

Drawing My Office
: A Study on Architectural Representation of Time

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A Thesis Submitted for the Fulfilment of the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture



January 2010

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The University of Sheffield



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Submitted for the Degree of PhD by In-Sung Kim

July 2009

Abstract

This thesis is an attempt to recover the temporality of architecture. Although many contemporary architects argue their ways of dealing with time in their architecture, their idea of time is confined within narrow-mined assumptions of science, and their methods are locked in the intrinsic limitation of architectural representation. This thesis criticises the idea of time with only successive instants for its incompetence of accommodating our exuberant experience of architecture, and finds the origin of the problem at the conventional architectural representation which cannot show what we are together with, but just what we can confront.

As a “research by design”, this thesis is led by a design experiment, which is simply to represent my office. The experiment tries to catch the time of my office with various strategies, and the theory follows it while weaving a story by analysing and evaluating it. Theoretical arguments, which have been initiated mainly from Deleuze, grope for their way in the dialogue with drawings. The strategy of drawing experiment is to approve material and conceptual substantiality of drawing so that it can ‘work’ in time. Concerning the material substantiality, physical size, shape, texture and frame of paper, and various qualities of lines and touches are examined. For the conceptual substantiality, metamorphosis of meaning, isolated figures, vibrating picture ground, and forces in drawing are explored. Ironically, the drawing can manifest my office-ness when it is truly itself. Although the experiment may not be executed in a systematic order, I hope that its audience will generate with the drawings his/her own meanings and sensations, which may ‘evolve’ into his/her architecture.



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Prologue

Across the ages and in all countries of the world, people have struggled to understand and imitate the beauty of living creatures. We could easily agree that anything made by human being cannot give a deeper pleasure of charm than one smile of a baby or a small tree on a hill.

Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: Yet I say unto you, that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.¹

Historically, almost every East Asian art and thought, such as Taoism, Buddhism and even Confucianism, concentrates on investigations into the ideas about changing nature and life itself.² They always try to construct a vague but magnificent cosmology which explains our world including both living things and inorganic matter with one comprehensive principle.³ In such a viewpoint, every human effort to make something could not be separated from ideas about the nature and life. In Western culture, I could find several philosophers attempting to construct ideas about life, such as H. Bergson(1859~1941), A. N. Whitehead(1861~1947), M. Heidegger(1889~1976) and G.Deleuze(1925~1985). If there are some similarities among their thoughts, they would be emphasis on life rather than things, relativity rather than subjectivity, change rather than stationariness and time rather than space.

¹ *The holy bible : revised version*. 1898, London: Oxford university press, Matthew 6:28~29.

² It would not be a proper idea to elaborate this 'naïve' statement in this thesis. It is my rough summary of East Asian tradition after studying many Korean books on this matter such as; Kim, Woo-chang. *Landscape and mind*. 2003, Seoul: Thinking Tree Publishing; Song, Hang-ryong. *Time and Space, and Now and Here- an attempt to understand East Asian philosophy*. 2007, Seoul: S.K.K. Univ. Press; Son, young-sik. *Reason and Reality- study on Neo Confucianism in Song dynasty*. 1999, Ulsan: Ulsan Univ. Press; Park, Ei-moon. *Future of Civilization and Ecological Worldview*. 1998, Seoul: Dangdae Press.

³ Whitehead argued a similar idea. "... At the lower end of the scale, it is hazardous to draw any sharp distinction between living thins and inorganic matter." Alfred North Whitehead, *The function of reason*. 1929, London: Princeton university press, p.3.

When it comes to architecture, ideas of life tend to be translated directly into so-called 'organic' form. We can see many contemporary architects who try to express vital force, dynamic flux, fluid and even chaos, through sleek or complex shape using computer technology. Charles Jencks seems to be one of the strong advocates of such a trend. Asserting that 'form follows world view', he wants to create various poetic forms by following the 'creativity of the cosmos' or a 'hidden deeper wave' which is justified by so-called sciences of complexity.⁴ However, we had better give ear to the following article by Karatani to be more discreet.

Though architecture is an event, and thereby necessarily contingent, we need not invoke the poet to refute Plato's use of the architect as a metaphor; to do so would only lead us to another sanctification. Instead, if one wants to discard architecture as metaphor, one can simply substitute secular architecture as a metaphor.⁵

Both idealist-architect and poet-architect dream of eternal architecture which emits absolute truth and beauty.⁶ However, they will find the simple truth that nothing can be so eternal and that none of their architecture is better than any little flower which breathes and grows with time. The acknowledgement of such a truth was a start of my research. It was one of my college days, and I was thinking of my design project in a bus to my studio. Suddenly, I found myself absorbed in contemplating a little cat in the front seat gazing at me after awakening from a light sleep in the bosom of its master. Its gestures united with its actions, desires, and its image. I remember that it was brightening its surroundings and even my heart, and the cat looked like the happiest creature in the world. I might vaguely guess that it would be a power of 'life', and thought, "If only I could create this impression in my architecture!" The image was a strong stimulus. Several years later, a book by Whitehead I met by chance recalled my experience of a cat to my mind. In so-called 'organic philosophy' by Whitehead, with its creative epistemology and temporal ontology, I could see some possibilities of 'living architecture' which I had long been yearning.

With those two vague motifs, a cat and Whitehead, I started my research in this PhD by design course. To state its conclusion first, in the course of my research, 'a cat' became the 'time', and Deleuze replaced Whitehead, although my aim was not much changed. Although

⁴ Charles Jencks, *The architecture of the jumping universe : a polemic : how complexity science is changing architecture and culture*. 1995, London: Academy Editions, p.7~16.

⁵ Kojin Karatani, and M. Speaks. *Architecture as metaphor : language, number, money*. 1995, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, p.77

⁶ With this ambiguous terms, idealist-architect and poet-architect, I was thinking of extreme 'rationalists' and extreme 'expressionists'.

this thesis concerned 'time' in architecture, the time was not just 'flowing time' but always a certain 'force' which enables things to be alive. I believed that to be truly 'temporal' is the first and essential step to be 'alive'. It might be a nonsense to make architecture alive, but I thought that it would depend on the definition of or our perspective on architecture, and that to be alive and dead would be just a matter of degree. For me, it was not to make architecture 'look' alive, but to make it alive. Although Deleuze and Whitehead showed to me many ideas in common, I found that Deleuzian arguments dealt with more issues on art practice directly and his terminology would sound more suitable for our contemporary discourse. His '*Difference and Repetition*(1968)' supplied a big picture for my thesis, and his '*Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*(1981)' gave many hints for my arguments.

At the early stage of my design research, I tried directly an architectural design project on a real site in Sheffield, to which I might apply my ideas from philosophical studies. However, I soon realized that I could never achieve what I wanted to design as far as I was confined within the limitation of 'architectural drawing'. The very drawing I had learnt in architecture school was a major obstacle to my understanding and expressing the 'temporal world'. Computer-aided-drawing or computer graphics was even worse for it. I started to study issues on 'representation' in both architectural and philosophical field. I had to reset my design experiment project, and it was simply to 'represent my office'. I adhered to the medium of pencil drawing and photograph rather than examining any other brand-new materials because I wanted to be an infighter rather than an out-boxer in the fight against conventional architectural drawing. I tried to investigate the 'origin' of the problem of representation to be 'original'.

My office was a proper subject for my drawing experiment because I could have various experiences, feelings, impressions, and memories of it as well as its information, data, and materials, and therefore, could examine the representation of my office's space and time from various angles. At the beginning, the ambitious aim of the experiment was to draw time of my office. However, I came to realize that it is not just an impossible mission but also an improper aim, because it was just another ideal; another 'sanctification'. What I struggled to draw in the end was neither the space of my office nor the time of my office, but just my office itself. I had better have recovered the innocent eyes of children.

My thesis criticizes the 'modern' idea of space and time and its influence on architectural drawing and theories. Or the reverse could be the case; the 'modern' way of representation and its influence on the idea of space and time. The thesis tries to suggest 'temporal ontology' instead, which may seem complex but rather 'natural', and examines alternative perspectives


on our architectural experience and its representation, which hopefully may evolve into the architecture breathing together with us. My thesis may not have any decisive conclusion, but will show a decisive standpoint throughout its whole story. My thesis may not be systematically organized from a question towards an answer, but will repeat its questioning and answering while orbiting an issue to approach the 'truth' hidden at the core. My thesis may not supply architects with a final drawing sample for alternative architecture, but I hope that it could help architects to see forgotten beauty of architecture and to find some clues for their own way of drawing and design.⁷

⁷ There is more explanation about the methodology of this research in the conclusion. See 'Methodology review' in the Conclusion.


Chapter 1: Meeting a building on a street

Togetherness

There is an essential difference between architects and ordinary people when they meet a building in a street. Architects 'view' the building, while ordinary people do not view in the same way. Or rather, they 'sense' it. They catch more of the building than architects do even without 'viewing' it. Even architects 'sense' the architecture when it comes to their own space like their home or office simply because they do not 'view' it. This is my assertion which will be elaborated throughout the thesis, and in this, I will argue that the architects' 'viewing' is widely based on spatial preconceptions, including the conventions of architectural drawings, while the laymen's 'sensing' is rather temporal. The term 'sense' is selected here to designate two different, but related concepts; 'meaning' and 'sensation'.



[Figure 1-1] Drawing experiment, *My office I as 'sense'*. modified from scanned images of *Perspective drawing of my office*; pencil on tracing paper, 79 x 41cm (S=1:100).



[Figure 1-2] Drawing experiment, *My office I as 'view'*. modified from scanned images of *Perspective drawing of my office*; pencil on tracing paper, 79 x 41cm (S=1:100).

Figures 1-1 and 1-2 are *Photoshop*-modified images from the same perspective drawing of my office, the size of which is 4.4×2.2m in plan and 3m in height. The original perspective drawing was made by overlapping three drawings; the first was 3D grid through a conventional drawing method, the second my office and furniture in it, and the third my possessions in the office which was a tracing of photographs. Although [Figure1-1] and [Figure1-2] are not so different from each other (since they are just tonal modifications of a conventional architectural drawing without any amendment of its composition or sizes), the very tonal difference generates different, or even opposite impressions.

Firstly, in general, [Figure1-1] is a representation of the office I work in, while [Figure1-2] is of the office 17-3 in the Arts Tower in which the student, In-sung, works. The former tries to be the experience of a layman who 'lives a space', while the latter is a tool for an architect who 'produces a space'. In [Figure1-1], 'I' am already an element of the drawing although it is an invisible one. Here, 'I' am certain forces that maintain the office in the unstable picture. My eyes are on the books, on the monitor, and on the windows. My hands are on the door handle, on the desk, on the keyboard, on the mouse, on the telephone, on the kettle, and on the notebooks. My mouth is on the telephone and my ears are on the speaker. Many other organs of mine are here 'and' there together with every part of my office. This togetherness is called 'sensation' and 'meaning' which are neither solely of my office nor solely of mine. In [Figure1-2], the office is apparently there in the picture. 'I', imagined to be in the scene, am a solid object which can be put here 'or' there in the office. When it starts to move, it is rather

an intruder of a calm space, which is one section of flowing time, called 'instant'. In the other drawing, time resides in rather than flows through.

From an analytic perspective, [Figure 1-1] has flows or vibrations of the office and the stuff in it on the surface of the drawing by the gradation of the tone, which generates centrifugal and centripetal forces, delicately linked with my presence; *horizontal breathing*. The tonal difference in [Figure 1-2] is dedicated for different 'layers' of different kinds of information. However, the difference is just the distinction for audiences, and the layers are accurately overlapped to accomplish the only stable spatial structure. In the drawing, [Figure 1-1], difference happens between the paper and the images; *vertical breathing*. Various stuffs with different tones float up from the ground without the ready-suggested spatial structure. Although one may not recognise this 'floating up' clearly, it is an event, a prior impression to any other clear distinction. In the process of its repetitive 'floating up', the book on the desk pulls out many other related things and events (my hand, my eyes, pencils, wind, reading, moving, stacking...), sensations and meanings (heaviness, hardness, thickness, smells, importance...) together with itself from the chaotic ground, the 'whole'. This 'floating up' exposes not only the floated image as a result, but also many other 'latent' images in the ground. The space does not 'accommodate' the book, but rather, 'happens' around the book. One final thing to remember here is that all those happenings are not just of the real office, the model of the drawing, but of the drawing itself. They are happening on the paper, over and beneath the paper, now.

When I, as an ordinary person, walk on Fulwood Road down to my office, I see many houses alongside the street. I can truly 'enjoy' them, as far as I avoid the conscious act of 'viewing' as an architect for a moment. It is a situation similar to that of a scientist who enjoys a placid lake reflecting sunshine trying to avoid the ideas of science like H₂O and other chemical elements, oxygen content, refraction or reflection of light etc. The houses over the road are various 'bodies' with their 'faces' before their being 'façades'. I sense the 'expressions' of a face with its body before I view the mere façades of the buildings. I sense dark and bright ivory, white and black, rough and smooth, lines and curves, rectangles and triangles through the branches of trees rustling in the wind. Some of them make a stone wall, some of them become a roof or a house. Some of them soak into the blue sky or grey earth, some of them resonate with their neighbours and with my-lax-self. Rough stones are contrasted with the

adjacent cold glass -shining with soft sunlight. It **might** be a window with white wood frame.¹ As soon as I find that it is opened, I sense the breeze through the gap touching my face, and my hand opening the window of my flat which my baby likes to touch. The window between leaves is opened **or** closed. Rather, I sense that it is open **and** closed.² While I see the blue curtains and wood furniture over the window, I sense the residents, stepping upstairs, watching TV on a sofa, cooking in the kitchen, sleeping in the bed, through the stone wall. Meanwhile, a car passes the road with noise and a person comes out through the front gate of the house **or** the next one. Things appear, disappear, and re-appear. It is not so clear whether they are called sensations or meanings or impressions or objects or events or phenomena or even phantom. In fact, what I actually experience is far more than such a brief statement in words since it is something before utterance, which 'slips between my fingers' whenever I try to grasp it. My body catches the 'sensations' and 'meanings' before my mind articulates them. Then, what is sensation and meaning? Where are they? When are they? How are they different? How are they similar? And, why are they temporal? Here is a good remark upon the sensation by Deleuze:

*Sensation has one face turned toward the subject (the nervous system, vital movement, "instinct," "temperament"...) and one face turned toward the object (the "fact," the place, the event). Or rather, it has no faces at all, it is both things indissolubly, it is Being-in-the-World, as the phenomenologists say: at one and the same time I become in the sensation and something happens through the sensation, one through the other, one in the other. And at the limit, it is the same body which, being both subject and object, gives and receives the sensation.*³

Where is the 'roughness' of the ivory stone surface? Is it intrinsically of the wall? Or, is it of my a priori mind? These two possible assumptions are, in fact, not so opposite ideas as it seems since both of them are based on a certain transcendent-ideal: transcendence of the object and transcendence of the subject.⁴ The roughness, the sensation, is considered as something secondary at best or even what should be ignored in both perspectives. For the object-transcendentalist, there only exists a rough stone, not such roughness. For the subject-

¹ One never finds a 'window' 'before' such complex sensations.

² 'Openedness' and 'closedness' are concepts relying on each other. Without the idea of the 'closedness', there is no 'openedness' possible. It is not a new idea because everyone already knows it. It is just too natural to be mentioned. It might be one of my aims in my drawing experiment to draw such 'togetherness' of openedness and closedness of a window.

³ Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*, translated from the French by Daniel W. Smith, 2003, London: Continuum, p.25

⁴ They are my terms to roughly categorise two distinctive philosophical tendencies. I thought of Materialism, Science, Positivism for the 'object-transcendentalism', and Intellectualism, Idealism for the 'subject-transcendentalism'.

transcendentalist like Kant, there is no roughness as sensation, as sensed, but rather, roughness is a conception produced by the internal source of pure intuition and pure thought.⁵ In short, sensation is an annoying side effect which disturbs the clear-cut distinction between pure object and pure subject. However, Deleuze inverts these approaches by explaining the subject and the object as the two faces of sensation. "At one and the same time roughness-sensing-I become in the roughness-sensation and rough stone wall happens through the roughness-sensation." If the sensation is a question, 'I' and 'thing' are the answer.⁶ It would be reasonable to argue the priority of the question to the answer. The time is nothing but this repetitive chain of questioning and answering. Yet, it is not that easy to understand the sensation, sensing I and sensed world in this way because we tend to believe in timeless identity of things and timeless identity of ourselves partly pushed by our practical or linguistic demands and partly swayed by formal education.

It would be a difficult task to fully examine Deleuzian metaphysical argument quoted above, but two insights need to be pointed out here. Firstly, with the terms 'becoming' and 'happening', he suggests that the 'being' itself is the event which needs to be repetitively renewed in time. Secondly, he proposes a new dimension or level where the sensation before the distinction between the subject and object resides. This ultimate dimension is, on the one hand, purely temporal since it is about the stage of the 'pure event', and on the other hand, atemporal in itself and in a conventional sense since it does not yet have any specific tense. Past, present and future coexist in this dimension, or rather, it is past, present and future at the same time since the time does not flow but repeats itself.⁷ This dimension has been called with slightly different connotations as 'expression'⁸, 'image'⁹, 'causal efficacy'¹⁰, 'virtual'¹¹,

⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. 1929, London: Macmillan, p.71, 86. There is also a good criticism of Whitehead on this Kantian epistemology. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality : an essay in cosmology*, Corrected ed. by D.R. Griffin, and D.W. Sherburne, 1978, New York: Free Press, p. 155

⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, translated from the French by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, 1991, New York: Zone Books, p14

⁷ This argument will be discussed in the following chapters. ('Flowing time' in chapter3, and 'Repeating time' in chapter4)

⁸ By Husserl and Arnheim. Gilles Deleuze, *The logic of sense*, translated by Mark Lester, 1990, New York: Columbia University Press, p.20. Rudolf Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception : a psychology of the creative eye*, 1974, London: University of California Press, pp.444-461.

⁹ Henry Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer, 1911, London: The Macmillan Co., pp. 35-69.

¹⁰ Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality : an essay in cosmology*, Corrected ed. by D.R. Griffin, and D.W. Sherburne, 1978, New York: Free Press, pp.121-123.

¹¹ "Subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul or the spirit, the virtual. The actual is always objective, but the virtual is subjective: it was initially the affect, that which we experience in time; the time itself, pure virtuality which divides itself in two as affector and affected, "the affection of self by self" as definition of time." Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, 2005, London: Continuum. p.83.

'surface between nature and culture'¹² by various scholars, but one thing common to these theories is that this dimension is not yet 'actual' but is still 'real'. Whitehead uses the term, 'causal efficacy', in contrast with 'presentational immediacy' which is believed to be our 'actual' world, while Bergson and Deleuze use for this dimension the terms, 'virtuality' which is prior to and more than 'actuality'. However, without cautious understanding, Whiteheadian 'causal efficacy' can be misinterpreted as a single-track cause and effect of science, and Deleuzian 'virtuality' can be hastily confused with the virtual reality in the computer world, a mere abstraction from an actuality. To avoid all these confusions, I suggest a rather easy term: '**Togetherness**'.¹³ It is togetherness because subject and object are yet together, because past, present and future are yet together, and because time and space are also yet together.

A similar question can be asked of 'meaning'. Where does the meaning of the 'window' I meet in the street reside? Does it come from the thing itself, which consists of a pair of glass panes and a frame? Is it just caught and composed by sensing I? Or, does it reside in the phonetic or visual sign of the 'window' itself, or in the ready-structured system of language? It would be unnecessary for this thesis to examine precisely these arguments of Positivism, Phenomenology and Structuralism, all of which seem to show a certain amount of 'truth', but are not enough to explain more fundamental, wilder aspects of the 'meaning'. The meaning seems not to reside solely in the object, the subject or the word. I catch a certain meaning of a window (or as a window), which is to say that I sense a window, and it is certainly before I utter or even think of the word, "window". What needs to be said here is that the meaning is a certain event which appears and disappears in time before its being a name or a proposition,¹⁴ and even before the 'confrontation' between the sensing and the sensed.

From this perspective, 'meaning' is not as different from 'sensation' as it seems, and it is the reason that these two could be subsumed in one word: 'sense'. (Whitehead uses another term for it; 'feeling'.) The difference is that the meaning faces language while sensation faces the body.¹⁵ However, the meaning is not so much mental as it is assumed, and the sensation is not so much material as it is understood. When I say that "I sense that the window is opened," the tendency of language already suggests the 'openedness' as a certain character or status of the window. However, in many cases, I sense the 'openedness' itself independently or even prior

¹² Gilles Deleuze, *The logic of sense*, translated by Mark Lester, 1990, New York: Columbia University Press, pp.4-11.

¹³ In this idea of 'togetherness', 'perception' is explained as a process from togetherness to confrontation. The perception is a human functioning to rescue himself/herself from the unknown 'whole'. It is an opposite way of understanding to that of science or common sense.

¹⁴ There are more discussions on this matter in chapter 3, "**Name and Calling a Name**".

¹⁵ This remark might look simplistic. I was eager to build my standpoint that is between, or even comprises Phenomenology and (Post) Structuralism.

to the recognition of the window. The complex feeling of ‘openedness’ emerges with enormous universal or personal connotations. Is this primary ‘openedness’ the sensation? Or, is it the meaning? One can see that such distinction is not clear any more as far as it is of the primary event before language, before subject and object, and one can surmise that it is purely temporal before any spatial distinctions or disposition.¹⁶ Indeed, countless ‘senses’ rise, emerge, or happen while I walk down the road, and my consciousness seems not actively involved in this stage because I myself am yet in the ‘senses’ together while I truly enjoy them.



[Figure 1-3] Drawing experiment, *A 'Wall' of My office-3*; pencil on watercolour paper, 25 x 40.5cm, 9/2008.

¹⁶ It is temporal because it is the ‘floating up’ from ‘togetherness’ to ‘confrontation’, or from ‘ground’ to ‘surface’. About ‘ground’ and ‘surface’, see ‘**Present, Past, Future**’ in chapter 2.

This drawing experiment asks about the 'wall-ness'. Can I draw 'the wall' itself in my office without relying on the formation of other neighbours or attachments of the wall? Can it be a wall only with other walls aside, with a ceiling, with a floor, and with attached pictures or furniture? Or can it exist only as a component of a room or a space? Then, what is it I sense in front of me whenever I study on my seat in my office?

I start from what the wall is 'doing' in time before it is suggested as a certain form in space, and what is happening between the supposed wall and 'I'. What has to be expressed is the repetitive 'becoming' of the wall, which is neither the 'accomplished' wall nor my ideas of the wall.¹⁷ In fact, it is not that complex or abstract as it seems in my long explanation. Rather, it is just too small, too close, and too wild to be caught by my consciousness.

The wall stands up from the floor, is hung down or flows down from the ceiling, and runs from left to right sometimes slow sometimes fast. The wall is in its supporting other stuff on it, in its confronting me, in its hiding its back, and in its reflecting its front. The wall is in its solid body, in its ivory paint, and in its surface touched by breeze and sunshine sometimes harsh, sometimes tender. The breeze makes the wall sway, the sunshine makes it vibrate, and nails make it quake. The wall has lines of its own edges, lines of its sectional surface with solid material behind and the air in front, lines of frames or paper hung on its surface, lines of scratches, cracks, and the traces of paint brush. The wall has its face with changing colours by the weathers, lighting, or my moods. It is divided into pieces, gathers together, changes its forms, contracts, and expands with many neighbours like stuff hung on, nails, tapes, shadows, and myself. The wall wedges itself between my drawings put on it, and the drawings are together with the wall around and behind, or rather, the drawings become the wall. Indeed, the wall is such countless and endless happenings. How can my drawing express those happenings without just mounting them. Can I make a drawing itself be such happenings?

¹⁷ "Returning is being, but only the being of becoming. The eternal return does not bring back "the same", but returning constitutes the only same of that which becomes. Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself. Returning is thus the only identity, but identity as a secondary power; the identity of difference, the identical which belongs to the different, or turns around the different." Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum, pp.50-51.

Confrontation

However, I cannot stay in such enjoyment forever. I need to escape from such ambiguity and 'confront' the object clearly. Without establishing a clear objective world, my identity would come to face the danger of dispersion.¹⁸ Normally, architects are keen to obtain and maintain such clarity to ensure their identity as architects. Indeed, they are too weak to be able to just 'enjoy' the architecture contrary to their expectation. When I, as an architect, walk on Fulwood Road down to my office, I see many houses alongside the street. I view the buildings and explore the forms filled in the space, which would otherwise be empty. What I assume first is the 'empty space', which I and the building are occupying, and the flat earth in it, on which I and the building are standing. Here, I and the building would never be possible without such a priori space. I am already seeing a homogeneous space before I view the building. Soon, my mind starts to construct the building on the earth in the empty space, detecting the remarkable contours in the view. It is similar to the way in which Robocop or Terminator view the world with their cyber-eyes. Naturally emerging senses are restrained since they are not reliable. Rather, those senses are attached to the building after the construction. On the distinct object, the building, and the distinct subject, I, the senses, sensation or meanings, are assigned and achieve stability. Finally, I gain a clear three-dimensional picture in my mind, and the last thing to do is to add other annoying objects and effects such as people, plants, sunshine, wind...etc. to the picture.


It is not a metaphorical description. It is literally how I, an architect, view the world. I cannot help being positivistic especially with architecture since I have to analyze it, understand it, and make it. Every part of architecture needs to be designated, and the designation basically demands three premises; the identity of object (individualized and stable), the identity of subject (with identical standard), and the identity of the 'field' (which accommodates such object and subject).¹⁹ Without these conditions, nothing can be designated. While it looks clear that the world and I seem not to be identical in time, the attractive way to resolve the difficulty is to solicit the 'field'. By assuming or inventing the identical and stable 'field', and

¹⁸ In a sense, children do not have their clear identity yet since they are more deeply involved in the world around than adults are. While children are good at 'enjoying', adults are good at 'confronting'. They are keen to situate themselves in a certain clear context. There are interesting arguments on 'passive ego' of a child here; Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum, pp.123-125.

¹⁹ They are the ideal conditions for the clear 'designation'. Lee Jung Woo, *The age of simulacre*, 2000, Seoul: Keorum, pp.97-106.

by reconstructing the world and 'I' in it, an ideal system in which everything can be clearly designated is accomplished. Even designating 'I' can be objectified as merely another element of the system. In the three-dimensional picture of the building in my mind, there also exists the viewing I as one object of the scene. Rather, it seems no longer important whether the picture is in my mind or my mind is in the picture.

In my person both 'an ordinary man' and 'an architect' (as opposed to 'an ordinary man') confront the building, since otherwise they cannot see it. However, their ways of 'confronting' are quite different or even opposite. For the ordinary man, to confront the building is the last stage of his/her sensing the building, while it is the start for the architect. Indeed, the architect constructs the 'confrontation' itself before his/her viewing the building but, ironically enough, he/she confronts nothing... but the confrontation itself.



[Figure 1-5] Architectural drawing sample, *Arts Tower floor plan*. original scale 1:100.

Every plan drawing suggests one stable universal space. The space is already there in, above, beneath, around a sheet of paper before an architect starts the drawing. It is never just two-dimensional because the paper expands three-dimensionally infinitely. Without assuming the space above and beneath the paper, we cannot read the plan drawing of [Figure 1-5]. The walls

and windows are extruded up and down, and it is a part of the infinite extrusion of the space. It is more than a mere abstraction from the spatio-temporal world. Rather, it is already a certain kind of spatio-temporal world established in a sheet of paper. The first and only condition of this world is its stability which enables stable objects in it and transparent translations of it.

It is not enough to say that there is no time in this kind of drawing. The situation is worse than that. The plan drawing never remains silent about time. On the contrary, it actively suggests a certain kind of time which ensures its stability. The space itself embodied by the drawing should not change or move under any condition. It repeats itself uniformly and infinitely. Time is suggested only in this bare repetition of universal space, and it is the bare repetition of the 'instant'. The magic of this time as serial instants is that any instant can be merged into one instant since there are no intrinsic differences between different instants. One uniform universe is successfully suggested.

In [Figure 1-5], moving person from a room through a corridor to another room does not trouble the stability of the drawing since every moment of the movement can be merged into one instant, the space. Every moment of drawing time of an architect also can be merged into one instant. The drawing seems to be made in an instant. When I read this drawing, I have to merge every moment of my scanning into one instant which is one stable space which supposedly contains the building suggested. The time works not for any differences but only for the stability. Differences do not 'happen' but just 'exist' as what are inscribed in this stable space.

Idea of Instant

As one can easily expect, the 'field' of the architect, which is an a priori set from extended 'confrontation', is so-called 'space'. It is "a container existing prior to, and independently of, the physical bodies that find their place within it."²⁰ Many architectural theorists have criticised such an abstract, idealized concept of space. They argue that such a concept is simply not 'real' and so, cannot deal with time. Yet it is real only because it is the result of

²⁰ Rudolf Arnheim, *The dynamics of architectural form*, 1975, London: University of California Press, p.17.

modern architects' wilful confusion with a philosophical category of 'space'²¹, a confusion originating with Kant. Yes, the main target of the criticism is Kant since he asserted that space is a property of the mind, part of the apparatus by which the mind makes the world intelligible. Forty(2000) quotes this sentence by Kant:²² 'Space does not represent any property of things in themselves nor does it represent them in their relation to one another.' Till(2000) analyses this part:²³ '...that space and time, as the necessary condition of all inner and outer experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuition.'²⁴

However, for me, it seems less important whether it is of the world or of the mind, or whether it is objective or subjective. But rather, I would ask what kind of space it is, what kind of time it is. I would argue that Kant clarified what Newton's idea of space and time was. The Newtonian universal space and time were already a priori of the mind although he argued that it was of the universe, and he did not notice it. How could he confront, designate, and so objectify the form of the universe while he himself, not only his body but also his mind, was in it? Here is his brave remark:

I. Absolute, true, and mathematical time, in and of itself and of its own nature, without reference to anything external, flows uniformly and by another name is called duration...

II. Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and immovable...²⁵

There have been many critiques arguing that the fundamental problem of such Newtonian universal space and time are their independency of, and irrelevance to, the things and events in them. And, that would be the reason why it could be so fit for the conditions of the mind. In fact, as one can see in the quotation above, Newton himself emphasized such independency. Furthermore, and more importantly, the time and the space seem suggested as something irrelevant to each other, and this crucial idea is either a misunderstanding or a trick. Instead, I would like to suggest and argue a simple, but crucial observation especially relevant to architecture, an equation as follows:

²¹ Adrian Forty, *Words and buildings : a vocabulary of modern architecture*. 2000, New York: Thames & Hudson, p.256.

²² Ibid., p.258.

²³ Jeremy Till, *Thick time: architecture and the traces of time*. in 'Intersections'. I. Borden and J. Rendell. 2000, London: Routledge, p.285.

²⁴ Quotations from, Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. 1929, London: Macmillan, p.71, 86.

²⁵ Isaac Newton, *The principia : mathematical principles of natural philosophy*. 1999, London: University of California Press, p.408, 410.

$$[Universal\ space] = [Universal\ Instant]$$

It could look like a simple platitude, a piece of common sense. But, when considered with more seriousness, this equation might look strange since it is quite different from the easy statement of that 'there is no time in the universal space.' It is, again, an equation, not explanation, and so, it demands common foundation to time and space, which might be absolutely nonsensical in science. There is a famous formula which looks as if explaining the relationship between time and space: $v[\text{velocity}] = d[\text{distance}] / t[\text{time}]$. However, it has a tricky variable, 'v[velocity]', which is defined by distance and time of a movement. In fact, this formula is just a mathematical definition of velocity, but shows nothing about any relationship between time and space itself. It is intrinsically self-referential. It deals with numbers, not time, not space, and not even the 'velocity'. Although Newton asserts that '*absolute space remains always similar and immovable without relation to anything external*', it is impossible without a certain involvement of time to define the very space. To be absolute and universal, the space needs to be homogeneous in every part of it at the same time. To define the sameness of every part, the parts need to be so simultaneously. And, the idea of universal simultaneousness demands the idea of instant since one cannot conceive any exact simultaneity if there is no sharply defined time. If the universal space is something actually 'existing', it is nothing but the universal simultaneousness and so the instant, because it just 'exists' throughout the universe simultaneously without any contents or events of its own. Otherwise, it is just nothing.

In the chapter titled 'The present', Kern(1983) shows how much modern technology contributed to the new human experience of the simultaneous world. He exemplifies the influences of the telegraph, high-speed rotary press, telephone, radio, cinema, and many others in detail stressing how deeply modern people, even artists, were fascinated by their power and possibilities.²⁶ In fact, such a fascination has not been finished yet since technology keeps advancing. With satellite, with internet, we are more and more convinced that there surely exists "the present in its totality" and so an extended spatial universe at such a moment. However, the conviction of simultaneity by technology is quite different from, or irrelevant to, the theory of 'simultaneousness', since what enables such experience is nothing but the fast speed of light. In the short animation film, 'Voices of a distant star'²⁷, Makoto(2002) questions the idea of simultaneity in the 'more' advanced world of technology. It starts with a monologue; "*There is a word, "world". Until about the time when I was in*

²⁶ Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918*. 1983, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, pp.65-81

²⁷ Makoto Shinkai, *Voices of a distant star*, 2002, animation film, run time 30minutes.

middle school, I vaguely thought the world meant the area where the signals from my cell would reach, but why is it my cell never reaches anyone. Hello? Say, isn't anyone there? How far should I go? I'm lonely..."

A middle-school girl named Mikako is drafted to the UN Space Army in a war against a group of aliens called the Tarsians. When the spacecraft, *Lysithea*, leaves the Earth to search for the Tarsians with Mikako on-board, Mikako's boyfriend Noboru remains behind. The couple continue to communicate across interplanetary, and eventually interstellar space via the e-mail facilities on their mobile phones. As the *Lysithea* travels deeper into space, the e-mails take increasingly longer to reach Noboru on Earth, and the time-lag of their correspondence eventually spans years. Here is one of the Mikako's Messages; "... *I wonder how I should explain this. I'm at the point where the ship Lysithea has just now warped one years distance. To me, one year hasn't passed at all, you know. I am still 15 years old, you know. To you, Noboru, it's one year ago, to me it's 30 minutes ago, around Pluto, you know. After this the Lysithea will enter a long distance warp. The destination is Sirius, 8.6 light-years away. By the time you receive this mail, I will already be at Sirius. From now on it will take eight years and seven months to receive each other's mail. Sorry...*" The audience is induced to question the meaning of the simultaneity again in this extraordinary situation. In the last scene, two lovers have a conversation of mind from 8.6 light-years' distance. Rather, there seems to be a flow of story-telling first, and then the two beings, Mikako and Noboru, **become** in the story-telling. It is like playing a Canon with its leader part and follower part, or the sensation of the violin and the sensation of the piano in the sonata.²⁸ What is played and listened to is a piece of music, not its parts. And, the becoming of the beings is properly supported by the contents of story, full of 'senses' regardless of their being past, present, or future. Indeed, they are the one in a certain flow of event in spite of their spatial and temporal distance; true togetherness.

Mikako - ... say, you know Noboru, I have a lot of things I reminisce about. After all I have nothing here for example you know...

Noboru - ...for example, things like summer clouds and the cold rain... things like the smell of a fall breeze...

Mikako - ...like the sound of rain drops hitting an umbrella... like the softness of Spring soil... like the feeling of peace at the convenience store in the middle of the night...

²⁸ "It was like the beginning of the world, as if there had been, as yet, only the two of them on Earth, or rather in this world closed to all the rest, constructed by the logic of a creator in such a way that in it no one else would ever exist except the two of them: this sonata." Marcel Proust, *In Search of Lost Time*, vol. 1, *Swann's Way*, trans. C.K.Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin, 1993, New York: Modern Library, p.500

Noboru - ... and then you know, like the cool wind after school...

Mikako - ... like the smell of chalkboard erasers...

Noboru - ... like the sound of a truck passing by in the middle of the night...

Mikako - ... like the smell of asphalt in the rain. Noboru, things like that, I have all this time...

Noboru - ...I have all this time thought that I would like to experience these with you Mikako.



[Figure1-4] Still image from the animation: *Voices of a distant star*, 2002

Two different shorts – one with Mikako in a space battle and the other with Noboru walking on earth, continue to cross each other in the film. Does it show two simultaneous events in different spaces? Or is it the power of film editing that can juxtapose an 8.6-year difference? Here is another interesting scene from the film which shows a Japanese newspaper of 25th of March, 2055: [Figure 1-4]. The headline of this newspaper is this; “8 years ago,

the victory in Sirius battle.” It looks strange for us who get used to the newspaper filled with only ‘contemporary’ events of the whole world. Ironically, this Sci-fi animation about the future enables us to guess the feeling of past people about the world in pre-modern period where news took months or years to be delivered to far countries. Does it not make sense if one argues that our today on the earth is simultaneous with the 8-years-ago of Sirius, which is reported in today’s newspaper? In fact, the concept of ‘simultaneity’ has long been rejected after Einstein. Einstein himself clearly declares this;

*There is no such thing as simultaneity of distant events; consequently there is also no such thing as immediate action at a distance in the sense of Newtonian mechanics.*²⁹

It would not be the purpose of this thesis to examine the whole ‘theory of relativity’ by Einstein, but I would like to argue two points in relation to his theory. Firstly, although he successfully resolved some problems of Newtonian mechanics, he still remained in the limitation of the science of objective observation and mathematics. He divides one universal inert system of time and space into many pieces according to relative velocity of moving observer. The piece is, as he emphasises, the four-dimensional continuum, the field of energy,

²⁹ Albert Einstein, *Autobiographical notes*. 1951, Problems of space and time, J.J.C.Smart, 1964, New York: Macmillan Company, p.283.

in which time and space have a formal dependence upon each other. However, in his theory, time is still time and, space is still space even though they are interdependently varied relying on 'the constancy of the speed of light.'³⁰ As a scientist, he deals only with ready-objective time and space, and puts aside any possibility of the not-yet-objective world of events in which the dichotomy between time and space, and between subject and object is not valid yet. He claims that "such a time of philosopher is nothing but a mere mental construction, and so the psychological time."³¹ Secondly, although his theory improved the ability of science to explain the world, it has not influenced the everyday life of common people and the perspective of architects much. We seem to live still in the Newtonian world in spite of such remarkable improvements by Einstein. It would be because his theory is not critically dealing with Newtonian assumptions but just expanding such ideas to the extreme. It would be because his theory is not based on time and space we actually experience, of living beings, but based on sophisticated measurement and mathematics. Bergson critically argued that "Far from removing the assumption of one universal duration, the special theory of relativity of Einstein demands it and allows it conceivable."³² It seems that we are less concerned about such extreme cases like the speed of light or other planets. In our everyday life, we live rather more phenomenologically than scientifically.

What actually matters for us is not whether the simultaneity can be logically defined, proved and demonstrated or not, but how it has influenced our experience of the world, and how it has been expressed in our way of life. The reason for my dealing with the simultaneity for pages is that it can be a bridge which links time and space and holds them together. Let me revise my previous equation and add a following amendment;

$$[Universal\ space] = [Universal\ simultaneousness] = [Universal\ Instant]$$

When the idea of simultaneousness is questioned, the idea of space and instant should also be questioned. From this, I am trying to point out the fundamental absurdity of our modern idea of space and time. Universal space is not just space but 'stopped-time' from its very definition. In the same way, universal time is not just time but 'fixed-space' from its very definition. And, the result is that we come to conceive our world based on the scientific foundation constructed by simple multiplication of stopped-time and fixed-space. This kind of definition

³⁰ Ibid., p.281.

³¹ Pete A.Y.Gunter, *Bergson and the Evolution of Physics*. 1969, Knoxville: the university of Tennessee Press, p.133.

³² This is based on the argument between Bergson and Einstein in DE LA SOCIETE FRANCAISE DE PHILOSOPHIE (July, 1922). Oh Young hwan., *Whitehead and human experience of time*. 1999, Seoul: Tongnamoo, pp.125-143.

seems unavoidable as far as time and space need to be objectively named and designated, which would be the limitation of the science of absolute objectivity. The issue I would like to address is not the absurdity itself, but that we are actually experiencing this irony everywhere in our life and that it causes practical problems for architects who make buildings in space out of our life in time. This is the story not about the far universe, but about the world in front of us. This is the issue we may easily ignore in our everyday life not because it is too abstract or far from us, but because it is too concrete and close to us. Indeed, we need to allow ourselves some distance to see the world clearly.

[Chapter review]

As an architect, I have felt a gap between architects and ordinary people in their attitude to the architecture. Whenever I talked about a building with a client or a layman, I realised that their feelings and opinions were rather close to the 'truth' than mine in many cases. They were always fully 'with' the building while I was out of it. When they were 'together' with the building, I was 'confronting' it. The building was always alive with their life, but for me, it was a mere object to be understood and handled. I had to separate the building from its every condition and surrounding for a clear investigation, and had to be fully 'rational' to analyse and design it. The knowledge of architecture prevented me from enjoying the building.

In the sections, 'Togetherness' and 'Confrontation', I tried to generalise my experience of this 'gap', using some philosophical ideas and terms. After investigating these two terms, I have realised that they are dependent upon each other and can never be considered separately. When ordinary people 'sense' the world around, it seems rather 'natural' for them to oscillate between the status of 'togetherness' and 'confrontation'.³³ The problem I address in this chapter appears when architects try to stabilise this temporal experience by fixing it to the ready-structured system of confrontation. The 'space' suggested is nothing but a generalised extension of such a confrontation, and the 'instant', another name of the 'space', is proposed as the only element of the 'time'. The 'world' we can clearly confront is successfully established, and consequently, there is nothing in this world which architects cannot 'represent'.

³³ "Oscillation" might not be a proper term for this situation since it gives an impression of a certain movement in linear time. The 'togetherness' and 'confrontation' are neither opposite to each other, nor appear in turns. Rather, they are co-existing and enabling each other every moment.

The next chapter is a variation, the 'repetition with difference', of this chapter. The idea of 'confrontation' will be re-examined in the context of architectural representation. The argument on the concept of time in 'Idea of Instant' will be developed in the section, 'Present, Past, Future', in the next chapter. The final section, 'Ruin and Drawing', will discuss another example of the experience of the 'togetherness'. The terms, 'ground/surface', will be suggested in the next chapter as a variation of 'togetherness/confrontation', but they are just different names for one idea which I will examine throughout this thesis.

Chapter 2: Architectural Drawing in Time

Drawing as Confrontation I : Screen

When 'space-time' (This term is possible not because space and time are related with each other, but because they are not intrinsically of different species) is replaced by stopped-time and fixed-space, what is left is only 'ready-confrontation', form without contents. It is neither space nor time, but just 'confrontation', which premises a dichotomy between the viewer and the viewed. It is what I have described previously as an architect's first construct before his/her viewing the building, and the reason for my tenacity for the 'confrontation' is that I believe it is a critical point from which true temporality starts to lose its validity by human reasoning which always tries to escape from 'togetherness' as quickly as possible.

This ideal confrontation is clearly demonstrated by a **sheet of white paper** in front of an architect. Indeed, paper for architectural drawing is already the manifestation of the ready-confrontation. It might appear suddenly to jump from confrontation with a building to that with drawing because they are usually regarded as intrinsically different kinds of experience. Then, what is the real difference between viewing a building and viewing a drawing of it? Before hastening to answer this question, we need to clarify one part of the very question: 'viewing a drawing of it'. Although it literally means 'viewing a **drawing** of a building', it is easily confused with 'viewing a **building** drawn'. Are we viewing a drawing or a building in it?¹

¹ In the article, 'how do pictures represent?', Max Black examines various arguments which explain the relation between any representation and its subject. After exemplifying theories like 'a causal history', 'producer's intention', 'information', 'semantic information', 'depiction as illusion' and 'depiction as resemblance', he concludes that none of them is separately necessary or sufficient, but each of them is relevant in the sense of potentially counting toward the proper application of the concept of depiction. Ernst H. Gombrich, Julian Hochberg, Max Black, *Art, Perception, and Reality*, 1994, London: Johns Hopkins Press Ltd., pp.95-130.



[Figure 2-1] *A house on Fulwood Road*, my drawing in pencil by tracing a photo.

[Figure 2-1] is my drawing of a house on Fulwood Road, which I mentioned previously. If you are a person ‘educated’ enough, you might see a house immediately in the drawing, not black lines on a white surface. This seems like a fair understanding as far as this kind of conventional depictive drawing is concerned. The artist does not want viewers to hang on his/her pencil lines or dots. He/she wants them to see a house instead. The house is considered the ‘meaning’ of this drawing. However, this is not the ‘meaning’ which I examined previously analysing the term, ‘sense’ because it is not the meaning-produced, but just the meaning-given. It is not the meaning-happening, but just the meaning-there. The meaning neither emerges ‘from’ the drawing nor resides ‘in’ the drawing. Rather, the ‘real’ house which the drawing is supposed to designate seems like the only beholder of every meaning of this drawing. You are supposed to neither produce meanings **with** the drawing nor find ‘the house’ **in** the drawing. Instead, you are induced to view ‘the house’ **through** the drawing. You do not actually ‘sense’ anything ‘in the drawing’. Indeed, you do not see the drawing while supposed to be a viewer confronting a house.

However, you do not see the real house either. Then, what are you actually seeing through the drawing? Is it an illusion or your imagination? Let me call it the ‘meaning-house’ first, and again, I need to ask what the meaning-house is and where it resides. Is it actually something

deputising for the ‘real’ house? Here is an irony of this meaning-house, a trick of drawing. Although the drawing feigns to be uninterested in the meaning-house as I have shown above, it tactfully reigns over the meaning by allocating the house **behind** it and the viewer **in front of** it. Then, why does such an allocation matter to the meaning? It matters because it is prior to any kind of meaning but is sustained by the meaning at the same time. After separating the two parties, the viewer and the viewed, the drawing fancies itself to be an innocent bridge between the two. It pretends to disappear while forcing the uniformity of the meaning-house of the real house and that of the viewer. It looks like an ironic dual affirmation of object-transcendence and subject-transcendence. The meaning-house is suggested as something from the material object and from the mind of the subject. However, it is a trick. In fact, the meaning-house comes neither from the object nor from the subject. Rather, it comes solely from the drawing symmetrically towards the object and subject at the same time. It is because there is no uniformity possible between what happens in your mind and what happens in the real house as far as they are ready-separated subject and object. Indeed, the meaning is in ideal object and ideal subject, both of which are constructed by the drawing with its power of ready-allocation. They are ‘ideal’ for the drawing. What you are seeing is not the real house. Who is seeing it is not the real ‘you’. The world accommodating subject and object together is compressed into the surface of confrontation.



[Figure 2-2] Albrecht Dürer, *aids to draw the perspective of a reclining woman*, from *Underweysung der Messung*, (Nuremberg, 1525), p.185

*“Dürer’s machine is still an appropriate metaphor for the scientific objectification of reality. ... Philosophically, this coincides with the growing occultation of Being in what Heidegger calls “the age of world picture,” the substitution of the world as presence for a fragmentary world of decontextualized objects awaiting our exploitation, a mere re-presented reality that necessarily conceals its ground of truth...”*²

This is a famous drawing by Dürer together with some comments on this drawing by Perez-Gomez. If I roughly compare this Perez-Gomez’s explanation quoting Heidegger with my

² Alberto Perez-Gomez, *Architectural Representation and the Perspective Hinge*. 2002, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p.34

previous arguments, his dichotomy between the world of presence and a fragmentary world can be matched with my dichotomy between 'togetherness' and 'confrontation'. However, the term, 'confrontation' emphasises not 'decontextualized objects' themselves but their symmetric position against 'us' exploiting them. It concerns not just 'a mere re-presented reality' but rather the system which generates it.

Dürer's drawing is not just a metaphor but a literal exhibition of the way we view the world. Here, detailed analyses would be needed to understand the situation of the drawing. Firstly, Dürer's drawing itself is made by the same technique as the draftsman in the drawing. We can imagine Dürer viewing this whole scene through another screen. The fact already shows that what we are seeing through the drawing is a certain meaning in an ideal world of the screen. In this ideal world, a woman model, a screen, and a draftsman exist simultaneously. As I examined previously, this simultaneity means its instantaneousness and so universal spatiality. They exist in the world of instant-space ready-limited by the nature of this kind of drawing. The drawing tacitly but strongly declares that at a certain instant, a model, a screen and a draftsman are occupying a certain space together but independently. As far as they are in an ideal world of drawing, there is no possibility for them to affect each other because any affection or interaction needs a certain amount of time which cannot be conceived in this simultaneous space. They enjoy their independency, but suffer from their loneliness. Then, what kind of relationship can they have in such a simultaneous space which Perez-Gomez called 'a fragmentary world'? We can find a clue for this question from another analysis on this drawing by Evans:

"... the behaviour of the line of sight that passes from the draftsman's eye through the framed grid and onward to the contour of the voluptuous woman he is studying, are sufficiently alike to make the geometrical description of the one event the same as that of the other".³

For the relationship, another external element needs to be introduced; 'the line of sight'. But, for me, Evans' expression is still too much a human-centred idea. In fact, no line 'passes' from the draftsman to the woman in reality and even in the drawing. Rather, the draftsman's eye and the contour of the woman **hang on** 'the line from the screen'. What is behind the screen is not the voluptuous woman but the contour. What is in front of the screen is not the draftsman but the eye. The screen with the lines from itself is an exact manifestation of the 'confrontation'. The confrontation is the rigorous ruler of the space. The draftsman and the

³ Robin Evans, *The Projective Cast : architecture and its three geometries*, 2000, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p.127.

woman are allowed to meet each other only on the screen since they are ready-separated. 'The line of sight' Evans explains is of no value any more since it is a journey from the screen to the screen. It is the only possible relationship between them in such an instant-space, a timeless world.

When Evans says 'the line of sight', he is not an innocent reader of the drawing because he is talking about something deduced from his experience. In reality, the draftsman would take time to scan the contour of the woman with his eyes, and then to move his hand to draw what he has studied. And, the whole process of drawing also has a certain temporal order. The draftsman never sees, thinks, remembers, draws at the same time. However, even this kind of basic temporality should not be introduced into the drawing mechanism of both Dürer and the draftsman in his drawing. If the draftsman's mechanism had any time factor in it, Dürer would not be able to draw this drawing successfully. What is in the woman, what is on the screen, what is in the draftsman's eye, and what is on the draftsman's paper should be identical timelessly. Otherwise, no system of representation is justifiable in this instant-space.

Now, we are ready to answer the question asked previously; what is the real difference between viewing a building and viewing a drawing of it? If one views a building through a screen like this draftsman, and a drawing is of this Dürer's kind, there is no intrinsic difference between viewing a building and viewing a drawing as they seem. It is not a difference between a building and a drawing, not a difference between an original and a copy, but just a difference of degree of its directness. In fact, anybody views the world through a certain screen of their own. A screen is a representation so much as a drawing is. Vesely argues that what we believe we are viewing is in fact our own representation:

"In a conventional understanding, representation appears to be a secondary and derivative issue, associated closely with the role of the representational arts. However, a more careful consideration reveals how critical and universal the problem of representation really is. What we normally refer to as reality, believing that it is something fixed and absolute, is always a result of our ability to experience, visualize, and articulate -in other words- to represent so as to participate in the world".⁴

Vesely, as Perez-Gomez has done, talks about a 'represented reality' here from a phenomenological perspective. As we can see in both quotations, the term, 'representation', tends to emphasise the activeness of the observing human. It seems confident of the a priori

⁴ Dalibor Vesely, *Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation*. 2004, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p.4

identity of human being, the omni-subject of any experience.⁵ It is true that the 'ability' to represent the world is partly 'ours', but at the same time, we need to accept the other truth that the 'ability' to enable 'us' and the world in front of us is of the 'representation'. Although I sympathise with their insight, I have suggested the terms, 'togetherness' and 'confrontation', instead of the term 'representation', in order to be fairer and more temporal.⁶ A human being is also in time becoming himself/herself in his/her experiences.⁷ In lieu of the orthodox phenomenalist argument that man represents the world, I prefer the expression that man is together with the world **and** confronts the world. A human being is temporal **with** the world by oscillating between these two modes continuously. However, they are not opposing each other. Confrontation does not mean not-being-together. Rather, it is a special type of togetherness or a ready-structured togetherness which fits for the instant-space structure when it is extreme and isolated. So, such oscillation is not between two opposite ends, but rather, repetitive 'contraction' and 'relaxation', according to Deleuzian terminology.⁸

As a manifestation of the 'confrontation', I have emphasised 'the screen' in the Dürer's drawing. In summary, the screen by its nature maintains two kinds of simultaneity; one vertical or implicit and the other horizontal or explicit. The first simultaneity is of its front and back, which enables static lines between the draftsman's eye and the woman's figure. Once the 'togetherness' contracts into the 'confrontation', which is illustrated as one-to-one links between the separated, the screen can **separate** and **collect** both sides. The second simultaneity is of its own surface, which enables a static exhibition of such collections. Relying on its material identity, the screen can **assemble** a simultaneous space with the cut and collected interactions between its front and back. What the screen anchors is not only the woman but also the draftsman. However, what actually remains in the screen is neither the woman nor the draftsman, but just a rearranged spatiality of the screen itself.

⁵ "For Deleuze, subjectivity is nothing but a special image or contingent centre." D.N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's time machine*, 2003, U.S.A.: Duke University Press, p.36.

⁶ It would be 'fairer' in a sense that the priority of human to the world is not claimed.

⁷ Whitehead imposes the priority of our reality over the 'interdependent drops of experience', instead of the unchanging subject or object of experience. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and reality: an essay in cosmology*. Edited by D.R. Griffin, and D.W. Sherburne, 1978, New York: Free Press, p.18.

⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum, p.358.

Lefebvre's more general term, 'rhythm' could be another proper way to express this situation. Henri Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis: space, time and everyday life*, translated by Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore, 2004, New York: Continuum.

Drawing as Confrontation II : Paper

In the Dürer' picture, the screen is considered identical with the paper on the table by its mechanical grid system. The reason of the draftsman's using paper is just because his arm is not long enough to reach the screen. The 'confrontation' is translated into the screen, and finally into the paper. Or rather, the paper is eager to be a pure confrontation.

"Paper is treated as if it is not really there, as if it occupies a liminal space between material and immaterial. This allows it to act as a bridge across the classical divide between material and idea. Drawings are seen as a unique form of access to the thoughts of the people that make them. Indeed, they are simply treated as thoughts. It is as if that materiality of the medium is transformed by the quasi-immateriality of the support rather than simply exposed by it. A certain blindness to it, allows physical marks to assume the status of immaterial ideas".⁹

I mostly agree with this Wigley's insight, but not totally. Considering that he is examining the drawings of Constant's New Babylon project in his article, the word 'thoughts' here seems to mean the 'dreams' of architects.¹⁰ However, if he argues that paper is treated as immaterial because the thoughts (or dreams) are immaterial, it is a half-truth. The situation is in fact, more prevalent and profound. His idea cannot explain the immateriality of Dürer's paper. The 'honest' draftsman in [Figure 2-2] is not imposing his thoughts or dreams on his drawing. On the contrary, he is struggling to avoid it. His physical marks are not intended to be in "the status of immaterial ideas." However, paper here, like the screen, is still, or even more so, treated "as if it were not really there." Then, why does the paper need to be treated to be immaterial while not standing for immaterial ideas? The answer could be rather simple. It is because you cannot look **through** the paper if it is to have any materiality. You need to look not only at objects but also at thoughts or dreams **through** the paper so as to 'confront' them. It has been a good strategy to avoid annoying 'togetherness' by fixing the way of making a relationship between 'front' and 'back' of the frozen confrontation. Time, which is generated

⁹ Mark Wigley, *Paper, Scissors, Blur*, in 'The Activist Drawing: Retacing Situationist Architectures from Constant's New Babylon to Beyond', Zegher, C. and Wigley, M., 2001, New York: The Drawing Center, p.29

¹⁰ It seems parallel with the Evans' idea of 'projection'. "What connects thinking to imagination, imagination to drawing, drawing to building, and building to our eyes is **projection** in one guise or another..." Robin Evans, *The Projective Cast: architecture and its three geometries*, 2000, Massachusetts: MIT Press, Introduction xxxi.

in ceaseless 'contraction towards confrontation'¹¹ and 'relaxation towards togetherness', can never be properly examined as far as we start from a priori identity of either the viewer or the viewed. For the sake of practical demands, clear spatiality is contrived to be achieved, by this trick, fundamentally of human reasoning by killing ambiguous temporality.

From a spatial perspective, immateriality directly means non-existence. Wigely seems to argue that the paper 'disappears' leaving just immaterial ideas. But from a temporal perspective, immateriality does not necessarily mean that paper disappears. By pretending immateriality, paper moves into the status of quasi-pure-temporality, which is another extreme. In fact, it never disappears. It exists even more clearly and strongly. The real issue is not whether it exists in space or not, but **what it is doing in time**. Here, what the paper 'does' can be examined in the following two categories; one vertical and the other horizontal. First, the category of 'vertical' is explained as follows; to be immaterial, the surface quality of paper needs to be ignored. The texture, any irregularity, any colours and the thickness of the paper should be eliminated either physically or at least, suggestively. Although paper disappears spatially with those strategies, it is, however, still a surface without face, simply relying on its formal aspect, quasi-two-dimensionality. While losing its own being in time-space, the paper turns into a pure 'action' in time. Or rather, the paper is **a constant action without body**. Here, the action is to keep dividing the world into its front and back. The paper is still there holding the viewer in front of it and the viewed behind it. Yes, the paper is purely temporal now since it never stops doing this. However, the problem is that such temporality neither contracts nor relaxes (but just a 'bare repetition') since it is based on the fixed spatial structure of ready-confronting the subject and object. It is rather more compatible with the Newtonian idea of time which I previously examined as 'universal time=fixed space'. In the second category of 'horizontal', the action is to keep dividing the world into its inside and outside, which could be generally called 'framing'.¹² However, the situation here is opposite to the 'vertical' one. Drawers demand the vertical separation although they may not recognise it, but they intentionally avoid the horizontal separation, which allows paper to be a pure confrontation. If there was no physical limit of the paper, we would not be able to distinguish a drawing from a confrontation, representation from presentation, as Borges showed it in his story of an extensive map of the Empire which was of the same scale as the Empire and which coincided with it, point for point.¹³ Indeed, the

¹¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum, pp.90-104.

¹² There are more discussions about 'framing/deframing' in chapter 6.

¹³ Jorge Luis Borges, *Of Exactitude in Science*, in 'A Universal History of Infamy', 1984, London: Penguin, p.131

physical boundary is the last obstacle, over which the paper struggles, in order to work as a pure confrontation.

Architects are the special type of drawers who are always interested in buildings, not drawings. They are reluctant to 'sense' a drawing and 'find' a building in it because they believe that they can see a building **through** a drawing. They are keen to achieve the paper in the status of confrontation. They firstly dematerialise the paper, and extend its surface to the infinite by deliberately ignoring any boundary of a drawing. The AutoCAD interface which displays the infinite 'virtual space' on a monitor would be the most successful type of 'paper', that which architects have demanded. Perez-Gomez points this out:

"During the last two decades, the seductive potential of virtual space has expanded beyond all expectations, through both technological breakthroughs and artistic endeavours, yet the architectural profession is still reluctant to question the transparency and homogeneity of its means of representation".¹⁴

No matter how successfully paper may become immaterial, it still remains as a rigid system of confrontation. Although architects believe that they objectify buildings, it is in fact the paper that objectifies architects as well as buildings. Ironically, such trial to banish paper results in the paper becoming the actual ruler of the world of stopped-time and fixed-space. Again, it never disappears, but alters into the even stronger system which transforms the world in its own way.


"First there is the ground or support on which the drawing is made. The character and qualities of this are very important, though they are often taken far too much for granted in this age of mass-produced paper; and we may easily be misled into thinking that this has always been so. The essential point is that the ground, whatever it be, is the underlying symbol in the drawing for the objective-as-such, for the Gegenstand which is set up facing us as the ontological basis of the communication. So it can never be ignored. Its symbolism is part of the symbolism of the drawing. And if it is a mass-produced paper, that is part of the drawing's meaning".¹⁵

¹⁴ Alberto Perez-Gomez, *Architectural Representation and the Perspective Hinge*. 2002, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p.3

¹⁵ Philip Rawson, *Drawing*, 1969, London: Oxford University Press, p.38



[Figure 2-3] Drawing experiment, *My office in colours*; cropped digital photographs on paper, 25 x 63cm, 11/2007.



[Figure 2-4] Drawing experiment, *Looking around my office*; pencil on modified watercolour paper, 39 x 51cm, 9/2007.

There might be two possible ways to avoid the reign of the ‘paper’, the implicit system of confrontation; to attack from outside, and to fight in the very heart of it. Two experiments above are the basic examples of those two ways. The first way is to start from the qualities without spatial dimensions. It is to give ‘senses’ without figuration directly through abstraction. It is a sudden farewell to the figurative drawing. In [Figure 2-3], each piece of

rectangular chip represents neither any form nor a specific object, but just expresses a certain colour of my office. The colour chips are arrayed by the logic of their own colours without relying on any external references or a system. They become the 'effect' itself of colours of my office on their own, rather than designate anything else behind. One does not view something 'through' this representation, but experiences the representation itself as a phenomenon with its own differences generated. The paper is not the 'confrontation' here, but rather, one 'confronts' the paper with its own validity, which also premises the togetherness of one and the paper. (a clothed repetition) The representation does not 'resemble' my office, but it is a kind of image in its entirety which is 'my office in colours'.

However, this way of abstraction still has different limitations. Firstly, for their own order or structure, senses need to be filtered into one layer. It displays one series of senses, the pure abstraction from compound senses in reality. [Figure 2-3] does not give any clues of other senses except for the colours. Or, other senses following colours should be restrained to ensure the clear order of arranged colours, which works as a structure for floating colours without figure. It can be a presentation of my office in an alternative order, but it is still questionable whether my experience of this artificial image has any relevance with my real experience of colours of my office because I never sense just colours, but the colours of something. Secondly, there still remains the problem of forms. Why do the colour chips have such a rectangular shape? Is it not because the paper and the photographs are rectangular? Is it not for the efficient sequential queuing up on the paper? There is no way free from the issue of the form even in the most abstract kind of drawings. When it tries to abandon any figural aspect to overcome the limitations of conventional descriptive drawing, the issues of the form return through a backdoor. Especially, it turns out to be a danger for many architects who emphasise invisible temporal qualities of architecture such as events, programmes, texture, and so forth. When they have to decide the form of a building, or when they translate their abstraction into a building, they are vulnerable to the reign of the paper and drawing conventions because they have not fought against the very problems, but just put them aside.

The second way to avoid the reign of the 'paper' is to start in the middle of the conventions of drawing, inverting, distorting, displacing, disguising them. It is to give 'figures' in a different way. [Figure 2-4] is an elementary experiment for this approach. It challenges the paper as a confrontation at an instant by just modifying the shape of the paper before drawing. The torus shaped paper with irregular contours already generates a certain rotating movement, which I applied as my looking around instead of a still confrontation. It is nevertheless a kind of confrontation with its drawing conventions although distorted forms in the scene, which

correspond with the irregular edge of the paper, interfere such a direct looking-through. However, it is not just an expanded surround confrontation as the IMAX theatre is. There are three of my offices in the drawing, and they are continuous without breaks. While your eyes stay in one of them, you have, or sense latently, another ahead and the other behind. You are confronting the one you are seeing, but also being together with the others. This drawing is about sensing the other offices which you are not confronting now. My intention in this drawing is not just the sequential looking around, but such a togetherness of different times in different phase, as the past and the future is always together with the present.

Present, Past, Future

Let me repeat the previous quotation from Vesely:

*“What we normally refer to as reality, believing that it is something fixed and absolute, is always a result of our ability to experience, visualize, and articulate -in other words- to represent so as to participate in the world”.*¹⁶

In our modern world, ‘our ability’ is ‘replaced’ by ‘paper’s ability’ to be objective. Our mysterious abilities are externalised and simplified into one clear ability of paper, which pushes us to confront the world. It means that we have come to see the world only through the paper as a screen even though we may not recognise it. Or rather, we become a mere part of a ‘system’, which the paper supplies. The ‘paper-ness’ is not just in ‘a piece of’ paper, but in that structure, in what it is doing. When we conceive any ‘objective’ world in our mind, we come to imagine a certain picture, photo or map all of which architects love. Or rather, everybody is forced to learn how architects view the world. My thesis is nothing but a trial to recover such abilities of our own, not of architects’, of drawing’s, or of paper’s.

When we conceive ‘reality’ this way, we come to have only one temporality; the ‘present’ as an ‘instant’. It is because the paper’s ability is to hold the viewer and the viewed separately but simultaneously. There remains only one true reality which is confronting us at the moment and extends infinitely from it. It is so-called ‘present’. Again, Dürer’s drawing, [Figure 2-2], clearly demonstrates ‘a draftsman’s present’. In his present, there exist a woman, himself, and their confrontation simultaneously. However, it is in fact, the screen’s present or

¹⁶ Dalibor Vesely, *Ibid.*, p.4

the confrontation's present to which both the woman and the draftsman adhere. The quality of the present is inferred from that of the system maintained by the paper. It is the 'time' of the fixed-space, and we are not asked to do anything to 'build' the present anymore.



[Figure 2-2] Albrecht Dürer, *aids to draw the perspective of a reclining woman*, from *Unterweysung der Messung*, (Nuremberg, 1525), p.185

Indeed, we live only the present. We never live past nor live future. But, we still talk about the past and the future. Then, can we 'experience' the past and the future? Is it just to remember and expect what does not 'exist' now? Do we actually 'have' the past and the future? If we have, where are they?



[Figure 2-5] A digital photograph of a low part of Arts Tower



[Figure 2-6] Proposal illustration of Arts Tower refurbishment project by HLM Architects

Here are two images of the Arts Tower in Sheffield, inside of which my office is situated. From my point of view now, [Figure 2-5] is **the past** since it is a photo taken in a certain past time, while [Figure 2-6] is **the future** because it is a proposal image expecting a certain moment in the future. I need to ask here whether they are actually of past and future. Again, we only see the present. We never see the past nor see the future. But, both images above are urging us to believe that we are 'seeing' the past and the future. They never **bring** the past and the future **into** the present when we see the images. Instead, they attempt to **take us into** the past and the future. They never show the past and the future. In fact, what they actually show to us is 'a present in the past' and 'a present in the future'. They successfully replace the

past and future with a passed-present and a coming-present.¹⁷ What we eventually obtain with such a trick of the images is the world with only the time of 'infinite sequential presents', which exactly corresponds with the Newtonian idea of time.

The principle of photograph like Figure 2-5 is in fact, exactly the same as that of the draftsman's drawing in Figure 2-2. When you take a photo, you devote yourself to the ready-fixed spatial structure of a camera, which holds any subject on one hand and any photographer on the other hand.¹⁸ What it records is not the subject pictured but the whole structure situated. When you see a printed photograph, you do not just see the subject but a certain structure in which you are already situated. What is delivered through such a system is not the subject pictured but a certain instant, 'the present' built by the camera. One can easily expect that the same principle can be applied to such virtual image by computer as [Figure 2-6]. Now, it does not matter any more whether it is the future, the past, or the present since we have only presents in this kind of world. Again, the images above are just certain frozen instants of one's seeing the Arts Tower, which is to be translated into your seeing the Arts Tower now. No temporal distance or difference is suggested between those two 'seeings' because they are in two 'presents', which are apparently identical although they have different positions in the calendar. Both images above resist being arrested in a specific temporality by hiding their material characters as pure 'confrontation', the present. What helps people to feel the age of a photo is rather its old wood frame or its faded colour.

However, the past is the past since we do not see it, but merely remember it. The future is the future since we do not see it, but dream it. The truth of the past is in its **togetherness** with the present, and the truth of the future is also in its **togetherness** with the present. The idea of past and future already implies their relationships with the present. But, the past is not behind the present, the future is not ahead of the present, but rather, they are deep into the present as a 'ground' of the present.¹⁹ The present is a repetitive rising up to the 'surface' from this ground. This 'rising up' is a struggle to be distinguished from the indistinctive whole by generating 'differences'. However, the ground itself also rises up following the rising present, splits the present into past and future, and swallows it when it reaches the surface. The ground,

¹⁷ "The empirical or chronological view of time measures past and future as self-similar moments that precede or follow the present in a line of succession. Time is understood as an indirect image – as spatial segmentations of a continuum that are themselves immobile." D.N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*, 1997, London: Duke University Press, p.81.

¹⁸ Barthes shows other interesting insights on the real nature of photography. Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. by Richard Howard, 1993, London: Vintage.

¹⁹ This term, 'ground' is an English translation for Deleuzian French term, '*fond*', which is the radix of 'foundation' and 'fundamental'. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum, pp.36-37.

in Deleuzian expression, is that which continues to espouse that which divorces it.²⁰ I myself am also participating in this vital world together with other neighbours. My temporal existence is maintained by this process of repeatedly becoming myself, repetitive rising up from the ground in which I am yet anonymous.²¹ My 'rising up' is a ceaseless distinguishing myself from the 'ground', which contains all the others and all (my) past and future indistinctively.²²

The 'surface', toward which the present rises up, is the bright world where everything is clearly distinguished from anything else. It is the world of objectivity, of science, and of modern ideas of the 'individual'. It is the world for the photograph, for the 'screen', and for the 'paper' because no temporal dimension is needed in it. It does not mean that it is a 'still' or 'frozen' world. Time 'flows' in this world, but as a successive 'instants', with a tacit ignorance of what happens between and beneath those instants. It is the world with only 'results' without knowing what has generated the results. While the ground is the world of the 'togetherness', the surface is the world of 'confrontation'. One sees the other by confronting it in the surface, the world of ideal presents as instants, but in the ground, they cannot recognise each other because they are fully together yet. 'I' am with (my) whole past and future in the 'ground', but cannot see it since there is no 'I' yet. However, when 'I' rises up to the 'surface', I start to be able to recognise not-yet clear pasts and futures in the ground which follows rising 'I' to swallow it.

What I try to argue through all this description is that we do not see the past and the future in the way we see the present. I have already mentioned that we do not see, but remember the past and dream the future. From this, one can misunderstand the remembering and dreaming as a pure 'mental' process to deal with stored data, which is intrinsically different from our bodily perceptions. However, on the contrary, I would argue that they are intrinsically different kind of perceptions 'because' the remembering and dreaming is an ever more 'bodily' and 'wild' experience. I see the other in the present by confronting it in the space, but 'see' the past and future (of mine and of others) by rising up to the surface together; going to the same direction rather than opposing. Indeed, I am 'in' the rising present. It is like a

²⁰ Gilles Deleuze, *Ibid.*, p.36.

²¹ "Returning is being, but only the being of becoming. The eternal return does not bring back "the same", but returning constitutes the only same of that which becomes. Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself. Returning is thus the only identity, but identity as a secondary power; the identity of difference, the identical which belongs to the different, or turns around the different." Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum, pp.50-51.

²² This paragraph is brief summary of my idea of time and identity inspired by that of Bergson, A.N.Whitehead, and Deleuze. This idea will be repetitively examined and developed in the following chapters concerning its relationship with architecture and drawing.

swimming in a wave. I never see or understand the waving water while swimming, but I still sense it, manage it, and make headway in it. A good swimmer, rather, becomes a piece of wave. While I actively 'detect' the others in the surface of ideal presents, the past and the future infiltrate into my 'becoming'. They are every condition and possibility of the becoming. It is rather passive perception since it is an intrusion of the following ground, dragging me back, into my whole body. My body, neither just mental nor merely physical, rather 'feels' it from inside of myself as a 'resonance'. That is why Whitehead called it a 'visceral feeling' when he explained the perception of 'causal efficacy' which is distinguished from the perception of 'presentational immediacy'.²³ It is not-yet-organised sensations and meanings I felt in my walking down the Fullwood Road, which I described in the previous chapter. They are the rising present from past and future, and the following past and future to swallow it. I experience the very 'rising' by rising together. Or rather, I am already a part of such a rising.

What should not be forgotten here is that it cannot be just a continuous 'rising', but also demands a ceaseless 'sinking' for the very rising.²⁴ I need to keep 'dying' every moment to be becoming 'alive' vividly in time. I need to forget first to remember it again.²⁵ My forgetting something means a certain death of my being together with it. Here, this sinking, dying, or forgetting may be the tragic for us, but never sad – because it is "not something senselessly coming from the outside but rather the realization of a tendency inherent in the deepest layer of existence"²⁶ of the sunk, died, or forgotten. It is rather 'returning home', returning to the 'togetherness', the profound peace.

Ruin and Drawing

Simmel finds this 'peace' in a 'ruin';

²³ Alfred North Whitehead, *Symbolism : its meaning and effect*. 1958, London : Cambridge University Press

²⁴ Bergson and Whitehead generally emphasise the 'rising' side with their terms, 'élan vital' and 'creative advance' respectively, although they explain the 'sinking' side as well. In Deleuze, the balance between (or co-happening of) rising and falling appears to be an essential issue for his idea of 'repetition'.

²⁵ Modernist architects seemed to misunderstand or distort the following famous assertion by Nietzsche to support their themes; "it is possible to live without memory... but it is altogether impossible to live at all without forgetting". Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the uses and Disadvantage of History for life*, Trans. R.J.Hollongdale, in *Untimely Meditations*, 1983, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.62.

²⁶ Georg Simmel, *The Ruin*. in *Georg Simmel, 1858-1918 : a collection of essays*. edited by Kurt H. Wolff, 1959, Columbus : Ohio State University Press, p.263

In the case of the ruin, the fact that life with its wealth and its changes once dwelled here constitutes an immediately perceived presence. The ruin creates the present form of a past life, not according to the contents or remnants of that life, but according to its past as such. ... Here, with its extreme intensification and fulfilment of the present form of the past, such profound and comprehensive energies of our soul are brought into play that there is no longer any sharp division between perception and thought. Here psychic wholeness is at work – seizing, in the same way that its object fuses the contrast of present and past into one united form, on the whole span of physical and spiritual vision in the unity of aesthetic enjoyment, which, after all, is always rooted in a deeper than merely aesthetic unity.²⁷

‘The present form of a past life’ is not the physical remnant of the ruin. Rather, it is there ‘with’ the remnant. In front of a ruin, you neither ‘see’ the past life of the ruin nor ‘imagine’ it, but you ‘experience’ its rising up to the surface. You are involved in the ruin’s repetitive generating its present by its ceaseless ‘rising up’ from the ground, the ‘whole’. The power of the ruin is, in short, to make you experience what you cannot see. How is it possible? It is the ruin’s refusal of the ‘confrontation’. The ruin refuses to be seen through the ‘screen’ in two ways. On the one hand, it hinders your confronting its immediate appearance of the present by suggesting ‘what of a building still lives in the ruin’. On the other hand, it also hinders your confronting its immediate appearance of the past by exhibiting ‘what of nature already lives in it.’²⁸ The ruin ‘deletes’ the building where it does appear, continually ‘replacing’ it, while itself being ‘replaced’ by the appearing building.²⁹ You fail to confront either the ruin or the building because they keep dragging to the ground each other in their ‘instants’, the surface. It is a new ‘whole’, with an unusual strength of the dragging ground; the togetherness of the ruin and the building, the present and the past. The building does not stay in the past, and the ruin does not just enjoy its present, but rather, the whole span of time from the building to the ruin keeps rising intensively up to the surface. The ruin becomes ever more intensive place than any other dense metropolis. Here, ‘the whole span of time’ does not just mean any specific number of dates from the beginning of the building to now. It is, rather, an unlimitedly expanded ‘now’. It includes not only the past but also the future, and its start and end are not clear since it can expand to literally the ‘whole’. ‘The building’ I mentioned above, is not the building at specific date in the past; not historical facts. It is the building which resides in all the moments around the ruin at the same time, and so, which maintains every

²⁷ Op. cit., pp.265-266.

²⁸ Op. cit., p.260.

²⁹ I borrowed terms here from Deleuze’s explanation of ‘lectosign’ which he borrowed from a stoic term. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, 2005, London: Continuum, pp.17-23.

relationship and change which happened and will happen. It is also the building which will be experienced by somebody else in the future.

In front of this ruin which you cannot 'confront', your identity collapses. It is a kind of death of yourself, forgetting yourself, sinking down to the ground. It is like a sleeping with your eyes open. It happens because you cannot situate yourself in a certain instant (= the space) without any confrontation. You become the 'whole' absolutely together with the ruin in the 'ground', where you do not distinctively exist yet. You in an instant become the whole of your past and the whole of your future. What you have to do now is to return back to the present restoring yourself, to rise up to the surface together with the rising ruin. You travel in the same direction as the ruin. You truly dialogue with the whole life of the ruin, and the ruin turns out to be an essential companion in the journey of finding yourself back. The 'senses' happen or appear here as if you are in a dream. They are raw sensations and raw meanings. They are yet vague but massive 'feelings'. You are yet 'unresistant to all currents and powers coming from all corners of reality'.³⁰ The appearing your identity is a necessary condition of such senses, but also an obstacle to them at the same time, because you establish your identity by confronting the ruin. However, as far as the ruin and the building refuse your clear confrontation of them, your identity remains as just an 'ideal' at which you are struggling to arrive. Here, you see or touch neither rough time-worn stones of the ruin nor well-finished stones of the building since you are yet together with all such stones. Rather, you, yourself are touched and worn out by so many people, wind, rain and sunshine for so long a period. The senses are never given from outside but felt from inside of your body. It is not 'you' that disappears as much as the confrontation based on the 'discernibility' of 'perception and thought', the real and the imaginary, objective and subjective.

However, in practice, ruins are preserved as certain clues to imagine their 'historical past', their original forms and stories. A narrow-minded logic would preserve the ruin just to designate something else as an imperfect demonstration of it. The profound experience is ignored, and the ruin is degraded to a mere 'screen'. Here, such a perspective on the ruin can be compared with depictive drawing, which is meant to designate its original subject as an imperfect copy of it. What is common to the ruin and drawing is their being a 'screen' through which one can see something else. The difference in general is that the ruin maintains and shows directly some physical parts of its origin although they are damaged ones, while the drawing itself does not have any physical inheritance from its original subject. Then, is it this 'directness' that enables such profound experience of the ruin which one can hardly find

³⁰ Georg Simmel, *Ibid.*, p.266.

in drawing? If yes, is there no hope for the drawing without such direct inheritance? Is it impossible to make a drawing with the virtue of the ruin?

In the case of the ruin, such profound experience is generated by the delicate balance between the power of the ruin and that of the building; between what is believed to be in front of you and what is believed as the origin of it. The term, 'balance', which Simmel keeps emphasising, sounds yet static for me to express such 'intensive' experience. I would rather explain the same idea as a 'paradoxical relationship' between the ruin and the building. Let us imagine again your experience of the ruin. If you meet both of them, the ruin itself and the building as its past, in your experience, are they one and the same thing or two different things? When I argue above that they keep replacing each other, they seem two different things. But it seems also clear that they are just one same thing in two different times. Then again, how can two different times of one thing appear simultaneously in your experience? Is it just your imagination or memory of something absent now as scientists would suggest?³¹ But, how can such absent one can be felt so massively? You even cannot be sure whether the ruin 'was' the building which you are experiencing now. ... I would rather suggest the answer of dual approval. They are one, and two independent ones at the same time. Neither of them is dependent upon each other, because they are already 'in' each other. They are ceaselessly fighting against each other to arrive at or occupy the 'one' place in the 'surface'. They are **not 'same', but 'one'**.³² They are 'one', not because the ruin 'was' the building, but because they are happening on one place now. The building is not 'constructed' on the ruin by your imagination or memory, but felt 'in' the very material ruin in front of you now. The ruin and the building prevent you from confronting each of them, but induce you to feel them together. Your sensing the stones and weeds in the ruin 'is' your sensing the building. This is the way of the ruin which brings its whole past and future into the 'intensive' now.

However, the relationship between a depictive drawing (including photograph and computer simulation image I discussed previously) and its subject is rather opposite to the situation of the ruin. They are clearly not 'one', but meant to be the 'same'. Their relationship is hierarchical. The drawing is absolutely subordinate to what it depicts. Rather, the drawing itself disappears by fancying itself to be a 'confrontation' of something else, as I argued already. It eradicates its own materiality or substantiality for it. When you see such a drawing, you never see 'the drawing' which is in front of you now. Instead, you are supposed to see something else which has nothing to do with the drawing itself, but it is still suggested as the same experience by the system of the paper as a confrontation. You are forced to revisit a

³¹ This scientific idea, which I call 'timeless identity', will be criticised in the next chapter.

³² The idea of 'difference', which will be discussed in following chapters, resides in this paradox.

certain past, when the drawing was made, to see what the drawing depicts, instead it is brought into the now you are experiencing. Or rather, such a confrontation by the drawing is 'out of time' since it does not matter when 'the past' was. The problem I would like to address here is that 'the now' becomes hollow because nothing happens now although both you and the drawing are in 'the now'. It is the world with only the 'surface', the present as instant, and so the world with only the space. There is no past, no future, no relationships, no 'ground', and no 'togetherness'. It is the world of 'answers' without 'questions'. You cannot feel the ruin any more in this world.

The way to rescue 'the now' from such hollow status is to see the drawing first, not what it depicts. Whatever the subject of a drawing, it should be rising up to the surface in and through the very drawing, while fighting against it. You rise up together with what is in front of you now, with its own histories, its inner and outer relationships, material characters such as size, shapes, weight, texture, marks, dirt, colours, movements. What you need to do is not to see something, a model of the drawing, through the drawing, not to find encoded sensations and hidden meanings on the drawing, but to sink into the drawing and rising up to the surface together with the drawing generating ever-new sensations and meanings. The drawing had better be a piece of 'stuff' on its own than a 'representation' of another. One needs not to worry about its self-substantiality like art work because it is never a closed world, but truly open to the bigger world of the 'whole' through infinite doors deep inside of itself. The drawing is the place where its subject is not merely 'represented', but 'replaced' continuously by the body of the drawing. However, the subject of the drawing, never stops rising up, and in its ceaseless rising, it is truly 'alive' 'now'. The drawing bears its subject in its own body as its rising ground, as the ruin bears its whole temporality in its body. The drawing and its subject are not 'same', but 'one'.

One might be still curious here; what is the 'subject' of drawing, which rises up? In a conventional sense, it would be 'the office' when I draw my office in my experiment. But, **what is 'the office'?** As an architect, it seems an easy task for me to draw such a small space. As I have argued previously, it is easy because I already have a specific 'frame', the universal homogeneous space, by which I define 'the office', through which I see 'the office', and in which I draw 'the office'. It does not matter whether it is a plan, elevation, section, isometric, or perspective drawing, as far as it has 'the space' in it in common, which is supposed to be 'same' as 'the space' in reality. The architect is confident to define 'the office' he/she needs to draw since he/she is only interested in the 'surface'. However, such an office never 'rises up' both in reality and in drawing because it stays on the 'surface' without sinking to the 'ground'. In the 'ground' of the office, deep inside of the office, the office only exists together

with ‘the others’ in infinite concrete events. It is in being touched by the breeze, in reflecting dazzling sunshine, in making and receiving shadows, in supporting my heavy desk, in being hollowed by my pressing chair, in gathering dust for years, in sheltering me from cold weather, in blocking noises from outside, in staying all night with me,... They are the ‘predicates’ before the ‘subject’. Are they not ‘the office’? What I tried to express by the term, ‘the building’ in my argument about the ruin was not just the building which occupies a certain amount of the space, but the building which lives its life. The office which lives its life

does not allow such a simple definition by the imposed border from outside. The wind, sunshine, temperature, gravity, dust, and ‘me’ are already in the life of the office as essential elements. How can one make a clear cut between the office and me while I am dialoguing with it through infinite physical, mental, emotional togetherness. In a sense, I and my office are ‘constituting’ a ‘study unit’ of Arts Tower, or of the University together.

Here, if I cannot even define the subject to draw, how can I start the drawing? My idea is to start from inside without knowing its border; to start from a small event or feeling. Once started, the drawing becomes a battle field where the rising office fights against the drawing materials and my hand. The drawing of my office is generated by ceaseless ‘deleting’ the rising office because the rising office turns out to be a cliché as soon as it arrives to the surface. My memories and dreams rise up with my office, but my hand and a pencil delete them when they arrive at the surface. When sensations and meanings find their place on the surface to be settled, the drawing ‘replaces’ such a place with its material marks. It is a repetitive fighting between the senses of the office and the senses of the drawing; like the fighting between the life of the building and the life of the ruin. The forms or figures are not abandoned here. Architects





[Figure 2-7] Example drawing by a child. From Rudolf Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception*. 1997, Berkeley: University of California Press, p.178.



[Figure 2-8] Paul Klee, *Diana in the Autumn Wind* (1934, 62x48cm), Kunstmuseum, Bern

cannot be ‘abstract expressionists’ because their drawings still need to be operative and controlled. ‘The violent methods must not be given free reign, and the necessary catastrophe must not submerge the whole.’³³ The drawing still has the contour of its model, but it is not so much of the model as of the material mark, of the movement of the hand. It is rather like a drawing by a child (Figure 2-7), or by Paul Klee (Figure 2-8).



[Figure 2-9] Drawing experiment & its part (actual scale), *My office in gathering dust*; cellular tape on glossy paper, 78 x 23cm, 5/2007.

The drawing exhibits ‘real’ dust collected from various spot of my office by sticky sellotape. You can see the concrete material substances in front of you now, which maintains their own histories in their bodies. But, it is almost impossible to analyse even one unit(38x18mm) of collected dust and dirt; its infinite complexity in various terms such as tones, colours, shapes,

³³ Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*, translated from the French by Daniel W. Smith, 2003, London: Continuum, p.77.


and disposition. My office 'rises up' in and through this complex materiality of dust and dirt. In other words, a small particle of dust has the 'whole' office in its body with its forms and dispositions. Rather, the dust itself is a result of the whole relationships and histories of the office. It does not just happen to be there. All the forms and texture of the office and furniture, all other dust and dirt, changeful breeze, sunshine, temperature, humidity, gravity, and my every activities are involved in the life of the dust, when it falls onto the floor, when a gentle breeze blows it to the side and behind my desk, when it grows or decomposes or breaks into smaller particles, when it moves about in the office, and when it is collected. There must have been an infinite number of events which I cannot begin to talk about. There are always 'more' than any detailed story of causation.

This drawing is, in a sense, an 'artificial ruin' of my office. You cannot just 'confront' a unit of dust and dirt with its certain patterns and colours because 'the office', the whole life of the dust and dirt, keeps rising up from behind and 'replacing' such immediate visual clues belonging to the material. You cannot see this complex forms made by dust and dirt in the way you see the forms in a depictive drawing or a photograph. You need to rise up with them feeling their 'whole'. However, it is not the dust and dirt living their life like the ruin, but a drawing, an artificially composed set. It would be rather natural for me to talk about just the dust and dirt above because the drawing tries to disappear leaving only the dust and dirt.

There are many strategies for the drawing to disappear. The transparent sellotape, the white paper, and the simple rectangular shape of the units try to hide their existence for the sake of the 'innocent' exhibition of dust and dirt. However, there is no 'innocent' exhibition possible. On the contrary to its pretention, every part of the drawing is actively working to restore the displaced dust and dirt to life by generating contrasts; between dark dust and glossy paper, between irregular form of dust and neat and regular form of units, and between changeful character of dust and fixing cellular tape. It is a ready-internalised 'confrontation'. It might be an inevitable effort by a human being to tame wild nature, but still, the way of this drawing does not look 'earnest'.

Instead of 'stealing' substantiality of real material from outside, the drawing below, [Figure 2-10] which I partly examined previously, produces its own substantiality from inside. It is to 'build' a 'figure' in a sheet of paper. It is more precisely a 'body' with its material than a mere symbol designating something else. It is rather a 'head' than a 'face'. The aim of this drawing is to produce a new body which is becoming the 'wall' of my office, or which the 'wall' is becoming. The drawing process is continuously 'replacing' the rising wall with the movement of a graphite, the texture of white paper, the touch of graphite on paper, the speed

of my hand, and the pressure of my fingers. The wall is not described or imposed on a paper, but rises up through the produced body which maintains its whole relationships and histories. It is like a 'figure' in a drawing by a child, [Figure 2-7]. In fact, what is rising is not the 'objective' wall in 'the space', but the 'life' of the wall with its memories and dreams, because it has not yet arrived at the 'surface'. You do not just see the traces of graphite on a paper, not just see the wall 'through' the drawing, but meet an independent 'body', together with which you rise up to feel the wall 'in time'.



[Figure 2-10] Drawing experiment, *A 'Wall' of My office-3*; pencil on watercolour paper, 25 x 40.5cm, 9/2008.

[Chapter review]

In the beginning of this chapter, I tried to show how the 'screen' and the 'paper' ruled our idea of space and time. When you believe that you are viewing an object 'through' the screen or paper, you as well as the object are already confined within the system of 'confrontation' produced by the screen or paper. You are never alive here since you are situated in the so-called 'universal space', the 'instant'. The idea of 'instant' was challenged in the subsequent section, 'Present, Past, Future'. Instead of the conventional idea of linear time as a succession of 'instants', I tried to argue the intrinsic differences between present, past, and future, and their 'togetherness' in 'now' at the same time. I introduced the terms, 'ground' and 'surface' for it, which are parallel concepts to 'togetherness' and 'confrontation'. A profound experience of the 'now' was exemplified in the final section, 'Ruin and Drawing', in which our experience of ruins was investigated and compared with that of drawings.


The issues dealt in this chapter might look various or scattered. It was because I was looking for the possible contact points or links between my philosophical ideas on time and issues of architectural representation. Consequently, this chapter became a rough cross section of the whole thesis, which would be partially repeated and specified in the following chapters. The next chapter will directly deal with architectural issues with temporal dimension, such as movement, context, history, and identity, examining the cases of several 'famous' architectural drawings. I will examine the limitations of the 'drawing as confrontation' in its representation of temporalities.

Chapter 3. Flowing Time and Drawing

I will start with Newton again:

Absolute, true, and mathematical time, in and of itself and of its own nature, without reference to anything external, flows uniformly and by another name is called duration...¹

I have previously questioned the idea of ‘instant’ and its ‘independency’ in the Newtonian concept of time, and the question here is this: Does time really ‘flow’? Not to mention uniformly? We are quite used to accepting without any trouble this expression which reminds us of the image of flowing water in a river. It is true that we come to think about our own life in front of a river. Certainly there are similarities between our life and a river. They go in a certain direction from somewhere unknown to somewhere else. However, I am still suspicious. Is it enough to justify our unquestioning acceptance of the direct Newtonian declaration that time flows? If Newton sees the similarity between time and river, what exactly would be the time in this river metaphor? Is it molecules of water? Is it the whole volume of water in the river? Is it the whole river including its banks? Or, is it the ground that contains the water? Is it even a boat in the river? All this confusion comes from the simple question we cannot easily answer: So, **What** flows?



[Figure 3-1] Drawing experiment, *Movement of my body in my office*; colour pencil on tracing paper, 33 x 49cm.



[Figure 3-2] Drawing experiment, *Breeze in my office 1-1*; woollen string with Chinese ink on paper, 42 x 59cm.

¹ Isaac Newton, *The principia : mathematical principles of natural philosophy*. 1999, London: University of California Press, p.408.

These drawings are kinds of recording over a certain period of time. In Figure2-1, complex movements of three points (left hand, body, and right hand) of my body are traced on the office plan after an analysis of a series of photographs. This kind of drawing is often used by architects to represent various 'flows' in buildings. In Figure2-2, the small forces of whimsical breeze in my office are recorded by the movement of woollen string with a sail. Deferring more detailed comparisons between these two, I would like to address just one question here: Which image looks more time-like?


Background of Flowing Time

The first issue I want to address here is the problem of 'background'. The river flows when we see it from its bank. Or, we can acknowledge on a raft in the river that the river flows when we see the trees on the banks moving backward. It always flows against something still. If everything flows together, how can one recognise it? Here is the issue. If Newtonian time flows, against what does it flow? Against space? Can space be the 'background' of flowing time? In fact, it might be the simplest Newtonian answer, we take for granted. However, according to my previous argument that the universal space is equal to the instant, such an answer turns out to be nonsense because time is suggested as something that flows against a certain part of itself which also flows.² This was why Newton had to establish his homogeneous universal space 'out of' time. But, in spite of his emphasis on the irrelevance between space and time, the universal space is rather omni-temporal as an unchanging 'background' of flowing time. Although we might naively believe that the time journeys 'through' this reliable background from the beginning until now to the end, it cannot be 'through' but 'in' since the space was, is, and will be the background of the journey. We need to have a ready-regulated full calendar in which all times can flow, and the space works as the ruler of the calendar in the Newtonian world. Space rules everything. As a physicist, he analogised the idea of time out of a moving object, which always demands a fixed system that proves the movement. Here, space is suggested as the 'white paper' of eternity³ on which time draws its endless movement. And, as a result, time is suggested as something playing on the ground, which is suggested to be timeless. Nonsense again.

² To avoid such a paradox, it would be wiser not to designate time directly. When Li bei, the great Chinese poet of the Tang Dynasty, portrays the transitoriness of life in his poem, he gives vivid descriptions of time without using the term, 'time' as a substantive. Instead, he depicts the change from 'hair looking like bluish threads in the morning' to 'snow in the evening'. One can see the time intact rather vividly between these two sentences. Oh, Y., *Whitehead and human experience of time*. 1999, Seoul: Tongnamoo, p.28.

³ Newtonian space is either instant or eternity. Rather, it is instant and eternity at the same time. I assert that the instant and the eternity are different names of the same condition, timelessness.

In [Figure 3-1], the drawing of ‘movement of my body in my office’, the space of my office, indicated by the plan drawing of furniture in it, is the container of various times which flow in and through it. If the coloured lines, indicating traces of movements, represent a certain temporality, it is the time confined within the office space not only spatially but also temporally. By several straight lines, the fixed space already dominates the whole picture plane. The space has been being there when coloured lines started, when they finished, and when you see it now. The time flows only by making difference in its position in this space. Without the suggested spatial composition, the coloured lines lose their value and meaning immediately. They become just a chaos.



[Figure 3-3] Bernard Tschumi, *a drawing for the competition of the 'Parc de la Villette' development*, 1982.

[Figure2-3] is the Tschumi's drawing for Parc de la Villette. Without an appreciation of theoretical background, what one can see in this drawing are three different types of plan design; of lines, of dots, and of surfaces. It seems to me that the only merit of this design is in juxtaposition of the three irrelevant shapes uninterestingly and generation of a certain complexity. But, this juxtaposition or 'superimposition', as Tschumi calls it, looks not quite different from that of [figure2-1] drawing. If there is any difference, it is that Tschumi's lines are deliberately random for what Tschumi calls 'pleasure' with a guise of 'movement notation'⁴, and he is brave enough to translate the 'flowing time' into spatial form directly. In the name of 'event architecture', Tschumi declares that


*"architecture is both about space and about the events that take place in that space."*⁵ Although he emphasises the 'dynamic or complex relationship'⁶ between space and events, their relationship through his design is rather simple; all or nothing. There are two kinds of events in his architecture. The first kind is **the event arrested by space**. Selected events are translated into various shapes and lengths to be put on the drawing. There happen 'complex relationships' on the drawing, but not between event and space but just between spatial elements. The events are already allocated to

⁴ "... the logic of movement notation ultimately suggests real corridors of space, ... as if a whole movement has been literally solidified, 'frozen' into a permanent and massive vector." Bernard Tschumi, *The Manhattan Transcripts*. 1994, London: Academy Group LTD, p.113.

⁵ Bernard Tschumi, *Event-Cities 2*. 2000, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, p.12.

⁶ "Their explicit purpose is to transcribe things normally removed from conventional architectural representation, namely the complex relationship between spaces and their use; between the set and the script; between 'type' and 'program'; between objects and events." Bernard Tschumi, *The Manhattan Transcripts*. 1994, London: Academy Group LTD, p.7.

their position in space. The event with endless contents and meanings is simplified into the hollow time that just 'flows', and finally the flow becomes space. Temporality of events regresses from that of post-structuralism (*Différance* of Derrida)⁷ through early structuralism (Arbitrariness and Difference of Saussure) to Newton to become architecture in the course of his design.⁸ The second is **the event disinterested in space**. After the construction of his architecture, events happen there not because the architecture provokes it but just because events happen anywhere anytime. His architecture can be a stage, another background, of the actual event, but in this time, it does not act because it resides in the world of space only, where even time is ruled by the space. They live in different worlds which never meet each other. The event is far more than the movement or sequence which can be easily 'transcribed'. In his explanation of 'Manhattan Transcripts', he clarifies that this 'backgroundness' of architecture is his intention:



[Figure 3-4]
Bernard Tschumi,
*The Manhattan
Transcripts*. 1994,
London: Academy
Group LTD, p.48.

Three disjoined levels of 'reality' are presented simultaneously in the Transcripts: the world of objects, composed of buildings abstracted from maps, plans, photographs; the world of movements, which can be abstracted from choreography, sport, or other movement diagrams; the world of events, which is abstracted from news photographs. At first, the respective importance of each level depends only on how each is interpreted by the viewer, since each level can always be seen against the background of another. ... But it is the

⁷ Bernard Tschumi, *La case vide : La Villette, 1985 / with essays by Jacques Derrida and Anthony Vidler*. 1986, London : Architectural Association.

⁸ It is the Tschumi's intention which seems not achieved: "*The very heterogeneity of the definition of architecture – space, action, and movement – makes it into that event, that place of shock, or that place of the invention of ourselves. The event is the place where the rethinking and reformulation of the different elements of architecture ... may lead to their solution. By definition, it is the place of the combination of differences.*" *Architecture and disjunction*. 1994, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, p.258.

*Transcripts' contention that only the striking relationship between the three levels makes for the architectural experience.*⁹

He argues that one can have an 'architectural experience' from his drawing. Yes, one can, but not with this kind of diagram. He might intend in his drawing the pleasurable play of 'images (simulacra)' without their fixed meanings or origins.¹⁰ However, when he inscribes them on the paper, when he constructs 'the world of images' in the paper, every line, face and volume turns out to be just members of 'infinite, unchanging and homogeneous space' as a background suggested by the strong power of the paper as 'confrontation'.¹¹ Although the clear and monotonous line quality seems to be intended to make the drawing more image-like, it just reinforces its character as the abstract contour of spatial elements. Although he tries to avoid the immediate spatial perception by unmatched faces and volumes, they are just read as fragmented or distorted spatial elements. Although the montage technique is suggested when he says "*each level can always be seen against the background of another*", there is always a far stronger background for all of them. On this background, the left meaning for the event in flowing time is only size or location. All those problems start when Tschumi believes that the time of architecture can be recorded and replayed like films. He tries to make a movie on paper, but the 'images' are never settled on paper because they only reside somewhere temporal, out of paper. In that temporal world, you never 'view' the images, but 'do' them.¹² In that sense, Tschumi's architecture is not



[Figure 3-5] My photo of a 'folly' in Parc de la Villette under repair works, 10/2005.

where you do events, but where you view the events (and some actors need to be engaged to play the events). It works as the 'background' of time in dual senses. First, it stands there as a piece of drawing which manifests the homogeneous space as a rigid background of the flowing time. Second, it works as a 'cold' background of unexpected events in reality without generating any genuine temporality.

⁹ Bernard Tschumi, *The Manhattan Transcripts*. 1994, London: Academy Group LTD, p.9.

¹⁰ Tschumi's drawings remind me of Baudrillard's '**simulacra**' which is "*postmodernity defined as the proliferation of images without models.*" However, Deleuzian '**cinematographic image**' is appropriation of Bergson's '**mediating image**' which is "*almost matter in that it still allows itself to be seen, and almost mind in that it no longer allows itself to be touched.*" Rodowick, D. N. *Gilles Deleuze's time machine*, 2003, U.S.A.: Duke University Press. pp.121-124. Direct arguments on 'simulacra' and 'image' by Deleuze can be found here; Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum, p.154-156.

¹¹ See '**Drawing as Confrontation II : Paper**' in Chapter 2.

¹² It is possible by the 'togetherness'. See my argument in Chapter I of this thesis.

Relationships

The next issue I want to address is the problem of the **timeless identity of objects** in flowing time. If time flows, do objects flow with time or not? Newton would say no. In his world, time flows 'in' space as a background, 'through' the gaps between objects. It dodges its way through a mass of objects. The object occupies a certain space for a certain period of time, but never flows in itself although it might be influenced by the flow. In other words, it is thought to be as spread out in space-time.¹³ It looks solid with concrete spatial extension, which 'exists' regardless of time, and in fact, this idea is common sense to us, who have learnt science in school. Again, it exists with its spatial dimensions, or it does not exist; either yes or no. Time does not need to be involved in its matter of existence. Can you imagine the idea that an object ceases to exist when time stops flowing? We are too familiar with a stopped world in still images to think in this way. Although time does not flow, every object seems 'enduring' there even more solidly and concretely.¹⁴ Let me take a 'desk' in front of me as an example of the 'object' to avoid unnecessary philosophical confusion of terminology. Even just with modern science, such a common sense turns out to be highly questionable. I know that the desk is supposedly composed of innumerable molecules of many kinds which are groups of atoms. I have learnt that an atom consists of a central nucleus surrounded by orbiting electrons that maintain their orbits by electromagnetic forces.¹⁵ I do not need to go further to start questioning. What will happen to the atom if time stops? Can I say that the atom can endure without or out of time? Then, can the desk exist when the time stops to flow? One may argue that I do not need to worry since time will never stop. However, the situation is rather complex because the involvement of the temporal dimension in the identity of the object causes many illogicalities in the foundation of science.

The time-saturated definition of an object may mean the introduction of complex **relationships** with others into the ontology of the object. One might understand this as a statement that things never stop to affect each other in time. The desk is pushing books and other stuffs and is being pushed by them since they are all in the field of gravity. It is touched by air and responds to humidity and temperature of the air. It invites dirt, marks and scratches on it. Indeed, the desk is in the middle of various physical and chemical processes. However, this understanding still remains


¹³ About 'Time' in *Britanica (Macropaedia)*. 15th edition ed. Vol. 28, Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc, p.652.

¹⁴ A. N. Whitehead points out that "we are unaccustomed to considering it as an event for a massive pyramid to endure for a certain day." Oh, Y., *Whitehead and human experience of time*. 1999, Seoul: Tongnamoo, p.202.

¹⁵ It seems not clear even in the latest science whether it is a particle or a wave if we go further.

in the realm of science when it presupposes the a priori identity of the desk which is omnitemporally situated in the core of every temporal interaction. Such interactions are externalised from the very existence of the desk and considered secondary. Rather, they are thought as the enemy of the concrete and clear identity of the desk since they make the border between the desk and surroundings blur. But, how can we distinguish the desk from its surroundings clearly while the desk is a series of ceaseless actions of its atoms which are regulated not only by its own rules but also by all other surroundings? Indeed, the desk is a result and cause of every relationship with others, and those endless relationships are also a result and cause of the very desk. Here, this complex identity of the desk is expended not only spatially but also temporally. The desk becomes the 'place' where its whole histories, its whole neighbours and their histories are playing together. In short, the full definition of the desk demands the involvement of the whole universe both spatially and temporally, and we are frustrated in our ambition to arrest a complete system, called 'the desk'.¹⁶

This difficulty may come from the gap between the intrinsic 'togetherness' of things in reality and the ontological '**groundlessness**' of the object in the Newtonian universe. Although this universe pretends to allow the independency of self-sufficient every single object, the hidden strategy is to supply the space with the objects as their ultimate ground as it has done to the flowing time in general. (Another name of this 'space' as the ultimate background is the 'confrontation', the 'screen' between a viewer and the world, an architect's the 'paper', which I discussed previously.) The identity of the desk obtains its eternal clarity by the shape and the amount of the space it occupies, in other words, only by imprinting itself on the homogeneous, eternal space. The distinction between the desk and its surroundings becomes a matter of simple difference between the parts 'of' the space itself. The solidity of the 'form' we believe as a primary foundation in the definition of the object belongs in fact, to the homogeneous space, not the object. While enjoying its eternity subsumed under the space, the object expels its interactions and relationships from its realm of existence because they do not occupy any space but 'play'




[Figure 3-6] Chora, Raoul Bunschoten, *Gameboard with Centres (A,B,C,etc.), Prototypes ([01],[02],[03],etc.) and Communities (spirals). Public Spaces*. 2002, London: Black Dog Publishing Limited, p.56

¹⁶ This idea is parallel with the 'incompleteness theorems' in mathematics by Kurt Gödel.

on it. They become ‘arrows’ and ‘dotted lines’ without body on the ‘paper’ of the space.

[Figure 3-6] shows a strategy of architects with this trouble. Architects are people who need to always deal with these complex relationships to suggest a new form of architecture, which are supposed to come from, and fit in such relationships. However, on architects’ paper, architectural forms and various relationships never truly meet each other because they are ontologically in different statuses. Architecture is ‘represented’ as something occupying a certain valid space of paper, but the externalised relationships are just ‘suggested’ by subsidiary ‘signs’ of phantoms. They lose their ability to validly play with the architecture in paper.



[Figure 3-7] Chora, Raoul Bunschoten, *Main plan of the Hoje Taastrup new suburb City. Public Spaces*. 2002, London: Black Dog Publishing Limited, p.59

The Chora’s strategy here is to give the signs certain ‘actuality’ or ‘materiality’ so that they can be subsumed under the space of paper and play with architecture that is already in it; to clothe a phantom. In their drawings, arrows, lines and even letters get fat longing to be a valid volume in the space. They have not only their tonal difference but also specific shapes and sizes in the drawing as if they have various material and spatial characteristics.¹⁷ Now, architects become able to ‘play’ with the relationship itself in their paper as they have done with architectural forms, and that is why Chora proudly name their drawing as ‘Gameboard’.¹⁸ However, the strict rule of this game is to obey the laws of paper. Once subsumed in the paper, the relations can tell things only through either their spatial equivalences like location and size, or their names which can be understood only by an external set of legend. In fact, the trick of this drawing is to invent the various signs with spatial quantities which look freely active in the paper regardless of their meanings. It creates the fantasy of the post-modern play of ‘signifier’ which endlessly generates creative relationships with different kinds of ‘signified’, while hiding its singular relationship with its fixed meaning behind. The ‘game’ in [Figure 3-7] is not for ‘generation’, but for ‘explanation’. It can ‘display’ various interactions and relationships on a map with its dynamic visuals, but it is, rather, a decoration on the map with ‘carcasses’ of time. Instead of this tragedy started from

¹⁷ One can see the similar situation in the drawing of so called ‘data-scape’ mainly by MVRDV.

¹⁸ Chora, Raoul Bunschoten, *Public Spaces*. 2002, London: Black Dog Publishing Limited, p.58

isolation and spatialisation of the relationship, my experiments look for the opposite way: Instead of clothing a phantom to be 'real' in the world of space, to summon the 'reality' to the world of phantom.

There is a famous term in architectural discourse, which deals with relationships around architecture; called 'context'. In his book, *Words and Buildings*, Adrian Forty explains how the meaning of this word has been distorted mainly by the translation from Italian to English, comparing Ernesto Rogers' original usage of the term in 1950s with that of other architects' afterwards. Here is one of the comparisons with Colin Rowe who introduced the term, 'contextualism' in 1966:

Whereas Rogers was concerned with how the dialectical processes of history were manifested through architecture, Rowe was uninterested in this speculative understanding of the historical environment, and concentrated on the formal properties of works of architecture. And whereas Rogers thought of the environment as formed by objects, 'monuments', Rowe was more interested in the relationships between objects and the spaces they occupied.¹⁹

For Rowe, designing a building on a site is to fill an 'empty' space with a brand-new object; to create something from nothing; to establish an 'order' in absolute chaos. In most cases, the architect starts his/her project on the drawing of an emptied site only with its boundary lines. It already suggests the irresistible presence of homogeneous structure in terms of the space within it and the indefinable presence of absolute chaos in terms of the object in it at the same time. It is a perfectly ordered ground ready for the 'play' of every groundless object. It has been called the 'fear of white paper' among architects starting their projects, and this 'fear' comes from the very 'groundlessness' of the object they are to design. The architect starts to collect every possible formal reference around, which is already engraved permanently in the ordered ground. It rescues the architect from the fear of chaos by giving some 'conditions' which he/she can rely on. The only possible way to relieve the object from its groundlessness is to make it a member of the ground itself. Rowe uses the terms, 'solid' and 'void' frequently in his essays,²⁰ which have been two of architect's favourite terms until now. The merit of these terms is that they help an object to become a member of the ground. As soon as I consider my desk as a 'solid' in a 'void' of my office, the desk starts to lose its intrinsic qualities and relationships such as its weight, temperature,

¹⁹ Adrian Forty, *Words and buildings: a vocabulary of modern architecture*. 2000, New York: Thames & Hudson, p135.

²⁰ Colin Rowe, *As I was saying. Recollections and Miscellaneous Essays*, 3 vols, ed. A. Carragone, 1996, Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press.

texture, stiffness, agedness, and so forth. It is more than just an innocent abstraction for convenience. The 'solid' means nothing but the 'non-void'. The 'void' means nothing but the 'non-solid'. 'Solid' and 'Void' are two different expressions for the same single event. The desk as a solid is defined by the void surrounding it. The desk becomes nothing but an occupation of the void. Indeed, the solid is not of the desk but of the space. It is not an abstraction but a disappearance. The object obtains its eternity by becoming the omni-temporal background. Rowe's 'contextualism' is about this 'becoming-background'. The relationship in it is not a 'conversation' with others, but the 'condition' for a groundless object to become the ground. Once the object successfully becomes the ground, no more relationships or interactions happen there simply because there are no objects any more but only the ground.



[Figure 3-8] *Desks and a bookshelf in my office*; digital photograph, 11/2006.



[Figure 3-9] Drawing experiment, *Desks and a bookshelf in my office*; ink and pencil on watercolour paper, 50 x 40cm, 10/2008.

The photograph in [Figure 3-8] shows how various objects are occupying the space of my office. In spite of the disorganised placement of books and other stuffs, one can easily 'see' the stable 3D-space behind the surface of the photograph, the screen, suggested by the system of camera, which I examined previously. In fact, without this solid structure of space, one cannot rescue each isolated object from the chaos of disordered colours and forms on the paper surface. The objects are filtered to be filled in the ready-situated structure, and every event and relationship left out of this homogeneous system needs to be added or reintroduced only by the viewer's imagination. The relationships are not in the picture, but just in the past experience and knowledge of the viewer.

Figure 3-9 is my drawing of the same setting of my office. Instead of starting from the structure or objects, I started from various relationships between objects or between objects and me, such as forces, traces, sensations, and meanings. On the left hand side of the drawing, instead of the spatial information like location, size and shape, the idea of a 'desk' is suggested by various relationships with others, such as 'being attached to the wall', 'being a floating surface', 'confronting a bookshelf', 'being adjacent to a window', 'being touched by the breeze', 'collecting dirt from the air and by my usage', 'encircling my sitting place', 'being a place of my reading', 'being transformed with books on it', 'being a background of texts', and so forth. Before its 'being a desk', it is a 'place' of all those interactions. Its ontological border with the wall, books, breeze, air, office space, and me is blurred. Instead of containing the desk, the object within it, the space emerges from and around these events.

History

Forty argues that the English word, 'context', in architectural discourse is a misunderstanding of the Italian '*le preesistenze ambientali*' (surrounding pre-existences) by Rogers. It might be hard to understand for us today when Rogers argues that "to consider *l'ambiente* means to consider history."²¹ What links the 'surroundings' with the 'history'? Is it because the surroundings have been there 'before' the new work arrives?

²¹ Ernesto Rogers, *Preexisting Conditions and Issues of Contemporary Building Practice*. In Ockman (ed.), *Architecture culture*, 1955, p203.

The term, 'history' is another big word in architectural vocabulary, but what concerns me here is a part of it related to the temporal ontology; not the general or public history, but rather private histories. In fact, the idea of 'flowing time' gives us the idea of the 'history in general'; the single linear history of the whole universe. Such a history is considered as a series of facts which is objectively and eternally fixed in the past. 'The history' is confused with 'the past' because it is what we already passed by with the flowing of time. The anti-historical attitude of the early twentieth-century avant-garde and the architectural debates around the 'historicism' in the mid-twentieth century seem to show the result of this confusion in many cases.²²

In a lecture in 1961, Pevsner asserted with the concern about the return of historicism that "*Of course, all reviving of styles of the past is a sign of weakness.*"²³ This sentence itself could be agreed in a sense. However, the issue I would like to address here is not whether it is good or bad to use a certain style in the past in architectural design, but the difference of understanding the term, history between Rogers and Pevsner. The argument I address here is that Pevsner's remark has nothing to do with any temporality in architecture, but rather, about the style samples in building design. If we can still call it 'history', it is just because those samples have their names after dates on a calendar.²⁴ He seems to question why architects need to care about the 'past' while designing the new work on the white paper, the empty space, the 'present'. He seems to consider the history as a bundle of precedent samples in the stacks of the past, or as scattered facts in the river of flowing time. In this river, one cannot find any intrinsic relationship between this sample and that sample, or between this fact and that fact. If they are contemporary, their relationship is only that they occupy the same space, as I examined above. If they are in different times, one needs to suggest a certain artificial category to establish a series, called 'history'. The history of architecture is constructed by gathering the facts in the past, falling into the category 'architecture', chronologically; categorised contents + external structure of time. Because there is no intrinsic relationship between contents in the series, it is nothing but a 'copy' to 'revive' a certain precedent. Any new building does not, or should not come from history, but just will be a part of history in the future. History is 'spread out' in recorded literatures, but never 'subsists' in anybody or anything.

²² There were two famous arguments on this issue in 1966, which were considered as important challenges to the modernist architects; '*The Architecture of the City*' by Aldo Rossi, and '*Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*' by Robert Venturi

²³ Adrian Forty, *op. cit.*, p199.

²⁴ One can find in Pevsner's book that he is keen on titling chapters after calendar dates like 'Eighteen-ninety in Painting', 'Engineering and Architecture in the Nineteenth Century', 'The Modern Movement before Nineteen-fourteen'... Nikolaus Pevsner, *Pioneers of Modern Design*. 1975, Great Britain: Penguin Books.

However, Rogers' understanding of history seems intrinsically different from 'history as the past'. For him, there is no such thing as history in general, but just someone's history or something's history. There is no such thing as architectural history in general, but a history of a specific place, of a specific building, of a specific person there, and of a specific architect. In this sense, his 'history' is rather substantial or even spatial, and it may result in a link with the surroundings. These 'histories' are not defined by any imposed category because they have their own substances, the bodies. However, we need to be careful not to confuse this 'body' with an 'object' with its a priori identity. While the body is the 'ground' of the history, the object is grounded in Newtonian space. While the body is the 'place' of the events, the object is just placed in the space. If one considers architecture as an object, as Tschumi did, the history or the event only 'flows' 'around' architecture, but if it is a body, architecture itself turns out to be the ground of the history, the place of the events. Here, the meaning of being the ground of history needs to be pondered upon seriously because it demands an ontological change in architecture. I am not arguing here that Architecture is more than mere buildings. On the contrary, history starts from the inside of the smallest of events of a building rather than imposed from outside, the category-architecture; not abstracted, but generated. To contain the history in its body, the definition of a building must include a certain temporal dimension intrinsically. A building does not just 'exist' as an object spread out in space-time, but 'acts' to renew its own history ceaselessly. Indeed, the history 'happens' 'in' architecture.



[Figure 3-10] Old buildings in 'Busuksa' temple, Young-ju, Korea, since AD 676.

One might imagine a literally 'old' building when I discuss the 'history of a building'. He/she would argue that a 'new' building does not have any history yet. Yes, the aging of a physical building clearly demonstrates its history, but only in part, not in its entirety. Is the construction period not a history of the building? Is the design period not a history of the building? Is the history of the site not part of the building's history? Is the history of timber for a pillar not part of the building's history? ... This questioning could be endless, and this fact has bothered people with 'scientific' mind. In the temporal definition of a building, it is not clear when/where it starts and when/where it ends. It does not allow any closed definition with clear limits, which human reason

always demands to confront and grasp.²⁵ This trouble comes when we try to articulate a 'historical continuum' by arraying it on the external standard, the ready-regulated calendar of flowing time, on which we can mark the start and the end. A certain 'past' is fixed on a certain point in flowing time which we can never revisit. It is another strategy of the 'confrontation' I examined in the first chapter. Although the 'calendar' is substituted for the 'screen', they work in the same way. What we obtain is the exact position of 'a past' and the order between 'pasts'. What we lose is the power of 'history' which is still alive enough to work in the 'now'. This history of a building is neither of the building nor of the people, but just of the calendar, of the flowing time.

When Rogers considers architecture as a dialogue with its surrounding pre-existences (*le preesistenze ambientali*) which he argues is a 'historical continuum', the architecture is suggested as a 'centre' surrounded by histories. This is a centre of the dialogue, a centre of the time, and a centre of the space at the same time. The architecture defined from its spatio-temporal core, not by its boundary (form in space, start and end in time), shows many possibilities of the temporal understanding of architecture. Firstly, it enables a building to live its 'here and now'. The now and here is the centre of time and space not in a geometric sense, but in the sense that it is the fountainhead of emerging time and space. By establishing itself on the here and now, the building becomes an active subject interacting with others and generating its own history. To live is to 'ground' itself on itself ceaselessly.²⁶ It never stops to become its now and here. Secondly, it enables the definition of architecture with its blurred boundary accepting its spatiotemporal 'togetherness' with others. If history is the mere past in flowing time, Rogers' 'dialogue' would turn out to be nonsense. How can something have a dialogue with what does not exist anymore? How can something be surrounded by what does not exist anymore? The architecture as a centre of the dialogue demands the presence of the history in the now and here. Rogers cited specifically an essay by the poet T. S. Eliot, 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' (1917), in which Eliot wrote, '*the historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence*'.²⁷ One had better go deep into the now to find the history than go back to the past. If it is not summoned by a building now, it is not the history of the building, but just its past. Through summoning its history, the centre, the smallest event of the building, expands infinitely embracing every relationship with others. Thirdly, Rogers' term, 'dialogue' implies that the relationship between the centre and its surroundings are not unilateral but reciprocal. Eliot again: '*...the past should be altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the past.*' Although Forty added a rather plain interpretation on this quotation that '*...all work impacts upon present*

²⁵ Whitehead explains the human reason as a practical functioning criticising the Kantian ideas. See Alfred North Whitehead, *The function of reason*. 1929, London: Princeton university press

²⁶ I will develop this idea in the following chapters suggesting the term, 'repetition'.

²⁷ Adrian Forty, *op. cit.*, p132.


*consciousness of the historical past...*²⁸, I think that the argument of Eliot needs to be interpreted more literally, and so, radically. Is there any 'historical past' which exists outside of the present? Is there any past which is not living in the present? Is there any past which maintains its individuality by itself while not being actively 'remembered' in the present? Is there any 'record' of the past which manifests its own pastness without being interpreted in the present? The 'togetherness' of the present, past and even future which I argued in the first chapter is not a metaphorical expression, but a literal statement of what I suggest. In fact, the term, history, itself already shows a deep understanding of our temporal world by suggesting the togetherness of the present and the past.²⁹ They constitute a completeness of the now together, and the complete 'whole' keeps transforming itself in time.

*The existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted; and this is conformity between the old and the new.*³⁰


²⁸ Ibid., p133.

²⁹ A milder expression on this idea by Forty is this: "'History', a dialectic between past and present, could only be made in the present, and accordingly every new architectural work was also a historical act, that would, to a greater or lesser extent, cause all previously existing work to be re-interpreted.", Adrian Forty, *op. cit.*, p201.

³⁰ T. S. Eliot, '*Tradition and the Individual Talent*' (1917) in T. S. Eliot, *Points of view*. 1941, London: Faber and Faber, p.26



[Figure 3-11] Francis Bacon, *Figures in Movement*, 1976



[Figure 3-12] Drawing experiment, *Computer works in my office*; pencil on watercolour paper, 25 x 40.5cm, 9/2008.

Following is an excerpt from Deleuze's explanation of Bacon's paintings.

[A round area] is a very simple technique that consists in isolating the Figure. ... These are all 'places' (lieux). In any case, Bacon does not hide the fact that these techniques are rather rudimentary, despite the subtlety of their combination. The important point is that they do not consign the Figure to immobility but, on the contrary, render sensible a kind of progression, an exploration of the Figure within the place, or upon itself. It is an operative field.³¹

There are parallel paradoxes; now-history, and isolation-relation. Bacon's techniques to isolate the Figure (A round area and a cube in [Figure 3-11]) are for the isolation of the 'now' from the 'whole'. The isolation of the now is not for differentiation from the whole, but for embracement of it. It is radically different from the isolation of an 'instant' from 'flowing time', which is the differentiation of a part from the summation. The Figure in the round area

³¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*, translated by Daniel W. Smith, 2003, London: Continuum, pp.1-2.

and the cube generates its own movement from inside of itself without relying on any external background. And it helps the Figure not just occupying or subsumed by the background, but in dialogue with it. Instead of pulling the Figure to swallow it, the background comes out or floats up to the Figure. "*[It] is not beneath, behind, or beyond the Figure, but are strictly to the side of it, or rather, all around it, and is thus grasped in a close view, a tactile or 'haptic' view, just as the Figure itself is.*"³²

It is a technique to rescue the temporal world from its chaos not by adapting itself to the ready-structured background, but by grounding itself upon itself. Bacon's round and cube I borrow here is a simple but strong device for it. In [Figure 3-12], a round area is suggested first as a mobile pedestal on the floor for a vibrating statue. A cube is added finally as another pedestal in the air holding exploding figures in. They are an entrance and an exit of the statue while themselves being a part of the statue. They are borders between the statue and the background. They are common limits of the two; contours with their own depths. 'Intelligible relations' of objects in the cube is not important. Rather, I tried to avoid such 'narratives' hoping them to be just movements, forces, and effects through my rough and hasty pencil touches and abnormal composition. The relation that matters is between the Figure and the background, the statue and my office space. Although the border line between the floor and the wall suggest the three-dimensional space of my office, it is not clear whether the statue stands 'in' this space. Rather, it is a statue besieged by its own space. The aim is to make the statue summon the whole, my office, and vibrate together. It accompanies the background to isolate itself from the very background. Is this a snapshot of my computer work in a certain moment, or the computer works in general? My intention is to express the history of my computer works in my office by drawing the active now and here. I want every 'now' in the history of my computer works to play in the now whenever I meet this drawing, not by being displayed, but by 'repeating' themselves in it; to make history ceaselessly spring out from the whole into the now without being a stabilised cliché.

Name and Calling a Name

It would be easy and natural to tag each object with its name if we accept the idea of the timeless identity of objects in flowing time. In fact, one can easily find such literal 'tags' in various types

³² Gilles Deleuze, *Ibid.*, p.4

of architectural drawing, such as room names or names of specific materials. They are used for a clear communication by answering the question; "what is it?" Even without such direct tagging, we immediately find numerous names in depictive drawings. Although my drawing, [Figure 3-12], is a struggle to avoid the timeless identity, one can still 'read' the names of objects like chair, printer, keyboard, and monitor despite their distorted shapes. Although the figures struggle not to be merged into the spatial system, their very names obstruct their freedom in the temporal world. Why?

Indicating lines for 'tags' in architectural drawing attest the explicit link between an object and its name. There seems to be no doubt about the idea that the name is of the object. The name, 'desk', is supposed to be of the desk. However, the name, 'desk', in fact, does not only indicate certain properties of the desk but also defines the relationship between the desk and 'I', who call the name. As soon as I find a 'desk' in a drawing, I am positioned as a counterpart of it, a working person sitting in front of it. In fact, no name is suggested irrelevantly to the interest of human. The names are suggested with practical reasons. The names are the 'results' of our establishing relations with others. Naming others might be a human nature more primitive than the language with rules, and I have always encountered this limit on the edge of all of my drawing experiments because of its primitiveness. My argument need not be confused with that of Saussure's '*langue*', saying that 'language is a differential formal system independent of its references, and that, conversely, the latter are products of the system itself.'³³ I have already criticised Chora's 'Gameboard' which might have been influenced by this kind of argument about 'independent play of signifiers'. My stance is rather against this formalist premise, following Wittgenstein instead:

It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because they lack the mental capacity. And this means: "they do not think, and that is why they do not talk." But – they simply do not talk. Or to put it better: they do not use language – if we except the most primitive forms of language. – Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing.³⁴

If calling a name is one of such primitive functioning, it is because it is the first step in establishing the ontological presence of 'I'. Without distinguishing 'I' from the whole, it is impossible to establish the idea of 'I'. This distinction is achieved by calling a name of 'other' in the case of human, and it is the very start of language. It is an ever-prior event to any grammar or

³³ Kojin Karatani, (1995). *Architecture as metaphor : language, number, money*. translated by Sabu Kohso, edited by Michael Speaks, 1995, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, p.134

³⁴ Ludwig F. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation*, 2nd ed., translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 1958, New York: Macmillan, p.39.

signs of language. I establish my identity by clarifying the relationships with others. Here is a thoughtful poem about this 'calling a name' by a Korean poet, Chun-soo Kim:

*Flower*³⁵

*Before I called its name,
It was no more
Than a gesture plain.*

*When I called its name,
It came to me
And became a flower.*

*As I called its name,
For me, the same,
Call me a name
One fitting my colour
And mine odour,*

*I, too wish to go to it,
So to become its flower.*

*We all wish to
Become something,*

*You to me and I to you
Wish to become a meaning unforgettable.*

It might be intrinsic human nature to desire to achieve a stable meaning from a transient gesture, to grasp a concrete identity from the obscure whole. However, what the poem is talking about is not the name nor the meaning, but 'calling a name' and 'becoming a meaning'. It is not about the lucid world of names, but about ceaseless groping toward lucidity. It is neither about just meaning

³⁵ Chun-soo Kim, *Flower*, in his 3rd collection of poems, *Sketch on flower*, 1959, translated by Peter Park.


nor about meaninglessness, but about a struggle toward a meaning. I find two main themes of my thesis in this poem; **difference** and **repetition**. The idea of 'difference' in my thesis, which will be fully discussed later, comes from the asymmetric nature of calling a name. It is asymmetric because a common rule has not yet been established between the giver and the receiver of the name. Here, the expression of 'giver and receiver' can cause a misunderstanding which leads us to mere spatial differences because the terms already give the impression of two counterparts in a single plane. This misunderstanding may cause confusion between the 'asymmetry' of Wittgenstein and that of Deleuze since Wittgenstein seems to argue the asymmetry in the dialogue between one and 'other'³⁶ while the Deleuze's asymmetry seems to happen in the course of the naming, between one before and after a name. However, they are not so different expressions as they seem. As far as one and 'other' do not share a common set of rules yet, they do not fully 'exist' in each other. As soon as they share the rule, they are not the 'other' to each other. To both Wittgenstein and Deleuze, the 'asymmetry' is between these two statuses. The distance between I and 'other' is identical to that between you before and after my calling the name, which is a 'leap' from the ambiguous 'whole' to the 'singular'. The difference is not between this flower and that flower, but 'is made or makes itself'³⁷ in the course from 'it' to 'flower', from 'gesture' to 'meaning'. The idea of 'repetition' in my thesis comes also from the dialogue, 'you to me and I to you', giving a name and receiving a name, ceaseless leaps from this world to that world. It is ceaseless because no name is 'enough' for you and me. The reason of the repetition is just to be 'something', to avoid being nothing; the most primitive!

In the lucid world of names, which is suggested by conventional architectural drawings, giver and receiver of the name are hung to both sides of the 'name' symmetrically. It is the same situation as the 'screen' of a priori spatial structure, which I examined previously. Saussure's 'langue', which is 'a differential formal system independent of its references', is nothing but another type of the 'screen' in the world of meaning. This system deliberately hides or substitutes the primitive process of 'naming'. It prevents 'others' from being involved in the establishment of one's identity. Relationships and histories are excluded from the timeless identity in flowing time. I do not actually meet 'the' desk in my office anymore. I do not need to 'name' the desk anymore. What I need to do is just to find the name, 'desk', which already provides a structured relationship between the desk and I. I do not actually 'sense' the desk as 'other', but just catch what I am already supposed to sense. 'Togetherness' before the name swarming with unsettled sensations and meanings is immediately erased for the sake of a clear 'confrontation'. 'The' desk is immediately replaced by 'a' desk. A name is a start of every possible relationship and history in

³⁶ Ludwig F. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation*, 2nd ed., translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 1958, New York: Macmillan, p.81.


³⁷ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum, p.36.

the flowing time. But, a name, I argue, is only a result of all those processes. The separated identities are not the start but the result.



[Figure 3-13] Drawing experiment, *My lazy afternoon*; pencil on watercolour paper, 50 x 38cm, 9/2007.

In [Figure 3-13], I drew a heap of stones for the desk not to draw a name, 'desk'. I intended to allow the 'audience' to 'call' a name for it instead of just finding the name. I wanted the audience to touch the stones with his/her eyes 'before' asking '*what it is*'. Before being a desk, it is certain roughness, heaviness, flatness, and hardness. Before being a desk, it supports things, weighs down grass, and is touched by afternoon breeze. I wanted the audience to experience the transformation of a heap of stones into a desk, together with the transformation of self in a prairie to self in an office, feeling the 'difference' between the stones and the desk in the course of the repetitive process of giving and receiving a name. I hoped the stones would not be 'a' desk, but to become 'the' desk in my office. I hoped this drawing would not 'finish' with names.




[Figure 3-14] Architectural drawing sample, *Arts Tower floor plan*. original scale 1:100.


Although an architectural drawing is normally for a specific situation or building, what is actually drawn in [Figure 3-14] is not a proper name but a general term. The drawing shows windows, stairs, partitions, doors, but not the door called Charlie or the window called Lola. The drawing shows a corridor, an office titled '17-3', but still not 'my' office. It is because there is no 'I and You', but just 'it' or 'they' in architectural drawing. The drawing does not want 'I' to call the name of 'You'; *other* who is not yet clearly identified. For the sake of transparent communication, a drawing has to reside in the realm of 'codes', the *'langue'*, where the name in a settled system already holds 'I' and 'you' in its own two hands. It is a hollow position in a structure which can accommodate all the substantiality. Indeed, the name of 'you' in the system prevents 'I' from calling you a name. What is drawn stops being 'You', who call me a name, to obtain the 'objective' identity as 'it'. Time evaporates, and results are left.

Architectural drawings are, I would argue, full of the 'names without calling'. 'I' am not invited into the drawing because there is no 'you' to have a dialogue with. It is so no matter whether it is a plan, an elevation, a section, an axonometric, or a perspective drawing. Every single part of the

drawing has its name, and so one can tag every single bit with its name. If you cannot find direct ‘name tags’ in the drawing, it is only because the name of that part is already visually clear enough just with its suggestive form. They are immediately a wall, a door, a lift, stairs, or a corridor. It does not matter whether it is a solid part or a void part, an object or a space, because all the names are not of ‘you’, but of the space as ground. Indeed, the work of drawing is nothing but dividing the ground into the parts with their names. There is even a ‘narrative’ with the names, but still without ‘I and You’. The name is not called, and the narrative is not told. Tschumi’s strategy to tackle this problem is rather clear. If it is not to be called, just eliminate it! Do not allow the names to limit ‘I’! ‘Program’ can be a type of such a ‘name’ for a ‘void’ in the following argument:



[Figure 3-4] Bernard Tschumi, *The Manhattan Transcripts*. 1994, London: Academy Group LTD, p.48.



[Figure 3-7] Chora, Raoul Bunschoten, *Main plan of the Hoje Taastrup new suburb City. Public Spaces*. 2002, London: Black Dog Publishing Limited, p.59

*“Program” is to be distinguished from “event.” A program is a determinate set of expected occurrence, a list of required utilities, often based on social behaviour, habit, or custom. In contrast, event occurs as an indeterminate set of unexpected outcomes. Revealing hidden potentialities or contradictions in a program, and relating them to a particularly appropriate spatial configuration, may create conditions for unexpected events to occur.*³⁸

His drawing of [Figure3-4] shows ‘forms without names’. His ‘useless architecture’³⁹ can be translated into the ‘nameless architecture’, in my terms. For the sake of ‘unexpected events’, all the names which inevitably suggest ‘determinate programs’ should not be tagged on his drawing and architecture. However, as I examined previously, the very forms without names can maintain

³⁸ Bernard Tschumi, *Event-Cities 2*. 2000, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, p.13.

³⁹ Jonathan Hill elaborates and advocates this idea especially exemplifying Tschumi’s ‘Parc de la Villette’. *Actions of architecture : architects and creative users*. 2003, London: Routledge, pp77-80.

their identities only by being merged into the background, the space of eternity. “*This arrested world, blind to the dimensions of time, produces an equally blind architecture, an architecture thrown from the metaworld into the real one, like a lead boat into time’s river. There are simply no corresponding hooks or currents to keep it afloat.*”⁴⁰ While trying to erase the system of names to rescue the ‘user’ from it, he banishes his architecture from ‘now’ to the ‘metaworld’. To emancipate the determinate relationship between I and You arrested by the name, he simply cuts off the relationship eternally. The ‘creative user’ generating ‘events’ is a stressful ‘I’ who is pushed to ‘call’ a name of nobody, without ‘You’. For the sake of absolute freedom of the user in time, architecture disappears into the space.

Instead of elimination of the name, Chora ‘hides’ the name by using mediating signs. The sign in their drawing is the name of the name, or the hyperlink in a website, which invites me to the far complex contents behind. It ‘calls’ the name of ‘you’ with flesh on my behalf. It is already a frozen ‘calling a name’. This, Chora’s strategy, may come from their proper understanding of reality, which is that the reality is too complex to be tagged with several names that can be handled in a drawing, and that there are many different levels of names that never meet each other on a single layer. Their strategy, following that of the computer, is to invent a new ‘*langue*’, their own system which is free from the restrictions of the name-meaning convention. However, it never solves, but just hides or even worsens the problem in two ways. Firstly, as I mentioned above, I cannot find ‘you’ behind the system. What I can find is a huge amount of ‘information’ of you; this name and that name of you. The new system does not replace the old one, but just overlays it. Secondly, this new system, freed from conventional language is absolutely ruled by the conventional space, the ‘screen’ instead. It is the very singular layer that can accommodate many different levels of names by flattening them. The play of signs is irrelevant to the real because reality is not the sum of information, but ‘You’ which should be called continuously even though it is never grasped as a name.

The strategy of OMA is rather direct. Put the ‘raw’ names before the *langue* directly on the drawing! In [Figure 3-15], the names are the tags neither of any object nor of the space as a ground. I am not invited to another world behind because the names are sufficient on their own. Instead of directly designating something else, the names vibrate and repeat themselves on the surface of the drawing to ‘become something’. They are ‘You’ waiting for my calling and calling me. They are not the result of calling, but something to be called. For this, OMA want the names not to be understood, but to be felt or ‘sensed’. They give various visual characters to the names as Chora do on their signs. However, they have different, or rather opposite purposes. For OMA, it is

⁴⁰ Sanford Kwinter, *Flying the Bullet, or When Did the Future Begin?* in *Rem Koolhaas: conversation with students*. 1996, New York: Princeton Architectural Press, p.71.



[Figure 3-15] Images from "Concept Book" by OMA/LMN. Concept proposal for Seattle's new central library from a public presentation at Seattle's Benaroya Hall, Dec. 15, 1999



[Figure 3-12] Drawing experiment, *Computer works in my office*; pencil on watercolour paper, 25 x 40.5cm, 9/2008.

a struggle to make names 'effects' with potential meanings; to float from the surface towards 'I'. For Chora, it is a method to make signs spatial characteristics to be merged in a single layer. What makes this difference? What enables OMA's names to fall into neither the system of language nor the realm of the homogeneous space? I find one clue by comparing it with my drawing experiment of [Figure 3-12]. What is common in these seemingly different drawings? It is the 'pedestal' I discussed before. OMA call it 'Platforms', 'each a programmatic cluster that is architecturally defined and equipped for maximum, dedicated performance'.⁴¹ It is the 'platform' in a building, and the 'pedestal' in a drawing at the same time. In OMA's drawings, one would frequently find such 'volumes' with various forms (mostly boxes) which are filled with letters with various characteristics. They are 'chunks' on their own rather than 'masses' in space. It is the chunk of swarming raw names while becoming the foundation of such swarming by itself. Although it is suggested as a spatial form, it is never easily subsumed by the space. The names are not settled in the space, but generate their own ground to play in. It is the pedestal of a 'vibrating statue' with letters. While boxes in the conventional drawing of Arts Tower, [Figure 3-14], are settled in the space of paper just partitioning it, the 'Platforms', five boxes in [Figure 3-15] keep working to hold dispersing names. Even when they are realised as a building, the chunks seem not easily subsumed by any a priori space. Rather, they express themselves while 'exhaling' their own space around themselves, and OMA propose abnormal sectional plays to emphasise it; the powerful chunks! Kwinter was right when he argued, regarding the architecture of Koolhaas:

⁴¹ OMA/LMN, *Concept Book*. Concept proposal for Seattle's new central library from a public presentation at Seattle's Benaroya Hall Dec. 15, 1999, p.21.

Architecture becomes dangerous when it forgoes all that is “pregiven” – in this case fixed types and predetermined matter – when, rather, it takes the actual flow of historical conditions as its privileged materiality (not the habitual discrete domains of geometry, masonry, stone, and glass), and works these, adapts these through transformations and deformations, in order to engender and bind its form.⁴²

Yes, it is a brilliant ‘calling you a name’. It is a clever way of a ‘engendering a form’ to the temporal flux around a given project. As Kwinter explains the Koolhaas’ radical view of ‘materiality’ as a perfectly active, fluid and mobile one, he is a skilful sculptor who shapes a material form out of invisible forces. However, is it as much ‘material’ as my ‘body’ is? Can it be also an affirmation of the temporality of the ‘physical matter’ in reality? Is it not ‘material’ only against my mind, but not my body? Then, is it not rather ‘visibility’ than ‘materiality’? In [Figure 3-15], the words in the boxes are never incomprehensible but insignificant, and their insignificance is revealed by their very precision. Their using ‘too’ direct and easy vocabulary is the operation that “consists in destroying clarity by clarity”.⁴³ This ‘raw’ name is used not for a fixed meaning but rather for the ‘impression’ of a meaning. It does not designate something else, but yields potential meanings from inside of itself. However, such impression passes through the brain, it does not act directly upon the nervous system, it does not attain the sensation. The visual aspect of the names as characters is another story. In fact, it is irrelevant with what ‘I’ call a name in the drawing. The shape, size, colour of the word, ‘BOOKS’ in the drawing have nothing to do with any potential meaning of the name, ‘books’. It is a doubtful hybrid of irrelevant sensation and its meaning. At first, what enabled five pedestals in the OMA’s drawing was the meaning of the names. They were proposed as ‘programmatic clusters’. But now, what are playing on the pedestals, are the visual letters of the names. It does not matter what the name is because the ‘play’ is to generate nothing but the general complexity which may express the complexity of temporal world in general. The meanings of names evaporate since it has already carried out its mission successfully; the meaning achieved, or the name ‘called’. Then, which one should I call a name, combination of letters with sensations or dead meanings of words? What OMA shaped is the ‘pedestal’ without ‘statue’. The pedestal is clearly ‘material’, but the statue is ‘visual’ at best. What is drawn or built is ‘bones without flesh’ or, in Deleuze’s expression, ‘a face without a head’.⁴⁴ The role of ‘the actual flow of historical conditions’ is accomplished and so evaporates when the pedestals, the platforms are shaped in the process of design, and the remaining

⁴² Sanford Kwinter, *Ibid.*, p.69.


⁴³ Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*, translated by Daniel W. Smith, 2003, London: Continuum, p.4.

⁴⁴ “... the face is a structured, spatial organization that conceals the head, whereas the head is dependent upon the body, even if it is the point of the body, its culmination.” Gilles Deleuze, *Ibid.*, p.15.

temporality is a hovering play of letters on the surface of the platforms, which is absolutely irrelevant to any flow of historical condition.



[Figure 3-16] Francis Bacon, *Study after Velazquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X*; Oil on canvas, 153 × 118 cm, 1953



[Figure 3-17] Edvard Munch, *The Scream*; Oil, tempera, and pastel on cardboard, 91 × 73.5 cm 1893

“I wanted to paint the scream more than the horror.”⁴⁵ Francis Bacon talks about his painting of the Pope, [Figure 3-16]. What he tries to paint is neither the primary figuration nor the horror. What he wants is the horror of sensation which is opposed to the horror of the represented. He wants audiences to ‘hear’ the scream rather than to find the horror in the painting or in their mind. The horror is inferred from the scream, and not the reverse. The horror might be a ‘name’ as a result, but he is interested in the ‘calling-it’, not the name itself. The same understanding can be applied to the painting by Munch, [Figure 3-17], and the very title of it is ‘The Scream’. Meanwhile, Koollhaas is a painter who tries to directly paint the horror since the scream has a danger of reintroducing the ‘pregiven’ which he wants to forgo. Instead of the tiresome fight against the persistent pre-given, he takes a shortcut. To avoid the primary figuration which tends to evoke spatial clichés, he suddenly abandons the ‘screen’ between the world and himself which is already invested virtually with all kinds of clichés, and retreats to his cerebrum in which the forms without body can be built. What ‘I’ actually meet as ‘You’ in the drawing is neither objects in space nor sensations on paper, but the flowing names in his cerebrum which is beautifully temporal and communicative. The excellence of his drawing is that it gives us eyes in the

⁴⁵ David Sylvester, *The Brutality of Fact: Interviews with Francis Bacon 1962-1979*, 1987, New York: Thames & Hudson, p.48.

cerebrum, or gives us the cerebrum in the eyes. However, his drawing never gives us eyes in other organs; in the ear, in the hand, in the stomach, in the lungs... He does not believe in 'drawing' as a place of happening anymore because he already abandoned 'paper' to avoid the screen. He believes in the brain but not hands. As a compensation for the absent body, the play of letters supplies fake sensations to persuade audiences. The word 'BOOKS' in Figure 3-15 does not just designate the real books in general. This raw name evokes far more connected ideas, and may induce its 'relationships' and 'histories' into its presence. However, Koolhaas' book does not have its weight, its size, its colours, its smell, or its texture. He seems very much interested in the complex temporal phenomena around a book, but does not believe in the temporality of the very book itself in front of me. He is not concerned that all the relationships and histories are incarnated only in the smallest sensations that happen when I move the book, read the book, turn the pages of the book, touch and smell the book. Before getting its name in the end, the book 'is' with my hands, with my eyes, with my nose, and with my every other organ. How can the relationships and histories live 'the now' if they do not actually act on me now?

Having renounced the religious sentiment, but besieged by the photograph, modern painting finds itself in a situation which, despite appearances, makes it much more difficult to break with the figuration that would seem to be its miserable domain. Abstract painting attests to this difficulty: the extraordinary work of abstract painting was necessary in order to tear modern art away from figuration. But is there not another path, more direct and more sensible?⁴⁶

[Chapter review]

As the title showed, this chapter questioned the idea of 'flowing time' and its influence on architectural issues. It might be a natural consequence for our 'modern man' with plentiful clocks and cars around to feel the time flowing. It is like the sensibility of the Futurists. However, one problem I tried to address was that this idea might easily end up with a dichotomy between what just flows and what does not; what is temporal and what is not. Architecture, of course, could be considered in this dichotomy something a-temporal surrounded by various temporalities. I criticised the idea of architecture as a 'background of time' with its 'timeless identity', and the

⁴⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Ibid.*, p.8. In his argument about the relationship between modern painting and figuration, Deleuze points out that modern painting is an atheistic game without "religious possibilities" that has given a pictorial meaning to figuration, and that photographs are already lodged on canvas before the painter even begins to work claiming to reign over vision. *Ibid.*, pp.6-8.

'drawing as confrontation' which successfully supported such an idea. The 'timeless identity' was examined from several perspectives in the sections of this chapter, 'Relationships', 'History', and 'Name and Calling a Name'. In fact, these categories came from my investigation of contemporary architectural arguments, which apparently intended to deal with temporalities of architecture, such as '*Event architecture*', '*Contextualism*', '*Datascape*', and so forth. However, what they tried to do, I argued, was to build a certain temporality out of something already a-temporal. Whatever settled in a drawing needed to be either a stable form or a fixed meaning. Time could appear as a mere 'flow' only in the ready-structured space or language. Time never happened in a drawing, but just could be arrested by the drawing. It was a limitation of the drawing which only designates something else without being itself.

Time 'flows' only when it is observed from outside. Time is treated as if it is a kind of special object with special characteristics when one tries to 'confront' it. Time, like water, seems to flow among still objects. It may touch the objects when it flows, but still reside out of them. Instead of the 'flowing time', which seems clearly out of things with their 'timeless identities', I will suggest the idea of 'repetition' in the next chapter, which tries to bring such a detached time back into the things in the world. It is not to argue whether the time flows or not, or is linear or cyclic because there is no such time out of 'things' and out of 'I' any more. It is not about 'repeating time', but rather about 'repeating desk', 'repeating office', 'repeating building', and 'repeating I'. Drawing does not represent the 'repetition', but 'repeats' itself. Drawing does not represent the 'time', but is temporal for itself.

Chapter 4. Repeating Time and Drawing

The term 'repetition' is used with negative connotations not only in architectural discourse but also in our general usage because it reminds us of feelings like 'boring', 'prosaic', 'regular', 'ordinary', or 'monotonous'. It is more so to our contemporaries who indulge in shock, novelty, and frustration of expectations. Umberto Eco points out this tendency especially in modern aesthetics suggesting that it corresponds to the idea of "scientific revolution":

The modern criterion for recognizing the artistic value was novelty, high information. The pleasurable repetition of an already known pattern was considered, by modern theories of art, typical of Crafts-not of Art- and of industry. ... every work of modern art figures out a new law, imposes a new paradigm, a new way of looking at the world.¹

The modernist architects had to cease to repeat any of their precedent for the sake of 'the new'. The search for new architectural forms that reflect our experience of the world could be understood as a constituent element of modernist ideology.² They 'invent' a new form for the single work on the screen of ready-structured space/time system leaving any scheme or sublime background and people or life foreground untouched.³ They neither float up nor go down, but just drift on the 'surface'. Ironically, what remains is the ever begetting production and consumption of the new. Emphasizing **repetition** that enables the "infinity of the text" instead of **innovation**, Eco suggests an interesting idea for the post-modern aesthetics:


What must be enjoyed is the fact that a series of possible variations is potentially infinite. What becomes celebrated here is a sort of victory of life over art, with the paradoxical result that the era of electronics would produce a return to the continuum, the Cyclical, the Periodical, the Regular.⁴

¹ Umberto Eco, *Innovation and Repetition: Between Modern and Post-Modern Aesthetics*. in *Daedalus*, Vol. 114, No. 4, *The Moving Image* (Fall, 1985) : MIT Press, p.161.

² Mary Louise Lobsinger, *That Obscure Object of Desire: Autobiography and Repetition in the Work of Aldo Rossi*. in *Grey Room*, No. 8 (Summer, 2002) : MIT Press, p.40.

³ See 'Drawing as Confrontation' in chapter 2.

⁴ Umberto Eco, *op. cit.*, p.179.



In the article, he mainly analyses the serial products of television, and his use of the term, repetition, seems rather general and literal as he mentions that it is not about the repetition in the sense of Kierkegaard or Deleuze. Although he is carefully limiting his terminology within the general usage to avoid any unnecessary confusion with human existential or metaphysical issues, I see the many characters in common with that of Heideggerian or Deleuzian repetition when he goes deep into the nature of the ‘repetition’, and that would be why Heidegger and Deleuze chose the very term. All of them struggle to rescue the ‘time of life’ from the ‘space of objects’ through their own ways.

[Figure 4-1] Drawing experiment, *One day of my office*. a series of twelve digital photographs, 11/2007.

Repeating Instant

[Figure 4-1] is a set of twelve photographs of my office taken exactly every two hours with the same frame and exposure. It would be the conventional way to ‘read’ this series of images by putting them on a ‘clock’ as the white numbers on the images indicate. They seem to represent one day of twenty-four-hours rather than my office living one day. Each image covers every two hour of a day, or rather, two cycles of the long hand of a clock. Here appears the first apparent ‘repetition’. One may find immediately twelve repetitive images with slight differences between them. Then, how can we say they are repetitive? What actually repeats? Is it my office, the images, or two hours? This would be a strange question for a person who argues that it is nonsense to distinguish the repetitions of my office, of the images, and of the two hours time just because they are the images of my



office of every two hours. If it is a proper argument, what binds these three apparently different entities into a single repetition? Yes, it is the very ‘confrontation’ which I discussed in the first and second chapter. What is considered repetitive here is my taking pictures every two hours. In other words, what repeats is a set of confrontations composed of my office, a camera, and my eye. The strategy of this experiment is to fix such a setting so that it can ‘just’ repeat every two hours, and it is achievable by a machine, a camera which holds my office and my eye in its two hands. In fact, what repeats is nothing but the system of the camera.

I have criticised the timeless identity in flowing time in the previous chapter, and in this chapter, suggest ‘repetition’ as the only alternative possibility to maintain a certain ‘identity within time’ without soliciting any a priori or transcendental ideas or unchanging characters of objects. It is the identity not given but generated in its own repetition in time. The repetition is neither identity nor time by itself, but something between them from which identity and time emerge. If a series of sounds can be a piece of music, or a certain meaning, there must be certain repetitions in any aspect of the sound so that one can recognise it as one ‘temporal’ body changing in time. Otherwise, it would be just a meaningless noise, chaos. If the images of [Figure 4-1] can be read as a unity, a ‘temporal’ body, it is because one can easily find many repetitive parts in images which are achieved by the fixed setting of a camera. It would be difficult to consider it as a unity if the angle, zoom, exposure of the camera keeps changing in each image.

However, the repetition in [Figure 4-1] is a ‘lame’ one since it has just one of two essential elements of repetition. Let me examine the repetition in a piece of music exemplified above. The repetitive beats of a drum in the music produce a temporal body which one can recognise as a certain unity. It

is a body made of the sounds of a drum. However, this temporal unity produced by repetition demands as its essential elements not just the sounds but also a certain silence between them, which is not just a hollow temporal distance between two beats, the absence of sound, but a substantial element of such a unity which has its own nature which is different from that of the sound.⁵ A drummer plays a piece of music not only by beating a drum, but also by not beating the drum. We can only listen to the sound by contrasting it with the silence, and also 'listen' to the silence by contrasting it with the sound. In fact, we always listen to the sound and the silence of a piece of music together when it repeats in time. Meanwhile, [Figure 4-1] is a piece of music without silence. It is the repetition without intermission. Can it be still called the 'repetition'?

What needs to be examined here is 'between' the images in [Figure 4-1]. There can be two different perspectives on this 'between' part. Firstly, and conventionally, one might suppose infinite number of same kind of images between two given images. It is an attempt to substitute silence with a simple absence of sound. If we put more images between given images, the gap can be reduced; from two hours, to one hour, to half an hour, to one minute, to one second, and so on. Then, will it be enough, if we have twenty four images in one second time so that it can be a cinema? Here is the confusion of Tschumi which I discussed in the previous chapter. The truth of cinema is not in the film strip, but in its 'play'. The mechanism of cinema is to force its audience to experience not only a series of taken photographs, but also 'something' between them. It becomes a piece of music with 'sound and silence', the true repetition, only when it 'runs'. Nevertheless, one still might feel certain repetitions and even temporality in [Figure 4-1] and supposedly 'hidden' images between them. It gives us a misunderstanding of repetition which consists of only repeating element; inhalation without exhalation, contraction without relaxation. However, there is another important element hidden in such repetition, which is the 'background'. Just like the background of flowing time in the previous chapter, it is a pre-structured background only on which things and events can repeat. The images in [Figure 4-1] repeat in accordance with the 'prepared' clock time. The repetition has been already there from the 'beginning' to the 'end'. To be more precise, my taking pictures, the system of confrontation, repeats on the regular distance of a clock. The images do not need the 'different something' between them to generate its own repetition, since the repetition is not of the images, not of my office, but of my taking pictures, the repetition of which is ensured by the ever-repeating movement of the second hand of a clock.

⁵ In relation to this 'silence or absence of sound', there is a famous and controversial piece of music named '4'33"', composed by John Cage (1912–1992). It was composed in 1952 for any instrument, and the score instructs the performer not to play the instrument during the entire duration of the piece. It is commonly perceived as "four minutes thirty-three seconds of silence". A conventional argument that "the piece actually consists of the sounds of the environment that the listeners hear while it is performed" is rather, simplistic considering its profound questioning about silence and music. However, in my text, I am interested in the silence with sound, or the silence between sounds, and the relationship or interaction between silence and sound.

However, what actually repeats is even not my taking photo itself but its location on a clock. Here is a 'beautiful' specialisation of the camera and the clock for the separated 'space and time'. As I examined previously, the camera produces a spatial universe in an instant by structuring a certain 'confrontation'. The clock produces a temporal universe by its 'pure' repetition without any difference, which accommodates every specific repetition of things and events as a background of them. To ensure the purity of the time's repetition, the camera should be fixed not to make any difference by its own repetitive working, while maintaining its stable structure of space. The clock hides behind the time with pure repetition without difference, and the camera hides behind the space with 'prepared' differences without repetition. The separation of space and time is achieved by this detachment of difference from repetition, of repetition from difference. In [Figure 4-1], one can easily find the different brightness of my office between 16:00 and 18:00. It seems clear that this difference cannot belong to any one of these two images. Even though numerous images are inserted between them, this difference cannot belong to any one of them. The brightness is surely a quality of a spatial universe. It is the brightness of my office suggested by the brightness of the images, but its 'change' cannot be accommodated either by one spatial universe suggested by a piece of photograph or by the time suggested by my repetitive taking photographs. The 'repeating instant' cannot constitute the 'time' with difference. If we can still talk about such a change from this series of images, how is it possible?

Repetition with Difference

Here, we need to introduce the second perspective on the 'between' part of the images.⁶ It is not enough just to suppose more detailed sequential images there. It is the 'silence', not 'omitted' sounds, not 'absence of sound'. In fact, I have already examined this 'interval' in three different names with different emphases in the first chapter; 'ground', 'togetherness', and 'whole'. Firstly, it is the 'ground' from which the images rise up to the 'surface'. At the same time, the 'ground' draws back the images as soon as they arrive at the 'surface'. Time is generated in this fight between ground and surface, between the 'interval' and images. In Figure 4-1, the arrangement of sequential images forces you not to stay on any one image of them. In contrast to conventional scientific preconceptions, neither you imagine additional images between given images. Regardless of your intention, you already 'see' the

⁶ I found it difficult to name this 'between part' because it is understood as purely temporal distance in my real office while presented as a certain space between images. I was reluctant to use a possible term, 'gap', since it can be confused with the 'gap' in the 'montage of fragments' by Jonathan Hill, which seems inclined to more spatial sense than my ideas. Instead, I will use the term, 'interval' taking a risk of misunderstanding, and will argue that the term, 'interval' needs to be understood in fundamentally different level, where time and space cannot be separated yet. See Jonathan Hill, *Actions of architecture : architects and creative users*. 2003, London: Routledge, pp109-128.

'interval' as a whole sum at once, while wandering from one given image to another. Indeed, such an arrangement of images is one of the simplest ways to allocate the repetitive 'interval', the 'ground', in the set. The ground keeps preventing you from 'confronting' any one of twelve given images. If this set of images 'works' in time, the secret is rather in this dragging 'ground' than in the images on 'surface'. Ironically, this ceaseless dragging back of the ground causes the repetitive rising up of the images. The repetition is 'vertical' rather than 'horizontal'. This vertical repetition accommodates the changing brightness of my office which I discussed above. One can 'compare' the difference of brightness between two given images. However, this difference is external to any of my office, the sun light, my taking photographs, or even the images. It is just the idea of difference drawn by a 'confronting' the viewer.⁷ Instead, the difference I concern here might be found between the ground and the image. It is rather a vertical difference between a rising image and itself than a horizontal difference between two neighbouring images. Time does not 'flow' from the first image to the last one, but 'repeats' its rising up in each image. The change is not 'found' between the images, but rather, each image 'changes'. One experiences the change by not confronting the given images.

I find the famous term, 'now and here' in this 'interval', the 'ground'. Rather, the 'ground' is an extreme now and here. You never establish yourself in the 'now and here' since you are 'doing' or 'making' the 'now and here' by rising up from the ground, with the ground. You can never confront the ground, since you are 'together' with it. You 'are' not yet there.⁸ Rather, you are 'pre-individual', a 'dissolved self'.⁹ Before your confronting an office with certain brightness, there are all the differences of brightness together in the 'ground', where no 'office' and 'you' have emerged yet. Indeed, the 'ground' is the wild world of differences where no identity can reside. Or, the 'ground' is rather a 'power' which 'makes' difference. The change of brightness is not from this brightness to another, but from the whole differentiating brightness to a certain brightness. Time is not such a flow from past to future, but a repetitive bifurcation of the 'now and here' into past and future. You establish yourself in these bifurcated past and future when you escape from the 'now and here', the 'togetherness'. Ironically, you are in the present, but only know yourself in the past and future. In [Figure4-1], the 'interval' between 16:00 and 18:00 rises up and bifurcates into two images of 16:00 and 18:00. Two images are not the 'cause' of their between part. On the contrary, they are the 'results' of the rising 'interval', which again will collapse by the aggression of the 'interval'. As soon as you rise up to the 'surface', as soon as you 'make' your identity on the 'surface' by confronting the images, the aggression of the 'interval' 'unmakes' it by dragging you down to the 'ground'. The process of

⁷ Deleuze calls it a 'difference drawn off'. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum, pp.356-358.

⁸ There are mere 'senses' before yourself, which I discussed in the first chapter. Or, you are yet 'a gesture plain' in the poem, 'Flower', I discussed in 'Name and Calling a Name' in chapter 3.

⁹ Gilles Deleuze, Op. cit., preface, p.xix.

experiencing the changing brightness of my office is the process of establishing your identity by rescuing yourself from undistinguishable togetherness.

However, the 'interval' is not limited within the space and time between two images. It is neither in the physical gap between two printed images nor in the time period between 16:00 and 18:00. It cannot be defined by limiting its border because it is a perpetual divergence and decentring. It is, rather, a power which keeps eroding the images. You can 'name' it, but it keeps escaping from the name. What you can do is just to keep 'naming' it. It is the 'history' and the 'context' of any given image.¹⁰ Or, it is all twelve images at the same time. It already contains all the brightness of my office. Without this 'interval' as the 'whole', the difference of brightness in [Figure 4-1] is either too large or too small. The difference between two separated images is too large, while the difference in one image is too small.¹¹ The former is generally called 'difference', and the latter is called 'identity'. Too large difference loses its essential character of the 'change' in time, while too small difference is subsumed under the 'sameness'. You cannot see the changing brightness by comparing two neighbouring images, or by confronting a single image. It is only possible when you see the 'interval' and the image simultaneously. You sense all twelve images 'behind' one image, or rather, you find one image rising up from the 'whole', in which twelve images are 'one', but not 'the same'. The difference 'happens' around and behind an image, and the image 'changes'.



[Figure 4-2] Drawing experiment, *Lighting and shadows*. overlapped sixteen digital photographs, 11/2006.



[Figure 4-3] Drawing experiment, *Movement in my office*. overlapped thirty three digital photographs, 9/2006.

¹⁰ In the second chapter, I have criticised the architects' trial to 'confront' the 'history' and the 'context'. My argument is that they cannot be the objects of confrontation because they are not in the 'surface', but in the 'ground'.

¹¹ Deleuze criticised that the greatest effort of philosophy was directed at conquering the difference by making it 'too large or too small, not only to be thought but to exist. Ceasing to be thought, difference was dissipated in non-being.' Gilles Deleuze, Op. cit., p.330.

Two images above are 'unattainable' challenges to catch the 'whole'. It is an endeavour to 'compose' a silence out of sounds. The first clear limitation of this kind of experiment is that it can only deal with movement, which can be translated into the difference of location in the space. The space as a 'background' needs to be suggested first by other fixed part in the picture. For the sake of the exhibition of moving lighting and shadow in Figure 4-2, and my moving body in Figure 4-3, every other element of my office is sacrificed. The shadows and bodies move only against their stable neighbours. Too big a difference is expressed on too a small difference, which is easily simplified into the misconception of 'timeless identity'. This strategy can never deal with myriad temporalities without movement; not even changing brightness of my office.¹² Rather, the image hides such subtle temporalities dwelling in everything around.

However, the potential of these experiments can be found when you experience 'unreal' togetherness of shadows and bodies in the image. It is rather large obstacle for this experience to know how the image is produced. If you were to find the overlap of different images, you might see just many instants, not the 'interval'. If you would see my office in different times through the image, the image might fall into just many 'screens'.¹³ When you just experience the image as it is, not designating its 'real' model, the image appears to be an 'interval', the 'whole'. It ceases to be a 'copy' of an original, and generates its own 'presence' together with you. The 'unreal' part of the image starts to erode the stable part around. It keeps preventing you from 'confronting' the office with its timeless identity. You as a viewer of the image lose yourself when you fail to confront 'a' reality, and fall into the 'ground'. While rising up to the 'surface', you do not 'find', but just keep 'recurring' my office with this shadow and that body from the brutal 'ground', the undistinguishable togetherness. The success of the image depends on its ability to draw you down to the 'interval' between instants repetitively. The image repeats itself in time, while ceaselessly yielding my office with difference together with you. Ironically enough, the 'unreal' togetherness of shadows and bodies in [Figure 4-2, 3-3] can seem more 'real' than the so-called 'reality' suggested by a single 'timeless' photograph.

E. H. Gombrich shows an interesting case of the film poster criticising the idea of '*punctum temporis*'. "*The so-called 'stills' which we see displayed outside cinemas and in books on the art of the film are not, as a rule, simply isolated frames from the moving picture enlarged and mounted. They are specially made and very often specially posed on the set, after a scene is taken.*"¹⁴ The 'specially made' poster of a film can be understood as an exercise to express the 'whole' of the film. None of the

¹² It is also the strategy of Bernard Tschumi which I have criticised in chapter 3.


¹³ See my argument about 'drawing as a screen' in the first chapter. It is a 'frozen confrontation' suggesting a spatial universe in an instant.

¹⁴ E. H. Gombrich, *The image and the eye*. 1986, Oxford: Phaidon, p.44.

huge amount of frames which consists of the film is really suitable for enlargement and display because it expresses neither the 'whole' nor the 'real' experience of the film. Indeed, the specially made poster is another 'unreal' image expressing the 'real' experience of the film. It tries to be the 'interval' of the frames which its audience experiences when the film runs. Is the architectural drawing an 'isolated frame' or a 'special poster'?



[Figure 4-4] Marcel Duchamp, *Sad Young Man on a Train*. 1911-1912. Oil on cardboard, 39 3/8 x 28 3/4 inches. Peggy Guggenheim Collection.



[Figure 4-5] Drawing experiment, *Rests beside the window of my office*; pencil on watercolour paper, 25 x 40.5cm, 9/2008.

Although [Figure 4-4] shows the subordination of representational fidelity to the demands of the abstract composition, both images above are the challenges to the 'isolated frame', a photographic scene. Duchamp's painting describes a young man smoking on a train while [Figure 4-5] describes objects in the window side of my office. Both works have clear physical objects to describe, but try to express more than mere photographs of them; a 'special poster' rather than an 'isolated frame',

'interval' rather than 'instant'. They are the 'interval' between two photographs of their objects, and the 'whole' photographs of their object at the same time.

It is generally accepted that this Duchamp's painting depicts two movements, that of the train in which we observe the young man smoking and that of the lurching figure itself. However, it seems not clear whether the figure is lurching, or the train is wobbling, or even the observer is swaying. Rather, there comes the lurch, wobble, or sway first before such distinction between the figure, the place, and the observer. The 'unreal' togetherness of repetitive lines and volumes hinders you from confronting any figure distinguished from its background. The painting draws you down to the 'interval' between moments, between lines, and between volumes, in which the 'lurch' itself is happening. Instead of representing the lurching figure and place, the painting generates its own 'lurch' together with its audience. Instead of representing the melancholy of young man with his drooping pose, the painting generates its own air of melancholy. The audience does not see such a scene 'through' the painting. The audience of the painting is not identified with the real observer of the scene. Instead, the audience of the painting 'keeps becoming' the observer of the scene in his/her repetitive struggle to rise up to the 'surface'. The forms in the scene glimmer on the 'surface' only after such movements and feelings as the 'whole'. However, without the glimmering forms, the movements and feelings in the 'interval' are nothing but a chaos of differences. Here is the paradox of the 'repetition'.

My drawing of [Figure 4-5] applies mixed strategies to express the 'interval'. There are three kinds of movement in the drawing. Firstly, there are 'physical movements' on the round area in the middle of the drawing. The 'unreal' togetherness of many cups on the area disturbs a timeless identity of a cup, and directly evokes the movement and repetition. It is an 'interval' between any two cups, and the 'whole' cups at the same time. It repeats my repetitive tea breaks in my office, and generates an air of relaxation. It is also the 'history' of the cup and my tea break, which is ever repeated in 'now'.¹⁵

Secondly, there is 'sensual movements' around the round area. It is in the fluttering windows and hanging electric heater. It is another possible strategy to disturb the confrontation through drawing to put things in unexpected settings. However, it is not for a 'shock', but for the generation of 'sensual movement' by 'forces' in the drawing. The forces of changing wind become the fluttering windows, while the force of the gravity becomes the hanging heater and cables. It is the role of audiences to find the windows and electric heater with their 'proper' form and location, but it is not before they find themselves in the drawing touched by the wind and pulled down by the gravity. They are asked

¹⁵ The idea of 'history' here can be contrasted to the history in architectural discourse which I criticised in the previous chapter.

to rescue themselves from the undistinguishable togetherness in the 'interval' repetitively.¹⁶ Finally, there is an 'ontological movement' between figures and their ground. It is about the technique of the 'paradoxical isolation' which I examined in the previous chapter. As in the drawing of [Figure 2-12], the round area in the drawing is a 'pedestal' for a mobile statue. Through this self-foundation, all the movements rise up to the 'surface' without soliciting any external structure. The space is never 'a priori', but rather, repetitively generated around this rising up isolated figure. It is not the space ruling the 'surface', but the space from the 'interval' glimmering on the 'surface'.

Repetition and Everyday

The difficulty in representing repetition is in the fact that we cannot confront it. It also means that we cannot confront time. We cannot recognise any repetition without our own repeating together. We can never contemplate the time from out of time. As I examined in the second chapter, our convention of drawing, especially architectural drawing, is deeply based on the system of confrontation. Rather, the drawing is suggested as a 'frozen' confrontation itself. It is inevitable that the drawing as confrontation is absolutely unable to deal with anything that cannot be confronted. This kind of drawing can only produce an architecture solely for confrontation, not for living together. What architects draw is not a building, but a specified relationship between a building and a person. From the very nature of such a drawing, architecture and human being are situated as opposite parties confronting each other only over a 'screen'. My experiments in this thesis are nothing but just to draw my office itself; the drawing which can 'replace' my office, not the drawing as my confrontation of my office.

I introduced the idea of 'repetition' in this chapter, but it is just another name for time within my argument. Ironically enough, the term, 'repetition' could be better term to investigate characters of time than the very term, 'time', which has long been corrupted by 'scientific' assumptions. I have criticised the idea of 'instant' in the first chapter and the idea of 'flowing time' in the third chapter both of which constitute the scientific assumption of time, which is a challenge of the human reason to construct the concept of time which we can fully 'confront', so that we can fully understand and control it. If we could confront it, we could represent it! However, as I have examined with many cases previously, various trials by architects to 'represent' time always show their intrinsic limitations and imperfection. Rather, the harder they try to catch time, the more they distort it because it is to

¹⁶ This idea was dealt in the examination of 'relationship' and 'context' in the previous chapter. See also the analysis of my drawing experiment, *Desks and a bookshelf in my office*, [Figure 2-9].

construct the whole body with its half elements. Here, the idea of repetition is introduced to examine the other half, which has been abandoned and even suppressed by science, and the relationship between those two parties. Through this idea of repetition, I argue that time for us is only possible with its two parties together, one we can confront and the other we cannot, working together by relying on and triggering each other. If architects can deal with only half of it in their drawing, they had better not talk about the other half, and so, any temporality in their architecture.

For architects with their conventional drawing, temporal reality is the 'repeating instant' since it has only elements on the 'surface' which they can confront. As I examined at the start of this chapter, it is a 'lame' repetition which only repeats in the background as a pre-given structure. There can be only the partitioned background between any two instants. Nothing can ensure the continuity between those instants, only with which one can call it a repetition, except their own absolute 'sameness'. There remains no possibility of the repetition with difference. This repetition of sameness is proved by the idea of timeless identity, and any difference is suggested external to it. For the architects with the modern criterion,¹⁷ the repetition is nothing more than the one that repeats since there is no difference between the one and the next.¹⁸ The repeating instant can be fully explored in one instant. The everyday is nothing more than many one days. However, Sarah Wigglesworth and Jeremy Till argue the everyday with difference, its brutal power.¹⁹ When they examine the everydayness in architectural reality (and also when Lefebvre analyses the 'rhythm' in everyday life), they try to recover the repetition by accentuating the other half forgotten or suppressed. They argue that "the contingent forces of the domestic everyday are too powerful to be suppressed". Yes, they are powerful because they ceaselessly float up from the 'ground' which you cannot confront since you are a part of it. As far as you cannot confront them, they are absolutely out of your control. Ironically, they are powerful not because they come from somewhere unknown, but because they are from deep inside of yourself.²⁰

In a sense, **you are the everyday**. It would be nonsense to generalise the everyday since there are as many different 'everydays' as the number of people in the world although they may reside together in the deepest 'ground'. It is to refuse any of your timeless identity prior to your everyday, your repetition, which is ceaseless rising up to the 'surface' and sinking down to the 'ground'. However,

¹⁷ In the sense in Eco's argument discussed in the start of this chapter.

¹⁸ "Absolute repetition is only a fiction of logical and mathematical thought, in the symbol of identity: $A=A$ (the sign reading 'identical' and not 'equal'). It serves as a point of departure for logical thought, with an immediate correction. The second A differs from the first by the fact that it is second. The repetition of unity, one(1), gives birth to the sequence of numbers." Henri Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis: space, time and everyday life*, translated by Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore, 2004, New York: Continuum. p. 7.

¹⁹ Sarah Wigglesworth, Jeremy Till, *The every day and architecture (Architectural Design)*. 1998, London: Academy Press. p. 6-9.

²⁰ "The everyday was always there, and we, like everyone else, were always immersed in it. To some extent it is this immersion which prevents us from seeing the everyday, or acknowledging it" Ibid. p. 7.

'your everyday' is not such a closed concept as 'your identity' is. It introduces your histories and relationships into your existence while repeating within time. You do not just repeat yourself alone. Rather, you cannot – because you are together with others in the 'ground', and rise up only by 'sensing' others, and set yourself on the 'surface' by confronting others. Wigglesworth and Till explain that they call the issue *The Everyday and Architecture* instead of *Architecture of the Everyday* "because that would subsume the term into the canon of architecture and suggest that architecture can represent the everyday in a reified manner."²¹ However, my concern here is, rather, **the everyday of architecture**. Can architecture be the everyday as you are? Does architecture repeat? Yes, it does. Everything repeats as far as it is being in time. But, what kind of repetition? Is it not the 'repetition of sameness', 'repetition without interval'? Does it ceaselessly rise up and sink down?

When you have a formal dialogue with another person in a businesslike way, you keep trying to stay on the *surface* hiding your repetition. You are there not as a living creature, but a certain timeless identity with a clear and concrete boundary in a certain social structure. Your repetition is disguised by a 'lame' repetition on the structure as a background, and your identity repeats the same itself just in the structure. Rather, you are positioned there as an element of the structure as the other person is, and the words travel in the structure reflected on your and the other's boundaries. Your confronting the other is already conditioned by the rule of dialogue in the structure. The dialogue may produce something 'new' as a 'result', but it does not make any difference of yourself since everything happens out of yourself just in the prepared structure, the *surface*. However, when you have a chat with a close person, your friend, you devote yourself into the evolving chat.²² There is no 'result' expected, but the chat is still woven. Ironically, your friend turns out to be the "*other*" in the Wittgenstein's sense, who does not share a set of rules with you, and it makes you sink down to the 'interval' of the chat, the *ground*.²³ You have less chance to 'confront' or even 'understand' your friend because you and your friend are weaving the everyday, the repetition, together. The everyday is not made in such a structured surface with rules, but makes and destroys its own rule repetitively. You and your friend are not the 'same', but still the 'one' while becoming one repetition. Your and your friend's identity just glimmer with uttered words on the *surface* by turns. It is everlasting 'calling a name'.²⁴ The generated 'new' is not out in the *surface*, but in yourself, your everyday, as the 'differences'. It is every kind of unexpected and uncontrollable 'senses' of the 'other' you feel from inside of yourself.

²¹ Ibid, p. 9.

²² I have already exemplified such a dialogue between Mikako and Noboru in the first chapter. Makoto Shinkai, *Voices of a distant star*, 2002, animation film, run time 30minutes.

²³ Ludwig F. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation*, 2nd ed., translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 1958, New York: Macmillan, p.81. And also, Kojin Karatani, (1995). *Architecture as metaphor: language, number, money*. translated by Sabu Kohso, edited by Michael Speaks, 1995, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp.108-112.

²⁴ See 'Name and Calling a Name' in chapter 3.

There is a famous way to make the “*other*” which does not share a set of rules; to follow the Kantian principal of ‘disinterestedness’ – satisfaction without interest.²⁵ Tschumi can be categorised in this class when he proposes the ‘useless architecture’ – “a building that escapes the utility of space, a building which would have no other purpose but ‘architecture’.”²⁶ However, this is to give up any dialogue only to suggest an architecture as the *other*. It seems a misunderstanding of the idea of the *other* because it is not a name for a certain identity, but something enduring only in a dialogue. It would be a better strategy to make the architectural functioning a true dialogue, the everyday, by displacing and disguising the function as a system of the ‘surface’, than just to abandon it; to go deep into the ‘ground’ of the function – an escape through the front line rather than a retreat.²⁷ While abandoning the ‘utility of space’ as a social structure, as I examined in the previous chapter, Tschumi’s architecture solely relies upon the powerful structure of the ‘space’ itself for the sake of absolute freedom of ‘events’.²⁸ It seems like an ‘art’ of space. I do not intend to criticise its being an art here. On the contrary, it had to be ‘more’ art by isolating itself, by being based on itself, rather than being inscribed in and subsumed by ready-prepared structure of the space.²⁹ The architecture disappears since it does not generate anything new, which is to be produced solely by such ‘events’ of people. What I would argue here instead is a paradox of dialogue, of everyday, of repetition, and of time, which is the ‘**simultaneity of togetherness and confrontation**’, or the ‘**simultaneity of the whole and the singular**’. It is to see the whole not around the *other*, but in it. It is to throw yourself into the *other* to repeat together, to weave a dialogue together. It is to throw my everyday into the office’s everyday to weave the everyday together. I never see or understand the everyday of my office without losing myself in it. But, it is fully sensed by and in my body and soul while I escape from the indistinguishable whole.

Now, let me answer my question above; can architecture be the everyday as you are? My answer is yes, but in two paradoxical conditions. Firstly, it needs to be ‘itself’ without relying on other external ‘rules’ in every physical and mental term. It needs to express itself every moment rather than something else. It does not mean to be independent from everything. Rather, it is to struggle ceaselessly to establish its own identity distinguished from the brutal whole by including ever-emerging every difference in itself. It is the repetition renewing itself on its own physical, mental, historical, and relational foundation. It is to be sensible to every event happening on its body. Architecture lives its own ‘now’ and becomes a ‘rhythm’ to be resonant with other rhythms. Secondly,

²⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of judgement*. translated by J.H. Bernard. 2nd ed. 1914, London: Macmillan.

²⁶ Bernard Tschumi, *Questions of Space: lectures on architecture*. London: Architectural Association, p.15.

²⁷ Jean Baudrillard, *Jean Baudrillard: a collection of essays*. edited and translated into Korean by Yon-bok Jung, 1993, Seoul: Sol, pp.19-21.

²⁸ My arguments about Tschumi is in ‘Background of Flowing Time’ in chapter 3.

²⁹ See the boxed argument on a painting by Bacon in the section ‘History’ in chapter 3.

it needs to disappear every moment so that it can re-establish itself ceaselessly. It needs to destroy its own identity as soon as it is settled in the 'surface'. It needs to lose its peculiarity to become anonymous. In other words, it needs to 'die' every moment. However, it does not mean to be subsumed by any 'rule' of the 'surface'. Rather, it is to sink down to itself, its foundation, its 'interval', its 'ground'. It is to return to its past future through its now. Architecture disappears by throwing itself into the dialogue with people, into the interaction with the nature, into its physical and mental functioning, into its history and relationships, to generate with the *other* the effects, the sensations, the meanings, and so, the 'now' and the 'everyday'.

[Chapter review]

In this chapter, I introduced the term, 'repetition' to overcome the dichotomy between 'pure' time and 'timeless identity'. It is an attempt to recover the temporality of every existence, by denying any distinction between changes and what changes. The 'repetition' is more 'material' than the 'pure' time, but more changeful than 'timeless identity'. 'Repeating I' is neither 'my everyday' nor 'I in everyday', but 'I as everyday'. If I 'repeats', it neither means the succession from this I here to that I there, nor the absolute repetition of the same 'I's, but the establishment of peculiar I now upon my 'wholeness'. It is the way I can maintain my identity in time, which, otherwise, would be scattered in chaos, without soliciting such an artificial concept of 'timeless identity'. It is to define myself not from outside, but from inside. My identity is not just given, but achieved every moment.


As a counterpart of 'instants' on the 'surface', I introduced 'interval' in the 'ground', which connects the idea of 'repetition' in this chapter with arguments in previous chapters. The 'instants' can be linked with each other to constitute time only together with this 'interval'. It is to suggest an idea of time without soliciting any external structure, 'background'. However, the 'interval' is not between the 'instants' because there are no such 'intervals' on the 'surface', but just 'the interval' in the 'ground', which holds the 'instants' on the 'surface' not to be scattered. It is the 'whole' from which every peculiar instant arises. Time is not an absolute repetition of the same instant, which is impossible without an external structure, the 'background', but 'repetition with difference' which produces an ever-new instant from one-changing-'interval'. The 'difference' is not out of time, but in the time with its 'body', the 'repetition'.

When we bring a temporal dimension into the identity of a 'thing' – when a 'thing' is considered as a certain 'repetition' – the 'representation' of it faces a dilemma because it can represent neither 'instant' nor 'interval'; neither the '*surface*' nor the '*ground*'. One cannot draw the 'interval' since he/she cannot 'confront' it. Neither can he/she draw the 'instant' since there is no 'background' of the 'instant', which would ensure the 'equality' between the 'thing' and its representation. The next chapter will deal with such a dilemma, investigating the relationship between a representation and what it represents in our temporal world, the world of the 'repetition'.

Chapter 5. Representation and Replacement

Representation of Equivalence

Before discussing the repetition of drawing elements such as paper (frame, texture, flatness...) and pen (lines, tones, movement...) in the following chapters, I need to examine here the repetition of the drawing itself; the 'drawingness' as a repetition. As I examined the repetition of architecture with the name of 'the everyday of architecture' above, I would argue here the paradoxical condition of the 'repeating drawing' in time. It is paradoxical because drawing fully 'endures' on its own, repeating its rising up to the 'surface' through its own 'body' every moment, while maintaining its original subject as its foundation on the 'ground' at the same time. My drawing of my office is a piece of drawing on its own and a kind of my office at the same time. The drawing keeps distinguishing itself from my office although it can never be freed from my office since it always demands my office to be distinguished from it. The drawing does not 'designate' my office out there since my office is already in the drawing, more precisely, in the repetition of the drawing. It is the ceaseless 'replacement', which is to be the 'one' but not the same, rather than the 'representation', which tries to be the 'same' but only by sacrificing its own life in time.



[Figure 5-1] Drawing experiment, *Perspective drawing of my office*; pencil on tracing paper, 79 x 41cm (S=1:100).


I have long been criticising the representation as a 'frozen' confrontation throughout this thesis. But, this seems the inevitable fate of representation especially in the architectural field which demands the drawing as a tool for the construction of a building. If it is an architectural drawing especially, it must have a certain relationship with our 'reality' including a certain type of 'building'. The relationship always has a temporal dimension because the drawing comes either before or after the building. The drawing tries to 'repeat' the building in its way sometimes after, sometimes before it. Here, the 'repetition' can be assured by a belief in the 'exchangeability' between the drawing and a building based on their 'equivalences'; that the drawing and the building can be translated into each other. They are understood and explained in the realm of the 'language of science', dominated by the symbol of equality, in which each term may be exchangeable by others.¹ We do not doubt any more the equality and exchangeability between a line of an edge of a wall in reality and a line in a drawing 'representing' it. But, when we concentrate on the lines only, how can the black trace of a pencil on paper and the edge of the wall be considered to be equal? I doubt the argument that this is just a matter of precision, or the nature of abstraction, because there is a fundamental difference in their ontological status. What can be found in this representational drawing is, in fact, the equality between the building and what you see through the drawing, which is proved by the equality between the drawing and your seeing the building. Here occur deep confusions between the building and your seeing the building, and between the drawing and what you see through the drawing. The strategy of the drawing to conceal such confusions is to invalidate such complex distinctions by suggesting a 'system' which accommodates them as a set. The first set is of **the building – your seeing the building – you**, while the other set is of **what you see through the drawing – the drawing – you**. The equality between these two sets is disguised as the equality between the building and the drawing. As you can expect, such a set is nothing but a certain 'instant' defined by a certain 'frozen' confrontation. It constitutes the strong idea of the 'repeating instant' which I examined in the previous chapter. The equality suggested here is, in fact, the equality between one instant pretending to be the building and another instant pretending to be the drawing. But, how can two different instants be equal?

Figure 5-1, following conventional methods of perspective drawing, shows a 'frozen' moment of a certain confrontation. Although it is an impossible view through the ceiling in reality, one can imagine oneself viewing such a scene at a certain position at a certain moment. What is suggested by the drawing is the equality between the moment one sees the office and the moment one sees something through the drawing although there can be no equality found between the office and the black marks on white paper. It would be reasonable to explain that the drawing is about my viewing the scene.

¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum, p.2.

More precisely, the black marks of the drawing are the record of my moving gaze following distinctive borders in the scene. What is 'frozen' is not my office, but my conditioned interaction with my office. To suggest two timeless sets which can be exchangeable by each other, the drawing hides my moving gaze scanning my office and on the drawing by concealing the movements of a pen on paper. The drawing should not be something 'made' because it needs to be equal to 'things' in reality that exist by themselves all at once. Indeed, the drawing pretends to be something exchangeable with my office with a name of 'representation'.

Indeed, Figure 5-1 is rather about an 'instant' settled by my office than about my office in an instant. It is because the 'instant' is nothing but the 'universal space'² which is suggested by the structure of my confronting the office. The drawing does not stop time to describe my office, but just uses a specific aspect of my office arbitrarily to construct an instant in it. What is drawn is not my office, but the instant, the 'space'. Now, the instant, the only instant regardless of its contents, repeats. It is the 'absolute repetition' which Lefebvre criticised.³ However, it is the 'lame' repetition on the 'surface' without the 'interval', the 'ground'. The equivalence between my office and its drawing is ensured by the equivalence between two instants, which is defined by the only universal space. It is a piece of music without any 'silence' and 'differences'. It could still be a sound, but no one can even catch it since it is the repetition of absolute equivalence. You may still believe that you can see the office in the drawing, but what you are actually seeing is the space 'proved' by the office. You are just unable to catch it because it is the 'music without silence and difference', 'repetition without interval'. You are introduced to construct another instant whenever you see the drawing, but your instant has no difference from the instants of anybody else at any time.



[Figure 5-2]
Drawing
experiment, *Plan
drawing of my
office*; pencil on
tracing paper, 79
x 41 cm
(S=1:100).

² See 'Idea of Instant' in the first chapter.

³ Henri Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis: space, time and everyday life*, translated by Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore, 2004, New York: Continuum. p.7.

It is not because it is a perspective drawing to explain it as an instant. Rather, it is an instant because it is defined by a certain 'frozen' confrontation. The plan drawing, [Figure 5-2], is not so different from this concept as one might expect. The drawing is still about one's seeing the office, not the office itself. It tries to hide your confronting the office pretending a so called 'objectivity', but the difference is just the distance of the confrontation. The drawing pushes you out to the infinite distance, but still, you are asked to be somewhere as a member of a 'set' of an instant confronting the office.⁴ Since you are supposed to see the office from infinite distance, it is rather easier to ignore the time for your moving gaze. It successfully gives you an impression that the lines in the drawing belong to the things in my office, and it is asserted as an evidence of the equivalence between the drawing and my office. However, the lines belong neither to the things in my office nor to the drawing, but to the 'space' which ensures the equivalence between two instants, of my office and of the drawing. Every relationship between points on the drawing is 'equal' to the relationship between positions in my office because there resides the same a priori 'space'. The drawing is suggested as an 'absolute repetition' of my office, but what repeats is not my office, not the drawing, but the 'instant', the 'universal space', the ruler of the 'surface' without the 'ground'. The drawing already 'represents' my office before anything drawn.

Resemblance as the Producer

In the article, 'How do pictures represent?', Max Black examines various possible answers to the very question.⁵ After investigating some candidates like 'causal history', 'intentions of the producer', and 'information', he concentrates on the oldest but strongest candidate, 'resemblance'. Throughout his elaborate argument, he points out that the 'resemblance' is the 'umbrella term' which covers a large variety of processes of matching and analogy-drawing. The conventional idea of resemblance, point-to-point correspondences, is discarded since it ignores various essential influences of temporal aspects of picture-making and picture-reading. Here are but two examples of many by him:

"What counts as a sufficient degree of resemblance, and the respects in which features of resemblance are treated as relevant, is strongly determined by the overall purpose of the process. ... If I am asked to compare A with B, or to say how much resemblance there is


⁴ Differently from the perspective drawing, the orthographic drawing tries to be 'eternal' by expelling the viewer out of its system. However, the 'eternity' is just another name of the 'instant'. Both of them just mean the unattainable timelessness.

⁵ Max Black, 'How do pictures represent?'. In E.H.Gombrich, Julian Hochberg, and Max Black, *Art, Perception, and Reality*, 1994, London: The Johns Hopkins Press Ltd., pp.95-129.

*between them, in the absence of any indication of what the comparison is to be used for, I do not know how to proceed...*⁶

*... our mastery of the skill of interpreting or "reading" photographs depends essentially upon our schematic knowledge of how such photographs are in fact normally produced. It is through our knowledge of the photograph's provenance that we understand what the photograph "shows." ... Indeed, specific reference to the circumstances of production may be necessary in order to determine what the subject is".*⁷

Black shows the complex relationship between a drawing and its subject when the point-to-point correspondences, enabled by a priori space common to both parties, are discarded. I have criticised conventional architectural drawings such as perspectives and orthographies for their embedded equality prior to any content. However, as soon as we discard this easy way to ensure absolute repetition, the impeccable representation, the drawing cannot help meeting a 'disaster'. The connectivity between the drawing and its subject, which looked simple before, turns out to be such a labyrinthine phenomenon, which Black struggled to elaborate with so many terms and reasons. When the instant-space ceases to generate its absolute repetition, how can the drawing still repeat its subject in the time for itself?



[Figure 5-3]
Drawing
experiment,
*Breeze in
my office
1-1*;
woollen
string with
Chinese ink
on paper,
42 x 59cm,
11/2007.

⁶ Max Black, Op. cit., p.121.

⁷ Max Black, Op. cit., p.126.

Let me clarify the question once again. Ironically enough, all the trouble starts with the drawing's unattainable attempt to be a purely temporal phenomenon in spite of its concrete materiality. The drawing establishes itself as an immaterial event while suggesting its subject as an illusion. It is a 'viewing' before the 'viewer' and the 'viewed'. When the drawing tries to be 'my confronting the office', it cannot help 'freezing' it, or 'spatializing' it. Instead of this 'mismatch' between the drawing and my confronting the office, what relationship between the drawing and my office can be suggested? My argument, the key argument of this thesis, is simply to accept the drawing's 'living in time' with its body, histories, and relationships, so that we can 'experience' it as we experience our surroundings, our neighbours, and buildings; **to establish the drawing in time**. Here arises the question; then, how can my drawing be of my office while maintaining its own substantiality?

The first strategy is to repeat 'my experiencing the office' through 'my making a drawing'. [Figure 5-3] was made by a special setting, which can record its own experiencing the breeze in my office. A piece of woollen string was hung from the ceiling onto the floor of my office. A piece of Korean paper for calligraphy was attached on the middle of the string to make it sensitive to the breeze. Ink absorbed in the string generated marks on a piece of paper on the floor while the 'sail' sensed the breeze. It seems not clear whether or not the drawing as a result 'looks like' or 'resembles' the breeze of my office since nobody ever has seen the breeze. But, it seems clear that the drawing is 'equal' to nothing, and that you do not see something 'through' the drawing. You neither 'find' something in the drawing because the drawing is neither signs nor symbols of something else, but just marks on paper with its own physical body and histories. You do not need to 'decode' any information from it since nothing has been encoded. Instead, you are asked to 'meet' the drawing as it is, and generate a unique experience of the breeze while repeating in time together with the drawing. The drawing does not 'designate' the breeze, but even more directly, brings the breeze into itself when it 'repeats' itself with its own uniqueness and singularity.⁸ The drawing already and always contains its being made and being read in its own 'existence', but as their ever-changing forms, because it has the 'interval', the 'whole' in its everlasting repetition in time. You experience the drawing's being made, the drawing's sensing the breeze, when you 'read' the drawing. Rather, the drawing 'speaks' to you about its experience, about itself.


If there is an 'analogy' in [Figure 5-3], it is between the setting that generates the drawing and 'you' as a sensing 'body', between the drawing's sensing the breeze and your sensing the breeze. The breeze is already a part of the setting, and produces the drawing together with it. Rather, the drawing

⁸ "To repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent." Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum, p.1.

is generated on the ‘surface’ when it rises up from and isolates itself from the ‘whole’, in which it was undistinguishably together with the breeze. If there is a ‘resemblance’ between the breeze and the drawing, it is the resemblance between one and itself since the breeze always resides in the ‘interval’ of the repeating drawing. Deleuze explains this kind of resemblance, calling it ‘**resemblance as the producer**’.

“Resemblance is the producer when the relations between the elements of one thing pass directly into the elements of another thing, which then becomes the image of the first – for example, the photograph, which captures relations of light”.⁹

[Figure 5-4] **Light in my office**; Digital photograph, 11/2006



His example of the photograph is simple but meaningful. Although we know well that the photograph is produced by the light captured by a camera, we tend to consider it as a copy of things taken, not the captured ‘relations of light’. [Figure 5-4] is a photograph ‘of my desk one sunny day’. However, is it not a ‘record’ of various lights which are refracted by windows, passing blinds, hitting books, dispersed on the desk, and reflected on the wall? Does it ‘resemble’ my office with light or the light in my office? They are two different perspectives on the camera. If one sees a desk, a monitor, books and pens in the photograph, he/she is considering the camera as a viewfinder, **the ‘screen’**, through which one sees the world. If one sees lights with various brightness and colours in the photograph, he/she is considering the camera as a set of lens and film, **the ‘eye’**, which directly senses the world. The camera as the screen is a tool which is going to be abandoned after the photograph as the screen. The camera as the eye is a unique body which never disappear from the photograph it has produced.

⁹ Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*, translated from the French by Daniel W. Smith, 2003, London: Continuum, p.80.

The objects are always over the screen, but the lights are in the photograph together with the camera. The former suggests the 'equivalence' between the one who sees the world through the camera and the one who sees the world through the photograph. The latter suggests the 'analogy' between the camera which senses the world and you who sense the world. You need to become a camera to sense the lights in the photograph.

In this sense, the photograph of the light, Figure 3-9 is not so much different from the drawing of the breeze, Figure 5-3. Both of them are the productions of special settings which have analogy with our bodily experiences. You are supposed to sense the breeze touching your skin and the light hitting your retina together with the images. Rather, you 'rescue' your skin and retina from the images because they are already in the drawing together with the breeze and the light. How can you have your skin without the touching air and your eyes without the light?

Skin, Bone, and Flesh


Although we may not be sensitive enough to catch it, we are experiencing such 'resemblance as producer' around us every day. A fluttering curtain resembles a wind through windows and a rolling boat resembles waves in the ocean. My disorderly desk resembles my working and roadways resemble the flows of running cars. Dirt and scratches on the floor resemble the movements of people and stains on a building wall resemble the wind and rain. Such resemblances are everywhere around architecture probably except for the 'shiny, hard, immutable surfaces' of so-called hi-tech buildings.¹⁰

An architect would be able to apply such resemblances to his/her building design in two ways. The first way is to use it for the 'skin'.¹¹ It is the surfaces of a building which 'accept' and collect their various experiences in time. The architect may devise a special setting for the building surface to amplify and record such experiences as I have installed the 'sail' in my office for the drawing of the breeze. The building approves its 'ageing' and exhibits it proudly on its face. However, although it could be the elements of the building which evoke certain temporalities, one cannot make up the building only with the 'skin'. What would be translated into a building here is rather the 'setting' than the 'drawing', the cause rather than the result. One cannot make up the building only with 'causes' because its materiality can never be removed after the 'result' as the physical 'sail' is not needed

¹⁰ Jeremy Till, *Thick time: architecture and the traces of time*. in 'Intersections'. I. Borden and J. Rendell. 2000, London: Routledge. pp.285-289.

¹¹ It is not the architectural term meaning a 'building envelope'. It is, rather, a 'face'. The terms, 'skin', 'flesh', and 'bone' were borrowed from the Deleuzian terms, 'face', 'head', and 'bone' for the interesting analysis on Bacon's portraits. See the chapter titled "Body, meat and spirit", in Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*, translated from the French by Daniel W. Smith, 2003, London: Continuum, pp.15-19.

anymore after the drawing of the breeze. The building can never be established only on the 'ground', but needs to be built on the 'surface' as well. The building can never be just the 'structure' for its 'skin', but has its own 'body'. As Tschumi's building tries to disappear to be just a 'background' for the 'events' of people,¹² the building body here, disappears to be the 'background' of natural events of its skin. However, a building never stays as a background, and is always more than just 'skins'.



[Figure 5-5] Drawing experiment, *Movement of my body in my office*; colour pencil on tracing paper, 33 x 49cm.




[Figure 5-6] A image from "Concept Book" for Seattle's new central library by OMA/LMN. Dec. 15, 1999

The second way is to use the 'resemblance as the producer' for the 'bone'. It is the 'spatial organisation' of a building which 'resembles' physical movements of people or our socio-political 'forces'. In fact, it is what every architect uses in his/her design without acknowledging it, and especially Koolhaas straightforwardly shows its extreme as I examined it before. The flowing lines in [Figure 5-5] certainly resemble my movement in my office. Although this resemblance is achieved through the medium of the space, the flowing lines are still different from those in conventional depictive drawings as far as one does not see something 'through' the drawing. However, as soon as the lines 'representing' the furniture of my office are introduced to make the drawing 'understandable', the flowing lines fall into mere signs on the space. The movement disappears, and only the instant-space in paper 'equivalent' to that of my office is exhibited. The drawing turns out to be the 'frozen' confrontation again, and only the instants repeat without the 'interval'. The strategy of Koolhaas is to stay in the immaterial diagram with words not to be submerged by the space as pre-structure. His drawing tries to be the 'bone' without 'body', even without the 'skin'. It might be 'temporal' because it is the image built in his 'thought'. The programmes generate the 'spatial organisation' as a form of the diagram, which is to be directly translated into a building without the medium of the space. He suggests the building of the 'bone' with its directness. His 'masses' may

¹² See "Background of Flowing Time" in chapter 3.

'vibrate' as the lines in [Figure 5-5] 'flow'. However, his building is like a 'ghost' since it refuses to be 'material', not to be merely 'spatial'. Rather, the materiality which is inevitably involved in a 'real' building is emancipated from the spatial organisation which resembles movements and programmes from the socio-political forces. The emancipated materials may become 'skins', which enjoy their freedom irrelevantly from the organising 'bone'. It is a 'ghost' only with its 'skin' and 'bone', without a 'body'.¹³

In general, a building meets nature on its 'skin' and accommodates people and their culture in its 'bone'. However, this is not a spatial issue of inside and outside. A building also has its skin inside and its space outside. Neither is this just an issue of the nature and culture. Nature, such as the gravity, is always involved in the organisation of the space and the form of a building, and culture also leaves its traces on the skin of a building. The 'skin' and the 'bone' are, rather, **two 'forces' which sustain**



[Figure 5-6] Lee Jung, **Bamboos in a wind**; ink on silk (17c, 127.8x71.4cm), Gansong Gallery, Seoul.

the identity of the building in destructive time; one from its outer border, the other from its innermost border. The 'skin' is the 'sensation' felt, while the 'bone' is the 'meaning' that is understood.¹⁴ Rather, the 'skin' settles fluttering sensations, while the 'bone' grasps scattering too-many-meanings. The 'skin' and the 'bone' repeat to establish 'the building' in our spatial world, and themselves are the 'paths' to the '*surface*' where the building's ceaseless rising up from the '*ground*' arrives. The 'skin' is the 'abstract' path, and the 'bone' is the 'figurative' path. They are the frontiers where time meets space and plants its footprint on it. However, they are already the structured, spatial organisations as far as they stay in the '*surface*' although they try to relate themselves with what repetitively comes from the '*ground*' through the 'resemblance as the producer'.

Although [Figure 5-6] is just a flat drawing on silk, it also has its 'skin' and 'bone'. The 'skin' of the

¹³ It might be a proper strategy for this age of computer. In computer simulation, one may build a form and 'map' its surface.

¹⁴ The 'sensation' and the 'meaning' can be implied by the term, 'sense'. See "Togetherness" in chapter 1.

drawing is neither the skin of the ‘bamboos’ nor the surface of the silk. It is the ‘border’, somewhere between the drawing as the settle-r and the painter as the settle-d. It collects and records the delicate interactions between the silk, ink, brush and painter. The painter is the person who leaves the traces of the movement of his/her body. The ‘good’ skin is sensitive enough to catch not only the trajectory of the movement, but also its speed, vibration, pressure, and many other ‘forces’. The drawing is the ‘abstract’ record of such forces before it is of the ‘bamboos in a wind’. The ‘bone’ of the drawing is neither the stems of the ‘bamboos’ nor the brush lines in the drawing. It is the ‘border’ somewhere between the drawing as the grasp-er and the ‘bamboos in a wind’ as the grasp-ed. Although it is still ‘visual’, it is not the representation as the absolute repetition of the frozen confrontation as far as it tries to grasp the ‘bamboo’ on its own. The only clue to its spatiality is the dim rocks at the bottom corner of the drawing. The organisation of forms in the drawing does not rely on the spatial structure, but comes from the ‘bamboo’ itself. The bamboo is not ‘being’ in the space, but ‘standing’ on the rock. The bamboo is not ‘occupying’ the structured space, but ‘spreading’ from its own structure. The structural organisation of the forms in the drawing ‘resembles’ that of the bamboo, but it does not mean the ‘equivalence’ between someone’s viewing the bamboo and viewing through the drawing because it is about the bamboo and the drawing themselves. In short, the drawing meets the painter at its ‘skin’ and the ‘bamboo’ at its ‘bone’. However, they are not as irrelevant from each other as those of the building by Koolhaas are. In this drawing, [Figure 5-6], the ‘sensation’ and the ‘meaning’ are seizing each other like two wrestlers. The drawing is ‘abstract’ and ‘figurative’ at the same time. Then, what is the relationship between the ‘skin’ and the ‘bone’ of the drawing?



[Figure 5-7] Paul Klee, *Diana in the Autumn Wind* (1934, 62x48cm), Kunstmuseum, Bern

This drawing by Klee, [Figure 5-7], could be another example with similar issues. One may find similarities between [Figure 5-6] and [Figure 5-7] in spite of their apparently different techniques. Instead of the strokes of the calligraphy brush, Klee ‘invented’ continuous lines to generate the ‘skin’ of the drawing. The lines are more ‘decorative’ than ‘representative’. By giving the same texture to the figure and its background, he also suggests the ‘skin of the drawing’. It is, rather, the traces of his pen and hand. But, it does not mean the material paper surface as a result. Rather, it is somewhere above it, between the paper and the painter or the viewer. The ‘bone’ holds these lines and marks so that they do not fall into the non-meaning, the chaos.

It is the border between the drawing itself and 'Diana in the autumn wind' out of the drawing. It is not in the drawing, but somewhere beneath it. Forms in the drawing emerge from running lines, but their organisation resembles that of Diana. In fact, the 'skin' and the 'bone' obstruct each other.¹⁵ The 'bone' deconstructs the 'skin' as a settled sensation, while the 'skin' dragging down the 'bone' on the 'surface'. While stabilising what rises from the 'ground' into their paths, the 'skin' and the 'bone' struggle to stay on the 'surface', but never achieve it. It is the competition to occupy the only 'surface', the instant. In a sense, the drawing has two 'surfaces'; one above and the other below, the 'skin' and the 'bone'. They may look two different 'surfaces' in the opposite positions when we see from outside, but in fact, they are just the one from the viewpoint of the drawing itself. They are the 'forces' which ceaselessly try to hold what rises up from the 'ground' on the 'surface'.

What rises up to the 'skin' and the 'bone' is the very drawing as the 'flesh'. It is the 'thickness' of the drawing between the 'surface-above' and the 'surface-below'. It is the 'interval' between two instants. If the 'skin' and the 'bone' deal with what happens 'around' the drawing, the 'flesh' deals with the drawing with its own temporal dimension; which 'repeats' itself in time. The 'flesh' of the drawing, [Figure 5-6] is the 'bamboos in a wind' living in the drawing, not out of the drawing. It is the bamboo made of black ink, but fluttering in a wind in the drawing. It is even more 'material' than the 'skin' or the 'bone' because it comes neither from the moving brush, nor from any given forms or structure, but emerges from the very marks of ink on silk. It is the sensation and meaning which 'grows' from material itself. While the 'skin' concerns what has left the traces on material, the 'flesh' grows at the sensations from the material. While the 'bone' concerns the connections of stems, branches, and leaves of the bamboo, the 'flesh' grows from the heart of one leaf made of single brush stroke with its whole history and materiality. The viewer cannot see the leaf of the bamboo 'through' the mark in the drawing since the mark has already got its own 'flesh' with thickness and volume. Rather, he/she finds the mark's 'becoming' the leaf while being devoted into the process together. He/she directly feels the blowing wind on his/her body, and even hears the fluttering leaves. The painter, viewer, bamboo, wind, sound and movement are all 'in' the 'flesh' of the drawing, and rise up to the 'surfaces' until meeting their 'skin' and 'bone'.

The painter does not need to blur the contour of leaves or overlap different forms of them to express their fluttering. What is needed is not the flutter of leaves, but the fluttering leaves. You cannot 'confront' the flutter, but just experience it by fluttering together. The untouched silk plane of the drawing does not 'represent' the empty inert space. It is not just the 'background' of the bamboos, but rather, the 'field' inseparable from the bamboos. It is not beneath, behind, or beyond the figure, but is strictly to the side of it, or rather, all around it. The border between the field and the figure does not

¹⁵ This can be understood as the same situation with the case of the 'ruin' which I examined in the second chapter.

just belong to the figure, but also belongs to the field. It is the contour as the common limit of the two. This 'absolute proximity'¹⁶ does not let the field consign the figure to immobility but, on the contrary, renders sensible a kind of progression, an exploration of the figure within the field, or upon itself. The fluttering leaves make the field flutter. Or rather, the whole drawing flutters. The bamboos are not confined in the black marks, but reside everywhere in the drawing. The border between the figure and the field may look clear, but because of such absolute proximity, the figure and the field, the form and its ground are situated on a single plane, and become exchangeable into each other.¹⁷ The bamboos are not clearly distinguished from the air around, the wind and the rock. The whole drawing is the 'bamboo in a wind'. The whole drawing with its own materiality and thickness 'becomes' the 'bamboo in a wind', and 'replaces' an actual bamboo out of the drawing. It is the 'flesh' of the drawing.

In summary, the '*surface*' receives the 'senses' while the '*ground*' generates them. We can 'confront' the senses in the '*surface*', but not in the '*ground*'. The '*surface*' may get aged while the '*ground*' grows. The '*skin*' receives the sensations, and the '*bone*' receives the meanings. They are the 'instants' on the '*surface*', and may have their 'interval' on the '*ground*'. The '*flesh*' of a drawing emerges from the deep inside of the very drawing, and keeps generating the sensations and meanings. The '*skin*' and the '*bone*' of the drawing try to define the drawing from outside while the '*flesh*' destroys it. The '*flesh*' is neither settled beneath the '*skin*' nor fixed upon the '*bone*'. It bulges out with the '*skin*' and collides with the '*bone*'. What matters is whether we can accept the '*flesh*', the very inside of 'temporal' drawing, and join it. The drawing needs to be able to bring us into its '*flesh*', the '*ground*'. In Klee's drawing, [Figure 5-7], Diana is walking through the brown autumn wind in the drawing. Diana, autumn, and wind are not supposed 'before' the 'Diana in the autumn wind' with its full of senses. Diana emerges from the wind, and the wind occurs around Diana. Diana arises from the autumn, and the autumn appears on the fluttering skirt of Diana. Klee's lines do not distinguish them, but instead, summon them together. Diana, autumn, and wind grow on the running lines and fill the vibrating canvas. You can never 'confront' any clear scene through the drawing because the drawing has its own 'thickness'. Your endeavour to stop the walking Diana and the wind would never be successful since the '*flesh*' of the drawing destroys it.¹⁸

¹⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*, translated from the French by Daniel W. Smith, 2003, London: Continuum, p.4.

¹⁷ One can find various strategies for this aim in the famous paintings by Gustav Klimt(1862-1918) or Jean Dubuffet(1901-1985).

¹⁸ If there is the '*flesh*' of a building, it would happen between the '*skin*' and the '*bone*' while destroying them. It is the '*history*' of the building which gnaws from inside and exudes through the '*skin*' working at present. It is the '*body*' of the building which deconstructs and leaps out from the 3-D space sustaining the stable form of the building from outside.

Resemblance as the Product

Throughout this chapter, I have examined two types of 'representation'; one for the 'spatial' and the other for the 'temporal'. The former is based on the 'equivalence' ensured by the very 'space' as a 'code', while the latter works by the mechanism of 'resemblance as the producer'. The intrinsic limitation of those two types is in their uncritical acceptance of the idea of space and time as the ready-separated. The 'representation of equivalence' cannot deal with any temporality since it is nothing but a 'frozen' confrontation. The 'representation of resemblance-producer' ignores concrete matters in the space to be 'purely' temporal.¹⁹ It may directly catch, through its own way of abstraction, the breeze, light, gravity, movements, and other 'forces' without body. The drawing becomes an 'illusion' itself, ethers the 'skin' or the 'bone', in order to resemble such forces. However, it is to simply give up talking about so many 'things' around us, which not only have their 'effects' and 'structures', but also their 'bodies'. The walls, desks, and books in my office are no less temporal than the breeze, sunshine, or my movement in my office.²⁰

In fact, it could be an intrinsic discrimination of language. The 'name' already distinguishes the change itself from what changes. There seems no name possible for things changing.²¹ However, can we distinguish a dance from a dancing dancer? Can we distinguish a breeze from air? A breeze can touch a wall only because the wall exposes itself to the breeze. The wall is never less temporal than the breeze is. Although the wall does not generate any difference in the space since it does not move, it is still living its time. It is the matter of not just its structure or effect on its surface, but its own body, the 'flesh'. It is the matter of not just its 'aging' for a long period of time, but also its 'living' now. Rather, it is even 'growing' since the wall is ever producing its time with new sensations and meanings. It does not just 'occupy' a certain amount of space, but 'is occupying' the space enduring many forces from inside and outside.²² The 'flesh' of the wall cannot be caught by the purely spatial world since it is rather a bundle of 'forces' generating changes than just an inert matter. Neither can it be purely temporal since the changes cannot be separated from the material body called the 'wall'. If we do not rely on the space as a common code which ensures the equivalence between a representation and its subject, and if we cannot rely on the 'resemblance as the producer' which


¹⁹ As I examined previously, the 'pure time' is nothing but a series of instants, the absolute repetition. Although differences happen in the time, they are not of the time, but of the space as far as it is just the difference between instants. The difference of the time happens only when the 'interval' between instants is involved.

²⁰ Architects who love exuberant events around a building, who are interested in various effects on aging or changing surface of a building, or who concerns socio-political rules and forces around a building are still confined within the idea of time 'out of architecture'. 'Architecture itself' is left atemporal surrounded by such variety of temporalities.

²¹ This is why I suggest the 'calling a name' instead of the 'name'. See 'Name' in chapter 3.

²² Whitehead argues that we are not used to considering the huge pyramid's enduring for a certain day as an event. Oh Young hwan, *Whitehead and human experience of time*. 1999, Seoul: Tongnamoo. P.202.

generates the image of the ‘force without body’ directly, how can we ‘represent’ such ‘fleshes’ of ‘things’ around us? Is any middle road possible?




[Figure 5-7] Drawing experiment, *The everyday of my office*; pencil on watercolour paper, 50 x 38cm, 9/2007.

In this drawing experiment, [Figure 5-7], my office is not ‘re-presented’ in the prepared spatial structure in the drawing as in the perspective drawing, [Figure 5-1]. Neither is my office involved directly as ‘forces’ in the generation of the image as in the drawing of the breeze, [Figure 5-3]. Then, what can be the relationship between this drawing and my ‘real’ office? The first impression of this drawing might be that it looks unstable and even looks child-like or childish. The drawing may still describe ‘things’ in my office with a pencil on paper, but in somewhat different style from that of conventional drawings. In fact, it is rather difficult for us, adults, to make such a ‘child-like’ work. Even if a right-handed person uses his/her left hand to make it, it would be doomed to be a failure since it is not just a matter of incomplete motor control. Then, what produces this ‘child-style’ drawing? What is the difference between this drawing and other conventional ones? Arnheim gives some clues to this question.

“... if I want to represent the roundness of an object such as the head, I cannot rely on any shape actually given in it but must find or invent a shape that will satisfactorily embody the visual generality “roundness” in the world of tangible things. If the child makes a circle stand for a head, that circle is not given to him in the object. It is a genuine invention, an impressive achievement, at which the child arrives only after laborious experimentation.”²³

Instead of drawing on the codified system of resemblance that is already there on a canvas, or instead of recording on a canvas what is directly given from outside of the drawing, the child plays with a piece of paper and a pencil. Instead of filling in the system, the child draws, or rather, generates what it actually experiences. In a child’s drawing, there resides the child as a drawer who produces the marks together with the pen and paper, and as an observer who is together with what the drawing describes. The child generates the chance manual marks, which Arnheim calls a ‘genuine invention’. The chance is neither certitude nor probability. Puis Servien (1949)²⁴ claims to dissociate two domains that were usually confused: ‘probabilities’ which are givens, the object of a possible science, and which concern the dice before they are thrown; and ‘chance’ which designates, on the contrary, a type of choice, non-scientific and not yet aesthetic. The prepared positions of the space are the probabilities on the canvas, while the play of the child is the chance. We draw ‘on’ the probabilities, while children draw chance. However, still, the child knows what it wants to do, but what saves it is the fact that it does not know how to get there.



[Figure 5-8] Drawing the breeze in my office

The ‘sail’ in [Figure 5-8] for my drawing of the breeze, [Figure 5-3], can be compared with the drawing child. The sail is the drawer and the observer of the breeze at the same time. It is absolutely ignorant of what it is doing and how to achieve the final drawing, but it has clear goal set by I who have set up it. It is truly ‘alive’ since it always lives its present, which is certainly not the instant. However, as I mentioned previously, this ‘aliveness’ can be recorded only on the absolutely ‘dead’ surface as a system or structure. It is a ‘pen’ alive contrasted with a piece of ‘paper’ dead. The drawing is the ‘skin’, although the ‘sail’ is the ‘fresh’. It is a successful device for bringing the differences in the ‘ground’ directly to the ‘surface’. Rather, the device ‘subtracts’ or ‘draw off’ such differences from the

²³ Rudolf Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception: a psychology of the creative eye*. 1974, London: University of California Press, Ltd., p.168.

²⁴ Re-quoted from Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*, translated from the French by Daniel W. Smith, 2003, London: Continuum, p.66.

'ground' to the 'surface'.²⁵ The paper 'extorts' the differences from the 'sail-pen'. The setting for the drawing 'steals' the aliveness of the breeze. It is the repetitive 'rising up', but without sinking down, which is only enabled by this ceaseless 'stealing'. In spite of its directness - rather, because of the very directness - the drawing 'invents' nothing, although it generates the beautiful marks of chance.

Meanwhile, the child 'utilizes' or 'manipulates' chance. While the 'sail' transmits the differences at the 'ground' to the images remaining afloat on the 'surface', the child keeps floating from the 'ground' to the 'surface' by itself, and it is only possible with the repetitive 'sinking down'. The child keeps sinking down to the 'ground' together with the chance mark so that the new mark can react on the 'whole'. The whole drawing renews itself every moment, and the chance becomes pictorial or is integrated into the act of painting. The child does not 're-present', but 'repeats' what it experiences. Rather, it is involved in the repetition of the drawing. It is weaving the 'dialogue' with the paper and pencil about what it sees. The drawing 'rises up' from its own 'ground', which is its physical, mental, historical, and relational 'whole'. The drawing expresses itself every moment rather than indicating something else. It ceaselessly establishes its own identity by including ever-emerging differences to itself, not only when it is made, but also when it just endures or is 'read'. It also 'sinks down' or 'disappears' every moment by throwing itself into the dialogue with people, into the interaction with nature, into its history and relationships, to generate with the *other* the effects, the sensations, the meanings, and so, the 'now' and the 'everyday'. Indeed, it is 'the everyday of drawing', which is not made by the resemblance, but generates the resemblance; not 'resemblance as producer', but 'resemblance as product'.

"... resemblance is the product when it appears abruptly as the result of relations that are completely different from those it is supposed to reproduce: resemblance then emerges as the brutal product of nonresembling means".²⁶

The drawing does not 'represent' its subject, but rather, 'replace' it. It replaces the 'fresh' of its subject with its own 'flesh'. The 'fresh' of the drawing is founded on its material body, gathering its whole history and relationship including its maker and viewer. My pencil marks on paper never resemble my office. To concentrate on the mark-making, or to 'play' with the pencil, is the way to 'escape' from the 'code' of the space and the 'cliché' from my office which already exists on the canvas before the drawing. My office is not 'represented', but instead, the office 'created' or 'invented' in the drawing 'replaces' my office. The drawing keeps 'destroying' the office coming into the drawing, and 're-building' its office in itself every moment.

²⁵ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum. P.359.

²⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*, translated from the French by Daniel W. Smith, 2003, London: Continuum, p.81.

[Chapter review]

This chapter argued the 'repetition' of drawing with its 'body'. As soon as we accept the 'body' of drawing, the term, 'representation' turns out to be an improper name of it since it is not a matter between what represents and what is represented, but a matter between a 'body' and another 'body'. They might resemble each other, but never be equal. The drawing here is a 'repetition' because it ceaselessly rises up to its '*surface*', its 'instant' with its substantiality, while sinking down to its '*ground*', its 'interval' where its history and relationships reside. The drawing is not confined in its 'skin' or by its 'bone', but produces them and destroys them with its 'flesh'. In my drawing experiment, my office is already in the '*ground*' of a drawing, and rises up to the '*surface*' through drawing's 'body'. If there is a certain 'resemblance' between the office on drawing's '*surface*' and the actual office on its own '*surface*', it is something 'produced' by the 'repetition' of the drawing.

Then, how does drawing rise up and sink down? How does the 'flesh' of drawing produce and destroy its 'skin' and 'bone'? There must be countless ways in which this occurs since every element of paper, touch, line, tone, colour, and figure would have their own way of doing it. In fact, I have exemplified some of those ways in boxed arguments on my experiment drawings throughout this thesis. The next chapter elaborates one of such examples, concerning the 'frame' of drawing paper. Drawing rises up by 'framing' and sinks down by 'de-framing'. 'Framing' exposes the drawing's '*surface*', and 'de-framing' reveals the drawing's '*ground*'.

Chapter 6. Repeating Paper

Net-frame


....in a series of lectures he gave in Bremen in 1949-1950, Heidegger introduced a new component of the picture – the frame (*das Ge-stell*) – as a metaphor for “representational thought.” For Heidegger, the *Ge-stell* became a key figure in his portrait of the world “conceived and grasped as a picture” – a world picture in a world set-before (*vorstellen*). The *Ge-stell* organizes perception, sets everything in place, orders the world. Heidegger did not assess the visual aspects of this framing: for him the *Ge-stell* was a philosophical “enframing” which transforms the world into objects, into a “standing reserve” (*Bestand*) awaiting its representation, ready for its close-up.¹

In the note on this lecture, Friedberg explains the linguistic connotations implicit in Heidegger’s German.² “*Das Gestell* is the nominalized form of the German verb *gestellen* (to place, to frame, to trap)... from the root *stellen* (to set, to place, to set into place).” She also points out that *Gestell* has been translated variously as “enframing”, “installation”, or “emplacement” by different translators. It seems clear that Heidegger is dealing with the term, *Gestell* at the metaphysical level, not as a literal frame. Friedberg stresses that “the frame is only a metaphor for the *enframing* implicit in modern thought and experience” for Heidegger. However, such a distinction is not important nor even valid any more when we consider the temporal ontology of the frame, which is consistent with Heideggerian temporal attitudes. This is because the literal frame comes after the *enframing*, not literally, but ontologically. Indeed, the frame is the *enframing*. It is not that the frame is the result of one’s enframing the world, nor that the actual frame of a picture affects or does something to its contents or to the viewer, but such ‘doing something’ is prior to its actualized material frame. Heidegger is talking about this level of ‘participle’ or ‘infinitive’ where the man, frame, world work together. It “organizes perception, sets everything in place, orders the world.”

¹ David Michael Levin, “*Decline and Fall: Ocularcentrism in Heidegger’s Reading of the History of Metaphysics*,” in David Michael Levin, ed., *Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision*, 1993, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp.186-215.

² Anne Friedberg, *The Virtual Window: from Alberti to Microsoft*, 2006, London: The MIT Press, pp.94-98.

When Heidegger explains “the conquest of the world as picture”, deeply concerned about the effects of modernity, “the word ‘picture’ (*Bild*) means the structured image (*Gebild*), enframed by the modern human. As he exemplifies the transformation of a natural river and its banks into a water power supplier, an “object on call” for technology’s instrumentalization, the world captured by orthographic representation is transformed into the “object under control” by the technology of orthography.³ A map transforms the land into a road network or partitioned areas on demand.



[Figure 6-1] Drawing experiment, *Plan drawing of My office*; pencil on tracing paper, 79 x 41cm (S=1:100).

Plan drawing is the most familiar tool for architects, but in fact, it is a rather extreme mode of drawing which was quite rare throughout the history of human civilization. Indeed, it becomes a powerful weapon by which the modern man can conquer the world. The world becomes enframed in a sheet of paper and reduced to a portable size. What is the “frame” in this plan drawing of my office interior? Does the edge of the paper, the “literal frame”, do all this? No. My office is not captured by the frame of the paper, not even in the paper. It is, rather, floating. Instead, the red crossing lines firmly hold the floating office. They make my office solid. Yes. They are the “frame”. They constitute the net of 20 square centimetres but, immediately proliferate to the closer net of a square millimetre. After all, no space is left uncovered. The frame is everywhere. The “net-frame” becomes the only ruler of this unreal plane which even reaches beyond the limit of the paper. Yet, it is a fair, uninterested ruler since it does not allow any privileged part in it to be swayed by the literal frame from outside or the various contents from inside.⁴

³ Dalibor Vesely. *Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation*. 2004, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

⁴ I have already examined this ‘net-frame’ in more general way as a name of the ‘space as a code’ which ensures the representation of equivalence. See ‘Representation of Equivalence’ in chapter 5.

Then, is this enframing, the ruling by the net-frame, temporal? Yes, in a conventional sense of the “scientific” time as the ‘absolute repetition’. Rather, it is the power contributing to the security of such an idea. It is the power working constantly and equally on the objects of drawing, the contents of drawing, and the makers or viewers of drawing. It is temporal by its ceaseless working but, instead, it debilitates, even erases the time of its objects, contents, makers, viewers, and their interactions, which generates endless differences. It absorbs those “real” times, kills them, and returns their carcasses. It holds everything on the ‘*surface*’ generating the time with only instants, and hides the ‘*interval*’, the ‘*ground*’. Heidegger argued that this enframing transforms the world into objects, but at the same time, it transforms my eye into that of a god, which can see every part of the drawing, the world uniformly, and past, present, future simultaneously.⁵ What is captured by the “net-frame” is its past, present, and future at the same time, which is called its timeless identity. I, transformed into a god, can manipulate things in the world without fear of the kaleidoscopic power of time, the brutal power of the ‘*ground*’. However, what I manipulate is not the real world but just the frame because drawing is all about the frame. Here, to draw just means to divide or to isolate some parts of the “net-frame”.

In this orthographic drawing, the edge of the paper, the real frame, has no specific role. On the contrary, the creator of a drawing tries to minimise or elude the effects of the real frame by deliberately making it obey the ruler, the net-frame, and keeping proper distance from the object, transformed from the world, in it. In fact, he/she wants this ponderous material influence to disappear altogether. Rather, he/she is also ruled by the only power of the drawing already. The “literal frame”, here, is not temporal anymore because it is nothing because it does nothing. If it is nothing already, one can just ignore it. It is true for every drawing made in a computer monitor. The world in the computer is the homogeneous space of the absolute ‘net-frame’ where any literal frame is meaningless.

Enframing

However, the problem is that without enframing, without killing the time, one cannot discern the world and cannot maintain an object’s identity distinguished from the world. In the truly temporal world, the ‘*ground*’, everything is too mingled to be distinguished as I have used the term, experiencing ‘togetherness’. Here, the possible solution is not to abandon but to repeat enframing. That does not stop the enframing. That does not allow it to be ultimate to emancipate the enframed as

⁵ This argument of Heidegger is parallel to what I examined through the idea of ‘drawing as confrontation’ in chapter 2.

much as possible. Then, what can the enframing be while not being fixation, not being the ‘net-frame’? Here is a clue from Deleuze:

In any case framing is limitation. But, depending on the concept itself the limits can be conceived in two ways, mathematically or dynamically: either as preliminary to the existence of the bodies whose essence they fix, or going as far as the power of the existing bodies goes.⁶

He explains the former as a “spatial composition of parallels and diagonals, the constitution of a receptacle,” and the latter as a “dynamic construction in act, which is closely linked to the scene, the image, the characters and the objects which fill it.” However, disappointingly, the framing here is the framing in cinema. When he mentions the ‘dynamic’, he seems mainly to be keeping a ‘moving camera’ in his mind which is not the case of drawing. But, his continuing investigation of framing is valid enough for the framing of drawing especially which is eager to be temporal because his concerns here are still “framing”, not a “moving frame”. The apparent link between drawing and cinema would be the photograph. And photography is the art of framing.



[Figure 6-3]
Digital photograph
of the Arts Tower
exterior.



[Figure 6-4]
Computer graphic
image of the Arts
Tower exterior.

In this type of photograph of a building exterior, the edge of it does not have much importance. The photograph, not to mention the computer graphic image, only concerns the self-related objects distanced from I, as a either creator or spectator. The enframing works only to hold the objects of interest still and to dispose ‘I’ at a certain position in timeless space. It is the ‘net-frame’ on the ‘screen’ which sustains the system of the ‘confrontation’. The situation is even plainer in the case of

⁶ D. N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze's time machine*, 2003, U.S.A.: Duke University Press, p.49.

the drawing shown on the right. The edge can disappear without trouble, and the ruling frame of the drawing can be found in the lines indicating window frames of the building.



[Figure 6-5] Digital photograph of my office and its part.

In the left image above, the edge of the photo starts to work here even though the ‘net-frame’ of the perspective structure still looks dominant. The edge starts enframing now. In these photos of my office interior, I can see that the edge is limiting both the continuing space and things over there and my ‘right to look’ at it, apart from its other function concealing the increasing distortion of the perspective view. Here, caused by the physical limitation of the ‘camera obscura’, the edge of the photo works like a “window”, and it works in the same way as depictive painting. Alberti writes:

*Let me tell you what I do when I am painting. First of all, on the surface on which I am going to paint, I draw a rectangle of whatever size I want, which I regard as an open window through which the subject to be painted is seen.*⁷

Arnheim explains this situation of the “window” clearly:

*...the edges of the picture designated the end of the composition, but not the end of represented space. The frame was thought of as a window, through which the observer peeped into an outer world, confined by the opening of the peephole but unbounded in itself.*⁸

However, while it is the window, it is also “the end of the composition.” Rawson also argues that “painters tend to treat the format of the sheet as if it were a frame to which the figures drawn stand in

⁷ Leon Battista Alberti, *On Painting and On Sculpture: The Latin Texts of De picture and De statua*, translated by Cecil Grayson, 1972, London: Phaidon, p.55.

⁸ Rudolf Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception : a psychology of the creative eye*, 1974, London: University of California Press, p.239.

some intelligible relationship.”⁹ In this sense, among the two photos above, the left one shows the method used by painters better than the right one. While I take this photo, one of my main concerns is to construct the composition, the proper relationship between the picture frame and the figures in it. Meanwhile, the right one demonstrates more clearly the ‘window’ character of the frame. I am forced to believe or even seduced into the outer world beyond the limits of the frame. The right hand photo is more “cinematic”, while the left one is more “pictorial” according to the famous distinction between “masking (cache)” and “framing (cadre) by Bazin(1967). In his article ‘Painting and Cinema’, he explains this:

The outer edges of the screen are not the frame of the film’s image, but a masking which can show only part of reality. The frame polarizes space inwards, while what the screen shows us is regarded, on the contrary, as something that extends indefinitely out into the world. The frame is centripetal, the screen centrifugal.¹⁰

He argues that such concealment of the “masking” in cinema is overcome by the movement of the camera during techniques such as a panning shot, a reframing, a countershot, and many other techniques. When the camera moves, the scene masked out of the frame enters into the screen while the image on the screen goes out to the reality outside the frame. This diachronic development of image is the basic power that makes the cinema temporal. It is a continuous repairing. This play between masking and framing is, according to the expression by Bonitzer(1978), also the play between “questioning” and “answering”.



[Figure 6-6]
Drawing
experiment,
*Photo-Plan of
My office*;
digital photo
montage
modified in
Photoshop.

⁹ Philip Rawson, *Drawing*, 1969, London: Oxford University Press, p.54.

¹⁰ Andre Bazin, *What Is Cinema?* translated by Hugh Gray, 1967, Berkeley: University of California Press.

This photomontage of my office, [Figure 6-6], is an indicative expression of such a “play”. The frames of interest are in the picture. The outer world of each frame is ensured its continuity by others although it does not look quite stable like the previous plan drawing. Masked reality is revealed by others adjacent. The question asked by one’s masking is answered by the other’s framing. However, to exhibit this interchange, the “play”, relies on a conflict between two answers which makes overlapped areas unstable. The overlapped area is a trace of a battle between two powers of enframing. This is because of the tendency of picture, framing rather than masking, answering rather than questioning, as Bazin has argued. However again, a different, but not opposite, perspective is possible, which is to see the overlapped area itself as a “questioning”, to see that image itself as a “peculiar” existence with unstable, deviant characteristics. The photomontage is not diachronic any more. It becomes an amalgam of “unanswered questions”, although the overlapped image is not “ghostly” enough to be the question itself, and “unquestioned answers”.¹¹

Deframing

Partly accepting the distinction of Bazin, Bonitzer points out that “the two properties can mutually corrupt each other.” He tries to overcome the polarity between painting and cinema by suggesting the interesting concept of “deframing (décadrage)”. After examining various kinds of modern paintings by the painters like Cremonini, Bacon, Ralph Goings..., and comparing them with classical paintings and modern cinemas, he starts to explain the concept:

*Deframing is a perversion, one that adds an ironic touch to the function of cinema, painting, even photography, all of them forms of exercising the right to look. ... the art of deframing, the displaced angle, the radical off-centredness of a point of view that mutilates the body and expels it beyond the frame to focus instead on dead, empty zones barren of décor, is ironically sadistic.*¹²

Instead of referring to the paintings he exemplified, which is radical and even dreadful, I would like to use the easy but earlier painting by Degas. Firstly, here is the somewhat classic analysis on this painting by Arnheim:


¹¹ Instead of this terms, ‘question and answer’, Deleuze uses ‘problem and proposition(or solution)’ for a similar argument. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum, pp.195-208.

¹² Pascal Bonitzer, *Deframings*. In *Cahiers du Cinema Vol.4 1973-1978: History, Ideology, Cultural Struggle*. Ed. Jim Hiller, 2000, London: Routledge. p.200.

... the frame was made to cut across human bodies and objects much more ostentatiously than ever before. This emphasized the accidental character of the boundary and therefore the figure character of the frame.¹³



[Figure 6-7] Edgar Degas, *The Rehearsal*, c. 1873-78; Oil on canvas, 41 x 61.7 cm; Fogg Art Museum, Harvard University.



[Figure 6-8] Drawing experiment, *Memories of my office*; (part) pencil on watercolour paper.

A heavy frame for classic painting is perfectly fit for this ‘cinematic’ scene, or rather, I even feel the need of the window frame around the scene which allows the wall, white paper, to end. In fact, the naked edges of the hole in the paper look “unconvincing” here. Arnheim called it a ‘peculiar visual paradox’, which is the conflict between “framing” and “masking” and so, between “centripetal” and “centrifugal” in Bazinian terms. It is something to be overcome by the movement of the camera. The question needs to be answered. However, Bonitzer positively accepts this conflict, which, in his term, is the ‘sadistic’ power.¹⁴ You might be disappointed, even frustrated, by the concealment, unfulfilled desires. But, look at the picture again, the periphery where something still flickers, on the point of disappearing. You can ‘read’ the outside of the picture, the deframing. But, it is not just the imagination of spatial extension. Rather, it is “another dimension of the image” which is inseparable from your ‘look’ itself. It is a ‘ghostly’ existence which is not ‘actual’ but still ‘real’. It is “the place of a mystery, of a suspended, interrupted narrative, of a question eternally without an answer.”¹⁵

¹³ Rudolf Arnheim, *op.cit.*, p.240.


¹⁴ Bonitzer might not be satisfied with this painting by Degas since it does not show enough power of decentralisation which expels bodies and objects beyond the frame, while maintaining classic values of depictive representation.

¹⁵ When the ‘enframing’ produces the ‘skin’ and ‘bone’, the ‘deframing’ exposes the ‘flesh’ of a drawing. They inevitably works together, and constitute the temporal body of the drawing. See ‘Skin, Bone, and Flesh’ in capter 5.

However, one should not confine deframing to the area external to the picture. “Deframing is not divisive, fragmentary but, on the contrary, a multiplier, a generator of new arrangements.” In fact, Degas’s painting has some difficulty on this point. In spite of its ‘unusual’ framing, the dominant ‘net-frame’, which has been examined at the start of this chapter, prevents you from ‘reading’ the deframing. You are already detached from the picture, and your ‘look’ becomes the mere point of view. Deframing turns back to the simple act of masking. That is why Bonitzer exemplified the painters of today who made the ‘mysterious’ works. The cropped photo of my office in [Figure 6-5] seems to work even better since it is empty, barren, and therefore sadistic.

A “fading of representation”, which evokes and is evoked by deframing, happens not only outwardly but also inwardly. Before exploring the other type of deframing, the other type of frame needs to be explained. Arnheim says again:

Painters began to think of the picture as an elaboration of the surface of the canvas. Pictorial space was no longer boundless but tended to end at the edges of the composition. This meant that the boundary line between frame and canvas was no longer the inner contour of the frame, but the outer contour of the picture. The picture was no longer ground behind the frame, but figure.¹⁶




[Figure 6-9] James Turrell, *Deer Shelter Skyspace*; installation work, 2006, Yorkshire Sculpture Park.

This is a picture of James Turrell’s installation work, ‘Skyspace’. As you can see even in the picture, rectangular framed sky rises up from the white ceiling which looks continuous behind the “blue screen”. The changing sky becomes a sheet of paper. The secret is in the sharp edge of the hole. By this immaterialised edge, “the small area on a ground plane is destined to be ‘figure’.” This conflicts with the previous painting by Degas but, here, it is precisely intended and works perfectly. The frame stops being frame any more as well as being ‘window’. It is rather a part, a body of the ‘picture’ and so, the picture is, ironically, boundless in itself although it looks strictly confined. The border is not enframing anything

¹⁶ Rudolf Arnheim, op.cit., p.240.

since it is just a window in reality. Neither is it deframing anything since there is no outside of the picture. Then, where is the enframing and deframing? Enframing ‘happens’ on the surface of the picture, but in a very opposite way to the that of “net-frame”. Deframing ‘happens in’ somewhere, “radical Elsewhere” for Deleuze,¹⁷ between the picture surface and I, a spectator. According to Deleuze, this “disturbing presence” of the deframing does not exist, but rather “insists” or “subsists”. I cannot find any object or even suggested meaning in it except for the changing colours and movements since my ‘look’ is intermingled with those changes. The surface has no depth and is infinitely deep at the same time.

This type of almost absolute ‘togetherness’ of actual and virtual, closed and open, space and time might be available in cinema, but not in static drawing. Can any of these examinations give us a clue to the dream? The drawing below starts from the idea of ‘picture without frame’ in the opposite manner to that of ‘net-frame’.



[Figure 6-10]
Drawing
experiment,
*The everyday
of my office*;
pencil on
watercolour
paper, 50 x
38cm, 9/2007.

In [Figure 6-10], the surface of the picture is filled with the forms of objects in my office. There is no emptiness in the drawing, and there is no outside of the drawing. This is the reversion of the first type of deframing, and the subversion of the ‘net-frame’. Although it is still a depictive drawing, nothing is masked and the centrifugal power is reflected at the edge of the paper. The strong power of enframing

¹⁷ I have explained this ‘radical Elsewhere’ with the names of ‘ground’, ‘whole’, and ‘interval’ throughout this thesis. They are just different names for one thing, which we cannot ‘confront’, from slightly different angles.

is still valid at the level of each object, but when objects are implicated in a bigger and bigger set, their continuity does not rely on the enframing so much as deframing. In the deframing, another dimension of the image, there subsists even outside of the office and, most importantly, many 'I's. The relationship between many 'I's and many objects is similar to that of a burglar and a lock of my house. A burglar always subsists in my house, and the existing lock is the clear evidence for it. Indeed, to some degree, I am living with a burglar. Many 'I's in "radical Elsewhere" is the key passage through which the time is flowing, and by which the space is generated. Deleuze gives a support on these arguments when he says this:

The more the image is spatially closed, even reduced to two dimensions, the greater is its capacity to 'open itself' on to a fourth dimension which is time, and on to a fifth which is Spirit...¹⁸

¹⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, 2005, London: Continuum, p.19.

Conclusion

Epilogue

It might be a sudden end of the story. But, I feel that I would have argued enough on issues I addressed, and suspect whether there can be an end. The main issue was that we need to approve a certain 'latent' layer as an intrinsic part of our reality, which I called 'togetherness', 'ground', 'whole', and 'interval', in order to explain our temporal experience of architecture. I struggled to argue the 'paradoxical co-existence' of pair-concepts (togetherness/confrontation, ground/surface, interval/instant, sinking down/floating up, and deframing/framing) to overcome contemporary architectural discourse on time, which dealt with only time of successive instants, time of 'absolute repetition', time on the 'surface', or time we can 'confront'. It was an attempt to bring the time, which was expelled to the world of ideal, back into our concrete world.

While struggling to 'draw time' in my drawing experiment, I found myself looking for the time as an mere ideal which I could clearly confront, as architects had long been drawing the space in the world of ideal. What I should have drawn was not the time of my office, but my office itself which was already spatio-temporal in itself. I realised that architects had never been drawing their buildings in our concrete world. 'Drawing as confrontation' was a proper tool for them to draw such an ideal world. When I tried to draw 'my office itself', my attempt came to a deadlock again since time and space did not work any more as a code, which ensured a link between my office and my drawing from outside, but was being produced from inside of my office. What I had to do was not to bring my office into my drawing, but to make my office emerge from inside of my drawing. I, together with my drawing, had to approach or grope for my office.

The strategy for it was to approve material and conceptual substantiality of drawing so that it can 'work' in time. It was to generate a drawing with its own 'ground' and 'surface' so that it can 'sink down' and 'float up'. Concerning the material substantiality, I examined physical size, shape, texture and frame of paper, and various qualities of lines and touches. For the

conceptual substantiality, I examined metamorphosis of meaning, isolated figures, vibrating picture ground, and forces in drawing. They might not be enough techniques, but could help me to 'meet' the 'drawing itself' with its body in time. Ironically, the drawing could manifest my office-ness when it was truly itself. In my portfolio, I tried to display my experiment drawings in certain orders by positioning them on a map, which is a simplified diagram of my arguments in this text thesis. Although the experiment was not executed in a systematic order, I hope that its audience will generate with the drawings his/her own meanings and sensations, which may 'evolve' into his/her architecture.

Methodology Review

If there was a structure for my text, it would be called an 'advance' from the 'concrete but vague' to the 'general but clear'. Although I acknowledge that a thesis needs to stay on the 'surface' which allows clear 'confrontation', I did not want my thesis to ignore the 'ground' which cannot be 'told' but still together with our temporal actuality. I tried to grope for the 'ground' and float up to the 'surface' at the same time throughout this thesis. Although the term 'advance' designated my general 'floating up' from the first chapter to the final one, I did not stop 'sinking down' in every part of the text in it. I hoped to invite a reader of this text into such vital vibrations, making it truly 'temporal'. Apparently, the first two chapters deal with 'our experiences', the next two are about 'time', and the final two chapters concern 'architectural representation'. However, I intended every part of these chapters to be a 'repetition' of others, evoking the 'whole' story as a 'ground' at every moment.

This thesis might look chaotic or scattered, but in fact, it tells just one argument repetitively which cannot be directly uttered because it always demands an interference of the unknown 'ground'. To tell something about the 'unknown', I had to wait for the apparition of each sentence from the 'whole' instead of organising sentences in a certain structure. However, "it is no longer even essence that appears, it is rather the apparition itself that creates essence and law: things rise up and ascend into the light."¹ Following Deleuze, I was thinking of a 'composition' which differs from an 'organisation'. "A composition is itself an organisation, but one that is in the process of disintegrating. Beings disintegrate while ascending into the light."²

¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*, translated from the French by Daniel W. Smith, 2003, London: Continuum, p.89.

² Ibid.

*I make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from an always decentred centre, from an always displaced periphery which repeats and differentiates them.*³

It was my attempt to build up a thesis which was supposed to be 'objective' out of my 'subjective' experiences. As I mentioned in my prologue, my study had started from my own small experience of a kitten in a bus, and my text began with a statement on my experience of a street in Sheffield. I was just hoping to understand a little bit more about such a precious moment in my everyday because it was the only chance that I could meet the 'ground' by losing myself in it. The distinction between 'subjective' and 'objective' was already pointless there. I could be truly temporal together with 'others' in such an experience, and I thought that architecture could be such 'others' together with which I could go 'deep'. Indeed, I believed that my experience had far more than my thesis might tell, because the experience was 'before and beyond' any words while the thesis must be in a realm of language.

*We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one into the other. Only in this manner are we resolved to write.*⁴

When I stood on the edge of my language or the border of my logic, I could be 'brave' since it was not a matter of right and wrong any more. I did not try to find a right answer, but just wanted to go deeper while not being lost. Rather, it was a start of a realm of 'belief', and my weapon to 'persuade' audiences was just my 'sincerity'.⁵ I had to keep asking myself after writing every sentence. "Was/Is it truly so?"⁶ My asking was an act of unmaking what I had made. However, I would argue that my braveness did not necessarily lead me to scholarly irresponsibility, because I believed that I was not the owner of my experience, but just a participant-investigator of it, who is passionate and sincere. I became curious how other people had dealt with their experiences in their writings and drawings. Through my research, I could find many 'sincere' artists and 'brave' philosophers. Artists were good at 'sinking down', while philosophers were skilful at 'floating up'. I might be eager to learn all their

³ Gilles Deleuze. *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, 2004, London: Continuum, pp. xix.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.xx.

⁵ It might be an approach of 'Romanticism', which appeals not to 'reason', but to 'sympathy'.

⁶ I realised that this might be a phenomenological methodology in its early stage.

virtues throughout my study.⁷ However, I soon realised that there were not many architects' work addressing such an issue since, I argued, they were intrinsically limited by the convention of architectural representation.

In a sense, my drawing experiment was developed in the opposite direction to that of my text. While my text tried to 'build up' a story out of my experience, my drawing struggled to 'attack' the drawing conventions. I wrote like a designer, and drew like a researcher because I could guess that my text would become an operating table, and my drawing would become poetry in the end. The experience was too vague, while the representation was too clear. The text and drawing were pulling each other in the opposite side in the beginning of my research. My text tried to 'float up' with my experience of my office, while my drawing started to 'sink down' with the architectural drawing convention, so that they could meet each other in the middle area. The 'time issue' were the glimmer that guided their journey to each other. Great thinkers helped the text, while artists stimulated the drawing. When I felt that they arrived at the middle area, I endeavoured to make them not explain or demonstrate each other. I hoped they would speak of the one same issue in their own different ways like a musical variation on a theme. They were not appendices of each other, but a 'repetition' of each other; not the 'same', but 'one'.⁸

My Studies in Broader Context

*'How would the painter or poet express anything other than his encounter with the world?'*⁹

I might be interested in a moment when, or a field where I meet the world.¹⁰ Although I have tried to concentrate on the time issue to fight against a priori space which predominates over

⁷ On the one hand, I myself tried to 'resemble' them, and on the other hand, I attempted to mix directly their works with my thesis. They were artists such as Borges, Proust, Kafka, Choon-soo Kim, Jung Lee, Klee, Klimt, Munch, and Bacon, and thinkers such as Georg Simmel, Karatani Kojin, Nietzsche, Whitehead, Bergson, Heidegger, and Deleuze.

⁸ See 'Ruin and Drawing' in chapter 2, and the following section, 'Reflections on Research by Design'.

⁹ Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As quoted in Juhani Pallasmaa, *The Eyes of the Skin: Architecture and the Senses*, 2005, Great Britain: Wiley-Academy, p.14.

¹⁰ It was not a critical issue for me whether it was a 'phenomenological field' of phenomenology or 'structure' of (post)structuralism. Admittedly, it would be rather impossible for me to fully understand their exact arguments. (, which I suspected there were.) After reading several books of them, I just found that both arguments had their own merits that I can apply in my story, which might be somewhere in the middle. Indeed, I was studying philosophy not to learn the philosophers and their theories, but to understand myself with vague but solid feelings.

other architectural issues, now I realise that the issue is not a conflict between space and time, but a relationship between 'being' that is situated in space and time and 'becoming' that generates space and time. In the world of 'being', time is already spatial, and such space and time exist before any 'being'. In the world of 'becoming', even space is temporal because time and space always follow a certain 'becoming'. What matters here is not whether architecture is spatial or temporal, but whether architecture is arrested in such universal structures or breaks them down ceaselessly to be truly itself. I remember one silent night in Sheffield when I experienced a certain 'apparition' or 'rise up' of a building in front of the Arts Tower extricating itself from its 'arrested' self. I was feeling that the whole universe was involved in that event. It was neither merely of the building nor fully mine. I believe that we are always surrounded by such experiences in our everyday life although they are not clear enough to be noticed in most cases. They are minute quivers, but that never vanish. I wanted to introduce such 'quivers' into the architectural discourse throughout my study.

It is difficult to define the boundary of my thesis since it has a centre and its radial dilation rather than a structure and its edges. It is also a hard task for me to situate my argument in a certain philosophical or architectural category, because I established my standpoint, the core of my thesis, on 'myself'¹¹. Although my ideas have been transformed and modified by many great thinkers, I myself cannot be settled in a set of theories because I believe that I as a human am far 'bigger' than any of such structured arguments. Whitehead or Deleuze was not a shoulder on which I need to step to reach higher, but just one of many passages through which the 'concrete but vague' I, could rise up to the 'surface' of language. I just asked their voices to speak of my story, which was already not fully mine. The voice could be of a poem, a novel, a painting, or a film as well as of such philosophers.

In spite of all this, I would like to mention several important 'forces' that have shaped me now. Firstly, as a Korean, I need to admit the influence of East Asian thoughts¹², poems, and paintings on me. Although they were not seriously dealt in this thesis, I realised later that they had been always working within my study as a minute but profound 'quiver'. They never gave me any answer, but supplied me with inexhaustible inspirations. I might be trying to figure out something East Asian in myself without mentioning the very 'East Asia'.

¹¹ It is neither 'empirical particularity' nor 'abstract universal'.

¹² I use this term to mean the common ground shared by Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism. In relation to my research, the basic common idea of them is the inseparability between time and space. Song, Hang-ryong. *Time and Space, and Now and Here - an attempt to understand East Asian philosophy*. 2007, Seoul: S.K.K. Univ. Press, p.23.

If such inspirations helped me to question, some Western thoughts gave me clues to 'compose' possible answers. The ideas of Phenomenology and (Post) Structuralism were attractive to me concerning the issue of my encountering the world. If I had to situate myself in a philosophical spectrum, it would be somewhere in the middle of them. I thought that the idea of 'research by design' was already phenomenological in one sense because of the inevitable involvement of 'I' throughout its journey. But, I personally felt that the phenomenology seemed too much a 'human-centred' idea sometimes; especially when it went toward the side of 'Existentialism'. Although I loved the depth of Norberg-Schulz¹³ and the warmth of Alexander¹⁴, the former was too much 'existential' and the latter was too 'structural' in the end. For me, 'Structuralism' seemed too 'spatial' when it solicits 'scientific' solutions.¹⁵ Considering that East Asian paradox that a human life was a mere part of the 'flow' of the 'living' universe while embracing its 'whole', I could feel familiar with some arguments of Whitehead and Deleuze. The difference between Whiteheadian 'Organic'¹⁶ and Deleuzian '*machinique*'¹⁷ looked not so big to me as far as they gave profound ideas on the temporal tangent between I and the world.

In terms of my drawing experiment, I loved Impressionists, Klee, Klimt, and Bacon since I was interested in a 'realism of deformation', rather than the 'idealism of transformation', for an alternative architectural drawing.¹⁸ It had to be still 'figurative' although it was not for the translation into the 'form'. The Cubists' code was too 'rational', a visual and spiritual code of abstractionists was too 'cold', and a veritable "mess" of abstract expressionists was too 'hot' for me.¹⁹ I might be looking for a drawing that could express the exuberance of my 'warm' encounter with the world through its own 'flesh',²⁰ so that I could introduce the 'living' world into my design. I was dreaming an architecture just like a flower in a East Asian calligraphic painting.

¹³ Christian Norberg-Schulz. *Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture*, 1980, London: Rizzoli International Publications.

¹⁴ Christopher Alexander. *Timeless Way of Building*, 1978, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁵ I noticed that there were two important issues in recent architectural discourse on 'time'; 'everyday' and 'user'. If the issue of 'everyday' was phenomenological and the issue of 'user' was (post) structural, I was looking for an issue that could argue with both parties.

¹⁶ Alfred North Whitehead. D.R. Griffin, and D.W. Sherburne. *Process and Reality: an essay in cosmology*. Corrected ed. Gifford lectures; 1927-28. 1978, New York: Free Press.

¹⁷ D. N. Rodowick. *Gilles Deleuze's time machine*, 2003, U.S.A.: Duke University Press.

¹⁸ Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*, translated from the French by Daniel W. Smith, 2003, London: Continuum, p.90.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.76-77.

²⁰ See 'Skin, Bone, and Flesh' in chapter 5.

Expected Contribution

One hidden argument of my thesis is that representation and design may not work in architecture in the opposite direction as they may seem. From a conventional perspective of linear time, representation copies what already exists, while design creates what will be in the future. However, after studying in detail how one copies and the other creates, I realised that both of them were just 'apparition' of something new which inherited their whole predecessors. The difference was how much the predecessor was clear and visible, or vague and invisible. Imagination and chance were participating in both parties throughout the act of making, the involvement of materials and 'I'. The issue was 'here and now'. The past and future were not so opposite to each other. I wanted to make the representation more active, and the design more passive. They were just the 'repetition with difference', or the ceaseless 'return of the future'.²¹

In any case, architects produce drawings, which my thesis mainly deals with. Although their work starts with a certain drawing, and finishes with another drawing, they do not know much about the drawing itself since they believe that they design a building. When they consider themselves as 'creators', the drawing turns out to be a mere tool. With this thesis, I hope architects become good 'receivers' who are sensitive to themselves and the world around them. I argue that they can meet themselves and the world only through their drawings. I suggest that they develop their own drawings, which would be a 'representation as creation' or a 'design as reception', to see more of the forgotten. I suggest that they not manipulate a design, but 'bear' a design with their whole body and soul. My drawing experiments do not create something that has not been before. They just evoke what has been forgotten behind the conventional drawings. Some audiences may find their experiences from them. Others may find a motif for their own drawings. The issue is not what it is, but what you see, what you feel, and what you talk about. I hope that people find the 'here and now' which summon the whole past and future. To design might be to represent *a future which is already there*.

Every architect 'takes' contexts or conditions of a project, and 'gives' a solution back. There exists a wide gap between the 'taking' and 'giving', and it is the very role of the architect to 'jump' the gap. It is nothing but this miraculous jump that justifies the status of the architect as a 'creator'. Some architects struggle to invent a possible logic of vindication at least to

²¹ Kim, Sang-hwan, *Satire and Deliverance, or love and death*. 2000, Seoul: Minumsa Press, pp.31-42.

pretend that there is no 'gap', but just a 'process' in their full control. They pretend to be an innocent controller of architectural design. Other 'pessimistic' architects give up jumping, and bravely pretend to be just the 'givers' to ignore the gap. What they give a project is amusement, chance, and their genius. The former is under the pressure of the past, and the latter is upon the evaporation of the future. However, there still exists the gap as long as we just take form from the past and only give to the future. Instead of the 'jump', my drawing suggests architects to 'creep' over the gap together, while building their own bridge on themselves. If the jump is a journey from here to there, the creep is a journey from one to itself. To build a bridge is to take the whole from itself, and give the whole to itself in every moment. It takes the context and condition not only of a project, but also of drawing materials and of an architect. It generates not only a solution for the project, but also marks on the drawing and the change of the architect. The drawing is for the gap. It tries to be in the vibration of 'here and now'.²² It does not only take from the past and future, but also generates the 'new' past and the 'new' future. The drawing is a 'bridge' between past and future, or between representation and design. Rather, it invalidates the sharp distinction between them.

My drawing is always a 'construction site'. I make, remake, and unmake in it. It takes from my office, and generates my office at the same time. It is a representation of my office, and a design of my office at the same time. Indeed, the drawing 'is' my new office. As my office has lots of invisible forces and qualities, the drawing also has such forces and qualities. The drawing may not 'represent' them, but still 'present' them. If there is resemblance between my office and the drawing, it is not equivalence, but 'produced' resemblance.²³ Throughout my experiment, I struggled to 'produce' such resemblance to express the invisible. However, the 'resemblance as the product' is not that which can be produced by a certain rule or a method. It just emerged after intensive 'wrestling' among my office, drawing materials, and 'I'. I suggest architects to attempt to produce such resemblance in their drawing so that they can bring the invisible of their project into their design.

Then, I hope such a drawing evolve into a building. It does not designate the building in the future, but 'is' a present-form of the building. It does not need to have a specific shape or form yet. It can be a certain feeling, meaning, movement, rhythm, force, flow, texture, colour, or any other qualities. But, it is still the building.

²² "Painting directly attempts to release the presences beneath representation, beyond representation." Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation*, translated from the French by Daniel W. Smith, 2003, London: Continuum, p.37.

²³ See 'Representation of Equivalence', 'Resemblance as the Producer', and 'Resemblance as the product' in the chapter 5.

Reflections on 'Research by Design'

The concept of 'research by design' seems still not clear. After taking the course, 'PhD by Design', I could realise that such 'uncertainty' might be its fate. Merely to justify its being uncertain, not to make it certain, I add some of my understandings of this kind of study from three different (but not so much) perspectives below.

Firstly, 'research by design' is nothing but a questioning, regarding what the 'research by design' is. A specific issue of a study is not an object to be mastered, but rather, a core around which 'a' research by design is established. It seems inevitable nature of the 'research by design' because it tells only about itself. It never talks about something out of itself, but still deals with everything around it without designating them.²⁴ It gathers everything into the generation of itself, and 'presents' them through its own body. Yes, it is an unstable creature with its own 'flesh'.²⁵ It ever denies to be settled, and so, is always 'under construction'. To maintain its flesh alive, it needs to keep renewing itself upon itself. To maintain its particular identity, it needs to keep 'floating up' from the 'whole'. 'A' research by design keeps establishing itself on the ceaseless questioning about 'the' Research by design. It is a never-ending escape from the 'whole'. The 'everything' is not explained but exposed by the chasing 'whole' that ever unseals what the 'particular' seals up.

As soon as it stops renewing itself, or stops escaping from the 'whole', the research cannot be a design, and the design cannot be a research any more. Without asking the nature of the 'research by design', research never designs, and design never researches. The title is neither 'research and design' nor 'research of design', but 'research by design' which implies their exchangeability. Throughout my study, the research by design asked me to 'sink down' to the 'whole' where the distinction between research and design is not valid anymore. My task in the thesis was to rescue 'my office', the core of my study, from the 'research by design'; to establish a 'particular' out of the 'whole'. The research and the design emerged by distinguishing themselves from each other in 'my office' rising from the 'whole'. However, they were still soft enough to be exchanged, since the research was yet a poem, and the design

²⁴ See the boxed argument on a painting by Bacon in the section 'History' in chapter 3.

²⁵ See 'Skin, Bone, and Flesh' in chapter 5.

was yet an image. They were just two faces of one emergence; one 'laborious' and the other 'playful'.²⁶

Secondly, 'research by design' is intrinsically 'temporal' since it is a journey without a map, or a race without a goal. Instead of expecting a 'big end', one had better enjoy the pathway studded with small happenings. It is a 'repetition with difference' that keeps taking a step toward nothing at every moment.²⁷ Since there is no organised way ready for the journey, each step feels the weight of the whole journey. It is the 'floating up' from the 'whole', which ever generates the 'new'.²⁸

The 'research by design' might have the advantage in generating such steps because it is composed of two parts, its text and its drawing, which instigate the steps of each other. However, one should not misunderstand that the text of my thesis represents the 'research', and the drawing portfolio of my thesis is a demonstration of the 'design'. As I mentioned above, both my text and drawing are the 'research by design' on their own. They build up 'not the same but one' way with different textures. Both of them do the research and the design at the same time.²⁹ In other words, the text and the drawing constitute one 'rhythm', or one 'wave' with different cycle, and this difference helps each other to take a further step forward. They can supply each other with a source of experience within the journey. They can construct themselves by deconstructing each other. They can unseal each other when they seal up themselves in time. They become an 'interval' of each other's instant, so that the 'wave' can be truly temporal.

Finally, 'Research by design' questions and answers only through and with 'I', 'myself'. However, it does not necessarily result in an autistic discourse because "I would be rather an unfolding of a discourse, its crevice, or its possible lapse, than its origin."³⁰ Although it is not 'autistic', a 'research by design' still needs to be 'isolated' to be itself. Only by designating itself, it can tell about the world outside, and start its conversation with its audiences. 'I' am not a creator of the 'isolated' because I am already a part of it, as I am a part of 'my office'.

²⁶ These terms can be used to explain the difference between philosophy and art. Kim, Sang-hwan, *Metaphysics for Artists: Culture and philosophy in the era of deconstruction*, 1999, Seoul: Minumsa Press, pp.242-253.

²⁷ See 'Repetition with Difference' in chapter 4.

²⁸ I feel a certain possible link between Deleuze and Whitehead here. I think that they share the idea of the 'whole' although Deleuze seems more interested in the 'floating up' while Whitehead gives an emphasis on the 'new'.

²⁹ In a broad sense, the text designs when it compose a poem, and the drawing researches when it concentrates on a certain analysis.

³⁰ Michel Foucault, *L'ordre du discours*, translated into Korean by Lee Jung-woo, 1993, Seoul: Saegil Press, p.13.

My 'research by design' was already there between I and my office yet vaguely, and started to build up its own identity by isolating itself from 'us'.

Yes, it is not such an 'objective' story, as far as the 'research by design' talks about itself. However, neither is it 'subjective' because it is a story about not 'I', but 'it'. 'I' in 'it' is a stranger even to me. Indeed, most great philosophers and artists were investigating themselves in their works. They knew that 'I' was the farthest creature from I since I could never 'confront' 'I', and that 'I' was an extreme 'other' to me. They knew that the only way to talk about what they could not 'confront' was to make it talk. They threw themselves into their works, and made voices or traces while escaping from them. The 'research by design' is a rather systematic way to do this. It is a 'brave' attempt to talk about 'everything' by exploring 'myself'. It is a long journey to find 'I' embracing the whole world.

*Therefore, people travel not to escape from themselves, but to retrieve themselves. ...
When we are amazed in front of an unknown town, what we are looking at is nothing
but the sincerest figure of ourselves.³¹*

³¹ Jean Grenier, *Les Iles*, translated into Korean by Ham, Yoo-sun, 1988, Seoul: Chungha Publishing Co., pp.94-95.


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Drawing my office

Architectural Representation of Time

PhD by Design Portfolio by In-sung Kim
School of Architecture, The University of Sheffield

Space-system

Time-instant

SURFACE

(Representation of Equivalence)

(Representation of Equivalence)

**Code
Form**

Bone (Resemblance as Producer)

Skin

**Code
Instant**

Meaning

Sensation

**Framing
Deframing**

(Resemblance as Product)

Flesh

GROUND


Space-time

Confrontation


Absolute Repetition

Togetherness


Repetition with Difference




1. Attacking Space-System





1.3 Timeless identity II, Plan drawing of my office,
pencil on tracing paper, 50 x 27cm (original scale=1:100)




1.1 Structured 3D-space, Perspective grid of my office,
pencil on tracing paper, 79 x 41cm (original scale=1:100)




1.4 Frozen confrontation, Perspective drawing of my office,
pencil on tracing paper, 79 x 41cm (original scale=1:100)




1.5 Frozen confrontation II
modified from scanned images of Perspective drawing of my office; pencil on tracing paper, 79 x 41cm (original scale=1:100).




1.7 Vibration by overlapping lines,
pencil on tracing paper, 49 x 32cm




1.8 Vibration by lines with qualities,
calligraphy brush and ink on rice paper, 49 x 32cm




1.6 Floating up by tonal difference
modified from scanned images of Perspective drawing of my office; pencil on tracing paper, 79 x 41cm (original scale=1:100).



1.9 Name of uses, Photoshop drawing on a scanned image




1.10 Moving "I", Analysis of photo recording of my office, pencil on tracing paper



1.11 My movement, pencil and colour pencil on tracing paper, 50 x 27cm




1.13 Movement of my hands, Finger painting, acrylic colour on paper, 92 x 215cm



1.12 Weaving space, Tracing from photo montage, pencil and colour pencil on tracing paper, 50 x 27cm




Door ← 90cm
(H = 0.0m)



<1-1> 21:00, 26/11/2007

1.14 Dancing breeze 1-1, Record of breeze in my office ; woollen string with Chinese ink on paper, 42 x 59cm, 11/2007

2. Questioning Time-Instant






2.1 Space - an instant, digital photograph



2.2 Space in mind, modification of digital photograph




2.3 Space in memory, digital photomontage on scanned drawing



2.12 Light - producer of picture, digital photographs



2.6 Movement, modification of digital photographs




2.5 Movement in repeating instants, digital photographs



2.4 One day in repeating instants, digital photographs of my office in every two hours



2.7 Lighting and shadows I, digital photographs of my office in 16 different lightings



2.8 Lighting and shadows II, modification of 16 digital photographs



2.9 Lighting and shadows III, modification of 16 digital photographs




2.11 Weaving space II, digital photomontage of my office at night



2.10 Weaving space I, digital photomontage of my office




2.13 Touches, digital photographs




2.14 Colours, cropped digital photographs on paper, 25 x 63cm, 11/2007




2.14 Dust and dirt, cellular tape on glossy paper, 78 x 23cm, 5/2007




3. Generating Space-Time



3.11 Surfaces I, (collection of texture by rubbing), colour pencil on rice paper, patch montage on modified formboard, 68 x 51 cm




3.1 Memories, pencil and digital photograph on watercolour paper, 38 x 50 cm




3.8 Night I, Chinese ink and coffee on rice paper, 49 x 32 cm




3.4 Repeating traces, (arranged height data), pencil on watercolour paper, 38 x 50 cm, 11/2008




3.2 Three times, pencil on modified watercolour paper, 51 x 39 cm, 9/2007



3.3 Vibrating traces, (made on the image of drawing 3-13, Everyday), pencil on watercolour paper, 50 x 38 cm, 10/2007




3.5 My desk, pencil on watercolour paper, 50 x 38cm, 11/2008




3.9 Night II, pencil on watercolour paper, 50 x 38cm, 9/2007



3.6 Desk and bookshelf, pencil and Chinese ink on watercolour paper, 50 x 40cm, 10/2008



3.7 Office and I, pencil and watercolour on watercolour paper, 50 x 38cm, 10/2007




3.10 Afternoon,
pencil on
watercolour
paper,
50 x 38cm,
9/2007

19.8.2007 I. Kim





10.2007 I. Kim

3.12 Surfaces II, pencil on modified watercolour paper, 50 x 34cm, 10/2007






3.13 Everyday,
pencil on
watercolour
paper,
50 x 38cm,
9/2007


08/09/2007 I. Kim



3.14,15,16 Working office, Tryptych, pencil on watercolour paper, 25 x 40.5cm each, 9/2008



3.17,18,19 Working office II, Tryptiyh, pencil on watercolour paper, 25 x 40.5cm each, 9/2008



3.20,21,22 Wall-ness, Tryptiyh, pencil on watercolour paper, 25 x 40.5cm each, 9/2008

Drawing My Office: A Study on Architectural Representation of Time

Submitted for the Degree of PhD by In-Sung Kim

July 2009

Abstract

This thesis is an attempt to recover the temporality of architecture. Although many contemporary architects argue their ways of dealing with time in their architecture, their idea of time is confined within narrow-mined assumptions of science, and their methods are locked in the intrinsic limitation of architectural representation. This thesis criticises the idea of time with only successive instants for its incompetence of accommodating our exuberant experience of architecture, and finds the origin of the problem at the conventional architectural representation which cannot show what we are together with, but just what we can confront.

As a "research by design", this thesis is led by a design experiment, which is simply to represent my office. The experiment tries to catch the time of my office with various strategies, and the theory follows it while weaving a story by analysing and evaluating it. Theoretical arguments, which have been initiated mainly from Deleuze, grope for their way in the dialogue with drawings. The strategy of drawing experiment is to approve material and conceptual substantiality of drawing so that it can 'work' in time. Concerning the material substantiality, physical size, shape, texture and frame of paper, and various qualities of lines and touches are examined. For the conceptual substantiality, metamorphosis of meaning, isolated figures, vibrating picture ground, and forces in drawing are explored. Ironically, the drawing can manifest my office-ness when it is truly itself. Although the experiment may not be executed in a systematic order, I hope that its audience will generate with the drawings his/her own meanings and sensations, which may 'evolve' into his/her architecture.