Pathways to ‘Fair Carbon’: Assessing Fairness in Standard Setting and Carbon Projects

Rebecca Joy Howard

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds
School of Earth and Environment

September 2016

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his/her own, except where work which has formed part of jointly-authored publications has been included. The contribution of the candidate and the other authors to this work has been explicitly indicated below. The candidate confirms that appropriate credit has been given within the thesis where reference has been made to the work of others.

PhD Publications

Parts of this thesis have been published in the following:

International journals

Howard, R.J., Tallontire, A., Stringer, L. and Marchant, R., 2015. Unraveling the Notion of "Fair Carbon": Key Challenges for Standards Development. *World development*, *70*, pp.343-356.

Howard, R.J., Tallontire, A.M., Stringer, L.C. and Marchant, R.A., 2016. Which "fairness", for whom, and why? An empirical analysis of plural notions of fairness in Fairtrade Carbon Projects, using Q methodology. *Environmental Science & Policy*, *56*, pp.100-109.

Working papers

Howard, R.J., Tallontire, A., Stringer, L. and Marchant, R., 2014. What lays at stake for standards organisations pursuing fairness in the carbon market? Lessons from literature applied to practice in the carbon market. *Sustainability Research Institute working paper No 71,* [online link]

Howard, R.J., Tallontire, A., Stringer, L. and Marchant, R., 2015. Which "fairness", for whom, and why? Broadening inputs for a standard designed to certify "fairtrade carbon credits" *Sustainability Research Institute working paper No 84,* [online link]

Declaration of authorship

In writing co-authored journal articles and working papers, I received comments and editorial guidance from my supervisors. However, as the lead author I designed the research and wrote the papers.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council and the Natural Environment Research Council for providing the scholarship and research and training support grant which made it possible to conduct this PhD project. I also thank the Sustainability Research Institute at the University of Leeds and the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy for providing additional financial support for expenses in my final year, and the Research and Innovation Service at the University of Leeds for providing contractual support at the beginning of the collaboration with the research partner organisations.

Dr. Anne Tallontire and Professor Lindsay Stringer at the University of Leeds and Dr. Rob Marchant at the University of York have been an amazing supervision team. They trusted me to engage in an unusual and potentially risky research project and have helped me to reflect and evaluate it throughout. They supported me during creative meanderings and helped me to establish focus and boundaries. Their complementary intellectual support, knowledge and experience and contacts in the research areas, and contrasting approaches to research and writing style rooted me on this journey and expanded my capacity and perspectives.

At Fairtrade International I would like to thank Vicky Pauschert in the Communications Team for paying attention to my initial email, and Carlos Canales, Shemina Amarsy and their colleagues who worked on the Fairtrade Climate Standard during the time I was conducting this research. Together we have been pioneers in a novel form of research which will impact on future Fairtrade research. I have learnt so much about how and what to communicate and how to make research more useful through this research collaboration. This thanks is echoed with respect to Gold Standard Foundation, in particular Pieter van Midwoud and his colleagues in the Land Use and Forests team.

Fieldwork in Kenya and Europe was primarily funded by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council. The research design and nature of the process I was researching necessitated considerable flexibility in spending this money and this must have created a few headaches amongst the administrators of the grant and the people in the Faculty Finance Office. I also thank Fairtrade International and the Gold Standard Foundation for the occasions when they paid for my travel and hosted me.

In Kenya I was hosted at the International Livestock Research Institute. I appreciated being temporarily part of a large international organisation and was enriched by the opportunities to meet other researchers, have a place to work, discuss my research and receive feedback from experienced colleagues. In particular, I thank Dr. Todd Crane for his consistent support since I first began working with him during my Masters. This continued into the PhD through letters of

support, useful contacts, encouragement and feedback on my work, regular checking-in, and hosting at the International Livestock Research Institute and in his family home in Nairobi.

I thank the programme managers and staff and participants in the Kenyan Domestic Biogas Programme for being open to my research at relatively short notice and accepting my inquisitiveness at such an early stage in the programme implementation. I came home from Kenya aspiring to own my own smallholding, cow and biogas digester one day! I thank Clean Air Action Corporation and TIST-Kenya for sharing their historic journey and future visions with me and accepting my presence at every layer of the programme during the time I spent with them in Kenya. This filled me with inspiration and transformed my perspective of what carbon programmes can look like and what people can be capable of. I have passed on some of the TIST best practices to groups I associate with in Leeds. In particular I would like to thank Dorothy, Joseph, Kimani, Naman, Martin, Frances and Jennifer in Kenya, Gayo in Tanzania, and the 'mother' and 'father' of TIST, Vanessa and Ben. My thanks also go to the numerous TIST members I met at each of the meetings I attended. I am also grateful to Martin Gikunda who provided a beacon of support and friendship from the first day we met and hosted me in his family throughout my time in Meru. I thank Catherine Sweeney for her friendship, guidance and hosting in Nairobi.

I thank my family, housemates and friends for their encouragement, inspiration, loving support and for helping me to let go and shake off regularly. I thank my partner Luke for the hours he put into assisting me with some of the graphics in this thesis, for all we have learnt together about facilitation and decision-making and for accompanying me faithfully during this journey and future ones.

Abstract

‘Fairness’ is veiled with multiple and competing interpretations. Standard Setting Organisations, non-governmental organisations and carbon market actors have introduced fairness notions into the carbon market in an attempt to charter, standardise and communicate alternative approaches for carbon credits produced in smallholder and rural settings in the global South. Propositions that carbon credits can be ‘fair’ are contentious, warranting careful analysis. Using an action-oriented case study approach, I explore Fairtrade International’s attempts to collaboratively develop the Fairtrade Climate Standard and examine its relevance within carbon programmes in Kenya. Multi-sited ethnographic observations and interviews, in Kenya and within various forums for deliberating the standard, are combined with specific tools designed to open-up inputs and enhance reflection amongst contributors to the standard.

A Q study reveals three empirical perspectives on fairness in carbon projects, held amongst stakeholders in the standard-setting process. These diverge regarding what would be fair for whom, and mechanisms for achieving it, and not all notions are incorporated into the standard. Critical analysis of the standard-setting process against the benchmark of Fairtrade International’s participatory governance approach illustrates process design features facilitating participatory collaboration and the limits to participatory governance in practice. I develop a heuristic to discuss how the most contentious topics were shaped by the initiators’ ambitions, shared and mutually incompatible interests amongst stakeholders, and dynamics of protectionism. Using a Theory of Change approach I unpack specific mechanisms believed to lead to fairer outcomes and explore associated assumptions and evidence-bases. Key Fairtrade concepts- ‘producers’, ‘organisations’, and transfer between external actors and Producer Organisations; are clouded by mixed evidence. This predicates future monitoring, evaluation and critical assessment of the standard once in operation. Finally I provide practical insights on doing collaborative action-oriented PhD research and make recommendations for researcher engagement in standard-setting processes and opportunities for enhancing deliberation and reflection.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ..... **iv**

Abstract ..... **vi**

Table of Contents ..... **vii**

List of Tables ..... **xiii**

List of Figures ..... **xv**

List of Boxes ..... **xvi**

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ..... **xvii**

Chapter 1 General Introduction **18**

1.1. Carbon: complex, controversial and fast evolving 18

1.2. Fair Carbon 19

1.2.1. Can carbon be fair? 21

1.3. Pathways to 'Fair Carbon' 23

1.3.1. Summary of pathways components 24

1.4. Thesis aim, objectives and questions 24

1.4.1. Objective 1 24

1.4.2. Objective 2 28

1.4.3. Objective 3 29

1.5. Thesis frameworks and outline 31

1.5.1. Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework 31

1.5.2. Outline of remaining chapters 37

Chapter 2 Unravelling 'fair carbon': key challenges for standards developments **39**

2.1. Introduction to chapter two 39

2.2. Constituting carbon and 'fair carbon' as a commodity 40

2.2.1. Limitations to existing scholarship on carbon commodification 41

2.2.2. Constituting 'Fair Carbon' 42

2.2.3. Stretching and extending Fairtrade 42

2.3. Governing by Private Rule-Setters 44

2.4. Standard Setters' framing: access, benefits and participation as three pillars of fairness 45

2.5. Carbon project review methodology 47

2.6. Limits to fair access, benefit-sharing and procedures 49

2.6.1. Access to markets: technical complexities, uncertainties and costs 50

2.6.2. Fair benefit-sharing 54

2.6.3. Fair Procedures....58
2.7. Conclusion to chapter two....65
Chapter 3 Fair Procedures in Standard Setting....67
3.1. Introduction to chapter 3....67
3.2. Literature review: key themes within standards governance....67
3.2.1. Standards: pathways and political processes....68
3.2.2. Legitimacy, inclusiveness and power....69
3.2.3. Conflicts, tensions and governing tools....70
3.2.4. Section summary....71
3.3. FTI: a representative and inclusive institution?....72
3.3.1. Rules and processes....73
3.4. Participatory Governance....75
3.4.1. Intention 1: Avoiding power imbalances in relationships....76
3.4.2. Intention 2: Enabling everyone with a stake to contribute to design and outcome....77
3.4.3. Underlying governance aim: alternatives to top-down development models....79
3.4.4. Opening Up and Closing Down in policy appraisal....81
3.5. Conclusion to chapter three....82
Chapter 4 Research Design and Methodology....83
4.1. Introduction to chapter four....83
4.1.1. Approach to knowledge....85
4.1.2. Research strategy....85
4.2. Case study design and selection criteria....86
4.2.1. Parallel units of analysis....87
4.2.2. Independent carbon programme research....87
4.2.3. Bounding the case....90
4.3. Stakeholder identification and selection strategies....91
4.4. Overview of data collection and analysis techniques....94
4.4.1. Data collection....94
4.4.2. Data analysis....99
4.4.3. Detailed description of primary data collection methods: FCSSP....101
4.4.4. Detailed description of primary data collection methods: Carbon programmes....104
4.4.5. Details on data analysis approaches....106
4.5. Quality control....108
4.6. Ethical and legal issues and methodological challenges....112

4.6.1. Timing/ sequencing of FCSSP alongside parallel units of analysis and PhD process 112
4.6.2. Challenges related to data collection techniques 113
4.6.3. Cultural bias and language 115
4.6.4. Reflections on researcher role and positionality 115
4.7. Conclusion to chapter four 117

Chapter 5 Which 'fairness', for whom and why? An empirical analysis of plural notions of fairness applied to Fairtrade carbon projects, using Q methodology 118

5.1. Introduction to chapter five 118
5.2. Space for debates on fairness within Fairtrade and carbon markets? 119
5.3. Methodology 121
5.3.1. Collation of the 'Fair Carbon' concourse 122
5.3.2. Refinement of concourse into a 'Q set' 123
5.3.3. Purposive selection of participants 124
5.3.4. Q-sorts and accompanying interviews 125
5.3.5. Correlation and factor analysis of Q-sorts 126
5.3.6. Qualitative results interpretation and development of 'Fair Carbon' narratives 127
5.4. Results 128
5.4.1. Factor 1 (F1): 'Producer First' - Participation and Price-Floors 128
5.4.2. Factor 2 (F2): Functional Value Chain, Maximum Impact for People and Planet. 131
5.4.3. Factor 3 (F3): Market Efficiency, Minimum Interference, More for the Project 134
5.5. Application of the findings for reflexive policy appraisal 135
5.6. Discussion of findings 136
5.6.1. The goals and target of fairness 136
5.6.2. The content of fairness 140
5.6.3. The parameters of fairness 144
5.7. Conclusion to chapter five 145

Chapter 6 A participatory governance analysis of the FCSSP 148

6.1. Introduction to chapter six 148
6.1.1. Fairtrade Participatory Governance 149
6.2. Methodological approach 149
6.3. Analytical framework and chapter structure 150
6.4. Results part 1: ambitions and interests 154
6.4.1. Ambitions that the initiators sought to achieve through the FCSSP 154

6.4.2. Interests shared (at face value) by stakeholders involved in the FCSSP 155

6.4.3. Section summary 156

6.5. Results part 2: description of the FCSSP 157

6.5.1. Stakeholders and Forums for Participation 157

6.5.2. Phases and Process Points 160

6.5.3. Missing stakeholders 165

6.5.4. Section summary 166

6.6. Results part 3: opening up and closure of 'hot topics' 167

6.6.1. Hot Topic 1: Standard Scope: Which projects and beneficiaries are included? 167

6.6.2. Hot Topic 2: Mechanisms for financial-benefit sharing 183

6.7. Discussion: Alternatives to top-down governance? 196

6.8. Conclusion to chapter six 201

6.8.1. Summary of key messages and contributions 203

Chapter 7 An exploration of evidence, assumptions and logic underpinning the FCS using the Theory of Change approach 205

7.1. Introduction to chapter seven 205

7.2. Construction and critical assessment of Theories of Change 207

7.2.1. Evidence and assumptions in Theories of Change 207

7.2.2. Learning opportunities in Theory of Change work 208

7.3. Methodological approach: a meta-analysis of the Theory of Change-construction process 208

7.3.1. Application of the Theory of Change approach to the FCSSP 208

7.3.2. Core aspects in the FCS Theory of Change 209

7.4. Results part 1: Analysis of assumptions about Hot Topic 3 (Project Actors and Roles) 213

7.4.1. Assumption 1: Carbon project participants are 'producers' and self-identify as such 213

7.4.2. Assumption 2: 'Producers' are in organisations 217

7.4.3. Assumption 3: People involved in delivering the project or supporting delivery are 'facilitators' and self-identify as such 223

7.5. Discussion: Project Actors and Roles 225

7.6. Results part 2: Exploration of Hot Topic 4 (Transfer of Knowledge and Capacities) 227

7.6.1. Roles, relationship and transfer between the Project Facilitator and the Producer Organisation: an in-depth look at the TIST programme 229

7.7. Discussion: Transfer of Knowledge and Capacities 244

7.8. Conclusion to chapter seven: addressing gaps in knowledge about Fairtrade carbon as a commodity 246

7.8.1. Carbon, materiality and marginalisation 247
7.8.2. Extending Fairtrade: checking claims and assumptions 247
7.8.3. The relational aspects of carbon, and fairness implications 248
7.8.4. Summary of key messages and contributions. 249
Chapter 8 Reflective discussion of the research process 250
8.1. Introduction to chapter eight 250
8.2. Facilitating Reflection- what, when, how and for whom? 251
8.2.1. Critical reflection within organisations 251
8.2.2. Facilitating reflection within the FCSSP team at FTI. 253
8.2.3. Facilitating learning and reflection amongst particular participants in the research 258
8.3. Discussion- evaluating my contributions to reflection 259
8.3.1. Strengths of the reflective sessions with the FCSSP team 260
8.3.2. Limits to reflection 261
8.3.3. Further opportunities for reflection within the FCSSP team 262
8.3.4. Strengths of the reflective sessions with TIST-Kenya. 262
8.3.5. Limits to reflection on Standards by targeted beneficiaries 263
8.3.6. Further opportunities for supported reflection. 263
8.4. Tracking possible researcher influence on outcomes 264
8.4.1. The Four Hot Topics. 264
8.4.2. A Fifth Hot Topic? 267
8.5. Synthesis of learning from the research process 268
8.5.1. Zone 1, Entrance porch: discussions at the initiation of a potential collaboration 269
8.5.2. Zone 2, Building exterior: designing collaborative infrastructure and institutional embedding 270
8.5.3. Zone 3: In the waiting room- considering timelines, time commitments and available resources 271
8.5.4. Zone 4: In the canteen- assessing potential stakeholders in the research and how they will be involved 272
8.5.5. Zone 5: In the office- discussing questions, tools and contributions 272
8.5.6. Zone 6: in the meeting room- sharing findings and supporting reflection 273
8.6. Conclusion to chapter eight 274
Chapter 9 General Conclusion 276
9.1. Addressing the research objectives 276
9.2. Advancing Theories on Fairness 281
9.3. Advancing Pathways research, Opening up Pathways? 283

9.4. Overall knowledge contributions: towards integration 284

9.4.1. Environmental Justice, Organisational Justice and theories on Fairness, Justice and Equity 284

9.4.2. Carbon trading, standards and projects 285

9.4.3. Fairtrade, governance and standard setting 286

9.4.4. Commodification of carbon and fairness 287

9.4.5. Bridging theory and practice: research-based knowledge and action 287

9.5. Recommendations for future standard setting processes 288

9.6. Recommendations for future research 291

9.7. Final remarks 293

Bibliography 294

Appendices 313

List of Tables

Table 1-1: Definition of fairness dimensions and their application in this thesis..... 35

Table 2-1: Details of carbon projects identified in literature..... 49

Table 2-2: Principles of Community Engagement 60

Table 3-1: Entities within the Fairtrade System and role played in governance and standard-setting..... 73

Table 3-2: Analytical interpretation of FTI's participatory governance approach..... 76

Table 3-3: Varieties of Governance Structures and Processes, based on Fung and Wright (2003) 80

Table 4-1: Data collection, analysis and application..... 97

Table 4-2: Examples of how the NCT approach was applied to analyses..... 100

Table 4-3: Quality tests, test questions, pass strategies and evidence of quality. 109

Table 5-1: Fairness concerns in the carbon market and links to fair trade debates... 120

Table 5-2: Fit between statements and thematic categories..... 124

Table 5-3: Statements making up the Q set..... 129

Table 5-4: Participants and degree of correlation with each factor (F1, F2 and F3).. 133

Table 5-5: Goals and target of fairness in the FCS 139

Table 5-6: Content of fairness in the FCS..... 143

Table 5-7: Price-setting parameters in the FCS 145

Table 6-1: Analytical interpretation of Fairtrade International's Participatory Governance Approach..... 150

Table 6-2: Links between research questions, chapter sections and frameworks 151

Table 6-3: Forums for Participation in the FCSSP..... 159

Table 6-4: Phases of the FCS-setting process including dates and key milestones (colours demarcate the four phases)..... 161

Table 6-5: Scope interests of stakeholders taking part in multi-stakeholder forums. 180

Table 6-6: Decision points where FMP and premium were deliberated..... 187

Table 6-7: Resistance to closure at the meeting for approval of the FCS (November 2014) 191

Table 6-8 Summary of governance forms evident within the FCSSP 200

Table 7-1: Assessment of core Theory of Change aspects in the FCS Theory of Change 210

Table 7-2: Extracts of FCSSP discussions illustrating assumptions about 'producers'214

Table 7-3: Mechanisms for transfer in the FCS (Fairtrade International, 2015c) 228

Table 7-4: Assumptions 4/5 and Mechanisms A-D 229

Table 7-5: Assumption 5 and Mechanism E..... 231

Table 7-6: Assumption 5 and Mechanism F.....234

Table 7-7: Comparison between timelines in the FCS and temporal evolution of TIST-Kenya.....236

Table 7-8: Assumptions 5/6/7 and Mechanism D.....237

Table 7-9: Assumption 6 and Mechanism G.....239

Table 7-10: Assumptions 5 and 6 and Mechanisms H and I.....240

Table 7-11: Assumption 7, Mechanism E.....242

Table 8-1: Definitions of reflection and reflexivity deployed in chapter 8 252

List of Figures

Figure 1-1: Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework 34

Figure 2-1: Elements of the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework included in FTI and GSF's pillars of fairness 46

Figure 3-1: Aspects of the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework explored in chapter 3 67

Figure 3-2: FTI formal bodies involved in standard-setting and interactions between them, compiled by author from www.fairtrade.net 74

Figure 4-1: FCSSP case design showing relationships between the example carbon programmes and the FCSSP 87

Figure 4-2 Coverage of mitigation measures between the two example programmes.. 90

Figure 4-3: Stakeholders in the FCSSP 92

Figure 4-4: Pools of stakeholders and events/ forums where research was conducted 93

Figure 4-5: Objectives, questions and methods 96

Figure 5-1: Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework: dimensions explored in ch 5 .. 122

Figure 5-2: The Q-sort grid. 126

Figure 6-1 Target framework: Interests and debates in the FCSSP 153

Figure 6-2: Steps of the FCSSP compared to the FTI SOP 163

Figure 6-3 Deliberative and decision-making diamond: the actual consensus decision process 188

Figure 6-4: Paraphrased opinions on payments to producers expressed during Q interviews 190

Figure 7-1: FCS Theory of Change annotated with embedded assumptions and aspects explored in this chapter outlined. 212

Figure 7-2: illustration of how carbon credits are produced and who is involved in production in example carbon programmes 216

Figure 7-3: views on organisation elicited during Q sort interviews 219

Figure 7-4: Levels of aggregation within TIST-Kenya 221

Figure 7-5 Accuracy: one of the TIST programme values 232

Figure 7-6: TIST-Kenya system for monitoring 233

Figure 7-7: Display material produced to communicate the profit share model and programme budget to TIST members 241

Figure 8-1: Action reflection cycle 253

Figure 8-2 The completed House Exercise 255

Figure 8-3 the target diagram 257

Figure 8-4: The 'Building Plan': spaces to negotiate, design and reflect on collaboration 269

List of Boxes

Box 2-1: search terms and criteria 48

Box 6-1 Examples of claims made by project developers and managers about people involved in cook stove projects (the 'producers') 166

Box 6-2: Examples of communicative strategies deployed by Fairtrade Producer Organisation representatives to advocate for the inclusion of agriculture within the scope 179

Box 6-3 phases in a typical consensus decision-making process 189

Box 7-1 Analysis of the assumptions embedded in the FCS Theory of Change 211

Box 7-2: Quotations from participants of the Producer/ Field staff workshop in Bonn about roles of Project Facilitators and involvement of project participants 224

Box 7-3: Dialogue from a subgroup discussion 224

Box 7-4: Testimonies of personal development given by TIST contractors 243

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

CBO	Community Based Organisation
COP	Conference of Parties
CSA	Climate Smart Agriculture
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
FCC	Fairtrade Carbon Credit
FCS	Fairtrade Climate Standard
FCSSP	Fairtrade Climate Standard Setting Process
FMP	Fairtrade Minimum Price
FPIC	Free Prior and Informed Consent
FTI	Fairtrade International
GSF	Gold Standard Foundation
ICCO	Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation
ISEAL Alliance	International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance
KENDBIP	Kenyan Domestic Biogas Programme
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
NFO	National Fairtrade Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PN	Producer Network
RPO	Research Partner Organisation
SACCO	Savings and Credit Co-operative Society
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSO	Standard Setting Organisation
TIST	The International Small Group Tree Planting programme
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States

Chapter 1 General Introduction

1.1. Carbon: complex, controversial and fast evolving

Carbon credits, which involve the measurement and transaction of emissions savings, have become a new commodity linking the global North and the global South via a complex array of technologies, institutions and discourses (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). They are created within carbon projects, which involve sets of activities that supposedly result in fewer greenhouse gases in the atmosphere compared to a hypothetical situation without the project (Lohmann, 2010). Credits created within projects are sold on carbon markets. Carbon markets allow governments, companies and individuals to compensate their own emissions by financing emissions reductions in another area of the world, in both an efficient and politically attractive way (Boyd et al., 2011). They are a popular approach for mitigating the climate crisis worldwide (Lohmann, 2010) and are firmly rooted in the next decades of climate policy through the Paris Agreement (Marcu, 2016) as part of a portfolio of actions believed to lead to cost effective solutions (Bodansky et al., 2015). The carbon market has been highly volatile and has become increasingly fragmented and complex (Lövbrand and Stripple, 2012), which led to concerted efforts prior to the adoption of the Paris Agreement to foster greater linkage between the various schemes and regulatory bodies. These efforts were partially successful, but the new provisions are still highly complex and require more work to develop the architecture for a functioning carbon market (Marcu, 2016).

Carbon credit infrastructure has been heralded as an opportunity for financing low carbon development in the global south whilst mitigating climate change. However it is criticised for dubious environmental effectiveness (Green, 2013) and is the subject of major discussions about fairness, equity and justice (Howard et al., 2015b, McDermott et al., 2013), and about governance, effectiveness and legitimacy of the mechanisms that carbon markets entail (Merger and Pistorius, 2011, Page, 2012). In particular, concerns have been raised regarding i) the burdens, benefits and positioning of local communities involved in international carbon projects (Mathur et al., 2014, Melo et al., 2014) and ii) the technical complexity of crediting mechanisms, which create dependency on outside expertise for audit that can shape and determine the character of carbon market access (Corbera and Brown, 2010, Lansing, 2013a). Interest in mitigation has often crowded out concerns about adaptation, but they are increasingly being recognised as inseparable, including within international climate policy and certification schemes (Willers, 2016). Scholars have laid important groundwork for understanding the trade-offs, winners and losers, and fairness issues surrounding both, as well as how they can be

targeted simultaneously (Grasso, 2010, Paavola and Adger, 2006). While this thesis focuses on mitigation rather than adaptation, it is acknowledged that mitigation is only part of the story.

In this complex, controversial and fast moving context, movements opposing carbon markets and their attempts to commodify the Earth's carbon cycling capacity, and campaigns for a fair transition away from fossil fuel dependence, co-exist along technical-fix proposals for governments to expand carbon markets, and for regulators (such as Standard Setting Organisations or SSOs) to oversee better measurement and calculation and develop new schemes for certification and reform (Lohmann, 2010). Insufficient attention has been paid to the performance of these schemes, or the normative ideals they invoke (Page, 2012). As both the schemes and the markets they are part of are socially and politically embedded, they hold the potential to be socially and politically transformative. There is need to determine whether SSOs can trigger alternative outcomes where equity and justice can emerge (Fairhead et al., 2012:254, Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013), or whether they are simply laying down ever more implausible sets of rules and procedures (Lohmann, 2010) that do little to interact with the global development agenda. In this thesis I respond to this need by undertaking a critical analysis of one particular attempt to innovate and revise a portion of the voluntary carbon market and introduce the normative ideal of fairness.

1.2. Fair Carbon

In 2011 the ethical standards body Fairtrade International (FTI) committed to address fairness within the climate change arena with a new fair trade commodity initially named 'Fair Carbon Credits' (Mhene, 2012). In 2012, FTI began a strategic collaboration with the Gold Standard Foundation (GSF), a non-profit organisation coordinating a standard to certify carbon projects which also contribute to sustainable development. Their partnership brought the concepts of Fair Trade and Carbon Trading to the same table for the first time, with a commitment to enhance fairness in the carbon market. They announced plans to develop a joint certification scheme (Gold Standard Foundation and Fairtrade International, 2012) expected to redress rural communities' unequal access to, information about, and capacity to benefit from, the carbon market (Howard et al., 2015b). The two organisations pooled their expertise and elicited inputs from multiple stakeholders familiar either with the carbon market or with Fairtrade[1] to develop a standard eventually named the Fairtrade Climate Standard (FCS) for projects that would

[1] I use 'Fairtrade' to refer to the product certification system operated by Fairtrade International, including all or any part of the activities of FLO ev, FLO-CERT, Fairtrade producer networks, national Fairtrade organisations and Fairtrade marketing organisations. I use 'fair trade' to refer to the broader movement, including activities under the umbrella of Fairtrade International and activities led by organisations independent of its system.

engage and benefit smallholders and rural communities in the production of Fairtrade Carbon Credits[2]. Both organisations would also jointly develop the components of a wider scheme supporting carbon project implementation and standard application, involving elements such as technical support, auditing, and joint marketing. The desire to codify fairness on the carbon market was a key motivation for the Dutch civil society organisation (CSO) ICCO to engage with FTI and contribute to funding the Fairtrade Climate Standard Setting Process (FCSSP). ICCO was already involved in carbon activities billed as 'fair'[3].

Fairness, equity and justice are widely interpreted and lack clear definitions within carbon projects (Luttrell et al., 2013, McDermott et al., 2013). This opaqueness is also apparent within sustainability product certification, where FTI's hegemony of power to define fairness is internally and externally contested, with competing actors beginning to develop their own 'fair' labels (Tallontire and Nelson, 2013, Renard and Loconto, 2013). FTI is one of many SSOs addressing fairness, equity and justice in commodity markets through people-centred approaches aimed at poverty alleviation, participation and empowerment (Melo et al., 2014, Phillips, 2014). However, actual impacts are shaped by the priorities driving standards and the multiple contexts where they are applied (McDermott, 2013, Nelson and Martin, 2015). Operating both 'within and against the market' (Brown, 1993), and deploying a technocratic logic of measurement, SSOs are in a place of inherent contradiction and have the potential to result in continued marginalisation of local communities, centralised control and reinforcing of dominant interests, despite efforts to avoid these outcomes (Melo et al., 2014). FTI is a membership-based organisation providing opportunities for its members to influence major decisions via a number of channels. Nevertheless, its sheer size, stakeholder diversity, political and historical foundations and subsequent trajectory into mainstream markets and new commodities render it a heterogeneous, evolving movement characterised by a number of fault lines and recent scissions between different cohorts who seek to represent, advocate, dilute or codify different notions of fairness in different ways (Bennett, 2012, Doherty et al., 2013, Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015, Renard and Loconto, 2013), see also chapter 5. Introduction of carbon credits into the Fairtrade system triggers new debates about what is fair about fair trade and carbon credits, both within and outside of the movement.

2 This was designed as an add-on label to the Gold Standard certification, for projects which meet the social, environmental, trade and carbon accounting criteria of both organisations.
3 These activities included supporting the development of the Fair Climate Network and holding 100% of shares in the Fair Climate Fund.

1.2.1. Can carbon be fair?

Carbon trading has divided NGO, academic and policy-making communities. Some acknowledge the key role it must play in combating climate change; others out-rightly oppose it (Bachram, 2004, Caney, 2010). Within academic, policy and campaigns literature, critics have referred to carbon trade as dumping of carbon in poor countries (Bachram, 2004, Lohmann, 2005), while rich countries 'continue in their unequal over-consumption' (Bachram, 2004:16). The term 'carbon colonialism' has been coined to refer to actors in rich countries who entice people in poorer countries into sacrificing long-term development goals in pursuit of short-term capital gains associated with creating carbon credits (Bachram, 2004, Page, 2012). As a result, poorer countries may exhaust their cheaper mitigation options and need to engage in costlier strategies to meet their reduction targets should these become compulsory. Other critics argue that everyone should minimise their own environmental impact (Sandel, 2005), with the ultimate goal being to catalyse a transition away from fossil fuels (Lohmann, 2010). Commodification approaches to carbon (chapter 2) posit that neoliberalism and market environmentalism are vehicles for promoting the abstraction or extraction of things from a local context to be sold elsewhere, involving unequal power relations (Lovell et al., 2009). Harvey's (2003) concept of 'accumulation by dispossession' has been reworded as 'accumulation by decarbonisation' (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, Wang and Corson, 2015) to refer to the injustices of profit-making on the back of mitigation burdens placed on people in the global south rather than reductions in the global north. This is essentially about taking advantage of the commodification of carbon 'because the creation, transfer, and sale of carbon…make money' (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008 p144).

The main argument for paying others to reduce emissions through carbon trading is that it can improve environmental quality (or minimise environmental harm) at least economic cost and with minimum worsening of existing global inequities (Page, 2012). When carbon trading was first introduced, developing nations were motivated by the prospect of financial and technological transfers from the global North to the global South (Boyd et al., 2011), which were intended to be channelled into low carbon development pathways. If an intervention does effectively reduce emissions to a safe level, it could be judged as just on one level because everyone is entitled, as a matter of justice, to be protected from anthropogenic climate change (Caney, 2010). However, arguments of efficiency and environmental effectiveness do not adequately address the ethical dimensions of carbon trading. It is important to assess whether those involved in carbon trading schemes consider the distribution of costs and burdens to be fair (Caney, 2010), and whether they perceive the scheme to be politically legitimate and procedurally just (Page, 2012).

It is important to illuminate the economic systems that commodities are situated within (Sayer, 2001) and to look at carbon relationally, in terms of its historical, material and social contexts in order to tell what is being talked about, how it is being reduced and who stands to gain (Bumpus, 2011a). Although the carbon economy is a relatively new phenomenon it is also part of a longer history of market environmentalism (Goodman and Boyd, 2011, Boyd et al., 2011). Nevertheless, framing the carbon economy as an example of imperialism, colonial or neo-colonialism or drawing parallels between them, does not necessarily aid understanding about what is occurring on the ground (Bridge, 2011), or what is already being, or could still be done to transform the system or carve out spaces for fairer practices to emerge. An overemphasis on uneven power relations between the global north and the global south may mask examples of countervailing power (Fung and Wright, 2003) or tactical and strategic use of power (Goodman and Herman, 2015) within particular places and spaces including in the global south. Any ethical appraisal of carbon trading 'must be sensitive to the very diverse forms it can take' (Caney, 2010 p198). Such an appraisal can only be done on a case-by-case basis, exploring how particular schemes operate, whether they are considered legitimate, which outcomes they result in and whether the people involved perceive them to be fair.

Drawing on the conclusions of a number of scholars, I recognise that what is needed is a combined approach that can produce multi-faceted and multi-dimensional explanations of how the carbon economy [or aspects of it] functions and for whom, and conscious of the wider sociological, economic and ecological landscape it is both part of and which it needs to transform (Boyd et al., 2011). Power must be a part of this analysis, but with adequate attention to the multiple forms and spaces it can occupy. This can appropriately be done by seeking nuanced and place-based understandings of carbon instruments in operation within particular projects and carbon reductions in particular places (Corbera and Martin, 2015), together with analyses of the particular networks, certification schemes and value chains (Bumpus and Liverman, 2011, Caney, 2010) that these projects are embedded within. Research needs to acknowledge the complications of commodification and critically assess the moral-ethical underpinnings of particular practices within carbon markets (Goodman and Boyd, 2011). Moreover, in each of these levels of analysis, it is useful to apply an empirical justice or fairness lens in order to give sufficient space to understanding what the people involved in these projects, networks, certification schemes and value chains perceive to be fair, legitimate and just rather than applying a universal justice lens and predisposing the analysis to one particular moral reading.

Accordingly, in this thesis I undertake an extensive appraisal of the FCSSP, its governance, the content of the FCS and how this interacts with different people's perceptions of fairness and realities within particular carbon projects. I do this by combining two intersecting approaches:

the pathways approach, and an empirical analysis of fairness, described in sections 1.3 and 1.4.1.1 respectively. Together these approaches help to illuminate the liminal space between the poles of the debate.

1.3. Pathways to 'Fair Carbon'

The pathways approach was developed by Leach et al. (2010) to deal with complex sustainability challenges in a dynamic world, and stems from the need to link environmental sustainability with poverty reduction and social justice, and make science and technology work for people who are poor. Their premise is that ideas of sustainability have become co-opted into managerial and bureaucratic 'solutions'. These take the form of dominant pathways which are universalising and generalising, and inappropriate for problems which are actually much more complex and political (such as climate change and carbon trading). Meanwhile, there may be alternative pathways, which are harder to detect as they are less powerfully articulated.

A central component of the pathways approach is a concern with the ways in which particular actors and networks produce, prioritise and promote particular 'framings'. Framing is understood as the different ways of understanding and representing a system, including its boundaries, key terms, functions and outcomes. Different people's framing involves their own choices and subjective judgements and it is therefore important to consider what is included or left out of the system framing, and to identify which goals, definitions, values, perspectives, interests and experiences are prioritised (Leach et al., 2010). System framings can turn into narratives, involving 'lock-in' of a particular world view and a categorisation of what the problem is and who is responsible for it. When used by powerful factions, framing and narratives provide the traction for particular pathways and close down alternatives (Leach et al., 2010, Nelson and Tallontire, 2014).

Climate change and mitigation has become one of the dominant narratives and leading drivers of development agendas (Goodman and Boyd, 2011). Within this context, the development of the FCS constitutes the construction of one particular pathway. It involves framing of problems and solutions, bounding definitions of what is fair and universalising these in terms of a standard to be applied in multiple contexts. It also involves setting out a narrative or theory about the change process, expected to lead from interventions and outputs to outcomes and impacts. A pathways approach to research involves unpacking the bounding definitions (such as 'fair carbon'), framing devices and narratives, and also attending to governance processes, as these are crucial in shaping which definitions, inputs and pathways are followed and which are ignored (Leach et al., 2010). Following Nelson and Tallontire (2014), I also understand the pathways concept as a way of considering historical and future trajectories and the fluidity of

governance processes. Specifically, it allows this research to encapsulate the dynamic nature of the FCSSP and its evolution over the months that I followed it whilst situating it within the moving trajectories of the Fairtrade movement and the carbon economy.

The pathways approach is normative, in that the ultimate aim is to 'open up' the space which may allow for recognition of the pathways which support the goals and ambitions of particular groups of poorer and marginalised people, and allow these to flourish (Leach et al., 2010). It aims to achieve this through the use of flexible methods applied at different scales, and conducive to an emphasis on diverse perspectives, enhanced learning and reflexivity.

1.3.1. Summary of pathways components

The following pathways components are used in this thesis. They are highlighted in the following sections in relation to each objective and research gap or contribution. Appendix Figure 1 visualises where in the thesis they are addressed.

1. Identifying and unpacking key terms used in pathway-building
2. Uncovering the pathway framing, and choices, assumptions, and judgements behind it
3. Identifying the implications of different pathways for poorer and marginalised people
4. Uncovering the actors, institutions, goals and governance processes involved in pathway-building
5. Engaging in pathway building processes
6. Enhancing reflexivity

1.4. Thesis aim, objectives and questions

This thesis aims to unpack fairness in standard-setting processes and carbon projects through action-oriented research. This is addressed through three research objectives and nine research questions rooted in the pathways approach. These are focussed firstly on the content of the FCS, secondly on the standard-setting process (the FCSSP), and thirdly on the research process itself. The objectives and questions are each linked to a research gap and/or methodological innovation that emerged from Howard et al. (2015b) and subsequent research design work.

1.4.1. Objective 1

To uncover the debates, perspectives and different options for achieving fairness within carbon projects, and explore them in relation to the FCS

Question 1.1: How is 'fair carbon' understood and defined by different people involved in the FCSSP? *(addressed in chapter 5)*

Question 1.2: Whose definitions and understandings are incorporated into the FCS? *(addressed in chapter 5)*

Question 1.3. Which assumptions and evidence is the Theory of Change for the FCS based on? *(addressed in chapter 7)*

Question 1.4. What can example carbon projects tell us about possible pathways to the outcomes and impacts articulated in the Theory of Change as the FCS is applied? *(addressed in chapter 7)*

1.4.1.1. Research gap 1: Empirical analysis of multiple definitions of, and mechanisms for achieving 'fair carbon'

I use the term 'fair carbon' as an analytical concept to guide an exploration both of the fairness elements that GSF and FTI sought to bring to the carbon market, but also what other stakeholders understand by fairness in the context of the carbon market. 'Fair carbon' exemplifies the tension between viewpoints because for some it represents a misnomer, while for others, it offers a space for change (Howard et al., 2015b).

Pathways component: identifying and unpacking key terms used in pathway building

'Fairness' and 'fair carbon' are key terms that were frequently used during the FCSSP but had no clear definition when FTI and GSF began their collaboration. Fuzzy concepts like these may have strong cohesive power, but this can disguise tensions between agendas of different stakeholders, making it challenging for those who are responsible for inscribing multiple interests into the technology to be developed (Allen, 2009:355). Underneath an apparent consensus on meanings there may be multiple conflicting definitions that cannot co-exist and some are likely to get pushed aside. McDermott et al. note with respect to equity (a term often used in place of fairness, see section 1.5.1), that 'without a clear definition of which aspects... are being pursued and how, it is difficult to evaluate the impact of policies and programs..., and impossible to plan for it effectively' (2013: p417). My goal was to capture plural definitions *in situ*, rather than to apply a universal or theory-driven singular definition of fairness (e.g. Rawls, 2009) to this particular context. To achieve my goal, an empirical approach was appropriate. Empirical analyses of justice, equity and fairness start from actual claims and the notions used to support these (Sikor et al., 2014). They acknowledge that multiple and competing notions co-exist that are experiential, context-dependent and vary according to the kinds of resources and responsibilities being shared (Sikor et al., 2014, McDermott et al., 2013).

Sikor et al. (2014) identify two overlapping lines of enquiry in empirical analyses of justice (or fairness). The first involves identifying dominant notions, exploring their appropriateness in different contexts, and analysing their operation in practice. This is important because the implications of using particular notions only become apparent when they are explored in practice in particular contexts (Sikor et al., 2014). Also, this analysis helps to reveal the underlying power dynamics shaping whose interests and definitions make it into the dominant pathway, and how different actors and networks may exercise discursive power to legitimate or side-line particular perspectives (Leach et al., 2010). The second involves characterising different stakeholders' notions in particular contexts, examining their justifications within public discourse, and then identifying how different notions gain or lose ground. This helps to identify which notions are driven by self-interest and which ones have wider relevance (Sikor et al., 2014). Together these lines of enquiry enable a better understanding of the interplay between different notions, contexts and practice, and the tensions between multiple notions upheld maintained at different scales. This is important because the interactions between different notions used simultaneously by different people is a key dynamic shaping outcomes (Sikor et al., 2014). Tensions can also be a creative force for generating definitions which are more appropriate or better adapted to the different contexts.

I address both lines of enquiry in this thesis. The literature review in chapter 2 pursues the first line of enquiry, focussing on the notions of 'fair carbon' initially held by FTI and GSF and exploring these within carbon projects documented by literature. Chapter 5 pursues the second line of enquiry, focussing on the perceptions of 'fair carbon' held by a range of FCSSP stakeholders and addressing questions 1.1 and 1.2. Chapter 7 combines both enquiries in questions 1.3 and 1.4 through its exploration of the specific standards mechanisms considered as quintessential for achieving fairness outcomes by actors taking part in the FCSSP. These mechanisms were incorporated into the FCS but their entry was a result of dynamic governance processes involving negotiation of interests, power dynamics, and compromise. In chapter 7 they are explored in terms of their justifications, different stakeholders' perceptions and their appropriateness in different contexts.

1.4.1.2. Research gap 2: Standards mechanisms and actual local level outcomes

The extent to which standards exclude smallholders from markets or provide them with opportunities to improve welfare and competitiveness is much debated and there is evidence to support both positions (Jaffee et al., 2011, Henson and Humphrey, 2010). Changes in standards provisions and development of new tools may fuel change on the ground in projects, but actual local outcomes are contingent on factors beyond standards themselves (Bumpus, 2011b), and

there is considerable room for interpretation and opportunism in the way these standards are implemented. Therefore, it is critical to explore not only the standards provisions or the project designs on paper, but also the implementation of standards and projects in practice in order to identify where standards mechanisms are not leading to envisaged changes, which factors shape actual outcomes, and how they interact with particular project designs. Several studies have explored the impact of Fairtrade standards (Jaffee, 2008, Nelson and Martin, 2014), as well as the impact of particular carbon projects on poverty reduction (e.g. Jindal et al., 2012). However, studies on the impact of particular carbon standards and their ability to produce changes within projects have been limited to desk reviews (Wood, 2011, Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). FTI maps out envisaged outcomes and impacts resulting from FTI interventions within a Theory of Change.

Pathways component: uncovering the pathway framing, and choices, assumptions, and judgements behind it

The Theory of Change is an example of a 'framing'- one particular way of understanding and representing a system, including its boundaries, functions and outcomes. Different people's analyses of a system involve drawing on their own sets of assumptions, interpretations, values and goals (Leach et al., 2010). It is important to explore whether the assumptions in the Theory of Change hold up in diverse contexts and whether they match with other people's assumptions, interpretations, values and goals because if not, the envisaged changes are unlikely to happen.

Pathways component: identifying the implications of different pathways for poorer and marginalised people

Given the prevalence of private standards, the structural power behind them, and the frequently negative social consequences they entail (Fuchs et al., 2011), exploring the implications of attempts to develop standards which are specifically geared towards smallholders, households and communities is still necessary. I find Leach et al.'s (2010) term 'poorer and marginalised people' slightly dissatisfactory because it suggests a static state that people are designated as belonging within. However, implied in their usage of this term is a recognition that while there are people who are actively trying to escape poverty and marginalisation, particular pathways can result in constraints to their livelihoods and freedom. In relative terms, the smallholders, households and communities affected by standards are more likely to be marginalised from the standard setting process, economically poorer and their livelihoods subject to more constraints than the people working for or partnering with the standard setting organisations to develop the standards.

While it will only be possible to explore the impact of the complete set of standards provisions and tools developed through FTI and GSF's partnership retrospectively, initial research can explore this theme on a micro-scale within the context of particular projects by examining whether any of the individual fairness mechanisms they propose are already mirrored in existing projects, if and how they are working, and by seeking the opinions of project participants or those who involved in project implementation on the ground. This research gap is addressed particularly in the latter part of chapter 7 through question 1.4, where evidence from carbon programmes is explored alongside the FCS.

1.4.2. Objective 2

To describe and analyse the process of collaborative development of the FCS *(addressed in chapter 6)*

Question 2.1 What did the FCSSP look like (in terms of forums for input, debates and interests)?

Question 2.2 How did the FCS reflect stakeholder input and what shaped this?

Question 2.3 What does this say about participatory governance in practice?

1.4.2.1. Research gap 3: Collaborative Standard Setting in Practice

The FTI-GSF partnership can be viewed within a broader context of sustainability governance, which is characterised by the emergence of market driven, voluntary standards which have expanded into ever new sectors (Loconto and Fouilleux, 2014, Cashore et al., 2004). Governance networks emerge as heterogeneous actors and institutions representing diverse organisational fields come together and negotiate multiple goals and interests (Bumpus et al., 2010). This involves different actors endowed with different amounts of power (Merger and Pistorius, 2011) and takes place at particular scales, often to the exclusion of actors operating at different scales (Swyngedouw, 2000). Several analytical focal points have been underlined with respect to such initiatives, such as how and why they emerge (Green, 2013, Loconto and Fouilleux, 2014), the issues they focus on and the way that they define the boundaries of these issues (Loconto and Fouilleux, 2014, Bulkeley et al., 2012). A number of authors have underlined the need to critically assess the legitimacy of initiatives and the mechanisms they deploy to garner accountability (Loconto and Fouilleux, 2014, Smith and Fischlein, 2010, Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013, Fuchs et al., 2011). This is particularly relevant to the FTI-GSF partnership because of the controversy surrounding carbon trading and the sensitivity of combining fairness with carbon.

There has been a growing interest in the governance of sustainability standards, including Fairtrade as standards become a key feature of international trade and a tool for ensuring responsible business practice (Tallontire et al., 2011, Tallontire, 2007). Sustainability standards developed through multi-stakeholder processes tend to be regarded as more democratically legitimate than standards developed by single companies or industries, without the input of NGOs, trade unions or other organs of civil society (Fuchs et al., 2011). Nevertheless, an analysis of a number of private standards in terms of participation, transparency and accountability concluded that they all face the challenge of needing to adjust asymmetries in access and influence, and most accord little decision-making power to small farmers (Fuchs et al., 2011). FTI, initially a network of consumer labelling organisations, has been commended for opening out its standard-setting process to southern based producer networks (Sutton, 2013, Bennett, 2015).

Pathways component: uncovering the actors, institutions, goals and governance processes in pathway-building

There has been less attention on the actual process of standard setting and how core criteria are determined. Significant exceptions are Bacon's (2010) historical reconstruction of the processes undergone in fixing coffee minimum prices, Reinecke's (2010) ethnographic study of the Standard Setting Unit, and Reinecke and Ansari's (2015) analysis of the tensions between FTI and FLOCERT in standard setting. This is important to look at because governance pressures can often push powerful institutions to overlook the goals of marginalised people or to ignore crucial uncertainties, leading to a closing down of approaches around those which are only suited to a relatively knowable and manageable world, which means that any solutions may only be short-lasting and easily disrupted (Leach et al., 2010). The exploration of the FCSSP comes at an important time when they are increasing tensions within fair trade as to the movement's priorities, some of which are related to 'politicising' versus 'pragmatic' narratives (Tallontire and Nelson, 2013) or the target 'beneficiary' (small producers or workers) (Renard and Loconto, 2013). Any precedents set within the FCSSP could have an implication on the future of fair trade as a whole. This thesis contributes to filling this research gap in chapter 6 in particular (questions 2.1-2.3) and also to some extent in chapter 7, through question 1.3.

1.4.3. Objective 3

To assess the value of action-oriented research in collaborative standards-setting processes *(addressed in chapter 8)*

Question 3.1 How can action oriented multi-sited research enhance reflection amongst stakeholders involved in the research, and how does it shape emergent outcomes?

Question 3.2 What can be learnt about conducting collaborative research on standard setting processes through this thesis?

1.4.3.1. Contribution: forging methodological innovations

The developers of the 'pathways' approach have made suggestions as to the types of methods and designs appropriate for doing pathways research on processes such as the FCSSP but recognise that these need to be developed, tested and adapted in diverse and dynamic settings and explored in terms of how they interact with governance, policy and decision-making processes (Stirling et al., 2007).

Pathways components: engaging with pathway-building processes and enhancing reflexivity

This thesis contributes methodologically to a better understanding of two particular pathways components in particular- 'engaging with pathway-building processes', and 'enhancing reflexivity'- both implying different roles and tasks for researchers.

The normative goal of the pathways approach is to encourage an 'opening up' towards more diverse narratives and pathways which may be more suited to the goals of poor and marginalised people. Conducting an appraisal of what might be required to reveal these entails a different role for researchers- one that involves crossing traditional research boundaries where the researcher seeks detachment from the subject of research, to one where s/he is engaged in the pathway-building process and proactively convenes processes of deliberation (Leach et al., 2010). These processes need to be initiated at various levels and scales to reduce the risk of exclusion and disempowerment of those who are not able to take part in the 'high-end' standards development activities.

Pathway-building must be reflexive, in order that 'destinations, routes and directions are continuously reconsidered by multiple participants' (Leach et al., 2010:37). This requires researchers, standard-setters and anyone else involved in the process, to be humble and reflexive and acknowledge how our own positions and assumptions shape our perspectives and ways we participate in political processes. Reflexivity is particularly important in the context of dynamic and complex systems, where engagement in the system can serve as a pivot for experiential learning and awareness about the possible implications of one choice as opposed to another (Leach et al., 2010). Being aware of the choice should be synergetic with taking responsibility for it, and this awareness opens up more possibilities for alternative actions (Schlindwein and Ison, 2004).

Research which can enhance the quality of reflection about the various options currently on the table is much needed in order to reduce the risk of 'fair carbon' being co-opted as a mask for a

lack of real change. In order to engage with the FCS pathway-building and to enhance reflection, this thesis involves action-oriented case study research. A number of researchers have illustrated that through involvement in standards-setting processes it becomes possible to determine dynamics of participation, inclusion and exclusion (Bacon, 2010, Reinecke, 2010, Cheyns, 2011). However, this thesis is the first example of a research process that follows and actively engages with a complete standard-setting process led by FTI. Chapter 8 is a reflection on the methodological approach and how I tackled these two pathways components, addressing questions 3.1 and 3.2.

1.5. Thesis frameworks and outline

This thesis draws on a number of frameworks derived from theory, data and practice, respectively. The data- and practice-driven frameworks are introduced in subsequent chapters but the theoretically-derived framework serves as a backbone for the structure of the thesis and is therefore introduced here.

1.5.1. Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework

The Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework is used in this thesis as a reference point for identifying what does or does not form part of different stakeholders' perceptions of fairness, and in understanding how the different dimensions of fairness are linked together and which questions frame them in a particular context. It is an adaptation of McDermott et al.'s (2013) Multi-Dimensional Equity Framework. The latter was developed as a tool to guide systematic empirical analyses of equity, enabling examination, assessment and planning of impacts on equity brought about by changes in the value of ecosystem services. I found it useful particularly because of its prior applications to certification schemes and carbon forestry projects (see Howard et al., 2016). I adapted the wording in the framework (see Figure 1-1 and Table 1-1) to reflect the language of FTI and GSF, and the input of scholars who have theorised on fairness, justice and equity (see Howard et al., 2016, Howard et al., 2015b).

1.5.1.1. Choice of terms: fairness, equity and justice

The terms fairness, equity and justice all face a similar challenge when definitions are sought because they are used interchangeably to refer to an overlapping set of values (Hay, 1995). The concept of fair trade in different languages provides a useful illustration- in Spanish it is *comercio justo* and in French, *commerce équitable* – both words translate as 'fair' but suggest concepts of justice and equity. In everyday language the three terms are loosely deployed (Levanthal, 1980) and in dictionary definitions and scholars' deployments they are commonly used to define each other. For example, the Cambridge dictionary defines justice as 'fairness in

the way people are dealt with' and equity as a situation 'in which everyone is treated fairly and equally' (Cambridge University Press, 2016). Schroeder and Pisupati (2010) recognise that all three terms are based on the principles of fair treatment or due reward. Equity is usually understood by scholars as based on merit or contributions (Levanthal, 1980), and implies the distribution of costs and benefits (Schroeder and McDermott, 2014). McDermott et al. (2013) find it an appropriate concept for emphasising context. In contrast to the word 'justice' it is more comparative and concerned with relationships and relative circumstances. Justice is usually distinguished by philosophers in terms of justice in exchange, distributive justice, corrective justice and retributive justice (Schroeder and Pisupati, 2010), and implies a respect for human rights (Schroeder and McDermott, 2014) and some kind of moral reasoning (McDermott et al., 2013). Fairness has been used more broadly by scholars to refer to elements implied by both justice and equity (Schroeder and McDermott, 2014), or in combination with justice to refer to equity that takes into account both distributional fairness and procedural fairness (Levanthal, 1980). In some usages of the term, fairness seems to imply subjectivity- for example Levanthal (1980) understands procedural fairness as the individual *perception* of the rules of allocation (emphasis added), and this is likely to influence the *perception* of fair distribution, which is also likely to be based on self-interest. Ariño and Ring (2010) use the term 'fairness', to refer to perceptions of fairness within organisational alliances, even though their theory of fairness is composed of different types of 'justice'.

This brief overview of the usage of terms is not designed to be comprehensive but to illustrate that the three concepts are socially constructed (Schroeder and McDermott, 2014) and that understanding who is involved in framing what is fair, just or equitable and how, is more important than attempting to establish universal principles to make sense of them (McDermott et al., 2013, Sikor et al., 2013). This is the approach laid down in empirical analyses of justice (Sikor et al., 2014), introduced in section 1.4.1.1. Similarly, Hay (1995 p501) understands the three concepts as an example of contextual-value pluralism: that 'there may be a variety of principles of equity, fairness and justice held and applied independently but which are often brought together in a particular context'. Moreover, when people are making choices and judgements, there may be other competing or more important goals which are also considered alongside or instead of conceptions of what is fair, equitable or just (Levanthal, 1980). In this thesis, I use the words 'fair' and 'fairness' as empirical concepts and seek to demonstrate how they are understood and used differently by people rather than defining them with a universal definition. I have three reasons for using the word 'fairness' over 'justice' and 'equity'. Firstly it is empirically meaningful and familiar (commonly used by people involved in the FCSSP). Secondly it offers space for exploring individual perception and subjectivity in judgement. Thirdly, I find it clearer to use the term fairness both to describe the overarching concept, and

the constituent parts it may be composed of for different people and within theories for the sake of consistence and clarity.

1.5.1.2. Adaptation of the framework

The original framework (McDermott et al., 2013) is composed of three elements (contextual, procedural and distributional equity) that form the core content of equity (what counts as equity). These are surrounded by three concentric layers of framing questions: 1) the scale and target of concern (who counts as a subject of equity), 2) the goals of an intervention with respect to equity (why equity) and 3) how decisions about each of these dimensions are taken (parameters of equity). Instead, I call the three core elements 'fair access' (replacing contextual equity), 'fair procedures' (replacing procedural equity) and 'fair benefit-sharing' (replacing distributional equity). I consider fair procedures as a pathway to fair benefit-sharing because for outcomes to be considered fair, stakeholders must have taken part in decision-making and their values considered (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). Fair procedures also link to fair access because they cover aspects of recognition, inclusion, representation, power relations and opportunities for participation (Mathur et al., 2014, Grasso, 2007, McDermott et al., 2013). While some scholars see fair access as a component of fair procedures (Mathur et al., 2014, Schlosberg, 2004), I recognise that it interacts with both fair procedures and fair benefit-sharing and consider them as separate but interlinked. For the three outer layers, I have changed the framing questions from 'equity' to 'fairness' for the reasons given above.



Figure 1-1: Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework

Table 1-1: Definition of fairness dimensions and their application in this thesis		
My term	My definition	Application in this thesis
Fair Access (Howard et al., 2016)	Ways people can engage with and participate in the carbon market via carbon projects, taking into account power, wealth and resource distribution differences (Sikor et al., 2013, McDermott et al., 2013) *Related concepts:* Contextual equity, equity of access (Howard et al., 2016)	Explored in a literature review (chapter 2) Multiple perceptions explored empirically amongst stakeholders in the FCSSP (chapter 5) Applied to the FCS and its application in projects in chapter 7 in terms of the mechanisms that promote engagement and participation by project participants.
Fair Procedures (Howard et al., 2016)	Ways people participate in decision-making and/or project implementation, the rules, procedures and political processes structuring this, and the inclusion and negotiation between competing views (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013, Brown and Corbera, 2003, Howard et al., 2016). *Related concepts:* Procedural equity, Equity and legitimacy of decision-making and institutions (Howard et al., 2016) *Links to Fair Access:* how do procedures shape access?	Explored at the level of carbon projects in a literature review (chapter 2) Multiple perceptions explored empirically amongst stakeholders in the FCSSP (chapter 5) Applied to the level of fairness of parameter setting in a review of Fairtrade governance parameters (chapter 3) and an analysis of how they operate in practice (chapter 6) Applied to the FCS and its application in projects in chapter 7 in terms of the mechanisms that promote participation and engagement (overlapping with fair access)
Fair Benefit-Sharing (Howard et al., 2016)	Ways people can benefit from project outcomes, in (non-) monetary and (non-) quantifiable terms. *Related concepts:* Distributional equity, Fair distribution of benefits and equity of outcome (Howard et al., 2016)	Explored in a literature review (chapter 2) Multiple perceptions explored empirically amongst stakeholders in the FCSSP (chapter 5) Debates around how to share benefits explored in relation to fair parameter setting (chapter 6)
Target of Fairness (Howard et al., 2016,	Who and what counts as a target for interventions aimed at enhancing fairness? Who and what counts as a target when fairness is being assessed within these interventions?	Multiple perceptions explored empirically amongst stakeholders in the FCSSP (chapter 5) Analysis of who and what is included in the scope of the FCS and how this shapes fair access (chapter 6), and which rules and definitions are used to

McDermott et al., 2013)	*Links to Fair Access:* any policies/ approaches being developed to promote access for a particular target population?	define people and prescribe how they are organised (chapter 7)
Goal of Fairness (Howard et al., 2016, McDermott et al., 2013)	Implicit and explicit fairness goals Specific goals of interventions to address fairness	Multiple perceptions explored empirically amongst stakeholders in the FCSSP (chapter 5) Analysis of the ambitions and interests of stakeholders engaging in the FCSSP, and of where FCS situates itself in relation to adaptation, mitigation and development goals (chapter 6) Exploration of the expected outcomes and impacts of the FCS and how they are expected to be achieved in the Theory of Change (chapter 7)
Parameters of Fairness (Howard et al., 2016, McDermott et al., 2013)	How decisions are made to set the overarching goals for fairness (the rules and procedures of the parameter-setting process) as well as specific mechanisms for achieving it (the content of the standard) Who is included or excluded in the setting of those goals and mechanisms. How parameters relate to pre-existing governance structures and approaches *Link to Fair Benefit-Sharing:* how do parameters for price-setting shape possibilities for fair benefit-sharing? *Link to Fair Procedures:* how does the parameter-setting process relate to fair procedures expected of projects?	Deployed in a narrow sense in chapter 5 in terms multiple perceptions about how parameters for trading relationships and pricing should be set (links to fair benefit-sharing). Deployed in a holistic sense in chapter 6 in terms of how the parameters for fairness are set within the FCS, and in chapter 3 in terms of how fair parameters relate to fair procedures.

1.5.2. Outline of remaining chapters

Chapter 2 unpacks the concept of 'fair carbon', firstly by exploring theoretically what it means to commodify carbon, fairness and fair carbon. This is followed by an analysis of how it is being used by FTI and GSF and benchmarking this against the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework introduced in section 1.5.1. The chapter then presents the results of a literature review, based on one of my published papers (Howard et al., 2015b) that explores the challenges associated with enhancing fairness in carbon projects aimed at small-scale farmers and communities and detailing the approaches that have already been developed in standards and certification systems. This chapter provides the backdrop for exploring multiple understandings of 'fair carbon' in chapter 5 and multiple approaches for standardising fairness mechanisms in chapter 7 (both addressing objective 1).

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the literature on the politics of standard setting and then gives a description of FTI's formal governance system, necessary for contextualising the analysis of how the FCSSP was governed (chapter 6 and objective 2). FTI's participatory governance intentions are introduced and then critically examined alongside literature on participatory governance and procedural fairness.

Chapter 4 describes the research design and methods deployed. The FCSSP case is introduced, alongside the two example carbon programmes explored as parallel units of analysis. The data collection and analysis techniques for all chapters are described here, with the exception of chapter 5 which has its own detailed methodology section.

Chapter 5 addresses questions 1.1 and 1.2. This chapter uses a Q study to draw out multiple perspectives on what fairness would mean and what fair outcomes would entail in the context of a Fairtrade carbon project. These are articulated by the different people involved in shaping the FCS. The study reveals three group perspectives (or 'factors') and compares them with perspectives incorporated into the final FCS.

Chapter 6 addresses objective 2 and questions 2.1-2.3. It explores the governance of the FCSSP, identifying contentious areas (hot topics) that emerged during discussions with multiple stakeholders, the power, strategies and interests that shaped how decisions were made, and the shifting of objectives and focus of the FCS from conception to launching. Empirical data comes from observations and engagement with the FCSSP during a period of 15 months, and analysis of documents produced or commissioned by FTI throughout the FCSSP. The findings focus on two particular hot topics: scope, and financial benefits/ revenue sharing. While the main aim of this chapter is to elucidate what participatory governance as defined by FTI looks like in practice, the chapter also reveals key insights about standard content.

Chapter 7 returns to objective 1 and addresses questions 1.3-1.4. It explores standard content, focussing on the mechanisms within the FCS identified by FTI as crucial for achieving the desired outcomes and impacts. Data from this chapter comes from participant observations and interviews within the FCSSP but also carbon programme research in Kenya. This chapter explores the remaining two hot topics introduced in chapter 6: the role of project actors and how they are organised; and transfer of knowledge and capacities to the project stakeholders defined by FTI as 'producers'. These are unravelled by looking firstly at how they relate to the Theory of Change developed for the FCS, and secondly how they play out in the context of two example carbon programmes in Kenya. This chapter unpacks the FCS Theory of Change in terms of the assumptions behind it, explores its hypothetical application based on existing programmes, and increases the pool of evidence which corroborates or contravenes it. Overall, this provides a basis for contextualising the FCS and identifying key areas to monitor and learn from as the FCS is applied, and the FCS and its Theory of Change are reviewed and revised.

Chapter 8 addresses objective 3 and questions 3.1-3.2 and as such, is a reflection on the research design, collaborative research process and role of the researcher. The analysis in chapter 8 revisits initial concerns and intentions in relation to the unfolding process, and reviews research inputs and interventions to support reflection in relation to emergent outcomes. The chapter synthesises lessons and underlines important considerations for future research collaborations. It also makes reference to tools and findings introduced in previous chapters and ties them together in preparation for the concluding chapter.

Chapter 9 concludes by recalling the gaps that each research objective was intended to address and reviewing the contributions made by this thesis towards each objective. It summarises contributions to theory, pathways research and each of the key literature areas and then makes recommendations for future standard-setting processes governed by organisations intending to operate in a participatory collaborative manner, and recommendations for further roles to be provided by researchers in such processes. It concludes with recommendations for further research.

Chapter 2 Unravelling 'fair carbon': key challenges for standards developments

2.1. Introduction to chapter two

Chapter one introduced the ongoing debate between those who are fundamentally opposed to carbon markets and those who advocate them and justified the pathways approach combined with an empirical analysis of fairness as ways of moving on from polarised viewpoints. In this chapter I situate FTI and GSF's initiative, as well as my analysis of it, within the broader academic landscape and summarise useful contributions and remaining gaps within existing literature. The primary purpose of this chapter is to operationalise the research term 'fair carbon' by exploring its symbolic significance, the governance context in which the concept is being introduced, the normative framing and subjective meanings attached to it, and the challenges implied by commitments to achieving it, by means of a literature review on commodification, standards and carbon projects. This provides the backdrop for exploring objective one of this thesis: to uncover the debates, perspectives and different options for achieving fairness within carbon projects, and explore them in relation to the FCS. This objective is addressed primarily in chapters 5 (focussing on questions 1.1 and 1.2) and 7 (questions 1.3 and 1.4).

The literature review on carbon projects sought to understand the practical constraints and structural and contextual factors associated with fair access, benefit-sharing and procedures for smallholders and communities, which Gold Standard (GSF) and Fairtrade International (FTI) may need to address if they are to fulfil their fairness commitments on the carbon market. These are mapped alongside their initially proposed interventions. I also highlight key lessons from ongoing attempts by carbon project developers and SSOs to shape benefits and procedures.

In section 2.2 I sketch out the theoretical backdrop for my analysis of 'fair carbon' and then locate the FTI-GSF alongside parallel standard setting initiatives, and explain the triggers for this particular partnership in section 2.3. In section 2.44 I examine the SSOs' own initial framing of fairness, which centre on questions of access, benefits and participation; and link these to theoretical understandings of fair access, benefits and procedures and relationships between them in the context of carbon markets and carbon projects based on the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework introduced in chapter 1. Section 2.55 describes the methodology for the review, which is presented in section 2.6.

2.2. Constituting carbon and 'fair carbon' as a commodity

Theoretical advances have been made to interpret the process of commodification of carbon, by which the tonne of CO_2 equivalent has become the currency of the carbon market (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, Bumpus, 2011a). Overall, these works have made important contributions to thinking about carbon credits, forging a tangible analytical component and discursive category out of both the intangible commodity and the invisible relationships imbued within them, and opening these up to critical analysis. Making sense of 'fair carbon' as a potential new commodity involves drawing on theoretical contributions to the commodification of carbon and the questions this poses, combined with analyses of the politics of ethical commodities.

Commodification approaches involve looking at the geographical lives of commodities and the social relationships made tangible through things and are usually characterised by an attention to the sites and subjects of social, cultural, environmental and economic exploitation (Castree, 2001). A key aspect of commodification is that nature is displaced and severed from sites of production and specificity (Bumpus, 2011a), which makes it easy to ignore the material implications of this process in specific places. Clarity is needed on what characterises a commodity in order to be able to make a normative assessment on the benefits or ills of commodification processes (Castree, 2004), which also needs to be a place-based assessment.

Carbon is a slippery commodity because it is intangible (it cannot physically change hands) and fictitious as it essentially involves creating value based on the absence of something (the non-production or removal of CO_2 from the atmosphere) (Bumpus, 2011a). It is also a fragile commodity, both created and destabilised by carbon projects, market dynamics and buyers' opinions (illustrated by 2011 market collapse and ongoing price fluctuation) (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). These characteristics pose challenges in terms of how carbon is understood and talked about, measured and transacted (Goodman and Boyd, 2011), and how benefits and burdens are shared. Its material and biophysical properties have necessitated new governance practices and institutions (Boyd et al., 2011), which serve to manage the conflicts and contradictions inherent in the commodification of carbon (Bumpus, 2011a). The technological practices developed to do this are beset with problems and complications, not least because the science itself is contentious and is shaped by particular normative framings (Goodman and Boyd, 2011) (Frame, 2011).

The process of commodification of carbon produces particular forms of socio-ecological relations (Boyd et al., 2011). Scholars have explored the social relationships that carbon credits are imbued with during production, circulation and consumption (Goodman and Boyd, 2011, Lovell et al., 2009, Wang and Corson, 2015), and the places and spaces where these relationships are played out (Lansing, 2012, Lovell and Ghaleigh, 2013). This builds on

scholarship on the geographical lives of Fairtrade commodities (Goodman, 2004, Guthman, 2009, Lyon, 2006) as well as other carbon-based commodities (Bridge, 2011). Commodification approaches have underlined the role of framing and narratives in sustaining production and consumption of carbon credits and constituting connections between the two. These include ethical and moral grounding about what is the 'right', 'good' or 'better' thing to do about climate change and its impacts and entrench particular pathways, whilst ignoring other questions such as who has the marketable and moral right to pump CO_2 into the atmosphere, and other pathways requiring larger behavioural or structural changes, or more collective or regulatory approaches (Goodman and Boyd, 2011). The association of normative framings and uncertain scientific conclusions with market-based approaches should be viewed with caution because of the potential to get it wrong or produce perverse incentives (Frame, 2011).

2.2.1. Limitations to existing scholarship on carbon commodification

Whilst the highly conceptual and discursive (as opposed to empirical) orientation of some of these works is useful, it still leaves a gap in terms of what may be practically be done within the context of carbon projects- where the carbon aspect often remains ambiguous and risks being misunderstood or non-transparently dealt with. Corbera and Martin (2015) point to evidence from projects whereby local people are handing over their property rights to carbon without sufficient understanding of what the carbon is or how much it is worth. An empirical analysis of fairness in combination with a pathways approach allows for the analytical connections to be made between the ways that the commodity is conceptualised and how fairness values are attached to it by different people involved in constituting and governing the commodity of 'fair carbon'.

Furthermore, while it is recognised that different types of carbon are more or less easy to measure, requiring different methods and leading to a propensity for certain types of project (Bumpus, 2011a) there is little acknowledgement in the literature of the implication this may have on social relationships. Fairtrade scholarship offers insights in terms of commodity and place specificity and how the Fairtrade concept plays out differently regarding different places and products (Phillips, 2014, McEwan et al., 2014) (see also chapter 7). Focus on the commodification process itself also risks underemphasising the wider aspects of carbon projects such as institutional and governance arrangements which do not necessarily change hands via the carbon credit or get projected onto it. For example Bridge (2011) describes these as 'external influences'. Again, Fairtrade scholarship offers some relevant insights on how different types of certification intersect with and affect local spaces differently (Getz and Shreck, 2006, Mutersbaugh et al., 2005), and the importance of considering institutions and place in analyses of commodity chains (Neilson and Pritchard, 2009). Governance processes are an essential

component of pathways research and an empirical analysis of fairness involves looking at place-based interpretations of fairness and implications of dominant fairness framing (see chapter 1).

2.2.2. Constituting 'Fair Carbon'

'Fair Carbon' is a new ethical-moral underpinning for carbon credits warranting critical assessment (Goodman and Boyd, 2011). Fairtrade scholarship has already raised questions about the politics of a movement attempting to achieve market-driven social change (Taylor, 2005b, Fridell, 2007), where any transformation of food systems and wider political action is limited by the whims of a consumer market (Goodman, 2004, Lekakis, 2012). Like 'fair carbon', an 'ethical commodity' can arguably be considered an oxymoron (Guthman, 2002), though with respect to Fairtrade, this assertion has been countered by recognising that the movement and label has effectively situated ethics, commoditisation and livelihood struggles side by side (Goodman, 2004). Carbon credit retailers have already attempted to embed 'care' and 'responsibility' for others, the environment and the future into the narratives and pricing of credits (Goodman and Boyd, 2011, Lovell et al., 2009). Claims are also being made about 'fair' conduct and 'fairly traded' carbon credits (Howard et al., 2015b) Given the controversy that surrounds carbon trading outlined in chapter 1, such claims are likely to be contested in the absence of sufficient contextual information. GSF and FTI's partnership can be seen as an attempt to mediate such claims.

As with Fairtrade commodities, it is questionable whether market-driven strategies (in this case for producing and selling 'Fair Carbon'), based on consumer politics and behavioural choice are 'right' and 'good' enough and whether alternative pathways involving structural, collectivised or regulatory changes might constitute a stronger ethical-moral underpinning (Goodman and Boyd, 2011).

2.2.3. Stretching and extending Fairtrade

Application of the fair trade concept to carbon comes at a time when the meaning of fair trade is under question from within and outside the movement. This results from recent trajectories including the development of the *Fair for Life* label as a rival to Fairtrade (Smith, 2013); the breakoff of Fairtrade USA from under the umbrella of Fairtrade International (Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015); and the new small producer label developed by the Latin American producers network (Renard, 2015). Mainstreaming and the increasing participation of profit-driven transnational corporations in Fairtrade has been held liable for the loss of the radical and political edge to the Fairtrade movement (Low and Davenport, 2005, Fridell, 2007) and the dilution of some its core principles (Doherty et al., 2013), despite the benefits that the extension of Fairtrade production and markets may also bring (Doherty et al., 2013, Goodman and

Herman, 2015). Meanwhile, there have been calls from scholars to expand or adapt Fairtrade certification to new areas and commodities such as wood (Klooster, 2006, Taylor, 2005a), gold (Hilson and Kamlongera, 2013) and commodities in conflict zones (Davenport and Low, 2015) where it seen as having the potential to enhance equity, fairness, promote peace and development, address access opportunities for smaller producers and communities, transform social relations and create new market niches and ties between producers and consumers. Nevertheless, potential challenges in implementing Fairtrade certification were noted in terms of the structure of the commodity chain, commodity characteristics and discrepancies between intended beneficiaries and producers actually capable of complying with the standard (Hilson and Kamlongera, 2013, Taylor, 2005a); and (with respect to gold in Sub Saharan Africa) the level of organisation that could be expected of producers (Hilson and Kamlongera, 2013). In practice, standards scoping development and improvement processes have subsequently been underway for both Fairtrade timber in Latin America and gold in Sub Saharan Africa[4] but these have not been documented by scholars so it remains to be understood whether the challenges have been dealt with. Notably, prior to FTI's decision to engage in the carbon market, Fairtrade certification of carbon credits had already been recommended as a means of (i) reframing the market to draw attention to the principles of dignity and common welfare and promote transparency and legitimacy; and (ii) organising long term collaborative interactions among stakeholders (Ciscell, 2010). Some of the same challenges related to the commodity chain structure (in terms of its complexity, fragmentation and poor consumer awareness) and commodity characteristics (sold in plural markets and not conducive to personalised consumption) recognised for Fairtrade wood (Taylor, 2005a) would nevertheless also apply to carbon. Ciscell (2010) does recognise some technical and financial challenges but proposes resolving most of them through the use of the Fairtrade premium (to cover administration costs, subsidise less cost-effective but more developmentally beneficial projects, and build capacity) and advance payments (to address lack of capital and the need for technical assistance). The Fairtrade premium was also flagged up as having potential to resolve some of access issues for small producers and communities in wood commodity chains. Without wider institutional support however, this alone was not expected to completely address the problem (Klooster, 2006).

[4] A pilot project led by FTI and the Forest Stewardship Council to develop joint certification of timber was implemented between 2009 and 2013 and resulted in the first jointly certified timber in 2012 initially marketed in Germany, see http://www.fairtrade.net/new/latest-news/single-view/article/a-world-first-furniture-made-from-fsc-and-fairtrade-timber.html. A consultation and standard adaptation process for Fairtrade gold in Sub Saharan Africa was being implemented in 2014.

2.3. Governing by Private Rule-Setters

Since the early 21st century, a growing field of carbon standards and associated methodologies has emerged together with the expansion of carbon projects pioneered primarily by project developers, NGOs and carbon credit brokers and retailers in the global North, in new locations and activity sectors in the global South (Howard et al., 2015b). The FCS was designed by FTI and GSF for the voluntary carbon market, which during the Kyoto Protocol commitment period (2005-2012), operated in parallel with the compliance market developed under the framework of the UN-created Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). However, the Paris Agreement established at the UNFCCC 21st Conference of Parties (COP) in December 2015 makes less of a distinction between voluntary and compliance markets in an effort to link and harmonise diverse schemes (Marcu, 2016). The FTI-GSF partnership coincided with GSF's decision to develop new methodologies and standards for reducing emissions from land use and forestry[5]. The FTI-GSF partnership is one of many cases of SSOs attempting to encourage, measure and communicate environmental and social benefits (such as Plan Vivo, Social Carbon, W+ and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard), and combining forces to enhance the range of their expertise (for example dual certification offered by the Verified Carbon Standard and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard). This attempt to meet demands of customers and suppliers and maintain market share is a common practice among private rule setters (Green, 2013).

This thesis follows an expanding series of studies attending to the potential spaces for change and incremental innovations and revisions being carved out by private rule-setters and carbon project implementers (Green, 2013, Hale and Roger, 2014, Bulkeley et al., 2012). These works have contributed to an understanding of the transnational governance landscape, but this thesis is novel in providing a detailed empirical assessment of governance within one particular standards setting process. I also contribute to the Fairtrade scholarship which has documented the development of new labels (Smith, 2013, Renard and Laconto, 2013, Renard, 2015) and revisions of existing Fairtrade standards mechanisms (Bacon, 2010, Reinecke, 2010, Reinecke and Ansari, 2015). While most of the work on labels has been limited to discourse and content analysis, ethnographic work by Bacon and Reinecke has enabled a close documentation of governance processes and negotiations involved in making the revisions. This thesis takes the latter approach but with an entire standard-setting process as its focus.

[5] This also involved entering into a partnership with the Forest Stewardship Council, also announced in 2012.

Critical literature on Fairtrade and other agro-food standards has suggested that standards are more than just technologies for organising and regulating markets (Busch, 2000). They have been understood as a political field and a neoliberal governance tool (Ponte et al., 2011) aimed at creating uniformity through disciplining of everyday practices according to technical and market logics (Busch, 2000, Leach et al., 2012). Standards have been criticised as being more about verification and auditability than they are about resolving social and environmental problems (Djama et al., 2011). In the case of Fairtrade, the standards were initially more about facilitating development as a process, but Fairtrade International faced pressure from the auditor FLOCert to reconceptualise development as an auditable outcome in order to comply with ISO 65 requirements for third party product certification (Reinecke and Ansari, 2015), as well as with the umbrella alliance ISEAL's codes for member standards organisations. Carbon standards have a relatively recent history. Existing literature has covered comparative and standard-specific content reviews (Kollmuss et al., 2008, Sterk, 2009) but there is a need for critical research that explores what they are expected to do and what they do in practice. I partially address this gap particularly in chapter 7 where I explore what the FCSSP is expected to do and which particular mechanisms within the standard are expected to lead to specific outcomes, but this should be seen in the wider context of standards as a political governance tool.

2.4. Standard Setters' framing: access, benefits and participation as three pillars of fairness

'Fair Carbon' was not clearly defined at the outset of the FCSSP. This section nevertheless explores FTI and GSF's initial framing of the issue. I underline the aspects of fairness these organisations originally announced that they were tackling, based on the initial press release announcing the collaboration between FTI and GSF (Gold Standard Foundation, 2012), and material published on GSF's website on the lines of partnership with FTI (Gold Standard Foundation, 2014). Firstly, FTI and GSF claimed their collaboration would enable access to the carbon market for 'thousands more smallholders in developing countries' (Gold Standard Foundation, 2012). 'Communities' and 'farming communities' were also referred to as intended target beneficiaries (Gold Standard Foundation, 2014). Several mechanisms were mentioned to address access issues: streamlined and simplified processes and reduced transaction costs (Gold Standard Foundation, 2012); guidelines for application of methodologies, making them easier and more relevant to smallholders and community projects; tools and capacity-building sessions for smallholders, making it easier for them to participate in carbon markets; and upfront finance mechanisms. Secondly, through their collaboration, GSF and FTI sought to ensure benefits to smallholders from the carbon market. This was framed in terms of finance for those who are least responsible for atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions, enabling them to both adapt to and

mitigate climate change in a way that is 'fair to both people and planet' (Gold Standard Foundation, 2012). One way in which GSF and FTI suggested benefits could be increased through a future Fairtrade label for GSF credits is through 'defined, direct and financial benefits to communities' (Gold Standard Foundation, 2014). When the objectives of the standard were publically announced a year later, 'participation' was also a major theme. Based on their initial research, FTI had concluded that the problem was not only smallholders' limited access to, and benefits from the carbon market, but also their limited involvement or active participation, noting for example that where they do take part in projects, they usually do not own the carbon credits. In terms of changes envisaged, the spokesperson for FTI mentioned procedures such as Free Prior Informed Consent, and farmer organisations empowered to take control and drive their own projects (Gold Standard Foundation et al., 2013).

The three pillars of access, benefits and participation underlined by FTI and GSF in public communications early on in the FCSSP roughly map onto the three elements that form the content of fairness in the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework. Fairness in participation is one element of the broader fairness concept of procedural fairness (see Figure 2-1 and Table 1-1). For example, regarding participation, it is important to ask not only whether smallholders have the opportunity to participate in carbon projects, but also whether they have the capacity to make an informed decision, and the freedom to choose whether to participate or not.



Figure 2-1: Elements of the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework included in FTI and GSF's pillars of fairness

2.5. Carbon project review methodology

The focus of the literature review on carbon projects is largely on sub-Saharan Africa and organic carbon projects (carbon stored above or below ground, in trees, forests and soils) targeting smallholders and communities. The regional focus was chosen because of choices made in the research design and because the region has fewer carbon projects being implemented[6], suggesting that the biggest constraints are present there. The sectoral focus was chosen for four reasons: 1) both forest and agricultural carbon projects were initially envisaged within the scope of the FCS; 2) their mitigation effectiveness is questionable (Newell et al., 2013), 3) benefits to participants are less evident (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008) compared to energy efficiency projects, for example involving distribution of improved cook-stoves (Simon et al., 2012), and 4) relatively few projects have been developed[7], so understanding of their implications is largely unknown. While many of the findings from the review apply to carbon projects in any sector, I have reduced the detail of the sections specific to agricultural carbon projects in order to remain relevant to the eventual scope of the FCS which excluded agricultural projects. Full details of these aspects are provided in Howard et al. (2015b).

I identified relevant literature (project-specific case studies, multi-project reviews, general discussions about carbon projects in the target category, literature on specific carbon standards and their application) by using search engines, reference lists of key articles, and articles citing them (see Box 2-1 for search terms used). I prioritised peer-reviewed literature but found limited studies of smallholder/ community-focused organic carbon projects being implemented, partly because there are still few projects to date and most are at early stages of implementation (see Table 2-1 for details on the eleven different carbon projects detailed in the case studies I identified- notably all but one are forest-carbon projects, but some also include agricultural land management within their activities). Many project studies conducted have been commissioned by project developers or donors and thus constitute grey literature, which I used only for background information rather than evidence. However, some of the peer-reviewed literature used grey literature as an evidence base (especially project documentation). I compensated for the paucity of project-specific literature by reviewing more general discussions on the challenges in implementing organic carbon projects with smallholders and communities in sub-Saharan Africa. I analysed identified literature to locate key limitations to access, benefits and

---

[6] I confirmed this through an analysis conducted for FTI of all the projects listed on the registries and websites up to the end of October 2013 for the following standards: Verified Carbon Standard, Gold Standard, Carbon Fix, the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance Standard, and Plan Vivo. Social Carbon projects were also reviewed where they were jointly certified by VCS and Social Carbon.

[7] The analysis mentioned above showed that there were significantly fewer forest and agricultural projects being implemented in comparison to renewable energy and energy efficiency projects.

procedures, on the basis of the themes underlined in Box 2-1. I also analysed the literature on specific carbon standards and their application using the Standards themes outlined in Box 2-1 as a basis. I found that Plan Vivo certified projects had been most extensively documented whereas literature on other standards and project outcomes was limited to desk reviews (Wood, 2011, Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013, Sterk, 2009).

Box 2-1: search terms and criteria

Details of search terms and themes used to identify and analyse literature
Key words used for initial literature search: 'carbon projects', crossed with themes such as equity; fairness; value chains; institutions; trade-offs; knowledge, expertise and roles for local communities; procedures; participation; community engagement and costs and benefits.
Access themes explored: Challenges and opportunities for implementing organic carbon projects with smallholders and communities in sub-Saharan Africa Pros, cons and risks associated with including smallholders and communities within carbon markets Types of organic carbon project designs amenable to registration Requirements for registering and implementing a project involving smallholders and communities Resources required for taking part in organic carbon projects Role of institutions in shaping access to these resources
Benefits themes explored: Costs and benefits associated with the carbon project Monetary and non-monetary benefits and their links with participation How costs and benefits are distributed between project stakeholders Opportunities for smallholders and community members to take part in project design or implementation.
Procedures themes explored: Mechanisms, processes and strategies for members of host communities to resist, influence, be informed about, take ownership over, or express discontent about projects and examples of how they operate in practice Dynamics of inclusion, exclusion, representation and participation within host communities Conditions required for procedural fairness and participatory parity
Standard themes explored: Rules, procedures and mechanisms codified by standards Impact of codification on project implementation and outcomes

Table 2-1: Details of carbon projects identified in literature

Type of literature	No. of key articles	Project details (and number of studies covering the project)
Single-project case studies	8	Kenya: Kenyan Agricultural Carbon Project (KACP) (soil carbon), VCS certified (2); Uganda: Trees For Global Benefits (TFGB) (community-based forestry), Plan Vivo certified (1) Mozambique: Sofala Community Carbon Project (a.k.a. N'hambita), (community-based forestry), Plan Vivo certified (2) Mali: Carbon From Communities (community-based natural resource management), not certified (1) Tanzania: Angai Villages Land Forest Reserve (REDD), no details of certification (1) Indonesia: Kalimantan Forest and Climate Partnership (REDD+ project)
Multi-project comparative case studies	7	Kenya: KACP (1) Mozambique: Sofala Community Carbon Project (3) Uganda: TFGB (2) Uganda: Nile Basin Reforestation Project, CDM certified (1) Uganda: Kikonda Forest Reserve, certified by Carbon Fix (now owned by Gold Standard) (protected area) (1) Malawi: Trees for Hope (community-based forestry), Plan Vivo certified (1) Ghana: Vision 2050 (forest plantation), considering CDM certification (1) Sierra Leone: Western Area Peninsula Forest Reserve (protected area), applying for VCS certification (1) Democratic Republic of Congo: Kamoa (environmental conservation), going for Plan Vivo certification (2) Tanzania: Angai Villages Land Forest Reserve (REDD), no details of certification (1) Tanzania: pseudonym Program Small-Grove, not certified (1)
Desk reviews of organic carbon projects	3	1 study covered 42 projects, another other covered 23 projects (including some overlaps) - both in Africa. A third covered 56 projects worldwide.

2.6. Limits to fair access, benefit-sharing and procedures

The literature search enabled a better understanding of the principal factors limiting the ability of smallholders and communities in Africa to access the carbon market. Constraining factors shaping ability to access the land and legal resources have been documented elsewhere (Howard et al., 2015b). These are a crucial prerequisite for taking part in carbon projects, but possibilities

for addressing them fall within the remit of GSF's requirements rather than the FCS[8]. I therefore focus in this section on access to markets, shaped by the project development and implementation process.

2.6.1. Access to markets: technical complexities, uncertainties and costs

Projects involving smallholders and communities face significant barriers to implementation and market access. Challenges relate to technical complexity, uncertainties and costs associated with project development, carbon accounting (monitoring, reporting and verification of the carbon sequestration or emissions reductions created by project activities) and sales of carbon credits. Below I explore how these limit access for smallholders and communities.

2.6.1.1. Project development and management

Project development requires multiple steps, starting with an initial assessment of the project idea, and outlining the carbon mitigation potential, social and environmental impacts and the financial feasibility (Leach and Scoones, 2013). This must usually be approved by the SSO before moving onto a more detailed Project Design Document (PDD).The PDD outlines which carbon accounting methodologies are appropriate. It is often a long, technically-dense document, has implications for the volume of emissions reductions that a project will potentially generate, and sets out the data requirements for verifying project implementation and actual emissions reductions (Leach and Scoones, 2013). It forms the backbone for validation (according to the rules and criteria of the chosen standard), and periodic verification after the project is running, but only has to be written once per project. Actors involved in multiple projects become adept at producing PDDs in quite a formulaic way, but sometimes PDDs are insufficiently sensitive to local context or adaptive to changing local conditions, needs and priorities (Leach and Scoones, 2013). Projects are usually managed by external (often foreign) project developers who have skills in identifying potential project activities, defining and assuring the principles of operation, and searching for buyers (Corbera and Brown, 2010), or who pay consultants to assist them. It would be difficult for smallholders and communities to manage and implement projects by themselves. They therefore rely on project developers and

[8] Through my involvement with GSF's standard-setting processes for Climate Smart Agriculture and Afforestation/ Reforestation smallholder guidelines, I used my knowledge of the existing challenges for smallholders, documented in the literature and testified by programme implementers I interviewed in Kenya, in order to lobby for changes in the requirements that would facilitate participation in carbon projects for people without formal land titles. Changes were effectuated in version 1.0 of the guidelines, published in November 2014, see http://www.goldstandard.org/sites/default/files/ar-guidelines-smallholder-microscale.pdf, p10.

other actors in the carbon offset value chain, and generally have a weak positioning in relation to these parties (Mathur et al., 2014).

2.6.1.2. Carbon accounting

Carbon accounting is characterised by considerable uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding hypothetical calculations about emissions trajectories with or without the project (Lohmann, 2010), and assessments of the actual mitigation capacity of carbon projects (Jindal et al., 2012, Simon et al., 2012). Various techniques are deployed for estimating and quantifying actual emissions reductions in forest and soil carbon projects. Calculations and measurements often involve computer-modelling, satellite imagery and positioning systems (Corbera and Brown, 2010) which require upfront investment and technical capacity building (Perez et al., 2007), or reliance on external parties. Information gained using technical methods needs to be contextualised and ground-truthed with field data from permanent fixed plots, tree surveys (Leach and Scoones, 2013), random sampling and/or self-assessments by project participants (Atela, 2012). Generally, the more robust and complex the methodology for carbon accounting, the more expensive it is to implement, with direct implications for the amount of carbon revenue available to those involved in generating the offset. Field techniques may involve lower upfront investment costs but are more labour-intensive and time-consuming. However, with less rigorous methodologies, projects may be required to earmark a larger proportion of the emissions reductions in a risk-buffer to allow for accounting inaccuracies. In the Kenyan Agricultural Carbon Project, 60% of the carbon credits generated were initially set aside (Atela, 2012), leaving little to cover project implementation and incentives for participants. Certain types and designs of project face larger challenges in monitoring of activities and carbon performance.

Projects may need to aggregate large numbers of smallholders and communities within single schemes in order to generate sufficient emissions reduction volumes to render a project financially viable (Scherr et al., 2012, Perez et al., 2007). When participants are geographically scattered, monitoring and verification become inherently more costly and complex (Perez et al., 2007, Leach et al., 2012). While some authors advocate a role for communities in field data collection, to reduce costs and empower local people, this must be balanced against the need for robust accounting (Danielsen et al., 2011, Palmer Fry, 2011, Gupta et al., 2012) and the money available to remunerate people adequately. Some projects, such as Trees for Global Benefits in Uganda, rely on volunteers to undertake monitoring (Peskett et al., 2011), which may keep costs down, but relies on people's willingness to work without direct remuneration. Decisions about which methodologies and techniques should be used to generate which kinds of data, and who to involve in the collection and analysis, are politically-laden (Gupta et al., 2012). They have

direct implications for the empowerment or disenfranchisement of local communities, as well as directly affecting the benefits received within the community.

2.6.1.3. Verification, Certification and Sales of Carbon Credits

The structure of the carbon market necessitates rigorous auditing (verification) of a project's performance and monitoring data, because the intangibility of carbon credits means it is possible to intentionally or unintentionally sell or account for them twice (double accounting). Also, both supplier and buyer have an interest in exaggerating the number of carbon credits that a project has produced (Kollmuss et al., 2008). For SSOs to be perceived as credible, they impose complex (and costly) methods for accounting both carbon and environmental and social benefits and granting certification. While some SSOs (e.g. Plan Vivo) reduce costs to the project by using their own staff to conduct desk audits of projects, SSOs that draw on CDM infrastructure (e.g. GSF) use CDM-accredited auditors or Designated Operating Entities. These auditors generally command much higher fees than the auditors from FLO-Cert (the designated Certification Body for Fairtrade International) or other sustainability certification schemes.

Sales of carbon credits are usually mediated electronically, via trading platforms and databases (Corbera and Brown, 2010) and often involve predominantly Northern brokers, retailers and industrial networks. Although some buyers have shown willingness to pay more for premium carbon credits which involve strong storylines and/or rigorous accounting and verification procedures, many buyers are interested in paying as little as possible (Merger and Pistorius, 2011) or combining a small volume of premium carbon credits with a larger volume of cheap carbon credits without co-benefits. Overall, carbon offset prices are extremely volatile and average prices may be insufficient to cover costs of production for smallholder- and community-focused organic carbon credits, which are comparatively more costly to generate than credits from cook stove projects, and less popular on the market (Swallow and Goddard, 2013). Their sales are mainly limited to voluntary markets because of restrictions or non-eligibility on compliance markets (Swallow and Goddard, 2013). Several organic carbon projects in sub-Saharan Africa have experienced difficulties or delays in making sales (Reynolds, 2012). In the Sofala Community Carbon project in Mozambique, it has been suggested that this was partly to do with the perception of the quality of the Plan Vivo certification (Grace et al., 2010).

2.6.1.4. Investment costs

It may take several years from the conception of a project to the generation and sale of its first carbon credits. The finance required during this period is likely to be a significant barrier for community or smallholder-led projects, necessitating a role for investors and donors to put

forward large sums of money with little guarantee of receiving returns at least in the initial years (Corbera and Brown, 2010). It is particularly difficult to design financially viable projects or source money to finance them in a context of price volatility. Many project ideas are abandoned during the initial feasibility assessment, because of both the lack of profitability and the complexity of developing them (Leach and Scoones, 2013). Pioneering organic carbon projects in sub-Saharan Africa such as the Sofala Community Carbon project in Mozambique and the Kenyan Agricultural Carbon project have been extremely costly to set up and heavily reliant on donor funding (Swallow and Goddard, 2013). Costs would have to be reduced if these projects were extended or implemented elsewhere (Jindal et al., 2012, Grace et al., 2010).

2.6.1.5. Proposed interventions and lessons

GSF and FTI proposed four interventions which could potentially alleviate some of the limitations related to access to markets. Firstly, streamlined and simplified processes would make it easier to tackle project development, carbon accounting and other certification requirements, potentially opening up these tasks to a broader range of actors. Secondly, tools and training to build capacity for smallholders and communities could facilitate them to take on particular roles within a carbon project. GSF has thus far chosen to go down the route of rigour, using existing CDM rules and adding further requirements. FTI standards are also becoming increasingly difficult for small producer organisations to apply. Simplicity and streamlining are greater challenges now that GSF and FTI are in partnership, as the combination of approaches could potentially make their certification system more complicated. If quality continues to be a key consideration, there will continue to be inherent trade-offs between rigour and simplification.

Thirdly, GSF and FTI's commitment to reduce transaction costs could partially resolve the issue of high costs in project development and generation of carbon credits. SSOs are responsible for setting the fees for project registration and certification and defining which actors audit projects against their standards and these fees absorb significant proportions of project budgets. In general, SSOs have been criticised for the high costs of certification that serve to exclude small producer organisations (Mutersbaugh, 2005). Nevertheless, projects involving smallholders and communities scattered over large areas may have structurally higher operational costs which make them less able to compete with more centralised types of project design and these are beyond the influence of SSOs. Fourthly, upfront financing mechanisms could alleviate another portion of the burden of investment costs, but outcomes depend on how these are devised and which conditions are placed on the finance. For example, if the upfront finance is provided by the buyer, they will incur greater risks, and this could fall back on those producing the carbon credits in terms of lower prices. This has often happened when carbon credits are sold *Ex-Ante*

(purchased before they have been delivered), but at lower prices. Also, imposing additional financing requirements on the buyer may discourage some potential buyers.

Notably, GSF and FTI did not include any interventions in their initial set of propositions which could facilitate sales of carbon credits. In the context of a weak carbon market, a shortage of demand for GSF-FTI certified credits is probable. However, there is some confidence that FTI could play a role in transforming the market (e.g. Ciscell, 2010). In the case of coffee, FTI has succeeded in increasing profits and commanding a price premium (Nelson and Martin, 2014) although most discussions on the impact of Fairtrade certification ignore that most coffee producers fail to sell all their certified coffee under Fairtrade conditions because of low demand (Bacon et al., 2008). Fairtrade certified products have traditionally been bought by individual consumers, but are increasingly incorporated into public and corporate procurement strategies (Fisher and Corbalán, 2013). Meanwhile, the voluntary carbon market has a predominantly corporate consumer base (Lovell et al., 2009) but public authorities are increasingly becoming customers (Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez, 2014). It is difficult to predict how the market will evolve in coming years.

2.6.2. Fair benefit-sharing

Organic carbon projects involving smallholders and communities involve significant transaction costs which render them costly to implement. Nevertheless, carbon projects are commonly considered an opportunity for channelling carbon finance to those least responsible for climate change. Several authors have questioned the legitimacy and efficacy of project budgets managed by donors and investors, underlining the need to decipher how costs and revenue are split between the stakeholders involved, what proportion of the budget is absorbed by transaction costs, and how much goes to the communities responsible for carbon sequestration (Sharma and Suppan, 2011, Fairhead et al., 2012). In this section I explore both financial and non-financial benefits in terms of who benefits, how they are discussed and decided on, their relative importance, and the limitations to determining a 'fair share'.

2.6.2.1. Financial and non-financial benefits

In organic carbon projects, there are ongoing debates about *who* should benefit and how benefits should be shared between actors. While there are rationales for making benefits available to those who facilitate the mitigation action at a project level (Luttrell et al., 2013), the individuals and groups carrying out the mitigation action will also need to receive direct and/or indirect financial and non-financial benefits (Stringer et al., 2012). These might include incentive payments, improvements to soil fertility, increased agricultural yields, employment, additional

income from timber or non-timber products harvested from the trees products, access to cheaper fuel, training or secure land tenure.

The cost and associated risks of implementing the recommended land management practices often serve as a barrier to farmers, who may not have the will to implement them without receiving financial payments upfront (Nhantumbo and Izidine, 2009). Evidence suggests that financial benefits have often been insufficiently attractive, regular or disseminated enough to motivate or compensate participants, especially when they incur significant investment, risks and labour costs (Dougill et al., 2012, Swallow and Goddard, 2013). Several debates surround the issue of payments, such as whether or not they are a key motivation for adoption and sustained implementation of new land use practices associated with carbon projects (Fisher, 2012), and how to design payments compensation or alternative approaches (Adhikari and Boag, 2013, Namirembe et al., 2014). Evidence from Trees for Global Benefits in Uganda showed that payments were the main motivation for involvement, particularly at the household level, although in one area, the aesthetic and existence value of trees was a bigger motivation (Fisher, 2012). Similarly, in the Sofala Community Carbon project in Mozambique, participants relied on payments which served as a safety net because planting of trees involved high transaction and opportunity costs and losses when they did not survive (Dougill et al., 2012). In both projects, payments are front-loaded, but this approach has implications for temporal sustainability of carbon sequestration activities, particularly after the end of the front-loaded payment period (Fisher, 2012). In the Mozambican project, payments temporarily ceased because of a rupture in the sale of credits, and participants were unwilling to act without them and faced disappointment as well as an income gap (Dougill et al., 2012). This also illustrates that participants' perceptions of a project and its associated risks and benefits can condition behavioural change or adoption and the sustained implementation of new land use practices (Dougill et al., 2012, Tschakert, 2007).

Carbon payments alone cannot release people from poverty, and are only intended as a way to smooth the transition to a more sustainable and productive set of land uses which eventually generate value independent of carbon payments (Jindal et al., 2012). In combination, these are often framed as providing multiple wins- addressing local environmental problems, offering a cheap pathway to climate mitigation, and providing financial benefits to farmers. In reality, wins may be optimistically overstated. Non-financial and non-quantifiable benefits are often harder to measure and attribute, which is perhaps why there is more focus in the literature on financial aspects. Non-financial benefits noted in the projects literature included personal development in the form of training, growth in women's confidence to speak or write publically and in the presence of men (Bozmoski and Hultman, 2010, Grace et al., 2010) and development of technical and business management skills (Grace et al., 2010); environmental benefits

(Bozmoski and Hultman, 2010); provision of appropriate equipment and use of project vehicles for emergencies (Dyer et al., 2014).

2.6.2.2. Benefit-sharing within the community

Where benefits do reach local communities, there is evidence of unjust distributions, as carbon projects are unlikely to address pre-existing marginalisation (Mathur et al., 2014). In the Sofala Community Carbon project in Mozambique, employment was deemed one of the major economic benefits by those who had been hired by the project (Jindal et al., 2012), but employment is usually limited to a few people and may only be temporary. Actors involved in projects aiming to benefit smallholders and communities face a challenge in designing them in ways that maximise investment returns for a range of farmers without marginalising others (Perez et al., 2007). The role of local organisations and leaders in brokering deals or facilitating the distribution of benefits shapes project participants' abilities to draw an equitable share of the benefits (Lipper et al., 2006, Perez et al., 2007, Dougill et al., 2012). This is especially when payments involve a proportion being paid into a community fund, as was the case in projects in Mozambique (Jindal et al., 2012), Uganda (Peskett et al., 2011) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Dyer et al., 2014). If community-based carbon projects are to achieve their multiple environmental, economic and social goals, the activities they incorporate must be backed by 'strong rural organisations, legitimate and representative leadership, client-driven extension, local capacity building, and informed and enabling policies' (Perez et al., 2007). There is a knowledge gap about what levels of organisation are happening in existing projects, the role that organisations serve, and how they shape access to benefits. SSOs and project developers also need to face the challenge of how to take into account the diversity of forms of social organisation, institutions and practices when designing standards or projects (Leach and Scoones, 2013, Perez et al., 2007).

2.6.2.3. Harmful effects and project reputation

Some projects entail negative impacts on local communities but very few tangible benefits. Large-scale forestry, biodiversity corridor and bio-char projects have been criticised as routes for foreign direct investors to buy tracts of land cheaply from national governments for extended periods, and to benefit disproportionately, whilst dispossessing local communities and excluding them from the resources from which they earn their living (Tienhaara, 2012, Leach et al., 2012). In some instances, these projects have incited strong critique from affected communities, and from journalists and NGOs, jeopardising the project's legitimacy and causing it to crumble (Reynolds, 2012). One of the projects featured in Table 2-1 was 'wound down' in 2015 because of persistent difficulties (Plan Vivo, 2015) and this happened after a scathing report had been published (Kill, 2013). This suggests that focusing on local goals may not

merely be a strategy for enhancing social benefits. There are also pragmatic reasons for doing so since a project's sustainability depends on its meeting of local and global expectations (Reynolds, 2012).

2.6.2.4. Proposed interventions and lessons

In the initial GSF-FTI communication, the only possible intervention relating to benefits was the suggestion of defined and direct financial benefits to communities. From a standards perspective, financial benefits may be easier to measure and track at least in the short term, compared to less tangible benefits, or benefits that take longer to materialise. Choosing to focus on community rather than individual payments has its own set of implications for fairness, and depends on the presence of strong local institutions which serve the interests of the smallholders and community members involved in projects. FTI's historic approach of working with and strengthening Producer Organisations (Nelson and Pound, 2010) aligns with the need identified in the literature for strong organisations to back carbon projects. Evidence suggests however that financial payments at the household level may be important motivations for participants in organic carbon projects but in themselves are not enough to pull people out of poverty, especially in the context of weak and dynamic market prices. This suggests payments need to be combined with other types of benefit. Therefore, GSF and FTI are potentially raising expectations by underlining defined and direct financial benefits, the delivery of which is beyond their control.

Meanwhile, GSF and FTI can potentially shape benefits accrued from using their label(s), in the form of reputation. Carbon certification has not always been successful in enhancing reputational benefits, especially in the face of critics' reports of negative social and environmental outcomes (e.g. Kill, 2013, Lohmann, 2006). Critics have also named and shamed projects certified by SSOs that prioritise these attributes (e.g. Plan Vivo). Evidence of lack of rigour in the enforcement of carbon standards (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013) also threatens the credibility of third party certified carbon credits. The GSF-FTI partnership is potentially an opportunity for enhancing reputational benefits since both SSOs take pride in emphasising the quality and attributes of their standards. FTI has succeeded in unveiling the social aspects of production (Nelson and Martin, 2014), although in some cases, FTI and other certification schemes have capitalised on and claimed credit for practices that coffee farmers have adopted for generations (Bacon et al., 2008). This critique is potentially applicable to GSF-FTI certified carbon credits. Carbon projects must involve activities which are different from 'business as usual'. If they fail to prove additionality of emissions reductions, they will lose their credibility.

2.6.3. Fair Procedures

Participation in carbon sequestration and trading schemes should ideally be voluntary, and individual resources users should have the freedom to participate in ways that allow for their varying resource endowments, tolerance to risk, and opportunity costs (Perez et al., 2007). In reality, power relations can transect the various levels of governance in a carbon project (Atela, 2012) and provoke participation. It is important to enquire whether the local community members who are asked to participate in project operations are actually provided with all the necessary information to make an informed decision on their involvement at the outset and whether they have the opportunity to opt out if it is costing them more than they are gaining. Achieving procedural fairness is dependent on the implementation of rules and processes, the presence of representative and inclusive institutions, and the possibility to include, or negotiate between competing views. This is within a context where different stakeholders have different levels of knowledge, skills, power, information and languages at their disposal (Brown and Corbera, 2003, Grasso, 2010). Involvement of local communities in project design and implementation is widely expected to lead to better social and environmental outcomes and support the overall success of organic carbon projects (Reynolds, 2012, Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). However, despite efforts to include local communities, claims of injustice still persist (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). Some of the challenges of effective communication and engagement with local communities relate to fair access and fair benefits. Unequal access to information results in price uncertainty and speculation, posing challenges for communicating prices. Transacting credits involves larger scale uncontrollable processes and unforeseen delays (for example credit sales) which can erode trust even in projects with high community involvement. This underlines the need for community engagement to adapt to dynamic situations (Dyer et al., 2014).

2.6.3.1. Community Engagement

Table 2-2 outlines some principles of effective community engagement, based on the review of projects outlined in Table 2-1 and incorporating experience of practitioners and scholars who have studied effective community engagement in multiple settings. Each principle is illustrated with examples of application. Although they are ideals to aim for, some caveats and counter-arguments are also given, in order to understand where the principle may be challenging or less effective to apply. Overall it is important to note that carbon projects may involve actors from business and NGO sectors, some of whom may have long-term histories of engagement with local communities while others are unfamiliar with tools and processes for facilitation and meaningful engagement. Those who create spaces for participation may use them to their own interests, co-opt them, or intentionally or unintentionally close them off to certain people

(Tallontire et al., 2014). If tools for engagement and participation are used instrumentally whilst ignoring contextual factors, they can instead serve to legitimise or exacerbate inequitable power dynamics and outcomes (Mahanty and McDermott, 2013), especially if the systems of decision-making involve misrepresentation or exclusion of certain individuals or groups from the circle of people who count (Fraser, 2009). Even the best applications cannot address many contextual factors or overcome social challenges at macro (e.g. legal and political rights) and micro levels (e.g. entrenched poverty, highly unequal land distribution and disparities within communities) (Mahanty and McDermott, 2013).

Table 2-2: Principles of Community Engagement

Principle	Examples within reviewed projects	Caveats and counter-arguments
Recognise heterogeneity of community/ audience (Dyer et al., 2014, Hillier, 1998) taking into account issues around how communities define themselves, and different interests and power relations (Mathur et al., 2014)	Kamoa: there were lower levels of trust/ consensus in a 'community' which was externally formed by combining two locations together to make up numbers (Dyer et al., 2014).	Inclusion of marginalised groups can be problematic because traditional authorities may resist this, but standards can be used as a lever to persuade local elites and officials to make compromises (Wood, 2011)
Dedicate the time, resources and repetition to ensure ongoing, two-way communication (World Agroforestry Centre, 2011, Dyer et al., 2014), using a range of tools and communication outlets (World Agroforestry Centre, 2011). This is both for project developers to understand community institutions, and communities to understand details of financing and contract arrangements and understand their commitments (Peskett et al., 2011, Wood, 2011)	Kamoa: participants reported that the initial meeting involved two-way communications, open and meaningful exchange and consensus from participants, and ongoing engagement was facilitated by frequent visits from project representatives, enabling info-exchange, support and help where needed (Dyer et al., 2014). N'hambita and TFGB: opportunities for fostering understanding and information exchange were limited by infrequent (twice-yearly) interactions with project staff and extension workers, who visited only to service contracts (Dyer et al., 2014, Fisher, 2011). Angai Villages: communication was hampered by irregular meetings and the cost of sharing information (Mustalahti et al., 2012)	Projects involving little participation may gain little from extra consultations- and project developers sometimes feel that they are unnecessary. Nevertheless, there is evidence of consultations being useful for identifying negative impacts or ways of improving even in such cases (Wood, 2011) Facilitation and management of group dynamics is more important than the tools used (Chess and Purcell, 1999) Too much consultation can result in consultation fatigue (Mulyani and Jepson, 2015)

Projects need charismatic leaders and facilitators (Chess and Purcell, 1999, Dyer et al., 2014, Hillier, 1998), and should be based on mutual respect and clarity of roles and responsibilities (World Agroforestry Centre, 2011)	N'hambita, Kamoa and the KACP project all involved approaching the traditional authorities first, who invited members of their communities to attend initial meetings (Atela, 2012, Dyer et al., 2014)	Communication can fail if it only goes through authorities and representatives rather than affected parties (Dyer et al., 2014, World Agroforestry Centre, 2011)
Seek common ownership of the project, goal or decisions made (Dyer et al., 2014, Hillier, 1998)	In a review of 42 African carbon forestry projects, all of the projects initiated and implemented by communities were classified as successes, suggesting that local ownership may be a determinant of success. Meanwhile, one of the failed projects involved a design which was incompatible with local economic incentives and social norms (Reynolds, 2012)	Well-designed frameworks and community participation in management are not enough to ensure access to benefits. External factors (e.g. dependency on outside actors for resources and technical support) and internal factors (around expectations of benefit-sharing) shape their effectiveness (Mustalahti et al., 2012)
Draw on people's knowledge and expertise (World Agroforestry Centre, 2011), recognising that they will have different images, values, meanings, information and languages at their disposal (Hillier, 1998)	Kamoa: design involved joint decision-making combined with farmers local knowledge, giving them the sovereignty to choose which land and planting system to adopt (Dyer et al., 2014). This characterises the Plan Vivo approach.	Avoid using patronising or insensitive examples and metaphors (World Agroforestry Centre, 2011)
Principle: design and approach of participatory activities is important,	Repeated small interest group meetings and intensive facilitation enhanced learning in Indonesian setting because	Participatory approaches can be used instrumentally and may not be capable of

e.g. small groups, where repeated interaction and communication are facilitated, as this can enhance social learning (Mulyani and Jepson, 2015, World Agroforestry Centre, 2011)	it enabled community members to learn and respect different viewpoints without intimidation and enabled shifts of understanding and increased trust to occur (Mulyani and Jepson, 2015).	challenging existing marginalisation (Mathur et al., 2014)
Principle: Free, Prior and Informed Consent: people need to understand the implications of what they are being proposed or asked to sign in carbon contracts and clarity of rules and terms of engagement is vital (Mulyani and Jepson, 2015, Mahanty and McDermott, 2013).	In TFGB and N'hambita there was incomplete understanding of contracts and the time-scale implications of commitments in projects, partially due to language used or illiteracy of farmers (Dyer et al., 2014, Kill, 2013) whereas in Kamoa there was evidence of a high level of understanding and recollection of information given during initial meetings (Dyer et al., 2014).	Clarity may be enhanced by using a local language but it should not be assumed that a local language is preferred (World Agroforestry Centre, 2011). There may always be a gap in knowledge and power between local communities and project proponents so communities should be given legal advice and support to balance external interests driving projects (Mulyani and Jepson, 2015, Peskett et al., 2011).

2.6.3.2. Standardised mechanisms for community engagement

Standards have the potential to serve as instruments for regulating the fairness of procedures through the practices they encode (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). In an attempt to promote transparency and participation and ensure that projects do no harm, some SSOs (e.g. Gold Standard, CCBA, Social Carbon, Plan Vivo) mandate the involvement of community stakeholders (to varying degrees and with varying levels of prescriptiveness) and audit the documentary evidence, through mechanisms for consultation, consent and expression of grievances. These also serve the purposes of reducing opposition and critique as projects are implemented, and therefore increase the attractiveness of credits certified under their schemes (Wood, 2011). The GSF Local Stakeholder Consultation guidelines specify a mandatory process with two rounds of consultations. These should be clearly documented, and include the names of people who attend and participate. Project details should be presented in non-technical form, and include an explanation of carbon markets and the generation of finance from offsetting (Wood, 2011). GSF provides guidance on how to organise a Local Stakeholder Consultation, by providing non-technical explanations of projects, templates of invitations, suggesting ways of engaging people and recording their input. In contrast, the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard specifies more *who* should be involved, *modalities* of involvement and require a continuous stakeholder involvement throughout the project (Sterk, 2009).

Tools such as the Local Stakeholder Consultation facilitate a more structured inclusion of social dimensions in a project (Bumpus, 2011b), but the actual outcomes are contingent on their enactment by different actors and the rigour with which the SSO checks for non-compliance and encourages corrective measures. Evidence from a desk-review of design documents of 56 forest carbon projects certified under the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard suggests that in many cases, mechanisms ‘were notably devoid of diverse measures of engagement that could potentially engage a more comprehensive- and possibly more representative- group of stakeholders’ taking part in the consultation process (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013:973). Where methods for inclusion were deployed, the choice of methods and the information provided about them suggested a more passive role for the community. In large meetings, people may be hesitant to express themselves (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013) and simply presenting technical information might be insufficient for communicating complex concepts related to forest carbon projects, and ensuring comprehension (Lewis and Sheppard, 2006). When it came to providing input, only 57% of projects reported any of the responses received from community members, and 16 projects did not gather any input from community-based stakeholders (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). There were multiple examples of design documents which were not compliant with aspects of the Standard but had nevertheless been validated, suggesting that the criteria were not being rigorously applied or audited (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013).

2.6.3.3. Proposed interventions and lessons

FTI initially proposed two ways in which they imagined addressing participation (understood as part of fair procedures) in carbon projects: introducing the tool of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), which is already a key tool within REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) projects; and empowering farmer organisations to take control in carbon projects. Challenges related to the latter have already been explored in relation to fair access so I elaborate on FPIC before making a brief comment about this second point.

FPIC means giving affected stakeholders the right to freely (without coercion, intimidation or manipulation) give or withhold consent, having been able to access appropriate and sufficient information to make an informed choice, prior to a course of action (Szablowski, 2010, Mahanty and McDermott, 2013). In theory, 'consent' goes beyond 'consultation' because it involves the sharing or transfer of decision-making authority to those giving or withholding consent, and can be used to facilitate collaborative and inclusive decision-making or to avoid projects (Szablowski, 2010). FPIC has been criticised for only offering the right of consent to people with formal land rights, although in some applications (such as FSC), the right is extended to the wider community (Mahanty and McDermott, 2013). GSF incorporated FPIC into their Land Use and Forest Framework[9]: it refers to the principle that a community has the right to give or withhold its consent to proposed projects that may affect the lands they customarily own, occupy or otherwise use, and therefore goes a step towards addressing the criticism about land rights. The Plan Vivo definition is the same but includes smallholders as well as communities and adds 'once they have a full and accurate understanding of the implications of the project' (Plan Vivo, 2013 p29).

In both cases, the problem may come in defining in practice who is included as a smallholder, community member, land owner or occupier (customary or otherwise), and also who makes this decision, and on what basis, given the highly politicised challenges associated with who has the 'right' level of knowledge and understanding. Project developers may not have these contextual understandings at the outset of a process when tools like FPIC are being applied. It is common for companies or project leaders to refer to points of contact such as traditional or administrative leaders in order to make connection with the community, but sole reliance on them is problematic when accountability and transparency in local systems of representation is weak as they can harbour and perpetuate intra-community disparities (Mahanty and McDermott, 2013).

[9] This was influenced by their partnership with FSC, as the two organisations had done an analysis of the areas of overlap and gaps between their standards (Public Presentation at the 19th UNFCCC Conference of Parties).

Deployments of terms like ‘consultation’ and ‘consent’ need to be critically assessed to understand not only what is understood and intended by them, but also how they operate in particular contexts, how agendas are set and participants selected (Tallontire et al., 2014). There is a danger that they are embraced as panaceas (Mahanty and McDermott, 2013) but in practice they are shaped by multiple factors. These include the project developer’s commitment to the process, the level of civil society engagement, cultural and institutional factors affecting communication and participation, knowledge gaps, power relations, inclusivity, and the presence of external officials, (Wood, 2011, Dyer et al., 2014, Mahanty and McDermott, 2013). Mandating them within the standard is therefore not enough in itself to guarantee positive participation of local people in practice (Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013).

FTI’s second proposition for addressing participation- empowering farmer organisations to take control of projects- needs to be understood within Fairtrade’s historical approach of working with Producer Organisations (see chapter 6). Although there is evidence of FTI’s success in this field, the transferability of the approach needs to take into account the challenges of carbon project development and implementation mentioned in the section on Fair Access.

2.7. Conclusion to chapter two

Heated debates surround the concept of fairness in carbon projects but the term itself is widely interpreted and lacks clear definition. After a review of relevant literature on the commodification of carbon and ‘fair carbon’, I then took a pragmatic approach by exploring the pillars of access, benefits and participation that FTI and GSF proposed to include in their framing of fairness, and reviewing academic literature in order to unravel what lies behind these pillars. I assessed how they are interconnected, and which practical constraints shape fairness outcomes within carbon projects. The GSF-FTI partnership provides an interesting focus because it potentially opens up discursive and material spaces, whereby more vulnerable stakeholders currently excluded from, or marginal in the carbon trading system could potentially play a more active role and reap more benefits. My analysis offers potential guidance for those involved in setting the parameters of fairness in refining their definitions, as well as informing further academic debate on ‘fair carbon’.

While the outcomes of efforts to enhance access and shape fairer benefits and procedures for smallholders and communities are highly uncertain, it is important to explore steps being taken towards these goals. With many actors involved, multiple interests at stake, and a competitive context which may push SSOs to act quickly to fill gaps in the standards market, independent research can help to enhance transparency within the process. This involves going beyond an exploration of fairness dimensions in projects and standards tools for addressing them, to

explore of fairness dimensions in the setting of the standards themselves. I turn to this in chapter 3.

Chapter 3 Fair Procedures in Standard Setting

3.1. Introduction to chapter 3

This chapter provides the backdrop for understanding the empirical material introduced in chapter 6 and for addressing objective two of this thesis. In this chapter I extend the concept of Fair Procedures introduced in chapter 2, to the process of Standard Setting by FTI (Figure 3-1). By doing this, I make a conceptual link between Fair Procedures and Fair Parameters. After a brief overview of relevant literature on Standards and standard setting, I then explore the framework (in terms of rules, procedures and political processes) that FTI has set in place to govern standard-setting and partnership processes, and examine how these look alongside both the ideal of fair procedures and participatory governance theories. This serves as a backdrop for a detailed analysis in chapter 6 of the application of FTI's governance framework in practice in the context of the FCSSP.



Figure 3-1: Aspects of the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework explored in chapter 3
The purple arrow represents the question of how the ideals of Fair Procedures relate to the pre-existing governance structures and approaches that are likely to shape Fairness Parameter-Setting.

3.2. Literature review: key themes within standards governance

Section 1.4.2.1 introduced the research gaps related to collaborative standard setting in practice. In this section I elaborate on each of the key themes relevant to this thesis with the support of existing literature.

3.2.1. Standards: pathways and political processes

The burgeoning of standards in the last two and a half decades has attracted a lot of scholarship aimed at better understanding their emergence, evolution and continued proliferation at different levels (Djama et al., 2011). The majority of works have applied an institutional theory lens, which posits that the quest for external legitimacy is the main explanation for the existence and proliferation of private standard setting (Djama et al., 2011).

By applying a pathways approach, I view standards and standard setting processes more critically, as an example of a managerial approach to sustainability issues resulting in universalising pathways that are not necessary appropriate to the problems they aim to address. Blowfield and Dolan (2008) protract this perspective by describing standards as techno-rationalist solutions that are part of a drive for neoliberal normalisation. Bacon's view on Fairtrade standards is that they are not a complete reflection of a neoliberal agenda, but Fairtrade governance is subject to 'an array of political economic constraints, personal convictions, and path-dependent contingencies' (2010 p112). A number of authors have explored how the organisational trajectories of standards organisations are shaped by cooperation and competition between participating stakeholders who seek to control the rules of the game and pursue their own interests (Mutersbaugh et al., 2005). It is important to acknowledge standards' political backdrop not least because it has consequences on poor and marginalised people (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008, Leach et al., 2010).

Attending to the political dimensions of standards requires an exploration of the internal processes of certification, socially embedded practices and governance tools deployed to set standards. Chapter 6 of this thesis is dedicated to this analysis and builds on existing works (e.g. Bacon, 2010, Blowfield and Dolan, 2008, Cheyns, 2011, Djama et al., 2011, Murphy and Yates, 2011, Ponte et al., 2011, Reinecke, 2010). Between them they have looked at how governing is accomplished in practical and technical terms within different types of standard setting initiatives including those led by Fairtrade International. This has involved exploring the circumstances within which standards are developed; questioning the rationales, strategies and moral reasoning behind them; mapping the configurations of actors, interests and alliances and dynamics of inclusion and exclusion; examining conflict, negotiation and co-existence of different viewpoints; and exploring the effects of standards and the interests they serve. Despite a common focus across these works, scholars' views differ on a number of aspects. Differences relate to some extent to the type of standards they looked at, but also the analytical lens applied.

3.2.2. Legitimacy, inclusiveness and power

Standards involving inputs from a broad range of stakeholders including civil society tend to be regarded as more legitimate than standards developed by single companies or industries (Fuchs et al., 2011). Multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Round table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) base their legitimacy on balanced representation and participation of 'all categories of stakeholders', and thus a wide range of interests (Cheyns, 2011). The involvement of coalitions of companies, trade unions, NGOs and other civil society stakeholders, is believed to reduce the likelihood that business will have too much influence on social and environmental issues and to better present workers' and producers' interests (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008). A significant defining feature of standards perceived by standard-setters is their democratic process orientation (Murphy and Yates, 2011), often involving extensive dialogue and consensus-based decision-making.

In practice, participation is 'inflected' by power relations, meaning that initiatives involving broad participation by multiple stakeholders are potentially as exclusionary as top down initiatives (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008 p16). For example, Cheyns (2011) has found that the RSPO's inclusive aims are compromised in practice in terms of who is considered a 'stakeholder' and how participation is managed: people who engage through personal attachments, drawing on lived experiences or principles of justice are less able to make themselves heard and their interventions accorded less legitimacy than those who adopt a pragmatic approach. Southern stakeholders have expressed concerns that ethical trade codes are developed behind desks in Europe with little consultation and some critics argue that these reflect colonial ethnocentrism (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008).

Standard setting is considered technical and SSOs such as FTI and Rainforest International have begun including both internal and external 'experts' on their standards committees. Murphy and Yates (2011) describe the members of technical standards committees rather benignly as epistemic communities who believe that humanity can benefit from their shared knowledge. Although they may represent certain interests and actors, they do not always advocate for what suits them. In contrast, Blowfield and Dolan (2008) detect more of a power asymmetry amongst the 'communities' who participate in devising ethical codes for horticulture. These are 'the community of the supply chain' including the poor and marginalised to which Northern business has a duty, and 'the community of principals'- the CSOs and companies who are not commercial participants in the supply chain but they influence its governance and their worldviews significantly inform what constitutes virtue. This latter community is more likely to be recognised by Multi Stakeholder Initiatives, and ethical trade involves them exerting power

over the community of the supply chain through the legitimisation of certain behaviour and instruments (ibid).

Standard setting committees may include people who claim to represent smallholders but may do so only on an ad hoc basis and without adequate accountability or legitimacy, rather than it being a truly representative smallholder participation (Tallontire et al., 2014, Cheyns, 2011). Efforts to include 'local' perspectives, for example within horticultural codes for African agriculture, are not necessarily more ethically relevant because they falsely assume that there is a community of beneficiaries who share a collective identity, culture and set of interests while ignoring the cultural embeddedness and contested nature of issues they may be consulted on such as gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008).

Several authors have described the management of participation within standard setting as an example of a managerialism: this refers to a set of knowledge and practices systematically aimed at increasing the efficiency of collective action (Djama et al., 2011). Arguably, the more managerial the approach, the less inclusive it is (Ponte et al., 2011). These same forms of exclusion, elitism and unequal access are likely to apply to the setting of carbon standards but few studies have documented this.

3.2.3. Conflicts, tensions and governing tools

The design, content, implementation and underlying epistemology of standards and codes are sites of conflict and negotiation (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008). Aside from looking at who comes to the bargaining table (Busch, 2000), it is important to look at how conflicts and tensions are dealt with, how multiple perspectives are allowed to co-exist and how conflicting viewpoints are transformed into cooperative attitudes (Djama et al., 2011). In an analysis of the adjustment of Fairtrade coffee prices in 2007-2008 from the perspective of a researcher positioned alongside the Latin American producer network, Bacon (2010) describes the outcomes as a result of a balance of power, convictions and capabilities within a contested governance system. Reinecke (2010) studied the same process as an intern within Fairtrade International and described it as a result of negotiation power drawing both on techno-scientific input from the Standards Unit and multi-stakeholder democracy from the Standards Committee and FTI Board.

The fair trade movement is already marked by tensions regarding what 'fairness' means, who fair trade should target, and where should it be going (Doherty et al., 2013, Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015, Smith, 2013) and bringing new stakeholders into debates about Fairtrade carbon was likely to increase the possibility for tension and conflict in the FCSSP. Views differ on whether or not multi-stakeholder standard setting processes can be a site for constructively dealing with conflict or not. Murphy and Yates (2011) recognise that greater understanding that

can come from participating and that better technical solutions are frequently discovered in the course of debates, especially through standard setting by consensus. Focht and Lawler (2000) recognise that policy [or standards] processes require particular tools (such as Q) to open up debate and expose underlying conflicts as failing to recognise them can inhibit deliberative processes. In contrast, Djama et al. (2011) see consensus as a tactic for neutralising debate because unlike compromise, it does not result from debate or negotiation. (Rancière, 2013 p8, c.f. Djama et al., 2011) describes consensus as a 'machine of power' with the aim of imposing a vision, a particular presentation of facts and a direction for their interpretation. Djama et al. (2011) note how consensus processes are strategically commandeered in the RSPO, by consultants who make efforts to mobilise particular intermediaries and confine debates on sensitive issues to specialised committees. Cheyns (2011) describes this as a technical 'professional style' of interaction without confrontation which comes down to the politically-correct style of language used.

The act of preventing conflict from arising in the first place has been described as 'the most insidious and effective use of power' (Lukes, 1974 p23). While some authors see consensus as a tool for wielding this sort of power, it is important to discern what the tool is designed to offer, the system it is part of, how it is enacted in practice and whether this meets the intended aims (Bühler, 2002). This topic is returned to in chapter 6.

Aside from consensus and the management of tensions, a number of other tools and tactics have been scrutinised and labelled as technologies of managerialism, deployed to wield power and impose particular directionalities and outcomes in standard setting processes. These include for example the control of issue-exploration through tactics to open up and close down discussions (Cheyns, 2011, Leach et al., 2010), see also section 3.4.4; using pragmatic arguments and the pressure for expediency to opt for short-term, practical, implementable, economically acceptable or most knowable solutions (Cheyns, 2011, Djama et al., 2011, Leach et al., 2010); and mystifying the auditing process by limiting discussion on how criteria have been established (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008).

3.2.4. Section summary

Different views on the above themes relate to different perspectives on standards and what they do, as well as authors' foci on different types of standard, ranging from standards with routes in social movements; to industry-dominated multi-stakeholder initiatives and business to business standards. While Fairtrade standards fit with the first category it is important to recognise that such standards are increasingly drawing on neoliberal governance tools (Djama et al., 2011). We can expect that FTI might hold the potential to design inclusive stakeholder processes, based on their participatory governance approach (see section 3.4), but this needs to be critically

unpacked. This section has underlined the need to look at governance processes enacted by particular SSOs whilst considering the wider political context within which standards are being deployed as techno-rational governance tools. My work builds on the authors cited in this section, particularly Bacon (2010) and Reinecke (2010) who have both looked at decision-making within FTI price negotiations. They positioned themselves inside the movement in order to understand socially embedded governance practices and situate governance processes within FTI's historical and future trajectory. My approach involves a similarly long term and embedded ethnographic engagement but with a broader and more comprehensive focus on an entire standard setting process rather than a pricing decision. I am also situated as an independent researcher rather than being attached to a particular sub-unit of FTI. Nevertheless it is important to be reflexive about the position I adopt. Leach et al. (2010) encourage engagement by researchers in path-building processes but some critics have questioned the appropriateness of intervening to make standards setting processes more democratic or to try to remove their structural limitations. The concern is that this can contribute to an advancement of the interests of already powerful actors in standard-setting, naturalise them as a form of governance, or disperse of local struggles (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008, Mutersbaugh, 2005). In chapter 8 I reflect on my positionality and its possible effects.

In the remainder of this chapter, section 3.3 introduces FTI's governance structure, rules and processes for standard-setting and explores the interface between stakeholders in the Fairtrade system and stakeholders involved in the FCSSP and section 3.4 discusses FTI's participatory governance approach and critically explores this in relation to literature on participatory and collaborative governance. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.

3.3. FTI: a representative and inclusive institution?

FTI is a membership organisation with an evolving governance structure. Their aims to achieve fairness and justice through democratic decision-making (Taylor, 2005b) are challenged by the number and diversity of stakeholders involved in the Fairtrade system (Sutton, 2013). The organisation is under substantial pressure from its consortium and onlookers to genuinely engage with and include not only its membership base (which includes more than 1.5 million producers and workers grouped within three Producer Networks (PNs) and 19 National Fairtrade Organisations (NFOs) involved in licensing and marketing Fairtrade products) but also a wider set of stakeholders such as NGOs, supporters and other CSOs in the north and south, as well as businesses and consumers, in its governance processes (Bacon, 2010, Sutton, 2013). There is evidence of significant efforts made to respond to this pressure (Bennett, 2015). A 'ground-breaking' vote in 2011 instigated major changes to increase producer representation, according the producer networks equal voting rights in the General Assembly, the highest

decision-making body, and reconfiguring the Board to offer an equal number of places to producer representatives and market representatives (see Table 3-1). Marking these changes, FTI announced, 'we're proud of our multi-stakeholder system. We know the importance of being held accountable to the producers, traders, NGOs and supporters who have worked so hard to make Fairtrade what it is today' (Fairtrade International, 2012 p18). However, these changes do not automatically render a stronger voice to all producers, particularly because of issues of capacity and representation (Sutton, 2013).

3.3.1. Rules and processes

The rules and processes for representation on the Standards Committee and decision making procedures are defined in the FTI Terms of Reference for the Standards Committee and the Standard Operating Procedure for standard setting (more details are given on decision-making provisions in section 6.6.2.1). However, this formal governance structure (Table 3-1 and Figure 3-2) needs to be understood alongside the spaces created for people who are not included within the existing Fairtrade membership or representative structure to have an influence on standards. The FCSSP implied the creation of a new Fairtrade commodity involving a new set of stakeholders who at the time were not members of FTI and were unfamiliar with its system and processes, but were being relied on to fill in gaps in carbon expertise that FTI did not possess. This dynamic implied the need to include and negotiate between an expanded set of viewpoints of FTI members and non-members.

Table 3-1: Entities within the Fairtrade System and role played in governance and standard-setting

Entity	Role in governance	Influence on standards
Producer Networks (PNs) (3): for Africa, Latin America and Asia	Full members of FTI. Voting rights at Annual General Assembly; 4 places on the Fairtrade Board	Can submit standard request Invited to provide input during research/ drafting phase, and during consultation PNs recruit producer-facing members of Standards Committee
Fairtrade Organisations: -19 NFOs (govern use of Fairtrade mark and promote Fairtrade) -6 Fairtrade Marketing Organisations (promote Fairtrade)	Only NFOs are full members (voting rights at Annual General Assembly and 4 places on the Fairtrade Board)	Can submit standard request Invited to provide input during research/ drafting phase, and during consultation Can postulate as members of the Standards Committee, recruited by FTI.
General Assembly (50% producer representatives; 50% NFO representatives)	Meets once per year to approve accounts, decide on membership issues and ratify Board members.	No role in standards development
FTI Board	Supreme decision-making	Advises on strategies/ objectives

	body for FTI	for standards development; Decides on the Standard Committee's responsibilities and membership and delegates decision-making authority to them
FTI Leadership team and staff	Leadership team manages day-to-day operations and strategic direction	The Standards Unit, led by Director of Standards and Pricing is responsible for developing and revising Fairtrade standards, research and coordination work.
FTI Standards Committee	No role in governance	Meets 4-6 times per year, takes major decisions about standards, delegating minor decisions to the Standards Unit. Responsible for resolving contentious issues; balancing stakeholder comments; clarifying terms and conditions; reviewing effectiveness and practicalities.
FLOCERT (independent certification body of the Fairtrade system)	Part of the Fairtrade system but not members of FTI (and no role in its governance)	Responsible for developing compliance criteria for standards, and auditing compliance
Source: compiled by author from www.fairtrade.net		

Figure 3-2: FTI formal bodies involved in standard-setting and interactions between them, compiled by author from www.fairtrade.net



3.4. Participatory Governance

Beyond the formal governance structures, FTI's Partnership Strategy 2011-2015 lays out intentions to include not only member organisations but 'everyone with a stake in a development process', following an approach they call 'participatory governance'. This is described as an inclusive approach, based on equality, which is critical in maximising the development potential of Fairtrade and in enabling partnerships to reach their potential (Fairtrade International, 2009).

Table 3-2 has been developed on the basis of the intentions laid out in FTI's Partnership Strategy for 2011-2015 (Fairtrade International, 2009). While the original document does not describe the approach in terms of intentions and underlying aims, this structure helps to draw out what exactly FTI are hoping to achieve, making it easier to assess. Note that this strategy is intended to set out the ways that FTI works with their longer term formal institutional partners, (see for example Fairtrade International, 2011a). However, in this thesis I extend it to an assessment of how they work with 'everyone with a stake in a development process' including the stakeholders they partner with on a more informal basis during standard setting processes. Although this may push the bar higher than FTI originally intended, the intention is to use the high bar to identify opportunities for improvement and extension in the implementation of the strategy.

Table 3-2: Analytical interpretation of FTI's participatory governance approach

FTI's Participatory Governance Approach	
Intention A: Avoiding power imbalances in relationships	A.1. Engaging with partners on an equal footing with shared resources and ambitions to find solutions to the most pressing development challenges
Intention B: Enabling everyone with a stake to contribute to design and outcome	B.1. Enabling diverse stakeholders to participate and interact B.2.Enabling diverse stakeholders to share in decision-making activities where practical
Underlying governance aim	To draw on alternatives to top-down development models

On the surface, FTI's participatory approach seems to fit with the ideal form of fair procedures described in the environmental justice literature: 'participatory parity' is when parties are recognised and affirmative efforts are made to ensure their inclusion and representation and redress imbalances, including removing institutional obstacles that prevent participation as peers (Fraser, 2009, Hillier, 1998). However, as an ideal form, it is hard to achieve in practice. Below I explore the possible limits to FTI's governance intentions.

3.4.1. Intention 1: Avoiding power imbalances in relationships

This intention is ambitious even if it is only applied to FTI's formal institutional partners. Power and resource imbalances between stakeholders are common problems in collaborative governance, and if stakeholders do not all have the same capacities, organisation, status or resources to participate on an equal footing, stronger actors can manipulate the governance process while certain interests and parties are subordinated (Ansell and Gash, 2008, Fung and Wright, 2003). Formal institutions involving participatory collaboration often involve significant asymmetries in prior organisation, knowledge, level of interest and capabilities (Fung and Wright, 2003). There is a risk that participation in governance is in practice no more

than an interest group approach where groups and individuals lobby a system to shape it to their own self-interests (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000). Competitive interest group bargaining is at the root of many policy failures (Fischer, 2003a). Fung and Wright (2003 p261) classify such bargaining as 'adversarial decision-making' and contrast it with collaborative decision-making 'where the central effort is to solve problems rather than to win victories, to discover the broadest commonality of interests rather than to mobilise maximum support for given interests'. Adversarialism emphasises differences rather than commonalities between groups and has the potential to generate excess conflict, and therefore may be unhelpful when working towards either intention in Fairtrade's Participatory Governance approach. Nevertheless, the tendency for co-optation of standards and adversarial decision-making by powerful players in the private sector is evidenced by a number of scholars (Busch, 2011, Cheyns, 2011, Tallontire et al., 2014) and power relations should always be tended to when exploring governance processes (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

While at the level of formal institutional partners, FTI can strive to ensure that resources and ambitions are shared and that engagement is on an equal footing, when this intention is applied to 'everyone with a stake' it may be more appropriate to start by recognising that power imbalances are very likely, and that positive strategies of empowerment and representation of weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders are required. This is the approach laid down in the ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Standard Setting (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b) through the principle of accessibility, which requires SSOs to ensure that appropriate opportunities to participate in the Standard Setting Process are provided for stakeholders, including those who are disadvantaged. Similarly, environmental justice literature notes that in the absence of participatory parity, expectable and/or unavoidable exclusions need to be recognised rather than concealed (Hillier, 1998), and the exclusion of certain visions of the environment, certain individuals and groups and certain kinds of values should be interrogated (Martinez-Alier, 2014, Mathur et al., 2014) .

3.4.2. Intention 2: Enabling everyone with a stake to contribute to design and outcome

Procedural injustice occurs either when the decision-rules deny the full participation of those who have been included, or when the boundaries used to define 'who counts' deny the inclusion of certain people (Fraser, 2009). The second intention needs to be understood in the context of who is defined as counting as a stakeholder, and who is allowed to fully participate according to which rules. In the Partnership Strategy (Fairtrade International, 2009), 'everyone with a stake' includes producers, consumers, businesses, funders and technical service providers. The ISEAL Code indicates that key stakeholders can include both directly affected stakeholders such as 'enterprises being assessed for compliance against the standard, community and indigenous

groups affected by application of the standard, and environmental organisations who have an interest in areas affected by the implementation of the standard' and also indirectly affected stakeholders who have an interest in the application of the standard (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b p12-14). The ISEAL Code recommends a mapping process for stakeholder identification, and this is included in FTI's Standard Operating Procedure. However, as a membership organisation FTI is also committed to providing particular opportunities for participation, representation and formal decision-making to members over and above non-members. Of the stakeholders listed above, only licensed producers, some businesses (licensed as traders) and NFOs (who may also provide funding or technical services) are actually members (see Table 3-1). While other diverse stakeholders may be given space to participate, interact and to contribute to design and outcome, if they are not members they are not included in formal decision-making processes. The ISEAL Code of Good Practice takes this potential tension into account within its clauses on Decision-Making, through the guidance that 'limiting decision-making to members does not preclude the standard-setting organisation from meeting other requirements for balanced, multi-stakeholder participation in decision-making' (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b p14). It is important to ensure that commitments to include a broader range of stakeholders including non-members is not done instrumentally or superficially, with no real commitment to take non-members' inputs on board. However it is also important to track whether existing governance arrangements resulting from long fought battles, are allowed to flourish when non-member stakeholders are allowed a hand in design, decision making and delivery of outcomes.

In parallel, another potential tension exists between the assumed need for expert or technical knowledge which is common within standard-setting processes (see e.g. Tallontire et al., 2014) and mandated within the ISEAL Code of Good Practice (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b), and the intention to include everyone with a stake (including stakeholders who do not yet have a high degree of technical knowledge). Literature on participatory governance provides evidence of the value of broadening of participation beyond FTI's formal partners to include civilians, including 'non-experts' in the search for solutions to pressing development problems. 'Including the public' has become an expected component of 'good practice' in many arenas across the world, enhancing the diversity of voices and opportunities for citizen engagement and deliberation (Cornwall, 2004). Non-expert input can contribute to the legitimisation of the standard or policy development and implementation process (increasing acceptance of, or trust in the decisions made), its role in enhancing learning, articulation of broader demands, and help to build and preserve present and future decision-making capacities (Fischer, 2003a, Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000). Non-experts in particular can contribute to problem characterisation by highlighting aspects of the problem requiring analysis, raising questions that have been overlooked, and providing knowledge and experience of specific conditions that need to be understood in order for assumptions to be more realistic (Fischer, 2003a). However, it is inherently complex to

integrate different types of knowledge and any attempts to do so need to take in account (i) that this must be supported by mechanisms to support mutual learning and deliberation, and (ii) that perspectives might change during a process as people take on board new information (Raymond et al., 2010). Overall, popular participation in governance processes has been heralded as a potential means for improving effectiveness of projects and alignment of participants' goals (Leach et al., 2010), although practical implementation is challenged in particular by barriers to participation and power relations. Too much focus on technical aspects can mean that the examination of social, ethical and political values is pushed off the agenda (Fischer, 2003a) and it may be those whose daily lives are affected by the standard or policy rather than those who are providing a professional contribution, who are best placed to raise these questions (see e.g. Cheyns, 2011). Participation may be in various ways, and in various 'spaces', e.g. closed or provided, 'invited', claimed, created or 'raided' spaces (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007), each of which may be bounded but permeable and navigable by different people at different times (Gaventa, 2004). Attending to the spaces sheds light on the people given entry but also those who are temporarily or permanently excluded from spaces for participation (Tallontire et al., 2014, Nelson et al., 2014).

These considerations are particularly relevant within this process because of the implications of a new Fairtrade commodity mentioned above. Research and reflection can be used to look at why some suggestions and interpretations are taken forward and used as the basis for decision-making while others are not, and this involves exploring counter-politics, operating outside those arenas (Leach et al., 2010). To understand how this dynamic operated in practice in the context of the FCSSP, including which stakeholders (members and non-members) actually contributed to design, decisions and delivery of outcomes, both formal and informal decision-making processes need to be examined.

3.4.3. Underlying governance aim: alternatives to top-down development models

Fung and Wright (2003) note that top down governance solutions may lack relevant information and local knowledge and involve long feedback loops, because those making the decisions are far from those who must live under them. Also they tend to generate fixed rules that are not suited to contexts of high local diversity, volatility and scientific uncertainty. In principle, participatory governance offers a counter governance mode to top down governance, by involving substantive direct involvement of actors from the bottom tiers of an organisational structure rather than imposing decisions from the top down. However, if those who participate are primarily experts and elites, then this is still a form of top-down governance subject to the same limitations as non-participatory governance, such as distance from those who are affected

by the policy or standard in their daily lives. Fung and Wright (2003) distinguish between four varieties of governance structures and processes, using the dimensions of top-down versus participatory, and adversarial versus collaborative (see Table 3-3).

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="4">Governance structure</td><td colspan="3">Character of decision-making process</td></tr>
<tr><td>1: Top down Adversarial</td><td colspan="2">2: Top down Collaborative</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">3: Participatory Adversarial</td><td colspan="2">4: Participatory Collaborative</td></tr>
<tr><td>Co-optation and participatory window dressing</td><td>Robust, democracy-enhancing forms of collaboration</td></tr>
</table>

Table 3-3: Varieties of Governance Structures and Processes, based on Fung and Wright (2003)

Participatory Governance as defined by FTI, should sit in quadrant 4 of the matrix. However, Fung and Wright (2003) posit that within this quadrant there are different possible outcomes- (i) those that take the form of co-optation and participatory window-dressing, and (ii) robust, democracy-enhancing forms of collaboration. Empowered Participatory Governance is an example of a governance design which can achieve the 4b-types of outcomes. It is characterised by decentralised decision-making, centralised coordination and includes mechanisms to counteract power imbalances and facilitate representation of the weak and less organised actors (Fung and Wright, 2003). Its three principles are *practical orientation, bottom-up participation,* and *deliberative solution generation.* Within this design, equality does not have to be absolute but it must be sufficient for the purposes of deliberation. They note that Empowered Participatory Governance in practice is hindered by the use of power relations to manipulate decisions but this can be counteracted if there is significant *countervailing power* (a form of power that develops to reduce, or even neutralises the power advantages of ordinarily powerful actors). It is therefore the degree of countervailing power that can shape outcomes of co-optation versus robust collaboration within Participatory Collaborative governance modes. Empowered Participatory Governance has generally been applied to settings involving state and non-state actors but Doherty et al (2013) have assessed Fairtrade governance against the benchmark of Empowered Participatory Governance. They have identified examples of countervailing power within the Latin American Producer Network, exemplified by their creation of a new label (Símbolo de Pequeños Productores) and their choice to exclude Hired Labour set-ups from their regional network. Doherty et al (2013) recognise that their analysis of countervailing power within FTI is limited, and recommend further exploration.

Participatory Deliberation is another governance form situated in quadrant 4b of the matrix, which involves bringing diverse actors and perspectives together into forums for debate, dialogue and negotiation (Leach et al., 2010). Its goals are to create a setting for social learning about existing interests, problems, possibilities and responsibilities, to build legitimacy around new interests, and in the process, influence 'the political pathways along which power and interest travel' (Fischer, 2003a p205). The emphasis is on the sense-making of complex policy problems (Leach et al., 2010), and this is often a timely process with no guarantee of consensus. However, over time, it can be more effective in helping to define and sustain chosen actions and can counter tendencies towards adversarialism (Fischer, 2003a). Facilitation of a participatory deliberation process involves creating the conditions that support people to pose questions, decide on important issues and make basic connections themselves (Fischer, 2003b). It may still imply that proposal generation and decision-making is done by the people with the official mandate, and that they come with their own values and specific ideas about what should be done. Nevertheless, by seeking input from and stimulating discussion amongst a wider set of people, they receive guidance about direction and a set of alternative visions about what is desirable and possible. This provokes them to re-examine the premises and values at the root of the decisions they make (Fischer, 2003a).

3.4.4. Opening Up and Closing Down in policy appraisal

Genuinely deliberative policy-making and consensus-based decision making, requires active attempts to open up the policy-making process to include a variety of inputs, as well as decisions to exclude some options and come to a decision on a particular way forward. Subjecting policy to appraisal (whereby a system is analysed in order to generate substantive understandings, social learning and decipher cultural meanings, see Smith and Stirling (2007)) involves both opening up and closing down processes.

Opening up involves posing alternative questions, looking at neglected issues, marginal perspectives and ignored uncertainties, triangulating contending knowledges, examining different options and highlighting new possibilities (Smith and Stirling, 2007). Closing down is about 'defining the right questions, finding the priority issues, identifying the salient knowledges, recruiting the appropriate protagonists, adopting the most effective methods, highlighting the most likely outcomes and so determining the "best" options' (Stirling, 2005 p221-222). This contrasts with premature closure which can occur before a proper examination of the options and the assumptions behind them has taken place, and may come about if powerful interests stand behind a particular option and push it to a decision-point.

Decision-making comes with an inherent tension, in that understanding may always be insufficient but approaches must be fixed in order 'to do something here and now and perhaps

make a difference' (Rip, 2006 p92). Smith and Stirling note that 'whether consensual, majoritarian, elitist, or to meet sectional interests, pragmatic "decisions" must be made' (Smith and Stirling, 2007 p369) which sometimes results in sub-optimal 'satisficing' strategies with the aim of producing acceptable outcomes. This happens in almost all governance settings but the key is to have regular self-critical reassessment to see if satisficing strategies are delivering the desired outcomes according to different people's perspectives (Smith and Stirling, 2007).

3.5. Conclusion to chapter three

This chapter described standard setting as an example of pathway-building and then situated research on standards governance processes within the broader literature. It then described FTI's own governance structure and approach and examined this through the lens of procedural fairness according to insight from literature on environmental justice and participatory governance. FTI is a multi-stakeholder organisation that has made efforts to include its broad membership base in top level governance. On paper, the organisation's participatory governance approach aligns closely with ideals of fair procedures and participatory parity. In practice, it may be better to recognise firstly that power imbalances are likely to exist and need to be factored into process design, and secondly to recognise the inherent tensions linked to the aim of enabling diverse stakeholders to interact and participate in design and decision-making. Alternative governance forms must be congruent with the issue and context, or problem space (Voss et al., 2006 p435). In this case, it could be expected that a mix of governance structures, processes and mechanisms might be required. This is because there is both a need to engender mutual learning and bridging between member and non-member stakeholders (who have different pieces of knowledge and experience to contribute); and a need to respect FTI's formal decision-making processes (which emphasises consensus). Governance structures and processes also need to be dynamic as issues move through the different stages deliberation and consensus-based decision making. This might begin with mechanisms that open up the issue to further exploration, and move into mechanisms that are more conducive to reaching closure on an issue when decisions ultimately need to be made. In chapter 6 of this thesis, I undertake an issue-based exploration of the various governance forms that came to the fore in practice, and assess the extent to which they were alternatives to top-down governance. This is preceded by a description of the overall research design and methodology (chapter 4) and an empirical assessment of perspectives on fairness held by stakeholders in the FCSSP in chapter 5.

Chapter 4 Research Design and Methodology

4.1. Introduction to chapter four

This thesis used a case study approach to conduct action-oriented research within the case of the Fairtrade Climate Standard Setting Process (FCSSP) managed by FTI in partnership with GSF. These approaches are conducive for exploring complex processes, which need to be understood in their real-life context (Nowotny et al., 2005). Case study research enables the researcher to maintain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of contemporary phenomenon, situated within their real life contexts, and is especially appropriate when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are entangled (Yin, 2013). Action-oriented research is also context-bound, and takes on real life and often complex problems (Greenwood and Levin, 1998, Bolwig et al., 2008). It recognises the inextricable link between research and action, or between research processes, outcomes, and the application of results to problem solving. Access to real time data on the early stages of organisational alliance formation (and in this case, on the early stages of a standard which was the principal product arising from the partnership between FTI and GSF) can be hard to come by for a number of reasons. Firstly, the alliance process may be happening secretly and is hidden to the researcher; secondly, it may move too fast for the researcher to gain access; thirdly, once the researcher's interest in the alliance is known, lawyers, partners and others may be ambivalent about an outsider's involvement; and fourthly the organisations may be concerned about research 'advertising' a non-successful outcome should their partnership result in this (Ariño and Ring, 2010). In my case, I met and surmounted the third and fourth barriers. Meanwhile, serendipity, timeliness and support from a number of key people during the research partnership negotiation phase helped me to bypass the first two potential barriers. Trust, determination and conviction from myself, my supervisors and the research partners made this process challenging rather than 'hard', but the real time data accessed is nonetheless a rare and valuable find.

I used the methods of participant observation, interviews, Q method, document analysis, participatory policy analysis, supported reflection and documentary evidence of impact. This was a novel mix of methods aimed not only at addressing the research questions but also at achieving the two pathways components 5 and 6 introduced in sections 1.3.1 and 1.4.3.1: engaging in pathway-building processes and enhancing reflection. While some methods were selected as the case study was being negotiated, others were added during the course of the research process. Flexibility of methods is a characteristic of action oriented research (see section 4.4.1) and indicative of my close engagement with the pathway-building process and hence the need to find ways of aligning my own unfolding research process with that of the

FCSSP. This positionality accorded me opportunities to be inventive, creating novel ways of enhancing reflection during moments when I discerned that it was most needed. The sections below set out the research design, data collection, analysis, and quality control procedures, and then outline important reflections on the role of the researcher, ethical issues and methodological challenges.

The approach I adopted is rooted in an 'organistic-oriented' action research process in which inquiry into the assumptions and ways of thinking and acting of the participants rather than problem-solving is central[10] (Coghlan, 2003). My purpose was to contribute to the ongoing FCSSP, support reflection and learning and reflect on the role of research in live standard-setting processes rather than engage in joint problem-solving alongside the Research Partner Organisations (RPOs) about how to produce an optimal standard. I had an understanding of the 'problem' and the 'solution' as framed by the RPOs but I did not know whether the same 'problem', or 'solution' would be articulated by the smallholders who were the intended target of the solution (I had not been able to consult them). Also I was agnostic as to whether or not it really would address the problems that it was expected to so I wanted to reserve the right to be critical of the process if necessary. Therefore I chose to intervene by asking questions; exploring values and assumptions; 'opening up' the inputs by shedding light on any alternative pathways before one particular approach to fairness became codified in the FCS; examining the extent of participation within the FCSSP (particularly in terms of whether and how the contributions of smallholders and rural communities were being taken into account); and supporting reflection on the FCSSP amongst those leading it. The extent to which I was able to facilitate reflection was limited by the time constraints and degree of willingness of the RPOs.

I intended my research would be useful and meaningful to the RPOs. Although we did not commit at the outset to a relationship of co-researchers (this would have required more time commitment on their part and more intense communication between us), I gave them opportunities to provide inputs on my proposed research questions[11], and we proposed activities I could take part in whilst contributing inputs to the FCSSP. My purpose was challenged during an early discussion where one of the coordinators asked whether I aimed to criticise the FCS, or to contribute to it. In several discussions, they stated that providing critique at the end of the

---

[10] This contrasts with a 'mechanistic-oriented' process where the researcher collectively defines the change required and works towards it with the other people involved.

[11] Although action research should really involve joint question development, in this case I approached them with a rough idea of questions and formulated them as the partnership grew more likely. On the whole they were happy with the questions though GSF made a proposition to add an enquiry about how a future standard would be better as a result of their collaboration. I chose not to frame the question in this way as it involved an assumption that the standard would *necessarily* be better.

FCSSP when it was too late to change anything, would not be useful to them. This shaped my design to incorporate multiple research inputs throughout the FCSSP as well as conducting a longitudinal process analysis. In hindsight I recognise that maintaining a constructively critical stance was a useful accompaniment as both RPOs underwent transformative learning journeys during the FCSSP. My contributions at different stages may have provided some fuel for undertaking these journeys or making sense of them in hindsight (see chapter 8).

4.1.1. Approach to knowledge

My research approach fits most closely to a critical action research paradigm, whereby participants and researchers are both subjects in the dialectical task of unveiling reality, critically analysing it, and recreating that knowledge (Freire, 1970). It is based on the action-oriented principle that understanding cannot be achieved independent of context, time and place (Small and Uttal, 2005). Co-learning is considered a primary aspect of the process, and researchers openly acknowledge their bias, making no attempts to be objective (Greenwood and Levin, 1998, O'brien, 2001). This involves both subjectivism and inter-subjectivism as forms of meaning-making and knowledge generation. Subjectivism, which is more common, posits that reality is a projection of the human imagination, and the subject is a reflective individual or actor. Knowing and meaning-making is based on individual experience and consciousness and can be explored using methods that inquire into people's interpretations and perceptions. As a researcher, I could step back from a situation or dialogue I participated in, and draw on my subjectivity to interpret and make sense of it, define patterns and construct metaphors. Nevertheless, as embodied, relational and reflexively-embedded humans, we are also inter-subjective. Action-oriented research involves acknowledging, valuing but also critically assessing inter-subjectivity in the research process, where meaning-making and knowledge generation arises through interactions between people in moments of space and time. As a researcher and participant in the FCSSP, I was often embedded in, or a witness to such interactions, and actively drew on them during open-ended interview dialogues and participant observation in meetings.

4.1.2. Research strategy

Action-oriented research creates theory grounded in action, whereby problem diagnoses are shaped by theory, and theory influences possible grounds for action based on the problem diagnoses (Susman and Evered, 1978). This thesis is based on abductive reasoning, which acknowledges that observing and thinking is theoretically shaped, but also that what we observe exceeds our ways of understanding (Locke, 2011). I carried theory and constructs with me into my field research, and they influenced the development of my research tools, data collection and analysis but they did not limit me from picking up on people's own theories even if they did not

fit within the frame of the theories I had come with. This was particularly the case in my use of McDermott et al's (2013) Equity Framework (see Q study, chapter 5), and my reading of theories on participatory governance before analysing the data on governance in chapter 6. I also drew on the 'local' theories developed by Fairtrade International on participatory governance from their organisational perspective, and the Theory of Change mapped out in the FCS, using them as principle benchmarks for analyses in chapters 6 and 7.

4.2. Case study design and selection criteria

This methodology is based on an 'extended case' design (Mitchell, 2006) which involved dealing with a sequence of events, where the same actors were involved in a series of situations and the links between different events were traced over time, through multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1995). The case selection strategy was information-oriented rather than random, selected for maximum utility on the basis of expectations about information content (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The justifications were formulated after entering into discussions with the RPOs, once I knew what might be possible. The FCSSP matched four of Yin's five rationales for opting for single case designs (Yin, 2013).

1) It was expected to be a 'critical case', of strategic importance in relation to the general problem- such cases are identified and explored by looking for most or least likely examples and exposing them to tests of falsification (Flyvbjerg, 2006). I expected that the FTI-GSF partnership would equip them and their wider consortium with multiple combined tools and ideas for addressing the problem of smallholder access and benefits within the carbon market, and I expected FTI to be exemplary at stakeholder inclusion in standard-setting processes, but both expectations warranted critical unpacking.
2) It was unusual (the FTI-GSF partnership itself, with both RPOs venturing into sectors that were novel for them; and the joint development of a standard incorporating fairness criteria were precedents).
3) It was revelatory (I was the first researcher to ever track an entire FTI Standard Setting Process, and following the FCSSP in real time would enable me to reveal new phenomena);
4) It was longitudinal (following it over an elongated time period).

The main criticism of a single case study design is that the nature of the case can shift substantially, making the original research questions no longer relevant (Yin, 2013). Action-oriented research counters this critique by incorporating flexibility and reactivity into the design, including potentially making changes to the methodology in response to the unfolding process (Small, 1995). The choice not to explore a second case was carefully considered, and had involved initial screening of possible parallel cases.

4.2.1. Parallel units of analysis

In addition to the research within the FCSSP, I also conducted research in parallel units of analysis in two example carbon programmes in Kenya (see Figure 4-1). This enabled me to explore the perspectives of a wider range of stakeholders on potential pathways to fair carbon and address question 1.4 ('What can example carbon projects tell us about possible pathways to the outcomes and impacts articulated in the Theory of Change as the FCS is applied?'). This is especially significant as the perspectives of those expected to implement standards on the ground are often missed out of more technical standards discussions (Tallontire et al., 2014). It also enabled me to analyse how some of the FCS mechanisms related to particular contextual realities. I had originally planned to explore these aspects within FTI and GSF's selected pilot projects but the piloting phase was delayed beyond the timeframe of my data collection period.

Figure 4-1: FCSSP case design showing relationships between the example carbon programmes and the FCSSP



Note that I actively shaped the interactions between the programmes and the FCSSP by (i) instigating FTI to invite the personnel from the first programme to a stakeholder workshop, (ii) holding a workshop with the personnel from this project to provide feedback on the FCS during the consultation phase; and (iii) choosing the second programme because it was initially expected to pilot the FCS.

4.2.2. Independent carbon programme research

Data were collected during four months of field research in Kenya in January-February and May-August 2014. Kenya was chosen as a study site for multiple reasons:

1) My previous fieldwork experience was in Africa and my supervisors all had fieldwork experience and networks in East Africa.
2) Staff from FTI and GSF expected that the FCS would be piloted in Kenya because the presence of Fairtrade Africa (the African Fairtrade Producers Network) would facilitate learning and support during the pilots.
3) Kenya had the highest incidence of carbon projects and programmes within Africa at the time.
4) My participation in a stakeholder workshop in February 2014 in Nairobi organised by FTI as part of the FCSSP was useful for building relationships with Kenyan stakeholders.

4.2.2.1. Selection of carbon programmes

The first programme was TIST-Kenya (The International Small group and Tree planting programme), primarily in operation around Mount Kenya and spreading to other areas in Kenya. The second was the Kenyan Domestic Biogas Programme (KENDBIP) present in most regions of Kenya. Both are linked to parallel initiatives elsewhere in Africa and Asia.

TIST-Kenya is an on-farm reforestation programme brought to Kenya in 2005 by Clean Air Action Corporation (CAAC), a US company specialised in designing and analysing emissions reductions strategies. With support from US charity Institute for Environmental Innovation (I4EI), the programme implements sustainable development, biodiversity, health and fuel-efficient stove training and activities to further benefit the TIST member farmers. TIST-Kenya received financial support from USAID and is now the largest of the four country programmes, expanding to include over 59,000 member farmers, who planted more than 6,000,000 trees on 14,000 hectares of land during the first ten years of operation (2005-2015). The Kenyan Domestic Biogas Programme (KENDBIP) is part of the African Biogas Partnership Programme funded by the Dutch government and implemented by two CSOs headquartered in the Netherlands. In the first phase (2009-2013), the programme was focussed on biogas sector development, and involved activities such as partnership building, training of biogas entrepreneurs, lobbying for biogas sector policies and norms, and promoting biogas amongst farmers. Digester subsidies were given and more than 11,000 were installed. The second phase, (2014-2017), was expected to involve continued sector development but with a view to phasing out the support of the CSOs, and promotion of biogas without subsidies. Carbon finance was envisaged as a means to financially sustain the sector.

The following criteria were used to make the selection, which was again information-oriented rather than random in order to maximise information from only two units of analysis:

Interest in the FCS: in the interests of designing the carbon programme research to be mutually useful (for my research, the RPOs and the programme implementers and participants), it was important that there was some interest from within the programmes to influence the FCS and/or eventually apply it. By May 2014 when I made the final selection, staff from both programmes had taken part in at least one of the stakeholder meetings or workshops organised by FTI and provided input while the standard was being drafted, and at the time were considering its potential applicability for their programmes in the future. KENDBIP was later selected as an FCS pilot project but subsequently pulled out.

Coverage of a spectrum of mitigation measures: bearing in mind the four sectors originally proposed within the scope of the FCS, I wanted to test my hypothesis that different types of carbon resource would have different implications for smallholder participation and benefits. Cook stove projects were already highly represented within the FCSSP and perspectives of project proponents often seemed at odds with those of land use projects. I therefore chose programmes which combined elements of land use and energy and between them covered all four sectors (Figure 4-2). I considered projects certified by any carbon standards within the selection, as GSF had only just begun certifying land use and forest projects at that point.

Potential to generate insight on projects/ programmes at different stages of development: given the time for projects to move through to issuance of credits, and the vast number of projects that spend years stuck in pre-registration phases (see e.g. Shames et al., 2010), I chose TIST-Kenya because of their ten year history which had included becoming the world's first programme to obtain dual certification from the Verified Carbon Standard and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard (see details in chapter 7). TIST-Kenya's success made it an 'unusual' or 'extreme' example (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The programme had generated more carbon credits compared to similar forest carbon projects in the East Africa region (Deshmukh et al., 2014) and received an award from Environmental Finance for the best offset project in 2014. In comparison to most of the carbon projects and programmes represented by people taking part in the FCSSP, the programme had already witnessed some of the outcomes underscored within the FCS. This implied that if the FCS requirements were too ambitious for TIST-Kenya, then it would be difficult to expect them in other projects.

The potential lessons to learn from TIST-Kenya became a justification for my later choice to prioritise focus on TIST-Kenya over KENDBIP. The programme managers were still working towards compliance with the Gold Standard despite running biogas activities since 2009. Steps had been taken in mid-2014 to register the biogas activities overseen by KENDBIP within a Programme of Activity (a term for a coordinated series of carbon mitigation measures) managed by a carbon actor in Europe but the carbon components were still being formulated when data

was collected. Nevertheless, the programme illustrates the challenges and uncertainties that often characterise the initial phases of a carbon programme.

Figure 4-2 Coverage of mitigation measures between the two example programmes



4.2.3. Bounding the case

4.2.3.1. Temporal boundaries

According to the projected timeframe, my fieldwork period was expected to cover the development of the FCS, its testing in a pilot project, and possibly its release. However, delays were envisaged and the content of my data was dependent on what would happen within the snapshot of time that I was able to witness (plus what I could gather about the historical processes prior to my engagement with the FCSSP). Eventually, the fieldwork period extended from September 2013 to November 2014. This coincided with phases 2 and 3 of the FCSSP and ended with an FTI meeting where the FCS was approved, thus marking the beginning of phase 4 of the FCSSP (see Appendix 1). I continued following the process remotely for another 12

months, by accessing documents and occasional email correspondence with FTI. The longer fieldwork period in Kenya (May-August 2014) was while FTI and GSF were preparing and conducting their public consultations, which meant (i) that I was only absent from one FCSSP event held in Europe during this period (and followed it via published minutes); and that (ii) I was able to channel inputs from Kenyan stakeholders for both consultations whilst there.

4.2.3.2. Spatial boundaries

I attended in person or online events held related to the FCSSP held in Germany, the U.K. and Kenya. Other events in Latin America and Asia were excluded from my scope because of my regional focus on Africa. Three CSO meetings held in Belgium, France and Germany; and the FCS launch event held at the UNFCCC 21st Conference of Parties in Paris were beyond my scope to attend because I had been unable to forecast them in my fieldwork budget. I bounded the two Kenyan carbon programmes by focussing on a geographical area of Kenya where they both had activities so that I could look at them both within the same time period.

4.3. Stakeholder identification and selection strategies

The work to develop the FCS was managed by a Project Team composed of FTI staff from Standards and Pricing Units, Strategy and Policy, and also FLO-cert staff. GSF staff were considered by FTI as project participants but not part of the project team. The FCSSP incorporated a wide net of stakeholders from FTI and GSF's combined networks as well as some people involved in carbon projects not yet certified by GSF but interested in the FCS (see Figure 4-3 for a visual mapping, and chapter 6 for more details). I came into contact with the majority of these stakeholders during my research. When doing so, I sought their permission to conduct participant observation and potentially interview them. The 26 participants of the Q study also came from this combined network of stakeholders. The Kenyan carbon programme research was conducted with two programmes not yet certified by GSF or FTI, but whose staff and contractors were included as stakeholders in the FCSSP through being invited to participate in meetings and workshops. Figure 4-4 maps stakeholders participating in the research and forums where research was conducted.



Figure 4-3: Stakeholders in the FCSSP



Figure 4-4: Pools of stakeholders and events/ forums where research was conducted

4.4. Overview of data collection and analysis techniques

4.4.1. Data collection

Triangulation through multiple methods and sources of evidence allows stronger substantiation in case study research (Yin, 2013). This may involve introducing methods during the course of the study (Eisenhardt, 1989) or in the case of action oriented research designing new tools or playing different roles at different points. This is because of the novelty of research problems, the need for practical utility, and the desire to capture multiple perspectives (Small, 1995). I established the majority of my data collection techniques before collecting data, but introduced Q method part way through and developed several novel tools for reflection and sharing findings (objective 3, questions 3.1 and 3.2, see chapter 8). Sources of data in this thesis were both primary (collected and documented by the researcher) and secondary (collected and documented by someone else)[12]. I drew on four different sampling strategies, which were purposeful sampling, where the researcher selects respondents, sites and events likely to be information-rich; opportunistic, where the researcher makes selections on the basis of available and willing participants or fortuitously occurring events; snowball sampling, where key informants are invited to suggest other people or sites that could generate useful information; and simple stratified sampling, where the researcher identifies key sub populations and ensures that they are included in the sample (Bernard, 2006). In the following sections I give an overview of data collection, sampling, recording, collation and initial analysis techniques, which are linked to the research questions in Figure 4-5 and Table 4-1. I then provide more detail on each collection technique and overarching approaches to analysis in sections 4.4.3, 4.4.4 and 4.4.5.

I collected **documents** and used them in different ways based on confidentiality restrictions. Within the main FCSSP case documents included all those generated during my 15 month period of close involvement and in the preceding phase prior to my involvement that had been shared with me, and documents put into the public domain in the final approval stage after I stepped back. I used them to inform my observations, prepare feedback documents, collect statements for the Q study and in holistic data analysis. With the carbon programmes, I collected and used secondary documents concerning TIST-Kenya, but not KENDBIP (because it was in an earlier stage limiting document availability). These were read during the data

[12] This binary categorisation mostly works but there are some examples of data which are jointly created, such as email correspondence between the researcher and collaborators, or minutes from a call generated by another party which I then added to, which for simplicity, I categorise as primary.

collection period and used to identify gaps in my understanding and further questions to ask. They were stored in a database alongside primary documents and re-read when writing up the case description and any relevant information was included as a means of triangulating primary evidence sources. Secondary documents were categorised as ‘confidential/ sensitive’ (categorised by the Project Team as such, and shared with me in order to get my feedback or to give me a background understanding); ‘limited sharing’ (shared with participants of the specific event within the FCSSP; or in the case of TIST, with registered members) or ‘public’ (freely available online, or shared at events where there were no restrictions on participation).

Objective 1: Standard Content

To uncover the debates, perspectives and different options for achieving fairness within carbon projects, and explore them in relation to the FCS

1.1 How is "fair carbon" understood and defined by different people involved in the FCSSP?

1.2. Whose definitions and understandings are incorporated into the FCS?

Methods: Q study, document analysis

1.3 Which assumptions and evidence is the Theory of Change for the FCS based on?

1.4 What can example carbon projects tell us about possible pathways to the outcomes and impacts articulated in the Theory of Change as the FCS is applied?

Methods: Participant observation, interviews, document analysis, participatory policy analysis workshop, Q interviews

Objective 2: Standard Setting Process

To describe and analyse the process of collaborative development of the FCS

2.1 What did FCSSP look like (in terms of forums for input, debates and interests)?

2.2 How did the FCS reflect stakeholder input and what shaped this?

2.3 What does this say about participatory governance in practice?

Methods: Participant observation, interviews, document analysis, Q interviews

Objective 3: Research Process

To assess the value of action-oriented research in collaborative standards-setting processes

3.1 How can action oriented multi-sited research enhance reflection amongst stakeholders involved in the research, and how does it shape emergent outcomes?

3.2 What can be learnt about conducting collaborative research on standard setting processes through this thesis?

Methods: Participant observation, interviews, supported reflection, findings sharing sessions, questionnaire

Figure 4-5: Objectives, questions and methods

Table 4-1: Data collection, analysis and application

Period of data collection	Case/ unit	Data tools	Period of data analysis	Approach and outputs	Use of data
Sep 2013-Mar 2014	FCSSP	Participant observation, interviews and document analysis	Oct, Nov and Dec 2013	Incremental coding in Atlas.ti	Feedback reports for FTI Preparation of House Exercise
	FCSSP		April 2014	Coding in Atlas.ti for 'fairness'	Compilation of Q concourse
May-Aug 2014	FCSSP	Q method (Q sorts and interviews)	Sep-Oct 2014	Factor analysis using PQ Method	Chapter 5 (Q1.1 and 1.2)
		Q method (interviews only)	April 2015	Coding in Atlas.ti for contentious issues (pricing/payments, producers and organisations, roles of project actors)	Chapters 6 (Q2.1) and 7 (Q1.3)
Jan-Feb and May-Aug 2014	TIST-Kenya	Participant observation, interviews	June 2014	Synthesis of data collected; benchmarking against the FCS draft	Preparation of participatory policy analysis workshop
	TIST-Kenya and KENDBIP	Participant observation, interviews (both programmes) and document analysis and participatory policy analysis workshop (TIST-Kenya only)	Jan-Mar 2015	Compilation of case study database; development of case descriptions in Microsoft Word, Excel and Powerpoint	Chapter 7 (Q1.4)
	TIST-Kenya and KENDBIP		Apr 2015	Systematic coding in Atlas.ti, for contentious issues and mechanisms linked to the FCS and their application	Chapter 7 (Q1.3, 1.4)
Sep 2013-Oct 2015	FCSSP	Participant observation, interviews, document analysis	Jun-Nov 2015	Manual holistic analysis of FCSSP case study database	Chapter 6 (Q2.1-2.3) and 7 (Q1.3)
Mar 2013-Apr 2016	FCSSP	Participant observation, interviews, correspondence, workshops, findings sharing sessions, questionnaire	July 2015 and Mar-Apr 2016	Manual holistic analysis of collaboration with RPOs	Chapter 8 (Q3.1 and 3.2)

Participant observation and **interviews** were the principal techniques for collecting data longitudinally throughout the FCSSP to address questions 1.3, 2.1-2.3, 3.1, 3.2, and during the four month field research period in Kenya (question 1.4). With the former, close involvement and association was intended to generate data by watching and listening to what people say and do whilst personally experiencing the same situation as them (Burgess, 2002). I mainly took the role of participant-as-observer, in which the researcher participates as well as observes, by developing relationships with people within natural settings and situations, whilst making it known that research is the overriding interest (Brewer, 2000). Interviewing served to triangulate or elaborate on material from participant observations and collect individual opinions outside of meeting or workshop settings. Interviewing in case studies often involves pursuing a consistent line of enquiry but fluidly generating questions in a conversational format (Rubin and Rubin, 2011). Such interviews are reciprocal because both parties engage in a dialogue which is about mutual discovery (Neuman, 1991 p367, c.f. Bailey, 1996). I applied this approach to both semi-structured and unstructured interviews, which were either 'formal' (planned conversations) or 'informal' (spontaneously arising conversations) (designation derived from Schut, 2012).

In contrast, the interviews I conducted using **Q method** to address question 1.1, followed the structure of the statements that were ordered randomly and I deliberately declined when asked to give my own opinion. The Q study took place over the FCSSP consultation period, and in contrast to FTI's quite structured consultation tool, my 26 Q interviews served to open up a space where people could discuss and reflect on the FCSSP and raise concerns that are sometimes held back in a meeting situation, and to unpack the different understandings that key actors in the FCSSP had about the emerging FCS criteria. I devised, organised and facilitated two **interactive workshops**, firstly with the staff in the FTI Standards Unit (the House Exercise), and secondly with a focus group of TIST-Kenya contractors (a participatory policy analysis workshop). Both served to critically reflect on the draft FCS and the mechanisms it included, and provided data for addressing questions 3.1-3.2, and 1.4 respectively. Finally I collected **documentary evidence of impact** to gather perspectives from RPO staff involved in the collaboration to gather their inputs on the usefulness of my research inputs and drew on this in addressing questions 3.1 and 3.2.

The multiplicity of methods in this thesis is novel and rich in terms of the multiple datasets generated; the tools for reflection developed; and its application within research on standards for the carbon market and research on fair trade. It drew on precedents such as Neilson and Pritchard's (2009) study of value chain struggles in Indian tea plantations and Cheyn's (2011) work with the Round table on Sustainable Palm Oil. Both studies used a three pronged methodology including analysis of written material; participation in conferences, meetings and events; and interviews (including informal conversations) and both studies were conducted over

several years (4 and 6 years respectively). Neilson and Pritchard describe the difficult ethical and practical choices involved in this level of engagement and the need to align oneself with particular gatekeepers which undoubtedly shapes the research orientation. Cheyn's position was comparatively more detached from the process than mine, and accordingly she faced more barriers to participation but also enjoyed more freedom to tell the story she wanted to tell. I discussed and reflected on my methodology and chosen positionality with a number of researchers engaged in standard setting processes including Emmanuelle Cheyns, Alison Loconto and Valerie Nelson, as well as with my supervisors. Other precedents for my approach are the 10 years of participatory action research with the Latin American Fairtrade Producers' Network and particular producer groups in the region completed by Bacon (2010) and ethnographic observations from within the Standards Unit at Fairtrade International (Reinecke, 2010, Reinecke and Ansari, 2015). My engagement was shorter than Bacon's and more extensive than Reinecke's, but like them, I was able to situate the events I observed within the evolving movement and relate them to ongoing fair trade debates. By positioning myself both at the level of Fairtrade International and at the level of production and project activities in Kenya I was able to achieve a multi-level analysis and compare perspectives held by people situated in different places. The choice to add Q methodology to the mix of methods was influenced by my attendance at a summer school hosted by Melissa Leach and her colleagues at the STEPS centre at Sussex University. They encouraged researchers using the pathways approach to go further in crafting methodologies capable of opening up policy-making and other decision-making processes to critical reflection and Q methodology was just one of the methods they suggested.

4.4.2. Data analysis

Case studies often involve overlapping data collection and analysis phases, allowing for more flexible data collection (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 'discovery' approach associated with field research methods (Locke, 2011) requires an analytical approach to data collection as the researcher picks up on themes as they emerge in the field and explores them further. Field notes should include analytic ideas and inferences (Bailey, 1996). In my research the RPOs' request for punctual feedback in the form of written documents was an additional reason for combining collection and analysis or returning to reanalyse data for different purposes. Table 4-1 and Appendix 1 indicate the different data collection and analysis phases that occurred throughout the research. With material collected during the FCSSP, I conducted incremental analyses on subsections of the dataset as they were gathered (mainly in order to provide punctual feedback to FTI) and then conducted a holistic analysis after the material had all been collected. At this point, documents were collated chronologically in a case study database and later used to provide evidence for chapters 6, 7 and 8. A case study database is a formal assembly of evidence which a) helps to increase familiarity with the case, b) facilitates 'playing' with the

data and the search for emergent patterns across the different evidence sources, c) serves as a basis for comparing evidence with theoretical propositions; and d) serves as a source to return to when the thesis is complete and therefore enhances reliability (Yin, 2013). With the Q study data, it was analysed on two occasions- firstly to derive the Q factors (chapter 5), and then later to provide more material for chapters 6 and 7. TIST-Kenya data was used to undertake a preliminary analysis in preparation for the participatory policy analysis workshop, and then again alongside KENDBIP data once the datasets were complete. They were compiled chronologically in carbon programme databases and subjected to coding with Atlas.ti and manual analysis, providing material for chapter 8. Appendix 2 details the complete list of documents collected and how they were used. Overall, the data analysis approach involved iterations between Noticing interesting things in the data, Collecting similar or linked pieces within the data (and giving them a higher order code), and Thinking about the data[13] (Friese, 2012). I applied this approach both within Atlas.ti software and manually when reading the hard copies of the datasets holistically (using the hard copies ordered chronologically in the case study database), see Table 4-2. The manual strategy enabled me to more easily cope with the size of the dataset and see the underlying threads and big picture.

Table 4-2: Examples of how the NCT approach was applied to analyses

NCT	Data in Atlas.ti	Manual holistic analysis
Noticing	Labelling 'quotations' (extracts of interesting text) with initial codes	Reading through the dataset and highlighting and noting themes and aspects of interest, resulting in a short list of key points per document
Collecting	Collecting similar things within the data and giving them a higher order code, or renaming and combining codes	Collecting themes and codes on cardboard. Producing tables, lists and graphics by hand or in Excel, Word or Powerpoint.
Thinking	Creating outputs generated by requesting all the quotations within one or more code categories	Making connections between themes and codes, or between data and theory. Devising an analytical framework.

[13] Note that the NCT approach does not prescribe what kind of coding to use- codes can be based on a combination of topics, emotions, values etc., and ideas for codes can derive from theory, research questions, literature, interview guidelines or the data itself.

4.4.3. Detailed description of primary data collection methods: FCSSP

4.4.3.1. Participant observation:

Throughout the FCSSP, the principal sampling strategy for participant observation was opportunistic- I took part in every event fitting within my spatial and temporal boundaries, but they had also been purposefully pre-selected as likely to be information-rich when I first established the fieldwork budget.

I took the role of participant-as-observer and communicated my research (in introduction rounds, coffee breaks, by sharing a concept note, see Appendix 6, or in more formal presentations) in each of the FCSSP stakeholder events I participated in, except at the FTI Standards Committee meetings. Here, an advance introduction to the committee was made on my behalf in the form of a formal request for me as researcher to attend the sections of the meetings where the FCS was being discussed, with the right to observe but not speak. I do not know how my research was introduced or whether all the members knew why I was there, but my presence was noted in the minutes. My role was therefore more like observer-as-participant (Brewer, 2000) as encounters with most of the meeting participants were brief and I was obliged to leave immediately after the discussion on the FCS (there were other items on the agenda that were not in my remit). As researcher, I took on particular roles within the events, partly by choice and partly as requested. I spoke rarely (usually only in go-rounds, or if my opinion was asked, or occasionally if I felt an important consideration was being neglected), in order to prioritise data recording. When requested to by FTI, I occasionally facilitated group discussions or gave summaries of them.

I recorded verbatim transcripts and wrote field notes. This consisted of mental or jotted notes at the time, and fuller notes written in the evenings. Mental and jotted notes included aspects such as notable dynamics in the room, syntheses of interesting conversations had or heard in the corridors and apparent relationships between stakeholders. In fuller notes I often wrote down my personal feelings and reflected on my role. For a full list of aspects I observed, see Appendix 3.

4.4.3.2. Interviews

Most of the interviews undertaken during, before or after FCSSP events were informal (see Appendix 3). Often they were a few minutes' length, occurring in breaks between sections of the meeting, but a few were prolonged (an hour or more), during journeys. I also undertook formal interviews lasting 30-90 minutes with members of the Project Team, where we scheduled to meet physically or on Skype to talk about the FCSSP or my PhD process; and with

three carbon market actors involved in the Group of Experts[14]. Interviewees were purposefully selected because of their pivotal roles in the process, gatekeeper positions, or because they had expressed interesting opinions I wanted to explore further. With physical interviews I usually took notes or sometimes drew graphics to ensure that the interviewee and I had a shared understanding. I typed them immediately afterwards and shared with the interviewee to check for accuracy. Some clarifications were made regarding minor details and any confidential aspects were signalled. With Skype interviews I was usually able to type verbatim.

Interviews with the Project Team were used at the time to inform my understanding of the unfolding FCSSP and cross-check my explanatory theories about what was happening and why. They were stored chronologically in the FCSSP case study database alongside email correspondence. They were reviewed holistically and used to reflect on the collaboration prior to a call with FTI in July 2015 and in the analysis for chapter 8. Interviews with carbon market actors were loaded into Atlas.ti. and used for the Q study (chapter 5).

4.4.3.3. The 'House Exercise'

The idea for the first workshop (called the 'House Exercise', see details in chapter 7- the House and surroundings was a metaphorical device) arose as I was writing a mid-term cumulative feedback report on the FCSSP in December 2013, and finding it difficult to a) conceptualise how each of the various component and contingent parts of the FCS scheme would fit together and b) make sense of which of the various options on the table had already been chosen or discarded and why. I devised an interactive exercise to collaboratively reflect on these aspects, eventually held in May 2014. Workshop participants were recruited by a Project Team member and were all involved in working on the FCS and related scheme. The workshop lasted three hours and was recorded and subsequently transcribed, and results shared with participants in the form of the transcript, photographs and a spreadsheet summarising the outcomes. Data from the 'House Exercise' was not used in this thesis but the process of developing and delivering the activity is discussed in chapter 8.

4.4.3.4. Documentary evidence of impact

I elaborated a brief set of online questions on www.surveymonkey.com as a way of collecting feedback from GSF and FTI staff on the value of my research inputs. I had planned to use a dialogue but the allotted time for the feedback sessions was insufficient. Instead, I was

[14] Although I undertook more interviews, I did not end up using them so have not described them here. I discounted them from my dataset because I did not get permission from the interviewee to use them, or because they ended up being about topics that were less relevant to the focus of my research.

recommended by a member of the Project Team to use a questionnaire as a tool not requiring coordination between the people from whom I was requesting feedback, and to elicit quick responses whenever it was convenient for people to fill it in. The design (Appendix 5) included ranking of the usefulness of each research input provided, and a space for comments to elaborate or explain. The link was sent to the four staff at FTI and one staff member at GSF who had taken part in the findings-sharing sessions. As the comment-giving was optional, few were provided. Only three responses came back despite prompts. Time spent filling it in varied from 5 to 15 minutes. I also filled it in myself, both as a means of testing it, and because I wanted to compare my viewpoints (on which inputs had been useful for me) with those of the RPOs. Rankings and comments were analysed by hand, given the small number of responses. I complemented this data with anecdotal evidence on the value of particular inputs provided at the time and used it to reflect on the collaboration in chapter 8.

4.4.3.5. Q study

Details on Q methodology are provided in chapter 5 as these are best read as an introduction to the Q results. I made the decision to undertake a Q study part way through the implementation of my research design in late February 2013. Q is a methodology used to empirically analyse subjectivity in an open, yet structured and statistically interpretable form (Curry et al., 2013, Setiawan and Cuppen, 2013). Although Q study preparation is often time-consuming (Webler et al., 2009), the understanding and contacts gained during the participant observation in the 6 months prior formed a basis. Also I already possessed a large body of primary and secondary data sources for compiling the Q concourse. Some of these sources were confidential, but using them to select statements was an appropriate way of extracting ideas whilst respecting confidentiality. Similarly, while I had detailed transcripts of what participants had said during meetings, I recognised that these did not always accurately portray exactly what people thought, and viewpoints were evolving throughout the FCSSP. Results were reflected back to FTI and study participants in a clear and synthesised form, serving as a punctual input to the FCSSP[15] (see Appendix 1). Q interviews were analysed according to the steps outlined in chapter 5 but in addition, Q interview transcripts were coded in Atlas.ti for contentious issues (pricing and payments, producers and producer organisations, roles of project actors- these became hot topics 2, 3 and 4 in chapters 6 and 7) and outputs were used to create matrices in Microsoft Powerpoint or included as quotations in these chapters.

[15] Although I recognise that the findings were shared later than they could have been because I waited several weeks to receive validation from one person before sharing the results with all participants.

4.4.4. Detailed description of primary data collection methods: Carbon programmes

4.4.4.1. Participant observation

TIST-Kenya's structure and functioning were conducive to participating in a diverse set of meetings, seminars and audits held in different geographical and ecological zones and grouping members at different scales (ranging from small groups in one locality, to representatives of the whole movement). I used three sampling strategies to compose my programme of which events to take part in.

Sampling strategy	Application
Simple stratified	Ensuring participation in events happening in three different project areas around Mount Kenya with different biophysical, cultural and economic characteristics and different programme histories and funding sources.
Opportunistic	Coinciding the start of my fieldwork period with a TIST celebratory event, two-day training course, and management meeting: these enabled a wide-lens introduction to the programme and contact with lots of TIST members. Through these events I received five invitations from people to attend their local TIST meetings and took up four.
Purposeful	Selecting meetings to attend that represented the full range of TIST activities (e.g. audits, payments to groups, training sessions, group savings schemes and meetings without a scheduled activity) happening at different levels of aggregation.

With KENDBIP there were no organised events to observe but I noted observations when conducting interviews and biogas visits. However, when farmers spontaneously gathered during one of my household visits, I used the opportunity to note interactions between them and I effectively became a participant in an ad hoc biogas plant demonstration.

I also conducted participant observation within both carbon programmes during transect walks- 'walks through an area, with key informants, observing and asking for explanations of everything[…]' (Bernard, 2006 p352). These were during one farm audit with TIST-Kenya and during visits to ten biogas plants with KENDBIP, enabling me to understand better farming practices, and how participation in the programme fitted with other livelihood activities. In all cases I was accompanied by the farmer and by programme field staff.

I adopted the role of participant-as-observer because I was interested in gaining a rich understanding of the programmes and their functioning in a relatively short period of time. Within TIST-Kenya and KENDBIP, the programme managers and some contractors or field staff were aware of my research and aims and had received either the concept note or a detailed

explanation from me. With other TIST members and also with participants of KENDBIP I met, I presented myself as a student researcher seeking to understand how the programme worked.

Data and reflections from participant observations within the carbon programmes were noted in field note books or occasionally typed, and frequently re-read during the carbon programme research period. Hand-drawn diagrams and sketches and 'to-do' lists were produced as I discovered themes, linkages and things to explore further. I also took photographs during observations of meetings and biogas visits and stored these electronically.

4.4.4.2. Interviews

Within the TIST-Kenya programme research, most of my interviews were informal, involving opportunistic sampling and occurring before or after events as we travelled together, or in spontaneous moments during events when I had opportunities to talk to English-speaking TIST members (individuals and groups). I also held formal interviews (usually lasting 30-60 minutes) with purposefully selected informants- mainly with one key informant but also occasionally with other TIST contractors. Interviews ranged from unstructured 'grand tour' (Bailey, 1996) sets of questions (such as 'what is this?', 'why does this happen?' etc.); to semi-structured eliciting of in-depth personal testimonies about individual TIST members' involvement in the programme; and semi-structured interviews to discuss topics and themes that had arisen in participant observation and field notes, or interview data that I wanted to corroborate or expand.

I held two informal interviews with the KENDBIP programme funder during FCSSP events. On both occasions, I made mental notes, asked for permission to use the information as data, then wrote them up and checked them back with the interviewee. In Kenya I followed a trail of interviewees from the top of the programme down to the biogas users, using a snowball sampling strategy. This facilitated access as the recommendations often came with introductions between me and the next person. All interviewees were semi-structured and formal but some of them were scheduled by key informants who served as gatekeepers. I jotted notes down at the time and wrote full notes the same evening. Programme managers were able to check their interview transcripts through email exchanges but this was not possible with farmers and entrepreneurs who I did not see again. Appendix 4 provides details on participant observation and interviews in Kenya.

4.4.4.3. Participatory Policy Analysis workshop

The workshop with TIST-Kenya during the FCS consultation in June 2014 constituted participatory policy analysis (Fischer, 2003a). The aim was to translate between the logic and language of the FCS consultation draft, and the lived experiences of six purposefully selected

TIST members who had been involved in the programme for several years as leadership council members, auditors or manager. I invited people who had some awareness of the FCSSP and based on recommendations from a key informant who was more aware of people's schedules, willingness to participate and ability to contribute. I facilitated the 6 hour workshop, recorded it and transcribed the recording afterwards. More details are provided in chapter 8. The transcript, summary of feedback, and the comments within the FCS consultation document were shared with participants and added to the case study database.

4.4.5. Details on data analysis approaches

A variety of approaches were used to analyse data at different levels, depending on the data type, the purpose, and the point at which the analysis was taking place. The section below describes the approaches applied for chapters 5-7. The specific approach for chapter 5, questions 1.1-1.2 is detailed in chapter 5 itself.

Results for chapter 5, addressing questions 2.1-2.3 were derived from a manual holistic analysis of the entire FCSSP case study database and Q transcripts coded in Atlas.ti, based on the following approaches:

4.4.5.1. Timeline analysis (Yin, 2013):

The ability to trace changes over time is a major strength in case studies including the FCSSP. I used my case study database to reconstruct the FCSSP along a timeline, identify critical events, debates and decisions and track them through the FCSSP and to pattern-match the actual process alongside FTI's Standard Operating Procedure for Standard Setting (see Figure 6-2). To validate my analysis, I shared findings with FTI in March 2016 and they completed gaps.

4.4.5.2. Explanation building (Yin, 2013):

Building on the first approach, I then began a process of explanation building in order to postulate what had led to certain outcomes within the FCSSP, and what meant that alternative outcomes or pathways were not pursued. These explanations were developed for the four 'hot topics' in the target framework introduced in chapter 6 (Figure 6-1). My explanations were based on a combination of theory (on participatory governance, see chapter 3), data and my personal experiences of the process and background understanding of FTI. In order to strengthen my explanations, I tested for some of Yin's 'real world' rivals (see Yin, 2013 p141), first in my own analyses, and then when presenting findings to FTI. In particular, I invited FTI to look for 'direct', 'commingled' and 'super' rival explanations (meaning respectively that the outcome can be explained by factors other than those I was proposing; that it was other factors

as well as those I was proposing that led to a certain outcome; or that a force larger than the factors I was proposing).

Results for chapter 7, addressing questions 1.3 and 1.4 were derived from Atlas.ti coding of data from Q interviews transcripts and Kenyan carbon programme data, combined with a holistic analysis of the FCSSP and carbon programme case descriptions, based on the following approaches:

4.4.5.3. Pattern matching (De Vaus and de Vaus, 2001)

Pattern matching involved looking for where mechanisms and requirements within the FCS matched or mismatched the example carbon programmes. By the time I conducted the carbon programme research, a rough FCS draft was available, identifying key mechanisms as important for achieving fairness in carbon projects. I had taken these as a basis for collecting data within the carbon programmes, seeking examples which demonstrated, nullified or suggested alternative mechanisms to the ones in the FCS. I validated and deepened this analysis during the Participatory Policy Analysis Workshop with TIST-Kenya. This workshop involved combining both timeline analysis and explanation-building. One of the key outputs was a participatory construction of a historical timeline of the evolving TIST-Kenya programme compared to the requirements for different project actors within the FCS and their evolution over time. By comparing the TIST-Kenya programme with the requirements and intentions of the FCS, I sought to test FTI's assumptions about which activities and mechanisms might lead to which outcomes, and whether any plausible alternative theories could be espoused. The KENDBIP data collection and analysis followed on sequentially from the TIST-Kenya programme research, as an opportunity to explore what evidence KENDBIP could provide that was not evident within TIST-Kenya. Once I had collected a series of aspects that did or did not fit with the FCS in the context of KENDBIP and/or TIST-Kenya, I then moved to an analysis of the FCS based on logic models.

4.4.5.4. Logic models (Yin, 2013)

Logic models involve unpacking assumptions, evidence and attending to contextual conditions and can come at individual, organisational or programme-levels. I used FTI's logic model for the FCS, known as a Theory of Change as a basis to undertake an analysis of its underlying assumptions and sketch out one particular impact pathway (making the links between particular aspects of Fairtrade interventions, and how they appear to be linked to outputs, outcomes and impacts in the Theory of Change). I then triangulated between multiple sources to assess the available evidence and identify the weak links in the Theory of Change. More details are given in chapter 7.

Results for chapter 8, addressing questions 3.1 and 3.2 were derived from a manual holistic analysis of the interactions (emails, meetings and interviews) with the RPOs, reflective field notes and research inputs contributed throughout the FCSSP combined with an analysis of the evolving drafts of the FCS, based on a reflexive analysis.

4.4.5.5. Reflexive analysis of researcher's role (Schut, 2012)

In addressing question 3.1, I undertook a reflexive analysis of my role in the FCSSP and the possible influence of the various inputs I provided. This involved (i) reviewing the inputs and highlighting the main points; (ii) analysing the correspondence between myself and the project team and anything that had been said in documentary evidence about the value of the input; and (iii) viewing these alongside the timeline and critical events analysis. Rather than seeking to build a complete explanation (i.e. that my overall contribution, or this particular input led to this outcome), I sought to develop tentative theories for the possible influence I had on the process, recognising the presence of commingled and super rivals (see chapter 8). I analysed material for question 3.2 by (i) reviewing the correspondence between myself and the project team or between myself and my supervisors about the collaborative architecture and reflecting on its merits; (ii) reconstructing a timeline of the roles that the RPOs and I had played and concerns and conundrums that had been expressed at different points and reflecting on whether they had manifested or been resolved; (iii) reviewing calls and interviews where the collaboration had been reflected on; and (iv) reviewing material produced by FTI (in particular the Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Unit who usually coordinate research) about their relationship with researchers and ongoing researcher-policy development work. My analysis was done partially in preparation for a reflection call in July 2015 initiated by the MEL Unit and reviewed at the end of the collaboration.

4.5. Quality control

Empirical research is commonly assessed in terms of four quality tests: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability (Yin, 2013). The third test, also referred to as generalisability or transferability, is thought to be particularly challenging for single-case study research because there is no possibility for searching emergent themes through cross-case analysis (Donmoyer, 2000). Yin (2013) recommends a number of strategies for passing the quality tests, while action research offers some strategies of its own. These strategies are presented in Table 4-3, alongside evidence of quality of this thesis.

Table 4-3: Quality tests, test questions, pass strategies and evidence of quality.

Quality Test	Test questions for action-oriented case study research	Action research and case study strategies	Evidence of quality of this thesis
Construct validity	Do recorded changes genuinely reflect critical events or are they only based on the investigator's impressions?	Use multiple sources of evidence, establish chains of evidence and ask participants to review empirical data (Yin, 2013). Seek critical feedback from peers, supervisors and critical friends (McNiff and Whitehead, 2011).	Project Team appreciated constructs I devised such as 'the house exercise' (chapter 4 and 8); the target diagram and concept of 'rug tugging' (chapter 6). Confidentiality requirements limited discussion of raw data and initial analyses with peers, but critique was provided by fellow academics during research group presentations, conferences and in peer reviewed papers.
Internal validity	Are inferences and connections between theories, frameworks and the real-life situation valid and recognisable to participants of the research? Did the research and arising actions contribute usefully to the policy-making process?	Seek validation from the people involved in the research (Greenwood and Levin, 1998). Reflect on the impact of the research with the people involved (Greenwood and Levin, 1998).	• Early feedback reports to FTI provided opportunities to check inferences. • Two academic papers combining theories, frameworks, empirical evidence and literature were reviewed and validated by FTI and GSF. • Q study participants reviewed the findings of the Q study. • TIST-Kenya members validated my inferences about the fit between their programme and the FCS. See chapter 8 for a discussion of the contribution of this research to reflection and FCSSP outcomes.
External validity	Do the study's findings resonate with those who were not involved in the	Link the case to hypotheses and theoretical concepts (Yin, 2013).	Findings of each empirical chapter shared and validated by FTI including by those who were not involved in the research.

	research? Are they transferable beyond the study itself?	Examine meanings for transferability to another situation through a conscious and collaborative reflection on the similarities and differences in context/history in both contexts (Greenwood and Levin, 1998).	• Findings are contextualised within the historical and political context of FTI but parallels are drawn between carbon credits and other commodities: FTI staff also recognised that some findings also applied to other standard-setting processes (chapter 8). • Some recommendations recognised by GSF as relevant to their own organisational processes (RRf.5) • The Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning unit within FTI and other researchers who have worked with FTI recognised the value of this thesis as a lesson for future collaborations.
Reliability	If another researcher conducted the same case study, would s/he arrive at the same findings and conclusions?	Document procedures using protocols and develop a case study database (Yin, 2013).	This test can only be hypothetical as no researcher will ever have the opportunity to do a real time action-oriented case study on this process. Nevertheless, the evidence, protocols, analytic strategies and other processes devised to conduct this research are stored in hard and soft copies and the important information is included in the appendices of this thesis.

4.6. Ethical and legal issues and methodological challenges

Engaging in real-life processes necessarily requires consideration of complex ethical issues, which were described in my application for ethical review). Action-oriented research involves a strong ethical commitment to participants who have as much right to benefit from the research process, including its findings, as the researcher (Small, 1995). Although the ethical review process safeguards against mistreatment of participants, much research with human participants does not benefit them. Also, provision of information to RPOs should be timely in both its manner and style. The challenge of designing and conducting mutually beneficial research and presenting it to the RPOs is discussed in chapter 8.

Procedures simultaneously needed to meet the RPOs' demands regarding treatment of confidential or sensitive information, and my need for freedom to be critical and make independent judgements and this required a sensitive balancing act. The need for some form of written agreement between the RPOs and the researcher was evident from the outset but initial drafts proposed by either RPO were unworkable as they were designed for interns or consultants. The eventual agreement signed in September 2013 between GSF, FTI and the University of Leeds took 6 months to develop and involved thirteen people's contributions.

A number of methodological challenges were encountered in my research. This section describes how they were dealt with and recognises both the strengths and weaknesses in the research design as a result. Chapter 8 covers some more specific aspects which helped or hindered the collaborative process at different points.

4.6.1. Timing/ sequencing of FCSSP alongside parallel units of analysis and PhD process

The unpredictability of the timing of FCSSP events made it difficult to plan research with the parallel units of analysis much in advance or to prolong the period of research with them. The first trip to Kenya was organised within three weeks and I had been unable to meet the staff from the second programme until the second trip, meaning that research tools were developed during the limited Kenyan fieldwork period. This related to the choice made to prioritise FCSSP events in order to get as complete a picture as possible. The problem of getting the 'whole picture' is not unique to this type of multi-sited ethnography but the method presents part of the solution because presence in multiple sites allows the researcher to gather multiple perspectives and take on multiple identities (Freidberg, 2001)- for example, using the fieldwork period with TIST-Kenya to generate useful feedback for the FCS consultation.

The limited timeframe for collecting data meant I had to step back from the FCSSP before it reached completion. The data collection period ended fortuitously with the approval of the FCS. However, in the months that followed, several important changes took place as the FCS went through a cycle of further revision and re-approval based on comments from FTI internal stakeholders. When I met with FTI in March 2016, staff expressed disappointment that I had not followed the process closely in this final phase but briefed me on changes so I could acknowledge them.

My ability to attend events in person was also limited by what I thought would take place when writing my fieldwork funding application in spring 2013. There were some important events which were critical to the FCSSP but had not been foreseen in the planning phases of my PhD or occurred after my fieldwork budget had temporally expired. Despite appeals to the funders, I was not permitted to access the remaining funds I had saved, which was disappointing.

4.6.2. Challenges related to data collection techniques

a) Participant observation

While the role of participant-as-observer has the advantage of providing greater opportunity to gain access to meanings assigned to what is said (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973), associated weaknesses are that participation may require too much attention relative to observation or that the researcher may need to assume positions or advocacy roles (Brewer, 2000). Regarding the attention needed to participate, I needed to choose between focussing on observing verbal and non-verbal behaviours during the FCSSP events, and generating complete transcripts of verbatim. Opting for the latter was a practical, strategic and ethical decision- it proved too difficult to systematically record observations at the same time as collecting verbatim during the meeting. Using audio-recording devices was not an option as I had been requested by FTI and GSF not to approach the meeting attenders in advance to ask them for permission to record. It was also most time-efficient to generate transcripts this way. These proved valuable to me as components of my dataset, but also for FTI[16] (see chapter 8).

Regarding the assuming of positions, I initially avoided giving my opinion given my relative lack of understanding of the topic area and my feedback to FTI came in the form of synthesising other stakeholders' perspectives, reminding them of different options proposed etc. However, as my understanding of the TIST-Kenya programme grew and I recognised the value of their learning for FTI, I deliberately supported them to make their voices heard. I did this by

[16] After the first meeting, I had been requested to share my meeting notes with FTI and was apologetic that they were 18 pages long! To my surprise, they told me that this level of detail was extremely useful.

encouraging FTI to invite them to participate in a workshop; supporting them to deliver feedback during the FCS consultation; facilitating a visit by FTI to TIST-Kenya; and speaking up for TIST-Kenya during a workshop that an invited TIST representative had been unable to attend.

During KENDBIP research I encountered an ethical dilemma as I became aware that I had been framing the programme as a carbon project while the programme staff had not communicated with biogas users that their digesters were going to be generating carbon credits. There was a growing dissatisfaction about this from some farmers who already had prior but somewhat misconceived ideas about the carbon market. I chose to respond to biogas users' ad hoc requests for more information about the carbon market, but did not reveal what I knew about the programme managers' intentions for the carbon credits, and then fed back this situation in the form of a recommendation for more transparency between the programme and biogas users. On this occasion, as well as another when I tried to explain to Fairtrade tea farmers about the FCS and how it related to tea and carbon credits, I think I created more confusion.

Marcus (1995 p113) gives advice regarding this dilemma:

> *'in conducting multi-sited research, one finds oneself with all sorts of cross-cutting and contradictory personal commitments. These conflicts are resolved, perhaps ambivalently [and, I add sometimes quite clumsily], not by refuge in being a detached anthropological scholar, but in being a sort of ethnographer-activist, renegotiating identities in different sites as one learns more about a slice of the world system'.*

I posit that these occasions are to be seen as human experiences and learning opportunities rather than weaknesses of the research design.

b) Interviews

With my TIST-Kenya research I relied heavily on one key informant, with whom I developed a friendship. She lived locally to where I was based, was enthusiastic to collaborate, enjoyed our discussions, and was a pioneer of the programme. I was hesitant about asking more time of other TIST contractors because I had been cautioned by U.S.-based programme founder that they were very busy. Key informants are often pivotal in the success of a case study but researchers are cautioned against over-dependence on one key informant (Bailey, 1996). I dealt with this by shadowing other TIST contractors during their work, and by corroborating what I had learnt in discussions with the principal key informant during the Participatory Policy Appraisal Workshop.

4.6.3. Cultural bias and language

My identity as a white female offered both opportunities for access which were mutually beneficial as well as creating expectations beyond my control. With one key informant, we regularly 'played the white card'. We used my presence to jointly visit civil servants and institutional partners so that she could discuss important topics with them or get policy updates and I could interview them[17]. Introducing herself as mentor for my PhD about TIST-Kenya helped her increase her status and credibility amongst these people (mostly men). Unfortunately her strengths of character and work were not inherently recognised without an association with whiteness, but I was nevertheless happy to stand behind her and nod.

On another occasion, my (white) presence in a farmer's compound accompanied by a KENDBIP staff member attracted about 20 local farmers who turned up to see what was going on, interpreting our visit to the farmer's newly installed biogas plant as the official opening ceremony. The occasion turned into a demonstration of the plant and an explanation of the programme to those present and I was told that afterwards those who had not been there would be frustrated to learn that they had missed a key event.

My inability to speak Kiswahili well enough or any of the more common local languages in the areas I visited limited opportunities to communicate with TIST members and narrowed my interviews to English-speakers or those that could translate for a group. This weakness relates to limited time with the carbon programmes but I experienced an abundance of willing translators.

4.6.4. Reflections on researcher role and positionality

In action-oriented research on policy-making processes, researcher roles are dynamically configured, changing as policy-processes unfold and it is important to be aware and reflect on this (Schut, 2012). My role shifted throughout the process in response to increasing contextual understanding, familiarity with the collaborators, and opportunities to contribute in different ways during the process. Predominantly, my positionality in relation to the FCSSP was one of a 'friendly outsider'[18] (Greenwood and Levin, 1998). While the external perspective is important for opening up internal processes for change, the friend is necessary for reflecting back to the participants. Greenwood and Levin (1998) recognise the following contributions that the

[17] I did not end up using this data.

[18] I variously used the phrase 'critical friend' and 'friendly outsider' to describe myself during the process. For simplicity, I use the latter term in this chapter because in Greenwood and Levin's definition, it includes providing encouragement such as helpful information and moral support as well as giving constructive critique and speaking the locally unspeakable - therefore, the right to be critical is embedded in the term.

friendly outsider can make: (i) providing constructive criticism (in terms of direct feedback and written reflections, pointing to comparable cases, bringing in examples from outside where similar problems, opportunities and processes have occurred); (ii) opening up lines of discussion (pointing out opportunities for flexibility and opportunities for change, alongside encouragement in the form of moral support and helpful information); (iii) making visible the forms of tacit knowledge that people are using and helping them to explore the resources that they have at their disposal; and (iv) speaking the locally unspeakable (by giving honest feedback, exploring tacit agreements which might actually be blocking a process).

I occupied a particular position as an outsider who was invited into the FCSSP to observe and make sense of the internal workings, in exchange for constructive feedback and critical analysis. Acting from here was important for enhancing process transparency, and because this was a critical case study offering lessons for science, standard-setting and practice. Nevertheless I needed to remain conscious of my role and positionality as I iterated between different levels of the process (from field to office, and from participant observer to external critic) and make these subtleties explicit to the various stakeholders I engaged with. Meanwhile, during my time with TIST-Kenya I shifted roles and became more of an on-the-ground correspondent and advocate, aiming to make their experiences, lessons and best practices known.

One of the critiques of participant observation is that it is impossible to genuinely experience the same as the other participants in the instance you are observing. In the role of participant-as-observer I received the same information as other participants in advance of workshops, sat at the table with other meeting participants, joined particular sub-group discussions, remained with the participants during breaks, and sometimes (when invited by FTI) stayed in the same accommodation and shared meals. This meant that some of my own experiences (such as noticing that I was becoming more familiar and confident as I returned to follow up meetings, forming friendly relationships with people) could have been experienced by other participants. At most meetings I was one of the youngest and one of fewer females, and knew less about carbon than most of the Group of Experts but came with some of my own experiences of project development and business in Africa. On the other hand, by participating in a wider range and larger number of workshops as part of the FCSSP than all other invited participants and regularly talking to the staff managing it, I experienced a heightened familiarity, gained a broader overview, and had privileged access to information (the non-sensitive aspects of which I sometimes shared when asked by other participants). Despite efforts to clarify, I was sometimes misconceived as coming from within FTI or working for them.

In Kenya, my participation in the meetings, trainings and workshops involved travelling by the same means as other programme level staff, sitting with people, hearing everything said to the meeting participants (or if it was in Kiswahili or a local dialect, hearing a synthesised translation

whispered to me by an English-speaker who I would sit next to), and sometimes being invited to stand up and say something[19]. I experienced such things as the hunger of sitting at a 6 hour meeting with no snacks, the anticipation of payments arriving via the mobile payment system and the honour of receiving *kujengana* (personal appraisal, see chapter 7). Nevertheless, many things were not possible to experience as a true participant of TIST because of my very different life experiences and income level.

Throughout my research, I sought to develop rapport with the various collaborators in the research and this was a two way thing- as a researcher, one is sometimes accorded trust and respect relatively easily, but it was important to be worthy of this through my actions, transparency of my intentions, and willingness to look critically at myself with the same scrutiny that I applied to the FCSSP. I reflect in more detail on my positionality in chapter 8.

4.7. Conclusion to chapter four

This chapter has described the research design, selection of cases, strategies for sampling and bounding the case, and specific tools for data collection and analysis for the multiple methods deployed in this thesis. With the exception of Q method, which is detailed in chapter 5, all other methods used in this thesis have been detailed in this chapter rather than in the results chapters as a strategy to avoid repetition (because they were used to address multiple questions and generate results presented in multiple chapters). The chapter has also outlined the main ethical, legal and methodological considerations associated with the design. Some of these are returned to in chapter 8, which involves a more detailed reflection on the research design.

[19] On several occasions, I was requested to explain what carbon credits were, and how they linked to tree planting activities and payments. Having witnessed an explanation given by seminar leaders to TIST members, I tried to align my explanation. Such incidents served as an indication of particular TIST members' understanding of carbon credits but also gave me an opportunity to influence it.

Chapter 5 Which 'fairness', for whom and why? An empirical analysis of plural notions of fairness applied to Fairtrade carbon projects, using Q methodology[20]

5.1. Introduction to chapter five

This is the first empirical chapter of this thesis, and contributes towards addressing objective 1, to uncover the debates, perspectives and different options for achieving fairness within carbon projects and explore them in relation to the FCS by answering questions 1.1 and 1.2. Most of the chapter is dedicated to question 1.1., namely *how is 'fair carbon' understood and articulated by the various stakeholders involved in developing the Fairtrade Climate Standard as well as those who may be affected by it?* This concept was initially used by FTI and GSF (see chapter 2) to refer to what they were seeking to achieve through the Fairtrade Climate Standard, i.e. *fair carbon credits.* During subsequent discussions with stakeholders taking part in the FCSSP, 'fair', 'fairness' and 'fair carbon' were frequently alluded to but not accorded space for an explicit discussion about what they actually meant to different actors, including FTI and GSF. Through my engagement with the FCSSP and my efforts to enhance reflexivity (pathways components 5 and 6, see section 1.3.1), I decided to open up a space for these discussions by means of a Q study. I conducted this between May and September 2014, during the consultation and revision phase of the FCSSP. The project team welcomed this contribution because they recognised that the Q study would enable people to go on a reflective journey whereas the consultation led by FTI was aimed at seeking answers to relatively closed questions (CoordC.2, April 2014, see Appendix 2). I operationalised the terms in the form of the research question posed to Q participants: 'what should 'fairness' mean in the context of a Fairtrade carbon project?'. At the end of this chapter I address question 1.2., namely *whose perspectives on 'fair carbon' are incorporated into the Fairtrade Climate Standard.*

[20] This chapter was developed from the following published papers: HOWARD, R. J., TALLONTIRE, A. M., STRINGER, L. C. & MARCHANT, R. A. 2016. Which "fairness", for whom, and why? An empirical analysis of plural notions of fairness in Fairtrade Carbon Projects, using Q methodology. Environmental Science & Policy, 56, 100-109. and HOWARD, R., TALLONTIRE, A., STRINGER, L. & MARCHANT, R. 2015a. Which "fairness", for whom, and why? Broadening inputs for a standard designed to certify "fairtrade carbon credits". Sustainability Research Institute Working Papers [Online]. I conceived, executed and led the study and conducted all the analysis and interpretation of the results. I also led the writing and collated inputs for the discussion and general comments from the supervisory team.

The chapter draws on the first pathways component (identifying and unpacking key terms used in pathway-building) that was introduced in sections 1.3.1 and 1.4.1.1. It also pursues the second line of enquiry characteristic of empirical analyses of fairness introduced in section 1.4.1.1 (Sikor et al., 2014), to characterise different stakeholders' notions in particular contexts, examine their justifications in public discourse, and identify how different notions gain or lose ground. It does this through an exploration of notions upheld by stakeholders in the deliberative contexts of the FCSSP and an assessment of which ones eventually make it into the FCS and why. Section 5.2 situates this chapter's enquiry within the landscape of debates on Fairtrade, carbon and what fairness means, based on a brief overview of literature. Section 5.3 describes the methodological approach and specific steps in detail. They are included here rather than in Chapter 4 because an understanding of these is a prerequisite for making sense of the results of the Q study (section 5.4) and analyses that follow in sections 5.5 and 5.6. These discussion sections link the results (the three Q factors) both to debates regarding Fairtrade and carbon, and to the published FCS. The chapter concludes with a summary of the Q study's findings and a reflection on the method and scope for further research. Chapter 9 revisits these latter two points.

5.2. Space for debates on fairness within Fairtrade and carbon markets?

This chapter responds to calls to unpack the normative ideals, in particular of fairness evoked by SSOs in the carbon market (Page, 2012) and used differently by different actors in depoliticised, technocratic, standardised and instrumental ways which threaten the achievement of fairer outcomes (Melo et al., 2014, McDermott et al., 2012). This builds on discussions in chapters 1 and 2 of the inherent tensions in the term 'fair carbon'. Without clear definitions, normative ideals and concepts are open to co-option or dilution by powerful actors (Leach et al., 2010). Attempts by SSOs to set 'rules' or standards on what constitutes 'fairness' necessarily involve legitimising some definitions over others and 'closing down' debates concerning its boundaries (Renard, 2005, Renard and Loconto, 2013). Standard setting processes and the tools and strategies used to govern them may deliberately involve avoidance of debate on visions, values and definitions (Djama et al., 2011, Cheyns, 2011). This may be attributed to the need for expediency (acting quickly to achieve desired ends), but the legitimacy of processes requires a consideration of what is the 'fair' or 'just' thing to do (Cheyns, 2011). As standards for fairness are set, it is important to critically assess what is understood by fairness in order to establish which types of fairness outcomes the standards are designed to achieve, for whom, how and why, and to enable the future evaluation of these outcomes (McDermott et al., 2013).

This is particularly important in the context of an initiative co-led by FTI. The fair trade movement's inherent tensions and current trends and pathways have thrown into question the meaning of fairness (Lyon, 2006, Smith, 2013). Philosophical explorations of this issue (Griffiths, 2012, Suranovic, 2015) have not managed to bring this debate into the heart of the movement where people act (with more or less power, legitimacy, capacity or authority) to shape the definitions and add direction and momentum to particular pathways. Facilitating this discussion amongst such actors therefore contributes empirically towards an understanding of the movement's current state and also impacts on the future of fair trade (Renard and Loconto, 2013). Questions raised about the meaning of fairness in fair trade relate to four major issue areas dividing both participants of the movement and its supporters. Each of these resonates with similar fairness concerns in the carbon market indicated in chapter 2 and Howard et al. (2015b). These are outlined briefly in Table 5-1

Table 5-1: Fairness concerns in the carbon market and links to fair trade debates

Issue	Fairness concerns in the carbon market	Summary of relevant debates in fair trade
1	Is it fair to place mitigation burdens on people less responsible for climate change? What is the role and responsibility of people who are more responsible for climate change? (Wang and Corson, 2015, Lovell et al., 2009, Goodman and Boyd, 2011)	Who should fair trade target as producers and consumers and what should be expected of them? (Keahey, 2015, Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015, Renard and Laconto, 2013, Tallontire, 2015)
2	Who should be benefitting from 'decarbonisation'? Is it a problem that smallholders and communities receive only marginal shares of the benefits? (Corbera and Martin, 2015, Wang and Corson, 2015)	Which kinds of benefits are accessible to whom in different contexts? (Getz and Shreck, 2006, Nelson and Martin, 2012, Tallontire et al., 2012)
3	Projects frequently result in a marginal positioning for smallholders and communities (Mathur et al., 2014, Leach and Scoones, 2013)	Which kinds of relationships and divisions of tasks should prevail between different actors in the chain? (Blowfield and Dolan, 2010, Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015, Taylor, 2005b)
4	Marketization and technocratisation approaches of standards result in exclusivity of expertise and inherent trade-offs (Corbera and Brown, 2010,	Tensions between the movement-driven origins of fair trade and current applications in multiple types of industries, commodities and supply

	Gupta et al., 2012, Lansing, 2013b, Melo et al., 2014)	chains. (Doherty et al., 2013, Smith, 2013, Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015, Renard and Laconto, 2013)

5.3. Methodology

I used Q methodology ('Q') to empirically analyse how the term 'fairness' was differently understood and deployed by people contributing to the development of the Fairtrade Climate Standard (FCS). Q is classified as both quantitative, because of the use of factor analysis as a calculation method, and qualitative, because discourse analysis or a descriptive approach is adopted for interpreting the Q results (Setiawan and Cuppen, 2013). It enables analysis of subjectivity in an open, yet structured and statistically interpretable form (Curry et al., 2013, Setiawan and Cuppen, 2013) and can be used to identify a range of voices, accounts and understandings (Barry and Proops, 1999). It 'opens up' inputs and reflexivity in policy-making processes (Leach et al., 2010, Ockwell, 2008), facilitating dialogue (Focht and Lawler, 2000) and enhancing policy implementation processes (Barry and Proops, 1999). My focus was on competing notions and discourses around fairness which shaped the FCS while it was under development.

I used the questions from the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework (see section 1.5.1 and Figure 5-1) to categorise and analyse these notions during statement selection and interpretation of results. In this chapter I refer to the framework's **content, goals and target of fairness**, and how the **parameters of fairness**, deploying the latter dimension in a narrower sense in my selection of statements and analysis of results, looking only at how parameters for trading relationships and pricing are set.



Figure 5-1: Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework: dimensions explored in ch 5

The Q study followed six methodological steps.

5.3.1. Collation of the 'Fair Carbon' concourse

A Q concourse is a body of literature which aims to represent the full range of ideas and opinions on the issue under study. This concourse, defined as opinion on what 'fairness' would mean in the (hypothetical[21]) context of a Fairtrade Carbon Credit (FCC) project, was collated from materials collected or accessed during observations of the standards development process between September 2013 and March 2014 (see Appendix 2 for sources used in the concourse). It included secondary documents; transcripts of events observed; and transcripts or notes from interviews (n=7) with individuals involved in carbon projects or carbon certification, based in East Africa, the U.S., Asia and Europe. Interview themes included gender in carbon projects, roles and responsibilities, challenges related to production, certification and sales of carbon credits, expectations of the standard, philosophy and moral positioning.

[21] The FCS was still under development and no projects had yet been certified.

5.3.2. Refinement of concourse into a 'Q set'

Concourse materials were analysed inductively using Atlas.ti software. 119 coded[22] extracts were derived and used to generate an initial set of 58 statements, which were edited down to 40 statements expected to trigger both positive and negative reactions (following Webler et al., 2009). The process of editing statements involved creating hybrid statements (from several sentences uttered by the same author); splitting up multiple propositions into separate statements; making statements less ambiguous by removing words (such as 'probably'); depersonalising statements to prevent feelings of exclusion or alienation; and rewording in order to transform rhetorical questions into statements. Finally, some statements were deliberately opposed to say the exact opposite from what the original author had intended with the purpose of attempting to achieve a balance of statements likely to trigger positive and negative reactions. This is because the Q sort is structured around a zero point (assumed to be a point of zero salience or no opinion). The 'agree' and 'disagree' points extend out either side of the zero point. In a forced normal distribution with a perfect balance of 'agree' and 'disagree' statements, this zero point is in the centre of the grid. Without knowing the perspectives of the participants, it is impossible to predict which statements will be categorised as 'agree', 'disagree' and 'neutral' and therefore where the zero point will appear for each sort, but by attempting to compose a balance of statements (a roughly equal number which could be expected to trigger positive and negative reactions), this zero point is more likely to appear in the middle (see Webler et al, 2009).

I conducted a pilot Q-sort with one person who was working for a carbon project advisory company but had conducted preliminary research for the Fairtrade Climate Standard and taken part in multiple stakeholder meetings. Using this feedback, I adjusted the set. Adjustment included rewording ambiguous, general or loaded statements, returning to the concourse and re-coding it for 'parameters of fairness' (the outer layer in the equity framework) and selecting statements referring specifically to pricing mechanisms. The final set contained 40 statements. I ensured the theoretical breadth by cross-checking the statements against six thematic categories, based on the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework, selecting at least five from each category, although some covered more than one category (Table 5-2 and

Table 5-3). Following Lansing (2013a), I chose not to make these categories explicit to participants because I did not want to confine their reactions.

---

[22] Five codes were theoretically inspired by the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework (fair access, fair benefit-sharing, fair procedures, the target of fairness and the goal of fairness), and three were developed inductively (generic fairness, issues of ownership of the credits and trade-offs involved in delivering fairness).

Table 5-2: Fit between statements and thematic categories

Thematic category	Number of associated statements	Statements used to build factor interpretations
Parameters of fairness	13	Statements about pricing and margins, and to what extent Fairtrade should prescribe parameters of fairness within a standard.
Goal of fairness	8	*Combined:* Statements about where credits should be produced and sold, by which kinds of people and structures; and statements about the overall goal of projects.
Target of fairness	11	
Fair Procedures	13	*Combined:* Statements about ownership of credits, involvement in project design and implementation, and participation in financial and management decisions.
Fair Access	6	
Fair Benefit-sharing	16	Statements about distribution of benefits, responsibilities and skills.

5.3.3. Purposive selection of participants

Q studies select participants based on a diversity of perspectives (Setiawan and Cuppen, 2013) rather than representativeness or quantity (Eden et al., 2005). In this case, most participants were purposively selected based on their views expressed during interventions in meetings, workshops and informal discussions as part of the Fairtrade Climate Standard Setting Process (FCSSP)[23]. Two additional participants from the fair trade system were encouraged to participate by their colleagues. Of 36 invited, 26 participated (Table 5-4): 23 had been involved in at least one stakeholder meeting connected to the standard development; the remainder had received information about the process via colleagues who had been involved. I ensured participants had experience of Fairtrade (nine were licensees, certifiers, or staff at FTI or any of its member organisations) and/ or experience of Gold Standard or carbon projects certified by other standards bodies (17 were involved in promoting, financing and/ or implementing projects, or developing new Gold Standard Foundation standards). Seven had practical experience of carbon projects involving Fairtrade producers and fitted in both categories.

[23] Overall, this process involved several meetings and workshops led by FTI with stakeholders from fair trade producer organisations; fair trade marketing organisations; and NGOs, businesses and consultants involved in carbon project financing, development, implementation or retailing of credits, see chapter 5.

5.3.4. Q-sorts and accompanying interviews

During May-September 2014, 26 Q interviews were conducted: 20 were face-to-face, using printed cards and a distribution grid, and six were via *Skype*, using Q-sort software application *Flash Q* (Hackert and Braehler, 2007). Participants were encouraged to think out loud during their first reading and sorting of statements into 'agree, disagree and neutral'. This rich interview data helped me understand how the statement was being interpreted and why, and highlighted statements or words that were ambiguous for some people[24]. Next, participants ranked the statements, positioning them on a 9-columned forced normal distribution grid, indicating a spectrum ranging from most disagree to most agree (Figure 5-2), helping to reveal participants' preferences (Brown et al., 2014, Webler et al., 2009). Participants were then asked open-ended questions about their positioning logic, helping me view each Q-sort from their perspective.

[24] Different participants of the Q study were endowed with different 'pieces' of expertise on the discourse area but no one was an expert in everything. This meant that some people struggled to understand some of the statements because of the use of concepts that were unfamiliar to them, and some concepts were automatically interpreted in different ways on the basis of participants' prior associations with them in their differing professions.

Figure 5-2: The Q-sort grid.
I distinguished columns using letters, but the equivalent numerals used in the Q data analysis software package (and used later in the presentation of the results) are given in brackets.

Most disagree ← → Most agree

Z (-4)	Y (-3)	X (-2)	W (-1)	N (0)	D (+1)	C (+2)	B (+3)	A (+4)

5.3.5. Correlation and factor analysis of Q-sorts

Q-Analysis identifies similar sorting patterns in the Q-sorts, meaning that participants share some distinct commonalities in their perceptions. Analysis of the 26 Q-sorts used PQ method software, version 2.35 (Schmolck, 2002). A 26 x 26 correlation matrix of the Q-sorts was produced and subjected to factor extraction using Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and Varimax rotation. PCA considers the specificity of individual sorts as well as the commonality between sorts (Webler et al., 2009)[25]. Rotation is applied to ensure each factor offers 'the best possible, or most meaningful vantage point from which to view the subject matter' (Watts and Stenner, 2012:142). Following Cairns et al, (2014), my aim was to find a factor solution which maximised the variance explained and number of loaders (participants significantly correlated with just one factor), while minimising the number of confounders (people loading significantly on more than one factor) and non-loaders (participants loading on no factor). I applied the

[25] Views differ within the Q community as to whether PCA or Centroid is most appropriate for factor extraction, but in our case we tried them both and eventually opted for PCA because several of the Centroid solutions contained empty factors with no significant loaders.

principle that each factor should contain at least two sorts loading significantly on that factor alone (Watts and Stenner, 2012). I compared a number of outputs before selecting a three-factor solution. Together, the three factors explained 46% of the study variance. Anything above 35% is ordinarily considered a sound solution in factor analysis (Kline, 1994). 22 participants' Q-sorts loaded significantly on one of these factors, with three confounders and one non-loader. Weighted averages of the significant single loaders' sort patterns from each factor were used to create three 'factor arrays' or idealised Q-sort patterns, following the same format as the original distribution grid (

Table 5-3).

5.3.6. Qualitative results interpretation and development of 'Fair Carbon' narratives

I wanted to understand the factors from the perspectives of the participants and create narratives which resonated with at least the highest loaders in each factor. Factor interpretation followed Watts and Stenner's (2012) guidelines, which involves drafting crib sheets of statements and checking back over demographic and post-interview data to formulate hypotheses. I used the rich by-statement interview data to compare the views of each significant loader in the factor and summarise shared views. My interpretative narratives paid particular attention to the interview data concerning the statements on the crib sheet. I chose not to draw on statements which had been understood quite differently by the various people in the factor, and invited the highest loaders to read over them and comment. To make explicit the links between the content of the narratives and the original themes, I organised them according to the headings in the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework. When categorising the statements, many spanned multiple categories, so I chose to combine the headings of 'goals' with 'target'; and 'access' with 'procedures' in order to avoid repetition.

5.4. Results

5.4.1. Factor 1 (F1): 'Producer First' - Participation and Price-Floors

F1 explains 17% of the study variance and has eight significant loaders; five working within the Fairtrade system; three involved in project development with experience of working with fair trade producers in carbon projects.

Goals and Target of fairness: Production of Fairtrade Carbon Credits (FCCs) should be in 'organised communities of disadvantaged people in the south' (statement 2, ranked +3). Production should not be limited to pre-existing organisations (30, -4), but well-functioning co-operatives should be targeted (14, +2). Large structures where individual members are 'not realistically engaged' and manufacturing companies that do not engage with organised communities should not be targeted (13, +2; 38, -3) and credits should not be produced in the industrialised north (4, -4). Buyers of FCCs must also commit to reducing their emissions (32, -3) as it would be unfair to ask poor people to reduce their emissions if high emitters are not committing to do the same (36, +1).

Access and procedures: participation in an organisation and active involvement in a carbon project are essential fairness components. This does not mean that community-based or farmer organisations should manage everything from the carbon project development process (21, -2) to the sale of credits (25, -1). However, participating individuals and households must be able to input into decision-making and management (40, +4) and financial discussions (10, +3). Credits must transfer hands in order to be transacted, but the first owners should be the participating individuals and households in a project (11, +2) and the signing of an agreement with an aggregator is insufficient for the fair transfer of the credits away from those generating the emissions savings (15, -3).

Benefit-sharing: Focus should be on the organisation carrying out the project, who must receive a fair price. The rest of the supply chain is not a target of fairness (hence 19 and 20, both 0). Choices made about budgeting and revenue do not need to be judged through a 'fairness' lens (see statements 9, 16, 22 and 23 all in zero)- these should be left to the discretion project participants. Nevertheless, intervening to ensure payments are reaching women may be appropriate in some project contexts (39, +1).

Parameters of fairness: Minimum prices are important in setting parameters for fairer trade (27, +4), rather than prices being *driven* by market forces (28, +1). This does not mean being oblivious to market prices, but setting a floor price which would guarantee projects a carbon credit price that covers production costs and ensuring that there is willingness to pay.

Table 5-3: Statements making up the Q set

Table includes idealised sort patterns for factors F1, F2 and F3 that emerged from the analysis. Sort patterns represent scores that an individual loading 100% on the factor would have assigned to each statement, where -4 is 'most disagree'

Δ denotes statements used to build the factor interpretations.

[c] denotes consensus statements (which did not distinguish between any pair of factors), non-significant at P<0.01. These were not used to build the factor interpretations unless they were also the highest or lowest scored statements.

T G Pa A B Pr denotes coding for statements according our adapted version of McDermott et al's (2013) equity framework, whereby *T* = target; *G* = goal; *Pa* = parameters; *A* = fair access; *B* = fair benefit-sharing and *Pr* = fair procedures.

	Statements in the Q set used to explore participants' views on the question What would 'fairness' mean in the context of a Fairtrade carbon project?	Idealised sort patterns		
		F1	F2	F3
1c	FCCs should only pay people for any emissions reductions resulting from the project G	-1	-1	0
2	FCCs should aim to shift more of the benefits of carbon trade to organised communities of disadvantaged people in the south G	3Δ	-1Δ	1
3	FCCs should be a mechanism for paying communities in developing countries for the fact that their carbon footprints are lower than the ones they are entitled to G	-1	-1	3Δ
4	The Fairtrade Climate Standard should include within its scope the regions that are heavy contributors of greenhouse gas emissions T	-4Δ	2Δ	-1
5c	In an FCC supply chain, intermediaries are acceptable as long as fair distribution of the benefits from sales is ensured B	2	3Δ	2
6	Buyers of FCCs should pay a price which takes into account the cost of the damage to the atmosphere caused by excess carbon emissions P	-2	0	-2
7	The Fairtrade Climate Standard should reward projects that start from scratch with a group of people and enable them to build an organisation Pr	-1	3Δ	-1
8	Manufacturing companies implementing carbon projects must provide opportunities for users to shape product design and use of profits Pr	-1	-1	0
9	Fairness should mean that a certain amount of the financial revenues are going into a carbon project for reinvestment, infrastructure, capacity-building etc B	0Δ	1	1

10	Individuals and households involved in an FCC project should have an opportunity to take part in discussions about its budget, funding source and revenue distribution Pr/ A	3Δ	1Δ	0Δ
11	Fairness should mean that the local households accepting an intervention are the initial owners of the FCCs Pr	2Δ	2	-1
12c	Fairness should mean that a project does not import cookstoves, as this means exporting jobs to China and America B	-2	-2	-4Δ
13	Carbon projects implemented by manufacturing companies that do not engage with organised communities should not be eligible for Fairtrade certification T/ Pr	2Δ	-4Δ	-1
14	Fairtrade Carbon should provide the opportunity for well-functioning co-operatives to benefit from more economic resources Pr/ T	2Δ	2Δ	1
15	It is fair for ownership of carbon credits to be transferred away from those who are generating the emissions savings as long as they are aware of what they are signing in an agreement Pr	-3Δ	0	4Δ
16	Fairtrade certification should be able to ensure that benefits from taking part in a project are reaching particular members of a household A	0Δ	-2Δ	1
17	The Fairtrade Climate standard should only support smaller types of projects T	-2	-3Δ	-2
18	For a fair supply chain, we need to regulate what everyone in the supply chain is getting P/ B	-2	-1	-3Δ
19	Fair revenue distribution along the carbon value chain should be governed by an 'open book policy' (where costs and margins are transparent) P/ B	0Δ	4Δ	-1
20	A fair business model in a carbon project will have to cater for a reasonable compensation of all parties involved B	0Δ	4Δ	3Δ
21	People generating FCCs should not need to take on the carbon project development process Pr/ B	-2Δ	-2Δ	2Δ
22c	Fairness in land-based projects is about securing a certain proportion of the carbon revenue as direct payments for farmers B	0Δ	-1	1Δ
23	It would be fair to use part of the carbon revenue in land based projects to pay for technical assistance to farmers B	0Δ	1	1
24c	Organisations must be able to make the steps and follow the procedures required to develop and implement an FCC project by themselves Pr/ B	0	0	-1
25	Trade of carbon credits can only be fair if communities have the chance to sell their credits by themselves Pr/ B/ A	-1Δ	-3Δ	-2
26c	Along with emissions reductions, development should be a primary target of an FCC project G	3	3	4Δ
27	Having Fairtrade minimum prices for carbon credits is fundamental for making trade fair P	4Δ	1Δ	-2Δ
28	Prices of FCCs should not be driven by market forces P	1Δ	-3Δ	-2Δ
29	You should be able to start receiving money for an FCC project delivering development, even before you have	2	-2	2

	delivered the carbon G/ B			
30c	The Fairtrade Climate Standard should only be applicable for projects implemented by pre-existing organisations Pr/ T	-4Δ	-4Δ	-3
31c	Fairness' should be assessed by looking at what the carbon revenue has achieved T/ G	1	0	0
32	FCCs should be sold to anyone, not just those who commit to reducing their emissions T	-3Δ	2Δ	0
33	Fairtrade carbon development should enable a strong bond between carbon credits suppliers and sellers T/ G	1	2Δ	0
34	A fair outcome would be that the money generated through a carbon project was having a direct impact on the long term income situation of a farmer or household B/ G	0	0	3Δ
35	If social impacts are monitored and distribution of economic and social benefits is balanced, it is acceptable for an FCC project to rely on private companies T/ B	1	1	3Δ
36	We cannot talk about fairness if we are asking poor people to reduce their emissions when high emitters have not made commitments to do the same T	1Δ	1Δ	-4Δ
37	Fairness in appliance-based projects is about access to the technology and maintenance B/ A	-1	0	2Δ
38	Projects carried out by large structures involving large numbers of beneficiaries should be eligible for Fairtrade certification even if individual members are not realistically engaged T/ Pr	-3Δ	0	0
39	Fairness should mean that in certain types of FCC projects, the carbon payments are made to women A/ B	1Δ	-2Δ	2Δ
40	Individuals and households participating in an FCC project must be able to input into decision-making and management Pr / A	4Δ	0Δ	0Δ

5.4.2. Factor 2 (F2): Functional Value Chain, Maximum Impact for People and Planet.

F2 explains 15% of the study variance and has nine significant loaders; eight involved in African carbon projects, as implementers, advisors or project partners; and two working with fair trade producers.

Goals and Target: Anyone willing to produce carbon credits should be allowed to, including those in heavily-emitting regions (4, +2). Entities should not be excluded on the basis of how organised they are at the outset (30, -4), their size (17, -3) or whether they engage with organised communities or not (13, -4). Projects which enable new organisations to emerge should be rewarded (7, +3), through encouragement and support. Well-functioning co-

operatives should be targeted (14, +2), but so should non-organised groups as organisation may not be relevant or realistic. Although FCCs should aim to shift more of the benefits of carbon trade to disadvantaged people in the South, the initiative should not only target organised communities, and neither should it limit scope to the South (2, -1). It is unfair to ask poor people to reduce emissions if high emitters are not doing the same (36, +1) but requiring customers to reduce their emissions is unhelpful (32, +2) because it narrows demand and reduces opportunities for those who are willing to carry out mitigation activities which can benefit communities, households, and more broadly the environment.

Benefit-sharing: the most important element of fairness in FCC projects is financial governance and distribution within the value chain. Transparency of costs and margins is essential (19, +4) and can facilitate trust between parties, encourage efficiency and prevent one party from making windfalls. All parties can ensure that everyone is reasonably compensated (20, +4). Micro-level decisions about how the carbon revenue is paid and what it is used for, e.g. whether it is paid to women or men (39, -2), and whether it reaches particular members of the household (16, -2), are not important components of fairness.

Access and procedures: communities involved in carbon projects do not have to sell credits by themselves (25, -3) as this is impractical and inefficient. Intermediaries have a role to play as long as they do not take an unfair proportion of the sales revenues, (5, +3), hence the people generating the carbon credits must be *involved* in the project development process (21, -2) so they can accept and appropriate it, and determine whether they are getting a fair deal. 'Taking on' the project development process should still allow for essential technical support, especially in a project's earlier phases. Some loaders suggested the onus is on FTI to make project procedures simple to facilitate people in taking on at least part of the project development process. Providing opportunities for individuals and households involved in a project to participate in management decisions and finance discussions will not be relevant (40, 0 and 10, +1) if they lack the capacity or willingness.

Parameters: Fairtrade minimum prices (a floor price) *may* have a role to play in fairer trade (27, +1) but market forces will naturally drive prices (28, -3) through supply, demand and negotiation between parties. A strong bond between credit suppliers and sellers is important (33, +2) but as one person noted, this should be a strong collaboration enabling benefit-sharing, rather than a binding chain.

Table 5-4: Participants and degree of correlation with each factor (F1, F2 and F3).

	Based	F1	F2	F3
Participants loading significantly on F1				
Staff of FTI	Europe	0.743*	0.193	-0.293
Staff of FTI	Europe	0.797*	-0.029	0.012
Carbon project financer and seller of credits	Europe	0.532*	-0.001	0.027
Staff of fair trade marketing organisation	Europe	0.618*	0.103	0.013
Carbon project advisor	Europe	0.548*	0.282	0.250
Staff of fair trade marketing organisation	Europe	0.643*	-0.031	0.163
Staff of fair trade marketing organisation	Europe	0.493*	-0.084	0.389
Carbon project technician/ advisor	Europe	0.595*	0.126	0.131
Participants loading significantly on F2				
Carbon project implementing partner	Africa	0.027	0.660*	0.326
Fair trade licensee and carbon project implementer	Africa	-0.142	0.789*	0.064
Carbon project implementing partner	Africa	-0.115	0.562*	0.253
Carbon project advisor	Africa	0.219	0.519*	-0.034
Staff of fair trade producer network	Africa	0.103	0.599*	0.081
Carbon project implementer	Africa	0.258	0.648*	-0.263
Carbon project implementer	Africa	0.050	0.608*	0.265
Carbon project developer and advisor	Europe	0.371	0.514*	0.060
Carbon project implementer	Africa	0.267	0.427*	0.256
Participants loading significantly on F3				
Staff of research organisation	Africa	-0.064	0.179	0.645*
Low-carbon technology promoter	U.S.	0.045	0.289	0.668*
Carbon project owner	U.S.	0.019	0.116	0.491*
Carbon project advisor and implementer	Africa	0.090	-0.032	0.725*
Staff of certification body	Europe	0.363	0.108	0.577*
Confounders (loading significantly on more than one factor)				
Staff of FTI	Europe	0.583*	0.187	0.465*
Carbon project technician/ advisor	Europe	-0.129	0.508*	0.472*
Staff of standards organisation	Europe	0.442*	0.004	0.644*
Non-loaders (loading significantly on none of the factors)				
Carbon project advisor and implementer	Africa	0.365	0.332	-0.031

* = significant sorts (±0.41 at the $p<0.01$ level).

5.4.3. Factor 3 (F3): Market Efficiency, Minimum Interference, More for the Project

F3 explains 14% of the study variance and has five significant loaders from a mixture of professional backgrounds and locations.

Goals and Target: Development must be a primary target of FCC projects, alongside emissions reductions (26, +4). They should not be a mechanism for paying communities for having low carbon footprints (3, -3) and insisting that poor people should only reduce their emissions if high emitters have made commitments to reduce theirs (36, -4) would deny them benefits of the carbon market (such as accessing low carbon technology, and channelling finance from developed countries to developing countries).

Benefit-sharing: fairness might be achieved by enabling access to low carbon technology and ensuring its maintenance (37, +1), provided this comes with an appropriate design, and training provision in usage. Technology should be sourced with users' interests and quality in mind: banning imported stoves is unhelpful and irrelevant (12, -4), as jobs are created in both stove production and distribution. Fairness in delivering benefits might mean making carbon payments specifically to women (39, +1), where payments are appropriate, and where women are doing the mitigation. Nevertheless, this is a project design issue, and should not be regulated by a Fairtrade standard. In land-based projects, direct payments to farmers for the costs they incur might be desirable (22, +1) but the money generated through a carbon project should directly impact the long term income of participating farmers or households (34, +3).

In an FCC value chain, each actor plays a distinct role. It is acceptable (and perhaps preferable) for private companies to be involved in projects and any criteria used to judge them (35, +3) should also be applied to NGOs and non-profits. Performance, not status is important. Every party should be reasonably compensated for what they deliver (20, +3), as per any functional business model. As one person loading on this factor emphasised, 'we are talking about a market mechanism and if you can't generate fair revenue for everybody in that process, you don't have a functional mechanism, or you're talking about development aid'. It is difficult to evaluate what is 'reasonable' or which costs and margins are acceptable, even within the chain, but this should not be regulated by any third party (18, -3).

Access and procedures: people generating carbon credits should understand what they are involved in, but do not need to take on the carbon project development process (21, +2). This requires a specific skill-set and is best left to those who can do it most efficiently. Offering opportunities for individuals and households involved in projects to input into financial and management decisions (e.g. through consultations), is welcomed though not relevant (10 & 40,

0) if they lack the capacity or willingness to meaningfully participate. As credits must be transacted, ownership must be transferred away from the people generating the emissions saving to the end buyer, but agreements between parties must be clearly understood (15, +4).

Parameters: Market forces will undoubtedly drive prices (28, -2) and the application of minimum prices is not necessarily going to make trade fair (27, -2). As some suggested, perhaps other tools are more practical and would not risk pricing the credits out of the market.

5.5. Application of the findings for reflexive policy appraisal

Q studies allow for questioning of the clarity and consensus of concept definitions used in academic, public, expert or lay contexts, particularly where no consensus definition can be achieved (Watts and Stenner, 2012). Exploring both 'expert' and 'lay' opinions in policy-making processes (e.g. Doody et al., 2009) is important for democratising policy deliberation (Fischer, 2003a). Q was useful for bringing to attention the terms within the concourse which were 'fuzzy' for some people because of lack of experience or familiarity or particular associations based on the field they were in, or because the words themselves were inadequately defined for a common understanding to emerge. This pointed to the need to develop clearer definitions within the FCS itself, which also became apparent within the FCS consultation process happening in parallel.

The synthesis of pluralistic viewpoints resulting from Q studies serve as useful inputs for policy-making processes, potentially enabling 'better problem identification and definition; estimation and specification of policy options' (Steelman and Maguire, 1999:386), reflexive appraisal of policy-making processes (Ockwell, 2008) and enhancement of policy implementation processes (Barry and Proops, 1999). Reflexivity in policy appraisal provides space to consider the plurality of opinions, exposing the underlying values, interests and subjective assumptions to critical reflection (Ockwell, 2008). During the development of the FCS, plural opinions were heard through the highly consultative process that new Fairtrade standards undergo (see Fairtrade International, 2011b), although hearing them does not necessarily mean that they would be taken into account. This Q study served as a novel opportunity to enhance reflexivity (welcomed by participants and staff responsible for the standard development) by facilitating a more systematic and in-depth reflection on the values, interests and assumptions underpinning their plural opinions, including the interrelationships between different dimensions of fairness and different ways of achieving it (particularly through instructions to think out loud, and the sorting process itself).

Input for the FCS was principally from a group of carbon market actors who were initially unfamiliar with the Fairtrade system, its history, principal tools and approaches, and from

Fairtrade staff and licensees lacking practical experience of the carbon market. It could be expected therefore that these departing differences in knowledge and experiences might produce a diverse and potentially irreconcilable set of inputs. Meanwhile, the Project Team were tasked with evaluating these inputs and discriminating between them and drafting a standard to be voted on and approved by the Fairtrade Standards Committee. My study's contribution was to provide a synthesis of different viewpoints so that participants of the Q study could gain a better understanding of perspectives held by other stakeholders in the FCSSP, and so that the Project Team writing the FCS would be more aware of which ones they were choosing to include or exclude. I did this by sharing a synthesis report of findings with all study participants and holding a webinar with FTI and GSF, both in May 2015. Publication of the study results in papers in June and December 2015 also enhanced the transparency of the standard-setting process itself by highlighting the array of opinions provided as inputs so that those who were not involved in the process could assess if and how these were used. After the FCS was published in October 2015, I used the factors as a benchmark for assessing which aspects present within any of them had been incorporated into the FCS and where alternative approaches had been adopted. This is summarised in the boxes following each of the sub-sections below, and serves as a key indicator of how notions gain or lose ground in public discourse and offers an important extension of this empirical line of enquiry (Sikor et al., 2014). When sharing the results of the benchmarking with FTI in March 2016, I also included a list of elements of fairness that participants of the Q study had identified as missing from the Q concourse (extracted from the accompanying interviews) and an assessment of which if any had been included in the published FCS.

5.6. Discussion of findings

This section discusses points of difference and convergence between factors, linking them to the dimensions of the adapted multi-dimensional framework, and to wider debates, evidence and lessons learned within fair trade and the carbon market. I also highlight some differences between existing fair trade commodity chains and the way things work in carbon projects, implying that some aspects of the Fairtrade approach may be under pressure to change as FTI moves into carbon. At the end of each section the results of the benchmarking assessment are displayed, indicating which perspectives were eventually incorporated into the FCS.

5.6.1. The goals and target of fairness

All factors agree that development and emissions reductions should both be primary goals of an FCC project, but differences emerge when exploring what is understood by 'development' and where priorities are placed. For F2 and F3, the goal is to maximise emissions reductions and

carbon credit sales whilst having a positive development impact. For F2 this is achieved by removing limitations to the production and marketing of credits in order to maximise the environmental impact. F3 envisages development at the level of the households and individuals participating in the project, through increased access to clean and usable technology, or positive impacts on household income. F1 prioritises development in the global south, achieved principally through participation in the project as organisational members: organisations being the target of support and benefits.

Differences between the factors relate to disagreements regarding issue 1 in Table 5-1. Disagreements on the target of fairness are clearest between F1 and F2 regarding the necessity of being organised, inclusion of projects in the north, and criteria for customers buying credits. Similar debates are articulated within fair trade, most visibly in the recent departure of Fair Trade USA from the FTI system. F2 fits more with Fair Trade USA's strategy of growing the market for fair trade products so that more producers will benefit (involving certifying farmers who are not democratically organised, plantations in sectors which FTI limits to small producers, and Northern producers). This has been widely condemned by FTI and other members of the movement because of the emphasis on market goals over movement principles (Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015).

Disagreements about the relevance of organisation between F1 and F2 loaders are a reminder that firmly rooted assumptions about 'organisation' need to be reality-tested by attending to the specificities of carbon credits (how they are produced and by whom) compared to existing fair trade commodities. Producer organisations form the roots of the fair trade movement, beginning with coffee co-operatives in Mexico (Smith and VanderHoff Boersma, 2013) and these roots continue to shape organisational preferences 30 years on. Producer organisations feature strongly in FTI's Theory of Change (Fairtrade International, 2013), which articulates how fair trade interventions result in impacts. However, scholars have underlined the need to attend to the geographical and cultural specificity of different commodities and modes of organisation (Nelson and Martin, 2015, McEwan et al., 2014). For example, African countries such as Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya had very different histories of co-operative formation compared to Latin America, leaving a legacy of very large co-operatives and co-operative unions initiated by colonial governments, many of which are struggling or facing particular challenges (Tallontire, 2015).

Disagreements about where carbon credits should be produced reflect ethical debates about neo-colonialism in carbon and fair trade arenas. Carbon debates are polarised by those who see carbon trading as northern customers dumping responsibility on the global south, and those who see it as an opportunity for people in the south to benefit from climate finance (Howard et al., 2015b). Perspectives taken in this debate also relate to one's particular normative framing of the

problem and assessment of strategies and solutions developed in the face of it. For example, based on a political ecology reading of a cook stove project in Western Kenya as an example of 'accumulation by decarbonisation', Wang and Corson (2015) conclude that carbon reduction commitments should be made in the global north rather than the global south. By applying a justice lens, Corbera and Martin (2015) recognise that some projects have enabled the provision of assistance to farmers, though they acknowledge that the market does seem to be designed to benefit the polluters more than the victims of pollution in the global south (Corbera and Martin, 2015). Obliging customers to reduce their own emissions before buying credits (F1) is a strategy to respond to this critique despite concerns that this could limit market size (F2). Fair trade's emphasis on cash crops produced in the global south for northern markets proliferates colonial commodity circuits and the colonial injustices that created the injustices underlying world trade despite efforts to transform production relations (Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015, Jaffee, 2014). In parallel with carbon trading, the Fairtrade movement brings together participants from the global north and south with disproportionate levels of economic power and such disparities were evident within the governance structures of Fairtrade International (Jaffee, 2014), at least before the governance reforms in 2011 (see chapter 3). The polarisation of producers and consumers is gradually changing with the development of fair trade markets in Africa (Keahey, 2015) and Latin America (Renard and Loconto, 2013), but there are concerns that the increasing participation of transnational corporations as both producers and retailers continues to proliferate unequal relationships to the market (Jaffee, 2014).

5.6.1.1. One year on: goals and target of fairness in the published FCS

Table 5-5 indicates that the goal in the FCS is a combination of aspects from all three factors, while the target for projects and customers resonates with F1. The FCS approach to producer organisations fits most closely with F2, although the assumption in the FCS is that organisation building is always necessary. This creates a new precedent in the approach to Producer Organisations under FTI standards, and is discussed further in chapter 7.

Table 5-5: Goals and target of fairness in the FCS

N.B. Light blue boxes indicate where perspective is reflected in the FCS

Theme	F1	F2	F3	Approach in FCS
Goal (impact)	Maximise participation (via the PO)	Maximise emissions reductions and opportunities to mitigate	Maximise access to appropriate tech & maintenance; enable livelihood improvements	Encourage participation; Promote mitigation, adaptation and livelihood improvements in projects in the global south; Promote emissions reductions in the north
Target: projects	Limit to global south	Global north and south	No consensual views	Projects only in Fairtrade producer regions
Target: customers	Buyers should commit to reducing their emissions	Don't limit number of buyers and size of market by requiring emissions reductions		End buyers of larger amounts of carbon credits commit to reducing their emissions
Target: producer organisation	Target organised communities, especially coops	Work with coops and non-organised groups	No consensual views	Projects can be led by a Project Facilitator (PF) who can start with less or more organised groups and support them to build up into Producer Organisations
	Exclude large structures that don't engage people	Support organisation-building only where relevant		

				(POs)

5.6.2. The content of fairness

Fair benefit-sharing

This theme links to issue 2 in Table 5-1. The three factors diverge on where to measure fair benefit-sharing (at the household level (F3); within the organisation producing the credits (F1); and across the commodity chain (F2 and F3)). F1 echoes the fair trade approach which is relatively prescriptive on fair benefit-sharing but limits the scope to producer co-operatives and worker associations (Fairtrade International, 2013, McDermott, 2013). Fair trade impact studies normally assess household level changes too, but lack of attention in F1 to individual households may be because FCCs cannot be expected to generate the same level of direct household income as other fair trade commodities, as the carbon revenue is often absorbed further along the chain (Howard et al., 2015b). Despite their bearing on available income, all factors agreed that intermediaries can be involved in an FCC commodity chain. However, while F1 advocates limiting them, F2 and F3 embrace them and advocate reasonable compensation. F1 maps onto the fair trade approach, which in the coffee sector has been focused on enabling primary producers to engage in 'direct' trade with shorter trading chains while F2 and F3 fit more with other sustainability standards such as by the Forest Stewardship Council which often include many intermediaries (Taylor, 2005b). Even so, the expectation raised by the Fairtrade label that producers are enabled to trade on their own terms needs to be explored in specific contexts because there is evidence that this is not always the case (Getz and Shreck, 2006). The role of intermediaries has been legitimated within Fairtrade standards, in the Contract Production standard developed by Fairtrade International for particular geographical areas and products, and in the Independent Smallholder standard developed by Fair Trade USA although there is not yet enough evidence of the intermediary playing the intended role. Within carbon projects, Boyd (2009) suggests that NGOs can sometimes serve as intermediary institutions, bridging the disconnect between the values and rhetoric of local resource users, and the global institutions that set the rules, however, evidence on how this would occur in practice is again lacking (Lansing, 2013a).

Fair Access and Procedures

This theme links to issue 3 in Table 5-1. All factors agreed that carbon project participants should be involved in design and implementation but recognised that households, farmers or community members may initially lack specific capacity or skills to engage effectively. However, while F1 aims to build capacities, F2 and F3 see limited capacity as reasons for continued involvement of additional parties. F2 recognises the need to shift power by enhancing

project participants' negotiation capacities, whereas F3 does not advocate for changes in capabilities or power. Notably, the extent to which the shift in capabilities and power is possible depends greatly on context as well as motivations of actors involved. The risk with fair trade is that approaches focusing on political empowerment only empower those producers that already have more resources. Equally, without political empowerment, once dependencies become institutionalised, there may be few opportunities to develop socially and institutionally, and to challenge the trading terms and positioning in the value chain (Tallontire and Nelson, 2013). One interviewee whose sort was categorised in factor 2, elaborated on this point at the end of his Q interview. For him, the real 'key to fairness' was information, and capacity to not only follow, but if possible drive the process. He explained that the lack of information, coupled with the complexity and uncertainty of the carbon market removed any ability to negotiate and made people and organisations dependent on being led, in his words, 'like sheep to a slaughterhouse'. He elaborated

> *That's why participation, critical analysis is very difficult, because you can only do that when you know the two sides of the coin. Otherwise you cannot know that the other side is dark.*

To address this issue, he argued that information was needed at all levels- from the farmer, to whoever is leading a group of farmers, to the intermediary. From his position as a national level manager of the project he acknowledged that they had a slightly better position than farmers (who lacked information from their cooperative leadership about what was going on), but still had no idea of the rationale for key decisions in the project such as which Project Developer to work with and why the verifier was coming from *X* country. This point suggests that there may be another element of fairness that is not fully captured in the dimensions of access and procedures. I return to this point in section 7.8.3.

Rationales for participation varied between the factors, from philosophical (F1) to pragmatic or even instrumental (F3), and from being a means to eventually take on more tasks (F1) or a tool for enhancing negotiation (F2), to a means of strengthening participants' commitment to emissions reductions (F3). These differences resonate with Melo et al.'s (2014) finding that different carbon projects certified by the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard deployed participation in different ways. While participation is commonly emphasised in standards and project design documents and is required for projects to achieve both mitigation and community benefits, interpretations are wide-ranging, and without clear definitions and prescriptions, the notion risks being used instrumentally (Melo et al., 2014). Also with respect to carbon projects based on Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), McDermott et al (2012) note that safeguards (including participation) intended to enhance equity are deployed in distinct ways by different actors with different interests. Nevertheless,

Lansing's (2013a) observation, that project designs are necessarily highly technical, require standardised procedures and often exclude different perspectives, thus making collaborative project design and implementation difficult, corroborates the comment of the interviewee in factor 2.

5.6.2.1. One year on: the content of fairness in the published FCS

Table 5-6 shows that the approach in the FCS for project management is a mix of F1 and F3: the role of a new actor in carbon projects called the Project Facilitator enables projects to be managed without the Producer Organisation needing to take full responsibility, but Producer Organisations should nevertheless take on tasks. The FCS does not explicitly claim to make things simpler for producers (F2) but this was one of the aims throughout. The polarised opinions on participation between F1 and F2/F3 are resolved in the FCS by splitting up decisions and financial responsibility regarding the project (primarily managed by the Project Facilitator at least initially), and the premium and adaptation plan. The only aspect from the factors explicitly carried into the FCS regarding benefit sharing is that of transparency. By paying the FMP to the Project Facilitator, there is no guarantee that the Producer Organisation will receive a fair price, but the contractual agreement is supposed to lay down how much each party is being compensated, and this would be auditable. The real test is how much projects can sell their credits for (as the FMP is only an absolute minimum) and whether the FMP will cover all of the various project costs (see 6.6.2.4).

Table 5-6: Content of fairness in the FCS

Theme	F1	F2	F3	Approach in FCS
Access and procedures: Management	Producers do not have to do everything themselves	Simplify the process so producers can do more	Leave technical aspects to those who can do it most efficiently	PF can manage but must eventually recruit a manager from PO to take on some management tasks; PO must eventually be involved in monitoring.
Access and procedures: Participation	Producer participation in decision-making re project budget and management is key	Producers need to be informed but might not have capacity/ willingness to take part in decisions		Producers participate in decision-making and budget re premium and adaptation plan; PF informs PO about management/ budget
Benefit-sharing (other trade aspects)	PO should receive a fair price	Everyone in the chain should be reasonably compensated	Everyone in the chain should be reasonably compensated	Any services provided deducted from FMP; remainder transferred to PO; Premium paid to PO
		Transparency of costs/ margins is key		Contractual agreement requires cost/ margin transparency between PF and PO.

5.6.3. The parameters of fairness

Although this theme is limited to a discussion of minimum price, it links up to wider debates around issue 4 in Table 5-1. Different reactions to some form of Fairtrade Minimum Price (FMP) point to different understandings of what this mechanism might look like and what it could achieve when applied to carbon. Some positive reactions (F1) were based on experience of the benefits it brings when applied to agricultural commodities, and awareness of the complexity and rigour used to work out prices. Other ambivalent or negative reactions (F2 and F3) came from people who had limited experience of FMPs or who were aware of the difficulties in challenging market forces or finding buyers willing to pay higher prices, following their experiences of carbon price slump in recent years. One said she was not in favour of FMPs was because she was not from fair trade, where she perceived that FMPs are 'in their DNA'. However, some participants from within fair trade were also unsure how the tool would work when applied to carbon. The FMP sets Fairtrade standards apart from other sustainability standards and attempt to modify conventional trading relations (Taylor, 2005b). However, this is harder to achieve in capital intensive, organisationally complex networks (Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015) and depends on actors in the supply chain and other contextual aspects inherent to the commodity and the industry (Nelson and Martin, 2015). Furthermore, corporate pressure can dilute key fair trade principles including FMPs (Doherty et al., 2013). Carbon projects are capital intensive and organisationally complex, often necessitating roles for expensive 'expert' input to fulfil their technocratic requirements (Gupta et al., 2012, Melo et al., 2014). They therefore constitute a specific context for applying FMPs, and it is not obvious who would receive them. People in F3 emphasised that payments to individuals are not always appropriate, especially when attached to the use of an energy-saving appliance such as a cook-stove or solar light, and are better translated into subsidies or services. In this case, an FMP would go to the entity implementing the project and as yet, these entities are primarily NGOs and foreign or national businesses. For F1, these actors are not the 'target' of fairness. Certain types of carbon projects such as afforestation/ reforestation often involve complex financial flows where investors commit to forwarding payments to project participants several years ahead of the carbon credits being fungible (e.g. Fisher, 2012, Jindal et al., 2012). This requires agreements and risk management mechanisms specific to each project. While there may be valid reasons for not applying FMPs to carbon credits, this would be very controversial within the fair trade movement and would set a precedent potentially shaping its whole trajectory. The backdrop of low carbon market prices suggests the need for tools to ensure that carbon projects can cover costs and hedge risks, but willingness to pay higher prices would also be necessary.

5.6.3.1. One year on: price-setting parameters in the published FCS

Table 5-7 shows that the typical Fairtrade pricing parameter of the FMP was included in the FCS, but paying it to the Project Facilitator rather than the Producer Organisation is a precedent within Fairtrade. At face value, this can be seen as a compromise that reflects the disagreement between F1, and F2/F3. I explore the dynamics behind this decision in more detail in chapter 6.

Table 5-7: Price-setting parameters in the FCS

Theme	F1	F2	F3	Approach in FCS
FMP	FMPs are essential	Not sure about FMPs- they will not necessarily make trade fair		PF receives FMP

Overall, the assessment shows that more of the aspects from F1 are visible within the FCS. Notably, most people loading on F1 come from within the fair trade system or are familiar with it, and the discussion above pinpointed a number of areas where the factor perspective resonates with key principles of fair trade (encoded for example in the Fairtrade Theory of Change, see Fairtrade International, 2013). Nevertheless, some participants from within Fairtrade loaded more significantly on other factors, reflecting internal debates within the fair trade movement.

5.7. Conclusion to chapter five

Definitions of fairness and how to achieve it are multiple and contested not only in the context of carbon markets but also within the fair trade movement. This chapter has contributed to what Schlosberg calls a 'plural yet unified theory and practice of justice' (2004:517), making sense of empirical notions of fairness by using a conceptual framework and linking findings to ongoing debates within the theory and practice of fair trade and fairness in carbon projects. One element perhaps not adequately captured by the framework came out of a post-sort interview where the interviewee emphasised that fairness was about information and sharing of rationales for decisions. This relates to Fair Access and Fair Procedures but suggests a dynamic and relational element where people actively choose how to treat each other and how much information to divulge. This point is explored again in chapters 7 and 9.

The chapter has also advanced the body of empirical knowledge on multiple notions of fairness in the context of environmental governance, by exposing the views which have contributed to the development of the FCS. Three distinct 'factors' (or perspectives) were identified, and discussed in relation to the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework. The first factor prioritises

development delivered through organisations, participation in decision-making and use of minimum prices to adjust trade imbalances. The second factor conceptualises a non-exclusive approach maximising generation and sales of FCCs, involving a commodity chain where everyone performs their optimum function with financial transparency and information-sharing to facilitate negotiations. The third factor involves minimising intervention, allowing carbon commodity chains and project set-ups to function efficiently, and make their own adjustments to enhance benefits access and quality received by beneficiaries. The three factors reflect debates within carbon and fair trade spheres about who should be playing which roles, who should be accessing which benefits, and how people should be supported to interact on an uneven playing field. Crucially, I have shown that there was no clear consensus between participants' notions, and that the published FCS eventually incorporated some aspects from each of the factors and some new aspects which bridged some of the differences between factors. However, it cannot be assumed to represent the views of all who took part in shaping it. Chapter 6 details the dynamics that shaped which viewpoints were represented in the FCS and how contested viewpoints were resolved.

Further research is needed to explore viewpoints amongst stakeholders who did not take part in the Q study but whose views could be equally influential on the legitimacy, success or failure of the eventual standard. These include representatives of civil society organisations and NGOs who took strong ethical positions on the carbon market (but were only consulted after the Q study had taken place), existing Fairtrade market actors, and member organisations of FTI who chose not to provide input for the FCS or who could not participate in the Q study (especially Latin American stakeholders who would have required Spanish translation).

It is important to be aware of the views and assumptions behind the experts and/or lobbyists who influence policy and standards, and social scientists have a role to play in analysing policy-change in a way that fosters stakeholder engagement, learning and feedback loops (Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2012), this research being an example of that. This study served to open up discussion and provide clarity on some of the key issues in carbon and Fairtrade debates. FTI's efforts to develop the FCS with the support of external stakeholders illustrates that some of the pre-existing internal contestations within the fair trade movement have been mirrored in disagreements between people both from within and outside the movement concerning the new fair trade commodity of carbon credits. This suggests both that the development of the FCS was an opportune moment for taking these debates seriously, and also that the choices made are likely to shape the future of Fairtrade (Renard and Loconto, 2013), either by creating precedents or by furthering the status quo.

While this study was appropriate for mapping viewpoints on fairness at one particular point in time and feeding them succinctly into the FCSSP, it was unable to capture the dynamism of

viewpoints (which are shaped by interactions with other stakeholders, critical reflection and ongoing experiences). The thinking-out-loud provided some insight into individuals' deliberative processes, but several participants pointed out they might do the sort differently next time. This weakness can be addressed by doing a Q study both before and after a deliberative process (see Schlosberg et al., 2016)[26] or by using Q as one of a series of methods for exploring a policy problem (Curry et al., 2013). In this thesis, it has been complemented by observational methods, collation of secondary sources and longitudinal analysis which were more appropriate for exploring evolving viewpoints. In chapter 9 I recommend some potential extensions of the methodological approach and results within the context of Fairtrade standard-setting.

To close this chapter I echo McDermott et al.'s (2013) assertion that unless sufficient attention is given to the process of defining fairness (the final layer of the framework), the concept may remain a reflection of prevailing discourses and power relations and standards and projects will therefore be limited in their scope to transform unfair situations and impact the beneficiaries who should have most to gain from them. In chapter 6 I undertake a deeper analysis of the process of defining the fairness mechanisms within the FCS.

[26] I did my own Q-sort of the study statements in September 2014 and again in April 2016 and experienced some radical changes in what I agreed or disagreed with and how I ranked them.

Chapter 6 A participatory governance analysis of the FCSSP

6.1. Introduction to chapter six

Between December 2012, when the partnership between FTI and GSF was publically announced at UNFCCC COP 18 in Doha, and December 2015 when the FCS was launched at UNFCCC COP 21 in Paris, a complex, iterative and negotiated process unfolded, involving inputs from multiple stakeholders in closed, invited and public spaces in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. FTI and GSF had boundaries to protect, positions to maintain and a wider consortium of members, partners, licensees and supporters to satisfy. Many of the stakeholders involved in the FCSSP shared interests which on the surface were similar, but in combination often proved incompatible. They possessed differential influence and stood to gain differently from what would become inscribed in the FCS. Faced with this situation, the outcome could involve compromise, co-optation, or consensual solutions. The final FCS was an emblem of collaborative standard-setting, but had departed substantially from its original billing.

Building on the literature review in chapter 3 and empirical evidence in chapter 5, this chapter addresses objective 2 of this thesis, to describe and analyse the process of collaborative development of the FCS. It is based on pathways component 4: uncovering the actors, institutions, goals and governance processes in pathway-building (section 1.3.1 and 1.4.2.1). The following three questions are addressed:

2.1 What did the FCSSP look like (in terms of forums for input, debates and interests)?

2.2 How did the FCS reflect stakeholder input and what shaped this?

2.3 What does this say about participatory governance in practice?

The critical appraisal of the FCSSP and outcomes in this chapter contributes to FTI's governance practices by supporting staff to reflect on the work they coordinated and making it visible to the FTI system as a whole. It contributes empirically to an understanding of the strengths and limitations of a participatory governance framework in practice and possible roles for researchers in supporting reflection, assumption-testing and legitimacy-building within similarly complex multi-stakeholder processes. Transparent documentation of the FCSSP can also facilitate consumers and civil society organisations in making their own assessments of the validity of future carbon credits certified under the FCS.

6.1.1. Fairtrade Participatory Governance

> *'it is not just what we achieve… [but] how we achieve [it that] matters…top-down development models fit neither with what we aim to achieve nor with how we plan to achieve it'* (Fairtrade International, 2009 Partnership Strategy 2011-2015, p3, p5).

FTI has committed to a participatory approach to governance as an alternative to a top-down model. This means an inclusive approach which brings together everyone with a stake in a development process, allowing them to interact, contribute to design and outcome, and where practical, share in decision-making activities. While FTI's intent fits closely to the ideals of procedural fairness, in practice the approach is likely to be inflected by power relations and pressures for expediency and may involve strategic deployment of tools for participation (see details in chapter 3). This chapter offers a critical analysis of participatory governance in action by looking at *what* was achieved by FTI and partners through the FCSSP, and *how* the FCS pathway was shaped by different interests.

6.2. Methodological approach

The previous chapter took a snapshot approach, portraying three particular shared viewpoints or factors that were subscribed to by some of the participating stakeholders at a particular point in the FCSSP (during phase 3). In contrast, this chapter takes a longitudinal approach drawing on primary and secondary data collected across the four phases of the FCSSP. These were 1) Request/ Planning; 2) Research/ Drafting; 3) Consultation/ Revision; and 4) Approval. This chapter mainly draws on primary data collected during 15 months of participant observation and closer engagement during phases 2-4 of the FCSSP (September 2013-November 2014), but access to secondary data produced during phase 1, and accounts from the Project Team about progress prior to, and after my involvement, has provided a backdrop for contextualising and making sense of the whole FCSSP. By maximising my attendance at the events organised with the FCSSP, my role as researcher was to support the Project Team to pick up and connect the different pieces of the puzzle, to underline contrary opinions and evidence, to open up questions to debate, and to lay bare (primarily in hindsight) the different common and opposing interests at stake and underlying conflicts in an overall effort to enhance transparency and reflection. Appendix 2 lists all the data sources drawn on to complete the analysis, some of which are referred to with document codes in this chapter. The analytical process was described in section 4.4.5. Overall, the longitudinal approach enabled me to understand when and how different stakeholder groups were given opportunities to contribute (as well as how their inputs were

used), analyse prolonged decision-making processes, and track modifications in FCS content during the four phases.

6.3. Analytical framework and chapter structure

The analysis in this chapter is structured around two intersecting components which together, shaped the FCSSP and FCS content. The first is FTI's participatory governance framework, (introduced in chapter three and presented again in Table 6-1), used here as a benchmark for assessing the FCSSP in relation to FTI's governance commitments. The second is a framework developed inductively from data collected during the FCSSP (Figure 6-1) that pinpoints dynamics within particular participative forums and frames them in the context of the evolving FCSSP. Both components need to be understood within the context of FTI's organisational structure and the wider standard-setting network within which FTI operates in partnership with GSF and as a member of ISEAL Alliance.

Table 6-1: Analytical interpretation of Fairtrade International's Participatory Governance Approach

Fairtrade International's Participatory Governance Approach	
Intention A: Avoiding power imbalances in relationships	A.1 Engaging with partners on an equal footing with shared resources and ambitions to find solutions to the most pressing development challenges
Intention B: Enabling everyone with a stake to contribute to design and outcome	B.1 Enabling diverse stakeholders to participate and interact B.2 Enabling diverse stakeholders to share in decision-making activities where practical
Underlying governance aim	To draw on alternatives to top-down development models

The results section begins with an analysis of the ambitions and shared interests of the stakeholders involved in the FCSSP (the two outer layers of Figure 6-1) as a means of critically examining the extent to which intention A.1 was possible (i.e. whether partners had shared resource/ interests and ambitions). It then proceeds to a stepwise description of the FCSSP, laying out the broad phases punctuating the process and the forums created by the Project Team for stakeholders to be involved in the process at different points, allowing exploration of intention B and B.1, (in which ways the FCSSP enabled diverse stakeholders to participate, interact and contribute to design and outcome).

This is followed by an analysis of two particular topics identified as contentious and of major influence during the FCSSP (the 'hot topics' indicated in the central quadrant of the target framework, see Figure 6-1). Each one sheds more light on governance dynamics, particularly intentions A, A.1 and B.2.

Hot Topic 1: Standard Scope, relates to the scope (in FTI's language) of the FCS and the projects and beneficiaries included within it. The FCS underwent a marked shift in scope and this illustrates the degrees of influence that particular stakeholders in fact had on the process of defining the standard and project scope. This serves as an opportunity to further explore intentions A and A.1- i.e. were relationships devoid of power imbalances? Were partners really able to engage on an equal footing? Did they share resources and ambitions? And were they seeking to find solutions to the same development challenges?

Hot Topic 2: Financial Mechanisms, concerns the Fairtrade Minimum Price and Fairtrade Premium- the principal mechanisms designed to ensure fairness in financial benefit-sharing. It is used in this chapter to explore decision-making activities and to unpack intention B.2, especially the caveat 'where practical'. This example provides lessons of use in the design and facilitation of drawn out deliberation and decision-making processes involving inputs from lots of different stakeholders at different points. Research questions 2.1 and 2.2 are addressed throughout these sections.

These insights are then combined in a discussion section which comments on the dynamics at play during the FCSSP and identifies the presence of a Protective Culture (the red layer in Figure 6-1). This is used to critically assess FTI's underlying governance aim and to address question 2.3. Table 6-2 summarises these links.

Table 6-2: Links between research questions, chapter sections and frameworks

Research questions	Chapter section and content	Aspect of the participatory governance approach explored	Layer of the target framework
2.1 What did the FCSSP look like (in terms of forums for input, debates and interests)?	Section 6.4: description and analysis of ambitions and shared interests. Section 6.5: description of the FCSSP including broad phases and participative forums created.	Intention A.1. Intention B.1	Ambitions and Shared Interests
2.2 How did the FCS reflect stakeholder input and what shaped this?	Sections 6.6 and 6.7: Analysis of Hot Topics 1 and 2 and how they were addressed in the FCSSP	Intention A Intention B.2	Hot Topic 1 Hot Topic 2 (Hot Topics 3 and 4 are discussed in chapter 7).
2.3 What does this	Section 6.7:	Underlying	Entire framework,

say about participatory governance in practice?	Discussion: Alternatives to top-down governance?	governance aim	especially the Protectionist Culture

Figure 6-1 Target framework: Interests and debates in the FCSSP



6.4. Results part 1: ambitions and interests

This first results section explores the green and blue layers of the target framework (Figure 6-1), describing the ambitions set by those who initiated the FCSSP and interests of those taking part.

6.4.1. Ambitions that the initiators sought to achieve through the FCSSP

6.4.1.1. Expanding expertise and networks

Feasibility studies conducted by external parties and internally by FTI staff in 2011 and 2012/3 had suggested that FTI lacked the capacity and prior knowledge to develop the standards infrastructure for Fairtrade Carbon Credits alone. The FTI-GSF partnership was timely because while FTI was rooted in agriculture and expanding into carbon credits, GSF was expanding into agriculture and experienced in certifying carbon projects in the energy sector. FTI and GSF hoped to provide each other with mutual support and to benefit from each other's knowledge, networks, access to potential suppliers and markets, thus increasing the pool of stakeholders to engage in the processes of standard development, piloting, roll-out and market uptake. Mutual recognition of interdependence is one factor identified as important in shaping successful collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash, 2008).

6.4.1.2. Putting forth alternative pathways

The Project Assignment developed for the FCS stated that 'through Fairtrade Carbon Credits, Fairtrade has the opportunity to contribute to the fairness of the carbon market by bringing its approach and experience of years of positive impact on producers in the developing world'. This had been solicited by the principal funder of the FCSSP who had already been involved in carbon activities billed as 'fair' but wanted to validate their own claims to fairness by incorporating them within a Fairtrade standard (T.GE.09.13, p3 and Int1, p10). Alternatives encountered resistance, particularly from GSF staff, supporters and stakeholders involved in GSF projects (with arguments along the lines of 'it is not done that way, it won't work'). Meanwhile, there were also occasions during the FCSSP when the pathways proposed were alternatives to the Fairtrade approach because of the specificity of carbon credits compared to other Fairtrade commodities. Such attempts were often met with resistance by members of FTI who advocated for consistency.

6.4.1.3. Accomplishing the project mission

FTI and GSF set a number of joint targets and timeframes, contingent on both parties' contributions. Delays to the process were an anticipated part of the multi-stakeholder

collaborative process but staff at FTI in particular often voiced a sense of urgency. This was triggered by a duty to respond to Fairtrade producers' struggles in the face of climate change, but also by a desire to use the momentum that was gathering. Accomplishing the project mission required commitment both to the process and the FTI-GSF collaboration itself. Obtaining such commitment is often a critical factor in the success of collaborative governance initiatives (Ansell and Gash, 2008). There were signs from both FTI and GSF partners and supporters that the collaboration between them was welcomed, but this ultimate commitment to the process was not shared by all stakeholders. Some may have been motivated to participate in the process to ensure their perspective was not neglected, and were still in a position to decide whether or not to apply the standard depending on its eventual content (CoordC.11.13).

6.4.1.4. Ensuring a credible standard

As multi-stakeholder organisations, FTI and GSF are strengthened, legitimated and held to account by their wider consortium of partners and supporters. FTI's membership in the ISEAL Alliance and commitment to the ISEAL Credibility Principles (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b) provides a further level of accountability. FTI's standard setting procedures are designed to be aligned with the ISEAL codes of good practice, and although compliance is not audited, upholding the organisational commitment was visible within the work of the Project Team.

6.4.2. Interests shared (at face value) by stakeholders involved in the FCSSP

Chapter 2 introduced the problem that FTI and GSF were trying to achieve through their collaboration. This was summarised in terms of enabling *access* to the carbon market (both in terms of access to knowhow needed for carrying out a project, and access to marketing channels) and facilitating *benefits* available from carbon finance. Although at face value these interests were shared by all stakeholders, when explored, there were underlying differences in opinion.

The initial target group for the FCS was smallholders and (farming) communities and FTI and GSF had announced plans to enable their **access to carbon credit knowhow** by simplifying tools and requirements and providing capacity-building. Simplification was an interest shared by stakeholders in all forums:

> *'The feedback from every stakeholder is that we need to make this simple and low-cost, and if we don't, we won't be achieving our goals' (Project Team to workshop participants, T.GE.09.14, p8)*

However, during the FCSSP it became clear that there would be a role for intermediaries (eventually named 'Project Facilitators' within the FCS) in facilitating access to knowhow for

the target group, either by managing projects on their behalf, or by contributing to their capacity-building. The degree of involvement by Project Facilitators remained a source of disagreement through much of the FCSSP (see chapter 7).

Access to market was critical for the success of the initiative but the market remained nebulous during most of the discussions. Stakeholders in the FCSSP sought reassurance of market capacity and were keen to were keen for FTI to conduct and share the results of their market research (T.GE.03.14a, p3 and T.PFS.B.d, p20) with retailers and customers (who had not present during FCSSP discussions):

> *'Do you think this can be achievable and a success? Why should I register my project? What is the guarantee that I'll get the FMP and sale of my credits?'*
> (Question posed to the Project Team by a project implementer, T.PFS.B.d, p22).

While market access was desired by all stakeholders, there were again disagreements about how this should be mediated, i.e. which roles for Fairtrade and for facilitators, brokers and traders.

Regarding **benefits**, chapter 5 identified a disagreement as to whether the benefits of participating in carbon trade should be enhanced for everyone involved in the supply chain, or whether the attention should only be focussed on those producing the emissions reductions. Discussions with stakeholders during the FCSSP highlighted differences in opinion about whether financial benefits should be accessed by individual producers and Producer Organisations, mediated by Project Facilitators or channelled into projects.

In summary, taken at face value, the interests in the green belt of Figure 6-1 appealed to everyone involved in the FCS-setting process but there were disagreements about *who* should be accessing and benefitting from the carbon market and how. These can be synthesised in terms of whether the people generating the emissions reductions (the producers and Producer Organisations) should be carrying out the projects with little or no involvement of external parties or facilitators (gaining the knowhow and accessing the market directly), or whether there should be a major and permanent role for external parties in the mediation of access to knowhow, markets and benefits. Different interpretations demonstrate the importance of context and positionality as a basis for assessing what is possible and desirable. These themes are discussed again in chapter 7.

6.4.3. Section summary

The above sections have discussed the outer two layers of the target framework, identifying the ambitions primarily held by the initiators of the FCSSP, as well as the apparently shared interests common to all stakeholders taking part. With the former, stakeholders who joined FTI

and GSF in their efforts did not have the same investment and commitment to the process as the initiators- their interest was more in shaping the content of the standard to make it appropriate and applicable to the contexts they worked in. These ambitions remained implicit but not were deliberately concealed from participants. They are all quite functional and fit with the view that standards organisations use networks and multi-stakeholder processes to legitimate their role in market regulation (see section 3.2.2). This relies on a presumption that standards are neutral and universal, that their authority is natural, and that their ethical values have resonance for beneficiaries, meanwhile leaving their moral reasoning unquestioned (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008). This was perhaps one reason for not being more explicit about their ambitions. Meanwhile, the shared interests were at face value, common to all stakeholders, but actually concealed a range of values and opinions about *how* to achieve them. Flagging up the way that conflicting ideas are able to co-exist within standard setting processes attends to a research gap noted by Djama et al. (2011). Some scholars have emphasised the way that standard setting processes can avoid exploration of underlying issues as a depoliticisation tactic to avoid tension (Cheyns, 2011, Djama et al., 2011). In contrast, the FCSSP did not involve concealing these underlying conflictual opinions. I have presented them in this section as both shared and conflictual in order to show how they were able to co-exist but within the FCSSP, the conflictual aspects were often more apparent (as emphasised in hot topics 2, 3 and 4). Djama et al. (2011) note that it is also important to explore how conflicting ideas are transformed into cooperative attitudes. I do this in Results part 3 of this chapter with respect to conflicting ideas on benefits, and in chapter 7 regarding conflicting ideas on access.

6.5. Results part 2: description of the FCSSP

Chapter 3 (section 3.2.2) underscored the way that participation can be strategically managed within standard setting processes and does not necessarily lead to inclusive outcomes. This has effects on opportunities for deliberation and consensus, and may be closely linked to the way that conflicts and tensions are approached (section 3.2.3). This section describes the FCSSP in terms of stakeholders and participation, addressing question 2.1. Attention is on the forums provided and stakeholders who participated; the phases of the FCSSP and key process points (pivotal moments within the process); and the stakeholders who did not take part.

6.5.1. Stakeholders and Forums for Participation

Aside from partnership discussions held bilaterally with GSF, the Project Team gathered inputs from eight different forums for participation, involving members of FTI (producer organisations, National Fairtrade Organisations, producer networks, staff at FTI), FLO-cert, and then businesses, NGOs, advocacy organisations, consultants, researchers and other standards

organisations (see Table 6-3). These forums had the broad purpose of engaging other people in developing the concept of Fairtrade Carbon Credits, seeking their input on standard and scheme content, and encouraging them to take ownership and be involved in implementation. They therefore supported ambitions 1 and 4. Stakeholder engagement efforts were conditioned by FTI's Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Standard Setting (which indicates the points in the process where different stakeholders are invited to provide input or influence decisions); by the participatory governance approach (see intentions B, B.1. and B.2 in Table 6-1); and by commitment to ISEAL's Credibility Principles.

Table 6-3: Forums for Participation in the FCSSP

	Forum number and name	Description
Internal groups and committees	1. The Working Group	Led by Project Team; voluntary participation of people from National Fairtrade Organisations, Producer Networks and FLOCERT interested in playing an active role in the standard and holding the Project Team to account.
	2. The Standards Committee	Permanent governance feature of FTI- provides input and takes major decisions about standards, including endorsing for consultation and final approval (see chapter 3)
Meetings/ workshops with invited stakeholders	3. The Group of Experts	Members identified (via recommendations from GSF, or because they had expressed interest) during phase 1 or as the Project Team came into contact with them, and invited to be involved on a voluntary basis. Composed of mostly European carbon organisations (project developers, consultants and carbon credit retailers): described by the Project Team as having a social perspective, interested in a social carbon scheme. Expected to be the front runners of the FCS (T.PFS.B.b, p2 and T.SC.59, p1).
	4. Producer/ Field staff workshops	Designed by the Project Team to assemble a balance of carbon organisations (NGOs/ businesses involved in implementing carbon projects) and Fairtrade Producer Organisations (specifically targeting those involved or interested in carbon projects. Described by the Project Team as 'people on the ground who know the realities' (T.GE.09.13a, p2). The Bonn workshop was specifically for those identified by the Project Team as 'more knowledgeable, vocal and interested in the scheme' (T.GE.09.14, p4).
	5. CSO workshops	Organised in an attempt by the Project Team to expand the input provided during the consultation period and to take on board participants' critiques so they would be less likely to criticise after the launching of the standard/ scheme
Consultations and public events	6. Internal feasibility consulta-tions	Consultations held during the Internal Feasibility Study led by the Project Team, to seek input from stakeholders within the Fairtrade system. Used as evidence of the receptiveness towards the concept of Fairtrade Carbon Credits, alongside the consultations which had previously conducted for the External Feasibility Study (led by a National Fairtrade Organisation and an NGO).
	7. FCS public consulta-tions	Consultations held in compliance with ISEAL guidelines and Fairtrade SOP for developing standards. The 1st consultation was on the first public draft; the second was on the revised draft and methodology for pricing and premiums
	8. Events at UNFCCC COPs	Events co-hosted by the Project Team with GSF and other partners at annual COPs as opportunities to present work in progress and seek feedback

6.5.2. Phases and Process Points

This section compares the actual FCSSP with the process laid down in the FTI Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The SOP maps out a flowchart involving nine steps (Fairtrade International, 2016) and various feedback loops. In practice, the FCS was developed in four broad phases (incorporating all nine steps and iterations between them). These are presented in Table 6-4, and in Figure 6-2 where the FCSSP is displayed alongside the SOP and my engagement with the FCSSP has been annotated. An A3 version of Figure 6-2 is also included in the inside back cover of this thesis.

Table 6-4: Phases of the FCS-setting process including dates and key milestones (colours demarcate the four phases)

Date	Milestone
Feb 2011	External feasibility study for 'Fairtrade certified carbon credits' delivered to FTI by Max Havelaar Netherlands and Dutch CSO.
Dec 2011	FTI announces commitments to address fairness within the climate change arena through two components- 'fair carbon credits' and 'fair adaptation', during side event at COP 17, Durban co-hosted by FTI and the Dutch CSO. Attended by public and private sector actors and NGOs, several of whom express an interest in partnering with Fairtrade.
Mar 2012	Working Group formed at FTI to develop Fairtrade Carbon Credits and Fair Adaptation.
Sep 2012	Info provided by SU to the Standards Committee, demonstrating alignment of Fair Carbon Credits and Fair Adaptation with FTI's Climate Change Strategy
Nov 2012	Memorandum signed between GSF and FTI and partnership publically announced at COP 18, Doha
Dutch CSO commits to funding the development of Fair Carbon Credits (later called the Fairtrade Climate Standard)	
Jan 2013	Standards Unit make Fair Carbon Credits a strategic priority for 2013
Jan 2013	Internal Feasibility Study for Fair Carbon Credits completed by the Standards Unit and Strategy & Policy Unit. This includes Feasibility Consultations (forum 6)
Mar 2013	Update to Standards Committee on Fair Carbon Credits
Apr 2013	Plans for Fairtrade Carbon Credits shared with Working Group Internal Feasibility Study for Fair Adaptation near completion but project is put on hold until funding/ technical partners are found.
Jun 2013	Consultants complete commissioned research on Fairtrade Carbon Credits, involving assessments of FTI's contribution to the carbon market, and synergies between FTI and GSF
Sep 2013	Development of Cornerstones (overview of key sections of standard, intent, provisional requirements, and rationale, produced by a consultant for FTI
Sep-Nov 2013	Feedback on Cornerstones from Group of Experts, Working Group and public attending side and parallel events at COP 19
Nov 2013	FTI and GSF co-host events at COP 19 (also with the Forest Stewardship Council) to update the public on their collaboration and introduce the Cornerstones
Nov 2013- Feb 2014	Project Team develop an evolving preliminary draft of the FCS, incorporating input as it is received.
	Versions of preliminary draft shared with forums 1-4. Input provided during meetings/ workshops and in some written comments sent afterwards.
Dec 2013	Final version of Project Assignment for the FCS completed and

	displayed on FTI's website.
Jan 2014	FTI and GSF complete harmonisation research which identifies the overlaps and discrepancies between the two organisations' requirements
Feb-Mar 2014	Project Team develop the 1st consultation draft of the FCS
Mar 2014	1st consultation draft shared with forums 2 and 3. Input provided during meetings and in some written comments sent afterwards.
Mar 2014	1st consultation draft presented to Standards Committee (forum 1) and receive their endorsement of the standard for consultation.
Jun 2014	Project Team update forum 1 on progress
Jun-Jul 2014	1st consultation period (30 days plus a week extension)
Aug-Sep 2014	Project Team develop the 2nd consultation draft of the FCS
Aug-Oct 2014	Project Team share 1st or 2nd consultation drafts with forum 5 during four separate meetings and with forum 3 during a final Group of Experts' meeting. Input received during the meetings and in written comments sent by some people afterwards.
Sep 2014	Project Team update forum 1 on progress.
Sep-Oct 2014	2nd consultation period (30 days)
Oct-Nov 2014	Project Team develop the draft of the FCS which is to be presented to forum 2 for approval
Nov 2014	FCS is approved by forum 2 with a request to the Project Team to make minor amendments.
Dec 2014	FTI and GSF update public on progress during side events at COP 20
Nov 2014- Sep 2015	Amendments and editing of final draft of FCS
Jan 2015 onwards	Selected projects pilot the FCS and learning and feedback are incorporated into the standard.
Mar 2015	Project Team update forum 2 on progress and decisions on prices and premiums are taken
Jun 2015	Project Team provide further updates on forum 2 on progress.
Oct 2015	Final FCS is published on FTI's website
Dec 2015	FTI and GSF co-host side and parallel events at COP 21 to update the public on progress and officially launch the FCS.

Key to colour-phases			
Phase 1: Request/ Planning	Phase 2: Research/ Drafting	Phase 3: Consultation/ Revision	Phase 4: Approval

Figure 6-2: Steps of the FCSSP compared to the FTI SOP



6.5.2.1. Commentary on phases and process points

Presenting the process alongside the steps laid down in the Standard Unit's SOP serves to illustrate the messiness of such a process in practice. The following key points can be drawn out from Figure 6-2.

6.5.2.1.1 Inclusion of stakeholders

FTI made significant efforts to include Fairtrade formal governance and other Fairtrade bodies as well as a broader set of stakeholders during each of the steps of the process. The density of stars in the research and consultation phases in particular demonstrate the investment in time

and money to engage a wide range of stakeholders during these key phases when stakeholder involvement is mandated by the SOP. The regional Producer/ Field staff workshops were brought forward with the financial support of a CSO in the Group of Experts because Fairtrade producer networks had requested to be involved early on in the process- as a Project Team member pointed out 'if this is a standard made for them, they should be shaping it rather than us deciding this in the north' (T.WG.4, p6).

6.5.2.1.2 Managing tensions between the need for technical input and a broad-based governance structure

In their efforts to ensure relevance of the FCS, the Project Team were faced with a tension. They needed to include members of the FTI system in the FCSSP from an early stage and accord decision-making powers on the FCS to the FTI Standards Committee (most of whom had no background in carbon projects). Meanwhile, they were reliant on stakeholders external to the FTI system for specific technical input on carbon projects (also expected to become frontrunners in implementing the FCS). This tension was managed by allowing the FCS to be shaped more by the recommendations of the carbon experts during phases 2 and 3, consulting Fairtrade producers involved in carbon projects during the Producer/ Field staff workshops, seeking comments from Fairtrade marketing organisations and CSO supporters during the consultation period and then submitting the FCS to a 'Fairtrade check' in the final approval phase, when producer networks gave more input. The FTI Standards Committee was consulted regularly in an attempt to receive their ongoing validation.

6.5.2.1.3 Separate forums, bridging disjunctures

FTI's intention is that diverse stakeholders can interact with each other but in practice, forums often grouped together those stakeholders that were similar (e.g. carbon project developers, or CSOs). In more mixed forums (e.g. the Producer/ Field staff workshops), stakeholders often divided into subgroups with similar types of stakeholders. This design contrasts with multi-stakeholder initiatives, which are designed to facilitate representation and participation of 'all categories of stakeholders' but in practice have been criticised for limited inclusiveness, and unequal power relations stemming from unequal resources and competences (Cheyns, 2011).

FTI's design enabled people with different levels of understanding and competencies to participate, enhancing feelings of ease, and created spaces for people to draw on commonalities they might not have been able to vocalise in larger or more diverse forums (see for example the discussions described in section 6.6.1.2.3). It also imbued the Project Team with the power-laden and challenging role of compiling and discriminating between divergent guidance, and deciding ways forward. In an attempt to remain legitimate and accountable, the Project Team

bridged forums, informing each about the major outcomes from others, and sometimes acknowledging inconsistencies in advice. At times, they also used their power to selectively draw on particular inputs, giving a false impression of consensual guidance. This happened in particular during the Standards Committee meeting for approval, when they were under most pressure to ensure that the FCS was passed (see section 6.6.2).

Several stakeholders in the FCSSP built bridges and alliances between forums and between Fairtrade and carbon 'worlds' by participating in multiple forums and drawing on multiple identities and experiences, or informally, during journeys together or coffee breaks. Motivations behind such actions were both collaborative, and interest-driven.

6.5.2.1.4 Iterations and feedback loops

The process was highly iterative. It moved through the four phases in a fairly linear way, and the FCS evolved from a set of 'cornerstones', to a document with gaps and inconsistencies, to a full document. However, the influence and inputs from different stakeholders at particular points in the process created additional feedback loops where the Project Team were called to revisit decisions and rework concepts before moving forward. Section 6.6.1 illustrates this dynamic regarding the decisions around agriculture and adaptation, which happened in the final phase of the FCSSP, when the majority of stakeholders consulted during phases 2 and 3 were no longer in the loop.

6.5.2.1.5 Time frame and delays

The SOP does not specify a time frame for standard-setting, perhaps in acknowledgement that each process differs according to various factors including product materiality, stakeholders involved, and novelty of the standard. In practice, the FCSSP took four years, from the seeding of the idea at UNFCCC COP 17 to the official launch during UNFCCC COP 21. This was two years longer than the Project Team had initially expected, although they had foreseen delays due to the nature of a collaboration between two organisations with multi-stakeholder governance structures. During this period, the climate governance context evolved, but process delays were driven more by organisational and inter-organisational dynamics, learning journeys that stakeholders and organisations embarked on and unforeseen feedback loops.

6.5.3. Missing stakeholders

While Table 6-3 and Figure 6-2 indicate that the range of stakeholders invited to participate in the FCSSP at various points was substantial, there were some people with a stake who were missing. Retailers were not invited to participate in any of the stakeholder events, meaning that expected sales of Fairtrade Carbon Credits remained uncertain. This was because the Project

Team were concerned that their presence would counter the 'nice cosy atmosphere' that they were trying to create within the Group of Experts (CoordC, 10.13). Selected retailers' opinions were eventually explored during the market research conducted by FTI in phase 3.

The voices of carbon project participants were generally channelled by project implementers who claimed to represent them. Several claims were made, especially about female participants concerning their identities, capacities and willingness to be involved (see Box 6-1). Had more producers, especially females taken part in the FCSSP, more diverse opinions on requirements for Producer Organisations (detailed in chapter 7) might have been gathered. An FTI staff member shared with me her surprise that when visiting an FCS pilot project in East Africa she had met a group of women very enthusiastic about the prospect of greater levels of organisation through being involved in Fairtrade, in contrast to the Project Developer's views on the organisational requirements being unwieldy for producers.

1. *'The lady using the cook stove is the producer' [said despite recognising that the ladies in this project did not identify themselves as such] (T.PFS.B.b p6)*

2. *'My experience in stove projects is that the women don't want to get more involved. There is no need to waste time at meetings, the groups will end up fighting amongst themselves. So as a facilitator I have to keep things together. Women are organised for the first year or so, but once they have the benefits of a subsidised stove, they don't want to be involved anymore. Once they have the training and the product, they already have the benefits' (T.PFS.B.b p9)*

3. *'What more do you want her to do, apart from using the cookstove? She won't do the monitoring, she can't' (T.PFS.B.b p9)*

Box 6-1 Examples of claims made by project developers and managers about people involved in cook stove projects (the 'producers')

6.5.4. Section summary

This section has explored how participation was managed during the FCSSP through a description of the participation spaces provided and a temporal analysis of when in the FCSSP they were offered. Mapping the process alongside the FTI Standard Operating Procedure serves to indicate the influence of existing governance structures and rules and procedures on decisions

made about participation, but also the power and responsibility of the Project Team in managing the participation and bridging between stakeholders. Illustrations of where the FCSSP differed from the Standard Operating Procedure show the messiness of standard setting in practice and the need to balance both expediency and legitimacy (Cheyns, 2011). They also point out the efforts of the Project Team to go beyond the minimum level of participation set by procedures and to accept iterations and slower progress instead of expediency at times, in order to maximise the inputs gathered and ensure buy-in from as many stakeholders as possible. This is recognised by standard setters as a route towards greater effectiveness (Murphy and Yates, 2011). Nevertheless, more participation is not necessarily better or fairer. Bühler (2002) argues that participation tools have real material implications, and when they lead to decisions that do not genuinely represent the concerns of those consulted or result in unrealistic propositions, this implies a lack of respect of one's own dignity and that of the other. Genuine participation involving the respect of dignity requires commitment and responsibility from all parties to ensure that any outcomes reached are real and effective. While the efforts to include a wide range of stakeholders during phases 2 and 3 are remarkable, the exclusion of anyone but the Standards Committee in the key decisions in phase 4 are also remarkable. This suggests the need for a more detailed exploration of (i) when important and contentious decisions were made, (ii) whether they represented stakeholders' concerns; and (iii) whether they point towards real and effective outcomes. I do this in section 6.6.

6.6. Results part 3: opening up and closure of 'hot topics'

This section explores hot topics 1 and 2 indicated in the yellow circle in Figure 6-1 as a means of illustrating how conflicting ideas were dealt with in the FCSSP. This contributes towards addressing question 2.2 of this thesis, namely: how did the FCS reflect stakeholder input and what shaped this?

6.6.1. Hot Topic 1: Standard Scope: Which projects and beneficiaries are included?

In this section, I explore the evolution of the goal and target of the FCS summarised in terms of hot topic 1. In particular, I draw attention to two aspects which changed substantially between the first attempts to set objectives in September 2012, and the publishing of the FCS in October 2015 because they serve as useful illustrations of the unequal footing and influence of different stakeholders in the process, the differences in resources and ambitions, and how these aspects intersected with the structural context of the carbon market, and the temporal constraints of a

partnership between two organisations who were both seeking to develop new standards infrastructure simultaneously.

The first aspect to note is the disappearance of agricultural projects from the FCS scope, despite FTI's self-identification as an organisation focussed on agriculture and despite the rationale for the collaboration between FTI and GSF being about enhancing access to the carbon market to smallholders and rural communities through agricultural projects. The second aspect is the shifting place of 'adaptation' amongst the drivers, strategic rationale, objectives and intended outcomes of the FCS. Both aspects were explored using timeline analysis and explanation building (see chapter 4). In order to contextualise the topic and make key links between adaptation and agriculture, changes in target beneficiaries were also included in the analysis. Section 6.6.1.1 indicates when these changes happened, and is followed by an account of why, who stood to lose or gain, and what this means for FTI's first participatory governance intention to avoid power imbalances and engage with partners on an equal footing (Table 6-1).

6.6.1.1. Commentary: shifting scope, target and aims

During phase 1, agricultural projects were firmly within the scope. Fairtrade Carbon Credits were framed as opportunities to reward agricultural practices, including efforts already made to adapt and implement sustainable agricultural practices. As plans developed, adaptation remained acknowledged as a necessary initiative to be developed in parallel, or a possible consequence of Fairtrade carbon projects, but the emphasis was on mitigation. Beneficiaries included community-based organisations, and Fairtrade certified Small Producer Organisations and the workers of Fairtrade certified Hired Labour set-ups (including plantations and factories). In phase 2 and phase 3, agricultural projects were still within the scope but there was a gradual acknowledgement that GSF methodologies and example projects were not available yet. Workers from Hired Labour set-ups were excluded as beneficiaries in all versions of the FCS, which focused in on 'small-scale producers'. However, the question of expanding the scope to include them was raised during discussions with stakeholders in forums 2, 4 and 5, and during the 1st consultation (forum 7). Adaptation activities were introduced into the environmental section of the draft FCS during phase 2, first as optional (but encouraged), then as mandatory. In phase 3, adaptation requirements were expanded. In phase 4, agricultural projects were removed from the scope and workers from Hired Labour set-ups remained excluded. Adaptation requirements meanwhile were further developed for the published FCS, resulting in mandatory spending of the premium on adaptation measures but with two caveats- i) *once the project generates income*, and ii) *unless there are other activities which respond to greater needs* of the Producer Organisation and communities. Nevertheless, published FCS' stated aims include generating climate finance opportunities to fund both mitigation and adaptation activities.

6.6.1.2. Understanding the changes in terms of stakeholders' disproportionate resources, ambitions, power and interests

In this section, the interests and influential powers of stakeholders who spoke out most strongly in favour or against the requirements around agriculture and adaptation are outlined.

6.6.1.2.1 The lobby against inclusion of agriculture

One of the CSOs involved in the FCSSP was concerned that including agricultural projects and workers from Hired Labour set-ups in the FCS scope might lead to land grabbing by large agro-industrial companies, potentially resulting in landlessness and food insecurity for surrounding populations. This view is supported by critical literature on carbon projects. In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, projects have been criticised for enabling foreign direct investors to buy tracts of land cheaply from national governments for extended periods and to benefit disproportionately, whilst dispossessing local communities (Lohmann, 2006, Tienhaara, 2012, Takacs, 2009, Leach et al., 2012, Fairhead et al., 2012). This occurs most often in the context of monoculture tree plantations, which may also lead to destructive environmental effects[27]. Women are recognised as being particularly vulnerable because they often lack formal land titles and men are usually the ones associated with cash crops[28] (Reddy, 2011). As an organisation with a close relationship to FTI, the CSO drew on multiple channels to advocate against their inclusion, including via a member of the Standards Committee who was also in the Working Group. Although other members of the Standards Committee had proposed that Hired Labour set-ups could be allowed to implement agricultural projects if the FCS incorporated safeguards to prevent negative impacts, the issue had remained unresolved within the meeting[29]. At the time, it was not assumed that the same risks would be present when agricultural projects were implemented by farmer organisations and community groups. During the CSO meetings in phase 3, some NGOs had also raised concerns about agricultural projects, especially soil carbon projects, linking them to potential land grabbing and accounting difficulties, and risks of food insecurity 'if smallholders are turned into carbon sinks' (p17, transcript, UK CSO meeting). They had also expressed concerns about forestry projects. The Project Team had been aware of

[27] For example eucalyptus plantations are notorious for drying out the soil.

[28] Despite its intangibility, carbon can be seen as a cash crop because it is being 'produced' for sale on the global carbon market.

[29] This disagreement is also a reflection of ongoing disagreements within the Fairtrade system regarding the inclusion of Hired Labour set-ups as target beneficiaries. The Latin American Producer Network excludes plantations from their regional Producer Network and had advised against including Hired Labour within the scope of the FCS during bilateral discussions with the Project Team. The Asian and African Producer Networks include Hired Labour set-ups within their regional networks. The Asian Producer Network had advocated including Hired Labour set-ups in the FCS scope.

such critique which reflects the anti-soil carbon viewpoints put forward by several CSOs such as Action Aid, the Durban Group for Climate Justice, Econexus and the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements, as they already asked me to produce a document reviewing critiques of the carbon market during phase 2 of the FCSSP (Howard, 2013).

6.6.1.2.2 Those with concerns about adaptation vs mitigation

At the CSO-UK workshop, the Project Team emphasised the adaptation components of the FCS and specifically asked for feedback on how to finance adaptation through carbon projects (T.CSO.08.14, p17). The Project Team proposed using the Premium money for this but the CSOs' views were mixed- some welcomed the idea, others doubted there would enough money remaining for adaptation, and preferred that the Producer Organisations would receive financial benefits without earmarking them for adaptation. At other CSO workshops, more critical views were expressed about the FCS' mitigation goal, drawing on climate justice arguments that it should not be an obligation in the global south, and that the focus should be adaptation. These critiques triggered the Project Team to develop stronger requirements on adaptation and to change the original name 'Fairtrade Carbon Credits Standard' to the Fairtrade Climate Standard.

6.6.1.2.3 Those in favour of inclusion of agriculture and adaptation

Firm support for agricultural projects was expressed during the Producer/ Field staff workshop in Bonn. A subgroup had formed to discuss the proposed FMP methodology and was composed entirely of Fairtrade Producer Organisations involved in carbon projects. In particular, two organisations spoke up against the over-representation of energy projects and questioned why there was no proposed FMP for agriculture, and a third joined them in providing a counter lobby in favour of agricultural projects. Box 6-2 presents quotations from each of the three organisations' representatives.

During another subgroup discussion with many of the same people, a Project Team member had asked for ideas on adaptation activities that could be made mandatory in the FCS in order to respond to the CSOs' concerns, namely that they 'were very critical on mitigation… and how [it] shouldn't really be an obligation for the global south', and that they 'want to see something more, like adaptation measures that you can measure the impact of' (T.PFS.B.c, p1). Not surprisingly, as everyone in the subgroup represented a Fairtrade Producer Organisation, their propositions had all been agriculture-specific, many of them types of organic agricultural practices that they were already implementing. Group members supported the various tools that the Project Team were proposing in the standard- including the adaptation plan, and using part of the carbon revenue for adaptation.

6.6.1.3. Power, Strategy and Countervailing Power?

The potential implications of relationship damage (by not taking the concerns of the CSOs into

account) were significant. The CSOs could damage FTI's reputation as they entered into a new

and contentious market by publically criticising Fairtrade's intervention. Furthermore, some of

these CSOs had been long term supporters of the fair trade movement. These dynamics are

explored in section 6.7. While the Fairtrade Producer Organisations did not possess the same

power as the CSOs, they made attempts to hold FTI accountable by making reference to

Fairtrade values and attempting to speak on behalf of Fairtrade producers (see Box 6-2),

differentiating them from other actors who potentially stand to gain from the FCS. Their views were included in a transcription of the group discussion shared with the Project Team, but they held less weight compared to the relationships maintained with the CSOs.

Box 6-2: Examples of communicative strategies deployed by Fairtrade Producer Organisation representatives to advocate for the inclusion of agriculture within the scope

Making reference to Fairtrade values and terminologies

Organisation 5g 'Fairtrade should really give importance to these land based aspects [meaning forestry and agriculture], energy is secondary'. (T.PFS.B.d, p11)

Organisation 5f 'That's very true. That's why I'm particular about agriculture, and hearing in good faith that you didn't get any scores [i.e. figures on costs for agricultural projects]. But that means agriculture was left out and that shows the concern. That means that people in the core values of Fairtrade are left out. And now giving investors in energy more clamour in this carbon credit market' (T.PFS.B.d, p11)

5g 'it's very demotivating to see no price for CSA, and it fails within the Fairtrade goals' (T.PFS.B.d, p11)

5g 'the biggest non-compliance is that it's not there' (T.PFS.B.d, p12)

Speaking on behalf of Fairtrade producers

Organisation 5g: 'And here [with agricultural projects] we are talking about the livelihood and existence of millions of people, compared to the other types of project' (T.PFS.B.d, p11)

Organisation 5f: 'And I appreciate what manufactures will do, but they are just assembling cook stoves. Whereas with a farmer, look at the time and commitment, and ecosystem value going with it. When we go to this scheme, people will find it easy to drop an agriculture project in favour of an energy project because the latter may be less bothersome or costly.' (T.PFS.B.d, p11)

While several members of the group were advocating for agricultural projects to be included in the scope using the minimum price calculated for forestry as a basis, one organisation expressed concerns with blurring the boundaries between agriculture and forestry.

Organisation 5a: 'I think we have to have things clear. My organisation produces coffee, so we're talking about agricultural projects, not about forestry projects, because forests create shade, and this affects our production. Also another factor is the surface area- we don't have enough areas to grow coffee, so let's put things together but not mix them up' (T.PFS.B.d,

6.6.1.3.1 The 'clamour' from energy investors

The 'clamour' from energy investors mentioned in the first quotation from organisation 5f in Box 6-2 was a subjective interpretation of a genuine case of energy project interests outnumbering forestry and in particular, agricultural project interests, that had been apparent at all the multi-stakeholder meetings apart from the Producer/ Field staff workshop in El Salvador. Table 6-5 expresses these figures.

Table 6-5: Scope interests of stakeholders taking part in multi-stakeholder forums

Developed on the basis of project type that their organisations are primarily involved in. Figures take into account organisations implementing carbon projects and Fairtrade certified Producer Organisations involved in carbon projects.

Forum	Group of Experts	Producer/ Field staff workshop El Salvador	Producer/ Field staff workshop Nairobi	Producer/ Field staff workshop Colombo	Producer/ Field staff workshop Bonn
Primary project type					
Renewable energy and energy efficiency	14	1	10	4	8
Forestry/ agroforestry and conservation	3	3	2	0	3
Mixed forestry and agriculture	1	0	1	0	0
Agriculture	1	1	0	0	2
Various project types	1	1	1		1
Unknown				6	

6.6.1.4. Reaching closure: winners and losers

The proposal to remove agriculture from the project scope was developed by the Project Team after the 2nd public consultation and taken to the Standards Committee for a decision. It was framed as follows:

> *'the scope needs to be more specific…stakeholders have asked Fairtrade to take a measured approach. Meanwhile many potential buyers don't indicate a preference for any particular type of credit' (T.SC.63, p5).*

The 'stakeholders' who had asked Fairtrade to take a measured approach were the CSOs. The market was also given as a justification (on the basis of a market study conducted by FTI in 2014), but there was no mention of the Fairtrade Producer Organisations who lobbied for the

inclusion of agriculture. The Project Team's proposal was approved after a short discussion, in which both Standards Committee members and the Project Team implicitly acknowledged the inconsistency of this narrowing of scope given FTI's membership and basis in agriculture. The Project Team explained it in terms of the timelines of GSF's own standard development work:

'We want to go with credible methodologies already there. The agriculture standard [is not ready] and there are not [projects out there yet]. We would come back to you to decide on inclusion of agriculture. I also want to go into agriculture. 98% of our producers are doing agriculture and they should have that link but for now the basis is not there' (T.SC.63, p5).

Delaying inclusion of agricultural projects within the scope until there are available methodologies and example projects was a cautious approach, and delays to unfolding processes managed separately and jointly by both organisations were to be expected when so many stages and stakeholders are involved. If agricultural projects were still the projects of most interest to Fairtrade's producer membership, FTI could have chosen to delay the FCS until the methodologies for agriculture were ready, but this would have risked losing the momentum and interest behind a standard for energy and forestry projects. In hindsight, FTI and GSF both recognise that there are still significant barriers to including agriculture within the scope of the FCS and that it will be necessary to revisit the issues before any decisions are made about it.

6.6.1.5. How thin is the line between adaptation and mitigation? Working within the constraints of the carbon market

It was acknowledged by the Project Team and by GSF on several occasions when the adaptation-mitigation discussion came up, that the two are often integrated. The Project Team noted that 'the line is often drawn between adaptation and mitigation but we think the line is very thin' (T.CSO.08.14, p3). GSF had noted that the best projects combine both. This may be the case with projects incorporating carbon-saving sustainable agricultural practices, but as these were eventually not included within the FCS project scope, the line was not so thin. Instead, adaptation became an additional goal that Producer Organisations should achieve with project revenue, and agricultural producers need to find non-agricultural mitigation activities to implement in order to produce carbon credits which will hopefully generate revenue to be channelled back into adaptation. Carbon market mechanics also increase the line width because of the concept of additionality, which involves generating credits from, and channelling finance into activities that would not otherwise have happened if the finance had not been provided. The early intention was that Fairtrade Carbon Credits would *reward* farmers for the efforts *they have already made* to adapt to climate change and implement sustainable agriculture practices (M.SC.52). However, it was noted by the Project Team and members of the Standards Committee on several occasions that sustainable agricultural practices (such as composting,

mulching and intercropping) which could otherwise be considered under methodologies for carbon sequestration through agriculture, are already written into FTI's environmental requirements.

Smallholders who comply with these and perhaps additionally the more stringent environmental requirements of other standards (such as Rainforest Alliance or organic certification schemes), will have already have undertaken many of the actions that could otherwise have been included in carbon projects, meaning that they are not eligible for financing through carbon credit mechanisms. As their awareness of the carbon market grew, and disparate viewpoints were expressed by stakeholders, the Project Team were faced with a difficult task of ensuring that the published FCS was congruent with the original claims made about it, as well as finding ways to incorporate the goals for adaptation set out in the parallel adaptation initiative which never got off the ground. In hindsight, an alternative approach not constrained by carbon market mechanics, might have been more appropriate for generating revenue for adaptation, and might have allowed for the recognition of efforts already made by agricultural producers. Meanwhile, over the two and a half years that GSF had been working on their agricultural standard, they were beginning to come to similar conclusions (personal communication with GSF staff member).

6.6.1.6. Summary of the section

This section has explored how a collaboration between FTI and GSF originally framed around smallholder agriculture eventually came to exclude agriculture from its scope, and discussed the attempt to incorporate adaptation elements into a standard based around mitigation. The treatment of this topic has been used to illustrate power imbalances within the FCSSP, divergent interests, and different capacities and tactics deployed to influence the process. The attempt by producers (Box 6-2) to resist the exclusion of agriculture was an example of countervailing power (Fung and Wright, 2003) that was limited in influence because it did not generate solutions and because the stakeholders expressing alternative viewpoints had multiple channels by which to influence the decision. Because the disparate viewpoints on agriculture and adaptation were generally expressed by proponents attending separate forums or bilaterally with FTI, stakeholders missed an opportunity for participatory solution generation characteristic of empowered participatory governance (Fung and Wright, 2003) or participatory deliberation where diverse participants come together to deliberate or debate (Leach et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the Project Team who formulated the decisions on agriculture and adaptation were aware of the diverse viewpoints and found themselves re-examining the premises and values at the root of their decisions (RRf.4). This is recognised by Fischer (2003a) as an outcome of participatory deliberation.

In this instance, the power and influence of the CSOs in the shaping of the scope of the FCS supports Blowfield and Dolan's (2008) argument that the 'community of principals' (in this case the CSOs) are more likely to be recognised in standard setting processes than the 'community of the supply chain', despite the justice imperative of representing the latter. When I shared the findings of this chapter with the project team, they expressed their dilemmas regarding project scope and the difficulty of taking on board the producers' comments. They recognised that this was not simply a matter of prioritising the CSOs' views. Although they did have considerable influence, the main barrier to taking on board producers' requests for agriculture in the FCS scope were structural, in relation to the way the carbon market works (RRf.4, Appendix 2). This constraint, which had not been foreseen at the beginning of the process, points to the difficulties of dealing with uncertainty when constructing pathways and demonstrates a preference for implementable and most-knowable solutions (Leach et al., 2010).

The unresolved issues around agriculture and adaptation remain a pressing development challenge and point to the gaps between decisions; stakeholders' concerns; and real and effective outcomes within the FCSSP. Addressing these issues in a way that brings together people with shared resources and ambitions on an equal footing, draws on the inputs of everyone with a stake, and accords them opportunity to shape design, decisions and outcome; will require an alternative governance form but also a specific process design. I return to this in chapter 9.

6.6.2. Hot Topic 2: Mechanisms for financial-benefit sharing

In this section I analyse the deliberation and decision-making processes that the Fairtrade Minimum Price (FMP) and Fairtrade Premium (Premium) passed through before becoming embedded in the trade section of the FCS, as two of a series of mechanisms intended to ensure fair financial benefit-sharing within certified projects. Whilst their presence in the published FCS is unsurprising given their centrality in the Fairtrade approach (see for example Fairtrade International, 2011c where they are listed alongside the Fairtrade Principles, Standards and Products as defining features of Fairtrade), a retrospective unpacking of the deliberative journey reveals that their inclusion was not always taken for granted, and decisions with respect to their requirements were not always consensual. Also, the FMP is applied one level away from the Producer Organisation compared to other Fairtrade products (between the Trader and the Project Facilitator, rather than between the Trader and the Producer Organisation). This example illustrates how the consensus process and the arrival at closure on a contested topic is shaped by the interplay between Fairtrade's formal governance structure, ISEAL's clauses on decision making (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b), and FTI's participatory governance intentions, in particular intention B, 'enabling everyone with a stake to contribute to design and outcome' and B2,

'enabling diverse stakeholders to share in decision-making activities where practical (Table 6-1).

6.6.2.1. Decision making provisions

FTI's formal governance structure shapes decision-making channels and opportunities to participate in the organisation and in standard setting (see chapter 3). The Standards Committee is mandated to decide on standards, and is composed of producer- and market-facing representatives of the Fairtrade system, as well as independent experts if required. The Standards Committee's Terms of Reference (FP.1) state that for reasons of pragmatism and efficiency, strategic decision making may be passed upwards to the FTI Board (the top level governance body), and minor decisions can delegated to the Director of Standards and Pricing. ISEAL's clauses on decision-making (ISEAL Alliance, 2014b) include openness to participation of all stakeholders including those directly affected by the standard and representativeness of decision-making bodies. The code acknowledges that even if decision-making is limited to members, this should not preclude balanced multi-stakeholder participation in decision-making, and if decisions for particular standards need to be made by Technical or Stakeholder Committees, top level governance bodies can still be involved in decisions on the quality of the standard-setting process. Consensus should be strived for in decision-making but predefined alternative mechanisms can be drawn on if consensus cannot be reached. These bases are important for understanding the broader context in which the participatory governance intention stated above, is framed. The *where practical* caveat allows for challenges that might be encountered in practice.

6.6.2.2. Deliberative and Decision Disjuncture in practice

During the FCSSP, the Standards Committee was accorded its due role in providing advice and making decisions on nine different occasions (Figure 6-2) but most of the members were devoid of the opportunity to take part in other forums and learn from these. As one item on the agenda, and one potential product among many Fairtrade products, the FCS only had one definite advocate sitting on the Standards Committee (who was also a Working Group member), while the other members struggled at times to understand the concept including its potential and limitations. The Project Team attempted to build an understanding amongst Standards Committee members over the times they met, and held an additional webinar for members that had recently joined, prior to the Standards Committee meeting where approval was being sought (in November 2014). However, the gap between the formal consensus-based decision making

processes within the Standards Committee, and the parallel deliberative processes within other forums[30] resulted in some disjuncture in the deliberation and decision-making process regarding the FMP and Premium. Timeline analysis was used to map the evolution in claims made about financial benefit-sharing and proposals and support for or against the FMP and Premium. Figure 6-3 portrays the decision points and compares the actual process with a typical consensus-based decision-making process (see Box 6-3). The diamond figure is based on a heuristic popular amongst groups using consensus for conceptualising and guiding themselves through a decision-making process, which is generally characterised by five phases or 'zones'. Although it is usually applied to a decision-making process held within a specific meeting, it also applies to protracted decision-making processes such as decisions on particular topics contained within the FCSSP.

The commentary below highlights some of the moments when consensus was compromised, negotiated or superficial, and two particular interventions intended to *open up* the topic to further deliberation and countervail premature *closure* (see chapter 3) are detailed, one which I led, and another led by a Standards Committee member.

During Phase 1 of the FCSSP (points 1-3 and 9 on Figure 6-3) when initial propositions for the FCS were articulated, claims were made about how Fairtrade Carbon Credits would result in economic benefits for producers, communities and organisations, including describing them as 'direct' and 'cash'. *How* this would happen was not thoroughly explored, though in one study, the Premium was recommended but the FMP was not.

During Phase 2 (points 4-8 and 10), research and stakeholder meetings generated an array of opinions and recommendations on the FMP and Premium. The Premium was questioned in discussions and discussion documents, and even removed from one version of the FCS (8). Discussions about the FMP generated lots of concerns, but its place in the FCS was not explicitly questioned. On one occasion (10), both the Project Team and a Group of Expert member portrayed consensual support for the FMP in the absence of a systematic check of people's opinions, effectively crowding out opportunities for divergence from the deliberation process. Meanwhile I had heard several people express strong doubts about the FMP outside this meeting. Moreover, the Q study (point Q on Figure 6-3) conducted during the consultation

[30] Note that although these forums were designed for gathering inputs rather than making decisions, the Project Team used language at times that suggested shared decision making or joint proposal generation. (e.g. T.GE.09.13, or T.PFS.B.c and T.PFS.B.d).

period explored participants' views on mechanisms for financial benefit-sharing, including the FMP and revealed a spectrum of opinions, from those who strongly agreed on the importance of the FMP to those who strongly disagreed or advocated alternative mechanisms.

During Phase 3 of the FCSSP (11-16), work to develop the details of the FMP and Premium was conducted by the Pricing Unit, and versions of the FCS were presented to diverse stakeholders for comments, and revised. The FMP and Premium were firmly embedded in both consultation versions of the FCS (11 and 15). Firm support for both mechanisms voiced at a Standards Committee meeting (13) dissuaded the Pricing Unit from questioning whether or not they were actually appropriate within the context of the FCS, despite doubts raised amongst some members of the Project Team.

Meanwhile the forums where FMP and Premium were deliberated produced a variety of proposals on *how* they should be structured within the FCS and often discussants were unable to reach consensus.

During Phase 4 of the FCS-setting process (17-19), when the FCS was finalised, deliberation and decision-making were limited to the Project Team and Standards Committee. Although the latter unanimously approved the FCS the first time it was presented to them for approval (17), the discussions around the FMP and Premium were highly contested, and consensus was reached partially as a result of strategic handling of the situation by the Standards Unit, and on condition that the Standards Committee members' persistent concerns would be addressed. The FMP values were approved at the following meeting (18) but no details are available on how this decision-making process played out. The Standards Unit was mandated to do final edits and the topic reached closure in the form of the published FCS (19).

Table 6-6: Decision points where FMP and premium were deliberated

Decision point	
1	Sep 2012, Standards Committee meeting
2	Nov 2012, COP 18
3	Jan 2013, Internal Feasibility Study
4	Sep 2013, Cornerstones document
5	Sep 2013, Group of Experts meeting
6	Nov 2013, COP 19
7	Nov 2013, Working Group meeting
8	Nov 2013, Preliminary drafts
9	Dec 2013, Final Project Assignment
10	Mar 2014, Further iteration of preliminary draft
11	Jun 2014, 1st consultation draft
12	Aug 2014, CSO London
13	Sep 2014, Standards Committee meeting
14	Sep 2014, Group of Experts meeting
15	Oct 2014, 2nd consultation document
16	Oct 2014, Producer/ Field staff workshop, Bonn
17	Nov 2014, Standards Committee meeting
18	Mar 2015, Standards Committee meeting
19	October 2015 Standard release documents

N.B. colours relate to phases of the FCSSP in Figure 6-2

Figure 6-3 Deliberative and decision-making diamond: the actual consensus decision process

Box 6-3 phases in a typical consensus decision-making process

(based on Kaner, 2014, Seeds for Change, 2013)

Initial proposals

In the first zone, the issue to be addressed is put forward and opinions are expressed. If there are some viewpoints or concerns expressed about initial propositions, it is necessary to open up discussion and enter the divergent zone.

Divergent zone

In this zone, further information is gathered and opinions are explored. People may be nervous, curious, and playful but it is important that efforts are made to support them to feel comfortable expressing points of view even if they are divergent.

Groan zone

Once the team has expressed all points of view, often conflicts come forward due to not understanding each other's perspectives. This zone may feel uncomfortable and stressful and consensus may appear difficult to achieve. However, the efforts to understand each other's perspectives that should be made during this stage are a necessary step for engaging in shared problem-solving, paving the way into the convergent zone.

Convergent zone

Now that everyone has a shared framework of understanding, discussions go smoother. Proposals generated are more likely to receive the support of the group, but should be checked to make sure they cover everyone's interests.

Closure zone

Finally, a decision has to be made. It has to be clear to everyone what the decision embodies and how it is supported by all.

6.6.2.3. Interventions to countervail premature closure

Research Intervention: mapping diverse perspectives through a Q study with stakeholders involved in the FCSSP

The Q study I conducted during the consultation period was a deliberate intervention to enhance reflexivity amongst stakeholders taking part in the FCSSP (see chapters 5 and 8) and create space for a thorough exploration of divergent viewpoints that were assumed to be in consensus (see decision point 10 in Figure 6-3). When the results of the study were discussed with the Project Team, they were surprised that participants loading on factors 2 and 3 were not convinced by the FMP but ascribed this to a lack of understanding of the FMP and how it worked by participants external to the Fairtrade system. However, factor 2 also included some Fairtrade-internal participants who saw the potential for alternatives to the FMP. The study also uncovered a key difference in opinion about where the focus for fair benefit-sharing should be, varying from the household, to the organisation grouping the individuals who produced the emissions reductions, to across the entire commodity chain. Further divergence in opinions on the topic of making payments to individual producers (those producing the emissions reductions) arose during the interviews accompanying the sorting activity. These are summarised in Figure 6-4.



Figure 6-4: Paraphrased opinions on payments to producers expressed during Q interviews
Given in reaction to statements about financial benefit-sharing. Bracketed numbers represent the number of people who expressed an equivalent opinion

The Project Team addressed the lack of understanding about the FMP by dedicating substantial workshop time during the Group of Experts and Producer/ Field staff meetings in September and October 2014 to explain and get feedback on the methodology used to develop the FMPs for Fairtrade Carbon Credits. Discussions at these points still revealed a wide array of opinions even after people had understood more about how the FMP would work. However, when the Project Team came to the Standards Committee to request FCS approval, the impression they gave was of general support from the stakeholders consulted, on the pricing methodology and proposed values (see commentary on phase 3 in Figure 6-3). Opinions on the FCS had been mixed at the previous Standards Committee meeting and the Project Team had doubted whether the FCS would be approved at the first attempt. The requirements around the FMP and Premium were the most contentious[31], and both Standards Committee members and Standards Unit members present at the meeting drew on strategies respectively to slow down and to manoeuvre into a closure (i.e. approval) of the requirements. Table 6-7 documents efforts led by one particular Standards Committee member to resist premature closure, which are presented in relation to the strategies deployed by the Standards Unit and Chair to enhance likelihood of reaching closure.

Table 6-7: Resistance to closure at the meeting for approval of the FCS (November 2014)

Type of strategy	Strategies deployed to facilitate closure	Strategies deployed mainly by Standards Committee member 1 (SCM1) to resist closure
Dealing with insufficient information/ understanding	Standards Unit hold an additional webinar for newer Standards Committee members prior to the meeting for approval	SCM1 acknowledges the gap in understanding and the discomfort this creates- '*I'm uncomfortable… It's taken us as committee members quite a while to follow'* (T.SC.63, p6)
Strategic agenda setting and critical deconstruction of the agenda	The Standards Unit choose to leave the more contentious points about the Fairtrade Carbon Credits pricing methodology until after the majority of the FCS has been approved, when people are also more tired.	SCM1 cross-references previous sub-points on the agenda and acknowledges their links to the discussion at hand, threatening the validity of previous decisions. When a vote is proposed, SCM1 says *'I'm uncomfortable to take part. It's a pity that we've approved the standard before discussing this'* (T.SC.63, p8)
Use of figures	The Standards Unit present the price calculations figures very small- few people in the room are able to read them. They	SCM1 uses the figures presented to calculate what this means for individual producers and Producer Organisations, doing this on a flipchart and asking for

[31] This was because of SC members' expectations about what they would generate for producers and Producer Organisations, rather than because they didn't agree with them

	admit they are not confident on the figures because of insufficient information but they are confident on the methodology because they have *'asked the experts'* (T.SC.63, p8). The Chair and Standards Unit try to steer the Standards Committee away from going into details	contributions from the room. Other members bring in concrete examples. When the calculations are complete, SCM1 says *'I want to check I've understood it right…'* and raises the question *'are we comfortable with that?'* (T.SC.63, p8). SCM1 is evidently not happy, and expresses this later.
Claiming representation	The Standards Unit present the views of particular forums as unanimously in support of the proposals, whilst ignoring the nuances or divergence in opinions within these forums *(e.g. 'everybody more or less agreed…', 'the consultation' or 'the Group of Experts' told us that…)*	When the viewpoint of SCM1 is thrown into question, this member claims that the PNs share it [on the topic of revenue sharing] SCM1: *'we can't make it aspirational because it won't happen. This is one of the ways to make more revenue come to individuals'* SC member 2: *'are we all sharing your point of view?'* SCM1: *'The PNs share my view definitely'* [not disputed by the PNs, even though one has just expressed a counter-opinion] SC member 3: *'I do too'*…(T.SC.63, p10)
Dealing with incompleteness	The Standards Unit reframe the decision which is put to the Standards Committee in terms of the Standards Committee deciding to give confidence to the Standards Unit to continue working on the values and suggest that there may be new requirements developed by the next Standards Committee meeting.	Standards Committee members hold off the vote to raise more concerns, and agree only when the Standards Unit has taken these concerns on board. Consensus is on condition that concerns will be addressed by the next meeting.

Throughout the discussion at the Standards Committee meeting, the main concern expressed by Standards Committee member 1 and shared by several other members, was that the pricing methodology, proposed FMP and premium values and proposed level at which to set the FMP, would not allow for sufficient financial benefits for individual producers or adequate transparency on the sharing of financial benefits between the Project Facilitator and the Producer Organisation and its members. They argue this both for land-based projects, where producers encounter opportunity costs which should be compensated, but also in energy efficiency projects. The issue is portrayed by Standards Committee member 1 as follows:

'the investor has put in money, so when money comes in, it's to his pocket. When money rolls in [from the premium], it's for the community, even though individuals have put money in…' (T.SC.63, p8)

'we've assumed an investor comes in with good intentions, and the community should be happy because they're going to use less wood. I don't agree with that and that is central to this standard. At the heart of Fairtrade, individual members benefit- in conventional Fairtrade. Here we are saying the community benefits. Who will measure the [impact on the] individual [in the] standard?' (T.SC.63, p9)

Figure 6-4 shows that the view that individual producers should benefit directly is not common to all stakeholders- several participants of the Q study strongly disagreed with this idea on a number of grounds, particularly in the context of energy-efficiency projects. However, this point of view does resonate with the original claims made about what Fairtrade Carbon Credits would achieve, made in phase 1 of the FCSSP, where expectations of direct cash benefits to producers were raised. Notably, claims in the published FCS are less explicit. The safety net function of the FMP is provided for *projects* rather than producers, the finance generated by the premium is earmarked for adaptation, and the share of the FMP paid to the Producer Organisation is contingent on each project set-up and the degree to which the Producer Organisation takes on project management tasks. This does not necessarily mean that the FCS is unlikely to achieve positive results, but like the analysis of adaptation and agriculture, it does provide an illustration of how the negotiation and learning process through which all those involved in the FCS-setting process passed, resulted in a standard promising to deliver something quite different from the original expectations.

6.6.2.4. Reaching closure: have all concerns been taken into account?

According to the practitioners' advice detailed in Box 6-3, closure in a decision-making process should come once proposals have been checked to ensure all stakeholders' concerns have been taken into account, and when everyone involved in the process is in support of the decision. In the FCSSP, the Project Team heard all the concerns expressed by stakeholders, but were also driven by the desired result to accomplish the project mission (i.e. get the FCS approved and ready for stakeholders to implement). Furthermore, the disjuncture between a) deliberation and guidance provision within the various stakeholder forums; and b) decision-making within the Standards Committee (which happened primarily in phase 4 once the Project Team had ceased to organise stakeholder forums for participation), means that the checking of decisions against the various concerns cannot be done by anyone but the Project Team, except in hindsight. This

research process therefore serves to enhance the accountability of the Project Team by tracking concerns raised throughout the FCSSP and assessing whether and how they have been taken into account. I provided a detailed analysis of concerns and efforts to address them, and shared this with FTI. Overall, the process of opening up the topic of financial-benefit sharing to exploration of diverse opinions and further research helped to enhance learning and mutual understanding for the diverse stakeholders involved, and as the issue moved towards closure, concerns were more about how the FMP and Premium mechanisms would operate rather than whether or not they should be in the standard. However, some remaining concerns can only be assessed once projects begin applying the FCS. Below is a list of questions relevant for FTI to ask when monitoring and evaluating the impact of the standard. These are non-exhaustive as more questions will arise as the FCS is rolled out. These questions were shared with the Project Team and they agreed that they were all relevant and crucial to monitor and would be addressed within monitoring work.

- Are the three FMPs adequate for capturing the diversity of project types and organisational set-ups applying the standard, without excluding or creating comparative disadvantages for those projects which fit with the FCS' purpose but are more expensive to implement?
- Does a pricing system which is structured in the same way regardless of project type, cater for the differences in organisational set-ups, embedded project benefits and motivations for action?
- Are buyers willing to pay the FMP and is it clear when the FMP applies as opposed to the reference market price? Are volumes of sales substantial enough to have a noticeable impact on the revenues of Producer Organisations? And is it actually possible to ascertain the amount of revenue flow back to Producer Organisations from Project Facilitators?
- Do the amounts of Fairtrade Premium and share of the FMP received by Producer Organisations and producers adequately compensate for the costs they have incurred, without creating false incentives for action? Do these amounts and shares meet with producers' and Producer Organisations' expectations and/or the claims made in communication material about the FCS?
- Do the projects being implemented involve working with Producer Organisations that are sufficiently organised to decide on the spending of the Premium, and are there effectively opportunities being created for them to take on more of the project management tasks and earn an increasing share of the FMP?

6.6.2.5. Section summary

This section analysed deliberation and decision-making about hot topic 2 (financial benefit-sharing through the mechanisms of FMP and premium). It serves as an illustration of how a consensus-based decision making process operated in practice and points to the challenges in applying FTI's participatory governance intention of enabling everyone with a stake to take part in decision-making activities. In particular it points to the deliberative and decision disjuncture created because formal decision making taking place within the Standards Committee meetings was relatively isolated from the deliberative forums happening in parallel, which were more conducive to learning. Although the Project Team acted as intermediaries between these forums and made substantial efforts towards transparency about outcomes from different forums, they could not be impartial because they were also influenced by the required outcome of accomplishing the project mission (getting the FCS approved and ready for implementation), the frames set by ISEAL and the FTI SOP, as well as by their own ideals and opinions[32]. This disjuncture, characterised by unequal access to information and differential powers to decide, contributed to a consensus process which was manoeuvred towards premature closure on various occasions and subsequently slowed down through research- and stakeholder-led interventions aimed at re-opening discussions. Nevertheless, the example also illustrates the agency of participants in the process including myself as researcher and facilitator of the Q study. Bühler (2002) recognises that the potential for manipulation, domination and undemocratic outcomes is present in most experiences of participation and it is an issue for participants themselves to consider how they can resist this. When I discussed with the Project Team the attempt by members of the Standards Committee to do this, they acknowledged the pressures and shortcomings that had led them to push the decision (see section 8.2.2). The end result was compromised in terms of its ability to adequately address all concerns (as indicated by the sharp descent out of the groan zone into closure in Figure 6-3) both because of remaining uncertainties, and because of the tensions inherent in standard-setting in participatory, collaborative and multi-stakeholder processes. In this case there is a need for a) technical inputs provided by stakeholders who are not full members of the existing system; b) representative decision-making rooted in the organisation's members; c) consistency with other standards (those of FTI, and GSF); d) buy-in from future implementers of the FCS and market actors (understood broadly in terms of buyers, promoters and influencers of civil society). These tensions are discussed in the following section.

---

[32] There has not been scope within this thesis to elaborate on the Project Team members' ideals and personal opinions, but as staff of a mission-driven organisation, they regularly expressed their own relationships to Fairtrade principles, and their own desires and quandaries about their relevance within the FCS.

6.7. Discussion: Alternatives to top-down governance?

Chapter 3 introduced FTI's underlying participatory governance aim, to strive for alternatives to top-down governance and discussed two potential alternatives resulting in robust deliberative forms of participatory collaboration. In this final section of the chapter I assess the degree to which this was achieved with the FCSSP through a discussion of the different instances of governance counterforces evident within the FCSSP. This involves drawing on the concepts of countervailing power and efforts to resist premature closure, introduced in chapter 3, and introducing my own concept of 'rug-tugging'. This is a form of adversarialism, which in the context of the FCSSP, arose as a result of interests outlined in Figure 6-1 in the 'protectionist culture belt.

Rug-tugging is an adversarial process whereby multiple parties, motivated by a culture of protectionism, act within their own camps and attempt to pull the rug in their direction to ensure they will fit on it or that it will satisfy the needs of the actors they represent, rather than acting towards shared interests or desired results. The 'rug' is a metaphor for the requirements and mechanisms within the FCS. Rug-tugging was motivated by a desire to maintain position, manage relationships and safeguard reputation, and to fit existing practices and protect the roles of existing actors within projects and supply chains. How does it operate? Imagine a rug. This rug is a bit too small to comfortably fit everybody who wants to sit on it…

Over to the left of the rug are people who shape, represent and promote Fairtrade. They are standing up for the consistency of Fairtrade standards; of what they consider to be key Fairtrade mechanisms- the Fairtrade Minimum Price, Premium, Producers and Producer Organisations; and for how Fairtrade is communicated on the market. Some have been involved in Fairtrade for years, and many have witnessed changes within Fairtrade which could be considered as a dilution of its original core values, triggered in response to pressures to sell more Fairtrade products, and incorporate a wider range of organisational set-ups and commodity supply chains. Some have been convinced of the need for a standard for Fairtrade Carbon Credits and a partnership with GSF since these ideas were first proposed. Others have hesitated before endorsing this direction and harbour some persistent doubts- both their own, and those of the wider network of Fairtrade producers, traders, retailers, customers, supporters and funders they interact with. Without the prior knowledge and experience of the carbon market, this is a move requiring blind faith- in the success of the partnership, in the genuineness and good intentions of those who come forward to help shape the FCS, and in the possibility of creating something relevant, novel, applicable, and useful. Even the most faithful can doubt sometimes.

Opposite them, to the right of the rug, are people involved in the making and governing of GSF and its standards- they are staff, founding partners, and advisory panel members. They have

witnessed, or actively taken part in forging GSF's new pathway into land use projects. Until 2013, all the focus had been on certifying carbon credits from energy projects, deemed by the much of the NGO community including their own supporters, to be a safer option for guaranteeing genuine emissions reductions and sustainable development. These are the foundations on which GSF was built, with the aim of offering an alternative to the failures of the faltering and much criticised Clean Development Mechanism. As an organisation that identifies itself to the public in terms of core values of quality, and trust, it is important to forge this pathway carefully. Whilst the partnership with FTI was welcomed by many of GSF's NGO supporters, there is a risk that GSF certification will now be seen as *unfair* when it is not combined with Fairtrade certification and this must be avoided at all costs. The NGO supporters play an important role in GSF's legitimacy and accountability.

Representatives of both organisations recognise their organisations' acquired expertise and areas of strength, as well as areas of weakness. The partnership begins with the idea of incorporating Fairtrade principles into GSF certification and evolves to support the creation of a Fairtrade Standard, applicable to projects also certified by GSF. Nevertheless, the division of labour is not clear-cut- both sides would like to influence the aspects that the other side was initially responsible for in order to produce something workable that harmonises with their organisations' positions and existing standards. Both organisations are also dependent on funds provided by organisations who are involved in the process- these funds are crucial for financing standards development activities such as the stakeholder engagement activities and trialling of the standard tools, which are considered as a way to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the process and final outcome. The organisations who have committed funding have their own expectations about process and outcome, as they would like to apply the standards of which they are financing the development.

At times, both sides dig their heels, in an effort to *maintain their position* on the market, and in their areas of standards expertise, *manage their relationships* with their wider consortium of partners, licensees and supporters, and *safeguard their own reputations* on the market and within civil society. Whilst they may be aware of the possibility to maintain both organisations' positions, jointly manage their relationships and safeguard their collective reputations, in moments of defensiveness and self-preservation, the rug gets tugged in both directions.

On the other two sides of the rug are those who are implementing standards - on one side are people implementing Fairtrade standards within their own producer organisations or within a Fairtrade supply chain they are involved in. On the other side are people involved in carbon projects, as developers, field staff, consultants, promoters, or traders of credits. Regardless of the role they play within the supply chain of their particular products or projects, they are concerned about *protecting their own roles, and* also those *of the other actors* that help to

sustain their supply chains. The two sides have functioned in isolation until recently, but some people are beginning to gain experiences of the other side, as Fairtrade producers involved in carbon projects, as carbon project representatives working with Fairtrade producers, or as consultants working with Fairtrade producers on carbon projects. They look to standards as a tool for recognising their practices, providing them with a benchmark and helping them to communicate to the market. They have experienced the efforts and rigour required to comply with standards, the aspects of standards which have proved useful, and the aspects which continue to be a burden. Most would share the view that simpler standards are preferable[33], but each has a different definition of 'simple'- what is easy to apply for one project or product supply chain is difficult for another and vice versa. Regarding questions of auditing, on one side someone is saying:

> *'The last thing we want to do is to give the people we work with a whole bucket of extra requirements they're not used to. We've invested a lot in training people about the requirements of carbon projects… the easier it is to snuggle the Fairtrade sticker into that, the better' (T.PFS.B.d, p1)*

This is mirrored on the other side by a Fairtrade Producer Organisational representative who advocates for the auditing requirements to be consistent with current practices for Small Producer Organisations, rather than adding a new set auditing requirement. Whilst they may all share the view that the ideal standard would *fit their own existing practices*, their practices are different and it will be impossible for the standard to fit each project and product supply chain's existing practices. Hence, in the moments of defensiveness, when it seems like the FCS is going to be too complicated, inappropriate and ill-fitting to the practices of one's own project or supply chain, or when there is a fear of threat to one's own role or those of other people relied on to get the product to market, the rug is tugged in both directions.

These are the forces which prevailed on different occasions during the FCSSP. They were not omnipresent, but often came to the fore during discussions of hot topics or triggered certain decisions, as this chapter has illustrated and Table 6-8 summarises. These forces can be understood in combination as a protectionist culture. Although there are mutual interests in maintaining positions, fitting existing practices and so on, the coming together of different actors and organisations representing diverse positions and practices means that these common interests become mutually incompatible. The protectionist culture as a form of defensiveness imposes a restriction to creativity and consensus in option generation. This dynamic has been

---

[33] Although there is one person in the room who whispered that complex standards are easier to hide behind.

noted by other scholars. As Cornwall identifies: ‘issues of power and difference may not only undermine the very possibility of equitable, consensual decision-making, they may also restrict the possibility of ‘thinking outside the box’, reinforcing hegemonic perspectives and status-quo reinforcing solutions’ (2002 p5). Fung and Wright (2003) also note that in such forms of adversarialism, the emphasis of differences rather than commonalities potentially generates excess conflict, the presence of which reduces process legitimacy and creativity of governance. Collective action faces barriers, and powerful interests dominate over or capture the less powerful.

Nevertheless, the protectionist culture is not only a barrier to innovation or consensual solutions- there are times when it serves, both to maintain the standards bar against genuine pressures to lower it (see Riisgaard et al., 2009 for a discussion of raising and lowering the standards bar), and to ensure the relevance of standards in the context where they are applied. Both these outcomes are supported by ISEAL’s Code of Good Practice, and are in the interests of those who set and those who implement standards. Discerning between the different motivations and intentions behind protectionist culture is difficult to do accurately by an external observer- it is best done by self-reflexively examining one’s own thoughts, feelings and speech and actions, or with the help of a process facilitator who supports stakeholders to recognise their commonalities and the tensions inherent in them, and guide them discursively towards finding consensual approaches which allow win-win outcomes. This discussion is returned to in chapter 8.

Table 6-8 Summary of governance forms evident within the FCSSP

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="5">Governance structure</td><td colspan="4">Character of decision-making process</td></tr>
<tr><td>1: Top down Adversarial

e.g. Negotiation between GSF and FTI about owns the Standard</td><td colspan="3">2: Top down Collaborative

e.g. Major final-phase changes in the scope of the FCS which were only subjected to review by the Standards Committee, not by the wider body of stakeholders

e.g. Prioritising the input of those considered as experts, based in Europe, or of CSOs, over the input of producers and field staff based in the project and or production areas</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">3: Participatory Adversarial

e.g. Instances of rug-tugging between diverse stakeholders during workshops and meetings when protectionist cultures came to the fore</td><td colspan="3">4: Participatory Collaborative</td></tr>
<tr><td>Co-optation and participatory window dressing

e.g. Instances when the Project Team represented selective evidence to the Standards Committee</td><td colspan="2">Robust, democracy-enhancing forms of collaboration</td></tr>
<tr><td>Empowered participatory governance with countervailing power

e.g. Instances when Standards Committee members subjected the Project Team to critical questioning and slowed down decisions in order to understand their implications (e.g. November 2014)

e.g. Instances during the Producer-Fieldstaff Bonn workshop when smaller subgroup of Fairtrade producers formed and spoke up against the exclusion of agricultural projects (although their attempt was unsuccessful)</td><td>Participatory Deliberation

e.g. Instances throughout the process where space was given to exploration of issues</td></tr>
</table>

6.8. Conclusion to chapter six

> *'Fair, effective and sustainable deliberation and participation in institutions depend… not just on the details of their design but also on background contexts, and in particular on the constellation of social forces that manoeuvre in and around [these] institutions' (Fung and Wright, 2003 p259)*

This chapter has provided a critical assessment of FTI's approach to participatory governance in practice. This was based on an analysis of how their aim and intentions shaped the design of the participatory governance process, and how the intentions, aims and design interacted with the wider context, and the array of social forces. The wider context included FTI's SOP and governance structure, their commitments to ISEAL's codes and principles and their partnership with GSF. Social forces included ambitions, protectionist culture, shared but sometimes mutually incompatible interests, strategies for empowerment and resistance to premature closure of decision-making processes. Power relations have been considered throughout, based on the understanding that they are inevitable and must be named before strategies to work with them can be identified.

It was noted in chapter 3 that the governance form must be appropriate to the issue and context. The issue was conducive to bringing together a wide range of stakeholders, from multiple levels. However, the context also required FTI to respect its existing governance structure, which accords decision-making authority to a Standards Committee that only represents members. This issue and context is well suited to participatory deliberation, but the sense of urgency emphasised by the Project Team throughout and the limited time and resources available for facilitating participatory deliberation, created a pressure to try to move things forward even if they were not ideal. This meant that there was not always enough time or opportunity to reach consensual recommendations and also that even if/when they were reached in one forum, they were often disjointed from the different sets of recommendations arising from other forums.

Various types of disjuncture were evident within the FCSSP- between deliberation and decision-making; between the outcomes and recommendations of different forums and sub-groups within them; and between the values and experiences of people coming from two different standard-setting organisations, and two different fields of practice (Fairtrade commodity production and carbon credit generation). On the whole, the Project Team were tasked with attempting to bridge these types of disjuncture, as the only parties to be present in all the forums. They made considerable efforts in accomplishing this stressful, challenging and power-imbued task. They were held to account by the Working Group and the Standards Committee who they regularly met with, and made efforts to the enhance transparency of their

work amongst the other stakeholders taking part in the FCSSP during process and content updates at each stakeholder forum and occasionally by email. They were aided by those stakeholders who attended several forums, or participants who made particular efforts to connect with and learn from those who had different experiences. Seeing each other on multiple occasions, and staying and socialising together helped this. Sometimes in their busyness, and under pressure to move things forward, get the FCS approved and accomplish their mission, the Project Team failed to connect pieces of the puzzle, heed contrary opinions or evidence, or portray them to their audiences. My role as researcher contributed by pointing out where opinions, evidence or puzzle pieces had been forgotten and supporting the Project Team to reintegrate them.

Findings suggest that the governance approach was neither entirely 'top down' nor 'bottom up', but instead oscillated between instances of robust and democratic participatory collaboration governance and more adversarial dynamics of 'rug-tugging' during moments when the protectionist interests came to the fore, and premature closure. Rug tugging involves using strategy and/or position to keep the discussion topic or standard clause within the bounds that suit organisational-interest. Premature closure involves using strategy and/or position to coerce discussants or the issue itself into a point of closure involving agreement and/or decision, before all the information has been gathered, understood, or before participants are ready to agree. However, I also identified signs of countervailing power and efforts to resist premature closure. These are important preconditions for a more developed form of participatory governance called Empowered Participatory Governance to come about (see chapter 3).

The pressure for expediency may come at the expense of legitimacy in multi-stakeholder processes (Cheyns, 2011). In this case, there was not always space provided to debate legitimate and fundamental questions such as what is fair, to search for common understandings of the problem or to self-reflexively explore the interests at stake. Not exploring certain topics or exposing underlying interests may have been a strategy to eliminate tension or because there might not have been a clear and consensual answer (Cheyns, 2011), but participatory deliberation and policy dialogue both point to the value of deliberation even if consensus cannot be reached. This chapter has illustrated both the opportunities and short comings of consensus processes when used within standard setting processes, supporting the view that consensus and other tools for participation must be understood within context and are neither automatically 'good' nor 'bad' (Bühler, 2002). It is important to acknowledge the consequences of decisions on participatory tools and processes and to assess whether they correspond with the aims and intentions for using them (ibid) as I have done in this chapter and through my work to enhance reflection amongst the Project Team (chapter 8).

While it was mentioned in chapter 3 that excess conflict can be a barrier to legitimacy and creativity in governance, not recognising inherent conflicts can also be a barrier to productive deliberation (Focht and Lawler, 2000). By pinpointing where goals of parties were mutually incompatible, I have identified examples of what Deutsch (1973) calls 'true conflict'. In hindsight, this helps to make sense of why adversarial dynamics of protectionism prevailed in certain discussions and crowded out creative option generation and opportunities to learn from each other.

Overall, this chapter is to be read as an illustration of how challenging it is to undertake / engage in participatory governance in practice, to applaud the efforts made and recognise the instances when robust, democracy-enhancing forms of collaboration were achieved, and to lay the groundwork for identifying areas of improvement and opportunities for enhancing participatory collaborative outcomes when this governance form is intended. In chapter 8 I discuss the value of my efforts to support reflection on the governance process and outcomes, but also the limits in terms of timing and targeted audience. I develop recommendations for enhancing participatory collaborative outcomes in chapters 8 and 9.

6.8.1. Summary of key messages and contributions

- This chapter has provided a nuanced and empirically grounded understanding of standard setting processes as embedded in a political and economic context but governed and shaped actively by the people who take part in them. This has gone beyond rather generalised political economic conceptions of standards as neoliberal governance forms, to look at the structural and contextual specificities of this particular process and the socially embedded nature of governance practices and tools.
- This has enabled a reality-testing of FTI's participatory governance approach. In particular, it has generated a more dynamic view of governance forms and their appropriateness at different points in a process, and a more multi-faceted portrayal of power and attempts at countervailing power (and structural carbon market constraints that limited one particular attempt). This helps to move beyond the perception implicit in the FTI approach that power imbalances can be avoided. I have also pointed to the tensions associated with combining inputs from 'expert' non-members of the Fairtrade system, licensees from the previously separate Fairtrade and carbon systems, and people who could be associated with a 'community of principals' (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008). In exploring whether all stakeholders were able to contribute to design and outcome, I have explored who had a voice, who had a vote, and whose views were represented in the final FCS. Opportunities and capacities to contribute were not equal, but it is also important to ask whether each contributing individual was considered as equal by the

Project Team. Findings suggest that this is not the case, but this needs further exploration.

- Evidence from this particular process has contributed in particular to a better understanding of conflict and tension, a theme introduced in chapter 3. In contrast to authors who posit that standard setting processes neutralise conflict, and also authors who speak only positively of the potential of deliberation to enable learning and mutual understanding, I found that the FCSSP was a negotiated and contested process, characterised by hot debate but also unacknowledged conflicts. Contributing to knowledge gaps outlined by Djama et al (2011), I have shown how conflicting ideas co-existed by demonstrating the adversarial process of rug-tugging where interests were shared but mutually incompatible in practice; and by illustrating where interests were shared on the surface but subject to underlying differences of opinion when operationalised. Both findings point to the potential of using conflict resolution tools to facilitate people's discovery of both differences and commonalities. Allowing ourselves and others their opinions and confronting differences through debate is an important part of participation with justice and dignity (Bühler, 2002), while too much focus on differences over commonalities can be unhelpful (Fung and Wright, 2003). I have also shown how conflictual views were not always transformed into cooperative attitudes, illustrated most clearly by the difference of opinion on agriculture and adaptation. This does not necessarily violate procedure, as consensus does not require that everybody agrees, but it does require that all concerns are taken into account. I return to the questions of whether or not this is 'fair' in chapter 9.
- My engagement with the FCSSP has enabled a depth of empirical evidence, a grounded and contextualised understanding and offered opportunities to flag up less democratic or inclusive governance practices and intervene directly. Recognising that it is essential to take responsibility for one's actions and their consequences, I argue that this level of engagement has been a virtue rather than a danger particularly because of the way it contributes towards a more reflective standard setting process. This is discussed in chapter 8.
- Exploring the establishment of auditing criteria for the FCS was beyond the scope of this research. This is an important remaining knowledge gap particularly, as standards' '"teeth" and hence their ultimate authority lie in [the] auditing process' (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008 p12). The auditing criteria for the FCS were developed without stakeholder input and for this reason, deserve even more scrutiny.

Chapter 7 An exploration of evidence, assumptions and logic underpinning the FCS using the Theory of Change approach

7.1. Introduction to chapter seven

> *'The nature of Fairtrade strategies and activities evolve over time in line with experiences and a changing environment. However, the fundamental vision, purpose and principles of Fairtrade remain constant, as does the basic approach' (Fairtrade International, 2013: Theory of Change p3).*

Building on the previous two empirical chapters, this chapter returns to objective 1, addressing two further questions. These are (1.3) *Which assumptions and evidence is the Theory of Change for the Fairtrade Climate Standard based on?* and (1.4) *What can example carbon programmes tell us about possible pathways to the outcomes and impacts articulated in the Theory of Change as the Fairtrade Climate Standard is applied?* Addressing these questions involves drawing on pathways components 2 and 3 (see sections 1.3.1 and 1.4.1.2). The Theory of Change is a concrete illustration of the way the FCS and its change process is being framed (component 2). Identification of the implications on poorer and marginalised people (component 3) is limited to my analysis of two example carbon projects.

The overarching aim in this chapter is to explore the applicability of core Fairtrade tenets as they are transferred from agricultural commodity contexts, to the novel area of Fairtrade Carbon Credits. Section 2.2.3 outlined the ways that the fair trade concept is already being extended and stretched (through mainstreaming, non-FTI fair trade labels and application to new commodities) and the challenges and opportunities this creates. This chapter contributes to this knowledge area with respect to carbon, paying attention to its materiality and the implications this has on knowledge, roles and relationships (building on literature from section 2.2). It also introduces a place-based understanding of carbon and carbon certification rooted in projects in Kenya. This builds on contributions by Blowfield and Dolan (2010) and Getz and Shreck (2006), that have critically explored the gaps between the ethical intentions and expectations raised by labels and certification, and the experiences of intended beneficiaries.

Section 1.4.1.1 introduced the empirical analysis approach to exploring fairness in this thesis, and this chapter is constructed using both lines of enquiry. While chapter 5 looked at multiple notions *of what fairness would mean* in the context of Fairtrade carbon projects, this chapter explores multiple notions *of the change process* that Fairtrade carbon projects are expected to encapsulate. I identify which ones dominate within the FCS and how perspectives differed on

them during its construction, and test their operationalisation and appropriateness in different contexts. This helps to illuminate tensions at different scales, the interplay between notions, context and practice and the effect on outcomes (Sikor et al., 2014).

FTI's approach to fairness in trade has been set out in its Theory of Change (Fairtrade International 2013). This was adapted[34] and incorporated into the FCS, following requests in the first FCS consultation in 2014. The Theory of Change is a methodology used extensively in designing and evaluating projects or interventions. Having a Theory of Change is recommended by the ISEAL Alliance in its Impact Assessment Guidelines (ISEAL Alliance, 2014a) because it helps in postulating *how* an intervention can lead to *which kinds of* change, *for* whom, and involving *which* actors. Evaluation approaches that focus on profit and yields struggle to make such attribution linkages between interventions and ultimate impact (Ton et al., 2014). While Theories of Change cannot produce improvements by themselves, they do provide opportunities to visualise and render transparent the assumptions, objectives and mechanisms within standards (Nelson and Martin, 2011).

The innovative aspects within the FCS and the commodity specificity of carbon credits mean that possible impact pathways of Fairtrade interventions might be quite different in the context of the FCS compared to other Fairtrade commodities. Critical reflection should be a part of the process of developing a Theory of Change but this opportunity was largely missed by FTI during the FCSSP because it was not discussed with stakeholders apart from asking for comments during the 2nd FCS consultation. In this chapter I bridge this reflection gap by critically assessing the FCS Theory of Change and unpicking the logic, evidence and assumptions behind it. This is useful for identifying key areas to monitor and learn from as the FCS and its Theory of Change is applied, reviewed and revised, and therefore contributes towards enhancing its robustness. Specifically, I tease out one particular impact pathway within the FCS Theory of Change that relies heavily on the roles that project actors take up and the ways they organise (Hot Topic 3), and the process of transferring knowledge and capacities (Hot Topic 4), both introduced in Figure 6-1. Given the contentiousness of these topics, it is reasonable to assume that formulations in the projects and programmes that implement the FCS may diverge considerably. I use evidence drawn from primary data from two carbon programmes in Kenya, data from participant observation and Q interviews during the FCSSP, and literature on producer organisations and carbon projects to critically assess this impact pathway, examine to what extent it holds up in particular contexts and expand knowledge of the

[34] This involved minor modifications to take into account the different language of carbon credits and specific roles within the FCS.

range of options that could potentially be relevant for FTI to encompass in the FCS requirements when they are revised.

This chapter continues with a brief overview of the Theory of Change approach followed by an analysis of the FCS Theory of Change including identification of seven underlying assumptions. The chapter then unpacks the first three assumptions and examines the various sources of evidence supporting or corroborating them (from the FCSSP and research with the two carbon programmes). These assumptions and evidence are used to shed light on Hot Topic 3, Project Actors and Roles. The concepts of Producer, Producer Organisation and Project Facilitator are each dealt with separately. The second half of the chapter explores the remaining four assumptions alongside (i) the mechanisms detailed in the FCS for achieving and measuring hand over from the Project Facilitator to the Producer Organisation; and (ii) evidence from TIST-Kenya. This discussion provides more understanding of Hot Topic 4, Transfer of Knowledge and Capacities.

7.2. Construction and critical assessment of Theories of Change

7.2.1. Evidence and assumptions in Theories of Change

Theories of Change must be substantiated by evidence and include a variety of perspectives (ISEAL Alliance, 2014a). In discussions convened to articulate them, it is important to allow space for critical thinking, and to triangulate understanding with reference to different people's contextual knowledge, other analytical perspectives, realistic timeframes and trajectories of change given the context, learning, and evidence from multiple sources (Vogel, 2012). The role of evidence is 'to check and challenge assumptions, broaden the range of strategic options potentially relevant to the context, and strengthen the quality of hypotheses to provide a confident basis for action' (Vogel, 2012 p33), but the mix of evidence bases may not align, and the influence of each is often difficult to discern (Mason and Barnes, 2007). The construction of a Theory of Change is an active, intentional and sometimes politically-charged process shaped by different biases depending on who produces them and the resources they draw on in the construction process (Mason and Barnes, 2007, Connell and Kubisch, 1998). The Project Team was exposed to a range of perspectives during the FCSSP but given that the FCS was a new initiative involving a non-tangible commodity produced in a wide variety of set-ups, the best available evidence came either from existing Fairtrade product supply chains not easily comparable with carbon credits, or from the carbon stakeholders' experiences and assumptions about what would work. There were few existing examples of the types of project FTI wanted to certify and the projects to pilot the FCS were only selected in the final phase of the FCSSP.

It is crucial to make different assumptions explicit when developing a standard or an intervention as these are often at the root of debates about strategic choices and decisions and can create tensions and power struggles (Eyben et al., 2008). Assumptions about the Fairtrade approach (including what it involves, and how it should be incorporated into the FCS) also played a key role in shaping the FCS and its Theory of Change. The key elements applied to the FCS were the Fairtrade Minimum Price and Premiums; and concept of Producers, Producer Organisations and additional actors. Whilst there was substantial pressure to include them, these are contested within the Fairtrade movement (see chapter 5).

7.2.2. Learning opportunities in Theory of Change work

Despite pressures to produce a Theory of Change at the beginning of a programme, what is intended to happen cannot be fully predicted because of the non-linear nature of programme developments, context of application and range of possible outcomes interventions (Mason and Barnes, 2007). The Theory of Change approach can be considered as a learning tool for reflecting on what an intervention aims to achieve, to explore the evidence for this, and to incrementally develop and adapt more robust Theory of Changes and Standards (Nelson and Martin, 2011). FTI welcomes research that contributes to their Theories of Change (Fairtrade International, 2015a, Fairtrade International: MEL Unit, 2015) and the Theory of Change approach is well suited to understanding complex interventions, led by organisations such as FTI who are not directly responsible for carrying out the change-inducing actions but are experienced and open to learning (James, 2011).

7.3. Methodological approach: a meta-analysis of the Theory of Change-construction process

7.3.1. Application of the Theory of Change approach to the FCSSP

Appendix 2 lists data sources used in this chapter and section 4.4.5.4 provides an overview of the analytical approach, which was based on logic models. The development of the FCS and its Theory of Change involved drawing on three principal elements: people's mental models, experienced based knowledge and project based examples. My methodological tools of observation, document analysis and interviews within the FCSSP and carbon programmes served as a secondary layer of triangulation between these three elements, resulting in increased opportunities for reflection and learning and additional sources of evidence. Overall this enabled critical assessment of the context for FTI's intervention, what change was envisaged and why, who it would involve, how it would happen, within which timeframe and which evidence there is to support or contradict these assumptions.

Specifically, holistic analysis of the FCSSP enabled me to observe the elements going into the FCS alongside the Theory of Change and to tease out some of the underlying assumptions that were contributing to the choice of particular pathways and sets of interventions and envisaged outputs, outcomes and impacts. Fieldwork in Kenya provided an opportunity to conduct an analysis of two carbon programmes and identify areas of overlap with the FCS (in approach, design, and outcomes) but also some fundamental mismatches. This pointed to the challenges of producing a standard broadly applicable amongst a diversity of project designs, organisational set-ups and contextual specificities and the need to undergo a critical reflection as to which elements of the Fairtrade approach are still applicable in the context of carbon credits.

7.3.2. Core aspects in the FCS Theory of Change

Core aspects of the Theory of Change methodology have been summarised by Vogel (2012 p4). Table 7-1 presents these in relation to the FCS Theory of Change.

Table 7-1: Assessment of core Theory of Change aspects in the FCS Theory of Change

Context for the initiative
FCS was developed in the context of the Fairtrade Climate Strategy, which underscores the need to support producers with adaptation and mitigation (Fairtrade International, 2015c: p3). Rationales are given in the 1st FCS consultation document in terms of enabling those who have contributed less to climate change but are most exposed to its impacts to benefit from carbon finance; and in terms of applying Fairtrade's unique approach to carbon, particularly regarding producer community involvement and right to financially benefit from carbon credit sales (Fairtrade International, 2014 pp2-4).
Long-term outcome that the initiative seeks to support and for whose ultimate benefit
The joint ambition shared by FTI and GSF is 'to create an enabling, fair and empowering carbon market', ensuring that producers and rural communities benefit from mitigation and adaptation activities, and play an increasingly active role whilst receiving technical support (Fairtrade International, 2015c p3).
Process/sequence of change anticipated to lead to the desired long-term outcome
The links between interventions, outputs, outcomes and impacts envisaged in the FCS Theory of Change are very rudimentary- they are laid out in blocks but there are no arrows tracing out pathways between them (Figure 7-1). More understanding and hindsight is needed in order to begin to articulate the pathways through it, and to make sense of the contextual factors unique to each carbon project which will shape them.
Assumptions about how change(s) might happen
Several aspects in the FCS Theory of Change relate directly to Producers and their Organisations but Project Facilitators are also seen as playing a pivotal role in the achievement of desired outcomes (Fairtrade International, 2015c). Box 7-1 shows my analysis of key assumptions apparent in the FCS Theory of Change, numbered on Figure 7-1.
Diagram and narrative summary
See Figure 7-1. In the published FCS, there was no narrative summary but reference is made to the FTI website where more information is given on the Fairtrade general Theory of Change.

Assumption 1: Carbon project participants are 'producers' and self-identify as such

Assumption 2: 'Producers' are in organisations

Assumption 3: People involved in delivering the project or supporting delivery are 'facilitators' and self-identify as such

Assumption 4: In addition to the support from the Fairtrade system, producers receive support from facilitators to build organisations and (via the project manager) to increase their knowledge and capacity in the implementation of carbon projects

Assumption 5: Producer organisations acquire the knowledge and capacity to take on more tasks within the project (at least monitoring tasks) and this leads to them exerting a greater control over it and receiving a larger proportion of the project revenue. These aspects are enjoyed not only by those that do the tasks, but by the organisation and community as a

Box 7-1 Analysis of the assumptions embedded in the FCS Theory of Change



Figure 7-1: FCS Theory of Change annotated with embedded assumptions and aspects explored in this chapter outlined.

N.B. The 'pathway' between the outlined aspects under analytical focus has deliberately not been drawn out because I would like to emphasise that without further articulation of the sequence of change, they are more like stepping stones, requiring leaps of uncertainty between them. The impact pathway I explore involves a vertical progression from the bottom towards the top of the figure, passing by each of the outlined aspects.

7.4. Results part 1: Analysis of assumptions about Hot Topic 3 (Project Actors and Roles)

7.4.1. Assumption 1: Carbon project participants are 'producers' and self-identify as such

The FCS is aimed at the same marginalised small-scale producers who were historically targeted by Fairtrade until agricultural workers begun to share the stage more recently (Reed, 2009). However the FCS defines them on the basis of the amount of carbon credits generated rather than by the amount of land, time spent on and income derived from the farm (as in the Standard for Small Producer Organisations)[35]. The new definition is necessary as agricultural projects are not within the FCS scope, and because carbon project participants are unlikely to spend the majority of their time or derive a substantial part of their incomes from generating carbon credits. The FCS acknowledges that small-scale producers can be households, smallholders, micro-enterprises etc. (Fairtrade International, 2015c). In doing so, it allows for flexibility in the application of the term 'producer' but also ambiguity- it can apply to both the households using an energy-efficient appliance (who in the carbon context would be referred to as 'users' or 'stakeholders') or the smallholder planting trees on-farm, but also potentially to the enterprise producing energy-efficient cook stoves or fitting and maintaining biogas digesters.

7.4.1.1. Mixed evidence from people participating in the FCSSP

Hot Topic 3 was characterised by divergent assumptions about whether or not carbon project participants are 'producers' particularly between stakeholders from within the Fairtrade system and stakeholders familiar with the carbon market (see Table 7-2).

.

[35] Defining small producers on the basis of the amount of work done by family or co-operative members or neighbours is common to both the FCS and the Standard for Small Producer Organisations.

Table 7-2: Extracts of FCSSP discussions illustrating assumptions about 'producers'

Carbon stakeholders	Fairtrade stakeholders
1. 'one thing that really jars, is the constant use of the word "producer". Some of us are using these cash crop groups because they're useful, but many of the people we work with are not clustered according to what they "produce" so we consider them more as "users"... people are not going to immediately see that they are "small producers" and we've had to unpack that' (T.PFS.B.d, p1)	*4. 'Sometimes the words used are not neutral. When we use the term producer, it's with a purpose- we're thinking about clustering of producers [i.e. into organisations] and we're forcing a bit the concept, because we want to emphasise the idea that we're trying to create a model that is empowering, so they can call themselves producers of a commodity going to market' (T.PFS.B.d, p2)*
2. 'So in a cookstove project, the user becomes the producer…In a borehole project, the "producer" is the person drinking the water, because by using the borehole they are no longer boiling the water- [this is what] creates the carbon credit?' (T.PFS.B.b, p6)	*5. 'FLO-ev is an international association of Fairtrade producers. As a producer you join a national platform, and can speak at the national and international level. FLOev is a democratic organisation. That's why we talk about producers, and organised producers…that's why some of us are very reluctant to erase the word producer. It's part of our governance, our raison d'être. You have to understand us, how we work, how we are structured, and why the word "producer" rather than "user" is used' (T.PFS.B.d, p3)*
3. 'For me, the producer is the one who makes a credit out of the wood savings' (T.PFS.B.d, p2)	*6. 'I support the term "producer" remaining in the standard, because what Fairtrade does, is it deals with producer organisations.' (T.PFS.B.d, p3)*

Quotations 1-3 point out the contextual specificities for different types of carbon, and the different tasks involved in creating the carbon credit, suggesting that where the line is drawn depends on each project, and that 'user' and 'producer' are interchangeable but producer is inappropriate as an identity. While there is recognition from Fairtrade staff that the 'producer' concept is not totally appropriate (see quotation 4), quotations 4-6 illustrate the value-laden assumptions upon which the producer concept is based and therefore why it must remain. These

include membership in a system and ideas about how change happens through producer organisations.

7.4.1.2. Contextualising the 'producer' debate: evidence from carbon programmes

The impact of the Fairtrade approach is dependent on the characteristics of each Fairtrade commodity and how it is traded as well as the socio- economic context (Nelson and Martin, 2012, McEwan et al., 2014). Like other commodity chains, 'production' of a carbon credit involves several layers starting with activities to create the emissions reductions, through to activities that successfully transform these reductions into fungible carbon credits. Activities vary in tangibility, requiring different tools and knowledge bases, and considerable resources, often necessitating an ongoing role for different actors (Gupta et al., 2012) such as external scientists, consultants and investors. On the basis of their commodity characteristics, carbon credits can be differentiated from other commodities in that it is harder to ascertain 'when' the production happens, and therefore 'who' is the producer in different carbon resource contexts.

Figure 7-2 illustrates the layers of production (including actors and tasks) involved in the two example programmes as of 2014 when data was collected. The TIST programme shows that it is possible for 'small producers' in the original Fairtrade sense (i.e. small farmers) to be involved in the majority of the layers of production, supported by a permanent role for the U.S. partner in layers 5-7. Layers 3 and 4 are managed by trained contractors who are also member farmers. Meanwhile, in KENDBIP, the producers of the emissions reductions (layers 1 and 2) are decoupled from the rest of the chain (by nature of them being 'users' of the digesters or 'clients' of the entrepreneurs who install them). This is in preparation for the eventual withdrawal of both the Dutch and Kenyan partners, the entrepreneurs are expected to incrementally perform a more active role in ensuring the production of carbon credits, by taking on some monitoring tasks previously performed by the national implementing partner (level 4).



Figure 7-2: illustration of how carbon credits are produced and who is involved in production in example carbon programmes

7.4.1.3. *Self-identification as a producer?*

FTI is triggering a shift in language in the carbon market by naming those who produce the emissions reductions as producers but this reframing is still quite theoretical. This could either help increase the dignity and confidence of these 'producers' or it could create confusion, especially when the 'producers' do not self-identify as such (see quotation 1 in Table 7-2) or when programme managers choose not to disclose technical details about carbon credit production to programme participants. In the TIST programme, farmers are taught that they are in the carbon business and some farmers articulate quite clearly what this means but there is still ambiguity about *how much* carbon they are producing because the actual quantities of carbon stored by different trees in different environments within the programme region are still being studied by US staff. With tangible commodities delivered by weight and distinguished by visible quality criteria, there is less ambiguity. In KENDBIP, I met farmers who knew about carbon credits through being members of TIST, but had not been told that their digesters would be generating carbon credits.

Differences between the two programmes also relate to the materiality of the carbon resource and the work required to ensure its permanence in each case. The TIST example involves an ongoing relationship between farmers and the other layers of production because maintaining or increasing their tree stock necessitates ongoing training, monitoring and payment of regular financial incentives, all of which are facilitated by aggregation of farmers into groups. In the KENDBIP example, the relationship between the users and the other layers of production is

most significant when the digester is being built, after which (if properly installed and appropriately used) it is assumed to function for 10-20 years. The presence and functioning of the digester is the main proxy for calculating emissions reductions[36]. The user does not need to be continually engaged in follow-up activities in the same way as tree-planters - an occasional call suffices. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs, whose livelihoods depend on continuous installation of new digesters, have a reason to be continually engaged in production activities. The next section discusses implications of different carbon resources on the level at which any types of 'organisation' are formed.

7.4.2. Assumption 2: 'Producers' are in organisations

The FCS introduces an innovative concept of the Producer Organisation to the carbon market, understood as the organisation producing the carbon credits. Formation and building up of Producer Organisations has been at the heart of the Fairtrade approach since the 1980s (Smith and VanderHoff Boersma, 2013). Small Producer Organisations continue to be the main form of organisation for small-scale Fairtrade producers (although other forms of organisation are controversially gaining ground within the Fairtrade movement[37]). The Producer Organisation was described in the FCS consultation draft as an attempt to 'bring increased socio-economic and community empowerment elements in the carbon world, and put producers at the heart of the decision-making for their project, lives and communities' (Fairtrade International, 2014 footnote 3, p15). Despite objections to the organisational structuring requirements[38] and the resulting decision to relax the requirements for some types of projects, FTI persisted with the Producer Organisation concept, explaining that 'one of the core benefits of the FCS should be that producers join or form producer organisations to achieve economies of scale, be better positioned to negotiate prices and progressively take on carbon trading tasks or carbon project management responsibly' (Fairtrade International, 2015b p5). The FCS states that mandating that individual producers are part of an organisation is a way to ensure that project benefits reach them (Fairtrade International, 2015c p20).

---

[36] This is on the basis of calculations about how much biomass fuel is saved by using the biogas as a replacement fuel. Nevertheless, these calculations may involve assumptions that the farmer will no longer use biomass fuel for cooking needs, which may not be the case.

[37] Such as Hired Labour set-ups and Joint Bodies within the Hired Labour Standard, Producer Organisations and Promoting Bodies within the Contract Production Standard and looser forms of organisation accepted under Fairtrade USA's requirements.

[38] The consultation synopsis states that the majority of participants of the first consultation disagreed on the basis that that they were too demanding in the context of carbon projects, and that small producers of Fair Carbon Credits did not necessarily have the ambition to join or form strong organisations, especially in the context of domestic energy projects involving usage of cook stoves or water filters.

7.4.2.1. Academic research evidence on Fairtrade Producer Organisations and farmers organisations

The emphasis on the Producer Organisation resonates with other commodities, where there is an implicit assumption that improvements to the quality of individual producers' lives happens via producer organisations (Ronchi, 2002) and that producer organisations are willing to channel benefits to members and the wider community (Phillips, 2014, Blowfield and Dolan, 2010). However, there is insufficient empirical evidence both within literature on Fairtrade producer organisations and also farmer organisations more generally, as to the organisational structures and mechanisms via which such improvements happen (Ruben et al., 2009, Hannan, 2014, Fairtrade International, 2015a), how this varies across geographical specificities (Nelson and Pound, 2010), different commodities and different forms of farmer organisation and to what extent improvements noted are predetermined by pre-existing conditions (Tallontire et al., 2012). Given that the FCS introduces a new degree of flexibility around organisational forms (both in terms of what they might look like when projects are first certified, and in terms of how they evolve over time- see below), there is even greater need to understand organisational development processes and internal/ external factors within the context of carbon projects.

7.4.2.2. Mixed evidence from Q interviews:

> *'I think the principle of organised communities in terms of carbon credits doesn't necessarily work in the same way as when you're speaking about co-operatives of agricultural producers- that concept doesn't translate' (carbon project technician, Q interview, August 2014).*

The Producer Organisation concept was called into question during Q interviews, FCSSP workshops as well as in the consultation, but it is central to the Fairtrade approach (see quotations 4, 5 and 6 in Table 7-2). My Q study created space to explore the narratives and counter-narratives in more detail. Figure 7-3 presents a range of opinions on 'organisation' which were voiced during Q interviews with Fairtrade and carbon market stakeholders. The matrix is based on a compilation of opinions voiced by 15 people- 8 from within Fairtrade and 7 from the carbon sector in reaction to 5 statements in a Q sort interview that related to organisation of communities and/or producers.



Figure 7-3: views on organisation elicited during Q sort interviews

Figure 7-3 shows the following aspects

- The horizontal string of opinions across the middle of the matrix are non-committal about whether organisation is essential from the outset or not, but can be differentiated in terms of moral arguments for enabling non- or less organised communities to enter the Fairtrade system, and pragmatic arguments which acknowledge the limits to organisational requirements in particular contexts.
- The majority of opinions stated by stakeholders from within Fairtrade agree that organisation is important, even if it is not always feasible from the outset, but some question what is meant by 'organisation'. This reflects broader discussions within the Fairtrade movement. One of the reasons for Fairtrade USA's split from FTI was because the Latin American Producer Network did not agree with their proposal to open up the system to include unorganised producers (Bennett, 2012).
- Few stakeholders from the carbon market are positive about organisation and several of them point out negative aspects of organisation.

7.4.2.3. Contextualising the 'organisation' debate: evidence from two carbon programmes

7.4.2.3.1 TIST: a movement composed of multiple representative nodes

TIST-Kenya is sometimes described by its members as more of a movement, reflecting its dynamic and fast-expanding nature. It is not a formal organisation, but its form does allow for democratic, transparent decision making and elections, communication and feedback and record keeping about membership and participation required by the FCS. It is composed of multiple nodes of farmers aggregated at different levels, and a series of coordinating activities and feedback mechanisms between levels (Figure 7-4). Farmers meet regularly in small groups and during 'Cluster' meetings to share best practices and technical advice. Clusters assemble farmers living within walking distance while ensuring efficient service delivery and relay of information. Each Cluster is appointed a 'servant[39]', who is contracted to collect monitoring data, relay information, oversee financial transactions, deliver training and nurture the Cluster and its elected leaders[40]. Internal auditors visit the Clusters to monitor progress, identify training needs, problems or incomprehension, and arrange visits to individual farms to cross-check data

[39] This name is based on the TIST principle of members being servants to one another.
[40] Clusters practice rotational leadership. They elect members to three consecutive leadership positions, each of which is normally occupied for 3 months before moving on to the next, and eventually standing down.

collected by Cluster Servants. Additional aggregation occurs at Group of Clusters Councils, and at the Leadership Council, where senior TIST members meet to manage field operations and take operational decisions.

The eventual aim is that Clusters self-govern, self-report and manage their own payment distribution, in order to minimise related costs, bring services closer to the membership, and pay them bonuses for the additional tasks taken on. Since year 8 (2013), Clusters were encouraged to transform into legally recognised entities, such as Associations, Community Based Organisations (CBOs) or Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs) and open bank accounts. By year 9, most Clusters had begun this process of their own accord, but by 2016 many had experienced difficulties with the registration process and were questioning the futility (personal communication with CAAC, June 2016). Participants of the Participatory Policy Analysis workshop considered that having a formal Producer Organisation could be important for protecting the producers against unscrupulous facilitators but in TIST's case groups were not required to formally register when joining the programme because of the cost inhibition and because farmers needed time to know each other, receive training, get to know the carbon business they were engaging in, and develop managerial capacities (TIST.PPA).

Figure 7-4: Levels of aggregation within TIST-Kenya



7.4.2.3.2 KENDBIP: attempts at top-down organisation-building

In the KENDBIP programme, organisational development is a top-down strategy initiated by the Dutch and Kenyan partners and focussed at the level of the entrepreneurs. The programme funding was ending in 2016, and therefore was aiming 'to devolve activities to the private sector in order to ensure durability, serving as a temporary interface... enabling [biogas entrepreneurs] to take additional steps in the value chain' (KEND.Int1).

They initiated the National Biogas Association and nine Regional Biogas Associations during 2013 (year 5 of the programme) as a step towards devolvement. Visions for these associations included building their capacities to conduct their own marketing; raise their own funds to support digester installation costs; self-regulate quality management within the sector; collect their own monitoring data; deal with the external carbon auditors (validators and verifiers) and eventually put their own credits on the market, aggregating them at the national level. Other functions performed by the Dutch and Kenyan partners would potentially be transferred to the Dutch organisation coordinating the carbon Programme of Activities they were expecting KENDBIP to join.

However, by mid-2014 the National Biogas Association was just a framework, and the vision had not been 'internalised' by the biogas entrepreneurs (KEND.Int1). Members of one of the regional associations were struggling to formally register their association because of a shortage of people willing to pay membership fees and attend meetings. One of them commented 'I haven't seen any benefits by now, but we were told it is better to form an association' (KEND.Int3). Relating to this struggle, one of the programme management staff noted that 'the association still needs to be made relevant for them. Coming to a meeting is perhaps not a priority- they want to construct biogas and make money' (KEND.Int1). Notably, the organisation envisaged by the Dutch and Kenyan partners is more of an industrial association of biogas entrepreneurs, composed of independent owner operators. There may be fewer benefits and higher costs related to collective action or participation in an organisation compared to the typical Fairtrade Producer Organisation. In the case of the former, associating is promoted as a strategy for enhancing reputation, but there is also a risk that this could weaken individual entrepreneurs' business strengths (for example personal reputations, relationships with clients) or allow weaker entrepreneurs to free-ride.

A National Biogas Users' Association was also initiated by the programme, but this consisted of a number of geographically dispersed enthusiastic biogas users and the association's field presence was minimal because the numbers of users were still few within any one local population (KEND.Int1). KENDBIP programme staff commented that groups at the user level do indeed serve many purposes and make life easier for most service providers (trainers, credit providers and biogas technicians). They can also serve as platforms for conducting monitoring and evaluation, for example because farmers compare notes on the performance of their digesters. However, farmers often take part in multiple groups already, and these groups can be used as platforms rather than attempting to unite people in one locality purely on the basis of them being digester-users.

7.4.3. Assumption 3: People involved in delivering the project or supporting delivery are 'facilitators' and self-identify as such

The FCS and its Theory of Change recognise that Producer Organisations might not be able to manage all the tasks related to the project and certification by themselves, at least initially. Producer Organisations can therefore receive assistance from an external actor called the Project Facilitator who supports the Producer Organisation (via a Project Manager appointed by the Producer Organisation) to gradually take more ownership. This actor is a transformation of the role of a project proponent, project owner or project developer in carbon terms. The relationship between the Producer Organisation and the Project Facilitator was initially considered temporary (RRf.1), but concerns expressed during the second consultation by certain stakeholders who would take on the role of Project Facilitator, that they were being 'withdrawn' from the project (Fairtrade International, 2015b) led to a new guidance note in the final FCS indicating that the transfer of capacities does not mean the Project Facilitator 'will fully disengage from the process over time, but that her/ his role should decrease over time, while the Project Manager continuously develops his/her capacities and skills' (Fairtrade International, 2015c p22, guidance note for 2.2.1). In practice, the Producer Organisation may grant the Project Facilitator substantial discretionary powers. For example, the Project Facilitator can be the certificate holder, open the project bank account, manage the project and certification, manage funds on behalf of the Producer Organisation (including receiving the Fairtrade Minimum Price and deducting their own costs, receiving the Premium and transferring it to the Producer Organisation) and manage trading of carbon credits. The FCS mandates a contractual agreement between the Producer Organisation and the Project Facilitator to formalise and render transparent their relationship.

7.4.3.1. Mixed evidence from people taking part in the FCSSP

When a group of carbon and Fairtrade stakeholders were asked by the Project Team, 'So do we all agree that the Producer Organisation should have an increasing role, and the Project Facilitator a decreasing role over time?', several responded 'No!' (T.PFS.B.b, p8). I interpreted this reluctance as motivated by self-interest and a desire to maintain a function for oneself, as well by the view that the work and existence of the Project Facilitator remains necessary for the success of the project (Box 7-2):

'the women using the stove…must have a feel of what is going on, but she won't become a carbon expert… you will never get the [coordinator/ organisation that registers the programme] withdrawing because we monitor (statistical work and all the complicated stuff), and we will always do that' (T.PFS.B.b, p8).

'It's unrealistic to withdraw the project facilitator at any time during the crediting period of the project activity… some of [the roles they offer] could be handed over, but in 99% of projects, people don't even know what carbon is' (T.PFS.B.b, p7).

Box 7-2: Quotations from participants of the Producer/ Field staff workshop in Bonn about roles of Project Facilitators and involvement of project participants

Discussions at the workshops with carbon market stakeholders and project implementers were often dominated by those who had limited or no experience of projects where participants really were playing a leading role in delivering the project or were even substantially organised, but there were occasional examples of where this does take place (see Box 7-3, from T.GE.09.14, p19). Similarly, a Latin American producer representative advocated against the role of an external facilitator and expected the support required to come from FTI. He said that if Producer Organisations have to hire an external facilitator they will not accept carbon projects under this condition (*T.PFS.B.b, p9*).

This dialogue was about whether the community organisation really needed to be the formal owner of the carbon credits, registered under their name in a carbon account. On the left are comments from a carbon project consultant working with Fairtrade producer organisations. On the right are comments from others in the subgroup (text in bold is my own emphasis):

But the community organisation is supposed to do the project

This will be complicated. It may be [done] on behalf of them

In our case, the cooperative is the owner of the carbon account. We're just supporting them to own and manage

This might be a rare case

But isn't the idea that the community ***contracts*** *the carbon facilitator. So the* ***community is really taking decisions*** *and* ***everything is supported by the facilitator****?*

Box 7-3: Dialogue from a subgroup discussion

7.5. Discussion: Project Actors and Roles

This part of the chapter has begun to address questions 1.3 and 1.4 of this thesis by unpacking the evidence and assumptions within the FCS Theory of Change that relate specifically to Hot Topic 3 (project actors and roles) and turning to two example carbon programmes for insight on possible pathways to outcomes and impacts envisaged by the Theory of Change. Thus far, the analysis has unpacked the first three assumptions. The next part of the chapter does the same for assumptions 4-7 and links them to Hot Topic 4. The Theory of Change and the envisaged impact pathway is firmly rooted in the concepts of Producer, Producer Organisation and Project Facilitator. However, evidence from example carbon programmes combined with *v*iews expressed by stakeholders involved in the FCSSP (some of whom are likely to be involved in implementing some of the first carbon projects to become Fairtrade certified) cast some doubt on the solidity of all three concepts and demonstrate how they are shaped by context and intentions.

Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 problematised the applicability of the label 'Producer' and the practicality of organisation at the base level of production in some contexts. The TIST-Kenya example illustrates the dynamic and long term nature of organisation-building and formalising, and the advantages and disadvantages of legal recognition of a Producer Organisation at the outset. KENDBIP shows that organisation is not intuitive at the lowest level of production, though it may serve the service provider. When initiated from top-down, it may not have genuine ownership by the people who have been 'told' to organise themselves. This point also problematises assumption 5 (see Box 7-1), explored later in the chapter.

These findings have the following implications. Firstly, the purpose of the Producer Organisation cannot be assumed as this may vary across projects and carbon resources. The benefits of being in a Producer Organisation are apparent when it allows individual producers of small undifferentiated quantities of products to aggregate their production and bargain for more favourable collective sales. This could be translated to a group of people generating small amounts of emissions reductions which need to be aggregated to create saleable tonnes of carbon credits. However, building collective bargaining power first requires a strong sense of identity as a 'producer of emissions reductions', the challenges of which are outlined above. Where 'producers' are dispersed over a large geographical area, the monetary value of the emissions reductions that each one is delivering is relatively low and the carbon aspect which unites them does not constitute a major part of their livelihood, this collective identity may be even harder to develop unless people are already united for another purpose. This finding is supported by McEwan et al.'s (2014) research with a raisin-producing co-operative in South

Africa. They recognise that it has been difficult to establish an effective and representative Producer Organisation in a context where capacity and confidence of the membership is low, producers are geographically dispersed and community cohesion is problematic. As the Producer Organisation alone has been unable to foster community development along Fairtrade lines, they recommend building on pre-existing positive elements of community life such as friendship and support networks and churches as a means for improving lines of communication between members. Throughout this chapter, evidence from the TIST programme is used to illustrate the value of incrementally building up a strong producer base united by common principles as a result of ongoing learning and adjustment and the crucial work of lots of people who move between the layers. While organisation-building is often assumed to be a key strategy for value chain development (Albu and Griffith, 2005), it is important to accord programmes the space and time to define themselves the most appropriate kind of organisation and division of roles. This is supported by van Beuningen and Knorringa (2009) who note that a producer organisation's structure may need to evolve as the group, its performance and level of trust develop or when problems arise. The FCS accords slightly more flexibility to Producer Organisations compared to the Standard for Small Producer Organisations but this may not be sufficient for an evolving organisation like TIST-Kenya and suggests the potential for exclusion.

Secondly, Fairtrade imagines a role for the Producer Organisation as a pivot for empowering producer communities and for channelling benefits of Fairtrade to its members and the surrounding community. For example, the Producer Organisation is a forum for deciding democratically on how to spend the Fairtrade Premium, attached to sales of Fairtrade products. The KENDBIP example suggests that forming an organisation at the level of the service provider (the Biogas Association) rather than the level of the emissions-saver may prove more practical. In such cases, it is unclear where the focus of empowerment and spending of the premium should be targeted (e.g. with the entrepreneurs or with the users of the biogas digesters), who constitutes the surrounding community, and how empowerment or benefit-sharing are expected to flow between actors if at all. The Premium is a key intervention in the FCS but is beyond this chapter's scope.

Section 7.4.3 has suggested that the imagined role of the Project Facilitator and his/ her relationship with the Producer Organisation is contingent on the Project Facilitator's intentions, the degree of organisation of the Producers, and their actual or assumed capacity, all of which are likely to vary across contexts. This warrants closer examination, and is therefore explored in the next part of the chapter with respect to the TIST programme.

7.6. Results part 2: Exploration of Hot Topic 4 (Transfer of Knowledge and Capacities)

This part of the chapter continues to use the Theory of Change approach to shed light on Hot Topic 4. I unravel further the envisaged impact pathway in the FCS Theory of Change through a more detailed examination of the five assumptions related to the transfer of knowledge and capacity from the Project Facilitator to the Producer Organisation, and its relationship to organisational strengthening and empowerment of individual members.

Assumptions 4-7 from Box 7-1 are explored, some in more detail than others:

- *Assumption 4:* Producer Organisations acquire the knowledge and capacity to take on more tasks within the project (at least monitoring tasks) and this leads to them exerting a greater control over it and receiving a larger proportion of the project revenue.
- *Assumption 5:* The benefits of greater control and a larger proportion of the revenue, are enjoyed by not only those that do the tasks but by the organisation and community as a whole.
- *Assumption 6:* Efforts to build capacity extend their impact (beyond the project manager) to the whole organisation.
- *Assumption 7:* Taking on more tasks within carbon projects contributes to producers gaining influence and status within the carbon sector. This impact is felt at an individual level (as well as within organisations and communities).

I also identify 9 mechanisms within the FCS which are intended to incentivise, ensure or measure this transfer (Table 7-3) and explore each one in relation to evidence from TIST-Kenya. As an exemplary project, TIST-Kenya illuminates how some of the envisaged mechanisms have been successfully operationalised, but also which contextual factors shape them, and where alternative approaches have resulted in comparable outcomes. At the end of the section, I summarise some potential limits to the FCS mechanisms for transfer of knowledge and skills and signal areas for FTI's attention as the FCS is rolled out.

Table 7-3: Mechanisms for transfer in the FCS (Fairtrade International, 2015c)

A	**Committing intentions to transfer** Contractual agreement (year 0) must include this as a clause.
B	**Framing of the relationship between Project Facilitator and Producer Organisation** Introduction to FCS: allows requirements to be 'outsourced' by the Producer Organisation to the Project Facilitator if the Producer Organisation is unable to carry them out. Contractual agreement (year 0) must include the clause that the Producer Organisation commissions the Project Facilitator to perform a support role, and is able to replace the Project Facilitator if they do not fulfil their function.
C	**Planned transfer** Contractual agreement (year 0) must specify how and when knowledge will be transferred for which activities. Core requirement (year 1): the Project Facilitator develops a plan for transfer with specific indicators
D	**Transfer via the Project Manager, to the Producer Organisation** Core requirement (year 3): the Producer Organisation designates Project Manager(s) who should be internal to the Producer Organisation, to take responsibility for project management and implementation. The Project Facilitator works closely with the Project Manager(s)
E	**Mandatory taking over of responsibilities by the Producer Organisation** Core requirement, which must start happening gradually as from year 3, applies at least to monitoring of carbon performance.
F	**Time limit for transfer in certain project types** Core requirement 2.2.12 (year 0): the contractual agreement cannot last more than $1/5^{th}$ of the crediting period for Afforestation/ Reforestation projects (for example year 6 or 8), suggesting that the Project Facilitator should no longer be involved in management after this.
G	**Increasing participation of Producer Organisation members in internal control of their organisation** Development requirement (optional, year 3)
H	**Clarity and transparency regarding ownership of assets, documents, investments, costs incurred, payment for services** Contractual agreement (year 0) must specify these and they should be discussed in regular meetings between the Project Facilitator and the Producer Organisation.
I	**Financial incentives for the Producer Organisation to take on more tasks** (Contractual agreement and core requirement 5.5.3, both year 0): the FMP is shared between the Project Facilitator and Producer Organisation based on the costs of the tasks they each conduct

7.6.1. Roles, relationship and transfer between the Project Facilitator and the Producer Organisation: an in-depth look at the TIST programme

The TIST-Kenya example offers particularly valuable lessons given their 10 years of experience and the programme's relative success in achieving some of the outcomes which are at higher risk of non-delivery within the FCS or have been found to fall short within other Fairtrade certification contexts. While some of the programme features are based on parallel Standards frameworks (the Verified Carbon Standard and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard), other features are the result of a careful and incremental crafting to fit the cultural, social, political and economic context; the evolving needs of the programme and TIST members; and underlying core values and principles.

7.6.1.1. TIST Programme Structure, Design and Intentions to Transfer

Table 7-4: Assumptions 4/5 and Mechanisms A-D

Assumptions	Mechanisms
4. Producer Organisations acquire the knowledge and capacity to take on more tasks within the project (at least monitoring tasks) and this leads to them exerting a greater control over it and receiving a larger proportion of the project revenue. 5. The benefits of greater control and a larger proportion of the revenue, are enjoyed by not only those that do the tasks but by the organisation and community as a whole.	A: Committing intentions to transfer B: Framing of the relationship between Project Facilitator and Producer Organisation C: Planned transfer D: Transfer via the Project Manager, to the Producer Organisation

Table 7-4 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. The TIST programme and evolving structure is not designed with the intention of complete handover to the Producer Organisation. Instead, the aim is to enable participation and maximise returns to farmers, through a strategy involving minimising management and operational costs. Five of the initial eight staff in the US supporting the programme have gradually devolved their duties to Kenyan staff, while Kenyan office staffing has reduced from an administrator and four staff, to two permanent staff. TIST members have worked hand-in -hand with the founder (hereafter referred to as Project Facilitator) from the outset to design and implement the programme, and have gradually increased their capacity to do so but this is a delicate and incremental process, and ten years after the programme was initiated, Clean Air Action Corporation and the office staff and Leadership Council continue to take management and operational decisions together, providing opportunities for other TIST members to contribute during seminars, Council and

Cluster meetings. The Leadership Council now meets without the presence of the Project Facilitator but he is in regular contact with them and visits annually. His financial investments are still tied up in the project, and there is continued uncertainty about the amount of carbon stored, credits to be generated and associated risks; and he intervenes to ensure the programme's commitments to its values, members and partners. As an example, the election of new members of the Leadership Council in June 2014 was the result of what the Project Facilitator called 'guided democracy' whereby he intervened to ensure that the members proposing the criteria for the election process had properly examined their implications. Once inclusive criteria had been agreed, members were left to facilitate their own decision-making process.

Members of the TIST Leadership Council endorsed the idea of a Producer Organisation and a Project Facilitator working hand-in-hand, with a gradual transfer of capacities from the latter to the former (policy appraisal workshop). However, they feared that a standard which was too prescriptive on the nature of the relationship between the two, or too stringent on the timelines for handover, might damage a project or create complications for both parties.

> *'When you come up with a standard, you always choke innovation, because people no longer think out of the box about the best way to go...so in the framing of the standard... it should be clear that it can accommodate innovations, and even support them. It should enable people to explain why they did things the way they did' (TIST member, TIST.PPA).*

The contractual agreement in the FCS does leave room for discussion between actors in a particular project as to which activities they intend the Producer Organisation to take on and when. However, circumscribing them from the outset (in year 0 when the contractual agreement is signed) may choke flexibility and adaptation. The actors involved in implementing the TIST programme operate more like a football team, where the division of roles is clear-cut, and each player is recognised for his/her function and contribution. The farmers in defence save the emissions, the contractors help make the emissions reductions marketable, and the Project Facilitator on the attack scores goals for the whole team by selling credits on the market (analogy developed with TIST members). The Project Facilitator's ultimate responsibility for certification, financial management and sales is seen as a (semi-) permanent arrangement, as he himself testified:

'I'm going to be doing this for the rest of my life' (TIST.Int1)

A TIST contractor pointed out that they needed someone playing the role of investor/ facilitator to offer money to pay for developing project documents, developing the methodologies, making pre-payments, paying for monitoring, validation and verification, and selling credits and that

this actor should be compensated. She noted that it is complex and takes time and resources to generate credits and sell them and only if the market was stable could they do more themselves. She and colleagues have tried to sell credits in Kenya but potential clients have struggled to understand the concept of carbon credits.

7.6.1.2. Involving TIST members in monitoring

Table 7-5: Assumption 5 and Mechanism E

Assumption	Mechanisms
5. The benefits of greater control and a larger proportion of the revenue, are enjoyed by not only those that do the tasks but by the organisation and community as a whole.	E: Mandatory taking over of responsibilities by the Producer Organisation

Table 7-5 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. TIST Kenya has worked hard to instil accuracy and develop monitoring (Figure 7-5) and has exceeded the requirements of the FCS by involving members in monitoring from the outset (rather than from year 3). The system has evolved in terms of human resources and technology. Figure 7-6 indicates the system in 2014 (year 9). At this point the programme had been providing training and running trial exercises. These aimed at building the capacity of the Group of Cluster Councils to collect their own monitoring data on tree size, species, but the trials produced some inaccurate results (including lots of cases of exaggerated numbers of trees). This demonstrated that a premature handover is dangerous to the programme at large but a gradual transfer of responsibilities based on incremental building up of both human and technological capacity has worked well in TIST-Kenya's case. This is facilitated by the extent of internet coverage in rural Kenya.

Figure 7-5 Accuracy: one of the TIST programme values

Figure 7-6: TIST-Kenya system for monitoring

Step	Actors
Yearly quantification of trees in each grove[41] (parcel(s) of land assigned to tree planting by TIST member): Location of tree grove created in the database and GPS coordinates recorded Number of trees quantified by age and species, using local and scientific names Circumference readings taken for trees above breast height and used to calculate diameter; photos taken Data synchronised via palm computer- goes to database and online	Cluster Servants in each local area  Cluster Servant measuring tree diameter
Desk audit, checking for errors in each grove against a baseline. Any errors queried by phone. If data is complete, the tree grove is next due for quantification a year later.	TIST contractor responsible for Kenyan data management and audit coordination
Preparation of monthly audit schedule (9 auditors do audits during the first fortnight of every month)	
Random sampling of groves: GPS coordinates recorded Trees re-quantified to ensure validity of data Data synchronised	TIST auditors, accompanied by the local Cluster Servant  Data recorded in palm computer
Database management and preparation for visits by verifiers	Clean Air Action Corporation staff in US and Tanzania

[41] In 2014 this was in the process of shifting to a three-yearly quantification as a cost-reduction strategy, based on observations that trees in TIST member's small scale agroforestry systems were at low risk of being cut.

TIST Timelines for transfer

Table 7-6: Assumption 5 and Mechanism F

Assumption	Mechanism
5. The benefits of greater control and a larger proportion of the revenue, are enjoyed by not only those that do the tasks but by the organisation and community as a whole.	F: Time limit for transfer in certain project types

Table 7-6 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. Despite TIST-Kenya's progress in transferring knowledge and capacity to Producer Organisation members, as an afforestation/ reforestation project it would be at risk of decertification because the Project Facilitator continues to be involved beyond the timeframe of 6 years mandated in the FCS. Table 7-7 compares the FCS timeline with the actual accomplishment of tasks and evolution of roles within TIST-Kenya, assuming the programme was launched in year 0. While some aspects of the FCS timeline were effectively reached early (for example involvement of farmers in monitoring from the outset), other aspects have taken much longer (such as the formalisation of the clusters) or have not been achieved.

TIST members noted the timeframe for achieving milestones, learning skills and taking on additional aspects of the management and implementation process relate closely to the nature of the carbon resource (TIST.PPA). Tree planting projects require a longer timeframe because it takes several years of tree growth before carbon can be reliably measured, whereas with biogas digesters, emissions savings can be calculated from the moment the digester is installed and operational. Different project types also require different frequencies of external auditing, so if the Producer Organisation is going to learn these skills, in a tree-planting project they may have to wait longer to witness the first audit and take on a more active role in the second one[42].

The key lesson from this section is that transfer of capacities and handover of tasks takes time, and is not necessarily in the interests of the people expected to take on the tasks, especially when the handover is premature. There is a danger that the FCS requirements could instigate premature handover by putting pressure on a programme to hand over tasks sooner than the realities on the ground allow. Rigid prescriptions about how and when activities should be taken on by the Producer Organisation would run the risk of excluding programmes at the outset or delisting them during subsequent audits. Certification has already been criticised as being more about proving compliance rather than improving performance (Tallontire et al., 2012). FTI

[42] However in the TIST case, because the programme in Kenya is registered as a number of different sub-programmes, each with their own auditing cycle, there is a higher frequency of audits on the ground compared to a project only registered once.

has factored in the need to be flexible by setting the majority of tasks that the Producer Organisation should take on as *development requirements* but these are contingent on decisions made by the auditor FLOCERT. It is important that the lessons learned from existing programmes are taken into account when setting out the development criteria, especially in term of how long it has actually taken to build capacity of Producer Organisations.

Table 7-7: Comparison between timelines in the FCS and temporal evolution of TIST-Kenya

FCS timeline	TIST-Kenya
Producer Organisation set up* (year 0)	Some form of farmer groups and aggregated groups set up from year 0 but not legally recognised and had no bank accounts. In year 8, Clusters began taking steps to formalise into CBOs and Cooperatives (legally recognised, eligible for bank accounts).
Certification **Project Facilitator responsible for certification** (year 0) **Producer Organisation appoints their own certification manager** (year 3)	Clean Air Action Corporation was initially responsible for collating initial project and certification documentation, with assistance from project administrator/ TIST-Kenya contractors. Documentation was developed between years 2 and 7. First audit was in year 5 and the programme received its first certification in year 6. During subsequent audits in years 7 and 9, TIST contractors took on some tasks, but Clean Air Action Corporation continues to manage certification.
Project Management **Project Facilitator and Producer Organisation sign contractual agreement** (year 0) **Project Manager appointed** (year 3) **Project Facilitator develops plan for transfer of skills and capacities to Producer Organisation** (year 1) **Project Facilitator gradually transfers management to Producer Organisation** (year 3) **Producer Organisation increasingly involves its members** (year 3)	Project administrator was appointed in year 0 and worked for 3 years before leaving. A number of office staff have also been employed since the outset and other key tasks are done by TIST contractors (recruited from the TIST farmer membership). From outset, Clean Air Action Corporation and the Leadership Council have taken management decisions and involved TIST contractors and farmers during seminars, Councils and Cluster meetings. Contractual agreements signed between individual farmers and Project Facilitator, not with TIST-Kenya. No specific plan for transfer- this has evolved organically.
Monitoring **Producer Organisation gradually develops skills and capacities to monitor carbon performance** (from year 3)	TIST farmers have been involved in monitoring since year 0. In year 9, TIST began making attempts to transfer greater responsibility to the Clusters but concluded that more training was needed

*Producer Organisation must have at outset: a) a form of structure enabling democratic and transparent decisions and democratically elected representatives, b) established communication and feedback system, c) clear written rules and records of membership and project participation, d) a bank account if Producer Organisation is a legal entity (otherwise this can be held by the Project Facilitator)

Core requirements (must be met); *Development requirements* (must achieve a minimum number-determined by FLOCERT, the auditing organisation)

7.6.1.3. Extending knowledge and capacities to the wider Producer Organisation: Rotational Leadership and *Kujengana*

Table 7-8: Assumptions 5/6/7 and Mechanism D

Assumptions	Mechanism
5. The benefits of greater control and a larger proportion of the revenue are enjoyed by not only those that do the tasks but by the organisation and community as a whole. 6. Efforts to build capacity extend their impact (beyond the project manager) to the whole organisation. 7. Taking on more tasks within carbon projects contributes to producers gaining influence and status within the carbon sector. This impact is felt at an individual level (as well as within organisations and communities).	D: Transfer via the Project Manager, to the Producer Organisation

Table 7-8 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. The assumptions within the FCS are that building up the capacities of a Project Manager who is a member of the Producer Organisation will enable the Producer Organisation as a whole to increase their capacity (assumption 6), take on the project, exert more control and enjoy greater benefits (assumption 5) and that this extends out beyond those that do the tasks to organisation and wider community (assumption 7). This extension relies on mechanisms of transfer between the Project Manager and other members of the Producer Organisation and these are not specified within the FCS. However, in their absence, there is a danger of concentrating skills and knowledge in the Project Manager who could then leave, meaning that efforts to build his/ her capacity are not harvested within the Producer Organisation. TIST-Kenya's early years exemplify this because the Project Manager initially appointed left after 3 years. He went into politics and later became Governor of his region and as he was a supporter and close ally of the programme, TIST-Kenya was able to continue harvesting the fruits of his leadership and management capacities, but not as originally envisaged.

Meanwhile, from the outset, the TIST-Kenya programme design has incorporated unique mechanisms which do allow for an extension of leadership capacities beyond the initial core, primarily by means of Rotational Leadership and the best practice of 'Building Up' Leaders or *Kujengana* in Kiswahili. These practices are incorporated within all the layers of the organisation, from the Leadership Council down to the Clusters and Small Groups. In the Leadership Council, duration of service as Leader is six months, after which the leader rotates. In the Clusters, there are three leadership positions of Accountability, Co-Leader and Leader which are deliberate reframing of the titles Treasurer, Secretary and Chairman. A member begins the leadership cycle in Accountability, and remains for three months before moving along the cycle. After nine months in positions, the member rotates out but is on hand to support

the people following him or her in the cycle. The rationale for rotational leadership is that community groups are often led by the same people throughout their existence, and are often dependent on them, or experience leaders who expropriate human resources (TIST.Int3). The idea came from church groups in Tanzania, where the TIST founders had worked as missionaries. Church group members had noted that if leadership changed regularly, it enabled women and quieter people to speak up and access positions that would otherwise have been concentrated amongst the same people more permanently (TIST.PO1). The result is that multiple people develop leadership skills and a group is not dependent on a leader in his or her absence.

The practice of *kujengana* is recommended within TIST as a way of ensuring that leadership skills and qualities are recognised and strengthened within particular individuals. It involves providing positive, specific appraisal to leaders or anyone who has contributed something to the group, based on observable behaviour. These comments are given publically, often when leadership is changing, or sometimes at every Cluster meeting. As unintended consequences, a co-leader sometimes tries to emulate all the qualities that a leader was praised for, and strive to do even more. These qualities sometimes become the values of a particular group. The quotation below is a testimony of a woman who initially lacked confidence and hesitated to come forward as a leader but experienced the uplifting that Rotational Leadership and *kujengana* targets:

> *'Interacting with people has become easier. I used to find it difficult to interact with people but through the rotational leadership, I took a turn at being a leader, and people encouraged me by telling me good things about what I had done as a leader. This is good because through rotational leadership, everybody has a turn at being a leader, even if you are shy. Some don't find it easy to be a leader but people encourage you and it builds you up' (TIST.Test).*

These practices are highly innovative and harbour potential for application elsewhere. However, their success depends on how they are practised, in which context and under which conditions. I collected anecdotal evidence of their strengths, design features and limitations during research with TIST-Kenya and these warrant further exploration but it is beyond the thesis scope to include them here. Nevertheless TIST's Rotational Leadership practices were commended by a District Forest Officer who listed many of the same advantages mentioned by TIST members. He noted that it is cultivating leadership growth amongst TIST members, enabling more people to have management skills, and encouraging the co-existence of leaders. This is an important non-financial benefit which the literature review in chapter 2 did not pick up on.

7.6.1.4. Increasing participation of TIST members

Table 7-9: Assumption 6 and Mechanism G

Assumption	Mechanism
6. Efforts to build capacity extend their impact (beyond the project manager) to the whole organisation.	G: Increasing participation of Producer Organisation members in internal control of their organisation

Table 7-9 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. In the FCS, Producer Organisations have the option of whether or not to promote producer participation in the internal control of the Producer Organisation (development requirement from year 3). Several stakeholders taking part in the FCSSP (including those who loaded on factors 2 and 3 in the Q study, see chapter 5) disputed the value of this in some circumstances. Participation in internal control of a carbon project requires willingness, access to information, and the capacity to understand it. Some stakeholders claimed that project participants do not want to get more involved, or that the majority do not understand what carbon is (see quotations in Box 7-2) but the carbon awareness amongst TIST-Kenya members serves as counter evidence. TIST-Kenya has put a strong emphasis on training, information sharing and checking whether people have understood, especially when they are new to the programme (for example during pre-membership training, seminars, newsletters, Cluster meetings, audits of training and Cluster meetings). This has not been straightforward, as two of the pioneers involved in TIST in its early days in Kenya recollect:

> *'It was rocket science at the beginning, fighting ignorance- "how do you carry the carbon from that tree?" how to convince people that that "money is good money". It was a challenge to get people to understand, because even the foresters do not understand, and community rely on them for information on forests. Also, because the carbon market is dynamic, we cannot say it will be this way tomorrow' (TIST.Int2)*

> *'[The idea of TIST] was not very interesting [to me] at first. We were hearing about the sale of carbon- how can we sell? It's like wind. But with training, I came to learn that it was a business. Some people in the training said it was a devilish thing… they were saying "how can you sell the wind?" I told them 'those that are learned know that trees breathe CO_2 and when there is less in the atmosphere, we can breathe fresh air and retain the rain'. When we first planted trees, there was no rain, but now there is more. Even those ones not wanting to join saw fruits' (TIST.Int2)*

I encountered TIST members who were able to articulate the links between planting trees in Kenya, industrial pollution in the north, cleaner air (or a reduction of greenhouse gases) in the atmosphere and local weather patterns, while others engaged me in conversation to try to learn more. Nevertheless, increasing participation in internal control is still contingent on members' capacity and willingness to attend forums where information is shared; and the accuracy of the information transmitted. The TIST-Kenya programme design has made adjustments to encourage and enable members to attend but meetings often clash with other community events and personal commitments or simply do not grab everyone's attention. I came across examples of Cluster Servants misrepresenting information because they had not understood it properly or had not updated it. Auditors can pick up on misinformation during Cluster Audits but as these are infrequent it remains a challenge to ensure that all the people involved in communicating have heard and understood the messages, and are passing them on accurately.

7.6.1.5. Clarity, Transparency and Financial Incentives for transfer of responsibilities

Table 7-10: Assumptions 5 and 6 and Mechanisms H and I

Assumptions	Mechanisms
5. The benefits of greater control and a larger proportion of the revenue, are enjoyed by not only those that do the tasks but by the organisation and community as a whole.	H: Clarity and transparency regarding ownership of assets, documents, investments, costs incurred, payment for services
6. Efforts to build capacity extend their impact (beyond the project manager) to the whole organisation.	I: Financial incentives for the Producer Organisation to take on more tasks

Table 7-10 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. The contractual agreement in the FCS mandates clarity and transparency between the Project Facilitator and Producer Organisation regarding ownership, costs and payments. This follows on from the previous discussion because participation in a Producer Organisation's internal control is probably a useful precondition for making sense of the arrangement between the Project Facilitator and the Producer Organisation. With TIST-Kenya, efforts are made to uphold transparency and clarity not only between the Project Facilitator and Producer Organisation but amongst all its members. The programme operates according to the TIST values of being

honest, accurate, transparent, mutually accountable, and being servants to each other. One of the members of the Leadership Council emphasised the importance of this basis:

> *'Clarity from the beginning is important. The principle lessons we have learnt are that the bedrocks (values) of the programme need to be laid first: give right and accurate information from the word go' (TIST.Int3).*

Adhering to these values requires a number of functioning channels, forums and brokers for relaying information and discussing its significance, as well as sanctions where the values are not upheld (such as excluding Auditors and Cluster Servants who have not been honest with money matters). Key steps in developing clarity involve a) training potential members and checking their understanding of what it means to be a member before they sign up to TIST; b) signature of an agreement between the Project Facilitator and each TIST small group that specifies obligations for both parties, ownership and transfer of assets, payments and share of the net revenue. TIST's model of revenue-sharing involves pre-payments to TIST members (0.0202 USD/year/tree) on the basis of trees planted, and promise of a share of future profits to the ratio of 70% to farmers, 30% to the investor. In 2014, the profit share was expected to become available in the next year or so, once income from carbon credits was exceeding the costs of creating the carbon credits and operating TIST (including making the prepayments) and investments had been recuperated. The rationale for this arrangement was that the Facilitator wanted to end up with 'as much financial alignment as possible'- the profit share model would motivate everybody involved in the programme (farmers, people contracted by the Producer Organisation, and the investor) to keep costs down and profits up.

Nevertheless, some aspects remain elusive to TIST farmers (especially as the first share of the profit is still to come) and Cluster Servants and Auditors are frequently asked to clarify understandings during Cluster meetings. Figure 7-7 shows this happening during a TIST event.

Figure 7-7: Display material produced to communicate the profit share model and programme budget to TIST members

In addition to the pre-payments and the promised profit-shares due to small groups, each Cluster also receives a small monthly budget for operational costs and is eligible for a bonus if they perform very well in terms of attendance, tree planting and other criteria. These bonuses have been awarded to a few select groups and are enough for implementing a Cluster project (e.g. developing a tree nursery or an income-generating activity) but have also been divided amongst small groups. Clusters make their own decisions about the use of the bonus, guided by the Cluster Servant.

There are parallels between the Cluster budget and bonus and the Premium because it is governed autonomously by the aggregated group of farmers, and the amount is linked to performance. Meanwhile the profit share model contrasts with the Fairtrade Minimum Price approach. Arguably, the TIST approach may incentivise handover because if TIST members take on more tasks, they are likely to perform that at a lower cost than the Project Facilitator, meaning that both parties gain. However, a full analysis of the differences and implications of each respective approach is beyond the scope of this thesis.

7.6.1.6. Monitoring, personal development and enhanced influence and status

Table 7-11: Assumption 7, Mechanism E

Assumption	Mechanism
7. Taking on more tasks within carbon projects contributes to producers gaining influence and status within the carbon sector. This impact is felt at an individual level (as well as within organisations and communities).	E: Mandatory taking over of responsibilities by the Producer Organisation

Table 7-11 indicates the assumptions and mechanisms explored in this section. In the FCS, monitoring should be taken on by the Producer Organisation as a minimum contribution to project management as a whole, and the assumption is that taking on more tasks contributes to an increase in influence and status in the carbon sector for individuals, organisations and communities (assumption 7). This is a long term impact and there are many aspects that could play a part in contributing to it. However, if monitoring is the only task that Producer Organisation members take on, it is questionable whether it is enough to start the journey towards this impact. I briefly explore the link between monitoring and personal development and enhanced influence and status amongst TIST members.

When a Project Team member visited TIST Kenya and observed the monitoring tasks that TIST members were accomplishing, he commented that they were really ‘empowered’. Several Cluster Servants and Auditors I met testified how much they had gained through their

involvement with TIST. However, monitoring tasks are part of a whole body of skills that TIST contractors have developed and monitoring itself may be more of a means towards personal development than an end in itself, because it necessitates travel, having a handle on information and technology, learning tree species and interacting with lots of people. However, the predominant form of personal development mentioned in interviews with Cluster Servants was an increase in confidence and articulacy as a result of speaking to large groups of people during Cluster meetings (see Box 7-4).

Box 7-4: Testimonies of personal development given by TIST contractors

'TIST has [enabled] many people to come together and socialise, and have courage to hold meetings. Cluster servants have gained confidence… TIST has helped me to stand and talk in front of meetings, be empowered, made us be leaders. TIST has …helped me to do so much… now I am very talkative. Farmers ask questions and I can answer them...TIST has made me have a big mind, my thinking capacity has increased…TIST has made me be a counsellor- I can meet people with problems and they can feel relieved after talking to me' (TIST.Test)

'We struggled at the beginning [with using the palm computers and phones for quantifying, auditing and making payments], but once you are used to the technology, now we know the problems and how to fix them… We have also travelled, going around, holding meetings and interacting' (TIST.Test)

'TIST has made me to be someone. It makes you to have courage, it's difficult for many people to start to address the meeting. It empowers you to do that. No matter how big is the meeting, you learn to address them. It has changed my life' (TIST.Test)

Walking around Nanyuki, *J* knows a lot of people, and they always stop her and ask her questions about TIST and she is very happy. She likes working as a Cluster Servant because of the opportunity to meet people, and because of the comments they give her about her work, such as 'you've taken us far!' or 'we have no complaints'. She also likes the opportunity to move around, and know people elsewhere. She has learnt many species of trees, and she has also become more courageous and sociable. This is because of interacting with lots of people of all types and learning how to work with not only the good ones and the polite ones, but also the difficult and rude ones. People are especially difficult when they've not been paid, and have failed to understand why. She has to convince them of why this might be (TIST.PO3)

According to one TIST contractor, her monitoring tasks involve following the Project Facilitator's instructions, but these do not come with any explanations as to *why* they are doing things and *why* the data is necessary and *what* the standards require. She had found it beneficial to learn this information during her involvement in the FCSSP because it had enabled her to contribute her own experiences. In her case, there was capacity and interest in taking on *more* than just monitoring, but if the FCS does not require any more than this, some Project Facilitators might not be incentivised to build the Producer Organisation's capacities to take on additional tasks. Notably, she already had a rich calibre of experiences before joining TIST and

had continued to develop her competences through involvement in TIST over 10 years. Meanwhile, the Cluster Servants recruited to do the initial monitoring (amongst other tasks) are generally younger women and men[43] and might not necessarily share her ambitions.

This section has begun to identify some links between the tasks that TIST members take on, and some individual proclamations of self-development. It is clear that it is more than just monitoring that has led to these outcomes. Some programme-specific practices such as Rotational Leadership and *Kujengana* could be assumed to have had some influence, increasing the pool of people who benefit from leadership positions and helping them develop in confidence. However each individual I met had a very unique story. About 80 contractors out of a total of more than 60,000 members work for TIST, and those who are not contracted are perhaps likely to have a more diluted experience of programme benefits. A more detailed impact assessment with a wider pool of informants or a more extensive evaluation tool such as Most Significant Change[44] would be necessary to make any firmer claims or trace out any plausible impact pathways.

7.7. Discussion: Transfer of Knowledge and Capacities

TIST provides evidence that the Fairtrade goal of involvement of the Producer Organisation in the management and implementation of a programme can be achieved with the support of a Project Facilitator working hand in hand with the Producer Organisation if this is the intention from the outset. However, the speed at which this has happened with TIST does not align with the FCS timeline and it was motivated by a different goal (to implement the programme in a way that maximised returns to the farmers, rather than to hand over as much as possible to the Producer Organisation). Incidentally, this has meant that many of the operational tasks are carried out by the farmers themselves, but it also comes down to choices about programme infrastructure beyond the staffing. The relationship between the Project Facilitator and the Producer Organisation in TIST's case is long term, and he has no time constraint in being involved (apart from the length of his life!). In contrast, programmes led by NGOs or heavily reliant on donor funding may have to work towards withdrawing as soon as their funding runs out: the KENDBIP example exemplified this but also that the organisation earmarked to take on additional tasks related to carbon was not motivated to do so (at least at the outset).There are other examples in East Africa of carbon programmes where the local organisation intended to

---

[43] They are selected from TIST members or members' sons or daughters and should be of a medium age and settling with a young family, based on observations that they are more likely to remain with the programme.

[44] This method was being used in some form to collect stories from trainees about how TIST had changed their life. There is potential to use it more systematically as an evaluation and learning tool.

take up programme management from the NGO has not developed the capacities within the envisaged timeframe (Deshmukh et al., 2014). Multi-stakeholder global forum discussions have pointed to the need for governments and donors giving support to co-operatives to consider how to provide long term support beyond the usual 2-3 year cycle of a development project (Global Forum on Food Security, 2012). Carbon projects do allow for a longer term role for external support, but the transfer process has to be carefully managed. As it may be difficult to predict how capacities within the Producer Organisation will evolve, planned transfer (mandated in the FCS) could lead to conservative commitments (i.e. avoid risks of not meeting targets) or unrealistic ambitions for transfer (at risk of being audited as non-compliant).

The gradual building of capacities with the support of an external actor has precedence within the Fairtrade Standard for Contract Production, designed for small-scale producers who are not yet democratically organised. In this case, a Producer Organisation is created with the support of an actor called the Promoting Body (an exporter, NGO, etc). Research with a cotton Producer Organisation formed by a Promoting Body in India showed that seven years after its establishment, the Producer Organisation had achieved significant organisational development, but still required significant capacity building before it could achieve full independence from the Promoting Body[45] (Nelson and Smith, 2011). This one example suggests that the timeline for handover to the Producer Organisation in the Contract Production Standard is ambitious but more evidence is needed its certification outcomes compared to other Fairtrade standards and certification schemes (Nelson and Smith, 2011). Similarly there is need for more evidence on outcomes related to the transfer of knowledge and capacities from Project Facilitator to Project Manager and Producer Organisation and possible timelines for this, in the context of the FCS.

The FCS is missing mechanisms for ensuring transfer not only between the Project Facilitator but also amongst the wider membership of the Producer Organisation. TIST-Kenya demonstrates some innovative practices for extending the benefits of leadership and increased responsibility outwards to a wider pool of members, but more understanding is needed of the extent of these ripples as my research concentrated on those who were active at the programme level. Systematic reviews of Fairtrade impact have pointed to the need to put more attention to involving wider numbers of individual producers rather than focussing on existing powerful leaders, and to capacity building (Nelson and Pound, 2010, Fairtrade International, 2015d), and this need is echoed for co-operatives in general (Global Forum on Food Security, 2012), where support is needed for them to develop skills and capacities to their members, and such skills development should not be limited to co-operative management. In the context of a new market

[45] The Contract Production Standard envisages that POs reach Small Producer Organisation status by year 6, although this is a development requirement.

opportunity, a Participatory Action Research project demonstrated a crucial role for change agents who can impart the skills and encourage the innovation needed to engage with markets and achieve long term market linkages (Kaganzi et al., 2009).

Perhaps the weakest of links in the FCS are those that extend the benefits of involvement in a carbon project beyond managers and people taking on specific tasks, to the organisation as a whole and the wider community. Researchers have already noted the need to unpack assumptions about community in Fairtrade as empowerment outcomes are specific to place, product and starting point, and it cannot be assumed that producers are willing to share benefits with the wider community (Phillips, 2014, McEwan et al., 2014).

7.8. Conclusion to chapter seven: addressing gaps in knowledge about Fairtrade carbon as a commodity

In this section I reflect on what the findings from this chapter say about Fairtrade carbon as a commodity, drawing on the literature introduced in section 2.2. The commodification process involves abstracting carbon from its place specificity (through carbon measurement technologies) and considering all carbon as generic (Bumpus, 2011a). Certification technologies also involve abstraction, as locally relevant social forms are translated into audit checklists legible for surveillance by actors from the global North (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008, Wright and Shore, 2000). This 'governing at a distance' is usually portrayed in political economy analyses as a form of *control over* production and producer knowledge in the global South by standards organisations and companies in the global North. Commodification approaches bring attention to carbon as a commodity produced in specific places and imbued with social relationships but there has been less attention to how different types of carbon resource entail different types of social relationships or how different carbon projects might involve different dynamics of control or marginalisation. Attention to place and commodity specificity has also often been missed in research on Fairtrade certification and assumptions about how it is supposed to work (Getz and Shreck, 2006).

This chapter has addressed these gaps through analysis of two carbon projects and their place-based implications of the commodification process and two types of carbon resource and their different implications on the scale, form and purpose of social organisation. These examples support the view that the commodification process and the material characteristics of carbon can offer opportunities *and* difficulties (Bumpus, 2011a), and that it can strengthen *or* marginalise and constrain producers in the South.

7.8.1. Carbon, materiality and marginalisation

One of FTI's goals was to create alternatives to the problem of marginalisation or exclusion from the benefits of carbon credits. While carbon credits are often deemed complicated and difficult to understand because of their intangibility, they are in some respects much easier to transact than agricultural commodities because they do not require physical infrastructure to store and transport them and they allow production tasks to be decoupled from the physical context where the initial mitigation action is carried out. This makes a number of outcomes possible with respect to marginalisation- one is that the people generating the emissions reductions may be marginalised or inadequately acknowledged within the commodity chain by more powerful actors who register the projects, aggregate the credits and decide on benefits. This chapter has shown how in some instances, Project Facilitators are controlling project participants and their knowledge by claiming that the participants would not be able to understand what carbon is or become experts. With respect to KENDBIP, it is yet to be seen whether the involvement of other actors in the production of credits will lead to the marginalisation of those doing the mitigation action. Meanwhile, the TIST project suggested another possible outcome: that the tasks related to transforming emissions reductions into tradable commodities can be divided between those who are best able or most efficiently able to carry them out, regardless of their position across the globe. In this case, the Producer Organisation is able to play an active, conscious and sophisticated role in the delivery of the project hand in hand with the Project Facilitator. What appears to be essential with this second outcome, is that the programme can demonstrate that such decisions have been made with the interests of the people generating the emissions reductions in mind, that they are treated with respect, and that adequate explanations and information are provided. The TIST project does demonstrate these aspects, but detailed explorations also need to be conducted with projects involving different histories, relationships between actors, and contextual factors.

7.8.2. Extending Fairtrade: checking claims and assumptions

Fairtrade Carbon Credits lie at the interface between agricultural commodity chains, and development projects. They are a tradable commodity, but revenue from carbon credits is becoming a strategy to fuel development projects and enable low carbon development. Existing literature has already identified the challenges and opportunities associated with extending Fairtrade to new commodity types, different types of supply chain and specific geographical areas (section 2.2.3) but this chapter has filled a gap by providing a detailed analysis of how Fairtrade might apply to carbon. In particular, findings from this chapter resonate with research on Fairtrade gold in Sub Saharan Africa, which has flagged up the difficulties of applying requirements about producer organisations in contexts where people are rudimentarily organised

and lack organisational support structures (Hilson and Kamlongera, 2013). Through a critical exploration of the role of the Project Facilitator in building organisations and transferring capacities, I have shown that assumptions of how Fairtrade certification can result in stronger organisations, need to be reality-checked in specific contexts. Outcomes are linked not only to the rules and procedures in the standard, but also to a number of context-specific interactional, temporal and structural factors including relationships, intentions, evolving organisational models and systems to mediate capacity transfer and information exchange.

This chapter has raised question marks surrounding the roles, responsibilities and expectations assigned to Project Facilitators and Producer Organisations and the change process that the FCS is expected to result. This links to other research which has pointed to the gaps between ethical intentions and expectations raised by labels, and experiences in specific contexts. Doubt has been cast for example on expectations that business can play the role of development agent (Blowfield and Dolan, 2010); that Fairtrade producers can trade on their own terms (Getz and Shreck, 2006); that a producer organisation founded on commodity production is enough to create strong social ties when members are geographically dispersed and social cohesion is weak (McEwan et al., 2014); and that members of producer organisations will share the benefits of Fairtrade with the wider community of non-members (Blowfield and Dolan, 2010, Phillips, 2014). Overall, this suggests the need to be cautious in claims-making during communication both with customers and producers of Fairtrade carbon credits.

7.8.3. The relational aspects of carbon, and fairness implications

Sections 7.8.1 and 7.8.2 have both underlined the relational aspects in the commodification of carbon and the implementation of carbon projects. Commodification approaches bring attention to the social relationships the commodity is imbued with and I would argue that in the case of Fairtrade carbon credits, the social relationships are more tangible and perhaps also more significant than the carbon itself. Clearly the carbon credits must be generated for the project to take place, but the Theory of Change and expected outcomes and impacts of the project and sale of the commodity are so tied to the way that relationships are enacted in particular contexts that they deserve more focus, both empirically and theoretically. This is necessary both for understanding how they shape the Theory of Change and also how they shape perceptions of fairness in carbon projects.

The Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework I chose to use to explore fairness begins to make room for consideration of these aspects within the dimensions of Fair Access and Fair Procedures, recognising that Fair Access includes power relations and Fair Procedures includes negotiation processes. Nevertheless, the aspect of how people choose to treat one another and

what they choose to share with one another is perhaps missing. This gap was already alluded to in section 5.6.2 and I return to it in chapter 9.

7.8.4. Summary of key messages and contributions.

The 'Theory of Change' is not a static framework but a set of questions to guide continuous reflection, assumption-uncovering and reality-checking. Findings suggest that FTI should continue cross-checking and adjusting their Theory of Change and standard guidelines in response to evidence, especially as there is still limited knowledge within Fairtrade about how carbon works as a commodity.

The translation of standards from agricultural commodities to carbon is a messy and complicated process and attention to context is crucial. FTI's collaboration with GSF facilitates this work of translation, but the two organisations and their networks had very different frames of reference and standard approaches, and entry into carbon projects with smallholders, was unchartered territory for both organisations, requiring adjustments to existing approaches for both organisations.

Concepts of 'Producers' and 'Producer Organisations' do not fit neatly to the carbon context. The function and form of the Producer Organisation also varies between different types of projects. The FCS will need to be able to take into account different types of producer and producer organisation.

Mechanisms of transfer from the Project Facilitator to the Producer Organisation are context specific and need careful monitoring to understand their operationalisation and improve their robustness. Divergent role repartition, and specific relationships, motivations and capacities in each project context are likely to significantly shape outcomes, including perceptions and experiences of fairness.

Organisational Justice theories add a useful dimension to understanding fairness in Fairtrade carbon projects by attending to the interactional elements in the enactment of procedures and the conveying of information on decisions made. These aspects are context and project specific and are likely to have an impact on how fairness is perceived as well as how the changes expected in the Theory of Change match actual outcomes.

Chapter 8 Reflective discussion of the research process

8.1. Introduction to chapter eight

This chapter addresses objective 3, to assess the value of action-oriented research in collaborative standard-setting processes. Chapter 1 associated this objective with two key pathways components- engaging in path-building, and enhancing reflexivity. By linking my research design, approach, tools and experiences to academic reflections and approaches used by other scholars, I contribute to methodological innovation. Documents drawn on in this chapter's analyses are listed in Appendix 2. The analytical approach was described in chapter 4.

This chapter is structured around questions 3.1, 'how can action-oriented multi-sited research enhance reflection amongst stakeholders involved in the research, and how does it shape emergent outcomes?' and 3.2, 'what can be learnt about conducting collaborative research on standard-setting processes through this thesis?' Question 3.1 is divided into two parts, dealing with 'reflection' and 'outcomes' separately. I begin by underlining the importance of reflection and the challenges of enhancing it, and then discuss the attempts I made with different stakeholders in the FCSSP and relate these to literature on post-positivist forms of policy analysis. I then move to reflect on how my research shaped outcomes, using the structure of the four hot topics as a basis. The remainder of the chapter addresses question 3.2, serving as a summary of lessons learnt from this collaboration. This part of the chapter was written as FTI were drafting a student research policy, and insights fed directly into the policy process. The section summarises key aspects to consider in future collaborative research, structuring them around the metaphor of a building plan.

The first part of this chapter addresses question 3.1. In chapter 4 I explained my rationale for taking a critical approach to research on the FCSSP, despite the RPOs' initial hopes that I would provide support to make the FCS a 'better' standard and that my conclusions would show how their collaborative approach had resulted in a better standard. What they wanted would have equated with more of a problem-solving approach. At the beginning of the process I was agnostic as to whether the FCS was going to lead to greater benefits for small-scale producers as they had promised (see chapter 2 and Appendix 6). I established with staff at FTI that we shared a common view that the carbon market was rife with problems and unfair mechanisms, but also shared an optimism that some changes could be made which might shift the balance of benefits in favour of those who were benefitting less. By choosing to partner with GSF and develop a joint approach, FTI was actively choosing to work within the carbon market rather than against it, but the partnership between two innovative and influential organisations (both committed to

bringing in the missing dimensions from conventional trade in their sectors) held potential for developing alternative pathways within the carbon market. For most of the collaboration I chose to uphold my critical stance[46] in a friendly way that I hoped would facilitate reflection and support learning throughout this journey. I did this from the position of an external to FTI and GSF, acting as 'friendly outsider' (see chapter 4) with a reserved right to be critical.

I reflect on the research approach I took, i.e. action-oriented research from a critical perspective- in terms of whether and how it facilitated reflection for stakeholders involved in the research, and how it might have shaped the emergent outcomes. Before doing this, I acknowledge a caveat. Attribution is always problematic when espousing explanatory theories about causality (Ton et al., 2014). I do not make any claims to have directly and unilaterally enhanced reflection or outcomes myself; I seek to identify ways by which the research design may have contributed to these. Here it is important to acknowledge the presence of 'super-rival' and 'commingled' rival explanations (see section 4.4.5.2). Firstly, the design was co-produced and co-implemented so any role that the design might have had is attributable to these collaborative efforts and not to me alone. Secondly, any enhanced reflection and emergence of outcomes must be understood within the broader context of (i) existing mechanisms for reflection and learning within GSF and FTI; (ii) the learning journeys that the two organisations embarked on when they first chose to collaborate and bring together their respective cohorts of partners and stakeholders; (iii) the context of a changing context within global climate change governance and the carbon market; (iv) a number of additional contextual and institutional factors beyond the scope of this thesis. My focus is mainly amongst the FTI staff involved directly in the FCSSP and some brief thoughts on possible reflection and learning for other stakeholders in the FCSSP. My intention throughout this reflective discussion is to transparently acknowledge both the strengths and weaknesses in the design and implementation of this collaborative research process.

8.2. Facilitating Reflection- what, when, how and for whom?

8.2.1. Critical reflection within organisations

In this chapter I explore several types of reflection and reflexivity, defined in Table 8-1.

[46] This oscillated between optimistic critique with the intention of helping both organisations to make it work, particularly for small scale farmers, and scepticism. I tried my best to be encouraging and to frame my critique constructively, but sometimes it was a struggle to be transparent, integral and constructive.

Table 8-1: Definitions of reflection and reflexivity deployed in chapter 8

Reflection and reflective practice	the practice of 'periodically stepping back to ponder the meaning of what has recently transpired to ourselves and to others in our immediate environment'(Raelin, 2002 p66)
Critical reflection and reflexivity[47]	'Making an assessment of the validity of one's assumptions, examining both sources and consequences' (Gray, 2007 p497); Self-confrontation with the unintended consequences of one's actions (Voss et al., 2006)
Organisational critical reflection	'a ruthless and courageous examination and deconstruction of assumptions, norms, expectations, limitations, language, results and applications of one's work' (Boyce, 1996 p9)

Reflective processes within organisations have been shown to have a significant bearing on learning and self-understanding at the management level, but the process of critical reflection involving the surfacing and critiquing of tacit or taken-for-granted assumptions and beliefs may not come naturally to many managers and may have to be learned or facilitated (Gray, 2007). One reason for this is that workplace pace and demands limit space for reflection (Raelin, 2002), but also that reflection can lead to scepticism, the questioning of long established beliefs, anxiety and even threats to one's (individual or organisational) identity (Gray, 2007). Reflection is the bridge between experience and learning (Boud et al., 2013) and FTI has a good foundation for embedding reflection given the value placed on learning. The organisation has a unit dedicated to Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL); they have a week of the year dedicated to learning; they have developed Theories of Change to make explicit their assumptions about how interventions are supposed to contribute to outcomes (see chapter 7), and staff (especially within the MEL unit) are encouraging research which supports them to critically assess and improve their Theories of Change (Fairtrade International, 2015a, Fairtrade International: MEL Unit, 2015).

Reflection is a fundamental part of action-oriented research, and the infrastructure or processes for embedding competencies in problem solving and reflection amongst staff lie at the hub of the wheel in the action research cycle depicted by Susman (1983), see Figure 8-1. However, less is known about the mechanics of how this can be achieved (Gray, 2007).

[47] Some authors define reflexivity differently, but I consider that the definition provided by Voss and colleagues is sufficiently similar to the concept of critical reflection to be amalgamated for the purposes of my analysis.



Figure 8-1: Action reflection cycle
Based on Susman (1983). The words in the centre have been adapted from Susman's model which refers instead to a 'client system infrastructure'

Susman and Evered (1978) recognise that action research facilitates the development of the necessary practical knowledge in terms of how to create settings for organisational learning, how to review, revise and refine systems that one is a part of, and how to formulate useful metaphors, constructs and images for articulating a more desirable future. Gray (2007) has compiled a set of tools that can be drawn on by people engaged in assisting the learning process. In my experience, the research process has enabled me to innovate tools to facilitate reflection as a prerequisite for learning. These have been developed intuitively rather than according to any guidelines from scholars or academic training, but in hindsight most of them can be understood as applications of Gray's toolset.

8.2.2. Facilitating reflection within the FCSSP team at FTI

I held two team sessions with the Standards Unit and FCS Project Manager aimed at facilitating organisational critical reflection. The first (the 'House Exercise') came during the Research/Drafting phase (phase 2) and was a reflection on content. The second was a process reflection (entitled 'Mirror on the Standard Setting Process') held after the FCS had been published. In addition, I held Q interviews with two members of the FCS Project Team and one staff member from GSF, which were also aimed at supporting reflection (see chapter 5).

The House Exercise was designed as a tool for (1) reflecting on the work done on the FCS and the supporting scheme and to relate this to the original aims and initial propositions, (2) identifying the variety of options that had been proposed for achieving the various aims, (3)

assessing which options had already been selected and why; and (4) mapping out conceptual connections between the different components including identifying when and where they would be dealt with and what else each one was contingent on. The exercise was scheduled to take place as the consultation version of the FCS was reaching completion. The staff member who had managed the work to develop the FCS draft said 'as the standard goes out for public consultation, there is a good opportunity now to reflect on the bigger picture again… [the exercise] will be useful for us to reflect on the FCC overall work…'. This staff member encouraged three other colleagues to participate in this 3-hour session. I had devised the exercise as a way to communicate and discuss the connections I had been trying to make between the various components of the standard and scheme, but also as a way to explore the team members' rationales for choosing different options and rejecting others. This latter objective was only superficially met- although the team shared some rationales, one staff member said midway through the exercise 'we're not talking much about the "why", because this takes time'. This is a common workplace challenge (Raelin, 2002). The completed 'House' is depicted in Figure 8-2.

The house and surroundings was used as a *Reflective Metaphor* (Gray, 2007) which I had proposed and the team adopted. Metaphors can be powerful mediums for 'understanding and presenting ideas, insights and intuitions' (Gray, 2007), opening up new ways of seeing organisations and generating creative possibilities (McCourt, 1997). Exploring connections between items in a visual manner was a variation on *Concept mapping* (Gray, 2007), a graphic technique used to tease out people's cognitive frameworks. Concepts are mapped hierarchically and then linked with arrows labelled with explanatory phrases. The technique focuses on the 'how' and 'why' of links. The 'House and Surroundings' picture, transcript of discussions and accompanying spreadsheet document portrayed at least some of the how and why of links between components but in a different format from the concept map**.** Whole-team discussions on which options had been chosen marked the beginning of *Reflective Dialogue* (Gray, 2007) which involves sharing thoughts and feelings on a subject within a group followed by group members self-reflecting on themselves and reacting to the dialogue of other participants. While the reflection within the exercise mainly focussed on content, there was some meta-reflection on the task of reflecting and the impact this had had. In particular, the team acknowledged how they felt about how much was still undecided but also how the greater clarity gained through the exercise about which aspects were uncertain would help them in preparing for the consultation.



Figure 8-2 The completed House Exercise

The Mirror on the Standard Setting Process was designed as a feedback session to share my interpretations of how the FCSSP had been governed, which interests had (from my perspective) shaped outcomes and whether the final standard reflected its original stated goals (based on the findings in chapter 6). My feedback involved both positive appraisal as well as acknowledgement of the instances when the FCSSP had been governed in a less than optimal participatory manner; gaps between original expectations or interests of key actors and final outcomes; and possible reasons for this. The key reflective tools I used during this session were (1) reflecting on critical incidents (2) use of reflective metaphors and (3) reflective dialogue.

Reflecting on Critical Incidents involves firstly providing a description of an incident and secondly providing an interpretation which frames this particular incident as significant for underlying trends, motives, structures or a wider social context (Gray, 2007). I interpreted the Standards Committee meeting for approval of the FCS (quoted in Table 6-7) as a critical incident and shared some extracts from the meeting alongside my interpretations of what I thought was going on. From this, the following dialogue emerged:

> *Staff 1: were you in that meeting or were you calling in?*
>
> *Researcher: I was there*
>
> [Silence, followed by laughter]
>
> *Staff 2: then there's no point in saying it wasn't like that*
>
> [This comment was followed by recollections of that meeting from each of the staff members who had been present]

The discussion triggered by my portrayal of this event allowed the staff to recognise themselves that this particular meeting had fallen short in terms of process, but also to provide their own explanations as to why they had used strategy to get the decision passed.

I introduced the **Reflective Metaphors** of 'rug-tugging' and the protective belt (Figure 8-3) interactively during the session, explaining the rug in a story format and encouraging the team to uncover the interests 'under the belt' of the protectionist culture. Although metaphors can focus attention towards one set of interpretations to the neglect of others (Gray, 2007), by contextualising the protectionist culture in the context of the other rings on the target diagram, and by noting that it had only come into play during certain instances during the FCSSP, the team began reflecting themselves on the salience of this interpretation. During a break in the session, the Project Manager asked the Director of the Standards Unit whether similar dynamics

were recognisable in other Standard Setting Processes at FTI, in other words whether the target diagram had resonance beyond the FCSSP. The reply is quoted below Figure 8-3.



Figure 8-3 the target diagram

'Yes, the green and blue circles are about building an aligned position, and you think that everyone is aligned and …that they share the goals, but then everyone comes from their own position and have their own defensive areas, "there's a red line I don't want to cross, these are my limits in terms of operational needs" etc, and then everybody needs to adapt from where you are to the new position, and…it's always around a couple of hot topics…there's always between 1 and 5 areas where 99% of the debate is happening. It's pretty standard. It's probably a reflection of our journey- we say we want to go from A to B, but there are always buts, and these are always concentrated around a certain number of hot topics… Having said that, it sounds like it is all logic and you can make it up from the beginning. That is exactly what you can't [do]. You can have these [concentric rings], and some type of thing[s] [referring to the protectionist culture interests] will come back every time, and there might be a 6th, 7th and 8th thing [in the protective culture belt], and the hot topics are always different. But you can't predict. This is only logic retroactively. You can't draw this for your next project. But you can have an empty diagram like that and you know at the end how to fill it' (RRf.4, slide 23)

The team then proposed that next time they could use the diagram at the beginning of future processes and predict which hot topics and interests might come up, and then do a comparison in hindsight. This was a key learning moment: they appropriated the target diagram as a visual conceptualisation of a new mental model about how standard setting processes unfold, and were intending to use it as a guiding framework in future processes.

Throughout the session, I used **Reflective Dialogue** by inviting the team to reflect on my interpretations, the questions it raised, how they felt about it, and to provide their own interpretations of what had happened and why. They continued to use the target diagram to explain their actions. In a reflection on the final outcome for pricing mechanisms, one team member said 'we stay loyal to these outer circles, and then we need to go over the red lines of people sometimes, and if we're not losing them on the journey because at the end the concept is ok (and it still needs to be demonstrated…) then I think it's still good'. The team member went on to reflect on the difficulties they had with price-setting for a first-time commodity but acknowledging that in hindsight, they should have started sooner on the pricing work. They had underestimated the time it would take for other people (especially those from outside the Fairtrade system) to go on the necessary learning journey about the Fairtrade Minimum Price and how it could work in the context of carbon credits.

I designed a third session in the form of an interactive game, to hold with the FCSSP team to reflect on the assumptions, evidence base and plausible links within the Theory of Change devised for the FCS. This session was based on the findings in chapter 7, and would involve facilitating a dialogue between the people involved in developing the Theory of Change and those who had been involved in collecting evidence for it during the FCSSP. This was still due to take place at the time of completing this thesis.

8.2.3. Facilitating learning and reflection amongst particular participants in the research

I recognise that I did not make efforts to facilitate reflection amongst all the various stakeholders in the FCSSP to the same extent as I tried to with the Project Team, but I did make two participatory or democratic attempts to open up inputs and create space for the consideration of alternatives. These were (i) the Q study undertaken with a broad spectrum of people participating (directly or via their organisations) in the FCSSP (see chapter 5) and (ii) the Participatory Policy Analysis Workshop. I reflect briefly on the latter here as it has not been described in detail elsewhere in the thesis. This workshop, which was synchronised with the first FCS consultation and came after a month of fieldwork with TIST-Kenya, served multiple purposes:

Firstly it was an opportunity for me to reflect back to the workshop participants my interpretations of the programme thus far in order to seek validation, correct any misinterpretations, fill in gaps, and triangulate evidence collected from key informants. I did this on the basis of the themes within the FCS, focussing in particular on roles and relationships between actors. This purpose was primarily about me learning from them.

Secondly, I supported TIST members to make sense of the FCS, its potential implications for their programme and existing practices if they were to apply it (including where it would or would not potentially fit, and which practices might be recognised or ignored). This reflection was aided by the insight I brought to them about the standard content, which I linked to what I knew of the TIST programme. Rather than assuming they were interested in the standard, the workshop began with a listing of what would make the standard interesting to them. This involved taking on a novel role as facilitator-researcher, where the task is to help people to establish basic connections (in this case between the FCS and their lived experiences as farmers and programme contractors), posing questions in their everyday language and deciding issues important to themselves (Fischer, 2003a).

Thirdly, the workshop enabled us to co-produce feedback for the FCS-consultation from a programme which had already generated many useful lessons, by establishing common perspectives amongst the participating TIST-Kenya members and articulating these in the format of the FCS consultation document. This involved me playing the role of translator (Throgmorton, 1991), bridging the experiences and framing used by the participants, and the language of the Standard. At the end of the workshop, participants requested that I write the feedback on their behalf based on their workshop inputs, share it with them, make any amendments (of which there were none) and then send to FTI. This purpose supported the Project Team to gather more feedback but it also served my normative objective to make stronger the more hidden voices during the consultation process.

8.3. Discussion- evaluating my contributions to reflection

Chapter 1 highlighted the importance of reflection in pathway-building processes such as the FCSSP, and the potential for researchers to enhance reflection. In this section I situate the role I played within academic approaches to policy analysis, and assess its merits. The interventions I undertook to actively influence the reflection and learning within the standard-setting process can be theorised as steps towards novel forms of policy analysis.

The role I played is linked to the concepts of deliberative and participatory policy analysis[48]. Li (2015) describes the tasks of a deliberative policy analyst as involving observation, facilitation and mediation within a process, giving attention to people and processes *as well as* the policy problem. The targets of analysis are the values and interests, dialogue, argumentation and deliberation and the desired outcome is that *all* stakeholders- policy-makers (or standard-setters), citizens and organised stakeholders- can reach a better understanding of the values, interests and discourses in the context of the policy or standard. This learning process is documented in the form of a report which is made available to everyone, and consequently can be used to inform broader public debates. Unlike traditional policy analysis, deliberative policy analysts are 'socialized to serve the "all"' rather than only the policy actors at the "top" (Li, 2015 p30).

There are close parallels between Li's deliberative policy analysis and Fischer's (2003a) participatory policy analysis in that both are aimed at bringing local knowledges into the policy process and enabling learning processes through the active involvement of the policy analyst as facilitator and translator between different knowledges and epistemic communities. However, whereas Li depicts a role for a team of deliberative policy analysts to instigate and coordinate the whole deliberative process, Fischer depicts the role of the participatory policy analyst in terms of facilitating 'the development of a learning process which, once set in motion can proceed on its own' (Fischer, 2003a p217). I interpret that in Fischer's view, the policy analyst should be a catalyst, rather than a bolt in the learning process.

In the sections below I reflect upon the FCSSP and the TIST sessions in turn.

8.3.1. Strengths of the reflective sessions with the FCSSP team

Forging and facilitating timely spaces for reflection and team coherence

Both exercises described above were timely because the first coincided with a rejigging of responsibilities between members of the Project Team and the involvement of an additional staff member, and the second was held shortly before two of the team were due to relocate or go on extended leave. Aside from the aspects mentioned above, the team appreciated the House Exercise because it was fun, and because of its value of keeping them 'on track' and requested that we organise to do it again a few months later. When I proposed leaving them the tools for them to use themselves, one member said 'but it's good that you are here, because you have the

[48] As a form of post-positivist policy analysis

external eye that we don't have. It's a matter of keeping us in line!'[49] The second session was appreciated as a way to help the team put the work completed into perspective. It also resulted in them deciding to adopt the target diagram as a new framework for guiding future reflection on standard-setting processes. They noted that the value of both exercises was that they brought the team together to reflect collectively, which they said was rare. Coming together also enabled them to combine their insights as they all had different roles and vantage points on the process. Their relationships to one another (for example as 'colleague', 'assistant', 'boss' or 'line manager') were apparent during the dialogue and shaped who spoke more or less, but both events provided opportunities for those supervising or assisting to better understand the work and rationales of those who had been managing and working on the project on a daily basis. This shows that action-oriented research and deliberate attempts to forge and facilitate specific, occasional and timely spaces for reflection, combined with willingness of staff members to participate in these sessions did help to develop at least a temporary infrastructure for reflection and to provide tools for a more embedded reflection. This is in spite of the tendency for workplace busyness to crowd out reflection opportunities (Raelin, 2002).

8.3.2. Limits to reflection

Time, capacities (staff members and researcher) and target group

The reflection opportunities were nevertheless squeezed into timeframes that were insufficient for a thorough reflection on the material I brought to the discussions. This was a lesson for me as facilitator, in terms of how to best make use of limited time, but it also signalled that time is a precious resource for staff members with multiple meetings and deadlines scheduled.

Another limitation of the support I provided in reflection was perhaps that my insights on governance dynamics, interests and hot topics mostly came after the FCS was complete, when actually it might have been more useful to share these insights as it was being developed. Also, a deliberative policy analysis approach would have entailed making insights available to all the various stakeholders in the process while the debates were happening as this could have enabled a better understanding and more chance of reducing conflicts and establishing consensus (Li, 2015). As a single researcher following the process and endeavouring to cover multiple perspectives gathered at multiple sites, I had limited capacity to analyse and deliver results sooner than I did. However, the punctual feedback I gave to the Project Team after the initial external stakeholder meetings did help to flag up potential conflicting interests. In hindsight,

[49] The exercise was not repeated mainly because one staff member began working remotely, limiting the opportunity to hold another whole-team face to face interactive session.

this might have been useful insight to share with all the stakeholders involved but I had not considered or discussed this with FTI at the time.

8.3.3. Further opportunities for reflection within the FCSSP team

Reflection coaching

The team's appreciation of the reflective sessions suggest that my role was necessary as a kind of reflection coach, creating spaces and bringing in tools to facilitate reflection which would not otherwise happen. I recognise that this coaching support could have potentially extended to a closer engagement with individual staff as well as more team sessions to facilitate both individual and organisational critical reflection and appraisal as the process unfolded. This was perhaps especially necessary as the FCSSP involved a novel product and market that FTI staff were completely new to and the learning journey is ongoing. Gray (2007) notes that supportive mechanisms (from a coach, mentor or colleague) may help to reduce likelihood of feelings of helplessness, frustration and burnout.

Despite this argument that a greater role for an external reflection coach might have been beneficial, the challenge noted by Fischer (2003a) is to catalyse a learning process that can continue by itself, without the need for an external party. The goal of a coach then would be to support staff and teams in developing the habit of reflecting and coaching themselves and each other, and helping them to equip themselves with tools (such as the target diagram) to use for this. For this to happen, it would require more time and commitment to reflection from FTI and individual staff, clear planning as to when and how to use this time, and a reframing of the relationship with the researcher who would need to be equipped with the skills to offer this kind of support (such as coaching, mediation and facilitation skills).

8.3.4. Strengths of the reflective sessions with TIST-Kenya

Enhancing awareness and gathering experiences of underrepresented stakeholders

At the end of my fieldwork period with TIST-Kenya, one key informant confirmed the value of such an opportunity (referring not only to the workshop but to the multiple discussions we had had since my first visit to TIST-Kenya 6 months prior). She said that seeing the Standards and Guidelines, and gaining an awareness of why they (as programme contractors) might be doing things and how this relates to Standard requirements, is not something they had been given the chance to do before. With respect to the Standards they were already certified against, they had just been given instructions about which information to collect without seeing the Standards themselves. In discussion, we agreed that when you not only see the Standard but participate in discussions about what it will look like, and take part in trying it out at a point when it can still

be shaped, you can then know what the Standard Setting Organisations are trying to achieve, and suggest alternative ways of achieving that, based on your experience. Ensuring the inclusion of TIST-Kenya's point of view at this point proved especially important as the TIST-Kenya representative was denied a visa to attend the follow up workshop. Her voice would have carried a lot of importance as the only female invitee, and the only person in the room who might have been able to testify on the basis of her own experience some of the assertions and assumptions being made about carbon project participants, especially women (for example that they did not know anything about carbon and did not want to be more actively involved).

8.3.5. Limits to reflection on Standards by targeted beneficiaries

Language, accessibility and translation

FTI had been concerned about not getting enough feedback based on experiences with other Standards consultations. The majority of feedback received by FTI during the consultation came from the European-based Group of Experts who were mostly active in project development and trade rather than from people involved in project implementation on the ground, despite FTI's efforts to engage the latter during the Producer/ Field staff workshops[50]. The dearth of feedback during the consultation from Fairtrade producers and potential FCS project participants points to the need for different ways of engaging people and doing the work of translating between policy (or Standards) and the everyday language of people. I prepared the participatory policy analysis workshop with TIST because I recognised that the FCS 46-page document, which needed to be read alongside GSF's consultation document (which had taken me several hours to download with a slow internet connection) was not going to be easy for a team of part time field-based workers to read, make sense of and comment on. I wanted to support the TIST-Kenya team to put their viewpoints into the consultation, and if I had not intervened, this reflection would not have happened and their insight probably would not have reached FTI.

8.3.6. Further opportunities for supported reflection

Participatory policy analysis workshops

The Project Team welcomed the detailed FCS consultation input I brought to them from TIST. More workshops of this type could be facilitated by researchers equipped to translate between Standards and specific contexts by researchers operating as I did within a specific standards-

[50] Feedback from Fairtrade internal stakeholders was later gathered by other means in the months following the first approval of the FCS. The Project Team described this as going through the 'Fairtrade check' and as a result, several mechanisms within the FCS changed substantially before it was published.

setting process. However, generating detailed feedback in this format from a sufficiently varied and diverse group would require scaling up workshops and would be difficult to do by one researcher alone. This could be done by developing a workshop facilitation guide (based for example on my workshop protocol) and briefing additional researchers or consultants who are familiar with particular producer organisations and contexts, on key aspects on which to gather detailed comments[51].

8.4. Tracking possible researcher influence on outcomes

In this section I address the second part of question 3.1- How can action oriented multi-sited research contribute to emergent outcomes?

It is inherent within action-oriented research that one's presence as a researcher will influence the outcome of the process, and that the 'construction of new knowledge is built on the premise of… mutual engagement' (Greenwood and Levin, 1998:78). Reflexivity or critical reflection, defined in Table 8-1, is important for recognising where and how such influences play out and taking responsibility for them where possible. It also involves considering the power and politics of the researcher's relation to the setting and actors that are the focus of the research (Yanow, 2007), and how such relationships shape what is learned and concluded (Small and Uttal, 2005). In section 4.6 I reflected on how my positionality shaped the data collection and analysis process. In this section I reflect on my choice to act as 'friendly outsider' and to contribute to the FCSSP (but without committing to make it a better Standard), and make some tentative suggestions as to the types of influence my role and contributions may have had on emergent outcomes of the FCSSP.

8.4.1. The Four Hot Topics

The four hot topics at the centre of the target diagram (Figure 8-3) had all been identified during my analysis of the first Group of Experts meeting in September 2013 but continued to remain salient when conducting the longitudinal analysis of the FCSSP[52]. My choice of four hot topics was validated by FTI and GSF when I shared findings with them, although GSF suggested that in hindsight a fifth hot topic could be added (see section 8.4.2). I provided inputs on each of the

[51] Note that the Project Team had asked me to guide them with questions that could be used in the consultation document. I declined because of time constraints, but they found that the questions I posed in the House Exercise were useful to draw on in the consultation document.

[52] Notably, if I had conducted equally detailed analyses of meetings with other stakeholders as I did after the first Group of Experts meeting, I might have stayed more open to picking up on other topics and keeping them on my radar as well.

four topics at different points. Below I reflect on how I may have shaped the debates and where this may have had intended or unintended consequences.

8.4.1.1. Project Actors, Roles and Transfer of Knowledge/ Capacities

My feedback on the role of the project facilitator and the degree to which project participants could be expected to organise themselves and take an active role in project management evolved throughout the FCSSP as I was exposed to different views and working examples. In initial feedback reports I had flagged up the potential that those playing the role of Project Facilitator might want to maintain a permanent role for themselves and that FTI should pay attention to how the process of transfer of capacities to the Producer Organisation would happen. However, during my research with TIST-Kenya I came across a model where it seemed to be working for everyone for the Project Facilitator to play a long term role and to have managed the carbon project development process. When I completed my own Q sort in September 2014, the statements I agreed most strongly with were that 'in a Fairtrade carbon supply chain, intermediaries are acceptable as long as fair distribution of the benefits from sales is ensured'; and that 'people involved in generating Fairtrade carbon credits should not need to take on the carbon project development process' (statements 5 and 21). At the time, I recognised the influence of the TIST programme on my responses- and my optimism that a relationship of support and skilling up of the Producer Organisation was possible even with the sustained presence of the Project Facilitator. I came across some counter evidence at a subsequent stakeholder meeting. I heard Project Facilitators deny that project participants were interested or capable of taking on more tasks, and I also heard strong views against the sustained involvement of a Project Facilitator from Latin American producers. When I conducted a more detailed analysis of the mechanisms for ensuring transfer of knowledge and skills to Producer Organisations in the final FCS, I identified that there were some shortcomings. In my choice to deepen my understanding of carbon projects and relationships between actors on the basis of detailed research with one particular programme where relationships were apparently very healthy, I may have blinded myself to other scenarios, such as strong co-operatives of producers who would like to manage the project entirely by themselves; project participants who genuinely do have little interest in taking on more responsibilities; and project participants who would like to have more responsibility but for whatever reason are not being given this opportunity.

8.4.1.2. Financial mechanisms

I had become aware of diverse viewpoints on a possible Fairtrade Minimum Price (FMP) for Fairtrade Carbon Credits before I formed any of my own opinions, and felt on several occasions that the counterarguments or alternative propositions were being ignored or downplayed,

perhaps because the Fairtrade Minimum Price was so embedded in the Fairtrade system that it was never an option to not include it. Nevertheless, I flagged up the disagreements on the FMP during feedback reports and made space to explore them further during the Q study, feeding the results back to FTI and GSF. During my research with TIST-Kenya, I noted that the FMP was unlikely to work in that particular context but foresaw that the alternative financial benefit sharing mechanism that TIST had customised could possibly work elsewhere as well. I suggested the difficulties in applying the FMP to carbon contexts and advocated for alternatives to the FMP in various forms of feedback to FTI (consultation documents, papers and a webinar) but chose not to write in detail about it in this thesis. This example illustrates that the wider politics within FTI and the unlikelihood of a fundamental shift in approach (i.e. alternatives to the FMP) shaped my choices about what to include in my analysis and limited the influence of my inputs on the FCSSP.

8.4.1.3. Scope

In May 2013, I produced a report highlighting the critical views on the carbon market, particularly on agricultural carbon projects. This had been requested by FTI so they could begin to prepare arguments in response to the critique which they expected would be directed at them. The Project Manager asked me to resend this report before the series of CSO meetings in August-October 2014, where critique of this nature was expected. The CSOs' views expressed during these meetings had a heavy influence on FTI's eventual choice to exclude agriculture from the scope. In hindsight, my one-sided report may have contributed to FTI's decision to exclude agriculture. A more balanced report presenting both sides of the argument might have supported FTI to be better prepared for the debates with CSOs.

I had expected agricultural projects to be included within the scope given FTI and GSF's original objectives and the centrality of agricultural activities for Fairtrade producers. I had noted on several occasions in my feedback that they were at risk of being forgotten or that the FCS was at risk of being shaped towards the interests and specificities of cook stove projects (because they were the predominant project type to be represented by carbon actors in most of the stakeholder meetings). I had been aware of the challenges of implementing viable and robust smallholder agriculture projects since the first months of my PhD and had continued to remain sceptical as to whether FTI and GSF would find a suitable way to address these challenges. However I discovered when presenting my findings that FTI and GSF had been aware of the acute challenges related to agriculture from early on in the process. Perhaps by choosing to frame my feedback in terms of 'don't forget agricultural projects!', I might have unintentionally helped to temporarily smother the more critical topic of 'are you going to be able to address the problems related to them?'.

Nevertheless, in the findings sharing sessions with both RPOs I initiated a discussion about the disappearance of agriculture from the scope. I framed this as a mismatch with initial public communication about the FCS but also raised the question of the challenges related to agricultural carbon projects. In both sessions, raising the question triggered both RPOs to acknowledge the learning about smallholder agriculture and carbon projects they had had to do since making the initial announcements, and admit that fundamental barriers still remained. Having spent the last two and a half years developing a Standard for agriculture, GSF had gradually gone full circle in their own organisational learning and concluded that agricultural carbon projects were unlikely to have a positive impact for smallholder farmers and that what they actually need is a means to support them to increase yields and adapt to climate change, not to engage in mitigation projects (RRf.5).

8.4.2. A Fifth Hot Topic?

When I shared my analysis of the four hot topics with GSF, I received feedback that an additional hot topic could be added- one that only emerged in late 2014. This was the question of whether commodification and the use of offsetting was really right for what GSF and FTI wanted to achieve- which at the outset, was to help smallholder farmers adapt to and mitigate climate change. This topic had influenced the FCS heavily in the approval phase, resulting in two major changes- one was the name change, from the Fairtrade Carbon Credits Standard to the Fairtrade Climate Standard, and the other was the addition of mandatory requirements for buyers of Fairtrade Carbon Credits to reduce their own emissions, not only to offset. Both were attempts to dilute the focus on offsetting and to bring more of a social justice element into the FCS. However during this discussion, the GSF staff member raised the question as to whether a standard for certifying projects to create carbon credits and sell to buyers in the north really was the right approach for achieving their joint goals, and whether another mechanism such as a carbon tax on Fairtrade products might not have been appropriate[53]. The ability to recognise the limitations of their jointly crafted intervention this far on in the process had come as a result of a learning journey that still continues for both organisations. It coincides with changes in global climate governance, evolving carbon markets, and debates within civil society about the place of offsetting. GSF acknowledge that there is still more work to do to design more appropriate and beneficial mechanisms to support smallholders in adapting to climate change, and are working with FTI and other organisations on this.

---

[53] The issue at stake here arose in the Q study when participants were asked to respond to the statement ‘we cannot talk about fairness if we are asking poor people to reduce their emissions when high emitters have not made commitments to do the same’. At the time, views varied from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ but the statement elicited an ethical dilemma for many participants.

In hindsight, my choice to play a critical role and support critical reflection may have served as a more useful accompaniment during this learning journey than the role that the RPOs had asked of me at the outset. Although I make no claims to have triggered such a striking example of organisational critical reflection, I am grateful to have witnessed it, and to be able to record it as this story comes to an end.

8.5. Synthesis of learning from the research process

The final part of this chapter synthesises the learning that has arisen from completing the first ever PhD research project embedded within an FTI Standard Setting Process, addressing question 3.2: What can be learnt about conducting collaborative research on standards setting processes through this thesis?

This learning has been based on trial, error and willingness from all parties to navigate arising issues and try to accommodate each other's needs. Given the interest in this form of action-oriented research both from within FTI and amongst fellow researchers, my aim is to summarise aspects which should be considered when designing and implementing future collaborative research projects between researchers (specifically PhD students) and Standard Setting Organisations or other Research Partner Organisations (RPOs). By making links between our experiences (my own and those of the RPOs) and academic literature on action-oriented research and post-positivist forms of policy analysis I identify aspects which may be common to other similar forms of collaborative research.

This summary has been developed by documenting the iterative phases of this particular collaboration, what was discussed or generated at each phase, and reflecting on what helped and what hindered the collaborative process and other aspects that are worth bearing in mind in future collaborations. I present this below in the form of a reflective metaphor of a building plan[54] (Figure 8-4), emphasising the constant iterations between the different zones and the need to be flexible and ready to reassess throughout the process.

[54] Not to be confused with the House metaphor in Figure 8-2.



Figure 8-4: The 'Building Plan': spaces to negotiate, design and reflect on collaboration

8.5.1. Zone 1, Entrance porch: discussions at the initiation of a potential collaboration

The Fairtrade movement receives many research requests from students and other researchers and thus far Fairtrade has had no clear process to guide their responses to different types of requests (personal communication, MEL consultant). My request was initially met with a favourable response because the Project Team saw a synergy between my research focus and their work plan. They identified the value of an external eye providing useful inputs as they embarked on a journey to develop an entirely new Fairtrade product. Nevertheless, the following aspects were important to clarify at this early stage in the collaboration before we mutually agreed on the collaboration. These were important for establishing a baseline of trust, and being clear about needs and constraints (Small and Uttal, 2005):

- Establishing purpose of research project and all parties' intentions and motivations for collaboration
- Clarifying boundaries of the research (e.g. spatial and temporal)
- Reflecting on expectations about roles/ functions that the researcher and the RPOs may take on within the research, and reassess as process unfolds.

Situating these aspects at the entrance porch is a reminder that these aspects are a first port of call but will need to be revisited as the process unfolds. This was particularly necessary in our case regarding the roles and functions I took on; the roles proposed by the Project Team that I declined to take on; and also the roles that the RPOs found themselves playing. Schut (2012) proposes a tool for use *ex ante* or *ex durante* for navigating dynamic research configurations in

action-oriented research processes where researchers are required to be aware of, and reflect on the consequences of fulfilling multiple roles. Unfortunately I discovered this tool only at the end of my research and found it relevant but in need of some adaptation to the context of research with SSOs.

8.5.2. Zone 2, Building exterior: designing collaborative infrastructure and institutional embedding

These are the collaboration-specific details that need to be placed in the centre of the action-research cycle depicted by Susman (1983) in Figure 8-1. In our case, institutional embedding involved the following aspects:

- Research agreement
- Communication mechanisms and coordination arrangements
- Structures, opportunities and resources to draw on from within each institution

The research agreement in particular was a key outcome welcomed by a colleague at the Sustainability Research Institute who used it as a model for developing her own agreement with another organisation, and staff members in the Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Unit of Fairtrade who drew on it when developing a student research policy. Pre-existing template agreements established by FTI and GSF for use with consultants and interns were inappropriate for usage, and prior negative experience of researchers who had misrepresented one of the organisations in academic work underscored the need to lay down safeguards and establish mutual understanding about intellectual property, the right to be critical, the right to review, and treatment of confidential/ sensitive information. Our research agreement was tailor-made for this collaboration at the outset without a precedent to draw on, but with a minor amendment (adding more detail to the procedures for article-reviewing based on experiences of the review process) proved to be appropriate for navigating the research.

Communication and coordination is likely to be person- and situation-specific but our collaboration was facilitated by monthly coordination calls during the main collaborative phases. My repeated requests for responses to my (often long-winded) emails and the RPOs' recommendations for shorter emails or quick phone calls demonstrated that we all had different communication styles based on our own institutional and professional embedding and other tasks to manage. Our collaboration was limited by me not being more widely connected with FTI as a whole at the outset. In hindsight, the MEL Unit expressed that they would like to have been involved in coordinating the research relationship as well as the Standards Unit. By locating this aspect at the exterior of the building, it is a reminder that a whole organisation approach to collaboration rather than a bilateral collaboration with a particular Unit at FTI might allow for a more systematic and coordinated collaboration infrastructure.

The collaboration was facilitated by support from within the University of Leeds and the Sustainability Research Institute (such as enthusiastic supervisors with experience of collaborative research, legal advice from the University's Research and Innovation Service, and departmental motivations to achieve Impact Agenda goals). Similarly, this collaboration timed with a growing interest from the MEL Unit within FTI in action research and research on and programmes as opposed to former primary interest in products (Fairtrade International: MEL Unit, 2015).

8.5.3. Zone 3: In the waiting room- considering timelines, time commitments and available resources

Waiting rooms are necessary in buildings because of a culture of operating to tight schedules that overrun, overcommitting ourselves, and underestimating how long things will take, sometimes leaving other people waiting. Initial concerns expressed by the RPOs about the different timelines for PhD research and standard-setting processes; and by myself and my supervisory teams about the uncertain timeframe of the FCSSP were addressed by the following actions:

- Forecasting and regularly reassessing timelines of standard-setting and research processes
- Defining time commitments and available resources and reassess as these evolve
- Incorporating different needs for more punctual results versus longitudinal overview into research design

The collaboration was helped by regular coordination meetings to provide updated timelines and plans from all parties; financial resources from my sponsors and from FTI and GSF for enabling my attendance at most FCSSP events (allowing for regular face-to-face contact); and a flexible research design (see chapter 4). Regarding time and resource commitments, it would have been useful for me to keep a better track of the time I spent producing inputs for FTI and GSF. The Human Resources department at FTI had asked me to estimate the number of hours I would spend but the figure I gave at the outset was arbitrary as I had no basis on which to estimate. Nevertheless, in the future, an initial discussion about numbers of hours expected of the researcher and RPOs could serve as a useful benchmark for reassessing further down the line what was reasonable, feasible and ethical and how to best make use of each party's time and resources. As far as I know, resources spent on supporting or liaising with me had also not been quantified by the Project staff with whom I dealt. The Project Manager did however recognise that they could have made more use of my support if they had been able to accord more time to working with me. One particular underestimated resource implication was the time required and short time frame on offer for FTI and GSF to review my academic papers. At the time of writing this chapter, FTI was seeking to gain an understanding of the internal resource

implications of different types of collaboration and support provided to students. Fairtrade would also like to ensure that Fairtrade stakeholders can benefit in return for their engagement with student researchers (personal communication, MEL consultant).

8.5.4. Zone 4: In the canteen- assessing potential stakeholders in the research and how they will be involved

- Assess stakeholders both internal and external to the collaborating organisation(s)

Canteens in large organisations and institutions are places for interacting with both non-familiar and familiar people and this changes the longer you are around. Researchers commonly approach Fairtrade organisations with requests to access stakeholders within the Fairtrade system but Fairtrade recognise that clearer procedures need to be established regarding what stakeholders can expect in return (personal communication, MEL consultant). From my perspective, it would have been useful to map relevant and interested stakeholders internal to the Fairtrade system to ensure that all those who were interested in the research and outputs knew about them. Instead, I came into contact with other staff members fairly organically. Sometimes this resulted in messy or uncoordinated communication or people discovering the collaboration and outputs late on in the process.

My involvement in the FCSSP also brought me into contact with a wide range of external stakeholders who were willing and relevant participants in my research, but it was important to manage these relationships in close communication with the Project Team. I mainly drew upon these contacts during the Q study. I attended to the Project Team's concerns about overburdening FCSSP stakeholders by giving each person ample opportunity to decline participating and ensuring that I provided something of benefit in return (i.e. support with reflection and sharing of findings).

8.5.5. Zone 5: In the office- discussing questions, tools and contributions

Offices are often where organisational or professional culture prevails and strongly differs from one office or organisation to the next. Action-oriented research often involves navigating the conundrum that RPOs and academic partners might frame their questions in different ways, and have different needs and concerns regarding research design and outputs (Small and Uttal, 2005). The following aspects were important to discuss at the outset and to regularly evaluate and reassess:

- Establishing any common questions for research and establishing degree of collaboration versus independence for gathering data
- Designing and creating a set of mutually useful contributions (and reassessing usefulness)

In my case, I entered into the collaboration with a desire to be as useful and available to respond to research needs as possible but later found myself struggling to respect my commitments to FTI and GSF as well as my own PhD targets. I dealt with this through a mid-term review and follow-up conversations with FTI. This led to clarity about expectations, roles, available resources and our mutual and distinct research agendas, all parties' needs, expectations, available resources and a decision on the extent to which we should align our research tools.

Initial expectations about which inputs would be mutually useful had to be reassessed in hindsight. Mutually useful inputs I provided included transcripts of meetings; feedback, notes and comments during the process (on standards, meetings and the process); brief syntheses of research findings aimed at increasing breadth or diversity of inputs to the FCSSP; and interpretations of the FCSSP in hindsight (RRf.5 and SDe). These are summarised in Appendix 7.

8.5.6. Zone 6: in the meeting room- sharing findings and supporting reflection

At the outset, we established the importance of sharing findings punctually rather than only at the end of the PhD process and planned various moments where research inputs and findings could be shared. However, in hindsight our initial plans lacked sufficient discussion on *how* research inputs could most usefully be shared, and *with whom*. I was often left to work this out for myself, and sometimes wasted time producing outputs in less useful formats or missing opportunities to share findings with interested and relevant stakeholders. Therefore I recommend that future collaborations incorporate the following aspects:

- Design of appropriate tools for supporting reflection and sharing findings
- Clarification of how results will be shared and with whom

One of my own major skill acquisitions from this collaboration was about how to create settings for organisational reflection (see section 8.3) and how to synthesise and share results in a meaningful way with RPOs. We found that the most effective and enjoyable method was interactive sessions combining reflections with syntheses of the process so far, or of general findings, as these brought together whole teams and were mutually beneficial for engaging with and validating findings (RRf.5 and SDe). Webinars were a suitable second best when we could not meet face-to face. Metaphors and images were also useful for facilitating reflection, which is why I have chosen the Building Plan as a metaphor for discussion here. Overall, it is important to take a frequent look at your framework and what it means to operate within it in practice. This Building Plan is missing a phone line, and a web-based platform where researchers and RPOs can communicate more regularly and share documents, and a garden to relax in and step

back from the workplace and research busyness. However, I have deliberately incorporated the space for reflection into the building to emphasise that this needs to be a central part of organisational culture and ideally is done collectively in the meeting room as well as individually.

8.6. Conclusion to chapter eight

Researchers engaging in action-oriented research based on the pathways approach are called to engage in pathway-building processes and activities to enhance reflection. We need to critically reflect on the dynamic roles and positions we take on and how this shapes process and outcomes, and we can also provide support to others in critically reflecting at an individual and organisational level (for example about what is happening and how it relates to one's actions; the validity of one's assumptions and norms; and how these might compare or conflict with others' assumptions and norms). Less is known however about *how* to do this (with *whom*, *when* and *where*, and using *which* tools). Creating the infrastructure for this is a key aspect of action-oriented research, resulting in the acquisition of practical knowledge necessary for addressing the *how* question. The knowledge originates from work within particular contexts, but has broader applicability. Susman and Evered (1978 p599) call it 'practics' and describe it as including the know-how necessary for creating settings for (i) organisational learning, (ii) acting in un-prescribed non-programmed situations, (iii) generating organisational self-help, (iv) establishing action guides where none exist, (v) reviewing, revising and refining the systems we are part of and (vi) formulating useful metaphors, constructs and images for articulating a more desirable future. This particular collaboration and research design enabled me to develop skills in each of these areas, especially (ii), (v) and (vi) (through my engagement in the FCSSP and tools to support reflection). The research agreement I developed with legal advice and support from my supervisors is an example of (iv); and the facilitation of reflection and sharing of my interpretations with the Project Team were contributions towards (i) and (iii).

I noted that the limitations of the research design and the collaborative context included my limited scope to enhance reflection amongst other stakeholders in the FCSSP to the same extent as I supported the Project Team; and staff members' limited time to engage in reflection processes or incorporate them into their organisational culture without relying on my presence as an external facilitator. This points to the need for researchers to ask themselves who they are intending to serve at the beginning of a research process and to position themselves accordingly, and for researchers and RPOs to be realistic and honest about capacities and expectations throughout a research process. One unresolved issue of capacity I encountered, was that as a single researcher, I was unable to reflect back to all stakeholders my interpretations of the governance dynamics and conflicting interests at a time when they could have made use of them

to navigate the FCSSP. I did this mainly *ex post*, with the Project Team only. Li (2015) recommends that a team or a think-tank of researchers and analysts is necessary for producing and delivering such reflections in real time.

Strengths of this design and collaborative context included opportunities to bring in localised knowledge to the FCSSP, assemble and reflect back diverse viewpoints, create temporary spaces for reflection and develop salient constructs and metaphors, at least one of which was taken on board by the Project Team as a tool for reflecting on future standard-setting processes (section 8.2.2). I recommended in this chapter that a more active role in standard-setting work for action-oriented researchers with appropriate skills could involve designing and/or facilitating participatory policy appraisal workshops and serving as reflection coaches for staff and team members, particularly when the work involves significant questioning of assumptions, steep learning curves and major uncertainties. Overall, the research serves as an example of a mutually beneficial collaboration and basis for FTI to draw on in their work to develop policies and infrastructure for future collaborations with researchers.

Chapter 9 General Conclusion

The overall aim of this thesis was to unpack fairness in standard setting processes and carbon projects through action-oriented research. A pathways approach was adopted in order to both critically assess, and engage with the processes of defining, framing, bounding of fairness and governing the FCSSP. This chapter summarises the contributions towards this aim, structuring the discussion around the three research objectives. This is followed by a brief discussion of how this thesis advances both theory and pathways research, followed by a thematic discussion of how it contributes to bridging a number of key literature areas and academic approaches. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future collaborations between researchers and standard-setting organisations and future research.

9.1. Addressing the research objectives

Objective 1: To uncover the debates, perspectives and different options for achieving fairness within carbon projects, and explore them in relation to the FCS

Objective 1 was addressed through four questions: (1.1) how is 'fair carbon' understood and defined by different people involved in the FCSSP? (1.2) whose definitions and understandings are incorporated into the FCS? (1.3) which assumptions and evidence is the Theory of Change for the FCS based on? and (1.4) what can example carbon projects tell us about possible pathways to the outcomes and impacts articulated in the Theory of Change as the FCS is applied? Questions 1.1 and 1.2 were set based on an observation that the concepts of 'fairness' and 'carbon' were being combined (by FTI, GSF and other actors) without sufficient clarity on what was meant by this. Chapter 1 recommended an empirical analysis of these concepts and their usage, particularly necessary because of the ethical debates about whether 'carbon' could be 'fair' (chapter 1) and the series of challenges that FTI and GSF would need to address if they were to achieve what they set out to (chapter 2).

Chapter 1 adapted an existing framework for exploring dimensions of fairness. This involved seeking a better understanding of how the various dimensions of fairness interact with one another, an aspect which had been noted as a knowledge gap in the original framework (McDermott et al., 2013). In particular, I made links between Fair Procedures and Fair Parameter-setting so that the analytical lens could be placed simultaneously on fairness within carbon projects and within standard-setting processes. This was a unique contribution that built on the work of previous scholars who had applied equity frameworks either to carbon projects (e.g. Mulyani and Jepson, 2015), or to standards governance and standards content (McDermott, 2013, Pinto and McDermott, 2013). As such, my own Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework

was used to navigate an exploration of fairness definitions and mechanisms used within, or relevant to analyses at, different levels (within projects, within standards content, and within standard-setting processes). The framework provided a structure for understanding the interplay between different notions, contexts and practice, and identifying tensions between multiple notions co-existing at different scales, and therefore shaped the analytical lenses for the remaining chapters of the thesis. In section 9.2 I discuss the potential extensions to this framework.

Chapter 2 operationalised FTI and GSF's concept of 'fair carbon' by exploring the aspects they had originally suggested it might include and relating these to theory and literature. 'Access', 'benefits' and 'participation' were linked to the three elements in the core of the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework and examined in the context of literature on carbon projects involving agriculture and forestry in Sub Saharan Africa. This review pointed to challenges that FTI and GSF would need to grapple with in developing the FCS which was due to be targeted at smallholders and communities; as well as existing tools and approaches already deployed within standards and certification. The Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework and literature review in chapter 2 laid the groundwork for the empirical contributions of this thesis linked to objective 1.

Chapter 5 addressed questions 1.1 and 1.2 by means of a Q study with 26 participants selected from the pool of stakeholders participating in the FCSSP. The study supported participants in reflecting on and articulating their own notions of fairness. Interpretation of the data resulted in three distinct factors or sets of shared viewpoints. These then served as a benchmark for exploring which definitions were eventually included in the final FCS (see section 5.6) and which ones were left out. This Q study was a unique contribution in terms of unpacking multiple perceptions of fairness, which were otherwise glossed over during the more narrowly focussed stakeholder discussions on standards mechanisms convened by FTI. Communication of the results to FTI, GSF and all the participants enabled a more open and inclusive standard-setting process. It was a way of assembling plural notions and demonstrating the tensions between them, reflecting them all back to the proponents of these notions, and providing a wider yet manageable set of inputs for the FCSSP. By contributing towards greater clarity on the dimensions of fairness that the FCS incorporates, the study results may be useful to FTI as a benchmark for evaluating performance and fairness outcomes with respect to each of these dimensions. The study also increased FTI's awareness of a methodological tool that could be useful for future explorations of diverse viewpoints on contentious topics arising in standard-setting processes (see section 9.5). The main limitation of this study was that by choosing to (i) select statements from material articulated in the context of the FCSSP and (ii) target participants I had encountered within the FCSSP activities, I missed an opportunity to explore notions of 'fair carbon' amongst a broader population. Also, the breadth of dimensions explored

in the Q study were limited by my use of the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework, which was my own (theoretically-driven) attempt at framing fairness and setting boundaries around what I explored. For the most part this proved useful and adequate, but in hindsight I recognise that I may have neglected attending to the more relational and dynamic aspects of fairness perhaps better captured within Organisational Theories of Justice (see section 9.2).

Chapter 7 moved beyond definitions of fairness to an exploration of different assumptions and evidence about how it might be achieved in carbon projects, tackled through questions 1.3 and 1.4. These questions were set in acknowledgement of a reflection gap regarding the FCS Theory of Change (it had not been adequately discussed with diverse stakeholders during its conception, see chapter 7). Also, FTI welcomes research that helps them to better understand, test and improve their Theories of Change (Chapter 7) and my research is the first example of a systematic critical unpacking of the FCS Theory of Change. Question 1.4 in particular was developed in response to a dearth of empirical data on the impact of carbon standards and their ability to produce changes in projects (chapter 1, research gap 2) and in recognition that it was still relatively unknown how the proposed fairness mechanisms in the FCS would apply to carbon projects. Chapter 2 identified knowledge gaps in the literature regarding (i) different types of organisational structures in carbon projects and how these interact with standards requirements, and (ii) non-financial benefits in particular. The original study design involved empirical work on the application of the FCS within pilot carbon projects (chapter 4) but as this proved not to be temporally feasible, chapter 7 is thus based on alternative empirical evidence collected from two independently selected carbon programmes[55] which offer useful hypothetical lessons about how the FCS would play out if applied by either programme. This empirical work served to contextualise the FCS and increase the pool of evidence relevant to the FCS Theory of Change.

Analysis for this chapter led to the identification of seven embedded assumptions, divergent evidence (both corroborating and contradicting the logic in the Theory of Change), only partial support for some of the key concepts in the Theory of Change (such as Producer, Producer Organisation and Facilitator) and potential weaknesses in the mechanisms expected to result in transfer of knowledge and capacities to producer organisations. Analysis of empirical work in Kenya illuminated the opinions, knowledge and unique approaches of those implementing carbon programmes and contributed new empirical insight on the dynamic roles and

[55] When this work was presented at the Fair Trade International Symposium in Milan in 2015, an audience member from Fairtrade Foundation (one of the National Fairtrade Organisations) appreciated in particular that my research had involved independent fieldwork (not commissioned by FTI and with carbon programmes not selected by FTI for piloting the FCS) as in her opinion, the latter was likely to be more biased.

relationships between different actors in carbon projects; organisational structures appropriate for carbon projects; and different types of non-financial benefit such as increase in skills and capacities and mechanisms for extending these benefits beyond the core management team within an organisation. This empirical data pointed to the relational elements within carbon projects and their impact on perceptions of fairness and change outcomes. This again led me to question the adequacy of the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework and look to Organisational Justice Theories for a better understanding (see 9.2). Overall, the analyses in chapter 7 serve as a basis for FTI to learn from and underline aspects to monitor as the FCS and its Theory of Change are reviewed and revised.

Objective 2: To describe and analyse the process of collaborative development of the FCS

The second objective and three associated questions were set in acknowledgement of the following weaknesses within, and knowledge gaps about the practice of standard-setting. Chapters 1 and 3 articulated the critique that producers or other stakeholders expected to comply with standards on the ground, are often not accorded sufficient space to articulate their views; and questioned the inclusivity, accessibility and participatory nature of standard-setting processes including those led by FTI. Chapter 1 pointed to the knowledge gap about how FTI standards are set and criteria are defined and the need for greater transparency and critical assessment of standard-setting processes. This was deemed particularly necessary in the context of an initiative seeking to define and legitimise the controversial matter of 'fair carbon' (chapter 1), which was led by the central organisation in a fair trade movement already beset with tensions regarding definitions of fairness (chapter 1 and 5).

Chapter 6 presented the empirical material for addressing objective 2 and questions 2.1-2.3 (what did the FCSSP look like in terms of forums for input, debates and interests? How did the FCS reflect stakeholder input and what shaped this? What does this say about participatory governance in practice?). It provided the first in-depth exploration of a complete standard-setting process (building on action-oriented and/or ethnographic research on particular decisions within FTI standard- and price-setting processes provided by previous researchers). This involved the following contributions:

- Providing a better understanding of standard setting processes as sites of conflict, tension and negotiation. This included surfacing and exploring inherent conflicts and non-consensus between stakeholders whose interests or opinions appeared on the surface to be shared, and understanding how conflicting views were able to co-exist, be transformed or remain opposed.

- Developing a heuristic for mapping governance dynamics in the context of the FCSSP, also considered by the Standards Unit at FTI to be relevant for navigating future standard-setting processes. This included developing a new concept of *rug-tugging.*
- Tracking the decision-making process regarding key topics of standard scope and pricing mechanisms. This included identifying attempts by different actors (including myself) to open up deliberation, counterbalance dominant interests and powers and slow down decisions; as well as attempts to steer towards decisions.
- Identifying the disjuncture between deliberation and decision-making that appeared in the FCSSP in interaction with FTI governance provisions, and the onus this placed on the Project Team to bridge the disjuncture, be accountable to all and craft a standard accepted by as many of the stakeholders as possible.

Overall, my empirical work and position with respect to the FCSSP allowed for an external eye as an extra measure of accountability vis à vis the Project Team and their onerous task; provided a transparent documentation of the FCSSP; and contributed towards a greater understanding of the strengths and limits of FTI's participatory governance approach in practice. My accompaniment of the FCSSP was recognised as valuable by the Project Team but also other staff within the Fairtrade system such as the Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Unit and staff at Fairtrade Foundation (the UK National Fairtrade Organisation)[56] particularly because of its nature as an innovative process involving embarking on a learning journey.

Objective 3: To assess the value of action-oriented research in collaborative standard-setting processes

Objective 3 and questions 3.1 and 3.2 (How can action-oriented multi-sited research enhance reflection amongst stakeholders involved in the research, and how does it shape outcomes? What can be learnt about conducting collaborative research on standard setting processes through this thesis?) were formulated because of the centrality of reflection (self-reflection and supporting others to reflect) in action-oriented research processes (see chapters 4 and 8). Also, it was paramount to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the methodological innovations and unusual role of the researcher enacted in this research process, and to glean lessons. This objective contributes to addressing two particular gaps in know-how (see chapter 1). The first gap is how to engage in pathway-building processes, including opening them up to receive a broader set of inputs and convening processes of deliberation at different levels. This gap was

[56] Evidence based on comments provided at the Fair Trade International Symposium during a presentation of my work and subsequent discussions between researchers and Fairtrade staff.

pertinent in the case of this thesis because researcher engagement with a complete standard-setting process led by FTI had never been done before. The second gap is how to enhance reflection and reflexivity in path-building processes, in terms of (i) allowing destinations, routes and directions to be considered by multiple people; (ii) developing infrastructure for reflection in organisations (see chapter 8) and (iii) acknowledging our own positions and influences vis à vis the pathway-building process and communicating honestly about them in an academically appropriate format.

Chapter 8 summarised my reflections on research design, efforts to support reflection, researcher roles, positionality and influence. The main contributions of this thesis regarding reflection were the tools and examples of attempts to enhance reflection assessed in chapter 8, and the Q study (chapter 5). Overall, I have demonstrated a role for researchers in (i) supporting people to reflect themselves, and (ii) reflecting back interpretations of what happened to those who lead an innovative process. Designing and conducting the research also enabled me to develop the practical skill-set for facilitating reflection (see chapter 8). The second part of chapter 8 discussed what can be learnt about conducting collaborative research (question 3.2). Infrastructure and learning from this particular collaboration is likely to contribute to future research processes (concretely in terms of creating a research agreement template and providing input for FTI's researcher-engagement policy making work). One of the key considerations to address each time a researcher intends to enhance reflection in a collaborative research context is *who* is the researcher serving- i.e. enhancing reflection for whom? A remaining challenge is how to temporally organising the reflecting-back and the trade-offs between doing it during the deliberative process when stakeholders can use the researcher's interpretations to make sense of the process as it unfolds; and doing it *ex post* (allowing the researcher to step back and conduct a holistic process analysis). Each has different implications on researcher capacity and the former in particular may require a team of researchers or a bigger time commitment from a single researcher, so that data collection, analysis, and feeding back can all happen in a short space of time.

9.2. Advancing Theories on Fairness

The Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework I used throughout this thesis was useful for exploring perceptions of fairness across the six dimensions included in the framework, but empirical work pointed to a more dynamic and relational aspect of fairness that was perhaps not adequately captured within my original framework. Fair Access in my framework (see Table 1-1) attends to the way that people participate based on power, wealth and resources but easily leads to an assessment of pre-existing conditions rather than seeing these elements as dynamic, shifting and actively shaped. Fair Procedures attends both to the procedures themselves, and the

ways that they shape people's participation and negotiation processes. However, once again, it is tempting to consider the procedures as static and to understand participation only in terms of the possibilities created by the procedures. The empirical evidence I gathered in this thesis (in the Q study interviews, during observations of the FCSSP and during programme observations with TIST), corroborates the assertion that 'the interpersonal implementation of procedures need not (or cannot) be separated from their structural aspects' (Colquitt et al., 2001 p427).

Having considered the limits of the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework, we can reflect in more depth on the dynamics of social relationships and their impact on fairness by looking at theories of Organisational Justice. While these began in the mid-1970s with a lens on procedural and distributive fairness (Colquitt et al., 2001), they began taking interactional fairness into account in the mid-1980s (initially by Bies and Moag, 1986). This involves a recognition that the ongoing experience of relationship and the quality of treatment within interactions has an effect on the way that fairness is perceived (Ariño and Ring, 2010). Views differ among Organisational Justice theorists on the way that interactional fairness overlaps with procedural fairness and how best to conceptualise it. Some authors have found it useful to refer to two separate elements of informational fairness and interpersonal fairness and explore them alongside procedural and distributive fairness (Ariño and Ring, 2010, Colquitt, 2001) whereas others have considered elements of interactional under the banner of procedural fairness (see Colquitt et al., 2001). Notably, within Organisational Justice theories there is no notion of 'Fair Access' (or related concepts used by Environmental Justice scholars such as equity of access or contextual equity, see Table 1-1) and so there has been no analysis of how interactional fairness and Fair Access might overlap. Colquitt et al. (2001 p427) define interpersonal fairness as the treatment of people with politeness, respect and dignity by those who are involved in executing procedures or determining outcomes; and informational fairness as the explanations given to people that convey information about why procedures were used in a certain way or why outcomes were distributed in a certain fashion. They see that the former is most likely to alter reactions to decisions on outcomes, and the latter is most likely to alter reactions to procedures. Connections between dignity, participation and justice or fairness have also been made within Peace Studies: drawing on the centrality of the concept of dignity in the Zapatista movement; Bühler (2002) proposes a focus on dignity as a way of moving on from the 'tyranny' of participation (see Cooke and Kothari, 2001).

These interactional dimensions of fairness are relevant both to standard setting processes led by FTI, and to the implementation of the FCS within carbon projects as both involve dynamics where some people have a greater hold on information and are more in control of procedures than others. For example, I perceived an informational shortfall in the FCSSP when the Project Team failed to provide sufficient feedback or a rationale to those who had taken part in the

earlier phases of the FCSSP, for eventually excluding agricultural projects from the scope in the final phase of the FCSSP (section 6.6.1.4.). It would be useful to assess perceptions of informational and interpersonal fairness amongst others who took part and to understand how this might have shaped their perception of fairness within (i) the procedures, and (ii) the outcomes of the FCSSP.

With respect to projects applying the FCS, their written procedures (such as the contractual agreement between the Project Facilitator and Producer Organisation) are the primary indices that the FCS relies on for assessing relationships. However, my analysis has shown that these are probably insufficient for understanding whether producer organisation members are satisfied with the arrangements with the Project Facilitator, the way they are being treated by others in the project and with the way that information is conveyed[57]. Also, experiences of social relationships are likely to be more material and tangible than notions of the carbon for many project participants. Further consideration of the dimensions of fairness (supported both by the Multi-Dimensional Fairness Framework and additional insight from Organisational Justice theories) suggests that focussing on the relationship aspects of the project might be more effective than focussing on the carbon, as a means for understanding what the project is all about and why it is Fairtrade.

Findings from chapter 7 also support the view that interpersonal fairness is linked to fair benefit-sharing (or in the language of Organisational Justice theorists, distributional fairness) (Colquitt et al., 2001). In section 7.6.1.3 I described some of the experiences reported by TIST members as a result of programme participation, including feeling uplifted, less shy and finding it easier to interact: these interpersonal dimensions were qualified as programme benefits. The FCS Theory of Change recognises dignity and self-esteem amongst the expected impacts of Fairtrade carbon projects Figure 7-1. A focus on interpersonal fairness might help to postulate plausible theories about how such impacts might be attained.

9.3. Advancing Pathways research, Opening up Pathways?

In section 1.3 I introduced the normative goal of pathways research, to ‘open up’ the space which may allow for recognition of the pathways which support the goals and ambitions of particular groups of poorer and marginalised people, and allow these to flourish (Leach et al., 2010). I have attempted to do this through the use of six pathways components. The first four, which were concerned with *uncovering* and *identifying*, aligned with a more typical style of

[57] Perceptions of fairness may not be the only factor that people draw on to determine their satisfaction with the relationship.

academic analysis done by social scientists. In contrast, the last two required me to take on a more active role in the path-building process- to *engage* with it and *enhance* reflexivity. This required a more novel role and less is known, even by those who advocate it (Gray, 2007, Stirling et al., 2007), about *how* to do this. I dedicated chapter 8 to a detailed reflection both on how I did this, as well as which possible impacts it might have had on the path-building process and where further opportunities to enhance reflection might be possible. Conceptualising the FCS as a universalising pathway, I have acted to resist temptations for 'fairness' to be co-opted in the carbon market without adequate reflection on what it means; I have tried to hold FTI accountable to their own governance processes and point out where perspectives were being forgotten or discounted; and I have sought to identify where the FCS pathway may not be appropriate or may not sufficiently recognise alternative approaches to achieving the same overarching goals. While FCS will always be generalising, by nature of it being a standard, its potential for dominance is yet to be seen, as this depends on whether and how it gains ground, both amongst potential licensees, and within the market.

9.4. Overall knowledge contributions: towards integration

By collaborating, FTI and GSF attempted to integrate the previously separate fields of fair trade and carbon and draw together a new combination of networks, knowledges, concepts, procedures, governance structures and certification systems. Taking this practice-based example of integration as the focus of enquiry, this thesis makes an important contribution to sustainability science as a practical example of 'integrative research'- research that attempts to counter the fragmentation between disciplines, between researchers and practitioners, and between research-based knowledge and action (van Kerkhoff, 2014). Researching this topic has involved combining literature from sustainability standards and carbon projects, and drawing on a broad set of disciplines such as environmental justice, environmental and sustainability governance, the geography of commodities, climate policy, participatory and deliberative policy analysis, mediation and conflict resolution, ethics, organisational change, organisational justice and management learning. In the paragraphs below I summarise briefly the main links made between these fields and my specific contributions (the details of which were provided in each empirical chapter).

9.4.1. Environmental Justice, Organisational Justice and theories on Fairness, Justice and Equity

This thesis has contributed to the body of social constructionist work on fairness, equity and justice. Under this approach, understanding particular framings is more important than the exact terminology (Schroeder and McDermott, 2014). I have chosen to use the concept of fairness

throughout but have sketched out the main overlaps and differences with respect to equity and justice. By applying Sikor et al.'s (2014) approach to a new area of standard setting, I have explored multiple empirical notions of fairness in practice, using theory to help identify and make sense of them, and I have examined their implications in different places. I have outlined a potential new bridge between Organisational Justice and Environmental Justice (see 9.2), but there is still more work to be done in discriminating between the constructs used in each field and understanding what they mean to people, how they link together and how they shape outcomes. Overall, this thesis has contributed to what Schlosberg (2004:517) calls a 'plural yet unified theory and practice' – of justice in his words, and of fairness in my own.

9.4.2. Carbon trading, standards and projects

In chapter 1 of this thesis I outlined the opposing views on the carbon economy, which are generally based on ethical or efficiency rationales. Some scholars have suggested ways to move on from the gridlock between views, for example by ensuring that any ethical appraisals are sensitive to the forms that carbon trading can take (Caney, 2010) and by examining what the people involved in carbon schemes consider as fair and legitimate (Caney, 2010, Page, 2012). However, their own analyses have remained at the level of carbon trading generally, as opposed to the instruments used to facilitate this trade or the actors involved in it. Other authors have recommended seeking a more nuanced understanding of how carbon instruments operate in particular places and linking this to justice debates (Corbera and Martin, 2015). There is fairly wide agreement amongst authors approaching the subject from different angles, that the carbon economy is not currently meeting intended objectives and that it needs to transform (Boyd et al., 2011, Bumpus, 2011a, Ciscell, 2010, Corbera and Martin, 2015), though there are fewer suggestions as to how, or research on instances where it is being transformed. My work has taken on board these concerns and has sought to consider ongoing processes to enhance fairness in the carbon sector. I have addressed the scalar fragmentation between research on carbon projects, and research on carbon standards by looking at how the requirements and approach within the FCS played out in the context of particular carbon projects, through empirical research. This bridges the contributions of scholars (such as Fisher, 2012, Mathur et al., 2014, Jindal et al., 2012, Reynolds, 2012) who focussed their analyses on carbon projects; reviews of carbon standards (such as Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez, 2014, Sterk, 2009, Kollmuss et al., 2008, Wood, 2011); and desk reviews of carbon projects and standards mechanisms (e.g. Suiseeya and Caplow, 2013). Overall I have contributed to the recognised need for multi-faceted and multi-dimensional explanations of how the carbon economy functions and for whom as well as how it might be transformed (Boyd et al., 2011), by focusing on and drawing lessons from one particular niche.

9.4.3. Fairtrade, governance and standard setting

By exploring an entire Fairtrade standard-setting process based around the development of a novel Fairtrade product, my work has contributed to the literature on Fairtrade, participatory governance and the politics of standard setting.

Several authors have suggested the opportunities and challenges for applying Fairtrade to other commodities (Ciscell, 2010, Klooster, 2006, Taylor, 2005a, Hilson and Kamlongera, 2013) or making existing product standards more appropriate to particular regions (Hilson and Kamlongera, 2013). Although Fairtrade has subsequently undertaken work to develop or modify standards to make it applicable in each of the recommended areas, no other authors have documented these processes. My work on extending Fairtrade to carbon contributes to a more integrated understanding of the Fairtrade movement and its evolution by linking debates that arose within the context of the FCSSP with broader debates across the Fairtrade movement (e.g. mainstreaming, commodification, governance) (Doherty et al., 2013, Raynolds and Greenfield, 2015, Renard and Laconto, 2013, Renard, 2015), and key concepts and mechanisms within the FCSSP. In this case, linking the concepts has also involved identifying where there are still significant differences in what they mean and how they apply in different contexts where Fairtrade certification is applied. This builds on points made by Blowfield and Dolan (2010), Getz and Shreck (2006), Nelson and Martin (2015), Phillips (2014), about the specificity of each Fairtrade commodity and geography where Fairtrade certification is applied and the need to be careful about claims made about ethical labels (see 9.6 for recommendations about which aspects of the FCS and its Theory of Change need to be better understood before any strong claims can be made about them in Fairtrade communications).

In terms of standard setting, my work extends a series of contributions by scholars (such as Bacon, 2010, Reinecke, 2010, Reinecke and Ansari, 2015) who looked at discrete decision-making processes on particular aspects of Fairtrade certification that had historic significance. It also builds on analyses of other standard setting processes where authors have also looked at the application of particular governance and decision-making tools and the management of participation in multi-stakeholder processes (Cheyns, 2011, Djama et al., 2011, Murphy and Yates, 2011). In an effort to move beyond some of the more critical approaches to the politics of standards (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008) where there is a tendency to focus on power as primarily concentrated in the global north, I have attended to the power and politics of standard-setters but also *countervailing power* and *counter-politics* in standard setting processes. This is an important part of pathways research (Leach et al., 2010) and builds on authors such as (Goodman and Herman, 2015) and (Renard, 2015, Sutton, 2013) who have acknowledged the

strategic use and/or transformation of Fairtrade by actors in the global south and the existence of countervailing power across the fair trade movement.

9.4.4. Commodification of carbon and fairness

My work made use of commodification approaches, both commodity-general (Castree, 2004) and specific to carbon (Bumpus, 2011a, Goodman and Boyd, 2011, Lovell et al., 2009) These have been necessary for rendering carbon into an analytical category; drawing attention to the social relationships it is imbued with and the neoliberal system that promotes and facilitates commodification. By combining this with literature on the commodification of Fairtrade (Guthman, 2002, Goodman, 2004, Lekakis, 2012), I have contributed to a better theoretical understanding of what it means to commodify 'fair carbon'. My practical and grounded approach has enabled a better empirical understanding of what the constitution and commodification of fair carbon means to the people actively involved producing, transacting and governing this new commodity and who has a hold on what carbon means. This has enabled a more nuanced understanding of the commodification process, recognising that it provides both opportunities and difficulties (Bumpus, 2011a), and that access to opportunities or experience of difficulties depends in part on the interpersonal relations between people in the project and the efforts to convey information. I have shown that more of a focus on what the 'fair' part of fair carbon means to the people involved in producing and transacting it might be more effective than expecting people to learn how to articulate exactly what the 'carbon' part means.

9.4.5. Bridging theory and practice: research-based knowledge and action

By situating myself amidst the FCSSP and taking a collaborative and process-oriented approach to knowledge creation, I have been well-positioned to address the arising knowledge gaps and deliberative shortfalls within the FCSSP and explore the trajectories of decision-making processes and outcomes. Producing knowledge in interaction is one way of attempting to increase the salience, legitimacy and credibility of knowledge (Cash et al., 2006, Miller, 2013)- in this case making this thesis more relevant, contextual and useful to the practitioners who are taking the action to develop and roll out the FCS. In order to test this, the main findings, frameworks and heuristics in each chapter were discussed interactively with FTI and GSF in order to validate them before completion. Working in this way is a contribution towards bridging the gap between research-based knowledge and action. My positionality is more similar to that of Reinecke (Reinecke, 2010, Reinecke and Ansari, 2015) and Bacon (2010), although in each case, the relationship and any prior history or future involvement with Fairtrade was unique. We have each found Fairtrade standard setting or price negotiation processes to be highly contested, negotiated and shaped by constraints and convictions, and we have each situated these processes as pathways shaped by historical trajectories and shaping

future trajectories. This highly engaged approach perhaps lends itself to recognising the individuals, the contradictions and dilemmas, the internal politics and interpersonal relationships that shape and characterise standard setting.

There are of course other options for producing knowledge about standards, certification and multi-stakeholder initiatives and I have used the insights gathered from alternative approaches throughout this thesis. These include the more critical and/or detached approaches where the research is conducted without a commitment to deliver findings to the SSO (Blowfield and Dolan, 2008, Cheyns, 2011), research completed as part of consultancies commissioned by FTI (Nelson and Smith, 2011, Nelson and Martin, 2011, Nelson and Pound, 2010), independent research conducted by scholars who maintain an ongoing relationship with FTI (Tallontire and Nelson, 2013, Tallontire, 2009) and research conducted by Fairtrade or ex-Fairtrade practitioners (Doherty et al., 2013). In each case, positionality has an impact on the researcher's access, framing choices and decisions about what to write, who should validate and where to publish. I recognise the value of each approach (and indeed many of the researchers cited here have conducted research from multiple angles). In my case, building relationships with the people who had a stake in the research and its outcomes and interacting in positive and productive ways helped to bridge the gap between researchers and practitioners, leaving the FTI and GSF staff with whom I interacted with a positive impression of what can arise from collaborating with researchers.

9.5. Recommendations for future standard setting processes

This thesis highlights a number of opportunities for enhancing participatory collaborative outcomes and engaging with researchers in standard-setting processes. These are given below, and are based on the four empirical chapters of this thesis.

Chapter 6 acknowledged the problems arising when decisions need to be made on 'hot topics' but the decision-makers are isolated from the spaces where such topics are deliberated. This places a burden on the middle managers who need to bridge the disjuncture between deliberation and decision-making. The following points should be considered if FTI or GSF are designing a multi-stakeholder process for deliberation of the issues that remain unresolved in the context of the FSSSP, regarding smallholder adaptation, mitigation and agricultural carbon projects and development of effective and consensual approaches.

Deliberators: during the FCSSP, those who had most opposing opinions on agricultural carbon projects did not get the opportunity to meet and discuss directly (chapter 6). Instead the process relied on the Project Team collecting opinions from separate participative forums and then encountering their non-reconcilability. The unresolved issues would benefit from being

deliberated by a range of stakeholders representing the spectrum of opinions. In the FCSSP, this would have meant combining members of the working group, civil society and Fairtrade producer organisations in one forum. Members of the Standards Committee would ideally be part of this deliberative process so that they could benefit from hearing and contributing to the spectrum of opinions, learning from the deliberative process and using this to inform their decision-making within the Standards Committee.

Deliberative focus: assembling people to discuss whether agricultural carbon projects should be included within the scope of the FCS is likely to result in stalemate because some of FTI's key partner CSOs are currently opposed to agricultural carbon projects while Fairtrade producers are likely to continue advocating for support for their agricultural activities. Instead, people could be assembled to discuss the question 'what should be done to support small-scale farmers to adapt to climate change?'. This question would unite deliberators around a common focus.

Inputs for deliberation: if FTI and GSF were to engage diverse stakeholders in a meaningful debate, they would need to pass onto them their lessons and evidence related to the issues of adaptation and mitigation, agricultural carbon projects and small-scale farmers in a way that would enable the deliberators to better understand the topic and come to their own conclusions. Such inputs could include (i) lessons from smallholder carbon projects in agriculture; (ii) assessments of sustainable agricultural practices and their relevance for small-scale farmers and mitigation projects; (iii) data from FCS-certified carbon projects about the application of the adaptation plan mandated by the FCS and which adaptation practices relevant to agriculture (if any) were being facilitated by it; (iv) data from FCS-certified carbon projects about any positive effects on agricultural adaptation facilitated by mitigation activities in the forestry or energy sectors.

Chapter 5 demonstrated the value of Q as a method for opening up standard-setting processes to a broad but manageable set of inputs from diverse stakeholders. Below are ways that Q could be used in standard-setting processes.

a) Q studies can be held before and after multi-stakeholder events in order to measure changes of an opinion on a topic and therefore support processes of reflection and learning. This Q **s**tudy could be repeated with the same participants now that the FCS has been published, as a means of comparing individuals' initial sorts with their second sorts and supporting them to reflect on what they have learnt through the FCSSP. Statements would need to be modified slightly to incorporate changes in wording.
b) If the goal is to create a forum where diverse stakeholders interact and share in decision-making, Q studies can help to identify which stakeholders need to be combined in a

deliberative forum in order to meet this goal. Researchers have used the results of Q studies as a tool for designing stakeholder input, in order to ensure the full coverage of perspectives on a topic are brought together in a discursively representative setting (see e.g. Cuppen et al., 2010, Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). The results of this Q study could be used to create a deliberative forum bringing together people from each of the factors to debate on remaining unresolved issues in a discursively representative setting (such as the adaptation-mitigation-smallholder-agriculture issue). It cannot be expected, nor would it be necessary, that there is consensus on the different dimensions of fairness. However, it remains important to acknowledge differences, to identify whose priorities and definitions are included or excluded in standards and projects aiming to enhance fairness, and to find ways of rebalancing this if it does not fit with the original intentions or has unintended consequences. Meeting together in the same forum can provide stakeholders with the opportunity to witness or directly debate with people voicing these alternative perspectives. However, in some cases there may be clear reasons for not bringing diverse stakeholders together in the same forum. In this case, the results of a Q study could be used to inform stakeholders of the alternative perspectives on a topic, in order that they still get the benefit of learning from one another and widening their perspectives.

c) Q is useful for diagnosing conflicts and exposing their underlying bases which may be masked when opinions are only otherwise voiced in a meeting setting, and can also suggest opportunities for consensus building. Within the context of the FCS, a new study could be devised with statements relating specifically to the hot topics which emerged from the longitudinal analysis presented in chapter 6. Q could also be used as a research methodology for understanding diverse perspectives on a topic in future standard-setting processes.

Chapter 7 recognised the value of critically unpacking Theories of Change and examining their assumptions and evidence. While this opportunity was largely missed during the FCSSP, future standard-setting processes could ensure that the Theory of Change language and methodology is brought more centrally into the standard-setting processes. For example, the staff developing the standard could be encouraged to make their own assumptions and logics more explicit when presenting drafts of standards to stakeholders, and stakeholders could be asked explicitly to provide diverse evidence supporting or contradicting these assumptions and logics. Together, they could examine competing assumptions, logics and evidence as part of the standard-setting process. This might require more training of standards and projects managers in Theory of Change thinking, and a rough sketching-out and sharing of a Theory of Change early on in the standard-setting process.

Chapter 8 highlighted opportunities for standard-setting organisations to deploy the services of suitably equipped researchers as reflection coaches, or for bigger teams of researchers to engage in deliberative policy analysis so that their interpretations and support with reflection could be made available to all stakeholders, during the standard-setting process. This would require more investment from the standard-setting organisation, identification of researchers with the necessary skill-sets, a reconfiguration of the relationship between the researcher and the standard-setting organisation and more specific goals for reflection. Similarly, researchers' or analysts' home institutions would need to accord them sufficient time and support to manage the dual tasks of reflection support and timely reflecting-back of results; and writing up their work for an academic audience.

9.6. Recommendations for future research

The following recommendations are based on observations of (i) mechanisms within the FCS and its Theory of Change that are still unproven or insufficiently validated; and (ii) unresolved tensions in debates about 'fair carbon'.

1. Chapter 7 contributed to a better understanding of how the FCS might operate in particular contexts through detailed empirical work on one particular carbon programme and illustrations from a second one. **As the FCS is rolled out, it will be necessary to do more detailed empirical research on FCS application and outcomes within carbon programmes implementing activities in each of the sectors covered by the standard, and in a wider range of geographical locations and organisational set-ups.** Contrasting conclusions might be gleaned from doing empirical research on the application of the FCS by large cook-stove programmes involving relatively little engagement with the cook-stove users or by sophisticated producer organisations in Latin America who are providing the majority of member services themselves; in contexts where the FCS is being incorporated into a project design or in contexts where it is being grafted onto an existing programme.
2. In chapter 7 it was noted that the FCS Theory of Change had been developed without sufficient input from stakeholders. I also recognise that my own interpretations of the assumptions and evidence behind it lacked the input and validation of a broad set of stakeholders as I was unable to share the findings with them before completing this thesis. These reflection gaps cannot be corrected, but each one creates an opportunity for a more thorough critical reflection on the FCS Theory of Change with the aim of enhancing its robustness. **It will be important to continue unpacking the FCS Theory of Change and assumptions and evidence behind it as the FCS is rolled out. Such research would preferably incorporate inputs from carbon project**

Facilitators and Producer Organisations who can contribute insight from their own projects, alongside people from the Fairtrade system who can draw on previous Fairtrade experiences and insight.

3. Chapters 6 and 7 both highlighted mechanisms within the FCS which were not wholly supported by stakeholders expected to be the front-runners of FCS-certified carbon programmes (particularly the Fairtrade Minimum Price and the concept of transfer of knowledge and capacities). Both chapters also identified mechanisms which were highly dependent on programme evolution and the preferences of Producer Organisations and Project Facilitators. One example is adaptation activities, which depend on sufficient revenue and on Producer Organisations opting to finance adaptation rather than using the Premium for more pressing needs (chapter 6). Transfer (mentioned above) is another example which depends on the relationship and motivations of programme actors and the speed at which the programme passes through different stages of development, certification, auditing etc. **Research on FCS implementation should focus in particular on the most contentious or uncertain mechanisms within the FCS, such as Fairtrade Premiums, finance for adaptation vs mitigation, project actors' roles and transfer of knowledge and capacities.**
4. Chapters 5 and 7 identified the importance of the dynamics of social relationships and the sharing of information between people involved in carbon projects. In chapter 6 I demonstrated how the FCSSP was shaped not only by the structure of FTI procedures, but crucially by individuals and interactions between them. I have noted that these interactional dimensions of fairness are missing from existing multi-dimensional approaches to fairness, equity or justice already put forward within environmental justice scholarship. **Future research should explore how the interactional dimensions of fairness (interpersonal and informational) might shape perceptions of fairness, and fairness outcomes in both projects and standard setting processes**, as this analytical lens on fairness borrowed from Organisational Justice has not to my knowledge been systematically applied to either of these areas.
5. Chapter 6 highlighted that the debate about agricultural carbon projects is currently unresolved and the development challenge of how to support smallholders to adapt to climate has only partially been addressed in the FCS. **Future research should document ongoing discussions convened by FTI and GSF with their stakeholder networks to discuss remaining issues regarding smallholder adaptation, mitigation and agricultural carbon projects and develop effective approaches.** Attention should be paid both to power relations and to instances of countervailing power in these debates, as the presence of the latter is necessary in order to govern in a participatory manner even if power relations are imbalanced.

9.7. Final remarks

This thesis has documented the evolution of the FCS from its conception to its entry into the public domain as a published standard. This is a process that is rare to be witnessed by anyone but the staff responsible for developing it. Rendering this more transparent is of value to members of the Fairtrade system, as well as researchers and members of civil society such as those who engage with the concept of Fairtrade but may lack all the elements to make informed judgements. By nature, standards are necessarily universalising and generalising, and like other ideas within sustainability, are susceptible to becoming dominant pathways that are managerial, bureaucratic and unworkable for the complex problems they are intended to address (Leach et al., 2010). This can only be judged as the FCS is applied and taken up by the market and will require further research. I have taken an unusual position in my choice to contribute to it whilst researching it, but this lays groundwork for understanding the future trajectory of the FCS and for identifying potentially unworkable aspects before they become more deeply embedded. Engaging with the pathway-building process has enabled me to open up inputs for the standard, underline the forgotten opinions, provide critique but also concrete suggestions and recommendations, make sense of debates, divergent perspectives and incompatible opinions, and reflect this back both during the process and in hindsight. This has hopefully served as an additional reminder to the standard-setters of the complexities of the issues and pluralities of perspectives and contexts where the FCS may be applied. The courage and willingness of the project team responsible for developing this standard to enter into a research collaboration and allow their work behind the scenes to be put to scrutiny made it possible for this research to take place. In hindsight, they were grateful of all they received in return. Now that the standard has reached implementation stage and this thesis complete, FTI must continue to embrace openness to critique and opportunities to reflect and learn from their work, and I will endeavour to do the same.

Bibliography

ADHIKARI, B. & BOAG, G. 2013. Designing payments for ecosystem services schemes: some considerations. *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability,* 5**,** 72-77.

ALBU, M. & GRIFFITH, A. 2005. Mapping the market: A framework for rural enterprise development policy and practice. *Rugby, UK: Practical Action (formerly ITDG)*.

ALLEN, D. 2009. From boundary concept to boundary object: The practice and politics of care pathway development. *Social Science & Medicine,* 69**,** 354-361.

ANSELL, C. & GASH, A. 2008. Collaborative governance in theory and practice. *Journal of public administration research and theory,* 18**,** 543-571.

ARIÑO, A. & RING, P. S. 2010. The role of fairness in alliance formation. *Strategic Management Journal,* 31**,** 1054-1087.

ATELA, J. O. 2012. The Politics of Agricultural Carbon Finance: The Case of the Kenya Agricultural Carbon Project. Brighton: STEPS Centre.

BACHRAM, H. 2004. Climate fraud and carbon colonialism: the new trade in greenhouse gases. *Capitalism Nature Socialism,* 15**,** 5-20.

BACON, C. M. 2010. Who decides what is fair in fair trade? The agri-environmental governance of standards, access, and price. *The Journal of Peasant Studies,* 37**,** 111-147.

BACON, C. M., MÉNDEZ, V. E. & FOX, J. A. 2008. Cultivating sustainable coffee: persistent paradoxes. *Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Fair Trade, Sustainable Livelihoods and Ecosystems in Mexico and Central America. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA***,** 337-372.

BAILEY, C. 1996. *A guide to field research*, Pine Forge Press.

BARRY, J. & PROOPS, J. 1999. Seeking sustainability discourses with Q methodology. *Ecological Economics,* 28**,** 337-345.

BENNETT, E. A. 2012. A short history of Fairtrade certification governance. *The Processes and Practices of Fair Trade: Trust, Ethics and Governance*.

BENNETT, E. A. 2015. Fairtrade International Governance. *In:* RAYNOLDS, L. T. & BENNETT, E. A. (eds.) *Handbook of Research on Fair Trade.* Edward Elgar Publishing.

BERNARD, H. 2006. *Research methods in anthropology: qualitative and quantitative approaches,* Rowman Altamira.

BIES, R. J. & MOAG, J. S. 1986. Interactional justice: Communication criteria of fairness. *Research on negotiation in organizations,* 1**,** 43-55.

BLOWFIELD, M. E. & DOLAN, C. 2010. Fairtrade facts and fancies: What Kenyan Fairtrade tea tells us about business' role as development agent. *Journal of Business Ethics,* 93**,** 143-162.

BLOWFIELD, M. E. & DOLAN, C. S. 2008. Stewards of virtue? The ethical dilemma of CSR in African agriculture. *Development and Change,* 39**,** 1-23.

BODANSKY, D. M., HOEDL, S. A., METCALF, G. E. & STAVINS, R. N. 2015. Facilitating linkage of climate policies through the Paris outcome. *Climate Policy***,** 1-17.

BOLWIG, S., PONTE, S., DU TOIT, A., RIISGAARD, L. & HALBERG, N. 2008. *Integrating poverty, gender and environmental concerns into value chain analysis: A conceptual framework and lessons for action research*, DIIS working paper.

BOUD, D., KEOGH, R. & WALKER, D. 2013. *Reflection: Turning experience into learning*, Routledge.

BOYCE, M. E. 1996. Organizational story and storytelling: a critical review. *Journal of Organizational Change Management,* 9**,** 5-26.

BOYD, E. 2009. Governing the Clean Development Mechanism: global rhetoric versus local realities in carbon sequestration projects. *Environment and planning. A,* 41**,** 2380.

BOYD, E., BOYKOFF, M. & NEWELL, P. 2011. The "New" Carbon Economy: What's New? *Antipode,* 43**,** 601-611.

BOZMOSKI, A. S. & HULTMAN, N. E. 2010. Participant perceptions of risk and benefit in carbon forestry: Evidence from central Tanzania. *The Journal of Environment & Development,* 19**,** 4-27.

BREWER, J. 2000. *Ethnography*, McGraw-Hill Education (UK).

BRIDGE, G. 2011. Resource geographies 1 Making carbon economies, old and new. *Progress in Human Geography,* 35**,** 820-834.

BROWN, K. & CORBERA, E. 2003. Exploring equity and sustainable development in the new carbon economy. *Climate Policy,* 3**,** S41-S56.

BROWN, M. B. 1993. *Fair trade: Reform and realities in the international trading system*, Zed books London.

BROWN, S. R., DANIELSON, S. & VAN EXEL, J. 2014. Overly ambitious critics and the Medici Effect: a reply to Kampen and Tamás. *Quality & Quantity***,** 1-15.

BÜHLER, U. 2002. Participation'with Justice and Dignity': Beyond the'New Tyranny'. *Peace, Conflict and Development,* 1**,** 16.

BULKELEY, H., ANDONOVA, L., BÄCKSTRAND, K., BETSILL, M., COMPAGNON, D., DUFFY, R., KOLK, A., HOFFMANN, M., LEVY, D. & NEWELL, P. 2012. Governing climate change transnationally: assessing the evidence from a database of sixty initiatives. *Environment and Planning-Part C,* 30**,** 591.

BUMPUS, A. G. 2011a. The matter of carbon: Understanding the materiality of tCO2e in carbon offsets. *Antipode,* 43**,** 612-638.

BUMPUS, A. G. 2011b. Realizing Local Development in the Carbon Commodity Chain? Political economy, value and connecting carbon commodities at multiple scales. *In:* UNRISD (ed.) *Green Economy and Sustainable Development: Bringing back the social dimension.* United Nations Research Institute on Sustainable Development and Frederich Ebert Stifting.

BUMPUS, A. G. & LIVERMAN, D. M. 2008. Accumulation by Decarbonization and the Governance of Carbon Offsets. *Economic geography,* 84**,** 127-155.

BUMPUS, A. G. & LIVERMAN, D. M. 2011. Carbon colonialism? Offsets, greenhouse gas reductions, and sustainable development. *In:* PEET, R. R., P.; WATTS, M. (ed.) *Global Political Ecology.* Taylor & Francis e library, US.

BUMPUS, A. G., LIVERMAN, D. M. & LOVELL, H. 2010. The rise of voluntary carbon offset standards: self-regulation, legitimacy and multi-scalar governance. *Legitimacy and Multi-Scalar Governance,* September 20th.

BURGESS, R. G. 2002. *In the field: An introduction to field research*, Routledge.

BUSCH, L. 2000. The moral economy of grades and standards. *Journal of Rural Studies,* 16**,** 273-283.

BUSCH, L. 2011. *Standards: Recipes for reality*, Mit Press.

CAIRNS, R., SALLU, S. M. & GOODMAN, S. 2014. Questioning calls to consensus in conservation: a Q study of conservation discourses on Galápagos. *Environmental Conservation,* 41**,** 13-26.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2016. Cambridge Dictionary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CANEY, S. 2010. Markets, morality and climate change: What, if anything, is wrong with emissions trading? *New Political Economy,* 15**,** 197-224.

CASH, D. W., BORCK, J. C. & PATT, A. G. 2006. Countering the loading-dock approach to linking science and decision making comparative analysis of El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) forecasting systems. *Science, Technology & Human Values,* 31**,** 465-494.

CASHORE, B. W., AULD, G. & NEWSOM, D. 2004. *Governing through markets: Forest certification and the emergence of non-state authority*, Yale University Press.

CASTREE, N. 2001. Commodity fetishism, geographical imaginations and imaginative geographies. *Environment and Planning A,* 33**,** 1519-1525.

CASTREE, N. 2004. The geographical lives of commodities: problems of analysis and critique. *Social & Cultural Geography,* 5**,** 21-35.

CHESS, C. & PURCELL, K. 1999. Public participation and the environment: Do we know what works? *Environmental Science & Technology,* 33**,** 2685-2692.

CHEYNS, E. 2011. Multi-stakeholder Initiatives for Sustainable Agriculture: Limits of the 'Inclusiveness' Paradigm. *In:* PONTE, S., GIBBON, P. & VESTERGAARD, J. (eds.) *Governing through standards: Origins, drivers and limitations.* Palgrave Macmillan.

CISCELL, G. M. 2010. Beyond CO2lonialism: The potential for fair trade certification to embrace voluntary carbon offsets. *International Journal of Sustainable Society,* 2**,** 121-132.

COGHLAN, D. 2003. Practitioner research for organizational knowledge mechanistic-and organistic-oriented approaches to insider action research. *Management Learning,* 34**,** 451-463.

COLQUITT, J. A. 2001. On the dimensionality of organizational justice: a construct validation of a measure. *Journal of applied psychology,* 86**,** 386.

COLQUITT, J. A., CONLON, D. E., WESSON, M. J., PORTER, C. O. & NG, K. Y. 2001. Justice at the millennium: a meta-analytic review of 25 years of organizational justice research. *Journal of applied psychology,* 86**,** 425.

CONNELL, J. P. & KUBISCH, A. C. 1998. Applying a theory of change approach to the evaluation of comprehensive community initiatives: progress, prospects, and problems. *New approaches to evaluating community initiatives,* 2.

COOKE, B. & KOTHARI, U. 2001. *Participation: The new tyranny?*, Zed Books.

CORBERA, E. & BROWN, K. 2010. Offsetting benefits? Analyzing access to forest carbon. *Environment and planning. A,* 42**,** 1739.

CORBERA, E. & MARTIN, A. 2015. Carbon offsets: Accommodation or resistance? *Environment and Planning A,* 47**,** 2023-2030.

CORNWALL, A. 2002. "Making spaces, changing places: situating participation in development".

CORNWALL, A. 2004. Introduction: New democratic spaces? The politics and dynamics of institutionalised participation. *iDS Bulletin,* 35**,** 1-10.

CORNWALL, A. & COELHO, V. S. 2007. *Spaces for change?: the politics of citizen participation in new democratic arenas*, Zed Books.

CORNWALL, A. & GAVENTA, J. 2000. From Users and Choosers to Makers and Shapers Repositioning Participation in Social Policy1. *IDS Bulletin,* 31**,** 50-62.

CUPPEN, E., BREUKERS, S., HISSCHEMÖLLER, M. & BERGSMA, E. 2010. Q methodology to select participants for a stakeholder dialogue on energy options from biomass in the Netherlands. *Ecological Economics,* 69**,** 579-591.

CURRY, R., BARRY, J. & MCCLENAGHAN, A. 2013. Northern Visions? Applying Q methodology to understand stakeholder views on the environmental and resource dimensions of sustainability. *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management,* 56**,** 624-649.

DANIELSEN, F., SKUTSCH, M., BURGESS, N. D., JENSEN, P. M., ANDRIANANDRASANA, H., KARKY, B., LEWIS, R., LOVETT, J. C., MASSAO, J. & NGAGA, Y. 2011. At the heart of REDD+: a role for local people in monitoring forests? *Conservation Letters,* 4**,** 158-167.

DAVENPORT, E. & LOW, W. 2015. 20. Fair trade, peace and development in conflict zones. *Handbook of Research on Fair Trade***,** 355.

DE VAUS, D. A. & DE VAUS, D. 2001. *Research design in social research*, Sage.

DESHMUKH, I., SOSIS, K. & PINJUV, G. 2014. Eastern Africa- Forest Carbon Projects Study. *In:* USAID FOREST CARBON, M. A. C. F. P. (ed.). Washington DC. .

DEUTSCH, M. 1973. The resolution of conflict. *New Haven, CT: Yale*.

DJAMA, M., FOUILLEUX, E. & VAGNERON, I. 2011. Standard-setting, certifying and benchmarking.

DOHERTY, B., DAVIES, I. A. & TRANCHELL, S. 2013. Where now for fair trade? *Business History,* 55**,** 161-189.

DONMOYER, R. 2000. Generalizability and the single case study. *In:* GOMM, R., FOSTER, P. & HAMMERSLEY, M. (eds.) *Case Study Method: key issues, key texts.* London: SAGE.

DOODY, D., KEARNEY, P., BARRY, J., MOLES, R. & O'REGAN, B. 2009. Evaluation of the Q-method as a method of public participation in the selection of sustainable development indicators. *Ecological indicators,* 9**,** 1129-1137.

DOUGILL, A. J., STRINGER, L. C., LEVENTON, J., RIDDELL, M., RUEFF, H., SPRACKLEN, D. V. & BUTT, E. 2012. Lessons from community-based payment for ecosystem service schemes: from forests to rangelands. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society,* B**,** 3178-3190.

DRYZEK, J. S. & NIEMEYER, S. 2008. Discursive representation. *American political science review,* 102**,** 481-493.

DYER, J., STRINGER, L., DOUGILL, A., LEVENTON, J., NSHIMBI, M., CHAMA, F., KAFWIFWI, A., MULEDI, J., KAUMBU, J.-M. & FALCAO, M. 2014. Assessing participatory practices in community-based natural resource management: experiences in community engagement from southern Africa. *Journal of environmental management,* 137**,** 137-145.

EDEN, S., DONALDSON, A. & WALKER, G. 2005. Structuring subjectivities? Using Q methodology in human geography. *Area,* 37**,** 413-422.

EISENHARDT, K. M. 1989. Building theories from case study research. *Academy of management review***,** 532-550.

EYBEN, R., KIDDER, T., ROWLANDS, J. & BRONSTEIN, A. 2008. Thinking about change for development practice: a case study from Oxfam GB. *Development in Practice,* 18**,** 201-212.

FAIRHEAD, J., LEACH, M. & SCOONES, I. 2012. Green Grabbing: a new appropriation of nature? *Journal of Peasant Studies,* 39**,** 237-261.

FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL 2009. Growing Stronger Together: Fairtrade's Partnership Strategy (2011-2015). *In:* FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL (ed.). online.

FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL. 2011a. *Fairtrade Partners* [Online]. online: Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, e.V. Available: http://www.fairtrade.net/about-fairtrade/our-partners/our-strategic-partners.html [Accessed December 2015].

FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL. 2011b. *Setting the Standards* [Online]. Available: http://www.fairtrade.net/setting-the-standards.html#c3943 [Accessed 30th July 2015.

FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL. 2011c. *What is Fairtrade?* [Online]. Available: http://www.fairtrade.net/what-is-fairtrade.html.

FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL 2012. Annual Report 2012. *In:* FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL (ed.). Bonn.

FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL 2013. Fairtrade Theory of Change. Bonn.

FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL 2014. Consultation document for Stakeholders, Fairtrade Carbon Credits: Standard and Pricing Methodology. Bonn: Fairtrade International,.

FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL. 2015a. *RE: Call for Tender: Baseline research: Small producer organization development, strengthening and resilience.*

FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL 2015b. Consultation Results Synopsis: Information to stakeholders on the outcome of the consultation on the development of the Fairtrade Climate Standard. Bonn: Fairtrade International.

FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL 2015c. Fairtrade Climate Standard. *v1.0.* Bonn: Fairtrade International.

FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL 2015d. Monitoring the Scope and Benefits of Fairtrade, 7th Edition. Bonn: Fairtrade International.

FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL 2016. Standard Operating Procedure for the Development of Fairtrade Standards. Bonn.

FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL: MEL UNIT 2015. Fairtrade and Research. *Fair Trade International Symposium.* Milan.

FISCHER, F. 2003a. Citizens and Experts: Democratizing Policy Deliberation. *In:* FISCHER, F. (ed.) *Reframing public policy: discursive politics and deliberative practices.* Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford University Press.

FISCHER, F. 2003b. The Deliberative Policy Analyst: Theoretical Issues and Practical Challenges. *Reframing public policy: discursive politics and deliberative practices.* Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford University Press.

FISHER, E. & CORBALÁN, S. 2013. Fair trade and European public procurement: legal principles and governance dynamics. *Social Enterprise Journal,* 9**,** 11-27.

FISHER, J. 2011. *Payments for Ecosystem Services in Forests: Analysing Innovations, Policy Debates and Practical Implementation.* Doctor of Philosophy, University of East Anglia.

FISHER, J. 2012. No pay, no care? A case study exploring motivations for participation in payments for ecosystem services in Uganda. *Oryx,* 46**,** 45-54.

FLYVBJERG, B. 2001. *Making social science matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again*, Cambridge university press.

FLYVBJERG, B. 2006. Five misunderstandings about case-study research. *Qualitative inquiry,* 12**,** 219-245.

FOCHT, W. & LAWLER, J. J. 2000. Using Q methodology to facilitate policy dialogue. *Social discourse and environmental policy: An application of Q methodology***,** 100-122.

FRAME, D. J. 2011. The problems of markets: science, norms and the commodification of carbon. *The Geographical Journal,* 177**,** 138-148.

FRASER, N. 2009. *Scales of justice: Reimagining political space in a globalizing world*, Columbia University Press.

FREIDBERG, S. 2001. On the trail of the global green bean: methodological considerations in multi-site ethnography. *Global Networks,* 1**,** 353-368.

FREIRE, P. 1970. Pedagogy of the oppressed (MB Ramos, Trans.). *New York: Continuum,* 2007.

FRIDELL, G. 2007. *Fair trade coffee: The prospects and pitfalls of market-driven social justice*, University of Toronto Press.

FRIESE, S. 2012. *Qualitative Data Analysis with ATLAS. ti*, SAGE.

FUCHS, D., KALFAGIANNI, A. & HAVINGA, T. 2011. Actors in private food governance: the legitimacy of retail standards and multistakeholder initiatives with civil society participation. *Agriculture and human values,* 28**,** 353-367.

FUNG, A. & WRIGHT, E. O. 2003. *Deepening democracy: Institutional innovations in empowered participatory governance*, Verso.

GAVENTA, J. 2004. Towards participatory governance: assessing the transformative possibilities. *Participation: From tyranny to transformation***,** 25-41.

GETZ, C. & SHRECK, A. 2006. What organic and Fair Trade labels do not tell us: towards a place-based understanding of certification. *International Journal of Consumer Studies,* 30**,** 490-501.

GLOBAL FORUM ON FOOD SECURITY. 2012. *Enabling rural cooperatives and producer organizations to thrive as sustainable business enterprises. Summary of discussion number 82, from 12 July to 6 August 2012.* [Online]. FAO. Available: http://www.fao.org/fsnforum/sites/default/files/files/82_cooperatives/SUMMARY_82_EN_rural_cooperatives.pdf [Accessed April 2016.

GOLD STANDARD FOUNDATION. 2012. *The Gold Standard and Fairtrade International announce new collaboration* [Online]. Available: http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/the-gold-standard-and-fairtrade-international-announce-new-collaboration and http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2012-11-30_PressRelease_Fairtrade-GoldStandard.pdf [Accessed 28th January 2013.

GOLD STANDARD FOUNDATION. 2014. *Fairtrade International* [Online]. Geneva: Gold Standard Foundation. Available: http://www.goldstandard.org/our-partners/fairtrade-international.

GOLD STANDARD FOUNDATION, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL & FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL 2013. Certifying ecosystem services in forestry and agriculture: Ensuring genuine MRV and social and environmental integrity at landscapes level. Global Landscapes Forum.

GOLD STANDARD FOUNDATION AND FAIRTRADE INTERNATIONAL. 2012. *Smallholders to benefit from carbon finance: Fairtrade and Gold Standard collaboration opens up new opportunities for farming communities in developing countries* [Online]. Available: http://www.fairtrade.net/single-view+M5559930c0a4.html [Accessed 28th January 2013.

GOODMAN, M. K. 2004. Reading fair trade: Political ecological imaginary and the moral economy of fair trade foods. *Political geography,* 23**,** 891-915.

GOODMAN, M. K. & BOYD, E. 2011. A social life for carbon? Commodification, markets and care. *The geographical journal,* 177**,** 102-109.

GOODMAN, M. K. & HERMAN, A. 2015. Connections in Fair Trade Food Networks. *Handbook of Research on Fair Trade***,** 139-56.

GRACE, J., RYAN, C., WILLIAMS, M., POWELL, P., GOODMAN, L. & TIPPER, R. 2010. A pilot project to store carbon as biomass in African woodlands. *Carbon,* 1**,** 227-235.

GRASSO, M. 2007. A normative ethical framework in climate change. *Climatic change,* 81**,** 223-246.

GRASSO, M. 2010. An ethical approach to climate adaptation finance. *Global Environmental Change,* 20**,** 74-81.

GRAY, D. E. 2007. Facilitating management learning developing critical reflection through reflective tools. *Management learning,* 38**,** 495-517.

GREEN, J. F. 2013. Order out of chaos: public and private rules for managing carbon. *Global Environmental Politics,* 13**,** 1-25.

GREENWOOD, D. J. & LEVIN, M. 1998. *Introduction to action research: Social research for social change,* SAGE Publications, Incorporated.

GRIFFITHS, P. 2012. Ethical objections to fairtrade. *Journal of business ethics,* 105**,** 357-373.

GUPTA, A., LÖVBRAND, E., TURNHOUT, E. & VIJGE, M. J. 2012. In pursuit of carbon accountability: the politics of REDD+ measuring, reporting and verification systems. *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*.

GUTHMAN, J. 2002. Commodified meanings, meaningful commodities: re–thinking production–consumption links through the organic system of provision. *Sociologia ruralis,* 42**,** 295-311.

GUTHMAN, J. 2009. Unveiling the Unveiling: Commodity Chains, Commodity Fetishism and the "Value" of Voluntary, Ethical Food Labels. *In:* BAIR, J. (ed.) *Frontiers of commodity chain research.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

HACKERT, C. & BRAEHLER, G. 2007. *Flash Q* [Online]. Available: http://www.hackert.biz/flashq/downloads/ [Accessed 28th October 2014.

HALE, T. & ROGER, C. 2014. Orchestration and transnational climate governance. *The Review of International Organizations,* 9**,** 59-82.

HANNAN, R. 2014. *Co-operative governance: pathways to poverty reduction? The case of Kenya.* Doctorate of Philosophy, University of Leeds.

HARVEY, D. 2003. Accumulation by dispossession. *The New Imperialism***,** 137-182.

HAY, A. M. 1995. Concepts of equity, fairness and justice in geographical studies. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers***,** 500-508.

HENSON, S. & HUMPHREY, J. 2010. Understanding the complexities of private standards in global agri-food chains as they impact developing countries. *The journal of development studies,* 46**,** 1628-1646.

HILLIER, J. 1998. Beyond confused noise: ideas toward communicative procedural justice. *Journal of Planning Education and Research,* 18**,** 14-24.

HILSON, G. & KAMLONGERA, P. 2013. 20 'Fair trade gold'. *Business Regulation and Non-State Actors: Whose Standards? Whose Development?,* 93**,** 277.

HOWARD, R., TALLONTIRE, A., STRINGER, L. & MARCHANT, R. 2015a. Which "fairness", for whom, and why? Broadening inputs for a standard designed to certify "fairtrade carbon credits". *Sustainability Research Institute Working Papers* [Online].

HOWARD, R. J. 2013. Critical Voices: critical views on the carbon market and agricultural carbon- a document for internal reflection. *written for Fairtrade International, not intended for publication*.

HOWARD, R. J., TALLONTIRE, A., STRINGER, L. & MARCHANT, R. 2015b. Unraveling the Notion of "Fair Carbon": Key Challenges for Standards Development. *World Development,* 70**,** 343-356.

HOWARD, R. J., TALLONTIRE, A. M., STRINGER, L. C. & MARCHANT, R. A. 2016. Which "fairness", for whom, and why? An empirical analysis of plural notions of fairness in Fairtrade Carbon Projects, using Q methodology. *Environmental Science & Policy,* 56**,** 100-109.

ISEAL ALLIANCE 2014a. Code of Good Practice for Assessing the Impacts of Social and Environmental Standards Systems: Revision 2.0. London: ISEAL Alliance.

ISEAL ALLIANCE 2014b. Setting Social and Environmental Standards: ISEAL code of good practice Version 6.0. London, ISEAL Alliance.

JAFFEE, D. 2008. Better, but not great': the social and environmental benefits and limitations of Fair Trade for indigenous coffee producers in Oaxaca, Mexico. *The impact of fair trade***,** 195-222.

JAFFEE, D. 2014. *Brewing justice: Fair trade coffee, sustainability, and survival*, Univ of California Press.

JAFFEE, S., HENSON, S. & DIAZ RIOS, L. 2011. Making the Grade: Smallholder Farmers, Emerging Standards, and Development Assistance Programs in Africa. *A Research Program Synthesis. Washington DC: World Bank. Report*.

JAMES, C. 2011. Theory of Change review. *a report commissioned by Comic Relief, London*.

JINDAL, R., KERR, J. M. & CARTER, S. 2012. Reducing Poverty Through Carbon Forestry? Impacts of the N'hambita Community Carbon Project in Mozambique. *World development,* 40**,** 2123-2135.

KAGANZI, E., FERRIS, S., BARHAM, J., ABENAKYO, A., SANGINGA, P. & NJUKI, J. 2009. Sustaining linkages to high value markets through collective action in Uganda. *Food policy,* 34**,** 23-30.

KANER, S. 2014. *Facilitator's guide to participatory decision-making*, John Wiley & Sons.

KEAHEY, J. 2015. Fair trade and racial equity in Africa. *In:* RAYNOLDS, L. T. & BENNETT, E. A. (eds.) *Handbook of Research on Fair Trade.* Edward Elgar Publishing.

KILL, J. 2013. "Carbon Discredited": Why the EU should steer clear of forest carbon offsets. Available: http://www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/Nhambita_internet.pdf [Accessed June 2013].

KLINE, P. 1994. An easy guide to factor analysis.: Routledge Press, London.

KLOOSTER, D. 2006. Environmental certification of forests in Mexico: The political ecology of a nongovernmental market intervention. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* 96**,** 541-565.

KOLLMUSS, A., ZINK, H. & POLYCARP, C. 2008. Making sense of the voluntary carbon market: A comparison of carbon offset standards. *WWF Germany*.

LANSING, D. M. 2012. Performing carbon's materiality: The production of carbon offsets and the framing of exchange. *Environment and Planning A,* 44**,** 204-220.

LANSING, D. M. 2013a. Not all baselines are created equal: A Q methodology analysis of stakeholder perspectives of additionality in a carbon forestry offset project in Costa Rica. *Global environmental change,* 23**,** 654-663.

LANSING, D. M. 2013b. Not all baselines are created equal: AQ methodology analysis of stakeholder perspectives of additionality in a carbon forestry offset project in Costa Rica. *Global environmental change,* 23**,** 654-663.

LEACH, M., FAIRHEAD, J. & FRASER, J. 2012. Green grabs and biochar: revaluing African soils and farming in the new carbon economy. *Journal of Peasant Studies,* 39**,** 285-307.

LEACH, M. & SCOONES, I. 2013. Carbon forestry in West Africa: The politics of models, measures and verification processes. *Global Environmental Change,* 23**,** 957-967.

LEACH, M., SCOONES, I. & STIRLING, A. 2010. *Dynamic sustainabilities: technology, environment, social justice*, Earthscan.

LEKAKIS, E. J. 2012. Will the fair trade revolution be marketised? Commodification, decommodification and the political intensity of consumer politics. *Culture and Organization,* 18**,** 345-358.

LEVANTHAL, G. 1980. What should be done with equity theory. *Social exchange: Advances in theory and research***,** 27-55.

LEWIS, J. L. & SHEPPARD, S. R. 2006. Culture and communication: can landscape visualization improve forest management consultation with indigenous communities? *Landscape and Urban Planning,* 77**,** 291-313.

LI, Y. 2015. Think tank 2.0 for deliberative policy analysis. *Policy Sciences,* 48**,** 25-50.

LIPPER, L., PINGALI, P. & ZUREK, M. 2006. Less-favoured areas: looking beyond agriculture towards ecosystem services. *Sustainable Poverty Reduction in Less-favoured Areas: Problems, Options and Strategies***,** 442.

LOCKE, K. 2011. Field research practice in management and organization studies: Reclaiming its tradition of discovery. *The Academy of Management Annals,* 5**,** 613-652.

LOCONTO, A. & FOUILLEUX, E. 2014. Politics of private regulation: ISEAL and the shaping of transnational sustainability governance. *Regulation & Governance,* 8**,** 166-185.

LOHMANN, L. 2005. Marketing and making carbon dumps: Commodification, calculation and counterfactuals in climate change mitigation. *Science as Culture,* 14**,** 203-235.

LOHMANN, L. 2006. Carbon trading. *A critical conversation on climate change, privatisation and power. Uppsala, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation*.

LOHMANN, L. 2010. Uncertainty markets and carbon markets: Variations on Polanyian themes. *New Political Economy,* 15**,** 225-254.

LÖVBRAND, E. & STRIPPLE, J. 2012. Disrupting the public–private distinction: excavating the government of carbon markets post-Copenhagen. *Environment and Planning-Part C,* 30**,** 658.

LOVELL, H., BULKELEY, H. & LIVERMAN, D. 2009. Carbon offsetting: sustaining consumption? *Environment and planning. A,* 41**,** 2357.

LOVELL, H. & GHALEIGH, N. S. 2013. Climate change and the professions: the unexpected places and spaces of carbon markets. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers,* 38**,** 512-516.

LOW, W. & DAVENPORT, E. 2005. Postcards from the edge: maintaining the 'alternative'character of fair trade. *Sustainable development,* 13**,** 143-153.

LUKES, S. 1974. *Power: A radical view*.

LUTTRELL, C., LOFT, L., GEBARA, M. F., KWEKA, D., BROCKHAUS, M., ANGELSEN, A. & SUNDERLIN, W. D. 2013. Who should benefit from REDD+? Rationales and realities. *Ecology and Society,* 18.

LYON, S. 2006. Evaluating fair trade consumption: Politics, defetishization and producer participation. *International Journal of Consumer Studies,* 30**,** 452-464.

MAHANTY, S. & MCDERMOTT, C. L. 2013. How does 'Free, Prior and Informed Consent'(FPIC) impact social equity? Lessons from mining and forestry and their implications for REDD+. *Land use policy,* 35**,** 406-416.

MARCU, A. 2016. Carbon Market Provisions in the Paris Agreement (Article 6). CEPS Special Report No. 128/January 2016. International Centre for Climate Governance.

MARCUS, G. E. 1995. Ethnography in/of the world system: The emergence of multi-sited ethnography. *Annual review of anthropology***,** 95-117.

MARTINEZ-ALIER, J. 2014. The environmentalism of the poor. *Geoforum,* 54**,** 239-241.

MASON, P. & BARNES, M. 2007. Constructing theories of change methods and sources. *Evaluation,* 13**,** 151-170.

MATHUR, V. N., AFIONIS, S., PAAVOLA, J., DOUGILL, A. J. & STRINGER, L. C. 2014. Experiences of host communities with carbon market projects: towards multi-level climate justice. *Climate Policy,* 14**,** 42-62.

MCCOURT, W. 1997. Discussion note: Using metaphors to understand and to change organizations: A critique of gareth morgan's approach. *Organization Studies,* 18**,** 511-522.

MCDERMOTT, C. L. 2013. Certification and equity: Applying an "equity framework" to compare certification schemes across product sectors and scales. *Environmental Science & Policy,* 33**,** 428-437.

MCDERMOTT, C. L., COAD, L., HELFGOTT, A. & SCHROEDER, H. 2012. Operationalizing social safeguards in REDD+: actors, interests and ideas. *Environmental Science & Policy,* 21**,** 63-72.

MCDERMOTT, M., MAHANTY, S. & SCHRECKENBERG, K. 2013. Examining equity: A multidimensional framework for assessing equity in payments for ecosystem services. *Environmental Science & Policy,* 33**,** 416-427.

MCEWAN, C., HUGHES, A., BEK, D. & ROSENBERG, Z. 2014. Why 'place'matters in the development and impacts of Fairtrade production. *Food Chain,* 4**,** 78-92.

MCNIFF, J. & WHITEHEAD, J. 2011. *All you need to know about action research*, Sage Publications.

MELO, I., TURNHOUT, E. & ARTS, B. 2014. Integrating multiple benefits in market-based climate mitigation schemes: The case of the Climate, Community and Biodiversity certification scheme. *Environmental Science & Policy,* 35**,** 49-56.

MERGER, E. & PISTORIUS, T. 2011. Effectiveness and legitimacy of forest carbon standards in the OTC voluntary carbon market. *Carbon Balance and Management,* 6.

MHENE, N. 2012. Fairtrade attendance at COP 17, Result & Feedback Report. Nairobi: Fairtrade Africa.

MILLER, T. R. 2013. Constructing sustainability science: emerging perspectives and research trajectories. *Sustainability science,* 8**,** 279-293.

MITCHELL, J. C. 2006. Case and situation analysis. *In:* ROGER GOMM, MARTYN HAMMERSLEY & PETER FOSTER (eds.) *Case study method: key issues, key texts.* London: SAGE.

MULYANI, M. & JEPSON, P. 2015. Social learning through a REDD+ 'village agreement': Insights from the KFCP in Indonesia. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint,* 56**,** 79-95.

MURPHY, C. & YATES, J. 2011. ISO 26000, Alternative Standards, and the 'Social Movement of Engineers' involved with Standard-Setting'. *Governing through Standards: Origins, Drivers and Limitations. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan***,** 159-83.

MUSTALAHTI, I., BOLIN, A., BOYD, E. & PAAVOLA, J. 2012. Can REDD+ Reconcile Local Priorities and Needs with Global Mitigation Benefits? Lessons from Angai Forest, Tanzania. *Ecology and Society,* 17**,** 16.

MUTERSBAUGH, T. 2005. Fighting standards with standards: harmonization, rents, and social accountability in certified agrofood networks. *Environment and Planning A,* 37**,** 2033.

MUTERSBAUGH, T., KLOOSTER, D., RENARD, M.-C. & TAYLOR, P. 2005. Certifying rural spaces: Quality-Certified Products and Rural Governance. *Journal of Rural Studies,* 21**,** 381-388.

NAMIREMBE, S., LEIMONA, B., VAN NOORDWIJK, M., BERNARD, F. & BACWAYO, K. E. 2014. Co-investment paradigms as alternatives to payments for tree-based ecosystem services in Africa. *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability,* 6**,** 89-97.

NEILSON, J. & PRITCHARD, B. 2009. *Value chain struggles: Institutions and governance in the plantation districts of South India*, John Wiley & Sons.

NELSON, V. & MARTIN, A. 2011. Impact Evaluation of Social and Environmental Voluntary Standard Systems (SEVSS): Using theories of change. *In:* NRI (ed.) *Working Paper 1.* University of Greenwich.

NELSON, V. & MARTIN, A. 2012. The impact of Fairtrade: Evidence, shaping factors, and future pathways. *Food Chain,* 2**,** 42-63.

NELSON, V. & MARTIN, A. 2014. Exploring issues of rigour and utility in Fairtrade impact assessment. *Food Chain,* 4**,** 14-33.

NELSON, V. & MARTIN, A. 2015. Fairtrade International's multi-dimensional impacts in Africa. *In:* RAYNOLDS, L. T. & BENNETT, E. A. (eds.) *Handbook of Research on Fair Trade.* Edward Elgar Publishing.

NELSON, V. & POUND, B. 2010. A review of the impact of Fairtrade over the last ten years. *Fairtrade Foundation (London, United Kingdom).*

NELSON, V. & SMITH, S. 2011. Fairtrade Cotton: Assessing Impact In Mali, Senegal, Cameroon and India: Synthesis Report for Fairtrade Foundation. Natural Resources Institute and Institute of Development Studies.

NELSON, V. & TALLONTIRE, A. 2014. Battlefields of ideas: changing narratives and power dynamics in private standards in global agricultural value chains. *Agriculture and Human Values,* 31**,** 481-497.

NELSON, V., TALLONTIRE, A., OPONDO, M. & MARTIN, A. 2014. Pathways of transformation or transgression? Power relations, ethical space and labour rights in Kenyan cut flower value chains. *In:* GOODMAN, M. & SAGE, C. (eds.) *Food Transgressions: Making Sense of Contemporary Food Politics.* Ashgate.

NEUMAN, W. 1991. *Social research methods: qualitative and quantitative approaches,* Boston, MA, Allyn and Bacon.

NEWELL, R. G., PIZER, W. A. & RAIMI, D. 2013. Carbon markets 15 years after kyoto: Lessons learned, new challenges. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives***,** 123-146.

NHANTUMBO, I. & IZIDINE, S. 2009. Preparing for REDD in dryland forests: investigating the options and potential synergy for REDD payments in the miombo eco-region: Mozambique country study. *International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), London.*

NOWOTNY, H., SCOTT, P. & GIBBONS, M. 2005. Re-thinking science: mode 2 in societal context. *Knowledge creation, diffusion and use in innovation networks and knowledge clusters, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport***,** 39-51.

O'BRIEN, R. 2001. *An overview of the methodological approach of action research* [Online]. Faculty of Information Studies, University of Toronto. Available: http://www.web.ca/~robrien/papers/arfinal.html#_edn3 [Accessed April 2016.

OCKWELL, D. G. 2008. 'Opening up'policy to reflexive appraisal: a role for Q Methodology? A case study of fire management in Cape York, Australia. *Policy sciences,* 41**,** 263-292.

PAAVOLA, J. & ADGER, W. N. 2006. Fair adaptation to climate change. *Ecological Economics,* 56**,** 594-609.

PAGE, E. A. 2012. The hidden costs of carbon commodification: emissions trading, political legitimacy and procedural justice. *Democratization,* 19**,** 932-950.

PALMER FRY, B. 2011. Community forest monitoring in REDD+: the 'M'in MRV? *Environmental Science & Policy,* 14**,** 181-187.

PEREZ, C., RONCOLI, C., NEELY, C. & STEINER, J. L. 2007. Can carbon sequestration markets benefit low-income producers in semi-arid Africa? Potentials and challenges. *Agricultural Systems,* 94**,** 2-12.

PESKETT, L., SCHRECKENBERG, K. & BROWN, J. 2011. Institutional approaches for carbon financing in the forest sector: Learning lessons for REDD+ from forest carbon projects in Uganda. *Environmental Science and Policy,* 14**,** 216-229.

PETERS-STANLEY, M. & GONZALEZ, G. 2014. Sharing the Stage State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2014. *A Report by Forest Trends' Ecosystem Marketplace: Executive Summary, Washington DC*.

PHILLIPS, D. P. 2014. Uneven and unequal people-centered development: the case of Fair Trade and Malawi sugar producers. *Agriculture and Human Values,* 31**,** 563-576.

PINTO, L. F. G. & MCDERMOTT, C. 2013. Equity and forest certification—A case study in Brazil. *Forest Policy and Economics*.

PLAN VIVO 2013. The Plan Vivo Standard for Community Payments for Ecosystem Services Programmes. Edinburgh: Plan Vivo.

PLAN VIVO. 2015. *Project Update - Mozambique: Sofala Community Carbon Project to close in 2015* [Online]. Edinburgh: Plan Vivo,. Available: http://www.planvivo.org/docs/Information-Note-Sofala-2015_10_13.pdf [Accessed 10th May 2016].

PONTE, S., GIBBON, P. & VESTERGAARD, J. 2011. Conclusion: The current status, limits and future of "governing through standards". *Governing through standards: origins, drivers and limitations, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke***,** 289-304.

RAELIN, J. A. 2002. I don't have time to think!" versus the art of reflective practice. *Reflections,* 4**,** 66-79.

RANCIÈRE, J. 2013. *Chroniques des temps consensuels*, Seuil.

RAWLS, J. 2009. *A theory of justice,* Harvard university press.

RAYMOND, C. M., FAZEY, I., REED, M. S., STRINGER, L. C., ROBINSON, G. M. & EVELY, A. C. 2010. Integrating local and scientific knowledge for environmental management. *Journal of environmental management,* 91**,** 1766-1777.

RAYNOLDS, L. T. & GREENFIELD, N. 2015. Fair trade: movement and markets. *In:* RAYNOLDS, L. T. & BENNETT, E. A. (eds.) *Handbook of Research on Fair Trade.* Edward Elgar Publishing.

REDDY, T. 2011. *Carbon Trading in Africa: A Critical Review,* Institute for Security Studies.

REED, D. 2009. What do corporations have to do with fair trade? Positive and normative analysis from a value chain perspective. *Journal of Business Ethics,* 86**,** 3-26.

REINECKE, J. 2010. Beyond a subjective theory of value and towards a 'fair price': An organizational perspective on Fairtrade minimum price setting. *Organization,* 17**,** 563-581.

REINECKE, J. & ANSARI, S. 2015. When Times Collide: Temporal Brokerage at the Intersection of Markets and Developments. *Academy of Management Journal,* 58**,** 618-648.

RENARD, M.-C. 2005. Quality certification, regulation and power in fair trade. *Journal of rural studies,* 21**,** 419-431.

RENARD, M.-C. 2015. Fair trade for small farmer cooperatives in Latin America. *In:* RAYNOLDS, L. T. & BENNETT, E. A. (eds.) *The Handbook of Research on Fair Trade.* Edward Elgar Publishing.

RENARD, M.-C. & LACONTO, A. 2013. Competing Logics in the Further Standardization of Fair Trade: ISEAL and the Símbolo de Pequeños Productores. *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture & Food,* 20.

RENARD, M.-C. & LOCONTO, A. 2013. Competing Logics in the Further Standardization of Fair Trade: ISEAL and the Símbolo de Pequeños Productores. *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture & Food,* 20.

REYNOLDS, T. W. 2012. Institutional Determinants of Success among Forestry-Based Carbon Sequestration Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. *World development,* 40**,** 542-554.

RIISGAARD, L., MICHUKI, G., GIBBON, P., BOLWIG, S., WARRING, N. & LUND RANTZ, L. 2009. The Performance of Voluntary Standard Schemes from the Perspective of Small Producers in East Africa. *Danish Institute for International Studies report prepared for Traidcraft (UK). Traidcraft, Gateshead, UK*.

RIP, A. 2006. A Co-Evolutionary Approach to Reflexive Governance–and its Ironies. *In:* VOSS, J., BAUKNECHT, D. & KEMP, R. (eds.) *Reflexive governance for sustainable development.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

RONCHI, L. 2002. The impact of fairtrade on producers and their organisations. *A Case Study with COOCAFE in Costa Rica, University of Sussex*.

RUBEN, R., FORT, R. & ZÚÑIGA-ARIAS, G. 2009. Measuring the impact of fair trade on development. *Development in Practice,* 19**,** 777-788.

RUBIN, H. J. & RUBIN, I. S. 2011. *Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data*, Sage.

SANDEL, M. 2005. Should we buy the right to pollute. *Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics***,** 93-6.

SAYER, A. 2001. For a critical cultural political economy. *Antipode,* 33**,** 687-708.

SCHATZMAN, L. & STRAUSS, A. L. 1973. *Field research: Strategies for a natural sociology*, Prentice Hall.

SCHERR, S. J., SHAMES, S. & FRIEDMAN, R. 2012. From climate-smart agriculture to climate-smart landscapes. *Agriculture & Food Security,* 1**,** 12.

SCHLINDWEIN, S. L. & ISON, R. 2004. Human knowing and perceived complexity: implications for systems practice. *Emergence: Complexity and Organization,* 6**,** 27-32.

SCHLOSBERG, D. 2004. Reconceiving environmental justice: global movements and political theories. *Environmental Politics,* 13**,** 517-540.

SCHLOSBERG, D., COLLINS, L. & NIEMEYER, S. 2016. Adaptation Policy and Community Discourse: Risk, Vulnerability, and Just Transformation. Unpublished manuscript.

SCHMOLCK, P. 2002. *PQMethod version 2.35* [Online]. Available: http://schmolck.userweb.mwn.de/qmethod/ [Accessed 28th October 2014.

SCHROEDER, D. & PISUPATI, B. 2010. *Ethics, justice and the convention on biological diversity*, UN.

SCHROEDER, H. & MCDERMOTT, C. 2014. Beyond Carbon: Enabling Justice and Equity in REDD+ Across Levels of Governance. *Ecology and Society,* 19**,** 31.

SCHUT, M. 2012. *Who cares about research? A study on the role of research in policy processes in competing claims contexts,* Wageningen Universiteit (Wageningen University).

SEEDS FOR CHANGE 2013. *A Consensus Handbook: cooperative decision-making for activists, coops and communities,* Lancaster, Seeds for Change.

SETIAWAN, A. D. & CUPPEN, E. 2013. Stakeholder perspectives on carbon capture and storage in Indonesia. *Energy Policy,* 61**,** 1188-1199.

SHAMES, S., BIGNONI, M., FAY, J., RUHWEZA, A. & WALLACE, C. 2010. Annexe 6: Inventory of African Agricultural Carbon Projects. *Carbon finance for sustainable agricultural development in Africa.*

SHARMA, S. & SUPPAN, S. 2011. Elusive promises of the Kenya Agricultural Carbon Project. Available: http://www.iatp.org/documents/elusive-promises-of-the-kenya-agricultural-carbon-project.

SIKOR, T., FISHER, J., FEW, R., MARTIN, A. & ZEITOUN, M. 2013. The justices and injustices of ecosystem services. *In:* SIKOR, T. (ed.) *The justices and injustices of ecosystem services.* Oxon: Routledge.

SIKOR, T., MARTIN, A., FISHER, J. & HE, J. 2014. Toward an empirical analysis of justice in ecosystem governance. *Conservation Letters,* 7**,** 524-532.

SIMON, G. L., BUMPUS, A. G. & MANN, P. 2012. Win-win scenarios at the climate–development interface: Challenges and opportunities for stove replacement programs through carbon finance. *Global environmental change,* 22**,** 275-287.

SMALL, S. A. 1995. Action-oriented research: Models and methods. *Journal of Marriage and the Family***,** 941-955.

SMALL, S. A. & UTTAL, L. 2005. Action-oriented research: Strategies for engaged scholarship. *Journal of Marriage and Family,* 67**,** 936-948.

SMITH, A. & STIRLING, A. 2007. Moving outside or inside? Objectification and reflexivity in the governance of socio-technical systems. *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning,* 9**,** 351-373.

SMITH, A. M. 2013. What does it mean to do fair trade? Ontology, praxis, and the "Fair for Life" certification system. *Social Enterprise Journal,* 9**,** 53-72.

SMITH, A. M. & VANDERHOFF BOERSMA, F. 2013. Comercio Justo Mexico Potential lessons for Fairtrade? *In:* REED, D., UTTING, P. & MUKHERJEE-REED, A. (eds.) *Business Regulation and Non-State Actors: Whose Standards? Whose Development?* Oxon: Routledge.

SMITH, T. M. & FISCHLEIN, M. 2010. Rival private governance networks: Competing to define the rules of sustainability performance. *Global environmental change,* 20**,** 511-522.

STEELMAN, T. A. & MAGUIRE, L. A. 1999. Understanding participant perspectives: Q-methodology in national forest management. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,* 18**,** 361-388.

STERK, W., RUDOLPH, F., ARENS, C., EICHHORST, U., KIYAR, D., WANG-HELMREICH, H. AND SWIDERSKI, M. 2009. Further Development of the Project-Based Mechanisms in a Post-2012 Regime. Final report of the project commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. Berlin: Wuppertal Institute.

STIRLING, A. 2005. Opening up or closing down? Analysis, participation and power in the social appraisal of technology. *In:* LEACH, M., SCOONES, I. & WYNNE, B. (eds.) *Science and citizens: globalization and the challenge of engagement.* London: Zed.

STIRLING, A., LEACH, M., MEHTA, L., SCOONES, I., SMITH, A., STAGL, S. & THOMPSON, J. 2007. Empowering Designs: towards more progressive appraisal of sustainability.

STRINGER, L. C., DOUGILL, A. J., THOMAS, A. D., SPRACKLEN, D. V., CHESTERMAN, S., SPERANZA, C. I., RUEFF, H., RIDDELL, M., WILLIAMS, M. & BEEDY, T. 2012. Challenges and opportunities in linking carbon sequestration, livelihoods and ecosystem service provision in drylands. *Environmental Science & Policy,* 19**,** 121-135.

SUISEEYA, K. R. M. & CAPLOW, S. 2013. In pursuit of procedural justice: Lessons from an analysis of 56 forest carbon project designs. *Global Environmental Change,* 23**,** 968-979.

SURANOVIC, S. 2015. 3. The meaning of fair trade. *Handbook of Research on Fair Trade***,** 45.

SUSMAN, G. I. 1983. "Action Research: A Sociotechnical Systems Perspective," *In:* MORGAN, G. (ed.). London: SAGE.

SUSMAN, G. I. & EVERED, R. D. 1978. An assessment of the scientific merits of action research. *Administrative science quarterly***,** 582-603.

SUTTON, S. 2013. Fairtrade governance and producer voices: stronger or silent? *Social Enterprise Journal,* 9**,** 73-87.

SWALLOW, B. M. & GODDARD, T. W. 2013. Value chains for bio-carbon sequestration services: Lessons from contrasting cases in Canada, Kenya and Mozambique. *Land use policy,* 31**,** 81-89.

SWYNGEDOUW, E. 2000. Authoritarian governance, power, and the politics of rescaling. *Environment and Planning D,* 18**,** 63-76.

SZABLOWSKI, D. 2010. Operationalizing free, prior, and informed consent in the extractive industry sector? Examining the challenges of a negotiated model of justice. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d'études du développement,* 30**,** 111-130.

TAKACS, D. 2009. Carbon into gold: forest carbon offsets, climate change adaptation, and international law. *Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envt'l L. & Pol'y,* 15**,** 39.

TALLONTIRE, A. 2009. Top heavy? Governance issues and policy decisions for the fair trade movement. *Journal of International Development,* 21**,** 1004-1014.

TALLONTIRE, A. 2015. Fair trade and Development in African Agriculture. *In:* RAYNOLDS, L. T. & BENNETT, E. A. (eds.) *Handbook of Research on Fair Trade.* Edward Elgar Publishing.

TALLONTIRE, A. & NELSON, V. 2013. Fair trade narratives and political dynamics. *Social Enterprise Journal,* 9**,** 28-52.

TALLONTIRE, A., NELSON, V., DIXON, J. & BENTON, T. G. 2012. A Review of the Literature and Knowledge of Standards and Certification Systems in Agricultural Production and Farming Systems. *In:* NRI (ed.) *NRI Working Paper Series on Sustainability Standards No. 2 September, 2012.* NRI.

TALLONTIRE, A., OPONDO, M. & NELSON, V. 2014. Contingent spaces for smallholder participation in GlobalGAP: insights from Kenyan horticulture value chains. *The Geographical Journal***,** pp.353-364.

TAYLOR, P. L. 2005a. A fair trade approach to community forest certification? A framework for discussion. *Journal of Rural Studies,* 21**,** 433-447.

TAYLOR, P. L. 2005b. In the market but not of it: Fair Trade coffee and Forest Stewardship Council certification as market-based social change. *World development,* 33**,** 129-147.

THROGMORTON, J. A. 1991. The rhetorics of policy analysis. *Policy Sciences,* 24**,** 153-179.

TIENHAARA, K. 2012. The potential perils of forest carbon contracts for developing countries: cases from Africa. *Journal of Peasant Studies,* 39**,** 551-572.

TON, G., VELLEMA, S. & GE, L. 2014. The Triviality of Measuring Ultimate Outcomes: Acknowledging the Span of Direct Influence. *IDS Bulletin,* 45**,** 37-48.

TSCHAKERT, P. 2007. Environmental services and poverty reduction: Options for smallholders in the Sahel. *Agricultural Systems,* 94**,** 75-86.

VAN BEUNINGEN, C. & KNORRINGA, P. 2009. *Inclusive Improvement: Standards And Smallholders: Taking Stock and Moving On,* The Hague.

VAN KERKHOFF, L. 2014. Developing integrative research for sustainability science through a complexity principles-based approach. *Sustainability science,* 9**,** 143-155.

VISSEREN-HAMAKERS, I. J., MCDERMOTT, C., VIJGE, M. J. & CASHORE, B. 2012. Trade-offs, co-benefits and safeguards: current debates on the breadth of REDD+. *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability,* 4**,** 646-653.

VOGEL, I. 2012. Review of the use of 'Theory of Change'in international development. *Report commissioned by the Department for International Development. Draft–review report and practical resources*.

VOSS, J.-P., BAUKNECHT, D. & KEMP, R. 2006. Reflexive governance: a view on an emerging path. *In:* VOSS, J.-P., BAUKNECHT, D. & KEMP, R. (eds.) *Reflexive governance for sustainable development.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

WANG, Y. & CORSON, C. 2015. The making of a 'charismatic'carbon credit: clean cookstoves and 'uncooperative'women in western Kenya. *Environment and Planning A,* 46**,** 1-16.

WATTS, S. & STENNER, P. 2012. *Doing Q methodological research: Theory, method & interpretation*, Sage.

WEBLER, T., DANIELSON, S. & TULER, S. 2009. Using Q method to reveal social perspectives in environmental research. *Greenfield MA: Social and Environmental Research Institute***,** 54.

WILLERS, C. 22nd January 2016 2016. COP 21 Analysis. Available from: http://www.goldstandard.org/blog-item/cop21-analysis [Accessed 16th May 2016].

WOOD, R. G. 2011. *Carbon finance and pro-poor co-benefits: The Gold Standard and Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standards*, International Institute for Environment & Development.

WORLD AGROFORESTRY CENTRE 2011. Improving carbon initiatives aimed at smallholders: Addressing opportunities and challenges through better communication. Nairobi: World Agroforestry Centre.

WRIGHT, S. & SHORE, C. 2000. Coercive accountability: the rise of audit culture in higher education. *Audit Cultures. Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics and the Academy.* Routledge.

YANOW, D. 2007. Interpretation in policy analysis: On methods and practice. *Critical policy analysis,* 1**,** 110-122.

YIN, R. K. 2013. *Case study research: Design and methods*, Sage publications.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Gantt chart 314

Appendix 2: List of documents in case study database 316

Appendix 3: Protocol for participant observation and informal interviews (A)..... 326

Appendix 4: Protocol for participation observation and interviews (B)..... 330

Appendix 5: Additional documentary evidence of impact 333

Appendix 6: Original research concept note 334

Appendix 7: Actual research inputs 336

Appendix Figure 1: Pathways elements in the thesis……..323

Appendix 1: Gantt chart

e Standard Setting Process (FCSSP)
ng applications
tailed proposal
dard Setting events
on and analysis*
ls (GS and W+)
on and proposal
ting and signature
d submission
Oct' 12
Nov
Dec
Jan '13
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan '14
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan '15
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan' 16
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep

Appendix 2: List of documents in case study database

Doc code	Key documents	Date created	Author	Document category	Data usage
	FTI policies, plans and procedures in the public domain				
FP.1	Terms of Reference: FTI Standards Committee	17.06.2015	FTI	Public domain	Used in analysis presented in chapter 6
FP.2	Standard Operating Procedure: development of Fairtrade Standards	12.01.2012	FTI	Public domain	
FP.3	Growing Stronger Together: Fairtrade's Partnership Strategy (2011-2015)	No date (prior to 2011)	FTI	Public domain	
FP.4	Project Assignment: development of Standard on Fairtrade Carbon Credits	05.12.2013	FTI	Public domain	
	Standards Committee Minutes				
M.SC.52	Meeting 52 (item 13)	19-20.09.2012	FTI	Public domain	Used in analysis presented in chapter 6
M.SC.55	Meeting 55 (item 9)	19-20.03.2013	FTI	Public domain	
M.SC.60	Meeting 60 (item 7)	19-20.03.2014	FTI	Public domain	
M.SC.61	Meeting 61 (item 10)	17-18.06.2014	FTI	Public domain	
M.SC.62	Meeting 62 (item 13)	16-17.09.2014	FTI	Public domain	
M.SC.63	Meeting 63 (item 5)	25-26.11.2014	FTI	Public domain	
M.SC.64	Meeting 64 (item 13)	18-19.03.2015	FTI	Public domain	
M.SC.65	Meeting 65 (item 6)	23-25.06.2015	FTI	Public domain	

M.SC.66	Meeting 66 (item 8)	29-30.09.2015	FTI	Public domain	
	Versions of the standard and consultation documents for Fair Carbon Credits				
SDr.1	V1.1	06.11.2013	FTI Standards Unit	Shared with FCSSP stakeholders	Used in analysis presented in chapter 6
SDr.2	FairCarbonCredits Draft Standard	20.11.2013	FTI Standards Unit	Shared with FCSSP stakeholders	
SDr.3	March 2014 version	March 2014	FTI Standards Unit	Shared with FCSSP stakeholders	
SDr.4	1st public consultation document	June 2014	FTI	Public domain	As above, also in chapter 7
SDr.5	2nd public consultation document	Sept 2014	FTI	Public domain	
FCS	Published version	01.10.2015	FTI	Public domain	
	Research Documents commissioned or conducted by FTI				
FR.1	External Feasibility Study	02.2011	Fairtrade internal/ external parties	Confidential documents: researcher discretionary use for background only	Used in analysis of pricing and scope decisions (chapter 6); otherwise only used to provide feedback to Fairtrade International
FR.2	Internal Feasibility Study-FairCarbonCredits	30.01.2013	FTI Strategy and Policy Unit/ Standards Unit		
FR.3	Gap Analysis: Development of FairCarbonCredits	15.06.2013	Consultant		
FR.4	FairCarbonCredits Standard: Assessment of Benefits and Terms of Trade	28.06.2013	Consultant		Used to prepare reflective House Exercise and feedback
FR.5	Cornerstones of the FairCarbonCredits Standard	11.09.2013	Consultant (identity withheld from this thesis)	Shared with stakeholders in the SSP	Used to provide feedback to Fairtrade International
	Working Group Minutes				
M.WG.1	Kick-off meeting (1)	28.03.2012	FTI	Shared with members of the WG (researcher joined	
M.WG.2	Meeting 2	14.04.2013	FTI		

M.WG.3	Meeting 3	05.09.2013	FTI	partway through): used with discretion	
M.WG.4	Meeting 4	19.11.2013	FTI		
M.WG.5	Meeting 5	05.03.2014	FTI		
	Workshop and other meeting minutes				
M.PFS.LA	Latin American pre-consultation workshop	No date (held Dec 2013)	FTI	Shared with participants and with researcher	Used to quantify stakeholders taking part in the FCSSP
M.PFS.Af	African pre-consultation workshop	No date (held Feb 2014)	FTI	Shared with participants-researcher participated	
M.PFS.As	Asian pre-consultation workshop	No date (held Feb 2014)	FTI	Shared with participants and with researcher	
M.GE.03.14	Group of Experts 2nd meeting	No date (held March 2014)	FTI	Shared with participants-researcher participated	Used in analysis presented in chapter 6
M.CSO.08.14	UK Civil Society Stakeholder meeting	No date (held Aug 2014)	FTI	Shared with participants-researcher participated	As above

	Transcripts from observed events (created by researcher unless indicated otherwise)				
	Event	**Document created**	**Date created**	**Creation/ sharing**	**Data usage**
T.GE.09.13	Group of Experts 1st meeting	Transcript	13.09.2013	Created by researcher, shared with FTI	Building Q concourse, and analysis for chapter 6
T.COP19.1	COP 19 events	Transcript from COP 19 side event	14.11.2013	Created by researcher	As above
T.COP19.2		Transcript from Global Landscapes Forum parallel event	17.11.2013	Created by researcher	
T.WG.4	Working group meeting 4	Transcript	19.11.2013	Created by researcher, shared with FTI	As above

T.SC.59	Standards Committee meeting 59	Transcript	20.11.2013	Created by researcher	As above
T.PFS.Af.a	African pre-consultation workshop	Transcript of plenary	04-05.02.2014	Created by researcher, shared with FTI	As above
T.PFS.Af.b		Transcript of observed group discussions and feedback to plenary	04-05.02.2014	Created by researcher, shared with FTI	As above
T.PFS.Af.c		Notes and slides from other groups' discussions, taken by facilitators and presenters	04-05.02.2014	Shared by other group facilitators with researcher	As above
T.WG.5	Working group meeting 5	Transcript	05.03.2014	Created by researcher	As above
T.GE.03.14a	Group of Experts 2nd meeting	Transcript of plenary	17.03.2014	Created by researcher, shared with FTI	As above
T.GE.03.14b		Transcript of observed group discussions and feedback to plenary	17.03.2014	Created by researcher, shared with FTI	As above
T.GE.03.14c		Notes from other groups' discussions, taken by facilitators	17.03.2014	Shared by other group facilitators with researcher	As above
T.SC.60	Standards Committee meeting 60	Transcript	19.03.2014	Created by researcher	As above
T.CSO.08.14	UK Civil Society Stakeholder meeting	Transcript	11.08.2014	Created by researcher, shared with FTI	Analysis for chapter 6
T.GE.09.14	Group of Experts 3rd meeting	Transcript from plenary and observed group sessions	19.09.2014	Created by researcher, shared with FTI	Analysis for chapter 6

T.PFS.B.a	Producer and Field Staff meeting (Bonn)	Transcript from introductions	23-24.10.2014	Created by researcher, shared with FTI	Analysis for chapters 6 and 7
T.PFS.B.b		Transcript from plenary day 1	23-24.10.2014		Analysis for chapters 6 and 7
T.PFS.B.c		Transcript from observed group discussions and feedback to plenary day 1	23-24.10.2014		Analysis for chapters 6 and 7
T.PFS.B.d		Transcript from plenary and observed group discussions day 2	23-24.10.2014		Analysis for chapters 6 and 7
T.SC.63	Standards Committee meeting 63	Transcript	25.11.2014	Created by researcher	Analysis for chapter 6
	Researcher Reports: Briefing, Scoping and Feedback reports				
RR.1	Scoping report on criticism of the carbon market	Critical voices	May 2013	Created by researcher for FTI	Cited in thesis
RR.2	Feedback on Group of Experts 1st meeting	Researcher's feedback report	21.10.2013		Analysis for chapter 6
RR.3	Feedback on COP 19 events	Researcher's feedback report	December 2013		Analysis for chapter 6
RRp.4	Feedback on standard development work to date	Perspectives, concerns and options still to consider in developing the FCC add-on standard and joint scheme	02.12.2013		Analysis for chapter 6
RRp.5	Briefing on visits to Kenyan carbon projects	Spotlight on Carbon Projects in Kenya: Initial insights from a research scoping visit	February 2014		Not used in thesis

	Notes and transcripts from facilitated exercises from researcher-facilitated reflection and feedback sessions				
RRf.1	House Exercise (FTI)	Transcript, photos and outcome summary spreadsheet	7th May 2014	Created by researcher, shared with FTI	Used to reflect on research design and collaboration, presented in chapter 8
RRf.2	Findings webinar (GS & FTI)	Typed transcript from discussions	18th May 2015	Created by researcher, shared with FTI and GSF	Used to validate early findings for chapters 5 and 7
RRf.3	Call with FTI to reflect on collaboration	Minutes from call	13th July 2015	Created by FTI, researcher contributed details	Used to reflect on research design and collaboration, presented in chapter 8
RRf.4	Findings workshop (FTI)	Powerpoint presentation with notes from discussions, transcript from discussions	15th March 2016	Created by researcher, Powerpoint presentation shared with FTI	Used to validate analysis presented in chapter 6
RRf.5	Findings webinar (GS)	Typed transcript from discussions	4th April 2016	Created by researcher, shared with GSF	Used to validate analysis presented in chapter 6
	Notes, minutes and transcripts of coordination calls/ meetings with Project Team (and GSF)				
CoordC.1	Calls/ meetings to discuss collaboration and research design		Notes taken by researcher, shared with RPOs	Feb-Jul 2013	Used to reflect on research design and collaboration, presented in chapter 8
CoordC.2	Coordination calls/ meetings during main collaborative phase		Notes taken by researcher, shared with FTI	Oct 2013, Jan, Feb, Apr, May, Jun and Jul 2014	
SDe	Additional documentary evidence on collaboration gathered through survey monkey		Participants' scorings	Mar 2016	Used to complement other data for chapter 8
	Email correspondence with Project Team and GSF				
EmCorr.1	Email correspondence to discuss research agreement		Jointly created (researcher, RPOs and other parties)	Mar-Sep 2013	Used to reflect on research design and collaboration, presented in chapter 8
EmCorr.2	Email correspondence throughout the		Jointly created (researcher and	Feb 2013- May 2016	

	research	RPOs)		
	Reflective diary entries and reflective correspondence with supervisors			
RfD/C	Adhoc diary entries	Created by researcher, not shared	Feb 2013- May 2016	Used to reflect on research design and collaboration, presented in chapter 8
	Notes from monthly supervision meetings	Created by researcher, shared with supervisors		
	Adhoc correspondence regarding particular details of the collaboration and my role	Jointly created		
	Semi-structured interviews, informal conversations and documentation provided by carbon market actors			
CMWeb.1	Position paper on fairness and carbon provided by a funder of the FCSSP	Provided by the interviewee (also available online)	Aug 2013 (accessed Oct 2013)	Used to build Q concourse
CMWeb.2	Statement of Fairtrade values	Provided by the party in email correspondence (also available online)	Sep 2013 (accessed Oct 2013)	As above
Int1	Funder of the FCSSP	Typed transcript of semi-structured interview	Oct 2013	Used to build Q concourse and in analysis presented in chapter 6
Int2	Carbon project implementer, Kenya	Typed notes from semi-structured interview	Jan 2014	Used to build Q concourse
Int3	Carbon project consultant, Europe	Typed transcript from semi-structured interview	Jan 2014	As above and to prepare for carbon project scoping visit
Int4	Carbon project consultant, East Africa	Typed notes from informal conversation (1), checked back with the person	Feb 2014	Used to build Q concourse
Int5	Carbon project funder/ developer, Europe	Typed notes from informal conversations (2), checked back with the person	Feb and Mar 2014	As above and to prepare for carbon project case study selection
Int6	Standards Organisation	Typed transcript of semi-	Mar 2014	Used to build Q concourse

		structured interview		
Int7	Cookstove project promoter, U.S.A	Typed notes from informal conversation (1), checked back with the person	Mar 2014	Used to build Q concourse
	Q sorts and interviews			
QInt	26 interviews	Photographs of Q sorts and transcripts of interviews	May-Sep 2014	Used in chapter 5 analysis; Chapters 6 and 7 used interviews only
	Project level research in Kenya: a) TIST			
	Activity	**Data type**	**Date(s) created (all 2014)**	**Data usage**
TISTWeb	Reading of publically available background material on TIST Kenya	Website downloads from www.tist.org and project reports on http://www.vcsprojectdatabase.org/#/projects and http://www.climate-standards.org/2012/11/29/tist-program-in-kenya-ccb-004/	Various	Read in advance of visiting the project, to inform my understanding and shape my choice of TIST as an extreme case study
TIST.Int1	Introductory interviews with programme founders (Skype and face to face)	Typed notes	Jan and May 2014	As above
TIST.Int2	Introductory interviews with TIST Kenya programme staff and contractors	Typed field notes and programme documentation such as example contracts	28th-30th Jan, 3rd-5th Feb 2014	As above
TIST.Int3	Key informant interviews (project administrator and TIST pioneer)	Typed field notes	7th, 8th, 19th, 23rd and 24th June; 24th and 29th July	Used to provide empirical principal carbon project evidence to test Fairtrade's Theory of Change, presented in chapter 7
TIST.PO1	Programme level observation (of 10 year celebratory event, leaders' training and leadership council meeting)	Typed field notes, photographs from 10 year celebratory event, and training materials	2nd-4th June	

TIST.PO2	Participant observation of 9 cluster meetings	Typed field notes	30th Jan; 5th, 12th, 14th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th June; and 2nd July	
TIST.PO3	Participant observation in 2 GOCC meetings	Typed field notes	1st and 3rd July	
TIST.Test	Eliciting of personal testimonies from TIST programme staff and contractors (8)	Typed field notes	30th Jan; 2nd-5th, 12th and 16th June; 1st July	
TIST.PO4	Participation observation in meetings between TIST and their institutional partners	Typed field notes	25th- 26th June	
TIST.PO5	Participant observation during visit of FCS project team member to TIST Kenya	Typed field notes	28th July	
TIST.Test.C	Reading of personal testimonies and most significant change stories collected from TIST members by CAAC and programme contractors	Typed testimonies and stories		Used to inform my understanding, not used as data as permission had not been sought from storytellers
TIST.PPA	Participatory policy analysis workshop with TIST contractors	Typed transcript and other workshop material generated	24th June	As above, also used to generate feedback for the 1st consultation on the FCS
TISTTz	Informal interviews with TIST Tanzania programme founders and pioneers	Typed field notes	8th-14th July	Used to inform my understanding of TIST Kenya as an extreme case
	Project level research in Kenya: b) KENDBIP			
KEND.Int1	Introductory conversations with programme managers in the Netherlands (1) and Kenya (3)		11th Feb, 17th March, 13th, 23rd, 26th and 27th May	Used to provide empirical additional carbon project evidence to test Fairtrade's Theory of Change, presented in chapter 7
KEND.Int2	Interviews with field staff in Mount Kenya region (2)		6th and 13th June	
KEND.Int3	Interviews with entrepreneurs (2)		9th and 13th June	

KEND.Int4	Conversations with extension service provider (1)			1st August	
KEND.Int5	Interviews with users (10)			Various, June and July	
	Project level research in Kenya: c) other projects				
KYOP1	Visits to biogas project, coffee-A/R project and cookstove project			22nd-27th Jan	Used for writing briefing note for FTI(RRp.5)
KYOP2	Interview with programme manager of an agricultural carbon project			18th July	Not used in thesis (used to inform feedback on GS CSA Standard)
	Interviews with carbon consulting organisations in Kenya				
KYCon1	Carbon Africa			20th May	Used to inform understanding of support structures for carbon projects in Kenya
KYCon2	ACX			21st July	

Appendix 3: Protocol for participant observation and informal interviews (A)

Events organised by FTI as part of the FCSSP

Role clarification and consent procedures

- Remind FTI/ GS that my role is observer rather than a discussant, but will provide commentated notes of the event afterwards.
- Make my role clear to participants during the event: introduce myself within the meeting as a researcher of the FCSSP; introduce the aims of my research within the meeting, or write afterwards. Share concept note either in soft or hard copy.
- Share consent forms either at the event or by email afterwards (based on what I agree with FTI and GSF) and ask people to return the form. If anyone does not give their consent, their contributions to the event will not be drawn upon as data
- Subsequent meetings: make sure anyone who is new to the process knows who I am and seek their consent.

Seating logistics

Sit where I can see everyone in the room, be unobtrusive, but not forgotten about entirely, where I can charge my laptop when needed.

Recording observations

N.B. for each meeting, clarify whether there will be a designated rapporteur or minute taker; whether any report or minutes will be shared with participants; whether they would like my notes afterwards

- Note-taking materials: enter meeting notes into an excel spreadsheet on my laptop, clearly recording intervenor and what they say
- Have pen and notebook ready in case of any laptop failure or if need to write any private field notes.
- Make mental or jotted field notes during the meeting, and write fuller notes when alone (by the end of the day if possible)

Interactions with participants and the Project Team before, during and immediately after the event:

- Be friendly and polite with participants, and transparent about my role as researcher
- Take up opportunities to ask questions (from lists of possible conversational cues) if people are not apparently exhausted, in a rush, wanting to talk about other things or network with other people

List of possible conversational cues for informal interviews with…

a) Participants:

- What brings you here?
- What's your particular interest in this meeting?
- What do you expect from this meeting?
- What do you feel you/ your organisation can bring to the process?
- Whose interests are you representing/ advocating for at this meeting?
- Have you/ has your organisation been involved with the process before now? How?

b) Project Team:

Before the event

- What are your goals/ what do you hope to gain from this meeting/ workshop?
- Do you foresee any obstacles to meeting these goals?

After the event

- Impressions of the meeting
- How does this meeting fit with the process as a whole?
- What will be the follow up/ next steps?

Initial analysis: elements to think about during the meeting and afterwards, and communicate in any feedback if relevant

a) Reflections on the meeting (design and nature of interactions)
   - What was the goal of this meeting? Was it explicit? And stated from the beginning?
   - Did the participants have a common understanding of the issue at stake?
   - Was there an emergent or coherent joint vision?
   - How did the structure of the meeting shape the dialogue?
   - Were there any ground rules for communication during the meeting? Did these encourage people to listen, learn, be open, honest and considerate?
   - Did the design allow for increased creativity and innovation?
   - Did the design of the process allow for broad and meaningful participation?
   - How will the stakeholders' input be fed into the process? Is it clear to them how their input will be used?

b) Individual stakeholder analysis: (aspects to ask about or interpret, based on what people say)
   - How did they come to participate in this meeting? (invited, or responding to a call?)
   - Possible motivations for participating?
   - What are their expectations about the process or the end result?
   - Whose interests are they representing/ advocating for at this meeting?
   - What previous involvement, if any, have they or their organisation had with the process so far (e.g. contributing ideas, carrying out consultancies, offering support or critique)?

c) Overall stakeholder analysis
   - What are the different areas/ orientations that the different experts bring?
   - Are inputs as wide as they could be?
   - What impact do inputs have on the process/ decisions?
   - Which are the different interests at stake?
   - How do these contrast/ complement/ brush up against each other?
   - Who are the brokers that can move between worlds, build trust or consensus among participants?
   - Who are the participants who are in direct competition?
   - Is participation equitable? i.e.

    - Are there any resourceful groups gaining undue influence and recognition of their specific interests?
    - Do the stakeholders have equitable capacities (i.e an equal understanding of the process and structure)
    - Have they all had the same amount of time to look at the documents in advance?
- Any apparent alliances or competition between actors?
- Who are the movers, followers, opposers, bystanders?
- How are stakeholders seated in the room
- Any signs of obstacles to the process, such as unrealistic expectations; insufficient experience, knowledge and capacities; opposed priorities; competition; intolerance; external frameworks that limit possible options

d) Stakeholder interactions: verbal and non-verbal behavioural cues to pick up on

- **Signs of conversations**

Views uttered one by one without reference to preceding speaker; Advocacy- making statements; No inquiry; Attempts to control outcomes; Trying to convince; Win-lose; Conversation stuck in opposites; Participants who aren't involved are bored; Tension; Balanced inputs; Structured inquiry; Safe framework for discussion of undiscussables; Respect of difference and diversity; Pace of the conversation; Nature of the gaps in conversation: Silence as thoughtful, sacred, tense, awkward

- **Signs of conflict**

Lack of willingness to communicate or talk with each other; Insufficient involvement of hierarchy, or insufficient regard to autonomy of individuals; Clashes of interest/ ideological differences/ hidden agendas; Lack of transparency; Power differences; Lack of willingness to come to an agreement; Lack of resources to conduct an effective dialogue; Lack of willingness or of professional capacity to design/ facilitate an effective dialogue; Lack of understanding/ capacity to contribute; Lack of ownership/ appropriation of the process; Differences in 'language'; Lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities; Lack of trust

e) Key principles of stakeholder participation and partnership: use headlines in coding strategy

Accountability

- Is there any discussion about how input will be used?
- If there are decisions to be made, are the mechanisms clear and transparent?
- Are discussions/ activities/ outcomes publicised in an understandable manner to non-participating stakeholders, and/ or the general public?

Effectiveness

- Does the standard have the broad support of the participants?
- Are the participants identifying with the outcomes of the meeting/ process?

- Are they committed to the process?

Equity

- Are everybody's contributions equally valued?
- Has everybody got equal access to information?

Flexibility

- How much flexibility does the structure of the meeting allow for?

Inclusiveness

- Are there provisions for all views to be represented?

Learning

- How is learning factored in to the process?
- Which channels exist for learning from each other?

Participation and engagement

- Who received the information about the meeting?
- How did people come to take part? Were they invited or did they volunteer?
- Was anyone turned away?

Partnership/ co-operative management

- Are any of the experts encouraged or given the opportunity to take on additional responsibilities?
- How is power shared between the various stakeholders?
- Is there evidence of network/ cooperation between the stakeholders? Is this encouraged?
- Which feedback mechanisms are put in place to keep participants in the loop as the process evolves?
- How are the contributions of participants encouraged and valued?

Voices and votes

- Who has a voice?
- Who has a vote?
- How do existing mechanisms for voting interact with this?

Appendix 4: Protocol for participation observation and interviews (B)

Events and visits within carbon programme research

Role clarification and consent procedures

- Introduce myself as a researcher at the start of any observed event- explain my purpose and give people an opportunity to ask any questions
- When conducting formal interviews, go over the consent form or verbally cover its contents, and seek written or verbal consent
- Check back over interview notes with the interviewee either at the time, or once written up if I have the possibility to do so

Recording observations

Make mental or jotted notes during events or in breaks; take photographs where this will not be invasive; and write fuller field notes in the evenings. Field notes to include items such as:

- Chronological log
- Things previously forgotten and now recalled
- Analytic ideas and inferences
- Impressions and personal feelings
- Things to think about and do
- Photographs

Types of questions to ask and themes to explore: TIST

Questions for visits and interviews

- 'Grand tour' questions (Bailey, 1996), useful for gleaning a basic understanding of the programme, such as 'why does this happen?', 'what is this?', 'what does this mean?' etc
- Programme overview questions (history, structure, scale, activities, quantification procedures, payment procedures, marketing of credits, networks)
- Programme detail questions (best practices and programme values, policies, voting and decision-making procedures, functioning of the payment system, impact of the programme, expansion, flow of financial benefits, organisational structures and coordination mechanisms at different levels within TIST as a whole, gender, leadership and capacity-building, evolving programme structure, lessons and learning in hindsight)
- Personal history questions (role in the programme, how/why did you get involved, which responsibilities have you/ do you have, impressions of the programme)

- Individual membership questions/questions to small-groups (length of involvement, motivation for being involved, individual land management practices, benefits from the programme, challenges, aspirations, participation in the cluster, training received)
- Analytical questions, e.g. 'how do you understand this phenomenon?', 'what do you think about this interpretation?', 'do you see a link between this and this?'

Things to observe during events

- Purpose of the event/ activities that are taking place
- Participation (profile, number, level of engagement)
- Leadership (who leads, how are leadership/ coordination responsibilities shared between people)
- Group dynamics
- Questions asked/ topics discussed
- Signs of best practices being observed
- Signs of governance practices being enacted (e.g. rotating leadership)
- Signs of things not working out as they should

Topic lists for KENDBIP research

Interviews with KENDBIP programme staff

- Involvement in the sector/ motivation for being involved
- Programme history/ background/ evolution and basic stats
- Details on programme activities in general and mitigation activities in particular, including monitoring
- Scope of the programme and interest of participants
- Cost/ benefits of participation
- Partnership/ networking activities
- Project registration/ verification/ validation/ certification processes
- Links with standards organisations, and Fairtrade
- Roles of different actors
- Carbon revenues, carbon rights

Topic list for entrepreneurs

- Professional background (route into biogas work, training received)
- Details on biogas work (e.g. time spent, work done, responsibilities held, impressions of how well business is going, other activities done in parallel)
- Finding clients (how, who, which age/ gender/ income stability)
- Types of digesters installed and relative costs; decision-making about which type to install
- Financing and subsidies
- Training and aftersales services to client including maintenance
- Association: membership/ relationship to it; understanding of it (interpretation of its function/ value/ reason for being set-up)
- Awareness of carbon business and any thoughts on it

Topic list for users

- How was it installed and when (was it part of a programme?)
- What was the trigger for installing it?
- What was the financing arrangement?
- Choice of technology
- Use
- What benefits does it bring?
- Have you had any difficulties with it? (How) were they resolved?
- Does it meet your needs (in terms of size? Functioning)
- How has it changed your energy use?
- Did you receive any training?
- After sales service
- Use of slurry

Themes explored in early findings report and discussion with programme manager

- Overview: interviews, visits and sources of information
- General impressions
- Aspects of programme implementation that caught my attention
- The role of groups
- Visions for the biogas constructors associations
- Different types of digester
- Technical points on usage of digesters, slurry and household fuel (and possible implications on carbon)
- Awareness about carbon and carbon credits

Appendix 5: Additional documentary evidence of impact

Evaluation of the research collaboration on Survey Monkey ®

The following text was given at the beginning of the survey

'This questionnaire invites you to comment from your perspective on the usefulness of the research collaboration between Fairtrade, Gold Standard and the University of Leeds (both in terms of specific inputs I provided, and more generally); and to make recommendations. I will also be filling it out myself and will be using the results to write the final chapter of my thesis and to feed into the development of Fairtrade's research collaboration guidelines'.

The survey then had the following 9 questions.

1. Please comment on the usefulness of the background research I provided (three inputs listed and described)
2. Please comment on the usefulness of the punctual written notes/ feedback I provided (three inputs listed and described)
3. Please comment on the usefulness of the interactive sessions I facilitated with the Standards Unit/ Project Team (two inputs listed and described)
4. Please comment on the usefulness of the interviews I conducted (Q interviews described)
5. Please comment on the usefulness of the insights from carbon projects I provided (one input described)
6. Please comment on the usefulness of my provisions of comments on draft versions of Standards (three sets of comments described)
7. Please comment on the usefulness of the other approaches I used for sharing findings (aside from what has already been mentioned above) (four approaches described)
8. Please comment on the usefulness of my overall engagement with the Fairtrade Climate Standard Setting Process (brief detail given on my engagement)

9. Please add anything else that you think should be taken into account in order to maximise the usefulness of any future collaborations between your organisation and a University/ PhD student

With questions 1-8, respondents were invited to tick one of the responses given below, and then had the option of providing comments. Question 9 consisted of a comments box.

Options for response

- 'I wasn't particularly aware of it'
- 'It wasn't that useful'
- 'It was somewhat useful'
- 'It was really useful'

Appendix 6: Original research concept note

UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

KITE
York Institute for Tropical Ecosystems

RESEARCH PROJECT PROPOSAL

August 2013 version

Pathways to 'Fair Carbon'
Assessing certification and fairness in carbon value chains

Background

Climate change is having an adverse impact on small-scale producers in global commodity chains. Carbon finance is a potential source of support; compensating or bolstering producers' efforts to adapt to and mitigate climate change.

Synergies are now being forged between ethical trading standards and carbon standards, in terms of dual certification and joint standard development. This combination of experience and resources could enhance standard rigour and reach, and ensure that fairness is on the carbon agenda.

This research will investigate pathways towards greater fairness in carbon standards and projects, using as a case study the process of developing and implementing a joint certification scheme by the Gold Standard Foundation (GSF) and Fairtrade International (FLO).

It raises questions about the implications of incorporating carbon services into existing commodity chains: will this lead to greater benefits for small-scale producers? Will this instead subject them to the risks of carbon price volatility, and lock them into meeting yet more requirements? Will this present adequate opportunity to assert their rights, negotiate their share of the benefits and participate in decision-making?

Insights will be of relevance to standards bodies, project developers and agribusiness, particularly if they are committed to enhancing the rights and interests of poor and vulnerable people and ensuring a fairer distribution of the benefits from carbon projects via robust standards and effective stakeholder engagement.

Aim and objectives

The aim of this research is to generate insight into the ways that carbon standards and projects designed to benefit producers are developed and implemented, and to uncover the material and discursive implications across the carbon value chain. The following objectives support this aim:

1. To pinpoint the multiple perspectives on 'fair carbon' held by the various stakeholders involved in carbon projects and carbon standards, and investigate the process of transforming diverse opinions into a validated standard;
2. To identify the standards mechanisms which can play a role in contributing to greater fairness, and explore the way that these are played out in local contexts where standards are implemented;
3. To understand the value of action-oriented multi-level research in collaborative standards-setting and implementation processes.

Research Process: Exploring Fairness

'Fairness' is a discursive term, subjectively understood. While its vagueness facilitates cooperation and communication between diverse stakeholders, behind the term are multiple goals and priorities. This presents challenges for those inscribed with translating it in a standard or applying it in a project. This research proposes to explore what 'fairness' means, how it is translated into standards and project design, how it is applied and the consequential effects on 'fairness' in projects.

A framework on equity will be used as a tool to elicit reflection with stakeholders and as a benchmark to assess standards content, project design and actual outcomes. Data will be collected where the standards are developed, and where carbon is generated and traded. The approach will be action-oriented, with an intention to contribute constructively to the standard.

Rationale

The case of FLO-GSF is of particular interest because: the combination of joint resources, ambitions and scope will potentially enable the certification of carbon projects involving thousands of producers to whom FLO and GSF have promised tangible producer benefits and fair development; the standards market is a site of innovation and imitation and standards initiatives have the potential to raise the bar. FLO and GSF's positions as leaders in their fields means their actions are likely to influence parallel initiatives.

Proposed Researcher's Role

Qualitative research methods will be used to document the process as it unfolds over the next year. Subject to approval by FLO and GSF, research would potentially involve:

1. Reviewing and providing feedback on standards recommendations produced by consultants;
2. Conducting some ad hoc research on specific aspects requiring further analysis, which are of mutual interest to the researcher and to FLO/ GSF;
3. Observing meetings of the joint standards development team and advisory panel and providing suggestions in commentated post-meeting notes;
4. Providing methodological input for workshops with producer representatives and outlining recommendations in commentated post-workshop notes;
5. Conducting interviews with standards team, advisory panel and workshop participants to explore their different perspectives on the joint standard scheme and how it can best be developed, and presenting these perspectives in a document;
6. Documenting standards pilot projects in Sub-Saharan Africa through field level research and interviews with producers and project developers and providing feedback and recommendations to FLO and GSF;
7. Measuring the response to GSF and FLO's joint standard by reviewing feedback after the public launch and presentations at public forums (such as Carbon Expo or COP 19) and conducting follow-up interviews with standards users and other carbon market actors;
8. Providing FLO and GSF with an opinion document at the end of the research period, on the way forward- outlining risks, opportunities and recommendations.

Expected benefits

For FLO and GSF:

External appraisal of the standards development process will enhance transparency and support FLO and GSF to forge the best way forward.

For project developers and agribusiness:

Detailed documentation of pilot projects will help to ensure that lessons from the project level are communicated up to the standards level.

For producers:

Focussing on producers' perspectives during pilot projects will help to contribute to their empowerment by ensuring that their voices are heard as standards and projects are developed.

For all stakeholders:

A thorough understanding of standard development and implementation processes will enable appropriate recommendations to enhance equity in standards and projects. This will lead to stronger and more mutually beneficial collaboration between stakeholders.

Project Information

This research will take place within a time frame of approximately 12 months beginning in August 2013 and will be part of a PhD project by Rebecca Howard at the University of Leeds (October 2012-September 2015), supervised by Dr. Anne Tallontire, Dr. Lindsay Stringer and Dr. Rob Marchant. The team has expertise in ethical trade and private standards, livelihood dynamics and ecosystem change. The PhD project will involve the publication of academic journal articles, presentations at academic conferences, and will culminate in the submission of a thesis. The project is funded by a studentship from the Economic and Social Research Council and the Natural Environment Research Council.

Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, LS29JT
R.J.Howard12@leeds.ac.uk; Tel. +44 7570 105 135; Skype: rebeccajoyhoward;
http:/www.see.leeds.ac.uk/people/r.howard

Appendix 7: Actual research inputs

<table>
<tr><th>Research tasks from proposal</th><th>Actual tasks accomplished</th></tr>
<tr><td>1. Reviewing and providing feedback on standards recommendations produced by consultants;</td><td>1. Feedback incorporated into mid-term feedback document, see 9.</td></tr>
<tr><td>2. Conducting some ad hoc research on specific aspects requiring further analysis, which are of mutual interest to the researcher and to FLO/ GSF;</td><td>2a) Review of critique of the carbon market produced for FTI in May 2013
2b) Quantitative analysis of carbon projects by country, region, technology type and standard, resulting in recommendations about where to locate producer/ field staff (PFS) workshops
See also 5.</td></tr>
<tr><td>3. Observing meetings of the joint standards development team and advisory panel and providing suggestions in commentated post-meeting notes;</td><td>3. Observed the following events:
<table>
<tr><th>Event</th><th>No.</th><th>Provided</th></tr>
<tr><td>SC meetings</td><td>3</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>WG meetings</td><td>2</td><td>Transcripts</td></tr>
<tr><td>GoE meetings</td><td>3</td><td>Transcripts (+ report after 1st meeting)</td></tr>
<tr><td>PFS meetings</td><td>2</td><td>Transcripts</td></tr>
<tr><td>CSO workshop</td><td>1</td><td>Transcript</td></tr>
<tr><td>COP 19 events</td><td>2</td><td>Independent report</td></tr>
<tr><td>GS CSA Advisory Panel</td><td>1</td><td>Feedback on draft</td></tr>
</table></td></tr>
<tr><td>4. Providing methodological input for workshops with producer representatives and outlining recommendations in commentated post-workshop notes;</td><td>4a) Identification of some potential participants for PFS workshops
4b) Facilitation of some discussion groups at Nairobi PFS
4c) Transcripts shared with FTI
See also 2b)</td></tr>
<tr><td>5. Conducting interviews with standards team, advisory panel and workshop participants to explore their different perspectives on the joint standard scheme and how it can best be developed, and presenting these perspectives in a document;</td><td>5. Undertook a study using Q methodology to explore diversity of opinions on fairness and how to achieve it in Fairtrade carbon projects. Involved conducting statement sorting exercise with 26 participants composed of staff from FTI, GS, and other Fairtrade and carbon stakeholders involved directly or indirectly in the FCS-setting process. Results shared with participants in a summary document.</td></tr>
<tr><td>6. Documenting standards pilot projects in Sub-Saharan Africa through field level research and interviews with producers and project developers and providing feedback and recommendations to FLO and GSF;</td><td>Not possible to undertake due to delays in FCS-piloting process- instead:
6. Undertook 15 weeks of independent research in Kenya exploring two carbon projects in detail and interviewing a range of actors involved in carbon projects. Fed insights back to FTI and GS in the form of:
Briefing note to FTI WG (Mar 2014)
Research findings webinar (May 2015)
Presentation at Fair Trade International Symposium (Jun 2015)
Research paper (Jun 2015)
Research findings workshops/ webinars (Mar 2016)</td></tr>
<tr><td>7. Measuring the response to GSF and FLO’s joint standard by reviewing feedback after the public launch and</td><td>7. Beyond scope- happened too late in my research process to engage closely with it</td></tr>
</table>

presentations at public forums (such as Carbon Expo or COP 19) and conducting follow-up interviews with standards users and other carbon market actors;	
8. Providing FLO and GSF with an opinion document at the end of the research period, on the way forward- outlining risks, opportunities and recommendations.	8. Findings shared during research findings workshops/ webinars with FTI and GS (Mar 2016) Thesis shared Jun 2016
Additional research tasks accomplished	
9. Provided process and content feedback on the following occasions: Independent report and feedback after Group of Experts meeting (Sep 2013) Independent report and feedback after COP 19 events (Nov 2013) Mid-term feedback report on progress to date (Dec 2013) Research findings workshops/ webinars (Mar 2016)	
10. Provided content feedback on the following standard drafts: FCS pre consultation draft (in mid-term feedback report, see 9) FCS 1st consultation draft (jointly prepared with participants of an A/R project) FCS 2nd consultation draft GS CSA Advisory Panel draft GS CSA consultation draft (jointly prepared with participants of an A/R project) GS A/R smallholder guidelines	
11. Provided support with reflection on process, content, values and assumptions on the following occasions: 'House' (building blocks) exercise with FTI, May 2014 Q interviews (statement sorting exercise) with FTI, GS and other stakeholders, May-Sep 2014 Research findings workshops/ webinars (Mar 2016)	
12. Wrote and published two open access journal articles, reviewed by FTI and GS on a) the opportunities and challenges for achieving fairness in carbon project through collaborative standard-setting; b) different perceptions of fairness in carbon projects visible amongst stakeholders in the FCS-setting process and how these relate to existing debates within Fairtrade and in the carbon sector	

Appendix Figure 1: Pathways elements in the thesis