KATŌ KANJI AND INTERWAR NAVAL ARMS LIMITATION: THE JAPANESE NAVY IN POLITICS AND POLITICS IN THE JAPANESE NAVY

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KATŌ KANJI AND INTERWAR NAVAL ARMS LIMITATION: THE JAPANESE NAVY IN POLITICS AND POLITICS IN THE JAPANESE NAVY

VOLUME II

CHAPTER SEVEN

FROM GENEVA TO LONDON

The Geneva Conference of 1927 had signally failed to halt the construction race in auxiliary naval vessels. The immediate cause of the failure was the inability of the United States to obtain concessions on the cruiser issue from Great Britain. Negotiations at Geneva had shown that a simple extension of the Washington agreements was out of the question and that extending existing capital ship ratios to all other vessels created a great number of strategic-technical questions. The various countries involved concluded that technical specialists were not capable of coming to an agreement and in any future conference ought to be relegated to advisory positions, as at Washington.

The Anglo-American deadlock over cruisers caused a marked deterioration in Anglo-American relations. The Coolidge Administration in the United States, angered by the failure to achieve its objectives at Geneva, responded in 1927 by announcing that a massive construction programme which included 25 more 'treaty cruisers' and one aircraft carrier would now be initiated.<1> This dramatic proposal threatened to increase naval competition to an intensity not experienced since the Anglo-German naval race prior to the First World War. The French and Italians were also affected and accelerated their programmes in naval auxiliary construction. As in the period before Geneva, naval planners, in all the major naval nations, continued to try

and find ways to offset naval limitation agreements, on capital ship ratios and Pacific fortifications in particular, thus increasing naval competition in auxiliaries. Failure at Geneva and the new American construction programme now posed a major threat to the newly established structure of international relations in the 1920s.

According to the Washington Treaty, the next naval discussions were scheduled for 1931, the date of the expiry of the naval holiday in capital ships, and the point at which replacement ship construction could commence. But in the immediate aftermath of Geneva, few had much confidence in the efficacy of another naval limitation conference.

After Geneva, Britain believed there was little immediate prospect of further progress in bilateral talks with the United States and began negotiating on naval limitation with France. In 1928 they reached an 'accord' on a formula for naval limitation. Japan approved of this but the United States was strongly opposed and, as the need for an improvement in Anglo-American relations became imperative, the British government decided not to pursue the 'accord' with the French any further.<2>

It has been said that the failure at Geneva was something which pleased professional navy men in all countries and this was certainly true of Japan. The failure to extend a Washington-style agreement to all other classes of ships, meant that Japan's efforts to offset the 'inferior ratio' in capital ships by auxiliary ship construction could continue apace. It also meant that when the next conference

took place, probably in Washington in 1931, Japan's 'existing strength' in these areas would be considerably expanded. This in turn would surely improve Japan's future negotiating position. Since the Washington Conference the Japanese Navy had revised the Imperial National Defence Plan in 1923 and had launched replenishment programmes in auxiliaries in 1923, 1926 and 1927. These programmes were expected to reach completion by 1931. Nevertheless, although the Japanese Navy was proceeding with an auxiliary ship buildup, it also continued to study naval limitation in the aftermath of the Geneva Conference. Generally speaking, Japanese naval planners still perceived certain advantages in naval limitation talks but, in any case, they needed to prepare for a further naval conference around 1931. Some two months after Geneva, on 15 October 1927, Navy Minister Admiral Okada Keisuke ordered Vice-Admiral Nomura Keisaburō to establish a Gunbi Seigen Kenkyūkai (Research Committee on Arms Limitation).<3>

Despite the pessimism engendered by the experience at Geneva, there still existed considerable international support for disarmament and arms control measures and agreements which might ease, if not end, competition in armaments. On 27 August 1928 nine nations signed the Kellog-Briand Pact which renounced war as a means of settling international disputes and America, Britain and Japan were among the signatories.<4> This international initiative provided the necessary stimulus for reviving the League of Nations Commission on Disarmament. This committee had been adjourned after failing in the previous five

sessions to make any real progress on disarmament.<5>

On 24 and 25 September 1928 the findings of the Imperial Navy's Research Committee on Arms Limitation were presented to the Navy Minister, Admiral Okada Keisuke. As Asada Sadao has pointed out, these documents reflect the positions of the key personnel involved in the study.<6> The majority perceived a continuing improvement in Japanese-American relations and favoured a more moderate China policy close to that of Shidehara Kijūrō. The dissenting minority opinion however, was extremely pessimistic and even hostile regarding relations with the United States. Moreover, the minority opinion was that conflict over competing interests in China was likely to lead to war with the United States. The majority opinion was that the Washington agreements were, on the whole, advantageous to Japan and that Japan would benefit from restricting British and American naval strength to a 10:10:6 ratio in capital ships. Conversely the minority opinion reflected a widespread feeling within the navy that the Washington Treaty had imposed an 'inferior ratio' on Japan. Differing views of relations with America notwithstanding the committee, were in complete agreement on the matter of auxiliary ship ratios. The report stated firmly that the 70% ratio was "absolutely necessary for the nation's defence, nay for its very existence" and was to be "adhered to without any bargaining at the next conference". They realised that America would almost certainly oppose this position. The committee was divided between those who would accept a compromise provided Japan obtained a guarantee as

to her security needs and those who would rather see the conference fail than compromise on the ratio issue.

The research findings clearly reflect a split. On the one hand the majority reflected views similar to those advocated by the late Katō Tomosaburō, who had believed that avoidance of war with America should be the guiding factor. On the other hand, the minority group's thinking was closer to that of Katō Kanji, and perceived an inevitable conflict with the United States probably over China. In 1928 Katō Kanji was still Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet and it is doubtful that he had any major influence on these discussions. Indeed at this stage, it would appear possible that Kato himself was merely reflecting commonly held 'realist' views rather than creating them within the top echelons of the naval officer corps.

In February 1929, the United States Senate finally approved a massive construction programme of fifteen heavy cruisers initiated by the Coolidge administration. This represented a reduction of ten cruisers. However, the Senate attached a rider to the effect that, in the event of any further agreement, the President would be empowered to suspend all or part of the authorised construction programme.<7> Following this a number of significant developments occurred in 1929 which made the early convening of an international naval conference more likely. In March, Herbert Hoover, a Quaker, was elected President of the United States and in June, Ramsay MacDonald formed a Labour Government in Britain. Both men were deeply committed to the principle that reduction of armaments was the surest way

to maintain peace. In July a Minseito cabinet, under Hamaguchi Osachi was established in Japan as a result of the fall of the Seiyukai administration of Tanaka Giichi. Faced with a series of persistent and worsening economic crises, the new Japanese government was determined to carry through its deflationary policy which involved a series of severe budgetary cuts.<8> The opportunity to reduce naval expenditure was a major factor in persuading the Japanese government to participate in another naval conference. Indeed, the economic benefits of cutting arms expenditure was important for all three countries, especially after the onset of the world economic crisis following the Wall Street Crash of October 1929. All three governments were determined on a solution to the naval race and advocated not simply arms control but actively sought arms reduction. In April 1929, The League of Nations Commission on Disarmament, having received new life from the signing of the Kellog-Briand Pact, began discussions on armaments once more. However they again found that no substantial progress could be expected unless advances were first made on naval arms control. The Americans pre-empted the Germans in proposing an international conference on this topic, when the leader of their delegation to the Commission, Hugh Gibson, indicated that America was willing to support major naval reductions. He indicated that a 'yardstick' for measuring ships might be provided to solve the vexing problem of negotiations on auxiliary vessels, especially cruisers.<9> This proposal was the direct result of President Hoover's efforts "to inject life" into the League

Commission's deliberations by a "bold and unexpected proposal".<10> It proved surprisingly effective and elicited an almost unanimous response throughout the world, in favour of pursuing an agreement on naval limitation and disarmament. Prior to this, Britain and America had already agreed to the necessity of talks on naval questions through diplomatic channels and on 3 May a proposal for a 'private and confidential exchange of views on naval disarmament' was communicated by Great Britain.<11> As a result of a series of preliminary discussions, the British Government, on 7 October 1929, issued formal invitations to the other four signatories of the Washington Five Power Treaty namely the United States, Japan, France and Italy, to attend a conference on naval limitation to be held in London from January 1930. On 16 October the Hamaguchi Cabinet willingly accepted. The negotiating positions adopted by Great Britain and particularly America and Japan in the months leading up to the conference, are crucial to an understanding of Japan's diplomatic and naval responses to the London Conference invitation and outcomes and require treatment in some detail.

The Anglo-American Position

To understand the situation faced by Japan, it is necessary to be clear as to the respective positions held by America and Britain vis-a-vis each other as well as their respective attitudes towards Japan individually and jointly regarding naval auxiliary vessel allocations prior to the Conference.<12> The key element was still cruiser,

especially heavy cruiser ratios, which had caused the failure at Geneva. Before discussing this in some detail, some general remarks about other aspects of ratios require comment.

In preliminary discussions, America and Britain agreed to extend the moratorium on capital ship replacement until 1936. America's position on auxiliaries was predicated on two major principles: parity with the Britain and a 60% ratio for Japan in auxiliaries. The United States particularly sought parity with Britain in cruiser ratios and in particular a 60% ratio in heavy cruisers vis-a-vis Japan. America claimed that the principle of a 5:5:3 ratio in auxiliaries had been agreed at Washington and her representatives often mentioned that Katō Tomosaburō himself had agreed to this at that time. Thus, the stage was set for a major confrontation between America and Japan over Japan's claim for an overall ratio of 70% which America claimed represented an 'increase' of 10% in ratio terms. America like Britain, though perhaps not so consistently, was also in favour of the abolition of submarines or certainly the reduction of submarine tonnages since these posed a real threat to American naval strategic planning for Pacific operations. Therefore America sought to reduce Japan's total submarine tonnage. America agreed to reductions of her own levels of destroyer and submarine tonnages to a level of parity with Great Britain, provided the latter compromised on the cruiser issue.

Great Britain's position on capital ships shifted dramatically as the conference approached. Prime Minister

MacDonald, who had tentatively agreed to extending the moratorium on capital ship replacements to 1936, suddenly began advocating the abolition of capital ships. The American delegates only heard of this on their last night at sea en route to London.<13> Great Britain's position on submarines was that she strongly desired total abolition and although this seemed unlikely she was determined to bring down Japanese overall submarine tonnage. Great Britain did not appear to be opposed to the Japanese principle of 70% overall but opposed Japan's 'existing tonnage' position on submarines. However, for Great Britain the real problem remained the cruiser issue. Britain did not object to even a 70% ratio in heavy cruisers for Japan provided the total number of ships in this class did not exceed twelve.

The following figures indicate that an allocation of twelve to Japan would actually give Japan 80% in heavy cruisers vis-a-vis Britain if the latter settled for 15. The position on 'treaty' cruisers in late 1929 was as follows:

Country	Type	Built	Building	Authorised
USA	Heavy	1	9	13
GB	Heavy	- 24	-	0
Japan	Heavy	8	4	0
USA	Light	12	0	0
GB	Light	38	0	0
Japan	Light	21	0	0 <14>

Before the conference, the British and the Americans had attempted to reach an agreement on 'parity' in cruisers incorporating adjusted totals in heavy and light cruisers. Britain proposed possessing 15 heavy cruisers and 45 light cruisers and the United States 18 heavy cruisers plus six additional small cruisers. The initial reaction of the

United States was one of outrage since they claimed this would require them to build and the aim was arms reduction. To some extent this seems to have been a smoke screen for their real objections since 13 heavy cruisers were in fact only authorised (not building) and if America agreed to 18 she could save on building five 10,000 ton ships and build six 6,000 ton ships. In other words America would build 36,000 tons more rather than 50,000 tons as originally intended.<15>

Leaving the complexities of how America and Britain perceived 'parity' the real problem was clearly that of heavy cruisers. Britain pointed out that if America possessed more than 18 in this class Japan would have to build more. This in turn would seriously threaten British security in the Southwest Pacific and force Great Britain (and possibly Australia and New Zealand) also to build. America initially held out for 23 heavy cruisers but, by the conference, had reduced this to 21 and had probably reached the conclusion that she would have to reduce even further. Britain's concern with American heavy cruisers was therefore primarily one of concern over its effect on Japan's heavy cruiser programme. MacDonald felt that if America came down to eighteen Japan could be persuaded to remain at twelve and Britain would be flexible on her light cruiser superiority. America's concerns were both to obtain a mix of heavy and light cruiser ratios between her and Britain which approximated parity and also keep Japanese heavy cruiser tonnage below 70%.

In discussions on 19 January 1930, immediately prior to

the opening of the conference, American Secretary of State and Chief Plenipotentiary Henry Stimson told MacDonald that the United States Senate would never accept a treaty granting Japan 70%.<16> The idea of a bilateral pact as a lever to force Japan below 70% now began to take shape. Both parties were certainly determined to keep Japanese heavy cruiser tonnage down but for differing reasons. Basically Prime Minister MacDonald (GB) wished to keep the figures down to allay fears in the dominions, especially Australia, and stated at this stage that, if America would accept 18 in heavy cruisers, Britain could make almost any settlement on light cruisers. By mid-February the basic unity of American and British positions was openly revealed to the Japanese and Stimson expressed regret that Japan would not concede since America had made concessions by reducing to 18. The Japanese position was that if the United States had 18 they would have to build two more ships in order to achieve the 70% ratio. Great Britain accepted that Japan was now entitled to 12.6 or 13 heavy cruisers but felt Japan would settle for a lower figure. It should perhaps be noted here, that whilst America was making concessions on the final number of vessels to be possessed i.e. from 23 (via 21) to 18, her 'existing strength' was actually ten according to the ships built and building formula. As Admiral Yarnell (USA) stated in 1930 "it is the ships that are built or under construction that count in an armament conference" and yet America was arguing from figures of ships built, building and authorised.<17> The 13 authorised can be regarded merely as a paper programme.

It could be argued therefore that her concessions were more apparent than real or, perhaps at least that they were not so great as America was trying to claim. Basically, America was asking Britain and Japan, who were supperior in heavy cruisers built and building (USA 10: GB 15: Japan 12), to stand still while the United States built a massive new heavy cruiser fleet.

Prime Minister MacDonald perceptively pointed out that the American problem was that her ships were in a programme whilst British ships were on the sea and that therefore the United States would have to build if she desired parity.<18> He also intimated that the major weakness of the Japanese position was the seeming rigidity of the "Three Fundamental Principles". These 'principles were; a ratio of 70% heavy cruisers vis-a-vis the United States, an overall ratio of 70% in auxiliaries and autonomy in submarine tonnage (set at 'existing strength' which was 78,000 tons).

The Japanese Navy had been carrying out important research on naval limitation since the collapse of the Geneva Conference. This research provided the basis for the so-called 'Three Principles' which in turn became the basis of the Japanese negotiating positon in the period immediately prior to the conference.

Japan's Position Prior to the Conference

The position taken by the Hamaguchi Cabinet towards the coming conference at London, particularly the clear stand taken on the 'Three Fundamental Principles', clearly indicated that a consensus had been reached between the

government and the navy. Moreover, it was a position which strongly reflected the perceived needs and firm convictions of naval planners. The question is when and how did the navy's "Three Principles" emerge.

Professor Ikeda Kiyoshi, in a recent essay on the London Conference, has suggested that the 'Three Principles' were created after Katō Kanji's appointment to the Naval General Staff. He wrote that Katō Kanji told Admiral Takarabe on the latter's appointment as Navy Minister in July 1929 that:

> an overall ratio of 70% in auxiliary ships for the Empire has a long history and is vital for national defence.<19>

But Ikeda states that Katō made no mention of the 'Three Principles' and therefore concludes that they emerged in the Naval General Staff planning after this time. Ikeda then adds that:

> These 'Three Principles' were drawn up when Katō Kanji was Chief of the Naval General Staff. Shortly after the decision to adopt the 'Three Principles' for the London Conference Suzuki Kantaro, Katō's predecessor as Chief of the Naval General Staff told Vice-Admiral Yamanashi Katsunoshin (Deputy Navy Minister) "when I retired from the position of Chief of the Naval General Staff last year such things did not exist...."<20>

Katō's general statement to Takarabe did not preclude the existence of the 'principles'. Suzuki Kantarō's assertion appears especially strange when we consider Japanese naval policy at the time of the Geneva Conference. At that time Suzuki was Chief of the Naval General Staff. In the instructions handed to the Chief Naval Advisor, Kobayashi Seizō for Geneva it was explicitly stated that Japan needed "a standard not lower than 70% of the United States as well

as Britain". The instructions also asked for "the requisite ratio of 70% in 10,000 ton 8" gun cruisers and the retention of Japan's existing submarine strength, 70,000 tons".<21> Suzuki's remarks seem all the more strange since at the time of the Geneva Conference, he had taken the position that "The size of armament is a matter to be decided by the Chief of the Naval General Staff".<22> Suzuki proceeded to oppose any change in the Japanese negotiating position which he had presumably approved prior to the conference. Given the apparent contradiction, a summary of the Japanese Navy's position in the period from the collapse of the Geneva Conference to the opening of the London Conference, would seem appropriate here.

As mentioned previously, the Imperial Navy had continued to study naval limitation after Washington and Geneva, since Japanese naval officers still perceived certain advantages in naval limitation measures. In any case since further conferences seemed inevitable it made sense to prepare for them. Some two months after Geneva, on 15 October 1927 a Gunbi Seigen Kenkyūkai (Research Committee on Arms Limitation) had been established. In late September 1928 its findings were presented to the Navy Minister.

The committee laid special emphasis on the 70% ratio in auxiliaries and the need to preserve a ratio of 70% in heavy cruisers. This had become even more important since the United States Navy General Board had surmounted the first obstacle in its major expansion programme when the House of Representatives authorised the funds for 15 heavy cruisers

in March 1928. In view of this the Japanese Navy researchers believed, that should this American plan go forward, Japan would need to construct a further five heavy cruisers in order to maintain the 70% ratio.<23> As a consequence of the American programmes the Japanese Navy began planning for post-1931 capital ship replacement and further auxiliaries to cope with the scheduled American expansion in auxiliaries. Therefore on 19 September 1928 (the week before the Limitation Committee findings were presented) the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff had commenced discussions on a new replenishment programme. On 5 March 1929 agreement had been reached between Okada Keisuke (Navy Minister) and Katō Kanji (the new Chief of the Naval General Staff) and a new plan was drafted. This plan, covering the period up to 1936, (the expiry date of the Washington Treaties) was for four capital ships (replacing over age vessels), five cruisers, eight destroyers, 32 submarines and various other assorted vessels totalling 112 ships 190,240 tons.<24> On the basis of this naval plan, Okada began discussions with the Finance Ministry on 14 May 1929, but since there were signs of another naval limitation conference being imminent, the two sides agreed to postpone discussions until after the conference.<25> In fact it might have been wiser, tactically, to have obtained approval. By so doing, Japan would have strenghtened its negotiating position at London since the Americans included 'authorised - but not yet building' ships in their new definition of 'existing strength'. On 28 June the Navy Minister Okada presented a policy paper to the Tanaka

Cabinet as part of preparations for a conference. This document entitled "Matters relating to Countermeasures on Armament Limitation" in the section on "Imperial Policy relating to Armament Limitation" stated:

> We recognise the need for a level of 70% in auxiliaries vis-a-vis the world's largest navies ... regarding the content of the naval strength to be possessed we place special emphasis on large ships of 10,000 ton-8" guns and above. Additionally we ought to have autonomy in light cruisers and below [including submarines].<26>

On 19 July 1929, the new Hamaguchi Cabinet cabled instructions to the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, Matsudaira Tsuneo. The Ambassador was asked to inform Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and United States Ambassador Dawes that "our country desires a ratio of 70% overall".<27>

Then on 20 August the Cabinet instructed Ambassador Matsudaira to request 70% in heavy cruisers and 70% in light cruisers vis-a-vis the United States and 80,000 tons in submarines.<28> Matsudaira attempted to enlist the support of Ambassador Dawes and Prime Minister MacDonald and the latter promised to help. However, it appeared that the Anglo-American negotiations were moving in the direction of an agreement of 21 (USA) to 18 (GB) in heavy cruisers. Therefore, on 20 September, the Hamaguchi Cabinet again cabled Matsudaira informing him that a 21:18 agreement would require Japan to possess approximately 40,000 tons more in heavy cruisers to retain the necessary ratio with the United States.<29> The Japanese government felt that such a development would not be in accordance with the spirit of arms reduction and therefore requested Matsudaira to persuade the Americans to reduce to below 21 heavy

cruisers. If not, Japan had no choice but to build and that would in turn compel Britain to commence further construction in cruisers.

Ironically Matsudaira had actually contributed to the formation of a joint front between America and Great Britain. When he had initially expressed Japan's willingness to participate in a naval limitation conference, Matsudaira had recommended two important steps.<30> First that Britain and America conduct preliminary discussions on parity. Given the cruiser issue and the Japanese ratio's relationship to both sides, Matsudaira had created a situation whereby Japan (and others) were reduced to responding to an Anglo-American 'fait accomplis' since all further decisions on auxiliary vessels would henceforth be judged in terms of the Anglo-American settlement.

Second, Matsudaira had asked for Japanese-American discussions on Japan's security requirements. On 18 September, the British Prime Minister MacDonald met Matsudaira and concluded that Japan would accept an allocation of 18(USA):15(GB):12(Japan) in heavy cruisers.<31> However, on 20 September the Japanese govenment informed Matsudaira that if America settled for 18 heavy cruisers, Japan must build two more and if America opted for 21 then Japan must build a further four.<32>

In the latter part of September 1929 Takarabe Takeshi, Okada's successor as Navy Minister, ordered his Kaigun Gunshukuin (Naval Disarmament Committee members), one captain and two commanders, to draft instructions for the

delegation to the coming conference and on 4 October it submitted a draft.<33> Five days later, the Navy Ministry began negotiating with the Foreign Ministry concerning draft instructions and from 12 October the leaders of the Naval General Staff inaugurated a series of five study groups.<34>

There was undoubtedly considerable opposition from right wing groups over Japan attending another naval conference.<35> These right wing elements perceived the forthcoming conference as yet another device by which the United States was seeking to tie Japan's hands in Asia, especially China. Premier Hamaguchi therefore sought a consensus amongst the more important groupings in Japanese political circles and on 10 October the Cabinet, leading members of the Privy Council, Opposition Party leaders and others, attended a briefing at the Navy Minister's official residence.<36> This was generally taken as indicating that all key political groupings supported the cabinet position on Japan's conference aims. After the briefing, the Prime Minister announced to the press that he intended to seek a 10:7 ratio with the United States in heavy cruisers stating that this was indispensable to Japan's security and also reasonable since it showed the defensive nature of Japan's navy. Moreover he added such a ratio would permit America to greatly increase her existing strength over Japan.<37> The United States was now to be allowed to build whilst Japan virtually stood still. Japan's acceptance of the invitation to London was made on 16 October 1929. The Hamaguchi Cabinet had willingly responded since the external policy of this new government was based on cooperation with

America and Britain, cooperation with China and Disarmament. Internally it concentrated on 'purification of politics' and fiscal retrenchment and a return to the gold standard. The latter had been further stimulated by increased international pressure.<38> Thus the conference provided a unique opportunity for them to increase their control over Japanese naval building plans, such as the postponed auxiliary replenishment programme and the renewal of capital construction in 1931.

The British invitation stressed that they wished to negotiate on all classes of vessels, postponement of replacement building in capital ships and total abolition of submarines.<39> The Minseitō Cabinet clearly perceived naval reductions as an essential prerequisite to achieving their programme of fiscal reconstruction. Moreover, a return to the gold standard was only possible provided there were continuing good relations with the United States and Great Britain. Thus, a successful international conference, particularly one related to 'military reductions' could not but bolster the Hamaguchi administration's 'progressive image'.

On 18 October the cabinet announced the plenipotentiaries for the delegation. Wakatsuji Reijiro (1865-1949), Matsudaira Tsuneo (1877-1949) Ambassador to Britain, and Admiral Takarabe Takeshi (1868-1949) Navy Minister and later Nagai Matsuzō (1877-1957) Ambassador to Belgium was added. Premier Hamaguchi, like Hara at Washington, assumed the post of Navy Minister protem in Takarabe's absence and the calibre of the team was a clear

reflection of the fact that government sought a successful conference. The government and especially the Foreign Ministry and the navy leadership now began to draft instructions for the Plenipotentiaries and the naval technical advisors. Meanwhile the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Debuchi pressed hard for preliminary discussions on the heavy cruiser issue with American Secretary of State Henry Stimson. However, after considerable stalling, Stimson finally consented to a meeting on 12 November and dismissed Japan's 10:7 claim insisting:

> If you will refer to the records of the Washington Conference, you will find that the original formula proposed by this government covered not only capital ships ... but also all auxiliary combatant craft and especially covered cruisers.<40>

Foreign Minister Shidehara pointed out on 15 November that this was wrong and that what Stimson claimed had formed no part of that agreement.<41> It is possible to interpret Hughes' opening speech at Washington in such a way as to support Stimson's claim but that was a 'proposal' not an agreement! It is also said that Baron Kato had agreed, in principle to the extension of the 60% ratio to all other ships at one point during the Washington Conference. This 'slip' by Plenipotentiary Kato was also a factor in the American insistence that a 'principle' of 10:6 overall had been agreed at Washington. It was therefore clear that the United States were going to prove very difficult indeed on negotiating the heavy cruiser issue.

On 25 November the Navy Ministry and the Foreign Ministry reached agreement on the draft instructions for the

conference and, on that same day naval leaders attended an unnofficial meeting of Gensui gunjisangiin Kaigi (Combined naval members of the Board Fleet Admirals and Supreme Military Council). At the same time the Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff sent the Deputy Navy Minister a document stipulating the absolute minimum standard the navy must assert for self defence. This was a three part document stipulating a range of possible negotiating positions and this was then passed to Rear-Admiral Sakonji the Chief Technical adviser to the London delegation.<42>

The Cabinet approved the plan put forward by the navy almost 'in toto', indicating that the Japanese government was determined to press for what it regarded as its 'reasonable' demands.

Prior to the departure of the delegation, on 26 November an outline of the cabinet decision was announced. This indicated the basis on which the delegation would negotiate in London.

> 1. With the objective of preserving international peace and lightening national burdens, to endeavour to advance from the stage of arms limitation to that of achieving arms reduction.
>
> 2. To possess as an ironclad rule, armaments which offer no threat or threat of invasion to anyone.
>
> 3. We assert the following three principles a) an overall tonnage versus the USA in surface vessels of 70%; b) A heavy cruisers ratio of 70% vis-a-vis the USA and c) Autonomy in terms of submarine tonnages which is the existing tonnage possessed of 78,000 tons.<43> (emphasis mine)

These so-called "Three Fundamental Principles", in 3. above, marked a departure from previous conferences in that

the ratio and tonnage figures were explicitly publicised and clearly stated in the instructions to the principal Delegates. This indicated that the government was, at this point in time, fully behind the navy.

However, Debuchi's failure to make any progress with Stimson did not give Japan's leaders any cause for optimism. Consequently when the Americans invited the Japanese delegation to stop off in the United States, Japan gladly accepted hoping that further progress could be made before the opening of the Conference. The delegation left for London via the United States on 26 November 1929. On 2 December, prior to their arrival, Foreign Minister Shidehara had made yet another attempt to persuade Stimson. He suggested that the discussion on heavy cruisers might proceed more smoothly if the present situation was taken as the basis. In other words a discussion on cruisers might proceed based on 'existing strength'. But, since America at this point only had one heavy cruiser built Stimson rejected this proposal.<44> This caused further apprehension on the part of the Japanese since it further confirmed that there were going to be major problems with the Americans over heavy cruisers. The Japanese Ambassador in Washington had made little progress and waited for the Japanese delegation to arrive for a further attempt to obtain concessions from the Americans. Plenipotentiary Wakatsuki and his team did meet Stimson in Washington but the United States Secretary of State made it clear that if Japan asked for more than the 60% agreed at the Washington Conference, this would creat a very unfavourable impression on the American people.

Wakatsuki responded that Japan was very willing to reduce cruiser and submarine tonnage and agree to making submarine warfare illegal provided America agreed to a 10:7 ratio. Stimson then began talking of the difficulties of defending two coastlines and the great American sacrifices made at the Washington Conference. Thus, not only were the Americans unprepared to discuss in terms of the principle of 'existing strength' which they had laid down at Washington, but they were now actually arguing on the basis of 'national needs', a principle they had rejected outright at Washington. Finally Stimson stated forcibly that, unless the Japanese Navy approved the 10:6 ratio in principle, the United States Navy would be expanded until its goals were reached.<45>

The most important departure from previous conferences was that the ratio's were explicitly stated in the Japanese government's instructions to the Plenipotentiaries and in the instructions to the naval technical advisors. The army had desired further development of Pacific fortifications but its requests had been ignored. Nevertheless, as it was a naval conference the army were quite content to wait and see if the conference offered the chance of reducing naval spending and thus offered the army a larger share of the defence budget.<46> On 26 November the Cabinet approved the instructions and on 28 November the Prime Minister, Hamaguchi and the Chief of the Naval General Staff Admiral Katō Kanji individually reported to the throne and received the Imperial sanction. Takarabe, the Navy Minister had hoped that the Emperor could be inveigled, by means of a Gozen Kaigi (Conference in the Imperial Presence) to bind

the delegates even more strongly to the letter of the instructions, but the genrō Prince Saionji Kimmochi had managed to block this manoeuvre.<47>

The 'Three Fundamental Principles' continually reappear in various naval policy and planning documents from Geneva onward. However, they were not always stated explicitly and the order of priority amongst them kept changing. Initially the most important 'principle' had been the 'overall ratio of 70% in auxiliaries' but the pace of technological change, embodied especially in the newer heavy cruisers, as well as the expansion of the American cruiser programme had necessitated adjustments relegating the 'overall ratio' to third place by the time of the London Conference. These changes were in part a result of the addition of an attrition strategy to that of interceptive operations against an oncoming American fleet crossing the Pacific. This required a full complement of submarines as well as an appropriate ratio of heavy cruisers.<48> The Naval General Staff in 1929 had produced a report on heavy cruisers which indicated that the emergence of this new 'treaty cruiser' with its greater speed, cruising range and firepower could only be cancelled out by ships of the same class and this was a view shared by the British (but not, strangely, by the American) Navy. By the time the London Conference was announced the Japanese Navy had reversed the order of the 'Three Principles' and now felt that the most important element was heavy cruisers and that the ratio must be at least 70%.<49> Concerning submarines the Japanese did not argue in terms of a ratio, that is to say relative strength,

but stressed the need for an overall tonnage decided autonomously. For Japan this meant its existing strength of 78,000 tons. Therefore parity in submarine tonnage at less than 78,000 tons would be regarded as a failure. In June 1929, Navy Minister Okada had asked for autonomy in light cruisers and below, but by the London Conference, Japan was prepared to compromise only on light cruisers and below (excluding submarines). This was in fact an offer to compromise on the one issue which Japanese naval planners had refused to concede at Geneva even when offered 80% in heavy cruisers. In the period between Washington and London some 54 heavy cruisers were in active service worldwide and this class of ship was increasingly regarded as a kind of quasi-capital ship whose only effective adversary was a ship of the same class (or an undetected submarine). Therefore it seems reasonable to assume that the Japanese Navy was altering its priorities as their knowledge of this new class of ship advanced. Moreover, the Japanese were faced with the prospect of the United States constructing 15 more of the latest ships in this class.

Japan was probably confident of obtaining a 70% ratio agreement in heavy cruisers with the United States. Immediately prior to London, Japan's 'existing strength' in heavy cruisers of less than twenty years of age was eight completed and four building. America had only completed one heavy cruiser (Salt Lake City) and was still completing another nine. Thus, according to the definition of 'existing strength', argued so vehemently by the United States delegation at Washington this, meant that Japan had

twelve and America had eleven. By Japan's definition of 'existing strength, i.e. ships built Japan had eight and the United States had one. However the United States had altered the definition of 'existing strength' to incorporate ships authorised and thus added another 15 to their own total. The United States was also claiming that the principle of 10:6 for auxiliaries had been agreed at Washington and that in any case the heavy cruiser was a kind of capital ship and therefore subject to the capital ship ratio. Japan had no further heavy cruisers authorised though she had been seeking Finance Ministry support for a further five. By the new American definition of 'existing strength' Japan had twelve and the United States had 26. Not for the first or last time in international relations Japan found that once she had mastered the rules of the game to her advantage, the Western Powers changed the rules. In this case it was evident to all that America sought not only to 'rule the waves' but to 'waive the rules'! Japan therefore was faced with an enormous task at London since the government had settled on figures which represented the absolute minimum and therefore any compromise would mean an infringement of one of the three principles. In addition the Japanese government had publicly stated these principles at home and abroad so that it would be apparent to all that Japan was being forced to concede if she budged from her pre-conference plans. One further complicating factor was that the 'Three Fundamental Principles' were not of the same value although the public did not know this. Perhaps more importantly they were principles with differing bases; two

principles were based on ratios and one on an absolute amount. On the latter, submarine tonnage, the British invitation to the conference had broached the possibility of a total abolition of submarines (a recurring British pipedream) and the Japanese knew negotiations were going to prove extremely tricky. With the benefit of hindsight, it is perhaps possible to suggest that the biggest single error was for Japan to lay down absolute minimum figures leaving herself with logical and moral arguments in her favour but with almost no flexibility. However, Ramsay MacDonald was in error when he commented on Japan's 'rigidity' on the 'Three Principles'. In reality there was a certain amount of flexibility even in the Naval General Staff's position. The heavy cruiser ratio was the most important and there was no flexibility on the ratio but there was some flexibility in terms of numbers possessed. There was no flexibility on submarine tonnage. But it was recognised by naval planners that sacrifices might have to be made in light cruisers and destroyers.

With this background in mind we can now turn to Katō Kanji's activities immediately prior to the conference.

Katō Kanji's position before the Conference

On 10 October 1928 Katō had ended his tour of duty as Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet, the highest command position afloat. During his two year tour Katō had been a great success.<50> He was next appointed a Supreme Military Councillor, a position he occupied for a little over a month. Then, since Suzuki Kantarō, Chief of the Naval

General Staff had been promoted to the august office of Grand Chamberlain, Kato was appointed his successor on 22 January 1929. There is little doubt that Kato's was a popular appointment within the navy especially amongst Naval General Staff officers. Suzuki had been a former Navy Minister (and Chief of the Naval General Staff) and was of the 'politician/administrator' rather than 'command' type of naval officer, as his new appointment indicated. It was a very proud moment for Fukui since two of its sons, Okada Keisuke and Kato Kanji, now occupied the 'Big Two' positions in the Imperial Navy. It was perhaps further confirmation, if that was still needed, that Satsuma's total dominance of the top echelons of the navy was a thing of the past. The appointment was the highest 'command' position in the navy carrying with it the right of jaku jōsō (direct access to the Emperor).

In July 1929 Takarabe Takeshi was appointed Navy Minister for the third time and took his place in the new Minseito Cabinet of Hamaguchi Osachi. Takarabe and Katō were quite close and it has been suggested that Takarabe had at times helped Katō's career.<51> At the time Takarabe took up his appointment Japan was already making preparations for the coming conference. Immediately after his appointment Katō informed Takarabe that:

> The Empire's basic plan on disarmament is something which was approved by the last cabinet. However the Empire's assertion on 70% overall in auxiliary vessels has a long history. Concerning its realisation, on the extremely important matter of national defence, it is necessary not only to obtain the understanding of the government but to lead public opinion in a unified fashion and to obtain the support of the whole nation for the Empire's position on disarmament. Concerning the

> reasons for acquiring an advantagous position and the accomplishment of the Empire's demands it is necessary to study previous policy.<52>

As mentioned previously, Professor Ikeda sees this statement as evidence that the "Three Fundamental Principles" had not been formulated yet since Katō only referred to the 'overall 70% ratio' but it seems fair to say that Katō probably did not need to state such things in detail since Takarabe had twice previously been Navy Minister and was surely well aware of the situation. What is perhaps more important here is Katō's advocation, yet again, of the need to lead public opinion and thus obtain the nation's support. Mizuno Kotoku, a naval critic writing in Chūō Kōron chided Katō Kanji for his stand on public opinion thus:

> I wonder if Naval Chief of Staff Katō identifies an international conference with a baseball game and believes that other parties will yield to our demands, if only we are backed by a vociferous public opinion ... I fear that the national backing with such a fanfare would make the mood of the conference more tense and the conclusion of an agreement more difficult.<53>

In the years since Washington, a consensus had been developing within the navy and in right wing circles in Japan, that the 'ratio' was unfair. Plenipotentiary Ishii had stated so publicly at Geneva in 1927. Those of Katō's inclination were certainly resentful and Katō publicly and privately, had condemned the 'unfair ratio' as 'irrational', and designed to perpetuate British and American supremacy at sea.<54>

Those in favour of the success of the next conference at almost any price, such as Prince Saionji, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki and Prime Minister Hamaguchi, were aware

that Japan would probably have to make some concessions at the conference. They were most apprehensive lest the likes of Katō utilise the media to create the impression that it would be better to have the conference fail rather than concede on Japan's absolute minimum strength in auxiliaries and especially in heavy cruisers and submarines. The Navy Ministry too were aware that Katō was, in many respects, a potential problem if given too much room to manoeuvre. Rear Admiral Sakonji, who was later to be the Chief Technical Adviser at the London Conference, in late September 1929 warned Prince Saionji's secretary Harada that Kato was, as far as possible, to be prevented from making any announcements on the conference.<55> A survey of the press at this time would appear to indicate that, in this at least, the Navy Ministry were rather successful. However, the navy does seem to have taken Katō's strategy of unifying the press and public opinion as its own prior to the conference. In the months immediately preceding the conference the Navy Ministry, through the Kuroshio (Black Current Society) group of reporters assigned to the Navy Ministry and through meetings with the heads of all the major newspapers, pushed hard for a consensus on the "Three Fundamental Principles". They succeeded in forging one at this time.<56> It is rather interesting to note that whilst Suetsugu Nobumasa was often in attendance at various meetings with newspaper chiefs together with Navy Ministry staff, Katō Kanji was not amongst the names listed. Katō however was active behind the scenes and concentrated his attention on Shidehara Kijūrō, the Foreign Minister and

Prime Minister Hamaguchi.

From September 1929 Katō had been busy with Naval General Staff preparations for the conference and especially the drawing up of draft instructions for the plenipotentiaries and the naval technical advisers. The latter instructions were primarily the responsibility of the Naval General Staff whilst the former were within the Navy Ministry's area of responsibility. Nevertheless, the Naval General Staff's thinking permeated both sets of documents and found its clearest expression in the detailed, explicit instructions on the 'Three Fundamental Principles'. Having obtained acceptance for these 'Principles' in the formal written instructions for the conference, Kato now had three important tasks. First to ensure that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were fully aware of the navy's position and the unacceptabiity of anything less than acceptance by the Anglo-American powers of the full Japanese demands. Second, Katō had to prepare a document explaining the position of the navy to the Emperor and third, to rally supporters of the "Three Principles".

On 11 October Katō visited Foreign Minister Shidehara at his private residence. This appears to support Kato's contention that they had remained on good terms since Washington.<57> According to Katō's recollections of this meeting, he began by expressing his happiness that there had been full accord between the navy and the Foreign Ministry on Japan's negotiating position for the coming conference. He then went on to point out that since he had taken up his new position, he had himself investigated the present

position of the navy regarding national defence and had been shocked by what he had found. Katō pointed out that the Washington agreements and various budget cuts in the Diet had caused a great imbalance in the fleets in auxiliary craft. Katō pointed out that under the present conditions decisive victory and protection of sea lanes could not both be achieved and that both were essential to victory against an oncoming fleet. Therefore the chances of Japan being successful with a navy which was numerically insufficient and unbalanced were a 'very rare possibility". He added that the navy was not like the army. It needed, he said, three to four years to train crews, unlike the army who could simply throw in raw recruits as they did in the Russo-Japanese war. Katō then stated clearly and forcefully his opinions on the China question saying:

> ...it goes without saying that I earnestly hope that we can try and act in concert with the United States. But I think American ambitions regarding ecomomic penetration in this area will never permit a compromise since Japan is an obstacle for them. Therefore the struggle for [economic] rights will become a political problem. I do not think that the posture by diehards on the American side, of clamouring for obtaining a forcible settlement of the China problem by naval power, will nullify this at all.<58>

Katō then stated that "Shidehara Diplomacy" would not be able to cope with this "high pressure stance" on the part of the United States. Katō stated also that he now regretted that "we had played our hand first and left ourselves no scope". He concluded that he hoped it might be possible to obtain acceptance of Japan's demands in the preliminary discussions.

Shidehara responded by saying that he thought that an

agreement on the 70% ratio could be made in the preliminary discussions since the United States and Great Britain had managed to reach agreement in this way. He then added that if Japan could conclude a no-war pact with Australia and New Zealand, this would be all the more advantageous and would cancel out the opposition of the United States and Australia. He then suggested it would be possible to agree on figures of 18:15:12 in heavy cruisers and postpone submarine programmes until 1936 and France would agree to this too.<59>

It is interesting to note that even at this early stage Shidehara was willing to compromise on heavy cruisers and on submarines. On the former he seems willing, by diplomatic measures i.e. a no-war pact, to accept 18:15:12 in heavy cruisers. This meant that Japan would actually have to accept less than 70% against one power, un-named but in this case certainly the United States. The figure 15 was the British negotiating figure and 18 the figure Britain wished the United States would agree to reduce to. Shidehara appeared to be suggesting that Japan should agree not to complete her submarine programme which was due for completion at the end of fiscal 1931.

In mid-November Katō attended Army manouevres and had the opportunity to meet Prime Minister Hamaguchi and explain his views on the coming conference.<60> He began by providing a detailed account of events at the Washington Conference. He brought the Premier's attention to the fact that America had refused to accept that Japan's existing strength had been 70%, that America had refused to consider

the principle of national security or autonomously decided national strength, and had dismissed the five different forms of calculations provided by the Japanese side. He then pointed out that Admiral Hilary Jones had indicated at Washington that it was absolutely necessary for America to reduce the Japanese ratio to 60% or less so that America could bring Japan to its knees over the China problem. Katō then cited Admiral of the Fleet Tōgō's opinions on the matter and the navy's elder statesman had said that "the future of China is the root of evil in the Far East" and that:

> If Japanese strength is not respected then peace in the Far East could not be upheld. Why did America and Britain, at the same time as declaring a no-war treaty and advocating it in the League of Nations, increase fortifications and armaments at Hawaii and Singapore.<61>

Katō then added that these were his own personal opinions on the reasons behind the compromise on 60% at Washington. Nevertheless, he added, they did reveal America's real intentions and the navy shared his opinions and was now struggling to make up for deficiencies caused by the imposition of an inferior ratio. He mentioned especially the relentless drilling and night exercises.<62> Kato saw the present time as the calm before the storm and moreover it was the calm of a preparatory period advantageous to the United States. However, more importantly he went on to add:

> If I am to state my personal opinion it is that even if we have 70% it is insufficient. My reasons for this are that the recent advances in modern vessels and machines have gradually eroded the attrition value of our fleet which was premised on the long distances between west and east. The increased range and activities now possible for

> enemy ships, especially the new 10,000 ton 8" gun cruiser, have reduced this all the more. We are concerned that we can no longer control the activities of enemy cruisers even with a 70% ratio.<63>

Katō concluded that these were good reasons for making 70% the absolute minimum since "the life and death of our navy depended on it and if it were not achieved one might as well scrap the navy...." Katō again quoted Tōgō's words at some length. It is worth bearing in mind that Admiral Tōgō had supported Katō Tomosaburō's compromise plan at Washington over the 5:5:3 ratio in capital ships. Katō cited Tōgō as saying:

> After the agreement on a 60% ratio in capital ships at the Washington Conference there was some anxiety but I agreed to it because we could make up the deficiency by increasing but I was concerned. But, in the present case I cannot agree at all to a reduction in the auxiliary craft ratio to less than 70% as well. At the Washington Conference we had less than the United States and Great Britain in 'existing strength' and because of that I did not know whether or not we could obtain the principle of parity. Today we surpass Britain and America respectably in cruisers. Despite this we have conceded in a spirit of compromise. Since we have declared a 70% ratio as the absolute minimum we must not budge one step from that. If Great Britain and the United States do not go along with us on this we should leave the conference.<64>

Katō fully supported Admiral Tōgō in this and added that unlike Washington, where a rupture of the conference would have rebounded to Japan's disadvantage, the situation was quite different today. By advocating the cessation of construction of capital ships and by reducing the scale of ships e.g. reducing cruisers to 8000 tons, opinion would be on Japan's side and turn against America. He also pointed out that:

> America had completely abolished the principle

> of 'existing strength' which they had advanced at Washington and, from a position which does not even exceed half of Great Britain's strength, now demands parity. For this reason whilst ordering the suspension of British construction, 18 ships as well as 21 of the very latest cruisers are being constructed by them [USA]. The reality is that they are pursuing superiority and this must be the posture of a country which intends to take the responsibility for abolishing the treaty.<65>

Kato's position here had evidently shifted somewhat. He now no longer appeared satisfied even with a 70% ratio. The theme of the China problem runs through both the above discussions and a number of possible reasons may have been responsible for this. The first is that, in a sense, the China problem had always been the real issue over which ratios had been discussed. This was because America needed a sufficiently superior fleet to cross the Pacific and defeat Japan in its own waters. American naval strategic planning saw this as a necessity if the United States intepretation of the 'Open Door' was to be upheld in China. Secondly, in the years 1927-1929, as Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, Katō had firsthand experience of the growing need for command of the seas off China. This was a period when problems increased there, for both Japan and America as a result of Prime Minister Tanaka's "positive" China policy. Katō's view of the unfairness of the ratio system and his concern with the China problem and the inevitable clash over economic interests there with the United States mirrored views held by many on the right wing of Japanese politics. Katō was close to people such as Hiranuma Koichirō, Deputy Chairman of the Privy Council and founder of the Kokuhonsha.<66> In this latter organisation Katō Kanji was a founder member and Tōgō was an

"adviser". Also, Katō increasingly had contacts with Privy Councillor Kaneko Kentarō. For example, his diary records that on 28 November Kaneko sent Katō an article critical of disarmament from the 'National Review' and they met the next day for a discussion. Katō, in turn sent Kaneko a book entitled Beikoku Tōyō Shinshitsu Saku (America's advance policy in the Far East) on 7 December and they met again four days later. On this occasion Katō was gratified that Kaneko's opinions were in complete agreement with his own.<67> Katō was, by now, actively seeking Kaneko's advice on "command" related matters involved in the coming conference instructions to the delegates. Professor Itō Takashi has pointed out perceptively that the increasing politicisation of Katō and Tōgō went against their previous policy of remaining aloof from political activities. He suggested that behind the statements and activities of Katō and Togo lurked the influence of two highly political officers, Suetsugu Nobumasa, Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff and Reserve Admiral Count Ogasawara, Tōgō's secretary.<68> Certainly Katō's diary refers to increased contact with Tōgō via Ogasawara. There is also, for a time pressure from Imperial Prince Admiral Fushimi who, as we shall see later, initially took an extremely hard line on the "Three Fundamental Principles". Navy Minister Takarabe, possibly after urgings from Katō Kanji had attempted to obtain Imperial sanction for the instructions by means of a Gozen Kaigi (Conference in the Imperial Presence) in an attempt to strengthen the position of those in favour of 'no compromise' on the "Three Principles". However this had

been blocked by Prince Saionji.<69> Katō, at this point was not in contact with Prince Saionji but he did speak to his secretary and he did manage to pass information to palace officials.<70>

On 27 November Katō submitted a report to the Throne on command matters relating to the instructions for the Delegates proceeding to London.<71> In this document he stated very clearly to the Emperor that the ratio in overall strength necessary for the security of the Empire was to be at least 70%. He went on to say that the 70% ratio in heavy cruisers and the existing tonnage in submarines at the end of fiscal 1931 were the most important elements in the instructions. Katō pointed out that it might be necessary to make concessions on light cruisers and destroyers in order to secure Japan's aims concerning the "Three Principles". Katō's diary also shows that on 11 December he met the Chief Military Aide-de-camp to the Emperor, General Nara and conveyed his sincere wishes and asked him to pass them on to Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantarō, Katō's predecessor as Chief of the Naval General Staff.<72>

Katō's official position was clear. It was that, as Chief of the Naval General Staff he fully, supported the inviolability of the "Three Fundamental Principles". He does appear to have been willing to compromise to a certain extent on light cruisers and destroyers but as with the other Naval General Staff planners this refers to compromises within the overall ratio of 70% on auxiliaries. As reports of difficulties with the Americans in Tokyo, Washington and London began to reach Katō he clearly became

more anxious. Katō was in contact with cabinet members, members of the Imperial Court and Privy Councilors as well as various politicians. He had already intimated to the Prime Minister that even 70% might not be enough and in the days leading up to the conference his resolve on this appeared to harden. Katō's own thoughts at the time of the preliminary negotiations in London are presented most clearly in correspondence with his friend Sugiyama Akihisa in London. On 9 January, shortly before the conference opened, he wrote:

> For the sake of young Japanese people retreat and submission are strictly prohibited. The independent spirit of man, no matter how low the position and no matter how reduced the cirumstances, is what has made Japan what it is today. It would be better to accept even an inferior strength in proportion to freely decided autonomous national power than a constraint of 70%. In other words rather than have 70% which acknowledges the superiority of Great Britain and America it is better to have a self-determined navy whose size alters according to national power. Therefore, there is some hope that the conference will collapse.... For the above reasons please understand that I am making every effort to prevent the delegates from preserving their own honour and dignity at the cost of the nation's security.<73>

Thus as the conference was about to begin Katō's position was that there was only scope for compromise in light cruisers and destroyers. But in fact, he was now prepared to see the conference collapse rather than make any major concession on the "Three Fundamental Principles". This was a position supported by the Naval General Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Tōgō and Admiral Prince Fushimi. At this time the Navy Ministry too, including Navy Minister and Plenipotentiary Takarabe in London supported this position. Yet although everyone appeared to be supporting the "Three

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Principles" as Japan's minimum strength the underlying assumptions were different. For Kato and others, the Japanese demands meant the absolute minimum that Japan would accept. The Cabinet, the Foreign Ministry and the Imperial Court as well as certain Navy Elders and some officers in the Navy Ministry probably saw it as the maximum Japan could achieve. The latter group therefore expected to have to make some concessions.

The conference opened on 21 January in London and immediately a series of complex negotiations with America and Great Britain, as well as within the Japanese delegation, took place. These events have been treated in detail elsewhere and space precludes describing them in detail here.<74> The discussions in London caused a major political furor in Tokyo, the so-called London Treaty Crisis of 1930. This involved all the major political institutions and at the very centre of the controversy was Katō Kanji. The existing literature has treated the domestic political crisis in great detail mainly from the side of those who fought to save the conference from collapse.<75> The chapters which follow will focus on Katō's struggle first to prevent the original delegate instructions being altered and then to prevent the treaty being signed and ratified.

CHAPTER EIGHT

KATŌ AND THE REED-MATSUDAIRA COMPROMISE

Following the opening of the London Conference on 21 January 1930, there was growing concern in Tokyo over the difficulties being encountered in negotiations, especially between the Japanese and American delegations in London. There was also evidence of a major split within the Japanese delegation between the diplomats and the naval specialists.<1> The naval specialists adhered very strictly to the 'Three Principles" and were opposed to any 'political' or 'diplomatic' solution to cope with the problem of American intransigence. Not surprisingly, since there were a variety of communication channels from London to Tokyo, both official and unofficial, the naval leaders in Tokyo were in touch with developments there. Nevertheless, the decision by the civilian delegates at London, to proceed with negotiations without full discussion with the navy specialists and even without the full knowledge of Plenipotentiary Takarabe, were a clear intimation of the determination of the civilians to reach an agreement. The exclusion of navy men in London from the decisionmaking process relating to an American-Japanese compromise, meant that the only information filtering through to the Navy in Tokyo was rather negative in character. This simply increased the speculation and fears of naval officers in Tokyo who were becoming more anxious lest the 'Three Principles' be the victim of a 'civilian' compromise. A

compromise would cause problems even for navy moderates who would have preferred that Japan's 'minimum' conditions at London be met in full. But for Katō Kanji, who had come to believe that even the fulfillment of the 'Three Principles' was inadequate, intelligence from London indicated that even these minimum demands would not be met. This clearly caused him very great concern which he believed necessitated prompt action.

On 29 January 1930, Katō sent a written opinion on disarmament to Count Makino, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. He explained the American intransigence on the ratio issue as follows:

> For America the most important matters are the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door policy in China. But although only a defensive navy is necessary in order to preserve the Monroe Doctrine an offensive navy is necessary for an Open Door policy in China. This has been the reality of American strategic planning for some years now. They must have sufficient superiority in order to plan an attack across the Pacific and since our calculations are based on 5:5 for success they in turn must have 5:3. Since the United States have decided to impose 60% on us from the outset we must assert 70% all the more. In short, for them disarmament is a kind of peacetime strategy. They, by having 60% achieve the reality of defeating us without war and we by possessing 70% protect the seas around us and avoid the dangers of inducing a war....<2>

Katō recorded on 5 February that Stimson's plan, which had been leaked to the press corps in London: "...rejects the 70% demand of Japan and stands on 60%. As might be expected this will excite public opinion at home".<3> That same day he sent a letter to his old friend Abō Kiyokazu, Chief Naval Adviser to the Plenipotentiaries saying:

> I received your letter of 10 January. Thankyou very much for letting me know precisely the recent situation there [in London].

Amongst knowledgeable people outside the service such as scholars, businessmen neutral politicians, the Privy Council etc, the numbers of those whose attitude to the conference is that it would be better if it collapsed, are increasing. They think that Plenipotentiary Wakatsuki and the like have made clear our righteous and just assertions but have their backs to the wall. If after having done all this they make some compromise it will mean they have failed the American test. Then America increasingly will hold Japan in contempt and on such matters as the Manchurian problem they will adopt a high pressure stance. Therefore it is now understood [by these people in Japan] to be a problem not only for the navy but for our national dignity and honour.

If the conference should rupture over Japan's assertion, which after all is only a matter of 10%, being unacceptable, then not only will the sympathy of the world gather around Japan but also America will fall into an impossible predicament whereby she will be unable to expand her navy afterwards without being shamed by the Kellog-Briand Pact. Even if America were to build a 'top fleet', no matter how many times greater than that of Japan, the country which will fear the threat of such a large American navy will be Great Britain rather than Japan. The consequence of that will be closer relations between Japan and Great Britain and America will become a second Germany.

If Japan refuses to budge one step from her just assertions, if Japan disrupts the conference and adopts an attitude of condemning America for infringement of the spirit of the Kellog Pact then the American puritan faction and peace party will admire the character of Japan and will wish to act in concert with us and keep their imperialists in check. One opinion heard here is that such an eventuality, as the collapse of the conference may look bad but in some ways well turn out for the best. (This is verified by Castle's address enclosed.) The number of people who believe that a compromise will be completely useless to Japan is increasing. However the Government is adopting a 'wait and see' attitude and is absorbed in the election. Firm resolution on their part is not to be seen and their attitude of ingratiating themselves with the people is transparently obvious. But I am in no doubt that if the number of telegrams from London, pointing out the coercion by Britain and America, increases then the government attitude will become more firm and be led by 'public opinion'. Please filter the above domestic political situation to the appropriate people. Please give one of the separate enclosures to Saito Hiroshi.<4>

On 8 February, Kato recorded that the Seiyūkai politician Kumazaki Ryoji and others were running about agitating against this 'Stimson proposal' and sent a telegram to the Naval Adviser Sakonji in London warning him of Ambassador Castle's efforts in 'softening up the Foreign Ministry and Press in Tokyo'. He informed Sakonji of the thinking and serious concern of the Naval General Staff over this blatant refusal by the United States to accept the 'Three Principles".<5>

Then on 12 February, in a second letter to Abō, Katō again expressed his innermost thoughts.<6> He began by telling Abō that he had been interviewed by a Mr Lamont from Associated Press regarding his personal opinion on the navy's position. He said that this was not reported in the papers due to it being unpalatable to Great Britain and the United States but that since Castle knew indirectly he had probably sent telegrams on this. Regarding the Stimson proposal, which had been leaked to the press in London in the first week of February, Katō had this to say:

> Stimson's proposal is understood here to be something which spits in the face of Japan. The Government and ~~the~~ the whole nation are angry and even if America raises the ratio and attempts to achieve a compromise somewhere in-between it looks like she is treating Japan as if she were a travelling salesman and the insult is all the worse because of this. America is standing on her dignity and cannot bear to agree to negotiation. Consequently the negotiations are changed into a struggle to protect the honour of both countries with an absolute value of six or seven. This being the case Stimson's proposal has rendered hopeless a conclusion of the auxiliary ship problem. It is now publicly debated in this way in Japan. Ambassador Castle told some acquaintances that: "Truly, Yes, America will never change 60%, this is the belief of the American people." The situation is such that the collapse of the conference will be most beneficial

> for Japan. I recognise that a firmer attitude is necessary. The above mentioned matters should be understood only by you. Based on this understanding please guide others appropriately.<7>

Then on 16 February, Katō allowed the Seiyūkai politician Kumazaki to pass a telegram carrying Katō's name to Mr Lamont of the Associated Press. It contained a firm rebuttal of the Americans for refusing to accept 70%. Katō noted that when he informed Deputy Navy Minister Yamanashi of this, the latter was very shocked at Katō's actions. However Lamont did not use the telegram much to Katō's annoyance. Katō was increasingly concerned over the attitudes of American negotiators in London and of Ambassador Castle in Tokyo who was receiving supported from the British. Katō's anxiety over their refusal to concede 70% and insist on a compromise must have been greatly intensified by information he received from Privy Councillor Kaneko Kentarō. According to Kaneko, Ambassador Castle had apparently told Shidehara that Admiral Pratt, Chief of Strategic Planning for the United States Navy had stated at a military conference that:

> ...if they permitted 70% in naval strength to the Japanese Navy an air attack on Tokyo by the United States Navy became impossible.<8>

Whether true or not, this information was, for Katō, confirmation of the ulterior motives connected with American naval desires for the 70% and this must have confirmed his worst fears.

For the remainder of February, Japan's civilian delegates were involved in secret negotiations trying to achieve a compromise and save the conference from collapse.

Telegrams from the naval team in London simply increased the tension within the naval leadership in Tokyo but no further major developments ocurred.

On 4 March Katō wrote that Deputy Navy Minister Yamanashi Katsunoshin, had stage-managed an initiative towards compromise within the navy by persuading Admiral Saitō Makoto, Governor General of Korea and Privy Councillor Ishii Kikujirō, former plenipotentiaries at Geneva in 1927, to speak to a gathering of senior staff officers of the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff. At this meeting Admiral Saitō had stated that the 70% assertion was meaningless and this "caused despair to the gathered Ministry/Staff officers".<9> Then, on 10 March Katō noted, "A report has come that plenipotentiary Wakatsuki has given it up as hopeless".<10> Katō immediately convened a meeting of his most trusted subordinates in the Naval General Staff, Vice-Chief Suetsugu Nobumasa and Katō Takayoshi, Chief of the Operations Department. On 12 March Wakatsuki cabled the Foreign Office stating that there was no expectation of success in negotiations.<11>

Then, on 15 March a telegram, containing a compromise proposal within a 'request for instructions', reached government authorities in Tokyo. This was to be known as the 'Reed-Matsudaira Plan' or 'American Plan' and it indicated that Katō and his allies had failed to prevent the delegation in London from opting for a compromise solution rather than rupturing the conference. The centre of the debate now shifted back to Tokyo as Katō and the Naval General Staff initiated determined efforts to prevent the

government accepting such a compromise.

Katō and the 'American' Plan

The telegram from London containing the compromise proposals sparked off a major struggle. On one side was the Naval General Staff and its supporters who were determined to leave the conference rather than compromise. On the other side was a pro-treaty government and its supporters determined to conclude a treaty at all costs. The result was a series of events which threatened to paralyse government operations in Japan, end the life of the Hamaguchi Cabinet and damage the advance towards constitutional government and party politics. At the very centre of the political storm was Katō Kanji. His struggle to reject the thinking contained in this telegram and prevent the signing and ratification of a treaty involved him with all the principal political and bureaucratic bodies which were in any way connected with the London Treaty. These events were to have a grave impact on his future naval and political career.

At 10 am on 15 March, telegram 208 from London arrived at the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, bearing the names of all four Japanese Plenipotentiaries.<13> It was a request for instructions, or to be more precise, a request to the Tokyo authorities to consider amending the original instructions. The communication contained a compromise plan worked out between the American and Japanese civilian delegates. It came to be known as the 'Reed-Matsudaira plan' or 'American-Japanese compromise plan' by pro-treaty forces and

the 'American plan' by staunch supporters of the 'Three Principles'. This telegram and the responses of the government and the navy sparked off a series of political crises, within the navy and within the domestic Japanese political arena, which, although effectively resolved after around six months when the treaty was eventually ratified, were to have far-reaching effects on Japanese domestic and international politics.

The proposal, mainly the work of the Americans, represented the results of a complex series of intensive negotiating sessions. Basically, it presented a series of figures which offered Japan 69.75% in overall tonnage, 60.2% in heavy cruisers [66% if one calculates according to numbers of ships], and 100% or parity in submarines at 52,700 tons. Moreover, it was proposed that America would delay and stagger construction of her last three heavy cruisers so that Japan's ratio in that class would not drop below 70% before 1936 [68%]. Since a new conference was expected to open in 1935 this gave Japan a 'de facto' 70% during the period of the treaty. The telegram suggested that this proposal was evidence of America's recognition of Japan's demands for 70%.<14> Treaty supporters, especially Foreign Minister Shidehara and his staff and Prime Minister Hamaguchi, generally accepted that this proposal gave Japan almost all her demands. Wakatsuki had also made it clear that there was no chance of getting any improvements on this and that any further push by Japan would endanger the success of the conference. Shidehara and Hamaguchi were certainly convinced that this was the case. They therefore

regarded the proposal from London as a final offer, not a new negotiating position.

However, whilst it appeared in many respects to be a reasonable compromise, it did fail to achieve in full any of the 'Three Principles'. In particular the agreement was 'flawed' in two major areas, the heavy cruiser ratio and the total tonnage for submarines. For the navy these rather than the overall ratio were the key elements. The original naval proposals had indicated that, within this overall ratio, there could be flexibility and even sacrifices regarding light cruisers and destroyers. These were the very areas where the Reed-Matsudaira plan permitted 70%. Japanese naval planners had consistently stated that there could be no flexibility on submarines and heavy cruisers. Regarding submarines the fact that Japan could have 'parity' was in fact meaningless, since Japan had sought neither parity nor seventy per cent in this class. She had sought autonomy in submarines as she regarded these ships as 'essential to a weaker power' and had stipulated her existing strength (at end of fiscal 1931) as her absolute minimum. This offer of 100% in submarines at a greatly reduced level, in effect a reduction from 78,000 to 52,700 tons, played havoc with Japan's underwater strategic planning and did not permit Japan to construct another vessel in this class during the life of the treaty. Regarding heavy (treaty) cruisers Japan had eight completed and four almost completed whilst America had one completed, twelve building and five authorised. On the basis of 'existing strength' as worked out by the Americans at

Washington, this meant thirteen for America and twelve for Japan. For many people in Japan, such figures indicated that for America to refuse Japan a 'defensive' 70% ratio, given Japan's existing position, was at best suspect and at worst grossly unfair. Japan was also being asked to virtually stand still in areas of rapid technological change whilst America was building a new fleet incorporating the latest technological advances. Thus a major struggle over whether or not to accept the compromise arrived at in London commenced.

At 1.30pm on 15 March, Foreign Minister Shidehara handed the telegram to the Prime Minister and at 5pm Hamaguchi handed a copy to Deputy Navy Minister Yamanashi and ordered the Navy to study it.<15> Yamanashi then telephoned and sent a telegram to Military Councillor Admiral Okada Keisuke, urging him to return to Tokyo at once. The Deputy Navy Minister then convened a meeting of top level Ministry and Naval General Staff officers and brought with him the copy of the telegram. Present at this meeting were many of the officers involved in the ensuing internal naval struggle over the compromise plan.<16>

These officers were already expecting such a telegram and had met already that day. Admiral Abō had apparently sent a message to Katō Kanji from London on 14 March that such a telegram was imminent. Abō had given his estimation of the contents of the telegram from the plenipotentiaries and this proved quite accurate. Abo's telegram had also stated that, in the event of the collapse of a five nation treaty, a three nation treaty would not improve Japan's

situation. Abō concluded that the civilians in London now appeared to be making policy and that "the situation is fairly serious and understanding this please study this with great care".<17> At this earlier meeting Kobayashi Seizo had suggested that they ought to consider making some concessions. This was vehemently opposed by Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff Suetsugu and a Captain Andō. Katō Kanji ended the heated discussion by saying, firmly, "I expect that there will be an important telegram again today. We will decide our policy in accordance with that telegram."<18> Katō recorded in his diary:

> The Wakatsuki request for instructions has finaly come. 60% in heavy cruisers, 52,000 tons in submarines. I called a conference in my room of top Navy Ministry/Staff officers on this today. Yamanashi, offering a pretext, did not join in the detailed discussions. A rumoured report of naval concessions from the Foreign Ministry's Information Bureau suddenly appeared in the papers.<19>

Then the real struggle, over whether or not to accept the compromise proposal from London, commenced in earnest. It was already clear that Yamanashi was distancing himself somewhat from the Naval General Staff, avoiding committing himself to their intransigent position and enlisting the help of navy elders such as Saitō Makoto and Okada Keisuke. The Naval General Staff also witheld Abō's telegram from London from the Navy Ministry and it did not reach the latter until August 1930.<20) Moreover, Vice-Chief Suetsugu was demanding to see telegrams in Yamanashi's possession. At this time the navy was still outwardly united but an internal split was developing. Moreover Katō's diary entry shows that the Foreign Ministry were utilising the press to

enhance public acceptability of a compromise. The Foreign Ministry's tactical assault, via the press, against the navy 'hardliners' position was as follows:

> Wouldn't it be best for the conference to settle the issues even if the 70% were reduced somewhat. At a conference you always deal with an opposite number, and you must first make some mutual concessions in order to come to an agreement.<21>

This naturally incensed Katō and others of like mind and confirmed their worst fears. They now suspected that Premier Hamaguchi and Foreign Minister Shidehara would make concessions and even sacrifice the principles embodied in the original instructions. Katō and his supporters clearly believed that the 'Three Principles' was their minumum demand and regarded the compromise proposal as a negotiating ploy. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister obviously regarded the 'Three Principles' as the maximum Japan could achieve and the compromise plan as the final offer. The major question now was who had the power to decide and who would advise or arbitrate among competing authorities.

One American historian of the London Conference stated:

> The size and composition of the armed forces constitute a political problem that rests with the government, not an exclusively technical problem to be decided by the professional expert.<22>

Unfortunately, in prewar Japan, such matters were not susceptible to so simple an analysis. Perhaps at this time the institutional framework, in which debate and decisionmaking had to take place, would help clarify matters. This will also be an aid to understanding the

polarisation of personnel in Tokyo. Regarding the latter a major split emerged, partially along organisational lines, between those prepared to compromise, the so-called Jōyaku-ha (Treaty Faction) and those determined to hold firm even at the expense of the conference failing, the so-called Kantai-ha (Fleet Faction).<23>

Under the Meiji Constitution all power resided in the Emperor but, in practice, at this time the Emperor operated in many respects like a constitutional monarch. In other words he acted on the advice of his constitutional advisers and extra-constitutional bodies such as the Genrō [Prince Saionji] and the Privy Council as well as senior Imperial Household officials. Constitutionally the imperial prerogative on treaty-making was exercised by the Emperor on the advice of his cabinet ministers. Since treaty matters involved dealings with foreign states the Foreign Ministry had a major role in negotiating and drafting such treaties. The role of the Cabinet and the Foreign Ministry in this area had been, to some extent, reduced by the creation of the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs and the latter body had in fact taken an active role in the negotiations, conclusion and ratification of the Washington Treaties. It was abolished in 1922 thus seemingly leaving the power almost exclusively with the cabinet.

Minobe Tatsukichi, whose constitutional interpretations provided much of the theoretical underpinnings of the government's pro-treaty forces:

> ...asserted it appertained exclusively to the political organs (i.e. the cabinet) to assume full responsibility for exercising the imperial prerogative to conclude treaties.<24>

But negotiations on this particular treaty involved decisions relating to (naval) armaments. Such a treaty would directly affect the size i.e. amount of strength of the navy . This 'strength' fell under the Emperor's Imperial prerogative of henseiken/gunsei (military administration) under Article 12 of the constitution. This was by tradition, exercised on behalf of the Emperor, by the Navy Minister but who was to exercise it at this time? Was it the Navy Minister, Takarabe now in London or the Prime Minister in his dual capacity as Navy Minister pro-tem? Whichever of these two actually had the power to advise, the Navy Ministry acted as if it was the naval body ultimately responsible (within the Navy) for advising the Emperor until the instructions were revised on 1 April 1930.

Two other military bodies were empowered to advise the Emperor on matters relating to military affairs. These were the gensuifu (Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshalls) and the gunjisangikankaigi (Supreme or High Military Council). The former, although seldom askd to perform anything other than honorific functions, had been involved in the ratification of the Washington Treaties. But since the London Treaty issue only concerned the Navy and moreover since there was now only one navy gensui, Admiral of the Fleet Tōgō (who was implacably opposed to any compromise on the 'Three Fundamental Principles'), it seemed unlikely that an Imperial Inquiry would be passed to this body regarding revision of the original instructions.

The more important of the two bodies in practice, and certainly during the London Treaty deliberations, was the

Supreme Military Council (both in unofficial gatherings and official meetings) often described as the highest military advisory body to the Emperor on military affairs. On this body sat the gensui, the service ministers, the respective Chiefs of Staff as well as other flag rank officers appointed by the Emperor. This organisation's regulations permitted naval officers alone to meet on navy matters and since Togo was automatically a member as well as being Chairman (the senior officer) it was in effect a combination of the Board and the Supreme Military Council. This explains repeated references in the literature to a gensuisangikan kaigi. Katō believed this to be an appropriate body to sit in judgement on 'revised instructions' and advocated its convening on a number of occasions before and after signing of the treaty and before ratification. This body convened formally only in response to an imperial inquiry from the Emperor. Whenever such a possibility arose, there were always 'unofficial meetings prior to the proper kaigi these are perhaps best translated as 'gatherings'.

There were still further complications in that the fixing of precise ship tonnages and ratios by a treaty strictly controlled and limited the number and variety of ships that Japan could put to sea. This naturally had a major impact on naval strategy and the revised (1923) Imperial National Defence Plans especially the "Requisite Strength for National Defence" and the "Outline of Strategy for National Defence". In addition it affected the "Annual Fiscal Strategic Plans". All of these were principal duties

of the respective Army and Naval General Staffs, individually in the case of their own services and collectively in the case of overall strategy. Such matters belonged to the imperial prerogative of tōsui taiken/gunrei (Military Command) under Article 11 of the constitution and advice was given by the General Staffs.

There was considerable debate as to whether, in the navy's case, the Navy Minister traditionally had rights under Article 11 as well as Article 12 of the constitution.<25> Such an interpretation was favoured by the pro-treaty forces in Japan at this time but there were clearly other, conflicting, interpretations. Those opposed to such an interpretation could also cite constitutional 'chapter and verse' in support of their own case. In Japan a matter such as a naval arms limitation treaty was not really susceptible to any simple, straightforward interpretation. The ultimate power lay with the Emperor but his advisers seldom permitted the Imperial Institution to be directly involved in political debates of this kind.

As noted previously Admirals Okada Keisuke, Saitō Makoto and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantarō, all navy elders, had frequently tried to moderate the hardline posture of Katō and his subordinates in the Naval General Staff and elsewhere in the navy. These three men, all noted for their political experience, flexibility and ambition were part of the grand strategy adopted by Hamaguchi and the Genrō Prince Saionji in pursuit of a successful conference. Prince Saionji in particular had ensured that those surrounding the throne, namely the Lord Keeper of the

Privy Seal Makino and Grand Chambelain Suzuki, were active in support of accepting the compromise.<26> Within the navy itself, Kobayashi Seizo, Hori Teikichi and Nomura Kichisaburo all assisted moderate, mild mannered Yamanashi in pursuit of a solution acceptable to the navy, the government and the Americans. At this early stage, however navy moderates were still attempting to pursue an appropriate means of achieving most of the 'Three Principles'. This configuration of forces came to be known as the Jōyakuha (Treaty Faction).

Katō and others of like mind, who were determined to secede from the conference over failure to achieve the 'Three Principles', had to contend with this truly formidable array of forces. Admiral of the Fleet Togo and Admiral Prince Fushimi, both Supreme Military Council members, were completely behind Katō and Privy Councillors Hiranuma and Kaneko Kentarō in particular were also key supporters. The naval officers here however, were primarily concerned with the 'Three Principles' whereas Katō's civilian supporters, right wing elements in the Privy Council and the Seiyukai were rather more concerned with ending Shidehara's softline approach in China or, and in some ways it was the same thing, bringing down the Minseito cabinet.

On 16 March Admiral Okada arrived back in Tokyo. Undoubtedly this was welcome news for Deputy Navy Minister Yamanashi, since he was clearly having great difficulty keeping Katō and his group in check let alone persuading them to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. Okada, a member

of the Supreme Military Council, had been Navy Minister in the previous government and had dealt briefly with Katō when the latter was first appointed to his present position. They had been successive Commanders-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet and both came from the same village in Fukui. Okada was already known to be strongly in favour of obtaining an agreement at London and he was also determined to try and avoid a head-on collision between the navy and the government. Thus, in the absence of Navy Minister Takarabe, he was clearly a great asset to Yamanashi, the cabinet and Prince Saionji.

Katō visited Rear-Admiral Kobayashi Seizo, at the latter's office on 16 March and spoke of Kobayashi's comments in the previous day's meeting concerning the need to compromise. He told Kobayashi:

> Your opinion is reasonable and if it had been said at the beginning that would have been alright. But we cannot make any changes now. There will be no problem. If we stick firmly to our original assertions, then they will be accepted. Please do not express your opinions for a while.<27>

Kobayashi reassured Katō that his opinions had been for internal research purposes only and Katō then left. Katō then visited Okada who recorded the meeting thus:

> 4pm Kato came. he said concerning the request for instructions from the plenipotentiaries, we can try and make up for the 60,000 tons in submarines by aircraft. Even so the Kansei Honbu will have difficulty in maintaining its ship construction skills and it also presents difficulties from the deployment aspect. I am not sure yet but it may have to be as it is in the instructions. It is difficult to compromise on 8" cruisers and submarines and we must push once more'. I [Okada] too agreed with this.<28>

In these discussions with two key figures in the

pro-treaty camp, Kobayashi and Okada, Katō does not appear, or at least wishes not to appear to be, rigidly inflexible at this time. Katō next paid a visit to Admiral Tōgō and afterwards wrote a detailed memorandum on the discussion. Tōgō stated his opinions as follows:

> In short, on this matter of 70%, if we are taking the attitude that if they [our demands] are not satisfied then national security is endangered, such a negotiation over 1 or 2% is meaningless. If our assertions are not accepted there is nothing but to firmly [resolve to] leave. Tell Hamaguchi and Shidehara this is my firm wish. What are Shidehara's inner thoughts? Civilian officials in general are prone not to worry about long term matters but are likely to settle loosely for short term immediate concerns.<29>

Katō wrote in red on this document

> Transmitted this to them. Even if our assertions are not accepted and even though it ends in non-agreement I think it must be a good thing for the country.<30>

A number of writers including contemporaries such as Harada and Hamaguchi have noted how Katō appeared more moderate in the absence of Suetsugu and more hardline on the latter's return. Suetsugu's influence on Katō, considerable as it was, did not begin to compare with that of Admiral of the Fleet Tōgō's influence on him. Thus Tōgō's words must have greatly bolstered Katō's resolve to fight on against the 'American plan' even at the risk of rupturing the conference and persuaded him away from a more conciliatory approach. Finally, on that day Katō noted "Saitō [Makoto]'s weak argument appears in the paper. It is greatly damaging.<31> Admiral Saitō was by now openly supporting concessions over the ratios and acceptance of the 'Japanese-American Compromise plan'. Already, in the 48

hours since the arrival of the telegram from London, the opposing battlelines were forming for all to see.

On 17 March Katō's Vice-Chief Suetsugu sparked off a considerable furor in Japan and abroad by releasing to the press the so-called 'Admiralty Statement'.<32> He had given it personally to the Rengō News Agency and The Times reported it on 18 and 19 March. In brief the 'statement' indicated that Japan was still adhering to two of the three original demands, namely the 70% ratio in heavy cruisers and the 78,000 tons in submarines. Suetsugu's statement was issued without the knowledge of the Navy Ministry and Cabinet much less their approval and greatly angered Prime Minister Hamaguchi who personally reprimanded him and later ordered Katō to discipline him.<33> It is not clear whether Suetsugu was acting on the instructions of Katō although, since Katō had 'shocked' Yamanashi in permitting his opinions to be passed to a news agency earlier, it does seem unlikely. It is possible that Katō had prior knowledge but, in fact, as Takeuchi indicates, Suetsugu appears to have been the Naval General Staff representative in navy meetings with the press prior to the opening of the London Conference.<34> It seems quite feasible that Suetsugu was acting entirely on his own and had disregarded the normal established method of passing everything through the Navy Ministry.

Whether Katō knew of it or not, it did reflect accurately the Naval General Staff position. The Prime Minister and others of like mind perceived it as part of a Naval General Staff offensive against the compromise plan.

British and American embassy staff in Tokyo were quick to assign significance to the fact that the 'statement' referred to an 'American plan'.<35> However, Harada Kumao perceptively noted that it was a response to the initiative taken by the Foreign Ministry's Information Bureau on 15 March. He noted:

> In effect then the navy's statement was a riposte to the foreign ministry; and in part there was direct allusion to these remarks: "at this time of grave crisis for such a statement to be made, for so plaintive a plea to be heard is bad enough. From the foreign ministry, it is utterly inexcusable, impudent and imprudent".<36>

These were strong words indeed and, whatever the provocation, Hamaguchi was very angry indeed with Suetsugu. On the same day Katō wired Takarabe in London that the compromise plan was an:

> ...attempt to recognise Japan's overall 70% ratio vis-a-vis America by a crafty policy which tries to deny Japan's fundamental demands on heavy cruisers and submarines. As to its content, it still tries to impose their demands on us. It is recognised that there can be no scope at all for consideration [of the Reed-Matsudaira plan].<37>

To make the point even more forcefully Katō also included a report of his meeting the previous day with Tōgō. He especially emphasised Tōgō's dissatisfaction with the conciliatory attitude of the Foreign Ministry.

During all of this ,Yamanashi was involved in extensive discussions with Okada over the request for instructions from London. Yamanashi asked Okada's advice on how to proceed and Okada replied:

> In a case where there is no other alternative, we have, in the final analysis, no other course than to swallow it whole. Moreover, if the naval strength possessed is to be at this level there must be some way to carry out national defence effectively. We must not cause the conference to

> collapse but we must push again at least once or twice more. Also I feel that at this time we need to ask, by telegram, for the opinion of the Navy Minister.<38>

At this point Okada clearly belongs to the group who wished to avoid the failure of the conference. But he does not yet appear to have accepted the compromise plan from London as the final proposal. On the other hand Hamaguchi, Shidehara and the civilian delegates in London saw no scope for further negotiation. At this time no one was sure of what the Navy Minister in London was thinking. It was not yet widely known that Takarabe was unhappy with the proposals but it was known that he had not been kept fully advised on negotiations by his civilian co-plenipotentiaries. Yet his name was on the Wakatsuki cable from London, despite his misgivings which emerged later.

On 19 March Katō noted in his diary:

> Naval General Staff resentment is reaching an extreme and we must quickly prepare a rebuttal [to the compromise plan]. I requested an interview with Hamaguchi. I told him that as the person responsible for strategic or operational planning of national defence I could not agree to accept the American plan at all.<39>

Aoki, working from official [cabinet] papers stated Katō's comments a little differently:

> In investigating the amount of strength in the American proposal, as the person responsible for strategic plans for national defence, it is impossible for me to accept the American plan unless there are, in addition, some improved conditions for national security.<40>

Hamaguchi's diary however seems rather closer to the Kato version namely:

> On the request of Katō Kanji, Chief of the Naval General Staff, I met him at my official

> residence. I listened to his opinion on the request for instructions. He holds the opinion that we should maintain the 'Three Principles'. Exceedingly unbending, promised to meet again.<41>

In the Aoki version Katō seems to offer (or appear to offer) hope of a compromise if the American's would alter some of the conditions. This is possibly correct and "unbending" in the Hamaguchi diary therefore applies to 'standing firm' and 'pushing again' for an improved offer. Hamaguchi was, of course, very loathe to do this or to be more correct had no intention of permitting this. Alternatively it may reflect Aoki's use of Hamaguchi's notes, prepared at a later date, for the Diet and Privy Council where he was to argue that Katō had not been in disagreement.

Around this time Harada noted Katō's comment that "the present American compromise plan offers us crumbs and tells us to like them. This is extremely high handed."<42> Katō then related to Harada his conversation with the German Ambassador Ernst A Voretzsch. The German had passed on information that the French Ambassador had heard something interesting from the United States Naval Attache. It was that before the conference America had regarded Japan's claims as "simply bluster"

> ...but now since both (y)our public opinion and the navy are quite unyeilding it [America] has become more troubled. If this is so, and if you pushed your demands a little further you might get surprisingly good results.<43>

Katō was obviously much pleased with this conversation and Harada, in a rather disparaging way, alluded to the 'simple' nature of Katō in being taken in by this and subsequently inviting the German Ambassador to dinner.

Katō, of course had repeatedly emphasised the need to have public opinion behind the Japanese team and unity at home, a lesson he felt should have been learned at Washington.

Meanwhile, on 19 March, Katō ordered his staff to prepare a counterproposal. This Naval General Staff position paper was passed to Hori at the Navy Ministry on 20 March.<44> Yamanashi, at 8.30am that same day, had been meeting with Okada. He informed Okada that Shidehara did not wish Yamanashi to sound out Takarabe for his views. He added that there was a considerable gap between the Chief of the Naval General Staff and the Foreign Minister and urged Okada to speak confidentially to Shidehara and Okada accepted.<45> Okada met Shidehara and Harada relates the meeting in this way:

> "Admiral Okada was called to the Foreign Minister's office. Shidehara put it to him point blank "Should negotiations be broken off if there is any change from the 70% ratio or should they be concluded even if that ratio is reduced somewhat?" Without hesitation Okada replied "By all means come to an agreement even if its 60% or 55." Well then, won't you do your best to bring about agreement within the navy on this issue?" Admiral Okada then said, "I'll not be able to check the Chief of the Naval General Staff by myself; but I'll do what I can together with Governor General Saitō.<46>

Okada's version of this meeting at Shidehara's office was as follows:

> 1.30 pm Shidehara came [Okada was waiting at the Foreign Ministry]. Showed me the text of the 'request for instructions'. He emphasised it had all four names on it and also said that Wakatsuki's words were "regarding our efforts on this, it is difficult for us to to do more" and, that for the Government to ask them to push again, is difficult.<47>

Okada responded:

> In the final analysis it is probably inevitable but it is absolutely necessary to have 70% of the United States in heavy cruisers and again 52,000 tons in submarines makes deployment difficult. When I said this Shidehara said "I will conceive a plan which will alleviate this to some extent. If we can we will make up deficiencies of national defence by aircraft and other vessels not subject to limitation." Finally its probably inevitable. But the opinion of the present Chief of the Naval General Staff is really quite at odds with this plan. They say it is like asking them to jump off the edge of a precipice. We must plan a way of climbing down from that precipice.<48>

Okada then asked Shidehara to allow Yamanashi to clarify what Takarabe's real thoughts were and promised to keep the meeting a secret. Since Okada makes no note of Shidehara summoning him the meeting had to be the one 'arranged' by Yamanashi after he had asked Okada to speak to the Foreign Minister. What is of much greater importance is Okada's own version of events. Okada was, according to his own writings, completely committed to a successful conference. But Harada makes out as if Okada did not really consider the ratios important at all. At this point in time Okada appears less a 'traitor' to the navy 'hardliners', someone willing to throw away the 'Three Principles'. Rather he appears to be supporting Katō. Namely he was pressing as hard as possible for the ratio at least in heavy cruisers. Harada did note that Okada had said he would have to 'don the mask of the diehards'.<49> Therefore whenever he speaks in the company of for example Katō, his words must always be, to some extent, suspect. But this is surely not the case when he is talking to Shidehara, a fellow member of the pro-treaty camp.

Katō received some encouragement, on 21 March, when Admiral Count Yamamoto Gonnohyoe spoke to him at a palace

function. Katō wrote:

> Yamamato made a special point of speaking to me. He recalled an example from the time of the negotiations over the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and urged a final insistence. I am encouraged very much.<50>

Yamamoto was a former superior of Katō's in the navy and had appointed the young Katō as his aide during the Russo-Japanese war and taken him on his mission to England to negotiate military aspects of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. He was also a former Navy Minister and Prime Minister and, at this particular time, was being proposed as a possible replacement for Genrō Prince Saionji on the latter's demise.<51> He was also, interestingly, Navy Minister Takarabe's father-in-law and Yamamoto's daughter was with the London delegation. Having Yamamoto on one's side would have helped Katō greatly but Yamamoto told Vice-Minister Yoshida of the Foreign Ministry on 23 March:

> Of course the matter must be settled. Though some may advocate a 70% ratio there are the views of other parties to consider and there must be some initial concessions made.<52>

The phrasing here seems vaguely reminiscent of the Foreign Ministry statement of 15 March. Katō had thus gained and then quickly lost a good ally. The pro-treaty forces approached Yamamoto later to try and mollify Admiral Tōgō but the Count refused.

By 20 March, the Naval General Staff had produced their response to the 'American plan' and had passed it to Rear-Admiral Hori Teikichi of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry. It was entitled "Countermeasures relating to the (Plenipotentiaries) request for instructions to the government" and stated:

JAPANESE NAVAL GENERAL STAFF POSITION PAPER

Dates 25/11/29.

Plan 1:	Japan	America
Heavy Cruisers	108,400 (12)	150,000 (15)
Light Cruisers	81,200 (14)	152,000
Destroyers	104,000 (80)	150,000
Submarines	79,000 (62)	79,000

Plan 2:

Heavy Cruisers	126,000 (13/14)	180,000 (18)
Light Cruisers	72,150 (12)	135,500
Destroyers	104,000 (80)	150,000
Submarines	79,000 (62)	79,000

Plan 3: Almost the same as above but if USA had 21 heavy cruisers.

Heavy Cruisers	147,000 (15/16)	210,000 (21)
Light Cruisers	31,150 (10)	105,500 (15)

Since all the the new cruisers the USA was building were 8" (treaty) cruisers, the tonnage remains constant at 10,000 tons for American calculations. Japan and Great Britain had some cruisers of less than 10,000 tons but classified these as heavy cruisers.

MATSUDAIRA-REED COMPROMISE PLAN

13/3/30 sent 14/3/30

	Japan	America	GB
Heavy Cr.	108,400 (12)	180,000 (18)	146,800 (15)
Light Cr.	100,450	143,500	192,200
Destroyer	105,500	150,000	150,000
Submarine	52,700	52,700	52,700
Totals	367,050	526,200	541,700

This gave Japan an overall ratio vis-a-vis the USA of 69.75, in heavy cruisers 60.2, (in ships 66.6). The ratio in submarines was 100. But in submarines Japan was not seeking a ratio but 'existing strength' and these figures greatly reduced that existing strength.

Taken from: Rengo Kantai (1), pp.224-226 and Kaigun Gunsenbi (1), pp.377-378.

NAVAL GENERAL STAFF COUNTERPROPOSAL

Naval General Staff Counterproposal to above Reed-Matsudaira proposal passed to Navy Ministry (20/3/30) and then to Foreign Ministry (and 'pigeonholed').

Heavy Cruisers	126,000 (14 ships)
Light Cruisers	72,000
Destroyers	104,000
Submarines	77,842
Total	379,842

Ratios Overall - 70.5 Heavy cruisers - 70

The tonnage figure here for submarines was the 'existing strength' in Fiscal 1931.
Interestingly however here Japan includes submarine figures in overall tonnage whereas originally the overall ratio applied to SURFACE vessels (according to Kaigun Gunsenbi (1)). If one calculates using only surface vessels then overall ratio is 63.8 and therefore does sacrifice one of the original 'Three Principles'.

> that the American plan, even though skilfully dressed up externally as a compromise, in content shows they are trying to impose the assertions of their own country....<53>

The Naval General Staff's main proposals were:

> 1. To transfer 17,600 tons of the 205,950 tons in light cruisers to heavy cruisers.
>
> 2. That if America builds a 16th heavy cruiser Japan utilising the transfer method, will build her 13th. If America builds an 18th then Japan will complete her 14th.
>
> 3. To make Japan's submarine tonnage 65,500 tons by transferring 12,250 tons from light cruisers and destroyers.
>
> 4. In the event that transfer to submarines is not acceptable, on the condition that submarines of 870 tons and below are excluded from the treaty figures, Japan will reduce existing tonnage to 72,000 tons.<54>

By 22 March Rear Admiral Hori and his staff had examined the Naval General Staff proposals and synthesised the various naval views. Then, in what was to be the final naval draft, the following assertions were made:

> By the American proposal one of the three fundamental demands is almost realised. But regarding heavy cruisers and submarines it is regrettable that these levels are a long way from what we would wish. Consequently we estimate that this makes us fear they wish to permanently restrict our country. It is not possible to give our assent easily. The delegates must push at least once or twice more....<55>

The most important elements in the plan (tables opposite) were:

> 1. On the basis of the American proposal of 5 February, America to have 15 heavy cruisers and to transfer 30,000 tons from light cruisers to obtain this.
>
> 2. On submarines and destroyers Japan will compromise as follows:
>
> a) Amount possessed in submarines to be [reduced to] 65,500.
>
> b) Transfer 12,800 tons from destroyers leaving 92,700 tons.

3. To recognise the method of transferring between auxiliary classes to a maximum of 20%, in accordance with the Gibson proposal in the sixth session of the League of Nation's Disarmament Commission.

4. To recognise America's right to superiority in heavy cruisers. Consequently Japan will only transfer tonnage after America does so.<56>

Katō had noted in his diary for that day:

> sent counterproposals to the Foreign Ministry based on the Gibson plan. Met Kaneko Kentaro ... Kaneko feels (Ambassador) Castle's confidence in agreement to the American plan is a result of meetings with Shidehara.<57>

Both the Naval General Staff draft, and the Hori draft which superceded it had made clear that the navy still wished to achieve or at least move much closer to achieving two of the three principles, those on heavy cruisers and submarines. But most importantly it was a compromise and showed that the navy were prepared to make some concessions, however minor. The Foreign Ministry had incorporated the navy's proposals, almost verbatim, in the original instructions to the delegation. Thus the navy was probably reasonably confident that its 'compromise proposal' would receive very careful consideration at least. However Foreign Minister Shidehara and his staff were already drafting their own response which was later to become known as the 'Foreign Ministry Plan' or 'Government Plan'. The Foreign Ministry believed ultimately that the matter would be settled "once Katō and his circle calm down from their excited state". Shidehara, in cooperation with the Premier had been furiously working on a response since 14 March. He was coming under increased pressure from the overseas diplomatic corps in Tokyo. On 17 March, the French Deputy

Ambassador asked Shidehara to hold firm on submarines against the British and Americans. On 18 March, the British Ambassador informed Shidehara that there was no scope for anything other than the Reed-Matsudaira compromise plan. That same afternoon the American Ambassador met Deputy Foreign Minister Yoshida and explained that if Japan supported the French hard-line assertion on submarines then Japan would be blamed for the collapse of the conference. There were numerous telegrams from British and American politicians in London direct to Shidehara and Hamaguchi, which applied pressure if not threats, although these were later denied.<58> The message was abundantly clear, Japan was being strongly advised not to 'push again' but instead accept the 'compromise proposals' reached in London. Shidehara was in no doubt what the correct decision was to be and as he wrote later:

> There is no way but to do it without thinking. If I listen to the explanation from the navy people a decision cannot be reached at all.<59>

The Foreign Ministry never responded to the navy's draft response and Shidehara instructed his team not to liase with the navy, not even the Navy Ministry. Professor Ikeda has pointed out that this move showed Shidehara as lacking in political sense since it needlessly antagonised the navy further.<60>

The navy of course were unaware of Shidehara's decision at the time. Katō was busy trying to arrange a 'gathering' of Supreme Military Councillors to approve the navy counterproposals. Deputy Navy Minister Yamanashi told Admiral Okada that he wished to avoid this but that he might

have to accede to the wishes of the Chief of the Naval General Staff. He told Okada that, though he had spoken already to Katō, he would like Okada to do the same. Yamanashi wanted the meeting to be restricted to background and progress reports.<61>

Meanwhile Suetsugu, Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff, had attempted once again to obtain press coverage for the 'admiralty' position but this time only a few papers carried it.<62> It did nevertheless incense Hamaguchi further and made him all the more determined to discipline Suetsugu.

At 8.30am on 23 March Okada called on Katō at his home. He asked Kato how they should proceed and Katō answered:

> I will explain our deployment to the Lord Privy Seal and proceed to explain the unsuitability of the American plan. But if there are points to be improved in my note I shall wait for Suetsugu.<63>

Okada advised Katō that it would be better to wait so as to leave scope for the future and that the Supreme Military Councillors gathering should go no further than progress reports. Katō agreed with the latter proposal saying that this was also the wish of Yamanashi. This meeting was, of course, an unofficial meeting of the Supreme Military Council since it required an 'imperial inquiry' to convene one officially. Okada then went to see Admiral Prince Fushimi and recorded the meeting as follows:

> I said there will be a gathering of the Supreme Military Councillors tomorrow. But because I think it is difficult to state what is in the mind of the Navy Minister [Takarabe] at this time we will only receive progress reports.<64>

Prince Fushimi replied:

> Takarabe's mind is clear. Before he left he twice told me "I will not budge one step from the Three Principles". It is not necessary to ask what is in the mind of the Navy Minister.<65>

Fushimi went on to criticise Shidehara's weak diplomacy and Okada responded by emphasising how necessary it was to avoid a clash between the navy and the government. Prince Fushimi then spoke firmly saying:

> If we retreat one step, then there is no hope for the future of the nation. If it becomes critical I have made up my mind to ask to see the Emperor and I shall tell him the same.<66>

Previous to this, Shidehara had objected to Yamanashi trying to contact Takarabe to find out his innermost thoughts on the negotiations. Shidehara had made a point of emphasising in his discussions with Okada that all four plenipotentiaries had put their names to the telegram. Prince Fushimi now apparently did not wish Takarabe to be given the chance to 'renege' and alter his position prior to departure.

That evening Okada visited Admiral Tōgō who informed him that he was greatly dissatisfied with the 'request for instructions' communication from London.<67> After that Okada met Rear Admiral Nomura Kichisaburō and Deputy Navy Minister Yamanashi to discuss their next steps. At this point both Prince Fushimi and Admiral of the Fleet Tōgō were completely behind Katō and the Naval General Staff's rejection of the 'American plan'.

Takarabe's position was much more difficult to ascertain. Vice-Admiral Sakonji wired Yamanashi from London and summarised the Navy Minister's thinking.<68> According to Sakonji, Takarabe had agreed it was difficult to agree to

the compromise plan and he hoped that the navy would devise an interim plan and negotiate further. But he was in a difficult position since he was a Plenipotentiary and Navy Minister.

On the same day Katō met Lord Privy Seal Makino and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki and stressed his non-agreement to the American compromise plan stating that acceptance was 'very dangerous'. They apparently made no comment.<69> Kato then sent a member of his staff to consult with Privy Councillor Kaneko Kentarō on "further details". These details were not recorded but probably related to Castle-Shidehara discussions.

On 24 March the naval members of the Supreme Military Council met to discuss the navy's plan [the Hori plan] which had been drafted in response to Hamaguchi's order to Yamanashi on 15 March. This navy response had been passed to the Foreign Ministry on 22 March.<70> Present at the meeting were Tōgō, Fushimi, Okada, Katō and Yamanashi. Katō spoke first giving a progress report and stating his opinions. Then Yamanashi explained the navy's draft reply which had been passed to the Foreign Ministry on 22 March. At this point Fushimi asked what Japan's position would be if the conference collapsed and "Katō replied lightheartedly that that was not a thing to be anxious about".<71> Okada, after the formal discussion had ended stressed the difficult position the cabinet was in. He said that if the Cabinet did not show flexibility the conference would collapse. He also emphasised the need to avoid the serious repercussions of a navy-government clash. That evening Okada had a three

hour discussion with Grand Chamberlain Suzuki.<72>

On 24 March another telegram from Vice Admiral Sakonji arrived from London. It contained further details of Takarabe's thinking on the Japanese-American plan.<73> According to Sakonji, Takarabe's thinking could be summarised as follows; that it was entirely impossible to agree to the American proposal as it stood; that he thought a final, temporary compromise, acceptable to Japan, could be reached for a limited period; that if the government did not use the navy compromise plan or accepted the plan reached in London, this would result in serious confusion and that was what he was most worried about. Katō, Okada, Suetsugu and Hori now met with Yamanashi at the Navy Minister's residence to discuss this latest development.

On 25 March a telegram arrived in Tokyo from Takarabe.<74> Takarabe's own telegram, addressed to Yamanashi confirmed Sakonji's assumptions but in a clearer and more positive fashion. In this communication Takarabe expressed clearly his wish that a temporary compromise be put forward by the navy as a final proposal; that consequently the government must include in the instructions, the limits to any compromise and that a final resolution be shown in the instructions. Okada noted that Takarabe had said, "dissatisfied with the American plan however as a plenipotentiary attached my signature, hoping for the occurrence of a new situation." He then noted that Yamanashi discussed the possibility of an interim plan but no conclusion was reached. Katō noted in his diary that Takarabe did not accept that the Wakatsuki request for

instructions was final and that the American-Japanese compromise plan was not a compromise.<75>

After the meeting, Yamanashi went to see the Prime Minister and told him that the navy found it impossible to accept the 'American plan' as it stood. Hamaguchi responded that the government earnestly desired the success of the conference and that if it collapsed it would be very difficult indeed for his administration.<76> According to Professor Ikeda's account, Hamaguchi then urged the navy to reconsider. However, Katō's diary states "as for the above Hamaguchi says he'll reconsider but its only words".<77> One point to note here is that a Navy Ministry official was referring to the 'American plan' not just the Naval General Staff. Much has been made of the fact that Katō and Suetsugu continually tried to have the Reed-Matsudaira plan labelled an 'American plan'. One would perhaps expect Sakonji to use the term but Takarabe himself and Yamanashi also referred to it in this way.

On 26 March naval leaders met to discuss naval policy for the immediate future. The policy document which emerged was a clear indication of the navy's (as opposed to just the Naval General Staff's or even Katō's) opinions. Present at the meeting were Kato, Suetsugu, Yamanashi, Okada and the Parliamentary Vice-Minister (Navy). After considerable discussion the following conclusions were reached and incorporated in a document entitled Kaigun Kaigo No Hōshin (Navy policy from now on). It stated:

> 1. We are not able to accept the American plan. As to our being able to compromise on our basic assertions this is limited to the levels contained in the navy's 'draft reply'. For the navy,

because of this level of demand, we wish to take the necessary measure of exhorting the plenipotentiaries to push again.

2. It is impossible for the navy to submit an interim or compromise plan to accompany this assertion. We cannot construct a compromise from the specialist point of view.

3. If the government decides then we we wish an explanation from the Navy Ministry Staff (including the Foreign Ministry) to the naval leaders.

4. Also whatever the government plan decides, concerning specialist matters this will require the endeavours of the delegates regarding necessary revisions.

5. That if the government did decide to accept the American plan the navy, naturally, would obey and do its best within the limits set.<78>

In the discussion which ensued Suetsugu apparently asked that articles four and five, since they merely stated the obvious, ought to be deleted from the document. Kato however, thought it essential that they remain in, so as to avoid misunderstandings.<79> Yamanashi then explained to the Prime Minister Hamaguchi but, although he passed a document to Hamaguchi, it only covered points 1 to 3 and points 4 and 5 were presented orally. They nevertheless remained in the navy's draft policy document.

After the navy meeting both Okada and Katō received visitors. Okada wrote in his diary

> Miyagi Ichizen called and said 'even though we must settle the conference we must push once more' then I heard from Katō that Count (Admiral) Yamamoto says we must push some more.<80>

Katō's visitor was Mizumachi Kesaroku, a Privy Councillor, who pressed him "to hold out for 70%."<81>

That same day the Deputy Navy Minister had asked Okada to speak to the Prime Minister and convey to him the

opinions of navy officers. He asked Okada if he would go with Katō. Okada replied he might see the Prime Minister alone if it was impossible to go with the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Kobayashi Tatsuo noted that Katō and Okada visited Hamaguchi and the latter said

> Since I am both Navy Minister protem and Prime Minister I must avoid disruption of the conference etc and having considered matters deeply from the national situation I will bring about an agreement based on the request for instructions'.<82>

Katō's version of the same events was as follows:

> Today met the Premier at 3pm at his official residence. Okada came along too. We stated our great opposition. Admiral Okada also advised him of the serious consequences which might be expected. Even though he spoke up he was not so positive. A second telegram came from Takarabe. Harada Kumao came to my private residence. He said that the Naval General Staff assertions were, on the whole, hopeless and pressed me to reconsider our demands. Support for Naval General Staff assertions is weakening. I absolutely refused, it was too late.<83>

Hamaguchi's diary entry was as follows:

> Katō Kanji still very firm. Takarabe telegram came and, as Navy Minister, not as plenipotentiary urged we should push again, but this may lead to rupture of the conference.<84>

Aoki Tokuzō's version, based on cabinet documents was:

> Since I am Prime Minister as well as Navy Minister protem I must deeply consider from the overall situation of the state and, as for the outline of policy, I wish to establish an agreement based on the draft (in the) request for instructions. I wish to avoid disruption of the conference.<85>

On 27 March Okada met with Katō and his version of events that day was:

> 8am met Katō. Will go together to Hamaguchi. 8.30am Harada came. 9am Yamanashi came. Telegram to Premier and Foreign Minister from Takarabe arrived. Premier said I should like to

have an interim plan in the reply instructions but without the resolution. I met Katō amd Yamanashi. The will of the Navy Minister is clear and the Naval General Staff should make every endeavour to submit an interim plan. Hamaguchi made his intentions clear that "this cabinet is not able to allow the disruption of the conference. If you submit a resolution along with an interim plan it will be difficult to consider". Met Hamaguchi at his residence. Kato came a little after me and said, "as it is said the Prime Minister asked me to come I have come". Suzuki, the Chief Secretary said "this is not so because the request came from your side. The Premier is waiting." We met at five past three in the Premier's private rooms and Katō explained in detail the 'Three Great Principles'. I said, since the Navy Minister's wishes have been made clear I'd like to respect these, if not the situation will be extremely serious. The Prime Minister said "the reply has already taken up more than two weeks, we must do something soon. Even if I listen to the navy, I will decide in some way on the basis of your speech, whatever the objections". 4pm Katō and I left. Katō said to Hamaguchi (at this point) "I should like to attend the cabinet meeting in my capacity as Chief of the Naval General Staff" Hamaguchi said "There is no precedent for that. I refuse. But, since you have close relations with cabinet members its up to you whether you convey your opinion to each one". Katō's words were "at this time my mind is made up". In the final analysis, if we can place an important emphasis on aircraft, we will be able to carry out national defence. But there are problems in the Naval General Staff and Kansei Honbu concerning submarines. For the Naval General Staff it is a deployment problem. There are difficulties for the Kansei Honbu. For these there are solutions in that every year we will prepare materiale for various ships. Regarding the technology we will build only the most difficult parts of various ships.<86>

On 28 March, Katō noted that there had been considerable press speculation over his meeting with the Prime Minister the day before. Hamaguchi's attitude was, by now, clear. He would accept the compromise plan arrived at in London. Katō was thus determined to open a gensuisangikan kaigi. Katō went to see Okada that afternoon and according to Okada:

> 4pm Katō came. He stressed we must open a gensuisangikan kaigi. I said this was not advisable. Then Katō said that in that case, as Chief of the Naval General Staff, he must appeal to the throne. As to that I told him it was not the time.<87>

What Katō did not know was that Okada had already summoned the Deputy Navy Minister earlier that day telling him:

> In other words, there is no scope other than to swallow it whole. But as for the amount of strength in the above American plan there is the feeling that there are deficiencies and also deployment [problems]. We must get the government to promise to make this up and get them to acknowledge it by a cabinet memorandum. But regarding a gensuisangikan kaigi, if we have one and it comes out in opposition to the government it will be serious. I stressed strongly that we must not have one.<88>

It would seem from the above that the interview with Hamaguchi, on 27 March, had produced contrasting reactions on the part of Okada and Katō. Katō had decided to try and confront the government through a military advisory body or by a direct appeal to the throne and force Hamaguchi to retreat. Okada, holding consistently to his avowed aim of avoiding a navy/government clash, now wished to prevent the convening of the military advisory body at this time. Having in effect conceded victory to the Prime Minister, Okada now took up Shidehara's suggestion of supplementary budgets and advised Yamanashi to make sure that a cabinet memorandum promising a supplementary budget was obtained. The Navy Ministry then began planning for the most effective compromise within the limits of the government reply, leaving Katō and the Naval General Staff isolated. One can only assume that the shift by the more pliant navy officers was conveyed to the Foreign Ministry by Okada or Yamanashi

directly or indirectly, since on 29 March, Katō received a visit from Nagai Ryutarō, the Foreign Ministry's parliamentary vice-minister. Katō commented:

> Nagai held the foolish opinion that I accept the American compromise plan, lie low and have another attempt later on.<89>

Katō then wrote that Count Makino, the Lord Privy Seal's secretary came and listened to Katō's explanations of the position.

While this was going on Okada, in response to a call from Admiral Prince Fushimi had hurried to the Prince's residence at 9.30 am. Fushimi spoke first:

> Until the reply is sent we must cause them [the navy] to push forcefully. However if they [government] decide we must obey. It is troublesome to be unbending like Katō. Again we must not open a gensuisangikan kaigi. On this problem, it is probable that Kato will resign if they decide on such a reply but it is perhaps best if he does not.<90>

Okada agreed completely with the Prince and the Prince then told Okada he would be away from Tokyo for a few days to attend various functions in Osaka and at the Submarine Training School. He then said:

> If during this time the Supreme Military Councillors meet then, at an appropriate moment, you should announce my opinion.<91>

Okada then "happily told Yamanashi of this conversation".

That evening Katō attended a banquet at the Palace and noted that:

> Makino, Shidehara and Suzuki attended. They were very sensitive about my attitude. Suzuki intimated that he intended to check my report to the throne.<92>

Makino and Suzuki had no doubt already been forewarned by Makino's secretary that Katō's resolve had not weakened and

doubtless Shidehara had also heard the same from Nagai. In any case it would appear that Kato took the government and especially Shidehara to task for this. The Tokyo Asahi Shinbun carried a report summarised as follows:

> ...the chief of naval staff was reported to have taken the foreign minister severely to task for the alleged disregard of the views of the admiralty by the latter. Admiral Katō protested against Baron Shidehara on the ground that, when Ambassador Matsudaira reached an agreement with Senator Reed, he was acting under informal instructions from the foreign minister and that the naval authorities were not consulted in the matter....<93>

According to this report, Katō then explained the navy situation and sought a detailed explanation from Shidehara but there is no evidence that any detailed response was forthcoming. On 30 March Katō wrote:

> Navy parliamentary vice-minister came and reported the general situation regarding the disarmament reply. In spite of the fact that two weeks have elapsed since the request from Wakatsuki there is still no meaningful reply from the government. And, as the one responsible, I have still not been shown the [revised] instructions.<94>

That same day, the Navy Ministry had completed a draft plan and it was passed from Deputy Navy Minister Yamanashi to Vice-Chief of the Naval Genral Staff, Suetsugu. He in turn presented it to Katō for his inspection. It was the supplementary measures plan. This was designed to try and make up for the deficiencies in the naval strength if the Reed-Matsudaira plan was accepted. Yamanashi then saw the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and obtained their consent. This left only the Finance Minister's consent to complete 'inner cabinet' approval and then the Minseitō cabinet would all be committed to the promise of a budgetary

allocation to the navy for aircraft, ships and facilities outside the treaty limitations. Any last lingering hopes of Navy Ministry assistance must have dissappeared from Katō's mind when, Yamanashi, on leaving his meeting with the Premier told the press that:

> although the navy department had so far sided with the stand of the naval general staff, it could do nothing but abide by the decision of the cabinet, it being a department of the government. He went on to declare however, that as a naval officer he was as firmly convinced that the "three fundamental claims" represented the minimum limits commensurate with national security and that the same should be upheld in all circumstances.<95>

Yamanashi did state that the 'Three Principles' ought to be upheld but it is clear that the Navy Ministry now, publicly, had abandoned any alliance with the Naval General Staff against the cabinet or more correctly the Hamaguchi/Shidehara alliance. From this point on to talk of a 'navy' or 'admiralty' stand, without qualifying who precisely one means, becomes difficult and often confusing.

The government reply to London was expected to be completed on 31 March and presented to a cabinet meeting the next day. Hamaguchi recorded in his diary that he received it from Shidehara on 31 March.<96> Katō Kanji meanwhile was involved in two different but related developments on the 31 March . These two events were later to be important elements in the political storm over the manner in which the government the 'reply' to London. These developments were: Katō's preparations for and final meeting with Premier Hamaguchi before the instructions were approved by the Emperor and despatched to London; and Katō's meetings with Grand Chamberlain Suzuki on 31 March and 1 April to

arrange an imperial audience.

It is very clear from the Okada and Katō diaries that the Foreign Ministry was a hive of activity on 31 March. The revised instructions had obviously been decided and it was to be the Foreign Ministry's own draft. The Navy draft had been pigeonholed and never reappeared. Vice Minister Yoshida met Yamanashi and Okada and having pressed Yamanashi to send a telegram to Takarabe in London then asked Okada to do the same and they urged Takarabe to agree to the Government 'reply'. Okada however decided it would be better if a message 'Admiral Okada is of the same opinion' was appended to Yamanashi's telegram.<97> Yamanashi had already spoken to Okada that morning to tell him that the Finance Minister had given his approval to the navy's supplementary budget for 'deficiencies' in the plan incorporated in the 'reply'. In the evening, two officials from the Foreign Ministry, Nagai and Hotta, explained the draft reply at the Navy Ministry but the text was not shown to the naval officers present.<98> Katō described this meeting in his diary as 'inconclusive, dispersed' but he in fact did not attend.<99>

Okada had noted "this morning when I saw Katō he was in a pathetic state" and commented that Katō had talked of resigning.<100> Katō's state of mind that day may have contributed to his absence in the evening from the Foreign Ministry's briefing to naval officers. On the other hand he may simply have felt that he should have received an explanation earlier, personally and from someone of higher rank so his absence may have been merely picque. Okada had

then discussed Katō's plight with Yamanashi and Admiral Osumi Mineo and Osumi was sent to Katō to try and comfort him. Kato's diary does not mention the Osumi visit but Harada's diary states that Osumi helped Katō revise his report to the throne. According to this source, Katō's report contained a number of references highly critical of the government and the Foreign Ministry over the 'reply'.<101> Osumi was said to have persuaded Katō to delete these. Okada and Katō had also met that day. Okada began by relating Prince Fushimi's wish to avoid a gensuisangikan kaigi and then discussed a possible meeting with Hamaguchi on 1 April. Katō commented that he wished to remain silent and let Okada do the talking. However, at 8pm Osumi phoned Okada and stated that Katō, whilst admitting that he had agreed to be silent in the coming meeting with Hamaguchi, now felt it might be better if he were absent.<102> Katō recorded in his diary that there was now nothing else for it and this was the day (31/3) he would appeal directly to the Emperor.<103> After meeting with Grand Chamberlain Suzuki however, Katō's meeting with the Emperor was postponed until the next day.<104> Katō had also had a secret visit that day from the Minister for the Colonies, Matsuda Genji, sounding out Katō's views on the 'reply'. Katō regarded him as an enthusiastic sympathiser and he was probably Katō's greatest ally in the cabinet. Katō asked him to pass on a warning to Hamaguchi if the government proceeded too quickly with the 'reply'. The shocked and concerned Matsuda promised to pass the message on the next morning before the cabinet formally met.<105>

It is therefore hardly surprising that Katō was as Okada noted, in a 'pathetic' state that day. It was by now very evident that the government would accept the 'American plan' and placate the navy with a supplementary budget. It was also clear that Yamanashi and the Navy Ministry moderates were, openly, no longer on the side of the Naval General Staff. The navy compromise draft had been ignored. Katō was left therefore with three main courses of action if he were to prevent the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister sending it to London. First he could influence the cabinet. Katō did have allies in the cabinet, such as Matsuda and possibly Koizumi Matajirō, Railways Minister, but they were few in number and not members of Hamaguchi's inner cabinet (Shidehara, Inoue and Egi). If he failed to persuade the cabinet then he would have to prevent the Emperor assenting to it. One method was therefore to have the Emperor submit an imperial inquiry to the Supreme Military Council as to the advisability of the Government's 'reply'. Katō had already tried to do this but Okada and Yamanashi had opposed it. Moreover Prince Fushimi's words to Okada, passed to Kato, now rendered that course of action unlikely to succeed. The final and most delicate course of action was to utilise his own right of <u>iaku jōsō</u> (direct access to the Emperor) and hope that then the Emperor would take appropriate steps. What steps the Emperor might have taken are a matter of conjecture. He could decide in favour of the cabinet but it was not considered proper for the Emperor to decide personally and he would have to choose between one of his two advisers (Cabinet or Naval General Staff). He

could have convened a Gozen Kaigi (Conference in the Imperial Presence) nevertheless and settled matters. Alternatively he could have asked the Supreme Military Council or Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshalls (or even the Privy Council) to arbitrate and advise. This course of action would have meant more delay and would have suited Kato Kanji. But it would have had grave consequences for the negotiations in London since the reply had been already delayed more than two weeks. However, Katō failed to obtain his audience with the Emperor on 31 March thus the crisis was avoided, albeit temporarily. Yet another alternative was possible and that was to resign and possibly persuade Navy Minister Takarabe to resign also and bring down the cabinet. But Katō, whilst prepared to resign himself, does not seem to have ever considered the latter option. It was most unlikely that Takarabe would have agreed anyway. Thus this particular day ended with Katō being frustrated at every turn. Moreover he was now aware that one of his most powerful supporters, Prince Fushimi, was now inclining towards the opposition's viewpoint. The loss of the Imperial Prince, also a Supreme Military Councillor, considerably weakened Katō's position and was a serious blow to his morale.

At 8am on 1 April, Katō arrived at his office and was met by the Navy Minister's aide, Captain Koga Mineichi. He informed Katō that Prime Minister Hamaguchi had requested that the Chief of the Naval General Staff come to his office, along with Military Councillor Admiral Okada, for a private showing of the government 'reply' about to be

submitted to the cabinet. Katō was at first reluctant to go. Katō wrote later that:

> When I replied to Koga that I must not respond to an invitation such as this he advised me that he well understood my thinking. However if it was difficult for me to agree (to the 'reply') wouldn't it be best to attend and disagree clearly in front of the Prime Minister. Suetsugu came and he also advised me to state my opposition clearly. As a result of this I went to the Prime Minister's official residence.<106>

Katō, Okada and Yamanashi met the Prime Minister in the room adjoining the cabinet meeting room at 8.30. Hamaguchi explained orally, and by means of a written document, the diplomatic, political and financial situation which formed the background to the government's decision on the reply. He informed both officers that he was satisfied that he had sufficient information from the navy and that the cabinet would now decide.

Since differing accounts of the responses of both Okada and Katō are to be found in the literature and, since Katō's response in particular was to become a major source of controversy later, the relevant sections of the Katō, Okada and Hamaguchi diaries will be cited here in full. First the Katō versions:

> I stated clearly "As for the Naval General Staff, as the ones responsible for national defence strategy, it is difficult to agree in regard to planning with the numbers which form the basis of the American proposal...."<107>

Katō later expanded on this diary entry as follows:"

> He explained that as Premier and Navy Minister protem he was showing us the draft government reply and explained the reasons and circumstances of the decision. On this Military Councillor Okada stated that the navy still was not able to change its assertions. But, as to the words used by Okada, they made the attitude of the navy sound weak. His actual words were "I have well

understood the Prime Minister's resolve. There is no other way than submitting this plan to the cabinet meeting. As for the assertions of the navy, from the specialist viewpoint, they will continue in existence as before and I request you permit Deputy Navy Minister Yamanashi to attend the cabinet meeting to speak [on the Navy's behalf]. But if the cabinet meeting decides on this plan the navy will endeavour to study the best methods based on that decision". Note [in original] I must say that as one without responsibility and without authority, since he is only one Military Councillor, it was criminal of the Navy Vice-Minister to cause him to say this and it is very strange. This is my estimation but there is no one else who could have developed such a strategy. Consequently this initial response of Military Councillor Okada had no authority at all but, in order to make matters clear on this day, I will record here my actual words. "I stated resolutely: As the one responsible for strategic planning of national defence I am not, from my position of responsibility, able to consent to the naval strength which forms the basis of the American plan". [I said this] To squash Okada's reply....<108>

Okada's version of these events is as follows:

Consequently I said "We are unable to stop the submission of these instructions to the cabinet but the Navy cannot discard the three fundamental principles. As for the naval situation I should like it to be stated adequately in the cabinet meeting by Yamanashi. On the basis of the cabinet decision we must endeavour to do our best". Katō said "As for the likes of this American plan, with regard to operations and strategy, I cannot accept reponsibility as Chief of the Naval General Staff."<109>

Hamaguchi's version of the same events in his diary was:

Okada said "The determination of the Prime Minister I well understand. As to the submission of this reply draft to today's cabinet, I think there is nothing we can do about it. The opinions of the military (naval) authorities have not changed up till now. I think I should like to request your permission for Yamanashi to attend the cabinet meeting to state these views. On the basis of the reply being decided in the cabinet meeting the military (naval) authorities will endeavour to do their very best. Then Katō said the following: "In the request for instructions plan, from operations and strategy I cannot agree, from operations and strategy....<110>

Katō had, of course, already stated on the previous day that he would be silent. According to his recollections he was stung into replying by the nature and content of Okada's reply. It was, according to Katō not sufficiently forceful and therefore weakened the navy case and moreover he clearly felt Okada had exceeded his authority. Okada's notes indicate a rather stronger reply but Hamaguchi's diary seems to support Kato's contentions. As to Okada's proposal that Yamanashi attend the cabinet meeting it was probably to obtain approval from the whole cabinet for the supplementary budget. Since he, as Deputy Navy Minister could attend cabinet meetings, this development was not surprising. It does show however that Hamaguchi, despite constantly referring to himself as Navy Minister protem would take no formal role on the navy side in these discussions. Nevertheless, Hamaguchi did use his position, informally, as Navy Minister protem when it suited his purposes. Katō had tried to persuade Hamaguchi on 27 March, to allow him to participate in the cabinet meeting and had failed. At a later date the government was accused of deciding on a policy which affected national defence planning at this meeting when neither of the service ministers were in attendance, the Army Minister being ill (Ugaki) and the Navy Minister being in London. This could have proved embarrassing for Hamaguchi and one doubts whether a statement that he was Navy Minister protem would have silenced the protests. However, by permitting Yamanashi (and Captain Hori Teikichi incidentally) to attend, Hamaguchi thus had both service Deputy Ministers present at

the meeting. Yamanashi was not a voting member but the army man was. For Hamaguchi to permit Katō's subordinates to attend after refusing him, whilst possibly constitutionally correct, must have been extremely annoying, especially since it was by now clear that the Navy Ministry planners had completely capitulated to the government. Katō's own response to the Government plan was, like Okada's, rather stronger in his own later recollections but in his actual diary entry and that of Hamaguchi his response is rather weak and open to a number of interpretations. It is nevertheless clear that Katō did register a clear objection despite planning to say nothing. This was obviously due to Okada's answer being more appropriate to Yamanashi's way of thinking than to what Katō thought they had agreed the day before.

After Okada and Katō had spoken Yamanashi then asked that the navy be allowed to study the 'reply' and requested that the cabinet not decide until the navy had examined it. The three naval officers then rushed back to the Navy Minister's offices and, along with Suetsugu, Hori and others began hurriedly, to try and modify their previous plans based on the document which they had seen for the first time that morning. It was almost exactly the same as the plan sent on 15 March and they had received verbal explanations from Foreign Ministry staff on 31 March and therefore little could be done to alter previous proposals. In less than an hour, Yamanashi had a reply ready for the cabinet. It comprised two documents, one a two-part response to the 'reply' which stated, in part one, the reasons why the navy

could not accept the naval strength as embodied in the American plan and in part two, the necessary measures required to make good deficiencies resulting fom acceptance of such a plan.<111> Most accounts of this meeting state that there were no dissenting opinions when Yamanashi asked for comments before leaving for the cabinet meeting. However, in a Naval General Staff document leaked to the Jiji Shinpō newspaper on 23 June, which could only have been prepared (but not necessarily leaked) by Katō and Suetsugu, the point was made that Suetsugu wanted to know why reservations were only expressed on heavy cruisers and not on submarines which were equally important. Yamanashi apparently simply ignored this.<112> Yamanashi's attitude towards the Naval General Staff officers present at this later meeting, elicited a similar response from them. In other words, when he read (three times) his prepared statement it was greeted with silence. Such a response was, according to one's perspective, either consent or dissent. A silent understanding in this tense atmosphere is very difficult indeed to interpret.

Prior to Yamanashi attending the cabinet meeting, Kato once more attempted to gain an audience with the Emperor on 1 April but again was told the Emperor's schedule was full. The cabinet meeting had begun before Yamanashi reached the Prime Minister's offices but apparently other matters were discussed in his absence. The Cabinet agreed to the government plan in the draft 'reply' to London and gave an understanding to Yamanashi regarding the supplementary budget in the form of a cabinet memorandum. Then, having

obtained cabinet approval, Hamaguchi saw the Emperor and despatched the revised instructions to London. Hamaguchi did not wait for the Chief of the Naval General Staff to report to the throne on relevant command aspects as he had done with the original instructions. Kato finally obtained an audience with the Emperor on 2 April, the day after the instructions had been sent.

Hamaguchi and Shidehara had clearly emerged victorious in the struggle over the revised instructions. But they had needed considerable assistance from navy elders such as Okada, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki and even, to some extent Prince Fushimi. But Katō and the so-called Fleet Faction were not yet defeated. This was merely the first stage and Kato now began to plan a campaign to prevent the signing and ratification of the treaty.

CHAPTER NINE

KATŌ AND THE TREATY RATIFICATION ISSUE

Katō had failed to prevent the Prime Minister from obtaining cabinet and Imperial approval for the 'revised instructions'. He finally received an audience with the Emperor on 2 April, the day after the 'government reply' had been despatched to London. Inevitably, there were press reports speculating on the content of Katō's report to the throne. Aoki Tokuzō produced some extracts from this report and Kato reproduced the whole text in his memoirs of the 'Treaty Crisis'.<1> Katō's original draft had contained direct criticisms of the government and the Foreign Office but in the end he submitted a relatively bland report to the throne.

After his audience with the Emperor, Katō returned to his office and gave a press interview. Although pressed, Katō naturally refused to disclose the contents of his appeal to the throne. However, he sparked off considerable controversy by making the following statement:

> The Imperial Japanese Navy will not act rashly or indiscreetly in connection with the instructions which have been sent to the Japanese delegation at the London Conference. However the navy believe that it will have to do the proper thing to meet the situation as it develops. There is decidedly no change in the policy of the Naval Staff which does not give its consent to a force defence based on the Reed-Matsudaira proposals. The reason for this is that it is the Naval Staff which is responsible for maintaining the national defences of the country. This attitude has been made public again and again by the naval authorities. They will continue to do the best that is in their power to see that the defences of the country are not put in a dangerous

position.<2>

Katō then drafted a telegram to Takarabe in London.<3> This particular telegram's contents were to be used later by pro-treaty forces as evidence in the Privy Council and elsewhere of Katō's 'tacit agreement' to the government 'reply'. Katō wrote:

> Today I reported to the throne that the Chief of the Naval General Staff cannot agree with the government's reply draft. I sincerely wish that you, as Navy Minister, should give careful thought as to policy from now on, and adopt a firm and resolute attitude. As for navy matters, don't worry.<4>

Katō, frustrated at almost every turn, had failed to prevent the government compromising on the 'Three Principles'. The delegation in London now had the means of obtaining an agreement and rescuing the conference from total failure. A Five Power Treaty had not been possible due to the refusal of the French and Italians to compromise on auxiliary naval strength. However, a Three Power Agreement was concluded between the United States, Great Britain and Japan.<5> The Minseitō Government, having overcome the internal opposition to the revised instructions to London, now awaited the final draft of the treaty. It arrived in Tokyo on 19 April and was immediately examined by Cabinet, Foreign Office and Navy Ministry staffs. The draft was approved without further revisions and the government cabled Plenipotentiary Wakatsuki on 20 April and the London Treaty was formally signed on 22 April. The first phase of the 'London Treaty Crisis' was now over and the forces, for and against the treaty, now readied themselves for a confrontation over its ratification. The government now

became involved in a long drawn out and often acrimonious struggle over ratification which lasted almost six months. During this period the government came under attack from sections of the military, reservists, the Opposition Party (the Seiyukai), right wing forces in the Diet and sections of the press. The more serious threats to the government's position however, came from the Supreme Military Council and especially the Privy Council.

Katō had two main options if he was to prevent the government ratifying the treaty. First, he could directly influence the military organisations in which he occupied a powerful position. These were the Naval General Staff and the Navy Ministry but also included the military advisory bodies, namely the Supreme Military Council and the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshalls. Katō was a member of the Supreme Military Council and also was close to Admiral Tōgō, the only naval officer on the Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshalls. His other option was to enlist the anti-government, anti-treaty forces outside the military, especially in both chambers of the Diet and in the Privy Council. The Privy Council had, traditionally, been involved in treaty ratification and Katō had considerable support amongst the Privy Councillors. Thus it was with this powerful body that Katō's greatest possibility of preventing ratification lay. Katō could aid these various groups and organisations in two ways. He could endeavour to forge a favourable consensus based on his interpretation of the correct procedures for decisions on naval strength levels within the navy and the Supreme Military Council.

Second, directly and indirectly, by his words and deeds (and even ommissions) he could provide ammunition to civilian anti-treaty, anti-government groupings. In the latter case a sufficient public outcry might cause the government to retreat. The Privy Council was seen by most people as the organisation most likely to defeat the government on the Treaty issue, provided it was consulted and especially if the Supreme Military Council also reached a decision critical of the government's handling of the treaty.

Katō's first major task after the instructions were sent, had been to divert the wrath of Hamaguchi and Yamanashi from Vice Admiral Suetsugu. On 16 April, Katō finally managed to restrict Suetsugu's punishment to an internal reprimand from Katō himself. He called this a 'moral responsibility' and this temporarily averted calls for Suetsugu's dismissal.<6>

On 21 April, one day before the treaty was signed, Deputy Navy Minister Yamanashi had been shocked by the arrival of a memorandum, officially stamped 'Naval General Staff' and signed by the Vice-Chief, Suetsugu. It was addressed to the Deputy Navy Minister and stated:

> Since the quantity of auxiliary vessels for the Empire contained in the London Naval Treaty draft is insufficient, the Naval General Staff cannot agree to this treaty.<7>

Hori Teikichi, Chief of the Navy Ministry's Naval Affairs Bureau received the document and it was then passed via Captain Koga to Yamanashi. Yamanashi was unable to contact Suetsugu since he was 'indisposed' and he immediately contacted Okada to see if he would try and persuade Katō to retract the 'notification'. Katō explained the background

of the memorandum to Okada as follows:

> In the (original) draft of this notification it was to be from the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the Navy Minister protem (Hamaguchi). But after considering it further I changed it to Vice-Chief to Deputy Navy Minister. I do not wish this notification to be seen by the Navy Minister protem. I will show it to Takarabe after his return. The reason why the memorandum was issued on 21 April was that I had hoped to resign before the signing of the treaty. However, since there are opinions to the effect that I ought not to submit my resignation to a Navy Minister protem, I am waiting a little longer for the opportunity to do so.<8>

Katō wrote in his diary that Okada appealed, on Yamanashi's behalf, for the notification to be withdrawn but "I firmly rejected this".<9> Yamanashi therefore decided to 'pigeonhole' the report until the Navy Minister returned from London and it was not passed to Premier Hamaguchi. The incident is significant since there was now an official notification from the Naval General Staff to the Navy Ministry rejecting the strength allocated in the treaty. It also indicated that Katō had initially intended this notification, along with his resignation, to be one last obstacle to the signing of the treaty. He then altered his strategy and the document and his imminent resignation now became the first broadside in a major anti-ratification campaign.

Katō and the Diet

Initially, the Treaty issue had been considered a 'supra-party' question by the political parties. The Seiyukai had given an undertaking that they would not make the London Treaty an issue in the February General Election.

The Minseitō emerged from that election in February 1930 with a massive majority, and the Seiyūkai now took the offensive and attacked any weak points in the government's handling of the naval limitation issue. The Seiyūkai had attempted to pass a resolution in the previous Diet session 'upholding the three fundamental principles' but had failed when the 57th Diet was dissolved that same day. However, Hamaguchi, Saionji and other pro-treaty supporters were well aware that the government's handling of the negotiations would have to be skilfully defended in the Diet. Apart from the Seiyūkai's failure over the Diet resolution, Prince Saionji had enlisted the help of Prince Konoe to block a move in the Upper House to declare 70% as national policy during the previous diet session.

The Special Session of the 58th Diet opened on 23 April amidst rumours of a major anti-government offensive by the Seiyūkai in the Lower House and by Seiyukai and naval sympathisers, including retired officers, in the Upper Chamber. The Diet had no authority on treaty matters although it could carry a vote of 'no confidence' in the government. This was most unlikely in the Lower House because of the Minseitō's commanding majority, but it was more of a possibility in the Upper Chamber which was not organised in the same way in terms of political parties. Hamaguchi did, of course, have certain 'understandings' with members of the House of Peers but there was a greater risk of a censure motion in that chamber, given its more conservative, rightist, pro-military complexion. However, censure motions were not the real danger it seems and both

houses presented threats to the government's handling of the treaty negotiatons in different ways.

Just before the new session commenced, the Seiyūkai intimated that it was preparing an offensive against the government's handling and the content of the 'reply' instructions. As the Harada-Saionji Memoirs show, rumours were ciculating that the attack would be based on one of two possibilities. The first was an attack on palace officials and the government for their alleged 'blocking' of Katō's appeal to the throne prior to the reply. This was regarded as evidence that the government and court officials had interfered with the military's constitutional 'right of direct access' to the Emperor.<10> The second was that the government had ignored the advice of the Naval General Staff as shown in Katō's press statement on 2 April, that national defence could not be guaranteed by the naval strength in the government 'reply'.<11> Premier Hamaguchi's first tactic was to ensure that Admiral Takarabe did not return to Tokyo until the special session of the Diet ended.<12> Thus, all interpellations on constitutional matters relating to the 'supreme command' could be handled by himself as acting Navy Minister. The Seiyukai strategy was clever but shortsighted. Since they lacked adequate numbers in the Lower Chamber to censure the government, their best hope lay in driving a wedge between the military authorities and the cabinet. If this happened, the opposition might provide sufficient grounds for alienating the military from the government. This was to be achieved by indicating how the cabinet had impinged, if not infringed, on the military's

constitutional rights. Then, the military might withdraw their cabinet repesentatives, refuse to appoint successors and bring down the cabinet. Alternatively, they might force the government, by constant and skilled interpellation, to make statements which could later be used by the Privy Council or the advisory military bodies to censure the cabinet. In such a case the government might well fall. The problem with such strategies was that the Seiyukai, whose leaders had previously been active in trying to bring the military under parliamentary and eventually party control, now embarked on a pragmatic policy which threatened to restore the military's insulation from political control. In other words a victory for the Seiyukai by these means would result in a setback for party cabinets. The opposition party even supported the military when it objected to the cabinet appointing a civilian as Army Minister protem, on behalf of the bedridden General Ugaki. This prevented the 58th Diet from witnessing both services being headed by civilians, albeit temporarily.<13> No matter how skilfully the opposition presented its case as 'concern for constitutional issues' and 'national defence', the real motivation behind the attack was to bring down the Minseitō government. But it should also be noted that the Minseitō had previously resorted to similar tactics over the Kellog-Briand Pact.<14>

Hamaguchi deliberately evaded constitutional questions concerning the 'reply' to London in the Diet. This laid him open to the criticism that such a tactic was not in keeping with the development and practices of constitutional

government. Neverthless, it was a well thought out, if risky, parliamentary strategy which was ultimately to prove very successful. Hamaguchi's tactics immediately created controversy and further alienated the Naval General Staff and especially Katō Kanji.

On the opening day of the 58th Diet, Foreign Minister Shidehara's traditional opening speech was largely devoted to the London Conference. He stated:

> None but extreme pessimists could possibly contend that the amount of strength to be allotted to Japan during the period ending in 1936, will prove fatally short of the needs of our national security. Taking fully into account the views of our naval experts, we have finally adopted the decision to join in the present treaty.<15>

Katō noted his displeasure in his diary, writing, "Shidehara spewed out an irrational statement". He angrily told Harada Kumao that:

> Shidehara's speech on foreign affairs in the Diet the other day is highly provocative and defiant. It was aimed directly at the Naval General Staff. Before the government dispatched the instructions to the delegation in London, they ought to have listened to our views on this matter; and yet when I had wanted to present explanations at meetings of the cabinet, I was prevented from attending. They constantly talked behind my back, and told me only two hours before dispatching the instructions that they were going to do so. They are altogether defiant of the [Naval] General Staff. It would have been acceptable if they had allowed me to have my say and then had given me to understand before the instructions were issued that there was no alternative after considering the matter from various angles. But they didn't even do that. The very issuance of the instructions shows a disregard for the Navy General Staff and is equivalent to ignoring the prerogative of supreme command. Can I stand by and allow decisions on the national defence to be made in this way.<16>

The leader of the Opposition, Inukai Tsuyoshi, launched a major Seiyukai attack when he cited Katō's statement of 2

April and used it to challenge the government's assertions on the treaty.<17> Hamaguchi calmly replied that "irrespective of the statement in question" the government was responsible to the Diet for national security and that the treaty did not endanger national security. Hamaguchi then proceeded to refuse to divulge the contents of Katō's appeal to the throne, the extent to which the Naval General Staff's views had been taken into consideration, the constitutional basis on which the decisions had been made and the details of the internal negotiations or the instructions to the delegation to London.<18> In a quite remarkable display of political nerve he held firmly to the line that the Diet was not within its rights in demanding such information, some of which in any case the government was not empowered to obtain, let alone release. But on 27 April he made a slight change to his previous statements by claiming that:

> In proceeding to conclude the treaty, the government thoroughly explored the views of the naval authorities, ... the chief of the naval general staff participates in planning the logistical estimates of national defence. His responsibility, however, does not extend into the whole realm of national defence.<19>

On 30 April, Hamaguchi told the Lower House Budget Committee that "there was no conflict of views between the government and the naval staff at the time".<20>

The House of Peers however presented more of a threat to the government. Hamaguchi had studiously avoided providing any constitutional basis or justificaton for his acts in the elected Lower House but he did go further under rigorous questioning from Peers. In reply to General

Shimizu Kōichirō, the Premier stated:

> ...that the instructions issued to the delegation embodied the government plan, that it was no more a Foreign Office plan than it was an Admiralty plan, that it was the responsibility of the cabinet under Article LV of the Constitution.<21>

He told Dr Hanai Takuzō of the Upper house Budgetary Committee on 10 May that the constitutional basis for decisions had been the treaty making power of the throne based on the responsible advice of the cabinet. However neither house succeeded in eliciting any comment from Hamaguchi or his cabinet on matters relating to Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution, those articles referring to supreme command matters.

During the Diet debates, Katō and his Naval General Staff became more and more incensed with the statements of both Shidehara and Hamaguchi. Anti-treaty forces in the navy provided documents and other information for attacks on the government inside and outside parliament. Katō Kanji and his staff had also been extremely active in military circles prior to and after the opening of the Diet and Katō had concentrated most of his energies there.<23>

Katō's Intention to Resign

Yamanashi's declaration on 30 March made public the growing schism within the navy over the government 'reply' to London. Katō's public statement on 2 April indicated that he and the Naval General Staff did not intend to give up the struggle. Therefore, it was not surprising that the press began carrying or even initiating stories connected

with resignations and dismissals of principal participants from the Navy Ministry, such as Takarabe and Yamanashi, or Katō and Suetsugu from the the Naval General Staff. In April, the officer most likely to resign or be dismissed appeared to be Suetsugu and he had already been disciplined. Anti-treaty forces, especially reserve admirals, were pressing for Yamanashi and Takarabe to step down either voluntarily or compulsorily.<23> Katō at this stage had not alienated pro-treaty forces sufficiently into clamouring for his dismissal, but rumours of his impending resignation were based on political realities. Katō's resignation was possibly welcome, for differing reasons, by both pro-treaty and anti-treaty forces but the timing was crucial.

Katō's first positive indication of an intention to resign over the 'reply' issue was made as early as 2 April when he so informed Admiral Okada. The latter counselled patience stating that the time was not opportune. Just over a week later Okada, having consulted others, suggested to Kato that an officer of his high rank ought not to resign in the absence of Navy Minister Takarabe and should await the latter's return from London.<24> This appears to have been accepted by Katō as a reasonable and proper suggestion. Katō's explanation of the Naval General Staff 'notification' showed that he had seriously considered resigning on 21 April on the eve of the signing of the London Treaty. Such a move would undoubtedly have had major political repercussions and caused the cabinet considerable embarrassment domestically and even internationally. It

would also have strengthened the opposition's case in the debate over ratification. Katō postponed his decision partially on Okada's advice but events in the weeks that followed may have given Katō cause to regret delaying the resignation.

Disciplinary measures against Katō's Vice-Chief Suetsugu were a direct result of pressure from Hamaguchi as Prime Minister or acting Navy Minister. Additionally on 24 April, the opening day of the Diet, the Premier and Foreign Minister had given opening addresses which reopened wounds received during the 'reply' negotiations. On that same day Yamanashi, in Katō's presence, had publicly stated that the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff had agreed on the revised instructions. This so incensed Katō that he felt compelled to show a memorandum to Admiral Moriyama 'proving' that this was not so.<25> Thus, there now appeared to be an 'unholy' alliance between the government and the Deputy Navy Minister. On 27 April Katō visited the home of Hiranuma Kiichirō, Vice-President of the Privy Council and a major figure in the right wing, anti-government forces. After exchanging opinions, Hiranuma urged Katō to "stand fast" stating that the rights or wrongs on the matter of Katō's report to the throne must be decided in the Privy Council.<26> In that same entry Katō noted that the papers were carrying stories of his own and Suetsugu's imminent dismissals. However, on the next day he was again visited by his friend Mr Murakami (Principal of a high school) who was helping him draft a certain document. This document was obviously his written resignation to be submitted to

Takarabe and the Emperor. All the indications were that Katō's resignation was merely being postponed.

Hamaguchi on 1 April had impressed upon Takarabe the need to delay his return to Japan until after the Diet session closed. This prevented Katō from utilising his resignation to the full by having the matter become a central issue in the 58th Diet. Prince Fushimi sent for Kato on 1 May and questioned him about the 'supreme command' and there were signs of increased activity on the part of reserve admirals against Takarabe and the pro-treaty forces.<27> Admiral Yamashita Gentarō, a reserve admiral whom Kato respected greatly, tried to persuade Katō that Takarabe should resign. Yamashita even offered to meet Takarabe prior to the Navy Minister's arrival in Tokyo. Katō "hesitated to agree" and instead asked another reserve admiral, Vice Admiral Chisaka, to dissuade Yamashita from this course of action and Yamashita relented.<28> On 7 May, Katō informed Matsushita, Chief of the navy's Personnel Bureau, that he wished his intention to resign be transmitted to Takarabe who was en route to Tokyo from Korea. The following day Vice Admirals Suetsugu and Nakamura came to see Katō and he informed them of his resolve to resign. Suetsugu asked if he really intended to do so and Katō wrote, "It was a stupid point to raise".<29> On 9 May, Katō recorded that the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shinbun carried a story containing a top secret Naval General Staff telegram and a Mr Hisatomi of the Nichi Nichi told Katō that it had been leaked by someone in the Foreign Ministry.<30>

The following day Reserve Admirals Nango and Ogasawara informed Katō that the forces which had delayed his report to the throne were also intimating they would prevent an imperial inquiry from the Emperor to the Supreme Military Council. The story was that Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantarō had told Admiral Prince Fushimi:

> If there is a request for the Emperor to ask the Supreme Military Council on the treaty problem the Emperor will, without fail, ask the Grand Chamberlain. Then, with the agreement of Saionji and Makino, it has been arranged that it will not be put into effect. The Prince is reported to have said "I do not accept your arrangement".<31>

On this matter Admiral Okada had already warned Takarabe, prior to his arrival home, that Katō's request for a gensuisangikan kaigi on the treaty issue was to be avoided, at least until the Naval General Staff could be made to say that defence could be secured or alternatively until Takarabe could persuade Tōgō or Fushimi "and then a Supreme Military Council would be no problem".<32>

The Diet closed on 13 May with matters concerning Katō and the 'reply' still being vigourously raised by the opposition and equally vigourously evaded by the government. In the final days of the diet session Katō received no respite in which to calmly reflect on the situation. His diary indicates that in addition to the government's evasive tactics in the Diet, the Foreign Ministry and Imperial Court Officials were still determined to weaken, frustrate or block any countermeasures by the anti-treaty camp.

On the day after the Diet was prorogued, Katō visited Admiral Tōgō and told him that he wished to resign as the

burden of remaining in office was now unbearable. Tōgō advised Katō to wait for Takarabe's imminent return.<#> Katō left and resolved to complete the drafting of his resignation to Takarabe. On the following day he summoned a secretary in the Naval General Staff and ordered him to produce a neater version. That same day, Katō received a visit from Privy Councillor Mizumachi Kesaroku who briefed him on the latest developments.<33> The following day, Hamaguchi paid a visit to Admiral Tōgō and they had their photograph taken together, a move which Katō deplored noting "the public will see through Hamaguchi and laugh at his thinking".<34> This was the day before Takarabe arrived back in Japan. Katō was determined not to delay his resignation much longer but he also had a strategy for internal naval reform which needed to precede this. The Navy Minister's return initiated the next phase in the conflict over the ratification of the London Naval Treaty.

Katō and Takarabe's return

During the final days of the 58th Diet Takarabe had remained in Korea. During this time he had received numerous messages from various emissaries as well as telegrams from pro-treaty and anti-treaty forces. Takarabe had ignored the pleas of the Naval General Staff to return home earlier although, significantly, Katō had not urged this in his message carried by Captain Koga. This officer carried messages from Hamaguchi, Shidehara, Okada, Yamanashi and Saionji among others. Katō contented himself with sending news of his impending resignation via one channel

and telling Koga to tell Takarabe:

> In these proceedings you know what I have been enduring. Since Shidehara has said foolish things I am thinking a little more, please say what you [Koga] think best to him.<35>

Takarabe had been urged to avoid the press prior to his return. Whilst in Korea he was a guest of Saitō Makoto and throughout this period the Governor-General had been speaking to the press, supporting the treaty agreement and attacking the irresponsible behaviour of Katō and the Naval General Staff.

Takarabe was undoubtedly apprehensive about his reception on his return, especially within the navy. He had arrived home after the naval experts and their comments and criticisms of his vacillating behaviour in London were well known. Moreover, Takarabe had ignored the pleas of the Naval General Staff to return as soon as possible and his extended stay in Korea intimated he was now aligned with the government against the Naval General Staff. Takarabe was well briefed regarding calls for his resignation, as well as Katō's intention to resign and to continue opposing the treaty and take up the matter of tōsuiken kanpan (infringement of the supreme command). Despite their long friendship, he was well aware that resolving internal naval problems with Katō would be difficult, if not impossible. Prior to their discussions, two violent incidents associated with Takarabe's reception occurred, which indicated to him that right wing elements and certain younger naval officers welcomed neither the Navy Minister nor the treaty terms. As he disembarked at Shimonoseki, Takarabe was presented with a dagger in order that he atone for his 'failure' in London in

the proper manner. Shortly after his arrival in Tokyo a young Lieutenant Commander, attached to the Naval General Staff, committed seppuku (ritual disembowelment) as a protest over the treaty. Such incidents were perhaps early indications of the potential for violence, associated with those who perceived events at London as 'submitting to western domination'. They may be regarded as a harbinger of the overt violence of the 'young officers' and the extreme right wing in the 1930s.

Katō himself was very moved by the suicide of the young naval officer, who according to some sources was reputed to be rather unbalanced. Katō was moved to publicly praise him and attended his funeral service viewing him as a 'martyr' to the cause of those opposing the treaty. Okada, whilst he undoubtedly understood Kato's response, took Katō severely to task for actually saying so in public.<36> Katō wrote later that:

> Navy Lt. Cdr. commits suicide. He left a note which was not announced. I got only fragments of information.... It is not certain but it is (said to be) about someone at the side of the Emperor.<37>

Katō did not elaborate, but it seems likely that this would have been a note mentioning either Makino or Suzuki since the rumour that they had contrived to delay Katō's report to the Emperor, was now circulating widely in Tokyo. If the true motive for the suicide was more than a protest against the treaty but against Katō's own treatment during the negotiations, this would have been even more likely to elicit a sympathetic and emotional public statement from the admiral. In any case the officer had been a member of

Katō's department. The suicide stirred up the emotions of right wing elements and young officers in the navy as well as members of the Naval General Staff. In the latter's case, it simply hardened their resolve to prevent treaty ratification.

Takarabe arrived in Tokyo on 19 May and Katō immediately presented the Navy Minister with a formal written resignation. They met again on 20 and 21 May when Katō again reiterated his determination to resign.<38> During these discussions, Katō raised the connected matter of whether the government had infringed the 'right of supreme command' of the Chief of the Naval General Staff by its handling of the 'revised instructions'. Such a serious matter naturally necessitated further consideration by the Navy Minister as well as consultation with Navy Ministry and government personnel. On 22 May, at their fourth meeting, Katō was extremely frustrated by Takarabe's evasiveness and seeming inability to comprehend the grave improprieties of the government and spoke harshly to the Navy Minister "even though he could not bear to do so in his heart".<39>

This meeting created a considerable impact and the following day the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, Yamamoto Eisuke, visited Katō and urged the two leaders to reach a compromise but Katō wrote that, since "it was not a private matter, I rejected his advice".<40> That same day Takarabe was also busy. Adachi Kenzō, the Home Minister, had visited him and questioned him on the 'supreme command' matter since fears were growing for the safety of certain key figures as the political situation became more

volatile.<41> Takarabe explained to Adachi that since there had been no objection by the Chief of the Naval General Staff over the reply, there could not be any infringement of the supreme command. Admiral Yamamoto Eisuke also visited Takarabe and complained about the government ignoring the wishes of the military authorities.<42> Takarabe explained the situation before and after the dispatch of telegrams and assured Yamamoto that he did not believe the military authorities had been disregarded. Yamamoto returned to Kato who said, cryptically,

> If the Prime Minister and the like have such an opinion as the Navy Minister said then the supreme command problem would not have occurred.<43>

Katō then added that he regretted he had not been more positive on 1 April.

On 24 May, Katō recorded that Takarabe came to work but avoided meeting him and Admiral Viscount Ogasawara reported that Fushimi had been visited by Takarabe. Ogasawara regarded this as a disgraceful state of affairs.<44> On 25 May, a Kempeitai (military police) chief, visited Admiral Katō and offered protection. There was certainly an increased danger to officials such as Count Makino as rumours of palace obstruction increased, but protection for Katō seemed rather unnecessary unless in fact it was a ruse to permit closer monitoring of Katō's movements. Harada Kumao had heard that Katō and Suetsugu were already under surveillance.<45> Katō not surprisingly declined the offer.

The Naval Strength Issue

The last days of May saw a shift in naval developments

as Katō now sought to persuade Takarabe to accept the Naval General Staff interpretation of Article 12 of the Constitution. Katō's aim was to establish that items under Article 12 were to be decided on the basis of agreement between the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff.<46>

On 28 May, Katō and Takarabe had agreed that Kato's resignation and the supreme command matter were to be treated as separate issues. Then Katō presented a document to Takarabe and asked for his agreement. The document stated:

> The amount of power and organisation are matters of Taiken under Article 12 and are matters for the joint advice of the service minister [the cabinet] and the Chief of the Naval General Staff [or Chief of the General Staff] and cannot be approved and decided by one side alone.<47>

This was a clever device to sanction a practice previously only accepted in the army. Hitherto, the Navy Minister had exercised sole authority in this area. Such an alteration in existing practice would be a significant diminution in the Navy Minister's power under Article 12. Katō recorded that:

> Met Takarabe, made him swear that Article 12 of the constitution was for the joint advice of Navy Minister and Chief of the Naval General Staff and told Prince Fushimi the same day.<48>

Katō may have believed that he had obtained Takarabe's agreement to the Naval General Staff draft but subsequent events indicated that this was not quite the interpretation Takarabe put on events. Takarabe's first response after seeing Katō, was to have Hori Teikichi draft a Navy Ministry version purporting to clarify the procedures for deciding

the naval strength.<49> The Hori draft had, as its preamble, an extract from regulations on areas of jurisdiction between the Ministry and the Staff. It stated that in deciding the amount of strength the Navy Minister ought to have obtained agreement from the Chief of the Naval General Staff. Hori's considerable legal skills are reflected here in the subtle shifts in meaning, whereby the actual power of decision still rested with the Navy Minister, that he 'ought to' have rather than 'must have' the agreement of the Chief of the Naval General Staff and finally that agreement was not a precondition for a decision and in effect could be reached retrospectively.

On 29 May, the Supreme Military Councillors gathered to discuss the 'supreme command' problem and the 'naval strength' issue.<50> The Navy Minister began by expressing his respect for the opinions of the Chief of the Naval General Staff on the naval strength issue. He then showed members a draft of the Navy Ministry version. After lunch, Katō explained in detail the events at the time of the government 'reply' as well as the interpellations which had taken place in the diet and then submitted the Naval General Staff opinion regarding a joint agreement on naval strength. Having examined these Okada stated that there were certain points in Katō's draft which were unclear, whilst the Navy Ministry draft was exceedingly clear and he would prefer the latter. Okada had discussed it at length with Takarabe prior to the meeting.<51> Okada supported the Navy Minister, since he realised that the Katō version would increase the likelihood of further navy/government clashes

over decisions regarding naval strength. However, Okada and the Navy Ministry were determined to further reduce any advantage which might accrue to Katō as a result of the Naval General Staff interpretation. Katō was most concerned lest the new version did not permit him to bring the government to account over ignoring his advice at the time of the 'reply'. Katō suggested that something needed to be done on this but Okada dismissed him saying: "There is no need. This is a matter which is limited to the navy and has no connection with the government."<52> Thus the pro-treaty forces within the navy now launched a two-pronged attack on Katō's understanding of the relationship between the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff relating to naval strength decisions. They had altered the wording and subtly changed it back to something more favourable to the Navy Minister. But in addition, even if Katō was now able to overrule the Navy Ministry draft, the document would only be acceptable internally and would not be binding on the government. This latter point was crucial in that eventually a version closer to Katō's was accepted but Hamaguchi was able to dismiss it by regarding it as only an internal naval 'understanding' which did not affect cabinet decisions. Moreover, the decision was seen to be binding on future agreements but not to be interpreted retrospectively. This effectively absolved Hamaguchi as Navy Minister protem, from requiring Katō's agreement on the naval strength in the 'reply' on 1 April.

In the main, Katō was victorious over the naval strength issue but it was unfortunately something of a

'pyrrhic victory'. The real reason he succeeded was that reports were reaching the Supreme Military Councillors of considerable unrest in the fleet. This had been caused by the treaty decision but had escalated due to the growing split between the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff. It was therefore urgent that an internal document be circulated showing that there was a unity of opinion between Katō and Takarabe on the navy strength issue. As a result of pressure from Togo, Fushimi and Katō, the phrase stating that when the Navy Minister decides the naval strength he must have the agreement... was altered and the term 'Navy Minister' deleted. It therefore read "when the navy strength is decided" thus weakening the the power of the Navy Minister.

On 2 June Takarabe obtained Imperial approval for Navy internal regulation 157 which stated:

> In accordance with established practice, when the navy strength is to be decided, there ought to be agreement between the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff.<53>

In the short term the pro-treaty forces were able to contain the opposition over this naval strength issue but, in the long term it provided the impetus for a concerted and successful attack on Navy Ministry supremacy within the navy.

Katō had therefore achieved recognition that the agreement of the Chief of the Naval General Staff was necessary on decisions relating to naval strength. His aim had been twofold: to establish a naval understanding which could be utilised for attacks on Hamaguchi's arbitrary actions in a formal Supreme Military Council and in the

Privy Council; and to ensure that such a thing would not occur again. This revised internal regulation was to be more effective in the latter case. The press covered these meetings in some detail but the papers interpreted such information as they were able to glean, to indicate that the Katō-Takarabe 'clash' in the Council was related directly to who had the right of decision on naval strength, the Chief of the Naval General Staff or the government. This probably reflected, intelligent speculation rather than 'leaks' from those present at the meetings. Having satisfied themselves that this issue was now settled, which was innaccurate, the press returned to speculation over the impending resignation and dismissals of navy personnel involved in the treaty dispute.

Katō's Resignation

Despite achieving an increase in the power of the Chief of the Naval General Staff within the navy on decisions on naval strength, Katō Kanji still intended to resign. Kato had been considering this at least as early as 2 April 1930, if not before. Given his determined opposition to the 'revised instructions' it was perhaps natural that others considered that Katō might have resigned even before the government 'reply' was sent. Okada recalled that on meeting Admiral Prince Fushimi on 29 March, the Prince's words had been, "If they decide on such a reply it is probable that Katō will resign but it is perhaps best that he doesn't."<54> Katō had, as previously described, postponed his resignation, originally planned for 21 April, until

Takarabe's return.

Okada, interestingly, indicated to Harada in late April, that Katō would resign before the Privy Council considered ratification of the treaty.<55> Katō, on 27 April had visited Privy Council Vice President Hiranuma, who had advised Katō to "stand firm the Privy Council will decide on the rights or wrongs of your case". Katō also noted that on that day the papers were carrying stories of the impending dismissals of himself and his Vice-Chief Suetsugu. Harada at this time believed that ultimately Katō and Suetsugu must resign.<56> On the last day of April the Nichi Nichi Shinbun speculated on the possible short term benefits of Katō's resignation but concluded that the navy felt that Takarabe should be the one to go.

On 5 May, Katō severely criticised the government to Harada and ended by saying, "can I stand by and allow decisions on national defence to be made in this way" a statement Meyer Oakes interprets as a veiled threat to resign.<57> Two days later Matsushita, Chief of Naval Personnel, received two different messages to convey to Takarabe. Katō had told Matsushita to inform Takarabe that he intended to resign. However, that same day, Okada had had a long chat with Katō in which Katō apparently indicated that the Naval General Staff would not make unreasonable supplementary budget demands. Okada therefore told Matsushita to inform Takarabe that there was now no need to be in a hurry to get rid of Katō.<58>

After Takarabe arrived in Tokyo, Katō immediately presented his written request for the Emperor to relieve him

of his post. Takarabe found the text to have certain improprieties and moreover, informed Katō that he would not be the means of presenting this to the Emperor.<59> He put aside Katō's request in order to give him more time to consider the various ramifications of Katō's resignation and to consult others on the means and timing and of course a suitable replacement. On the same day, Hamaguchi told Harada that Yamanashi's request to resign, conveyed to Takarabe before the latter's return to Tokyo, was part of a strategy to force the resignation of both Suetsugu and Katō.<60> The probable reason would have been that these three were to take the responsibility for the confusion during negotiations. In the days that followed, Katō repeatedly emphasised his determination to resign at the very earliest opportunity and in the heated discussions on this and the related 'supreme command' issue, it reached a stage where Katō felt that Takarabe was deliberately avoiding him.

The numerous conversations between Katō and Takarabe in the days after the Navy Minister's return, were naturally of considerable interest to the press, but again the fact that leaks did not occur caused much speculation in the press. Nippon Denpo on 21 May indicated that Katō would resign over what officers of the Naval General Staff were descibing as "an unbearable slight" against the Naval General Staff by the government.<61> Harada told Okada and Takarabe that same day, that Katō ought to go as soon as possible but they again felt that haste was inappropriate.<62> The Japan Advertiser on 22 May, carried a story stating that the

opinion was gaining ground that even if the goverment reached a compromise with Katō, he would still resign but that it would be after ratification.<63> Okada who had already advised caution over Katō leaving his post had, by 22 May become concerned over the way that political intriguers were using Katō and now felt that resignation should no longer be delayed unduly. This contradicted his statement to Harada the previous day.<64>

Harada noted on the 23 May that "the right man had been found to replace Katō" and thus the timing rather than the fact of Katō's resignation was now the main concern of the Navy Minister and Admiral Okada.<65>

News of an unofficial gathering of the Supreme Military Councillors on 29 May sparked off a new wave of press speculation. The Jiji Shinbun on 26 May had carried the story that Katō had told Tōgō of his impending resignation and also that Katō and Suetsugu planned to resign together.<66> A government statement indicated that it would be difficult to find a successor for Katō. This indicates how delicate the issue was since it is known from Harada that a successor had already been found some days before this statement. On the other hand, it may simply indicate that the Emperor had first to approve a successor. The day before the gathering of the navy members of the Supreme Military Council, the press were carrying the story that Katō would resign after explaining to the Council.<67> By then, Takarabe had persuaded Katō that the issue of the Supreme Command and Katō's resignation should be kept separate. There was certainly no evidence that Katō

intended to resign after this meeting in his diary or in the notes of that meeting by others. After the meeting, the press perceived as a victory for Katō over Takarabe on the naval strength issue, the papers seemed to believe that Kato had been placated by a promise of a supplementary budget. This again was untrue and indicated that the public were still unaware that an agreement had been negotiated by Yamanashi with the cabinet at the time of the government 'reply' to London on 1 April.

Takarabe's defeat by Katō over the naval strength issue, together with the Navy Minister's apparent compromise of his position as a cabinet officer in the Supreme Military Council in conceding Katō's case, was widely reported in the press. Stories began circulating that navy officers felt that Katō might well delay his resignation now that he had won a victory over Takarabe.<68> On the other hand Takarabe and Okada were now of the opinion that Katō's actions in the Supreme Military Council were such as to require them to hasten rather than delay Katō's resignation.<69>

At the beginning of July, the issue of the transfer of Suetsugu and Yamanashi came to the fore causing another major clash between Katō and Takarabe. In the end, the Navy Ministry personnel chief and Takarabe came to the conclusion that Suetsugu's transfer could only be carried out with Katō's approval.<70> Just prior to this, Yamanashi had advised that Kato be transferred to the Supreme Military Council thus retaining him on the active list. Katō, in a discussion with Okada on 2 July, agreed to a compromise on the Supreme Command issue saying:

> The government must apologise to the people and by this the supreme command problem will be ended. Then I will say that I can be reconciled with Takarabe but I must resign in order to save face.<71>

On 6 July, Katō had a very long and highly emotional meeting with Takarabe, ostensibly on Suetsugu's dismissal but actually to do with the naval strength issue and the timing and method of Katō's own resignation. On Suetsugu, Katō felt compelled in the end to accede to the Navy Minister's wishes but he wrote on that day: "I'll not let Suetsugu be cut down alone, I expect to resign immediately."<72> James Crowley felt that Katō's harsh treatment by Takarabe in this meeting left Katō no choice but to resign but this appears most unlikely. On 9 July Okada met with the Navy Minister and discussed Katō's resignation in some detail and both felt that Katō should not be replaced for some time.<73> However, the Navy Ministry had now taken the necessary steps to transfer Suetsugu and Yamanashi on 10 July. That same day, Takarabe emerged from a cabinet meeting to find that Katō had received an audience with the Emperor, ostensibly regarding forthcoming manoeuvres and had caused a panic in the palace by asking the Emperor to permit him to resign. This move sent a shock wave through the political world even though papers on 10 July had hinted that Katō was not the sort of man to allow subordinates to be sacrificed for his own benefit.<74> Futagami, Chief Secretary to the Privy Council and a notorious 'leaker' to the press, had actually hinted some days earlier that the Chief of the Naval General Staff would independently memorialise the Emperor.<75> The news

stunned both Takarabe [illegible]nce only the day before they had decided not to proceed hastily with the appointment of a new Chief of the Naval General Staff. Katō had been very careful not to give any hint of his real intention when he asked for an audience with the Emperor, since he felt he had been outmanoeuvred previously in attempts to reach the Emperor.

Katō Kanji's resignation did cause a considerable furor but he had perhaps delayed too long for it to have a major impact on developments. His reasons for resigning were primarily personal, in the sense that he felt he had 'lost face' in his struggle with Hamaguchi and the pro-treaty forces. From time to time, he clearly considered using his resignation as a means of embarrassing the government but was persuaded by others to postpone the decision. In the end he resigned together with his deputy, Suetsugu Nobumasa, rather than let his subordinate take the full responsibility. This can be regarded as an act designed to further embarrass the government. However, others had decided on Suetsugu's 'transfer' and it is also plausible that Katō had been outmanoeuvred. Now that a suitable replacement had been found, Katō could be made to resign by the well known tactic of firing a loyal subordinate to compel that person's superior to resign also.

Katō and the Supreme Military Council

On 11 June, Admiral Katō Kanji was relieved of his post as Chief of the Naval General Staff and appointed a military councillor. He was surprised and delighted since he had

expected to be placed on the reserve list. His new appointment meant that he could continue as a serving officer and more importantly, could still influence events since it appeared likely that the London Treaty would be submitted to the Supreme Military Council for examination prior to ratification.<76> Placing Katō on the reserve list might have decreased his direct influence on the ratification process but it would also have made him more outspoken and possibly easier to manipulate by anti-treaty political groupings such as the reserve admirals. His appointment was partially for professional reasons in that the navy could scarcely afford to lose a man of his calibre. It was also political, since Katō's departure from the Naval General Staff would have further lowered the morale of the fleet. In addition, as a Military Councillor, Katō's role was to take a wider pespective and thus the new position might even produce a more moderate response from him. Katō's appointment to the Council did not increase the influence on this body of the anti-treaty forces. Katō had already been a member and his successor as Chief of the Naval General Staff, Taniguchi Naozane was pro-treaty, a necessary prerequisite for his appointment. Thus the committee was expanded to six and Katō's vote was effectively neutralised.<77>

The literature on the London Treaty Crisis abounds with references to meetings of the Supreme Military (War) Council but there is certain confusion of nomenclature, mainly in English writings on the subject. The Navy's military councillors were undoubtedly an important and influential

group within the navy but a formal meeting of this body (gunji sangiin kaigi) could only be convened by the Emperor. Informal meetings are referred to in Japanese as gunji sangikan kaigō which will be termed 'gatherings' in this chapter.<78>

Yet another confusing term was gensui gunji sangikan kaigi. This will be interpreted here as an informal meeting of naval members of the Supreme Military Council with gensui (Admiral of the Fleet) Tōgō in the chair.<79>

Katō had already viewed the Supreme Military Council as a means of blocking the 'revised instructions' and had actively campaigned for a formal meeting prior to the government's 'reply' to London in late March.<80> Okada, aided by Prince Fushimi, helped the government prevent this since it had been likely that the Council would have found the government 'plan' defective and questioned the Foreign Ministry's failure to reply to the navy's counterproposals.<81> However, on 7 April, Fushimi told Katō that there should be a meeting before the government sent a 'reply' to London! Katō failed to obtain this meeting before the 'revised instructions' were sent and began campaigning for a submission of the treaty to the Supreme Military Council prior to ratification. Okada however told Harada in late April, that he would do everything possible to prevent this happening. In May, Katō informed Okada that not only did he wish a meeting but that it should be the full Council with army officers as well.<82>

Okada and the government naturally wished to avoid this

and two days after Okada and Katō spoke on this issue, Ogasawara related Fushimi's meeting with Grand Chamberlain Suzuki. At this time Suzuki made it clear that court advisers would see to it that such a request for an Imperial inquiry to the Council would be blocked.<83>

An important gathering of naval military councillors occurred on 29 May. Itō Takashi intimates that this meeting was initiated by the navy leadership as part of its strategy "against Katō's circle".<84> James Crowley states that Takarabe, immediately after a showdown with Katō in which he had rejected Katō's criticisms of the treaty and resignation memorial to the Emperor: "...resolved that the matter should be decided by another session of the Supreme War Council."<85> The first thing to note is that this was not a session of the Supreme Military Council but an informal gathering of councillors. Secondly, it was primarily concerned with considering two differing naval interpretations on decisions on the 'naval strength'. This was initiated by Katō and the Naval General Staff and the Navy Minister responded to that. Crowley goes on to state that the Supreme Military Council:

> resolved that, as far as the cabinet was concerned, the opinions of the naval ministry could be regarded as reflecting the views of the navy. Consequently it rejected Katō's basic legal contention, ruling that the premier could inform the Privy Council that the revised instructions of April 1 did not conflict with the professional advice of the Imperial navy.... As far as the Supreme War Council was concerned, the treaty had been accepted by the naval ministry and this act alone gave it legal force.<86>

Itō Takashi wrote that the Staff and the Ministry each presented drafts on the naval strength and that a compromise

sufficiently ambiguous to be acceptable to both was arrived at. He omits the fact that this was a decision reached later. Crowley, basing his conclusions on the secondary materials of Okada and interviews with Hori Teikichi completely misinterprets the situation. As to the fact that the Supreme Military Council actually "resolved" anything or "ruled" against Katō and in favour of the cabinet/navy ministry alliance this is gravely erronous on a number of counts. First, the impression is given that this was a meeting of the official body and this was patently not so. It therefore could decide, resolve or rule on nothing. Furthermore, it did not decide against Katō at all, since it was not asked to do so and since the meeting was deadlocked over the two different drafts by Katō and Hori for the Staff and Ministry respectively. The issue discussed was a draft memorandum and was only indirectly related to Katō's 'memorial' which was not considered. The balance within the Council, had it voted, would clearly have favoured Katō since only Okada spoke in favour of the Hori draft and Tōgō and Fushimi sided with Kato (Hori was not a member although he did attend). As to the Council finding that the cabinet could accept the Navy Ministry views as reflecting those of the navy, this is something which Takarabe, Okada and Hori may have accepted and was clearly Hamaguchi's interpretation but it was not a conclusion reached at this 'gathering'. Had this been the case then Takarabe and Hamaguchi would not have responded to the result of this meeting in the way Aoki describes them as doing. Aoki, using cabinet paper's found that Takarabe met Shidehara and Hamaguchi prior to a cabinet

meeting on the day following the gathering of military councillors and advised that:

> they should adopt the policy of saying that the government recognises that it obtained the agreement of the military. The Prime Minister repeated two or three times that he approved the policy.<87>

Then in the cabinet meeting, according to Aoki, Takarabe simply mentioned the decision of the meeting of the Councillors and stated that he believed the cabinet had acted with the approval of the naval authorities. In fact the only decision the assembled councillors had made was to leave Katō and Takarabe to sort out the naval strength issue between themselves. Thus, Crowley's assessment of the importance and decisions of this meeting are quite inaccurate and his conclusion on "the moderate policies of the Supreme War Council" is, to say the least, rather misleading.

Katō and Takarabe clashed again on 30 May over the naval strength issue recounted earlier. In an English language article, Itō Takashi stated that a compromise "sufficiently ambiguous to be acceptable to both was arrived at"<88> but in his extended treatment of the subject in Japanese he stated:

> It was clear that this represented a considerable retreat from the Okada, Yamanashi line and was much closer to the Naval General Staff draft.<89>

By the beginning of June both Takarabe and Okada were inclining towards the convening of a formal meeting of the Supreme Council on the treaty issue. Okada by now was of the opinion it should take place before ratification. Katō had informed Takarabe on 6 June that he wished an Imperial

inquiry to be submitted to a meeting of military councillors from both the army and the navy with a gensui in the chair (rikukaigun gensui sangikan). Its remit would be to examine the reasons behind Katō's resignation. Katō recorded that Takarabe said at first that he had signed approval requesting the Emperor to convene a meeting of a rikukaigun sangiin (a formal meeting of the full Supreme Military Council) but that he then changed his mind preferring Katō instead to submit his reasons for resignation direct to the throne.<90> The next day Katō asked for the following to be requested as subjects for imperial inquiries to the Supreme Military Council:

1. A formal meeting of the Supreme Military Council, with only navy members in attendance, to decide on the agreement between the Navy Minister and himself on the naval strengh issue. This would be signed jointly, memorialised to the throne and distributed to the fleet.

2. A meeting of the full combined army/navy Council to decide on the propriety of the Government 'reply' and the procedures adopted prior to the signing of the treaty.

3. A meeting of the Council (navy only) to decide whether the treaty power allocated presented any obstacles to national defence which would affect operational strategy.<91>

On that same day Katō had heard directly from Prince Fushimi of the determination of those close to the throne, namely Suzuki, Makino and Saionji, to block any request for an Imperial inquiry to the Supreme Military Council.

Katō's appeal to the Emperor to be relieved of his post

on 10 June once more affected the strategies of both sides in the dispute. Itō Takashi has suggested that:

> In early June then having disposed of the problem of the prerogative of the supreme command, Navy Minister Takarabe discharged Chief of Staff Katō and the Vice-Chief. This done he intended to go on and hold a military councillors conference on the subject of the treaty.<92>

This is somewhat misleading and attributes too much to Takarabe when it is clear that the Navy Minister was, for most of the time, paralysed with indecision. The supreme command problem had not been resolved and whilst Suetusgu the Vice Chief had been discharged on 10 June Katō had in effect forced Takarabe to accept his resignation on 11 June by his appeal to the throne the previous day. If Takarabe had removed Katō in order to hold a meeting of the Supreme Military Council, why did the Navy Minister then appoint Katō to that very body. Katō's appointment as a Supreme Military Councillor did reduce pressure for a formal meeting of that body since normally the Navy Minister or the Chief of the Naval General Staff requested the Emperor to convene formal meetings.

The appointment of Taniguchi as the new Chief of the Naval General Staff, since he had been carefully vetted beforehand by the pro-treaty forces, changed the balance within the Supreme Military Council. There were now six members and they were divided evenly into two groups, Okada Takarabe and Taniguchi versus Katō, Tōgō and Fushimi. However, in July there were to be disputes over whether Tōgō had two votes, one as Councillor and one as Chairman.

On 16 June Katō received a visit from Count Ogasawara. He asked Katō to persuade Field Marshall Prince Kanin to

side with Admiral of the Fleet Tōgō if a gensuifu (Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshalls) was convened.<93> Since Ogasawara was close to Tōgō, it seems reasonable to assume that he and Togo were expecting a Board to be convened rather than a Council at this time.

One week later a formal gathering of the Supreme Military Council with Tōgō in the chair met at the palace. The subject of the Imperial Inquiry was the appointment of a Naval Inspector, a matter unrelated to the London Treaty.<94> Katō, not surprisingly, seized the opportunity to state his "opinion regarding the making up of defects in agreed strength". Takarabe observed that such a matter was outside the scope of the Imperial Inquiry. Chairman Tōgō however then asked Taniguchi for his opinion but he too refrained from being drawn into the discussion merely saying it merited serious and further consideration. Katō however went on to say:

> In this meeting I do not seek a debate. At this important time we are carrying out a special inspection and, if by any chance, such things as instability in the navy were to be exposed, this must be prevented. In order to avoid such things it [naval strength] must be considered in the top echelons of the navy beforehand.<95>

Chairman Tōgō concluded the discussion by requesting Takarabe and Katō to reach some agreement on this serious matter. The following day Okada urged Taniguchi to proceed as quickly as possible with the replenishment plan in order to make up 'defects' caused by the treaty limitations. On 27 June Taniguchi produced his proposals and they were basically the same as those which had been drafted during Katō's period of office. This may have been deliberate

since Katō could hardly object to a replenishment plan almost identical to the one approved whilst he had been in office. Whilst this may have been how it was perceived by Katō's opponents, it implies Taniguchi was party to the strategy. It seems rather more likely that the opinions of naval general staff planners had not altered in two months, in other words, presented with the same problem they would naturally arrive at the same solution!

By the end of June, both sides in the treaty dispute were now much better prepared for an Imperial Inquiry on the London treaty. Katō had a document, albeit for internal purposes, by which Takarabe agreed that naval strength decisions were to be reached by an agreement between the Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff. He also had a written notification by the Naval General Staff rejecting the strength allocated in the treaty dated the day before the treaty was signed. Moreover, Taniguchi's replenishment plan was essentially the same as his own had been and was 'proof' that defects did exist in treaty strengths'.

The government/navy ministry coalition however, were even better prepared for an Imperial Inquiry on the treaty. Okada had been of the opinion that it would be best if the Council was convened after ratification. However he did change his mind more than once. He was basically in favour of a formal Supreme Military Council provided the Naval General Staff could be made to accept that national defence was not endangered by the treaty. This had necessitated replacing the top Naval General Staff officers, the Chief

and Vice Chief, with officers more amenable to the government position and this had now taken place. In addition, by submitting a replenishment plan to make up for the defects, the Naval General Staff were effectively conceding that national defence could be secured provided the supplementary plan was funded by the government. Thus Okada's conditions for a meeting prior to ratification had now been met. Katō's appointment as a Councillor actually improved the government position in a Supreme Military Council meeting by adding Taniguchi to the pro-treaty forces in that body. However it was still not certain which military body would be convened by an Imperial inquiry. Hamaguchi and Takarabe were now inclining more strongly towards a gensuifu (Board) rather than a gunji sangiin kaigi (Council).

On the last day of June Takarabe, in a meeting with leaders of the majority grouping in the House of Peers, the Kenseikai, made his current thinking on this quite clear. Responding to a statement that the opening of a Supreme Military Council on the question of naval strength ought to occur, Takarabe responded:

> Under the law I think that opening a Supreme Military Council is appropriate. But if the supreme command issue is discussed in that meeting it makes people's thoughts unstable without any beneficial effects. Personally, and also from precedent, I wish to convene the gensuifu.<96>

Thus, once more the pendulum had swung in favour of the Board rather than the Council and one can presume that Takarabe was reflecting the wishes of Premier Hamaguchi who was following closely, the precedents set at the time of the Washington Conference, rather than the advice of Okada who

considered the Council the appropriate body. It was now quite clear that an Imperial Inquiry related to the London Treaty would now be convened before ratification but which body was still unresolved.

Throughout May and June, the opposing sides in the treaty dispute had continued to fence over when and how the London Treaty was to be submitted to one of the senior military advisory agencies: The Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshalls or the Supreme Military Council. Initially, pro-treaty forces seem to have inclined towards delaying an Imperial Inquiry to such a body until after the Privy Council approved treaty ratification, since rejection by such august military bodies would be a most useful weapon in the hands of the anti-treaty party and especially anti-Minseito groupings within the Privy Council.

The naval leadership however, was increasingly concerned that an Imperial Inquiry now be initiated as soon as possible, meaning prior to ratification of the treaty and preferably before submission to the Privy Council. The problem was which body would the Imperial Inquiry be directed to, since there were three possibilities: The Board, The full Supreme Military Council with army and navy represented or a navy-only Supreme Military Council.

The Navy Ministry-government coalition was basically in favour of convening the Board. The Naval General Staff and especially Katō himself favoured a formal meeting of the Council. If one analyses why a Board was preferred by pro-treaty forces, two reasons are immediately apparent. At the time of the Washington Treaties, the Board had approved

the treaties prior to ratification creating a precedent. Furthermore, Katō Kanji was not a member of this body and therefore would effectively have no direct influence on its deliberations. At this time there were only four members of the Board, three army field marshalls Uehara Yusaku, Prince Kanin Kotohito and the bedridden Oku Yasukata and one admiral of the fleet Tōgō Heihachirō. It has been suggested that since Uehara was from the same village as Takarabe this might have been a significant factor in Takarabe favouring this body. But given that Okada and Katō were also from one village this in no way affected their being on opposing sides on the treaty.<97> The lack of specialist expertise may also have been seen as advantageous to the pro-treaty side in any deliberations. However, it should be pointed out that this could have been a double-edged sword since there was also the possibility that the army representatives would defer to the naval 'expert' Tōgō who was absolutely opposed to ratification and merely 'rubberstamp' his opinions. This latter factor may have influenced the government's ultimate decision on the appropriate advisory body.

Throughout early July, a series of internal negotiations were carried out between the Army and Navy Ministries and between the respective General Staff agencies. Since the naval strength in the treaty affected national defence plans the army believed it had a contribution to make and agreed at one point that participation in either a Board or full Council was appropriate.<98> However, gradually the army appears to

have become nervous lest army personnel on either of these bodies be used as political pawns. Army leaders were also aware that a vote against ratification would possibly mean a naval arms race which would place greater pressure on the limited financial resources available for military expenditures. In the end, the most important factor was the attitude of Admiral Tōgō himself. He personally rejected suggestions for a Board from both the navy and the army and opted instead for a navy-only Council.<99> The army and particularly the General Staff concurred provided they were kept fully informed. But when it was suggested that to be fully informed and to approve what transpired might be interpreted as army support for a naval air corps expansion programme, the army distanced itself from the issue.<100> It is unclear who was primarily responsible for influencing Tōgō in this direction but both Katō and Ogasawara were in favour of a Council and had the ear of the ageing Tōgō. Katō had visited Tōgō on 3 July and tried to explain to him and to Ogasawara that Tōgō must not take the sole responsibility for scrapping the treaty.<101> Three days later he again visited Tōgō and told him that:

> A meeting of the Board or the Council is absolutely necessary. But, in addition to the fact that there are disadvantages in a majority decision with the army and navy together because of either lack of understanding or antipathy, there might be someone who makes an 'impure' declaration [statement with ulterior motives].<102>

On 14 July the two Chiefs of Staff agreed in writing to a navy-only Council.<103> Katō's influence on this decision had been via Tōgō. That same day the navy's 'Big Four', Takarabe, Taniguchi, Okada and Katō met. This was the last

of a series of important meetings held almost daily to try and decide the wording of an Imperial Inquiry and the reply to such an inquiry. Katō also pressed for them to commence drafting a reply on behalf of the Council.<104> These early meetings of the 'Big Four' of the navy were primarily to decide the specific inquiry and the main elements in the answer and it seems that their judgement of the appropriate reply to a question on the London treaty actually determined the phrasing of the question! It is highly probable that no Imperial Inquiry would be issued normally unless the answer had already been agreed beforehand.

Taniguchi refused to agree to Katō's suggestions but Katō then suggested an informal gathering of Councillors to explain the supplementary budget and this was accepted. Katō persuaded Takarabe to agree that at the beginning of the Council's reply to the Imperial Inquiry the phrase 'there are defects in national defence' would appear. This appears to have been a concession in order to soften the wording of the Imperial Inquiry. Apparently Katō had been adamant that it be a very simple question such as "Is the London Treaty defective" and that the reply state "grave defects".<105> Takarabe then received permission to discuss this with Hamaguchi which he duly did. Katō had reservations when Takarabe told him the Premier agreed but since Takarabe was as usual, impossibly vague, the matter was taken no further. The next day Taniguchi explained to Prince Fushimi and received his approval. However the Prince registered his extreme dissatisfaction with the way the government had handled the 'reply' sent to London.

Takarabe, Taniguchi and Okada now made great efforts in order to ensure that Tōgō did not stand alone and thus damage his reputation. Katō too was becoming increasingly apprehensive lest Togo be isolated and take the sole responsibility for preventing ratification. At this point, Itō Takashi states that Katō is no longer clearly in the anti-ratification camp.<106> It is possible that here Katō can be interpreted as bowing to the inevitable or viewing things slightly differently from his new position as a Councillor only. But another possibility exists and is contained in Katō's explanations to Count Ogasawara on 14 July. Kato, at this point tried to convince the reserve admiral and confidante of Tōgō that he (Katō) had had to concede over appending a statement to the 'reply' to the throne to the effect that the replenishment plan would eliminate the defects in national defence. Ogasawara was against the inclusion of details of the supplementary budget and urged that the treaty be scrapped. Katō told him:

> From the position of the navy's highest leaders, it is necessary to have the utmost caution in the text of such a reply to the Emperor. To indicate that there are clearly defects in national defence without providing countermeasures merely causes anxiety to the Emperor alone, and this is irresponsible advice. I endeavoured to get 'defects' into the reply text and happily I succeeded. In the long run the main factor in bringing about the agreement of the other leaders was that they would accept if there was a supplementary reply to the Emperor on countermeasures to supplement naval strength. The Privy Council, if it is loyal to its special responsibilities, must deny ratification because of the phrase "there are defects in national defence".<107>

Katō here was being quite consistent in that he is not moving towards being so much "for ratification" as against

the Council and especially Tōgō being damaged by pressing for and taking responsibility for non-ratificaton. Also he did not wish to place the Emperor in another difficult predicament. Katō felt that his achievement in obtaining an agreement that "defects in national defence" would be clearly stated in the 'reply' was sufficient for the Privy Council to recommend against ratification. On 18 July Katō finally persuaded Tōgō not to press for a vote against ratification in the Council although Ogasawara was still trying to incite Togo to block the treaty. Ogasawara and Katō had ended their previous discussions with an angry Ogasawara saying "regarding such a conditional reply I will prevent it by all means".<108> Ogasawara had then demanded they discuss it in front of Tōgō but Katō refused preferring to talk with Tōgō alone. After speaking to Tōgō, Katō finally persuaded him and the latter replied that "it is regrettable but we cannot but do it".<109> Tōgō and Katō also agreed that Ogasawara ought not to be involved in such delicate naval matters from this point on. Katō's attitude here, and his caution over the reply, also bear the imprint of Okada's influence. Moreover Katō's efforts to prevent Tōgō from arguing against ratification were a result of Taniguchi's direct request to Katō to try and succeed where the present Chief of the Naval General Staff had failed. Katō was to note later that people were criticising him for 'softening' in this way.<110>. Tōgō now agreed and requested that an informal Council be convened as soon as possible.

Reassured that Tōgō would not insist that the Council

reject the treaty, the 'Big Four' of the navy proceeded with preparations for a formal convening of a navy-only Council. Itō Takashi has suggested that the reason why the Council had moved towards avoiding an outright rejection of the treaty was the result of the tactical manoeuvres of the government and the military leaders. He feels that they had decided that if the Military Council rejected the treaty they would: "submit their opinion and force the Emperor to choose - in that event the Military Council people would have to resign."<111> This accords well with Kato's growing concern that Tōgō and the Military Council would be damaged by a vote rejecting the treaty and Katō deciding to leave the responsibility to the Privy Council. Naturally the press was full of speculation on the 'Big Four' meetings and the imminent formal Military Council meeting but again the reporting was speculative rather than accurate. At the time even Harada, Saionji's secretary, did not know the precise wording which the Imperial Inquiry would take, but it had obviously been decided during the preceding meetings of the navy's 'Big Four' and was to consider:

> The existence or non-existence of impediments to national defence strategy in the naval strength allocated in the recent London Naval Treaty agreement and the matter of countermeasures.<112>

It is important to note here that Katō had mentioned a supplementary comment on replenishment measures would be appended, but the actual wording incorporated the countermeasures directly into the inquiry. Harada stated that at the first meeting, a new defence plan was presented and James Crowley wrote that a naval budget was presented and unanimously approved by the Military Council thus

creating a dangerous precedent whereby the Chief of the Naval General Staff was preempting the prerogative on budgetary allocation of the Premier, Finance Minister and Navy Minister.<113> Both these conclusions are most misleading since what Taniguchi presented was a supplementary plan to make up deficiencies in the London Treaty. Since it was a plan and not a budget, though naturally costed, it was within the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Naval General Staff to draft. The evidence clearly shows that the Councillors were expecting previous government promises on supplemtary fiscal allocations to be morally binding. Thus it was unnecessary for Crowley to imply such a 'budget' was not legally binding on the cabinet. At the meeting, the supplementary plan as well as the 'reply' to the throne were discussed. Prince Fushimi asked Takarabe if he believed this supplementary plan would be carried out. Takarabe apparently answered lamely and evasively.<114> According to Harada, Katō thereupon stated: "such vagueness is most alarming. In this case I must put my query directly to the Prime Minister" but Takarabe said this would be improper.<115> As with so much of the Harada diaries there is a certain amount of truth in all the entries but it was Prince Fushimi not Katō who had put the 'query' and Katō noted "because of the vacillating behaviour of Takarabe Prince Fushimi's attitude changed rapidly".<116> Thus it would appear that the comment ascribed to Katō here probably referred to Prince Fushimi, since even Okada did not record any comment by Katō. Taniguchi requested that Takarabe get a firmer and more

positive answer from the Prime Minister. Afterwards Okada took Takarabe to task for the way he had handled Prince Fushimi's question and Taniguchi and Katō concurred. Kobayashi, the Deputy Navy Minister, later relayed to Harada his great disappointment with the way Takarabe had handled things even when presented with adequate materials.<117> After the meeting adjourned Takarabe met Hamaguchi, Egi and later Adachi but Inoue the Finance Minister did not attend. After much discussion they agreed upon a reply which was primarily the work of Egi. Takarabe emerged from this meeting with a document, not as Crowley would have it a verbal promise, from the Premier.<118> The next morning, (22 July) prior to the second official meeting of the Councillors at the Navy Ministry, Takarabe showed the document to Admiral Okada. He found the document in the main acceptable, but indicated that the promise to do their utmost, "within the scope permitted by financial and other circumstances" would cause a problem with the other Councillors. He thus suggested the phrase: "the government will arrange the financial and other circumstances according to priority".<119> Takarabe read out the document and when finished he was attacked by Tōgō who was still dissatisfied with this 'qualified' promise. Tōgō now inclined again towards the 'reply' concluding with, 'there are defects in national defence' but both Okada and Katō pointed out that to state only that there were defects was irresponsible if no countermeasures were advanced. Okada noted Katō's words to Togo as follows: "As the military authority it is irresponsible if we do not append that we are able to make

up deficiences."<120> Finally, agreement was reached unanimously, and Taniguchi empowered to proceed to Hayama and request an Imperial Inquiry to be submitted from the throne. Katō concluded the entry for that day "happy day for the navy" obviously delighted with finally achieving a kind of unanimity. Harada recorded that Katō had much to say on the 'Three Principles' but this is not confirmed by other sources.<121>

Taniguchi met the Emperor at Hayama, who made it clear that the reply should not be anything which would restrict Japan at the next naval conference in 1935. A formal meeting of the Council was convened on 23 June at the Imperial Palace. The meeting lasted a mere 40 minutes since the reply had already been decided. The vote approving the reply was unanimous and the only recorded query was Katō Kanji's on an obscure grammatical point in the text.<122> Most of the 40 minutes was taken up by a discussion after the decision had been taken between Katō and Takarabe. Katō noted:

> When the above finished I stated to the Navy Minister my wishes regarding the disposition of the memorandum relating to the supreme command and wished these to be recorded.<123>

This was a reference to their 'agreement' on naval strength decisions procedures but Katō noted Takarabe's reluctance to discuss this in the meeting. Nevertheless the Navy Minister conceded that:

> I approve completely in spirit. In any cases from now on, no matter who is Navy Minister, we will respect and carry this out.<124>

This was of course a major achievement for Katō since this was stated during an official Council meeting but the

phrase 'from now on' effectively prevented Hamaguchi from being subjected to a retrospective judgement on his handling of the 'reply' on 1 April.

The concern over whether Tōgō would have two votes or one in the final decision and whether somehow Prince Fushimi could be prevented from voting seem, in retrospect, to have been rather a 'storm in a teacup' since no one intended to or could vote against ratification since it lay outside the scope of the Imperial Inquiry.

Taniguchi and Tōgō presented the reply to the Emperor and it was then passed to the Premier for comment. It stated clearly that there were defects in national defence according to the naval strength allocated by the treaty. However, it was qualified by details of supplementary measures to make up any deficiencies. The government was now required to provide funds for the navy to build up to treaty limits and expand in areas not limited by the treaty such as airpower, improvement of training and naval facilities. The Prime Minister then added a comment, stating that the government would do its best but it was a little less positive in its wording than in the document presented by Takarabe to the Council on 23 June.<125>

In the end, the Supreme Military Council had not opposed ratification. Although a reassurance was sought and obtained from the government that the supplementary plans would be fulfilled, this was not a condition of the Council's approval but it could possibly have been interpreted in that way. The stage was now set for the government to try and surmount the last and possibly the

greatest obstacle to ratification, the Privy Council. There was a very strong feeling in Japan at the time that this was where the government was likely to come to grief, especially since the Privy Council had brought down a previous Minseito cabinet. Speculation over the Supreme Military Council's reply to the Emperor did not end and details of the 'defects' were leaked to anti-treaty elements and 'supplementary plans' leaked to pro-treaty forces so that both sides were claiming a victory. Katō himself believed that since the document had stated that 'defects' had been created by the treaty this was sufficient grounds for the Privy Council to bring down the Hamaguchi cabinet. Takarabe's position was weakened by reports that he had been worsted in the unofficial meetings and had conceded to Katō on the 'supreme command' issue.<126> Both pro-treaty and anti-treaty camps were now clamouring for Takarabe's resignation and the question was not if, but when he would depart. The conclusion, common in the press, that the military advisory body had decided against ratification, reflected wishful thinking on the part of anti-treaty forces and over-anxiety on the part of pro-treaty forces.

Katō and the Privy Council

Hamaguchi's decision of 24 July to submit the London Treaty to the Privy Council, gave rise to greater optimism on the part of anti-treaty rather than pro-treaty forces. At this time, the complexion of the Privy Council was somewhat anti-party and particularly anti-Minseitō. It was led by Count Itō Miyōji, who had brought down the Wakatsuki

(Minseitō) cabinet in 1927.<127> This had led to calls for the revision or even abolition of this extra- and pre-constitutional body and the Minseito had unsuccessfully sought a diet resolution to impeach the Privy Council. This mutual antipathy between the Minseitō and the Privy Council must be borne in mind when examining the clash between the government and this body over the London Treaty. In some respects the 'treaty issue' was a symptom rather than a cause of the clash. Hamaguchi however showed considerable political acumen and bravery in his dealings with the Privy Council and although obliged, by precedent, to submit the treaty to it for consideration, he was determined that it would be on his own terms.

Katō had great hopes for his cause and believed that the Privy Council would eventually recommend against ratification. Katō was on familiar terms with a number of Privy Councillors and amongst these were two of the most powerful, Baron Hiranuma Kiichirō, the Vice-President and Count Kaneko Kentarō. Moreoever, these two were amongst the most vociferous critics of the present cabinet. Itō Takashi has pointed out that Katō and Kaneko were in agreement on at least three points: opposition to American Far East strategy; agreement to Japanese demands or no treaty at all; opposition to the weak diplomacy of the Hamaguchi cabinet [Shidehara diplomacy]. One might add that they were in considerable agreement on the constitutional interpretation of the 'supreme command' and Count Kaneko was the single most influential adviser to Katō on this subject.

Katō's relationship with Hiranuma went back at least a

decade.<128> However, Katō's diary shows that Kaneko was much more influential and in much more frequent contact with Katō. Katō seems to have only flirted with joining in the political intrigues of anti-Minseito, right-wing conservative groupings led by Hiranuma and others. In truth, Katō probably retreated from too close an alliance wih politicians, not because he believed that military men should not get involved in politics but because basically he found party government distasteful. It would be more correct to say that Suetsugu was closer than Katō to Hiranuma and to the powerful Suzuki faction of the Seiyūkai.

Katō's diaries offer two other interesting comments on Privy Council contacts. On 26 March, Mizumachi Kesaroku visited Katō and urged him to hold out for 70% and later, on 15 May visited Katō again to give him a report of the latest situation on the government and the treaty. From this Katō may have believed, like others, that Mizumachi was on their side, but later fears by reserve admirals that Mizumachi was weakening, add substance to Mayer-Oakes conclusion that Mizumachi was Hamaguchi's man on the Privy Council and he was a recent Hamaguchi appointee to the Privy Council. In early June a certain Yamashita Kamezaburō visited Katō and after informing Katō that he was very close to Privy Councillor Itō Miyōji, he offered to liase between the two men.<129> However, there were no further contacts recorded between Kato and Yamashita or Itō. Katō did send materials, directly and indirectly to the Privy Council, as did Suetsugu and other members of the Naval General Staff in preparation for the ratification struggle.

Katō therefore was not without contacts and even allies in the Privy Council and, given the expectation that the latter would cause the government great difficulties and probably come out against ratification, Katō was very optimistic. In early May Katō was reported as saying:

> the actions of the government which disregards the power of the supreme command violate the very spirit of the Constitution. On the right or wrong of this I am anxious for His Majesty to obtain the advice of the Privy Council<130>

This wording is almost exactly the same as Katō's diary entry of a discussion with Hiranuma in late April. Just prior to Katō's statement, Itō Miyōji had told Harada that although he was happy at the conclusion of a treaty he was "very troubled that the Chief of the Naval General Staff opposed it". Harada concluded, probably correctly, that what really troubled Itō was that 'this 'Katō opposition' would become a problem in the Privy Council.<131> Equally, Ito could have been humouring Harada and actually pleased at the prospect of causing problems for the cabinet. One week prior to the imperial inquiry to the Privy Council, Katō had explained to Tōgō's secretary, Rear Admiral Ogasawara, that he was hopeful that the Privy Council would recommend against ratification. Katō fully expected the Privy Council to oppose ratification and correct the injustices he himself had suffered. It would do so, he believed, by challenging the government on the basis of the Supreme Military Council's report as well as by an examination of the events at the time of the preparation of the 'reply' to London on 1 April.

Proceedings of the Privy Council began immediately on

24 July and developed in two stages. In the first stage, they considered the method of dealing with the inquiry and the Privy Council met six times between 26 July and 5 August. Kobayashi Tatsuo's analysis of events indicate clearly that the deliberations had a definite anti-government colouring.<132> It became clear that a quick response was out of the question to the Imperial Inquiry even in the uncomfortable Tokyo summer weather. The possibility of lengthy deliberations merely heightened speculation but it was also deliberate policy by the Chief Secretary to the Privy Council, Futagami Hyoji, a noted opponent of the treaty. He not only went through the treaty with a 'fine tooth comb' searching for errors to catch out the Foreign Ministry and the cabinet, but also continually 'leaked' information to the press favourable to the anti-treaty forces and prejudicial to the cabinet.<133> He held up the report for two weeks before a sub-comittee was chosen.

The second stage commenced with the first meeting of the examining sub-committee on 18 August and this committee met twelve times between 23 August and 17 September.

On 4 August, immediately prior to the last meeting of the Privy Council in the first stage, the president of the Privy Council, Kuratomi Yusaburō, called on the Prime Minister and requested a copy of the Supreme Military Council's report to the throne. Hamaguchi refused, stating he did not have a copy and that it was for the Imperial Court to permit it. Hamaguchi formally refused again the next day as the confused and angry Kuratomi failed to make

any impact on Hamaguchi at all.<134> Hamaguchi had prepared his ground very well indeed. He had been most careful to ask for the Privy Council to examine the treaty before he had officially received the Supreme Military Council's reply to the throne for his comments (but after he knew its contents). This effectively precluded the report from the Privy Council's deliberations. There is no evidence that Katō was aware of this move by Hamaguchi to preclude the Supreme Military Council report from the Privy Council Inquiry and then to refuse point-blank the repeated request and even 'order' of the president of the Privy Council to provide a copy. Had Katō known, he would have doubtless realised that one of his major achievements, namely the inclusion of "defects in national defence" in the Military Council report was now being neutralised by Hamaguchi's tactics. On 11 August the examining sub-committee was formed. It included Kaneko Kentarō, Hiranuma Kiichirō and Mizumachi Kesaroku and was to be chaired by Itō Miyōji. Leading experts in the diplomatic and constitutional fields amongst the Privy Councillors such as Baron Ishii and Professor Tomii, known Hamaguchi supporters, were deliberately excluded. Consequently the sub-committee, unlike the Privy Council as a whole, did not have a division of pro-treaty and anti-treaty/anti-government forces and this undoubtedly pleased Katō and forces opposed to the Hamaguchi cabinet and the treaty.<135>

The sub-committee also felt, as the president had done, that they would not be able to reach a decision unless they saw the reply text of the Supreme Military Council memorial

to the Emperor. Originally, anti-treaty forces on the Privy Council had hoped that a negative response from the Supreme Military Council could have been used in their deliberations to block ratification. Even the "conditional" approval of the Supreme Military Council might have, as Katō believed, been sufficient, but this too was denied them by Hamaguchi who would not permit the document to be submitted. However, there were a vast number of issues where the sub-committee could challenge the government. Amongst the subjects scheduled for examination were the circumstances in London and Tokyo prior to and at the time of the 'reply'; the issue of who decided naval strength; the supplementary naval budget; Katō's own side of the story and his attendance at the sub-committee to give evidence and finally fiscal matters related to the treaty.<136>

Katō's diary does not indicate precisely when or if he expected to be asked to attend the proceedings of the sub-committee. Vice Admiral Kobayashi, Deputy Navy Minister reported to Prince Saionji's secretary Harada, that the Navy Minister had endeavoured to persuade Katō and Suetsugu to go on a South Seas tour. They had refused, but it was obvious that Takarabe did not wish Katō or Suetsugu to be in Tokyo during Privy Council deliberations.<137> Vice Admiral Osumi and Rear Admiral Terashima told Harada that Katō and Suetsugu were away from Tokyo attending fleet exercises in late August and did not intend to return to Tokyo until 1 September. Then, on 22 August Katō sent a message to the Navy Ministry saying he was returning forthwith because of his niece's illness but would not present himself at the

Navy Ministry. According to these two naval officers, Kato was still in Aomori Prefecture two days later and then, on the evening of 24 August returned to Tokyo. Harada deduced from this that Katō was returning to make himself available for a call from the sub-committee and found it strange that Suetsugu, "who has no family relationship with him" accompanied him to Tokyo.<138> It is certainly the case that Katō, whose diary for that week was blank, noted on 27 August that he was preparing materials for the Privy Council and completed them on 28 August. What is not clear is whether this was in preparation for a summons to appear or whether he knew a discussion on his role would arise and was preparing written materials to send to the sub-committee.

The sub-committee had restricted attendance at its meetings to try and avoid the numerous leaks but Chief Secretary Futagami, the principal source of such leaks, was still in attendance. Mizumachi Kesaroku claimed that he was responsible for limiting the cabinet members to be cross-examined to only Hamaguchi, Takarabe and Shidehara.<139> After some preliminary skirmishes the sub-committee began in earnest to examine supreme command matters at the beginning of September. The principal interpellators were Kaneko Kentarō and Kawai Misao (a former Chief of the General Staff). At meetings on 1 and 3 September, Hamaguchi responded to questions on his negotiations with Kato by stating clearly: "I'm firmly of the opinion that the Chief of the Naval General Staff had no objections". The chairman, Itō Miyōji told Hamaguchi that this was quite at variance with their own 'facts' and that

more would be heard of this later.<140> At the sixth meeting two days later, cross examination of Hamaguchi and Takarabe continued. Takarabe told the committee that Katō had given his implicit agreement and that the evidence for this was the telegram which Katō had sent on 2 April to Takarabe in London. However, when the sub-committee asked for a copy of the telegram Takarabe refused, although it would appear that the sub-committee had a version already from Katō or some other source.<141> The news that Katō was the main subject for discussion had obviously 'leaked' since Katō found his home invaded by reserve admirals led by Ogasawara on 2 September. Ogasawara and Admirals Yamashita and Arima "strongly advised" Katō to attend the sub-committee and give evidence. Katō responded cautiously and to some extent evasively. He wrote in his diary that he did not think it good for a Supreme Military Councillor to attend as a witness and was dubious as to the legality, but "since their advice was so strong I delayed replying until the next day".<142>

On 3 September Katō noted that Hamaguchi had not changed his stand and was still insisting that Katō had agreed. Harada had recorded in his diary that Privy Councillors Arai, Kawai and Kaneko had focussed on the supreme command issue and said:

> Though the prime minister may say, as he did the other day, that we should accept that the Chief of the Naval General Staff had no objection to the final instructions, yet this is extremely doubtful.<143>

Katō heard that same day from Admiral Nango, one of the leading activist reserve admirals, that Chairman Ito had

requested Katō's attendance at the sub-committee hearings.<144> Nango's information was correct and also reveals that leaks were still occurring. Ito and the sub-committee, frustrated by the fact that neither Hamaguchi nor Takarabe's contentions over Katō's "agreement" could be shaken and by Takarabe's refusal to let them see the telegram with Katō's "implicit" agreement now asked Hamaguchi to ask the Navy Minister to permit Kato to attend. With Katō's attendance, Itō hoped to resolve the conflict between the evidence his committee had and the assertions of Hamaguchi and Takarabe, or at the very least, further embarrass the government.<145> Katō had told Ogasawara that same day that "provided it was not illegal" he would attend.<146>

After discussing with his advisors, especially his 'brainstruster' Egi, the Railways Minister Hamaguchi issued a note refusing to permit Katō to appear, a decision strictly in accord with Privy Council regulations. Katō's diary for 4 September read:

> The Nichi Nichi Shinbun newspaper scooped the situation. Various newspaper writers arrived at my house and I could not help stating all the details of the cabinet memorandum but the government rejected my attendance (because) it is only possible, according to Privy Council regulations, to deal with the government.<147>

There are two interesting points here. First that Katō, from the beginning, appears to have suspected that legally he could not hope to present his evidence in person. Therefore his preparation of materials for the Privy Council at the end of August, seems to have been based on this assumption. Secondly, Itō Takashi stated that during the

deliberations of the Privy Council Katō was expected to make some public statements critical of the governmemt but refrained from doing so.<148> However, this diary entry shows clearly that Katō did make a public statement possibly out of sheer frustration after Hamaguchi had refused to allow him to attend. Moreover on 5 September Katō's diary stated:

> Every newspaper except the Nichi Nichi Shinbun and the Asahi Shinbun carried an article called 'Katō's note' exposing the content of the negotiations [prior to 1 April].<149>

In the days that followed, Katō found himself the focus of attention in the press and his house was subjected to a steady procession of reserve admirals, members of conservative and right wing societies, the Seiyūkai and even the Kempeitai. The latter offered him protection but Katō demurred. Katō visited the Navy Ministry on 5 September but, since Takarabe was not present, he spoke instead to Taniguchi, the Chief of the Naval General Staff. According to Aoki Tokuzō, Katō asked him to pass a message to Takarabe that regarding the various questions in the Privy Council hearings:

> For the sake of the Navy or the Naval General Staff I am prepared to take total responsibility. I will not act rashly and will not begrudge sacrificing myself alone.<150>

From this statement it is unclear what precisely Kato meant. However it could be interpreted as a willingness to take "total responsibility" by relating events to the Privy Council sub-committee personally since Kobayashi Tatsuo wrote that Katō had asked Taniguchi to inform the Navy Minister of his wish to attend the Privy Council hearings

and explain the situation at the time the 'reply' was sent to London.<151>

On 7 August Katō received a long note from Suetsugu, former Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff. At this time Suetsugu was very closely involved with the opposition party, the Seiyūkai, especially the powerful Suzuki faction.<152> The letter began by stating that newspapers were reporting that the government would refuse to permit Katō to appear before the sub-committee to give evidence. On this matter, Katō seems to have been better informed than Suetsugu. Suetsugu quoted from newspaper reports but Katō had known on the very day (4 August) that the Premier had rejected the request. Suetsugu went on to propose courses of action for Katō. First, he suggested Kato require an explanation from Takarabe regarding the Navy Minister's statements in the sub-committee that Katō had 'implicitly agreed' to the revised instructions'. If he was vague in his response Katō was to press him hard. Secondly, because the Navy Minister has distorted Katō's true intentions, Katō must insist that he be allowed to attend the hearings and explain for himself. Thirdly, if Takarabe did not agree then to ask for a transcript of the notification sent to the Navy Ministry on 21 April. Finally, if Takarabe did not agree to these conditions Katō should resign from the Supreme Military Council and publicly explain his reasons. Katō, either as a result of his conversation with Taniguchi on 5 August or from Suetsugu's letter, met the Navy Minister on 8 August and a heated discussion ensued.<153> Kato began by inquiring whether it was true that he was under

observation by the Kempeitai and that they were relaying information to the Navy Minister. He then demanded to know precisely what had been said regarding his position in the sub-committee. Takarabe stated clearly that he believed the Prime Minister had been sincere when he said he had obtained Katō's agreement. Finally, Katō asked that he be allowed to attend the Privy Council hearing and explain matters personally, but Takarabe replied that this was neither legal nor practicable. Katō then threatened he would resort to the 'ultimate solution' of requesting a meeting of the Supreme Military Council and resign after explaining his reasons. This was a serious threat but it fell somewhat short of Suetsugu's plea for him to make his reasons for resignation public, a move clearly designed to aid the opposition party and pressure the sub-committee into rejecting the treaty.<154> Takarabe's activities in the Privy Council in support of the cabinet, further angered reserve admirals and naval officers sympathetic to Katō. It was now clear that Takarabe would resign shortly, probably immediately after ratification of the treaty. The conversation with Takarabe and the threat to resign from the Supreme Military Council and active service, were Katō's last desperate efforts to obtain leverage in the dispute. However Takarabe, probably under the guidance of Hamaguchi, remained resolute during the Privy Council hearings, a state of affairs somewhat out of character for him. Katō did not resign and the Privy Council examining committee, to the great surprise of the majority of informed political observers, unconditionally approved ratification of the

London Treaty. Hamaguchi had stood firm throughout, refusing to provide the texts of the Supreme Military Council's reply to the throne, Katō's telegram of 2 April to Takarabe, the navy's supplementary plan and other documents as well as refusing to permit Katō Kanji to attend and give evidence. It appears that the government also had contingency plans drawn up in case the sub-committee ruled against the cabinet. In that event, Hamaguchi and the pro-treaty forces intended to lobby members of the plenary session of the Privy Council. This was the body with the power of decision within the Privy Council. If the Privy Council, in plenary session, also refused to approve ratification of the treaty, they would appeal to the throne and proceed with ratification anyway. This was possible since constitutional experts believed that Privy Council approval was merely advisable but not mandatory. In the end the sub-committee, lacking a clear rejection from the Supreme Military Council, retreated from shouldering sole responsiblity for rejecting the treaty and bringing down the government.

The reasons for Katō's defeat over ratification are not susceptible to any simple answers. Katō softened his opposition to ratification in the Supreme Military Council out of concern for Togo and concern for other members of this organisation, rather than from any change in his perspective in his new post. He had not altered his opposition to ratification but had decided that the fact that 'defects in national defence' was cited in the Supreme Miltary Council document, was sufficient grounds for the

Privy Council to reject the treaty. Unfortunately the Privy Council, having brought down a previous Minseitō administration and been severely criticised for it, appeared to lose its nerve. Had it caused the downfall of the Hamaguchi cabinet, then probably the movement to reduce the powers of the Privy Council would have gained even greater momentum. Katō's behaviour during the ratification dispute can perhaps be regarded as somewhat politically naive. However he was not alone in miscalculating the Privy Council's final decision, since many shrewd commentators on Japanese domestic politics had also been convinced that the Privy Council would decide against ratification. Katō might have taken comfort from the fact that the sub-committee believed that the Prime Minister had now agreed that the naval strength ought to be decided by the Navy Minister, with the Chief of Staff's agreement and that they had grave doubts concerning either Hamaguchi or Takarabe's versions of events involving Katō. Nevertheless these were minor gains, the battle over ratification had been lost and the anti-treaty and anti-government forces outmanoeuvred by Prime Minister Hamaguchi. All that remained now was to ensure that the cabinet kept to its promises on the supplementary budgets for the navy and that further efforts to strengthen the Naval General Staff vis-a-vis the Navy Ministry (and therefore the cabinet) would continue.

CHAPTER TEN

KATŌ'S FINAL YEARS

On 1 October 1930, immediately after the Privy Council and cabinet had given their approval, the London Treaty received Imperial sanction. Katō and those of like mind had failed in their efforts to prevent both the signing and the ratification of the treaty. However, this did not imply that Katō and the navy were now prepared to abandon the issue. The treaty decision was irreversible but discussions on the navy's supplementary budget to remedy 'defects' in the treaty had still to be completed. On this issue the navy, including Takiguchi, Katō's successor as Chief of the Naval General Staff, were determined to see that the cabinet fulfilled its previous promises. These had been given by the cabinet at the time of the final dispatch of instructions to London, and subsequent to the Supreme Military Council's report on the treaty issue. The cabinet had promised to fulfill its obligation "economic and other circumstances permitting". The navy was demanding an expediture of 500 million yen, a figure which seriously threatened the Minseito programme of economic retrenchment. A series of complex and often heated discussions between the navy and the government ensued, in which the government sought a reduction in expenditure of around 125 million yen. However, the navy was not prepared to go below the figure of 378 million yen.<1> Eventually a compromise was reached but not before the conflict between

the navy and the government had been made public. Naturally Katō Kanji was involved in this controversy since he was determined that the government should provide the money for the entire supplementary budget. The new Chief of the Naval General Staff was also most concerned as the government had apparently reneged on its promise. On 22 October 1930, following discussions with the Finance Minister, Deputy Navy Minister Kobayashi told Harada Kumao that:

> the navy appropriation has been reduced far below our expectations. With an allocation like this the Navy can move neither hand nor foot.<2>

If the naval officers selected by the dominant 'pro-treaty' forces were dissatisfied with the government's handling of the supplementary budget, then it is hardly surprising that Katō Kanji again entered the conflict. Katō was determined that the government should be compelled to provide the money for the entire supplementary budget. Speaking to newsmen at this time Katō stated:

> It is dangerous for rank outsiders to argue about naval armament. The navy's supplementary program is the absolute minimum. On this matter of disarmament we persist in our original belief. Armaments never have the waging of war as their objective. But each country must possess them so that the very existence of the state may not be endangered. The strength allowed us under the London Treaty, unless the supplementary program is established fully, will be a most serious matter for the rise or fall of the state. Especially in view of the government's response to the Throne that it would take all necessary measures to insure national defence once the treaty was ratified. I feel that we must look forward to the fulfillment of our national defence plans through complete realization of the navy's supplementary program. Talk of resolving our national defence needs through political solutions is an extremely dangerous layman's notion and it makes me shudder for the consequences it may have.<3>

For Harada, this statement was positive evidence that

Katō was continuing to attack the London Treaty. But although this statement implied a dislike of the treaty and the way it was concluded, the real message was rather different. It was that Katō was now prepared to accept the treaty publicly, provided the supplementary budget for the navy was fulfilled. The battle over the supplementary budget was not confined to the navy and the cabinet since the opposition Seiyūkai party was still searching for ways of bringing down the Minseito administration. Yamamoto Teijirō, a leading opposition party politician, sent a number of letters to Katō in late 1930. In a letter dated 8 November 1930 he spelled out the Seiyūkai position.<4> In rather vague terms he hinted that if the navy was to bring down the cabinet as the army had brought down the Saionji cabinet before the First World War, then the Seiyukai would rebuild the national finances and meet the navy's demands in full. There is however no evidence that Katō was active in any efforts to bring down the cabinet at this time. Indeed Katō had tearfully promised Navy Minister Takarabe he would cease "contacts with politicians of low class and scheming minds" and that "I shall never again see such persons. In fact I have already been careful to break this practice."<5> It may well be true that Katō was sincere and did not actively pursue party links, but he did receive visits from many politicians in the months that followed. He may not have actively sought such meetings himself but, as the government appeared to be going back on its word, Katō again became more actively involved in the political debate over the supplementary budget for the navy.

Thus, the London Treaty issue continued to have a major effect on the Hamaguchi cabinet and they were clearly not to be permitted to savour for long the fruits of this apparent victory for civilian control of the military. Admiral Takarabe had resigned immediately after ratification, thus fulfilling an Imperial request to see the treaty through to ratification. On 24 November, Premier Hamaguchi was shot down by an assassin and Wakatsuki Reijirō took control of the Cabinet. Hamaguchi died of his wounds in August 1931.<6> The shooting of Hamaguchi was linked to the London Treaty and especially the 'infringement of the supreme command'. Thus the only two prime ministers who ever occupied the Navy Minister protem portfolio, Hara in 1921 and Hamaguchi in 1930 were both to die for reasons which included alleged 'crimes' against the military authorities during negotiations over naval limitation treaties. Harada Kumao, mirroring the opinions of many liberals no doubt, felt that there was a possibility that Katō was involved either directly or indirectly in this. Deputy Navy Minister Kobayashi promised to investigate this and take prompt steps to deal with the matter.<7> Katō's diary entry for that day had used the same term "ruffian" which Harada used to describe the assassin and it apears most unlikely that Katō had, in any conscious way, sought to aid anyone attempting such a deed. However, he had been the central figure in the 'infringement of the supreme command" problem and thus was possibly indirectly responsible. Certainly his words and deeds had a considerable impact on many people, especially right wing and nationalist extremists within and outside the

military.

On 2 February 1931 Foreign Minister Shidehara, one of the principal architects of the London Treaty agreement, committed a classic "slip of the tongue" in the Diet. In answering a question on the treaty he had stated that the Emperor had ratified it therefore it was acceptable. This was immediately seized upon by opposition politicians as being disrespectful of the Emperor and attempting to make the Emperor responsible (and not the cabinet) for the treaty and involving the Imperial institution in politics. Extremists on the opposition benches seized their opportunity and brought in Seiyūkai ingaidan (party strong arm squads) which made further parliamentary debate impossible. Three days later when the Minseitō attempted to restart debate in the budget committee, a riot broke out on the floor of the Diet and at least ten people were injured and disturbances continued for some days afterwards. Thus the London Treaty crisis continued to influence events and appeared increasingly to be associated with political violence.

On 10 December, the navy had finally agreed to a compromise proposal which provided the major part of their demands and this was coupled with the promise of a further supplement later.<8> Details of this second supplementary budget were kept secret but, whilst it may have satisfied Taniguchi, the Chief of the Naval General Staff and other leaders within the navy, it did not meet Katō's demand that the navy obtain the original supplementary budget in full. On 23 February 1931, Admiral Okada told Prince Saionji's

secretary that he had heard, from the Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff, that Kato had been in contact with the Seikyōsha, a right wing nationalist group.<9> Kato had apparently told them of the existence and content of the second supplementary plan and the promise the navy had received from the Prime Minister. Katō also told them that if the second supplementary plan was not completed then this would contradict the Supreme Military Council reply to the throne prior to ratification. Apparently the Seikyōsha made a copy of his statement and distributed it to certain members of the House of Peers. This inevitably created further problems and yet more controversy.<10> Okada warned Kato that he must be more careful. The Seikyōsha published the influential right wing nationalist magazine Nihon Oyobi Nihonjin (Japan and the Japanese) and in the March 1931 issue, there appeared an article entitled "An open letter to Admiral Katō". In this Katō was urged to fight against the "reduced budget" and stay true to his previous declarations. It also demanded that the proposed second supplementary budget be made public.<11>

Other events in 1931 and 1932 pushed matters of naval limitation and naval budgets into the background as the Minseito government sought to retain control of Japan's domestic and international policymaking. The Minseito cabinet, weakened by the loss of Hamaguchi, was faced with a worsening domestic and international economic situation and by an increase in army pressure for more funding. In September 1931 Great Britain abandoned the gold standard thus undermining the economic policies of the Minseito

cabinet. In that same month the Manchurian Incident occurred and the ability of civilian policymakers to control the army's expansionist policy on the Asian mainland effectively ended.<12> Thus one month after Hamaguchi's death the economic and diplomatic policies of economic retrenchment and 'cooperative diplomacy' were almost completely undermined.

The Mukden Incident and the broader Manchurian Incident were essentially army affairs and the navy did not ~~not~~ openly support this particular 'continental adventurism'. Nevertheless Katō, as a Supreme Military Councillor, was involved in numerous discussions on Manchuria and his considerable expertise on the Soviet Union proved an important asset. Katō also attended many functions at the Russo-Japanese Society and met various Soviet diplomatic officials and sent a number of opinion papers on Manchurian developments to the Foreign Ministry and the army.

The escalation in political violence continued during 1931 and into 1932. It was especially marked among young officers of the army and navy who were increasingly involved with extremists determined to force Japan back on to what they thought was the proper course for the nation. The fall of the Minseitō cabinet in December 1931 brought the Seiyukai, led by Inukai Tsuyoshi, to power.<13> This Seiyukai cabinet however, despite new economic policies, found that it could not solve the major domestic and international problems facing Japan either. The army's expanded operations on the Asian continent destroyed any hope of restructuring domestic finances as well as any

chance of international cooperation in solving Japan's continuing economic crisis. The world depression had all but destroyed progress towards collective security and a new cooperative world order and the economic crises forced nations increasingly to turn inward for economic and political survival. Japan's problems were not merely economic and the increasing influence of top level military, especially army officers, in national policy caused considerable problems. In addition young military officers from both services were increasingly involved in political violence.<14> This was not simply because of the changing nature of civil-military relations in Japan. A major factor was the rapid decline in the confidence of younger military officers of both services in their own superiors. The latter development was sometimes directly but more often indirectly connected with the London Treaty and 'Supreme Command' crises.

In 1931 increased military involvement on the Asian mainland had been primarily an army matter. However the Shanghai Incident of January 1932 involved joint army/navy operations and brought Japan even more criticism from the rest of the world.<15> Katō's diaries for this period are not detailed but show that he met a vast number of important military, diplomatic and party officials. Katō was also in demand regarding visits from important foreign dignitaries. His diary indicates he was asked for advice on the recent election of American President Roosevelt and that he was also involved in discussions with the Lytton Commission visiting Japan as part of the League of Nations

investigation of the Manchurian Crisis. In 1932, he was clearly most concerned with naval involvement at Shanghai and recorded daily developments including the names of prominent young officers killed, especially those who were sons of his colleagues or were known to him personally. Katō later received an Imperial appointment as Chairman of the Special Commemorative Ceremony at the Yasukini Shrine for the war dead at Shanghai. In all of these things Kato's experience, ability and position as a Supreme Military Councillor made him a natural sounding board for various people attempting to solve many of the problems facing Japan at this time. However, it would be wrong to place too great an importance on his role. His influence is difficult to measure but one could not say that he was initiating any developments at this time. More and more it appears that others were using Katō in support of their own policies.

In March and October 1931 coup d'etat plans by middle echelon military officers were thwarted.<16> But in May 1932, the so-called 'May 15 Incident' occurred when young naval officer cadets, aided by army colleagues and civilian right wing fanatics, carried out a series of violent acts. They assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi and hurled bombs at the residence of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Count Makino, the Metropolitan Police headquarters, the Seiyukai offices and the Mitsubishi Bank. Katō's diary entry read:

> 5.30-5.45 army/navy officers and army cadets, 18 in all, attacked the Prime Minister's official residence. He received serious wounds. Immediately phoned Prince Fushimi, Admiral Togo and Count Ogasawara.<17>

As with the attack on Hamaguchi over the London Treaty, Kato's name was once again linked with with these violent events. The evidence in the trials of the perpetrators of these deeds invariably included Katō's name. The Kido diaries reveal that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Count Makino, whose house was bombed, mentioned the testimony of one defendant who had said that Makino had blocked Kato's report to the throne on 31 March and 1 April 1930.<18> In September 1932 defendants in the 'May 15 Incident' trial were demanding recognition that Katō's access to the throne had been blocked during the treaty debate.<19> The 'supreme command' again was a feature of the trial. The airing of the defendants statements appeared not to work against them but seemed if anything, to further exacerbate the feelings of those who had opposed the London Conference. The defendants had clearly intended to eliminate people who might have allowed a simililar "betrayal" at the next naval limitation conference.

By now, the close relationship between Kato's struggle during the London Conference and the politics of violence was even more clear. This was especially true of the accusations of palace officials being involved on the pro-treaty side. Although a similar accusation had circulated in April and May 1930 it did not surface in the Privy Council cross-examinations during the ratification debate. Katō cannot be directly connected in any way with the 'May 15 Incident' but he was clearly very much in the minds of these young officers. Katō had previously stated his concern, in early 1930, that junior naval officers might

get out of control unless the navy put its own house in order. But his frequent controversial statements and his manipulation by Suetsugu and the right wing, possibly render Katō partially responsible for inciting these young men, even though it was not deliberate. Katō was obviously a symbol for these young officers. On the day before the 'May 15 Incident' Kita Ikki, a key influence on the young officers involved in the violence, had visited Katō urging the establishing of a strong cabinet.<20>

Katō had continued throughout 1931 and 1932 to carry out the numerous duties of a Supreme Military Councillor. This included visits to military facilities, manoeuvres, inspection trips and the like. He had also kept abreast of domestic political developments, especially the inter-party battle for control of the cabinet and the increased military intervention, both violent and non-violent, in government.

The assassination of Prime Minister Inukai on 15 May 1932, did not result in a stronger Seiyūkai cabinet but in a so-called 'national unity' cabinet headed by Saitō Makoto, a former naval officer.<21> The latter had been one of the leading naval elders on the side of the pro-treaty forces during the London Treaty Crisis. It seems reasonable to assume that, given the expectation of a new naval limitation conference in 1935, Saitō's appointment was probably a major factor in the navy now turning its attention seriously to dealing with the naval limitation issue, especially since a pro-treaty admiral now occupied the premiership. During 1931 and early 1932, the issue of naval limitation had featured only indirectly in that various events had caused

people to continually reflect on the London Treaty Crisis of 1930. However, the problem from this point on was how to cope with the forthcoming naval conference or, as the vast force of navy and other propogandists chose to call it 'the coming crisis of 1935/36'.

Katō and Naval Politics 1932-34

The result of the London Naval Treaty crisis had been a badly divided navy. This split, which is often depicted as a jōyaku-ha (Treaty faction) versus kantai-ha (Fleet faction) split, might more accurately be termed a schism between a hitherto dominant gunseiha (administrative faction) and a gunreiha (command faction). These two factions, centred mainly in the Navy Ministry and Naval General Staff respectively, had for some years been engaged in a battle for supremacy within the navy. Hitherto, the Naval General Staff had occupied the subordinate position and Katō Kanji continued to play a key role in this internal power struggle.<22> On the surface, the events of 1930 over the right to decide the strength of the navy, appeared to have thwarted the efforts of Katō Kanji and his subordinates to increase the power of the the Naval General Staff in such matters. But, as the debate over ratification showed, the Naval General Staff had actually made a number of definite gains in terms of the allocation of decisionmaking power within the navy on naval strength. This was mainly due to the strength of Katō Kanji and the relative weakness of Navy Minister Takarabe. The appointments of Katō and Suetsugu prior to the London Treaty, had clearly been important

elements in a shift in 'de facto' power within the navy towards the Naval General Staff. As the previous chapter showed, Katō obtained virtual equality for the Chief of the Naval General Staff in future decisions on naval strength by forcing Takarabe to agree to an internal memorandum on the subject. Hamaguchi, in his various statements during the treaty debate, had repeatedly stated that Katō and the Naval General Staff had been consulted but, in his statement later to the Privy Council, Hamaguchi had actually said that he had obtained the Chief's (Katō's) tacit consent. To some shrewd observers this was regarded as tantamount to an admission that the permission of the Naval General Staff had been required. Therefore, although the cabinet had triumphed over the Naval General Staff regarding the signing and ratification of the treaty and had dismissed the internal agreement as a purely internal matter, there had been a distinct shift in power distribution which in the longer term weakened the power of the Navy Ministry.

The events of 1931 and early 1932 were probably an important factor in lessening the friction between the two groups within the navy but in fact, considerable damage had been done. The Naval General Staff were merely awaiting the opportunity to launch a major offensive against the Navy Ministry and the 'administrative faction'. The army, as a strategy for improving its negotiating position with the government, had appointed Imperial Prince Kanin as Chief of the General Staff and the navy, in an apparent response to this, appointed Imperial Prince Fushimi as his navy counterpart.<23>

It is usually suggested that the appointment of imperial princes to these top posts was a device to ensure more effective access to the throne. Princes Kanin and Fushimi in theory, now possessed dual access to the Emperor as Chiefs of Staff and members of the Imperial family. But, as the London Treaty debate showed, the Emperor and his close advisers were determined to prevent imperial princes abusing their privileges or being manipulated by others. Both before and after his appointment, the Emperor refused audiences to Prince Fushimi on naval matters and on occasion rebuked him severely. The real importance of appointing an imperial prince was far more important in intra-military politics. In the case of the navy, the appointment of Prince Fushimi was the ideal opportunity for the Naval General Staff to challenge the traditional domination of the Navy Ministry. A Navy Minister would have needed considerable nerve and support to refuse the wishes of an imperial prince. Prince Fushimi was generally regarded as a man manipulated by his subordinates. This is probably true of the efforts to reform the Naval General Staff which were carried out in his name. However Prince Fushimi had made known his support of the Chief of the Naval General Staff's (Kato's) position on the supreme command, during the London treaty crisis and had even volunteered to speak to the Emperor about it.

Yale Candee Maxon, citing the Harada Saionji memoirs, wrote of the reforms of the Naval General Staff in 1933:

> In the summer of 1933, Admiral Katō Kanji ... and Viscount Kaneko seem to have prevailed upon the nominal Navy chief of staff, Prince Fushimi, to request that the respective powers of the Navy

> minister and the navy chief of staff be changed to approximate those existing between the war minister and the Army chief of staff - to request an increase in the power of the navy chief of staff relative to the navy minister.<24>

Harada heard this from Rear Admiral Terashima, chief of the Navy Ministry's naval affairs bureau, but in fact the conclusions of Harada and others are open to question. The planning for such reforms commenced much earlier than the summer of 1933 and can be dated from the appointment of Rear Admiral Takahashi Sankichi as Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff in February of 1932. At this time he was President of the Naval War College and he exchanged places with Rear Admiral Hyakutake Gengo who had only been in his post a mere four months. Hyakutake, who had served under Katō when the latter was Chief Gunner of the Mikasa, was convinced that this was a result of "Admiral Kato Kanji urging navy minister Osumi to exchange the two officers".<25> Whilst it was most unusual for a Supreme Military Councillor to interfere in such appointments, Professor Nomura Minoru feels that Katō, being six academy classes senior to Navy Minister Osumi, put pressure on him which he found impossible to refuse.<26> The new Vice-Chief Takahashi Sankichi, was the same officer who had carried out research and discussions on Katō's behalf regarding the strengthening of the Naval General Staff in 1922 and 1923. There is little doubt that Takahashi effectively ran the Naval General Staff and used his royal superior to implement sweeping reforms. He came to dominate the Staff in much the same way as Katō had done after the Washington Conference and may well have learned from Katō's example. Takahashi

was clearly a protege and admirer of Katō and even suggested to Katō that he might again become Chief in the event of a national emergency. But it should be borne in mind that in 1923 Takahashi had continued to agitate for a strengthened Naval General Staff even after Katō had urged him to cease doing so. It is possible that Katō had engineered Takahashi's appointment so as to carry out precisely those reforms since the time was more opportune, but it may be that Katō was simply recommending someone whom he knew would be needed, to run the organisation in the name of the "robot" prince.<27> Katō was most certainly involved in the later stages of the reforms and, when the two service ministers and two chiefs of staff signed a document on the rights of deciding the military strengths in January 1933, the document was passed to Katō who in turn passed it to Privy Councillor Kaneko Kentarō. Katō and Kaneko were known to have colluded during the London Treaty Crisis over how the right of the supreme command ought to be interpreted. Indeed Katō recalled Kaneko lecturing Prince Fushimi and colleagues on the subject at that time. Katō had studied the various regulations at great length and was undoubtedly influenced strongly by the interpretations of Kaneko who had been involved in the drafting of the Meiji Constitution. Kaneko was the legal expert behind Katō's revised regulations on the strength issue during the ratification dispute and it is hardly surprising that Katō and Kaneko should be called on in 1933 to help with the legal aspects of revising naval general staff regulations.<28> Katō himself seems to have been closely involved with the

revision of the "Regulations Concerning the Mutual Jurisdiction of the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff" and proudly recorded the gratitude for his efforts shown by Prince Fushimi suggesting that even giving up his life would be insufficient in return for the nice things that the Prince had said to him.<29> The end result was a series of far reaching reforms in September 1933 which totally realigned the power stucture within the navy and made the Naval General Staff Chief superior even in peacetime on command matters. Osumi the Navy Minister, had tried to explain the necessity of the changes for improving relations between the Chief of Staff and the Navy Ministry, but the Emperor retorted that he was far more concerned about the relation between the Chief of the Naval General Staff and the cabinet!<30> The changes affected all areas of civil-military relations and by increasing the powers of the navy's Chief of Staff, caused problems at Imperial Headquarters regarding jurisdiction between the army and navy General Staffs.

Katō's involvement in the strengthening of the Naval General Staff, both directly and indirectly was considerable. He had already made certain incursions into the areas traditionally regarded as the Navy Ministry's domain, by obtaining Takarabe's approval on the 'joint agreement' on naval strength and now with these reforms, the Staff moved from equality to superiority in this area. However, to credit (or blame) Katō for directly masterminding the initiative taken under Prince Fushimi, does not take into account sufficiently the determination of

Takahashi Sankichi and indeed Fushimi himself to strengthen this organisation. It would perhaps be more accurate to say the changes were initiated by followers of Katō Kanji. There can be no doubt that Katō was a willing and active participant in the later stages and was undoubtedly highly delighted with the results.

Such a drastic realignment in the power structure within the navy could not but produce confrontation and for those officers, mainly in the Navy Ministry, who attempted to resist the reforming zeal of Takahashi and his superior Prince Fushimi, defeat was to be followed by voluntary and compulsory resignations. In 1933 some of the finest brains in the Adminstrative Faction went into the reserve, prematurely ending distinguished careers. This was the so-called "Osumi purge" and Asada Sadao stated "The mastermind behind this so-called "Osumi purge" was again Katō Kanji".<31> Whilst there is a certain amount of circumstantial evidence to connect Katō with the Naval General Staff reform movement, there is no evidence at all that he was responsible for the "Purge". It was not, as is often stated, a witchhunt amongst the moderate top echelon "treaty faction" it was something more than that. Harada, who was informed of the intimate details of the resignations and 'sackings" by Admiral Kobayahi stated as follows:

> Furthermore, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Prince Fushimi, desires the personal resignation of those who had any connections with the London treaty or persons in the navy ministry who criticised the revision of the Naval General Staff.<32> (emphasis mine)

It would seem more accurate to see the "purge" as the inevitable result of an intra-organisational struggle for

supremacy between the administrative and command factions of the navy. Viewed from this perspective the London Treaty Crisis itself appears more a symptom of longstanding rivalry, a crisis which merely brought matters to a head. Such bitter infighting inevitably led to a series of resignations, especially by officers who had tried to resist the demands of an imperial prince, who also now happened to be an Admiral of The Fleet (gensui) as well as the Chief of the Naval General Staff. Katō's diary gives no indication whatsoever that he controlled Prince Fushimi. The latter seems to have been controlled during the Treaty debate by a Captain Katō of the Operations Bureau of the Naval General Staff and by Takahashi during the organisational reforms.

The tendency in the existing literature, especially in the works of Stephen Pelz and Asada Sadao, has been to accord Katō a far more powerful role than he really merits. Undoubtedly his influence pervades the reforms and the 'purge' but the available historical evidence does not warrant the contention that he instigated either development. Nor does it sustain Asada's contention that he was at the peak of his powers in 1933/34.<33> It appears much more likely that his power was declining steadily from mid-1930 on, although his 'involvement' continued.

Preparing for the next Naval Conference

The damage to Japan's international image resulting from military expansion on the Asian mainland and Japan's notification of her intent to secede from the League of

Nations in 1933, contributed to an increased perception by policymakers and public alike that Japan was becoming increasingly isolated from the world community. As the sense of insecurity increased, the belief in the benefits from international cooperation, decreased. These develoments combined with increased military intervention in domestic politics tended to create a heightened sense of vulnerability by Japanese civilian leaders. They now began to adopt a more cautious approach to further arms control agreements and avoided too open a committment to a pro-treaty posture. Moreover, the internal power and personnel realignments within the navy produced a growing consensus that naval limitation would only be acceptable if Japan's terms were met. A major shift in emphasis required a realignment, not only in naval politics but also changes in national politics and the creation of a 'strong cabinet'. By this, Katō and others meant a cabinet which would adopt a hardline approach in future naval limitations talks and Premier Saitō Makoto was a strong supporter of Shidehara-style, soft-line diplomacy as his activities during the London Treaty cisis of 1930 showed. Preparations for the coming conference went through three distinct phases, first the decision to abrogate the Washington treaties, second the formation of a strong cabinet and third the actual preparations for the forthcoming conference. Katō was to be involved in all three phases to varying degrees and clearly the changes in the domestic and international political climate had shifted quite dramatically in the direction favoured by Kato and other

'hardliners' on naval limitation agreements.

The strengthening of the Naval General Staff and the 'purge' of certain key pro-treaty officers had been a positive indication of the shift in internal power alignments within the navy. This shift was in the direction of adopting a very hardline attitude towards previous and future agreements on naval limitation. Parallel with these changes Japan's role in the international community had also changed dramatically as a result of her military expansionist policy on the Asian mainland. This in turn led to growing international criticism of Japan which by late 1932 was so strong that Japan felt compelled to leave the League of Nations. In March 1933 Japan gave the statutory two years notice of secession from the League. The sense of isolation and possibly ostracism especially over her behaviour in establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo, created an environment within Japan which could easily be manipulated by right wing nationalists as well as military propogandists. Greater control of the media by such people led to the emergence of a 'Garrison State' mentality. Japan's expansion on the Asian mainland concerned naval arms limitation since control of the seas around Japan meant she could operate with relative impunity on the mainland. But even without this 'continental adventurism' on the part of Japan the structure of naval limitation based international relations would have been under a great strain. World Depression, French, German and Italian competition in armaments and other factors all combined to produce an atmosphere of mutual suspicion rather than

international cooperation. Britain was being forced to consider accelerated naval building programmes against the European Powers and was beginning to question the policy of cooperating with the United States. Japan was unhappy with the inferior ratio and the United States, from 1933, began building up to treaty limits. President Roosevelt's motives were probably political in that he needed to improve America's negotiating position at the next naval conference but were also related to job creation as part of an economic recovery programme.

For Katō and the navy, the period 1931-32 was one in which naval limitation had been pushed into the background. In early 1933, the navy began again to systematically study naval limitation, since another conference was imminent. The Washington treaties could be terminated in 1936 but only by giving two years notice, otherwise they would run on automatically. The London Treaty however would automatically terminate on the last day of 1936. If Japan wished to end or renegotiate limitation and especially ratios on a different basis, naval policy would have to be decided and approved before the end of 1934. In May 1933, a temporary investigation section was established in the Navy Ministry's Secretariat to prepare for the next conference and American naval intelligence was already, in June 1933, clearly aware of the likely approach that Japanese naval policy at the next conference would take:

> The Japanese Naval Staff is taking the attitude that the next conference will be in the nature of a crisis, and that Japan must prepare for it now. From statements by senior officers, Japan will either get parity with Great Britain and the USA or will withdraw from the conference and shape her

naval policy as she thinks best.<34>

The Supreme Military Council, in its report to the throne in 1930, had stated that after 1936, Japan should shape her policy as she saw best, in effect stating that new arrangements would have to be made. Comments by Japanese representatives at the League of Nations were also extremely critical of the London Treaty in this period.

Commander Ishikawa Shingo of the Naval General Staff sent Katō a position paper on the next conference in October 1933 and on 21 November it was approved by the Naval General Staff. Its most important proposal was the scrapping of the ratio and the assertion of the right to equality. He also demanded the scrapping of capital ships and aircraft carriers and free choice within categories to suit national needs under a fixed tonnage ceiling for all countries. Katō had a very high opinion indeed of Ishikawa and forecast a great future for him.<35> However, there were people within the Naval General Staff who would have been happy with a ratio revised upwards to around 80% of the United States. By 1933 this figure was probably an accurate reflection of the actual situation since Japan had built her fleet up to treaty limits whilst the United States had not yet done so. However the principle of the inherent right to equality was adopted and was, of course, strongly supported by Kato, Suetsugu Nobumasa now Commander-in-Chief Combined fleet and Prince Fushimi, Chief of the Naval General Staff among others. By June 1934 the navy plan for limitation negotiations had been finalised and on 27 June was sent to the army authorities for approval.<36> The single most

important element was the demand that America and Britain must recognise the Japanese claim to equality under an agreed upper limit of tonnage. Failure to obtain this would mean that Japan would leave the conference. Japan's claim of the principle to equality which, it should be pointed out did not necessarily imply that Japan would actually build a fleet equal to these powers, obviously required a strong cabinet and the abrogation of the Washington Treaties by the end of the year. A failure to abrogate would mean that the 5:5:3 ratio would continue for capital ships. Developments in terms of naval limitation in early 1933 and 1934 were obviously moving in a direction favourable to Kato since his cherished wish to see Japan liberated from the restrictions of an 'inferior ratio' now appeared to be moving towards realisation.

At this time, Katō received two important appointments from the Emperor. In April 1934, Katō received an Imperial appointment as Chairman of a special committee at the Yasukuni Shrine, to carry out a special ceremony for those who had died in the recent fighting in Manchuria and Shanghai.<37> A month later his great hero, Admiral Tōgō died at the age of 88 and was honoured with a state funeral. Katō received an Imperial appointment as Chief Priest at Tōgō's funeral.<38> Along with such formal imperial appointments, Katō was also asked to give a keynote lecture at the special ceremony celebrating the 50th Anniversary for the "Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors". Such developments, when combined with the widespread acceptance within the navy of Katō's perceptions

of the iniquities of the ratio system, appeared to indicate that Katō himself was being elevated to a position whereby he was increasingly regarded as the embodiment of the true Japanese naval officer, just as Tōgō had been. Certainly, within military circles, his prestige was very high. Given his past "problems" with court officials, the imperial appointments suggest that his standing was such that the Imperial Court was compelled to honour him but such honours as were bestowed were transitory rather than permanent.

Katō, the Fleet Memorial and the Premiership

In early 1934 Katō again became heavily involved in manoeuvrings in the navy and in national politics. In June, Harada Kumao noted that Katō and Suetsugu were "drunk with power" and were intriguing with officers of the fleet, urging them to advocate a harder line on disarmament and the need for a strong cabinet.<39> Harada's sources for the information were Admiral Osumi and Admiral Kobayashi, the Navy Minister and Deputy Navy Minister respectively. According to Kobayashi:

> Admiral Katō summoned Chief engineer Machida (Captain) before the combined fleet moved out and told him that both in the Naval General Staff and in the Navy Ministry the heads (of departments) are weak. Therefore the men of the fleet must combine and take a strong stand against disarmament.' Secondly the coming cabinet must be a strong one. He (Admiral Katō) hinted that he wouldn't mind being the head of it and instigated Machida to work with Captain Nagumo of the Second Squadron in visiting the various squadron commanders of the combined fleet and writing a combined report.<40>

The Kido diary records almost the same story, heard from Harada via Navy Minister Osumi but Kido wrote:

> Admiral Katō Kanji was said to have disclosed his idea ... to the effect that the naval reduction agreement should be abrogated immediately and the next cabinet should be a "national unity cabinet" and, under the circumstances, he wished them to assist him in creating such a situation as to make him premier.<41>

According to both accounts the officers of the fleet responded favourably to adopting a hardline approach on naval reduction and proposals for abrogation. But they refused to be drawn into political issues concerning the making or unmaking of cabinets. Nevertheless, a memorial was produced and presented to Prince Fushimi by Admiral Suetsugu, Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet. Fushimi was outraged by this blatant political manoeuvring by Suetsugu and Katō. Both were severely reprimanded and Harada stated that relations betwen Fushimi and Katō after this were increasingly distant.<42> Prince Fushimi, after investigating the matter, heard that Suetsugu had acted under the orders of Katō but, given their past relationship it seems probable that Suetsugu probably inveigled Katō into acting rather than the reverse. As to Katō wishing to be made Prime Minister this would appear to have been the result of suggestions from Baron Hiranuma. In June 1934 the Saito cabinet was nearing collapse and there was considerable activity over finding a suitable replacement. Among the front runners were Suzuki Kisaburō, head of the largest faction in the Seiyūkai and Baron Hiranuma of the Privy Council. Prince Saionji found neither a pleasing possibility. Saionji told Harada on 19 June that Nakagawa Kojirō met Hiranuma who had announced:

> I have no intention of taking charge of the

> political situation. Please relay to Prince Saionji that Katō Kanji is suitable as the next prime minister. He [Hiranuma] added that Mazaki, Araki and War Minister Hayashi held the same view over the appointment of Katō. Nakagawa met the war minister and was told "Admiral Katō is a good choice".<43>

Saionji, probably correctly, perceived this as a strategy by which Hiranuma could control the cabinet from behind the scenes probably as Home Minister, since the baron knew that Saionji would not permit his appointment as Premier. Katō recorded in his own diary on 17 June that month "Hiranuma promised to help". Thus although Katō undoubtedly began pushing for support for himself as Premier within the fleet, he had probably been approached by Hiranuma beforehand. Kato failed to perceive that Hiranuma, as he had during the London Treaty Crisis, was merely manipulating him for his own political ends.

Nevertheless, the memorial was also leaked to the Press and the Nichi Nichi Shinbun, with which Katō had a special relationship, supported Katō's candidacy for the premiership.<44> Undoubtedly Katō would have been delighted to have headed a cabinet which abrogated the Washington Treaties and thus liberated Japan from the "inferior ratio". His own political ambitions seem to have gone no further than the creation of a strong "national unity" cabinet for this purpose. However even such limited ambitions were thwarted by Prince Saionji's determination not to submit to the increasingly nationalistic, hardline elements now tending to dominate Japanese politics at almost all levels. He refused to return to a party cabinet and instead appointed Admiral Okada Keisuke as the head of yet

another "national unity" cabinet. This was a double blow to Kato since Okada was not only pro-treaty and a moderate but was also from Kato's own village. Katō and Okada had once been close but the events of 1930 had caused a rift and they were now bitter rivals. On 9 July, Katō recorded that he would not attend the official banquet for Okada and the next day he was counselled to play down his anti-Okada attitude.<45> However, the appointment of Okada was not a major reversal for naval planners who were now moving rapidly towards declaring for a policy of scrapping the treaties.

Katō's thoughts at this time are clearly documented but what is difficult to ascertain is how deeply he was involved in this movement to abrogate the treaties. His diary does not provide any real evidence that he played a key role although clearly the navy position now reflected policies Katō had long advocated. Katō's approach over the years on naval limitation were now almost conventional wisdom within naval circles. Katō himself was continually consulted but usually at a very late stage. One could argue, though it seems less likely, that it was not necessary to continually consult him since he was effectively controlling the navy through loyal subordinates.<46>

On 16 August 1934, Katō's diary stated simply "received clear declaration from Navy Minister Osumi to scrap the treaties". This referred to a top level meeting of navy leaders and fleet commanders held that day. Katō had spoken on behalf of the officers present to the Navy Minister's proposal to abrogate the treaties and repeated many of his

past pronouncements on the subject of naval limitation.<47> But there were two versions of the document presented by Kato at this meeting and the omissions from the final document are most interesting in indicating Katō's thinking.

Katō stated that the principle of the ratio contained in the Washington Treaties had been the "root of evil", had badly affected morale in the navy and had been a misapplication and abuse of the fundamentals of arms limitation. He thoroughly concurred, as did his fellow officers present, with the decision to abandon the ratios. He perceived the success or failure of the assertions being presented at the meeting to be crucial to the control of the navy, the rise and fall of morale, the life and death of Japan's China and Manchuria policy and finally:

> We must say that the policy indicated today is truly final. Our navy is in a position where our backs are to the wall and it is obvious that all of us here, and the entire navy must cooperate to reach these objectives....<48>

In his first draft version, Katō had described how America had manipulated the world media into believing that the discussions had been based on "existing strength" when in fact the ratios had been merely an argument over 60% or 70% bearing no real relationship to the true "existing strength". He deeply regretted that Japan had not achieved the right of "freely decided power under a fixed world standard at Washington". He then said "Today those cancers are going to be cut out" but this probably referred to agreement on a ratio rather than all the Washington treaties or naval arms limitation in general. He concluded:

> If it is possible for us to decide our level of military power autonomously and to expand and

> contract this according to the national economy, then our navy, on the basis of increase of morale and self confidence, which will be produced by this, can expect victory no matter what percentage of national power our potential enemy possesses. I believe it will be like the Russo-Japanese campaign.<49>

This in a way contradicts what Katō had said in 1923 when he had told young officers at the Navy War College that conditions were no longer similar to those in the Russo-Japanese War and that material strength was vital. He appears here to be shifting towards a brand of spiritualism but it was after all a speech in front of fleet commanders. It is always difficult when reading such a speech for one to separate the psychologically effective exhorations from what officers such as Katō actually believed. Furthermore, Kato recognised that Japan could hardly be expected to build a fleet equal to that of the United States or Great Britain and he had to show that the Japanese Navy was still confident of victory even if materially inferior.

The navy had now decided on abrogation of the Washington Treaty but the Okada cabinet was vacillating and Katō noted press reports stating the illogicality of such vacillation. Okada felt that it would be better to delay the formal announcement of abrogation lest it make the preliminary negotiations difficult if not impossible. Of course, giving notice of abrogation did not imply that the navy was advocating a no-treaty situation, but rather that they wished to remove the 'inferior ratio'. However, Japanese policymakers knew well that the United States was absolutely determined to retain the ratio system almost unchanged.

In terms of naval limitaion 1933 and 1934 were good years for Kato since his cherished wish of seeing Japan freed from the discriminatory ratio system seemed well on the way to realisation.

The government finally conceded on abrogation but Kato noted on 19 December 1934 that there were rumours of a movement to postpone abrogation amongst the Japanese diplomats in London. Katō immediatly contacted Katō, Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff who reassured him they would respond quickly to such moves. Then on 19 December the Supreme Military Council approved the decision to announce the abrogation of the treaties and on 22 December notification was sent to Washington. Katō was clearly delighted and on the day the notification was announced, Katō's biographers described it thus:

> When he received the report on the abrogation his joy was almost unbearable. He changed into full uniform and reported in front of Tōgō's tomb in Tama cemetery. On his way home he visited Ogasawara. Since he was not at home Kato left his card. On the card the following was written: At last the announcement of the abrogation of the treaty has been made. It seems we are now at the dawn of the revival of the Imperial Navy and I have just been to Tama cemetery. I have reported in front of our departed Admiral of the Fleet's tomb and I feel I have slightly eased his soul.<50>

Katō wrote again in his diary on 3 January that:

> I walked through the streets of Atami. Today they were crowded with people toasting the abrogation of the treaties. Their spirits and morale were high and, viewing the situation, I felt like shouting "Its good".<51>

At the end of January 1935, Katō was approached by the Deputy Navy Minister Hasegawa Kiyosi and asked to chair the Navy's High Technology Committee, the highest advisory body

to the Navy Minister on advances in naval technology. Kato accepted and this was effectivly his last major duty as a serving officer. This again indicates the duality of Kato, in terms of his own thinking and in the way he was perceived by others. On the one hand he was a traditionalist who had always retained a deep feeling for the spiritual aspects of Japanese culture. But he also had a great knowledge and respect for new technology. This appointment reflected the fact that he was highly regarded by the navy in technical matters. His past appointments also indicated that he was increasingly perceived as a guardian of the Japanese warrior spirit.

Katō's influence at the Navy War College was still considerable and he was a constant visitor and speaker. Harada was told by one naval officer lecturing there in May 1935, that he was experiencing great difficulty, since Katō's interpretation of the constitution, regarding the right of the Supreme Command, was making the delivery of lectures very difficult.<52>

On 2 November 1935 Katō reached the age of 65 and retired from active service including the Supreme Military Council. Thus ended a distinguished naval career spanning 42 years. Immmeiately prior to his official retirement, the question had arisen of Katō's possible promotion to gensui (Admiral of the Fleet). He would have been, for many, an ideal successor to the late Admiral Tōgō. Indeed Ishikawa Shingo the architect of the draft document for abrogating the Washington Treaties, had reported to Katō in 1933 that the young officers in the Fleet were voicing their support

of Katō to be appointed Admiral of the Fleet.<53> However, one of the principal requirements of an Admiral of the Fleet was that he had commanded a Fleet in wartime. Kato had of course commanded a squadron in the First World War and at Vladivostock but strictly speaking he was ineligible. However, the regulations were never strictly enforced and Katō's record was clearly more worthy of such an appointment than many other army and navy officers who had actually received this honour, including Prince Fushimi. It seems reasonable to assume that there were members of the Imperial Court, probably even including the Emperor himself, who would not have approved Katō's elevation to such a powerful (and permanent) position. Moreover, Prince Fushimi who was on the Board of Fleet Admirals, was no longer particularly friendly towards Katō and this too may have militated against Katō receiving this distinction. Also, relations between Katō and Admiral Okada, the Prime Minister, were very strained indeed especially after the latter's appointment as Premier. Interestingly, Katō's long time friend and gunnery mentor Admiral Yamashita Gentarō had also been suggested as a suitable candidate for Admiral of the Fleet and had also been rejected. But Yamashita became a baron and this does seem to have been the normal way of honouring men who either did not qualify or were not regarded as suitable for appointment to Admiral of the Fleet.

Katō was never appointed a baron, nor did he ever receive any significant civil honour. Indeed one can view the various imperial appointments he did receive as evidence

that the Court could not ignore him completely but chose not to award permanent honours. Moreover, these appointments were narrowly military rather than civil honours. Undoubtedly there were many in the navy who wished Katō could continue in some capacity and Rear Admiral Katō, then Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff, had suggested in 1933 that, in an emergency Katō could return as Chief of the Naval General Staff. American naval intelligence reports also deemed this likely should a war break out.

In 1935 the press carried reports predicting Katō as a possible appointment as Governor-General of Formosa. Harada records that Katō's name was suggested directly to the Premier but that the Foreign Minister had said to Admiral Okada "please stop the selection of Admiral Katō or even the selection of a military man". The Premier, after consultation wih the Governor-general of Formosa and the Foreign Minister then apparently said: "...to have Admiral Katō as Governor-general at this time would be very dangerous. I will not appoint him."<54> Actually Katō did not want this appointment, although he might have been pleased to have been asked and might even have been persuaded. Katō favoured Admiral Kobayashi Seizō and he was in fact appointed.<55>

In September 1935, one month after the Premier had vetoed Katō as a possible Governor-general of Formosa, the Chief of the Metropolitan Police reported to Harada that Admirals Suetsugu and Katō and Generals Mazaki and Araki had joined forces and were making efforts to overthrow the cabinet.<56> This was perceived as being orchestrated by

Baron Hiranuma. Katō was probably in favour of Okada being replaced for personal reasons as well as because he felt that Okada would try to soften the Japanese position at the coming naval conference.

Katō's personal disappointments were probably softened somewhat by the prospects of a 'successful' naval conference at the end of the year. He must by now have been very confident that either the major western naval powers would concede naval equality as a right or Japan would leave the conference. Japan was determined to have its inherent right of equality recognised at the London Conference and the Americans were equally determined on retaining the ratio system. Japan's decision to abrogate the Washington Treaties effectively, destroyed any real chance of a Japanese concession on the lines of the Washington and London Conferences. This is not to say that Japan was unwilling to accept a naval arms limitation or naval disarmament agreement at the Second London Conference. But it did mean that any agreement would have to recognise their right to equality.

The Second London Conference lasted from December 1935 to March 1936. As a result of the 'hardline' Japanese naval position, Japan predictably broke off negotiations and continued to attend only as an observer.<57> The naval agreements reached were not signed by Japan, except for laws regulating submarine warfare and without Japan the agreements, while interesting, left the signatories with only the shell of international naval limitation. The result was an intensification of naval armament competition

especially between Japan and America.

Katō and the "February Incident"

The London Confrence continued until March 1936 although Japan took no active role after January. However, before the conference concluded Japan suffered an armed revolt by "Young Officers" (and right wing extremists) of the army intent on overthrowing the cabinet, the so-called Ni Ni Roku Jiken (The February or 2.2.6. Incident). They intended to dispose of 'traitors' in order to pave the way for a national renovation.<58> Some 1500 troops occupied key points in Tokyo while bands of assassination squads from amongst the rebels roamed Tokyo in search of pre-selected targets. Amongst the targets were the Prime Minister Admiral Okada Keisuke, Grand Chamberlain Admiral Suzuki Kantarō and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Admiral Saitō Makoto. Saitō was killed, Suzuki badly injured and Okada had a most fortunate escape. It is no coincidence that these former navy officers targeted for assassination and labelled "traitors" were all key naval elders of the pro-treaty faction during the London Naval Treaty Crisis of 1930. Two other major figures also active in that crisis were on the list, Prince Saionji and former Lord Keeper Count Makino. The Young Officers had counted on the support of anti-treaty navy officers such as Katō. But the navy, no doubt incensed by attacks on prominent navy men by army officers, threatened to turn the fleet guns in Tokyo harbour on the rebels and this was an important contributary factor in their eventual surrender. Katō never openly gave any

sign of support for their actions although, in a testimony given to the police for the trials, he did actually show some sympathy for their 'pure motives' but felt that they should all have left a note and taken their own lives.<59> Once again the events in 1930 had contributed to yet another outburst of political violence since:

> The greatest act of treason of the ruling clique was the ratification of the London naval treaty. This was cited by both the May 15 1932 rebels and those of February 26 1936 as major grounds for their actions.<60>

One report by United States naval intelligence in Tokyo actually stated that the insurgents were demanding Hiranuma or Katō Kanji for Premier, but Shillony's detailed study makes no mention of this, although it does name others proposed by the insurgents. However, a second American report repeated this saying a military dictatorship under either Katō or Baron Hiranuma was demanded.<61> As with earlier outbreaks of violence by military officers, Katō may have been guilty by association, but supporting evidence for any direct link with insurgents is extremely weak.

Katō's retirement seems mainly to have been spent contemplating Japan's experience with naval limitation. In an article he published in March 1936, Katō commented on the decision to leave the naval limitation system. He conceded that the chances of war could be lessened by mutual limitations of armaments but only if it was achieved:

> in a manner that does not stir up ill feelings. If it is attempted on a basis that is not impartial, prohibiting to one nation what is allowed to another, it not only fails to alleviate the situation, but tends to arouse resentment that makes the situation all the worse.<62>

In an obvious reference to his own delegation's mistakes

at Washington in 1921/22, Katō suggested that making decisions under pressure or by misjudgement could well place a country in a position where its own hands would be tied and other countries' superiority recognised. This would lead to insecurity and efforts to carry out increases in armaments outside the scope of the agreements. He stressed that it was not armaments but men who were the cause of wars. He proposed:

> to alleviate world tension by a treaty guaranteeing mutual non-aggression and limiting the powers to a level that will be the same for all of them and so low that none can adopt a challenging attitude, thereby discouraging agressive ambition....<63>

He went on to say that, at the recent conference at London, Japan had this in mind and had therefore proposed the right of the five Washington Treaty signatories to have "equal volumes of naval armaments", a reduction to a common upper limit and scope for each Power to distribute its armaments within that limit in the way it saw fit. This, Kato believed, would remove inequality, reduce naval expenditures and take into account the special needs of each country. It would moreover have permitted a naval race, within safe limits, which would safeguard the morale of officers and permit further progress in technology. The Washington agreements might well have had some validity, he agreed, but developments since then had changed the situation dramatically, especially advances in naval aviation. Katō then attacked the outmoded ideas of the British and the "America First" concept which he found to be an acceptable quest in the cultural sphere but not in armaments. Parity with other nations was all that the

United States needed, Katō argued, since her potential was so great that, in the event of war, she would easily and quickly outstrip less well endowed nations. Katō saw the real need was for concessions by the Great Powers to the weak rather than the reverse. He then pointed out that discriminatory ratios had never been successful, pointing to the Anglo-German discussions on a 16:10 ratio before the First World War which worsened rather than improved Anglo-German relations. Ironically it was just around this time (1937) that Germany actually agreed to an inferior ratio with Britain, but in this case it meant an increase from zero to one third for Germany.<64> For Katō the previous naval limitation agreements from Washington onward had been "coercive disarmament" (by the United States and Great Britain) rather than "voluntary disarmament'. Katō believed that the American determination to cling to the status quo was the problem and that this was being done in spite of the fact that many people, even Americans, realised that the 'inferior ratio' was an 'evil'. The Japanese position he stated more than once, was one of non-menace and non-aggression. Although not stated explicitly Kato was obviously referring to the fact that a 10:6 ratio gave the American fleet an offensive capacity in Japanese home waters.

In this article Katō saw no future for massive armament building. since technological obsolescence was rendering the lifespan of equipment ever shorter. He did not believe that racing by others would bankrupt Japan since Japan's own "creative genius" would be able to come up with appropriate

weapons systems which Japan could afford and which suited her particular needs. He observed that the American obsession with the capital ship was misguided since aviation now threatened to render these vessels, and any others not constructed with airpower in mind, obsolete. Great Britain and the United States would not build massive armaments against Japan after the latter left the conference, he continued, since such increases would frighten France, Italy and Germany into intensifying their efforts in naval construction.

Katō then turned to the key element in the antagonistic relationship between the Anglo-American powers and Japan. Japan was in trouble, internationally, he felt, because of her position as the "stabilizing force in East Asia" and "her destined mission of rescuing her neighbours from their plight" and "consolidating Oriental peace". For Katō the desire to retain the 5:5:3 ratio, paricularly by America but also by Great Britain: "is born of their excessive ambition to have sufficient dominance to expand their influence in Asia and monopolize its markets."<65> This was not vital to the Anglo-Americans he felt but simply selfish but it was vital to the survival of Japan.

> To the Japanese, however, it involves their very existence and the spirit of the Yamato race, tempered during the 3,000 years since the founding of the empire has the fervour and vitality to defend its righteous cause in defiance of all the science, skill and wealth the West can muster. We who are sailors are prepared for any emergency in the firm belief that the empire can again be safeguarded as it was in the battle of the Japan Sea.<66>

One does not have to agree with Katō, especially his implicit assumption that Japan rather than the West, was to

lead Asia out of its "plight", to see that Katō's thinking was consistent with his statements over the years on the unfairness of discriminatory ratios, American ambitions and technological developments. He repeats again the reference to Japan overcoming vastly superior material forces as she had done in the Russo-Japanese War. This, of course, can clearly be interpreted as a further emphasis on Japanese spiritual power overcoming Western material superiority but there is another possibility. Since Japan was always going to be materially inferior, one could hardly build up defence forces on the basis of the inevitability of defeat. He may have felt that Japan had to stress spiritual strength for morale purposes. Therefore this may have been realism rather than a regression into some mystical Japanese spiritual superiority (Yamato damashii). In conclusion Katō firmly stated his views which clearly reflected a "realist" interpretation of international relations:

> If a nation is provided with the armaments necessary for security, however, and backs its policies with unanimity and high morale it will be relatively secure from war. It will be respected and this respect will allow peaceful adjustment of most issues. This is the philosophy underlying Japan's rejection of the ratio principle and her advocacy of non-menace and non-agression.<67>

In 1936 Katō's name was considered in discussions for Navy Minister but Yamamoto Isoroku then Deputy Navy Minister was against it telling Harada:

> In certain respects one can place confidence in the ability of Admiral Suetsugu. His opinions are not as unreasonable as those of Admiral Katō Kanji.<68>

Suetsugu however was ruled out by Prince Fushimi, Chief of the Naval General Staff and the ill feeling on the part

of Yamamoto to Katō seems to have been reciprocated.<69> In 1939 Hiranuma once again began to feature in the list of candidates for Premier and, since Saionji was now dead, Hiranuma finally received this appointment. However, Katō's secretary noted Katō's great disappointment that after being appointed Premier, Hiranuma did not contact Katō at all.<70> For Katō this final rejection by Hiranuma and perhaps the realisation that he had simply been cynically manipulated by the politician probably hastened his death. Katō retired to his summer residence in Atami and began writing his recollections of the London Treaty Crisis. According to one press report, he was so delighted when he finished the manuscript on 2 February 1939 that he told a member of his family: "I've finished my work and am ready to die at any moment."<71> The following morning Katō died of a cerebral haemorrhage at the age of 69. He had spent the last remaining days of his life reliving the painful events of 1930 and the Japan Advertiser ran a headline which adequately summed this up: "Admiral Katō's death - A final attack on the London Naval Treaty".

Katō's funeral was a magnificent affair attended by over one thousand people including Imperial Princes and Prime Ministers. Admiral Prince Fushimi, representing the navy, gave an address and former Prime Minister Admiral Okada Keisuke from Katō's own village, spoke representing the Hashimoto Sanai Society. Okada later unveiled a special commemorative memorial in Fukui which still stands there today. The Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma also attended although Katō's secretary Sakai Keinan felt he had behaved

appallingly in not contacting Kato after taking up the premiership.

Katō's popularity at this time was considerable and many naval officers, Japanese and Western, felt that the Imperial Japanese Navy had lost a fine officer and one who would undoubtedly have been recalled to active service in a future war. Katō's popularity later received a further boost as books about him were produced showing him as an example for Japanese wartime youth to emulate. Moreover Japan's early successes in the Pacific War, attributed to such factors as superior training and highly developed night combat skills, were deemed by many of his admirers to be a legacy of Katō's continuing influence on Japanese naval personnel. Equally his critics would probably have attributed the Japanese navy's later weaknesses such as 'victory disease' to what they would have seen as Katō's overemphasis on the superiority of Japanese spirit over western material power.

Katō's last years, from the ratification of the London Treaty to his death, were years of minor triumphs and major setbacks. The events surrounding the 'treaty crisis' continued to involve Katō, sometimes personally and sometimes by association. He did intervene in politics again in 1931 in an attempt to force the government to keep its promise on supplementary budgets to make up for 'deficiencies' in the naval strength allotted in the London Treaty. Again it was rather clumsy if well intentioned. His name was linked with the violence of the 1930s from the assassination of Premier Hamaguchi through the various

'Young Officer' revolts although there is no concrete evidence whatsoever of any real involvement by him. Kato was certainly consulted on many important naval matters relating to the revision of the Naval General Staff to Japan's decision not to renew the Washington Treaty agreements. In part, this was a natural consequence of his being a Supreme Military Councillor, but it was also due to the fact that the navy was led by officers who could well be described as followers of Katō or at least officers whose thinking tended to be along similar lines. Katō was undoubtedly useful in naval politics but the decline in contacts and the fact that often he was consulted long after developments began, indicates perhaps that he was no longer a principal actor. Events touched him rather than resulted from his own initiatives.

The admiral could have been in no doubt that there was a penalty to pay for the events of the traumatic political crisis of 1930. Although he received certain honorary duties, usually of a military nature as well as minor presentations to the Emperor, he did not receive the kind of honours many felt he merited. His appointment as an Admiral of the Fleet was blocked as was his appointment as Navy Minister. He was also passed over for Governor-general of Formosa and perhaps the unkindest cut of all, ruled out as a candidate for the premiership. In itself this would have been a bitter blow but in fact, Katō saw two former colleagues, Admirals Saitō Makoto and Okada Keisuke elevated consecutively to this high rank. This was all the more ironic since these officers had played a major role in the

pro-treaty camp in 1930 and were reaching the highest political office just when their opponents were taking over key positions in the navy. Katō was bitterly disappointed in Okada's appointment and even went so far as to refuse to attend celebratory functions for Fukui's other leading naval officer. His greatest moment was undoubtedly the day that Japan announced that she would not renew the Washington treaties. In the end the appointments which may have given him the greatest pleasure or pride were the Chairmanships of the Yasukuni Shrine Committees, the Imperial Appointment as High Priest at Tōgō's funeral and perhaps his selection to give the national address at the commemorative celebrations for the "Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors". These in a sense indicated how closely he was associated with the military and perhaps spiritual side of Japanese life. His final appointment as a serving officer had been as Chairman of the navy's highest committee on technology and together with those other honorific appointments indicated the dual nature and strengths of the man, that very special blending of tradition and technology.

CONCLUSION

In the 'introduction' it was suggested that 'lessons' from interwar naval limitation may have some applicability to contemporary arms control negotiations. However this would only be useful if the prewar conferences and their consequences were re-examined using analytical tools and insights developed in analyses of postwar arms limitation and disarmament negotiations. This would seem to be substantiated in that the findings here indicate that major revisions of interpretations of the politics of interwar naval limitation, in international and domestic terms, are not only possible but necessary. One has to balance, for example, a preference for the 'idealist' view of international relations with the fact that a 'realist' or 'hardline' approach is relevant and has considerable validity even for the period in question although, in the rhetoric it may have been less fashionable. One has to accept that 'realist' interpretations, based on the evil nature of man and the inevitability of war, which in turn lead one to believe that bigger arsenals mean increased security and arms races avoid wars, are not irrational. They may be unpalatable but they should be accepted as differences of opinion rather than as being wrong. Those who oppose disarmament for example do not necessarily wish war, they simply feel that seeking disarmament is unrealistic. Equally arms limitation or arms control is not necessarily, as some with 'idealist' views are convinced, a step towards disarmament. It is, as America's behaviour at

Washington sometimes suggests, fuelled more by power political considerations especially preserving or indeed improving the 'status quo' in one's own favour. Moreover the belief that arms races lead to wars again tends to reflect the idealist position in international relations. There is as yet no convincing evidence that arms races leads to wars. It is equally possible to argue that arms races may prevent wars by making countries stronger and therefore making war too costly or that perhaps arms races may even be a substitute for that other, more hideous form of armed competition. Historical objectivity may be ultimately unattainable but nevertheless one should attempt a balance in analyses of this kind and if judgements are to be made then one can at least accept that decisions and actions taken by 'realists' in arms limitation negotiations are 'rational' within their own particular value system.

The prewar cases do indicate, especially regarding the debate over 'existing strength' the continuities in the American approach to arms control. 'existing strength' was always defined and indeed redefined in terms most favourable to the United States. But more importantly 'existing strength' always incorporated not only what the United States actually possessed but also what it would have at some point in the future. The Japanese approach to 'existing strength' was ships in the water and fully operational. This position did receive some support from the British but it is also very close to the present Soviet definition of 'existing strength'.

An examination of the career of Kato Kanji casts

considerable doubt on the validity of existing assessments of the man, whether by Japanese or Western scholars. He has often been referred to as simple, narrow minded, overly traditional and irrational as well as implacably opposed to naval limitation.

A number of Japanese writers, echoing the thoughts of some of Katō's contemporaries, have portrayed Kato as 'simple'. However one should differentiate between the use of the term in a negative and a positive sense. Kato's numerous contemporary critics, as well as his political enemies and also some later scholars, have attempted to portray him as simple and here the contrast with clever is either implicit or explicit. The available evidence indicates clearly that Katō Kanji was one of the most brilliant officers of his generation or indeed of the prewar Imperial Japanese Navy. However, to be fair to his critics, one must accept that he does appear to have been somewhat naive or simple in terms of domestic politics. He himself would perhaps have taken this as a compliment since he abhorred the nature of party politics but there can be little doubt that sophisticated political operators such as Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa or Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro did, at times, find it easy to manipulate him. Indeed Kato probably tended to overestimate his own ability in domestic politics because his knowledge and ability in international politics was considerable. Katō's admirers however used 'simple' to mean uncomplicated, direct, showing his heart on his sleeve, a man of action or even 'straight', that is to say, someone unwilling to compromise on principles no matter

the personal cost. In this they may have seen him as somewhat akin to the likes of Saigō Takamori. The latter figure in many respects, represents what some Japanese feel is an ideal type of man. In such cases the inbility to manipulate others and a certain clumsiness in the corrupt environment of domestic politics were to be regarded as manifestaion of innate purity and righteousness. In terms of his emotional makeup Kato again may justly be described as 'simple'. He often openly wept, joyfully or sorrowfully, and this trait could elicit admiration or contempt.

Katō is often described as 'narrow minded' and again one has first to examine the values and especially the positions of those who held this view in relation to Kato himself. By 'narrow minded' his critics meant that he saw things only from a narrow naval or technical/strategic perspective. One ought to consider the rather incisive and prophetic note appended by a naval attache in Tokyo to a glowing assessment of Katō Kanji prior to the Washington Conference. He wrote "his enemies call him narrow minded and a radical". One should consider also that Katō's narrowness may have been based on something other than simple beliefs in set ratios. Namely that often his narrow perspective reflected the particular position he occupied. For example Katō was not in a position at Washington or London (1930) where his primary responsibility was to be broadminded or to take the wider view. At Washington he represented the interests of the navy. Katō Tomosaburō on the other hand represented the cabinet. Katō did believe that Japan needed a 70% ratio for strategic reasons at

Washington and that national needs dictated the required naval strength. However he did not argue this view in committees. He argued according to the criterion set, 'existing strength' but challenged the American definition of this. During the London Conference he did appear rigid in terms of the 'Three Principles ' but one perhaps ought again to consider the question of his position namely Chief of the Naval General Staff. In the end Katō Kanji and the Naval General Staff were effectively outmanoeuvred in their determination to have the Naval General Staff's views given full consideration. The man who prevented Katō reaching the Emperor on this was Grand Chamberlain Admiral Suzuki Kantarō. Yet Admiral Suzuki, when he was Chief of the Naval General Staff during the Geneval Conference of 1927, was adamant that on naval strength the views of the Chief of the Naval General Staff would prevail!! Katō was undoubtedly a strong believer in the 'mathematical' ratios arrived at by naval planners but he, possibly correctly, was most suspicious of the American opposition to Japan acquiring a 70% ratio. He saw this as based on power politics and, if based on strategy, then it indicated American 'offensive' planning in marked contrast to Japan's 70% ratio which he and many others saw as 'defensive'. Katō certainly had 'broad' experience in terms of his time spent overseas and his knowledge of world developments in naval and related technologies. However it has to be said that this wide knowledge of the West was used to bolster a 'realist' view of international relations which increasingly viewed America, and to a slightly lesser extent Britain, as

countries determined to relegate Japan to a position of semi-permanent inferiority.

Much is made in the literature of Katō's traditional values. By this is usually meant his belief in the innate superiority of Japanese values and the Japanese spirit over western materialism and his distaste for the increasingly decadent nature of western culture. Even Katō's clearly documented knowledge and respect for western technology does not invalidate his belief in the superiority of Japanese over western culture. Katō's background, like so many of his generation, was one which provided him with an appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of Japan and the West. The influence of his birthplace, of Hashimoto Sanai and his parents especially his mother, pointed him in the direction of a blending of traditional values and 'modern' western technology and occasionally western values. But, as with so many other Japanese born in the mid-19th and late 19th century, the blending of elements from two such disparate cultures was an uneasy one, often subject to wild fluctuations. It would perhaps be fair to say that Katō in the years from the Russo-Japanese War to the aftermath of the Washington Conference, tended to evaluate highly the material strengths of western culture and material power in general but always wished to balance these with 'Japanese Spirit' and traditional values. However, in the late 1920s and beyond, Katō began to shift the balance in the direction of Japanese values with an increased emphasis on the innate superiority of 'Japanese Spirit' over western materialism.

This increased advocacy of the superiority of Japanese spirit is in fact one of the key factors involved in assessments of Katō as 'irrational'. By this it is often implied that strong traditional values can be shown to be 'pre-modern' or not 'modern'. In early postwar works on Japan and elsewhere the 'modernisation' theories were very influential and 'modern' was often synonomous with 'rational'. It is highly questionable that such a view is still valid without severe qualifications. But if one accepts it then perhaps Katō, being very traditional, was essentially 'premodern' and therefore irrational in terms of his value system. However there were rational reasons for advocating the superiority of Japanese spirit over western material culture at least within the closed value system of the military. In the first place Japan was faced with western powers, especially the United States, whose material power was unquestionably vastly superior. One could hardly motivate Japanese naval personnel by stating that Japanese material power was innately and possibly permanently inferior. In addition the language, concepts and values in speeches made by military leaders in addressing their own personnel may not always reflect their subjective evaluation of the situation. In addition, since the ratios agreed at Washington and London (1930) effectively precluded increasing Japan's material power vis-a-vis the western naval powers of America and Britain, one could perhaps only improve the quality of the men, their attitude and their morale. In this a reinforcement of traditionl values had a place. Such a move, adopted by Kato and many other officers,

would not be out of place in many western military organisations. That those who blindly believed in the complete superiority of 'Japanese Spirit', within and outside the military, were able to utilise this 'rational' response for their own 'irrational' beliefs does not render Katō's actions irrational.

Katō's 'irrationality' however was also, in part, attributable to his much avowed implacable opposition to naval arms limitation and disarmament. Here the value systems underpinning Katō's critics and Kato himself are not to be evaluated as Japanese versus Western. Rather they perhaps ought to be seen in terms of the value systems of 'realists' versus 'idealists' in international relations. Polarisation of opinion in such an area, where there is not and possibly cannot be universal agreement, tends to produce the labelling of opposing views as irrational. Katō's views on the subjects of disarmament and arms limitation were mainly to be found in the 'realist' camp. He regarded war as inevitable, and he dismissed disarmament as 'utopian'. He was not, however, as implacably opposed to arms limitation as the secondary literature would have us believe. He clearly viewed arms limitation, like most 'realists', as an end in itself and something which was related to 'power' and the 'status quo' rather than leading to disarmament. He believed that arms competition was a symptom rather than a cause of arms races. At best he was a lukewarm supporter of naval arms limitation but only under certain conditions. He fervently believed in the inherent principle of equality of rights in terms of arms. He could

therefore support arms limitation where it was based on a common upper limit on all armaments to be followed perhaps by a lowering of that 'ceiling' by mutual agreement. He was implacably opposed to 'inferior ratios' for this reason. Katō continually advocated that it must be recognised that Japan, as a sovereign nation, was inherently entitled to equality in naval armaments 'in principle'. 'In Principle' is the key here since he never advocated that Japan should have equality of armaments in practice but instead sufficiency, within a commonly agreed upper limit for her own definition of national security requirements, was the aim. Viewed in this way, Katō's attitude to arms limitation must be judged in terms of occasional shifts along a particular spectrum of lukewarm support for general arms limitation. For example, Katō's attitude to arms limitation hardened perceptibly as the 'inferior' ratios were applied first to capital ships at Washington and then especially after they were applied to auxiliary vessels at London (1930). He could still be described as a supporter of naval limitation provided it was carried out according to his concept of equality under an agreed maximum. However, if the actual agreements in existence in the interwar period, based on differing ratios for various countries, were what one meant by naval limitation then Katō could reluctantly accept it after Washington provided the deficiencies could be remedied by auxiliary craft. The London agreements however, eliminated this option and he was totally opposed to comprehensive arms limitation based on discriminatory ratios. In the final analysis Katō's attitude to the United

States and his belief in a tough negotiating stance backed by a united public opinion, was probably more important in forming his views than his admitted belief in the 70% ratio as necessary for Japan's defence.

Katō would have labelled the thinking of supporters of agreements reached at Washington and London 'irrational' or at least illogical. He believed that arms limitation agreements carried out because of financial strains were illogical and certainly insincere. He found agreements based on 'inferior' ratios to be the same and felt that arms limitation could not be limited to one class of ships or one service. In any case he felt that the naval race was a symptom not a cause of international tension and advocated settling national differences around a table which would alleviate the tension and thus slow down the arms race. This conclusion lead Itō Takashi to label Katō Kanji as an 'idealist' and, depending on one's value system, might be regarded as naivety in international politics to add to Kato's sometimes obvious naivety in domestic Japanese politics. Nevertheless, a reassessment of Katō's own position and his thinking is long overdue and one should perhaps be cautious of assessments of Katō, especially at Washington, which have been overly influenced by later events during the 'London Treaty Crisis' of 1930 and its aftermath.

The fundamental problem in judging a man such as Katō Kanji, despite his oft-cited simplicity, lies mainly in the nature of the materials one has to work with. Opinions and writings on Katō Kanji are often themselves value-laden and

sometimes tell us more about the writer than about Kato. Newspaper materials, whilst interesting and occasionally illuminating, are often inaccurate due either to deliberate journalistic license or to misinformed speculation. Materials written on Katō by his supporters tend to be hagiographic and rather one dimensional. Japanese biography, written by the Japanese, is a branch of history which has improved considerably in recent years but still remains far below the high standards set by leading western scholars. One often finds that it is the 'factional' writing, by which one means fictionalised fact as in certain types of historical novels, which provides a greater insight into the behaviour and thought processess of Japanese figures. Primary sources too present the researchers with problems. For example the discovery of the Katō diaries was undoubtedly a major historical find. However they should be treated with caution. Katō's diaries do tell us more about the man and especially those whom he contacted regularly. But his recollections of events in the diaries, and especialy in his later embellishments of diary entries, were often selective and indeed sometimes rationalised events years later. In this Katō is not alone. The Hamaguchi and Okada diaries should also be treated with considerable caution and of course the Saionji-Harada memoirs have achieved a certain notoriety for much the same reasons.

It is possible that most studies of Japanese historical figures by westerners, no matter the amount and quality of materials and the linguistic expertise available, offers at best a plausible but nevetheless overly westernised

interpretation of the Japanese personality at best and an oversimplistic caricature at worst.

Assessing Katō's influence on his fellow officers, on naval politics or on civil-military relations is also fraught with difficulties. There can be no doubt that he influenced a whole generation of officers. This was partly in a practical sense through his formal teaching appointments. He also taught by example and became for many a symbol of the ideal naval officer by his actions in peace and war and by his close associations with great naval heroes such as Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō and Lt Cdr Hirose Takeo. In the arms limitation debates, especially after London (1930), Katō also became a symbol for young officers and for certain people on the right wing of Japanese politics due to his efforts to prevent a successful agreement being concluded and ratified as a result of the London Naval Conference. In addition, his treatment at the hands of the pro-treaty forces, especially the 'infringement of the supreme command' issues, such as Premier Hamaguchi ignoring or rejecting his advice and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki blocking his constitutional right to direct access to the Emperor, generated much sympathy for his position and admiration for his 'principled' stand.

However, to conclude from this that Katō was largely responsible for the politicisation of the naval officer corps, or indeed that the 'Fleet' or 'Anti-Treaty faction' was directly responsible for this is open to question. The research carried out for this thesis indicates that arms limitation disputes were not so much the cause of internal

naval splits as symptomatic of existing internal naval organisational rivalry between a hitherto dominant, established Navy Ministry and an increasingly confident assertive Naval General Staff seeking parity or even superiority over the administrative branch of the navy. It could of course be argued that Katō created this mode of thinking within the Naval General Staff. On the other hand, one could equally plausibly argue that Katō was merely reflecting existing thinking not changing it. Katō's influence is generally regarded as being at its peak just prior to Japan's secession from the Second London Naval Conference. But this does not seem to be supported by the available evidence. Undoubtedly the thinking which permeated naval circles in 1933 and 1934 was similar to the longheld views of Katō Kanji but such views were not previously exclusive to Katō. Katō is generally associated with the so-called 'Osumi Purge' of pro-treaty naval officers which denied the Japanese Navy the services of so many talented officers and caused a personnel imbalance within the navy. He is also credited with considerable responsibility for the strengthening of the Naval General Staff and the reforms preceding the Second London Naval Conference. One can accept that he was, by his previous actions, a contributor to these developments and his support was utilised in carrying them out. Beyond that the evidence is ambiguous or inconclusive and certainly his influence, such as it was, was in decline from 1930 onwards except in a symbolic sense. Politicisation of the navy seems more likely to have been a consequence of the lack of adequate

coordinating mechanisms between the navy and the government and within the navy. On such issues the Emperor was probably the only one able to arbitrate effectively, an option deemed improper and too risky by his constitutional advisers. This being the case parties on either side, be they 'treaty faction' or 'anti-treaty faction' had to look elsewhere for help in resolving the impasse. Consequently role expansion by the naval officer corps in politics did occur and added to the politicisation already emerging from the trend to monitor or even intervene in politics emanating from the emergence of 'total war' planning. Again the overt, violent political intervention by young officers of the army and navy is constantly linked with Katō Kanji. The evidence, such as it is, linking him with such movements is at best circumstantial. His actions and words did, at times, inflame emotions and in this way, perhaps unintentionally, Katō was responsible. However he never actively encouraged such deeds and did not condone them although at times he appears to have had a certain sympathy for the 'purity' of their motives. He could at best have been only guilty by association in that his name was often on the lips of such young officers.

Such splits as appeared in Japanese domestic politics, whether inside or outside the navy, ought not to be interpreted as simply the product of internal naval rivalry alone. The groups which competed during the London Treaty Crisis often had opposing views of how to negotiate at an international conference, how to view the attitude of the United States and even how to view Japan's future role in

the existing international political and economic order. In turn such groups can be differentiated in terms of shifting attitudes to western culture. It is no more accurate to place the main responsibilty for the politicisation of the navy on Katō Kanji than it is to blame the naval race in the late 1930s and the Pacific War on the Japanese Naval General Staff in the form of the Gunsei-ha or Kantai-ha.

The study of interwar naval limitation issues will continue to remain a richly rewarding research area where much work has yet to be done. Analyses of the roles of other major figures such as Premier Hamaguchi, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki and Admirals Okada and Takarabe as well as Admirals Togo, Suetsugu, Prince Fushimi and others would undoubtedly shed even further light on this subject. Again more sophisticated analyses of the various organisations and factions would also be of great value.

In all of this, a re-assessment of Katō Kanji's role and activities remains indispensable. Further research may shed light not only on civil-military, inter-military and intra-military relations but on the processes of domestic politics in Japan. Interwar arms limitation materials can also illuminate the difficulties and evaluate the efficacy of Japan's prewar international negotiating strategies.

Katō died after writing his memoirs of the London Conference Crisis. Undoubtedly he painfully relived the events that led to a premature end to a brilliant career and it has been suggested that this was a contributary factor in his sudden death. Another factor was the treatment he received at the last from his long time associate, Baron

Hiranuma. His resentment of his shabby treatment at the end, when Hiranuma became Premier, must have made him realise that he had at times been cynically manipulated by skilful and devious politicians on more than one occasion.

He was, by any criterion, an outstanding officer who contributed much to the development the Imperial Japanese Navy to which he devoted his life. For this reason alone, whether one agrees or disagrees with his views, Katō Kanji remains an important and often under-rated historical figure and deserves to be remembered and reassessed in a more favourable or more objective light.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. For analyses of the "Washington System" see especially Hosoya Chihiro, "Washinton Taisei to NichiBeiEi Kankei", in Hosoya Chihiro, Saitō Makoto, Katō Ichirō, (eds.), Washinton Taisei to NichiBei Kankei, (Tokyo, 1978), pp.3-39 and also the special issue of the Annals of the Japanese Political Science Association on the "Washington System", Nihon Seiji Gakkai (eds), "Kokusai Kinchō Kanwa no Seiji Katei", Nihon Seiji Gakkai Nenpo 1969, (Tokyo, 1969).

2. A selective bibliography of writings on the various conferences, in English and Japanese, can be found in the bibliography.

3. Donald Watt, "Historical Light on SALT: Parallels with Inter-War Naval Arms Control", The Round Table, No.245, (January 1972), pp.29-35; Hedley Bull, "Strategic Arms Limitation: The Precedent of the Washington and London Naval Treaties", in Morton A Kaplan (ed.), SALT, Problems and Prospects, (New York, 1973), pp.26-52. This is a slightly revised version of Bull's earlier Occasional Paper published by the Center for Policy Study, University of Chicago in 1971 under the same title; Roger Dingman, "Statesmen, Admirals and SALT: The United States and the Washington Conference of 1921-1922", California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, (Santa Monica, December 1972).

4. Colin Gray, "Arms Races and Their Influence upon International Stability with Special Reference to the Middle East", in G Sheffer (ed.), Dynamics of a Conflict, (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1975), p.43.

5. Such a statement on defence spending by western democracies, especially those belonging to or attached to NATO, remains true in general. However particular American Administrations such as the present Reagan Administration (1983/4) can generate a domestic climate whereby defence spending can be increased considerably.

6. Ernest May, "Lessons" of History: The Uses of History in American Foreign Policy, (New York, 1975). The underlying assumption in this doctoral dissertation is that there probably are lessons to be learned from inter-war naval arms control negotiations. It is of course perfectly possible to take the position that the main problem in comparing the prewar and postwar experience is that the situations are entirely different, politically and technologically. This being the case no valid comparisons can be made. For a fierce rejection of the validity of prewar data see especially Herman Kahn, "The Arms Race and

Some of its Hazards," Daedalus, Vol.89, (Fall 1960), pp.764-768.

7. The most trenchant criticisms are to be found in the writings of Colin Gray especially his, "The Arms Race phenomenon", World Politics, Vol.34, No.1, (October 1971), pp.30-79, and "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing", World Politics, Vol.34, No.2, (January 1974), pp.207-233 as well as op.cit., Gray, (1975).

8. An excellent review of the literature on SALT is Colin Gray, "Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Pespectives on SALT", The American Political Science Review, Vol.70, (1976), pp.1242-1256.

9. Abstract theorising on the prewar experience at this stage would appear to be rather premature. This thesis will, whilst implicitly utilising findings from arms race theory, concentrate on gathering empirical data. Thus this is not, in essence, a theoretical analysis but a necessary first stage towards a future analysis of this kind.

10. Richard D Burns and Donald Urquidi, Disarmament in Perspective: an analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements between the Wars, 1919-1939, Vol 4 Conclusions, [ACDA/RS-551, (Washington D.C., 1968), p.1.

11. op.cit., Gray, (1975), p.43.

12. The best treatment in English of Japan and the League of Nations is Thomas Burkman, Japan, The League of Nations, and The New World Order, Ph.D., (University of Michigan, 1975), which gives some valuable coverage of navy and army disarmament measures. For a useful summary in English of the Army 'reductions' or 'reorganisations' of the 1920s see Leonard Humphries, "Crisis and Reaction: The Japanese Army in the Liberal Twenties", Armed Forces and Society, Vol.5, No.1, (November 1978), pp.73-91. For a more extended treatment see his The Imperial Japanese Army, 1918-1929: The Disintegration of the Meiji Military System, Ph.D., (Stanford University, 1974). Unfortunately Humphreys neglected to examine the army's role at the Washington Conference as well as its significance for the Army. The best treatment of this is the series of essays by Segawa Yoshinobu "Washinton Kaigi (1921-1922 Nen) to Nihon Rikugun 1,2,3", Bōei Ronshu, Vol.4, No.1, (April 1965), pp.45-67; Vol.4, No.2, (July 1965), pp.163-187; Vol.4, No.3, (October 1965), pp.53-67. For London 1930 see his "1930-nen Rondon Gunshuku Kaigi Hakken to Nihon Rikugun", Saitama Daigaku Kiyō, (1965), pp.1-9.

13. Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Limitation 1914-1922, (Chicago, 1976); Ian Nish, "Japan and Naval Aspects of the Washington Conference", in William G Beasley (ed.), Modern Japan: Aspects of History, Literature and Society, (Tokyo, 1976); Asada Sadao, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Arms Limitation: Katō Tomosaburō vs Katō Kanji", in G Jordan

(ed.), Naval Warfare in the 20th Century: Essays in Honour of Arthur Marder, (London 1977); Stephen Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, (Cambridge, Mass., 1974).

14. Peter Duus's, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan, (Harvard, 1968), went some way to remedy this neglect of the period. However, despite its considerable relevance for domestic politics, Duus scarcely mentions the Washington Conference of 1921-1922.

15. For example Michael Blaker utilised many writings on the conferences in, Japanese International Negotiating Style, (New York, 1977). See also the various papers by Asada Sadao especially his "Nihon Kaigun to Gunshuku - Taibei Seisaku o meguru Seiji Katei", in op.cit., Hosoya, Saito and Kato (eds.), pp.353-414 and "Washinton Kaigi o meguru NichiBei no Seisaku Kettei Katei no Hikaku - Hito to Kikō", in Hosoya Chihiro and Watanuki Jōji (eds.), Taigai Seisaku Kettei Katei ni NichiBei Hikaku, (Tokyo, 1977), pp.419-464.

16. Kobayashi Tatsuo, "Kaigun Gunshuku Jōyaku", Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Taihiyo Sensō Genin Kenkyūbu-hen, Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi, Vol.1, (Tokyo, 1963), pp.3-160. (Hereafter referred to in all notes as TSM.)

17. James Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy 1930-38, (Princeton, 1966), especially pp.35-81. One should not however be blind to some of Crowley's failings and Mark Peattie has taken him to task on certain issues relating to army matters in his Ishihara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West, (Princeton, 1975). I shall also be questioning some of his findings regarding naval matters during the London Conference Crisis of 1930.

18. See particularly, Yale Candee Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry 1930-1945, (Westport, 1975); Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge, Mass., 1957).

19. Tsunoda Jun, "Nihon Kaigun Sandai no Rekishi", Jiyū, (January 1969), pp.90-125; op.cit., Pelz; Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and the United States", in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (eds.), Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941, (New York, 1973), pp.225-259.

20. ibid., Pelz, p.1, "The result of the Five Power pact or Washington Naval Treaty ... that froze the navies of the five great powers at new low levels".

21. For a discussion of realism in international relations as a reaction to the idealism of the 1920s, see John Baylis, et.al., Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, (London, 1975), pp.9-12.

22. op.cit., Dingman, (1976).

23. op.cit., Asada, (1973) shows this clearly.

24. op.cit., Tsunoda. Tsunoda divides the navy into three eras: The Yamamoto Gonnohyoe, Katō Tomosaburō and Katō Kanji eras.

25. Ikeda Kiyoshi, "Rondon Kaigun Jōyaku ni kansuru Gunreibugawa no Shiryō Sanpen", Hōgaku Zasshi, Vol.15, No.4, (March, 1969), pp.102-126, was an attempt to remedy the neglect of materials on the Naval General Staff/'Fleet Faction' side. Ikeda stated in this article that very little of their materials had appeared or been utilised by Japanese scholars.

26. This tendency to ascribe superior qualities to naval officers of the 'Treaty Faction' whilst at the same time denigrating officers of the 'Fleet Faction' is particularly marked in the writings of Asada Sadao.

27. A possible exception to this generalisation is Paul S Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1941-1945, (Cambridge, 1978). This however tells us nothing of the development of the navy nor does it concern itself with politics, being a narrow campaign history. See works listed in note 13 above.

28. Roger F Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan 1838-1922, (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); Mark Peattie, Ishihara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West, (Princeton, 1975); William F. Morton, Tanaka Giichi and Japan's China Policy, (Folkestone, 1980).

CHAPTER ONE

1. Katō Kanji Taishō Denki Hensankai, Katō Kanji Taishō Den, (Tokyo, 1941). (Hereafter referred to in all notes as KKD.)

2. Albert Craig, "Introduction", in Albert Craig and Donald Shively (eds.), Personality in Japanese History, (Berkeley, 1970), p.11.

3. ibid., p.6.

4. An example of this is the 'heroic biography' (ijin den) style of writing. It resembles the historical novel (rekishi shōsetsu) in that it contains numerous re-created 'conversations' and the like and these, in toto, create a moral or other message. A book in this vein written for youths is Kunieda Kanji, Katō Kanji Taishō Den, (Tokyo, 1944). There are of course also popular writers who write of great men, (Jimbutsu) in Japanese history.

5. I was able to see this memorial thanks to the

hospitality of Professor Takahashi Sankichi and Professor Mikami Kazuo who provided accomodation and a tour of Fukui in 1980.

6. op.cit., Craig and Shively, p.7.

7. There is considerable debate as to the actual population at this time and wide discepancies in the figures given. The best discussion is to be found in Edward R Beauchamp, An American Teacher in Early Meiji Japan, (Hawaii, 1976), p.35ff. See also William Fruin, Labor Migration in Nineteenth Century Japan, Ph.D., (Stanford University, 1973), especially for population data on Fukui in early Meiji Japan. However caution should be exercised regarding Fruin's grasp of early Fukui (Echizen) history.

8. ibid., Beauchamp, p.35.

9. A good general history is Kanemaki Kunio, Fukui Ken no Rekishi, (Tokyo, 1979).

10. An excellent general history of late Bakufu Echizen is Mikami Kazuo, Bakumatsu no Echizen Han, (Fukui, 1974). For Matsudaira's later reforming efforts at the han and national levels see Mikami Kazuo, Kōbugattairon no Kenkyū: Echizen Bakumatsu Ishinshi Bunseki, (Tokyo, 1979). This mōnograph contains a wealth of bibliographic data on Fukui history. For a good overview of economic reforms see Mikami Kazuo, "Bakumatsu ni okeru Echizen Han no Fukokusaku ni tsuite: Yuri Kimimasa no Chisaku o chushin ni", Nihon Rekishi, No.241, (June 1968), pp.91-107. For military reforms see his "Echizen no Kyohei Seisaku ni tsuite: Kaibō Seisaku to Yoshiki iki Kogyo o chushin ni", Wakaetsu Kyōdo Kenkyū, Vol.12, No.3, (1967), pp.41-54.

11. A good English summary and analysis of Fukui's reforms and the western impact is Grant K Goodman, The Dutch Impact on Japan (1640-1853), (Leiden, 1967), Chapter 13, especially pp.158-159.

12. Yokoi Shōnan (1809-1869) an advocate of reform of the Bakufu system and had considerable influence on ideas of anti-Bakufu groups. He became a Sanyō in the early Meiji government. Yuri Kimimasa (1829-1909) a Finance specialist was also linked with the anti-Bakufu movement and held senior posts in the early Meiji goverment. He was involved in drafting the Charter Oath but little involved in national government affairs after the first years of the Meiji period. For Hashimoto Sanai see George M Wilson, "The Bakumatsu Intellectual in Action: Hashimoto Sanai in the Political Crisis of 1858", in op.cit., Craig and Shively, pp.234-263. However Wilson errs in stating (Note 2, p.235), that the only postwar biography in Japanese was published in 1962. There is also Nomura Eiichi, Hashimoto Sanai, (Fukui, 1970).

13. William G Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, (London, 1973), p.24.

14. see op.cit., Wilson for details.

15. A detailed analysis is to be found in Mikami Kazuo, Kōbugattairon no Kenkyū: Echizen Bakumatsu Ishinshi Bunseki, (Tokyo, 1979).

16. op.cit., Beauchamp, p.35.

17. ibid., p.36.

18. Details on Katō's father are taken from the official biography op.cit., KKD, p.48-72 and also Fukui Shinbunsha (eds.), Fukui Jinbutsu Fūdoki, (Fukui, 1973) pp.174-179. A detailed search of numerous local histories failed to turn up further information on Naokata.

19. For a detailed analyis of the Sankin Kōtai (Edo residence system) see T G Tsukahira, Feudal Control in Tokugawa Japan: The Sankin Kōtai System, (Cambridge, Mass., 1966).

20. Kanai Madōka in "Fukui, the Domain of a Tokugawa Collateral Daimyō: Its Tradition and Transition", states that in the Bakumatsu period 25 Koku was above average in this area even for a samurai (cited in op.cit., Wilson, p.235, note 2).

21. op.cit., Fukui Shinbunsha (eds.), p.174 and p.180.

22 op.cit., KKD, p.49.

23 David Evans, The Satsuma Faction and Professionalism in the Japanese Naval Officer Corps of the Meiji Period, Ph.D., (Stanford University, 1978), p.12.

24. op.cit., Fukui Shinbunsha (eds.), p.179.

25. op.cit., KKD, p.72. Alfred Lucy was not a missionary but an English teacher. For details of his career in Japan see the relevant entry in Umetani Noburo, Oyatoi Gaikokujin, (Tokyo, 1965). op.cit., Beauchamp gives brief details.

26. op.cit., KKD, p.75.

27. Kuribayashi Yoshimitsu, "Yondai no Gunkan Kōshinkyoku", Sandei Mainichi, 16/10/77, pp.134-135 (op.cit., KKD, p.75). This article recounts the four generations of the Kato family including a grandson who is a captain in the Maritime Self Defence forces. The grandson at first agreed and then declined to be interviewed.

28. op.cit., KKD, pp.78-79.

29. The Mitogaku (Mito School [of history]) was very influential in the Bakumatsu period and the Meidokan was reputed to be modelled on the Kodokan Academy of Tokugawa

Nariaki in Mito. Hashimoto had a very high opinion of the latter. op.cit., Wilson, p.239.

30. Asada Sadao, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Arms Limitation: Katō Tomosaburō vs Katō Kanji", in Gerald Jordan (ed.), Naval Warfare in th 20th Century: Essays in Honour of Arthur Marder, (London, 1977); Stephen Pelz, "Japan's Revolt against World Order 1931-38", paper presented at Association for Asian Studies, (New York, March 1972), and "The Good Empire: Japan's New Order at Home and Abroad", Occasional Paper No.1, Asian Studies Committee, (University of Massachussetts at Amherst, 1978).

31. Stephen Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), p.27.

32. op.cit., Asada, (1977), p.142.

33. Ito Kinjiro, Ikiteiru Taisho Kato Kanji, (Tokyo, 1942), p.107.

34. Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, (New York, 1979), p.133.

35. Albert Craig "Kido Koin and Okubo Toshimichi: A Psychohistorical Analysis", in op.cit., Craig and Shively, p.279.

36. Numata Jirō, "Acceptance and Rejection of Elements of European Culture in Japan", Caheirs d'histoire Mondiale, Vol.3, No.1, (1956), p.241. (cited in op.cit., Wilson, p.238.)

37. Ivan Hall, Mori Arinori, (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), p.28. p.28.

38. ibid., pp.26-27.

39. ibid., p.28.

40. op.cit., KKD, p.81.

41. ibid., p.86.

42. ibid., p.128.

43. ibid., p.139.

44. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of toppubatsu and Yamamoto Gonnohyoe see op.cit., Evans, especially pp.210-212.

45. op.cit., KKD, p.162.

46. ibid., pp.162-163.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Bōeichō Bōei Kenshūjo Senshishitsu, Daihonei Kaigunbu - Rengō Kantai <1> Kaisen made, (Tokyo, 1975), p.1. (Hereafter referred to in all notes as Rengō Kantai <1>.)

2. I have made considerable use of the historical overview in David C Evans, The Satsuma Faction and Professionalism in the Japanese Naval Officer Corps of the Meiji Period, 1868-1912. Ph.D., (Stanford University, 1978), p.8ff. But see also the earlier works of Arthur J Marder, "From Jimmu Tenno to Perry: Sea Power in Early Japanese History", American Historical Review, Vol.51, (October 1945), pp.1-34; and Vice Admiral G A Ballard, The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan, (New York, 1921).

3. For the significance of this publication see Toyama Saburō, Nihon Kaigunshi, (Tokyo, 1980), p.10.

4. ibid., pp.11-12.

5. ibid., p.13.

6. The training of the Bakumatsu and early Meiji Navy, and the contributions of the Dutch and British in particular, have been described in three American doctoral dissertations op.cit., Evans; Peter G Cornwall, The Meiji Navy: Training in an Age of Change, Ph.D., (University of Michigan, 1970); John C Perry, Great Britain and the Emergence of Japan as a Naval Power, Ph.D.,](Harvard University, 1961), and also his article "Great Britain and the Emergence of Japan as a Naval Power", Monumenta Nipponica, Vol.21, (1966) pp.305-19. See also Ikeda Kiyoshi, Kaigun to Nihon, (Tokyo, 1981) pp.46-56, for a recent Japanese assessment of British influence.

7. Katsu Kaishū is generally given the credit for the success of this cruise but this is challenged in Ikeda Kiyoshi, Nihon no Kaigun, Vol.1, (Tokyo, 1969), p.13.

8. The standard treatment of this is to be found in Marius Jansen, Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration, (Princeton, 1961).

9. For an extensive listing of naval vessels at this time see Saito Makoto, "The Navy", in Alfred Stead (ed.), Japan by the Japanese: A Survey of its Highest Authorities, (New York, 1904), especially pp.121-126.

10. The most recent study of the military campaigns, which deliberately ignores what its author calls the "complex but well documented and accessible story of Bakumatsu naval developments" is Conrad Totman, The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862-1868, (Hawaii, 1980). He refers the reader to the Complete Works of Katsu Kaishū (in Japanese). It is very difficult to accept this contention and I would

suggest that naval developments at this time are badly neglected by western scholars.

11. Hyman Kublin, "Admiral Enomoto and the Imperial Restoration", United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol.79, (April, 1953), pp.409-19.

12. A concise administrative history of the Navy is to be found in Nihon Kindai Shiryō-hen, Nihon Rikukaigun no Seido, Sōshiki, Jinji, (Tokyo, 1975), pp.411-435. For an account in English see Ian Gow, "Evolution of a General Staff System in the Imperial Japanese Navy", in Gordon Daniels (ed.), Proceedings of the British Association of Japnes Studies (BAJS): History and International Relations, Vol.4, Pt.1, (1979).

13. A detailed account of civil-military relations at this time is to be found in Itō Kobun, "Meiji Kokka ni okeru Seigun-Kankei: Guntai to Kokka no kankei no ichijirei Kenkyū", Bōei Ronshū, Vol.7, No.2, (November 1968) pp.1-92.

14. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.6.

15. For Tōgō's career see R V C Bodley, Admiral Tōgō: The Authorised Life of Admiral of the Fleet Tōgō, (London, 1935); Tōgō Gensui Hensankai, (ed.), Admiral Tōgō: A Memoir, (Tokyo, 1936); Edward Falk, Tōgō and the Rise of Japanese Sea Power, (New York, 1936); George Blond, Admiral Tōgō, (New York, 1960).

16. For an evaluation of the Douglas Mission see op.cit., Perry and Cornwall. See also Archibald C Douglas, "The Genesis of Japan's Navy", Transactions of the Japan Society of London, Vols.36-38, (1939), pp.19-28 and Life of Admiral Sir Archibald Lucius Douglas RN GCB, (Devon, 1938), by the same author.

17. op.cit., Toyama, p.46.

18. ibid., p.46. See op.cit., Evans for an excellent precis of his contribution to the development of the Meiji Navy.

19. For Meiji shipbuilding in general see Seymour Broadbridge, "Shipbuilding and the State in Japan since the 1850s", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.11, No.4, (1977) pp.601-613.

20. Philip H Colomb, Naval Warfare, (1891). Mahan is generally thought to have been the most influential but op.cit., Perry argues that Colomb should receive the credit. Many commentators equate early translation dates for Mahan's volumes into Japanese as indicative of his influence. I feel this may be misleading in that it seems likely that the works of both Colomb and Mahan would have been read by most Japanese naval officers in the original English.

21. For an analysis of the origins of this organisation in English see op.cit., Gow. This makes considerable use of Umetani Noboru's essay "Kaigun Sanbō Honbu Setchiron no Hassei to Sono Rekishiteki Seikaku", Nihon Rekishi, No.252, (May 1969), pp.67-88.

22. For a discussion of "cordons of sovereignty" and "cordons of interest" see James Crowley, "From Closed Door to Empire - The Foundation of the Meiji Military Establishment", in Bernard S Silberman and Harry S Harootunian (eds.), Modern Japanese Leadership, (Tucson, 1966), pp73ff.

23. Bōeichō Bōei Kenshūjo Senshishitsu, Kaigun Gunsenbi<1> Showa Jūroku-nen Jūichi-gatsu made, (Tokyo, 1969), (hereafter referred to in all notes as Kaigun Gunsenbi <1>), pp.221-223 and op.cit., Toyama, pp.43-53 for general summaries of the various plans.

24. op.cit., Evans, p.255.

25. op.cit., Kaigun Gunsenbi <1>, p.222.

26. ibid., pp.222-223.

27. The definitive account of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance remains Ian Nish's two volume study, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907, (London, 1966) and Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-1923, (London, 1972). See also his recent essay "Naval Thinking and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1900-1904", Hōgaku Kenkyū (Keiō University), Vol.56, No.3, (1983), pp.963-972. For recent Japanese accounts of military aspects of the Alliance see S Murashima, "NichiEi Dōmeishi no Ichikawamen - Ryōkoku Gunji Kyōshō no Seiritsu o megutte", pp.15-31 in Nihon Seiji Gakkai (eds.), NichiEi Kankei no Shiteki Tenkai, (Tokyo, 1977), No.2, pp.15-31 and S Murashima "Dainikai NichiEi Gungi Kyōshō ni kansuru Jakkan no Kōsatsu", Seiji Keizai Shigaku, No.153, (February, 1979), pp.1-12.

28. A general account is to be found in Thomas A Bailey, "Japan's Protest Against the Annexation of Hawaii", Journal of Modern History, Vol.3, (March, 1931), pp.46-61.

29. Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion 1897-1911, (New York, 1967), p.52.

30. For a detailed chart of Japanese naval forces see op.cit., Kaigun Gunsenbi <1>, pp.112-119.

31. See note 27 references.

32. op.cit., Nish, (1966), p.357.

33. An excellent summary of the INDP is to be found in op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, pp.112-124 and also Shimanuki

Takeharu, "Nichiro Sensō Igo ni okeru Kokubō Hōshin, Shoyō Heiryoku, Yōrei Kōryō no Hensen", Gunji Shigaku, Vol.8, No.4, (March, 1973), pp.2-11.

34. See Ian Nish, "Army-Navy Conflict and the Russo-Japanese War", BAJS Proceedings: History/International Relations, Vol.7, Pt.1, (1982), (Forthcoming). For a discussion of the consequences of army-navy rivalry see Takagi Sokichi, Taiheiyō Sensō to RikuKaigun no Kōsō, (Tokyo, 1967).

35. Banno Junji, "The Taishō Political Crisis and the Problem of Japanese Government, 1906-1914", Papers in Far Eastern History, Australian National University, (March 1979).

36. A good English language treatment of the Siemens Incident's impact on the navy is to be found in op.cit., Evans, pp.270-287.

37. English language translations of important diplomatic documents relating to Japan's decision to enter the First World War and involvement in the war are to be found in Kajima Morinosuke, The Diplomacy of Japan 1894-1922 Volume 3 First World war, Paris Peace Conference, Washington Conference, (Tokyo, 1980) pp.35-347.

38. For military (army) involvement in China at this time see Tsing Yuan, "The Japanese Intervention in Shantung during World War One", pp.21-33 and Hsi-Ping Shao, "From the Twenty-one demands to the Sino-Japanese Military Agreements, 1915-1918: Ambivalent Relations", pp.37-57 in Alvin Coox and Hilary Conroy (eds.), China and Japan, (Santa Barbara, 1978). See also Craig N Canning, The Japanese Occupation of Shantung during World War 1, Ph.D., (Stanford University, 1975). In Japanese see especially Kitaoka Shinichi, Nihon Rikugun to Tairiku Seisaku 1906-1918, (Tokyo, 1979).

39. General accounts of Japan's naval involvement in the war are to be found in op.cit., Ikeda, Vol.2, op.cit., pp.28-36; op.cit., Toyama, pp.114-120; op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, pp.143-155 and op.cit., Kaigun Gunsenbi, pp.130-133, 272-277. In English see G Nakashima, "The Japanese Navy in the Great War", Japan Society of London Transactions and Proceedings, Vol.17, (1918-1920) pp.32-39; Arthur Diosy, "Japan's Part in the War, 1914-17", Japan Society of London, Transactions and Proceedings, Vol.16, (1917-1918), pp.2-14; "The Japanese Navy" pp.269-285 in The Times (ed.), The Times Documentary History of the War: Vol XI Naval Part 4 Documentary History - Naval, (London, 1919).

40. op.cit., The Times (ed.), p.275.

41. Viscount, Admiral of the Fleet Jellicoe, The Crisis of the Naval War, (London, 1920), p.47 and p.149.

42. Naval involvement in the Siberian Expedition will be treated in the next chapter. It would be fair to say that western analyses have tended to ignore the early Japanese naval involvement but see James Morley, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia 1918, (New York, 1957). In Japanese see Hosoya Chihiro, Shiberia Shuppei no Shiteki Kenkyū, (Tokyo, 1976), and his "Nihon Kaigun Rikusentai no Urajivostokku Jāriku: Taiso Kanshō Sensō no Purorōgu", Rekishi Kyoiku, Vol.7, No.1, (January 1959), pp.38-45.

CHAPTER THREE

1. I am indebted to Professor Mikami Kazuo for bringing these diaries to my attention. I was unable to obtain permission to xerox them but fortunately they were not central to my research. Moreover, important extracts are printed in Katō's official biography.

2. The standard work is Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Fronteir in Hawaii 1868-1898, (Berkely, 1953). The most recent study of Japan's relations with Hawaii is John J Stephan, Hawaii under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest after Pearl Harbor, (Honolulu, 1984).

3. Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion 1897-1911, (New York, 1967), p.11.

4. ibid., p.48. The population reached 61,000 by 1900. ibid., p.54.

5. Charles E Neu, Troubled Encounter: The United States and Japan, (New York, 1979), p.34.

6. op.cit., Iriye, p.52.

7. See Chapter 1 note 15 for the various English language biographies on Admiral Togo which relate these events in some detail.

8. op.cit., KKD, p.235ff.

9. Asada Sadao, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitation: Katō Tomosaburō vs Katō Kanji", in Gerald Jordan (ed.), Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1977), p.142.

10. op.cit., KKD, pp.272-273.

11. op.cit., KKD, pp.302-303.

12. For a recent essay on the Meiji Navy and the Suez Canal see Nomura Minoru, "Suezu Unga to Yamamoto Gonnohyoe". in his Rekishi no naka no Nihon Kaigun, (Tokyo, 1980), pp.18-27.

13. op.cit., KKD, pp.272-273.

14. The best account of Hirose is Shimada Kinji, Roshia ni okeru Hirose Takeo, (Tokyo, 1970). For a popular account featuring Kato's relations with Hirose see Eto Jun, Umi ga Yomigaeru, (Tokyo, 1976), (2 Vols), which was made into the first three hour drama documentary in Japan and shown on TBS Television on August 29, 1977.

15. Chart is reproduced in op.cit., KKD, p.433.

16. op.cit., KKD, p.445.

17. Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, (London, 1966), p.346.

18. United States National Archives Record Group 45, April 1907, Lt Cdr Frank Marble USN 07-323-E7D. 19. op.cit., KKD, p.542.

20. ibid., pp.547-561 for a detailed description.

21. op.cit., Nish, p.357.

22. Katō Kanji, "Fundamentals of Disarmament" Contemporary Japan, (March 1936), Vol.IV, No.4, pp.490-491.

23. The Times, 13/9/1911.

24. op.cit., KKD, pp.577-579.

25. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.146.

26. ibid., pp.144-146 for a discussion of the problems of coordination between Japanese officers and those of the British China Fleet.

27. ibid., p.146.

28. The Times, 29/1/1916.

29. op.cit., KKD, p.639.

30. ibid., pp.651-652.

31. James Morley, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia 1918, (New York, 1957); Hosoya Chihiro, Shiberia Shuppei no Shiteki Kenkyū, (Tokyo, 1976); Hosoya Chihiro "Japanese Documents in the Siberian Intervention, 1917-1922: Part 1, November 1917-January 1919", Hitotsubashi Journal of Law & Politics, Vol.1, (Apr 60), pp.30-53; Hosoya Chihiro, "Nihon Kaigun Rikusentai no Urajivostokku Jōriku: Taiso, Kanshō Sensō no Purorōgu", Rekishi Kyōiku, Vol.7, No.1, (January 1959), pp.38-45. A selection of Katō's telegrams to Tokyo and the various replies is to be found in Gaimushō (eds.), Nihon Gaikō Bunsho Taishō 7 Nen, (Tokyo, 1968), especially pp.476-763. See also bibliography for various books using western sources only. See also op.cit., KKD, and Osumi

Taishō Denki Kankōkai (eds.), Danshoku Osumi Mineo Den (Tokyo, 1943), for assessments of the situation focssing on the two leading Japanese naval officers.

32. The complete set of telegrams is to be found at the Military History office in Tokyo in a folder entitled "Nichi-Doitsu Senso Taishō 3-8".

33. op.cit., Morley, p.146.

34. op.cit., Hosoya, (1959), p.40 and op.cit., KKD, p.667.

35. op.cit., KKD, p.663.

36. ibid., pp.664-665.

37. op.cit., Hosoya, (1976), p.130, shows clearly the differing views of army and navy planners.

38. ibid., Hosoya, (1959), p.41.

39. ibid.

40. op.cit., Gaimushō (eds.), p.647.

41. op.cit., Hosoya, (1959), pp.46ff.

42. Iwabuchi Tatsuo, "Admiral Katō and the Japanese Navy", Contemporary Japan, Vol.3, No.3, (December 1934), p.421.

43. See especially National Archives Record Group 45 Subject file 1911-1917 WA 6 Siberia Conditions at Vladivostock.

44. op.cit., Hosoya, (1976), p.134 cites 6th April issue of Izvestia, "The Japanese Imperialists are planning to try and crush the Soviet Revolution, cut Russia off fron the shores of Europe, seize the fertile territories of the Soviets and enslave the workers and farmers of Siberia".

45. Subject file 1911-1917 WA 6 Siberia Conditions at Vladivostock. FlagBrook to SecNav 5 April 1918.

46. ibid., WA 6 Knight USS Brooklyn to C-in-C Asiatic Fleet 4 November 1918.

47. op.cit., Morley, p.147.

48. op.cit., National Archives Record Group 45 WA 6 ONI, August 12 1918, to State/General Board. Intercepted letter dated June 18/1918.

49. op.cit., Hosoya, (1960), p.105.

50. op.cit., National Archives Record Group 45 WA 6 FlagBrook to OpNav, 24 March 1918.

51. George Kennan, Soviet-American Relations 1917-1920: Vol 2 The Decision to Intervene, (Princeton, 1956), p.96.

52. op.cit., Gaimushō (eds.), p.669.

53. op.cit., KKD, pp.695ff.

54. National Archives, Decimal File State Department 1910-1929, March 24 1920 (81.111/28936)

55. John Henry Engram, Partner or Peril: Japan in German Foreign Policy and Diplomacy 1914-1920 Ph.D., (Washington State University, 1976), pp.267-275. John W M Chapman, "Japan and German Naval Policy 1919-1945", in Joseph Kreiner (ed.), Deutschland - Japan Historische Kontakte Sonderdruck, (Bonn, 1984), pp211-264.

56. op.cit., Engram, p.271.

57. ibid., p.272.

58. I am indebted to Dr John Chapman for the provision and translation of an "Unsigned Memorandum to the [German] Naval Staff", entitled "Discussion with Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz on 8 November 1923", where Tirpitz, rightly or wrongly, places the blame squarely on Katō Kanji. Dr Chapman however is in error in stating that Katō visited Tirpitz on his way to the Washington Conference in op.cit., Chapman (84) p.239.

59. See Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and the United States", in D Borg and S Okamoto (eds.), Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese American Relations 1931-1941, (New York, 1973), pp.228-229, for the development of a pro-German faction in the Imperial Japanese Navy.

60. op.cit., KKD, pp.726-727.

61. ibid., pp.714-727, reproduces the entire lecture.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. The best outline of the INDP is, as stated previously, Professor Nomura Minoru's summary in Rengō Kantai <1>, pp.112-124. See also Shimanuki Takeharu, "Nichi-Ro Sensō iko ni okeru Kokubō Hōshin, Shoyō Heiryoku, Yōhei Kōryō no Hensen", Gunji Shigaku, Vol.8, No.4, (March 1973), pp.2-11, which revises his earlier findings in "Nihon no Kokubō Hōshin, Yōhei Kōryō", Kokubo, (November 1961), Vol.10, No.3.

2. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.116.

3. ibid., p.116.

4. Asada Sadao, The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Policy of Naval Limitation, (unpublished paper), p.17.

5. For a general discussion see Nomura Minoru, Rekishi no naka no Kaigun, (Tokyo, 1980), pp.28-38, "Sekai Kenkan Funso to Hachi-Hachi-Hachi Kantai".

6. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.118.

7. ibid., pp.161-163.

8. op.cit., Nomura, (1980).

9. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, pp.157-159, but see also Nomura Minoru, "Tai-Bei-Ei Kaisen to Kaigun no Tai-Bei Shichiwari Shiso", Gunji Shigaku, Vol.9, No.3, (September 1973).

10. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.158.

11. For a brief description of attrition strategy see Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and the United States" in D Borg and S Okamoto (eds.), Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese American Relations 1931-1941, (New York, 1973), pp.234-236.

12. Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, (New York, 1975), postulates three roles/duties for a navy: military, diplomatic and policing.

13. Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms limitation 1914-1922, (Chicago, 1976), analyses in considerable detail the domestic factors which fuelled pre-Washington naval arms racing.

14. ibid., p.37.

15. Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars Vol 1 1919-1929, (London, 1968), pp.53-54

16. ibid., p.85.

17. ibid., pp.73-74 and p.89.

18. Article 8 of the League of Nations Charter. Thomas Burkman, Japan, The League of Nations and the New World Order 1918-1920, Ph.D., (University of Michigan, 1975), pp.247-249, gives a discussion of the debate and an earlier version of Article 8.

19. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, pp.180-182 and also op.cit., Dingman, p.78.

20. op.cit., Dingman, p.81; op.cit., Burkman, p.241.

21. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.180.

22. The complete text is to be found in Japanese Military

Documents National Archives Microfilm item T1208.

23. Segawa Yoshinobu, "Washinton Gunshuku Kaigi to Nihon: Kaigunshō Kokusai Renmei Kankei Jikō Kenkyūkai no Hōkoku o chūshin", Hōgaku Jihō, Vol.75, No.3, (1968), p.67. This essay is a detailed study which quotes extensively from the original documents.

24. See Itō Takashi and Nomura Minoru (eds.), Kaigun Taisō Kobayashi Seizō Oboegaki, (Tokyo, 1981), for this officer's role in the various arms limitation conferences.

25. op.cit., Segawa, pp.68-77, for a summary.

26. op.cit., Rengō Kantai<1>, p.183.

27. op.cit., Segawa, pp.67-68.

28. op.cit., Dingman, pp.181-182; op.cit., Takeuchi, pp.227-230.

29. ibid., p.184.

30. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.183.

31. Joseph V Guilefoile, The Japanese Press and the Washington Conference of 1921-22, (Washington, 1949), is a useful summary.

32. op.cit., Segawa, pp.67-68.

33. ibid., p.69.

34. ibid., p.71.

35. ibid., p.72.

36. ibid., pp.81-82.

37. op.cit., Gaimushō (eds.), pp.797ff.

38. ibid., p.817.

39. ibid., pp.817-831, is an excellent overview of these discussions.

40. ibid., pp.811-812.

41. ibid., p.815.

42. The background to the codebreaking is to be found in Herbert Yardley, The American Black Chamber, (New York, 1981), pp.163-211. A five page appendix on the generally accurate nature of the translated documents is to be found in Asada Sadao, Japan and the United States 1915-1925, Ph.D., (Yale, 1963). There are numerous references to another book which Yardley was not permitted to publish on the Washington Conference. In fact the manuscript was

written by Marie Stuart Klooz from documents supplied by Yardley and is 19 chapters, 920 pages long. It is located in the US Ministry of Justice files Record Group 60 235334 under the 'provisional title' Japanese Diplomatic Secrets 1921-1922. For its background see David Kahn, "A New Source for Historians: Yardley's Seized Manuscript", Cryptologia, Vol.6, No.2, (April, 1982), pp.115-118.

43. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.183.

44. op.cit., Nihon Gaikō Monjo: Washinton Kaigi, Vol.1, (Tokyo, 1977), pp.185-187.

45. For an analysis of Hara's political position at this time see op.cit., Dingman and Peter Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taishō Japan, (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).

46. Hara Takashi (ed.), Hara Kei Nikki, (Tokyo, 1950), pp.465-468 covering period October 5-7, 1921.

47. op.cit., Dingman, p.191.

48. op.cit., Gaimushō (eds.), pp.820-821.

49. ibid., p.820.

50. See especially the various works of Asada Sadao listed in the bibliography.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. KKD, p.733.

2. Ian Nish, "Japan and Naval Aspects of the Washington Conference", in Wiliam G Beasley (ed.), Modern Japan: Aspects of History, Literature and Society, (Berkeley, 1975), p.72.

3. ibid., p.72.

4. Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Limitation 1918-1921, (Chicago, 1976), p.191.

5. I was also shown a silver ashtray presented by Sir Archibald Lucius Douglas and Major B Green making Kato an Honorary member of the Knights Commander of St Michael and St George dated July 1911.

6. National Archives Record Group 45 C-10-L QY 14746-B, Box 487.

7. ibid., p.2.

8. Admiralty 116 3447 X/N 02288 "Summary of Coversation between N A Tokyo and Vice-Admiral H Katō", (September

1921), p.1.

9. ibid., p.1.

10. ibid., p.4.

11. See Segawa Yoshinobu's three part series "Washinton Gunshuku Kaigi (1921-1922) to Nihon Rikugun", Bōei Ronshu, Vol.4, No.1, (April 1965), pp.45-67; Vol.4, No.2, (July 1965), pp.163-187; Vol.4, No.3, (October 1965), pp.53-67. The press also carried reports asking why the navy specialist, Katō Kanji had been appointed since he was senior to major general Tanaka Kazushige of the Army.

12. Katō Kanji, "Gunbi Seigen no Taisei to Sono Teido", Taiyo, Vol.27, (October 1921), pp.18-22.

13. ibid., p.20.

14. ibid., p.22.

15. Itō Kinjirō, Ikiteiru Taishō Katō Kanji (Tokyo, 1942), p.32. For an impression of Katō during the trip by a civilian reporter see Komatsu Midori, Kafu Kaigi no Shinsō, (Tokyo, 1922), pp.54ff. For Katō Kanji's own account see Kato Kanji, "Kafu Kaigi ni tsukaishite", in Tokyo Asahi Shinbun Seibu-hen, Sono Koro o Kataru, (Tokyo, 1929), pp.378-384.

16. See especially the Washington Post and New York Times, (October 23-30, 1921).

17. For details of the US Navy and the conference see especially, Thomas Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference 1921-22, (Knoxville, 1971); William Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific 1919-1922, (Austin, 1971). For the US Army, Thomas L Powers, The United States Army and the Washington Conference, Ph.D., (University of Georgia, 1978).

18. Kaigun Gunreibu, "Kaigun Gunbi Seigen ni kan suru Katō Chūjō Kōen Hikki", pp.6-8. This 48 page document is not dated but was delivered at the Japanese Naval War College sometime in May or June 1922. I am indebted to Katō Kanji's son Katō Kanichi for providing a copy of this document. "Hereafter referred to as "Katō Chūjō Kōen Hikki").

20. New York Times, October 13, 1921.

21. Washington Post, October 19, 1921.

22. New York Times, October 28, referring to an Associated Press report from Tokyo dated October 23, 1921, on an Asahi Shinbun article.

23. For the other aspects of the conference see Morinosuke Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan 1894-1922, Vol.3, Tokyo 1980, Part Three, "The Washington Conference", pp.419-671 and

Asada Sadao, Japan and America 1915-1925, Ph.D., (Yale, 1963) and Asada Sadao, "Japan's 'Special Interests' and the the Washington Conference, 1921-1922", American Historical Review, (October 1961), pp.62-70.

24. Richard Dean Burns and Donald Urquidi, Disaramament in Perspective: An Analysis of Selected arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919-1939, Vol.3 Limitation of Sea Power, (Los Angeles, 1968), p.14.

25. ibid., pp.14-15.

26. Gabrielle d'Annunzio, International Naval Disarmament Conferences at Washington and Genoa November 1921-April 1922, (New York, 1950) p.57.

27. Roosevelt Diaries, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress 14/11/21.

28. op.cit., "Katō Chūjō Kōen Hikki", p.8.

29. op.cit., Roosevelt Diaries, 14/11/21.

30. op.cit., "Kātō Chūjō Kōen Hikki", p.9.

31. ibid., p.9.

32. op.cit., Kajima, p.475.

33. ibid., p.475.

34. ibid., pp.470-471.

35. op.cit., Roosevelt Diaries, 15/12/21.

36. "Memorandum of a Conversation held in Mr Hughes Room at the State Department, Washington, on Monday December 12, 1921", p.9, in Charles Evans Hughes Papers Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

37. Boston Evening Transcript (comp.), Review of the Conference on Limitation of Armaments in connection with the Pacific and Far Eastern Questions pts 1-4 (July 10 1921-February 14 1922), (Boston, 1922), p.15.

38. Conference on the Limitation of Armament: November 12, 1941-February 6, 1922, (Washington DC, 1922), pp.82-84.

39. op.cit., Roosevelt Diaries, 15/11/1921.

40. ibid., 16/11/1921.

41. Asada Sadao, Japan and the United States, 1915-1925, Ph.D., (Yale University), p. The diary, and one might add Roosevelt's behaviour over Hawaii years earlier, lead one to believe he was as much if not more of a 'fighter' than the samurai Katō Kanji. Roosevelt also refers to Katō Tomosaburō as a samurai which Asada conveniently omits to

mention.

42. op.cit., Roosevelt Diaries.

43. Japan Advertiser, 16/11/21.

44. op.cit., Roosvelt Diaries, 16/11/21.

45. ibid., op.cit., Braisted, pp.603-604, implies that Admiral Beatty and the British Delegation were a major contributor to the deadlock.

46. Adm 116.3446 HN 0288 Dated November 30th 1921 p.1. op.cit., Buckley, p.82, also states Admiral Katō Kanji was "under orders from Baron Katō".

47. op.cit., Roosevelt Diaries, 30/11/21.

48. ibid., 16/11/21.

49. Washington Post, 16/11/21.

50. op.cit., Klooz, pp.131-132.

51. op.cit., Roosevelt Diaries, 17/11/21.

52. op.cit., "Katō Chūjō Kōen Hikki", pp.11-12.

53. Memorandum (undated) on "Questions asked by Japanese advisors at informal meeting, November 21, with answers" C E Hughes Papers Box 169 9 (a) Naval Treaty Data furnished by the Navy Department.

54. ibid., p.2.

55. ibid.

56 op.cit., Kajima, pp.471-472, but see also Adm 116 3446 HN 0288 Dated November 30th 1921 for a British account of the Japanese assertions.

57. op.cit., "Katō Chūjō Kōen Hikki", op.cit., pp.14-15.

58. ibid., p.15.

59. Memorandum (undated) on "reply to the questions and the Japanese opinions concerning the replies received from the United States", C E Hughes Papers Box 169 9 (a) Naval Treaty Data furnished by the Navy Department.

60. Memorandum of a conversation held in the Secretary of State's room, State department, Washington, on Friday December 2, 1921, p.7. C E Hughes Papers.

61. Plenipotentiary Katō's case for retention of the Mutsu is to be found in ibid., and another memorandum of conversations between Balfour Hughes and Katō dated December

12, 1921, also to be found in the same folder amongst the Hughes papers.

62. Mark Sullivan, The Great Adventure at Washington 1922, p.113.

63. op.cit., Memorandum (undated "reply to questions..." Hughes papers pp.2-3.

64. op.cit., Kajima, p.467.

65. Undated memorandum, no title but obviously Navy Department data: Box 169 Hughes papers included in folder with memoranda cited in notes 67 and 72.

66. op.cit., "Katō Chūjō Kōen Hikki", pp.15-16.

67. Hughes opening address cited in op.cit., Kajima, pp.468-469.

68. Undated memorandum p.6, op.cit., see note 65.

69. Roosevelt Diaries, 27/11/21.

70. op.cit., "Katō Chūjō Kōen Hikki", pp.16-17.

71. op.cit., Nish, p.77. There was clearly considerable confusion in the American press and Plenipotentary Katō was referred to occasionally as 'the real Katō'!

72. Ichihashi Yamato, The Washington Conference and After: A Historical Survey, (Stanford, 1928) p.47.

73. Chugai Shogyo, 29/11/21.

74. New York Times, 29/11/21.

75. Washington Post, 1/12/21.

76. Japan Advertiser, 2/12/21.

77. op.cit., Asada, (1963), p.237.

78. Washington Post, 1/12/21.

79. Asaha Shinbun, 2/12/21.

80. Japan Advertiser, 4/12/21.

81. Osaka Mainichi, 3/12/21.

82. The Times, 2/12/21.

83. op.cit., KKD, p.745.

84. Japan Advertiser, 3/12/21.

85. op.cit., Dingman. p.201.

86. Miyako Shinbun, 3/12/21.

87. Japan Advertiser, 13/12/21.

88. op.cit., Asada, p.208.

89. ibid.

90. ibid.

91. Asada Sadao "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Arms Limitation: Katō Tomosaburō vs Katō Kanji", in Gerald Jordan (ed.), Naval Warfare in the 20th Century, (London, 1977) and Ikeda Kiyoshi, "Futari no Kato" in his Nihon no Kaigun, Vol.2, (Tokyo, 1967) pp.52-60.

92. op.cit., Dingman, Chapter 11.

93. ibid., pp.185-190, for a description of interservice problems over the conference.

94. op.cit., Hughes Papers Box 169 Naval Treaty 3 Misc.

95. ibid.

96. The best English language discussion of Kato Tomosaburo's struggles with Tokyo authorities is op.cit., Dingman.

97. Washington Post, 25/10/21. Hughes Papers Box 169 Naval Treaty 3 Misc.

98. op.cit., Kajima, pp.469-470.

99. ibid., pp.470-471.

100. op.cit., Klooz Manuscript, pp.132-133.

101. op.cit., Kajima, p.472.

102. ibid., p.472.

103. ibid., p.473.

104. ibid., p.473.

105. op.cit., Memorandum December 2, 1921, Hughes Papers pp.3-4.

106. op.cit., Memorandum December 12, 1921, Hughes Papers op.cit., pp1-2.

107. op.cit., Asada, (1977).

108. Arai Tatsuo, Katō Tomosaburō, (Tokyo, 1959); Kurihara Hirota, Gensui Katō Tomosaburō Den, (Tokyo, 1928);

Yamanashi Katsunoshin, Katō Tomosaburō Gensui o Shinobu, (Tokyo, 1967). Yamanashi had his career damaged in the political struggle (and its aftermath) during the London Treaty Crisis of 1930 when he and Kato Kanji were on opposite sides. Shidehara Kijūrō, Shidehara Kijūrō GaikoJunen, (Tokyo, 1951), is a rather selective set of remininiscences and moreover after London (1930) he and Katō Kanji had become implacably opposed.

109. op.cit., "Katō Chujō Kōen Hikki", p.17.

110. op.cit., Nish, p.79.

111. op.cit., KKD, p.758.

112. op.cit., Ikeda, p.53.

113. op.cit., Asada, (1963), p.230 refers to a rumour that circulated in Tokyo that Katō Kanji had actually committed suicide in Washington.

114. op.cit., Shidehara, p.65.

115. op.cit., Ikeda p.54.

116. For Suetsugu's career see Hata Ikuhiko, "Suetsugu Nobumasa: Kantai-ha no Yu", Keizai Orai, (June 1979) pp.220-230; Ito Takashi, "Kantai-ha Sōsui-Suetsugu", Rekishi to Jimbutsu, (August 1976), pp.74-82.

117. op.cit., KKD, p.745.

118. op.cit., KKD, pp.743-744.

119. op.cit., KKD, p.1008.

120. Komatsu Midori, Washinton Kaigi no Shinsō, (Tokyo, 1922), pp.54ff and documents of British Naval Attache Tokyo cited above.

121. Japan Chronicle, 3/3/1922.

122. op.cit., "Katō Chūjō Kōen Hikki", p.41 for Kato Kanji's assessment of Balfour.

CHAPTER 6

1. Asada Sadao, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitation: Katō Tomosaburō vs Katō Kanji", in Gerald Jordan (ed.), Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1977), p.157 notes that Katō Tomosaburō told Saito Makoto "I thought I was about to die in Washington. Asada emphasises Katō Kanji constantly argued with Plenipotentiary Kato. Shidehara Kijūrō noted that Katō Tomosaburō received a very hard time from Kato Kanji and that they often argued and discussed late into the night. He also stresses Katō

Kanji's arguments with the Americans. Shidehara Kijuro, Gaikō Gojūnenshi, (Tokyo, 1951), pp.64-65. One should be aware that Shidehara and Katō were fierce opponents during the London Naval Treaty Crisis of 1930 and Shidehara's memory may therefore have been somewhat selective.

2. Ian Nish, "Naval Aspects of the Washington Conference", in William G Beasley (ed.), Modern Japan: Aspects of History, Literature and Society, (Tokyo 1976), p.79. Ikeda Kiyoshi, Nihon no Kaigun, (Tokyo, 1967), Vol.2, p.53, mentions the possible dissatisfaction as a reason for returning home but confirms that Katō did enter hospital. op.cit., KKD, p.744, mentions a rumour circulating in Tokyo that Kato returned early because of the "great collision" with Plenipotentiary Katō but refutes this. Kato's diary covers the sea voyage home and confirms that he was very ill.

3. Washington Post, 19/11/21.

4. Japan Chronicle, 3/3/22.

5. ibid.

6. ibid.

7. ibid.

8. op.cit., Asada, (1977), p.155, "A figure of unquestioned leadership and towering prestige, he simply defied any challenge from his subordinates".

9. The best treatments of this subject in Japanese are Kobayashi Tatsuo, "Tōsui Kanpanron to Kaigun Gunreibu Jōrei no Kaisei", Kokugakuin Hōgaku Zasshi, Vol.5, No.5, (April 1968), pp.215-248 and Nomura Minoru, "Kaigun Gunreibu no Kengen Kakudai no Rekishi to Onken-ha Kaigun Shunō no Rigeneki", in Nomura Minoru, Rekishi no naka no Kaigun, (Tokyo 1980), pp.46-80.

10. See op.cit., Asada, (1977), pp.158ff, for details of Katō Tomosaburō's efforts to develop a civilian control system similar to that of the Royal Navy.

11. A convenient summary of the essential naval aspects of this revision is to be found in op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, especially pp.195-206. See also Shimanuki Takeharu, "Daiichiji Sekai Sensō Igo no Kokubō Hōshin, Shoyō Heiryoku, Yōhei Kōryō no Hensen", Gunji Shigakui, Vol.9, No.1, pp.65ff.

12. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, pp.195-197.

13. James Crowley, "Japan's Military Foreign Policies", in J Morley (ed.), Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1941: A Research Guide, (New York, 1974), p.39.

14. Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and its Policy

centering on Naval Limitation, 1907-1930", (unpublished paper presented at the January 1976 Hawaii Conference on 'US-Japan Relations from WW1 to the Manchurian Incident), p.33.

15. ibid., p.17.

16. op.cit., KKD, p.768.

17. Microfilm MT 24351, Reel 307, p.98, Japan Advertiser, 17/1/23.

18. Katō Kanji Nikki 4/6/81. A printed version is now being prepared under the guidance of Professor Ito Takashi, Tokyo University. I am indebted to him and to the Kato family for allowing me to make a copy of the handwritten manuscript in full.

19. Leonard Humphreys, The Imperial Japanese Army 1918-1929: The Disintegration of the Meiji Military System, Ph.D., (Stanford University, 1974), pp.122-124, provides a graphic account.

20. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki 9/6/23.

21. Imai Seichi, Nihon Kindaishi, Vol.2, (Tokyo, 1977), pp.238-239.

22. op.cit., KKD, pp.789-794, reproduces the complete lecture.

23. David J Lu, From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor, (Washington DC, 1961), p.1.

24. op.cit., KKD, pp.836-840 where Katō's address is presented in full.

25. I am indebted to Professor Nomura Minoru for this information.

26. This document was discovered by Professor Asada Sadao and can be found in the Saitō Papers at the Kenkyushitsu, National Diet Library.

27. David Carlton, "Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927", Political Science Quarterly, Vol.83, No.4, (1968), p.573.

28. For a general treatment see Richard Dean Burns and Donald Urquidi, Disarmament in Perspective 1918-1939, (Washington, 1968) pp.83-87. For the British side see op.cit., Carlton and for the American side see Adolph B Clemensen, The Geneva Tripartite Conference of 1927 in Japanese-American Relations, Ph.D. (University of Arizona, 1975). For the Japanese side see Kobaysahi Tatsuo, "Kaigun Gunshuku 1921-1936" in Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi, Vol.1, and Asada Sadao, "Nihon Kaigun to Gunshuku: Taibei Seisaku o meguru Seiji Katei", in Hosoya Chihiro and Saitō Makoto

(eds.), Washinton Taisei to NichìBei Kankei, (Tokyo, 1978), for naval aspects. Unno Yoshiro Nihon Gaikoshi: Vol.16, Kaigun Gunshuku Kosho, Fusen Joyaku, (Tokyo, 1973), covers diplomatic aspects thoroughly. For a contemporary account by a leading journalist on naval affairs see Itō Masanori, Gunshuku? (Tokyo, 1928).

29. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.217.

30. For France's position at Washington see Donald Birn, "Open Diplomacy: The Washington Conference of 1921-22", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.12, (July 1970).

31. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.217.

32. For a contemporary analysis of the development of treaty cruisers see Hector Bywater Scientific American, (November 1926).

33. Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol.1, (London, 1968), p.332.

34. ibid., p.332.

35. op.cit., Asada, (1978), p.369.

36. ibid., pp.369-370.

37. ibid., p.370.

38. op.cit., Clemensen, p.146.

39. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.218.

40. ibid., p.219.

41. op.cit., Burns, p.84.

42. op.cit., Roskill, pp.449-450.

43. op.cit., Carlton, pp.580ff.

44. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.218.

45. op.cit., Carlton, pp.580ff, for a discussion on the British "Doctrine of Requirements".

46. op.cit., Kaigún Gunsenbi <1>, p.365.

47. op.cit., Burns, p.85.

48. op.cit., Roskill, Vol.1, p.502.

49. op.cit., Asada, (1978), p.379.

50. ibid., p.379.

51. op.cit., Carlton, p.586.

52. ibid., p.586.

53. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.219.

54. op.cit., Itō Masanori, p.48.

55. op.cit., Burns, pp.85-87.

56. op.cit., Clemensen, p.93.

57. From Katō Kanji to Saitō Makoto March 23 1927, Saitō Makoto Papers marked "Confidential-please destroy upon reading", I am indebted to Professor Asada for providing a transliteration of this letter.

58. op.cit., Asada, (1978), p.376.

59. ibid.

60. According to the files in the Saitō Papers Katō wrote numerous letters to his superior commencing around 1909.

62. Asahi Shinbun, 5/6/1927.

63. op.cit., Asada, (1978), p.372.

64. Togo stated this also to Captain Yamanashi Katsunoshin who had been despatched home from Washington in advance of Katō Tomosaburō op.cit., Ikeda, Vol.2, p.58.

65. op.cit., KKD, p.855.

66. ibid., p.851.

67. Okada Teikan (ed.), Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku, (Tokyo, 1977), p.31.

CHAPTER 7

1. Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol.1, (London, 1968), pp.415-416 and p.554. op.cit., TSM, Vol.1, p.53.

2. Rengō Kantai <1>, pp.220-221. See also op.cit., Roskill pp.545-548.

3. Kaigun Gunsenbi <1>, pp.350-360, for an outline of the activities of this committee.

4. The best account of the Kellogg Briand Pact from the Japanese side is to be found in Unno Yoshiro, Nihon Gaikōshi 16: Kaigun Gunshuku Kōshō - Fūsen Joyaku, (Tokyo, 1973), pp.76-132.

5. Raymond G O'Connor, "The 'Yardstick' and Naval Disarmament in the 1920s", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol.45, (December 1958), p.88.

6. In English see Asada Sadao, "The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitation 1918-1930", (unpublished paper) pp.36-41. In Japanese see Asada Sadao, "Nihon Kaigun to Gunshuku: Taibei Seisaku o meguru Seiji Katei" in Hosoya Chihiro, Saitō Makoto (eds.), Washinton Taisei to Nichibei Kankei, (Tokyo, 1978) pp.384-389.

7. Richard D Burns and Donald Urquidi, Disarmament in Perspective: An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919-1939 Vol 111 Limitation of Sea Power, (Washington DC, 1968), p.87.

8. Arthur E. Tiedeman, The Hamaguchi Cabinet: First Phase July 1929-February 1930 Ph.D., (Columbia University, 1959), provides an excellent background.

9. op.cit., O'Connor, pp.450-455.

10. ibid., p.444.

11. ibid., p.449.

12. I have drawn heavily here on James Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, (Princeton, 1966), especialy pp.35ff. But see also op.cit., Burns and Urquidi for the general background; Roskill op.cit., for a British perspective and Raymond G. O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium: The US and the London Naval Conference 1930, (Kansas, 1962), for an American one.

13. op.cit., Burns and Urquidi, p.97.

14. ibid., p119, and op.cit., Kaigun Gunsenbi <1>, pp.362-363, for precise details of Japanese naval vessels circa 1931.

15. However I would venture to suggest that the real inflexibility was shown by the Americans and indicates clearly that they regarded the whole issue as a political problem rather than a technical/strategic one.

16. op.cit., James Crowley, p.47.

17. ibid., p.43.

18. op.cit., Burns and Urquidi p.91.

19. Ikeda Kiyoshi, "Rondon Gunshuku Mondai Nikki Kaisetsu - Rondon Jōyaku to Tōsuiken Mondai o chūshin ni shite", in Okada Teikan (ed.), Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku, (Tokyo, 1977), p.245.

20. ibid., p.245.

21. op.cit., Asada, (1978), p.375.

22. Suzuki Kantarō, Suzuki Kantarō Jiden, (Tokyo, 1949), p.276.

23. op.cit., Kaigun Gunsenbi <1>, p.354.

24. ibid., pp.363-364.

25. ibid., p.364.

26. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, pp.221-222.

27. op.cit., TSM, Vol.1, p.58.

28. ibid., p.58.

29. op.cit., Crowley, p.59.

30. ibid., p.38.

31. ibid., p.40.

32. op.cit., TSM, Vol.1, p.59.

33. op.cit., Kaigun Gunsenbi <1>, p.375.

34. ibid., p.375.

35. The best study in English is Ito Takashi, "Conflicts and Coalitions in Japan 1930: Political Groups (and) the London Naval Conference", in Sven Groennings et al., (eds.), The Study of Coalition Behaviour, (New York, 1970), pp.160-176. In Japanese see Ito Takashi, Shōwa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyu, (Tokyo, 1969), especially pp.389-433 for a detailed analyis of the right wing before, during and after the Treaty was signed.

36. Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire, (Chicago, 1935), p.284 for a list of those attending.

37. op.cit., Crowley, p.44.

38. For a succinct anaysis of the fiscal problems and fiscal strategies of the Hamaguchi Cabinet see op.cit., Tiedemann.

39. A good overview of the British position prior to the conference is to be found in op.cit., Roskill, pp.37-57.

40. op.cit., Crowley, p.44.

41. ibid., p.44.

42. op.cit., Kaigun Gunsenbi <1>, p.375.

43. ibid., pp.378-379.

44. According to op.cit., Crowley, p.43, the Salt Lake City, was the United States only post-1922 (treaty) cruiser of 10,000 tons and 8 inch guns actually completed at this time.

45. ibid., p.45.

46. For the army and the London Naval Conference see Segawa Zen, "1930-nen Rondon Kaigun Gunshuku Kaigi Kaisai to Nihon Rikugun", Saitama Daigaku Kiyō, (Shakai Kagaku), (1965), pp.1-9, and his "Tōsuiken Kanpan Ronsō no Tenkai to Sanbō Honbu", Nihon Rekishi, No.376, (September 1979), pp.68-84.

47. Thomas F Mayer-Oakes, (ed. and tr.), Fragile Victory: Saionji-Harada Memoirs, (Detroit, 1968), p.145.

48. For a brief discussion of the significance of the Japanese tonnage figures and their relationship with strategy see op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.223.

49. op.cit., Kaigun Gunsenbi <1>, p.376, cites Kato's report to the throne prior to the despatch of the delegation.

50. Admiral Okada Keisuke recorded that it was only after Katō Kanji had succeeded him as Commander-in-Chief that the incumbent of the post came to be 'lionised' by the Fleet op.cit., Okada Teikan, p.31.

51. op.cit., Itō Takashi, (1969), p.142.

52. Aoki Tokuzo, Taiheiyō Sensō Zenshi, 6 Vols (Tokyo, 1946), Vol.1, p.6.

53. Tsutomu David Yamamoto, The Japanese Press and Japanese Foreign Policy 1927-1933, Ph.D., (London University, SOAS).

54. Itō Takashi interestingly sees Katō Kanji as the idealist insofar as arms control and disarmament are concerned!!. op.cit., Ito Takashi, (1969), p.137.

55. ibid., p.142. He continued to keep Prince Saionji informed after September 1929, op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.138.

56. For naval propoganda efforts at this time see op.cit., Takeuchi Tatsuji, pp.303-305; op.cit., Itō Takashi, (1969), pp.435-446, is a succinct appraisal of press and public opinion at this time but see also op.cit., Yamamoto, pp.76ff.

57. Katō Hirokazu (ed.), Shōwa 4-nen 5-nen Rondon Kaigun Jōyaku Hiroku - ko-Katō Kanji Taishō Ikō, (Tokyo, 1956). A complete printed version is to be found in Sakai Keinan,

Eiketsu Katō Kanji, (Tokyo, 1979), pp149-208, especially pp.142-145. Figures in parentheses after Katō Kanji Nikki indicate pages in Sakai's book.

58. ibid., p.143.

59. ibid., p.145.

60. ibid., pp.145-150.

61. ibid., p.147.

62. ibid., p.148.

63. ibid., p.148.

64. ibid., p.149.

65. ibid., p.150.

66. Katō was a founder member of the Kokuhonsha, see Richard Storry, The Double Patriots, (London, 1957), p.311. This is not quite the same as "a leading member" which is how Asada sees him: Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and the United States", in D Borg and S Okamoto (eds.), Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American relations 1931-1941, (New York, 1971), p.234. Asada provides no evidence for this assumption and Kato's diaries do not mention him attending this organisation's meetings. Moreover Asada conveniently omits the fact that his 'hero' Kato Tomosaburo was also a founder member!

67. Katō Kanji Nikki, 11/12/29, (p.151).

68. op.cit., Itō Takashi, (1969), p.139.

69. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.145.

70. According to Kato's diaries Kato was visited By the Lord Privy Seal's secretary and the Chief Military Aide-de-Camp and he also met the Lord Keeper and the Grand Chamberlain socially at this time.

71. op.cit., Kaigun Gunsenbi <1>, pp.376-377 for extracts from this report. Prime Minister Hamaguchi, significantly, did not follow this procedure when the instructions were later revised.

72. Katō Kanji Nikki, 11/12/30, (p.151).

73. KKD, pp.889-890.

74. See particularly op.cit., Unno, pp.133-262, on diplomatic aspects and op.cit., Asada, (1978) pp.384-400, for naval aspects.

75. See especially op.cit., Itō Takashi (1969), for an remarkably detailed and fascinating account of domestic

developments in Japanese. In English see op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, and op.cit., Takeuchi.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. For coverage of internal matters at London and relations between London and Tokyo during the conference see Unno Yoshiro, Nihon Gaikōshi, Vol 16: Kaigun Gunshuku Kōshō, Fusen Jōyaku, (Tokyo, 1973), pp.133-262, a study principally based on diplomatic documents. For a view based on naval sources see Asada Sadao, "Nihon Kaigun to Gunshuku: Tai-Bei Seisaku o meguru Seiji Katei", in Hosoya Chihiro, Saitō Makoto (eds.), Washinton taisei to Nichibei kankei, (Tokyo, 1978), especially pp.389-398. See also Kobayashi Tatsuo, "Kaigun Gunshuku 1918-1936", in TSM, especially pp.53-100.

2. From Katō Kanji to Makino Nobuaki, 29/1/1930 Makino Papers, National Diet Library Tokyo.

3. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 5/2/30, (p.152).

4. Katō Kanji Taishō Denki Hensankai (eds.), KKD, (Tokyo, 1941), pp.892-893.

5. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 8/2/30, (p.152).

6. op.cit., KKD, pp.893-894.

7. ibid.

8. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 16/2/30, (p.153).

9. ibid., 4/3/30.

10. ibid., 10/3/30.

11. Ikeda Kiyoshi, "Rondon Gunshuku Mondai Nikki Kaisetsu", in Okada Teikan (ed.), Okada Keisuke Kaikoruku, (Tokyo, 1977), p.245.

12. A good description, in English, of the events leading to the Reed-Matsudaira compromise proposal is James Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy 1930-1938, (Princeton, 1966), pp.51-56.

13. Premier Hamaguchi continually emphasised to Admiral Okada and Deputy Navy Minister Yamanashi that all four plenipotentiaries (which therefore included Navy Minister Takarabe) had signed the telegram and therefore 'approved' of its contents. The telegram actually arrived in Japan on the 14/3/30.

14. This conclusion was based on a 'de facto' ratio of 70% (69.75) until at least 1936, op.cit., Crowley, p.55. However this calculation incorporated 100% in submarines for

Japan. Japan was negotiating on submarines separately based on 'existing strength' not a ratio.

15. op.cit., TSM, Vol.1, p.69.

16. The Chief and Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff Katō Kanji and Suetsugu Nobumasa, Deputy Navy Minister Yamanashi Katsunoshin and Admiral Kobayashi Seizō.

17. op.cit., TSM, p.78.

18. ibid., p.78.

19. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 15/3/30. (p.153).

20. op.cit., TSM, p.78.

21. Thomas F Mayer-Oakes, Fragile Victory: Saionji-Harada Memoirs, (Detroit, 1968), p.96.

22. Raymond G O'Connor, Perilous Equilibrium: The US Navy and the London Conference 1930, (Kansas, 1962), preface.

23. The literature on the interwar naval limitation conferences and especially the London Naval Conference of 1930 abounds with references to two opposed groupings: the Kantai-ha (Fleet Faction) and the Jōyaku-ha (Treaty Faction). Other terms, often used interchangeably with the above are Kyōkō-ha (hardline) or Gunrei-ha (Command Faction) versus Onken-ha (Moderate Faction) or Gunsei-ha (Administrative Faction). In general these labels are attached to the two sides which emerged from splits in the Imperial Japanese Navy during or after the Washington Conference. The former group, Kantai-ha/Gunrei-ha/ Kyōkō-ha usually refers to groupings of naval officers who opposed naval limitation and especially the ratios agreed at Washington and particularly London (1930). They are usually assumed to be located within the Naval General Staff or supportive of that organisation. The latter group, usually located in or supportive of the Navy Ministry supported the Government's decisions to accept the treaty restrictions set at Washington and London. The Kantai-ha and its variants are generally regarded as being guided by narrow, professional, technical/strategic imperatives whilst the Jōyaku-ha were regarded as more internationalist and cosmopolitan.

It is suggested here that these distinctions are inappropriate and at times misleading. First, the opposing forces in the naval limitation debate were not limited to naval officers, serving or retired. Second, that certainly the Kantai-ha/ Jōyaku-ha distinction was not one used by naval officers at the time although there was another Kantai-ha which had existed since the Meiji era (see David Evans thesis listed in the bibliography). Third, that these distinctions do not take into account changes over time by various individuals or indeed organisations. The distinctions may have had some utility at the macro-level but, as with many such devices, they prove less useful and

even misleading at the micro-level and therefore impair understanding of and oversimplify exceedingly complex matters.

There can be little doubt that there was, in the 1920s (or even before) a growing schism within the navy along organisational lines as the Naval General Staff began to challenge the historical domination of the Navy Ministry especially in command-related matters (Gunrei). This split is often labelled Gunrei-ha vs Gunsei-ha. Although not totally limited to naval officers the competition was essentially an internal naval matter. It is clearly linked to the naval limitation issue especially if one accepts my suggestion that the 1920s split within the navy was an organisational one with the naval limitation dispute within the navy seen as a symptom (rather than a cause) of that split. Awareness of this particular dichotomy should possibly be borne in mind when examining the opposing sides in the debates during the London Treaty crisis and its aftermath. However here let us examine another and possibly more rewarding distinction in terms of the naval limitation issue in Japanese naval and domestic politics. Namely a pro-treaty and anti-treaty faction.

'Pro-Treaty Faction will denote those people, important to the decisionmaking process, whether civilian or military, who ultimately believed that a treaty must be concluded for Japan's domestic or international wellbeing and even security. This group therefore can include people whether they approve or disapprove of the 1930 Reed-Matsudaira compromise or not since the principal aim is a successful treaty. Using this approach we can therefore differentiate between 'hardliners' and 'softliners'. The former group may include those who did not wish to accept the treaty based on the 'American proposals', believed the Reed-Matsudaira compromise was not the final offer and that standing up to the Americans would gain further concessions. They basically wished to 'push again' and probably went into the negotiations believing that the 'Three Principles' represented something very close to what they would ultimately receive and that it was the maximum they would concede or put another way the 'floor' in terms of negotiations. Soft-liners on the other hand thought almost entirely in terms of a successful treaty, accepted the Reed-Matsudaira as a final offer and feared the consequences of calling the Americans' bluff and possibly being blamed for disrupting the conference. This would be very detrimental to Japan's image and/or would damage them in domestic politics. I would suggest that they regarded the 'Three Principles' as a 'ceiling' on their achievements, the best they could possibly achieve and always expected to make major concessions. Prime Minister Hamaguchi, Foreign Minister Shidehara, Genrō Prince Saionji and Admiral Saito Makoto clearly belong in the 'softliner' category. On the other hand, Admiral Okada is normally grouped with these men but in fact seems initially to have been in the 'hardliner' group who advocated continually for the Japanese to 'push again'. An even bigger shift took place concerning Admiral Prince Fushimi. He certainly moved from anti-treaty to hardline pro-treaty in late March/early April before later

returning to the anti-treaty grouping.

Ranged against these men (and often their organisations such as the Court, Foreign Ministry and the Navy Ministry were the anti-treaty forces. Here again the distinction between 'hardliners' and 'softliners' may be useful. Many 'hardliners in this group took the extreme stand that there should be no treaty at all on either capital ships or all ships even advocating that the Washington Treaty ratios should be scrapped. They certainly regarded the 'Three Principles' as the 'floor' in terms of negotiation and on which there was no possibility of compromise. Katō and the Naval General Staff would be generally regarded as being in this group by many people then and now.

The 'softliners' in this case would be those who would have preferred not to sign limitation agreements limiting Japan's naval strength, who disliked the 'inferior ratio' but who could see some possible advantages to naval limitation if a 'reasonable' agreement could be reached. Nevertheless they regarded the 'Three Principles' as the maximim concession they would make and very close indeed to the 'floor' in terms of negotiations. Nevertheless the documentary evidence does show that Kato Kanji and the Naval General Staff were willing to concede even on the 'Three Principles' but not on all three!! Compromises were possible on overall ratios and on light cruisers and destroyers. Concessions were even possible on submarines but emphatically not on heavy cruisers. They believed firmly that Japan must push again after the Reed-Matsudaira compromise which in any case was for them an 'American' plan and not a compromise. They felt the Americans were bluffing and moreover believed that America would be prevented from making good its threats to massively expand its Navy by international opinion.

These distinctions, which allow for intra-faction and even inter-faction shifts by individuals and organisations over time, may prove more useful than the existing distinctions. Past analyses of cleavages arising from or existing during the London Treaty debate have tended to be static. It is suggested here that it would not be difficult to find officers, even in the Naval General Staff, who felt arms limitation was beneficial before Washington, who still felt so after Washington but did not like the existing form (anti-inferior ratio) and who then moved into the anti-treaty camp. Organisational transfers such as Naval General Staff - Navy Ministry might alter perspectives. Such things as awareness of the impact of Washington agreements or American foreign policy on Japan in the 1920s, may have caused shifts also. Moreover it would be possible to identify major inter-factional (and intra-factional) shifts in 1930 after the 'revised instructions were sent, after the treaty was signed, and after ratification.

The subject, though exceedingly complex, seems worthy of further research by Japanese or western scholars of Japan. One possibly rewarding approach would be to examine naval groupings throughout the inter-war period in terms of naval limitation/inferior ratios and, on the other hand examining the domestic crisis of 1930 in terms of differing

perspectives, civilian or military on international negotiating strategies.

24. Takeuchi Tatsuji, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire, (Chicago, 1935), p.311. For a fuller analysis of Minobe see Frank Miller, Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionalism in Japan, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965). Katō Kanji's son, a graduate of the elite Tokyo University Law Faculty, told me that Kato Kanji admired Minobe very much and much preferred him to Minobe's great rival Professor Uesugi. In fact Katō's own views on constitutional matters would seem to have been closer to the latter but Katō Kanji personally did not like him at all.

25. The best summary of the constitutional interpretions of Navy Ministry and Naval General Staff 'experts' is Boeicho Senshishitsau, Rengō Kantai, <1>, (Tokyo, 1976), pp.232-251.

26. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes is a translation of the Saionji-Harada Memoirs for 1930 and provides a graphic account of how Prince Saionji Kimmochi (and his secretary Harada Kumao) made efforts to gather support in court, cabinet, parliamentary and military circles.

27. Ito Takashi and Nomura Minoru (eds.), Kaigun Taisho Nomura Seizō Oboegaki, (Tokyo, 1981), p.62.

28. Okada Nikki, 16/3/30, The diary is reproduced in Okada Teikan (ed.), Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku, (Tokyo, 1977), pp.167-239 "Rondon Gunshuku Mondai Nikki", (hereafter referred to as Okada Nikki.

29. Ito Takashi, Shōwa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyū, (Tokyo, 1969), p.160. This fascinating study is, and will almost certainly remain, the definitive work on the domestic developments and impact of the London Naval Treaty Crisis of 1930. In English see also his essay, "Conflicts and Coalitions in Japan: Political Groups (and) the London Naval Disarmament Conference' In Sven Groennings et al., (eds.), The Study of Coalition Behaviour: Theoretical Perspectives and Cases from Four Continents, (New York, 1970).

30. ibid., p.160.

31. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 16/3/30, (p.154).

32. The navy also sent a telegram in support of this 'statement' to Vice Admiral Sakonji Chief technical adviser in London on that same day. Kobayashi Tatsuo is convinced that Suetsugu acted solely on his own initiative. op.cit., TSM, p.79. Suetsugu did try again but only a few papers carried it.

33. op.cit., Aoki, p.109, for details.

34. op.cit., Itō Takashi, (1969), p.439.

35. Kobayashi Tatsuo implies that the two sides used standard terms and that the anti-treaty forces labelled it a Beiteian (American proposal) or Beikoku Saigoan (final American plan) whilst the pro-treaty forces called it a NichiBei Dakyōan (Japanese-American Compromise plan). However both Takarabe and Yamanashi at times referred to it as the "American Plan"

36. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes p.96.

37. op.cit., Ikeda, p.247.

38. op.cit., Okada Teikan (ed.), pp.168-169.

39. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 19/3/30, (p.154).

40. op.cit., Aoki, Vol.1, p.10.

41. op.cit., Hamaguchi Nikki, 19/3/30, cited in Nomura Minoru, "Gunshuku Mondai ni kansuru Hamaguchi Shusho Nikki", Gunji Shigaku, Vol.12, No.3, (December 1976), p.77.

42. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.97. Earlier Kato had apparently told Harada that "America's attitude is as haggling as that of a street vendor. Utterly outrageous!! We ought to be content with an agreement on capital ships and come home. ibid., p.93.

43. ibid., p.97.

44. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, pp.225-228.

45. op.cit., Okada Nikki, 20/3/30.

46. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.96.

47. op.cit., Okada Nikki, 20/3/30.

48. ibid.

49. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.99.

50. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 21/3/30, (p.154).

51. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, pp.116-117. This was something Prince Saionji was strongly opposed to.

52. ibid., p.100.

53. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.225.

54. op.cit., TSM, p.80. pp.205,950 refers to destroyers and light cruisers totals. An excellent tabulation of all plans is to be found in Bōeichō Bōei Kenshūjo Senshishitsu, Kaigun Gunsenbi 1 Showa Jūrokunen Jūichigatsu made, (Tokyo, 1969). (Hereafter Kaigun Gunsenbi <1>.)

55. op.cit., TSM, pp.80-81 and op.cit., Ikeda, p.249.

56. op.cit., Rengo Kantai <1>, p.226.

57. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 20/3/30, (p.154).

58. In the House of Representatives on April 30 1930, Shidehara denied that any pressure had been brought. This was certainly untrue as the British and American governments had been doing so directly and indirectly.

59. op.cit., Ikeda, p.249.

60. ibid., p.249.

61 op.cit., Okada Nikki, 22/3/30 and 23/3/30 (pp.169-170).

62. op.cit., Aoki, p.10.

63. op.cit., Okada Nikki.

64. ibid., p.179.

65. ibid.

66. ibid.

67. Actually it was 2 pm in the afternoon.

68. op.cit., TSM, Vol.1, p.74.

69. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 23/3/30, (p.155).

70. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.226.

71. op.cit., TSM, Vol.1, p.81.

72. op.cit., Okada Nikki, 24/3/30,.

73. op.cit., TSM, Vol.1,.

74. ibid., p.73.

75. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 25/3/30, (p.155).

76. op.cit., Ikeda, p.249.

77. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 25/3/30, (p.155).

78. op.cit., TSM. Vol.1, pp.81-82 and op.cit., Aoki, p.11.

79. ibid., TSM, Vol.1, p.82 and op.cit., Aoki, p.11.

80. op.cit., Okada Nikki. It was actually Yamaji Jōichi a leading member of the Minseito Party bureaucracy.

81. op.cit,. Katō Kanji Nikki, 26/3/30, (p.155).

82. op.cit., TSM, Vol.1, p.84.

83. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 27/3/30, (p.155).

84. op.cit., Hamuguchi Nikki, 27/3/30, cited in op.cit., Nomura. Hamaguchi also noted that takarabe had advocated that Japan push again but that this was in his capacity of Navy Minister and not as a Plenipotentiary.

85. op.cit., Aoki, p.12.

86. op.cit., Okada Nikki.

87. ibid.

88. ibid.

89. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 29/3/30, (p.156).

90. op.cit., Okada Nikki, p.172. A possible reason for Prince Fushimi's volte-face is that he had succumbed to pressure from Saionji via Grand Chamberlain Suzuki who had been his superior in the navy.

91. op.cit., Okada Nikki.

92. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 29/3/30, (p.156).

93. op.cit., Takeuchi, p.298.

94. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 30/3/30, (p.156).

95. Tokyo Asahi, 31/3/30.

96. op.cit., Hamaguchi Nikki, cited in op.cit., Nomura.

97. op.cit., Okada Nikki, 31/3/30,.

98. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 31/3/30, (p.157).

99. ibid.

100. op.cit., Okada Nikki.

101. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.108.

102. op.cit., Okada Nikki.

103. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 31/3/30, (p.157).

104. ibid.

105. ibid., Katō recorded that the message was passed on but ignored.

106. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 1/4/30, (p.158).

107. ibid.

108. op.cit., Sakai Keinan, pp.158-159.

109. op.cit., Okada Nikki, (pp.174-175).

110. op.cit., Hamaguchi Nikki.

111. op.cit., Aoki, pp.69-70.

112. ibid., p.65. For the background of the internal negotiations and the Jiji Shinpō, article see also the same author p.14.

CHAPTER NINE

1. Aoki Tokuzō, Taiheiyō Sensō Zenshi, 6 Vols, (Tokyo, 1951). 1946 Vol.1, pp.15-19, reproduces the version presented to the Emperor and Aoki also reproduces Katō's memorial on resignation pp.33-35. This volume contains considerable information (including original documents) on Katō Kanji and is based on cabinet papers. However one should bear in mind that the study was commissioned by Shidehara Kijūrō whose relations with Kato during and after the London Treaty Crisis were extremely bad.

2. Japan Advertiser, 3/4/30.

3. Katō apparently drafted this personally and showed it only to the Navy Minister's aide, Captain Koga before sending it off. op.cit., Aoki, p.17.

4. See Katō Hirokazu (ed.), Shōwa 4-nen, 5-nen Rondon Kaigun Jōyaku Hiroku - ko-Katō Kanji Taishō Ikō, (Tokyo, 1956). The original was handwritten and I have used the complete (printed) version in Sakai Keinan, Eiketsu Katō Kanji, (Tokyo, 1979), pp.149-208, and the text of the telegram is reproduced on page 160.

5. The compromise plan did give Japan a 10:7 ratio in auxiliaries in practice (until 1936) but not in principle.

6. Katō's diaries for part of 1930 and all of 1932-37 are reproduced in op.cit., Sakai. Katō's diary entries will, where possible, use the Sakai printed version indicating the page in parenthesis rather than the original manuscript as follows Katō Kanji Nikki, 16/4/30, (p.161). Where no parentheses I have used the original diaries.

7. TSM, Vol.1, p.90, and Aoki, op.cit., pp.22-25.

8. Admiral Okada Keisuke's diaries for 1930/31/32 are reproduced in Okada Teikan (ed.), Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku, (Tokyo, 1977), pp.167-239. Diary entries will indicate page

numbers from this version in parentheses. Okada Nikki, 22/4/30, (p.179).

9. op.cit., Katō KanjiNikki, 22/4/30, (p.162).

10. For the problem of the Supreme Command in the 58th Diet see TSM, Vol.1, pp.103-105. Since the Diet debates were reported extensively in the press and in the official gazette Takeuchi Tatsuji, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire, (Chicago, 1935), is still a valuable study. See especially pp.305-309. For the Seiyukai's tactics see Takeuchi pp.236-255 and also Norman S Hastings, The Seiyūkai and Party Government in Japan 1924-1932, Ph.D. (University of Kansas), pp.106-118.

11. op.cit., Takeuchi, p.307.

12. op.cit., Aoki, p.29.

13. Hochi Shinbun, 15/5/30.

14. William F Morton, Tanaka Giichi and Japan's China Policy, (Fokestone, 1980), pp.157-158.

15. op.cit., Takeuchi, pp.305-306.

16. Thomas F Mayer-Oakes (ed. and tr.), Fragile Victory, (Detroit, 1968), pp.120-121.

17. See op.cit., Takeuchi, pp.305-309, for a succinct summary taken from the official Kanpo Gogai.

18. ibid., and also op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, pp.129-131

19. James Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy 1930-1938, (Princeton, 1966).

20. op.cit., Takeuchi, p.308.

21. op.cit., Takeuchi, p.309.

22. Itō Takashi, "Conflicts and Coalitions in Japan: Political Groups (and) the London Naval Disarmament Conference", in Sven Groennings et al., (eds.), The Study of Coalition Behaviour: Theoretical Perspectives and Cases from Four Continents, (New York, 1970). Professor Ito points out that Kato Kanji was expected to be very active in the party debates but in fact refrained from so doing.

23. op.cit., Aoki, Vol.1, pp.37ff, for rising Anti-Takarabe sentiments.

24. op.cit., Okada Nikki, 2/4/30, 9/4/30 and 11/4/30, (pp.175-178).

25. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 24/4/30, (p.162).

26. ibid., 27/4/30, (p.163).

27. ibid., 1/5/30, (p.163).

28. ibid., 1/5/30, (p.163).

29. ibid., 8/5/30, (p.164).

30. ibid., 9/5/30, (p.164).

31. ibid., 10/5/30, (p.164).

32. op.cit., Aoki, p.28. Aoki reproduces all the messages Koga carried pp.27-32.

33. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 15/5/30, (p.165). Mizumachi aoppears to have been regarded by reserve admirals and Katō as an ally but he was a Hamaguchi appointee to the Privy Council and was almost certainly channeling information back to the Prime Minister.

34. ibid., 16/5/30, (p.165). It is perhaps not just coincidence that Premier Hamaguchi made a special visit to Admiral of the Fleet Tōgō the day following Mizumachi's visit to Katō.

35. op.cit., Aoki, p.32.

36. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.139.

37. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 20/5/30, (p.166).

38. op.cit., Aoki, pp.33-35 for the document and op.cit., Sakai, pp.203-205. Katō Nikki 19/5, 20/5, 21/5 (p.166).

39. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 22/5/30.

40. ibid., 23/5/30.

41. op.cit., Aoki, p.38.

42. ibid., p.39.

43. ibid., p.39.

44. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 24/5/30.

45. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.139. Harada was told by the Chief of the Metropolitan Police that there was no truth in this.

46. Regarding Gunsei (the right of administrative command) the army and navy customs were quite different. In the Army the administrative command was exercised by the Army Minister in cooperation with the Chief of the General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff had complete jurisdiction at all times over Gunrei (the right of military command). In the navy the Navy Minister had total

jurisdiction over Gunsei and the Chief of the Naval General Staff had no authority. The chief of the Naval General Staff only exercised complete jurisdiction over Gunrei in wartime (provided an Imperial Headquarters had been established. At all other times the ultimate authority was the Navy Minister.

47. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.236.

48. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 28/5/30, (p.167).

49. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, in which Professor Nomura Minoru contends that he did not agree immediately but Kato's diary implies that he did. Vice-admiral Hori Teikichi's draft response is to be found in TSM., Vol.1, p.128.

50. op.cit., TSM, p.128. Navy Minister Takarabe visited Admiral Prince Fushimi and Admiral of the Fleet Togo beforehand and was clearly trying to outmanouevre Kato.

51. op.cit., Okada Nikki, (p.187). Takarabe first despatched his aide Captain Koga to Admiral Okada's house to explain the situation and then, between 10.40 and 11 am, prior to the meeting with Katō the Navy Minister discussed matters further with Admiral Okada.

52. op.cit., Okada Nikki, 29/5/30, (p.187).

53. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.236.

54. op.cit., Okada Nikki, 29/3/30, (p.172).

55. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.119.

56. ibid., p.118.

57. ibid., p.121, note 28.

58. op.cit., Okada Nikki, 7/5/30, (p.181).

59. op.cit., Aoki, p.35.

60. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.134.

61. ibid., p.140.

62. op.cit., Nippon Denpō, 21/5/30.

63. Japan Advertiser, 22/5/30.

64. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.146. Harada had visited Okada at 6pm that evening, Okada Nikki 22/5/30, (p.185).

65. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.140.

66. Jiji Shinbun, 26/5/30.

67. A good summary of the press coverage of these meetings is to be found in op.cit., Takeuchi, pp.313-322. However the press reports frequently tend to be rather speculative about these meetings behind closed doors. There seem to have been few leaks particularly where internal naval matters were discussed.

68. Japan Advertiser, 31/5/30.

69. op.cit., Aoki, Vol.1, pp.42-48.

70. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.151.

71. op.cit., Okada Nikki, 2/6/30, (p.189).

72. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 6/7/30, (p.189.

73. op.cit., Okada Nikki, 2/6/30, (p.190).

74. The dismissal of Suetsugu could of course have been part of anot uncommon (Japanese) strategy of firing a subordinate to force his immediate superior (Kato) to resign.

75. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.155.

76. Katō's appointment however may have influenced both Takarabe and Hamaguchi to incline towards convening a Gensuifu Kaigi.

77. This effectively meant that the pro-treaty and anti-treaty forces in the Supreme Military council were split 3-3. However Chairman Admiral of the Fleet Tōgō was to argue that, as chairman, he also had a casting (as well as an individual) vote.

78. The Gunji Sangikan Kaigi was the older body and was replaced by the Gunji Sangiin Kaigi. For details of the evolution of both organisations see Matsushita Yoshio, Meiji Gunsei Shiron, (Tokyo, 1956), pp.287-289 and pp.535-540 respectively. It is feasible that references to the GunjiSangikan Kaigi were simply a continued use of the older term, especially by older military officers. However it is more likely that GunjiSangikan Kaigi was literally a Meeting of the Councillors (informal) as opposed to a meeting of the Supreme Military Council (formal). In this case it would appear to be interchangeable with GunjiSangikan Kaigō and GunjiSangikan Shugo.

79. There were no provisions for the two bodies (especially single service gatherings) to act together in a formal sense. The Gensuifu was the highest advisory body comprising military officers and could, in fact, be convened on any matter the Emperor wished. The Supreme Military Council was th highest advisory body on national defence matters. However Gensui were also Gunjisangikan and, as in the naval case, they attended as senior members and often chaired the sessions. This then became a GensuiSangikan

Kaigi, at this time effectively a meeting of the Supreme Military Council naval members with Admiral of the Fleet Tōgō in the chair.

80. See previous chapter for details. Kato had been thwarted by Admiral Prince Fushimi, whom he regarded as an ally, colluding with Admiral Okada to prevent the Council being convened. Okada also transmitted this message to Navy Minister Takarabe via Captain Koga on 27/4/30. Prince Saionji and his allies in the Imperial Court were also against such a meeting being convened at this time. Okada later changed his mind and decided on a meeting of the Supreme Military Council but only after ratification. Ito Takashi, Shōwa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyū, (Tokyo, 1969) p.164.

81. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 7/4/30, (p.172).

82. op.cit., Okada Nikki, 7/5/30.

83. op.cit., Katō Nikki, 10/5/30. This is also confirmed from other sources than Kato's diary by op.cit., Ito Takashi, (1969), p.163.

84. op.cit., Itō Takashi, (1970), p/171. However this article tends to exaggerate the influence and power of Navy Minister Takarabe even stating "Navy Minister Takarabe discharged Chief of Staff Katō".

85. op.cit., Crowley, p.73.

86. ibid., p.74.

87. op.cit., Aoki, Vol.1, p.43.

88. op.cit., Itō Takashi, (1970), p.171.

89. op.cit., Itō Takashi, (1969), p.171.

90. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 6/6/30.

91. op.cit., Sakai, p.174.

92. op.cit., Itō, (1970), p.171.

93. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 16/6/30, (p.183).

94. op.cit., Aoki, pp.76-77 which describes this meeting.

95. ibid., Aoki, p.77.

96. op.cit., TSM., p.135.

97. op.cit., Itō Takashi, (1969), p.176, note 18.

98. A succinct account of army-navy discussions on this matter by Kobayashi Tatsuo is to be found in TSM., Vol.1, pp.133-135.

99. ibid., TSM., p.136 and op.cit., Kato Nikki, 6/7/30.

100. ibid., TSM., p.135.

101. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 3/7/30.

102. ibid., 6/7/30.

103. op.cit., TSM., p.137.

104. ibid., 137.

105. ibid., p.137, op.cit.; Itō Takashi, (1969), p.181 and op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 14/7/30, (p.193).

106. op.cit., Itō Takashi, (1969), p.182 states "At this stage one cannot say of Kato's position that it was totally opposed to ratification".

107. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 15/7/30, (p.194).

108. ibid., 15/7/30, (p.194).

109. op.cit., Itō Takashi, (1969), p.182.

110. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 31/8/30, where he recounts being accused of being unfaithful to Togo to help Taniguchi.

111. op.cit., Itō Takashi, (1970), p.172.

112. op.cit., Aoki, p.87.

113. op.cit., Crowley, p.77.

114. op.cit., Itō, (1969), p.183.

115. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, pp.196-197.

116. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 21/7/30, (p.197).

117. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.198.

118. op.cit., Crowley, p.77.

119. op.cit., Itō, (1969) pp.183-184.

120. ibid., p.203.

121. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.199.

122. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 23/7/30, (p.198).

123. ibid.

124. ibid.

125. op.cit., TSM., p.140.

126. Japan Advertiser, 31/5/30.

127. For the privy Council's role in these events see op.cit., Aoki, pp.89-100; op.cit., TSM., pp.140-149 and especially op.cit., Ito, (1969), pp.325-352. In English see op.cit., Takeuchi, pp322-335.

128. Katō had joined the Kokuhonsha when it was first established and Hiranuma was the founder and leading member of this organisation so their relationship probably dates from then. On Hiranuma's role in prewar politics see especially Richard Yasko, Hiranuma Kiichiro and Conservative Politics in Prewar Japan, Ph.D., (Columbia University, 1959). For Hiranuma and the Kokuhonsha and his role in the London Naval Treaty Crisis see especially op.cit., Ito, (1969), pp.353-371 and pp.372-389 respectively. The available evidence tends to indicate that his influence over Kato has been somewhat exaggerated.

129. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 4/6/30, (p.168),

130. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.126.

131. ibid.

132. op.cit., TSM, p.141.

133. op.cit., Itō, (1969), p.341 and op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.205 and pp.208-209.

134. op.cit., TSM, p.141.

135. op.cit., Takeuchi, p.326.

136. op.cit., TSM, p.142.

137. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.174. The Navy Minister had repeatedly attempted to persuade Katō and Suetsugu to go on a South Seas Tour at this criticial juncture.

138. ibid., p.243.

139. ibid., p.217.

140. ibid., p.224.

141. It is difficult to support Takarabe's contention that Kato agreed from the text of this telegram. Katō had possibly supplied a copy to the Privy Council but since Navy Minister Takarabe refused to disclose the text the Privy Council could neither prove nor disprove Takarabe's contention.

142. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 2/9/30.

143. op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.122.

144. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 3/9/30.

145. Katō could not attend and his diary entries attest to the fact that he was well aware of the legalities which precluded him from attending. Privy Council Regulations 111 states: The Privy Council shall have official connection with the Cabinet and the Ministers of State only and officially shall not communicate or have any connection whatsoever with any other governmental offices, with the Diet or with His Majesty's private subjects. Sumitsuin Jimukitei. (Regulations for the Conduct of the Business of the Privy Council) op.cit., Mayer-Oakes, p.223.

146. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 3/9/30. "I promised (Admiral) Ogasawara that if it is not illegal I will attend". On the previous day he had told other reserve admirals that, "It is not a good thing for a Supreme Military Councillor to attend as a witness".

147. ibid., 4/9/30. The memorandum in question was concerned with the matter of making up deficiencies in defence planning resulting from the treaty.

148. op.cit., Ito, (1970), p.172.

149. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 5/9/30.

150. op.cit., Aoki, p.93.

151. op.cit., TSM, p.144.

152. For the role of Suzuki in Seiyukai politics at this time see Gordon Berger, Parties out of Power in Japan, 1931-1941, (Princeton, 1977).

153. The letter is reproduced in op.cit., Itō Takashi, (1969), pp.185-186.

154. op.cit., Aoki, pp.94-96 for the Katō-Takarabe talks.

CHAPTER TEN

1. The figures for the Navy Supplementary Programme, proposed and approved, are to be found in Itō Takashi, Shōwa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyū, (Tokyo, 1969), p.188 and P.192 respectively.

2. Thomas F Mayer Oakes, (ed. and tr.), Fragile Victory: Saionji-Harada Memoirs, (Detroit, 1968), p.257.

3. ibid., p.258.

4. op.cit., Itō Takashi, p.251.

5. op.cit., Mayer Oakes, p.253.

6. The assassination incident is described in detail by Kobayashi Tatsuo in TSM, Vol.1, pp.151-152

7. op.cit., Mayer Oakes, pp.272ff.

8. An excellent description of the debates over the supplementary budget is to be found in op.cit., Ito Takashi, pp.188-194.

9. op.cit., Mayer Oakes, p.277 and Okada Nikki, 23/2/30, (p.207). Page numbers in parentheses indicate pages of printed diary in Okada Teikan (ed.), Okada Keisuke Kaikoroku, (Tokyo, 1977). Katō was also thought to be linked to the right wing Aikokusha.

10. ibid.

11. op.cit., Itō Takashi, p.252.

12. The best treatments of the Japanese Army and Manchuria are James Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, (Princeton, 1966) and Sadako Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy 1931-32, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964).

13. For the political background to these events see especially Gordon M Berger, Parties out of Power in Japan, 1931-1941, (Princeton, 1977) and Norman S Hastings, The Seiyūkai and Party Government in Japan, 1924-1932, Ph.D., (University of Kansas, 1977).

14. The best analysis in English of the Young Officer's movement in the 1930s is Ben Ami Shillony, Revolt in Japan, (Princeton, 1973).

15. For the international significance of the Shanghai Incident see Christopher Thorne, "The Shanghai crisis of 1932: the Basis of British Policy", American Historical Review, Vol.LXXV, No.6, (October 1970).

16. These were known respectively as the "March Incident" and the "October Incident". For details see op.cit., Shillony, Revolt in Japan.

17. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 15/5/32, (p.229). Kato's diary for 1932-37 is reproduced in printed form in Sakai Keinan Eiketsu Katō Kanji, (Tokyo, 1979), pp209-347. Page numbers in parentheses after Kato Nikki entries refer to this book.

18. Kido Koichi, Kido Koichi Nikki, 2 Vols (Tokyo, 1966), Vol.1, 28/8/33, p.252.

19. ibid., 16/9/33, (p.261).

20. Katō Kanji Nikki, 14/5/32, (p.229).

21. For details concerning the formation of 'National Unity Cabinets' see op.cit., Berger, pp.49-53.

22. The best analyses of this struggle between the Naval General Staff and the Navy Ministry are Kobayashi Tatsuo, "Tōisuiken Kanpanron to Kaigun Gunreibu Jōrei no Kaisei", Kokugakuin Hōgaku Zasshi, Vol.5, No.5, (April 1968), pp.215-248 and Nomura Minoru, "Kaigun Gunreibu no Kengen Kakudai no Rekishi to Onken-ha Kaigun Shunō no Rigeneki", in his Rekishi no naka no Nihon no Kaigun, (Tokyo, 1980), pp.46-80.

23. Prince Fushimi vehemently denied that this was the reason for his selection but some of the navy leadership were very lukewarm about his appointment. Harada noted that former Navy Ministers Abō, Osumi and Okada were most troubled about the appointment. Harada Kumao. Saionji-ko to Seikyoku, 9 vols (Tokyo, 1950-56), Vol.2, pp.197ff. Apparently it was Admiral of the Fleet Togo Heihachiro who proposed Prince Fushimi and the Supreme Military Councillors were apparently afraid of offending the Gensui. There is no evidence that Katō Kanji initiated this appointment although he had been close to Prince Fushimi since their time together at Etajima. Nevertheless Katō would certainly have supported Admiral Tōgō.

24. Yale Candee Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, (Westport, 1975), p.227, fn22.

25. op.cit., Nomura Minoru, p.58.

26. ibid., p.58.

27. This term is used by Kobayashi Tatsuo in op.cit., TSM, Vol.1, p.152.

28. Kaneko is the anonymous author of "The Autonomous Power of the Japanese Military", reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan 1931-1941, Vol.1, pp.689-695. The document is dated 18 December and, on the original W Cameron Forbes wrote that the author's name was not to be released. For a comment on Kaneko's influence, especially legal influence on Katō Kanji see op.cit., Sakai, pp.93-95. Sakai was Katō's private secretary in the 1930s but I was unable to obtain an interview with him. Kato's diaries contain numerous references to Kaneko's constitutional interpretations and advice in 1929, 1930, 1932 and 1933. He would appear to have been a far more influential Privy Councillor than Baron Hiranuma as far as Katō was concerned.

29. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 6/8/33, (pp.260-261).

30. op.cit., Kido, Vol.1, 30/9/33, p.268.

31. Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and the United States", in D Borg and S Okamoto (eds.), Pearl Harbor as History:

Japanese-American Relations 1931-41, (New York, 1973), p.232.

32. op.cit., Harada, Vol.3, pp.172-173.

33. op.cit., Asada, p.259.

34. National Archives, Records Group 59, ONI 895.00 reports, 27/7/33.

35. Commander Ishikawa Shingo, like some other military officers at this time, was involved in writing books under an assumed name. Such literature implicitly and explicitly described Asian and world developments from narrow military perspectives. For an assessment of this in relation to Ishikawa see Kudo Michirō "Kaigun Gunshuku Jōyaku Ridatsugo no Nihon no Kaigun" Gunji Shigaku, Vol.15, No.1. Ishikawa wrote under the name Otani Hayato and his book Nihon Kore Kyuki was published in 1931.

36. op.cit., Rengō Kantai <1>, p.280.

37. op.cit., KKD, p.930.

38. ibid., pp.931-938, reproduces Kato's speech. 39. op.cit., Harada, Vol.3, p.323.

40. ibid., Vol.4, pp.34-35.

41. op.cit., Kido, Vol.1, p.350.

42. op.cit., Harada, Vol.4, p.33.

43. ibid., Vol.3, p.333.

44. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 18/6/34, (p.288).

45. ibid., 9/7/34, (p.292).

46. One is continually faced with the problem of how to measure Katō Kanji's influence and/or power at any one time. One cannot 'prove' that Katō created the state of mind existing within the Naval general Staff. It seems equally plausible that, in the true traditions of 'groupthink' Kato may have been reflecting the organisational consensus over time. His diary at this time does not support the contention that he was actively pursuing matters with active service officers. It merely shows that he had visits from such officers from time to time asking his advice.

47. Katō Hirokazu (comp), Katō Kanji Kankei Bunsho, Vol.3, Document 14. These documents are held, in bound folders (4) at the library of the Social Science Research Institute, University of Tokyo.

48. ibid.

49. ibid.

50. op.cit., KKD, p.766.

51. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 3/1/35, (p.306).

52. op.cit., Harada, Vol.4, p.248.

53. op.cit., Katō Kanji Nikki, 18/1/33, (p.245).

54. op.cit., Harada, Vol.4, pp.257-259.

55. op.cit., Sakai, p.111.

56. op.cit., Harada, Vol.4, p.342.

57. Stephen Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II, (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), Pelz utilises British, American and Japanese sources in this book. However some caution should be exercised regarding the range and interpretations of Japanese sources utilised as well as his conclusions regarding the causes and consequences of naval arms races. For good general summaries see the works of Richard Burns and Donald Urquidi and Unno Yoshiro listed in the bibliography. Also useful is Kobayashi Tatsuo in TSM, Vol.1.

58. op.cit., Shillony, p.122.

59. op.cit., Ni Ni Roku Jiken Hiroku, Vol.2, p.337.

60. op.cit., Shillony, p.11.

61. National Archives Record Group 45 ONI 894.00 620 dated 6/3/36. "It is understood that at first the insurgents had demanded a military distatorship under Admiral Kato Kanji or Baron Hiranuma.

62. Katō Kanji, "Fundamentals of Disarmament", Contemporary Japan, Vol.4, No.4, (March 1936), p.488.

63. ibid., p.488.

64. ibid., p.491.

65. ibid., p.494.

66. ibdi., p.494.

67. ibid., p.495.

68. op.cit., Harada, Vol.5, p.228.

69. op.cit., Sakai, pp.111-121.

70. ibid., pp.92-93.

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Japan

Katō Kanji Diaries and other documents in the possession of his son Katō Hirokazu.

Materials relating to Katō Kanji (4 Vols), Library of the Social Science Research Institute, University of Tokyo.

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KATŌ KANJI (HIROHARU) 1870-1939

10/1870	Born, Fukui.
7/82	Entered Naval Preparatory Course
9/87	Entered Naval Academy Main Course
7/91	Graduated from Naval Academy
3/94	Midshipman - Joined HMJS Naniwa then HMJS Hashidate
10/96-10/97	Crew of new ship HMJS Fuji from UK
12/97	Sub.Lt. then Lt. HMJS Fuji Section Leader
7/98	Chief Navigator of HMJS Tatsuta
2/99	Member No3 Bureau Naval General Staff
5/99	Foreign student - Russia
8/1901	Resident in Russia
3/02	Trip home through Russia
6/02	Arrived home from Russia
7/02	Division chief HMJS Mikasa
2/03	Chief Navigator HMJS Kasagi
7/03	Chief Gunner HMJS Asahi
9/03	Lt.Commander
3/04	Chief Gunner HMJS Mikasa
2/05-9/07	Aide-de-camp and Secretary to Navy Minister
9/06	Commander
1/07-8/07	Prince Fushimi Mission to England member
9/07	Second in Command HMJS Asama
12/08	Second in Command HMJS Tsukuba
4/09	Navy Ministry duties
5/09-9/11	Naval Attache in London
12/10	Captain
12/11	Commandant Naval Academy
12/13	Captain HMJS Tsukuba
5/14	Captain HMJS Ibuki
2/15	Chief of Staff Second Fleet
12/15	Captain HMJS Hiei
12/16	Rear Admiral - President Naval Gunnery School
1/18	Commander-in-Chief Fifth (Vladivostock) Squadon
12/18	Chief of Staff Yokosuka Navy Yard
6/19	Special duties (Europe and USA)
8/20	President Naval War College
12/20	Vice Admiral
9/21-2/22	Chief Technical Delegate Washington Conference
5/22	Vice-Chief Naval General Staff
6/23	Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet
12/24	Admiral Superintendent Yokosuka Navy Yard
12/26	Commander-in-Chief First Fleet and Combined Fleet
4/27	Admiral
12/28	Supreme Military Councillor
1/29-6/30	Chief of the Naval General Staff
6/30	Supreme Military Councillor
11/35	Placed on reserve
2/39	Died