

**JAPAN AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING:
FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION IN THE POST-COLD
WAR WORLD**

Hugo James Dobson

A Dissertation Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
University of Sheffield

Faculty of Social Science
School of East Asian Studies
May 1998

UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD
SHEFFIELD
S10 2TN

**JAPAN AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING:
FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD**

This thesis investigates Japan's contribution to United Nations (UN)-sponsored peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) by locating sources of activism and passivism in Japan's foreign policymaking process. In particular, it examines the influence of factors, such as Japan's traditional post-W.W.II commitment to pacifism, its relationships with the US and its East Asian neighbours, and the role of the UN.

The introduction provides a broad overview of the remit of the thesis as well as clarifying its ontological commitments and justifying the topics of focus, Japan and the UN.

Chapter One constructs a detailed theoretical approach to this topic by rejecting traditional realist, liberal, and Marxist interpretations of international politics and, instead, highlighting the study of norms in international society.

Chapter Two centres on the topic of UN peacekeeping operations and explains how this practice has become a norm of international society.

Chapter Three introduces the topic of Japan's foreign policy by examining traditional approaches and interpretations. It also utilises the approach outlined in Chapter One and examines Japan's contribution to PKO from the time of admission to the UN in 1956 through to the eve of the outbreak of the Second Gulf War.

Chapter Four looks at Japan's response to the Second Gulf War from the financial contribution through to the legislation adopted to facilitate the despatch of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF). It demonstrates the initial power of traditional norms in shaping policy and how this changed with the rise of the influence of the UN.

Chapter Five takes the first despatch of the SDF to Cambodia as its case study and reveals how the traditional norms of domestic-rooted pacifism and the opposition of East Asian nations to Japanese re-militarisation continued to be eroded.

Chapter Six looks at the most recent of the SDF's despatches to Mozambique, Rwanda and the Golan Heights and demonstrates the continued influence of the US as well as the consolidated power of the UN, in contrast to the declining influence of pacifism and Japan's East Asian neighbours.

Taking this empirical investigation into account, the conclusion reappraises the importance of norms in Japan's foreign policymaking process, and highlights the influence of the UN.

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND DIAGRAMS	4
PREFACE	5
GLOSSARY	6
INTRODUCTION	8
CHAPTER ONE: APPROACH	18
CHAPTER TWO: UNPKO	54
CHAPTER THREE: JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND UNPKO, 1956 TO 1990	74
CHAPTER FOUR: THE SECOND GULF WAR	122
CHAPTER FIVE: CAMBODIA	175
CHAPTER SIX: SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS	212
CONCLUSION	247
APPENDIX I: UNPKO	264
APPENDIX II: POLITICAL CARTOONS	267
APPENDIX III: MAPS	277
NOTES	286
BIBLIOGRAPHY	309

LIST OF TABLES AND DIAGRAMS

Table I: Typology of Changing Norms	17
Table II: Opinion polls on whether Japan should join the free world, the Communist camp, or be neutral	88
Table III: Factional Support for the UN Peace Co-operation Bill	135
Table IV: Diet Support for the UN Peace Co-operation Bill	143
* * *	
Diagram I: Changes in Japanese Public Opinion regarding the Despatch of the SDF on UN Peacekeeping Operations	9
Diagram II: Policymaking Matrix for Chapter Three: Japanese Foreign Policy and UNPKO, 1956 to 1990	121
Diagram III: Policymaking Matrix for Chapter Four: The Second Gulf War	174
Diagram IV: Policymaking Matrix for Chapter Five: Cambodia	211
Diagram V: Policymaking Matrix for Chapter Six: Subsequent Missions	246

PREFACE

I want to thank a multitude of people for their assistance in what has been a sometimes frustrating, but ultimately rewarding, experience. My supervisor in Sheffield, Professor Glenn Hook, deserves the greatest credit for providing the inspiration, constructive criticism and deadlines that are so necessary to any postgraduate undertaking. Gratitude is also extended to everybody else at Sheffield, particularly Professor Ian Gow. In Japan, the late Professor Kamo Takehiko and Professor Takahashi Susumu of the University of Tokyo were kind enough to act as my sponsors and supervisors during the two years I have spent in Japan. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Kashiwagi Noboru, Wada Keiko and the Hise Gârusu of the International Center for Comparative Law and Politics at the University of Tokyo for giving me the opportunity to come to Japan in the first place and then keeping me here. Finally, thanks to my contemporaries from Sheffield—Julie Gilson, Christopher Hughes, Ise Naoko and James Malcolm—for advice, encouragement and alcohol. If this dissertation proves to be of interest or use to the reader, the credit belongs to them; if there are any errors in fact or interpretation, the fault is mine.

Throughout this dissertation, Japanese names are given in their proper order, i.e. the surname first and the given name second. Long vowels are expressed in the form of a macron except in the case of 'Tokyo'. North American spelling, e.g. organization, minimize, etc., is maintained in citations from North American publications; otherwise, British spelling, e.g. organisation, minimise, etc., is observed.

GLOSSARY

AHG	<i>Ad hoc</i> Group on Co-operation in Peacekeeping (NACC)
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASDF	Air Self-Defence Force
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measure
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
DSP	Democratic Socialist Party
DMZ	Demilitarised Zone
EC	European Community
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group (in Liberia)
ECOWAS	Economic Organisation of West African States
EU	European Union
JASDF	Japan Air Self-Defence Forces
JCP	Japan Communist Party (Kyôsan-tô)
JDA	Japan Defence Agency
JMSDF	Japan Marine Self-Defence Forces
JSDF	Japan Self-Defence Forces
JSP	Japan Socialist Party (Shakaitô)
LDP	Liberal-Democratic Party (Jiyûminshutô)
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers (in Sinai)
MICIVH	Mission Civile Internationale en Haiti (International Civilian Mission to Haiti)
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan)
MNF	Multinational Force in Haiti
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)
MOF	Ministry of Finance (Japan)
MOHA	Ministry of Home Affairs (Japan)
MOJ	Ministry of Justice (Japan)
NACC	North Atlantic Co-operation Council
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation of African States
ONUC	Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (UN Organisation in the Congo)
ONUCA	Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en Centro-america (UN Observer Mission in Central America)
ONUMOZ	UN Operation in Mozambique
OUNSAL	Mision de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador (UN Observer Mission in El Salvador)
ONUVEH	UN Mission to Verify the Election in Haiti
ONUVEN	Observadores de las Naciones Unidas para la Verificacion de las Elecciones en Nicaragua (UN Verification Mission for the Nicaraguan Elections in Europe)

OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
SDPJ	Social Democratic Party of Japan (Nihon Shakaiminshutō)
UN	UN
UNAMIC	UN Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAVEM	UN Angola Verification Mission
UNCRO	UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force (in Syria)
UNEF	UN Emergency Force (in Israel and Egypt)
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGOMAP	UN Good Office Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNPKO	UN Peacekeeping Operations
UNIPOM	UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission
UNITAF	Unified Task Force (in Somalia)
UNMIH	UN Mission in Haiti
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in Lebanon
UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	UN Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSA	UN Observer Mission in South Africa
UNOMUR	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM	UN Operation in Somalia
UNPF	UN Peace Forces (incorporates after March 1995 UNPROFOR, UNCRO and UNPREDEP)
UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment Force (in Macedonia)
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force (in the former Yugoslavia 1992-March 1995; from March 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
UNSF	UN Security Force (in Irian Jaya)
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organisation
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group (in Namibia)
UNTEA	UN Transitional Executive Authority (in Irian Jaya)
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organisation (in Egypt/Israel/Lebanon/Syria)
UNYOM	UN Yemen Observation Mission
WEU	West European Union


INTRODUCTION

THE REMIT OF THIS DISSERTATION

The end of the Cold War has raised questions both within and outside Japan as to the future role it will play in international society. In the fields of Japanese foreign, security and defence policies, one of the most salient changes is the now legally permissible despatch abroad of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in a non-combat role under the aegis of United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO). Due to legislation enacted in the wake of the Second Gulf War of 1991, Japan was able to contribute personnel for the first time to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) mission in September, 1992, and subsequently to missions in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), El Salvador (ONUSAL), Rwanda (UNAMIR), and the Golan Heights (UNDOF). After ten years of minimal contributions of civilian personnel to UNPKO and nearly half a century of emphasis on purely economic contributions to the maintenance of the international system, this change is all the more remarkable. Equally, as seen in Diagram 1, the attitude of the Japanese public towards SDF despatch has changed dramatically. There is a multitude of reasons for this state of affairs, both internal and external, and it is the purpose of this dissertation to investigate the various reasons for this change with particular emphasis being placed on the role that the UN has played in encouraging, constraining, and justifying Japan's watershed decision to expand its participation in UNPKO. The kinds of questions this dissertation will address include: what factors have influenced, encouraged and prohibited Japan's sudden UNPKO activity? How has Japan regarded the UN system and its PKO functions? What kind of role has the UN specifically played in legitimising the despatch of JSDF personnel? What kind of role can Japan play within UNPKO?

**DIAGRAM I: CHANGES IN JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING
THE DESPATCH OF THE SDF ON UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

(Source: Takeishi, C., 'Japanese National Identity in Transition: Who Wants to Send the Military Abroad?', *International Sociology*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1996), p. 245).



WHY PEACEKEEPING?¹

The UN's increase in importance is one phenomenon of the post-Cold War period, especially as regards its PKO functions. However, as Charles Kegley has posited, the UN continues to suffer from certain weaknesses like the fear that it 'has become a captive of the strongest member at the moment, the United States.' In addition, there are criticisms that a renewed UN will need more resources to fulfil increasing PKO commitments.² Yet, as Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley and Carl Kaysen have written, 'over the second half of the 20th century the foundations of the existing norm of non-intervention have been shaken.... The proliferation of domestic insurgencies, rebellions and full-fledged civil wars has superimposed an image of domestic

implosion as a major challenge to the stability of the international system.³ All of the thirty major armed conflicts fought in 1995 were intrastate wars.⁴ Addressing these conflicts and the post-war reconstruction of these nations is a major preoccupation of the international community and peacekeeping is often touted as the means by which to carry out these tasks. Furthermore, as Barry Blechman has observed, 'all people in other countries, and their governments, have not only the right, but the obligation, to intervene on behalf of both oppressed peoples and innocent bystanders.'⁵ In a world characterised by the extremities of political life with genocide and ethnic cleansing in Africa, Asia and Europe, Richard Falk is correct in stressing that the immediate task is to find 'the will and means to oppose those forms of extremism.'⁶ Therein lies the importance of peacekeeping specifically, and more broadly, the UN system, in addressing these various manifestation of disorder. In the first twenty-five years of its existence, the UN created twelve PKO. In contrast, as many have been created since 1989.⁷ Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has recognised the way in which these developments have propagated the expansion in the number and duties of PKO: '[t]he world is being changed by powerful forces that no state, or even group of states, has the capacity to manage by itself.'⁸

The development and refinement of peacekeeping techniques is one of the many methods which can be used to achieve the goal of 'resituating the sovereign state, making governments less responsive to the priorities of global market forces, and more receptive to the needs and aspirations of the peoples of the world, especially those who are most economically, socially, and politically deprived.'⁹ Michael Mandelbaum has stated that 'the world is ready for government, or rather it is ready for more international governance than ever before. But the UN is not a world government and it will not be one. The instruments of order are sovereign states.'¹⁰ I concur with Mandelbaum's assertion that sovereign states still count and world government under the UN is

an unlikely normative proposition, but will argue that international organisations can and do play a salient role in the promotion of multilateralism and can influence the behaviour of sovereign states. In this dissertation, the state under examination is Japan and the international organisation is the UN in the specific issue-area of peacekeeping.

With the expansion of PKO both in number and nature, 'the UN has become the all-purpose ambulance service for bleeding countries.'¹¹ Yet trying to interpret these developments in the framework of international relations' (IR) theory, as Charles Kegley has done, reveals that 'realism is fundamentally opposed to the idea of international organization.'¹² Realism (or, in its later variant, 'neo-realism'), the chief paradigm of IR, places emphasis on sovereign states as the main actors of world politics. Its rejection of the concept of global governance plays down or even denies any role for an international organisation like the UN and its peacekeeping functions. As a result, realism regards states as having to provide for their own security needs. However, as new strains of peacekeeping begin to question the once sacrosanct status of the nation-state and ignore national boundaries, the use of PKO is on the ascendance and the explanatory power of realism is on the wane.¹³ With the increasing relevance of PKO as a multilateral response to security matters, new explanatory models are the *sine qua non* for good social science. Thus, the underpinning threads of realism are slowly being unwoven and PKO is gaining acceptance as a valid multilateral method of providing security. The use of force as part of UNPKO comes to mind as the only justifiable exercise by states of military power in an interdependent post-Cold War world. It could be argued that, to a certain extent, PKO has become the new just war outlined centuries ago by St. Augustine and Hugo Grotius. Certainly, it is suited to the recent type of ethnic conflicts and unstable political situations that have emerged in the post-Cold War world, as well as having a proven record in the more traditional inter-state conflicts. Charles Kegley has

captured this spirit in stating that:

The post-Cold War challenges scholars to resume the search for that hybrid combination of both realist and idealist concepts around which a neo-idealist paradigm might be organized, and attempt to construct, to borrow a phrase, a 'realism with a human face'. Because a concern for justice arguably would serve states' interest, should not this principle serve as a springboard for the redirection of theory building in the post-Cold War period?¹⁴

THE RELEVANCE OF JAPAN

A central question to any study in the field of area studies concerns the relevance of the nation or region under examination. In the case of Japan, it is possible to describe the remarkable development and economic growth of post-W.W.II Japan. However, this task has been undertaken *ad nauseum* in the literature pertaining to Japan—outlining Japan's remarkable levels of GNP, status as largest creditor nation, etc.—and need not be repeated here. This is very much an upshot of the shock the West received with Japan's sudden growth in the 1960s and the vast amounts of wealth that accumulated thereafter in Tokyo.¹⁵ In other fields, however, it is not so widely expounded why Japan matters. After having justified the reasons for concentrating on PKO in the post-Cold War period, it is now necessary to shed light on the salience of Japan's experience, both generally in the field of security and foreign policy, and specifically in the sub-field of peacekeeping.

As David Williams has stated, 'in a way true of no Asian nation since the vigorous prime of the Ottoman Empire, Japan looms large today in the practical affairs and speculative cares of the contemporary Westerner.'¹⁶ Despite this attention, the Japanese experience of government, security and foreign policy has singularly failed to enter into the West's understanding.

Japan is one of the only nations to have renounced its right to belligerency and the maintenance of an armed force with an explicit statement in its Peace Constitution of 1947.¹⁷ Despite traditionally Western interpretations of pacifism based on Christian ethics, Japan has

demonstrated a commitment to pacifism based in society and rooted in the A-bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the firebombing of Tokyo, and the reaction to the colonisation of East Asia by the Imperial Army. With a societal, not religious, basis for this noteworthy stance (no Western, Christian country, except for Costa Rica, has ever renounced violence as a state policy so explicitly), Japan is undeniably worthy of attention.

There is an obvious gap in the literature addressing and evaluating sufficiently the contribution Japan can make to PKO as a war-renouncing nation, in addition to the contribution peacekeeping can make in the promotion of Japan's international policy. The Japanese experience of security in terms of its Peace Constitution and the respect it accords to both society and international organisations, especially the UN, should provide us with new ways in which to think about the practice and conceptualisation of peacekeeping, as well as the way we think about foreign policymaking and the role of non-traditional actors in this process. Japan can shed new light on Western ways of thinking about politics and unearth new centres of power, in line with the contention that 'one should study Japan to understand the totality of human experience, not because Japan is part of the whole, but because the Japanese example illuminates the whole.'¹⁸ Thus, recognising the Japanese political experience as something different from the Western political experience is crucial in differentiating between the subject and the object under observation, and how the two interact each other. As Japan is one of the few states in the world, along with Costa Rica, to renounce its right of belligerency in constitutional terms, and its right of collective self-defence, as an interpretation of the constitution, the Japanese experience of peacekeeping is highly relevant. UNPKO now appears to be the issue that is the trigger for a reconsideration of Japan's position in and contribution to the international system, rather than the once dominate US-Japanese bilateral relationship. In a similar way to

Japan, Finland has suffered from restrictions to its military posture resulting from its action in W.W.II. However, it has carved out a role for itself as one of the world's leading peacekeepers.¹⁹ Thus, UNPKO has been used by certain elements in Japanese society as the justifying factor for a new military role for Japan.

In this way, Japan is examined because of its capabilities, rather than because it is there. Thus, this dissertation is classified as falling into the work of what Williams has called the 'miracle men' (studying Japan because it is important), rather than the work of the Everest-ites (studying Japan because it is there), in an attempt to locate the foundations of Japan's post-Cold War foreign policy.²⁰ As a result, the Japan-shaped hole in the discourse of Western IR can be filled in and thinking space can be opened up in the mainstream of Western IR theory.

THE STRUCTURE OF THIS DISSERTATION

Traditionally analyses of Japan's foreign, security and defence policy have been concerned chiefly with the bilateral relationship between Japan and the United States (US) and, *ergo*, an imbalance, with too much focus upon inter-state relations, has developed. The relationship between the Japanese state and society has been chiefly ignored, and furthermore so has the influence of international organisations in framing and guiding Japanese foreign policy.²¹ These links will be the focus of this dissertation with the objective of addressing a related gap in the literature and enhancing our understanding of both the influence the UN possesses in the post-Cold War world and the way in which Japanese foreign policy is shaped in this new era.

The first three chapters of the dissertation will highlight the theoretical debates regarding both the role of international organisations in international politics and the foreign policymaking process in Japan. Chapter One (Approach) will outline the traditional approaches to Japan's

relationship with the UN, its PKO policy and multilateralism before proceeding to describe, differentiate, and justify the particular normative approach adopted to the questions raised above. Concrete criteria of measuring changes in these internal (pacifism) and external (the US, the UN and East Asian nations) norms will be explained. With this approach in mind, Chapter Two (UNPKO) will discuss the rise in the profile of the UN with the end of the Cold War, and in particular the increase in importance of its peacekeeping functions as a norm of the international community. This analysis will refer to the classic debate in the discipline of international relations between neo-realists and neo-liberals regarding the importance of international organisations, in addition to making reference to the Marxist contribution. Suffice it to say at this point that neo-realists minimise the role of international organisations in favour of the nation-state, whereas neo-liberals outline various roles that they can play in influencing state behaviour. Chapter Three (Japanese Foreign Policy and UNPKO, 1956 to 1990) will address the factors that influence Japan's foreign policy firstly by tracing the traditional interpretations centring on the triumvirate of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the bureaucracy, and big business. While not dismissing the contribution the traditional interpretation has made to our understanding of Japanese foreign policy, this dissertation will seek to supplement this body of knowledge with an analysis of other factors, particularly the role of the UN. Traditional interpretations of Japan's participation in the UN system have revolved around Japan's relations with the United States and the subordinate position Japan has played within this bilateral relationship; as will be seen, foreign pressure or *gaiatsu* is the main theme of this debate. Alternatively, many have highlighted the internal workings of the Japanese body politic positing the ruling triad model of the LDP, the business elite and the bureaucracy mentioned above. Keeping in mind the broader debate between neo-realists and neo-liberals, I will highlight and evaluate the role and the particular input of the UN as

the embodiment of an international institution, and UNPKO as a norm of international society into an evolving multilateral foreign policymaking process in Japan. This chapter will also provide a broad historical overview of the role in PKO played by Japan from admission to the UN in 1956 through to the Gulf Crisis of 1990, examining the factors that resulted in Japan's minimal and predominantly financial contribution. This is not in order to locate a single point of origin for the discourse, but rather to understand how the debate has been nurtured, framed and limited for those involved with the issue today. Thus, the past and the present can be scrutinised, and issues questioned that may have been omitted from the traditional debates, thereby opening up thinking space and liberating this dissertation from 'the slavery of habit.'²² In this case we can also locate influences for change which existed before the end of the Cold War and, thus, critically examine what kind of internal and external factors have been predominately responsible for the change in Japan's UNPKO policy.

The remaining three chapters will deal with the empirical evidence and will address the exact nature of Japan's participation in UNPKO through a series of case studies. Chapter Four (The Second Gulf War) will take the Second Gulf War of 1991 as its theme in an attempt to understand which factors were influential in the resulting legislation that heralded the change in Japan's PKO policy. Chapter Five (Cambodia) will deal with Japan's first despatch of the SDF to Cambodia in 1991 examining the various problems that were encountered and the solutions found. The final case study in Chapter Six (Subsequent Missions) will bring the debate up to date by looking at the subsequent missions in which Japan has participated including Mozambique, Rwanda, El Salvador and the Golan Heights. The dissertation will conclude by highlighting various empirical and theoretical points that have arisen through the case studies as to the influence of certain norms and especially the role the UN and its peacekeeping functions have

played in framing Japan's UNPKO policy. In short, by examining and measuring the role of norms in constraining and also promoting Japan's PKO policy, this dissertation will demonstrate the essential importance and utility of norms in analysing Japan's foreign policy formulation, in addition to highlighting specifically which norms are on the ascendance and which are in decline in terms of influence. A simple table of findings can be given at this point and will be referred to again in the following chapters and the Conclusion:

TABLE I: TYPOLOGY OF CHANGING NORMS

	PACIFISM	US	UN	EAST ASIAN NATIONS
SPECIFICITY	Medium-Falling	High	Medium-Rising	Medium-Falling
DURABILITY	Medium	High	High	Medium
CONCORDANCE	Medium	High	High	Medium

CHAPTER ONE: APPROACH

After having introduced the topic under investigation in the previous chapter, let us now turn to how I will examine the role of norms in encouraging and constraining Japan's UNPKO policy formulation. In this chapter I will outline firstly the traditional approaches to the discipline of international relations with two objectives in mind: on the one hand, to comprehend how the discourse of international relations has evolved in the late twentieth century and how it has attempted to interpret the practice of peacekeeping; and, on the other hand, to provide an understanding of the mainstream approaches to the study of IR, which can provide a juxtaposition for the different approach I will outline thereafter. After introducing the 'mainstream', I will relate these paradigms to Japan's UNPKO policy and demonstrate how, although they may provide us with a degree of understanding, they fail to provide us with the necessary new perspectives in the light of the end of the Cold War. Then, I will outline my own approach discussing the analysis of ideas, norms and language in international relations before continuing to relate this approach to the topic of Japan's UNPKO in order to highlight the advantages of the approach adopted here.

TRADITIONAL APPROACHES: NEO-REALISM

Neo-realism has been criticised as it 'addresses only questions, the answers to which we already knew, and its explanatory framework is the night in which all cows are black.'¹ However, it would be a mistake to underestimate its influence, for, as Berthold Brecht stated, 'realism is an issue not only for literature: it is a major political, philosophical and practical issue and must be handled and explained as such—as a matter of general human interest.'² In other words, to ignore the

realist paradigm, whether or not one agrees or disagrees with it, is to ignore not only the central discourse of world politics, but modern philosophy.

Political realist thinking can be traced back to the writings of Thucydides on the Peloponnesian Wars (c. 400 B.C.). However, realism in modern IR is usually associated with the writings of Hans Morgenthau. In response to the attacks of liberals in the 1970s, Kenneth Waltz attempted to reinvigorate realism by shifting attention to the structure of the international system and neo-realism was born. It is questionable and outside of the remit of this dissertation as to how much of an improvement neo-realism was upon traditional realism.³ Thus, for the sake of clarity the more recent term neo-realism will be employed in this study. Both variants of realism would regard Japan's broader relations with the UN, and more specifically Japan's PKO policy, in the light of three major assumptions: first, that the state is the main actor in world politics; second, that the use of force is effective in realising policy goals; and third, that a hierarchy of issues exists in world politics with the security field constituting 'high politics' and economic, social and ecological issues constituting 'low politics'. Thus, the world of the neo-realist scholar is one characterised by the constant threat of violence and, due to this constant threat, political integration and co-operation are seen only to exist for as long as it is deemed to be in a state's interest. It is believed that the world has always been like this and will continue to be so; ultimately, there is little chance of change and progress within the neo-realist paradigm.⁴ History is cyclical and characterised either by conflict and war, or peace through a balancing of nation-states. States remain, thus, reluctant to enter into a system of dependence upon other states; the desire to maintain autonomy is paramount and, as a result, the influence of international institutions will be minimal. States are seen as billiard balls, impenetrable and self-governing, impervious to external stimuli—state sovereignty is of the utmost importance to the neo-realist.

Thus, if one were to adopt a neo-realist approach, Japan's UNPKO policy would be relegated to the lower reaches of the hierarchy of issues in the international system. Although touching upon security issues, realists would not regard UNPKO as providing a justifiable alternative to the ability of states to provide for their own security. In the case of a war-renouncing state like Japan, where its ability to provide for its own security has been circumscribed, realists look for an explanation of Japan's recent activism in PKO to the most powerful state in the international system, i.e. the US. Thus, Japan's increased contribution is regarded as a result of US pressure in the bilateral relationship between these two nation-states.⁵ Furthermore, the emphasis is placed on security, power, and nation-states at the expense of civil society, the role of international organisations, ideas and norms. Neo-realists would regard these latter factors as of minor importance with public opinion mattering little to politicians, international organisations being merely tools of the most powerful nation-state, and ideas and norms being an unambiguous representation of an objective reality. For example, Charles Pentland describes a scene where various international organisations represent nothing more than a variety of tools which the state inspects and assesses for utility in achieving its objectives. The more powerful the state, the more easily it can utilise an international organisation for its own ends. Smaller states, which cannot act freely in a unilateral manner, need to form coalitions in order to make the most of international organisations. Whatever the level of multilateral co-operation, the end goal is to accumulate power.⁶ The traditional realist model of international relations does not place any onus on international organisations as important actors in the international system. Instead, their actions are seen to be curtailed by the policies and actions of states. International organisations are simply tools of state policy and one more arena in which they can compete for power. Under the realist view of the world, the UN is

not considered a form, or an emerging form, of world government with the authority to act as such. Rather, the UN is a product of the states that make up the international system and is a forum for these states to pursue their own interests. Thus, the UN is constrained by states' interests and will invariably fail in its attempts to influence state behaviour. As Samuel Huntington has stated, '...every international organization at some point finds itself limited by the very principle which gives it being.'⁷ Huntington has little time for the argument that international organisations can behave as autonomous entities separate from the controls of the nation-state, contending that, as the number of international organisations increases, so will the need for these organisations to access the resources of particular nations and, thus, the consent of the nation-state to enter its borders will become of ultimate importance.

In seeking to improve on the realist model, a critique of the realist model must highlight the vagueness of the concept of defining power, the over-attention paid to states as the central actors of international politics, the lack of attention paid to economics and other 'softer' aspects of power such as norms, and the weakness of the idea that states are always in competition with each other and will only co-operate in order to maximise their own national interest in the short term. Thus, to neo-realist eyes, the Japanese government's recent activism in UNPKO is an attempt at self-promotion in the international system, with one eye on a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC).⁸ Moreover, with the emphasis placed upon the primacy of state sovereignty, UNPKO is seen as a practice at the beck and call of nation-states. If a nation-state wishes to secure the withdrawal of an operation it can always refer to its sovereign borders. UNPKO is, in this light, a practice both brought to life and curtailed by the nation-state.

Morgenthau wrote that 'it is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives meaning to the facts of international politics and makes a

theory of politics possible'.⁹ With this in mind it appears that when Morgenthau first advocated political realism the theory was sustainable and was highly applicable to the competitive interstate system in the immediate post-war era being concomitant with US aims 'of [exorcising] isolationism, [justifying] a permanent and global involvement in world affairs, [and rationalising] the accumulation of power'.¹⁰ However, in the post-Cold War world it no longer provides a useable map, if it ever did, of a world in which the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War has ended, ethnic and religious conflicts proliferate, and security threats begin to encompass issues such as drugs, AIDS and global warming which have no respect for abstract national boundaries. Looking at the post-Cold War world through neo-realist eyes, one would expect the number of international organisations to decrease as their functional utility declines with the end of superpower conflict. However, it is *adaptation* which seems to characterise how international organisations have fared after the end of the Cold War, with their continued existence and even an increase in number. Neo-realism appears to have a limited memory and fails to allow for such types of change. UNPKO is a practice that has changed drastically over the years, increasing its remit and influence. In a world of declining sovereignty, UNPKO, as will be seen in Chapter Two, is becoming a norm of international society at the expense of the realist principle of state sovereignty. Thus, the argument put forward that Japan's relations with the UN and its peacekeeping policy are merely adjuncts to the US-Japan bilateral relationship is similarly called into question. Both generally and specifically, neo-realism provides only a limited view of the world; thus, further approaches are necessary to produce a more multi-faceted understanding of any issue.

Neo-realism, as Cox has stated, has failed to allow for change because it deals with a frozen world and does not understand the way in which this image came about as it has failed to

reflect upon these processes. Interests and identity are exogenously given and never investigated. In light of the failure of realism to even adequately explain the collapse of the Soviet Union and the global disorder that followed, where the mainstream went wrong needs to be located, addressed, and thinking space created. This can be achieved by moving into a post-positivist field, characterised by the shibboleth: 'reality is never a complete, entirely coherent "thing", accessible to universalized, essentialist or totalized understandings of it.'¹¹ Thus, limitations in understanding and bias must be recognised before embarking on a research programme. In addition, the traditional, positivist assertion that all social science research must be value-free is questioned. Having recognised that there are doubts about what the world refers to, then the non-existence of value judgements must also be questioned. Ideas and research must be articulated by language, which is heavily laden with values. Essentially, it is impossible to divorce the subject from the object and value judgements are unavoidable; it is a matter of recognising bias in the early stages of any research programme.¹² With a move away from the traditional realist approaches to security we can begin to look upon the UN and its peacekeeping functions as a revitalised and important tool in creating security in the post-Cold War. Moreover, Japan can be considered for the contribution it can make to international society in terms different to a realist-type billiard ball.

TRADITIONAL APPROACHES: NEO-LIBERALISM

Neo-liberalism is a critique of the neo-realist view of international relations questioning the neo-realist explanation of the way in which the international system works. With this in mind, it is necessary to highlight the major characteristics of neo-liberalism and demonstrate how it has claimed the greater explanatory power and set forth a much more useable map of the world.¹³

Nevertheless, scholars have attacked neo-liberalism for its lack of conceptual clarity and weakness in defining its terms.¹⁴ Thus, I will explain what I understand by the term neo-liberalism and how it has attempted to tackle the shortcomings of neo-realism.

Neo-liberalism has sought to debunk neo-realism by highlighting the importance of non-state actors, like international organisations. In addition, it stresses the inability of the state to make its own decisions as it is forced to compromise with a series of governmental and non-governmental, transnational and domestic actors. This has created a system of interdependence that, as David Baldwin demonstrated, has a long and rich history helping to underpin its conceptual clarity. Baldwin draws upon the work of Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau to illustrate the earliest conceptions of interdependence defined in terms of reliance upon others, and, as a result, in terms of the benefits that a state would rather not spurn by renegeing upon a relationship. In the twentieth century, writers such as Ramsay Muir and Sir Norman Angell continued this idea of reliance by painting a world where states would join together to achieve a greater good, like peace or economic growth, transcending their own parochial national interests.¹⁵ Keohane and Nye expanded this predominantly mercantilist definition of interdependence and applied it to other areas of international politics, and, importantly, not necessarily in the positive sense of mutual benefit; an arms race could be cited as an example of a relationship where the risks of breaking the relationship are too costly to take.¹⁶ Thus, it would seem that interdependence is a term which is normatively understood as not only encapsulating a degree of sensitivity to other actors in the international system, but also in terms of a dependence on a certain relationship which, being too damaging to break, tends to persist.¹⁷ Being affected by external forces does not adequately describe the commonly held definitions of interdependence. The onus needs to be placed on the vulnerability each state suffers from and

the inability to face the consequences of severing a certain relationship. This line of argument follows the thinking of functional studies of international organisations which presumes that international organisations are given life by the interests of states converging over certain issues.¹⁸

Keohane and Nye contend that non-state actors have become as much a part of foreign relations as they are a part of domestic relations.¹⁹ In other words, these new actors have begun to blur the link between domestic and foreign policy: their actions make foreign governments more sensitive to each other. Government interests have had to become broader and transnational organisations have begun to make decisions that exert a global influence. Domestic policy in one state has, thus, begun to exert an effect on the domestic policy of other states. The variety of channels of communication and the global nature of communications reinforces this characteristic. As a result, the sovereign state, the central tenet of realism, has been slowly eroded so that it could be said that 'the actual content of sovereignty, the scope of the authority of the states can exercise, has always been contested.'²⁰ Furthermore, theorists of interdependence stress that there is no hierarchy among issues, and thus, military and security issues are consequently not the dominant issues. The important point to emphasise here is that the dichotomy between domestic and foreign policy is obscured.²¹ This demonstrates how issues tend to overlap and cannot be addressed fully without reference to other issues. Thus, governance is rendered a much more problematic exercise. Keohane and Nye quote the energy crises of the 1970s which were categorised as a foreign policy problem; however, the introduction of fuel tax domestically could not have hoped to solve this problem due to the opposition of interest groups at home. Thus, in pluralist democracies, a domestic consensus may be necessary before foreign policy problems can be addressed. The consequences for theory

are that the divide between domestic and foreign policy is bridged. Third, when a situation of interdependence exists the importance of military power for the solution of a range of problems will diminish; ecological problems, say, would not be solved by military means. In a number of areas the use of the military to find a solution has been precluded and the fear of military attack has declined generally. Furthermore, it is reasoned that the processes of agenda-setting will become more prominent. In the traditional realist model the agenda was decided by relevance to the central issue of security interests, and the balance of power; non-military issues would only be regarded in terms of how far they affected the balance of power. Keohane and Nye claim that due to the non-centrality of military issues, the dichotomy between domestic and foreign policies will be bridged, and with the growing role of international organisations, the agenda of international politics will become more varied. Domestic pressure groups will be able to bring internal problems to a global arena. States and other actors will gain access to a variety of international organisations in which they can campaign for an issue to be raised. Economic issues will no longer occupy the position of low politics they once possessed in relation to the high politics of security. Simply put, the once dominant issue of military security, and how states deal with it, is no longer an accurate reflection of global concerns.

With all this mind, it would be fair to say that for a number of reasons neo-liberalism is a progression beyond neo-realism in looking at the issue of Japan's PKO policy. Neo-liberalism stresses the abandonment of a hierarchy of issues, and thus, peacekeeping can be regarded as a relevant issue. Furthermore, with the distance put between neo-liberalism and neo-realism on the issue of the centrality of the nation-state, and the importance of dependence as opposed to self-sufficiency, other influential actors, like civil society and international organisations, can begin to be included in an analysis. Thus, an analysis of Japan's PKO policy can move away

from a dependence on the bilateral relationship with the US and the dominance of the Japanese state. In this way, previously ignored factors, like public opinion, international organisations, etc., become worthy of attention. Furthermore, peacekeeping is no longer regarded purely as a makeshift security palliative, as realists would stress, but rather as including economic, humanitarian, and social aspects which states contribute to, not solely out of a desire to promote their own narrow interests, but rather due to an obligation and dependence on others to collectively provide security. *Ergo*, the neo-liberal approach is drawing closer to fleshing out the initially narrow picture of the world provided by the neo-realist approach.

However, the debate between the neo-realist and neo-liberal schools is not a zero-sum game; it is not a matter of states losing power so as to be rendered into a condition of obscurity. There has been a noticeable synthesis in interpreting international relations resulting in what Ole Wæver has termed the 'neo-neo synthesis', where states 'are sharing powers—including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty—with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizen groups.'²² Neo-liberalism does not aim to be a critique of political realism and '...replace one oversimplification with another', but rather, '...to encourage a differentiated approach that distinguishes among dimensions and areas of world politics.'²³ Thus, neo-liberalism still accepts the nation-state as the primary actor in the anarchy of world politics. It may recognise norms of international behaviour, but only regulative norms of behaviour and not constitutive ones, a definition that will be discussed later. Thus, it fails to explain change. To understand what is occurring in current Japanese security and foreign policy it is necessary to pay attention to how new norms are constructed and how Japanese society and government respond to them. Moreover, as far as neo-liberalism is concerned, international institutions can be useful in facilitating co-operation between states, but only within the confines

of the anarchical state system usually labelled the 'Westphalian System'. Thus, the two mainstream approaches of international relations are time-bound to this historical period and, as Zacher and Sutton have suggested, 'Westphalian realism' and 'Westphalian liberalism' are more suitable terms for these two main discourses of IR theory.²⁴

TRADITIONAL APPROACHES: MARXISM

There is no single representative work dealing with the Marxist contribution to IR theory, chiefly because the work of Karl Marx never dealt directly with international relations as a discipline. Some scholars have even argued that the works of Marx have nothing useful to say about the field of international affairs.²⁵ Marx took labour, production and inter-class relationships, not inter-state relations, as the focus of his work. Thus, it raises the question of what possible use Marxist theory could provide in deepening our understanding of international relations. A traditional Marxist contribution is limited to the core concept of the production of wealth and profit. Because of this, in certain fields, especially those related to security, it is difficult to see the way in which Marxist theory can be related to UNPKO and what benefits this would result in. Marxism can certainly throw light upon the source of various conflicts being addressed by the UN and its peacekeeping activities. For example, Marxist theory would point to the global reorganisation of production, class struggle and the political vacuum resulting from the withdrawal of an imperialist power as sources of disorder in the Third World. Equally, the foreign policy of China and the once influential superpower, the Soviet Union, can be understood to a degree, in addition to the ideological motives of various revolutionary groups in Africa, Asia and Latin America which were, and are, all informed by Marxist thought. In this light, UNPKO would be regarded as a tool of the Western, capitalist states designed for the promotion and domination of Western values of

democracy and the free market economy throughout the globe. One Japanese scholar, Watanabe Osamu, has interpreted Japan's activity in UNPKO (as well as its ODA contributions) as a step in the development of Japanese neo-imperialism. Watanabe argues that the strength of internal pacifism in Japan against the overseas despatch of the SDF created one of the strongest set of 'shackles' (*ashikase*) against the growth of Japanese neo-imperialism. Moreover, the adoption of the PKO Law is regarded as an important first step in the progression of Japanese militarisation, the incremental revision of the Peace Constitution and the attainment of a permanent seat on the UNSC. Under the name of 'international contribution' the Japanese government is seen to be implementing a neo-imperialist policy in line with the bilateral relationship with the US.²⁶

However, many of the fields in which a Marxist contribution can be discerned are time-locked in a Cold War scenario. A Marxist approach may be useful for examining the sources of regional conflicts; however, the origins and causes of the conflicts to which Japan has despatched its SDF peacekeepers are solely on the margins of this study. Moreover, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of a free market economy, the role of these two Marxist-adhering superpowers is thrown into question. Watanabe's study attempts to make radical approaches more relevant to the post-Cold War world, yet is limited in the range of actors it takes into consideration and falls into the neo-realist trap of being overtly state-centred. In understanding what factors have affected Japan (or any state) in its decision to expand its UNPKO commitment, Marxism sits very much on the periphery, highlighting in the case of Japan only the influence of the US and the power triumvirate of the LDP, big business and the bureaucracy as the essential policymaking forces. No consideration of international and civil society and their respective norms is embraced beyond the concepts of production, profit and class exploitation.

However, some analysts have argued that Marxist theory is highly relevant to the study of international affairs. By investigating the nature of the state, causes of peace and war, and when coupled with Lenin's later and highly Marxist-influenced work on imperialism and other recent neo-Marxist work, a case has been made that Marxism can provide us with a degree of understanding.²⁷ Three areas of Marxist contribution do exist in dependency/development studies, 'world-systems' approaches, and Gramscian interpretations of international political economy and hegemony which pay attention to non-material aspects of power, like ideology, which is linked to the study of norms and values.²⁸ Especially the work of Robert Cox in critical theory has been influenced by the writings of Marx and Gramsci. By using Gramsci's ideas of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie over both government circles and civil society in capitalist systems, an analogy can be drawn with the dominance of Western, capitalist states in international society and the use of UNPKO as a tool in propagating this hegemony—in keeping with a traditional Marxist interpretation. Yet, the more interesting concept is that due to this hegemony, a definition of the state which is limited to government organs is too limited and needs to include civil society. By civil society, Cox's interpretation of Gramsci is referring to 'all the institutions which helped to create in people certain modes of behaviour and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order.'²⁹ Thus, an analysis of Japan's UNPKO policy can begin to move away from the state-centred 'neo-neo synthesis' of 'Westphalian realism' and 'Westphalian liberalism'. Moreover, Cox has placed the emphasis on historicism more so than neo-realism or neo-liberalism and has taken the idea of production and widened its meaning to include 'the production of ideas, of intersubjective meanings, of norms, of institutions and social practices... Looking at production is simply a way of thinking about collective life, not a reference to the 'economic' sectors of human activity.'³⁰ Thus, ideas, not just material resources, are credited with

possessing power and international organisations are regarded as assisting 'the process through which the institutions of hegemony and its ideology are developed.'³¹ In this way, a Coxian analysis builds upon traditional Marxist theories by including ideas, norms and international organisations.

Only with Cox's Gramscian-influenced work on ontology and intersubjectively understood meanings has Marxist international relations theory broken free of the historical structure of the Cold War and can an original and specific approach for studying Japan's UNPKO policy be constructed. Cox outlined three broad categories of forces: material capabilities (a necessary recognition of the role of the neo-realist debate); ideas; and institutions. These latter two will be taken up in the following section which outlines my own approach referring to the decline of sovereignty, the importance of international organisations, and the norms of international society and how they are understood.

BEYOND POSITIVISM TO CONSTRUCTIVISM

As has been demonstrated, there are gaps in the neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches that render them, in their traditional forms, both essentially rational, positivist approaches. They fail to envisage a role for international institutions beyond the facilitation of co-operation within the primary national interest of the state. Furthermore, change is ignored within these approaches: change both in institutional arrangements, the international system, and the language, values and norms which frame the possibility of co-operation in international politics. Under the tenets of realism the likelihood of international organisations playing an effective role in the international system seems unlikely when the constant struggle for power motivated by self-interest is highlighted. In a world characterised by interdependence, the opportunity for international

organisations to play an integral role is somewhat improved; as described above, the creation of transnational interest groups can also encourage this development. International organisations have demonstrated the ability to highlight a problem in a given country, like the 1974 World Food Conference did in the United States, or the 1992 Global Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, international organisations have brought government representatives together who would not normally come into contact with each other, and non-governmental organisations can take the opportunity to form transnational understandings. In this way international organisations become an arena for fostering co-operation. International organisations can, in fact, affect state strategies by serving as templates for policy choices as demonstrated by the nations of Eastern Europe altering their economic policies in order to gain admittance to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). As a result of the multiplicity of channels, the traditional view that national boundaries will limit the scope of a problem no longer seems to be an accurate assessment. On the societal and governmental level, co-operation among certain groups across national boundaries can be witnessed as a means to politicise a given problem. With a multiplicity of channels and a variety of actors connecting each other, the role of centralised government becomes complicated when it attempts to give the impression of a united front against a foreign threat. Simply put, the once all-powerful state has been eclipsed from below on the societal level, and from above on the transnational level.

Connected to this, Robert Cox has argued that with a high quality of leadership, international organisations can play an important role by creating their own power base independent of nation-states. Cox describes an interdependent world where states join together because of higher interests which only co-operation through international organisations can promote. Under Article IX of the UN Charter the Secretary-General is given the power to bring

matters to the attention of the Security Council. Thus, an administrator with ebullience will promote the work of the UN as Dag Hammarskjöld did in the field of PKO and Albert Thomas did with the International Labour Organisation (ILO). An international organisation led by an executive head can raise issues when states are incapable or disinclined to advocate a certain line, as was the case with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF-I) in the Suez Crisis.³² Personal initiative can create a new consensus or norm of behaviour, as Hammarskjöld did with UNPKO by concentrating on that particular issue and leaving other issues to under-secretaries. Cox argues that a true sense of independence and an international viewpoint can be fostered among the civil service of an international organisation with the promotion of long-term employment and the avoidance of short-term secondment. Thus, any loyalties to their nationality can be overcome. Moreover, the way in which an executive head organises the bureaucracy around him, the political connections he/she possesses with various member states, (purely diplomatic leaders are regarded as inclined to failure), the utilisation not only of governmental links, but links with domestic pressure groups, can all influence the executive head's ability to succeed. His role as a consensus builder can be a central factor if the confidence of the major powers is maintained.³³ Thus, in a number of ways institutional arrangements can prevail over the neo-realist paradigm of inter-state co-operation. First, the neo-realist distribution of power is ignored and the previously disenfranchised are accredited voting power equal to that of major powers. Second, international institutions can link different issues ensuring state participation in issues that may not necessarily be of interest.³⁴ Third, international institutions can provide 'road maps' as alternative policy directions or in the absence of policy options all together, thus providing international institutions with a utility value.³⁵

The independence of international organisations is not only a recent phenomenon but can

be seen in the example of the British India Company that cultivated the whole of the Indian sub-continent independently of the British government. The important thing about the current state of affairs is the scope and number of these actors. More capable institutions are needed by states to address issues and in the post-Cold War world they have been created but with uncertainty as to where the borderline between state sovereignty and the remit of international organisations is drawn. Some have been given the power to ignore state sovereignty, like the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction. The process has been described in the following terms:

States do co-operate regularly because it is in their own best interest to do so. Co-operation pertaining to particular sets of issues in international relations is reinforced by social learning and results in specific patterns of behaviour and institutions. International institutions are significant to states' actions because they provide for an exchange of information and help define areas of common interest; they thus affect the formulation of security concepts and strategies. A growing specialization among units resulting from a division of labour leads to increasing participation of states in joint decision-making and contributes to a transformation of the atomistic structure of the international system.³⁶

Multilateralist approaches are proliferating with the end of the Cold War. Nobody would dispute the power and potential of the European Union. Even institutions like NATO, the object of much concern, have redefined their role in the post-Cold War world. John Ruggie makes the historical analysis by contending that not since the Congress of Vienna in 1815 has the world been so keen to repudiate the system of bilateral alliances and forge ahead with multilateral approaches to a variety of issues.³⁷ The Asia-Pacific region, which traditionally had been the exception to this rule, has begun to embrace this new multilateralism with a wide proliferation, reinvigoration and expansion of organisations from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). Although behind the progress seen in Europe, multilateral approaches have begun to take root in

Asia.

This is because international organisations often act as the venue for an increased amount of transgovernmental policy co-ordination. Face-to-face communications between similar organs of different governments can be promoted within the aegis of an international organisation and, as a result, affect the resultant policy. Thus, the seemingly closed walls of a state's decision-making processes are broken down and external influences are endowed with the power to influence policy. This functionalist view of international institutions stresses that they are able to 'reduce the transaction costs of bargaining, provide opportunities for looking at issues, inform governments about their alternatives, and mitigate fears of uncoordinated or exploitative strategies by stabilising expectations about future state behaviour.'³⁸ If allowed to develop over a certain time frame this contact can produce a sense of collegiality amongst policymakers, scientists, engineers, etc., of various nations. Keohane and Nye contend that, eventually, these groups behave with more deference to their respective group's interests than their respective nation's interests. Negotiations between members of the British Commonwealth and relations between the US and Canada are put forward as examples of communities that have reached a certain level of mutual understanding.³⁹ Within these areas transgovernmental elite networks can be seen at work created through friendship, common interests, etc., and to a certain degree influencing or easing the bargaining processes between each group. To the die-hard political realist, this level of co-operation among transgovernmental elites within the forum of an international organisation may be regarded as something approaching disloyalty or treason.

As international organisations facilitate the growth of these transgovernmental elite networks, the area that these organisations decide to promote decides in which areas this kind of transgovernmental activity can proceed. Thus, through agenda setting, international

organisations can influence how these elites regard certain issues. From this perspective, we perhaps need to look at Cox's examination of the role of the executive head of a given international organisation in deciding which areas are to be tackled. Yet, Keohane and Nye contend that even without the existence of an active executive head, purely by being arenas of discussion, international organisations can promote potential transnational coalitions.

However, this role is primarily passive. Keohane and Nye elaborated subsequently a more active role for international organisations based on the assumption that the bureaucracy of an international organisation has its own interests and objectives. Moreover, an international organisation can play the role of a catalyst in a given issue area, thereby acquiring the qualities of an independent actor alongside nation-states (in no way do Keohane and Nye regard the relationship between international organisations and the nation-state as a zero-sum game, rather they can co-exist quite harmoniously). As opposed to the minimal role of international organisations where they foster transgovernmental co-operation, in this case, a government agency can work with an international organisation to achieve certain ends, as the Chilean conservatives did with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reinforce their domestic position. Keohane defined these institutions as 'persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.'⁴⁰ The number of actors within this institution imbues it with the quality of multilateralism—'a belief that activities ought to be organised on a universal (or at least many-sided) basis for a relevant group, such as the group of democracies.'⁴¹ Multilateralism requires states to forego their immediate national interest and attempt to co-operate with each other for the realisation of a common good. This study will concentrate on the achievement of the public good of peace through the peacekeeping functions of the UN.

In addition, if the element of time is introduced and repeated interaction is fostered, the purely functional approach to international organisations is overcome as states view national interest with a more long-term focus. Thus, in this study I seek to adopt an approach that does not regard international organisations in such functional terms. Oran Young has noted that co-operation within institutions leads to 'identifiable social conventions' which can limit or encourage state behaviour.⁴² Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins state that co-operation and interaction can produce patterns and routines which, as Young concurs, can result in future expectations.⁴³ Cognitive approaches take this line of argument further and overcome the limits of functionalism. In addition to functional terms, within a cognitive approach the practices of international organisations and the intersubjective meanings and norms they produce are emphasised rather than the utility value of an international organisation. March and Olsen have suggested that:

the core notion is that life is organized by sets of shared meanings and practices that come to be taken as a given for a long time. Political actors act and organize themselves in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted. Actions of individuals and collectivities occur within these shared meanings and practices, which can be called institutions and identities.⁴⁴

Institutions can learn from their past and adapt through a process of trial and error. In order to understand how these inter-subjective meanings are constructed, it is crucial to examine the history, language used and the ideas posited in the creation of institutions and norms of behaviour. As Keohane has noted, '[i]nstitutions are often discussed without being defined at all, or after having been defined only casually.'⁴⁵ In this neo-institutionalist view, institutions are defined in functionalist terms which tends to shed light on international institutions and organisations for the benefits they can provide for states. However, while recognising that states still retain importance as units of analysis in any paradigm of international relations, I intend to move beyond functionalism and suggest that international institutions, especially when manifested as international organisations, can behave independently of states and influence

state behaviour. Thus, I will regard the relationship between Japan and the UN within a systems approach regarding each as a unit, or a collectivity as defined by James Rosenau:

Collectivities are actors in the sense that they have authority structures and other mechanisms for sustaining the coherence and co-ordination of their members and for maintaining the boundary distinction between themselves and their environments, which makes it possible for their leaders to undertake actions on behalf of their memberships.⁴⁶

Thus, I seek below to demonstrate that the UN and Japan can both be regarded as Rosenau's collectivities, thus making any analysis of a bilateral relationship between the two as unproblematic as the analysis of the relationship between two sovereign states.

Moving on from having justified the importance of international organisations, it is important to outline the related decline of the state as the main actor of world politics. In contrast to the realist paradigm, the decline of the sovereign state in being able to provide security is evident over recent decades. According to Falk, 'there are no commanding ideas of a progressive or humanist character coming forth in these various forms of deterioration.'⁴⁷ What is meant by sovereignty often remains unclear. Bodin has been cited as one of the first thinkers to address the idea of sovereignty making a similar distinction to that of later writers in recognising an internal and international sovereignty.⁴⁸ A date for the appearance of state sovereignty, commonly referred to as the Westphalian system, is often given in the literature as 1648 with the end of the Thirty Years War. Effective control in a geopolitical space by a single source of governance to control law and order and maintain the loyalty of civil society has been the traditional interpretation of sovereignty since that time.⁴⁹ For the purposes of this study the idea of sovereignty is regarded as a doctrine that posits that 'within a given territory there should be a single identifiable source of political rule, internally supreme, and with no legally sanctioned external overlord.'⁵⁰ Thus, for the purpose of analysis, sovereign states are self-determined with no responsibility to an alternative authority either inside or outside the geographical space the

state occupies. By assuming the traditionally realist interpretation of sovereignty the extent to which it has been eroded will come into relief.

Tangible characteristics of a sovereign state may exist like territory, peoples, government, etc., yet these are variables that may be marginalised and even disappear and reappear, as seen in the case of Poland, Scotland or the Baltic States. Thus, sovereignty can be regarded legally, and thus far there is little doubt that state sovereignty is intact today *de jure*. Traditional approaches to sovereignty have stressed that 'a sovereign state is able to show actual political supremacy in its own territory', as well as 'actual independence from outside authority, not the supremacy of one state over others, but the independence of one state from its peers.'⁵¹ Thus, in addition to legal recognition of sovereignty, a state must be in a position to assert its power capabilities and behave with a measure of independence. Hedley Bull described internal supremacy in terms of 'states assert, in relation to territory and population, what may be called internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other authorities within that region and population.'⁵² Raymond Aron described sovereignty as the 'supreme power of deciding in a case of crisis,' thus, stressing the concept of national interest and the government's autonomy to pursue this interest.⁵³

This is, however, an extreme case of independent sovereignty. To be totally free of external influence is, in an interdependent world, difficult to achieve. As Inis Claude has noted, 'for all their vaunted sovereignty and independence, states are rarely lone wolves, intent upon going their own way heedless of the actions of other states.'⁵⁴ Thus, the direction for a synthesis of the neo-realist/neo-liberal debate lies in recognising the importance of the state as the main actor in international politics, but denying it the full independent political authority that traditional realists have accorded it in the face of domestic and external challenges to its power:

A helpful way of envisaging sovereignty is as a kind of shell encasing an appropriately qualified state, but not of the sort which helps to provide a barrier to penetration. For what sovereignty entails is not a physical but a constitutional shell. It expresses the lack of any links that place the state concerned in a subordinate constitutional position to another state.⁵⁵

Thus, sovereignty is only regarded rigidly as a legal term and sovereign states are what are recognised by international law as the main actors. Politically, sovereignty is, however, not such a rigid term and can allow for influence from various sources to affect policy outcomes and promoting multilateral solutions to transnational problems.

Not only, according to many, has the territoriality of states come to mean less, the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to address the problems of any state have been greatly circumscribed by a number of factors ranging from popular disillusionment with government to the globalisation of the world economy. As a result, the idea of the sovereign state, the central tenet of realism, has been slowly eroded so that it could be said that 'the actual content of sovereignty, the scope of the authority states can exercise, has always been contested.'⁵⁶ In contrast to this decline in state authority, there are a number of would-be states attempting to realise their potential in statehood. This only contributes to the weakening of the state as can be seen in the case of Britain's control over Northern Ireland and Scotland, or Italy's control over Lombardy in the North and the Mafia in the South.⁵⁷ It is evident that 'authority in society...is legitimately exercised by agents other than states, and has come to be freely acknowledged by those who are subject to it,' and 'no one really believes that recognition of their sovereignty is more than a courteous pretence.'⁵⁸ The duties that the sovereign state had been charged with over the centuries, like providing national security, controlling currency exchange, and maintaining law and order are these days tasks assigned to transnational institutions or domestic organisations, like the Big Six accountancy firms, telecommunication companies, and the Mafia, Chinese triads and other gangster organisations of the world which either ignore or avoid the

authority of the traditional, realist-defined state.⁵⁹ Relating this to Japan's UNPKO contribution, this dissertation will examine how the state's ability to take the crucial security decisions of participation, scale of contribution, right to withdraw, etc., has been constrained by non-state actors on the societal level, and by international institutions on the transnational level. In achieving accurate interpretations of international relations, new actors need to be taken into account. UNPKO can be seen to be promoting this same process. The principal actors in international politics are those that can make and pursue their demands effectively and it has traditionally been regarded that sovereign states can do this, 'the state is the principal actor in that the nature of the state and the pattern of relations among states are the most important determinants of the character of international relations at any given moment.'⁶⁰ This study seeks to question the above assertion and supplement its definition in the face of the erosion of state sovereignty by adding international organisations, and particularly the UN, to the list of actors that can articulate and realise their objectives with efficacy. With the end of the Cold War, 'the UN and its proxy armies intervene in Somalia, Iraq, and Rwanda for humanitarian reasons and apply sanctions on Haiti on behalf of democracy, all without the consent of local parties.'⁶¹ The European Union is probably the most evident challenge to the order put in place by the Treaty of Westphalia, although the UN's humanitarian and peacekeeping activities are also contributing to the weakening of the Westphalian paradigm. By becoming an international norm, UNPKO can contribute to the erosion of the 'closed walls' of a state's decision-making process and external influences can shape resultant policy.

However, the state system remains intact for the time being. As Falk states, 'this is certainly not the end of history, but it is a weakening, at the very least, of the geographical glue that gave modern statecraft its coherence.'⁶² Thus, there is an urgent need to make the state

UNIVERSITY
SHEFFIELD
LIBRARY

more receptive to the transnational concerns and security threats of the post-Cold War world:

What we are seeing then are the outlines of a global system that has been in the making since the French Revolution; in the process, the principal defining element of it - the autonomous nation-state - is losing its privileged position...the map is changing, literally and metaphorically.⁶³

In the case of Japan we can see a rigid state structure having to address these demands for a multilateral slant to its foreign policy in reaction to the UN's call for pro-activism (see Appendix II for the way in which Japanese political cartoonists have portrayed this phenomenon).

As regards ontological commitments, I recognise the existence of norms in an international society and the Japanese state as a policymaking unit that will be investigated in Chapters Two and Three respectively. The definition of norms in international society revolves around the UN system and its peacekeeping functions as a standard of behaviour and manifestation of this society's will. According to Martin Wight, on the one hand, domestic society is characterised by central authority; on the other hand, international society is characterised by the lack of rigid governance.⁶⁴ However, this is made up for by the rules and institutions, like the UN, which provide the rules and authority for the conduct of international affairs.⁶⁵ A hard-nosed neo-realist argument would be that international society does not exist. The emphasis on the anarchical nature of international politics precludes any existence of the construct of mutual rules and institutions. In reply to this thinking typified by Hobbes, Grotius stressed an international society distinct from domestic society recognising common interests and the need for rules of behaviour. States do not 'exist in a political or cultural vacuum, but in continuous political relations with one another.'⁶⁶ As Hedley Bull states:

A group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.⁶⁷

It must be remembered that these rules are not the first principles naturally given, but are socially constructed by the states whose behaviour they affect. This is the contribution of social

constructivism and needs to be kept in mind in tracing the sources of the rules and institutions of an international society.⁶⁸ However, the point which should not be forgotten is that, 'the allegedly inescapable consequences of anarchy have been largely overcome by a complex web of institutions that govern interstate relations and provide mechanisms for resolving disputes...a community of nations has evolved that is bound together by the realisation that national security and economic well-being require close co-operation and co-ordination with other democratic and democratising states.'⁶⁹ Thus, an international society differs from an international system in the level of its co-operation and development. An international system may be characterised by discord or dominance and an appropriate synonym, as investigated later in this chapter, would be a structure, or an environment. Obviously, a system is required before an international society can develop and encourage multilateral co-operation.⁷⁰

In line with the introduction to this dissertation, I will undertake an examination of the 'soft' side of Japan's participation in UNPKO by looking at norms, ideas and language in the UNPKO debate in Japan in order to trace the external (international society) and internal pressures (civil society) on Japan to make some form of contribution.⁷¹ David Baldwin has stated, 'the elucidation of the language of political science is by no means an idle exercise in semantics, but in many instances a most effective way to solve substantive problems of political research.'⁷² In this dissertation I seek to analyse the way norms, ideas and language play a role within the debate on Japan's participation in UNPKO in order to come to a clearer understanding of Japan's international relations and commitment to multilateralism.

This can be achieved chiefly by examining the way in which peacekeeping as a practice and in definition has changed and how this, as a norm, has affected other norms within Japan as to what kind of actions are permissible, or not, under the Japanese Constitution. As will be

demonstrated in the following chapter, UNPKO is not mentioned in the UN Charter and was very much a makeshift attempt to address instability in a collective security system crippled by bipolarity; thus, what peacekeeping entails has changed over the decades and can be regarded as a regime of sorts if we take Stephen Krasner's definition:

Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.⁷³

Under this definition of norms and principles, UNPKO (as well as pacifism, the relationship with the US and the attitudes of East Asian nations) becomes a sign of commitment to international society from a particular state and a belief in collective decisions. Principles are the standards of behaviour that can be attributed to a policy decision and will naturally come into conflict with each other. Norms are the basic actions expected of actors in a given issue area. Norms of behaviour often consist of a trade-off between principles and, although bereft of any legal weight, contain a moral weight. As Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie have shown 'norms need not exist in a formal sense in order to be valid.' as actors can 'exhibit principles and shared understanding of desirable and acceptable forms of social behaviour.'⁷⁴ Peter Katzenstein has suggested that traditional approaches to the study of Japan's security and foreign policies, 'as variants of realist political thought, both seek causal primacy in the structure of the international state system and the putative effects of that structure on rational state actors seeking to maximize their relative gains in the international system.'⁷⁵ To overcome these heavily positivist approaches, one different area of scholarship can be drawn upon in the form of the role of norms and ideas in foreign policy—the normative context that shapes acceptable and appropriate behaviour which is, of course, shaped by historical change. Thus, what is acceptable is altered by time, and consequently interests are affected. What kind of contribution states

should make to the international community is a norm that has changed over time. For example, it is not a rule, or a legal norm, that states have to contribute to UNPKO. However, I will seek to demonstrate in Chapter Two that UNPKO has attained recently the status of a political and social norm in the international system. In later chapters I will illustrate how Japan has interpreted and reacted to this norm and accommodated it with other internal and external norms.

Culture is a difficult concept to define and, thus, problems exist in utilising the concept as an analytical tool. However, these difficulties can be overcome by examining the constituent parts of culture, i.e. norms. Norms can be regarded in both a legal, political and social light: legally, in the interpretations that have been developed regarding Japan's international contribution based on the Constitution. Politically and socially, they can be seen in developments which have encouraged or circumscribed the kind of contribution Japan can make. These phenomena can be seen in Nakasone's militarisation of the 1980s on the political side, and in the changes in public opinion and awareness of the UN, peacekeeping, and an international contribution on the societal side. Another important norm may be seen in anti-militarism which has become entrenched in Japanese society since the end of W.W.II, firstly under the hegemony of the US and then independently, described by some as a process of 'Hollandisation' as they became suspicious of military issues and international engagements.⁷⁶ Rather than looking to the international system or the most powerful state within the system, as a neo-realist would, to explain Japan's increased UNPKO contribution, a great deal can also be learnt by paying attention to these norms of behaviour both within Japan and international society.⁷⁷ As Peter Katzenstein has stated, 'most variants of structural analysis take as a given the normative context in which actors define their interests. But structures often embody different norms and thus give different cues as to what actors should do. And in times of change when structures

crumble, these norms acquire particular importance in informing actors about the interests they hold.⁷⁸ Especially when the Cold War structure of bipolarity has collapsed it is necessary to look to new areas for original viewpoints, one of which is the study of norms and ideas, regarding them not as given, but as affected by historical change and informing the decisions of politicians and bureaucrats.

What is meant by the word 'norm'? Keohane and Goldstein have conceptualised 'ideas' (which, for the purposes of this study, approximate to norms) into three categories—world views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs. World views are regarded as having the widest impact on human thought and action. Examples of world views are religions, capitalism or communism, and state sovereignty. Principled beliefs are defined as normative ideas that are worthy of realisation. Examples of which include, human rights, abolition of slavery, and environmentalism. In these cases moral authority is important and can be regarded in the same way as military and economic capabilities as a power source.⁷⁹ It is argued that decolonisation was a principled idea that had an enormous impact on foreign policies of both the states fighting for and resisting decolonisation. The final category, causal beliefs, is defined as a consensus amongst policy elites to address a specific problem, like pollution or financial regulation. The necessity to address a particular problem ensures that decision-making elites will congregate, discuss, and introduce policies to alleviate these problems. Of course, these three categories can overlap as is the case with UNPKO. As will be demonstrated, peacekeeping is both a principled idea in that it was created in the post-W.W.II world in the spirit of the UN Charter to eradicate war and poverty, and also a causal belief in so far as it was an attempt, in the face of the East-West stand off, to navigate the UN through the inertia that resulted from unprincipled use of the veto in the Security Council.⁸⁰ In the next chapter, I seek to identify the development of the idea of

peacekeeping as both a principled and a causal belief, and in later chapters, examine the causality of the idea of peacekeeping in the foreign policymaking process in Japan, keeping in mind Keohane and Goldstein's assertions that 'ideas serve as road maps', 'ideas contribute to outcomes in the absence of a unique equilibrium', and 'ideas embedded in institutions specify policy in the absence of innovation'.⁸¹

Language, equally, can contribute to the legitimatisation of the existence and meaning of an international organisation. Language can subconsciously determine the choices and actions of actors: 'not only do intersubjective meanings supply the context that renders practices and actions intelligible, they are also enmeshed inseparably with these practices and actions. Fundamentally, intersubjective meanings are constitutive of social practices.'⁸² International organisations can become dominated by a certain use of language and since 'once particular arguments and phraseology have been deployed, a *rhetorical momentum* is generated which operates independently to affect policies.'⁸³ As Victor Hugo declared, 'there is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come.'⁸⁴ I seek to examine the power of the idea of the UN, and PKO in particular, in influencing Japanese foreign policy.

Peter Katzenstein has defined norms as:

social facts whose effects are potentially as important in shaping politics as raw power or rational calculation. Norms typically inform how political actors define what they want to accomplish. Norms help co-ordinate political conflicts (regulative norms), and they shape political conflicts over identity (constitutive norms). To disregard norms and take the interests of actors as given is thus to short-circuit an important aspect of the politics and policy of national security.⁸⁵

The way in which these regulative (constraining) and constitutive (encouraging) norms not only affect the decisions of actors, but also how they are created and prevail over competing norms is one area of investigation of this study in understanding how the changes in Japan's contribution to UNPKO were realised. After all, norms are not static or permanent. The Japanese government and society went through a soul-searching process in the 1940s and 1950s which

contributed to defining the norms that would influence its behaviour with militarism and imperialism losing and pacifism and economism winning. They can, however, be accorded some degree of permanence through institutionalisation in law, through historical practise or be manifested in the form of organisations. Axelrod regards norms as standards of behaviour which, if not lived up to, can result in some kind of punishment.⁸⁶ However, this is a purely restrictive definition of norms. As Friedrich Kratochwil has stated:

We understand the international arena largely negatively, i.e., in terms of the "lack" of binding legal norms, of central institutions, of a sovereign will, etc....the conceptual links between order, law, and special institutions remain largely unexamined even for domestic affairs.⁸⁷

Kratochwil's work, however, is chiefly concerned with contract making in a legal context and the norms that involve the language of promising. However, theoretical commitments in this discipline can hold for foreign and security policies:

Norms are therefore not only "guidance devices", but also the means which allow people to pursue goals, share meanings, communicate with each other, criticize assertions, and justify actions.⁸⁸

Florini makes the insightful comparison with genetic science. Norms and genes are instructional units which influence the behaviour of the host organisms.⁸⁹ Norms can be of an either domestic or international nature, but both influence the construction of interests and identities. The emphasis is upon how actors *ought* to behave in reference to a legitimate not enforced ideal. Constitutive and regulatory norms have been mentioned as types of norms, but a sense of shame or 'ought-to-ness' should be added to these two variants which can encourage and constrain behaviour. As Finnemore has stated, norms are 'a set of intersubjective understandings readily apparent to actors that make behavioural claims on those actors.'⁹⁰ Norms can be assessed for their robustness based on the principles cited in Table I, gauged in the Conclusion and outlined by Jeffrey Legro: specificity, how well defined and understood a norm is; durability, how long a norm has been recognised; and concordance, how widely

recognised a norm is. In this way we can comprehend how norms have changed, which are rising and which, internal or external, are in decline in the case of Japan's reaction to UNPKO.⁹¹

This approach can overcome the traditional preoccupation with the material power of nation-states, by centring upon how norms influence the discourse. A fine example of this failure of the realist paradigm and the importance of ideas and norms has been posited by Keohane:

As Stalin once famously quipped about the pope: "How many divisions does he have?" Not only did an unarmed Pope John Paul II prevail in the contest for the allegiance of the Polish people, but after the failed 1991 coup against Gorbachev, the Soviet Union broke into its constituent parts on the basis of the norm of "self-determination," rather than along lines of military power or economic resources.⁹²

This approach also improves on neo-liberal approaches by examining the identity of actors which is ignored within both the traditional 'neo-neo' approaches. Political actors are a great deal more than unitary actors engaged in making decisions, political institutions can create, confirm, and modify interpretations of reality, 'through politics, individuals develop their identities.' Thus, by examining norms and identities, the weaknesses of a positivist approach can be overcome. The emphasis is placed upon improving our analytical tools. Traditional interpretations are not to be rejected out of hand as redundant in the act of throwing the neo-realist and neo-liberalist babies out with the Cold War theoretical bathwater. The way to improve our understanding of Japan and world politics is to supplement the understanding the traditional approaches have provided with the concepts of different fields, like culture, history and norms, while still leaving room for structural and situational determinants of state behaviour. In this way the following problem can be addressed:

The end of the Cold War has reminded us once more how naked the emperor of international relations theory is. It will take more than a couple of tailors to provide the necessary clothes.⁹³

As well as placing the emphasis upon ideas into my analysis, I also seek to add the elements of time and the evolution of ideas in order to explain how norms can change over time. Using Florini's genetic analogy, the ideas of *inheritance* and *competition* are important. Like

genes, norms can pass on information and identities previously constructed to the current actor in question. From parent to child the information that decides how an actor will generally behave is transmitted. Equally, as genes often become warped, die and are replaced, so norms are in competition with each other and differing norms can rise and fall over time. This study will investigate how domestic norms like pacifism have come into competition with international norms of behaviour like UNPKO. Norms, like mutant genes, find processes by which they can gain permanency and survive. Incorrect information can enter the mainstream and become institutionalised driving out the original correct information. A good analogy is the tendency people have to misquote. For example, the quotation 'old wine in new bottles' is current but incorrect; the original quotation from the Bible is 'new skins', not bottles, obvious for anybody aware of their bible but regularly misquoted to the extent that the original citation has almost been lost.⁹⁴ Once manifested as policy over time, norms (like genes or misquotations) become institutionalised and written into laws and continue to exert influence on policy, even if the fashion of a particular idea has passed. Without an understanding of how a norm, like participation in UNPKO, became institutionalised, a researcher may, in behaviouralist terms, identify purely the distribution of power and come to under-developed or even incorrect conclusions about a policy decision. In order to understand how norms became dominant, it is necessary to respect the process of evolution and be a good historian. This is why I seek to include in Chapter Four an outline of Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations from the date of Japan's admission to the UN and include an analysis of the Second Gulf War. Although not officially a UN peacekeeping operation, any understanding of subsequent contribution to UNPKO cannot be understood without a knowledge of the policymaking process at this time and the institutionalisation of PKO contribution in Japanese law. This approach is highly compatible with

liberal institutionalist thinking which stresses the creation of international norms through the interaction of belief systems and the exchange of ideas, rather than the material capabilities of states which can also be mediated by belief systems and perceptions.

SUMMARY

Using an approach centring on the examination of norms of behaviour and the role of international organisations as described above, I seek in the following chapters to trace the processes leading to Japan's participation in UNPKO with particular attention on the internal and external pressures upon the Japanese government. Furthermore, the clash of norms will be examined as the new norm of peacekeeping finds accommodation with the traditional norms in Japan of pacifism and non-involvement in overseas military operations.

This study also attempts to understand change in policymaking by incorporating other aspects of critical theory in addition to ideas and norms. Critical theory contends that 'all social reality is subject to historical change, that a normative discourse of understandings and values entails corresponding practices, and that social theory must include interpretation and dialectical critique.'⁹⁵ In essence, this means rejecting the ahistoric, overly scientific methods of traditional realist international relations theorists in favour of concentrating on changes in practices, ideas and discourses over time. This stands in direct contrast to neo-realism, which as demonstrated in this chapter, ignores the possibility of social change: the 'texture of international politics remains highly consistent, patterns recur, events repeat themselves endlessly.'⁹⁶ Neo-realists explain this lack of change due to the structure of anarchy using rational, naturalist scientific methods to discover the 'objective' laws of international politics; these 'objective' laws being that the state is the main unit of analysis and that it behaves in a self-interested manner tending to balance

against other states. Critical theorists, however, reject these positivist laws and stress change: 'the term human nature...does not refer to an original or an eternal or a uniform essence...new individual and social qualities arise in the historical process.'⁹⁷

Thus, 'social events have to be understood by a critical analysis which interprets the discourse of norms and understandings that motivate people to act, which explains the material relations of production, and which undertakes a dialectical study of social contradictions in order to emancipate people for a life of freedom and reason.'⁹⁸ In this way, rather than through a neo-realist structure, critical theorists see the world as a community organised by shared, inter-subjective norms, values and understandings which shape human action. For example, state sovereignty is a social discourse dating back to around the time of the Treaty of Westphalia, which has been restated time and time again to make the principle of the nation-state inviolable.⁹⁹ Implied in this is that people possess the ability to change the world for the better by promoting the discussion of new norms like peace, co-operation and exchange as opposed to the realist paradigm of war, the balance of power and survival. Furthermore, any research design must include an explanation of how these norms come about, through what kind of discursive practices, and in this way neo-realists are culpable for simply taking the sovereign state as a given without tracing the discourse that led to its acceptance and institutionalisation.

Relating this to the Japanese state, it has been stated that, in economic terms, the Japanese government lacks a strong commitment to international norms, with no sense of 'internationalism in the sense of identification with the international community, with human kind as a whole, that is, rather than in the sense of good neighbour punctiliousness about international obligations—which the Japanese have in good measure.'¹⁰⁰ This dissertation looks at the international (the UN and its peacekeeping functions) and domestic norms (pacifism/anti-militarism) which have

shaped the debate on Japan's contribution to UNPKO in the post-Cold War world in order to overcome this disparity in the over-attention paid to the sovereign state.

The text is extremely faint and largely illegible. It appears to be a long paragraph of text, possibly a chapter introduction or a section of an academic paper. The content is mostly lost due to the low contrast and blurriness of the scan.

CHAPTER TWO: UNPKO

Having outlined in the previous chapter my approach to the topic of Japan's participation in UNPKO, I will in this chapter now address the growing importance of both the UN and its peacekeeping functions in the wake of the Cold War's end and the extent to which UNPKO has become a behavioural norm in international society. In order to achieve this, I will outline firstly the growth in the remit and importance of UN duties that has occurred in recent years. Next, I will demonstrate the way in which the practice and meaning of peacekeeping has changed in its development in becoming a norm since its inception and through the changes in the international system during the 1980s and 1990s, gaining in specificity, durability and concordance. Having highlighted what role the UN and its peacekeeping functions can play in the international system, the following chapters will illustrate how the conceptualisations of the UN and UNPKO in this chapter, originating both inside and outside of Japan, have affected the debate regarding Japan's participation in the Second Gulf War, Cambodia and subsequent missions—the case studies later in this dissertation. Simply put, this chapter will illustrate how since 1945 the concept and practice of peacekeeping has become a standard of behaviour in international society by means of a necessary historical review.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UN

Before establishing the importance of the norm of peacekeeping, it is necessary to establish the relevance of the sponsor of so many of these operations, the UN. The post-W.W.II expansion of global mechanisms of governance is remarkable. Especially Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have expanded in number as people seek to construct institutions to govern rules in their

daily lives. The UN is one of the more salient examples of this as seen in the rise in the number of UN members from 51 in 1945 to 184 fifty years later—demonstrating the extent of its acceptance/concordance in international politics. As James Rosenau has stated, 'the world is undergoing a remarkable expansion of collective power.'¹ Certainly this growth has been uneven; however, 'global governance in the twenty-first century may not take the form of a single world order, but it will not be lacking in activities designed to bring a measure of coherence to the multitude of jurisdictions that is proliferating on the world stage.'² The reasons behind this are manifold and extend from the collapse of the East-West confrontation, to the globalisation of the world economy, to the rise of transnational problems like AIDS, drugs, and pollution. Situations where the conditions described above are realised include those where certain services, the creation of accepted norms, rule observance, and the settlement of disputes are required.³ Furthermore as the number of actors (usually nation-states) increases, as happened with the processes of decolonisation and with the end of the Cold War, the need for communication increases. Thus, the steady rise in importance of international organisations as arenas for states to come together is a result. Moreover, with the desire of these newly created states to develop economically and politically, the need for a system-wide actor with the resources and know-how to devise, implement, and realise programmes of development, settlement of disputes etc., will increase. Four revolutions in thinking which have influenced the scope of the UN's work have been discerned: first, the move from laissez-faire thinking to a welfare state-based philosophy; second, the discrediting of imperialism and colonialism and the shift to decolonisation; third, the rise in concern for environmental issues; and fourth, the promotion of gender issues.⁴

Pentland also argues that international organisations can modify state behaviour by altering the complexion of the international system and also as fully qualified independent actors.

In a similar vein to Keohane and Nye's argument, Pentland suggests that international organisations acting as fora for debate and channels for communication can modify state behaviour. The international system needs to be multipolar, in order to provide states with the freedom to manoeuvre, as tight bipolarity ensures that states are tied to one of the two superpowers. Power needs to be distributed evenly amongst states so as not to produce one superpower that can dominate the international organisation. As a result, transgovernmental interaction should be high and will facilitate the growth in the role of the international organisation. Pentland further argues that international organisations can possess the ability to restrain states and in this regard function as independent actors alongside the nation-state. However, their numbers are few. Autonomy, in this sense, is a result of a 'process whereby an initially dependent system, created by a set of actors representing different and relatively independent nation-states, acquires the capabilities of a self-maintaining and self-steering system, one whose course cannot be predicted solely from knowledge of its environment.'⁵ The ability of international organisations to do this is dependent upon the resources available—cash, expertise, arms, bureaucrats, etc. The most obvious proof of the UN's firm identity and specificity as an actor and a norm is in the existence of its budgets, its own flag, buildings, legislature, civil service, etc. Recently, with the appointment of Kofi Annan as UN Secretary-General, a concerted effort can be discerned to sharpen the axe of the UN in preparation for the 21st century. The revamping of the organisation seeks to combine departments and cut 1,000 jobs in an attempt to ensure efficiency, save money, and curry favour with the US in order to cajole it into fulfilling its payment duties.⁶

The UN's new-found relevance can be seen in one typical newspaper report stating that:

In a resolution approved 10 to 3, the Council dismissed Iraq's objection that its handling of the Kurdish and Shiite Muslim Arab insurgencies was an internal affair, saying the wave of refugees

flowing toward neighbouring Turkey and Iran threatens "international peace and security." Never before has the UN Security Council held that governments threaten international security if their actions force thousands of their citizens to flee to other lands.⁷

The further decline of Iraqi sovereignty as a barrier to the work of the UN was apparent during the Iraqi crisis of February, 1998. These events demonstrate not only the expansion in the UN's role but also the watershed that these new undertakings signify. The UN has become not merely a product of change but an agent of change in international politics. As demonstrated in the last chapter, it would be wrong to regard the Westphalian state system as a given, and as James Rosenau has stated, 'states are not eternal verities; they are as susceptible to variability as any other social system, and this includes the possibility of a decline in the sovereignty principle from which they derive their legitimacy as well as an erosion of their ability to address problems, much less to come up with satisfactory solutions to them.'⁸ Thus, with civil society looking elsewhere for its security, the UN has been empowered with a greater role to influence outcomes. Looking at the UN in this way allows us to escape from the theoretical dead-end of neo-realism that looks upon the UN only in relation to the states system and the principle of sovereignty. Thus, the UN can be regarded as responding to change and is beginning to expand the remit of its work beyond its Charter, so much so that it has become a challenge in itself to delineate where the UN's duties end.

The turbulence in world politics that has been evident since the collapse of bipolarity has called into question the existence of the sovereign state. It is now challenged from below and above by differing levels of governance, calling into question its ability to implement policy and confront crises. One of the major results of this turbulence, as well as the increased importance of factors, such as civil society and multilateralism in their decisional power, has been the equally important relevance of the UN. The UN has, in equal measure, benefited from this trend as seen

above in the increase of its peacekeeping duties. The UN has shown itself to be adaptable to international politics as seen in the expansion of the duties of the Secretary-General, the expansion of its administration, and, as demonstrated below, in the development of its peacekeeping abilities.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEKEEPING AS A NORM

In this section I seek to demonstrate that peacekeeping has progressed to constitute a norm of international behaviour since operations first began. Especially as the UN itself has gained in relevance, as shown above, with the end of the Cold War, so has its peacekeeping functions. It will be shown in later chapters that this has had a bearing upon the debate about Japan's participation in UNPKO. As stated in the previous chapter, norms exist in international society and can attain a level of institutionalisation and legitimisation: 'states operate in an international environment awash with organizational and professional networks that both reflect and alter that environment.'⁹ This section seeks to outline the historical process by which, despite not being referred to in the UN Charter and lacking a degree of specificity, peacekeeping has become a recognised behavioural norm of the international system, especially in the post-Cold War world. Building on this background, later chapters will examine the evolution of state preferences in regard to peacekeeping, rather than presuming them to be given.

'Peacekeeping is an uncertain, unpredictable, and unregulated international operation.'¹⁰ By tracing the origins of UNPKO from their inception through to the kind of operations undertaken in the post-Cold War world, a period in which a considerable number of peacekeeping operations were sanctioned by the Security Council, the wide range of peacekeeping operations can be demonstrated.¹¹ Obviously each peacekeeping operation, like the conflict it is meant to address,

has its own characteristics, objectives, and degree of success. However, certain continuities, styles and hybrids can be seen and it is by concentrating on this inventory of UNPKO that I will outline various definitions of UNPKO undertaken during the Cold War period—a period which is quantitatively and qualitatively different with the kind of operations undertaken in the post-Cold War world and have yet become a standard of international behaviour.

'Peacekeeping is a technique which has been developed, mainly by the UN, to help control and resolve armed conflicts.'¹² The concept and practice of UN peacekeeping came about on an *ad hoc* basis as the UN adapted to the unforeseen circumstances of the Cold War. Under the catholic term of peacekeeping, a variety of functions existed including monitoring cease-fire arrangements, supervising the disengagement of forces from a conflict area and establishing a buffer zone, fact-finding and providing humanitarian assistance. Placing peacekeeping in historical context, the practice was a response to the paralysis the UN security provisions suffered with the onset of US-Soviet animosity. Peacekeeping was seen as an effective method of containing regional conflict and preventing it from escalating into a direct East-West confrontation.¹³ It must be noted that the UN does not possess a monopoly in peacekeeping, but is one of the main instigators of peacekeeping operations building a whole bureaucracy and military staff to deal with the undertaking. However, nowhere in the UN Charter or in the writings of those who set up the UN system in 1945 does the term 'peacekeeping' appear. Thus, although initially lacking in a degree of institutionalisation, in the Cold War period and especially after the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping came to acquire the recognition and inter-subjective understanding a norm requires. Moreover, the practice of peacekeeping can claim a heritage of sorts.

Peacekeeping has been called 'a modern application of an ancient arrangement—that of

the use of impartial and non-threatening go-betweens'.¹⁴ The concept of peacekeeping can claim a long history and high level of durability going back to before the creation of modern international organisations.¹⁵ A case can be made that peacekeeping as a concept can be dated back to the Crusades, or the Napoleonic Wars. Although punitive, the collective security action in Shanghai at the turn of the century against the Boxer Rebellion involved 20,000 US, British, French, Russian, German, Japanese, Italian, and Austrian troops. Thereafter, the Saar plebiscite of the 1930s saw international troops being used to prevent rioting and maintain public order. Other examples can be cited in Crete in the last century, the Åland Islands and the Greco-Bulgarian Crisis. But whatever the period, peacekeeping has always been placed within the context of international politics as the collective decision of a number of states to come to a troubled state's aid. Although all these operations were *ad hoc* in the same way much UN peacekeeping would prove to be, they did not display any co-ordination in military planning and did not have the sanction of an international body to legitimise their actions. This was first seen with peacekeeping undertaken by the League of Nations.

The League did undertake a number of what can be termed 'first' and 'second' generation peacekeeping operations.¹⁶ After W.W.I, a desire to bring an end to the scourge of war led to the creation of the League of Nations and the drafting of Article X and Article XVI of the League's Covenant to sanction collective security actions.¹⁷ Two well-known examples of the League's operations involved the administration of the Saar between 1922 and 1935 and the organisation of a plebiscite to determine possession between France and Germany, mentioned above. A similar operation was thereafter undertaken with the city of Danzig coming under the protection of the League. Minor peacekeeping operations took place with the League attempting to broker deals over the possession of the city of Vilnius between Poland and Russia and the region of

Mosul between Britain and Turkey. A peacekeeping force of sorts was even despatched in 1933—consisting of 75 men—which sought to arbitrate the possession of the province of Leticia between Peru and Colombia.

However, when the covenant was tested by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, it was found lacking. Articles X and XVI sanctioning collective security actions were never enacted as Japan possessed veto power over any decisions. In the case of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, severer measures were enacted by the League in the form of sanctions; however, with Britain, France and the United States ignoring these sanctions and the idea of an international community for their own national interest and the recognition of Italian domination in North Africa, the League's attempts at collective security once again came to nought. To summarise, the failure of peacekeeping under the aegis of the League was due to a number of reasons: first, the great powers were unwilling to sacrifice their interests for the interests of the international community; second, the necessary unanimous voting structure in the League led to passivity; and third, there were no League troops to undertake peacekeeping operations in the unlikely event that a resolution was agreed upon.

The term 'peacekeeping' was first used in the late 1950s. The UN's earliest attempts at peacekeeping took the form of observer missions. UNTSO was the first UN operation that resembled modern peacekeeping as conceptualised below in the UNEF-I mission. Despatched in 1948, UNTSO aimed to supervise a truce in the Palestine. A similar operation, UNMOGIP, was created in 1949 and despatched to the India-Pakistan border. Although not referred to at the time as such, these operations displayed some of the characteristics that define the modern practice of peacekeeping. For instance, they were unarmed in adherence with the principle of the non-use of force (the UN Mediator for Palestine, Ralph J. Bunche, reasoned that an armed force would

probably invite aggression).¹⁸ The UN peacekeeping force UNEF-I first despatched in 1956 can be regarded as a watershed. The objective of UNEF-I was to contain the Suez Crisis precipitated by military action taken by Israel, France and Britain against Egypt. This new strategy of 'peacekeeping' was to improve the functional role of an observer mission and avoid the hostility of great powers caused by proposing an enforcement action. The mandate for this mission, although sanctioned by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution (demonstrating further how peacekeeping was an attempt to circumnavigate the East-West confrontation), was given life and specificity by the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, when he outlined the principles which were to shape the development of peacekeeping operations until the late 1980s: the involved parties' consent to the operation, the non-use of force except in self-defence, acceptance of troop contributions from small and middle powers, impartiality, and day-to-day control of the operation by the Secretary-General. This mandate has been described as 'a conceptual masterpiece in a completely new field, the blueprint for a non-violent, international military operation.'¹⁹ In fulfilling its mandate the UNEF-I force was successful in accommodating the withdrawal of Britain and France in 1956, and eventually Israel in 1957.

The success of UNEF-I can be seen in the phase of activism in the field of peacekeeping that followed. Observer missions continued with UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958, UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963, Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) in 1965 and UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) in 1965. Peacekeeping operations on the scale of UNEF-I were undertaken with ONUC in the Congo (mentioned below), UN Temporary Executive Authority and UN Security Force in West New Guinea (UNTEA/UNSF) in 1962 and UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964. This period saw the UN at its most active in the field of peacekeeping until the collapse of the

Cold War.

The crisis in the Congo between 1960 and 1964 demonstrated the limits of peacekeeping operations, came closer to defining what was and was not involved ideally in the act of peacekeeping, and added to its specificity as a norm of international society. The operation resulted in the UN using force to restore order, prevent the secession of Katanga and aid the central government in governing the country. The ONUC operation presents an exception to the peacekeeping rule: an ambiguous mandate; no cease-fire and, thus, no peace to keep; an internal conflict with undisciplined elements in the Congo like the Congolese National Army; and an eventual revision of the mandate leading to the abandonment of the principles of the non-use of force and impartiality. Hammarskjöld did not intend to create this path-breaking peace enforcement mission, and the initial mandate could be categorised as a 'classic' first-generation peacekeeping operation. Initially, the concept of the non-use of force was strictly adhered to and Bunche's opinion took priority that, 'the UN Force is in the Congo as a friend and partner, not as an army of occupation.... Obviously, if the force began to use its arms to wound and kill Congolese, its doom would be quickly sealed, for it cannot long survive amidst a hostile public.'²⁰ However, after some time in the field ONUC found itself dragged into an ethnic, civilian conflict that could not be addressed without compromising the operation's neutrality. ONUC was unable to interpose itself between two opposing sides and was forced to take sides in the conflict to prevent the disintegration of the Congo with the secession of Katanga. The other new direction in the development of peacekeeping was the nation-building aspects of the mission. ONUC was responsible not only for the training and installation of a new civilian personnel in the Congo (with 426 new Congolese administrators in place by the end of 1961 and 1,149 by the end of 1962), but also 'provided bone and sinew to the administration in its different branches, denuded as it

was of technical and administrative personnel.²¹ In practise, this meant creating financial institutions, education systems, and drafting a constitution. However, the divisions centring around ONUC within the Security Council, nearly 200 peacekeeping fatalities, and the unfortunate death of Hammarskjöld cast a shadow over the positive and innovative administrative elements of the operation. The Congo provided the disillusionment after the enthusiasm that had greeted the UNEF-I operation.

With the failure of ONUC and the withdrawal of UNEF-I in 1967 at Egyptian insistence, UN peacekeeping retired into the shadows with no operations undertaken until 1973 that saw a revival of peacekeeping operations centred around the Middle East. The UN Emergency Force-II (UNEF-II) was created in 1973 and despatched to Sinai. Soon after the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in 1974 and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978 were sanctioned.

The UNEF-II operation is important in that it saw the definition and specificity of the concept of the non-use of force widened: 'self-defence should include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent [UNEF-II] from discharging its duties under the Security Council's mandate.'²² In the field UN forces managed to contain certain explosive situations without resorting to the use of force.²³ However, in the case of UNIFIL the multinational UN force, faced with a multitude of actors in the conflict, demonstrated little solidarity in undertaking the mission and little uniformity in the use of force. This mission also showed, in the same way as ONUC, that consent is a central element in defining a peacekeeping operation from a peace enforcement mission. A successful peacekeeping operation is one where belligerents have decided to settle their dispute by peaceful means and are willing to allow the UN to monitor a cease-fire while the peace-brokering process takes place. Liu is correct when he classifies UNPKO during the Cold

War as 'essentially palliative measures that could be taken to contain regional conflicts in a few cases when it was in the interest of the superpowers to do so.'²⁴ After this spurt of activity the UN peacekeeping initiatives again took a back seat due to the resurgence of the Cold War with the Reagan administration. Despite the activity in the Middle East described above, there were no peacekeeping operations undertaken between 1965 and 1988. Only with the willingness of the US and the USSR to co-operate were demands for UNPKO heard once again and the process of acceptance in international society given another boost.

The end of the Cold War saw peacekeeping operations continue, to an extent, in the same vein with observer missions monitoring cease-fires—what has been termed 'traditional', or 'first-generation' peacekeeping. However, peace-building and peacemaking elements also came to the fore, two terms that have caused a great deal of trouble as regards their definition. Boutros Ghali described peacemaking as 'action to bring hostile parties to an agreement', and peacebuilding as 'efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people.'²⁵ These definitions appear to be similar to traditional peacekeeping, but in practice can be seen in the operations undertaken in Cambodia, characterised by nation-building exercises such as election-monitoring and human rights regulation, and in Somalia and Yugoslavia, characterised by humanitarian efforts such as assisting refugees. These more recent missions, although often including elements of traditional peacekeeping operations, have also demonstrated a willingness to use force and thereby compromise impartiality. One of the more remarkable aspects of the 'new' peacekeeping is the increase in the number of states willing to participate not only in UNPKO, but generally peacekeeping, despite the perceived failures of recent years. Appendix I illustrates the important newcomers to this practice and the extent of peacekeeping's acceptance/concordance in

international society as a behavioural norm.

DEFINING PEACEKEEPING

As is evident from this overview of the growth of the UN and its peacekeeping duties, due to the failure of the concept of collective security because of superpower rivalry, peacekeeping evolved as a stopgap measure, but eventually became an established practice of international society. However, peacekeeping exists in a grey area of the UN Charter between peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter VI) and military enforcement (Chapter VII). For this reason, peacekeeping has been defined functionally necessitating the previous historical review before a definition of this norm, recognised by international society, could be posited. During the Cold War period attempts were made to enact peacekeeping operations with clarity to distinguish them from military enforcement and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus, generally, UNPKO can be divided into two categories: unarmed military observer missions and armed peacekeeping missions; however, each peacekeeping operation has its own particular criteria. Generally speaking, peacekeeping was an attempt to end hostilities through non-coercive methods; peace enforcement used military muscle to achieve the same ends. Of course the attainment of peace is referred to frequently within the Charter.²⁶ The International Peace Academy has defined the term as 'the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third-party intervention organised and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.'²⁷ This definition is worthy of attention because it de-emphasises the action of enforcement and places the emphasis upon mediation and negotiation. The theoretical underpinning appears to be that violence and conflict can be controlled and limited through non-

violent means and through the process of negotiation. Peacekeeping does not solve an issue at the heart of a conflict; it brings an end to the conflict so that a solution to the issue may be found. Peacekeeping's aim is not to provide solutions to global problems, but to furnish those involved in a conflict with the conditions to resolve the issues. Peacekeeping is equated with diplomacy, whereas peace enforcement is placed on the same side of the ledger as war. Combining the two can be dangerous as it may transform 'a peacekeeping operation into a fighting force [which] erodes international consensus on their functions, encourages withdrawals by contributing contingents, converts it into a factional participant in the internal power struggle, and turns it into a target of attack by rival internal factions.'²⁸

Looking at the actions undertaken by the various UN operations, a certain number of common factors can be identified which are encompassed by the term peacekeeping. First, the consent and co-operation of the parties to the conflict. Peacekeeping operations require the permission of a particular state to enter the sovereign territory to be patrolled. In contrast, enforcement actions do not. PKO has respected the concept of state sovereignty as lack of consent would jeopardise the neutrality of an operation and fail to limit hostilities. Consent can be seen as an important factor when Nasser withdrew it in 1967 forcing the withdrawal of UNEF-I, supporting David Wainhouse's contention that 'where co-operation of the parties is not sustained and whole-hearted, a positive result will be difficult to obtain.'²⁹

Second, international backing, especially in the Security Council, is necessary. This is another prerequisite to maintaining an impartial role and a non-threatening character. Operations originate within the UN and not with a particular nation and subsequent command is retained within the UN (thus, under this definition the police action in Korea (1950-1953) is not categorised as peacekeeping). International backing accentuates a peacekeeping force's

attractiveness and facilitates acceptance by member states that may think twice about allowing foreign troops onto their soil.

Third, UN command and control is a prerequisite. Under the UN Charter, it is the Security Council (Chapters VI and VII) and the Secretary-General using his 'good offices' (Article IX) which possess the power to instigate a peacekeeping operation; the General Assembly is only imbued with the power of discussing and making recommendations to the Security Council (Article XI).

Fourth, the non-use of force has been generally recognised as a characteristic of UNPKO. It has been said that when the first peacekeeping troops were despatched to the Palestine in 1948 they carried revolvers, but no ammunition. Provisions for the non-use of force (except for self-defence) are usually contained within the Rules of Engagement drafted for each operation. Traditionally, only light weapons have been carried because peacekeepers are only sanctioned to use force in self-defence. This goes hand in hand with peacekeeping being regarded as a confidence-building measure and taking a non-threatening stance. Peacekeeping troops are not meant to restore order or stop the fighting. They follow a peace agreement so that the order should already be in place with the first full-blown peacekeeping operation, UNEF-I, being a classic example of this. William Durch describes the use of force in peacekeeping in the following terms, 'what constitutes appropriate self-defence will vary by mission, but because they are almost by definition outgunned by the disputants they are sent out to monitor, any recourse to force must be calibrated to localise and defuse, rather than escalate, violence.'³⁰

The definition of self-defence and the minimum amount of force acceptable have changed over time with a shift from the earlier and more rigid interpretation to a broader definition during Kurt Waldheim's time as Secretary-General. In 1973 the definition was widened to include

scenarios where UN peacekeepers were obstructed from carrying out their duties. However, in the field, UN commanders often avoided implementing this definition for fear of alienating their impartial position.³¹ Other aspects of UN peacekeeping are contingent upon the concept of non-use of force. Neutrality of UN forces between belligerents can be jeopardised by the rash use of force. Furthermore, consent to allow the despatch of UN troops by the belligerents can be facilitated by the non-use of force. Based on the study of four decades of UN peacekeeping, Ramesh Thakur states that '[Peacekeepers] should not...have the obligation, the soldiers, or the equipment to engage violators in hostilities. International peacekeeping forces express and facilitate the erstwhile belligerents' will to live in peace; they cannot supervise peace in conditions of war. Turning them into a fighting force erodes international consensus on their function, encourages withdrawals by contributing contingents, converts them into a factional participant in the internal power struggle, and turns them into targets of attack from rival internal factions.'³² Parties to a conflict are more likely to allow a non-offensive, mediatory force into the conflict as '[p]eacekeeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other.'³³ Moreover, greater contribution by UN members is likely to be achieved if the operation is characterised by pacifism, rather than aggression.

Fifth, the military and political neutrality of the UN between belligerents is a necessary condition. UNPKO do not target an enemy which may be the case in a collective security action. Ideally, there are no judgements made by PKO troops as to who is guilty or not and independence between the policies of each belligerent must be retained.³⁴ It has been said that UN forces have 'no enemies...just a series of difficult and sometimes homicidal clients.'³⁵ The accepted procedure has been that the troops of states involved in a conflict are not utilised, and

generally the same goes for the troops of major powers. For these reasons, the conflicting parties are more likely to accept UN intervention. In order to encourage this, non-aligned countries have traditionally contributed most troops to PKO—Fiji, Canada, Sweden, to name but a few. Using superpower troops or troops from nations that have a vested interest in a given conflict would run counter to the idea of impartiality and neutrality. Peacekeeping operations should not promote the interests of one particular nation or group of nations. Thus, once again the police action taken in Korean cannot be classified as PKO as it promoted the interests of South Korea against North Korea. We can conceptualise peacekeeping further by making a distinction between passive and active operations. Passive operations have been elaborated in the following terms: 'The theoretical concept of international peacekeeping is that the control of violence in interstate and intrastate conflict is possible without resort to the use of force or enforcement measures.'³⁶ Furthermore, '[y]ou do not need so thoroughly trained troops in peacekeeping activities as is needed in war'.³⁷ The key is mediation through non-military means. UNPKO are reactive to a conflict and do not usually play a preventative role. An active approach would involve the use of troops to settle a conflict or prevent it in order to allow negotiations to proceed.

With all this in mind, Goulding tentatively defines UN peacekeeping as:

Field operations established by the UN, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under UN command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary.³⁸

Furthermore, co-operation from all parties involved is required. Ultimately, this is what distinguishes peacekeeping from enforcement. Peacekeeping involves creating a 'thin blue line' separating parties in conflict and creating the atmosphere for negotiation. UNPKO have been likened to a nurse attending a patient constantly providing care but not playing the role of a

surgeon and providing a cure.³⁹ Peacekeeping in the Cold War period had a number of functions including defusing a conflict, or crisis that may develop into a conflict, stabilising a situation which will allow for the peaceful conduct of negotiations, and facilitating a solution which can include demilitarising an area, international jurisdiction of an area. With the end of the Cold War, the characteristics that have begun to be compromised include the consent of parties involved, the impartiality of UN forces, and the use of force. However, these conditions have been ignored in previous missions and the new-ness of this peacekeeping is not necessarily the most salient factor. Operations are case-specific and as former UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali noted, 'peacekeeping has to be reinvented every day.'⁴⁰

As can be seen in Appendix I, the level of global concordance with peacekeeping has increased rapidly with the end of the Cold War. There is evidently some motive or sense of responsibility for states both old and new, large and small, powerful and weak to make some contribution to PKO. Seemingly, UNPKO has become a norm in international society to which states feel a compulsion to respond. In 1988 the UN's peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their traditional peacekeeping operations adding to its acceptance and recognition in international society. The end of the Cold War has seen the traditional reliance upon a handful of states (Norway, Finland, Sweden, Canada, India, etc.) been abandoned and the number of states participating has risen from 26 in 1988, to 76 in 1994. One major reason for this increase is that the end of bipolarity allowed both the chance of settlement of certain conflicts but also ignited new conflicts. The response has been an expansion in the number, quality and remit of PKO undertaken by both the UN and a steadily increasing number of international organisations. Examining the motives for this increased participation in peacekeeping, altruism can be pointed to in two ways. First, the humanitarian desire exists, as it always has done, to

assist a fellow member of the international system, demonstrated in the operations in Somalia. Second, participation in peacekeeping has been traditionally regarded by states, like Canada and Finland, as a norm for members of an international society. With the increased promotion of peacekeeping it now possesses a degree of prestige and participation can enhance a state's reputation. Peacekeeping contribution can also be inspired by a desire to enhance security. As a means for achieving security in Asia, the ASEAN states championed the UNTAC operation in Cambodia. The issue of security can also be seen in the contributions of smaller states hoping to enhance their reputation in case they need to receive peacekeeping assistance in the future. For instance, the contribution of the Baltic states can be regarded in this way. This is what Trevor Findlay has called 'a down payment on future assistance.'⁴¹ States like South Korea, Israel, and Greece, have tended to regard contributions to peacekeeping as the repayment of a debt to the international community.

Neo-realist explanations also exist. Contributions can also enhance a state's prestige in furthering its own objectives, particularly in acquiring a coveted permanent seat on the Security Council; all the states currently vying for seats are now contributing to UNPKO—Japan, Brazil, Germany, Nigeria, etc. However, there are other illuminating ways to regard motivations in UNPKO contributions. The state in question may not always be a unified actor with the Foreign Ministry often promoting participation more actively than other state organs. Equally, public opinion is a factor especially in the more humanitarian operations. There is certainly a neo-realist side to the motivations for contributing to UNPKO. Some states may be attempting to profit by UN reimbursements, to acquire more advanced equipment, and to receive free training for their troops. However, no single motive can explain a state's decision to participate in UNPKO. There will always be a *mélange* of reasons. The important point is that the end of the Cold War has

complicated the family tree of peacekeeping operations with new duties extending the remit and specificity of peacekeeping. Moreover, a sense of 'ought' exists regarding participation in UNPKO so that 'the days of turning up equipped with only good intentions, blue berets, and a cut lunch are over' and states have begun to consider their participation in UNPKO more earnestly.⁴²

SUMMARY

To summarise this far, in the previous chapter I outlined an approach to the study of Japan's UNPKO contribution centring upon the examination of domestic and international norms. In this chapter I continued the emphasis on norms by singling out the practice of peacekeeping and the role of the UN in the post-Cold War world as an international norm. By means of a historical investigation I demonstrated how the two have come to provide current standards of behaviour in international society. Based on these foundations, I posited a clarification and definition of UNPKO. The following chapter will examine specifically the case of foreign policymaking in Japan and how an analysis of Japan's security, foreign, and defence policies needs to take norms into account within its ontological commitments, not only such as UNPKO, the topic of this chapter, but also traditional domestic and international norms peculiar to Japan, which will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE: JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND UNPKO, 1956 TO 1990

In the previous chapter I built upon the normative theoretical approach detailed in Chapter One and demonstrated the way in which specifically the UN and its peacekeeping operations have over the years become a norm of international society by increasing in specificity, durability and concordance. This was achieved by means of a historical review, centring chiefly upon the post-W.W.II period, and resulted in a proposed definition of the practice of peacekeeping. In this chapter I will touch upon the traditional interpretations of Japan's foreign policy which have placed emphasis upon the influence of, among others, the US, the LDP, the bureaucracy, and the business community within Japan. I will then proceed to illustrate how these interpretations are lacking in explanatory power in the case of UNPKO and, thereafter, explain why, connecting this chapter to the previous two chapters, they need to take into account both domestic and international norms: the UN (particularly its peacekeeping functions), civil society, the US, and Japan's neighbouring nations in Asia. Firstly, however, I will explore in general terms what is regarded as constituting the remit of foreign policy in order to understand which factors have been understood in the literature to influence the decision-making process. I will then move on to outline the most common interpretations of the Japanese state in its foreign policymaking as either reactive, or pro-active.

In addition, little attention has been focused in the extant literature upon Japan's contribution to UNPKO during the Cold War period. Interest only developed during the Second Gulf War and the consequent passing of the UN Peace Co-operation Law in June 1992. However, it would be an oversimplification to characterise the passing of this law as nothing more than an automatic reaction to the demands of Japan's Gulf War allies; emphasis needs to be

placed on the processes that began some time previously and had shaped the environment in which Japan's reaction to the Second Gulf War took place. As Karl Marx wrote, 'men make their own history, but not just as they please. They do not choose the circumstances for themselves, but have to work upon circumstances as they find them, have to fashion the material handed down by the past.'¹ Thus, this chapter also seeks to outline the material handed down by the past as the current political-military culture of Japan is still shaped by the events of the post-W.W.II period. Of course, at any time there are a number of actors attempting to establish their agendas and ideology as a norm for the rest of society; thus, this study will delineate between competing norms, concurring with Thomas Berger that, 'as a result of their historical experiences and the way in which those experiences were interpreted by domestic political actors, [Japan and Germany] have developed beliefs and values that make them peculiarly reluctant to resort to the use of military force.'²

FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy has been defined in many ways:

Foreign policy consists of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others.³

The grand designs of a de Gaulle, and the day-to-day reactions of diverse policy-makers to foreign events in the light of their habits of response.⁴

It [foreign policy] is never free from muddle, from mistaken information, from the clash of personalities, from human infirmity in all its social guises.⁵

Thus, foreign policy can include both the attainment of objectives as part of a grand design and the everyday reaction to or shaping of external events. Foreign policy must take into account the domestic environment in which a state makes decisions: foreign policy is, in essence, a series of decisions made by a group of people who can be called decision-makers. Foreign policy

decisions do not simply emerge in response to external stimuli, rather, they are processed through an identifiable machinery within the state.⁶ However, it must also be recognised that these decisions are formulated with the foreign/external environment in mind. William Wallace described foreign policy as 'the all-important boundary between the nation-state and its international environment.'⁷ With the expansion of interdependence between states, the distinction between domestic and foreign has become blurred and foreign policy as an activity cannot proceed without taking into account a variety of both internal and external pressures. The kind of questions James Rosenau believed needed to be asked about foreign policy analysis included:

Under what conditions does the influence of individual leaders on foreign policy outweigh that of complex societal processes? Why are domestic factors more of a hindrance in the construction and maintenance of foreign aid programs than in the formation and conduct of military alliances.⁸

In other words, why are certain factors, whether they are externally or internally based, more influential in a particular foreign policymaking area? It has been argued that an approach of this sort can imbue an analysis of foreign policy with a rigorous scientific underpinning, which has been lacking in many studies overly concerned with a particular event, or period. Foreign policy decisions are made based upon particular biases and knowledge; thus, it is necessary to reject the positivist role of third party observer and attempt to empathise with the decision-maker, the environment in which decisions are made, and the norms which constitute the environment. As

Rosenau has stated:

Decision-making sustains bureaucracies, dominates legislatures, preoccupies chief executives, and characterizes judicial bodies. Decisions lead to policy, produce conflict, and foster co-operation. They differentiate political parties and underlie foreign policies, activate local governments, and maintain federal authorities, guide armies, and stir international organizations. To explain any sequence of political actions, therefore, the analyst must ascertain who made the key decisions that gave rise to the action and then assess the intellectual and interactive processes whereby the decision-makers reached their conclusions.⁹

This kind of approach can help us to avoid an approach based on 'a world composed of

abstract states...with a mythical quest for single-cause explanations of objective reality' and brings us to the question of the actors and the intellectual and interactive processes we identify as playing an important role in the formulation of foreign policy.¹⁰ In other words, what are the inputs in any foreign policy systems approach? Traditional approaches have limited the actors involved to the governmental actors. However, as Roger Hillsman observed, 'many more people are involved in the process of government than merely those who hold the duly constituted official positions.'¹¹ Moreover, within the government itself there are a number of actors with their own separate agendas vying to affect the foreign policymaking process. In addition to this, external actors, including other states, international organisations, treaties, etc., must not be forgotten as resultant policy (output) can feed back into the system and affect future policy decisions by creating a precedence, norm, or the background which frames policy decisions. Thus, there are a number of actors challenging the monolithic state structure and if the state structure is no longer regarded as unified then the rational-actor approach must be questioned.

The traditional approaches to foreign policy have been greatly influenced by the realist school of international relations. The inputs or influences into foreign policy are regarded by Hans Morgenthau as being elements of national power, population, resources, the political system, but these factors were regarded as of limited influence and lay on the periphery of influence. At the core lies military power and national interest. Furthermore, there is little interest in how these factors interacted with each other or how resulting policy could feedback into the system and become, in turn, a norm in its own right, and thus, a foreign policy input. The state is the primary unit of decision-making and the state comprises the official decision-makers, the politicians and the bureaucrats. Thus, no attention is extended towards external international organisations or internal civil society. Improving on this model, Almond was one of the first theorists to posit an

input-output system of foreign policy by highlighting the historical background, the policy process and the substance of policy.¹² However, again there was no investigation as to how the inputs interact, or how a hierarchy of inputs develops, or foreign policy outputs influence the system through the creation of norms.

Attention needs to be paid to the operational environment, i.e. the time and space in which decisions are made.¹³ The overall structure of the international system can influence greatly the decisions a state makes. For example, a bipolar system encourages states to side with one of the two poles; alternatively, a multipolar system allows greater manoeuvre in a state's foreign policy choices. The distribution of power within the international system can also be a factor. Superpowers are likely to press their foreign policy concerns, whereas micro-states are less likely to aggressively pursue policy directions and may have to combine their efforts to do so. The environment could also be shaped by the level of technology in the world, the level of exchange between nations, the levels of interdependence, the existence of less well-developed states, and the gap between the developed states. These and other factors create the decision-making process, the atmosphere in which decisions are made. This can also involve factors like the way in which a policy-maker views a situation or their perception of reality, often based upon experience. His or her prejudices, social status, values, and beliefs can regulate what a decision-maker decides to ignore or emphasise. Information and reality can be distorted through this filter of the decision-makers' belief system.

In the case of Japan, it can be alleged that the international environment has always exerted an influence upon Japanese political decisions since Japan was first exposed to the West with the Meiji restoration. It was an international system of Western Imperialism against which Japan was reacting in its attempts to enrich the nation. After defeat in W.W.II, the

environment within which Japan was able to promote its neo-mercantilist growth was highly influential in the decisions that were made to maximise Japan's interests. The dominance of the US after W.W.II enabled Japan to develop economically and reduce its security spending by positioning itself under the wing of the US. The policy direction commonly known as the Yoshida Doctrine could not have been contemplated under any other international environment.¹⁴ US hegemony helped to promote the ruling triad within Japan's domestic system, demonstrating the strong influence the environment of the time and the possible shape of future environments can have upon the domestic framework of decision-making and the resultant policy. Donald Hellman pointed to three major developments in the international political environment which greatly influences the decisions the Japanese government makes: first, the strong position Japan occupies in the international economy at a time when the future development of the world economy is unclear; second, the precarious state of US hegemony which has provided so well for Japan for so long, both in the economic and security fields; and third, the growing influence of Asia as an economic entity and the role Japan will play vis-à-vis the economically strong nations it once occupied militarily.¹⁵ This is the international environment which provides some of the norms that Japan must take into account when making its decisions with one eye on the present, and the other on current and future developments. Policy makers will tend to make a decision with consideration for already existing norms as well as the *longue durée* of possible future norms, like the decline in US hegemony, the development of regionalism, and the growing importance of civil society.

JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

There are a number of internal and external norms at play in the formulation of Japan's foreign

policy, and if one surveys the literature on Japan's foreign policy, each interpretation, either knowingly or unknowingly, accredits a different norm with having influence upon policy formulation. One strand of the literature sees policy as remaining within the hands of a political elite, in Japan's case, consisting of the LDP, big business, and the bureaucracy.¹⁶ The relationship between these three entities is regarded as intimate, reinforced by an exchange of personnel after retirement (*amakudari*), and impervious to outside influence: '[i]t is not coincidental that administrative guidance can produce the best effects on the premise of such government officials [as the] hiring of retired government officials by business firms.'¹⁷

The Japanese bureaucracy is regarded in much of the literature as playing a central role in Japan's foreign policymaking process with a related strand of the literature portraying the bureaucracy as being hand in glove with the LDP and the business world, reinforced by the interchange of personnel between the three poles of power.¹⁸ During the occupation period the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) held a central role in Japan's policymaking process due to the close ties it had with the American forces. Under the Yoshida Doctrine, the security relationship with the US was of central importance and the MOFA was one of the strongest advocates of it. Thus, the MOFA dominated this central policy and even the Defence Agency saw its role diminished to a purely operational role at the expense of the MOFA. The MOFA's strength was, and still is, its specialised knowledge and ability to co-ordinate disparate opinions; the government of the day is seen to rely upon the bureaucracy for the expertise, specialised knowledge, experience, and manpower that the bureaucracy can provide. Other traditions of post-war Japanese politics, like the regular shuffling of ministers, has led to ministers being dependent on their bureaucracy for information. Thus, the dominant role of the bureaucracy in Japan's post-war political climate is a result of a number of factors, including the historically

powerful pre-war role of the bureaucracy, and the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) post-war reforms with relations between the ruling triad of the bureaucracy, the LDP, and big business also strengthened by the common fear of what would happen if the Socialists were to gain power.

Moreover, remembering that Japan is a country of few natural resources and the resulting dependency on international trade, it may be said that it would be natural for the business world (*zaikai*) to influence the nation's foreign policy.¹⁹ Large business associations, like Keidanren and Nikkeiren, dominate business in Japan and through various consultation bodies attached to the ministries, representatives of these organisations are able to meet members of government and exchange views on foreign policy issues. The LDP, the bureaucracy, and big business are able to work together for the common goal of Japanese economic prosperity. Japan's recognition of the People's Republic of China in the 1970s represents a classic example of this phenomenon.²⁰ Business has often been held responsible for much of the economic nature of Japanese foreign policy as seen in the payment of reparations to East Asia, and for its power as kingmaker within the LDP, with most Prime Ministers coming from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) rather than, say, the Defence Agency or the MOFA. From the earliest days of the LDP, big businesses came together to support the LDP in return for promotion of policies favourable to the business world. The Economic Reconstruction Council was created in 1955 by the head of Keidanren at that time, Uemura Kogoro, with the expressed aim of providing election funds for the LDP: '[p]ut the contributions into a blender to remove their colouring, so to speak, consolidate them, and use them to implement policies for reconstructing the Japanese economy and stabilising people's livelihood.'²¹ Despite strong criticism, Keidanren continued to make these election fund contributions, often using scare tactics to ensure payment.²² Moreover, the old-boy network of

university and marriage added to the ability of the business world to influence policymaking. Furthermore, through the process of *amakudari*, the bureaucracy and the bigger businesses have been able to promote an intimate relationship.²³

Finally, in the post-war period Japan's political system was dominated by conservative elements and particularly by the LDP in the form of the 1955 system which only collapsed in 1992, but has recently been reconstituted to an extent with the election victory of the LDP in 1996, the decline of the Socialists, and constant rumours of a merger with elements of the now defunct opposition party, Shinshintô. The LDP has often been characterised as a monolithic structure permeating every aspect of Japanese society joining together with the bureaucracy and big business to produce a ruling triad of policymaking.

Thus, the Japan Inc. model portrays the Japanese state as an all-powerful monolith with the LDP, the bureaucracy, and big business comprising the mutually reinforcing and omnipotent organs of state power. Any other factor, like civil society, international organisations, foreign states, is marginalised to the point of insignificance. Furthermore, the conception of the bureaucracy as a united monolithic structure, which guides Japanese public policy without disagreement, has been challenged as seen in the role of policy tribes. John Creighton Campbell has demonstrated the cleavages between various ministries, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the MOF over macro-economics policy, the MITI and the MOFA over foreign aid and export promotion.²⁴ Daniel Okimoto also points to this inter-ministerial wrangling stating that, '[h]ere is a stage at which rational factors, reasonably well safeguarded at the level of the individual ministry, tend to be overwhelmed by the free-for-all that sets loose potentially irrational forces.'²⁵ One would expect to see the MOFA playing an integral role in the formulation of foreign policy; however, with a strong economic interest in foreign policy, a variety of agencies,

ministries, and private organisations all have an interest in the foreign policymaking process and a plurality of influences exist. The MITI has been a great rival with the MOFA. And the MOFA has had to second personnel from other ministries and agencies that have the specialised knowledge to meet the new challenges of interdependence, like drugs, AIDS, etc. The influence of a particular ministry over a certain issue is a great deal more complicated than it may seem at first glance. A single issue like the increase in number of US cars imported may involve the MITI, the MOFA, and the Ministry of Transport; the number of foreign workers in Japan can cut across the jurisdiction of the MOFA, Ministry of Labour, and the Ministry of Justice, if not other ministries. Thus, the concept of a unified, monolithic bureaucracy is not an accurate reflection because of the number of actors involved in a single issue. It may well be this plurality of interests that complicates the policymaking process and leads to frustration on the part of foreign counterparts who receive 'nothing but promises, promises' from Japanese bureaucrats and then fail to see anything materialise.²⁶

Adding to this plurality, one strand of the literature sees the bureaucracy as constitutionally subordinate to the Diet. Politicians do not rely solely upon the MOFA for foreign policy information. They tend to refer to other sources, often against the advice of the MOFA bureaucrats, like their own *kōenkai* (support groups), or public opinion. Furthermore the MOFA is further weakened by its numeric inferiority to other ministries and is often regarded as ranking low in the pecking order of ministries, losing out to other ministries and regularly coming into conflict with other ministries over jurisdictional control. In some ways the bureaucracy can be overcome by the politicians, as was demonstrated by Prime Minister Tanaka's avoidance of the MOF in raising funds for his own policy objectives.²⁷ However, with the weakening of ties between the LDP and the bureaucracy, and the increase in the number of career politicians

rather than bureaucratic politicians, the power of the bureaucracy over the policymaking process waned. As Pempel has quipped, '[j]ust as war is too important to be left to the generals, public policy had become too important to be left to the bureaucrats.'²⁸

Some writers have promoted the idea of *tōtō kantei*, with the LDP in a dominant position over the bureaucracy. Due to the presence of policy tribes or *zoku* with specialised knowledge in certain areas, the LDP has been able to curtail the influence of the bureaucracy in the policymaking process and has developed its own expertise and base of knowledge to conduct policy. Schoppa has demonstrated how a policy tribe concerned with education reforms was able to prevent Prime Minister Nakasone in his attempted comprehensive reform of the Japanese education system in the 1980s.²⁹ A policy tribe has been defined as Diet members who have a considerable amount of expertise and practical experience about a particular area of government policy and enough seniority in the party to influence the ministry responsible for that policy area.³⁰ However, the tribes can also complicate the LDP's power in the decision-making process, as well as increase the LDP's influence over that of the bureaucracy. A clash of interests can occur if the Prime Minister is not a member of a particular tribe, as happened with Nakasone and the education tribe when this former Prime Minister attempted to impose his vision of the education system, ignoring the pleas of this tribe. Furthermore, the tribes can often bring in other interest groups, as the education tribe did with private universities, into the policymaking process, adding to the plurality of Japanese decision-making process. Policy tribes have been instrumental in increasing the power of the LDP over and above that of the bureaucracy. Members of a tribe often sit on Diet committees for longer than bureaucrats and often acquire greater familiarity with an issue and have a commitment to that issue through obligations to local constituents.

However, through images such as Japan Inc. and various strands of the *Nihonjinron* thesis, the impression of a monolithic structure of Japanese politics has prospered as the mainstream interpretation. This traditional model of Japan's foreign policymaking has been challenged but still remains, as Fukui, stated, 'the single most popular and influential model of policymaking in contemporary Japan.'³¹ The following section has three objectives: first, to discuss the various interpretations of Japanese foreign policymaking; second, to highlight the norms each approach emphasises; and third, to discuss how each exposition adds to our understanding of Japan's UNPKO policy from Japan's admission to the UN in 1956 until the eve of the Second Gulf War.

THE REACTIVE STATE AND EXTERNAL NORMS

Kent Calder coined the appellation of Japan as a reactive state in the 1980s.³² In a single sentence this conceptual framework can be summarised as attempting to explain 'the complex mixture of strategy, hesitancy and pragmatism that characterizes Japanese foreign economic policy behaviour in the late 1980s.'³³ The main thrust of Calder's argument is that despite the various fields in which Japanese economic strength manifests itself, the formulation of policy in Japan is still remarkably reactive to external stimulus, especially from the US. Calder's analysis has two main strands: first, the Japanese state fails to undertake major foreign economic policy initiatives despite the economic power and leverage it possesses; and second, the Japanese state reacts to external demand for activity 'erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely.'³⁴ Despite its economic size, population, and a history of pro-activism before W.W.II, Japan's behaviour is regarded as more similar to that of a reactive state like Austria or Norway, rather than resembling a pro-active middle power like Germany or France. For a variety

of reasons, existing both in the structure of the international system and in Japan's domestic political structure, a more independent policy has never materialised. Other terms have been used to describe Japan's reactivity, including missing the boat (*nori-okure*), diplomacy of cowardice (*okubyo gaikō*) and a kowtow foreign policy (*dogeza gaikō*).³⁵ Dennis Yasutomo uses the phrase acquiescent activism to describe Japan's reaction to external stimuli, defining its policy objectives in external terms with no policy agenda of its own. Essentially they all add up to the same thing, namely, the maintenance of good relations with a majority of states and the guarantee of access to global markets and raw materials.

In the case of Japan, the term state strategy refers to the post-1945 national strategy commonly known as the Yoshida Doctrine. This policy continued unchanged through the 1950s and 1960s despite the fact that Japan gradually achieved international recognition and agreed to various international commitments with admission to the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and a number of other international organisations. Economic growth continued apace while security matters continued to be left to the US under the Security Treaty. Further policy initiatives ensured this direction of avoiding political-strategic concerns and devotion to a mercantilist role in the world: the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (1967), the Three Principles of Arms Exports, the one percent ceiling on defence spending (1977 to 1986), and an omni-directional foreign policy being the most obvious examples.

The international system borne out of defeat in W.W.II was the system of bipolarity. Under this system two ideological and military blocs faced each other with other states taking their place within a certain bloc, thereby acquiring the economic and security benefits of the bloc leader. Within this system Japan's place was determined by the signing of the US-Japan Security Treaty in September 1951 bringing Japan into the US-centred collective security system.³⁶ Furthermore,

due to Japan's lack of natural resources, Japan was forced to receive most of its food, fuel, and raw materials from either the US, or states within its sphere of influence. In addition, Japan tended to produce manufactured goods for states within this sphere. This only served to heighten the relationship of dependence between Japan and the US. In other words, the hegemonic role played by the US in the post-W.W.II international system precluded the need for an independent Japanese policy. As interests coincided on the issues of a multilateral free trade system and a system of stable exchange-rate mechanisms, Japan was willing to put its faith in US world leadership, minimise its security expenditure, and conduct a foreign policy in a submissive position to that of the US.³⁷ The Cold War symbolised prosperity and stability for Japan in cooperation with the US, while other states within the Western bloc were willing to tolerate Japan's closed markets and aggressive export policies for the sake of global security. It is argued that Japan, having demonstrated an excessive adaptation to the favourable Cold War structure of bipolarity, could not begin to adapt its domestic institutions to transformations in the international system in the 1980s and 1990s, and that out of habit Japan has simply continued to play the part of the reactive state following the US.³⁸ Thus, the US has, over time, become a strong norm both regulating and constituting Japanese policy.

Although concerned with Japan's aid policy and role within multilateral development banks, Dennis Yasutomo draws a useful and clear distinction between the concepts of reactivity and pro-activity. He develops the term reactive in a broader sense than Calder's interpretation.

Initially Yasutomo encapsulates writing thus far on reactivity in the following terms:

Japan's reactivity is portrayed as a congenital defect of the body politic, deeply embedded in the post-war national psyche and the policy process. It constitutes the identity of the Japanese state and nation. This picture argues or implies that reactivity applies to Japan's entire diplomacy, not just to the political dimension, that it subordinates indigenous motives or interests, de-emphasizes will or choice, and makes few efforts to shape, rather than take the shape of, the environment. This is not the profile of a great power; it is the profile of a dysfunctional state and a passive, stagnant diplomacy.³⁹

The result of what is described above is that the only force for change comes from outside Japan. Inoguchi puts it in the following terms, '...[p]ressure from overseas seems to be the only force that can transcend the framework of Diet operations, strike down the vested interests syndicate, and remodel Japan into a fair society eager to contribute to the international community.'⁴⁰ Moreover, it is argued, repeated pressure from outside does not tend to produce healthy debate on issues and thereby create the appropriate environment for promoting a proactive foreign policy. Thus, as far as Japan's contribution to international society is concerned, this analysis would point to the role of the US in encouraging Japan's contribution, in a similar way to the neo-realist approach outlined in Chapter One. The US-Japan security alliance has repeatedly been called 'the world's most important bilateral relationship—bar none.'⁴¹ For the time being, a strong relationship between the two most important economies in the world seems likely to persist. This is in the interests of the US as 'there is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we have with Japan. It is fundamental to both our Pacific security policy and our global strategic objectives...the lynchpin of US security policy in Asia.'⁴²

Tying this interpretation of Japan's foreign and security policies specifically to the field of peacekeeping, the influence of the US as a norm in forcing Japan to play a subservient role during the Cold War period is evident. The institutionalisation of the relationship with the US can be seen in opinion polls throughout the post-war period:

TABLE II: SHOULD JAPAN JOIN THE FREE WORLD, THE COMMUNIST CAMP, OR BE NEUTRAL?
(Answers in percent)⁴³

Year	Communist World	Be Neutral	Free World
1960	1	32	44
1963	1	28	45
1966	1	31	41
1969	2	30	44
1972	2	34	37
1975	2	29	41
1978	2	25	49
1980	2	25	55

Despite vocal and violent opposition to the security ties with the US, it would be foolhardy to downplay the importance this arrangement has had upon Japan's national identity and policymaking process. Especially in the late-1970s and early-1980s with the US withdrawal from Vietnam and the intensification of Cold War tensions, the security ties with the US were expanded in scope. As a result, the 1978 Guidelines on US-Japanese Defence Co-operation promoted exchange between the SDF and US military. Under the Nakasone administration, this trend was actively pursued as Japan attempted to shape itself as an unsinkable aircraft carrier as part of the US global strategy against Communism.

Thus, with the US providing for Japan's security, a norm developed in Japan's foreign and security policies that dictated that there was no need or desire to participate in UNPKO when attention was being paid to economic recovery and the US could be relied upon. The initial high rate of coincidence in voting patterns between Japan and the US provides evidence of this.⁴⁴ Ueki contends that dependence upon the US rendered Japan's policy reactive and that reliance upon the US ensured that Japan could not openly criticise its ally. However, although certainly true for the early period of Japan's entry into the UN, the 1980s saw Japan take independent initiatives as voting patterns started to diverge from those of the US. The 1980s was a period when the US turned away from the UN. However, in contrast to Calder's thesis, Japan visibly increased its contribution. The reasons for this dichotomy in policy can be explained by an inability on the part of Japan to ally with the extreme and non-participatory policies of the US, policies which left a vacuum to be filled. The US Ambassador to the UN, Jean Kirkpatrick's policy of never consulting Japan on UN issues, and the Kassebaum amendment capping US contributions to the UN budget provoked Japan into sponsoring reform plans of PKO and the UN as a whole in order to assist the functioning of the UN and to bring the US back into the UN

fold.⁴⁵

A Singaporean diplomat, Tommy B. Koh, encapsulated the role of the US as a norm in stating that the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 is an important pillar of peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific: 'If Japan stopped relying on the US nuclear umbrella and became an independent power, it would destabilize the region.'⁴⁶ It was the strong encouragement of the US which led to the creation of the National Police Reserve in 1950, converted to a National Safety Force in 1952 and finally assuming the title of SDF in 1954. During this period minesweepers were sent by Japan to assist the UN forces after a request from the US. This is another area where the norm of pacifism clashed with the norm of the role of the US in the international system. Furthermore, US pressure in 1968 was evident in US Ambassador to the UN, George Ball, remarking in Tokyo that the UN's ability to send observers and armed contingents on peacekeeping missions to the world's danger spots would be vital to future peace.⁴⁷ Once again this call for action, as with the other cases mentioned above, was met with immobile statements on the paramount position of the Japanese Constitution.

The attitudes of East Asian nations, especially China and the two Koreas, who suffered under the yoke of Japanese imperialism from the turn of the century, have also had a regulative norm, like the US, rendering Japan's foreign policy reactive to outside stimulus. The areas in which this norm has been most salient have included the controversy over Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo dedicated to the spirit of Japan's war dead, the revision of Japanese schoolbooks and how they address Japan's modern history, and Japan's level of militarisation.⁴⁸ Although Shigemitsu in his initial speech to the UN proposed to play the role of a bridge between East and West, Japan rarely managed to do this, although on occasions this role has prompted Japan to behave in a pro-active manner. One successful attempt was in 1959 when Laos, faced with military

incursions from Vietnam, brought the matter to the UN. Japan was seen by the West and the parties to the conflict as an acceptable mediator and a potentially explosive Cold War conflict was averted.⁴⁹ However, the Japanese inability to take an active stance over certain policies for fear of alienating fellow East Asian nations was evident in the adoption of a conciliatory policy in the Congo, Cyprus, and can be seen Japan's tradition of working with nations of the non-aligned movement.

However, in general, both Japan's UNPKO policy and its foreign policy in general was deeply influenced by the regulatory norms of the relationship with the US and the attitudes of East Asian neighbours and as a result Japan's policy tended, until the 1980s, to be reactive. Only in the 1980s and the 1990s, with the collapse of the Cold War structure the growth in the work of the UN, did Japan's policy come under the influence of a differing international norm, as will be shown later.

THE JAPANESE STATE AND DOMESTIC NORMS

Calder also attempted to examine Japan's reactivity at the domestic level by looking at Japan's political and social structure. In Calder's investigation, internal constraints could be witnessed during the 1980s in the fragmented character of state authority, as Karel van Wolferen put it, '...a complex of overlapping hierarchies.... There is no supreme institution with ultimate policymaking jurisdiction.'⁵⁰ In addition to the structure of the ministries in Japanese state authority, the structure of the Japanese electoral system also, in Calder's opinion, before its reform, failed to encourage a pro-active foreign policy. These ideas are supported by Peter F. Cowhey who put forward the idea more strongly that domestic institutions colour a state's policy, 'a country's rise to great power [status] does not assure a conversion from international free riding. Increased

power may make it logical for a country to become a "good citizen" internationally, but its political institutions may not support that position.⁵¹ Calder states that with the fragmented character of state authority in Japan, decisive action was more difficult to achieve than in countries with a central chief executive. The problem is still today exacerbated by overlapping hierarchies and the issue of which ministry has jurisdiction over a particular issue.⁵² Japanese politics is characterised by factional divisions, a slow process of consensus building, a weakened Prime Minister who is 'the custodian of the national consensus, not the creator of it,' and a heavy reliance on the bureaucracy.⁵³ The bureaucracy is seen by some to be more influential than the political parties or individual politicians.⁵⁴

In Calder's thesis, the existence of regional chambers of commerce, dominated by small agricultural federations and small businesses with no interest in international affairs, except to resist foreign encroachments into Japan's domestic markets, precluded any pressure to conduct a pro-active foreign policy. To further compound this state of affairs, during the 1970s and 1980s, these groups entered into quasi-alliances with politicians and diplomats to enforce an even more reactive policy. Calder mentions in passing larger business federations, like Keidanren, which are dismissed as too nebulous to conduct a consistent policy encompassing all members' interests.⁵⁵ Calder cites the existence of medium-size electoral districts which forced as many as five members of the same party to run against each other. As a result, extremely small shifts in the vote became central to a candidate's chances of success and candidates were forced into a state of extreme sensitivity to constituency affairs, particularly the concerns of agriculture and small businesses. This necessity led to the issues of international affairs slipping down a candidate's list of priorities. Politicians tended to concern themselves with parochial issues at the expense of vision and expertise in foreign affairs. Calder claims that empirical research has

demonstrated that politicians specialising in foreign affairs tended to do badly at the polls.⁵⁶ Cowhey supports this view of particularist politics, stressing that foreign policy is not a rewarding undertaking for Japanese politicians.⁵⁷

As Calder's thesis deals chiefly with economic foreign policy in the 1980s, it would be overly harsh to criticise this exposition for not addressing issues more relevant to current security and foreign policy. The important point is that, this study, like Calder's, also perceives a domestic norm influencing foreign policymaking. However, it is rooted not in the electoral and ministerial systems in Japan, but in the pacifist norm of Japanese society. This internal norm originated in the post-W.W.II settlement and Constitution, particularly the Preamble and Article IX, and the efforts of intellectuals, social movements, political parties, especially the Socialists, to give them roots in Japanese civil society. The importance of this particular internal norm as a constraining factor can be seen in the fact that a number of Japanese Prime Ministers, including Kishi Nobusuke and Satō Eisaku, were wholly in favour of expanding Japan's military support for the US in Asia, but still were limited by the domestic, societal norm of pacifism institutionalised in the Constitution. Addressing the norms and core beliefs of Japanese civil society, lacking in a neo-realist or neo-liberal approach, is crucial to understanding its security policy, as over time they evolve into what Emile Durkheim has termed, 'social facts.'⁵⁸ Pacifism in Japan has a deeply social origin, unlike Western pacifism which is rooted in Christianity.⁵⁹ Before W.W.II there was a small, but vocal, tradition of pacifism led by thinkers such as Andō Shōeki, Shidehara Kijūrō, and Nitobe Inazō. The social element and durability of Japanese pacifism can be seen in the Ashio copper mine incident of 1903 where pollution from a copper mine supplying the military infected the local water supply and resulted in a number of protest marches in Tokyo.⁶⁰ However, this early pacifism was greatly put in the shadows by Japan's militarism and invasion of East Asia.

Yet, defeat as encapsulated by the two atomic bombs, the firebombing of Tokyo, and the American occupation provided the experience which gave this pacifist norm meaning in Japanese society as seen in recurrent opinion polls.⁶¹ There is a sense that any expansion of the military in Japanese society will jeopardise the democratic society Japan has become since W.W.II.—a particularly prominent theme during the 1960 demonstrations surrounding the extension of the US-Japan Security Treaty. The idea of pacifism in one country is still very strong in Japanese society; in other words, although other nations may adopt an aggressive stance, Japan should rise above this and maintain a peaceful approach to the conduct of its foreign policy. A pacifist public opinion also stems from a belief that concentrating on economic development and prosperity should shape Japanese foreign policy, ensuring Japan's economic welfare and leading to a world free from conflict. Japan's pacifist stance has been manifested in both the Constitution of 1947 and the Kyoto school (*gakuha*) interpretation that the spirit of the Constitution is always the same and should not be changed by interpretation due to the whims of particular politicians in power at that time. This norm is reinforced by the SDF law, several policy documents, and adopted resolutions like the one percent limit on military spending or the three non-nuclear principles. These elements that make up Japan's limited military stance either originated from outside stimulus (e.g., the Constitution, which although accepted by the Japanese people and hardly imposed by the US, was a result of the occupation period), or were domestic responses to either external or internal pressures to limit Japan's military growth (e.g., the one percent spending limit).

Traditionally, Japanese civil society has always participated actively in elections. However, public opinion has usually been an abstract constraint on policymaking, not a solid, preventive barrier. As witnessed in the government's policy towards the recognition of South Korea and the

revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, public opinion only delayed government policy.⁶² Alternatively, public opinion can act as a stimulus to undertake a particular policy, as in the case of the reversion of Okinawa and establishment of diplomatic ties with China.⁶³ Public opinion has manifested itself successfully and actively in the form of citizen's movements especially concerned with the environmental problems caused by Japan's rapid post-war economic growth which 'became a noisy, smelly, overcrowded, unhealthy testament to human greed.'⁶⁴ The citizen's groups organised around, most famously, the Minamata disease, and victims of the A-bomb attacks (*hibakusha*), can be regarded as successfully forcing the LDP to recognise the issues and eventually pay compensation. These kind of pressure groups have been more successful than the traditional Western trade union-centred form of political protest. Trade Unions have traditionally been tied to the Social Democrats who themselves have almost constantly been in a position of opposition and after the October 1996 Lower House elections lost its role as the major left-wing party to the Communists. Not a great number of Japanese are members of any given trade union that adds to the inefficacy of unions. Student activism has also waned in influence from the days of pro-activism in the 1960s to a position of apathy and conservatism amongst students in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the power of civil society in Japan may be regarded as on the increase in the future with the changes to the electoral system in 1994. There is an argument that the extent to which politicians can now be punished and must remain accountable to the electorate has increased. An age of coalition governments will mean that small shifts in the vote will lead to the fall of governments the populace fails to support.⁶⁵

Relating the role of domestic pacifism to Japan's UNPKO participation, during Diet debates on the draft Constitution, the extent of Japan's contribution to the UN has been raised including the possible need for constitutional revision. Immediately after the war Nanbara Shigeru

raised the issue in terms of the world community expecting a peace based on justice in which Japan would be expected to participate, especially in the UN's peace activities.⁶⁶ Sasaki Sôichi also raised the issue in the House of Peers stressing co-operative efforts to attain international peace and the importance of Japan's active role therein. In both these cases, the Yoshida administration's reaction was to stress specifically the centrality of Article IX to Japan's foreign policy and refused to postulate on how Japan may react upon joining the UN.⁶⁷ The government continually stressed Japan's right to individual self-defence but not collective self-defence. Thus, in 1954 the SDF Laws made to include contain articles prohibiting the despatch of SDF troops abroad mainly in consideration of what Japan might be obliged to do under the terms of the treaty with the US, although with obvious implications for UNPKO.

When in 1956 Japan did join the UN it was maintained by the government that the Constitution forbade any despatch of military forces for the purpose of using armed force and that the UN's peace activities was a manifestation of this. Soon after Japan served its first term as non-permanent member of the UNSC and played an integral role in the drafting of the resolution establishing UNOGIL. Ambassador Matsudaira Koto was asked by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld whether Japan would be in a position to despatch military observers but was turned down due to the controversy surrounding the newly created SDF. Thus, upon admission to the UN in 1956 fears were widespread in government, public and media circles about what role Japan would play in security arrangements, and whether the Charter would compromise and militarise Japan's role in the world. During this period Article IX was an oft-quoted restricting factor of some significance. For example, upon being questioned by LDP politician Namagi Yoshio, Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo acknowledged the argument for sending troops abroad but insisted that in the case of Japan, due to Article IX and its denial of

the right of belligerence, it would be improper for Japan to contribute and overstep the bounds of the Constitution.⁶⁸ This opinion was reiterated by Shimoda Takezō, Chief of the Treaties Division, stressing the despatch of Japanese troops within the limits imposed by the Constitution as being 'impossible'.⁶⁹ However, an equally important legal obstacle was the Self-Defence Force Law which had to be altered to allow the despatch of Japanese troops. During the Cold War period this was impossible due to domestic and Socialist opposition within the Diet.⁷⁰ The Constitution, Article IX, and the SDF's lack of a legal framework to allow SDF despatch were prohibiting factors leading to a policy of what has been termed 'chequebook diplomacy' and chiefly financial and minimal personnel contributions to the UN. The opposition parties supported co-operation with the UN but regarded the LDP's motives as being based upon a desire to expand the interpretation of the Constitution.⁷¹ It must be remembered that in this period classic peacekeeping operations involved the carrying and use of weapons; therefore, Japan's participation was limited to the financial sphere.

Early on, sections of the Japanese government did make clear that they wished to promote expansion of Japan's role within UNPKO and that the Constitution and Article IX would not be regarded as an impediment. In 1963 the Budget Committee declared:

Inspection activities of the UN Forces not accompanied by any military action would lie outside the scope of Article IX; nor would the participation of Japan in an international police force in the true sense of the word be prohibited under Article IX of the Constitution.⁷²

And in 1966:

If Article 42 [of the UN Charter] were to be set in motion, the actions taken would be that of the UN and not military activities of individual Member States, and thus would not amount to the exercise of the belligerent right of each state participating in it.⁷³

However, these attempts at widening Japan's role invariably led to a related restricting factor in the form of East Asia and the debt of history ensuring that Japan's policy *vis-à-vis* peacekeeping would be minimal. In general Japan's war experience was a constraining factor;

shock of defeat in W.W.II and the occupation, the poverty that followed, the Yoshida Doctrine's emphasis upon economic prosperity, and, as will be seen in a later section, a desire not to alienate East Asian neighbours limited the debate on PKO participation within Japan.⁷⁴

Public opinion was both a source of activity and passivity. The UN has always been highly thought of in Japan with opinion polls regularly expressing a very high percentage of support for the security mechanisms of the UN, and the UN in general. However, public opinion has also been a constraining factor whenever issues involving the despatch of the SDF were raised.⁷⁵ The MOFA has described this period as providing the Japanese people with a 'psychological cocoon that had protected them from the world at large throughout the post-war years'.⁷⁶ By the 1990s the pacifist norm had become so embedded in Japanese society that it was true to the degree that the 'post-war military restraints have become the core of the country's self-image'.⁷⁷ One analyst has asserted that Japan 'has no goals and ideas of its own to offer the world and thus lacks the ability to lead effectively...the values that shape the Japanese paradigm are not, by definition, designed to benefit the rest of the world'.⁷⁸ This is an extreme and inaccurate interpretation, and, as will be seen in the following chapter, this norm came into conflict with other norms described below with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the consequent Second Gulf War, as will be seen in the following chapter.

THE RISING STATE AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

The literature, which contends that Japan, once a reactive state, has recently begun to pursue a more pro-active foreign policy, yet stopping short of a full-blown political big power, is linked strongly to the idea of relative decline of US hegemony. The Yoshida Doctrine served Japan's national interest well until the relative decline of US hegemony, shifts in the configuration of the

international system, and the changing security environment with the onset of the Second Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s forced Japan to pursue a more independent security policy. The decline in US hegemony could be seen in the withdrawal from Vietnam, the achievement of superpower strategic parity in nuclear weapons and the oil crises of the 1970s. Akaha Tsuneo argues that with the declining ability of the US to stabilise the international system, as seen in Vietnam, Japan was forced to pursue a more independent policy of economic security, encouraged by President Reagan's emphasis on burden sharing. This situation was compounded by the onset of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the appearance of Soviet bases on the Kurile Islands, the Korean Airlines Incident, and the military build-up of forces in East Asia, in other words the Second Cold War of the 1980s. Akaha contends that the policy initiatives Japan took in reaction to these developments demonstrated a growing desire to play a more pro-active role.⁷⁹ During the 1980s it was believed, among government circles, that 'US military power can no longer provide the security it once did to its allies to strengthen their self-help efforts and particularly in the area of conventional forces, and the credibility of the US 'nuclear umbrella' can no longer be maintained without their co-operation with the US.'⁸⁰ Thus the role of a rising Japan, but also a Japan supporting the existing system, developed.

Furthermore, with the premiership of Nakasone Yasuhiro in the 1980s, a domestically-based call for a more pro-active Japanese state became more vocal, '...the first necessity is a change in our thinking. Having "caught up", we must now expect others to try to catch up with us. We must seek out a new path for ourselves and open it up ourselves.'⁸¹

Japan's role as a rising state was first witnessed in the 1980s when a more pro-active role went by the name of 'internationalisation'. In a variety of fields, not solely military, Japan's growing desire to move away from its formerly passive role and undertake a more pro-active role

was discernible. It is contended that Japan was seemingly aspiring to play a more visible and responsible international role without threatening or challenging the US role as world leader. The decline of military power with the end of the Cold War and the growth in importance of economic power enabled Japan to make a greater international contribution. With high savings rates and a large trade surplus Japan was in a position to underwrite global public policy undertakings.

Sasaki argues that it was not just the economic success of Japan which led it to assume a more pro-active role but the subsequent global recession and necessity to restructure the global economy. He also contends that the collapse of bipolarity in the late 1980s contributed to a more independent, pro-active role.⁸² On a military level, advocates of the rising-state model contend that Japan has displayed an 'incremental adaptation within an agreed policy framework.'⁸³ Nakasone's rise to power also heralded the rise of the defence *zoku* and meant that attention was not paid solely to economic interests. Nakasone was willing to promote Japan as a partner of the US, as seen in the portrayal of Japan as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' and the removal of the one-percent barrier on military spending. With the growth in its economy so the expansion of its military capabilities could be witnessed. The relationship with Washington was strengthened but acquired aspects of an alliance, rather than Japan as the junior partner of the US: host nation support increased, and Japan co-operated in the SDI program. Particularly in the form of Ozawa Ichirô a new desire to 'step up to the broad array of global responsibilities ordinarily borne by major nations' can be witnessed. 'We have learned that just being a peaceful nation is not much of a philosophy if it is not backed up by a willingness to take action in defence of freedom and peace.'⁸⁴ *Vis-à-vis* the fears of other Asian nations over a growing Japanese military role and the possibility of Japan as the next world leader, advocates of the rising state thesis would propose that the growing role of the SDF can be justified as a growth in the international security role of

Japan and not the military-defence role of Japan. A non-combat role within UNPKO should not be equated with either an increased self-defence role for the SDF or an attempt to project Japan's military power abroad. With the increased role of the UN as a peacekeeper Japan is increasing its international contribution but stopping short of a blatantly military and hegemonic role. With this argument Japan has defended itself against accusations of growing militarism. Domestic apathy was cited in Calder's work as an obstacle to a pro-active role, yet by portraying an increasingly pro-active role as a contribution to the international good, domestic (and international) fears over the despatch of the SDF can be assuaged. After the Gulf Crisis domestic opposition seemingly quickly evaporated as government-sponsored public education strategies took effect. Even the issue of Article IX and revision of the Constitution are now firmly on the agenda of public discussion, an event that a decade ago would have seemed unlikely. Domestic support for Japanese pro-activism is very much in evidence with opinion polls demonstrating the acceptance of Japan's military role albeit only within the framework of the UN.⁸⁵ According to Aurelia George Mulgan, this direction will change the whole outlook of Japan's foreign policy as through peacekeeping activities Japan will come into contact with other states on an independent basis, not within the framework of its relationship with the US. To this end the UN is the body through which Japan aims to promote this new activism and can be seen in the political cartoons from the Japanese press included in Appendix II.

Within the framework of the comprehensive security, Japan also expanded its non-military contributions behaving with greater autonomy from the US. This contribution was seen in Japan's increasing financial contribution to various agencies of the UN and deployment of electoral supervisors in the 1980s on UNPKO.⁸⁶ Japan has also increased its ODA contributions as one element of its comprehensive security policy to become the largest donor in the world in 1989.

Moreover, its one-time deficit in UN personnel and participation in areas other than the social and economic field was addressed in the 1980s.⁸⁷ With the approval Japan has received in public opinion polls, its continued growing role seems to have been sanctioned.⁸⁸

Yasutomo's interpretation of pro-activism sees Japan as purposive, unaffected by inertia, not based solely upon external stimuli. The pro-activist stance is differentiated into induced activism and promotive activism. Promotive activism shows no signs of reactivity allowing for a purposive behaviour with no sign of immobility in policymaking. The state has a clear conception of national interest and attempts to mobilise public opinion in its favour. Induced pro-activism allows for some reactivity exerting an influence, but this is not the dominant role. External stimuli may instigate a policy change but does not shape the resultant policy. Both forms of pro-activism concentrate on Japan's own policy decision-making process as the dominant factor imbuing reactivity with a peripheral catalytic role. Another form of activism posited by Yasutomo is anticipatory activism. Developing the idea of induced pro-activism, Yasutomo claims that external stimuli can play not only a catalytic role but also a formative role. Resultant policy predicts a future stimulus from outside. The resultant policy is neither a defiant stand (defensive activism), nor excessively pliant (acquiescent activism). Yasutomo describes policymaking as 'an exercise in preventive diplomacy,' with the state in control of domestic and international influences making strategic decisions.⁸⁹

Under this interpretation of the Japanese state, a more pluralist viewpoint is adopted with sources of activity originating not only from the US, as the reactive state would suggest, or simply from the ruling triad of the LDP, bureaucracy and big business, as the Japan Inc. model would suggest. This new pro-activity has targeted the UN as the forum for Japan's international contribution. With the end of the Cold War, the UN has been liberated from the East-West

confrontation that did so much to curtail its work. 'The UN plumbing has been in place for many years, even though nothing was flowing through the pipes.'⁹⁰ The end of the Cold War seemingly has allowed the water to run freely through the pipes again and the UN has gained in specificity, durability and concordance. Furthermore, with a widening in the definition of the term 'security' to include economic, environmental, and cultural dimensions the UN appears to be well positioned to address the issues of the post-Cold War international system. The reasons given above for participating within the enhanced UN system all apply in the case of Japan. Yet there are additional catalytic incentives to participate. Robert Immerman has outlined a number of elements at play: first, the idealistic way in which the Japanese population regard the UN. The UN has regularly polled upwards of 80 percent popularity in opinion polls in Japan and is seen by the Japanese population as a yardstick to measure how Japan stands in the international community. Furthermore, support for UN agencies like UNESCO and UNICEF is especially strong in Japan.⁹¹ This popularity can be seen in government circles if the recent plethora of 'vision' books by Japanese politicians and the references therein to the UN are taken seriously.⁹² Second, the desire of Japan's political and business communities to gain recognition for Japan's post-W.W.II economic achievements needs to be mentioned. The political and business communities have regularly attempted to acquire status within the UN by maintaining seats on organisations like the OECD and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Third, the Japanese bureaucracy desires to increase Japan's global contributions incrementally. Fourth, the LDP and the MOFA are campaigning to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The MOFA (and particularly the UN Bureau of the MOFA) has, since the 1980s and the US's withdrawal from much UN work, attempted to increase Japan's financial contributions and personnel, Namibia and Cambodia being early examples of the MOFA's activism.⁹³ In addition to

Immerman's points, the external influence of the Secretary-General must be taken into account. With the increase in UNPKO Japan appears to be in a position to pick up an ever-increasing cheque and the Secretary-General can encourage, in the way Robert Cox suggests, Japan to underwrite UN expenses and contribute personnel by offering support for Japan's UNSC seat bid.

With the influence of international society embodied in the UN, the realisation of the following tenet of Japan's foreign policy can be discerned, and will be examined in more detail in the next section:

The strengthening of the world organization as a means of maintaining international peace and security is one of the fundamental policies of Japan.⁹⁴

UN-CENTRED DIPLOMACY

The UN system was welcomed by most shades of Japanese political opinion upon Japan's admission in 1956. From the point of view of the Yoshida administration, the UN was a mechanism by which the Security Treaty with the US could be justified. If the treaty made reference to the UN Charter and its principles then the Japanese public could be persuaded into accepting American bases on Japanese soil as a duty under the popular principles of the UN Charter.⁹⁵ However, Japan's participation in UNPKO was an extremely divisive issue for some time, as seen in the divisions in the Socialist Party caused by Sone Eki, the party's Foreign Affairs spokesman, who in a 1954 party congress document outlined a new direction for Japanese foreign policy which involved a more equal Security Treaty with the US, support for a policy of gradual rearmament, and the participation of Japanese troops in UNPKO. Divisions were overcome by the suggestion of a permanent UN armed force to deal with peacekeeping while the issue of Japan's participation therein was not raised.⁹⁶ Debates within the Diet also

prevailed centring around the question of whether Japan would be forced under UN membership to despatch Japanese troops abroad on missions like that in Korea, or if Japan could fulfil the criteria for membership if it were not to despatch troops on peacekeeping operations. In June 1954 the House of Councillors eventually silenced debate on the issue and approved a resolution preventing the despatch overseas of the Self-Defence Forces.⁹⁷

Japan's admission to the UN in 1956 saw the proclamation of the three pillars of Japan's foreign policy: first, the centrality of the UN; second, Japan would co-operate with the democratic nations of the world; and third, Japan would align itself with the nations of Asia. This year also saw the creation of the National Defence Council (NDC) charged with the duty of creating national defence policies and plans—its pivotal contribution being the Basic Policy for National Defence (BPND) of May, 1957. Article I of the BPND stressed the importance of support for UN peace activities. However, until such a time as the UN could function as envisaged at the end of W.W.II, Article IV called for the Japan's defence policy to be aligned in the event of an external threat with the US.⁹⁸ Thus, although the strength of the US norm was ultimately persuasive in the Cold War period, recognition and respect for the norm of the UN was noteworthy from the time of Japan's admission to the UN and was used by defence planners in promoting the bilateral relationship with the US. This was a similar line to that taken in Article IV of the US-Japan Security Treaty of September, 1951 which stated that:

This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and of Japan there have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.⁹⁹

Thus, 'UN-centred diplomacy' was never defined in concrete terms and the early period of Japan's membership within the UN was characterised by winning elections and increasing its representation within the UN system in an attempt to establish itself, while relying on the US for

its security needs. However, soon after gaining membership Japan was faced with the West Irian dispute and managed to play with some success the role of a bridge between East and West, as Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru had envisaged in his advocacy of the three pillars of Japan's foreign policy. Japan's aim was to dilute Third World radicalism and find some accommodation with the Western nations.

In 1958 Hammarskjöld promoted the idea of active Japanese participation by inviting the despatch of personnel on the observer mission UNOGIL in the Lebanon. Despite this early form of *gaiatsu*, the Japanese government declined due to the hostile domestic climate and the lack of legal provision for the despatch of Japanese personnel on UN peacekeeping operations. However, the following year it did decide to despatch a diplomat to a minor fact-finding mission in Laos—a policy that was repeated in 1971 and 1982. At this time Professor Sakamoto Yoshikazu of Tokyo University published his seminal article, *The Defence Structure of a Neutral Japan* (*Chûritsu Nihon no Bôei Kôzô*), and placed further emphasis on Japan's relationship with the UN. Sakamoto envisaged a UN Police Force, similar to that despatched to Egypt during the Suez Crisis, as an alternative to reliance upon the US for Japan's security needs. This UN-sanctioned multinational force of international officials (*kokusai kômuin*) would be stationed in Japan and, unlike the US-Japan Security Treaty, would guarantee a truly independent defence policy and inspire reassurance within the Japanese people.¹⁰⁰ In this way, the idea of reliance upon the UN rather than the US was mooted at this early stage. As will be demonstrated in the following empirical chapters, the end of the Cold War enabled Sakamoto's ideas of UN-centrism to regain some currency.

In 1961 Prime Minister Ikeda contended that despatch of the SDF could be constitutional if the particular peacekeeping operation was one of policing and maintaining law and order. Due to

opposition objections the government did not attempt to push the issue. Although 1961 also saw Matsudaira acknowledge that it was inconsistent for Japan to adhere to UN principles and not make its troops available for peacekeeping operations, he was forced by the Diet to withdraw the comment.¹⁰¹ Hayashi Suzô, Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau clarified the government's position in the wake of Matsudaira's comment in the following terms:

If the UN police activities are conducted in an ideal form, in other words, when a country that disrupted order within the UN system is to be punished, or in the case of establishing a police corps to maintain order, and if a unitary force under the UN is created with the participation of personnel despatched by member countries, then [Japan's participation in a force] would not be an act of a sovereign nation. Also there is a possibility of a peaceful police force which does not conduct military activities. These possibilities would not pose problems relating to the First Clause of Article IX.¹⁰²

Thus, the importance of the UN as a norm and standard in international society was beginning to be evident as Japan sought to respond to international expectations. Furthermore, Japan sat upon the Special Committee for Peacekeeping within the UN, being appointed in February 1965 by the President of the General Assembly with the aim of undertaking a comprehensive review of financing UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁰³ Japan subsequently reported to the 20th and 21st Sessions of the General Assembly in 1966 and 1967 respectively supporting Canada in adopting a broader method of financing peacekeeping operations to include permanent members of the Security Council. At the same time, with Canadian disillusionment with its peacekeeping role in the UNEF operation, Japan was considered as a likely contender to adopt the role of peacekeeper for the SDF as part of a contribution to the international community.¹⁰⁴ Subsequently studies regularly appeared suggesting that Japan ought to attempt to despatch the SDF on UNPKO, particularly a report in 1970 published by the UN bureau of the MOFA and in 1977 by the Nomura Institute. A similar middle road was forged in Japan's consequent UNPKO policy. As regards the Congo, Japan had opposed any radical Third World proposals that singled out Belgium and the Congolese Army for blame, supporting a

moderate solution put forward by the US and Britain.¹⁰⁵ Similarly with the despatch of the UNFICYP operation Japan opposed an Asian-African stance that took sides with Greece against Turkey, giving its support to a statement sponsored by Afghanistan which preserved respect and recognition for Cypriot independence, sovereignty, and territory.

The 1980s witnessed one of the most active periods of Japan's PKO policy. 1980 saw Japan propose certain guidelines for the reinforcement of fact-finding missions to the Committee on the Charter of the UN and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization. These proposals included the strengthening of Article IX regarding the role of the Secretary-General and the constraining of Security Council duties. Japan's proposals aimed to see the creation of a subsidiary organ to be despatched on fact-finding missions and an end to Security Council unanimity on the despatch of these fact-finding missions. The government made clear its interpretation of Japanese participation in UNPKO in 1980:

It is impossible to discuss the right or wrong of Japan's participation in a UN force in general because the so-called UN forces have different objectives and missions. If the objectives and missions of the UN force in question include the use of force, we believe that the Constitution does not allow the participation of the SDF in it. On the other hand, if their objectives and missions do not include the use of force, the Constitution does not prohibit the participation of the SDF. But because the current SDF law does not give such a mission to the SDF, the SDF is not allowed to participate in it.¹⁰⁶

Prime Minister Suzuki Zentarō addressed the 37th General Assembly in June 1982 proposing 'the possibility of establishing a mechanism whereby both global and regional military situations could be monitored and made public as deemed proper', stressing 'the modalities of co-operation by Member States in peacekeeping operations'.¹⁰⁷ Later that year, Japan proposed a resolution to the 37th General Assembly working closely with nations of the non-aligned movement, such as Yugoslavia, Austria, India, Sweden, and Egypt. In reaction to Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's appeal in his annual report highlighting the global insecurity of the time, Japan's proposal aimed to strengthen the peacekeeping aspects of the UN by creating a

small group of experts under the Secretary-General 'to undertake technical studies regarding the strengthening and expansion of UN peacekeeping functions'.¹⁰⁸ Although the plan for a panel of experts did not materialise, Japan did manage to pass successfully resolution 37/67 in the face of Western major power opposition, a resolution stressing 'the imperative need to strengthen the role and effectiveness of the UN'.¹⁰⁹ The logical conclusion of promoting this kind of proposal was that Japan would be called upon to make a greater contribution. Furthermore, these proposals were made at a time when public opinion was beginning to shift to allow greater participation (including manpower and not just financial aid) by Japan within UNPKO.¹¹⁰ Before the opening of the General Assembly both houses of the Japanese Diet unanimously passed a declaration of support for disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and Suzuki was, thus, fully cognisant of the acceptance of and support for the promotion of peace through the UN, as he addressed the General Assembly:

I stand here today in this Assembly Hall, representing the collective will of the Japanese people, as expressed in those resolutions. I am convinced from the bottom of my heart that the common aspiration for peace of all peoples of the world is concentrated in this room. Our mission here is to combine our efforts in response to this common aspiration of mankind and to move decisively together on the road to peace.¹¹¹

These proposals were re-emphasised by Foreign Minister Sakurauchi Yoshio in October 1982 by proposing 'a system of prior registration and organisation of the personnel and equipment which the member states are ready to contribute to future operations; and the securing of effective financial backing', and that 'Japan, for its part, is ready to co-operate more actively in the strengthening of the peacekeeping operations of the UN'.¹¹² Soon after there was talk in the press and in government circles of Japan revising the SDF law to allow the despatch of the SDF on election monitoring operations.¹¹³ The Suzuki administration was keen to continue Japan's long-term commitment to the UN as a global peacekeeper and expand the role of the SDF in UNPKO. However, the strength of the internal pacifist norm ensured that any despatch

would be highly sensitive and that the MOFA would have to skirt around the issue by proposing such ideas as sending observers to the UN, SDF medical teams and retired SDF members.¹¹⁴ Despite the constraint of the pacifist norm, the centrality of the UN to Japanese security and foreign policy was evident and Ogata is correct in surmising that the further increase in Japan's role was dependent on the UN and in particular the role of the Secretary-General—a theme that will become more evident in the next chapter as peacekeeping establishes itself more solidly as a norm with the end of the Cold War as in the case of Japan is able to 'circumvent this [the Constitution] barrier to SDF role expansion.'¹¹⁵

In 1983 the MOFA enthusiastically promoted the 'blue ribbon' committee report on Japan's role in UNPKO despite opposition which finally sank the proposal. The report promoted a more active and broader role for Japan in UNPKO by advocating participation in police operations, logistic support, transportation and communications, medical activities, election supervision, and the despatch of military personnel on patrol and supervision missions. It recommended the strengthening of the UNSC and Secretary-General yet with an incremental approach so as not to alienate Japanese public opinion.¹¹⁶ In 1984 Japan again declared explicitly its intent 'to cooperate with the world body's mission to be despatched to monitor the partial cease-fire between Iran and Iraq...by providing civilian personnel, necessary equipment or financial assistance.'¹¹⁷ However, this avocation was softened somewhat by the subsequent distancing comments made by Foreign Minister Abe Shintarō that 'Japan will neither attempt to become a major military power nor send numbers of its Self-Defence Forces on overseas peacekeeping missions.'¹¹⁸

In 1988 Japan's proposals were eventually adopted aiming at encouraging member states 'to prevent in their international relations the emergence or aggravation of disputes or situations'; encouraging the Security Council '[to send], at an early stage, fact-finding or good offices

missions or establishing appropriate forms of UN presence, including observers and peacekeeping operations'; and encouraging the Secretary-General 'to consider using, at as early a stage as he deems appropriate, the right that is accorded him under Article IX of the [UN] Charter.'¹¹⁹

The UNTAG operation in Namibia provided an opportunity for Japan to expand its participation within UNPKO. The Japanese delegation to the UN stated the intention to contribute civilian personnel to the election monitoring process in Namibia as early as 1980.¹²⁰ Thereafter, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar suggested in 1983 that, 'Japan should play a more positive and broader-ranging role in peacekeeping operations', and UNTAG, with a considerable civilian element, was seen to be the perfect forum for this expansion.¹²¹ This came to fruition in 1989 with the despatch of 31 electoral observers to Namibia with the duties of monitoring elections and continued with the despatch of a team of six to monitor elections in Nicaragua under the ONUVEN operation. In fact 1987 had already seen the despatch of two MOFA representatives to the UN operation in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) at a time when Japan's financial contributions to UNPKO was steadily on the rise.

In summary, as posited by Robert Cox in his article on the executive head, the Secretary-General of the UN at times petitioned Japan and solicited support, aid and personnel. Although originally always considering but refusing requests for assistance, in the 1980s Japan began to meet requests from the Secretary-General and contributed personnel and financial aid to the UNIIMOG and UNTAG operations. Internally, this is because the MOFA has always been in favour of a greater role for Japan in peacekeeping operations with the aim of enhancing Japan's chances of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.¹²² Throughout the Cold War period the MOFA attempted to increase Japan's contribution whenever the opportunity arose although at

times was forced to tone down any blatant support for despatch of the SDF on UNPKO.

THE JAPANESE STATE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

Susan J. Pharr developed the defensive state model of the Japanese state, particularly in the post-Cold War world, as a reaction to the two depictions of Japanese foreign policy discussed above. Japanese foreign policy is regarded as:

a low-risk, benefit-maximizing strategy that has served Japan's national self-interest extraordinarily well in the past, and that continues to do so today. The strategy is essentially defensive in character; yet to call it 'reactive' misses the point, for what is impressive is the degree to which Japan, faced with a barrage of pressures from the United States and other industrial nations, has actively and successfully manoeuvred to advantage among them while seeking to avoid risks of all kinds.¹²³

Pharr uses the analogy of defensive driving to describe the defensive state. Under this analogy driving defensively is regarded as neither aggressive, nor passive. She regards Japan as not behaving according to a grand design but choosing its policy from a variety of paths available. In this sense, Japanese foreign policy acquires a certain degree of activism, yet decisions are made through a process of debate coloured by internal and external pressures. The 'defensive state' model is seen to exhibit a number of characteristics of activism: aversion to risks, low cost, and continuity in objectives throughout the entire post-W.W.II period. To illustrate this strategy Pharr has taken the issue of defence burden sharing between the US and Japan. Military security is selected as an area of study as it is regarded as an important international public good and because of the fact that the debate has influenced other debates like ODA and the deregularisation of markets. Regarding this particular issue, Japan's overriding aim is to gain the maximum number of benefits and simultaneously minimise the costs.

These four factors can be witnessed in Japan's participation in the US led security framework; first, risk aversion was demonstrated in Japan's attempts to avoid alienating nations which were targeted as adversaries by the Security Treaty with the US. This could be seen in

continuing trade with North Vietnam and China, on the one hand, and participating in the policy of containment, on the other hand. Furthermore, risks were minimised with the introduction of restrictive measures like the three non-nuclear principles, the one-percent military spending ceiling, and restrictions on the despatch of the SDF abroad. Second, the low cost of Japan's foreign policy was maintained by what Pharr labels 'substitution policy'. This policy entails Japan redefining and repackaging defence contributions as various types of aid and debt relief. The introduction of comprehensive security in the 1970s was the logical upshot of this policy. Third, the activism in Japan's defence posture exists but is masked by a veneer of pacifism. Japanese support for US action in Vietnam and Korea and Japanese permission for US vessels carrying nuclear weapons to utilise Japanese ports are quoted as manifestations of this policy. Finally, continuity can be witnessed in Japan's consistent denial of militarisation. In the 1950s the priority of economic recovery was cited as the main reason against militarisation. The 1960s witnessed the 'allergy' of the Japanese to a military role. The 1970s saw the one percent spending barrier, and finally the 1980s saw the nationalism provoked by US Japan-bashing used to refute burden-sharing responsibilities.¹²⁴

By utilising these methods Japan's foreign policy:

far from being the passive strategy of a reactive state, was a carefully calculated set of actions blending well-timed verbal endorsements of US overall policy, dissociation from any overt role in US interventions, lucrative back stage support within carefully prescribed limits, and a variety of self-containment measures—a blend, in short, that minimized security risk-by-association with the US while reaping maximum economic benefits.¹²⁵

In contrast to the advocates of the rising state thesis, Pharr proposes that Japanese foreign policy did not display any aspects of change in the 1980s and 1990s. The self-containment policies continued in the 1980s with military spending at a lower level in 1990 than it was in 1955 or 1965.¹²⁶ Substitution policies continued with the expansion of ODA. The Japanese government utilised Asian fears of remilitarisation to contain its own military spending.

Various forms of co-operation continued between the US and Japan in tandem with risk minimisation as Japan co-operated in various UN sanctions but avoided direct, belligerent policies. Thus, it is argued that Japan's role in the Second Gulf War was a continuation of the defensive state model as no direct role was undertaken, except in the background.

In a similar fashion, Martin Weinstein addresses the issue of Japan's reactivity through a state-centred framework and argues that in the field of security the Japanese government had clear policy goals and achieved them in a manner elaborated by Pharr, i.e. by absorbing and sidelining pressure from the US but maintaining its objectives.¹²⁷ A good example of the defensive state in action is the role Japan has managed to play as a go-between in regional conflicts. Despite *gaiatsu* from the US in the 1950s for Japan to follow its lead and sever relations with Communist China in favour of the Taiwanese government, Japan continued to conduct relations with both countries so that by the 1960s China was Japan's largest trading partner.¹²⁸

It appears that within the framework of the defensive state, Pharr would argue that pressure from the international system and the societal level to make a full-blown or limited contribution to the international system is being resisted in Japan and any concessions the state may make to the international system are to maximise its own benefits, deflect criticism of Japan, and continue what Wan would call the 'first strategy' or Yoshida Doctrine. Thus, pressure from domestic or external sources would only be regarded as possessing explanatory power insofar as it could be used to promote Japan's national interest. The defensive state thesis fails to allow for a role in international society for Japan by placing too much emphasis on governmental actors resisting external pressures in favour of emphasising their own agenda. Although the focus on US-Japanese relations and the Cold War structure is comprehensive, Pharr's approach suggests that a change in policy could only originate within the Japanese state. Describing the

state as impervious to external influence, a Japan that constantly says no, portrays the state as an independent body acting regardless of outside pressure, which, as the following empirical chapters will demonstrate, is evidently not the case. Furthermore, societal pressures are totally ignored. Domestic constraints, like the norm of pacifism, embodied in the Constitution, are solely regarded as tools the government can manipulate in the realisation of its policy goals, rather than documents 'living' within Japanese civil society. Pharr, like Calder, fails to examine societal pressures thoroughly enough, as well as pressure coming from above originating from international society and its organisations. Pharr's analysis admittedly cites these constraining and encouraging norms, but cannot comprehend them beyond a framework centring upon the imagined unitary actor of the Japanese state.

Each of the traditional approaches to the Japanese state has contributed something to our understanding of Japan. However, in their own ways they have failed to recognise the explanatory power of ideas and norms in Japanese policymaking and appear to be deeply entrenched in Cold-War thinking. The reactive state places too much emphasis on the US and *gaiatsu* with the claim that change cannot appear from within Japan. Equally, the pro-active state approach again falls into the realist trap of looking to the international system and the most powerful state within that international system in order to understand Japan's UNPKO policy. The defensive state attempts to relax this assumption and look within Japan to understand how policy is developed but fails to include a societal element in its analysis by examining purely governmental actors.

A more pluralistic view of Japanese politics places emphasis on factors like public opinion, opposition parties, norms and ideas both within and outside of Japan, and divisions within the LDP, bureaucracy, and big business in an attempt to explain events which the Japan Inc. model

fails to address. Thus, power is diffused, not concentrated in an elite, and policymaking is rendered divisive and often an attempt to build a compromise between various groups, very much in contrast to the rational choice approaches which regard decisions as interest-maximising, rational and the product of individuals. Writers such as Eliss Krauss and Muramatsu Michio have characterised Japanese politics as pluralistic with the term 'patterned pluralism' used to describe the various points of reference policy-makers must acknowledge.¹²⁹ Nakane has attempted to develop a model of Japanese society somewhere between the two extreme models given above. By placing an emphasis on consensus (*wa*) in Japanese society, Nakane Chie sees the state deriving its power and playing an integral, but not necessarily dominant, role in achieving consensus between various inputs into the policymaking process. The state is the guardian of the public interest and as it cannot use force to achieve its ends must mediate, between the various public and private interest groups in Japanese society without becoming the puppet of either group to achieve the national interest. In this paradigm, the concept of *wa* is the goal of Japanese policymaking. This approaches the study of ideas and norms within Japan; this thesis seeks to supplement this approach with attention given to international norms such as peacekeeping.

The objective of this study is to overcome the short-sightedness of traditional interpretations centring on the ruling triad and focus on the marginalised factors such as civil society, opposition parties, and the norms of both Japanese and international society. A number of norms and ideas can be discerned which have shaped Japan's foreign and security policy and which tend to be ignored in traditional approaches to the Japanese state. For example, Peter Katzenstein has pointed to the uncontested norms of economic security to reduce Japan's economic vulnerability—a norm which can be regarded as responsible for both Japan's militarist

episode and its post-war policy of aligning itself with the US.¹³⁰ Furthermore, the Peace Constitution has created a norm strong in specificity and concordance within Japanese society of what is and is not possible in the despatch of the JSDF. Rooted in the defeat of W.W.II, anti-militarism has become deeply rooted within Japanese society, seen repeatedly in times of crisis, like the revision of the Security Treaty with the US and the UNPKO legislation, and in an unambiguous opposition to any attempt at militarisation in opinion polls.¹³¹ The only way in which this opposition has been compromised is when the despatch of the JSDF is within the aegis of the UN; in other words, one norm reinforcing another. This norm (like the norm of PKO in the international system outlined in the previous chapter) has been marginalised in the traditional literature. A more pluralist approach to the Japanese state has been posited by many, like Richard Samuels, T. J. Pempel, and Gary Allinson who all regard conflict between various centres of power as important to the decision-making process in Japan. Thus, an approach which recognises both the domestic norms of a civil society and the international norms of international society is necessary in order to push our understanding beyond traditional analyses. These domestic norms can be combined with the international norms created and institutionalised within the UN, as demonstrated in the previous chapter.

SUMMARY

Evidently a noticeable increase in Japan's contribution to UN peacekeeping operations took place from admission to the UN until the eve of the Second Gulf War. From Japan's first refusals to actively participate in UNPKO in the 1950s, through to the despatch of personnel and considerable cash contributions in the 1980s, a shift from passivity to activity is discernible with this decade representing an important watershed. The period saw Japan break free from an

overly restrictive relationship with the US, target the UN with the support it commanded at home as an area within which to improve its international contribution, and sponsor independent initiatives. A clear dichotomy exists between its initial policy in the 1950s and 1960s of refusing to involve itself in any issue too controversial, while the Japanese government and the MOFA slowly established itself within the organs of the UN (more like Pharr's defensive state than Calder's reactive state) and the activism of the 1980s. The two decades after Japan's admission to the UN may appear, and have usually been characterised, as reactive in the style described by Calder with Japan subservient to the US, failing to undertake independent initiatives, and adhering closely to the Yoshida Doctrine. Thus, the norm of the security relationship with the US was of crucial importance in shaping Japan's identity and defining what Japan would and would not do. To this end, the norm of the relationship with the US played the role of both a constitutive and restrictive norm shaping and constraining Japan's behaviour. Calder's explanatory model of Japan's foreign policy to an extent can explain Japan's policy in this period, with Japan in a position of reliance for its security upon the US. However, Calder's model fails to explain the instances of Japanese activism in this early period, like gaining non-permanent seats on the Security Council and winning elections and representation in other areas of the UN, the incremental increase in despatch of personnel, and involvement in conflict resolution in West Irian and Laos. However, it was not the only norm at play as seen in the fact that despite the withdrawal of the US from UN activities in the 1980s, Japan began to play a more active role. During this period, Japan (unlike the United Kingdom in the case of UNESCO) resisted pressure from the US and continued to gradually increase its contribution to the administration of UNPKO and the UN as a whole. Thus, with *gaiatsu* not only being resisted, but Japan actively stepping up to assume the previous responsibilities of the US, Calder's reactive state model fails to


provide an adequate explanation.

This is where the UN, the Secretary-General, and the utility of PKO as norms come into play. Having previously refused to contribute to UNPKO, the Japanese government began, in the face of increasing financial commitments to the UN and calls from within the UN, to step up its visible contribution and, thus, the first civilian personnel were sent on monitoring missions. Moving on from the period straight after Japan's entry to the UN, the 1980s saw Japan's UN policy take on a certain activism. Robert Immerman outlines the following four elements at play in Japan's UN policy in the 1980s: first, the idealised view of the UN in the Japanese public's opinion; second, the desire of business and political elites to gain recognition for its successes; third, the attempt to secure the alliance with the US, but also to increase an international contribution incrementally; and fourth, the LDP and MOFA's desire to get a UNSC permanent seat.¹³² However, Japan's participation was still limited to non-combat situations and the despatch of civilian personnel due to the strength of the internal norm of pacifism. The characteristics of Pharr's model—aversion to risks, low cost and continuity—can all, in varying degrees, be witnessed in Japan's UN peacekeeping policy affected by the pacifist norm. Low cost and aversion to risks are seen in Japan's desire to play the role of mediator within Asia and Japan's refusal to comply with Hammarskjöld's request for a greater Japanese contribution in 1958. Continuity is evident in the manner in which Japan concerned itself with steadily establishing itself within the various organs of the UN system gaining admission and representation on the ECOSOC, the International Court of Human Justice, etc. Immerman, despite noting sources of activism, sees Japan as simply trying not to alienate anyone, pay lip service to certain causes, and pay its UN bills on time: a categorisation in keeping with Pharr's defensive state model. Examining Japanese delegates' declarations in the UN in the 1980s, it

appears that Japan hoped to avoid the institutionalisation of the practice of UNPKO as a burgeoning norm. Japanese delegates at the UN repeatedly expressed their wariness of the despatch of missions after hostilities have broken out, their suspicions regarding *ad hoc* missions, and doubts about voluntary contributions. Japan supported the creation of a permanent force funded by all member states on an obligatory basis, emphasising the role of the Secretary-General over the Security Council and exhibiting a truly multinational composition. Thus, Japan saw UN peacekeeping in this period as a stopgap measure on the road to a more tangible and well organised security system.

By 1990 and the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, the situation in Japan was that the traditional norm of pacifism was largely intact as was the militarily restrictive nature of relations with the rest of East Asia. The relationship with the US was equally of great importance but one could begin to see the UN, and in particular its peacekeeping functions, beginning to be established as a new norm in an embryonic form of the international society (the policymaking matrix in Diagram II demonstrates this interplay of norms during the period with which this chapter deals). With the outbreak of the Gulf War, as will be seen in the next chapter, these norms came into conflict with each other and called Japan's identity and political-military culture into question.

**DIAGRAM II: POLICYMAKING MATRIX FOR CHAPTER THREE,
JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND UNPKO, 1956 TO 1990**



CHAPTER FOUR: THE SECOND GULF WAR¹

INTRODUCTION

Although the Second Gulf War of February 1991 can in no way be considered as a typical example of UNPKO, any study of Japan's evolving UN peacekeeping policy and the role and influence of the UN as a norm in the development of this policy must begin by necessity with an analysis of the Second Gulf War. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, pressure on Japan to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations was hardly a new phenomenon. However, before the Second Gulf War this pressure had failed to reap any concrete benefits from the point of view of the international community—the only exception being Japan's financial contributions to the UN budget encouraged by the deeply embedded domestic norm of pacifism and the externally-based norm of the relationship with the US. However, it was in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War that Japan began a process of political, social, and legal soul-searching, with traditional norms coming into conflict with newer norms in an attempt to make a 'visible contribution' to the international community's efforts in the Persian Gulf.² For this reason, the Second Gulf War is to be the first case study in this investigation of Japan's international peacekeeping contribution.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SECOND GULF WAR

Iraq's claims on Kuwaiti territory originated with the creation of the Kuwaiti state in 1961, met by Iraq with threats of invasion. This initial crisis was averted by the creation of an Arab League force to protect the newly created Kuwaiti state and was settled by the eventual recognition of Kuwait by Iraq.³ However, thereafter relations were characterised by border disputes over the

Shatt al-Arab waterway, the islands of Bubiyan and Warba, and disputed Kuwaiti oil-drilling techniques in contested regions. This tense state of affairs again boiled over into aggression in 1973 with a partial occupation of Kuwait by Iraq whose withdrawal was eventually bought by Kuwaiti cash payments.

Faced with the First Gulf War, Kuwait decided to support Iraq against Iranian Shiites and extended Saddam Hussein's regime millions of dollars in loans with which to conduct the war. This eventually led to Iraq emerging victorious after the war, but economically and militarily exhausted. US estimates put the cost of the war at \$500 billion. Moreover, Kuwait was one of the most vehement in its demands for the repayment of \$10 to \$14 billion in interest-free loans.⁴ Faced with Kuwaiti intransigence over the relaxation of repayment terms, Saddam behaved in a similar fashion and at an Arab Council Co-operation meeting in February 1990 refused to repay the money, alternatively demanding more money from Kuwait in order to re-build Iraq. In July 1990, Iraq threatened to use force against any Arab oil-exporting state that pumped excess oil and thereby forced the price of oil down creating difficulties for Iraq's post-war reconstruction—a threat aimed at Kuwait which was the main offender in overstepping its allocation decided by OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) agreements. This threat was followed by a build-up of Iraqi troops on the border with Kuwait, possibly with the belief that the US would not intervene in any conflict between fellow Arab states.⁵ Iraqi demands of wiping out its war debts and the acquisition of Bubiyan were issued during talks in Jiddah, when the talks failed to produce any resolution of differences.

Events culminated in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the morning of August 2, 1990 with Iraq quickly overcoming any Kuwaiti resistance.⁶ The permanent occupation of Kuwait and the creation of the 19th province of the Iraqi state were announced duly. The reaction of the UN and

the international community is examined in the next section, but faced with almost universal condemnation and the build-up of multinational forces in Saudi Arabia against the Iraqi invasion under the Desert Shield operation, Saddam attempted to link the conflict with Kuwait to the general situation in the Middle East by agreeing to withdraw from Kuwait if Israel agreed to withdraw from the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Iraqi forces were also strengthened in Kuwait, seemingly with the aim of either consolidating the occupation of Kuwait or continuing Iraqi aggression into Saudi Arabia. It was at this stage in the conflict that Saddam began to move foreign nationals in Kuwait and Iraq to military installations as 'human shields' against any military strikes on these bases from the multinational force. Eventually the hostage incident passed with their release before Christmas 1990 for reasons that remain unclear. Nevertheless, the Iraqi military build-up in Kuwait continued to frustrate any diplomatic attempt, investigated below, to resolve the dispute peacefully before the UN deadline for Iraq's withdrawal of January 15, 1991.

The Second Gulf War began with the passing of this deadline. The initial stages of the conflict were characterised by the air campaign designed to destroy Iraqi air defences and command and control structures with a massive demonstration of force (in the first twenty four hours of the air campaign over 1,000 sorties were made) and the objectives of preventing Iraqi interference in Allied air operations, grinding down Iraqi air defences in Kuwait, and a sustained attack on the Iraqi field army were largely achieved with minimal casualties in preparation for the ground campaign. Saddam's policy in reaction to the air war included the use of Scud-B missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel, particularly from mobile missile launchers, a threat which was addressed with the use of Patriot missiles but would continue to be a military and diplomatic issue until Iraq's defeat.

As the air campaign ended, the allied ground offensive began on February 24, 1991, postponed by three days due eleventh-hour diplomatic attempts to broker a deal. The ground offensive, sometimes called the 100 hour war, was a 1990s version of the Schlieffen Plan.⁷ The multi-national force shifted to the West, attacked the Iraqi divisions in Kuwait from the rear and western flanks in a swift encirclement movement. The strategy was successful in ejecting Iraqi troops from Kuwait and minimised Allied casualties. On February 27, 1991 the multinational troops liberated Kuwait City, but operations were only called to a conclusion after retreating Iraqi troops were bombed back to Iraq in the north. Discussions began on March 3, 1991 between Iraqi and Allied military leaders at the Safwan airstrip with the aim of agreeing a cease-fire. There followed a political process which culminated in a UN-mandated cease-fire in mid-April. At the same time the process of policing and clearing up the polluted battlefield began.

THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was met by near universal condemnation by the international community. On August 2, 1990, President George Bush condemned publicly the invasion and called upon the UN to adopt resolutions demanding Iraqi withdrawal. This happened the same day with Resolution 660 being adopted by a 14-0 vote with only Yemen abstaining.⁸ This resolution called on Iraq and Kuwait 'to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard.'⁹ A few days later President Bush met with Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain in Aspen, Colorado and discussed the possibility of using force against Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. Similarly, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, despite the number of Soviet military advisors in Iraq at that time. The EC imposed broad sanctions against Iraq in response to the

invasion and a number of states froze Iraqi and Kuwait assets. However, condemnation was not universal and King Hussein of Jordan, mainly due to domestic pressures, cast Saddam Hussein as a leader of the Arab world.

On August 7, 1990 the military response began to take shape. After having carefully obtained the agreement of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, President Bush ordered the despatch of US troops and aircraft to the Gulf. US ships already in the Gulf were supplemented in number, Egyptian troops augmented the Saudi and US forces, and were added to by the troops of Australia, Great Britain, Canada, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, with the aim of enforcing the blockade under the operation, 'Desert Shield'. Turkey closed oil pipelines from Iraq, leaving Jordan the only route for Iraqi oil and goods to escape the embargo initiated under UN Resolution 665. The Arab world supported this military build-up with the Arab League meeting in Cairo on August 9-10, 1990 where thirteen of the twenty-one member states agreed to send military forces.

The military build-up continued with the call-up of US reserves on November 8, 1990, and the despatch of another 200,000 troops to the Gulf with an eye on the possibility of a military solution. However, in these final months before the start of Operation Desert Storm there was a flurry of shuttle diplomacy with figures such as King Hussein, Kurt Waldheim, Edward Heath, Willy Brandt, Yasser Arafat, Nakasone Yasuhiro, Mikhail Gorbachev, and naturally, the UN's Perez de Cuellar all attempting to find some non-military solution to the conflict. On January 9, 1991, Secretary of State James Baker met with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva in an attempt to find a last-minute solution as the January 15, 1991 deadline approached. This three-day meeting came to nothing as did a last-minute meeting with Perez de Cuellar in Baghdad on January 12, 1991. All the while the multi-national force was being assembled and by the January

15, 1991 deadline had reached the level of 700,000 troops comprising 28 nations. However, diplomatic manoeuvres were in evidence, with Gorbachev's renewed attempts in mid-February to find a solution through his personal envoy, Yevgeny Primakov. The Soviet attempt appeared to meet with success as Iraq responded that it would respect UN Resolution 660. This peace proposal put plans for the ground offensive back by three days to February 24, 1991 in order to assess the seriousness of the Iraqi response. Yet, like the other diplomatic efforts, this also ultimately came to nothing and the ground war began.

What followed after the January 15, 1990 deadline—the air war, and the subsequent 100 hour land war commencing on February 28, 1990—has been mentioned above and need only be referred to as the culmination of the international community's efforts to find a solution to the crisis.¹⁰ This was the area where the generals took over from the UN, the diplomats, and the politicians. After the short land war had been concluded, the international community's efforts began again with the aim of reconstructing Iraq, Kuwait, and the Gulf region. Problems like the transport of refugees, the continuing presence of Saddam Hussein as head of the Iraqi state, and the Kurdish rebellion within Iraq continued; thus, on April 28, 1991 Operation Provide Comfort to assist the Kurdish populations began. In May the UN began to establish its presence in the Turkish border areas where the Kurdish populations were centred, with all humanitarian tasks handed over to the UNHCR on June 7, 1991.

JAPAN'S RESPONSE

INTERNAL NORMS: PACIFISM

Japan's political response up until Christmas 1990 began with a burst of activity and focused upon the hostage crisis. The MOFA busied itself with ensuring that the Japanese nationals in

Kuwait were safe and in contact with the Japanese Embassy. The Japanese government was informed on August 17, 1990 that Japanese nationals would not be allowed to leave Iraq, in response to which the government officially complained and termed the decision, 'a clear violation of international law which is absolutely unacceptable.'¹¹ Japan refused to close its embassy for some months as the crisis proceeded and kept the *Hinomaru* national flag flying outside its embassy in Kuwait City until August 29, 1990. Towards the end of August Iraq moved all Japanese nationals to Baghdad in accordance with the Iraqi claims to close foreign missions in Kuwait. In reaction to the deteriorating situation, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki met with Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakamoto Misoji and other MOFA officials on August 24, 1990 and as a result declared that Japan would turn to international organisations to secure the release of Japanese nationals.¹² The first hostages consisting of 69 women, children and sick men were released at the beginning of September and at the beginning of October Kaifu became the first head of state of an industrialised democracy to meet with a member of the Iraqi leadership, Deputy Prime Minister, Taha Yassin Ramadan in order to secure the release of the hostages.¹³ By the end of the month former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro decided to make a visit to Baghdad to attempt to negotiate the release of the remaining hostages, returning at the beginning of November with 74 freed hostages. During a Lower House Committee Meeting on Security, Foreign Minister Nakayama Tarô stressed that Japan would rely upon the efforts of the UN and in particular, Secretary-General de Cuellar, in attaining the release of the hostages.¹⁴ The issue was finally resolved in the first week of December with the sudden release of all the hostages. Yet, at these early stages in the crisis, it can be seen that Japan's contribution was to be in keeping with its traditional reactive pacifist line stressing a minimal contribution.

While Japan was attempting to resolve the hostage crisis the package of financial

assistance which was to define Japan's contribution to the Gulf crisis was delayed. The package was announced eventually, however, on the same day that Japanese nationals were first forced to appear on television broadcasts, condemned by Sakamoto as a 'meaningless attempt to give the world an impression that foreign nationals in Iraq are safe', stressing that this was a problem for the international community and not just for Japan.¹⁵ This package contained: first, an unspecified amount of aid to the Multi-national Force (MNF), rumoured at the time to be \$1 billion; second, the despatch of government chartered civil aircraft and ships to be used in the humanitarian effort; third, one hundred civil medical experts; four, financial aid to Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan; five, ¥1.5 billion in aid to Kuwaiti refugees in Jordan; and six, a new bill entitled the UN Peace Co-operation Law to allow the SDF to participate in the international community's effort.¹⁶

The response of the US was both respectful and critical. While describing elements of the package as 'useful first steps', it was stressed that 'we want to see the Japanese flag [in the Gulf area]. This [the package of measures] is not what we had in mind.'¹⁷ In response, the limitations of the Constitution were cited by Fujii Kazuo of the Defence Agency's Policy Bureau when faced with demands for financial, diplomatic, and military assistance by a four-man team of visitors from the US: Henry Rouen, assistance secretary of defence; Carl Ford, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence; Allen Holmes, Ambassador at Large for Burden-sharing; and Carl Jackson, National Security Advisor.¹⁸

Opposition within Japan was highly vocal and a great deal of criticism originated from organisations such as the Japan Trade Union Congress (*Rengô*), the W.W.II Victims' Relatives Association (*Wadatsumikai*), the Japan Taxpayers' Association and all opposition parties with the exception of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). Two female citizens in Kagoshima filed a

lawsuit with the district court claiming that aid for the Gulf War was unconstitutional. Ishida Kōshirō, Chairman of the Kōmei Party, regarded the financial package as unclear and, therefore, unacceptable—it was necessary to know whether the contributions would be spent on arms and ammunition or not. Doi Takako, of the Socialist Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), argued along the same lines that if the money were spent on aggressive weapons this would be against Article IX of the Constitution.¹⁹ The SDPJ to this end pledged at its party convention to oppose the government package.²⁰ With these reactions in mind the government undertook an advertising campaign in an attempt to secure public understanding on the issue. The DSP stood firmly by the government's decision emphasising, 'positive co-operation befitting its status as an internationally minded nation and in accordance with the spirit embodied in the Constitution.'²¹ Government policy as regards financial contributions was to donate the cash directly to a Gulf Steering Council, whereas the opposition parties were demanding in the Diet that the government ensure that the money would not be spent on arms. On this issue the government did back down and Kaifu agreed to lodge a request with the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) Fund to prevent the use of Japanese money on arms: a result of the government's need for the Kōmei Party's votes in the Diet as well as an expression of the power of the norm of pacifism in Japan. The power of the minority parties was also seen in the government's decision to raise 40 percent of the contribution through defence budget cuts as the Kōmei Party and DSP had been opposed to the tax hikes. It was with this approval of the DSP and Kōmei Party that the Lower House approved the Second Supplementary Budget and tax increases on February 28, 1991, and the Upper House on March 7, 1991. By July, the government found itself contributing an extra ¥70 billion to help post-war peace efforts in the Gulf through the GCC to make up for the shortfall which occurred with the collapse in the value of the yen from the time of the pledge to the actual

payment.

The initial reaction of the Japanese business community was highly cynical of active participation in any punitive action against Iraq and was demonstrative of the strength of pacifism and reactivity within Japan. Due to private sector claims on Iraq and the plummet in share prices by 1,106 points in the first few days after the invasion, MITI and the business community were wary of antagonising Iraq any further with harsh sanctions.²² The leading members of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry were gathered in Karuizawa at the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and were warned by Kaifu that, 'if this conflict should drag on, it could very possibly adversely affect Japan. Japan must proceed to play an active role.'²³ The reaction to this call was tardy and slight. Chairman Ishikawa Rokuro issued a statement minimising concerns for the business community by stressing the co-operation of the two superpowers.²⁴ When asked to respond to Ozawa Ichirō's similar call for activity the Keidanren Chairman, Saitō Eishiro, failed to address the issue specifically.²⁵ The Japanese business community's apparent lack of interest in the crisis was certainly connected with the minimal dependence on Iraq and Kuwait for its oil supplies, but also was rooted in the traditional adherence to the Yoshida Doctrine and a desire to maintain good relations with the majority of states.

The business community's reaction to the financial contribution was similarly polarised.

Nikkeiren's President, Suzuki Eiji, stated that:

I don't believe the military situation will be smoothed over. Japan still has taken no concrete measures to respond to this crisis. It is not reasonable to rely on private-sector medical assistance and measures of that sort. Surely the government must take the lead. However, there are problems involved in sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. And what about our financial contribution? First it was one billion dollars, then two billion. And the demands will keep on coming. What we need is a more independent attitude.²⁶

Thus, the financial contribution was supported but needed stabilising. Ishikawa suggested that a nation-wide Gulf fund should be set up to allow the Japanese population to contribute what

they wanted to.²⁷ However, more active members of the business community appeared to be more than ready to contribute to the Gulf, as seen in Keidanren's creation of a special fund to provide food and medical aid to refugees in response to a request from Ogata Sadako in UNHCR. Keidanren also supported payment of the \$9 billion in extra assistance.²⁸

Another issue in the first month of the crisis, which was affected by the norm of pacifism, was the visit of Prime Minister Kaifu to the Gulf region which had been planned before the invasion of Kuwait. By the weekend of August 11-12, 1990 the visit was to go ahead, although Kaifu had described the invasion as 'intolerable', and Foreign Minister Nakayama had declared he would urge Kaifu to cancel the visit.²⁹ The US position on Kaifu's visit was made clear by Clayton Yeutter, the US Agriculture Minister, expressing support for the visit as a symbolic expression of support for the deployment of the multi-national force in the region.³⁰ The decision came on August 13, 1990 with Kaifu cancelling his trip and Nakayama taking his place. The reason behind this decision was a desire to keep Kaifu in Tokyo while a response to the crisis was hammered out and fears that Kaifu could be faced with demands from Gulf nations to contribute militarily which he would have to decline on constitutional grounds. The visit was tentatively rescheduled for October depending on the resolution of the hostage crisis. Thus, the specificity, durability and acceptance of the pacifist norm in constraining the extent of the government and business community's financial and diplomatic contribution continued to play an important role.

The key issue of despatch of Japanese personnel, as included in the government's package, first manifested itself with demands for Japan to contribute aircraft and ships to help in the transportation of refugees, personnel and weapons. These proposals were met with protests from Japanese unions about the degree of safety in the Gulf region: four Japanese seaman had

died in the Iran-Iraq war and fears of repetition were high. It was this opposition from both unions and commercial airlines that eventually pushed the government into using the ASDF to transport the peace co-operation team. With the outbreak of hostilities in the Gulf, Kaifu met with opposition leaders to discuss the despatch of ASDF aircraft to aid refugees. Doi had referred to the despatch of the ASDF without discussion as a 'fascist act and a denial of parliamentary procedures.'³¹ The Communist Party referred to the plan simply as 'unconditional support for the war.'³² Again, the DSP expressed support for the plan but opposition was expressed by both the SDPJ and the Kōmei Party on the grounds of the Constitution and the fear that the SDF's role may escalate into a blatantly military one.³³

However, in the face of opposition, the government decided not to despatch the ASDF until such a despatch was requested by a relevant international organisation. And until that time no new ordinance would be introduced to expand the transportation clauses of the SDF Law to include refugees as well as foreign dignitaries. As the refugee crisis passed and with the absence of any request from international organisations for assistance, it was decided that the ordinance based on Article 100 of the SDF Law that would facilitate the despatch of the ASDF would be scrapped.³⁴

However, opposition based on durable, traditional pacifism existed in several quarters—see Table IV. The Socialists refused to consider any despatch of the SDF or any other action beyond what the UN called for.³⁵ Doi stressed that this would be 'making an open declaration to the world that Japan intends to part with the one thing of which it truly could be proud—adherence to peace.'³⁶ The SDPJ's report entitled *Points Regarding the Act Creating a UN Peace Organization (Kokusai Heiwa Kikō Secchi Hōan Yōshi)*, published on January 4, 1991 outlined the SDPJ's support only for the despatch of Japanese civilian personnel to assist in a

limited definition of peacekeeping.³⁷ The Kōmei Party's position was summarised in an edition of the *Kōmei Shimbun* favouring the despatch of SDF 'old boys' limited to electoral, medical, and refugee-related duties.³⁸ The Kōmei Party's aim was to contribute to UNPKO with personnel widely removed from the SDF. The fact that troops participating in PKO are referred to as 'peace soldiers' and 'soldiers without enemies' was stressed through the media and Diet debates.³⁹ The JCP's position was declared in a letter to Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar in March 1991. Although emphasising its support for the non-military aspects of the UN's work, this letter stressed the importance of the Constitution within the strictest interpretation regarding the very existence of the SDF, even within Japan, as unconstitutional.⁴⁰ The Communist Party's stance was encapsulated in the report, *Lessons from the Gulf War in Bringing about Peace in the Persian Gulf and the World*. Although disapproving of legislation to allow the despatch of the SDF because of its perceived militarist overtones, the report did support international contribution based on the Constitution and the UN Charter, rather than the US-led effort.⁴¹ Citizen groups like the New Japan Women's Association and the Japan Council of Christianity also opposed any despatch on the grounds of Article IX. Municipal Assemblies began to pass resolutions demanding the bill's rejection, including Sapporo, Chiba, Miyagi and Kanagawa prefectures. Public opinion at this time was firmly against any despatch with 21 percent supporting the bill as opposed to 57 percent against; moreover 67 percent of those polled regarded despatch of the SDF abroad as unconstitutional, with only 15 percent regarding despatch as constitutionally unproblematic.⁴² One poll of the Kyōdō News Service estimated that half of the electorate was against the bill and two-thirds generally against the despatch of the SDF due to constitutional reasons, with only 13 percent in favour.

During the 119th regular session of the Diet, debate was polarised between, on the one

hand, the opposition parties criticising the despatch on the grounds of the Constitution, with extreme views within the Communist Party against even aid in transportation as an act of war. On the other hand, the government and DSP's position supported the despatch on the grounds of co-operation 'to keep global peace as a member of the international community', and the role of the UN in the post-Cold War world as stated by Sasaki Man of the LDP.⁴³ However, the Abe and Takeshita factions of the LDP began to express reservations on the chances of passing the bill as seen in Table III. Within the LDP, divisions emerged as to the content of the bill; particularly the Abe, Miyashita and Watanabe factions were demonstrably against the legislation, with the large Takeshita and Kōmoto factions (the latter being Kaifu's home faction) strongly in favour of the bill.⁴⁴ A similar pattern could be witnessed as regards other issues like the despatch of minesweepers with the Abe and Miyazawa factions the least supportive.⁴⁵

TABLE III: FACTIONAL SUPPORT

The following figures demonstrate the factional support in the LDP for the UN Peace Co-operation Bill.
(Source: *Wangan Sensō to Nihon: towareru Kiki Kanri*, Tokyo, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1991).

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>No Answer/ Don't Know</u>
LDP	115 (63.5 percent)	20 (11.0 percent)	46 (25.4 percent)
Takeshita	32 (72.7 percent)	3 (6.8 percent)	9 (20.5 percent)
Abe	20 (51.3 percent)	8 (20.5 percent)	11 (28.2 percent)
Miyazawa	23 (53.5 percent)	7 (16.3 percent)	13 (30.2 percent)
Watanabe	19 (61.3 percent)	2 (6.5 percent)	10 (32.3 percent)
Kōmoto	14 (82.4 percent)	-	13 (17.6 percent)

The debate moved onto the possibility of transferring SDF personnel to a newly created peace co-operation team to allow them to participate in the Gulf. The creation of a new category of public servant including 1,000 to 2,000 members for military, medical, and transportation assistance was proposed to avoid violation of the Constitution. This idea, however, was

dismissed by Ozawa and Ishikawa as too complicated and it was thought that efficiency would be maintained by retaining SDF status and SDF structures. Kurihara Yûko, chairman of the LDP's Research Commission on the Constitution, stated that Japan would be able to despatch the SDF to UN cease-fire monitoring and emergency relief activities overseas. However, the Cabinet Legislation bureau regarded this as excessive and unconstitutional. The eventual outline of the proposed UN Peace Co-operation Law stated that the SDF members will be registered with a UN Peace Co-operation team under direct control of the Prime Minister to ensure civilian control. During deliberations on this first bill, the government officially distinguished on October 27, 1990 between *participation in* and *co-operation with* UN military forces. *Participation in* would involve the despatch of the Peace Co-operation Corps under the command of the UN military force. *Co-operation with* would be characterised by support activities outside the command of such forces.⁴⁶ This distinction would play an even greater role in the subsequent debate about the second bill. The DSP agreed with this plan. However, the Socialists and the Kômei Party expressed reservations, although the Kômei Party began to extend its support with certain conditions attached, including the emphasis on non-military activities, unarmed personnel, and SDF participation as individuals not units.

This issue caused public disenchantment with the Kaifu administration, despite the government using the LDP's victory in an Aichi-ken by-election in an attempt to portray public agreement with the bill.⁴⁷ Partly due to this and due to time restrictions in the Diet, the LDP appeared to give up any chance of passing the bill in the 119th session of the Diet and began by November to start petitioning the opposition parties for support of a new bill. In the face of this pressure, the bill was eventually withdrawn but not before the LDP, Kômei Party and DSP agreed a three-party accord to introduce new legislation allowing the despatch of Japanese personnel on

UNPKO.⁴⁸

With the failure of the first bill, other plans were mooted as to how Japan should frame its international contribution. The Forum for Foreign Policy Innovation suggested that a PKO unit of private citizens without any government involvement should be established as this would avoid the issue of the Constitution.⁴⁹ The SDPJ outlined a bill to create a permanent peace corps for UN peacekeeping limited to non-military activities based on UN resolutions and under the command of the Secretary-General.⁵⁰ Miyazawa called for the creation of a UN force including personnel of each UN member state as public servants as one way to navigate through the Constitution.⁵¹ Sakamoto envisaged the despatch of civilians upon Iraqi acceptance of the UN cease-fire terms, 'Japan will contribute with UN activities as much as possible and will continue to make active contributions to restoring peace in the Middle East.'⁵² In addressing both houses of the Diet, Kaifu stressed that Japan would do as much as possible in collaboration with international organisations respecting both the UN Charter and the Constitution.⁵³

This trend of replacement of one internal norm of pacifism with an external norm of the UN was beginning to become increasingly salient. Furthermore, with the success of the ground offensive in the Gulf, changes in opinion could be witnessed. Domestically, opinion polls began to suggest that the Japanese population would support a limited role in UNPKO for the SDF: 54 percent in favour of some kind of role in disaster relief and 30 percent against. In addition to this, 48 percent now supported a non-combat PKO role, with 38 percent against.⁵⁴ By the end of August, according to a Jiji press poll, 60 percent support for some kind of contribution to UNPKO existed; however, disagreement emerged over the scope.⁵⁵ As regards the opposition parties, a dissident break-away section of the SDPJ supported SDF despatch on PKO. Faced with election failure, the SDPJ began to rethink its traditional policies and drafted revisions to recognise the

SDF and the right of self-defence in order for Japan to take some role in the post-conflict international effort in the Gulf.⁵⁶

Connected with this, the idea of despatching minesweepers to the Persian Gulf was first mooted soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Based on a constitutional interpretation going back to 1987 and the First Gulf War, proposals were made by Watanabe Michio, the senior LDP Diet member, that protection of Japan's oil supply could be incorporated easily within the definition of self-defence. It was further argued that this would also add to Japan's 'visible contribution' and that Japan should consider increasing aid for the MNF in the Gulf.⁵⁷ However, disagreement with this plan was to be found not only amongst the expected sources of the opposition parties, but also in former Prime Minister Nakasone, who argued that the situation in 1990 was very different from that of 1987 and that Japan should consider its contributions purely within the confines of a strict interpretation of the Constitution.⁵⁸ However, the issue was not raised again until after the ground war had been concluded and the post-war reconstruction of Iraq was under discussion by the international community. In March, 1991 the government declared its intention to search for a role for the SDF in Iraq's post-war reconstruction within the framework of the three-party consensus.⁵⁹ By mid-March, pressure from the US had begun to be applied again specifically with a request for the despatch of minesweepers to the Gulf. Armacost urged the despatch of minesweepers to the Gulf at a meeting of LDP Diet members.⁶⁰ In response, the LDP sought to gain the support and understanding of the DSP, Kōmei Party, and the SDPJ.⁶¹ The initial response from the other parties was one of caution with fears that the despatch of minesweepers could lead to a more active role for the SDF. In reaction to these fears, Nakayama tried his utmost to stress the fact that hostilities were over and that this contribution was part of an international effort, 'the Japanese government has to be interested in

the issue of how to ensure the safe passage of ships in the Gulf.' Watanabe joined in this line of argument by stressing that, 'it would only be normal to remove dangerous objects. Since many ships bound for Japan pass through the Gulf, it would be a natural action for Japan. And the public would understand it.'⁶² With this in mind the Defence Agency began to make the necessary technical preparations to despatch minesweepers and Kaifu stressed to the Diet the legality of the despatch of minesweepers and Nakayama stressed to Secretary-General de Cuellar the non-military PKO role Japan was ready to assume.⁶³

The MOFA regarded this issue as one within which Japan could do a great deal to improve its image.⁶⁴ Similarly, the Defence Agency called upon the MSDF to consider the despatch of minesweepers. According to one government source it appeared that the government would be able to rely on the support of the DSP; however, the Kōmei Party stood against the despatch and the SDPJ stressed the necessity to prepare new legislation to precede the planned despatch.⁶⁵ In order to address this problem Kaifu met with the opposition parties in the last week of April stressing that the despatch was part of an international effort, occurring in peacetime, as part of a duty to maintain oil supplies, but was only able to illicit the support of the DSP with the remaining opposition parties requiring debate in the Diet before any despatch.⁶⁶ Opposition was also expressed by domestic civil groups, like the group, 'Peace Now! We Won't Pay Taxes for War,' which filed an injunction with the Tokyo District Court against the despatch of minesweepers. Furthermore, eight members of the MSDF declared their unwillingness to go to the Gulf. The fears of East Asian nations will be examined at a later stage but were expressed by Beijing urging prudence in resolving the issue, and expressing concern about Japanese actions through Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to Nakasone.⁶⁷

Finally, on the night of Wednesday, April 24, 1991 the decision to despatch the

minesweepers was made at an extraordinary Cabinet meeting. Four minesweepers (*Yurishima*, *Hikoshima*, *Awashima*, and *Sakushima*), one flagship (*Hayase*), and a support ship (*Tokiwa*) were to leave Japan by the end of the week. Captain Ochiai Taosa was appointed commander of the operation only a week before the departure of the task force. On the day before the despatch, faced with protests near the Defence Agency and even the torching of vehicles, Kaifu underlined to the House of Representative's Foreign Affairs Committee the peaceful nature of Japan's actions, 'it is quite important for those countries [which are capable of contributing to peacekeeping in this area] to co-operate in safety in the region.'⁶⁸ The minesweepers finally left on April 26, 1991 with the farewell address given by Ôshima Tadamori, Deputy Director-General of the Defence Agency, making pains to characterise the despatch as part of an international contribution. The minesweeper episode came to an end on October 31, 1991 with the return of the task force to the port of Kure after having detonated thirty-four mines without incurring any casualties.

With the minesweeping aspect of Japan's contribution resolved, the final details of the PKO Bill, as it came to be called, were settled in September 1991 several months after the first bill had died in the Diet while attention was drawn towards the leadership crisis in the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and scandals in the banking and securities industries in Japan, on the other. A *Japan Times* editorial was correct in observing that the major issue was the kind of PKO Japan would participate in and how this would sit with the Constitution.⁶⁹ This was resolved in August and September 1991 within the framework of the three-party agreement and resulted in the drafting of five conditions demanded by the DSP and the Kômei Party which would have to be met in any SDF despatch on UNPKO:

- a cease-fire accord must be reached.

- Japan's participation must have the agreement of the parties directly involved in the conflict.
- The UN force must remain neutral.
- When the above three conditions are not met, Japanese personnel must withdraw.
- Japanese personnel can use firearms only to defend themselves.⁷⁰

The bill stated that Japanese personnel would be allowed to participate in all non-military UNPKO, including supervising elections and transporting refugees. Monitoring of cease-fires would be undertaken by members of the SDF and they would be allowed to participate in a UN force separating opposing troops while retaining their SDF status. The use of firearms would be limited to the minimum necessary for self-defence. A limit of 2,000 troops were designated as Japan's uppermost contribution.

Dispute arose within the three-party agreement over the necessity of Diet approval each time the SDF is despatched on UNPKO, a result of demands from the DSP in order to strengthen the concept of civilian control opposed to the LDP and Kōmei Party's policy of only reporting back to the Diet on the despatch and completion of a mission. This led the LDP to approve the bill on September 18, 1991 and submit it the next day without the primary support of the DSP. The role of the DSP was crucial to the successful passage of the bill, as seen in Table IV, and its objection to the LDP's demand that Diet approval was unnecessary proved to be one of the major stumbling blocks in the Diet discussion. The Kōmei Party was satisfied with the five conditions as an assurance for civilian control, leaving the DSP in a pivotal position with the deciding votes, at one stage even threatening to sink the bill unless Diet approval was recognised.⁷¹ On November 27, 1991, the bill was forced through the House of Representatives' *Ad hoc* Committee on International Peace Co-operation by the LDP and Kōmei Party without the

approval of the DSP as the issue of Diet approval was not resolved. The LDP did concede some ground on the issue of Diet approval by including a clause calling for Diet approval if an operation continues for over two years. Despite this, the DSP, JCP, and SDPJ all voted against the bill but to no avail as the LDP called an early vote and railroaded the bill through to the Upper House. Ultimately the bill was sent back to the Lower House for further debate to be passed at the beginning of December and sent to the Upper House for further discussion. This passage was facilitated by the LDP agreeing to re-open the *ad hoc* committee in the face of SDPJ pressure and threats of using delaying tactics.

Debate was concerned also with the specificity of the Constitution and whether it allowed Japan's participation in a peacekeeping force using force like that witnessed in the Congo operation. An *Asahi Shimbun* survey of 172 constitutional experts demonstrated that roughly 80 percent of those experts asked regarded Japan's participation as unconstitutional, and only 10 percent expressed support. In the same edition of the *Asahi Shimbun*, it was reported that the Ozawa committee was considering the participation of the SDF within a UN army as constitutional under the term 'international security' (*kokusaiteki anzen hoshō*) as different from 'right of collective self-defence (*shūdanteki jieiken*).⁷² The LDP seemingly regarded contribution to UNPKO as only one facet of the expansion of Japan's international contribution. This could be seen in the policy package submitted to the party convention which called for greater activism in UNPKO as well as expansion of overseas development assistance and contribution to fighting environmental problems. In this way, Japan would be in a position to justify any level of contribution to UN-sponsored peacekeeping from election observation to enforcement measures. As regards the Constitution's stress upon the non-use of force to settle international disputes, the Ozawa Committee's use of the term 'international security' stressed the maintenance of peace—

a cause upon which the Constitution was constructed in its preamble and which coincides with the objective of UNPKO as seen in its award of the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize.⁷³ As Professor Kitaoka Shinichi, then of Rikkyô University, now of Tokyo University, pointed out, the Constitution was based on the concepts of pacifism, internationalism, freedom and democracy, similar to the underpinnings of UNPKO.⁷⁴ In this way, the specificity of the pacifist norm could be seen to merge with that of the UN Charter.

TABLE IV: DIET SUPPORT FOR THE UN PEACE CO-OPERATION BILL

(Source: *Asahi Shimbun* opinion poll taken on October 29-30, 1991 among the Diet members demonstrated the following results (number of Diet members)).

1) Do you support or oppose the UN Peace Co-operation Bill?

	LDP	SDPJ	Kômei Party	JCP	DSP	Others
Yes	115	0	0	0	0	0
No	20	134	46	16	1	6
Not Sure	43	0	0	0	13	0
No Answer	3	0	0	0	0	0

2) Should the SDF be despatched on PKO not involving the use of force?

	LDP	SDPJ	Kômei Party	JCP	DSP	Others
Yes	130	0	0	0	13	0
No	37	134	45	16	0	6
Not Sure	7	0	1	0	1	0
No Answer	7	0	0	0	0	0

3) In the case of a UN army allowing the use of force, should the SDF be despatched?

	LDP	SDPJ	Kômei Party	JCP	DSP	Others
Yes	50	0	0	0	4	0
No	79	132	46	16	10	6
Not Sure	42	2	0	0	0	0
No Answer	10	0	0	0	0	0

4) If the answer to no. 3 was yes, then should the Constitution be reinterpreted and revised?

	LDP	SDPJ	Kômei Party	JCP	DSP	Others
Revised	16	-	-	-	0	-
Reinterpreted	29	-	-	-	4	-
Not Sure	5	-	-	-	0	-

The extent to which public opinion had changed by this stage from its traditionally stalwart pacifist stance can be seen in a number of opinion polls. The largest trade union in Japan, which is seen as a base of support for the SDPJ, Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union

(Jichirō), expressed two-thirds support for SDF despatch overseas on UNPKO restricted to non-military activities.⁷⁵ Public opinion during the debate clearly sanctioned a PKO role for the SDF. A poll published on Constitution Day demonstrated that 45.7 percent of people supported a role encompassing medical, election observation, etc., a further 12.1 percent supported an unarmed cease-fire observation role, while 10 percent supported an armed role. Alternatively, only 24.4 percent opposed any kind of despatch of the SDF. Support for the UN remained high at 88 percent of people polled backing the actions of the UN. Even 38.4 percent of the SDPJ showed a desire to despatch the SDF on a limited role as opposed to 37.5 percent opposed.⁷⁶ Divisions within the SDPJ over the issue of participation in UNPKO emerged with the 1992 Upper House elections with SDPJ candidates diametrically opposed to each other and arguing in public over the issue of the SDF's despatch.⁷⁷ Seemingly, the UN had become an arena in which Japan's military contribution could be justified and co-exist with the concordance and specificity accorded to the traditional norm of pacifism as the Ozawa committee clearly recognised.

However, in order to gain enough votes in the Diet, the LDP eventually was forced to come to some compromise with the Kōmei Party and the DSP in order to pass the bill before the session finished in June 1992. Thus, the LDP had to give in to the more traditional pacifist norm and proposed barring SDF participation in UNPKO forces until the Diet approved separate legislation allowing for this.⁷⁸ Chief Cabinet Secretary, Katō Kōji, and LDP Deputy-Chairman, Kanemaru Shin, met with the chairman of Rengō, Yamagishi Akira, towards the end of March in an attempt to secure the opposition's understanding and ensure passage of the bill in the opposition-dominated Upper House where the bill had been shelved as priority was given to the Budget.

Debate began in earnest towards the end of April 1992 with the DSP still refusing to back

down over the issue of a mandatory Diet approval of each SDF despatch but supportive of placing the troops under UN command. Ôuchi Keigo did appear willing to compromise if the elements of the bill allowing for SDF participation in UN armed forces were frozen. Despite only having 14 seats in the House of Representatives and 10 seats in the House of Councillors, the DSP and its chairman appeared to be playing a high profile role in the Diet discussions. Equally the Kômei Party objected to certain issues, chiefly the placing of Japanese personnel under UN command. However, the party came round eventually to the DSP's demands for Diet approval. In his attempt to secure the successful passage of the bill, Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi was willing to compromise with the centrist parties and modify the LDP line. With the Upper House elections approaching in July 1992 no party, at this stage, wanted to risk alienating the electorate with an aggressive approach to the issue. Rengô also touted its own proposals to set up a force that may include SDF personnel if they are on leave or retired; Diet approval and non-combat missions were also regarded as essential.⁷⁹ The SDPJ's plans continued to develop with the proposal of a 2,000 man corps separate from the SDF taking part in non-military activities and maintaining an unarmed status.⁸⁰ However, the role of the SDPJ was marginalised as the LDP, DSP and Kômei Party through backstage negotiations came closer to a modified bill that could be passed through the Upper House, prompting Ôuchi to suggest that there was a 80 percent likelihood of the bill passing through the Diet by the end of June.⁸¹ The LDP had moved closer to accepting the principle of UN command over Japanese personnel which the DSP had been demanding. As far as the LDP was concerned the centrist parties held the key to successful passage of the bill and the SDPJ and Rengô could be ignored, criticised or pilloried. The Kômei Party's Ishida Kôshirô and LDP Chairman, Watanuki Tamisuke, did attempt to court the Rengô and the SDPJ's understanding and co-operation in a successful passage of the bill and

avoidance of aggressive resistance in the Diet but to little avail as the Socialists refused to compromise.⁸²

The real influence seemed to lie with the DSP and the Kōmei Party as they began to discuss the modifications they would request of the LDP including a freeze on certain military activities and civilian control through the Diet.⁸³ By the end of May, the LDP and centrist parties had re-found their understanding and agreed on certain modifications to the bill, including the *freezing* of the bill's sections that dealt with participation in military activities of UNPKO, review of the bill three years after its enactment, and the need for Diet approval when these sections are *unfrozen*. The discussion on the command of the despatch resulted in an addition to Article VI of the bill to the effect that the government would seek approval of the Diet if a particular despatch were to be continued over the period of two years. The three main issues under debate at the time were: first, would the SDF or a separate organisation carry out duties in a UNPKO; second, the use of weapons within these operations; and third, where would command of the despatched personnel lie—with the UN or the Japanese Diet? The tri-party consensus sought to resolve the first problem by creating a separate organisation which would avoid the debate over whether the SDF's existence was constitutional or not—a concession to the SDPJ and the Kōmei Party. However, the idea of a separate organisation was rejected in the face of the efficiency the SDF could bring to a role, the public support for the SDF after the Gulf War, and the administrative and funding problems for the new organisation.

As regards the use of force, a careful study of peacekeeping operations was undertaken by the Diet that contributed to the specificity of UNPKO by demonstrating the peaceful and unarmed nature of the vast majority of UNPKO respecting concepts such as strict impartiality, recognition of a cease-fire, consent of the parties involved, and the non-use of force. It was

demonstrated that force was only used when peacekeepers were prevented from completing their duties. The inter-agency committee wondered if Japan would be in a position to withdraw its troops in the event that the level of violence escalated. Again, precedence suggested that other countries had withdrawn their troops (Sweden from UNFICYP in 1987, Iran from UNIFIL and UNDOF in 1979, and Tunisia from ONUC in 1961). Thus, with this in mind, the government formulated five guidelines, based on the three-party consensus talks of August-September 1991, to regulate the withdrawal of Japanese peacekeepers and provide criteria to follow on occasions when peacekeepers were prevented from fulfilling their duties:

- Agreement on a cease-fire will have been reached among the parties to the conflict.
- The parties to the conflict, including the territorial state(s), will have given their consent to the deployment of peace-keeping forces and Japan's participation in such forces.
- The peacekeeping forces will strictly maintain impartiality, not favouring any party to the conflict.
- Should any of the above guidelines cease to exist, the Government of Japan may withdraw its contingent.
- Use of weapons will be limited to the minimum necessary to protect personnel's lives, etc.

These principles were the basis for the law and were explained to and accepted by the UN. These issues also were resolved in discussions between the MOFA, the Defence Agency, the Cabinet Councillor's Office on External Affairs and the National Legislation Bureau of the Prime Minister's Cabinet. This inter-agency drafting group, consisting of thirty-three staff members from eleven ministries headed by Nomura Issei, Deputy Director-General of the Treaties Bureau of the MOFA, concluded that the use of weapons in self-defence does not contravene the Constitution. As most UN peacekeepers had experienced their lives being put in

danger when obstructed from fulfilling their duties, this was seen as another area that was constitutionally defensible.⁸⁴

The SDPJ and the minor opposition party Rengô Sangiin which was linked to Rengô refused to participate in this modified bill demanding further debate on the issue.⁸⁵ The bill was eventually revised and submitted to the Upper House at the beginning of June. Initial debate was marked by paralysis as a special Upper House Committee continued to debate through the night as the SDPJ questioned the legality of certain clauses contained in the bill despite LDP calls for a rapid and calm resolution of the bill. The opposition techniques of delaying the passage of the bill included raising no confidence measures in the government and particular members of the government and the 'ox-walk' (*gyûhō*) technique of delayed voting. These tactics led the LDP to force the bill through an Upper House committee by calling a plenary session vote on the bill—a vote which lasted the weekend of June 6-7, 1992 due to the opposition delaying tactics including questioning the LDP's move to call for an immediate vote as compromising the legislative supremacy of the Diet. The bill eventually passed the Upper House in the early hours of Tuesday, June 9, 1992 with the bill sent back to the Lower House for approval of the revisions the LDP, Kōmei Party, and DSP had agreed. In the Lower House, the opposition used similar tactics by calling no-confidence measures in the government. However, in the face of the LDP-Kōmei Party-DSP consensus there was little the other opposition parties were able to do except delay the passage of what was inevitable. The bill became law on the evening of June 15, 1992 with a vote of 329-17 in its favour with the SDPJ boycotting the vote and registering mass resignations, ignored by the government, and with only the JCP voting against it.⁸⁶

Opposition reactions regarded the PKO Bill as one step in the beginning of the dismantling of the Constitution and the beginning of Japan's active military participation in the global strategy

of the US by abusing the name of the UN.⁸⁷ The SDPJ disagreed with the Ozawa Committee's interpretation of 'international security' and the rationale for despatching the SDF overseas. The SDPJ regarded UNPKO and the PKO Bill as two very different concepts. Unlike UNPKO, the PKO Bill had failed to gain the understanding of the Japanese public, the Diet and the other nations of East Asia.⁸⁸ As far as the SDPJ was concerned the PKO Bill was an attempt to take a road to becoming a military superpower and was a result of political bargaining and compromise by the LDP, Kōmei Party, and DSP rather than a deeply considered attempt to contribute to international society. This was one reason why the SDPJ tried to force a dissolution of parliament and force an election on the issue. The SDPJ envisaged Japan's contribution being based on economic and technological ability, as mentioned in the SDPJ resignation statement.⁸⁹ Yet, ultimately, the opposition parties, in the face of a fluid public opinion questioning its traditional opposition to participation in UNPKO, failed to derail the government's legislation. This was due, not only to the changing attitudes of civil society, but also, as I will demonstrate next, because of external norms at play. In particular the emerging norm of UNPKO found some common ground with the traditional norm of pacifism in Japan, encapsulated by the Ozawa committee's definition of 'international security.'

EXTERNAL NORMS: THE UNITED STATES

As stated above, Japan's first financial package in reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was introduced rapidly and involved the freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, a ban on oil imports, and the suspension of credit and loans to Iraq. In addition, Japan abided by UN resolutions concerning the cessation of trade with Iraq. As regards aid for Middle Eastern nations affected by the invasion, Foreign Minister Nakayama guaranteed aid to compensate for any economic

damage arising out of participation with UN sanctions against Iraq.⁹⁰ Yet, by mid-August, pressure from the US had become apparent with President Bush demanding an increase in aid from Japan to Middle Eastern nations, while at the same time praising Japan for respecting and behaving in line with the UN resolutions dealing with sanctions.⁹¹ Soon after this request a government source declared that it was constitutional for Japan to contribute financially to a UN-backed MNF, but stressed the requirement of UN approval.⁹²

The package, announced on August 29, 1990, included an unspecified amount of aid to the MNF (rumoured at the time to be \$1 billion), the use of government chartered civil aircraft and ships for evacuating refugees, the despatch of one hundred medical experts, a sizeable, but unspecified, amount of financial aid to Turkey, Egypt and Jordan, ¥1.5 billion to aid Kuwaiti refugees in Jordan, and a proposed new law to allow the despatch of the SDF, dealt with in a separate section.⁹³ The next day, it was announced that a Gulf Fund would be established to help Middle Eastern nations hit by the Gulf crisis. The US reaction to the package was, like President Bush's first attempt to pressurise Japan, both encouraging and critical. Ambassador Armacost also stressed to a LDP seminar the necessity of increasing Japan's contribution: a figure of \$2 billion in aid to Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey was mooted by the US, in response to which Nakayama cancelled his attendance at the APEC conference in Vancouver so that a revised package of funding proposals could be negotiated. The perceived tardiness of Japan's financial contribution to the MNF in the Persian Gulf provoked the US House of Representatives into voting 370-53 to withdraw 5,000 troops a year from Japan until it began 'to support their own defence and to support our efforts in the Gulf.'⁹⁴ The Japanese government hastily attempted to deny any link between its financial contribution in the Gulf and US bases in Japan. However, the next day after this demonstration of US will, Sakamoto announced an extra \$1 billion dollars for

the MNF and the extension of \$2 billion dollars in aid to Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey.⁹⁵ Kaifu took pains to explain to the US public the package of measures Japan would be undertaking by appearing on CNN. Furthermore, the Japanese embassy mailed explanatory briefs to prominent scholars and media heads to ensure understanding of Japan's contributions in the package. Thus, US pressure had come to play the role as a norm in encouraging Japan's active response manifested both as criticism and praise with efficacy.

Further expansion of Japan's financial contribution came in October with \$250 million in loans to Jordan extended in order to tighten up sanctions against Iraq, \$300 million in aid to Turkey to compensate for losses resulting from the Gulf Crisis, and a further \$150 million in loans to finance a World Bank-sponsored industry and trade project in the region.⁹⁶ The Japanese contribution was further expanded in January 1991 with \$38 million contributed to help alleviate the refugee problem. In these final days before the air war started US pressure continued with Armacost attempting to determine what assistance could be expected from Japan in the event of the outbreak of military operations and suggesting to Miyazawa and Watanabe that the financial support for the MNF and refugee relief be increased.⁹⁷ With the outbreak of hostilities, Kaifu promised to increase Japan's aid contribution but failed to specify a figure. This figure was specified towards the end of January when the Finance Minister, Hashimoto Ryūtarō, and US Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady, agreed on an additional \$9 billion to be paid to the MNF. This financial contribution was to be raised through tax increases, mostly through corporate, petroleum, and tobacco taxes—the equivalent of ¥10,000 per person.⁹⁸ Japan had discovered that the traditional norm dictating reliance upon the US to provide for its security was not a feasible policy and was faced with a US seeking to encourage Japan to play a larger role while maintaining the traditional security structure.

However, the likelihood of despatching the SDF at this early stage was remote as demonstrated by Nakayama's statement to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia that 'Japan will do its utmost in terms of extending measures of assistance in co-operation with other countries, but it cannot send the military.'⁹⁹ Kaifu met with Sakamoto and MOFA officials on August 22, 1990 to discuss Japan's response and the possibility of despatching personnel to aid in transport, medical, and communications' duties.¹⁰⁰ Soon after this, US pressure was to be witnessed with Ambassador Armacost calling for an active and military role for Japan: 'the importance of [Japan] being involved directly in multinational ventures in the area to support and enforce UN sanctions including direct participation...in the region, either through military presence, minesweepers, or other ships, or some form of support.'¹⁰¹ US Defence Secretary Richard Cheney called for Japan to participate in multi-national peacekeeping.¹⁰² Pressure also came from Canada with Nakayama stressing in reaction to Joe Clark, the Canadian Foreign Minister, that Japan attached the greatest importance to UNPKO.¹⁰³

At the same time, support for the bill was expressed by the US State Department stressing Japan and Germany's role in the post-Cold War world.¹⁰⁴ Vice-President Quayle and a number of world leaders in Tokyo for the enthronement ceremony of the new Emperor in November used the opportunity to call on Japan to contribute personnel to the Gulf. And in reaction to this, Kaifu addressed US and Japanese policymakers stressing the 'unified efforts from the international community' and the 'greater emphasis on the role the UN can play [in the resolution of post-Cold War conflicts].'¹⁰⁵

The attitude in the US to the despatch of Japanese personnel was one of despair and annoyance that an ally had acted so belatedly and minimally, with phrases such as 'burden-shirking' and 'bogus constitutional excuses' used in the US press.¹⁰⁶ Specifically in reference to

the despatch of minesweepers, one academic referred to the event as the 'belated despatch of four small wooden minesweepers two months after the hostilities ended.'¹⁰⁷ Others regarded it as contributing to an incremental process encapsulated in a quote from the *Wall Street Journal* regarding the despatch as a 'cautious but significant step in [Japan's] effort to define an international role beyond that of banker and trader.'¹⁰⁸

As shown in the previous section, the business community's reaction to events in the early stages of the Gulf conflict was similarly evenly split down the middle depending on the interpretation of the Constitution. However, the business community can be seen to have been more susceptible to outside pressure and the fear of ruining a good relationship with the US. This was seen as the impetus behind Keidanren's Chairman Hiraiwa Gaishi's statement of April 8, 1991 calling for the deployment of minesweepers to the Gulf under certain conditions including the existence of a cease-fire and the acquiescence of East Asian nations.¹⁰⁹ The statement was received generally well by the rest of the business community, notoriously sensitive to outside pressure, and in particular by the US. This was witnessed at the US Business Conference in Pittsburgh in July 1991 where the Japanese delegate came under severe criticism for his government's reaction to the Gulf crisis. The Japanese business community began to look for ways in which the government could despatch personnel abroad as part of an effort by the international community.¹¹⁰ In line with its reaction to Japan's overall contribution to the Gulf crisis, the business community's reaction to the despatch of minesweepers was tempered by the effect inactivity could have upon relations with the US. Hiraiwa declared his support of MSDF minesweeper despatch in April 1991 overcoming dovish voices in the business community but still conditioned by the reaction of the nations of East Asia.¹¹¹ Thus, the norms of Japan's security relation with the US and the attitude of Japan's Asian neighbours overlapped. The

relationship with the US represents a constitutive norm, attempting to create and shape Japan's identity to a degree within the bilateral relationship. In contrast, relations with East Asian nations, as will be seen later, represent a more restrictive norm, seeking to limit and curtail Japan's actions.

EXTERNAL NORMS: UNPKO

As negotiations broke down between Iraq and Kuwait, Sakamoto stressed that 'Japan is deeply concerned about the deteriorating situation.'¹¹² This was demonstrated in the establishment of a Foreign Ministry Task Force under the command of the MOFA Vice-Minister, Kuriyama Takakazu, to monitor the situation in the Persian Gulf and protect the 267 Japanese nationals in Kuwait, as well as in discussion of prolonging the suspension of economic co-operation with Baghdad which had been in force since the First Gulf War and which Japan had been looking to overturn prior to the invasion.¹¹³ Although surprised by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Japan was quick to impose its own economic embargo even before the UN-endorsed embargo. Sakamoto announced the freezing of Kuwaiti assets on August 3, 1990 in response to a request from the Kuwaiti embassy in Tokyo, in addition to promising to consider other punitive economic measures in line with the US and European response. A ban on oil imports and the suspension of ¥400 billion in credits and loans to Iraq and Kuwait were among the suggestions. Japan's response was to be declared once Sakamoto and Kuriyama had talked with Prime Minister Kaifu who had to cancel his holiday in Gunma-ken. At this stage US pressure had already come into play with a request for 'concerted action' from Japan and the first of many phone conversations between Bush and Kaifu.¹¹⁴ Kaifu's commitment to economic sanctions at this stage involved no determined response except to stress that if a UNSC Resolution called for sanctions Japan

would respond favourably. Generally, the political response from Tokyo was rapid, assertive and in keeping with the response of the international community during this early period of the crisis.

Despite the apathy of the business community, the government imposed a ban on oil imports and all other trade with Iraq and Kuwait, suspended financial transactions with both nations and froze the ¥400 billion in economic assistance with Kaifu characterising the invasion as 'unpardonable conduct for a sovereign state.'¹¹⁵ In announcing this package of retaliatory measures, Ishihara Nobuo, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, stressed the concept of co-operation with the international community. To this end, Japan was seemingly waiting for the UN's response which would act as a framework within which Japan would develop its own response. Moreover, Japan's desire to address the crisis through the UN was further demonstrated by Foreign Minister Nakayama's announcement with regard to the UN order to cease trade with Iraq, '[t]he government of Japan regards as of the highest significance that the international community has decided, through the UN, to combine their efforts to act towards the withdrawal of Iraqi troops and restoration of peace in the region.'¹¹⁶ Japan complied with UN resolutions by invoking two provisions under the Foreign Trade Control Law freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in Japan.¹¹⁷ The government also cited the UN in its support for the US effort in the Gulf when Prime Minister Kaifu stressed that the 'use of force as an unavoidable last resort by the US and the other countries concerned seeking to push back aggression and to restore peace in accordance with UNSC Resolution 676.'¹¹⁸

As mentioned above, with the outbreak of hostilities, Kaifu promised to increase Japan's contribution and aid but failed to specify a figure. The eventual figure of \$9 billion was agreed upon at the end of January by Finance Minister Hashimoto and US Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady.¹¹⁹ This contribution, one of the most controversial within Japan, was explained to the

public by Prime Minister Kaifu using the UN as a justifying factor, 'Although the financial contribution needs to be borne by each member of Japanese society, I want the public to understand the necessity of Japan's international contribution *based on the UN's activities* [my stress].'¹²⁰ Foreign Minister Nakayama also justified the contributions to a Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee Meeting with reference to various UNSC resolutions and Japan's responsibilities to international society.¹²¹

Kaifu's plan was to despatch the ASDF based on a broad reading of the SDF Law allowing for the transport of refugees as well as foreign dignitaries, and thus, negating the need for any revision of the legislation. In this way, Japan would be capable of responding to calls from the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) and the International Organisation for Migration for aircraft to aid the refugee situation by simply adding a new ordinance to the SDF Law. In Diet debates, Kaifu defended his position, when questioned by Doi and Ishida, by emphasising that Japan's response would respect both the Constitution and the UN Charter, the transportation of refugees did not constitute a military activity, and that the possibility of despatching the SDF on this duty would still be investigated.¹²² Kaifu still envisaged a role for the US-Japan Security Treaty alongside a UN-centred policy based on Article X of the Security Treaty which expresses the hope that the UN would be in a position to secure the peace and security that the Security Treaty aims to provide until that day comes.¹²³ Similar sentiments of a duty to co-operate with the international community were expressed by Matsunaga Nobuo, an advisor to the MOFA, stressing the role of the UN in the post-Cold War world and stating that, 'if it [a UN police force] were set up, we should co-operate with it, including by military means. That does not mean renouncing our anti-war Constitution.'¹²⁴ In this way, the amalgamation of the pacifist norm and the external UN was becoming increasingly evident.

One of the first mentions of despatching Japanese personnel to the Gulf was suggested by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke with the aim of maintaining the blockade against Iraq. The MOFA rejected this suggestion citing the constraints of the Constitution and pledging to limit Japan's response to financial contributions.¹²⁵ The issue re-surfaced when Terashima Taizô, the Self-Defence Force's Joint Staff Council Chairman, stated publicly that SDF members were eager to participate in the MNF gathering in the Gulf, '...we are ready to go abroad anytime and I am confident the SDF is confident [sic] of carrying out whatever missions are required.'¹²⁶ Ôuchi Keigo, leader of the DSP, suggested the despatch of the SDF because of the fact that financial contributions were regarded as insufficient by the international community but limited its role to purely non-military matters.¹²⁷

Japan's package of measures in response to the Gulf crisis was announced on August 29, 1990 with emphasis placed not only on the aid to be given to refugees and the medical aspects but also the logistical support that Japan could offer to the MNF. Kaifu presented this idea in these terms:

I believe that, within the framework of international society in the years ahead, it will be necessary to review our existing laws, regulations and systems, to consider what can be done for peace within the framework of the Constitution, and, for instance, and this is my personal opinion, to seriously consider fresh legislation, such as a UN Peace Co-operation Law, with a view to enabling Japan to perform its duties appropriately with regard to co-operating in UN activities for keeping and maintaining peace and for international efforts by the member states in support of those activities.¹²⁸

Kaifu and Ôuchi were in agreement that personnel could and should be despatched and began to plan the first legislation to facilitate despatch. Nakayama also seems to have changed his opinions in line with Kaifu and Ôuchi upon returning from his tour of the Gulf, stating that, 'it is high time that Japan considered what kind of contributions it can make as a member of the international community and what kind of legislation is needed [to make such contributions]'.¹²⁹ The LDP defence-related committees agreed on a more visible effort to contribute to the Gulf and

suggested revision of the legislation on the despatch of personnel overseas. Sakamoto also called for a new law to allow Japanese participation in UNPKO with an announcement on September 5, 1990 that 'the government is considering whether and to what extent the SDF should play a role in achieving peace in the Gulf.'¹³⁰ Ishikawa Yôzô of the Defence Agency called for Diet debate to clarify what the SDF was allowed and not allowed to do.¹³¹ Kaifu's statement demonstrated a certain vagueness but also a desire to contribute to the international community particularly through the UN:

I have no intention of sending armed personnel [to the Gulf] to join military activities. But Japan, as a major economic power, must fulfil its international responsibilities by providing personnel as well as financial assistance to help peace activities by the UN.... In the days when Japan was still in the process of rebuilding its war-battered economy, financial contributions alone may have been enough. But now Japan is one of the seven most industrialised democracies and must fulfil its international responsibilities.¹³²

Thus, the UN and its peacekeeping activities had become a constitutive norm enabling Japan to construct a new identity for itself in the pursuit of peace through the UN.

Another argument put forward by supporters of a visible Japanese contribution was based on Article 98 of the Japanese Constitution which states that Japan will honour other international treaties over and above the Constitution as a norm of international society. Furthermore, as Japan had agreed to the UN Charter upon joining the UN, Article 43, stating that each member state will make various materials available to the UN to fulfil its numerous duties, had to be respected. This was raised in a Diet committee meeting by Itô Kenichi, of the Japan International Forum Foundation (*Zaidan Hôjin Nihon Kokusai Forumu*). He also stated, in answer to the claim that Japan was denied the right to collective self-defence, that, although Japan may have denied this right, it cannot deny the responsibility that Japan's position in the world has been accorded.¹³³ Similar opinions were expressed, including a portrayal of Japan as an economic superpower failing to provide the blood and sweat that the US was ready to contribute, Japan's

responsibility to support the emerging international order, and the interpretation of Nishihara Tadashi of the Defence Agency, which the Ozawa report would later put forward, that the Constitution in focusing on the attainment of peace could sanction various kinds of contribution to UNPKO including both non-military and military activities.¹³⁴

The eventual bill presented to the Diet allowed the SDF to retain their status and split control between the Prime Minister and the Defence Agency, but would allow the team to participate in various activities deemed necessary by the UN. In defending this bill during the 119th extraordinary Diet sessions, Kaifu underlined changes in the post-Cold War world, the prominence of the UN and the 'inevitable cost arising from Japan's international position.'¹³⁵ To this end Kaifu agreed to accept a reinterpretation of the term 'collective self-defence' which had rejected military co-operation with other nations but was now seen to be constitutional when based on the UN Charter and its resolutions.¹³⁶ Other LDP sources agreed with Kaifu that peacekeeping based on a UN resolution does not constitute collective defence and 'collective security' was used and regarded as a post-Cold War term to replace collective defence and allow for a peacekeeping role in Japan. This thinking could be seen when the Diplomatic Bluebook was published in mid-October 1990 with stress placed on the contribution of personnel on UNPKO. Ozawa regarded any activity falling under the title of UNPKO as behaviour working towards peaceful goals in line with the Constitution.¹³⁷

Swedish Prime Minister, Ingvar Carlsson, stressed this appearance in urging Japan to adopt the identity of a nation like Sweden with a pacifist image, but a high profile in UNPKO.¹³⁸ This was an opinion echoed by UN Under-Secretary-General, Ronald Spiers, in urging Nakayama to adopt a position like Sweden and Canada in contributing actively to UNPKO.¹³⁹ And again reiterated by Brian Mulroney, Canadian Prime Minister, by offering to share Canada's

expertise in this area.¹⁴⁰ The MOFA concurred with this interpretation with one official stating that 'the revitalization of the UN will offer a good opportunity for Japan to gain a higher profile in the world political scene,' and thus Japan could begin to orient its foreign policy around the UN rather than the US.¹⁴¹

In a round-table discussion of prominent academics, Diet members, and bureaucrats conducted by a journalist from the magazine, *Bungeishunjū*, the overwhelming feeling was that if SDF personnel had to be despatched overseas then the only acceptable way of doing so would be under the UN flag. This would imbue Japan's peacekeeping contribution with the degree of concordance accredited to UNPKO. Yamasaki Taku, acting chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party's General Council, expressed the opinion that, '[i]f the multinational troops are re-organized under the UN flag, amending the law will be easier.... Japan upholds the UN as the cornerstone of its diplomacy and defence; this means that our country has a duty to support UN operations.'¹⁴² Even the SDPJ agreed on the centrality of the UN with Doi stating that, '[n]ow is the time to make use of the UN. We in the Japan Socialist Party are drawing up a concrete proposal for UN leadership, and we'll be announcing the main points shortly.... One of the main roles of the UN is to preserve peace and work out political resolutions of conflicts. The JSP is now considering the establishment of a UN peacekeeping fund. In the event of religious or ethnic conflicts—and we'll be seeing more of them—the UN would use this money to seek political solutions. Japan, of course, would actively provide a fair share of the funding.'¹⁴³ Moroi Ken, chairman of Chichibu Cement Company, voiced similar concerns that, 'participation in a UN force is not a matter of our rights; it is a matter of our duties as part of the international community.'¹⁴⁴

Opinion polls seemed to change as the success of the Gulf campaign became evident. As in the words on of one Kōmei Party spokesman:

There has been a national change of mind in this country. The Gulf War had a strong impact. We watched the war on TV, with newscasters and scholars and pundits talking about what Japan's role in the world ought to be. And the new consensus that merged is that our strong anti-war pacifism is still there. But, beyond that, shouldn't Japan have some role in helping the UN preserve peace?... How can our country lock itself out of the world and sit here behind the closed door of anti-war pacifism?¹⁴⁵

Indicative of the conflict of norms, despite displaying shades of pacifism, elements of the business community demonstrated a degree of hawkish-ness in their attitude to the despatch of SDF personnel from the SDF to the Gulf, but expressed also support for despatch under the UN flag. The President of Sony, Oga Norio, supported the despatch of troops in the face of foreign pressure:

Young Americans are suffering out there in scorching heat. That is being widely reported on in the American press, and it plays on people's minds in unpredictable ways. They are exasperated by the lack of action in the Diet. We must not forget those young Americans.... The world is watching the Diet, and I believe we should contribute our fair share of sweat¹⁴⁶

Other members of the business community went as far to promote constitutional revision.

Vice-Chairman of *Keizai Dōyūkai*, Kaku Ryūzaburō, stated that:

This problem has arisen because Japan has left unchanged things that ought to have been changed. We should have reviewed also the Constitution, but we left it as it was. We need a military force in order to protect the international order from fanatical elements. We should have given thought to contributing [to international security], and the fact that we did nothing has brought the contempt of the rest of the world upon us.¹⁴⁷

This reflected the business community's frustration at the lack of progress of the UN Peace Co-operation Bill in the Diet. The bill's eventual demise was met with regret by the President of *Nikkeiren*, Suzuki Eiji:

It is extremely regrettable that the UN Peace Co-operation Bill was rejected. There ought not to be any stigma attached to this nation taking part in UN peacekeeping activities. As it stands, Japan is going to end up in the terrible position of an orphan among nations.¹⁴⁸

This statement was followed up on the outbreak of war in the Gulf with the comment that, '[t]here are a lot of Japanese companies in the gulf region. We should be drawing on all our resources and taking action. We ought to do everything possible within the limits of the law, and if there are obstacles, we must think about changing the law.'¹⁴⁹ *Keizai Dōyūkai*'s Ishihara

echoed a popular theme of support for UNPKO in stating that, 'Japan would have a greater voice in world affairs if the Self-Defence Forces could be used for the preservation of world peace as well as for the defence of Japan. We have to contribute people, not just money. There is nothing wrong with Japan co-operating in police operations *under the auspices of the UN* [my stress].'¹⁵⁰

A subsequent Special Hearing of the Lower House centred upon the role that the UN could play in the post-Cold War world now it was freed from the constraints of the US-Soviet confrontation. Foreign Minister Nakayama and Defence Agency Director Ishikawa emphasised the preventative peacekeeping role the UN could play in the international order and that Japan's traditional UN-centred foreign policy could now come to fruition.¹⁵¹ This factor, which had initially been responsible for the demise of the first bill sanctioning the despatch of SDF personnel, overcame the vocal opposition within and outside of Japan.

During special committee hearings, Kaifu stressed the fact that traditional peacekeeping depends upon a cease-fire being in place and the UN force taking a neutral, independent, and non-enforcement stance. These conditions, it was argued, would minimise the danger of a particular PKO and be in keeping with the Constitution and Japan's traditional UN-centred foreign policy.¹⁵² In a subsequent hearing, Nakayama stressed the demands that Secretary-General de Cuellar was making on Japan to release money and personnel to meet the requirements of expanding PKO missions.¹⁵³

The Diet's session ended in October 1991 and the debate on the bill carried over to the next session in 1992. In the meantime, Kaifu was replaced as Prime Minister by Miyazawa Kiichi, a keen supporter of Japan's participation within the UN who refused to drop the bill in Diet debate, envisioning Cambodia as the anticipated first despatch for the SDF. Miyazawa stressed the necessity of despatching personnel abroad as part of Japan's international contribution and

emphasised the central role UN would play in realising this contribution.¹⁵⁴ The centrality of the UN was also witnessed in the Socialists submitting an alternative bill to the Diet at this time constraining contribution to civilian roles including election observation and medical help. SDF personnel were required to first resign their position before participating. Diet approval and UN command were also points which differed in this opposition party's bill.¹⁵⁵

In February 1992 the Special Study Group on Japan's Role in the International Community, commonly known as the Ozawa committee, reported its findings. The main themes included the end of the Cold War, the importance of the UN, the strengthening of collective leadership, and the role Japan would have to play in the future after the Persian Gulf War as one of the main members of the international community, 'the recent war in the Persian Gulf has made it clear that appeals for peace are not enough, that peace in some cases cannot be realised without united action by the international community.'¹⁵⁶ Viewing the UN as 'a forum where the world can express its will on security issues, conferring legitimacy on any actions taken, the security function of this organisation can be quite meaningful.'¹⁵⁷ Within this framework, the report called on the government to strengthen ties with the US, co-operate and strengthen the G-7, promote stability in Asia, and actively participate in UN activities. To this end, a distinction was drawn between active and passive pacifism in the reading of the Constitution to allow for a more active role within UNPKO rather than the passive role Japan had played in the post-W.W.II world:

It can be argued that if Japan were to employ its forces overseas in such an instance [when international action is being taken in line with an agreement by the community of nations], it would not be contravening its constitutional renunciation of war and of the use of force to settle disputes.¹⁵⁸

Moreover:

Japan should not assume this role in the international community only because other countries have asked it to do so. Since the role is essential for realising the ideals expressed in our own Constitution, we should assume it as one that Japan has a duty to perform as its own responsibility and on the

basis of its own judgement.¹⁵⁹

On the issue of Japan participating in an armed UN force the report is clear in stating that:

As long as the force is acting under the authority of the UN, though, Japan should give it personnel support in areas that do not entail the use of force, such as medical care, transport, and environmental protection. The question of whether to co-operate with personnel in areas that go beyond these should be judged on the basis of a careful examination of the characteristics and functions of the multinational force, including the number of countries involved and the nature of the decision-making set-up.¹⁶⁰

Essentially, the message of the report was that 'no nation is responsible to itself alone.'¹⁶¹

Under this interpretation, the MNF was regarded as working towards the goal of creating peace and order, the same goal of the Constitution and international co-operation.¹⁶²

This line of argument was taken up by many, including Professor Katô Hiroshi of Keio University, who stressed the interpretation of the Constitution lay in the preamble which calls for international co-operation to preserve peace and this sanctioned Japan's participation in UNPKO. Professor Kitaoka rejected Japan's post-W.W.II stance and urged Japan to put the SDF under the command of the UN which would avoid violation of the Constitution.

In late January 1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi addressed the UN Security Council in the spirit of the Ozawa committee urging major reform of the UN's organisations and functions. Implicit in this was the desire to see Japan become one of the permanent members of the Security Council.¹⁶³ And in late March Miyazawa stressed, 'it is significant for the SDF to respond to expectations from the international community and to demonstrate its ability.'¹⁶⁴ The UN was regarded in this speech as the logical channel for Japan's international contribution, as Robert Immerman of Columbia University has suggested, 'participation in this multilateral organization is perhaps the only aspect of Japan's post-war foreign policy on which there has been virtual agreement across that country's political spectrum.'¹⁶⁵ However, Prime Minister Miyazawa was unwilling to expand the interpretation of the Constitution to allow the peacemaking role envisaged

in the Ozawa Report, stressing Japan's right to self-defence only.¹⁶⁶

At this time foreign opinion was also in evidence supporting a UNPKO role for the SDF. German politicians and academics who were themselves going through a debate on contributing to UNPKO supported Japan's participation even if constitutional revision was necessary. Gareth Evans, head of the Australian Foreign and Trade Ministry at that time, also supported Japan's planned despatch of the SDF on UNPKO.¹⁶⁷ Boutros-Ghali added his voice to the despatch of Japanese personnel to the UN.¹⁶⁸ The importance of the UN Secretary-General's statements can be seen in the inaccurate reports stating that Boutros-Ghali had rejected Japan's projected personnel contribution as unnecessary. Despite the fact that it was later revealed that Boutros-Ghali had made no such claim, reports suggested that it was therefore no longer necessary for Japan to enact PKO legislation.¹⁶⁹

Article III, Paragraph I of the Law states, 'UN peacekeeping operations conducted under the control of the UN based on resolutions of the General Assembly or Security Council.' Therefore, Japan can only despatch peacekeeping troops under the remit of the UN and not any state or international organisation outside of the UN. Investigations were carried out as to the viability of participation in non-UNPKO but it was believed that the UN could guarantee the impartiality of an operation and had a track record of approaching some kind of definition of peacekeeping. The concept of peace enforcement was still at this stage unclear and was only given theoretical meat to the bones after the publication of Agenda for Peace in June 1992.

The MOFA hailed the law as a step to a more visible global role which will improve Japan's role in the UN and the bilateral relationship with the US. Despatch to the UNTAC mission in Cambodia was the next objective of the MOFA. The nations of ASEAN also welcomed the bill and urged Japan to play a role in Cambodia. The overall tone of the ASEAN response was

encouraging as long as Japan participated within the UN and its resolutions to reduce the fear of a resurgence in Japanese militarism.¹⁷⁰ Some domestic opposition was voiced but the UN was a legitimising factor if Japan kept its military within the remit of the UN's mandate. Particularly Cambodia, as will be seen in the next chapter, urged Japan to quickly implement the law and despatch the SDF to the UNTAC mission.¹⁷¹

After this stage the debate began to be characterised by the question of the suitability of the case of Cambodia and the necessary preparations for the SDF despatch. Again public opinion had completed a *volte-face* with 52 percent supporting the despatch of the SDF to Cambodia and 36 percent opposing any despatch, although the mood was still predominantly against the non-use of force, with 71 percent of those polled favouring a non-military role.¹⁷² Japan had previously been unable to actively participate within the UN as Shigeki Sumi, First Secretary of Japan's Permanent Mission to the UN, declared at the 46th Session of the UN General Assembly held in October 1991:

The international community owes a profound debt of gratitude to those countries that contribute personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. Japan is deeply grateful for the contributions they have made to the maintenance of world peace and security and is eager to join them in that noble endeavour. My government is studying ways in which it might broaden its participation in PKO activities.¹⁷³

In contrast, with the passage and successful implementation of the UNPKO legislation, Sumi Shigeki was able to announce a year later that:

The international community owes a profound debt of gratitude to UN peacekeeping operations. When I addressed this Committee last year I announced that my government had been studying ways in which Japan might broaden its participation in this indispensable endeavour.... The Government of Japan is pleased to join the countries that contribute personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, and intends to co-operate to the maximum degree allowed within the framework of this new law.¹⁷⁴

Reflecting upon Japan's response to the Second Gulf War, the traditional reference points and identities of Japan's policymaking process appear to have been blurred. The business community appears to have been almost mute on the topic and the LDP was far from free to

initiate policy. The smaller opposition parties demonstrated their ability to wield influence in a world of coalition politics. Furthermore, the role of the UN as a legitimising factor was integral to any despatch of Japanese SDF personnel, both in justifying it to the Japanese public and opposition parties. The UN and its peacekeeping duties in the post-Cold War era was becoming a new norm of international society, and began to supersede the traditional norm of pacifism in its specificity, durability and concordance by merging with it and redefining what kind of overseas despatch was and was not permissible. In failing to recognise this trend, the SDPJ suffered in the polls and eventually changed its security position under the leadership of Murayama Tomiichi.

EXTERNAL NORMS: EAST ASIAN NATIONS

The traditional fears of East Asian nations about any sign of Japanese remilitarisation were aroused at an early stage when Kim Dae-Jung, head of the South Korean opposition party for Peace and Democracy in Korea, called upon Japan to make it explicit that it would not contribute military to the MNF.¹⁷⁵ In addition, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, declared that:

The people of China and some other Asian countries cannot but be concerned over the Japanese government's plan to despatch members of its SDF to [the] UN peace co-operation corps abroad as that unfortunate part of history remains fresh in our minds.... It is our hope that the Japanese government will deal with this matter prudently.¹⁷⁶

These fears were acknowledged by Foreign Minister Nakayama in stating that, 'Southeast Asian countries, which suffered during W.W.II, have shown a serious interest in [the law]. It is extremely important to draw up a flawless bill.'¹⁷⁷ Nakayama took the opportunity of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York towards the end of September to approach representatives of East Asian nations and allay any concern. Kaifu also took pains to mitigate fears in East Asia, 'Japan has pledged since the end of W.W.II that it will never become a military power and launch a war of aggression again.'¹⁷⁸ Kaifu's statement stressed the non-military

nature of Japan's contribution but also the role of the UN and Japan's responsibilities to the international community—again grafting the concordance with the UN onto Japan's peacekeeping contribution.

All this time, East Asian nations continued to express their fears with South Korean Foreign Minister, Choi Ho Yoong, referring to the bill as 'worrisome' and Beijing referring to the despatch as a 'mistake'.¹⁷⁹ The Chinese President, Yang Shangkun, went as far to say that despatch would cause 'severe and emotional repulsion' amongst the Chinese people.¹⁸⁰ The feelings of the nations of East Asia were articulated in the following terms, 'the most extreme foreign critics suggest that a SDF overseas peacekeeping despatch could be the precursor to Japanese forces marching abroad under the battle flag of the Rising Sun.... Most important to all parties is the question of what SDF despatch abroad might indicate about future Japanese military intentions.'¹⁸¹ And with this in mind, MOFA spokesman, Watanabe Taizō, instructed Japanese ambassadors throughout the world to explain to their host governments that any Japanese contribution of personnel would be conducted through the UN.¹⁸² Hashimoto Hiroshi, Japanese Ambassador in Beijing, met with the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Qi Huaiyuan, to reassure China that Japan would uphold UN resolutions. Similarly, Yanagi Kenichi, Ambassador in Seoul, stressed that Japan's action was one of contribution to international society not a military action. Senior members of the LDP, however, began to express concern about the chances of the bill passing into law with Kanemaru citing East Asian nations' concerns as he was at that time involved in talks on the state of the Korean peninsula.

Indonesia's President Suharto, after listening to Watanabe stress the despatch within the terms of UN resolution, expressed sympathy with Japan's plans for the SDF.¹⁸³ Corazon Aquino declared in talks with Watanabe that the Philippines would not oppose an SDF role as long it was

part of UN peacekeeping.¹⁸⁴ Despite being cited as the source of the famous quote likening Japan's participation in UNPKO to giving an alcoholic chocolates, Lee Quan Yu also expressed understanding for the despatch of the SDF. Even a minority opinion within South Korea was expressed by Choi Chang Yoonm, Public Information Minister, that the SDF despatch, 'within the UN peacekeeping corps following the Persian Gulf war, I think it is natural that a number of roles will emerge. It would be natural for Japan to take part.'¹⁸⁵ The Thai ambassador in Tokyo, Birabhongse Kaseusri, stated that, 'despite world-war memories, Southeast Asian countries believe the intentions of the Japanese government are peaceful and constructive.... It is appropriate for Japan to play a role in UN peacekeeping efforts.'¹⁸⁶ Watanabe's tour of Asia also met with opposition to the SDF despatch, the Chinese Vice-Premier, Wu Xueqian, stated that, 'if Japan's proposed international contribution means the despatch of SDF members, Japan should exercise prudence because it would be a sensitive issue.'¹⁸⁷ However, this opinion was seemingly in a minority. By displaying Japan's effort as in concert with the UN, the impression of militarism was avoided and opposition was weakened both inside and outside of Japan.

As the minesweepers made their way to the Gulf, support was expressed in some quarters for the despatch. President Mahathir did not regard the despatch of minesweepers as an act of belligerence and in fact welcomed the MSDF despatch as Kaifu arrived in Malaysia to begin a tour of East Asian neighbours.¹⁸⁸ The tour continued to Singapore where Kaifu again stressed that the despatch of minesweepers was part of Japan's international contribution and not a sign of resurgent militarism.¹⁸⁹ It was with this desire to preserve a pacifist image of Japan's effort that helicopters were not utilised despite the presence of helipads on both the vessels, Hayase and Tokiwa. At the same time, Nakasone in Beijing had seemed to make progress in dealing with China. Jiang Zemin, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, expressed understanding at the

MSDF despatch of minesweepers as part of the international effort to clear the Gulf sea lanes.¹⁹⁰

During the Diet debate the government endeavoured to reassure the opposition parties and the neighbouring nations of East Asia of the non-aggressive stance of the legislation. Furthermore, that the law should be implemented 'after getting consent from all neighbouring countries', according to Prime Minister Kaifu.¹⁹¹ Furthermore, he envisaged, 'Asian countries able to discuss ways of joining together to participate in peacekeeping operations and how to divide up those roles.'¹⁹² At this time, the Kōmei Party's Ishida was in China reassuring Jiang Zemin, Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, that China had nothing to fear from Japan's participation in UNPKO.¹⁹³ He also stressed the type of UNPKO Japan would participate in, namely the more traditional kind of peacekeeping in line with the Constitution, rather than the enforcement measures seen in the Congo in the 1960s. Kaifu also attempted to stress that the command of SDF troops participating in UNPKO would rest with the Prime Minister, not the UN Secretary-General.

In reaction to the opposition's reference to the concerns of East Asian nations, again Foreign Minister Nakayama was forced to use the General Assembly of the UN to calm fears of neighbouring East Asian nations. It was stressed that 'Japan has an obligation to contribute actively to efforts led by the UN to secure and maintain world peace.'¹⁹⁴ With this in mind Nakayama conducted talks with his Korean and Chinese counterparts, Lee Sang Oh and Qian Qichen, to assuage any fears of a resurgent Japanese militarism. Although this restrictive norm can be seen to have eroded to an extent in the case of East Asian nations such as Malaysia, the Philippines, etc., in the case of China and the two Koreas anxiety was, and is, still pervasive. In reaction to the passage of the PKO Law, opposition to the bill was expressed by South Korean officials fearing the subsequent repeal of the frozen clauses and a consequent resurgence of

Japanese militarism. Equally, the Chinese media focused on the Diet debate and urged prudence in the matter.¹⁹⁵ To an extent, in the case of Southeast Asian nations, the norm of the UN and its peacekeeping functions facilitated the relaxation of misgivings among certain nations that would rather see Japanese remilitarisation take place under the aegis of the UN (or US) than unilaterally. Yet fears of East Asia nations continued to be evident with South Korean Japan specialist Song Yong-sun stating that 'I don't object to the new US-Japan Security Pact due to the lack of alternatives, but the problem lies in the momentum generated by developments that started with Japan's participation in UN peacekeeping operations and it will continue with the unshackling of devices put in place to prevent it from becoming a military power.'¹⁹⁶ Clearly, this norm, although weakening slightly in its durability and specificity in some countries, was still deeply rooted in especially China and South Korea despite the justification provided by participation based on UN resolutions. The concerns of these nations came to the forefront and yet altered in some cases, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, with the realisation of Japan's PKO contribution in Cambodia.

SUMMARY

At the beginning of the Second Gulf War the traditional norms of Japan's political-military culture of the 1940s and 1950s, as discussed in the previous chapter, were in evidence, namely a durable sense of pacifism, clearly defined reliance on the US, and deference to the concerns of neighbouring East Asian nations over Japan's remilitarisation. Japan looked to the US for leadership in the crisis and had to adapt its policies in the light of US criticism—a similar situation particularly with regards to China and South Korea.

Japan's minesweeper contribution was all part of Kaifu's strategy of 'as much as possible',


rather than 'too little, too late' and fitted into Japan's incrementally salient role.¹⁹⁷ Considering the obstacles that stood in Japan's way and the lack of precedence to refer to, the Kaifu administration had done what it could, and more, by progressively assuming responsibilities, including minesweeping. Faced with the mixed signals from the nations of East Asia and civil society, it would be expected that Japan's policy would be gradual and time-consuming rather than rapid and path-breaking. The reasons for the despatch of the minesweepers fit more into an incrementalist, rather than alarmist, or organisational, interpretation and demonstrates the strength of the norm of pacifism and its constraining power.¹⁹⁸ The Defence Agency and the MSDF were evidently not prepared to take on minesweeping duties, as was demonstrated above, in opposition from the MSDF itself, the lack of precedence on which to base a decision, and the fact that they had not had the opportunity to train together before being hastily brought together from three bases.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, if this was a routine operation then the task force was singularly unprepared to undertake this mission, as Captain Ochiai stated, 'We knew the Persian Gulf was a very hot place, but that's about all. We knew nothing about such basic concerns as prevalent winds, current speed, or seabed contours. We didn't even know what kinds and quantities of mines had been laid.'²⁰⁰ Furthermore, leave was never properly decided so that whereas other nations' personnel got leave every three months, the MSDF personnel worked straight through without leave. In addition, certain equipment was lacking in comparison to other nations, like automated devices and computer systems for detecting mines. A hasty departure and lack of preparedness led to some embarrassing mistakes, like the loading of fifty chainsaws onto one minesweeper; thus, the despatch hardly constituted a routine of any definition. Woolley claims that 'other policy responses involving the SDF simply were not available because little or no routine behaviour existed.'²⁰¹ However, ultimately, this was not a straightforward operation

and to categorise it as such is to fail to take into account both domestic and external pulls and pushes which were integral to the despatch.²⁰² This episode demonstrates the restrictions imposed by the pacifist norm upon the government's available actions, but also demonstrates the extent to which pacifism's durability had waned and making a contribution to international society had become a norm for the Japanese government in a more constitutive way than the pacifist norm.

With the rise in profile of the Secretary-General and the international community in dealing with the crisis, the norm of the UN and its peacekeeping functions developed rapidly from the embryonic stage of the 1980s demonstrated in the previous chapter into a liberating and enabling norm in contrast to the restrictive norms of the security relationship with the US and the fear of alienating East Asia. Thus, this chapter has demonstrated how these norms came into conflict with each other, in addition to how the UN gained concordance within the PKO debate in Japan as a justifying factor and also the embodiment of a duty to the international community. It has appeared that this norm could transcend all other norms in importance as the Ozawa Committee Report gained acceptance both within the Diet, civil society, and in parts of East Asia. Sections of Japanese society began to comprehend the new norm of UNPKO and adjust their traditional pacifism accordingly. Moreover, a divide developed between the stalwart opposition of China and South Korea and the acceptance of South East Asian nations—this development from Diagram II can be seen in Diagram III. The reason for this is rooted in the constitutive, rather than restrictive, nature of this norm, providing Japan with a new field in which to fulfil its perceived commitments to the post-Cold War international community without overtly compromising its traditional identities. The following chapter will continue to interpret events in the UNTAC operation through the framework of competing types of norms in order to explain how events progressed with the

fulfilment of Japan's first despatch of military personnel since the SDF was established.

DIAGRAM III: POLICYMAKING MATRIX FOR CHAPTER FOUR, THE SECOND GULF WAR



CHAPTER FIVE: CAMBODIA¹

The international community owes a profound debt of gratitude to UN peacekeeping operations. When I addressed this Committee last year I announced that my government had been studying ways in which Japan might broaden its participation in this indispensable endeavour. Today I am pleased to inform the members of this Committee that Japan has in fact provided some 700 personnel, both civilian and military, to the operations in Cambodia, in accordance with the recently enacted Peace Co-operation Law... The Government of Japan is pleased to join the countries that contribute personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, and intends to co-operate to the maximum degree allowed within the framework of this new law.

Statement by Sumi Shigeki, First Secretary, Permanent Japanese Mission to the UN.
47th Session of the General Assembly, November 10, 1992.

INTRODUCTION

The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) operation was a watershed for a number of actors involved. For the UN it was the largest peacekeeping operation mounted in its history, embracing unprecedentedly ambitious plans for the administration of an entire country.² For the Cambodian nation it symbolised the desire to end the institutionalised violence of recent Cambodian history and the hope that reconstruction could be promoted. For Japan it was the first despatch of military personnel since the end of the Korean War thanks to the legislative process outlined in the previous chapter. Japan's contribution to this ground-breaking operation can be classified into four areas: first, as cease-fire observers with the duties of overseeing the cease-fire, monitoring the smuggling of arms into Cambodia and supervising the storage of weapons from the disarmament process. In order to fulfil this duty, Japan first despatched two contingents of eight personnel each from September 1992 to March 1993 and March 1993 to September 1993 respectively (see Appendix III); second, electoral observation monitoring and assistance in the national election that took place from May 23 to 28. Five national government officers,

thirteen local government officers and twenty three volunteers were sent by the Japanese government charged with participating in this mandate; third, civilian police duties to survey local police activities for impartiality and the training of Cambodian police in investigation techniques, to which end 75 Japanese civilian police were despatched from October 1992 to July 1993; and finally, SDF engineering units were charged with the duty of rebuilding roads, bridges and the transport of supplies. Two contingents, both of 600-men, were sent from September 1992 to April 1993 and March to September 1993.³

As outlined by Shigeki in the statement above, Japan sought to participate actively in the resolution of the Cambodian conflict and the consequent reconstruction. However, this was by no means a recent development. Japan's relations with Cambodia always had been amicable, although not particularly intimate, since Cambodia's attainment of independence in 1953. With the Vietnamese invasion of 1978 Japan's policy was built on the foundations of ASEAN's policy of opposition to the invasion. However, with the collapse of the Cold War and the more concrete possibility of a solution to the conflict, Japan began to adopt a more salient role in Cambodia's conflict resolution.⁴ This chapter seeks to build on the previous empirical material by investigating how the norms upon which Japan's foreign policy and political-military culture are based altered in the post-Cold War world, particularly focusing on how the changes witnessed during the Second Gulf War (see the previous chapter) continued to develop with the first despatch of the JSDF to Cambodia. The introductory review of recent Cambodian history is by necessity and without apology brief and uneven due to the emphasis it places on the UNTAC administration of Cambodia. With this 'time-chart' in mind the subsequent sections will shed light on the changing norms framing, encouraging and constraining Japan's first military participation in UNPKO.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT

Cambodia's history is a long and violent one constituting what David Chandler has called a 'majestic two thousand years of history'.⁵ For nearly a century Cambodia was a French protectorate with an intervening but considerably shorter period during W.W.II. under Japanese occupation. Independence was conceded by France in November 1953 and Cambodia was subsequently given international recognition in July 1954 by the Geneva Conference on Indochina and admitted to the UN in 1955.⁶ During the Vietnam War, despite Prince Norodom Sihanouk's attempt to keep the country out of the conflict, Cambodia suffered carpet-bombing by the US airforce. In 1970 a right-wing military coup by General Lon Nol overthrew Sihanouk and changed the name of the country from the Kingdom of Cambodia to the Khmer Republic. However, the promised stability failed to materialise and civil war followed resulting in the victory of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea in April 1975, Prince Sihanouk's relinquishment of the head of state and the horror of the ensuing killing fields. This soon led Vietnam to invade Cambodia towards the end of 1978 and impose their own brand of communism on the long-suffering Cambodian people with the establishment of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, known after 1989 as the State of Cambodia. However, this regime was widely accepted by the Cambodian people as a welcome alternative to the 'contemptible Pot'. By this stage the conflict had acquired regional as well as internal implications as a struggle between Vietnam and China as to who would dominate Indochina. The global implications were seen in the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam which was regarded by Beijing and Washington as proof of Soviet expansionist intentions leading to, on the one hand, military intervention by China in northern Vietnam in February 1979 and, on the other hand, a concerted effort by the ASEAN member states to find a diplomatic solution to the

problem.

The PRK led by Heng Samrin as president and Hun Sen as Prime Minister waged an ultimately unsuccessful campaign against the remnants of the Khmer Rouge hiding along the Thai-Cambodian border, in addition to Sihanouk's royalist FUNCINPEC and the republican Khmer People's National Liberation Front led by Lon Nol's former Prime Minister, Son Sann. With the financial backing of China, Thailand, and the West, these three factions formed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) and achieved the privilege of occupying Cambodia's seat in the UN General Assembly. In a classic Cold War scenario, in opposition stood the People's Republic of Cambodia supported by Vietnam and the Soviet Union. This confrontation eventually reached a stalemate with each side unable to defeat the other, thereby facilitating the desire to come to some kind of settlement; in Munck and Kumar's words 'a classic lose-lose situation' developed.⁷ This situation was of course aided by the improvement of external factors, namely the withdrawal of Vietnam in 1989 and the general improvement of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union ended financial aid for Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Finally, the US, fearing a return to power of the Khmer Rouge, began to pressurise Thailand and China to rescind their support for Pol Pot.

The outcome of all this was a series of attempts throughout the 1980s to resolve the Cambodian conflict based on multilateral efforts. The UN General Assembly convened an international conference in 1980 ultimately failing due to the Soviet Union's and Vietnam's boycott. In 1988 and 1989 Indonesia sponsored the two Jakarta Informal Meetings attended by the four Cambodia factions, the members of ASEAN, Laos and Vietnam. The result of these two meetings was the Vietnamese offer to withdraw from Cambodia which was subsequently followed by the Paris Conference on Cambodia of July 1989 co-sponsored by France and

Indonesia. Progress was made at the conference but it ultimately became deadlocked due to Hun Sen's refusal to accept any power-sharing arrangements with the Khmer Rouge.⁸

The solution to this deadlock was first mooted by US Congressman Stephen Solarz to Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and hinged on the abandonment of any power-sharing arrangements in favour of placing faith in the renewed importance of the UN in the post-Cold War world. Thus, instead of power-sharing, the stress was placed on the UN administration of Cambodia in the run-up to a UN observed election.⁹ This was developed by Australia into a document submitted to the February 1990 Informal Meeting on Cambodia and supported by a back-breaking diplomatic effort by Australian diplomat Michael Costello to win the acceptance of the nations attending the meeting.¹⁰ At the same time the Japanese government launched its first ill-fated effort to broker a deal with the Tokyo Conference on Cambodia ignored by, and thus doomed by, the Khmer Rouge. The Australian document acted as the basis for the UNSC's Framework Document for a Cambodian Settlement accepted by all attendants of the Informal Meeting on Cambodia and initiated the creation of the Supreme National Council comprising all the factions with the aim of sustaining the peace process through a working relationship.¹¹

With the creation of this body, the attainment of a solid cease-fire and agreement on the scope of the UN administrative role, the Paris Peace Accords were signed on 23 October 1991 by the four Cambodian factions under the umbrella of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia (SNC), the UNSC Permanent Five, and a number of other states.¹² The Accords pledged the four factions to maintain the cease-fire and facilitate the cantonment and disarmament of military forces along with recognising the SNC as the legitimate authority of Cambodia through the transitional period. The non-Cambodian signatories pledged to remove their troops from Cambodian territory, end military and financial assistance, and recognise the

sovereignty, integrity and neutrality of Cambodia. The UN would administer the country until an election (also administered by the UN) could be held and a national government formed. Thus, the Accords hinged on the effectiveness of the interaction between the SNC and the UN, specifically UNTAC and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. This was the most ambitious large-scale UNPKO in the history of the UN embracing a mixture of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding.¹³ In detail, UNTAC's mandate included: first, supervision, monitoring and verification of the withdrawal and non-return of foreign troops; second, cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of the four Cambodian factions; third, the conduct of a free and fair election; four, promotion and protection of human rights; five, clearing the country of landmines; six, repatriation of Cambodian refugees; seven, maintenance of law and order, military security and civil administration; and finally, establishment of an economic infrastructure and encouragement of sustained development.

Pre-empting UNTAC's despatch, UN Secretary-General de Cuellar recommended to the Security Council that the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIR) be established. With a limited mandate, only 268 personnel and led by Ataul Karim of Bangladesh, UNAMIR began to address the removal of mines in Cambodia and assisted in the maintenance of the cease-fire. The lack of resources meant that cease-fire violations, particularly by the Khmer Rouge, went unchecked at this time and corruption continued within the Hun Sen government because a strong, neutral UN mediator was essentially lacking. UNAMIR was not envisaged in the Paris Peace Accords and, although established, this initial presence in Cambodia, was ultimately a failure.

However, the main mission, UNTAC, began to take shape following Akashi Yasushi's appointment as Special Representative to the Secretary-General and head of UNTAC in January

1992. Lieutenant-General John Sanderson of Australia was also appointed commander of UNTAC's military force.¹⁴ The operation was sanctioned by the UNSC in February 1992 and an election date was set for April/May 1993 with the establishment of a new government for August 1993. A peacekeeping force of 15,900 military personnel was planned with 3,600 civilian police and 2,000 civilians with 450 UN Volunteers taken from 46 contributing countries swelling the numbers. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand were the first nations to deploy their troops with full and complete deployment taking longer than expected. To achieve its aims the UNTAC mission divided Cambodia into several regions for the deployment of personnel (see Appendix III). Sector one contained Dutch personnel; sector two was under Bangladeshi administration; sector three, Pakistani; sector four, Uruguayan; sector five was split into eastern and western zones with Indonesian troops in the west and Indian troops in the east; sector six was French; sector seven did not exist; sector eight was Malaysian; again sector nine was split into east and west with Tunisian troops in the west and Bulgarian in the east; and finally Ghanaian personnel occupied the special sector created around Phnom Penh.¹⁵ The creation of UNTAC constituted the first phase of the operation. The cantonment, disarmament, and demobilisation of the four factions constituted the second phase complemented by the repatriation of Cambodian refugees, implemented hand in hand with mine-clearing in arable land. Furthermore, in preparation for the election, UNTAC's activities embraced enrolment and registration, in addition to the everyday administration of the country, maintenance of law and order, and protection of human rights. This stage was complicated by the reports of intrusions by Vietnamese troops still present in Cambodia, the intransigence of the Khmer Rouge over this issue, the sporadic attacks on Vietnamese residents in Cambodia, and the consequent failure of Pol Pot to co-operate with the second phase of the peace process. As the situation escalated over the months that followed the

Khmer Rouge began a campaign of kidnapping UN peacekeepers. Moreover, violence was not a monopoly of the Khmer Rouge, as the State of Cambodia undertook terror campaigns of drive-by shootings and grenade attacks on opposition party election offices and candidates. Throughout this time the use of force by UNTAC was never ruled out and was most strongly advocated by General Lardon of France. Eventually the peace process proceeded with the disarmament of the three co-operating factions in the face of Khmer Rouge intransigence, so much so that by September 1992 52,000 troops of the co-operating parties had been cantoned and 50,000 weapons taken into custody. However, this still left a considerable number of trained and armed troops on all sides. On October 13 1992, the Security Council decided to proceed with the election despite the failure to end the civil war and create a peaceful environment, opting to pressurise the Khmer Rouge into co-operation through diplomatic efforts on the part of France, Indonesia, Thailand, and Japan.

The election campaign began on April 7, 1993 having been postponed due to the poor security situation, lasting until May 19 followed by a cooling-off period and then polling from May 23 to 28. Khmer Rouge violence continued and fears of an outright attack on the campaign were heightened when in mid-April the Khmer Rouge suddenly closed its office in Phnom Penh and withdrew its representatives. Doubts were being expressed by both Australia and Japan about a continuing presence in Cambodia. Despite these misgivings and violence, the Cambodian people turned out in millions to cast their votes, thereby allowing the operation to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. In all, close to 90 percent of the those registered to vote came to the ballot box—a remarkable percentage by any nation's standards—and polling took place in a remarkably free and fair atmosphere contrasting dramatically with the run-up period to the election. Khmer Rouge soldiers appeared at election stations and declared support for the new government even if it

was of a Sihanouk nature. Ultimately, the election was largely free and fair and recognised by the international community as well as the four Cambodian factions.¹⁶

In the aftermath of the election and various political manoeuvrings by the four factions, a Constituent Assembly was formed and a draft Constitution ratified on September 21 1993. The Constituent Assembly was transformed subsequently into the new National Assembly and UNTAC's role formally ended. With no one party assuming a majority, a coalition government excluding the Khmer Rouge was formed. With the success of the largest election in Cambodian history and the largest peacekeeping operation undertaken by the international community, UNTAC was an enormous confidence-building measure in the short-term to both the Cambodian nation and the UN. To assess how Japan affected, and was affected by, the UNTAC operation is the remit of the remainder of this chapter.

INTERNAL NORMS: PACIFISM

Japan's contribution to UNTAC was built on the foundations of the traditional norms of Japanese foreign policy, as outlined in Chapter Three. These norms were both liberating in that they encouraged and shaped policy as constitutive norms, and also constraining in defining what was acceptable and unacceptable as regulatory norms. The norm of pacifism was seen to have begun to change during and after the Second Gulf War, becoming less of a regulatory and more of a constitutive norm. Furthermore, during the UNTAC operation the pacifist norm can be seen to have continued to shape behaviour in this direction.

No issue dominated the debate over Japan's participation in the UNTAC operation more than the violations of the cease-fire committed mainly by the Khmer Rouge and the debate over whether this compromised the presence of the SDF in light of the five principles of the PKO Law.

In reaction to one of the many attacks on a UN installation commonly known as 'Japan House' on January 12, 1993, where a number of Japanese officers were regularly resident, then Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kôno Yôhei, stressed that the five principles guiding Japan's participation were not compromised and that the cease-fire was still in place. Nevertheless, he stressed that the Japanese government would request UNTAC to ensure the safety of Japanese peacekeepers, especially police officers, who were grouped in pairs and regarded as particularly vulnerable as opposed to SDF units, which were organised in groups.¹⁷ In the face of the February 1993 full-scale offensive by the Phnom Penh government against the Khmer Rouge, the interpretation that the Paris Peace Accords were still intact was maintained by members of UNTAC as well as by the Japanese Prime Minister, Miyazawa Kiichi, and Ambassador to Cambodia, Imagawa Yukio.¹⁸ Foreign Minister Watanabe Michio concluded to Prime Minister Miyazawa that the Paris Peace Accords were seen to be intact and there was no need to consider withdrawal of Japanese personnel in light of the five principles. Miyazawa thereafter reported this to the Diet.¹⁹ A few days later the government even agreed to the step requested by UNTAC that the Japanese contingents area of operations be expanded towards the north of Cambodia but avoiding Khmer Rouge areas.²⁰

It was at the time of this offensive that Ozawa Ichirô made public the final draft of the Ozawa Report. This report stressed a reinterpretation of the Japanese Constitution, as opposed to revision, allowing Japan to contribute to UN military peacekeeping operations in support of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's proposal for more heavily armed UNPKO. This more 'active' rather than 'passive' interpretation of the Constitution was framed solely within the UN's collective security system with the kind of multinational operations like those undertaken in the Second Gulf War and the Korean War; in other words, operations which this report excluded from

the remit of Japan's expected participation due to the lack of UN consensus. At this time Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, head of the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council, suggested the insertion into Article IX of a clause stating that a UN decision supersedes the provisions of the Constitution in order to clearly delineate the remit of Japan's actions in a bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC.²¹

As the violence in Cambodia continued to call into question the Paris Peace Accords and the five principles framing SDF participation, Japanese public opinion began to question the continued stationing of the SDF in Cambodia. Boutros-Ghali's visit to Tokyo on February 15, 1993 was met with a rally organised by a number of protest groups from the Kantô area urging the government to resist Boutros-Ghali's call for Japan to increase its UNPKO contribution in quantity and quality and to withdraw from Cambodia as the cease-fire was in ruins.²² Furthermore, the issue that brought opposition to UNPKO participation to a head was the murder of UN volunteer worker Nakata Atsuhito in April 1993.²³ In the face of this event, the government was swift to express regret and to stress that it would not affect the continuance of the mission. In fact, Kôno stressed the resolve Japan possessed to continue with the mission despite this tragedy.²⁴ In reaction members of the SDPJ called for the withdrawal of Japanese personnel as the cease-fire obviously was failing to hold due to the non-compliance and terrorism of the Khmer Rouge. In fact, the situation was to some closer to 'a state of war'.²⁵ The Kômei Party's Secretary-General, Ichikawa Yûichi was more restrained in his assessment of whether to withdraw Japanese troops stressing a policy of wait-and-see.²⁶ The government stressed that although an independent pullout was permissible under the five principles, Japanese personnel would stay in Cambodia until the UN regarded the cease-fire as untenable. One of Gotoda Masaharu's first acts upon being appointed Deputy Prime Minister in April 1993, due to the ill-

health of Watanabe, was to assure the nation that Japanese personnel would remain in Cambodia and confirmed that Mozambique would be the next destination for Japan's peacekeepers.²⁷ All this was in keeping with Minister of State Nakayama Kazuo's statement in front of the House of Representatives' Committee on National Security of April 6 1993, where he stressed the need to make not only a financial contribution, but a human contribution to UNPKO. Needless to say, the government regarded the SDF as most suited to the task.²⁸ Thus, the government met pacifist dissent amongst the population with reference to the UN stressing that Japan would only withdraw if the UN decided to withdraw—the regulatory norm of pacifism being remoulded as a constitutive norm of peacekeeping under the aegis of the UN.

Public opposition was demonstrated in protests outside government buildings demanding immediate withdrawal from Cambodia and suspension of plans to despatch the SDF to Mozambique. The All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers' Union submitted a petition to the Ministry of Home Affairs to ensure its members would not be despatched to Cambodia to help with the election. The Gunma Prefectural Government began to advise its staff enlisted to help in the administrative preparations for the election in Cambodia to refuse their despatch.²⁹ The SDPJ and JCP began to place pressure on Prime Minister Miyazawa in the Diet to withdraw SDF troops from Cambodia and that the UN postpone the election from May 23 to 28 as the country was in no peaceful state to maintain a free and fair election. However, opposition was not as vociferous as the debate over the PKO Law highlighted in the previous chapter, mainly due to the electoral losses of the SDPJ in the previous summer's election and the need to build bridges with the centrist parties. Kōmei Party members took a middle line recognising that the Khmer Rouge may well have broken the cease-fire but that a hasty withdrawal of SDF troops should be avoided. Similarly DSP members feared that a hasty withdrawal could lead to the isolation of

Japan in the international community.³⁰ Thus, one norm of internal pacifism was being replaced with the external one of international standards of behaviour, particularly through the UN. Throughout this period the government was steadfast in opposing unilateral withdrawal, but supporting the maintenance of the original date for the election, and the improvement of the security situation for Japanese peacekeepers. Miyazawa reiterated this point, both on the domestic stage and the international stage while visiting Australia in talks with Prime Minister Paul Keating.³¹ At this time even participation within a UN army in the peace enforcement aspects of UNPKO was mooted as a possible idea with Foreign Minister Mutō Kabun stressing the necessity to investigate the possibility.³² The conflict between the two norms of domestic pacifism and commitments to the UN was summed up by the chairman of the LDP's Research Commission on the Constitution, Kurihara Yūko, in asking rhetorically whether the government 'will follow the international community or domestic opinion'.³³ Moreover, this was demonstrated by disagreement within the government, with Koizumi Junichirō, Minister for Posts and Telecommunications, on the one hand, demanding the withdrawal of Japanese personnel to safer areas, while, on the other hand, Miyazawa and Mutō led the damage limitation campaign and attempted to move the debate on to the frozen aspects of PKO and investigate the possibility of using weapons.³⁴ The opposition parties demonstrated similar divisions over the issue; for instance, on the one hand, Murayama Tomiichi of the SDPJ opposed any patrols of election stations by the SDF as they may encounter violent resistance by Khmer Rouge troops; on the other hand, Kamisaki Takehō of the Kōmei Party supported the patrols under the PKO Law and Kanda Gen of the DSP regarded participation in these patrols as inevitable.³⁵ In addition, Kōno sought to expand the remit of the SDF's use of weapons to include the defence of UN volunteers working at the election stations where the SDF were patrolling, thereby

broadening the government's interpretation of the five principles.³⁶

The government, however, at this time rather than reacting to the demands of civil society and the traditional norm of pacifism, began to investigate the idea of giving SDF personnel weapons in order to address the unstable security situation in Cambodia in addition to confirming its future and firm participation. Deputy Director of the Defence Agency, Hiyoshi Akira, indicated that in light of the turmoil in Cambodia, the SDF may have been given guns to carry rather than limiting the possession of guns to personnel guarding arsenals.³⁷ The decision was made eventually to equip the second contingent of SDF peacekeepers with weapons when moving around Cambodia, depending on the severity of the situation on the ground, but to leave them unarmed when working on road and bridge repairs.³⁸ This was extended a few days later to include the protection of civilians transported to the ballot boxes in their proximity during the election. Moreover, military expansion of the SDF's role came from within the SDF gaining approval from Prime Minister Miyazawa that the SDF may form 'intelligence-gathering units' to act inside Takeo province. The main aim was to ensure the safety of Japanese civilian election monitors by visiting local election stations every day inquiring as to the state of security.³⁹ Furthermore, even within the Socialist Party there existed support for a more active contribution to the UN. The Action New Democracy group, founded by Yoshioka Hiroshi, promoted the recognition of the expanded military role of the SDF and also the possible participation by it, or a similar organisation, in a UN army in the future.⁴⁰

This debate was overtaken by events. On May 4, 1993 a Japanese police officer, Takata Haruyuki, was killed in an ambush by unidentified aggressors in north-west Cambodia. In response to this event, Murata Keijirō, Minister of Home Affairs, then on a visit to Cambodia called on Akashi to move Japanese officers to safe areas. While refusing to give Japan special

treatment, Akashi did agree to place Japanese election monitors in the relative safety of Takeo province. He stressed that Japan could not be given preferential treatment and was free to withdraw its troops if the government so desired, yet sought to establish an understanding with Murata to ensure the continued stationing of the SDF.⁴¹ At the same time as Japan was being refused special treatment, the Defence Agency was readying the SDF for its second despatch to Mozambique.⁴² Moreover, despite a degree of uncertainty amongst the Japanese election monitors on the point of being despatched to Cambodia, there was equally a strong sense of resolve to participate within the international effort to ensure fair and free elections in Cambodia.⁴³

The institutionalisation of the pacifist norm within certain government circles can be seen in Koizumi Junichirō's assertion that:

Ever since the gulf war, the Diet has debated the proper nature of Japan's contribution to the international community, but the government never claimed that we would have to go so far as to shed blood. What it said was that we need to contribute with our own sweat because it's no longer sufficient to provide only money and material supplies.... Japan differs from other countries in terms of its consensus and determination regarding participation in peacekeeping operations. This point must be considered. We should now include withdrawal from PKO activities as one of our options. It's important to know when to pull back. If we explain our position to other countries, I think they'll go along with us. Their PKO contingents probably also sense the same dangers.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the UNTAC operation, when the Japanese nation began to review its behaviour in Cambodia, the DSP came out in favour of lifting the ban on arms for Japanese peacekeepers but stopped short of support for the creation of a peace enforcement unit as envisaged by Boutros-Ghali.⁴⁵ Moreover, both during and after the UNTAC operation public opinion polls demonstrated a change in people's thinking about Japan's contribution to the UN and in particular its peacekeeping functions. By examining opinion polls taken by the Prime Minister's Office and major daily newspapers, this becomes all-too-salient.⁴⁶ Immediately before the passage of the PKO Law, 41.6 percent of respondents supported SDF participation in

UNPKO with 36.9 percent opposed. In addition, 50.3 percent believed despatch to be constitutionally problematic with 28.2 percent thinking otherwise.⁴⁷ Yet, immediately after the conclusion of the UNTAC mission a *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll found 55 percent supportive of the PKO Law.⁴⁸ A NHK poll carried out in May 1993 saw 17 percent of those polled rate highly Japan's role in UNTAC and 47.8 percent rate Japan's role fairly highly, making a total majority of 64.8 percent holding a positive view of UNPKO.⁴⁹ In January 1994 a Prime Minister's Office Survey revealed that 22 percent of pollees believed that international co-operation should be the future area in which the SDF should concentrate. In addition, 5.7 percent perceived the main purpose of the SDF to be in the area of international contribution. In the same poll 48.4 percent supported Japan's participation in UNPKO, an increase from 45.5 percent as polled in 1991. Significantly those opposing Japan's participation fell from 37.9 percent to 30.6 percent over the same time frame.⁵⁰ The UN also became the focus of people's attention: 53.6 percent of people thinking that UNSC reform was necessary because it was an anomaly to have the five victorious powers of W.W.II controlling the UN and over 30 percent of people polled believing it to be an anomaly that Japan was not represented. 52.9 percent believed Japan ought to be represented on the UNSC with only 14.8 percent opposed. The second most popular reason was the contribution Japan could make to international peace as a pacifist nation coming after the reason that Japan should make a contribution to the international order as an economic superpower.⁵¹ In the same poll 41.2 percent stated their support for the maximum possible contribution to UNPKO under the existing constitutional framework and 38.8 percent agreed with this as long as military contribution was excluded. 16.3 percent sought constitutional revision in order to improve upon Japan's contribution. This poll certainly revealed the 'honourable allergy' with 60.7 percent of the 14.8 percent of people against Japan becoming a permanent member of the UNSC due to the

military contribution Japan would be forced to make. Yet, the fact that this is only the majority of a very small minority should not be forgotten.

In October 1994 a Prime Minister's Office Survey on Diplomacy confirmed this trend with findings of 35.2 percent regarding Japan's main role in international society to be the support of UNPKO, when support for this in previous years had been 28.8 percent in 1993 and 31.4 percent in 1992.⁵² More importantly, the main field of UN work meriting most importance was seen to be peacekeeping with 66.3 percent. Japan's participation thus far was supported by 43.4 percent with 15.5 percent supportive of further qualitative and quantitative participation and only 8.6 percent suggesting that Japan should not participate.⁵³ Connected with this, 56 percent of the population supported Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC with only 18 percent opposing it. The percentage of people supporting the pursuit of international peace and stability as Japan's main task in the UN increased to 67.2 percent in a Prime Minister's Survey of April 1995.⁵⁴

A further poll in July 1995 found 74.8 percent regarding UNPKO like UNTAC as resulting in concrete improvements, whereas 18.9 percent failed to see any benefits from UN intervention.⁵⁵ In this poll support for Japan's future participation in UNPKO was estimated at 75.1 percent with 14.3 percent opposed, while an even more emphatic 80 percent supported participation in humanitarian operations with 10.7 percent opposed. 17.3 percent regarded international contribution as the main role of the SDF.⁵⁶ In comparison, a similar poll taken in February 1991 45.5 percent had agreed with participation and 37.9 percent opposed participation in UNPKO.⁵⁷ By the time the poll was taken again in January 1994 48.4 percent agreed with 30.6 percent opposed.⁵⁸ Compared to these figures the results of the July 1995 poll demonstrate a steady acceptance of peacekeeping amongst the Japanese population as long as

it is under the aegis of the UN. Thus, the pacifist norm most strongly held within Japanese civil society was continuing to be reconstituted in the light of the revival of the UN—a process which began during the Second Gulf War, as demonstrated in the previous chapter.

Alternatively, within government circles, the MOFA has demonstrated its role as the main promoter of an active UNPKO policy for Japan and has sought to link this with the issue of permanent representation on the UNSC coming into conflict with other domestic agents imbued with the pacifist norm. One of the early examples of these differences can be seen in Prime Minister Hosokawa's speech to the UN General Assembly on September 27, 1993 stipulating that:

Japan is prepared to do all it can to discharge its responsibilities in a UN reformed with the previous three points [one of which being the restructuring and strengthening of the UNSC] taken into account.⁵⁹

The MOFA had previously submitted a position paper to the UN Secretariat not mentioning UNSC reform as a condition to Japan's admission. This discrepancy has been attributed to the intervention of Tanaka Shūsei, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister and later head of the Sakigake Party, seeking a UN more suited to the post-Cold War world, rather than Japan pursuing UNSC membership in order to add to its national prestige. Despite MOFA's protestations that consistency was of utmost importance in Japan's policy, Tanaka's insistence upon Article 41 of the Constitution stressing the supremacy of the Diet over the bureaucracy, and the diffusion of power to small coalition parties with the break-up of the LDP system ensured Tanaka's modification remained. Then Sakigake Party leader, Takemura Masayoshi, was in a pivotal policymaking position as Chief Cabinet Secretary and backed Tanaka ensuring the success of this modification. This is a theme which will become more salient in the following chapter as coalition governments began to establish themselves in Japan giving Japan's UN and

UNPKO policy a more fractured appearance as new sources of power and influence began to diffuse traditional ones.

EXTERNAL NORMS: THE UNITED STATES

Similar to the Japanese government's policy, the US government's overall objective was concerned with maintaining a Japanese presence in Cambodia. This was publicly declared after a two-day conference of the US-ASEAN senior officials' forum calling for all participating nations to 'maintain their troops and personnel in Cambodia in line with the mandate of UNTAC' in addition to condemning the violence in violation of the cease-fire.⁶⁰ US policy was intrinsically linked with burden-sharing and attempting to shift not only the financial burden but also the personnel burden onto allied states. For example, on the financial side, towards the end of September 1993 President Clinton addressed the General Assembly of the UN with the suggestion that his country's financial contribution be cut from 30.4 percent to 25 percent. In mind was the idea of particularly Japan and Germany taking a greater responsibility for UNPKO.⁶¹ US interest also extended to the role that Japan can play in making up the difference in the event of a withdrawal of the US. The UNTAC operation incurred start-up costs of \$200 million with the US paying its \$60.8 million share and then an additional share of \$184.1 million out of \$606 million estimated by the General Assembly.⁶² With this being the costliest UN operation in its history and the central role of the US government in funding this expansion of the UN's work, interest developed as to how Japan could assume its burden for maintaining order in the post-Cold War world, especially with the backtracking of the Clinton administration from a promised active peacekeeping policy and 'aggressive multilateralism'. Due to disillusionment over the deaths of eighteen US soldiers in Somalia in October 1993 and inter-agency conflict

between the State Department and the Department of Defence, resultant policy was delayed until the release of PDD-25 (Presidential Decision Directive 25) which ultimately failed to decide concretely future policy as it just provided a basis from which US policy could act. With the Republican electoral gains of November 1994 it appeared that US support for UNPKO would continue to stall; thus, the desire to encourage Japan was strengthened and plans to this end were put forward, such as the joint training of US and Japanese peacekeepers, shared financial contributions, and technological exchange.⁶³ In addition, this contributed to the public justification of the Japan-US Security Treaty in a post-Cold War world lacking an obvious enemy. As the range of Japanese military hardware was limited, the US was in the position of providing logistical support for Japan in the form of fuel supply ships and planes to assist in the long journey to Sihanoukville, Cambodia's main port. In May 1993, there were reports that the Japanese government had approached the US about the provision of transport and food-supply services to remote areas with Nakayama Toshio, Director-General of the Defence Agency, openly supporting expanded US support for Japan's UNPKO contribution.⁶⁴ In return, although the Japanese side was (and still is) constrained in what it can contribute to support the US in the field of UNPKO, the private sector in Japan can provide certain airlift and sealift capabilities while the government can continue its despatch of personnel limited to certain roles while supplementing this contribution with financial assistance. It is with this in mind that the US encouraged and pushed Japan in the direction of a more pro-active role during the UNTAC operation.

On the human resource side of the ledger, during the debate in the aftermath of the death of Nakata and Takata, William Perry, US Deputy Secretary of Defence, spoke in Tokyo on the need for Japan to exercise leadership in global issues and that the Cambodian operation was a

useful step in the right direction. The desire on the part of the US to see Japan playing an active role at times led to exasperation at the soul-searching and debate within Japan. The *Yomiuri Shimbun* reported one State Department source as stating that it hoped that Japan would take a greater burden for US troops stationed within Japan and in the field of PKO would make more of a human contribution even to peace enforcement operations with the majority of American citizens believed to have no objection to the despatch of Japanese troops abroad.⁶⁵ According to a *Yomiuri Shimbun* opinion poll of April 1993 support for Japan's participation in UNPKO amongst the Western nations reached a mean of 70 percent (with France at 73 percent, the US at 71 percent, the UK at 69 percent and Germany at 68 percent—a higher proportion than in Japan itself polled at 59 percent support). This showed a steady increase from a poll conducted in 1992 before the UNTAC operation which estimated support among the West as being 66 percent in the US and 54 percent in Japan.⁶⁶

As Assistant Professor Tanaka Akihiko of the University of Tokyo has stated, 'Japan and the US may be depicted as polar opposites with respect to their involvement in the UN'.⁶⁷ In other words, the US is able to deploy its power unilaterally or with the help of allies in any corner of the globe, yet is not overtly interested in UNPKO. Japan lacks this capability but is troubled by the issue. However, in a similar fashion to Japan, the US has been inhibited in its involvement in UNPKO by domestic factors. Thus, the US attitude to encourage Japan in the field of UNPKO is evident and has been recognised and reciprocated by the Japanese side. Previously in 1990 Vice-Foreign Minister Kuriyama Takakazu explained Japan's future diplomatic strategy:

Today, the time when Japan could take for granted an international order sustained by US strength...is long past. The two nations...are in a position to share the responsibilities for world peace and prosperity together with Western Europe. This is precisely what is meant by *global partnership* [my stress].⁶⁸

Thus, the norm that emerged was a constitutive one in that it encouraged a new defining

role for Japan and was based around partnership within an alliance with the US, rather than domination by the US—which in itself would be a questionable way to characterise US-Japanese relations. The US began at this time to regard Japanese participation in UNPKO as one form of burden-sharing and to this end came to support Japan's quest for a permanent seat on the UNSC and increased financial contributions. In the light of the failure of the Somalian mission, the US has been keen to disengage from UNPKO and Japan is willing to expand its contributions and commitments. US policy was encapsulated in President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), mentioned above, of May 1994 stating that 'US and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective'.⁶⁹ US disengagement has, thus, provided an encouraging norm for Japan—a theme which becomes even more salient in the following chapter.

Certain critics have objected to Japan's security ties with the US on the grounds that they have inhibited Japan from developing an independent, fully-rounded role and, thus, US troops should be withdrawn from Japanese territory.⁷⁰ However, it is evident that the US has played a positive and encouraging role for Japan in its pro-active, military role as long as it is contained within either the UN, or preferably, the framework of relations with the US. Thus, the traditional norm of reliance on the US, the bedrock of the Yoshida Doctrine, has slowly eroded and now appears to be liberated to some extent by the norm of the UN and the international community.

EXTERNAL NORMS: UNPKO

Previous to the UNTAC operation, Japan had attempted to play an active role in the Cambodian peace process within the framework of the UN by sending a senior official to Phnom Penh in February 1990 to discuss a Japanese peace plan with the PRK government. In April of the same

year, Premier Hun Sen was invited to Tokyo for medical treatment; then in June, Japan acted as co-host with Thailand for the 1990 conference intended to resolve the conflict. All this activity was regarded by the Japanese government as 'an unprecedented attempt in Japan's post-W.W.II diplomacy'.⁷¹ In March 1991, CGDK Premier Sonn Sann visited Tokyo for talks with Prime Minister Kaifu and Foreign Minister Nakayama. Nakayama met with Sihanouk the next month in Beijing. Japan later became a signatory to the Peace Accords and promoted the appointment of Akashi Yasushi to head the UNTAC operation.⁷² Further co-operation came in January 1992 when Tokyo dropped its insistence on the precondition that the conflict be resolved before overseas development assistance could be extended. A pledge of ¥1.1 billion to Cambodian reconstruction followed. The despatch of personnel was recognised by Miyazawa as necessary for the new ground-breaking UNTAC operation, '[UNTAC] will have a range of activities unprecedented in UN history. Japan is now striving to make the necessary domestic arrangements to enable it to contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations'.⁷³ Akashi's encouragement prevailed throughout the UNTAC operation. In the early stages of the operation in mid-January 1992 Akashi proposed that Japan provide police support stressing that his own appointment was linked to the weighty international expectations of Japan to provide for the restoration of peace in Cambodia. The whole issue of SDF command was resolved when explicit reference was made to the UN. Commander of the Second Battalion, Ishioroshi Yoshio, stated a preference for command under the UN while conducting operations under the UNTAC operation (*kokurengawa komando no meikaku na yûsen*).⁷⁴

In his speech to the 126th regular Diet session, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Watanabe Michio, highlighted the growing number of UNPKO in addition to the development and evolution of new types of operations. In the light of these developments,

Watanabe called for 'greater flexibility' and 'further participation in UN peace efforts world-wide', stressing that 'I believe this is an issue that Japan, as a responsible member of the international community, must take up with all seriousness'.⁷⁵ A known supporter of an expanded military role for Japan was able, thus, to refer to a new norm in the international community in the form of UNPKO to expand and justify Japan's military expansion. The development of policy around this norm was to become a salient characteristic of Japan's PKO policy.

During his visit to Tokyo in mid-February, Boutros-Ghali praised Japan for its participation thus far and sought to encourage further participation within the framework of the Constitution in a similar interpretation as adopted by the Ozawa Report, 'Japan, through her [sic] Constitution, and by political chance, has opted for the path of peace and of internationalism. Japan's support in the new UN will be crucial'.⁷⁶ Encouragement also came from Ogata Sadako, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, calling on the Japanese government to despatch SDF personnel even when the five principles of Japan's participation are not met.⁷⁷

As mentioned above, in reaction to the worsening security situation in Cambodia, Japan began to push for a solution through multilateral methods including an international conference to place pressure on the Khmer Rouge via China.⁷⁸ At the same time, within Japan there was a process of recognising what UNPKO actually involved—an initial apprenticeship learning an important lesson. As stated by Senior Superintendent Yamazaki Hiroto of the National Police Agency, 'a peacekeeping mission is naturally a dangerous task. The UN and the international community had addressed the worsening situation. That is the nature of the UN peacekeeping mission. Japan didn't realize that'.⁷⁹ Further encouragement came from Akashi Yasushi in meeting Nakayama Toshio, head of the Defence Agency.⁸⁰ Stressing to the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan that Japan would need to discard its insular thinking for fear of

damaging its international reputation, he stated that 'there is no free ride in international peace'.⁸¹ Furthermore, the norm of limitation by fellow East Asian nations in the light of Japan's behaviour during W.W.II could be overcome by the goodwill created by participation in UNPKO in the East Asian region. In this light, in conversation with Miyazawa after the conclusion of the UNTAC operation, Akashi continued to praise Japan's role and particularly the part played by Miyazawa describing it as a monumental achievement (*kinjitô*).⁸²

The worsening Cambodian security situation for Japan reached its zenith in April and May 1993 with the death of Nakata and Takata. The government's position was that although the Khmer Rouge had closed down its offices in Phnom Penh, it had not repudiated the Paris Peace Accords and, thus, Japan's continued participation in UNTAC was not compromised. This argument was summarised by Genkawa Sachio, an advisor at Hitachi and former general of the GSDF, when he stated that, 'as shown by previous UN operations, it's necessary to be prepared for danger even after a cease-fire goes into effect'.⁸³ This was one of the many aspects of this new norm of peacekeeping that Japan was having to become used to and grasp the specificity of—an aspect that needs to be fully comprehended in understanding Professor Takubo Tadae of Kyôrin University, when he asked rhetorically, 'but when have UN peacekeeping missions ever proceeded as originally hoped? And even though they have not, why have countries rushed to participate in them?'⁸⁴ According to UN data, by the time of Takata's death, in all 896 personnel had died in UNPKO with the ONUC operation accounting for the largest number, 234, followed by UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNFICYP in Cyprus. In all, only 12 of the 28 UNPKO which had taken place up to the Japanese deaths in Cambodia had been free of casualties.⁸⁵ The debate in Japan had lost sight of the fact that participation in UNPKO might entail sustaining casualties.⁸⁶

It was this distinction which divided the Japanese press into two clear camps: firstly, the

Sankei Shimbun and *Yomiuri Shimbun* formed the supportive group with the *Sankei Shimbun* writing that:

We were surely prepared for certain risks and dangers, including the possible loss of human life, when we decided to despatch personnel to Cambodia.... Just because of [Takata's] death, we should not go off on our own and upset the solidarity of the UN.⁸⁷

The *Yomiuri Shimbun* contributed to the debate by stating that:

We believe that, in view of the objective of making an international contribution, it is a mistake to call for the immediate withdrawal of Japanese civilian police officers and Self-Defence Forces personnel and the halting of the despatch of election monitors to Cambodia.⁸⁸

The opposing camp consisted of the *Asahi Shimbun* and *Mainichi Shimbun*, both considerably more troubled by the deaths in Cambodia and unsure of the implications. The *Asahi Shimbun* stated its editorial position:

Unfortunately, efforts to make an international contribution can involve the loss of lives. The important point is to determine for what purpose and for whom such unstinting efforts are to be made. What also must not be forgotten are the local conditions in the target area and the timing of the despatch. Human lives must not be sacrificed haphazardly in the name of making an international contribution.⁸⁹

Seemingly, the *Asahi Shimbun* had not embraced the new norm of UNPKO and continued to cling to a tight interpretation of pacifism. The *Mainichi Shimbun* echoed this attitude:

Unless the government demonstrates its sincerity to the people, all its claims to have guaranteed the safety of Japanese personnel in Cambodia and to have improved the situation for them will ring hollow.⁹⁰

During this period of national soul-searching combined with the sense of commitment to the international community, the attitude of Nakata Takehito, father of the UN volunteer killed in April, played an important role in justifying the continued existence of the Japanese contribution to the UNTAC operation. Nakata corrected certain misreportings in the Japanese press that despite his grief he had not in fact sought to persuade his son from going to Cambodia; moreover, he had his son cremated in Cambodia rather than transporting the body back to Japan in accordance with his son's wishes and in giving his life for the ideal of peace was providing an example for the rest of the Japanese people to follow.⁹¹ He stated while in Cambodia that, 'my

son is alive in all your hearts. We have lost...but I believe that...he gave his life for the right cause and I hope that peace will come one day'.⁹² After his son's death, Nakata Takehito set up the Nakata Atsuhito Memorial Foundation to support the work of UN volunteers, a cause in keeping with his son's wishes.⁹³

Yanai Shunji, then Head of the Peacekeeping section of the Prime Minister's Office, maintained that the issue of whether the cease-fire had collapsed or not had to be examined holistically; although the Khmer Rouge was refusing to participate in the second phase of the UNTAC operation, the operation and peace accords as a whole were being respected and that out of more than forty nations participating in the operation not one country withdrew its personnel for fear of the peace accords and cease-fire not being in place.⁹⁴ Thus, it can be seen that the government was making decisions on the basis of the new norm of UNPKO, rather than the traditional norm of pacifism which would have dictated a withdrawal from a dangerous situation involving the use of arms. As Yanai stated throughout the PKO debate, a cease-fire ought to be in place and Japanese television tended to give the impression that the SDF would be despatched to a war situation with images of tanks and warships in combat situations. Yet, it was also stressed that UNPKO are not wholly safe and that a degree of risk is inherently involved.⁹⁵ Equally Kakizawa Kôji described PKO as something that a state had to participate in regardless of whether it liked the idea of PKO or not—an international commitment to an international society.⁹⁶

The deaths of Nakata and Takata did have an educational effect on the Japanese public as to the worth and value of the norm of peacekeeping. With the victims not being members of the SDF attention was drawn to the non-military aspects of the work of the UN and its peacekeeping activities. During the Diet debate attention had not been paid to the non-military

aspects of UNPKO, but with the Japanese deaths in Cambodia the public began to accept the utility of UNPKO. This can be seen, for instance, in the increase in the number of applicants to the Japan Overseas Co-operation Volunteers.⁹⁷ Moreover, Nakata's father, who had done so much to explain his son's death to the Japanese people, introduced an initiative to establish a fund for UN volunteers. The fact that an amendment to the International Relief Force Bill to include SDF personnel passed by the Diet with few objections demonstrated that the relief and non-military aspects of UNPKO had an impact on the Japanese government and people. As long as military exercises were excluded and the 'honourable allergy' of the Japanese nation was not compromised, and the new norm of multifaceted peacekeeping could be supported and established in Japan.⁹⁸

Due to political developments within Japan in June and July, the LDP fell from power for the first time since its establishment in 1955 and a coalition government was formed under Prime Minister Hosokawa. The new Deputy Prime Minister, Hata Tsutomu, foresaw a continued effort by Japan with 'the ideal of the UN Charter—to maintain peace and stability in the world—[not running] counter to that of the Constitution. We must be determined to sweat and do our utmost to bring about a peaceful world'.⁹⁹ Hand in hand with this policy, Hata envisaged honesty in its relations with neighbouring East Asian nations about the events of W.W.II and the attainment of a UNSC permanent seat in the near future. Thus, UN-centred policy was further promoted by Prime Minister Hosokawa in addressing the General Assembly when he stressed Japan's desire to strengthen the nation's bonds with the international community by quoting the inter-war Japanese internationalist Nitobe Inazō, 'an international mind is an expansion of the national, just as philanthropy or charity should begin at home'.¹⁰⁰ Perhaps, more bluntly stated but amounting to the same belief in a new norm of international behaviour, Director-General of the Defence

Agency, Nakanishi Keisuke, stated in the aftermath of the UNTAC operation that if Japan did go through with a unilateral withdrawal it would then lose face within the international community.¹⁰¹

Japan's contribution of personnel to UNTAC was certainly not quantitatively or qualitatively of particular note. It is in understanding this and the importance of the UN and its peacekeeping activities that neo-liberalism, and particularly neo-realism, fail to provide convincing answers to explain Japan's decision to play a role in UNPKO. Interest within Japan in these troop contributions, the US and East Asia can only be understood with a knowledge of the norms which had heretofore guided Japan's UN policy. By May 1993, Japan had contributed some 600 troops, 41 civilians participating in the electoral component of the UNTAC mission and 75 police officers attached to the civilian police component out of the 20,000 in Cambodia under UNTAC at that time. When the four norms outlined in each section are understood, then this contribution truly can be seen as 'a sign of the changing strategic map that Japan for the first time since World War II may now send ground troops abroad'.¹⁰² The overlap between the traditional norms and the objectives of the UN became a hugely liberating norm for Japan, particularly in the case of the UNTAC operation.

Within the UN system the contribution of Akashi must not be forgotten in promoting the UN's specificity, durability and concordance. Akashi publicly thanked Japan for its contribution describing it as a considerable pillar supporting UNTAC and taking this historic first step in a new direction for its diplomacy—contrasting starkly with the visible omission of Japan's name in Kuwait's public declaration of thanks.¹⁰³ Not only was Akashi supported by the Japanese government, but he also sought to encourage its contribution by appearing in front of the House of Councillors' Special Committee on the UN Peacekeeping Support Bill advocating the government use the UN as a conduit for a new post-cold diplomacy. As demonstrated in the

section on the pacifist norm, opinion polls demonstrate that although anathema to military actions still existed in Japan, it could be negated or ameliorated by the UN.

Japan's effort to co-ordinate policy with and contribute to the efforts of the international community were not limited solely to the contribution of personnel. Japan was one of the most vocal nations in favour of providing Cambodia with aid. Between March 1991 and November 1992, Japan provided over \$36 million of aid through bilateral channels and \$70.9 million through international organisations. At the Paris Conference of October 1991 Japan proposed an international meeting on reconstruction in Cambodia to take place in Tokyo which was held in June 1992 entitled the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia chaired by both Japan and the UNDP, pledging \$880 million in aid. This was praised by Akashi as 'the most remarkable success that Japan's diplomacy had in recent years'.¹⁰⁴ Japan appeared to be tying its reputation to that of the UN seeking to enhance both its and the UN's credibility. As Professor Tomoda Seki of Asia University has stressed, 'Japan's aid to Cambodia is becoming a touchstone for Japan which has a slogan of international contribution'.¹⁰⁵

To achieve the objectives outlined above continued military spending has been cited as a necessity in order to, 'maintain this capability to participate in the efforts to uphold international justice and protect the global community'.¹⁰⁶ However, this was only in so far as it complemented Miyazawa's aim that 'we must recognize that our international role in the building of a global order for peace can only grow larger.... Among the indispensable underpinnings of our UN-centred efforts for global order are close co-operation with the US and friendly relations with other countries of Asia'.¹⁰⁷ This was symbolically encapsulated in the flying of the UN flag next to the *Hinomaru* at the camp in Takeo. Alone, the *Hinomaru* would have caused problems offending

the sensibilities of East Asian nations, so every opportunity was taken to link the UN to the SDF.

Although stated in a different and negative context, the trend of Japan as under the spell of UN absolutism became steadily apparent with the passage of the PKO Bill and the despatch of troops to Cambodia.¹⁰⁸ Yet, despite any UN absolutism, the reception of Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace and especially the proposed expansion of the remit of peacekeeping and creation of peace enforcement units can only be described as lukewarm. Foreign Minister Watanabe addressed the General Assembly in September 1992 as follows:

Japan believes that the principles and practices of peacekeeping operations upheld by the UN for more than 40 years are still both appropriate and valid today and will continue to be so in the future. The idea of peace-enforcement units, proposed by the Secretary-General's report, offers an interesting approach to the future peacemaking efforts of the UN, but requires further study because it is rooted in a mode of thinking completely different from past peacekeeping forces.¹⁰⁹

With Boutros-Ghali's visit to Japan in February 1993, similar wariness was expressed when the Japanese government refused a request to despatch troops to Somalia for fear of the peace enforcement aspects of the mission. However, the suggestion of Mozambique where, 'there is a solid cease-fire agreement and operations are under way for rehabilitation of refugees' was welcomed as the next avenue along which Japan could expand its UNPKO experience.¹¹⁰ This will be examined in the following chapter along with Japan's effort in the Golan Heights and Rwanda.

A poll of SDF participants in Cambodia demonstrated both the fact that participation in UNPKO was a new experience and that a sense of contribution to the international community had developed. 58 percent of personnel believed it to have been a good thing that they came to Cambodia as opposed to 11 percent believing it to have been a bad thing; 49 percent wanted to participate a second time in UNPKO with 19 percent unwilling to participate again; moreover, 55 percent wanted to see the SDF participate in UNPKO again with 10 percent opposed. Most opposition was seemingly based on the meagre sum of ¥16,000 a day paid as a peacekeeping

allowance; 59 percent were dissatisfied with this, with only 11 percent of personnel happy with the amount.¹¹¹ The lessons learnt from the UNTAC mission were clearly reflected in the Advisory Group on Defence Issues report of September 1994 entitled, *The Modality of the Security and Defence Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century (Nippon no Anzen Hoshô to Bôeiryoku no Arikata: Nijûisseiki e Mukete no Tenbô)*. Otherwise known as the Higuchi Report, it stressed that Japan could not be exempt from contributing to the role of the UN and strengthening its peacekeeping functions:

It is important to consider it a major duty of the SDF, along with the primary duty of national defence, to participate as positively as possible in various forms of multilateral co-operation that are conducted within the framework of the UN for the purposes of international security, including peacekeeping operations.... Regarding the mode of SDF participation in peacekeeping operations, it is desirable that discussions should be continued with a view to removing as soon as possible the provision in the International Peace Co-operation Law calling for the freeze on participation by the SDF in the field of peacekeeping activities mainly conducted by infantry units. In this connection, Japan should study the common understanding that is recognized by the UN with regard to the use of arms.¹¹²

Thus, not only can the traditional pacifistic role of the SDF as a self-defence force used solely in the event of an attack upon the Japanese homeland be seen to have expanded in its scope, the new norm of the UN and its peacekeeping operations has been incorporated as both a regulatory norm in that Japan is expected to participate within this norm and, moreover, as a constitutive norm as it can define a new, more multilateral, direction in its security and foreign policies. Furthermore, this norm was regarded as possessing the ability to promote transparency, confidence-building initiatives and, thus, security in East Asia through the execution of shared military operations and mutual exchange visits.¹¹³

Returning participants also managed to paint a favourable picture of their experience in Cambodia, thereby contributing to the acceptance of participation in UNPKO. Fukui Yusuke, SDF Colonel in the Cease-fire Observer mission of UNTAC, stressed the favourable response he had from Cambodians and other foreign nationals during his time in Cambodia and urged the

Japanese government to continue its contribution to UNPKO.¹¹⁴ One point which deserves emphasis was highlighted in a press conference given by Akashi when he alluded to the need for the Japanese public to allow SDF participation within a PKF mission (*yoron ga yuruseba*).¹¹⁵ Thus, despite the role of the UN, the US or the attitude of East Asian nations, the role of public opinion and the durable, restrictive norm of pacifism was still a factor to be taken into account.

EXTERNAL NORMS: EAST ASIAN NATIONS

As seen in the previous chapter, the attitude of East Asian nations was beginning to alter and polarise with one set of nations spearheaded by ASEAN supportive of an active and expanded Japanese role, while China and South Korea continued to be apprehensive of perceived Japanese remilitarisation. Yet, even these traditional stalwarts against Japanese activism could be seen in certain circumstances to be reconsidering their positions and creating a liberating and defining norm affecting Japanese policy.

The nations of ASEAN were firmly behind the SDF's participation in the UNTAC operation and encouraged Japan to maintain its presence despite the threats to the cease-fire by the Khmer Rouge.¹¹⁶ On May 13, 1993 Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad stressed that Japan could not remain removed from UNPKO and would have to do more than contribute financially.¹¹⁷ Previously in April 1991, Thailand's Foreign Minister Arsa Sarasin had spoken on behalf of the members of ASEAN in stating that Japan's more pro-active role in East Asian security and UNPKO was 'the burden that comes with being a big power.... Japan should become actively involved, diplomatically and politically, in the search for solutions to regional conflict and tension as Japan is currently doing in the case of Cambodia'.¹¹⁸ This view was reiterated during Prime Minister Kaifu's visit to Thailand in May 1991 with particular reference to

the Cambodian conflict.¹¹⁹ Disillusionment with the traditional bipolar international order has led many states of East Asia to look to Japan as a new player and encourage pro-activity in the field of ODA, conflict resolution, diplomacy, etc.

Sections of Cambodian society were also supportive of Japan's pro-active participation in the UNTAC operation. Prince Sihanouk asked the visiting JSP Chairman to encourage the despatch of Japanese troops to help clear mines and restore peace.¹²⁰ Moreover, Premier Hun Sen travelled to Tokyo in March 1992 under the sponsorship of the MOFA and encouraged the Japanese government in the following terms:

The purpose of my visit is to call on Japan to despatch Self-Defence Force troops, police and administrative officers to work with UNTAC. More than twenty nations have already decided to despatch their troops for UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. Why doesn't Japan decide to despatch its troops? We hope that the political parties will co-ordinate their views in order to make it possible to despatch Self-Defence Forces to Cambodia.... Even if Japan despatches its troops to the UNTAC, no country would associate it with Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere concept which prevailed before and during the war.¹²¹

In addition the Japanese government agreed to help the Philippines in transporting its equipment for participation in UNTAC and for a while the MOFA did consider discussing co-operation with the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia in the resettlement of refugees.¹²² Thus, the working relationship with the nations of ASEAN was excellent. More specifically, the Singaporean attitude was positively encouraging in helping Japan weather the storm of Nakata and Takata's deaths. In a meeting on May 11, 1993 between Nakayama Toshio, Chief of the Defence Agency, and Goh Chok Tong, Singaporean Prime Minister, it was made quite clear it believed that the Khmer Rouge was testing UNTAC and if Japan wavered confidence in the entire UNTAC operation would be questioned.¹²³ As regards the possibility of JSDF withdrawal in the aftermath of the two deaths of Japanese citizens and the attack on the Japanese barracks, Goh Chok, stated that 'the world is watching Japan's reaction. If it is the only nation to withdraw its troops, then in the future Japan will not be regarded as a nation that can make an

international contribution'.¹²⁴

However, China and South Korea were the main obstacles to acceptance in East Asia of Japan's new role. As one Chinese official confidentially stated, 'what we are worried about is not the present but the future. The fear is that the law [regarding UNPKO] is a start in a bad direction'.¹²⁵ During the time of the UNTAC mission, one of the most salient areas of Japan's relations with East Asia was over Japan's portrayal of its wartime behaviour in its schoolbooks and the necessity for Japan to apologise. Prime Minister Miyazawa visited Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Brunei in January 1993 claiming that the Asia-Pacific region is the focus of Japan's foreign policy. While this was encouraged in the nations of ASEAN, Foreign Minister Mutô met with President Kim of South Korea on June 30, 1993 and was told that although South Korea would not claim compensation Japan needed to face its history in a similar way to Germany, investigate the comfort women issue, and review the way history is portrayed in Japanese schools.¹²⁶ In the case of the nations of ASEAN, expectations were transferred, to an extent, from the USA as regional leader to Japan. In these nations memories of W.W.II have evidently not prospered with durability to the same extent as on the Korean Peninsula and China.¹²⁷

Yet, with the Japanese contribution to Cambodia, China can be seen to have adjusted slowly its opinion from the outright opposition demonstrated in the previous chapter. Towards the end of May 1993 the Chinese Vice-Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, visited Japan and was reported as having praised Japan's efforts as a positive contribution.¹²⁸ Qian expressed on behalf of the Chinese government an understanding of Japan's PKO dilemma and praised Japan's contribution to the UNTAC operation as shouldering the responsibility of the international community, although still expressing general reservations about the despatch of SDF personnel abroad.¹²⁹

Thus, it is clear that Japan's neighbours were set into two camps with the nations of Southeast Asia accepting Japan's expanded role and acting as a constitutive norm, while the traditionally opposed nations of South Korea and China continued to be wary of Japan's participation but would accept it within the framework of the UN. Ergo, the norm constituted by the UN was able to overcome traditionally restrictive norms of Japanese foreign policymaking.


SUMMARY

The final engineering battalion working with UNTAC returned to Japan and disbanded on October 3, 1993. Greeted by Defence Agency Chief Nakanishi, the battalion was welcomed and praised in a formal ceremony in Sapporo with Nakanishi justifying its despatch in so far as, 'the UN and many countries highly appreciate your activities in Cambodia. It has been a great historical significance as Japan's personal contribution to the world community'.¹³⁰ In all, Japan sent about 1,300 peacekeepers to Cambodia including military observers, civilian police, as well as over 1,200 engineering troops. In the aftermath of the operation the Japanese government did begin to seek ways in which the safety of Japanese peacekeepers could be ensured through pre-despatch training but this was never confused with the pacifist norm which would dictate complete withdrawal from UNPKO.¹³¹ Akashi, having been strongly pitched by the Japanese government for the post of Special Representative to the Secretary-General in UNTAC, in return did a great deal to encourage Japan during the UNTAC period both in its financial, personnel, and military contribution.¹³² He continued to draw the link between Japan's responsibility to the international community, a permanent seat on the UNSC, and expanded UNPKO duties:

If Japan were given the status of a Security Council permanent member, it needs to act in accordance with its new responsibility because the Security Council is responsible for ensuring world peace and security. If the Japanese people can hammer out a national agreement on this matter, I want Japan to send a contingent of foot soldiers as peacekeepers.¹³³

This chapter has demonstrated that a national consensus of sorts was beginning to take shape during the UNTAC operation. Whereas, during the Gulf Crisis and Second Gulf War, policymaking was in a state of flux, with the SDF's despatch to Cambodia attitudes and norms began to solidify with agreement being built around acceptance of the SDF's participation as long as the Constitution was respected and, more importantly, activities took place under the aegis of the UN (see Diagram IV). This was of particular importance as regards Japan's Asian neighbours and especially during the controversy over the deaths of Nakata and Takata as justifying Japan's contribution to the international community. The norms of Japanese foreign and security policy were beginning to constitute Japanese identity rather than regulate it as had previously been the case. The next chapter will examine how these norms continued to shape Japan's UNPKO policy as the government continued to expand Japan's peacekeeping profile.

DIAGRAM IV: POLICYMAKING MATRIX FOR CHAPTER FIVE, CAMBODIA



CHAPTER SIX: SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will address the UNPKO missions in which Japan subsequently took part following the watershed UNTAC mission, namely ONUMOZ, UNAMIR, and UNDOF. The chapter will begin with a general introduction to the particular characteristics of each peacekeeping operation before proceeding to examine, as in previous chapters, the roles played by the various norms in both constraining and encouraging Japan's contribution and policymaking processes. This chapter also seeks to bring the reader up-to-date by including the most recent developments in Japan's security milieu, like the reviewed US-Japan defence guidelines with the US, and will attempt to judge how these developments have influenced, and continue to influence, specifically Japan's PKO experience and more generally its foreign policymaking.

POST-COLD WAR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Despite the title attributed to this sub-section, there is still a peacekeeping operation in progress to which Japan is contributing, namely UNDOF, which originated in the Cold War period. However, looking at UN activities holistically the catholic nature of peacekeeping operations is evident. First, there are the 'traditional' peacekeeping operations like UNDOF which entail the observance of a cease-fire and the blue helmets of the UN acting as a 'thin blue line'.¹ Second, there are the newer post-Cold War operations typified by UNTAC in the previous chapter as a nation-building exercise and continued in Mozambique with election monitoring and organisation. Third, there are humanitarian operations which have expanded the remit of UNPKO to include a new norm of international society in providing relief from persecution, starvation, and poverty.

Finally, the issue of peace-enforcement has never been very far away with the situation in the former-Yugoslavia demanding forceful action from the international community. However, with these kind of operations in mind, attention will be paid to the actual operations to which Japan has contributed; a description of which will follow.

ONUMOS

Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975 after a long civil war led by the Frente de la Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), a Marxist-Leninist group which formed the government and began to receive aid from the Soviet Union. In reaction to this, aid was channelled to the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) by Rhodesia and South Africa. Throughout this conflict, estimates of almost one million Mozambican deaths due, not only to combat, but also to hunger and disease, have been made in addition to over one and a half million people who fled the fighting to neighbouring countries. In a similar situation to Cambodia, a stalemate or 'lose-lose' situation developed allowing the possibility of a solution from outside to be adopted. Initially the government of Kenya and Zimbabwe, and soon Malawi and Botswana, led the way to a diplomatic solution with Italy, the UK and the US subsequently contributing to these efforts.

The FRELIMO government and the RENAMO rebels agreed to a general peace agreement in Rome in October 1992 calling for the UN to monitor the implementation of the agreement, provide assistance for the upcoming elections and monitor these elections once a cease-fire had come into effect.² The two sides were to withdraw, be separated, and prepare for the election to be held before October 1993. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali outlined the UN's role as not only election observation but also humanitarian aid and planned to appoint a special

representative, which was to be an Italian senior staff member of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), Aldo Ajello.³

As in Cambodia, violations of the cease-fire were again a typical occurrence.⁴ There was a recognised risk involved in the operation due to the instability in Mozambique with the Secretary-

General characterising the danger in the following terms:

in the light of recent experiences elsewhere, the recommendations in the present report may be thought to invite the international community to take a risk. I believe that the risk is worth taking; but I cannot disguise that it exists.⁵

The ONUMOZ mandate comprised four interdependent elements: political, military, electoral and humanitarian. Its duties included monitoring and verifying the cease-fire, separating the two parties, ensuring the collection, storage and destruction of weapons, verifying the withdrawal of foreign troops, providing vital infrastructures, and generally promoting the peace process. Demobilised soldiers were provided with humanitarian assistance in readjusting to civilian society. Moreover, technical assistance was made available in the organisation of the legislative and presidential election. Furthermore, food supplies were distributed to the civilian victims of the civil war.

Preparations for the election proceeded apace with registration taking place in the first two weeks of September and the campaign commencing on September 22, 1994. Demonstrative of the interdependence of each aspect of the operation, the repatriation successfully proceeded with 75 percent of displaced persons returned and registered for the election. By October, 750,000 soldiers had been demobilised, the cease-fire was intact and Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council that Mozambique was ready for the election.⁶ As a result, but with ONUMOZ still having to ensure the two factions would honour the results, polling stations opened on October 27 until October 29, 1994.⁷ The elections were conducted in a fair and organised

manner experiencing no major irregularities, with the voting rate in some areas reaching as high as 90 percent returning FRELIMO to power in both the presidential and legislative elections.⁸ The Secretary-General's Special Representative issued a statement after the election declaring the process as 'characterized by the impartiality, dedication and high professionalism of the electoral authorities'.⁹ The Security Council endorsed the results on November 21, 1994 allowing the new parliament and president to be installed and the ONUMOZ mission to be dissolved in December 1994.

The ONUMOZ mission was typical of the post-Cold War variant of peacekeeping mission with a variety of roles being played at one time, but all dependent on each other. The electoral and political processes could not have gone ahead without the humanitarian process of clearing landmines and securing financial investment, and the military process ensuring the safe return of Mozambicans and the secure environment in which to conduct elections. The changes in thinking about security in the post-Cold War world and the advocates of a wider definition of security could see their arguments realised in this and similar operations. UNPKO developed a hybrid of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and humanitarian aid to ensure negotiations between a one-party socialist regime and an armed rebellious group for the peaceful resolution of their dispute. By providing a trust fund, the UN was able to encourage RENAMO to transform itself from a militia group into a political party participating within the democratic process. This, in addition to the humanitarian effort, was the major achievement of the ONUMOZ operation.

UNDOF

The UNDOF operation originates back in the 1973 war between Syria and Israel. Fighting on the Syrian front was contained by Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22 1973 with the

Israeli troops occupying territory around the Golan Heights intruding into Syrian territory—a situation which was characterised by high tensions and sporadic military clashes. In order to address this state of affairs, the US Secretary of State brokered a deal between Israeli and Syrian forces in May 1974. The result of the deal was reported to Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and the Security Council.¹⁰ Israel and Syria were to respect the cease-fire on air, sea, and land. The sides were to be separated according to an agreed formula ensuring an equal area for both sides with equal levels of armament to be allowed and decided by the military representatives of Israel and Syria. These agreements to disengage and remain disengaged were to be monitored by UNDOF personnel with the aim of providing a stepping stone to a peace agreement not a peace settlement *per se*.

Security Council Resolution 350 was adopted on the same day, May 31, 1974, as the agreement was signed by Israeli and Syrian representatives calling on the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to realise the creation of UNDOF. UNDOF personnel levels were set at 1,250 chiefly taken from forces already in the region and originally given a six-month mandate to be extended by the Security Council. Initially troops from Austria, Peru, Poland and Canada made up the core of the force with UNDOF reaching near full-strength by June 1974.¹¹ The situation has remained relatively stable since this time despite tensions elsewhere in the Middle East.¹² The Polish logistic unit was withdrawn in 1993 and its duties transferred to the Canadian unit. It was this unit that was augmented with the despatch of a Japanese SDF transportation unit in 1996 consisting of 45 personnel.

UNDOF's activities included originally overseeing the disengagement phase of the operation with the objective of ensuring Israeli and Syrian troops were safely separated. Following this, UNDOF personnel clearly delineated the zones of separation with the

establishment of checkpoints and observation points and, thus, began UNDOF's major task of supervising the area of separation to ensure there was no military activity therein through 24 surveillance observation posts, patrols, and the regular inspection of the zones or arms limitation on each side of the area of separation. In addition to this traditional peacekeeping role, UNDOF embraces humanitarian roles in encouraging and overseeing the repatriation of prisoners and the return of bodies, in addition to the exchange of mail and the supervision of Druze family reunions separated by the zones of separation. In fulfilling these duties UNDOF has incurred a number of fatalities and casualties over the years. However, since 1991 there have been no major problems except the occasional straying of shepherds into the zone of separation searching for better grazing pastures—a typical example of the essential peaceful nature of the UNDOF operation in the Middle East.¹³

OTHER PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

In addition to participation in the two main operations above, there have also been smaller operations in Africa which the Japanese government has seen as suitable and in keeping with the development and maturing of Japan's peacekeeping experience.

In 1975, with the fall of the Portuguese Empire, the future of Angola was fought over by three factions: the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). The main confrontation was between the established government party, MPLA, backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba and UNITA supported by the US and South Africa. However, with declining Cold War tensions UNAVEM I was created to ensure the withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola. With this achieved UNAVEM II was created in 1991 charged with the duties of

observing and verifying the first elections, demobilising the troops, and creating a joint armed force, and monitoring the police. Subsequent to this mission was the 1995 UNAVEM III operation which sought to achieve national reconciliation through five fields of military, political, humanitarian, electoral, and police assistance. Japanese participation was in UNAVEM II and was limited to a small number of peacekeepers despatched as election observers.

Rwanda's plight was rooted in ethnic differences between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes comprising respectively 85 percent and 14 percent of the population. Ethnic violence erupted with the deaths of President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi in an unexplained plane crash at Kigali airport. Hutu violence was directed at the Tutsi population and Hutu sympathisers with between 500,000 and one million victims. The rapidly established UNAMIR operation concentrated on addressing this tragedy by securing a cease-fire and providing humanitarian assistance often in the face of strong opposition from both sides.

Not only the above operations have encouraged the Japanese government to actively reconsider its peacekeeping contribution. Other events, like the revised defence guidelines with the US, have touched on the peacekeeping debate and affected the norms which govern Japan's foreign policymaking process. This chapter seeks to include these events in its analysis, as well as the concrete participation in the operations outlined above.

INTERNAL NORMS: PACIFISM

Protests within civil society against perceived Japanese militarisation through UNPKO continued to be in evidence during subsequent peacekeeping debates and continued to be framed within the traditional pacifist language. One protest outside the MOFA in February 1993 demanded no further despatch of SDF troops with claims that military force would solve nothing.¹⁴ These

protests often equated UNPKO with brute military force and failed to take cognisance of the changing nature of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, UNPKO could now involve humanitarian and social aspects as saliently as the military aspects. Ogata Sadako, however, did recognise this evolving and not so absolutist interpretation of pacifism and called on the Japanese government to overcome the constraints of the five conditions and participate in UNPKO involving numerous different aspects within one mission. The government can be seen to have understood this position when, as seen in the previous chapter, amidst the controversy of the deaths of Nakata Atsuhito and Takata Haruyuki and despite the opposition of various civil society groups, an SDF advance party of six officers arrived in Maputo to make preparations for the SDF's second despatch on UNPKO of eventually forty-two SDF members charged with transport control operations to the ONUMOZ operation in Mozambique.¹⁵

However, with the rise in Japan of coalition politics after the fall of the LDP in July 1993, the SDPJ came to take up government positions under the coalition leader, Hosokawa Morihiro, yet were forced to compromise their position on UNPKO while a member of the coalition.¹⁶ Thus, with the advent of coalition politics compromise became a watchword for the various factions. This was evident in coalition partners urging the SDPJ to accept the submission of a bill to allow JSDF aircraft to be used in the evacuation of Japanese nationals from crisis situations stressing that each coalition member had agreed to maintain the security and foreign policies of the LDP.¹⁷ In reaction, the SDPJ declared it would rethink its position for fear of putting the coalition at risk.¹⁸ The party leaders were pressured by younger members of the government into accepting a bill dealing with the despatch of SDF aircraft otherwise the impression would be created that the Socialists were unconcerned about the safety of Japanese nationals overseas.¹⁹ The one

concession to the traditional norm of pacifism was that the SDPJ gained guarantees that considerations would be allowed over restrictions on the type of aircraft to be used and the type of weapons allowed during an airlift.²⁰ In addition to this process of compromise coalition politics within the SDPJ, Ichikawa Yûichi of the Kômei Party announced his party's support for unfreezing an article in the PKO Law proscribing the use of weapons. In the review scheduled to start in the summer of 1995, Ichikawa supported reconsidering this freeze in the light of the understanding East Asian nations now displayed for UNPKO after the Cambodia mission.²¹

Civil society was also undergoing a process of reassessing its traditional pacifism. Public opinion polls in the aftermath of the UNTAC mission demonstrated a fresh understanding and support for Japan's peacekeeping role. The Prime Minister's Office polls demonstrated a steady increase in support for Japan's PKO contribution. In May 1997, the *Public Opinion Poll on the Self-Defence Forces and Defense Issues* was released by the Prime Minister's Office with the statistic that 64 percent of those polled agreed with Japan's participation—the highest ever proportion polled. Compared with the previous poll in 1994 this demonstrated a rise of 15.6 points to take the support rate over the 50 percent mark for the first time. Opposition to PKO participation stood at 13.6 percent, a drop of 17 percentage points. Related to this, support for the despatch of the SDF on relief missions increased to 78 percent, whereas 11.9 percent were opposed—a huge and convincing majority demonstrating a positive image of the SDF which was borne out by the statistic that 80.5 percent of those polled had a good impression of the SDF with only 11.7 percent left with a bad impression.²² A *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll of June 1994 demonstrated that the SDF was beginning to 'put down roots in the population' with 53.1 percent regarding the SDF as constitutional and of the 22.1 percent which regarded it as unconstitutional 57.8 percent still regarded the SDF as necessary. Furthermore, 71 percent supported PKO

participation to some degree. Yet, there were still misgivings about the unfreezing of the PKF aspects of PKO with 48 percent preferring to see Japan's participation continue at its existing rate.²³ More recent opinion polls continued to demonstrate support for the SDF's participation in UNPKO. Another Prime Minister's Opinion Poll showed a steady increase in support for some contribution including the despatch of personnel in solving regional conflicts to 38 percent in 1996, an increase from 35.2 percent in 1995 and 28.8 percent in 1994. The important work of the UN which should be actively supported by Japan was deemed to be the support of international peace and security by 69.3 percent, an increase from 67.2 percent in 1995 the previous year and from 66.3 percent in 1994. The same poll demonstrated support of the level of contribution made this far as being 46.4 percent with 23.5 percent (an increase from 15.5 percent in the previous poll) seeking a more active role for Japan. In contrast, only 18.3 percent (a decrease from 25 percent) wished Japan's contribution to be as minimal as possible and 5.7 percent opposed to any participation at all. However, as regards Japan's role as a possible permanent member of the UNSC (which a considerable minority of 15.7 percent of those polled opposed) the main reason for opposition was seen to be the military role Japan would have to play by 23.4 percent of those polled. Yet, it must be stressed that this was a considerable decrease from 31 percent with the same opinion in the previous poll.²⁴

Regarding Japan's role in the UNTAC and ONUMOZ operations, 74.8 percent responded that results had been achieved with 18.9 percent believing participation to have achieved little or no result. As regards SDF participation in humanitarian assistance 76 percent believed they had achieved results with 16.6 percent failing to discern any substantial results. In reference to future participation, 75.1 percent approved to various degrees further participation with 14.2 percent opposed. Humanitarian assistance was slightly more popular with 80 percent approving and 10.7

percent disapproving of future participation.²⁵

1997 was a prominent year as the 50th anniversary of the Japanese Peace Constitution and a great deal of debate in the media centred upon its future. The nation appeared to be equally divided over the issue of revision as it was over UNPKO. In contrast to the overwhelming support for SDF participation in PKO, 45.6 percent supported revision of the Constitution with 43.7 percent opposed. Generational differences naturally were also evident with people born after the war tending to support revision and those born during or before the war tending to support the present Constitution. Political parties also appeared to be fairly divided with Shintô Sakigake and Shinshintô members expressing over 50 percent support for revision and Taiyôtô, Minshutô and Shamintô members displaying over 50 percent support for preservation of the status quo; however, sizeable minorities existed opposed to each majority opinion.²⁶ Thus, although the idea of contribution to international society through the UN was widely supported, the constitutional changes that may be connected to such a pro-active policy were more divisive within Japanese society.

The press reaction within Japan was mixed with the traditional stalwarts of the Constitution criticising the expansion of Japan's role. The *Asahi Shimbun* stated that:

In light of the principles set forth in Article IX, Japan should not supply weapons and ammunition to US warships in international waters, nor should it take actions that would be part and parcel of US military operations.²⁷

In contrast, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* declared that:

The government's current views and interpretations of Article IX, established during the so-called 1955 system make it difficult for Japan to provide effective co-operation. The new guidelines offer an opportunity to give a wider interpretation to Article IX so that the right of collective self defence can never be exercised.²⁸

And the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* arguing that:

As a member of the international community, Japan cannot simply watch on the sidelines in the event of conflict on the Korean Peninsula and in other areas around Japan. We must seriously discuss in specific terms what Japan should do to ensure national security.²⁹

Thus, the media opinions remained solidly compatible with the editorial stance of each particular newspaper which had prevailed throughout the Second Gulf War and the UNTAC operation.

The effect of these altering public opinions and coalition politics on the SDPJ was that it was forced into clarifying what exactly the party's position was. At first, a certain degree of pacifism returned to characterise Japanese politics. Prime Minister Murayama stressed that Japan would never participate in the military aspects of UN peacekeeping missions. The SDPJ also sought to suspend the fact-finding mission in the Golan Heights after it had been decided.³⁰ This was supported by the troops already in the field with UNDOF Force Commander Major-General Johannes C. Kosterf of the Netherlands stating that the SDF would not be welcome, would be highly disruptive, and that UNDOF was functioning perfectly as it was.³¹ Encouragement did exist, however, with Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq Shara's statement to the Japanese fact-finding mission that Japan's participation would be welcomed.³² Equally, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres welcomed Japanese peacekeepers.³³

Within the opposition parties confusion could also be seen with the Kōmei Party declaring Japan's participation in UNPKO as 'premature' whilst its Shinshintō and DSP partners began to tilt towards UNPKO participation.³⁴ The LDP was clear in voicing its support for Japanese participation, yet Shintō Sakigake and the SDPJ were more wary in expressing their support until further negotiation.³⁵ The SDPJ eventually came out against participation in the UNDOF operation with the Central Executive Committee regarding it as a premature move as the SDF may well become involved in a combat situation.³⁶ However, after much deliberation the SDPJ Central Committee agreed to the despatch of an army transportation unit with no participation in transporting ammunition or weapons for other national contingents.³⁷ Eventually, the stalwarts of

Japanese pacifism slowly abandoned the most incompatible of their policies and recognised the existence of the SDF and the Security Treaty with the US. The advent of Murayama Tomiichi as the SDPJ Prime Minister did put on hold the idea of the Hata government to despatch the SDF to Cambodia during the crisis of 1997. The necessary policy reversals of the SDPJ were a precondition before acceptance. The MOFA and the Defence Agency officials also urged the Murayama administration to undertake these commitments in order to promote consistency in Japan's foreign and security policies. Soon after the decision came to despatch between 200 and 300 SDF troops from the engineering, sanitation, and transport units to nations bordering Rwanda. This contribution was further encouraged by Ogata Sadako in meetings with Murayama and Kôno Yôhei of the LDP faction in the ruling coalition. In a similar fashion to the Cambodia mission, Prime Minister Murayama stressed that the SDF would be withdrawn from Zaire if the security situation continued to deteriorate, yet stressed that this despatch was nothing to do with Japan's bid for a UNSC permanent seat, but rather to do with responding to a call from the international community.³⁸ Japan's contribution to the situation in Rwanda began with financial aid pledged in response to requests by Boutros-Ghali. In July 1994, Chief Cabinet Secretary Igarashi Kôzô promised an additional 32.3 million dollars in humanitarian aid in addition to the nine million dollars already pledged but stressed that personnel contributions could not be contemplated until a cease-fire was in place, as had been made clear in the five conditions.³⁹ However, a government fact-finding tour did report from Central Africa that the option of deploying SDF peacekeepers should be kept open, whilst in the meantime the Defense Agency planned the despatch of 300 SDF personnel to assist Rwandan refugees pending approval by the cabinet.⁴⁰ The main issues surrounding the participation of Japanese personnel again proved to be the scope of actions they may take and the deteriorating security situation. The number of

peacekeepers in Zaire varied at different times at around the 260 figure and questions were asked about the rights they had to protect other civilians they were assisting. Tamazawa eventually clarified the situation by stressing that SDF personnel would only be withdrawn if the civil war in Rwanda spread to Zaire, the SDF personnel's neutrality came under threat and the units were no longer required.⁴¹

These changes to the SDPJ's credo were adopted officially at a party conference at the beginning of September 1994 with pledges to maintain the security relationship with the US and to recognise the SDF with over 60 percent of the party agreeing to these changes. Based on the Shadow Cabinet Security Special Committee and the policy shingikai, the Socialists produced the *Challenge for Peace* proposal (*Heiwa e no Chōsen*) which moved the Socialist stance on defence from one of limited security (*gentei bōei*) to one of minimum self-defence (*saishōgen jieiryoku*). Within this document the debate of whether to despatch the SDF or create a new organisation was raised, but with consideration for both points of view placing the emphasis on the non-military contribution that should be made by either organisation with the understanding of neighbouring Asian nations.⁴² Rumours even appeared that the SDPJ was beginning to accept the idea of peace enforcement units.⁴³ The 180-degree change in the thinking of the SDPJ and the trouble this caused for the bureaucracy has its origins in the report entitled *Choices for the 21st Century* submitted to the Temporary Party Congress in September 1994 which recognised participation in operations like Cambodia and promoted a review of the idea of creating a separate organisation for PKO duties. The SDPJ's new thinking on PKO was that participation in traditional operations would be acceptable and that participation in new operations, which do not include any military element, could be promoted.⁴⁴ This was reiterated in Murayama's speech to the 31st SDF High Level Chief Meeting (*Jieitai Kōkyū Kanbukai*) where active participation in PKO of the sort so far

promoted was supported. Before Murayama had recognised the constitutionality of the SDF, the frail coalition was in jeopardy over the extent of Japan's PKO participation. Thus, any role in a possible Macedonian mission was turned down in January 1994, but Zaire was possible by August of the same year. Traces of the SDPJ's originally anti-PKO policy was in evidence recently with its retraction at a defence affairs meeting in May 1998 of support for the LDP-sponsored legislation to ease the use of arms within UNPKO, calling for further discussion with the LDP after having originally approved the proposed legislation.⁴⁵ The objective of this reform was to entrust the right to authorise the use of weapons to the SDF's senior officers, rather than individual peacekeepers. In addition, the remit of Japan's participation would be expanded beyond missions organised by the UN to include regional security organisations. Moreover, in the field of humanitarian aid, relief could be despatched whether a cease-fire is in existence or not. Thus, the Japanese government would be able to overcome the problems encountered in Rwanda where no cease-fire existed and as a consequence humanitarian aid was only able to be extended after compromises with the non-cabinet member coalition partners. The SDPJ's chief concern was that Japan's denial of collective self-defence would be compromised and the Constitution violated. The LDP's Policy Research Council insisted that the legislation was necessary as these changes had been called for by Japanese peacekeepers in the field, and, thus, 'the revision is in keeping with international common sense. Thus, I hope the SDPJ will be able to approve it'—once again showing the pacifist norm slightly altered by the international peacekeeping norm, and also the LDP feeling confident enough that the coalition with the non-Cabinet members of the SDPJ and the Shintō Sakigake would not be broken in submitting this revisionist legislation which had originally been drawn up in Autumn 1996.⁴⁶

Changes in the credo of the SDF can also be seen with its participation in the UNDOF

operation. The Golan Heights were first mentioned as a possible future destination for SDF peacekeepers in May 1994 when the Middle East was regarded as a potential destination as the five conditions for Japanese participation were met and would be a new regional experience for Japanese peacekeepers.⁴⁷ Opposition to the UNDOF participation was voiced by a number of Cabinet members, expressing particular worries about the possibility of becoming embroiled in a long-term UNPKO commitment and the independent behaviour of the MOFA in deciding the SDF's next despatch without reference to the government. The government did stress one aspect of its PKO participation: that only one mission would be addressed at a time by the SDF with troops having to return from Mozambique first.⁴⁸ Especially in the aftermath of the Hanshin Earthquake of January 1995, the SDPJ argued for the despatch of SDF troops to be postponed and concentrated upon aiding victims of the quake disaster.⁴⁹ However, it was eventually decided by all three government factions in discussion with the MOFA and the Defense Agency in March 1995 to send a fact-finding mission to the Golan Heights to explore the SDF's possible participation.⁵⁰ The results of the fact-finding mission were also the cause of debate and concern over the length of the mission and the fact it was a cease-fire observance mission between nations not within a nation—a new direction for Japan; Home Affairs Minister, Nonaka Hiromu described the region as the powder keg of the world.⁵¹ The LDP faction of the government quickly came to the decision to support despatch to the Golan Heights with the SDPJ and Sakigake delaying any decision and stressing further consultation. Yet, eventually the SDPJ did agree to the Golan despatch starting in February 1996 armed with light machine-guns, despite initial emphasis on pistols only. Thus, the SDPJ underwent one more of many changes demonstrated above during the adjustment to coalition politics in Japan.

The five principles of Japan's participation in UNPKO can be seen as an aspect of Japan's

internal norm of pacifism becoming the basis of Japan's refusal to respond to a UN demand to despatch hygiene troops to work with the medical personnel in the evolving PKO on the Iraq-Kuwait border in September 1993 as there existed no consensus or agreement with the warring parties, explicitly stated in the five principles.⁵² Again these principles were raised in June 1994 when the unofficial request from the UN came for Japanese participation in the UNDOF operation as well as the claim that Japan would only participate in one UNPKO at a time and as troops were committed to the extended ONUMOZ operation Japan was in no position to despatch troops.⁵³ In the case of despatching troops to the UNDOF operation, the SDPJ demonstrated how its pacifist ideals had diminished by eventually compromising with its coalition partners over allowing SDF personnel to carry arms, thereby allowing the coalition to draw up plans for the SDF despatch and maintain the SDPJ presence in the government.⁵⁴

A further challenge to the traditional pacifist norm came when the opposition Shinshintō party adopted legislation to expand the SDF's role in UN operations to include participation in multinational forces and sought to present it as a bill.⁵⁵ However, the Shinshintō's position was not solely that of Ozawa Ichirō, as opposition was led by Akamatsu Masao, a junior party member supporting only non-military activities. Support for Ozawa's position tended to cut across party divides (with the exception of the Communist Party) so that the alleged 60 percent of Diet members supporting constitutional revision failed to follow party lines.⁵⁶ Yet, the importance of UNPKO and the extent of Japan's participation had been demonstrated during the negotiations for the creation of the Shinshintō with the Kōmei Party against the unfreezing of the PKF aspects of the PKO Bill for fear of the reaction of the Sōka Gakkai.⁵⁷ Thus, the weak foundations on which Shinshintō were built were exacerbated by the issue of UNPKO.

In mid-July 1997 with the deteriorating security situation in Cambodia the Japanese

government sought to evacuate Japanese nationals in Phnom Penh by using ASDF C-130s. Although this airlift never materialised due to the improvement in the situation in Cambodia it sparked a debate over the appropriate policy. Certain editorials like the *Mainichi Shimbun* questioned the move:

The Prime Minister's decision to send SDF planes abroad has raised many questions. The apologists may say the operation was just a 'dud' that hurt nobody. But how would the Prime Minister respond to the criticism that his hasty decision has just created a lot of confusion?⁵⁸

In contrast, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* argued that:

In certain emergency situations SDF ships may be more effective than SDF planes.... Given the uncertainty in situations around Japan, it is clear that aircraft are not the only available means of transportation. Relevant legislation should be amended as soon as possible.⁵⁹

Equally, the peacekeeping operations that never materialised demonstrate the extent of Japan's actions and the changes of the pacifist norm. A request made by Akashi Yasushi in January 1994 for Japan to contribute a small number of unarmed officers to an observer team in Macedonia was rejected by Hata Tsutomu, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, due to divisions in the coalition between hawks and doves. The supportive and pro-active position taken by the MOFA was in keeping with that of the short-lived Hata cabinet. From April to June 1994, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were both known publicly to be supportive of Japan's permanent representation on the UNSC. However, with the fall of Hata and the rise of the unholy alliance of the LDP, Sakigake, and SDPJ, the MOFA's position weakened considerably. The LDP-Sakigake-SDPJ 'Study Group for the Deliberation of Japan's Entry to the UNSC' reported that the Prime Minister should appoint an advisory committee on the issue of UNSC representation and clearly state that Japan will not participate in UN military actions. Prime Minister Murayama readily accepted the findings of this study group under the chairmanship of Koizumi Junichirō.⁶⁰ The SDPJ's foreign affairs panel soon after confirmed the party's conditions for entry to the UNSC and stressed the support of China and South Korea before securing entry to this elite group of nations

and placed emphasis on the non-military nature of Japan's contribution.⁶¹ Further divisions could be seen within the coalition with Sakigake issuing its own position paper on the UNSC issue in protest at Kôno's speech at the UN General Assembly omitting the condition of UN reform. Kôno was seen to be torn between the MOFA and the traditionally pacifist wings of the coalition creating a 'triangular grid linking the cabinet, the chief party secretary, and the bureaucracy [coupled with a] failure in interparty policy co-ordination in the governing coalition'.⁶² Furthermore, divisions among all three parties of the coalition were in evidence with a vocal minority within the LDP led by Koizumi attaching similar conditions to UNSC membership as the leadership of the Sakigake and SDPJ. Yet, despite the veneer of unity on the issue and support for harsher conditions attached to UNSC entry even the Socialists were divided on the issue. An *Asahi Shimbun* poll estimated 49 percent of SDPJ members opposed to UNSC membership as it promoted big powerism, with 20 percent supportive, and 31 percent failing to respond.⁶³

The effect on the relationship between the bureaucracy and the politicians appears not to have strengthened the bureaucracy's position in the absence of government unity. Instead the MOFA has been seen to have to lobby politicians a great deal more and attempt to create a consensus with little result. Thus, coalition politics has to a degree brought about immobilism in Japan's UN policy for a period with bureaucrats being forced into a position where they must 'do the rounds' and visit each party with the aim of describing the ministry's objectives and inquiring as to the particular party's agenda. With the ascendancy of the LDP after the 1997 election this may be surmounted; however, with the Satô incident and the perennial problems of the Japanese economy, the future of the LDP and the stability it can create in Japanese domestic politics is in question.⁶⁴

The long and still awaited review of the PKO Bill which began in 1995 did make some

preliminary reports in September 1996. The Peace Co-operation Department of the Prime Minister's Office stated in a report to Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō that it believed that the use of arms should be allowed, suggesting that to avoid conflict with the Constitution either a new body should be established or the law cleared up.⁶⁵ In a Lower House Budget Committee, Ozawa confronted Hashimoto over security issues with Ozawa backing more active participation in UNPKO quizzing Hashimoto over whether Japan would be allowed to enforce UN sanctions and participate in peace enforcement units. Hashimoto maintained the traditional interpretation that Article IX does not include UNPKO with an element including the use of force.⁶⁶ Similar traces of the old pacifist norm can still be noted in the debate of the revised defence guidelines and the necessary legislation. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau decided that when hailing and inspecting ships under UN resolutions, SDF personnel would not be allowed to fire warning shots as this would be an aggressive act prohibited by the Constitution.⁶⁷ The Mayor of Naha, Kōsei Oyadomari, opposed the US-Japan defence guidelines and the consequent use of Naha port by US forces in the event of an emergency in areas surrounding Japan.⁶⁸ This necessary legislation also served to force a rift between the LDP and SDPJ, resulting in a growing animosity between the two parties. Doi claimed that 'mutual trust among the ruling parties has gone.'⁶⁹ However, despite this claim, the Socialists have abandoned their adherence to the once durable, pacifist norm of Japanese society and have shown little sign of leaving the coalition.

EXTERNAL NORMS: THE UNITED STATES

The attitude of the Clinton administration to the UN has been to arrange a re-negotiation of the formula employed for the calculation of the peacekeeping budget with the objective of lessening the burden of the US so its budget deficit could be addressed. Fears expressed within the US as

regards the efficacy of the UN also created a vacuum for Japan to fill in the UN system both financially and in other materially personnel ways. Fears that the UN is failing to protect US interests as the chief contributor have been expressed in particular reference to the voting system. The one-nation/one-vote system has often allowed minor and micro states to scupper US plans for reform of the UN. For this reason, the US began a policy of withholding contributions.⁷⁰ The obvious target was to place more burden on Japan and Germany, a plan which President Clinton outlined in a speech to the UN General Assembly suggesting a reduction from the 30.4 percent contribution to 25 percent with Germany and Japan making up the difference.⁷¹ A further call was made by Bill Richardson, US Ambassador to the UN, that Japan make up the difference when the US cuts its contributions to the UN budget to 20 percent.⁷² This policy direction continued in July 1994 with the US Senate urging Japan to follow Germany's example and shed any inhibitions about full UNPKO participation. The Senate passed a resolution threatening not to support Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC unless it lived up to a full commitment to UNPKO particularly with reference to the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula.⁷³ Thus, the relationship with the US was becoming increasingly a constructive norm for Japan.

As seen in the previous chapter, in the aftermath of the UNOSOM missions in Somalia, the US had begun to adopt a new UNPKO policy under the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) stating that, 'US and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective' in addition to encouraging Japanese UNPKO contributions. Thus, UNPKO has become for the US another area to encourage burden-sharing. In the fiscal year 1989, the US share of UNPKO was \$29 million and by 1991 had increased to \$107 million. By 1994 it had exceeded \$1 billion forcing the US to introduce a ceiling on UNPKO contributions of 30.4 percent of all peacekeeping costs

in April 1995. The US attitude is that it cannot push Japan to take up the slack, but if Japan expresses the desire to expand its expertise in this direction then the US will readily provide support in the form of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) agreement.⁷⁴

In September 1994 Vice-President Al Gore continued to call for Japanese assistance and approached Tamazawa Tokuichirō requesting that Japanese SDF troops be allowed to take part in the multinational invasion of Haiti in addition to providing financial aid for reconstruction. Tamazawa stated that he would certainly explore the possibility but stressed the five principles of Japan's UNPKO participation and the constitutional restrictions.⁷⁵ Eventually Kōno Yōhei was reported as planning to offer President Clinton the financial aid and civilian police for the resolution of the Haiti issue only once stability had been secured on the island.⁷⁶ In any event, Tamazawa stated that SDF troops would not be despatched as 'Haiti will hold elections without help and there will be no request for UN peacekeeping operations and a despatch of personnel.'⁷⁷ Thus, the style of operation was the guiding factor in Japan's decision not to participate.

In April 1996, in a meeting between Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton, Japan was urged to assume more of the UN burden previously shouldered by the US. However, for Japan to carry this weight, a greater level of representation would be necessary to persuade Japan and this is where the importance of a permanent seat on the UNSC comes into play. A corollary of this is that the US supports a permanent seat for Japan on the UNSC. Thus, Bill Richardson declared a seat for Japan as a *sine qua non* of any UN reform.⁷⁸

US-Japanese co-operation has recently been extended to include the previously mentioned ACSA. By this agreement the US would supply Japan with the information and transport aircraft for UNPKO participation and Japan would provide fuel, food, lodgings, and

medical care for these operations. This plan was most actively promoted by William Perry, US Secretary of State in talks with the Defense Agency. The unveiling of the interim report of the review of 1978 US-Japan defence guidelines in June 1997 was an extension of this policy obliging Japan to extend the full co-operation of the SDF in joint US exercises, save for a war situation. During a conflict Japan would be obliged to conduct minesweeping exercises, repair US battleships and aircraft and join US blockades. In the event of an attack on Japan it was stated that Japan and the US would co-operate in repelling an invader rather than Japan acting alone at first. This demonstrated a continuing commitment from the US but also clearly expressed a desire to increase Japan's role and extend the security interest of Japan to a regional level. Peacetime co-operation based on the ACSA was also to be encouraged.⁷⁹ The release of the actual revised guidelines stressed as one of the main points the promotion of UNPKO and humanitarian operation when either or both countries are involved. Expanding duties to minesweeping and the evacuation of refugees and non-combatants extends Japan's range of duties both geographically and qualitatively. A similar policy could be seen in Secretary-General of NATO Javier Solana's praise for Japan's UNPKO policy as 'an important contributor to the international effort in Bosnia' despite the fact that Japan contributed no personnel there.⁸⁰ Essentially the policy was similar to the US in encouraging a pro-active role for Japan within the bounds of the bilateral relationship and seeking to lessen the burden upon NATO.

As this relationship is expected to continue for the foreseeable future, it is necessary to examine the role it can play as a norm, especially as the alliance is now aimed at promoting regional stability through multilateral means rather than pointed at any one enemy.⁸¹ The US still regards the relationship with Japan as 'the linchpin of US security policy in Asia'.⁸² This was re-confirmed with the signing of a revised bilateral agreement on mutual logistic support in April

1998 when Madeleine Albright stressed that, 'the US-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of regional security.'⁸³ Moreover, co-operation with the US was stressed by the Japanese government submitting two bills to the Diet in order to accommodate the revised guidelines.⁸⁴ And it must be stressed that this is not an attempt to constrain Japan and prevent it becoming a 'normal' nation. In actual fact the US relationship in the case of UNPKO can be seen as encouraging an active role for Japan as constitutive rather than restrictive. Yet, this has been recognised by Asian observers in negative terms believing that the US has:

deputized part of its role as policeman in the region to Japan.... Basically I don't object to the new US-Japan security pact due to the lack of alternatives, but the problem lies in the momentum generated by developments that started with Japan's participation in the UN peacekeeping operations and will continue with the unshackling of devices put in place to prevent it from becoming a military power.⁸⁵

However, this unshackling from militarism is not the concern of most US and Japanese policymakers. On the Japanese side, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryûtarô stressed the centrality of the US to Japan in that 'our bilateral relationship is growing in importance, offering a foundation for stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region'.⁸⁶ On the US side, Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, Joseph Nye declared that 'regional peacekeeping operations aimed at reinforcing UN peace missions will become important in East Asia', stressing that Japan should thus play a more active role in UNPKO and the US would in return support Japan with information and transportation assistance, very much in keeping with the ACAS agreement.⁸⁷ Thus, the US envisages and encourages a peacekeeping role for the SDF and Japanese pro-activism within the UN; however, this role is very much within the framework of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the revised defence guidelines and the ACAS agreement. As will be seen later with the Higuchi Report, the US advocates multilateralism but only as an adjunct to bilateralism.

EXTERNAL NORMS: UNPKO

With the possibility of Japan participating in the UN's mission in Somalia, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Watanabe Michio addressed the 126th regular Diet session in January 1993 with a call to adopt a new flexibility towards the changing nature of peacekeeping operations: 'I believe that this is an issue that Japan, as a responsible member of the international community, must take up with all due seriousness'.⁸⁸ Thus, the five conditions restricting Japan's participation were seen to be symbols of an old pacifism, incompatible with the changing security and peacekeeping demands. With the changing norm of UNPKO participation and the demands this new norm would make on Japan, Watanabe advocated that the government jettison its old pacifism for a new set of international norms by which to guide Japan's foreign and security policies.

This direction was supported by other government members like Mitsuzuka Hiroshi, head of the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council, who proposed the addition of a clause to Article IX of the Constitution stressing that a UN decision would supersede the Constitution's provisions.⁸⁹ Although Mitsuzuka's particular proposals were linked strongly with a Japanese bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC as he had advocated settling the issue of what Japan was and was not in a position to do before joining the UNSC, framing this debate within the work of the UN system can only be understood by the norms and culture of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War world. To exchange a degree of sovereignty for UN centralism is to dilute the power of the state rather than accumulating power, in this case through representation of the UNSC. This was in contrast to Ozawa's line that reinterpretation of the Constitution was the key to an expanded participation in UNPKO; however, they both stress the centrality of the UN in the Japanese state rather than the Japanese state in the UN system.

Kakizawa Kôji, parliamentary vice-minister for foreign affairs in the Miyazawa cabinet, summed up the expanded sense of commitment by stressing that 'our place in the world today has evolved to a point where this country can no longer afford to remain preoccupied only with the affairs of Asia but must raise its sights beyond it'.⁹⁰ Thus, he began to advocate participation in the UNITAF effort in Somalia and the ONUMOZ operation in Mozambique. Kakizawa stressed, unlike Mitsuzuka, not the need to demonstrate what Japan can and cannot do but rather, 'help dispel the suspicion at home that the passage of the PKO Bill last year was engineered in a hasty, politically-motivated move to send SDF personnel abroad with only Cambodia in mind. The truth is that the International Peace Co-operation Law is an instrument of co-operation for UN peacekeeping operations everywhere in the world and not one of serving Japan's interests in our part of the world alone'.⁹¹

The position of the new coalition government of Hosokawa was highly supportive of a more active role in UNPKO with Hata Tsutomu, Foreign Minister stressing the effort that Japan must produce in order to realise peace in international society, 'we must be determined to sweat and do our utmost to bring about a peaceful world'.⁹² When considered with Hosokawa's speech to the General Assembly quoting the famed Japanese inter-war internationalist Nitobe Inazô, this demonstrates the administration's commitment to international society cannot be interpreted by a traditional realist approach to the study of international relations which places no importance on philanthropy or standards of behaviour in its narrow analysis.⁹³ Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Hosokawa government sanctioned for the first time in two decades the advisory report *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century*. This report stressed a new direction for Japan's foreign and security policy:

Seen in this light [the increased importance of the UN in the post-Cold War world] it should be emphasized anew that one of the major pillars of Japan's security policy is to contribute positively to

strengthening the UN functions for international peace, including further improvement of peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, such contribution is important in the sense that Japan's firm committing [sic] to such an international trend regarding security problems will strengthen its role befitting its international position. The closer the world moves to the realization of the ideal held up in the UN Charter of a world without wars, the better place it will become for nations such as Japan, which aspires for a true peace in the original sense of the word; therefore, it is extremely important to Japan's national interest to make utmost efforts toward this goal. The SDF, whose most important mission is to ensure the security of Japan, cannot be exempt from this duty. From this viewpoint, a number of improvements are needed in such areas as statutes governing the operation of the SDF, SDF organization, equipment and training.⁹⁴

Thus, it was recognised that the work of the UN would be a new direction for the SDF to enhance its reputation. The newer aspects of peacekeeping were to be stressed in addition to whatever contribution Japan could make within the constraints of its pacifist traditions. The ramifications of further participation would be both internal and external:

Giving the SDF opportunities to participate in peacekeeping operations and other international activities will greatly help, internally to broaden the international perspective of the SDF and defense authorities and enhance the public understanding of the SDF and, externally to increase transparency in the real image of the SDF and eventually build confidence in Japan.⁹⁵

This emphasis in Japan's security, defence and foreign policy on the UN and its peacekeeping operations evoked memories of Sakamoto Yoshikazu's *Sekai* article mentioned in Chapter Three and also caused controversy in the US. The report stressed multilateral cooperation under the UN and the US-Japan Security Treaty as the basis of Japan's security policy *in that order*. Criticisms from a Clinton Administration failing to live up to its declaration of 'aggressive multilateralism' accused the report of regarding the bilateral relationship too lightly and *gaiatsu* was applied in order to reverse the order.⁹⁶ This episode demonstrated the currency the UN had gained within Japan after the end of the Cold War as a legitimate forum for a proactive contribution to international society, in addition to the fears that any overtly independent policy direction could arouse in the US. As has been demonstrated, the US was keen to promote Japan's UNPKO policy as one area of burden-sharing, but not at the expense of the bilateral relationship.

The original orders for despatch on the ONUMOZ mission came in May 1993 at the height of fears over the safety of SDF peacekeepers in Cambodia, although considerably less controversy was created by the threat of conditions in Mozambique with the cease-fire in existence.⁹⁷ Controversy did occur over the slow pace of the peace process and the need to delay the election. However, in Japan the term of the UN force was extended with the minimum of opposition. With the formation of a new 48-man team despatched to Mozambique to replace the first team, Nakanishi Keisuke, Director-General of the Defense Agency, urged a review of Japan's PKO restrictions to allow the bearing of arms to be decided by the force commander and, furthermore, to avoid a unilateral withdrawal of troops in a future operation. The DSP also took up this theme proposing a review of the use of weapons by SDF troops with a view to possible participation in the peace enforcement units envisaged by Boutros-Ghali. It was because of comments like this that Nakanishi was eventually forced to resign and was replaced with Aichi Kazuo who supported a role for the SDF in UNPKO without creating a new organisation but would not go so far as to support participation in peace enforcement units.

El Salvador became the third recipient of Japanese peacekeepers in March 1994 with fifteen Japanese personnel despatched to observe the presidential election scheduled for March of that year. At the same time, Owada Hisashi's appointment as Japanese Ambassador to the UN was widely regarded as an attempt to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC—an accurate appraisal considering the MOFA appoints its own officials; however, not a move to be confused with Japan's participation in PKO which is characterised more as an attempt to live up to a norm of international society. This undertaking of international responsibility was also evident in Japan's active role in drafting and becoming a party to the Convention of the Safety of the UN and Associated Personnel in June 1995, as well as contributing \$500,000 to a project aimed at

improving the protection of UN Volunteers—a direct consequence of the lessons from the UNTAC operation. Moreover, in April 1997, Owada Hisashi, Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN, elaborated a plan to the Committee on Peacekeeping Operations for the strengthening of the UN's peacekeeping activities stressing co-operation with regional organisations, provision of humanitarian assistance and preventative diplomacy.⁹⁸

With the debate over whether to participate in the UNDOF operation or not between the three coalition government members, the MOFA stressed that participation was not linked with the attainment of a permanent seat on the UNSC, but with avoiding discrediting Japan's reputation in the eyes of the world.⁹⁹ Thus, rather than a realist interpretation of power accumulation, Japan is being seen as having to live up to certain standards and norms of the international community. This was in evidence when Murayama promised 'forward-looking consideration' of Japan's participation in UNDOF in reaction to fears expressed that Japan was not making a full commitment to international society by Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien.¹⁰⁰ André Quétel, Canadian Foreign Minister, intimated to Tamazawa Tokuichirō, Director-General of the Defense Agency, that Canada would welcome Japanese SDF forces in the Middle East and in return would support Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC if Japan lived up to its role in the world.¹⁰¹ Japan did soon after begin to investigate the possibility of despatching troops to the UNDOF mission with a view to replacing the Canadian logistics battalion hit by Canadian peacekeeping cuts and sent a preliminary fact-finding mission. However, significant opposition existed within the Cabinet citing public attitudes and also criticising the manner in which the MOFA was behaving without reference to the government stressing that only one UNPKO would be contemplated at a time and SDF troops would have to return from Mozambique beforehand.¹⁰² Japan's particular contribution to the UNDOF mission

continued as predicted with the despatch renewed in July 1997. Kyuma Fumio, Director-General of the Defence Agency, upon visiting the SDF units in Syria and Israel stated that, 'our forces, which were just newcomers at the start, have now started to build a firm position in UNDOF' with participation expected at the least until February 2000.¹⁰³

Japanese personnel have steadily gained a higher profile within the UN system and have encouraged the Japanese government to act in a more pro-active manner. In particular with his subsequent appointment as Special Representative to the Former Yugoslavia, Akashi Yasushi continued to use his position to encourage a more active role from Japan particularly in its despatch of foot soldiers stressing that:

If Japan were given the status of a Security Council permanent member, it needs to act in accordance with its new responsibility because the Security Council is responsible for ensuring world peace and security.¹⁰⁴

Japan's Ambassador to the UN, Owada Hisashi, stressed the importance of the changes in peacekeeping and the role Japan could play in new, multidimensional peacekeeping:

In the post-Cold War era, cases are increasing in which the traditional type of UN peacekeeping by itself cannot bring about the desired goal of political stability.... Japan is convinced that a new innovative approach to peacekeeping is urgently needed and pledges its best endeavour to reshape and re-organize a new paradigm for the UN peacekeeping operations which could function as an effective means for the prevention and the resolution of the conflict in a new international environment.¹⁰⁵

Owada stressed a multilateral approach bringing together the disparate strategies of cease-fire negotiation, humanitarian assistance to refugees, the stationing of troops, etc., combined with the promotion of rapid deployment units and co-operation with regional organisations.

In the case of Rwanda, the SDPJ agreed to the despatch of medical personnel under the PKO Law with the condition that the contribution was limited to medical work in recognition of the severity of the mission and the necessity to make a contribution as a member of the international

community.¹⁰⁶ Ogata Sadako again encouraged the Japanese government to contribute with claims that, 'we are expecting the general support of financial, material and personnel. Now is a time when the military can make a non-military contribution'—an opinion echoed by Prime Minister Murayama and Foreign Minister Kôno.¹⁰⁷ Thus, Japan's first SDF despatch under the humanitarian terms of the PKO Law was inaugurated and the SDPJ continued its redefinition of its post-war security and foreign stances. This was also an option which was preferable to the SDPJ, which although recognising the existence of the SDF, was not willing to actively despatch it, as was seen in its agreement to the UNDOF operation as long as the SDF was not automatically premised for despatch.¹⁰⁸ More recently, government activism with the aim of improving Japan's peacekeeping contribution has been very much in evidence. The Defence Agency decided upon the creation of a peacekeeping office including about seventy staff to collect information on various peacekeeping activities from all over the globe, in addition to assisting in the training of future peacekeepers which started operations in 1997.¹⁰⁹

EXTERNAL NORMS: EAST ASIAN NATIONS

Prime Minister Murayama, like his post-Cold War Prime Ministerial predecessors, also took the initiative in attempting to dilute the influence of W.W.II in Japan's diplomacy with East Asia.

Murayama especially stressed the importance of ASEAN and stated that:

we will promote our Asia diplomacy with a strong determination to maintain our pacifist Constitution and never repeat our mistakes by becoming a military power.¹¹⁰

In particular Murayama addressed the issues of the 'comfort women' and the treatment of W.W.II in Japanese school textbooks. Nevertheless, the watchword of Murayama's policy was caution and often this softly-softly approach was thrown into contrast with the activism of leaders like Mahathir who strongly advocated a pro-active role for Japan in the UNSC.¹¹¹ This activism

was echoed by the Thai leader Chuan Leepai supporting Japan's role as appropriate considering its financial contributions.¹¹² The chairman of the *Philippine Star* newspaper recognised the *raison d'être* for Japan's existing military strength and stressed that rearmament by Japan was nothing to fear despite the fact he had fought in the Philippine resistance and lost family and friends in W.W.II to Japanese imperialism.¹¹³ Yet, a stronger role for Japan was seen as a growing reality and something to be encouraged.

However, South Korea still expressed doubts to a certain, but softening, degree. Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo informed Foreign Minister Kôno that Korea understood Japan's desires and position in the international order but refrained from all-out support for Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC.¹¹⁴ Whereas South Korea's approach may have been seen to have softened throughout the 1990s, China always sought to ensure that the East Asian nations' memory of W.W.II remained intact as a norm restricting any trace of military activism in Japan. This was evident with the announcement of the revised US-Japanese guidelines, where the Japanese government favoured an early publication and flew to Beijing in order to deal with fears in neighbouring East Asian nations. When the US-Japanese revised guidelines were released in September 1997 the importance of China was stressed as the two nations both sought to improve bilateral ties with China and despatched advisors to quell fears in Beijing. China was vehemently against the expanded role for Japan stressing the Cold War mentality behind it and the danger of expanding Japan's role into the Asian region. Hashimoto's four-day visit to Beijing in September 1997 was characterised by Chinese fears that Japan would involve itself with the Taiwan dispute. Hashimoto departed with the aim of making 'efforts to promote relations of trust between Japan and China by keeping in mind lessons learnt from such history. This is the biggest aim of my visit to China'.¹¹⁵

South Korea, however, was notably taciturn about the guidelines chiefly because in the case of conflict with North Korea it would benefit from US-Japanese military co-operation. South Korea was not so concerned as long as 'the Japanese government obeyed the principle of transparency and the Constitution [then] the new guidelines will contribute to Asia-Pacific stability'.¹¹⁶ South Korea has generally in the 1990s become more lenient in its dealings with Japanese military and political activism. Fears have been expressed in South Korea over Japan's acquisition of a permanent seat on the UNSC; a group of 30 politicians submitted a proposal to the Korean parliament to overturn the government's understanding of Japan's desire to gain a permanent UNSC seat unless apologies, compensation, and the return of cultural treasures to Korea were undertaken by the Japanese side.¹¹⁷ However, this is an exception and generally South Korea has moved closer in line with the majority of East Asian nations and away from the unyielding line taken by China. With the release of the revised guidelines certain nations like Indonesia and the Philippines were, as had previously occurred, less concerned about the possibility of Japanese remilitarisation.

There were reports in July 1995 of Defense and Foreign Affairs officials of Japan and South Korea discussing joint co-operation in the field of peacekeeping with joint training exercises and the mutual use of transport planes.¹¹⁸ Similar reports surfaced over Sino-Japanese relations with a view to improving the bilateral relationship as well as refining PKO skills.¹¹⁹ These developments had been previously mooted by Kakizawa Kôji with his proposal for an Asian Peacekeeping Force under UN auspices.¹²⁰ This is possibly one area where the traditionally restrictive norm of Japan's relations with its Asian neighbours can be turned into an invigorating and constructive norm allowing both sides to redefine their military activities in addition to their own bilateral relations with a new specificity and concordance.


SUMMARY

With the General Election of October 20 1996 the LDP regained a lot of the ground it had lost in the previous three years winning 239 of the 500 seats available with Shinshintō acquiring 156 seats.¹²¹ The LDP was, thus, able to form a minority government with only informal connections to its former coalition partners Shintō Sakigake and the SDPJ, and the reformist parties were now marginalised and proceeded to fracture in opposition along the lines of old party and personality loyalties. Thus, one of the effects on the government's UNPKO policy ought to have been that the LDP was in a position to influence the direction Japan took with little reference to other domestic actors.

However, since this time there has been no obvious test of Japan's UNPKO policy with stability prevalent on the Golan Heights. Moreover, Prime Minister Hashimoto has compromised his public popularity with his handling of the appointment of Satō Koko from the Nakasone faction to his cabinet. In an upsurge of public opposition, Hashimoto was forced to withdraw this appointment and his approval rating almost collapsed. Whether the post-1993 period of coalition politics will continue or not remains, thus, vague. However, one of the major effects of coalition politics was not so much the SDPJ managing to insist upon its traditionally pacifist agenda, but more in the SDPJ altering its traditional post-1945 stance on security and foreign policy. As demonstrated in previous chapters, the SDPJ came to be the political personification of the Japanese pacifist norm, yet has altered its position to such an extent that only the Communist Party has remained true to its pacifist leanings. Yet, it would be missing the point to regard this as a simple jettisoning of principles; it would be more accurate to view it as a re-conceptualisation of the pacifist norm in the light of the primacy of UNPKO in post-Cold War security. Thus, the SDPJ has responded to the norm of international co-operation through possible military means,

incorporating it into their casting of pacifism. This is one of the main themes of Japan's period of coalition politics and of this chapter, in addition to the steady support coming from the US within the bilateral framework, and the gradually shifting attitude of Japan's East Asian neighbours, as demonstrated in Diagram V.

DIAGRAM V: POLICYMAKING MATRIX FOR CHAPTER SIX, SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS



CONCLUSION

This study has sought to demonstrate that norms matter in the formation of Japan's foreign and security policies. This was achieved by outlining in Chapter One the traditional approaches to international relations, and by examining the literature related to norms in order to settle upon a definition of norms. The following Chapter Two built upon this by tracing the development of the particular norm of UNPKO. Thus, this study has sought to comment not only on Japan but also on the practice of peacekeeping as a security issue. Chapter Three then outlined traditional approaches to the study of Japan's foreign and security policies and what these approaches could and could not tell us about Japan's watershed contribution to UNPKO. In addition it highlighted gaps in our knowledge, and suggested ways in which the study of norms could contribute to our deeper understanding. This chapter also brought the reader up-to-date on Japan's contribution to UNPKO during the oft-ignored period from 1956 to 1990 by setting the historical scene in preparation for the following empirical chapters. Thus, Chapters Four, Five and Six examined empirically how these norms have manifested themselves in each case study from the outbreak of the Second Gulf War through to the present time. This conclusion will highlight the main findings of this study by commenting upon the changes which have occurred over this time frame. Following sub-sections will deal with recognising the existence of norms, the changing nature of norms and how to measure these changes, the degree of compliance with these norms, the role of the UN in influencing Japan's foreign and security policies and the level of internationalism, and the role of civil society in Japan. The findings are summarised in Table I. In addition, areas which merit further research will be suggested in summarising.

THE EXISTENCE AND IMPORTANCE OF NORMS

Norms are undoubtedly important as seen in Kratochwil's work on the Cuban Missile Crisis.¹ Norms, often overlooked in the realist-dominated literature, dictated what options were available to the US and the USSR in resolving the crisis. In a similar fashion, this study has sought to contribute to this ignored field of study in the international sphere by explaining the norms which have informed Japan's watershed decision to dispatch the SDF on UNPKO. In addition, our understanding of how the norms (both the internal pacifist norm and external norms, like the US and East Asian Nations) which inform Japan's foreign and security policies are changing has been deepened. Moreover, attention has been drawn to the influence of a Super-Leviathan in the form of the UN and its peacekeeping functions acting as the intervening variable in influencing, constraining and encouraging state behaviour. Of course, the role of individuals in the policymaking project is not being denied. Simply, in a similar fashion to the genetic structure of the human body deciding the remit of available actions, the norms which have been pointed to in this dissertation create the environment in which politicians and bureaucrats (like genes in relation to their host organisms) make their decisions.

The reverence extended to these norms can be seen in various examples throughout this study and provide these supposedly elusive norms with a tangible body proving to be more than the exogenously given preferences of actors as both neo-realism and neo-liberalism contend. All the actions described above in Kratochwil's quotations can be seen in Japan's UNPKO policy, thereby demonstrating the existence and recognition of these norms. Through these examples we can see that norms of international behaviour do exist borne of internal and external sources that can both constrain and liberate the decisions of the Japanese government. Particularly the sense of *ought* has come clearly through in this study with a compulsion on the part of

government, bureaucratic and civil societal circles to contribute something to international society in the security field consummate with Japan's international economic standing. With the evidence offered in this study in mind a definition of a norm can be proffered:

an intersubjectively understood standard of behaviour rooted either in domestic or international society, often (but not always) embodied in the form of a treaty, charter, constitution, etc., which upon gaining a degree of legitimacy frames the gamut of decisions and actions available to individual decision-makers.

Thus, norms are accorded a great deal more attention as an influencing variable than neo-realism or neo-liberalism, the traditional interpretations of IR theory, have conceded. With this point established, the aims and objectives of the Japanese government and bureaucracy also need to be rethought; simply maximising power and wealth is not sufficient. A social sense of duty and contribution to international society which has little concrete or immediate gain behind it has become a clear objective for Japanese decision-makers. Norms, like UNPKO, can influence, encourage, or limit the objectives of governments. Thus, state interests are seen to extend beyond simple power maximisation and are not given but constructed endogenously.

MEASURING CHANGING NORMS

Still, it is not simply enough to identify norms. It is also necessary to explain their origins, which are more relevant, and how they rise and decline in influence. In the case of the Second Gulf War, it is clear that a crisis can always bring about change and cause havoc as to which traditional norms possess influence. However, in concluding it has to be stressed that there is also a more subtle and evolutionary way in which norms can alter. In Chapter One I proposed examining the changes in norms by centring on the three criteria expounded by Legro: specificity, durability and concordance. This definition of norms is lacking in that he only examines regulatory norms and pays no attention to the idea that norms can liberate, encourage

and constitute human action. However, these three criteria are still applicable to the task of discovering which norms are in the ascendance and which are in decline. Thus, norms which score highly in each of these criteria will be presumed to be influential in character and vice-versa. In the case of Japan's peacekeeping experience, the four identified norms can be measured by these guidelines (see Table I) to attain an understanding of which internal and external norms matter.

SPECIFICITY

The domestic norm of pacifism, with its social rather than Christian origins, is well understood in Japanese society. With a strong tradition going back to the pre-war period when Japan's military enterprise in Asia was called into question, through to the A-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the firebombing of Tokyo, the anti-militaristic tendencies have been clearly expressed in opinion polls throughout this period. The specific objects of this restrictive norm have been the US-Japan Security Treaty, revision of the Constitution, particularly Article IX, the existence of the SDF and its dispatch overseas. Thus, during the Second Gulf War, the traditional pacifist attitudes of Japanese civil society were still largely intact and reflected the stance the SDPJ had taken since shortly after W.W.II.

So, if this domestic norm and its restrictive nature is widely recognised and comprehended, why has its specificity been classified in Table I as 'Middle-Falling'? Simply put, this is due to the emerging norm of the UN and its peacekeeping functions. This norm, as is demonstrated later, has been categorised in its specificity as 'Middle-Rising', and I would suggest that the international norm of UNPKO is rising at the expense of the domestic norm of pacifism. In the aftermath of the Second Gulf War and the failed attempt to pass legislation to allow the

dispatch of SDF personnel, as was seen in Chapter Three, the Japanese government came under a great deal of criticism from the international community and it became increasingly evident that some kind of military contribution would have to be made. The question for the ruling LDP was how to realise this contribution without invoking the domestic norm of pacifism and its restrictive nature. The answer was to avoid a unilateral dispatch of SDF personnel within a multinational force and to marry an international contribution with the UN system, recently liberated from the confining structure of the Cold War and enjoying a renaissance. Any contribution that could be justified under the UN Charter could also be justified under the Japanese Constitution with their common origins. A hard-nosed neo-realist interpretation would regard this contribution as part of the Japanese government's policy of continuing to avoid international contributions for as long as possible, rather than reacting to an internationalist norm embodied by the UN and a pacifist norm embodied in civil society. However, neo-realism only gains a limited understanding of Japan's policymaking process as it fails to comprehend how deep anti-militarist roots had been put down in post-W.W.II Japanese society, and, moreover, the extent to which the Japanese government has had to use stealth and incrementalism in responding to both international and domestic norms. There has been a clash of internal and external norms in Japan for the last half-century over the role of the UN in relation to domestic pacifism and the dominant role of the US—a clash seen throughout the empirical chapters. The neo-realist approach is ahistoric and by regarding all nation-states as similar 'billiard balls' is incapable of factoring in the specific characteristics of a nation-state—unlike a study which lays an emphasis upon norms.

Thus, during the Diet debates concerning the passage of the PKO Bill and in dealing with the neighbouring states in East Asia, Japanese politicians and bureaucrats stressed that the

contribution of personnel would take place within the framework of the UN. This policy was realised with the first dispatch of SDF troops on the UNTAC mission where the terms of the UN's mandate and the maintenance of a cease-fire were repeatedly referred to—a trend that has continued up until recently with the recent attempt at revising the PKO Law including contribution to peacekeeping operations under the aegis of regional organisations. However, the strength of feeling for a multilateral commitment is still noteworthy. In this way, the LDP leadership, eager to expand Japan's contribution to international society and in particular the UN with one eye on a UNSC permanent seat, was able to weaken the traditionally stringently recognised norm of pacifism by combining it with the norm of the UN and its peacekeeping activities. The norm of UNPKO is still of a pacifist nature but recognises the use of force in achieving the goal of peace. In this way, the LDP leadership could proceed in its goal of making Japan a 'normal' state and overcoming the anti-militarist 'allergy'. For these reasons, the pacifist norm is regarded as not having necessarily weakened but having mutated to permit a level of force acceptable to the Japanese government and society of the day.

However, UNPKO have shown themselves to be undergoing a process of redefinition in the post-Cold War world leading to a degree of fuzziness in their definition not only in Japan, but elsewhere in the world—especially the US. The three remaining norms, domestic pacifism, the relationship with the US, and the attitude of East Asian nations, have much more of an understood history in Japan and are much more clearly defined and are institutionalised in the Constitution, Article IX, and the US-Japan Security Treaty, and are, thus, legitimised. In contrast, this lack of understanding of UNPKO can be seen during the Second Gulf War. Partly because the operation was a UN-sanctioned multinational operation under the leadership of the US and not a traditional UNPKO, a warped impression of the practice of peacekeeping was current

among the Japanese public. Thus, the fear of an inevitable loss of Japanese life was anticipated and activated the traditional, internal norm of Japanese pacifism with the result that, after the public and Diet debate, the PKO Bill could only be passed successfully with the attached five guidelines.

Moreover, during the UNTAC operation the outrage caused in Japan by the deaths of the UN volunteer, Nakata Atsuhito, and civilian policeman, Takata Haruyuki, was partly borne out of a failure to understand the risks of UNPKO and the fact that casualties are not uncommon. Due largely to the actions and statements of the volunteer's father, Nakata Takehito, the furore and clamour to bring back the SDF personnel abated and a deeper understanding of the practice of peacekeeping was attained.

Only recently has the ruling LDP, nearly five years after the initial legislation, felt strong enough to attempt to once again challenge the domestic, regulatory norm of pacifism and redefine the US-Japan defence guidelines concerning firstly, the existence of a cease-fire in the case of the dispatch of humanitarian aid, and secondly, the order to use force residing with the unit commander and not the individual, thus questioning the denial of the right to collective self-defence.² There still exists a certain vagueness in the understanding of UNPKO generally and Japan's contribution specifically. Moreover, the process of defining what the SDF can or cannot do is still being debated and it may be some time before a clear consensus is reached. However, although the details may be vague, the sense of making a contribution to international society is clearly understood across party divides. This can be seen in the SDPJ's major policy reversals originating in the report entitled, *Choices for the 21st Century* submitted to the Temporary Party Congress in September in 1994 and continued through until the New Security Proposals in September 1997. The concrete outcome of these proposals was that the SDF, the US-Japan

Security Treaty and the necessity of contributing to UNPKO were all recognised. In short, a broad understanding of the need to make an international contribution has been reached but the details of how the SDF may be permitted to realise this contribution are still vague.

Despite this, the process of re-definition of UNPKO, the *globalisation of the practice of peacekeeping* has been shown to have progressed in the post-Cold War world and to have gained a near global acceptance (see Appendix I) which is all the more remarkable as UNPKO lacks a degree of legitimisation and institutionalisation by not being mentioned anywhere in the UN Charter. It is through a behavioural process of acceptance by a vast majority of states that UNPKO has gained its current acceptance and understanding. Thus, UNPKO can be classified as a *standard of international behaviour* to which states feel an obligation to respond—in other words, a norm. The process of this political globalisation has been a more lengthy process than any economic globalisation due to the not-so-obvious benefits to be gained. However, peacekeeping goes against the traditional Western-based interpretations of globalisation. It cannot be seen as having laid down roots firmly as a western action from an early stage of the UN's development as India, Pakistan, Fiji etc. were all traditional supporters of UNPKO. And recently, with the end of the Cold War, UNPKO have gained currency and comprehension in both Western and non-Western societies, most remarkably in Japan in a positive sense, and in the US in a negative sense. Thus, the globalisation of peacekeeping has created over time a truly global norm and set of values and is not simply the transplantation of Western values of democracy and free market economics—as a Marxist interpretation would posit. In Table I, as UNPKO is still undergoing a process of being comprehended and re-defined, despite the necessity of these activities being recognised, the specificity grading has been rated as 'Medium-Rising'.

The relationship with the US Institutionalised in the US-Japan Security Treaty is clearly

understood. The fact that the US has wanted Japan to play a more active role in regional and global security, but not at the expense of the bilateral relationship, has been clearly stated in various pronouncements and declarations from the Second Gulf War onwards. Although not so obvious during the UNTAC episode (certainly when compared to the attitudes of Japan's Asian neighbours), it was intersubjectively understood and kept alive through William Perry's visit to Tokyo in May 1993 in the aftermath of the deaths of Nakata and Takata and the Presidential Decision Directive in May 1994. Further substance was given to the US-Japan relationship and the encouraging, constitutive norm it has proved to be with the release of the ACSA in February 1995 and the reviewed US-Japan defence guidelines in June 1997. Thus, with this in mind, the relationship with the US has been graded as 'High' in the field of specificity (see Table I).

East Asian nations have made clear their opposition in a comprehensive, almost automatic, reaction to anything that smacks of Japanese remilitarisation. From the time of the Second Gulf War reaching a height during the UNTAC operation and still evident in recent years, China and South Korea have been the most vociferous opponents of what is perceived in these nations, not as a necessary international contribution, but as a sign of Japanese remilitarisation. However, states that have come directly into contact with Japan in participating in the UNTAC operation have come to an understanding of Japan's contribution. Particularly with the encouragement from the Cambodia factions, the working relationship with the Philippines in transportation duties, and the proposed co-operation with Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines in the resettlement of refugees, certain of Japan's neighbours can be seen to have broken away from their traditional monolithic opposition to a more proactive role for Japan. Thus, in diagrams III and IV, the policymaking matrices after the Second Gulf War have made a clear distinction between the two camps. Moreover, even the stalwart opposition of South Korea has

softened in recent years with the proposal of joint exercises between the two nations first appearing in July 1995. Especially in the light of the revised US-Japanese defence guidelines, it is in South Korea's interests to promote a co-operative and less critical relationship with Japan as in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula it will be the US and Japan which are expected to come to South Korea's aid.

Thus, it is clear that slowly over time the once solid opposition of the nations of East Asia to the rising pro-activism of their former colonial master has waned and clearly divided. For these reasons, the specificity of the regulative norm created by the attitudes of East Asia nations has been given a rating of 'Medium-Falling'.

DURABILITY

The obvious victim from all of the norms examined in this work appears to be the domestic norm of pacifism, seen in the failure to check the dispatch of SDF personnel abroad and the electoral embarrassment of the SDPJ, the self-professed guardians of the Japanese Peace Constitution, in the October 1996 Lower House elections. In addition to this, the once monolithic opposition of the Japanese public to any hint of 'militarism' began to fracture in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War and Japan's embarrassment in failing to co-ordinate a meaningful contribution to the US-led international effort. Demonstrated in repeated opinion polls, the Japanese public has come from a stage of opposing any participation with regularly over 50 percent voicing their opposition in a variety of opinion polls, to a stage where 71 percent supported a degree of participation in peacekeeping activities.³ The reason for this undeniable turnaround in public perceptions ending the durability of the pacifist norm can be credited in great measure to the role of the UN. In the opinion polls cited in each chapter the proviso for Japanese participation in

peacekeeping activities has always been the leadership and guidance of the UN. Thus, Japanese participation in non-UN missions like that in Haiti has been unthinkable and repeatedly declined by the Japanese government, citing the aegis of the UN as a prevailing norm.

Moreover, the initial opposition of the business community has, in parallel fashion to Japanese public opinion, steadily weakened since the controversy of the Second Gulf War. The wariness at the time of organisations like the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Nikkeiren has metamorphosed into the representative attitude of organisations like the Kansai Association of Corporate Executives (*Kansai Dōyūkai*) and its recent report entitled, *Thinking Straight about Japan's Security: Toward Strategic and Proactive Decision-making and Responsible Action*. This report was clear in placing its emphasis upon national, regional and global security:

while conducting positive diplomacy in peacetime we must also make steady preparation in peacetime in order to make prompt and accurate judgement in times of crisis. We must think, but not in terms of legal interpretation, what is the best option for this country.⁴

Thus, in similar fashion to civil society, the business community's representative opinions have gradually changed in line with the work of the UN system and the concept of multilateral security.

The durability of the relationship with the US is beyond question. Already institutionalised in the US-Japan Security Treaty, it has been further strengthened by the revised guidelines. Despite recurrent doubts expressed, particularly in Okinawa, about the continuing stationing of US troops in Japan, the central position each government accords to the relationship is a prevailing factor. Unlike the domestic norm of pacifism, the external norm of the relationship has gone through no great re-interpretation and, thus, scores highly in its durability.

Once again, the UN, and Japan's relationship with it, has been the beneficiary of

developments since the end of the Cold War. Already accorded high levels of support within Japan since admission in 1956, the UN and its peacekeeping functions have been strengthened in their normative power by the metamorphosis undergone by the domestic interpretations of pacifism. The UN, now married to traditional Japanese pacifism, scores highly in its durability and, for similar reasons, its concordance. For these reasons, although an important change in Japan's post-Cold War foreign and security policy climate, it would be an oversimplification to regard the pacifist norm as waning. A more accurate interpretation would be to link this internal norm with the international norm of participation in international society institutionalised in the UN and its peacekeeping activities. The UN's new-found legitimacy in the post-Cold War world has been married to the traditional pacifism whereby the use of force for peaceful ends, ends defined by the UN, has become a new international standard.

CONCORDANCE

With which norms has Japan felt a duty to comply and what are the factors which have ensured compliance by Japan? The reasons for any compliance are both internal and external and through institutionalisation exist within the norms themselves as they become what Durkheim termed 'social facts'.

Compliance is strongly linked to the idea of legitimacy and coherence. This aspect has been defined by Thomas Franck as:

a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles or right process.⁵

The development of the new norm of UNPKO is backed up by a history outlined in Chapter Two. Through this historical development it is evident why as far as certain states such as

Scandinavian states, Canada, India, etc., are concerned, the concept of UNPKO is clearly understood and this comes across in the high regard for this practice in these states, the level of their contribution, and the respect which these nations have earned for their participation and their ability to redefine their security policies in the light of this multilateral norm.

In Japan the understanding of UNPKO, which is a proviso to its consequent concordance, is still developing as seen in the deaths of Nakata and Takata during the UNTAC operation. However, in Japan with its traditional norm of pacifism, anything that smacked of the dark side of militarism resulted in outcry and demands to recall the SDF. The reaction of the government was to refer to a more clearly comprehended norm in Japan in the form of the UN. As mentioned previously, the UN has traditionally received high levels of support from the Japanese public, and the government knew the process of education about SDF dispatch on peacekeeping activities could be assisted by making reference to the UN system and international society. Legitimacy and coherence could be acquired for the newer norm by reference to the more traditional norm within which it existed. This is connected to the perlocutionary effect of norms, i.e. the success of communicating norms and how they are intersubjectively understood. This has been relatively successful in the case of the emerging norm of UNPKO, due to what Florini has called an entrepreneurial evolutionary path which can exist for a norm. Under the aegis of a sponsor like the UN or the US, a practice, like UNPKO, can gain legitimacy. This is evident in the central role the UN played in justifying Japan's new pro-activism in the field of peacekeeping. From the reflections of this belief in opinion polls through to the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council's proposal to attach greater weight to UN resolutions than the Peace Constitution, the utility of the UN as a means of justifying the end and providing the practice of peacekeeping with legitimisation has been demonstrated in this study.

There is also an almost anti-legitimacy argument for legitimacy in the form of emulation. Anti-legitimate in the sense that it is a passive, rather than active, form of legitimisation. Often at times of incomplete information where the logic of a decision is unclear or the available alternatives are not obvious, emulation of allies and neighbours can be an option. These decisions are far from irrational but would be unacceptable to a hard-nosed, realist rational-choice theorist. This aspect can be seen in the reverence for the relationship with the US. This study has shown that the relationship still possesses a great deal of normative power within Japanese government circles. However, it is also evident that in the post-Cold War world, where the justification for the relationship was weakened with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, following the US lead or the process of emulation has been evident, especially during the Second Gulf War where *gaiatsu* was at its most obvious. Since that time an effort has been made to reinvent the relationship with the US through the revised guidelines and its normative power has continued to be in evidence by encouraging a pro-active role, within the limits of multilateral institutions, for Japan's foreign and security policies.

Moreover, by going back to the analogy of human genetic make-up, a deeper understanding of Japan's concordance with the norms highlighted here can be attained. The idea of *inheritance* has played an important role in deciding which norms have governed the decisions the Japanese government has made. For example, the attitudes of Japan's neighbouring Asian neighbours have been inherited throughout the generations to influence those with neither experience nor memory of Japan's colonisation of Asia from the Meiji period. Like the information contained in a gene, the information contained in this norm has been to oppose any degree of Japanese remilitarisation unquestioningly. In the case of China and South Korea, the inheritance process has been going on for a longer time and has reached a greater level of

institutionalisation. In the case of nations like Thailand and Malaysia, the war-time experience may be quite different, but has weakened as this norm has been contested by other norms, like UNPKO or the attitude of the US, carrying different information and instructions from the traditional norm. To continue Florini's genetic analogy, the law of survival governs which norms prevail and, in the case of these states bordering on Cambodia, the immediate desire for a strong UN presence restoring security to the region mitigated the traditional opposition to Japan's perceived remilitarisation. Two directly opposed norms cannot be followed at once; thus, an old, traditional norm is driven out or weakened by a new rising standard of international behaviour, although there may be a period of following polymorphically two separate norms before a new standard is found. This can currently be seen in the case of South Korea. The traditional opposition to Japan's UNPKO participation is slowly being accepted and the previously inconceivable state of affairs that South Korea and Japan conduct joint military training exercises together has been mooted and encouraged by the UN and US informed norms—the two of which have been credited with a higher degree of concordance than the internal pacifist norm and the norm created by the attitudes of East Asian nations.

SUMMARY

This study has located sources of activity and reactivity in Japan's foreign and security policy by shifting the focus away from the traditional concepts of realist material definitions of power towards a study of the norms of international behaviour. This study has demonstrated that the UN has been able to provide:

a boundedly rational forum for the mounting of innovations [and it is not inevitable for the UN, international and regional organizations to] remain the tool their creators have in mind when they set them up—means toward the attainment of some end valued by the creators. Alternatively, international organizations can become ends in their own right, become valued as institutions quite apart from the services they were initially expected to perform.⁶

During this process over the years since the end of the Cold War, the traditional norms of domestic pacifism and externally-based constraints raised by the nations of East Asia have as a result been both weakened and metamorphosed. In contrast, the highly institutionalised, understood and durable relationship with the US has remained by and large a constant throughout the period.

This study has had to be limited to an extent in its scope. However, there are a number of possible future research projects both theoretical and empirical stemming out from this initial work on Japan and peacekeeping. On the theoretical level, it has been shown that norms provide a rich framework for research which, unlike the 'neo-neo' synthesis of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, avoids the pitfalls of positivism and pays respect to constructivist interpretations by attempting to measure such vague concepts as identity and interests. Differing from the traditional approaches addressed in Chapter One, an approach based on norms possesses explanatory power in a wide variety of fields, but also reclaims the field of security traditionally claimed by the realists as the area of their explanatory superiority.⁷

On the empirical side, as regards Japan's relationship with the UN, it would be both interesting and original to examine the role of individuals and epistemic communities in framing Japan's interaction with the UN. The role of these non-governmental individuals (NGIs) has a rich theoretical background going back to Robert Cox's idea of the executive head mentioned in Chapter One, and has not been addressed in the literature pertaining to Japan, although it was touched upon briefly in this study with reference to the work of Akashi Yasushi, Owada Hisashi and Ogata Sadako. Similarly in the security field, the changing relationship with its East Asian neighbours, particularly South Korea, will be of great interest if the anticipated joint military training exercises proceed smoothly. Hopefully such projects can be undertaken in the future, as

all demonstrate that slowly, but surely, Japan is showing signs of realising the preamble to its

Constitution:

We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that the laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations.

APPENDIX I: UNPKO

I.I FIRST-TIME PARTICIPANTS IN UN PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVER MISSIONS SINCE 1989 (ONLY MISSIONS LISTED BY THE UN AS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS ARE INCLUDED).

(Source: Findlay, T., *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 4-5).

Country	First mission	Year
Albania	UNOMIG	1994
Algeria	UNAMIC	1991
Barbados	UNTAG	1989
Botswana	ONUMOZ	1993
Brunei Darussalam	UNTAC	1992
Bulgaria	UNTAC	1992
Cameroon	UNTAC	1992
Cape Verde	ONUMOZ	1993
Chad	UNAMIR	1994
China	UNTAG	1989
Congo	UNAVEM I	1989
Costa Rica	UNTAG	1989
Cuba	UNOMIG	1994
Czechoslovakia ^①	UNAVEM I	1989
Czech Republic ^①	UNPROFOR	1993
Djibouti	UNMIH	1994
Egypt ^②	UNTAG	1989
El Salvador	MINURSO	1995
Estonia	UNPROFOR	1995
Germany ^③	UNAMIC	1991
FRG ^③	UNTAG	1989
GDR ^③	UNTAG	1989
Greece	UNTAG	1989
Guatemala	UNMIH	1994
Guinea Bissau	UNAVEM II	1991
Guyana	UNTAG	1989
Honduras	MINURSO	1991
Jamaica	UNTAG	1989
Japan	UNTAC	1992
Jordan	UNAVEM I	1989
Kuwait	UNOSOM II	1993
Lithuania	UNPROFOR	1994

Luxembourg	UNPROFOR	1992
Malawi	UNAMIR	1993
Mali④	UNAMIR	1993
Namibia	UNTAC	1992
Niger	UNAMIR	1994
Romania	UNIKOM	1991
Russian Federation	UNIKOM	1991
Saudi Arabia	UNOSOM II	1993
Singapore	UNTAG	1989
Slovakia①	UNPROFOR	1993
South Korea	UNOSOM II	1993
Spain	UNAVEM I	1989
Switzerland	UNTAG	1989
Togo	UNTAG	1989
Trinidad and Tobago	UNTAG	1989
Uganda	UNOSOM II	1993
Ukraine	UNPROFOR	1992
United Arab Emirates	UNOSOM I	1993
USA⑤	UNIKOM	1991
Zimbabwe	UNAVEM II	1991

① On December 31, 1992 Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

② Participated in ONUC 1960-61 as the United Arab Republic.

③ The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic merged into one state in 1990.

④ Participated in ONUC in 1960 as a part of the Federation of Mali (now Mali and Senegal). Senegal participated for the first time as an independent state in UNEF II in 1974.

⑤ The USA was involved in two earlier missions, UNTSO (1948 to date) and UNMOGIP (1949-54).

I.II FIRST-TIME PARTICIPANTS IN NON-UN PEACEKEEPING AND OBSERVER MISSIONS SINCE 1989 (ONLY COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NEVER PARTICIPATED IN UN MISSIONS. IN ADDITION TO STATES, THREE NON-STATE ACTORS (SOUTH OSSETIA AND NORTH OSSETIA IN GEORGIA AND THE TRANS-DNIESTER REGION IN MOLDOVA) ARE INVOLVED IN RUSSIAN-LED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS.

(Source: Findlay, *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, p. 6).

Country	First mission	Year
Antigua and Barbuda	MNF	1994
Armenia ^①	OSCE Skopje	1992
Bahamas	MNF	1994
Belize	MNF	1994
Benin	MNF	1994
Dominica	MNF	1994
Gambia	ECOMOG	1990
Georgia ^②	South Ossetia	1992
Grenada	MNF	1994
Israel	MNF	1994
Kazakhstan ^③	CIS Tajikistan	1993
Kyrgyzstan	CIS Tajikistan	1993
Mauritania	Operation Turquoise	1994
Moldova ^④	Moldova Joint Force	1992
St Kitts and Nevis	MNF	1994
St Lucia	MNF	1994
St Vincent and Grenadines	MNF	1994
Tanzania	ECOMOG	1994
Tonga	SPPKF	1994
Uzbekistan	CIS Tajikistan	1993
Vanuatu	SPPKF	1994

① OSCE Spillover Mission to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

② South Ossetia Joint Force in Georgia.

③ CIS Tajikistan Buffer Force in Tajikistan (Afghan border).

④ Moldova Joint Force in Moldova (Trans-Dniester).

APPENDIX II: POLITICAL CARTOONS

II.1 UN SECRETARY-GENERAL BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI INVITES PM MIYAZAWA TO SIT ABOARD THE MATERIALISING TANK REPRESENTING A UN PEACE ENFORCEMENT ARMY. MIYAZAWA IS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE JAPANESE PEACE CONSTITUTION

(Asahi Shimbun, February 3, 1993, p. 2)



“かげろう軍隊、に誘われても、
憲法がねエ…… 山田 紳

II.II PRIME MINISTER MIYAZAWA IS TROUBLED NOT ONLY BY THE PROBLEM OF UNPKO DESPATCH BUT ALSO THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION WITHIN CAMBODIA

(Asahi Shimbun, May 12, 1993, p. 2)



II.III ONE JAPANESE CARTOONIST PAYS RESPECT TO THE ROLE PEACEKEEPERS HAVE PLAYED IN BRINGING PEACE TO THE WORLD, IN THIS CASE FACILITATING CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE THREE CO-OPERATIVE CAMBODIAN FACTIONS

(Yomiuri Shimbun, May 16, 1993, p. 2)



II.IV THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS THAT THE CEASE-FIRE IS HOLDING DESPITE CONTINUED AGGRESSION BETWEEN THE KHMER ROUGE AND THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT

(Yomiuri Shimbun, February 3, 1993, p. 2)



II.V AGAIN BOUTROS-GHALI ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE PM MIYAZAWA INTO WEARING THE OUTFIT OF A UN
PEACE ENFORCEMENT ARMY

(Yomiuri Shimbun, February 2, 1993, p. 2)



II.VI AT THE SAME TIME AS THE J-LEAGUE INTRODUCED SOCCER TO A SUSPICIOUS JAPAN
TRADITIONALLY REARED ON BASEBALL, POLITICIANS APPEAR ILL-EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH THE
SIMILARLY NEW ISSUE OF UNPKO

(Yomiuri Shimbun, May 17, 1993, p. 2)




II.VII MURAYAMA ATTEMPTS TO 'BAZOOKA' THE SDPJ CONFERENCE WITH A NEW SECURITY POLICY PROPOSAL

(Asahi Shimbun, September 1, 1997)



II.VIII THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCES PROBLEMS WITH ITS FIRST HUMANITARIAN UNPKO

(Asahi Shimbun, September 12, 1994)




II.IX MURAYAMA, BURDENED DOWN BY PARTY CONCERNS, ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE THE DESPATCH OF SDF PERSONNEL TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

(Yomiuri Shimbun, August 26, 1995)



II.X PRIME MINISTER HASHIMOTO TROUBLED BY PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (PKO) CONSOLES THE OTHER HASHIMOTO CONVALESCING AFTER CRITICISMS OVER PRICE KEEPING OPERATIONS (PKO)

(Asahi Shimbun, April 2, 1998)



APPENDIX III: MAPS


III.I MAP OF CAMBODIA DURING THE UNTAC PERIOD

(Source: Mayall, J. (ed.), *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: UN Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.27)




III.III ENGINEERING UNITS POSTING MAP

(Source: The MOFA Homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/2_4.html)




III.IV ELECTORAL OBSERVERS POSTING MAP (TAKEO PROVINCE)

(Source: The MOFA Homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/2_6.html)




III.V POSTING OF ELECTORAL OBSERVERS IN MOZAMBIQUE

(Source: *The MOFA Homepage*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/2_9.html)




III.VI POSTING OF JAPANESE STAFF OFFICERS AND COMPONENT IN MOZAMBIQUE (FINAL POSTINGS)

(Source: The MOFA Homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/02_3.html)




III.VII POSTING OF JAPANESE ELECTORAL OBSERVERS IN EL SALVADOR

(Source: *The MOFA Homepage*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/2_11.html)




III.VIII JAPANESE CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS

(Source: The MOFA Homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/3_2.html)



III.IX OPERATION SITES OF JAPANESE UNITS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

(Source: *The MOFA Homepage*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/2_14.html)



NOTES

INTRODUCTION

- ¹ Examining why peacekeeping, and at a later stage why Japan, are the focus of this study is at the heart of what Peter Evans has termed the 'microfoundations' of research; in other words, our motivations for undertaking research. This is an integral first step in proceeding beyond a positivist standpoint and recognising that the subject and object of research are connected. See Kohli, A., Evans, P., Katzenstein, P. J., Przeworski, A., Rudolph, S. H., Scott, J. C., and Skocpol, T., 'The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium', *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1995), p. 3.
- ² Kegley, C. W., 'International Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: The Morality of Multilateral Measures', *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol. 10 (1996), p. 33.
- ³ Slaughter Burley, A. M., and Kaysen, C., 'Introductory Note', in Laura W. Reed and Carl Rayson (eds.), *Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993, p. 9.
- ⁴ Sollenberg, M., and Wallenstein, P., 'Major Armed Conflicts', *SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 15. A major armed conflict is defined as a prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organised group incurring at least 1,000 deaths during the conflict.
- ⁵ Blechman, B. M., 'The Intervention Dilemma', in Dick Clark (ed.), *The UN, Peacekeeping, and American Foreign Policy*, Washington, The Aspen Institute, 1995, p. 10. There is still controversy regarding interference in domestic affairs seen over recent years in the stand-off between UN chemical and biological weapons' inspectors and Iraq. See Bailey, K. C., *The UN Inspectors in Iraq: Lessons for On-Site Verification*, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1995. Moreover, humanitarian intervention, another form of domestic intervention, has also aroused debate. See McCoubrey, H., and White, N. G., *International Organizations and Civil Wars*, Brookfield, Dartmouth Publishers, 1995; Weiss, T. G. (ed.), *The United Nations and Civil Wars*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995; and Teson, F. R., *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality*, Dobbs Ferry, New York, Transnational Publishers, 1997.
- ⁶ Falk, R., 'An Inquiry into the Political Economy of World Order', *New Political Economy*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1996), p. 13.
- ⁷ See chapter two, footnote 11.
- ⁸ Boutros-Ghali, B., *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, New York, UN Publications, 1992, p. 7.
- ⁹ Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, p. 13.
- ¹⁰ Mandelbaum, M., 'The Reluctance to Intervene', *Foreign Policy*, No. 95 (1994), p. 17.
- ¹¹ Krauthammer, C., 'The Immaculate Intervention', *Time*, July 26, 1992, p. 78.
- ¹² Kegley, 'International Peacemaking and Peacekeeping', p. 29.
- ¹³ Lebow, R. N., 'The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism', *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1994), pp. 249-277; and Kegley, C. W., 'The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1993), pp. 131-146.
- ¹⁴ Kegley, 'The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies?', p. 142.
- ¹⁵ A typical text being Vogel, E. F., *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1979.
- ¹⁶ Williams, D., *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. xii-xiii.
- ¹⁷ Costa Rica, the Switzerland of the Americas, also confirmed the abolition of its army by Article XII of its Constitution promulgated in 1949. It retains a Civil Guard with no authority to intervene in national political affairs and there has also been a similar debate to that in Japan as to whether the Civil Guard is a police force or a pseudo-army, see Bird, L., *Costa Rica: The Unarmed Democracy*, London, Sheppard Press, 1984. Similar to Japan, Costa Rica only recently began to participate in peacekeeping with the UNTAG mission of 1989.
- ¹⁸ Williams, *Japan and the Enemies*, p. 5.
- ¹⁹ Wiklund, L., 'The Nordic Countries in the UN', *Internasjonal Politikk*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (1996), p. 75.
- ²⁰ Williams, D., *Japan: Beyond the End of History*, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 146.
- ²¹ For a criticism of the predominantly state-centred approach to Japan's security policy and an attempt to address the imbalance by examining the link between state and society, see Hook, G. D., *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*, London, Routledge, 1996. The political cartoons in Appendix II demonstrate the role the UN played in framing and encouraging the PKO debate in Japan.

²² Fuller, M., 'Women in the Nineteenth Century', in J. Steele (ed.), *The Essential Margaret Fuller*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1992, p. 312.

CHAPTER ONE: APPROACH

¹ Schroeder, P. W., 'History vs. Neorealism: A Second Look', *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1995), p. 195.

² Der Derian, J., 'A Reinterpretation of Realism', in James Der Derian (ed.), *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, London, Macmillan, 1995, p. 367.

³ For three representative articles in this debate see Keohane, R. O., 'Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics', pp. 1-26; Ashley, R. K., 'The Poverty of Neorealism', pp. 255-300; and Gilpin, K. G., 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism', pp. 301-321 all in Keohane, R. O. (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986.

⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau outlined famously six principles of political realism. First, realism espouses the objective laws of human society which dictate that politicians will act in a rational manner; second, realism defines the national interest in terms of power, distinguishing it from economics which is defined in terms of wealth; third, the idea of 'interest' is not fixed in time or space and is the essence of politics. Power can be specifically defined within the context of the time and place, but the desire of states to achieve and maximise this power is regarded as a universal truth. Fourth, morality takes a back seat to the principle of national survival, 'there can be no political morality without prudence [and] political ethics judge action by its political consequences'. Fifth, realism seeks to disrobe a state's promotion of its national interest of moral superiority. Judging each state as an entity attempting to pursue its national interest defined in terms of power is seen as a way of dealing fairly with each state without imputing a sense of moral outrage or divine mission into a state's foreign policy. The result of this is that 'we are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own'. Six, realism attempts to define the sphere of politics in its own very separate sphere, thus, legal and moral influences will be of a minimum. Morgenthau cites the example of the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939 to demonstrate this. Most definitely an illegal action, had Britain and France's policy been tempered by the legal implications they would have found themselves at war with the Soviet Union and Germany concurrently. The moral side of the question can be seen in Western states' quandary as to whether they should deal with Communist states, or not. Morgenthau, H. J., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Knopf, 1973.

⁵ Watanabe, O., *Gendai Nihon no Teikokushugika: Keisei to Kôzô* (The Imperialisation of Contemporary Japan: Formation and Structure), Tokyo, Ôtsuki Shoten, 1996, pp. 330-332.

⁶ Pentland, C., 'International Organizations and their Roles', in J. N. Rosenau, K. W. Thompson and G. Boyd (eds.), *World Politics*, New York, Free Press, 1976, p. 632; Young, O. R., 'System and Society in World Affairs: Implications for International Organizations', *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1995), p. 201.

⁷ Huntington, S. P., 'Transnational Organizations in World Politics', *World Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1973), p. 337.

⁸ Takahara, T., 'Japan', in Findlay, T. (ed.), *Challengers for the New Peacekeepers*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 64; and Leitenberg, M., 'The Participation of Japanese Military Forces in UN Peacekeeping Operations', *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1996), pp. 5-50.

⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 5.

¹⁰ Keohane, R. O., 'Neorealism and World Politics', in Keohane, *Neorealism*, 1986, p. 9.

¹¹ George, J., *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, p. 11.

¹² Delanty, G., *Social Science: Beyond Constructivism and Realism*, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1997.

¹³ Keohane and Nye's assertion that, '[b]efore one decides what explanatory model to apply to a situation or problem, one will need to understand the degree to which realist or complex interdependence assumptions correspond to the situation.' Keohane, R. O., and Nye, J. S., *Power and Interdependence*, New York, Harper Collins, 1987, p.24.

¹⁴ Rosecrance, R., and Stein, A., 'Interdependence: Myth or Reality?', *World Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1973), pp. 1-27; Rosecrance, R., Alexandroff, A., Koehler, W., Kroll, J., Laqueur, S., and Stocker, J., 'Whither Interdependence?', *International Organization*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1977), pp. 425-426.

¹⁵ Baldwin, D. A., 'Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis', *International Organization*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1980), pp. 483-4.

¹⁶ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁷ Baldwin, 'Interdependence and Power', p. 485.

¹⁸ Similarly Stephen Krasner has written on regimes as 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and

- decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.' Krasner, S. D. (ed.), *International Regimes*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 2.
- ¹⁹ Keohane and Nye attempt to relax the realist tenets described above and define a system of complex interdependence. It is posited that a multiplicity of channels connects societies. These channels of communication range from the traditional channels of diplomacy (interstate relations, very much in the realist tradition) to transnational organizations like banks (transnational relations, questioning the realist tent of states as the only actors in the international system) to unofficial ties between government elites (transgovernmental relations, questioning the realist proposition that states behave coherently as units).
- ²⁰ Krasner, S. D., 'Westphalia and All That', in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 235.
- ²¹ Domestic issues can become major issues of foreign policy. Henry Kissinger demonstrated this point by saying, 'progress in dealing with the traditional agenda is no longer enough. A new and unprecedented kind of issue has emerged. The problems of energy, resources, environment, population, the uses of space and territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the domestic agenda.' Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, p. 26.
- ²² Matthews, J. T., 'Power Shift', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 1 (1997), p. 50.
- ²³ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, p. 29.
- ²⁴ Zacher, M. W., and Sutton, B. A., *Governing Global Networks: International Regimes for Transportation and Communications*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 18.
- ²⁵ Kubáľková, V., and Cruikshank, A. A., 'The "New Cold War" in "Critical International Relations Studies"', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1986), pp. 163-185; Kubáľková, V., and Cruikshank, A. A., 'A Rambo Come to Judgement: Fred Halliday, Marxism and International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1989), pp. 37-47.
- ²⁶ Watanabe, *Gendai Nihon no Teikokushugika*, pp. 328-334.
- ²⁷ Shaw, M. (ed.), *War, State and Society*, London, Macmillan, 1994; Gallie, W. B., *Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- ²⁸ For representative writers in each of these respective fields see Brenner, R., 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism', *New Left Review*, No. 104 (1977), pp. 54-71; Wallerstein, I., *The Modern World System III*, San Diego, Academic Press, 1989; Cox, R. W., 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1983), pp. 162-175.
- ²⁹ Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations', p. 164.
- ³⁰ Sinclair, T. J., 'Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order', in R. W. Cox with T. J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 9. This book contains a wide selection of Cox's work and outlines its relationship to Marx and Gramsci in detail.
- ³¹ Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations', p. 172.
- ³² Cox, R., 'The Executive Head: An Essay in Leadership in International Organizations', *International Organization*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1969), pp. 205-230.
- ³³ Goodrich, L. M., 'The Political Role of the Secretary-General', *International Organization*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1962), pp. 734-5.
- ³⁴ Keohane, R. O., 'Reciprocity in International Relations', *International Organization*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1986), p. 2.
- ³⁵ Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, p. 20.
- ³⁶ Haftendorn, H., 'The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1991), p. 13.
- ³⁷ Ruggie, J. G., 'The Anatomy of an Institution', in J. G., Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an International Form*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 4.
- ³⁸ Keohane, R. O., Nye, J. S., and Hoffmann, S., *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 175.
- ³⁹ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, p. 40.
- ⁴⁰ Robert O. Keohane, 'Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research', *International Journal*, No. 45, No. 4 (1990), p. 732.
- ⁴¹ Caporaso, J. A., 'International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1992), p. 603.
- ⁴² Young, O., 'International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions', *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (1986), p. 107.
- ⁴³ Puchala, D. J., and Hopkins, R. F., 'International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis', in Krasner, *International Regimes*, pp. 61-91.

- ⁴⁴ March, J. A., and Olsen, J. P., 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, No. 3 (1984), p. 249.
- ⁴⁵ Keohane, R. O., 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1988), p. 382.
- ⁴⁶ Rosenau, J. N., *Turbulence in World Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 122.
- ⁴⁷ Falk, R., 'An Inquiry into the Political Economy of World Order', *New Political Economy*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1996), p. 17.
- ⁴⁸ Lauterpacht, E., 'Sovereignty: Myth or Reality?', *International Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1 (1997), p. 138.
- ⁴⁹ Hinsley, F. H., *Sovereignty*, London, Watts and Co., 1966; Walker, R. B. J., *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- ⁵⁰ Brown, C., 'Back to Normal? Some Reflections on Sovereignty and Self-Determination after the Cold War', *Global Society*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1996), p. 17.
- ⁵¹ Fowler, M. S., and Bunck, J. M., 'What Constitutes the Sovereign State?' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1996), p. 383.
- ⁵² Bull, H., *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1977, pp. 8-9.
- ⁵³ Aron, R. (translated by Howard, R. A., and Baker-Fox, A.), *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, New York, Knopf, 1967, p. 746.
- ⁵⁴ Claude, I. L., *American Approaches to World Affairs*, New York, Random House, 1986, p. 39.
- ⁵⁵ James, A., *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society*, London, Macmillan, 1986, p. 24.
- ⁵⁶ Krasner, S. D., 'Westphalia and All That', in Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, p. 235.
- ⁵⁷ Strange, S., *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 91-182.
- ⁵⁸ Strange, *The Retreat of the State*, p. 13.
- ⁵⁹ Strange, *The Retreat of the State*, pp. 14-15.
- ⁶⁰ Gilpin, R., *War and Change in World Politics*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 18.
- ⁶¹ Philpott, D., 'Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1995), p. 355.
- ⁶² Falk, 'An Inquiry', p. 22.
- ⁶³ Strange, *The Retreat of the State*, p. 86.
- ⁶⁴ Wight, M., 'An Anatomy of International Thought', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1987), p. 222.
- ⁶⁵ For a detailed examination of the construction of international society from the early 18th century, see Reus-Smit, C., 'The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions', *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997), pp. 576-589.
- ⁶⁶ Wight, 'An Anatomy of International Thought', p. 223.
- ⁶⁷ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 13.
- ⁶⁸ By the term 'international society', I am referring to the idea of a community of nation-states bound together by institutionalised rules and a sense of obligation which is characteristic of the so-called English School of international relations theory led by Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and John Vincent among others. For a detailed review see Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., and Rittberger, V., *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 169-176; and Neumann, I. B., 'John Vincent and the English School of International Relations', in I. B. Neumann, and O. Wæver (eds.), *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?*, London, Routledge, 1997, p. 38-65.
- ⁶⁹ Lebow, 'The Long Peace', p. 269.
- ⁷⁰ Buzan, B., 'From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School', *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (1993), pp. 327-352.
- ⁷¹ Glenn Hook has made this distinction between the 'hard' and 'soft' sides in particular reference to militarisation. The 'hard' side being characterised by the defence build-up of the 1990s and the despatch of the JSDF on UNPKO; whereas, the 'soft' side is characterised by 'values, attitudes, norms, and language used in legitimising militarization and demilitarization processes.' Hook, G. D., *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*, London, Routledge, 1996, p. 5.
- ⁷² Baldwin, 'Interdependence and Power', pp. 471-506.
- ⁷³ Krasner, S. D., 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in Krasner, *International Regimes*, p. 2.
- ⁷⁴ Ruggie, J. G., and Kratochwil, F. V., 'International Organization: A State of the Art on the State of the Art', *International Organization*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (1986), p. 764.

- ⁷⁵ Katzenstein, P. J., and Okawara, N., 'Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies', *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1993), p. 85.
- ⁷⁶ Mueller, J., *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Modern War*, New York, Basic Books, 1989, pp. 95-96.
- ⁷⁷ See in particular, Berger, T. U., 'From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism', *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1993), pp. 119-150; and Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization*.
- ⁷⁸ Katzenstein, P. J., 'Coping with Terrorism: Norms and Internal Security in Germany and Japan', in Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, p. 266.
- ⁷⁹ Hall, R. B., 'Moral Authority as a Power Resource', *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997), pp. 591-622.
- ⁸⁰ Durch, W. J. (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- ⁸¹ Goldstein and Keohane, 'Ideas and Foreign Policy', p. 12-13.
- ⁸² Yee, A. S., 'The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies', *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1996), p. 98; and Zucker, L. G., 'The Role of Institutionalisation in Cultural Persistence', in W. W. Powell, and P. J. Di Maggio, *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1991, p. 104.
- ⁸³ Yee, 'The Causal Effects of Ideas', p. 95.
- ⁸⁴ Partington, A. (ed.), *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 432.
- ⁸⁵ Katzenstein, P. J., *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Post-War Japan*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1996, pp. ix-x. Katzenstein distinguishes between these two types of norms that respectively define standards of appropriate behaviour, like the peaceful resolution of disputes; the latter refers to the identity and interests of actors. How these norms interact and are redefined can affect policy decisions as much as national capabilities.
- ⁸⁶ Axelrod, R., 'An Evolutionary Approach to Norms', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (1986), pp. 1095-1111.
- ⁸⁷ Kratochwil, F., *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 2.
- ⁸⁸ Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms and Decisions*, p. 11.
- ⁸⁹ Florini, A., 'The Evolution of International Norms', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1996), pp. 363-389.
- ⁹⁰ Finnemore, M., *Defining National Interests in International Society*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 8.
- ⁹¹ Legro, J., 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism', *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1997), pp. 31-63.
- ⁹² Keohane, R. O., International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?, *Foreign Policy*, No. 110 (1998), p. 90.
- ⁹³ Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York, Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 71.
- ⁹⁴ Matthew, Chapter 9, Verse 17, *The Holy Bible*, New York, American Bible Society, 1988.
- ⁹⁵ Fischer, M., 'Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1992), p. 427.
- ⁹⁶ Waltz, K. N., *Theory of International Politics*, New York, Random House, 1979, p. 66.
- ⁹⁷ Horkheimer, M., *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, New York, Herder and Herder, 1972, p. 66.
- ⁹⁸ Fischer, 'Feudal Europe', p. 430; Anatol Rappoport has put this point in an illustrative manner, 'The physicist might spend thousands of years studying the behaviour of ocean waves on a beach in most meticulous detail; in the end he would be no wiser than before in regard to what is essential in wave motion. The really profound understanding of waves is quite independent of observing any real waves. For that matter, the most important waves in our lives are not even observable directly.... It goes without saying that ultimately the findings of theory must somehow be translated into real predictions and observations. But to demand this too soon is not wise', in Rappoport, A., 'Various Meanings of Theory', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1958), p. 988.
- ⁹⁹ Krasner, 'Westphalia and All That', pp. 235-238.
- ¹⁰⁰ Dore, R., *Flexible Rigidities: Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustment in the Japanese Economy, 1970-1980*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1986, p. 245.

CHAPTER TWO: UNPKO

- ¹ Rosenau, J. N., 'Governance in the Twenty-first Century', *Global Governance*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), p. 18.
- ² Rosenau, 'Governance', p. 18.

- ³ These are conditions put forth by Skolnikoff, E. B., 'Science and Technology: The Implications for International Institutions', *International Organization*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1971), p. 772.
- ⁴ Rae, H., and Reus-Smit, C. (eds.), *The UN: Between Sovereignty and Global Governance? Report on the International Conference held at La Trobe University, Melbourne, 2-6 July 1995*, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1996, pp. 10-11.
- ⁵ Schmitter, P. C., 'The 'Organizational Development' of International Organizations', *International Organization*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1971), p. 918.
- ⁶ *The Times*, May 12, 1997.
- ⁷ *The New York Times*, April 6, 1991.
- ⁸ Rosenau, J. N., *The UN in a Turbulent World*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, p. 30.
- ⁹ Katzenstein, P. J., *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Post-War Japan*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 20.
- ¹⁰ Diehl, P. F., *International Peacekeeping*, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, p. 8.
- ¹¹ Which operations constitute PKO and which don't is widely contested. For the purposes of this study I will use reports of the UN Department of Public Information and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations: UNSCOB (UN Special Commission on the Balkans), 1947-1951; UNEF-I (UN Emergency Force I), 1956-67; UNOGIL (UN Observation Group in Lebanon), 1958; ONUC (UN Operation in the Congo), 1960-64; UNSF (UN Security Force in West New Guinea), 1962-63; UNYOM (UN Yemen Observation Mission), 1963-1964; UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus), 1964-present; DOMREP (Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic), 1965-1966; UNIPOM (UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission), 1965-1966; UNEF-II (UN Emergency Force II), 1973-79; UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force), 1974-present; UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon), 1978-present; UNGOMAP (UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan), 1988-1990; UNIIMOG (UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group), 1988-1991; UNAVEM-I (UN Angola Verification Mission I), 1989-1991; UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group), 1989-1990; ONUCA (UN Observer Group in Central America), 1989-1992.
- ¹² Goulding, M., 'The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping', *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (1993), p. 452.
- ¹³ Alan James identifies four currents which aided the growth of PKO: 1) national self-determination becoming widespread in the 20th century; 2) superpower confrontation provided an encouragement to use peacekeeping as an instrument to limit a conflict the superpowers wanted to avoid; 3) the way in which a state treats its own people has become a concern of the international community, a threat to peace; and 4) the ability of the state to use force has become an improper idea. James, A., 'A Review of UN Peacekeeping', *Internationale Spectator* (November 1993), p. 32.
- ¹⁴ Verrier, A., *International Peacekeeping: UN Forces in a Troubled World*, London, Penguin, 1981, p. 11
- ¹⁵ Singer, J. D., and Wallace, M., 'Inter-Governmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1816-1965: Some Bivariate Relationships', *International Organization*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1970), pp. 520-547.
- ¹⁶ First generation peacekeeping operations being the traditional separation of warring parties; whereas, second generation peacekeeping operations involve the possible use of arms, expanded duties to include nation-building activities, and compromising state territoriality.
- ¹⁷ Article X reads, 'the Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression of the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.' Article XVI reads, 'should any Member resort to war...it shall, *ipso facto*, be deemed to have committed an act of war against all Members....It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces used to protect the covenants of the League.'
- ¹⁸ Liu, F. T., *UN Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, p.13. This principle was observed in every other UN Observer Mission until the UNTAG operation in Namibia from 1989 to 1990 and even in this case the only reason UN observers were issued with weapons was due to the presence of wild animals.
- ¹⁹ Fetherston, A. B., *Towards a Theory of UN Peacekeeping*, London, Macmillan, 1994, p. 13.
- ²⁰ Liu, *UN Peacekeeping*, p. 20.
- ²¹ Ratner, S. R., *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995, p. 106.
- ²² Liu, *UN Peacekeeping*, p. 25.

²³ For a description of the use of a human wall against Israeli troops, see Liu, *UN Peacekeeping*, p. 26.

²⁴ Liu, *UN Peacekeeping*, p. 38.

²⁵ *UN Document A/47/277-S/24111*, June 17, 1992.

²⁶ Article I describes the UN's aims 'to maintain international peace and security...and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.' Article II asks 'all states to settle their international disputes by peaceful means.'

²⁷ Rikhye, I. J., Harbottle, M., and Egge, B., *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1974, p. 11.

²⁸ Verrier, *International Peacekeeping*, p. 14.

²⁹ Wainhouse, D., *International Peace Observation*, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966, p. 557.

³⁰ Durch, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 3-4.

³¹ Goulding, 'Evolution', p. 455.

³² Thakur, R., 'From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1994), p. 387.

³³ Boutros-Ghali, B., *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, New York, UN Publications, 1995, p. 24.

³⁴ Kôzai, S., 'Kokuren to Sekai Heiwa no Iji', (The UN and the Maintenance of World Peace), *Kokusai Mondai*, No. 428 (1995), p. 27.

³⁵ Urquhart, B., *A Life in Peace and War*, London, Macmillan, 1987, p. 293.

³⁶ James, A., *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1990, p. xxvi.

³⁷ James, *Peacekeeping*, p. xxvi.

³⁸ Goulding, 'Evolution', p. 455.

³⁹ James, 'A Review', p. 633.

⁴⁰ *UN Document A/48/1: UN Report on the Work of the Organization*, September 12, 1993, p. 101.

⁴¹ Findlay, T., 'The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping', in Trevor Findlay (ed.), *Challengers for the New Peacekeepers*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 1.

⁴² Findlay, T., 'The New Peacekeepers', p. 8.

CHAPTER THREE: JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND UNPKO, 1956 TO 1990

¹ Marx, K., *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1926, p. 23.

² Berger, T. U., 'Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan' in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York, Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 318.

³ Frankel, J., *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-making*, London, OUP, 1963, p. 3.

⁴ Pettiman, R., *Human Behaviour and World Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1975, p. 41.

⁵ Jones, R., *Analysing Foreign Policy*, London, Routledge, 1970, p. 11.

⁶ Clarke, M., and White, B., *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1989, p. 13.

⁷ Wallace, W., *Foreign Policy and the Political Process*, London, Macmillan, 1971, p. 7.

⁸ Rosenau, J. N., *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, New York, The Free Press, 1971, p. 101.

⁹ Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, p. 257

¹⁰ Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, p. 265.

¹¹ Hilsman, R., 'Intelligence and Policymaking in Foreign Affairs', in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, New York, Free Press, 1961, p. 215.

¹² Macidris, R., *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, New York, Prentice Hall, 1962, pp. 1-8.

¹³ Brecher, M., Steinberg, B., and Stein, J., 'A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1969), pp. 75-101.

¹⁴ Simply put, this strategy involved avoiding international commitments and pro-activism in order to concentrate on the priority of economic growth. In the aftermath of defeat in W.W.II and the collapse of Japan's regional hegemonic challenge, namely the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, Japan's post-war strategy was deeply affected and chiefly developed by a series of LDP governments, many dominated by the ideas of Yoshida Shigeru. With the objective of one day establishing Japan's independence, Yoshida surmised that with the central role of the US in the international system for the foreseeable future, Japan would be forced into playing a submissive and reactive role concentrating on its economic recovery. To ensure this recovery Japan had to carefully plan its economic

- reconstruction, coerce left-wing groups within Japan, keep military spending and development to a minimum, and rely to a large extent for its security on the US. In addition to this, Japan was repeatedly censured by East Asian nations which had suffered under Japanese militarism in the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, a pro-active policy was seen to be militarily threatening and, therefore, unfeasible. The result has been described as a first rate economy, third rate politics, economic giant, political dwarf, economism, or GNP-ism. See Dower, J. W., *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1979.
- ¹⁵ Hellman, D. C., 'Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy within an American Greenhouse', in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel Okimoto, *The Political Economy of Japan: The Changing International Context, Volume II*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1988.
- ¹⁶ Hayes, L. D., *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, New York, Marlowe and Company, 1994; Van Wolferen, K., *The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation*, Tokyo, Tuttle, 1993; Kataoka, T., *The 1955 System of Japanese Politics: Its Origins and Consequences*, Tokyo, National Institute for Research Advancement, 1990.
- ¹⁷ Johnson, C., *Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State*, New York, W. W. Norton, 1995, pp. 141-156.
- ¹⁸ See Fukui, H., 'Policymaking in the Japanese Foreign Ministry', in Robert A. Scalapino, *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1977, p. 3-4.
- ¹⁹ In 1983 the LDP had an income of ¥24.8 million, of which ¥10.9 billion came from the business-supported National Political Association (*Kokumin Seiji Kyōkai*). For more detail, see Bernstein, G. L., and Fukui, H. (eds.), *Japan and the World: Essays on Japanese History and Politics in Honour of Ishida Takeshi*, London, Macmillan, 1988, p. 180.
- ²⁰ Ogata, S., 'The Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy: Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China', in Scalapino, *Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, pp. 175-204.
- ²¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 15, 1955.
- ²² 'If the Red Army mobilized and set fire to your companies next June, you would suffer losses of ¥1 billion or ¥2 billion in no time. We must have the LDP win this election in order to prevent this.' Junnosuke, M., *Contemporary Politics in Japan*, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1995, p. 222.
- ²³ For a detailed account of this process see Johnson, *Japan: Who Governs*, Chapter 7.
- ²⁴ Campbell, J. C., 'Policy Conflict and its Resolution within the Government System', in Eliss Krauss et al., *Conflict in Japan*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii, 1984, p. 297-299.
- ²⁵ Quoted in Campbell, 'Policy Conflict', p. 299.
- ²⁶ Haley, J. O., 'Governance by Negotiation: A Reappraisal of Bureaucratic Power in Japan', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1987), p. 344.
- ²⁷ Kakizawa, K., *Kasumigaseki Sanchōme no Ōkura Kanryō* (MOF Bureaucracy in the Government Heartland), Tokyo, Gakuyō Shobō, 1977, pp. 53-65.
- ²⁸ Pempel, T. J., 'The Unbundling of "Japan Inc.": The Changing Dynamics of Japanese Policy Formation', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1987), p. 288.
- ²⁹ Schoppa, L. J., 'Zoku Power and LDP Power: A Case Study of the Zoku Role in Education Policy', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1991), pp. 79-106; Curtis, Gerald L., *The Japanese Way of Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1988; Muramatsu, M., *Sengo Nihon no Kanryōsei* (Post-war Japanese Bureaucracy), Tokyo, Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1981.
- ³⁰ Curtis, *The Japanese Way of Politics*, p. 114.
- ³¹ Fukui, H., 'State in Policymaking: A Review of the Literature', in T. J. Pempel (ed.), *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1977, p. 22.
- ³² Calder, K. E., 'Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State', *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (1988), pp. 517-541; Calder, K. E., *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988.
- ³³ Calder, 'Explaining the Reactive State', p. 518.
- ³⁴ Calder, 'Explaining the Reactive State', p. 519.
- ³⁵ Pyle, K. B., *Japan, the World and the Twenty-first Century*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1988.
- ³⁶ By this treaty Japan agreed to build a 180,000 man self-defence force, keep US troops in Japan indefinitely, and help in the policy of containing the Soviet Union. Thus, Japan was brought most firmly into the capitalist Western sphere.
- ³⁷ Kenneth Pyle argues that the 1930s and 1940s were the only period when Japan did not follow a reactive policy. From the opening of Japan in the Meiji period, and reinforced by defeat and occupation, Japan has been essentially

a reactive state. See Pyle, *Japan, the World and the Twenty-first Century*.

³⁸ Tanaka, T., 'Japan in Structural Transformation of International Politics: A Historical Overview', *Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics*, Special Issue (1994), p. 75.

³⁹ Yasutomo, D., *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy*, London, Macmillan, 1995, p. 182.

⁴⁰ Inoguchi, T., 'Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future', *International Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 1 (1988/89), p. 58.

⁴¹ A phrase attributed to former US ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield and repeated by every subsequent ambassador, president, and US visiting dignitary since.

⁴² *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, 1995, p. 10.

⁴³ Taken from Berger, 'Norms and Identity', p. 339.

⁴⁴ Ogata, S., 'Japan's Policy towards the UN', in Chadwick F. Alger, Gene M. Lyons and John E. Trent, *The UN System: The Policies of Member States*, Tokyo, UNU Press, 1995, pp. 236-7.

⁴⁵ The Kassebaum amendments of 1983 and 1985, named after Democrat Senator Nancy Kassebaum, were aimed at the 1984 financial year and 1986 financial year authorisation acts for US assessed contributions to the UN and its specialised agencies respectively. They sought to reduce contributions to the level of 70 per cent of the assessment paid in financial year 1980. Although unsuccessful in 1983, the amendment was adopted by Congress in 1985.

⁴⁶ *The International Herald Tribune*, December 17, 1991.

⁴⁷ Leitenberg, M., 'The Participation of Japanese Military Forces in UN Peacekeeping Operations', *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1996), p. 9.

⁴⁸ Recently South Korea has proposed an international governing body to regulate the contents of schoolbooks.

⁴⁹ See Ueki, Y., 'Japan's UN Diplomacy: Sources of Passivism and Activism' in Curtis, Gerald L., (ed.), *Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1993, p. 350.

⁵⁰ Van Wolferen, K., 'The Japan Problem', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 2 (1986-7), p. 289.

⁵¹ Cowhey, P. F., 'Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States', *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1993), pp. 299-326.

⁵² Who holds responsibility for the SDF and military issues is also a grey area which tends to contribute to a reactive policy. The Japan Defence Agency (JDA) is responsible for the SDF but does not possess full ministerial status. The Ministry of Finance controls the budget of the SDF. Whereas, the MITI controls military procurement. The MOFA is responsible for the policy co-ordination of basic and middle or long-term foreign, national security and UN policy—a duty traditionally denied to the JDA for fear of the erosion of civilian control. For a discussion of civilian control in Japan see Gow, I. T. M., 'Civilian Control of the Military in Post-war Japan', in R. Matthews and K. Matsuyama (eds.), *Japan's Military Renaissance?*, London, Macmillan, 1993, pp. 50-68. Recently the JDA has begun to carve out a role for itself in policy formulation. For a detailed account, see Funabashi, Y., *Dōmei Hyōryū* (The Drifting Alliance), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1997, pp. 3-136.

⁵³ Pyle, K. B., 'In Pursuit of a Grand Design: Nakasone Betwixt the Past and the Future', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1987), pp. 243-270.

⁵⁴ Sasaki, T., 'Post-war Japanese Politics at a Turning Point', *The Japan Foundation Newsletter*, May 1991.

⁵⁵ Calder, 'Explaining the Reactive State', p. 530.

⁵⁶ Calder, 'Explaining the Reactive State', p. 532. Since Calder wrote this book the Japanese electoral system was reformed based on proposals introduced in 1994 with the first election under the reformed system taking place for the Lower House in October 1996. The phenomenon of same-party candidates running against each other was removed with 300 seats elected on a 'first-past-the-post' system and the remaining 200 seats elected by a form of proportional representation. Whether it is possible to discern any differences yet is the topic of much debate, see Jain, P., and Inoguchi, T. (eds.), *Japanese Politics Today: Beyond Karaoke Democracy?*, Melbourne, Macmillan, 1997.

⁵⁷ Cowhey, 'Domestic Institutions', p. 307.

⁵⁸ Durkheim, E. [translated by Sarah A. Solovay and John D. Mueller], *The Rules of Sociological Method* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, pp. 1061-1062.

⁵⁹ Pacifism in Western philosophy is rooted in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas and the idea of a 'just war'. It could be argued that this thinking justified wars if based upon religious conversion of surrounding 'heathen' faiths. It is noteworthy that it is only in a non-Christian country, i.e. Japan, that pacifism has been officially adopted as government policy—reinforcing the social nature of Japan's pacifism. This pacifist thought has also been tied into Marxist and Christian thinking with the thinker Tabata Shinobu stressing the dialectic which the Peace Constitution addresses in improving the general happiness of mankind. Japan's need for stability and consequent support for pacifism can also be seen in financial and geographical terms. No developed country more than Japan would be

- crippled by a nuclear strike. Moreover, no country more than Japan requires peace for the stable functioning of international trade and finance. See Baba, N., and Howes, J. F., *Pacifism in Japan: The Christian and Socialist Tradition*, Kyoto, Minerva Press, 1978.
- ⁶⁰ Ôta, S., *Ashio Dôzan no Shakaishi* [A Social History of Ashio Copper Mine], Tokyo, Yûkon Kikaku, 1992.
- ⁶¹ For a detailed investigation of opinion polls see Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 100-128.
- ⁶² Watanabe, A., 'Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs: 1964-1973', in Scalapino, *Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, pp. 105-146.
- ⁶³ Watanabe, 'Japanese Public Opinion', p. 145.
- ⁶⁴ Pempel, *Polycymaking in Contemporary Japan*, p. 223.
- ⁶⁵ Iwanaga, K., *Democracy and Electoral Systems in Japan: A Comparative Perspective*, Centre for Pacific Asia Studies, Stockholm University, Occasional Paper No. 26, 1995.
- ⁶⁶ Satô, K., 'The Pursuit of the Principle of International Co-operation in the Constitution of Japan', *The Japanese Annual of International Law*, No. 36 (1993), pp. 13-14.
- ⁶⁷ Satô, 'The Pursuit of the Principle of International Co-operation', pp. 14-15.
- ⁶⁸ *Proceedings of the 19th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, No. 16, March 13, 1954, pp. 10-13.
- ⁶⁹ *Proceedings of the 19th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, No. 27, March 27, 1954, pp. 9-10.
- ⁷⁰ See Dore, R., 'Japan's Place in the World', *The World Today*, Vol. 22, No. 7 (1966), pp. 14-23; also see public opinion polls in Peek, J. M., *Japan and the UN: International Co-operation and World Order*, Doctoral Thesis, University of Kansas, 1985, pp. 259-263.
- ⁷¹ Statement by Ishibashi Seiji, *Proceedings of the 38th Regular Diet Lower House Budget Committee*, No. 26, February 22, 1961, p. 8.
- ⁷² Peek, *Japan and the UN*, p. 263.
- ⁷³ Peek, *Japan and the UN*, p. 263.
- ⁷⁴ Takai, S., 'Japan's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping', *Social Science Japan*, February 1996, pp. 7-10.
- ⁷⁵ Ogata, S., 'Japan's UN Policy in the 1980s', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 27, No. 5 (1987), pp. 964-968.
- ⁷⁶ MOFA Homepage at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/issues.html>
- ⁷⁷ *The New York Times*, May 5, 1992.
- ⁷⁸ Tamamoto, M., 'Japan: Uncertain Role', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1991), p. 591.
- ⁷⁹ Akaha, T., 'Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy: A New East Asian Environment', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1991), pp. 324-340.
- ⁸⁰ Akaha, T., 'Japan's Security Policy after US Hegemony', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1989), p. 440.
- ⁸¹ Calder, 'Explaining the Reactive State', p.525.
- ⁸² Sasaki, 'Post-war Japanese Politics', p. 1.
- ⁸³ George, A., 'Japan's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Radical Departure or Predictable Response?', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 33, No. 6 (1993), p. 561.
- ⁸⁴ *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 8, 1992.
- ⁸⁵ Itô, M., 'Expanding Japan's Role in the UN', *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1995), pp. 288-290.
- ⁸⁶ Akaha, 'Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy', pp. 328-329.
- ⁸⁷ Ogata, S., 'Japan's UN Policy in the 1980s', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 27, No. 9 (1987), pp. 957-972; Morello, T., 'Japanese Muscle', *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 23, 1992 notes the rise of diplomats such as Akashi Yasushi, Ogata Sadako and Nakajima Hiroshi within the UN.
- ⁸⁸ Ogata, S., 'The Changing Role of Japan in the UN', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1983), p. 40.
- ⁸⁹ Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism*, p.186.
- ⁹⁰ Coate, R. A., and Puchala, D. J., 'Global Policies and the UN System', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1990), p. 129.
- ⁹¹ Ogata, S., 'Japan's Policy towards the UN', p. 255.
- ⁹² Hosokawa, M., *New Japan Party: Responsible Reform*, Tokyo, Tôyô Keizai Shinpôsha, 1993; Ozawa, I., *Blueprint for a New Japan*, Tokyo, Kôdansha, 1994; Takemura, M., *A Small but Shining Country, Japan*, Tokyo, Kôbunsha, 1994; Hashimoto, R., *Vision of Japan: A Realistic Direction for the 21st Century*, Tokyo, K. K. Bestseller, 1994 are but a few examples of the recent trend.

- ⁹³ Immerman, R., 'Japan in the UN', from Craig Garby and Mary Brown Bullock, *Japan: A New Kind of Superpower?*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994.
- ⁹⁴ Peek, *Japan and the UN*, p. 273.
- ⁹⁵ Yoshitsu, M. M., *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1983, pp. 47-48; and Hosoya, C., 'Japan's Responses to US policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty: The Dulles-Yoshida talks of January-February 1951', *Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics*, Vol. 10 (1981), p. 23.
- ⁹⁶ Stockwin, J. A. A., *The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of a Political Party and its Foreign Policy*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 67.
- ⁹⁷ Ogata, 'Japan's Policy towards the UN', p. 248.
- ⁹⁸ 'Kokubō no Kihon Hōshin' (Basic Policy for National Defence), *Bōei Hakusho*, Tokyo, Ōkura Insatsukyoku, 1997, p. 320.
- ⁹⁹ See Hook, *Militarisation and Demilitarisation*, pp. 200-201.
- ¹⁰⁰ Sakamoto, Y., 'Chūritsu Nihon no Bōei Kōzō' (The Defence Structure of a Neutral Japan), *Sekai*, No. 164 (1959), pp. 42-46.
- ¹⁰¹ Peek, *Japan and the UN*, p. 265
- ¹⁰² Tanaka, A., 'The Domestic Context: Japanese Politics and UN Peacekeeping', in Selig S. Harrison and Masashi Nishihara (eds.), *UN Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives*, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1995, p. 91.
- ¹⁰³ *General Assembly Resolution 2006 (XIX)/Rev. I*, February 18, 1965.
- ¹⁰⁴ Bloomfield, L. P., 'The United States, the Soviet Union and the Prospects for Peacekeeping', *International Organization*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1970), p. 558; Wakaizumi, K., 'Japan beyond 1970', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (1969), p. 514; and Kirsch, M. P., 'Soviet Security Objectives in Asia', *International Organization*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1970), p. 477.
- ¹⁰⁵ Hosoya, C., 'Japan and the UN', *Japan Institute of International Affairs Annual Review*, Vol. 4 (1965-68), p. 35.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ogata, 'Japan's Policy towards the UN', pp. 245-246.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ogata, 'Japan's UN Policy', p. 963.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ogata, 'Japan's Policy towards the UN', p. 246.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ogata, 'Japan's UN Policy', p. 963.
- ¹¹⁰ See opinion polls in Ogata, 'Japan's UN Policy', pp. 965-966; and Hosoya, 'Japan and the UN', p. 37.
- ¹¹¹ Ogata, 'The Changing Role of Japan', p. 39.
- ¹¹² Ogata, 'The Changing Role of Japan', p. 40.
- ¹¹³ *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 24, 1982.
- ¹¹⁴ See Chapman, J. W. M., Driete, R., and Gow, I. T. M., *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence, Diplomacy, Dependence*, London, Frances Pinter, 1983, pp. 33-34.
- ¹¹⁵ Chapman, Driete and Gow, *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security*, p. 34.
- ¹¹⁶ Peek, *Japan and the UN*, p. 268
- ¹¹⁷ *The Japan Times*, June 15, 1984.
- ¹¹⁸ *The Japan Times*, October 1, 1984.
- ¹¹⁹ Ogata, 'Japan's Policy towards the UN', p. 247.
- ¹²⁰ *The Japan Times*, July 28, 1980.
- ¹²¹ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, New York, UN Department of Public Information, September 1982.
- ¹²² Immerman, 'Japan in the UN', p. 184.
- ¹²³ Pharr, S. J., 'Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing', in Curtis, *Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, p. 236.
- ¹²⁴ Pharr, 'Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy', p. 245.
- ¹²⁵ Pharr, 'Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy', p. 246.
- ¹²⁶ Pharr, 'Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy', p. 244.
- ¹²⁷ Weinstein, M. E., *Japan's Post-war Defense Policy, 1947-1968*, New York, W. W. Norton, 1971.
- ¹²⁸ This policy has been described by Chalmers Johnson as 'one of the most skilfully executed foreign policies pursued by Japan in the post-war era—a clever, covert adaptation by Japan to the Cold War and a good example of Japan's essentially neo-mercantilist foreign policy.' Johnson, C., 'The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952-82', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (1986), p. 405.
- ¹²⁹ Krauss, E. S., and Muramatsu, M., 'The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned Pluralism', in

Yamamura K., and Yasuba, Y. (eds.), *The Political Economy of Japan, Volume I: The Domestic Transformation*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1987.

¹³⁰ Katzenstein P. J., and Okawara, N., 'Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies', *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1993), pp. 97-100; Berger, T. U., 'From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism', *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1993), pp. 119-150.

¹³¹ See for example McNelly, T., 'Disarmament and Civilian Control in Japan: A Constitutional Dilemma', *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1982), p. 357; Takeishi, C., 'Japanese National Identity in Transition: Who Wants to Send the Military Abroad?', *International Sociology*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1996), pp. 239-268.

¹³² Immerman 'Japan in the UN', p. 184.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE SECOND GULF WAR

¹ In this chapter, I concur with the terms used by Dilip Hiro. Thus, the Iran-Iraq War is regarded as the First Gulf War and the US-led campaign against Iraq, a direct descendant of the former war, is referred to as the Second Gulf War. This terminology acknowledges the connection between the two conflicts, as it was during the First Gulf War that Iraq accumulated the huge foreign loans from Kuwait that consequently led to the Second Gulf War and places the two conflicts in the broader context of the situation in the Middle East. See Hiro, D., *Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War*, New York, Routledge, 1992.

² 'Visible contribution' is a euphemism for the despatch of personnel, as opposed to the 'invisible' financial contributions Japan had previously made.

³ Documents pertaining to all the issues discussed here can be found in Laterpacht, E., Greenwood, C. J., Weller, M., and Bethlehem D., (eds.), *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents, Cambridge International Documents Series, Volume I*, Cambridge, Grotius Publications, 1991.

⁴ *The Wall Street Journal*, July 18, 1990.

⁵ Debate still prevails as to the impression April Glaspie, the US ambassador in Iraq, gave Saddam Hussein as regards US intentions.

⁶ *The Times*, August 3, 1990; *The Guardian*, August 3, 1990; *The New York Times*, August 4, 1990.

⁷ The encirclement strategy employed by Germany against France in the opening campaign of W.W.I.

⁸ Bennis, P., and Moushabeck, M. (eds.), *Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader*, New York, Olive Branch Press, 1991, p. 376.

⁹ Resolution 660 was followed in the months to come by Resolution 661 on August 6, 1990 imposing sanctions on trade with the exception of humanitarian materials; Resolution 662 on August 9, 1990 declaring the annexation of Iraq null and void; Resolution 664 on August 18, 1990 demanding the Iraqi release of foreign nationals from Iraq and Kuwait; Resolution 665 on August 25, 1990 approved the use of minimal force by naval forces in enforcing the blockade against Iraq; Resolution 666 on September 13, 1990 allowed for the shipment and distribution of humanitarian goods to Iraq under the supervision of international aid groups; Resolution 667 on September 13, 1990 condemned Iraqi attacks on diplomatic missions in Kuwait; Resolution 669 on September 25, 1990 requested a sanctions committee to consider requests for aid from neighbouring states affected by the blockade on Iraq; Resolution 670 on September 25, 1990 prohibited non-humanitarian air traffic into Iraq and Kuwait; Resolution 674 on October 29, 1990 requested states to compile financial losses and human rights' violations occurring as a result of the Iraqi invasion; Resolution 677 on November 28, 1990 called upon the Secretary-General to safeguard a copy of Kuwait's pre-war population register; and Resolution 678 on November 29, 1990 authorised states to use necessary force to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait unless withdrawal had been completed by January 15, 1991. For full details on these resolutions, see *The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996 (The United Nations Blue Book Series, Vol. IX)*, New York, UN Department of Public Information, 1996.

¹⁰ For a full discussion see Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm*, pp. 56-180.

¹¹ *The Japan Times*, August 18, 1990.

¹² *The Japan Times*, August 25, 1990.

¹³ *The Japan Times*, October 1, 1990.

¹⁴ *Proceedings of the 119th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on Security*, No. 7, October 5, 1990, pp. 5-6.

¹⁵ *The Japan Times*, August 30, 1990.

¹⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 30, 1990.

¹⁷ *The Japan Times*, August 31, 1990.

¹⁸ *The Daily Yomiuri*, August 14, 1990.

¹⁹ The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) changed its name to the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) in 1995. For

the purposes of clarity the latter term shall be used throughout this dissertation.

²⁰ *The Japan Times*, January 31, 1991.

²¹ *The Japan Times*, February 4, 1991.

²² *The Japan Times*, August 4, 1990 and August 7, 1990.

²³ Abe, K., 'The Japanese Business Community's Response to the Gulf War', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1991), p. 182.

²⁴ Abe, 'The Japanese Business Community's Response to the Gulf War', p. 182.

²⁵ Abe, 'The Japanese Business Community's Response to the Gulf War', p. 182.

²⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 18, 1990.

²⁷ *The Japan Times*, February 8, 1991.

²⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, February 15, 1991.

²⁹ *The Japan Times*, August 11, 1990.

³⁰ *The Japan Times*, August 13, 1990.

³¹ *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 13A, April 5, 1991.

³² *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 6B, February 15, 1991.

³³ *The Japan Times*, January 19, 1991.

³⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, April 17, 1991.

³⁵ *Sankei Shimbun*, August 23, 1990.

³⁶ *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 35A, September 14, 1990.

³⁷ Higashinaka M., 'Jikōmin Burokku no PKO Hōan Sakudō' (The LDP-Kōmei Party-DSP Block's Machinations over the PKO Bill), *Zenei*, No. 605 (1991), p. 35.

³⁸ *Kōmei Shimbun*, March 1, 1991.

³⁹ Yamauchi T., 'Nihonkoku Kenpō to PKO' (The Japanese Constitution and PKO), *Hōritsu Jihō*, Vol. 63, No. 7 (1991), p. 73.

⁴⁰ Hasegawa M., 'Kenpō o Mamoru to iu koto: PKO Kyōryoku Hōan ni suite' (Protecting the Constitution and the PKO Co-operation Bill), *Zenei*, No. 606 (1991), pp. 74-84.

⁴¹ Higashinaka, 'Jikōmin Burokku', p. 26.

⁴² *Asahi Shimbun*, September 3, 1990.

⁴³ *The Japan Times*, October 18, 1990.

⁴⁴ *The Japan Times*, October 31, 1990. Also see table III.

⁴⁵ *Wangan Sensō to Nihon: Towareru Kiki Kanri* (The Gulf War and Japan: Questioning Crisis Management), Tokyo, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1991, pp. 200-204.

⁴⁶ Satō, K., 'The Pursuit of the Principle of International Co-operation in the Constitution of Japan', *The Japanese Annual of International Law*, No. 36 (1993), pp. 12-13.

⁴⁷ *The Japan Times*, November 15, 1990. According to another opinion poll published on December 6, 1990, Kaifu's support had fallen by almost 7 percent from 59.1 percent to 52.1 percent and this decline was attributed to the failed bill.

⁴⁸ The three-party accord was signed on November 9, 1990 by Ozawa Ichirō of the LDP, Ichikawa Yūichiro of Kōmei Party, and Yonezawa Takashi of the DSP. The text stated that:

We shall firmly uphold the peace principles of the constitution and pursue diplomacy that has the UN as its central pillar.

In the process of the recent deliberations in the Diet, our parties have agreed that, in order to co-operate with the UN, financial co-operation or co-operation in kind will not be sufficient and that Japan should also send personnel.

For this purpose, an organization shall be established, separate from the Self-Defence Forces, with the task of co-operating in UN peacekeeping operations.

This organization shall implement co-operation in UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief activities carried out pursuant to UN resolutions.

Furthermore, this organization will be able to participate in disaster relief activities in accordance with the provisions of the law concerning Despatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams.

Legislative work shall be commenced on the basis of the above agreed principles with a view to completing a bill without delay.

⁴⁹ *The Japan Times*, December 15, 1990.

⁵⁰ *The Japan Times*, January 5, 1991.

⁵¹ *The Japan Times*, April 4, 1991.

- ⁵² *The Japan Times*, April 5, 1991.
- ⁵³ 120th Regular Diet Lower House Address by Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki, January 28, 1991.
- ⁵⁴ *The Japan Times*, June 10, 1991.
- ⁵⁵ *The Japan Times*, August 2, 1991.
- ⁵⁶ *The Japan Times*, June 21, 1991.
- ⁵⁷ *The Japan Times*, August 1, 1990.
- ⁵⁸ *The Japan Times*, August 2, 1990.
- ⁵⁹ *The Japan Times*, March 2, 1991.
- ⁶⁰ *The Japan Times*, March 21, 1991.
- ⁶¹ *The Japan Times*, March 14, 1991.
- ⁶² *The Japan Times*, March 15, 1991.
- ⁶³ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 20, 1991 and March 25, 1991.
- ⁶⁴ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 12, 1991.
- ⁶⁵ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 20, 1991.
- ⁶⁶ *The Japan Times*, April 24, 1991.
- ⁶⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, May 1, 1991.
- ⁶⁸ *The Japan Times*, April 26, 1991.
- ⁶⁹ *The Japan Times*, September 7, 1991.
- ⁷⁰ *The Japan Times*, September 10, 1991.
- ⁷¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, November 18, 1991.
- ⁷² *Asahi Shimbun*, November 18, 1991.
- ⁷³ *Mainichi Shimbun*, April 16, 1992.
- ⁷⁴ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 12, 1991.
- ⁷⁵ *The Japan Times*, February 28, 1992.
- ⁷⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 3, 1992.
- ⁷⁷ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 28, 1992.
- ⁷⁸ *The Japan Times*, March 1, 1992, and March 27, 1992.
- ⁷⁹ *The Japan Times*, May 17, 1992.
- ⁸⁰ *Asahi Shimbun*, April 28, 1992.
- ⁸¹ *Mainichi Shimbun*, May 13, 1992.
- ⁸² *The Japan Times*, May 20, 1992, and May 22, 1992.
- ⁸³ *The Japan Times*, May 27, 1992.
- ⁸⁴ Article 24 of the International Peace Co-operation Law states in Clause 4 that, 'the use of small-sized weapons or arms under the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases corresponding to the provisions of Article 36 and 37 of the Penal Code.' Article 36 dealing with self-defence and Article 37 with necessity.
- ⁸⁵ *The Japan Times*, May 30, 1992.
- ⁸⁶ *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 16, 1992.
- ⁸⁷ Yoshikawa, H., 'Jūdai Kyokumen ni kita PKO Mondai', (The PKO Problem Entering on an Important Phase), *Zenei*, No. 618 (1992), p. 60.
- ⁸⁸ 'Interview with Tanabe Makoto, Chairman of the SDPJ', *Gekkan Shakaitō*, No. 444 (1992), pp. 6-7.
- ⁸⁹ *Gekkan Shakaitō*, No. 444, pp. 178-179.
- ⁹⁰ *The Japan Times*, August 22, 1990.
- ⁹¹ *The Daily Yomiuri*, August 15, 1990.
- ⁹² *The Japan Times*, August 16, 1990.
- ⁹³ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 30, 1990.
- ⁹⁴ *The Japan Times*, September 14, 1990.
- ⁹⁵ *The Japan Times*, September 15, 1990.
- ⁹⁶ *Mainichi Shimbun*, October 4, 1990.
- ⁹⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 17, 1991.
- ⁹⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 23, 1991.
- ⁹⁹ *The Japan Times*, August 19, 1990.
- ¹⁰⁰ *The Japan Times*, August 23, 1990.
- ¹⁰¹ *The Japan Times*, August 24, 1990.

- ¹⁰² *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 14, 1990.
- ¹⁰³ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 19, 1990.
- ¹⁰⁴ *The Japan Times*, October 24, 1990.
- ¹⁰⁵ *The Japan Times*, November 16, 1990.
- ¹⁰⁶ Woolley, P. J., 'Japan's 1991 Minesweeping Decision: An Organizational Response', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 36, No. 8 (1996), pp. 805-6.
- ¹⁰⁷ Arase, D., 'New Directions in Japanese Security Policy', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1994), p. 46.
- ¹⁰⁸ *The Wall Street Journal*, April 25, 1991.
- ¹⁰⁹ Abe, 'The Japanese Business Community's Response to the Gulf War', p. 178.
- ¹¹⁰ Abe, 'The Japanese Business Community's Response to the Gulf War', p. 179.
- ¹¹¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, April 9, 1991.
- ¹¹² *The Japan Times*, August 3, 1990.
- ¹¹³ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 3, 1990.
- ¹¹⁴ *The Japan Times*, August 4, 1990, and August 5, 1990; *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 35B, September 14, 1990.
- ¹¹⁵ *The Japan Times*, August 7, 1990.
- ¹¹⁶ *The Japan Times*, August 8, 1990.
- ¹¹⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 8, 1990.
- ¹¹⁸ *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 3B, January 25, 1991.
- ¹¹⁹ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 23, 1991.
- ¹²⁰ *The Japan Times*, January 25, 1991.
- ¹²¹ *Proceedings of the 119th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on Security*, No. 7, October 5, 1990, pp. 4-5
- ¹²² *Proceedings of the 119th Regular Diet Lower House Honkaigi*, January 28, 1991, p. 4.
- ¹²³ Kaifu, T., 'Heiwa to Hanei ni Hatasu Nihon no Yakuwari' (Japan's Role in Peace and Prosperity), *Gekkan Jiyū Minshu*, No. 454 (1991), p. 33.
- ¹²⁴ *The Japan Times*, February 7, 1991.
- ¹²⁵ *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 12, 1990.
- ¹²⁶ *The Japan Times*, August 16, 1990.
- ¹²⁷ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 19, 1990.
- ¹²⁸ Yanai, S., 'Law concerning Co-operation for UN Peace-keeping Operations and other Operations: Japanese PKO Experience', *The Japanese Annual of International Law*, No. 36 (1993), p. 35.
- ¹²⁹ *The Japan Times*, August 25, 1990.
- ¹³⁰ *The Japan Times*, September 6, 1990.
- ¹³¹ *The Japan Times*, September 1, 1990.
- ¹³² *The Japan Times*, September 9, 1990.
- ¹³³ *Proceedings of the 119th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on Security*, No. 6, October 4, 1990, p. 12.
- ¹³⁴ *Proceedings of the 119th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on Security*, No. 6, October 4, 1990, p. 16.
- ¹³⁵ *The Japan Times*, October 12, 1990.
- ¹³⁶ *The Japan Times*, October 15, 1990.
- ¹³⁷ *Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Bluebook*, Tokyo, Ôkurasho Shuppankyoku, 1990; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 12, 1990.
- ¹³⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 18, 1991.
- ¹³⁹ *Mainichi Shimbun*, March 26, 1991.
- ¹⁴⁰ *The Japan Times*, May 31, 1991.
- ¹⁴¹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 17, 1991.
- ¹⁴² Tahara, S., 'The Invasion of Kuwait: Six Leaders Discuss Tokyo's Response', *Japan Echo*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1990), p. 14.
- ¹⁴³ Tahara, 'The Invasion of Kuwait', p. 15.
- ¹⁴⁴ Tahara, 'The Invasion of Kuwait', p. 17.
- ¹⁴⁵ *The Washington Post*, September 20, 1991.
- ¹⁴⁶ Abe, 'The Japanese Business Community's Response to the Gulf War', p. 184.
- ¹⁴⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, November 7, 1990.
- ¹⁴⁸ Abe, 'The Japanese Business Community's Response to the Gulf War', pp. 185-186.

- ¹⁴⁹ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 16, 1991.
- ¹⁵⁰ *Asahi Shimbun*, February 26, 1991.
- ¹⁵¹ *Proceedings of the 119th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on Security*, No. 7, October 5, 1990, p. 13.
- ¹⁵² *Lower House Special Hearing on the PKO Bill*, No. 3, September 25, 1991, p. 9.
- ¹⁵³ *Lower House Special Hearing on the PKO Bill*, No. 6, October 1, 1991, p. 11.
- ¹⁵⁴ *The Japan Times*, November 9, 1991, and November 13, 1991.
- ¹⁵⁵ *The Japan Times*, November 23, 1991.
- ¹⁵⁶ 'Kokusai Shakai ni Okeru Nihon no Yakuwari' (Japan's Role in International Society), *Bungeishunjū*, April 1992, pp. 133.
- ¹⁵⁷ 'Kokusai Shakai ni Okeru Nihon no Yakuwari', p. 136.
- ¹⁵⁸ 'Kokusai Shakai ni Okeru Nihon no Yakuwari', p. 139.
- ¹⁵⁹ 'Kokusai Shakai ni Okeru Nihon no Yakuwari', p. 141.
- ¹⁶⁰ 'Kokusai Shakai ni Okeru Nihon no Yakuwari', p. 142.
- ¹⁶¹ *The Japan Times*, February 21, 1992.
- ¹⁶² See Matsutake, S., 'Jieitai Kaigai Hahei o Nerau PKO Rippōka Sakudō no Kiken' (The Dangers of the PKO Legislative Process and the Overseas Despatch of the SDF), *Keizai*, No. 327 (1991), pp. 134-135.
- ¹⁶³ *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 10A, March 13, 1992, pp. 1-11.
- ¹⁶⁴ *The Japan Times*, March 23, 1992.
- ¹⁶⁵ Paper presented by Robert Immerman at the, 'Japan and the World', Woodrow Wilson Center Conference in Washington D.C., January 27-28, 1992.
- ¹⁶⁶ *The Japan Times*, February 22, 1992.
- ¹⁶⁷ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 9, 1992.
- ¹⁶⁸ *The Japan Times*, April 21, 1992.
- ¹⁶⁹ *Mainichi Shimbun*, April 16, 1992.
- ¹⁷⁰ *The Japan Times*, June 17, 1992.
- ¹⁷¹ Diagram III displays each actor's position on the issue of UNPKO.
- ¹⁷² *Asahi Shimbun*, September 28, 1992.
- ¹⁷³ Statement by Sumi Shigeki, Delegation of Japan, on Item 74: Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their Aspects. UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Special Political Committee, October 29, 1991.
- ¹⁷⁴ Statement by Sumi Shigeki, Delegation of Japan, on Item 75: Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their Aspects. UN General Assembly, 47th Session, Special Political Committee, November 10, 1992.
- ¹⁷⁵ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 2, 1990.
- ¹⁷⁶ *The Japan Times*, October 1, 1990.
- ¹⁷⁷ *The Japan Times*, September 20, 1990.
- ¹⁷⁸ *The Japan Times*, September 28, 1990.
- ¹⁷⁹ *The Japan Times*, October 20, 1990 and October 22, 1990.
- ¹⁸⁰ *The Japan Times*, October 28, 1990.
- ¹⁸¹ Kim, A. H. N., 'Japan and Peacekeeping Operations', *Military Review*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (1994), p. 22.
- ¹⁸² *The Japan Times*, October 28, 1990.
- ¹⁸³ *The Japan Times*, March 5, 1991.
- ¹⁸⁴ *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 10B, March 15, 1991, p. 6.
- ¹⁸⁵ *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 10B, March 15, 1991, p. 7.
- ¹⁸⁶ *The Japan Times*, March 9, 1991.
- ¹⁸⁷ *The Japan Times*, March 8, 1991.
- ¹⁸⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, April 28, 1991.
- ¹⁸⁹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 3, 1991.
- ¹⁹⁰ *The Japan Times*, May 4, 1991.
- ¹⁹¹ *The Japan Times*, September 25, 1991.
- ¹⁹² *The Japan Times*, September 26, 1991.
- ¹⁹³ *Asahi Shimbun*, October 9, 1991.
- ¹⁹⁴ *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 36B, September 27, 1991, p. 4.
- ¹⁹⁵ *The Japan Times*, June 12, 1992; for a review of East Asian nations' reaction to the Diet debate and suggestions

as to how Japan should deal with these nations, see Enoki K., 'Bei-Chu to tomo ni Shinanpô Taisei o' (For a New Security System with the US and China), *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 22, 1992.

¹⁹⁶ *The Korea Times*, 23 April, 1996.

¹⁹⁷ *The Washington Post*, March 17, 1991.

¹⁹⁸ All terms used by Woolley, 'Japan's 1991 Minesweeping Decision', pp. 804-817.

¹⁹⁹ Ushiba, A., 'The Minesweeping Mission: A Job Well Done', *Japan Echo*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1992), p. 43.

²⁰⁰ Ushiba, 'The Minesweeping Mission', pp. 44.

²⁰¹ Woolley, 'Japan's 1991 Minesweeping Decision', pp. 804-817.

²⁰² With the surprising comment that 'the ever popular question, "why did Japan not do more," can be reasonably answered, at least in part, without reference to public polling results, the peace Constitution, and the rest of the familiar baggage that accompanies discussions of Japanese public policy.' Woolley ignores central issues and tends to be arguing an incrementalist view, rather than introducing any new framework for analysis. The incrementalist, pluralist view of Japan's politics is more useful to understand both the decision to despatch minesweepers and generally Japan's Gulf War policy. Woolley, 'Japan's 1991 Minesweeping Decision', p. 817.

CHAPTER FIVE: CAMBODIA

¹ In this chapter, except when referring to the regimes that have governed Cambodia since 1975, I have used the name 'Cambodia' as opposed to 'Kampuchea' due to its wider usage in the English language.

² Created by UNSC Resolution 745 on February 28, 1992, UNTAC cost around \$1.7 billion to implement and deployed over 22,000 military and civilian personnel from over 44 countries joined by about 1,000 international polling station officers and over 50,000 Cambodian staff. For a more detailed description of the UNTAC operation, see Akashi, Y., 'The Challenges Faced by UNTAC', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1993), pp. 185-201.

³ See the MOFA Homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/02_2.html.

⁴ A detailed review of Japan's policy towards Cambodia since 1953 can be found in Tomoda, S., 'Japan's Search for a Political Role in Asia: The Cambodian Peace Settlement', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1992), pp. 43-60; Iikura, A., 'Japan's Foreign Policy on Cambodia: A New Pattern of Diplomacy', *Outlook*, No. 20 (1993), pp. 53-88.

⁵ Chandler, D. P., *A History of Cambodia: 2nd Edition*, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1992, p. 240.

⁶ For a more detailed analysis of the process, see Leifer, M., 'The International Representation of Kampuchea', *Southeast Asian Affairs 1982*, Singapore, Heinmann Asia for Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982, pp. 47-59.

⁷ Munck, G. L., and Kumar, C., *Conflict Resolution through International Intervention: A Comparative Study of Cambodia and El Salvador*, University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign Occasional Paper, April 1993, p. 6.

⁸ This issue was regarded as crucial to the failure of the conference. See Koh, T., 'The Paris Conference on Cambodia: A Multilateral Negotiation that Failed', *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1990), p. 86. The thorny issue of atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge was put aside until a peace deal had been brokered and Cambodian unity promoted.

⁹ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 April, 1989, p. 11.

¹⁰ *Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal*, Canberra, Australian Government Printing Service, 1990.

¹¹ *UN Document S/RES/668*, September 20, 1990; *UN General Assembly Resolution 45/3*, October 8, 1990; *UN Document A7/RES/45/3*, October 15, 1990.

¹² Australia, Brunei, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam and Yugoslavia.

¹³ See chapter two for a discussion of these terms.

¹⁴ Particularly Akashi was entrusted with extraordinary privileges in retaining the right to decide whether decisions undertaken by the Supreme National Council were in keeping with the Paris Peace Accords or not. It could be said that UNTAC was Akashi. See Akashi, 'The Challenges Faced by UNTAC', p. 188.

¹⁵ Fukui Y., 'Kanbojia PKO Hôkoku: Heiwa Kôchiku e no Kokuren no Yakuwari wa Ôkii—UNTAC no Ichiin toshite mita Kanbojia' (Cambodia PKO Report: The Large Role of the UN in Constructing Peace—Cambodia as seen by one member of UNTAC), *Gekkan Jiyû Minshu* (July 1993), p. 118.

¹⁶ The results of the election were FUNCINPEC: 58 seats (45.47 percent); Cambodian People's Party: 51 seats (38.23 percent); Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP): 10 seats (3.81); Molinka Party: 1 seats (1.37percent); other parties: no seats (11.12 percent). See Cambodia Election Results, *UN Document DPI/1389*, June 21, 1993.

¹⁷ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 14, 1993; *Asahi Shimbun*, January 14, 1993.

- ¹⁸ *The Japan Times*, February 4, 1993.
- ¹⁹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 2, 1993.
- ²⁰ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 10, 1993.
- ²¹ *The Japan Times*, February 4, 1993.
- ²² *The Japan Times*, February 16, 1993.
- ²³ While assisting with preparations for the election, Nakata was shot in the province of Kompong Thom by what was at first believed to be Khmer Rouge guerrillas but subsequently turned out to be an armed officer of the State of Cambodia party. See Findlay, T., *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 77.
- ²⁴ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 9, 1993.
- ²⁵ *The Japan Times*, April 9, 1993. According to Japan's National Police Agency, danger existed in seven of the twenty-one areas where Japanese civilian police were stationed. See *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, May 13, 1993.
- ²⁶ *The Japan Times*, April 9, 1993.
- ²⁷ *The Japan Times*, April 10, 1993.
- ²⁸ *Proceedings of the 121st Regular Diet Lower House Committee on National Security*, No. 6, April 6, 1993, p. 8.
- ²⁹ *The Japan Times*, April 16, 1993.
- ³⁰ *The Japan Times*, May 14, 1993.
- ³¹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 1, 1993.
- ³² *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 18, 1993.
- ³³ *The Japan Times*, May 14, 1993.
- ³⁴ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 18 and May 19, 1993.
- ³⁵ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 22, 1993.
- ³⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 24, 1993.
- ³⁷ *The Japan Times*, April 13, 1993.
- ³⁸ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 13, 1993.
- ³⁹ *The Japan Times*, May 22, 1993.
- ⁴⁰ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 23, 1993.
- ⁴¹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 10, 1993; *The Japan Times*, May 11, 1993.
- ⁴² *The Japan Times*, May 11, 1993. See Chapter Six.
- ⁴³ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 11, 1993 and May 12, 1993.
- ⁴⁴ 'Kokuren wa Bannō de wa nai' (The UN is not Omnipotent), *Shokun* (July 1993), pp. 38-47.
- ⁴⁵ *The Japan Times*, November 21, 1993.
- ⁴⁶ *The Prime Minister's Office Public Opinion Poll* was established in 1969 and takes place every three years.
- ⁴⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, June 12 1992.
- ⁴⁸ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 27, 1993.
- ⁴⁹ Yanai, S., 'Law concerning Co-operation for UN Peacekeeping Operations and other Operations: Japanese PKO Experience', *The Japanese Annual of International Law*, No. 36 (1993), p. 65.
- ⁵⁰ *Public Opinion Survey on Self-Defense Forces and Defense Problems*, Prime Minister's Office, January 1994.
- ⁵¹ *Public Opinion Survey on the UN Security Council*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 1994.
- ⁵² *Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy*, Prime Minister's Office, October 1994.
- ⁵³ *Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy*, Prime Minister's Office, October 1994.
- ⁵⁴ *Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy*, Prime Minister's Office, April 1995.
- ⁵⁵ *Public Opinion Survey on the Role of the Self-Defense Forces*, Prime Minister's Office, July 1995.
- ⁵⁶ *Public Opinion Survey on the Role of the Self-Defense Forces*, Prime Minister's Office, July 1995.
- ⁵⁷ *Public Opinion Survey on the Role of the Self-Defense Forces*, Prime Minister's Office, February 1991.
- ⁵⁸ *Public Opinion Survey on the Role of the Self-Defense Forces*, Prime Minister's Office, January 1996.
- ⁵⁹ Ahn, C. S., 'Government-Party Co-ordination in Japan's Foreign Policymaking: The Issue of Permanent Membership in the UNSC', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1997), p. 369.
- ⁶⁰ *The Japan Times*, May 18, 1993.
- ⁶¹ *The Japan Times*, September 19, 1993.
- ⁶² McHugh, L. B., and Shinn, R., *UN Operations in Cambodia and Japanese Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, Washington, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1992, p. 7.
- ⁶³ Nishihara, M., 'Trilateral Country Roles: Challenges and Opportunities' in John Roper et al. (eds.), *Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Strengthening Multilateral Peacekeeping*, New York, The Trilateral Commission,

- 1993, p. 64. It is argued that this would provide for Akashi's suggested 'peace in parts' and that Japan and the US could contribute like Scandinavian states sending combined forces.
- ⁶⁴ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 17, 1993.
- ⁶⁵ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 7, 1993.
- ⁶⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 30, 1993.
- ⁶⁷ Tanaka, A., 'UN Peace Operations and Japan-US Relations' in Peter Gourevitch, Takashi Inoguchi and Courtney Purrington, *United States-Japan Relations and International Institutions after the Cold War*, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1995, p. 77.
- ⁶⁸ Kuriyama, T., *New Directions for Japanese Foreign Policy in the Changing World of the 1990s*, Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990, p. 23.
- ⁶⁹ *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, Washington, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State Publication No. 10161, 1994, p. 1.
- ⁷⁰ For example, Johnson, C., and Keehn, E. B., 'The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (1995), pp. 103-114.
- ⁷¹ *Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Bluebook*, Tokyo, Ôkurasho Shuppanyoku, 1990, p. 46.
- ⁷² The appointment of Akashi was welcomed in Tokyo by Foreign minister Watanabe, 'Japan recognizes the importance of a role to be played by the UNTAC to ensure the smooth implementation of the Cambodian peace accord'. *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 6B (February 14, 1992), p. 6.
- ⁷³ *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 6B (February 14, 1992), p. 6.
- ⁷⁴ Arisawa, N., 'Jieitai PKO Haken no Ichinen: Kenshō' (Evidence from the First Year of the SDF's PKO Despatch), *Sekai*, No. 588 (1993), p. 61.
- ⁷⁵ *The Japan Times*, January 23, 1993.
- ⁷⁶ *The Japan Times*, February 18, 1993.
- ⁷⁷ *The Japan Times*, April 13, 1993.
- ⁷⁸ *The Japan Times*, April 17, 1993.
- ⁷⁹ *The Japan Times*, July 29, 1993.
- ⁸⁰ *The Japan Times*, July 29, 1993.
- ⁸¹ *The Japan Times*, July 30, 1993.
- ⁸² *Asahi Shimbun*, July 28, 1993.
- ⁸³ 'Nakata Atsuhito-shi no Ikun' (The Achievements of the Late Nakata Atsuhito), *Shokun* (June 1993), pp. 209-215.
- ⁸⁴ 'Kokuren wa Bannō de wa nai', pp. 38-47.
- ⁸⁵ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 12, 1993.
- ⁸⁶ Boutros-Ghali had stated on May 13, 1992 that the UN role in Cambodia would be one of peacemaker and peacebuilder rather than peacekeeper shouldering both military and civilian duties. McHugh and Shinn, *UN Operations in Cambodia*, 1992, p. 1.
- ⁸⁷ *Sankei Shimbun*, May 5, 1993.
- ⁸⁸ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 5, 1993.
- ⁸⁹ *Asahi Shimbun*, May 12, 1993.
- ⁹⁰ *Mainichi Shimbun*, May 13, 1993.
- ⁹¹ For a detailed account of Nakata Takehito's reaction to his son's death refer to, Nakata, T., 'Sakura to tomo ni Ten ni mesareta Musuko' (With the Cherry Blossom my Son looks up to Heaven), *Bungeishunjū* (June 1993), pp. 168-176.
- ⁹² Matsumoto, T., *PKO to Kokusai Kōken* (PKO and International Contribution), Tokyo, Kenpakusha, 1994, p. 185.
- ⁹³ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 28, 1993.
- ⁹⁴ Maeda, T., *Kenshō: PKO to Jieitai* (Evidence: PKO and the SDF), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1996, p. 26.
- ⁹⁵ Maeda, *Kenshō*, pp. 27-28.
- ⁹⁶ Maeda, *Kenshō*, p. 38.
- ⁹⁷ The Japan Overseas Co-operation Volunteers (JOCV) is a Japanese version of the Peace Corps accepting about 1,000 applicants twice a year. Applicants used to level off at 3,500 each time but in November 1994 exceeded 6,300 more than half being women. See Takahara, T., 'Japan', in Findlay, *Challengers for the New Peacekeepers*, pp. 59-60.
- ⁹⁸ *The New York Times*, June 2, 1992.
- ⁹⁹ *The Japan Times*, August 11, 1993.
- ¹⁰⁰ *The Japan Times*, September 29, 1993.

- ¹⁰¹ *The Japan Times*, November 18, 1993.
- ¹⁰² *The Wall Street Journal*, June 21, 1992.
- ¹⁰³ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 31, 1993.
- ¹⁰⁴ Akashi, Y., 'Nihonjin yo PKO o Gôkai surunakare' (Fellow Japanese, Don't Misunderstand PKO), *Foresight* (July 1992), p. 11.
- ¹⁰⁵ Tomoda, S., 'Kanbojia Enjo Seisaku no Atarashisa' (The Novelty of the Cambodian Aid Policy), *Gaikô Forumu* (March 1993), p. 32.
- ¹⁰⁶ Okazaki, H., and Satô, S., 'Redefining the Role of Japanese Military Power', *Japan Echo*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1991), p. 21.
- ¹⁰⁷ *The Bangkok Post*, October 30, 1991.
- ¹⁰⁸ Hiraiwa, G., 'In this Uncertain World Japan must Carve out its own Future', *Keidanren Review*, No. 130 (August 1991), p. 3.
- ¹⁰⁹ *UN Document S/1992/132*, September 22, 1992.
- ¹¹⁰ *The Washington Post*, February 19, 1993; *The Financial Times*, February 17, 1993.
- ¹¹¹ Maeda, Kenshō, pp. 47-49.
- ¹¹² *Nippon no Anzen Hoshō to Bōeiryoku no Arikata: Nijūisseiki e Mukete no Tenbō* (The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century), Tokyo, Ōkurasho Insatsukyoku, 1994, pp. 13-14.
- ¹¹³ *Nippon no Anzen Hoshō to Bōeiryoku no Arikata*, p. 16.
- ¹¹⁴ Fukui, 'Kanbojia PKO Hōkoku', p. 120.
- ¹¹⁵ Kondō, N., 'Kanbojia Genchi Repōto 12: Jieitai, Kanbojia PKO Tesshū' (On the Ground Report from Cambodia: The SDF and Withdrawal from Cambodia), *Hōgaku Seminā*, No. 467, (November 1993), p. 5.
- ¹¹⁶ *The Japan Times*, May 18, 1993.
- ¹¹⁷ 'Kokuren wa Bannō de wa nai', pp. 38-47.
- ¹¹⁸ *Thailand Foreign Affairs Newsletter*, Bangkok, May 1991, p. 11.
- ¹¹⁹ Chittiwatanapong, P., 'Japan's Roles in the Post-hegemonic World: Perspectives from Southeast Asia', in Tsuneko Akaha and Frank Langdon (eds.), *Japan in the Post-hegemonic World*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, p. 212.
- ¹²⁰ Leitenberg, M., *The Participation of Japanese Military Forces in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, Maryland, Maryland University Press, 1996, p. 22.
- ¹²¹ Leitenberg, *The Participation of Japanese Military Forces*, p. 22.
- ¹²² *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 9, 1992; Leitenberg, *The Participation of Japanese Military Forces*, p. 31. The Philippines allowed ASDF planes to use Manila airport for refuelling and other services with Japanese C-130s transported supplies for the Philippines' contingent. As regards Thailand, U-Thapao Royal Naval Base was made available for the use of ASDF transport planes. Furthermore, Thailand provided training in tropical medicine for Japanese personnel serving in a Japanese engineering battalion stationed in Takeo.
- ¹²³ 'Kokuren wa Bannō de wa nai', pp. 38-47.
- ¹²⁴ Matsumoto, T., *PKO to Kokusai Kōken*, p. 188.
- ¹²⁵ *The Los Angeles Times*, September 8, 1992.
- ¹²⁶ Xintian, Y., 'Japan's Role and Responsibility in East Asia', *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1994), pp. 57-60.
- ¹²⁷ See Stubbs, R., 'Reluctant Leader, Expectant Followers: Japan and Southeast Asia', *International Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (1991), pp. 655-658; Chittiwatanapong, 'Japan's Roles in the Post-hegemonic World', pp. 201-231.
- ¹²⁸ *The Japan Times*, May 30, 1993; *Asahi Shimbun*, June 5, 1993.
- ¹²⁹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 30, 1993.
- ¹³⁰ *The Japan Times*, October 5, 1993.
- ¹³¹ *The Japan Times*, November 13, 1993.
- ¹³² *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 6B, February 14, 1992, pp. 6-8.
- ¹³³ *The Japan Times*, January 4, 1994.

CHAPTER SIX: SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS

- ¹ Rikhye, I. J., Harbottle, M., and Egge, B., *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Yale University Press, 1974, p. 112.
- ² *UN Document S/24635*, October 8, 1992.
- ³ *UN Document S/24642*, October 9, 1992.

- ⁴ UN Document S/24719, October 27, 1992.
- ⁵ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peacekeeping*, New York, UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 323.
- ⁶ UN Document S/1994/1196, October 21, 1994.
- ⁷ UN Press Release SC/5922, October 27, 1994 and UN Press Release SG/SM/5456, October 27, 1994.
- ⁸ UN Document S/1994/1282, November 11, 1994. The election results were in the presidential election, Joaquim Chissano (FRELIMO): 53.3 percent; Afonso Dhlakama (RENAMO): 33.7 percent; Wehia Ripua (Partido Democrático de Mozambique): 2.9 percent. In the legislative election, FRELIMO: 44.3 percent (129 seats); RENAMO: 37.8 percent (109 seats); União Democrático (UD): 5.2 percent (12 seats). See *The Blue Helmets*, p. 334.
- ⁹ UN Press Release SG/SM/5488, November 19, 1994.
- ¹⁰ UN Document S/11302 and UN Document S/11302/Add. 1, May 24, 1974.
- ¹¹ The six month mandate has since 1974 been regularly renewed by the Security Council with the recommendation of the Secretary-General and the agreement of the Israeli and Syrian sides.
- ¹² In December 1981, Syria protested at the introduction by Israel of Israeli law into the occupied region receiving international support. However, this did not affect the everyday execution of the UNDOF operation.
- ¹³ See *Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council*, UN Document S/1995/952, November 28, 1995.
- ¹⁴ *The Japan Times*, February 16, 1993.
- ¹⁵ *The Japan Times*, May 14, 1993.
- ¹⁶ *The Japan Times*, August 10, 1993.
- ¹⁷ *The Japan Times*, September 28, 1993.
- ¹⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, October 5, 1993.
- ¹⁹ *The Japan Times*, October 14, 1993.
- ²⁰ *The Japan Times*, October 28, 1993.
- ²¹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 30, 1993.
- ²² *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 1, 1997.
- ²³ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 9, 1994.
- ²⁴ *The Prime Minister's Office Public Opinion Poll on Diplomacy*, May 1996.
- ²⁵ *The Prime Minister's Office Public Opinion Poll on the Future Role of the Self-Defense Forces*, February 1996.
- ²⁶ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, May 2, 1997.
- ²⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, June 25, 1997.
- ²⁸ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 26, 1997.
- ²⁹ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 26, 1997.
- ³⁰ *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-950213.063, February 10, 1994.
- ³¹ *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-950329.017, March 28, 1994; *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-940725.128, July 21, 1994.
- ³² *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-950413.032, April 10, 1995.
- ³³ *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-950418.086, April 14, 1995.
- ³⁴ *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-941031.161, October 28, 1994.
- ³⁵ *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-950428.013, April 27, 1995.
- ³⁶ *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-950512.024, May 11, 1995.
- ³⁷ *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-950830.145, August 25, 1995.
- ³⁸ *The Japan Times*, October 7, 1994.
- ³⁹ *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-940801.185, July 26, 1994.
- ⁴⁰ *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-940831.028, August 30, 1994; *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-940905.086, September 2, 1994.
- ⁴¹ *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-941004.044, October 2, 1994.
- ⁴² *Gekkan Shakaitô*, No. 473 (November 1994), p. 37.
- ⁴³ *The Japan Times*, September 13, 1994.
- ⁴⁴ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 24, 1994.
- ⁴⁵ *The Japan Times*, March 13, 1995.
- ⁴⁶ *The Daily Yomiuri* (Internet Edition), February 26, 1998.
- ⁴⁷ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, June 1, 1994.
- ⁴⁸ *The Japan Times*, December 14, 1994. This one-at-a-time formula is still the position of the MOFA as intimated in conversation with Itô Naoki, Deputy Director of the UN Policy Division of the MOFA, September 14, 1996.
- ⁴⁹ *The Japan Times*, February 2, 1995.
- ⁵⁰ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 15, 1995.

- ⁵¹ *The Japan Times*, April 22, 1995.
- ⁵² *Asahi Shimbun*, September 14, 1993.
- ⁵³ *Asahi Shimbun*, June 2, 1994.
- ⁵⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, December 12, 1995.
- ⁵⁵ *The Japan Times*, January 15, 1997.
- ⁵⁶ *The Economist*, May 3, 1997.
- ⁵⁷ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 29, 1994.
- ⁵⁸ *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 20, 1997.
- ⁵⁹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 21, 1997.
- ⁶⁰ *Kyōdō News Service*, File t-940019.093, September 2, 1994.
- ⁶¹ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, September 10, 1994.
- ⁶² Ahn, C. S., 'Government-Party Co-ordination in Japan's Foreign Policymaking: The Issue of Permanent Membership in the UNSC', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1997), pp. 373-375.
- ⁶³ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 6, 1994.
- ⁶⁴ In September 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto attempted to appoint Satō Koko, a politician convicted of accepting bribes during the Lockheed scandal, as Director-General of the Management and Co-ordination Agency. Faced with the public and opposition parties' outcry, Hashimoto was forced to withdraw this appointment.
- ⁶⁵ *Asahi Shimbun*, September 6, 1996.
- ⁶⁶ *The Daily Yomiuri* (Internet Edition), October 14, 1997.
- ⁶⁷ *The Daily Yomiuri* (Internet Edition), April 30, 1998.
- ⁶⁸ *The Daily Yomiuri* (Internet Edition), April 29, 1998.
- ⁶⁹ *The Daily Yomiuri* (Internet Edition), April 30, 1998.
- ⁷⁰ Estimated to be in May 1997 more than one billion dollars. *The Times* (Internet Edition), May 12, 1997.
- ⁷¹ *The Japan Times*, September 29, 1993.
- ⁷² *The Times* (Internet Edition), September 17, 1997.
- ⁷³ *The Japan Times*, July 1994.
- ⁷⁴ *Special Briefing Transcription on East Asia Strategy Report*, US Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, February 27, 1995.
- ⁷⁵ *Kyōdō News Service*, File t-940919.062, September 16, 1994.
- ⁷⁶ *Kyōdō News Service*, File t-940926.161, September 18, 1994.
- ⁷⁷ *Kyōdō News Service*, File t-941017.138, October 14, 1994.
- ⁷⁸ *The Japan Times*, March 13, 1997.
- ⁷⁹ For a detailed discussion of the revised guidelines see 'Tokushū: Gaidorain no Minaoshi' (Special Edition: Revision of the Guidelines) *Securitarian*, No. 468 (December 1997), pp. 10-29.
- ⁸⁰ *The Daily Yomiuri* (Internet Edition), October 16, 1997.
- ⁸¹ Cossa, R. A., 'Avoiding New Myths: US-Japan Security Relations', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1997), pp. 219-231.
- ⁸² *United States Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific Region*, US Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, February 1995.
- ⁸³ *The Daily Yomiuri* (Internet Edition), April 29, 1998. This agreement allows the US and Japan to provide each other with logistic support during emergencies in 'areas surrounding Japan.'
- ⁸⁴ *The Daily Yomiuri* (Internet Edition), April 29, 1998. The bills included legislation allowing for logistical support to US forces, search and rescue operations for injured US personnel outside a combat zone, ship inspections in accordance with UNSC resolutions, and rescue operations of Japanese nationals in a conflict zone. The use of weapons was sanctioned in these bills where SDF personnel found it unavoidable for their own defense and for the protection of those engaged in operations with them.
- ⁸⁵ Citation of Song Yong-son of the Korean Institute of Defense Analyses in Seoul in *The Korea Times*, April 23, 1996.
- ⁸⁶ *The Daily Yomiuri* (Internet Edition), June 25, 1997.
- ⁸⁷ *Kyōdō News Service*, File t-950310.073, March 8, 1995. The ACSA agreement was revised in line with the guidelines and submitted for Diet approval in April, 1998. *Daily Yomiuri* (Internet Edition), April 29, 1998.
- ⁸⁸ *The Japan Times*, January 23, 1993.
- ⁸⁹ *The Japan Times*, February 4, 1993.
- ⁹⁰ *The Japan Times*, February 16, 1993.

- ⁹¹ *The Japan Times*, February 16, 1993.
- ⁹² *The Japan Times*, August 11, 1993.
- ⁹³ *The Japan Times*, September 29, 1993.
- ⁹⁴ *Nippon no Anzen Hoshô to Bôeiryoku no Arikata: Nijûisseiki e Mukete no Tenbô* (The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century), Tokyo, Ôkurasho Insatsukyoku, 1994, p. 11.
- ⁹⁵ *Nippon no Anzen Hoshô to Bôeiryoku no Arikata*, p. 12.
- ⁹⁶ Funabashi, Y., *Dômei Hyôryû* (The Drifting Alliance), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1997, pp. 259-275.
- ⁹⁷ *The Japan Times*, May 11, 1993. However, a minor demonstration of some 300 people was organised at Narita airport as the SDF personnel left for Mozambique to replace existing forces. *The Japan Times*, November 23, 1993.
- ⁹⁸ *UN Peacekeeping Operations: Japanese Policy and Practice*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, April 1997, pp. 90-95.
- ⁹⁹ *The Japan Times*, May 16, 1995.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, June 16, 1995.
- ¹⁰¹ *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-940725.128, July 21, 1994.
- ¹⁰² *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-950103.153, December 14, 1994.
- ¹⁰³ *Asahi Shimbun*, July 29, 1997.
- ¹⁰⁴ *The Japan Times*, January 4, 1993.
- ¹⁰⁵ Owada, H., Statement at the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, April 11, 1997. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Homepage, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/pko/committee.html>
- ¹⁰⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 17, 1994.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 22, 1994.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 15, 1995.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Kyôdô News Service*, File t-950818.033, August 1, 1995.
- ¹¹⁰ *The Japan Times*, August 25, 1994.
- ¹¹¹ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 29, 1994.
- ¹¹² *The Japan Times*, September 4, 1994.
- ¹¹³ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 5, 1995.
- ¹¹⁴ *The Japan Times*, October 7, 1994.
- ¹¹⁵ *The Times* (Internet Edition), September 4, 1997.
- ¹¹⁶ *The Japan Times*, October 30, 1997.
- ¹¹⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 7, 1995.
- ¹¹⁸ *International Peacekeeping News*, No. 12 (September-October 1995). A monthly report of global peacekeeping activities, its homepage can be found at <http://csf.Colorado.EDU/dfax/ipn/ipn12htm>.
- ¹¹⁹ *The Japan Times*, December 7, 1995.
- ¹²⁰ Pyle, K. B., 'Japan and the Future of Collective Security', in Daniel Unger and Paul Blackburn, *Japan's Emerging Global Role*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, p. 111.
- ¹²¹ See Inoguchi, T., 'A Step Towards One-Party Predominance: Japan's General Election of 20 October 1996', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1997), pp. 48-64.

CONCLUSION

- ¹ Kratochwil, F., *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 47-57.
- ² *The Daily Yomiuri* (Internet Edition), February 26, 1998.
- ³ *The Prime Minister's Office Public Opinion Poll on Diplomacy*, May 1996.
- ⁴ *The Japan Times*, March 31, 1998.
- ⁵ Franck, T., *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 24.
- ⁶ Haas, E. B., *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations*, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1990, pp. 14-15.
- ⁷ See the wide range of topics dealt with in Katzenstein, P. J., (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Interviews

- Itô Naoki Deputy Director, United Nations Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
- Kamiya Mataka Associate Professor of International Relations, Department of Social Sciences, National Defense Academy
- Kitaoka Shinichi Professor of Diplomatic History, University of Tokyo
- Nakatani Gen Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Posts and Telecommunications; Member of the House of Representatives
- Richard Lloyd Parry Tokyo Bureau Chief, The Independent
- Shimura Hisako Professor of International Affairs; President, Tsuda College
- Takeuchi Haruhisa Press Division, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
- Tanaka Akihiko Associate Professor of International Politics, University of Tokyo
- Tsuchiyama Jitsuo Professor of Political Science, Aoyama Gakuin University

Surveys and other Official Publications (in Japanese)

Bôei Nenkan (Defence Annual)

Gaikô Seisho (Diplomatic Bluebook)

Nihon Bôeichô Hakusho (Japan Defence Agency White Paper)

Sôrifu, Naikaku Sôri Daijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu, Gaikô ni kan suru Yoron Chôsa (Prime Minister's Office, Prime Minister's Secretariat, Public Relations Office, Opinion Poll on Diplomacy)

Sôrifu, Naikaku Sôri Daijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu, Jieitai Bôei Mondai ni kan suru Yoron Chôsa (Prime Minister's Office, Prime Minister's Secretariat, Public Relations Office, Opinion Poll on the Self-Defence Forces of Japan and Defense Affairs)

Shūgiin Gaimu linkai Gijiroku (Proceedings of the Lower House Committee on Foreign Affairs)

Shūgiin Anzen Hoshō linkai Gijiroku (Proceedings of the Lower House Committee on National Security)

Sangiin Gaimu linkai Gijiroku (Proceedings of the Upper House Committee on Foreign Affairs)

Surveys and other Official Publications (in English)

The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peacekeeping, New York, UN Department of Public Information, 1996.

The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Washington, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State Publication No. 10161, 1994.

Kyōdō News Service Files

Special Briefing Transcription on East Asia Strategy Report, US Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, February 27, 1995.

United Nations Security Council Resolutions

United Nations General Assembly Resolutions

The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996 (The United Nations Blue Book Series, Vol. IX), New York, UN Department of Public Information, 1996.

UN Peacekeeping Operations: Japanese Policy and Practice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, April 1997.

United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, 1995.

Newspapers and Magazines (in Japanese)

Asahi Shimbun

Bungeishunjū

Chūō Kōron

Mainichi Shimbun

Nihon Keizai Shimbun

Sankei Shimbun

Sekai

Yomiuri Shimbun

Newspapers and Magazines (in English)

Asahi Evening News

The Bangkok Post

Daily Yomiuri

The Economist

Far Eastern Economic Review

The Financial Times

International Herald Tribune

International Peacekeeping News

Japan Economic Institute Report

The Japan Times

The Korea Times

The Los Angeles Times

The New York Times

Thailand Foreign Affairs Newsletter

The Times

The Wall Street Journal

The Washington Post

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books (in Japanese)

Asai, M., *PKO to Nihon no Shinro: Jieitai Kaigai Hahei to Kokusai Shakai ni okeru Nihon no Yakuwari* (PKO and Japan's Direction: Overseas Despatch of the SDF and Japan's Role within International Society), Tokyo, Binebaru Shuppan, 1992.

— *Kokusaiteki Jôshiki to Kokunaiteki Jôshiki: 'Datsureisen' go no Kokusai Shakai to Nihon no Yakuwari* (International Common-sense and Domestic Common-sense: International Society and Japan's Role in Escaping from the Cold War), Tokyo, Kashiwashobô, 1994.

— *Taikoku Nihon no Sentaku: Kokuren Anzen Hoshôrijikai to Nihon* (Japan's Choices as a Great Power: the UN Security Council and Japan), Tokyo, Rôdôjunpôsha, 1995.

Funabashi, Y., *Dômei Hyôryû* (The Drifting Alliance), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1997.

Harada, K., *Kokuren Kaikaku to Nihon no Yakuwari* (UN Reform and the Role of Japan), Tokyo, Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1995.

Hirose, Y., *Kokuren no Heiwa Iji Katsudô: Kokusaihô to Kenpô no Shiza Kara* (UN Peacekeeping Operations from the Perspective of International Law and the Constitution), Tokyo, Shinsansha, 1992.

Kakizawa, K., *Kasumigaseki Sanchôme no Ôkura Kanryô* (MOF Bureaucracy in the Government Heartland), Tokyo, Gakuyô Shobô, 1977.

Kôzai, S., *Kokuren no Heiwa Iji Katsudô* (The UN's Peacekeeping Activities), Tokyo, Yûhikaku, 1991.

Konishi, M., *Kiki no Ninshiki: Kawari yuku Kokusai Gunji Jôsei to Kokuren PKO* (Crisis Knowledge: The Changing State of the Military and UNPKO), Tokyo, Shakai Hihyôsha, 1992.

Kunugi, T. (ed.), *Kokusai Kyôryoku: Kokuren Shinjidai to Nihon no Yakuwari* (International Cooperation: The UN in a New Age and Japan's Role), Tokyo, Saimaru Shuppankai, 1995.

Kurozawa, M., and Garten, J. (eds.), *Taiheiyô Kokka no Toraianguru: Gendai no Nichi-Bei-Ka Kankei* (A Triangle of Pacific Nations: Contemporary Japanese-US-Canadian Relations), Tokyo, Sairyûsha, 1995.

Maeda, T., *PKO: Sono Sôzôteki Kannôsei* (PKO: The Creative Possibilities), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1991.

— (ed.), *Kenshô: PKO to Jieitai* (Evidence: PKO and the SDF) Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1996.

Matsumoto, T., *PKO to Kokusai Kôken* (PKO and International Contribution), Tokyo, Kenpakusha, 1994.

Muramatsu, M., *Sengo Nihon no Kanryôsei* (Post-war Japanese Bureaucracy), Tokyo, Tôyô Keizai Shinpôsha, 1981.

Ôta, S., *Ashio Dôzan no Shakaishi* [A Social History of Ashio Copper Mine], Tokyo, Yûkon Kikaku, 1992.

Sakamoto, Y., *Chikyû Jidai no Kokusai Seiji* (International Politics in a Global Age), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1990.

Sasaki, Y., *Umi o Wataru Jieitai: PKO Rippô to Seiji Kenryoku* (The SDF Overseas: PKO Legislation and Political Power), Tokyo, Iwanami Shinsho, 1992.

Shikata, T., and Maeda, T., *Jieitai wa Doko e Iku?: Reisengo no Nihon no Anzen Hoshô o Ronzu* (Whither the SDF?: A Polemic on Post-Cold War Japanese Security), Nihon Hyôronsha, Tokyo, 1994.

Shinyo, T., *Shinkokurenron: Kokusai Heiwa no tame no Kokuren to Nihon no Yakuwari* (A New Theory of the UN: A UN Working for World Peace and Japan's Role), Suita, Ôsaka Daigaku Shuppankai, 1995.

Tanaka, A., *Atarashii Chûsei: 21 Seiki no Sekai Shisutemu* (The New Medievalism: The 21st Century World System), Tokyo, Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1996.

Tomoda, S., 'Kanbojia Enjo Seisaku no Atarashisa' (The Novelty of the Cambodian Aid Policy), *Gaikô Foramu* (March 1993), pp. 23-32.

Wangan Sensô to Nihon: towareru Kiki Kanri, Tokyo, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1991.

Watanabe, A. (ed.), *Gendai Nihon no Kokusai Seisaku* (Japan's Contemporary International Policy), Tokyo, Yûhikaku Sensho, 1997.

Watanabe, O., *Gendai Nihon no Teikokushugika: Keisei to Kôzô* (The Imperialisation of Contemporary Japan: Formation and Structure), Tokyo, Ôtsuki Shoten, 1996.

Articles and Chapters in Books (in Japanese)

Akashi, Y., 'Nihonjin yo PKO o Gôkai surunakare' (Fellow Japanese, Don't Misunderstand PKO), *Foresight* (July 1992), pp. 7-11.

Aoyama, T., 'Kanbojia PKO no Seikô to Hansei' (Cambodia PKO: Success and Reflections), *Hôrei Nyûsu*, Vol. 28, No. 12 (1993), pp. 33-37.

Arisawa, N., 'Jieitai PKO Haken no Ichinen: Kenshô' (Evidence from the First Year of the SDF's PKO Despatch), *Sekai*, No. 588 (1993), pp. 60-68.

Fukui Y., 'Kanbojia PKO Hôkoku: Heiwa Kôchiku e no Kokuren no Yakuwari wa Ôkii—UNTAC no Ichiin toshite mita Kanbojia' (Cambodia PKO Report: The Large Role of the UN in Constructing Peace—Cambodia as seen by one member of UNTAC), *Gekkan Jiyû Minshu* (July 1993), pp. 112-118.

Hasegawa, M., 'Kenpô o Mamoru to iu koto: PKO Kyôryoku Hôan ni tsuite' (Protecting the Constitution and the PKO Co-operation Bill), *Zenei*, No. 606 (1991), pp. 74-84.

Higashinaka, M., 'Jikômin Burokku no PKO Hôan Sakudô' (The LDP-Kômei Party-DSP Block's Machinations over the PKO Bill), *Zenei*, No. 605 (1991), pp. 26-36.

Inoguchi, T., 'Nihon no Kokuren Heiwa Iji oyobi hoka no Shokatsudô' (Japan's UN Peacekeeping and Other Activities), *Rebaisan* (Special Edition, 1996), pp. 67-80.

Inoki, M., and Kitaoka, S., 'Rekishiteki Sôkyo to shite no Sensô' (War as an Historical Grand Project), *Bungeishunjû* (April 1991), pp. 94-104.

Iseri, H., 'PKO Rongi no Konmei o Toku' (Explaining the PKO Debate), *Gaikô Foramu*, Vol. 5, No. 5 (1992), pp. 31-37.

Itô, K., 'Buryoku Kaiketsu ka, Chôki Fujikome ka?' (Military Solution or Long-term Containment?), *Shokun*, Vol. 22, No. 12 (1990), pp. 26-38.

Kaifu, T., 'Heiwa to Hanei ni Hatasu Nihon no Yakuwari' (Japan's Role in Peace and Prosperity), *Gekkan Jiyû Minshu*, No. 454 (1991), pp. 30-37.

Kitaoka, S., 'Wangan Sensô to Nihon no Gaikô' (The Gulf War and Japanese Diplomacy), *Kokusai Mondai*, No. 377 (1991), pp. 2-13.

'Kokuren wa Bannô de wa nai' (The UN is not Omnipotent), *Shokun* (July 1993), pp. 38-47.

'Kokusai Shakai ni Okeru Nihon no Yakuwari', *Bungeishunjû* (April 1992), pp. 131-143.

Kondô, N., 'Kanbojia Genchi Repôto 12: Jieitai, Kanbojia PKO Tesshû' (On the Ground Report from Cambodia: The SDF and Withdrawal from Cambodia), *Hôgaku Seminâ*, No. 467, (November 1993), pp. 3-6.

Kôno, T., 'Kokuren Heiwa Iji Katsudô to Nihon no Sanka' (UN Peacekeeping Operations and Japan's Participation), *Rebaisan* (Special Edition, 1996), pp. 7-20.

Kosaka, M., 'Keizai Pawâ no Jidai no Gensô' (The Fantasy of the Era of Economic Power), *Bungeishunjû* (November, 1990), pp. 94-104.

Kôzai, S., 'Kokuren to Sekai Heiwa no Iji' (The UN and the Maintenance of World Peace), *Kokusai Mondai*, No. 428 (1995), pp. 15-30.

Maeda, T., 'PKO Hôan: Saisei no Michi' (The PKO Bill: The Road to Rebirth), *Sekai*, No. 570 (1992), pp. 10-15.

Matsutake, S., 'Jieitai Kaigai Hahei o Nerau PKO Rippôka Sakudô no Kiken' (The Dangers of the PKO Legislative Process and the Overseas Despatch of the SDF), *Keizai*, No. 327 (1991), pp. 134-135.

Nagao, R., Ebashi, T., and Kobayashi, S., 'Daikyûjô o Meguru Fumô o Koete' (Overcoming the Sterility of Article IX), *This is Yomiuri* (November, 1996), pp. 34-48.

Nakasone, Y., 'Waga Taikenteki Yûji Kôdô Ron' (A Theory of Japan's Experience of Crisis Management), *Bungeishunjû* (October, 1990), pp. 112-22.

Nakata, T., 'Sakura to tomo ni Ten ni mesareta Musuko' (With the Cherry Blossom my Son looks up to Heaven), *Bungeishunjû* (June 1993), pp. 168-176.

Nippon no Anzen Hoshô to Bôeiryoku no Arikata: Nijûisseiki e Mukete no Tenbô (The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century), Tokyo, Ôkurasho Insatsukyoku, 1994.

Nishimura, M., 'PKO Rongi no Tadashii Susumekata' (The Correct Direction for the PKO Debate), *Chûô Kôron*, Vol. 107, No. 1284 (1992), pp. 78-88.

Okazaki, H., and Satô, S., 'Nihon wa Kokusaiteki Sekinin o do Hatasu no ka?' (How can Japan Fulfil its International Responsibilities), *Gaikô Foramu*, Vol. 3, No. 10 (1990), pp. 4-12.

Sakaiya, T., 'Sekaishi no naka no Wangan Sensô' (The Gulf War within World History), *Chûô Kôron*, Vol. 106, No. 1269 (1991), pp. 48-87.

Sakamoto, Y., 'Chûritsu Nihon no Bôei Kôzô' (The Defence Structure of a Neutral Japan), *Sekai*, No. 164 (1959), pp. 31-47.

Satô, S., 'Ima koso Anzen Hoshô Senryaku o Tenkan seyo' (Reverse Current Security Strategies), *Chûô Kôron*, Vol. 105, No. 1263 (1990), pp. 76-85.

Shiina, M., 'Kokuren Gaikô ka, Nichi-Bei Dômei ka' (UN-Centred Diplomacy or the US-Japanese Alliance?), *Chûô Kôron*, Vol. 105, No. 1264 (1990), pp. 120-131.

Shinyo, T., 'Kokuren Heiwa Iji Katsudô no Kannôsei to Genkai' (The Possibilities and Limits of UN Peacekeeping Operations), *Kikan Kokuren*, No. 4 (1996), pp. 2-17.

'Tokushû: Gaidorain no Minaoshi' (Special Edition: Revision of the Guidelines) *Securitarian*, No. 468 (December 1997), pp. 10-29.

Ueno, Y., 'Nihonkoku Kenpô to Kokurenhugi' (The Japanese Constitution and UN-centrism), *Hôgaku Seminâ*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1992), pp. 60-61.

Ushiba, A., 'Sôkaitei no 188 nichi ga tôta mono' (Inquiry into the Minesweepers' 188 Days), *Chûô Kôron*, Vol. 107, No. 1278 (1992), pp. 158-169.

Yamauchi, T., 'Nihonkoku Kenpô to PKO' (The Japanese Constitution and PKO), *Hôritsu Jihô*, Vol. 63, No. 7 (1991), pp. 71-76.

— 'Kenpô Seiji no Hakai o motarasu PKO Hôan' (The PKO Bill's Destruction of Constitutional Politics), *Hôritsu Jihô*, Vol. 63, No. 13 (1991), pp. 2-5.

— 'Heiwa Kenpô to Kokusai "Kôken"' (The Peace Constitution and International 'Contribution'), *Hôgaku Seminâ*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1992), pp. 62-63.

Yoshikawa, H., 'Jûdai Kyokumen ni kita PKO Mondai' (The PKO Problem Entering on an Important Phase), *Zenei*, No. 618 (1992), pp. 59-70.

Yoshikawa, J., 'Heiwa Kenpô to Kokuren Heiwa Iji Katsudô: Jieitai no Kaigai Shutsudô ni Shinten o awaseru PKO Hôan' (The Peace Constitution and UN Peacekeeping Operations: Focus on the Overseas Activities of the SDF), *Hô to Minshushugi*, No. 261 (1991), pp. 62-64.

Books (in English)

Adler, E., *The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil*, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1987.

Adler, E., and Crawford, B. (eds.), *Progress in Postwar International Relations*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1991.

Ansari, J. A., *The Political Economy of International Economic Organizations*, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1990.

Aron, R. (translated by Howard, R. A., and Baker-Fox, A.), *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, New York, Knopf, 1967.

Baba, N., and Howes, J. F., *Pacifism in Japan: The Christian and Socialist Tradition*, Kyoto, Minerva Press, 1978.

Baerwald, H. H., *Party Politics in Japan*, Boston, Allen and Unwin, 1986.

Bailey, K. C., *The UN Inspectors in Iraq: Lessons for On-Site Verification*, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1995.

Baldwin, D. A. (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993.

- Bamba, N., and Howes, J. F. (eds.), *Pacifism in Japan: The Christian and Socialist Tradition*, Kyoto, Minerva Press, 1978.
- Beck, R. J., Clark Arend, A., and Vander Lugt, R. D. (eds.), *International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Bennis, P., and Moushabeck, M. (eds.), *Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader*, New York, Olive Branch Press, 1991.
- Bernstein, G. L., and Fukui, H. (eds.), *Japan and the World: Essays on Japanese History and Politics in Honour of Ishida Takeshi*, London, Macmillan, 1988.
- Bird, L., *Costa Rica: The Unarmed Democracy*, London, Sheppard Press, 1984.
- Bloch, M., *The Historian's Craft*, New York, Knopf, 1953.
- Boutros-Ghali, B., *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, New York, UN Publications, 1992.
- Brinkley, A., *Liberalism and its Discontents*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1998.
- Brown M., (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, London, MIT Press, 1996.
- Bull, H., *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1977.
- Bulloch, J., and Morriss, H., *Saddam's War: The Origins of the Kuwait Crisis and the International Response*, London, Faber and Faber, 1991.
- Calder, K. E., *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal*, Canberra, Australian Government Printing Service, 1990.
- Chandler, A. D., *Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise*, New York, Doubleday, 1966.
- Chandler, D. P., *A History of Cambodia*, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1992.
- Chapman, J. W. M., Drifte, R., and Gow, I. T. M., *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence, Diplomacy, Dependence*, London, Frances Pinter, 1983.
- Childers E., and Urquhart, B., *Renewing the UN System*, Uppsala, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1994.

- Clarke, M., and White, B., *Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1989.
- Claude, I. L., *American Approaches to World Affairs*, New York, Random House, 1986.
- Cox, R. W., and Sinclair, T. J., *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Cox, R. W. (ed.), *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order*, London, Macmillan, 1997.
- Curtis, G. L., *The Japanese Way of Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Dahl, R., *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982.
- Delanty, G., *Social Science: Beyond Constructivism and Realism*, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1997.
- Der Derian, J., and Shapiro, M. (eds.), *International Relations/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, Toronto, Lexington Books, 1989.
- Der Derian J. (ed.), *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, London, Macmillan, 1995.
- Diehl, P. F., *International Peacekeeping*, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.
- Dillon, M., *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, London, Routledge, 1996.
- Dore, R., *Flexible Rigidities: Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustment in the Japanese Economy, 1970-1980*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1986.
- *Japan, Internationalism and the UN*, London, Routledge, 1997.
- Dower, J. W., *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese, 1878-1954*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Doyle, M. W., *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism*, New York, W. W. Norton, 1997.
- Drifte, R., *Japan's Foreign Policy*, London, Routledge, 1990.
- *Japan's Rise to International Responsibilities: The Case of Arms Control*, London, Athlone Press, 1990.

- *Japan's Foreign Policy in the 1990s: From Economic Superpower to What Power?*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996.
- Duprée, A. H. (ed.), *Science and the Emergence of Modern America, 1865-1916*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963.
- Durch, W. J. (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, London, Macmillan, 1997.
- Durkheim, E. (translated by Solovay, S. A., and Mueller, J. D.), *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938.
- Eckstein, H., *Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change*, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1992.
- Falk, R. A., Kim, S. A., and Mendlovitz, S. H. (eds.), *The UN and a Just World Order*, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1991.
- Fetherston, A. B., *Towards a Theory of UN Peacekeeping*, London, Macmillan, 1994.
- Findlay, T., *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
- (ed.), *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Finnemore, M., *Defining National Interests in International Society*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Franck, T., *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Frankel, J., *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-making*, London, OUP, 1963.
- Friedman, E. (ed.), *The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences*, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1994.
- Gallie, W. B., *Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Engels and Tolstoy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- George, J., *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994.
- Gibbons, M., *Interpreting Politics*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987.

- Giddens, A., *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971.
- Gilbert, P., *Terrorism, Security and Nationality: An Introductory Study in Applied Political Philosophy*, London, Routledge, 1994.
- Gilpin, R., *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Goldstein, J., and Keohane, R. O. (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1993.
- Gordon, W., *The UN at the Cross-roads of Reform*, London, M. E. Sharpe, 1994.
- Haas, E. B., *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations*, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1990.
- Hall, P. A. (ed.), *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., and Rittberger, V., *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Hashimoto, R., *Vision of Japan: A Realistic Direction for the 21st Century*, Tokyo, K. K. Bestsellers, 1994.
- Hayao K., *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993.
- Hayes, L. D., *Introduction to Japanese Politics*, New York, Marlowe and Company, 1994.
- Heder, S., and Ledgerwood, J., (eds.), *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under UN Peacekeeping*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
- Hinsley, F. H., *Sovereignty*, London, Watts and Co., 1966.
- *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practise in the History of Relations between States*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967.
- Hiro, D., *Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War*, New York, Routledge, 1992.
- Hobsbawm, E., *On History*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1997.
- Holsti, K. J., *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Seventh Edition*, New York, Prentice Hall, 1995.

- Holton, R. J., and Turner, B. S., *Max Weber on Economy and Society*, London, Routledge, 1989.
- The Holy Bible*, New York, American Bible Society, 1988.
- Hook, G. D., *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*, London Routledge, 1996.
- Horkheimer, M., *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, New York, Herder and Herder, 1972.
- Hosokawa, M., *New Japan Party: Responsible Reform*, Tokyo, Tôyô Keizai Shinpôsha, 1993.
- Inoguchi, T., *Japan's Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change*, London, Pinter Publishers, 1993.
- Ishida, T., *Japanese Society*, New York, Random House, 1971.
- Iwanaga, K., *Democracy and Electoral Systems in Japan: A Comparative Perspective*, Centre for Pacific Asia Studies, Stockholm University, Occasional Paper No. 26, 1995.
- Jacobson, H. K., *Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System*, New York, Random House, 1979.
- Jain, P., and Inoguchi, T. (eds.), *Japanese Politics Today: Beyond Karaoke Democracy?*, Melbourne, Macmillan, 1997.
- James, A., *Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society*, London, Macmillan, 1986.
- *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1990.
- Johnson, C., *Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State*, New York, W. W. Norton, 1995.
- Jones, R., *Analysing Foreign Policy*, London, Routledge, 1970.
- Kataoka, T., *The 1955 System of Japanese Politics: Its Origins and Consequences*, Tokyo, National Institute for Research Advancement, 1990.
- Katzenstein, P. J., *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1985.
- *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Post-war Japan*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1996.
- (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996.

- Katzenstein, P. J., and Tsujinaka, Y., *Defending the Japanese State: Structures, Norms and the Political Responses to Terrorism and Violent Social Protest in the 1970s and 1980s*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell East Asia Series, 1991.
- Keep, J. L. H., *Last of the Empires: A History of the Soviet Union, 1945-1991*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Keohane, R. O., *After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1984.
- (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986.
- *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989.
- Keohane, R. O., and Nye, J. S., *Power and Interdependence*, New York, Harper Collins, 1987.
- Keohane, R. O., Nye, J. S., and Hoffmann, S., *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1993.
- Kolodziej, E. A., and Kanet, R. E., *Coping with Conflict after the Cold War*, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Krasner, S. D., *International Regimes*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Kratochwil, F. V., *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Kuriyama, T., *New Directions for Japanese Foreign Policy in the Changing World of the 1990s*, Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990.
- Kyogoku, J., *The Political Dynamics of Japan*, Tokyo, Tokyo University Press, 1987.
- Landesman, C., *An Introduction to Epistemology*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997.
- Lauterpacht, E., Greenwood, C. J., Weller, M., and Bethlehem, D. (eds.), *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents, Cambridge International Documents Series, Volume I*, Cambridge, Grotius Publications, 1991.
- Leifer, M., 'The International Representation of Kampuchea', in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1982*, Singapore, Heinmann Asia for Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982, pp. 47-59.

- Liu, F. T., *UN Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.
- Machiavelli, N. (translated by Marriott, W. K.), *The Prince*, London, David Campbell, 1992.
- Macidris, R., *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, New York, Prentice Hall, 1962.
- Marx, K., *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1926.
- Masumi, J., *Contemporary Japanese Politics*, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1995.
- Mayall, J. (ed.), *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: UN Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- McCoubrey, H., and White, N. G., *International Organizations and Civil Wars*, Brookfield, Dartmouth Publishers, 1995.
- McHugh, L. B., and Shinn, R. S., *UN Operations in Cambodia and Japanese Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, Washington, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 1992.
- McKinley, M. (ed.), *The Gulf War: Critical Perspectives*, St. Leonards, Allen and Unwin, 1994.
- Miller, L. H., *Global Order: Values and Power in International Politics*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990.
- Morgenthau, H. J., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Knopf, 1973.
- Mowery, D. C., and Rosenberg, N., *Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Mueller, J., *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Modern War*, New York, Basic Books, 1989.
- Nakane, C., *Japanese Society*, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1970.
- Nau, H. R., *The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy in the 1990s*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Neufeld, M. A., *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Neumann, I. B., and Wæver, O., *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making?*, London, Routledge, 1997.

- Newland, K., (ed.), *The International Relations of Japan*, London, Macmillan, 1990.
- Oberdorfer, D., *The Turn: from the Cold War to a New Era*, New York, Simon & Shuster, 1992.
- Ozawa, I., *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation*, Tokyo, Kôdansha, 1994.
- Parkinson, F., *The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the History of Thought*, London, Sage Publishers, 1977.
- Partington, A. (ed.), *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Peou, S., *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Powell, W. W., and DiMaggio, P. (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Puchala, D. J., and Coate, R. A., *The Challenge of Relevance: The UN in a Changing World Environment*, Hanover, New Hampshire, ACUNS, 1989.
- Pugh, M., (ed.), *The UN, Peace and Force*, London, Frank Cass, 1997.
- Pyle, K. B., *Japan, the World and the Twenty-first Century*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1988.
- Pettiman, R., *Human Behaviour and World Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1975.
- Rae, H., and Reus-Smit, C. (eds.), *The UN: Between Sovereignty and Global Governance? Report on the International Conference held at La Trobe University, Melbourne, 2-6 July 1995*, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1996.
- Ratner, S. R., *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995.
- Renninger, J. P. (ed.), *The Future Role of the UN in an Interdependent World*, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989.
- Riggs, R. E., and Plano, J. C., *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics*, Belmont, California, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994.
- Rikhye, I. R., Harbottle, M., and Egge, B., *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1974.
- Rosenau, J. N., (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, New York, Free Press, 1961.

- *Linkage Politics*, New York, Free Press, 1969.
- *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, New York, The Free Press, 1971.
- *Turbulence in World Politics*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1990.
- *The UN in a Turbulent World*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.
- *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Ruggie, J. G. (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an International Form*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993.
- Sakamoto, Y. (ed.), *Global Transformation: Challenges to the States System*, Tokyo, UNU Press, 1994.
- Scalapino, R. A., and Masumi J., *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1968.
- Scalapino, R. A., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1977.
- Shaw, M. (ed.), *War, State and Society*, London, Macmillan, 1994.
- Sifri, M. L., and Christopher Cerf, C. (eds.), *The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions*, New York, Times Books, 1991.
- Sikkink, K., *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1991.
- Sorenson, T. C., *Decision-Making in the White House*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1963.
- Stockwin, J. A. A., *The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of a Political Party and its Foreign Policy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968.
- (ed.), *Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan*, London, Macmillan, 1988.
- Strange, S., *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Strinati, D., *An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture*, London, Routledge, 1995.
- Takemura, M., *A Small but Shining Country, Japan*, Tokyo, Kōbunsha, 1994.

- Teson, F. R., *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality*, Dobbs Ferry, New York, Transnational Publishers, 1997.
- Urquhart, B., *A Life in Peace and War*, New York, W. W. Norton, 1987.
- Verrier, A., *International Peacekeeping: UN Forces in a Troubled World*, London, Penguin, 1981.
- Van Wolferen, K., *The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation*, Tokyo, Charles Tuttle, 1993.
- Vogel, E. F., *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Wainhouse, D., *International Peace Observation*, Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966.
- Wallace, W., *Foreign Policy and the Political Process*, London, Macmillan, 1971.
- Wallerstein, I., *The Modern World System III*, San Diego, Academic Press, 1989.
- Walker, R. B. J., *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Waltz, K. N., *Theory of International Politics*, New York, Random House, 1979.
- Walzer, M., *Toward a Global Civil Society*, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 1995.
- Weinstein, M. E., *Japan's Post-war Defense Policy, 1947-1968*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.
- Weiss, T. G. (ed.), *The United Nations and Civil Wars*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.
- White, N. D., *Keeping the Peace: The UN and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 1993.
- Williams, D., *Japan: Beyond the End of History*, London, Routledge, 1994.
- *Japan and the Enemies of Open Political Science*, London, Routledge, 1996.
- Woodward, B., *The Commanders*, London, Simon and Schuster, 1991.
- Yasutomo, D., *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy*, London, Macmillan, 1995.

Yoshitsu, M. M., *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1983.

Zacher, M. K., and Sutton, B. A., *Governing Global Networks: International Regimes for Transportation and Communications*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Articles and Chapters in Books (in English)

Abe, K., 'The Japanese Business Community's Response to the Gulf War', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1991), pp. 177-200.

Adler, E., and Haas, P. M., 'Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1992), pp. 368-390.

Ahn, C. S., 'Government-Party Co-ordination in Japan's Foreign Policymaking: The Issue of Permanent Membership in the UNSC', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1997), pp. 368-382.

Akaha, T., 'Japan's Security Policy after US Hegemony', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1989), pp. 422-448.

— 'Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy: A New East Asian Environment', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1991), pp. 324-340.

Akashi, Y., 'The Challenges Faced by UNTAC', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1993), pp. 185-201.

Arase, D., 'New Directions in Japanese Security Policy', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1994), pp. 24-46.

Axelrod, R., 'An Evolutionary Approach to Norms', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (1986), pp. 363-389.

Baldwin, D. A., 'Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis', *International Organization*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1980), pp. 471-506.

— 'Security Studies and the End of the Cold War', *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1995), pp. 117-141.

Bartelson, J., 'Short Circuits: Society and Tradition in International Relations Theory', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1996), pp. 339-360.

Berger, T. U., 'From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism', *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1993), pp. 119-150.

- Biersteker, T. J., 'Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1989), pp. 263-267.
- Blechman, B. M., 'The Intervention Dilemma', in D. Clark (ed.), *The UN, Peacekeeping, and American Foreign Policy*, Washington, The Aspen Institute, 1995.
- Bleiker, R., 'Forget IR Theory', *Alternatives*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1997), pp. 57-85.
- Bloomfield, L. P., 'The United States, the Soviet Union and the Prospects for Peacekeeping', *International Organization*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1970), pp. 548-565.
- Brecher, M., Steinberg, B., and Stein, J., 'A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1969), pp. 75-101.
- Brenner, R., 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism', *New Left Review*, No. 104 (1977), pp. 54-71.
- Brown, C., 'Turtles all the Way Down: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1994), pp. 213-236.
- 'Back to Normal? Some Reflections on Sovereignty and Self-Determination after the Cold War', *Global Society*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1996), pp. 11-24.
- Buzan, B., 'Japan's Future: Old History Versus New Roles', *International Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (1988), pp. 557-73.
- 'From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School', *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (1993), pp. 327-352.
- 'Japan's Defence Problematique', *Pacific Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1995), pp. 25-44.
- Calder, K. E., 'Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State', *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (1988), pp. 517-541.
- Campbell, J. C., 'Policy Conflict and its Resolution Within the Government System', in Eliss Krauss et al., *Conflict in Japan*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii, 1984.
- Caporaso, J. A., 'International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1992), pp. 599-632.
- Chittiwatanapong, P., 'Japan's Roles in the Post-hegemonic World: Perspectives from Southeast Asia', in Tsuneo Akaha and Frank Langdon (eds.), *Japan in the Post-hegemonic World*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.

- Chuma, K., 'The Debate over Japan's Participation in Peace-keeping Operations', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1992), pp. 239-254.
- Coate, R. A., and Puchala, D. J., 'Global Policies and the UN System: A Current Assessment', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1990), pp. 127-140.
- Cossa, R. A., 'Avoiding New Myths: US-Japan Security Relations', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1997), pp. 219-231.
- Cowhey, P. F., 'Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States', *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1993), pp. 299-326.
- Cox, R. W., 'The Executive Head: an Essay in Leadership in International Organizations', *International Organization*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1969), pp. 205-230.
- 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1983), pp. 162-175.
- Dessler, D., 'What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?', *International Organization*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1989), pp. 441-474.
- Dore, R., 'Japan's Place in the World', *The World Today*, Vol. 22, No. 7 (1966), pp. 293-306.
- Dunlavy, C. A., 'Political Structure, State Policy, and Industrial Change: Early Railroad Policy in the United States and Prussia', in S. Steinmo, K. Thelan and F. Longstreth (eds.), *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Dworkin, R. M., 'The Model of Rules', *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1967), pp. 14-46.
- Elliott, J., 'The 1981 Administrative Reform in Japan', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 23, No. 6 (1983), pp. 765-779.
- Falk, R. A., 'An Inquiry into the Political Economy of World Order', *New Political Economy*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1996), pp. 13-26.
- Fischer, M., 'Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1992), pp. 427-466.
- Florini, A., 'The Evolution of International Norms', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1996), pp. 363-389.
- Fowler, M. R., and Bunck, J. M., 'What Constitutes the Sovereign State?' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1996), pp. 381-404.

- Fukui, H., 'State in Policymaking: A Review of the Literature', in T. J. Pempel (ed.), *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1977.
- 'Too Many Captains in Japan's Internationalization: Travails at the Foreign Ministry', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1987), pp. 359-382.
- Fuller, M., 'Women in the Nineteenth Century', in J. Steele (ed.), *The Essential Margaret Fuller*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1992.
- Funabashi, Y., 'Japan and the New World Order', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 5 (1991/92), pp. 58-74.
- George, J., 'International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: another View of the Third Debate', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1989), pp. 269-279.
- 'Of Incarceration and Closure: Neo-realism and the New/Old World Order', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1993), pp. 197-234.
- Goldstein, J., 'Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy', *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1988), pp. 179-218.
- Goodrich, L. M., 'The Political Role of the Secretary-General', *International Organization*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1962), pp. 734-35.
- Goulding, M., 'The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping', *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (1993), pp. 451-464.
- Gow, I. T. M., 'Civilian Control of the Military in Post-war Japan', in R. Matthews and K. Matsuyama (eds.), *Japan's Military Renaissance?*, London, Macmillan, 1993.
- Haas, E. B., 'Reason and Change in International Life: Justifying a Hypothesis', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1995), pp. 209-240.
- Haas, M., 'International Relations Theory', in M. Haas and H. S. Kariel (eds.), *Approaches to the Study of Political Science*, Scranton: PA, Chandler Publishing Company, 1970.
- Haas, P. M., 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Co-ordination', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1992), pp. 1-35.
- Haftendorn, H., 'The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1991), pp. 3-17.
- Haley, J. O., 'Governance by Negotiation: A Reappraisal of Bureaucratic Power in Japan', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1987), pp. 343-358.

- Hall, R. B., 'Moral Authority as a Power Resource', *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997), pp. 591-622.
- Hellman, D. C., 'Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy within an American Greenhouse', in T. Inoguchi and D. Okimoto (eds.), *The Political Economy of Japan: the Changing International Context*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1988.
- Hettne, B., 'Security and Peace in Post-Cold War Europe', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1991), pp. 279-294.
- Hiraiwa, G., 'In this Uncertain World Japan must Carve out its own Future', *Keidanren Review*, No. 130 (August 1991), pp. 1-9.
- Hirobe, K., 'Article 98, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Japan and International Effects of the Resolutions of the UN Security Council', *The Japan Annual of International Law*, No. 36 (1993), pp. 17-32.
- Holsti, K. J., 'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which are the Fairest Theories of All?', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1989), pp. 255-261.
- Hosoya, C., 'Japan's Responses to US policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty: The Dulles-Yoshida talks of January-February 1951', *Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics*, Vol. 10 (1981), pp. 18-34.
- 'Japan and the UN', *Japan Institute of International Affairs Annual Review*, Vol. 4 (1965-68), pp. 27-42.
- Huntington, S. P. 'Transnational Organizations in World Politics', *World Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1973), pp. 333-368.
- Iikura, A., 'Japan's Foreign Policy on Cambodia: A New Pattern of Diplomacy', *Outlook*, No. 20 (1993), pp. 53-88.
- Immerman, R., 'Japan in the UN', in C. G. and M. B. Bullock (eds.), *Japan, a New Kind of Superpower?*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.
- Inoguchi, T., 'Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future', *International Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 1 (1988/89), pp. 57-76.
- 'Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis: An Analytic Overview', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1991), pp. 257-274.
- 'A Step Toward One-Party Predominance: Japan's General Election of 20 October 1996', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1997), pp. 48-64.

- 'Japan, UN Peacekeeping and Other Operations', *International Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (1995), pp. 325-342.
- Itô, K., 'The Japanese State of Mind: Deliberations on the Gulf Crisis', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1991), pp. 275-190.
- James, A., 'A Review of UN Peacekeeping', *Internationale Spectator* (November 1993), pp. 24-32.
- Johnson, C., 'The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952-82', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (1986), pp. 402-428.
- Johnson, C., and Keehn, E. B., 'The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (1995), pp. 103-114.
- Kakizawa, K., 'Planning for the Twenty-first Century: A Personal View of Possible UN Reforms', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1994), pp. 263-272.
- Katô, H., Okamoto, Y., Kitaoka, S., and Nishihiro, S., 'Evaluating the Ozawa Committee's Report', *Japan Echo*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1992), pp. 59-64.
- Katzenstein, P. J., and Okawara, N., 'Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies', *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1993), pp. 84-118.
- Kegley, C. W., 'The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1993), pp. 131-146.
- 'International Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: the Morality of Multilateral Measures', *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol. 10, (1996), pp. 25-46.
- Kennedy, P. and Russett, B., 'Reforming the UN', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 5 (1995), pp. 56-71.
- Keohane, R. O., 'Reciprocity in International Relations', *International Organization*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1986), pp. 1-27.
- 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1988), pp. 379-396.
- 'Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research', *International Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (1990), pp. 731-764.
- Kim, A. H. N., 'Japan and Peacekeeping Operations', *Military Review*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (1994), pp. 18-38.

- Kirsch, M. P., 'Soviet Security Objectives in Asia', *International Organization*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1970), pp. 451-478.
- Koh, T., 'The Paris Conference on Cambodia: A Multilateral Negotiation that Failed', *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1990), pp. 68-86.
- Kohli, A., Evans, P., Katzenstein, P. J., Przeworski, A., Rudolph, S. H., Scott, J. C., and Skocpol, T., 'The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium', *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1995), pp. 1-49.
- Krasner, S. D., 'Westphalia and All That', in J. Goldstein and R. O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1993.
- Krauss, E. S., and Muramatsu, M., 'The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned Pluralism', in K. Yamamura and Y. Yasuba (eds.), *The Political Economy of Japan, Volume I: The Domestic Transformation*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1987.
- Krishna, S., 'The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory', *Alternatives*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1993), pp. 385-417.
- Kubáľková, V., and Cruikshank, A. A., 'The "New Cold War" in "Critical International Relations Studies"', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1986), pp. 163-185.
- 'A Rambo Come to Judgement: Fred Halliday, Marxism and International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1989), pp. 37-47.
- Kwon, G. H., 'The UN Burden Sharing in the Post-hegemonic Era: Declining Contributions of the Large Industrialized Nations', *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1994), pp. 1-28.
- Lake, D., 'International Economic Structure and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887-1934', *World Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1983), pp. 517-543.
- Lapid, Y., 'The Third Debate: on the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1989), pp. 235-254.
- Larson, D. W., 'Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-making', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1994), pp. 17-33.
- Lauterpacht, E., 'Sovereignty: Myth or Reality?', *International Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1 (1997), pp. 137-150.
- Lebow, R. N., 'The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism', *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1994), pp. 249-277.

- Legro, J. W., 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism', *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1997), pp. 31-63.
- Leitenberg, M., 'The Participation of Japanese Military Forces in UN Peacekeeping Operations', *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1996), pp. 5-50.
- Mandelbaum, M., 'The Reluctance to Intervene', *Foreign Policy*, No. 95 (1994), pp. 3-18.
- March, J. A., and Olsen, J. P., 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, No. 3 (1984), pp. 734-749.
- Matthews, J. T., 'Power Shift', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 1 (1997), pp. 50-66.
- McCargo, D., 'The Political Role of the Japanese Media', *Pacific Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1996), pp. 251-264.
- McClosky, H., 'Concerning Strategies for a Science of International Politics', *World Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1956), pp. 281-295.
- McCubbins, M. D., and Noble, G. W., 'The Appearance of Power: Legislators, Bureaucrats, and the Budget Process in the United States and Japan', in P. F. Cowhey and M. D. McCubbins (eds.), *Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- McDermott, A., 'UN Peacekeeping: Expansion and Evolution of Operations in a New Era', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1997), pp. 247-248.
- McNelly, T., 'Disarmament and Civilian Control in Japan: a Constitutional Dilemma', *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1982), p. 353-376.
- Morse, R., 'Japan's Search for an Independent Foreign Policy: An American Perspective', *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1986), pp. 27-44.
- Mulgan George, A., 'Japan's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Radical Departure or Predictable Response?', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 33, No. 6 (1993), pp. 543-559.
- Muramatsu, M., and Krauss, E. S., 'Bureaucrats and Politicians in Policymaking: The Case of Japan', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, No. 1 (1984), pp. 126-146.
- Muramatsu, M., 'In Search of National Identity: The Politics and Policies of the Nakasone Administration', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1987), pp. 307-342.
- Nishihara, M., 'Trilateral Country Roles: Challenges and Opportunities' in John Roper et al. (eds.), *Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Strengthening Multilateral Peacekeeping*, New York, The Trilateral Commission, 1993.

- Ogata, S., 'The Changing Role of Japan in the UN', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1983), pp. 29-42.
- 'The UN and Japanese Diplomacy', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1990), pp. 141-165.
- 'Japan's Policy Towards the UN', in C. F. Alger, G. M. Lyons, and J. E. Trent (eds.), *The UN System: The Policies of Member States*, Tokyo, UN Publications, 1995.
- Okita, S., 'Japan's Quiet Strength', *Foreign Policy*, No. 75 (1989), pp. 128-145.
- Otake, H., 'Political Reform', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1996), pp. 286-289.
- Okawara, Y., 'Japan's Global Responsibilities', in D. Unger and P. Blackburn (eds.), *Japan's Emerging Global Role*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.
- Paris, R., 'Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism', *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997), pp. 54-89.
- Pempel, T. J., 'Bureaucratization of Policymaking in Post-War Japan', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (1974), pp. 647-664.
- 'The Unbundling 'Japan Inc.': The Changing Dynamics of Japanese Policy Formation', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1987), pp. 271-306.
- Pentland, C., 'International Organizations and their Roles', in J. N. Rosenau, K. W. Thompson and G. Boyd (eds.), *World Politics*, New York, Free Press, 1976.
- Pharr, S. J., 'Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing', in G. L. Curtis (ed.), *Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change*, New York, Eastgate Books, 1993.
- Philpott, D., 'Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1995), pp. 353-368.
- Puchala, D. J., 'Woe to the Orphans of the Scientific Revolution', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1995), pp. 59-80.
- 'Some Non-Western Perspectives on International Relations', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1997), pp. 129-134.
- Purrington, C., and A. K., 'Tokyo's Policy Responses during the Gulf War', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1991), pp. 314-322.

- Pyle, K. B., 'In Pursuit of a Grand Design: Nakasone Betwixt the Past and the Future', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1987), pp. 243-270.
- 'Japan and the Future of Collective Security', in Daniel Unger and Paul Blackburn, *Japan's Emerging Global Role*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.
- Rappoport, A., 'Various Meanings of Theory', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1958), pp. 972-988.
- Raz, J., 'Legal Principles and the Limits of the Law', *The Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 81, No. 4 (1972), pp. 823-854.
- Renegger, N., 'The Ethics of Trust in World Politics', *International Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (1997), pp. 469-487.
- Reus-Smit, C., 'The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions', *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997), pp. 555-589.
- Rosecrance, R., and Stein, A., 'Interdependence: Myth or Reality?', *World Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1973), pp. 1-27.
- Rosecrance, R., Alexandroff, A., Koehler, W., Kroll, J., Laqueur, S., and Stocker, J., 'Whither Interdependence?', *International Organization*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1977), pp. 425-472.
- Rosenau, J. N., 'Governance in the Twenty-first Century', *Global Governance*, Vol. 1., No. 1 (1995), pp. 13-44.
- Ruggie, J. G., 'Territoriality and Beyond', *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 1, (1993), pp. 139-174.
- Ruggie, J. G., and Kratochwil, F. V., 'International Organization: A State of the Art on the State of the Art', *International Organization*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (1986), p. 764.
- Saitô, S., 'The Evolution of Japan's UN Policy', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1987), pp. 186-206.
- 'The UN and the Issues of a Fluid Global Society', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1993), pp. 234-253.
- Sasaki, T., 'Post-war Japanese Politics at a Turning Point', *The Japan Foundation Newsletter*, May 1991, pp. 1-2.
- Satô, K., 'The Pursuit of the Principle of International Co-operation in the Constitution of Japan', *The Japanese Annual of International Law*, No. 36 (1993), pp. 5-16.

- Schaede, U., 'The 'Old Boy' Network and Government-Business Relationships in Japan', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1987), pp. 293-318.
- Schmitter, P. C., 'The 'Organizational Development' of International Organizations', *International Organization*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1971), pp. 917-937.
- Schoppa, L. J., 'Zoku Power and LDP Power: A Case Study of the Zoku Role in Education Policy', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1991), pp. 79-106.
- Schroeder, P. W., 'History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look', *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1995), pp. 193-195.
- Seligmann, A. L., 'Japan's New Electoral System: Has Anything Changed?', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 37, No. 5 (1997), pp. 409-428.
- Simai, M., 'The Future Role of Japan within the UN', *Global Governance*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1995), pp. 319-338.
- Singer, J. D., and Wallace, M., 'Inter-Governmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1816-1965: Some Bivariate Relationships', *International Organization*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1970), pp. 239-287.
- Skolnikoff, E. B., 'Science and Technology: The Implications for International Institutions', *International Organization*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1971), pp. 759-775.
- Slaughter Burley, A. M., and Kaysen, C., 'Introductory Note', in L. W. Reed and C. Raysen (eds.), *Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993.
- Snyder, R. C., Bruck, H. W., and Sapin, B., 'Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics', in R. C. Snyder et al (eds.), *Foreign Policy Decision-making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics*, New York, Free Press, 1962.
- Sollenberg, M., and Wallenstein, P., 'Major Armed Conflicts', in *SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996
- Song, Y. S., 'Japanese Peacekeeping Operations: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow', *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1996), pp. 51-69.
- Steiner, Z., 'On Writing International History', *International Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (1997), pp. 531-546.
- Stubbs, R., 'Reluctant Leader, Expectant Followers: Japan and Southeast Asia', *International Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (1991), pp. 645-668.

- Swede, S. W., and Tetlock, P. E., 'Henry Kissinger's Implicit Theory of Personality: A Quantitative Case Study', *Journal of Personality*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1986), pp. 604-634.
- Takai, S., 'Japan's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping', *Social Science Japan*, February 1996, pp. 7-10.
- Takeishi, C., 'Japanese National Identity in Transition: Who Wants to Send the Military Abroad?', *International Sociology*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1996), pp. 239-268.
- Tamamoto, M., 'Japan's Uncertain Role', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1991), pp. 579-598.
- Tahara, S., 'The Invasion of Kuwait: Six Leaders Discuss Tokyo's Response', *Japan Echo*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1990), pp. 13-18.
- Tanaka, A., 'The Domestic Context: Japanese Politics and UN Peacekeeping', in S. S. Harrison and M. Nishihara (eds.), *UN Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives*, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1995.
- 'UN Peace Operations and Japan-US Relations' in Peter Gourevitch, Takashi Inoguchi and Courtney Purrington, *United States-Japan Relations and International Institutions after the Cold War*, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1995.
- Thakur, R., 'From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: the UN Operation in Somalia', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1994), pp. 365-389.
- Tomoda, S., 'Japan's Search for a Political Role in Asia: The Cambodian Peace Settlement', *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1992), pp. 43-60.
- Ueki, Y., 'Japan's UN Diplomacy: Sources of Passivism and Activism' in G. L. Curtis (ed.), *Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change*, New York, Eastgate Books, 1993.
- Ushiba, A., 'The Minesweeping Mission: A Job Well Done', *Japan Echo*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1992), pp. 43-50.
- Van Wolferen, K., 'The Japan Problem', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 2 (1986/87), pp. 288-303.
- Vogel, D., 'Political Science and the Study of Corporate Power: A Dissent from the New Conventional Wisdom', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1987), pp. 385-408.
- Wakaizumi, K., 'Japan beyond 1970', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (1969), pp. 509-520.
- Walt, S. M., 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1991), pp. 211-239.

Wan, M., 'Spending Strategies in World Politics: How Japan has Used its Economic Power in the Past Decade', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (1995), pp. 85-108.

Wendt, A., 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1987), pp. 353-370.

— 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1992), pp. 391-426.

Wight, M., 'An Anatomy of International Thought', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1987), p. 222.

Wiklund, L., 'The Nordic Countries in the UN', *Internasjonal Politikk*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (1996), p. 75.

Woolley, P. J., 'Japan's 1991 Minesweeping Decision: An Organizational Response', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 36, No. 8 (1996), pp. 804-817.

Xintian, Y., 'Japan's Role and Responsibility in East Asia', *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1994), pp. 47-64.

Yanai, S., 'Law concerning Co-operation for UN Peacekeeping Operations and other Operations—Japanese PKO Experience', *The Japanese Annual of International Law*, No. 36 (1993), pp. 33-75.

Yee, A. S., 'The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies', *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1996), pp. 69-108.

Young, O. R., 'Aron and the Whale: A Jonah in Theory', in K. Knorr and J. N. Rosenau (eds.), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969.

— 'International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions', *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (1986), pp. 104-122.

— 'System and Society in World Affairs: Implications for International Organizations', *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1995), pp. 197-212.

Zucker, L. G., 'The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence', in W. W. Powell and P. J. Di Maggio (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1991.

Unpublished Doctoral Dissertations

Peek, J. M., *Japan and the UN: International Co-operation and World Order*, University of Kansas, 1985.

Sirman, R. H., *The Domestic and International Effects of Japan's UN Peace Co-operation Law: A Case Study*, University of Pittsburgh, 1996.

Internet Sources (in Japanese)

Asahi Shimbun <http://www.asahi.com/>
Mainichi Shimbun <http://www.mainichi.co.jp/index-e.htm>

Internet Sources (in English)

The Daily Yomiuri On-line <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/index-e.htm>
Foreign Policy <http://foreignpolicy.com/foreignpolicy/>
Integrative Global Action <http://www.uia.org/>
International Studies Association Network <http://csf.colorado.edu/isa/>
Japan Defense Agency http://www.jda.go.jp/index_h.htm
Japan Documentation Center <http://lcweb.loc.gov/rr/jdc>
Japan Politics Information Central <http://www.people.virginia.edu~ljs2k/webtext.html>
The Lester B. Pearson. Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center <http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca/>
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan <http://www.mofa.go.jp>
United Nations <http://www.un.org/>