


Adversarial moves in political discourse in the UK, US, and France



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Declaration

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“Metaphor to a politician is what sex appeal is to an individual: a covert way of sending out messages of desirability...” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 198)

*...Or how politicians pimp themselves out in order to get what we are all here for:
just a lil' bit of love...*

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Abstract

This thesis, based on a purpose-built corpus of political discourse from the UK, US, and France, focuses on electoral discourse and, more specifically, on adversarial relations within electoral discourse. It draws on theories of politeness and adversariness to characterise what adversarial discourse is made of, that is, it defines the adversarial moves performed by politicians in an electoral context.

I firstly ask how does one *do* adversariness, second, I consider the importance of individual style in the performance of adversarial moves, and third, I review the goals that politicians hope to achieve. To carry out this analysis, I consider the three traditional discourse subtypes featured in electoral discourse: debates, speeches, and manifestos.

The claim of this research is that adversarial discourse does not exclusively occur in an interactional environment, as it is currently defined, but that the moves it is made of, facework, Face Threatening Acts (FTAs), evasion techniques, and stancetaking, can also be carried out in the absence of the adversary/opponent. I set out to define adversarial moves as found in interactional electoral discourse: election debates. I focus on the 2012 US presidential election debate series between the Democrat and Republican “tickets.” Second, I consider the findings from the debate series and transpose them to campaign speeches, a context in which speech acts are still performed by individuals in front of an audience, thus, still in an interactional context. Finally, I ask whether the adversarial moves I have identified so far can be found in a monologic type of electoral discourse: manifestos.

I conclude that the absence of direct interaction does not impair the performance of adversarial moves, that individual style as well as personality impact on that performance, and that different types of goals motivate adversarial moves.

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1 Introduction

Adversarial discourse is commonly understood in terms of speech acts that are carried out in an interactional face-to-face context (Bull and Wells, 2012). This study proposes to define the moves adversarial discourse is characterised by in terms of those speech acts as well as other strategies. For this purpose, I focus not only on interactive talk, as is commonly the case in studies of adversarial discourse (Harris, 1991; Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Clayman, 2010; Bull and Wells, 2012; Vertommen, 2014), but also on electoral discourse as a genre, and what it is traditionally constituted of: electoral debates, campaign speeches, and election manifestos. In addition, this is done while focusing on “real world” data extracted from a purpose-built corpus of political discourse from the UK, US, and France. Therefore, the purpose of this study is not comparative, but, rather, to map out the uses of adversarial moves across three different countries, and review the salience of said move across the different political contexts these countries offer, in an electoral context.

1.1 Defining adversarial moves

Adversarial discourse is a rather elusive notion in discourse analysis. It is often mentioned (Harris, 1991; Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Clayman, 2010; Bull and Wells, 2012; Vertommen, 2014) but seldom defined in terms of what it effectively is. In most cases, it is spoken about as the result of impoliteness, and as such, is related to the original theories of politeness, and impoliteness, from Goffman (1955, 1967)

to Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) and Culpeper (1996). It is, therefore, deeply embedded within the concepts of facework (Goffman, 1955, 1967; Brown and Levinson, 1978, 1987), appraisal (Martin, 2000; Zappavigna, 2012) and evaluation (Channel, 2000; Hunston and Thompson, 2000; Leudar et al, 2004; Jaffe, 2012), which are themselves pragmatic resources interrelated in many aspects. In effect, adversarial discourse, as I have come to understand it, is based on the evaluation or appraisal of an act, speech act, or even attitude of an interactant B by an interactant A and, because of its adversarial nature, is bound to be negative or at least contrastive. That is, adversarial discourse consists of, in theory, expressing A's (negative) judgement, or appraisal of B's actions or attitude. In an electoral context, this translates into *how* candidates comment on, evaluate and judge other candidates' attitudes, acts and/or speech acts, with a general goal in mind: to undermine the opponent and/or enhance their own face in order to gain the favour of the voters. The *how* of that process is what I characterise as *adversarial moves*.

In this study, I follow Harris's plea for the extension of the study of politeness to several different discourse types (2001: 452-53) and I set out to define adversarial moves across the three types of electoral discourse previously mentioned. To that effect, Harris (2001) refers to a variety of speech acts through which adversarial discourse may occur: accusations, contempt, criticism, ridicule, challenge, as well as deliberately insulting lexical choices, which can all be found in electoral debates, campaign speeches, and election manifestos.

In effect, adversarial discourse does not solely occur in an electoral context, nor does it only occur in political discourse, or does political discourse solely consist of adversarial moves. I review studies of evidence of adversarial discourse in different text and interaction types, and I draw on how the place of adversariality in political discourse, especially in relation to its increased mediatisation in the three countries studied presently.

One dimension of adversarial discourse that needs mentioning first and foremost, is that it is an essential feature of argumentation and dialogue. In effect, it relates in many aspects to contexts in which individuals compare points of views and take stances on said points of views. As a result, adversarial discourse can occur in any discourse type which includes such interactions, that is, practically any type. In effect, adversarial discourse has also been, and is being studied, as aforementioned, in contexts including the courtroom, parliamentary discourse, but also academic supervision meetings (Bartlett and Mercer, 2010) as well as scientific discourse (Edwards, 2007) and many more.

In addition, not all political discourse is adversarial. In the case of parliamentary discourse, for instance, Harris (2001: 466) notes that Members of Parliament (MPs) tend to appeal to adversarial means of discourse in certain types of interactions, which include public parliamentary debates, and draws on the “institutional” nature of such adversariality in that context (Harris, 2001: 466) She continues, to emphasize that said adversarial discourse does not have a particularly negative impact on interpersonal relations between MPs, which implies that a different type of political discourse occurs between the same interactants in other types of interactions, and perhaps “behind closed doors,” where the public cannot see. This invites a third important dimension to remember when it comes to adversarial discourse in politics: that the increased mediatisation of political life in the UK, US, and France (but not only) in the past century may have had an impact in terms of how adversarial political discourse has become in the early 21st century. This is however not the point of the present study.

This study focuses on how and to what end adversarial moves are carried out in political discourse. To provide a comprehensive answer, it focuses on the three main text types found in electoral politics: election debates, campaign speeches, and electoral manifestos. First, this study focuses on the “conflictive talk” (Harris, 2001: 181; Levinson, 1992; Culpeper, 1996) that occurs in the 2012 US presidential

Election debate series, as a means to map out the strategies of adversarial discourse that occur in this highly adversarial context. Drawing on this, Chapter 4 focuses on campaign speeches from the 2008 US presidential campaign and the 2012 French presidential campaign, and Chapter 5 asks whether evidence of adversarial moves can be found in election manifestos, through the analysis of data from the 2010 British general elections and the 2012 French presidential Election.

In this study, I consider that adversarial moves can be broken down into two types: strategies, and means. Strategies apply to macro-scale moves, which can be observed across parts of, or even an entire interaction or part of the electoral discourse, such as parts of a speech, a manifesto section, or during a specific interaction between two candidates (for instance, the 2012 US vice-presidential debate). Strategies can include moves such as: self-promotion, the use of a certain tone (such as irony), as well as distracting the audience, as Joe Biden does in the aforementioned debate. Adversely, means refer to adversarial moves which can be observed at specific times during a given interaction, such as instances of laughter to mock the opponent, or rolling one's eyes, or specific uses of irony and sarcasm, as is observed regularly in both Hollande and Sarkozy's 2012 campaign speeches. The combination of such means with other henceforth constitute strategies.

In addition, it is important to note that none of the means studied here have been found to belong to a given strategy, as well as no given strategy implies the use of a specific means. This distinction is made solely for the purpose of clearly identifying the types of adversarial moves on both micro and macro levels of discourse analysis.

Finally, the results of this study demonstrate that some moves can be apprehended from both perspectives: vague language, for instance, can be considered as a strategy in itself in Romney and Ryan's discourse during the 2012 US debate series, while its very nature means it is also a means to an end:

vagueness effectively allows the candidates to avoid addressing sensitive topics directly and in so many details that it may become costly for them in the future.

Strategies can be identified in that they carry specific, context-dependent, “macro-goals (my definition), whereas means as a subtype do not other than the one they carry primarily, such as, for instance, uses of vague language to avoid addressing an issue in specific terms, or using multiples modes of communication to distract the audience from the opponent’s discourse. Thus, means have “micro-goals” (my definition), whereas it is the strategies that drive the means through the “macro-goals” they include. The strategies I account for here can as well be transposed in other discourse and interaction types, where end goals, of course, differ, although this is not the purpose of this study to draw on this further. Table 1.1 below, provides a non-exhaustive list of the strategies and means found in the data.

Table 1.1. Strategies and means forming adversarial moves (non-exhaustive list).

| Strategies | Means |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| Creating distractions | FTAs, (Facework) |
| Self-promotion | Metaphors |
| Stancetaking | Evasion techniques |
| Address strategies | Rhetorical questions & RQAs |
| Irony | Multimodal communication |
| Honesty | Linguistic choices |
| Self-victimisation | Sarcasm |
| Vague language | Making promises |
| Ethos building | Negative promises |
| Stancetaking | Appropriating the opponent’s argument |
| Newsworthiness and “reaching-out” | Using change/continuity as an electoral argument |

In addition, a distinction needs to be made between means which support adversarial moves, and those which constitute adversarial discourse per se. Supporting Means of Adversarial Discourse (SMADs) occur at times as a means to support the overall adversarial strategy, and are highly dependent on the context of

the interaction, while Constitutive Means of Adversarial Discourse (CMADs), are those means which constitute key root elements of the speaker's strategy to "do" adversarial discourse. In both cases, those means are context dependent, to the exception of Face Threatening Acts, which participate in adversarial discourse whatever the context. I refer to those means throughout this study, when appropriate.

1.2 Aims

My first aim is to provide a comprehensive definition of what constitutes adversarial discourse in contemporary political discourse in the UK, US and France that can be used as a means of determining the nature of adversarial moves in political discourse as well as other discourse types.

Second, I aim to provide an insight into how adversarial moves are carried out in an electoral context in these three Western democracies, and across two languages (English and French) through different types of electoral discourse, in order to answer to the following questions: how do leading politicians *do* adversariality, what is those leaders' adversarial *style* throughout? And what goals do they (expect to) achieve through those strategies?

My method for this study is as follows: I start from the assumption that adversarial moves are most likely to occur in an interactional context. Within the scope of this study, this means focusing on electoral debates (Chapter 3). Once adversarial moves have been defined in that context, I move on to considering how those moves transpose into other types of electoral discourse, where direct face-to-face interactions between candidates do not occur: campaign speeches (chapter 4) and election manifestos (chapter 5). Those adversarial moves are considered here

in terms of speech acts as well as alternative strategies, such as evasion and vague language, and in relation to the role of individual style.

1.3 Studying electoral discourse in the UK, US, and France

The UK, US, and France are three countries that share a great deal of history, yet three very different democratic systems. The UK, first, is a parliamentary system in which all cabinet members are elected Members of Parliament (MPs), including the Prime Minister (PM) (UK Parliament, 2016). The British voting system is that of universal suffrage, and consists of general elections held every five years (Fixed-terms Parliaments Act 2011, 2011), in which Members of Parliament (MPs) from the House of Commons are elected locally according to the “First Past the Post rules” (Wilkinson, 2015). The power distribution is as follows once the election results are known: the leader of the party with the most seats becomes PM. However, as in the case of the 2010 general elections, when the party with the most seats holds less than 326 out of 650 (that is, less than the absolute majority of seats) a “hung parliament” occurs, (UK Parliament, 2016), during which said party has to make an alliance with other political parties to secure the absolute majority of 326 seats out of 650 (The Independent, 2015) in order to form a government. In the British general elections, candidates from each party run for election locally, while party leaders also provide a voice for the party nationally, as opposed to strictly one individual competing against another in presidential systems. In relation to this study, this means that electoral discourse is essentially inclusive and *group-focused* (my definition).

France is a presidential republic, where presidential elections are held in May every five years (Service-Public, 2016). From 2002, legislative elections have been held every five years as well, on the third Tuesday of June (Loi organique no. 2001-419 du 15 May 2001, 2001), which incidentally follows the presidential elections. This allows a newly elected president to nominate their Premier Ministre, and avoid a *cohabitation*, that is, an opposition Premier Ministre and parliament majority (Vie Publique, 2016a). The presidential elections consist of two rounds: the first round includes all candidates with sufficient elected public servants' support to run (Conseil Constitutionnel, 2016b) while the second round only includes the top two candidates, and is won by the candidate which earns an absolute majority of "expressed" votes¹ (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2016). The official campaign starts on "the second Monday preceding the first round of the election and ends on the evening preceding the election at midnight" (Conseil Constitutionnel, 2016a). A further two weeks' campaign occurs between the two rounds, "from the date of publication of the names in the Journal Officiel" of the two remaining candidates (Conseil Constitutionnel, 2016a). It is during that time that a debate is broadcast between the two candidates (Vie publique, 2016b). Electoral discourse is, consequently, complexified by calls to rally made by eliminated first round candidates to those qualified for the second round. Since 1981, the main right-wing party, the Rassemblement Pour la République (RPR), subsequently rebranded Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) (2002), then Les Républicains (LR) (2015) (Mensah, 2015), and the main Left-wing party: the Parti Socialiste (PS) have competed against one-another in the second round of the presidential election. These two parties traditionally dominate both the legislative and presidential elections as the two main political forces of the country (France Politique, 2016), except for the 2002 presidential election in which

¹ That is, excluding nil or blank votes

RPR candidate Jacques Chirac competed against far-right candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen from the Front National (FN) (Lexpress.fr, 2016). Since then, the FN has been gathering more votes, especially in local and European elections, however, without succeeding in qualifying for the second round of the “présidentielles” (Paris Match, 2015). This rise of the FN is of significant importance in relation to the data studied here, and especially the political rhetoric adopted by the candidates, particularly Nicolas Sarkozy.

The United States (US) is also a presidential democracy. However, the American electoral system is slightly more complex in terms of how votes are cast as two separate votes effectively take place in the process of electing the American President: that of the public, and that of the Electoral College. Members of the public who cast their votes on election day effectively vote for the “electors” (USA.gov, 2016), that is, members of the Electoral College. The general election in which citizens vote takes place every four years on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November (USA.gov, 2016). The Electoral College consists of 538 electors, who subsequently cast their votes in December, which are then counted by the Congress (usa.gov). This system is considered as “a compromise between election of the President by a vote in Congress and election of the President by a popular vote of qualified citizens” (National archives and records administration, 2016). Traditionally, the two main candidates running for the US Presidency are Republicans and Democrats; although other candidates run as well, they usually do not succeed. In effect, the Republican and Democratic parties are the two major political parties which dominate the American political landscape. As a result, American political discourse is representative of this duality in the balance of political powers, unlike France and the UK, whose electoral systems allow more than two parties to exist politically and influence national politics. If one considers the results of the 2015 British general election, for instance, the Scottish National Party (SNP), the Liberal Democrats (LibDem), the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the

Green party all succeeded in gaining seats in Parliament (BBC News, 2015) alongside Labour and the Conservatives. Meanwhile the French parliament is constituted by no-less than seven different “groups” since the 2012 elections (Assemblée Nationale, 2016), including those of the two main parties: Parti Socialiste and Les Républicains (former UMP).

As a result, studying political discourse from these three countries implies some significant differences in relation to who is speaking, and more importantly, which opponent(s) they are addressing.

1.4 The storyline

The starting point of this study is the 2012 US presidential election debate series between the incumbent Democratic Party candidates, Barack Obama and Joe Biden, and the opposition candidates from the Republican Party, Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan. I focus on the 2012 election data because it is the latest occurrence of this text type, which does, therefore, make it more “current” and relevant to this study of contemporary political discourse.

Once adversarial moves are defined, I consider how other text types from electoral discourse compare from one country to the next. For that purpose, I refer to my 2.83 million-word corpus of political discourse in the UK, US and France. To start with, I focus on electoral speeches in France and the US, to find out what form could adversarial moves take when the leaders are not facing their opponent.

Finally, in the last chapter of this analysis I focus on the third pillar of electoral discourse: manifestos. In doing so, I endeavour to analyse how adversarial moves are transmitted through this medium on the one hand, but also how they evolve

diachronically on the other hand, through the study of the Conservatives' election manifestos from 2010 and 2015.

2 Methods and approaches

I developed an interest in studying political discourse during the writing of my Masters dissertation on the 1960 US presidential debate series between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon. In doing so, I became familiar with the theories of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), which led me to focus on the power relations between the two candidates in those debates, in relation to the public's response to their respective performances. I also familiarised myself with studying discourse from a multimodal perspective, which led me to include a multimodal dimension in my dissertation.

The present research began effectively as a journey back to where I first started, with, this time, the ambition to go further, and study electoral discourse in its entirety. It soon became evident that such a study would benefit from a corpus approach, which led me to build PolDisc, my 2.8 million-word corpus. In addition, I expanded the scope of this research project to three countries rather than one: France, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US), in order to study how adversarial strategies are carried out in those three historically and, in the case of the UK and the US, linguistically related western modern democracies. In addition, the focus of this research is not only to study the relations of power as they occur in electoral discourse through CDA, but rather, to study what constitutes the adversarial moves that contribute to shaping those power relations between the candidates.

This study relies on a mixed methods approach (cf Creswell, 2013: 3; Newman and Benz, 1998) in that it is based on both quantitative and qualitative aspects of language analysis in order to study adversarial moves in political discourse. I use the data from PolDisc, which provides insights into language use, and combine this with aspects of pragmatic research, which provide the framework to define adversarial

moves. This chapter is organised in three parts. To start with, I review the corpus and its design; second, I consider the benefits of a corpus approach for this type of study. Third, I discuss the combination of theoretical outlooks I refer to for the qualitative dimension of this study: stance and face, political rhetoric and the use of metaphors, and evasion techniques and vague language.

2.1. Corpus design

The collection phase of the data determined the exact focus of this study. At the time of collection, during the summer of 2012, online availability of the data from each of those three countries varied greatly. In addition, the starting point of this study being electoral debates, there was an important gap between France and the US on the one hand, and the UK on the other hand, where only one debate series had ever taken place (during the 2010 general elections). This section presents the data, and reviews the process of its selection.

This study is based on a 2.83-million-word purpose-built corpus of political discourse (PoIDisc) in French and English. The French data (FraPol) accounts for 1.12 million words, and the English data (EngPol) accounts for 1.70 million words. The latter includes a subcorpus of US data (UPol) and a British subcorpus (BRiPol). A breakdown of PoIDisc by text type is provided in Table 2.1. The data collected spans the years 1996 to 2015. It includes both electoral and non-electoral data. The electoral data consists of specifically electoral discourse relating to nation-wide, government related campaigns: the US and French presidential Elections, and the British general elections. I chose to focus on national campaigns for two reasons.

Table 2.1 Corpus breakdown

| Main corpus | | PolDisc | | | | | |
|--|-----------|--|-----------|--------------------------|---------|--|--|
| Word count (W) | | 2,831,336 | | | | | |
| Subcorpora | | EngPol (English language data) | | | | FraPol (French data) 1, 128,575 41 | |
| Word count | 1,702,761 | | | | | | |
| Percentage | 59 | | | | | | |
| Subcorpora | | BriPol (British data) | | UPol (US data) | | | |
| Word count | 640,984 | | 1,061,777 | | | | |
| Percentage | 41 | | 59 | | | | |
| Text types | | | | | | | |
| | W | % | W | % | W | % | |
| Debates | 56,367 | 9 | 262,481 | 29 | 70,426 | 6 | |
| Speeches | 309,116 | 48 | 712,038 | 67 | 813,460 | 72 | |
| Manifestos | 181,378 | 28 | 12,982 | 1 | 93,000 | 8 | |
| Tweets | 94,123 | 15 | 74,276 | 7 | | | |
| Interviews | | | | | 112,625 | 10 | |
| Written publications | | | | | 39,064 | 4 | |
| Context: Electoral vs Non-Electoral (EC / NC) | | | | | | | |
| | EC | NC | EC | NC | EC | NC | |
| % | 52 | 48 | 82 | 18 | 98 | 2 | |

First, this restricted the focus to a limited number of candidates, which was necessary in order to gather enough data to focus on individual style. Second, I chose those whose discourse was most likely to be well archived and documented: aspiring Prime Ministers and Presidents. In addition, this choice was also safer in terms of finding external contextual information if necessary, as those types of leaders benefit from more comprehensive and easily accessible media coverage, all the while attracting more interest from various fields of research related to mine. I provide a comprehensive list of who those leaders are in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Corpus breakdown by speaker, party, political side and years

| Corpus | Speaker | Party | Political side | year(s) | No. of texts | % overall |
|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------|----------------|------------------|--------------|-----------|
| FraPol | Ségolène Royal | PS | Left | 2007 | 35 | 7 |
| | François Hollande | PS | Left | 2012 | 31 | 6 |
| | François Bayrou | Modem | Centre | 2007-12 | 46 | 10 |
| | Nicolas Sarkozy | UMP | Right | 2007-12 | 77 | 15 |
| | Debates | | | 2007-12 | 3 | 2 |
| Total FraPol | | | | 2007-12 | 192 | 40 |
| UPol | Al Gore | Democrat | Left | 2000 | 1 | 0.2 |
| | John Kerry | Democrat | Left | 2004 | 13 | 1 |
| | Barack Obama | Democrat | Left | 2007-12 | 132 | 19 |
| | George. W. Bush | Republican | Right | 2000-04 | 26 | 3 |
| | John McCain | Republican | Right | 2008 | 23 | 2 |
| | Mitt Romney | Republican | Right | 2012 | 37 | 3 |
| | Debates | | | 2000-12 | 16 | 9 |
| Total UPol | | | | 2000-12 | 248 | 37.2 |
| BriPol | Tony Blair | Labour | Left | 1997-2005 | 11 | 2 |
| | Gordon Brown | Labour | Left | 2005-10 | 12 | 2 |
| | Ed Milliband | Labour | Left | 2010-15 | 9 | 2 |
| | Charles Kennedy | LibDem | Centre | 2004-04 | 2 | 0.3 |
| | Nick Clegg | LibDem | Centre | 2010-15 | 13 | 3 |
| | John Major | Conservatives | Right | 1996-97 | 2 | 0.2 |
| | Michael Howard | Conservatives | Right | 2004-05 | 2 | 0.3 |
| | David Cameron - Debates | Conservatives | Right | 2005-15 2010 | 57 3 | 11 2 |
| Total BriPol | | | | 1996-2015 | 111 | 22.8 |
| EngPol | | | | 1996-2015 | 359 | 60 |
| PolDisc | | | | 1996-2015 | 551 | 100 |

This data was collected from free-access online resources, including state-funded official websites: vie-publique.fr for most of the French data, gov.uk, for current data from the British Prime Minister, whitehouse.gov for data from the current US President. Other sources include media websites, especially in relation to the debate series: C-Span.org for the UK (2010a, b, c), and US debates (2012a, b, c, d), Tf1 News (2012) and Dailymotion (2007) for the French debates. Each file was named according to its date, and separated, as shown Tables 2.1 and 2.2, primarily according to country, then according to speaker, and text type.

In addition, I created multiple separate subcorpora, among which are those of electoral and non-electoral data, based on the official campaign dates in each country. Separate datasets were also created for each subcorpus I focus on in this research: the 2012 US Debate series (UDebates12, Chapter 3), the Campaign Speeches (CampSpeeches) corpus, which focuses on the 2008 US and 2012 French presidential election speeches (Chapter 4), and the Election Manifestos (EIMan) corpus, focused on the 2012 French and 2010-2015 British election manifestos. Each subcorpus was designed with a concern for balance between text types, when applicable, to respect its representative dimension and ensure the accuracy of the findings (cf Adolphs, 2006: 21).

Tables 2.1 and 2.2 also highlight some cultural differences that show in the different text types available according to country. For instance, French politicians often contribute to *tribunes* (front-page articles) and other written publications in the weeks preceding an election (Table 2.1), which is not a text type I came across while selecting the data from British and American leaders. In addition, on the contrary to EngPol, FraPol does not include any data from Twitter. This is related to the fact that social media in general were not part of my primary focus until later in the research, at which point Twitter made it considerably more difficult for individual researchers to collect it retrospectively.

2.2 Corpus Linguistics: theory and applications in this research

In this section, I first review the Corpus Linguistic (CL) theory, before moving on to the benefits of CL tools for the present research.

2.2.1. The theory

Corpus Linguistics originated as a discourse analysis method in the 1960s, with the creation of the very first corpora (Kucera, 1967). In contrast to other language analysis theories, it is not so much concerned with a particular “aspect of language.” Rather, it is used in cases where language studies require the manipulation and analysis of large amounts of data (McEnery and Hardie, 2012: 1-2).

Corpus Linguistics has been the focus of a long lasting debate on the benefits of rational versus empirical approaches to language studies (McEnery and Wilson, 2001: 5, Andor, 2004). The rationalist approach considers how the mind processes the language, and as such, “associates theory with introspection,” “favours the intuition of native speakers, and focuses on language competence” (Adolphs, 2006: 6). Meanwhile, the empirical approach, claimed by Corpus Linguists, relies on the observation of naturally occurring data, and builds its theory on language use (Adolphs, 2006: 7) rather than intuition. One of its limitations is, however, that it is closer to quantitative analysis, even though it forms a solid basis for qualitative study (Adolphs, 2006: 19), whereas the limitations of the rational approach arise from the reliance on intuitions of the researchers, which could prove erroneous or unreliable (Adolphs, 2006: 6) in that they are subjective.

Chomsky claims, however, (Andor, 2004) that Corpus Linguistics cannot be considered as empirical or as a reliable method of language analysis, as it is based on the mere recordings or “videotapes” of “things happening in the world” and “tries to develop the results from them” (Andor, 2004: 97). However, In McEnery and Hardie’s terms, the argument is either the result of “naivety” or “deliberately misleading” as they claim the approach adopted in CL is not so peculiar in the scientific community since the corpus itself is hard evidence of language use (McEnery and Hardie, 2012: 26). Flowerdew (2005: 324-25) accounts for further criticism of CL in relation to concordance searches, which form an essential part of

this study, claiming that they do not provide enough information on the context of occurrence of the analysed words. Flowerdew acknowledges that this “can be problematic for the corpus analyst when dealing with pragmatic features of text, which may only be recoverable from the socio-cultural context” (Flowerdew, 2005: 325). And in fact, this is the case of this study of political discourse. In that respect, CL provides a word-based analysis of the text, but unless the researcher can retrieve the context of occurrence of the utterances studied, such pragmatic features cannot be uncovered solely through corpus analysis.

To overcome this issue, I draw on Flowerdew’s second counter-argument (2005: 328-29) against the claim that corpus analysis relies on decontextualized texts. In effect, in the cases where the analyst is “the compiler and does have familiarity with the wider socio-cultural context in which the text was created” (Flowerdew, 2005: 328-29), or where the contextual features of the texts analysed can be easily recovered, the analyst is able to recover both pragmatic and contextual features of the utterance studied. In this research, for instance, socio-political and cultural contextual information can be retrieved from both the data itself in *Wordsmith*, (Scott, 2012) using the context tools available through concordance lists, as well as through referring to news stories relating to a specific event, interaction, or political leader.

Thirdly, if most corpus linguists agree that CL does not provide a bias-free rationale for language analysis (Adolphs, 2006: 7-8), the replicable processes to which it can be subjected thanks to the software tools mean nonetheless that the data can be verified by one or more researchers. CL also provides a privileged and easy access to data that intuition may overlook, and, thanks to technological advances in recent years, the software assists the human researcher and does the basic sorting of the data which means more accurate and consistent results in a shorter amount of time (Adolphs, 2006: 8). Finally, the mixed methods approach adopted in this thesis allows the researcher to ensure that a comprehensive analysis

is carried out. This is why this research adopts a combined approach, where the researcher's intuition triggers the initial focus of the electronic analysis, and where the latter subsequently takes over and guides the former, thanks to its systematic nature, through naturally occurring findings, a process that eventually ensures higher objectivity and reliability of the results.

2.2.2 The tools

This research relies on corpus analysis tools provided by *Wordsmith* (Scott, 2012) and *SketchEngine* (2016). Wordlists and concordance lists (Figure 2.1a,b) are used to uncover the trends and patterns, which leads to qualitative analysis of the data.

Wordlists allow the researcher to find out and compare frequency patterns in a corpus of texts, “study the type of vocabulary used” (Scott, 2012), and to access concordance lists of any item it features. Two wordlists can also be compared, which allows the researchers to find positive and negative keywords, that is, words that occur more (positive) or less (negative) often in a given corpus than in the other, which can be used to “carry out consistency analysis [...] for stylistic comparison purposes” (Scott, 2012).

Concordance lists can be used to find out more on the context in which a given word occurs. They also highlight the most frequent clusters and patterns that occur in conjunction with the *node*, that is, the key term upon which the concordance line is focused, for instance, *il* in Figure 2.1b. In addition, they allow one to carry out “investigations of lexical items within a corpus to better understand how ideology is encoded in language” (Adolphs, 2006: 4). Concordance lists and wordlists form the backbone of the quantitative aspect of this analysis, which supports the qualitative aspects comprised within the pragmatic study of the data, as I explain in detail in the next section.

US Debates.lst

File Edit View Compute Settings Windows Help

case-sensitive search typing Print Preview Find... Layout Concordance

| N | Word | Freq. | % | Texts | % | Lemmas | Set |
|----|------|--------|------|-------|--------|--------|-----|
| 1 | THE | 12,705 | 4.80 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 2 | TO | 9,885 | 3.73 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 3 | AND | 7,771 | 2.94 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 4 | THAT | 5,872 | 2.22 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 5 | OF | 5,840 | 2.21 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 6 | A | 5,336 | 2.02 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 7 | I | 4,881 | 1.84 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 8 | IN | 4,662 | 1.76 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 9 | WE | 4,264 | 1.61 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 10 | YOU | 3,475 | 1.31 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 11 | IS | 3,212 | 1.21 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 12 | HAVE | 2,777 | 1.05 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 13 | FOR | 2,555 | 0.97 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 14 | IT | 2,540 | 0.96 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 15 | # | 2,282 | 0.86 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 16 | ON | 1,838 | 0.69 | 16 | 100.00 | | |
| 17 | THIS | 1,730 | 0.65 | 16 | 100.00 | | |

a. Wordlist view in Wordsmith Tools 6.0 (Scott, 2012)

IL-Hollandet12-(sarko).cnc

File Edit View Compute Settings Windows Help

case-sensitive search tagfile tags Undefined tags Print Preview Find... Layout Concordance Context Menu

| N | Concordance | Set | Tag | Word # |
|----|--|-----|-----|--------|
| 1 | trois propositions qu'il avait faites en 2007. Il avait dit : « Jamais, vous m'entendez, | | | 1,186 |
| 2 | en 2010, l'autre au Pakistan en 2011. Il avait justifié un motif touristique. Un | | | 1,395 |
| 3 | 2007. Parce qu'en 2007, il fut élu. En 2007, il avait promis le droit opposable au | | | 1,100 |
| 4 | ce qui s'est passé en 2007. Parce qu'en 2007, il fut élu. En 2007, il avait promis le | | | 1,095 |
| 5 | : il ne voit plus personne. Il s'abrite. Il reste entre amis complaisants. Eh bien moi | | | 2,684 |
| 6 | à 5 %, il est à 10 % de la population active. Il avait affirmé que le pouvoir d'achat | | | 2,397 |
| 7 | c'était vers les jeunes qu'il s'adressait. Il avait trouvé une nouvelle idée : les | | | 2,901 |
| 8 | pas assez de compliments à lui adresser. Il trouvait ses propositions formidables. Il | | | 636 |
| 9 | était de retirer nos troupes d'Afghanistan. Il considérait que la mission était accomplie | | | 1,326 |
| 10 | les promouvoir. Et notamment la laïcité. Ah ! Il s'en fait le champion, maintenant, de la | | | 2,369 |
| 11 | vais refaire une nouvelle loi ». D'ailleurs, il parle comme s'il était lui-même le | | | 2,323 |
| 12 | Mélenchon, que je connais par ailleurs. Il lui trouve du talent - cela peut arriver. | | | 3,173 |
| 13 | de cette centrale : il n'y est jamais allé ! Il est comme ça, il s'invente même des | | | 1,642 |
| 14 | a été dit et ce qui n'a pas été dit. Alors, il est dans une phase de repentance, il a | | | 1,512 |
| 15 | . C'est suffisamment éloquent ! Alors, il va chercher d'autres suffrages, et il fait | | | 2,362 |
| 16 | sa situation. Il doit en être informé. Alors il n'est pas regardant sur les arguments | | | 891 |
| 17 | Son bilan ne peut pas parler pour lui, alors il n'en parle pas, et notamment sur le | | | 3,721 |
| 18 | tout, mais jamais responsable de rien ! Alors, il prétend qu'il a changé, qu'il est un autre | | | 667 |
| 19 | à l'aide pour empêcher l'alternance ! Il n'y parviendra pas car le peuple français | | | 1,044 |
| 20 | pensées les plus profondes. Mais cette année il s'y est invité. Il en a bien le droit, | | | 1,400 |

b. Concordance list view of *il* in Wordsmith Tools 6.0 (Scott, 2012)

Figure 2.1 Sample view of the corpus analysis tools in Wordsmith (Scott, 2012)

2.3 Defining adversarial moves: a mixed methods approach

This study relies on several aspects of pragmatic and Discourse Analysis (DA) theory. Firstly, two interrelated dimensions of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

terminology are important. Its very essence comes from the fact that unlike many other theories of language, the word 'critical' implies not only an interest in theoretical issues of discourse, but also an approach that links the theoretical to the social (Wodak, 2001: 12). In addition, I discuss the compatibility and relationship of CDA terminology with Corpus Linguistics, and the other theoretical perspectives of this study, especially stance and facework.

2.3.1 CDA

In this research, I follow the claim that "CDA can be conducted in, and combined with, any approach and subdiscipline in the humanities and social sciences" (Flowerdew, 2008: 199, van Dijk, 2001:96), and more precisely, that the "use of pragmatics, conversation analysis and Corpus Linguistics" is compatible with CDA (Fairclough, 2003: 5-6).

CDA links the use of language to the organisation of society, and specifically to social order: that is, how a society is broken down and organised into groups, which hold power for themselves and over others, the elites, and those subjected to that power: the masses (van Dijk, 1993: 249). CDA traditionally (although not only) focuses on political leaders as the powerful elites, and considers how they use and relate to discourse in order to maintain and develop their power over the masses (van Dijk, 1993: 250). In that respect, it is often considered as descending from Marxist philosophy and the Frankfurt school in that it is ideologically oriented, and focuses on the class struggles that take place between the dominated masses and the dominating elites (van Dijk, 1993: 251). The power of those elites is maintained through the influence they exert on the mass media, through which favourable public discourse is broadcast to the masses (van Dijk, 1993: 251).

The goal of CDA is to deconstruct the underlying ideological structures that are inherent in all types of discourse (van Dijk, 1993: 249-250). It draws on Systemic

Functional Linguistics (SFL) which focuses on recurring patterns of language that could then be “systematizable as social behaviour” (Halliday, 2007: 44). SFL describes language as a social phenomenon (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004; Martin, 2010; Matthiessen, 1995) and considers it as a stratified system where different levels of phenomena “such as semantics, grammar, and phonology” interact with one another (Crystal, 1997: 82-83). This stratified system is best exemplified through the metafunctions, which reflect its internal organisation: the experiential, interpersonal, and textual metafunctions (Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 Metafunctions and their reflexes in grammar (inspired by Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 61)

| Metafunction | Definition (type of meaning) | Corresponding status in clause |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Experiential | construing a model of experience | clause as representation |
| Interpersonal | enacting social relationships | clause as exchange |
| Textual | creating relevance to context | clause as message |

Within each metafunction, the type of meaning is attributable to the word’s function (i.e. in Hallidayan terms: actor, process, circumstance) in a specific context, rather than its class (i.e. verb, adverb, adjective, prepositional phrase, nominal clause etc.) (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 24-27). In addition, the attributed “class” meaning of a given item may not be relevant if separated from its “functional” meaning. This combined analysis of function and class serves the purpose of SFL, and provides the basis of the CDA argument: “to provide a means of interpreting grammatical structure, in such a way as to relate any given instance to the system of the language as a whole” (Butler, 2003: 166), rather than separating meaning word by word.

This research mainly refers to the experiential metafunction and its useful terminology as a tool for breaking down political discourse into meaningful unit. In effect, the experiential metafunction describes how we break down what we experience and how we reconstruct it in meaningful phenomena in language, in

relation to our representation of the listener and of ourselves and the world around us. This provides the terminology through which I consider how interactants adopt stances, evaluate themselves, the other, and the rest of the world, and, in the context of this research, the combination of the experiential metafunction's terminology within this mixed-methods approach allows the researcher to retrieve how relations of power are distributed within the discourse.

In Example 2.1, extracted from BriPol, the power relationship is established through the moderator's request (Adam Boulton), for the listener *David Cameron* to give some information.

Example 2.1 Question from Adam Boulton, second British Leaders' Debate, (22/04/2010 – BriPol) and breakdown according to the experiential metafunction terminology

How are you going to tackle Europe, David Cameron?

| Actor | Patient / goal | Process | Circumstance |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| <i>you / David Cameron</i> | <i>Europe</i> | <i>be going to tackle</i> | <i>how</i> (manner) |

In this request, the experiential metafunction allows us to breakdown the power relations as follows: *you / David Cameron* is the actor of the process *be going to tackle*, whereas *Europe*, the other participant, is the patient of the process. As a result, *you / David Cameron* as aspiring British Prime Minister, is represented with enough power over Europe to be able to *tackle* it. Table 2.4 provides a comprehensive breakdown of the function types: participants, processes, circumstances, and their subtypes.

Table 2.4 Functions enacted in the experiential metafunction

| Function types | Participants | Processes | Circumstances | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Subtypes | Actor | Material | Accompaniment | Matter |
| | Goal | Behavioural | Angle | Role |
| | Agent | Mental | Cause | Location |
| | Patient | Verbal | Extent | Manner |
| | | Relational | | |
| | | Existential | | |

The function of participant, which encompasses the actor and goal subtypes, corresponds to “Entities (person, thing, idea, etc.) involved in a process” (Jackson, 2007: 144). Processes take the form of a verb and describe the actions that are carried out by the actor. Similar to the category of participants, that of processes also includes subtypes, which are further included in a higher plane divided into three ‘worlds’: the physical world, the world of abstract relations and the world of consciousness (Figure 2.2). Of all these subtypes, material, mental, relational (and verbal) processes are the most frequent.




Figure 2.2 "Wheel of processes" (reproduction from Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 172)

Figure 2.2 represents the main areas of meaning which each process type belongs to. This representation highlights the fact that each world is permeable to the others

with which it is also connected. As a result, process types sometimes overlap two different worlds, as, for instance, do behavioural processes, which can be considered from both a physical world and a world of consciousness perspective.

In effect, behavioural processes can represent an interactant's behaviour in the physical world, but also how it is perceived by another interactant, which belongs to the world of sensing.

Circumstances are the third type of function encountered in the experiential metafunction: they "augment the configuration of process plus participants involved [...] through the logico-semantic relations of projection and expansion" (Jackson, 2007: 69-70). In other words, circumstances are concerned with the processes and participants involved in the clause, in that they provide information on the configuration of the processes in which the participants are involved. For instance, in Example 2.1, *how* is a circumstance that indicates the manner in which Cameron is going to *tackle Europe*, as opposed to *where*, which would indicate a circumstance of location. Similar to processes (which apply solely to verbs and verbal groups) and participants (which apply specifically to noun, pronouns and nominal groups), the function of circumstance also applies to adverbs, adverbial and prepositional phrases (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 176). They are, however, not necessarily present in all instances of discourse.

Thus, the consistent framework CDA provides is effectively compatible with the different theoretical outlooks I adopt in the next chapters, and can be used throughout this analysis to uncover what drives political discourse, how adversarial moves are made, and the role played by stancetaking and face management in that process, in relation to individual style.

2.3.2 Facework and politeness

This research focuses on the expression of stance and the performance of speech acts which participate in facework, and which, I argue, contribute to the performance of adversarial moves. This section reviews how the two aspects are interconnected.

Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness is based on "the mutual awareness of "face' sensitivity" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 5), and the claim that evaluation is expressed through the patterns of verbal and non-verbal acts which every person acts out in daily interactions (Goffman, 1969: 3). This is, in other words, the acknowledgement by all participants in a given social interaction of:

the positive social value a person effectively claims for [themselves] by the line others assume [they have] taken during a particular contact" (Goffman, 1967: 5, Bull and Wells, 2012: 32-33). Drawing on this important notion of face, the Brown and Levinson model presupposes a system of "Face Management" and "Face Threatening", which leads to the notion of FTAs mentioned above: speech acts that are "intrinsically threatening to face" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 24).

Politeness is researched in a range of settings: in ordinary conversation (Bousfield and Locher, 2005; Culpeper, 1996, 1998; Culpeper et al., 2003, 2011; Haugh, 2015; Spencer-Oatey, 2005), in language in the courtroom and in legal proceedings (Archer, 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2015), the workplace, (Archer and Jagodzinski, 2015; Harris and Bargiela-Chiappini, 2006; Newton, 2004), in online and media discourse (Culpeper, 2005; Hardaker, 2015; Lorenzo-Dus, 2009), political and parliamentary discourse, (Harris, 2001, 2003; Ilie, 2003; Bull and Wells, 2012; Bull, 2013) including speeches and political debates (Garcia Pastor, 2001; Hinck and Hinck, 2002; Vertommen, 2014). Research in politeness is mostly grounded in Brown and Levinson's theory (1987). As a result, politeness researchers "define linguistic politeness along the lines of discourse behaviour 'which actively expresses positive concern for others as well as non-imposing behaviour' (Holmes, 1995: 4) or, at the very least, which provides 'a means of minimising the risk of confrontation in

discourse” (Harris, 2001: 452). Politeness research has therefore mostly been concentrated on interactive discourse, where two or more people are having a conversation.

Face Threatening Acts (FTAs) are speech acts whereby, in any given interaction, one participant evaluates the other participant’s social identity: the stance(s) they assume in a particular interaction and/or regarding a specific topic. In this framework, the Brown and Levinson system assumes that such evaluations are done pragmatically in conversation, which results in face management, face enhancement, and FTAs. In the context of political discourse, especially in political debates, which constitute the first part of this analysis, FTAs are considered to be of an institutional nature (Harris, 2001: 466), in the sense that political opponents are expected to “oppose”, “criticise”, “challenge” and “subvert the policies and positions” of the opponent (Bull and Wells, 2012: 34). Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) extend that description of face to “the public self-image that every member wants to claim for [themselves], consisting of two related aspects:

- (a) Negative face: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction – i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition
- (b) Positive face: the positive consistent self-image or ‘personality’ (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants” (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 61).

FTAs are a key feature of politeness and impoliteness theory. They can be recognised in that they “impose on a hearer’s face by threatening the latter’s needs (Linssen, et al. 2013: 72), and as such, form an essential element of adversarial discourse. In effect, adversarial discourse is often described in terms of speech acts and, in political discourse, studied in the context of interviews (see Bull and Wells, 2012; Harris, 1991; Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Clayman, 2010) and debates (Lorenzo-Dus, 2009; Vertommen, 2014). It is, however, seldom

characterised further, in terms of *what it does* in the context of the interaction for all participants involved, and how it fits into individual style. In addition, this analysis is also concerned with defining adversarial moves as not only offensive speech acts such as FTAs, but also subtler, more positive forms as embodied in self-promotion and defensive strategies such as face-enhancing. In effect, FTAs are sometimes “anticipated” and can even “play a positive role in the proceedings subject to certain conventions” (Harris, 2011: 87) which makes them a rather obvious choice of adversarial move in the context of electoral debating. In the meantime, the perspectives of studies in impoliteness have evolved since Brown and Levinson’s theory (1987) in considering impoliteness as not only a derivative of politeness, but also rather a “common part of human linguistic behaviour” in which FTAs are intentional and with a purpose (Limberg, 2005: 155). This study follows Harris’s and Limberg’s argument based on Lakoff’s assumption (1989) that there is not just politeness and impoliteness, and that theories of politeness should be “extended to a consideration of the different discourse types associated with certain professional and institutional contexts, and that examining such contexts forces us to see politeness from a different perspective and to foreground different dimensions” (Harris, 2001: 452-3). Thus, it is bearing these two notions in mind that I study adversarial moves not only in the form of FTAs but also in other forms that may not necessarily be associated with them. My research uses this as a starting point, via the study of adversarial discourse in political debates. Taking this further, I study what takes place in other text/interaction types of electoral discourse where the study of politeness does not conventionally apply, as no direct interaction takes place through manifestos, although they have an implied reader and audience. In doing so, I determine whether there is enough evidence to confirm the existence of adversarial moves in that electoral discourse subtype.

2.3.3 Political rhetoric and metaphors

This research scrutinises how political rhetoric is used by leaders from the UK, US and France, and finds that rhetorical tools, such as rhetorical questions and metaphors, play an important part in and around the performance of adversarial moves. This is not a surprise as “persuasive and manipulative language use to a large extent employs language material that is emotionally charged” (Wodak, 1989: 99). This implies that the speakers are prone to appeal to the audience’s emotional responses in order to win them over, all the while performing facework, especially FTAs and face enhancement strategies. As a result, the notions of ethos, logos, and pathos are of crucial importance in relation to stancetaking, as well as to understand adversarial moves as performed in electoral discourse.

Ethos, logos and pathos are three “inevitable components” of argumentation (Mshvenieradze, 2013: 1939), in that they help back up a speaker’s claim and make it effective enough to impact on, and change, the audience’s opinion (Mshvenieradze, 2013: 1939). Logos is the means of persuasion via reason, that is, via the presentation of arguments that include “critical cognition, analytical skills, good memory and purposeful behaviour” (Mshvenieradze, 2013: 1939).

Pathos is “the power with which the speaker’s message moves the audience to his or her desirable emotional action. A good orator should know for sure which emotion would effectively impact on the audience considering their social status, age and other features” (Mshvenieradze, 2013: 1940). Metaphors can heighten pathos in a variety of “leadership contexts” among which are commonly found the attempt to “sustain morale during times of national crisis, [...] communicate the emotional investment that political leaders have in their ideas, [or] communicate their empathy” with a specific electorate (Charteris-Black, 2005: 20). This entails the creation of heroes/villains/victims and implies the “arousal of emotions” which triggers the relevant responses from the audience in relation, for instance, to the “protection of

the family, loyalty to the tribe, or fear of invasion by an unknown other” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 203). In this way, metaphors play an important role in the performance of adversarial moves in that they heighten the speaker’s own logos/pathos/ethos, especially in relation to the creation of contrasts and comparisons. In effect, the combination of metaphors and contrasts allow the speaker to create associations of ideas in extreme contexts (Charteris-Black, 2005: 197), such as, for instance, associating one’s opponent with the notion of evil, and oneself with the notion of good. This can then be used “to create cause/effect relations” and consequently make metaphors more persuasive.

Thirdly, ethos consists of convincing the audience through arguments that highlight the morality, “trustworthiness and credibility” (Mshvenieradze, 2013: 1940) of a speaker. This is in fact referred to by Aristotle as the “face” of the speaker, or “face created by the discourse: [...] [that is], conditioned by the fact that the orator earns the credibility only in case if his or her arguments are competent, reliable, fair and frank” (Mshvenieradze, 2013: 1940). As a result, the theory tells us that the notion of ethos, and ethos-enhancement in political rhetoric, is closely related to that of face and the performance of FTAs.

In the meantime, “hyperbolic language,” that is, the tendency in public discourse (whether advertising, or political) to emphasize [...] the “use of evaluative lexical material” (Sornig, 1989: 99) allows us to connect rhetorical politics to stancetaking. This study explores how ethos-building strategies often intertwine with stancetaking and FTAs in electoral discourse. Furthermore, the combination of metaphors and contrasts conveys an ethical value system: “legitimation often works by highlighting the contrasts between, and placing emotional values on, different political choices” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 197). In addition, the study of metaphor in electoral discourse as presented by Charteris-Black resonates with the CDA methods outlined above:

Charismatic leadership is communicated through linguistic behaviour and it is by critical analysis of language that we are able to identify underlying ideologies and expose the nature of the value systems on which they are based. By becoming aware of linguistic choices we are also becoming aware of the political choices they imply and their underlying assumptions” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 198).

There are numerous types of metaphors, among those, journeys and personifications are the most “pervasive domains” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 198). In those metaphors, the starting point is usually “the present and is familiar or known while the destination is in the future and may well not be known” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 199). They “typically refer to the predetermined objectives of policy [...], imply some type of planned progress and assume a conscious agent [the politician] who will follow a fixed oath towards an imagined goal” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 199). They are, therefore, “inherently purposeful, [...] show directionality” and allow politicians to “appear to have planned intentions” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 199). Charteris-Black provides a sub-mapping for this type of metaphor (2005: 201):

- Purposes are Destinations
- **Means** are Paths
- *Difficulties* are impediments to motion
- Long-term, Purposeful Activities are Journeys.

e.g. Instead, it is **that American spirit, that American promise**, that pushes us forward even when the path is uncertain; that binds us together in spite of our differences; that makes us fix our eye not on what is seen, but what is unseen, that better place around the bend.

(Barack Obama, nomination acceptance speech 28/08/2008)

Politicians use this type of “sub-mapping” to convince voters/audiences of the do-ability of their plans “while at the same time highlighting the need for social unity, effort, etc. in order to attain them” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 201). This type of metaphor is especially pervasive in political discourse, because of the wide variety of types of travel that are possible whether in terms of means, difficulties, distances, terrain types, speed and so on (Charteris-Black, 2005: 201), and because of that richness, contrasts are easily made between different journey types.

Thus, “the expressive force of the journey metaphors is precisely because of the readiness with which familiar bodily experience can be integrated into a set of contrasts that serve the basis for a system of evaluation” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 201). That is, talking about a long hard rock climb will remind people how painful that feels in comparison with cruising along the motorway in a nice comfortable car. In addition, it will trigger a universal response from the audience, and create an impression of proximity with the politician in that it represents them as able to relate to a commonly shared experience. Furthermore, Charteris-Black (2005: 201) insists especially on the theme of guidance through which the politicians represent themselves as the voters’ guide through the metaphorical journey. This “may systematically be used to give positive evaluations of political leadership and negative evaluations of absence of leadership” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 201), which can in turn be used to create a powerful contrast between the politician speaking and their opponent.

In effect, metaphors can be used for both self-evaluation and evaluation of other things: policies, opponents, groups of people etc. For that purpose, Charteris-Black (2005: 203) distinguishes between outward and inward-looking metaphors, whereby, in the latter, the politician attempts to build up their own ethos in view of further legitimisation, and in the former, politicians attempt to evaluate another interactant’s ethos. This way, metaphors constitute a means for politicians to

heighten their ethical qualities by “self-represent[ing] as a judge of ethical issues” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 203):

Self-representation as a moral arbiter provides the basis for representing those close to the speaker as insiders who share in the ethical virtues of the leader and those who are far from the speaker as outsiders who are excluded from a nest of virtue (Charteris-Black, 2005: 203).

In that respect, they are made persuasive through this “mirror-like quality, [through which] the ethical ideals of the audience are reflected in the image of the politician” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 203).

As well as journey metaphors, personifications present a special interest to this study, in that they turn an out-of-reach abstract notion into something concrete and upon which one can act. In example 2.1: *How are you going to tackle Europe, David Cameron*, Europe is personified in that it is turned from the abstract, out-of-reach concept of Europe into something that can be physically tackled, which allows Cameron to respond in a way that seems more concrete to the audience (whether he chooses to do so, or not). Such personifications “activate emotions originating in pre-existent myths about classes, nations and other social and ethnic groupings etc.” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 204). In addition, representing political abstractions such as the European Union as people “creates the myth that ideologies can be classified as either good or evil – just as we do people” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 204). This dimension of metaphor, in relation to ethos building and as part of political rhetoric, contributes to demonstrating how closely related it is to the study of stance and evaluation in that it can play a determining role in stancetaking processes.

2.3.4 Stancetaking

Stancetaking is achieved through persuasive stylistic language features. They can typically be divided into two categories: epistemic and interpersonal, and can be defined as:

A public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically, through overt communicative means [...] through which social actors simultaneously evaluate objects, position subjects (themselves and others) and align with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field (Du Bois, 2007: 163).

Interpersonal stances are the result of linguistic choices made by 'people in interaction with others while 'thinking who they are' in relation to their interlocutor(s)', this way, when individuals adopt a stance they manifestly attach themselves to 'a constellation of associated identities' (Kiesling, 2012: 172-73). In doing so, the speaker also defines the role of the interactant (Jaffe, 2012: 8). In addition, this process of stancetaking can also be related to that of ethos-enhancement.

Epistemic stances serve the purpose of "establishing the relative authority of interactants," which echoes the Hallidayan interpersonal relationships (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 29), while situating the source of that authority "in a wider socio-cultural field," possibly to legitimate further acts of evaluation (Jaffe, 2012: 7). In stancetaking, Jaffe claims that the use of generalisations is essential in that it allows a speaker to shift the location of the epistemic authority from individual to societal level (cf Scheibman, 2007: 132): "indexing societal discourses as shared and compelling through the use of generalizations can indirectly strengthen speakers' stances." (Jaffe, 2012: 7). The reverse is also possible, in political discourse, for instance, through the downgrading of the authority of an opponent to contest relevant pieces of information to the profit of another. Such interactions can either be the result of consensually defined social roles in the discussion, or be an active resource

for one of the interactants to assert their ideology/domination over the other(s), thus those interactions “may be subject to contestation” (Jaffe, 2012: 8). If the utterance is framed as a performance, for instance, when a teacher speaks to a student, the other interactant (the student) is considered as the audience, while in the case of the speaker taking up an expert stance, the other interactant is considered as a novice, or in need of counsel. This can also apply to more than one interactant at a time, for instance, when a teacher speaks to an entire classroom of students. In that process, the speaker’s stance effectively carries meaning as to how the other interactant, or the opponent, is represented. In political discourse, this is not without repercussions as, for instance, speakers may use a stance in order to enhance their own ethos, which, through contrasts and comparisons, can be used as a means to threaten and diminish another interactant, or, for instance in the 2012 US Debate series (Chapter 3) the opponent’s ethos.

Stance is “a person’s expression of their relationship to their talk.” Epistemic stance has to do with how certain they are about their talk, while interpersonal stance has to do with how they express their relation to the interlocutor: friendly/dominating/patronising... (Kiesling, 2012: 172). In fact, the two are often interrelated. For instance, the higher the degree of certainty, the more likely the relationship is to be patronising (Kiesling, 2012: 173).

Stancetaking is the main constitutive social activity that speakers engage in when both creating a style and ‘style-shifting.’ The Stanford group shows that personal style is similarly constitutive of more widespread social group variation patterns, and so by logic, stance underpins social group variation as well as the two conceptions of style. (Kiesling, 2012: 175)

Ochs (1986) and Labov (1989) reach similar conclusions that the learning of stancetaking comes from infancy, and directly relates to style: “distinct style patterns are present for children as young as seven, and generally pattern according to their

parents' style-shifting" (Kiesling, 2012: 176). We can consequently assume that if style variation is related to stance, then it is stance that children are learning.

Style is best defined indexically (Bucholtz, 2012: 146): the social meaning of linguistic form is a matter of "interactional, subtle moves" through which "speakers take stance, create alignments and construct personae" rather than a matter of social categories (genre, social class, ethnicity, age etc.). There are two levels of indexicality. Direct indexicality is achieved through linguistic forms, which "most immediately index interactional stances – that is, subjective orientations to ongoing talk, including affective, evaluative, and epistemic stances" (Bucholtz, 2012, 148). Indirect indexicality is achieved through the same linguistic forms, which "become associated with particular social types believed to take such stances. It is at this level that ideology comes most centrally into play, for it is here that stances acquire more enduring semiotic associations" (Bucholtz, 2012: 148-49). Furthermore, indexical meaning depends on the notion of context "understood fairly broadly, including aspects of the speaker, hearer, and speaking situation" (Kiesling, 2012: 177). For instance, address terms show how context can be encoded. The term *dude* exemplified by Kiesling (2012: 177) usually identifies both speaker and hearer as male, and shows the speaker's interpretation of the type of speech event as probably informal.

2.3.5 Evasion techniques and vague language

Evasion techniques and vague language form the last dimension of the qualitative part of this study. These two aspects are studied together as they are closely related in two ways. First, they are most often triggered in Question and Answer interactions (Q&As), and second, they both consist of moves from an interactant (usually the questioned person, or interviewee) to either reset (or change) the agenda, or avoid responding to the said question for any number of reasons.

This dimension of adversarial discourse also relates to politeness and both positive (speech acts which are intended to be polite) and negative face acts (which are intended to avoid impoliteness) (Harris, 2001: 463; Brown and Levinson, 1987: 61), in that this type of answer can be associated with an intention of either performing a positive or negative face act. However, I find in this study that evasion techniques and uses of vague language are used in relation to a third aspect of (im)politeness: FTAs.

In their study of news interviews, Clayman and Heritage (2002) draw on Harris's assumption (1991) that politicians are widely perceived as being evasive when answering questions from the media.

The impetus towards evasiveness is understandable in the context of the contemporary news interview, which is so often adversarial in character. Hostile questions, if answered straightforwardly, can inflict real damage on an interviewee's policy objectives and career prospects. (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 238-39).

Through this consideration, Clayman and Heritage also link evasion to adversariality, in that questions can be hostile and inflict damage to the interviewee, which relates directly to the notion of FTAs. The comparison goes further in that evasion techniques, similar to FTAs, have a downside: the normative ground rules of the interview genre and interview contract to which interviewees (IE) are held accountable. In effect, interviewees "are obliged to answer questions posed by interviewers (IR), and thus deal with whatever agendas they raise in the way in which they raise them" (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 239). In addition, interviewers "monitor for evasiveness and respond to such moves with probing follow-up questions, and, at times, explicitly negative sanctions" (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 239). This is the case in Extract 3.2 studied in Chapter 3. The goal of such responses from the interviewer is to "allow the audience to be informed [...] that the answer is evasive [and to] thereby increase the pressure for a full-fledged answer" (Clayman

and Heritage, 2002: 239). This constitutes a risk for interviewees of becoming newsworthy because of that very attempt at evasiveness, in which case they see the matter escalate far beyond the point it might have reached had they answered differently (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 239).

Determining whether an answer is evasive is, however, very difficult to achieve. Clayman and Heritage (2002: 242) provide a method for accurately determining that this is effectively the case.

1. The interviewer (IR) and interviewee may disagree on whether the response was “improperly evasive” or “an essentially valid way of dealing with a difficult and perhaps flawed question” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 242)
2. Evasion “connotes moral impropriety”, and “may be seen as embodying a contestable perspective on the action under analysis” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 242).
3. The participants’ understanding of the question is “not always transparent” and may sometimes be “designedly opaque” in order to: “avoid prompting a hostile follow-up question” or to “forestall negative inferences from the viewing audience” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 242).
4. Finally, the interviewer themselves may just decide not to “register” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 242) the attempt from the interviewee, for a variety of reasons: to “move the interview forward” for instance.

This, in itself, resonates with the mechanisms at work within facework, and the attempts from both interactants to maintain, enhance or threaten face that result from it. The interviewee may in effect consider the question hostile, and thus attempt not to fall into a trap set by the interviewer in order to maintain face, whereas the interviewer may consider their question a fair one while talking on behalf of the viewers/voters. In addition, they may choose to “not register” (Clayman and Heritage,

2002: 242) an attempt at evasive discourse or an improper response as a means of doing negative politeness and thus enable the interviewee to maintain face. That way, both speakers attempt facework, while evasion techniques occur in the IE's discourse, which triggers counter-evasion reactions from the IR. Clayman and Heritage (2002: 243) account for other types of "inadequate responses" which differentiate from evasion proper, where interviewees "resist, sidestep, agenda-shift" etc., and through which they "do' answering" (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 242-43). Here I review the types of evasion strategies found and studied in PoIDisc.

The minimal answer plus elaboration (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 245) is commonly found in PoIDisc, and sometimes includes repetition of terms used in the original question as explicit markers of an answer. In the case of yes/no questions, this includes the explicit "yes" or "no" in the answer, before the speaker moves on to developing their argument. Sometimes the IE repeats the framework of the question, which is "a way to assert [...] independence from the question while they answer it" (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 245). This is also a marker of hostility or resistance, repeating the framework instead of building from it, which eventually leads to an answer that does not fit the question. Alternatively, this can be seen as "hyper correct" which on the other hand allows the interviewee to "propose that they are attending to the question in detail, and are thus properly responsive to the issues that it raises" (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 247). Repetitions such as these, if they occur for instance at the beginning and end of an answer, also serve as pragmatic markers of turn-taking in the conversation (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 248). In addition, anaphoric indexicals are an alternative to exact repetitions: the pronoun *that*, context-dependent verbs for their meanings such as *was* (Clayman and Heritage, 200: 249), as well as "units of talk (which are shorter than a sentence [and] who also tend to be parasitic on the question for their meaning)", for instance (Clayman and Heritage's example, 2002: 249):

Question: "But who's going to be the judge of that [...]?"

Answer: "Child support offices."

Clayman and Heritage study the positive and negative dimensions of resistance in Q&As (2002: 250-257). Negative aspects include plain, explicit refusals to answer a question, partial or incomplete responses (especially in answer to complex questions "with multiple components": the speaker chooses to answer on some but not all) (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 251), and minimal responses (especially in the case of yes/no questions), as studied previously.

Positive aspects of resistance include "departures" (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 253), when IE changes the topic of the question altogether. In those cases, though, "a response may lie within the question's topical parameters but perform a task or action other than what was specifically requested by the question" (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 254). In the following examples (Example 2.2 and 2.3) extracted from the 2012 US debate series, the interviewer Martha Raddatz asks in turn Joe Biden (the Democratic Vice President) and Paul Ryan (his Republican opponent) about the terrorist attack on the American Embassy in Benghazi (Libya) that occurred one month before the debate. In the debate, this interaction occurs the other way around, Biden answers first, and then Ryan. However, their answers are presented in reverse order here, to illustrate each evasion strategy. Here, Ryan is effectively performing a departure. The question asked is: *wasn't this a massive intelligence failure [...]?* (cf Example 2.2).

Example 2.2

RADDATZ: Congressman Ryan?

RYAN: We mourn the loss of these four Americans who were murdered.

In this case, the response is in a “broadly similar topical parameter of the question”, but “performs a somewhat different task than the question originally called for” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 254), namely the expression of one’s state of mourning, rather than addressing the issue of the *massive intelligence failure*. Finally, there is a subtler form, in which the IE introduces competing qualifiers or “qualifying adjectives” with those used in the question in order to avoid a too abrupt answer which may be impact the remainder of the candidate’s campaign negatively. Example 2.3 shows Biden’s attempt to do so in response to Raddatz’s question on the Benghazi attack.

Example 2.3

RADDATZ: it was a pre-planned assault by heavily armed men. **Wasn't** this a massive intelligence failure, Vice President Biden?

BIDEN: **What is was, it was** a tragedy, Martha. It -- Chris Stevens was one of our best. We lost three other brave Americans.

In this example, Biden switches the qualifier used by the IR to describe the attack: *massive intelligence failure* (underlined) with *a tragedy* (underlined), while he repeats the framework of the question, by using the verbal form *was* (bold) twice, to assert his independence from the question, and introduce his own agenda. To accomplish these means of *doing answering*, Clayman and Heritage review two types of practices: overt and covert types. The goal of overt practices is to shift the agenda via permission requests (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 257-269). Permission requests to shift the agenda show deference to the interviewer, in that they openly acknowledge attempts to shift the agenda. This way, both interactants maintain face.

Token requests for permission are a pervasive overt technique found in the data studied here. They resemble permission requests but do not actually require a

response from IR. They are prefaced by means similar to: *can I also point out, let me just say this*, usually including “minimising characterisations” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 261) such as *very quick, just one...* This “incomplete clausal unit” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 260) informs the IR (and the audience) that there is more talk to come, which makes it more difficult for them to interrupt or interject (that is if they attempt to do so). It nevertheless allows the IE to show that they are “going through the motions” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 260) of seeking permission, thereby continuing to “honor the principle that it is the interviewer who normally sets the agenda” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 260). Such requests or request tokens have the effect of “mitigating” the threat these impose on the IR’s authority over the agenda-setting of the interview (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 260) which, as a result, primarily constitute a face management strategy as well as an attempt to shift the agenda.

In addition, justifying the shift via permission requests can be performed, such as a reference to something specific: another interactant’s question, embedded as an answer preface (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 262), which “provides an implicit rationale to the shift” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 262).

In the case of debates, a response to points made earlier by an opponent tactfully justifies the shift on the grounds of fairness between interviewees, and “the principle that partisan accusations should not be permitted to stand unanswered” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 262). In effect, the particularity of electoral debates warrants two basic principles: on the one hand, fairness and the right of response to another interactant, and on the other hand, the principle that “the unsolicited intervention has some relevant bearing on the subject” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 263). Such an “import” is “seeking to forestall unflattering inferences that interviewers and audience members might otherwise draw [...] by portraying the shift as legitimate and properly motivated” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 264).

Covert practices (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 269-286) imply that the interviewee “avoids any explicit acknowledgement of the fact that they are shifting the agenda” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 269). These strategies present one advantage: “getting away with it” and one major inconvenience: they may be “particularly costly” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 269) in that they may represent the IE as devious and manipulative. There are steps Clayman and Heritage account for to “to render it less conspicuous” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 269). This includes unmarked transitions beyond answering, such as a tense shift, or a similar tense use but a response that does not address the question directly (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 270). This allows the speaker, in the case of a tense shift, for instance from past to present, to provide answers that “fall broadly within the topical domain targeted by the prior question, but [...] exploit tense shifts and allied practices to alter the temporal orientation of the talk” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 271-72). In relation to this strategy, Clayman and Heritage point out that *and* prefaces can, in some cases be used as a device that puts each part of the argument on an equal footing. This is done even though it may have been previously established that they are not similarly relevant to the question: “when items are grouped together in this way, their differences are minimized and they are presented as if they somehow “belong together”” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 272, Jefferson, 1986). This generic interactional practice obscures the transition from answer to unsolicited material.

Another strategy consists of subverting the trappings of “answering”: using markers of typical “answers” such as word repeats, anaphora etc. which “construct the answers” as a way of shifting the agenda (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 274). Word repeats, as mentioned above, “preserve some of the exact wording of the question in the initial response” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 274), but “veer away from the question as it framed, deal instead with the presupposition that was embedded in the question [...] and counter that presupposition in [their] response” (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 274).

Other types of strategies are available to politicians in order to perform adversarial moves. In the next section, I review features of multimodal communication that contribute to the performance of such moves.

2.4 Multimodality

Questions and answer interactions (Q&As), are the starting point of this analysis. I study questions from both the moderators and the debaters, and especially Rhetorical Questions as a means of Answering (RQAs) from the debaters, as they indicate the performance of FTAs as well as attempts to reset the agenda (Clayman, 2010: 265-68; Clayman and Heritage, 2002). Studying adversarial moves as they are performed in a live filmed context allows the researcher to focus both on the verbal and non-verbal modes of communication, and on how adversarial moves are performed through these modes. The multimodal character of this study refers to the assumption that the verbal part of the message is less explicit in face-to-face dialogue (than in written language) because it is “continuously accompanied and supplemented by various non-verbal signals,” which makes it “part of a comprehensive communicative act.” (Bavelas and Chovil, 2000: 164). In fact, research on multimodality increasingly considers spoken language as only one mode among others (Goodwin, 1981: 1490; Kress et al., 2001, Norris, 2004), rather than the one and only primary mode of communication. Norris (2004: 2) considers that the central role in any given interaction is not always attributed to verbal communication, and that it can be effectively subordinated to other means (and vice-versa): gesture, gaze, and head movements, which are all different systems of representation, that is, “semiotic systems with rules and regularities attached to [them]” (Norris, 2004: 11; Kress and van Leeuwen, 2001).

Posture relates to how participants position their bodies in a given interaction, and specifically evaluate degrees of open/closed-ness as well as directionality, in order to gain an insight into the participants' involvement with other interactants (Norris, 2004: 24).

Gesture can occur in several forms: iconic, metaphoric, deictic, and beat. In this study, I only review iconic gestures: gesture with pictorial content "mimicking what is conveyed verbally, describing specific objects or events, making them more vivid" (Norris, 2004: 28).

Head movements can be either simple or complex, and include conventional and iconic movements, such as yes/no movements, for instance (Norris, 2004: 32-33). I focus on head movement in relation to gaze, and to the direction that the speakers are facing at a particular time.

Gaze can play a subordinate role when people are conversing and not engaging in another activity (Norris, 2004: 36), that is, it is conceived as being primarily dependent on the activity of the interaction. It can also hold a superordinate role when interactants are engaging in different activities simultaneously (Norris, 2004: 37). This is the case in the debates. For instance, when interactants are listening, and taking notes at the same time, their gaze focuses on the notes instead of the other interactants. Gaze is sequentially structured or randomly structured according to whether it is integrated with "the higher-level acting performed and the environment in which the interaction takes place" (Norris, 2004: 37). Kendon (1967) also finds that hearers tend to gaze at speakers more often than the other way around. This is an important point in relation to the findings discussed in this chapter. In addition, patterns of gaze are found to be different in each position (hearer/speaker):

Hearers give speakers fairly long looks broken by brief glances away, whereas speakers alternate looks toward their recipients with looks away from them of about equal length (Norris, 2004: 37).

Finally, Goodwin, (1981) analyses mutual gaze at turn beginning and co-participation, and finds that gaze is subordinate to language, and varies from culture to culture, as well as within subcultures, and among individuals. It is also not always sequentially structured, that is, it does not always match the object of the talk in which the interactant is taking part. For instance, gaze is more “random” (Norris, 2004: 2) in certain types of interactions, such as walking in the street or in the forest, and so on. In effect, the study of interactive talk in the 2012 US election debates (Chapter 3) finds that gaze does vary drastically from one speaker to another. The next section details the transcription conventions used in the study of those debates.

2.5 Transcription and translation of the data

In Chapter 3, I study the 2012 US presidential debate series. In doing so I focus on extracts from the debates, which I have transcribed manually referring to Clayman and Heritage’s conventions (2002) (Table 2.5).

Table 2.5 Transcription nomenclature used for the debate extracts.

| Symbol | Meaning |
|-------------|--|
| . | At the end of a sentence: indicates a falling, or final, intonation contour, not necessarily the end of a sentence. Between individual words/syllables: indicates pauses/insistence on each item. |
| , | Indicates “continuing intonation,” not necessarily clause boundaries. |
| : | Indicates prolongation or stretching of the sound just preceding them: the more colons, the longer the stretching, also used as indicator of a short pause before reported speech. |
| ? | Indicates rising intonation, not necessarily a question. |
| ! | Indicates insistence with a short pause. |
| (!) | Indicates apparent irony in the speaker’s tone. |
| “ ” | Indicates reported speech |
| (text) | Indicates almost inaudible speech |
| [...] | Indicates text omission for relevance purposes |
| <u>text</u> | Indicates some form of stress or emphasis on phrases, words or syllables, either by increased loudness or higher pitch. The more underlining, the more emphasis. |
| TEXT | Indicates especially loud talk. |
| (.) | Indicates a short but noticeable pause between words, not necessarily matching the presence of punctuation. Most often used to create effects, emphasis, but also to mark hesitations and time for the speaker to catch their breath |
| (0.2) | Indicates pauses between words in seconds. Nowhere lower than (0.2), in which case the (.) symbol is preferred. |
| - | Marker of hesitation at the end/beginning of a word, followed/preceded by a space: indicates very short breaks, usually to account for spasmodic, involuntary breaks, when the speaker is searching for words or about to rephrase his talk. Between syllables or between words: indicates syllable omission, and/or acceleration of speech rate, by which very little silence is noticeable between words. |
| ' | Indicates omitted syllables. |
| *text* | Indicates multimodal features of language. |
| ... | Indicates interrupted speech, usually because another participant starts speaking. |
| [text] | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - On two or more lines, indicates the onset and termination of simultaneous speech, also marked by vertical alignment of the text on both lines. - On a single line, indicates “best guess” of transcriber as to what the speaker has said, when somewhat intelligible. |

The multimodal features studied in Chapter 3 are also included in two different ways. The first one consists of describing vocal features in the following way:

laughter. The second means relies on screen captures. When applicable, references to the relevant screen capture are made as shown below (boxed) in the relevant extract.

1 **Fig 3.5d** now, and the jobs of the future. (.) Number three.

In order to avoid cluttering, and to keep the analysis as clear as possible, this study focuses solely on the features of multimodality that are relevant to the analysis.

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined the methods I follow through this analysis. The analytical focus is driven by the subcorpus studied in each chapter, to which I apply the mixed methods approach outlined above. CDA provides the terminology, and allows me to uncover what ideologies drive political discourse. Face, stancetaking, evasion, and political rhetoric echo that terminology in that “by becoming aware of linguistic choices we are also becoming aware of the political choices they imply and their underlying assumptions” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 198).

In addition, the compatibility of the CDA framework with the other dimensions of this mixed methods approach allows me to study adversarial discourse from a comprehensive point of view. I combine the methodology of face with that of stancetaking, in relation to FTAs, which are speech acts whereby interactants evaluate one another, and sometimes themselves. This leads me to studying adversarial moves as not only hostile speech acts, as seen in evasion strategies, but

also subtler, positive forms of discourse such as self-promotion strategies, and displays of honesty.

To start with, I focus on the 2012 US presidential debate series, in which I focus on three different strategies of adversariality, which allows me to highlight the importance of individual style, performance, and state of mind. Second, I focus on campaign speeches, through which more strategies are uncovered, especially in relation to metaphors, ethos-enhancement, and self-victimisation. Finally, I consider electoral manifestos, in order to find out if and how adversarial moves are performed in this different electoral discourse type. This allows me to build on the work of Harris (2001) in that this research analyses politeness strategies in a monologic discourse type, written manifestos, in order to see politeness from a different perspective, and to “foreground different dimensions” (Harris, 2001: 453)

3 Characterising adversarial moves in political debates: a case study of the 2012 US presidential election debate series

3.1 Introduction

My analysis of the 2012 US presidential election debate series consists of a case study of a subcorpus of my data, and uncovers how aspiring leaders interact with their opponents in an adversarial manner in the context of political debates. Rhetorical questions (RQs) and FTAs as well as vague language and a constant fight for setting the agenda are among the most significant techniques identified and studied in this chapter.

Focusing on the four candidates, the presidential nominees, Barack Obama (Democrat) versus Mitt Romney (Republican), and the vice presidential nominees, Joe Biden (Democrat) and Paul Ryan (Republican), as well as on the debate moderators, I investigate the nature and function of adversarial moves. FTAs constitute an important part of those moves, and their study uncovers the three main strategies used by the candidates: Obama's self-promotion, Biden's attempts to intimidate Ryan (and to a lesser extent, the moderator), and Romney and Ryan's very similar rhetoric, which involves regular evasion techniques and use of vague language.

Electoral debates are the only ultra-mediatised opportunities for candidates to interact with one another. This type of event takes place so that the candidates can confront each other's ideas, and eventually *win* the debate, or debate series, in the public opinion. As a result, the adversarial moves that occur in that context are expected to be antagonistic, in that the candidates use an array of rhetorical

tools to highlight their competence to the expense of the opponent(s). This requires finding the right balance for each candidate between talking combatively and appearing likeable to engage to the voter, through all modes of communication. In effect, this analysis demonstrates that adversarial discourse is an inherent part of individual style and is constituted from the adversarial moves the speaker chooses to perform in interaction, whether such moves occur verbally or non-verbally. The ultra-mediatised nature of the data, live broadcast debate interactions, allows me to study how adversarial moves are performed through multimodal communication.

3.2 Data

The subcorpus created for this chapter, *UDebates12*, is made up of the four main debates from the 2012 US election extracted from my main corpus of political discourse (PolDisc). I have selected these debates as this chapter's focus, as they are an event of significant importance in the campaign. In 2012, the first debate of the series (Debate 1) was watched by 70 million Americans whereas the three remaining debates were watched by approximately 60 million Americans. As a result, this debate series became the most widely televised event after the Super Bowl of that same year (Kalb, 2012), and thus, a series of political events of great importance in the 2012 US presidential campaign. Table 3.1 provides a breakdown of the corpus (*UDebates12*) debate by debate, including dates, the participating candidates and moderators, duration and location. This also provides more information on the internal organisation of the debates. The eight participants in the debates (Table 3.1) are as follows: four moderators (one per debate) and four candidates (two per debate). The two presidential nominees, Obama and Romney, participate in three debates, whereas the two vice presidential nominees (Biden

and Ryan) only participate in one: Debate 2, the Vice Presidential (VP) debate. There are other participants too. Members of the audience directly interact with the candidates in Debate 3.

Table 3.1 UDebates12 subcorpus overview

| | Debate 1 | Debate 2 / VP Debate | Debate 3 | Debate 4 |
|---------------------|---|---------------------------------|---|---|
| Date | 03/10/2012 | 11/10/2012 | 16/10/2012 | 22/10/2012 |
| Participants | Barack Obama vs Mitt Romney | Joe Biden vs Paul Ryan | Barack Obama vs Mitt Romney | Barack Obama vs Mitt Romney |
| Theme(s) | Domestic Issues | Domestic and Foreign Policy | n/a (cf Organisation) | Foreign Policy |
| Moderator | Jim Lehrer (PBS NewsHour) | Martha Raddatz (ABC News) | Candy Crowley (CNN State of the Union) | Bob Schieffer (CBS News) |
| Organisation | 6x 15min segments | 9x segments | Questions and Answers (Q&As), "as many as possible" | 5 segments agreed upon with each "campaign" |
| Questions | Written submissions to the broadcaster by members of the public | Moderator's questions | Submitted by the Gallup institute, on behalf of 82 uncommitted voters from the New York Area (audience members) | Moderator's questions |
| Location | Denver (Colorado) | Danville (Kentucky) | Hempstead (New York) | Boca Raton (Florida) |
| Duration | 90 min | 90 min | 90 min | 90 min |
| Word count | 17,458 | 17,098 | 18,777 | 17,658 |

This participation is, however, minimal as it only consists of reading out their own questions, which have already been submitted to the broadcasters (cf organisation section of Debate 3, in Table 3.1). At other times, the studio audiences are

reminded before the debate starts that they have to stay silent at any time except at the beginning (and end) of the debates:

The audience here in the hall has promised to remain silent. No cheers, applause, boos, hisses — among other noisy distracting things — so we may all concentrate on what the candidates have to say. There is a noise exception right now, though, as we welcome President Obama and Governor Romney. (Jim Lehrer, Debate 1)

Other types of interactions, booing, applauding, tweeting, talking, which may take place in the privacy of the viewers' homes, or in other settings, are neither captured nor included in the interactions studied here; they are performed by different participants in different settings that do not influence the interactions taking place in the debate studios.

The US election debates are run by the Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD), which describes itself as an “independent organisation.” Its purpose is to “ensure, for the benefit of the American electorate, that general election debates are held every four years between and among the leading candidates for the offices of President and Vice President of the United States” (The CPD, 2015). It is financed by the input of “the communities that host the debates and, to a lesser extent, from corporate, foundation and private donors” (The CPD, 2015), which ensures its independence from either parties. In effect, the Commission only organises the debates between the two main candidates, whereas other networks organise other debates. The Commission is also in charge of choosing the debate moderators according to three criteria: “a) familiarity with the candidates and the major issues of the presidential campaign; b) extensive experience in live television broadcast news; and c) an understanding that the debate should focus maximum time and attention on the candidates and their views” (The CPD, 2015). It is added that, to ensure that they are left unbiased and independent, the moderators “alone select the questions to be asked, which are not known to the CPD or to the

candidates. They do not meet with the campaigns, nor do the campaigns have a role in moderator selection” (The CPD, 2015). According to the moderator of Debate 1: Jim Lehrer, the preparation required for the moderators differs greatly from that of “practiced journalism”:

It’s about preparation, but its preparation so you could listen, intelligently [...] it’s spending hours and hours trying to get enough in your head [...] you bring a context, with you, for the listening. [...] The debate is among the candidates, and it’s for the candidates, for the public, and has nothing to do with the people who’re asking the questions [...].” (Lehrer, 2012).

The extracts on which this study is based are transcribed according to Clayman and Heritage’s conventions (2002), laid out in Table 2.5 (Chapter 2). This analysis starts with Extract 3.1 from Debate 2 (VP debate) in the next section.

3.3 Rhetorical Questions as a means of answer (RQAs)

Election debates essentially rely on questions from the debate moderators to the candidates. In this context, it is interesting to note that rhetorical questions are often used as a means of answering those genuine moderator’s questions. In addition, questions and answers characterise moments in interaction during which adversarial relations are the most obvious (Clayman and Heritage, 2002). The analysis of the questions in the debates shows that, as well as appearing in the questioners’ moves, rhetorical questions (RQs) are a crucial part of the debaters’ answers. I have called these Rhetorical Questions as a means of Answering (RQAs). Examples 3.1 and 3.2 provide an insight into how RQAs are used by different candidates (bold, in Examples 3.1 and 3.2).

Example 3.1 RQA in Joe Biden's discourse during the VP Debate (Debate 2)

RADDATZ: Vice President Biden?

BIDEN: It's incredible. Look, imagine had we let the Republican Congress work out the sanctions. **You think there's any possibility the entire world would have joined us, Russia and China, all of our allies?**

Example 3.2 RQA in Romney's discourse during Debate 1

ROMNEY: No, I – I have to respond to that –

LEHRER: No, but –

ROMNEY: – which is – [...] I want to bring down the tax burden on middle-income families. And I'm going to work together with Congress to say, **OK, what are the various ways we could bring down deductions, for instance?**

The interest in studying this phenomenon lies in the fact that although a common feature of the political interview genre, rhetorical questions are not a commonly agreed upon feature of political debates, as they are in fact often used by politicians as a means to reset the agenda and thereby avoid a sensitive topic during interviews. The two examples above show that each speaker attempts to reset the agenda with the rhetorical question. In Example 3.1, Biden's rhetorical question aims at refocusing the discussion on the benefits of having a Democratic President on international relations. In Example 3.2, Romney attempts to steer the agenda away from a sensitive topic: *the tax burden on middle-income families*, towards the broader area of *bringing down deductions*. This exemplifies how the two debaters, as well as their running mates, are no exception, although I find that rhetorical

questions are not used as frequently across the board, nor are they used in the same way, or with the same goal.




Figure 3.1 RQA frequencies per candidate in the 2012 US presidential debate series

In Figure 3.1, RQA types (1) break down the rhetorical questions found in the debates according to their syntactic forms (Archer, 2005: 24): wh-questions, yes/no questions, disjunctive questions and negative questions, to show exactly how the candidates use this powerful rhetorical tool. In parallel, I have broken down RQAs according to how they occur in the data (RQA types (2)): prefaced questions, questions to which the speakers provide answers, bulk questions (that is, a series of successive questions), and how many questions are asked in bulk.

Some of the RQA types (1) such as negative questions are possibly more powerful as rhetorical questions in that they are “always conducive, i.e. they indicate the speaker’s expectation of and preference for a given answer” (Archer, 2005: 26). Consequently, they are often seen as “controlling,” and “powerful” (Archer, 2005: 26). This way, the use of negative questions as RQAs effectively allows the speaker to achieve greater persuasion in that it manipulates the type of response this triggers in the audience, whether mental or expressed. In addition, this question type as an RQA can be a powerful “face aggravating structure,” similar to negative-tag questions, (Johnson and Clifford, 2011: 56) in that the speaker can construct the question in such a way that it elicits a type of response that could be damaging to the opponent:

Example 3.3 Negative face aggravating question (in bold), Paul Ryan, Debate 2 (VP Debate): 00.04.48-00.05-07

Our ambassador in Paris has a Marine detachment guarding him.
Shouldn't we have a Marine detachment guarding our ambassador in Benghazi, a place where we knew that there was an Al Qaida cell with arms?

This question exemplifies how Ryan attempts to direct the audience into thinking that the decision of the Obama/Biden administration not to have a marine detachment guard the US ambassador in Benghazi was a mistake in relation to the

question preface (underlined). As a result, this constitutes an attack on Biden's (and Obama's) positive face in that it expresses Ryan's disapproval of an administration's decision, for which he holds them responsible.

Wh-questions usually start with an interrogative word. The "question element is usually sentence/utterance initial [...] and indicates an element to be specified by the addressee. In addition, it can be "a subject, object, predicate, complement, or a part of a phrase" (Archer, 2005: 25, Biber et al. 1999: 204). In the context of rhetorical questions, this type allows the speaker, for instance, to redirect the topic of the discussion to something specific, or perform an agenda shift. As RQAs, wh-questions enable the speaker to hold the floor in that they assume the role of both the questioner and the addressee and are, consequently, expected to "specify the element" that constitutes the answer to the question, before the interaction can follow its course. This proves to be a handy device for the debaters whose answers often overrun the allocated speaking time, in a context where timing is scrutinised to ensure that equality of treatment is respected. This prompts two facework related side effects. First, it may enable the speaker to hold the floor for longer, as it is pragmatically more difficult for the moderator to interrupt either participant while they perform such RQAs. Interruptions are, in fact, "universally considered to be impolite, as [they constitute] 'an attempt to deny the speaker's right to take that turn construction unit to its first possible completion' (Hutchby 2008: 228)" (Johnson and Clifford, 2011: 50). However, if a speaker uses this technique too often, or, in the context of the debates, generally ends up overrunning their timer, interruptions become justified in that they protect the integrity of the debate, in which case the speaker's turn is ended by the moderator, to the benefit of the opponent, which, in itself, constitutes a threat to the speaker's face.

Disjunctive questions can be used to achieve similar goals (that is, holding the floor) although to a lesser extent as they usually already include elements of the possible responses in themselves. Example 3.4 occurs towards the end of

Obama's timed two-minute introductory statement to the Debate 1 segment on entitlements (Debate 1: 00.38.31). As a result, Obama uses the rhetorical question: *how do we strengthen the system over the long term*, as a tool to ensure the moderator does not attempt to move on to Romney's introductory statement. In effect, the question complexifies what would be an otherwise straightforward statement: *my approach is to find the means to strengthen the system over the long term*.

Example 3.4 Disjunctive question as a technique to hold the floor, Obama, Debate 1: 00.40.18-00.40.57

So my approach is to say, how do we strengthen the system over the long term?

RQA types (2) show that all three main categories (bulk, prefaced, and answered) are a trademark of Romney's discourse, which is also most likely to provide answers to those questions among the four candidates.

RQA uses are very different across the four candidates: they are much more frequent in Romney and Biden's discourse than in the other two, whilst Obama is the least likely to use them throughout the three debates he participates in. In addition, Romney is most likely to provide answers to his rhetorical questions (30 out of 39 in Figure 3.1). This phenomenon is only accounted for approximately half of the time in Biden's discourse (11 out of 21 occurrences, Figure 3.1) and Ryan's discourse (7 out of 13), whereas Obama only provides answers to 6 out of 16 rhetorical questions over three debates. Example 3.5 reviews a case of RQA with answer provided in Ryan's discourse.

Example 3.5 RQA with answer provided in Ryan's discourse, Debate 2

RYAN **Look** (.) *chuckles* (.) *sniffles* (0.2) Did they come in (.)
an' inherit' tough situation? Absolutely. (0.2) **But** we're

Example 3.5 highlights how Ryan clearly provides a direct answer to the rhetorical question: *did they come in and inherit a tough situation?* In doing so, he effectively builds up his own ethos (cf Mshvenieradze, 2013: 1940) as he acknowledges the difficult task the opponent had in this particular case. This allows him to subsequently launch an attack, introduced by *but* (bold). Meanwhile, Romney very often uses rhetorical questions as a 'bulk' tool (my definition), with successive rhetorical questions, rather than dispersed throughout the debates (Figure 3.1, Types 2). Extract 3.1 exemplifies the bulk tool in Romney's discourse (rhetorical questions, ll. 3, 5-6, 7-8, and 10-11, bold; answers, ll. 3-5, 6-7, 8-10, 11-14, italics).

Extract 3.1. 'Bulk' rhetorical questions in Romney's discourse (Debate 3, 00.13.09-00.15.28).

1 ROMNEY **'s a matter of fact, oil production is down 14 percent**
2 this year, on federal land, and gas production is down
3 9 percent. (.) **Why?**-Because the President cut in ha:lf
4 (.)the number of licenses and permits (.) for
5 drilling- on federal lands, and in fed'ral waters. **So**
6 **where'd the increase come from?** (.) Well, 'lot of it
7 came from the Bakken Range in North Dakota. (.) **What**
8 **was his participation there?** (.)The administration (.)
9 brought a criminal action (.)against the people
10 drilling up there for oil, this massive new resource
11 we have. **Eh-u-uh-eh- an' and what was the cause?** Uh-
12 twen'y or twen'y five birds were killed and they
13 (.)brought out a: (.)migratory bird act to go after
14 them on a criminal basis.-Look I wanna make sure...

In this extract, all rhetorical questions are *wh*-questions. They are introduced strategically by Romney in order to create empathy with the public, while asking “out loud” what everybody thinks about the incumbent President’s record on this specific issue. In doing so, Romney’s aim is to damage the opponent’s credibility, and to appeal to the voters’ emotions through pathos (cf Mshvenieradze, 2013: 1940) by showing that he is closer to them than the opponent is. More importantly, the bulk aspect of these questions also allows Romney to hold the floor, which highlights the role of said RQAs as a Constitutive means of an Adversarial Move (CMAD), rather than supportive (SMAD) as it is a salient reoccurring pattern of Romney’s strategy during the debates. Transition Relevance Places (TRPs) (Cora Garcia and Baker Jacobs, 2010: 345; Sacks et al., 1974) are avoided through using questions, which call for an answer (either by the speaker, or mentally, by the listener), and therefore prevent a speaker change from occurring as the next action. Thus, an interruption from either interactant carries a risk of being accused of preventing him from providing a clear account of his thoughts on the matter, and communicating effectively with the public. It is therefore both rhetorically powerful, and an efficient pragmatic tool that contributes to asserting his position as a worthy candidate and opponent.

By comparison, Romney’s running mate Paul Ryan makes a different use of rhetorical questions. Table 3.5, highlights that rhetorical questions are more likely to appear at the beginning of each of his interventions than at any other point of the debate (8 occurrences out of 13 in total), that is, when his turn to speak formally comes up in the debate. He also uses twice as many *yes/no* questions as *wh*-questions, (Figure 3.1. columns 2 and 3) which is an especially high figure in comparison to the other speakers, all the more so at the beginning of his interventions. More peculiarly, Ryan’s use of rhetorical questions differs from that of Romney, as they appear to be genuine requests for information.

Example 3.6

Was it a good idea to spend taxpayer dollars on electric cars in Finland, or on windmills in China?

Example 3.7

Can I tell you what that meant?

The use of the modal verb *can* in Example 3.6 creates ambiguity in that it is uncertain whether an answer is expected from another participant, even though Ryan does provide his own answer straight away. This way, the question functions pragmatically as a rhetorical question. In Example 3.6, the positive orientation of the rhetorical question seems to indicate a preference for the negative answer (Archer, 2005: 26) while in Example 3.7, the illocutionary speech act performed through the question pragmatically functions like an introduction of his argument rather than an actual request for permission. “In saying [it, Ryan] do[e]s as [he] says” (Butler, 2013: 12). This, in fact, is an example of conversationalised monologue (Steen, 2003: 2), whereby Ryan attempts to make his input more spontaneous and dynamic, “in order to increase the attraction and involvement” of the public (Steen, 2003: 2). This way, both Republican candidates seem to use RQAs as a means to achieve pragmatic goals in the context of the debates, which demonstrates how two similar means of adversarial discourse can be used in order to fulfill two different strategies: to hold the floor, or to conversationalise the discourse. I provide more detail on Ryan’s discourse in the next section, and more specifically how adversarial relations are constructed between him, the opponent, and the moderator, in the 2012 US vice-presidential debate (Debate 2).

3.4 Contrasts in challenging the opponent: the Biden/Ryan face-to-face

Confrontation occurs when two or more interactants challenge one another rather than cooperate on a given topic. Confrontation consists of “the bringing of persons face-to-face [...] for examination and eliciting of the truth” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2015a). In the case of “countries, parties, etc., face-to-face: used of a state of political tension with or without actual conflict” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2015a). In addition, *confrontational* is “characterised by or likely to cause confrontation [...]; aggressive, marked by an adversarial approach” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2015a). This is the case of the face-to-face between the two vice presidential nominees Joe Biden (Democrat, incumbent) and Paul Ryan (Republican, opposition), which took place in the second presidential debate of the 2012 series (Debate 2 / VP Debate). On this occasion, Biden’s performance was described in terms of his “aggressive offence from the very beginning [which] drowned out Ryan [...]” (Hamby et al., 2012), to the point that the latter “was unable to regain his footing” (Hamby et al., 2012). In effect, it seems Vice President Biden’s gaffe-free performance (Hamby et al., 2012; Burkeman, 2012), during a debate which “much like Vice Presidents themselves, [does not] particularly matter,” was generally perceived as a “high energy performance” (Burkeman, 2012). Meanwhile, his opponent “visibly gulped” “on more than one occasion” (Burkeman, 2012): “Biden did absolutely roll his eyes, snort, laugh derisively, and throw his hands up in the air whenever Ryan trotted out his little beady-eyed BS-isms. [...] He was absolutely right to be doing it” (Taibbi, 2012), especially in light of “Obama’s uninspiring performance” the previous week (Cillizza, 2012). In relation to how the debate was perceived through the above examples of media coverage, I review how confrontation plays a key part in the development of adversarial moves in this

event. I focus on how questions from the moderator are answered by the two debaters, with a particular focus on how this is performed by Ryan and Biden through a multimodal analysis of two extracts from the debate.

3.4.1 Stancetaking, distractions, and setting the agenda

Extract 3.2 highlights one particular interaction during which the moderator (Martha Raddatz) interrogates Paul Ryan on tax cuts. This interaction takes place approximately half-way through the debate. At this point, Joe Biden has already responded to the question: *who will pay more in taxes? Who will pay less?* In relation to this, Raddatz specifically asks Ryan for *specifics* (ll.3, 5, 10) through a multiple *yes/no* question (ll. 4-6) prefaced by the explicit accusation: *you have refused, and again...* (ll. 1, 3-4). In addition, the combination of the past process *refused* in the question preface (l.3) combined with the future process *won't* (l.6) insinuates that he is not prepared to comply, whatever the time and place.

Through that question (l.1, 3-6), Raddatz places herself as the spokesperson of *the voters* (l.6). This stance allows her to justify the direct attack on the credibility of Ryan's plan, and constitutes an adversarial move in the sense that her accusation implies an antagonistic relationship between the candidate, Ryan, and the voters, whom she implies Ryan is misleading, and on whose behalf she claims to be speaking. In fact, this stance type is commonly used as leverage to motivate the pursuit of an "adversarial line of questioning" vis-à-vis the interviewee. (Clayman, 2010: 271) (Extract 3.2, ll. 3-6). This stance is expressed throughout the entire interaction. First, the repetition of the keyword *specifics*, (ll. 3, 10, 35) acts as a reminder to the audience that she is not satisfied with Ryan's answer throughout the interaction. Second, the proposition *you won't tell the voters* (l.6) implies that Ryan's failure to respond accordingly results from his reluctance to communicate effectively with the voters, while the stress on have (ll.5, 10) implies that this is a

key element of her question, which presupposes that Ryan refuses to answer because he does not know how to. Furthermore, the insinuations and interruptions she performs contribute to the adversarial move she has launched against him, on behalf of the voters (ll. 3, 4-5, 10, 13, 35): *do you actually have the specifics, do you have the specifics, do you know exactly what you're doing? No specifics again.* Also, those interruptions illustrate her attempts to redirect the focus of the discussion on the agenda she has set. Raddatz does not leave time for Ryan to respond to each part of the question, which allows her to restrict his answer within the limits of the agenda (cf Clayman, 2010: 265). In fact, not allowing time to answer is face aggravating (Archer, 2008: 182) and has the effect of further justifying the allegations she is formally making through the question, that the candidate is indeed misleading the voters. Second, the format of the yes/no question *do you have the specifics* allows her to provide the two possible reasons why this is the case in advance, which further restricts the scope of Ryan's response within such a rigidly set agenda. Thus, he can accept that he does not *have the specifics* and *does not know what [he's] doing* (l.4-5, 10, 13). This implies that there is no tangible evidence that his proposal will work, as he has not done any research on the matter. And, Raddatz's concern suggests that Ryan is either "misguided" or "unreasonable," which poses a threat to his positive face (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 67). Alternatively, he admits he is *still working on it* (l.5) which confirms his ill preparedness, which also constitutes a loss of face. This establishes an overall threat to Ryan's face as it challenges both his good faith and intentions towards the voters, which is "face threatening to the interlocutor" (Bull and Wells, 2012: 34) as well as his knowledge of the technical side of the policies he advocates, which is equally damaging. In addition, this showcases Raddatz's strategy to confront the candidate on issues about which she assumes he has not been forthcoming, which exemplifies how debate moderators can also carry out adversarial strategies as part of their moderating role.

*Extract 3.2 Confrontation between Martha Raddatz (MRAD), Paul Ryan, and Joe Biden
(Debate 2/VP Debate: 00.47.52 - 00.49.04)*

1 MRAD We-well, let-let' [s talk] about this [20 percent]. (.) You
2 BIDEN [M-Mah...] [*laughs*]
3 MRAD refused, and-again, (0.2) to offer specifics on ho:w you
4 (.)pay for that 20 percent across.the board.tax cut. Do
5 actually have the specifics? Or are you still working on
6 and that's why you won't tell voters?
7 RYAN Different (.) than this administration, (.) we actually
8 to have (.) big bipartisan agreements. (0.2) You see (.)I
9 understand the...
10 MRAD Do you have the specifics? [D'you have the...]
11 BIDEN [That woul'-that would be a
12 first for the Republican Congress] *chuckles*
13 MRAD [Do you know exactly what you're doing?]
14 RYAN Look-look at what Mitt Romn'-(.)look at what Ronald
15 Reagan and Tip O'Neill did, (.) they worked together
16 (.) out of a **framework** to lower tax rates and broaden
17 the base (0.2) and they worked together to fix that.
18 What we're saying is: "here's our **framework**: (.) **Lower**
19 (.)"**tax rates** 20 percent. We raised about \$1.2
20 trillion through income taxes, (.) We forego: about
21 \$1.1 trillion in loopholes and deductions, (.)And so
22 what we're saying is, deny: those loopholes and
23 deductions to higher-income taxpayers, (.) so that
24 more of their income is taxed, (.) which has a broader
25 [base of taxation...]
26 BIDEN [Can I translate?]
27 RYAN ...so we can **l:ower tax rates** across the board.-Now
28 here's why I'm saying this. (.) What we're saying is,
29 [here's the **framework**...]
30 BIDEN [I hope I'm going to get time to respond to this, Martha]
31 MRAD [You-you'll get time.]
32 RYAN [We wanna work with Congress...](.)We wanna work with
33 the Congress on how best to achieve this. That mea:ns

34 (0.2) successful.-Look...
35 MRAD No specifics, again.
36 BIDEN *laughs*
37 RYAN [What we're saying is...]

Because the loss of face would constitute a severe risk of damaging his campaign, the other alternative for Ryan is to attempt to maintain face and shift the agenda via a new proposal of his own, which he does each time the moderator enquires again about those *specifics* (ll. 7-9, 14-25, 27-29, 32-34, 37).


Multiple verbal interruptions by Joe Biden occur in addition to those from the moderator: *that would be a first for the Republican congress* (ll. 11-12), *can I translate* (l.26) and so on (l. 2, 30, 36). More importantly, these interruptions often include a form of laughter (ll.2, 12, 36) and contribute to challenging Ryan's credibility, (and act as FTAs on the part of Biden). This is made especially clear to television viewers, who can witness the two candidates' very different body language side by side during the interaction, thanks to the split screen broadcast format of this entire debate (cf Figures 3.2a, b, c).

Figure 3.2 highlights those differences. Biden's reaction and first interruption to Raddatz's challenge of Ryan's credibility: [*M-Mah...*] [**laughs**] (l. 2, Extract 3.2; Fig 3.2a), primarily informs the viewer that he does not give his opponent's proposal much credibility. The laughter at the mention of the *20 percent* tax decrease proposed by Ryan (l.2, Fig 3.2a) indicates Biden is effectively mocking his opponent. This constitutes a threat to the latter's positive face in that it "ridicules" the hearer's (Ryan) want (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 66) for, in this case, being considered as a politician worthy of the policies they advocate. In fact, this aside is the starting point of gradually intensified attempts from Biden to destabilise his young opponent during his turn to speak by 1) creating an impression of mutual understanding between



a. Biden (left): [*M-Mah...*] [**laughs**] (1. 2, Extract 3.2)

b. Biden (left): [*That woul'that would be a*] (1.11 Extract 3.2)




c. Ryan (right): *they worked together* (1. 15, Extract 3.2)

Figure 3.2 Screen capture of Ryan's (right) bodily communication compared to Biden's (left) (Debate 2: 00.48.15-00.49.04)

himself and the moderator (II.2, 11-12, 26, 30, 36), and 2) seemingly attempting to distract the audience from the opponent's answer. In addition, Biden's cheerful expressions throughout the interaction (Figures 3.1a, b) whether he looks at the moderator (Figure 3.2a), the camera, or his notes (Figure 3.2c) give an impression of spontaneity, ease, and confidence which contrast with the more restrained, composed (Fig 3.2a), serious (Figure 3.2c) and sometimes tense expressions displayed by Ryan. This contrast is effectively heightened by Ryan's stiff and crouched posture, while Biden alternates between a variety of postures and effectively occupies the space, without seeming agitated or nervous. Biden's second interruption takes the form of a sarcastic interjection in answer to Raddatz's question (I.11-12, Figure 3.2b) which pushes the FTA further:

MRAD Do you have the specifics? [D'you have the...]

BIDEN [That woul'-that would be a
first for the Republican Congress] *chuckles*



a. Ryan (right): *What we're saying is:* (1.18, Extract 3.2)




b. Ryan (right): (.) *We forego:...* (1.20, Extract 3.2)


Figure 3.3 Ryan's (right) posture and facial expressions during Extract 3.2

Meanwhile, Paul Ryan's face is slightly tilted down (Figure 3.2c.). Throughout the extract, his face tenses up as he argues his case, and his eyebrows are almost constantly raised, which as a result make his eyes look bigger. This enables the

viewer to notice how intensely focused his gaze is towards the moderator (Figure 3.2a, b, c), which should preferably be avoided so that “the primary parties to the eye contact [do not feel] uncomfortable” (Freeley and Steinberg, 2013: 341). This is also peculiar, as hearers usually tend to focus their gaze more in the direction of



a. Ryan (right): *...deductions to higher-income taxpayers...* (1.23, Extract 3.2)



b. Ryan (right): *[here's the **framework**...]* (1.29, Extract 3.2)
Biden (left): *[I hope I'm going to get time to respond to this, Martha]* (1.30, Extract 3.2)

Figure 3.4 Ryan's upper body movements and facial expressions during the interaction (Extract 3.2)

the speaker rather than the other way around (Norris, 2004: 37).

Meanwhile, Ryan's upper body movements are synchronised with his own involvement with the facts he is reporting on, although they are quite spasmodic. At the beginning of his answer, he starts almost immobile while referring to Tip O'Neil and Reagan (l. 14-17). He then starts moving with a sudden shrug as soon as he says, *what we're saying* (l. 18). Neck and shoulder movements as well as hand movements follow through in accordance with the parts of discourse during which he shows the most empathy: *we forego, higher income, their income is taxed, lower tax rates* (l.20: Fig 3.3b, and ll. 18, 23, 24, 27).

Overall, Ryan's body language seems rather agitated at times, quite different from general expectations in a political debate of this scale, and quite different from his opponent's too:

Debaters and most public speakers should limit their physical movement so as to allow the audience to maintain focus on their face and eyes [...] keeping the shoulders square to the audience [...] the head relatively still (not bobbing, looking down, or swaying side to side). [...] Movement should be purposeful – it should aid in communicating with the audience, [...] easy, economical, and purposeful, yet apparently spontaneous (Freeley and Steinberg, 2013: 341).

Body movements mark his reactions to interruptions from Joe Biden throughout the extract, and synchronise with repetitions in verbal language (ll. 28-33, Figure 3.4): *here's why I'm saying this. What we're saying is, here's the framework...* This draws attention to Ryan's struggle in his fight to move the agenda away from that which has been set by the moderator, in order to portray himself as a worthy and serious candidate to the voters. This also highlights his struggle to maintain face whilst dealing with FTAs coming from both his opponent and the moderator.

3.4.2 Creating distractions as an adversarial strategy

Biden's third interruption is a rhetorical question: *can I translate?* (l.26) which functions as a "token request for permission" (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 260) and, because of its rhetorical nature, Biden takes it for granted. However, that attempt fails and Ryan keeps speaking (ll. 27-29). Biden's next interruption intervenes immediately after (l.30-31), in which he directly addresses the moderator again without consideration for the opponent, and this attempt is successful: Raddatz acknowledges his requests and provides an answer to it (Figure 3.4b). This constitutes a very powerful threat to Ryan's positive face.

BIDEN [I hope I'm going to get time to respond to this, Martha]
MRAD [You-you'll get time.]

Biden ignores the principle of turn-taking and offers to respond instead of Ryan. Consequently, he blatantly refuses to cooperate in the activity of turn-taking in providing answers to the moderator's questions (cf Brown and Levinson, 1987: 67), which shows he does not care about Ryan's 'positive or negative face wants' (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 67). Furthermore, the moderator's response to this interruptive question from Biden (l.31, and extracted above) endorses Biden's FTA against Ryan. His final interruption occurs towards the end of the interaction, and solely consists of laughter, following Raddatz's conclusion in response to Ryan's argument (l.36) (Figure 3.5).



Raddatz (off-screen): *No specifics, again.* (1.35, Extract 3.2)

Biden (left): **laughs** (1.36, Extract 3.2)

Figure 3.5 Biden's reaction to Raddatz's conclusion of the interaction (Extract 3.2)

In those instances, Biden either triggers responses from the moderator by his interruptions, or chooses to react to her interventions/criticism of the opponent. This combination of perfect timing, a certain ability to engage with the moderator (see




Figure 3.6 Biden's (left) bodily communication in reaction to Ryan's (right) answer (Debate 2: 00.48.15 - 00.49.04)

Biden's gaze towards her, and away from Ryan, Figure 3.5), and to monopolise her attention while his opponent speaks, enhances Biden's face considerably, in that it shows strength and leadership in ways the opponent does not. In addition, it allows him to play the role of a commenting figure, and Raddatz's equal in that respect, rather than a simple debater.

Further consideration of Biden's bodily communication throughout the debate highlights his ability to balance appropriate behaviour and expressions of spontaneity which enable him to effectively communicate both when it is his turn to speak, and when it is not. In effect, Biden's body language and facial expressions become more tense and serious at times. He frequently appears to be taking notes while listening to the opponent. In those moments, head movements are key to convey silent messages, which distract the public from the opponent's discourse. He alternates between facing the camera, the opponent, and looking down to write notes, thereby showing he is fully engaged with all aspects of the interaction, in contrast with Ryan's fixed stare towards the moderator (cf Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6).

The study of Biden's behaviour also highlights telltale signs of interruptions (l. 26, Extract 3.2). Before uttering the words: *can I translate?* Biden's gaze shifts quickly towards the moderator (who is off camera during the whole interaction) which seems to convey he is taking issue with what the opponent just said. This is confirmed when he interrupts Ryan again to address the moderator (l.30): *I hope I'm going to get time to respond to this, Martha*, as if to bear witness that Ryan's discourse is not only inaccurate to his ears but also to hers, in spite of the impartiality required by her position. In this way, Biden is effectively drawing on her own attitude towards Ryan during this interaction, and exploiting the weaknesses in her impartiality, which also participates in Biden's adversarial strategy.

3.4.3 Ryan's fight to reset the agenda

Ryan's first attempt at resetting the agenda consists of antagonising the opponent (Joe Biden), *different than this administration* (I.7) and redirecting the topic of the discussion on bipartisanship, or alluding to the absence thereof in the incumbent administration led by the opponent: *we actually want to have big partisan agreements* (II.7-8). In spite of the multiple interruptions from the moderator and from the opponent discussed above: *do you have the specifics* (I.10), *can I translate?* (I.26) (also, II.11, 13, 30, 31, 35, 36), Ryan attempts to maintain the focus of his talk on a twofold argument based on the repetition of sets of key words: *lower tax(es)*, and *framework*, first introduced at I.16, then repeated at II. 18, 19, 27, 29 (highlighted: bold). In the meantime, the second axis of his argument draws a parallel between a historical precedent, which occurred in the 1980s: *look at what Ronald Reagan and Tip O' Neill did, they worked together...* (II.15-16), and the plan he promotes: *What we're saying is: "here's our framework"* (II.18-19). He achieves this while using identical grammatical items: the keyword *framework* (II.16, 18, 29, in bold) and the phrase *lower tax rates* (I.6, 18-19, 27) which guide the argument throughout the interaction. However, the use of deictic markers (*you see, look, what we're saying is*, at II.8,14, 18, 21-22,27-28-29, 34, 37) at the start of a new block of coordinate phrases makes the argument more complex and therefore less intelligible. Although those are usually referred to as "topicalisers," that is, markers of a topical shift, so that the argumentation can be followed easily (Hind, 2012: 1262-63), it is difficult to see how they make Ryan's argument any clearer in this particular case. In addition, the array of politico-economical jargon: *loopholes, deductions, forego, higher income, base of taxation*, which punctuate the extract, render it even less intelligible to the average viewer. Thirdly, the use of the inclusive pronoun *we* (II.7, 18, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 32) is ambiguous at times in relation to its level of inclusivity: *we raised*, *we forego* (II.19-20), which adds to the incoherence of the discourse. In fact, it does

not specify whether *we* refers to Ryan and the Republicans as part of his argument for bipartisanship, or to the Democrats, as part of his attempt at antagonising the opponent. The succession of subordinate relative clauses: *so that more of their income is taxed, which has a broader base of taxation, so we can lower tax rates* (ll.23-27) make the argument longer and more complex, which is likely to create a loss of interest from the audience. Ryan's conclusion of the argument crystallises that impression: *We wanna work with the Congress on how best to achieve this. That means... Successful.*" (ll. 32-34)

3.4.4 Power relations and stancetaking in the 2012 US vice presidential debate

On multiple occasions throughout the debate, as exemplified in Extract 3.2 above, and Extract 3.3 below, Biden addresses the moderator by her first name. Although it is common practice for candidates to address the moderators by their first names, in this particular case, this is associated with the performance of an adversarial move. Addressing another interactant by their first name is usually associated with higher ranked individuals addressing subordinates: "higher status actors enjoy a general right of entry into the psychological sphere of subordinates.

Examples 3.8a, (Extract 3.2) and b (Extract 3.3). Biden's address strategy in the VP Debate

-
- | | | |
|-----------|------------|------------|
| a. | [M-Mah...] | [*laughs*] |
|-----------|------------|------------|
-
- b.** Oh, I didn't say-no, I'm not saying that! (.) But facts ma:tter, Martha.-You're a foreign policy expert,-Facts matter. (.) All this loose talk about them, "All they have to
-

They address subordinates by first-name, while subordinates use title-last-name speaking 'up'" (Morand and Hocker, 2002: 305). Second, in Extracts 3.2 (l.2) and

3.3 (l.17), these injunctions are in effect token requests for permission to speak and interrupt the opponent, in order to assert one's authority.

In doing so, Biden asserts his social rank in spite of the debate rules, and, as discussed above, this is not challenged by either the moderator herself or the opponent. Raddatz is summoned for attention, even though she is the figure of authority in this context, and the guarantor of a fair treatment to both candidates, therefore, if she responds her integrity as moderator is jeopardised. In addition, the summons also functions as a double threat to Ryan's face. As the moderator replies positively, acknowledges the summons and complies, neither she nor Biden is now paying attention to Ryan (Extract 3.2, ll.30-31). This move is pragmatically extremely powerful in destabilising the opponent. Biden's attitude and multiple interruptions constitute a very aggressive strategy of face threats overall. This apparent alignment and mutual understanding with the moderator implied at times by Biden is, however, not consistent throughout the debate, and is sometimes a rather dangerous, potentially self-damaging strategy. In Extract 3.3, Biden addresses Raddatz by her first name again (l.17), as he responds to her statement: *you're acting a little bit like they don't want one*. In this case, he uses her name not as a request for attention, but as a ploy to reassess his authority as a socially higher ranked individual. In doing so, he also takes the opportunity to remind her of her own expertise as *a foreign policy expert*, and implies that her expertise may come into question if she does not agree with what he is saying. This constitutes a dangerous move for the candidate because appearing too assertive may cause him to lose face if the moderator responds negatively to the threat. However, Biden's earlier demonstration of force and leadership allow him to maintain and even enhance his own face via the repetition of the phrase *facts matter* (ll. 16-17, 17-18).

Extract 3.3 Joe Biden: signs of assertiveness. (Debate 2: 00.19.00 - 00.19.53)

1 RYAN Thank heavens we had these sanctions in place, (.) it's in
2 spite of their oppos[ition.] (.) They've given 20 waivers
3 BIDEN [O:h God!]*chuckling*
4 RYAN to this sanction. (.) And a:ll I have to point to are the
5 results! (.) They're four years closer toward a nuclear
6 weapon. (.) I think that case speaks for itself.
7 BIDEN [And they're...] *laughing*
8 MRAD Ca-can... can you tell the [American people, what's worse:
9 BIDEN [By the way, they-they are not four
10 years closer to a nuclear weapon.]
11 MRAD another war in the Middle East...]
12 RYAN [Of course they are]
13 BIDEN They-they're closer to being able to get enough fissile
14 material to put i:n a weapon if they HA:D a weapon!
15 MRAD You're acting a little bit like they don't want one.
16 BIDEN Oh, I didn't say-no, I'm not saying that! (.) But facts
17 ma:tter, Martha.-You're a foreign policy expert,-Facts
18 matter. (.) All this loose talk about them, "All they have to
19 do is get to (.) enrich uranium in a certain amount and they
20 have a weapon," no:t. true. Not true. They. Are. More...-And if
21 we ever have to take action, (.) unlike when we took office,
22 we will have the world behind us, and that matters. (.)
23 That matters.

Extract 3.3 highlights another instance in the debate in which Biden's style is particularly assertive. In this extract, the debaters are discussing the probability, and subsequent menace, of a *nuclear-armed Iran*. At this point in the discussion, Ryan accuses (l. 1-2) the incumbent ticket (Obama-Biden) of opposing sanctions against Iran, to which Biden's reaction is unequivocal (l. 3):

BIDEN [O:h God!]*chuckling*

The first half of the interaction (up to l. 14 included) allows Biden to assert his confidence on the topic and showcase his experience as Vice President for the past four years, which contributes to the creation of a stark contrast with his younger, and relatively inexperienced opponent Paul Ryan. This confidence is shown (l. 2, 7) in Biden's reactions to what Ryan is saying: *chuckling*, and *laughing* (ll.3, 7). Those spontaneous reactions emphasise his ability to perform and occupy the stage when he is supposed to stay silent, all the while creating a distraction from the opponent when it is his turn to speak. As a result, this contributes to increasing the contrast with the dramatic tone Ryan adopts: *thank heavens* (l. 1), *they're four years closer towards a nuclear weapon* (l. 4). Multimodal study of Biden's behaviour at this point of the interaction reveals that he is very lively, both in his reactions as a recipient and while speaking. Similar to Extract 3.2, he appears either to be enjoying himself far more than his serious and tense opponent, or to be in perfect control of his image, through both verbal and non-verbal communication (cf Figures 3.2, 3, 4, 5, 6). Extract 3.3 confirms the previous findings. Biden interrupts both his opponent and the moderator on several occasions (ll. 3, 7, 10). At ll.3, 7, he interrupts the opponent. First, it consists of an exclamation: *Oh God*, followed by laughter, which indicates disbelief regarding what Ryan is trying to say, and a similar interruption occurs at l.7: *And they're... *laughing**. What occurs at l.10 is, however, quite different, for this time Biden interrupts the moderator, thereby denying her position of authority.

course they are (l.12). This use of force is performed on multiple levels of communication, via non-verbal means as described above, and via verbal means: repetitions (*they*) and emphasis: *weapon, HA:D*.

On a lexical level, the repetition of the opponent's words: *they're four years closer to a nuclear weapon* (ll.5, 10, 11, 13-14) allows Biden to mitigate the impact of his attempt to reset the agenda, while his insistence on a vocal level and the closing of his eyes allow him to clearly assert his opinion as definitive and unquestionable.

In the second part of the interaction, Biden directly addresses the moderator by her first name (l.17) as a defensive reaction to what seems like an attempted FTA from her: *you're acting a little bit like they don't want one* (l.15, highlighted: red). This reaction marks a crucial difference between him and Paul Ryan in relation to how both respond to FTAs throughout the debate. The next section highlights how Obama's strategy varies greatly from that of his running mate Joe Biden, in that it focuses on self-promotion to perform adversarial moves, rather than open confrontation.

3.5 Self-promotion: the Obama strategy

While Biden and Ryan choose confrontational strategies, using antagonisation, evasion techniques to reset the agenda, intimidation, and distracting the audience, Obama avoids direct confrontation with his opponent Mitt Romney and uses promotion of his own record as a means of indirectly attacking his him.

To begin, I discuss the importance of the quality of the performance of the candidate, and draw on this dimension of adversarial moves to discuss the effectiveness of Obama's self-promoting strategy throughout the debate series, and

the implications of Obama and Biden's diametrically opposed adversarial styles as a consequence.

Extract 3.4 Debate 1 - 00.07.15 - 00.08.10

1 LEHRER Mr. President-u:h. please respond directly to what the
2 governor just said about:t **trickle-down** - u:h his **trickle-**
3 **down** approach he's (.) -as he said yours is.
4 OBAMA Well (.)-uh let me talk specifically about what I think
5 we need to do (.) u::h First (0.2) we've gotta improve
6 our education system. An::d we've made enormous progress
7 drawing on ideas from (0.5) both Democrats and
8 Republicans. Uh-that are already starting to show gai:ns
9 in some of the (.) toughest to-deal-with school. Uh:
10 we've got a program called Race to the Top (.) that (0.3)
11 uh (0.3) has (0.3) prompted (.) reforms in 46 states
12 around the country raising standards, improving (.) how
13 we train teachers, so now I wanna (0.2) hire another
14 100,000(.) uh new math and science teachers. And create
15 2 million more slots in our community colleges, so that
16 (.) people can get trained for the jo:bs (.) that are out
17 there right now. And I wanna make sure that we keep
18 (.)u:uh)tuition low (0.3) for our young people.-uh- [...]

In Extract 3.4, the moderator Jim Lehrer requests that Obama comments on Mitt Romney's opening statement, and especially on the *trickle down government* criticism (in bold, below).

Now, I'm concerned that the path that we're on has just been unsuccessful. The President has a view very similar to the view he had when he ran four years ago, that a bigger government, spending more, taxing more, regulating more - if you will, **trickle-down government** would work.

That's not the right answer for America. I'll restore the vitality that gets America working again.

(Mitt Romney, Debate 1: 00.06.54-00.07.15).

In his response (Extract 3.4), Obama does not comply with the request expressed quite clearly by the moderator (l.1): *please respond directly to what the governor just said about trickle down* [...]. In his answer: *Well, let me talk specifically about what I think we need to do* (l.4), Obama ignores the term *trickle down* (ll.2-3, highlighted: bold) and performs an explicit “request for permission token” with the use of the “shift marker” *well* (Hind, 2012: 1267), which pre-indicates Obama’s intention to move away from the agenda (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 260). This is enhanced through *let me*, which performs the explicit permission token itself to shift the agenda towards a different perspective (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 260). This pragmatically forms a turn-type violation (Greatbatch, 1986: 443), through which he denies the topical relevance of that which is set by the interviewer, thus enabling him to avoid responding to the question. In the meantime, the “marker of differentiation of opinion” performed through *well* (Hind, 2012: 1267) serves the purpose of 1) mitigating the agenda shift (cf Bull and Wells, 2012: 43; Harris, 2001) and 2) maintaining face for both himself and the moderator. However, multiple hesitations (highlighted: grey), make his speech delivery staggered, with pauses placed within clauses rather than in between them, which indicate the speaker’s lack of focus (ll.9-11) and/or struggle to find the words to speak his mind.

OBAMA in some of the (.) toughest to-deal-with school. Uh:
we've got a program called Race to the Top (.) that (0.3)
uh (0.3) has (0.3) prompted (.) reforms in 46 states

Consequently, the argument is less intelligible to the audience, as the numerous pauses become a distraction from the argument, which shows Obama in a rather weak position, very similar to that of Ryan, as studied in the previous section. After a successful attempt to shift the agenda, he does not succeed in articulating clearly the key points of his argument. The comparison of this answer with that which he performs in Extract 3.5 is particularly interesting in that it highlights the differences in Obama's performances on these two occasions (Debate 1 and Debate 3).

The interaction captured in Extract 3.5 occurs in Debate 3 (the second debate in which Obama and Romney participate), which consists of a Q&A session during which the candidates take turns to answer preselected questions from uncommitted audience members from the area. Here, both candidates have been asked about what they can do to ensure that young people can find a job after graduating, which invites a very similar response with Extract 3.4 from Obama.




Figure 3.8 Public perception of the debates' outcomes

In relation to this phenomenon, let me introduce Figure 3.8, relating the public's perception of the candidates' performances throughout the debate series (Dutton et

al., 2012a, b, c, d). Those results are based on the percentage of uncommitted voters whose opinion was requested in relation to each debate's result: a victory/defeat of either side, or a tie.

First, Obama's performance was reported to be notably worse in the first debate (Extract 3.4, Debate 1 in Figure 3.8) in which he participated (Extract 3.5, Debate 3 in Figure 3.8). Second, the argument repetition almost word for word in Extract 3.5 (ll.15-19) exemplifies the attention to detail that is put in by the candidates' teams prior to the debates. The line: *offering slots for workers to get retrained for the jobs that are there right now* is repeated in Extracts 3.4 (ll. 15-17) and 3.5 (ll. 20-21). The differences in terms of the execution of the answer highlight how Obama's performance was poorly executed on the first occasion (Extract 3.4), in comparison to Extract 3.5. In addition, the line *I want to make sure* is almost exclusively present in the Debate 3 (Extract 3.5), with one occurrence in Debates 1 and 4 respectively, out of 9, with a few variants: *I do want to make sure* (Figure 3.9, bold). Figure 3.9 shows that the phrase is used in a specific context, where the outcome of the actions carried in the subordinate clauses introduced by *make sure that*, have to be mostly inclusive and with a positive outcome. Additionally, the keyness of *make sure* (85 occurrences overall in the entire corpus) reaches a score of 338.13 in *Wordsmith Tools* (Scott, 2005), whereas its log likelihood score (UCREL, 2015) is 119.59 in comparison with the COCA wordlist. This demonstrates the importance of the phrase in Obama's discourse during this debate especially.

Extract 3.5 Obama's response to a question from the audience. Debate 3 - 00.05.28 – 00.06.40

1 OBAMA And there're (.) a bunch of things that we can do- to
2 Fig 3.5a make sure your future (.) is bright. (.) Number one. I
3 Fig 3.5b (0.2) wanna build manufacturing -jobs in this country
4 (.)again. Now when (0.2) Governor-Romney said we should
5 let Detroit go bankrupt. (.) I said: (.) we're gonna bet
6 on American workers and the American auto industry, and
7 Fig 3.5c it's come (.) surging back. I wanna do that in industries
8 not just (.) in Detroit but all across the country! (.)
9 And that means we change our tax code so we're giving
10 incentives (.) to companies that're investing here in
11 the United States and, creating jobs here. It also means
12 we're helping them- and to small businesses, to export
13 all around the world new markets. (.) Number two. (.)
14 We've got to make su:re- that we have the best education
15 system in the world. And the fact that you're- going to
16 college is great, but I want everybody to get a great
17 education. And we've- worked hard to make sure (.)that
18 student loans are available for folks like you. (.) But
19 I also want to make sure that community colleges are
20 offering slots for workers to get retrain:ned for the
21 Fig 3.5d jo:bs that are there right now, and the jobs of the
22 future. (.) Number three. (.) We've got to control our
23 own energy. (.) Not only oi:l and natural gas (.)which
24 we've been investing in, but also we've got to make sure
25 we're (.) building (.) the energy sources of the future
26 (.)not just thinking about next year, but 10 years from
27 now, 20 years from now. That's why we invest in solar
28 and wind and biofuels, (0.2) energy-efficient cars. (.)
29 We've gotta reduce our deficit,but we've got to do it in
30 a balanced way...

Furthermore, the alternating inclusive and individual dimension of *I want to make sure, we want to make sure, we make sure, make sure that we* (ll. 14, 19, 24) subtly implies that the Obama approach to tackling the problem of education is a personal concern, while it also needs to be the result of a common, if not national, effort to find the right solution.

N Concordance

20 on. THE PRESIDENT: **I do want to make sure** -- THE PRESIDENT: I
21 mportant thing we can do is to make sure we control our own en
22 rterrorism efforts. Number two, make sure that they are standin
23 dy have during my administration, make sure that they can affor
24 me initial emergency measures to make sure we didn't slip into
25 sure your kids can go to college, make sure that you are getting
26 th our tax code, and how do we make sure that we are reducing
27 there right now. And I want to make sure that we keep tuition
28 t cooperation from Congress to make sure that we fixed the sys
29 , what he says is he's going to make sure that this doesn't ad
30 ot two daughters and I want to make sure that they have the sa
31 e entire country. And I want to make sure that the next generati
32 here, not overseas. I want to make sure we've got the best ed
33 n't think so, Candy. I want to make sure your timekeepers are
34 or structural change in order to make sure that Social Security
35 ely to help you in your life, make sure your kids can go to c
36 g an international coalition to make sure these sanctions were
37 at grows the economy is when we make sure small businesses ar

Figure 3.9 Concordance list extract of make sure in Obama's discourse during the 2012 US debate series

The audience member's question provides an opportunity for him to give the same message in Extract 3.5 in a more effective way than in Extract 3.4. In effect, Obama's

speech delivery has radically changed. It is more assured and more regular, as the transcript shows. Here, the absence of any noticeable hesitations contributes to making the argument clear and intelligible, on the contrary to Obama's spasmodic speech delivery highlighted in Extract 3.4. In addition, even though the argument relies in both cases on self-promotion rather than confrontation, the articulation of the discourse has evolved between the two extracts. In Extract 3.5, the argument is well structured, broken-down into numbered points: *number one*, *number two*, *number three* (ll.2, 13, 22) which are followed by first person pronouns, *I* to start with (ll.2-3) then Obama switches to *we* (ll.13-14, 22-23).

Number one. I (0.2) wanna build manufacturing -jobs in this country

Number two. (.)We've got to make su:re- that we have the best

Education system in the world.

Number three. (.) We've got to control our own energy. (.)

Each point of the argument is constructed as a procatalepsis, through which the candidate anticipates a possible counterargument from another interactant by raising an objection (Silva Rhetoricae, 2016, Lanham, 1991: 119) to it, which enables him to strengthen the argument eventually. The first procatalepsis, (ll.4-7, grey) features the only openly negative reference to the opponent: Mitt Romney: *Now when Governor Romney said [...] I said [...]*. This is the only confrontational part of the argument, in that it directly refers to his opponent and effectively makes him endorse the paraphrase: *let Detroit go bankrupt*. This argument is fallacious (Kessler, 2012), as Romney did advocate for bankruptcy in the case of Detroit, but for a *managed* one, which "is a process in which the company [or in this case, a city] uses the bankruptcy code to discharge its debts, but emerges from the process a leaner, less leveraged company" (Kessler, 2012). However, this serves the development of Obama's argument, as it forms the concession part of Obama's first procatalepsis.

Consequently, this allows him to introduce himself as the main actor in the objection: *When Governor Romney said X, I said Y* (ll.4-6) which, in relation to the performance of the procatalepsis, allows the speaker to pragmatically claim the objection for himself rather than to anticipate it to come from the opponent. In doing so, Obama challenges Romney's opinion on the issue, and "associates [it] with disapproval" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 66-67), which constitutes an attack on the Romney's positive face, and is, in the present case, expressed through an objection followed by an outbid. This pattern is reproduced through the remainder of the extract, and creates an effect of parallelism through which Obama associates Romney's approach to that which is the "bare minimum" (my definition), which he presents as not enough in comparison to his own more "comprehensive" (my definition) outbids.

Obama introduces the concession part of the procatalepsis through sequencers, which "serve to guide the reader in the presentation of different arguments" and topicalisers, which "explicitly indicate some type of topic shift to the reader" (Ismail, 2012: 1263), such as: *now when, and, also, not only, not just, also* (ll.4, 8, 9, 15, 17, 19, 23, 26). Those deictic markers allow the speaker to "emphasize important points" (Khalil, 2014: 532) while reminding the audience of their connection with what precedes and follows (Khalil, 2014: 531). Second, he introduces the objection: in this particular case, how he objects to and outbids the first part of the argument. In most occurrences, this is signalled by: *but (also), it also means*, (ll.8, 11, 16, 18, 24, 26, 29). For instance, in Extract 3.5:

Examples 3.9a, b (Obama, Debate 3 - 00.05.28 – 00.06.40)

a. **And** the fact that you're- going to college is great, **but** I want everybody to get a great education.

b. **And** we've worked hard to make sure that student loans are available for folks like you. **But** I also want to make sure that community colleges are offering slots for workers to get retrained...

This is included in Obama's strategy to self-promote rather than to attack openly the opponent, as it explicitly focuses the discourse on his plans/record only, and does not mention the opponent explicitly or implicitly throughout the rest of the interaction. The repetition of the procatleipsis structure builds up units that in turn build up a bigger/better whole when added together. In Examples 3.9a and 3.9b the concession part of the argument is (to paraphrase, ll1-2): *it is great that you're going to college*. The objection is: *I want everybody to get a great education*, (ll. 2-3) and the bigger and better whole that results from the two is: *thanks to Obama's past and future administration* (promoting his record, ll.3-4), college students can/will be able to afford *a great education*. Thus, the efforts of the Obama administration do not only account for what has been achieved, but also for what he *wants* to do: make college education available *for workers to get retrained* (ll.6-7). A similar structure is observed in the next part of the extract (ll.22-28): *we've got to control our energy, not only oil and gas* is the concession (ll.22-23). The objection is: *we've got to make sure we're building the energy sources of the future*, (ll.24-25). In this case, this exposes a *given*, generally agreed upon, and/or expected of him to say, as opposed to what he advances as a *new* argument. This leads to Obama's more comprehensive proposal: *not just thinking about next year, but 10 years from now* (ll.24-26), which allows him to emphasize his leadership skills and forward thinking, and yet again focus the argument on self-promotion entirely.

This almost mechanical structure of the argument allows Obama to emphasize his thorough knowledge of the complexity of the issues, and the comprehensive solutions he proposes over the bare minimum introduced as the concessions of each

argument. In addition, the repeated structure allows the argument to be systematised, and potentially understood as a simple matter of a cause/effect chain reaction, which, once it has started, will start producing those positive results for the people. This discourse structure also makes it possible for Obama to make a complex process seem quite easy and a matter of common sense.

In doing so, Obama's overall bodily communication in the debates is very different from that of his co-nominee Joe Biden. Figure 3.10 illustrates his demeanour in Extract 3.5. As previously mentioned, this extract is part of Obama's response to a question from an audience member (vertical arrow, Figure 3.10a). It is also important to note that the settings of this debate are very different from those of the other debates (including the vice presidential debate). In effect, this debate is the only one of the four during which the two debaters, Obama and Romney, are given the opportunity to answer questions asked by members of the audience in the studio. Second, and as a consequence, as shown in Figure 3.10, the candidates are standing on a stage and free to walk around rather than sitting around a table with the moderator (Debate 4, VP Debate), or standing behind a lectern (Debate 1). However, this seems to be subject to one rule, that one candidate occupies the stage floor when their turn to speak comes up, while the other sits on a stool at the back of the stage. This is what is shown in Figure 3.10: Obama's turn to speak has just started, and, as he starts speaking, he moves across the stage towards where he stands in Fig 3.10a, that is, fairly close to the audience member, and presumably right in front of him (although that is not possible to see for certain from the available footage).



a. Obama: *make sure your future* (.) *is bright* (Debate 3: 05.17-05.22; Extract 3.7, 1.2)



b. Obama: *Now when* (0.2) *Governor-Romney said we should...* (Debate 3: 05.28-05.32; Extract 3.7, 1.4)



c. Obama: *we're gonna bet on American workers...* (Debate 3: 05.30-05.34; Extract 3.7, 1.6)



d. Obama: (.) *Number three.* (.) *We've got to control* (Debate 3: 06.15-06.18, Extract 3.7, 1.21)

Figure 3.10 Obama's posture, gesture, gaze and head movement (Debate 3: 00.05.28 – 00.06.40; Extract 3.5)

As Figure 3.10d also shows, this position in the available space allows the speaker to look his recipient directly in the eye (thin arrow, Figure. 3.10d), which he does most of the time during this interaction (except at times, as shown in Figure 3.10c). Hand gestures quite clearly accompany Obama's verbal language, with iconic gestures (Norris, 2004: 29) easily identifiable. In Figure 3.10d, Obama stretches three fingers for the number three, simultaneously with the phrase *number three*, (Extract 3.7, 1.21.), while directly looking at the audience member. In addition, Figure 3.10a shows an example of deictic gesture, in which Obama points his finger at the audience member when he says *you*. The purpose of these hand gestures is clear: to accompany and depict the same message as provided via verbal language, in addition to the speaker's gaze towards the audience member, and his position on

the edge of the stage. This shows that Obama's strategy is to engage and show proximity with the audience member while responding to his concern and building empathy. Therefore, on a spatial level, it seems Obama's strategy is to appeal to the audience's emotions directly, both in the audience as well as on television. In addition, Obama's use of the stage during this interaction allows him to literally turn his back on Romney and focus exclusively on the audience member who asked the question. In doing so, he manages to show he is close to the American public.

For Obama, the interest lies in the fact that the adversarial moves he performs here are very subtle, in fact much more so than Biden's (Obama's running mate) against Ryan. Ultimately, this highlights that Obama is as good an orator as his reputation has made him to be, thus showing the public that he is the advocate of common sense, which is a strong, powerful, yet simple argument within the grasp of any member of the public. Finally, this allows him to rebuild face and maintain it from the previous debate while in the position of the incumbent thus more accountable to the young questioner than the opponent. He manages a clear and simple response, which enhances his ethos and makes him look and sound Presidential.

In the final section of this chapter, I focus on how Mitt Romney, Obama's opponent, performs, and, more specifically, I review how similar his discourse and that of his running mate, Paul Ryan, rely on similar uses of vague language according to whether they focus on themselves or the opponent.

3.6 Vague language uses in relation to the candidate's discourse

This chapter's goal is to identify strategies that characterise adversarial moves. Because of the nature and specificities of the data, the two previous sections find that contrasts occur between individuals, which demonstrate the importance of

individual style in the performance of adversarial moves. The final dimension of this characterisation is emphasized by the patterns I describe below: the similar discourse structure in the two Republican candidates' discourses. In doing so, this chapter exemplifies all dimensions of adversarial discourse reviewed in Chapter 2, that is, facework, stancetaking, evasion and vague language, and multimodality, and thus, contributes to providing a comprehensive mapping of what adversarial discourse is made of in this debate series, in order to carry out the subsequent analysis of adversarial moves in campaign speeches (Chapter 4) and election manifestos (Chapter 5)

The two previous sections have uncovered two types of adversarial moves: overt confrontation and self-promotion. However, these are not the only types of moves found in this data. In effect, vague language as an evasion technique forms the third type of adversarial move that can be identified through the 2012 US debate series. The use of vague language is neither bad nor good, but "what matters is that [it] is used properly" (Channell, 1994: 3). It becomes problematic when "someone seems to be deliberately withholding information" (Channell, 1994: 3). This is sometimes the case in political discourse, where politicians use vague language in parts of the messages they deliver. The study of Extract 3.2 has demonstrated that some elements of vague language are present in Paul Ryan's response to Martha Raddatz's question, which, in her own words lacked "specifics" (Martha Raddatz, Extract 3.2 ll. 2, 5, 10, 35).

I study how this phenomenon reoccurs in both the Republican nominees' discourse (Romney and Ryan), as they both rely on using different planes of vagueness and precision in relation to the focus of the argument either on their own or on the opponent's plans and/or record. This indicates that the two Republican candidates not only share a party nomination, but also similar strategies in terms of how the language is constructed and processed. Extract 3.6 from the first debate of the 2012 election series (Debate 1) exemplifies a part of the discussion on the

economy. Here, Mitt Romney gives an account of a personal encounter he made with a small business owner (who I will refer to as “the ordinary man”) which he uses to exemplify how his opponent’s plan for the future will mean nothing but an avalanche of negative consequences on ordinary people.

Extract 3.6 Vague language in Romney’s discourse. Debate 1 - 00.20.32-00.21.32

1 ROMNEY [I] talked to a guys who has a very small business. he’s in
2 th’electronics business in-a, in St Louis, he has four
3 employees. (.) He said he and his son calculat’d how much they
4 pay in tax[es] (.) [fed]eral income tax, federal payroll tax,
5 OBAMA [Mmh-hmm.]
6 ROMNEY state income tax, state sales tax, state property tax,
7 Fig 3.6a gasoline tax, it added up to we:ll over 50 percent (.) of what
8 they earned (0.2) and your plan is to take the tax rate on,
9 successful small businesses from 35 percent (.) to 40 percent
10 (0.2) the national federation of independent businesses said
11 that will cost (.) seven, hundred, thousand jobs (0.2) I don’t
12 Fig 3.6b wanna cost jobs! (0.2)My priority (0.2) is jobs! (.) And so
13 what I do is I bring down the tax rates, (.) lower deductions
14 and exemptions (.) the same idea behind Bowles-Simpson by the
15 way. (.) Get the rates down (.) lower deductions and
16 exemptions, to create more jobs because there’s nothing better
17 (.) for getting us to a balanced budget (.) than having more
18 people working (.) earning more money (.) paying more taxes
19 (.)that’s by far the most effective and efficient way to get
20 this (.) budget balanced.

Romney’s argument contains three main parts, during which he switches between different planes of vagueness and precision. The first part consists of telling the backstory of the ordinary man (II.1-4). The second part focuses on criticising the results of the opponent’s economic policies as incumbent President (II.5-8), which consists of a long enumeration of all the taxes the ordinary man pays at present. It

then focuses on attacking the opponent on his plans in relation to said taxing policies (ll.8-11): *and your plan is [...] that will cost seven hundred thousand jobs.*

This allows Romney to highlight the heavy and bureaucratic taxation system of Obama's government, and to convey the message that things will deteriorate if he is re-elected. The third part of the argument starts as the focus of the discourse is shifted (ll.11-12: grey line mark) to the speaker's own solution to the situation, and this coincides with a very noticeable shift in relation to how he accounts for the two key elements of his argument: jobs, and taxes of all forms.

In the first part, (ll.1-8) Romney provides the audience with two sets of information. The first focuses on how ordinary the man of the encounter is: he owns a *very small business of four employees with his son*, and pays *taxes* (ll. 1, 2, 3, 4, grey highlights). He gives a hyper-detailed account of this ordinary citizen. He is described as the most ordinary human being, upon whom a cluster of traditional values is thrown: family values, he works *with his son*, and a tight community life, he has *four employees*. He is also described as *successful* (l.9), and presented as a reliable source of information (who the speaker has personally met and spoken to). This is contrasted with the second set of information Romney provides. This set provides information relating to the negative effects of Obama's current economic policies (ll.4, 6-7, grey highlights). This consists of an enumeration of the many taxes the ordinary man pays: *federal income tax, federal payroll tax, state income tax, state sale tax, state property tax, gasoline tax* (ll. 4, 6-7). This long, rhythmic enumeration culminates with the percentage to which the ordinary man is taxed at that moment in time: *it add[s] up to we:ll over 50 percent*, with a significant emphasis on *well* (l. 7). This allows Romney to associate the opponent with the dehumanised, systematic and bureaucratic federal government that subjects the ordinary man to all those taxes.

The second part (ll.8-11) is introduced by the deictic marker *and* (l.8) which indicates the "speaker's continuation" of the argument (Hind, 2012: 1262). Here, this

allows him to continue and build up the argument against the opponent as it introduces Obama's plan for higher tax rates: *from 35 to 40 percent* (l.9, grey highlights). This acts as a device for Romney to build up his ethos all the while adopting a stance against his opponent, in that if it were not for him, the opponent's government would carry on subjecting ordinary people to illegitimate taxes. In addition, Romney takes the opportunity to digress further on the consequences of such a tax increase: the loss of *seven, hundred, thousand jobs* (l.11, grey highlight). In that sentence, the way he insists on each word and especially on jobs increases the dramatic dimension of the argument, which appeals to the voters' pathos. Finally, Romney claims expertise (Clayman and Heritage, 2002) on the subject by citing an allegedly expert source, the *National Federation of Independent Businesses* (l.10, grey highlight), which appeals to the voters' logos.

This coincides with the beginning of the third part of the argument and is marked with a clear shift in terms of how he accounts for jobs and taxes in relation to whose policies and plans (his, or the opponent's) he focuses on. This shift is activated with the epistrophe ("ending a series of lines, phrases, clauses, or sentences with the same word or words") (Lanham, 1991: 69; Silva Rhetoricae, 2016) of the word *jobs*, three times (ll.11, 12), first in the description of mass job destructions: *seven hundred thousand jobs* (l.11) (because of the opponent's plan) and then as its antithesis, as Romney's *priority* (l.12). The shift is also carried out through a different articulation of the argument. Coordinate clauses forming isocolons, *bring down the tax rates, lower deductions and exemptions* (two occurrences), *get the rates down* (ll. 13, 14, 15) construct the argument in a similar way as in the first part of the extract: *state income tax, state sales tax, state property tax, gasoline tax* (ll. 6-7). However, in this case, Romney focuses on processes: *bring down, lower, get down*, and comparative/superlative adjectives and adverbial phrases: *more, most, better, same, balanced, by far*, (ll.11-20, grey highlights) while noun groups form a key part of the argument in the first part of the extract (ll.6-7,

grey highlights). In addition, the topic of this part of the argument is more abstract, the only active participant is himself: *I* (ll.11, 13), while *us* and *people*, are both passive participants (l.17). No mention is made of either the opponent or the ordinary man, even though the argument's focus was originally on them.

Patterns of repetition, such as the anaphora (the repetition of a word or succession of words at the beginning of successive clauses, sentences, or lines) (Silva, *Rhetoricae*, 2016; Lanham, 1991: 11) of *more* (ll.17-19) occur throughout. This ends with the adnominatio (repetition of a word but in a different form) of the word *most*, (Silva *Rhetoricae*, 2016; Lanham, 1991: 3) to mark the climax of the argument, and increase the importance of the alleged positive effects of his proposed plan. This allows him to distract the audience from the fact that precise numbers and figures are absent from this part of the argument, while they form the core part of the attack against the opponent's plans.

This part of the argument is logically structured to follow a cause/effect axis: *lowering taxes to create more jobs*, which enables the government to collect *more taxes* and move towards a *balanced budget* (l.16, 17, 18). As with the first part of the argument, Romney also attempts to legitimise his position (Archer, 2005: 16; French and Raven, 1960) by referring to *Bowles-Simpson* (l.14): the bipartisan Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, created by Barack Obama in 2010, and claiming a similarity with his own proposed plan: *the same idea behind Bowles-Simpson, by the way* (l.14-15). However, the move from precise numbers and figures in part one and two to relational processes in part three fails to provide a similarly precise account of how his plans will be carried out successfully. Instead, he tailors "the amount of information by using an approximation in direct contrast with an exact number [...], [which] may have the effect of focusing attention towards [...] what is considered most important in the utterance" (Channell, 1994: 175), and therefore performs a switch to vague language. Romney tailors the amount of information by respectively appealing to numbers and figures when attacking the opponent, in order

to imprint efficiently the negative representation of the opponent's record and plans in the minds of the voters, while he uses more vague language to describe his own plans for the future.

In this way, the audience's attention is focused on the precisely detailed, negative impact of Obama's record and plans for the future, which allows Romney to pass a comparatively vague plan for a more credible and serious alternative. Overall, Romney's argument here has two goals. The first one is to attack the opponent in a rather overt manner, which serves the purpose of creating a contrast between the latter's and his own plans, laid out in the third and last part of his argument. This opposes a contrastive description of a bright future, only achievable thanks to his own propositions, however sketchily devised they may be. In addition, he also attempts to create an impression of proximity with ordinary people.

Considering Romney's running mate, Paul Ryan, this study finds that he uses a very similar strategy during the vice presidential debate (Debate 2), as illustrated in Extract 3.7. Here, the topic is very close to the one debated in Extract 3.6: Ryan responds to a question from the moderator regarding jobs and the economy. At this point, Biden has already responded, and it is now Ryan's turn. Overall, the answer resembles to that provided by Romney in Extract 3.6.

In the first part of the argument, (ll.1-12) Ryan focuses essentially on denigrating the opponent's record on the subject, while the second part (ll.13-23) consists of outlining his plans if elected. The line between ll.12-13 marks the shift between the two parts and, similar to Extract 3.6, where the most noticeable shift in language occurs. Here, the shift concerns the way in which the speaker accounts for growth and jobs.

Extract 3.7 Vague language in Ryan's discourse. Debate 2 - 00.25.05-00.26.05

1 RYAN Look (.) *chuckles* (.) *sniffles* (0.2) Did they come i:n (.)
2 an' inherit' tough situation? Absolutely. (0.2) But we're
3 BIDEN *laughs*
4 RYAN goin' in th' wrong direction! (0.2) Look at where we are!(0.2)
5 Th' economy is bar'ly limping along, it's growing at 1.3
6 percent! (.) That's slo:wer than it grew last year, and last
7 year was slower than the year before. Job growth in September,
8 (.)was slower than it was in August, and August was slower
9 than it wa:s' in July! (.) We're heading in the wrong
10 **Fig** direction. (.) Twen-ty-three: million Americans, (0.2) are
3.6a struggling for work today. (0.2) fif-tee:n percent of
11 Americans(0.2)are living in poverty today. (.)Thi:s (0.2) is
12

not what a real recovery looks like. (.)We need real reforms
13 (.)for real recovery-(n')-that's exactly what Mitt Romney and
14 I are proposing. (0.2) It's a five-point plan. Get America
15 energy independent in North North America by the end of the
16 decade. (0.2) Help people Who're hurti:ng (.) get the skills
17 **Fig** they need to get the jobs they want. (0.2) Get this deficit
3.6b and debt under control to prevent a debt crisis. Make trade
18 work for America so we can make more things in America, (.)
19 and sell them oversea:s, and ch:ampion small businesses.-Don't
20 raise taxes on small businesses because they're our job
21 creators...
22
23

The first part of the argument starts with the rhetorical question: *did they come in and inherit a tough situation?* (l.1-2) introduced by the deictic marker *look*, which functions as a request for the attention of both the audience and the moderator (to whom Ryan is responding). This also allows Ryan to request the moderator, and the voters, to bear witness and take his side, which is reinforced with the use of the inclusive *we* in: *where we are*. The primary semantic function of this rhetorical question is to formulate a concession, that the 2007-08 worldwide financial crisis did not facilitate the job of *they* (l.1): the newly elected Obama administration of 2008. However, this

concession's sole purpose is to mitigate the argument that follows, introduced by *but* (l.2). In doing so, Ryan implies that the aforementioned gravity of the situation is a factor of lesser importance than the opponent's incompetence to deal with it: *we're going in the wrong direction! Look at where we are* (ll.2-4). However, Ryan does use different grammatical tenses throughout his argument, while, in Extract 3.6, Romney uses the present tense to describe both the opponent's policies' negative effects, and his own proposals for the future. Ryan starts with the present progressive to adopt a stance on the country's current economic situation: *we are going in the wrong direction, barely limping along, growing at 1.3 percent* (ll.2,4,5,9).

Second, he describes the situation in more detail, through specific figures relating to the country's current growth and employment situation (ll. 5-12, grey highlights):

RYAN Th' economy is bar'ly limping along, it's growing at 1.3 percent! (.) That's slo:wer than it grew last year, and last year was slower than the year before. Job growth in September, (.)was slower than it was in August, and August was slower than it wa:s' in July! (.) We're heading in the wrong direction. (.) Twen-ty-three: million Americans, (0.2)are struggling for work today. (0.2) fif-tee:n percent of Americans(0.2)are living in poverty today. (.)

This is accomplished in a very similar fashion to Romney's argument in Extract 3.6. The anaphora of *we're going/heading in the wrong direction* (ll. 2-4, 9-10) gives a cohesive structure to the argument. It both introduces and concludes it, which increases the importance of the negative aspects mentioned in between: the poor state of the economy, which is *limping along* (l.5), mass poverty, and job losses. In this part of the argument, Ryan switches to the imperative mode to lay out the various

stages of his *five point plan*: *Get America energy independent, help people who're hurting, get this deficit and debt under control, make trade work, and champion small businesses* (l. 15, 17, 18, 19, 21-22, grey highlights). He finally uses a negative imperative form: *don't raise taxes* (l.21, highlighted: grey) at the very end of his argument, to emphasize the importance of that measure, as well as to remind the voters that this is what the opponent plans to do. The use of the imperative throughout this part of the argument allows the speaker to perform suggestions rather than orders, except in that very last instance, where its ambiguous use helps him enhance his own ethos in that it shows confidence and determination, and functions as an injunction to the incumbents. It is also his second attempt at conversationalising the discourse (after the repeated uses of the deictic marker *look* in introducing his argument (ll.1, 4) and a way of circling back to where he started with the rhetorical question: *did they inherit a tough situation?* It also allows him to appear closer to the voters, as it makes his monologue more dynamic.

When the shift occurs, Ryan uses the epistrophe of the noun group *real recovery* in the same way Romney does in Extract 3.6 with the word *jobs*:

Thi:s (0.2) is not what a real recovery looks like. (.)We
need real reforms (.)for real recovery-(n')

Here, Ryan insists especially on *this*, and *looks* to a lesser extent, which amplifies the dramatic dimension of the discourse. In addition, the second sentence is a potential soundbite, in the form of the isocolon: *real reforms for real recovery*. This also allows Ryan to create a gap between the undesirable *not a real recovery* and the desirable *real reforms* (ll.12-13). In this final part of the argument, the semantic field of patriotism and protectionism emerges clearly via the repetitions of the word *America* (ll.15, 16, 20, 20). In addition, the sports metaphor of *champion[ing] small businesses* (l.21) enhances his ethos further in that it portrays him with the kind of

attitude he is advocating: that of a champion. Similar to Romney, however, the shift that occurs between the two parts of the argument and the final soundbite: *champion small businesses* (l.21) implies a loss of precise information that is given to the audience. Ryan effectively fails to provide as precise an account of the job growth that would arise if his plans were implemented as that which resulted from the opponent's policies. In this case, the important piece of information he wants the voters to register is the detailed, well documented, negative effects of the opponent's plans on the one hand, and the overall patriotic, protectionist and leading attitude of a champion that is needed (and provided) by the speaker on the other hand.

The study of both Republican candidates' gestures, postures and head movements throughout these two extract reveal that their overall non-verbal communication is also quite similar. In Extract 3.6, Romney's overall posture is permanently oriented towards Obama (Figure 3.11a), who is also turned towards him. Romney's gaze is also locked in the direction of Obama's face, whereas the latter switches directions at times, most noticeably to write down notes. Romney's posture remains static throughout this interaction. He performs iconic hand movements: while he mentions the *gasoline tax*, he raises his thumb to form the number one (Figure 3.11a), which completes the enumeration he makes verbally at that specific moment. This hand gesture emphasizes the accumulative aspect of the enumeration, which allows him to strengthen the impact of his argument against the opponent's taxing system, all the while staring the opponent in the eye. This insistent gaze can be interpreted as a bold move, through which Romney endorses the role of the president's contradictor, which consequently enhances his ethos as a worthy competitor. However, as in the case of Ryan discussed previously, he runs the risk of appearing too persistent, and almost robotic, which could damage the public's opinion of his performance in this debate.

In terms of posture, Romney remains quite stable. He moves slightly from time to time. The most noticeable posture change (Figure 3.11b) occurs at the same

time as the shift, as he says: *I don't wanna cost jobs, my priority is jobs*, while the pitch of his voice raises in the first part of this sentence, and lowers remarkably in the second part. This combination shows Romney's ability to deliver his message effectively across all modes of communication, as in this particular case he uses gesture, posture, voice control and verbal communication to communicate his argument clearly. He insists that his aim is not *to cost jobs*, which his raised voice informs us he is adopting a stance against, whereas the lowered voice in the second sentence: *my priority is jobs*, conveys that his goal is to reassure and appease.



a. Romney (left), facing Obama (right).



b. Romney (left), facing Obama (right).



a. Ryan's (right) facing Biden (left)



d. Ryan's (right) facing Biden (left)

Figure 3.11 Romney and Ryan's bodily communication during Extracts 3.6 and 3.7

On the other hand, Ryan's facial and upper body movements in Extract 3.7 highlight the contrasts found previously between his performance and Biden's. His gaze is locked into that of his interlocutor (the moderator), who is slightly off the camera angle (Figures 3.10c and 3.10d). As a result, this makes him look away from the camera (and the viewers) and the opponent, while his gaze remains very intensely focused on something the viewers cannot see. Head movements include nods varying in intensity, more pronounced simultaneously with verbal emphasis on some

parts of the discourse: *twenty-three million Americans, fifteen percent* (ll.10, 11). His posture is very fidgety at first, which makes Ryan seem rather agitated and nervous, in contrast with Romney who remains more collected. He also appears to sit hunched up (Figure 3.6d), in stark contrast with his opponent Joe Biden, as well as with his running mate Mitt Romney.

3.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have reviewed the different strategies and techniques used by the four candidates to perform adversarial moves. I found that rhetorical questions are often used as a means to answer the moderator's question, which is in itself an adversarial move, in that it often constitutes an attempt to reset the agenda and, as in the case of Ryan, attack the opponent on their record.

I found that adversarial relations are more complex than one-to-one confrontations. Extracts 3.2 and 3.3 have shown that the moderator's role is significant in the setting up of adversarial relations. In relation to this, I found that individual style plays a central part in the way these moves are performed.

In the interactions between Biden, Ryan, and Raddatz, especially, I found that individual style and persona influenced greatly how adversarial relations were created. On the one hand, this study showed how Biden's spontaneity and complete mastering of his image allowed him to effectively dominate the interactions with both his opponent and the moderator, whether it is his turn to speak or not. On the other hand, this study found that Ryan often succumbed to attacks from both the moderator and the opponent, which the latter used as a means to intensify said attacks. I also found that these two candidates display the most important contrasts in terms of bodily communication.

In contrast, the analysis of Obama's discourse in Extracts 3.5 and 3.6 has shown the extent to which his demeanour and persona were expressed differently from that of his running mate Joe Biden throughout the debates. The two candidates' diametrically opposed behaviours, not unlike the dynamics of a "good cop/bad cop" relationship, also seem to work to their advantage, which demonstrates the importance of individual style in relation to adversarial moves in political discourse. Biden's intimidating, rigorous, and firm attitude over both the moderator and his opponent allows him to enhance his ethos as incumbent Vice President. In addition, his overtly aggressive attitude was viewed as a means for the Democratic ticket to reclaim lost ground from the first debate, in which Obama's performance was particularly bad (cf Figure 3.7). Meanwhile, Obama's calm and collected attitude coupled with his positive and informative discourse allowed him to prove his ability to serve as President. In addition, it also showed the importance of contextual factors in determining the quality of the performance of the candidates. Extract 3.5 from Debate 1 showed that Obama seemed distracted, which had a negative impact on his discourse and enunciation, whereas the study of Extract 3.6 showed how effectively he could communicate on the same topic on a separate occasion. This confirms the key importance of rhetoric in this type of exercise; although the comparison of the two extracts shows that individual style together with performance and focus do play a tremendous part in how effectively the message is delivered.

Thirdly, the analysis of Extracts 3.7 and 3.8 showed how two candidates from a same party, Romney and Ryan, make use of their time to adopt a similar strategy of adversarial discourse that actively debunks the opponent's plan with a view to discredit them, and allows them to divert the attention of the public when it comes to laying out their own rather sketchily articulated propositions. This part of the analysis shows how similarly articulated their discourses are in relation to 1) argument structure, and 2) how they account for a similar issue, such as growth, taxes, or unemployment, according to whether the focus is on the opponent's record or on

their own plans. In consequence, both use a very similar array of rhetorical tools to achieve that goal, which allow them to shift from precision to vagueness in a very similar fashion. Precision and details are used to attack the opponent's plans, whereas vagueness is saved for the second part of their argument: the promotion of their own ideas and plans for the future. This makes both their discourses highly, almost mechanically, processed rhetorically.

To conclude this first part of the analysis, I find that adversarial moves rely on both verbal and non-verbal means of communication. In addition, I find that these moves often involve facework in the form of FTAs as well as Face Management and Face Enhancement Acts (FMAs and FEAs), which are in most cases related to building up the speaker's ethos. I also find that while three different strategies occur (confrontation, self-promotion, and uses of vague language), similar means are used by the candidates to achieve the different goals set by those strategies. These include facework, rhetorical questions and RQAs, as well as multimodal communication. The next chapter studies this phenomenon further in campaign speeches.

4 Adversariality in campaign speeches

4.1. Introduction

Political leaders use language as a means 'to sketch a positive image of themselves' (Cabrejas-Peñuelas and Díez-Prados, 2014:160) and adopt attitudes or stances in order to appeal to the public/voters, and get elected. Those stances are mostly established through linguistic choices (Kiesling, 2012: 171) made by the speakers. This chapter reviews the stances adopted by candidates towards their opponents in the French (2012) and US (2008) presidential elections, and considers how these participate in the elaboration of adversarial strategies in the context of campaign speeches.

The starting point of this analysis is the "address strategies" (my definition) found in the data. Address strategies include all means through which the candidates refer to the opponent, whether by name, personal pronouns (for instance: *il/he*) and so on. In addition, I study how metaphors, contrasts, and comparisons support this elaboration of stances, and thereby constitute some means for the candidates to perform FTAs (Brown and Levinson, 1987, Harris, 2001, Bull and Wells, 2012).

4.2. The speeches

I focus on campaign speeches from the 2008 US presidential election campaign between John McCain (Republican) and Barack Obama (Democrat), and from the

2012 French presidential election campaign between François Hollande (Socialist Party) and Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP). Table 4.1 provides an overview of this corpus.

Table 4.1 The CampSpeeches subcorpus

| Candidate (Country, year) | Barack Obama (US, 2008) | John McCain (US, 2008) | François Hollande (France, 2012) | Nicolas Sarkozy (France, 2012) |
|--|-------------------------------|---------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|
| Corpus | UBOB08 | UMAC08 | FRAHOL12 | FRANIS12 |
| Texts | 25 | 14 | 22 | 29 |
| Tokens | 70, 435 | 26, 366 | 113, 847 | 200, 520 |

Text and token numbers vary between the speakers, which is due to different degrees of availability of the data, especially in the case of John McCain. This, however, does not impair the results produced in this study: percentage and other statistical figures are used whenever comparing the data quantitatively. In addition, I provide my own translation of the French extracts discussed in the following pages.

4.3. Stance and electoral rhetoric

The main theoretical outlook of this chapter is that of stance in relation to adversarial relations. I consider how political leaders use discourse to convey stances and representations of both the opponent and themselves in order to favour a specific response from the audience: to get their votes.

Drawing on Bell's audience design model (1984), I argue that stances can be developed in campaign speeches as the candidates refer to the opponent even though they are not present. In doing so, I postulate that the candidates assume the opponent to be part of the overhearing audience: "third parties whom the speaker knows to be there, but who are not ratified participants" (Bell, 1984: 159). Thus,

McCain, for instance, is likely to be informed of Obama's latest speech via media coverage, which may trigger a response from him, as I explain in the next section of this analysis.

As a result, the expression of stance is highly ideological in the sense that, drawing the theories of CDA (van Dijk, 1993), it attributes relations of power between the interactants. In relation to adversarial moves, I consider how stances adopted by speakers constitute a threat to the opponent (in the manner of FTAs for instance), through ethical/moral evaluation strategies. I find that such strategies do not always focus on evaluating the opponent explicitly or directly. Indeed, some speakers prefer to focus on evaluating themselves and building up their own ethos, as a way of heightening contrasts and comparisons with the opponent, and thereby performing implicit FTAs towards them. This is especially the case in Nicolas Sarkozy's and Barack Obama's speeches.

In political discourse, stances are often achieved through pronoun uses (Chilton and Schäffner, 1997: 216). Pronouns "reveal how the politician positions himself/herself with regard to his/her discussants, and by extension, to the audience at a given moment of speaking", thereby achieving both interpersonal and epistemic stances. This chapter starts with a comparison of pronominal uses as a way of referring to the opponent, which, serves as a primary indicator of the manner in which the opponent is represented in each candidate's discourse, and how indicative this is in terms of stancetaking.

Metaphors, when used in political discourse, highlight contrasts between the speaker and their opponent(s), and allow the former to compare *better* than the latter, thanks to the *emotional values* (Charteris-Black, 2005: 197) placed on those contrasting positions, or stances adopted by each politician. In the present context, however, I prefer to refer to ethos, logos and pathos, rather than emotional values, as they explain more specifically how exactly the speaker builds stances. In addition, ethos and especially logos do not necessarily appeal to emotional responses. Ethos

appeals to a person's moral compass, while logos appeals to their capacities of reasoning, and in that sense, neither aspects particularly rely on an emotional response from the audience, which, however, pathos relies on.

In this chapter, I study how Charteris-Black's theory of metaphor can be linked to stancetaking, as well as widened to other rhetorical tools available to aspiring leaders in an electoral context. Thus, I analyse how stances can be considered as the result of rhetorical moves such as metaphors, and comparisons as well as other kinds of matching relations (Winter, 2002), that is, clause relations which warrant the question "how does X compare with Y in respect of Z feature?" (Winter, 1977: 6).

More importantly, I focus on how stances signal a speaker's claim of authority, or expertise, (cf Clayman and Heritage, 2002) by performing epistemic stances, that is, aligning themselves with pre-existing systems of beliefs and values (Jaffe, 2012). In addition, I focus on the speakers' attempts to perform interpersonal stances (Jaffe, 2012) in evaluating the discourse of other interactants. In the present case, this is achieved via the quoting of campaign material by the speakers themselves: speeches, adverts, and so on, based on the system of beliefs and values they represent in being the candidate of a given party. In doing so, the speakers attempt to legitimise themselves.




Figure 4.1 Metaphor and the Formation of Legitimacy in Political Speeches (reproduced from Charteris-Black, 2005: 199)

Figure 4.1 (Charteris-Black, 2005: 199) provides a breakdown of how such legitimisation strategies are achieved through metaphors, and an overview of the four key strategies linked to legitimisation in metaphors in political discourse.

In this study, I review how moves such as: *establishing ethical integrity*, *heightening emotional impact*, *communicating political arguments* and *communicating ideology by political myth*, are formed not only through metaphors but also through explicit comparisons and other types of matching sequences (Winter, 2002, Hoey, 1994, Hadley, 1995). In addition, I study how these attempts inherently constitute adversarial moves. I consider that the comparisons, especially in the form of claim/counterclaim sequences (McCarthy, 1993) and metaphors made by a given speaker between themselves (and/or the stance they claim for themselves) and the opponent(s)'s, naturally entail that one compared party is legitimate as opposed to the other. Therefore, I study how this is in itself an example of an adversarial move as this type of matching relation characterises attempts to destabilise an opponent's campaign in that it delegitimises them.

4.4 Stancetaking and strategies of referring to the opponent

In CampSpeeches, various address strategies are available to the candidates to refer to, and address the opponent. I break down these strategies in four categories: first, explicit references through naming the opponent, second, periphrase references such as *le candidat sortant*, *le candidat de la gauche* (*the incumbent candidate*, *the candidate of the left*), *the Republican nominee*, and so on. Thirdly, the most frequent of all, personal pronoun uses: *he/il*, and finally, the phrase *my opponent*, which does not have an equivalent found in the French data. Table 4.2

below provides an overview of those strategies and their uses by each of the four speakers: François Hollande, Nicolas Sarkozy, Barack Obama, and John McCain.

Table 4.2 Address strategies overview in CampSpeeches

| Candidate, year | Hollande, 2012 | Sarkozy, 2012 | Obama, 2008 | McCain, 2008 |
|------------------------------------|--|----------------|---|----------------|
| Address strategy | Opponent's name | | | |
| Freq. (%) | 28 (0.02%) | 106 (0.06%) | 233 (0.33%) | 145 (0.55%) |
| Address strategy | Le candidat sortant/de la gauche... | | The Republican/Democratic nominee... | |
| Total Freq. (%) | 296 (0.26%) | 125 (0.06%) | 2 (0.003%) | 0 |
| F Opponent (%) | 172 (0.15%) | 20 (0.01%) | 2 (0.003%) | 0 |
| Address strategy | il | | he | |
| Total Freq. (%) | 1,494 (1.30%) | 2,130 (1.06%) | 153 (0.22%) | 202 (0.76%) |
| F Opponent (%) | 538 (0.46%) | 125 (0.06%) | 103 (0.15%) | 173 (0.54%) |
| Address strategy | | | My opponent | |
| Freq. (%) | | | | 28 (0.03%) |
| Total referring to opponent | | | | |
| % | 0.63 | 0.18 | 0.51 | 1.18 |

In addition, Figure 4.2 provides a breakdown of how each speaker uses the third person pronoun *il/he* in his campaign speeches. This gives some insight into how each campaign discourse is focused on the opponent.





Figure 4.2 Third person pronoun uses in CampSpeeches

Two trends are revealed from Figure 4.2. First, *il* in French can also be used as the equivalent of *it*, in adverbial and verbal phrases such as *il faut*, *il y a*, and as a result, they account for a significant share of all uses of *il* in both the French candidates' discourse (more details on these uses are provided in Figure 4.3). This, however, does not affect how often the candidates refer to their opponent using *il/he*. In effect, Hollande and McCain both use the pronoun to refer to the opponent much more frequently than their opponent does to refer to them. Furthermore, the most important difference occurs between Hollande (36%) and Sarkozy (4%). If one were to take out

all adverbial and verbal phrase uses, the difference would be 71% in Hollande, to 14% in Sarkozy, which is a much wider gap than between Obama (84%) and McCain (67%).

Verbal and adverbial phrases are nonetheless relevant to the purpose of this chapter, as they also indicate how the speakers, and particularly Sarkozy, use them to attack the opponent, Hollande, without referring to him explicitly. Figure 4.3, breaks down such uses further in Sarkozy's campaign speeches, where they account for most occurrences of *il* overall (72%, in Figure 4.2).



| French | English translation | French | English translation |
|------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| <i>Il suffit</i> | It is enough to, one only needs to... | <i>Il est</i> | It is |
| <i>Il s'agit</i> | It is about, it is a question of... | <i>Il faut / il nous faut</i> | It must, there has to, it is necessary to / we must, we need to... |
| <i>Il y a</i> | There is/are | | |

Figure 4.3 Adverbial and verbal uses of *il* (he) in Sarkozy's 2012 campaign speeches

In those phrases, *il* is a non-referential pronoun whose best English translation is the dummy *it*, as no respective referent can be identified in both pronouns. In Figure 4.3, present tense forms are used in the translation to account for all forms: past, present,

and future, of each phrase, for the purpose of simplicity and intelligibility. This is not inclusive of plural forms except in the case of *il y a*, which is invariably used in both the singular and plural, and thus can be translated by both *there is*, and *there are*. Examples 4.1 and 4.2 highlight the expression of the speaker's stance through pronominal uses.

Example 4.1 Speech extract, François Hollande, Lille. 17/04/2012

Moi je n'accepte plus que certaines entreprises, parmi les plus brillantes, les plus innovantes, soient achetée par des fonds étrangers alors même que ces entreprises ont été soutenues par la puissance publique.

I personally do not accept anymore that some companies, among the most successful, the most innovative, are bought out by foreign funds when at the same time these companies have been supported by the public purse.

In Example 4.1 (and 4.2 below), the use of the singular or plural personal pronoun (underlined) by the speaker is crucial in supporting the adversarial move that is being carried out, in relation to the overall meaning of the sentence, and to the overall direction taken by their stance towards a specific phenomenon. In Example 4.1, the joint use of the reflexive and personal pronouns: *moi je* enhances the individuality of the speaker's opinion. This establishes the speaker's position of strength and authority. Second, the matching relation (Winter, 2002) established between the two clauses via *when in the meantime* (*alors même que*) creates a contrastive structure in which two stances are implicitly compared. On the one hand, there is the stance of the speaker: Hollande, reinforced by the use of *moi je* (*I personally*). On the other hand, there is the stance adopted by *la puissance publique* (*the public purse*), which implicitly refers to the opponent Nicolas Sarkozy as he is the incumbent French

President. Thus, this metonym (*la puissance publique*) allows Hollande to attack implicitly the opponent on his record.

In addition, Hollande's use of the reflexive pronoun contributes to widening the distance between his stance and that of the opponent. In doing so, he also attempts to antagonise the opponent: the reflexive pronoun effectively insists on the contrasting relation between the two clauses, through which Hollande compares *better*, which thus expresses an interpersonal stance. If we consider how legitimisation is formed in this case, Hollande attempts to establish his own ethical integrity by implying he has taken the stance that defends the interests of the State: *I personally do not accept*. Furthermore, the emotional impact of the passage is heightened through the evaluation of the *companies*, described with repeated superlatives: *les plus brillantes, les plus innovantes (the most successful, the most innovative)*, which characterises an appeal to patriotism through the overvaluation (*les plus, the most*) of French industrial excellence. Finally, he also creates a political myth through the overall adoption of the stance of defender of the French industries and the State's interests, which it is implied is not what the incumbent President (and opponent) has been doing while in power. This way, Hollande manages to build his own legitimacy using simultaneously three of the four legitimation techniques accounted for in Figure 4.2.

Example 4.2 Speech extract, Barack Obama, 2008 US presidential election

When it comes to health care, we don't have to choose between a government-run health care system and the unaffordable one we have now.

In Example 4.2, the use of the plural form *we* makes Obama's stance inclusive of himself and, in this case, the American people. This effectively facilitates the following negation: *don't (have to choose)*, and allows him to perform a "directive"

speech act towards the audience, while uttering it in the form of a statement (cf Quirk et. al, 1985: 803-4). That is, through the statement *we don't have to choose*, Obama directs the voters to follow the choice he has made for them towards *a government-run health care system*.

This statement also contains a hyperbole in *the unaffordable one*, in that it dramatizes the long-term (un)sustainability of the current medical system. This reinforces his argument that the choice is an obvious one, and in the meantime strengthens his claim for the allegiance of the audience to his cause, in part due to the very negatively described alternative: *the unaffordable one we have now*. This argument is grounded in two key aspects of the sentence: 1) his use of the inclusive *we*, which allows him to claim to be on the same side as the audience, and 2) the contrastive sequence, which shapes the argument as effectively emanating from common sense (on which side he argues he is). As such, those linguistic choices effectively support the adversarial move he performs, rather than constitute an adversarial move in themselves, as it is the combination of those aspects, in relation to stancetaking, that creates the adversarial dimension of this part of the discourse. Here, the adversarial move resides in the implication that the *unaffordable* alternative is in place *now* under Republican President George W. Bush, of whom the opponent - John McCain - is the chosen successor. Thus, Obama associates both his opponent and the incumbent President with the alleged failure and *unaffordability* of the current health system, in comparison to which, his proposal is represented as the better one.

Through this construction of the argument, Obama establishes his ideology by political myth (by communicating to the voters that if they vote for him he will make healthcare a government-run system). The emotional impact of the argument is also heightened as the argument touches two areas of public life that are likely to create an emotional response from the voters: government-run health-care and its affordability. Thirdly, political arguments are effectively communicated through

Obama’s comparison between his own stance and that of the opponent and future predecessor.

The next section focuses on uncovering how Sarkozy refers to the opponent in his campaign speeches, and more precisely how he attempts to establish his own ethical integrity through adverbial and verbal phrases, in order to threaten implicitly his opponent.

4.5 Ethos-enhancing via adverbial and verbal phrases in Sarkozy’s 2012 campaign speeches

Figures 4.2 and 4.3 have established that of all four speakers, Sarkozy is the one who uses the four main address strategies the least (0.18%) to refer to the opponent. The second finding that distinguishes Sarkozy from the three other speakers is that he uses adverbial phrases to express stances about and representations of the opponent nonetheless. In addition, many of these instances are found to be expressing a form of deontic modality: *il faut, fallait, faudra* (*it is/was/will be necessary to/one needs, must, should /will need, have to/needed, had to, should have...*)

| L5 | L4 | L3 | L2 | L1 | NODE | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 |
|-----|------|------|-------|--------|------|---------|-------|------|------|------|
| DE | DE | DE | PARCE | QU | IL | FAUT | FAUT | PAS | PAS | DE |
| IL | PAS | EST | LA | Où | | NE | EN | DES | DE | IL |
| LE | LA | JE | CE | ET | | EST | QUE | UN | PLUS | QUI |
| LA | LE | LE | DE | QUAND | | NOUS | AVAIT | DES | DES | ET |
| PAS | QUE | PAS | ET | MAIS | | FALLAIT | FALLU | UNE | LES | POUR |
| ET | EST | LA | LES | FRANCE | | SE | EST | LE | LA | QUE |
| EST | DANS | POUR | LE | PAS | | PEUT | AIT | LA | IL | UN |
| QUE | IL | DANS | EST | AORS | | DOIT | LE | LES | UN | LA |
| LES | ET | ET | DES | LORSQU | | VEUT | FAIRE | EU | ANS | LE |
| UN | JE | LES | EN | DIT | | VA | DE | DEUX | LES | LES |
| JE | UN | UN | POUR | DONT | | FAUDRA | AURA | PLUS | ET | DES |

Figure 4.4 Pattern findings with *il* in Sarkozy’s 2012 campaign speeches

Figure 4.4 highlights this clearly through pattern findings. Figure 4.4 shows that both affirmative (red) and negative variants (bold), *il faut* and *il ne faut pas*, are very frequent in Sarkozy's discourse. Here, the variants of *il faut* are used as a type of deontic modality (Simpson, 1993: 37-55), which is thematised, in that the modality is expressed through the theme, as it occurs at the beginning of the clause (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 64). A concordance study reveals how this allows the speaker to express stances on a variety of topics relating to the function of President through *il ne faut pas*, which can be translated as *it must not*, as in: *il ne faut pas en parler* (l.1071), *it must not be spoken about*.

N Concordance

1,071 devant vous. L'immigration. Alors **il ne faut pas en parler**. Un cera
1,072 ux de ces observateurs attentifs, **il ne faut débattre de rien**, ne
1,073 a un choix à faire. Et ce choix, il ne faut pas le faire le 7 mai
1,074 ion essentielle, dont on me dit : **il ne faut pas en parler**, ça n'i
1,075 Lorsque Monsieur HOLLANDE dit : « Il ne faut pas la réforme SARKOZY
1,076 c'est la tradition de la France, il ne faut pas avoir peur des a
1,077 C'est toujours la même histoire, **il ne faut fâcher personne**, ce
1,078 era plus forte grâce à vous. Mais il ne faut pas que vous soyez o
1,079 ançais : « ce n'est pas la peine, il ne faut pas de cette réforme
1,080 c'est neuf contre un. Et en plus, **il ne faut pas se plaindre**. Je
1,081 ffrontés avec les Allemands et qu'il ne faut plus jamais cela. C'e
1,082 pas leur apporter une réponse, qu'il ne faut pas se battre pour e
1,083 quer à 65 millions de Français **qu'il ne faut rien changer** à un ars
1,084 entre vous, dois-je considérer **qu'il ne faut demander des efforts**
1,085 istes, vous allez les retrouver ! Il ne faut pas leur en vouloir,
1,086 non » ou à la France qui souffre, il ne faut pas s'étonner que cet
1,087 non » ou à la France qui souffre, il ne faut pas s'étonner que cet
1,088 ins d'hypocrisie, plus de vérité, il ne faut juger ni nos parents
1,089 rs cet héritage qui est le vôtre, il ne faut pas l'oublier. Oui b
1,090 rs cet héritage qui est le vôtre, il ne faut pas l'oublier. Oui b

Figure 4.5 Concordance view of *il ne faut pas* in Sarkozy's 2012 campaign speeches

Figure 4.5 shows all the occurrences of *il ne faut* in Sarkozy's campaign speeches. A study of this list highlights that two different stances are expressed through this verbal phrase. On the one hand, Sarkozy expresses irony and sarcasm in examples such as: *il ne faut pas en parler (it must not be spoken about)* (l.1071, 74, bold), which, contextual help informs us, refer to the topic of immigration.

In addition, Sarkozy uses irony as a supportive means of adversarial discourse, in order to convey his stance on the interdictions, which he implies come from adversarial sources, expressed through the deontic modality in *il ne faut pas*. These instances of *il ne faut pas* can be translated as: *nobody must get upset, no complaint may be made, nothing has to change, no effort must be required* (ll.1077, 80, 83, 84: bold).

Example 4.3 highlights one of these uses in context (extracted from line 1071). In this example, Sarkozy primarily communicates a political argument aiming to denunciate the attitude of *a number of* unnamed actors of the campaign, whom he refers to as *censors*, and whose decision he challenges, thereby asserting his political difference.

Example 4.3 Speech extract, Nicolas Sarkozy, Saint Maurice, 19/04/2012

Je vais prendre deux exemples devant vous. L'immigration. Alors **il ne faut pas** en parler. Un certain nombre de censeurs ont décidé qu'on n'en parlerait pas, que prononcer le mot est en soi déjà la preuve d'une forme de culpabilité.

I will provide you with two examples. Immigration. So **we must not speak about it**. A number of censors have decided that we would not speak about it, that to utter the word is in itself already a proof of some form of guilt.

On the other hand, underlined highlights in Figure 4.5 (ll.1085, 86, 87, 89, 90) are effectively interdictions or cautions uttered by the candidate himself: *il ne faut pas leur en vouloir, il ne faut pas s'étonner, il ne faut pas l'oublier* (you cannot blame them, it is not a surprise, it must not be forgotten). These statements take the form of sarcasm and act as a way of denouncing the attitude of other actors in the campaign. Through this mechanism, Sarkozy effectively evaluates those other stances, and thus performs an epistemic stance himself on the duties of the function of President, all the while attacking his opponents, François Hollande in particular, on their lack of experience at such a high executive level of government, as per Example 4.4.

Example 4.4 Speech extract, Nicolas Sarkozy, Nice, 20/04/2012

Je veux parler de cette France, je veux parler à ces Français et je conteste à quiconque de m'interdire de le faire parce que lorsque les Républicains ne parlent pas à la France du « non » ou à la France qui souffre, **il ne faut pas s'étonner** que cette France-là soit devenue l'otage des extrémistes de gauche ou des extrémistes de droite. C'est parce que nous, les Républicains, pendant trop longtemps, nous avons eu peur d'affronter cette souffrance,

I want to talk about that France, I want to speak to those French people and I challenge anyone to forbid me to do so because when Republicans do not speak to the France of the "no" or to the France that suffers, **it cannot be a surprise** that that same France has become the hostage of left wing extremists or right wing extremists. It is because we, Republicans, for too long, we have been scared to tackle that suffering,

In Example 4.4, repetitions of *je veux parler* (*I want to talk*), and of the word *France* develop Sarkozy's claim for ethical integrity. In addition, the repetition of explicitly emotional and powerful terms: *souffre*, *souffrance*, *otage*, *extrémistes* (*suffer*, *suffering*, *hostage*, *extremists*) allows him to heighten the emotional impact of his argument, and triggers an emotional response from the public. Thirdly, he claims the political middle ground for himself via the inclusive *we*: *nous*, *les Républicains*, as opposed to *them*: *les extrémistes de gauche* and *les extrémistes de droite*. This allows him to perform his political argument and make an adversarial move against those he brands as extremists on the one hand, but more importantly those others who *forbid* him to address *the French people who suffer*. In fact, in relation to the topic of the extract, the personification of the *France that suffers*, or the *France of the "no"* (underlined) is a more politically correct metaphor for the aforementioned extremists (or those tempted to vote for them). What points in that direction is the complexity of the argument, which relies on the system of beliefs he exposes at the same time. 1) France is made of three different parts: the Republican France, the France that suffers, and the France of the extremists. 2) He implicitly attacks the left (and Hollande) who he claims forbid him to address one part of this France: the France that suffers. 3) The France that suffers is the hostage of the France of the extremists, and it is the fault of the Republicans for allowing it to happen. This is a metaphor for the rise of the far-right, mitigated with the inclusion of the far left as well. 4) He is forbidden to address the people tempted to vote for the far-right by the people from the left because their system of belief tells them it is wrong ideologically to do so, as it means appropriating a dangerous opponent's argument. In doing so, Sarkozy's argument remains ambiguous in the sense that he claims the political middle ground on the one hand, in order to justify his appropriating of the far-right's arguments, to characterise clearly the *France* he claims he is *forbidden* to address.

The ambiguity of this argument allows Sarkozy to communicate his ideology by political myth: that of a President running for re-election, who does not cave in

when faced with adversity, challenges that adversity, and most importantly had acquired experience *on the job*, in order to establish the “political myth” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 199) of a leader who will reunify the country. In doing so, Sarkozy manages to strengthen his own ethos, all the while undermining that of any opponent, since he is the only candidate who has already been President. The stance expressed in this example is in fact both epistemic, in that Sarkozy claims the ideology of Republicanism as his own, and

Example 4.5 Speech extract, Nicolas Sarkozy, Nice, 20/04/2012

Cette dame a dit une chose, des choses qui ne m'engagent pas dans les mots **mais qui me créent un devoir dans la réalité**. [...] Cette femme, elle n'aurait pas dû parler comme ça, **mais je comprends sa souffrance et je conteste que qui que ce soit qui n'habite pas** dans ces quartiers, **qui ne met pas** ses enfants dans ces écoles donne des leçons de morale à **cette femme** qui s'est sans doute mal exprimée **mais qui derrière les mots a traduit une réalité** et **cette réalité, mon devoir, c'est d'y apporter une réponse**. Voilà **ma réponse** devant le peuple de France!

This lady said **one thing, things** that do not involve me in the words **but which create a duty for me in real life**. [...] This woman, she should not have spoken that way, **but I understand her ordeal and I challenge anyone who does not live** in those neighbourhoods, **who does not put** their children in those schools to give a lecture in ethics to **that woman** who undoubtedly expressed herself badly, **but whose words translated a reality** and to **this reality, my duty is to provide a response**. There is **my response** in front of the **people of France!**

interpersonal, when he utters the *challenge* to *anyone who will forbid him to do so*. In addition, this demonstration of strength is a way to attack his opponent, however implicitly. The same argument is used again later in the same speech (Example 4.5). Here, Sarkozy's argument is constructed in a similar fashion to that studied in Example 4.4. He follows a similar strategy through which he adopts an ambiguous stance which allows him to claim the political middle ground because it is his *duty*, all the while claiming he *understands the ordeal* of far-right sympathisers. In addition, he defends a very paternalistic stance, that of a patriarchal leading figure (bold, in Example 4.5). Furthermore, this example relies heavily on patterns of repetition (grey highlights): the adnominatio combined with the anadiplosis of *une chose, des choses, une réalité, cette réalité, une réponse, ma réponse* give a certain rhythm to the argument, while the repetitions of *cette dame, cette femme* and *un devoir* and *mon devoir* ensure the continuity of the argument. As a result, these create a powerful rhetorical effect overall.

In addition, Sarkozy appeals to the contrastive structure of the antithesis throughout, with coordinated clauses linked by *but*. This construction allows him to soften the controversial dimension of the argument (cf Hunston, 2000: 192), that is, claiming to *understand the ordeal* of the woman, who is reported to have made a racist comment about Muslim immigrants, which is an identical strategy to that found in Example 4.4.

The repetitions, *qui n'habite pas, qui ne mets pas* (*who does not live, who does not put*) (underlined) heighten the emotional appeal of the argument, and allow the speaker to take a powerful stance in which he instructs the audience on the duties of a President. In that process, he reminds them that he is the only candidate who has the experience of the Presidency, and who, therefore, is able to understand the rights and duties of the function, which constitutes a CMAD, as his overall strategy relies heavily on this argument. This contributes to building his ethos, and undermines that of the opponent in comparison. It also represents the speaker as

the only worthy, patriarchal, leading figure. In Example 4.5, Sarkozy's adversarial move resides in his attempt to instruct the voters and the other candidates on what is acceptable and not acceptable as a candidate and President. This extensive effort allows him to enhance his ethos further while damaging that of the other candidates in comparison. This also exemplifies how Sarkozy's vision of the opponent is not limited to Hollande, but also to other actors in the campaign, as is discussed further in this chapter.

In this section, I have discussed Sarkozy's ethos building strategy, which relies heavily on sarcasm and some specific choices in relation to address strategies, and established how he manages to perform adversarial moves against not only one but all opponents without naming them. This demonstrates how adversarial moves can be carried out very subtly without explicit references to the opponent and in alternative contexts from a face-to-face between two (or more) opponents. The next section reviews how two candidates from the left, Obama and Hollande, refer to the opponent in comparison in order to express interpersonal stances that carry adversarial moves.

4.6 Power relations and stancetaking

In this section, I focus on how stancetaking is achieved through naming strategies in Hollande and Obama's campaign speeches.

4.6.1 Hollande's stancetaking against Sarkozy

I draw on pattern findings (Figure 4.6) which highlight that function words *que/qu'* (*that*) and *où* (*where*) (red) are very frequent L1 collocates of the address strategy *il*.

| L5 | L4 | L3 | L2 | L1 | NODE | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 |
|-----|-----|------|-------|------------|------|--------|-------|-------|------|-----|
| DE | DE | DE | ET | QU | IL | EST | EN | PAS | PAS | DE |
| IL | IL | LE | CE | ET | | NE | EST | DES | DE | IL |
| EST | LE | IL | LA | MAIS | | FAUT | AIT | IL | IL | QUI |
| LE | EST | LA | PARCE | Où | | NOUS | AURA | DES | LA | LA |
| LA | PAS | EST | DE | QUAND | | AVAIT | AVAIT | UNE | DES | LE |
| ET | LA | ET | LE | PUIS | | EN | DE | UN | UN | QUE |
| QUE | NE | LES | EST | NON | | VA | LE | LA | LE | ET |
| UN | ET | POUR | MAIS | REPUBLIQUE | | ETAIT | QU | QUE | PLUS | UNE |
| LES | JE | EN | PAS | Là | | SE | QUE | QU | EST | DES |
| PAS | QUE | UNE | EN | LUI | | FAIT | DIT | LE | LES | CE |
| QU | UN | JE | DES | OUI | | PUISSE | FAIT | EU | QU | QU |
| JE | LES | PAS | QUE | ALORS | | SERA | FAUT | AUSSI | QUE | JE |

Figure 4.6 Pattern findings with *il* referring to Sarkozy in Hollande's 2012 campaign speeches

N Concordance

240 t de l'insertion ! Et **voilà qu'il** s'en prend encore aux 35 heu
 241 éclair de lucidité. Et **voilà qu'il** s'en prend à la Banque centr
 242 trale européenne ! Et **voilà qu'il** réclame que la Banque central
 243 de la même manière. Et **voilà qu'il** prétend que ces régularisati
 244 sont défiscalisées. Et **voilà qu'il** pense encore que les problèm
 245 le et du nucléaire. Et **voilà qu'il** ouvre un procès ! J'annonçais
 246 étayer son argument, **voilà qu'il** nous raconte une histoire, à
 247 . Et puis maintenant, **voilà qu'il** laisse penser que l'on voudra
 248 ont été les siens. Et **voilà qu'il** invente des propositions cha
 249 t de le garder ! Et **voilà qu'il** en arrive à la dernière peur
 250 rs la même chose ! – **voilà qu'il** dit partout que je serais sou
 251 bourde, une de plus, **voilà qu'il** change l'ordre des mots. Il
 252 lustrer son propos. Et **voilà qu'il** annonce, convoque une fête
 253 traverser notre pays. **Voilà qu'il** invente le vrai travail – co

Figure 4.7 Concordance view of *et voilà qu'il* referring to the opponent in Hollande's campaign speeches

Meanwhile, Figure 4.7 highlights the uses of *qu'il* (literally: that he) in Hollande's campaign speeches.

In Figure 4.7, the structure *(et) voilà qu'il + verb (and here he + verb)* is either sentence initial (ll.240-45, 48, 49, 52, 53) or clause initial (ll. 246-47, 50-51). The use of the deictic marker *voilà (there/here²)* allows Hollande to build up the connection between the new sentence (or clause), all the more so when *voilà* is preceded by *et (and)* as in Example 4.6, which exemplifies how the phrase is used in context. In addition, in this case, *et voilà que* is used as a CMAD, as it forms the starting point of Hollande's adversarial strategy, which consists of mocking the opponent through *il* as an address strategy.

Example 4.6 Speech extract, François Hollande, Lille, 17/04/2012

J'ai compris ces derniers jours, [...] que le candidat sortant avait eu d'un seul coup - cela peut lui arriver - un éclair de lucidité. **Et voilà qu'il** s'en prend à la Banque centrale européenne ! **Et voilà qu'il** réclame que la Banque centrale intervienne pour soutenir la croissance. Mais qu'a-t-il fait pendant cinq ans ? Qu'a-t-il dit ? Qu'a-t-il changé?

I have realised these past few days, [...] that the incumbent candidate had just had, this can happen sometimes, come to his senses. **And here he goes**, threatening the European central bank! **And here he goes**, demanding the ECB intervene to support growth. But what has he done for five years? What has he said? What has he changed?

In Example 4.6, underlining highlights occurrences where the speaker refers to Sarkozy, whereas bold highlights the original concordance line found in Figure 4.5.

² Translation tools from the Institut des Sciences Cognitives (dico.isc.cnrs.fr) effectively provides both translations.

II (ll. 241 and 242, Figure 4.7) is a “mark of systematic repetition” of the noun phrase, *le candidat sortant (the incumbent candidate)* (Winter, 2002: 54) (underlined). This strengthens the relation between sentence one: *j’ai compris ces derniers jours, [...] que le candidat sortant avait eu [...] un éclair de lucidité*, and sentences two and three: *Et voilà qu’il s’en prends..., Et voilà qu’il réclame*.

In those instances, *et voilà qu’* heightens the audience’s expectations of what is to follow, while it also indicates that this builds up from previous parts of the argument. The first part of the argument focuses on how the opponent *sometimes come to his senses* which is further demonstrated by the second part of the argument: *and here he goes, threatening the [ECB]*, which is a means for Hollande to exemplify the opponent’s *strike of lucidity*.

In addition, the reference to the opponent in embedded clauses introduced by *que/qu’ (that/her, bold)* shows that the representation of the opponent is explicitly done through the speaker’s eyes, which subjects him to the speaker’s power. In both sentences, the initial position of *Et voilà que* creates a rhetorical effect as it emphasises the following processes: *s’en prends, réclame (threatening, demanding)* which are quite extreme forms of verbal/relational processes. Through those processes, Hollande represents the opponent in a particularly derogatory light, which allows him to express his disapproval and thereby perform both an interpersonal stance and a threat on the opponent’s positive face (cf Brown and Levinson, 1987: 66), which sums up both the means (*et voilà que*) and strategy (stancetaking) used by Hollande to achieve that goal.

In the last part of the argument introduced by *but*, Hollande uses rhetorical questions in the form of a tricolon (“a figure of speech containing three equal and syntactically balanced parts,” Charteris-Black, 2014: 271): *what has he done, what has he said, what has he changed*, to conclude and imply that the opponent has failed to act in spite of *coming to his senses*. This sarcastic attack is further amplified with the use of exclamative clauses (although more frequently in the form of

statements, in Figure 4.7 with one exception: (l.245, bold). In addition, this supports the adversarial discourse, in that it emphasises Hollande's strong interpersonal stance against the opponent, thus enhancing the impact of the FTA.

Repetitions of *et voilà qu'il* throughout the extract amplify the irony in Hollande's interpersonal stance vis-à-vis Sarkozy: he expresses a judgement on the opponent's own stance on the topic that is discussed, and thereby criticises him for *coming to his senses* too late. This stance is clearly stated in the conclusion of the argument, with the tricolon/rhetorical questions: *what has he done... What has he said? What has he changed?* Coincidentally, these are three basic ways in which a President is supposed to act: *doing, saying, and changing*. This is a way for François Hollande to communicate his ideology and stance on the duties of a President, which he implies the opponent has not complied with. In doing so, Hollande also communicates a political argument against the opponent, in that he has failed to act as a President, and these combined strategies contribute to the legitimisation of his own bid for the French Presidency.

Hollande's argument against the opponent also features hyperboles as a frequent rhetorical tool, and thus, as CMADs, to attack Nicolas Sarkozy on his presidential style, dubbed by the French media as the "hyper-presidency" (Schofield, 2007). In the first half of Example 4.7, Hollande' style seems to mimic that of the hyper-President. Semantically powerful verbal processes: *réclame, s'en prend, invente, dit partout* (*demands, threatens, makes up, tells everywhere*), as well as dramatic expressions: *et voilà qu'il en arrive à la dernière peur* (*and here he gets to the ultimate fear*), and exclamative clauses contribute to generating a very dynamic tone.

Il nous dira que nous allons mettre en cause la croissance - elle n'y est plus ! -, le chômage - il a augmenté ! N'ayez peur de rien ! Ne craignez rien ! Le seul risque que le pays peut courir, c'est de le garder !

Et voilà qu'il en arrive à la dernière peur : « la spéculation arrive, les marchés sont en train de s'inquiéter ». Ce matin, c'est vrai, la bourse de Paris a perdu quelques points, inquiète non pas de notre résultat mais, hélas, de la montée du Front national.

He will tell us that we are going to jeopardise growth - it is not there anymore! -, unemployment - it has increased! Don't be afraid! Fear not! The only risk the country runs is to keep him! And here he gets to the ultimate fear: "speculation is coming, the markets are worrying". This morning, it is true, Paris' stock market lost a few points, not concerned by our result but, unfortunately, by the rise of the National Front.

In addition, the combined matching sequence (Winter, 2002: 52) highlights contrasts between the main clauses: *He will tell us that we are going to jeopardise growth, - unemployment -, and those that follow: it is not there anymore! It has increased!* which imply Hollande's refutation of what he presents as the opponent's discourse. The tone becomes more appeased in the last part of the extract, from *ce matin, c'est vrai*, where Hollande does not paraphrase the opponent anymore, but instead provides a reasoned argument, appealing to the voters' logos, to counter the opponent's claim. *This morning, it is true, Paris's stock market lost a few points*, is a concession through which Hollande shows an objective attitude and consequently establishes his political integrity. The remainder of the extract: *not concerned by our result but, unfortunately, by the rise of the Front National*, is a contrastive argument

in which *not* and *but* are the main pivotal parts which allow him to communicate a political argument that also counters that of the opponent. Finally, the metaphor: *the rise of the Front National*, which concludes the argument appeals to the voters' pathos, and heightens the emotional impact of the argument, allowing Hollande to build his own ethos further and strengthen his stance against the opponent.

4.6.2 Hollande's stance against his competitors on the left

Hollande does not only focus on attacking his main opponent in the 2012 presidential election: Nicolas Sarkozy. Example 4.8 highlights occurrences in which *il* is used to support a different interpersonal stance, whilst referring to his main competitor on the left: Jean Luc Mélenchon, from the Front de Gauche (FdG), although these instances are also interestingly linked to representing the opponent. Thus, in this case, one interpersonal stance is used to support another, with the view to create adversariality with the main opponent, Nicolas Sarkozy.

In Example 4.8, underlined words show instances in which the speaker refers to Sarkozy, whereas words in bold show the original concordance node (from which this example is extracted): *qu'il*, which refers to Mélenchon. Hollande draws on the Sarkozy's 'divide and conquer' tactic, which consists of praising Hollande's main competitor on the left: Jean-Luc Mélenchon, to undermine his result in the first round, and possibly prevent his qualification in the second round of the election. However, Hollande uses this as a double-edged threat to those tempted to vote for the FdG Candidate. His argument relies on the stance he adopts against the dispersion of votes, which constitutes a threat to his own qualification for the second round of the presidential election.

Example 4.8 Speech extract, François Hollande, Tours, 03/04/2012

J'ai même entendu le candidat sortant faire des compliments sur le candidat du Front de Gauche ! Il l'a trouvé très bien ! Jean-Luc Mélenchon n'y est pour rien. Il n'est pas responsable. Mais alors Nicolas Sarkozy, s'il avait à voter, c'était pour le candidat du Front de Gauche ! Il a trouvé très bien ses propositions. Il a trouvé **qu'il** faisait une bonne campagne, qu'il avait du dynamisme. Moi j'ai tout compris, parce qu'il n'est pas difficile à déchiffrer, Nicolas Sarkozy ! Eh bien vous, si vous voulez gagner, si vous voulez changer, c'est au premier tour que vous devez le faire !

I even heard the incumbent candidate make compliments on (sic) the [FDG] candidate! He thought he was very good! Jean-Luc Mélenchon has nothing to do with it. He is not responsible. Then, Nicolas Sarkozy, if he had to vote, it was (sic) for the candidate of the [FDG]! He thought his propositions were very good, he thought **that he** was doing a good campaign, that he had dynamism. I, however, I have understood everything, because he is not hard to read, Nicolas Sarkozy! Well then, you, if you want to win, if you want to change, you need to do so in the first round.

In the meantime, this creates an opportunity for Hollande to maintain face while overtly asking his main competitor's voters for their support in *the first round*. His argument relies on the fact that he is the most likely of the two to be elected in the second round, and therefore, if he does not qualify for the second round of the election the voters may find themselves with a more difficult choice to make between two candidates from the right: Nicolas Sarkozy and Marine Le Pen. This argument allows him to build up his ethos as a worthy leader and alternative to the incumbent

Nicolas Sarkozy. This extract highlights an example of interpersonal stance, through which Hollande uses his main competitor - Jean-Luc Mélenchon - and evaluates – negatively – the latter’s capacity to beat their right-wing opponent.

4.6.3 Ethos-building and power relations in stancetaking in the US 2008 elections: the case of Barack Obama

In the 2008 US presidential election campaign, Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 show that Obama and McCain refer to each other principally using either the opponent’s name (0.33% in Obama’s campaign speeches, 0.55% in McCain’s) or the third person personal pronoun *he* (0.15% in Obama’s discourse, and 0.54% in McCain’s). In this section, I review how Obama refers to McCain using these address strategies. While this type of strategy towards debate moderators (Chapter 3) exemplifies a form of power struggle and a floor claiming strategy, the goals are here, quite different, as I explain below.

N Concordance

88 all. First, we found out that he wants to pay for his plan by
89 change. It's not change when he wants to give \$200 billion to
90 tax cuts. The difference is, he wants to give a \$700,000 tax
91 tax cuts. The difference is, he wants to give a \$700,000 tax
92 tax cuts. The difference is, he wants to give the average Fort
93 de in banking." That's right, he wants to deregulate the insur
94 on Wall Street. He's so angry he wants to punish them with \$20
95 de in banking." That's right, he wants to deregulate the insur
96 00 CEO. It's not change when he wants to give \$200 billion to
97 conomy toward a cliff, and now he wants to take the wheel and

Figure 4.8 Concordance view of he wants referring to the opponent in Obama’s 2008 campaign speeches

Figure 4.8 highlights the most frequent 3-word cluster occurring with *he* in Obama's discourse while referring to John McCain: *he wants to*. This lexical choice allows Obama to indicate that the he has figuratively acquired omniscience in that he has the ability to tell the voters what his opponent *wants*, which is a constitutive means (CMAD) of the adversarial move he is about to launch. This allows the speaker to hijack the opponent's discourse towards a different register: that of emotions, feelings, and needs. Via the use of *want*, Obama effectively paraphrases the opponent's election program and represents it as something that has to do with the opponent's pathos rather than logos. This participates to the strategy of delegitimation of the opponent's argument, which also allows Obama to express an interpersonal stance on the topic: he makes a judgement of the opponent's proposals for the future of the country, and effectively spins the argument as an issue of affect through *wants*, which subsequently allows him to reduce the political dimension of said proposals.

The power of electoral rhetoric in making adversarial moves is undeniable. Barack Obama's campaign discourse provides an excellent example of this if one compares how he refers to two experienced politicians involved in the 2008 presidential election: Joe Biden, his running mate, and John McCain, his opponent. The comparison is interesting because the two men are both political veterans and they are both represented in opposite ways in Barack Obama's campaign speeches, which serves his overall strategy of ethos-building while delegitimising the opponent. To make this comparison, this chapter takes a step out of the CampSpeeches corpus to draw in a campaign speech from 23/08/2008 (five days before Obama officially received the Democratic Party nomination to run for President), when he revealed Biden would be his running mate (as vice presidential nominee).

What is interesting is the fact that Obama seems to base his ulterior attacks on one (McCain) and praise of the other (Biden) in terms of their respective political careers, and their lengths, without acknowledging that similarity. Table 4.3 provides

examples of how the two politicians are represented in Obama's campaign speeches.

Table 4.3 References to Biden and McCain through he in Obama's 2008 campaign speeches

| Joe Biden | John McCain |
|--|---|
| He looked Slobodan Milosevic in the eye... | He spent years backing a dictator. |
| He has been a powerful critic... | He supported a massive cut in Medicare. |
| He has brought change... | He served as Washington's biggest cheerleader for going to war in Iraq. |
| He has stared down dictators. | |

In evaluating their political record, Obama draws the audience's attention to both Biden and McCain's political careers, although in diametrically opposed ways, as it separates the two men into the in-group (Biden), and the out-group (McCain) (van Dijk, 2009: 193). This allows Obama to emphasize the "positive representation of" the in-group "Us" through Biden, versus the negative representations of the out-group: "Them" through McCain (van Dijk, 2009: 194). As a result, Obama associates himself with the in-group and the positive representation he builds of it through Biden.

Biden and McCain are experienced politicians, and both have a long record of accomplishment. The use of past tense processes shows that experience seems to be the key part of Obama's argument. However, this is used with a different goal in mind. In the case of Biden, Obama refers to his long career as a positive political achievement: *he has been a powerful critic, he has brought change, he has stared down dictators*, whereas he describes McCain's career in a more negative way, perhaps too long, and spent on supporting the wrong causes: *he spent years backing a dictator* (Table 4.3).

This focus allows Obama to first claim to ground the argument in facts, thereby claiming legitimacy in the ethical integrity of his argument. Second, this enables him to select the information he needs according to the argument that is made to construct the appropriate representation. Third, referring to factual evidence (or presenting it as such) reinforces his argument without running the risk of losing face

from being called out for defaming one (McCain) to the benefit of the other (Biden). In addition, the finite and nonfinite aspects of the preterit and present perfect reinforce the contrastive dimension of this strategy: Obama's insistence on the finite aspect while representing McCain's career through: *spent, supported, served*, (Table 4.3) enhances the semantics of the argument that the latter's career is over. In the meantime, the nonfinite aspects used to refer to Biden's career (*has been*, in Table 4.3) allow Obama to represent that career as still ongoing, which contrasts with that of McCain, and enhances the adversarial point Obama is trying to make.

Example 4.9 Barack Obama, nomination acceptance speech, 28/08/2008.

Washington has been talking about **our oil addiction** for the last 30 years. And, by the way, **John McCain has been there** for 26 of them. (LAUGHTER) And in that time, **he has said no** to higher fuel-efficiency standards for cars, **no** to investments in renewable energy, **no** to renewable fuels. And today, we import triple the amount of oil than we had on the day that Senator McCain took office. Now is the time to end **this addiction** and to understand that drilling is a stop-gap measure, **not a long-term solution, not even close.** (APPLAUSE)

Alternatively, when Obama switches to the nonfinite aspect in referring to McCain's political career: *John McCain has been there for 26 of them* (Example 4.9), this naturally emphasizes that McCain's career has been a very long one. Furthermore, it implies that retirement rather than presidency should be his next step, as is shown in Examples 4.9 and 4.10, both extracted from Obama's campaign speeches.

In Example 4.9, *Washington* is a metonym for the US Congress, of which both Obama and McCain were elected members at the time of the 2008 election. One shift occurs throughout the extract from the possessive *our* to the demonstrative *this*

in collocation with *addiction*, a semantically powerful term which appeals to the voters' pathos.

In addition, the sentence initial deictic focus carried by *and by the way*, *and in that time*, *and today*, pinpoint each chronological stage of the argument, which emphasizes the pertinence of Obama's argument. The syntactic parallelism in *he has said no to + Noun Phrase (NP)*, *no to + NP*, *no to + NP* also emphasizes the systematic nature of the opponent's behaviour throughout a long period of time (26 years) and highlights his stubbornness, which contributes to the negative representation.

The logical sequence in Example 4.9 represents a selective change in the time/space continuum (Winter, 1977: 6). The change occurs grammatically between the initial nonfinite aspect in *has been talking* and the repeated finite aspect in the tricolon *has said no*. This results in a double contrast, the objects of the clause *he has said no to*: a set of positive, reassuring terms, *efficiency standards*, *renewable energy*, *renewable fuels*, are in stark contrast with the opponent's constant negative response to them. The second level of contrast is in the logical sequence that is marked by the deictic phrases mentioned above: *and by the way*, *and in that time*, *and today*, through which Obama describes ongoing talks over a long period during which one of the participants (the opponent) has constantly held the same negative position.

The argument culminates with the kairos *now is the time*, which indicates Obama's move to draw on this account of the opponent's past behaviour and relate it to the present time in order to strengthen the effectiveness of his argument. This effectively changes the outlook and highlights the speaker's will to bring change, which he expresses both semantically and lexically in this new choice of word in contrast with: *and in that time*, *and today*. The argument concludes on the invalidation of the opponent's stance based on the ideological differences that reside between the two candidates. Obama's argument is grounded in logic, the opponent's

stance does not evolve through time while other factors do, such as, *today we import triple the amount of oil than we had on the day that Senator McCain took office.* Obama uses this argument to claim legitimacy for his own stance in comparison, and implies that the opponent's long career should have brought change to the politics of the nation, which it has not.

Example.4.10 expresses the same argument against the opponent and highlights his lack of legitimacy through the logical sequence: (underlined and bold in Example 4.10). This creates a tension between the ideology that is defended by the opponent: *the need for change and reform in Washington*, and the fact that he has been *part of the scene for about three decades*.

Example 4.10 Speech extract, Barack Obama, Dayton, OH, 09/09/2008

In the past few weeks, my opponent has taken to talking about the need for change and reform in Washington, **where he has been part of the scene for about three decades.**

In the meantime, references to his own running mate, Joe Biden, paint a very different picture, as shown in Figure 4.9. Obama's extremely complimentary representation of his running mate relies on three axes: 1) his power and strength (underlined), 2), his record as a politician through time (bold), and 3) his exemplary family life (boxed).

These concordance lines show how differently Joe Biden is represented in Obama's campaign, and what is very interesting in this case, is the fact that Obama uses a similar argument: the length of the politician's career to make a diametrically opposed point, in spite of the argument being fallacious. In effect, John McCain is older than Joe Biden (they were respectively 71 and 65 years old in 2008). However, Biden's political career started when he first became Senator in 1973 whereas McCain was first elected 14 years later in 1987.

N Concordance

7 hear him talk now, but as a child he had a terrible stutter. The
8 o NATO. **Over the last eight years**, he has been a powerful critic
9 chance at life. **Year after year**, he has been at the forefront of
10 en is that rare mix - **for decades**, he has **brought change to Was**
11 k in the Senate. **Time and again**, he has made a difference for t
12 ooted firmly in the middle class. He has stared down dictators
13 e is blessed with 5 grandchildren. He instilled in them such a
14 ading voices on national security. He looked Slobodan Milosevic
15 He recently went to Georgia, where he met quietly with the Pres
16 Here's how Joe Biden responded. He **never moved to Washington**.
17 They called him "Bu-bu-Biden." But he picked himself up, worked
18 did more than become a Senator - he raised a family. That is
19 hen his Senate business was done. He raised his boys - first as
20 ng weekends to make ends meet. But he raised his family with a

Figure 4.9 Concordance view of he referring to Biden in Obama's 2008 campaign speeches

In this section, I have uncovered how pronominal uses participate, sometimes as CMADs, sometimes as SMADs, in the strategies of political leaders while referring directly to the opponent in order to actively attack them, whether directly through delegitimation strategies, or indirectly, through ethos-building strategies. The next section reviews how political leaders use other means to carry out adversarial moves, such as victimisation, irony, and sarcasm.

4. 7 Irony, honesty, and self-victimisation

4.7.1. Irony and self-victimisation

Campaign speeches are traditionally an opportunity for candidates to speak to an already acquired audience but, in recent years, thanks to mass media coverage and the advances of new technologies and social media, they have also become a powerful campaigning tool to broadcast potentially newsworthy content to a wider audience. This section focuses on the strategies used by candidates that may trigger the interest of the media, which in turn enables them to reach out and convince parts of the public who would not have paid attention otherwise. Irony combined with self-victimisation is a very common tool used by some candidates. Examples 4.11-13 highlight instances of Nicolas Sarkozy's self-victimisation strategy through hyperboles, which constitute the core of the adversarial attack (CMAD), as they drive the entire argument: *m'insulter, les injures*, (*insulting me, the insults*) and irony with antitheses (Ex. 4.12).

In Example 4.11, Sarkozy adopts the posture of a victim through the infinitive *m'insulter*. The infinitive aspect of the verb (*insulting me* in English) gives a repetitive dimension to the speech act of the insult, thereby implying that it is a recurrent event. However, *in the morning* provides a circumstantial clue of the specific event it refers to: the opponent's radio interview on the morning before Sarkozy's speech (Lexpress.fr, 2012). The ironic tone of the statement is conveyed through the phrase *c'est facile quand je ne suis pas là* (*that's easy when I'm not there*). This additionally allows Sarkozy to imply cowardice drives the opponent's attacks, in that they choose to attack him when he cannot defend himself, and that this would not be the case under different circumstances, that is, if another candidate were to be the victim of similar attacks.

Examples 4.11-12-13 Self victimisation in Sarkozy's 2012 campaign speeches

4.11 Le matin m'insulter dans une radio, c'est facile quand je ne suis pas là.

In the morning insulting me in a radio (sic), that's easy when I am not there.

4.12 J'ai supporté les injures d'un certain nombre de candidats et de candidates.

I have tolerated the insults from a certain number of both male and female candidates

4.13 J'étais persuadé que quand il reste deux candidats, on est à égalité de droits et de devoirs.

I was certain that when there remain two candidates, we are equal in rights and duties.

Second, in Example 4.12, Sarkozy poses as a victim of further insults: *j'ai supporté les insultes*, and in the meantime attempts an appeal to the audience's emotions in order to create an emphatic response from them. In addition, the finite aspect of the passé composé *j'ai supporté* indicates that this has been a recurring type of event in the past, and that it is not or will not be the case anymore.

Thirdly, in Example 4.13, Sarkozy appeals to irony through the phrase: *j'étais persuade que (I was certain that)*, implying that it is not the case and that instead other candidates are treated with more kindness than he is by the media. This statement functions as an attempt to denounce this inequality of *rights and duties (droits et devoirs)* among the candidates. In this case, the attack is not directed towards the opponent(s) only, who participate in this system of attacks, but also towards the media and its regulating authority which allow it, which is a recurring pattern in Sarkozy's self-victimisation strategy as Examples 4.14 and 15 show.

In Example 4.14, the euphemism, *manifestement on ne m'attendait pas* (*they clearly did not expect me*) implies sarcasm, and acts as a means to show that the media are set against him (underlined). Second, the ironic (bold): *Fortunately, the CSA was there* allows Sarkozy to denounce the fact that the CSA is not really doing its regulating job properly, otherwise he would not be facing such difficulties in the media. Overall, this allows him to adopt the stance of a victim of both the opponent's cowardly attacks, and the media and its regulatory body (the CSA) who both fail in their role of impartiality.

Example 4.14 Speech extract, Nicolas Sarkozy. Nice. 20/04/2012

L'autre jour, j'étais invité d'une radio, manifestement on ne m'attendait pas. **Heureusement qu'il y avait le CSA³** pour m'obliger à faire [sic] une toute petite place.

The other day, I was invited by a radio station, they clearly did not expect me. **Fortunately the CSA was there** to force me [sic] to make a very tiny space.

This strategy of self-victimisation effectively appeals to the voters' emotional response, emphasized by the euphemism, which concludes the extract: *to make a very tiny space*.

In Example 4.15, multiple hyperboles: *jamais menée, extraordinaire(s), neuf contre un* (*ever conducted, extraordinary nine against one*) (underlined) appeal to the public's emotional response, which consolidates the candidate's strategy, and thereby constitutes a SMAD, as they help the candidate to push further the argument that he is not treated fairly and with the respect that is due to his function of President:

³ The Conseil National de l'Audiovisuel: public French media regulator, in charge of, in election times, keeping track of the time allowed on air by each media to each candidate.

entre deux personnes que je ne connais pas d'ailleurs (*between two people I do not know*). The political myth is thereby attacked and not respected. Therefore Sarkozy claims that his integrity is under attack as well, and he uses this to legitimise this interpersonal stance.

Example 4.15 Speech extract, Nicolas Sarkozy. Saint Maurice. 19/04/12

Mes chers amis, c'est une campagne comme sans doute je n'en ai jamais menée [...]. La conception extraordinaire de l'égalité à la française, c'est neuf contre un. Et en plus, il ne faut pas se plaindre. Je passe dans des émissions à des heures extraordinaires entre deux personnes que je ne connais pas d'ailleurs...

My dear friends, this is campaign undoubtedly unlike any I have ever conducted [...]. The extraordinary conception of French-style equality, it's nine against one. And what more, one should not complain. I am invited to shows at extraordinary times between two people I do not know by the way...

This self-victimisation strategy, however, does not define Sarkozy's campaign. Barack Obama also uses this combination in parts of his speeches, although in his case, the person to blame is clearly identified, it is the opponent John McCain (Figure 4.10). This concordance view first exemplifies how Obama uses the opponent's full name for the purpose of his self-victimisation strategy. Second, it shows how a similar strategy of self-victimisation can be carried out whilst appealing to slightly different means. Third, it shows that this rhetoric is somewhat systematic (underlined, bold and circled) in the case of Obama. Example 4.16 provides a detailed view of the argument that is made in each of these lines.

N Concordance

11 ake four more weeks of **John McCain's attacks**, but America can't
12 take one more week of **John McCain's attacks**, but this country
13 take one more week of **John McCain's attacks**, but this country
14 e a few more weeks of **John McCain's attacks**, but the American
15 take two more weeks of **John McCain's attacks**, but the American
16 rd more four years of John McCain's call for less regulation s
17 ause, in the words of John McCain's campaign manager, this elec
18 o be the architect of John McCain's economic plan and one of h
19 ke four more years of John McCain's George Bush policies. We c
20 exactly the point of John McCain's plan - to drive you out of

Figure 4.10 Concordance view of John McCain's attacks in Obama's 2008 campaign speeches

Example 4.16 Speech extract, Barack Obama, Tampa Bay, FL. 20/10/08

I can take four more weeks of John McCain's attacks, but America
can't take four more years of John McCain's George Bush policies.

John McCain's attacks is a generalisation that enables Obama to imply that this is a regular phenomenon, similar to Sarkozy's strategic use of the infinitive form *m'insulter* found previously. Unlike Sarkozy's, however, this strategy does not stop with the victimisation. Instead, it capitalises on this appeal to the voters' emotional response to build up the speaker's ethos, and, in this case, the appeal to pathos enriches the strategy already launched. This climaxes in Example 4.16, as Obama metaphorically sacrifices himself to *the attacks* of the opponent, as a means to save the country from the likes of said opponent. The argument is a logical cause/effect sequence in which he argues that he has the capacities to make a sacrifice: *I can take four more weeks of* in order to save the trouble to the nation: *America can't take four more years*. In addition, the grammatical parallelism between *I can take four more weeks* and *America can't take four more years* emphasizes the contrast

between the positive and negative aspects of *can*, with the view to heighten the empathic response from the voters.

Second, the personification of America “activate[s] emotions originating in pre-existent myths about [in this case, the] nation,” and creates “the myth that ideologies can be classified as either good or evil – just as we do people.” (Charteris-Black, 2005: 204). In this case, a contrast is created with this metaphor. America is conceived as the good entity in contrast with the evil attacks it is subject to by both the opponent and the incumbent President: John McCain and George W. Bush. Meanwhile, Obama’s positioning as a victim of similar attacks allows him to, once again, use inclusivity as a lever to gain the support of the people and therefore acquire legitimacy.

Example 4.17 Speech extract, Barack Obama, one week to go speech. Canton. Ohio. 27/10/08.

Deep down, Senator McCain knows that, which is why his campaign said that "if we keep talking about the economy, we're going to lose." That's why he's spending these last weeks calling me every name in the book. Because that's how you play the game in Washington. If you can't beat your opponent's ideas, you distort those ideas and maybe make some up. If you don't have a record to run on, then you paint your opponent as someone people should run away from. You make a big election about small things.

His argument concludes in sarcasm: *four more years of John McCain's George Bush policies*, whereby he reduces McCain to a clone of the incumbent President or a pawn of the Republican Party, whose sole purpose is to carry on with the same policies. Example 4.17 reviews this counter-attack strategy in more detail. Here, Obama claims omniscience again (similar to when he claimed to know what McCain

wants in Figure 4.8) in that he can tell what the opponent *knows, deep down* (bold). He uses this to point out the opponent's weaknesses: his economic argument and the unfair attacks that result from the latter's lack of imagination: *If you can't beat your opponent's ideas, you distort those ideas and maybe make some up.*

Repetitive grammatical parallelisms also form the structure the argument (underlined) (cf Example 4.9): *which is why, that's why, because that's, and if you can't, if you don't.* These introduce logical sequences of condition/consequence, similar to earlier findings from this chapter, and in this case, allow Obama to delegitimise the opponent further. In addition, the impersonal pronoun use of *you* allows him to introduce a present of generality that allows him to represent his perception as the reality, and gain the sympathy of the voters through an appeal to logos.

Overall, Obama expresses an evaluation of the opponent's worth as a potential President. In doing so, he hints at his opponent's politico-bureaucratic career and implies this is related to insults he has been a victim of: *that's why he's spending these last weeks calling me every name in the book. Because that's how you play the game in Washington.* The final section of this chapter reviews what John McCain has to say in response.

4.7.2 The combination of irony and honesty as an adversarial move: the case of John McCain

This final section focuses on how John McCain, Barack Obama's opponent in the 2008 US presidential election, uses a combination of honesty and irony to carry out adversarial moves. His performance in the 2008 election was a serious defeat in terms of both the popular and Electoral College votes, which were won by Obama with respectively 52.9% and 365 votes to 173: the largest percentage since 1964 for a Democrat (BBCNews). Effectively, McCain's discourse during this campaign is

remarkably different from that of his opponent, and from that of all other political leaders studied in this thesis. Irony, in particular, is expressed very differently by McCain than by any other aspiring leader.

To begin, Example 4.18 highlights how he often refers to his own weakness, his age, which, as aforementioned, has also been used by his opponent.

Example 4.18, Speech extract, John McCain, Kenner, LO, 03/06/2008

I have a few years on my opponent, so I am surprised that **a young man** has bought in to so many failed ideas.

The argument takes the form of an admission (underlined), which McCain, however, uses as a means to attack the opponent, Obama, on his strength: his youth. Two contrasting relations are built through this argument. First, in acknowledging his own weakness with the euphemism, *a few years*, McCain attempts to use it as a weapon to attack the opponent's strength, the exact opposite of McCain's weakness, his youth (bold). He then proceeds to build an argument that involves the creation of a paradox: *a young man has bought in to so many failed ideas*, thereby implying that in his experience, such a high number of failed ideas can only be accumulated through a much longer career than that of the opponent. This complex argument allows McCain to attack Obama on his ideology and explicitly take a stance on the ideas it promotes (thereby adopting an epistemic stance). In doing so, McCain establishes his ethical integrity by claiming his ideology is not made of failed ideas. Through this, he also communicates a political argument in that he values experience over change.

Example 4.19 Speech extract, John McCain, Orlando, FL, 01/08/2008

You'll hear from my opponent, Senator Obama, tomorrow, **and if there's one thing he always delivers, it's a great speech.** But I hope you'll listen carefully, because his ideas are not always as impressive as his rhetoric.

In Example 4.19, McCain addresses the audience directly and performs a concession about one of the opponent's qualities in that *if there's one thing he always delivers, it's a great speech*. Similar to Sarkozy's discourse, the concession sits in introduction of the argument, an attack on Obama's ability to come up with *impressive ideas*, mitigates its impact.

This strategy seems to further demonstrate that McCain's stance with regard to his opponent is not completely focused on his weaknesses but also on an honest assessment of his strengths as well, which is a strategy that this study has not found in any of the other three speakers, including Obama. In addition, in spite of referring to his own weakness, he does not opt for self-victimisation but instead goes for another type of attack. Consequently, the comparison carried out through the matching sequence: *his ideas are not always as impressive as his rhetoric* constitute an attack all the while acknowledging his oratory skill. An adversarial move is nonetheless performed, through which McCain establishes his ethical integrity by effectively acknowledging both the strengths and weaknesses of his opponent, which has, however, a limited impact in terms of building his legitimacy as a potential President. Example 4.20 further highlights findings that question the efficiency of McCain's overall electoral rhetoric in the 2008 campaign.

Example 4.20, Speech extract, John McCain, Phoenix, AR, 26/08/2008

And if he really thinks that, by liberating Iraq from a dangerous tyrant, America somehow set a bad example [...] then he should state it outright because **that is a debate I welcome.**

Example 4.20 takes the form of a logical conditional sequence that implies a cause/effect relation between the proposition: *if he really thinks that*, and its result: *then he should state it outright*, which has a dangerously formulated implication: *because that is a debate I welcome*.

This argument is based on pathos. To start with, McCain questions the sincerity of the opponent in *if he really thinks that*. Then, he proceeds to appeal to the emotional response of the public through the personification metaphor of *America*, characterised as the “good” *liberator of Iraq*, as opposed to the *dangerous tyrant* Saddam Hussein. In addition, the fact that this type of metaphor characterised under “the USA is the moral leader” is documented as a recurring metaphor in the Bush dynasty (Charteris-Black, 2005: 204) highlights McCain’s allegiance not only to the Republican ideology but also to the incumbent President’s rhetoric. However, the efficiency of this rhetoric is somewhat reduced by the conclusion: *because that is a debate I welcome*, which invites questioning as to whether there is another type of debate that the speaker does not welcome, which in turn invites much more questioning of the candidate’s integrity as a prospective leader.

Example 4.21 also draws on the war in Iraq, and revolves around a matching relation that compares the opponent’s equal failures on two separate accounts. He *still cannot bring himself to admit his own failure in judgment* (a recurring argument in the McCain attacks against Obama, as found in the previous extracts) and he *hasn’t been willing to heed the guidance of General Petraus* [in charge of the US military operations in Iraq at the time].

Example 4.21, Speech extract, John McCain, Orlando, FL. 18/08/2008

Senator Obama still cannot quite bring himself **to admit his own failure in judgment.** Nor has he been willing **to heed the guidance of General Petraeus.** [...]He would oppose **the surge.** Even in retrospect, he would choose **the path of retreat and failure for America.**

McCain's lexical choice of mental processes: *cannot bring himself, he hasn't been willing, he would choose, he would oppose*, indicates that the argument is oriented towards making the issue a matter of affect (or pathos) for Obama rather than reason (or logos). This consequently depicts him in an unfavourable light: as a prospective leader who will not listen to reason. Second, McCain uses the personification of America again combined with a path metaphor: *the path of retreat and failure*. In terms of political rhetoric, this implies "some type of planned progress and assumes a conscious agent who will follow a fixed oath towards an imagined goal," making it therefore "inherently purposeful" and allowing politicians to "appear to have planned intentions" (Charteris-Black, 2005: 199). Through this metaphor, *he would choose the path of retreat and failure for America*, McCain's focus is not on himself and on his planned intentions but on those of the opponent. He uses the metaphor to criticise the opponent's stance on the US military presence in Iraq, and appeals to the voters' emotional response in associating retreat with failure. This way, he performs an adversarial move that de-legitimises the opponent's stance and ideological myth.

This last example especially shows how McCain distinguishes himself from the other speakers I focus on in this study. On the one hand, marks of irony and sarcasm are present, which are means commonly found in all candidates' discourses. The marker of differentiation is, however, that McCain's strategy seems to include instances of genuine praise for his opponent's achievements as well as honesty in relation to his own (potential) weakness. If, on the one hand, this display of honest

appraisal of the opponent's skills contributes to building a rather positive self-image for McCain, it does seem, on the other hand, to be counter-productive in comparison with the type of discourse found in Obama's speeches, in that it may be a marker of weakness and lack of leadership. However, this highlights the different interpersonal stance McCain is building here, which contributes to the construction of a different kind of ethos from that of the other candidates. He gives praise to the opponent, which Obama does not do until his victory speech, in which he acknowledges McCain's War veteran past.

4.8. Conclusion

In the primary findings of this chapter, I discuss how the address strategies performed by the four candidates provide quantitative indications of their stances in relation to their respective opponents. This analysis has demonstrated that those findings were accurate in relation to how the speakers refer to one another. In the case of Hollande and Sarkozy, the findings from Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 showed a stark difference between the two speakers which is verified by the qualitative data: Sarkozy's focus is indeed not solely on Hollande, but on a multitude of opponents, whereas Hollande is mostly focused on Sarkozy as his main opponent.

Overall, this chapter shows that adversarial moves can be performed with metaphors, contrasts, and comparisons that co-occur with those address strategies. The stances expressed by each speaker remain relatively stable throughout. Sarkozy's expression of stance is particularly interesting in the sense that he singles himself out from the other candidates, including Hollande, in an attempt to enhance his own ethos (which is of course not possible in the race opposing only two

candidates in the US). This stance allows him to represent himself as a victim of not only of the opponent(s) attacks, but also of unfair treatment from the media.

In the case of Hollande, the stances expressed are often related to evaluating Sarkozy's record as the incumbent President.

Obama and McCain' strategies are interesting in the sense that they seem to pinpoint accurately the two candidates' weaknesses: Obama's relative inexperience on this level of international politics as a young Senator, which he compensates for by legitimising himself through the choice of his running mate Joe Biden. McCain's age in comparison to Obama's is also legitimised by the former in his attempts to value his experience as a politics and war veteran, whereas Obama's particularly interesting representation of McCain and Biden shows how refined his electoral rhetoric is.

Finally, metaphors, contrasts, comparisons along with the other rhetorical moves accounted for in this study play an essential role in the performance of those stances, in that they indicate where adversarial moves are likely to occur.

5 Adversarial moves in election manifestos

5.1. Introduction

In chapter 3, I define three main strategies that produce adversarial moves: self-promotion, intimidation, and a contrastive use of specific versus vague language. In chapter 4, I review how these strategies are utilised in campaign speeches in order to carry out face Threatening Acts (FTAs) in the absence of the opponent, but in presence of an audience. In the present chapter, I consider the possibility of carrying out adversarial moves in election manifestos. I study two manifesto series from Britain and France: François Hollande's manifestos from the French 2012 presidential election, and the British Conservative party's general election manifestos from 2010 and 2015.

This study of electoral manifestos focuses on three main areas of the discourse which the candidates (and their parties) use as means to carry out strategies of adversarial discourse: the making or breaking of promises, appropriating the opponent's argument or discourse, and finally, advocating change or continuity. This chapter focuses on accusations – contempt, criticism, ridicule, challenge – as well as deliberately insulting lexical choices (Harris, 2001, 452-53) and how they occur in manifestos. These are strategies and means I have documented in the previous chapters (cf the 2012 US vice presidential election debate between Joe Biden and Paul Ryan), as well as features of face management in parliamentary discourse (Harris, 2001, 2003; Bull and Wells, 2012). Here, I consider that similar phenomena occur in manifestos, and I attempt to demonstrate how these also constitute examples of adversarial discourse.

It is important to note the importance of multiple FTA targets in the context of manifestos. This study acknowledges that the voters are not always the only addressees of the manifestos, and that they are divisible into several different electorates. In addition, FTAs do not necessarily target one opponent in particular, and, in fact, I find examples of multiple-targets FTAs, whereby the speaker attacks several opponents at once. I also consider the importance of inclusion and exclusion in facework; which adversary and how many of them are being targeted by FTAs? Is being adversarial: *I versus him*, *I versus them*, *we/us versus him*, or *we/us versus them*, etc.?

5.2. Selection and summary of the data


In this chapter, I study two sets of election manifestos: François Hollande's from the 2012 French presidential election, and the British Conservative party's from the 2010 and 2015 British general elections. I selected this data according to the following definition of "manifesto" from the Oxford English Dictionary (2015b):

A public declaration or proclamation, written or spoken; esp. a printed declaration, explanation, or justification of policy issued by a head of state, government, or political party or candidate [...].

I add an extra requirement to the selection of these manifestos: they have to be produced for the attention of the public, rather than that of a specific part of the population. For instance, the 2012 Sarkozy campaign documents are excluded from this study since only a fraction of the data found met those requirements; most of the data found was for the attention of journalists only. Second, the aim in gathering this data was to find electoral discourse that is meant to be communicated in written form

to the electorate, regardless of how it reaches them, rather than in a written to be spoken format, as in campaign speeches.

Table 5.1 EIMan subcorpus overview









| FRENCH DATA | | BRITISH DATA | |
|---|--|--|---|
| François Hollande's 2012 mainstream manifestos | | The Conservatives' 2010 and 2015 manifestos | |
|  |  |  |  |
| François Hollande's "Presidential project" - April 2012 Tokens: 5,401 | François Hollande's "First round manifesto" - April 2012 Tokens: 996 | The Conservative manifesto - 2010 Tokens: 28,579 | The Conservative manifesto – 2015 Tokens: 34,246 |
| François Hollande's 2012 adversarial manifestos | | | |
|  |  | | |
| "Sarkozy's five year presidency: an appalling record" – December 2011 Tokens: 35,185 | "The Primer of Nicolas Sarkozy's contradictory remarks" – 9 December 2011 Tokens: 6,726 | | |

The English data is broken down in terms of election years, whereas the French data is broken down according to the nature of the manifestos (Table 5.1). This

breakdown allows me to adopt a comparative view on both the French and English sets, all the while keeping one single source for each set (Hollande, and the Conservatives). As a result, and also because of the language difference, my approach in this chapter is to study each dataset separately, and then to draw conclusions from the findings that emerge, in order to avoid the unnecessary distraction provoked by translation issues that arise from cross-linguistic studies.

Hollande's "mainstream" manifestos were released during the 2012 campaign and focus on the candidate's promises, whereas the "adversarial" manifestos were published earlier (in December 2011), once Hollande had secured the Socialist Party's nomination in view of the 2012 presidential election, and focus on attacking one opponent only, Nicolas Sarkozy (the incumbent President). These documents are labelled "adversarial" in consequence of their exclusively anti-Sarkozy discourse, as this study highlights.

Table 5.2 Semantic key highlights of the data

| | |
|---|---|
|  | The citizens / voters (addressee group) |
|  | The candidate/party (speaker group) |
|  | Forms of inclusivity (i.e. whereby both addressee and speaker groups: <i>our, we, us, our country</i>). |
|  | Public services (<i>schools, hospitals, parks, environment and nature preservation</i>) and care (<i>help, support, protect, conserve, enhance</i>) |
|  | Contextually dependent key items (for instance, a recurring item: <i>change/continue</i>). |
|  | The opponent / main opposing party: LABOUR / NICOLAS SARKOZY but also implied, context dependent forms: <i>the government, ministers...</i>) |
|  | Government, law and financial services (<i>the economy, jobs, unemployment, taxes, local government agencies...</i>) |
|  | National, international and supranational entities and related issues (<i>immigration, Britain, the European Union, France, this country...</i>) |

I break down the data according to the categories outlined in Table 5.2, which group the principal semantic fields found in electoral discourse across PolDisc. This key is

created from studying the data, and highlights the key foci, which are inevitably put forward by the candidates and their parties in electoral discourse.

- The participants: the candidate themselves, and the citizens, that is the speaker and addressee(s).
- Recurrent semantic fields that are invariably covered in electoral discourse: public services (the NHS, schools, hospitals, parks, the police, and so on), as well as finance and other government services (jobs, banks) and all law and economic issues.
- The semantic field of patriotism, which includes both immigration and dealings with supra-national entities such as the E.U, as opposed to national identities/entities (Britain, France, *the French people, our country...*)
- The opponent(s) which is context dependent, for instance, in the 2012 French presidential election, the main opponents include Nicolas Sarkozy as well as competing candidates on the left: the “Front de Gauche” (Left Front, FdG) candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon for instance.

When ambiguity may occur, each item was checked for contextual features to determine which category they belonged to, for instance: *they, you, we* in the British corpus and *je (I)* in the French corpus are among the items that needed disambiguating in order to place them in the *addressee* or *opponent* category. This key is used throughout this chapter, unless specified otherwise, in cases when an alternative is more relevant to the analysis.

In addition, this analysis is organised according to the three main themes I found to be leading the argument of these manifestos, and through which the parties, or their candidates, perform adversarial moves. Its starting point is the study of the making and breaking of promises, which is a particularly recurrent theme throughout

these election manifestos. Second, I study how each manifesto series attempts to appropriate some of the opponent's arguments. I discuss the aims of such strategies in relation to the performance of adversarial moves. Thirdly, I consider how change and continuity are emphasized in each campaign, and particularly how this changes according to the electoral context.

5.3. Making and breaking promises

Promises are an essential part of political discourse, even more so in manifestos, which are used as propaganda tools by the candidates. Two types of discourse relating to promises are found in these manifestos. First, there are the promises made in both Hollande's and the Conservatives' manifestos. I study how they are formulated, and how they fit within adversarial discourse, as CMADs or SMADs. Second, I study how the opponent's promises are used by the candidates as a tool to attack them on the ground that those promises were broken or cannot be kept. This second type is much more prominent in Hollande's adversarial manifestos, whose main purpose is to enumerate and comment on Nicolas Sarkozy's broken promises since his election in 2007. In the meantime, the diachronic study of the Conservatives' manifestos highlights a similar shift, which occurs between the 2010 and 2015 elections. In 2010, the Conservatives focus on the incumbent Party's broken commitment (Labour), while in 2015 they focus on their own promises for the future. The questions I ask are: who is making the promises? Who in particular are the promises made to? And how are they adversarial?

5.3.1. What promises?

The lemma *promis** is generally quite rare in English. A comparative study in UPol, BRiPol, Coca, and the BNC (which I use as the two reference corpora) finds that it accounts for 0.01% of the data in the two reference corpora, while it accounts for respectively 0.06 and 0.03% in UPol and BriPol. This is possibly related to the assumption that the lemma *promis** is considered a dangerous, and perhaps too compelling a term, and that speakers use other means of making promises instead. In fact, Figure 5.1 shows that that the word *promise* is often used cautiously in political discourse, or used negatively, as a means to attack the opponent on promises they did not keep, rather than to express the speaker's own promises. This triggers a paradigmatic choice that seems to work against the lemma in political discourse, to the profit of other alternatives.

N Concordance

11 ame a national priority and there was a promise of a property owning democracy,
12 velopment aid, has become with Labour a promise, and will in future become a law
13 seniors have **the promise made will be a promise kept**, but I want younger workers
14 vote for him, hear me loud and clear. **A promise made will be a promise kept**. You
15 he rules of the road. Ours -- ours is a promise that says government cannot solv
16 ld has ever known. (Applause.) **That's a promise I've kept**. Four years ago, I pro
17 he workers all across America -- **it's a promise that we've already begun to fulf**
18 rt to restore the promise of America, a promise we all know has been frayed by
19 erfect President. And that's probably a promise that Governor Romney thinks I've
20 rack Obama Barack Obama ?@BarackObama **A promise kept**: pic.twitter.com/m7iLA3eF
21 en they come home. (Applause.) **That's a promise we will keep**. On issue after iss
22 may not always agree, **but when I make a promise to you, I will keep it**. Let me
23 and a promise that you make to yours, a promise that has led immigrants to cross
24 ters when I tuck them in at night and a promise that you make to yours, a promis
25 ise is our greatest inheritance. **It's a promise I make to my daughters** when I t
26 s oceans and pioneers to travel west, a promise that led workers to picket lines

Figure 5.1 Concordance extract of promise in EngPol

| L5 | L4 | L3 | L2 | L1 | NODE | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 |
|------------|-----------|-------------|------------|------------|------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| WILL | OF | OF | BE | PAYMENT | BY | THE | THE | AND | THE | THE |
| OF | OUR | WILL | IS | AND | | RESULTS | AND | TO | AND | OF |
| TO | THE | THE | BEEN | FOR | | CUTTING | PER | OF | OF | AND |
| AND | TO | TO | BEING | COSTS | | PUBLISHING | PEOPLE | ON | WE | WE |
| THE | WE | AND | THE | MADE | | INTRODUCING | MORE | CENT | IN | TO |
| THAT | THEIR | ARE | ARE | SPENDING | | CREATING | THAT | WE | TO | WILL |
| BY | THAT | HAS | OF | DRIVEN | | GIVING | WE | THE | WEEK | PEOPLE |
| ON | WITH | IS | TO | SPENT | | REDUCING | SURE | WAY | AS | POWER |
| THIS | WILL | THEIR | PAID | SMES | | 2020 | SPENDING | WILL | WILL | BUSINESS |
| HAVE | PEOPLE | ON | NATIONAL | TRIGGERED | | ENSURING | STATE | THEY | ACHIEVE | IS |
| GOVERNMENT | DATA | HAVE | WILL | THREATENED | | MANY | BASIS | OUR | HAVE | IN |
| WE | THIS | FOR | THEIR | THAT | | CHANGING | THIRD | BUSINESS | GOVERNMENT | BY |
| BE | WHICH | CAN | REGULATION | START | | BUREAUCRATS | TAX | ENSURING | BY | THEIR |
| EMISSIONS | THEY | BE | ENERGY | SYSTEM | | 80 | UP | ABOUT | THAT | KIND |
| WHO | BY | CONTRACTS | ENSURE | SERVED | | IMPROVING | SINGLE | AGENCY | OUR | ADDITION |
| IN | HAVE | CRISIS | ACCOUNTED | FALLEN | | ENVIRONMENTAL | IN | IN | | ONE |
| SUPPLIERS | ARE | THEY | AND | FURTHER | | DISTANT | OF | MINISTER | | REGULATION |
| NHS | BE | WE | HAS | BACKED | | | DOWN | FOR | | PROVIDERS |
| MINISTERS | SUPPORT | UP | MORE | CHAired | | | GOVERNMENT | GOVERNMENT | | |
| | TAX | SHOULD | FOR | ONLY | | | ON | | | |
| | POLITICAL | OUR | GO | PROVIDED | | | PRIME | | | |
| | PROMOTE | FROM | | INSURANCE | | | PUBLIC | | | |
| | | GOVERNMENT | | LIVES | | | OUR | | | |
| | | PLANS | | | | | CITIZENS | | | |
| | | RESPONSIBLE | | | | | | | | |
| | | REDUCE | | | | | | | | |
| | | PUBLIC | | | | | | | | |

a. Patterns of by in the Conservatives 2010 manifesto

| L5 | L4 | L3 | L2 | L1 | NODE | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 |
|--------------|---------|-----------|-----------|------------|------|--------------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|
| THE | THE | THE | THE | TERMS | BY | THE | THE | OF | THE | OF |
| TO | OF | IN | OF | LIVES | | 2020 | AND | WILL | TO | THE |
| HAVE | TO | TO | IN | PAYMENT | | CONTINUING | END | WE | OF | AND |
| WILL | WILL | WILL | BE | SAVINGS | | INCREASING | TO | AND | WE | TO |
| WE | WE | OF | AND | PROMOTED | | PROVIDING | WE | TO | IN | FOR |
| YOUR | HAS | AND | IS | RICHEST | | INTRODUCING | PER | CENT | WILL | WE |
| OUR | KEEP | BE | TO | RATED | | RESULTS | THAN | ON | 207 | THAT |
| WITH | FROM | OUR | REAL | REFERENDUM | | MORE | WITH | THE | AND | NEXT |
| THIS | AND | PROTECT | NEW | UNION | | OFSTED | FREE | EFFECTIVE | PER | IN |
| NEW | ALL | TERM | ARE | WORK | | RAISING | WELFARE | NEW | FOR | CENT |
| FOR | PEOPLE | SWITH | SCHOOLS | WORLD | | BUILDING | TAX | 2.5 | SUCH | ALL |
| MAJOR | PARTY | HELPED | BACK | SPENDING | | 2017 | THEIR | BE | WORK | WILL |
| AND | FURLS | HAS | OUT | SUPPORTED | | REFORMING | UP | GOOD | THROUGH | OUTSTANDING |
| MORE | AN | BUT | 2015 | TAX | | REQUIRING | THAT | WORK | THRESHOLD | THOSE |
| CONSERVATIVE | ACCESS | IT | UK | PRINTED | | 11 | FOR | DEFICIT | SO | TUDOR |
| WORK | ON | NEW | TAKEN | CUT | | WORKING | IN | RULES | GREAT | WITH |
| BACK | IS | MANIFESTO | 9HQ | FOR | | ST | BEST | FLC | INHERITANCE | HAVE |
| N | IN | MAKE | ECONOMIC | HOME | | SUPPORTING | 20305 | IN | BEHALF | LABOUR |
| STREET | FALLEN | | CHILDREN | AND | | REDUCING | AS | TAX | ENSURE | AS |
| OF | ECONOMY | | EUROPEAN | BUSINESS | | ESTABLISHING | MABBUTT | | OR | DECADE |
| SUPPORT | BRITISH | | FOR | BUSINESSES | | EXPANDING | ON | | SAVE | PAST |
| INTEGRITY | LONG | | BUSINESS | OWNED | | EXTENDING | LEAST | | MORE | TAX |
| THEY | LONDON | | NOT | PAID | | MAKING | INDEPENDENT | | ONE | 1.4 |
| | | | IMGRATION | PLAN | | ALAN | IVES | | | OUR |
| | | | MORE | HOMES | | AT | | | | |
| | | | | MONEY | | ENSURING | | | | |
| | | | | OVER | | | | | | |

b. Patterns of by in the Conservatives 2015 manifesto

| | | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|-------------|-------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Address | Address | ee | group | Contextually | Contextually | dependent | items |
| Speaker | Speaker | group | | Opponent | Opponent | group | |
| Forms of | Forms of | inclusivity | | Government, law | Government, law | and financial | services |
| Public | Public | services | | Governing | Governing | entities and | related issues |

c. key

Figure 5.2 Patterns of by in the Conservatives' 2010 and 2015 manifestos

Figure 5.1 also shows that politicians often use the word *promise* in concordance with the process *to keep* (ll. 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22) and as a means to highlight the reliability of their word(bold), or as an attack on the opponent in relation to betrayed promises, or promises with negative consequences (ll. 18, 23, 26: underlined): *a promise that led workers to picket lines* (l. 26). Consequently, this chapter focuses on alternative ways of expressing promises, mostly through future forms such as *we will*. In addition, considering prepositions, conjunctions and other function words that collocate with *will* provides a good insight into how promises are made through this alternative. I present the results of a concordance search based on the preposition *by* found in the Conservatives' 2010 and 2015 election manifestos. Figure 5.2 provide a visual comparison of the patterns surrounding *by* in the two campaigns, while Examples 5.1a,b and 5.2a, b, c, provide a detailed view of the patterns found with *by* in Figure 5.2.

Examples 5.1a,b, from the Conservatives 2010 manifesto

a. Our national security is threatened **by** a looming energy crunch in which a third of our electricity generating capacity *will close*, and most of our gas *will need* to be imported by 2020.

b. The wishes of local people are second-guessed **by** bureaucrats; the activities of councils are micro-managed by unelected quangos. This hoarding of power by distant politicians and unaccountable officials in Whitehall has damaged society by eroding trust.

Examples 5.1a and b provide a contextual view of how key items such as *threatened*, *bureaucrats*, and *quangos* (underlined) are used in conjunction with *by* (bold). This highlights the negative orientation of the discourse in the Conservatives' 2010

manifesto as a CMAD that carries out the main theme of the attack against the opponent. In addition, the instances of *will* (italics) indicates that in the present case, the Conservatives use this process in order to dramatise the situation of the country, as in: *most of our gas will need to be imported by 2020*, and thereby perform negative promises.

Examples 5.2.a, b, c by in the Conservatives' 2015 manifesto

a. We *will protect* intellectual property **by** continuing to require internet service providers to block sites

b. We *will*, in addition, *tackle* the disproportionate impact of strikes in essential public services **by** introducing a tougher threshold in health, education, fire and transport.

c. *we will continue* to increase the Basic State Pension **by** at least 2.5 per cent through the triple lock,

In comparison, Examples 5.2a,b and c from the Conservatives' 2015 manifesto show a much more positive outlook towards the future. In this case, *will* is not used for scaremonging but, rather, for the promotion of the Conservatives' promises for the future: *we will protect*, *we will tackle*, *we will continue* (italics). This is achieved in conjunction with present progressive processes introduced by *by* (bold) *continuing*, *introducing*, (underlined), the same processes found in conjunction with *we will*. This indicates the key role these processes play in the Conservatives' 2015 manifesto, as this study shows in the next pages.

Comparing the data from both Figure 5.2 and Examples 5.1 and 5.2 shows how differently the argument is structured five years apart by the same party, and how this reflects the two different strategies adopted by the Conservatives in each election. In 2015, the first person pronoun *we* and the future auxiliary *will* are much

more frequent as L collocates of the node than in 2010 (Figure 5.2). This suggests that the Conservatives' strategy is to focus on inclusivity in the 2015 election, and therefore to represent the party as a cohesive group of people which is, more importantly, hard at work to better the lives of the voters. Second, the clause relation in the structure *by+V-ing* as seen in Examples 5.2a, and b allows the writers to introduce a problem/solution pattern (Hoey, 1994; Thompson and Thompson, 2001: 60), or rather, in this case a response/solution pattern. Here, this type of matching relation enables the writers to present the situations in such a way that represents themselves in a favourable light to the voters. This way, the discourse is articulated in order to draw on the work they have already accomplished / will *continue* to (red highlights, in Figure 5.2b) through the use of a variety of present progressive processes in R1: *by continuing, introducing, raising, building, reforming, working, supporting, expanding* (purple highlights in Figure 5.2b).

| L5 | L4 | L3 | L2 | L1 | NODE | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 |
|------------|------------|--------------|---------|--------|------|-------|----------|---------|---------|-----------|
| THE | THE | WILL | AND | THAN | AT | LEAST | WE | OF | THE | THE |
| TO | TO | TO | OUR | TAX | | THE | AND | PER | CENT | TO |
| WILL | AND | AD | OF | BOTH | | HOME | HEART | MILLION | WE | OUR |
| WE | OF | THE | THE | ALL | | ALL | END | THE | OUR | SCHOOLS |
| PARLIAMENT | YOU | WE | WILL | TO | | RISK | SAME | TIME | BILLION | WILL |
| FOR | WILL | WORK | TO | SOLD | | EVERY | IN | HAVE | THAT | INFLATION |
| AND | WHICH | SO | INCOME | THEM | | ITS | STAGE | WILL | WITH | IN |
| OF | WE | IN | THEIR | IS | | THIS | THE | YEAR | YOUR | THROUGH |
| MANIFESTO | INVESTMENT | CONSERVATIVE | FURTHER | BY | | ANY | TO | SINCE | TO | AS |
| | GO | NO | BE | AND | | | TIME | IN | THEIR | APPROACH |
| | SO | PUTTING | IS | FOR | | | ELECTION | CENT | HIGH | AN |
| | ONE | PUTTING | PARTY | INVEST | | | 2.5 | LINE | CLEAR | WITH |
| | | | IN | HELP | | | PER | PARKER | MADE | LONDON |
| | | | | | | | MATTHEW | AND | STREET | LIFE |
| | | | | | | | | | PEOPLE | OVER |
| | | | | | | | | | | CONTINUE |
| | | | | | | | | | | SCHOOL |

Figure 5.3 Patterns of at in the Conservatives 2015 manifesto

This pattern is used to show how they intend to do what they promise to do by introducing the processes rather than modifying them, as is the case of the prepositional phrase *at least* studied below in the Conservatives' 2015 manifesto.

At co-occurs with *least* (R1) but also to a lesser extent with *will* (L3, L2), which in most cases involves *we* (the Conservatives) (green highlights in Figure 5.3). *At least* acts as a post-modifier, which emphasizes the extent to which what precedes applies, and also acts as a SMAD to the strategy of promise-making.

Example 5.3 at least in the Conservatives 2015 manifesto

We will continue to increase the Basic State Pension by at least 2.5 per cent through the triple lock..

In effect, in Example 5.3, *at least* modifies the noun phrase *2.5 percent* in the sense that it provides a specific range by which the *increase* is *continued*. Furthermore, sentence position data shows this specific concordance set occurs regularly throughout the document until the very end, where it occurs three times in the same sentence (see Figure 5.4).




Figure 5.4 Distribution of the set *at least* in the Conservatives' 2015 manifesto

In Example 5.4, the Conservatives' argument focuses on their pledge to provide help to fellow human beings, not only in the UK but also across the world: *in the poorest countries*. Breaking down the sentence according to clause types shows that this argument is made with a tricolon.

Example 5.4. At least in the Conservatives' 2015 manifesto

We will help **at least** 11 million children in the poorest countries gain a decent education, improve nutrition for **at least** 50 million people, who would otherwise go hungry; and help **at least** 60 million people [get access to clean water and sanitation, to stop terrible diseases.

This pledge is expressed with the verbal form *will*, which in this case expresses the speaker's intention. This constitutes, therefore, an electoral promise. Second, the semantically positive relational processes: *help*, *improve*, the repetitions of *at least* (bold) carry insistence, and the tricolon highlight the focus of this argument on promise making, rather than attacking the opponent on broken promises. This part of the discourse constitutes nonetheless an adversarial move, whose primary focus is ethos-enhancement, for the attention of the audience. Second, this move appropriates a stance on social issues and poverty that is closer to the left, and Labour, than to the Conservatives, which constitutes a threat to Labour's *raison d'être* as a worthy opponent. In effect, the Conservatives manage to destabilise Labour while addressing the voters, by invalidating an argument that Labour could have used. This stancetaking allows the Conservatives to not only appropriate the opponent's discourse, but also anticipate and circumvents possible attacks from Labour on the Conservatives' traditional approach to welfare and social issues.

In this context, *at least* functions as a booster (Quirk et. al. 1985: 590), in that it intensifies the degree of the verbal form that precedes it. This allows the writers to

create a hyperbole that strengthens the intentionality of the discourse, in the sense that it effectively *boosts* the degree to which the promise that is made will be carried out. Using rounded-up figures, this conveys the idea that the Conservatives take the issue seriously, and are able to make propositions that *will* make a significant impact on people's lives across the world. Overall, this and the repetition of *at least* as an intensifier show that a significant amount of work has been done to back up the claim that they are making. This constitutes an example of how promise-making strategies are used by the Conservatives to enhance the party's ethos (in the wake of the deep cuts in the welfare system carried out by their government for the five years prior to this election) and in so doing, to attack the opponent and appropriate their discourse.

5.3.2. Promising what, and to whom?

Differences between the Conservatives' 2010 and 2015 manifestos concern not only the outlook of the discourse but also the addressees of the promises made. In both Conservatives' manifestos, the process *ensure* is used remarkably similarly in terms of frequencies: 86 occurrences in 2015 (0.25%) compared to 67 occurrences in 2010 (0.23%). A comparative study of concordance lines shows the differences of focus in the discourse on promise making or breaking found earlier in the case of *by* carry on in other areas of the discourse. More importantly, this indicates which part of the electorate the Conservatives are attempting to convince, and further highlights how two different strategies can be achieved through the use of a similar means of adversarial discourse. In the 2010 manifesto (purple highlights, Figure 5.2a). Figures 5.2a and b highlight the contrast that occurs with the process *ensure* in the two manifestos.

Examples 5.5a, b ensure in the 2010 and 2015 Conservative manifestos.

a. **Ensure** failing schools are inspected more often, with the best schools visited less frequently. (The Conservatives' 2010 manifesto)

b. We will **ensure** the continuing success and stability of these reforms. (The Conservatives' 2015 manifesto)

The comparison of these two examples shows a very different type of argument is put in place by the Conservatives in each election. Example 5.5a highlights how, in 2010, *ensure* is included in several section headlines of the manifestos, which seem to focus more on criticizing the negative impact of the incumbent's policies: *failing schools*, which makes the discourse more adversarial. While five years later, Example 5.5b is indicative of the Conservatives' efforts to redirect the voters' focus on the positive outcomes of their policies. A close study of the set *we will* shows that, however, adversarial elements are still present.

Example 5.6. we will in the Conservatives' 2015 manifesto

"if **we** do not stick to our long-term economic plan, **we will** slip back again, reversing the progress **we** have made in the last five years [...]"

Example 5.6 highlights an adversarial move made by the Conservatives against Labour in three different ways. First, the use of the inclusive pronoun *we* (bold) allows the Conservatives to place themselves and the people of Britain on the same side from the beginning. In the meantime, *our long term economic plan* (underlined) leaves an element of uncertainty as to whose plan it is, and this ambiguity allows the Conservatives to move towards an aggregation of their plan as not only theirs but also that of the country. Second, the noun group *long-term economic plan* implies that there is a *plan*, that said plan is for the *long-term*, and that since it is *our(s)*, it

excludes by definition the participation of the opponent from it. In effect, the *long-term economic plan* is that of *we*: the Conservatives and the people, but not Labour. Here, the Conservatives attempt to imply that the opponent, Labour, lacks the capacity to make and follow a similar long-term economic plan in the second part of the sentence. This is done via two embedded clauses, *reversing the progress we have made in the past five years*, which describe in detail the steps that will follow should the country decide not to go according to *the Conservatives' long-term plan*, but to the alternative: Labour's. Finally, the phrase *slip back* is used as a metaphor, which expresses the writers' negative interpersonal stance on Labour's alternative, and indicates that it is used with the purpose of insisting on the dangerous and negative effects the alternative would have: effectively a return *five years* in the past.

This type of discourse effectively acts as a warning to the voters who may be tempted to vote for the opponent, which are in themselves face threatening to the opponents, in that it warrants that such a stance should need to be explicitly taken. In doing so, they remind the voters that in 2007, the most important financial crisis that the country suffered since the 1930s happened while Labour was in power, and use this argument as an adversarial move in that it associates the opponent with difficult times, and holds them responsible for what happened, which is an inherent part of the adversarial strategy adopted by the Conservatives in their 2010 manifesto.

In committing to caring for the people in their 2015 manifesto, the Conservatives anticipate possible attacks from the opponents, and attempt to invalidate their arguments on the subject. They build up their ethos as a Party worthy of leading the country and which is hard at work for the greater good of not only Britain but also millions of people overseas. This also constitutes an attempt to elevate their own position above petty electoral arguments, which is a classic evasion strategy (Clayman and Heritage, 2002). Second, the use of specific processes such as *ensure*, allow the Conservatives to carry out FTAs as the context in which these processes are used imply that Labour are part of the problem the Conservatives are

attempting to control. Thirdly, inclusive strategies allow them to isolate further Labour as the opponent, but also, and more importantly, Britain's enemy from within. Finally, the negative semantics of some of the key expressions they use (such as *slip back*) supports this overall strategy of undermining the opponent. This allows them to present the vote as the choice between a party who cares about the people, and has a *plan*, or a party who precipitated the country into chaos due to their incompetence, and broken commitments.

In comparison, the next section focuses on Hollande's manifestos in relation to criticising the opponent's record of broken promises.

5.3.3. Broken promises in Hollande's 2012 adversarial manifestos

In Hollande's campaign literature, the adversarial manifestos are openly anti-Sarkozy, the incumbent President and Hollande's main opponent in the election. As such, they aim to attack the incumbent President on his poor record and broken promises. The argument takes the very systematic form of a direct quote from Sarkozy, signalled by the title "*Les promesses*" (*The promises*), which is then invariably followed by another section titled "*Les mesures*" (*The measures*) in which is provided a summary of *measures* taken under Sarkozy's presidency. This is followed by a third headline "*Les consequences*" (*The consequences*), in which the speaker expands more on the negative outcomes of Sarkozy's broken promises. As such, this constitutes a clearly designed adversarial strategy, which relies heavily on irony and negativity.

Figures 5.5 and 5.6, and Extract 5.3 highlight those phenomena. The gloomy tone of the discourse (bold) is striking in Figure 5.5: *inefficient and inhuman policy* (l.6), *women's Rights: the great decline* (l.8), *security: the complete failure* (l.9) *threatened public freedoms* (sic) (l.10), *A damaged republic* (l.18), *[the] buried [reform] of financial capitalism* (l.24) *Industry: the accelerated decline* (l.25). The

occurrence of those expressions mostly on the left-hand side of the node *Les Promesses* indicates they are likely to occur in the *consequences* section of each *promises-measures-consequences* sequence.

N Concordance

3 ne justice **précarisée et fragilisée** Les promesses « Je veillerai
4 ires Le monde rural **relégué** Les promesses « Aménager le territoire
5 le 1er octobre 2009. Malgré les promesses du gouvernement, seule
6 ique **inefficace et inhumaine** Les promesses « Il faut de l'humanité
7 sans précédent de la laïcité Les promesses « La vie spirituelle
8 des femmes : **le grand recul** Les promesses « Je veux faire de l'é
9 té Sécurité : **l'échec total** Les promesses « La police de proximité
10 libertés publiques **menacées** Les promesses « Je souhaite que notr
11 **l'effacement** de la France Les promesses « Je favoriserai le
12 nancer à moins de rogner sur les promesses précédentes. Des serm
13 le ferai pas.» Mais voilà, les promesses n'engagent que ceux qui
14 publiques **mises à mal** par les promesses du candidat depuis lors.
15 budgétaire et recentralisation Les promesses « On ne peut pas
16 **nde casse** des services publics Les promesses « Je crois résolumen
17 oires Les Outremer **oubliés** Les promesses « J'ai toujours pensé
18 toires La République **abîmée** Les promesses « Je souhaite une Répu
19 Les contre-pouvoirs **affaiblis** Les promesses « Je renforcerai les
20 mie L'agriculture **sacrifiée** Les promesses « L'agriculture frança
21 torique des comptes publics Les promesses « La maîtrise de nos
22 thématique de la loi de 2005 Les promesses« Chaque préfet devra
23 : **un abandon sans précédent** Les promesses « Je suis donc pour
24 **terrée** du capitalisme financier Les promesses « L'Europe doit p
25 ustrie : **le déclin s'accélère** Les promesses « Contre les délocali

Figure 5.5 Concordance view of les promesses in Hollande's 2012 adversarial manifestos

N Concordance

1 et international] **inquiets** des conséquences pour la France
2 imentaire gratuite aura des conséquences **sociales et humanit**
3 lois Grenelle 1 et 2, et des conséquences de la RGPP sur l'
4 gouvernement, a abouti à des conséquences **dramatiques** : tr
5 du parc épuratoire français, conséquences de la mise en con
6 oportion de femmes élues. Les conséquences La rémunération d
7 **émunies et en difficulté**. Les conséquences M. Sarkozy a impo
8 leur rétention. Société Les conséquences En 2009, plus de
9 un **non problème** ». Société Les conséquences Les effectifs du
10 tion, jeunesse et culture Les conséquences **Loin des discours**
11 tion, jeunesse et culture Les conséquences La France est dev
12 ion en matière de culture. Les conséquences **Un recul réel** de
13 e la performance (INSEP). Les conséquences La pratique sport
14 tion, jeunesse et culture Les conséquences La France **n'est p**
15 . Europe et international Les conséquences La situation des
16 lectivités territoriales. Les conséquences Les collectivités
17 en **subissent aujourd'hui** les conséquences **de plein fouet**, v
18 t nous **payons lourdement** les conséquences et qu'il nous fa
19 ice **subit** jour après jour les conséquences (néfastes) de la
20 es **pressions** politiques. Les conséquences L'Assemblée nation
21 ngement de **statut refusé**. Les conséquences **L'impasse** du disc
22 **nce à l'égard** du pouvoir. Les conséquences Le classement eur
23 nstitutions et territoires Les conséquences 42 établissement
24 stitutions et territoires Les conséquences **Recul** de la puiss
25 mentalisation de Mayotte. Les conséquences Depuis 2007, le s

Figure 5.6 Concordance view of les conséquences in Hollande's 2012 anti-Sarkozy manifestos

This also explains the higher frequency of *je* (*l*), (underlined) on the right side of the node, between quotation marks, as part of the aforementioned quotations from Sarkozy.

Similarly negative expressions are found in Figure 5.6 (bold), on both sides of the node: *les conséquences*' section, this time (which follows *the measures*' section): *impoverished families facing difficulties* (l.7) *we pay a heavy price* (l.18), *political pressures* (l.20), *social and humanitarian consequences* (l.2), *dramatic consequences* (l.4), *M. Sarkozy has imposed* (l.7). *A real decline* (l.12) *France is now only at...* (l.14), *the decline of the public power* (l.24). The presence of these negative expressions on both sides of the node show that the negative discourse is present at least throughout both *the measures* and *the consequences* sections of each sequence. Some of these expressions are also nominalised relational processes in which *human-like sensors* (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 201) sense *phenomena*: *France is now only at* (l.14 Figure 5.6), *A damaged Republic*, (l.18, Figure 5.6), *a degraded and weakened justice* (l.1, Figure 5.5). These characteristics show how the writers refer to the opponent in parts of the discourse where they cannot quote him directly. This is done through complex structures, which eradicate any possibility of making a direct reference to Sarkozy, all the while implying that he is the actor of those processes: *degraded, weakened, damaged*, and so on. Extract 5.1 provides a complete example of one of those sequences. In addition, the metaphorical dimension of those human-like sensors allows the writers to heighten the pathos of the discourse, in that it enables the audience to relate to what those sensors feel.

Extract 5.1 exemplifies how the writers use contrasts as a CMAD to build up a solid argument against Sarkozy. To start with, the hyperbole in the noun modification *priorité absolue* (bold) in combination with the superlative *les pays les plus en pointe* in the reported speech allows the writers to refer to those to lay out the counter argument in the measures section: *aucun emploi scientifique* (underlined) contrasts dramatically with *priorité absolue* in the first section. This is enhanced with the

Extract 5.1 A « Les promesses-mesures-conséquences » section example from Hollande's 2012 adversarial manifesto

Les promesses - The promises

« L'enseignement supérieur et la recherche seront pour moi **une priorité absolue**. Leurs moyens seront portés au même niveau que dans **les pays les plus en pointe** sur le sujet. » [...] (Projet présidentiel de M. Sarkozy pour 2007)

"Higher education and research will be for me **an absolute priority**. Their means will be increased to reach the same level as in **the most advanced countries** on the subject." [...] (Presidential project of Mr Sarkozy for 2007).

Les mesures - The measures

Aucun emploi scientifique nouveau n'a été créé. 900 postes ont même été supprimés en 2009 malgré la mobilisation du monde universitaire. [...]

Not one new scientific job has been created. 900 jobs have even been lost in 2009 in spite of the unrest of the academic world. [...]

Les conséquences - The consequences

La France n'est plus qu'au 13e rang de l'OCDE en matière de recherche et développement et y consacre seulement 2 % de son PIB (c'est 10% de moins qu'il y a dix ans, et très loin de l'objectif de 3%) [...].

France is now only ranked 13th in the OECD in terms of research and development and only sanctions 2% of its GDP to it (it is 10% less than ten years ago, and very far from the 3% objective).

extreme negativity of *aucun, même, n'est plus, seulement, très loin de*, and so on (underlined) in the measures-consequences sections. As a result, the direct quote from the opponent is debunked by the facts that are exposed in the aftermath of the *promises* he made.

In effect, the argument relies on the impact of direct quotations from the opponent, which “reflects [the writers’] concern for the integrity and authenticity of the quoted message” (Besnier, 1993: 162; Voloshinov, 1929, [1978]) as well as a significant interest in using these quotes as an essential means to achieve Hollande’s adversarial move against Sarkozy. In addition, references for these quotes are provided in most cases. This enables the writers to claim the voters’ trust for themselves in the first instance, so that once this is achieved they can move on to the second stage of the demonstration, which consists of debunking the reported *promises*. Second, the use of numbers and figures originating from independent, supranational, and trustworthy sources such as the OECD, and GDP figures, helps the writers to reinforce the trust relationship with the readers, which, contributes to building a more effective argument against the opponent. Overall, this strategy is very similar to that observed in the 2012 US presidential debates, in which Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan refer to external sources to claim expertise (Clayman and Heritage, 2002), attack the opponent, and thereby perform an attack on the opponent’s credibility, which confirms the claim that different means can be used to achieve different adversarial goals in different contexts. Furthermore, this tailoring of the information also corresponds to Romney and Ryan’s strategic use of precise and vague language according to whose electoral program they focus on. Finally, the organisation of the argument in a tricolon allows the writers to build a “logical sequence” (Hoey, 1983, Winter, 1994) (between the promise (that is broken) and its (negative) consequences for all French people. The repetition of the combination of headlines *the promises / the consequences* helps that process in emphasizing the negative semantics of Sarkozy’s promises as broken commitments. This implies that

in addition to repeatedly breaking electoral promises, the opponent's actions as incumbent President have also had a negative impact on France's rank and influence in the world, which is a similar argument as found in the Conservatives' scaremongering studied in Example 5.1. This constitutes another dimension of the adversarial move in that it addresses not only Hollande's traditional electorate (such as academic staff and students, referred to in Extract 5.1 as *la mobilisation du monde universitaire*) but also the more conservative electorate of Sarkozy: those to whom the argument of France's ranking and influence in the world is more likely to appeal.

Overall, Extract 5.1 exemplifies how each sequence is elaborated to provide enough material to depict Sarkozy as unworthy of the voters' trust, which constitutes an important attack on Sarkozy's positive face. Hollande's party have an advantage on Sarkozy, as they are in the opposition. In consequence, the use of direct quotations is an important tool in itself because the opponent cannot claim plausible deniability of things that have been documented on. In addition, this allows the writers to use contrasts to enhance their own ethos (Charteris-Black, 2005) and appear more trustworthy while quoting an opponent who is not. Numbers and figures from various independent and credible sources help consolidate the discourse and build up a relationship of trust with the voters. In doing so, the writers carry out a continuous implied comparison between the topic of the discourse: Sarkozy's broken promises, and the metalanguage used to talk about those promises.

Finally, both Hollande and the Conservatives, even though they refer to promises in different ways, use the discourse of promise-making to carry out adversarial moves. And in the meantime, this allows them to enhance their own facework, and build up their ethos in a very similar way as found in both the debates and campaign speeches studied in Chapters 3 and 4. I continue this analysis in the next section, and focus on the second recurrent theme found to be harbouring evidence of adversarial moves in those manifestos: the appropriation of the opponent's argument.

5.4. Appropriating the opponent's argument and/or discourse

In the study carried out in the previous sections, I find that election manifestos rely on one's own traditional strengths in order to weaken the opponent in reminding the voters of their lack of expertise in that same area. This is the case of the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto where the writers emphasize the Conservative party's expertise in relation to economic matters, as a way of exacerbating Labour's failure to control the effects of the 2007 financial crisis. I also find that both the Conservatives and François Hollande also sometimes appropriate the opponent's discourse in the process of promise making. This section draws on this phenomenon and studies it further.

5.4.1. The socio-economic argument in Hollande's adversarial manifestos.

In Hollande's manifestos, appropriating the opponent's argument occurs in relation to the economy, as is exemplified in Extract 5.2.

In Extract 5.2, the discourse relies on three striking language patterns. There is the very detailed account of the increase of unemployment figures during Sarkozy's term in a very repetitive pattern which includes, on the one hand, specific numbers, figures and percentages in combination with, on the other hand, a very precise account of those figures' progression through time in the months leading up to the 2012 presidential election. To achieve this, key phrases are repeated throughout: *fin Octobre, fin Septembre, en un an, sur le000000000 seul mois d'Octobre, sur un an, aujourd'hui* (ll. 5, 6, 7-8, 11, 12, 13-14, 15, 19, 20, 26 28, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36 in bold). In addition, the overwording, that is, the "unusually high degree of wording, often involving many words which are near synonyms"

Extract 5.2.(1) Original version from Hollande's 2012 adversarial manifesto

1 23 Économie - Les conséquences

2 *Les politiques de droite* ont contribué à l'explosion d'un
3 chômage de masse. Le nombre de demandeurs d'emploi sans aucune
4 activité (catégorie A) ne cesse d'augmenter : il s'établit à
5 **2 814 900** en France métropolitaine **fin octobre 2011**. Ce nombre
6 est en hausse par rapport à la **fin septembre 2011** (+1,2%, soit
7 **+ 34 400**). Sur un an, il augmente de **4,9%** soit **+ 130 700** **en un**
8 **an !** Au total, le nombre des inscrits en catégories ABC - c'est-
9 à-dire l'ensemble des demandeurs d'emploi « tenus d'accomplir
10 des actes positifs de recherche » a explosé pour s'élever
11 **aujourd'hui** à **4 193 000**. Un chiffre en augmentation de **0,4%**
12 (**+17 200**) **sur le seul mois d'octobre**. **Sur un an**, il est en
13 hausse de **5,2%**, soit **+ 207 000** ! **Depuis** que *M. Sarkozy est au*
14 **pouvoir**, le nombre de ces demandeurs d'emploi (A, B, C) a
15 augmenté de **961 500** ! **Depuis le début de l'année 2011** : on
16 dénombre une augmentation de **+ 92 400** demandeurs d'emploi pour
17 la catégorie A et **+ 147 500** pour les catégories A, B, C. Un
18 taux de chômage élevé et qui ne recule plus : le taux de chômage
19 se stabilise à plus de **9%** (**aujourd'hui 9,6%**) alors qu'il était
20 à **7,5%** **avant la crise**. Il faut revenir à **début 1999** pour
21 retrouver un tel niveau ! Une inquiétude forte pour les seniors
22 et pour les jeunes : malgré *les injonctions répétées du*
23 *gouvernement* appelant à travailler plus longtemps, les seniors
24 restent massivement exclus du marché du travail. Le nombre de
25 demandeurs d'emploi de catégorie A, de 50 ans et plus, est de
26 **585 800** et s'accroît **en un an** de **15,5%**, soit **+ 78 700** (ce nombre
27 est de **847 100**, soit une augmentation de **112 300** pour la
28 catégorie A, B, C, soit **+ 15,3%**). Pour le seul **mois d'octobre**,
29 cette augmentation pour la catégorie A est de **13 500**, soit
30 **+2,4%** (pour les catégories A, B, C, l'augmentation **sur un mois**
31 est de **11 600**, soit **+ 1,4%**). Le nombre de demandeurs d'emploi
32 de moins de 25 ans de la catégorie A est de **440 300**, en hausse
33 de **0,6%**, **en octobre** (**+ 1,2%** sur un an), soit une augmentation
34 de **2 500** **sur un mois** (et une hausse de **5 100** **sur un an**). Pour
35 les A, B, C, ce nombre est porté à **626 500**, en hausse **sur un**
36 **an** de **1,2%** soit **+ 7 200** ; et en hausse **sur un mois** de **1 500**,
37 soit **+ 0,2%**.

Extract 5.2 (2) English translation of (1)

1 23 The Economy - The consequences

2 *Right-wing policies* have contributed to the explosion of mass
3 unemployment. The number of jobseekers with no activity
4 whatsoever (Category A) never ceases to rise: it totals
5 **2,814,900** in mainland France in **late October 2011**. This number
6 has increased in comparison with **late September 2011** (+1.2%,
7 i.e. + 34,000). **Over one year**, it has increased by 4.9%, i.e.,
8 **+130,000 in one year!** Overall, the enrolment figures in
9 categories ABC - that is, the entirety of job seekers « expected
10 to accomplish positive actions of research » has surged up to
11 **4,193,000 today**. This number has increased by 0.4% (+17,000)
12 **only over the month of October. Over one year**, it has increased
13 by 5.2% that is **+207,000!** **Since Mr Sarkozy has gained in power**,
14 the number of those job seekers (A, B, C) has increased by **961,**
15 **000!** An increase of the number of job seekers of **+ 92,000** has
16 been accounted for **in the year 2011** for the category A and **+**
17 **147,000** for categories A, B, C. An elevated unemployment rate
18 and which does not fall anymore: the unemployment rate has
19 stabilised above **9%** (**9.6% today**) when it was at **7.5%** before the
20 credit crunch. One has to look back **as far as 1999** to find a
21 similar rate! Concern is high for the elderly and the young,
22 in spite of *repeated injunctions from the government* calling
23 (sic) people to work longer, senior citizens remain massively
24 excluded from the job market. The number of job seekers of
25 category A, aged 50 and over, has reached **585,800** and has
26 increased by **15.5%** **In one year**, that is **+78.700** (this number
27 equals **847,100**, that is an increase of **112,300** for the category
28 (sic) A, B, C, that is **+15.3%**). **Only over the month of October**,
29 this increase for the category A is **13,500** that is **+2.4%** (for
30 categories A, B, C, the increase over a month is **11,600**, that
31 is **+1.4%**). The number of job seekers under 25 in category A is
32 **440,300** increasing by **0.6%** **in October** (**+1.2% over one year**),
33 that is an increase of 2500 over a month (and an increase of
34 **5,100 over one year**). As far as the A, B, C are concerned, this
35 number has reached **626,500**, increased by **1.2% over a year**, that
is **+7,200**; and still increasing by **1,500 over a month**, that is
+0.2%

(Fairclough, 2001: 96) of, in this case, synonymous processes and nominalised processes: *l'explosion, augmente, en hausse, a explosé, s'accroît, une augmentation* (underlined), in combination with the saturation of statistics and figures (grey highlights), produce a very technical discourse which is quite difficult to follow. As a result, none of the numbers and figures makes a lasting impression on the reader's mind. Instead, this is a very effective means for the writers in Hollande's campaign team to highlight that they are fully aware of the whole extent of the unemployment situation in France.

The adversarial move that motivates this extensive layout of technical discourse still undermines the opponent. In addition, the writers highlight quite effectively that common perceptions of Hollande's Socialist Party are misguided in that they are principally concerned with the well-being of the many and a strong welfare system, to the expense of socio-economic factors, and helping private enterprise (Moynot, 2012), which is usually Sarkozy's right-wing party's traditional concern.

In effect, in this case, the Socialist Party makes no mention of their traditional support for a strong welfare system at any point of the argument. Instead, the focus is on breaking down the unemployment figures, category by category, all the while implying the opponent's responsibility for said *increase*. To make this attack clearer, key items referring to Sarkozy or his government are found throughout the extract (italics), guiding the argument from three different angles.

The first one (l.1) takes the form of a statement opening the extract: *Les politiques de droite ont contribué à l'explosion d'un chômage de masse*. In this sentence, *les politiques de droite* is the actor of the relational process: *ont contribué*. In the form of a metonymy, the writers attempt to make it clear that *right-wing policies* (led by Sarkozy) are responsible for *the explosion of unemployment*. Therefore, not only Sarkozy but anyone involved in the writing of said *right-wing policies* is implicitly held responsible.

Second (l.13-15): a new declarative sentence provides another statement: *Depuis que M. Sarkozy est au pouvoir, le nombre de ces demandeurs d'emploi (A, B, C) a augmenté de 961 500!* In this statement, the writers precisely associate Sarkozy's coming into power five years earlier with the increase in the number of jobseekers. This argument is fallacious in that it is a deductive/causal (Winter, 2002: 52) which associates "two separate categories" (Charteris-Black, 2014: 147) while deliberately ignoring any other factors in the process. It does, however, constitute an adversarial move in the form of an FTA to Sarkozy as it holds him as solely responsible (out of the many alleged actors and factors in the French unemployment crisis) for the sole purpose of destabilisation.

Further in the extract, (l.21-22) the writers make a third statement: *Une inquiétude forte pour les seniors et pour les jeunes*. This is a second metonymy (cf l.1: *les politiques de droite*), which expresses the writers' concern and associates the people with it thanks to its elliptic structure: the nominalised process, *une inquiétude*, effectively stands for that concern. In doing so, the writers emphasize the government's, and implicitly, Sarkozy's, incapacity to deal with the crisis and solve the issue. This way, they attack the opponent on all possible fronts, by appropriating their argument on the economy and proving to the readers that they are capable of understanding, and therefore dealing with the situation. Second, they imply that the problem was caused by the opponent in the first place, and finally, that the opponent's government is unable to solve a crisis they were responsible for originally, which constitutes the final phase of the FTA. This strategy is very similar to those documented in the 2012 US presidential debates (Chapter 3). However, in the present case this seems to be done with a different goal in mind: to attract the right-wing electorate and show that Hollande, the left-wing candidate, is no less competent than his right-wing opponent in terms of socio-economic policies, especially after providing such a negative representation of Sarkozy's record.

Appropriating the opponent’s economic arguments as Hollande’s team main strategy allows them to carry out powerful FTAs. First, this allows them to present Hollande as a worthy candidate, second, that the source of the problem is the policies led by the opponent and other leaders of the right. Third, they insist on the fact that since the opponent’s arrival in power things have got worse, thereby providing a fallacious argument to the voters as none of the other possible factors are mentioned in the discourse. Finally, they state that the opponent and his government have been incompetent in dealing with a situation for which they are responsible. This strategy is, in effect, very similar to that of Mitt Romney facing Obama (the incumbent US President) in the 2012 debate series (Chapter 3).

5.4.2. A diachronic review of *and* in the Conservatives’ election manifestos

| L1 | NODE | R1 | KEY |
|-------------|------------|---------|--|
| FAMILIES | AND | THE | Addressee group |
| SERVICES | | WE | Speaker group |
| OPEN | | OTHER | Forms of inclusivity |
| POWER | | SUPPORT | Public services |
| POVERTY | | GIVE | Contextually dependent items |
| STABILITY | | TO | Opponent group |
| CHILDREN | | ENSURE | Government, law and financial services |
| REGULATION | | WILL | Governing entities and related issues |
| SCHOOLS | | WORK | |
| CONSERVE | | MAKE | |
| ENTERPRISE | | FOR | |
| ENVIRONMENT | | PROTECT | |
| INVESTMENT | | CONTROL | |
| POLITICS | | BY | |
| HEALTH | | IMPROVE | |
| CHANGE | | MORE | |
| PEOPLE | | ENHANCE | |
| DEFENCE | INEQUALITY | | |
| SECTOR | REFORM | | |
| COUNCILS | SECURITY | | |

Figure 5.7 L1 and R1 Patterns of *and* in the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto

The study of the conjunction *and* in the British Conservatives' manifestos shows how adaptive the discourse is relation to the electoral context. In 2010, the Conservatives have been in the opposition for 13 years, while the main opponent, Labour, has been in power. Figure 5.7 highlights the main patterns of *and* found in the Conservatives' 2010 election manifesto. The patterns view reproduced from Wordsmith (Scott, 2012) in Figure 5.7 highlights how binomials are used by the Conservatives to claim themes that are more traditional to the left, and Labour: the opponent, than to the right. Families and services are the most frequent L1 collocates, as illustrated in Figures 5.8a and b. This use of key items constitutes an essential part (CMAD) of the Conservatives' strategy of appropriating the opponent's discourse

| N | Concordance |
|-----|--|
| 364 | for business, bad for families and bad for everyone's quality |
| 365 | ocus on the neediest families, and better involve organisations |
| 366 | It needs individuals, families and businesses pulling alongside. |
| 367 | the poorest third of families and families with disabled childre |
| 368 | hildren, Schools and Families; and, giving the poorest children |
| 369 | older people play in families and in society, and will not let |
| 370 | state to individuals, families and local communities . We will gi |
| 371 | cracy to individuals, families and neighbourhoods . We will give |
| 372 | men and women, their families, and our veterans deserve the best |
| 373 | ising, and could save families and pensioners up to £219 over t |
| 374 | and benefits to help families and pensioners Strong families are |
| 375 | r Armed Forces, their families and veterans are properly taken c |
| 376 | vice personnel, their families and veterans . Labour have failed |

Figure 5.8a Concordance lines of families and services as L1 collocates of and in the Conservatives 2010 manifesto

In the case of *families*, (Figure 5.8a) this plural noun frequently co-occurs with other plural nouns: *veterans*, *pensioners*, but also *neighbourhoods*, and *businesses* (highlighted: bold).

N Concordance

801 ployed in our **public services**, and a Conservative government will
802 se who have left the services; and, ' review the rules governin
803 s to vital drugs and services, and create a greater focus on prev
804 ding **GP out of hours services**, and ensure that every patient can
805 tter access to **local services**, and give mothers a real choice ov
806 ake control of **vital services**, and give people the chance to have
807 s to the **treatments, services** and information that improve and
808 uality of our **public services**. And only in this way will we rebui
809 in delivering **public services** and tackling deep-rooted social pr
810 ses to deliver **public services** and training new community organis
811 success of **financial services**, and where all parts of the country

Figure 5.8b Concordance lines of services as L1 collocates of and in the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto

On the one hand, *services* (Figure 5.8b) is part of the noun-group *public services* in many occurrences (highlighted: bold), and on the other hand, that noun group collocates with processes *give* and *ensure* on the other side of the node. These phrases resonate with the notion of public services and care: *ensure that every patient, give mothers a real choice, give people the chance* (highlighted: underlined).

Figure 5.9 gives an account of the most frequent cluster occurring with *and*, and together, these two tables clearly show the recurrent binomials which occur in this context, and constitute patterns of repetition and overwording (Fairclough, 2001: 96) as part of the Conservatives' rhetoric.

| CLUSTER | FREQ. | KEY |
|-------------------------|-------|--|
| AND WE WILL | 34 | Addressee group |
| AN OPEN AND | 8 | Speaker group |
| ENHANCE THE NATURAL | 7 | Forms of inclusivity |
| THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT | 7 | Public services |
| WE WILL GIVE | 6 | Contextually dependent items |
| CONSERVE AND ENHANCE | 6 | Opponent group |
| AND ENHANCE THE | 6 | Government, law and financial services |
| THE NUMBER OF | 5 | Governing entities and related issues |
| AND DEMOCRATIC EUROPE | 5 | |
| AND CONTROL OVER | 5 | |
| WE WILL INTRODUCE | 5 | |
| PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT | 5 | |
| AND ENSURE THAT | 5 | |
| AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT | 5 | |
| POWER AND CONTROL | 5 | |

Figure 5.9 Clusters of and in the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto

A recurrent theme surfaces: the protection of the environment (purple highlights in Figure 5.9). This shows that *and* is frequently used as a rhetorical device in a sentence initial position, while preceding *we will* which emphasizes the positive characteristics of what it is that *we will* do, and thereby increases the intensity of the adversarial strategy (SMAD). In addition, this also emphasizes the intentionality of *will*, as if to defy the opponent, thus implicitly acknowledging that this is not a traditional discourse from the Conservatives.

| | |
|----|---|
| N | Concordance |
| 9 | ONMENT <u>Conserve and enhance</u> the natural environment We will |
| 10 | onment <u>CONSERVE AND ENHANCE</u> THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT With a |
| 11 | onment <u>CONSERVE AND ENHANCE</u> THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT â€¢ not |
| 12 | nge 91 <u>Conserve and enhance</u> the natural environment 95 Promote |
| 13 | onment <u>CONSERVE AND ENHANCE</u> THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT Conserve |
| 14 | onment <u>CONSERVE AND ENHANCE</u> THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT To give |

Figure 5.10 Concordance view of environment in the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto

The findings from Figures 5.9, 10, 11 indicate that *will* co-occurs with items of the semantic category of public services and care, and more specifically the protection of *the natural environment* (Figures 5.9 and 5.11).

N Concordance

951 high Labour have failed to do. And we will not pay hospitals i
952 Union We are a unionist party and we will not put the Union at
953 is passionate about the Union and we will never do anything to
954 is unacceptable and abhorrent, and we will never condone it. W
955 d over any more areas of power and we will never join the Euro.
960 communities in deprived areas, and we will **introduce** National
961 or people and the environment; and, We will **introduce** honesty
962 to be voted on in Parliament. And we will **introduce** a new Public
963 accountable to its customers. And we will **introduce** a moratorium
964 by proven serious wrongdoing. And we will **introduce** a Parliament
967 elsewhere by a greater amount. And we will **give** the public the
968 is not arrested or prosecuted, and we will **give** householders g
969 uch more open and transparent. And we will **give** the people who

Figure 5.11 Concordance view of *and we will* in the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto (27 lines of 31)

Additionally, the binomial: *conserve and enhance*, is used as a main section headline (Figure 5.10), which emphasizes this focus on environment in the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto. The set *and we will* is a key element of the discourse in that it is used in sentence initial position, which allows the writer to insist on what is to follow. Figure 5.11 shows two trends that can be found in this context. First, *and we will* is part of a negative phrase either including *not* or *never* (highlighted: underlined) which emphasizes the writers' determination and functions as an act of reassurance towards the voters. In addition, *will* is used here as both a marker of willpower,

emphasized by the sentence initial position of the phrase, and a marker of futurity, which creates an impression of certainty. Second, *and we will* is used to introduce processes mentioned earlier: *introduce, reform, give* (highlighted: bold) which also emphasizes the writers' intention to reassure the voters with this type of discourse, all the while promoting the ideal of change as an essential part of their 2010 strategy. Examples 5.7.a, b, c, highlight what is conveyed through some of those instances.

Examples 5.7.a, b, c: instances of and we will in the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto

a. **And we will introduce** a Parliamentary Privilege Act to make clear that privilege cannot be abused by MPs to evade justice.

b. **And we will reform** the police, giving them back their professional discretion

c. **And we will tighten** the rules on taxpayer-funded publicity spending by town halls.

Finally, coordinated clauses where *we will* stands for both futurity and willpower also occur throughout the discourse, as Examples 5.7d, e, f, show. These examples demonstrate how the Conservatives attempt to appropriate the opponent's argument in a convincing manner, and thereby perform an adversarial move against them, which requires the use of powerful rhetorical tools. Among those, I account for the over-representation of the semantic categories of public services and welfare (*support, enhance, families, pensioners, public services*). In addition, I find evidence of rhetorical underlining performed through binomials, especially in section headings of the document (*conserve and enhance*, but also *promote and ensure*). And finally, the sentence initial *And* phrases allow the writers to increase the impact of this discourse on the voters as well as emphasize the degree of intentionality of the process *will*.

Examples 5.7.d-h: we will in the Conservatives 2010 manifesto

d. **we will promote** the teaching of systematic synthetic phonics **and ensure** that teachers are properly trained to teach using this method.

e. **We will honour** our commitment to spend 0.7 per cent of national income in aid, **and ensure** our aid is transparent and properly targeted.

f. **We will promote** high animal welfare standards **and ensure** that government procures locally-produced food wherever possible.

g. **We will restore** the Military Covenant **and ensure** that our Armed Forces, their families and veterans are properly taken care of

h. **We will sweep away** the rules that stop local newspapers owning other local media platforms **and create** a new network of local television stations.

NConcordance

1 ellence and root out poor care, and we will continue to back th
2 arch and development tax credits and we will continue to support
3 . But there is still more to do, and we will continue to champion
4 lobal processes on arms control. And we will continue to support
5 frozen, pending Charter renewal. And we will continue to topsl
6 and frustration for the public. And we will continue to review o
7 on in the five years since 2010. And we will continue spend more

Figure 5.12 Concordance view of and in the Conservatives' 2015 manifesto

Considering the discourse in the Conservatives' 2015 manifestos, the argument is radically different. The concept of *continuity* emerges as an important theme, as Figure 5.12 shows. This is quite clearly due to the change of context for the Conservatives, as they had then become the incumbent party running for re-election. Therefore, their electoral rhetoric has indeed changed to advocate for *continuity* instead. *And* placed in sentence-initial position as it is above (ll.4, 5, 6), is a rhetorical tool that emphasizes what is to follow: in this case, *we will continue*. This allows the Conservatives to use a similarly structured argument relying on the rhetorical force of *and* in sentence initial position in both manifestos, all the while advocating for radically different ideas. AS such, this use of sentence-initial *and* constitutes a SMAD, as it supports two different strategies across time.

Table 5.3 Clusters of *and* in the Conservatives' 2015 manifesto

| N | CLUSTER | FREQ. | LENGTH |
|---|---|-------|--------|
| 1 | THE BEST SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS FOR YOU AND YOUR FAMILY | 39 | 9 |
| 2 | SECURING A BETTER FUTURE FOR YOU, YOUR FAMILY, AND BRITAIN | 17 | 10 |
| 3 | SECURING YOUR HOME AND YOUR NEIGHBOURHOOD | 15 | 6 |
| 4 | AN ECONOMIC PLAN TO HELP YOU AND YOUR FAMILY | 11 | 9 |
| 5 | CUTTING TAXES MAKING WELFARE FAIRER AND CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION | 9 | 9 |
| 6 | ENGLAND AND WALES | 8 | 3 |
| 7 | HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE | 6 | 4 |
| 8 | YOU AND YOUR FAMILY | 5 | 4 |

Table 5.3 shows that in 2015, the Conservatives' strategy still focuses on trying to win over a wider part of the electorate by appropriating the opponent's argument on welfare and social issues. However, in this case, the protection of the environment does not seem to be as important an argument as it was five years before. Instead, the Conservatives seem to make an extra effort to address the voters on family matters: *schools and hospitals* in particular. Table 5.3 also shows that this intense focus on family issues is achieved through section headings (ll.1-5), in a similar

fashion to their 2010 manifesto. One keyword *your*, and the binomial *you and your* are particularly frequent in those headings, as Figure 5.13 demonstrates (boxed).

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Figure 5.13 Contents page of the Conservatives' 2015 manifesto

Similar to the findings from 2010, Figure 5.13 shows that the clusters found in the Conservatives' 2015 manifesto also correspond to major headlines of the document,

which confirms the fact that this argument is indeed central, and has replaced that of the *protection of the natural environment* from 2010. Furthermore, binomials are used repeatedly again (*you and your*) which allows the Conservatives to increase the impact of the argument. In doing so, the strategy also changes from 2010 in that they are now addressing the voters directly. Meanwhile, the inclusion of *your family* allows them build up inclusivity in the discourse, and show that their manifesto is both about the well-being of voters and non-voters, an argument that has already been introduced with the narrow focus on schools in particular, and which contributes greatly to the elaboration of the Conservatives' 2015 strategy of addressing the voters (CMAD). This, therefore, also constitutes a means for the Conservatives to address a more ordinary part of the electorate, who may have suffered most from the cuts in the aforementioned welfare system the Conservative-led coalition government carried out in the five years prior to this election.

In addition, the notion of *continuity* that is present in the 2015 manifesto entails that something has already started. Figure 5.14 shows what this consists of. Many processes with a positive outcome or a positive semantic prosody that were used in the 2010 manifesto are also found here: *succeed, introduce, help, support*. However, these are used in collocation with the set *we have already* and at times in a past form, whereas they were more frequent as R collocates of *we will* in the 2010 manifesto. This allows the Conservatives to mark continuity with their own material from five years ago. This also allows them to provide a very positive representation of their record after five years in power, which eventually justifies semantically the subsequent use of the set *we will continue*.

N Concordance

93 ay from Brussels, not to it. We have already taken action to ret
94 not one that holds us back. We have already succeeded in exempti
95 arine Conservation Zones that we have already started, to create
96 cluding non-violent extremism We have already reformed the Prevent
97 trafficking and exploitation We have already re-introduced a prop
98 urs of free childcare a week We have already legislated to introdu
99 and support the vulnerable We have already introduced a new Vic
100 s alcoholism and gambling. We have already introduced tougher r
101 ke schools funding fairer. We have already increased funding f
102 and the rights of victims. We have already increased the propor
103 top of the £120 billion that we have already identified and deliv
104 overnment suppliers sign up. We have already helped small busine
105 l back your child's teachers We have already given teachers grea
106 d help you secure a good job We have already delivered 2.2 millio
107 services wherever possible. We have already created 20 high-qual
108 gration from outside the EU We have already capped the level of
109 pport our creative industries We have already boosted funding f
110 rement in the renegotiation. We have already banned housing benef
111 have been dragged into it. We have already announced an above-
112 rity in the next Parliament. We have already allowed for expulsio

Figure 5.14 Concordance view of we have in the Conservatives' 2015 manifesto

Thirdly, the set *we have already* in a sentence initial position shows that this is the starting point of a new argument, which therefore, makes it more difficult to question as a topos of reality: "*Because reality is like X, Y should be done*" (Charteris-Black, 2014: 133-135). In this case, the argument follows a similar logic, *we have already done X, therefore we will continue Y*.

5.4.3. Addressing the voters in the Conservatives' 2010 manifestos

The previous section has highlighted that the Conservatives address the voters directly in their 2015 manifesto, through binomials such as *you and your* used as section headlines of the documents. This section reviews how this strategy differs dramatically from the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto, in which they seem to refer to the voters through *they* and *their* and, as a consequence, barely address them directly.

| N | KEY WORD | FREQ. | % | KEYNESS |
|----|-------------|-------|------|---------|
| 1 | A | 343 | 1.19 | 111.35 |
| 2 | CHANGE | 112 | 0.39 | 103.47 |
| 3 | POLITICS | 54 | 0.19 | 53.82 |
| 4 | A | 628 | 2.17 | 47.99 |
| 5 | GOVERNMENT | 156 | 0.54 | 47.6 |
| 6 | SOCIETY | 70 | 0.24 | 39.72 |
| 7 | POWER | 68 | 0.24 | 39.37 |
| 8 | IS | 271 | 0.94 | 35.71 |
| 9 | STATE | 48 | 0.17 | 34.81 |
| 10 | SUSTAINABLE | 20 | 0.07 | 31.69 |
| 11 | GET | 41 | 0.14 | 28.69 |
| 12 | SECTOR | 47 | 0.16 | 27.44 |
| 13 | OF | 806 | 2.79 | 26.62 |
| 14 | GIVE | 78 | 0.27 | 25.96 |
| 15 | CARBON | 28 | 0.1 | 25.08 |
| 16 | LABOUR'S | 37 | 0.13 | 24.01 |
| 17 | SECURE | 4 | 0.01 | -29.84 |
| 18 | NEXT | 10 | 0.03 | -32.64 |
| 19 | INCOME | 3 | 0.01 | -33.39 |
| 20 | HAVE | 127 | 0.44 | -34.34 |
| 21 | FAMILY | 16 | 0.06 | -37.93 |
| 22 | PLAN | 15 | 0.05 | -48.07 |
| 23 | PARTY | 16 | 0.06 | -53.89 |
| 24 | MANIFESTO | 10 | 0.03 | -57.47 |
| 25 | # | 329 | 1.14 | -66.3 |
| 26 | CONTINUE | 14 | 0.05 | -72.42 |
| 27 | YOUR | 6 | 0.02 | -209.67 |
| 28 | YOU | 6 | 0.02 | -224.72 |

Figure 5.15 Keyword list comparison between the Conservatives' 2010 and 2015 manifestos

In effect, Figure 5.15 reproduces a positive and negative keywords list comparison from Wordsmith (Scott, 2012) between the two manifestos, which highlights that *your* and *you* (ll. 27 and 28) are indeed negative keywords in the 2010 manifesto (while *sustainable* is a positive keyword). Furthermore, the negative keyness of *you* (-224.72,) is particularly striking in Figure 5.15, in that it indicates the remarkable rarity of the item in comparison with 2015, which clearly highlights a change of address strategy between the two election campaigns. In addition, Figures 5.16 and 5.17 reproduce concordance lines which highlight how *they* and *their* are used instead.

Figures 5.16 and 5.17 show that in their 2010 manifesto, the Conservatives use *they* and *their* cohesively to refer back to the public: *families, our Forces* and so on (blue highlights in Figures 5.16 and 5.17), which are, consequently, not used for othering (cf van Dijk, 1993; Pennycook, 1994: 177; Maalej, 2013: 639). Examples 5.8a, b provide a more detailed insight into how *they* and *their* are use as inclusive rather than excluding pronouns in this context.

N Concordance

1 our Forces without the resources they need to fulfil this goal.
2 de parents with the reassurance they need that their child is m
3 e our Forces have the resources they need to carry out their mi
4 yone can access the advice they need. â€¢ provide 10,000 extra
5 d have access to the personal care they need. We will work to d
6 the start-up funding and support they need to bid for governme
7 ol every year without the skills they need to get a good As wel
8 lthcare providers the incentives they need to drive up quality.
9 on of illness get the attention they need. We will provide sepa
10 ide people with the information they need to make more respons
11 er by giving people the information they need to challenge the

Figure 5.16 Concordance view of they in the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto (11 of 95 entries)

N Concordance

1 opportunity to take more control over their lives. We will strengthen
2 give families more control over their lives. We will support and
3 give families more control over their lives, we will put funding
4 plans deserve the best for putting their lives on the line to pro
5 Give families more control over their lives To give families more
6 giving people more power over their lives, we have a government
7 much more power and control over their lives. Citizens themselves
8 trusts that would prolong or improve their lives by reforming the wa
9 ple more power and control over their lives â€“ giving local coun
10 have more power and control over their lives â€“ is a massive un
11 to take power and control over their lives. Our approach is ab

Figure 5.17 Concordance view of their in the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto (11 of 137 entries)

Examples 5.8.a, b, of uses of they and their in the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto

- a. We will always ensure our Forces have the resources they need to carry out their mission properly..
- b. ...and our veterans deserve the best for putting their lives on the line to protect our liberties.

In Example 5.8a, the promise: *we will always*, and inclusivity (*our*) confirms this aspect of the discourse. In addition, the use of superlatives in collocation with the topic: *armed forces*, highlights that this discourse is an appeal to the voters' emotions (or pathos) (Mshvenieradze, 2013 1940). In this sentence, the speaker is present as actor of the main processes while the armed forces' participant role is that of the patient of those same processes.

In 5.8b, the writers are only implicitly accounted for, through the inclusive determiner *our*, which shows inclusivity. In addition, the relational process *deserve* confirms the relationship of dependence between the *veterans* and *we*. Thirdly, in the adverbial phrase: *for putting their lives on the line* introduced by the conjunction *for*, the function of the conjunction (Halliday and Matthiessen: 2004: 52, 358) is to bind the two clauses together: it provides a justification to the main process *deserve (the best)*: because they *put their lives on the line*.

This study demonstrates that the Conservatives use a similar rhetoric in the 2010 and 2015 elections (for instance, *And we will...*) but with a view to support two diametrically opposed adversarial strategies. In 2010, they appropriate the argument of the protection of the environment, whereas in 2015 they focus this part of the discourse on the care of ordinary people. Second, this is done while using two different means with regards to inclusivity, using the third person plural *they* and *their* in 2010, and switching to the direct mode of address available with *you* and *your* in 2015. It seems they use these arguments with two related but different goals. In 2010, the argument for the protection of the environment seems to be an attempt to compete, and therefore undermine, the Labour party on issues that they are traditionally closer to. In 2015, their discourse changes to focus on the care of the people (*you and your family*) which seems to constitute an attempt to reassure parts of the electorate that may have suffered from the policies of deep cuts in welfare services that the Conservative-led coalition government carried out between 2010 and 2015. Finally, the next section of this chapter focuses on the third theme through which Hollande and the Conservatives attempt to reassure the voters all the while performing adversarial moves.

5.5. Change as an adversarial strategy

The final area where I find evidence of adversarial discourse relates to the concept of change versus continuity. The previous chapters have highlighted cases in which candidates rely on those concepts to promote their electoral programs, and increase their desirability. This is especially the case with Romney and Ryan in the 2012 US debates, with regards to change, as they attempt to differentiate themselves from the Obama/Biden incumbent administration. Obama himself plays this card in his 2008 campaign speeches, in which he insists on the similarities between his opponent John McCain and the incumbent President George W. Bush. The present section reviews how the British Conservatives and French candidate François Hollande also refer to the concept of change in their respective manifestos as a means to perform adversarial moves.

5.5.1. The Conservatives' manifestos

Figure 5.15 (in the previous section) provides a comparative view of keywords in the Conservatives' 2010 and 2015 manifestos. Among those, *change* features as a positive keyword in the 2010 manifesto while *continue* is a negative keyword (which means it occurs more often in 2015 than in 2010). In 2010, some of the Conservatives' manifesto headings include the keywords *change* and *ensure*. This highlights the party's attempts to promote *change* through their electoral program, which implies change from the Labour government, which had been in power at the time for 13 years.

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Figure 5.18a Change and ensure in headings (boxed) in the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto (part 1)

Figures 5.18a and b highlight these patterns (boxed). The focus, here, is on bringing *change* to many parts of the British society: *the economy, society, and politics*. *Change*, in political discourse, is often used as a powerful tool to emphasize a positive looking future. As a result, it is found quite regularly in political campaigns:

vote for change in the 2008 Obama campaign (Huffington Post, 2008 [2011]), *le changement c'est maintenant* in Hollande's 2012 campaign (see second part of this

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This manifesto is available in braille, easyread, large print and audio.
Please call 020 7222 9000 to request a copy, or visit our website
www.conservatives.com.

Figure 5.18b Change in headings (boxed) in the Conservatives' 2010 manifesto (part 2)

section), and in the 2010 Conservative manifesto, are only but a few examples. Here, *change* is for the best, and from the worst: a *change* from the Labour government.

In Figure 5.18a, the notion of *change* is applied to the economy, and more specifically to *macroeconomic stability* (Figure 5.18a, boxed). This key noun group is indicative of two correlated moves. First, the Conservatives effectively challenge the opponent without naming them. To do so, they draw on the instability of the economy, which needs *changing*, and thereby imply that the opponent is responsible for said instability, as they were in power till then. Second, this discourse aims to mobilise parts of the electorate whose interests are deeply embedded within the notion of macroeconomic stability: the financial elites and business owners, in order to steer those votes away from the opponent towards the Conservatives. This way, the Conservatives' discourse is constructed in order to lay the blame for said crisis on the opponent, through phrases such as *change the economy*, (ll. 1, 2, 3) in the wake of which they adopt the opposite stance and advocate *stability*, which will provide hope to a wide part of the electorate. In addition, the term *macroeconomic* has the potential to effectively reassure the voters in that it claims knowledge and expertise (cf Clayman and Heritage, 2002). This allows the Conservatives to make a strategic move to undermine the opponent in that it questions their ability to deal with the crisis in the past, as well as in the future. This orientation of the argument continues in other parts of the manifestos.

Figure 5.18b highlights another domain, *society*, on which the discourse is focused, and underlines the intention of the writers to reach as wide an audience as possible. The fact that *change society*, *change politics* and *change the economy* occur in the manifestos as section headlines (Figures 5.13a and b, boxed) indicates how crucial it is to pass on this information to the voters, and thus how essential to the overall strategy this is (CMAD). This also indicates the importance of the notion of change in their electoral argument.

Examples 5.9a,b, c, d. change in the Conservatives' 2010 manifestos.

a. **change** the economy | *get Britain working again*

Get Britain working again

We will reduce youth unemployment and reduce the number of children in workless households as part of our strategy for tackling poverty and inequality.

b. **change** society | *back the NHS*

Back the NHS

We will back the NHS. We will increase health spending every year.

c. **change** politics | *make politics more transparent*

Make politics more transparent

We will publish details of the money government spends and the people it employs. People will have a right to government data to make the performance of the state transparent. We will cut the unaccountable quango state and root out waste.

d. So we plan to **change** Britain with a sweeping redistribution of power: *from the state to citizens; from the government to Parliament; from Whitehall to communities; from Brussels to Britain; from bureaucracy to democracy.* Taking power away from the political elite and handing it to the man and woman in the street.

Examples 5.9a-d highlight how *change* is used in the manifesto. In Examples 5.9a, b, c, *change* is included in the section headings, headers as well as in introduction to the discourse itself, which increases its keyness in the document overall. This allows the writers to insist on this notion and make it omnipresent. In addition, Example 5.9d shows how *change* is also used within the discourse, in different sequences than in collocation with section headings.

Repetition patterns are a key component of each example above. This is the case of *change*, of course (bold) on a macro-scale across the document, as explained above. Second, this also includes the recurrence of structures, sometimes word for word (italics, Examples 5.9a, b, c) in section headings and headers, and more importantly in Example 5.9d, with the four successive isocolons *from X to Y* (italics), which create a rhythm that appeals to the audience's pathos. This resonates with Hollande's adversarial strategy in some of his manifestos. As such, this constitutes a supportive means of adversarial discourse (SMAD). Thirdly, *will* and other expressions of futurity and intentionality (underlined) punctuate each example, which allows the writers to highlight the intentionality of the discourse (and thereby make promises). Finally, because the notion of *change* is central to each of these examples, the writers implicitly refer to the opponent, Labour, whose policies as the party in power have damaged *society, the economy, politics, and Britain* in such a way that it requires *changes*. Juxtapositions as in *change society, back the NHS* (Example 5.9b) constitute a powerful attack against Labour, in that they imply they did not do so. However, the process *back the NHS*, does not convey a particularly radical idea of *change*. Instead, it indicates mere support, which increases considerably the power of the attack on Labour, as it implies they did not even support it during the past 13 years.

In fact, most processes are quite similar in that the kind of change they indicate is rather unspecified and vague: *reduce and reduce* (Example 5.9a), *back, increase* (Example 5.9b), *publish, cut* (Example 5.9c). These processes effectively contrast with the powerful statements made in the section headings. They do not, however, seem to jeopardise the strength of the argument, and as such, seem to constitute a successful use of vague language, which allows the Conservatives to emphasize intentionality rather than facts. This resonates, this time, with Romney and Ryan's usage of vague language in the 2012 US debate series (Chapter 3), which confirms the use of vague language as a SMAD rather than CMAD, as it is used invariably to

support different strategies in different contexts. Finally, Example 5.8d exemplifies this quite clearly in that it fails to provide any precise indication of how the change will be operated, all the while focusing the argument on the powerful rhetorical tool of the isocolons which build up from: *from the state to citizens*, to the climax: *from bureaucracy to democracy*.

5.5.2 Hollande's manifestos

In Hollande's mainstream manifestos, the notion of *change* is also central to his electoral argument. Figure 5.19 and Extract 5.8 show the two combined strategies he uses to refer to the *change* he calls for, in addition with his campaign slogan *le changement c'est maintenant* (*change is now*).

| L5 | L4 | L3 | L2 | L1 | NODE | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 |
|----------|---------|-----------|---------|-------------|------|--------------|-----------|--------------|----------|------------|
| ET | DE | DE | LA | ET | JE | VEUX | LA7 | LA | DE | DE |
| LA | E | LES | DE | QUE | | FERAI | UNE | UNE | DES | LES |
| DES | LA | ET | ET | ANS | | PROPOSERAI | LES | LES | LA | LA |
| DES | DES | LA | DES | FRANCE | | RENFORCERAI | LES | PLACE | LES | DES |
| UN | DANS | DES | LES | ECONOMIE | | CREERAI | EN | LOI | DU | ET |
| LES | POUR | DANS | LE | TRAVAIL | | METTRAI | UNE | CE | QUE | EN |
| DU | JE | AUX | DU | QUINQUENNAT | | REFORMERAI | FAIRE | DE | JUSTICE | QUI |
| POUR | VEUX | OU | EN | CHANGEMENT | | SOUTIENDRAI | REDONNER | CREATION | POUR | POUR |
| LES | LES | PLUS | CE | PUBLIC | | FAVORISERAI | REDRESSER | INDEPENDENCE | AUX | NOUVELLES |
| REDONNER | FRANCE | REDRESSER | UNE | ETAT | | GARANTIRAI | SUR | PRESENCE | EN | JE |
| EN | MOYENS | DU | CET | 2012 | | REVIENDRAI | POUR | UN | LE | DANS |
| JE | EN | EN | PARCE | ARTISTIQUE | | LUTTERAI | DE | REPUBLIQUE | NOUVELLE | FRANCE |
| SERONT | CONTRE | LE | PAR | DIGNITE | | DEFENDRAI | VOTER | SORTE | LOI | REFORME |
| SCOLAIRE | DES | | PLUS | EFFET | | RELANCERAI | DES | STATUT | JE | BANQUES |
| UNE | COMME | | SERA | ENTREPRISES | | PRESERVERAI | AUX | EPARGNE | FRANCE | UN |
| AUX | INTERET | | VIE | MOYENS | | DONNERAI | RETABLIR | AVEC | UN | SUR |
| SUR | LE | | POUR | MONDE | | RETABLIRAI | CONTRE | TOUTE | EUROPEEN | PAR |
| LUTTER | ESPOIR | | SA | GENERATIONS | | LANCERAI | DEFENDE | POLITIQUE | DANS | EUROPEENNE |
| FACE | | | DIX | | | VEILLERAI | DONNER | FISCALITE | UNE | CONTRE |
| FRANCE | | | DEFENSE | | | MAINTIENDRAI | QUE | LE | ET | PAYS |

Figure 5.19 Patterns of *je* in Hollande's 2012 mainstream manifestos

Figure 5.19 shows the patterns occurring with the node *je* (*I*), which refers in a wide majority of cases to François Hollande himself. This highlights the type of processes Hollande/*je* is the actor of: *proposerai, soutiendrai, favoriserai, lancerai, rétablirai, donnerai* (*make propositions, support, favour, launch, re-establish, give*)... (R1

collocates: purple). These positive outcome processes convey an idea of change, among which the “re-processes” (my definition): *redonner, rétablir, renforcer*, (*restore, re-establish, reinforce*) especially imply their object was taken away from the addressees, allegedly by the opponent.

Extract 5.8. Conclusion of Hollande’s 2012 mainstream manifesto.

ALORS, OÙ EN SOMMES-NOUS MAINTENANT ? ON NOUS DIT QUE PLUS RIEN N'EST POSSIBLE. ON NOUS DIT QU'ON NE PEUT RIEN FACE À LA DETTE, FACE AUX MARCHÉS FINANCIERS, FACE AU RESTE DU MONDE. ON NOUS DIT QUE NOS ENFANTS AURONT UNE VIE MOINS FACILE QUE LEURS PARENTS. ON NOUS DIT QU'ON N'A PLUS D'AUTRE CHOIX QUE DE SUBIR. ALORS QUE C'EST JUSTEMENT POUR TOUTES CES RAISONS QUE C'EST MAINTENANT QU'IL FAUT AGIR. C'EST MAINTENANT QU'IL FAUT RELEVER LA TÊTE, C'EST MAINTENANT QU'IL FAUT FAIRE LES BONS CHOIX, C'EST MAINTENANT QU'IL FAUT REPREDRE CONFIANCE EN NOUS, C'EST MAINTENANT QU'IL FAUT SE DONNER TOUTES LES CHANCES DE RÉUSSIR, C'EST MAINTENANT QUE NOUS AVONS UNE CHANCE À SAISIR.

THEN, WHERE ARE WE NOW? **WE ARE BEING TOLD** THAT NOTHING IS POSSIBLE ANYMORE. **WE ARE BEING TOLD** THAT WE CANNOT DO ANYTHING TO FACE THE DEBT, TO FACE THE FINANCIAL MARKETS, TO FACE THE REST OF THE WORLD. **WE ARE BEING TOLD** THAT OUR CHILDREN WILL HAVE A HARDER LIFE THAN THEIR PARENTS. **WE ARE BEING TOLD** THAT THERE IS NO OTHER CHOICE BUT TO SUFFER. *WHEN* IT IS ACTUALLY FOR ALL THOSE REASONS THAT NOW WE MUST ACT. NOW WE MUST RAISE OUR HEADS. NOW WE MUST MAKE THE RIGHT CHOICES, NOW WE MUST RESTORE OUR CONFIDENCE, NOW WE MUST GIVE OURSELVES EVERY CHANCE TO SUCCEED, NOW WE HAVE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY

CHANGE IS NOW.

LE CHANGEMENT C'EST MAINTENANT **FRANCOIS HOLLANDE 2012**

PS Radical Gauche

francoishollande.fr

Extract 5.8 is the conclusion of Hollande’s main 2012 manifesto. It appears at the last page, and as such, the political rhetoric it contains is somewhat expected, as this is the last chance for the candidate to convince the electorate to vote for him. Therefore, as the leader of the main opposition party, the choice to emphasize the ideal of change is quite natural.

The argument is carried out in three parts. It starts with the rhetorical question: *then where are we now?* to which Hollande replies in the remainder of the extract. The repetitive structure contained in the phrase *on nous dit* (*they tell us*; Extract 5.8: bold) exacerbates the negative dimension of being repeatedly *told* the same thing. The tricolons it contains, *face à la dette, face aux marchés financiers*,

face au reste du monde (to face the debt, to face the financial markets, and to face the rest of the world; Extract 5.8: underlined), increase this phenomenon further. This leads to the final part of the extract introduced by *Alors que (when; Extract 5.8: italics)* which indicates a rejection of the matching sequence he implies is provided by the opponent's repetitive argument (Winter, 2002: 50). The generic use of *on* also allows Hollande to leave its identity unspecified in *on nous dit (they tell us)*, while implying association and inclusivity (*nous*) with the voters. In addition, the negative semantic prosody of this phrase, well established in French culture (see Figure 5.20) indicates that *on (we)* can only be someone of whom the candidate disapproves.

| | |
|----|--|
| 1 | référence en brousse. Eh oui, <u>on nous dit</u> à longueur de colonnes (ce que |
| 2 | ieux, le chômage des jeunes, <u>on nous dit</u> qu'il faut : </p><p> " profess |
| 3 | est là. </p><p> Et voilà qu' <u>on nous dit</u> : " sauvons-les en sauvant la |
| 4 | vous malmenez. Depuis 40 ans, <u>on nous dit</u> que c'est lepen le vilain. Dep |
| 5 | ême pas ! on nous cache tout, <u>on nous dit</u> rien ... comme d'habitude ! La |
| 6 | 011 contrairement à ce que l' <u>on nous dit</u> . Cette Espagne a fait n'impor |
| 7 | e génocide. Quand aujourd'hui <u>on nous dit</u> qu'il y a des jeunes de la gal |
| 8 | ts par la photosynthèse. Mais <u>on nous dit</u> que l'atmosphère de Martienne a |
| 9 | itifs par la Cour Suprême. Si <u>on nous dit</u> que compte tenu de l'ampleur d |
| 10 | cle de notre alimentation), <u>on nous dit</u> 2 choses différentes... Alors |
| 11 | ais souvent chez les initiés <u>on nous dit</u> qu'elles seraient très lourdes |
| 12 | bulaires divers, c'est ce qu' <u>on nous dit</u> . Sous le vocabulaire qui nous |
| 13 | la liste d'attente. 19h00 : <u>on nous dit</u> ... </p><p> Contrairement à ce |
| 14 | aires: </p><p> C'est un jeu : <u>on nous dit</u> quand c'est la crise mais à no |
| 15 | ur d'un conseil municipal dont <u>on nous dit</u> qu'il est calé pour le mois de |
| 16 | ement, avec la constitution . <u>on nous dit</u> : on se fiance, on a 15 ans po |
| 17 | vous souvenez de ces pubs où <u>on nous dit</u> que X ou Y compagnie est parti |
| 18 | ner du sentiment aux astres : <u>on nous dit</u> que les astres louaient Yahveh |
| 19 | 2008 - "on nous cache tout, <u>on nous dit</u> rien" - accompagné, qui plus e |
| 20 | yaume du ciel ? </p><p> Et l' <u>on nous dit</u> alors : " allez et proclamez l' |

Figure 5.20 Concordance view of *on nous dit* in *frTenTen (2012)* (sketchEngine, 2016)

In this context, it is very likely to be referring to the opponent, Nicolas Sarkozy, whose negative discourse is also used in Hollande's campaign through both manifestos and speeches, as a means to attack him, which constitutes a crucial part of Hollande's strategy overall (CMAD).

Figure 5.20 shows that the phrase *on nous dit* is often used in French to express the speaker's disapproval towards *on*, and this effectively acts as a means of othering while enhancing the repetitive characteristics of the process *dit* (*tell*) (Figure 5.13, ll. 1, 3, 4, 5, 11,14, 17, 20: underlined). As a result, inclusivity as an adversarial means in this part of Hollande's discourse is a powerful tool in that it excludes the opponent from *nous*, which is inclusive of Hollande and the voters.

In the last part of Extract 5.8, Hollande's angle of attack switches from exacerbating the negative semantic prosody of *on nous dit* to expressing thematised deontic modality (as I also found Sarkozy's discourse) through *il faut*, in conjunction with the inclusive *nous*. This appeal to deontic modality also echoes a similar use found in Sarkozy's speeches, through the uses of *il ne faut pas*, which enhances the supportive characteristic of this means of adversarial discourse. In addition, this allows Hollande to switch the role of *nous* from being the patient of the process in *on nous dit*, to the actor in *il faut relever la tête*, *il faut agir* and so on. In addition, the anaphora of *c'est maintenant* (literally: *it is now*) build the argument up and constitute a powerful appeal to pathos that climaxes with Hollande's slogan: *le changement c'est maintenant*.

Finally, in the slogan itself, *le changement c'est maintenant* (*change is now*), the statement allows Hollande to perform an appeal to vote for change, that is, for him. In addition, the general meaning of change in this context, allows Hollande to do inclusivity without the traditional, overused inclusive pronoun *nous* (*we*). This strengthens Hollande's argument in that he speaks for the country united as one behind himself, and, more importantly, against Sarkozy who, therefore, is considered

as not only Hollande's political opponent in this election, but also that of the people, the reason for France's decline, and main obstacle to its recovery.

5.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I found that discourse related to promise making and/or breaking is essential adversarial, in that it either draws on an incumbent candidate's broken promises, or highlights the opponent's lack of expertise to carry out the necessary reforms, which is threatening to their positive face. In addition, I found that negative promise making can be used as a CMAD in the case of the 2010 Conservatives' manifestos, while I also found that promises in general could also be used as a means to support an overall strategy to undermine the opponent.

First, I find that fallacious arguments are particularly frequent in manifestos (Examples 5.5, 5.7; Extract 5.4), which indicates how this type of medium is used on an intertextual level throughout an electoral campaign. In effect, this analysis shows that spreading propaganda is the main goal of electoral manifestos, whereas the other types of electoral discourses analysed here allow the candidates to carry out different types of adversarial moves, such as FTAs.

This study also highlights that strategies of appropriating the opponent's argument rely on two principles: primarily attracting a wider range of voters, while simultaneously undermining the opponent's credibility. In this process, the theme of trust seems crucial in both datasets. In Hollande's discourse, the interaction between direct quotes from the opponent and the metalanguage used to review them allows the writers to build up trust with the readers, while undermining the opponent's legitimacy. Finally, the Conservatives' manifestos show that the themes of change

and continuity can be interchangeable in an electoral context, all the while using a very similar rhetoric.

Overall, the diachronic study of the Conservatives' manifestos highlights the evolution of their stance in relation to the electoral context. Stancetaking is very inclusive in their 2015 manifesto, in that it engages the party with their electorate through binomials such as *you and yours*. In their 2010 manifesto, however, the Conservatives' stance is pragmatically less inclusive in that they use *they* counter-intuitively (cf van Dijk, 1993, Pennycook, 1994: 177, Maalej, 2013: 639). In both cases, this is done in order to highlight the Conservatives' promises to the ordinary people: *our armed forces, families* and public service users. The dramatic change in addressing them is indeed very peculiar and warrants further analysis.

6 Concluding remarks and implications

6.1 Research questions

This thesis set out to review electoral discourse in the UK, US and France in order to provide a definition of adversarial moves across three different subtypes of electoral discourse: election debates, campaign speeches and electoral manifestos, and two different languages. In doing so, I asked how those leaders *do* adversariality, what strategies do they follow, and what goals they (expect to) achieve in relation to the above different contextual, textual and individual variables.

Second, this study followed Harris's plea (2001) for the study of adversarial discourse in a wider range of discourse types, in that it researches adversarial moves in a monologic discourse type, election manifestos, in order to "foreground new dimensions" in studies of politeness (Harris, 2001: 453).

6.1.1 How does one *do* adversariality

I found two types of adversarial moves. There are those types which are recurrent across multiple speakers, if not all, and which, therefore, constitute typical adversarial moves. And there are those types which are indicative of a speaker's persona, and/or individual style, and which are less widespread in comparison. I review these types in more detail in section 6.1.2 on adversarial style. This study also endeavoured to map-out adversarial moves in terms of the strategies adopted by the speakers, and the means developed in relation to said strategies (cf Table 1.1).

In electoral discourse, adversarial moves rely heavily on political rhetoric and figures of speech, especially repetitive structures such as anaphors, epistrophes in the debates and manifestos (Chapters 3 and 5), and adnominatio in the debates and speeches (Chapters 3 and 4). In addition, stancetaking is usually performed to criticise and undermine the opponent, whether through interpersonal or epistemic stances. In relation to face and in the context of electoral discourse, FTAs invariably focus on the opponent's positive face, "the want of every [interactant] that [their] wants be desirable to at least some others" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 62) (rather than negative), in that candidates exclusively criticise and express disapproval of the opponent's stance, discourse, and/or actions/policies.

In relation to text types, the manifestos studied in Chapter 5 seem to, overall, transmit typical adversarial moves rather than markers of individual style. The organisation of Chapter 5 effectively highlights this in that common themes, such as making and breaking promises, appropriating the opponent's strategy in relation to change or continuity, can be found throughout manifestos produced at different times, in different countries, across different languages, and from different political perspectives.

6.1.2 What are the candidates' adversarial *styles* throughout?

I found that adversariality is not carried out in the same way by each leader. In effect, even though there are a number of strategies that the candidates seem to use to some extent, individual style and persona seem to have a significant impact on how adversarial moves are performed. The debate, which is focused on in Chapter 3, proves to be the richest text type in relation to finding strategies that reflect individual style. In addition, different strategies occur in different contexts, which are reflected by the three text types studied here.

In the debates, Biden's style is overtly intimidating, and coupled with an overall strategy of distraction and interruptions in order to occupy the stage, (Chapter 3, Extracts 3.2 and 3.3) while Obama's is mostly focused on self-promotion and avoidance of open confrontation through evasion techniques (Chapter 3, Extracts 3.4 and 3.5). In fact, when Obama explicitly attacks the opponent, these attacks are minimal yet very effective. In Extract 3.5, Obama uses one reference to Romney to launch a counter-argument that performs a self-promotional move. More importantly procatalepses can be identified here as a key item characterising Obama's self-promotional strategy, which allows him to carry out implicit attacks on Romney's positive face. In addition, Obama's style is probably the most accomplished in terms of effective use of political rhetoric. Repetitions, shift markers, and deictics are but a few of the tools he uses which contribute to building solid, systemised arguments (SMADs). In effect, Obama's performance is only, but significantly, jeopardised when he appears distracted (Extract 3.4, Debate 1). Studying extracts from two different debates (Extracts 3.4 and 3.5) allows us to find that, in the case of Obama, facework is performed at an intertextual level, which gives him the opportunity to communicate an idea effectively in Debate 3 (Extract 3.5) that he failed to explain previously in Debate 1 (Extract 3.4). Meanwhile, his opponent, Mitt Romney, remains composed throughout the debates. In fact, his overall attitude appears almost robotic: his very static posture, combined with neutral facial expressions and a very controlled, polished demeanour appear almost artificial (Figure 3.11 and Extract 3.6, Chapter 3) which effectively creates a rather self-aware and standardised performance. This also contrasts with Biden's in Debate 2, which consists of a combination of perfect control of himself, perfect timing, and use of the televised media, especially as a means for him to provide silent visual distractions to the audience when the opponent is speaking. In addition, he performs evasion techniques, which serve to attack the opponent's face as well as the moderator's at times (Extract 3.3, Chapter 3), which exemplifies how adversarial means (in this case, evasion techniques) can be used

as part of diametrically opposed strategies: self-promotion and open confrontation. Meanwhile, Paul Ryan's attempts at adversariality are jeopardised by the effect the moderator and Biden's FTAs have on him, notably in his ability to articulate his argument intelligibly. The confrontation that takes place between Ryan and Biden (Debate 2/VP Debate) also highlights the influence of a candidate's individual persona on their reactions to adversarial moves. In effect, Joe Biden's responses to FTAs greatly contrast with those of Ryan, in that he challenges the moderator when she expresses her doubts about his integrity, retaliates, and attempts to intimidate her.

In the speeches, Sarkozy's style is defined by his reluctance to address the opponent directly. Instead, he uses impersonal adverbial strategies (*il faut que, il ne faut pas*), which most frequently express a high level of deontic modality to perform adversarial moves against his opponent François Hollande. This is part of his strategy of self-victimisation, as it allows him to place himself as the addressee of some of those impersonal structures, especially negative forms such as *il ne faut pas* (*it must not*). In addition, his stancetaking strategies are rather ambiguous in that he claims the political middle ground on the one hand, and claims to be a *républicain* (*republican*, that is, a defender of the principles of the République), which he uses to justify addressing a specific part of the electorate: the far-right. I review this in more detail in the next section, in relation to the types of goals the candidates attempt to achieve through adversarial moves

6.1.3 What goals do candidates (expect to) achieve through adversarial moves?

Overall, goals evolve in conjunction with a multitude of factors, including individual style, electoral context, discourse type. I find that to undermine the opponent is an important goal for all candidates whether in the debates, speeches or manifestos,

while ethos-enhancement is sometimes more important to some candidates, particularly in campaign speeches and election manifestos. In effect, Barack Obama focuses essentially on ethos-enhancing and legitimation strategies whether in his 2008 campaign speeches or during the 2012 debate series. Self-victimisation is also used by Obama in 2008, as well as by Sarkozy in 2012, to depict the opponent in a particularly negative way, and, in the case of Sarkozy, this self-victimisation strategy also concerns the French media, which he accuses of unfair treatment against him (Example 4.14, Chapter 4). Furthermore, Sarkozy's ambiguous stancetaking as a marker of his adversarial style is carried out in order to address a specific part of the electorate: far-right voters, (Example 4.4, Chapter 4) as well as to antagonise the opponent, through powerful metaphors and especially personifications, which appeal to the voters' emotions through pathos. Obama also uses personifications and metaphors in his 2008 speeches, through which he also appeals to the voters' emotions, but in order to represent John McCain very negatively, rather than to court a specific part of the electorate as Sarkozy does. This highlights how typical adversarial tools, which politicians commonly use to build legitimacy (Charteris-Black 2005: 199), promote different goal types in different types of situations.

In the case of François Hollande, irony is frequently used in his 2012 speeches to mock Sarkozy and potentially amuse the audience at his expense, while the irony and especially hyperboles allow him to perform powerful attacks on Sarkozy's positive face. In addition, reported speech is a powerful tool, which is used against Sarkozy, the incumbent president, as well as against Hollande's competitor on his left: Jean-Luc Mélenchon from the Parti de Gauche. In his manifestos, Hollande's goal is very different, however. It is, in effect, much more aggressive, even though the tone is sarcastic in both text types. In manifestos, the goal is to imprint as vivid a picture of the opponent as possible, thanks to direct quotes which are subsequently, and systematically debunked as part of a three-part structure, *les promesses, les mesures, les conséquences*, that is used throughout the document. In addition, this

is combined with the use of numbers and figures quoted from independent and reliable sources throughout, in order to create a relation of trust between Hollande and the voters, at the expense of Sarkozy.

In manifestos, the fact that common themes could be found in all six documents, as well as the recurrence of several important semantic fields in both Hollande's and the Conservatives' manifestos (Table 5.2, Chapter 4), highlights the particularity of this text type. In addition, promises are used in order to attack the opponent, whether the candidates make them, or draw on the opponent's unkept ones. In addition, I find that manifestos are used in both the Conservatives' and Hollande's cases to attack the opponent. I draw on these findings further in the next section in order to discuss the implications of this research.

6.2 Implications for the research field and future work

Some of the findings summarised above warrant further research. This includes Sarkozy's ambiguous stancetaking throughout the 2012 campaign speeches, as well as Hollande's sarcastic attacks on Sarkozy, and the use of binomials in the Conservatives' manifestos.

In the case of Hollande, the overall derogatory manner in which he refers to Sarkozy in both his speeches and manifestos, through irony, hyperboles and sarcasm echo Biden's powerful attacks on Ryan in the 2012 US debate series. This directs me towards a further study of Hollande and Sarkozy's discourse in the 2012 French election debate, which would provide a more comprehensive view of his overall discourse during the campaign, and would benefit from the study carried out in the 2012 US debate series.

I mention that binomials seem to be a trademark of the Conservatives' manifestos. However, I believe that future studies of their opponent's discourse in those same elections should be carried out in order to compare this phenomenon especially. In addition, further study of the discourse of the same candidates I focus on, but through other types of media would prove particularly interesting in characterising further the types of adversarial moves than can be performed.

Finally, in relation to the above findings, and the current political trends in the UK, US, and France, future research on adversariality in political discourse would benefit from an expanded outlook of each country's political landscape. In addition, between 2015 and 2017, each of these three countries will have seen a new national election, at a moment in time when the European Union, the US and the world at large face dramatic changes. Climate change, global economic instability, and major humanitarian challenges affect those three countries whose voices are among the most powerful in the world, as well as the future of the European Union. In the face of this rapidly changing global context, I think the next steps for this study of adversarial discourse would be to consider: 1) how do political leaders do leadership and adversariality in a world that grows ever more complex every day? 2) What are the new arguments put forward by those aspiring leaders from the far-right in comparison with the mainstream party discourses? And 3) how does that impact on the whole performance of adversariality in electoral discourse?

6.3 What does adversariality *do*?

Different goals are pursued according to electoral discourse types. In manifestos, the goal is essentially to attack the opponent, and spread ideological propaganda, whereas amusing the audience and mocking the opponent are more prominent in

speeches and debates, which allow the candidates to interact directly with one another and/or with the audience.

Across languages, this study found that similar strategies are used, such as self-victimisation in campaign speeches, but with different goals. In the case of Sarkozy, this is done to appeal to the voter's emotions through pathos, triggering their sympathy towards him, whereas Obama's strategy effectively allows him to build up his presidential ethos and stature. In addition, this study uncovered how powerful concepts such as *change* are used by candidates from the opposition to attack the (incumbent) opponent on the quality of their policy record, and create contrasts with their own promises, which invariably involves the vision of a better future. This is especially the case in manifestos, where *change* plays a key part in the construction of both the Conservatives' 2010 and Hollande's 2012 campaigns, while Obama also uses the concept of change in one of his 2008 slogans: *vote for change*. How this appeal for change is carried out differs, though, across those candidates. In the case of Hollande, *change* is, above all else, advanced as a means to attack the incumbent president Sarkozy directly and personally on his poor record as President, as well as on his leadership style, while in Britain, the Conservatives' argument for change relies heavily on a theme: rebuilding the economy, rather than attacking Labour (in power for 13 years) directly.

6.4 Redefining adversarial discourse

Previous research on adversarial discourse (Harris, 2001; Ilie, 2003; Bull and Wells, 2012) essentially focuses on specific discourse types such as questions and answers, evasion techniques, challenges to one's integrity and facework in parliamentary discourse (Harris, 2001), and pronoun uses in political debates

(Vertommen, 2013). In addition, these previous researchers often focus on a set of pragmatic resources. Bull and Wells (2012) focus on evasion techniques, Archer (2008) and Harris (2001) essentially consider features of politeness, and facework, whereas Vertommen (2013) refers to SFL and evaluation to identify ways of othering in political debates through pronominal uses.

This study proposed a different outlook, which combines the above methods in order to provide a comprehensive typology of adversarial moves in electoral discourse. This mixed methods approach has allowed me to relate the processes of stancetaking with the performance of metaphors, ethos building, and facework. In effect, this dimension of the study indicates that while the rhetorical tools are similar, the goals do differ, as in the cases of Obama and Sarkozy, who both use personifications and self-victimisation to different ends.

In the case of the introduction of the notion of *change* as an electoral argument, this research highlights that this argument is purely adversarial and context-dependent rather than ideological. It is used by several different candidates through the years: Obama, in 2008, the Conservatives in 2010, and Hollande in 2012. The use of *change* as an electoral argument triggers different types of adversarial moves. Interpersonal stances are taken by the Conservatives; through which they express a judgement on the opponent's ability (or lack thereof) to deal with the 2007 world financial crisis. FTAs are performed by Hollande in 2012, in that he advocates change both from the opponent's policies as incumbent president, and from the opponent himself as an individual and leader.

Evasion techniques are carried out in the 2012 US debates with very different goals, especially in the case of Biden and Obama, the Democratic candidates. Biden uses evasion techniques to launch better, more powerful FTAs against the opponent and, at times, the moderator too. Obama, however, performs evasion techniques in order to enhance his ethos and appear more Presidential. In doing so, it seems that because Obama motivates those evasion strategies through his refusal to

antagonise the opponent, the moderator chooses “not to register” these attempts at shifting the agenda, (Clayman and Heritage, 2002: 242), which allows Obama to carry on without subsequent loss of face. In the case of the two Republican candidates, however, a very different, yet shared strategy is observed. Evasion strategies consist of, in this case, introducing successive arguments based on precise and then contrastively language, which allow them to 1) undermine the opponents and attack them on their record, in order to 2) introduce their own rather sketchily devised proposals using a very similar rhetoric in both cases (Extracts 3.6 and 3.7, Chapter 3).

Consequently, this study has contributed to showing that adversarial discourse does not only occur in an interactional context and that adversarial moves can be found in written material such as election manifestos. Furthermore, it also found that adversarial moves can correspond to a variety of strategies and means in relation to individual style, the electoral context, and text types. They are sometimes directed at one opponent, sometimes at several and most importantly, they can be carried out in order to undermine the opponent, as well as build up the candidate’s ethos. Finally, they can also be carried out in this context as a way of attacking the opponent personally, as is especially the case in the 2012 French presidential election between Sarkozy and Hollande, instead of the facework that is merely *part of the game* (cf Harris, 2001: 466).

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