MPs who are against hunting. They also work with other parties and campaign organisations like LACS. Blue Fox occupies an unusual position in the deliberative system as it is embedded in empowered space, given that its members are MPs. It is still a transmission mechanism however because its target audience is primarily the Parliamentary Conservative Party and other MPs because ‘if we want to keep this ban in place, we want to go straight to the top, and focus strategically on those MPs, on those decision makers, to support those MPs to vote to keep the ban in place’ (interview Lorraine Platt). Despite this focus they also recognise the importance of public support ‘because although the vote doesn’t extend to the public, the public are very very important because the public will press their individual MPs, and MPs will take note’ (interview Lorraine Platt).

Blue Fox site overwhelmingly represents the liberal-progressive position, in some cases echoing almost word for word the statements scored highest by this position in the Q study:

…in the 21st century it is unacceptable to hunt and kill an animal with dogs for sport (Blue Fox 2015y).

Improving animal welfare and how we view animals is an integral part of a civilised society (Blue Fox 2015b).

The key elements of the discourse are present, including the emphasis on modern, civilised society. This runs alongside an opposition to hunting based on the rejection of pro-hunting arguments about wildlife management. There is, to a far lesser extent, some evidence of the critical-radical discourse in its original form. These elements are seen in the argument for strengthening the Hunting Act and viewing the current ban as a compromise with many loopholes. Further aspects are seen in the indication that humans (and particularly agriculturists) ought to take responsibility for their actions before placing the blame on animals. Notably, this assertion comes from a farmer and landowner:

If humans are to use the countryside for large numbers of non-native stock such as sheep, chicken, and pheasants it is not fair to blame a wild animal for assuming some of it to be food…Farm stock (unnatural creatures engineered by humans) certain species of deer, rabbits, rats, grey squirrels, pheasant, and red legged partridge all introduced by humans (Cooper quoted in Blue Fox 2015x).

The discursive claims made in the Blue Fox campaign are narrower than the liberal-progressive discourse. Focus is very much on hunting and does not stray beyond to claims about humane slaughter or vegetarianism, for example. Considerable space is also given to reporting the group’s successes and thanking its supporters. The tone of the articles is for the most part positive and supportive. The emphasis is on fostering an environment conducive to persuading new or undecided MPs to take a stand against hunting. Blue Fox aims to support such MPs ‘because they need that support, because they’re being lobbied constantly…by the pro hunt lobby, so they need that, support and that strength, and there is something in strength in numbers’ (interview Lorraine Platt).

Blue Fox is in the unique position of sitting *within* the Tory Party, whilst opposing the leadership on this issue. It is perhaps for this reason that there is no demonisation or antagonism of those who hunt. The disagreement is noted, but with respect and restraint: ‘I have instinctive sympathy with groups like the Countryside Alliance, but I just don’t agree with them on this issue’ (Raab quoted in Blue Fox 2015o). There is no name-calling or class war phantom, arguably because the group aims to unite its audience, rather than divide.

The articles base their persuasive appeal primarily on the argument that the majority of the British public and conservative supporters are opposed to hunting. Although the results of opinion polls cannot be seen as a deliberated public view, I argue that *appealing* to public opinion is deliberative in the sense that it is an appeal to that goes beyond a narrow section of society (see section 6.4). Whilst this is not the same as appealing to generalisable interests, it is a step beyond appealing to self-interest. Naturally, appealing to Conservative voters is sectional, but it is framed as a broad appeal beyond the sectional interests of the pro-hunting lobby:

Mr Cameron *risks sacrificing his wider appeal for the sake of appeasing his friends* in the hunting lobby which further enforces the view that he is out of touch with the *majority opinion* on this issue. It is dispiriting to see the Prime Minister appearing to use his position to push a *personal interest issue which is overwhelmingly opposed by the general public* (Blue Fox 2015d, emphasis added).

For too long, the Party leadership has appeared to be swayed by the hunting lobby rather than representing the majority of the public’s support for the ban on hunting with dogs (Blue Fox 2015e).

This line of argument is part of Blue Fox’s persuasive strategy. The notion that voters will support them taking a stand against party leadership could be a powerful catalyst for some Tory MPs. Sitting alongside a concerted effort to debunk pro-hunting arguments, the Blue Fox newsfeed comprises a barrage of reason-based arguments presented in a respectful and supportive manner. It displays a range of deliberative qualities. It is plausible that the Blue Fox also encompasses a degree of reflexivity in its actions: it clearly has a good deal of awareness of how to proceed given its position. There is less inclination towards a mutually acceptable outcome – ‘I don’t think there’s any compromise on cruelty…I know that there are moves to offer a compromise…to amend the Hunting Act…but it will be…it will be wrecked. It will drive a coach and horses through this legislation’ (interview Lorraine Platt).

Perhaps the most important thing to mention about this mechanism is that the Blue Fox Group appears to have been relatively successful. According to its founder, since inception of Blue Fox in 2010 the number of anti-hunting Tory MPs has apparently grown from 22 to 55. This is up from just 6 at the time the hunting ban was introduced in 2004 (interview Lorraine Platt). This trend *could* indicate a decrease in the politicisation of the hunting issue with less party cohesion than when the ban was introduced (see Plumb and Marsh 2013). However, my analysis of Parliamentary debates suggests that the party political aspect of the hunting debate is still very much alive in Westminster. Nonetheless, Blue Fox emphasise their view that hunting is not and should not be party political:

The SNP alongside anti-hunting Conservative and cross Party MPs have in this instance represented the will of the vast majority of the British people and helped prevent what would have been the return of hunting wild animals with packs of dogs (Blue Fox 2015m).

We would have struggled without the SNP…so we’re very grateful to them. I mean, we wrote to them as well, we wrote to all parties – we feel that this issue transcends political affiliation (interview Lorraine Platt).

Blue Fox is at its core a group of and for Conservative MPs. It does work with other parties but its self-proclaimed focus is on the Tories. This - combined with the supportive atmosphere the group facilitates - gives Blue Fox some features of a deliberative enclave. Typically a deliberative enclave is a protected space where a marginalised group communicate with like-minded others. The deliberative benefits or otherwise are a matter of debate amongst scholars. Sunstein (2009) warns against the dangers of enclave deliberation – group polarisation and the adoption of extreme positions. Conversely Mansbridge suggests that ‘working and talking together in an atmosphere of sustained commitment’ (2010, p17) can help marginalised activists sharpen their arguments and ultimately present a stronger counterargument to interlocutors. I suggest that Blue Fox is a sort of deliberative enclave – albeit an elite one made up of politicians and not marginalised activists. Anti-hunting Tory MPs are still a minority within their own party and much of Blue Fox’s aim has been to provide support for isolated MPs:

…we’re very proud of the fact that we can support these MPs, because we know they’re in a very challenging position, they don’t want to be seen as…causing dissent…yet it’s very necessary to oppose this policy, to protect wildlife, so we unite anti-hunting Conservative MPs together (interview Lorraine Platt).

…they feel they’re not the only ones…there’s a consensus among themselves…This is why we started Blue Fox, for that support because they were quite isolated…we want to give them support, to let them know, they’re doing the right thing… (interview Lorraine Platt)

The enclave nature of the group is fostered by the fact that Blue Fox was founded by Conservative supporters: ‘we come from the same angle as them, we’ve come from the grassroots you see, we’ve come straight up from within the party, and they can trust us’ (interview Lorraine Platt). Thus from the start the group was a protected space (Mansbridge 2010, p16) for anti-hunting Tory MPs to access information and connect with each other. The normative justification for enclave deliberation stems from the typically marginalised position of those deliberating within the enclave; this is obviously not the case for a group of anti-hunting Tory MPs. Nonetheless, I suggest that the enclave nature of the Blue Fox group – in particular the focus on providing support to members – is justified on some level. The point is that the anti-hunting position of the Blue Fox Group is at odds with the party leadership and official line. This means that anti-hunting Tory MPs are a minority, if not marginalised. The supportive and constructive atmosphere of the group is conducive to strengthening the voice of anti-hunting Conservatives in Parliament. Thus, although the group may not be marginalised, it does contribute positively to deliberative capacity in that it promotes respectful, reasoned arguments against hunting. Given the tit-for-tat nature of the debate in Westminster, Blue Fox may provide some counter to this antagonism. Moreover, this enclave does break beyond talking with like-minded others and appears to have persuaded some MPs to join their cause. ‘Some former pro-hunt MPs, who’ve been pro-hunt in the last session 2010-15…they’ve changed their minds in the last few months’ (interview Lorraine Platt). In addition to persuading Tory MPs, the group also works with other parties: ‘we’re used to working with Labour Party and Lib Dems, also, we’ve spoken to Caroline Lucas[[48]](#footnote-48) so yeah…this issue needs the involvement of everybody, to the left and to the right’ (interview Lorraine Platt). However, the group’s primary focus remains on the Conservative Party, because ultimately they hope to change the party line on hunting.

Blue Fox cannot be considered a true deliberative enclave because of its open nature. In particular, it is linked to other anti-hunting organisations. The website contains a number of links to individuals and organisations who support the cause. The newsfeed itself frequently reposts messages from these organisations. It does however, seem to function like a deliberative enclave on some levels – particularly the supportive, reinforcing atmosphere it tries to provide for anti-hunting Tories. The Blue Fox Group is also a decent example of a successful transmission mechanism. It represents the most central aspects of the liberal-progressive discourse in its original form. It is worth noting that the liberal-progressive position is also the most prominent and unscathed discourse seen in empowered space – though I make no inferences about causation here. It is also *relatively* deliberative in itself – certainly in comparison with much of the tone of the debate. Perhaps most important is the positive, constructive focus of the group’s campaign; it aims to support MPs, celebrates it achievements, and fosters a ‘group identity of Blue Fox’ (Blue Fox 2015f).

## Section 7.4: LACS videos

The League Against Cruel Sports (LACS) was established in 1924 in the UK and campaigns against ‘cruelty to animals in the name of sport’ (LACS 2016a) including dog fighting, grouse shooting and fox hunting. Here I analyse 11 videos published by LACS on their YouTube page.[[49]](#footnote-49) There are good reasons to analyse LACS videos over text in this case. The first is relatively straightforward: LACS stipulate on their website that sharing videos is ‘a great way of getting the message out there’ (LACS 2016b). Moreover, one of the organisation’s key aims is to ‘expose the cruelty that underpins hunting, and the false claims that are made by those who want to bring blood sports back’ (LACS 2016c). The majority of this is pursued with video recordings of illegal activities related to hunting. The videos analysed here are ostensibly aimed at the public – as well as being used to gather an evidence base for criminal investigation. However, one video posted on YouTube speaks directly to MPs. The LACS website suggests that supporters share their videos online to help spread their message. In addition to this, LACS encourages supporters to write to their MPs with a prepared email template. This multidirectional transmission raises questions about how we understand transmission in the deliberative system and is discussed in the final section of this chapter.

Video analysis also enables us to examine two tactics often used by animal advocates: graphic imagery and moral shocks. Graphic imagery involves visual depictions of animal suffering and abuse. Often this takes the form of undercover footage obtained secretly by activists. In the case of hunting, video footage is captured by hunt monitors[[50]](#footnote-50) either covertly at a distance, or more rarely at close quarters. Moral shock is a tactic that aims to shock its audience into seeing a situation in a different light. One example is the book *Eternal Treblinka*, which compares the plight of factory farmed animals to the Holocaust (see Humphrey and Stears p411). Central to the notion of moral shock is ‘emotion work’ (Brown and Quinn-Allan 2015, p2): ‘the weaving of an affective story that is designed to elicit an emotional shock’. The assumption underlying both graphic imagery and moral shocks is that they provide the catalyst for concomitant behavioural change. This is a prominent strand in the animal protection movement, encapsulated in PETA’s 2009 campaign ‘if slaughterhouses had glass walls’ (PETA 2016). In other words, if people could see the suffering that animals are subjected to behind closed doors, they would not support those industries and practices.

The use of moral shocks and graphic imagery as a tool of persuasion is non-deliberative. This does not mean that it does not harbour some deliberative potential, but the use of such tactics stands alone as non-deliberative. This is because they tend to rely on provoking visceral reactions as a catalyst for behaviour change. Humphrey and Stears have argued in support of such tactics, suggesting that the ‘exaggeration of moral disagreement’ can help ‘kick-start the process of reconsideration’ (2006, p407) in an audience, leading to reflection on one’s behaviour and habits. I argue that animal advocates ought to deploy these tactics with great caution and awareness of the negative impact they can have on different audiences. For example, Brown and Quinn-Allan (2015) suggest that some graphic videos have a high attrition rate because of the psychological cost imposed on the viewer. Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that those associated with animal use industries are less susceptible to visceral disgust responses (Herzog and Golden 2009) than people who already identify with animal causes. Obversely, Brown and Quinn-Allan suggest that animal industries may be more persuaded by rational appeals (2015, p4). The analysis below proceeds with this in mind.

Like Blue Fox, LACS is very focused in its campaign against hunting. Primarily it seeks to expose illegal hunting and animal cruelty and this is reflected in the videos. Correspondingly, there is less discursive substance found in the analysis. This is compounded by the fact that the majority of the videos[[51]](#footnote-51) analysed do not use narration, but rely primarily on text on the screen alongside video footage or images. The videos fall roughly into two categories: hunt exposés, and campaign videos. The former rely on shaky, mainly long-distance shots filmed by hunt monitors; the latter are professionally produced and designed to elicit an emotional response from the audience. Three videos fall somewhere in between the two.

For the most part the LACS videos represent the critical-radical discourse, and to a lesser extent liberal-progressivism. The critical-radical discourse has various elements represented, although it cannot be said that the videos wholly represent the discourse; as with Blue Fox the focus is narrow and confined to hunting; there are no generalised claims about the moral status of animals or the farming industry. The key discursive elements present are the critical-radical view that hunting is a sadistic and gratuitous form of cruelty to animals (S22, +5): ‘I don’t understand why that’s fun, for anybody’ (LACS 2015b) and that the authorities are not interested in pursuing illegal hunters (S34, +2). Implicitly, the videos also undermine the claim that hunting is difficult to regulate because it’s hard to tell what goes on (S38, -2) given that they aim to provide evidence of what *is* going on. Emphasis is also placed the way in which the hunted animal dies; this is a concern for the liberal-progressive position (S36, +2). This relates to the proposed amendment of July 2015 – LACS argue in one video titled ‘Shot then slaughtered’ (2015h) that increasing the number of dogs allowed from two also increases the likelihood of excess suffering:

An autopsy showed the fox was shot and wounded shortly before being killed by the hounds, demonstrating that allowing more dogs to flush causes greater suffering for hunted mammals… This poor fox was wounded by one of the hunt's guns but carried on running, only to be torn apart by the hounds (LACS 2015h).

The primary reasoning presented in the videos relates to illegal hunting and the possible consequences of repeal. This emphasis is a departure from the critical-radical discourse position that the fox population does not need to be controlled, as it suggests implicitly that foxes can be controlled by methods other than hunting.

The primary mode of persuasion arguably comes under the ‘exaggeration of moral disagreement’ (Humphrey and Stears 2006). It seeks to emphasise the moral distance between the pro and anti-hunt camps by asking the viewer to choose which side they identify with – there is no in-between. Video evidence of illegal hunting and cruelty is presented to the audience, but leaves the audience to decide for themselves who they agree with:

*In our opinion*, there can only be one explanation: the fox cubs were being kept as a ready supply of animals to be hunted illegally (LACS 2015j)

*We believe* this footage shows hunters flouting the law and committing a terrible act of animal cruelty. *What do you think?* (LACS 2015c)

Does it shock *you* that hunting could become legal again this year? (LACS 2015b; emphasis added in all)

Despite this seemingly open invitation to the audience, the message presented about hunting in the videos is unequivocal: ‘Hunting has never been about pest control or 'wildlife management'. It is a cruel bloodsport pure and simple’ (LACS 2015f). What the video is really asking of the audience is: are you with us or against us? Do you have the compassion to join us in condemning this? There is no middle ground. This is seen most explicitly in a direct message to MPs on protecting the hunting act: ‘Can’t stomach watching this cruelty? Then don’t vote for it!’ This video (which comes with an age restriction imposed by YouTube) follows up the message with a montage of unsettling footage. This tactic is also a form of ‘cost-levying’ (Humphrey and Stears 2006). Cost-levying is an activist method whereby activists seek to impose such heavy costs on carrying out an activity that perpetrators are compelled to cease. Cost-levying ranges from the relatively benign boycotting of a company to violent, criminal activity. Hunt sabbing is a form of cost-levying in that it disrupts hunts to the point where they sometimes have to be abandoned altogether.

Video activism presents a different type of cost-levying; it is not direct action as it does not directly interfere with hunting activity. Rather, I argue it constitutes ‘conscience-levying’ (Parry forthcoming, p16) where the video may impose a psychological or emotional cost on the viewer. Conscience-levying combines elements of cost-levying and the exaggeration of moral disagreement: it emphasises the moral gulf between the pro and anti-camps when it asks people to pick which side they’re on. It also seeks to persuade through imposing emotional cost – if you don’t like it, then don’t support it.

This is not to say that this approach does not play an important role in the deliberative system. In fact, I argue that the use of graphic imagery plays a key role in the political representation of animals. The footage presented in some of the LACS videos is confronting: ‘a dead new born fox cub…an autopsy showed the cub had died of massive trauma consistent with injuries that would have resulted from being bitten by a small dog’ (LACS 2015c). Hunting for the most part takes place in rural areas that are relatively isolated from public arenas. The video footage obtained by hunt monitors is not only evidence – it is representation; it makes visible animal suffering that might otherwise remain hidden (Parry forthcoming, p14). On this basis graphic imagery is justifiable as it enhances inclusivity in the deliberative system. It does not necessarily follow however, that it is effective as a mechanism for transmitting messages through to empowered space and decision-makers. Indeed, that the critical-radical discourse is poorly represented in Parliamentary debates suggests that those who transmit its claims are not succeeding. Critical-radicalism – when it does appear in empowered space – is distorted and caricatured, losing its structural critique and playing into the hands of the class war phantom. It is worth noting that the LACS videos do not indulge in *ad hominem* attacks on the *personality* of those who hunt – or their class status. Yet it is these representations that persist in Westminster. Whilst the videos do make clear their views on hunting as a ‘repugnant and archaic sport’ (LACS 2015g) the focus is on the practice and legal technicalities.

Alongside graphic imagery, several videos rely on emotion work and moral shock. ‘Horror of hunting – celebrity reactions’ (LACS 2015b) shows a range of public figures, individually watching footage of fox hunting. What they are actually watching is only hinted at – occasional flashes through a red screen filter. For the most part viewers see only the corner of a black monitor, with the camera focussed on the celebrities’ reactions. This is a sort of deferred shock tactic – the audience is spared the presumed horror of the footage, but can only imagine what the celebrities are watching. It is in this video that the most profound discursive content is found – uttered by the celebrities themselves:

I think the human beings are actually letting down humanity (Bill Oddie, LACS 2015b).

This is *nothing* to do with the love of animals, *nothing* to do with love of the countryside (Tony Robinson, LACS 2015b; emphasis in original).

This isn't nature. This is an abomination (Colin Baker, LACS 2015b).

These sentiments are highlighted in the video by the screen turning to black and white, and the camera zooming on the speaker’s face as they watch the unseen footage. The above statements are powerful because they articulate the underlying values of anti-hunting discourses: undermining the wildlife management and survival of the fittest arguments and simultaneously embodying emotion and passion. I argue that this combination of emotion work *and* narrative makes this video arguably the most powerful from a deliberative perspective. Footage of illegal hunting and cruelty alone may have the emotional clout but without the articulation of underlying arguments their persuasive potential is lessened. Furthermore, imposing graphic imagery and intense emotion work on an audience has risks: desensitising viewers to images of suffering, or alienating audiences who may be antagonised by controversial moral shock messages (Brown and Quinn-Allan 2015, p1-7). The celebrity video avoids imposing graphic imagery on its audience, and instead allows others to articulate discursive claims.

Perhaps the most controversial video is ‘What if it was you?’ (2015k). It is a classic example of moral shock tactics. A young, redheaded human mother is seen cradling her infant, before becoming alarmed as she hears an approaching commotion. The video sees her place her baby in its crib and flee terrified into woodland, before being run down by an unseen pack of hounds. The film ends with a close up of the woman’s face as her body is tugged and pulled off camera, followed by the baby, alone in the crib, and the words ‘What if it was you?’ The comparison between the fear experienced by humans, and a fox, is a controversial one. The purported difference is also central to pro-hunting discourses which argue that wild animals do not feel fear in the same way that humans or domestic animals do. The problem with this video is that it is so vulnerable to attack from the countryside management position. This pro-hunting discourse, as discussed in chapter five (see section 5.2 and 5.3) emphasises rationality. Relying solely on moral shock and emotion work, as this video does, allows pro-hunting viewpoints to contest it on the basis that it is over-emotional and anthropomorphic; not rooted in rational argument. Ultimately, this ‘detracts from the rationalistic basis of animal rights philosophy’ (Garner 2016, p1; Parry forthcoming, p19). There are plenty of reason-based arguments employed in the liberal-progressive and critical-radical discourses that contest pro-hunting claims; excluding them solely in favour of emotion work does those discourses a disservice.

If we accept that some audiences are less susceptible to visceral disgust than animal activists (Herzog and Golden 2009) and that ‘audiences involved in animal farming and allied industries may be persuaded through a more prominent use of rational message appeals’ (Brown and Quinn-Allan 2015, p4), animal activists may do well to use such tactics with caution and deploy them *alongside* reasoned-argument and discursive claims. LACS do not rely on videos alone in their campaign. My analysis and critique is confined to the 11 videos analysed. Nonetheless, it remains that the critical-radical discourse – which demands the strongest protection for animals – remains marginalised and distorted in empowered space.

## Section 7.5: discussion

My analysis of transmission mechanisms in the hunting debate has implications for the study of transmission in the deliberative system. The most obvious point is that it shows that transmission does not simply occur between public and empowered space. All three mechanisms indicate this. Although Blue Fox appears ostensibly to be the most conventional form of linear transmission, its target audience is the public as well as Tory MPs. Blue Fox uses public opinion polls as a basis for persuading MPs. It encourages the public to contact their MPs about hunting. The same tactic is seen on the LACS website – encouraging members of the public to get in touch with their MPs. Conceptually, this means that both mechanisms transmit messages to the public with the ultimate intention of the public transmitting messages to empowered space. However, this remains a form of mediated transmission as the LACS website provides a template letter (including a link to one of their videos) to send to one’s local MP (LACS 2016d). The Blue Fox website also contains a link to ‘contact your MP’ which redirects to the LACS site. In this way, Blue Fox and LACS constitute what I call ‘feedback loop transmission’. Both organisations target empowered space directly. But they also transmit claims to decision-makers indirectly *through* public space.

The link between the Blue Fox and LACS websites is worth exploring. Although LACS share the same cause as Blue Fox, they clearly transmit their claims in different ways. I argued above that the primarily visual emotion work done by LACS is alone not sufficient to persuade. However, when taken together with the approach taken by Blue Fox, it could be that the anti-hunting discourses are strengthened by combining both deliberative and non-deliberative methods. This is a good example of the division of labour in the deliberative system – LACS videos may help spark public debate and get the issue onto the agenda, whereas Blue Fox focus on persuasion in empowered space.

Both organisations (but primarily LACS) also target public space as an end in itself. The majority of LACS videos end with an appeal to join or donate because ‘investigations and rescues like this are only possible thanks to the generosity and support of people like you’ (2015j). It is important to remember that LACS relies on financial support from the public to support its activities; it is reasonable to assume that its videos are designed to appeal to this target market. If we accept that this is the case, then it also draws into question the deliberative potential of the videos. In the analysis above, I questioned an over-reliance on emotion work and graphic imagery as a persuasive tool. However, if LACS’ primary target audience is not people involved with hunting or decision-makers – but its supporters, this changes things. If, as Herzog and Golden stipulate, animal activists are more susceptible to visceral emotional responses, then using graphic imagery of mangled animals makes perfect sense to incite further support for LACS. Indeed, this puts LACS in the realm of enclave deliberation: using graphic images to cement an audience’s convictions about hunting and strengthen their opposition to it. However, the deliberative benefits of enclave deliberation are inherently finite (Parry forthcoming, p20) because enclaves must at some point open up to contestation and critique in the public sphere. Here, an over-reliance on emotion work is still problematic because it leaves protagonists lacking in the discursive grist to contest pro-hunting discourses that emphasise rationality. Consequently, relying on emotion work to bolster a support base may work on one front – bonding and fundraising – but not in the broader context of the deliberative system *or* effecting change.

Blue Fox also employs feedback loop transmission and relies on public support for its activities. However, it is not a registered charity and does not canvas the public for fundraising purposes. The group is instead ‘run by volunteers…we’ve all got day jobs’ (interview Lorraine Platt). Therefore, although the public ‘are very important’ because ‘the public will press their individual MPs, and MPs will…take note of what their constituents contact them on’ (interview Lorraine Platt), Blue Fox does not rely on them in the same way that LACS do. Instead, Blue Fox seeks to persuade other Tory MPs to join their cause. It is perhaps for this reason that Blue Fox utilises a more deliberative approach, providing a variety of measured arguments against hunting in a respectful and engaging manner. On the one hand, this is fairly strategic: they recognise that demonising Tory colleagues who hunt is not going to invoke sympathy for their cause. On the other, it is highly deliberative: couching arguments in terms that others can accept (see Gutmann and Thompson 1996).

Notably, Blue Fox works with MPs and organisations that it can get along with – rather than the hunting lobby, for example. Their website has a sidebar linking to a number of individuals and organisations who support the cause including IFAW, the RSPCA and LACS. This demonstrates aptly the practical and constructive emphasis of the group and the desire to effect change rather than contributing to already entrenched divisions.

…we come from such different polarising views on this issue…I prefer, as a founder of Blue Fox, to focus all my energies where we can affect change, amongst politicians, and at the moment there isn’t that time to focus on the Countryside Alliance, on the hunting lobby. It’s on the MPs (interview Lorraine Platt).

The Telegraph appears to employ precisely the opposite tactic. In driving home party politics and the class war phantom, its coverage appears to aim at dividing the campaign against hunting. This is its mode of persuasion: if it can convince its readership that anti-hunting people are class warriors and/or Tory bashers, then it potentially divides anti-hunting support. This strategy does not seek accommodation with alternative viewpoints, but seeks to demonise them. It is in fact the same ‘exaggeration of moral disagreement’ that Humphrey and Stears describe and the same tactic used by LACS. Like LACS, the Telegraph also aims to appeal to its readership and support base. One distinction is that the Telegraph (obviously) uses words to present its claims rather than video. However, the most significant difference is that the rhetoric used by the Telegraph is prominent in Westminster debates; unlike LACS. This suggests intuitively that the Telegraph - despite its massive deliberative deficit - is arguably a more successful form of transmission from public to empowered space. However, reflecting on the discussion in chapter six (see sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2) remember that the class war phantom and party politics seen in Westminster are almost entirely absent from the original four discourses covered in chapter four. Yet it is the Westminster version that is reflected in the Telegraph coverage. Consequently, it is unclear exactly which direction the Telegraph is transmitting claims from. One possibility is that the Telegraph is a sort of reverse transmission mechanism – reporting Parliamentary debates from empowered space to public space. But given that its tone is even more adversarial than Westminster, the Telegraph is clearly not an empty vehicle for conducting Parliamentary debate. Rather, it has its own agenda which is woven into coverage of hunting. And clearly someone is listening: chapter six illustrates that politicised rhetoric far outweighs substantive discursive argument in Parliamentary debates on hunting. The relationship between the Telegraph and Westminster in the deliberative system appears to form a ‘reverse cyclical transmission’: polarised messages are passed to and from Westminster and back again; reiterating the same politicised rhetoric *ad infinitum*. This contributes to the paralysed nature of the debate in Westminster where polarisation is so ingrained in the hunting debate that it prevents meaningful dialogue.

It would be naïve to suggest that the Telegraph simply reflects the debate in Westminster. Rather I argue that it indicates the extent of the hunting lobby’s influence in both transmission and empowered space. The Countryside Alliance is quoted or cited in 15 of the 35 articles analysed in the Telegraph. All but one of these references are positive towards the CA, except for one opinion piece which speculates that ‘the CA seem to have lost the plot’ (Page 2015) without providing an explanation. Obversely, Blue Fox director Lorraine Platt feels that *their* campaign is often overlooked by media outlets:

…we feel that the hunting lobby receives a great deal more exposure than we do…and we have very good relationships with the media, we have some journalists who are wonderful and very supportive, but we feel that there’s one or two papers that won’t – even though we send them our releases – won’t publish them, they’ll just publish the hunt lobby so you know…certain papers, their readers, will only hear the pro hunting messages (interview Lorraine Platt).

The above quote suggests that the hunting lobby may have a disproportionate influence in traditional media. Given the prominence of divisive rhetoric in Westminster, this may be the case in empowered space as well. It is certainly the case that a number of MPs and Peers have declared interests in hunting – former or current Hunt Masters or trustees of the CA, for example. However, this is ostensibly the case for plenty of anti-hunting organisations as well. It would be hasty to claim that the hunting lobby are the *only* side with influence in Parliament.

**Conclusions**

My analysis of transmission mechanisms in the hunting debate serves to highlight a number of key points about the deliberative capacity of the system. It is encouraging to see that the liberal-progressive viewpoint is successfully represented in Westminster debates. It is also well represented and transmitted by the Blue Fox group in a relatively deliberative manner. It is possible that the deliberative nature of the transmission mechanism is in part due to the discursive commitments of the discourse itself: analysis in chapter five (section 5.2) showed that the liberal-progressive position is in its nature open to alternative viewpoints and diverse debate. However, the deliberative inclination of Blue Fox is also partly strategic; it recognises that antagonising Tory colleagues is not the best way to pursue its goal. Nonetheless, Blue Fox is unique in that party politics here make a positive contribution to deliberative potential.

The Telegraph, for its part, appears to be a relatively successful transmission mechanism insofar as its rhetoric is represented in Westminster. However, the direction of transmission is murky: it is not clear exactly how transmission is connected to public space in this case. Rather, it seems that the Telegraph is coupled more closely to empowered space than public space. Although it does represent both sporting libertarian and countryside management positions, this is outweighed by references to party politics and class war. Moreover, it is unclear exactly where this kind of rhetoric originates from, if not from public space.

Although elements of the critical-radical discourse are represented sincerely in the LACS videos, I suggest that the videos lack the discursive grist needed to fully represent the anti-hunting discourses. The recourse to emotion work may well be intended if the videos are aimed at LACS supporters. That notwithstanding, this approach still leaves LACS vulnerable to contestation from pro-hunting positions that seek to undermine what they see as anthropomorphism and over-emotionalism.

Finally, the analysis presented here has implications for the way in which we conceptualise transmission in the deliberative system. It seems that none of three mechanisms analysed represent conventional linear transmission. All three have features of enclave deliberation; typically seen amongst marginalised activists yet none of the three fit this bill. Blue Fox and LACS appear to employ ‘feedback loop transmission’: targeting empowered space *through* public space, through mediated but direct transmission. The Telegraph, although technically a form of indirect transmission, appears to be a conduit of the hunting lobby; attempting to divide and discredit its adversaries. These conclusions are tentative; my analysis is limited in given that it is illustrative rather than comprehensive in scope. Nonetheless, it is clear that deliberative scholars need to go beyond a narrow understanding of transmission to be able to evaluate different ways in which claims are transmitted between different sites in the deliberative system: not simply from public to empowered space.

# Chapter Eight: accountability and meta-deliberation

**Introduction**

This chapter explores accountability and meta-deliberation in the hunting debate. These features are primarily sought after in empowered space but may occur at different sites; if a public organisation calls on decision-makers to provide an account of their actions, for example. Both are important indicators of overall deliberative capacity in the system.

Unfortunately the scope for analysis is limited. This is because the Parliamentary debate and vote on amending the Hunting Act in July 2015 were cancelled. Although the time leading up to the debate did spark interest and discussion in both public and empowered space, the debate over amendment would have provided the opportunity certainly for accountability and meta-deliberation. Without this opportunity it is more difficult to discern exactly what to look for. Here I provide a discussion of *moments* of accountability and meta-deliberation in the hunting debate. There are no formal accountability mechanisms to speak of, nor any systemic capacity for meta-deliberation. Both are in short supply.

The chapter proceeds in two main sections. In the first, I examine accountability. I analyse the public accounts given by those in empowered space through Parliamentary debates. I also consider the accounts provided to me either through interview or Freedom of Information requests. The latter, although illuminating for the hunting debate, do not contribute to accountability in the deliberative system because they were not offered publicly, but were only given in response to this research. There are two opportunities to examine accountability. Firstly, accounts relating to the decision to amend the Hunting Act are assessed and found wanting in many respects. Secondly, I examine accounts of why the debate and vote on amendment was cancelled. Whilst this account is clearer, it comes only as a result of interview material and was not articulated publicly by the government. In the second section I turn to meta-deliberation. Meta-deliberation and accountability should be interdependent in the deliberative system; if accountability is lacking, a healthy deliberative system will reflect on this weakness and attempt to self-correct (Pickering 2016, p9). Therefore, one would hope to see reflections on the lack of accountability in the hunting debate. Unfortunately this is not the case. Meta-deliberation does occur at the individual level, with several research participants reflecting on the state and terms of the debate. However, these reflections do not emphasise accountability but rather focus on imagining the possibility of a more constructive debate. Despite these moments of meta-deliberation, there is no indication that this takes place at the systemic level, nor does it lead to self-correction.

## Section 8.1: accountability

Traditional notions of accountability are often closely related to the classic accounts of representation discussed briefly in chapter two (section 2.2). In the standard principal-agent relationship, the agent can be held accountable for their actions, and sanctioned accordingly through removal from office, and so on (Mansbridge 2009, p384). However, to be held accountable means ‘quite literally, having to give an account’ (Dryzek and Stevenson 2011, p1867). This is in line with the ‘narrative accountability’ outlined by Mansbridge (2009): one-way communication through which ‘representatives can relatively easily explain changes in policy by new facts and circumstances, but changes in principles throw doubt on the consistency of their characters’ (2009, p384-5). In this chapter I take the above definition of accountability. There are two practical reasons for this approach. Firstly, the hunting debate, though salient in 2015, has been dormant for several years in terms of actual legislation. Amendments were only proposed from 2010 onwards, with no amendments getting to the point of a formal Commons debate. This means that there are no opportunities to examine accountability mechanisms arising from attempts to legislate. The second reason for seeking narrative accountability is the UK political system in which the debate is embedded. In the Westminster system, the government is accountable to Members of Parliament, who are directly elected by the voting public. Therefore, the executive is not directly accountable to public space because constituents rely on their representatives to hold government to account. For this reason, it is more practicable to examine Parliamentary debates where MPs call on the government for an account of their actions than to follow exactly Stevenson and Dryzek’s (2014, p1867) conceptualisation of empowered space giving an account to public space. This is because in the Westminster system, the government is not directly accountable to the citizenry. Members of Parliament are, but the executive is not (Kumarasingham 2013, p580).

It is also worth noting that the Westminster system does not lend itself well to accountability. Power is both concentrated and centralised in the executive and not shared with the legislature (Lijphart 1999). This can be broadly contrasted with an American-style system that formally incorporates a comprehensive system of checks and balances that limit executive power. There is the possibility of accountability occurring through Parliamentary select committees, where MPs from across parties sit to examine policy areas in depth. Select committees are also held in the Upper House. The role of select committees is to examine the work of each government department. Although select committees do not have sanctioning power, reports from select committees do require a government response of some sort (Gov.uk 2016). Furthermore, work undertaken by select committees such as inquiries, reviewing legislation and considering emerging issues (Hendriks 2015, p48) is conducive to accountability.

There are two possible avenues to examine accountability in the hunting debate. The first are formal accountability mechanisms. This includes select committees, DEFRA announcements or press releases and Freedom of Information (FOI) releases. The second option for examining accountability is to look for instances in Parliamentary debates where MPs call on government representatives to give an account of their actions.

I focus my analysis around two key decision moments in 2015. Firstly, the decision to amend the Hunting Act 2004. Unfortunately the opportunity for an open debate on the proposed amendment was lost when the government cancelled the debate at the last minute,[[52]](#footnote-52) meaning that material for analysis is limited. I then examine the explanations offered by empowered space for the abrupt cancellation of the debate on amendment. This is much easier to discern, although the majority of accounts are offered by interviewees and not publicly in Parliamentary debates, limiting the contribution to systemic capacity.

### Section 8.1.1: the decision to amend

The relevant select committee for hunting policy, Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (EFRA), did not formally discuss hunting policy during 2015 or indeed for several years.[[53]](#footnote-53) The DEFRA website provides a brief explanation for the proposed amendment:

A small number of technical amendments to the Hunting Act have been proposed to more closely align legislation in England and Wales with that in Scotland, while maintaining safeguards.

The amendments to the Act would enable farmers and gamekeepers to make a judgement, based on the terrain and other circumstances, to use more than two dogs to flush out and stalk wild animals for effective and humane shooting as part of the existing exemption in the Act that allows for pest control.

This is important in upland areas where the current limit of using two dogs across large and often wooded areas is not regarded as effective or practical for pest control purposes. There is no limit on the number of dogs that can be used to flush out or stalk an animal in this way in Scotland.

The Hunting Act will remain in place and will still prohibit the pursuit and killing of a wild animal by dogs (DEFRA 2015).

This account suggests that the use of only two dogs to flush foxes from coverts is ineffective in upland areas. It is reasonable to then look for possible accounts that have informed this position. From the insight of some interviewees, it appears that DEFRA’s position was informed by a paper published by the Federation of Welsh Farmers’ Packs (FWFP) on the efficacy of flushing foxes to guns using two or more dogs (Naylor and Knott n.d.). I make no attempt here to evaluate the quality of this paper or its findings. However, it is the case that some actors in Westminster doubted the veracity of the findings and consequently the suitability of basing legislation on it. As one Parliamentarian noted:

…the upland Welsh farming thing on which the amendment is based – hasn’t been peer reviewed… so when they laid the amendment in July, DEFRA ministers knew that they were ordering the peer review of the research, whilst at the same time laying an amendment on which the research was based, before the peer review was complete. Which is totally, totally immoral. Especially given that we knew from Freedom of Information that DEFRA officials were not satisfied that the research was sound….so, I mean…research like that should be peer-reviewed… (HC3 interview)

The FOI release mentioned by the interviewee above is correspondence from DEFRA officials to the then-DEFRA Secretary Owen Paterson. The correspondence - dated October 2013 - details the background surrounding the debate of using two or more dogs to flush, followed by an ‘initial assessment’ of the methodology and results of the Naylor and Knott paper. It concludes that

Until a process of independent peer review has reached a satisfactory conclusion it would be premature for this report to be regarded as an evidence-based justification for a review of current policy (DEFRA 2013; underlined in original).

In May 2016 I submitted an FOI request asking for an account of the peer review process and the extent to which the proposed amendment was based on the paper. DEFRA provided a partial response in August 2016 which disclosed that the department requested peer review in March/April 2014. Reviews were ‘undertaken by three UK based University professors to provide Defra with an independent assessment of the flushing with foxes paper…The results of the reviews were provided for Defra’s own purposes’ (DEFRA 2016). The results of the peer review were withheld from disclosure, as was all correspondence relating to the process.[[54]](#footnote-54) The date that the peer review was completed was not provided. The provision of the Freedom of Information Act is extremely important in terms of the systemic capacity of accountability given that is an established legal mechanism by which anybody can call on empowered space to provide an account of its actions. However, it is reliant on motivated citizens to pursue this route of accountability. In addition, as in my case, the response is not guaranteed to be a full account. We can think of the August 2016 FOI release as both a weak and incomplete form of accountability. It is incomplete given that it did not provide a full account, and weak given that it is an account that is not readily available to the public – it must be sought out. Thus FOI will always be a weak form of accountability, but can vary in terms of how comprehensive an account it provides.

There are some inconsistencies in the account given by DEFRA, which are illuminated by a meeting of the All-Party Group for Animal Welfare (APGAW) held in September 2015. APGAW is a group of MPs and Peers from across the parties who aim ‘to promote and further the cause of animal welfare by all means available to the Parliaments at Westminster and in Europe’ (APGAW 2015). APGAW is not a select committee and is not empowered to make decisions, nor does it hold any sanctioning power. Nonetheless, the minutes of the meeting do highlight inconsistencies in the account given in the August 2016 FOI release. Given the lack of activity in formal accountability mechanisms, the APGAW meeting is important in bringing together key actors from public space and MPs. Furthermore, part of the discussion focuses on the proposed amendments to the Hunting Act. APGAW thus does present an opportunity for accounts to be provided by empowered space to public space as outlined above. In addition to this, the September meeting draws attention to what appear to be inconsistencies in the account provided by DEFRA. Although meetings are not open to the general public, AGPAW has an extensive range of associate members, the majority of whom are organisations in public space. This includes key organisations in the hunting debate including the Countryside Alliance, RSPCA and LACS. Representatives from these organisations and other key actors including Lorraine Platt, along with MPs and Peers, were present.

During the meeting, APGAW members presented three questions to a panel which included Jim Barrington (Countryside Alliance Consultant), Toni Shephard (then director of research at LACS), David Bowles (RSPCA) and notably, one of the authors of the flushing paper, Jeremy Naylor. The debate appears to have been conducted in a reasoned and relatively respectful manner, judging by the formal minutes. The second question asked of the panel relates to the proposed amendments and there was a brief discussion over the peer review of the paper. Several statements appear to contradict the account given by DEFRA that the flushing paper had been independently peer reviewed at this point. One would assume that, since the peer review was requested in March/April 2014, that by September 2015 the results of the review would be known, at the very least by the author of the paper. However, this does not appear to be the case:

I look forward to Dr Naylor’s research on this subject being peer reviewed and published and I know the Defra civil servants had concerns about it and did not feel it proved the case. If the case has not been proved why should you amend the legislations [sic]? (David Bowles, RSPCA).

The statistical analysis has been looked at independently and it has been put in for peer review and the answers are clear-cut. I think that information will inform the debate and once it is peer review [sic] it will strengthen the case (Jeremy Naylor).

I believe it is right to say that the study Dr Naylor referred to was seriously questioned by civil servants in 2013 and was not peer reviewed (Angela Smith MP).

The study that we undertook was reviewed by certain scientists and the civil servants did review it but frankly some of the questions they asked were totally irrelevant to the study…That study has now been submitted for independent peer review (Jeremy Naylor).

If we take DEFRA’s account to be true, then the results of the peer review must have come through at some point after September 2015 and before August 2016 when the response was given to my FOI request. This suggests that the proposed amendments to the Hunting Act tabled in July 2015 were put forward before the peer review had come in. There is an additional caveat; two interviewees in November 2015 and January 2016 mentioned that the paper had not been subject to peer review. This gives the peer review process a possible time lag of more than two years. The other possibility is that the results of the peer review were delivered to DEFRA in a timely manner, but were not made available to the public, campaign organisations, Parliament or the authors of the paper. Even if this is the case it still surmounts to a worrying lack of accountability. DEFRA’s account maintains that the amendments were ‘not a response to any specific piece of work’ (DEFRA 2016).

Given the murkiness surrounding this issue, it is safe to say that the government’s decision to table the amendments suffers from a dearth of accountability and transparency. The accounts that have been provided by DEFRA through FOIs do not provide an adequate account of the process surrounding the flushing paper. Furthermore, the account has not been offered but only partially provided after being requested. DEFRA claims that the amendments were not based on a single piece of work and this cannot be proven otherwise. However, this does not account for the attention that the paper received: from DEFRA civil servants in 2013, or various actors in public and empowered space who are considered experts or advocates in the hunting debate. Furthermore, there is no mention in either the APGAW meeting, FOI releases or by interviewees of any other research or evidence that might have informed the amendments.

It is certainly the case that because the debate and vote on amendment was cancelled, an opportunity for accountability was lost. The remaining avenues for accountability are sparse and upon examination provide an inconsistent and opaque account of the decision-making. This is surprising given the level of public interest in the issue and the attention given to the proposed amendment around July 2015. However, it is less surprising if we take into account the broader political system that this deliberative system sits within: Westminster is not designed to enable direct accountability between the electorate and the executive. This could explain why DEFRA is unable to provide a clear account of the decision-making process behind the amendment – they are not accustomed to having to provide such an account.

### Section 8.1.2: the decision to postpone

Accounts of why the government decided to postpone are more liberally deployed. Debates in Westminster contain a bevy of demands and explanations to account for the last minute decision. This content is also related to the decision to amend in the first place; anti-hunting MPs call the proposed amendments an ‘attempt to wreck the Hunting Act’ (Angela Eagle, HC Deb 9 July, vol598 c452) and call on the government to account for the amendment as well as the cancellation. Unfortunately the government is less than forthcoming on both accounts.

At the beginning of the week commencing 9th July, MPs took the opportunity to ask the Leader of the House[[55]](#footnote-55) Chris Grayling about the decision to amend the Hunting Act. Attention is focussed on the nature of the proposed amendment rather than substantive justification of it. The amendments, though subject to a debate and vote in the Commons, were proposed under a Statutory Instrument as the government maintained that the amendments were small changes to the Hunting Act 2004. Anti-hunting advocates however, argued that lifting the threshold on the number of dogs allowed was tantamount to wrecking the Act. Arguably, increasing the number of dogs allowed to flush from two to a pack increases the likelihood that the pack will kill the fox as they are harder to control.

The proposed debate was due to take place on 15th July. Prior to this, some MPs called on the government to account for this:

Why will the Leader of the House not allow more than 90 minutes for the debate? Will he confirm that it is indeed the Government’s intention to wreck the Hunting Act using this back-door device because they do not have the majority to repeal the Act itself or the guts to try? (Angela Eagle HC Deb 9 July, vol598 c452).

The government’s account was consistent at least: the proposed amendments were ‘a simple reform’ in response to ‘representations of uplands farmers’ (Chris Grayling, HC Deb 9 July, vol598 c452-3). The Minister does not provide a detailed account of the reasoning behind the amendment but this seems reasonable given that at the time, a 90 minute debate was scheduled on the topic for later that week. Nonetheless, during the 9th July debate there were further demands for explanation:

*David Winnick, Labour:*

Millions of people will lose out as a result of the Budget, but, regarding other business next week, is the Leader of the House aware that despite all his denials, there will be a dishonest attempt to legalise foxhunting? A 90-minute debate is totally unacceptable and will be viewed with contempt by millions of people in the country who detest the very idea of foxhunting being brought back?

*Chris Grayling:*

The hon. Gentleman will have the chance in that debate to make his point. I simply reiterate what I said earlier: this measure does not overturn the ban on hunting with dogs (HC Deb 9 July, vol598 c462-3).

As the week went on and the debate was cancelled at the last minute, the focus of discussion shifted to the reasons why it was pulled. Here the hunting issue became embroiled with EVEL, which was also debated on 15th July. Several MPs speculated that the hunting vote was cancelled because the SNP announced it would vote against the government. This was perceived as a guarantee that the government would lose the vote and the amendments to the Hunting Act would not pass. Concomitantly, critics conjectured that the debate was postponed so the government could get EVEL through first and hold a later vote that the SNP could be excluded from. At several other HC debates that week including EVEL, MPs called on the government to explain its actions:

*David Hanson, Labour:*

The Leader of the House tabled the hunting vote to take place tomorrow before the final decision on English votes for English laws. Will he give a commitment that in future the hunting vote will come before a resolution on EVEL?

*Chris Grayling:*

I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman reads our proposals more carefully, which he clearly has not done. If he does, he will realise that there is no connection between the two (HC Deb 14 July, vol598 c748).

Several similar exchanges took place between the Minister and opposition MPs throughout the week. The government response was invariably a reiteration that the hunting amendments were not related to EVEL, and that the amendments would not have repealed the Hunting Act. Nonetheless, the accounts given are perfunctory. Again, had the amendment debate taken place the situation may have been different. In some sense, by cancelling it the government withdrew the possibility of accountability; pro- and anti-hunting MPs alike were denied the possibility of providing and calling for an account.

The reasoning behind the cancelling the amendment vote is relatively simple, but it reveals something much more concerning from a deliberative perspective. In interview I asked MPs and Peers to reflect on the July events and account for what happened. Invariably, I heard the same response:

I can tell you exactly why it was postponed; it was because the government couldn’t win it…there’s no point in having votes you can’t win (interview HL1).

…they couldn’t get the vote through the House of Commons (interview HL2).

…they had really no chance of gaining a majority, so they limped away and that was the end of it… (interview HC4).

The reason why the government could not win the vote varied, with some interviewees squarely placing the blame on the SNP’s involvement. Others remained optimistic that the government may have still lost given the number of anti-hunting Conservative MPs: ‘they said it was all the fault of those pesky SNP, and clearly that was a block vote that was significant, but the numbers have changed since we last looked at hunting…and the government they sought a way to caricature it in the public sphere’ (interview HL2). Whoever is perceived as culpable, it comes down to the same conclusion: it all comes down to the vote, and voting is a numbers game.

The significance of numbers was highlighted further in interview. Interviewees discussed the importance of numbers in any future votes and calculated what could happen:

…we reckon there’s probably about 30 Conservatives who would now vote against, so….if you add that up, on the assumption that virtually all, although not quite all of the Labour Party would vote to retain the Act as it is… (interview HC5).

...it wouldn’t take much I mean…if the Conservatives won in 2020, boundary changes, which will lend itself to an advantage for the Tories, the SNP may have dropped their strange position on hunting by then…so actually a 10% improvement for us, a 10% movement for Labour, and a neutralisation of the SNP and the job’s done. The job’s done. You don’t need to convert a lot of people, you only need to convert relatively few. Or neutralise (interview HC2).

The preoccupation with numbers is worrying from a deliberative perspective because it highlights the importance of preference aggregation in Westminster. Effort is thus focussed on trying to persuade MPs to join either ‘side’ of the hunting debate. The aim is winning over enough people to win the argument based on the aggregation of preferences; it is entirely strategic. This is unavoidable in a sense due to the way in which Westminster operates: bills are voted on. However, it also means there is no motivation to reach a collective decision through deliberation or any other means. Ultimately, it will still come down to a vote. Voting *per se* is not necessarily incompatible with deliberative democracy and many deliberative mini-publics use voting of some form. However, in a deliberative forum, voting is preceded by collective and constructive deliberation. The same cannot be said for the hunting debate in Westminster, judging by my analysis of empowered space. Even if this had been the case, one interviewee suggested that ‘in here there seems to be a bit of reasoned argument followed by a tribal vote…they’re not prepared to take a principled stand’ (interview HC2). According to this account, a more deliberative debate around hunting would have no impact on the outcome. Another interviewee discussed how well-researched and well-informed backbench speeches often are, but noted that ‘one of the least effective things is debates in Parliament …the backbench debates…they’re too long for soundbites’ (interview HC4). Both these accounts give a rather depressing account of the deliberative health of Parliamentary debates in general, beyond hunting.

The majority of my FOI request to DEFRA was denied under the aforementioned exemptions. It is possible that the information that was not disclosed contains a satisfactory account of the decision that informed the proposed amendment. The issue of publicity in deliberation is contested within deliberative democracy. Chambers has argued that publicity can reduce deliberative quality and result in poor and shallow reasoning (2004, p389). This may well have been what is observed in the hunting debate in Westminster; ‘speakers still appeal to what they think are common or public values but with a twist: under the “glare” of publicity these arguments may become shallow, poorly reasoned, or appeal to the worst that we have in common’ (Chambers 2004, p393). However, democratic accountability requires that those in empowered space provide (at the very least) an account of their actions to public space. As Chambers goes on to say,

A legitimate political order is one that could be justified to all those living under its laws. It is not simple consent that contains the moment of legitimacy but rather a process of accountability in which citizens have objections answered and hear and evaluate the reasons (2004, p394).

Even if we abandon hope of two-way deliberative accountability, it is clear that in the case of hunting, even narrative accountability is lacking. The government seems unable to provide an account for the proposed amendments or the decision-making process behind them. The lack of accountability regarding amendment is symptomatic of wider accountability issues in Westminster. However, empowered space must share some of the blame with key actors in public space for accountability in the hunting debate. The majority of accounts outlined here were elicited through my own research – interviews, close reading of the APGAW meeting and the FOI request. Without this research, an even more patchy account of the decision to amend would exist. This raises questions regarding the responsibility of organisations such as LACS and the RSPCA to push the government to provide accounts. From the minutes of the APGAW meeting and from interviews, it appears to be the case that these public space actors were aware of concerns regarding the flushing paper. However, there is no *public* record of these actors pressing the government over this issue. The analysis provided here is limited to narrative accountability, which is primarily a one-way process where empowered space explains itself. However, this case highlights the need for deliberative accountability (Mansbridge 2009), where accountability comprises exchanges between actors in public and empowered space. In the absence of formal accountability mechanisms, there is certainly a need for public space actors to call on empowered space to provide an account when it is not automatically forthcoming.

## Section 8.2: meta-deliberation

Meta-deliberation is the capacity of a deliberative system to reflect on itself and, if necessary, self-correct (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, p29). The term was originally coined by Thompson (2008, p515) to describe how deliberative scholars ought to deliberate over the terms and outcomes of deliberation. In this case, meta-deliberation will not be about the practice of hunting but should focus on the terms and state of the hunting debate. It is not a component or a mechanism; signs of meta-deliberation may be observed at any point in the system. In this section, I look for indications of meta-deliberation from interviews carried out in both public and empowered space. Meta-deliberation requires reflexivity, but that alone is not sufficient; ‘a specific kind of reflexivity is required…the ability of any process to deliberate on its own deliberative shortcomings, and correct them’ (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, p210). Thus, there are two related components that we can look for as a sign of meta-deliberation. The first is reflexivity, not about hunting itself but the ability to reflect on the terms and nature of the hunting *debate*. Secondly, we can look for signs that the system at least attempts to self-correct. As with accountability, the decision to amend the Hunting Act would have provided an apt moment for meta-deliberation to occur. However, it is possible to look for moments of reflexivity and self-correction in public and empowered space without this decision. My analysis finds that despite significant individual reflection on the debate, this does not translate to anything approaching systemic meta-deliberation. The existence of meta-deliberation at the individual level demonstrates the constraining effect that the UK political system has on deliberative capacity.

### Section 8.2.1: reflecting on the debate

Reflexivity takes different forms. In chapter five (section 5.3) I outlined moments of reflexivity amongst individuals in public space. Interviewees during the Q study also shared their reflections on the hunting debate itself. Their thoughts indicate a sort of meta-deliberation: reflecting on the state of the debate and the possibilities for reforming it.

The most prominent reflection expressed by interviewees is the acknowledgement of polarisation in the hunting debate. People from all sides of the debate discussed this, and saw it as one of the main barriers to any progress on the issue:

I think people that are polar opposites of things, can get very stuck on, they can’t change their opinions, because they think they shouldn’t change their opinions. Because they think “I’m anti-hunting” “I’m pro hunting” and “I can’t see your point of view, because if I do that’s a weakness to what I believe” (interview P19).

…there are people at both end of the extreme…you’ve got people at either end, and they’re never gonna be persuaded by argument…I think it’s ingrown… (interview P28).

The biggest problem with animal rights is you get two wildly opposing camps which are not particularly representative of wider society...I get that people are against hunting, but I don't get that it's one of the most important political issues, and I don't get pro-hunting people at all (interview P2).

Whereas the majority of interviewees saw polarisation as a barrier to a constructive debate, there was no consensus on the implications of this. For some, ‘there is a binary, and quite a precise division in principle between whether you should or shouldn't’ (interview P12). According to this account, a more deliberative debate is highly unlikely. ‘In practice people lose their temper’ (interview P28) because

There are such strong, embedded opinions on both sides, and you are trying to overcome something that's been embedded in the rural life for a long time, and peoples' ways of life, and challenging that is always going to be difficult...rational debate often goes out the window, when you're in those sorts of circumstances...it's the same when you bring the two sides together in any dispute - there are going to be passions that run high, and deeply felt issues and experiences that are going to be very hard for people to put to one side and enter into a rational debate, sadly...humans beings are like that, sadly (interview P3).

Whilst some people saw this as inevitable and ‘an almost immovable object’ (interview HC2), others were more optimistic for the possibility of a more deliberative debate. Many interviewees talked about holding discussions with a ‘middle ground’ of people who don’t have strong feelings about the issue. In this case,

…the way to do it is to bring everyone involved, in those disputes around the table, again that probably wouldn't work because some people are very very extreme, and will never ever see their opposition’s point of view, what you do, is what actually, John Major and Tony Blair did in Northern Ireland, and that is carve out a middle ground. So you have people of different views, but reasonable. Holding a middle ground, and you leave extremists on the extreme (interview P33)

One former hunt master (P6) felt that there must be some aspect of the debate that all sides could converge upon. He felt strongly that hunting was about conservation, and that this could be a goal that both pro- and anti-hunting advocates would be in favour of. Again, Northern Ireland was referred to as a seemingly intractable conflict where some agreement had been reached. Another, anti-hunting interviewee also considered that ‘if you can identify those areas where there is already agreement where people didn't expect there to be any agreement, then you've got quite a good opportunity to then talk about the things where there might not be so much agreement’ (interview P31). However, appealing to a middle ground was seen by some as a move towards having some sort of regulated hunting – especially by interviewees in empowered space. Some anti-hunting advocates were sceptical about the possibility for finding that middle ground ‘because positions became so entrenched, last time round, all those years ago’ (interview HL2). This scepticism is partly associated with the Middle Way Group, a former all-party Parliamentary group that advocated regulated hunting (see section 6.4). Despite scepticism on all sides, several interviewees made constructive suggestions about what a more deliberative hunting debate might look like.

### Section 8.2.2: imagining deliberation

Throughout this research I was struck by the extent to which many participants imagined the possibility of a more deliberative debate around hunting. Although this only occurred at an individual level, it does demonstrate the desire for a more constructive debate. In doing so, several interviewees described deliberative conditions and principles (see section 5.3). This was in response to an interview question that asked participants if they could envisage different sides on the hunting debate sitting down together and having a ‘decent conversation’. It was left open to interviewees how to interpret ‘decent’.

I think it's very important that proper debate happens and that you do it in a just and fair manner as well I think that people that shouldn't necessarily be judged based on stereotypes...there is a lot wrong with various different viewpoints but we should at least come at them like everyone has something valuable to say, and unless we do that I don't think we can have a proper debate about it (interview P4).

Well, if you're going to debate anything, you need to know both sides of the story...whether it's the class system in hunting, or your hounds, or how you're conducting your day out, in order to have a balanced view, you need to know left, right, middle, and make your own educated judgement I guess really (interview P7).

I think there's certainly a perception that decisions are being made in London all by city people that are affecting the countryside and that country people aren't having a say....it would be very interesting to have a more localised debate and see what local people did think because you never really know whether it's the pro hunting lobby pulling that card out, or not - I honestly don't know (interview P5).

I would respect if someone sat down with me, a hunt person, and said "well listen, these are my thoughts, and reasoned thoughts, and these are the reasons why I go hunting" and you said "right, OK" and had a reasoned debate...rather than these polarised thoughts...I think it's far better and conducive to good, to progression, is to have these sort of, considered thoughts, considered debates (P30).

The above quotes indicate that there could be appetite for a more constructive, reasoned debate on hunting. However, despite imagining deliberation, most interviewees who made these suggestions were also resigned to the belief that ‘there'd be no rational unemotional debate will [sic] there, from an MP down to whoever you want to talk to really’ (P7) and that holding such a conversation would be ‘extremely difficult’ (P30). One participant speculated that this could be more feasible ‘if everyone was sort of prepped and you know you've got to keep your emotions out of it... I think if it was chaired and facilitated properly, then that would help’ (P16). The latter suggestion resembles something approaching a deliberative forum, where participants could be briefed with all the relevant viewpoints and discussion would be facilitated. This is particularly noteworthy given that during interview, I did not explain the format of a standard deliberative mini-public.

The majority of deliberative-type suggestions originate from individuals in public space. For its part, empowered space actors muster less enthusiasm to revisit the issue: ‘I think they’ve got an acceptable solution, personally. And the fact that the hunts are still functioning, that ought to be, from my point of view, acceptable to the majority’ (interview HC1). For some, there is no appetite in Westminster to return to the hunting debate because

Whatever anybody’s view of the Hunting Act, and it is a fairly ramshackle piece of legislation to be honest, it sort of worked. It’s upset everybody but nobody too much; it’s done a significant chunk of what it set out to do, although not all of it. We’ve spent hours and hours and hours of Parliamentary time, over the years on it, and I think there’s no appetite whatsoever, no real appetite to do it again (interview HC5).

Several interviewees in empowered space discussed other issues facing the country, including other animal issues - particularly intensive farming - that they believed deserve political attention much more urgently than hunting. This point was picked up in public space as well, who expressed frustration that hunting had come back into the limelight soon after the election:

…why is this a political issue? I mean, we have just had – for better or for worse – the return of a Tory government which, out of all the things we could possible talk about in the first few weeks, even if it’s the more controversial stuff like, benefit reduction or corporation tax or this or that – one of the top ones is fox hunting. And it’s like, *really*? (interview P18; emphasis in original)

Should it be a priority for a government that's got loads of other things to do, should it be part of a modern, political party going forward? Those things haven't gone away but ironically, because it is a very totemic issue…it has much more volume and airspace than it really deserves at all (interview P14).

Notably the sentiment that we should all just leave it and move on is mostly expressed by anti-hunting advocates; not surprising given that ostensibly, hunting with dogs is banned. Despite this sentiment in both public and empowered space, there remains the expectation that the hunting issue has not yet been put to bed.

It was a manifesto commitment for this government, and the government’s already made clear on a number of other – what might be regarded by others as unpalatable issues – that if it’s a manifesto commitment, they will deliver on it. So, I’m sure that they will reflect on their failure and think about how to bring this forward, in the remaining four years of this term (interview HL2).

There is little indication as to what form the issue might take as and when it returns to Parliament; some speculated that ‘the amendment is dead’ (interview HC3) because ‘there’s not much point in re-running the whole thing again and hoping for different outcomes. I think something has to change in the meantime’ (interview HC2). One interviewee had given a good deal of consideration to how the debate should be framed by Labour in Westminster:

I am worried about the return of the debate. If it happens while the Labour Party is in the position it’s in at the moment. Only because, despite the overwhelming public support for keeping the Hunting Act in place…if we get the tone of our response to any government initiative wrong… we may lose key Conservative votes… that was the other big reason for not playing the class card, because we knew we needed every single Tory vote we could get, so… not only is it wrong to play the class card, because it’s about animals not social class, it’s also very stupid. So yeah, we’ll have to wait and see. And let’s hope it doesn’t come back (interview HC3).

This could be seen as a sign of meta-deliberation – it is certainly reflecting on the terms of the debate – but it is also a highly strategic approach which prioritises how best to frame the debate in order to win a future vote. This reflects the pervasive emphasis on numbers discussed earlier (section 8.1.2). Nonetheless, it is an attempt to move the hunting debate away from the party political and class warfare rhetoric seen in Parliament, and is commendable on those grounds.

### Section 8.2.3: systemic meta-deliberation?

Moments of meta-deliberation can be found in the hunting debate. The above discussion indicates that individuals do reflect on the state of the debate and are aware of the restraints and barriers that frame it. In particular, they are acutely aware of the level of entrenchment and polarisation at play. Whilst some remain optimistic about holding a reasonable debate with a middle ground of less extreme people, many are sceptical about this happening in reality. Moreover, many perceive hunting to be a binary issue: you either agree with it or you don’t. For these people, it is unclear how re-structuring the debate would change the possible outcome. Despite pervasive cynicism, several interviewees in public space imagined deliberation through describing an idealised debate on hunting which would be reasoned, respectful and facilitated. In reality however, the same people acknowledged that this was unlikely to occur.

One possibility for taking the debate forward is to pursue meta-consensus. Meta-consensus is agreement on the nature of the issue, even if disagreement over preferred outcomes remains (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, p500). In the case of the hunting debate however, first-order disagreement over hunting persists (see section 5.2); the debate is not only over how the fox population should be controlled but also whether it needs controlling in the first place. This makes meta-consensus unlikely because interlocutors are divided over whether it is a wildlife management, animal welfare or a rights issue (that is, the right to hunt as recreation or otherwise). To elaborate further – the two pro-hunting perspectives agree that the fox population needs to be controlled. However, proponents of liberal-progressivism are somewhat divided on this and the critical-radical discourse rejects it altogether, meaning that first-order disagreement is maintained. If protagonists could agree on this aspect of the debate, there would be a possibility for meta-consensus because the question would be about the most appropriate and humane method of controlling foxes. However, as long as people disagree over whether the population needs to be controlled at all, there is no chance of meta-consensus because interlocutors do not agree on the nature of the problem to be solved. Similarly, the critical-radical discourse takes an anti-agriculture stance: in response to the Q-statement ‘farmers have a duty to protect their livestock’ (S1), some proponents responded that ‘farmers don’t have a duty to keep livestock in the first place’ (P16). This makes productive discussion over *how* farmers protect livestock unlikely. As such there is no consensus across the four perspectives on the terms of the hunting debate; it is not simply a question of *how* humane the hunting method but a fundamental disagreement over *what* the issue is in the first place.

Unfortunately, although meta-deliberation does appear at an individual level this does not scale up to anything resembling systemic or organised reflexivity that might lead to self-correction. Stevenson and Dryzek observe something similar in their analysis of global climate change negotiations. Whilst individuals involved in the process are well aware of the problems in the decision-making process and the need to improve, ‘such human capacity does not necessarily scale up to an institutional capacity’ (2014, p210). This indicates that the lack of systemic meta-deliberation is not necessarily down to human failings. Indeed, individual reflexivity and the desire for a more deliberative debate were present in public space. However, the debate in empowered space is constrained by the broader political system on two fronts: a lack of executive accountability and the adversarial nature of the Commons.

**Conclusions**

Both accountability and meta-deliberation are in short supply in the hunting debate. Again, it is possible that the debate on amendment might have changed this somewhat, but this is just speculation. It is perhaps unsurprising that meta-deliberation does not exist at the system level, given the length of time the debate has dragged on for and the entailing entrenchment of views. Despite this, there is evidence of reflexivity at the individual level and those involved in the hunting debate are acutely aware of its shortcomings.

There is very little evidence of even a minimal form of narrative accountability in the hunting debate. DEFRA and government representatives appear to be unable to provide a clear account of the decision to amend the Hunting Act. Moreover, calls for an account from other MPs were primarily met by deflections in Parliament. There is no opportunity for public space to hold empowered space to account for its actions on hunting policy. Although, as was shown in chapter six, attention in Parliament was drawn to the proposed amendment, there seems to have been little attention given to the dubious process which seems to have informed the decision to amend in the first place. It seems bizarre given the controversy surrounding hunting that the EFRA select committee have not been able to discuss the amendment. The closest thing to accountability came in the form of the APGAW meeting which discussed the amendments and included key actors from public and empowered space. The lack of accountability must be considered in context; it is symptomatic not necessarily of the hunting debate but of the broader set-up in Westminster where the executive is not directly accountable to the electorate and where power is highly centralised.

It is surprising that the lack of accountability is not more widely considered by actors in public and empowered space. We can reasonably expect that the broader lack of accountability in the debate might be a key concern of meta-deliberation. However, reflections on the debate focus more on the extent of polarisation and entrenchment rather than the broader context. This could be indicative of a lack of reflexivity on a deeper level beyond the hunting debate: the deliberative system does not seem to reflect on the relevance of the political context in which it sits. This level of reflexivity, for want of a better phrase, could be termed a kind of meta-meta-deliberation. This is a significant shortcoming given that in reality, several features of Westminster politics further stymie the debate from progressing. The adversarial nature of the Commons contributes to the perpetuation of tit-for-tat politics, whilst the reliance on winning majority votes incentivises Parliamentarians to manoeuvre strategically when considering the issue at stake. Furthermore, the government’s stranglehold on power successfully avoids accountability.

There is a potential role here for key actors in public space; they could heighten pressure on the government to be accountable for decisions such as amendment. However, there is significant risk in doing this – it increases the likelihood of animal protection organisations being accused of being too political – an accusation that the RSPCA has suffered from in recent years due to their pursuance of hunting prosecutions. Such accusations are often proffered by the Countryside Alliance via the right-wing press[[56]](#footnote-56) and aim to reinforce the perceived binary between animal welfare and animal rights. As one Guardian columnist aptly points out, ‘if you can leave a bad impression of your opponents on people who aren’t concentrating, this will cause them more reputational damage than you will suffer yourself from the opprobrium of those who are paying attention’ (Williams 2015).

In the following chapter, I draw conclusions together on the overall systemic capacity of the hunting debate. Here I draw on the analyses from all components of the deliberative system, as well as taking into consideration the significance of the broader Westminster context discussed in this chapter.

# Chapter Nine: conclusions

**Introduction**

The deliberative system is evaluated according to the systemic criteria of inclusivity, authenticity and consequentiality (Dryzek 2009). In this chapter I draw on the findings and analysis from throughout the thesis to evaluate systemic capacity. This systemic evaluation is in addition to the analysis of each component of the system in each chapter. Through evaluating components as well as systemic capacity, I aim to allay the concerns of Owen and Smith (2015). Their concern is that relying solely on systemic evaluation of the deliberative system could result in an ‘anything goes’ approach whereby the system could be considered healthy without any individual settings actually displaying deliberative qualities. My analysis has sought to address this by assessing authentic deliberation in public space, empowered space and transmission. The quality of all components is synthesised into the concluding remarks of this chapter.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first considers the extent to which the hunting debate is inclusive. To do this I consider the contestation of the four discourses and how they intertwine, and the extent to which the four are represented in empowered space. Following this I consider how animals are represented in the hunting debate. The discursive representation of animals has implications for both inclusivity and authenticity in the deliberative system. The third section evaluates authentic deliberation, summarising the analysis of deliberative qualities in different settings. In the fourth part of the chapter I turn to consequentiality. This requires considering the extent to which communication across different sites in the system actually has an impact on any outcome. Although the cancellation of the July 2015 debate could be seen as a victory for anti-hunting advocates, the reality is that the hunting issue is far from resolved. Finally I consider the limitations of the research and consider future lines of inquiry, before turning to reflect on the state of the hunting debate and the future of this contentious animal issue.

## Section 9.1: inclusivity

Inclusivity is sought primarily in public and empowered space (Dryzek 2009, p1387). In public space, I analysed the possibility for inclusive deliberation in two ways. The first was an examination of the interplay between the four discourses. This enabled an evaluation of how open to considering alternative views each position is. This is vital for inclusivity because if one perspective is in essence closed to listening, this forecloses the possibility of meaningful deliberation. I also take the discursive representation of animals to come under the criterion of inclusivity. This is because inclusive deliberation demands the inclusion of animals – in this case through their representation in discourse. However, animal representation is also important for authentic deliberation as it requires interlocutors to consider interests beyond their own.

### Section 9.1.1: inclusivity through the contestation of discourses in public space

By examining how discourses counter or agree with each other, it is possible to see whether alternative perspectives are dismissed out of hand or if consideration is given to actual arguments. If the former prevails, then the chances for inclusive deliberation are greatly diminished because broader perspectives will not be given serious consideration.

The high correlation of the liberal-progressive and critical-radical viewpoints is a positive indication of inclusivity. These positions hold more in common than not; their convergence on the specific hunting issue should be beneficial to the anti-hunting movement. The liberal-progressive and critical-radical discourses bear some resemblance to animal welfare and animal rights respectively. Nonetheless, the two diverge on broader attitudes towards animals and more importantly from a deliberative perspective, on the nature of contestation itself. The liberal-progressive position holds that anyone can have an opinion on hunting and reject the notion that ‘you can only understand a thing if you are a part of that world’ (P18). This discourse places great emphasis on the importance of having an open debate and beginning from the assumption that ‘everyone has something valuable to say’ (P4). This view is akin to the deliberative condition of giving all perspectives equal consideration, and respecting alternative viewpoints. This suggests that the liberal-progressive discourse is relatively inclusive.

Although it does not discount the possibility of an open and diverse debate, this is not a primary concern for the critical-radical position. Indeed, the Q-statement ‘debates about hunting should include a range of people and perspectives’ (S51) is one of the items that the two positions differ significantly on. The two also differ on some more fundamental questions over hunting and animals, but from an inclusive perspective, it is the critical-radical ambivalence towards open and diverse debate that could foreclose inclusive deliberation.

The sporting libertarian position uses a *tu quoque* approach to contestation: it points out inconsistencies in alternative viewpoints. The effect is, at its worst, a *prima facie* de-validation of anti-hunting viewpoints. At its best however, this approach could provide stimulation for anti-hunting discourses to bring forth further justifications. In this case, it is difficult to discern whether the sporting-libertarian discourse stimulates or precludes inclusive deliberation – it could go either way. The countryside management discourse is explicit about the need for an open debate and this point is central to the position. Despite this commitment, this viewpoint is closed to including other perspectives in debate because it maintains that those who are against hunting simply do not understand it. Part of this conviction is based on the agreement that people don’t think rationally about hunting (S4). This highlights a fundamental contradiction in the countryside management discourse: it supports the idea of an open debate whilst at the same time remaining closed to considering alternative viewpoints.

The contestation of discourses is alive and well in the hunting debate. But discursive contestation alone is not sufficient to satisfy the normative demands of deliberative democracy. The nature of contestation between these four discourses can give an indication of inclusivity in public space. There is fundamental divergence between pro- and anti-hunting positions. Notably, the main points of convergence across the four are the points that are also the least salient for them all. In other words, the only things they agree on are the points nobody really cares about. Moreover, there is first-order disagreement between critical-radicalism and countryside management. Because of the first-level disagreement over whether the fox population needs controlling at all, proponents of these two discourses are unlikely to progress onto *how* this is done. Similarly, where the pro-hunting discourses believe that farmers have a duty to protect their livestock, critical-radicalism counters that ‘farmers don’t have a duty to keep livestock in the first place’ (P16). This first-order disagreement also precludes the possibility of meta-consensus, where interlocutors agree at least on the nature of the issue. In this debate, hunting is contemporaneously about conservation, animal welfare, wildlife management, animal rights and pest control – to name a few. Beyond that, there is also disagreement over the meaning of these terms, so polarised is this debate.

Fundamental disagreement is not necessarily disastrous for deliberative democracy. Contestation is cited as an indication of a healthy deliberative public sphere (see Dryzek 2001; Mouffe 1999). However, the characteristics of three out of the four discourses suggest that possibilities for inclusive deliberation are limited.

### Section 9.1.2: inclusivity through discourses in empowered space

The liberal-progressive discourse is the most prevalent in empowered space. In some cases, the wording used in Parliamentary debates is almost identical to the Q-statements that are most important in liberal-progressivism. However, party politics is presented alongside references to the discourse and often overshadows its presentation.

Countryside management is also well represented in Parliamentary debate and used to support the realm of countryside pursuits in general. There is some translation in its presentation: in Westminster more emphasis is placed on the social/economic benefits of countryside sports, and the importance of hunting as a British tradition. Both these elements are more salient in empowered space than in public space. This is particularly interesting as it seems to indicate that empowered space resembles the pro-hunting arguments from around the time of the ban in 2004: defence of rural identity and fear of job losses (see Anderson 2006; Plumb and Marsh 2013; Toke 2011). If this is the case, it shows that Westminster lags behind debates in public space that have progressed since then.

Both sporting libertarianism and critical-radical discourses are also represented in empowered space, but their presentation is patchy and distorted. The critical-radical position in particular loses its important structural arguments against hunting. The elements that remain are present in tandem with an excess of party political slurs. Whereas the original discourse presents a structural critique of the hegemonic system that enables hunting, in Westminster this becomes a farcical attack on ‘tory toffs’. Although translation of some sort is necessary in the transition from public to empowered space (Elstub 2016), the distortion of the critical-radical viewpoint is extremely damaging in this case. It transforms a counter-hegemonic discourse into a joke. It also leaves the door wide open for pro-hunting advocates to attack the anti-hunting movement on this basis. The distortion of the critical-radical discourse should be particularly concerning to both animal protectionists and deliberative democrats. It is the only discourse that questions and critiques the broader political system in relation to hunting. As argued in chapter eight, systemic reflection on the Westminster model is almost entirely absent in the hunting debate – yet it is this system that helps paralyse the debate.

My analysis has shown that all four public discourses on hunting are present in some form in empowered space. This is positive from a deliberative perspective as it seems to indicate inclusivity. However, none of the four perspectives are present without party political aspects lumped onto them. Notably, party politics is not present in public space. It is unsurprising given the Westminster environment that party politics plays such a prominent role. However, the politicisation of hunting does present an additional barrier to meaningful dialogue. The addition of party politics also has a negative impact on authenticity of empowered space, hampering reflexivity and entrenching views.

## Section 9.2: inclusion of all-affected interests: the discursive representation of animals

How animals are represented in the hunting debate straddles the criteria of inclusivity and authenticity. On the one hand, representing animals demands that interlocutors consider the needs of differently situated others beyond their own self-interests – a tenet of authentic deliberation. On the other hand, inclusive deliberation requires that all those affected by an issue are included – including animals. With this in mind, the proceeding section considers the discursive representation of animals in the hunting debate.

In order to consider the needs of nonhuman animals, deliberators must give serious consideration to the viewpoint of such a differently-situated other. Each discourse provides a different interpretation of the needs of animals and these interpretations should be open to critique and contestation in the public sphere. This demands that all positions require rigorous defence and justification for their claims and that all arguments be considered equally.

Animals are represented in all four discourses. Both liberal-progressive and critical-radical discourses base representation in the foundational assumption that animals are sentient beings that can suffer and feel pain. This terminology is less salient for countryside management and sporting libertarianism. However, those subscribing to the countryside management position also rated themselves as animal lovers higher than any other viewpoint. Sporting libertarianism also clearly cares for animals and shows the most concern about the danger of hunting for horses and in defending the way that the hounds are kept for hunting.

Representations of animals in the two anti-hunting positions build on first-hand experiences to build empathy with animals and emphasise the belief that ‘they do suffer, they do feel pain, fear, terror...and a lot of emotions that we do as well’ (P4). Interviewees also built on scientific knowledge to base their claims about sentience. The experiences recounted by participants are important because they represent animals as capable of pain and suffering; characteristics that are not only in common with humans but also suggest that concomitantly, animals should be treated with this in mind. This approach echoes the argument given in chapter two to justify the political representations of animals (section 2.1): that sentience is a morally relevant characteristic.

By contrast, the pro-hunting positions tend to use personal experience to justify claims about people rather than animals. In particular, negative encounters with anti-hunting advocates were important especially for sporting libertarianism. Animals are still important to proponents of both these positions, but representations are quite different. The language of ‘animal sentience’ may not resonate, but countryside management scored highest out of all four for the statement ‘I consider myself to be an animal lover’ (S25). For the sporting libertarian however, the idea of an ‘animal lover’ is uncomfortable, as one participant explained: ‘not so much as loving the animal, as giving the animal respect and basically giving it what it deserves, what I think it should have’ (P22). Although they differ on the precise language, both countryside management and sporting libertarianism suggest that different animals should be treated differently. This is in contrast to the liberal-progressive position, in which animals should be treated equally. Instead, the former argues that there is an important difference between wild animals and domesticated animals: wild animals do not feel fear in the same way as domesticated animals or humans. Therefore, they do not suffer the level of trauma that anti-hunting campaigners claim they do whilst being pursued during a hunt.

At the same time, countryside management maintains that wild animal populations – as part of a man-made British landscape – need to be managed. By contrast, sporting libertarianism holds that wildlife should, for the most part, be left alone. This does not preclude hunting, however. The two positions agree though that the fox population should be controlled, one of the main reasons being that doing so protects livestock. However, it is far from clear whether this concern for livestock stems from concern for animals at hand. Ultimately, animal representations in both sporting libertarianism and countryside management are compartmentalised: wild and domestic, prey and predator animals are different in kind and therefore require different treatment. By contrast, liberal-progressive and critical-radical advocates defer to animal sentience, a more generalisable characteristic and one that emphasises what animals and humans have in common. This is a fundamental distinction between pro- and anti-hunting discursive representations of animals.

The second key difference is not so much a representation of animals, but disagreement over the meaning of *respect* for animals. All four viewpoints refer to respect for animals but with different conclusions. For liberal-progressivism and critical-radicalism, respecting animals sentience means not hunting, because ‘that word respect, means politeness, love, caring…if you’re polite loving and caring you don’t rip apart somebody else’ (P26). Critical-radicalism also argues that respect entails giving animals the same moral consideration as humans. For both countryside management and sporting libertarianism however, respect can mean killing an animal, but doing it properly: ‘you can go and shoot a fox out in the park if you want, but they should be treated with respect really’ (P7).

Analysing the discursive representation of animals in the hunting debate shows us that all four positions do consider animals with care and in some depth. Pro- and anti-hunting representations divide in whether they appeal to generalisable or sectional interests. Whilst anti-hunting perspectives appeal to the capacity to suffer, pro-hunting viewpoints tend to compartmentalise animals. Respect for animals is also very different for pro- and anti-hunting discourses. Ultimately, the discursive representations of animals revealed in the hunting debate help illuminate attitudes towards animals beyond just hunting. Most importantly for animal protection, interrogation of these discourses reveals that the representations differ not only over scientific knowledge about the animals involved. Rather, disagreement is over *values* and belief systems. In a way this leads us back to the arguments presented in chapter two (section 2.1) over the role of animals in human society. The discursive representations presented in this thesis offer further evidence that animal issues cannot be reduced to the most convincing scientific evidence. Rather, animal issues are always also people issues, layered with discursive meaning and subjectivity.

## Section 9.3: authenticity

### Section 9.3.1: the deliberative potential of non-deliberative action

Authentic deliberation is sought in public and empowered spaces, transmission and accountability. Given that communication in public space is more informal and unconstrained, we might reasonably expect that deliberative quality to be lower in public space than empowered. In the hunting debate however, this does not appear to be the case. Although authentic deliberation is fairly sparse overall, moments of deliberation are more prevalent in public space than anywhere else.

My analysis of public space revealed an insight into the deliberative quality of the hunting debate in public space. I did not specifically analyse hunt sabbing, and draw only tentative conclusions based on participants’ insights. For the most part, face-to-face interactions between activists and hunters were characterised as hostile, with violence and intimidation on both sides. Actions and comments recounted by participants relating to the hunt sabbing experience suggest a deep lack of respect and consideration. There were some notable exceptions to this; a few interviewees relayed genial moments of humour and even teamwork between antagonists. However, these were the exception rather than the rule, and positive experiences were shared only by those on the anti-hunting side.

Hunt sabbing is by its nature non-deliberative because it involves coercion, but the systemic approach holds that non-deliberative acts can harbour deliberative potential. In order to consider the deliberative potential of hunt sabbing, there are two aspects to examine. First is the actual interaction between protagonists; second is the footage often gathered by sabs and/or hunt monitors. I suggest that the former has very little potential to enhance deliberative capacity further down the line. For one thing, hunt sabbing is a form of cost-levying (Humphrey and Stears 2006) which does not seek to persuade hunters by way of argument to halt their activities. Instead sabbing seeks to disrupt the hunt to the extent that it will be called off or be impossible to continue. However, this goal is secondary to the straightforward aim of stopping an animal being killed by the hunt. Given the level of antagonism between sabs and hunters, it is unlikely that this kind of interaction might at some later point spark deliberative potential. For the sporting libertarian discourse especially, negative encounters with hunt sabs are central to opinion formation and serve to further entrench antipathy. Moreover, the actions of hunt saboteurs are not discussed in empowered space at all and the Telegraph coverage is highly condemnatory of animal activists, even likening them to IRA terrorists (Aslet 2015).

The second aspect of sabbing that could harbour deliberative potential is the footage gathered out in the field. This may be gathered by sabs themselves or hunt monitors who follow a hunt and monitor for illegal hunting. Hunt monitors not only collect footage of hunting itself but also often record unpleasant encounters with members of the hunt.[[57]](#footnote-57) I suggest that the footage produced out in the field – unlike the interactions themselves – can contribute to deliberation. This is because videos are posted on YouTube and elsewhere online. This enables activities that usually remain relatively clandestine to be made public. Moreover, footage of illegal hunting provides an important vehicle of representation for the animals involved and therefore contributes to *inclusivity* in the system. Images such as those used in some LACS videos show animal suffering that would otherwise remain hidden. However, as I argue in chapter seven (section 7.4), graphic imagery of hunting must be accompanied by a narrative that articulates discursive claims. Without this discursive grist, it makes it easier for pro-hunting advocates to pass off illegal hunting or violence as isolated incidents.

Unfortunately this conclusion is somewhat paradoxical – hunt sabbing has no deliberative potential but videos of it do. The key distinction is that video footage makes hunting activities visible to a much wider audience, and provide a stimulus for further contestation in public space. However, harbouring deliberative potential does not necessarily entail that this potential is realised in the deliberative system. Deliberative deficits in other parts of the system may stymie the deliberative possibility offered by video footage; the lack of reference to video evidence in other parts of the system suggest that its deliberative potential is limited outside of public space. Ultimately, whilst hunt footage does contribute towards inclusivity and *possibly* authenticity in public space, its scope for contributing to systemic capacity is negligible. Furthermore, assessing the deliberative effects of hunt footage within public space would involve close analysis of the ways in which the videos are shared and commented on; this is beyond the scope of the thesis.

### Section 9.3.2: deliberative quality of the hunting debate

Overall, moments of authentic deliberation in the hunting debate are few and far between. Nonetheless, deliberative moments are found throughout public space and include participants reflecting on their own relationships to animals, and sharing stories of preference-change on hunting. However, these individual moments are overshadowed by the entrenchment of views in the hunting debate. With perhaps the exception of the liberal-progressive discourse, there is a certainty across other discourses that the position endorsed is the correct one. This precludes open and reflexive deliberation because interlocutors are steadfast in their preference. Although preference-change is disputed amongst deliberative scholars (Baccaro *et al* 2016; Niemeyer 2016), the level of entrenchment seen in the hunting debate also hampers the possibility for reflexivity, mutually acceptable outcomes and inclusivity.

Despite this somewhat dire prognosis, individuals who took part in the Q study research often showed a remarkable capacity for deliberation. The deliberative moments scattered throughout public space indicate the capacity of individual citizens to deliberate. Furthermore, it suggests that the hunting debate is as much a victim of the broader political system as it is of vehement disagreement. This point is vindicated in my analysis of deliberative quality in empowered space.

The tone of Parliamentary debates is overwhelmingly non-deliberative. This is perhaps unsurprising given the adversarial nature of the Commons. It may well be the case that legislature debates are not the right place to look for deliberation but given their public nature and the salience of the hunting issue in 2015, it does not seem unreasonable to consider Parliamentary debates as an important communicative site. Notwithstanding the kind of pantomime-like exchanges that take place across the floor, it is the priority of sectional interests and coercion present in empowered space that really serve to undermine authentic deliberation.

Party politics hold sway in Westminster. Although elements of all four discourses are expressed in this space, they are accompanied by party political references that are not salient in the original discourses. Towing the party line and the level of entrenchment in the hunting debate paralyses opportunities for meaningful dialogue in Parliament. This is aggravated by the fact that there is no motivation to reach a mutually acceptable outcome because it comes down to a vote, and everybody wants to be on the winning side. Thus efforts to persuade others are highly strategic. Bargaining and coercion allegedly occur between party whips and MPs who are encouraged not to vote against the government, with possible repercussions against their career. What matters in Westminster is how many people you can persuade to join you, not based on the better argument but on party affiliation, career ambitions and *quid pro quo*.

Empowered space is not entirely bereft of authentic deliberation. The House of Lords – despite its glaring democratic deficit – was cited as ‘a house that respects expertise, and respects evidence, I think…values facts, and facts-based argument’ (interview HL3). In addition, some MPs interviewed went to great lengths to articulate an anti-hunting position that transcends party politics and class war stereotypes. This effort is replicated by the Blue Fox group, who although aligned with the Tories, work with cross-party MPs on hunting and other animal welfare issues. That these individuals hold fast against the partisan tide of Westminster is quite impressive. Beyond the hunting debate, the UK Parliamentary system is not set up to foster cross-party alliances, and that they exist at all is indicative that animal issues can and should transcend party barriers. The existence of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Animal Welfare, despite not being formally empowered, is further testament to this.

The ‘inordinate amount of time’ (interview HC5) that has been spent debating hunting in Westminster arguably contributes to the paralysis of the debate. Unlike participants in public space, who imagined the possibility of a more deliberative debate, there is little appetite to rehash the debate in Parliament. This sentiment comes primarily from anti-hunting advocates, for whom ‘there’s nothing to resolve’ (interview HC3) and who ‘don’t think there’s anything new to say about it’ (interview HC5). Unsurprisingly pro-hunting Members are more optimistic of reaching a different solution in the future. The proposed amendments were seen as a ‘significant move’ (interview HC2) in the direction of a mutually acceptable solution. This is based on the perception that the amendments were not tantamount to repeal but just small adjustments to the Act.

There is some indication of *individual* reflexivity in empowered space, as in public space. Interviewees provided some insightful reflections on the hunting debate itself. Individual reflections on the hunting *debate* illustrate the capacity for meta-deliberation. Unfortunately, this only exists at the individual level and does not approach anything resembling systemic reflexivity or the impetus for systemic self-correction. However, this is not a symptom only of the hunting debate, but of the UK political system, where decision-making is set up in such a way that handicaps the legislature and undermines accountability. The lack of accountability in the hunting debate serves to highlight a deficit in meta-deliberation as well. We could reasonably expect that the dearth of accountability mechanisms might prompt reflection and reform, but this is not the case. The accountability deficit was highlighted in chapter eight, where it proved difficult even to *elicit* an account of the decision to amend the Hunting Act. The lack of even narrative accountability is another indicator of deliberative arrears: DEFRA is unable to provide a coherent justification of the reasoning behind the decision to amend.

## Section 9.4: consequentiality

It is tempting to characterise the cancellation of the debate on amendment as a victory for the anti-hunting movement: a consequence of hard-won campaigning by LACS and its allies. Unfortunately, this is simply not the case. From my findings in empowered space, it would appear that communication from public space and even transmission had little to no impact on the government’s decision to scrap the July 2015 debate and vote. Ultimately it was the realisation that the government would lose the vote that led to its cancellation. This is particularly disheartening from a deliberative perspective; it suggests that even if deliberative quality was high in public space and transmission, it would be of no consequence to decision-making. Furthermore, although coming down to a vote is not the most deliberative method of decision-making, it could be redeemed if preceded by a constructive, deliberative Parliamentary debate. However, if the government can simply cancel the vote if it doesn’t think it will win, then any prior deliberation is somewhat fruitless.

One positive outcome is that the cancellation could provide a catalyst for meta-deliberation and an attempt to improve the deliberative system. My analysis does not show any signs of this happening however, because there is no reflection on the broader political system. Even if the vote had gone ahead, the divisive nature of Parliamentary voting supports strategic decision-making and coercive persuasion, framed purely in terms of self-interest.

It would however be unfair to tar the whole of Westminster with this brush. My analysis is based on a small sample of interviews and documentary analysis. Even within that small sample, interviewees pointed out that some MPs do vote based on conviction rather than the party line. Testament to this is the growing number of anti-hunting Conservative MPs. Indeed, Lorraine Platt of Blue Fox speculated that even without the SNP, the government may still have lost the vote in July due to the number of Labour and anti-hunting Tories combined, although ‘it would have been very close’ (interview Lorraine Platt). There is a deliberative caveat here of course: anti-hunting conviction does not necessarily equate to a deliberated opinion. It is equally possible that Labour MPs voting against hunting do so strategically for party political reasons.

Despite the fact that the cancellation removed a decisive element from the debate, the reasoning behind the decision to ‘postpone’ can indicate how consequential deliberation is in the hunting debate. Unfortunately, the answer appears to be: of no consequence whatsoever. The combination of focusing on voting and the government’s ability to just withdraw the debate suggests that highly strategic thinking is at play. This raises important questions for the efficacy of the transmission mechanisms examined in chapter six. Out of the three analysed, the Blue Fox has the most deliberative potential (see sections 7.3 and 7.5). Furthermore, it does appear to have had some consequences in empowered space - ‘we’ve had some pro-hunting MPs change their mind in the last few months’ (interview Lorraine Platt). Blue Fox’s activities are a positive for the anti-hunting movement as well as authentic and consequential deliberation. However, given that the group is made up of political elites already operating within empowered space may be concerning from a systemic perspective. Blue Fox was founded based on the perception that there was a large portion of Tory voters who were against hunting. In this sense, ‘it came from the public interest’ (interview Lorraine Platt) but nonetheless its influence in empowered space is down to the fact that its members are already empowered to make decisions that could influence a collective outcome; they can vote on hunting policy. A direct partisan link through political elites between public and empowered space undermines the development of an oppositional public sphere (Habermas 1962). However, since Blue Fox are going against the dominant party line, this concern is abated to *some* extent.

The impact of the Telegraph’s 2015 coverage is less clear. For one, it is unclear in which direction transmission is travelling: articles seem to report empowered space to public space, rather than the other way round. The Telegraph resembles the antagonistic tone of the hunting debate in Westminster, although it manages to outweigh even Westminster in terms of vitriol. Given that the Telegraph does not function as a conduit for messages in public space, its main contribution is to heighten the divisiveness of the hunting debate and to perpetuate hostility. It is difficult to imagine any deliberative potential emerging out of this.

LACS, for its part, seems to have a disappointing impact in other parts of the system. Again, consequentiality here is dispersed across the system given that LACS targets both public and empowered space. I suggest that, based on the paucity of the critical-radical discourse in empowered space, the videos analysed in chapter seven have little impact on debates in Westminster. This conclusion remains tentative given that my analysis was limited to videos rather than written material. The purpose of this approach was to examine the non-deliberative tactics used to elicit negative emotions in an audience. Whilst moral shock-type approaches can impact individuals and provide a stimulus for reflexivity (see Humphrey and Stears 2006) I argue that this has minimal impact on systemic consequences in the hunting debate. Ultimately eliciting an emotion-based reaction in an individual is unlikely to have an impact on rationalistic policy paradigms. It can serve to rally actors in public space to act collectively in a more effective way – but this requires collective action rather than an aggregation of individual responses.

## Section 9.5: the future of the hunting debate

### Section 9.5.1: reforming the deliberative system

It is one thing to recommend that animal protection organisations adopt a more deliberative approach – which I do. It is quite another to claim that a more deliberative approach will actually be more effective in the political system in question. In the hunting debate, even if we set aside the high level of polarisation and vitriol, the fact remains that the UK political system undermines accountability and collective reasoning. Instead, Westminster further reifies party political divisions and perpetuates adversarial politics. On this basis, I suggest that a more deliberative approach may help animal advocates to be taken more seriously and have their voices heard by those in power. However, any positive effect is highly mitigated by the political organisation that binds actors in empowered space. Moreover, any animal debate that divides along party lines – as hunting ostensibly does – will struggle to forge a constructive deliberative path in Parliament. So divisive is the *outcome* of this issue that any new *process* introduced will be vulnerable to attack from both pro- and anti-hunting advocates.

Hunting remains a polarised debate. The Q study illustrates the level of divergence between pro- and anti-hunting positions. However, it also highlights the different stances on hunting and the nuances of shared viewpoints. Moreover, although we can safely recognise the low deliberative quality of debate in public space, it must also be acknowledged that the health of the debate is, deliberatively speaking, better in public space than empowered space. Party politics is almost entirely absent, and the class critique is less *ad hominem* and more structural. There are clearly deliberative deficits; hostility characterises the majority of encounters between pro- and anti-hunting advocates. Nonetheless, moments of humour and tolerance *do* exist. Moreover, individual moments of reflexivity can be found and many research participants articulated the desire for a better hunting debate.

These deliberative moments do not translate into transmission or empowered space, except for the saving grace of Blue Fox. Yet Blue Fox fails on a different front given its partisan and elite nature. Empowered space is not entirely bereft of authentic deliberation – again, some instances of reflexivity are present and two out of the four discourses are well-represented in Parliamentary debates. It may be the case however that the individual capacity of actors in empowered space is undermined by the adversarial culture of Westminster. Deliberative capacity is further undermined by the lack of direct accountability between public and empowered space, and the paucity of formal accountability mechanisms.

Select committees offer a rare opportunity for accountability in Westminster. Although hunting has not been discussed by the relevant committee in recent years, it is feasible that select committees could enhance deliberative capacity as an avenue for reason-based argument, accountability and meta-deliberation. However, given that the EFRA committee (and DEFRA) covers animal agriculture *and* animal welfare there is arguably something of a conflict of interest at play. An independent select committee or other empowered body for animal protection could provide a nonpartisan space in Westminster for a more deliberative democratic approach. Until that point, more deliberative activities undertaken by animal advocates in public space face an uphill struggle. This is not to say that animal protection organisations ought not to bother; any attempts to emphasise the importance of a constructive, deliberative debate in public space could contribute positively to animal protection. In particular, discourse that demonstrates the fallibility of a welfare/rights dichotomy is necessary in order to unite the animal protection movement and concomitantly give a more robust defence against the animal use paradigm. My findings demonstrate the high correlation between two anti-hunting positions which could be construed as welfare and rights respectively. That they are so intertwined and most participants are aligned to both is testament to the point that these positions are far from diametrically opposed.

Although empowered space may, in the case of the UK, be closed to deliberative possibilities, there are opportunities in public space for activists and animal protection organisations to employ a more deliberative approach. And as Habermas (1962) argues, a vibrant oppositional public sphere is best placed to challenge state authority. For animal protectionists, employing a more deliberative approach that emphasises the underlying rationale of the critical-radical discourse could help strengthen the movement and ultimately, present a viable challenge to the dominant approach in Westminster, which currently clearly undermines both deliberative democratic and animal protection goals.

### Section 9.5.2: limitations and future research

There are limits to the conclusions that can be drawn from my analysis. In attempting to evaluate the deliberative system’s various components, it has been necessary to compromise on depth at some points. Special effort was taken in the research to try and ensure that the full range of viewpoints on hunting was represented. Although I am not a neutral analyst in this research and have a normative position of my own, this does not preclude the inclusion of alternative viewpoints. Indeed, I am committed to the deliberative ideal of including and considering all relevant viewpoints and a research project that did not do this would be essentially worthless from a deliberative perspective. Therefore, I made an additional effort to invite participants to represent pro-hunting viewpoints. This was not always successful, and some people and organisations declined to participate due to my affiliation with the Centre for Animals and Social Justice. Nonetheless, others were willing to participate and I maintain that the full range of *shared* viewpoints was included in the Q study. It is possible that some individuals and opinions were left out of the Q study. However, the aim of Q is to establish the existence of shared viewpoints, not groups of people or individual opinions. Moreover, saturation point was reached during the study; the same argument reiterated by several participants.

The resulting discourses produced by the factor analysis represent a best-possible estimate of a shared viewpoint. A factor cannot represent the combined complexity of all the individuals who are associated with it, nor does Q method claim that this is the case. Each statement in the Q-set is open to interpretation and the placing and prioritising of the statements is meaningful to the individual doing the Q sort. This allows for the differential interpretation of statements by participants – indeed differential interpretation forms the basis of important distinctions between the discourses. On the one hand, for sporting libertarianism, the notion of an ‘animal lover’ (S22, +2) was interpreted cautiously, with negative connotations for some participants. Countryside management on the other hand appears to interpret ‘animal lover’ in wholly positive terms (+6), rating the statement higher than any other viewpoint. Similarly, both sporting libertarianism and critical radicalism score the statement ‘wildlife is better off without human intervention’ (S13) positively (both +3) but interpret its meaning quite differently: for the former the statement meant that humans should not interfere if they come across an injured or baby animal in the wild (P21; P22; P29). For the latter, it meant not hunting and not trying to manage wild animal populations. One of the strengths of Q methodology is its ability to elucidate the differential interpretation of given statements. This is in contrast to a standard survey approach which might only ask participants whether they agree or disagree with a statement.

Q factor analysis clusters together individual Q-sorts that have been sorted in a similar way. The unit of analysis is the subjectivity of each individual Q-sort, and how it relates to every other Q-sort in the P-set. My interpretation of the four viewpoints presented proceeded with this holism in mind – attempting to interpret the viewpoint as a whole, rather than honing in on single statements. Naturally, greater emphasis is placed on statements at the most extreme ends of the matrix given that they typically have greater salience – but interpretation also takes into account the interviews that took place alongside the sorting process. The holistic emphasis is underpinned by the point that Q studies variance across individual subjective viewpoints (each Q sort) rather than the variety of responses to a single statement: ‘keeping parts together in their interrelation (synthesis) is what Q factor analysis does’ (Brown 1997, p4). Nonetheless, the factor analysis alone can only tell us the similarities and differences in how participants scored the statements – it does not tell us anything substantial about how sorters interpreted the meaning of each statement, only how their relative valuation of it. Differences in interpretation are elaborated during interview, as illustrated by the discussion above.

There remains the possibility of differential interpretation of a statement *within* a single viewpoint. It is unlikely that individuals whose Q-sorts are highly correlated will have vastly different interpretations of statements, but this does not entail that all participants loading on the same factor will interpret a statement in exactly the same manner (see Brown and Mathieson 1990). In this sense, factor analysis does posit some unity on the meaning of each statement. If Q-method were to rely wholly on factor analysis then this would certainly be rather reductionist. Indeed, the factors produced by the analysis do reduce the full range of individual viewpoints represented in the study to a much smaller number of shared viewpoints. This does mean that some of the nuance and complexity are sacrificed, but given that two integral parts of Q-methodology are the qualitative material gathered through interview and the holistic approach to the interpretation of factors (rather than focus on single statements), this concern is allayed somewhat. Furthermore, the aim of Q is to identify and elucidate *shared* viewpoints; in doing this, it is impossible to represent the full array of individual opinions (see also sections 2.4 and 3.3).[[58]](#footnote-58)

A possible further limitation is the choice of Parliamentary debates as a potential site for deliberation. Parliamentary debate has been seen as largely performative and grandstanding in nature; serving primarily to underline partisan rhetoric. My analysis of Westminster does little to contradict this conventional view. As a consequence of this view, legislative talk has received little scholarly attention (Bächtiger 2014, p145). Therefore, although my analysis does not significantly challenge the conventional view, it does serve as empirical evidence for it. Furthermore, Parliamentary debates are the most public mechanisms of government decision-making and thus, even if they do not perform a substantive decision-making function, they are still an important empowered site in the deliberative and wider political system. The public nature of Parliamentary debates also makes them readily available for analysis, unlike other decision-making processes in the UK executive. My experience from the FOI requests discussed in chapter eight suggests that accessing private deliberations or documents related to hunting would not have been possible. Information relating to the formation of government policy is exempt from the Freedom of Information Act making it highly unlikely that access to decision-making materials would have been granted.

The analysis of transmission mechanisms in chapter seven is primarily illustrative. The very different functions of the three mechanisms examined render comparative analysis impossible. However, my intention was not to provide a systematic comparison of transmission mechanisms but to illustrate the different ways in which messages are conducted in the deliberative system. The Telegraph, Blue Fox and LACS each exemplify approaches that have important implications for deliberative capacity and the hunting debate. LACS videos were selected in order to consider the use of graphic imagery and moral shock which is a prominent tactic in the animal protection movement. The Blue Fox Group is a *sui generis*, making comparison impossible but nonetheless providing a valuable insight into a more deliberative approach in the hunting debate and an example of the intermeshing of different components in the deliberative system; performing a transmission function whilst being located within empowered space. The Telegraph illustrates the possible extent of the influence of the hunting lobby given that it primarily reflects pro-hunting discourses and gives prominence to the Countryside Alliance. These three cases were selected to highlight the different ways in which messages are transmitted in the deliberative system, following Boswell *et al*’s (2016, p6) suggestion that studies of transmission should aim at ‘how, under what conditions, and to what effect’ transmission occurs. My choices of cases in chapter seven proceeded with this aim in mind.

The analysis of transmission would benefit from a more rigorous methodological approach. Given that the three transmission mechanisms are only a partial view of a single component in the system, it was not feasible to carry out a more robust analysis. If the thesis had focussed specifically on transmission rather than the deliberative system at large, considerably more time and resources would have been utilised to provide a more rigorous evaluation. In this case more robust analytical methods would have been deployed. For example, a more systematic review of the literature around video activism would have served to bolster the claims about LACS videos and situate the case within the broader context (see for example, Matusitz and Forrester 2013; Askanius 2012). An appreciation of textual and visual analysis in media studies would further serve to strengthen the analysis. As my analysis is primarily content-based in order to discern various discursive claims, this comes at the expense of attention to aesthetics and form. Although attention is given to the ways in which claims are presented, my aim is primarily to distil the deliberativeness or otherwise of the respective approaches, rather than evaluate form in a comprehensive manner. As it stands, my discussion of transmission has the modest aim of illustrating the divergent approaches to transmission in the hunting debate. Further research into transmission mechanisms would be greatly enhanced by more robust methods of analysis.

Beyond methodological choices, future work on transmission would also benefit greatly from the substantial literature in political communication, media research and psychology as an aid for interpreting the broader context within which these transmission mechanisms sit. An understanding of the role and function of different media formats – above and beyond the deliberative system – can help crystallise the specific contributions those forms make to systemic capacity. In particular, the ways in which audiences receive messages and conceptions of media power have important implications for the deliberative system. This is especially the case if scholars are interested in the contestation and transmission of discourses in public space. As Neil Gavin (2009, p766) points out, the media are ‘deeply involved’ in the articulation of the public sphere. Analyses of different forms of media as linkages between different sites in the deliberative system must be able to engage with broader scholarship around media effects and opinion formation.

Foxhunting is in many ways, a peculiarly British affair. From this it might be concluded that the thesis is limited to this jurisdiction. However, I suggest that the discourses identified and analysed here are relevant to other animal issues beyond foxhunting. A pertinent future study would do well to survey existing studies of discourses on animals and map out the ways in which discourses on different issues overlap and converge; it is highly likely that there will be a myriad of discursive links between seemingly disparate animal issues. This would serve to further demonstrate the importance of discursive representation for animals and offer the opportunity to interrogate dominant animal use discourses.

The aim of this thesis has not been to refute or support the practice of hunting with dogs, but to provide a comprehensive analysis of the debate around hunting from a deliberative perspective. It is undeniable that my own views on the topic have influenced the analysis and interpretation of the debate given in this thesis. Although this can be seen as a limitation, I simply acknowledge myself as a part of the research rather than an outside observer. I make no claims to objectivity or neutrality. Nonetheless, my commitment to deliberative democracy demands the inclusion and consideration of alternative viewpoints, and it was with this in mind that that I proceeded with this research.

*Studying deliberative systems*

The work presented here provides an insight into the complexities of empirical research on deliberative systems. The discussion in chapter seven suggests different ways of conceptualising transmission in the system. These suggestions require further and more rigorous investigation to establish whether my findings comprise discrete *modes* of transmission, or simply individual examples of transmission. Arguably, transmission may come to be the most important element in the deliberative system, with an increasing number of studies exploring the how, what, why and when of mechanisms that transmit claims (see, for example Boswell 2016; Boswell *et al* forthcoming; Davis 2016; Lyons 2016). However, my experience highlights the difficulty of conceptualising the deliberative system as a set of interrelated communicative settings. In reality, such spaces are not discrete but porous. Organisations like the RSPCA act in public and empowered space as well transmission. Arguably, they also have an important role to play regarding accountability (see chapter eight, p152). Similarly, mainstream media outlets such as the Telegraph also perform important functions in public space, but in my analysis are treated as a transmission mechanism. A further conceptual limitation is the posited divide between public and private space in the Dryzekian system, which in my empirical investigation breaks down for a variety of reasons (section 3.4.1). Although private space has been considered important in terms of preference-formation, it has perhaps been neglected thus far in the study of deliberative systems. My findings indicate the centrality of personal and private experiences in the articulation of discourses on hunting. Concomitantly, I suggest that more attention should be devoted to the generation and evolution of discourses in the deliberative system, alongside an appreciation of everyday talk (Mansbridge 2010) as occupying a more central role in the system (see also Mansbridge et al 2012, p8).

One possible alternative to conceptualising the deliberative system that takes these points into account is to consider how discourses ‘travel’ through different spaces and how they are articulated by different actors in respective settings. In other words, ‘to present a structure for thinking about public spheres in terms of “flows” first, and “spaces” only secondarily (Allen 2015, p278). Empirically, this could assist in moving away from the difficulties of spaces or actors that do not fit neatly into rigidly demarcated settings. As the prior quote indicates, this need not entail abandoning an analysis of contestation and deliberation between citizens, but requires a shift in emphasis away from the notion of discrete settings. My analysis of discourses in public space took a step in this direction through analysing the characteristics and interplay of the discourses themselves. However, this approach raises concerns of its own, namely the question of whether a discourse *qua* discourse be considered deliberative or otherwise. The approach I took here was novel and experimental; it requires deeper conceptual investigation than I have been able to provide within the confines of this thesis. My aim is that my approach might engage deliberative systems scholars in a fruitful reflection over the ways in which we utilise deliberative systems in empirical research. Overall, my findings serve to illustrate that deliberative systems as an approach requires further interrogation and contestation, and that empirical research can provide important insights to aid the theoretical development of the concept.

### Section 9.5.3: moving forward, looking back

A paradox persists regarding the hunting debate. On the one hand, my analysis suggests little appetite in Parliament to revisit the issue. On the other, the government remains committed to a free vote on the future of the Hunting Act. Therefore, they are compelled to return it to the Commons at some point in the next few years.

So what of the future for the hunting debate? Interviewees in both public and empowered space speculated about how the debate could evolve. One element particularly prevalent was the notion of generational change: ‘the Tory party itself is changing, and it’s less and less of a totemic issue for many of the new type of Tory MPs that are coming in, that’s what’s changing’ (HC3). With this change, ‘the numbers will go down, the supporters of fox hunting’ (HC4). This sentiment is reminiscent of both the liberal-progressive and critical-radical discourses. The liberal-progressive discourse incorporates an argument from modernity that suggest that hunting is something that we as a society have progressed beyond. The critical-radical discourses incorporates this line of thought in a slightly different way. Rather than looking back from the present moment, proponents of critical-radicalism look to the future and reflect on how foxhunting and other animal issues will be viewed in the future. Ultimately however, this is two faces of the same argument – hunting will die out as a practice and concomitantly, as a political issue.

Other issues such as capital punishment (HC4), badger baiting or dog fighting (P10, P16, P23, P30, HC5) were cited as ‘horrendous’ (P30) practices that have now been consigned to history. Hunting is now, with the passing of the Hunting Act 2004, ‘in the dustbin of history and that’s where it belongs’ (HC5). For the time being, this will remain a contentious debate. However, like many who have participated in my research, I am inclined to suggest that as the time since the Act lengthens, so too the salience of the debate will wane. I will end the thesis with the words of one particularly astute participant, who articulates this point rather better than I:

To stop a fire from burning the forest...what you need to do is come back a few yards, and burn the forest, under controlled conditions...and then when the main fire comes along, it can't breach it, so there's your fire wall. And what they've done is they've stripped this out now…And it'll be gone. And we will all look back in several hundred years’ time when we're all reincarnated [laughs]...but you know, in hundreds of years’ time, they will look back, won't they, future generations will look back, and shake their heads with wonderment - "what the hell was going on there?!", you know...just as we look back into the 13th, 14th, 15th century, with the practises that went on then, and say "my god.." - bear baiting, cock fighting, badger baiting you know - horrendous...and these things will die eventually, if you don't give them any oxygen...and it will be time... (P30)

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# Appendices

**Appendix 1: Public space**

1.1: list of Q study participants

1.2: information sheet given to Q study participants

1.3: interview guide used in concourse interviews

1.4: full list of Q-statements

1.5: PQMethod raw output from Q study

**Appendix 2: Empowered space**

2.1: information sheet given to MPs and Peers

2.2: interview guide used in empowered space interviews

**Appendix 3: Freedom of Information releases**

3.1: October 2013

3.2: August 2016

# Appendix 1

## Appendix 1.1: list of Q study participants

(P1)\* PhD researcher researching the ethics of hunting

(P2)\* PhD researcher rural Shropshire who grew up with experience of hunting

(P3) Former hunt saboteur

(P4) Political theorist from a farming background and pro-hunting family

(P5)\* Member of a drag hunt in Derbyshire

(P6) Former Hunt Master and livestock breeder

(P7) Currents Huntsman of a Foxhound Pack

(P8) Veterinary nurse and long term hunt supporter and helper

(P9) Member of a drag hunt, also involved in training and working dogs

(P10) Professional animal protectionist with extensive experience of the Hunting Act and background in zoology

(P11) Professional animal protection advocate with background in ecology

(P12) Prominent conservation and heritage organisation.

(P13) PhD researcher researching attitudes to animal sentience and welfare.

(P14)\* David Bowles, Head of Public Affairs at the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA).

(P15) Prominent animal protection organisation.

(P16)\* Research centre focusing on policy and politics of animal protection\*\*

(P17) Lifelong animal advocate and campaigner\*\*

(P18) PhD researcher from a rural background with experience of hunting.

(P19) Horse owner with experience of working dogs and countryside pursuits\*\*

(P20) Fire fighter and dog trainer with experience of other types of hunting\*\*

(P21)\* Equine and farm veterinarian and horse owner\*\*

(P22)\* Horse trainer with experience of countryside pursuits\*\*

(P23) Documentary film-maker about hunting with dogs

(P24) PhD researcher researching the sociology of sport

(P25)\* Member of the hunting community with farming background

(P26) Horse owner, raised in the countryside

(P27) Social work student in Liverpool, from a rural background with experience of hunting

(P28) Former Justice of the Peace and former hunt follower

(P29) Agribusiness owner whose land is used by hunts

(P30) Former sheep farmer

(P31)\* Conservation and animal welfare advocate

(P32) Political theorist working on animals and political theory

(P33) Jim Barrington, animal welfare consultant for the Countryside Alliance and former Director at League Against Cruel Sports

\*Participants who were also interviewed for the generation of Q-statements

\*\* P16 & P17 interviews were conducted together. Q-sorts conducted individually.

\*\* P19, P20, P21 and P22 are part of the same extended family. Their interviews were carried out together in conversational form, with Q-sorts conducted individually.

## Appendix 1.2: information sheet given to Q study participants

**INFORMATION SHEET – STAGE 1**

**Representing Animals in the Deliberative System: the case of hunting.**

This project is being carried out by Lucy J Parry, in the Department of Politics, University of Sheffield (UK).

**Rationale**

Although animals are affected by many policy areas - such as agriculture, rural affairs and medical research – their interests are not represented during the political process in the same way that affected humans are entitled to representation. Hunting is one of the most salient and controversial animal issues in UK politics and in the decade since the Hunting Act it has not ceased to ignite tension and conflict. However, analysis shows that debates around hunting at the time of the bill were mainly about party politics and class conflict rather than the issue per se. The purpose of this project is to understand how animals are represented through conversations and discourses about hunting and to explore the possibilities for improving representation. The project uses deliberative democracy as a normative framework following the assertion that an enhanced deliberative process can enables all affected interests to be represented.

**Objectives**

The project has two main empirical components. The first part will identify the range of opinions that exist about hunting. Mapping these discourses, or narratives, will allow us to examine the role that animals play in debates on an issue which affects them, but in which they have no voice. It will also allow us to see how different discourses interact with each other and whether there are points of convergence which could form the basis for deliberation.

The second part of the project will investigate the settings in which decisions have been made about hunting, and will explore the extent to which the map of discourses is reflected in decision-making arenas.

**What does the research involve?**

**Stage 1**

You have been selected as a potential participant for the first stage of the research, which is focused on the first aim (as identified above). You have been selected because of your personal involvement or affiliation with an organisation known to have a well-formed view on hunting. Participation in the project is purely voluntary, and there will be no adverse consequences if you decide not to participate.

If you agree to participate in this project, you will be first asked to sign an informed consent form. You will then be asked to participate in a ‘Q sort’ face-to-face with Lucy J Parry. The Q sort will last for up to one hour and will take place at your place of work, or at a convenient location nearby. The Q sort involves ordering a collection of statements according to how much you agree with each statement. Guidance will be provided throughout and you may be asked additional questions to complement your Q sort. The purpose of the study is to cluster groups of statements together to form coherent discourses (this stage is completed by the researcher).

With your consent, the process will be audio recorded for transcription.

**Confidentiality**

The personal identities (name, position, and contact details) of participants will be known only to the researcher (Lucy J Parry). However, she may also share this information with her supervisor (Dr Hayley Stevenson) if assistance is sought with the interpretation of interview material.

**Dissemination of Findings**

The results of this study will form part of a doctoral thesis. They will also be reported to the funding body (Centre for Animals and Social Justice), shared with the University of Sheffield and may be published in academic journals and books, in policy briefs, and on online blogs.

You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time, and you do not need to provide any reason to me. If you decide to withdraw from the project I will not use any of the information you have provided to me.

**Contact Details**

If you have any questions or comments about the study please feel free to contact:

Lucy J Parry

Department of Politics, University of Sheffield

Telephone: +44 114 222 1682

Email: [lucy.parry@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:lucy.parry@sheffield.ac.uk)

Dr Hayley Stevenson

Department of Politics, University of Sheffield

Telephone: +44 114 222 1664

## Appendix 1.3: interview guide used to help construct concourse for Q study

Interview Guide

INTRODUCTION

* Explain my project and what the interview material will be used for ie. The Q study. Explain that they can also participate in the Q sort IF THEY WISH. There is no obligation.
* Explain the ethics and consent forms.
* Explain what I mean when I refer to ‘hunting’ during the interview – the hunting of wild mammals with more than two dogs ie. Hunting banned under the 2004 Hunting Act. They may have other experiences of hunting (eg grouse shooting etc) which they are also welcome to mention, although this is not the explicit focus.

VIEWS ON HUNTING (INTRODUCTORY)

* Can you explain to me your position/opinion on hunting?
* Can you tell me how you arrived at this view, or what made you come to this decision? Eg. Personal experience/through friends or family/instinctive reaction/through reading something or the media
* What factors are important to you?
* When you think about hunting, what are the first words, or images, that come into your head?

PLACE

* In your experience, where does hunting happen/take place? What happens when hunting takes place here?
* Is this place important to you, and why?
* What is your relationship to this place/environment?
* What is the relationship between this place, and hunting, if any?

ANIMALS

* For you, which animals (if any) matter the most in hunting? Eg Foxes, dogs, horses, deer etc
* Can you explain why you think these animals are important/why they should be important?
* When you think about the animals involved in hunting, which words might you use to describe them?
* Eg/ how would you describe a fox? Not in physical appearance as such, but more its character – if you think it has a character at all?
* How do you see your relationship with animals? Eg. Do you think you have a responsibility to care for animals, and if so, how do you do this?

PEOPLE

* How are you involved in hunting (if at all)/ do you have any personal experience of hunting?
* Which people or groups do you think are important when you think about hunting, and why? Eg. Farmers, because their livestock is affected, or landowners, because hunting takes place on their land
* Who should be involved in deciding policy or laws on hunting?
* Do you ever talk to/interact with people who have a different view on hunting? And what are those conversations like? Eg. Are they respectful etc

## Appendix 1.4: Full list of Q-statements

1. Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predators
2. Hunting is dangerous for the horses
3. Hunting is an important British tradition
4. Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think rationally about it
5. If hunt supporters listened more to people in their own local communities they would understand that the majority of people are against it
6. Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and interest for housing and food rather than the interests of animals and their habitats
7. People who work with animals have a different attitude and approach to them than people who just have animals as companions
8. The British countryside isn’t entirely natural
9. The British countryside only exists because of man’s investment and management of it
10. The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrenaline junkies and they love the thrill and terror of riding cross country on their horse
11. There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression around hunting that I find quite sinister
12. There’s no nice way to kill any animal
13. Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human intervention
14. Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is for the animal’s benefit
15. Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural policies
16. All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that people like can still be enjoyed by following an artificial scent
17. Being out in the countryside is really important to me
18. During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause damage and disruption
19. Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disruptive for the local community and their property than hunting a live quarry
20. Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like putting down poison for rats and mice
21. Hunting is an important social activity for people living in the countryside – like going to the cinema or the pub, and like those things, it plays an important role in supporting the rural economy.
22. Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting suffering and gratuitous cruelty on animals for the sake of entertainment
23. Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling the fox population
24. Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fittest’ relationship
25. I consider myself to be an animal lover
26. I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cruel
27. I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-ho!’ when I think of hunting people
28. Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are towards the back and have never really seen the animal being killed
29. People should respect animals as sentient individuals that can suffer and feel pain
30. People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue about how rural life works
31. Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant attitude that they can do whatever they like, and no one else has the right to tell them what to do
32. The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a working class sport it would have been banned much sooner than it was
33. The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding rural policies
34. The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting campaigners than the people who are hunting illegally
35. Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of animal abuse – there are a lot of practices that cause more suffering that should have been banned before hunting.
36. My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is killed
37. All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse, dog, fox or deer.
38. Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never quite be sure what’s actually happening on a hunt
39. The fox population needs to be controlled
40. There’s a big difference between killing animals for food and killing them for sport
41. We should give animals the same moral consideration as humans
42. We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher natural predators like wolves to the UK
43. I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes
44. Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do it to survive
45. Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong things
46. I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspective
47. It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, like saying a fox is clever or cunning
48. Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the time is not really in their best interests
49. The only population out of control is us humans!
50. There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society
51. Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of people and viewpoints
52. Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particularly cruel and unfair practice

## Appendix 1.5: PQMethod raw output from Q study

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 1

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Correlation Matrix Between Sorts

SORTS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

1 P1 100 22 59 49 -22 -35 -29 -40 7 56 66 -16 47 40 65 72 73 49 -25 -21 -1 -14 62 68 -32 75 52 -18 -11 38

2 P2 22 100 41 38 -21 -28 -36 -37 -8 42 44 10 34 3 22 44 32 33 -19 -13 -13 -16 29 44 -40 23 43 -2 10 -4

3 P3 59 41 100 54 7 -25 -34 -45 -13 65 66 -8 65 27 42 62 70 42 -13 -16 -13 -28 60 56 -33 52 48 0 -9 35

4 P4 49 38 54 100 7 -1 -2 -27 3 47 42 2 47 48 58 56 47 58 -10 -12 3 -10 52 49 -12 51 59 7 -2 39

5 P5 -22 -21 7 7 100 46 40 32 44 6 -1 29 18 14 -2 -14 -4 -15 41 37 29 14 3 -12 40 -14 4 47 10 20

6 P6 -35 -28 -25 -1 46 100 49 31 25 -21 -41 39 -17 0 -2 -38 -42 -13 32 34 25 12 -26 -27 73 -39 4 37 1 9

7 P7 -29 -36 -34 -2 40 49 100 52 28 -31 -25 20 -14 17 8 -40 -37 -5 44 40 35 23 -22 -29 58 -17 -16 40 27 -8

8 P8 -40 -37 -45 -27 32 31 52 100 41 -40 -51 20 -22 6 -28 -63 -42 -34 43 25 44 35 -29 -31 56 -39 -29 44 39 -18

9 P9 7 -8 -13 3 44 25 28 41 100 5 5 30 23 24 5 -4 12 6 25 38 60 41 14 -4 35 2 11 44 43 14

10 P10 56 42 65 47 6 -21 -31 -40 5 100 61 3 55 37 48 76 70 39 -19 -26 -10 -25 63 63 -36 42 43 -2 -3 43

11 P11 66 44 66 42 -1 -41 -25 -51 5 61 100 -4 50 24 49 80 69 39 -7 0 -3 -20 66 47 -42 64 40 -15 4 38

12 P12 -16 10 -8 2 29 39 20 20 30 3 -4 100 15 21 1 -11 -18 13 41 41 23 10 15 2 35 -8 18 36 14 -1

13 P13 47 34 65 47 18 -17 -14 -22 23 55 50 15 100 39 50 55 54 43 6 -3 22 8 53 49 -13 39 46 11 14 43

14 P14 40 3 27 48 14 0 17 6 24 37 24 21 39 100 53 31 31 53 -5 -4 16 14 56 33 16 31 34 40 11 22

15 P15 65 22 42 58 -2 -2 8 -28 5 48 49 1 50 53 100 64 47 54 -11 -12 6 -20 55 64 -9 48 58 3 3 22

16 P16 72 44 62 56 -14 -38 -40 -63 -4 76 80 -11 55 31 64 100 78 49 -30 -26 -8 -19 61 66 -50 67 52 -18 -5 41

17 P17 73 32 70 47 -4 -42 -37 -42 12 70 69 -18 54 31 47 78 100 45 -29 -21 7 -13 57 58 -44 62 45 -7 -10 44

18 P18 49 33 42 58 -15 -13 -5 -34 6 39 39 13 43 53 54 49 45 100 -16 -15 -5 -11 39 57 -20 41 57 17 -6 25

19 P19 -25 -19 -13 -10 41 32 44 43 25 -19 -7 41 6 -5 -11 -30 -29 -16 100 53 40 18 -3 -15 41 -11 -7 21 26 18

20 P20 -21 -13 -16 -12 37 34 40 25 38 -26 0 41 -3 -4 -12 -26 -21 -15 53 100 54 36 -2 -40 37 1 -8 33 41 10

21 P21 -1 -13 -13 3 29 25 35 44 60 -10 -3 23 22 16 6 -8 7 -5 40 54 100 38 0 -13 27 -6 -2 25 31 16

22 P22 -14 -16 -28 -10 14 12 23 35 41 -25 -20 10 8 14 -20 -19 -13 -11 18 36 38 100 -16 -33 26 -5 -13 52 33 14

23 P23 62 29 60 52 3 -26 -22 -29 14 63 66 15 53 56 55 61 57 39 -3 -2 0 -16 100 51 -22 58 50 5 10 31

24 P24 68 44 56 49 -12 -27 -29 -31 -4 63 47 2 49 33 64 66 58 57 -15 -40 -13 -33 51 100 -41 49 62 -10 -17 25

25 P25 -32 -40 -33 -12 40 73 58 56 35 -36 -42 35 -13 16 -9 -50 -44 -20 41 37 27 26 -22 -41 100 -39 -10 46 30 -9

26 P26 75 23 52 51 -14 -39 -17 -39 2 42 64 -8 39 31 48 67 62 41 -11 1 -6 -5 58 49 -39 100 41 -17 -4 32

27 P27 52 43 48 59 4 4 -16 -29 11 43 40 18 46 34 58 52 45 57 -7 -8 -2 -13 50 62 -10 41 100 16 6 23

28 P28 -18 -2 0 7 47 37 40 44 44 -2 -15 36 11 40 3 -18 -7 17 21 33 25 52 5 -10 46 -17 16 100 38 7

29 P29 -11 10 -9 -2 10 1 27 39 43 -3 4 14 14 11 3 -5 -10 -6 26 41 31 33 10 -17 30 -4 6 38 100 -9

30 P30 38 -4 35 39 20 9 -8 -18 14 43 38 -1 43 22 22 41 44 25 18 10 16 14 31 25 -9 32 23 7 -9 100

31 P31 56 27 43 49 -11 -19 -16 -28 -4 55 55 32 40 53 63 56 47 49 -1 -13 -17 -17 70 57 -15 43 45 7 -11 26

32 P32 56 14 41 40 14 -20 -6 -20 14 48 48 9 35 37 50 46 45 33 9 -9 15 -26 49 48 -18 40 28 -10 -14 19

33 P33 -30 -39 -20 -6 53 58 52 40 33 -18 -24 33 -19 13 -17 -39 -38 -14 43 45 30 20 -13 -32 59 -31 -10 38 9 20

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 2

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Correlation Matrix Between Sorts

SORTS 31 32 33

1 P1 56 56 -30

2 P2 27 14 -39

3 P3 43 41 -20

4 P4 49 40 -6

5 P5 -11 14 53

6 P6 -19 -20 58

7 P7 -16 -6 52

8 P8 -28 -20 40

9 P9 -4 14 33

10 P10 55 48 -18

11 P11 55 48 -24

12 P12 32 9 33

13 P13 40 35 -19

14 P14 53 37 13

15 P15 63 50 -17

16 P16 56 46 -39

17 P17 47 45 -38

18 P18 49 33 -14

19 P19 -1 9 43

20 P20 -13 -9 45

21 P21 -17 15 30

22 P22 -17 -26 20

23 P23 70 49 -13

24 P24 57 48 -32

25 P25 -15 -18 59

26 P26 43 40 -31

27 P27 45 28 -10

28 P28 7 -10 38

29 P29 -11 -14 9

30 P30 26 19 20

31 P31 100 49 -11

32 P32 49 100 -6

33 P33 -11 -6 100

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 3

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Unrotated Factor Matrix

Factors

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

SORTS

1 P1 0.7929 0.2504 0.0875 0.0078 -0.0136 -0.2148 0.0237

2 P2 0.4724 0.0150 0.0863 0.0076 -0.0257 0.1356 0.0160

3 P3 0.7205 0.2442 -0.1587 0.0222 -0.1308 0.2334 0.0536

4 P4 0.5712 0.4323 0.0477 0.0025 0.1768 0.1588 0.0400

5 P5 -0.2877 0.5225 -0.2806 0.0751 -0.0054 0.1988 0.0309

6 P6 -0.5091 0.3422 -0.2031 0.0374 0.3398 0.2269 0.1168

7 P7 -0.5144 0.4190 0.0229 0.0007 0.2329 -0.1454 0.0435

8 P8 -0.6838 0.2838 0.2288 0.0526 0.0414 -0.1464 0.0105

9 P9 -0.2245 0.6281 0.2090 0.0439 -0.2142 -0.0137 0.0301

10 P10 0.7149 0.2988 -0.1481 0.0192 -0.0768 0.1732 0.0281

11 P11 0.7170 0.2866 -0.1257 0.0136 -0.3634 -0.1254 0.0962

12 P12 -0.1753 0.4639 -0.2311 0.0493 0.1551 -0.0285 0.0143

13 P13 0.4919 0.5083 0.0362 0.0016 -0.2247 0.1600 0.0549

14 P14 0.2780 0.5725 0.1444 0.0209 0.3118 -0.0534 0.0622

15 P15 0.5998 0.4313 0.1219 0.0149 0.2979 -0.1511 0.0672

16 P16 0.8788 0.2005 0.0020 0.0000 -0.1736 0.0326 0.0216

17 P17 0.7711 0.2369 0.0616 0.0040 -0.2937 0.0620 0.0619

18 P18 0.5594 0.3178 0.2241 0.0504 0.3357 0.0883 0.0802

19 P19 -0.3927 0.4453 -0.3065 0.0913 -0.0661 -0.1826 0.0193

20 P20 -0.4484 0.4803 -0.0975 0.0080 -0.3389 -0.1546 0.0889

21 P21 -0.2788 0.5311 0.1649 0.0271 -0.2629 -0.1041 0.0501

22 P22 -0.3641 0.2803 0.3857 0.1644 -0.2455 0.0537 0.0437

23 P23 0.6386 0.4483 -0.1242 0.0132 -0.0317 -0.2273 0.0276

24 P24 0.7675 0.1996 0.0850 0.0074 0.2113 0.0198 0.0284

25 P25 -0.6286 0.4272 -0.0449 0.0014 0.2920 -0.0155 0.0537

26 P26 0.6629 0.2275 0.0591 0.0037 -0.1789 -0.2086 0.0438

27 P27 0.5214 0.4200 0.1022 0.0106 0.1690 0.2090 0.0519

28 P28 -0.2891 0.5896 0.1587 0.0252 0.1040 0.2554 0.0561

29 P29 -0.2292 0.3675 0.3094 0.0997 -0.2463 -0.1357 0.0485

30 P30 0.2734 0.3910 -0.1428 0.0178 -0.2159 0.2976 0.0994

31 P31 0.6111 0.3572 -0.1721 0.0263 0.2889 -0.2357 0.0835

32 P32 0.4794 0.3265 -0.1257 0.0136 0.0002 -0.2637 0.0374

33 P33 -0.5135 0.4315 -0.3858 0.1551 0.1585 0.0581 0.0192

Eigenvalues 9.9830 5.2035 1.0948 0.0909 1.5608 0.8995 0.1010

% expl.Var. 30 16 3 0 5 3 0

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 4

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Cumulative Communalities Matrix

Factors 1 Thru ....

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

SORTS

1 P1 0.6287 0.6914 0.6990 0.6991 0.6993 0.7454 0.7460

2 P2 0.2231 0.2234 0.2308 0.2309 0.2315 0.2499 0.2502

3 P3 0.5191 0.5787 0.6039 0.6044 0.6215 0.6760 0.6789

4 P4 0.3263 0.5132 0.5155 0.5155 0.5468 0.5720 0.5736

5 P5 0.0828 0.3558 0.4346 0.4402 0.4403 0.4798 0.4807

6 P6 0.2592 0.3763 0.4176 0.4190 0.5344 0.5859 0.5995

7 P7 0.2646 0.4401 0.4406 0.4406 0.4949 0.5160 0.5179

8 P8 0.4675 0.5481 0.6004 0.6032 0.6049 0.6263 0.6264

9 P9 0.0504 0.4449 0.4886 0.4906 0.5364 0.5366 0.5375

10 P10 0.5111 0.6004 0.6223 0.6226 0.6285 0.6585 0.6593

11 P11 0.5141 0.5962 0.6120 0.6122 0.7442 0.7600 0.7692

12 P12 0.0307 0.2459 0.2993 0.3018 0.3258 0.3266 0.3268

13 P13 0.2419 0.5003 0.5016 0.5016 0.5521 0.5776 0.5807

14 P14 0.0773 0.4051 0.4259 0.4264 0.5236 0.5264 0.5303

15 P15 0.3597 0.5457 0.5606 0.5608 0.6496 0.6724 0.6769

16 P16 0.7722 0.8124 0.8124 0.8124 0.8425 0.8436 0.8441

17 P17 0.5946 0.6507 0.6545 0.6545 0.7408 0.7447 0.7485

18 P18 0.3129 0.4139 0.4641 0.4666 0.5793 0.5871 0.5935

19 P19 0.1542 0.3525 0.4465 0.4548 0.4592 0.4925 0.4929

20 P20 0.2011 0.4318 0.4413 0.4414 0.5562 0.5801 0.5880

21 P21 0.0777 0.3598 0.3870 0.3877 0.4568 0.4677 0.4702

22 P22 0.1326 0.2112 0.3599 0.3870 0.4472 0.4501 0.4520

23 P23 0.4079 0.6088 0.6242 0.6244 0.6254 0.6771 0.6778

24 P24 0.5890 0.6289 0.6361 0.6362 0.6808 0.6812 0.6820

25 P25 0.3951 0.5776 0.5796 0.5797 0.6649 0.6652 0.6680

26 P26 0.4395 0.4913 0.4948 0.4948 0.5268 0.5703 0.5722

27 P27 0.2718 0.4482 0.4586 0.4588 0.4873 0.5310 0.5337

28 P28 0.0836 0.4312 0.4564 0.4570 0.4679 0.5331 0.5362

29 P29 0.0525 0.1876 0.2833 0.2933 0.3539 0.3724 0.3747

30 P30 0.0748 0.2276 0.2480 0.2484 0.2950 0.3835 0.3934

31 P31 0.3735 0.5011 0.5307 0.5314 0.6149 0.6704 0.6774

32 P32 0.2298 0.3365 0.3522 0.3524 0.3524 0.4219 0.4233

33 P33 0.2637 0.4499 0.5987 0.6228 0.6479 0.6513 0.6516

cum% expl.Var. 30 46 49 50 54 57 57

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 5

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Matrix with an X Indicating a Defining Sort

Loadings

QSORT 1 2 3 4

1 P1 0.6746X -0.2946 -0.0301 0.4190

2 P2 0.2676 -0.2491 -0.0999 0.2941

3 P3 0.3866 -0.1118 -0.1600 0.6924X

4 P4 0.6133X 0.0432 -0.0225 0.3870

5 P5 -0.0545 0.6285X 0.1992 0.1864

6 P6 -0.0782 0.6966X 0.0551 -0.2047

7 P7 0.0494 0.5360X 0.3250 -0.3398

8 P8 -0.1670 0.3614 0.5195 -0.4444

9 P9 0.0996 0.2980 0.6471X 0.1181

10 P10 0.4545 -0.0738 -0.1406 0.6485X

11 P11 0.3890 -0.2175 0.0437 0.7079X

12 P12 0.1432 0.5363X 0.1135 0.0394

13 P13 0.3871 0.0040 0.2247 0.6054X

14 P14 0.6525X 0.2309 0.1769 0.0858

15 P15 0.7973X -0.0062 0.0019 0.2020

16 P16 0.5319 -0.3404 -0.0973 0.6586X

17 P17 0.4286 -0.3342 0.0470 0.6715X

18 P18 0.7016X -0.0682 -0.0337 0.1665

19 P19 -0.0896 0.5828X 0.2588 0.0195

20 P20 -0.2062 0.4272 0.5362X 0.0929

21 P21 0.0099 0.2635 0.6204X 0.0733

22 P22 -0.1347 0.0661 0.6251X -0.0904

23 P23 0.6148X 0.0052 0.0148 0.4829

24 P24 0.6896X -0.2123 -0.1882 0.3397

25 P25 -0.0368 0.6659X 0.2817 -0.3637

26 P26 0.4901 -0.2836 0.0593 0.4504

27 P27 0.5735X 0.0335 0.0171 0.3578

28 P28 0.1248 0.4656 0.4316 -0.0017

29 P29 0.0188 0.0706 0.6044 -0.0244

30 P30 0.1255 0.1567 0.1074 0.5616X

31 P31 0.7175X 0.0959 -0.1966 0.2739

32 P32 0.4877X 0.0139 -0.0099 0.3277

33 P33 -0.1345 0.7791X 0.1130 -0.0687

% expl.Var. 18 13 9 15

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 6

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Free Distribution Data Results

QSORT MEAN ST.DEV.

1 P1 0.000 2.779

2 P2 0.000 2.779

3 P3 0.000 2.779

4 P4 0.000 2.779

5 P5 0.000 2.779

6 P6 0.000 2.779

7 P7 0.000 2.779

8 P8 0.000 2.779

9 P9 0.000 2.779

10 P10 0.000 2.779

11 P11 0.000 2.779

12 P12 0.000 2.779

13 P13 0.000 2.779

14 P14 0.000 2.779

15 P15 0.000 2.779

16 P16 0.000 2.779

17 P17 0.000 2.779

18 P18 0.000 2.779

19 P19 0.000 2.779

20 P20 0.000 2.779

21 P21 0.000 2.779

22 P22 0.000 2.779

23 P23 0.000 2.779

24 P24 0.000 2.779

25 P25 0.000 2.779

26 P26 0.000 2.779

27 P27 0.000 2.779

28 P28 0.000 2.779

29 P29 0.000 2.779

30 P30 0.000 2.779

31 P31 0.000 2.779

32 P32 0.000 2.779

33 P33 1.308 4.873

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 7

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Scores with Corresponding Ranks

Factors

No. Statement No. 1 2 3 4

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from pr 1 0.15 26 1.26 5 1.94 2 -0.04 30

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 0.31 22 -0.38 34 1.32 6 0.84 12

3 Hunting is an important British tradition 3 -2.04 51 0.62 16 0.60 16 -1.71 50

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t th 4 0.14 28 1.95 2 0.10 22 -0.43 35

5 If hunt supporters listened more to people in their ow 5 0.37 20 -1.40 49 -1.02 45 0.39 19

6 Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand an 6 1.01 8 0.53 17 1.36 5 0.89 9

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude 7 0.09 29 1.42 4 0.74 12 0.28 23

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 0.49 17 1.11 8 0.04 23 0.45 18

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s i 9 -0.50 38 0.95 10 -0.61 38 -0.97 43

10 The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re 10 -0.11 33 0.03 27 -0.53 37 -0.40 34

11 There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression aro 11 0.84 11 -1.32 48 -1.10 47 0.48 17

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 -0.63 40 0.47 19 1.27 7 1.08 7

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human 13 0.19 25 -0.65 38 1.58 4 1.43 4

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if 14 0.00 30 -1.29 47 -0.18 30 0.17 25

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in 15 -0.45 37 0.38 22 0.76 11 -1.37 46

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that 16 0.56 16 -0.62 37 0.79 10 0.37 20

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 0.62 15 1.20 6 1.64 3 -0.00 29

18 During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cau 18 0.25 24 0.28 24 -0.07 27 0.26 24

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less 19 0.33 21 -0.25 32 0.11 21 0.09 27

20 Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – 20 -1.51 49 -1.22 43 -1.03 46 -1.55 47

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people liv 21 -1.40 46 0.73 13 0.50 19 -0.75 39

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting s 22 0.88 10 -1.82 51 -2.31 52 1.55 3

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of control 23 -2.07 52 0.73 14 -0.19 31 -1.78 52

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of 24 -1.71 50 1.06 9 -0.16 29 -1.60 49

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 1.10 6 2.03 1 0.68 14 0.78 14

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting 26 0.14 27 -1.21 42 -2.05 50 0.34 21

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘t 27 -0.04 32 -1.23 44 -0.87 42 -0.57 36

28 Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are toward 28 -0.13 34 0.46 20 -0.11 28 -0.24 32

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals 29 2.25 1 0.76 12 0.04 24 2.36 1

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a cl 30 -1.46 47 -0.21 31 -0.25 33 -0.93 42

31 Some people in the hunting community have a really arr 31 0.48 18 0.06 26 -0.27 34 0.82 13

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had b 32 0.77 12 -1.23 45 -1.19 48 1.28 5

33 The hunting community should have more of a say in dec 33 -1.36 44 0.17 25 -0.30 35 -1.15 45

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-huntin 34 -0.41 36 -0.73 39 -0.00 25 0.87 11

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of 35 -0.85 41 -0.07 30 0.58 17 -0.78 40

36 My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal 36 0.74 13 0.29 23 -0.23 32 -0.62 38

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the 37 1.43 3 -0.04 29 -0.41 36 0.33 22

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can ne 38 0.39 19 -0.01 28 0.55 18 -0.93 41

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 -1.02 42 1.13 7 0.85 9 -1.58 48

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for f 40 1.04 7 -0.97 41 0.69 13 -0.35 33

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as 41 0.26 23 -1.26 46 -0.86 41 1.05 8

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing 42 -0.62 39 -0.27 33 -1.29 49 0.66 16

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 -1.36 45 0.89 11 -0.87 43 -1.77 51

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Scores with Corresponding Ranks

Factors

No. Statement No. 1 2 3 4

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need t 44 0.67 14 -1.87 52 -0.63 39 0.02 28

45 Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong 45 -1.49 48 0.46 21 0.43 20 -1.09 44

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ p 46 0.89 9 0.49 18 -0.78 40 0.73 15

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteris 47 -1.29 43 -0.54 36 -0.07 26 -0.59 37

48 Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them al 48 -0.02 31 0.70 15 0.64 15 -0.20 31

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -0.15 35 -0.84 40 2.17 1 1.18 6

50 There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised s 50 1.81 2 -1.75 50 -2.10 51 1.64 2

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range o 51 1.32 4 1.46 3 1.05 8 0.14 26

52 Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particu 52 1.12 5 -0.43 35 -0.95 44 0.89 10

Correlations Between Factor Scores

1 2 3 4

1 1.0000 -0.1693 -0.0867 0.7577

2 -0.1693 1.0000 0.5127 -0.3164

3 -0.0867 0.5127 1.0000 -0.0751

4 0.7577 -0.3164 -0.0751 1.0000

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 9

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Scores -- For Factor 1

No. Statement No. Z-SCORES

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 2.247

50 There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society 50 1.810

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse 37 1.435

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of peop 51 1.321

52 Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particularly 52 1.123

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 1.099

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 1.043

6 Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and inte 6 1.008

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspec 46 0.888

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 0.877

11 There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression around hu 11 0.836

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 0.765

36 My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is ki 36 0.736

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 0.667

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 0.625

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that peopl 16 0.557

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 0.488

31 Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant 31 0.481

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never qu 38 0.392

5 If hunt supporters listened more to people in their own loca 5 0.369

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disru 19 0.334

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 0.307

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 0.264

18 During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause dam 18 0.252

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 0.185

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 0.152

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 0.142

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think ra 4 0.136

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude and a 7 0.088

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is 14 0.003

48 Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the 48 -0.023

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-h 27 -0.044

10 The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrena 10 -0.108

28 Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are towards the 28 -0.133

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -0.145

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting camp 34 -0.410

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 -0.447

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s investm 9 -0.504

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 -0.617

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 -0.634

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 -0.852

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 -1.016

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, 47 -1.293

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 10

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Scores -- For Factor 1

No. Statement No. Z-SCORES

33 The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding 33 -1.360

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 -1.360

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 -1.400

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -1.459

45 Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong thing 45 -1.495

20 Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like p 20 -1.506

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 -1.710

3 Hunting is an important British tradition 3 -2.039

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 -2.075

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 11

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Scores -- For Factor 2

No. Statement No. Z-SCORES

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 2.027

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think ra 4 1.951

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of peop 51 1.462

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude and a 7 1.419

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 1.263

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 1.196

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 1.134

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 1.110

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 1.055

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s investm 9 0.947

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 0.885

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 0.761

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 0.729

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 0.726

48 Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the 48 0.700

3 Hunting is an important British tradition 3 0.621

6 Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and inte 6 0.527

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspec 46 0.486

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 0.467

28 Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are towards the 28 0.464

45 Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong thing 45 0.457

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 0.379

36 My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is ki 36 0.294

18 During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause dam 18 0.283

33 The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding 33 0.170

31 Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant 31 0.061

10 The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrena 10 0.035

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never qu 38 -0.006

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse 37 -0.040

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 -0.071

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -0.206

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disru 19 -0.254

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 -0.270

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 -0.378

52 Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particularly 52 -0.433

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, 47 -0.544

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that peopl 16 -0.621

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 -0.650

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting camp 34 -0.727

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -0.842

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 -0.968

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 -1.211

20 Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like p 20 -1.218

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 12

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Scores -- For Factor 2

No. Statement No. Z-SCORES

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-h 27 -1.230

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 -1.234

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 -1.262

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is 14 -1.285

11 There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression around hu 11 -1.319

5 If hunt supporters listened more to people in their own loca 5 -1.396

50 There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society 50 -1.751

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 -1.820

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 -1.868

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 13

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Scores -- For Factor 3

No. Statement No. Z-SCORES

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 2.170

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 1.940

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 1.640

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 1.584

6 Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and inte 6 1.362

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 1.322

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 1.274

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of peop 51 1.049

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 0.848

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that peopl 16 0.790

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 0.761

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude and a 7 0.736

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 0.692

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 0.678

48 Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the 48 0.640

3 Hunting is an important British tradition 3 0.601

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 0.584

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never qu 38 0.547

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 0.496

45 Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong thing 45 0.428

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disru 19 0.108

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think ra 4 0.103

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 0.044

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 0.043

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting camp 34 -0.004

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, 47 -0.068

18 During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause dam 18 -0.073

28 Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are towards the 28 -0.109

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 -0.163

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is 14 -0.183

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 -0.189

36 My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is ki 36 -0.226

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -0.249

31 Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant 31 -0.269

33 The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding 33 -0.299

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse 37 -0.412

10 The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrena 10 -0.533

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s investm 9 -0.609

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 -0.630

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspec 46 -0.776

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 -0.864

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-h 27 -0.868

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 -0.871

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Scores -- For Factor 3

No. Statement No. Z-SCORES

52 Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particularly 52 -0.948

5 If hunt supporters listened more to people in their own loca 5 -1.024

20 Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like p 20 -1.026

11 There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression around hu 11 -1.103

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 -1.187

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 -1.293

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 -2.051

50 There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society 50 -2.098

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 -2.314

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 15

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Scores -- For Factor 4

No. Statement No. Z-SCORES

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 2.356

50 There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society 50 1.642

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 1.553

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 1.429

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 1.283

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 1.185

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 1.080

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 1.054

6 Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and inte 6 0.893

52 Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particularly 52 0.889

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting camp 34 0.871

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 0.845

31 Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant 31 0.822

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 0.775

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspec 46 0.726

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 0.662

11 There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression around hu 11 0.483

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 0.454

5 If hunt supporters listened more to people in their own loca 5 0.393

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that peopl 16 0.367

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 0.335

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse 37 0.332

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude and a 7 0.283

18 During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause dam 18 0.257

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is 14 0.167

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of peop 51 0.145

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disru 19 0.089

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 0.016

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 -0.001

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 -0.037

48 Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the 48 -0.202

28 Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are towards the 28 -0.240

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 -0.351

10 The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrena 10 -0.402

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think ra 4 -0.425

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-h 27 -0.566

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, 47 -0.586

36 My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is ki 36 -0.621

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 -0.752

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 -0.779

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never qu 38 -0.930

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -0.934

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s investm 9 -0.966

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Scores -- For Factor 4

No. Statement No. Z-SCORES

45 Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong thing 45 -1.095

33 The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding 33 -1.148

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 -1.369

20 Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like p 20 -1.549

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 -1.581

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 -1.601

3 Hunting is an important British tradition 3 -1.709

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 -1.768

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 -1.776

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 17

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 1 and 2

No. Statement No. Type 1 Type 2 Difference

50 There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society 50 1.810 -1.751 3.560

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 0.877 -1.820 2.697

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 0.667 -1.868 2.536

11 There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression around hu 11 0.836 -1.319 2.155

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 1.043 -0.968 2.011

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 0.765 -1.234 1.999

5 If hunt supporters listened more to people in their own loca 5 0.369 -1.396 1.765

52 Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particularly 52 1.123 -0.433 1.556

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 0.264 -1.262 1.527

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 2.247 0.761 1.486

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse 37 1.435 -0.040 1.475

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 0.142 -1.211 1.353

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is 14 0.003 -1.285 1.288

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-h 27 -0.044 -1.230 1.186

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that peopl 16 0.557 -0.621 1.178

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 0.185 -0.650 0.835

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -0.145 -0.842 0.697

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 0.307 -0.378 0.685

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disru 19 0.334 -0.254 0.588

6 Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and inte 6 1.008 0.527 0.481

36 My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is ki 36 0.736 0.294 0.443

31 Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant 31 0.481 0.061 0.420

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspec 46 0.888 0.486 0.402

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never qu 38 0.392 -0.006 0.398

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting camp 34 -0.410 -0.727 0.317

18 During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause dam 18 0.252 0.283 -0.031

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of peop 51 1.321 1.462 -0.141

10 The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrena 10 -0.108 0.035 -0.143

20 Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like p 20 -1.506 -1.218 -0.288

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 -0.617 -0.270 -0.347

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 0.625 1.196 -0.571

28 Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are towards the 28 -0.133 0.464 -0.597

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 0.488 1.110 -0.622

48 Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the 48 -0.023 0.700 -0.723

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, 47 -1.293 -0.544 -0.749

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 -0.852 -0.071 -0.781

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 -0.447 0.379 -0.826

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 1.099 2.027 -0.928

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 -0.634 0.467 -1.101

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 0.152 1.263 -1.111

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -1.459 -0.206 -1.253

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude and a 7 0.088 1.419 -1.331

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s investm 9 -0.504 0.947 -1.451

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 1 and 2

No. Statement No. Type 1 Type 2 Difference

33 The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding 33 -1.360 0.170 -1.530

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think ra 4 0.136 1.951 -1.815

45 Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong thing 45 -1.495 0.457 -1.952

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 -1.400 0.729 -2.129

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 -1.016 1.134 -2.150

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 -1.360 0.885 -2.245

3 Hunting is an important British tradition 3 -2.039 0.621 -2.660

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 -1.710 1.055 -2.765

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 -2.075 0.726 -2.801

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 1 and 3

No. Statement No. Type 1 Type 3 Difference

50 There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society 50 1.810 -2.098 3.908

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 0.877 -2.314 3.192

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 2.247 0.043 2.204

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 0.142 -2.051 2.192

52 Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particularly 52 1.123 -0.948 2.071

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 0.765 -1.187 1.952

11 There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression around hu 11 0.836 -1.103 1.939

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse 37 1.435 -0.412 1.847

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspec 46 0.888 -0.776 1.663

5 If hunt supporters listened more to people in their own loca 5 0.369 -1.024 1.394

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 0.667 -0.630 1.297

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 0.264 -0.864 1.128

36 My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is ki 36 0.736 -0.226 0.963

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-h 27 -0.044 -0.868 0.824

31 Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant 31 0.481 -0.269 0.751

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 -0.617 -1.293 0.675

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 0.488 0.044 0.445

10 The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrena 10 -0.108 -0.533 0.425

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 1.099 0.678 0.421

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 1.043 0.692 0.351

18 During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause dam 18 0.252 -0.073 0.325

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of peop 51 1.321 1.049 0.273

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disru 19 0.334 0.108 0.226

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is 14 0.003 -0.183 0.186

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s investm 9 -0.504 -0.609 0.105

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think ra 4 0.136 0.103 0.033

28 Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are towards the 28 -0.133 -0.109 -0.024

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never qu 38 0.392 0.547 -0.155

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that peopl 16 0.557 0.790 -0.233

6 Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and inte 6 1.008 1.362 -0.354

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting camp 34 -0.410 -0.004 -0.406

20 Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like p 20 -1.506 -1.026 -0.480

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 -1.360 -0.871 -0.489

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude and a 7 0.088 0.736 -0.649

48 Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the 48 -0.023 0.640 -0.663

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 0.625 1.640 -1.015

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 0.307 1.322 -1.015

33 The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding 33 -1.360 -0.299 -1.061

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 -0.447 0.761 -1.208

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -1.459 -0.249 -1.210

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, 47 -1.293 -0.068 -1.226

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 0.185 1.584 -1.399

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 -0.852 0.584 -1.436

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 1 and 3

No. Statement No. Type 1 Type 3 Difference

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 -1.710 -0.163 -1.547

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 0.152 1.940 -1.788

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 -1.016 0.848 -1.863

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 -2.075 -0.189 -1.886

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 -1.400 0.496 -1.896

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 -0.634 1.274 -1.908

45 Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong thing 45 -1.495 0.428 -1.923

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -0.145 2.170 -2.315

3 Hunting is an important British tradition 3 -2.039 0.601 -2.640

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 1 and 4

No. Statement No. Type 1 Type 4 Difference

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 1.043 -0.351 1.394

36 My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is ki 36 0.736 -0.621 1.357

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never qu 38 0.392 -0.930 1.321

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of peop 51 1.321 0.145 1.177

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse 37 1.435 0.332 1.103

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 -0.447 -1.369 0.923

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 0.667 0.016 0.651

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 0.625 -0.001 0.626

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 -1.016 -1.581 0.565

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think ra 4 0.136 -0.425 0.562

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-h 27 -0.044 -0.566 0.521

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s investm 9 -0.504 -0.966 0.462

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 -1.360 -1.768 0.408

11 There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression around hu 11 0.836 0.483 0.353

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 1.099 0.775 0.324

10 The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrena 10 -0.108 -0.402 0.293

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disru 19 0.334 0.089 0.244

52 Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particularly 52 1.123 0.889 0.234

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that peopl 16 0.557 0.367 0.190

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 0.152 -0.037 0.189

48 Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the 48 -0.023 -0.202 0.179

50 There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society 50 1.810 1.642 0.168

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspec 46 0.888 0.726 0.161

6 Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and inte 6 1.008 0.893 0.115

28 Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are towards the 28 -0.133 -0.240 0.107

20 Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like p 20 -1.506 -1.549 0.043

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 0.488 0.454 0.035

18 During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause dam 18 0.252 0.257 -0.005

5 If hunt supporters listened more to people in their own loca 5 0.369 0.393 -0.024

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 -0.852 -0.779 -0.073

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 -1.710 -1.601 -0.108

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 2.247 2.356 -0.109

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is 14 0.003 0.167 -0.164

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 0.142 0.335 -0.194

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude and a 7 0.088 0.283 -0.195

33 The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding 33 -1.360 -1.148 -0.212

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 -2.075 -1.776 -0.299

3 Hunting is an important British tradition 3 -2.039 -1.709 -0.330

31 Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant 31 0.481 0.822 -0.341

45 Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong thing 45 -1.495 -1.095 -0.400

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 0.765 1.283 -0.518

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -1.459 -0.934 -0.525

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 0.307 0.845 -0.537

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 22

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 1 and 4

No. Statement No. Type 1 Type 4 Difference

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 -1.400 -0.752 -0.648

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 0.877 1.553 -0.676

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, 47 -1.293 -0.586 -0.707

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 0.264 1.054 -0.790

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 0.185 1.429 -1.244

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 -0.617 0.662 -1.279

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting camp 34 -0.410 0.871 -1.281

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -0.145 1.185 -1.330

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 -0.634 1.080 -1.714

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 23

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 2 and 3

No. Statement No. Type 2 Type 3 Difference

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think ra 4 1.951 0.103 1.848

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 0.885 -0.871 1.756

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s investm 9 0.947 -0.609 1.556

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 2.027 0.678 1.349

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspec 46 0.486 -0.776 1.261

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 1.055 -0.163 1.218

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 1.110 0.044 1.067

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 -0.270 -1.293 1.023

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 0.726 -0.189 0.915

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 -1.211 -2.051 0.839

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 0.761 0.043 0.717

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude and a 7 1.419 0.736 0.683

28 Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are towards the 28 0.464 -0.109 0.572

10 The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrena 10 0.035 -0.533 0.568

36 My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is ki 36 0.294 -0.226 0.520

52 Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particularly 52 -0.433 -0.948 0.515

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 -1.820 -2.314 0.494

33 The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding 33 0.170 -0.299 0.469

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of peop 51 1.462 1.049 0.413

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse 37 -0.040 -0.412 0.372

18 During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause dam 18 0.283 -0.073 0.356

50 There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society 50 -1.751 -2.098 0.348

31 Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant 31 0.061 -0.269 0.330

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 1.134 0.848 0.286

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 0.729 0.496 0.234

48 Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the 48 0.700 0.640 0.061

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -0.206 -0.249 0.043

45 Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong thing 45 0.457 0.428 0.029

3 Hunting is an important British tradition 3 0.621 0.601 0.020

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 -1.234 -1.187 -0.047

20 Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like p 20 -1.218 -1.026 -0.192

11 There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression around hu 11 -1.319 -1.103 -0.216

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disru 19 -0.254 0.108 -0.362

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-h 27 -1.230 -0.868 -0.362

5 If hunt supporters listened more to people in their own loca 5 -1.396 -1.024 -0.372

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 0.379 0.761 -0.382

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 -1.262 -0.864 -0.399

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 1.196 1.640 -0.444

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, 47 -0.544 -0.068 -0.476

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never qu 38 -0.006 0.547 -0.553

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 -0.071 0.584 -0.656

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 1.263 1.940 -0.677

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting camp 34 -0.727 -0.004 -0.723

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 2 and 3

No. Statement No. Type 2 Type 3 Difference

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 0.467 1.274 -0.807

6 Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and inte 6 0.527 1.362 -0.835

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is 14 -1.285 -0.183 -1.102

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 -1.868 -0.630 -1.239

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that peopl 16 -0.621 0.790 -1.411

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 -0.968 0.692 -1.660

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 -0.378 1.322 -1.701

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 -0.650 1.584 -2.234

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -0.842 2.170 -3.012

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 2 and 4

No. Statement No. Type 2 Type 4 Difference

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 1.134 -1.581 2.715

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 1.055 -1.601 2.657

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 0.885 -1.768 2.654

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 0.726 -1.776 2.501

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think ra 4 1.951 -0.425 2.376

3 Hunting is an important British tradition 3 0.621 -1.709 2.330

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s investm 9 0.947 -0.966 1.912

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 0.379 -1.369 1.748

45 Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong thing 45 0.457 -1.095 1.552

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 0.729 -0.752 1.481

33 The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding 33 0.170 -1.148 1.318

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of peop 51 1.462 0.145 1.317

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 1.263 -0.037 1.300

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 2.027 0.775 1.252

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 1.196 -0.001 1.197

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude and a 7 1.419 0.283 1.136

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never qu 38 -0.006 -0.930 0.923

36 My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is ki 36 0.294 -0.621 0.915

48 Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the 48 0.700 -0.202 0.903

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -0.206 -0.934 0.728

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 -0.071 -0.779 0.708

28 Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are towards the 28 0.464 -0.240 0.704

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 1.110 0.454 0.657

10 The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrena 10 0.035 -0.402 0.436

20 Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like p 20 -1.218 -1.549 0.331

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, 47 -0.544 -0.586 0.042

18 During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause dam 18 0.283 0.257 0.026

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspec 46 0.486 0.726 -0.241

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disru 19 -0.254 0.089 -0.343

6 Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and inte 6 0.527 0.893 -0.366

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse 37 -0.040 0.332 -0.372

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 0.467 1.080 -0.614

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 -0.968 -0.351 -0.617

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-h 27 -1.230 -0.566 -0.665

31 Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant 31 0.061 0.822 -0.761

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 -0.270 0.662 -0.932

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that peopl 16 -0.621 0.367 -0.988

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 -0.378 0.845 -1.223

52 Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particularly 52 -0.433 0.889 -1.322

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is 14 -1.285 0.167 -1.452

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 -1.211 0.335 -1.547

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 0.761 2.356 -1.596

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting camp 34 -0.727 0.871 -1.598

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 2 and 4

No. Statement No. Type 2 Type 4 Difference

5 If hunt supporters listened more to people in their own loca 5 -1.396 0.393 -1.789

11 There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression around hu 11 -1.319 0.483 -1.802

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 -1.868 0.016 -1.884

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -0.842 1.185 -2.027

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 -0.650 1.429 -2.079

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 -1.262 1.054 -2.317

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 -1.234 1.283 -2.517

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 -1.820 1.553 -3.373

50 There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society 50 -1.751 1.642 -3.392

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Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 3 and 4

No. Statement No. Type 3 Type 4 Difference

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 0.848 -1.581 2.428

3 Hunting is an important British tradition 3 0.601 -1.709 2.310

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 0.761 -1.369 2.131

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 1.940 -0.037 1.977

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 1.640 -0.001 1.641

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 -0.189 -1.776 1.586

45 Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong thing 45 0.428 -1.095 1.522

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never qu 38 0.547 -0.930 1.477

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 -0.163 -1.601 1.439

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 0.584 -0.779 1.364

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 0.496 -0.752 1.248

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 0.692 -0.351 1.043

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 2.170 1.185 0.985

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of peop 51 1.049 0.145 0.904

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 -0.871 -1.768 0.898

33 The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding 33 -0.299 -1.148 0.850

48 Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the 48 0.640 -0.202 0.842

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -0.249 -0.934 0.685

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think ra 4 0.103 -0.425 0.528

20 Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like p 20 -1.026 -1.549 0.523

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, 47 -0.068 -0.586 0.518

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 1.322 0.845 0.478

6 Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and inte 6 1.362 0.893 0.469

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude and a 7 0.736 0.283 0.453

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that peopl 16 0.790 0.367 0.423

36 My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is ki 36 -0.226 -0.621 0.394

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s investm 9 -0.609 -0.966 0.357

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 1.274 1.080 0.193

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 1.584 1.429 0.155

28 Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are towards the 28 -0.109 -0.240 0.131

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disru 19 0.108 0.089 0.018

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 0.678 0.775 -0.098

10 The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrena 10 -0.533 -0.402 -0.132

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-h 27 -0.868 -0.566 -0.303

18 During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause dam 18 -0.073 0.257 -0.330

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is 14 -0.183 0.167 -0.350

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 0.044 0.454 -0.410

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 -0.630 0.016 -0.646

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse 37 -0.412 0.332 -0.744

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting camp 34 -0.004 0.871 -0.875

31 Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant 31 -0.269 0.822 -1.091

5 If hunt supporters listened more to people in their own loca 5 -1.024 0.393 -1.417

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspec 46 -0.776 0.726 -1.502

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Descending Array of Differences Between Factors 3 and 4

No. Statement No. Type 3 Type 4 Difference

11 There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression around hu 11 -1.103 0.483 -1.586

52 Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particularly 52 -0.948 0.889 -1.837

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 -0.864 1.054 -1.918

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 -1.293 0.662 -1.955

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 0.043 2.356 -2.313

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 -2.051 0.335 -2.386

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 -1.187 1.283 -2.470

50 There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society 50 -2.098 1.642 -3.740

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 -2.314 1.553 -3.868

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Q-Sort Values for Each Statement

Factor Arrays

No. Statement No. 1 2 3 4

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 0 4 5 0

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 1 -1 4 2

3 Hunting is an important British tradition 3 -5 1 1 -5

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think ra 4 0 5 1 -1

5 If hunt supporters listened more to people in their own loca 5 1 -4 -3 1

6 Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and inte 6 3 1 4 3

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude and a 7 0 4 2 0

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 1 3 0 1

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s investm 9 -2 3 -2 -3

10 The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrena 10 -1 0 -1 -1

11 There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression around hu 11 2 -4 -4 1

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 -2 1 3 3

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 0 -2 4 4

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is 14 0 -4 0 0

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 -1 1 2 -3

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that peopl 16 1 -1 3 1

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 2 4 5 0

18 During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause dam 18 0 0 0 0

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disru 19 1 -1 1 0

20 Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like p 20 -4 -3 -3 -4

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 -3 2 1 -2

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 3 -5 -6 5

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 -6 2 -1 -6

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 -5 3 0 -4

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 4 6 2 2

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 0 -2 -5 1

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-h 27 -1 -3 -2 -1

28 Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are towards the 28 -1 1 0 -1

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 6 2 0 6

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -4 -1 -1 -2

31 Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant 31 1 0 -1 2

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 2 -3 -4 4

33 The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding 33 -3 0 -1 -3

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting camp 34 -1 -2 0 2

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 -2 0 1 -2

36 My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is ki 36 2 0 -1 -2

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse 37 5 0 -1 1

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never qu 38 1 0 1 -2

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 -2 3 3 -4

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 3 -2 2 -1

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 0 -3 -2 3

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 -2 -1 -4 1

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 -3 2 -3 -5

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 2 -6 -2 0

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Factor Arrays

No. Statement No. 1 2 3 4

45 Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong thing 45 -4 1 1 -3

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspec 46 3 1 -2 2

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, 47 -3 -1 0 -1

48 Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the 48 -1 2 2 -1

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -1 -2 6 4

50 There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society 50 5 -5 -5 5

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of peop 51 4 5 3 0

52 Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particularly 52 4 -1 -3 3

Variance = 7.577 St. Dev. = 2.753

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Q-Sort Values for Statements sorted by Consensus vs. Disagreement (Variance across Factor Z-Scores)

Factor Arrays

No. Statement No. 1 2 3 4

18 During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause dam 18 0 0 0 0

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disru 19 1 -1 1 0

20 Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like p 20 -4 -3 -3 -4

10 The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrena 10 -1 0 -1 -1

28 Most of the people who go on an actual hunt are towards the 28 -1 1 0 -1

6 Our impact on the countryside reflects human demand and inte 6 3 1 4 3

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 1 3 0 1

48 Being soft about animals and wanting to cuddle them all the 48 -1 2 2 -1

31 Some people in the hunting community have a really arrogant 31 1 0 -1 2

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-h 27 -1 -3 -2 -1

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, 47 -3 -1 0 -1

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude and a 7 0 4 2 0

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of peop 51 4 5 3 0

36 My main concern about hunting is how the hunted animal is ki 36 2 0 -1 -2

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -4 -1 -1 -2

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 4 6 2 2

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that peopl 16 1 -1 3 1

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is 14 0 -4 0 0

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never qu 38 1 0 1 -2

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 -2 0 1 -2

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting camp 34 -1 -2 0 2

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 2 4 5 0

33 The hunting community should have more of a say in deciding 33 -3 0 -1 -3

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 1 -1 4 2

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspec 46 3 1 -2 2

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse 37 5 0 -1 1

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 -2 -1 -4 1

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s investm 9 -2 3 -2 -3

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 -2 1 3 3

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 3 -2 2 -1

5 If hunt supporters listened more to people in their own loca 5 1 -4 -3 1

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 0 4 5 0

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 -1 1 2 -3

52 Within hunting, I think that terrier work is a particularly 52 4 -1 -3 3

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 -3 2 1 -2

45 Anti-hunting campaigners get worked up about the wrong thing 45 -4 1 1 -3

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think ra 4 0 5 1 -1

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 0 -3 -2 3

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 0 -2 4 4

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 2 -6 -2 0

11 There’s an undercurrent of violence and aggression around hu 11 2 -4 -4 1

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 0 -2 -5 1

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 6 2 0 6

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 -3 2 -3 -5

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 32

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Factor Arrays

No. Statement No. 1 2 3 4

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 2 -3 -4 4

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 -5 3 0 -4

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 -6 2 -1 -6

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 -2 3 3 -4

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -1 -2 6 4

3 Hunting is an important British tradition 3 -5 1 1 -5

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 3 -5 -6 5

50 There is no place for hunting in a modern, civilised society 50 5 -5 -5 5

Factor Characteristics

Factors

1 2 3 4

No. of Defining Variables 10 7 4 7

Average Rel. Coef. 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800

Composite Reliability 0.976 0.966 0.941 0.966

S.E. of Factor Z-Scores 0.156 0.186 0.243 0.186

Standard Errors for Differences in Factor Z-Scores

(Diagonal Entries Are S.E. Within Factors)

Factors 1 2 3 4

1 0.221 0.243 0.288 0.243

2 0.243 0.263 0.305 0.263

3 0.288 0.305 0.343 0.305

4 0.243 0.263 0.305 0.263

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 1

(P < .05 ; Asterisk (\*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

Both the Factor Q-Sort Value (Q-SV) and the Z-Score (Z-SCR) are Shown.

Factors

1 2 3 4

No. Statement No. Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR

37 All animals should be treated equally whether it’s the horse 37 5 1.43\* 0 -0.04 -1 -0.41 1 0.33

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 3 0.88\* -5 -1.82 -6 -2.31 5 1.55

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 2 0.77 -3 -1.23 -4 -1.19 4 1.28

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 2 0.67\* -6 -1.87 -2 -0.63 0 0.02

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 2 0.62 4 1.20 5 1.64 0 -0.00

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 1 0.31 -1 -0.38 4 1.32 2 0.84

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 0 0.26\* -3 -1.26 -2 -0.86 3 1.05

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 0 0.19\* -2 -0.65 4 1.58 4 1.43

27 I usually envision posh, upper class types shouting ‘tally-h 27 -1 -0.04 -3 -1.23 -2 -0.87 -1 -0.57

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -1 -0.15\* -2 -0.84 6 2.17 4 1.18

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 -1 -0.45\* 1 0.38 2 0.76 -3 -1.37

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 -2 -0.63\* 1 0.47 3 1.27 3 1.08

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 -2 -1.02 3 1.13 3 0.85 -4 -1.58

47 It’s silly to say that animals share human characteristics, 47 -3 -1.29\* -1 -0.54 0 -0.07 -1 -0.59

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 -3 -1.40\* 2 0.73 1 0.50 -2 -0.75

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -4 -1.46 -1 -0.21 -1 -0.25 -2 -0.93

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 34

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 2

(P < .05 ; Asterisk (\*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

Both the Factor Q-Sort Value (Q-SV) and the Z-Score (Z-SCR) are Shown.

Factors

1 2 3 4

No. Statement No. Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR

25 I consider myself to be an animal lover 25 4 1.10 6 2.03\* 2 0.68 2 0.78

4 Hunting is such a polarised issue that people don’t think ra 4 0 0.14 5 1.95\* 1 0.10 -1 -0.43

7 People who work with animals have a different attitude and a 7 0 0.09 4 1.42 2 0.74 0 0.28

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 0 0.15 4 1.26 5 1.94 0 -0.04

8 The British countryside isn’t entirely natural 8 1 0.49 3 1.11 0 0.04 1 0.45

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 -5 -1.71 3 1.06\* 0 -0.16 -4 -1.60

9 The British countryside only exists because of man’s investm 9 -2 -0.50 3 0.95\* -2 -0.61 -3 -0.97

43 I think the huntsmen do respect the foxes 43 -3 -1.36 2 0.89\* -3 -0.87 -5 -1.77

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 6 2.25 2 0.76 0 0.04 6 2.36

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 -6 -2.07 2 0.73\* -1 -0.19 -6 -1.78

12 There’s no nice way to kill any animal 12 -2 -0.63 1 0.47 3 1.27 3 1.08

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 -2 -0.85 0 -0.07 1 0.58 -2 -0.78

2 Hunting is dangerous for the horses 2 1 0.31 -1 -0.38\* 4 1.32 2 0.84

16 All the traditional and social aspects of hunting that peopl 16 1 0.56 -1 -0.62\* 3 0.79 1 0.37

13 Most of the time, wildlife is better off without human inter 13 0 0.19 -2 -0.65\* 4 1.58 4 1.43

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -1 -0.15 -2 -0.84\* 6 2.17 4 1.18

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 3 1.04 -2 -0.97 2 0.69 -1 -0.35

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 0 0.14 -2 -1.21\* -5 -2.05 1 0.34

14 Humans should only intervene in wild animals’ lives if it is 14 0 0.00 -4 -1.29\* 0 -0.18 0 0.17

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 2 0.67 -6 -1.87\* -2 -0.63 0 0.02

PQMethod2.35 DiscoursesOnHunting PAGE 35

Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 3

(P < .05 ; Asterisk (\*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

Both the Factor Q-Sort Value (Q-SV) and the Z-Score (Z-SCR) are Shown.

Factors

1 2 3 4

No. Statement No. Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -1 -0.15 -2 -0.84 6 2.17\* 4 1.18

1 Farmers have a duty to protect their livestock from predator 1 0 0.15 4 1.26 5 1.94 0 -0.04

35 Hunting is the lesser of a number of evils in terms of anima 35 -2 -0.85 0 -0.07 1 0.58 -2 -0.78

29 People should respect animals as sentient individuals that c 29 6 2.25 2 0.76 0 0.04 6 2.36

24 Hunting with dogs replicates the natural ‘survival of the fi 24 -5 -1.71 3 1.06 0 -0.16\* -4 -1.60

23 Hunting with dogs is the most effective way of controlling t 23 -6 -2.07 2 0.73 -1 -0.19\* -6 -1.78

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 2 0.67 -6 -1.87 -2 -0.63 0 0.02

46 I try to look at the hunting issue from the animals’ perspec 46 3 0.89 1 0.49 -2 -0.78\* 2 0.73

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 -2 -0.62 -1 -0.27 -4 -1.29 1 0.66

26 I think the way the dogs are used and kept for hunting is cr 26 0 0.14 -2 -1.21 -5 -2.05\* 1 0.34

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Distinguishing Statements for Factor 4

(P < .05 ; Asterisk (\*) Indicates Significance at P < .01)

Both the Factor Q-Sort Value (Q-SV) and the Z-Score (Z-SCR) are Shown.

Factors

1 2 3 4

No. Statement No. Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR

22 Hunting is nothing more than deliberately inflicting sufferi 22 3 0.88 -5 -1.82 -6 -2.31 5 1.55\*

32 The class structure favours hunters – if hunting had been a 32 2 0.77 -3 -1.23 -4 -1.19 4 1.28

49 The only population out of control is us humans! 49 -1 -0.15 -2 -0.84 6 2.17 4 1.18\*

41 We should give animals the same moral consideration as human 41 0 0.26 -3 -1.26 -2 -0.86 3 1.05\*

34 The police are more interested in pursuing anti-hunting camp 34 -1 -0.41 -2 -0.73 0 -0.00 2 0.87\*

42 We need to re-balance the ecosystem by re-introducing higher 42 -2 -0.62 -1 -0.27 -4 -1.29 1 0.66\*

51 Debates about hunting should include a diverse range of peop 51 4 1.32 5 1.46 3 1.05 0 0.14\*

44 Hunting wild animals is only justifiable if you need to do i 44 2 0.67 -6 -1.87 -2 -0.63 0 0.02

17 Being out in the countryside is really important to me 17 2 0.62 4 1.20 5 1.64 0 -0.00\*

40 There’s a big difference between killing animals for food an 40 3 1.04 -2 -0.97 2 0.69 -1 -0.35

21 Hunting is an important social activity for people living in 21 -3 -1.40 2 0.73 1 0.50 -2 -0.75\*

38 Hunting is so difficult to regulate because you can never qu 38 1 0.39 0 -0.01 1 0.55 -2 -0.93\*

30 People who live in urban areas haven’t really got a clue abo 30 -4 -1.46 -1 -0.21 -1 -0.25 -2 -0.93

15 Protecting farmers’ interests should be a priority in rural 15 -1 -0.45 1 0.38 2 0.76 -3 -1.37\*

39 The fox population needs to be controlled 39 -2 -1.02 3 1.13 3 0.85 -4 -1.58

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Path and Project Name: E:\PQMethod\projects/discours Feb 19 16

Consensus Statements -- Those That Do Not Distinguish Between ANY Pair of Factors.

All Listed Statements are Non-Significant at P>.01, and Those Flagged With an \* are also Non-Significant at P>.05.

Factors

1 2 3 4

No. Statement No. Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR Q-SV Z-SCR

10\* The underlying reason why people hunt is that they’re adrena 10 -1 -0.11 0 0.03 -1 -0.53 -1 -0.40

18\* During a hunt, the dogs can get out of control and cause dam 18 0 0.25 0 0.28 0 -0.07 0 0.26

19 Following a pre-planned scent with a drag hunt is less disru 19 1 0.33 -1 -0.25 1 0.11 0 0.09

20\* Hunting is nothing more than a form of pest control – like p 20 -4 -1.51 -3 -1.22 -3 -1.03 -4 -1.55

QANALYZE was completet at 14:27:10

# Appendix 2: Empowered Space

## Appendix 2.1: information sheet given to MPs and Peers

**INFORMATION SHEET – STAGE 2**

**Representing Animals in the Deliberative System: the case of hunting.**

This project is being carried out by Lucy J Parry, in the Department of Politics, University of Sheffield (UK).

**Rationale**

The purpose of this project is to understand how animals are represented through discourses and how these discourses are transmitted from the public sphere to where political decisions are made. The project uses deliberative democracy as a normative framework to investigate the theoretical potential of an enhanced deliberative process improving animal representation in political processes. Deliberation is an ideal type of communication that involves respectful, reasoned discussion of all affected interests and collective decision-making.

**Objectives**

The project has two main empirical components. Stage 1 identified the range of current viewpoints on hunting in the public sphere and mapped out four narratives. Stage 2 will examine the extent to which public narratives are also found within decision making bodies, and appraise the deliberative nature of the hunting debate within the decision-making arena.

**What does the research involve?**

**Stage 2**

You have been selected as a potential participant for Stage 2 which focuses on the second aim of identifying discourses in ‘empowered space’ (where political decisions are made). You have been selected because of your role or known interest in the hunting debate. Participation in the project is purely voluntary, and there will be no adverse consequences if you decide not to participate.

If you agree to participate in this project, you will be first asked to sign an informed consent form. You will then be asked to participate in a face-to-face interview with Lucy J Parry. The interview will last for up to 45 minutes and will take place at a location convenient for you. The interview will be semi-structured and will encourage you to reflect on conversations and debates you have participated in, and your overall impression of the hunting debate. Questions have been constructed to gauge the quality of communication according to the Discourse Quality Index (DQI).

With your consent, the interview will be audio recorded for transcription.

**Confidentiality**

The personal identities (name, position, and contact details) of participants will be known only to the researcher (Lucy J Parry). However, she may also share this information with her supervisor (Dr Hayley Stevenson) if assistance is sought with the interpretation of interview material.

**Dissemination of Findings**

The results of this study will form part of a doctoral thesis. They will also be reported to the funding body (Centre for Animals and Social Justice), shared with the University of Sheffield and may be published in academic journals and books, in policy briefs, and on online blogs.

You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time, and you do not need to provide any reason to me. If you decide to withdraw from the project I will not use any of the information you have provided to me.

**Contact Details**

If you have any questions or comments about the study please feel free to contact:\

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Department of Politics, University of Sheffield

Telephone: +44 114 222 1697

Email: [lucy.parry@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:lucy.parry@sheffield.ac.uk)

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## Appendix 2.2: interview guide for interviews with MPs and Peers

**Interview Guide: Stage 2**

**Aims and Objectives**

The aims of my research are to explore how hunting discourses (or narratives) are generated in the public sphere, and how and if these discourses influence political decisions taken by government. I am exploring the hunting from the perspective of deliberative democracy, a theory which emphasises the importance of deliberation in making collective decisions.

In order to meet these aims, this interview will address two areas:

* The nature of any discussions, negotiations and conversations you have had about hunting in recent months (namely in the run up to the election and after). This section focuses on key ideal features of deliberation
* The decision to postpone the proposed free vote on amending the hunting act in July 2015

**Introduction**

* Introduce self and briefly the purpose of interview
* Ensure they have read & signed info and consent sheets
* Ask if they have any further questions

**Section One: Conversations about hunting**

I’d like you think now about any interactions you have been a part of, related to hunting, in the past year and especially since May this year. This could include commons debates, meetings with or within DEFRA, stakeholder meeting, committees, and private conversations with colleagues. I am specifically interested in the conversations you have had with MPs, civil servants or stakeholders, rather than with members of the general public.

The following questions relate to the ideal features of deliberative democracy and will help me evaluate the deliberative nature of the hunting debate within government.

**Participation**

* **Have you been able to participate** in discussions about hunting and hunting legislation with other MPs, ministers, select committees, hearings, debates, PMQs etc in recent months?
* Do you feel like you have had **the opportunity to express your views** on hunting? And on top of that, you feel like your views have been given serious consideration? In particular, maybe you could comment on whether you think there is a particular viewpoint (or individual/group) that has dominated discussions about hunting.

*- why do you think certain people/groups dominate debates about hunting?*

**Level of Justification**

* Do you feel that people have justified their position on hunting, using **reason and argument**? Or perhaps some people have a position on hunting without justifying it. If people don’t provide reasons for their support or opposition to hunting, what other factors might influence their position – for example, their party’s position, or personal feelings.

*- do people simply state their position without providing any reasoning?*

**Authenticity**

* During conversations about hunting, **do you think that people are honest** in expressing their true views? As well as this, maybe you could tell me whether you feel like there is trust between people during debates on hunting. Or, maybe you think **that people act more tactically** to get the outcome they want, rather than being completely open.

**Common good appeals**

* **Whose interests** do you think are the most important in the hunting debate? For example, perhaps animal welfare is your priority, or it could be protecting farmers’ interests that motivates you.
* During conversations about hunting, do you feel like people push to promote their own interests, or do they try to appeal to a wider audience through **appealing to a common good, or public interest**?
* Do you think that there are **any vested interests** that influence the debate on hunting?

*- do you think people actually care about animals in the hunting debate? What other issues might people prioritise?*

**Respect**

* Thinking of the conversations you’ve had about hunting, do you feel that they have been respectful? Do you feel like **your views have been treated with respect**? Or maybe you feel like some people aren’t willing to listen to what others have to say about hunting?

**Constructive politics**

* Do you think that **people are open to changing their views** about hunting – perhaps you can think of an example of someone changing their mind. Or maybe you feel like peoples’ view on hunting are very entrenched and unlikely to change – why might this be?
* And finally…do you feel like **people are willing to work together constructivel**y to find a mutually acceptable solution on the hunting issue? Or do you feel like people are going to stick their position on hunting and not compromise?

**Section Two: the decision to scrap proposed free vote on amendment**

Moving on now to think about the decision to hold a free vote on amending the act, and the subsequent decision to postpone the vote:


* **Who** do you feel made the decision to scrap the free vote?
* **Why** do you think that happened/ **what factors** influenced the decision to postpone the vote


If needed:


* *Can you explain to me your own views on hunting, and how you came to that viewpoint?*

# Appendix 3: Freedom of Information Releases

## Appendix 3.1: October 2013







## Appendix 3.1: August 2016

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Area 4C, Nobel House |  |
| 17 Smith Square | T: 03459 33 55 77 |
| London |
| helpline@defra.gsi.gov.uk |
| SW1P 3JR |
| [www.gov.uk/defra](http://www.gov.uk/defra) |
|  |

Lucy J Parry Our ref: RFI 8324

By email: [lucy.parry@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:lucy.parry@sheffield.ac.uk) 9 August 2016

Dear Ms Parry,

**REQUEST FOR INFORMATION: DETAILS OF THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS OF**

**RESEARCH PAPER ON THE FLUSHING OF FOXES USING TWO OR MORE DOGS**

**(NAYLOR AND KNOTT)**

Thank you for your request for information which we received on 17 May 2015. As you know, we have considered your request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA).

Following careful consideration, we have decided to disclose some of this information. Our response follows the same order as used in your request for ease of reference.

**Definition of peer review; peer review process undertaken on the paper, etc.**

Defra uses the peer review of selected evidence proposals and outputs to help ensure evidence is of good quality and fit-for-purpose. In most cases, peer review is applied to research and other evidence that we fund. As this information is reasonably accessible to you by other means, it is exempt from disclosure under section 21 of the FOIA. See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-environment-food-rural-affairs/about/research>

Defra commissioned peer reviews of the paper published by the Federation of Welsh Farmers Packs in March/April 2014. The peer reviews were undertaken by three UK based University professors to provide Defra with an independent assessment of the flushing with foxes paper. Peer reviewers were provided with a Defra peer review template to complete. The results of the reviews were provided for Defra’s own purposes.

**The evidence base for the amendments to the Hunting Act 2004 laid in July 2015**

The proposed amendments to the Hunting Act 2004 are not a response to any specific piece of work, but intended to help farmers and gamekeepers to make a judgement as to whether it was appropriate to use more than two dogs to flush out foxes and other wild mammals for effective and humane shooting when used for pest control purposes.

**All correspondence in Defra regarding the peer review (or otherwise)**

****

The remainder of the information falling within the scope of your request is being withheld under the following exemptions in the FOIA:

* Section 40(2) read in conjunction with section 40(3)(a)(i) – Information consisting of personal data.
* Sections 35(1)(a),(b) and (d) – Formulation of government policy, ministerial communications and information relating to the operation of any Minister’s Private

Office.

* Section 38(1)(b) – Safety of any individual
* Section 42(1) – Legal professional privilege

Section 40(2), read in conjunction with section 40(3)(a)(i), is an absolute exemption, which means that where it applies, the requested information can be withheld without consideration of the public interest in disclosure. Sections 35(1)(a),(b) and (d), 38(1)b) and 42(1) are qualified exemptions and are therefore subject to the public interest test, which means that where they apply to requested information a public authority has to determine whether the public interest in maintaining the exemptions outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

**Absolute exemption**

Section 40(2) read in conjunction with section 40(3)(a)(i) – Information consisting of personal data.

Information consisting of personal data relating to all Civil Servants working on hunting policy is being withheld under section 40(2) read in conjunction with section 40(3)(a)(i) of the FOIA, as the information constitutes personal data relating to persons other than the requester.

Section 40(2) read in conjunction with section 40(3)(a)(i) of the FOIA provides that personal data relating to other persons is exempt information if disclosure would breach any of the data protection principles of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA). We consider that disclosure of this information is likely to breach the first data protection principle in Schedule 1 to the DPA, which relates to the fair and lawful processing of personal data. Disclosure would not constitute ‘fair’ processing of the personal data because given the sensitive nature of hunting policy, it would not be fair to any official, regardless of position, to publicly associate them with a policy where they would potentially be subject to threats to their safety, therefore breaching the first data protection principle in relation to all those involved.

**Qualified exemptions**

Section 35(1)(a), (b) and (d) – Formulation of government policy, ministerial communications, and information which relates to the operation of any Minister’s Private

Office

Information consisting of exchanges between officials, Ministers and other government departments is being withheld under the exemption at section 35(1)(a), (b) and (d) of the FOIA, which applies to information relating to the formulation of government policy, any ministerial communications, and any information which relates to the operation of any Minister’s Private Office. Transparency in the decision-making process and access to the information upon which decisions have been made can enhance accountability.

We recognise that there is a public interest in disclosure of information concerning hunting with dogs, the Hunting Act 2004 and flushing out wild mammals with dogs, as these issues have been of considerable interest to some stakeholders. There is also a public interest in public authorities being accountable for the quality of their decision-making.

On the other hand, there is a strong public interest in withholding the information because it relates to internal communications within the Department between Ministers and officials concerning the formulation or development of Government policy or discussions to reach a position of collective agreement within Government. Confidential discussions are important to policy development and there needs to be a space within which Ministers and officials are able to discuss all policy options and delivery in order to ensure that high quality advice can be given and that all options can be discussed openly, including ones which are decided against. Ministers should also be free to discuss their position in the process of reaching collective agreement. Therefore some of the information is exempt, as disclosure of discussions would inhibit free and frank discussions in the future, and that loss of frankness and candour would damage the quality of future advice and decision-making.

Section 38(1)(b) – Safety of any individual

Information consisting of the names of all civil servants, regardless of position, working on hunting policy is being withheld under the exemption at section 38(1)(b) of the FOIA, which relates to information that if disclosed would endanger the safety of any individual. We recognise that there is a public interest in the names of Senior Civil Servants (SCS) working on hunting being made available to the public so that senior officials working on controversial or sensitive areas of policy can be held to account, for example by being called before Parliamentary Select Committees. On the other hand, there is a strong public interest in withholding this information if disclosure of SCS personal details would, or would be likely to, endanger the safety of any individual, and we have decided that disclosing this information could potentially cause harm to the individual(s) concerned.

Section 42(1) – Legal professional privilege

Information consisting of confidential communications between lawyers and their clients is being withheld under the exemption in section 42(1) of the FOIA, which relates to information that is subject to legal professional privilege. Legal advisers need to be able to present government departments with high quality comprehensive legal advice for the effective conduct of their business. This advice needs to be given with a full appreciation of the facts and can include arguments which consider various options. Without comprehensive advice the quality of the government's decision-making would be much reduced, because it would not be fully informed, and this would be contrary to the public interest.

In addition, the disclosure of legal advice has a high potential to prejudice the government's ability to defend its legal interests – both directly, by unfairly exposing its legal position to challenge, and indirectly by diminishing the reliance that Ministers can place on the advice having been fully considered and presented without fear or favour. In this case it has been necessary to consider some complex legal issues requiring the advice and input of our professional legal advisers.

Therefore, we have concluded that, in all the circumstances of the case, the information should be withheld.

Information disclosed in response to this FOIA request is releasable to the public. In keeping with the spirit and effect of the FOIA and the government’s Transparency Agenda, this letter and the information disclosed to you may be placed on [GOV.UK,](http://www.gov.uk/) together with any related information that will provide a key to its wider context. No information identifying you will be placed on the GOV.UK website.

I attach Annex A, which explains the copyright that applies to the information being released to you.

I also attach Annex B giving contact details should you be unhappy with the service you have received.

If you have any queries about this letter please contact the address below.

Yours sincerely,

**Andy Jennings**

**Information Rights Team**

[InformationRequests@defra.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:InformationRequests@defra.gsi.gov.uk)

**Annex A: Copyright**

The information supplied to you continues to be protected by copyright. You are free to use it for your own purposes, including for private study and non-commercial research, and for any other purpose authorised by an exception in current copyright law. Documents (except photographs) can be also used in the UK without requiring permission for the purposes of news reporting. Any other re-use, for example commercial publication, would require the permission of the copyright holder.

Most documents produced by Defra will be protected by Crown Copyright. Most Crown copyright information can be re-used under the Open Government Licence. For information about the OGL and about re-using Crown Copyright information please see The National Archives website.

Copyright in other documents may rest with a third party. For information about obtaining permission from a third party see the Intellectual Property Office’s website.

**Annex B: Complaints**

If you are unhappy with the service you have received in relation to your request you may make a complaint or appeal against our decision under section 17(7) of the FOIA or under regulation 18 of the EIRs, as applicable, within 40 working days of the date of this letter.

Please write to Nick Teall, Head of Information Standards, Area 4C, Nobel House,

17 Smith Square, London, SW1P 3JR (email: [InformationRequests@defra.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:InformationRequests@defra.gsi.gov.uk)) and he will arrange for an internal review of your case. Details of Defra’s complaints procedure are on our [website.](http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/contacts/complaints/)

If you are not content with the outcome of the internal review, section 50 of the FOIA and regulation 18 of the EIRs gives you the right to apply directly to the Information Commissioner for a decision. Please note that generally the Information Commissioner cannot make a decision unless you have first exhausted Defra’s own complaints procedure. The Information Commissioner can be contacted at:

Information Commissioner’s Office

Wycliffe House

Water Lane

Wilmslow

Cheshire

SK9 5AF

1. Also known as foxhunting, hunting with hounds, riding to hounds, hunting, hunting with dogs; hereafter referred to interchangeably. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Please refer to the glossary at the beginning of this thesis for definitions of fox hunting terms. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. There are 317 registered foxhound packs in England and Wales, according to the Master of Foxhounds Association. This only covers hunts using foxhounds. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. One piece published in The Times warns of the RSPCA’s ‘drift towards angry veganism, animal rights militancy and vengeful authoritarianism’ (Purves 2015) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Including, non-exhaustively: factor eigenvalues, Humphrey’s rule and factor variance (see Watts and Stenner 2012, p105-107). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Just one participant (P6) said they felt something was missing from the Q-set. They would have liked a statement about the conservation function of hunting, as for this person hunting is primarily about conservation (see p88). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Note here that *I* do not advance an argument for animal *rights* as such – I simply argue that the possession of interests is sufficient to demand political representation. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. In fact, Cochrane uses interests as a basis for positing animal rights, which is slightly different to my own argument here – I focus mainly on arguments for representation here, rather than rights explicitly. Positing the concept of animal rights is not necessary to justify animal representation. Political representation can be justified on the basis of a) interests and b) the all-affected principle alone. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. This is not to say that the notion of accountability is not important; it is. However, accountability needn’t only be defined in relation to sanctioning of representatives. In chapters three and eight of the thesis, a more expansive idea of accountability in the deliberative system is described, in which to be accountable can simply mean providing an explanation of ones’ actions. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. I use the term nature here because Dryzek specifically refers to nature communicating as a collective, rather than an individual animal or animals. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. The significance of ascribing agency to nonhuman nature should not go without commendation here. Dryzek accepts that some will revert to Vogel’s assertion that any characteristics ascribed to nature will still be imposed by us humans, and nature cannot retort as such. However, the move to acknowledge and welcome the potential forms of agency possessed by nonhuman nature is a positive move, in my eyes, to challenge the long-established orthodoxy in Western political thought about what kind of things can or cannot have agency (see Philo and Wilbert, 2000, chapter one). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The term ‘man-made’ reflects the Countryside Alliance’s specific choice of words (Countryside Alliance 2012) and not my own; further use of the term (in the Q study for example) has been taken verbatim from participants. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Parts of this chapter also appear in Parry (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See Fung (2003); Ryan and Smith (2014) for a survey of mini-publics and institutional designs for deliberative democracy. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. I take the term ‘radical’ to mean radical in comparison with the discursive status quo in the UK and in particular when compared to the dominant animal use paradigm that dominates the current government’s policy trajectory. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See <http://yoursay.sa.gov.au/decisions/citizens-jury-dog-and-cat-management/about> for a full breakdown of the Jury’s recommendations, report and government response. Observed 18 July 2015, Adelaide. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. This discussion was initiated at the Centre for Animals and Social Justice (2015) After the election: prospects for animal protection, London, September 10th 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. I acknowledge that for many animal rights activists, this may not be the case. Many activist activities do not conflict with deliberative democracy and involve awareness-raising, discursive persuasion, and so on. But many activities do involve coercion of some sort. And more extreme activities are more likely to be carried out by the most committed activists, since they hold their beliefs to be more important than potential prosecution. Moreover, it is these kinds of activities – such as hunt sabotaging – that receive the most media attention and subsequently, have a disproportionate impact on public debate on animal issues. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Mansbridge (1999) emphasises the importance of such ‘everyday talk’ in private conversations for its role in preference-forming. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Including non-exhaustively shooting (grouse, rough shooting), hawking, terrier work and other forms of hunting that use a dog for various purposes (ferreting, rabbiting), and lamping. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Limited biographical information for participants can be found in Appendix 1.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. A playkurtic distribution is a flattened curve which enables more variation at the extremes of the spectrum. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Steven Brown manages a mailing list on Q-methodology which comprises an online community of Q scholars. The above quote was iterated in email correspondence on the mailing list during an extensive discussion on the purported relevance of participant numbers in Q-methodology. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Slang word meaning very nice, comfortable situation [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Derived from Victorian times, this phrase has been used to describe the opinion of the average nondescript person in the UK [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. This participant is actually vegetarian and was speaking about principles rather than practice. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Anglo colloquial term for making fun of; mocking. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Tetsuki Tamura (2016) provides a critique of existing conceptions of public-private distinctions in deliberative systems literature, proposing instead ‘nested’ deliberative systems whereby the intimate sphere can be seen as a deliberative system in itself [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Focusing on incidents of criminal damage, threats, assault, damage to property, and so forth. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. ‘hunting the clean boot’ refers to drag hunting, where an artificial scent is laid by a (human) runner, and uses bloodhounds to track the scent. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Nine interviewees in total comprising three Peers, five MPs and one former MP. All have been anonymised. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. The DQI is a quantitative tool for measuring the quality of deliberation, rooted in Habermasian discourse ethics. Structuring interview questions according to the DQI was informed by Stevenson and Dryzek 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Scores for the Q study range from -6 (most disagree) to +6 (most agree). For the full scores, see Table 1 on p55. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. In 2001 an outbreak of this infectious viral disease led to the destruction of millions of farmed animals and lasting damage to the animal agriculture industry in the UK. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. The House of Lords is less adversarial in nature, with more independent and cross-bench Members and “I think, people are less party political here, and they are more measured. And they take very seriously the role of this chamber, which is scrutinising, and using the expertise…to try and improve legislation…so I think there’s a maturity and less of a boo-ha attitude, you know” (interview HL3) [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. British vulgar slang for testicles. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. The Federation of Welsh Farmers’ Packs is responsible for managing fox populations and is campaigning to amend the two-dog limitation currently imposed by the Hunting Act. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. International Fund for Animal Welfare [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Lembik Öpik was a Liberal Democrat MP from 1997 – 2010 who gained some notoriety in the UK press for his personal life. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. The Daily Telegraph had the highest circulation of all broadsheet papers in the UK, as of July 2015, with an average monthly readership of almost 500,000.The Sunday Telegraph has a slightly lower circulation of under 400,000 (Press Gazette 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Personal communication with Lorraine Platt, 29 July 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. As of July 2016 [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Lexis Nexis custom search for: hunting AND foxhunting OR hunting act OR hunting ban between 1st Jan 2015 and 1st Jan 2016. Hunting AND foxhunting were used as hunting OR foxhunting returned a high number of irrelevant pieces. Initial search returned 62 results which were examined for relevance; duplicate articles, obituaries and letters to the editor were removed, leaving 35 relevant articles for documentary analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Country Life is a weekly magazine covering aspects of rural life with a focus on property and countryside pursuits. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Jimmy Hill, a British football player, manager and commentator – cited here as some bastion of the working class – passed away two days prior to this article’s publication. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Irish Republican Army [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. The group also campaigns on other animal issues including the badger cull and farmed animal welfare. My analysis is restricted to 2015 articles that specifically focus on hunting. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Green Party MP & leader of the Green Party. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. The analysis is restricted to videos about hunting published during 2015. One video which was originally published in 2014 but was re-posted in 2015 has been included. Out of four videos covering the same story (16 fox cubs found in a barn), only one – the most recent and comprehensive – has been analysed. Also excluded was a 15 minute video of a public lecture on fox ecology for the purpose of brevity. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Hunt monitors observe organised hunts and gather video evidence or otherwise of illegal hunting. They are occasionally employed by LACS and other organisations but may also be private individuals. Hunt monitors are not completely synonymous with hunt sabs as their intention is to capture evidence of illegal hunting, not to disrupt the activity. In reality however, the division is often blurred and they are associated with sabs out in the field. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. This does not include two Scottish videos which have a comprehensive narrative. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Note that DEFRA lists the debate and vote on amendment as ‘postponed’ on their website. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Phone call with EFRA Committee Clerk David Weir in November 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Withheld under exemptions relating to: information consisting of personal data; formulation of government policy; safety of any individual and legal professional. Full details can be found in Appendix 3.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. The Leader of the House of Commons is a senior government Minister who is responsible for organising daily business in the Commons, such as debates, inquiries and so on. They also announce the day’s business each day. During the week of 9th July 2015, the hunting amendments were discussed several times during these announcements. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Choice headlines include ‘RSPCA has become 'sinister and nasty', warns head of the Countryside Alliance’ (Telegraph.co.uk 2013) and ‘Bullied and threatened with jail by RSPCA ‘zealots’(Sunday Times 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. One video shows a member of the South Pembrokeshire Hunt looming in front of the camera shouting “go and ram your fucking thoughts down somebody else’s fucking throat…you must be as fucking thick as a fucking rhinoceros, you stupid fucking woman.” (West Wales Antis 2011) [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. I am grateful to members of the Q-method mailing list, especially Steven Brown, Peter Schmolck and Rikki Dean, all of whom provided valuable reflections on this issue during an email discussion dated 21 January 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)